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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A HET MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO COUNSELLING THEORY:
A COMPARISON OF HE AND ES WORLD VIEWS

BY
GREGORY JANZ



A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1990



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
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
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
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WORLD VIEWS SUBMITTED BY GREGORY JANZ IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY.


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Date: October 4th 1990

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Charles C. Anderson whose wisdom and caring challenged me to be a "scholar and not just a counsellor", and to Julianne Colbow whose love steadfastly endured through the most difficult moments of its writing.

ABSTRACT

Psychotherapists are often unaware of the socio-cultural and historico-philosophical context within which counselling theories develop. They often do not consider the metatheoretical foundations and metaclinical implications of these theories, as evidenced by their unquestioned adoption of newly emerging counselling trends. The central task of this study is to heighten counsellors' awareness of these metatheoretical issues.

This study describes the important metatheoretical influences which have guided developments in psychotherapy. The writings of Barrett, Lasch, MacIntyre, and Montagu and Matson, which critique modernity's dehumanizing impact on the human sciences, conclude that counselling perspectives have developed within an amoral, pragmatic, bureaucratic, and survivalistic ethos. Modernity's naturalistic world view, which espouses an empirico-positivist (EP) view of reality, has engendered reductionistic and dehumanizing approaches to psychotherapy.

In order to counteract modernity's dehumanization, this study incorporates the metatheoretical approach of humanistic-existential transcendentalism (HET) which considers both natural and nonnatural or uniquely human dimensions of reality. HET, founded on the writings of Dabrowski and Frankl, espouses an antimonistic ontology and multidimensional approach to the human sciences.

Two approaches to human existence, which evolved as a result of rejecting the EP epistemology, are the

humanistic-existential (HE) and ecological-systems (ES) world views. ES theory, founded on the writings of such fourth force theorists as Bateson and Keeney, advocates a nonlinear, systemic, ecological, and holistic approach to reality. This study, after comparing the central tenets of these two world views, concludes that they are considerably dissimilar. Furthermore, this study espouses that the HET multidimensional model provides a more humanizing approach to the human sciences than either EP or ES paradigms. HET metatheory is also used to differentiate higher and lower levels of EP, HE, and ES counselling schools of thought. It was found that all three counselling approaches demonstrate lower and higher level variants.

This project concludes that the human sciences need a major metatheoretical restructuring, based on an ethical approach to human affairs, which differentiates the natural and nonnatural dimensions of human existence. Finally, counsellors need to become cognizant of all developments within the human sciences which allows them to critique newly emerging epistemologies.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Prologue

Man has been philosophizing for more than twenty-five centuries, but the net result of his persistent efforts is a multitude of contradictory philosophical systems. While the men of science marvel at the astonishing fruitfulness of their own, relatively young field of learning, and pity--or mock--the poor philosopher, every century sees at least one genius come forward with a new philosophy. Man appears to be unable to stop philosophizing, he cannot give up philosophy. The mockers do not seem to realize that to laugh at philosophy itself is a kind of philosophy, albeit a bad kind. The funeral oration of philosophy somehow always transforms the speaker into a reincarnation of the unbeloved corpse. (Luijpen & Koren, 1983, p. 9)

Statement of the Problem

Paradigmatic developments in any branch of learning do not take place in a historical vacuum, but rather, are guided by the dominant historico-philosophical and socio-cultural influences of the time at which they evolved (Kuhn, 1970). Cooper (1981) argues that "man is prior to science in any science of man" (p. 97) and that in examining "the epistemological order of value and fact" (p. 97) the act of human valuing precedes the observation of facts in any scientific endeavor, particularly in the human sciences. Coward and Royce (1981) also point out that each historical period manifests a dominant philosophic Weltanschauung which governs the type of questions that are asked and, as importantly, the types of answers that are proposed during a particular theory's evolution. The influence of this dominant Weltanschauung, which is often not recognized or considered in the

development of the human sciences, is of fundamental importance to counselling theory and practice. The discipline of counselling has not been developed and is not practiced in a metatheoretical or epistemological vacuum. Yet, for many counsellor researchers, educators, and practitioners, the consideration of the metatheoretical foundations of counselling theory is regarded as being of secondary importance, when compared to more pragmatic concerns about specific counselling strategies and techniques. Frankl (1969) encourages psychotherapists to make explicit their concept of humanity and the metaclinical implications of whatever therapeutic approach they utilize. This would suggest that specific counselling perspectives have a profound impact not only on the process and goals of therapy (at the clinical level), but more importantly, their influence is felt at an even more fundamental level (metaclinical level) which affects how human problems are basically understood and interpreted.

In spite of Frankl's (1969) cautions, many counsellor practitioners, educators, and researchers still are not willing or able to critically examine the dominant Weltanschauung which has guided the particular counselling theory which they avow. Langer (cited in Coward and Royce, 1981) accuses the general populace, counsellor and psychologist included, of blindly following the dominant philosophic presuppositions of the day without critically questioning the specific metatheoretical ramifications that their view may entail. A shortcoming of this

practice is that psychologists and counsellors are too often unaware of or reluctant to seriously consider the larger socio-cultural and historico-philosophical context within which counselling theory inevitably develops. Increasingly, counsellors are unaware of the basic metaclinical implications of counselling theories, as evidenced by their frequent and unquestioned adoption of newly emerging counselling trends.

Purpose of the Study

The central task of this study is to heighten the counsellor's awareness of the importance of theoretical issues within counselling. The counsellor's ability to adequately understand, contrast, and critique various counselling perspectives is deemed necessary for the development of an appropriate counselling framework. The unquestioned acceptance and inflexible adhesion to any model of counselling is regarded as an inappropriate and potentially dehumanizing approach to both human problems and psychotherapy. A second goal of this project is to present an overview of important socio-cultural and historico-philosophical influences which have guided recent developments in psychotherapy. An examination of these epistemological changes is provided so that counsellors can not only identify important differences between counselling perspectives but also appreciate the larger philosophical context or Weltanschauung within which these differences evolved. A critical analysis of these important issues is necessary in order to provide a metatheoretical framework from which newly emerging trends

in psychotherapeutic theory and practice can be more adequately comprehended and evaluated.

A recent trend in modern psychology and psychotherapy has been the evolution of what Berman (1986) calls "cybernetic holism" (p. 26) or the "new holistic paradigm" (p. 25). Rather than denoting a unified and cohesive approach to counselling theory and practice, Berman (1986) argues, the "new paradigm literature" (p. 25) more typically describes a plurality of metatheoretical perspectives. Berman (1986) identifies these "varieties of holistic thinking" (p. 25) as cybernetic holism or cybernetic theory and ecological-systems theory. This study shall designate all diverse forms of this new holistic paradigm, particularly those stemming from the works of Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 1988), as 'ecological-systems' (ES) theory. This 'new age' paradigm, drawing heavily upon quantum mechanics, general systems or cybernetic theory, and the ecological movement, is said to constitute a "major shift in the history of Western thought" (Berman, 1986, p. 25) and represents a significant "break with scientific materialism" (Berman, 1986, p. 25).

Central to the ES perspective, Berman (1986) argues, is its basic contention that existence can be fundamentally viewed as "pure metaphor and programmed activity" (p. 26). Berman (1986) summarizes the "new holistic paradigm" (p. 26) as depicting a "purely formal, disembodied, and abstract reality" (p. 25) which basically constitutes an elaboration of "Neo-Platonic or

Augustinian" metaphysics (p. 31). Similarly, Rollo May (1976) describes the ES theory of Gregory Bateson as a "kind of Berkeleyan idealism" (p. 33) which emphasizes "form, order, and process" (p. 40). The subjective idealism of ES theory takes a decidedly 'mentalistic' approach to reality where "mental processes, like ideas, communication, organization, pattern, and order (are seen as) matters of form rather than substance" (May, 1976, p. 44). Bateson's ES theory might be more appropriately described as a 'right-hemisphere', 'analogical', and 'antirational' approach to the human sciences which concertedly emphasizes "primary process, intuition, living closer to nature, and letting oneself be carried away by the life process" (May, 1976, p. 46). This ES version of holism, with its nonlinear, recursive, and ecological view of reality, fundamentally opposes "secondary process (which) tries to sieve everything through rationality and represents the left hemisphere of the brain" (May, 1976, p. 46). It is in this precise sense that ES theory is critical of and stands in direct contrast to Western rationalism, positivism, and materialism.

Another major school of thought within psychology which has unequivocally rejected the overdeveloped reductionism and materialism of Empirical-Positivistic (EP) traditions is the Third Force or Humanistic-Existential (HE) movement. Similar to the new holistic paradigm or ES movement, Tateson (1982) maintains, HE or Third Force psychology does not constitute a "remarkably cohesive group" (p. 10) but, more accurately, reflects a

"broad movement which spans many continents and embraces a large number of psychologists and psychiatrists...which might be variously labelled as humanists, personalists, phenomenologists, or existentialists" (p. 11). A central theme of all of these variants of HE theory, what Osborne and Angus (1989) might describe as its "root metaphor" (p. 3), is the concerted belief that "we (humanity) alone exist; stand out in the world of being, alone in the awareness that we are, capable of reflecting on our own ongoing reality" (p. 11). Tageson (1982) concludes that a central concern of the HE movement is its "effort to revalidate the study of 'human consciousness' as a central focus of concern in the discipline of psychology" (p. 2). An inherent outcome of the HE perspective, Tageson (1982) maintains, is its rejection of "biological reductionism" (p. 11) and its movement towards a "broader, open-at-the-top" (p. 11) and "transpersonal" (p. 12) approach to human existence. Summarizing the central tenets of this approach to psychology, Tageson (1982) lists the major characteristics of Humanistic-Existential (HE) thought as:

...a scientific phenomenological approach to the study of human personality, a holistic and antireductionistic emphasis, the assumption of a teleological principle of self-actualization, a belief in the potentiality for a limited form of self-determination or personal freedom, a more-or-less explicit ideal of authentic human existence, a preoccupation with the problem of self-transcendence, and, finally, a valuing of the individual person. (pp. 50-51)

It is these dimensions of the HE school of thought which specifically distinguishes it from EP traditions.

Although both HE and ES theorists have contrasted their theoretical views with EP traditions, there has been insufficient comparisons made between these two frameworks regarding their basic metatheoretical tenets, counselling goals, and strategies. Because HE and ES views of human existence and psychotherapy have evolved as a direct consequence of their concerted opposition to EP traditions, it may be erroneously assumed that they are metatheoretically similar. Apart from a surprisingly few articles which even attempt to address this issue (Berman, 1986; May, 1976; Osborne & Angus, 1989; Slife & Barnard, 1988; Wilson, 1988), there appears to be an unspoken and unexamined consensus that these two world view are somehow metatheoretically equivalent. This, as yet, unfounded assumption is largely suggested through the substantial lack of literature even considering this important question. Another important task of this project is to examine both HE and ES epistemologies and counselling perspectives in order to specifically address this question. A second task of this study is to develop a metatheoretical framework whereby all theories of counselling might be more easily and adequately compared, contrasted, and evaluated.

Overview of the Chapters

Chapter II proposes that the development of a more appropriate and humanizing framework within modern psychology necessitates a thorough understanding of what has come to constitute modernity. Rather than viewing modernity as merely a historical epoch, both Lasch (1979,

1984) and MacIntyre (1981) suggest that modernity more accurately reflects a particular metaphysical orientation called 'scientific materialism'. These authors characterize 'modernity' as constituting a secular and amoral approach to human existence which has come to concertedly emphasize pragmatic, technical, instrumental, and utilitarian approaches to human affairs. Both of these authors argue that the abandonment of a 'teleological' or 'classical' approach to human existence--that is a moral, ethical, and ends focus to human affairs--has resulted in predominantly "managerial" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 82), "instrumental" (Lasch, 1984, p. 253), and "technological" (Lasch, 1984, p. 223) approaches to human problems. It is within this thoroughly modern context that all counselling perspectives have inevitably emerged, developed, and must be evaluated.

The two dominant Zeitgeists of modernity have been described by Reber (1985) as "the naturalistic approach" of philosophical naturalism and the "personalistic approach" (p. 836) of humanistic-existentialism. The more predominant and influential Zeitgeist of modernity to date, as outlined by Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955, 1964, 1975), Lasch (1979, 1984), MacIntyre (1981), Montagu and Matson (1983), has been philosophical naturalism in its various forms. This often unrecognized metatheoretical bias, which has come to characterize modernity, has lead to the development of amoral, secular, and naturalistic view of human existence and counselling. These developments have subsequently resulted in the considerable diminishment of

moral and ethical concerns within the human sciences. It is argued that all schools of thought within modern psychology and psychotherapy have been dramatically affected by naturalism's diminishing, fragmenting, reductionistic, and dehumanizing influences. Therefore, no theoretical perspective within the human sciences can be said to be completely immune to these metatheoretical biases. This thoroughly modern and dehumanizing Zeitgeist must be first clearly recognized and acknowledged before an appropriate metatheoretical framework for counselling can be developed. Chapter II specifically undertakes this task.

Chapter III examines the dehumanizing philosophical and scientific developments of psychology and psychotherapy which have come to predominantly characterize modern perspectives of human existence. This analysis of dehumanizing trends in the human sciences is undertaken in order to clarify the types of theoretical and practical changes which are necessary to 'rehumanize' modern psychology and psychotherapy. These important issues and concerns are specifically examined utilizing a Humanistic-Existential (HE) framework which encompasses the philosophical perspective of 'transcendentalism'. Halverson (1981) defines transcendentalism as a "world view which attempts to find some common ground between theism and naturalism" (p. 487)--that is between scientific and religious interests. Frankl (1967) describes HE transcendentalism as a philosophical and metaclinical orientation which emphasizes the uniquely

human capacity for self-transcendence (p. 46) as the *sine qua non* of human existence. Frankl (1967) explains:

What does existence mean? It means a certain kind of being--the specific manner of being of which man and man alone is capable. One characteristic of human existence is transcendence. That is to say man transcends his environment toward the world; but more than this, he also transcends his being towards an ought. When he does this, he rises above the level of the somatic and the psychic and enters the realm of the genuinely human. (p. 137).

HE transcendentalism emphasizes the consideration of the responsibilities, ends, and oughts of human existence which constitute its moral, ethical, and spiritual focus. This study supports Frankl's (1967, 1978) contention that the inclusion of the transcendent dimension of human existence is pivotal to the development of an appropriate model of psychology and psychotherapy. HE transcendentalism necessitates a return to a teleological or purposive view of human existence. A telic view of human actions must include the imperative consideration of moral freedom, moral choice, and moral responsibilities.

Chapter III also provides arguments for a multidimensional model of human existence, psychology, and psychotherapy based on HE transcendentalism. Barrett (1987), Frankl (1967, 1975, 1978), May (1979), and Schumacher (1977) maintain that the rehumanization of psychology and psychotherapy necessitates a return to a hierarchical and multidimensional approach within the human sciences which involves important elements of the 'classical' or 'Aristotelean' paradigm. A major aspect of the classical perspective is its emphasis on the

development of conscience and moral character. It is these dimensions of human existence which need to be substantively reintroduced to both the human sciences and psychotherapy. This multidimensional model of human existence and psychotherapy stands in direct contrast to the unidimensional, bureaucratic, instrumental, and managerial approaches of scientific materialism. Perspectives of counselling which do not encompass these noological, spiritual or higher dimensions of human existence, that is which do not recognize the importance of moral character and the development of conscience, are viewed as being limited and dehumanizing world views.

Chapter IV, incorporating Frankl's multidimensional approach to existence and Dabrowski and Piechowski's (1977) multilevel view of human development, endorses both a hierarchical and multidimensional approach to the human sciences. Central to this perspective is the inclusion of both 'natural' and 'nonnatural' dimensions of human existence. This multidimensional perspective is offered in contrast to both 'natural' and 'supernatural' philosophical monisms. The multilevel and dualistic ontology of 'humanistic-existential transcendentalism' (HET) is deemed a more appropriate metatheoretical orientation in that it does not obfuscate important ontological distinctions between human and nonhuman organisms and, therefore, addresses the full dimensionality of human existence. HET, within its multilevel or multidimensional ontology, also recognizes the anthropological unity or holism of human experience.

This perspective emphasizes the uniqueness and primacy of the noological or spiritual dimensions of human existence without negating or discounting the physiological/organic or psychosocial/mental realms.

While acknowledging that both HET and ES schools of thought have developed in response to the dehumanizing materialism of EP traditions, Chapter V proposes that these two approaches to human existence, psychology, and psychotherapy are considerably dissimilar. HET, reflecting its philosophical dualism and multidimensional ontology, incorporates both naturalism and nonnaturalism within its basic metatheoretical perspective. By contrast, the ES perspective of Gregory Bateson totally negates the nonnatural or transcendent dimension of existence and in this sense thoroughly constitutes both a reductionistic and dehumanizing approach. It is from this basic metatheoretical distinction that all other major contrasts between HET and ES theory are engendered. Chapter V provides a comparison of these two world views, specifically addressing the major points of contention between these two schools. As a result of comparing the basic metatheoretical constructs between HET and ES theories, this study considers the degree of theoretical congruence between these differing approaches as extremely limited.

Chapter VI proposes that although there are many differences between the basic constructs of HE and ES perspectives there also exists qualitatively different counselling perspectives within each of these two world

views. Therefore, in the same way that individuals can be differentiated by their level of development, counselling theories can also be multidimensionally differentiated. Utilizing Frankl's (1969) concept of dimensional ontology, Dabrowski and Piechowski's (1977) multilevel developmental perspective, Schumacher's (1973, 1977) vertical philosophical map, and Anderson's (1981) three modes of psychological science, a metatheoretical topology for categorizing counselling perspectives will be created. This multilevel framework, the HET multidimensional ontology, will be utilized to in the assessment of EP, HE, and ES world views and related approaches to counselling.

Based on this multilevel framework, it will also be concluded that there may be as great or greater differences between different levels of one school of thought (for example: two different levels of HE theory) than a comparison of two different schools of thought (for example: HE and ES frameworks) which are evaluated as being at the same level.

Chapter VII, the concluding chapter of this study provides an overview of the conclusions arising from the theoretical analysis of this study. One of the most important implications is the recognition of the need for a multidimensional or multilevel revisioning of psychology and psychotherapy which incorporates HE transcendentalism or HET. This enquiry recognizes that the transcendental or noological dimensions of human existence and human problems must be concertedly incorporated into modern psychology and psychotherapy.

Another important implication of this study is the recognition that individual counselling practitioners may also be functioning at 'lower' or 'higher' levels regardless of the particular EP, HE, and ES theory they happen to avow.

Finally, a pivotal task of this project is to instill within the psychologist and counsellor the imperative need to be far more critical of all metatheoretical developments within the human sciences.

CHAPTER II

The Socio-Cultural Context of the Problem

Introduction

To facilitate a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the development of counselling theory, education, research, and practice, it is necessary to delineate the socio-cultural problems which confront modern society and the individual within--counsellors included. These socio-cultural influences, distinctively colour our perceptions and conceptions of the nature of psychology and humanity itself. The types of problems confronting counsellor educators and practitioners exemplify the types of problems confronting the larger socio-cultural milieu. The discipline of counselling has not developed and is not practiced within an epistemological vacuum. The invisible nature of a dominant Weltanschauung (Romanyshyn, 1978) may not only distort, rigidify, and narrow perspectives on human problems but also influences the types of solutions we engage to address them. An incomplete or inappropriate model of humanity may result in psychology and counselling addressing limited types of problems in an inappropriate manner. The adhesion to an inappropriate Weltanschauung by psychologists and counsellors will lead to their being part of human problems rather than their solution. An initial step towards developing a more appropriate and encompassing perspective towards human problems and related solutions, entails the development of a more

comprehensive understanding of the types of socio-cultural influences which impact us all.

Many social theorists, philosophers and historians (Barrett, 1979, 1987; Berlyne, 1981; Cooper, 1981, Copleston, 1963, 1974; Lasch, 1979, 1984; MacIntyre, 1981, 1985; Schafer, 1987) as well as psychological theorists and practitioners (Anderson, 1981; Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977; Frankl, 1969, 1978; Fromm, 1941, 1947, 1975; Giorgi, 1981; Graumann, 1981; Hague, 1936; Heather, 1976; May, 1953, 1958, 1979, 1983; Montagu & Matson, 1983, Romanyshyn, 1978) have directed their attention to the types of socio-cultural, historical, and philosophical influences which radically influence the development of psychology today. An overview of selected contributors will be presented in order to highlight some of the dominant themes in the interaction between socio-cultural variables and developments in psychology and psychotherapy. These socio-cultural themes reflect the types of epistemological forces which influence our conceptions of human nature and the development of counselling theory and practice.

Erich Fromm--The Marketing Orientation,

Monocerebral Man, and Normative Humanism

Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955, 1975) has examined the relationship between the psychological health of the individual and modern societies' cultural norms and values. Fromm (1955) confronts us with the difficult predicament of "the pathology of normalacy" (p. 15) in our consumeristic and industrial world, characterizing "(the)

whole society as lacking in mental health" (p. 21). Fromm (1947, 1955, 1975) maintains that the consumeristic tendencies of our industrial mass societies create a dominant marketing ethos. This ethos influences our attitudes towards most aspects of our culture, thus becoming so invasive that it pathologically transforms our perspective of what it essentially means to be human. Within this marketing ethos individuals are regarded as mere commodities where one's essential worth is characterized by one's marketability and the demands of the human market. This transformation of the individual's sense of self has been designated as the "marketing orientation" (Fromm, 1947, p. 75). The marketing orientation or character structure is seen by Fromm (1947) as a human crisis not just in terms of "self evaluation and self esteem but of one's identity with oneself" (p. 80).

Fromm (1975) attributes the development of the marketing orientation to our general spiritual and cultural decay, contempt for genuine ethical values, and a profound increase in the "technicalization" (p. 390) of life. He describes the 'marketing' individual as having schizoid or schizophrenic qualities because of a separation of thought, affect and will. The individual evolving within this marketing ethos is depicted as being exclusively cerebrally oriented, what Fromm (1975) calls "monocerebral man" (p. 391). The monocerebral attitude towards both human existence and oneself is predominantly intellectual. This intellectualization of life

facilitates a world view which emphasizes knowing what things are, how they function, and most importantly how they can be construed and manipulated. This approach to self, others, and the world Fromm (1975) attributes to the scientific approach, technical domination of the world, and mass consumption; it is the essence of the modern world.

The monocerebral person can be identified by a "special kind of narcissism" (Fromm, 1975, p. 391) where the individual, both one's body and skills, are objectified as being instruments for success. Fromm (1975) classifies the monocerebral individual as being a "'normal' low-grade schizophrenic person" (p.397) who has not lost the capacity to look at the world 'realistically'--that is intellectually in order to deal with it effectively or pragmatically--but has lost the capacity to experience things personally, subjectively, and with one's heart. This "pathology of normalacy" (Fromm, 1975, p. 15) rarely atrophies to graver forms because it is supported by the larger society and becomes both culturally patterned and sanctioned. The monocerebral person is incapable of visualizing aims which may further both the individual and the total society. Fromm (1975) maintains that to formulate such goals, 'reason' is required which is far more than mere intellectualization. This 'process of reasoning' can only be developed when there is a high degree of unity between the 'brain' and the 'heart'--that is between human rationality and emotions.

Fromm's (1947, 1955, 1975) perspective of modernity's conceptualizations of normalacy has far reaching implications for the development of counselling theory and practice. Fromm (1955) advocates a position of "normative humanism" (p. 21), supporting universal criteria for defining mental health based on a consideration of the unique problems of human existence. This existentially grounded basis for determining mental health is directed towards finding "ever-new solutions for the contradictions in his (mankind's) existence," what Fromm (1947) defines as "finding ever-high forms of unity with nature, his fellow man and himself" (p. 31). This perspective on mental health is diametrically opposed to relativistic views held by many social scientists, what Fromm (1947) calls "sociological relativism" (p.21). He states that mental health cannot be defined in terms of the adjustment of the individual to society, the position of social relativism, but must be designated in terms of adjustment of society to the needs of man. Fromm (1955) further elaborates:

A healthy society furthers man's capacity to love his fellow men, to work creatively, to develop reason and objectivity, to have a sense of self which is based on his own productive powers. An unhealthy society is one which creates mutual hostility, distrust, which transforms man into an instrument of use and exploitation for others, which deprives him of a sense of self, except as he submits to others or becomes an automaton. (p. 71)

This criticism of the pathological nature of modern society and its impact on definitions of psychological health and illness, has become a persistent and important

theme within humanistic-existential (HE) writings on both modern culture and psychology. The resultant socio-cultural dehumanization, through modernity's over-emphasis of intellectual analysis and technical proficiency, is a specific concern which will be examined more closely.

Ashley Montagu and Floyd Matson--Dehumanized Man,
the Technological Imperative, and Homo Humanus

Montagu and Matson (1983) examine the various sources, symptoms, and products of an invisible affliction of the human spirit in our modern world--what they term a sickness of the soul or the "dehuman syndrome" (p. xi). Their work is primarily directed towards identifying "the brute facts of dehumanization in contemporary life and culture with (its) dehumanizing acts and dehumanized actors" (p. xii). They define the dehuman syndrome, as "one of enervated 'passiveness,' a state in which the individual feels powerless, lonely, and anxious...[with] little sense of integrity or self-identity'" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xiv). Montagu and Matson (1983) associate this syndrome with "the loss of community and solidarity in the modern world"--what might be called "the breaking of the human connection" (p. xx), "the alienation of affection" (p.xx), "flight from self" (p. xxxi), and the transformation of human values and morality into a "technical ethos, a morality of means" (p. 20). They associate these various individual and social pathologies as being symptomatic of a more fundamental shift in the dominant social and cultural ethos--a radical transformation in basic epistemology.

The dehumanization of the individual within modernity, Montagu and Matson (1983) ascribe to various social and individual sources which are collectively conceptualized as the mechanization of life through the "technological imperative" (p. xxix). They describe the technological imperative as that which connects man and machine--the spirit of technique. They assert that when technique enters into every area of life, including those aspects of existence which are fundamentally human, the spirit of technique is no longer external to man but becomes his very essence. This mechanization or dehumanization of life, they argue, has been facilitated by various representatives of the human sciences.

Psychology's Contribution to Dehumanization

Behavioral Sciences. Montagu and Matson (1983) criticize particular developments within psychology and psychotherapy as contributing to an ethos of dehumanization. The authors attack the epistemology of the behavioral sciences, espoused by the advocates of behavioral control from Huxley (1953) to Skinner (1971), calling such endeavors "dehuman engineering" and "the science of good behavior" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. 57). They state that the science of behaviorism and behavioral engineering contribute to the diminishment of one's sense of self. Montagu and Matson (1983) emphasize that "the behaviorist bible, in both its Old Testament (Watson) and its New Testament (Skinner), tells of the fall of Man--the dispossession of 'Autonomous Man' and his replacement by the divine forces of Natural Law" (pp. 87-88). Skinner

(1971) summarizes the dehumanizing intent and effect of such behavioral control as follows:

What is being abolished is autonomous man--the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity....Science does not dehumanize man, it dehomunculizes him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species. To man qua man we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable. (pp. 200-201)

Montagu and Matson (1983) characterize Skinner's epistemology as being ultimately concerned with "control" referring to this word as "the most resonant and recurrent theme in Skinner's vocabulary" (p. 82). They underscore that the notion of a developed social technocracy has had a venerable history in most modern industrialized societies, particularly those of North America. Skinner merely represents the most blatant disciple of such 'dehuman' engineering. The dehumanized ethos behind the technical jargon is depicted by Montagu and Matson (1983):

...the barely hidden authoritarian impulse that underlies the psychology of behaviorism is, of course, the will to power, the secret wish to dominate. To "condition" behavior is to control it, and the meaning of control, in the real world as well as the laboratory is power...Having defined man as no more or less than an "assembled organic machine ready to run," the behaviorist defined himself as an engineer ready to run it.

In what direction? The explicit answer given by Watson to this irresistible question was: in the direction of good behavior, meaning simply that which conforms to the established social norms and conventions. (pp. 64-65)

The above examples are only a few of the many that Montagu and Matson (1983) offer as supporting the litany of

behavioral control and dehuman engineering espoused within the fundamental ethos of behavioral psychology.

Humanistic Sciences. However, they are also critical of some of the more humanistically oriented counselling perspectives for their potentially dehumanizing impact. Montagu and Matson (1983) contend that the "human relations" (p. 72) or "non-directive" (p. 73) approaches to counselling often perpetrate even more subtle and unrecognized forms of dehuman engineering. The professional redefining and reallocation of real political conflicts and inequities to mere problems of human relations or morale often has dehumanizing consequences. The utilization of human relations or non-directive strategies in resolving such problems as industrial and labor relations disputes, is characterized as being "deliberately set up as a safety valve, a means of siphoning off hostility and frustration which might be otherwise directed" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. 74) against the real sources of individual and social conflict. Montagu and Matson (1983) note that the human relations counsellor, although providing "a kind of silent therapeutic audience for grievances" and "a vague impression that the counsellor was his ally if not his advocate," offers "neither practical solutions to the problems brought to him nor any real advice" (p. 73). The counsellor's amoral and apolitical approach to human conflict and problems "was often not only nondirective, it was systematically unhelpful" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. 75).

The further dehumanization of human problems Montagu and Matson (1983) attribute to perceiving and conceptualizing these issues as mere problems of "'communication'--of verbal misunderstandings, crossed signals and poor connections" (p. 75). The communications theory was based on the conviction that "the source of human problems generally was not to be found in concrete issues of injustice, exploitation, discrimination and the like but rather in the sphere of 'communication'" (Montagu and Matson, 1983, pp. 74-75). The erosion of perceiving human problems as having moral and political contexts, that is of seeing human problems as being a result of both genuine socio-political inequities and moral/ethical conflicts, further led to the dehumanization and alienation of humanity. This redefining of human problems to matters of mere technical concerns underscores the destructive and dehumanizing impact of the "technological imperative" (p. xxix). The human sciences were content not only to discount, mechanize, and technicalize human problems but further continued such endeavors by defining human identity itself as lacking any concrete or existential validity.

Sociology's Contribution to Dehumanization

The dissolution of one's sense of self as an active "agent, subject or centre" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xxxiii), has been exacerbated by particular theories of personal identity. Montagu and Matson (1983) are critical of relativistic and interactional perspectives of self represented by the works of Cooley

(1964)--"the looking glass self"--and Goffman (1959)--The presentation of self in everyday life. These sociologists advocate an interactionalist perspective of the self, where the self in its most immediate sense is regarded as an illusion or a mere role construction created by the norms and expectations of the larger social order. Cooley (1964) typifies the interactionalist perspective towards the self:

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals..."Society" and "individuals" do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing...(pp. 36-37)

Goffman (1959) further epitomizes this perspective by stating "the self, then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die, it is a dramatic effect..." (pp. 252-253). Gouldner (1970), a dissenting sociologist, criticizes Goffman's views stating "Goffman thus declares a moratorium on the conventional distinction between make-believe and reality, or between the cynical and the sincere" (p. 380). Gouldner (1970) concludes that Goffman's interactionalist approach reflects and reinforces dehumanized cultural values of "mass marketing and promotion, including the marketing of self" (p. 381). Montagu and Matson (1983) add that if one were to follow the interactionalist view then the "'presentation of self in everyday life' soon becomes all presentation and no self" (p. xxxiii). Montagu and Matson (1983) suggest that beneath the

relativistic and interactionalist "sociologism" (p. xxxv) of Cooley's and Goffman's work lies a much deeper cause for such dehumanized attitudes towards the self. The deification of science (scientism), objectification and mechanization of life, mass consumption and mass marketing, and the technological imperative are regarded as more fundamental causes in the development and maintenance of both individual and societal dehumanization.

Rehumanization as an Alternative Perspective

Montagu and Matson's (1983) work, though essentially diagnostic in its intent, suggests important epistemological changes which could initiate the rehumanization of modern society, psychology, and psychotherapy. Montagu and Matson (1983) emphasize that what is needed is a basic transformation of human values and more importantly the valuing of humans. Although highly critical of certain developments within third force psychology the authors hold that there is hope in the essential core and basic tenets of humanistic psychology. The authors define this essence as:

The real humanistic psychology, which had begun to find its voice in the fifties, was not so much insurgent as it is resurgent in its message; it presented rare philosophical wine in new laboratory bottles. It called us back to ourselves, away from the toolbox and the calculator. This new psychological humanism dared to speak openly of the self --that old spook so long ago exorcised from the house of the intellect; and worse yet, it spoke well of the self....The humanist alternative holds that man's fate, his course of conduct for good or ill, is not preprogrammed but self-determined: Man at some time is master of his fate; the fault is not in our stars or our genes

but ourselves that we are...whatever we become.
(Montagu & Matson, 1983, pp. 218-219)

The rehumanization of our culture and the resurgence of the self, these authors proclaim, necessitates a "transformation of the species from Homo Sapiens to Homo Humanus" (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. 220), a move away from intellectual man to humanized man.

The remarriage of intellect and affect becomes necessary for the rehumanization and salvation of the self and the total society. The authors conclude:

The time has come for remaking. Homo Sapiens has had his day on earth--and has failed. The great lesson now beginning to be learned by the overmechanized and overmobilized world, a world of power inhabited by a powerless race, is that sapience is not enough to save us. Mind divorced from feeling, rationality without mercy, is not a divine gift but a devil's bargain. The enveloping culture of nihilism and the new dark age of dehumanization, reflect a fatal disorder of the modern world, generated systematically out of the mainsprings of industrial society and nurtured by purely technical intelligence cut off from those balancing attributes of human nature invidiously categorized as sentimentality....No, mind alone cannot save us from this extremity; what is needed now is minding--the marriage of thought and feeling. Out of that marriage may come more than a new balance, a new sanity; it holds the prospect of a new higher consciousness....The possible attainment of full humanness--the transformation of the species from Homo sapiens to Homo humanus--rests upon our recovery of the lost world of fellow feeling, the source of all human connection. (Montagu & Matson, 1983, pp. 219-220)

The rehumanization of both the individual and the larger social order, the authors maintain, is partially dependent on the resurgence of one's sense of self. However, our modern society's emphasis on mass consumerism and productivity, the technicalization and mechanization of

life, and an over emphasis on the intellectual understanding of human problems by an elite core of dehuman engineers, continues to diminish one's sense of self. Furthermore, Christopher Lasch (1979, 1984) exhorts that our modern society not only diminishes one's sense of self but diminishes the individual's sense of reality. Lasch's (1979, 1984) perspective on how modern society distorts our conceptions of self and reality will now be presented.

Christopher Lasch--The Culture of Narcissism,
Survivalism, and the Minimal Self

Lasch (1984), examining the pathology of modern mass society, condemns our "culture of consumption" and rampant "consumerism" (p. 30) for their destructive assault against selfhood. This review will consider the central themes of Lasch's (1979, 1984) books, The culture of narcissism and The minimal self as they apply to socio-cultural disintegration and psychology's contribution to dehumanization.

Mass Society, Consumerism, and our Narcissistic Culture

Similar to Fromm (1941, 1947, 1975) and Montagu and Matson (1983), Lasch attacks our consumeristic culture's basic marketing ethos for its extensive erosion of both public and private spheres of life. Not only does he condemn modern technologically oriented society for its blatant assault on selfhood, but Lasch (1984) believes that it also psychologically transforms our perspective and experience of reality itself. Lasch (1984) maintains:

...commodity production and consumerism alter perceptions not just of the self but of the

world outside of self. They create a world of mirrors, unsubstantial images, illusions increasingly indistinguishable from reality. The mirror effect makes the subject an object; at the same time, it makes the world of objects an extension or projection of the self. It is misleading to characterize the culture of consumption as a culture dominated by things. The consumer lives surrounded not so much by things as by fantasies....This insubstantiality of the external world arises out of the very nature of commodity production...commodities are produced for immediate consumption. Their value lies not in their usefulness but in their marketability. (pp. 30-31)

Lasch (1979) uses the term "narcissism" (p. 71) for depicting the human condition within our consumeristic and technologically oriented mass culture--what he calls the culture of narcissism. However, the author indicates that there has been considerable confusion by what is meant by this term. Lasch (1984) points out that the most prevalent error that occurs "is the confusion of narcissism with egoism and selfishness" (p. 18). Lasch (1984) identifies the central plight of Narcissus, the ancient Greek mythological character from whom the term is derived, as not being "egoism" but a "confusion of self and not self" (p. 19). Lasch (1984) indicates that the fundamental distinction between self and not-self or self and other is "the source of all other distinctions...as the first principle of mental life, the axiomatic premise without which mental life cannot even begin" (p. 163). Our narcissistic culture's cardinal problem or conflict lies in the inability to distinguish between image and reality. Both the consumeristic and technological orientations to life distort the boundaries between these two fundamentally different aspects of human experience.

Our culture's overreliance on technological adaptation and advancement increases the average consumer's dependence on sophisticated life-support systems (not excluding counselling and other therapeutic services), intricate technologies, and generally externally provided goods and services which may both create and sustain feelings of incompetence and helplessness. Lasch (1984) adds that science "heightens the prevailing sense of unreality by giving men the power to achieve their wildest fantasies...by holding out a vision of limitless technological possibilities...which removes the last obstacle to wishful thinking" (p. 36). Consumerism subjectifies the external world through the selling of images which makes all aspects of both public and private life amenable to the conditions of the commodities market. Correspondingly, the internal subjective life of the individual is objectified through overreliance on and over-identification with technology and science. Thus the boundaries between self and not-self--that is subjectivity and objectivity--become increasingly indistinguishable. This predicament of human identity, as well as the disintegration of the experiencing of reality, Lasch (1979, 1984) refers to respectively as individual and cultural narcissism.

Psychology's and Psychotherapy's Facilitation of Narcissism

Lasch (1979, 1984) examines the historical development of the therapeutic services, as well as the general fields of psychiatry and psychology, for their

contributions to individual and cultural narcissism. Therapeutic services have developed in context to a dominant world view which stresses both scientific and technological advancement. Lasch (1984) conveys that the origins of the modern day therapeutic ethic are found in the 19th century traditions of "pragmatic liberalism" (p. 75). The tradition of pragmatic liberalism, which developed under the auspices of liberal educators and social scientists, emphasizes an overdependence on rationality and what Lasch (1984) calls "ego-strengthening education" (p. 206) as a means of addressing human problems. The author argues that whether one examines the development of psychotherapy within first, second, or third force perspectives, all of these traditions emphasize the dominant role of the ego or rationality in their therapeutic endeavors. However, Lasch (1984) argues that science has not fulfilled the promise that it would and could replace metaphysical traditions with a coherent rational explanation of the world and man's place in it. The author indicates that science cannot tell people how to create and live a good life and should not pretend to do so. The development of science, technology, and the therapeutic ethic of liberal pragmatism instead avowed "the refusal of moral and emotional commitment" (p. 76). The social sciences, within the tradition of pragmatic liberalism, adopted the ethos of "instrumental reasoning" (Lasch, 1984, p. 253)--what Montagu and Matson have described as a "morality of means" (p. 20).

Our cultural preference for mass production, mass marketing, and mass consumerism not only changed the individual's sense of self and reality, but also radically transformed human values, morality and ethics. This narcissistic assault against human identity, values and reality itself has resulted in a fragmentation of life, a loss of historical significance, the shrinking of the human experience to the immediate present, and the adoption of instrumental reasoning. Lasch (1984) argues that our narcissistic culture has transformed our perspective of human existence supporting what the author calls an ethos of "survivalism" (Lasch, 1984, p. 59).

Survivalism, the Proliferation of Meaningless Choice, and the Protean Self

The technological and scientific control of mankind's external world has been adopted as a parallel paradigm for the management of the individual's personal and psychic life. In our mass society, Lasch (1984) maintains, "the self is threatened with disintegration and a sense of inner emptiness" and "everyday life...(begins) to pattern itself on the survival strategies forced upon those exposed to severe adversity" (p. 58). Human existence in our narcissistic culture is perceived as a matter of psychic survival and the individual as a survivalist.

Lasch (1984) elaborates:

...people have lost confidence in the future. Faced with an escalating arms race, rising crime and terrorism, environmental deterioration, and long-term economic decline, they have retreated from commitments that presuppose a secure orderly world. Self-concern, so characteristic of our time, has become a search for psychic survival. (p. 16)

The conversion of the individual into a consumer of commodities, Lasch (1984) asserts, was followed by "his conversion into a consumer of therapies designed to ease his 'adjustment' to the realities of industrial life" (p. 46). The consequences of this survivalistic epistemology has been largely reflected in dehumanizing changes, developments and trends in therapy. Lasch (1984) describes these transformations as follows:

With the help of an elaborate network of therapeutic professions, which themselves have largely abandoned approaches stressing introspective insight in favor of "coping" and "behavior modification," men and women today are trying to piece together a technology of self, the only alternative to personal collapse. Among many people, the fear that man will be enslaved by machines has given way to a hope that man will become something like a machine in his own right thereby achieving a state of mind "beyond freedom and dignity," in the words of B.F. Skinner. Behind the injunction to "get in touch with your feelings"--remnant of an earlier "depth" psychology--lies the now-familiar insistence that there is no depth, no desire even, and that human personality is merely a collection of needs programmed either by biology or culture. (p. 58)

The survivalist mentality is further identified by Lasch (1984) as the "normalization" or "trivialization of crisis" (p. 62) where the individual is unable "to distinguish between events that threaten the future of mankind and events that merely threaten his peace of mind" (p. 63). This inability to differentiate between mere pleasure, survival, and deeper human meaning, is symptomatic of the shrinking of human life to an ahierarchical or value atrophied existence.

Stress/Coping Literature as Supporting a Survivalistic Ethos. The human sciences, psychology and psychotherapy in particular, have not been totally remiss in their contributing to modernity's 'ethos of survivalism'. The development of survivalism Lasch (1984) associates with the proliferation of recent stress and coping literature which supports a siege mentality. Lasch (1984) is critical of much of this literature for reframing the adaptation and solving of human problems within the context of survival which are based on situations of extreme adversity. Basic paradigms for stress and coping research (Benner, Roskies, & Lazarus, 1980; Bettelheim, 1979; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) have often been based on the observations and commentary of individuals incarcerated in concentration camps during the second world war. The inability to discriminate between concentration camp experiences and stress-coping situations in everyday life appears lacking in most of the research in this area. The development of the survivalist ethos, reflected in various social scientific perspectives on stress, coping, and general human adaptation, reflects the dehumanized potential of purely instrumental reasoning when applied to human problems and related solutions.

Survivalism and the Proliferation of Meaningless Choice. A further negative consequence of consumerism and mass culture Lasch (1984) describes as "the proliferation of choice" (p. 35). The author states the "most plausible defense of consumerism and modern mass culture has been that they make available to everybody an array of personal

choices formerly restricted to the rich" (Lasch 1984, p. 35). However, Lasch's (1984) counter argument is that choice has been reduced to a superficial matter of taste reflected in our "preoccupation with lifestyle" (p. 35). Choice within our narcissistic culture is centered predominantly around the selection of consumer products ranging from choice of hair color to choice of therapist.

The atrophy of human freedom, choice, and responsibility within modernity Lasch (1984) associates with the "pluralistic ideology" (p. 38) of our most recent historical period. This pluralistic ideology has been supported by cultural anthropology, which Lasch (1984) suggests fosters the belief that "every culture must be judged on its own terms...and that no one has the right to impose his own preferences or moral judgements on anyone else" (p. 36). The basically amoral and ahierarchical orientation of appreciable anthropological, sociological, and psychological thought "robs choice of its meaning by denying that its exercise leads to 'any' important consequence" (Lasch, 1984, p. 35). Lasch (1984) argues that authentic human choice is not represented by this pluralistic fantasy but rather "every moral and cultural choice of any consequence rules out a series of other choices" (p. 38). The author further elaborates:

A society of consumers defines choice not as the freedom to choose one course of action over another but as the freedom to choose everything at once. "Freedom of choice" means "keeping your options open"...But if choice no longer implies commitments and consequences, the freedom to choose in practice amounts to the abstention of choice...Unless the idea of choice carries with it the possibility of making a difference, or changing the course of events, of

setting in motion a chain of events that may prove irreversible, it negates the freedom it claims to uphold...(Lasch, 1984, p. 38)

Mass culture and the survivalistic ethos demean the very essence of human choice and freedom, whereby noncommitment has become an adaptive response upon which individuals base both their private and collective lives in our modern day culture.

The survivalist's ideological distortion of individual freedom, choice, and responsibility has precipitated what Lasch (1984) has designated as a cultural crisis reflected in the "collapse of traditional values" (p. 23) and the "emergence of a new morality of self-gratification" (p. 23). This transformation of human values, reflected in the devaluing of one's essential humanity, Lasch (1984) contends has become the adaptational rhetoric of a survivalistic culture. Our consumeristic culture's emphasis on the technicalization and commodization of life has resulted in the "commodization of self" (Lasch, 1984, p. 30)--that is a pathological transformation of the individual's sense of selfhood or human identity itself.

Survivalism and the Protean Self. Liberal pragmatism, Lasch (1984) argues, encourages the dispensation of an authentic moral self. In fact the cult of survivalism, the author suggests, encourages the development and maintenance of what he describes as a "protean sense of self" (Lasch, 1984, p. 98). The term "protean" is derived from the name Proteus, a "minor sea god in the court of Poseidon, who could readily adopt any

form or guise he desired" (Fowler, 1981, p. 19). Fowler (1981) further typifies the protean individual as:

Protean people make a series of relatively intense or total identity and faith plunges, but their commitments prove to be transient and shifting. They thus move from one faith-relational triad (Fowler's conception of how we develop both meaning and identity in our lives) to another, often with sharp discontinuities and abrupt changes of direction. (pp. 20-21)

Fowler (1981) emphasizes that our commitments and trusts substantially shape and determine our identity or selfhood.

Lasch (1984) argues that survivalism fosters the development of protean selfhood as an adaptational mechanism. In a culture that increasingly emphasizes adaptation and coping as mechanisms for both individual and collective survival, a protean sense of selfhood is a logical extension of the survivalistic ethos. Lasch (1984) explains:

A conceptualization of an endlessly adaptable and interchangeable identity can help to free men and women from outworn social conventions, but it can also encourage defensive maneuvers and protective mimicry. A stable identity stands among other things as a reminder of the limits of one's adaptability. Limits imply vulnerability, whereas the survivalist seeks to become invulnerable, to protect himself against pain and loss. (p. 98)

It can be readily seen that the protean self, what Lasch (1984) colorfully terms as "protective mimicry" (p. 98) and what this writer metaphorically envisions as the 'chameleon complex,' becomes a significant adaptational mechanism in everyday life. Although the protean sense of self may be effective as a psychic coping mechanism it is a dehumanized and dehumanizing adaptation. Lasch (1984)

argues the cult of survivalism "shrinks the self by conceiving of it as only a product of cultural conditioning...carried to its logical conclusion, it diminishes selfhood as a illusion"(p. 98).

Practical Reasoning, Guilty Conscience and the Moral Self

Lasch (1984) asserts that an appropriate solution to the diverse problems of modernity is to develop an adaptation of the classical view of man which emphasizes "practical reasoning", "the development of character", and the "encouragement of citizens to tests themselves against standards of moral excellence" (p. 254). Practical reasoning and the development of character reflect the classical or Aristotelean concept of "phronesis" (Lasch, 1984, p. 253). In particular, the Aristotelean concept of phronesis entails the "faculty (power, ability, capacity) in humans which...enables them to discover what the correct (proper, right) action is in a given situation" (Angeles, 1981, p. 212). Conceptualizations of phronesis entail the continued integration of morality and ethics at all levels of human development in order to facilitate the 'internal' or 'moral' development of the individual rather than just instrumentally meeting external needs or demands. Phronesis, distinctly incorporating the development of moral character, acknowledges the need for the continual consideration and evaluation of 'what ought to be' in relation to modes of interacting with or changing 'what is.' The concept of phronesis, within human development, is directly opposed to instrumentalism

and its "morality of means" (Montagu & Matson, 1984, p. 20).

An alternative model of human development, which is directly contrasted with the tradition of 'pragmatic liberalism', Lasch (1984) identifies as "the case for the guilty conscience" (p. 258)--what this writer interprets as the development of self-transcendence and the moral self. Lasch (1984) clarifies:

Both the champions and critics of the rational ego turn their back on what remains valuable to the Western, Judaeo-Christian traditions of individualism (as opposed to the tradition of acquisitive individualism, which parodies and subverts it): the definition of selfhood as tension, division, conflict. As Neibuhr pointed out, attempts to ease an uneasy conscience take the form of a denial of man's divided nature...conscience (as distinguished from the superego) originates not so much in the "fear of God" as in the urge to make amends. Conscience arises not so much from the dread of reprisals by those we have injured or wish to injure as in the capacity for mourning and remorse...it (moral consciousness) lives on, even in our enlightened age, as a reminder of our fallen state and of our surprising capacity for gratitude, remorse, and forgiveness, by means of which we now and then transcend it. (pp. 258-259)

This acknowledgement of the uniquely human capacity for self-transcendence and the development of a moral self, has important theoretical and practical implications for the understanding of human existence, socio-cultural problems, as well as continuing developments in psychology and psychotherapy.

In summary, Lasch's (1979,1984) criticisms of psychology's fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, as well as the profound negative impact this distorted epistemology has had on both psychological theory and

practice, is documented in his two most recent books. The impact of these epistemological distortions, as demonstrated by psychology's role in the development and exacerbation of particular socio-cultural problems, is also clearly delineated in these works. However, what also seems to be evident is either Lasch's (1979, 1984) ignorance of the full spectrum of developments in psychological theory or his substantial inability to perceive any merit in the field of psychology at all. Despite his often insightful critique of modern psychology, Lasch seems to have thrown the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. What Lasch (1979, 1984) has failed to do is either examine or report important developments in psychological theory and praxis as represented by humanistic-existential (HE) schools of thought. Many of the criticisms and solutions offered by Lasch (1979, 1984) are equally shared by important HE writers, philosophers, psychologists, and therapists.

Alasdair MacIntyre's (1981) analysis of historical and philosophical influences, which have impacted modern conceptualizations of human existence, the human sciences, and psychotherapy, will be now examined. MacIntyre's (1981) criticisms are particularly relevant to the various problems of modernity and modern psychotherapy in that he examines these issues from a predominantly moral perspective.

Alasdair MacIntyre--The Moral Decline of Modernity,
the Emotivist Self, and a Teleological View of Man

Similar to Lasch (1979, 1984), MacIntyre (1981) has scrutinized the problems of modernity within a predominantly historical context. He specifically focuses on the major philosophical transitions which have radically impacted our basic understanding of morality and have been pivotal in laying the foundation for the diverse problems of modernity. MacIntyre (1981) argues that one cannot truly understand and appropriately address these problems without acknowledging important changes in epistemology which have both preceded and engendered them. He also examines the types of socio-cultural and historico-philosophical influences which have resulted in dehumanizing developments in the social sciences and therapeutic services.

The Moral Decline of Modernity, the Failure of the Enlightenment Project, and the Abandonment of Teleology

The moral decline of modernity. MacIntyre (1981) states that one of the definitive characteristics of modern day culture is its inability to arrive at any significant degree of agreement regarding issues of morality--what he collectively terms the modern "moral calamity" (p. vii). The roots of this problem lie in the inability of our culture to appeal to any form of objective moral criteria, which means that moral discourse exists primarily within the context of interminable moral disagreements. This has resulted in a particularly modern and peculiar moral ethos where the language of morality remains even though it (morality) has largely "been fragmented and then in part destroyed" (MacIntyre, 1981,

p. 5). A consequence of this modern moral predicament, MacIntyre (1981) contends, is that "there can be no rational way of securing moral agreement" (p. 6) and thus moral argument only serves to hide the "private arbitrariness" (p. 8) of all moral perspectives. The socio-cultural result of this disintegrative process, MacIntyre (1981) maintains, has been the development of the modern ethos of "liberal individualism" (p. vi) and its counterpart "moral pluralism" (p. 11). Liberal individualism, or "acquisitive individualism" (p. 258) as denoted by Lasch (1984), has become the dominant Weltanschauung of modernity.

MacIntyre (1981) asserts that within modernity "morality has become generally available in quite a new way" (p. 104) where "moral utterance provides a possible mask for almost any face" (p. 104) and what is good simply means what "I approve of" (p. 12). This characteristically modern moral ethos, where all "evaluative judgements...(are seen) as nothing but expressions of attitude or feelings" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 11), is variously identified by MacIntyre (1981) as emotivism and the emotivist perspective. Moral pluralism, the author maintains, is a concomitant of emotivism and fosters the tendency to regard the "value neutral-viewpoint" of all "evaluative predispositions" (p. 4) as paradoxically establishing some form of moral criteria. However, instead of doing this, moral pluralism only disguises moral discord and serves to hide the extensive erosion of the very basis of morality.

Furthermore, MacIntyre (1981) maintains, emotivism and moral pluralism have lead to "utilitarianism" where "no action is ever right or wrong as such" (p. 15) and therefore moral behavior is always ultimately contextual in nature. The advent of moral pluralism and the adoption of utilitarian ethics have lead to the "the obliteration of a genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 22). MacIntyre (1981) elaborates on the essential nature of this problem:

The difference between a human relationship uninformed by morality and one so informed is precisely the difference between one in which each person treats the other primarily as a means to his or her ends and one in which each treats the other as an end. To treat someone as an end is to offer them what I take to be good reasons for acting in one way rather than another, but to leave it to them to evaluate those reasons....By contrast, to treat someone else as a means is to seek to make him or her an instrument of my purposes by adducing whatever influences or considerations will in fact be effective in this or that occasion. (p. 23)

This rejection of any form of objective moral criteria has ultimately resulted in the abandonment of morality. This dehumanizing Weltanschauung, comprised of liberal individualism, moral pluralism or emotivism, and utilitarian ethics, has had a dramatic and devastating impact on social scientific and therapeutic developments.

Failure of the enlightenment project. The author maintains that to understand the unique problems of modernity, in particular the emotivist perspective towards morality, one has to understand that it was key episodes in the history of philosophy which "transformed,

fragmented,...and largely displaced morality" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 35). MacIntyre (1981) explains:

...the history of the word "moral" cannot be told adequately apart from an account of the attempts to provide a rational justification for morality in that historical period--from 1630 to 1850--when it acquired a sense at once general and specific. In that period "morality" became the name for that particular sphere in which rules of conduct which are neither theological nor legal nor aesthetic are allowed a cultural space of their own. It is only in the later seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, when this distinguishing of the moral from the theological, the legal and the aesthetic has become a received doctrine that the project of an independent rational justification of morality (the enlightenment project) becomes not merely the concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European culture. (p. 38)

The central thesis of MacIntyre's (1981) book, After virtue, is that the failure of the enlightenment project was precipitated by a major transitional period and dominant shift in world view or metaphysical assumptions.

