John Dewey and G.E. Moore were the moral lions of two competing philosophical schools, who did not cooperate, correspond, or regularly meet. Dewey, a founder of classic American Pragmatism devoted his mature philosophy to naturalizing neo-Hegelian ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics to eliminate dualisms between the right and the good, the knower and the known, experience and reality. Moore was just as devotedly rebuilding those distinctions on a neo-realist foundation. So different did their aims and methods once seem that it was with difficulty (if at all) that the followers of one could credit the other with practicing ‘philosophy’ at all, let alone philosophy worthy of attention. None would have supposed that the views of either could be illuminated by study of the other. Thus the coincidence of both men publishing in 1903 what were to prove seminal works of their respective moral philosophies, Moore’s *Principia Ethica* and Dewey’s “The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality,”¹ has not received any particular comment. But with the benefit of hindsight, we recognize that the distinctions which so impressed their followers were often simply variations on common themes. In the case of Moore’s *Principia* and Dewey’s “Scientific Treatment of Morality,” the texts are variations on one theme in particular: the problem of reconciling scientific and moral knowledge in such a way as to justify the autonomy of moral inquiry.

No philosopher beginning his or her career before the end of the nineteenth century could ignore the prestige of the physical sciences or their tremendous impact on intellectual, social, and economic life.

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As Dewey once remarked, for his generation it was “a commonplace to speak of the crisis which has been caused by the progress of the natural sciences... This effect of modern science has, it is notorious, set the main problems for modern philosophy. How is science to be accepted and yet the realm of values to be conserved? This question forms the philosophical version of the popular conflict of religion and science.”2 But this obscures the more immediate professional problem it posed for Dewey in the 1880’s and Moore in the 1890’s as each prepared for a philosophical career.

When Dewey began his graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University in 1882, the survival of philosophy in the modern university was uncertain. G.S. Morris, a theist idealist and G. Stanley Hall, a Darwinian empiricist, were joint holders of half-year appointments to the chair in philosophy and joint competitors for its sole possession. Because absolute idealism is today best-recalled for its defense of theistic metaphysics and Christian virtues, it has been thought that to the University’s President and Board of Trustees, it was a choice between religion as represented by Morris and science as represented by Hall. Hall’s eventual appointment is thus seen as a victory for philosophy as an independent discipline. But this view is mistaken. No American university President in the 1880’s could afford to choose ‘science’ over ‘religion.’ Hall was a serious candidate for the post not because he was a Darwinian and an experimentalist, but because he was a Darwinian experimentalist with a degree in divinity. Hall’s appointment did not symbolize the victory of science or philosophy over religion, but rather the victory of science and religion over philosophy. Since the university’s need for instruction in both mental and moral theory could be provided by Hall, philosophy was a luxury the perennially cash-strapped university could do without. For Dewey, the professional crisis was starkly immediate. Science allied with religion was threatening to make philosophy obsolete.

For Moore, arriving in Cambridge a decade later, the professional issue was different. Room in the university had been made for secular philosophies by the suspension of the requirement that Fellows subscribe to the 39 Articles of the Church of England. The
survival of philosophy as an autonomous discipline was not now at issue. What was at issue, at least for Moore, was whether philosophy had any right to survive. Moore shared his professor Henry Sidgwick’s view that: “the predominance in the minds of moralists of a desire to edify has impeded the real progress of ethical science: and that this would be benefitted by the application to it of the same disinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries of physics.”

As a young man, Moore was scornful of the “would-be scientific moralist” who rendered moral philosophy “as a science wholly abject and contemptible” by confusing the scientist’s search for truth with the preacher’s job of spiritual uplift. Good intentions, Moore insisted, “cannot defend his lack of science.” Moore’s professional pride was at stake. Moral philosophy was a legitimately autonomous discipline if and only if its researches could be pursued on a scientific basis. And as late as 1903, Moore felt it had been left to him to write the first true “prolegomena to any future ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific.”

Given each man’s interest in establishing moral philosophy as an autonomous discipline, it may seem odd that each began his career as an absolute idealist. Absolute idealism denied the reality of time, space, and the physical world as depicted by the natural sciences, in favor of a conception of the universe as an absolute entity engaged in a continuous sui generis creation. But if absolute idealism was anti-realistic it was not anti-science. Indeed, its defenders were often adamantly pro-science. They could afford to be, since they believed that idealist epistemology alone could adequately explain modern scientists’ knowledge of the natural world.

