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THE MEANING OF THE EVALUATIVE LOOK
IN TEACHER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

BY

PEGGY ANN HOWARD Ⓒ

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY STUDIES

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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
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
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
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
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
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
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DEDICATION

To my sons

Willis John McLennan and **Berton Lawrence McLennan**

I dedicate this study as manifestation of the possible.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a hermeneutic phenomenological exploration of the teacher's experience of being evaluated. Specifically, it investigates the meaning of the evaluative look in formal teacher performance evaluation.

Written in first person narrative, the question is opened in Chapter One by addressing *The Scholarly Context of Inquiry into Teacher Evaluatio*... Through positivist and interpretivist frames, evaluation practices are historically examined as reflections of epistemological perspectives. Criticisms and issues arising from metaphorical looking at teaching are addressed.

Chapter Two, *Clarification of Methodological Principles Guiding the Question*, introduces the concepts integral to understanding hermeneutic phenomenological methodology. Anecdotal remembrance is explored as a unique way of hermeneutics.

The Journey Begins with a *Prologue* to Chapter Three, which captures a childhood adventure in straying beyond a mother's watchful eye. This introduces Chapter Four, *The Experience* of being evaluated.

Chapter Five, entitled *Interrogating the Silence,* is presented in two parts: "The Masks of Evaluation," and "Casting Off the Masks" of evaluation as improvement of instruction and teacher professional growth. The evaluative look is revealed as objectifying and devaluing teachers, forcing inauthentic being and removal of possibility of existential growth. Teaching is reduced to a relation ingenuine encounter. A constrained notion of pedagogy and pedagogue are sustained through an historical privileging of vision. Evaluation, as mendacious experience, is ultimately little more than the handmaiden of accountability.

Chapter Six, *Appropriation*, calls for the need to reconceptualise teaching, to look beyond the metaphors of labor/craft, art, professional judgment and moral craft, to re-envision teaching as pedagogic relationship.

In *Creating the Space for Possibility*, Chapter Seven informs administrative practice by calling for pedagogic looking at teachers. It suggests the development of a language of being and becoming to describe how teachers *are* with students. Through reframing administrative structure, evaluation may be revisioned and reconceived to help teachers become self-evaluative.

An *Epilogue: Completing the Circle* closes the study with "A Journey to the Possible," in taking one final adventure with the child of the hermeneutic circle in "Exploring the Enhancing Look."

An extensive *Bibliography* on teacher evaluation, administrative practice, narrative discourse, hermeneutics and phenomenology precede the *Appendix*, which contains samples of conventional teacher evaluation instruments, checklists, and forms, used in Alberta school districts.

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The world is sometimes a strange place where things do not unfold as planned. Yours was the gift of always expecting more of me, knowing that better lie within. To you, my thanks for endless hours of critique, and especially for your love and support.

And lastly to the silent participants in this study,

To **Richard, Alicia, Dana, Marnie, Maureen, Ronald, David, Dale, Jack, David, Debbie,** and to the many others whose stories I heard or read

To you I owe the beginning.

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Forward

Coming To The Question

I walk back to my empty classroom, glad that everyone has gone home. It seems I need some quiet time to fit the pieces together. Except for that one little comment, I guess my evaluation has gone pretty well. Still . . .

An uneasiness? A disquietude? Sometimes evaluations happen like that even when they go well. For me they did. Each time I was evaluated a dissonance grew within me, a space where ambiguity and uncertainty grew as well. It did not seem to matter where or what or who I was teaching, I came away from evaluations with the lingering feeling that something had gone askew.

What was it about evaluation that unsettled me so much? Why, when my reports were good, even excellent, did I feel less than I should? Despite all the nice things that were said about me, I felt somehow cheated. Why did evaluations leave me cold, wanting to avoid my principal for a day or two, stay clear of the staff room? It was a subtle kind of bothering, not a lack of self-esteem, or not knowing what I was doing. I was a seasoned teacher. Yet something in the evaluation experience threw me off. Something inside me seemed to change. I did not really understand it. I had even more difficulty communicating it to others. In fact, it was something I did not talk about very much.

Evaluation became a gnawing question, one that surfaced and resurfaced as I saw other teachers being evaluated. I watched them quietly prime themselves, manicure their lessons, fill their classrooms with students' work. And I saw the looks on teachers' faces, the smiles too bright, the eyes too alert, the walks a little too stiff. And I also saw the quiet journeys back from the principal's office to the empty classrooms. Evaluation changed teachers. I could see that it disturbed the teacher's lifeworld in ways I could only wonder about, in ways, perhaps that I myself had felt. Did others experience evaluation as I did? Was there something in this experience that we shared?

Evaluation became *my* question. It became a living part of me. I can no longer remember not having wondered about it. For as long as I have been a teacher, I cannot remember when it was not my question. And so in this most fortuitous time in my life when I have been able to take the opportunity to reflect and ask what was really important to me in education, what really mattered to me as a teacher, and what I could do to make a difference in teachers' lives, the question of evaluation was a natural one. It would have been simple to say that it was an objective choice, that it was appropriate to the field of educational administration and that it met a deadline date. But, in truth, it was none of those things.

After a long overdue gestation, and with the help of other teachers, I began to give language to the evaluation experience. Driven by a personal need to understand, my question has grown into something far richer than even I had imagined. I have been changed by my question. I am a different person now, different from the classroom teacher and from the college instructor I once was. I have a deeper understanding of what it means to go through a formal performance evaluation.

My intention was to talk to other teachers and learn from them, which I did. But in the course of this study I also learned a great deal about myself. I am this question. It lives in me and it has come alive in and through me. Human science research is conducted from the heart. It lives and breathes its questioner in ways we do not always understand. So much of what unfolds here has defied a master plan. I was not sure where this question would lead when I began this journey. I was not sure that I could do it. Sometimes I thought I knew too much, felt too deeply what I was investigating, and could not be objective enough. It is not easy to separate yourself from what you feel. But I also learned that when I stopped trying to export myself from my study, my question began to open itself to me.

That was almost three years ago now. It is hard for me to imagine that I have been consumed by one question for so long, when in the life of a teacher, decisions are made on the spur of the moment, classes and faces change almost hourly. Times of reflection are few. We just do the job. But I left that job. I made a conscious decision not to go back to the classroom, more than once, in fact. But somehow, through the course of this study, that has changed. What has played a part, perhaps, in turning me away from teaching, may be the very thing that now turns me back to it. How ironic to think that what I turned away from, is what has compelled me to turn back to see!

Perhaps this is what is most rich in life--ambiguity, contradiction, uncertainty. Ultimately this is what causes us to question ourselves as teachers and as human beings in our lived worlds. Undoubtedly this has been my impetus to address the question of what it means to be evaluated. It is an experience which affects teachers. Evaluation makes a difference. It is no small concern.

Chapter One

Opening the Question:

The Scholarly Context of Inquiry into Teacher Evaluation

Setting the Context

As novice academics we often have a preconceived notion that research begins in books, that practical experience and knowledge are nice but probably not the "stuff" of which doctoral studies are made. A victim perhaps of my own ignorance and certainly due to my naiveté about what phenomenology was, I set about beginning this study by conducting the cursory literature review. But it came up short. There was nothing about the teachers' experience of evaluation in it. What does one do when there is little or nothing written about what you wish to explore? Do you abandon the question, choose another direction, or do you become more convinced than ever, that your question is a compelling one?

Certainly the topic of teacher evaluation has been researched at length. A plethora of articles and texts have been written on the when, where and how of evaluation practice, but very little information exits on the what, the why's and why not's. I toyed with the idea of relegating the unfulfilling fruits of that initial literature search to some far-off shelf where it too would gather dust. It had so little to do with the teacher's *experience* of evaluation. But I reconsidered. Was not locating my question in its historical and ideational contexts (Greene, 1984) important to understanding the issue of teacher evaluation in the whole? How would I come to understand what it means to be evaluated, specifically come to understand the meaning of the "evaluative look" in teacher evaluation, when "evaluation" itself, and "teaching," for that matter, are such loaded words, intensely and personally significant and meaningful to teachers? How would I uncover the layers of meaning within the question itself, in other words, to de-contextualize it, so that I would be able to find its root within the literature?

That search would begin by de-constructing the terms of my question, not in a post-modern sense, but in coming to an experiential, lived-world grasp of what the terms "teacher evaluation" mean and how the process of evaluation affects

teachers. I would then be able to use that understanding to inform administrative practice. It is important to understand, however, that this study does not culminate in answering whether administrators "should" evaluate teachers the way they do, although that issue will be addressed as well. Rather, it is a matter of trying to understand what it is in the evaluation experience that makes even teachers who have "aced" the forms feel a little less than they should. Whether a very positive or negative experience in general terms, there seems to be a nagging something that gnaws at teachers long after the evaluation is over. It is that something that cannot be denied, that certain unforgettable . . . "It went OK, but . . . ."

There always seems to be the "but."

In an effort to understand the unspeakables in the evaluation experience, those instances so difficult to express, this dissertation seeks to give language to what seems to elude us. And while that elusiveness seems at first glance to have little to do with the literature on teacher evaluation, it nevertheless exists within the context of evaluation practice. It is necessary, then, to look at that more objective and technical information on teacher evaluation, which although it sits outside our direct experience of being evaluated, still forms part of the larger picture within which the phenomenon of being watched in the classroom occurs. Situating this question within its scholarly context helps to form a theoretical backdrop to this study and to locate this particular phenomenon within the broader field of educational administration.

Teacher Evaluation as Reflection of Epistemological Perspective

When teachers are evaluated, that is, when a supervisor comes into the classroom to watch the teacher teach, what is it really that is being watched? This is an important question, one that lies at the basis of understanding how and why teachers are evaluated the way they are. Practices of teacher evaluation and policies that dictate those practices, are based on assumptions about what teaching is, and

also on how a teacher can demonstrate a particular teaching knowledge or teaching expertise. And while most teacher evaluation policies in Alberta (Ratsoy, Haughey, Townsend & O'Reilly, 1993) and abroad (Lokan & McKenzie, 1989) state that teacher evaluation is conducted for purposes of improvement of instruction and teacher professional growth, most evaluation policies do not address the philosophic presuppositions underlying beliefs and assumptions about what constitutes teaching, albeit good teaching.

While this study does not intend to be a philosophic treatise about teaching, or about ways to look at human existence, I think a few brief statements explicating what might serve as the presuppositional bases underlying the practice of teacher evaluation will help to frame our conversation about evaluation by setting it in the context of what is considered teaching knowledge in the first place. But it is not just teaching knowledge that must be considered. Knowledge is considered to be mainly an epistemological question, but admittedly, issues of ontology and axiology are inevitably intertwined in what it means to teach. If we are to understand the experience of being evaluated within teacher evaluation, then, we must recognize that examining the assumptions underlying what constitutes teaching knowledge, or what counts as knowledge in the first place, what is valued as true and good, and where we think knowledge and being originate, inevitably become concomitant issues in understanding what it means to teach. Therefore, separating epistemological from axiological and ontological elements of this question of "teaching," may be a fruitless, if not impossible, endeavor.

In a simplistic analysis of basic philosophic considerations as to claims to knowledge in general, from which claims to teaching knowledge can be drawn, I have found Zais' (1976) framework useful. In his view, if knowledge is discovered through the senses and reason, and reality exists outside personal experience, then evaluation will rely on scientific observation as a data-gathering

strategy from which conclusions about teaching competence and expertise can then be deduced and verified. In this "earth-centered" philosophy, as Zais (1976) called it, objectivity, inherent in the laws of nature, is what is valued. If, though, it is believed that knowledge is created through and from personal experience, then teaching knowledge is inevitably relative and contextual, or "human-centered" in origin, to use Zais' term. From this perspective, human experience, the existential, is significant in determining reality. Zais' (1976) third view holds that knowledge is neither gained through personal experience nor through logical deduction and verification, but like its ontological anchor, places its locus of reality in a supernatural realm. From this perspective knowledge is believed to exist as something that is granted and acquired through revelation. Teaching and evaluation of teaching would be revealed through "ideal" thought and guided through external authority, providing and sustaining a permanent "truth."

What emerges from these contrasting worldviews, albeit never in a pure sense, are frameworks through which to view and analyze knowledge and a means through which to come to understanding evaluation practice. These frameworks can, and often do, serve as the foundation for paradigmatic analysis. While there seems to be no direct correlation between supernatural sources of teaching knowledge and evaluation practice in the literature, when epistemological perspectives are derived from "earth-centered" and "man-centered" philosophies (Zais, 1976), there seems to be congruence between these worldviews and positivist and interpretivist views of the world (Foster, 1986; Guba, 1990) and, significantly, practices of teacher evaluation that reflect those perspectives. Uncovering this connection removes a layer in coming to understand the influence of worldview on teaching, and more importantly for this question, on how a teacher comes to be observed in the classroom.

Examining the field of teacher evaluation through positivist and interpretivist lenses suggests that evidence or proof of teaching competence is derived from some very basic assumptions about what teaching knowledge is and what relation the teacher has to the discovery or production of that knowledge. What these views ultimately determine is ways of looking at teaching, and therefore at teachers. When a teacher is watched in the classroom, what epistemological orientations have come to influence how the observer might observe the teacher?

Teacher Evaluation within Positivist and Interpretivist Frames

Traditionally, teacher evaluation practices have been based on a positivist frame, where, through scientific methods, knowledge about teaching is gathered and verified through observation. As part of the natural world, teaching is considered to be a human act which occurs in relation to fixed laws of nature. Evaluators, as scientists, exercise authority in conducting objective evaluations (Noblit & Eaker, 1989) of teachers.

When evaluation practices are based on an interpretivist view of the world, however, the evaluator and evaluatee construct a reading of mutiperspectival realities to come to a shared understanding of what constitutes good teaching. Content expertise, instrumental utility and authority, prevalent in positivist designs, are minor issues when teaching is viewed from an interpretivist perspective. In one derivation of this position the teacher is viewed as connoisseur (Eisner, 1988). What is important is the teacher's wealth of knowledge about teaching derived from practice. The teacher is recognized as being expert and is independent of power or authority.

Critical theory designs of evaluation are also built on an interpretivist notion of teaching, and regard teaching knowledge as legitimated through practice. More importantly that knowledge is made valid through a critique of the ideologies surrounding practice. Based on Habermas' formulation that, "ideology distorts

communication by masking social contradictions" (Noblit & Eaker, 1989, p. 131), critical theory designs do not rely on an outside expert or authority conducting what might be considered objective observations to gather information for evaluation purposes. Instead, teachers use self-reflection and critique to achieve self-enlightenment and ultimately social emancipation. Through the processes of dialogue and discourse, the evaluator/critical theorist provides content and process direction, but subjects his/her assumptions and beliefs to examination by the group.

In these ways the teacher, as connoisseur or critical theorist, plays a significantly different role in evaluation than s/he does when the teacher is the object of scientific observation. When the teacher relies on the connoisseur to determine the teacher's attainment of certain teaching standards, whether those standards are collectively developed and shared by teachers or not, or when the teacher is in the process of becoming a connoisseur him/herself, or when the teacher questions the political, moral and ethical questions surrounding his/her practice (Gitlin & Smyth, 1990), the nature of teaching knowledge and the role of the teacher in the production and/or acquisition of that knowledge varies. So too, then, may the teacher's experience of being evaluated.

However, paradigmatic analysis of teacher evaluation practice refuses to be partitioned neatly into positivist and interpretivist frames. Responsibilities and opportunities for knowledge production and assessment have not unfolded in an historical vacuum. Rather, the two paradigms have ebbed and flowed with each other, developed and shared the spotlight in different ways. Furthermore, what this analysis points to is that paradigmatic categorization, while helpful in broadly conceptualising knowledge about teaching, is too general, too obtuse. What has evolved, instead, is a more focused and concrete way to look at teaching knowledge and/or expertise. To see how teaching has come to be seen and described in more

concrete ways, a brief overview of evaluation practice will show how teaching has come to be seen historically and how it has come to be viewed through metaphor.

Overview of Evaluation Practice

Prior to the 1900s education in North America was largely dictated by systems of religious and/or political beliefs (Worthen & Sanders, 1991). In the United States, the study of teacher evaluation began at the turn of the century with the growing momentum of the educational testing movement. In conjunction with Bloom's (1956) taxonomic thinking, together with contributions from the behaviorist schools, models of teacher evaluation emphasizing behavioral objectives flourished until well into the 1950s. Underlying this approach to evaluation was the assumption that teaching was a technology and that it consisted of a set of measurable techniques (House, 1980).

With the Soviet's successful launching of Sputnik in 1957, technological and military supremacy in the United States became an issue of prime political importance. Partly because of the lack of systematic mechanisms to evaluate programs which had received massive government funding at the local level, an earlier call for a reconceptualization of program evaluation (Cronbach, 1963) gained strong political and academic support (Worthen & Sanders, 1991). Viewed as a "multidimensional, pluralistic, situational, and political activity," (Worthen & Sanders, 1991, p. 5) evaluation came to be viewed as a complex process involving skills additional to what empirical science could offer. Thus began the thrust to develop schemes and strategies of evaluation alternative to those reflecting the predominantly positivist testing movement.

In the late 1960s Scriven, Guba, Stake and Stufflebeam were among those who offered new conceptual frameworks for models and designs of evaluation (Worthen & Sanders, 1991). Scriven (1967) advocated the use of formative and summative forms of evaluation to distinguish process from product. Stake (1967)

argued that values, which were socially constructed and therefore arguable, be recognized in setting standards for evaluation. He used descriptive and judgmental data, but nevertheless relied on explicit standards to measure them. Stufflebeam (1968) promoted his CIPP (Context Input Process Product) model, as goal-based in terms of a systems approach to evaluation. While his model was used mainly for decision-making purposes, and had much to do with program description, it had little to do with values or clearly defining a methodology for evaluation. What it did, however, was to fit nicely into a "factory" model of education.

To this time, program and personnel evaluations were largely based on a worldview of logical positivism, an objectivist epistemology, and on quantitative methodology. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the qualitative and naturalistic approaches of Guba (1978), Lincoln and Guba (1985), Eisner (1985), and Patton (1980) became persuasive alternatives to the predominantly quantitative tradition. Their contributions fueled open debate of the positivist tradition of "Adopting a set of standards, defining the standards, specifying the class of comparison, and deducing the degree to which the object meets the standards" (House, 1980, p. 19). In House's (1980) view, naturalistic evaluations signaled the modern era. "Modernization was liberation from tradition, a shift from the unquestioned reality given by tradition to a social context in which everything could be questioned and changed" (p. 16).

Pragmatists, such as Dewey and James in the United States, and existentialists and phenomenologists in Europe lent further support to shifting away from the Tylerian models and practices of evaluation which had enjoyed popularity since the 1940s, towards more qualitative approaches to viewing educational research and to evaluating programs and policies. Many of the techniques and practices of evaluation that applied to program and policy development and assessment had become adopted into practices used to evaluate the performance of

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teachers. But what worked for programs did not necessarily work for teachers, for human subjects.

When teaching was viewed "through the structures of industry, through fixing outcomes, by controlling processing and inputs. . . . the belief that . . . rational, scientific, reliable and calculated techniques used to increase production in the factory could be applied to education as a way to engineer increased efficiency and effectiveness" (Brophy, 1984, p. 7), evaluation failed to translate into a meaningful experience for teachers. Being treated "like a machine," labelling what happened in classrooms as a "production line," described a factory model of teaching, one that adopted the language, and subsequently the metaphorical comparison of performance and production.

Other metaphors to describe teaching existed at this time, however. In their comprehensive analysis of implementation of evaluation policies, Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin & Bernstein (1985) offered a seminal piece of research to the field of teacher evaluation. In addition to clarifying the need for shared values and assumptions to successfully implement evaluation policy, they conceptualised teaching through metaphors of labour/craft (referred to technical expertise in the Ratsoy et al., 1993, study), art and professional judgment. It is that metaphorical conceptualisation of teaching I use here.

Metaphorical Analyses of Teaching

Teaching as Labour/Craft

Wise et al. (1985), (see also Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Pease, 1983) theoretically conceived of teaching as labor and craft meaning that demonstration of teaching knowledge consisted of identifying, defining and executing sets of complex skills "rationally planned, programmatically organized, and routinized in the form of standard operating procedures" (Wise et al., p. 7). This technical expertise conceptualization of teaching, which encompassed teaching procedures,

management, knowledge of subject matter, personal characteristics, and professional responsibility, formed the basis of the "teaching effectiveness" movement, and with it the development of a proliferation of prescribed models or recipes of good teaching (the Madeline Hunter (1984) model of instructional theory into practice, for example). So popular was this model of teaching that much of the reform movement in education in North America, Great Britain and Australia reflected this set of beliefs about what constituted good teaching (Lokan & McKenzie, 1989).

Criticisms and Issues Arising from Teaching as Labor/Craft

In teacher evaluation reflecting teaching as labor/craft, the evaluative process and subsequent reporting are the responsibility of the evaluator, while the teacher remains relatively or totally passive. The teacher had little input into either the data collection or its interpretation. The Wise et al. (1985) study revealed that, for the most part, teachers found that evaluations of this kind did not improve their teaching, but teachers did report increased discussion with administrators about practice, and increased awareness of their instructional goals and classroom practice. They appreciated affirmation of good teaching, while administrators reported that evaluation of this kind allowed for better supervision of beginning teachers and "counselling out" of deficient ones (cross-purposes, to be sure).

For teachers, issues of trust and fairness become paramount. Ultimately, according to Gitlin (1989), teachers are politically pressured into "buying into" or committing to the evaluation process and to openly supporting evaluation policy by participating in the development of the criteria that would ultimately judges them. McLaughlin and Pfiefer (1988) similarly warned that participation in the formulation of evaluation policy did not necessarily ensure its implementation in the classroom. Rather than a process of compliance, McLaughlin and Pfiefer envisioned that evaluation could be a process of culture-building. In their view,

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when teaching was viewed as technical expertise, the norms of accountability, measurement, and institutional goals and agendas are made problematic in relation to teacher professional growth and personal fulfillment (McLaughlin & Pfiefer, 1988). However, evaluations reflecting a technical expertise model were ideally suited to purposes of accountability. Teaching techniques could be delineated into observable, measurable quantities which could then be checklisted, rated and compared (Sergiovanni, 1984; Sergiovanni & Starratt, 1988). So, too, though, could teachers (Gitlin & Goldstein, 1987; Gitlin & Smyth, 1989).

Since the early 1970s school systems have become entrenched in evaluations reflecting a deficiency model of teaching--a tradition Popham (1975) referred to as the "unthinking adulation" of a practice as revered as motherhood and apple pie! Others, as well, have been critical of a view of teaching based on sets of behavioral objectives that have measurable outcomes (Bloom, 1956; House, 1980). Gitlin & Smyth (1989) have described teacher evaluation as an instrumental and ritual practice (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989) aimed at expediency and efficiency (Brophy, 1984). From their critical theorist perspective, Gitlin and Smyth (1989) concluded that evaluation practices were themselves "imbued with a political agenda" (p. x), that they rested on an authoritarian notion of pedagogy, one competency-based upon technical rationality, and the non-disclosure and absence of critical debate. Their concern was that the values inherent in evaluation became natural and uncontested, and were therefore, probably impenetrable. The result, in their words, was that "The 'management pedagogies' (Giroux, 1985) that lie behind dominant modes of evaluation have led to the reduction and standardization of knowledge; the measurement of attainment against arbitrarily determined objectives and standards; and the allocation of teaching resources so as to maximize output" (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989, p. 39). They have further criticized classroom observations in the use of data collection about teaching performance as being

neither value-free nor objective, and claimed that they formed the basis of a "hierarchical and dehumanizing process" for teachers (Gitlin and Smyth, 1989). The evaluator, the influence of whose personal background and experience in evaluation cast further doubt on the validity of observations themselves (Collins, 1990), was seen as "fault-finder." As a form of "technocratic surveillance" (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989) that ensured teacher compliance to the system, Gitlin and Goldstein (1987) condemned evaluation as isolated, episodic, monologic events conducted strictly for purposes of accountability.

Gitlin and Smyth (1989) further claimed that scientific research was inappropriate to reveal the true nature of teaching. They, among others, called for understanding teaching in its historical and social context highlighting a general rethinking of the assumptions underlying teacher evaluation (Garman, 1990; Smyth & Garman 1989; Gitlin, 1989; Gitlin & Smyth, 1989, 1990; Peterson & Comeaux, 1990; Smyth, 1989; Wise et al., 1985). Others supported their criticisms.

As the objects of observation (Juska, 1991; Stodolsky, 1984, 1990; Wise et al., 1985) teachers, supported by theoreticians, rejected, first, the assumption that teaching behaviors could influence student achievement in any positive and predictive way (Redfield, 1988), and second, that observations and measurements of teaching behaviors were themselves stable, consistent and generalizable indicators of good teaching (Weade & Evertson, 1991). What became problematic was evaluator expertise, observer bias, and the relationship between evaluation and teacher professional growth. If the presuppositions underpinning the gathering of knowledge about teaching performance were themselves questionable, then the entire practice of evaluation became suspect as well. Furthermore, when the language used to describe classroom observations of teachers was itself only a representation of the reality that occurred in the classroom (Weade & Evertson, 1991), the foundational validity of evaluation was weakened still further.

To elaborate, observing teaching as separate molecular acts embodied an assumption between observable performance and underlying teaching competence (Ryan & Hickcox, 1980). Limited observation of teachers did not account for what teachers did when they were not observed and did not include knowledge or mastery of skills the teacher was unable to demonstrate during the observation episode (Shulman, 1987). Additional contextual factors such as subject matter, grade level, lesson type, and student ability, further limited the validity of classroom observations (Evertson & Holley, 1981; Evertson & Green, 1986, Medley, Coker & Soar, 1984; Schlechty, 1990; Stodolsky, 1984, 1990). Lieberman and Miller (1984) went on to suggest that administrators observing teachers in classrooms was, itself, a fundamental violation and disruption of the teacher's world.

Researchers were also concerned with the effect of evaluation on students. They questioned the relationship of effective teaching to effective student learning (Darling-Hammond, Wise & Pease, 1983; Glickman, 1986; Joyce & Showers, 1988; Stodolsky, 1984; Wise et al., 1985). Brophy and Good (1986) concluded the relationship was inconclusive. Costa, Garmston and Lambert (1988), and Glickman (1986) went so far as to suggest that student achievement was based on the level of intellectual development of the teacher and that it was these levels that should be measured--a novel idea which seems to have died a quick death. A more acceptable alternative was to examine teaching through the metaphor of art.

Teaching as Art

When teaching is defined as art, teacher evaluation becomes a form of artistic criticism. Knowledge about teaching that is derived from the indeterminate zones of practice (Schon, 1983, 1987), is held by the connoisseur (Eisner, 1979, 1988) who recognizes the complexities, nuances and subtleties in the art of teaching (Eisner, 1991a, 1991b). In Eisner's view "immaculate perception and ontologically

objective description are impossible" (1991a, p. 172). Therefore, only through intuition, creativity and improvisation (Gage, 1978) can a teacher appropriately respond to the uniqueness of classroom situations (Eisner, 1979).