MacIntyre (1981) maintains that the enlightenment project facilitated a liberation from the external authority of traditional morality--that is a liberation from "divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical authority" (p. 66)--towards a secular and individualistic view of moral agency. The central thrust of the enlightenment period was the attempt to provide a "rational justification" for "the rules of morality" (p. 42). The failure of the enlightenment project resulted in the Nietzschean indictment that all appeals to moral objectivity were merely subterfuge for a disguised will to power. Similarly, MacIntyre (1981) argues, for Hume morality is either the work "of reason" (p. 51) that is

having an objective foundation or a work "of the passions" (p. 42), that is essentially subjective and a product of the sentiments. The failure to provide a rational basis for morality ultimately lead to the Humean invocation that morality is a product of the human passions or fundamentally irrational. MacIntyre (1981) holds it is these metaphysical or metatheoretical developments of the enlightenment period which have become the basis for emotivism and emotivist perspectives toward morality. A metatheoretical consequence of the failure of the enlightenment project has been the diminishment in importance of moral issues and concerns within much of psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Luijpen and Koren (1983) have described the essence of this problem as the evolution of a peculiar metaphysics or world view which paradoxically denies the legitimacy of metaphysical concerns.

The rejection of teleology. MacIntyre (1981) argues it is also necessary to recognize the enlightenment period as demarking a major historical turning point regarding assumptions about human nature. The author maintains that many of the major enlightenment writers shared a common flaw or metatheoretical bias which characterized the dominant philosophical ethos or Weltanschauung of the time. MacIntyre (1981) explains:

All reject any teleological view of human nature, any view of man as having an essence which defines his true end. But to understand this is to understand why the enlightenment project of finding a basis for morality had to fail....The joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical

rejection of Aristoteleanism was to eliminate any notion of man as he could be if he realized his telos. Since the whole point of ethics--both as a theoretical and practical discipline--is to enable man to pass from his present state to his true end, the elimination of any notion of essential human nature and with it the abandonment of any notion of telos leaves behind a moral scheme (which) becomes quite unclear....Morality did in the eighteenth century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose something very like the teleological scheme of God....Detach morality from that framework and you will no longer have morality; or, at the very least, you will have radically transformed its character. (p. 52)

Without this teleological view, whether specifically envisioned within a natural or supernatural context, morality becomes unintelligible. The abandonment of a teleological or purposive view of man replaced pre-enlightenment religious dogmatism with a post-enlightenment materialism and secular scientism--what Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) have referred to as the "hegemony of positivism" (p. vii).

Another outcome of the many influences of the enlightenment philosophy was the development of an anti-Aristotelean view of science which, MacIntyre (1981) argues, "set strict boundaries to the powers of reason" (p. 52). The enlightenment and post-enlightenment view of reason, distinctly representative of modernity, is characterized as:

Reason is calculative; it can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm of practice therefore it can only speak of means. About ends it must be silent. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 52)

This predominant shift in our perspective of what constitutes 'reasoning' has profound implications for how

we have come to view both rationality and the human sciences within post-enlightenment societies. At a conference examining the importance of values within the helping services, Dr. Willis Harman (1986) summarizes the dehumanizing consequences of this radical shift in our basic world view as follows:

From it also came an increased technological emphasis -- an attitude of manipulative rationality in relationship to the earth and other creatures on the earth. Furthermore, it lead to the increasing economic rationalization of all sorts of human activities...increasingly characterized by positivism (the idea that what is physically measurable is what is real -- or at any rate, is the reality which science measures) and reductionism (the idea that understanding is gained by reducing complex to more elemental phenomena...). These characteristics ...contributed to a neglect of the realm of human subjective experience, which could not -- given the predelictions of science -- easily be studied "scientifically". That neglect turned out to be a very serious one, because of the relationship of these inner experiences of every society's basic patterns of values and meaning. As the power and prestige of positivistic, reductionistic science increased, there was a weakening too of the claims of religion and philosophy that there can be an important body of knowledge about wholesome human values and goals, personal growth and development, and spiritual aspirations. (p. 6)

MacIntyre's (1981) analysis of the specific consequences of this particular shift in world view for the individual, modern society, and the human sciences, will now be examined.

The Emotivist Self, Bureaucratic Rationality, and the Therapist as Bureaucrat

The emotivist self. Modernity's abandonment of morality, the author maintains, has dramatically altered our basic conceptualizations of self and human relations.

MacIntyre (1981) argues that within our highly consumeristic, technological, and bureaucratic culture, human relations can be best described by the "metaphor of consumption" (p. 23) and the individual as a "consumer of persons...and a person consumed" (p. 23). The emergence of emotivism, as a dominant philosophical and socio-cultural force, has engendered new and peculiar conceptions of self which MacIntyre (1981) designates as the "emotivist" (p. 30) or "democratised self" (p. 30). These distinctly modern conceptualizations of self are characterized by their unconditional ability to identify "with any particular moral attitude or point of view" (p. 30). Specifically, the author identifies the modern or emotivist self as follows:

This democratised self which has no social content and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself nothing. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 30)

The insubstantial and illusive nature of emotivist conceptualizations of self, prototypical of what Fowler (1981) and Lasch (1984) have previously identified as protean selfhood, are characterized by two distinct social forms. The first is represented within the interactionalist sociology of Irving Goffman where the self is seen as comprised entirely of "roles" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 30). The second form is articulated within the existential philosophy of Sartre where "the self (is seen) as entirely distinct from any particular social role it may happen to assume...(and) the self's self-discovery is characterized as the discovery that the self is 'nothing',

is not a substance but a set of perpetually open possibilities" (pp. 30, 31). In spite of these seemingly contrasting views, MacIntyre (1981) summarizes their commonality of approach as follows:

Thus at a deep level a certain agreement underlies Sartre's and Goffman's surface disagreements; and they agree on nothing more than this, that both see the self set against the social world. For Goffman, whom the social world is everything, the self therefore is nothing at all, it occupies no social space. For Sartre, whatever social space it occupies it does so accidentally, and therefore he too sees the self as in no way an actuality....It is the self with no given continuities, save those of the body which is its bearer and of the memory which to the best of its abilities gathers its past. For one way of re-envisaging the emotivist self is as having suffered deprivation, a stripping away of qualities that were once believed to belong to the self. (p. 31)

The emotivist self, as represented by Goffman and Sartre, typifies the uniquely modern approach to human identity which can best be summarized as denying any authentic sense of selfhood. In essence, emotivism not only denies any ultimate moral criteria but also dismisses any objective basis for authentic selfhood.

Modernity's diminishment of selfhood is conjoined by a parallel dehumanization of basic human relations within modernity. This radical conversion of the self has also resulted in an transformation of our social world. The dehumanizing nature of modern social relations, characteristic of our emotivist culture, MacIntyre (1981) summarizes as follows:

The unifying preoccupation of that (the emotivist) tradition is the condition of those who see in the social world nothing but a meeting place for individual wills, each with its own set of attitudes and preferences and who

understand that world solely as an arena for the achievement of their own satisfaction, who interpret reality as a series of opportunities for their enjoyment and for whom the last enemy is boredom. (p. 24)

In fact, the emotivist self can only truly be at home in the modern socio-cultural context, which the author argues, is the "distinctive type of social order, that we in the so-called advanced countries presently inhabit" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 32).

Bureaucratic rationality. This modern social order is divided into two distinct and largely incompatible social realms. The first MacIntyre (1981) describes as the "realm of the organizational" (p. 33), where ends are not viewed as being subject to scrutiny and the preponderant power of the bureaucratic organization prevails. The second sphere of modern cultural life is the "realm of the personal" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 33) in which the arbitrary choices of the individual predominate. Here, however, there exists considerable judgement and interminable debate about human values or ends, but, to which no resolution is possible due to the absence of objective moral criteria. In spite of these two disparate and frequently antagonistic realms, MacIntyre (1981) maintains there is a dominant feature which is characteristic of each. The abandonment of morality, evidenced within both societal and personal contexts, has resulted in a marked cultural tendency to obfuscate any clear distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative human relations.

Modernity's derogation of morality to the periphery of cultural life has resulted in the evolution of dehumanized perspectives towards human problems and related solutions. The author identifies this predominant and characteristically modern mode of reasoning as "bureaucratic rationality" (p. 24). Utilizing the conceptual framework of the eminent turn of the century sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920), MacIntyre (1981) defines bureaucratic rationality as "the rationality of matching means to ends economically and efficiently" (p. 24). In Weber's categorization of human actions, this represents what Cozer (1971) has identified as 'purposeful' or 'goal' oriented action. Purposeful or goal-oriented behavior is representative of what MacIntyre (1981) has termed as 'bureaucratic rationality'. For Weber, the fundamental problem confronting modernity is its propensity to utilize 'bureaucratic rationality' as a means of conceptualizing and addressing all levels of human problems.

Although agreeing that bureaucratic rationality has become the dominant form of reasoning within modernity, MacIntyre's analysis is even more penetrating in that he perceives the Weberian categorization, itself, as being basically emotivist in context. It is not just modernity's over-reliance on bureaucratic rationality which constitutes its emotivist orientation but its conceptualization of distinct and separate modes of human action which is emotivist.

Modernity's abandonment of a teleological view of man--that is its epistemological separation of 'is' and 'ought' or 'fact' and 'value'--established the metatheoretical foundation upon which a Weberian view of modes of human action becomes possible. The enlightenment philosophy of science constituted a fundamental shift in world view which provided a basis for the development of the Weberian perspective of human action and bureaucratic rationality in particular. MacIntyre (1981) argues that these important historico-philosophical developments laid the groundwork for the establishment of what he calls the "folk-concept" (p. 76) called 'fact' and the illusion that "the observer can confront a fact face to face without theoretical interpretation interposing itself" (p. 76). The author clarifies:

The notion of "fact" with respect to human beings is thus transformed from the Aristotelean view to the mechanistic view. On the former view, human action, because it is to be explained teleologically not only can, but must be, characterized with reference to a hierarchy of goods which provide the ends of human action. On the latter view human action not only can, but must be, characterized without reference to such goods. On the former view the facts about human action include facts about what is valuable to human beings...on the latter view there are no facts about what is valuable. "Fact" becomes value-free, "is" becomes a stranger to "ought" and explanation, as well as evaluation, changes its character as a result of this divorce between "is" and "ought". (MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 80-81)

MacIntyre (1981) argues that pre-enlightenment metaphysics supported the view that human actions are to be envisioned in terms of final and higher ends. Within the classical or more specifically Aristotelean tradition "the good for

man" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 139) was always an ultimate consideration in determining appropriate means as well as the ends of human action. Within enlightenment and post-enlightenment societies there arose a "deep incompatibility between any account of action which recognizes moral imperatives...and any such mechanical type of explanation" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 79). This shift in basic epistemology, from a teleological or classical view of human action to a mechanistic or positivistic framework, provided the necessary metaphysical assumptions and metatheoretical context for the development of modern bureaucratic rationality.

The therapist as bureaucrat. MacIntyre (1981) maintains that the enlightenment's abandonment of a teleological view of man necessitated morality being re-established on some new and preferably secular basis. The secular alternative to a traditional and religious basis for morality was grounded in the enlightenment view that "the only motives for human action are attraction to pleasure and the aversion to pain" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 60). This 'secularism' has since become the espoused 'moral' orthodoxy of twentieth century positivism and the so-called behavioral sciences. The enlightenment eventually endorsed a utilitarian perspective of morality founded on the belief that the pursuit of happiness as dictated by "pleasure-seeking" would provide the "principles for an enlightened morality" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 60). These metaphysical assumptions provide an epistemological foundation for bureaucratic rationality

and the managerial authority of the ~~therapist~~ manager.

MacIntyre (1981) summarizes the profound impact of these metatheoretical developments stating "truth has been displaced as a value and replaced by by psychological effectiveness" (p. 29) within the human sciences.

MacIntyre (1981) contends, "the social uses of managerial effectiveness" (p. 73) are not what they purport to be and function primarily as a "masquerade for bureaucratic social control" (p. 72). Furthermore, MacIntyre (1981) maintains such managerial expertise, as purported within the bureaucratic and therapeutic milieu, is a type of modern "moral fiction" where "fundamentally people are oppressed not by power but by impotence" (p. 72). MacIntyre (1981) endorses the concept of expertise as applied to other fields, such as biochemistry or history, but questions it as it pertains to the human or behavioral sciences. Managerial and therapeutic claims to effectiveness are founded on the belief that such supposed 'experts' possess "a stock of knowledge" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 74) whereby controlled, systematic, and predictable change is possible. The essential nature of this knowledge is depicted as follows:

Such knowledge would have to include a set of factual law-like generalizations which would enable the manager (or therapist) to predict that, an event or state of affairs of some specific kind would result. For only such law-like generalizations could yield those particular causal explanations and predictions by means of which the manager (as well as the therapist) could mould, influence and control the environment. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 74)

Paradoxically, the Manager's and Therapist's claims to moral authority lay in their belief in "the existence of a domain of morally neutral fact about which the manager (and therapist) is expert" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 74) and from which "law-like generalizations" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 72) supposedly are developed.

The enlightenment must be recognized as a shift from one theoretical stance to another where "the explanation of action is increasingly held to be a matter of laying bare the physiological and physical mechanisms which underlie action" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 79). Within enlightenment and post-enlightenment paradigms of the human sciences, "the ideal of mechanical explanation was transferred from physics to the understanding of human behavior" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 80). More precisely, the emerging behavioral sciences encouraged the development "of a vocabulary which omits all reference to intentions, purposes, and reasons for action" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 80). Influenced by these particular philosophical and epistemological influences, MacIntyre (1981) maintains, the notion of human action entailing purpose becomes "detached from good or virtue" (p. 79), such that "the realm of fact" and therefore the realm of efficient means becomes divorced from "the realm of values" (p. 83). Behavioral or positivistic psychology, in order to gain respectability as a genuine science, had to rid itself of uniquely human attributes--such as intentionality, purposes, ideals, morals and values.

This mechanistic account of human action is predicated on the assumption that human behavior can be both scientifically predicted and manipulated. However, MacIntyre (1981) argues, the record of the social scientist as predictor is extremely poor, thus undermining the legitimacy of such avowed "bureaucratic managerial expertise" (p. 101). Anderson (1981) similarly is contemptuous of the way in which fundamentally erroneous and simplistic notions of human existence have received such unquestioned and simple-minded endorsement. Anderson (1981) states:

This creation of psychology as a science-labelled Science₁ here--entailed risks because there was no reason to believe that human behavior could be predicted and controlled in the same way as inanimate objects. The conventional method of arriving at the laws at the basis of prediction and control was not necessarily suitable when applied to the study of human behavior, nor were the laws themselves...only hardy materialists could have assumed the human behavior was predictable and explainable in terms of Science₁. (p. 9)

MacIntyre (1981), extending Anderson's basic contentions, argues that not only are the social or human sciences predictably weak, but, "the true achievements of the social scientists are concealed from us and from many social scientists themselves by such systematic misrepresentations" (p. 85). Because there are various "sources of systematic unpredictability in human affairs" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 89), the unique nature of human life is that it necessitates both "unpredictability" and "long term" plans (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 99). Therefore, within a teleological or purposive view of human affairs, the

bureaucratic-managerial or enlightenment paradigm of the human sciences becomes highly suspect if not considerably inappropriate and dysfunctional.

MacIntyre concludes, as a result of the human sciences having evolved from an enlightenment world view, modern psychology has generated dehumanizing conceptualizations of its theoretical foundations, applications, and ultimate goals. In order to appropriately address these particular concerns and needs, MacIntyre (1981) endorses the following:

We therefore have to start out afresh and so doing discover whether the social sciences may not have looked in the wrong place for their philosophical ancestry as well as their logical structure....But let us suppose once again that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, brilliant and creative as they were, were in fact centuries not as we and they take them to be of Enlightenment, but of a peculiar kind of darkness in which men so dazzled themselves that they could no longer see and ask whether the social sciences might not have an alternative ancestry. (pp. 87-88)

This alternative philosophical or metatheoretical foundation for the human sciences is an important aspect of MacIntyre's writings, to which we now turn.

A Teleological View of Man, the Role of Phronesis, and the Development of Moral Character

The classical view of man. MacIntyre (1981) maintains that modernity's view of the human sciences, identified by its overt physicalism and reductionistic positivism, has evolved as a result of the enlightenment's rejection of the classical, and more specifically, Aristotelean view of man. Similarly, the distinct problems of modernity, previously characterized as the

diminishment of morality and the emergence of bureaucratic rationality, are outcomes of these particular metatheoretical developments. For these reasons, MacIntyre (1981) argues, it has been a profound historical and philosophical mistake to reject the classical view of man. By the terms "classical tradition" (p. 113) and "classical view of man" (p. 113) MacIntyre (1981) is specifically referring to "the resources of a whole tradition of acting, thinking, and discourse...(to) which Aristotle provides a central point of focus" (p. 113).

Historically, both classical and Christian societies evolved from similar cultural elements which emphasized "human life as it ought to be" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 125). However, within the modern moral ethos, the distinct separation of technical knowledge and moral agency (MacIntyre, 1981) has become a general cultural dictum forming the metatheoretical foundations for the human sciences. MacIntyre (1981), summarizing the dehumanizing context of this modern and often unrecognized 'secular orthodoxy', concludes:

...the central doctrine of liberalism is the thesis that questions about the "good life for man" or the ends of human life are to be regarded from the public standpoint as systematically unsettlable. On these individuals are free to disagree. The rules of morality and law are not hence justified in terms of some fundamental conception of the good for man. In arguing thus...I believe (there is) identified a characteristic not just of liberalism, but of modernity. (p. 112)

The author cautions that bureaucratic rationality and liberal or acquisitive individualism are not to be viewed as mere outcomes of modern political ideologies. What we

presently contrast as Conservative and Liberal political factions are merely "older rather than later versions" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 207) of the same ideology. Liberal individualism, whether specifically envisioned within its newer (liberal) or older (conservative) forms, essentially constitutes the elevation of acquisitiveness and related values of the market place to a position of central importance in modern life--what Fromm (1947) has previously characterized as the "marketing orientation" (p. 75).

In contrast to the acquisitiveness and utilitarianism of modernity, is the moral perspective offered within the Aristotelean or classical view of man. Within what MacIntyre (1981) collectively identifies as "the classical tradition" (p. 113), there is an inherent emphasis on the moral education or development of the individual, where "excellence of character and intelligence cannot be separated" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 145). Aristoteleanism constitutes an antithesis to the moral ethos espoused within modernity and therefore "the classical view of man" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 113) is to be considered a more appropriate and humanizing metatheoretical foundation for the human sciences. To fully comprehend what is meant by the 'classical view' MacIntyre's (1981) interpretation of the Aristotelean perspective will now be reviewed.

Teleology. Central to understanding the classical view, particularly as an alternative foundation for the human sciences, is the importance this perspective places on human teleology (MacIntyre, 1981). Within the

classical world view, human behavior is ultimately intentional in nature and therefore guided by ultimate ends, goals, aims, and purposes--characterized as "telos" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 139). This classical account of human action is to be contrasted with enlightenment and modern perspectives, where human nature and behavior are fundamentally understood in terms of physical and mechanistic processes. The specific aim or goal (telos) to which human action is directed Aristotle calls the "eudaimonic" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 139) or "the good to which man aims" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 139). The author elaborates:

Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good; for by "the good" or "a good" we mean that at which human beings characteristically aim....For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best....It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man being well-favored himself and in relation to the divine. (MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 139, 140)

The author concedes that Aristotle is somewhat vague about what constitutes 'the good for man' as its exact nature is largely left open. However, MacIntyre (1981) maintains, Aristotle gives us some sense of the eudaimonic' in stating that the individual good and the good for mankind are inseparable, and that it ultimately involves the "metaphysical contemplation of the impersonal unchanging divinity...which furnishes man with his specific and ultimate telos" (p. 148). According to MacIntyre (1981), the Aristotelean view of the good which is sought by man is to be found both within the

political/communitarian (polis) and the cosmic/universal (religious and spiritual) dimensions of human existence.

Summarizing, MacIntyre (1981) describes telos as essentially constituting not only an epistemological but an ontological foundation for the human sciences. The teleological perspective of man, human problems, and related solutions, necessitates regarding the individual as being fundamentally a moral being whose actions and choices ultimately entail moral considerations and concerns, and therefore eudaimonia is conducive to the moral development of both the individual and society. Human beings are truly human when they are guided by an overt consideration of the 'oughts' or 'ultimate ends' of human endeavors. This particular view of man necessitates the consideration of what are to be regarded as truly worthy ends or goals of human undertakings, and, as importantly, a thorough consideration of the appropriate means to achieve such ends. A teleological view of human nature is fundamentally concerned with the development of appropriate ways of living one's existence. Human telos ultimately involves those 'virtues' or 'dispositions of character' which are necessary in order to achieve such ends. It is these dimensions of Aristoteleanism and the teleological view of human action which have far-reaching implications for both modern psychology and psychotherapy.

The role of phronesis. An integral constituent of the classical view of man is the role "the virtues" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 140) play in the individual's realization of telos. MacIntyre (1981) depicts the

virtues as "those dispositions which enable the attainment of "'eudaimonia' or 'the good'" (p. 140) and the exercise of which "allows for the choice which issues in the right action" (p. 140). The central Aristotelean virtue is "phronesis" or "practical intelligence" which MacIntyre (1981) identifies as the human disposition which allows for the integration of the sentiments and the rational capacity of man. It is through this particular virtue, involving both rational and emotional capacities, where technical knowledge and moral agency (MacIntyre, 1981) are integrated. Practical intelligence is not intellectualizing or the application of pure technical/means-end know-how. MacIntyre (1981) distinguishes 'phronesis' from both so-called 'managerial expertise' and 'technical know-how' as follows:

...the exercise of practical intelligence requires the presence of virtues of character; otherwise it degenerates into or remains from the outset merely a certain cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for man. (p. 145)

Copleston (1946) suggests that if one is to truly understand the Aristotelean notion of phronesis, one has to comprehend its conceptual predecessor, the Platonic virtue of "prudence" (p. 219). For Plato the virtue of prudence is the 'knowledge of what is truly good for man' in the sense that "goodness is not merely a relative term, but refers to something that is absolute and unchanging" (Copleston, 1946, p. 219). Thus, the Aristotelean virtue of phronesis, being founded upon the Platonic concept of prudence, entails a knowledge of the good. This knowledge

is developed in order to direct the appropriate selection of human ends or goals, as well as, the right means of achieving these endeavors. Both MacIntyre (1981) and Lasch (1984) advocate the utilization of phronesis as a more appropriate and humanizing means of conceptualizing and addressing human problems, certainly, when contrasted with bureaucratic rationality.

Furthermore, the utilization of phronesis rather than bureaucratic rationality, as a pivotal construct within the human sciences, is based on the important distinction MacIntyre (1981) makes between "internal goods" and "external goods" (p. 178). MacIntyre (1981) defines external goods as material goods or commodities, which are often the object of extreme competition and whose acquisition is important because they denote status and prestige. In contrast, MacIntyre (1981) describes internal goods as "particular dispositions of character" which develop as a result of the desire to enoble life and contribute to "a good for the whole community" (p. 178). The acquisition of particular 'technical' skills, therefore, must be conjoined by a developed desire to live an exemplary life in order to contribute to a greater good which transcends the needs of the particular individual.

The development and utilization of one's skills for the purpose of acquiring external goods is of secondary importance compared to the development of internal goods. The concerted use of skills or abilities, primarily for the purposes of acquiring external goods or commodities, is regarded within the classical tradition as "pleonexia"

(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 129) or the vice of acquisitiveness. Pleonexia, illustrative of modernity's acquisitive individualism and pragmatic liberalism, has thoroughly impacted modern culture and the human sciences.

MacIntyre (1981) maintains that modern utilitarianism cannot accommodate any distinction between internal and external goods. Bureaucratic rationality, synonymous with a survivalistic and utilitarian approach to human affairs, must be clearly differentiated from phronesis in that the development of moral character plays a marginal role within its conceptual framework. Furthermore, MacIntyre (1981) argues, "any society that recognized only external goods" (p. 182) is innately dysfunctional in that "competitiveness" (p. 183) and not cooperation become its central feature.

The modern moral ethos of acquisitive or competitive individualism, which Authur Schafer (1987) says "places the marketplace at the centre of all social transactions" (p. 23), substantially facilitates both individual and socio-cultural disintegration. Schafer (1987), in Morals in the rat race, summarizes the essential nature of this problem:

A civilization that encourages the motive of self-interested calculation to rule every sphere of social life is on the sure path of moral bankruptcy. The ultimate freedom--from bonds of community, family friendship and neighbourliness--become the ultimate slavery. This way lies social disintegration....Perhaps the most striking paradox of our times is that liberal market society can survive only as long as most people live by the value system that pre-dated the marketplace--the prebourgeois values of public-spiritedness, civic virtue, honesty and honor, mutual co-operation, family bonds. Instead, wherever we turn--to

government, business, to work, to the family--we observe a radical loosening of social bonds. It is the rapid spread of the marketplace morality throughout society which now threatens the very existence of this society. (p. 7A)

The development of moral character. Positivistic approaches to psychology and psychotherapy, which emphasize both bureaucratic rationality and utilitarian ethics, place little emphasis on moral considerations and the ultimate ends of human endeavors. However, the classical or Aristotelean concept of phronesis necessitates a thorough consideration of internal goods and the individual's moral development. For these reasons, MacIntyre (1981) argues, the development of character must occupy a preeminent place in both psychological theory and psychotherapeutic practice.

To appreciate the critical role that the development of character has within the classical perspective, it is necessary to adopt a view of human life which is in large part alien to modernity. MacIntyre (1981) holds that modern conceptualizations of human action tend to not conceive of "life as a whole" (p. 190) but rather tend "to think atomistically" and to "analyze complex transactions in terms of simplistic components" (p. 190). This reductionistic world view, characteristic of the social sciences, has resulted in the separation of the self and human transactions from both their interactional (social) and intentional (purposive/teleological) contexts.

However, the classical tradition, which emphasizes human teleology and the development of moral character, examines human relations both within an intentional and

moral context. Therefore, both human action and identity become intelligible only in context to the individual's short and long-term development--that is in relation to specific goals, values, beliefs and purposes. MacIntyre (1981) argues "there is no such thing as 'behavior', to be identified prior to and independently of intentions, beliefs and settings" (p. 194). The author explains:

...the concept of 'intelligible action' is a more fundamental concept than that of 'an action' as such....The importance of the concept of intelligibility is closely related to the fact that the most basic distinction in our discourse and our practice in this area is that between human beings and other beings. Human beings can be held to account for that which they are authors; other beings cannot. To identify an occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic instance to identify it under a type of description which enables us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions, and purposes. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 195)

The teleological view of human actions and the development of character, necessitates the recognition that, for humans, "there is no present which is not informed by some image of some future" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 200)--that is by some important ideal to which we strive.

Conclusions

The need to thoroughly understand and evaluate emerging metatheoretical assumptions within the human sciences cannot be overemphasized. A concerted recognition of the far-reaching implications of modern culture must be acknowledged before assessing, correcting, and endorsing further developments in psychology. MacIntyre (1985) argues that psychology is fundamentally not only descriptive of human existence but, as

importantly, prescriptive in its orientation. The author argues that psychology inevitably invents and introduces new modes of thought about how to think about human nature. MacIntyre (1985) summarizes:

Psychology is not only the study of human thinking, acting, and interacting: it has itself--like other human sciences--brought into being new ways of feeling, acting and interacting...Psychologists have had varying success in interpreting the human world; but they have been systematically successful in changing it...Psychology is inevitably a new mode--or rather a set of assorted, even rival modes--of human self-knowledge....The result is that psychology provides a series of new prescriptive models for those whom it is engaged in studying, a set of new dramatic texts embodying new histrionic possibilities...So the cultural impact is two-fold: it provides new models for self knowledge and a partially new self for us to have knowledge of. (pp. 897, 898)

A direct implication of MacIntyre's (1981, 1985) assessment of psychology and psychotherapy is that such endeavors have a very real potential to exacerbate human problems as well as to solve them. It is specifically within this context that the development of an appropriate metaphysics has profound implications for psychology's and psychotherapy's impact on both the individual and modern culture. All of the authors mentioned in this chapter have described the profound impact that cultural values have had on modern psychology and, in turn, how psychology--seen as a collection of modes of examining human nature and problems--has similarly impacted modern culture. Both MacIntyre's (1981, 1985) and Lasch's (1979, 1984) attention has been principally directed towards

examining these dehumanizing developments associated with enlightenment metaphysics.

Schumacher (1973) states the enlightenment's advocacy of both positivism and value relativism furthered the cultural endorsement of what he calls a peculiar metaphysical doctrine which tends to "deny the validity of all metaphysics" (p. 90). However what has been abolished, he argues, is essentially a hierarchical view of life which makes some sort of important distinction between the base and the sublime. Modernity's ahierarchical view of life and the human sciences has resulted in "the loss of all higher forces which enoble life and the degradation of the emotional part of our nature...our intellect and moral character" (Schumacher, 1973, p. 98). Schumacher (1973) argues that "the leading ideas of the nineteenth century" (p. 91), what MacIntyre (1981) considers the essence of the enlightenment world view, have produced a "bad vicious, life-destroying metaphysics" (p. 92). What has been clearly delineated, by the various authors mentioned within this chapter, is the devastating impact that the enlightenment has had on the development of metaphysics, as well as modern psychology and psychotherapy.

The acknowledgement of the importance of metaphysics, as it profoundly impacts all human affairs, cannot be ignored any longer without further negative consequences. The education of the psychologist and psychotherapist must once again include an education towards fully appreciating

the importance of metaphysics for understanding and addressing human problems. Shumacher (1973) states:

Education cannot help us as long as it accords no place to metaphysics. Whether the subjects taught are subjects of science or the humanities, if the teaching does not lead to a clarification of metaphysics, that is to say, of our fundamental convictions, it cannot educate a man and, consequently, cannot be of real value to society. (p. 93)

What is needed to address the fundamental problems of modernity, what Schumacher (1973) aptly describes as a "metaphysical disease" (p. 101), is to concertedly attack the "anti-metaphysical temper" (p. 101) of our time. The critical view of man, with its emphasis on teleology, phronesis, and moral development, is an alternative foundation for the human sciences which specifically addresses these metaphysical concerns. The metaphysical or metatheoretical foundations of the human sciences must no longer be considered, by counsellor educators, researchers, and practitioners, as something strictly esoteric or peripheral to the real concerns of psychology and psychotherapy.

CHAPTER III

A Humanistic-Existential (HE) Perspective of the Problem

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that not all schools of thought within the human sciences have ignored the various problems of modern life. In particular, selected advocates of the Humanistic-Existential (HE) perspective of man and the human sciences will be studied in order to resolve, unequivocally, two fundamental issues. First, recognizing the important criticisms of modern psychology as reviewed in chapter two, it will be demonstrated that not all of psychology has been remiss in both appropriately examining and addressing the aforementioned problems of modernity. Secondly, a review of these selected writers is intended to establish a conceptual framework by which one may begin to ascertain why the HE perspective is a more appropriate metatheoretical foundation for the human sciences. The writings of William Barrett, Rollo May, and Viktor Frankl, have been selected as representative of HE perspectives which directly address the issues and concerns mentioned in the previous chapter.

William Barrett--Scientific Materialism, the Disavowal of Metaphysics, and Kierkegaardian Existentialism

Barrett (1987) has examined the problems of modernity similar to Lasch (1979, 1984) and MacIntyre (1981). However, what distinguishes Barrett (1987) from Lasch and MacIntyre is that he has surveyed these issues from a HE perspective. The author also directs considerably more attention than either Lasch (1979, 1984) or MacIntyre

(1981) to the secularization of modern life. In essence, the author's analysis is developed within a metatheoretical framework which examines changes in metaphysical assumptions which have taken place between the enlightenment era and modernity. The impact of these philosophical revolutions, which altered our conceptualizations of human nature and mankind's place in the order of things, has had profound theoretical and practical implications for the human sciences. It is regarding these fundamental issues that Barrett (1987) has directed his attention and concern.

Scientific Materialism, the Bifurcation of Reality, and the Problems of Human Consciousness

Scientific materialism. Barrett (1987) maintains that the evolution of science, not unlike other philosophical developments which radically influenced the modern era, had its metatheoretical beginnings in the early 17th century. When examined within this context, 'modernity' not only denotes a particular, historical period, but, a distinct way of envisioning human nature and mankind's place in the order of things. The term 'modernity' entails a particular metaphysical stance or world view and is not to be regarded as a mere adjunct of time. Modernity denotes a predominant way of characterizing our experience of reality--what Barrett (1987) describes as a "way to organize our experience of nature" (Barrett, (1987, p. xv).

Utilizing Barrett's (1987) historico-philosophical analysis, modernity is viewed as the characterization of

reality and human nature within a particular philosophical framework called "scientific materialism" (p. 7). Barrett (1987) maintains the materialist view of reality eventually became the orthodoxy of modernity, which he describes as "defacto, the dominant mentality of the West" (p. 7). Scientific materialism or scientism, Barrett (1987) argues, is "neither science or philosophy but ideology" (p. xv) which has extensively replaced the theological orthodoxy of the medieval period. In order to understand the profound implications of contextualizing modernity, itself, as essentially constituting a particular world view, one must first examine particular metaphysical assumptions which parallel the development of modern science.

Barrett (1987) argues that what we call science, is merely a particular "way of understanding physical nature" (p. xvi)--including human nature--which has evolved both philosophically and historically. The 17th century understanding of science was initially developed by minds "immersed in theology, as the age itself was saturated in theology" (Barrett, 1987, p. 4). The enlightenment view of science was conceptualized within a philosophical framework which envisioned a "Divine Mind within Nature" (Barrett, 1987, p. 3). Barrett (1987) maintains the 17th century was predominantly "theologically oriented" (p. 7) such that the emerging "New Science" (p. 4) reflected both a classical and Christian view of reality. A fundamental characteristic of both Christian and classical metaphysics is the assumption that there exists a hierarchical

ordering to reality. The early enlightenment philosophers envisioned the newly emerging sciences as revealing to mankind the basic laws of nature. These philosophers thought that the provision of such laws would ultimately provide evidence for a theological vision of reality, where the cosmos demonstrated purposive design. Thus, the early enlightenment philosophers adopted a metatheoretical framework where philosophy, science, and religion were regarded as essentially having compatible interests and concerns.

However, in contrast to European or Continental 'rationalism', there emerged in Britain the 'empiricist' philosophical school which dramatically altered the metaphysical assumptions of modern philosophy and science. Integral to empiricism is the assumption that all knowledge is essentially sense based or experiential in nature. The empiricist doctrine differed radically from both classical and later European rationalism because it refuted the existence of a priori or deductive knowledge. An eventual outcome of this particular doctrine was the conclusion that no rational nor empirical evidence could be derived which would support the notion of a purposively structured or designed cosmos. The ideological adoption of these basic tenets had a profound impact on theoretical and practical developments within the human sciences.

Influenced by these various philosophical developments and biases, in particular those metaphysical assumptions endorsed by the British empiricists, the central role of mechanics in physics was adopted as a

fundamental paradigm for the human sciences. Empiricism, with its mechanistic and positivistic world view, contextualized human nature within the basic tenets of scientific materialism and thus became the new orthodoxy of modernity. These particular metatheoretical developments have had not only a profound impact on the development of science, but also on our view of human existence itself. Barrett (1987) characterizes these philosophical developments as follows:

It (science) marks...a turn in human reason, and consequently a transformation of our human being in its deepest attitudes toward the world (where) humankind turned away from a passive, to a more active, role in the struggle with nature. (Barrett, 1987, pp.73-74)

The evolution of science, with its philosophy of scientific materialism, demarks a significant change in humanity's attitudes towards life itself. Life is now viewed as something "to be mastered" (Barrett, 1987, p. 74). Barrett (1987) metaphorically illustrates the coercive nature of scientific materialism by citing Francis Bacon's famous injunction that "knowledge is power" and therefore "we must put nature to the rack" (p. 74). This particular philosophy of life would later provide a metatheoretical foundation for the development of what MacIntyre (1981) terms bureaucratic rationality and a manipulative approach to human affairs.

Scientific materialism, Barrett (1987) suggests, denotes not only particular assumptions about what constitutes nature, but, more importantly, implies particular moral imperatives as articulated within the

philosophical doctrine of Frederick Nietzsche and his concept of mankind's "Will to Power" (Copleston, 1963, p. 408). For Nietzsche, Copleston (1963) maintains, there is only one fundamental principle by which the impetus for the behavior of all living organisms may be understood; this is called the "Will to Power" (p. 408).

Nietzsche's description of science as "the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of governing nature" (Copleston, 1974, p. 409) illustrates the coercive character of scientific materialism as a philosophy of life. This 'Will to Power' essentially constitutes a kind of unrestricted "self assertion" (p. 102) which "is one of the chief characteristics of the modern mind and indeed the modern world" (Barrett, p. 102). This dehumanizing aspect of materialism is manifested in science's predominantly technological and manipulative orientation to life.

The bifurcation of reality. To appreciate the extent to which the scientific world view constitutes a fundamental shift in mankind's perspective towards life itself, it is necessary to examine other philosophical developments associated with the enlightenment. Barrett (1981) maintains the philosophical legacy that has been bequeathed to modernity is the idea of a fundamental "rift between ourselves and the cosmos" (p. 11)--what he also identifies as a rift "between subject and object" (p. 11). Empiricism and materialism, as represented within the works of John Locke (1632-1683) and David Hume (1711-1776), epitomize these reductionistic tendencies.

The rise of British empiricism marked the reemergence and reformulation of "an ancient doctrine" (Barrett, 1987, p. 56) which became the metatheoretical foundation for modern science. Barrett (1987) argues that a common feature of both enlightenment and modern empiricist doctrines, such as those represented by John Locke, is the a priori assumption that "the world of material science, gives us the real and basic truth" (p. 36) about the nature of reality. The empiricist view of reality is a bifurcated one in that "the world of experience is arbitrarily split by a distinction between reality--what is really real--and appearance" (Barrett, 1987, p. 36). What is to be regarded as real is the 'objective' or 'empirical', whereas the 'subjective' dimensions of human experience are perceived as mere appearance. This epistemological restructuring of human experience endorsed a "division within our human nature between its scientific and religious interests" (Barrett, 1987, p. 89). Barrett (1987) argues that "the separation of the natural and the moral" (p. 91) was quite alien to the Aristotelean or classical view of reality, where to live the moral life is to fulfill human nature. Modernity's materialist influence within both the physical and human sciences resulted in the wide acceptance of a bifurcated human existence. Locke's contribution to an empiricist view of reality, with its bifurcated view of human experience, represents only half of the dehumanizing developments within modern philosophy and the human sciences.

The second dehumanizing trend of enlightenment metaphysics is manifested within the philosophical works of David Hume. Barrett (1987) holds that "the mind of the 17th century was firmly planted in God...but with Hume we enter the secular world of modernity" (p. 43). The "so-called Enlightenment" marked the passing of philosophical and scientific thought into empiricism and secularism which eventually established the metatheoretical foundation for "modern day positivism" (Barrett, 1987, p. 43). A secularized view of reality and human existence ultimately led to a materialist and positivist view of the self. This dehumanized approach to the self is articulated within the philosophical writings of David Hume. It is these metatheoretical developments, which now shall be considered.

Human consciousness. Barrett (1987) maintains one of the fundamental dilemmas confronting modern day philosophy and science is how to correctly examine and address the problematic nature of human consciousness. Twentieth century philosophy and science have either avoided this issue altogether or have reduced human consciousness to a mere psycho-physiological substrate. Barrett (1987) characterizes the central theme of his book as an examination of "the fate of the mind or consciousness within the modern epoch" (p. 107). The importance of this to the human sciences lies in the fact that "how we interpret the human mind and its powers is central to our understanding of ourselves as human beings and our place in the cosmos" (Barrett, 1987, p. 107). The degree to

which the human sciences misunderstand and distort what constitutes 'the self' or 'mind' directly influences our perspectives of human existence and humanity's place in the order of things. A consequence of the enlightenment is that "the nineteenth century is a century we are still trying to extricate ourselves from" (Barrett, 1987, p. 119). During this time, philosophical doctrines were espoused in which more holistic notions of the mind or self were largely either ignored or discounted entirely. The predominant philosophical bias of that era was "to simply move away from any concern with the human subject and subjectivity" (Barrett, 1987, p. 120). This dehumanizing approach to selfhood facilitated theories of human existence where "mind and self became pretty much disappearing items"--what Barrett (1987) has termed "the disappearing self" (p. 141).

This distorted and truncated approach to human consciousness and the self is attributable to the philosophical influences of David Hume. Hume's version of the self is essentially disembodied in that the self is separated from both bodily emotions and the mind's intuitions. For Hume "the mind sits precariously, externally to its body, from which it receives the discrete data of impressions" and thus Hume takes a "purely spectator view of the mind, forgetting that he himself is a participant" (Barrett, 1987, p. 46). Within this Humean model of the mind, Barrett (1987) argues, "the self thus becomes only a heap of sense data" (p. 46) and the existence of consciousness, as a distinctively human

attribute, becomes reduced to a mere sensory substratum. Barrett (1987) maintains that with "Hume we take a giant step in the progress of the modern mind...which typifies the reductionistic tendencies of the Enlightenment or Age of Reason" (p. 43). This Humean perspective of human consciousness continues to be espoused by "our present-day behaviorists who seek to treat the self as nothing but a bundle of behavior patterns" (Barrett, 1987, p. 126). These reductionistic and dehumanizing tendencies of Humean metaphysics is still endorsed within the human sciences today.

The problem for the human sciences, resides in how they define what exactly constitutes human consciousness and the self. Howard Morowitz (1987) suggests a more constructive, holistic, and integrative approach to this problem. Morowitz (1987), critiquing modern philosophical and scientific theories of the self, endorses the development of a distinctly humanistic approach to human consciousness. Morowitz (1987) maintains that if we define consciousness solely "in terms of sensing the environment and responding to those sensations, then the concept can be removed from the philosophical arena" (p. 267) because "consciousness in this sense seems almost coexistent with life" (p. 267). Consciousness in this limited sense cannot be distinguished from the consciousness of other living organisms. However, if by the term 'consciousness' we mean "reflective thought" (Morowitz, 1987, p. 268) then the nature of human consciousness radically changes. The author suggests:

Reflective thought is a different matter, it involves consciousness of being conscious, knowing that we know. The capacity for reflective thought is a description of mind in the philosophical sense...(Morowitz, 1987, p. 268)

The recognition of the self's 'self-reflective capacity' is necessary for the rehumanization of modern theories of human consciousness. However, this redefinition of the self must be recognized as only the first, of many further initiatives, which must be taken to rehumanize modern theories of the self.

Hume's bifurcated approach to human existence has had a dehumanizing impact on enlightenment and post-enlightenment views of the self. Barrett (1987) argues that a fundamental problem of the empiricist approach to the self stems from Hume's obfuscation of "the epistemological and the existential" (p. 115) or the "the requirements of strict knowledge, on the one hand, and urgent claims of existence on the other" (p. 115). Within Hume's 'enlightenment' epistemology, human feelings and intuitions are ideologically allocated to the 'subjective' dimension of human experience where they are discounted as being indivisible facets of human character and the self.

Opposed to this empiricist approach to the self, Barrett (1987) maintains, the 'I' of consciousness is an enduring "concrete self" (p. 13) which is inescapably moral and emotional, as well as cognitive. Barrett (1987) holds that one's affective state or emotional mood thoroughly infuses one's experience of the world, and, "it is precisely this relational and interpenetrating aspect

of experience which Hume fails to see" (p. 44). Barrett's (1987) decidedly Humanistic-Existential (HE) perspective of the self is illustrated as follows:

The "I" that cogitates here...drags a history and memories with it. It is a concrete self, dense, particular, unique--myself, in short--and I cannot escape it. I have lived within it, through it, and seemingly beyond it, but if so by means of it. My feelings and emotions go on inseparable from my thoughts, coloring them, and I am aware of my body, my body, whose presence has always been here, penetrating thought....In short, this "I" that emerges, but remains also hidden, is a concrete self, inescapably moral and emotional as well as cogitative; and not in the sense that morality and feeling are somehow pasted on or added to my thinking; they are there at the roots of the "I". (Barrett, 1987, pp. 13, 14)

These irreducible emotional and moral aspects of the self, as central rather than peripheral dimensions of human existence, constitute pivotal dimensions of human consciousness which have been fundamentally ignored or discounted within enlightenment and post-enlightenment doctrine. These truncated and dehumanizing approaches to human consciousness and the self have been unquestionably endorsed within modernity's scientific materialism.

Morowitz (1987) maintains that all reductionistic views of human consciousness and self ignore the essential "discontinuity" (Morowitz, 1987, p. 281) of development which distinguishes the various biologic organisms from each other and from humankind. The author explains:

A number of contemporary biologists and psychologists believe that the origin of reflective thought that occurred during primate evolution is a discontinuity that has changed the rules. Again, this new situation does not abrogate the underlying biological laws, but it adds a feature that necessitates novel ways of thinking about the problem....This discontinuity needs to be thoroughly studied and evaluated,

but it first needs to be recognized. Primates are different from other animals, and human beings are different from other primates. (Morowitz, 1987, p. 281)

However, rather than emphasizing the unique nature of human consciousness, positivism has directly attacked theoretical perspectives supporting the discontinuous nature of human development (ontogenetic discontinuity), as well as, the marked evolutionary discontinuity between all levels of biologic organisms (phylogenetic discontinuity). The imperative need to recognize these important distinctions is summarized by Morowitz (1987) as follows:

We now understand the troublesome features of a forceful commitment to uncritical reductionism as a solution to the problem of mind. In addition to being weak, it is dangerous, since the way we respond to our fellow humans is dependent on the way we conceptualize them in our theoretical formulations. If we envision our fellows solely as animals or machines, we drain our interactions of humanistic richness. If we seek our behavioral norms in the study of animal societies, we ignore those uniquely human features that so enrich our own lives. Radical reductionism offers very little in the area of moral imperatives. Further, it presents the wrong glossary of terms for humanistic pursuit....We should be reluctant to...lock ourselves into philosophical positions that impoverish our humanity by denying the most intriguing aspect of our species. To underrate the significance of the appearance and character of reflective thought is a high price to pay in order to honor the liberation of science from theology by our reductionistic predecessors several generations back...What emerges from all this is the return to "mind" to all areas of scientific thought. This is good news from the point of view of all varieties of natural theology. For a universe where mind is a fundamental part of reality more easily makes contact with the mind of god than does a mindless world. (Morowitz, 1987, p. 282)

The perennial problem and paradox of human consciousness, as it pertains to the development of more humanistically based conceptualizations of the self, must become a fundamental concern within the human sciences.

The Disavowal of Metaphysics, the Denigration of Faith, and the Fragmentation of the Person

The disavowal of metaphysics. The development of these particular metatheoretical biases has predominantly displaced metaphysics or cosmology as an important concern within both philosophy and the human sciences. A central feature of modern positivism, as articulated within the ideology of scientific materialism, is its insidious characterization of the "'metaphysical'" within the bad sense of this word, about which contemporary philosophers have so copiously instructed us" (Barrett, 1987, p. 59). Modernity's evident aversion to anything remotely metaphysical has its origins, once again, within enlightenment philosophical doctrines--in particular the empiricist perspective of Hume. This cynical approach to anything metaphysical is not only attributable to positivists' desire to generalize the successes of the physical sciences to other fields of endeavour, but, as importantly, to completely disassociate themselves from anything remotely theological or religious in nature. This materialist bias is a significant contributor to the growing secularism of modernity, and has profoundly impacted both theoretical and methodological developments within the human sciences.

It should be recognized that both empiricism and positivism are thoroughly entrenched within their own assorted metaphysical assumptions. Positivism constitutes a particular metaphysical stance, even though it is one which paradoxically eschews anything metaphysical.

Luijpen and Koren (1983) hold that "a rejection of metaphysics implies a metaphysics" (p. 213) in that the rejecter must also have a particular cosmology or "implicit doctrine" (p. 214) from which specific criteria for rejection are developed. It is for this reason that enlightenment empiricism and modern positivism thoroughly constitute metaphysical doctrines. The fundamental task of metaphysics is the "thematization of our most fundamental presuppositions" (Luijpen & Koren, 1983, p. 215). It is also in this sense that 'metaphysics' has been significantly displaced or discredited as an important and necessary theoretical propaedeutic within the human sciences.

Luijpen and Koren (1983) maintain 'metaphysics' is not just an invention of "metaphysics as a science" (p. 215) but also ontologically constitutes a "mode of being-man" (p. 215). Metaphysics, within an existential-phenomenological context, presupposes what is called "the metaphysical in man" (Luijpen & Koren, 1983, p. 216), explained as follows:

The knowing subject himself is "metaphysical consciousness." Metaphysical consciousness is a kind of "knowing" of what it means that everything is of which it has been, will be, or is being said that it is belongs to reality, the order of being...Metaphysics, then, is based on a dimension of the subject's immediate presence to reality, via, the dimension in which the

subject dwells in the universe, the universality of all beings as beings. (pp. 215-216)

Human beings, therefore, may be regarded as being 'most' human when they become deeply aware of their own 'existence' and contemplate what Angeles (1981) calls "being-as-such" (p. 26) or "that which is the ground for the existence and the explanation of all things" (p. 26).

This ontological sense of the 'metaphysical-in-man' is often experienced when the individual is confronted with the enduring question of one's consciousness of the cosmos and his/her place in it. Barrett (1987) elaborates:

As moral beings, we are thrown into the question, Why? Why this world? Why is there anything at all, rather than nothing? And we clamour for an answer that, alas, the poor intellect can never settle. For Heidegger, the essence of our human being is that we exist within Being. But, following Kant, we would go further: We exist within the question of God. We cannot escape it; it is always there for us, however we may seek to forget or evade it. (p. 87)

Barrett (1987) concludes "there is something humanly deeper than philosophy--and that is religion" (Barrett, 1987, p. 56). The 'metaphysical-in-man', which confronts the individual with profound metaphysical questions, essentially constitutes both authentic faith and religiousness.

William Hague (1988), developing a more holistic approach to human valuing and religious experience, describes the metaphysical function of religion as follows:

Religion, if it is playing its real role, is there as a guide to what is worthy of concern. Religion is the guide to putting things, values

included, into perspective. The individual who asks questions of ultimate meaning has recourse to religious experience and the "logic of contemplation". (p. 19)

This contemplative logic ontologically constitutes what Luijpen and Koren (1987) have identified as the 'metaphysical-in-man' (p. 216). Religion and metaphysics converge in a philosophical sense in that religion "has a more general, abstract 'philosophical' function of explaining some of the great questions of life" (Hague, 1986, p. 18). It is this perspective-taking function of religion which fundamentally constitutes its metaphysical context.

However, within the secularism of modernity, this higher dimension of human existence is often either entirely discounted or ideologically ascribed as being mere nonsense or naive spiritualism. Opposed to this type of reductionistic and dehumanizing approach to human existence, Barrett (1987) argues:

The religious question is ultimately at the center of all philosophy, even if it be way of rejection. That some contemporary philosophers have reached the point where they never enter into the question, where the philosopher never seems even to be troubled by the word "God," is itself a profound sign of the state of our culture. It took an immense amount of philosophic thinking and unthinking to prepare the human psyche for this matter-of-fact state of godlessness. (p. 56)

Modern philosophy and psychology have tended to avoid metaphysics and the question of 'Being' because it "points beyond the world of empirical facts and clear-cut concepts" (Barrett, 1987, p. 88)--the ideological foundation of both modern positivism and scientific

materialism. Therefore, because such uniquely human questions, concerns, and experiences cannot be simplistically comprehended they are not considered worthy of serious and legitimate academic study.

Denigration of faith. Modernity's secularist disavowal of metaphysics, religion, aesthetics and ethics, as legitimate areas of philosophical and scientific enquiry, has also directly resulted in the repudiation of "faith" (Barrett, 1987, p. 123) as an important and authentic aspect of human experience. In order to understand what Barrett (1987) means by faith, one has to differentiate between what is commonly regarded as 'religious orthodoxy' and what the author refers to as "the direct expression of religious feeling" (p. 18). Because "our human mind is so constituted in its way of understanding that it cannot grasp conceptually those matter which are of ultimate significance" (p. 78), Barrett (1987) maintains, "our moods are more metaphysical than we would like to think" (p. 29). When gripped by such 'matters of ultimate concern'--what Barrett (1987) describes as an initial "dull worldless feeling that can gnaw at anyone of us and which we sometimes translate into the question, What is the meaning of my life"? (p. 28)--the individual may begin to develop both genuine faith and what may be called authentic religiousness.

Hague (1988) suggests "faith...is a 'state of being ultimately concerned'" (p. 15) whereas "religion...is there as a guide to what is worthy of concern" (p. 19).

It is in this exact sense that Fowler (1981) illustrates the reciprocal nature of faith and religion:

Faith is not always religious in its content or context...It is a way of finding coherence in and giving meaning to the multiple forces and relations which make up our lives. Faith is a person's way of seeing him- or herself in relation to others against a background of shared meaning and purpose....Faith as a state of being ultimately concerned may or may not find its expression within institutional cultic religious forms. Faith so understood is a very serious business. It involves the way we invest our deepest loves and our most costly loyalties....Faith, at once deeper and more personal than religion, is the person's and the group's way of responding to transcendent value and power as perceived and grasped through forms of the cumulative tradition. Faith and religion, in this view, are reciprocal. Each is dynamic; each grows or is renewed through its interaction with the other. (pp. 4-5, 8)

Within this context, Barrett (1987) suggests, "feelings have a metaphysical depth beyond that of the rational intellect" (p. 88) which, through experiences of faith, "lay hold, however dimly, of something in the cosmos inaccessible to reason" (p. 88). These experiences constitute an intuitive grasping of what the author calls "a transcendent realm" where "other human attitudes come into play" which transcend the positivistic idioms of so-called 'fact' and "definite proof and disproof" (Barrett, 1987, p. 82). Barrett (1987) concludes "this reason of ours is not a kind to answer the question that it brings before us" (p. 84), the question of the meaning of life, and, therefore, "science can never take the place of religion" (p. 84). A human science contextualized only within the paradigmatic strictures of enlightenment empiricism and modern positivism will never be able to

appropriately address these fundamentally human issues and concerns.

Fragmentation of the person. Not surprisingly then, within the dehumanizing tendencies of scientific materialism, it is exactly these pivotal dimensions of human experience which have been consistently either ignored or entirely discounted. The human sciences, influenced by the ideological tenets of both Humean empiricism and modern positivism, have concertedly failed to distinguish between what Barrett (1987) calls "subjectivity as an existential fact...and subjectivism as a problem for the theory of knowledge" (p. 124). Human 'subjectivity', as an irreducible constituent of individual consciousness and the self, is an integral aspect of one's identity and must be clearly contrasted with the epistemological 'subjectivism' of empiricism. In fact, Barrett (1987) argues, human "consciousness and subjectivity are...coextensive" (p. 124). However, within the objectivistic and reductionistic tendencies endemic to modern positivism, there can be no qualitative distinction made between subjectivity--as a basis for authentic faith and selfhood--and mere 'subjectivism' as an epistemological problem. Because subjectivity is intricately connected to the individual's personal sense of faith and religiousness, Barrett (1987) maintains, modernity's denigration of faith paralleled the diminishment of human subjectivity as an authentic aspect of individual identity. This disavowal of authentic faith and religiousness has resulted in what Barrett (1987) has

called the "fragmentation of the human person" (p. 111). It is these metatheoretical developments which have had a devastating impact on modern conceptualizations of selfhood within the human sciences.

