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"IN THE POPULIST TRADITION: ORGANIZING THE
UKRAINIAN FARMER IN ALBERTA, 1909-1935."

University — Université

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

M.A.

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1983

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

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IN THE POPULIST TRADITION:
ORGANIZING THE UKRAINIAN FARMER
IN ALBERTA, 1909-1935

BY

ANDRIJ BORYS MAKUCH

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1983

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: Andrij Borys Makuch

TITLE OF THESIS: "In the Populist Tradition: Organizing the
Ukrainian Farmer in Alberta, 1909-1935."

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED: Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1983

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DEDICATION

To Tamara and Larisa,
the women in my life

ABSTRACT

This study examines the various attempts made to organize Ukrainian farmers in the bloc settlement district of East Central Alberta between 1909 and 1935 in light of the populist tradition which had developed in Western Ukraine during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, it attempts to assess the extent to which Ukrainians kept up this specific political tradition in Canada.

During the late nineteenth century, a Ukrainian national populist movement developed in the Austrian province of Galicia as the Ukrainian intelligentsia organized the peasantry around a program of education, economic self-aid and political reform. The movement sought to ameliorate an ever-worsening economic situation by helping the peasantry to become more self-sufficient and by challenging the virtual monopoly of political power held by the province's predominantly Polish aristocracy. By 1914, the movement was relatively successful, although it had by no means achieved all its aims. Meanwhile, thousands of Ukrainian peasants had sought to improve their own condition by emigration to the New World.

In Alberta, one of the major centres of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, Peter Svarich started to espouse the typically populist touchstones of education, economic self-aid and political representation as the basis of a program for social development among the province's Ukrainians. When he attempted to implement certain parts of this program, however, Svarich encountered opposition from the province's Liberal administration, which was unfavourably disposed to the growing Ukrainian desire for political representation and bilingual education. This situation finally led to an open conflict in 1913, when the Ukrainians ran a number of independent political candidates during the provincial elections that

year, and the Liberals retaliated with measures which solidly established the principle of unilingual English education over the Ukrainian hopes for bilingual schools. This outcome set back the Ukrainian organizing effort considerably.

Ironically, this unsuccessful attempt to implement a populist program among the Ukrainian farmers of Alberta along Old World lines occurred at a time when a new current of populism was developing among North American farmers. This raised the possibility that Ukrainians might have reconciled their populist heritage with a North American brand of populism. In Alberta, this would have taken the form of Ukrainian support for the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), the province's representative agrarian organization. However, Ukrainian support for the UFA was minimal, despite an initial period of involvement before the UFA's first election campaign in 1921 and an attempt by Ukrainians to form their own autonomous section of the UFA in 1923. In the end, however, Ukrainians found it difficult to reconcile themselves with the English, Protestant and assimilationist nature of the organization. At best, the two could co-operate only in concrete areas of mutual concern, specifically co-operative ventures and electoral politics.

Because of their superficial integration into the UFA, it was easier for many Ukrainians to reconcile themselves with providing the Communist Party of Canada with a disproportionately great amount of support during the Depression years. In Alberta, this meant that Ukrainians were the strongest supporters of a CP front organization, the Farmers' Unity League. In one respect, this was the ultimate consequence of neither having re-established their own populist tradition in Canada nor having adapted to the North American tradition.

PREFACE

When one chooses to write on a certain theme, he or she implicitly chooses to address a specific concern. Often in the case of a thesis or some other scholarly work, this concern is to deal with perceived shortcomings in the existing body of knowledge about a given topic. This is true with the following study. The transfer of Ukrainian political traditions to Canada has only recently been examined in Canadian historical writing, and the entire question of ethnic participation in the agrarian movement has been studied only nominally to date. Underlying the question of the very topics dealt with are certain methodological considerations: taking into account the historic background of Ukrainians coming to Canada in a Hartzian manner; and trying to integrate the Ukrainians' story into a general framework of Canadian history. Finally, at the very base of this effort is a personal motivation. I believe that Canadians in general and Ukrainian Canadians specifically should be aware of Ukrainian-Canadian history as being something more than the story of peasant immigrant settlers, their hardships, and their eventual success in the New World.