Because the work of teaching happens within a political and historical context, as critically reflective practitioners, teachers are encouraged to continually examine the political, moral and ethical dimensions of teaching. This process involves examining the taken-for-grantedness of evaluation (Garman, 1990), critiquing the social, political and moral context surrounding evaluation practices (Frisbie, 1991; Grimmett,1989), so that evaluation becomes a culturally responsive activity (Flinders, 1991; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Many have supported the position that evaluation was a political activity (Gitlin, 1989; Gitlin & Smyth, 1990; Glickman, 1990; McGreal, 1988; Noblit & Eaker, 1989; Wise et al., 1985), one which involved the tensions of unfreezing and examining beliefs and practices (Darling-Hammond, 1990a, 1990b; McLaughlin & Pfeifer, 1988), or what McLaughlin (1990) termed, "embracing the contraries" of accountability, bureaucratic control and institutional goals with professional autonomy and individual teachers' needs.

When teaching is viewed as an art, the teacher acts in an individualistic, autonomous manner (Gitlin & Goldstein, 1987), directed by the moral and ethical dimensions of practice (Gitlin & Smyth, 1990), always critically reflective, always using insight and understanding to inform practice. Teachers are encouraged to interrogate the structures and ideologies which constrain autonomous decision-making (Gitlin & Smyth, 1990). Their relationship with administrators is characterized by equality, reciprocation and collaboration, in other words, horizontal, dialogic and enabling (Gitlin, 1990; Gitlin & Goldstein, 1987). Whatever inputs into the teaching/learning process are collected, the teacher ultimately decides the course of action to be taken.

Criticisms and Issues Arising from Teaching as Art

When the teacher is self-autonomous, what of public accountability? Sergiovanni (1985, 1989) was quick to raise cautions. He warned of the excesses of both scientism or poetism in describing or evaluating teaching as art. He, among others, agreed that knowledge should come from the landscape of practice, and that reflection on that practice should serve as the source of knowledge-making (Clandinin, 1986; Glickman, 1990; Hunt, 1987; Schon, 1983, 1987; Sergiovanni, 1985, 1990), but he questioned the role of leadership in this view of teaching. Is it, in fact, necessary? And if it is, what are the moral dimensions of it?

What the teaching as art metaphor essentially challenges is the hierarchical nature of school systems (Sergiovanni & Starratt, 1988). While considerable opposition has arisen from not recognizing the teacher's intuition, creativity and spontaneity (Eisner, 1979) in the unique relationship with students (Gitlin, 1989; Gitlin & Goldstein, 1987; Gitlin & Smyth, 1990; Smyth, 1988), the fact that administrators are demoted to the position of facilitator from that of judge, is an obstacle to implementing teaching as art within school systems. As Gitlin and Smyth (1990) have stated, reforming school structure and freeing constrained notions of teaching and learning lie at the crux of public acceptance of teaching as anything but technical expertise.

It should not be overlooked, however, that an alternative practice of evaluating teaching has existed in the literature for many years, and has recently resurfaced with renewed fervor--that of clinical supervision. Because its intent was to bridge the gap between positivist and interpretivist views of teaching, and concomitantly, teacher evaluation practices which reflected those views, the thrust of clinical supervision was to transform evaluation into an empowering process for teachers. Originally based on a view of teaching as professional judgment, a closer

examination of the original conception of clinical supervision and how it has unfolded in practice, is worthwhile at this point.

Clinical Supervision: An Attempt to Bridge

Originally based on notions of colleagueship and collaboration, Goldhammer (1969) and Cogan (1973) devised a system of supervision that literally swept across North America during the 1970s and 1980s. Scriven's (1967, 1981, 1991) notions of formative, or process evaluation, and summative, or product evaluations, which had been used in the assessment of programs and policies became adopted into models of performance evaluation of teachers. These words appear in teacher evaluation policies in Alberta to the present day (Ratsoy et al., 1993). What was to be a collaborative process of clinical supervision quickly became distorted into yet another form of sophisticated teacher surveillance and inspection. In practice, clinical supervision came to be understood by teachers as clinical evaluation (Garman, 1990; Garman & Hazi, 1988; Gitlin & Smyth, 1989; Hazi & Garman, 1988; Holland, 1989, 1990; McGreal, 1983).

As might be expected, in reaction to clinical supervision, considerable criticism voiced many of the old arguments: clinical observation altered the classroom dynamic, peer observations were inconsistent, and most of all, good teaching remained ill-defined (Hazi, 1989; McGill, 1991). The teacher's role in all of this? The supervisor was assumed to have greater knowledge and authority (Garman & Hazi, 1988; Holland, 1989) than the teacher being evaluated. So much for colleagueship and collaboration.

Recently the whole issue of clinical supervision has been revisited in the literature as a worthwhile practice that needs to return to its original notions (Tracy and MacNaughton, 1989). The neo-progressives adhere to the original roots of Goldhammer-Cogan, while the neo-traditionalists adhere to a model of supervision which reflects a view of teaching based on "stressing teaching strategies as they

relate to learning theory and effective-teaching research" (Tracy and MacNaughton, 1989, p. 248). The neo-progressives believe that the supervisory process is built on necessarily changing criteria, responsive to the context of teaching, while the neo-traditionalists hold to a consistent interpretation of teaching criteria, those derived from quantitative research on the teaching/learning process. Tracy and MacNaughton (1989) argued that both approaches could work in concert with one another--the traditional approach for teachers who required specific direction and assistance in improving practice, and the neo-progressive approach for teachers interested in "clarifying, problem solving and active listening" (p. 255) so that they could take advantage of their innate creativity and motivation. This latter notion is similar to Glickman's (1985) developmental supervision.

The original thrust behind clinical supervision was that it would lead the practice of teacher evaluation away from a view of teaching as a technology, and as a form of legalizing scientism (Hazi & Garman, 1988), to a process of professional judgment. The momentum to accept practice as a credible source of knowledge-making that would inherently change the direction of teacher evaluation practice, provided an attractive alternative to the view of teaching as technical expertise. Unfortunately, for teachers, the idea back-fired. What clinical supervision was striving for, was to look at teaching as professional judgment.

Teaching as Professional Judgment

When the teacher is regarded as a critically reflective and autonomous professional capable of making decisions about practice, and the consequence of reflection and dialogue is the establishment of a body of professional standards, the metaphor of teaching as art is transformed into one of teaching as professional judgment. With less emphasis placed on illuminating historical, cultural and social phenomena surrounding teaching (Greene & McClintock, 1991), and more on collaboratively developing a body of shared professional knowledge, standards of

professional practice result. These standards guide and govern practice and are continually reviewed for qualities of goodness (Greene, 1989). Teachers' situational or workplace knowledge (Rosenholtz, 1989) informs the practical knowledge base. Research and sources external to the school (Lieberman & Miller, 1990) contribute the theoretical knowledge base. Collectively they form the pool of teaching knowledge from which standards are derived.

Developing a body of professional knowledge (Boyer, 1990; Conley, 1990; Gideonse, 1990; Johnson, 1990; Shanker, 1990, Sykes, 1990a, 1990b), and formulating policy as a collaborative effort between all stakeholders involved in educating students (Boyer, 1990; Bridges, 1990; Conley, 1990; Gideonse, 1990; Johnson, 1990; Koretz, 1990; Metz, 1990; Root & Overly, 1990; Shanker, 1990; Sykes, 1990a, 1990b) reflects a notion of teaching which supports the larger restructuring movement in education. It is a movement which advocates transformative evaluation (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989; Holland, 1990), a practice of evaluation McLaughlin and Pfiefer (1988) advocated as satisfying goals of both accountability and improvement. In their view, these two aims need not compete, but instead, can become mutually supportive. In their words, "Accountability . . . occurs *through* strategies based in improvement of learning because it is rooted in professional norms and values" (p. 82-83). Successful evaluation in this context is dependent on supportive administrators involved in the goal-setting process, by the creation of opportunities for peer observation and collaborative enquiry conducted in a climate which fosters discussion and open debate arising from dilemmas and tensions when institutional and individual goals mismatch. In this way evaluation serves a continuous feedback function in reassessing norms and values of the organization (McLaughlin & Pfiefer, 1988).

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Professional Judgment in Practice

Reflection, dialogue, collegiality and trust (Stiggins & Duke, 1988), hallmarks of teaching viewed as professional judgment, reflect what the Rand Corporation (Wise et al., 1985) recommended ten years ago and what others have supported since that time: evaluation systems should be compatible with the educational goals, values and needs of the community (Townsend, 1987), top-level commitment to evaluation should be demonstrated in time and resources (Babiuk, 1987; Burger, 1988; Stiggins & Bridgeford, 1985), and that there be congruence between the process and purpose of evaluation. A fourth recommendation was that the evaluation system in place should be perceived as competent in achieving resource commitment and political support, and finally, that the evaluation process should be collaborative in involving teachers' organizations in the development and implementation of evaluation policy. With these recommendations realized in practice, Wise et al., (1985) suggested that the teaching profession could become self-determining and self-accountable.

Lieberman and Miller (1984) have suggested that the shift to pluralistic and participatory evaluation will be difficult since evaluation may serve as a legitimation device for school systems themselves (Natriello, 1990), and may mitigate against the kind of dialogue and space for teacher reflection that is fundamental and necessary to the development of teaching as professional judgment (Lortie, 1975). Others share this skepticism since, in reality, they see teacher evaluation having little or no effect on teacher's decision-making powers in the classroom (Huddle, 1985). As recently as 1990, Schlechty wrote that evaluation was still being used as a punitive measure against teachers in classrooms.

Summary

Although the literature on teacher evaluation from the 1950s through to the late 1980s, and indeed into the present, is filled with the advocacy of various

models of teacher evaluation, many of them reflect views congruent with instrumental, positivistic views of teaching. The recent teacher evaluation policy impact study conducted throughout Alberta school jurisdictions (Ratsoy et al., 1993) has revealed that despite metaphorical conceptualizations of teaching beyond labor/craft, the majority of teachers in Alberta are evaluated in accordance with a view of teaching as "technical expertise." In other words, in a great many schools, teachers are evaluated on the basis of competence in lists of skills supposedly representative of their craft knowledge. (Samples of such lists are located in the Appendix of this study). The Alberta Education study (Ratsoy et al., 1993) further supports the view that evaluation has little to do with improving teaching or increasing student achievement (Redfield, 1988). In their comprehensive analysis of implementation of evaluation policies, McLaughlin and Pfiefer (1988) attributed the possible lack of positive correlations between evaluation and improvement of instruction or teacher professional growth, as reflective of the existence of competing assumptions among participants involved in the evaluation process. When values espoused are incongruent with those revealed in practice (Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin & Bernstein, 1985), in other words, with those lived by teachers, evaluation is meaningless to teachers. And if it is meaningless to teachers, what good is it to students, or to school boards?

Historically, most teacher evaluation policies have shared two fundamental purposes: to improve instruction *and* to promote teacher professional growth. McLaughlin and Pfiefer (1988) have argued strenuously that the dual purposes of accountability and improvement can and should be addressed simultaneously for evaluation to be meaningful to teachers and to serve any useful purpose at all. Others are less confident that these dual functions of evaluation are compatible or even achievable (Stiggins & Bridgeford, 1985; Stiggins & Duke, 1988). Might this incompatibility of espoused values to those lived in practice, and the failure to

positively correlate teacher evaluation with improved student achievement, possibly be related to how teaching has come to be conceived in the first place? Perhaps looking metaphorically at teaching has limited what we really see, or even can see, about what teachers do in classrooms.

What Metaphorical Looking Has Marginalized

Metaphor serves a useful purpose in trying to describe something that seems quite indescribable. We use metaphor to compare the act of teaching to something we think we already understand or to attach it to some picture we have in our minds already. Metaphorical analysis of teaching, then, builds and draws similarities and comparisons. But in drawing closer and in strengthening comparisons, is it also possible that we may have moved away from what did not lend itself to easy comparison? In trying to make teaching "look" like something else, perhaps we have not really seen it for what it is. Could it be that we need to look at metaphor as a conceptual organizer for teaching in a more cautious manner?

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) advocate the use of metaphor as a way to "perceive and experience much of the world" (p. 239). As a means to simplify complexity by transferring meaning through comparative understanding (Ortony, 1975), metaphor may also over-simply and distort (Haynes, 1975). It may do so on two levels. In addition to inaccurate comparisons transferred through the creation of metaphor, the metaphor itself may not truly represent the original thing or experience to which it referred in the first place (Miller, 1976). The rather unfortunate legacy of metaphor, then, is that while some elements of comparison may be highlighted, others may remain hidden or camouflaged (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is precisely what remains hidden which we must seek to uncover in coming to understand what it is in the evaluation experience which seems so difficult to explain. By looking metaphorically at teaching what have we neglected to see? Is it possible that teaching can be seen through other lenses which may

bring us closer to understanding what it is, and also then, understanding what evaluating it means?

Ten years ago a study of teacher evaluation emphasized that viewing teaching through the metaphors of production and performance (congruent with the technical expertise or labor/craft metaphors) did not capture what teaching really was (Brophy, 1984). An alternative metaphor, however, did exist even at that time--that of "parenting" (Langeveld, 1983a, 1983b; van Manen. 1982; Vandenberg. 1979). It described the pedagogic nature of teaching, inimical to an instrumental or technical view. And while it would have seemed more appropriate to describe what teaching was, it failed to take hold in the literature on teaching or in the practice of judging it. Save for this study (Brophy, 1984), which conducted a phenomenological investigation into the evaluation experience of teachers, the phenomenon of the evaluative look and its significance to the evaluation experience has not been explicated, understood, nor addressed in the literature on teacher evaluation. Despite alternative conceptions of teahing and therefore alternative ways to judge teaching practice, it is necessary to revisit and embellish that original study in a way that brings the evaluation experience to life, re-enlivens it in a way that brings voice to the teacher's experience so that we may grasp its full and rich significance before reflection, before interrogation and before interpretation. Let us journey forward now to examine how that might be done.

Chapter Two

Clarification of Methodological Principles
Guiding the Question

"Questioning builds a way."

(Heidegger, 1977)

The Search For Meaning

Drawn to Question the Lifeworld

The literature search revealed that teaching could be conceived in different ways and that, correspondingly, teaching could be evaluated in ways reflecting the assumptions and beliefs congruent with those particular worldviews or metaphorical conceputalisations of teaching. In my search through the literature I found that while I was "learning" about teacher evaluation, I was coming no closer to understanding the teacher's *experience* of being evaluated. Was it possible that I had begun to investigate my question in the wrong place?

My search for meaning could not come solely from what I had read in books. Instead, my journey had to begin with what I already knew about being evaluated from my own life experience and from what others had shared with me. When I gathered fugitive memories I was reminded of the stories my mother-in-law told me about her days in a one-room school house when the superintendent would suddenly arrive at her door. I remembered the far away look in her eyes when she recalled those endless days of waiting for the letter to arrive at the post office--the one that would tell her whether she would be back next fall or whether her services would no longer be needed. I remembered my father's stories about how he, as a student, had hidden a mouse in his teacher's desk the day the "Inspector" came to school. These were the memories that began to weave their way into this question.

My lived understanding of the evaluation experience began, then, not so much in books as it did in my own and other peoples' remembrances of our experiences of being evaluated. I was reluctant, at first, to give those incidents much credit, fearful that they pulled too far from yesteryear to be relevant to what was happening in classrooms now. But I came to understand that perhaps things had not changed so much, that perhaps the pot-bellied stove and the lunches carried to school in syrup pails made no difference at all. Was the look in my mother-in-

law's eyes not similar to the look I saw in the teachers eyes as I spoke to them now? Something in the evaluation experience seemed to transcend time and place, seemed to wash away what time and distance had done to cloud the experience. Could it be that at its core, there was something in the evaluation experience that teachers shared regardless of when or where?

I began to understand that sometimes when experiences are familiar to us we do not question them. In fact, we are prone to ignore them, cast them aside as nothing out of the ordinary. But sometimes we are called back to experience, encouraged to address those little stirrings that lurk in the back of our minds, the ones that keep us awake at night, or that when we least expect, are there again. It is precisely those whisperings of our souls which nudge and allure us to listen mindfully to what it is we have lived through. When something just does not seem right, or quite in place, we cannot turn away from it. Instead, we are encouraged to try to understand.

These experiences may not even be ones we have lived through. Sometimes even in an unfamiliar experience there is a certain rush of something that seems to connect us to it, like what it must be like to win a medal at the Olympics, or what it must be like to arrive at the scene of an accident. We seem to have some sort of understanding as to what that experience might be like already, a sort of companionship to it. I have never climbed a mountain, for example, yet I can imagine what a climber must feel to reach the peak, to look out across the sky and into the clouds. In that "alluring familiarity" (Jardine, 1992), I have some sense of the exhilaration, excitement and accomplishment the climber must feel. This sense of belongingness, of connectedness, is a belief that phenomenologists share about any possible human experience. We believe that there are elements in every human experience that human beings are able to share. That sense of kinship which may make no rational sense at all, is evoked through a sort of "illicit interplay," which

cannot seem to be denied. It remains unvoiced (Jardine, 1992), and yet it beckons us into the experience.

This wonder about what it is creates the impetus to investigate questions of human science, questions of phenomenological origin like this one about the evaluation experience. It is a curiosity of who we *are* as human beings and how we stand in the world. How does one come to research questions of meaning, questions of human science phenomena?

Phenomenology

Phenomenon comes from the Greek *phainomenon* derived from the verb *phainesthai*, to show itself. *Phainesthai*, or middle voice, is constructed from *phaino* meaning to bring to light. *Phaino* belongs to the root *pha*, light. Thus phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself. In more conventional terms this showing may be referred to as whatness, or what the thing itself is, or "that which shows itself, the manifested, the revealed" (Palmer, 1969, p. 127). From *pha* (*phos* in Greek) meaning light or becoming visible, and *logos*, meaning conveyed in speaking or letting show.

> The mind does not project a meaning onto the phenomenon; rather, what appears is an ontological manifesting of the thing itself. (Palmer, 1969, p. 128)

> In returning to the thing itself, an idea borrowed from Husserl, "Phenomenology is a means of being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it" (Palmer, 1969, p. 128). It is this aspect of phenomenological inquiry which makes doing phenomenological research somewhat uncertain. One does not know exactly where the question will lead, but in arriving there, at what the phenomenon is, one can look back and track the journey. This is why phenomenological method and phenomenological

methodology are inextricably intertwined. One leads the other. And therein lies the tension, the mystery and the excitement in doing phenomenological research.

Essence in Lived Experience

Phenomenology is the study of whatness or essence, a human science and a philosophy that intends to put essence back into experience. It seeks to study and understand human existence from the point where experience begins, that is, to reawaken basic experience, to "re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p. vii). Merleau-Ponty regarded experience as an act of intention, an acting on the world. In my unconsciousness there would be no experience, or at least none of which I would be conscious. Therefore intention, derived from Latin *intentio* meaning the mind's capacity to knowingly direct itself towards an original engagement with the world, is a matter of agency (Burch, 1990). For Merleau-Ponty experience was the means by which one became conscious of one's existence, in other words, conscious of something. In a more general way, intentionality indicates the inseparable connectedness of us to our lifeworlds (van Manen, 1990). For an existential phenomenologist intentionality signifies a co-constitution between self and the world (Osborne, 1990). Co-constitutionality is an important concept in phenomenology and therefore in phenomenological research. Because experience and the world exist in unison, it is a basic belief of phenomenology that phenomenological method itself accesses essence--its method is inseparable from the essence of what it discloses.

The guiding aim of phenomenological study is the search for the truth of lived experience, rather than directly for practical competence, and its content is existential/ontological rather than simply empirical (Burch, 1991). In Burch's words,

> All phenomenological theorizing, including that of human science,
>
> maintains a perspective on the lived human experience not just because this

is a domain inevitably ignored by "objective" orientations, nor even because on the face of it to do so seems more respectful of what others actually think and feel. Rather, phenomenology maintains this perspective because it holds that we *are* our lived experience. (1991, p. 58-59)

How do we come to know our world, understand our experience? Knowledge of our world is derived from the world as lived, as Dilthey (Palmer, 1969) suggested, not as psychologically oriented or causally explained, but from experience as it is re-awakened in the re-living of it. Husserl referred to this as returning to the "thing itself" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p. viii) before knowledge of it, or before reflection on it. But how does one do this? How does one return to the world as lived, relive experience before actually being consciously aware of it? It would seem impossible.

Some acknowledge that we can never return to experience exactly as lived because experience, in that sense, has already been lived; it has preceded us (van Manen, 1990). But as Burch (1989) explained, "Phenomenology never purely coincides with lived experience in itself, but by probing its ultimate horizons and seeking to grasp the englobing sense of what appears within" (p. 195) it, lived experience is rendered anew. Returning to lived experience, then, is returning to the world "of which knowledge always *speaks*" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p. ix), or to what van Manen (1990) referred to as where experience points. Embedded within experience is the "breathing of meaning" (van Manen, 1990, p. 36), or the "place where meaning lives" (Evans, 1989, p. 33).

Wondering about that meaning, or what is in experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1989) is what orients phenomenological researchers to their question. A phenomenological inquiry is a questioning of the nature of lived experience, "a certain way of being in the world" (van Manen, 1990, p. 39). For Heidegger (1977) bringing this essential meaning into unconcealment was a question of how

human beings exist, an ontological question. "The lived experience in and through which we ourselves come to be also constitutes our basic ontological understanding of beings encountered within the world" (Burch, 1991, p. 59). Phenomenology, therefore, is the science of understanding not only our own existential being, but being in a wider sense.

This seems like an engulfing task for a single research project. Certainly for my question I had to acknowledge that my experience and my perception of my experience, and other teachers' perceptions of their experiences, might differ (Merleau-Ponty, 1989). We might, in fact, live in very different worlds. How then, was I to come to understand what connected us in the evaluation experience?

Accessing Essence for Shared Understanding

My question was not asking how teachers experienced evaluation differently, or to what varying degrees they did or did not, or why they did or did not, but what it was in the evaluation experience that we could collectively identify as being the experience of evaluation. How would we come to share that understanding?

For Heidegger "what calls for phenomenology is just that which lies hidden in the familiar as its 'meaning and ground' and which therefore 'first and foremost does *not* show itself' to everyday understanding" (Burch, 1989, p. 193-194). It is that beckoning back to unravel and understand which orients me to this phenomenon. It is a compelling calling inherent in Heidegger's (1977) notion of *Dasein* which refers to existence or being that already has some understanding of Being in general, a kind of "being that is open to Being" (p. 32), the human capacity to wonder about its own existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1989).

But without some kind of prior connection to lived experience, we would hear no hearkening back to it to want to investigate it. The notion of belongingness, whose root *horig* pertains to hearing, comes from Heidegger

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(1977). It is a particularly fitting word to describe the primordial nature of our listening as "an originary belonging, a bodily felt inherence and attunement . . . a response-ability implicit in a pre-ontological relationship to the Being of beings" (Levin, 1989, p. 67). Levin viewed *Dasein*, the coming to Being, as a visionary project or the opening of vision (Levin, 1988), a "primordially operative pre-ontologic understanding" (p. 41), that is, for seeing a common humanity. It is this hearing of one another's fundamental experiences which connects one to Other, and all of us to Being as a whole. My task, as a phenomenologist, was to come to the fundamentals of the evaluation experience, disclose these essentials in a way that would connect those of us who had had the experience to those who had not. Fundamentally, my question was to uncover what was inside the evaluation experience that allowed us to connect to a wider humanity.

In looking to lived experience as something immutable and transhistorical, we must look to what it is in experience that is capable of transcending time and place. What is it about experience that seems to be unchanging? These essentials, or universals, are what Husserl referred to as "essences" of "whatness" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), the essential structures of lived experience (van Manen, 1990). Derived from the Greek *ousia*, meaning the inner essential nature of a thing (van Manen, 1990), "The essence of a phenomenon is a universal which can be described through a study of the structure that governs the instances or particular manifestations of the essence of that phenomenon" (van Manen, 1990, p. 10). This concept has evolved from Husserl who traced all phenomena back to human consciousness, to transcendental subjectivity. "Heidegger held that the facticity of being is a still more fundamental matter than human consciousness and human knowledge," while Husserl "tended to regard even the facticity of being as a datum of consciousness" (Palmer, 1969, p. 125). For Heidegger, the whatness, or

essence in human phenomena exists before we are actually conscious of it. It is that pre-conscious awareness I was trying to reach.

According to van Manen (1990) essence lives in that primordial, pre-reflective awareness of experience. In pre-theoretic disclosure (van Manen, 1990) experience has its own implicate potential, an integrity that "enable[s] it to unfold according to its own immanent rhythm, direction, sense and order" (Levin, 1992, p. 3). It is precisely there where phenomenological investigation begins. To understand what lay at that core of the evaluation experience, I would have to access these pre-theoretic meaning structures (van Manen, 1990) within the evaluation experience.

That whatness, or essence, seems at first, to be an elusive thing, something that while we are experiencing the experience, we do not think about or reflect on. As Dilthey said,

> The way in which "lived experience" presents itself to me [literally, "is there-for-me"] is completely different from the way in which images stand before me. The consciousness of the experience and its constitution are the same: there is no separation between what is there-for-me and what *in* experience is there-for-me. . . . its very existence for me is undifferentiated from the *whatness* which is present for me in it. (Palmer, 1969, p. 108-109)

Husserl thought we could separate ourselves from our thinking about experience. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, believed that we could never completely separate ourselves from our thinking about or reflection on our own experience. They believed that the structures of human phenomena, the essences, could be described as universals of the experience, and that these structures are what transcend historical and temporal bounds. "Phenomenology always addresses any phenomenon as a *possible human experience*. It is in this

sense that phenomenological descriptions have a universal (intersubjective) character" (van Manen, 1990, p. 58).

To uncover what lay at the core of the evaluation experience, I had to go back to experience, back to the thing itself, back to where an embodied knowing and being lay (Husserl in van Manen, 1990). If I could recapture that, I could gain access to essence (Merleau-Ponty, 1989), or as close to essence as I could come. Realistically, I could not deceive myself into thinking that I could ever disclose all of what I had experienced, or for that matter even return directly to experience as I had lived it, or as other teachers had lived it. I realized that reflection on experience is already removed from the actual experience, as is talking about it or writing about it. However, if I could access pre-reflective experience, that is where experience would hold its most rich and hidden meanings, I could access essence. In van Manen's (1990) words, "the essence or nature of an experience has been adequately described in language if the description reawakens or shows us the lived quality and significance of the experience in a fuller or deeper manner" (p. 10). This was my task then--to write the evaluation experience in a way that would bring it back to life.