Kierkegaardian Existentialism, Human Subjectivity, and Levels of Development

Kierkegaardian existentialism. Alternatively, utilizing the philosophical framework of Soren Kierkegaard (1773-1855), Barrett (1987) proposes a Humanistic-Existential (HE) framework for the human sciences. A central thrust of Kierkegaard's existential philosophy, Barrett (1962) maintains, is its concerted opposition to the exaggerated rationalism and materialism which predominate Western philosophic traditions. Positivism's reductionistic impact on modern philosophy, characterized by Kierkegaard as the "imperialism of intelligence" (Barrett, 1962) and "the overinflation of reason" (Barrett, 1962, p. 159), profoundly influenced modern conceptualizations of the self within the human sciences. The epistemological bias towards so-called 'objective facts' and 'logical analysis' historically engendered what Barrett (1987) describes as positivism's "decided insensitivity to the human subject" (p. 145). It is this fundamental dimension of human experience which Kierkegaard restores to a level of philosophical importance where it is deemed worthy of genuine scientific enquiry. Furthermore, it is precisely the subjective dimension of human experience which Kierkegaard holds as

constituting an authentic ground for individual identity, faith, and truth.

However, it is not only Kierkegaard's emphasis of the subjective dimension of human experience which distinguishes his philosophical perspective, but, more profoundly, his view of human existence as being indivisibly moral and ultimately religious in nature. Kierkegaard is described as a "psychologist of religious experience" (Barrett, 1962, p. 169) and his philosophical works as "an intensely personal philosophy" (Copleston, 1974, p. 336). It is these two dimensions of the man and his work which starkly contrast with the objectivist and secularist tendencies of Humean empiricism and modern positivism.

Human subjectivity. The importance of Kierkegaard's philosophy, as it pertains to developing an awareness of and solution to the fragmenting influences of modernity, must be understood in context to his view of "truth as subjectivity" (Copleston, 1963, p. 345). However, Copleston (1963) cautions, it is vitally important to be cognizant of the fact that Kierkegaard's existential philosophy does not negate the existence of 'objective' or 'impersonal truths', as unfortunately posited by many present day existentialists and phenomenologists. This critical philosophical distinction becomes increasingly important particularly when viewed in light of certain radically subjectivist or contextualist, 'phenomenological-existential' and 'constructivist-

constructionist' schools of thought, as outlined by Osborne and Angus (1989).

First, Kierkegaard's philosophical perspective is subjective in that it focuses on the uniquely personal or lived experience of the individual rather than abstract conceptualizations or universal essences. Kierkegaard emphasizes both "individual choice" (Copleston, 1963, p. 336) and "self-commitment" (Copleston, 1963, p. 336) as being fundamental constituents of human existence. The individual's profound responsibility for freely choosing the type of life that shall constitute one's existence and the type of person they will become thoroughly distinguishes human life from the existence of all other organisms. It is in this unique aspect of human existence which represents the focus of Kierkegaard's philosophy.

Secondly, Kierkegaard's philosophy is subjective in that it is concertedly 'individualistic' in its orientation. Here, authentic human existence is characterized by the person "becoming more and more an individual and less and less a mere member of a group" (Copleston, 1963, p. 333). In fact, what Kierkegaard refers to as the exact antithesis of 'truth' is that which is ultimately directed towards the collective and the impersonal--what he refers to as "the crowd" (Copleston, 1963, p. 340). The degree to which the 'crowd' or the 'mob' interferes with one's life task, through lessening the individual's awareness of his/her personal responsibility, constitutes for Kierkegaard "the untruth" (Copleston, 1963, p. 340).

Within the Kierkegaardian framework, authentic existence is constituted by choice, "whereby the individual resolutely chooses one alternative and rejects another" (Copleston, 1963, p. 336). In this immediate sense human existence must be regarded as a continual process of deciding--that is one's existence is constituted by moral decisions, responsibility, and action. Copleston (1963) summarizes:

With the emphasis on the individual, on choice, on self-commitment, Kierkegaard's philosophical thought tends to become a clarification of issues and an appeal to choose, an attempt to get men to see their existential situation and the great alternatives with which they are faced....The really important problems, that is the problems which are of real importance for man as the existing individual, are not solved by thought...but by the act of choice on the level of existence rather than on that of detached, objective reflection. (p. 336)

Thus, authentic existence is irrefutably subjective in that it fundamentally entails uniquely human moral choices and responsibilities rather than being comprised of only objective facts and essences. Because truth is seen as 'commitment' or 'faith', Kierkegaard's philosophical perspective of both human existence and the self has strong religious and moral connotations. Correspondingly, authentic existence for the individual is not just a choice of choosing any type of existence, but, a choice to freely choose a certain type of existence. It is these pivotal dimensions of Kierkegaard's philosophical perspective which have profound moral and spiritual implications for the human sciences.

Levels of development. Kierkegaard's view of human development emphasizes a willed self-commitment to choose "the higher alternative" (Copleston, 1966, p. 341). Thus authentic human existence necessitates choosing between what Kierkegaard contrasts as a "life of unbridled sensuality or an absolutely religious one" (Barrett, 1987, p. 154)--that is between 'lower' and 'higher' levels of existence. For Kierkegaard, Copleston (1966) maintains, "the highest level of actualization of the individual is relating oneself to God" (p. 341). Hence becoming an individual necessitates one passing through what Kierkegaard refers to as "the three stages on life's way" (Barrett, 1962, p. 164), whereby one eventually comes to realize the uniquely religious dimension(s) of life. These three levels of human existence are depicted by Kierkegaard as 'the aesthetic', 'the ethical', and 'the religious'. Barrett (1962) regards Kierkegaard's conceptualization of the levels or stages of life as constituting one of his most significant contributions to philosophy and to our basic understanding of human existence.

The third or religious level of human development is the level of existence at which the individual is confronted with the difficult task of either affirming or rejecting one's faith. The development of faith, within the Kierkegardean perspective, involves the affirming of one's relationship to God--"the personal and transcendent absolute" (Copleston, 1966, p. 343)--through a leap of faith. Because God is not an object the existence of

which can be proved, Kierkegaard regards 'faith' as a leap or risk in that it constitutes "a self-commitment to an objective uncertainty" (Copleson, 1966, p. 344). This religious or spiritual stage of life is the highest level of human development, but, more importantly, it constitutes the core of the self--what Barrett (1987) calls Kierkegaard's view of the "concrete and humble self" (p. 125), depicted as follows:

At the center of the self, then, lies a passionate self-concern. This has nothing to do with egotism, for the self-concern could be that of the saint struggling to sink his own private will in God's. The point is that at the center of the self lies a vital passion, not some inert mental stuff or amalgam of perceptions...Wherever there is consciousness, there is a point of view from which things are seen, and hence subjectivity of one kind or another....(However) we have passed to a greater degree of subjectivity when we deal with a self that makes decisions about itself and seeks to change itself or its way of life. At its most elementary stage, subjectivity is merely the essential accompaniment of consciousness as such, any consciousness: to be aware is to be conscious from some point of view or other. But we pass to a more concrete level of subjectivity when we deal with an actual subject who is possessed by self-concern and who makes decisions about himself and his life. Nor are these decisions merely peripheral; on the contrary, they can enter into the very substance of that person's life and make it what it is. (Barrett, 1987, pp. 123, 123, 125-126)

The extent to which modern psychological and psychotherapeutic perspectives exclude these core dimensions of the self and human existence is a direct measure of their reductionistic and dehumanizing influence.

Rollo May--The Human Dilemma, Man's Loss of
Significance, and Human Values

Paralleling many of the views of the previously mentioned writers (Barrett, 1987; Fromm, 1947, 1955, 1955; Lasch, 1979, 1984; MacIntyre, 1981; Montagu & Matson, 1983), Rollo May also acknowledges the negative impact that socio-cultural and historico-philosophical influences have had on theoretical and practical developments within the human sciences. Utilizing a Humanistic-Existential (HE) philosophy and metaclinical orientation, May attributes many of the problems of modernity to our profound misunderstanding of the unique nature of human existence itself. The persistence of these particular problems is facilitated by the human science's inability or reluctance to fully acknowledge the paradoxical nature of human existence. This interrelationship between our misunderstanding of human existence and the diverse problems of modernity has been a consistent concern of May's (1953, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1983). A brief examination of his particular HE perspective will now be provided.

The Human Dilemma, Human Consciousness, and Metatheoretical Simplification

The human dilemma. Rollo May asserts that psychology is ultimately confronted with the paradox of what he calls the "human dilemma" (May, 1979, p. ix). May (1979) describes this unique and often perplexing aspect of human existence as follows:

The human dilemma is that which arises out of a man's capacity to experience himself as both subject and object at the same time. Both are necessary--for the science of psychology, for therapy, and for gratifying living. (p. 8)

The author suggests that if we are truly to develop a "science of human beings" (May, 1979, p. ix) then the subject matter of psychology will inevitably have to acknowledge and integrate this dilemma into both its theory and praxis. May (1979) cautions that by the term dilemma he does not mean in a technical sense an "insolvable problem" (p. ix), but refers to the inescapable "polarities and paradoxes" (p. ix) of human existence. The individual's ability to experience self and others as both subject and object is the essence of the human dilemma. The author argues that the subject-object dichotomy of human existence is not just a description of two alternative ways of behaving, nor, that we experience both simultaneously. The essence of the human dilemma necessitates the framing of human existence as a "dialectical relationship" (p. 9) between these two existing polarities. The recognition and integration of the dialectical nature of human existence into psychological theory has important implications for the human sciences.

Human consciousness. The recognition of the paradoxical or dialectical nature of human existence necessitates a thorough re-examination of our basic perspectives concerning the nature of human consciousness. May (1979) holds that a comprehensive understanding of the complexities and intricacies of human existence must entail a greater cognizance of the unique nature of human consciousness itself. Contrary to the reductionistic epistemologies espoused within the positivism, May (1979)

argues, human consciousness is the most fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of human existence. Human consciousness neither consists only of objectivity nor subjectivity but the dialectical choosing of both modes of experience. The author clarifies:

The important point is that our consciousness is a process of oscillation between the two (poles of experience). Indeed, is not this dialectical relationship between experiencing myself as subject and as object just what consciousness consists of? The process of oscillation gives me potentiality--I can choose between them, can throw my weight to one side or the other...it is the gap between two ways of responding that is important. My freedom, in any genuine sense, lies not in my capacity to live as "pure subject" (or object), but rather my capacity to experience both modes, to live in a dialectical relationship. (p. 9)

The unique nature of human consciousness also includes "man's capacity to transcend the immediate situation of which he is inescapably a part and to think in abstract terms--i.e., to think in terms of the 'possible'" (May, 1979, p. 11). The author cites Neibhur as stating that "human experience combines both 'nature' and 'spirit' and man functions in both dimensions simultaneously" (May, 1979, p. 11). However, the unique and self-transcending nature of human consciousness has yielded particular and lasting problems for the developing human sciences.

Metatheoretical simplification. Psychology, in particular, has been remiss in appropriately addressing the dialectical nature of human consciousness which has resulted in dehumanizing developments in both psychological theory and praxis. May (1979) argues that the appropriate consideration of the dialectical nature of

human consciousness is exactly what contemporary psychology has tried to avoid. For example, Skinner (1954) ideologically describes the dialectical nature of human existence as simple "bifurcation" (p. 15). It is exactly the bifurcated nature of human consciousness which has posed difficult and lasting problems for a behavioral approach to human affairs. May (1979) argues that behavioral or positivistic psychology has tried to reductionistically resolve the bifurcated nature of human consciousness by largely addressing only one of its polarities--the objective aspect or dimension. The author explains:

Out of his work in operant conditioning, Professor Skinner proposes that the dilemma--or "bifurcation," as he calls it--can be avoided by the universal application of his behavioristic assumptions and methods. "By arguing that the individual organism simply reacts to its environment, rather than some inner experience of that environment, the bifurcation of nature into physical and psychic properties can be avoided." (May, 1979, p. 15)

Behaviorism's simplistic attempt to resolve the bifurcated nature of human existence, by entirely omitting or subsuming the subjective side of human consciousness under factors of environmental control, has resulted in truncated approaches to human existence. Although such procedures have seemingly yielded an objective and unitary science of human behavior, it has not been accomplished without distorting our basic conceptualizations of human existence itself.

Behaviorism has not been the only school of thought within the human sciences to commit such 'categorical'

error or 'metaphysical' distortion. Humanistic psychology has been equally guilty of oversimplifying or polarizing their own perspectives on the nature of human consciousness. May (1979) cites Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy as being another example of 'metatheoretical simplication' or the 'nothing but' approach to man. May (1979) elaborates:

Carl Rogers...has consistently and firmly argued that it is inner control which is significant, "client-centered" as he is rather than environment centered....Our point is that the overemphasis upon the subjective, freedom pole of the human dilemma is also an error....The error on both sides--for which I have Skinner and the preparadox Rogers as examples--is the assumption that one can avoid the dilemma by taking one side of its poles. (pp. 17, 18, 19).

The human sciences have tended, from within various and often opposing metatheoretical perspectives, to oversimplify the paradoxical and dialectical nature of human existence--what May (1979) calls "nimis simplicandum" or "excessive simplifying" (p. 6). Endeavoring to construct unidimensional and monistic metatheoretical systems, whether behaviorally or humanistically oriented, the human sciences have basically misunderstood and distorted our basic conceptualizations of human existence.

May's proposed metatheoretical resolution to the 'problem' of bifurcation is diametrically opposed to the solutions previously discussed. Instead of assuming that one can avoid the human dilemma, by developing an overly simplistic human science based on one of the two

'subjective-objective' polarities, May (1979) suggests the following alternative:

It is not simply that man must learn to live with paradox--the human being has always lived in this paradox or dilemma, from the time that he first became aware of the fact that he was the one who would die and coined a word for his own death. Illness, limitations of all sorts, and every aspect of our biological state we have indicated are aspects of the deterministic side of the dilemma--man is like the grass in the field, it withereth. The awareness of this, and the acting on this awareness is the genius of the man the subject. But we must also take the implications of this dilemma into our psychological theory. Between the two horns of the dilemma man has developed symbols, art, language, and the kind of science which is always expanding its presuppositions. The courageous living within this dilemma, I believe, is the source of human creativity. (p. 20)

The human sciences' reductionistic orientation to human existence itself has resulted in simplistic approaches to the complex nature of human problems. Viewed within this context, May (1979) argues, both individual and cultural problems are often a direct result of these distorted metatheoretical presuppositions.

The Individual's Loss of Significance, Organizational Man, and Technological Dependency

Loss of significance. May (1979) characterizes the central problem of modern man as being that "he experiences himself without significance as an individual" (p. 25). Collectivism, mass education, mass communication, mass technology, and other conditions of our mass oriented society have profoundly diminished the individual's sense of identity. Lacking the positive traditions, myths, and values of the past, the individual

now "finds only the model of the machine beckoning him from every side to make himself over into its image" (May, 1979, p. 30). As people's sense of significance is diminished May (1979) argues "there is a parallel undermining of their sense of human responsibility" (p. 31). May (1979) describes the destructive consequences of such socio-cultural dehumanization and individual designification as follows:

...the real danger was that we would retreat to the only answer available, namely the pragmatic answer, the answer given by logistics, the answer that can be arrived at by our computers, the impersonal answer, the answer furnished by the very technology whose magnificent spawning has been central in bringing us into the situation in which our force for destruction so vastly exceeds our capacity for significant decision. (p. 35)

This diminishment of personal significance May (1979) associates with a related diminution of our sense of historical consciousness. May (1979) contends that this may be the last age of what he calls "historical man" (p. 36), where the individual and culture as a whole experiences a sense of connectedness with both its past and future. This diminished capacity for historical consciousness prevents the development of a committed sense of personal responsibility and has far reaching consequences regarding our basic approach to both human problems and solutions. May (1979) elaborates:

(It is) not the last age in which there is factual history--that is not the point--but the last age in which I can self-consciously stand as a human being who knows that he stands at this point in history, and taking responsibility for this fact, can use the wisdom of the past to illuminate the life and world around me. Such actions requires a self-consciousness that can affirm and assert itself, and that in turn

requires that I believe in my own significance. It does matter then whether I act, and act in faith that my actions can have some significance. (p. 36)

This diminished sense of personal significance and responsibility, May (1972, 1979) maintains, inevitably results in exaggerated feelings of impotency and helplessness, both within an individual and societal context.

Organizational man. The diminishment of the individual's sense of personal identity and responsibility has resulted in the pathological emergence of what the author terms "organizational man" (May, 1979, p. 37). May (1979) attributes the development of the organizational man to the extensive "collectivization" (p. 37) of both the individual's private and public life. A preoccupation with basic survival, rather than uniquely human values and ideals, is an ideological position which has been substantially adopted within the human sciences. The emergence of the organizational individual and survivalism has resulted in a transformation of both human identity and ideals. May (1979) argues that the competitive goal of success in the past two decades has been slowly transformed so that "the dominant value then becomes not getting ahead of the next man but being like everyone else--that is conformity...one validates oneself by fitting into the herd" (May 1979, p. 77). The author characterizes the organizational individual and his/her survivalistic orientation as follows:

Increasingly in our time--this is an inevitable result of collectivization--it is the organizational man who succeeds. And he is

characterized by the fact that he has significance only if he gives up his significance....One becomes the man who works well in an organization, the harmonistic "team man," the worker who maintains a protective coloring so that he won't be singled out...To this extent you are said to be significant, but it is a significance bought precisely at the price of giving up your significance.
(p. 37)

In examining the interrelationship between ideological trends and theoretical developments, the dehumanizing impact of this 'organizational' orientation has received increasing attention within recent writings examining the interrelationships between socio-cultural trends and developments in psychology. For example, Lasch's (1984) conceptualizations of the "ethos of survivalism" (p. 58) and "protean selfhood" (p. 98) exemplify both cultural and individual aspects of such modern dehumanization to which May is referring. The individual's tendency to escape from personal freedom and responsibility, within the collective security of highly bureaucratic structures, is not an entirely new or unfamiliar motif within existential thought. The plight of the organizational individual was critically examined more than four decades ago in Fromm's (1941) book Escape From Freedom.

Technological dependency. The organizational man's escape from freedom and responsibility has facilitated technological dependency, instrumental reasoning, and overdeveloped pragmatism. The overreliance on technical solutions to solve all levels of human problems is

symptomatic rather than a cause of individual and collective dehumanization. May (1979) clarifies:

...the devil of this drama is not technology, and it's absurd to think that if we could throw out technology, we could escape our human dilemmas....but the critical threat with respect to technology...is that we succumb to the temptation to use technology as a way of avoiding confronting our own alienation, and our own loneliness...The ultimately self-destructive use of technology consists of employing it to fill the vacuum of our own diminished consciousness. And conversely, the ultimate challenge facing modern man is whether he can widen and deepen his own consciousness to fill the vacuum created by the fantastic increase of his technological power. (pp. 36-37)

This technicalization of both human problems and related solutions is merely reflective of the 'metatheoretical simplification' or 'nothing but' response to human problems. These developments have radically influenced developments in psychology and psychotherapy, resulting in turn, with the technicalization and pragmatization of these 'human' services. The tendency of modern thought has been to overutilize technological approaches to both understand and address uniquely human problems. May (1983) summarizes:

...one of the chief (if not the chief) blocks to the understanding of human beings in Western culture is precisely the overemphasis that goes along with the tendency to see the human being as an object to be calculated, managed, "analyzed." Our Western tendency has been to believe that "understanding follows technique;" if we get the right technique, then we can penetrate the riddle of the patient, or, as said popularly with amazing perspicacity, we can "get the other person's number." (p. 151)

A dehumanizing impact of this overt technicalization has been a concerted neglect of the uniquely human dimensions

of our existence such as values, ethics, morality, and ideals--that is the 'oughts' of human existence.

Human Values, Self-Transcendence, and the Development of Self

Ultimate values. May's (1979) answer to the human dilemma and its concomitant socio-cultural problems is to creatively acknowledge the paradoxical and dialectical nature of human existence. Stressing "the deepening and widening of human consciousness" (p. 20), as a more appropriate response to human problems, May (1979) asserts that the human dilemma is never fully resolved nor should this even be considered a desirable goal. The ability of the individual and his culture to 'resolve' the conflicting nature of human existence can be accomplished through the individual's self-transcending capacity to realize ultimate values and moral ideals. The only alternative to the anxiety of depersonalization and dehumanization of modernity is "the rediscovery of mankind's capacity to value" (May, 1979, p. 51). May (1979) describes "learning the act of valuing...note that I emphasize 'value' here as a verb" (pp. 51-52), as a humanizing solution to modern problems. The author explains:

...the usually assumed goals of survival and adaptation are not enough, and that Aristotle was right when he said, "not life, but the good life, is to be valued"...man is the valuing animal, the being who interprets his life and world in terms of symbols and meanings, and identifies himself with his existence as a self. (pp. 52, 72-73)

May (1979) differentiates human existence from that of other beings in that man is a "symbol-user" (p. 76) who interprets his experiences in symbolic and valuational terms. The author argues that the uniqueness of human experience can never be understood apart from "ethical symbols" (May, 1979, p. 76) which constitute an integral part of our basic humanity. May (1979) explains:

Through his distinctive social capacity to see himself as others see him, to imagine himself empathetically in his fellowman's or stranger's position, the person can direct his decisions in light of long-term values, which are the basis of ethics and therefore the basis of moral(ity)...I use the terms "symbols" and "values" incidentally, in the sense of the quintessence of experience.
p. 76)

The effective and healthy living of our human dilemma necessitates both the individual and humanity as a whole reaffirming the world of values and the art of genuine valuing, which will result in the rediscovery of human significance. However, the goal of science and the scientific development of psychology, that is its predominant metatheoretical bias, has been to emphasize the 'removal' or 'devaluing' of values as its methodological preference in developing a (de)human science.

Self-transcendence. The development of an appropriate view of man and psychology, which entails human values and ideals, must recognize the uniquely human capacity for self-transcendence. This capacity for self-transcendence involves mature values which:

...transcend the immediate situation in time and encompass past and future. Mature values transcend also the immediate in-group, and

extend outwards into the community, ideally and ultimately embracing humanity as a whole...the more mature a man's values are, the less it matters to him whether his values are literally satisfied or not. The satisfaction and security lie in holding of the values. To the genuine scientist or religious person or artist, security and confidence arise from his awareness of the devotion to the "search" for truth and beauty rather than finding it. (May, 1979, p.82)

May's (1979) perspective of human development incorporates a process which ultimately can lead beyond 'the self' towards 'self-transcendence'. Our uniquely human capacity to strive beyond 'what is' and struggle towards 'what ought to be'--the lofty realm of human ideals--is the only humanizing and fitting response to mankind's eternal dilemma.

Development of the self. The realization of genuine and ultimate human meaning, expressed in the capacity for self-transcendence and moral development, will also facilitate the gradual emergence of a morally autonomous and authentic self. May (1979) explains:

Consciousness of self actually expands our control of our lives, and with that expanded power comes the capacity to let ourselves go. This is the truth of the seeming paradox, that the more conscious of one's self one is the more spontaneous and creative one can be at the same time...(p. 104)

The author emphasizes that this emerging consciousness of self "is not introversion...or morbid introspection" (May, 1979, p. 102) but part of a difficult developmental process culminating in what May (1979) calls "becoming a person" (p. 138). This developmental process invariably involves the individual's difficult struggle through "several stages of consciousness of self" (p. 138). This

developmental process may continue until the final stage--"creative consciousness of the self" (May, 1979, p. 139) where the individual's capacity for inner strength, autonomy, and conscience are more highly developed. Opposed to the 'survivalistic ethos' of modernity, May (1953) summarizes this process of 'self-development by citing Simone de Beauvoir as follows:

Life is occupied in both perpetuating itself and in surpassing itself. If all it does is maintain itself, then living is only not dying, and human existence is indistinguishable from absurd vegetation. (Simone Du Beauvoir, cited in May, 1951, p. 141)

This perspective of human existence, whereby the individual confronts the difficult and self-transcending journey of self-development, is an area which will be further examined within the works of Viktor Frankl.

Viktor Frankl--The Existential Vacuum, the New Nihilism
and the Rehumanization of Psychotherapy

Viktor Frankl is also critical of our modern day culture and its dehumanizing impact on the individual. Frankl (1975) argues that disparate socio-cultural influences, which significantly represent modern industrial societies today, have had a dehumanizing impact on developments within the human sciences. A central task of Frankl's (1962, 1967, 1969, 1975, 1978) is to illucidate the various dehumanizing developments in psychotherapeutic theory and practice. The interrelationship between dehumanizing developments in modern culture and related therapeutic services is extensively explored within his writings.

The Existential Vacuum, Man's Search for Meaning, and Sociogenic Neuroses

The existential vacuum. Frankl (1969) maintains that within modernity, with its marked consumeristic and technological orientation, "we live in an age of crumbling and vanishing traditions...(where) universal values are on the wane" (p. 69), and thus individuals are now confronted with a uniquely human predicament. In contrast to other species, humans are no longer directed primarily by drives or instincts nor, as in previous eras, are they guided by established values and traditions. Frankl (1975) summarizes this modern dilemma by concluding that the individual "now, knowing neither what he must do, nor basically what he should do, he often does not even know what he wishes to do" (p. 91). Frankl (1969) describes the experiencing of this modern day predicament as the "abyss-experience" (p. 83), counterposed to Maslow's (1975) "peak experience" (p. 19). Frankl (1962) terms the individual and collective occurrence of this phenomena as the "existential vacuum" (p. 106). The existential vacuum, characterized by distinct feelings of "apathy, futility,....emptiness, and meaninglessness" (Frankl, 1975, p. 91), involves a heightened sense of lacking both a direction or purpose in one's life and authentic values from which the individual may orient their life.

Frankl (1969) argues that individuals experiencing the existential vacuum fall prey to external forces and the control of others. They are increasingly more apt to unquestioningly do (and to value) what others do,

resulting in "conformism" (Frankl, 1969, p. 83), or worse yet, authoritatively forced to do what they are told to do, resulting in "totalitarianism" (Frankl, 1969, p. 83). Respectively, the author maintains, the first expression of the existential vacuum is indicative of the West while the second is largely representative of Eastern cultures. To facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the etiology of the existential vacuum it may be helpful for the reader to explore Frankl's perspective on mankind's unique orientation towards human existence.

Man's search for meaning. Frankl (1978) maintains that unless we acknowledge and comprehend the "specifically human" (p. 22) dimension of human existence "we cannot understand let alone overcome, the ills of our age" (p. 22). Opposed to both psychodynamic and behavioristic explanations of human motivation, Frankl (1962) states that the primary motivational force in the individual's life--a dimension which is indispensibly human--is "man's search for meaning" (p. 97) or "will to meaning" (p. 97).

The concept of the will to meaning has important epistemological implications for the development of a model of human existence and psychotherapy. Frankl (1978), in advocating a humanistic-existential (HE) perspective and teleological view of man, defines the essence of human existence as essentially dependent on mankind's unique ability for "self-transcendence" (p. 35). Frankl (1978) identifies this dimension of human existence as follows:

I thereby understand the primordial anthropological fact that being human is always directed, and pointing, to something or someone other than oneself: to a meaning to fulfill or another human being to encounter, a cause to serve or a person to love. Only to the extent that someone is living out this self-transcendence of human existence, is he truly human or does he become a true self.
(p. 35)

The importance of a self-transcendent or teleological framework, as a distinguishing characteristic of human nature and problems, may be more clearly understood when contrasted with psychodynamic and learning theory (homeostatic) approaches to human existence.

Current motivational theories, including both behavioral/learning theory and psychodynamic epistemologies, distort the essential nature of humanity and its basic orientation towards human existence. What is most inappropriate about these theories, Frankl (1975) contends, is that:

...they deny that uniquely human phenomenon exist at all. And they do so not on empirical grounds as one might assume, but on the basis of a priori denial. They insist that there is nothing in man which cannot be found in animals as well. (p. 116)

Both psychodynamic and learning theory perspectives avow a view of human nature where man is seen, fundamentally, "as a being who is either reacting to external stimuli or abreacting his impulses..." (Frankl, 1978, p. 30). They conceptualize the individual "as if he were merely a closed system within which cause-effect relations, such as conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, are operant" (Frankl, 1978, p. 47). Perceiving human existence as a closed system of innate drives or learned behaviors

necessitates the reframing of human motivation as being only concerned with satisfying basic bio-physical or somatic needs--thus being principally concerned with tension reduction and the maintenance of organismic "homeostasis" (Frankl, 1978, p. 80). This homeostatic model of man reduces all levels of human endeavor, no matter how base or sublime, to "mere means" (Frankl, 1978, p. 32). This reductionistic perspective is clearly reminiscent of what Lasch (1979) has previously referred to as a 'survivalistic' view of life.

In direct opposition to homeostatic theory, Frankl (1978) argues, human existence should be construed as striving towards meanings and not mere means. Similar to May's (1979) description of the 'human dilemma', Frankl (1969) contends the specific tension each individual must maintain is "the polar field of tension between subject and object..."(p. 51). However, Frankl (1969) expands on this idea stressing that this dynamic tension is pivotal to establishing the foundation for one's orientation towards ultimate values and meaning. Frankl (1969) explains:

This tension is the same as the tension between the "I am" and the "I ought," between reality and ideal, between being and meaning....being human means being in the face of meanings to fulfill and values to realize. It means living in the polar field of tension established between reality and ideals to materialize. Man lives by ideals and values. (pp. 51-52)

This search for meaning, rather than being conceived as some form of "neurosis of mankind" (Frankl, 1969, p. 27), needs to be regarded as an essential characteristic of

one's humanness. Homeostatic models of human existence, which distort and dehumanize perspectives of human existence, contribute to the depersonalization of modernity and to the experiencing of the existential vacuum.

Sociogenic neurosis. Frankl (1967) charges the existential vacuum for engendering particular dehumanized character traits frequently representative of contemporary man. The development of "ephemeral" and "fatalistic" (Frankl, 1967, p. 117) attitudes towards life, prototypical of what Lasch (1984) respectively describes as "protean selfhood" (p. 98) and "survivalism" (p. 58), exemplify the dehumanizing impact of the existential vacuum. Furthermore, "conformist or collectivistic thinking" and "fanaticism" (Frankl, 1967, p. 119, 120) demark other pathogenic consequences of a frustrated will to meaning.

To comprehend the extensiveness of the degenerating influence of the existential vacuum, it is important to understand the socio-cultural context of its etiology. Frankl, (1967) believes that the existential vacuum is a "concomitant of industrialization" (p. 19) and in this fundamental sense constitutes a pervasive "sociogenic" (Frankl, 1975, p. 139) neuroses, rooted in the existence of repressive socio-cultural values such as "deified reason and megalomaniac technology" (p. 70). These powerful influences have been an indivisible part of our modern cultural values. Therefore the sociogenic origins of the existential vacuum are fundamentally a product of

modernity's embeddedness in particular dehumanizing and unrecognized world views. Frankl (1969) argues that the important question cannot be whether or not there is a dominant Weltanschauung influencing our perspectives towards human existence, but, "whether the Weltanschauung...is a right or wrong" (p. 15) one. By right or wrong Frankl means "whether or not the humanness of man is preserved in a given philosophy" (1969, p. 15). The development of the 'existential vacuum', or 'sociogenic neuroses' is a product of our dehumanizing models of human existence. A more comprehensive examination of the dehumanizing nature of this Weltanschauung will now be examined.

The New Nihilism, Dehumanization, and a Homunculist View of Man

Modern nihilism. Contrary to the nihilism of yesterday, associated with Sartrean (1977) existentialism, Frankl (1978) asserts that humanity is now confronted with a new form of nihilistic philosophy. Where the nihilism of the past taught about the 'nothingness' of human existence, Frankl (1978) argues the new nihilism now teaches of the "nothing-but-ness" (p. 55) of man. Within this approach "man is said to be nothing but a computer or a 'naked ape'" (Frankl, 1978, p. 55), thus discounting important dimensional or ontological differences between human and nonhuman existence. In opposition to modern nihilism, whether envisioned within its 'nothingness' or 'nothing-but-ness' contexts, he asserts that "a human being is no thing...(and) this no-thing-ness, rather than

nothingness is the lesson to learn from existentialism" (Frankl, 1969, p. 6).

The origins of the new nihilism lie in the "mechanistic ideology of the nineteenth century" (Frankl, 1975, p. 15) which emphasizes a philosophy of "materialism", "naturalism" (Frankl, 1975, p. 21), and a "deterministic" (Frankl, 1967, p. 2) view of human existence. Frankl (1967) acknowledges certain aspects of materialism and determinism conceding that often individuals are not free from determining conditions, be they of biological, psychological, or sociological significance. However, to construe from these various factors that human existence is totally determined is to confuse the facticity of human existence for its totality. Frankl radically departs from philosophical naturalism advocating that the uniqueness of human freedom lies in our distinct ability to transcend determining influences. For Frankl (1978) various dimensions of human existence may be determined but never what he terms, "pan-determined" (p. 48). Human freedom must be conceived as existing between the alternatives of "pan-determinism versus determinism" and not "determinism versus indeterminism" (Frankl, 1978, p. 48). By the term "pandeterminism" Frankl (1967) means "any view of man which disregards or neglects the intrinsically human capacity of free choice and interprets human existence in terms of mere dynamics" (p. 59), irrespective of whether such dynamics are conceptualized within behavioral, psychoanalytic, or pseudo-humanistic terminology.

Biological, psychological, and sociological factors may indeed impact the types of choices the individual can make, however, human freedom is still realizable within what he calls the "noological" (Frankl, 1967, p. 3) or uniquely human dimension:

...the freedom of a finite being such as man is freedom within limits. Man is not free from conditions, be they biological, psychological, or sociological in nature. But he is, and always remains, free to take a stand towards these conditions, he always retains the freedom to choose his attitude towards these conditions...we (must) interpret man in terms of a being capable of detaching himself, leaving the "plane" of the biological or psychological, passing into the "space" of the noological. This specifically human dimension, which I have entitled noological, is not accessible to the beast. (Frankl, 1967, p. 3)

Deterministic, naturalistic, and homeostatic epistemologies discount the noological or spiritual dimension of human existence often treating it as a "mere epiphenomenon" (Frankl, 1978, p. 55). In essence, the new nihilism is supported by these depersonalizing and dehumanizing views of human existence.

Dehumanization. These incomplete and dehumanizing philosophies have radically influenced developments in psychotherapeutic theory, research, and practice. Frankl (1975) argues that such world views engender a "manipulative approach" (p. 14) to human problems as well as the "inappropriate objectification and reification of human phenomena" (p. 14). The development of sociogenic neuroses or the existential vacuum is also attributable to these developments which Frankl (1975) collectively delimits as "indoctrination along the lines of

reductionism" (p. 92). The author specifically criticizes these dehumanizing epistemologies for "reducing all dimensions of human existence to a subhuman level" (Frankl, 1969, p. 18).

The most fundamental problem confronting humanity, psychology and psychotherapy, is establishing an appropriate axiological foundation for the study of human existence. The dehumanization or subhumanization of the helping services has been a consequence of a significant diminution involving issues of axiology in the developing human sciences. Frankl (1975) concludes:

...there is hope for mankind's survival only as long or as soon as people will arrive at the awareness of common denominators in axiological terms--that is common denominators in what they feel makes their lives worth living. It is thus obvious that the subject boils down to an axiological issue: Will there be values and meanings that can be shared by people--and peoples? Values and meanings they might have in common? (p. 140)

It is rather ironic that the very species which can ultimately be concerned about human values and meanings keeps developing pervasive epistemologies which radically diminish or entirely discount such uniquely human concerns. The dehumanizing nature of scientism, with its positivistic and relativistic world views, lies fundamentally in its inherent predisposition to deny its own metaphysical foundations.

Frankl (1967) maintains that the scientific or materialistic approach to reality disregards the full dimensionality of human existence because it is based on the "indispensible fiction of a unidimensional world" (p.

138). This reductionistic approach to man, psychology, and psychotherapy, Frankl (1969) believes has manifested two dehumanizing trends in psychotherapeutic theory and praxis.

The first manifestation of this reductionistic epistemology in the human sciences is largely evidenced by the "reification or depersonalization of man" (Frankl, 1967, p. 63). The author identifies the essence of this particular problem as:

By the process of reification or depersonalization the subject is made an object. The human person when dealt with merely in terms of a psychic mechanism, ruled by the laws of cause and effect, loses his intrinsic character as a subject who is ultimately self-determining...The subject who "wills" has been made an object that "must"! (Frankl, 1967, p. 63)

Frankl (1969) holds that the reification or objectification of the human subject is the "original sin" (p. 6) of psychotherapy. The objectifying nature of scientism results in the human sciences' tendency to approach human beings "merely in terms of techniques" which "implies manipulating them" (Frankl, 1969, p. 6). Frankl (1967) states that "technique by its very nature tends to reify whatever it touches" (p. 80), leading to even further objectification of the individual.

The second dehumanizing trend within the human sciences is the extensive "subjectification of meaning and values" (Frankl, 1967, p. 64). Frankl (1967) holds that reductionistic approaches to human existence have resulted in the subjectification of human values or meaning--what he terms "the subjectification of logos" (p. 65). Frankl

(1969) argues that authentic human existence always entails the individual's existence "in the face of meaning to fulfill and values to realize" (p. 52), which ultimately orients one towards the "the world of values and meanings" (p. 64).

However, the inclusion of uniquely human values and meaning has been a problem for the developing human sciences, particularly for those theoreticians and social scientists advocating a homeostatic approach to human existence. Because of its theoretical and methodological limitations, this reductionistic approach has perceived human values as "'nothing but' a subjective design, or even a projection of instincts or archetypes" (Frankl, 1967, p. 65). Contrary to this subjectivistic perspective, the author argues that human values and meaning ultimately have an 'objective' character distinguished as follows:

...what we mean by this term "objective" is that values are necessarily more than a mere self-expression of the subject himself. They are more than a mere expression of one's inner life, whether in the sense of sublimations or secondary rationalizations of one's own instinctual drives as Freudian psychoanalysis would explain them, or in the sense of inherent archetypes of one's collective unconscious as Jungian psychology would assume... (Frankl, 1967, p. 64)

Because science cannot cope with reality in its multidimensionality but must deal with reality as if reality were "unidimensional" (Frankl, 1969, p. 29), it epistemologically constricts human existence to the point where "meaning is missing in the world described by science" (Frankl, 1978, p. 59). Scientism erodes man's

original and natural concern with meaning and values through its "prevalent subjectivism and relativism" (Frankl, 1967, p. 52) which has become characteristic of the developing human sciences.

The new homunculumism. This truncated approach to human existence has resulted in a caricature of man and of humanity as a whole, which Frankl (1967) refers to as the "new homunculumism" (p. 123). The homunculumist approach to human existence supports a world view "where man misinterprets and misunderstands himself as a product of the environment, of his psycho-physical makeup" (Frankl, 1967, p. 118). The inherent dangers of homunculumism are depicted as follows:

Here lies in wait the danger of the new homunculumism. The danger that man may once more misunderstand and misinterpret himself as a "nothing but". According to the three great homunculumisms--biologism, psychologism, and sociologism--man was "nothing but" either an automation of reflexes, a bundle of drives, a psychic mechanism, or simply a product of economic environment....The human essence has been removed. Nor should we forget that homunculumism can make history--indeed, has already done so. We have only to remember how in recent history the conception of man as "nothing but" the product of heredity and environment or, as it was then termed, "Food and Soil", pushed us all into historical disaster. (Frankl, 1967, pp. 123-124)

The new homunculumism, within its doctrine of "biological progressivism and scientism" (Frankl, 1967, p. 111) has created an "engineering approach" (Frankl, 1967, p. 111) to human problems, where ultimately the human being is regarded "as a machine to repair or a mechanism to be fixed" (Frankl, 1975, p. 111). Frankl (1967) designates this as

advocating this approach to human existence as the "peacemakers" (p. 12) which he characterizes as follows:

Peacemakers...appease people; they try to reconcile them with themselves. "Let's face facts," they say "why worry about our shortcomings? Only a minority live up to ideals. So let's forget them; let's care for peace of mind, or soul, rather than those existential meanings which just arouse tension in human beings"...What peacemakers overlook is the wisdom laid down in Goethe's warning: "If we take man as he is, we make him worse; if we take him as he ought to be, we help him become it." (Frankl, 1967, p. 12)

'Peacemaker' or 'homunculist' approaches to psychotherapy "alleviate the burden of meaning confrontation" (p. 12), and are fundamentally not concerned with issues of human values and ideals but with what Tennesen (1973) calls "quotidian objectives" (p. 412). Contrary to this survivalist or peacemaker perspective, Frankl (1975) remarks, "survival cannot be the supreme value" because irrevocably "survival is dependent on direction" (Frankl, 1975, p. 139). He clarifies:

Unless life points to something beyond itself; survival is pointless and meaningless. It is not even possible....And I think that it is not only true for the survival of individuals but also holds for the survival of mankind. (Frankl, 1975, pp. 139-140)

Advocating a "pacemaker" (Frankl, 1967, p. 12) approach to human existence, the author argues, psychotherapy should also incorporate ultimate questions of meanings, values, and ideals. These must be 'existentialized' or 'lived' in order to establish for the individual an authentic "meaning orientation" (Frankl, 1967, p. 12). The result of taking a meaning orientation to life and psychotherapy

is that it results in what Frankl (1967) refers to as 'meaning confrontation', explained below:

Once meaning orientation turns into meaning confrontation, that stage of maturation and development is reached in which freedom--that concept so much emphasized by existentialist philosophy--becomes responsibility. Man is responsible for the fulfillment of the specific meaning of his personal life. But he is responsible before something, or to something, be it society, or humanity, or mankind, or his own conscience. (Frankl, 1967, pp. 12-13)

Human responsibility and the development of conscience are inevitable outcomes which ensue when individuals search for and discover "right" or "true meanings" (Frankl, 1969, p. 62) to important life questions. These values and meanings are not arbitrary constructions of the individual. Materialistic approaches have historically been concerned only with the facticity of human existence, directing their endeavors towards the collection of data through controlled experimental studies as a knowledge base. However, Frankl (1978) cautions:

Our scientists need to have more than knowledge: they need to have wisdom as well. And wisdom I define as knowledge plus the awareness of its limitations. (p. 63)

When facing issues of meaning, values, and ideals--basic considerations of axiology--"is the point at which science gives up and wisdom takes over" (Frankl, 1978, p. 59). "Ontological self-understanding", or what Frankl (1978) calls "wisdom of the heart" (p. 59) and Bettelheim (1979) "the informed heart" (p. viii), is a dimension of human existence largely excluded or subhumanized within the human sciences. Frankl's perspective on how this "wisdom

of the heart" may be utilized to transform and rehumanize the human sciences will now be examined.

The Rehumanization of Psychotherapy, a Multidimensional Approach to Man, and the Development of Conscience

Rehumanization of psychotherapy. Frankl (1975)

maintains that "we are in a dire need of a rehumanization of psychotherapy" and unless we address this formidable task, psychologists and psychotherapists are likely to "reinforce rather than counteract, the ills and ailments of our age" (p. 105). The rehumanization of psychology and psychotherapy necessitates a continued examination of metatheoretical assumptions associated with these disciplines.

Recognizing that "every age has its neuroses, and every age needs its own psychotherapy", the roots of our modern day neuroses or "noogenic neuroses" specifically entail "spiritual problems, moral conflicts, and existential crises" (Frankl, 1967, p. 122). The various socio-cultural problems confronting the individual today, rather than being resolved psychotherapeutically, are instead maintained by "many a theory and unconscious philosophical system of modern day psychotherapy" (Frankl, 1967, p. 130). Unless metatheoretical systems are developed which embrace the uniqueness of human existence, including our spiritual orientation towards meanings and ideals, psychotherapies will continue to reflect distorted and dehumanizing conceptualizations of man. Frankl (1967) elaborates:

It is all the more important to make the psychotherapist himself conscious of his often

unconscious image of man....The only way for him to straighten his image of man, distorted as it was by the influence of the past century, is to realize that what he has taken as a starting point is really a caricature of man and not a true image and that it is necessary to correct his image of man....If psychotherapy is to remain therapy and not become a symptom within the pathology of our time (Zeitgeist), then it needs a correct picture of man; it needs this at least as much as it needs an exact technique. (Frankl, 1967, pp. 141-142)

Therefore, the rehumanization of psychotherapy necessitates the rejection of overly simplistic, unidimensional, and reductionistic approaches to human existence. A significant error that unidimensional approaches to psychotherapy commit is their misplaced belief that human existence and problems can be understood in the same way as others 'things' in nature --that is subject to the same invariant laws of 'natural' science.

A Multidimensional Approach. Opposed to this unidimensional framework, Frankl (1969) advocates the development of a "multidimensional" (p. 28) approach to human existence where "therapy, too, must be multidimensionally oriented" (p. 28). By the term 'multidimensional', Frankl (1967) advocates a metaphysics which envisions human existence as being comprised of "spiritual, mental, and bodily levels" (p. 74). Furthermore, this multidimensional approach contextualizes human existence as being stratified within differentiated "heirarchical structures...or layers", which distinguish "the more or less peripheral biological and psychological layers from the central personal one--the spiritual axis" (Frankl, 1969, p. 22). Paradoxically, ontological multidimensionalism also recognizes the "anthropological

unity" (Frankl, 1969, p. 22) of man which constitutes "a unity inspite of the multiplicity of body and mind" (p. 24). This holistic aspect of man "cannot be found in the biological or psychological but must be sought in the noological dimension" (Frankl, 1969, p. 24)--that is the uniquely human or spiritual dimension of man.

Within this unitary, yet multidimensional framework, determined dimensions of human existence no longer contradict the essential humanness of man because "closedness in the lower dimensions is compatible with openness in a higher one" (Frankl, 1969, p. 26). Unlike unidimensional approaches to reality, a multidimensional perspective recognizes the determined dimensions of human existence without excluding the transcendent one(s). This transcendent or spiritual dimension of human existence is pivotal to the development of an accurate model of man and psychotherapy. The multidimensional approach to human existence allows one to consider that the etiology or genesis of human problems may originate in any one dimension of human existence. Thus a particular approach to psychotherapy may or may not be appropriate depending on the ontological sphere or realm where the particular problem is rooted and at which the particular psychotherapeutic intervention is correspondingly conceptualized and directed.

Historically, unidimensional perspectives of human existence, psychology, and psychotherapy have epistemologically and methodologically excluded the teleological and valuational dimension of human existence.

The development of a multidimensional approach to the helping services, which recognizes the paramount importance of human values, ethics, and ideals within the human equation, must include the transcendent or spiritual dimension of existence. An essential step in the rehumanization of psychotherapy, the psychotherapist, and the culture at large, Frankl (1969, 1975, 1978) argues, is reinstating the preeminence of moral development or the development of conscience within psychology and psychotherapy.

The development of conscience. The dehumanization of the human sciences has included the subhumanization of our conceptualizations of both morality and the human conscience. Behaviorism simplistically conceptualizes "conscience merely in terms of the result of conditioning processes" (Frankl, 1969, p. 19), whereby conscience is robbed of its essential intuitive and volitional qualities. Such simplistic conceptualizations of human existence ignore the uniquely human capacity for self-transcendence which, Frankl (1969, 1975, 1979) deems, is necessary for the development of an authentic conscience. In fact, Frankl (1969) defines the act of 'being conscientious' as presupposing "the uniquely human capacity to rise above oneself, to judge and evaluate one's deeds in moral and ethical terms" (p. 18).

Similarly, psychoanalytic approaches to moral development are also overly simplistic in that they equate 'authentic' conscience merely with the superego. Frankl (1969) believes that psychoanalytic approaches to

moral concerns and the development of conscience are fundamentally wrong because:

...conscience cannot be merely the superego--for the simple reason that conscience is assigned if need be to oppose those conventions and standards, traditions and values which are transmitted by the superego. Thus, if conscience may have, in a given case, the function of contradicting the superego, it certainly cannot be identical with the superego....Obviously, such a view of man's moral behavior misses the point of true morality, which begins only when man has begun to act for the sake of something or someone, but not just for his own sake, that is, for the sake of having a good conscience or of getting rid of a bad one." (pp. 19, 42)

Behavioristic and psychoanalytic approaches to human existence reduce conscience to mere biologically or environmentally engendered epiphenomenon. Frankl (1975) maintains that a more humane and uniquely human concept of conscience must be envisioned within the human sciences. In rejecting reductionistic perspectives of conscience, the author asserts:

Conscience is a human phenomenon, and we must first of all see to it that it is preserved in its humanness rather than being dealt with reductionistically....Konrad Lorenz was cautious enough to speak of "moralanaloges Verhalten bei Tieren" (behavior in animals that is analagous to moral behavior in man). By contrast, the reductionists do not recognize a qualitative difference between the two types of behavior. They deny that uniquely human phenomenon exist. (Frankl, 1975, pp. 115-116)

Frankl's (1975) conceptualization of conscience serves as an ontological bridge between the spiritual and nonspiritual realms of existence. Within the multidimensional model of humanity, conscience is described as an "intuitive" (Frankl, 1975, p. 37) capacity or "ethical instinct" (p. 36) facilitating "pre-reflective

ontological understanding" (Frankl, 1975, p. 129) or "wisdom of the heart" (Frankl, 1978, p. 59). In order to understand this intuitive capacity, Frankl (1975) argues the human sciences must begin to distinguish ontological differences between feelings as "mere emotional state(s)" (p. 39) and feelings which are "intentional feeling(s)" (p. 39)--that is feelings which are "directed towards an intentional referrent" (p. 35). The author clarifies:

To say that this concept of feeling is vague in no way implies that feeling itself is vague. At least as far as "intentional feeling" is concerned, rather the contrary: feeling can be much more sensitive [to meaning or moral and ethical concerns] than reason can ever be sensible. (Frankl, 1975, p. 39)

Contextualized in this way, conscience is a uniquely human capacity which intuitively apprehends the "ought-to-ness of human existence" (Frankl, 1975, p. 34). This existential and multidimensional perspective fosters a Weltanschauung which supports the view that "man interprets human existence, and indeed being human, ultimately in terms of being responsible" (p. 23). To truly comprehend the uniquely human nature of conscience one "cannot consider conscience simply in terms of its psychological facticity, but must also grasp it in its transcendent essence" (p. 53)--that is conscience has its origins in the "noological" (Frankl, 1975, p. 25) or spiritual dimension of man. Frankl (1975) maintains that conscience is that which is transcendent of man and, as importantly, "originates in transcendence" (p. 56). Frankl (1975) explains:

If conscience is the voice of transcendence it is thus itself transcendent. Viewed in this

light, an irreligious man is one who does not recognize this transcendent quality. Needless to say, the irreligious man also "has" a conscience, and he may also be responsible; he simply asks no further--neither what he is responsible to, nor from what his conscience stems...To be sure, among those who have committed themselves to an atheistic or agnostic world view, there are some who are ready to accept the concept of transcendence, but do not feel the necessity that they speak of "God". However, there are others who do not feel any reason why not to denote transcendence by the age-old word "God." (pp. 55-56)

Ultimately, Frankl (1975) maintains, to the perplexing question of the origin and unique nature of conscience "there can be no psychological answer but only an ontological one" (Frankl, 1975, p. 56).

The depiction of conscience as a 'transrational' or 'intuitive' capacity is a more appropriate perspective, according to Frankl (1975), because what is revealed to conscience is not anything "that is" (Frankl, 1975, p. 34) but an intuitive apprehending of what "ought to be" (Frankl, 1975, p. 34). The author elaborates:

To anticipate what is not yet, but is to be made real, conscience must be based on intuition. And it is in this sense that conscience may be called irrational....It is the task of conscience to disclose to man the unum necesse, the one thing that is required. This thing, however, is absolutely unique inasmuch as it is the unique possibility, a concrete person has to actualize in a specific situation. What matters is the unique "ought to be" which cannot be comprehended by any universal law...And above all it cannot be comprehended in rational terms, but only intuitively. (Frankl, 1975, pp. 34-35)

This writer prefers to interpret the 'irrational' or 'intuitive' nature of conscience as being essentially a 'trans-rational' capacity. Frankl (1975) depicts conscience as being a "trans-human" (p. 53) and

"transpersonal" (p. 54) agency, suggesting that the conceptualization of conscience be framed within a HE transcendental paradigm. It is this particular multilevel view of human existence, emphasizing the transcendent capacity of conscience, which is central to Frankl's proposed answer to the predicaments confronting modern man, psychology and psychotherapy.

In summary, the central problem confronting humanity and psychotherapy is that they have been "indoctrinated" (Frankl, 1975, p. 94) within the reductionistic and dehumanizing metaphysics of materialism and naturalism. The predominant error being made by modern psychology is a metaphysical one, which overtly distorts or totally denies important ontological differences between levels or dimensions of human existence. Schumacher (1973) summarizes the fundamental essence of this problem:

While the nineteenth-century ideas deny or obliterate the hierarchy of levels in the universe, the notion of a hierarchical order is an indispensable instrument of understanding. Without the recognition of "Levels of Being" or "Grades of Significance" we cannot make the world intelligible to ourselves nor have the slightest possibility to define our position, the position of man, in the scheme of the universe. It is only when we can see the world as a ladder, that we can recognize a meaningful task for man's life on earth....As soon, however, as we accept the existence of "levels of being," we can readily understand, for instance, why the methods of science cannot be applied to the study of politics or economics, or why the findings of physics--as Einstein recognized--have no philosophical implication....To the extent that we interpret the world through the great vital ideas of the nineteenth century, we are blind to these differences of level, because we have been blinded. (p. 96)

Schumacher (1973) maintains that this 'categorical' error is expressed in the inability of the human sciences to distinguish between what he calls "convergent" and "divergent" (p. 97) problems. Convergent problems are identified as those which can be "solved by logical reasoning" (Schumacher, 1973, p. 97), and once solved "the solution can be written down and passed to others" (Schumacher, 1973, p. 97). Schumacher (1976) argues that "the physical sciences and mathematics are concerned exclusively with convergent problems" (p. 98). Divergent problems, however, are uniquely human problems and thus are of a different ontological order than convergent ones. Schumacher (1976) argues that human thinking is such that we cannot help thinking in opposites" (p. 97), thus, throughout life, "we are faced with reconciling opposites" (p. 97), which "in logical thought cannot be reconciled" (p. 97). The author explains:

Divergent problems, as it were, force man to strain himself to a level above himself; they demand, and thus provoke the supply of forces from a higher level, thus bringing love, beauty, goodness, and truth into our lives. It is only with the help of these higher forces that the opposites can be reconciled in the living situation....The true problems of living--in politics, economics, education, marriages, etc.--are always problems of overcoming or reconciling opposites. They are divergent problems and have no solution in the ordinary sense of the word. They demand of man not merely the employment of his reasoning powers but the commitment of his whole personality. (Schumacher, 1973, pp. 97-98, 98-99)

The metaphysical distortion committed within the philosophies of materialism and naturalism is the belief that all human dilemmas are simplistically reducible to

convergent problems--what Wilber (1983) identifies as "category error" (p. 7). By 'category error' Wilber (1983) means the overt tendency of modern science and philosophical schools of thought to ignore or discount important ontological differences between what he calls empirical, rational, and transcendental realms of human experience. Schumacher (1973) argues that "dealing exclusively with convergent problems does not lead into life but away from it" (p. 98) resulting in a world where "there would be no more human relations but only mechanical relations" (p. 97). Human existence, within the dehumanizing epistemology of scientism, thus becomes what he refers to as a "living death" (Schumacher, 1976, p. 97). Schumacher (1973) believes that the inappropriate extension of positivism and convergent thinking to uniquely human or divergent problems will inevitably lead to an impoverishment of our basic humanity to the degree that it may "overwhelm our entire civilization" (p. 98). This lack of understanding of man's place in the scheme of things, previously termed the existential vacuum and noogenic neuroses, is essentially a problem of a mistaken metaphysics and category error. Frankl (1969) argues that education has consistently added to the existential vacuum through the "indoctrination" (p. 85) of students--most certainly students of psychology--in a dehumanizing Weltanschauung espousing a "mechanistic theory of man" (p. 85) as well as a "relativistic philosophy of life" (p. 85). Schumacher (1973) argues that our educational traditions, which have historically embraced the

reductionistic philosophies of naturalism and materialism, ideologically obscure and subjectify the valuational and ethical realms of human existence. Schumacher (1973) elaborates:

The most powerful ideas of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, have denied or at least obscured the whole concept of "levels of being" and the idea that some things are higher [objectively better] than others. This, of course, has meant the destruction of ethics, which is based on the distinction of good and evil, claiming that good is higher than evil....The men who conceived the ideal that "morality is bunk," did so with a mind well-stocked with moral ideas. But the minds of the third and fourth generations are no longer well-stocked with such ideas: they are well-stocked with ideas conceived in the nineteenth century, namely, that "morality is bunk," that everything that appears to be "higher" is really nothing but something quite mean and vulgar. (pp. 99-100)

What has been lost, Schumacher (1973) argues, is an appropriate "guiding image" or "Leitbild" (p. 100) by which individuals can educate themselves. Instead, what has been developed within modernity is a "muddle and mess of images" (Schumacher, 1973, p. 100) which offer no constructive guidance because they proclaim that "everything is relative" (Schumacher, 1973, p. 100). Schumacher (1976) maintains that this "soul and life-destroying metaphysics" (p. 101) has resulted in the human sciences viewing "ethical matters in terms of the most unabashed cynicism" (p. 100). Essentially, Schumacher (1973) has depicted the hidden and often unrecognized metaphysics of modernity--that is the predominant metatheoretical ethos of our time.