Ukrainians brought a well-developed civic legacy with themselves to Canada. They had a history of political thought; fully-fledged political parties which had proven themselves capable of cultivating the possibilities for political expression under the Austrian constitution; an extensive tradition of political journalism; civic institutions to address their various social and material needs; a concept of themselves as a group to which certain rights

were owed; and capable leaders to speak on their behalf. Accordingly, the actions of Ukrainians in Canada reflected this sort of a background. The attempts to set up co-operatives, to establish effective English-Ukrainian bilingual education, and to seek proportional Ukrainian political representation, all reflected a certain way of looking at the world. They were not random ideas. The fact that Ukrainian peasant immigrants looked immediately to their better-educated countrymen for leadership was not rooted in simple-mindedness, but in the bond which had been forged between the intelligentsia and the peasantry in Galicia. As well, the very fact that Ukrainians were willing to issue what they perceived to be their group rights more than many other immigrant groups in Canada was not based on obstreperousness on their part, but on the fact that they had left the Old Country at a time that many of these same rights had been issues of contention there. Ukrainians would address these concerns almost by reflex. These sorts of facts must be taken into account in a general re-evaluation of Ukrainian-Canadian history. Admittedly, some work has started in this regard, but much remains to be done.

At the same time, the Ukrainians' story has not found its way into Canadian history in general. The existing studies about the UFA are a case in point. They have not looked at the question of Ukrainian participation in the organization closely nor have they examined the UFA in ethnic terms which would reveal its strongly Anglo-Protestant character, and note the subsequent implications of this fact. These might be said to be errors of either omission or commission: omission because studies about this particular aspect of Ukrainian-Canadian history have not yet appeared, and the facts

X
about it are not known; or commission because this aspect of history might have been regarded as not significant enough to warrant further study and/or inclusion into scholarly works. This is most unfortunate, because the story of Ukrainians is legitimately an integral part of Canadian history. Hopefully, the current historiographical situation will change soon, and this sort of material will be integrated into general Canadian histories and texts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indeed grateful for the help which was given to me during the course of the preparation of this manuscript, and consequently I regard these acknowledgments as an avowed pleasure rather than a duty.

The research for this thesis was made possible in part by two Province of Alberta Scholarships. As well, I wish to thank the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for its offer of financial assistance.

I would like to thank Roma Franko, Dr. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, and Dr. John-Paul Himka for reading over individual chapters of this manuscript. Broader editorial comments were made by Drs. Jerry Petryshyn and Zenon Pohorecky and David Lupul. Needless to say, they were usually very insightful and very useful. Finally, I must make a special note of the thorough guidance provided by my supervisor, Dr. David J. Hall.

The physical preparation of this manuscript is in itself a story. A great many people deserve mention for their role in it. As a group, I wish to thank the staff of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, particularly Khrystia Kohut, Assya Berezowsky, and Andrii Hornjatkevyc, for their constant co-operation and goodwill.

I would also thank the various people who did an outstanding job on typing various portions of this manuscript: Mary Pizurny, Andrii Nahachewsky, Sonia Riabokin, and especially Kim Osowetski.

My colleagues, friends and family were a great source of support for me while researching and writing. My thanks to you all. I would

like to thank my wife, Tamara, sincerely for her continual support of this project over an extended period of time and especially during its final phases. She was a great help.