Bracketing

I would begin by writing my own story, my own personal experience of being evaluated. It would be a means to disclose what I already knew in experience, but perhaps did not yet understand. That reliving and retelling would allow me to begin the process of placing my own experience within the context of my question. It would encourage me to regard and consider *my* experience as no more important, but also no less important, than the experiences of evaluation that other teachers would share with me.

This kind of bracketing of my own experience, a term originated by Husserl (van Manen, 1990), is an important concept to phenomenological study and crucial

in coming to understand what lies at the core of the evaluation experience. Husserl used this term "bracketing" to name the process of holding one's assumptions and preconceptions in abeyance (van Manen, 1990) so that the meaning structures within an experience could unfold naturally. The notion of bracketing is closely related to Heidegger's notion of "hearkening" in that it allows, encourages, and makes way for a special kind of listening to other people's experiences. "Hearkening requires the disciplined practice of . . . letting-go and letting-be, as a mode or style of listening . . . hearkening makes, or lets . . . the difference between beings and Being - be manifest" (Levin, 1989, p. 48). It is a way to suspend oneself so that others' experiences may show themselves through the researcher's own. As Burch (1991) stated,

> my rendering of another's experience, however trusting and faithful I
> presume to be to what she says and does, is always inevitably *my*
> rendering, that is, a story constructed within the stream of my experience
> and personal history and hence meaningful to me in a way always different
> from the meaning of the experience to the participant. . . . it is not that my
> understanding is inevitably blinkered by my limited perspective, but that my
> perspective with all of its prejudices, is the very condition of my
> understanding, its locus and medium. (p. 42)

I would have to understand and acknowledge that even as I laid my own story aside, others' lived experiences of evaluation would inevitably be filtered through my own. As much as I would try to separate myself from others' experiences, I would undeniably become the sieve (Merleau-Ponty, 1989) through which I would hear and re-tell what it was like for others to go through a formal performance evaluation. To begin the never-ending process of suspending my experiences of being evaluated, I would, as Jardine (1992) suggested, begin the "systematic acts of severance aimed at retrieving the given ('the isolated incident')

out of the amorphous web of interweaving meanings in which it was originally embedded" (p. 52). In this way I would adopt, and perhaps more correctly, develop, a hermeneutic ear that would listen through (Jardine, 1992) my own experiences to those of others. By decentering myself I would lay myself open to the essences in the evaluation experience.

Admittedly, bracketing is a difficult thing to do. It is, in fact, impossible to totally reduce, remove, or suspend one's perceptions from the interpretive process (Merleau-Ponty, 1989). We are our experience. We are the understandings we embody. In a continual and self-constituting and dialectical process between our experience and us, we already bring undisclosed meaning to whatever we experience (Burch, 1989, 1990). How can that be denied?

Jardine (1992) has criticized this kind of setting self aside. To him bracketing, as a methodical act of severance of the knowing subject from the object, is a means of ensuring "phenomenological objectivity." In his view "any interconnection or evocation that must somehow be put out of play before the essence of the incident can be retrieved, as a process of "purification," is an unfortunate Cartesian legacy which plagues phenomenologists. The result is that the "the knowing subject [now severed from its living context] no longer understands the object [now severed from its living context]" (Jardine, 1992, p. 53). Jardine has warned that

> These fundamental acts of severance and the convoluted sequence of
>
> correlative 'purification transformations' in both the object of inquiry and
>
> the inquirer lead to a peculiar kind of rootlessness. Once we become
>
> severed from the abiding senses of kinship and familiarity and embodied
>
> allure this instance evokes (once it becomes an 'object' and we become a
>
> 'knowing subject'), we are left with clear, univocal, given surfaces *both*
>
> regarding the instance and regarding ourselves. (1992, p. 53)

Perhaps this is the tension and ambivalence I felt in the beginning and continue to feel in never being able to completely reduce my own experience. Van Manen (1990) provides some calm, though, when he reminds that we should at least make our presuppositions and pre-understandings explicit and thereby visible to interrogation and examination within the context of the phenomenon (p. 18).

It is also important to note that our use of language, is itself, a form of reduction. We talk of our lived worlds through language and it is through language that we share understanding. "One does not invent and manipulate language to suit himself [sic]; he [sic] participates in language and allows a situation to come to stand in language" (Palmer, 1969, p. 231). Gadamer referred to the coming-into-language of the thing itself as "endeavoring to approach the mystery of language from the conversation that we ourselves are" (1989, p. 378). He believed that language was a process of understanding. Similarly, Heidegger (1977) spoke of "all ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead[ing] through language" (p. 287). Words, then, must be carefully chosen so as not to distort or diminish experience (or the interpretation of experience). That is why phenomenology and semiotics are so closely intertwined and meaning and language support an : embellish one other.

Stories from the Lifeworld

I would have to use language in such a way as to express the evaluation experience in a way that would re-awaken it. I would have to encourage my participants to express their experiences of evaluation in the way they actually lived them. "Lead me through what it was like to have a principal or superintendent come into your classroom to watch you teach," I would say. "Put me in your shoes and lead me through your experience." But could I expect teachers to re-tell their experiences in a pre-reflective, atheoretic, non-psychologizing manner? Could I expect that they would tell the experience as they lived it? Many of the teachers I

spoke to could not. Of the twelve I interviewed, five teachers provided the richest articulations which formed the beginnings of this study. Open-ended interviews were conducted with twelve teachers, equal numbers of male and female. Participants were either currently teaching or had taught at a variety of levels from grades one to twelve. Each interview plotted its own course, set its own landmarks that led to my asking, "Tell me more." These unfettered stories were not rushed or hurried or pressured by time, but borne from teachers' lived remembrances of what was it like to be visited by a principal or superintendent. Their words became the language of experience relived in a bodily felt sense through the existentials of lived body, lived space, lived time, and lived relation to other (van Manen, 1990).

Transcripts of interviews were reviewed and authenticated by the twelve participants. The description of their collective experience, presented in this dissertation in the next chapter as *The Experience*, has been validated by the participants as being true and representative of their own personal experience of being evaluated. Our purpose was to reach a common description of the experience, one that we collectively regarded and understood as being like our own. It was important that we share a common base. Without that, interpretation of the experience would be meaningless.

Transcending Individual Horizons

Sharing understanding is the ultimate aim of phenomenological research. While each of us lives within our own individual horizons of experience (Gadamer, 1989), "Understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 306). "Thus, phenomenology consists in mediating in a personal way the antinomy of particularity (being interested in concreteness, difference and what is unique) and universality (being interested in the essential, in difference that makes a difference)" (van Manen, 1990, p. 23). And while "all understanding is ultimately self-understanding" (van Manen, 1984,

p. 50), phenomenological research "is not merely egocentric, since it concerns first and foremost the meanings in and through which one is already open to and implicated in a *shared* world of discourse and action" (Burch, 1989, p. 209). In this way understanding takes us beyond ourselves and thus achieves a transcendent quality.

This somewhat ethereal, spiritualistic element of phenomenology is closely connected to the notion of human potential. As Heidegger (1977) said, "Higher than actuality stands *possibility*" (p. 87). To Husserl, transcendence was the manner in which the ego came to understand itself, "the projection and appropriation of transcendent meanings as essential to the way a self constitutes itself" (Burch, 1991, p. 49), in other words, the way beings become more of what they can be. For Dilthey, though, understanding human existence was historically situated. In Dilthey's view it was not possible "'to go back behind the relativity of historical consciousness'. . . . History is ultimately a series of world views, and we have no firm and fixed standards of judgment for seeing the superiority of one world view over another" (Palmer, 1969, p. 116).

> Meaning always stands in a horizonal context that stretches into the past and into the future. Gradually this temporality becomes an intrinsic part of the concept of "historicality" so that the term comes to refer not only to man's [sic] dependence on history for his self-understanding and self-interpretation, and to his [sic] creative finitude in determining his own essence historically, but also to the inescapability of history and the intrinsic temporality of all understanding. (Palmer, 1969, p. 117)

Heidegger's notion of coming to being was less bound to Dilthey's historical rootedness of understanding. He viewed understanding as a mysterious process of disclosure whereby being came into existence. Heidegger viewed self-understanding as intrinsically temporal, that is, even in the present one is "thrown"

into, oriented to the future in reaching into the not-yet seized possibilities (Palmer, 1969). Levin (1988) holds closer to Heidegger's notion of transcendence in that he believes that Being is primordial and transhistorical, not bound by historical being. He views the body as being the point of transhistorical connectedness, the vehicle through which temporal being is transcended.

> What makes the body of felt experience so very significant is the fact that it is transhistorically informed, always already informed, by a pre-ontological understanding of Being. . . . Being thus informed, the body can speak, if we are prepared to listen, with an 'authority' which must be respected.
> (Levin, 1988, p. 45)

In this way transcendence has inherent in it the notion of becoming, essential to ontology, the phenomenology of being. *Dasein*, as being-in-the-world is the open space where beings reveal themselves. In this way there is an element of future in *Dasein*, but there also are elements of past and present. This idea of transcendence into possibles is congruent with Gadamer's notion of moving beyond one's own horizon into fusion with a more universal horizon of understanding. Each of us lives within our own horizon of experience, but "A horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 245).

I view phenomenological understanding as a kind of transcendence, congruent to Levin's (1988) notion that "our bodies transcend history" (p. 44-45), and that a pre-ontological understanding of Being already exists in the body (the gift of being human). I have used the body as a means to understand. I have imported childhood experience told through anecdote as a means to understand this particular human experience. For me, the connection of bodily understanding and transcendence into possibility are what intertwines (Merleau-Ponty, 1989) humans to each other and to Being of humanity as a whole. Necessarily, then, this study

attempts, even in a small way, to move beyond individual understanding, it will inevitably be incomplete--another tension in conducting phenomenological research. But as Greene (1978) has suggested, it is precisely in incompleteness that we experience a sense of growth and understand the possibility of ourselves. We look to the process of hermeneutics, interpretation, "to clarify this miracle of understanding, which [may not only be] a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in a common meaning" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 292).

Hermeneutics as a Process of Interpretation

How does one interpret the text of lived experience? Hermeneutics is the study of the methodological principles of interpretation and explanation (Palmer, 1969), in other words, the theory and practice of understanding (van Manen, 1990). It is a two-fold process derived from the verb "to interpret," from the Greek *hermeneuein*, and the noun "interpretation," from the Greek *hermeneia*. Most recently hermeneutics has been profoundly influenced by German phenomenology and existential philosophy, but the word "hermeneutics" stems from the Greek wing-footed messenger-god Hermes, responsible for bringing into intelligibility that which was believed to be beyond human understanding. "Traced back to their earliest known root words in Greek, the origins of the modern words 'hermeneutics' and 'hermeneutical' suggest the process of 'bringing to understanding,' especially as this process involves language" (Palmer, 1969, p. 13).

There are three basic meanings associated with the word interpretation: to say, to explain, and to translate. Etymologically the word hermeneutics is derived from *herme*, close to the Latin "to say," and "word." In thinking that language, or words, can accurately interpret experience, Palmer (1969) reminds us that "Written language lacks the primordial 'expressiveness' of the spoken word. Admittedly, the writing down of language fixes and preserves it, gives it durability, and is the

foundation of history (and literature), but at the same time it weakens it" (p. 15). Often phenomenological writing has greater meaning when it is read aloud.

The second meaning of hermeneutics, to explain, emphasizes the discursive aspect of understanding. Explanatory interpretation is horizonal or contextual. A pre-understanding is assumed, so that in understanding there is a meeting of horizons, a fusion of horizons as Gadamer (1975) called it. "Only when [the interpreter] can step into the magic circle of its horizon can [he] she understand its meaning. This is that mysterious 'hermeneutic circle' without which the meaning of the text cannot emerge" (Palmer, 1969, p. 25). (Schleiermacher, however, is actually credited with the expression "the hermeneutic circle"). Interpretation becomes, then, a dialectical process where partial understanding precedes and is necessary for full understanding.

The third meaning of interpretation, translation, reminds us how language shapes our world. "Language is clearly a repository of cultural experience; we exist in and through this medium; we see through its eyes" (Palmer, 1969, p. 27). Strong writing, writing which is sensitive to experience and which embodies the expressiveness of the oral word and the richness of the experience it is trying to describe, is the vehicle of interpretation.

As this dissertation explores bodily felt remembrance as a particular way to understand, a brief historical review of hermeneutics is useful to provide a theoretical backdrop to my particular method of hermeneutic interpretation of the evaluation experience. At this point it is important to note that the study of hermeneutics is derived mainly from the work of German and Dutch scholars, and whether convention of the time, or deliberate choice, inclusive language was not and has not been the norm. While I pay tribute to these scholars' ideas, and thus explain hermeneutics in their terms, on each and every occasion of the use of terms

or phrases exhibiting male gender, I assume that because hermeneutics is a study of human endeavor, its reference includes female gender as well.

Hermeneutics in Perspective

Schleiermacher, regarded as the father of modern hermeneutics, began his studies of hermeneutics in the early 1800s. His fundamental idea of understanding was one of relation. We understand something by relating it to something we already know--a circle which defines the parts, the parts which derive their meaning from the whole--the hermeneutic circle. To operate, this circle involved an element of intuition, or pre-knowledge, not only of the subject at hand, but also of the language used to discuss the subject. His emphasis on the psychological and intuitive could not overwhelm the importance of linguistic style. "The fulfilled understanding of style is the whole goal of hermeneutics," Schleiermacher wrote (Palmer, 1969, p. 90).

Dilthey (1833-1911) followed Scheiermacher and from *Naturwissenschaften*, or natural sciences, distinguished *Geisteswissenschaften* to include the social sciences and humanities as expressions of our inner life, expressions, and actions (van Manen, 1990). Dilthey based his interpretations in the concrete, historical lived experience as the starting and end point of interpretation. This was Dilthey's effort to lay the epistemological foundation for the human sciences as opposed to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* which sought to lay out the epistemological foundations for the natural sciences. Dilthey believed that our inner life was not based on the norms of causality or mechanistic, quantifiable thinking, but on the cognitive, affective and willful disposition of the individual. He felt that meaning was experience one knew from within, therefore relative and historical. Dilthey believed that through some mysterio is process of mental transfer, one person could come to understand the inner experience of another. This trans-position was not achieved through introspection, but through

interpretation, "through deciphering the imprint of [self] on phenomena" (Palmer, p. 104). Dilthey understood that the difference between the natural and human sciences lay in the context within which the perceived object was understood. He thought that both natural and human sciences used facts, but in different contexts or relationships. Sciences were explained, while understanding united the inner and outer person.

Dilthey's hermeneutical formula, or science of hermeneutics, involved three elements: experience (in that lived experience is the starting point for understanding in which he rejects the thinking/acting dualism in experience), expression (which refers to an expression of life such as an idea, language, a law, anything that indicates an outward expression of the inner person), and understanding (a communion of minds). An important element in Dilthey's conception of hermeneutics was historicality which did not refer to the fact that people are born, live, then die, or that history sits outside of us, objectively there for us to examine, but that we understand ourselves through our development over time, and also that we have no fixed essence, but the power to alter our history. "Man understands himself [herself] in terms of interpreting a heritage and shared world bequeathed him [her] from the past, a heritage constantly present and active in all his [her] actions and decisions" (Palmer, 1969, p. 118). In this manner of historicality there is no presuppositionless understanding, no understanding without constant reference to our experience.

In contrast to Dilthey who saw hermeneutics as an historically-oriented theory for understanding the human sciences, Heidegger saw it as a way to understand being. While Husserl held to the notion that being was a function of consciousness, and that all phenomena stemmed from transcendental subjectivity (that is, our consciousness of the phenomena), Heidegger held that being was more fundamental than consciousness or knowledge. Heidegger saw phenomenology

itself, fundamentally hermeneutic, as a project to come to an understanding of being, *Dasein.* He believed that phenomenology could be a means of disclosing being in its facticity and historicality. Essentially Heidegger held that phenomenology was hermeneutical, that by doing phenomenology, one came to an understanding of Being.

As elusive as metaphysical understanding is, Heidegger relied on phenomenology to be the hermeneutic of existence, a way to render visible what was invisible in being-in-the-world. So for Heidegger, phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology, became a study of and in ontology. It is important to note that for Heidegger understanding lay not only in grasping one's present situation, but in disclosing the potentialities for one's being--a projective notion to which Heidegger referred to as "existentiality" (always at a point beyond ourselves but not separate from ourselves). Basic to Heidegger's philosophy was that world and self are inseparable parts of *Dasein.*

The method of coming to understand ourselves and the project of how to allow our individual horizons to be open to the text we are interpreting, became the life work of Gadamer, Heidegger's successor. The irony of his *Truth and Method* (originally published in 1960) was that for Gadamer, method was not the way to truth. Understanding was not a subjective process of man over object, but the way of being of man/woman himself/herself. Both Heidegger and Gadamer rejected technological thinking "taking the human subjective consciousness, and the certainties of reason based on it, as the ultimate point of reference for human knowledge" (p. 164). For Gadamer, truth was reached through a dialectical process, not a methodical one, since method only rendered the kind of truth implicit in its method. In contrast to the subject manipulating the object, in Gadamer's dialectic the "questioner suddenly finds himself [herself] in the being who is interrogated by the 'subject matter'" (p. 165) in a reciprocal process which

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Gadamer referred to as the fusion of horizons. For Heidegger, interpretation was aimed at understanding one's own possibilities for being in the world. For Gadamer, interpretation was approached from within one's own horizon, in other words, through the self. One interprets and fuses one's horizon with that of the text by entering into a dialogic conversation with it. Because language is what we use to mediate our experience, it becomes the space where being is disclosed. We belong to language through a hearkening or listening to the lifeworld. Rather than a controller, one becomes an experiencer, open to the dialectic encounter with experience through which the phenomena will emerge. "One does not invent and manipulate language to suit himself; he [she] participates in language and allows the situation to come to stand in language" (Palmer, 1969, p. 231). In Gadamer's words (1989),

> Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common language. Something is placed in the center . . . which the partners in dialogue both share, and . . . come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community . . . transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (p. 378-379)

Communion in Conversation

In keeping with Gadamer's notion, I have presented my interpretation of the evaluation experience in a conversational encounter between the teacher and principal. I did this for two important reasons. First, teachers, although usually "debriefed" during the post-conference, often have much to say about their evaluation experience that they do not say, or for whatever reasons, choose not to say. Through the medium of conversation, opportunities are created for teachers' voices. Second, and conceptually vital to the presentation of this interpretation, is that conversation itself is a medium for communion, that is, for shared

understanding (Gadamer, 1989). While the principal is noticeably passive in this dialogue, his/her silence should not be misconstrued to mean that principals should be silent, or that the relationship between evaluator and evaluatee should be a non-relationship. On the contrary. I have used a conversation between the teacher and the principal as the vehicle for communion, first, because the principal is the person with whom most teachers conference formally about their teaching performance, and second, because I believe re-establishing the relationship between administrator and teacher is a worthy endeavor. This does not assume from the outset that administrator/teacher relations are necessarily negatively affected by the evaluation experience, but it does reinforce the possibility that evaluation may affect administrator/teacher relationships. As human beings, we come to understand through reflection, through "the conversation that we ourselves are" (Gadamer, 1989). Based on this presupposition, conversation seemed the most logical manner in which to present interpretation of the evaluation experience.

Understanding Through Anecdotal Remembrance

Anecdotes are interwoven throughout the conversation, and indeed throughout this dissertation. They are derived from my childhood and from my experiences as a classroom teacher. They serve to ground and explicate my understanding of what the evaluation experience has come to mean. For me meaning begins in experience, so to give full import to meaning I had to return to the beginnings of meaning-making. Childhood was that place. Insights derived from those times and from times in my adult teaching career are presented and made more clear here through anecdote--stories which are recreations of my lived experience that open themselves to possibilities of understanding the unfamiliar. They become vehicles, a way to understand.

In the beginning I had hoped to frame these anecdotes as metaphors (Smith, 1988), ready-made conceptual scaffolds from which to hang emergent meanings. I

had hoped that anecdote, as metaphor, would serve a useful purpose since interrogating silence is a primary function of interpretation. As interrogation unfolded, however, and my understanding of the hermeneutic process deepened, I came to regard my anecdotes less as metaphors and more as images that might elicit an even broader understanding than metaphor could allow. While metaphorical comparison seemed to constrict, image seemed to expand (Bachelard, 1964).

I have used anecdotes in two ways. First, they are told as particular incidents from my childhood and from my teaching career, but are written to address the universals of the evaluation experience. Their purpose is to evoke in you a personal sense of kinship to the experience in a bodily lived and felt way. They are written to allow you to rediscover and import your own memories into the evaluation experience in order to encourage a richer, more personal understanding to this phenomenon. Methodologically, the use of anecdote, from the Greek meaning "things unpublished," "in human science discourse is analogous to the use of metaphor. . . . While metaphor may tend to dwell at the level of abstraction, anecdote turns the attention more naturally to the level of the concrete" (van Manen, 1989, p. 243). To understand the unfamiliar we compare to something we already concretely know and understand. In this way anecdote becomes a way to lay bare what is concealed and difficult to describe in a practical way. They may be "encountered as demonstrations of wisdom, sensitive insight, and proverbial truth" (van Manen, 1989, p. 246). More importantly, my use of anecdote may encourage you to remember your own stories that also befit the evaluation experience.

My second purpose for using childhood anecdote in this study is "to create a new perspective" (Smith, 1988, p. 154) on the teachers' experience of being evaluated. As Virginia Woolf explained of metaphor, which I intend of anecdote,

the bold and running use of [anecdote] . . . will amplify and give us not the thing itself, but the reverberation and reflection which, taken into . . . mind,

the thing has made; close enough to the original to illustrate it, remote enough to heighten, enlarge, and make splendid the other to which it speaks. (van Manen, 1984, p. 48-49)

In other words, my purpose is to unlock meaning that lies silent in experience.

But one might wonder whether a single person's experience can serve as a way to open understanding for others. Admittedly there is a tension in anecdotal narrative telling the particular while striving to address the universal. Is this not, in fact, the "test" of phenomenological research? Can it be validated by lived experience? In van Manen's words (1992), "Narrative reason speaks to the emotions as well as to the conceptual and the moral aspects of a broader human rationality." I have chosen to use anecdotal narrative, story, as my most significant connections to coming to know my world, as the interloper between experience and understanding. Sense-making, not as an impartial or strictly intellectual activity, but "as a source, [to which] we have to return again and again; the experience of our sensory reality" (Danner, 1986, p. 35) lies, for me, in childhood remembrance. As connections from my past, and thrusts into my future, these stories are offered, in Bruzina and Wilshire's (1982) words, to achieve "The sensuousness of writing [that] becomes the opening of thoughtful reading" (p. 73).

While the use of anecdotal narrative may give you opportunities to participate in meaning-making, the telling of them has been somewhat more cathartic for me. It is a word I use cautiously as many readers may immediately dismiss this technique as a sign of "childhood regression or psychosis" (Levin, 1992). I have deliberately chosen to use this technique based on a firm belief that we come to know and understand life in ways that are sometimes mysterious and difficult to unravel. In fact, we might call this kind of understanding spiritual. It is a method of hermeneutic interpretation that I felt compelled to include in this study. As adults we share a bodily felt connection to the world, a "blood remembering"

(Rilke, 1977), of what it means to be a human being that may be derived from childhood. This sense of moral belonging may provide the impulse for pedagogic action, for ethical action which seems to lie at the base of and is in question in the evaluation of teachers. Because within us lies an embodied lived sense, not as something invented, but as a "bodily felt sense of ecstatic openness to the world" (Levin, 1992, p. 7), as adults we are the child *of* the hermeneutic circle ⌐evin, 1992). We come to understanding naturally and logically through an awareness and understanding of ourselves as human beings in our own implicate potentials. Storying that understanding through life experience (Clandinin, 1991), elicits a kind of narrative knowing (Polkinghorne, 1988) inherent in lived experience. Childhood remembrance seemed the most natural place to begin hermeneutic interpretation of the evaluation experience.

Listening to our lifeworlds, particularly to childhood experience, in an attentive and thoughtful vigilance, can be regarded as a maieutic process in which the child *of* the hermeneutic circle generatively transforms existential experience into universal understanding. I believe that there is an ethic in childhood that has a way of connecting us to the world and to a larger humanity. In this way,

> Interpretive inquiry does not wish literally and univocally to say what [the evaluation experience] *is*. Rather, it wishes to playfully explore what understandings and meanings . . . [are] *possible*. . . . It . . . evokes and opens up an already familiar way of belonging in the world, a possible way of being . . . reopening it to new generative instances. (Jardine, 1992, p. 56)

Unlike description of lived experience where we bracket our personal histories to arrive at as pure a description as possible, in interpretation of the evaluation experience, it is my intent not to deny the gifts of introspection and intuition, but instead to use them to their full import. As human beings we are both

the victims of behavioristic and ideological schemes and cultural stereotypes, which we may or may not choose to be aware of and reflect on, and the beneficiaries of them. In anything we interpret and understand we embody this legacy. We simply cannot avoid what we have lived through. Why not take advantage of that legacy in interpretive endeavors? Why not employ style as an exploration of *Geist* (Schleiermacher in van Manen, 1990) to embody trans-historical meaning?

Geist, translated from German, means "mind" or "spirit." It "refers to an aspect of our humanness that includes a quality of inwardness, of spiritual refinement" (van Manen, 1990, p. 13). Root of *Geisteswissenschaften*, or human science, Bollnow used the word *Geistig* to mean "a matter of the depth of the soul, spirit, embodied knowing and being" (van Manen, 1990, p. 14). This term embodies a kind of understanding beyond intellectual understanding. Schleiermacher referred to the representation of this rich and knowing understanding as style. It is a way of showing how we see and how we have come to see the world, and how we are oriented to it, particularly through literary representation of it (van Manen, 1989). How we present phenomenological description and interpretation reveals the ways knowing, as style, is embodied within us. It is my intent, through the use of language, to draw you into the evaluation experience witn me. While I want us to take this journey into understanding together, my efforts to interpret and understand the evaluation experience have largely become a process of coming to understand myself. This, too, may be peculiar to phenomenological research. If investigating this question is such an individualistic activity, why should you accept that my description and interpretation of the evaluation experience are accurate or representative or true at all?

Accepting and Valuing This Research

There is one important "test" to phenomenological research. The degree to which you are drawn into this study and can experience what teachers experience as they go through a formal performance evaluation will determine the success of the description of the evaluation experience, in other words, the degree to which the evaluation experience "resonates" (van Manen, 1990) with you personally. Van Manen (1990) refers to the validity issue in this way: *"a good phenomenological description is collected by lived experience and recollects lived experience--is validated by lived experience and it validates lived experience"* (p. 27). The degree to which description of lived experience resonates with our sense of it, is the degree to which the description is successful in attaining Buytendijk's "phenomenological nod" (p. 27). In other words, in achieving the truth of lived experience, Burch's (1989) statement signifies the source and endpoint of validation and verification of phenomenological research: "Against dogmatic rationalism, phenomenology necessarily affirms an existential m···rix (i.e., lived experience) in terms of which alone its truth is first accessible and ag···nst the totality of which its truth must be tested" (p. 197).