Conclusion

Utilizing Abbott's (1987) book Flatland, with its prophetic depiction of 'two-dimensional' beings who lack the capacity to perceive height and who live in a limited 'two-dimensional' world, it would seem we have predominantly become 'flatlanders' within the dehumanizing metaphysics of modernity. This writer suggests that a more appropriate descriptor of this particular metatheoretical pathology might be best depicted as a profound 'metaphysical acrophobia'. As a result of our thorough indoctrination within a vast array of naturalistic ideologies, 'metaphysical acrophobia' continues to be a recurrent and dehumanizing theme within modern psychology and psychotherapy. Disclosing some of the major consequences of this metaphysical problem has been the specific goal of this chapter.

To counteract the various theoretical deficiencies and biases within modern psychology, Schumacher (1976) suggests that the "task of our generation...is one of metaphysical reconstruction" (p. 101). Correspondingly, Boon and Short (1988) recommend the development of a more comprehensive and inclusive metatheoretical orientation within the human sciences. In order to reconstruct a more appropriate metaphysical foundation for the human sciences they suggest:

...the future of psychology lies in its ability to deal with the multiplicity of existence, to be a dynamic subjective/objective science simultaneously. A new philosophy should allow many views to flourish without contradiction. A future psychology should allow (note this emphasis is a value contamination) psychologists to fuse their scientific attitudes with humanistic sensitivities (Koch, 1960). Loftus-

Sanders (1978) suggests psychology's future lies in synthesis. (Boon & Short, 1988, p. 18)

These authors suggest that a metatheoretical synthesis of 'objective-empirical' and 'subjective-phenomenological' approaches to the human sciences would facilitate the development of a plurality of perspectives, methodologies, and strategies which would more appropriately address the multiplicity of human experience. Although a step in the right direction, this writer holds that their recommendations, alone, do not sufficiently address the 'hierarchical' or 'multidimensional' nature of human existence. Only a hierarchically structured and multidimensional view of the human sciences will appropriately address the uniqueness of human existence, problems, and related solutions. The human sciences must not only contend with the multiplicity of existence, but, more importantly, clearly acknowledge the multidimensionality or multilevelness of human experience. That is the human sciences must not only adopt a pluralistic metatheoretical orientation, but must also embrace a 'multidimensional' perspective encompassing what Frankl (1967) calls the "noological" (p. 74) or "transcendent" (p. 136) dimension(s) of human existence.

It is regarding this objective that the above mentioned HE writers have concertedly directed their attention and recommendations. The specific implications of these particular metatheoretical developments for the human sciences, and psychotherapy have also been outlined. The development of a hierachically oriented

multidimensional or multilevel framework for the human sciences, will be more fully outlined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
HET's Multidimensional Ontology
and
Dabrowski's Developmental Perspective
Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a metatheoretical perspective of the human sciences which emphasizes the multidimensional or multilevel nature of existence, human problems and related solutions. This multidimensional framework specifically incorporates the Humanistic-Existential Transcendentalism (HET) of Victor Frankl and Kazimierz Dabrowski. HET advocates a philosophical framework which recognizes and emphasizes important ontological distinctions or discontinuities between naturalistic and personalistic dimensions of human existence. This multidimensional approach to reality, the human sciences, and psychotherapy is decidedly antimonistic and personalistic in its philosophical outlook. The multilevel nature of HET rejects both monistic naturalism (materialism/positivism) and monistic nonnaturalism (panpsychism/mysticism). Yet, HET also unequivocally recognizes the material/physiological, psychological/mental, and spiritual/transcendent dimensions of human experience. All of these distinct ontological realms must be incorporated into any metatheoretical approach to the human sciences for it to be regarded as a truly humanizing and nonreductionistic enterprise. A central task of this chapter is to reintroduce a greater conceptual precision within the

human sciences which allows for a more appropriate differentiation of various counselling perspectives within a multidimensional context.

Descriptive Metaphysics, Humanistic-Existential Transcendentalism (HET), and Multidimensional Ontology
Descriptive Metaphysics

In order to facilitate an appropriate "metaphysical reconstruction" (Schumacher, 1976, p. 101) within the human sciences and psychotherapy, it is imperative to depict what is exactly meant by this term, particularly, as articulated within HET thought. MacQuarrie (1987) states that there are various forms of 'metaphysics', two of which are identified as "speculative" and "descriptive" (p. 240) metaphysics. Similarly, Hamlyn (1985) contrasts two basic conceptualizations of metaphysics as "revisionary" and "descriptive" (p. 4) frameworks. Speculative or revisionary metaphysics is characterized by MacQuarrie (1987) as the "traditional sort" (p. 240), most often espoused within monistic and essentialistic philosophies, which attempts "to grasp the supposedly supersensible reality underlying the phenomena of the world" (p. 240). MacQuarrie (1987) defines descriptive metaphysics as a "more modest kind of metaphysics" (p. 240) which only attempts "to describe the general categories under which we understand our world" and "the most general conditions of human experience" (p. 240), Hamlyn (1985) defines descriptive metaphysics as simply an attempt to "describe our conceptual scheme--an account of the matter which has given rise to some speculation about

who the 'we' in questions are" (p. 4). Descriptive metaphysics, MacQuarrie (1987) argues, entails an "existential ontology of a vastly different kind from the speculative ontologies of the older style metaphysics" (p. 273). The primary purpose of descriptive metaphysics is to develop an "existential ontology which might be a modern counterpart to the old-fashioned and largely discredited natural theology" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 273).

The type of metaphysical reconstruction advocated within this study, clearly contrasts with the speculative metaphysics of philosophical idealism. However, MacQuarrie (1987) cautions, all metaphysics are conditioned by history, one's finite point of view, the personality of the metaphysician, and one's particular sensitivities or lack of sensitivities. Therefore, he argues, "no ontology is ever final or completely adequate" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 251). The purpose of this project is to develop a descriptive and multidimensional ontology which provides a more adequate depiction of human existence and which corresponds more closely with the antimonistic and personalistic approach of HET.

Humanistic-Existential Transcendentalism (HET)

The descriptive metaphysics and philosophical orientation of this project--that is its admitted world view--emphasizes both the philosophies of Humanism and Existentialism as its basic metatheoretical foundation. The ontological descriptor 'transcendentalism' is also necessary in order to further specify a particular class or type of humanistic-existential (HE) thought which is

clearly distinguished from other variants of HE world views. Transcendentalism, as incorporated within this particular world view, is also to be contrasted with the 'transcendentalism' of Immanuel Kant.

Humanism. The humanistic dimension of HET has important metatheoretical implications for both the human sciences and related psychotherapies. Halverson (1981) defines humanism as a world view which fundamentally espouses that "human beings, unlike all other creatures, are, in some respects, not merely a part of nature" (p. 481). He further characterizes humanism as a world view which holds "a firm determination that human values and human potentialities shall not get swallowed up in any system that either takes no account of human beings or that makes them something less than they truly are" (Halverson, 1981, p. 436). Halverson (1981) depicts the "touchstone proposition" (p. 417) of humanism as follows:

Whatever may be the whole truth about nature, humanity, and God (if he exists), humanity, at least, is unique and not merely a part of nature. Humanism says, in effect, whatever view of the whole you choose to adopt, I insist that you preserve the uniqueness and dignity of human beings. (p. 417)

Halverson (1981) argues that whether one views humanism from the 'naturalistic' perspective of Jean-Paul Sartre, the 'transcendentalistic' view of Paul Tillich, or the 'theistic' orientation of Blaise Pascal, all these variants of humanism recognize that "human beings are free in a way which is not compatible with universal (monistic) determinism" (p. 436) and "are not 'merely' material entities" (p. 436). Halverson (1981) concludes that

humanists are "ontological dualists in their view of humanity" (p. 436) and regard human beings as profoundly "more than complex physical or biological organisms" (p.436). An essential tenet of humanism, in spite of the influence of both naturalistic and historical determinants, is that human existence is still "to some extent open and undetermined" (p. 437). It is these dimensions of the humanistic world view(s) which have important metatheoretical implications for HET.

Existentialism. The existential component of HET also emphasizes the ontological uniqueness of man. Macquarrie (1987) describes existentialism as a world view which clearly differentiates "man's being and that of the world" (p. 45). Within the existential perspective, Macquarrie (1987) argues, "human existence is set over against the being of the inanimate world" (p. 17), in order to emphasize that "man is 'never' just part of the cosmos" (p. 17). To understand the existential world view is to recognize the radically "historical character of man" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 221). Macquarrie (1987) holds that mankind can never be understood in terms of "process and occurrence" (p. 221) as these are "natural events describable in terms of natural causality" (p. 221). Macquarrie (1987) elaborates:

...historical events are different. They are 'caused' by human agency...The long process of evolution, both cosmic and biological, was natural process, describable in terms of those 'laws of nature' or regularities that the natural sciences discovered; but with the emergence of man, a new factor enters, the historical factor, in virtue of which man's inner life is shaping the world....If the phenomena of history are to be distinguished

from occurrences or process of nature, it would seem clear that the method of studying them must also be different....there has been an attempt to impose on the human sciences those methods which are really only appropriate to the natural sciences. (p. 221-222)

The existentialist's recognition of the 'self as agent' and the 'historical dimension' of human existence, which constitutes the unique 'being of mankind', is clearly differentiated from mere 'natural process' or the 'being of nature'.

In order to emphasize the ontological uniqueness of man, one needs to understand the precise meaning of existence as articulated within existentialism. The word 'existence' itself, MacQuarrie (1987) maintains, should be restricted "to the kind of being exemplified in man" (p. 69) and must be distinguished "from the being of plants, mountains, animals, and whatever else" (p. 69). Existence, in this Kierkegaardian sense, refers to the "unique concrete being of the individual person" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 65) and ontologically constitutes the philosophical orientation of "personalism" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 65). This personalistic approach to human existence, MacQuarrie (1987) adds, emphasizes the uniquely human "autonomy and responsibility of the individual" (p. 21), whereby "freedom, decision, and responsibility...constitute the core of personal being" (p. 16). The personalistic orientation of existentialism eschews both materialism and rationalism in that both of these world views posit some fundamental "'nature' or 'essence' of man" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 15). In contrast,

existentialism asserts that "man's existence precedes his essence...(in) that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world--and defines himself afterwards" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 15). If there is any so-called 'essence' to man it might be best articulated within the Heideggerean view whereby "man's 'essence' lies in his existence" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 71). For these reasons, existentialism turns away from a static or essentialistic view of human existence and conceives of "the self as agent rather than the traditional understanding of the self as subject" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 174). Macquarrie (1987) explains:

The existentialist, then insists on action, for only in action does existence attain concreteness and fullness...action is not mere function or mere activism. For the existentialist, action properly so-called is intensely personal and involves the whole man. It includes both thought and passion. Were thought, passion, and inward decision (will) lacking, there would be nothing worthy of the name action....The existentialist attempts to get away from substantial and static categories to ways of thinking that are more dynamic and more appropriate to a living, changing being...(The individual) is a unity of a 'person' who expresses himself in all these activities or, perhaps better expressed, makes himself in these activities. His actions are more than empirical deeds, for in them he is both projecting and realizing an image of personhood. (pp. 175-176).

These personalistic dimensions of existentialism, emphasizing freedom, decision, and enacted responsibility towards the attainment of authentic selfhood, constitute the existential orientation of HET.

Transcendentalism. The transcendental component of the HET world view differentiates it from both monistic

naturalism/positivism and monistic
 nonnaturalism/panpsychism. Halverson (1981) defines
 transcendentalism as "a world view that attempts to find
 some common ground between theism and naturalism" (p. 487)
 and which posits "a dimension or depth in everything that
 exists" (p. 487) whereby "the complete reality of the
 world is not apparent on the surface of things" (p. 431).
 Halverson (1981) describes this transcendental approach to
 human existence as follows:

Consider yourself. You are, of course, a
 collection of atoms and molecules--material
 entities--that are governed by certain laws.
 Like every physical object, you have a certain
 weight, a certain size, a certain shape, a
 certain specific gravity, a certain
 temperature and so on. You are also an animal
 organism: you are capable of nourishing
 yourself by assimilating nutrients from the
 environment, you are capable of locomotion and
 so on. But you know that you are more than
 this: you are also a mind, a consciousness.
 Your being as a physical entity and as an
 organism is illuminated, so to speak, by the
 spirit that is within you, by the
 consciousness that you 'are'. Deep within
 you, at a level of yourself that the objective
 observer cannot fathom, you are the bearer of
 hopes, fears, dreams, and aspirations that are
 as much a part of the reality that is you as
 are your weight, your blood pressure, and
 whatever "surface facts" you seek to mention.
 (p. 431).

The transcendental and antimonistic ontology of HET is
 metatheoretically incompatible with both the "naive or
 direct realism" (Halverson, 1981, p. 482) of monistic
 materialism (philosophical naturalism) and the "subjective
 idealism or phenomenalism" (Halverson, 1981, p. 106) of
 monistic immaterialism (philosophical nonnaturalism).

HET also reflects an "open humanism" (MacQuarrie,
 1987, p. 28) which acknowledges that "human life is set

within the context of being...(whereby) man does not create being, but receives his existence from being and to being" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 29). Open humanism, MacQuarrie (1987) maintains, is "very much concerned with human values and with the realization of authentic existence" (p. 28). The open humanism of HET insists that "man is transcendent in his being" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 69) in that the individual "is at any moment transcending or going beyond what one is at any moment" (Halverson, 1981, p. 70). It is this uniquely human aspect which allows the individual to "thrust himself into the possibilities of existence" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 70) and which thoroughly constitutes the transcendentalistic or teleological approach of HET. MacQuarrie (1987) explains:

What distinguishes man's 'existing' from biological evolution is that man does not transcend his given situation in terms of 'laws of nature' operating from the outside, but in terms of images of himself which he seeks consciously to realize -- he considers 'the kind of being he is, and what it is that he wants to do and to become'. (p. 70)

It is this 'becoming' and 'self-transcendent' dimension of human existence which constitutes the philosophical core of HET.

Frankl (1967) argues that the HET approach to man and the human sciences "implies both activism and optimism" (p. 31). Therefore, this approach is incompatible with both the extreme negativism of nihilistic existentialism and the extreme passivism, fatalism, and quietism of philosophical idealism. In order to further clarify HET's world view, these important

philosophical and metaclinical distinctions will be briefly examined.

First, the transcendental component of HET distinguishes it from the 'nihilistic' or "closed humanism" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 28) of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism. The naturalistic and atheistic orientation of closed humanism is constituted by its central proposition that "man is the sole creator of meaning and value in the world" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 28). In contrast, HET maintains that self-transcendence denotes not only the individual's ability to experience "being-in-the-world" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 95) but, more importantly, the capacity to discover "an objective world of meanings and values" (Frankl, 1967, p. 51). Frankl (1967) argues that human existence is constituted not just by the fact that "man transcends his environment towards the world" (p. 136) but, more importantly, "transcends his being toward an 'ought'" (p. 136)--what he calls the "realm of the genuinely human" (p. 136) or "the spiritual dimension of being" (p. 73). HET's predominantly 'ethical' and 'oughts' focus is diametrically "opposed to the Sartrean contention that "ideals and values are merely designed and invented by man" (Frankl, 1969, p. 60).

Similarly, Mitchell (1974) is critical of relativistic and subjectivistic approaches to human existence, which he categorically denotes as "unqualified humanism" (p. 69). This rather dubious ethical orientation to human affairs, Mitchell (1974) argues, may be best exemplified by its attempt to evaluate the

"ethical rightness of an act" (p. 69) merely in terms of the type of "subjective experience it arouses" (p. 69). This dehumanizing approach to ethics and human existence ultimately engenders a self-interested hedonism which basically espouses that "one may live by any value system as long as one is willing to assume responsibility for his actions" (Mitchell, 1974, p. 69). In contrast to the value relativism and ethical hedonism of 'unqualified' humanism, Mitchell (1978) recommends the following developments within the human sciences:

It is time humanistic philosophy began to isolate those values and behaviors that genuinely contribute to humanism. Humanism is not a neutral term. It implies that some things are more accordant with the interests of man than others. It also implies that some things are antithetical to the humane interests of man....The humanist who values everyone values no one or no thing. He values only the experiencing of his own valuing. His pursuit of humanism is, in fact, only scantily disguised hedonism. (p. 69)

Value subjectivism and moral relativism, as evidenced within the 'unqualified' humanism of Sartrean existentialism, are incompatible with the ethical outlook and metatheoretical perspective of HET.

Secondly, the personalistic approach of HET is also decidedly different from the monistic view of philosophical idealism. The ontological approach of HET, which emphasizes that "man does not simply exist but must also decide his existence" (Frankl, 1962, p. 31), maintains that there is a "tension inherent in being human" (Frankl, 1967, p. 32) engendered by the fact that the being of man and nature are irrevocably different.

Frankl (1962) describes this "inner tension as an ontological gap between 'is' and 'ought'" (p. 104) whereby a human being is "confronted with both the objectivity of the world (immanence) as well as the objectivity of meaning (transcendence)" (Frankl, 1969, p. 52). The antimonistic approach of HET emphasizes that the individual "cannot overcome the dichotomy between subject and object" (Frankl, 1969, p. 50) nor should the "tension between reality and ideals of the 'I am' and the 'I ought'" (p. 51) ever be eradicated. This ontological gap, described by MacQuarrie (1987) as an ever present tension between "facticity and possibility" (p. 192), constitutes the "essence of existence" (Frankl, 1967, p. 74) and allows for the uniquely human capacity for 'self-transcendence'. Furthermore, Frankl (1967) maintains, "meaning must not coincide with being" because "meaning sets the pace for being" and "existence falters unless it is lived in terms of transcendence towards something beyond itself" (p. 12). It is from within this transcendental or teleological framework that HET directly attacks the modern "ethos of survivalism" (Lasch, 1984, p. 59), with its bureaucratic and utilitarian approach to human affairs.

The transcendental component of human existence, Frankl (1978) asserts, also places an "emphasis on the present" (p. 102) and constitutes "the opposite...of quietism which, in the tradition of St. Augustine, holds that eternity rather than the present is the true reality"

(pp. 102-103). Frankl (1978) denotes this quietist and fatalistic approach to ontology as follows:

According to quietism, time is imaginary and the past, the present, and the future are mere illusions of our consciousness. Everything exists simultaneously. Events do not follow each other in a temporal sequence, but what appears to be a temporal sequence is only a self-deception caused by our consciousness gliding along the "events," i.e., the individual aspects of the unchanging reality, which do not follow each other but really coexist....quietism by necessity leads to fatalism: if everything already "is", nothing can be changed and there is no point to action. This fatalism, born out of a belief in an unchangeable 'being', has its counterpart in the pessimism of (nihilistic) existentialism, which is the consequence of the belief that everything is unstable and changing. (p. 103)

Correspondingly, May (1983) differentiates the world views of Sartrean existentialism (nihilism) and Platonic idealism (quietism) by their respective emphasis and deemphasis of 'becoming' versus 'being'. Platonic idealism focuses on 'being' and deemphasizes 'becoming', while Sartrean existentialism exclusively focuses on 'becoming' and negates 'being'. May (1983) regards both of these as misrepresentations of the true nature of human existence. His approach to ontology, which incorporates both 'being' and 'becoming' into our understanding of human existence, is described as follows:

The tendency in the United States is to contrast 'being' with 'becoming'...Becoming is believed to represent the dynamic, the moving, the changing condition, in contrast to what is wrongly considered the static quality of being. I believe this is an error....human psychology is always more than biology....(and) the values of human life never come about automatically. The human being 'can lose his own being by his own choices', as a tree or stone cannot. Affirming one's own being creates the values of life. Individuality, worth, and dignity are not 'gegeben'. i.e., given us as data by nature, but

'aufgegeben'--i.e., given or assigned us as a task which we must solve.' This is an emphasis which likewise comes out in Tillich's belief that courage opens the way to being: if you do not have 'the courage to be', you lose your own being...you 'are' your choices. (May, 1983, pp. 80-81)

May's (1987) ontological framework is highly concordant with the metaphysical perspective of HET.

Finally, HET's ontological approach, in contrast to Sartrean existentialism and Platonic idealism, may also be identified by its orientation towards the 'future' and, therefore, ultimate 'ends'. This teleological approach to human existence requires one to "'shake up' and change the future--and with the future, in the future, we can change even ourselves" (Frankl, 1967, p. 104). Frankl (1987) encapsulates the metatheoretical approach of HET by characterizing it as taking "a middle position between (Platonic) quietism and (nihilistic) existentialism" (p. 103). The ethical orientation of HET advocates that the human sciences must begin by identifying, supporting, and instilling, as previously outlined by Mitchell (1974), "those values and behaviors which genuinely contribute to humanism" (p. 69) and the "humane interests of man" (p. 69). Frankl (1967) defines the metatheoretical orientation of HET as constituting a "height psychology" (p. 18), whereby individuals are encouraged to transcend their own self-interests and to "live, and die, for some aim nobler and better than themselves" (p. 18). This approach to human existence, the human sciences, and psychotherapy would ultimately teach that "ideals are the very stuff of survival" (Frankl, 1967, p. 18).

Multidimensional Ontology

Overview. The descriptive metaphysics of HET, with its antinomic and personalistic approach to human existence, advocates an ontological perspective which is significantly different from traditional ontologies. The evolution of this multidimensional ontology, as an alternative world view, follows from HET's commitment toward recognizing the uniqueness of human existence and preserving this fact within a more appropriate and humanizing metaphysics. However, before outlining the characteristics of HET's multidimensional ontology, it is necessary to examine briefly the more traditional metaphysics that preceded it.

Traditional ontologies. Traditional ontologies have unfortunately tended to depict the totality of existence within what Osborne and Angus (1989) have described as four basic and considerably different "root metaphors" (p. 4) or "world views" (p. 5). Osborne and Angus (1989) depict these "four world views" (p. 4) as: a) Mechanicism, b) Organicism, c) Contextualism, and d) Formism. Each of these disparate metaphysical root metaphors or world views will be described in order to philosophically differentiate them from the multidimensional ontology of HET.

The world view of 'mechanicism' conceptualizes the world "as a machine, composed of elements which can be reductively analyzed" (Osborne & Angus, 1989). Angeles (1981) depicts the central metaphysical postulate of mechanicism as stipulating that "all phenomena (natural,

biological, psychological) are physical and can be explained in terms of material changes (matter in motion)" (p. 167). Furthermore, Angeles (1981) characterizes mechanicism as being fundamentally opposed to "animism" (p. 167), stating that "the interaction of parts with other parts within a whole (or system) unintentionally produces purposive activity" (p. 167) whereby "the whole is neither ontologically prior to the parts nor causally efficacious upon them but merely the sum total of the interacting parts" (p. 167). Finally, Angeles (1981) argues, the mechanistic world view is fundamentally opposed to "vitalism and teleology" (p. 167) in that mechanicism maintains "all phenomena can be explained in terms of the principles by which machines (mechanical systems) are explained without recourse to intelligence as an operating cause or principle" (p. 167).

Mechanicism also promotes an approach to the human sciences which Reber (1985) calls "physicalism" (p. 547). Physicalism, Reber (1985) maintains, espouses "a philosophical point of view that all scientific propositions can be expressed in the terminology of the physical sciences" (p. 547). Similarly, Angeles (1981) defines physicalism as "the theory that the language of any science is (should be) translatable into a language containing terms and concepts that refer only to empirically observable and testable characteristics" (p. 212). The world view of mechanicism has been most often associated with the monistic ideology of Physicalism.

Osborne and Angus (1989) describe the second root metaphor as "organicism" (p. 5) which advocates an approach to ontology that conceptualizes "the world as purposeful organic processes which can be both quantitative and qualitative" (p. 5) in nature. Correspondingly, Angeles (1981) depicts organicism as "any theory that explains the universe on the basis of a living organism" (p. 200) and "as the function of a whole causing and coordinating the activities of the parts" (p. 200). Reber (1985) defines organicism as "any of several theoretical approaches that emphasize the need to view a behaving organism as a biological entity, one which must be approached as the coordinated functioning of a multitude of interrelated processes" (p. 500). The organismic ontology, Reber (1985) maintains, is "uniformly 'monistic'" (p. 500) thereby "rejecting mind-body dualism" (p. 500) and "tends to focus on larger, more molar analyses to the relative neglect of reductionistic analyses" (p. 500). The vitalistic ontology of organicism can be conceived as representing the opposite philosophical position of mechanism and ontologically constitutes what Reber (1985) has called "Biologism" (p. 93). Biologism fundamentally represents a monistic ideology where there has been a predominant "use of biological principles as a basis for describing and explaining human behavior" (Reber, 1985, p. 93).

Osborne and Angus (1989) describe the third root metaphor or world view as "contextualism" (p. 5). Contextualism conceives of the world as "events, where

change and novelty characterize the temporality of events" (p. 5). Osborne and Angus (1989) hold that contextualism advocates a world view which eschews both the epistemological "absolutisms of realism and idealism" (p. 4). This metatheoretical approach to humanity and the human sciences espouses a "methodological pluralism" (Osborne & Angus, 1989, p. 16) and a "relativistic approach to knowledge and behavior" (Osborne & Angus, 1989, p. 17). Reber (1985) defines contextualism as "any theoretical view maintaining that all behavior must be analyzed within the context which it occurs, that to interpret any act independent of context will ultimately be misleading" (p. 153).

Contextualism can also be characterized as a variant of what Reber (1985) has termed "phenomenalism" (p. 541). Phenomenalism advocates "the philosophical point of view that knowledge and understanding are limited to 'appearances', to ways in which objects and events are perceived, that true reality of that which is phenomenological is unknowable" (Reber, 1985, p. 541). Therefore, contextualism essentially espouses a "philosophical doctrine that advocates that the scientific study of immediate experience be the basis of psychology" (Reber, 1985, p. 541) with its focus directed toward "events, occurrences, happenings, etc. as one experiences them with a minimum regard for external, physical reality and for the so-called 'scientific biases' of the natural sciences" (Reber, 1985, p. 541). Contextualism's introspective and phenomenological approach to existence

metatheoretically constitutes the pluralistic ideology of Phenomenalism.

Osborne and Angus (1989) identify the final root metaphor or world view as 'formism' (p. 5). Formism is a metatheoretical orientation which contends "the world is forms or patterns which are apprehended through phenomenal experience" (Osborne & Angus, 1989, p. 5). Reber (1985) labels this particular approach to ontology as metatheoretical "idealism" (p. 340). Idealism espouses "a philosophical doctrine that the ultimate reality is mental and that this mental representation forms the basis of all experience and knowledge" (Reber, 1985, p. 340) and, therefore, "it is meaningless to speak of the existence of things independent of their perception and experiencing by a conscious observer" (Reber, 1985, p. 340). The 'immaterialist' or 'mentalistic' orientation of idealism is to be directly "contrasted with 'realism'" (p. 340) which posits that "the physical world has a reality separate from perception and mind" (p. 616). Angeles (1981) characterizes "absolute idealism" (p. 120) as a "monistic or pantheistic philosophy" (p. 120) which contends that "the universe is an embodiment of mind" (p. 120) whereby "all reality is mental (spiritual or psychical)" (p. 120). The monistic "mentalism or immaterialism" (Reber, 1985, p. 120) of idealism holds that all of reality "can be explained in terms of such psychic phenomena as minds, selves, spirits, ideas, Absolute Thought, etc., rather than matter" (p. 120). The metatheoretical orientation of formism, therefore,

constitutes the monistic ideology of Idealism or Immaterialism.

HET rejects the philosophical monisms of Materialism, Organicism and Immaterialism. It also rejects the pluralistic approach of Contextualism or Phenomenalism. The ontological orientation of HET maintains that the totality of existence can never be appropriately described, examined, and conveyed within any one of these approaches to ontology, whether construed within the Physicalism of Mechanicism, the Biologism of Organicism, the Contextualism of Phenomenalism, or the Formism of Idealism.

Similarly, Frankl (1969) maintains the unilevel approach of modern science, which engenders such reductionistic world views, really constitutes a predominant and, too often, unrecognized bias within the human sciences. This metatheoretical bias or ontological distortion lies at the root of problems within the human sciences. Whether viewed from the materialist and organismic biases of naturalism, the contextual bias of phenomenism, or the immaterialist bias of idealism, all these approaches have fundamentally adhered to a unidimensional or 'horizontal' approach to ontology--what has been previously termed by this writer as 'metatheoretical acrophobia'. Each of these root metaphors or world views may be said to constitute a unique metatheoretical 'overgeneralization' as a result of its overspecialized and limited approach to ontology. Frankl (1969) explains:

What is dangerous is the attempt of a man who is an 'expert', say, in the field of biology, to understand and explain human beings exclusively in terms of biology. The same is true of psychology and sociology as well. At the moment at which totality is claimed, biology becomes biologism, psychology become psychologism, and sociology becomes sociologism. In other words, at that moment science is turned into ideology. What we have to deplore, I would say, is not only that 'scientists are specializing' but that the 'specialists are generalizing'....we must become acquainted with a type I would like to call 'terrible generalizateurs'. I mean those who cannot resist the temptation to make overgeneralized statements on limited findings. (p. 21)

Thus, Physicalism/Mechanicism, Biologism/Organicism, Phenomenalism/Contextualism, and Idealism/Immaterialism can be philosophically construed as ontological overgeneralizations which, in and of themselves, perpetuate profoundly simplistic, reductionistic, and erroneous world views. Frankl (1969) has previously attacked the "nothing-but-ness" (p. 21) of such reductionistic approaches to ontology as constituting modernity's "mask of nihilism" (p. 21). These various world views or philosophical frameworks constitute the antithesis to HET's antimonistic and multidimensional approach to ontology. Although each world view offers some important insights into a particular dimension or realm of reality, the totality of existence is not adequately envisioned within any one of them. In particular, the uniquely human dimension of existence, as previously outlined within the metatheoretical perspective of HET, has been poorly and reductively represented. The multidimensional approach of HET more adequately addresses

the metatheoretical insufficiencies of Physicalism, Biologism, Phenomenalism, and Idealism.

HET's multidimensional ontology. The metatheoretical approach of HET emphasizes what Frankl (1967) has envisaged as a "multidimensional view" (p. 75) of existence. A multidimensional approach to ontology "emphasizes the manifold character of body-mind-spirit within the unity of human existence" (Frankl, 1967, p. 135). The recognition of these distinct realms or dimensions of existence is incorporated into HET's world view called "dimensional ontology" (Frankl, 1969, p. 23). Dimensional ontology, Frankl (1967) argues, eschews unidimensional or monistic approaches to ontology which inevitably confuse or totally negate "different dimensions of being" through their "neglect of ontological differences" (p. 114). Frankl (1967) elaborates:

A multidimensional view enables us to avoid not only psychologism (naturalism) but also noologism (spiritualism). Spiritualism is no less a one-sided world view than materialism. Monism, be it spiritual or material, does not so much disclose the onesidedness of the world as it betrays the onesidedness of its own view. (p. 75)

The multidimensional ontology of HET would suggest that it is as ontologically incorrect to 'homunculize' the natural world as it is to totally 'naturalize' human existence. Both of these approaches to ontology unequivocally commit what Wilber (1983) has called "category error" (p. 7)- -that is the metatheoretical negation, distortion, and confusion of important and qualitatively different categories of being.

The depiction of the totality of existence as constituting some kind of 'amorphous ontological homogeneity', whether espoused within the touchstone propositions of philosophical naturalism or nonnaturalism, is diametrically opposed to HET's multidimensional approach to ontology. HET's multidimensional framework constitutes what Reber (1985) denotes as a "personalistic approach" (p. 309) to ontology that is "contrasted with naturalistic approaches which stress the role of social, cultural, and intellectual" (p. 309) factors as principal determinants of human behavior.

This multidimensional approach necessitates the ontological separation and demarcation of what Frankl (1978) has called "the realm of nature" (p. 22) and "the realm of spirit" (p. 22). HET advocates a philosophical framework which requires the recognition of an "ontological hiatus which separates these two distinct regions within the total structure of the human being" (Frankl, 1975, p. 27). HET's dimensional ontology, at the very least, incorporates a dualistic view of reality which posits that "on one side is existence and on the other side is whatever belongs to facticity" (Frankl, 1975, p. 27). Frankl (1975) describes ontological facticity as comprising "the physiological (body) as well as the psychological (mind)" and, therefore, "contains both somatic and psychic 'facts'" (p. 27). On the other side of this dualism Frankl (1975) maintains, lies "existence" (p. 27) defined as "the existential, personal, spiritual core" (p. 28) of our being. This philosophical dualism

does not imply some form of ontological division between mind and body but an ontological separation of the realms of "facticity and possibility" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 192)-what Frankl (1969) has also characterized as a necessary distinction between "reality and ideals or the 'I am' and the 'I ought'" (p. 51). Dimensional ontology's fundamental dualism exists between "spiritual existence versus psycho-physical facticity" (Frankl, 1975, p. 28) or the realms of 'natural processes' (facticity/naturalism) versus uniquely human 'freedom, choice, and responsibility' (existence/nonnaturalism).

HET's multidimensional ontology also conceptualizes the totality of human existence as being comprised of various strata or layers which, Frankl (1969) maintains, distinguishes "ontological differences between body, mind, and spirit by conceiving of them in terms of qualitative rather than quantitative differences" (p. 22). The multilevel orientation of HET's dimensional ontology further distinguishes "the more or less peripheral biological and psychological layers from the central personal one--the spiritual axis" (Frankl, 1969, p. 22). It is in this sense, Frankl (1969) argues, dimensional ontology "helps us to understand what is meant by higher and lower" (p. 74) and is in direct contrast to traditional science "which cannot cope with reality in its multidimensionality but must deal with it as if it were unidimensional" (p. 29). In their attempt to establish a monistic view of reality, materialistic and idealistic essentialisms overemphasize particular dimensions of being

while totally negating others. Both of these monistic ontologies are totally rejected by HET's antimonistic and personalistic approach to human existence. The multidimensional holism of HET is clearly differentiated from the 'essentialistic monism' or 'monistic holism' of philosophical naturalism and nonnaturalism.

HET specifically focuses on what Frankl (1975) has termed the "autonomy of spiritual existence" (p. 23) in order to "indicate that we are dealing with specifically human phenomenon (in contrast to subhuman phenomenon we share with other animals)" (p. 23). Frankl (1975) holds that this spiritual or noological dimension of existence refers only to "what is human in man" and "is used here without any religious connotations" (p. 23). The spiritual or noetic dimension is only realized through the individual's uniquely human capacity for "self-transcendence" (Frankl, 1969, p. 18). Frankl (1969) maintains that mankind enters the "noological dimension whenever he is reflecting upon himself or whenever he exhibits being conscientious" (p. 18). This spiritual aspect is predominantly demonstrated through the "uniquely human capacity to rise above oneself, to judge and evaluate one's own deeds in moral and ethical terms" (Frankl, 1969, p. 18). Frankl (1969) explains:

...man enters the dimension of the noetic (spiritual), in counterdistinction to the somatic and psychic...(when)...he becomes capable of taking a stand not only towards the world but also towards himself. Man is capable of reflecting on, and even rejecting himself. He can be his own judge, the judge of his deeds. In short, the specifically human phenomena linked with one another, self-consciousness and conscience, would not be understandable unless

we interpret man in terms of a being capable of detaching himself from himself, leaving the "plane" of the biological and psychological, passing into the "space" of the noological. This specifically human dimension, what I have entitled noological, is not assessable to a beast...An adequate view of man can only be properly formulated when it goes beyond homeostasis, beyond self-actualization, to the sphere of human existence in which man chooses what he will do and be in the midst of an objective world of meaning and values....If we want to obtain an appropriate view of human reality in its full dimensionality we must go beyond both necessities and possibilities and bring in...that dimension which can be referred to as the "I ought" (Frankl, 1969, pp. 3, 51, 54)

It is this uniquely human capacity to experience and choose one's existence in spiritual or ethical terms which allows the individual to be "ultimately self-determining" (Frankl, 1967, p. 61). It is only within this dimension, Frankl (1967) argues, that the individual "determines not only his fate but his own self" (p. 61), through the "steadily molding and forging of his own character" (p. 61). This human capacity to shape one's character and existence, through ethical choices and decisions, categorically demonstrates what Frankl (1969) has termed the "ontological difference between noetic and psychic (or)...spirit and mind" (p. 2). It is for these reasons that HET advocates an 'ethical activism' in its approach to human existence.

HET's multidimensional ontology, which recognizes ontological differences between body, mind, and spirit, also conceives of the totality of human existence as representing a hierarchical or increasingly encompassing composite of these various realms. Although recognizing

the ontological distinctiveness of each realm, none of these dimensions of reality can be regarded as being what Frankl (1975) has termed "mutually exclusive" (p. 13). This does not negate the fact that particular dimensions of existence are considered 'higher' or more 'distinctively human' than other realms. Frankl (1975) explains:

A higher dimension, by definition, is a more inclusive one. The lower dimension is included within the higher one, it is subsumed in it and encompassed by it. Thus biology is overarched by psychology, psychology by noology, and noology by theology. (p. 13)

It is within this multidimensional context, envisioned as increasingly encompassing somatic, psychological, and spiritual dimensions, that man experiences "determinism in the somatic and psychological dimensions and freedom in the noological dimension" (Frankl, 1978, p. 47). It is only within the noological or spiritual dimension that the individual experiences "freedom in spite of determinism" (Frankl, 1975, p. 47). Although being "subject to biological, psychological, and sociological conditions" (Frankl, 1975, p. 48), the individual is not only subject to these determinants but also "these conditions are subject to his decision" (Frankl, 1975, p. 48). Frankl (1975) maintains the human sciences must come to recognize the "'no-thingness' of the human being" (p. 55) and that "a human being is not one thing among other things" (p. 55). This profoundly important ontological distinction necessitates the recognition that "things determine each other--man, however, determines himself" (Frankl, 1975, p.

55). For these reasons HET advocates that "being human is not being driven but 'deciding what one is going to be'" (Frankl, 1975, p. 26). It is this higher dimension of human existence which fundamentally constitutes the spiritual or noological dimension of reality and is clearly differentiated from both the somatic and psychological realms.

HET's multidimensional structuralism can also be used as a metatheoretical framework for reorganizing the various contradictory world views into a more encompassing and humanizing ontology. As a result of the human sciences negating profoundly important ontological differences, each science has tended to only "cut out a cross section of reality" (Frankl, 1969, p. 45) resulting in a metatheoretical pluralism where "each individual science depicts reality in such different ways that the pictures contradict each other" (Frankl, 1969, p. 45).

Rather than viewing Mechanicism, Organicism, Contextualism, and Formism as distinct and mutually exclusive world views, one can metatheoretically restructure each of them within a more encompassing and cohesive metaphysics. Each of these disparate world views can be more appropriately reorganized and subsumed within a multidimensional and hierarchically restructured ontology as follows: Mechanicism/Physicalism is overarched by Organicism/Biologism, Organicism/Biologism by Contextualism/Phenomenalism, and Contextualism/Phenomenalism by Formism/Idealism. Each of these world views, therefore, can be said to represent

only a cross section or realm of reality, while none, in and of itself, can appropriately address the full dimensionality of existence. This hierarchical and multidimensional orientation to metaphysics fundamentally constitutes HET's 'descriptive' and 'antimonistic' approach to ontology.

Dabrowski's Developmental Perspective, Positive Disintegration, and Levels of Emotional Development
Dabrowski's Developmental Perspective

Overview. Kazimierz Dabrowski's developmental perspective represents a further elaboration of HET's descriptive metaphysics and multidimensional ontology. Dabrowski's theory is particularly important due to its recognition of and emphasis on the higher or uniquely human levels of development. These higher developmental levels essentially depict a more 'qualified' humanism which elucidates those types of values and behaviors that might serve as exemplars for human conduct and development. This developmental perspective also provides a multidimensional framework which would integrate the various and often contradictory world views into a more inclusive and cohesive ontology.

In order to counteract our seemingly persistent failure to recognize and acknowledge the ontological uniqueness of human existence, this multidimensional framework can also be used to identify dehumanizing tendencies within the human sciences. Such theoretical insights might better provide the psychological theorist, teacher, researcher, and practitioner with a more

humanizing and, therefore, more appropriate framework for understanding the multidimensional nature of human problems, and related solutions.

Philosophical orientation. Dabrowski (1973) describes his "philosophical point of view" as fundamentally constituting a "personalistic and antimonistic" (p. 85) approach to ontology. Dabrowski's (1973) developmental framework espouses a "multilevel notion of reality" (p. 1) where reality is defined as including "everything which can be perceived by the senses, as well as, through the co-operation of thinking and emotion" (p. 1). This multidimensional approach to reality encompasses "everything which is accessible to man" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 5) including that which is experienced during "states of contemplation or mystical experience, even if not given in sensory experience" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 1). A multilevel conceptualization, certainly as advocated within Dabrowski's (1973) ontology, incorporates both "external and internal reality of various levels" (p. 5). These differing levels, which are accessed through various means such as "sensory perception, imagination, intellectual, intuitive, emotional, or combined operations" (p. 5), constitute the philosophical foundation of Dabrowski's descriptive and multidimensional ontology.

Dabrowski's (1970) developmental perspective comprises a dualistic ontology that depicts a "philosophical dualism of higher and lower, of good and bad, of spirit and matter" (p. 76). This philosophical

dualism necessitates making an ontological distinction between what Dabrowski (1973) contrasts as "concrete reality" and "theoretical" or "higher reality" (p. 2). Concrete or 'lower level' reality is construed as that "which is grasped by the senses" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 3) and constitutes 'psychophysical facticity' or "what is" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 2). In contrast, theoretical or 'higher level' reality consists of "what ought to be" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 6) and is principally constituted by objective moral values and ideals. This important differentiation, what Dabrowski (1973) portrays as a necessary "dualism between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'" (p. 36) or "between the ideal, absolute, on the one hand and the more primitive, biological, and instinctive on the other hand" (p. 36), characterizes the philosophical dualism of Dabrowski's HET ontology.

This dualism is further illustrated through Dabrowski's (1967, 1970) differentiation of the "biological" and "suprabiological" (p. 63) or "heteronomous" and "autonomous" (p. 11) realms of existence. The biological or heteronomous realm hierarchically constitutes a 'lower level' reality which is "biologically (organismically) and socially (environmentally) determined" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 16). This lower level or heteronomous realm is characterized largely by reactive or unreflective types of behavior which constitutes a more basic and limited (amoral) approach to existence. Webster's (1973) dictionary defines 'heteronomy' as that which is "subject to

something else; esp: a lack of moral freedom or self-determination" (p. 533). The heteronomous or psychophysical realm of being constitutes a level of existence which human beings share with other organisms.

Alternatively, the autonomous or suprabiological realm constitutes a 'uniquely human' level of being where existence is neither determined by biological (organismic) or environmental (mechanistic) factors. Dabrowski (1970), reflecting a Kierkegaardian approach to ontology, qualitatively distinguishes the autonomous realm of existence by its emphasis towards "self-conscious" and "self-controlled" (p. 5) behavior. Here, existence is experienced as having profoundly important ethical and moral implications and, therefore, "depends increasingly upon deliberate and authentic acts of choice" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 5). This higher level or autonomous dimension of being is attained through the individual's struggles with and increasing separation from the controlling influences of heteronomous or "biopsychological" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 60) determinants. Thus human development, Dabrowski (1970) maintains, necessitates a significant movement "towards moral self-determination" (p. 78) and the development of an "authentic self" (p. 78). This development of character or higher level personality is facilitated, in part, through one's increasing "sensitivity to meaning in life, to existential, and even transcendental concerns, hierarchies of values, intuition, mystical experiences" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 36) and the gradual realization of one's "personality ideal"

(Dabrowski, 1970, p. 5). It is the contrasting of the heteronomous and autonomous realms of being which constitutes the multilevel, and antimonistic orientation of Dabrowski's HET philosophy.

Dabrowski's (1970) philosophical approach rejects both the naturalism of 'materialism' and the "nihilistic liberatinism" (p. 120) of 'unqualified' humanism. Combating what Dabrowski (1970) refers to as the "twentieth century crisis in moral philosophy" (p. 122) and the "moral skepticism" (p. 122) of modernity, his human science perspective advocates a "normative-evaluative" (p. 2) approach to human affairs. This normative-evaluative orientation is specifically engendered to counteract what he has termed "the dangerous bifurcation between the method of science and the method of ethics" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 7). The ethical focus of Dabrowski's model transcends the metatheoretical and ethical limitations of unilevel approaches to empiricism. Dabrowski (1975) alternatively proposes a "multilevel empiricism" (p. 8) which advocates a multidimensional approach to ontology and a 'transcendentalistic' realism.

Multilevel empiricism or transcendentalistic realism entails both an "existentio-essentialist" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 127) and "empirico-normative" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 116) approach to human existence and the human sciences. By 'existentio-essentialist' Dabrowski refers to a view of human existence which incorporates both 'existential' and 'essentialist' elements into its ontology. The existential dimension of this

multidimensional framework is reflected in Dabrowski (1973) making the ontological distinction that "existence is prior to essence" (p. 20). This profoundly important ontological distinction entails that "mankind chooses his existence" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 16) and supports existentialism's basic axiom that "one's 'essence'...arises from one's existence" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 22). The choosing of one's essence involves the development of a "critical awareness of oneself and other people" (p. 22), particularly, in terms of ethical and moral considerations. This choosing of one's essence, which increasingly necessitates the ability to distinguish between "'what is' and 'what ought to be'" (p. 22), is called the "process of hierarchization" (p. 22). The hierarchization or moral transformation of one's personality, and therefore one's existence, constitutes the Dabrowskian developmental process.

Correspondingly, the 'essentialist' component of Dabrowski's (1967) philosophical framework is demonstrated in his view of human existence as necessitating "the preservation of man as a spiritual being" which "emphasizes moral action" (p. 48). This 'existentialist' approach to 'essentialism' is most clearly emphasized in Dabrowski's (1967) conceptualization of "personality as the synthesis of essential human values in man" (p. 9). The author's transcendentalistic humanism is illustrated in his depiction of human existence, personality development, and mental health as a progressive "adaptation towards exemplary values and actions"

(Dabrowski, 1964, p. 113) or "transcendent concerns and moral ideals" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 33).

The moral and ethical focus of this developmental theory characterizes it as philosophically advocating not only an 'empirical' (descriptive) but, as importantly, a 'normative' (prescriptive) approach to human existence. The "normative-evaluative" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 2) component of the theory is reflected in its conceptualization of human existence as a "normative reality which entails an adjustment to 'oughts' and a maladjustment to 'is'" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 58). Here, human existence is regarded as being both "normative" and "teleological" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 44) in nature, whereby, the development of personality necessitates the uniquely human "process of shaping character" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 141). The developmental shaping of one's character involves ethical decisions which entail one's existence becoming increasingly more "self-conscious, self-affirmed, and self-educated" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 58). This type of characterological transformation, which emphasizes the "extra-biological character of the self" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 42), necessitates a fundamental metamorphosis in personality from "heterodeterminism" to "autodeterminism" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 108). This transformation of one's character, Dabrowski (1967) holds, requires an ontological shift from "biological determinism to psychological indeterminism to moral determinism" (p. 132)--that is towards ethically chosen and existentially affirmed "exemplary values" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. xvi).

Transposing Osborne and Angus' (1989) topography of world views onto Dabrowski's multidimensional (HET) ontology, this developmental shift can also be depicted as a metatheoretical transition from Physicalism to Biologism, from Biologism to Phenomenalism, and finally, from Phenomenalism to Idealism. However, Idealism in the Dabrowskian sense is meant to metatheoretically reflect the HET approach of 'existentio-essentialist' or 'transcendentalistic' humanism.

Finally, Dabrowski's (1970) ontology is a "humanistic model" (p. 17) which is demonstrated through his assertion that "man differs from all other organisms" (p. 118) and, therefore, "human development is distinct from all other kinds of development" (p. 16). This humanistic approach to ontology emphasizes the uniquely human capacity for "turning away from basic organismic needs and drives" (Dabrowski, 1975, p. 132) and to orient oneself towards what he calls the "transcendental sphere" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 155). Dabrowski's transcendentalistic and personalistic approach to humanism is to be clearly distinguished from the philosophical monism of both Western idealism and Eastern mysticism. The metatheoretical differences between transcendentalistic humanism (HET) and philosophical Idealism have already been outlined by Frankl (1967, 1978) and May (1983).

This writer's admitted bias and interpretation of the HET perspective rejects all forms of mysticism, realizing that there also exist HE world views which include forms of mysticism. Reflecting many of the views of Frankl

(1967, 1969, 1978), Dabrowski's HET ontology is also to be distinguished from the monistic ontologies of Eastern mysticism. Dabrowski's (1973) transcendentalistic and multilevel (HET) perspective of humanism is "opposed to unilevel approaches" (p. ix) to human existence and the human sciences. This is demonstrated in Dabrowski's (1973) basic metatheoretical position that "from a philosophical point of view the author presents a personalistic and antimonistic attitude" (p. 85). In fact, the author has specifically developed his "transcendental interpretation" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 125) of humanism and human existence in order to precisely "protect against unilateral mysticism, against quietism, or an excessive retiring into one's internal life" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 25). Dabrowski (1973) may be interpreted as rejecting Eastern mysticism, both as a basic philosophical perspective and religious orientation, because its ontological framework tends to promote the "obliteration of differences between I and non-I" (p. 125) as well as advocating the "'complete unification' with the Supreme Being" (p. 125). Dabrowski's (1973) "rejection of monistic tendencies" (p. 125) reflects Paul Tillich's (1952) transcendentalistic humanism and its basic axiological invocation that "Eastern mysticism is not the solution to the problems of Western Existentialism" (p. 186). Similarly, Hazel Barnes (1978), in her comparison of the philosophies of humanistic-existentialism and Eastern mysticism, concludes:

Much of what I object to in Eastern mysticism stems from two basic positions: its view on

"desire" (the annihilation of desire) and its attitude towards basic human relations (which) result in an extreme asceticism and quietism....Eastern philosophy promises a higher irrationality which transcends the admitted limitation of human reason and opens the door to an infinite expansion of consciousness. It is my belief that this promise is an invitation to avoid working to achieve such progress as reason can make, despite its restrictions, and a temptation to escape the burden of responsibility which inevitably accompanies individual consciousness. It is neither self-expansion nor self-realization but a refusal to engage any longer in pursuing or making a self. (pp. 276-277)

Barnes' (1978) critique of Eastern mysticism exemplifies the differences in philosophical perspective between these two divergent approaches to reality, personality development, and the self. Dabrowski's HET perspective advocates an 'ethical' approach to human existence, personality development and the human sciences, which emphasizes the importance of 'moral' struggle in our understanding of the human predicament, whereas "Eastern writers admit that ethics as such is primarily the concern of 'dualistic philosophers'" (Barnes, 1978, p. 276).

Theory of Positive Disintegration

Positive Disintegration theory (Dabrowski, 1964, 1966, 1967; Dabrowski, Kawczak, & Piechowski, 1970; Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977) provides a much needed reconceptualization of human development as well as an axiological revisioning of the human sciences within an ethical context. This dualistic approach to ontology conceives of development as being initially organismically driven but, ultimately, ethically oriented. Positive disintegration theory, reflecting the existential

philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard, also emphasizes the emotional-subjective aspect of human existence in order to counteract the objectivistic biases of previous materialist and rationalist approaches to human development. The multidimensional orientation of Dabrowski's theory of development recognizes the ontological uniqueness of both mankind's "inner psychic milieu" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 81) and transcendent capacity for "moral self-determination" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 78).

These central constituents of positive disintegration theory reflect Dabrowski's commitment to a personalistic and antimonistic approach to human development and psychotherapy. Other prominent characteristics of his model, paralleling Hague's (1984) theoretical analysis of Dabrowski's developmental theory, are briefly outlined below.

Human development as an ontological transition from
amic-intrapsychic (organismic) process to existentio-
ethical (moral) transcendency. The antimonistic orientation of Dabrowski's theory is reflected in its dualistic approach to ontology which hierarchically integrates and emphasizes both an 'intrapsychic-organismic' and 'existentio-ethical' approach to human development. This ontological dualism emphasizes both the "orthogenetic principle" (Crain, 1985, p. 67) of Werner's 'organismic' naturalism and the "ethical-religious" (Barrett, 1962, p. 165) stance of Soren Kierkegaard's 'existentialism'. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize both the 'organismic-naturalistic' and

'existential-nonnaturalistic' components of Dabrowski's developmental model.

Dabrowski's structuralist approach to personality development defines this process as a "non-ontogenetic pattern of individual growth" where "the evolution of structures underlying the organization of behavior...determines the particular level of development" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 12). The organismic or process component of Dabrowski's theory is established through his adaptation of Werner's 'orthogenic' approach to development. Here, lower level developmental changes are principally governed by both external (environmental) and, increasingly, internal (intrapsychic) transformations within the personality or self. Therefore, lower or less advanced levels of development are principally biopsychological in nature where personality growth is increasingly engendered by 'organismic' processes. These initial structural changes within the individual's psyche are predominantly epigenetic in nature and proceed developmentally from a "state of relative differentiation to increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration" (Werner & Kaplan, 1956, p. 866). This gradual transformation of the 'self', involving both quantitative (continuous) and qualitative (discontinuous) intrapsychic change, allows for the personality to come increasingly "under the control of higher regulating centers" (Crain, 1985, p. 68).