Absolute idealism, they believed, was unique in its ability to dissolve the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Idealists treated it as a pseudo-problem to be dissolved by recasting the assumption that created the problem in the first place — the assumption that the world is external not just to our minds, but to every mind. The world external to our minds, they argued, is internal to its absolute conceiver, whose knowledge of the world is thus immediate and indubitable — as is our knowledge of the world to the extent
that we can reproduce the absolute’s conception in our particular finite minds. This view of the world not only guaranteed that we could have genuine knowledge of the natural world, it guaranteed that our knowledge could never be complete without the input of philosophy. As Moore explained in an unpublished paper written in 1896,6 “Philosophy is necessarily the highest of sciences, since its object is ultimate truth, whereas the other sciences, in as much as they are special, can only furnish particular truths ... it is the business of philosophy alone to discover what it is that makes those truths true.”7 For although we may be certain that the natural world exists and that we can discover laws which truly describe that world, we can also be certain that any law, generalization, or hypothesis which incorporates temporal and spatial relations, is not one which perfectly reproduces the Absolute’s own immediate constitutive conceptions. All such hypotheses, generalizations and laws express merely relative truths of the world, relative to some finite perspective, and thus can not be absolutely true until or unless they are subsumed under genuinely absolute conceptions. Philosophy (idealist philosophy) achieves this by the logical analysis of the laws, generalizations, and hypotheses which the natural sciences have so far yielded and relating these to the absolute’s more fundamental conceptions. Since no empirical science is fitted to perform this sort of task, it falls to philosophy as, in Moore’s words, the “ultimate science” to finish the job empirical scientists have begun.8 Or as Dewey once put it, “Philosophy ... appears no longer therefore as a science but as all Science taken in its organic systematic wholeness.”9

So radical a conception of philosophy required a radical reformulation of the special philosophical disciplines. First, the logical analysis envisioned would be a ‘New Logic,’ that is, a logic that neither conflated mental events with their contents (as empiricist psychologisms did), nor forgot that there is more to knowledge than the construction of syllogistic proofs (as formal logicians did). The New logic was to be a ‘real’ logic, an analysis of the real forms that the constitution and employment of meanings actually takes, meanings originating in absolute conceptions whose non-natural existence was inherently atemporal and nonspatial.
Similarly, moral philosophy had to be reformulated. As T.H. Green noted: "it has generally been expected of a moralist ... that he should explain not only how men do act, but how they should act."\(^{10}\) But idealist moral philosophers were obliged to repudiate the expectation. Their problem was that as traditionally conceived, moral philosophy is practical. It deals with the events of past and future action. Temporal relations are inexpungible from its subject matter. Consequently, none of the practical principles which are the moralist's ordinary stock-in-trade can be faithful reproductions of the absolute's objective appreciation of acts and persons.

Their solution was to recast the central question of moral life, "what ought I to do," as "am I what I ought to be." For while the first involves inherent reference to a future (which would be meaningless to the Absolute) the latter does not. The job of the moral philosopher was likewise reformulated. When Green said moralists were expected to tell us what to do, he was reporting an opinion, not endorsing it. Green insisted that moral philosophers confine themselves to understanding what a person ought to be. Philosophers should seek to analyze particular practical rules and traditional virtues to determine how well or ill they would serve as means to the realization of moral character. By these means, idealists sought to elevate moral philosophy from a practical art to a scientific, that is, analytic, form of inquiry, anticipating the twentieth century meta-ethicists who would follow them.

Under the influence of this conception of ethics, we find Dewey in 1891 making the otherwise extraordinary assertion that moral rules are not prescriptive:

Some who would be the first to repudiate the practical consequences in the way of casuistry logically involved, entertain the idea that a moral law is a command: that it actually tells us what we should or should not do!\(^{11}\)

Not even the Golden Rule is really prescriptive, Dewey insists. It is instead "a tool of analysis" analogous to the "law of gravitation"\(^{12}\).
And under the influence of the same conception we find Moore, six years later, declaring that ethics is not a species of practical philosophy, as Aristotle and Sidgwick had supposed, because:

The object of Ethics, 'what ought to be,' is certainly different from that of any science, but inasmuch as the direct aim of Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes pure theory and is subordinate to the general conditions of knowledge.\(^{13}\)