Truth, to Heidegger (1977), was "neither the 'correctness' or 'correspondence' of assertions with regard to states of affairs nor the 'agreement' of subject and object within those assertions; it was rather the *self-showing* that allowed beings to *be* objects of assertions in the first place" (p.18). Meeting *aletheic* truth, as disclosedness or unconcealment, is strikingly different from truth as correctness.

Participant teachers in this research have validated the evaluation experience as being true of their experience. Concerns about false consciousness, or being unaware of the truth of one's own experiences, have been raised by authors such as Lather (1986). In Burch's view (1989), in examining lived experience false

consciousness and ideology become manifest. They are notions relative, not to truth, but to self-criticism in an on-going manner but with the understanding that one must move beyond their limitations to seek the truth of lived experience. "If to understand genuinely is not just to affirm a set of beliefs but to transform ourselves singly to truth, 'to change, to go beyond ourselves,' then understanding should be more or less reflected in all our actions" (Burch, 1989, p. 204-205). Understanding, as self-understanding (van Manen, 1984) "is not merely egocentric, since it concerns first and foremost the meanings in and through which one is already open to and implicated in a *shared* world of discourse and action" (Burch, 1989, p. 209).

Horizons Beyond Ourselves

It is acting in and through this sense of truth which creates the impetus for administrators to act pedagogically towards teachers. This sense of truth, as a measure of the validity of this research, is what makes phenomenological research so significant to a study of human science in general and to the field of educational administration specifically. It is this sense of truth that is achieved through writing and rewriting until finally the words seemed to say what I intended them to mean. Because we really only understand phenomenology through doing it (Merleau-Ponty, 1989; van Manen, 1990), I have wanted to demonstrate the marriage of theory and practice to show "how understanding emerges in human existence" (Palmer, 1969, p. 137). As Burch (1990) said, "We are our lived experience and lived experience is the realization of transcendent meaning. Hence we always already understand something of the truth of lived experience because our very being lies in this understanding" (p. 135). By using the human gifts of introspection and intuition we gain a "personal knowledge driven by insight and ingenuity" (van Manen, 1992) to use as a means to understand not only the world,

but as Heidegger (Palmer, 1969, p. 29) suggested, "the power to grasp one's own possibilities for being" (Heidegger in Palmer, 1969, p. 29) in the world.

Well, that may be alright for one researcher, but what of the rest of academe and whomever else might read these pages? Does this study in any way have significance in furthering human understanding? What is its transcendent capabilities or qualities? If awakening, acknowledging and responding to experience can be achieved through language so that words can listen, resonate and respond to one another (Levin, 1992) then the words on these pages will have served their purpose. But in addition to language, you also have a part to play. In this study you are not asked to objectively disengage from the teacher's experience of being evaluated. Instead, you are invited to fully participate in feeling, and therefore in understanding what the teacher's experience is. Being outside oneself is the positive possibility of being wholly with something else. This kind of being present is a self-forgetfulness, and to be a spectator consists in giving oneself in self-forgetfulness to what one is watching. In the journey of this dissertation, you are asked to be a self-forgetful participant.

Much of what I want to communicate to you will occur at a point beyond these words you are about to read. Sometimes their meaning takes hold long after an initial read. The words play on you and toy in the recesses of your mind in a way that bothers, like the evaluation experience did me in the very beginning of this study, in fact, before this study began. It is a way of asking you to stand inside the circle. We situate ourselves in the hermeneutic circle and use the language of the lifeworld to bring the silence out of it into unconcealment (Heidegger, 1977). But we do not enter into phenomenological research innocent. Human science research reminds us to recognize and remain open to what we ourselves have marginalized. It helps us to recognize the potentials of human existence of which maybe even we are not yet aware. In maintaining an openness to the dimensionality and richness

that experience is, we engage in questions of this sort to be "fully participant in the generativity of humanity as a whole" (Jardine, 1992, p. 59). It is a human endeavor which, in this case derived from understanding through childhood and adult experience, allows us to move beyond our individual horizons to reach a "correlative univocity" (Jardine, 1992) where we may share a sense of wholeness and completeness. As Levin (1992) reminds,

> the prepersonal dimension of our life as children is a dimension in which there is always already, however unconscious, however attenuated, however rudimentary and inchoate, a certain mimetic identification with other beings, and a certain sense of being interdependent, being a part of a larger whole . . . in the transpersonal sensibility of the body of understanding that would emerge from such a practice of the self. (p. 14)

It is from the self that this question emerged. It was posed in the need to understand. It is a question not unlike the one a child of a friend of mine once asked.

My friend's daughter had recently witnessed the interment of her grandfather who had passed away in his elderly years. Trying to understand why grandfather had been laid to rest in a box in the ground, the child worried, "Mommy, will he not be cold in there?" Taking the child into the quiet of her bedroom, and putting her arm around her as they sat down on the bed, mother explained that grandfather was not really in that box, that only the shell of him remained there, and that the important part, his soul, had gone away. "His soul will not be cold," mother reassured. Seemingly comforted by those words the child returned to her playing while mother set about preparing the family dinner. Soon, though, a tug at mother's apron announced the child once again. "Mommy," the child looked up perplexed, "What kind of clothes do souls wear?"

A question of meaning. A need to understand. An attempt to make concrete that which seems elusive. A question that defies quantification or measurement, one that deals with the mystery of life. In some ways, too, the question of this dissertation is a question of the soul. It began in a deep inner stirring and a need to make sense of what might be considered rather ordinary in a teacher's life. But like the child's question, it too is filled with wonder, captivated by the mystery of itself, somewhat immeasurable in what it might mean. Van Manen's words help to allay the unrest: "The fact that we cannot unambiguously summarize evoked meaning is a function of the nature of meaning that is being expressed in qualitative research" (van Manen, 1992, p. 214). It is the beauty and also the burden of this research to lay itself and hold itself open (Gadamer, 1989) to possibilities of meaning which may yet lie within. In incompleteness we experience a sense of the possible (Greene, 1978). And in this kind of questioning, in being responsive to and responsible to experience (Levin, 1992), we become strong and self-reliant as intelligently reflective human beings. It is also in coming to know the reality of our own lived lives (Lather, 1986) that we are oriented to a praxis way of being, energized not to accept the world as "predefined or objectively there" (Greene, 1978, p. 17), but encouraged to question the meaning of our existence that "transcend[s] theoretical understanding that goes beyond lived experience to situate it, to judge it, to comprehend it, endowing lived experience with new meaning" (Heidegger in Burch, 1989, p. 192).

It is through this process of continual questioning, of remaining open to the possibilities of meaning that lie within experience, that we become part of the larger circle of understanding (Gadamer, 1989), and moved to possibilities beyond ourselves. This dissertation is an attempt to free our horizons for a more authentic speaking, for a truth disclosed and interpreted. Please allow this originary openness and childlike innocence with its "capacity for wonder, enchantment, and

freshness" (Levin, 1992, p. 6) to play on you, so that the space of possibility may be created for you in the process of your becoming as it has in mine.

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Chapter Three

Prologue: The Journey Begins

"Higher than actuality stands possibility."

<div align="right">(Heidegger, 1977)</div>

When I was four years old I thought there was nothing I wanted more than rubber boots with spurs. I had seen a pair in the Sears catalogue and I wished that somehow they could be mine. Everyone I knew wore boots--my Dad, my grandfather, my brother, the hired men. And on very special days they wore spurs too. This was one of those days.

That morning the men had already left. By now they would be checking calves and fences and whatever else they did when they went "riding." That left my sister and me to busy ourselves, which was what we usually did. We had been pals since cradle days, "womb-mates," they called us, whatever that was. All we understood about being twins was that you always had someone to play with, and as long as we were within sight of our mother's kitchen window the world was well.

That particular morning my sister and I were making mudpies beside the creek. It was running full force now with spring run-off, and it drew us like a magnet. Soon huge globs of mud had collected on the bottom of our shoes, so we decided to take them off. That made searching for twigs and shiny rocks to decorate our pies all the easier. But on the other side of the creek we spied pretty yellow flowers.

With bits of scrap lumber we scavenged from behind the barn, we built a make-shift bridge and off we set. The flowers, buffalo beans I think, were about half way up the hill. As I started up towards them I was not quite sure that I had seen it. But when I looked again, sure enough, there it was--a tiny furry wiggle, not quite white, and not quite brown. A bush bunny.

"Look!" I whispered to my sister, *"A bunny!"* Crouching down low, careful not to scare him, we watched as he nibbled the grass, his wet nose wiggly pink. But then he paused and saw us, or smelled us, and off he scampered. With

each little hop he took we took one step closer. The closer we got the faster he hopped. He was getting away!

He crested the top of the hill, leaving us and our mudpies far behind. *"Hurry, hurry,"* I called my sister. We could not let him go. Already I could feel him in my hands, see him snuggled soft and warm in the shoe box in my closet. No one would think to look there. *"Not so fast!"* my sister warned. *"You're too close!"*

On and on the rabbit raced, under the fence and out onto the road. Now what? That fence marked the end of the line for us. It was too far from the kitchen window. *"Cross that fence,"* our mother had warned, and *"There will be trouble, big trouble, and I mean with a capital T!"* (We did not know exactly what "Capital T" was, but it sounded pretty bad).

For a moment we stood there staring after him, and then like lightening, *"C'mon. Let's go!"* and under the fence we scrambled. We made better time out on the road. There were no prickles and only a few sharp rocks. Over one rise and then the next we raced but we were losing ground. Soon the rabbit was out of sight altogether.

"Where did he go?" we gasped. He could not have just disappeared. He was right there. We stood there panting, frantic that we had lost him. But then we saw a culvert running directly beneath where we stood. We faced each other, smiling, knowing where he must have gone.

Slowly my sister crept to one end of the culvert, I to the other. The rabbit trembled there inside, his little nose puffing, his head turning one way to face my sister and then the other to face me. We had him cornered, that was sure, but how were we going to reach him?

We decided my sister would go in first. As she closed in on her end, I comforted him. *"Don't you worry, little rabbit."* I coaxed. *"We'll be nice to you."*

But soon my sister urged, *"You come in too,"* she said *"I won't have to go in so far if you come in too."* She had a point.

Carefully, reluctantly, I lifted my knee into the cold metal culvert. Just then, *"Honk!"* I thought I heard. I listened harder. *"Honk!"* this time more insistent. I backed out of the culvert and peeked up to the road. There stood our mother, muddy shoes in hand. There was no point in trying to explain. She would not even come down to look at the rabbit.

I have a rather sorry memory of that day, not because of the red rubber boots I did not have, and not because of the spanking either, but because we had to let the rabbit go. I may not have understood then exactly why, but "going beyond the fence" and "staying where I could be seen" took on very special meaning, a significance that was to continue into my adult life.

In my career as a teacher there have been days filled with rabbits, though they may not have had fur. And there have been days marked by fences, though they may not have had barbs. And there have been other days when I was watched. Evaluation day was one of those.

Chapter Four

The Experience

"The world is not what I think, but what I live through."

(Merleau-Ponty, 1989)

The Anticipation

It started right after Christmas with a memo in my mailbox. It said, "I'll be in to see you Friday." Oh my God, I thought. Friday! Then I felt a flutter. A knot. Was it really there? Surely not. Not after all these years.

As a student teacher, that memo would have thrown me into a flurry of activity, dusting shelves, sorting papers, cleaning desks, putting up a new bulletin board, anything to spruce up the classroom for the grand inspection. I would have put a red circle around Friday on my calendar, and had a *very* special lesson planned for the big day. Now, ten years later, I sit here at my desk, thinking some of those same thoughts, even if not with quite the same intensity. Despite the many evaluations I have gone through, I am starting to feel uncomfortable.

I feel confident about my abilities, and comfortable with my students, so why the uneasiness? What is gnawing at me? I am surprised at how ruffled I am feeling. I have had lots of visitors in my classroom, and several formal evaluations. In fact, I have been called a "model teacher." Yet, at this moment, I do not feel very sure of myself. It is still four days away and already there is an uneasiness here that I cannot put my finger on. Ironically, I had been the one to say, "Come whenever you like. I won't do anything special." But now I am starting to wonder. This isn't going to be just another ordinary day.

I thought that I might put a little extra effort into Friday, have something just a little special planned to do. In some ways I am looking forward to having my principal come in to visit me. This is one of those rare opportunities to show off-- to shine. I could use what I picked up at the last conference to show that I am current, or tell a joke or two to prove that I am not really that nervous. Or I may just hang around the staff room a little more to show that I am not overly bothered

by Friday. But the truth is, I am bothered, and I am annoyed at myself for being so.

The staff room is a very interesting place come evaluation time. I have seen colleagues come to work a little more dressed up than usual, walking a little more briskly than normal, trying to seem a little brighter, and I would think, "Oh, this must be *their* day." Joyce would talk incessantly about it, and just about drive us crazy. We wanted her turn to be over just as much as she did. Craig would try to slough it off as if it were nothing more important than a visit from the janitor. And Joan, well, she just wished the whole thing was over. You could always tell, though, when it was that time of year, about mid-February. Teachers would look for a jazzy bulletin board display, sort their files, and add a few more marks to their mark books. The air seemed to change a bit, like there were tiny electric currents somewhere close to the surface. Nerves were a little raw, tempers a bit short.

It was the kind of thing you didn't talk about unless somebody else brought it up first, or else, you would have to endure weeks of interminable babble about how nervous someone was, or how they wished so and so would be away ill that day. Some would joke. Some would be very critical, and some just plain mad, "a complete waste of time," they would say, or "I'll have to water down the whole thing so that *He* (meaning the principal) can understand it." More often than not, though, the conversation would center on whose day it was this week, or whose turn it was next. Now I wonder if it shows on me like it does on everyone else.

My principal doesn't seem to like his role in performance evaluation much either. He grumbles and groans and complains about how much time it takes. He says he enjoys "seeing the students," but where does that leave me? A strange bird, "performance evaluation."

The Preparation

I cannot deny that Friday is looking different now. When I brush my teeth it is there. When I drive to work it is there. I get into my car in the morning thinking, "Only three more days to go," like it is some sort of countdown. I seem to gauge my week and my days by Friday now. Come Thursday I make sure I have my clothes laid out. I warn the sitter that I will be at her house about a half hour early. I make sure the car is filled with gas, everything to be ready for Friday. I think about the questions I will ask, and try to imagine all the "what if's" and "what could go wrong's" so that I will not be caught off guard.

I remember my superintendent's first visit. He couldn't find my mark sheet. Now I make sure it sits front and center, and is strategically labeled MARK BOOK. Funny, that happened many years ago, and it is one of the first things I think about now.

Friday!

I awake long before the alarm is supposed to ring and still feel tired. I wonder how I will feel at 3:30 today. I don't eat much breakfast, especially the kind of foods that may cause my stomach to make all those weird and wonderful noises when it is bound to be very, very quiet in the room.

I stand guard for him in the hallway before class, not sure why. When he finally does show up (about twenty minutes late), I cannot help but catch my breath at the sight of him in my doorway. He seems bigger somehow, taller than his six foot two. Instantly I feel guilty, wondering if he knew that I had been watching for him. I notice his tie. Bright red. He never wears a tie. He is the kind of man who says he only wears them to weddings and funerals. That throws me a little.

But my principal is generally OK. We have known one another for several years. We wave good morning to each other from down the hallway. We have shared some happy times and some sad times. He jokes and teases me about my

flopped desserts that I have taken to staff functions, but he eats them anyway. I have argued with this man and he will listen, so why the flutters, why the sudden urge to flee?

He says his hellos to the class, tells me to go ahead with whatever I am doing, just to pretend he isn't there. Oh, sure, I think, bloody likely!

He walks to the back table, puts down his briefcase, and tries to get comfortable in a chair built for someone three foot six. I can't help but smile to myself. The tables in my room are also made for little people, so his feet stick way out. That is when I notice his shoes, brand new, hardly a scuff on the sole. His feet seem bigger than before, and he is having trouble finding a place to put them. I should feel sorry for him, but I must admit, I am enjoying his discomfort.

I look at him now. He is no longer just the man from down the hall, but different, somehow--distant, cool perhaps. He doesn't smile. He just sits there watching me. Out come the pen and paper, and it starts.

Feeling the Look

The "good morning look" is not the one we share now. I start to feel really uncomfortable, like one of those floating ducks at a shooting gallery you see in the midway--back and forth, back and forth. I feel like the target. His eyes are right on me. They follow me around the room wherever I move. His looking isn't a comfortable, friendly kind of looking. It is not a mother's watching either, that says, "I'm sorry, I know how you must feel." This look is not nurturing or protecting me. It is not a pedagogic look that is open to my possibilities. His look puts me at a distance. I wish I could step aside and use a hand puppet, the kind of thing counselors do when they talk to kids. I feel cloistered, as if the room has suddenly become smaller and narrower. I feel as if his eyes are sitting right here on my shoulder scrutinizing everything I do, every move I make.

I begin to feel like I am not quite all there, like I am sort of floating. It is really strange. It is me alright, but it doesn't feel like me. Part of me is gone. Part of me has run for cover. It is an awful feeling. All the little things I doubt about myself start to come to the fore. All my vulnerabilities are set out here for him to look at. And for me too. I really do not like this. I have to push those thoughts away, to keep them down, so that I can concentrate on what I am supposed to do. But I have two jobs now. Not just the one that he has come to observe, but also the one that I am fighting not to do. No wonder I feel so tired. My students ask me why my face is so red!

I had invited him to come into my room, but I do not like his looking at me. Sometimes when I think I'm looking really good, or I've just had my hair done, I don't mind people looking at me. In fact, those are times one likes to be looked at. This wasn't the kind of looking that my son does when he inspects his hairdo in the mirror on picture day. This looking seems thrust on me, and I feel trapped by it. I feel unraveled, out of tune, not quite in balance, like I want to stand closer to my desk. I notice other things about me too. My arm seems heavier when I lift it to the board. I watch it go there, something I do not normally do. It seems forever to get the word written out on the blackboard. I feel clumsy, and I misspell the word. I have to grip the chalk more tightly. When I erase the error, I leave an awful greasy streak on the board. I wish that it would hurry and disappear. The cord on the projector fights me. My shoes make too much noise. My voice sounds like it belongs to someone else. I can actually hear myself talking, as if the words are coming out of my mouth one by one. I feel my face get hot. Awkward, disoriented, a visitor to my own body--a body that I am not normally aware of. Now it seems to betray me.

When I must concentrate on my body, to check and see how I am doing something, then surely I will falter. But when I can forget my body, I can do

wonderful things. My fingers will fly across the keys when I look beyond the keystrokes to the melody that unfolds. Being noticed in this sense is pleasant. The look is welcomed. There is even a showing off for this kind of look. I feel extended. My possibilities are opened in pushing beyond the limits of this look.

Becoming Object

But now my position has changed. Frustrated, vulnerable, I am no longer in charge of my-self. I have become his look, the object of his look. I begin to watch myself as I imagine he must see me. It is as if I have moved outside myself, and am looking down on myself, watching like an out of body experience. Sartre (1977) said, "Because I am now the object I experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities, which are now associated with objects of the world. . . . I am no longer master of the situation" (p. 265). Is this what my principal is seeing? Is he seeing me as an object that he can measure?

I am conscious of this splitting. I feel that I have become two. I magnify and scrutinize everything I say and do. The silent talking I do with myself becomes louder and interferes with what I am trying to say to my class. I struggle to keep my inner talk quiet, to keep my own coaching in abeyance. Normally there is no need to coach, to talk to myself about what I must do. I just do what is needed. Here it seems that everything I do must be questioned. He becomes the Other, outside myself. "By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other" (Sartre, 1977, p. 267). I stand outside my self now to take measure of my self.

Being Measured

I had dressed for this occasion. But now I feel transparent, as if he is looking right through me to other things in the room. Now he seems to pay more attention to the gum wrappers on the floor than to me. I wonder if that matters.

Perhaps the gum wrappers are saying something about me. Suddenly I have this awful image of being covered in gum wrappers, and that is how he is measuring me.

I had worked to present my world to him. I had polished and rehearsed my lesson, gone over and over it. I had the watertight plan, every word down verbatim. There would to be no slip-ups, no mistakes. There was so much on the line here. The stakes were high and I wasn't about to risk anything. Now that piece of paper on his table has "upped the ante." His checklist lights his way into my world, but I am not sure that he really sees me. His boxes and numbers are already there to say something about me. I feel that I must perform in relevance to those silly little boxes. Is that how I am to be measured, by check marks in a box?

I feel no more important than my desk or my chair. In this object-ness I feel less human, less worthy. I am on display to be measured, to be given a value, a grade. I am held up here to be a measure of his worth. His worth? It is not *his* worth that is to be measured. It is *mine*. How did he become my measure? I seem to have lost *my* worth. I want to be in a position where I am in charge, where I am the one who says, "Yes, that's good," or "No, you could do this a little better." I really do not like him sitting there passing judgment on me.

When I am aware that I am being judged, I become uncertain, unnatural. His looking deprives me of my doing, and I must concentrate on how to do it, rather than on the doing of it. I measure every step and try to double guess what he will think, or like, or want to see. My students, who should be my concern, are not my concern. My concern is him, to please him. Of two minds now, my work is twice as hard. I seem to have to work twice as hard to accomplish half as much. Time goes so slowly, and yet it goes so fast. I don't seem to be able to gauge it just right.

He looks up now and again, but mostly he just writes, and writes, and writes. I wonder what his pages say? What value will he give me? How is it that I can stand up here, of value to my students, or so some parents tell me, and feel that I am devalued?

Regaining Subjectivity

I set my class to their assignment now, and I sit at the front of the room with a small group of children. I leave the rest to read independently at their desks. Jason, a quiet child, sits at the end of the row where he is most comfortable. The principal's table is just behind Jason's desk. I see Jason begin to get up from his desk, his finger glued to a word he cannot read. He leans toward the principal. Jason tilts his book so the principal can see. Silence. Jason leans a little closer. Silence. Jason leans closer still and points harder at the word not looking up from his book. "Go ask your teacher!" Jason points harder still. "Go ask your teacher!" For a moment there is blankness, and then it hits Jason. The word he is pointing to cannot possibly say, "goaskyourteacher". In that instant Jason hears what is said to him. He looks up. His mouth begins to open. "Jason," I whisper, motioning with my finger, "Come here."

He comes to me, brow slightly wrinkled. "Sensitive" I tell him, my finger close to his. "Sen-si-tive," I say more slowly, smiling, not looking up from the word. Jason moves back to his desk now, my eyes trailing after him. I glance at the principal whose pen lifts from his paper. He too is watching Jason. Our eyes meet and quickly he gets back to his writing.

"Do you think we could do that?" Rochelle asks, tugging at my arm. "Rochelle, what was that?" I ask, looking at her as if for the first time today. "What did you say?" I ask again. Suddenly I want to say, "Good morning Rochelle. How are you today?" the way that I normally did. I want to start again, the way that I usually started my days.

His sitting there at the back does not seem to matter now. Jason reminds me why I am here. I hope that he has forgotten the incident by now, that somewhere deep inside him his body is remembering the care and compassion I feel for him in our fingers almost touching.

My principal says his good-byes rather simply, and leaves.

Now I stand here feeling that there is a gap I need to fill, like I should explain what has happened, to my students, and perhaps to me.

Getting the Evaluation

The rest of the day goes by in a blur, anti-climatic. I try to catch a quiet moment here and there where I can replay the lesson, get a sense of how it went. Did it go alright? What will he say? He said that we should meet in his office after school to discuss my evaluation. I feel somewhat reluctant to see my students go. I spend more time seeing them off than I normally do, linger in the doorway watching them leave.

As I walk down the hallway to my principal's office I feel the mild churning begin again. The butterflies are back. The floor feels slightly spongy beneath my feet although I know that it is not.

He says to come in and close the door behind me. That always makes me nervous. The handle is cold and that does not help either. I can see the piece of paper sitting there on his desk, flat and white and thin. He hands it to me smiling, as if I should know what it will say. I scan it quickly as he waits. I can feel him watching me as my eyes move down the page.

Uses good questioning strategies. Yes. *Challenges the students.* Yes. *Creates a safe environment.* Yes. *Invites student interaction.* Yes. It all seems there.

But then I spot it. Tucked obscurely in the middle it says, *Colleagues find you somewhat reserved.* That statement races through my head. I can feel myself

hold my breath. Reserved. "Reserved!" I want to say. "What does that mean?" "What is reserved?" Does he think I am unfriendly, cool, a snob? But I keep reading. I can feel my eyes move down the page oblivious of what is there, still handcuffed by that word *reserved*. Does it matter that I do not talk very much or that exchanging gossip in the staff room is not my source of joy? My God, am I forever to be known as reserved?

He says that everything is fine, and that there really is no need for a second visit, just sign the form and that will do.

He hands me a pen to sign and I watch my name come out of it on the line beneath his. He shakes my hand and I smile rather weakly saying, "Thanks," and off I go, finished for another year.

The walk back to my classroom is a quiet one. I am glad that everyone has gone home. I want to leave and yet I feel the need to stay. It seems I need some quiet time to fit the pieces together. I sit there in a kind of semi-hereness watching the dust particles float down through what is left of the afternoon sun. My room has that lonely stillness like it does on Sunday afternoons. My students' desks are empty, their books are put away, but everything does not seem to be in place. I cannot hear the hum of our busy classroom. My students faces seem a blur, colorless.

I pick up my evaluation form again. I read it more slowly this time, trying to fit the words to me, trying to make some sense of what they say. He has called me a model teacher, again. Not very original. The words do not feel like me. His signature sits at the bottom of the page, and mine beneath his. I have borne witness to these words and now they do belong to me, but they feel like someone else. Their shape seems different from mine. And yet this page is supposed to be who I am. I should feel proud, and yet all I want to do is put it away.

Afterward

I feel such ambivalence about this day. I got up early. I was prepared. I told my students he was coming. There should have been no surprises.

I tried to look my best, even suffered through the nervous stomach and the sweaty palms. And me a seasoned teacher!

I had my room ship-shape, my plan book in order, marks displayed for him to see. No one got out of line. But it is that word "reserved" that keeps coming back to me. I feel haunted by it wondering if one day someone in central office will open my file and read it, or worse, that the secretary who typed it will let it slip one day at coffee. Strange, how that word affects me.

He called me model. What is that? A mannequin? A puppet? It all seemed so innocent. We have done this many times before. Why should I be so bothered now? Why should I feel so disconnected, from me, from him, from my students, maybe even from teaching? What has happened here to leave me so cold, so filled with ambivalence and uncertainty about myself and about what I do?