At the higher levels of development (Levels III, IV, V) Kierkegaard's 'existentio-ethical' approach to human

existence plays a more notable role within Dabrowski's developmental theory. Kierkegaard differentiates three qualitatively distinct ontological realms, called the "aesthetic, ethical, and religious spheres" (Bretall, 1943, p. 172), which constitute the philosophical cornerstone of Dabrowski's multilevel approach to ontology and human development. Dabrowski (1967) states that if the individual's developmental transitions are qualitatively dramatic enough, a higher level of personality development may eventually be achieved where one's existence is no longer determined by either environmental or organismic (heteronomous) influences. Higher levels are characterized by the individual's uniquely human capacity for 'ethical' decision and 'moral' self-determination (autodeterminism). Dabrowski (1967) maintains personality development involves "one's rising to the demands and challenges of conscience" (p. xvi), as human existence cannot be construed in an "ethically neutral manner" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 118). This type of developmental change constitutes a qualitative "evolution from impulse to will" (Dabrowski, 1964, p. 88) which necessitates the individual's "tearing away from the biological life cycle" (Dabrowski, 1964, p. 480). Progress towards these higher levels of development necessitates one's "purposeful nonadaptation" (Dabrowski, 1964, p. 123) to lower level or heteronomous influences and a moral "adaptation towards exemplary values" (Dabrowski, 1964, p. 125) or the "transcendental sphere" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 173). It is this ontological

transition from 'organismic' or 'dynamic-intrapsychic' (lower level) process to a 'existential-ethical' (higher level) transcendence that constitutes both progressive human development and authentic existence.

The hierarchical multilevelness of developmental structures and realms of existence. Positive disintegration theory posits that various levels in human development can be hierarchically categorized according to qualitatively different intrapsychic "constellations" (Hague, 1984, p. 11) or developmental structures. This multilevel structuralist view of personality development involves both the displacement and reorganization of various intrapsychic structures, whereby 'ahierarchical' or 'horizontal' (lower level) psychic structures are replaced by 'hierarchical' or 'vertical' (higher level) structures. Here, human development proceeds from amoral, unconscious, simple, reflexive and automatic or 'heteronomous' (lower level) functions to morally conscious, complex, and voluntary or 'autonomous' (higher level) functions.

This multilevel paradigm recognizes that any aspect of human nature, whether examining discrete behaviors, attitudes, affectivity, intentions, or values, may be qualitatively or multilevelly examined, distinguished, and comprehended. Emphasizing this multilevel approach to our understanding of human existence, Dabrowski and Piechowski (1970) hold:

It is now less meaningful to consider for instance aggression, inferiority, empathy or sexual behavior as unitary phenomena, but it becomes more meaningful to examine different levels of these behaviors. Through this approach, we may discover that there is less

difference between the phenomenon of love and the phenomenon of aggression at the lowest level of development than there is between the lowest and the highest levels of love or the lowest and highest level of aggression. (p. 12)

Therefore, differing levels of development are characterized by qualitatively different 'constellations' of developmental structures which reveal distinctly different ranges of particular given phenomena. For example, Hague (1984) illustrates the multilevelness of fear by contrasting lower and higher level differentiations of this particular phenomenon. Lower level or "primitive immobilizing fear" (Hague, 1984, pp. 11-12) is engendered primarily by external stimuli and the perception of specific threat. Higher level "existential" fear (Hague, 1984, p. 12), in contrast, arises from one's sensitivity to mankind's suffering. Thus, the type of fear one is able to experience is, in part, developmentally dependent on the type of intrapsychic structures which constitute one's particular level of development.

However, the hierarchization or humanization of one's personality requires not only a hierarchical transformation of one's 'intrapsychic' structures (the biological-organismic component of the model), but more importantly, an 'ontological' transformation in one's basic orientation to existence (the existential-ethical component of the model). That is higher levels of development are not only characterized by hierarchical advancements in one's psychic structures, for example, changes in one's apperceptive or affective (emotional)

sensibilities, but, as importantly, by the individual's demonstrated capacity for higher level moral choice, decision, and action. Therefore, human development must be construed as a multilevel hierarchization of intrapsychic structures and also an 'existentio-ethical' transformation where one is confronted with the task of morally and ethically choosing one's existence. It is this 'existentio-ethical' aspect of the theory which most clearly transcends the 'biologistic' component of Werner's 'organismic' naturalism. Because of this 'existentio-ethical' dimension of human existence 'organicism', in and of itself, is an insufficient metaphor or world view for understanding the full dimensionality and complexities of human existence.

Developmental dynamisms, psychic overexcitability and developmental potential. A fundamental and uniquely human component of personality is the "inner psychic milieu" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 81). The particular structure of one's inner psychic milieu is dependent upon the types of intrapsychic dynamisms which constitute one's personality. Intrapsychic dynamisms are defined as particular "intrapsychic dispositional traits which shape development" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 37). Kawczak (1970) also describes these structural components as "psychological compounds which unite intellectual and intuitive insights with affective involvement and commitment" (p. 37). It is the presense and absense of particular intrapsychic traits or developmental structures which determines the various developmental levels. The

hierarchical and multilevel differentiation of intrapsychic structures constitutes the basis for developing a descriptive topology of levels of development.

The lowest level of development (Level One--Primary Integration) is characterized by a notable absence of "intrapsychic factors at work" and, therefore, the absence of an "inner psychic milieu proper" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 37). The next developmental level (Level Two--Unilevel Disintegration) is marked by the gradual emergence of structural dynamisms within the inner psychic milieu but which "are not transformative but only disintegrative" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 37) in function. The primary task of intrapsychic dynamisms, at this level, is the dissimulation of lower level structures. The next three levels of development (Level Three--Spontaneous Multilevel Disintegration, Level Four--Organized Multilevel Disintegration, and Level V--Secondary Integration) are predominantly characterized by "the appearance of multilevel transformative dynamisms" and "a hierarchically structured inner psychic milieu" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 37). This hierarchically discontinuous transformation of the self's intrapsychic structures, in part, represents an ontological transition towards the gradual humanization of one's existence.

A second characteristic of human development is what Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) refer to as forms of "psychic overexcitability" (p. 30). Psychic

overexcitability refers to "a variety of types of nervousness" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 37) which are necessary for the transformation, displacement, and emergence of specific intrapsychic structures, as they relate to overall development. The presence and levels of particular psychic overexcitabilities, which may be regarded as qualitatively different experiential and response capacities, constitute a second means of assessing levels of human development.

Positive disintegration theory posits there are five psychic channels for the overexcitabilities: sensual, psychomotor, intellectual, imaginational, and emotional. All of these are present, in varying degrees, within all individuals. However, the levels of particular overexcitabilities are more important for developmental transformations than others. High levels of psychomotor and sensual overexcitability, with a diminishment of imaginational, intellectual, and emotional forms, would indicate poor potential for higher level development. High levels of imaginational, emotional, and intellectual overexcitability, with a relative decrease of sensual and psychomotor forms, would indicate higher potential for development.

Developmental potential (DP), defined as "a fixed endowment which determines the levels of development a person may reach" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 61), is a direct measure of these five forms of overexcitabilities. Dabrowski & Piechowski (1977) maintain DP is strongest if "all forms of overexcitability

are present" (p. 58). However, they also indicate that the "highest level of development is possible only if the emotional form is the strongest or, at least, no less strong than other forms" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 58). Thus one's level of personality development can be assessed as a composite of the particular levels of the various overexcitabilities and the dominant types of intrapsychic or characterological traits which tend to comprise the self.

Developmental conflict and positive versus negative disintegration. Positive disintegration theory stipulates that developmental conflict, that is conflict as a result of emerging intrapsychic structures, is an essential aspect of human development. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) maintain "the richer the developmental potential the greater the number and variety of conflicting and mutually opposing elements are brought in play" (p. 65) within the personality. Human development, conceived as a gradual multilevel hierarchization and enriching of the individual's characterological traits and moral actions, necessitates periods of inner conflict, emotional disequilibrium, inherent anxieties, and depressions. The predominant types of 'intrapsychic conflict' one experiences are qualitatively different dependent upon the individual's level of development.

Positive disintegration theory depicts two distinct types of intrapsychic conflict called 'horizontal' or 'unilevel' (lower level) and 'vertical' or 'multilevel' (higher level) forms. Unilevel or horizontal conflict is

most often created by "opposing tendencies of equal value" where "phenomena are perceived as relative, arbitrary, and governed, for the most part, by moment and circumstance" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 66). Higher level (vertical) or multilevel conflict is felt as a result of perceived differences "between 'higher' and 'lower'" levels of reality where "relativism and chance yield to a developmental hierarchy of autonomous direction and choice" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 66). Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) regard the presence of vertical or multilevel conflict as the "'sine qua non' dynamic of development" (p. 65). At the lowest and highest levels of development there is an almost complete absence of developmental conflict.

Intrapsychic conflict is essential for the characterological transformation of one's personality or the self. Therefore, positive disintegration theory maintains human development first necessitates the dissolution or disintegration of lower level structures before higher level ones can be realized. However, the disintegration of psychic structures can take various forms such a partial, global, permanent, or chronic disintegration. Dabrowski (1964) distinguishes developmental and adevelopmental forms of this process by stating that "disintegration is described as positive (developmental) when it enriches life, enlarges the horizons, and brings forth creativity; it is negative (adevelopmental) when it either has no developmental effects or causes involution" (p. 10). Thus

'psychoneuroses' or 'positive disintegration', that is the psychic breakdown, reorganization, and transformation of lower level character structures, attitudes, and behaviors, is a fundamental requirement for one's personality development and essential humanization.

"Positive maladjustment" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 30), which Dabrowski (1970) regards as a "process of humanizing oneself" (p. 62), is a paramount feature of his antimonistic and personalistic approach to human development. Positive maladjustment, conceived as an ontological transition from "primitive adjustment, to positive maladjustment, onto secondary adjustment to the personality ideal" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 69), involves the individual's gradual distinguishing of "good and evil" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 131) and, ultimately requires "fighting for moral and ethical reforms" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 116). This type of "purposeful nonadaptation" or "moral disadaptation" (Dabrowski, 1964, p. 118, 123), which "must involve moral dynamisms" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 70), necessitates a "reconstruction of the personality" (Dabrowski, 1975, p. 24) where there is developed a "selective attitude with regard to the properties of one's own character" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 82).

Positive maladjustment, which Dabrowski (1967) maintains is "the most important indicator of a potential for accelerated development" (p. 69), leads to three basic types of intrapsychic structures: 'spontaneous multilevel disintegration' (Level III), 'organized multilevel disintegration' (Level IV), and 'towards secondary

integration' (Level V). Dabrowski (1967) describes the developmental dynamisms of spontaneous multilevel disintegration as "astonishment and disquietude with oneself" (p. 65), "dissatisfaction with oneself" (p. 65), "feelings of shame and guilt" (p. 65), "feelings of inferiority with regard to oneself" (p. 68), and "creative dynamisms" (p. 69). The dynamisms associated with organized multilevel disintegration are "subject-object in oneself" (p. 71), "syntony, identification, and empathy" (p. 71), "the third factor" (conscious choice) (p. 72), "inner psychic transformation" (p. 74), "education-of-oneseif and auto-psychotherapy" (p. 75). Dabrowski (1967) depicts the last group or secondary integration dynamisms as "responsibility for oneself and others" (p. 77), "autonomy and authentism" (p. 77), "disposing and directing center" (p. 79), and the "personality ideal" (p. 80). These developmental structures, which can ultimately lead to secondary integration or the personality ideal, are the 'sine qua non' of human development. They constitute a profoundly important ontological division between man and nature, reflecting a developmental transition from organismic process (amoral heteronomy) to an ethical existence (moral autonomy).

Personality integration: primary versus secondary character structures. Positive disintegration theory, as a consequence of its multilevel approach to personality development, maintains there are two highly cohesive and stable, but, qualitatively different, character structures called 'primary' and 'secondary' integration. Human

development, which necessitates the development of character, may also be conceived as an ontological transition from lower level primary integration to higher level secondary integration. It is the multilevel and multidimensional contrasting of these two integrated character structures which gives Dabrowski's development theory both its psychological depth and ontological height.

Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) distinguish two types of primary integration or lower level character structures called "extreme" and "milder" (p. 20) forms. The extreme form of primary integration is called the "successful" or "near psychopath" (Dabrowski Piechowski, 1977, p. 20). The successful psychopath's personality is distinguished by the following character traits: 1) a somatic and automatonistic orientation to life where there exists a fundamental concern for one's self in biological or organismic terms; 2) a tendency to be highly competitive, where one's behaviour is often coldly calculating and manipulative to achieve self-serving goals; 3) a predominant use of instrumental intelligence and manipulative activity to satisfy basic goals with little consideration of others; and 4) a level of awareness which does not go beyond the external world and, therefore, is unable to judge oneself in moral and ethical terms. The characterological traits of the successful psychopath may result in a highly successful individual, particularly with regards to the competitive work world, who might achieve many rewards in terms of power and financial

success, yet, still lives a morally and ethically atrophied existence. Representative examples of the successful psychopath might be best illustrated by the lives and deeds of such infamous contemporaries as Panama's Manuel Noriega or Romania's Elena and Nicolai Ceausescu.

The second type of primary integration, what Dabrowski & Piechowski (1977) call the "milder form" or "normal" (p. 20), demonstrates the following personality dispositions or character traits: 1) a narrowly developed scope of interests and limited range of horizons in terms of thinking, aspirations, behaviors, and affect; 2) a basic development of skills which are primarily oriented to the demands and influences of the 'job market'; 3) a basic orientation to achievement which emphasizes immediate rewards, particularly in financial terms; and 4) a very limited ability to evaluate oneself and one's life in the larger context of human existence. Both the 'successful psychopath' and 'normal', that is extreme and milder variants of primary integration, constitute an approach to life which is predominantly 'instrumental', 'here and now', 'heteronomous', and 'what is' oriented.

The "personality ideal" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 107) or secondary integration, what Dabrowski (1967) defines as "the ultimate goal of development" (p. vii), represents a dramatic transformation in one's personality structure that is qualitatively different and significantly more enobled than the characterological structure of primary integration. Empirical validation of the objective merits

of 'secondary integration', as an exemplar for personality development, can be best ascertained through the representative "lives of eminent men" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 107) such as Mahatma Gandhi, Albert Schweitzer, Father Kolbe, and Dr. Janusz Korczak. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) list the central personality dynamics which can lead to secondary integration, that is from 'what is' to 'what ought to be', as: "empathy, responsibility, authenticity, autonomy, personality ideal, and self-perfection" (p. 54).

Developmental advancement towards this ideal of personality necessitates an integration and actualization of high level aesthetic and moral (emotional) sensibilities with equally high level capacity for ethical decision and moral responsibility. High level aesthetic and moral (emotional) apperceptiveness, without an equal capacity for high level ethical decision and moral action, would ontologically constitute what this writer would characterize as profound moral and ethical flatulence. It is this inclusion of Kierkegaard's 'ethical-religious' approach to human existence which gives Dabrowski's developmental model its existential validity, ontological height, and moral breadth. Contemporary examples of individuals moving towards secondary integration or the personality ideal might be best illustrated by: the hostage mediator, Terry Waite; human rights activists, Andrei Sakharov, Martin Luther King Jr., Archbishop Tutu, Stephen Biko, and Nelson Mandela; slain ecological activists, Chico Mendes and Dian Fossey; political

activists and world leaders, Lech Welesa, Olaf Palmer, and Dag Hammerskjold; and humanitarians, Elizabeth Kubler-Ross and Mother Theresa.

Levels of Emotional Development

Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) descriptively categorize five qualitatively different, hierarchically structured, and empirically verifiable, levels of emotional or personality development. These five levels of development, viewed here as phenomenological depictions of qualitatively different character structures or personality traits, are: Primary Integration (level I), Unilevel Disintegration (level II), Spontaneous Multilevel Disintegration (level III), Organized Multilevel Disintegration (level IV), and Secondary Integration (level V). Each of these distinct levels of development are depicted in terms of characteristic representation of the self, constellations of dynamisms, and related functions.

Primary integration. Level one or primary integration (the manipulative or mechanistic self) is the most primitive level of emotional development where the personality is narrow, rigid, biologically oriented, and governed by somatism and automatism. Reality is predominantly experienced in sensory or tangible terms where the individual's personality is primarily oriented towards the external world rather than inward psychological realities. Here, there is little, if any, self-reflection or evaluation of one's actions in terms of morality and personal responsibility. This level of

existence represents what Dabrowski has called the biopsychological or heteronomous realm where the individual is unable to judge deeds in moral or ethical terms. Therefore, others are most often treated instrumentally or as objects and as means to one's own ends.

Developmental dynamisms are largely governed by feelings of ambitions, cravings for power, and the desire for security and financial gain. This 'what is', rather than 'what ought to be', approach to existence is dominated by selfish egotism and one's own goals--what has been termed as the 'successful psychopath' and 'normal' self (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977). A more complete depiction of primary integration, as the most basic level of personality development, is portrayed in Table 1, Appendix A.

Unilevel disintegration. Level two or unilevel disintegration (the protean or narcissistic self) may be most characteristically identified by one's tendency towards marked psychological instability. This is demonstrated through characterological polarizations, ambivalences, ambitendencies, and radical shifts in one's psychological perspective. Here one's personality structure is considerably loose and ill-defined where reality is experienced as being arbitrary and having no discernable order. Utilitarianism and value relativism or liberatinism characterizes one's moral orientation as values are perceived as being arbitrary, relative, and externally determined. Therefore, there exists a general

blindness to a larger sense of order regarding both human experience and the hierarchization of one's values.

Developmental dynamisms, as primary characterological traits, exist within a loose ahierarchic form where one's personality or character structure may be best defined as a structure without a structure. Here, the self is primarily constituted by ambivalences and ambitemencies where radical and perpetual change define both one's character and existence--what Fowler (1981) and Lasch (1984) have respectively categorized as the 'protean' and the 'emotivist' self. A more complete depiction of unilevel disintegration, as the second level of personality development, is portrayed in Table 2, Appendix A.

Spontaneous multilevel disintegration. Level three or spontaneous multilevel disintegration (the multilevel or hierarchical self) is the first developmental level where there exists a hierarchization to one's personality and developmental conflict. The perpetual waverings and fluctuations of personality, associated with unilevel disintegration and the protean self, are replaced by a growing sense of direction in one's life towards the personality ideal. One experiences a substantial existential opposition to and struggle with the so-called relativism of values. Moral concerns and the problem of autonomous moral responsibility come to the fore at this level of existence.

Here, developmental dynamisms largely reflect both conflicting and complementary characterological tendencies

which mark the beginning of one's sorting things out before the emergence of an autonomous hierarchy of values. Feelings of frustration, anger, guilt, discomfort, shame, and anguish are often characteristic of this level of development. One experiences aversion to or de-identification with lower level existence and a corresponding identification with the internal hierarchy of values rising from one's existence. One's character and related behaviors tend to become increasingly guided by empathy for others and by the development of an intrinsic, authentic, and existentially validated ethics--what this author has depicted characterologically as the 'hierarchical' or 'multilevel' self. A more complete description of spontaneous multilevel disintegration, as the third level of personality development, is portrayed in Table 3, Appendix A.

Organized multilevel disintegration. Level four or organized multilevel disintegration (the morally directed or consciously determined self) is principally marked by the development of consciously determined hierarchies of values and aims. Here, one's behavior is primarily oriented towards self-perfection and the service of others. This establishment of an internal hierarchy of values within the personality is consciously chosen and deliberately engaged. This approach to reality is consistently multilevel or hierarchical in nature where there is a significant lessening of psychic tensions, through the systematic organization of personality structures, in the service of personality development.

The essential structure of the personality, at this level, consists of the personality ideal with its transformation of 'what ought to be' to a realized 'what will be'. The chief developmental dynamism of one's personality is the conscious actualization of responsibility and the personality ideal. At level four the inner psychic milieu is increasingly organized through the synthesis of intuitive-emotional and rational-discursive processes--what Maslow (1970) has characterized as the self-actualizing individual. A more complete depiction of organized multilevel disintegration, as the fourth level of personality development, is portrayed in Table 4, Appendix A.

Towards secondary integration. The highest level of character development (the integrated or ideal self) leads to an increasing harmony within the personality, epitomizing universal compassion and self-sacrifice, where there exists a marked tendency to put the needs of others before one's own. The 'what is' of lower levels is replaced by 'oughts' of the highest level which becomes, then, the new and ultimate 'what is' of secondary integration. Here, there are no internal or intrapsychic conflicts experienced between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'. However, at this level, there may be experienced considerable ethical conflicts with the external world in terms of fighting for higher level or more humanitarian rights and ideals.

The chief developmental dynamism, at this level, is the 'personality ideal' which is a self-aware, self-

chosen, and self-affirmed personality structure of the order as might be typified by someone such as Nelson Mandela. The principal dynamisms leading to secondary integration are empathy, responsibility, authenticity, autonomy, personality ideal, and self-perfection. A more complete depiction of secondary integration or the personality ideal is portrayed in Table 5, Appendix A.

Conclusion

HET's descriptive metaphysics and multidimensional ontology, as outlined and summarized in this chapter, represents an appropriate metaphysics for the human sciences. HET's multidimensional and personalistic approach to ontology is suggested as a metatheoretical corrective to the various forms of dehumanizing ontologies which have unfortunately characterized the human sciences. HET, as a descriptive metaphysics and multidimensional approach to understanding human existence, is meant to replace monistic ontologies of both philosophical naturalism (positivism) and nonnaturalism (panpsychism), as the two dominant hegemonies within the human sciences.

However, rather than totally negating previous ontologies, HET metatheoretically subsumes the world views of Mechanicism, Organicism, Contextualism, and Idealism within its multidimensional framework. This is accomplished by regarding each of the previous world views as depicting a qualitatively distinct ontological realm which is metatheoretically incorporated into HET's multidimensional ontology. HET recognizes the ontological

uniqueness of the noological, spiritual, or transcendental realm of human existence and is, therefore, a more discriminating, integrative, and humanizing approach to the human sciences, psychology, and psychotherapy.

Dabrowski's multilevel framework reflects the multidimensional ontology of HET and constitutes a more appropriate model for viewing the multilevel nature of human existence, development, problems, and related solutions. Dabrowski's personalism, which incorporates a multilevel notion of reality, a transcendentalistic realism, and an empirico-normative approach to human development, advocates a moral or oughts approach to human affairs. The conceptualization of human development as an ontological transition from organismic process to moral transcendence predominantly characterizes Dabrowski's theoretical framework as an ethical approach to both human existence and the human sciences.

HET's multidimensional ontology and multilevel personalism conceptualizes human development as necessitating a moral disadaptation to biopsychological or heteronomous (lower level) reality, a characterological transformation towards secondary integration (personality ideal), and the living of a morally autonomous and responsible (ethical) existence. This multidimensional and existential-ethical approach to human existence, as represented within both HET and Dabrowski's model of human development, fundamentally constitutes a qualified humanism. Chapter V will compare and contrast the HET world view of qualified humanism with the Ecological-

Systems (ES) approach to human existence and the human sciences.

CHAPTER V
 Ecological-Systems (ES) Theory
 and
 Its Comparison with the HET World View
 Prologue

In the beginning was Gregory Bateson.
 (Luepnitz, 1988, p. 150)

...no idea can be wrong, no purpose
 destructive, and no dissection (tautological
 construction) misleading. (Gregory Bateson,
 1979, p. 230)

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the fundamental constructs of the ecological-systems (ES) world view, as articulated in the writings of Gregory Bateson. It will be demonstrated that Bateson's ES theory shares many of the same reductionistic and dehumanizing metatheoretical characteristics as the empirico-positivist (EP) school of thought which preceded it. A second, and as important objective, is to compare ES constructs and basic metatheoretical propositions with those of the HET world view. In contrasting these models, it will be shown that the two world views are incompatible in their basic approach to reality and human existence, and that profound philosophical differences exist between them. The final conclusion of this chapter is that the ES world view constitutes another variant of metatheoretical oversimplification or an alternative 'nothing but' approach to reality.

Ecological-Systems (ES) Theory

Overview

Ecological-systems (ES) theory, characterized by Andreoff, Cornie, Friedenbergr, and Lawrence (1982) as "Fourth Force Psychology" (p. 1), is a metatheoretical derivative of what Berman (1986) calls "the new holistic paradigm" (p. 25) or "cybernetic holism" (p. 26). This approach to humanity, psychology, and psychotherapy does not constitute a very cohesive group of theories or theorists. However, in spite of the many variants of this "new holistic paradigm" (Berman, 1986), the ES perspective features certain identifying characteristics which differentiate it from both EP (first and second force) and HE (third force) schools of thought. The ES world view or metatheoretical orientation is most clearly depicted in such 'New Age' literature as "Mind and Nature" (Bateson, 1979), "Stalking the Wild Pendulum" (Bentov, 1978), "Wholeness and the Implicate Order" (Bohm, 1980), "The Tao of Physics" (Capra, 1975), "Sympathetic Vibrations: Reflections on Physics as a Way of life" (Cole, 1985), "The Cosmic Blueprint" (Davies, 1988), "The Aquarian Conspiracy" (Ferguson, 1980), "Observing Systems" (Von Foerster, 1984), "Godel, Escher, Bach" (Hofstadter, 1979), "Beyond Einstein: The Cosmic Quest for the Theory of the Universe" (Kaku & Trainer, 1987), "Aesthetics of Change" (Keeney, 1983), "The Cosmic Code" (Pagels, 1982), "The Recursive Universe" (Poundstone, 1985), and "The Dancing Wu Li Masters" (Zukav, 1979). These variants of the 'New

Age' or 'ES' paradigm, Berman (1986) argues, draw heavily upon quantum mechanics, general systems or cybernetic theory, Eastern mysticism, and the ecological or new holistic movement.

The ES world view or fourth force psychology, what Keeney (1983) characterizes as an "alternative paradigm" (p. 6) to first, second, and third force schools of thought, has been categorized under such varied nomenclature as ecological epistemology, general systems paradigm, ecosystemic epistemology and cybernetic epistemology. Luepnitz (1988) describes the cybernetic, ecological, and general systems approach of ES theory as emphasizing "the study of phenomena, from mechanisms to biological entities, as systems--that is, as organizations of interdependent parts" which demonstrate the capacity to "exchange information with the environment and exhibit self-governing characteristics" (p. 150). Surveying over fifty family therapy texts, in an attempt to discover a principal theorist and articulator of the ES paradigm, Luepnitz (1988) found "no name cited more often than that of Gregory Bateson" (p. 150). Furthermore, Keeney (1983) portrays Gregory Bateson as the cardinal "prophet of postmodern science" whose essential ideas are largely responsible for the "philosophical reorientation of the human sciences" towards this "new epistemology" (pp. 5-6). It is for these reasons that this study will focus upon the ES perspective as developed, articulated, and espoused by Gregory Bateson.

Historico-Philosophical Background

To understand the intricacies and complexities of the new holism or ES paradigm, of which Bateson's cybernetic-systems cosmology represents merely one variant, it is necessary to briefly examine the epistemological and historico-philosophical influences which initiated its development. Berman (1986) maintains the evolution of this "new paradigm" (p. 25) was instigated by the growing "awareness of the ideological and culture-bound character of (traditional) science" (p. 25). This growing realization of the value-laden nature of all scientific endeavours engendered a corresponding "need for a new epistemology" (Berman, 1986, p. 25). This epistemological transformation entailed a metaphysical "transition from mechanicism to holism" (Berman, 1986, p. 26), resulting in two distinct variants of the new holistic paradigm which Berman (1986) defines as "two alternative modes of consciousness" (p. 25).

The first 'holistic' epistemology, what Berman (1986) refers to as "the magical world view" (p. 25) and Wilber (1983) as "new-age enthusiasts" (p. 217), espouses a theistic monism which is "strongly value-laden" and "biased toward an ecological or sacred view of nature" (p. 25). Variants of this theistic monism may range from those advocating "a revival of magic and occult practice" (Berman, 1986, p. 25) to a "new breed of eco-theologians" (Hamer & Mead, 1990, p. 49), such as Father Thomas Berry, who espouse a "'creation spirituality,' which emphasizes the creative powers of the universe over issues of redemption and original sin" (Hamer & Mead, 1990, p. 49).

This creation or process theology is reflected in the philosophical monisms of Alfred North Whitehead's 'animistic panpsychism' and Teilhard de Chardin's 'evolutionary theology'.

The second variant or alternative mode of consciousness, what Berman (1986) calls "cybernetic holism" (p. 26), constitutes a rather "abstract philosophy" which posits a "formal, disembodied, and abstract reality" (p. 25). Here "reality is now seen as a matter of 'mentation' or 'symbolic patterned activity'" (Berman, 1986, p. 25). Berman (1986) maintains the cybernetic approach to holism does not constitute a "substantive methodological shift from the scientific paradigm that preceded it (because) it too is formal, abstract, 'value-free,' and disembodied" (p. 26). Cybernetic or systemic holism invariably represents the naturalistic or atheistic variant of ES theory's monistic approach to reality. Gregory Bateson's cybernetic holism, Berman (1986) maintains, really constitutes "the last outpost of the mechanical world view" (p. 26).

Finally, it should be noted that as the human sciences incorporate a metatheoretical transition from mechanicism to holism profoundly important discriminations need to be made between "varieties of holistic thinking" (Berman, 1986, p. 26). However, to date, these necessary metatheoretical distinctions are more apparent than real. For example, metatheoretical elements of both theistic and naturalistic variants of the 'new holistic paradigm' are too often epistemologically intermixed and confounded

within much of ES theory. This confusing of naturalistic and theistic monisms or organismic naturalism and absolute idealism has resulted in a plethora of divergent 'holisms' which are said to represent the ES world view. None of these, however, reflect the antimonistic ontology, multidimensional approach, and transcendentalistic holism of HET.

Central Metatheoretical Constructs of the ES World View

An overview of the ES world view, as represented within the pivotal works of Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 1988), will examine the most fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of the model. This review is not intended to cover or represent all ES theory's metatheoretical intricacies nor all of its epistemological variants. The central task of this chapter is to compare the fundamental constructs of the ES and HET world views.

A monistic ontology. One of the most fundamental and encompassing characteristics of the ES world view is its espousal of a monistic approach to ontology. Angeles (1981) defines a monistic ontology as any "theory that (states) all things in the universe can be reduced to (or explained in terms of) the activity of one fundamental constituent (God, matter, mind, energy, form)" (p. 178). Reber (1985) characterizes monistic orientations as "any of several philosophical positions which argue that there is one kind of ultimate reality" (p. 448). A metatheoretical concomitant of philosophical monisms, whatever their view of the ultimate nature of reality, is that this reality must be conceived as "one unitary

organic whole with no 'independent' parts" (Webster, 1980, p. 737). Bateson and Bateson (1988) maintain the ES world view rejects the "Cartesian separation of mind and matter that has become habitual in Western thought" because "mind without matter cannot exist" (p. 6). Bateson and Bateson's (1988) ES approach to ontology represents a "unified view of reality" (p. 7) which maintains a "Transcendent deity is an impossibility" (p. 6). Therefore, Bateson's approach to ES theory constitutes an ontological monism which is decidedly naturalistic and atheistic in its basic philosophical orientation.

However, Bateson's ES epistemology, paradoxically, also promotes a kind of ontological dualism. Although Bateson contends that mind cannot exist without matter, he also maintains "matter without mind can exist but is inaccessible" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 6). This important ontological distinction introduces a 'dualism' within ES theory's philosophical 'monism'. Bateson (1979) further emphasizes the dualistic aspect of his so-called naturalistic monism by making an ontological differentiation between two distinct realms of being.

The first sphere of being, what Bateson (1979) calls the realm of "'pleroma' (the nonliving)" (p. 7), ontologically constitutes what he refers to as "the world of nonliving billiard balls and galaxies (where forces and impacts are the 'causes' of events)" (p. 7). This pleromatic/physical realm represents the material world where "forces and impacts provide a sufficient basis of explanation" (Bateson, 1979) for understanding phenomena.

The pleromatic realm has been previously described within the world view of "mechanicism" (Osborne & Angus, 1988, p.5) or "physicalism" (Reber, 1985, p. 547).

The second sphere of being, what Bateson (1979) calls the world of "'creatura' (the living)" (p. 7), constitutes the realm of living beings "where nothing can be understood until 'differences' and 'distinctions' are invoked" (Bateson, 1979, p. 8). The creatural realm cannot be understood, conceptualized, and explained merely in terms of physical causes or impacts. The organic or biological processes and mental distinctions of the creatural world has also been previously portrayed within the world view of "organicism" (Osborne & Angus, 1988, p. 5) or "biologism" (Reber, 1985, p. 93).

Gregory Bateson's (1972, 1979, 1988) ontological distinction between the 'physical/pleromatic' and 'organic/creatural' realms constitutes a naturalistic and vitalistic dualism which contends "there is a real dichotomy between living (organic) and nonliving (inorganic) phenomena" (Angeles, 1981, p. 314). Therefore, Bateson's naturalistic monism, which contradictorily espouses a vitalistic distinction between the physical (nonliving) and organic (living) spheres of being, in reality constitutes an ontological dualism. These types of metatheoretical confusions and inconsistencies are one of the most consistent characteristics of Bateson's ES epistemology.

Subjective idealism. The ecological-systemic (ES) world view(s), what Berman (1986) refers to as "Batesonian

holism" (p. 32), advocates an approach to reality which May (1976) depicts as a "kind of Berkeleyan idealism" (p. 33). Angeles (1981) defines "idealism, mentalism, or immaterialism" (p. 120) as an approach to reality which regards "the universe as the embodiment of a mind" (p. 120) where "no knowledge is possible except of mental states and processes" (p. 120). Subjective idealism or mentalism, which constitutes a kind of 'process' cosmology, stresses that "reality is (to be) explained in terms of such psychic phenomena as minds, selves, spirits, ideas, absolute Thought, etc., rather than in terms of matter" (p. 120). Reber (1985) characterizes idealism as a "philosophical doctrine that holds that the ultimate reality is mental and that this mental representation forms the basis of all experience and knowledge" where "it is meaningless to speak of the existence of things independent of their perception and experiencing by a conscious observer" (p. 340). Alfred North Whitehead's monistic panpsychism or process philosophy, which regards everything in the universe as possessing "consciousness" and "inner lives of feeling, willing, thinking, and conating" (Angeles, 1981, pp. 202-203), represents an epistemological pure type of subjective idealism.

Bateson's (1972) ES world view shares some metatheoretical similarities with monistic panpsychism in that it espouses a kind of "animism" which extends "the notion of personality or mind to mountains, rivers, forests, and such things" (p. 484). Similarly, Bateson (1972) characterizes his ES holism as a form of "totemism"

(p. 484) whereby "man in society takes clues from the natural world around him and applies those clues in a sort of metaphoric way to the society in which he lives" (p. 484). This 'anthropological totemism' or 'naturalistic animism' is illustrated in the following:

...(Man) identified with or empathized with the natural world around him and took that empathy as a guide for his own social organization and his own theories of his psychology. this is what is called "totemism"...the natural world around us really has the same general structure and therefore is an appropriate metaphor to enable man to understand himself in his social organization. (Bateson, 1972, p. 484).

However, Bateson's ES cosmology does not entirely reflect Whitehead's monistic panpsychism in that it makes a important ontological distinction between the physical or inorganic realm, where matter can exist without mind, and the mental or organic sphere of being.

The mentalism and subjectivism of ES theory, as a basic approach to reality, is clearly reflected in Bateson's (1979) central epistemological proposition that "the map is not the territory, and the name is not the thing named" (p. 32). This subjectivistic perspective towards reality and knowledge, as engendered by ES theory's predominantly immaterialist or desubstantialized approach to ontology, is revealed in Bateson's (1979) contention that "there is no objective experience" in "that our brains make the images that we think we 'perceive'"--that is "all experience is subjective" (p. 33). ES theory's extreme subjectivism is illustrated by the following example of how one experiences reality:

When somebody steps on my toe, what I experience is, not his stepping on my toe, but my 'image' of his stepping on my toe reconstructed from neural reports reaching my brain somewhat after his foot has landed on mine. Experience of the exterior is always mediated by particular sense organs and neural pathways. To that extent, objects are my creation, and my experience of them is subjective, not objective. (Bateson, 1979, p. 34).

Bateson's ES epistemology represents an extreme form of "constructivism" (Reber, 1985, p. 151) which is basically 'anti-realist' in its approach to reality. Reber (1985) defines this constructivist approach as follows:

A general theoretical position that characterizes perception and perceptual experience as being constructed from...fleeting fragmentary scraps of data signalled from the senses and drawn from the brain's memory banks--themselves constructions from snippets of the past. The essence of all constructivist theories is that perceptual experience is viewed as more than a direct response to stimulation. It is instead viewed as an elaboration or "construction" based on hypothesized cognitive and affective operations. (p. 151).

The constructivist orientation of subjective idealism contrasts with the theory of "direct realism" (Angeles, 1981, p. 237) or "direct perception" (Reber, 1985, p. 151) which espouses "the external world is as it appears to us" and "there is no distinction between what the world appears to be like (appearance) and what the world is really like (reality)" (Angeles, 1981, p. 237). ES theory's constructivist world view leads to Bateson's (1979) philosophical proposition that "science can never prove any generalization or even test a single descriptive statement" whereby one can "arrive at some final truth" (p. 30). Bateson's (1979) ES world view results in his

epistemological perspective that "science never proves anything" (p. 29). ES theory's abstract and formalistic approach to ontology, what Angeles (1981) describes as a theoretical "system that stresses 'form' (principles, rules, laws) as the significant or ultimate ground of explanation or evaluation" (pp. 104-105), espouses a Batesonian holism or constructivist view of reality.

Science as tautology. The constructivist focus of Bateson's (1979) ES world view construes "science as only a vast tautology" (p. 29), as reflected philosophically within the Platonic notion of the "formal relations of ideas" (p. 4), whose so-called 'tautological themes' have only "formalistic and aesthetic value" (p. 31). A tautology is a series of interrelated analytic propositions or logical statements which "fits the facts or meaning to be presented" in the abstract "forming of definitions" (Angeles, 1981, p. 10). The philosophical orientation of ES theory, which reflects analytic idealism, is principally concerned with "the systematic uncovering of the logical structure of concepts and language, especially the language of science"--that is a language "which is purely formal" (p. 11). The main concern of both analytic philosophy and ES theory is "not with the meaning of words and not with the meaning relation between our language and the real world but with the 'structural interrelationships' of language" (p. 11).

Science as a tautology, therefore, merely represents an a priori interrelated conceptual structure, pattern, or constellation of ideas. Traditional (empirical) science,

as contextualized within the epistemological subjectivism of ES theory, is viewed merely as a tautology--that is as a "way of perceiving" (Bateson, 1979, p. 21) or, more correctly, abstractly 'constructing' reality. This constructivist view of science as "only a method of perception" (p. 32), what Keeney (1983) correspondingly refers to as a way of "constructing a reality" (p. 44), is based on the epistemological assumption that "truth is unattainable" (p. 29). Therefore, the notion of positivism as an objective and empirical science is rejected because Bateson (1979) holds "there is no objective experience" (p. 70). Bateson (1979) maintains that what we experience is "influenced by our maps of reality" (p. 142) and, therefore, "no description is true" (p. 156) because we are "constrained to our ideas" (p. 187)--that is all knowledge is basically inferential or deductive in nature and founded on particular a priori metatheoretical assumptions.

This subjectivist and constructivist view ultimately leads Bateson (1979) to assert that science suffers from the delusion of "right premises" (p. 28). Bateson (1979) argues that because "we can know only about ideas and nothing else" (p. 211) traditional science constitutes a descriptive tautology which "never proves anything about ourselves and the world, it only probes" (p. 155). This mentalistic and abstract approach to knowledge (epistemology) and reality (ontology) is reflected in the ES proposition that "there can be no clear line between epistemology and ontology" (Bateson, 1987, p. 19) because

"things-in-themselves" or "Dinge an sich" are "unknowable" (Bateson, 1979, p. 211). In fact, Keeney (1983) maintains the ES world view is fundamentally concerned with "the embodiment of pattern in the nonmaterial imaginary world" (p. 62) and, therefore, it is "wrong to ask ontological questions such as what is the structure of the real world" (p. 107). ES theory's immaterialist view of reality and science is reflected in Keeney's (1983) assertion that the ES paradigm "negates ontological reality" (p. 106) because "what is really real is irrelevant" (p. 107). This desubstantialized and abstract approach to reality inevitably results in Bateson's (1979) extreme epistemological relativism that asserts "no idea can be wrong, no purpose destructive, and no dissection (tautological construction) misleading" (p. 230).

Bateson and Bateson's (1988) desubstantialized and formalistic approach to both science and reality is epitomized in their belief that one "can know nothing about a thing in itself only about relationships between things". ES theory's propositional and rationalist approach to both knowledge and reality, as influenced by such analytical philosophers as Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Rudolf Carnap, is summarized by Bateson and Bateson (1988) as follows:

...this book is not so much concerned with the truth about things--only with truth about truths, with the natural history of descriptive propositions, information, injunctions, abstract premises, and the aggregate networks of such ideas. (p. 157)

This relational, interactional, and formalistic (aesthetic) approach views all scientific explanation as only tautology which never bridges the "gap between 'percipio' and 'est' (perception and reality)" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 96). Therefore, what is metatheoretically construed as reality merely represents a theoretical convenience, which is "only necessary for explanation" (Bateson, 1988, p. 132), but, which is ultimately only "supported by faith" (p. 95). Batesonian holism or the ES perspective, which obfuscates any important distinction between epistemology and ontology, advocates a form of philosophical 'constructivism'--what Berman (1988) has previously identified as a purely formal, disembodied, and abstract approach to both science and reality.

Existence as cybernetic/mental process. The ecological approach of Bateson's (1979) ES world view conceptualizes "biological evolution in terms of cybernetic information processing" which regards both 'mind' and 'nature' as merely "an aggregate of interacting parts" (p. 102). Keeney (1983) defines cybernetics as the "general science of pattern and organization" (p. 6) which "provides an aesthetic understanding of change" and promotes an "appreciation of natural systems" (p. 8). Cybernetics, as an alternative perspective for the human sciences, entails a philosophical transformation from a "paradigm of things" to a "paradigm of pattern" (Keeney, 1983, p. 13) which constitutes a metatheoretical shift from monistic materialism to monistic immaterialism.

Although ES theory is most often touted as the new 'holistic' paradigm, Keeney (1983) states, its most important epistemological transition is "from material to pattern rather than parts to whole" (p. 13).

Paradigmatically, the cybernetic approach of Bateson's ES world view focuses on epistemology, rather than ontology, and, therefore, is principally "concerned with the rules of operation that govern cognition" and "how particular organisms and aggregates of organisms know, think, and decide" (Keeney, 1983, p. 13). Batesonian holism, as a cybernetic approach to understanding human existence, promotes a "nonlinear epistemology emphasizing ecology, relationship, and whole systems" and the "development of psychology into a science which can embody mind" (Keeney, 1983, p. 14). This cybernetic view of 'mind' or 'self' as nothing but 'mental process' emphasizes the "act of epistemology" (Keeney, 1983, p. 18), whereby, the individual comes to 'know' the world only through "the fundamental epistemological operation of drawing distinctions" (Keeney, 1983, p. 18).

The ES perspective can be further differentiated by its computer (cybernetic) approach to the self which views all adaptive behavior as being initiated by mental feedback processes. Keeney (1983) depicts this cybernetic view of mind as "orders of recursion" (p. 34) or levels of feedback, whereby "properties (programming) of the observer shape what is observed" and, recursively, "the observer observes (programs) by drawing distinctions" (p. 18). Therefore, in this tautological or self-referential

sense, "what we see is a consequence of punctuation" (Keeney, 1983, p. 97). Mental process, as contextualized within the cybernetic framework, proceeds 'reactively' through these various interactional 'feedback oscillations' (mental recursions) where more encompassing (broader) networks of epistemological punctuations (mental distinctions) are built upon previous and less encompassing (narrower) punctuations. Keeney (1983) characterizes this gyroscopic or self-corrective process as a movement from simple "cybernetics" or "homeostasis" to higher order of adaptive control called "cybernetics of cybernetics" or "homeostasis of homeostasis" (p. 89). This self-corrective approach to human behavior is based on a view of mental process where "higher order feedback recalibrates (readjusts) lower order process" (p. 90).

In this sense, ES cybernetics characterizes all human experience as fundamentally arising from "sets of commands" where "description (experience) is secondary to the act of having obeyed a command, injunction or prescription for drawing a distinction" (Keeney, 1983, p. 20). Therefore, within this cybernetic and constructivist context, all human experience and activity is epistemologically reduced to "programming, rules, plans, scripts, recipes, agenda, sequences, relations, recursive systems, structures, grammars, sequences, 'schticks', and so forth" (Keeney, 1983, p. 21)--what Lasch (1984) has identified as a view of human personality as merely a "collection of needs programmed either by biology or culture" (p. 58). Keeney (1983) contends this cybernetic view of

mental process and human action, which "emphasizes the idea of (mind as) a recursive network with feedback structures" (p. 72), provides a much more "useful (utilitarian) fiction for the behavioral sciences" (p. 72). Therefore, within ES cybernetics, what ultimately constitutes 'authentic' existence is one's building of a personal epistemology or, more simply, the constructing of one's "habitual patterns of punctuation" (Keeney, 1983, p. 25).

The cybernetic or information processing approach to ontology perceives 'mental process' as being initiated by (qualitative/interactional/digital) mental distinctions and not by (quantitative/linear/analogic) physical forces. Bateson and Bateson's (1988) cybernetic approach to ontology characterizes both mind and mental process as follows: 1. mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components; 2. the interaction between parts is triggered by difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon, not located in space and time; difference is related to negentropy (order) and entropy (disorder); 3. mental process requires collateral energy; mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains of determination; 4. in mental process, the effects of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions) of events which preceded them; 5. description and classification of these processes of transformation disclose a (natural) hierarchy of logical (tautological) types immanent in phenomena.

Batesonian cybernetics, as a metatheoretically distinct approach to the 'human' sciences, attempts to describe and explain "the nature of order and pattern in the universe" (Bateson, 1972, p. xvi) through regarding all sentient beings as merely "information processing entities" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 76). This cybernetic approach to both mental process and the human sciences is summarized by Angeles (1981) as follows:

1. The study of feedback mechanisms, communication systems, and controls found in machines and living organisms,
2. The study of how mechanical systems can be regarded as adaptive.
3. The study of the self-regulatory features of artificial automata (and living organisms) which 'display' "purposiveness" and other functions that have been traditionally assigned to the activity of a mind. (p. 52).

Similarly, Reber (1973) defines the science of cybernetics as being "primarily concerned with control mechanisms and their associated communications system, particularly those which involve feedback information (recursiveness) to the mechanism about its activities" (p. 173). The mechanistic tenor of cybernetic language, which is used to depict its constructivist view of mind and reality, is an important indicator of its own unrecognized 'epistemological biases'--that is its own dehumanizing ideological distortions.

Organismic functionalism. The ES approach to human existence, which Keeney (1983) states is founded on the "appreciation of natural systems" (p. 8) and "discovering the biological nature of ourselves" (p. 10), fundamentally constitutes an organismic and functionalist approach to the human sciences. Batesonian cybernetics,

conceptualizes all "action as an interactive dance" (Keeney, 1983, p. 109) whereby "all change can be understood as the effort to maintain some constancy (homeostasis) and all constancy maintained through change (interaction)" (Keeney, 1983, p. 69). Bateson's ES approach to human affairs, conceptualized here as an interactive dialectic between homeostasis and change, emphasizes the "primacy and priority of relationship" (Keeney, 1983, p. 38) where "no action is an island (and) all actions are parts of organized interactions" (Keeney, 1983, p. 39). This view of both mind and nature, that is as an 'ecologically' reactive world of "recursive process" (Keeney, 1983, p. 48), therefore, condemns all conscious or intended (morally proactive) purpose as "pathology" (Keeney, 1983, p. 10). The primary intent or goal of all action, as contextualized within the ES approach to change, is to "activate the order of feedback process that will enable a disturbed ecology to correct itself" (Keeney, 1983, p. 71)--that is its function is the reestablish the maintenance of ecological stability or homeostasis.

This perspective of human existence is based on an organismic and cybernetic approach to the 'purposive' action, fundamentally constituting a functionalist approach to human behavior. This approach defines this epistemological functionalism,

The doctrine that conscious processes or states as those of willing (volition), thinking, emoting, perceiving, sensating and activities or operations of an organism in physical interrelationship with a physical environment and cannot be given hypostatized,

substantive existence. The activities facilitate the organism's control, survival, adaptation, engagement or withdrawal, recognition, direction, etc. See cybernetics. (p. 107).

The functionalist view of mind, as construed within ES theory's cybernetic and interactionalist world view, contextualizes existence as a "functional unity" (Angeles, 1981, p. 107) or what Keeney (1983) refers to as a "monistic whole" (p. 47). The functionalist metatheoretical framework simply depicts mind or self as "any self-regulating, self-directing, self-organizing, or self-maintaining unit (system)" (Angeles, 1981, p. 107). Angeles (1981) further defines the organismic and functionalist orientation of ES theory, as follows:

Such integrated systems are regarded as organic wholes as in biology, or unitary wholes as in cybernetics, in which the parts of the whole interrelate with each other (a) enabling the system to accomplish a specific activity (function, task), and/or (b) enabling the system to persist in its activity merely as an ordered system. That activity which a part within the whole plays in its interrelationships with other parts in support of a and/or b is called its "function" within the system. (p. 107).

However, this functionalist view of mind also reductively maintains "consciousness is not produced by faculties, a soul or mind, but is the variety of functions found in the human considered a biological, physical creature interacting with an environment" (Angeles, 1981, p. 107). Jung (1981) depicts the organismic or cybernetic functionalism of the ES world view as advocating a theory of human behavior where, "instead of a teleological conceptualization, action is seen as governed not by

future goals but by past and present extremum constraints" (p. 248). Angeles (1981) maintains this functionalist view of reality negates any conceptualization of mind or self which encompasses a "will as a faculty of the self (mind, personality, consciousness) that causes us to make decisions or exert energy towards a goal"--that is "acts of choice and striving are not acts that 'obey' a will" (p. 107). Both behavioristic and cybernetic functionalism, in essence, negate the uniquely human self-transcendent capacity to ethically engage in 'morally proactive' (freely chosen) acts which entail "an agent choosing or deciding some course of action" where "the choice must be uncompelled, or self-determined" (Angeles, 1981, p. 179).

Interactional determinism. ES theory, which emphasizes the "unity of the biosphere and humanity" (Bateson, 1979, p. 19), espouses a recursively deterministic approach to both reality and human affairs. It adopts a "relational view" (Bateson, 1979, p. 18) that regards all behavior, including those types of 'purposive' actions which uniquely characterize human affairs, as being "governed by relationship" (Bateson, 1979, p. 106). This relational and systemic approach to ontology views all levels of sentient behavior as being recursively established through cybernetically reactive (interactional) mental processes--what Bateson (1979) defines as "circular (or more complex) chains of determination" (p. 116). That is, rather than viewing human behavior as being determined by mechanistic and

linear forces, as postulated within the behavioral sciences, all sentient activity is regarded as a cybernetic artifact of "natural relationship" (Bateson, 1979, p. 153) and "mental process" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 16). These recursive mental processes are ecologically (interactionally) determined and cybernetically (reactively) governed by existing "patterns of interrelations" (p. 153) within the ecological biosphere or creatural realm. Therefore, all levels of mental process and creatural activity are ostensibly regulated by ever increasingly complex and interrelated "circular chains of determination" (Bateson, 1979, p. 101) or natural "patterns of interaction" (Bateson, 1979, p. 153). Keeney (1983) maintains that this cybernetic, ecological, and aesthetic "pattern which binds idea is as close as we can get to some version of ultimate truth" (p. 47).

ES determinism, which is founded on the "process" (Bateson, 1979, p. 214) perspective of cybernetics, espouses that it is a profound epistemological error to mistakenly believe "that we can decide on some action" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 102). Bateson and Bateson (1988) conceptualize the individual as existing within a "determined universe" (p. 168) where human development is viewed as an ecological process of moving from a "narrower to slightly wider determinism" (p. 168). The deterministic perspective of the ES paradigm is exemplified in Bateson and Bateson's (1988) metaphysical conclusion that ecological determinants or "constraints

are Eternal (or)...necessarily true, and to recognize them gives us something resembling freedom" (p. 21).

Therefore, human action, as contextualized within cybernetic determinism or ecological fatalism, is conceptualized as nothing more than reactively determined responding. Here, uniquely human and higher level (ethical) "purpose and growth" are ecologically reduced to mere "laws of sequence" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 159) which are governed by evolutionary cybernetic programming. This approach to humanity and human existence suffers from not only what is known as the "naturalistic fallacy" (Angeles, 1981) but, as importantly, from what Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1988) call the "ecological fallacy" (p. 82)--that is "the fallacy of drawing conclusions about individual people from data that refer only to aggregates" (p. 82).

ES theory's approach to human action advocates a metatheoretical shift from 'causal' (linear/mechanistic) determinism of physical forces to a 'tautological' (ecological/interactive) determinism of mental processes. Although the ES world view espouses an epistemological transition from mechanicism/physicalism to organicism/mentalism, it still constitutes a deterministic approach to humanity and human affairs. This ecologically reductionistic approach to reality, based on an epistemology emphasizing cybernetic or systemic determinism, can be said to represent an immanent and naturalistic variant of neoplatonic predeterminism--what Bateson (1979) refers to as "Platonism" without a

"Designer or Artificer (God) hiding in the machinery of evolutionary process" (p. 202). Angeles (1981) defines this predeterministic or fatalistic approach to reality, as follows:

1. The theory that every event has a cause which is necessitated to be that cause at the exact time it is that cause and at no other time, in accordance with designs of some operating principle (God, natural necessity, eternal forms).
2. All things in the universe are "governed" by, or operate in accordance with fixed laws that compel things to happen the way they do happen without exception and according to a necessitated sequence of time. (p. 221).

The ES epistemology of Batesonian holism, which emphasizes the "necessitated scheme and interconnections of all events in the universe" (Angeles, 1981, p. 221), constitutes an ecologically deterministic approach to both reality and human affairs.

Moral relativism. ES theory's epistemological pluralism and moral relativism is best illustrated in Bateson's (1979) central philosophical tenet that both science and religion suffer from the delusion of "right premises and presuppositions" (p. 28) and, therefore, "no idea can be wrong, no purpose destructive, and no dissections (epistemologies) misleading" (p. 230). By the term 'right' Bateson (1979) rejects any notion of truth as stemming from a "precise correspondence between our description and what we describe" (p. 29)--what Angeles (1981) terms the "correspondence theory of truth" (p. 298). Bateson and Bateson's (1988) epistemological relativism, which is similar to the "pluralistic" (p. 23) orientations of Hinduism and Buddhism, does not seriously

entertain questions of "epistemological error" (p. 23) or fundamental issues of right and wrong. This relativistic approach to both reality and morality is based on a kind of New Age ecological naturalism which contends that evolutionary process, including human evolution, is fundamentally "value-free" (Bateson, 1979, p. 191).