Moore notes that ethics was commonly defined as the science of conduct. Ethics, so conceived, would be a "normative science" on a par with aesthetics and political theory. But Moore continues, it remains open to us to ask whether the goals that our rules of action point out to us ought actually to be pursued. Indeed it is open to us to inquire, "not even what it is we ought to pursue but why we \textit{ought to pursue} anything at all, or what is meant by saying that a thing is good or \textit{ought to be}."\(^{14}\) This, Moore considered an altogether different sort of inquiry. In his two unpublished Dissertations written in 1897 and 1898, Moore remarks that "I have preferred to entitle it 'the Metaphysical basis of Ethics' or 'Metaphysics of Ethics,' although authority might have been found for calling it 'Ethics' simply."\(^{15}\)

Dewey and Moore's agreement in the 1890's upon the necessity of recasting ethics as a species of descriptive analytical inquiry was not quite complete. They strongly disagreed on the question of what 'ethics' ought to analyze and describe. In both his 1897 and 1898 Dissertations, Moore rejects the suggestion that ethics should be defined as either the 'art' or the 'science' 'of conduct,' because this would limit ethics to "the actual pursuit of some end, or ... ends, in so far as such pursuit involves a systematic use of certain definite means and not to include any statement or, or enquiry into, the rules by which such end or ends may be attained"\(^{16}\) — in which case ethics is simply the attempt to do what's right without worrying about why it's right. Indeed elsewhere in the same year, Moore baldly asserts that ethics has nothing in particular to do with human conduct, being instead simply "the general enquiry into what is good."\(^{17}\)
His remarks indicate that Moore was taking sides in a debate occurring within idealism about how radically to revise the conception and practice of ethical philosophy. Moore sided with idealists such as F.H. Bradley, T.H. Green, and Bernard Bosanquet, who followed the logic of their own analysis of philosophy to its end point. Since idealist metaphysics is the ultimate science, ethical science must be a branch of metaphysics, a logical inquiry into the nature and/or conditions of being and becoming. Speaking for this party, Bradley proclaimed that, "ethics has not to make the world moral, but to reduce to theory the morality current in the world. If we want it to do anything more, so much the worse for us."\(^\text{18}\)

The opposing party did not question the purists' identification of philosophy with science nor of science with metaphysics. Instead they rejected the identification of ethics with philosophy in this sense. Scottish idealist, J.S. MacKenzie, from whom Moore borrowed the term "normative science,"\(^\text{19}\) classified ethics as a normative science because he considered it one of the 'special sciences' — albeit not a special natural science. Ethics, he wrote, was a special science "of mixed character, being partly concerned with the analysis of facts, and partly, with the definition of ends or ideals and with the statement of rules to be observed for the attainment of them."\(^\text{20}\) Thus ethics is more closely related to architecture, jurisprudence, and medicine, than to metaphysics. Dewey concurred.

In *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics* of 1891, Dewey analyzes commonsense notions of the good, arriving at last at what he calls the fundamental postulate of ethics — the realization of private good is the realization of public good and vice versa. He then abruptly suspends his analysis, declaring that:

> Each branch of human experience rests upon some presupposition which for *that branch*, is ultimate. The further inquiry into such presuppositions belongs not to mathematics, or physics, or ethics, but to metaphysics.\(^\text{21}\)

So it appears that the disagreement between Dewey and Moore might
be considered purely verbal since what they disagreed about were the proper names to adopt for what we now call normative and meta-ethics and not the legitimacy of either sort of inquiry. On the contrary, both agreed in viewing normative science and the metaphysics of ethics as simply different stages in one continuum of inquiry, differing only in the degree of abstraction from particular acts and events involved.

As long as each man retained his faith in absolute idealism, each could continue to conduct his one of these two complementary lines of inquiry, confident of the scientific character of his work. This relatively happy state of affairs ended when each man broke with idealism towards the end of the 1890’s. Given their respective views of what ‘science’ involved, the break with idealism posed Moore less of a challenge than it did Dewey. Both men had accepted a view of science which defined the activity in terms of its products: systematization of laws, hypotheses, and generalizations. A consequence of this view was that idealist philosophers’ claims to be conducting scientific research rested on their ability to produce a unique systematization of laws, hypotheses, and generalizations beyond the scope of the natural sciences and not on the procedures by which they obtained their results. The fact that philosophers did not perform controlled experiments or engage in other practices typical of the natural sciences was irrelevant. Thus when Moore sat down to revise his earlier ethical views in order to construct a new realist ethical theory, he did not have to make any substantial changes to his conceptions of science and ethics in order to reconcile the two.