It seems that we have crossed a line somewhere in all of this, that I cannot look at my principal like I used to, that something has changed. Something has gone deeper than the jokes we tell. I will not forget how uncomfortable I was today, how vulnerable and out of control I felt with myself and with my students. Even now it is hard for me to feel what I felt for Jason then, a child who re-connected me to why I was there at all. Now all that seems a universe away. I can no longer see his face or feel the warmth of our fingers almost touching. And yet that is the feeling I want to hold on to.

Something is missing from that form. The numbers, the letters, they do not seem like me. Maybe to figure skaters or to gymnasts they do mean something-- 5.7 for technique, 5.9 for artistic merit. But for me it is different. These numbers just do not say who I am.

I wander through the next few days, busy, but troubled with my thoughts. When there is a knock at my classroom door I wonder if it is him. Is there something he forgot to say? Does he need the piece of paper back? I have grown to resent it, sitting like a magnet in the bottom of my drawer. And yet I know that when I go to apply for a new position it will sit front and center in my dossier, proof that I am a good teacher, a passport to the next stage in my career, this paper that haunts me. It began so simply with a memo in my mailbox, and now it sits there committing itself to history--mine! There seems so much I need to say, so much I did not get a chance to say. I wish that we could talk again.

Chapter Five

Interrogating the Silence

"Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common language. . . . attempting to approach the mystery of language from the conversation that we ourselves are. . . . but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were."

<div align="right">(Gadamer, 1989)</div>

Part I: The Masks Of Evaluation

"Masks . . . testify to an awareness of the ambiguities of appearance and to a tendency toward paradox characteristic of transitional states. . . . the recognition of illusion is the . . . pre-requisite for understanding [and] . . . recognizing paradox."

(Napier, 1986)

Masking Teacher

"Objectivity has meaning only for a Subject who judges."

(Heidegger, 1977)

The Look Objectifies

When you came into my classroom my constellation changed--not just with my students and me, or with you and me, but something deep inside of me, something that went to my very core. Whatever inner strength resides there to give me foundation, direction, sense, and order, seemed shaken, and for a time, gone entirely. It was as if my silent invisible pivot had slipped and then disappeared.

It was your watching that changed me.

Looking at me in my classroom is more than you idly passing me in the hallway or on the street when you really take no special notice of me at all. I blend into the woodwork then, one person among many. I become part of your landscape, a shape no more significant than any other form you see. When I look at you down the hall, for instance, I see a man who is standing there. He is next to the door or talking to some children, and that is how I see you, in relation to other things around you. My eyes travel down the hallway and across the floor to where you are. There is an expanse between us and it remains there because I notice you off in the distance. I just am and so are you. Our look is a sort of non-look in this case.

Looking at me in my classroom is different too from how you look at me when you admire the way I style my hair or when you examine the clothes I might wear. In this case you look at me in a discerning way, but in a way of which I am unaware. If I want to look more closely at you, for example, at the expression on your face, or what kind of mood you are in, or try to read the words you say, then that distance between us lessens. I bring you closer to me, set you before my eyes so that I can see you. I begin to watch you, not just the whole of you, but specific

parts of you. Yet you take no notice of me in the same way. I am not hindered by your look.

Even I can regard my body in this objective way. I do my hair in the morning and regard or inspect it in the mirror, looking at it as I think someone else might. I look at it objectively and thus objectify myself. I make myself into something that I can regard away from me, still a part of me, connected to me, but in a manner I can survey. Sometimes it is even necessary for me to do this. I willingly objectify a part of me, as when a doctor inspects an injury on my leg. I do not want a judgment or decision to be made because it might hurt. I want a sound and objective decision to be drawn from the facts. I want to distance myself from my leg, examine it as if it were not part of me at all. Together the doctor and I must weigh what is best for this thing we want to treat. Van den Berg (1972) suggested that the body is something that is unalienably ours, and that we do not recognize or take notice of it until it changes in some fundamental way. When it does we begin to regard it "as a thing among other" things (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 106), although of course I cannot regard it exactly as I might a table or a chair. After all, they are not connected to me like my leg is. My purpose in objectifying myself in this manner, though, is to remove the emotive me in order that I may regain my body as a smooth and working whole of which I take no notice. Buytendijk said that of all conceivable things our bodies should be "least opposed to us, least foreign and so least antagonistic" (Van den Berg, 1972). I want to feel, or perhaps, not to feel my injured leg at all.

Van den Berg has described Sartre's (1977) three modes of bodily being. In the first instance, the body is not given concern. It simply exists as part of the landscape.

The qualities of the body: its measurements, its ability, its efficiency and vulnerability can only become apparent when the body itself is forgotten,

eliminated, passed over in silence for the occupation or for the landscape for whose sake the passing is necessary. *It is only the behavior that explains the body.* (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 108).

In this case one forgets the body when one becomes absorbed in what the body does; "le passe' sous silence," Sartre (1977) said.

In the second dimension the body is regarded as an object-thing, similar in manner to how someone else might look at it. One inspects the body, so to speak. In the third dimension one becomes aware of his/her body because someone else is regarding or looking at it. In the case of a mountain climber, for example, Van den Berg describes him as feeling "hindered, because he knows that the other sees and criticizes just that which he himself must forget in order not to fail in his climbing. He feels vulnerable in an absolutely defenseless domain" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 114). The climber's world has flown to the other and he begins to make mistakes in his climbing. He cannot pass over his body in silence when he is looked at in this way. The Other's look st kes him "in his silently transcended body" now kept present by the look.

This can happen to anyone watched in this way. One is deprived of his/her looking, and becomes uncomfortable with his/her own body. The voice, for instance, is too loud or too harsh. Things do not seem to work as they should. The person tries to escape the look, but does so in vain. Under "the glance of the other . . . [the body] acquires an inescapably negative value" (Van den 1972, p. 116). It is this dimension of looking which I experience when you watch me.

Your look is not the kind of look that encourages me to forget myself or to simply go on teaching. I cannot pass over myself in silence, ignore my body, nor can I regard myself in an admiring way. Your look sets me at a distance away from you where you can dissect and dismantle me in what I do.

Your eyes focus only on me. I become the center of your attention. You remove the distance and space between us. I am "under the microscope," so to speak. Everything else in the periphery becomes less important, allowing you to concentrate on me. It is in this state that I begin to feel myself change. I begin to experience a cloistered feeling, constricted by that certain spatiality your look confers on me (Sartre, 1977). No longer am I at will to explore my lived space in the way I normally do. The playful distance that separates us disappears. I am drawn to your eyes. No longer do you regard me as just something that exists out there in your landscape like the books on the shelf, or the curtains on the windows. Now I am at the distanceless end of your look. I feel preyed upon, pinioned by your eyes that are set "upon me without distance while at the same time [they] hold me at a distance" (Sartre, 1977, p. 258). You sit at the back of my classroom but still I feel your eyes. They sit on my shoulder or just beyond my nose. They miss nothing in their stare, and what is more, they move with me. They shadow and record every move I make. I become extremely conscious of them. Your look feels like something I cannot shed, even when I turn my back on you. It is as if there is fixity of space between us, no meeting half-way. How strange it is to be watched like that, by someone you already know, by eyes you cannot seem to get inside. And yet they seem to penetrate my very soul.

Something shatters deep inside me. The inner calm that keeps my world in place, the one that creates a certain comfort zone, and a space of confidence for me is disturbed. My equilibrium is off. My position in my world seems changed and I begin to experience myself as the object I think you must see. And strangely I begin to distance myself from myself so that I may see me as I think you must.

When I am watched by the Other, Sartre said, "It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other" (1977, p. 256) that I apprehend you as subject. I feel a virtual fleeing of my Self towards you, "the flight of myself

toward objectivation" (Sartre, 1977, p. 257). When one is being watched, Sartre (1977) said, the Other's look puts one "beyond [their] being in this world and puts [them] in the midst of the world which is at once *this world* and beyond this world" (p. 261). I feel suspended, out of step, out of control. In a reluctant of out-of-body fleeing I experience myself as a kind of object. My subjectivity, my power to be is lost.

This transition, so subtle, so strange, consumes me. I begin to see myself through your eyes. You see me standing beside my desk, or standing at the front of the room. So do I. But when I see myself in that way, the desk, for instance, loses itself to me. I no longer see those things because they no longer exist for me at a distance from me. In fact, I do not see them at all. I am oblivious of my students. I constantly look over them to you. I forget that my desk is there. I back into it. I do not see my student's chair in front of me. I stub my toe. I experience myself as alienated from my world, as a stranger to myself in a double kind of distancing. "I experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities, which are now associated with objects of the world," Sartre said (1977, p. 265). I am no longer master of my situation. The power that exists for me to be at the helm of my ship is usurped, snatched by your looking. The oneness I must feel with myself to do what I must do is denied. I begin to feel like an "unknown object of unknowable appraisals," experience myself as a "defenseless being for a freedom" which is no longer mine. I become "an instrument of possibilities which are not my possibilities" (Sartre, 1977, p. 267-268).

Nevertheless I am forced to get my bearings, forced to try to make some sense of where I am, to re-establish myself as quickly as I can. After all, you came to see me teach, and that is what I must do. You came to judge me. But in the strange objectifying power of your look, "I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to you"

(Sartre, 1943, p. 222). I slip into a kind of interregnum state so that I can appraise myself as I think you do. It is a double kind of being judged. But I am never exactly sure just what you see, or what it is you want to see. And so I feel really out of step and never know exactly how I do. Even though we discussed the lists, discussed what the boxes mean, I feel unsure. I should know what you are looking for, but it seems that a glass box has gone up around you. I cannot talk to you. You only stare. I am in complete uncertainty. What do you *really* think of me? I live a paranoiac state, and still I am "under the gun" to show you what I can.

And yet I feel that when you come into the classroom to watch me teach, you do not really see who I am. I am worried that no matter what your lists say, and no matter how hard I try, I cannot really show you what I can do. There seems to be so much that watching will not show--like what I saw with Bill.

Bill was a teacher on our staff, an older man who kept mostly to himself, a quiet, gentle sort of man. But one day in particular, Halloween I think, this was not the case.

There were several of us teachers standing around in the staff room, commenting on each other's costumes, when suddenly amidst a gush of noise and flurry of motion Bill burst into the room. Through flailing arms and gesticulating legs he yelled, "Left 34! Right 76! Hup! Hup!" loud, very loud. On his head he wore a carved and enormous rubber football, the sides cascading down round his ears. His body was a mass of torn hockey net and dangling pads. His scrawny, hairy legs (the kind that looked better covered up), were bandaged in soiled, checkered rags. We stood there quite dumbfounded thinking that this mild and gentle man had finally succumbed. And then, as if to make us sure, he erupted into a voluminous blood-rendering yell with force so loud it brought the kids out on the playground running to peek in the windows. As abruptly as he started, he stopped,

shrunk to more his normal size, and said to us quite simply, "Thought I'd give you guys a thrill!"

I remember feeling my mouth close. This was a side of Bill I had not seen before. He was always in such complete control, collected and calm. But there was another side of Bill that I had seen, one I think not too many people knew. You see, Bill's room was next to mine, and at the end of each long day he would go inside, close his door, and play the piano. If it was Eroica that I heard, I knew that he had had a pretty rough day. But if it was the Pastorale, then I would smile and think that things had gone alright. And some days Bill would leave his door a bit ajar and play something that I think he may have composed himself.

There was a very special man behind that door, one I passed in the hallway almost every day, but one I think I hardly knew. Evaluations could not capture Bill, the essence that was him, any more than they can capture me. How do you measure the specialness that was him? Can evaluations see behind the doors, see beyond the order in the halls, beyond the mark books filled with A's and B's? Do evaluations see into the specialness that is me?

Inauthentic Being De-values Self

I worry that your looking has distanced us. It seems, in fact, that I have been distanced from myself. "Everything takes place," Sartre (1977) explained, "as if I had a dimension of being from which I was separated by a radical nothingness; and this nothingness is the Other's freedom" (p. 262). But I do not willingly give myself over to you. It seems to happen without my say and beyond my control. And yet I am not shackled to my desk or to the floor. Why do I find it hard to move, and difficult to breathe?

This freedom, which is not mine, is what your looking conquers. It calls for a state of my being Sartre (1977) referred to as a "being-in-itself." "Being is in-itself. Being is what it is," Sartre (1977) said, a kind of being that exists for the

outer world in its facticity. It is not the conscious part that is capable of wondering about itself in its existence. It just is—a non-conscious core, a kind of nothing existence which your evaluative look calls forth. This state of my being is the only one I can experience. The whole of me is rendered immobile, like that inert core, so that I am incapable of acting on my world, incapable of intentional acts of freedom. I exist inertly, in bad faith to myself, wanting to "fill up the nothingness which I am in relation to myself" (Sartre, 1977, p. 44). I feel exiled from my potentials, removed from what I might be, from what I might become. I am value-less to me, removed from my potentializing essence, the part Heidegger (1977) referred to as *Dasein*. It is an important word, not a term to be understood as a reason for being, or as a word to describe something ethereal and beyond understanding, but a word that embodies the "power to gather and preserve things that are manifest in their Being" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 20). It is a word of intentionality and potentiality. For van Manen (1990), it is a word which describes that "aspect of our humanness which is capable of wondering about its own existence and inquiring into its own Being" (p. 176). Gadamer (1975) regarded *Dasein* as "potentiality-for-being and possibility" (p. 259), "always ahead of itself" Heidegger (1977, p. 22) said, always looking into what is not yet as "a kind of being that is open to Being" (p. 32). It is this potentializing part of me that your evaluative looking separates from me. The "Being-in-itself" the part you see, separates from the "Being-for-itself" which is the value in me (Sartre, 1977). No wonder I begin to jealously guard that which you cannot see.

My existence as a being-in-itself is an "existence without participation, nor any kind of relation" (Sartre. 1977, p. xxv). I feel marginalized as a human being because I know that in my heart of hearts I am more—more than what is there for you to see, and more even than what is available for me. My Being-for-itself, what I recognize as my potential for being, is beyond what even I can know of it. "This

passing beyond the world," Sartre (1977) said, "is effected by the *Dasein* which directs the surpassing *toward itself* (p. 17). It is a potentializing force which is unknowable even to me. But when I realize that I am blocked from that, my "Being-Self," is transformed into a "Being-Thing." When that happens, my "Being-in-itself" is created; my possibility withheld. I am, as Sartre (1977) said, separated from what I am by all that I am not. It is a feeling of marginalization wh.ch only my lived body can understand (Levin, 1988). It is not something I can strictly intellectualize. Rather, it is bodily-attunement, a moral capacity for understanding existential growth (Levin, 1988), an implicate understanding and guardianship of Being (Levin, 1988), of my core. *Dasein,* which "exists in advance of itself and has the power to transcend--to remake itself by projecting itself into what is not yet" (Heidegger in Muller, 1987, p. 37). "Inauthenticity is forfeiture of the self," Muller said (1987, p. 3), a state which negates wholeness (Levin, 1985), a falling out of Being (Heidegger, 1977). How absurd to think that you came in to value me! (Absurd comes from the Latin *absurditas* meaning discordance and disharmony, translated into English to mean something ridiculous or farcical).

I know in my soul that there is something more that you do not see. I understand in my bodily being that there is more to me than what I can make available for you to see. As Sartre (1977) said, "Value is beyond being . . . it is that toward which a being surpasses its being . . . it is *as* the absent in-itself which haunts being-for-itself . . . value *gives being to itself* (p. 93). It is that kind of being that your looking will not grant. It steals ɩ.ɩy value from me. Instead of allowing me to reach into my possibles I am restricted and confined to whatever value you choose to place on me. You set a worth on me that I can be no more, and there I am-- finished, complete! Now I am destined to walk the halls a "1" or an "outstanding" or "not quite good enough." How do I shirk these labels? How do I break the mold that you have cast for me? Even "model" marks me like a brand.

I know, too, that it is not only when you watch me in my classroom that you are judging me. You talk to other teachers about me even if only in an indirect way. You get a sense of me from how I act in the staff room, how I talk with other teachers, with parents and with students in the hallways. You ask my students how things are going. All of these things reflect on me. You look at my bulletin boards and wonder what goes on inside my room. You notice what I photocopy and what time I arrive and leave the school. You notice the kinds of conferences I attend. Always I am judged. Perhaps Heidegger was right: "Objectivity has meaning only for a Subject who judges" (1977, p. 11). Little wonder I feel empty when evaluation is done.

Potential Denied

Evaluating me dispirits me. It objectifies and devalues me, robs me of my freedom, my potential and my fundamental worth. It reminds me of what I saw happen to a horse when I was young. It was branding time.

He was a beautiful black stallion, majestic and wild. It had rained that June morning. The prairie air was fresh and sweet, mixed with a hint of sage. Trees lined the horizon as if they had been painted on the rim, a kind of seal to keep the quiet in. From where I sat atop the corral fence I could see the riders begin to herd the cattle toward the corral. They all seemed a blur that far away, but not the stallion, the black one. He stood out tall. I watched as he frolicked and bucked, the cows and calves mere playthings in his way. Even the riders looked small and insignificant, but not the stallion. He looked mischievous and defiant.

Branding time was a day to spend with friends, a time for quiet walks, laughing, joking, the kind of things you did as kids. But brandings had in some strange way begun to lose their charm for me--the dust, the dirt, perhaps the stark reality of what went on. Or maybe it was just part of growing up. Still, I was drawn to my perch in the corral, lured by the sound of thundering hooves and the

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ever-present danger of stampede. The riders and the cattle were closing in now. I could hear their snorts, feel the ground beneath me begin to shake. How wonderful the stallion looked, lithe and wild and free. He must have grown up here on this ranch, probably untouched by human hands. His long untrimmed tail and mane were streaked with flashes of blue, his nostrils flared, his black eyes wide against his gleaming coat. His legs were magnificent and long, his ears cocked straight and sharp. He circled nervously inside the corral, bolted when they shut the gate. It was then that I saw the gash on his leg had begun to bleed. "A problem," the ranch hands said. He had tried to jump the fence.

The riders culled the cows and calves and left the stallion standing there. Apparently his cut would be attended first. Two ropes were thrown around his neck, two more around his legs. A quick jerk and he was down, the riders held him taut. But it was not his leg that was the problem. A few quick strokes, the job was done, the stallion's freedom stripped. I could not take my eyes from him as he lay there straddled on the ground. The young boys giggled nervously and disappeared, but I sat frozen to my spot.

The afternoon faded into a greyish kind of blur. I sought out my dad and asked, "Why was it done? Was there nothing else that we could do?" He looked at me quite puzzled for a moment, and then remarked as he turned away, "He would have turned the rest."

A spirit denied. A possibility lost.

Masking Teaching

Performance: A Deception of Self and Technique

What meaning does evaluation have for me if I cannot be myself? I do not feel authentically a teacher, free to do and free to be. I constitute my body only emptily. "The object-state of my body for the Other is not an object for me and can not constitute my body as an object; it is experienced as the flight of the body which I exist" (Sartre, 1977, p. 354). It is a body which pretends to be, a body which fulfills its role with empty gestures, so that no matter what I do to "dress it up," or to "present the perfect picture" I still feel somewhat naked and vulnerable. My body mocks itself. Hollow words ring emptily. They fall brittle, lifeless to the floor. Movements shadow and haunt the phantom that is me. When I pretend to be, I cannot be. My teaching remains unfulfilled, performed as the execution of items on the list, boxes on the form. I anchor to the pen. Yet my performance is a masquerade. My teaching is unfulfilled.

I am reminded of a similar time long ago when I was a child in school. The props were readied. I was prepared, filled with anticipation, but somehow things just did not seem to fit.

I had a friend at that school, a boy about my age. He had a favorite pair of shoes he wore to school, a pair of round-toed, high-topped boots. They laced up tight around his ankles and were scuffed in a friendly sort of way. How I admired those shoes. So did he. He hardly ever took them off.

But one day I wore a brand new pair of shoes to school--patent leather that shone clear to the sky. Brilliant and black and bold and finally they did the trick. He decided we could swap!

I sat down to try his shoes, pulled my socks up tight, smoothed all the wrinkles to ensure a perfect fit. And then I slid my feet down inside his shoes. I could feel the leather close around my toes and around my ankles too. The humps

and bumps of where his feet had been began to encase mine. And then the strangest feeling moved over me as if I had done an awful thing. But I shrugged off those thoughts and stood up tall to give his shoes a try. They were tiny, timid steps I took, not like my steps usually were at all. His shoes were my size alright, but I did not like the way they fit.

Your checklists are something like that. They are worn too often by another, by a stranger to my kind of teaching. The skeleton, the technique may be there, but not the part that lets me be me. That part is absent from your lists. They capture only the dismantled me. I feel like Heidegger's (1977) hammer, measured only for my usefulness, measurable and calculable (Luijpen, 1969). When I am the "forgetfulness of being" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 141) I cannot put myself into my teaching. So what do I do? I perform. Laing (1950) said that for my actions to be genuine I must be able to put myself into what I do, else I feel empty, and my teaching is also thus empty.

Evaluation as Relation Ingenuine Encounter

When I cannot feel whole in myself or in my teaching and must resort to presenting a performance for you to measure, I am reduced in what I am as a person and in what I can offer of myself to students as teacher. My capacity to be with them is reduced and denied in the same way that my capacity to realize my potentials is denied. In being with Others, I yield, or give myself over to a "harmony of opposites" (Levin, 1988, p. 60) so that together we come to realize a kind of communion. This is the gift of Self, one I give willingly to my students. It is in the reception of my gift to them that my teaching becomes complete. This giving and receiving lies at the foundation of establishing a pedagogic relationship between myself and students. It becomes the rhythm of our being together. When that giving or receiving is cut short, my gift is barren and devoid of potentializing being for me as well as for them. My teaching becomes a futile effort, a shutting

down of possibility for them. When I am with my students in my classroom I work *with* them. During evaluation I am not there for them. The "intertwining" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989) of body and mind which lies at the heart of pedagogic relation is absent when you come *in* to see me teach. My sense of Being whole is denied. My teach'ng is denied and I am struck to the core. Try as I might to camouflage my discomfort, my students see that I am "different." They see that my face is red and my voice sounds funny. We encounter each other differently.

Encounter, to Bollnow (1987) is "the profoundly stirring contact of one human being with another, in his[/her] ultimate depths" (p. 143). An encounter is not something entered into deliberately, but perhaps more accidentally and unexpectedly, as a kind of shattering which shakes one into realizing that something fundamental in his or her existence has changed. "This shattering determines what is genuine in the human being" (Bollnow, 1987, p. 161) by a stirring of the unfamiliar. When my natural being with my students cannot be, then I experience a relation ingenuine encounter, a non-being with my students. My pedagogic sensibilities are affronted and I feel teacher no more. And what is more, you and I encounter a non-relationship as well.

Illusion and Paradox

What grand deception evaluation is. I wear the mask that pretends to Be (Marcel, 1963). You wear the mask that pretends to see. Such paradox that evaluation claims to value me!

Evaluative looking is a look that denies. It forfeits my authentic self at the "center of infinite possibilities" (Sartre, 1977, p. 288) which my students and I never come to know. What irony to think that your coming in to see yields only "empty comments," (Brophy, 1984), words sanitized and removed from me. And yet to construct a visibility through which you differentiate and judge (Foucault,

1977), we have resorted to look at teaching and at teachers in this way. Is this really teaching that we see?

Bollnow (1987) said about pedagogy that it "cannot itself bring about . . . [or] even influence, [the way we look at teaching] but . . . it must understand [itself] if it is to assist growing, maturing human beings in their development" (p. 166). For me pedagogy is a matter of allowing, respecting and encouraging an openness to develop and grow in me as a pre-condition for my engendering openness and growth in my students. If I am to be with them must potential and growth not first be encouraged and engendered in me?

Evaluation as Mendacious Experience

I cannot believe we meant for evaluation to turn out this way. Surely you did not intend to objectify and reduce me to a functionary thing, to remove me from my possibilities and strip me of my fundamental worth. Surely we intended something else. Sometimes, though, intentions go awry. I remember a day when they did.

It was wash day on the farm, a beautiful summer morning filled with warmth and sunshine and purpose. It was a busy time, an endless cycle of watching our mother carry heavy loads of laundry to and from the wash line that stood behind our house.

My sister and I had wanted to help, but we were told that we were still too little; we would have to wait. We were not good at waiting though. We had to find something to do.

That morning the hired man had told us about a new litter of kittens that were hidden under the barn floor. He thought that by lifting a board or two we might be able to reach them. He was right. It was dark and musty under the floor. The timbers were dry and squeezed against our skulls as we crawled inside. The smell of old stale hay and dirt hung heavy and made our hesitant going even

slower. We were determined, though, not to give up. The darkness bothered me. I felt claustrophobic, but my sister urged me on. Guided by the kittens' faint "meows" we drew to the warm and furry mass, filled our hands with what we could, then backed out quickly into the sunlight. I had two kittens; my sister had three, one in each hand and one wedged between. The kittens spat and hissed, of course, but that did not bother us. We had washing on our minds.

We found an old tobacco tin on the garbage heap behind the barn. It would be a washtub. We filled it with water from the creek, then scoured and scrubbed each kitten in its turn. Soon all five lay neat and shiny slick on the manure pile waiting to dry.

It took much longer than we thought, so when we heard footsteps come from around the corner we called to the hired man. "Come and see!" we said, "Look what we have done!"

He climbed up on the fence, then climbed up one rung more to get a closer look. As he took off his hat I squinted up to hear his silhouetted words, "'Ya killed 'em!"

I do not recall the expression on his face, just the sound those awful, black and wrenching words made from a place the sun had been. We held each other's hands on our walk back to the house. I wanted to turn around to see what he would do with them, but I dared not. I felt like crying, but I did not. You did not cry for dead things on the farm. That's just the way it was.

Part II: Casting Off The Masks

"Seeing is determined, not by the eye but by the Lighting of Being."

(Heidegger, 1977)

Questioning The Way It Is

"Beyond the policy statements and directives of curricula there lurks a more basic meaning of teaching as a deeply moral activity."

(Carson, 1986)

I used to think that feeling the way I did after evaluation had something to do with you being a man and me being a women and that we simply lived in different worlds and that we saw and valued different things, that you held closer to a scientific way to look at teaching, and I did not. But I have come to understand that evaluation is more complex than that. I have come to understand that historically and ideologically, although our context may be one dominated by a male point of view (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Shakeshaft, Nowell & Perry, 1991; Young, 1990), there is something deeper here, a common experience that we, as male and female teachers share. It may not be a question of balancing individual traits labeled 'masculine,' or 'feminine,' or setting androgynous goals for evaluation, but ultimately of addressing what it means to be a human being (Noddings, 1984). I do not intend to diminish the fact that respect for our difference is not important (Levin, 1989), but is it not also important to sharing "a sense of our common humanity" (Levin, 1989, p. 124)?