Bateson and Bateson's (1988) deterministic and naturalistic approach to reality, which stems from ES theory's central doctrine that the biosphere or "ECO is not concerned with good or bad...and freewill" (p. 149), espouses an aesthetic approach to moral action emphasizing ecological "adaptation" (p. 149) and cybernetic "homeostasis" (p. 120). Similarly, Keeney (1983) endorses this kind of ecological naturalism, reflected in his contention that the "separation of man and nature is only epistemological" (p. 111), where man is regarded as merely "another category of animal" (p. 14). This type of ES reductionism, which obfuscates important ontological differences between human and nonhuman entities, is further exacerbated as a result of Bateson's (1979) monistic naturalism that views all sentient activity, including uniquely human behavior, as having its "roots in external adaptation" (p. 197) and "perfecting adaptive acts" (p. 217). This ecologically reductionistic approach to human affairs results in a profoundly dehumanizing moral perspective where what makes any activity 'good' or 'bad' is merely its "survival" (Bateson, 1979, p. 201) value. This kind of aesthetically based moral relativism espouses a moral perspective concerned only with

'survival'--what Lasch (1984) has previously identified as the modern moral ethos of "survivalism" (p. 59).

Keeney (1983) maintains the ES approach to morality and ethical-normative behavior, characterized as "ecosystemic health" (p. 128), emphasizes "homeodynamics" (p. 69) rather than teleology, choice, intentionality, and oughts. ES theory, Keeney (1983) holds, adopts a naturalistic and deterministic approach to psychological well-being which emphasizes recursive "hierarchies of control" (p. 71) and the "regulatory processes" of "homeostasis and adaptation" (p. 77). ES theory's basic approach to moral action, which emphasizes considerations of 'is/process' rather than 'ends/oughts', epistemologically exorcises so-called lineal, ethical and normative notions of "bad, sick, or mad" (Keeney, 1983, p. 14). This approach to moral behavior, what Keeney (1983) characterizes as a "larger view" of "health and pathology" (p. 128), contextualizes psychological health merely in terms of an ecological and cybernetic "vital balance" or "synergy" (p. 126). For Keeney (1983), there are no "bits of action" or "patterns of interactional process" which, in and of themselves, are "an indication of health and pathology" (p. 128).

This naturalistic and ecological approach to moral issues and normative parameters, which emphasizes homeostatic adjustment or self-correction, stems from Bateson's (1979) declaration that "there are no monotone values in biology" (p. 59). By the term 'monotone values' Bateson (1979) is referring to those kinds of value

distinctions where "more of something is always better than less of something" (p. 59) and, conversely, less of something is always better than more of something. The moral foundation of Bateson's (1979) ES epistemology is established on naturalistic criteria utilizing biological terminology, as illustrated by his central value construct called "biological value" (p. 59). Bateson (1979) defines 'biological value' within the context of a range of "optimum values" (p. 59). If a quantity or level of any variable (oxygen, for example) falls above or below a certain optimum value range (homeostatic bias) it becomes "toxic" (Bateson, 1979, p. 59) to the organism. However, for this writer, it is extremely difficult to comprehend how such uniquely human behaviours as wife battery, incest, emotional abuse, racial hatred, for example, can be conceived as having any 'optimum' level of occurrence or frequency apart from zero. Similarly, it is this writer's admitted epistemological bias (value contamination) that one should never view the immoral and dehumanizing atrocities of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, or Belsen as merely some type of naturalistic or ecological 'self-correction'. Therefore, within the uniquely human realm of ethical considerations and moral ends, which necessitate profoundly important questions and considerations of good and evil, there clearly exist nonrelativistic 'monotone' values. The metatheoretical and moral contextualization of such immoral and dehumanizing behavior as having some 'ecologically' optimum (tolerable) level of occurrence, apart from zero,

would and should be regarded as a distinct indicator of both epistemological and personal psychopathology.

Bateson and Bateson (1988) maintain that any notion of "goal activated" (p. 39) behavior, which constitutes a teleological or ends approach to human affairs, commits a type of "epistemological lie" (p. 39) that ultimately encourages an "appetitive orientation" (p. 39) to life. This extremely limited and truncated view of human purpose, which views all intentional or ends-oriented behavior as essentially 'pleonexic' or 'acquisitive' in nature, is characteristic of some of the fundamental problems of the ES world view and Batesonian holism. That there might exist higher level moral purposes/ends and better ethical choice/actions, based on important considerations of good and evil, is too often missed by Gregory Bateson and, in large part, absent from his writings.

Summary. This section of the study, based on the pivotal works of Gregory Bateson, has been principally directed towards elucidating and summarizing the central metatheoretical constructs of what has been called fourth force psychology, New Age paradigm, Batesonian holism, and the ES world view. This limited review of the New Age or ES paradigm has not covered all of its metatheoretical intricacies or epistemological variants. It was intended to give the reader an overview of the most fundamental philosophical tenets of the model to allow for comparisons with HET. In developing an overview of the ES paradigm, some of these metatheoretical differences have already

been alluded to. The next section specifically compares and contrasts the central metatheoretical postulates of ES and HET paradigms.

Metatheoretical Comparison of ES and HET World Views

This comparison of ES and HET world views is directed towards establishing that profound philosophical differences exist between these two models or schools of thought. These important differences are to be recognized in spite of their shared dissatisfaction with the fundamental epistemological presuppositions and metatheoretical assumptions of empirico-positivist (EP) traditions. Bateson disassociates the ES paradigm from the HET world view because he considers it epistemologically no different than EP schools of thought. Keeney (1983) summarizes Bateson's specific articulations on this matter:

Gregory Bateson argued that since humanistic psychology is "materialistic", it does not differ from the basic premises of behaviorism and psychoanalysis. This is another way of saying that all these various approaches to psychology belong to the same world view, that is, one postulating a material world of physical objects obeying the laws of force and energy. (p. 12)

This superficial critique of the HET world view stems from "Bateson's argument that humanistic psychologists' use of the term 'third force' connected them to a vocabulary and thus an epistemology of physics" (Keeney, 1983, p. 96). That the term 'third force' psychology might have an alternative meaning, which merely denotes a 'third movement' (school of thought) in psychology, seems not to occur to Gregory Bateson. This type of epistemological

confusion of meanings, regarding profound differences between EP and HET world views, reveals Gregory Bateson's inability to denote any substantive differences between a 'thing' and a thing's 'name'--that is between ontology and epistemology. The following metatheoretical comparisons will cover the more important philosophical differences between ES and HET paradigms. The contrasting of these epistemological biases or differences is the pivotal focus of this last section of Chapter V.

ES Monistic versus HET Antimonistic Ontologies

One of the fundamental metatheoretical differences distinguishing ES and HET world views is their profound philosophical differences regarding a monistic or unified approach to reality. Bateson and Bateson's (1988) ES world view espouses a "monistic and unified way of looking at the world" (p. 50) where "mind and nature form a necessary unity, in which there is no mind separate from body and no god separate from his creation" (p. 12). Bateson and Bateson's (1988) ES holism or naturalistic monism rejects all dualistic approaches to reality, which emphasize a "conceptual separation between mind and matter" (p. 179), because such notions are seen as only an epistemological "by-product of--a spin-off from--'an insufficient holism'" (p. 179). ES theory naturalistic monism or organismic holism emphasizes an interactional, interrelational, and interdependent approach to ontology where reality is conceived as "one unitary organic whole with no 'independent' parts" (Webster, 1980, p. 737)--that

is mankind is conceived as never being ontologically separate or fundamentally different than nature.

HET adopts a decidedly antimonistic approach to ontology which incorporates both natural (material, mental) and nonnatural (spiritual/transcendent) dimensions of reality. HET emphasizes that the being of nature and the being of man are fundamentally different and cannot be adequately conceptualized or understood within a monistic approach to ontology. HET is founded on a "multidimensional view of existence" (Frankl, 1975, p. 75), what Dabrowski (1973) describes as an "antimonistic" (p. 85) and "multilevel view of reality" (p. 1), which unequivocally opposes "unilevel approaches" (p. ix) to ontology and emphasizes the complete "rejection of monistic tendencies" (p. 125). Halverson (1981) maintains that HET theorists are fundamentally "ontological dualists" (p. 436), emphasizing a "philosophical dualism of higher and lower...spirit and matter" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 76), which necessitates making important ontological distinctions between "facticity and possibility" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 192), "subject and object" (Frankl, 1969, p. 50), "existence versus facticity" (Frankl, 1975, p. 27), and "what is versus what ought to be" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 2). This antimonistic and multidimensional approach to ontology, which recognizes the "psychophysiological, psychosocial, and the spiritual" (Tageson, 1982, p. 117) dimensions of human reality, ontologically differentiates what MacQuarrie (1981) terms "man's being and that of the world" (p. 45). HET's

antimonistic and multidimensional approach to ontology emphasizes that "man is never just part of the cosmos" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 221) where the individual can be understood in terms of "process and occurrence" (p. 221) based on "natural events describable in terms of natural causality" (p. 221). HET's multidimensional ontology incorporates both naturalistic and nonnaturalistic dimensions of human reality which rejects both naturalistic and nonnaturalistic monisms.

ES Essentialism versus HET Existentialism

Gregory Bateson's ES world view comprises a New Age variant of philosophical idealism which epistemologically endorses an 'essentialistic' view of reality. Angeles (1981) defines essentialism as any philosophical orientation which espouses the central "belief that things have essences" (p. 81), that is pivotal forms, patterns, or qualities, which constitute the "necessary and defining characteristic of a thing" (p. 80). MacQuarrie (1987) also characterizes essentialism as a philosophy which focuses on the immaterial "realm of forms and ideas" (p. 62) and, therefore, fundamentally constitutes a metatheoretical orientation which emphasizes "abstraction and universality" (p. 61). This desubstantialized and abstract approach to both epistemology and ontology maintains that form and pattern constitute the basis of reality and, therefore, concludes that "essence is prior in reality to existence" (Barrett, 1962, p. 104). Idealism or neoplatonic essentialism contends that the immaterial realm of eternal ideas, patterns, and forms

constitute the ultimate foundation of reality and is regarded as being ontologically "really real" or "more real than particular things that derived their own individual existence from participation in ideas" (Barrett, 1962, p. 103). Essentialism, as an idealistic approach to philosophy, inevitably focuses on what Barrett (1962) refers to as the "timeless self-identity of essences and hence always gravitates spontaneously to one form of Platonism or another" (p. 106). Essentialism's epistemological idealism espouses that reality is fundamentally constituted by logical structures or eternal forms (aesthetic patterns) and therefore, essence (immaterial pattern) ultimately determines existence (substantive reality).

Correspondingly, the ES world view focuses on the immaterial realm of pattern, form, and ideas, as reflected in the Platonic notion that "pattern was fundamental to all mind and ideation" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 60). This results in its epistemological assertion that ultimately "ideas have a (superordinate) cogency and a reality" because "they are all what we can know and we can know nothing else" (Bateson, 1979, p. 211). This desubstantialized and abstract approach to reality is further revealed in Bateson and Bateson's (1988) epistemological proposition that "while I can know nothing about any individual thing by itself, I can know something about relation between things" (p. 157) and, therefore, "there are no things in creatura--only ideas, images, clusters of abstract relations" (p. 188). These so-called

ordered clusters of relations or patterns of ideas constitute ultimate reality and are regarded as "the formal regularities or 'laws' that bind ideas together" and are as close as we can get to ultimate truth" (Bateson, 1979, p. 221). Bateson's ES epistemology is oriented towards the mental realm of cybernetic process and ecological interrelationships, as revealed within the aesthetic patterning or ordering of the biosphere, which forms the ultimate basis of reality called 'metapattern'. Bateson's (1972) metatheoretical subsumption of ontology within epistemology unequivocally reveals his philosophical bias towards essentialism as a philosophical foundation for both the human sciences and an understanding of reality.

In opposition to ES theory's essentialism, HET adopts a existential-humanistic approach to human reality. MacQuarrie (1987) maintains that HET's basic metatheoretical orientation is founded on the fundamental philosophical assumption that "man's existence precedes his essence in that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world, and defines himself afterwards" (p. 15)--that is HET maintains "man's essence lies in his existence" (p. 71). This existential approach to the human sciences espouses that "human beings, unlike other creatures, are in some respects, not merely part of nature" (Halverson, (1981, p. 481) because the 'existential' dimension of human reality irrevocably "differentiates man's being and that of the world" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 43). Human existence can never be

fully comprehended, understood, and lived merely in terms of abstract references to immaterial essences or aesthetic patterns.

HET's existential approach to ontology rejects the abstract world of philosophical idealism or what Tennessen (1966) refers to as "brain-philosophy" where the individual sits "blindfolded in his ivory tower, meditating absolute and eternal forms in a world of abstract ideas" (p. 272). Instead, HET existentialism constitutes what Tennessen (1966) refers to as a "Heart Philosophy" which entails a "world view in which human life is more than a puppet show" and espouses a "plea for freedom, initiative, decision, and responsibility" (p. 273). MacQuarrie (1987) maintains the existential paradigm insists that uniquely human "freedom, decision, and responsibility constitute the core of personal being" (p. 15) which necessitates a consideration of the moral "autonomy and responsibility of the individual" (p. 21). The existential approach of HET asserts that "man does not simply exist but must also decide his existence" (Frankl, 1962, p. 31) which emphasizes the ontological distinction that "man chooses what he will do and be" (Frankl, 1969, p. 51). MacQuarrie (1987) summarizes HET's existential approach to ontology by emphasizing that the term "existence is restricted to the kind of being exemplified in man" because man's existence is ontologically distinct "from the being of plants, mountains, animals and whatever else" (p. 21). The abstract, formalistic, and deterministic epistemology of ES essentialism reductively

negates the ontological distinction that "human beings are free in a way which is not compatible with universal determinism" (Halverson, 1981, p. 481) and, therefore, totally discounts the fact that human existence is always "to some extent open and undetermined" (Halverson, 1981, p. 437). The ontological and moral uniqueness of human existence, as metatheoretically contextualized within HET's existential framework, can never be fully understood in terms of abstract essences and forms or formal laws and aesthetic patterns.

ES Organismic Naturalism versus HET Multidimensionalism

Gregory Bateson's (1972, 1979, 1988) ES world view fundamentally depicts an organismic approach to ontology which conceptualizes "the world as purposeful organic processes which can be both quantitative and qualitative in nature" (Osborne & Angus, 1989, p. 5). Organicism, as a monistic or holistic approach to ontology, metatheoretically constitutes "any theory that explains the universe on the basis of a living organism" and "as a function of a whole causing and coordinating the activities of the parts" (Angeles, 1981, p. 200). The epistemological bias and ontological orientation of ES theory promotes an organismic world view which adopts a decidedly vitalistic or animistic approach to reality. Organicism predominantly adopts a biological approach to reality where any behaving organism, including the human species, is viewed as a "biological entity, one which must be approached as the coordinated functioning of a multitude of interrelated processes" (Reber, 1985, p.

500). This approach to reality fundamentally utilizes "biological principles as a basis for describing and explaining human behavior" (Reber, 1985, p. 93). Monistic organicism or biologism constitutes what Reber (1985) terms a "uniformly monistic" (p. 500) ontology and unequivocally rejects "mind-body dualism" (p. 500). Organicism, therefore, fundamentally represents a biological and naturalistic approach to ontology which views all organic beings, including humankind, as merely biological entities explainable within the basic metatheoretical tenets of philosophical naturalism. ES theory can be contextualized as reflecting the world view of organismic naturalism.

The naturalistic orientation of Bateson's (1972) ES world view is revealed in his contention that "the natural world around us really has the same general structure and therefore is an appropriate metaphor to enable man to understand himself in his social organization" (p. 484). ES theory's naturalistic monism construes "existence as a functional unity" (Angeles, 1981, p. 107) where "man in society takes his clues from natural world around him and applies those clues in a sort of of metaphoric way to the society in which he lives" (Bateson, 1972, p. 484). Bateson's (1979) organismic or ecological naturalism focuses on "biological evolution in terms of cybernetic information processing" (p. 102) where mind and nature, as well as man and nature, are epistemologically reduced to "an aggregate of interacting parts" (p. 102). That is, the uniquely human dimension of moral "purpose and growth"

is organismically and cybernetically reduced to ecologically determined "laws of sequence" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 159). Keeney (1983) further illustrates the naturalistic and dehumanizing tenor of ES theory's so-called "broader view" (p. 115) of reality, stating that the ontological "separation of man and nature is only epistemological" (p. 111) because humanity constitutes merely "another category of animal" (p. 14). ES theory's monistic naturalism not only eschews both materialism (realism) and supernaturalism (idealism) but, as importantly, also regards humanistic-existential (HET) thought as fundamentally materialist in nature. Therefore, Batesonian holism or ES naturalism espouses a decidedly antihumanistic approach to both reality and human existence.

In contrast, HET advocates a multidimensional approach to ontology which eschews the philosophical monisms of both naturalism (materialism/organicism) and supernaturalism (panpsychism/idealism). HET develops a multidimensional approach to reality, called "dimensional ontology" (Frankl, 1969, p. 23), which ontologically distinguishes the natural and nonnatural dimensions of being. These differing ontological realms are often depicted in HET thought as the "realm of nature" and the "realm of spirit" (Frankl, 1978, p. 22), "facticity" and "existence" (Frankl, 1975, p. 27), "facticity and possibility" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 192), "reality and ideals or the I am and the I ought" (Frankl, 1975, p. 51).

Similarly, Dabrowski's (1967, 1970) HET multilevel model of human development ontologically differentiates these distinct dimensions of being, philosophically contrasted as a necessary dualism between 'what is' and 'what ought to be', the 'biological' and 'suprabiological', and the 'heteronomous' and 'autonomous' realms of being. This dualistic ontology, multidimensional perspective, and humanistic view of reality, incorporates, yet ontologically distinguishes, both natural and nonnatural realms of being within its metatheoretical framework. HET's basic approach to human existence maintains that reality comprises, at least, a trilevel hierarchy of being which is ontologically distinguished as the "psychophysiological", "psychosocial", and "transpersonal" (Tageson, 1982, pp. 22, 23) realms of being or, alternatively, as the "manifold character of body-mind-spirit within the unity of human existence" (Frankl, 1967, p. 135). HET's dualistic ontology and multidimensional approach to human existence is unquestionably different from the organismic, cybernetic, and ecological approach of ES theory's organismic naturalism.

ES Immanent Mind versus HET Transcendent Logos

Bateson's (1972) ES world view is built upon the central epistemological concept of "immanence" which stipulates that 'mental functioning' or 'mind' is embedded within and pervasive throughout "the entire planetary ecology" (p. 461). Bateson and Bateson (1988) define this cybernetic and organismic approach to 'immanent mind' as

any aggregational "system capable of mental process or thought" which need "not include consciousness" nor "association with a single organism" (p. 210). ES theory's interactional (cybernetic) and deterministic (reactive) view of 'immanent mind' is characterized as any ordered ecological structure or tautological pattern that demonstrates the mental "regularities and necessities of communication and logic (which) form a unity" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 142) within the biosphere. This immanent realm of mental processes or ecological interconnections, which have biologically evolved as a result of the interactive (cybernetic) properties of the biosphere, fundamentally constitutes 'immanent mind' or what Bateson (1979) also terms "the pattern which connects" or "metapattern" (p. 12).

Bateson's (1972) metatheoretical speculations concerning the exact nature of mind emphasizes that "whether the mind is immanent or transcendent can be answered in favour of immanence" (p. 315). In fact, the very idea of any kind of transcendent dimension or realm to reality is anathema to Gregory Bateson's atheistic and naturalistic perspective of both mind and reality. Batesonian holism or organismic naturalism unequivocally rejects all notions of a transcendent aspect of human existence and, more emphatically, all notions of a transcendent deity or god. ES theory considers transcendence possible only in terms of organismic/cybernetic (immanent) and ever increasing (broader) mental processes (ecological recursions) and

logical typologies (classifications). Any concept of a transcendent dimension or aspect of human reality, which allows for the possibility of a supernatural/supernatural dimension to reality and some form of "Transcendent deity" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 6), is totally incompatible with ES theory's naturalistic, anithumanistic and atheistic world view. In fact, Bateson (1979) rejects all notions of a self-transcending and self-determining (spiritual) aspect to human reality because such notions ultimately lead to the "thought of a separate (self-determined) existence" (p. 149) which is not "epistemologically valid" (p. 149) within ES theory's monistic naturalism. Any notion of a self-transcending quality or aspect of the human mind, as well as human existence, allows for the possibility of a morally autonomous and ethically responsible self--that is a conceptualization of mind or the self which is ontologically independent of naturalistic determinants. A cardinal tenet of Bateson's (1972) ES world view stipulates that "no part of an internally interactive system can have unilateral control over the remainder or over any other part" (p. 316).

Similarly, Bateson and Bateson's (1988) naturalistic and immanent view of mind, which characterizes the whole ecological biosphere as constituting 'mind' or "Eco god" (p. 142), epistemologically clashes with HET's notion of an ethical or self-transcendent quality or capacity to the human mind. Bateson's ecological or systemic approach to reality conceives of mind as being an immanent and

naturally occurring mental process of the total biosphere which is both ecologically determined and morally neutral. This ecological and immanent approach to mind construes the so-called 'self' as a cybernetic component which makes no "evaluative comment" (Bateson, 1972, p. 466) and is totally unconcerned with moral issues and ethical notions of "good and evil" and "good and bad" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 149).

Opposingly, the HET approach to human existence emphasizes the spiritual or self-transcendent capacity of the human 'mind' or 'self' to "rise above oneself and judge one's deeds in moral and ethical terms" (Frankl, 1969, p. 18). Bateson (1988) maintains the human mind has the unique capacity for "self-reflexivity" which constitutes the "capacity of mind to rise above itself and turn back critically on what it normally does" (p. 28). This developed self-reflexive or self-transcendent capacity of mind allows human consciousness to transcend what Bateson (1982) refers to as "the here and now" and "encompass the whole of reality" which is ultimately concerned with:

...existence itself: (which includes) truth, beauty, justice, good and evil, suffering in all its forms, right and wrong, ultimate meaning, order and chaos, design and change. (p. 185)

These uniquely human dimensions and concerns of mind or self are not merely constituted and determined by psychophysiological structures of the brain or immanent patterns within the biosphere, as Bateson maintains, but comprise the spiritual or noetic dimension of the self.

This "allows man to rise above the level of the biological and psychological foundations of his existence" (Frankl, 1967, p. 74) and to reach out for a "world of meanings and values" termed "logos" (Frankl, 1969, pp. 17-18). The HET dualistic approach to ontology and human existence incorporates both a natural and nonnatural approach to metatheoretical conceptualizations of the human mind. Tateson (1982) aptly contrasts ES immanent mind and HET transcendent logos, as follows:

We are not sufficient unto ourselves, nor is Nature sufficient unto itself to provide the solution that we yearn for. The Nature that we perceive through our senses or their technological extensions is as much a creature as we are, subject to decay and death through the laws of entropy. It follows then that any immanentist view (such as Taoism) which equates the Absolute with nature, however it is contrived, is not a solution to our dilemma as one which posits the existence of a transcendent Creator who graces us both (nature and humanity) with existence and meaning. (p. 206)

Frankl (1967) maintains that this self-transcendent capacity of the human mind fundamentally constitutes "the essence of existence; and existence, in turn, means the specifically human mode of being" (p. 74). This nonnatural or transcendent aspect of human existence and the human mind, as opposed to the naturalistic and immanent approach of ES theory, distinguishes the human mind and existence from the being of all other organisms.

ES Cybernetic Determinism versus HET Self-Determinism

Bateson and Bateson's (1988) ES epistemology, which contextualizes human development as an evolutionary process that moves from a "narrower to slightly wider

determinism" (p. 68), maintains "freewill is nonsense" (p. 103). ES theory's cybernetic approach to determinism, which views all living things as being irrevocably governed by "circular or more complex chains of determination" (Bateson, 1979, p. 115), claims it is a profound epistemological error to believe "we can decide on some action" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 102). The ES world view, which contextualizes human existence as always being "part of a more encompassing self-corrective system" (Keeney, 1983, p. 165), espouses that "man is fundamentally part of larger systems and that any part can never control the whole" (Bateson, 1973, p. 437) because, even as the individual moves from a "narrower to slightly wider determinism, you remain within a determined universe" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 168).

ES theory's ecological view of reality, even though unequivocally rejecting the linear and mechanistic determinism of EP traditions, reestablishes its own kind of organismic, ecological, or cybernetic determinism. Batesonian holism posits, that for all living organisms including man, existence is ecologically or cybernetically determined by the more encompassing total biosphere. Therefore, ES theory contends that what we call 'freedom' is merely an abstraction or epistemological "habit of punctuating the stream of experience" (Bateson, 1972, p. 438) where we "suppress our awareness that perception is active, and...action is passive" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 103). Bateson's (1972) fatalistic approach to human reality concludes that "we are not by any means captains

of our souls" (p. 438) because, ultimately, "even within the individual human being control is limited" (p. 438). Human freedom and choice, which is cybernetically diminished to mere reactive "self-corrective possibilities" (Bateson, 1979, p. 141), is dramatically altered or entirely absent from ES theory's world view. That is, epistemologically, 'freedom' is reductively contextualized as only the mind's capacity to self-correct or self-adjust to the cybernetic and ecological demands of the total biosphere. Therefore, ES theory merely substitutes a tautological, cybernetic, or ecological determinism for the linear and mechanistic determinism of EP traditions.

The HET world view, incorporating a multidimensional approach to ontology, epistemologically embraces both philosophical determinism and indeterminism. HET emphasizes that humanity experiences "determinism in the somatic and psychological dimensions" and "freedom in the noological" (Frankl, 1978, p. 47) or spiritual realm--that is man is never entirely a determined being. HET's personalistic approach to philosophy emphasizes that human existence is always "to some extent open and undetermined" (Halverson, 1981, p. 437) and ultimately, therefore, "freedom, decision, and responsibility constitute the core of personal being" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 21). Similarly, Dabrowski's (1970) multilevel approach to reality, which contextualizes human growth as necessitating movement "towards moral self-determination" (p. 78), emphasizes the "suprabiological realm" (p. 5) where the individual

exhibits morally directed "self-controlled" (p. 33) behavior--what Dabrowski (1967) appropriately terms "autodeterminism" (p. 36).

Tageson (1982) maintains that authentic human existence does not merely imply "adjustment" (p. 44), which is the principal concern of ES theory's cybernetic determinism, but, as importantly, incorporates a "process of internal integration and individuation" which "may lead an individual to reject some of the standards that society attempts to impose" (p. 44). Therefore, within the multidimensional and existential approach of HET "man does not simply exist but must also decide his existence" where "man is free to answer the questions he is asked by life" (Frankl, 1969, p. 62). HET's decidedly self-deterministic approach to human existence, which opposes the naturalistic determinism or cybernetic fatalism of ES theory, is founded on what MacQuarrie (1987) depicts as the uniquely human capacity for "moral responsibility" (p. 21). HET's open humanism emphasizes the indeterminant nature of human existence, which insists that "man is transcendent in his being" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 69), where the individual is ultimately concerned with "human values and the realization of an authentic existence" (MacQuarrie, 1981, p. 28). The self-deterministic perspective of HET, which emphasizes freedom, choice, moral responsibility, and authentic existence, is to be metatheoretically contrasted with the ES epistemology which emphasizes naturalism, reactive or self-corrective responsivity, and cybernetic determinism.

ES Self-Correction versus HET Teleology

Batesonian holism emphasizes the cybernetic notion of 'self-correction' as a metatheoretical foundation for the human sciences. Self-correction is so fundamental to ES theory that Bateson (1972) argues "when we talk about the process of civilization or evaluate human behavior, human organization or any biological system, we are concerned with self-corrective systems"--that is "people are self-corrective systems" (p. 429). The monistic naturalism of ES theory insists that "all biological and evolving systems (ie. individual organisms, animal and human societies, ecosystems and the like) consist of complex cybernetic networks, and all such systems share formal characteristics" in that they are "homeostatic" (Bateson, 1972, p. 441). This self-corrective or homeostatic approach to human action views all behavior within an ecological or systemic context, where "the effects of small changes of input will be negated and a steady state maintained by reversible adjustment" (Bateson, 1972, p. 441). It also emphasizes that all organisms, including mankind, engage their world 'reactively'--that is all organismic behavior, including human actions, can be understood in terms of 'cybernetic reactivity' or 'homeostatic self-correction'.

ES theory's cybernetic or self-corrective approach to our understanding of reality, which was founded on the notion that the "self-corrective circuit and its variants provided possibilities for modelling adaptive actions of organisms" (Bateson, 1979, p. 118), extended its basic

metatheoretical assumptions whereby all human behavior could be fully understood in terms of 'feedback', 'calibration', 'adaptation', and 'adjustment' (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1988). ES theory's basic epistemological creed, which is founded on a deterministic approach to reality, espouses that "when causal systems become circular...a change in any part of the circle can be regarded as a cause for change at a later time in any variable anywhere in the circle" (Bateson, 1979, p. 66)-what he terms as "self-corrective" or "cybernetic" (p. 221) sequences. Bateson's (1972) ES world view, reflecting a naturalistic monism, does not distinguish human behavior, in any way, from the behavior of other organisms. This cybernetic reductionism is evidenced in Bateson's (1972) statement that "in principle, if you want to explain or understand anything in human behavior, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits" which is "elementary cybernetic thought" (p. 459).

ES theory's recursive and self-corrective approach to human behavior conceptualizes all linear notions of 'purposiveness' as epitomizing some kind of epistemological or metatheoretical "pathology" (Bateson, 1972, p. 436). In fact, Bateson (1972) maintains "man commits the error of purposive thinking and disregards the systemic nature of the world, with which he must deal" (p. 438) when, conceptually, the "universe is dissected" (p. 459). This cybernetic or self-corrective approach to human behavior, rejects all notions of telology,

maintaining that mankind's unhealthy relationship to the ecology stems basically from "excessive purposiveness" and "lineal thinking" (Bateson, 1972, p. 438). ES theory holds that both 'lineal thinking' and 'ideas of purposiveness' ultimately generate "either the teleological fallacy (that ends determine process) or the myth of some supernatural controlling agency" (Bateson, 1979, p. 66) called God. ES theory's epistemological rejection of the "mysterious 'final causes' of Aristotle" is paradigmatically replaced with ES theory's "multiple cycles of self-correction" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, pp. 11, 199)

Opposingly, HET theory emphasizes teleology, purpose, and meaning, that is the ends and oughts of human existence, as a metatheoretical foundation for the human sciences. Frankl (1969) categorically states that "the homeostasis principle does not yield a sufficient ground on which to explain human behavior" because "the creativity of man...is oriented towards values and meaning" (p. 33). Similarly, Tateson (1982) depicts HET's teleology as an "antihomeostatic concept" (p. 111) which he defines as follows:

...it (teleology) pictures the organism as constantly striving to actualize new potentialities as they develop during the course of life, rather than merely seeking to maintain or restore a tension-free state of equilibrium. It is a (uniquely human) process concept, involving notions of continual change and readjustment in the face of shifting environmental contingencies, but always in the direction of a goal or end-point present within the organism itself. (p. 37)

Tageson's (1982) teleological approach to human existence, which is founded on the "Aristotelean legacy" of an "intrinsic telos or directional thrust" (p. 110) to human nature, emphasizes that "intelligent (conscious) activity does often transcend the here and now by proposing goals or purposes to be obtained in the future, and such goals do affect behavior in present time as final causes in the Aristotelean sense" (p. 111).

This teleological or purposive approach to human behavior is rejected by ES theory because Bateson (1979) argues "causality does not work backwards" (p. 66). However, Frankl (1969) rejects homeostasis theory because it "falls short of representing the nature of propiarte striving" (p. 32) in humans. Tageson (1982) argues that "teleological premises must be woven into the science of human behavior" (p. 110) because human activity can only be understood in terms of a "teleological principle, a final cause, a directional goal intrinsic to the organism by virtue of which it is pulled by what lies ahead rather than being merely pushed from behind" (p. 107). Similarly, Frankl (1969), in contrasting ES homeostatic and HET teleological perspective of human existence, stipulates that man is not only "pushed by drives" (process), but, more importantly, "pulled by meaning, and this implies that it is always up to him to decide whether to fulfill the later"--that is "meaning fulfillment always implies decision making" (p. 43). Tageson (1982) further distinguishes the teleological approach to human experience in stating that it occurs as a direct result of

the 'self-transcendent' nature of human "consciousness" which "transforms the actualizing tendency in the human organism into a directional tendency" (p. 40)--what Frankl (1969) characterizes as the "will to meaning" (p. 5). This self-transcending directional tendency, value orientation, or will to meaning is ultimately expressed when "man chooses what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meanings and values" (p. 51). However, Bateson's (1972) ES approach to human motivation and behavior views all "conscious purpose" as constituting a cybernetic or systemic "loss of balance" which he refers to as a uniquely human "pathology" (p. 434). The teleological and ends approach of HET, which contextualizes human behavior in terms of meaning, purpose, moral ends, and oughts (proactive ethical engagement), is directly contrasted with the ES world view where human behavior is conceptualized in terms of cybernetic or homeostatic self-correction (amoral reactive engagement).

ES Protean Self versus HET Authentic Self

ES theory's basic approach to selfhood stems from what Wilson (1988) defines as a "symbolic interactionalist perspective" (p. 42) which emphasizes that the "acquisition of language" is the only characteristic which "distinguishes humans from other animals" (p. 42). Similarly, Bateson and Bateson's (1988) organismic naturalism maintains that "language", as a "system of coding and communication", is the only feature which "sets the human species off from others" (p. 186).

Interactionalist and systemic approaches to selfhood have evolved from a long tradition in the human sciences adopted, primarily, from the fields of anthropology and sociology. The interactionalist view of selfhood is epitomized in such sociological perspectives as exemplified by Cooley's (1964) notion of the "looking glass self" (p. 36). This sociological view of the 'self' stipulates that "a separate individual is an abstraction" because "'society' and 'individual' do not denote separable phenomena, but, are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing" (Cooley, 1964, pp. 36-37). Wilson (1988) maintains that Cooley's view of selfhood, which reflects the interactionalist reactivity of cybernetic determinism, emphasizes that "people are constantly evaluating the reactions of others and adjusting their behavior accordingly" (pp. 42-43). Similarly, Goffman (1959), within the sociological relativism of interactionalist theory, declares "the self, then as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whole fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die, it is a dramatic effect" (pp. 252-253).

This sociological and anthropological contextualization or perspective of selfhood, which basically maintains the so-called 'self' constitutes an interactionally reactive and interminably self-adjusting social construction, is depicted by Wilson (1988), as follows:

...the actual behavior of others sets off a chain of events, again creating a complex,

multilevel social feedback process, which is made possible through the use of symbolic communication. This ongoing feedback process constitutes what the symbolic interactionist calls the "social self". (p. 43)

Bateson's (1979) cybernetic view of self, in large measure, reflects the sociological relativism of interactionist theory which views the self as "sort of a fiction" or "heuristic concept, a ladder useful in climbing, but perhaps to be thrown away at a later stage" (p. 147). ES theory's ecological or systemic world view reductively conceptualizes 'selfhood' as follows:

"Cybernetics would go somewhat further and recognize that the "self" as ordinarily understood is only a small part of a much larger trial-and-error system, which does the thinking, acting, and deciding. This system includes all the informational pathways which are relevant at any given moment. The "self" is always part of a much large field of interlocking processes. (Bateson, 1972, p. 331)

Bateson's (1972) cybernetic approach to the self totally rejects "Occidental" notions of the "concrete self" (Barrett, 1987, p. 14), which emphasize "there is a delimited agent, the 'self'" which can perform a "delimited 'purposive' action upon a delimited object" (p. 318). The cybernetic approach of ES theory focuses on the ecological biosphere or "total self-corrective unit" which "processes information, or... 'thinks', 'acts', and 'decides'" (Bateson, 1972, p. 319). This unit "is a system whose boundaries do not at all coincide with the boundaries of the body or what is popularly called the 'self' or 'consciousness'" (Bateson, 1972, p. 319). Bateson (1972) categorically emphasizes that there are

"multiple differences between the 'thinking system' and the 'self' as popularly conceived" (p. 319). These central differences are summarized as follows: 1) the system is not a transcendent entity as the self; 2) ideas are immanent in a network (ecological system) of causal (determining) pathways; 3) the network of pathways is not bound with consciousness but extends to include the pathways of all unconscious mentation; and 4) the network is not bound by the skin but includes all external pathways (the total ecology or biosphere) along which information can travel. Bateson's (1972) desubstantialized, mentalistic, and cybernetic approach to reality essentially maintains that any concept of 'selfhood' is harmful because one forgets that we are "part of a wider eco-mental system" (p. 484). Similarly, Keeney (1983) rejects notions of self as a separate entity because cybernetics does not recognize the morally autonomous "separate agent" but only a "pattern of feedback" (p. 111)--what Bateson and Bateson (1988) refer to as a cybernetically determined "bias of the system" (p. 38). The systemic and ecological view of 'selfhood', epitomizing what Barrett (1987) has previously termed the "desubstantialization of consciousness" (p. 112) or the "disappearing self" (p. 119) and Lasch (1984) as the "protean self" (p. 97), encourages the total cybernetic dispensation of an autonomous moral self.

In contrast, Tageson (1982) maintains the HET approach to 'selfhood' construes the self as fundamentally a "centre of intentionality" which "functions as an active

agent within its environment and is, therefore, more than the reactive product of the forces which impinge upon it from within and without" (p. 33). Lasch (1984) maintains this ontological distinction between self and not self, self and other, or self and environment, is the primary "source of all other distinctions" and, therefore, constitutes the "first principle of mental life" (p. 163). This view of the self as ontologically distinct, that is as an independent 'centre of intentionality' or 'active agent', is what Tateson (1982) calls the "concrete self" that "each of us experiences as his own" (p. 112). This concrete or real self ontologically stems from one's immediate experience of an "inescapable sense of subjective continuity" which gives one the sense that "I am somehow a stable centre of existence, a 'self' persisting through all the changes and stages of my life" (Tateson, 1982, p. 55). Wilson (1988) maintains that "reference to a 'real self' is found in Aristotelean philosophy...and most recently within humanistic psychology" (p. 40) which constitutes the substantive "I of consciousness" or the "enduring concrete self" (p. 13).

Barrett (1982) maintains the existential uniqueness of human "subjectivity is the basis for authentic selfhood" because, as he argues, "we have passed to a greater degree of subjectivity when we deal with a self which makes decisions about itself, and seeks to change itself" (p. 123)--what May (1979) calls the "creative consciousness of the self" (p. 139). Similarly, Fromm (1980) holds "man transcends all other life" because,

ultimately, "he is, for the first time, life aware of himself" (p. 117), what Morowitz (1987) depicts as an essential ontological "discontinuity" (p. 281) between humanity and other organisms. Fromm (1980) elaborates on this notion, as follows:

Man is 'in' nature, subject to its dictates and accidents, yet he transcends nature because he lacks the unawareness which makes the animal part of nature--as one with it. Man is confronted with the frightening conflict of being the prisoner of nature, yet as it were a freak of nature; neither here nor there. Human self-awareness has made man a stranger in the world, separate, lonely, and frightened. (p. 117)

This self-transcendent capacity of man, that is his existential self-consciousness or self-awareness of his existence, as well as existence itself, constitutes humanity's most fundamental essence. Hence, the individual must unequivocally choose and take responsibility for his existence, ultimately, in moral and ethical terms--that is in terms of moral means, ends, and oughts. Correspondingly, Frankl (1967) concludes that "man is ultimately self-determining", that is, "he determines not only his own fate but also his own self, for man is not only forming and shaping the course of his life, but also his very own self" (p. 61). This 'existential' process of human development necessitates a developmental (ontological) transition from the "heteronomous" to "autonomous" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 11) realm of being which necessitates the individual "steadily molding and forging his own character" (Frankl, 1967, p. 61)--what Dabrowski (1970) defines as the "authentic self" (p. 78).

ES Moral Relativism versus HET Moral Objectivism

ES theory's basic metatheoretical orientation, as it pertains to fundamental issues of morality and ethics, is extremely convoluted and contradictory in nature which lends to its rather naive, tenuous, and dehumanizing approach to ethical issues and moral imperatives. Bateson's (1979) central epistemological tenet that "no ideas can be wrong, no purposes destructive, and no dissections misleading" (p. 230) leads ES theory to the ultimate conclusion that all notions of "right premises and presuppositions" (p. 23) are illusionary. Therefore, any objective sense or foundation for 'right' and 'wrong' or 'good' and 'evil', certainly in uniquely human terms, is entirely abandoned. Bateson's (1979) relativistic approach to moral issues stems from his naturalistic ontology and epistemological assumption that evolution, including human evolution, is fundamentally "value-free" (p. 191). This value-free approach to reality supposedly allows one to discuss metatheoretical issues or "formal questions without moralizing" which "moves us away from questions of values" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 132)-that is uniquely human questions and concerns. Bateson and Bateson's (1988) ES approach to reality, which does not entertain the possibility of "epistemological error" (p. 23), maintains the ecological biosphere or "ECO is not concerned with good or bad...and freewill" (p. 149). That is, profound questions of truth and falsehood or good and evil constitute a metatheoretical impossibility because moral choice and responsibility are epistemologically

obliterated in an ecologically or cybernetically determined universe. The ES world view, at best, merely represents a metatheoretical and metaethical shift from a linear-mechanistic determinism (mechanistic naturalism) to a recursive-cybernetic functionalism (organismic naturalism). In both cases, the uniquely human (transcendent) realm of autonomous decision and moral purposes, ends, and oughts are unequivocally abandoned.

Paradoxically, although epistemologically rejecting moral notions of values, right and wrong, good and evil, choice and responsibility, and freewill and purpose, ES theory attempts to establish a moral framework and ethical foundation based upon aesthetics. This ES approach to morality and ethics emphasizes a New Age variant of moral "aestheticism" which attempts to establish a deontological or formalistic moral foundation based on a naturalistic cybernetic harmony involving "principles of beauty" (Webster's Dictionary, 1980, p. 90). Bateson's (1979) ES epistemology develops a moral and ethical foundation which construes the 'good' merely in terms of an ecological or aesthetic quality called "the pattern which connects" or "metapattern" (p. 9, 12). Here, the ES 'ethic' is conceptualized in terms of determinant "interactive process" where notions of 'good' and 'evil' or 'right' and 'wrong' merely constitute "reversible" and "irreversible" or "self-limiting" and "self-maximizing" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p.132) ecological or cybernetic adjustments. This aesthetic approach to moral action, more appropriately framed moral inaction, emphasizes

ecological or systemic "adaptation" and cybernetic "homeostasis" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 120). ES theory's organismic naturalism maintains that human affairs may be appropriately contextualized and explained in terms of a cybernetic functionalism. Here, Bateson (1979) maintains, all human behavior has its roots in "external adaptation" (p. 197) and "perfecting adaptive acts" (p. 217)--that is what ultimately constitutes 'good' or 'bad' is merely its "survival" (p. 201) value for the total ecosystem.

Bateson's (1979) aesthetic approach to morality rejects all Occidental notions of "final causes" or "teleology" (p. 66) where "some type of end determines process" (p. 66)--that is ES theory totally rejects the humanistic and Aristotelean notions of the moral 'ends' and 'oughts' of uniquely human existence. ES theory ecologically and naturalistically construes "purpose and choice" (Bateson & Bateson, 1988, p. 141) merely in terms of "self-corrective adjustments" (Bateson, 1979, p. 141) or what Keeney (1983) similarly refers to as "hierarchies of control" (p. 71), "regulatory process", and, cybernetic "adaptation" (p. 77). This eco-systemic approach to so-called normative issues discounts all Occidental and lineal notions of "bad, sick, or mad" (Keeney, 1983, p. 128) in favor of cybernetic conceptualizations of ecological "vital balance" (Keeney, 1983, p. 126) and "biological value" or "optimum value" (Bateson, 1979, p. 59). Bateson and Bateson (1988) maintain that all references to teleology or "goal activated" (p. 39)

behavior, as reflected within the ends and oughts of human existence, constitutes a profound "epistemological lie" (p. 39) which only foster's humanity's extreme "appetitive orientation" (p. 39).

In opposition, MacQuarrie (1987) maintains HET's dualistic and multidimensional approach to ontology insists that "man is never just part of the cosmos" (p. 17) and, therefore, can never be understood simplistically in terms of some kind of natural or determined "process and occurrence" (p. 221). MacQuarrie (1987) insists that man is unique as a 'historical' being where the "phenomena of history" historically distinguishes human existence from mere determined "occurrence and processes of nature" (p. 221). That is, MacQuarrie (1987) argues, HET emphasizes a 'personalistic' approach to human existence which unequivocally acknowledges the moral "autonomy and responsibility of the individual" (p. 21) because "freedom, decision, and responsibility constitute the core of personal being" (p. 16). This personalistic view of human existence, which does not negate the natural and determined dimensions of reality, fundamentally construes the "self as agent" which "insists on action for only in action does (human) existence attain concreteness and fullness" (MacQuarrie, 1987, pp. 174, 175). Similarly, Halverson (1981) emphasizes the activist and transcendent capacity of the individual which recognizes "man is transcendent in his being" (p. 69) and "is at any moment going beyond what one is at that moment" (p. 70). However, HET's personalism also insists that "man does not

transcend his situation in terms of images or laws of nature operating from the outside, but in terms of images of himself which he consciously seeks to realize" (MacQuarrie, 1987, p. 70). Frankl (1967) espouses that "man transcends his being towards a world", but, far more importantly, also "transcends his being towards an 'ought'"--what he refers to as the "realm of the genuinely human" (p. 136). Therefore, the "open humanism" of HET is ultimately concerned with what MacQuarrie (1987) refers to as the uniqueness of "human values and with the realization of authentic existence" (p. 28).

HET's moral, purposive, and ends approach to human existence emphasizes what Barrett (1987) depicts as an "Aristotelean view of reality" which espouses that "to live the moral life is to fulfill human nature" (p. 91). May (1979) maintains the teleological approach to human existence construes the individual as a freely choosing entity whereby the "person can direct his decisions in light of long term values, which are the basis of ethics and therefore the basis of morals" (p. 82). Similarly, Frankl (1969) states human existence is morally directed by one's "uniquely human capacity to rise above one self, to judge and evaluate one's deeds in moral and ethical terms" (p. 18). This moral and ethical approach to human affairs insists that authentic human existence is directed towards nonrelativistic values and meanings--what Frankl (1967) describes as those values and meanings which are not just subjective emotional experience or merely an artifact of socio-cultural preference. HET's moral

objectivism, which unequivocally rejects the sociological, anthropological, and ecological relativism of the ES world view, insists that "man lives by ideals and values" and, ultimately, "being human means being in the face of meanings to fulfill and values to realize" (Frankl, 1969, pp. 51, 52). HET emphasizes that man "chooses what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meanings and values" (Frankl, 1967, p. 51) whereby higher level "ideals" become the very "stuff of survival" (Frankl, 1967, p. 18).

This teleological approach to human existence, which acknowledges the profoundly important moral dimension of human reality, necessitates what Dabrowski (1967) terms as "the preservation of man as a spiritual being" which emphasizes "moral action" (p. 48). This moral approach to human existence emphasizes one's ability to "judge oneself, to evaluate the consequences of one's actions not in utilitarian terms but in terms of universal ethical principles, and to take others into consideration (which) is not possible by reasoning alone" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 57). HET's ethical approach to human affairs emphasizes the uniqueness of human freedom and mankind's ability to choose good over evil. Fromm (1980) emphasizes the importance of this moral and ethical dimension of human existence, as follows:

Freedom is more than acting in the awareness of necessity; it is man's great chance of choosing good as against evil--it is a chance of choosing between real possibilities on the basis of awareness and effort. This position is neither determinism or indeterminism; it is the position of realistic critical humanism...Evil is man's loss of himself in

the tragic attempt to escape the burden of his humanity. (pp. 147-148)

Man's uniquely human capacity to morally choose and enact both good and evil distinguishes his existence or being from the being of all other organisms. It is this dimension of human existence, based on the ontological uniqueness of man's spiritual/transcendent or moral/ethical existence, which is totally eradicated within ES theory's naturalistic ontology and moral relativism.

Conclusion

A comparison of the central philosophical foundations and metatheoretical constructs of ES and HET world views demonstrate that they represent fundamentally different approaches to reality, human existence, and the human sciences. The ES world view constitutes a monistic and unified approach to reality which emphasizes cybernetic process, homeostatic adjustment, and ecological self-correction. ES theory's organismic naturalism conceptualizes all activity, including human activity, as being ecologically deterministic or cybernetically reactive in nature which metatheoretically represents a cybernetic/ organismic functionalism. This functionalist approach to human affairs deemphasizes, if not entirely discounts, the profound importance of moral choice, decision, and responsibility which constitutes the foundation of uniquely human values, meanings, ethics, and ends. ES theory's moral relativism reductively diminishes human existence, values and ends within a naturalistic

moral ethos of survivalism. ES theory's epistemological negation of health and pathology, right and wrong, and, most importantly, good and evil is replaced with a naturalistic, aesthetic, and cybernetic moral ethos where the ultimate value becomes only survival itself--what Lasch has previously depicted as the modern moral ethos of survivalism.

The uniquely human mind or self, as construed within ES theory's monistic naturalism, is almost entirely obliterated or desubstantialized whereby it is epistemologically contextualized as merely some type of immanent, ecological, and cybernetically reactive, self-programming 'bias in the system'. This extremely deterministic and dehumanizing approach to selfhood totally negates any self-transcendent capacity of the human mind which allows it (the self) to freely reflect upon, choose, and to proactively engage one's world in terms of particular moral goals, ends, and purposes. ES theory's ecological or cybernetic approach to selfhood views the self as 'nothing but' an epistemological construct which is to be eventually abandoned in the name of so-called cybernetic enlightenment. This 'ecological self' or 'bias in the system' is merely an illusion or cybernetic artifact of the greater ecological system or biosphere. The best that this ES variant of 'selfhood' can do is to 'reactively' self-correct or self-adjust to the deterministic and naturalistic demands of the ecosystem or ECO god. ES theory rejects all teleological, purposive, and ends approaches to human existence which

emphasize the profoundly important and uniquely human capacity to ethically choose between higher and lower or good and evil.

Opposingly, the HET world view represents philosophical transcendentalism, that is an antimonistic ontology and multidimensional approach to human affairs, which ontologically incorporates both naturalism and nonnaturalism into its metatheoretical framework. HET's 'open humanism' represents a transcendentalistic approach to human existence which advocates an 'open-at-the-top' metatheoretical perspective. This HET multilevel holism is to be clearly distinguished from the monistic holism of ES theory's 'organismic naturalism', as represented by Suzuki's (1989) conceptualization of reality as a "seamless whole" (p. xii). HET's multidimensional ontology both distinguishes and recognizes the ontologically distinct psychophysiological (physical/biological), psychosocial (mental/interactional), and transpersonal (moral/spiritual) dimensions of human reality which metatheoretically incorporates the uniquely human capacity for self-transcendence. This transcendent or transpersonal realm of human experience allows for purposive intentionality to be included within HET's conceptualization of human actions. HET's 'intentional' or 'proactive' view of human existence moves beyond the dehumanizing and 'reactive' approach of ES theory's cybernetic determinism. That is man's relationship to his ecology is fundamentally one of moral choice, decision,

and 'responsibility' rather than being merely constituted by ecologically programmed cybernetic 'responsivity'.

HET's multidimensional ontology adopts a teleological approach to selfhood which emphasizes the self-transcendent nature of the self. HET's dualistic ontology incorporates both naturalistic (immanent) and nonnaturalistic (transcendent) capacities of the human mind or self which entails a spiritual or moral dimension to human existence. Here, selfhood necessitates the uniquely human capacity to rise above the facticity of reality and judge one's deeds or behaviors in moral and ethical terms. HET's perspective of selfhood, which is founded on the Aristotelean notion of a concrete, real, or authentic self, emphasizes the uniquely human ability to transcend the natural or determined dimensions of reality and to develop a higher level or moral and ethical self. This authentic or ethical self is ultimately directed towards and pulled by nonrelativistic or objective values and meanings--that is the individual must choose existence and selfhood in terms of profoundly important questions of good and evil.



The metatheoretical similarities between ES and HET theories are remote, at best, and reflect primarily their shared opposition to the 'nothing but' materialism of positivistic approaches to human existence. These metatheoretical differences are topologically depicted as illustrated in figure 1. However, the HET world view also rejects the monistic ontology of organismic naturalism or ES theory as constituting another variant of

metatheoretical oversimplification. This reductionistic or 'nothing but' approach to human reality epistemologically confuses 'ecological breadth' (naturalism) for 'ontological height' (nonnaturalism).

Bateson (1979) contends that "a miracle is a materialist's idea of how to escape materialism" (p. 232). This HET theorist, reflecting Kierkegaard's existential analysis and critique of the modern aesthete, would equally maintain that 'aestheticism' is the only way in which the organismic naturalist can escape his/her own self-imposed, antihumanistic, and atheistic nihilism. That is, Gregory Bateson not only abolishes God (Transcendence) from the heavens but also eradicates humanity from terra firma. Unlike Gregory Bateson, this HET theorist readily maintains that, indeed, ideas can be incredibly wrong, purposes extremely destructive, and tautological/epistemological dissections profoundly dehumanizing and misleading.

Figure 1

A Multidimensional Topology of HET and ES World Views



CHAPTER VI

A Multidimensional Topology for the Human Sciences and A Multilevel Counselling Framework

Prologue

Nothing is more conducive to the brutalization of the modern world than the launching, in the name of the science, wrongful and degraded definitions of man. (Schumacher, 1977, p. 31)

One must think like a hero to behave like a merely decent human being. (May Sarton, cited in Le Carre, 1989)

A Multidimensional Topology for the Human Sciences

Overview

The establishment of a more appropriate and encompassing metatheoretical framework for the human sciences, which fully addresses the reductionistic and dehumanizing tendencies of both EP and ES world views, necessitates the development of a philosophical approach which recognizes the multidimensional nature of reality and the ontological uniqueness of human existence. This multidimensional approach, which incorporates HET's dimensional ontology, provides a metatheoretical framework and multilevel topology whereby the various EP, HE and ES world views and counselling perspectives can be more adequately viewed, compared, and contrasted. This multidimensional approach to human affairs can also be utilized to develop a more appropriate perspective on the multilevel nature of human reality, problems and related solutions.

Philosophical Maps

Schumacher (1977) maintains, within the human sciences, there is an indispensable need to develop a more appropriate and encompassing metatheoretical framework or "philosophy which is comprehensive enough to embrace the whole of knowledge" (p. 16). Historically, there has been a radical epistemological shift from a supernatural (religious) to a natural (scientific) monism which Schumacher (1977) aptly characterizes as a metatheoretical transition from "many centuries of theological imperialism" to "three centuries of scientific imperialism" (p. 14). These metatheoretical developments have resulted in truncated philosophical perspectives within the human sciences which depict reality and human existence within the limited perspectives of either mechanistic or organismic naturalism. Schumacher (1977) maintains 19th and 20th century "philosophical maps" (p. 9) have consistently painted reality and human existence within the "utilitarian colors" (p. 12) of "pragmatism" (p. 124)--that is emphasizing a "philosophy that holds that the only valid idea of truth is that it works'" (p. 124).

An unfortunate consequence of this reductionistic metatheoretical oversimplification, as construed within the diminishing epistemological auspices of "modern materialist scientism" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 13), has been the development and facilitation of a human science which is predominantly concerned with 'means' not 'ends'. This historically engendered metatheoretical atrophy has

resulted in a reductionistic approach to the human sciences which does not adequately entertain, understand, and address, let alone acknowledge, the uniquely human realm of nonrelativistic "values and meanings" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 13)--that is the moral, ethical, and spiritual/transcendent dimension(s) of human reality. The purpose of this chapter is to develop an antimonistic and multidimensional 'philosophical map' which moves beyond the limiting influences of both mechanistic and organismic naturalism as well as the relativistic orientation of contextualism or unqualified humanism.