In 1898, the year in which Moore was accomplishing his transition to realism, he had argued that science may be distinguished from other forms of intellectual activity by its production of “certificated knowledge,” that is, of statements of fact which are not only true but whose truth can be explained and defended. Ethical science was the production of unique certificated knowledge, unique in virtue of its unique subject: “the notion ‘good.’” These same ideas reappear in *Principia Ethica* according to which ethics is “the general inquiry into what is good” whose objective is “systematic knowledge.” As it turned out, the curious status of ethic’s unique subject,
‘good,’ entailed a rather special method of observation and analysis of its particular instances. Moore’s suggested method, the ‘method of isolation,’ is more reminiscent of mathematics, arithmetic, and logic than the natural sciences. But for Moore this was no objection. Mathematics, arithmetic, and logic were sciences to his way of thinking, because like the natural sciences they systematized knowledge of a unique subject matter. The metaphysical status of the subject matter of any one science or the analytic techniques practiced to study it were thus irrelevant. Moore himself considered his ethical science to be more closely related to the sciences of “physics, chemistry, and physiology” than to mathematics because he believed the quality ‘good’ though non-natural, nevertheless came into existence via causal processes. Casuistry, the branch of ethical science which attempts to systematize our knowledge of the causal conditions of the occurrence of good and the Good, Moore explains, would make use not only of the results but also the methods of empirical natural sciences.25

Moore’s science of ethics produced remarkably little systematic knowledge of a practical character. In 1898, he had argued that the formulation of reliable laws, generalizations, and predictions about the causal conditions of the occurrences of both ‘good’ and ‘the good’ must await “the completion of every science, including such sciences as psychology ... and such sciences as sociology and anthropology, which are yet in extreme infancy” with the immediate practical result that “questions of conduct can not pretend to scientific answers.”26 Moore was very nearly as pessimistic in 1903, arguing that “of the effects which principally concern us in ethical discussions, as having intrinsic value, we know the causes so little, that we can scarcely claim with regard to any single one, to have obtained even a hypothetical universal law, such as has been obtained in the exact sciences.”27 While the commonsense moral rules which underpin social life are generally adequate guides to action, we may be sure that rules so unscientifically formulated will often misdirect us. Nevertheless, Moore believes, “though we may be sure that there are cases where [a] rule should be broken we can never know which those cases are, and ought therefore, never to break it.”28
Conservative as Moore’s practical conclusions were, his methodology was not wholly without practical import. If one accepted Moore’s view that ethical science could not resolve moral controversies, establish new moral duties, virtues, and principles, or invalidate old ones, one was supplied with a touchstone by which to test and reject scientifically spurious moral exhortations. Moore points out that “a great part of ordinary moral exhortation and social discussion consists in the advocating rules, which are not generally practiced; and with regard to these it seems very doubtful whether a case for their general utility can ever be conclusively made out.” Thus Moore’s ethical science provides its practitioner with a defense against the charge that his or her rejection of normative theories of conduct which demand more of an individual than commonsense morality expects or requires somehow entails a rejection of morality. And it provides its practitioner with a reassuring answer for those who feared that the application of scientific critical methods to moral controversies would undermine if not utterly dissolve traditional human values. It is these traditional and commonsense values, rather than the innovative would-be scientific ethics of evolutionary philosophers, such as Herbert Spencer or Leslie Stephen, which can survive the application of critical scientific methods of analysis and proof. These were by no means insignificant or unimportant practical implications for many in 1903 nor indeed even today.

Dewey’s break with idealism, by contrast, posed him a much greater problem. Like Moore, he had, as an idealist, defined science in terms of its product — systematized knowledge (albeit systematized knowledge of the causal conditions of good, rather than of ‘good’ itself.) But when Dewey abandoned idealism for pragmatism, he adopted a non-foundational theory of knowledge that did not distinguish science from speculation by the unity of its products or their relation to particular foundational principles. Pragmatism distinguished science from speculation by the techniques which science used to produce its intellectual products. Consequently, if Dewey was to stand by his earlier claims that ethics was a normative science, he was obliged, as Moore was not, to argue that ethical theorists...
could and should use the techniques distinctive of natural sciences like physics, chemistry, or physiology.