If I am afraid that my slip will show and Gavin across the hall says he feels less a man when you are done, perhaps there is a common experience that Gavin and I share in being evaluated. Is it not from common experience that understanding and appreciating difference begins? There are feminists who say that ideologies are themselves gender-based and therefore gender-biased (Oseen, 1993), and that it is impossible to look at experience without first addressing gender differences in that experience. They may be right, but that is another study. For

this study let us examine sameness within the difference. What drives evaluative looking at teachers, whether they be male or female?

Policy handbooks tell us that teacher evaluation is most often conducted to improve instruction (Ratsoy et al., 1993), a desire based on an assumption that "looking" at teaching during evaluation actually "sees" teaching. It is a belief, too, that the techniques of teaching, which can be and are measured, are what teaching really is, and that thus measured, solid evidence exists to identify which of those techniques require improvement. We seem to accept that there is some form of "best" teaching for which teachers can and should strive. In short, evaluation mandates improvement of instruction and that is what it must mean. Or does it?

My experiential understanding of the evaluative look is not one of improvement of instruction or of growth, but rather, of objectification and reduction, of removal of possibility for my growth, and of non-relationship with my students and with my evaluator. Yet the practice of observing teachers in formal performance evaluation continues. Why?

A Legacy of Looking: The Historical Privileging of Vision

Perhaps we need to go back to the Greek word 'physis' which once meant an overwhelming power, a luminous eruption of living energy inexhaustibly appearing and bringing beings into the light. Over the centuries, since the time of the Great Reformation, there has been an "enframing," to use Heidegger's (1977) word, of this lighting of Being. We have inherited a legacy of metaphysical looking that has witnessed an unfolding of ourselves to others in a progressive closure in the dimensionality of Being and a narrowing of our vision of what we consider Being to be (Levin, 1988). "In wonder, we stand open to the enchantment of Being and are disposed to let being be" (p. 59), but in our more restricted way of visioning, of looking, we are more curious about the objects under our gaze than we are open to their being.

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Heidegger (1977) referred to this closing down as an "enframing" or "block[ing] off the shining forth and holding sway of truth" (p. 309). Truth, he believed, existed not in what was visible to be seen, but in what was revealed as the potential of Being. In closing down of the lighting of being, access to Being as a potentializing existence, is similarly shut down. According to Levin (1988) "technologically manufactured desire, the masculine will to power" (p. 59) has dominated western world vision. It is this tradition which accounts for the enframing of Being to which Heidegger referred. Levin (1988) contends, that throughout modern times, human understanding as seeing, has become increasingly restricted and confined by a predominantly Cartesian legacy or tradition in which seeing as understanding is satisfied by what the gaze itself can possess as the object of its vision. Things have become

> sub-stances, standing under the masterful gaze, transfixed and possessed.
> That gaze must always dominate; uncertainty must be completely ruled out.
> There must be nothing hidden, nothing hiding, nothing beyond the point of
> focus which appears with the event of the gaze. (Levin, 1988, p. 74)

Under the evaluative look I experience this closing down of visioning. The look of triumphed subjectivity triumphs me. I fall under its spell to assume an object-ness, while, you, my watcher, become "subject to the objectivity it [your looking] set in power" (Levin, 1988, p. 4). Instead of letting me be subject and setting me free to be true to myself to fulfill my possibilities, your masterful technological looking confines me in looking for correctness and conformity of my teaching to some predetermined and standardized lists. In this way, I am not condemned to freedom (Sartre, 1977), or to making meaning out of my existence as a human being. I am condemned to the nothingness of my existence--a term Sartre (1977) used to refer to the dichotomies of human existence as Being and nothingness.

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It is creating meaning out of the look that I want. I want you to look at me

in a "gaze embodying correctness *with aletheia* . . . a gaze that can encourage others

to be true to themselves, so that they may develop their ownmost potentialities"

(Levin, 1988, p. 439). *Aletheia*, from the Greek, means correctness or a satisfying

representation of reality (Levin, 1988). For Heidegger truth meant an opening or

unconcealment of what illuminates the core of existing or *Dasein*. "To let be is to

engage oneself with beings," Heidegger said (1977, p. 127). *Aletheic* truth, then,

according to Heidegger's notion, requires a playful gaze open to the presencing

way of being (Levin, 1988). A playful gaze is "centered by virtue of its openness

to experience . . . drawn into the invisible" (Levin, 1988, p. 438). The look you

give me in evaluation is an ontological spoiling of looking for my potential, and in a

larger way it has repercussions for more than just me. The

> detachment of theoretical-instrumental vision from its *body of felt*
>
> *experience* is finally making itself visible to us as a decisive factor in the
>
> historical advent of nihilism. For this detachment of vision from the body
>
> of feeling encourages the rise to power of an ego-logical subjectivity whose
>
> will to power has lost touch with that primordial ontological attunement we
>
> once enjoyed as visionary beings. (Levin, 1988, p. 117)

It seems a sad thing that evaluative looking can deny my attunement and

openness to the dimensionality and potential implicit in Being. After all, evaluation

was to be for growth. Apparently we have forgotten that "To let be . . . means to

engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes

to stand, bringing an openness . . . along with itself" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 127).

Apparently we have forgotten that pedagogy is presupposed by this kind of open

and potentializing relationship of teachers with students.

Let me give you an example of what I mean. I believe I saw this kind of

looking one year at Teachers' Convention. I was sitting in my chair in a very large,

cold auditorium that February morning. The coffee in my styrofoam cup did little to warm me. Even the metal chair felt cold through my clothes. I remember feeling rather tired and alone, maybe the winter blues. But I was also thinking how peaceful it was not having to make small talk or worry about making sure that the right people saw me. I was content to let the "keeners" elbow their way through the book displays. I would relax.

The high school band was assembling their music stands near the front of the gym. They emptied their cases, arranging their music in a tired sort of way. Even their clatter seemed subdued. Gradually, though, they began to warm their instruments in earnest. They tested, prodded, blew and strummed and then after a few moments their conductor, who had been waiting patiently at the side, arose, and with his baton signaled, "Enough. Let's start."

He began rather slowly which I thought was wise, but soon he broke into jazz which surprised me. He looked more the Toronto Conservatory type. His ducks and dives seemed contrived at first, but then some strange spell began to work its magic between him and his students. Rising to his toes he winked and frowned, cajoled, and coaxed, and soon they played as one.

Something special happened there, something in the way he looked at his students, something in the way he brought it out of them. It was a performance and yet it was not. It was something more. How would you measure what happened there--by the shining in their eyes, by the way they came alive? I do not think checklists could capture that. And yet, that is just what we try to do.

We try to capture the truth that is teaching, that is, what teaching really is, try to turn it into a series of things on a list, "dim it down," so that we cannot "see that truth whose beauty can be seen to shine" (Levin, 1988, p. 399). An historical privileging of vision Levin (1988) called it--our reliance on *looking as seeing*--a

kind of looking that eliminates ambiguity, uncertainty, spontaneity, the very things which seem to lie at the foundation of being a good teacher.

Evaluative looking is so unlike Levin's (1988) notion of insight where vision is 'outside' of the ego's control, more rooted in the soul and spirit, in "the 'inner light' of our visionary being" (p. 350), closer to truth as *aletheia*, and consonant with Heidegger's (1962) notion of a playful gaze, "centred by virtue of its openness to experience . . . decentred, drawn into the invisible" (Levin, 1988, p. 438). This provides a very different view of teaching than a technological gaze, one which looks for the truth as correctness, and requires a correct gaze, a gaze correctly positioned, correctly focused. But technological looking is not the only legacy of an enframed way to see.

Power Relationships Sustained Through Language and Structure

By assuming that teaching is seen by looking at teachers, the meaning of evaluation has become managed or institutionalized in how we have come to think about and write about teaching (Bates, 1988). This management of meaning is marked by and reinforced by power arrangements between administrators and teachers which so constrict teachers' behaviors that eventually teachers, themselves, conform to how teaching must be shown.

Giddens (1979) referred to this constrained form of meaning-making as a guided interpretation of reality, that is, what is believed to be "real" about evaluation is that looking at teachers during evaluation actually sees teaching. When the vehicle of meaning-making, such as evaluation, is couched in an "ideology [which] functions to articulate a sense of the world in which contradictions and structures of domination are obscured, and the particular interests of dominant groups are perceived as universal interests and hence actively supported, even by oppressed groups" (Mumby, 1988, p. xiv-xv), then we, as administrators and teachers,

support the structures and the means of looking into teaching, albeit in a very narrow way.

I have come to believe that evaluating me is necessary to show that I am a good teacher, to prove that I am of worth to my students and to the school. It is a way to ensure that my students are getting the best instruction they can get. This is a worthy goal. I want to be fair. Evaluation embodies a tradition of fairness and excellence that I willingly strive to uphold. But herein lies the tension.

I now understand that evaluation signals, and perhaps encourages, a non-relationship with my students. It also breaks a trust between you, my evaluator, and me. Even though we say that evaluation is for improvement of instruction and for teacher professional growth, I have come to understand that when you look at me evaluatively, I do not grow. I have come to understand that "improvement" and "growth," are not what my experience of being evaluated is. This meaning I derive from this experience is different from what evaluation is "supposed" to mean.

For a musician or an actor being auditioned for a specific part, evaluative looking may serve a useful function. Special skills may be required, and it is those skills on which the evaluative look focuses. Growth, in this case, is not the intent, nor is it described, or cloaked, in the language of growth. But in teaching it is different. As Greenfield (1984) said, "Language is power . . . whoever controls language controls thinking and behavior, has the power to make reality disappear" (p. 8). So that calling evaluation a "process of teacher empowerment," "being fair to students and to teachers," "colleagueship," "support," "enabling," in short, "professional development," serves only to reinforce what policy-makers would like to think evaluation is. What is more, by asking me to voluntarily identify specific areas in which I am weak I further accomplice myself in the knowledge/power construction and reconstruction of what keeps me in my place. Evaluation becomes a leveling device, a mechanism that serves to standardize me.

Instead of discussing *this*, we spend our time devising more skillful strategies to effectively and efficiently accomplish what it is that marginalizes me in the first place.

In this way a positivistic, technological ideology has come to shape the "process of judgment that informs the evaluative process and makes evaluation possible" (Bates, 1988, p. 16). Thus legitimizing itself, evaluation has become hegemonized through a relationship of authority between you and me, evaluator and evaluatee. A reciprocal relationship results, one which simply produces and reproduces our dependency on each other (Burbules, 1986). I need you to evaluate me and you need me to make it work. Thus we are both caught in a web, not just an ideological web, but in an organizational one as well.

Greenfield (1980) reminds us that organizations are "limited by and defined by us . . . simply manifestation of mind and will" (Greenfield, 1980, p. 27). But whose mind and whose will is it that would marginalize teachers, make us less worthy? In Greenfield's (1980) words,

> we can never control the web, never control life, society or organizations, for to do so would be to control individuality and to obliterate that which distinguishes self from other, person from person. We can only seek to understand the web of meaning [wo/]man lives in--that is, to understand ourselves through actions that define self, existence, and something of the history of human consciousness. (p. 34)

Perhaps it is not a matter of who is entrapped or to what degree, but to recognize that in a shared dependency (Giddens, 1979) "everyone is caught, those who exercise power as well as those who are subjected to it" (Foucault in Burbules, 1986, p. 97). Evaluation has become the controlling force, the leveling device to screen and monitor and, even, to certify teachers. It is a seductive kind of mechanism that wields a power which soothes like a tonic, albeit an addictive one

(Burbules, 1986). And we are moved to ask, how have we come to this? How has evaluation, evaluative looking at teaching, become so distorted and misdirected? Perhaps this acquiescence to and reliance on looking at teaching may be related to how a technological society understands "technique" and "technology."

The Distortion Of Techne

The Greeks used the word techne to name the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also to refer to the arts of the mind and the fine arts. "*Techne* belongs to bringing-forth," Heidegger said (1977, p. 294). It is a word that has been linked since Plato to *episteme* or knowing in an expert way. It denotes a mode of knowing or seeing in its widest sense, in the Greek manner, "a bringing forth of beings in that it *brings forth* what is present as such *out of* concealedness . . . *techne* never signifies the action of making" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 180). "Technology," then, "is a means to an end" (p. 288), a "way of revealing. . . . where *aletheia*, truth, happens" (p. 295).

But our modern view of technology has distorted technology in the Greek sense. According to Heidegger (1977), "Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology" (p. 294). Rather than a bringing forth, technique has come to mean "a kind of practical performance" (p. 180), in other words, teaching as a set of skills. The techniques have become the teaching. No longer are they the vehicles that see into teaching, they have become the destination in themselves. The techniques of teaching do not embody a bodily-attunement to being as well as a craft knowledge implicit in that being. The word technique has, like being, undergone the same kind of "enframing" to which Heidegger referred. To him, "The essence of modern technology lies in enframing" (1977, p. 307), or restricted being, not in a bringing-forth, or as revealing truth as unconcealment.

A technological worldview allows and presupposes a "science of teaching" where technique becomes more than "know-how," but instead, becomes

preoccupied with a one best way to teach. Technique "ceases to be external to man and becomes his very substance" (Ellul, 1964, p. 6), a way of life. In this way technology becomes a "root metaphor" (Berry, 1984), the underlying assumption for systemic inquiry, a way to describe a particular way of life which Tillich (1982) describes as one of production. We come to understand life and ourselves, then, through a technologically-mediated view of the world (Burch, 1984), a view which Heidegger (1977) referred to as "enframed." Humans have enframed nature as something to be measured, conquered and made useful. In this technological way of being-in-the-world, every thing and all humans are measured by their usefulness.

> To view teaching as a social construction is to see teaching as a cultural artifact that evolves as people refine and redefine which knowledge, skills, and attitudes are imp· ant for future generations. At the root of the socially constructed conception of teaching, therefore, is the question of desirable ends, an endpoint that brings us back to the moral basis of teaching. (Tom, 1986, p. 96).

Always we are compelled to address the moral implications of technological looking at teaching. Tom (1984) has developed the term "moral" to "include those social evaluational situations in which desirable ends are at issue, both through judgments about what is worthwhile and through evaluations of right conduct" (p. 125). Tom is concerned that in our technological world we have become mesmerized with how to reveal, and have forgotten what lies beyond the revealing or in the possibility of the revealing. People, as Heidegger (1977) says, are endangered by this enframing in a way which "conceals that revealing which, in the sense of *poiesis,* lets what presences come forth into appearance" (p. 309). Thus our narrow view of teaching as a set of identifiable and measurable techniques only confirms Heidegger's notion

of enframing. We have come to look at teaching through enframed looking in the same way teachers have come to be observed through evaluative watching.

A Constrained Notion of Pedagogy and Pedagogue

> A technological view of the world is a view that
>
> is no longer a matter of open responsiveness to the world but of restless
>
> efforts to master it; it does not conserve and act as guardian of the riches of
>
> the earth, but exhausts the world in trying to restructure it to [wo/]man's
>
> purposes. (Palmer, 1969, p. 145-146)

It promotes a view of teaching in which "the dominance of technological rationality prevents educators from holding onto a non-instrumental understanding of the pedagogical nature of teaching" (van Manen, 1992, p. 15). It seems that in our effort to inscribe the technical face of teaching we have dismembered it and disembodied it from relationship with teachers and students. What has resulted is an authoritarian notion of pedagogy (Sergiovanni, 1991) in which teacher evaluation hides behind the "label of scientific neutrality of objectivity" (Gitlin & Smyth, 1990, p. 85). In our thrust to be accountable and fair, we have silenced our experiences, "buried, camouflaged, and discredited" (Fine, 1987, p. 157) them. Teachers do not like being evaluated; principals do not like doing it. Evaluation is regarded as a "necessary evil." Could it be, that in our narcissistic rise to power, "It is now becoming painfully clear that the institutional authority of science and technology has successfully effected a reduction of human beings to the dual status of subjectified, privatized egos and subjugated, engineerable objects" (Levin, 1989, p. 13)?

Re-View

For the most part, during formal evaluation, I am viewed as an unwitting subject, or rather, as an object. In that process I become de-intellectualized and de-professionalized (Giroux, 1985). While we have wanted to demonstrate fairness to

students, the result is that we have constructed a visibility into teaching (Berger & Luckman, 1966) that may be publicly and legally defensible (Hazi, 1989), but also that ultimately confirms and reconfirms my subordinate position as teacher (Mumby, 1988). I perpetuate a constrained view of pedagogy and myself as pedagogue. Ironically, I have become part of a modernist "rule of narcissistic subjectivity . . . a reduction of the Being of beings to the condition of objecthood-- that turns out to be inimical to genuine subjectivity" (Levin, 1989, p. 13-14). These masks and that of evaluation as improvement and growth, may be, as Levin says, no more than "a cancer of the spirit." At best, evaluation may be little more than the handmaiden of accountability.

Chapter Six

Appropriation

"In the nexus of the dialectic between self-understanding of the researched and the creation of the context by the researcher to question taken-for-granted beliefs and authority, lies the opportunity for research as praxis."

<div align="right">(Lather, 1986)</div>

Recapitulation

This journey began by questioning the meaning of the evaluation experience. That experience has now been brought into unconcealment (Heidegger, 1977), or in another way, been given language (Gadamer, 1989). A possible understanding of that experience is now offered to the field of educational administration in an effort to fuse existential with organizational and administrative horizons (Gadamer, 1989). By marrying lived experience with intellectual understanding we are thrust into other possibilities of the question and "thrown," to use Heidegger's (1977) term, into other possibilities of ourselves. In this way the question is kept alive; it remains open to itself (Gadamer, 1989).

By incorporating what we have experienced into present understanding, our futures are similarly endowed and transformed for more thoughtful and caring action. Through a continual process of reflection and interrogation we come to realize more of what we are and are encouraged to become more of what we can be. Such is the spirit of the hermeneutic circle of understanding (Heidegger, 1977). The end of one journey, then, is but the beginning of another.

Teacher evaluation beckons many questions. We understand what the teacher's experience of being evaluated is, but what, historically, has that experience been? How have our past perceptions of teaching influenced the practice of teacher evaluation now? Do we regard teaching and teacher evaluation differently now than we have in the past? How might we conceptualize teaching, and what influence might that have on future evaluat'- s of teachers and how teaching may be seen?

Re-view of Metaphorical Analyses of Teaching

About a decade ago a researcher (Brophy, 1984) examined the evaluation experience of teachers using the metaphors of production and performance to characterize popularized notions of teaching. While metaphorical analysis always

runs the risk of not truthfully or authentically representing the original experience to which the metaphor refers, and thus clouding the comparison it attempts to highlight, certain characteristics derived from a factory model of teaching were useful in indicating how evaluators viewed teaching. Further, the use of metaphor helped to illuminate what evaluators regarded as important or noteworthy in documenting teaching competence, in other words, what to notice, what to ignore, what to document, what to omit. As Gertenbach (cited in Brophy, 1984) stated, "One who subscribes to any one of [the metaphors] does so because [s]he holds a certain view of the world in terms of what is real and what is worthy of consideration as we live" (p. 6). It appeared that the production and performance metaphors aptly described the predominant views of teaching at that time.

According to the production metaphor, teachers were regarded and written about as human resources or as elements of input in the production equation. Optimizing returns on investments was the goal. According to the performance metaphor, teaching and teachers were described as processes rather than products. Teaching involved the competent display of discrete skills or strategies, which when examined apart from the teacher, yielded valid, objective judgments about the standard of performance the teacher achieved (Medley, Soar & Coker, 1984). Clearly, teaching was conceived to be little more than an instrumental practice (House, 1979, 1980; Popham, 1975; Tyler, 1981).

But were there not other metaphors besides those derived from the factory model which would have been more appropriate to describe teaching? From a philosophic standpoint, Brophy warned that metaphorical analysis and comparison of teaching to the factory model, although popular, *was* inappropriate. The metaphor distorted the concept of teaching (Miller, 1976), growth was conceived to be externally constructed from the teacher, and the use of the factory metaphor simply reinforced a process of social valuing (Apple & Subkoviak, 1974) in which

expediency and efficiency were emphasized over treating one another in a humane fashion. Clearly, relationships between administrator and teacher and teacher and student were not the paramount issue. The "parenting" metaphor offered by phenomenologists such as Beekman (1983), Langeveld (1983a, 1983b), van Manen (1986, 1991, 1992), Grumet (1983) and Smith (1983), was given little heed. While it opposed the language of goals, objectives, performance and functions, encouraging an understanding of teaching as a "showing" or revealing of possibilities of the child, it had little impact on how teachers were evaluated then, and according to the Alberta Education study (Ratsoy et al., 1993), it has had little effect on how teachers are evaluated now.

An Experience Essentially Unchanged

In the lived world of the teacher Brophy revealed that teachers experienced evaluation as a nagging thorn, as rehearsed performance, as fine tuning, in short, as empty comment (Brophy, 1984). While educational philosophers, theorists, and practitioners demonstrated the "dysfunctional nature of the production and performance metaphor, and thus of many of the current evaluation practices" (p. 18), we might ask why, after so many years, has so little changed?

Despite the existence today of alternate ways of looking at teaching, such as through the metaphors of artistic criticism and professional judgment (Ratsoy et al., 1993), the language of evaluation continues to be instrumental. Teachers continue to experience evaluation as a separation of self from teaching, of functioning as inauthentic beings, in short, as being de-valued. Even when the final reports are good, the psychological pat on the back is shrouded in resentment. Clearly, the essence of the evaluation experience remains unchanged--at least the experience of the evaluative look remains unchanged.

What may be more important is that the ways in which we have viewed teaching in the past, and the ways we metaphorically analyze and understand

teaching now, continue to seem inappropriate. Or, if our metaphors are appropriate and they do further our understanding of what teaching is, why in evaluation do they not translate into an experience of growth for teachers? Is it possible that evaluative looking may transcend how we conceive of teaching? In other words, if no matter how we metaphorically describe teaching, will the teacher's experience of the evaluative look be any different? The Ratsoy et al. study (1993) would lead us to believe so. For teachers in schools where teaching is viewed as "professional judgment" it seems that teachers do not experience the evaluative look. But sadly, those instances are in the minority. Despite the existence of alternate ways to look at teaching, why do the majority of Alberta teachers experience the evaluative look?

A Moral Issue

It may be that our understanding of teaching has been and is still rather barren. Only recently in the evaluation literature (a search which has been restricted mainly to North America) has anything other than an instrumental view of teaching surfaced. Except for a few isolated European authors, and even fewer in America, "the notion of pedagogical relation has been virtually absent from the literature" (van Manen, 1992, p. 1). Regarding teaching as a leading into possibility or a revealing of possibility, seems too ethereal to swallow--except, that is, for teachers.

From their experiences teachers tell us that evaluation does not touch relationship with students. Evaluation stands outside what is most important in teaching. What teachers remember about evaluation is not how good they feel when it is done or how much they grew. Evaluation does not capture the essence of teachers' relationships with students. In fact, teachers tell us that evaluation is devoid of relationship and it creates a tension which signals that something in their lived world is not right, not as it should be. Teachers' pedagogic sensibilities are affronted. The rampant rationalization of the "personal and moral dimensions of teaching are constantly being threatened by the divisive consequences of . . .

instrumental reason" (van Manen, 1992, p. 13). Teachers find it difficult to hold fast to a "non-instrumental understanding of the pedagogical nature of teaching" (p. 13) when their evaluations, proof of how good they are, are couched in terms that defy relationship. Evaluation has, as van Manen suggested, created "divisions within us, between us, and between ourselves and the world" (p. 15)--chasms which I believe have been created on two levels: On the first level, existential, where in the experience of evaluation there is the realization that transcendence into possibles is impossible, and on the second level, organizational, where evaluation manifests an institutional faith in technical rationality which strips the pedagogic relation of its moral dimensions.

While evaluation may create a comfort zone for public accountability, what it ultimately produces is a bureaucratic neutering of teachers (Frymier, 1987). The myth of evaluation as improvement of instruction and as growth reinforces teachers' submission to a malefic organizational generosity (Greene, 1978) which must be unmasked and dispelled. Evaluative looking does not promote growth. It is not professional development. It is not colleagueship nor support. Rather, it is an emasculation of potential, nothing more, but certainly nothing less. We must understand that measuring technique is only that, and that standardization has a leveling not an enriching effect on teachers. Fitting into boxes does little to bolster self-esteem.

> Tom (1984) reminds us that while
>
> Predictions and control of behavior are perfectly appropriate criteria if one's purpose is technical, that is, to achieve agreed upon goals efficiently. . . . [but] if phenomena are socially constructed and partly normative, then a predominant technical orientation is appropriate only if teaching is directed toward either indoctrination or maintenance of the status quo. (p. 197)

But it would seem absurd to think that in a democracy, educational systems should operate outside some form of public scrutiny or monitoring. Not having a say in how schools should run would be contrary to our beliefs about free speech, fairness, equality and perhaps even justice. Yet evaluation seems a pernicious benevolence that has been bestowed on teachers.

Described as an artificial, unimaginative and cold process (Blumberg, 1967), evaluation was condemned long ago as an inhuman endeavor where one person "plays God" over another. Consider what lies beneath what teachers say when they tell of "feeling like the target," "like being a standard two-by-four," "like being judged by someone of slightly lesser ranking than God," or that knowing when the lesson did not go as planned they were, "Toast! Done for!" Consider what it means to have a teacher confide that when the principal arrives unannounced at the classroom door, "Could I say no!"

We should not mistake what evaluative looking is and what it does. When teachers say they feel "branded with a number" or that they "need to save their skin," we should recognize that marginalizing them in what they do does not help them grow. Feeling "stripped," "exhausted," "deflated," signals a way of being for teachers that burns the evaluation experience into teachers' minds: "He wore an awful green striped suit," "Buffy's Beautiful Burgers, page 14," a page one teacher never will forget, "polishing the performance," calling the plan book "Exhibit A," "not turning my back on the enemy." These teachers' words point to the artificial and legalistic nature of evaluation that lingers long after the psychological pat on the back has disappeared.

So why do we evaluate teachers the way we do?

A Tradition: The Handmaiden of Accountability

Evaluation is a tradition. "I think it's justified," one teacher remarked, "Nothing is free, I guess." Resignation. Compliance. Acquiescence. As one teacher said,

> I guess everybody's concerned that there's somebody out there that's the big eye watching you to make sure that you're performing to certain standards. But nowhere on the evaluation form is there a place for me to say, "This is a nice person I can trust," or "This is a person you can talk to in confidence."

The recent impact study of teacher evaluation policy conducted in Alberta schools supports what this teacher had to say (Ratsoy et al., 1993): "Where relationships [between administrators and teachers] were temporary, private, isolated, and divorced from teachers' working realities and from life in schools, negotiations of power, trust, and expertise were never far from the surface" (p. 291). Clearly, administrator/teacher relationships are at stake when evaluation involves evaluating teachers through the evaluative look and when teaching is viewed narrowly as technical expertise.