Ontological Verticality

The development of an antimonistic and multidimensional approach to the human sciences necessitates the ontological demarcation and epistemological consideration of what Schumacher (1977) refers to as the "vertical dimension" (p. 19) of reality. This vertical or hierarchical dimension emphasizes philosophical notions of "higher" and "lower" (p. 20) levels of being which unequivocally differentiate and incorporate the ontological uniqueness of human existence. Schumacher (1977) maintains it is the epistemological negation or "loss of the vertical dimension" (p. 20), which philosophically obliterates all "ontological discontinuities between levels of being" (p. 25), that constitutes the fundamental philosophical mistake (categorical error) of both mechanistic and organismic naturalism, as well as, monistic idealism or panpsychism.

It is the continued failure of the human sciences to adequately recognize and emphasize these profoundly important "ontological gaps or discontinuities" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 35) that has perpetuated the erroneous belief that the human sciences could be appropriately contextualized as some kind of unidimensional or monomorphic enterprise--that is as either a naturalistic or nonnaturalistic monism. This failure to recognize profound differences between "inanimate" matter and "animate" life, as well as animal "consciousness" and uniquely human "self-awareness" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 26), stems from modern biology's complete rejection of the so-called "discredited idea" of "vitalism" (Suzuki, 1989, p. 6). This has resulted in the human sciences viewing matters of ontology unidimensionally or merely in terms of "horizontal extension" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 48). Schumacher's (1977) notion of ontological gaps or the vertical dimension of reality is poignantly articulated, in the movie "The Elephant Man", when John Merrick, in a moment of moral outrage and rebellion, expresses to his crowd of antagonizers--"I am not an animal, I am a human being".

It is precisely these qualitative types of ontological distinctions and philosophical insights that have been significantly lost to many modern day psychologists and psychotherapists, who still confuse ontological distinctions of "differences of kind" for "differences of degree" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 30). All monistic ontologies, whether naturalistic or nonnaturalist

in orientation, commit this type of categorical error which obfuscates and confounds profoundly important ontological discontinuities and distinctions. Schumacher (1977) summarizes the importance of this vertical dimension of reality, as follows:

The ability to see the Great truth of the hierarchic structure of the world, which makes it possible to distinguish between higher and lower levels of Being, is one of the indispensable conditions of understanding. (p. 23).

Mortimer Adler (1985) holds modern philosophy's failure to distinguish between differences of 'kind' and 'degree', that is qualitative distinctions, comprises one of the basic errors in modern thought--what he basically terms as one of "Ten Subjects About Which Philosophical Mistakes Have Been Made". (p. xi).

This vertical or hierarchical dimension of reality is precisely what both modern philosophy and science have consistently rejected in their attempt to develop what Lerner (1976) terms as a "unity of science" (p. 23) approach to the human sciences. Lerner (1976) characterizes the unity-of-science position, as follows:

In the unity-of-science viewpoint, psychology is viewed as a branch of natural science. Hence, this view holds that the phenomena of psychology are not unique in nature but rather are controlled by the laws that govern all events and phenomena in the natural world. The position thus holds that there are basic common laws that govern all things in the universe. Neither biology, psychology, sociology nor any science for that matter has its own special laws; rather in a basic sense, all sciences and more importantly all events and phenomena in the real world are controlled by a common set of principles. (p. 23)

In essence, the ES world view (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1988), as well as the New Age epistemologies in general, represent an organismic or cybernetic variant of the unity-of-science approach to the human sciences. Therefore, the ES world view or organismic naturalism is as dissimilar to the antimonistic ontology and multidimensional approach of HET as the mechanistic variant of the unity-of-science perspective which preceded it--that is the world view of mechanism or mechanistic naturalism.

Four Levels of Being

HET's multidimensional holism and antimonistic ontology is founded on the basic premise that there exist profoundly important ontological discontinuities which demark qualitatively different realms of being. Schumacher (1977) maintains these basic ontological distinctions constitute the vertical dimension of reality or the "hierarchical structure of the world" (p. 23). Schumacher (1977) depicts these hierarchical levels, which constitute higher and lower levels of existence, as the "four kingdoms" of the "Great Chain of Being" (p. 23)--what he ontologically differentiates as the "mineral, plant, animal and human" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 23) realms. It is the metatheoretical recognition of these ontologically distinct realms of being which constitutes HET's antimonistic and multidimensional approach to ontology.

Unfortunately, it is also EP and ES theory's epistemological rejection of these profoundly important

ontological realms and distinctions which constitutes their metatheoretically reductionistic unity-of-science bias. These nothing-but approaches to reality, as evidenced within the world views of both mechanistic and organismic naturalism, philosophically conclude it is unrealistic and unscientific to "define the nature of man other than animal" because "neither physics or mathematics can entertain the qualitative notion of 'higher' and 'lower'" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 20) realms of being.

Schumacher (1977) holds that "the modern world tends to be skeptical about everything that demands higher faculties", paradoxically however, "it is not at all skeptical about skepticism, which hardly demands anything at all" (p. 73). This epistemological bias, unquestioned skepticism, and reductionistic article of faith either disregards or totally negates the higher levels of being such that there is a total loss of the vertical dimension of reality. This loss of the vertical dimension, particularly from 19th and 20th century philosophical maps, dramatically prevents the ontological distinguishing of qualitatively different levels or realms of being. These four levels or kingdoms of being will be briefly discussed in order for the reader to appreciate the philosophical importance of both recognizing and differentiating them as ontologically distinct realms.

Schumacher (1977) depicts the first level of being as the mineral or physical world of "inanimate matter" (p. 25). This physical, material, or inorganic realm constitutes what Bateson (1979) has previously termed the

realm of 'pleroma' (the nonliving), that is the lowest level of being, which he defines as "the world of nonliving billiard balls and galaxies" (p. 7). The material, physical, inorganic, or pleromatic realm can be understood and appropriately analyzed in terms of the linear causality and mechanistic forces of "physics and chemistry" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 28). This realm constitutes the appropriate ontological level at which the physical sciences can best direct their positivistic experimentation, analysis, and understanding. Schumacher (1977) maintains, at the material realm of being, "life, consciousness, and self-awareness" (p. 28) are totally absent.

The first ontological discontinuity or qualitative jump occurs between the material, physical, or inorganic realm and the realm of organic, vegetative, plant life. The realm of vegetative plant life cannot be understood merely in terms of mechanical causes or physical forces, although such physical and mechanistic forces still have an impact on organic life. This second realm is ontologically distinguished through the making of a vitalistic distinction between "inanimate and animate" (Schumacher, 1988, p. 2) or physical and biological realms. Similarly, ES theory (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1988) makes an ontological distinction between the pleromatic (physical/material) and creatural (organic/mental) realms of being. There emerges at the biological or organic level of existence, the capacity to be self-organizational at the basic cellular,

physiological, or biological level which Schumacher (1977) characterizes as "where there is life there is form". Vegetative plant life is directed by innate developmental or growth tendencies but also is able to react to external environmental stimuli. Schumacher (1977) maintains at the organic level of being "it is not unduly difficult to appreciate the (ontologically distinct) difference between alive and lifeless" (p. 31) or physical and biological levels of being.

The third ontological realm, the animal realm of being, constitutes a further ontological jump or discontinuity which is marked by the emergence of another qualitatively distinct feature called "consciousness" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 25). The development of consciousness, which ontologically differentiates animal life forms from vegetative ones, allows animals to have some power over their physical and biological worlds rather than merely reacting to physical or biological determinants. Consciousness, even at the animal level, enables these organisms to have a basic awareness of their environments which allows them to actively engage in their immediate world rather than just react to either mechanistic (external) forces or organismic (internal) drives. There also exists, at the animal level of being, a certain degree of curiosity towards, learning about, and power over their immediate external environment. Here, at the third level, it is still relatively easy for scientists to distinguish between mere vegetative and animal life which incorporates the higher faculty and

power of animal consciousness. The ES epistemology (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1988) does not make an important ontological distinction between vegetative or biological life and animal consciousness other than in terms of logical typology.

The fourth realm of being, the uniquely human realm, constitutes another ontological jump where there is the emergence of what Schumacher (1977) refers to as "self-awareness" (p. 1) or "self-consciousness" (p. 32). The uniquely human capacity for self-awareness represents a profoundly important ontological "difference between an animal and man" (Schumacher, 1977 p. 29). Schumacher (1977) ontologically emphasizes that "self-awareness is 'higher' than consciousness" (p. 90) and, as a result, "without self-awareness...man acts, speaks, studies, reacts mechanistically, like a machine: on the basis of 'programmes' acquired accidentally, unintentionally, mechanically" (p. 89). It is this uniquely human capacity for self-awareness or self-reflective (purposive) consciousness that Bateson's ES theory portrays as a uniquely human pathology. Schumacher (1977) maintains it is precisely this important ontological distinction that traditional positivistic science has consistently failed to acknowledge. Schumacher (1977) comments:

It is not unduly difficult to appreciate the difference between 'alive' and 'lifeless'; it is more difficult to distinguish consciousness from life; to realize and appreciate the difference between self-awareness and consciousness...is hard indeed....Hence we are given a large number of definitions of man which make him out to be nothing but an exceptionally intelligent animal with an unduly large brain, or a tool-making

animal, or a political animal, or an unfinished animal, or simply a naked ape. (p. 31)

Modern definitions of man and human existence obfuscate this important ontological distinction, that is a 'qualitative' difference of kind and not just a 'quantitative' difference of degree, which dramatically distinguishes basic animal consciousnesses from human self-consciousness and moral self-awareness.

The emergence of this uniquely human capacity allows humanity to transcend the determinant givens of any particular situation and decide one's existence in moral and ethical terms. Schumacher (1977) exhorts that this uniquely human capacity is never "narrowly determined, confined, or programmed" (p. 31) and is ontologically "distinct from the powers of life and consciousness" (p. 32). Self-awareness or self-consciousness have "nothing automatic or mechanical about them" but "have to be developed and 'realized' by each human individual if he is to become truly human, that is to say a 'person'" (p. 32). Schumacher (1977) states that this self-awareness which "constitutes the difference between animal and man" is "the power of unlimited potential, a power that makes man not only human, but gives him the possibility, even the need, to become superhuman". Schumacher (1977) concludes that "to be properly human, you must go beyond the merely human" (p. 49). Human existence, at the very least, is uniquely constituted by these four ontologically distinct realms of being--that is the physical (material), organic (vegetative), animal (conscious), and self-aware (self-

transcendent) dimensions of existence. Therefore, human problems and related solutions can originate in any one of these ontologically distinct levels of being.

Four Basic Progressions

Schumacher (1977) states these four ontologically distinct realms of being, exhibit certain "characteristics" which may be regarded as basic ontological "progressions" (p. 36). An awareness, understanding, and incorporation of these four ontological progressions is necessary in order to develop a multidimensional topology for the human sciences. These four progressions incorporate the previous notion of 'ontological verticality' which constitutes the metatheoretical foundation for this hierarchical and multidimensional topology. Schumacher (1977) emphasizes that any multidimensional ontology, which recognizes the hierarchic structure of reality, should incorporate the basic awareness that "higher does not merely possess powers that are additional to and exceed those of lower: it also has power over the lower, the power of organizing the lower and using it for its own purposes" (p. 35). Correspondingly, Schumacher (1977) also insists that any multidimensional approach to ontology must acknowledge the "open-endedness" (p. 32) of human existence and must consider that the "great 'Chain of Being extends upwards beyond man" (p. 35)--that is towards "the Absolute (which) transcends Nature itself" (Tageson, 1982, p. 197).

Passivity to activity. Schumacher (1977) characterizes the first ontological transition as a

"progression from passivity to activity" (p. 36)--that is as there exists an ontological progression through the mineral, vegetative, animal, and human realms of being there also occurs a corresponding "change in orientation of movement" (p. 37).

Activity, movement or change at the inorganic realm of being is entirely determined by external physical forces or mechanistic causes. Schumacher (1977) states at the level of "inanimate matter, there cannot be change of movement without a physical cause" (p. 37) which infers a linear and direct "linkage between cause and effect" (p. 37), as stipulated within the positivistic sciences.

At the organic realm of being the "causal chain is more complex" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 37) than is demonstrated at the physical or mineral level of being. Movement or change, at the vegetative level, can be caused by both "physical effects", that is lower level causes, and additionally by external stimuli such as a plant being stimulated by sunlight. This level of change can be due to actual physical forces or external stimuli.

Schumacher (1977) maintains, at the level of animal consciousness, "causation of movement becomes still more complex" where "an animal can be pushed around like a stone" and "can also be stimulated like a plant" (p. 38). However, Schumacher (1977) adds, at the animal realm of reality there also exists a "third causative factor" originating internally which he categorizes as basic animal "motives" (p. 38). These motivational influences are defined as "certain drives, attractions, and

compulsions of a totally non-physical kind" which "come from inside" (Schumacher, 1977. p. 38). These motives or internal causes, at the animal level of being, need a 'motivational' cause to be "physically present to be effective" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 38) in influencing their behavior. For example, an animal's conscious recognition of its master and related response of jumping for joy, as well as recognizing its enemies and running in fear, are two basic examples of how animal motives may influence behavior. Animal activity, therefore, can be influenced by direct physical forces, external stimuli, and physically present motivations.

Schumacher (1977) maintains the human realm of being is marked by "another possibility of the origination of movement" which he terms "will"--"that is, the power to move and act even when there is no physical compulsion, no physical stimulus, and no motivating force actually present" (p. 38). Here, human behavior can be motivated by what Schumacher (1977) maintains as the "power of foreknowledge" or "naked insight", where there can occur "anticipation in one's mind (of) future developments" (p. 38), which results in an individual's taking a particular course of action over another. Luijpen and Koren (1969) emphasize that "man's free action is not a deterministic process nor mere discharge of forces" because, at the level of human existence, human action "is the execution of the self-project which man is" (p. 125). This "progression from physical cause to stimulus to motive and to will", which precisely characterizes human development

and autonomous existence, necessitates the development of a will which is "capable of overriding the causative forces" (Schumacher, 1977. p. 39) of lower levels, whether construed within physical/mechanistic or biological/organismic terms.

Determinism to freedom. Schumacher (1977) states that the previous ontological progression from passivity to activity closely corresponds to the next progression of "necessity to freedom" (p.39). At the inanimate or physical realm of being there exists what Schumacher (1977) describes as "nothing but necessity" where inorganic matter "is what it is and cannot be any other; (with) no possibility of "'developing' or in any way changing its nature" (p. 39). Schumacher (1977) totally rejects the monistic and New Age mystical interpretations of physics stating that "the so-called indeterminacy at the level of nuclear particles is simply another manifestation of necessity" because, ultimately, "total necessity means the absence of any creative principle (p. 39). The so-called "'freedom' of indeterminacy" constitutes the "extreme opposite of freedom"--that is a "necessity which can only be understood in terms of statistical probability" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 39). Schumacher (1977) maintains that at the "level of inanimate matter" there exists "no 'inner space'" or "autonomous powers" which he characterizes as "the scene of freedom" (p. 39).

The ontologically distinct emergence of vegetative life, animal consciousness, and human self-awareness also

marks a distinct increasing progression in the quality of "inner space" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 39). Schumacher (1977) maintains that "inner space is created by the powers of life, consciousness, and self-awareness", however, it is only at the human level of existence where "we have direct and personal experience...of our own inner space" and the freedom it affords us" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 39). Human existence, therefore is only authentically human when "a man makes use of his power of self-awareness" and attains "the level of a person"--that is "the level of freedom" when s/he "is living" and "not being lived" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 40). The individual must make it an "aim to become free", through the development of one's inner space or moral character, where there is developed a "centre of strength so that the power of...freedom exceeds that of...necessity" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 40).

Disunity to integration. Schumacher (1977) maintains the four realms can also be differentiated by a "marked and unmistakable progression towards integration and unity" (p. 40). Inanimate matter, that is at the mineral or inorganic level of being, can be "divided and subdivided without loss of character or Gestalt" because "at this level there is nothing to lose" (p. 40). Even at the realm of organic plant life, Schumacher (1977) contends, the inner unity or Gestalt of a plant is still relatively weak, such that, "parts of a plant can be cut off and will continue to live and develop as separate beings" (p. 40).

However, at the level of animal consciousness, animals constitute a much greater unity, that is more highly integrated beings or biological systems, where generally "parts...cannot survive separation" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 41) from the whole. However, Schumacher (1977) adds, for animals, there is little integration at the "mental plane" (p. 41) as can be evidenced at the human level. Schumacher (1977) characterizes the level of human existence, that is the realm of conscious self-awareness, as demonstrating "much more inner unity than any (lower) being" although such integration "is not guaranteed to him at birth" but "remains one of his major tasks" (p. 41). The individual, as an organic or biological system, is more easily able to be harmoniously integrated. However, Schumacher (1977) maintains, at the 'mental plane' "integration is far less perfect but is capable of improvement" (p. 41). This uniquely human progression towards integration ultimately necessitates the following:

Integration means the creation of an inner unity, a centre of strength and freedom, so that the being ceases to be a mere object, acted upon from outside forces and becomes a subject, acting from its own 'inner space' into the space outside itself. (Schumacher, 1977, p. 41).

This multidimensional progression towards greater unity or integration means a hierarchical transition or vertical progression from "visibility" to "invisibility" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 43). That is the more unified and interior a thing is the less likely it is to be "visible". (Schumacher, 1977, p. 43). The ontologically distinct realms of life, consciousnesses, and self-awareness are

"wholly invisible without colour, sound, taste, smell, and also without extension or weight." (Schumacher, 1977, p. 43). Within the context of multidimensional ontology, "'higher' always means and implies 'more inner', 'more interior', 'deeper', 'more intimate'; while 'lower' means and implies 'more outer', 'more external'; 'shallower', 'less intimate'" (Schumacher, 1977. p. 43). This hierarchic progression, what Schumacher (1988) describes as a multidimensional discontinuity from "the wholly visible mineral to be the largely invisible person" (p. 44), points towards "Levels of Being above man which would be totally invisible to the senses" (p. 44).

No world to purposive world. The multidimensional ontological discontinuities or qualitative leaps which distinguish the differing levels of being also differentiate "the kind of 'world' that exists for beings at different levels" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 44). This ontological shift from lower to higher levels of being, that is a discontinuous transition which involves qualitative leaps or progressions from passivity to activity, determinism to freedom, disunity to integration, can be characterized as demonstrating 'differences of kind' in the world one experiences.

Schumacher (1977) states that for physical matter there is "no 'world'" because "its total passivity is equivalent to the emptiness of its world" (p. 44). At the material or physical realm of being there exist only physical or mechanistic forces which externally determine reality.

The next ontological realm, the level of biological or vegetative being, Schumacher (1977) depicts as "a 'world' limited to its biological needs"--that is "a plant has a 'world' of its own--a bit of soil, water, air, light and possibly other influences" (p. 44). Vegetative plant life or the biological realm is totally oriented towards brute survival in strict biological or physiological terms--that is it truly exists as a realm where the "'struggle for survival'" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 45) predominates.

The next realm of being, the world of animal consciousness, "is incomparably greater and richer, although mainly determined by biological needs" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 45). However, at the animal level, because of the emergence of consciousness and curiosity there also exists qualitatively distinct factors which "enlarges the animal's world beyond narrow biological confines" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 45). Animals can have the capacity to form interrelationships with other beings, as well as the world around them, beyond mere biological or survivalistic terms. There is the development of rudimentary amoral 'social' relationships at this level of being.

The world of human existence, Schumacher (1977) argues, is infinitely more "greater and richer; indeed, it is asserted in traditional philosophy that man is capax universi, capable of bringing the whole universe into his experience" (p. 45). However, Schumacher (1977) also maintains that what the individual "will actually grasp

depends on each person's own Level of Being", therefore, "the 'higher' the person, the greater and richer is his or her world" (p. 45). At the lowest level of human existence, what Schumacher (1977) terms as "materialistic scientism" (p. 45), the world is experienced as an "accidental collection of atoms" where life is experienced as "nothing but a 'struggle for survival' and 'will to power'"--that is as a world which is "'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'" (p. 45). However, at higher and uniquely human levels of being, the world is experienced as infinitely "greater, richer, and more wonderful" (Schumacher, 1977, p. 45). Higher level worlds are basically purposive in nature and qualitatively distinct from the lowest level world which is fundamentally non-teleological or nonpurposive in nature. Schumacher (1977) contends that "to deny teleological action at the human level would be as foolish as to impute it at the level of inanimate matter" (p. 47). This type of multidimensional ontology or multilevel holism distinguishes the HET world view from both monistic naturalism and monistic nonnaturalism.

Levels of Science

Anderson (1981) examines, reviews, and critiques the major historical movements or metatheoretical transitions in the human sciences which have resulted in the development of what he differentiates as "three sorts of psychological science" (p. 8). These three alternative views within the human sciences qualitatively distinguish three distinct approaches to the psychological sciences

which Anderson (1981) refers to as Science₁ Science₂ and Science₃.

Science₁. Anderson (1981) describes the first approach to psychology as "Science₁" which equates psychological science with a "natural science" subject to determinate "conditional (causal) laws" (p. 8). Science₁ was founded upon the "salient successes of the natural sciences in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" and, therefore, adopted the metatheoretical perspective of "conventional science replete with laws expressed in mathematical terms" (Anderson, 1981, pp. 8, 9). Anderson (1981) maintains that Science₁ attempted to establish a psychological science similar to the physical sciences which advocated an "anti-clerical materialism and full determinism" as "a method of arriving at the laws at the basis of prediction and control" (p. 8). This Science₁ approach to psychology "treated psychology as a natural science" and interpreted human phenomena on the basis of "physiological processes" whereby the individual is conceptualized in terms of "a system--roughly speaking, a machine--like every other system subject to the inescapable and uniform laws of nature" (p. 9). Science₁, similar to the natural sciences, highly emphasized the experimental approach to psychology in attaining so-called objective data similar to the "physical and biological sciences" (p. 11).

Science₂. The next historical movement and metatheoretical transition in the psychological sciences, what Anderson (1981) terms "Science₂", developed at the

turn of the century and viewed humanity, predominantly, as a "active searcher for, and processor of, information" (p. 9). This metatheoretical transition from Science₁ to Science₂, also incorporated a methodological shift from an "experimental" to "correlational" (Anderson, 1981, p. 10) approach to understanding human behavior. Anderson (1981) argues that Science₂ represents a minor metatheoretical transition whereby the "causal (conditional) laws of Science₁" are now conceived as being "of a probalistic, Science₂ sort"--that is, in essence, constituting an epistemological transition from "provable" to "probable" (p. 10). Fundamental distinctions between Science₁ and Science₂, Anderson (1981) concludes, lie in their differing perspectives on the assumed "passive state of the organism", methodological differences in the "size of errors of measurement", and the types of accurate "causal inferences" (p. 13) made within each school of thought.

Science₃. The third historical movement and metatheoretical transition within the psychological sciences, what Anderson (1981) conceptualizes as "Science₃," evolved as a direct result of its "disliking the application of the methods and approaches of the natural sciences to human behavior or 'experience-behavior' dialectics" (pp. 15-16). Science₃, what Anderson (1981) describes as a "human science" (p. 16), emphasizes a humanistic or existential-phenomenological approach which opposed the "'reductionistic' approach to natural science" and which tries to gain "some understanding of the meaning of total human 'experiential

behavior dialectics'" (p. 16). This experiential and phenomenological approach to the human sciences emphasizes that "we should treat people, for scientific purposes, 'as if they were human beings,' as we know and understand them in everyday life" (p. 87). Science₃ emphasizes a personalistic or "person-oriented" (Anderson, 1981, p.16) approach to psychology which metatheoretically represents the HET world view.

This personalistic, experiential, and phenomenological approach to the human sciences, Anderson's (1981) Science₃, focuses on what Frankl (1969) terms the "noological dimension" (p. 17) or uniquely human aspect of reality--what he also depicts as the "anthropological rather than the theological dimension" (p. 17). Frankl (1967) states the "noological dimension is to be defined as that dimension in which the specifically human phenomena are located" (p. 74) whereby the individual "leaves the plane of the merely biopsychological and enters the sphere of the specifically human" (p. 63). Frankl (1975) depicts the noological dimension as the ontological realm where the individual freely chooses and takes full responsibility for one's existence and decides life in moral and ethical terms. One can depict the personalistic and experiential approach of Science₃ as essentially representing what can be alternatively termed 'noological humanism'--that is Science₃ attempts to understand and study the uniquely human or noological dimension of reality. Therefore, Anderson's (1981) three models of science, as alternative

modes of viewing the various dimensions of reality, can be used to depict and understand three ontologically distinct or discontinuous realms of being. Science₁ may be associated with mechanistic naturalism, Science₂ with organismic naturalism, and Science₃ with noological humanism or the specifically human realm of moral freedom. This is the realm of uniquely human choice, decision, responsibility, purpose and meaning.

Science₄. However, Frankl (1975) maintains that there are basically four realms of being which need to be included when developing a multidimensional approach to the human sciences which recognizes "biology is overarched by psychology, psychology by noology, and noology by theology" (p. 13). What needs to be developed is a fourth approach to the psychological sciences which studies, understands, and addresses the theological, religious, spiritual, and transpersonal dimension(s) of human experience. This fourth area of study and related approach to the human sciences would be termed Science₄ or 'theistic humanism'. This multidimensional approach to the human sciences, which incorporate Schumacher's (1977) four levels of being and Anderson's (1981) multilevel approach to the human sciences, forms the topology for a multidimensional view of reality and a multilevel perspective of four distinct modes (Science₁, Science₂, Science₃, and Science₄) of understanding, fields of knowledge, or areas of Science. Anderson's (1981) multidimensional approach to the human sciences, which epistemologically differentiates qualitatively distinct

realms of science or fields of knowledge, parallels what Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) have referred to as "multilevel empiricism" (p. 208).

Towards a Multilevel Counselling Framework

HET's dualistic or antimonistic approach to reality (Dabrowski, 1970, 1973; Frankl, 1969, 1975; Halverson, 1981; MacQuarrie, 1987; Schumacher, 1972, 1977), dimensional ontology (Dabrowski, 1973; Frankl, 1975; Schumacher, 1972, 1977), and hierarchic view of the psychological sciences (Anderson, 1981), provides a specific multidimensional and hierarchic framework in considering the various metatheoretical perspectives in counselling. A touchstone philosophical tenet of HET is its dualistic differentiation of the natural and nonnatural, facticity and existence, is and ought, or lower and higher realms of being which allow the various counselling perspectives to be multilevelly differentiated into a more comprehensive framework. More importantly, because the HET model considers both the lower and higher dimensions of human existence, it provides what Frankl (1967) terms "a correct picture of man"--that is "a picture of man in all his dimensions" (Frankl, 1967, p. 142).

Although Schumacher (1977) has established the theoretical groundwork for a vertical and ontologically discontinuous model of human existence, Dabrowski's HET concept of multilevelness provides further elaboration of the specific features which differentiate the various levels of being within the uniquely human realm--that is a

more detailed philosophical map of the nonnatural (noological and theological) realms of being. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) provide greater description in differentiating what Schumacher (1977) has briefly alluded to as the "hierarchic structure of gifts inside us" (p. 153). Furthermore, at the highest levels of the HET model, there is an understanding and conceptualization of the spiritual or transpersonal dimension, thus making provision for theistic humanism, previously referred to by this writer as Science₄.

Finally, the concept of multilevelness, within the HET antimonistic framework, provides a useful tool for the multilevel analysis of EP (first and second force), HE (third force), and ES (fourth force) world views. This multidimensional ontology and multilevel approach to counselling theory facilitates the making of important distinctions 'between' EP, HE, and ES world views, as well as, differentiating the various levels of theory 'within' each distinct school of thought.

HET's dualistic and antimonistic ontology has been described in detail in chapters four and five, including specific explanation of its core metatheoretical constructs. In summary these include: the ontological uniqueness of human existence, the teleological nature of human development, an antimonistic approach to ontology, a self-transcendent capacity, self-determinism and autonomy within the noological realm, a concrete and enduring self, the uniquely human moral and ethical dimension of existence, the related preeminence of moral development,

and finally, a multidimensional or multilevel view of human existence. It is this last aspect of the HET model which will be highlighted in the application of this framework to differentiate the various levels of the EP, HE and ES world views.

Dabrowski's Multilevel View of Counselling Theories

Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) refer to their concept of multilevelness as a "new 'system of thought' suited to represent the developmental approach on the official map of psychology and clinical sciences" (p. 12). In the same way that this model can be used to differentiate individuals based on their level of emotional development, counselling theories, too, can be multilevelly differentiated. Different metatheoretical perspectives or counselling world views can be sorted out and analyzed according to the level or realm of human existence which they predominantly characterize. The following section will provide a general description of five levels of counselling world views reflected within the Dabrowskian HET multidimensional ontology and multilevel framework.

Level one -- unilevel integration. Dabrowski's lowest developmental level, level one or primary integration, may be characterized as espousing a conception of reality which is "limited to only what is tangible, concrete, and available to sensory cognition" which constitutes "the reality of everyday life and statistically established norms" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96). This fundamentally constitutes the world of

physical reality and the realm of linear or mechanistic forces--that is the realm of mechanistic naturalism. This level one or Science₁ approach to reality and the human sciences corresponds most closely with what is advocated within the physicalist doctrine of physical sciences and the mechanistic orthodoxy of Skinner's behaviorism. Here, science is construed predominantly, if not entirely, within a deterministic 'what is' approach to reality where behavior is regarded as being instrumentally conditioned, automatic, and impulsive in nature.

This Science₁ view of reality, which constitutes the biopsychological or heteronomous realm, demonstrates an "insufficient understanding of the horizontal dimension of reality", as well as, a profound "lack of understanding of the vertical aspect of human reality, that is, of higher levels of human experience" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96). Reality and the human sciences are conceived within an unidimensional or monomorphic context where there is a complete lack of an understanding of the "multilevelness of reality" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96). Science₁, as a level one metatheoretical perspective, conceptualizes the totality of reality as only being comprised of what Schumacher (1977) refers to as the "visible" (p. 43). This Science₁ approach to human existence reductionistically contextualizes humanity as a 'nothing but'--that is as merely "a product of external determinants" whereby "the individual is treated as a human animal" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, pp. 206, 212). Science₁ (mechanistic naturalism) advocates

positivism, empiricism, and operationalism and espouses a philosophy of mechanistic object relations where the "mental norm is patterned after the physiological and physical norm" (Dabrowski, 1977, p. 209). This fundamentally constitutes metatheoretical realism and an instrumental approach to both reality and the human sciences. Science₁ or level one reality reflects what Osborne and Angus (1989) have previously referred to as the world view of Mechanicism and Reber (1989) as Physicalism.

Level two -- unilevel disintegration. Dabrowski's second level of development, unilevel disintegration or what Anderson (1981) refers to as Science₂, no longer conceptualizes reality as "something fixed"--that is reality "ceases to be something compact and manipulable" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96). There is limited consideration that reality may have "many dimensions and, vaguely, even many levels" where "reality is usually understood as that which, at the present moment, gives the most varied and rich experiences" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96). Here, most importantly, "theories influence a person's unstable conceptions of reality that either keep on replacing each other or take the form of paradoxical relativistic views" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 96)--that is epistemological versus ontological distinctions are often metatheoretically confused and confounded. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) maintain that at level two "the subjectivity of individual realities" is predominantly "molded by society and culture" (p. 96).

Reality, at level two, is depicted by Dabrowski as a structure without a structure and reflecting both value relativism and utilitarianism.

Science₂, the second level of this metatheoretical framework, consists of two dominant and alternative world views. The first and lower form is founded upon a biological and organismic approach to reality--what Osborne and Angus (1989) refer to as organicism and which can also be termed organismic naturalism. This lower form of Science₂ (organismic naturalism) adopts a predominantly biological or cybernetic approach to reality and reflects Gregory Bateson's ecosystemic world view. This metatheoretical approach represents an approach to reality which emphasizes cybernetic process and homeostatic adaptation. This organismic variant of Science₂ regards developmental tensions as primarily needing to be either "released or converted" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 24), which allows the human system to self-correct or regain homeostatic adjustment or equilibrium, rather than having positive developmental transformative value. This organismic variant of Science₂ constitutes a metatheoretical transition from linear or mechanistic determinism (mechanistic naturalism) to level two cybernetic or interactional determinism (organismic naturalism). Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) maintain that at the organismic level of reality there is often an epistemological fluctuation between "pantheistic and monistic" (p. 214) approaches to reality.

The second and more developed variant of level two reality or Science₂ represents a gradual movement away from what Schumacher (1977) refers to as 'visibilia' towards 'invisibilia' and can be metatheoretically depicted as either phenomenism (Reber, 1985) or contextualism (Osborne & Angus, 1989). This epistemological transition represents movement away from both mechanistic and organismic naturalism (objective empiricism) towards a more personalistic and existential (subjective empiricism) approach to reality. Both variants of Science₂, that is lower order organicism and higher order phenomenism or contextualism, metatheoretically endorse a "pluralism of philosophical orientations" and espouse "moral relativism" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 214, p. 218). Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) state that, at unilevel disintegration or level two, "values are seen as arbitrary, relative, and externally determined" which supports a moral ethos of "utilitarianism and majority rule...as solutions to problems" (p. 26)--that is a culturally survivalistic moral ethos. Philosophical contextualism represents a gradual metatheoretical transition from organismic naturalism to a form of unqualified or relativistic humanism. Therefore, Science₂, whether viewed from either organismic naturalism or phenomenological contextualism, emphasizes a belief in the "cultural relativism of values" and disavows any kind of objective or nonrelativistic "moral hierarchy" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 212).

Level three -- spontaneous multilevel disintegration.

Dabrowski's third developmental level, spontaneous multilevel disintegration, can be characterized as depicting a major ontological jump or discontinuity into the uniquely human realm of being. Here, the individual begins to experience a growing sense of direction in one's life which involves an "effort to carry out a hierarchization of reality" and "is an expression of active choice of higher against lower" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 99). Level three marks a developmental transition into the uniquely human realm of being where "a new hierarchy of reality emerges and, with it, the need to adapt to this hierarchy" which "we can actually interpret...as meaning that the individual has already left lower levels of reality" (Dabrowski, 1977, p. 98).

Level three developmental transition represents a hierarchical transformation from the psychophysiological to the noological or uniquely human dimension of reality, where "psychology becomes existential" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 207). This metatheoretical shift necessitates the ontological hierarchization or differentiation of 'lower' versus 'higher', or 'what is' and 'what ought to be' realms of being. The vertical and multidimensional approach to reality incorporates an epistemological or metatheoretical transformation where "the philosophy of the external world gradually becomes subordinated to the philosophy of the inner world" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 214). This ontological hierarchization of reality, what Schumacher (1977) depicts

as a kind of ontological verticalization, marks the emergence of an autonomous hierarchy of values and an increasing emphasis on moral development, higher level ends, ethical decisions, and individual responsibility.

Dabrowski's third developmental level, what Anderson (1981) depicts as a Science₃ approach to reality and the human sciences, signifies an ontologically discontinuous shift from the realm of nature (mechanistic and organismic process) to the uniquely human realm (moral choice, decision, and responsibility) where one's behavior is now guided by empathy and ethics or the oughts of human existence. This developmental and epistemological shift involves the "negation of a unilevel (stereotyped) reality" and is manifested in one's "effort (proactive choice) to carry out a hierarchization of reality" through "positive maladjustment" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 99). This level three or Science₃ metatheoretical perspective represents a higher level human science where psychology becomes increasingly cognizant of the hierarchical or vertical nature of reality and where the "multidimensionality of life's problems is perceived and applied" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 212).

Science₃ or level three metatheory necessitates the development of a uniquely human science or noological science (noological humanism) which both considers and emphasizes the individual's developmental or existential "struggle between higher and lower tendencies" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 212)--that is between natural and nonnatural dimensions of human existence. This

developmental transition, which entails an existential struggle of moral will (freedom and responsibility) and overcoming or transcending psychophysical facticity (deterministic process), allows for the self-chosen realization or actualization of a genuine, authentic, and nonrelativistic "hierarchy of values" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 212). Level three science, Science₃, or noological humanism necessitates the ontological recognition of the uniquely human realm which is based on a profoundly important ontological discontinuity, what Frankl (1975) characterizes as an "ontological hiatus" (p. 27) and Schumacher (1977) as a ontologically distinct "difference of kind" (p. 30), between the natural (is/process and occurrence) and nonnatural (ought/choice and responsibility) realms of being. Level three science or Anderson's (1981) Science₃ marks the emergence of a truly humanistic science and develops both an existential-phenomenological and normative-prescriptive approach to psychology which incorporates an ethical/oughts approach to human reality, problems, and related solutions.

Level four-five -- towards secondary integration.

The fourth developmental transition incorporates both Dabrowski and Piechowski's (1977) developmental levels four (organized multilevel disintegration) and five (secondary integration) in that this writer considers level five as a goal and ideal which one constantly strives for, yet, never fully attains. Level four-five or towards secondary integration constitutes a fourth level of science or Science₄ which is not considered within

Anderson's (1981) multilevel approach to the human sciences. Reality, at the fourth level of development, is truly experienced in a multidimensional context where "one clearly sees, analyzes, and differentiates primitive levels of reactions, stimuli, and responses...and contrasts them with the complex higher levels of emotionally rich, multilevel, autonomous behaviors of high empathy and insight into oneself" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 100). Higher level reality, what Schumacher (1977) epitomizes as an ontological transition from the visible to the invisible or is to ought, has a profound impact on the individual's life and "is expressed in philosophical conceptions of development, in existential experiences, in true mysticism, contemplation, and ecstasy" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 101).

What needs to be developed and taken far more seriously, within the humanistic sciences, is the careful consideration and development of a fourth level of human science, Science₄, which transcends the noological or uniquely human realm and is directed towards what Frankl (1975) ontologically distinguishes as the realm of "theology" (p. 13). Frankl (1975) insists that any multidimensional approach to reality and the human sciences must conceptualize that "a higher dimension...is a more inclusive one" and that "the lower dimension is included within the higher one, it is subsumed within it and encompassed by it" (p. 13). This approach to the multilevelness of reality insists that the various realms of reality are ontologically distinct (discontinuous) and

increasingly more encompassing as one hierarchically ascends the various ontological sphere's of being. That is higher level ontological realms do not negate lower spheres of being nor obliterate the various ontological discontinuities.

Similarly, the development of Science₄ or theistic humanism does not obliterate the multidimensional metatheoretical distinctiveness of Science₁, Science₂, or Science₃. All levels of science are necessary for a complete understanding of human reality, problems and related solutions. The fundamental problem of a monistic ontology, whether viewed from the perspective of either science (scientism) or religion (mysticism) is that, by definition, it must obfuscate profoundly important ontological (levels of being) and epistemological (levels of knowledge or science) distinctions. HET's antimonistic or multidimensional approach to reality (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977; Frankl, 1975; and Schumacher, 1972, 1977) and science (Anderson, 1981, Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977; Schumacher, 1972, 1977) does neither. It is this multidimensional metatheoretical framework, within the human sciences, which has been consistently abandoned in favor of monistic unity-of-science positions (scientism) or religious monisms (mysticism/panpsychism/pantheism). Neither are conducive to an appropriate understanding of the multidimensional nature and full complexities of human life. Human existence ontologically is comprised of both the natural and nonnatural realms of being which exhibit various and profoundly important ontological distinctions

or discontinuities. The fundamental task of HET's multidimensional ontology is to clearly recognize and emphasize these ontological distinctions in any metatheoretical perspective and counselling framework.

Metatheoretical Implications of HET Multidimensionalism

Utilizing HET's multidimensional framework, Osborne and Angus' (1989) horizontal depiction of a plurality of world views, ranging from Mechanicism to Idealism, can be hierarchically restructured within a multidimensional context. This restructuring necessitates an orthogonal rotation of Osborne and Angus' (1989) multiplicity of world views from its pluralistic (horizontal) axis to a multidimensional (vertical) one. The orthogonal restructuring of their various world views results in full dimensionality (ontological verticality) being returned to a metatheoretical perspective. Instead of a plurality of contradictory monistic world views, one develops a vertical restructuring of them within an appropriate multidimensional context. Therefore, instead of having the horizontal metatheoretical pluralism of Mechanicism, Organicism, Phenomenalism/Contextualism, and Idealism, each being separate monistic ontologies, one develops a hierarchical multidimensional ontology.

Here, Mechanicism is encompassed by Organicism, Organicism by Phenomenalism/Contextualism, and Phenomenalism/Contextualism by Idealism or Transcendentalism (HET). Each of Osborne and Angus' (1989) monistic world views, when orthogonally rotated from a horizontal to vertical axis, now appropriately

depicts an ontologically distinct realm of being. This multidimensional reframing of monistic world views constitutes the appropriate remedy to what has been previously termed 'metatheoretical acrophobia'. This metatheoretical transformation opens the door to allow the rehumanization of the human sciences which recognizes the ontological uniqueness of man.

Similarly, Anderson's (1981) multiplicity of sciences can be rotated from a horizontal (pluralistic) axis to a vertical (multidimensional) axis. This orthogonal rotation of the horizontal plurality or multiplicity of sciences, that is Science₁, Science₂, Science₃, and Science₄, now becomes a multidimensional approach to the human sciences which recognizes both distinct sciences and realms of being. That is, Science₁ now is encompassed by Science₂, Science₂ by Science₃, and Science₃ by Science₄. Each field of knowledge or school of science now has an area of expertise which can be directed towards an appropriate realm of being. The totality of reality contains all the ontologically distinct realms of being and can only be understood through the utilization of all levels of science. Existence, that is the totality of being, contains the realm of objective, material, physical forces and impacts (Physicalism), the realm of organismic process and mental distinctions (Biologism), the realm of inner, personal experience, private motivations, and subjective consciousness (Phenomenalism/Contextualism), and, finally, the transcendent realm of objective or nonrelative values, meanings, purposes, and ends

(Idealism/Transcendentalism) which includes religious or mystical experiences of Transcendence. Polarizing monisms or orthodoxies, whether of a scientific (scientism) or religious (mysticism) nature, tend to obliterate profoundly important ontological (realms of being) and epistemological (realms of knowledge or science) distinctions. HET rejects all monistic ontologies, such as suggested in Suzuki's (1989) depiction of reality as a "seamless whole" (p. xii), because they tend, by definition, to obfuscate ontological distinctions. Rather HET supports an 'open-at-the-top' holism which clearly recognizes ontological 'seams' or distinctions, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Specific Implications of HET Model for Counselling

HET's multidimensional metatheoretical framework can be utilized in order to compare, contrast, and evaluate major theories of counselling. Within any one of the three EP, HE, or ES philosophical schools of thought and related counselling frameworks, there exist qualitatively different levels of counselling perspectives. Any one of these three basic metatheoretical perspectives may range from a materialist/realist and manipulative (lower level/less inclusive) approach to an idealist/transcendent and morally directed (higher level/more inclusive) one. Any EP, HE, or ES perspective, dependent on the developmental level of its theoretical constructs, can be assessed as predominantly constituting a particular level of metatheoretical development. Finally, there may be as significant a difference between levels of one school of

thought, for example between two levels of HE theory, as exists between two different world views that are at the same level, for example May's agnostic humanism and Satir's humanistic ecological-systems approach. However, similarity of developmental level of two distinct schools of thought does not, in any way, entirely obliterate the important philosophical and metatheoretical differences which distinguish them in the first place. Regardless of the multilevelness within schools, all of these world views have separate and fundamentally different philosophical foundations and different central epistemological constructs.

One of the greatest benefits of this multidimensional ontology and multilevel framework is in assessing and, therefore exposing, the potentially dehumanizing consequences of all lower level theories. Counselling perspectives, which display dehumanizing and reductionistic characteristics, as a function of the central metatheoretical assumptions of the model or the individual's personal ignorance of them, are assessed as reflecting a lower level theory.

Similar to the manner in which the HET world view was used to critique the central constructs of Bateson's ES world view, HET's multilevel topology, can be applied to evaluate the dehumanizing tendencies of any counselling model, be it EP, HE or ES in its central orientation. That is, in the same way that Gregory Bateson's epistemology was shown to be both a reductionistic and dehumanizing view of human existence, any counselling

perspective which negates the nonnatural or transcendent dimension of human existence would be considered equally limited as a specific approach within the human sciences. Secondly, any model, which diminishes the importance of moral, ethical, and religious concerns within the totality of human existence, would be considered a lower level model within the HET approach. Any individual approach, whether principally EP, HE, or ES oriented, which does not consider the full dimensionality and ontological distinctiveness of human existence constitutes a lower level model.

The following multilevel examination and analysis will briefly review and contrast one example of a lower and a higher level counselling theory for each EP, HE, and ES school of thought. These multilevel comparisons and contrasts are intended only to give the reader some initial and, admittedly, simplistic insight into the multilevel (lower and higher) differences which exist in any one school of thought. It is not intended, in any way, to explore all of the intricacies and complexities of any one model or world view nor any one level of a particular school of thought.

The EP (first and second force) world view. A central assumption of HET's multidimensional approach to ontology and counselling theory is that all schools of thought demonstrate a range of lower to higher level theories, theorists, and related therapies. First and second force schools of thought are no exception. However, because the EP world view is comprised of two

different schools of thought, the psychoanalytic (first force) and behavioral (second force) traditions, their distinctive approaches to counselling will be separately examined, reviewed, and multilevelly differentiated.

The empirico-positivist (EP) world view is built upon the central philosophical assumption that one can appropriately understand the full dynamics and complexities of human life utilizing the same fundamental principles and methodologies as the physical and biological sciences. In general, all EP schools of thought are founded upon a naturalistic philosophy which adopts a unity-of-science approach to the psychological sciences. First force (psychoanalytic) traditions are generally more oriented towards a biological or organismic approach (organismic naturalism) while second force (behavioral) traditions, more often, adopt a mechanistic (mechanistic naturalism) world view. However, both EP perspectives represent a decidedly positivistic view of both reality and the human sciences.

Two contrasting examples of the first force approach to psychotherapy can be best illustrated utilizing Freud's (lower level) and Jung's (higher level) approaches to psychoanalysis. Although both of these psychoanalytic views of therapy share many of the same metatheoretical assumptions and biases, they also demonstrate distinct multilevel differences.

Freud's basic approach to psychoanalysis is primarily concerned with enhancing the ego's capacity for appropriate 'reality' adjustment through therapeutic

insight. The principal task of the Freudian therapist is to help the patient regain 'homeostatic adjustment' of inner, psychic, forces, that is to control, in a more healthy fashion, the inner psychic dynamics of the id, ego, and superego. In a direct sense, the primary goal of Freudian psychoanalysis is the reestablishment of a more healthy, well-adjusted, ego-syntonic, ego which can regain control of the patient's inner life and allow for a much more healthy (psychically and socially adjusted) existence.

All of Freud's patients were, more or less, managed in this manner, utilizing similar techniques, strategies, and psychic control mechanisms in order to attain similar outcomes. For Freud, the science of psychoanalysis, following the rapidly developing advances made in the physical sciences, was to become the psychotherapeutic panacea for all human problems and areas of life. It is this unidimensional, positivistic, and monomorphic adjustment approach of Freud's psychoanalysis which constitutes its lower level status. The fundamental orientation of Freudian psychoanalysis is for the patients to regain control or appropriate 'psychic management' of their psychic life in order to live a full and 'well adjusted' existence.

Similarly, for most of his patients, Jung also regarded their problems and the task of psychoanalysis in the same manner. Ostensibly, for Jung too, most of his patient's required psychotherapy in order to allow them to regain or reestablish a more well adjusted psychic

homeostasis or inner psychic equilibrium, through healthy ego adjustment. However, Jung's psychoanalytic approach becomes more multidimensional or higher level because he also recognizes and attempts to address a much different (higher level) set of problems and issues. This higher level approach to psychoanalysis requires a decidedly expanded (higher level) view of human existence, problems, and psychotherapeutic goals than what is advocated by Freud. Jung's depiction of the uniquely human developmental process of 'intrapsychic individuation'--what he describes as a qualitatively distinct developmental transformation--involves a qualitatively different approach to psychoanalysis where the individual struggles for a more highly developed, autonomous, creative, and spiritual existence. This unique and higher level approach to both human existence and psychotherapy goes far beyond the more limited (lower level) confines of Freud's 'ego adjustment' approach to psychotherapy. It is in this context that C. G. Jung can be regarded as one of the first multidimensional, higher level, and humanistically oriented psychotherapists. It is also these distinct metatheoretical and psychotherapeutic differences which multidimensionally differentiate Freud's (lower level) and Jung's (higher level) basic approaches to psychoanalysis (see Figure 2).

Similarly, lower (less encompassing) and higher (more encompassing) variants of the behavioral approach to psychology can be distinguished within a multidimensional context. Lloyd, Neidermayer, Long, and Reynolds (1982)

argue that "contemporary behavior therapy is not easily defined" but can be characterized by its central "commitment to maintain a strong tie to the principles, procedures, and findings of experimental psychology" (p. 1). It substantively adheres to a naturalistic philosophy and materialist or empirico-positivist (EP) approach to reality. Rather than adopting the organicist naturalism or biologism of the EP psychoanalytic traditions, Lloyd et al. (1982) maintain the behavioral sciences have tended to adopt the philosophy of mechanistic naturalism or mechanicism which is founded on three basic philosophical principles; empiricism (observable and measurable data), macrodeterminism (linear causation), and pragmatic behaviorism (pragmatic utilitarianism).

A lower level or less encompassing approach to ES behaviorism would be best represented within the overt behavioral orthodoxy of B. F. Skinner. Orthodox behaviorism totally adopts the philosophical stance and experimental methodologies of the physical sciences in its basic approach to understanding human behavior. That is, all human behavior is considered learned and determined by external or environmental contingencies. This lower level approach operates totally within the "constructs of respondent or operant conditioning" which strictly adheres to the "philosophy of behaviorism which dictates a non-mentalistic view of functioning" (Lloyd, et al. 1982). Therefore, within the Skinnerian or operant conditioning approach of behavioral therapy, all behavior, including so-called maladjusted behavior, is learned as a result of

the organism's interactions with its environment. The fundamental view of this operant (lower level) variant of behaviorism is that the organism, including the human organism, merely needs to be conditionally reinforced in order to learn new and more appropriate behaviors. This approach to human problems reflects a highly scientific, pragmatic, utilitarian, and managerial approach to human problems and affairs. Moral questions of 'right' or 'wrong' behaviors are subordinated to those behaviors which society (the behavioral technocrats), at any particular time, deem 'adjusted' or 'maladjusted'. EP orthodox behaviorism adopts a culturally defined moral relativism (pragmatic utilitarianism) in its basic approach to moral ends and ethical behavior.

Conversely, a higher level (more encompassing) variant of the EP behavioral approach is represented by the cognitive learning theories and approaches of Donald Meichenbaum's (1977) cognitive-behavior modification or cognitive theory of self-control and Albert Ellis' (1974) rational-emotive therapy. Neither of these approaches abandon the basic principles of 'learning theory', that is the naturalistic ideologies of positivism and empiricism, but they expand the fundamentals of learning theory to include the cognitive-rational (internal) dynamics of human behavior. Rather than just therapeutically attending to external observable behavior, both of these approaches closely monitor internal mediating (cognitive) variables--what Meichenbaum (1977) terms 'self-talk' and Ellis (1974) 'irrational thoughts'. It is the presence of

these internal variable which can both assist and interfere with the individual attaining desired goals and behaviors. Causation of human behavior is not only determined by external, environmental variables but also by the internal or cognitive processes.

Cognitive behavior therapy, although still adhering to the basic propositions of learning theory, can be regarded as a higher level therapy in that it includes mediating variables which allow the individual to be cognitively self-monitoring and self-directing. One's behavior now comes under the control of cognitive (internal) environments, rather than just being determined by external contingencies. In this sense, EP behaviorism has made some movement from merely monitoring and controlling 'visibilia' to an awareness of the importance of 'invisibilia' in understanding and influencing human behavior. However, to a large degree the ends of human existence are still conceived within instrumental, pragmatic, utilitarian, and morally relativistic terms. All levels of human problems are still dealt with, primarily, in a mechanistic sense which can ultimately be conceptualized in terms of basic scientific (positivistic) principles. For a HET multilevel and multidimensional contrasting of various EP behavioral therapies see Figure 2.

The HE (third force) world view. The humanistic-existential (HE) world view is built upon the assumption that one cannot understand the totality of existence within the fundamental metatheoretical tenets of empirico-

positivist (EP) or traditional science paradigms--what Tennesen (1981) depicts as the complete rejection of "scientific autarchy" (p. 259). It is in this exact sense that Tennesen (1981) refers to "the very idea of a 'humanistic psychology'" (p. 259) as being founded upon its common aim "to demonstrate the fatuous futility of the very idea of 'scientific autarchy'" (p. 259) or what Berlyne (1981) characterizes as a "protest movement" against "contemporary psychology, especially experimental psychology" (p. 261). However, as with the EP world view, there also exists varying lower and higher level metatheoretical positions and related psychotherapies within the HE world view. A lower and higher level example of two representative, yet distinct, HE approaches to therapy are Alexander Lowen's organismic (lower level) 'bioenergetics' and Viktor Frankl's (higher level) existential 'logotherapy'.

Waldman (1980) states the fundamental goal of "bioenergetic analysis" is to "bring us back to the energetic and functional unity of mind and body" (p. 49). This organismic HE approach to psychotherapy maintains that "we do not simply have bodies; we are bodies (where) our living bodies are expressions of our total selves" (Waldman, 1980, p. 59). Waldman also argues that the organismic view of bioenergetics is based on the "functional unity of human experience" which "our movement is regulated by the goals of play and 'grounding'" (p. 59). Waldman (1981) describes psychological health and "the difference between health

and illness", merely in organismic terms of "our grounding of both pleasure and reality functions in the pulsatory process of our biological life force" (p. 59). Healthy development and the psychotherapeutic process is directed at restoring a "person's (organismic or mind/body) balance and grace" through a "pulsatory process which couples the excitatory and the inhibitory (biological processes) in a functional unity" (Waldman, 1980, p. 59). The regaining of this naturally occurring and organismically grounded functional process, that is self-correcting organismic "energy charge and discharge" (Waldman, 1980, p. 59), constitutes the fundamental defining characteristic of bioenergetic's approach to psychological health.

The goal of bioenergetic psychotherapy, therefore, is to recorrect or reestablish the human organism's naturally occurring bioenergetic pulsations, facilitating an awareness of the "functional unity of ourselves and our world" (Waldman, 1980, p. 60). The breaking of this functional unity or organismic process of excitation and discharge results in "tension patterns" developing in our physiological musculature, termed "character armor" (Waldman, 1980, p. 60). This development of character armor prevents the individual from naturally (organismically) interacting in the world. Bioenergetic analysis and technique is directed towards breaking down this long established character armoring through various bioenergetic exercises. The result is "the character armor begins to soften" and "pulsations fill deadened areas of the body with a new consciousness of life"

(Waldman, 1980, p. 60). Bioenergetics represents a lower level of HE psychotherapeutic intervention in that it predominantly adopts an organismic or biological approach as its central framework. It is in this direct sense that bioenergetic counselling emphasizes an organismic functionalism as its primary 'modus operandi' in understanding human problems and developing therapeutic interventions. The moral, ethical, ends, and oughts dimensions of human existence, as well as the uniquely human capacity for self-reflective choice, moral decision, and responsibility (the nonnatural dimension of human existence), is notably absent from the model. Therefore, although bioenergetic analysis' organismic approach constitutes a higher level therapy, at least when compared with Skinnerean operant conditioning, it still does not constitute a 'high' level approach when compared to other higher level HE therapies (see Figure 2).