Dewey believed that he could. In the following years, Dewey aimed to prove it by answering what he then saw as the chief objections: (1) that moral conduct is not accessible to controlled observation and (2) that moral principles, being entirely prescriptive, are not amenable to scientific confirmation. In a paper published in 1902, Dewey argued that it is an error to suppose that experimentation is the only form of controlled observation scientists use. He writes:

The essence of the experimental method I take to be control of the analysis or interpretation of any phenomenon by bringing to light the exact conditions... involved in its coming into being. Suppose the problem to be the nature of water... Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner or process by which anything comes into experienced existence.

Thus experimentation is not an activity restricted to laboratories. Laboratories allow for the maximum physical control of the process to be observed. But history provides a means of intellectual control which may be equally effective. By carefully analyzing and comparing the features of many historical instances of a process, we may eventually isolate its necessary and contingent features. In fact, this form of historical control is used in many fields, such as geology, zoology, and anthropology. Since no one would deny that these are sciences or that they use scientific methods of observation, then there is no reason to deny that an applied science of conduct could likewise use scientific methods of observation.

The more serious obstacle was the second, the objection that scientific methods of confirmation were inappropriate for the confirmation of prescriptive ethical principles and judgments. It is some
measure of the seriousness with which Dewey viewed it that he con-
sidered the paper in which he overcame it, "Scientific Treatment of
Morality," to be a turning point in his career.32
Dewey's constructive argument proper opens by focusing atten-
tion on the character of scientific activities and role 'laws' play in
scientists' inquiries. Dewey argues the popular view of scientific laws
as the objective of inquiry is mistaken.

The aim of science is law... When, however, it is argued that
this direct and obvious concern of science with generic state-
ments exhausts the logical significance of scientific method,
... the logical question at issue is begged. The real question
is not whether science aims at statements which take the form
of universals, or formulas of connections of conditions, but
how it comes to do so, and what it does with the universal
statements after they have been secured."

The real question is not whether ethical laws and generalizations are
really disguised descriptions, as some materialists have argued. It is
whether ethics can or should borrow scientific methods of develop-
and confirming its laws. To answer this question we must deter-
mine why and how scientists develop and confirm scientific laws.33
Scientific laws in use, Dewey suggests, are "generic propositions
[that] occupy a purely intermediate position. They are neither initial
nor final. They are ... bridges"34 When Dewey was an idealist, he had
argued that they were a bridge between particular experiences and
absolute truths. Now a pragmatist, he argues that scientific laws bridge
the gap between our most fundamental assumptions about the con-
stitution of the world and the particular events and things we observe
in the world. Covering laws are putative descriptions of relations be-
tween the things and events assumed to exist at the outset. Adoption
of a proposed law is justified pragmatically if it proves "experiment-
tally fruitful," i.e., if it suggests empirically testable hypotheses which
actual tests confirm.

The difference between prescriptive moral principles and descrip-
Dewey and Moore on the Science of Ethics 404

tive scientific laws is thus real, but lacks the significance so often attributed to it. For it is a comparison between the fundamental, stipulative propositions of the one with the intermediate, descriptive generalizations of the other. Every inquiry necessarily begins with stipulations setting the parameters within which the inquiry will proceed. Thus every inquiry begins with normative principles, develops descriptive generalizations regarding classes of the stipulated field of inquiry, and applies these to particular cases. Success warrants both the intermediate laws and fundamental stipulations. Failure calls one or both into question.

To make this line of reasoning somewhat less abstract, we might consider Dewey’s example of a medical doctor contemplating a patient’s complaint. Dewey argues that she can and should reach her conclusions about the cause of a patient’s illness and what she should do about it by precisely the same methods. She will begin with normative principles of nature and of morals, principles which determine the limits of her field of inquiry, excluding various possibilities at the outset (e.g., curses, non-natural forces, backwards causation on the one hand, identifications of good with pain or duty with insensitivity, on the other). She will bridge the gap between these and the particular situation at hand with hypothetical laws relating classes of things of the sort with which the situation presents her. By these means, she determines what the cause of the problem is (e.g., typhoid fever) and what she should do about it (prescribe treatment).