So what drives evaluation? Is it public accountability; our intense need to create and sustain a confidence that all is well in schools and that teachers are publicly accountable? In a democratic society this responsibility is inevitable. It seems, though, that the enormity and gravity of judging teachers has been underestimated and certainly delegitimized (Bates, 1988; Smyth, 1984, 1985, 1989). After all, teacher evaluation is supposed to be good for teachers. It is an opportunity to reflect on one's practice. It is an opportunity to reassess and reaffirm. It is, however, a practice which places a worth on a human being. *E-valuation* means to take the value from. Somehow the word "evaluation" has become distorted to mean placing value on or endowing worth. It is time to debunk

the myth. Evaluation is not growth. It marks relation-ingenuine encounter between teachers and students. It takes the value from teachers. This is evaluation's chore-- to set a worth on teachers--not to call forth more.

A Morally Acceptable Alternative?

Clinical supervision, however, has been offered as a morally acceptable alternative, one that will create an opportunity for teachers to participate in judging their own performance, in questioning their own assumptions, in formulating their own plans and decisions. It is supposedly a view of teaching that recognizes relationship. But even clinical supervision is fraught with controversy.

Many recognize that teacher evaluation practices reflect assumptions and beliefs about the nature of teaching which are incongruent with "pedagogic relation" (Garman, 1990; Garman & Smyth, 1989; Gitlin, 1989; Gitlin & Smyth, 1989, 1990; Holland, 1989, 1990; Smyth, 1986). In clinical supervision, observation is based on the assumption that a knowledge of teaching is created collaboratively and hermeneutically between supervisor and teacher (Garman, 1990) as opposed to being derived from a source external to the teacher. But let us examine more closely the observation of teachers in the creation of this knowledge base.

In her critique of the assumptions underlying the post-observation conference, Holland (1989) concluded that teacher observation was made palatable as a preface to the post-conference, whether the conference served a summative or formative function. Under such a model, the conference, as a didactic teaching/learning occasion, encouraged the teacher to be self-supervising in expanding an empirically limited view of the conference to a more phenomenologically expansive opportunity for collaborative analysis of observational data. The conference's purpose was facilitative not judgmental. Through the development of a shared language (Garman, 1990), supervisor and teacher could develop a "pattern of mutually orienting action" (p. 205).

What was forgotten, however, was that the language derived from and through the creation of the text of observational data was already distorted by "looking" at teaching through historically rational/technically-oriented eyes. I would posit that while we may know of other ways to understand teaching, we employ few ways of "looking" at teaching other than through eyes which objectify and reduce what which we look at or that which we measure. This is the phenomenon of evaluative looking. This is what it means to be watched by a supervisor through the evaluative look. It may be that being watched evaluatively by a peer, may render a similar experience for teachers, even though "peer" is supposed to negate unequal power relationships. In practice, though, that experience is yet to be investigated.

There is a also a second kind of reduction in clinical supervision. Holland (1989) has shown that ultimately the control of the post-conference rests in the supervisor's hands. Despite our desires and efforts to treat the text of observation in an inquiry mode rather than in a performance mode (Garman, 1990), the extent to which the power and control of the post-conference is in the teachers' hands is ultimately determined by the supervisor. Observational data, collected through administrators' eyes, which have been traditionally bound by the constrictions of technical rationality and public accountability, yield a "contrived vulnerability" evidencing a "hidden agenda functioning to allow the supervisor's manipulation and paternalistic control of the ratio of power in the conference" (Holland, 1989, p. 369). When supervisors put themselves in this supportive ego-counseling position (Mosher & Purpel, 1972) the power position is reaffirmed, and teachers feel even further demeaned. Supervisory techniques such as positive paraphrasing and inviting posturing simply serve to reinforce who is in control. The teacher may not only experience the reduction of being objectified through the evaluative look, now the teacher is politically reduced as well.

Even though, in Garman's (1990) view, the clinical supervision model of Cogan (1973) and Goldhammer (1969) has failed because it has been distorted (by Acheson and Gall, 1980) into functional applications for planning, observing, and conferencing; by Glickman (1985) as in-class supervision; by Glatthorn (1984) as differentiated from cooperative professional development, self-directed development and administrative monitoring; and by McGreal (1983) who co-opted clinical supervision for in-class evaluation, there is an assumption that observing teachers creates some sort of clean data about teaching. In addition to the concerns with hidden bureaucratic agendas, which are relevant and important, what fails to be addressed is understanding the teacher's experience of being observed and understanding how that experience influences pedagogical relation. Even *ideal* clinical supervision conducted in a purely cooperative and collegial environment, if there were any, has failed to account for the phenomenal experience of being watched. With limited understanding of the evaluative look and what it takes to establish an environment where the evaluative look is transformed into a non-judmental look, is it any wonder that clinical supervision, as the savior to humane teacher evaluation, has failed so miserably?

Observation of teaching, as the basis for collaborative exploration and/or for summative judgment, misunderstands the significance of being observed in the lifeworld of the teacher, and its influence on pedagogic relation. Just as Garman would preface supervisory encounters by building the "languages of teaching," I would suggest that we build the language of what it means to be observed, since observation is most often the key to creating the text of teaching, whether it be for collaborative or bureaucratic ends. Nor should we neglect to consider that observation works from an assumption that teacher and supervisor share an understanding not only of what constitutes teaching, but of what constitutes good teaching. There seems to be an unstated kind of ideal teaching toward which we

strive as an ultimate and common goal. And so we propel ourselves towards a certainty of instruction that allows us to develop law-like generalizations about "effective teaching." Yet, we also know that "Research on effective teaching does not enlighten us about the technical secrets of teaching, let alone about which subject matter is worthy of being taught" (Tom, 1984, p. 73).

The Need to Reconceptualize Teaching

The captivation of scholars and practitioners to use achievement tests as indicators of quality teaching, to systematize curriculum and to link teaching behaviors to student outcomes (Tom, 1984) has helped to create a comfort zone of public accountability, but Tom asks

> Is it because education has been deeply affected by the business ideology of
> efficiency . . . with the popularity in education of such business-related
> techniques as management by objectives, performance contracting, and cost
> containment? Or is it because modern social science, widely accepted as the
> most appropriate means for studying education, is based on the premise that
> empirical issues must be rigorously separated from any value decisions
> involved in identifying the needs of teaching? Or is it because educational
> issues are increasingly resolved by court orders and legislative decisions,
> procedures whose ties to educational ends are frequently tenuous? Or
> perhaps some combination of business efficiency, "objective" social
> science, and legal mandates has in large part neutralized the impact of those
> educators who have attended to the ends of education? (p. 36)

Despite the fact that supervision is purported to be practiced to create trust, to build community and teamwork, and network teachers, in short, to build a culture of professionalism, supervision nevertheless fulfills a bureaucratic function of personnel evaluation, performance evaluation, and institutional assessment (Starratt, 1992, p. 78). Whether "under the rubric of clinical supervision, human

resource development, democratic supervision, classroom effectiveness supervision, outcomes-based supervision" (Starratt, 1992, p. 77), teacher evaluation essentially upholds a tradition. What is worse, when supervisory "relationship is reinforced in the professional literature by a rationalistic concept of leadership and by bureaucratic models that foster tighter control through standardization and accountability measures in the name of school reform" (p. 79), then teacher professional autonomy is further diminished. Teacher's sense of lived practice (Connelly & Clandinin, 1985, 1988) has been disregarded as worthy indication of the need for change in supervisory policy and practice. What does it take to break out of the cycle of perpetuating power relations between principals and teachers, of discontinuing the debasement of teachers to bureaucratic agendas, hidden or overt?

Accepting the Pedagogical Alternative--Teaching as Moral Craft

If we rely on the logic of bodily felt experience and bodily felt remembrance to come to an understanding of the evaluation experience as an intensely moral activity, we may be closer to understanding what teaching really is. To consider, to envision a pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, Tom (1984) has offered the notion of "moral craft." It is a metaphorical understanding of teaching which asks us to turn away from the historical propensity to study teaching in a value-neutral way and instead accept that "teaching is at heart a virtuous normative practice" (van Manen, 1992, p. 16). Bodily attunement calls for an alternative understanding of teaching, just as it elicits and evokes an understanding of the evaluation experience. That understanding is borne out of moral impulse.

In his *Crisis And New Beginning* (1987), Bollnow said that

Until now education has been understood as a kind of "making," or

production, that is, as a conscious, goal-directed activity. The alternative

conception, however, based on a facilitation of growth, is also not

applicable here. Like production, growth is a process which runs a regular

course, whereas all regularity is disrupted. . . . Pedagogy must include such

irregular processes . . . which it cannot itself bring about, and which in their

essentials it cannot even influence, but which it must understand if it is to

assist growing, maturing human beings in their development. It must at the

same time include the entire environment in which education unfolds.

(p. 166)

Perhaps, we have not been clear enough in describing what it is we are looking for.

Some call it "pedagogy," a word which has become associated with and even used

to replace "teaching" or "education" (van Manen, 1992). Yet, in a North American

sense, we seem to have a rather narrow understanding of teaching as something that

is taught, something that has little to do with the notion of "pedagogic relation."

Except for a few European authors, and even fewer in North America, we are little

closer to understanding and appreciating what a pedagogic relationship is, much

less, and heaven forbid, what it "looks like."

Tom (1984) coined the term "moral craft" to embody a notion of teaching as

a moral act which "subsumes that the goodness or appropriateness of pedagogical

action requires principled moral judgment and critical reflection" (van Manen, 1992,

p. 1). While teachers can be evaluated for technique which may take care of the

craft notion, the moral component remains immeasurable. How do you measure

moral impulse, its capacity, its evidence? Is that what we should be looking for?

Or should we be satisfied to realize that measuring technique measures only the

minimal skills of the trade, so to speak, and those minimal skills determine the

salary level and affect the pedagogic relation only in so far as it is the technique

which is acted through in order to teach? As Tom remarks, "teaching effectiveness

knowledge--should we ever find any--will be inherently trivial, since it is generated

by applying a purely technical perspective to phenomena intimately connected to

underlying human purposes" (p. 72). But it is precisely the division of moral from craft that Tom wishes to avoid. Every act of teaching is a moral one; it affects another person's life experience.

Treating teaching as if it were a quantifiable something which can be exorcised from the teacher is the mechanism which holds teachers in their place. Evaluating them as if craft were the only portion of what they did that mattered, that made a difference to their profession, their promotion, and their tenure, fails to recognize the moral aspect of teaching. Insisting, requiring, mandating that teachers' careers are measured by technique insults not only the pedagogic sensibilities of teachers, but their moral and practical intelligence as well. Teaching cannot be separated from caring and compassion. Teachers understand that it is these instances which seem to have so little to do with evaluation, and yet which are the lifeblood of teaching, that are often not recorded and not seen by administrators. "For some reason those things never make it to the forms," one teacher recalled.

Many administrators say they "know" that someone is a good teacher, that they may not need checklists to prove it. Perhaps the mask of evaluation as professional growth should finally be cast aside. The rhetoric, incidentally, might follow suit. Masking evaluation as something other than judgment of technical skill is dishonest to teachers and to the public who may wish, or need, to understand that teaching is more than measurable technique. Certainly it is easier to measure isolated skills one can visibly see in order to more rationally determine hiring or firing. Perhaps this too, should be unmasked. Sadly though, there are those who would hold the mask in place.

Looking at Evaluation Now

There exists the claim that observation of teachers is not really evaluation (Glatthorn, 1990), that "Evaluation instruments are intended to summarize and judge competence . . . that *Formal evaluation* is performed to determine whether or

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not a teacher measures up to a standard of acceptable work--that is, to sum up the value of the teacher (p. 293). Nothing new. There also exists a belief that classroom visitations, observations that is, should continue to be unannounced to avoid the performance of staged lessons (Glatthorn, 1990). Also nothing new.

Some continue to argue that if formative and summative functions of evaluation were finally separated and conducted by different administrators, then growth, as opposed to judgment, would surely result (Popham, 1988). Even Sergiovanni (1992), who writes of "moral leadership," offers that a formative evaluation holds teachers professionally accountable and is therefore growth-oriented. Bureaucratic accountability, on the other hand, "is not growth-oriented at all but merely seeks to ensure that teachers measure up to some predetermined standard" (p. 305). "With a few changes in basic assumptions," he says, "and with better choices about how to proceed, a professional practice of supervision, designed to be helpful and able to win the confidence of supervisors, teachers, and the public, can emerge" (p. 306). What Sergiovanni and others fail to recognize is that being judged a little, is being judged a lot (Ratsoy et al., 1993). There is no difference between formative and summative judgment. A difference in name is irrelevant to what is felt in experience. Both are judgment. Neither is growth.

After an intensive look at the impact of evaluation practices on Alberta teachers what did the Ratsoy et al. (1993) study recommend?

> In terms of the present policies on teacher evaluation, jurisdictions should retain and refine their teacher evaluation policies for teachers in their first year to the profession and to the jurisdiction, and for teachers requiring particular assistance; however, a moratorium on the routine evaluation of competent teachers using this evaluation as scrutiny perspective should be reconsidered. (p. 295)

While recommending a review of existing evaluation policies for veteran teachers may be admirable, if the policies of evaluation continue to look at teaching as a set of skills, measurable techniques, that ultimately count as indicators that one is finally to be called "teacher" and to be initiated into the teaching profession, what message have we sent teachers and student teachers? What message does the teaching profession continue to send the public? Will not the practice of evaluation as the observation of requisite skills be perpetuated as a practice that narrowly understands pedagogic relationship? It appears that we have not yet taken the teachers' experience of evaluation into our hearts. We have not yet recognized that first experiences, rights of passage and initiation are ever-lasting.

Teachers regard evaluation as an inevitable, perhaps necessary, gate-keeping device and although they suffer ambivalence and tension, they want to ensure quality education and fairness to students. This is part of being a moral educator—a pedagogue. Even in schools where teaching is regarded as a process of professional judgment and administrators believe that teachers are competent, evaluation fractures the trusting and collaborative relationship which administrator and teacher may have developed, or one they may have been trying to cultivate.

Consider Popham's (1993) contention that "because of the nature of a typical instructional event in which a teacher is involved, we are obliged to consider the individual teacher as an instructional *treatment*" (p. 273)--this from the same person, who in 1975 queried the "unthinking adulation of a practice" as revered as motherhood and apple pie! Popham goes on to say: "We simply do not possess the measurement ploys needed to get a good fix on a particular teacher's instructional prowess" (p. 275) but that "in data-gathering for day-to-day assistance to teachers they [observations] can't hurt all that much," (p. 276). Incredible to think that in 1993 Popham would write: "One difficulty with observational techniques is that they rely heavily on intrinsic criteria, that is, the *processes* that the

teacher employs, in contrast to extrinsic criteria, that is, the results that the teacher produces in learners" (p. 277). "Truly effective classroom observation," he offers, "depends on first-rate observation instruments and painstaking lengthy training of observers" to avoid the "fixing versus firing" routine. By sifting through observational evidence one is able to separate "data-wheat from data-chaff." It takes backbone, he says, to get the job of evaluation done.

Perhaps we have not come so far after all. For a public insistent on measurable outcomes, Popham's statements may find a warm reception. To teachers these statements spell doom. It is this continued faith in technical rationality and the disregard for teaching as a moral activity that evaluation continues to serve as the handmaiden of accountability, nothing less, but also nothing more. Evaluation is a mechanism, however sophisticated and organized, which keeps teachers in their place. If we adhere to the notion of teaching as moral craft and our responsibility as educational administrators is to minister to the needs of teachers and students, then our moral and practical responsibility is to ensure the creation of spaces where growth, pedagogic possibility, cannot not only emerge, but flourish.

Chapter Seven

Creating The Space For Possibility

"To have a horizon means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it."

(Gadamer, 1975)

"Enlightened administration ministers to the need for marginal space where tactful pedagogical relations can be sustained. For tactful practices in teaching to be possible, administrators need to learn, not how to 'control' or 'manage' these practices, but how to create the spaces wherein pedagogical relations can 'naturally' emerge."

(van Manen, 1992)

A Different Kind of Visioning

"You wish to see?" he said, "Listen then:
hearing is a step in the direction of vision."

If we understand that "pedagogy does not reside in certain observable behaviors or actions" but "in that which makes the action pedagogic in the first place" (van Manen, 1990, p. 145-146), we may be more willing to accept alternative notions of teaching. With the exception of a very few pedagogues, phenomenologists such as Bollnow (1987), Aoki (1992, 1993), and van Manen (1986, 1991, 1992), we understand very little about pedagogy, except, of course, in practice. Pedagogy encompasses an openness of being with students that evaluation of teaching does not see or allow. I do not mean to suggest that we should completely abandon the wealth of teaching effectiveness literature and ignore what can be learned from execution of technique. But unless we incorporate an understanding of teachers' lived experiences of being evaluated into the evaluation of those techniques, our study of teaching remains narrow and perhaps even empty.

We need to become oriented toward a study of teaching as one of relationship rather than as one of measurement of performance. Defining, or seeking to uncover the essence of a pedagogic relationship as van Manen (1991, 1992) and others are attempting to do, will, I believe, contribute more to understanding teaching and how we might "look" at it rather than continuing to train or judge teachers through sophisticated observational techniques. As van Manen (1992) reminds, "The problem of observability of the pedagogical relation makes it difficult to subject it to scientific measurement or objective evaluation" (p. 13).

Perhaps the most important reason for studies of this sort, for phenomenological investigations into teachers' lived experience of evaluation, is

that they speak the language of being. They are intended to evoke a kinship with human experience that we cannot ignore, but instead take into our hearts. We understand that the process of change is slow and difficult, that it requires perseverance and transformation of ideas and behavior, of constructing and reconstructing new ways to think about teaching (Darling-Hammond, 1990b). But if the wave of reflective practice, which may incorporate all that evaluation does not, is, like clinical supervision, still tied to observation of teaching through technical eyes, then we may only have succeeded in substituting yet another form of rational looking at teaching. We must be sensitive to and mindful of the vision embodied within the eyes of well-meaning collaborators or within those who claim to engender collaboration in others.

Looking at teaching differently may require an awareness and a demand for a gaze of "radically different modality of engagement: presence rather than re-presentation, diffuse attunement, rather than concentrated focus" (Levin, 1988, p. 74). It may involve a conception of education as formation, closer to what Bollnow (1987) described as *Bildung*, where growth in the individual is consonant with growth in humanity. It involves the realization and acknowledgment of the connectedness of phenomenological research to pedagogy, so that even this research is not regarded as *just* how teachers *feel*, but as intimately connected to that which "makes possible a close proximity to praxis" (p. 153). Teachers' lived experience as moral human beings can provide the impulse for moral action by administrators.

Grounding empirical research in the body of lived experience, and more specifically in understanding reached through the body of lived remembrance, is a way "To be in touch with our landscapes [and] to be conscious of our evolving experiences, [in a manner which allows us] to be aware of the ways in which we encounter the world" (Greene, 1978, p. 2). By storying our everyday lived

experiences through narrative we are able to link "individual human actions and events into interrelated aspects of an understandable composite" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 13). Between the primacies of text, perception and action, meaning, to direct moral action, can be derived. Using remembrances derived from bodily felt experience to describe what lies at the essence of the evaluation experiences calls on each of us to create our own images of embodied meaning and understanding in a way that allows administrators and teachers to connect in shared understanding of what the experience of evaluation means. Through feeling we see things differently.

Listening to teachers' lived experiences of evaluation, as a kind of looking, helps us to recognize that teaching is a relationship which occurs at a point beyond technique. It may be just that which we cannot see. Our primary task as administrators, then, "as visionary beings" may be to become the "keepers of the invisible" (Levin, 1988, p. 253). Our responsibility to teachers is to relentlessly guard that which we cannot see but to create the spaces where the invisible can emerge. As Greene (1973) said, "teaching happens when praxis opens into what has not yet been" (p. 172). Instead of casting an eye, perhaps we should consider, as Straus (in Levin, 1989) suggested, to lend an ear. There is a wisdom in listening that emphasizes the communicativeness of hearing over the possessiveness of vision (Levin, 1989). This kind of listening, closer to Heidegger's notion of hearkening, asks us to "break away from the self-centredness of our tradition, a humanism which, since the beginning of modernity, has conceived the 'Self' of this centredness in terms of egoity" (p. 64).

Instead, we need to decenter ourselves to the openness of Being. By opening our vision (Levin, 1988) of teaching we begin to hear one another, "experience a new *sense* of ourselves, of who, most deeply, we are: not only individuals, different from all others, but human beings, sharing in the flesh, the

anonymous intercorporeal subjectivity, of the world" (p. 179). It is this connectedness to humanity that we often overlook, but one that lies profoundly at the heart of teaching. Think about some of those most special times in your life when words were unnecessary, when silence spoke louder than words. And then think about those times in your life when you did not have to see, you just knew. It is this silent seeing and this silent knowing that makes experience "resonate" from one human being to another (van Manen, 1990). It is this kind of looking through listening to which Levin (1988) referred.

It is a kind of looking that I believe I have experienced. It happened long ago when I was a child performer at a music festival. My sister, a friend and I sang as a trio. We had no formal training; we were just three farm kids who could sing. Festival was a time you tried to look your best. I remember choosing my outfit with exceptional care--a navy dress with orange piping and matching orange stockings. They were very special stockings which had come from Montreal. They had lain in a special white box in my bottom bureau drawer just waiting for a special time to wear them. I would peek at them occasionally, and admire the tiny threads of silver woven into the silk, and when it came time to finally put them on I was worried that I might snag them on a wooden chair while we sat waiting our turn to sing.

A large choir sang before us. They were well-trained and professional, that was clear. Then it was our turn. Nervous, we stood together on the stage. It was big and we were small. "Julianne" began rather timidly, but soon our song brought smiles from the crowd. Into the second verse the adjudicator pushed back his chair, and listened. But it was not his smile that I saw.

It was the giggles from the girls in front who caught my eye. It seemed that my stockings were too bright or too orange or just too something. Suddenly the words and harmony of "Julianne" were breaking into parts. I could not put away

their pointed looking, could not shake their stares. Our stage that had been a place of song became a place of parts.

The adjudicator, though, saw something different. He had put down his pen. His head moved in lilt with ours. It was not orange stockings that he saw.

Could it be that in his looking he looked beyond what we performed to what attuned to something deep inside of him? Could it be that he did not judge at all, but instead sang silently with us? Had he become the person who did not judge, but one who became united with us (Gadamer, 1975)? Perhaps this kind of looking is what listens to the pedagogic call.

Where Listening To Experience Points

The teacher's experience of going through a formal performance evaluation has historically been discounted. Personal experiences and feelings have largely been irrelevant to a scientific view of teaching and to what counted in how we looked at teachers. But as researchers broaden their perspectives and metaphorical analyses of teaching, phenomenal human experience, in this case, that of being evaluated, becomes increasingly important.

Seeing as Understanding: Addressing the Moral Dilemmas

If we understand that what is ultimately achieved in formally observing teachers is the perpetuation of constrained notions of both pedagogy and pedagogue, we, as educational administrators, may be moved to act on the knowledge gained from understanding this phenomenal experience. Our challenge is to fuse existential with organizational and administrative horizons, to incorporate the teacher's lived experience into thoughtful, caring administrative action. That challenge may begin by overcoming personal dissonance.

When truth is disclosed, as in the Heideggerian sense of coming into unconcealment (Heidegger, 1977), human experience is cast in new light, and seeing as understanding is changed. With deeper understanding we may experience

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dissonance; we may no longer be comfortable with the thoughts or beliefs we once held to be true. In this case, the uncertainties and ambiguities experienced by teachers in being evaluated, may collide what we had hoped evaluation would do and with what we had hoped the evaluation process would achieve. As educational administrators, we are compelled to address the illusion and paradox surrounding this formal kind of "looking to see." Ultimately, we may be called upon to rethink the practice of formal teacher performance evaluation.

This does not mean that I am about to offer lists of "should do's" or "ought to's," as then I would fall victim to the very things that preyed on me as a teacher going through a formal performance evaluation. You might also conclude that what I had set out to do in the very beginning of this research, was to come up with some definitive answer or solution to the problems surrounding evaluation practice. That was not my intent. In the beginning I sought only to understand. But now, at this research draws to a close, understanding seems incomplete. And herein lies the tension of concluding this research.

It has to do with welcoming incompleteness and thriving on what is not yet (Greene, 1978). Phenomenological research asks that I be satisfied, even exhilarated, with perpetual beginning. And while this notion fits well with Gadamer's (1989) allowing the question to remain open to itself, this particular investigation beckons resolve. I find myself asking, if I now understand the teacher's experience of being evaluated, what do I do with this understanding? Am I moved, even compelled, to some course of action because I *now do* understand?

For the impartial reader, I might be satisfied that a superficial appreciation of what the teacher experiences be gained. But for the engaged participant, the reader who has become involved in this question and its journey, insight and introspection may thrust one to ponder the whole issue of what it is like to be on the receiving end of the look. One might even be moved to reconsider putting teachers through

t<.is process. And while I hope it has become abundantly clear that evaluation of this kind is counter-productive to teacher growth, and more importantly, that what is seen during formal performance evaluation is not really teaching, but a facsimile of it, I still suffer the incredible dissonance of knowing, that as supervisor, I want to "see" my teachers teach. I must know what is going on inside their rooms.

As administrator, I can appreciate the teacher's uncomfortableness, nervousness, resentment and the artificiality of it all, but I also know that I have an obligation to fulfill--one to students, to parents, and one to my superiors as well. Despite the fact that I want to sleep peacefully at night, secure in the thought that I have done my best to establish a caring environment in which my teachers are treated fairly and with respect, is not my first responsibility to students? Is it not for them, *in loco parentis*, that my legal and moral responsibility is to confirm that teaching, good teaching, is taking place in my school? I am obliged to follow the rules and procedures of due process, and use the "proof" of what I have seen, as license to promote or dismiss. But now that I understand what it means to be observed, I cannot avoid questioning the integrity and purpose of the very kind of looking I am obliged to do. Must I sacrifice moral obligation to teachers to fulfill moral and legal responsibility to students? It is not an easy tension.

I can sit behind my desk protected by the sign on the door that says "Principal," but can I ignore what I have learned from this experience, ignore the sinking smile on my teacher's face when I say, "It's time for me to come and see you again"? Perhaps this looking asks too much of me. If understanding leads to little or nothing that I can "do" in my school, what good is understanding this phenomenon anyway! How am I to look at teachers in a way that does not shut down their possibilities, in a way that is fair to students, meaningful to those who already understand what it means to teach, and communicable to those who do not? Perhaps, at its core, accountability is not the burning issue. Perhaps, what lies at

the heart of this question of the evaluative look in teacher evaluation, is that we do not really know what it is we are looking for, or that if we do, we do not yet have the words to explain it in a publicly defensible manner. How am I to reconcile action with understanding?