A higher level metatheoretical variant of the HE world view can be illustrated utilizing Viktor Frankl's logotherapeutic approach to psychotherapy. Frankl's logotherapy is founded on a multidimensional ontology which recognizes a profoundly important ontological distinction, discontinuity, or hiatus between psychophysical facticity (determined process and occurrence) and the truly existential, noological, or uniquely human (freely chosen, morally responsible, and ethico-religious) realm of human existence. Frankl adopts neither a deterministic or indeterministic approach to psychology and psychotherapy stating that human existence

is ultimately multidimensional and, therefore, one may experience determinism at lower levels of existence and indeterminism or freedom at higher and uniquely human realms.

The etiology of human problems is viewed within a multidimensional context, where depression, for example, may be due to a whole host of multidimensionally differentiated factors. Frankl's multidimensional logotherapy is not intended to entirely replace lower level HE models and interventions, but is only meant to supplement those approaches with a higher level focus. Frankl does not negate the fact that depression can be caused by extreme and dehumanizing environmental conditions (external causes) nor by biological or psychophysiological factors (internal causes) such as biochemically induced endogenous depression. He argues that, for these lower level depressions, either the alternation of one's environment or one's biological processes may be the best and most efficacious way in which to deal with lower level depressions. However, he also acknowledges that higher level depressions can be due to an individual lacking appropriate meaning in one's life and that the etiology of this 'existential' type of depression is of a totally different order.

Logotherapy, specifically for higher level problems, is directed towards humanely challenging the client to find or rediscover new meanings in life, in the love of another human being, rededication and recommitment to some self-transcending goal or project, and through the

development of a higher level or self-transcending attitude towards one's unchangeable life situation.

Logotherapy is intended to deal with the uniquely human or existential challenges and problems of existence. Bugental (1980) describes "existential-humanistic" psychotherapy as "an approach aiding persons to live more fully and (if they choose) to explore the transpersonal possibilities that are latent in being human" (p. 186). This higher level HE approach to psychotherapy usually involves a "very intense relationship, great commitment to the work and purposes of therapy, and a readiness to make major life changes" (Bugental, 1980, p. 186). A central metatheoretical tenet of HE therapy is that it regards human beings as "conscious, finite, able to act or not act, confronted with inexorable choice, at once part of all other beings and 'apart' from them" (Bugental, 1980, p. 186). Because of the multidimensional nature of Frankl's logotherapeutic perspective, which attempts to address both the uniqueness and full dimensionality of human existence, it is regarded as a higher level (vertically more encompassing) HE framework.

The ES (fourth force) world view. The alternative, new age, eco-systemic (ES) paradigm evolved as a direct result of its metatheoretical dissatisfaction with previous EP and HE world views. ES theory regards these approaches as being fundamentally materialist in their basic metatheoretical orientation. The epistemological focus of the ES world view, which adopts a constructivist, mentalistic, and interactional process approach to

reality, represents a plethora of divergent views which include the pragmatic and management approach of 'problem-solving' therapy (Watzlawick & Weakland, 1974; Haley, 1976), an atheistic, monistic, and ecological-systemic view of organismic naturalism (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1988), and a theistic, ecosystemic, organismic, and holistic process monism of idealism (Hague, 1988). Whichever epistemological variant of the fourth force one happens to adopt, Andreoff, Cormie, Feidenberg, and Lawrence (1982) maintain ES theory focuses on an ecological perspective which emphasizes "the interconnectedness of all objects and events" and that "reality as we know it is created by patterns of information organization" (p. 4). Andreoff et al. (1982) epistemologically characterize the ES world view as a "group of diverse theoretical positions which emphasize the 'holistic' and communicative nature of human existence" (p. 83). A lower level (less inclusive) variant of ES theory is represented by Haley and Madanes' strategic therapy and a higher level (more inclusive) one by Satir's (1967) conjoint family therapy.

Haley and Madanes (1980) describe strategic therapy as having "its origins in communication theory" and "cybernetics" which "emphasize homeostatic systems with feedback processes that caused the system to be self-corrective" (p. 633). The main characteristic of this therapy is that "the therapist plans a strategy for solving the client's problems" where "the goals are clearly set and always coincide with solving the

presenting problem" rather than "emphasizing growth and development of the person" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 633). The therapeutic unit is often contextualized in terms of two or more individuals, such as a couple or an entire family, where "interventions take the form of directives" which emphasize "communication in the present" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 633). This strategic approach adopts Gregory Bateson's "communication point of view" which regards human relationships as merely an "interchange of messages between people (which) define relationships, and these relationships are stabilized by homeostatic processes in the form of actions of family members" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 634). Haley and Madanes (1980) argue this communication, process, or relational interchange model of human action is oriented towards "changing a family system by rearranging how family members behave, or communicate to one another" (p. 634). Strategic therapy is not concerned with either "lifting repression or bringing about self-understanding" but more with the interactional dynamics of ecological "organization and structure" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 634). Strategic therapy holds that it is the experiencing of new behaviors, initiated through therapeutic interventions or strategic directives, which "provoke changes in the family system" and brings about change through new "communicative pathways" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 634). The primary psychotherapeutic focus and interventions involve strategic directives or prescriptions "that will shift the family organization so

that the presenting problem (symptom) is not necessary" (Haley & Madanes, 1980, p. 635).

Haley and Madanes (1980) maintain the fundamental orientation of therapy is "neither growth oriented--nor concerned with the past" but "focuses on solving the presenting problem"--that is prevents "the repetition of (maladaptive) sequences" through the introduction of greater behavioral and communicative "complexity and alternatives" (p. 635). The fundamental responsibility for therapeutic change resides only with the therapist whose job it is to get rid of the presenting problem. This approach to therapy is highly manipulative, takes a bureaucratic-managerial approach to human affairs, and adheres to an extreme kind of new age pragmatism and moral relativism. It represents the new age epitomy of survivalism and a protean adaptational approach to both human existence and the self. Luepnitz (1988) describes strategic family therapy as "perfecting the unexamined life" which "encourages a split between science and ethics so that 'means' and 'ends', far from being used to 'justify' each other, would become part of a single 'process' "--which fundamentally constitutes the "'organic' view of society, now embraced by systems thinkers" (p. 85).

A higher level of ES theory is represented by Virginia Satir's (1967) conjoint family therapy (CFT). Wegscheider (1980) holds that "conjoint family counselling" (CFC) evolved out of the Palo Alto Mental Research Institute which was founded by such ecosystemic,

communication, and cybernetic theorists as "Virginia Satir, Don Jackson, and Jay Haley" (p. 208). This CFT/CFC perspective of family counselling is founded on the same central metatheoretical foundations and epistemological tenets of all ecosystemic (ES) or process models of family therapy. However, its different view of both the process and goals of psychotherapy, as distinguished from the strategic model, constitutes its higher level ES status.

Wegscheider (1980) defines CFC as "process counselling" whose fundamental task is the "stimulating of healthy relationships" (p. 208) within a family. Unlike the strategic model, the CFC therapist's task is "to give new insights or added reaffirmations to the family's view of itself" so that the "family will discover a process of growth, namely, the nurturance of the self-worth of the individual family members" (Wegscheider, 1980, p. 208). This ecosystemic growth approach to family therapy facilitates interactive communicative dynamics where families are ecologically reconstituted by "people who know they count, who risk saying what they feel, and who make their choices with their own growth a priority" (Wegschieder, 1980, p. 208).

The CFC therapist's central task, unlike the pragmatic orientation of the strategic approach, is to hear the family's stories in order to observe the communication and interactive patterns which are evident within the family's communication style. Wegscheider (1980) maintains that these "stories are important 'only' to get at the process" (p. 210) of the family's

interactive communication style. The CFC psychotherapist allows the family to get "in touch with new ways of validating self-worth" (p. 210). Individual self-worth is either facilitated or diminished by the types of family rules existent in one's family as "rules that are valuable to us become our value system" (Wegscheider, 1980, p. 210). The CFC/CFT goal of getting systems "working efficiently and effectively", the language of the bureaucratic-managerial approach to human affairs, is dependent upon two factors; a) the individual family member "developing into what we call a whole person", and b) not creating "fragmented persons" who negatively "affect the functioning of systems" (Wegscheider, 1980, p. 210).

The central ideal behind CFC systems therapy is that persons develop communication patterns that tend to protect their self-worth and that "the person finds whichever communication pattern best protects him in his system, and that is the personality he begins to develop" (Wegscheider, 1980, p. 210). CFC constitutes a higher level ecosystemic (ES) approach to family therapy, certainly more so than the strategic model, because it is also concerned with individual development in the context of family dynamics, personality growth, and the enhancement of individual self-esteem.

However, Leupnitz (1988), although recognizing the decidedly more human approach of Satir's systemic view, states that a limitation of her work is constituted by "the fallacy of believing that one can change the world by

appealing to principles of therapeutic change alone", which ignores "the global political changes that must be understood and grappled with" (p. 55). Leupnitz (1988) concludes that "Satir...has no theory that will help explain the violence or the evil that has broken individuals and entire peoples on the wheel of history" in that "low self-esteem cannot account for the eradication of entire nations" (p. 55). This organismic, ecosystemic, naturalistic, and process naivete, which in some cases insufficiently considers the uniquely human capacity to freely choose both good and evil, constitutes the fundamental metatheoretical achilles heel of the ES world view.

Conclusion

This HET multidimensional topology for the human sciences and multilevel counselling framework emphasizes the need for the psychological sciences to redevelop and reinstitute a hierarchical and multidimensional approach to human existence, human problems, and related psychotherapeutic solutions. The counsellor's capacity to develop and utilize this multidimensional ontology and multilevel topology will enhance his or her ability to develop a more enlightened and fully encompassing approach to the vast complexities of the plethora of psychotherapeutic approaches available today.

Regardless of the particular EP, HE, or ES world view which characterize one's counselling approach, this multidimensional topology will allow one to gain a greater awareness of the various strengths and weaknesses of all

metatheoretical perspectives and related approaches to psychotherapy. It is suggested that through this multidimensional and multilevel comparative analysis, regardless of one's particular psychotherapeutic orientation, one can better appreciate the metatheoretical foundations, epistemological biases, and psychotherapeutic limitations of all schools of thought.


In spite of the multilevel variations which characterize any psychotherapeutic orientation, it is the admitted bias of this writer that the philosophical and metatheoretical foundations of EP, HE, and ES world views still unquestionably distinguish these three basic models from each other. The basic philosophical constructs of a world view constitute the metatheoretical foundation of that model and these differentiating features are not obliterated at any one level of metatheoretical development. However, it should also be noted that there may be as great of difference between two higher and lower variants of the same model as exist between totally different models of psychotherapy. Furthermore, taking a particular approach to psychotherapy, regardless of the world view it embraces, does not guarantee that a therapy is not being used in a dehumanizing and destructive manner. The developmental level of the therapist and the skill with which the therapy is delivered is as important as the metatheoretical perspective one avows and its related metatheoretical level. Psychotherapists, regardless of school of thought, have an incredible potential and power to hurt individuals as they do to help

them. An awareness of this reality, hopefully, should facilitate the therapist's humility regardless of school of thought and level of metatheoretical development.

Finally, it should be noted that, as with human beings, human problems exist at differing levels and because of this they require the appropriate levels of intervention regardless of one's psychotherapeutic orientation. As mentioned above, the multilevel discrimination of qualitatively different etiologies and types of depression may require profoundly different approaches to psychotherapy ranging from biochemical to logopsychotherapeutic interventions. It is this writer's bias that to get too entrenched in any one approach is not advantageous to the development of one's counselling skills nor does it facilitate the counsellor's capacity to perceive the vast complexities of life, human problems, and appropriate therapeutic possibilities. Similarly, the blurring of distinctions between approaches does not lead to the counsellor's full appreciation of the vast array of therapeutic interventions available.

Figure 2

A HET Multilevel Comparison of EP, HE, and ES Counselling Perspectives



CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

Prologue

In the choice between the somewhat arbitrarily distinguished realism and idealism, a sensible person would want to be both, or neither. But, momentarily accepting a distinction I reject, idealism as it is commonly conceived should have primacy in an education, for man is a being who must take his orientation by his possible perfection. To attempt to suppress this most natural of all inclinations because of possible abuses is, almost literally, to throw out the baby with the bath. (Bloom, 1987, p. 67)

Either the university of the future will take hold of the connection between knowledge and human values, or it will sink quietly and indiscriminately into the non-committal moral stupor of the rest of the knowledge industry. (Muscatine, cited in Smith, 1990, p. 253)

Introduction

As stipulated in the beginning of this study, the main objectives of this endeavor were to overview the important socio-cultural and historico-philosophical influences which guide the development of psychology and counselling theories, to compare the metatheoretical constructs of two counselling world views, and to develop a multidimensional framework which could be used to facilitate future analysis and comparisons of any counselling perspectives. The overall goal was to heighten an awareness in counsellor theorists, educators, and practitioners of the importance of the theoretical foundations of counselling models, with the intention that they might be more cautious and more appropriately critical of the implications of developments in counselling theories and models of man.

Although this project has closely followed these primary objectives, some additional important insights were gained in the writing of this study. First, in reviewing the historico-philosophical and socio-cultural influences of modernity, in particular as they related to developments and practices in the human sciences, it became increasingly evident that there exists an extensive interrelationship between important developments in counselling and those types of philosophical and metatheoretical trends which impact the larger socio-cultural milieu. The appreciation of this 'big picture' has resulted in the conclusion that "psychology is not an island", supporting Anderson's (1981) prescription that psychologists, including counselling psychologists, must be able to comprehend the world in which their discipline is developing.

A second realization was that the metatheoretical differences between the HET and ES world view, are reflective of a centuries old argument regarding the basic nature of existence and what it means to be human. In deciding whether counselling should look to Plato or Aristotle for its basic philosophical foundation, this study, echoing the moral sentiments of MacIntyre (1981), chooses the latter.

In the beginning of this study, the framework for a multilevel perspective of counselling had already been formulated, based on Frankl's and Dabrowski's models of human existence. During the development of the counselling topology, a further discovery was the

similarity of their ideas with Schumacher's vertical or hierarchical view, Anderson's three fields of psychological science, and Osborne and Angus' four world views or root metaphors.

These comparable concepts were incorporated into the final HET multidimensional topology and multilevel model of basic approaches to counselling theory, as presented in Chapter six. Furthermore, this multidimensional topology's applicability was broadened, such that it was presented, not only a useful framework for evaluating the various counselling theories and practices, but also as a more appropriate perspective for approaching the multidimensional nature of reality, human existence, human problems, and related solutions.

Basic Philosophical Implications

Overview. A fundamental task of this project has been to increase, within the psychological educator, researcher, and therapist, a desire to more carefully examine the ongoing metatheoretical developments within modern psychological theory and praxis. Many of the same unrecognized and dehumanizing epistemological biases which have dramatically influenced modernity, have similarly impacted emerging developments within the human sciences. Greater insight into these historically based, often unrecognized, and profoundly important metatheoretical distortions and biases can be used as a guide for preventing future reductionistic and dehumanizing developments in the human sciences. At the very least, it should serve as an important reminder for the teacher,

researcher, and counsellor of psychology to carefully reflect upon the fundamental metatheoretical propositions of any world view before blindly and naively adhering to any of the various models of human existence that exist within psychology and psychotherapy.

A predominant trend within the human sciences, as a result of psychology existing as a particular professional microcosm within the larger historical, philosophical, political, and socio-cultural macrocosm of modernity, is its persistent tendency to completely throw out previous metatheoretical babies with the bath water of indiscriminate, nonselective, and overly simplistic criticism. Newly emerging epistemologies consistently seem to merely replace previously overly simplistic 'nothing-but' dogmas with new unquestioned 'nothing-but' orthodoxies. These kinds of unquestioned epistemological transitions within the human sciences, although demonstrating some kind of metatheoretical change, do not necessarily constitute substantive progress in either psychological theory or praxis. All epistemological transitions and related metatheoretical shifts should always be conscientiously screened, analysed, debated, and evaluated in terms of the kinds of changes which are really being instituted, and, more importantly, the ends towards which these types of epistemologies and related practices are being directed--that is a profound consideration of both means and ends.

This type of qualitative and careful evaluation of so-called metatheoretical 'developments' in the human

sciences is needed to avoid those types of limited, unquestioned, and dehumanizing orthodoxies which substitute one brand of naturalistic or nonnaturalistic orthodoxy for another. Epistemological transformations of this nature tend only to obfuscate profoundly important ontological distinctions and often are generated out of a survivalistic moral relativism and protean need for mere novelty and change. These dehumanizing forms of epistemological change too often only entail the repetition of the same old unquestioned and unidimensional approaches to understanding, which either distort or totally deny the multidimensional nature of human existence, within reconstituted forms. These types of more apparent than real epistemological transformations constitute neither good philosophy, psychology, or psychotherapy. An antimonistic and multidimensional approach to psychology and psychotherapy will allow for a much more encompassing approach to the vast complexities of human existence, problems, and, therefore, related solutions.

On academic fundamentalism. Related to this issue of epistemological transformations, Page Smith (1990) examines the central problems confronting higher educations in America today. In his review of the modern academic scene, which he terms "mapping the desert" (p. 5), Smith (1990) isolates the fundamental problem in education as the "spiritual illness of 'post-modernism'" (p. 6). Modernity's despiritizing of both human existence and modern life has resulted in the development of a human

science where "quality, uniqueness, creativity, and the moral dimension of existence fall before a reductive insistence upon measurement, quantification, and restrictive procedures of infinitely tedious and irrelevant observation" (p. 5). What results from this reductionist approach to the human sciences is a model of humanity which is "ahistorical, atomistic, mechanical, disjunctive, and, ...ostensibly neutral" (Smith, 1990, p. 5). These dehumanizing and morally neutral approaches to understanding human existence, as well as academic endeavors, has been institutionally reified and perpetuated by a "scheme of orthodoxies" or what Smith (1990) terms forms of "academic fundamentalism" (p. 5). Smith defines all forms of academic fundamentalism as "the stubborn refusal of the academy to acknowledge any truth that does not conform to professorial dogmas" (p. 5).

Academic fundamentalism, not entirely dissimilar from the unquestioned orthodox fervor of religious fundamentalism, epistemologically conceals what Smith (1990) refers to as a "poverty of spirit and barrenness of intellect beyond calculating" (p. 7). One of the principal problems within the human sciences, which certainly includes both psychology and psychotherapy, is often the individual's unquestioned or fundamentalistic adherence to particular world views without any great degree of reflective consideration, debate or analysis. A pivotal task of this project was to develop, within the psychological educator, researcher, and practitioner, a more enlightening approach to the human sciences which

inveighs against all forms of unquestioned and orthodox academic fundamentalism.

On the war between religion and science. One of the most persistent and perplexing dilemmas of modern approaches to the human sciences is the continuing antagonism between the two opposing orthodoxies of religion and science, what Smith (1990) terms "the war between religion and science" or "science and the classics" (p. 106). This continuing antagonism unfortunately still persists in most approaches to psychology which tend to oversimplistically obfuscate or entirely obliterate important ontological distinctions and discontinuities between levels of being. Smith (1990) maintains that a more appropriate and encompassing approach to both religion and science can be reflected in the philosophical recognition of both the natural and nonnatural dimensions of reality. Smith (1990) emphasizes this approach as follows:

A philosophy worthy of the name must admit both sciences--the science of the natural and the science of the spiritual which transcends nature--or its conclusions will only be half truths....Nature is not a mere collection of specimens preserved for our dissection; and philosophy has a higher task to fulfill other than to keep the doors of a world-museum. There is an 'inner life of things' and a unity of spirit in the creation". (p. 99)

This writer and this study reject all forms of academic fundamentalism which support either a totally naturalistic and nonnaturalistic approach to the human sciences whether monistically representing a scientific (naturalistic) or religious (nonnaturalistic) world view. The

multidimensional ontology of HET hierarchically embraces both of these ontologically distinct realms of being, spheres of reality, fields of knowledge, and modes of science. HET's multidimensional ontology affirms that an unquestioned and dehumanizing scientific dogma or fundamentalism (scientism) is no better than a theological or religious one (mysticism). A more complex and encompassing approach to both philosophy and science must include a thorough consideration of both the natural and nonnatural realms of existence which, therefore, eschews both the metatheoretical polarizations of monistic scientism and mysticism.

On a moral approach to the human sciences. HET's multidimensional approach to psychology and psychotherapy emphasizes a moral and ethical approach to reality which recognizes the ends and oughts of human existence--that is which clearly differentiates human life from all other forms of living beings. This moral and ethical approach to reality evolved as a direct response to the relativistic and survivalistic moral ethos of modernity. Both Lasch and MacIntyre have previously commented on the profound need to restructure the human sciences within a uniquely human moral and ethical context. The development of an amoral or utilitarian, bureaucratic-managerial, and coping-adjustment approach to human affairs has evolved as a direct result of certain historico-philosophical biases and modern socio-cultural influences. These reductionistic influences have had a profound impact on the metatheoretical developments and psychotherapeutic

practices within modern psychology. Flannery O'Connor (cited in Smith, 1990) aptly summarizes the demoralization or amoralization of modern society, as follows:

It is easy to see that the moral sense has been bred out of certain sections of population, like the wings have been bred off certain chickens to produce more white meat on them. This is a generation of wingless chickens....(p. 1)

It is this morally relativistic or basically amoral view of human existence, problems, and related solutions that has so insidiously invaded and unfortunately come to characterize most approaches to psychology and psychotherapy regardless of the particular EP, HE, or ES school of thought one happens to avow. HET's multidimensional ontology and multilevel topology, for the human sciences and related psychotherapies, was created in order to aid in the metatheoretical reconstruction of the human sciences within a predominantly moral and ethical context.

This multidimensional approach to psychology has also evolved as a direct response to recent developments within the human sciences which have emphasized the ES epistemology. It has been demonstrated that ES approaches to psychology and psychotherapy, although admittedly distinguished from EP world views, also do not reflect the identifying characteristics of HE perspectives. The multidimensional topology of HET also hierarchically differentiates the various multilevel psychotherapeutic approaches within the EP, HE, and ES world views. It was emphasized that all EP, HE and ES schools of thought exhibit both lower (less encompassing/less humanizing) and

higher (more encompassing/more humanizing) approaches to psychotherapy.

I would like to conclude on a personal note. The original impetus for doing this project, grew out of this writer's increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of critical analysis that was being directed at emerging counselling models. During the time of my doctoral studies I felt there was an uncritical acceptance of newly developing directions in psychotherapy which were somehow strangely connected with developments in the physical (quantum physics) and biological (ecological) sciences. These new age developments, at times, seemed to be fully and unquestioningly embraced with what, in the past, would only be described as a kind of religious fervor and were now being endorsed within psychotherapy. What was lacking, however, was the questioning of where these developments were leading the field of psychology and our approach to human beings in general. The intent of this study has been an attempt to fill in this gap and overcome recent metatheoretical imbalances.

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APPENDIX A
DABROWSKI'S DEVELOPMENTAL LEVELS

TABLE 1

**A Dabrowskian Multilevel and Descriptive Topography of
The Self, Developmental Dynamics, and Functions:**

**Level I -- Primary Integration
(The Manipulative or Mechanistic Self)**

**Level I - PRIMARY
INTEGRATION:**

**The Mechanistic/
Manipulative Self**

(Extreme form--The Successful/Near Psychopath: Typified by the 'Authoritarian Personality' which is clearly both externally oriented and self-centered with a marked absence of self-reflection and guilt.)

- Personality is narrow and rigid and governed by both somatism and automatism.
- Narrow concern with one's own organism in terms of biological functioning.
- Integration of mental functions subordinated to primitive drives.
- Behavior is automatic, impulsive, and coldly calculated towards attaining self-serving goals.
- Cooperative social responsiveness lacking with a marked lack of consideration of others.
- Mechanism of social bonds typically limited to expressed aggression against a common opponent.
- Feelings of kinship principally related to group feelings of team, blood relation, ethnic origin, or other external category.
- Reality is perceived in tangible and sensory terms

**LEVEL I -- PRIMARY
INTEGRATION**

REALITY FUNCTION:

- Insufficient understanding of the horizontal dimension of 'human' reality, that is, of different kinds and elements of human on the same level.
- Lack of any understanding of the vertical aspect of human reality, that is, the higher levels of experience.

-It is not uncommon that highly intelligent and educated people--scholars and scientists--may lack the perception of the multilevelness of reality.

-This reality is the reality of everyday life and statistical norms.

INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:

- Intellectual activity consists mainly of skills of manipulation (a brain like a computer).
- Intelligence rather than intellectual overexcitability serves as an instrument (instrumentalism) subservient to the dictates of primitive drives.

SUCCESS FUNCTION:

- Success is measured externally for the sake of possession or attracting attention; as achievement in sports, exercise of violence, securing position, money, material possessions. Success is seen as gaining power and

with little appreciation of psychological realities.

-Orientation and awareness focused on the external world where obedience to social rules is dependent on external pressures, i.e. the desire to avoid punishment.

-There is little if any reflection on individual behavior and experiences which does not allow for an evaluation of one's actions in terms of morality and personal responsibilities.

-One is not able to judge behavior in terms of emotional or moral terms and thus others are treated as objects or means to ends.

-Personal success is seen as getting ahead in life, through competition, winning, and advancing, at any cost.

(Milder Form--The so-called 'Normal' or 'Conformist')

-Narrow scope of interest, limited horizons in thinking, aspirations, and affect, but are not totally without feeling.

-Development of skills, abilities, and competencies principally in terms of the job market where such achievements are readily visible and rewarded.

-No actual development in basic underlying structure of personality resulting in a 'stereotypical' development towards social advancement.

-In times of stress there is some self-reflection but with no reevaluation of one's life in a larger context characteristic of higher levels of development.

defeating others in ruthless competition.

IDEAL FUNCTION:

-There are no ideals only goals. A person may be quite incapable of distinguishing the two. There is no understanding, or almost none, of the 'ideals' or, rather, goals of other people and groups. There is an unconscious, onesided, automatic identification with models of power, wealth, authority, violence, or criminality.

JUSTICE FUNCTION:

-Egocentric sense of "justice" serving only one's selfish gain and self-preservation.

"Justice" is always to one's own primitive advantage.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTION:

-Primitive anthropomorphic conception of forces of "good" and "evil" based partly on a magical approach and partly on unreflective tendencies of approach and avoidance.

-One appeals to higher forces primarily to obtain support and protection in the realization of primitive endeavors and satisfaction of biological needs. Such religious attitudes are characteristic of primitive tribes and psychopathic individuals who believe themselves to possess superhuman powers.

AESTHETIC FUNCTION:

-Preference for uncomplicated, "hard beat" rhythms of dance, loudness, strong voice, strong colors, distinct and primitive symbolism in painting and sculpture, primitive realism of gigantic forms, huge

Developmental Dynamics (Shapers of Development)

- Behavior and experience determined largely by primitive drives and automatic functions.
- The dominant factor which guides one's behavior (Disposing and Directing Centre --DDC) is represented by feelings of ambition, craving for power, craving for security or financial gain, etc.
- There is a concerted absence of feelings of relationship with others and of a recognition of a common hierarchy of values. However, there is a clear recognition of one's own goals demonstrating selfish egocentrism.

figures, rigid definiteness of features.

COGNITIVE FUNCTION:

- Cognitive activities and intelligences are in the service of basic needs (self-preservation, feeding aggression, sex etc.). Intelligence is directed toward the external world in order to find means and methods necessary to satisfy the primitive needs of the individual and group to which he belongs.

INTUITIVE FUNCTION:

- No intuition. Intuition is replaced by shrewdness and, usually, by extensive experience in observing well-established stereotype patterns of behavior.
- The individual relies upon sensory perceptions without being capable of individual differentiation.

RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTION:

- Lack of responsibility toward others; selfish interests govern the individual's behavior; total lack of understanding, and sensitivity, and responsibility toward others, including close associates.
- Responsibility for others arises only when it is used to fulfill primitive instinctive needs of the individual.

TABLE 2

**A Dabrowskian Multilevel and Descriptive Topography of
The Self, Developmental Dynamisms, and Functions:**

**Level II -- Unitary Disintegration
(The Protean or Narcissistic Self)**

**LEVEL II -- UNILEVEL
DISINTEGRATION:**

**The Protean/Narcissistic
Self (Fowler, 1981, Lasch,
1984)**

(The Schismatic/Divided
Personality:
Typified by built-in
imbalances of physiological
and psychological systems
with autonomic liabilities
and polarizations. Here
the personality structure
is somewhat loose and made
up of varied and uneven
parts which do not match,
fit, and work together.
These polarizing
disequilibriums contribute
to a loss of cohesion and
stability in one's
perspective.)

-Insight into oneself
(self-awareness) is weak as
well as the capacity for
inner psychic
transformation of
conflicts, difficulties,
and experienced tensions.
-Tensions are often
released and converted
through the body rather
than being transformed.
Tensions are often
externalized as
projections, hallucinations
, and distortions of
reality.
-Guilt feelings are passive
and come from lack of
acceptance. Feelings of
moral responsibility are
absent and thus guilt is
experienced as
debilitating.

**LEVEL II -- UNILEVEL
DISINTEGRATION**

REALITY FUNCTION:

-Reality ceases to be
perceived as something
fixed, but its perception
begins to show fluctuations
(ambivalences).
-Reality ceases to be
compact and manipulable but
may begin to appear as
having many dimensions,
vaguely, even many levels.
Reality is usually
understood as that which,
at the present moment,
gives the most varied and
rich experiences.
-There may be a quick
saturation with a given
dimension of reality, but
on the other hand, there
may be a desire to bring
that dimension into another
kind of reality
(ambitendency).
-Changeable vogues and
theories influence a
person's unstable
conceptions of reality that
either keep on replacing
each other or take the form
of paradoxical relativistic
views, for instance, that
the subjectivity of
individual realities cannot
be known but, at the same
time, that it is molded by
society and culture (second
factor).

INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:

-The functions of
intelligence become
uncertain and, at times,
suspended by emotional
needs. Internal
opposition, ambivalences,

-Reality, perceived as distorted and in an endless variety of manifestations, is experienced as arbitrary and having no discerned order.

-Utilitarianism and majority rule are seen as solutions to human problems because values are seen as arbitrary, relative, and externally determined.

-In art there is much fascination with the morbid and bizarre (surrealism), pathology, decay, rule of the id (the unconscious), psychopathy.

-There is a general blindness to a larger sense of order, regarding both human experience and the hierarchization of universal values, due to a lack of inner direction and organization preventing inner psychic transformation.

Developmental Dynamics (Shapers of Development)

-Unilevel disintegration is best described as a loose ahierarchic structure, more correctly, as structure without a structure.

-Authenticism and existential experience are considered aberrations.

-Ambivalences are experienced where changeable or simultaneous feelings of like and dislike, approach and avoidance, inferiority and superiority, love and hate, are clearly felt.

-Ambitendencies are experienced where changeable and conflicting courses of action are taken resulting in indecision, wanting and not wanting, or wanting two irreconcilable things at once.

and ambitendencies create a fair chance of disconnection of the linkage between intelligence and primitive drives.

-Erudition can be extensive and brilliant but without systemization and evaluation of knowledge. There is no felt necessity to penetrate into the meaning of knowledge, to analyze in order to uncover the "hidden order of things," or to arrive at a deeper synthesis.

PLEASURE FUNCTION:

-Psychologization of basic drives appears as a result of beginnings of reflection in respect to oneself.

Mental and physiological needs become fluctuating and changeable, but some satisfaction in the pleasure of psychological or even moral nature is possible.

-In most instances, the source of pleasure is external and contingent upon variety and frequent turnover of social contacts, sports, or pleasant escapes in nature.

SUCCESS FUNCTION:

-Success is also measured externally, however, there is a beginning of selectiveness and lessening of a drive to attain primitive forms of success.

-Beginnings of aesthetic and moral considerations in relation to success (beginning of hierarchization).

IDEAL FUNCTION:

-In the transition states from one set of tendencies to another there may arise certain, usually short-lived, glimpses of the "ideal."

-These moments of recognition are, however,

-Behavior is guided by what people will think and say or by the need for recognition and approval.

-Values are internalized from external sources such as parents, church, government, or the authority of the printed word.

-Identification is associated with one's image of another while that image is not checked with the psychological and emotional reality of the other.

-Identification with another person may be excessive to the point of losing one's identity.

-The dominant fact which guides one's behavior (Disposing and Directing Centre -- DDC) is hardly existent at all. The influences affecting behavior and self-expression come principally from external sources of desires, needs, and primitive drives, all vying for dominance. However none gain it and hence the personality is driven by ambivalencies or a "multiplicity of wills".

transitory and changeable, and, most often, an ideal is understood in terms of imitation of another or of flowing with one's moods and changes.

JUSTICE FUNCTION:

-Hesitation in deciding what is just and unjust. Beginnings of "justice for others" as a consequence of felt sympathy.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTION:

-Ambivalencies and ambivalencies manifested as belief and disbelief, as "spiritualization" of one's approach to a divinity, as periods of fear or disregard of a divinity.

-Also characteristic at this level are periodical attitudes of atheism alternating with search for contact with a deity and its protective power.

AESTHETIC FUNCTION:

-There is a tendency for seeking saturation with some aesthetic stimuli. Absence of response to the expression of personality (that is, the highest developmental level) in aesthetic forms, absence of recognition and of connection between aesthetic sensitivity and self-perfection.

-One observes a variety of interests, sensitivities, and talents. Aesthetic experiences do not tend to be mutually related within a larger context of development and search for "new" and "higher".

-A hierarchical experiencing is manifest in search for "disintegration and decay" in art. This can be seen in that type of modern art which is preoccupied with fragmentation of faces, figures, displacement of limbs and features, visual disorientation,

pathological anatomy and physiology depicted in art or film, as the art of the negative, delimited by typology and biological constitution (no transcending one's type). Equipotentiality of good and evil.

COGNITIVE FUNCTION:

-Characteristic for this level is a one-sided and brief directing of intelligence to the individual himself, to his motives of cognition, to a primitive "knowledge of oneself", which requires certain capacity for retrospection, prospection, and analysis.

-The beginning of thinking for the sake of thinking (in contrast to thinking serving only primitive drives or special abilities whether in science, philosophy, or business) is a signal of developing intellectual activity.

-Intellectual and emotional functions are separate but begin to interact.

INTUITIVE FUNCTION:

-Beginning of primitive intuition. Intuitive feelings are a matter of change. One encounters apparent intuitions, intuitions of primitive suggestions and of self-suggestion such as guessing the thoughts of other people with whom one has an emotional contact, superstitions and charms associated with cats or non-living objects, the moon, numerology, etc.

RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTION:

-Beginnings of sensitivity toward others induce initial development of responsibility. However, the understanding of responsibility is short-term because of a tendency

to delimit the range of responsibility "from-to".
-Responsibility does not grow or develop at this level and is replaced by various emotional attitudes of concern for others. Ambivalences produce fluctuation between occasional altruistic and the more frequent selfish concerns.

TABLE 3

**A Dabrowskian Multilevel and Descriptive Topography of
The Self, Developmental Dynamisms, and Functions:**

**Level III -- Spontaneous Multilevel Disintegration
(The Hierarchical or Multilevel Self)**

**LEVEL III -- SPONTANEOUS
MULTILEVEL DISINTEGRATION**

**The Hierarchical/Multilevel
Self**

(Personality is characterized by extensive differentiation of mental life where intrapsychic processes begin to influence and direct behavior)

- Wavering and fluctuations of personality are replaced by a growing sense of direction from "what is" to "what ought to be".
- Inner conflicts are often numerous and intense often resulting in negative judgements. Behavior is increasingly guided by an emerging, autonomous, and emotionally discovered hierarchy of values and aims.
- Moral concerns and the problem of moral responsibility comes to the fore.
- Self-evaluation, negative self-concept, reflection on the ills of the world, perception of the uniqueness of others, human fragility and vulnerability, exclusive relationship, existential anxieties, and search for the ideal are many of the characteristic problems and phenomena which are confronted at this level of development.

**LEVEL III -- SPONTANEOUS
MULTILEVEL DISINTEGRATION**

REALITY FUNCTION:

-A gradual hierarchization of reality begins. The individual regards reality, objects, and experiential phenomena not according to established interpretations and values but according to his higher emotional functions.

-Reality begins to be experienced in its complexity, and dimensions and levels of reality begins to open up. This leads to irritation with common practical conceptions of reality.

-Reality becomes hierarchical, changeable, multilevel, and multigeneric. Other mental functions are introduced into the reality function in order to provide a wider basis for understanding and evaluating reality.

INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:

-Intellectual overexcitability intensifies the tendency towards inner conflicts and intensifies the activity of dynamisms of spontaneous multilevel disintegration. It enhances the development of awareness and of self-awareness.

-It develops the need for finding the meaning of knowledge and of human experience, as well as, developing intuitive intelligence.

PLEASURE FUNCTION:

Developmental Dynamisms (Shapers of Development)

-The psychic milieu is a hierarchic structure where many dynamisms are in conflict or complement each other.

-Conflict is always between "what is" and "what ought to be".

-The spontaneous emergence of a vertical direction in development, that is an emerging split between the "lower" and the "higher", marks the beginnings of sorting things out prior to the emergence of an autonomous hierarchy of values.

-Frustration, anger, and general dissatisfaction with one-self is one of the most significant indicators of accelerated development.

-An increasing awareness of the disparity between one's actual level and a higher one towards which one strives.

-Feelings of embarrassment and shame over one's deficiencies.

-Feelings of guilt, discomfort, or anguish over moral failure. A sense of guilt is particularly significant if it is combined with a need for reparation and self-correction.

-Protest against violation of intrinsic ethical principles. Conflict with, and rejection of, those standards and attitudes of one's social environment which are incompatible with one's growing awareness of higher values.

-Creativity comes to express the drama and tragedy, even the agony, of human existence--on the one hand, the inexorable power of fate, humiliation, absence of grace, on the

-The gradual development of needs of higher order brings more satisfaction from realizing those needs.

-An ascendancy of pleasure in the moral category such as pleasures arising from altruistic and allocentric actions, from fulfillment of ambitions of higher order (pleasure derived from one's own personal growth, from the shaping of one's own hierarchy of values), also from maladjustment to some forms of reality but adjustment to that which "ought to be".

SUCCESS FUNCTION:

-Hierarchization of success: gradual turning away from external forms of success. Transfer of weight toward moral, altruistic, and creative success. "Lower" forms of success are renounced for the sake of "higher" ones. At times, this involves the greater step of asceticism and renunciation of worldly life. The meaning of success is developed in meditation and contemplation.

IDEAL FUNCTION:

-Transition from an imitative to an authentic ideal. Hierarchization and multilevelness provide a structure for understanding and for an actual experiencing of the "lower" and "higher".

-Ideal becomes something essential and concrete. The realization of ideal gives meaning to one's existence. Thus, the realization of ideal becomes comprehensible and necessary.

JUSTICE FUNCTION:

-Hierarchization of justice and injustice. What is primitive is considered

other hand, longing for ideal, inspiration, and a heroic struggle.

-Existential opposition to, and struggle with, relativism of values. The formation of a hierarchy of values out of one's personal experience, and the fear that those values may not survive are themes of the great existential poems, and novels, religious dramas and tragedies extant in the history of art and literature.

-There is both 'identification' and 'des-identification' at this level of development. Identification, initiated through the development of a hierarchy of values, is associated with the growth of understanding and feeling for others. Des-identification is associated with a deeply felt aversion to models of lower levels.

-Empathic feelings towards others are developed which stem from reflection, self-evaluation, clear hierarchization of values, and growing readiness to help others. There is an ability to discern subjective individualities.

-One's behavior is tended to be guided by an even increasing empathy towards oneself and others. This is shown by reduced irritability but augmented sensitivity and responsiveness to the difficulties and strivings of others.

-The hallmark of Level III is the existence of internal conflict between "what is" against "what ought to be". Such conflict is most

unjust, what is empathic and more differentiated is considered just, where there is a gradual development of distinct moral feelings.

-There is a capacity to go against one's own advantage for the sake of justice.

What is altruistic and "higher" is felt to be just, the opposite to be unjust.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTION:

-Under the influence of multilevel dynamisms there develops a hierarchy of religious values which engender a need to spiritualize and differentiate the conception of divinity. The image and a conception of divinity grows out of one's developmental tendencies and strivings.

-The concreteness of immanence is lined with the concreteness of transcendence. In

religious immanence, one creates an ideal of God through one's subjective needs; in transcendence, one sees God independently of one's subjectivity.

-Concrete transcendental realities correspond with strong emotional realities of a high level of development. Immanence and transcendence may appear as an antimony, yet, at the same time, they constitute a two-part harmony.

-In the search for grace, it is experienced as coming from two directions at once; from the subject and from higher reality.

AESTHETIC FUNCTION:

-Beginning of giving aesthetic expression to the life of experiences of others and one's own.

Understanding of one's own drama and that of others in

fundamentally moral in nature.

-External conflicts arise not from conflict of interest with other persons but from a conflict of moral principles and human ideals. Most strongly external conflict arises out of the need to defend and protect those who are weak, helpless, and defenseless.

-The dominant factor which guides one's behavior (Disposing and Directing Centre -- DDC) is very indistinct.

aesthetic creativity; picture, sculpture, sound, and word. Unharmonized reaches into the depth of human experience.

-Moral and religious strivings appear in artistic expression. Need for finding and expressing philosophical elements in art. Increasingly more distinct hierarchization of values in art.

-Problems of positive disintegration expressed in art: contrasts of higher and lower, sublimity and degradation, search for hierarchies other than good and evil, introduction of empathy as one of the highest values.

COGNITIVE FUNCTION:

-Gradual process of relating cognitive activities and methods to a developing hierarchy of values. Cognition comes under the influence and eventual control of higher emotions. Intellectual functions are more clearly subordinated and combined with the activity of multilevel dynamisms.

INTUITIVE FUNCTION:

-Development of intuitive insight as an ability to grasp the core of a problem without having to approach it by trial and error. Beginnings of developing intuitions of a lower and higher level. Intuition is the product of a hierarchization of values and of gradual detachment from on going involvements and preferences.

RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTION:

-Distinct growth of responsibility for others where one experiences uneasiness of conscience. As a consequence of the action of multilevel dynamisms, the individual

develops sensitivity and insight in regard to matters for which one did not feel responsible. There is a distinct development of a hierarchy of levels of responsibility.

TABLE 4

**A Dabrowskian Multilevel and Descriptive Topography of
The Self, Developmental Dynamisms, and Functions:**

**Level IV -- Organized Multilevel Disintegration
(The Morally Directed or Consciously Determined Self)**

**LEVEL IV -- ORGANIZED
MULTILEVEL DISINTEGRATION:**

**The Morally
Directed/Consciously
Determined Self**

(Personality is principally characterized by a conscious formation and synthesis towards a directed and self-determined organization of development.)

-In contrast to the spontaneity of Level III, the establishment of an internal hierarchy within the personality occurs quite consciously and deliberately.

-Although tensions and conflicts are still felt, individual autonomy and an internal hierarchy of values and aims are experienced much stronger and are more clearly developed.

-Behavior tends towards self-perfection and to the service of others.

-Essential structure of developmental process at this level is the transformation of "what ought to be" to "will be".

-Chief dynamisms of personality development, at this level, are best represented by both responsibility and personality ideal.

**Developmental Dynamisms
(Shapers of Development)**

**LEVEL IV -- ORGANIZED
MULTILEVEL DISINTEGRATION:**

REALITY FUNCTION:

-Dynamisms of this level together with highly developed emotional functions and cognitive activities enable one to develop a multilevel organization of reality. One of the fundamental factors operating here is intuition, which functions as a process of multidimensional synthesis. Consequently, the approach to reality is consistently multilevel.

INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:

-Intellectual overexcitability in close linkage with emotional and imaginal operates in a harmony of drives, emotions and volitions. The DDC (Directing and Disposing Centre) is more closely unified with personality (the level of secondary integration).

-Intellectual interests are extensive, universal, and multilevel. Great deal of interest and effort in the objectivization of the hierarchy of values.

-Inclination toward synthesis. Intellectual-emotional and intellectual-emotional-imaginal linkages are the basis of highly creative intelligence.

PLEASURE FUNCTION:

-Experiencing pleasure has its source in the realization of a more

-The structure of this level is one of synthesis and increasing organization of the inner psychic milieu. Inner conflicts abate while the unifying power of the personality ideal increases in intensity.

-The characteristics of level IV correspond closely to Maslow's description of self-actualizing people.

-Developed process of looking at oneself as if from the outside (the self as object) and of perceiving the individuality of others (the self of the other as subject, that is, an individual knower and experiencer).

-The development of a consciously chosen autonomous hierarchy of values (The Third Factor) by which one sets apart both in oneself and one's environment those elements which are positive, and therefore, considered higher from those which are negative and, therefore, considered lower. The Third Factor is the 'par excellence' dynamism of self-directed development.

-This leads directly to the awareness of not being identified with one's body, but that body and consciousness can be separated. By this process, a person denies and rejects demands of the internal as well as the external milieu and accepts, affirms, and selects positive elements in either milieu.

-Inner psychic transformations are observed which are fundamental, deep responses, sometimes very sudden and intense, which change the

developed hierarchy of values and in the work directed toward the realization of one's personality ideal. Growth of empathy is a source of profound pleasure, as is meditation and contemplation.

SUCCESS FUNCTION:

-The principle "My Kingdom is not of this world" begins to be enacted more and more. The notion of the principle of success begin to disappear.

Success is measured in terms of helpfulness in others' personal growth or as "success through love."

-Renunciation of external, lower forms of success becomes a principle and a natural habit. Success is perceived in terms of the path of self-perfection. Success of lasting bonds of love and friendship.

IDEAL FUNCTION:

-Ideal is individual and is developed and discovered authentically. An authentic ideal may be a group ideal as well. Personality ideal becomes the dominant principle and directing force of development.

-There is no weakening or wavering of attitude toward one's ideal. The DDC and, later, personality are the exponents of the ideal.

JUSTICE FUNCTION:

-Hierarchization of just and unjust actions is experienced and systematically organized. Good will and justice are more and more strongly linked together. There is also an active realization of justice.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTION:

-Gradual development of existential attitudes, of delving into essence of

direction of behavior, deepen sensitivity, and bring about the transformation of psychological type.

-There is the transcending of the biological life cycle where somatic determination of maturation, aging, or disease are replaced by mental and emotional determinants of rich accelerated psychic development.

-The transcending of psychological type occurs where traits of opposite type are realized. For example, an extravert may become somewhat introverted, or an impatient and irascible person becomes patient and gentle, or a timid and anxious person turns into a confident leader.

-Autopsychotherapy is initiated, as a process of education-of-oneself under conditions of increased stress, as in developmental crisis, in critical moments of life, or in neuroses or psychoneuroses.

-Conscious self-healing is initiated through solitude and concentration. It entails conscious alertness and activity of converting one's experiences and actions towards personal growth.

-Creativity, at this stage of development, is distinguished by religious, existential, and transcendental elements. It deals with the problem of lasting unchangeable, and unique emotions essential to deep relationships of love and friendship.

-Self-perfection, as the systematization and organization of a program

valuing divinity as an embodiment of love together with a deepening need of faith in the uniqueness of God and his personal attributes.

-The development of a tendency toward making one's subjective religious needs more objective and toward making transcendence a concrete reality.

-Religious attitude is manifested as a search for transcendence for objective supernatural realms.

AESTHETIC FUNCTION:

-Attitude in art expressed as "nothing human is alien to me." Multilevel and authentic synthesis of many different kinds of art.

-Responsiveness to drama and tragedy in life generates the need to give them expression in art, in fact, to infuse art with the sublimity of tragic human experience.

-Understanding of, and need for, religious drama. Identification with others and individual authenticity in art.

-Experiencing and expressing in art the absolute "I-and-Thou". Art as a foundation of growing calmness and inner peace, concentration, meditation, and contemplation.

-The highest art synthesis of many levels of art into one integrated whole.

COGNITIVE FUNCTION:

-The development of a hierarchy of values in relation to different problems. One approaches in similar manner cognitive methods directed towards these problems.

-The interests of knowing are universal and, at the same time, with a clearly elaborated multilevel hierarchy.

of personality development, becomes a fundamental goal with special emphasis on moral and empathic development.

-Empathy, expressed both in an increasing discretion with respect to others but without diminishing a profound sympathy, understanding, or readiness for sacrifice, becomes a pivotal feature of one's personality development.

-Here there is a systematic "organization of conflicts" in the service of personality development.

Such conflicts are primarily existential, philosophical, and transcendental conflicts.

-The dominant factor which guides one's behavior (Disposing and Directing Centre --DDC) or conscience becomes unified and is firmly established at a higher level.

-Cognitive activities are entirely in the service of developing personality.

Through meditation and contemplation, they reach to empirical forms of mystical cognition. The link between cognitive functions and higher emotional dynamisms is here very distinct and strong.

INTUITIVE FUNCTION:

-Development and deepening intuition is closely related to the increasing distance from lower levels of reality and closer approach to its highest levels.

-The framework of reference for intuitive process is much broader because it is taken, so to speak, from a higher altitude.

-Intuition is thus developed by detachment from the needs of a lower level and by union with the personality ideal.

Meditation and contemplation contribute to the growth of intuition.

RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTION:

-Responsibility is not only more broadly elaborated but is also more systematized.

Responsibility is completely free of a "formal conception" but finds its source in responsiveness to the suffering and development of others.

-The growth and expansion of responsibility make it resemble a program of altruistic action such as exemplified by Mahatma Gandhi, Albert Schweitzer, Antoine de Saint-Eupery, Dag Hammarskjöld, Dorothy Day, and many others. Such people are incapable of being satisfied with a discussion of evil, they must actively engage in action against it.

TABLE 5

**A Dabrowskian Multilevel and Descriptive Topography of
The Self, Developmental Dynamisms, and Functions:**

**Level IV-V -- Secondary Integration
(The Ideal or Integrated Self)**

**LEVEL IV-V -- TOWARDS
SECONDARY INTEGRATION:**

The Ideal/Integrated Self

(Personality is best typified by the highest levels of development.)

-The process of developmental synthesis here leads to a harmonious unity within the personality, as a function of the "fullest dynamization of the ideal".

-Individuals who achieve this level epitomize universal compassion and self-sacrifice.

-There are no internal conflicts at this level between "what is" and "what ought to be".

-Developmental differentiation here reaches its fullest fruition.

-The lower "what is" is replaced by the "ought" of the highest level, which, thus, becomes the new and ultimate "what is."

-Personality ideal is the principal and strongest dynamism of secondary integration.

**Developmental Dynamisms
(The Shapers of
Development)**

-Secondary integration is the highest level of development and is also the highest level of personality. By "personality" is meant a

**LEVEL IV-V -- TOWARD
SECONDARY INTEGRATION:**

REALITY FUNCTION:

-Reality of a higher level is expressed in philosophical conceptions of development, in existential experiences, in true mysticism, contemplation, and ecstasy.

-On the highest level, it is not a reality of objects and psychosocial relations but a reality of the ideal. It is the threshold of transcendental reality discovered through firsthand experience.

INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:

-Intellectual function synthesized with emotional and imaginational functions.

PLEASURE FUNCTION:

-Experiencing pleasure comes from the realization of ideals, from a growing autonomy and authenticity, from empathy which encompasses all aspects of life.

-We observe here a clearly developed harmony between the need and the attempts of uniting oneself with others on the threshold of transcendence.

SUCCESS FUNCTION:

-The problem of success drops out naturally from life concerns. There is only the need for realizing self-perfection.

-The success in activating the ideal and the attainment of universal love are not regarded as

self-aware, self-chosen, and self-affirmed structure whose one dominant dynamism is personality ideal.

-The chief dynamisms leading to secondary integration are: empathy, responsibility, authenticity, autonomy, personality ideal and self-perfection.

-The sources of responsibility are the highest level of empathy and love for every human being and the need to "turn this love into action". Christ's life was the acme of responsibility for all those who suffered injustice.

-Authenticism signifies the realization that essence, that is the meaning and value of human experience, is more fundamental than essence.

-Autonomy is a functional identification with one's highest developmental level--that is with the personality ideal.

-Empathy, here, achieves its highest expression in the readiness to sacrifice one's life for the sake of others. Empathy develops not only toward the people one is responsible for but also toward one's highest strivings, one's own unrepeatability harmonized with a total respect for "Thou", which exceed the respect for oneself: the highest level of an authentic "I" in relationship with an authentic "Thou". Empathy develops for everything that exists specially for all living creatures.

-Self-perfection is conceived as a synthesis through intuition. Personality ideal becomes accessible and comprehensible as a

success because such terms lose meaning when one begins to dwell in "other dimensions".

IDEAL FUNCTION:

-The main principle is the striving for complete identification with one's ideal. All dynamisms of personality are linked into unity and subordinated to the ideal.

-Ideal becomes the only dynamism endowed with the fullness of developmental tension.

JUSTICE FUNCTION:

-The qualities of justice are more developed, more calm, and more harmonious than those of level IV. There is a consistent tendency to put the needs of others before one's own.

-Justice through self-sacrifice. Dynamization of ideal in dealing with others: all-encompassing universal love above justice.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTION:

-Development of the relationship "I" and "Thou" in the sense of development of absolute religious values of faith together with all-encompassing empathy and universal love.

-The search for transcendental hierarchy in religious attitude finds expression in authenticity and in idealization of personality. Such an attitude develops through an intuitive synthesis of one's personal relationship with divinity.

-Religious attitude is characterized by an effort to make the relation between immanence and transcendence understandable, to make God a concrete existence, to carry on with Him a

concrete process because the main dynamisms of personality are unified with the personality ideal.

-Moral differentiation of others is based on the deepest empathy towards them. This empathic through intuitive-empathic insights, obtained frequently during meditation and contemplation.

-Feelings are developed that it is possible to step over from empirical experiences into the borderline of transcendence is based on an understanding of the differences and closeness of "I" and "Thou" in a harmonic duality of existence and essence.

-The dominant factor which guides one's behavior (Disposing and Directing Centre -- DDC) is totally unified and identified with the personality ideal.

dialogue in place of his monologue.

-There may occur breaks and interruptions in such dialogue leading to the "dark night of the soul," but the need and search for the dialogue remain intact and unassailable. The search is calm though intense.

AESTHETIC FUNCTION:

-High level of empathy in art. A need to express in art a synthesis of science and philosophy, goodness and wisdom.

COGNITIVE FUNCTION:

-Cognitive function synthesized with the emotional, imaginational, and intuitive.

INTUITIVE FUNCTION:

-The highest level of intuition has its source in personality as a structure and as a developmental ideal. Intuition as a means of knowing and cognizing denotes a multidimensional and multilevel grasp of external and internal reality. Such intuition is contemplative and mystical, it comes from reaching the absolute "I" and the absolute "Thou."

RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTION:

-Responsibility becomes a dynamism of secondary integration.