However few if any moral philosophers have ever committed themselves to pragmatically warranting their fundamental assumptions about human conduct as Dewey presumes scientists do. Worries about experimental fruitfulness and empirical confirmation have never been a common feature of moral philosophizing. As a result, few if any of Dewey’s contemporaries could legitimately have claimed to be moral scientists. Thus in 1903, Dewey had no more grounds for optimism about the rapid progress of his pragmatic normative science of conduct than Moore had for his empirical science of casuistry. Nevertheless, Dewey’s methodology had immediate practical import. If the ethical innovations of would-be scientific moralists are
in fact wholly without scientific warrant, then at least we have grounds for ignoring their exhortations. In "Moral Theory and Practice," Dewey had written:

No undertaking is more tedious because more fruitless, than the attempt to pump up moral motive forces... People are ... tired of hearing, "You ought to do thus and so," they are ... tired of hearing, "If you would only do this and somebody else would do that ... how much better everything would be." This condition of fatigue may be due to the depravity of human nature but I think it is rather due to its goodness; human nature refuses to be moved except in the one truly human way — through intelligence.35

The first and arguably still chief accomplishment of Dewey's pragmatic ethical science is that it justifies our refusal to settle moral controversies by appeals to tradition, intuition, or imagination in the absence of more publically accessible forms of confirmation.

Given the substantial differences in Dewey's and Moore's philosophical methods and commitments by 1903, it might seem ironic that their practical achievements would turn out to be essentially the same. Each provided assurance that ethics could endure the application of methods of inquiry as rigorous as those found in the mathematical and the natural sciences without evaporating into thin air; that questions of value were not rendered illusory by the adoption of critical methods; and that little if anything of importance to human values or human progress would be lost if traditional ideals were subjected to the disinterested scrutiny of scientifically-informed moral philosophers. It was assurance both moral philosophers and the somewhat apprehensive supporters of new secular institutions of higher learning needed to hear. It is assurance needed even today as the secularization of public institutions continues.

However, the irony disappears when we recognize that the autonomy of ethics was not a conclusion reached as a result of the application of either man's distinct philosophical methods, it was a presupposition
which drove the development of those methods. This presupposition was a common legacy of their respective encounters with absolute idealism — in particular of absolute idealism's reformulation of the central issues and questions of ethics. It is perhaps some recognition of the fundamental community of interests and attitudes between Dewey and Moore as moral philosophers that subsequent rise of emotivism in America and in England has widely — though I believe mistakenly — been interpreted as the logical consummation of each man's moral methodology.

Ironically, the most fundamental difference between Dewey's and Moore's approaches to ethics in 1903 — their disagreement over the definition of philosophical ethics — pre-dates their respective adoptions of pragmatism and realist empiricism and thus can not be attributed to these events. Moore's focus on metaethical questions was no more an outcome of his analytic approach to philosophical questions than Dewey's emphasis on practical ethics was an outcome of his pragmatism. As we have seen, these emerged from each man's efforts to interpret ethical issues and concepts within the framework of absolute idealism's hierarchical classification of knowledge.

And this brings me back to my starting point: the triviality of some the disagreements that have often times made it no more than a polite fiction for an analytic or pragmatic moral philosopher to credit the other with doing philosophy. In either Moore's or Dewey's estimation, the other was doing moral philosophy (however bad a job he might be making of it), since he agreed in seeing moral philosophy as having the same central problems to solve. How they went about these tasks certainly differed. But it is, I think, their unanimity about what doing moral philosophy most fundamentally involves that ultimately marks them as co-founders of a one and the same tradition of twentieth-century moral inquiry.

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NOTES:


5. See *Principia Ethica*, 35.


8. See "The Philosophical Basis of the Natural Sciences, " 1.


13. G.E. Moore, 1897 Dissertation, marginalia, ii, i verso, and 1898 Dissertation, ii. Both Dissertations are held in the Trinity College Library, Cambridge University. Moore notes that he is responding particularly to

19. Moore credits MacKenzie for his use of the term in both his 1897 and 1898 Dissertations.
24. See *Principia Ethica*, 54.
25. See *Principia Ethica*, 196.
26. See *Elements of Ethics*, 177.
27. See *Principia Ethica*, 204.
28. See *Principia Ethica*, 212.
29. See *Principia Ethica*, 209.
32. Jane Dewey's biography of John Dewey, prepared from notes supplied by her father, gives this description: “Another of these publications was a monograph by Dewey, *The Scientific Conditions of a Theory of Morality* [sic], which gives in schematic outline his first published endeavor to set forth
the principles of a unified logic of scientific enquiry and moral judgment. This attracted no attention ... but in a study of his development it marks a crucial change of position." "Biography of John Dewey," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, Paul Arthur Schlipp, ed, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1939), 33.

33. To Dewey the question is 'logical' because he continued to espouse the New Logic even after his conversion to pragmatism.

34. See "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," MW 3:9