Looking Differently: Places to Start

My task as administrator, as visionary being, is to deal with tension, ambivalence, uncertainty. It is also my task to ensure that quality instruction happens in classrooms. But if I am to avoid voyeuristic descriptions of pedagogy and pedagogues, and to curtail evaluative looking at teachers, I must begin to look at teaching and at teachers differently. I must be responsible to bridge the gap between research and practice. I must use research of this kind, phenomenological research, which relies on bodily felt experience to understand what it means to be with children, to come to understand teaching as a moral craft already subsuming moral judgment and critical reflection, in order to understand why it is I must look beyond technique into the teaching relationship which I so desperately want to see. I must realize and acknowledge the connectedness of phenomenological research to pedagogy, understand that phenomenological research is not *just* how teachers *feel*, but believe that it is the logical precursor to policy-making. This lived experience of teachers can provide the impulse for moral action of administrators towards teachers. It can inform educational administration in general. It is this connectedness of self to other that evaluation has most profoundly overlooked in evaluation. It is that same connectedness of one to a larger humanity which lies profoundly at the heart of pedagogic relationship. If it is that relationship that I want to look into, to see, then I must begin the task of pedagogic looking.

Developing a Language of Being and Becoming

If teaching is reconceived to be a "mindful watching" (Aoki, 1992, 1993), we might begin to look at teaching in a way that concentrates on relationship

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between teacher and student, rather than on the execution of specific skills to meet particular objectives. In the past, an applied science model of "effective" teaching strategies has described teaching in instrumental language. While that language has helped to project a public image of "rational thought and institutional efficiency," (Popkewitz, 1987, p. 11) it has brought us little closer to understanding and describing how teachers *are* with students. It is this *being* that is so difficult to explain. And yet, "moral craft" (Tom, 1984), "pedagogical thoughtfulness," and "tact" (van Manen, 1991, 1992) seem more appropriate words to point to what lies at the heart of teaching, words more appropriate to capture relationship between teacher and student. Would not developing the language of teaching, then, reframing it in relationship, meaningfully congruent with what teachers already understand to be true in practice, help to lift the guise of clinical beneficence and empirical certainty (St. Maurice, 1987)? The language of relationship, while admittedly still in infancy, is nevertheless, already available to us to use and incorporate into how we describe teaching and how we might begin to look at it.

For example, if I listen to the tone of the teacher's voice, listen to the questions being asked of students, how they are asked, to whom they are addressed, with what purpose and expectation of wanting the student to succeed and grow, would I not come to better understand teaching as mindful action? It seems that in the orientation of teacher to student, in those unplannable moments, that I am able to sense, more than see, how teachers stand open to students and their potentials. It is in the wisdom of those moments that the teacher chooses to act pedagogically, chooses to comment or offer criticism, or to allow self-experience to speak to the child. In observing those instances, I might be better able to see *into* relationship. The teacher is not the target in this kind of watching; instead what goes on *between* teacher and student is what counts. The skills, the how-to's, merely become the vehicles of "looking into"--the modes of transportation, not the

destination in themselves. I do not mean to suggest that the techniques of teaching are unimportant, or that seeing mainly technique assumes a lack of care and compassion in how a teacher interacts with his or her students. What I am suggesting, however, is that the voyage of looking into, may be contrary to what traditional school structures are prepared to allow and accept.

Reforming Administrative Structure

"Structure," itself, has been conceived in different ways. One perspective is that structure constrains how relationships develop and thrive (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Burbules, 1986). Many educators realize this and advocate the dissolution of administrative hierarchies altogether (Elmore, 1991; Gitlin & Smyth, 1989; Glickman, 1993; Lieberman, 1988; Sergiovanni, 1992). An alternative view of structure and organization theory is that offered by Greenfield (Greenfield & Ribbins, 1993). He posits that social scientists have forgotten the experiential basis of ideas used to interpret reality, knowledge and understanding, ideas which subsequently serve to guide or organize and, therefore, predict human behavior within organizations. Such structuralist-functionalist thinking, in Greenfield's view, is the "ideological hegemony [underlying] administrative studies" (p. 76), the same kind of thinking that has led to sterile research about people in organizations--in this case, about teachers in schools.

When the organization of school is viewed in a fixed and functionalist way, and experienced in this way, as the teachers in this study did, the "moral order" of watching and evaluating teachers "is seen not only as right but as effective" (Greenfield & Ribbins, 1993, p. 55) in serving the needs of the organization as if it were an entity quite separate from the people who compose it. Looking at schools and teachers' classrooms as if there was an inside and an outside, prohibits a shared kind of looking at what happens between teachers and children. What I do not think we understand well enough about schools, as organizations, and classrooms

as part of administrative structures, is that what lies at the root of perpetuating hierarchical relationships between supervisors and teachers, is evaluative looking-- the kind of looking that teachers in this study experienced.

If, however, we reconceive the organization of school as resting on experience, as Greenfield has suggested, on "how we come to understand what we do and what is happening to us" (Greenfield & Ribbins, 1993, p. 55), then listening to the evaluation experience of teachers, points to the need to reframe and reform the structure, since it no longer serves its intended purpose, that is, to value and professionally develop teachers. When teachers are considered neither the legitimate creators of the language used to describe their practice, nor enfranchised to judge their practice, personal practical knowledge (Clandinin, 1986, 1991; Elbaz, 1983) is forsaken. Gone with it, the opportunities for self-evaluation and, therefore, self-autonomy. Absent, as well, is the opportunity, the invitation, to look together.

What is called for, then, is a shift in power relations, a relinquishment of authority of administrators to classroom teachers. What is required in schools to break what Foucault called "regimes of truth," or codes that govern the hierarchy of practice (Popkewitz, 1987), is a flattening of administrative structure and a rethinking of the purpose of "supervision" as it relates to teacher evaluation. To begin, this may mean that teachers and administrators assume at least equal opportunity and responsibility to judge classroom practice. Ideally, evaluation would be practiced as a dialogic enterprise in which all stakeholders involved in the teaching/learning process have input into decisions regarding instruction--that is, teachers, administrators, students, parents, trustees, government. It seems to me that relationship, pedagogic relationship, is not limited to what happens within classroom walls.

These thoughts are not new (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989; Fullan & Hargreaves, 1991); they have been offered before. But as the teacher evaluation policy impact study has revealed, (Ratsoy et al., 1993), they are slow to materialize. Sarason (1990) believes that school systems are incapable of this kind of reform. He has predicted that nothing short of radical and total reconfiguration of educational hierarchies will ever confront the intractabilities of school systems. Even teachers themselves may be reluctant to assume control over judging their own practice. While self-evaluation sounds good in theory, the impact of peer observation, for example, has yet to be explored in an experiential way. It may just be that the teachers' experience of peer observation is little different than that conducted by a supervisor.

These concerns aside, however, I suspect that the greatest resistance to reform of this sort may continue to arise from the public sector. Given the privileges of equal rights and equal voice in a democratic society, at least in principle if not in practice, it seems that everyone, if not already a judge of teachers and of teaching, has something significant to say about what good teaching is. From hockey rinks, to Parliament, there seems to be no shortage of those who would judge teaching and teachers. And perhaps that has been one of the greatest obstacles of all to teachers taking control of their own evaluative practice. The tension of public versus private has pitted professional teacher against non-professional for a long time. Admittedly, the teaching profession has encountered great difficulty in being publicly accepted as a profession, let alone a self-governing one (Densmore, 1987).

For Strike (1991) a profession is characterized by possession of an esoteric knowledge base, substantial training for entrance, a professional organization which speaks authoritatively for the occupation, a code of ethics, significant autonomy, and an orientation to client welfare. For us, this means organizing

ourselves as a self-regulating profession, a notion in conflict with democratic/bureaucratic authority. As publicly-funded institutions, schools have had to bow to public demand for visible achievement of such things as higher math and science scores. Public discourse about teaching has steered away from a conception of teaching as relationship. Strike (1991) believes this is due, in part, to the ethics of teaching being "internal to the practice and the knowledge base of teaching," which makes it difficult to "distinguish between those goals that teaching attempts to promote, the ethical principles that govern practice, and the techniques of teaching" (p. 106). It may be that in a moral-based skills craft, as Tom (1984) has described teaching, the only aspect of teaching which those without contextual knowledge of what the practice itself entails, is the technical part, or those aspects most visible to the technical eye. An unenlightened eye may look for the technical measures of success--where the school ranks in comparison to others on provincial test scores or on national averages, for example. Since pedagogic relation seems to play a very minor role in judgments of teaching of this sort, our challenge, as educational administrators, may be to re-introduce, re-integrate, and re-focus on the notion of pedagogic relationship as it overlays the techniques of teaching, since we already understand that without the gift of relationship, technique is only, ever, empty teaching (Brophy, 1984).

Understanding Pedagogy for Possibility

Initially, I began this section by writing about helping teachers to become self-evaluative through re-professionalizing the teaching profession. Both notions embodied what I wanted to say about improving the quality of teachers going into classrooms. I wanted to say that being able to draw upon a cohort of intelligent, critically reflective individuals, student teachers, would enable the teaching profession to become perpetually self-critical and therefore, self-autonomous. Also, I wanted to say that more stringent entrance requirements into teacher

education programs are required, together with a reconceptualisation of teaching cast realistically in terms of messy business, ambiguous, neither consistent, nor value-free, where no 'control' group seems to exist, where even expert teachers have difficulty explaining exactly what it is they do (Berliner, 1990). I also wanted to say that if our intent is to introduce student teachers to the real world of practice, where technique is only one tool among many and not the screening mechanism into the profession, would it not make more sense to initiate teachers into the profession through a rigorous process of mentorship and apprenticeship where the student of teaching lives and functions within a community of learners (Barth, 1990), that is, within the school? It made sense to me that learning to teach should involve immersion in a teaching relationship within the context of where teaching takes place, that is, in classrooms. It made equally good sense to me that helping student teachers make sense of teaching *as* relationship might be achieved through developing the skills of reflective practice (Connelly & Clandinin, 1985, 1988; Schon, 1987), through investigating the impact of autobiography (Raymond, Butt, & Townsend, 1992) and teacher lore (Schubert & Ayers, 1992) on personal practical knowledge (Clandinin, 1986), and especially on existential growth. Is it not this process and these skills, in particular, that would better prepare student teachers to become self-critical and therefore capable of self-evaluation?

But as I was forming and writing these ideas, I was moved to question the suggestions I was making. Do not "apprenticeship" and "mentorship" already embody the notion of guide, or miser of knowledge, and of judgment? In my effort to release teachers from evaluative looking, in my fervent desire to suggest how administrators might help teachers to become autonomous, who ultimately decides when a teacher is ready to teach, has the necessary skills and the level of human compassion required to enter a classroom to act tactfully *in loco parentis?"* Can there be any greater responsibility than that we would endow another to act in our

place as parent of our children? To whom should the right of this decision be granted?

The task of educational administration is not an easy one, but perhaps it does not have to be such a lonely one. If I hold fast to my belief that teacher preparation programs can involve apprenticeship and mentorship, and that through them a language of teaching is legitimated through what teachers already understand to be true in practice, might not this living and learning in classrooms not communicate clearly to the public that "being with students" is part of how one becomes a teacher and how one is initiated into the teaching profession? Perhaps these concerns stray beyond the scope of this study, but surely, they might be seen as stepping stones to begin to develop a professional culture of teaching (Lieberman, 1988) where inside/outside boundaries between teaching and the judgment of it, dissolve, and administrative structures are seen as fluid rather than fixed.

Revisioning as Accepting Change

Restructuring and reconceptualisation of this kind may mean abdication of the role of supervisor for administrators, and assumption, instead, of the role of facilitator or creator of spaces where relationship between teacher and student is allowed to flourish, and where opportunity for reflection and dialogue become the status quo. Essentially, for administrators and for teachers, it may mean a radical shift in supervisory responsibility.

Advocating change of this magnitude is, of course, risky (Fullan, 1993). As administrators, we must ask ourselves if we have the courage to create the same kind of "consensual domain" (Garman, 1990) built on trust and faith between schools and the public, as that which must exist between teachers and supervisors in order for teaching be reconceived and evaluated in a pedagogic way. As educational leaders, if we are to bring about change in schools, in how things are

done, we must re-examine how we conceive teaching and how we orient ourselves to seeing it.

The essence of teaching, as Aoki (1992) said, is a reorienting to seeing as a kind of "attunement to the care that silently dwells" (Aoki, 1992, p. 22)--a notion perhaps too ethereal, too unrealistic for many to accept. But not adopting alternative ways of looking for teaching and looking at teachers, simply distances us even further from what it is we wish to see most of all. What is more, revisioning teaching in ways more meaningful to those who teach and more understandable to those who do not, can only mean that teachers are better understood as well.

In taking the evaluation experience of teachers to heart, in believing that teaching exists as and in relationship, in confirming that teachers are legitimate judges of their own practice, in feeling confident that teachers have gone through a rigorous process of mentorship and apprenticeship to be called "teacher" in the first place, we may feel no need to "super-vise" at all. As Fullan (1993) has said, change is accomplished through the "capacity to suspend belief, take risks, and experience the unknown" (p. 17). Alternative looking at teachers is a journey that awaits.

Epilogue: Completing The Circle

"An imaginativeness, an awareness, and a sense of possibility are required, along with a sense of autonomy and agency, of being present to the self."

(Greene, 1978)

The Final Leg

Phenomenological journeys are practices of the Self (Foucault, 1977). I hope, though, that I have not taken this journey alone. It has been my intent for you to join this study, to have you enter into my horizon into a "new circle, incorporating a new, *mutually constituted* body of understanding" (Levin, 1992, p. 6), or into what Gadamer (1975) referred to as a "shared horizon." It has also been my intent that we achieve this look at evaluation through "an intentionality trustingly open to the world and embraced by the world in its wholeness" (Levin, 1992, p. 13). It is a moral kind of looking that connects us, one that reminds us not to marginalize the teachers' experience of objectification, of devaluing, of the creation of impossibility for growth. It is an encouragement to question the taken-for-grantedness of evaluation as improvement of instruction and as professional growth and to dispel the myths which surround the practice. Unmasking the illusions, speaking to the silent paradox asks us to consider teaching as a moral craft and administrative practice as

> one that will free persons to understand the ways in which each of [us] reaches out from [our] location to constitute a common continent, a common world . . . to be responsive to consciously incarnated principles of freedom, justice, and regard for others . . . [in] ways [that] may be opened for *praxis*, for bringing the world closer to heart's desire. (Greene, 1978, p. 71)

In that heart's desire is our awakeness of our freedom, a being responsible to our own lived lives to create the space for us to be authentically ourselves. It involves a changed worldview, a journey into the pedagogy of possibility (Giroux & Simon, 1989). Others are encouraged "to be true to themselves, so that they may develop their ownmost potentialities" (Levin, 1988, p. 439).

While concerns for public accountability will be ever-present, the creation of pedagogic spaces may involve journeys of different kinds than conventionally exist

in many schools. We must rely on our lived experiences to provide an ethical course of action that opens pedagogic spaces. If childhood "is the gift of our emerging body of understanding, a grounding for ethics that we have only begun to realize" (Levin, 1992, p. 15), then the words of childhood experience, may already embody the creation of those spaces. For this study, let us take one final journey with a child.

A Journey to the Possible: Exploring the Enhancing Look

I could not help but think that I had been given, and perhaps even chosen, a task that was much beyond me. I should have walked; driving was simply not what I did. I could not even reach the foot pedals, at least not comfortably, and I certainly could not see clearly through the windshield.

Spring trail ride was a time my family enjoyed, a time my mother, whose job it usually was to drive, had chosen, instead, to walk. I had become entrusted to perform the duty of driver. It was my job to bring the truck loaded with the lunch to the riders at the top of the hill. More importantly, the truck was used to haul the calves that had become too tired to walk the entire way up the hill. It was not just any hill, though. It was a three-mile hill, the "Bull Trail," and exactly as it sounded, it was little more than a trail through the woods.

I should have feigned bravery, yelled all those inane sounding, cow-trailing yells everyone else did. Then I would not have had to drive. I suppose, though, my high-pitched squeak would have given me away. The truth was, if you really want to know it, I was afraid of horses. Walking seemed like an attractive alternative.

I had made it up the hill on foot. I stayed close to the fence so that I could jump over if the cattle decided to stampede. But the walk back down was actually quite pleasant. Crocuses were blooming, the sun was melting what was left of the snow, the smell of evergreen was strong and fresh, and except for the crow, it was

quiet. I listened to the sound of my pant legs rubbing, imagined the early fur traders and settlers who might have walked exactly where I did. They might have worn leather pants, carried rifles and cast iron pots, and might even have been followed by a Sioux warrior or two. My grandfather told me the ruts in the prairie had been left by their wagons, but I had not believed him. It was not in any history books I had read.

But enough daydreaming. I had a job to do, one I did not seem to be doing very well. It did not matter in which order I performed the routine, I could not make the truck move forward. Hit the gas, lift the clutch, take my foot off the brake. Nothing. Each time I came to a grinding halt. I would have given up if it had it not been for the smoke.

"My God I'm on fire!" was my first thought.

Now what!? Jump? Rescue the calves? Throw out the lunch? What do I do?

I jumped out of the truck, raced to the other door and began flinging out whatever came first--extra coats, shirts, gloves, and then the lunch. As I set about to dart back to the driver's side I saw a rider approaching, fast.

"I just can't make it go!" I stammered, flailing my hands uselessly in front of me. My father handed me his reins. Wordlessly he got into the truck, released a red lever on the floor, drove it a few feet and stopped.

The emergency brake.

You idiot, I said to myself.

He took back his reins, and over his shoulder yelled as he galloped off, "Try compound low."

"Compound low." I stood in disbelief, "What was compound low?"

The letters on the gear shift knob had long since worn off, but there was an indentation below where 'L' had been. That must be it. I let the clutch out slowly

and, "Easy now," I coached, "More gas, more gas!" And wonder of wonders, we were off.

The trees sent up a silent cheer for me. The calves lurched and stumbled in the back. I did not care. I was explorer, pathfinder. How marvelous it felt. We jostled round one corner then around the next. I moved from first gear to second and even toyed with third. Then I rolled down the window and rested my elbow on the frame like I knew what I was doing. As I overtook my father up the last leg of the hill I could see a tiny smile play at the corner of his mouth. He did not look at me. He did not say a word.

Coda

That day will always be a special one for me. I did not think that I could do what I was called to do. There were no fences to bar my way, no looks that held me prisoner, no words that cut me short. There was just faith, a little risk (and someone to release the brake).

Evaluation does not have to remove teachers from the contexts of their lived lives. It does not have to strip them of their dignity or their fundamental worth. Opening the possibilities for growth begins in understanding built on trust in the integrity of teachers and faith in the potential of their becoming. It begins in understanding experience and appropriating that understanding to the journey of transforming the evaluative look into an enhancing look, a look of becoming that opens a journey into possibility.

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Appendix

An analysis of teacher evaluation policies throughout Alberta school jurisdictions (Ratsoy et al., 1993) revealed that "the most frequently declared for the policy was Improvement of instruction (88.5%)," (p. 32). The most frequently specified guidelines focussed on legal implications "(disposition of reports, access to reports, specification of criteria and schedules, etc.)" (p. 32). Of the one hundred thirty teacher evaluation policies analyzed, 45.9% encouraged teacher self-evaluation and 25.6% peer evaluation. Almost all (98.5%) policies specified the principal, followed by the superintendent, as the person who would conduct teacher evaluations. As the Ratsoy et al. study (1993) indicates, "Although the most often declared purpose for teacher evaluation in Alberta is Improvement of instruction, a closer examination indicates that the main purpose for school jurisdictions is to discharge their legal responsibilities as they pertain to contractual matters, fair personnel decision making, and to the matter of certification" (p. 33).

The following are excerpts and lists of criteria taken from various teacher evaluation policies analyzed in the Ratsoy et al. (1993) study. They provide examples of characteristics, qualities, responsibilities and duties on which evaluators base their comments and judgments of teacher performance derived from classroom observations. Teachers usually confirm that they have read and acknowledged evaluators' summaries by signing their names to the final documents which are then submitted to the Superintendent.

SAMPLE:

Formative evaluation shall be documentation for the purpose of recognizing excellence in teaching and the improvement of teacher effectiveness.

Summative evaluation shall provide the basis for promotion, transfer, tenure or termination.

SAMPLE:

Lesson Preparation:
___ Prepares daily, unit, and long range plans appropriate to the subject, class, and teacher's experience.
___ Refers to, and follows, provincial and local curriculum.
___ Chooses appropriate objectives and learning strategies.
___ Makes objectives known to students.

Classroom Procedures:
___ Attempts to meet needs of individual students.
___ Uses a variety of teaching techniques.
___ Provides for student participation in each lesson.
___ Communicates effectively with students.

Classroom Climates:
___ Provides for purposeful activity.
___ Commands students' attention.
___ Has rapport with students.
___ Shows respect for the individual.
___ Establishes classroom routines which lead to appropriate student deportment.

General Effectiveness:
___ Exemplified good personal hygiene and appearance.
___ Makes progress towards objectives of the lesson.
___ Shows evidence of background knowledge.
___ Provides a stimulating learning environment, i.e. physical setting.

Other Professional Responsibilities:
___ Demonstrates knowledge of and ensures that district and school policies and guidelines are followed.
___ Takes active part in co-curricular program.
___ Grows professionally, i.e. in-service, etc.
___ Has rapport with colleagues, administration, and parents.

SAMPLE:

I have read and discussed the report with the evaluator and have received a copy of this document.

Comments:

Teacher's signature: _____Date:_____

SAMPLE:

A. Long Range Plans:
___reflect the curriculum guide
___provide evidence of organization
___follow a logical sequence
___have a built in timeline
___include field trips, major activities, materials, supplies and other resources
___have built in flexibility
___provide a rational scheme for student evaluation

B. Short Range Plans:
___include student objectives
___reflect needs of whole class
___provide for individual students
___must be flexible enough to let a teacher take advantage of the moment
___need not be written out in detail

SAMPLE:

Lesson Preparation
___teacher has chosen method of presentation after considering lesson objectives
___material presented in the lesson encompasses a range of difficulty to challenge
         and motivate all students
___directions are clear
___students know what they are to learn and why
___teacher exhibits a positive style
___language used by the teacher is appropriate to the level of the student and to the
         subject being taught
___pace of activities is appropriate
___teacher includes closure

Classroom Management
___students are aware of what they are to do
___rules are applied consistently, but not inflexibly
___classroom climate promotes learning
___teacher appears to have a mental picture of all activities within the classroom
___effective classroom management does not have to be overt

Professional and Personal Qualities
___demonstrates commitment to teaching as a career
___people oriented not process oriented
___has earned trust and respect from his/her colleagues
___contribution to the total school environment extends beyond the classroom
___good citizen and leader in the community

SAMPLE:

CRITERIA:	CRITERIA COMPONENTS:
Professional and Personal Qualities	-commitment to education -poise and confidence -shows initiative -projects enthusiasm -grooming, dependability and punctuality -reflects and acts upon supervisory suggestions -relationship with school staff -co-curricular/extra-curricular involvement
Planning and Teaching	-appropriateness of objectives -sequencing of topics division of lessons (short- term and long-term) -designs appropriate student and teacher activities evaluation procedures -demonstrates knowledge of subject area -suitability of content
Teaching Skills and Strategies	-introduction -motivation -clarity of illustrations/explanations -checks for understanding -distributes questions throughout class -effective use of questioning strategies -etc.
Communication	-command of language -quality of voice -enunciation and pronunciation -appropriateness of language -printing/handwriting/graphics -non-verbal (gestures) -etc.
Relationship	-shows empathy and develops climate for mutual respect -demonstrates an awareness for individual differences and needs -develops and maintains an environment that secures class attention

SAMPLE:

Learning Environment
a. noise level
b. student-teacher interaction
c. patience, courtesy, tact
d. identification of student difficulties
e. individual assistance and guidance
f. motivation of students to learn to develop positive self-image

Classroom Management
a. discipline
b. handling of routines
c. room appearance/organization
d. room environment/displays/decorations

Student Evaluation
a. implementation of and adherence to policy

Personal/Professional
a. attitude, enthusiasm
b. communication skills
c. response to supervision
d. appearance and mannerisms
e. relationship with students, teachers, parents, and others
f. punctuality

SAMPLE:

Personal Characteristics

-poise and confidence
-flexibility
-initiative
-responsible, independence
-professional commitment
-capacity to work
-attendance and punctuality
-personal involvement and commitment
-respected and respectful

SAMPLE:

Yes   Somewhat   No   Uses a wide variety of strategies including lectures, demonstrations, small group, individual interest centers, etc.

SAMPLE:

E (Exemplary) - Superior performance.
S (Satisfactory) - Indicates performance which meets or that reasonably
 expected of a well trained individual and is commensurate with experience.
NI (Needs Improvement) - Indicates performance below that reasonably
 expected of a well trained individual with similar experience.
U (Unacceptable) - Indicates performance totally incongruent with professional
 responsibilities and/or district expectations.
N/A (Not Applicable) - was not observed or discussed with the teacher during
 the assessment cycle.

	E	S	NI	U	N/A

Preparation for Teaching
1. knowledge of subject area
2. curriculum requirements followed
3. long range objectives
4. daily planning
5. knowledge of learning/behavioral
characteristics of students
6. diagnosis of learning requirements
and adaptation of lessons to suit
7. prescribed resources supplementary when
necessary
8. required resources available

Lesson Presentation Skills
1. introduction & motivation
2. clarity of objectives
3. subject development and presentation
4. monitoring student understanding
5. student participation
6. appropriate independent practice
7. questioning techniques
8. use of instructional media
9. lesson summary (closure)

Interaction with Pupils
1. guidelines for behavior established
2. appropriateness of communication
3. evidence of respect
4. reinforcement of appropriate behavior
5. assistance for students in developing positive
attitudes toward self, others, and work.
etc.

SAMPLE:

A CHECKLIST FOR DOING CLASSROOM OBSERVATIONS

When observing in the classroom a principal or supervisor usually notices:

1. the general appearance of the room
2. classroom organization by the teacher
3. classroom management and control
4. independent work of pupils and general interest level being shown
5. "atmosphere" or climate or feeling of the classroom
6. daily lesson plans
7. teacher's presentation of the lessons to be learned
8. teacher's use and kinds of questions
9. positive use of students' answers, ideas, and suggestions
10. creativeness of the teacher
11. rhythm of the daily schedule: active time, quiet time, subject arrangement
etc.

SAMPLE:

A. PLANNING AND ORGANIZING CLASS WORK
1. Careful   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Careless   N
2. Purposeful__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Aimless   N
3. Systematic __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Dogmatic   N
4. Cooperative__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Antagonistic   N
5. Original   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Unimaginative N
6. Productive __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Unproductive N

Comments:

B. CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT
1. Punctual   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Tardy   N
2. Control   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Disorderly   N
3. Consistent __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Inconsistent   N
4. Calm   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Excitable   N
5. Flexible   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Fixed   N
6. Fair   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Partial   N
7. Warm   __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Hostile   N
8. Responsive __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Indifferent   N
9. Objective __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Subjective   N