And that leaves only myself to take all the blame for all the mistakes..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I Introduction	1
II The Populist Legacy of the Galician Ukrainian Movement	9
III Ukrainian National Populism in Alberta: A Model for Social Organization	41
IV Ukrainians and the UFA: Hope Against Hope. .	84
V Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Depression in the Bloc District . .	130
VI Conclusion	168
BIBLIOGRAPHY	176

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The following study concerns the various attempts made to organize Ukrainian farmers in Alberta into representative political organizations during the years 1909 to 1935. Moreover, since the major efforts in this regard were by groups with a professed populist outlook, it is also the story of the efforts to develop a populist movement among them, initially along Old World lines, then in North American terms. Because neither approach was wholly successful, a political vacuum of sorts was left in the bloc settlement district, making it easier for avowedly-revolutionary pro-Communist elements to organize among Ukrainians during the Depression years.

Because it deals generally with efforts which were not successful, this study is marked by a certain amount of discontinuity. Nevertheless, the history of a failure can be equally interesting or revealing as a success story. In addition to narrative details, one must account for the underlying reasons as to why certain efforts were made and what factors determined their relative success or failure. In the case of this work, it is attempts by Ukrainians to transfer their populist tradition to the New World, the hostility of English-Canadian society to specifically Ukrainian concerns, and the chronic difficulties Ukrainians had in organizing themselves which provide an underpinning and narrative continuity. On the whole, it is much needed because this study has a wide scope, starting in late nineteenth-century Galicia and ending in mid-Depression Alberta.

It is essential to understand the use of the term "populism" throughout the text, and the differentiation between a Ukrainian and a Canadian variety. In textbook terms, populism can be defined as a broadly-based movement, often led by the intelligentsia, which mobilizes the rural lower classes around a program of economic action and political reform intended to improve its general lot in society.¹ From this point of view, both the Ukrainian movement in Galicia and the agrarian movement in Canada were legitimate "populist" movements. However, populism can also be understood as a somewhat fluid term used to describe particular phenomena which fall into its conceptual framework.² From this point of view, both movements were still "populist" ones, though they may have had little in common except for some theoretical traits. Moreover, since these were social as well as political movements, their specific characteristics were defined by the societies out of which they arose. In this respect, the differences between the Ukrainian national populist movement, with its East European underpinnings of liberal nationalism, and the Canadian agrarian movement, with its North American underpinnings of Anglo-Protestant moral reform along the lines of the social gospel, were vast. Accordingly, when the two traditions met face to face, these differences became clearly evident.

In the late nineteenth century, Ukrainian peasants in the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovina faced a grim future.³ Their already dismal situation was steadily deteriorating as the population continued to grow and land holdings were sub-divided to the point where they could no longer support a family at even a

subsistence level. Moreover, there was little hope of improving the economic situation through increased agricultural productivity or industrialization. Thousands of peasants became dispossessed of their lands, and many died from starvation or malnutrition. To add to their general economic woes, Ukrainian peasants also had to contend with callous exploitation by Galicia's predominantly Polish nobility, which used its privileged economic and political position to defend its own vested interests.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia took up the peasants' cause and developed a broadly-based national populist movement around a program of education, economic self-aid, and political reform. The movement sought to improve conditions among the Ukrainian peasantry and to challenge the Polish monopoly of power in Galicia, goals which were linked by the manner in which social stratification had left Ukrainians on the very bottom rung of the province's economic and political ladder. By the First World War, the intelligentsia could claim a partial success in its efforts. The Ukrainian movement had been able to improve the condition of the peasantry considerably and to effect a change in the province's balance of political power. Nevertheless, it had not been able to eliminate the root causes of poverty in Galicia. Meanwhile, many peasants had found their own personal salvation in emigration to countries like Brazil, Canada, and the United States.

Once they arrived in Canada, Ukrainian peasants did not divest themselves of their Old Country experiences. In fact, these became guideposts to the type of a society many of them would have liked

to develop. The populist legacy of the Galician Ukrainian movement in particular provided a strong model for social organization.

In Alberta, one of the major centres of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, Peter Svarich began to espouse the typically populist principles of education, economic self-aid, and political representation as the basis of a program for developing representative institutions among the province's Ukrainians. Since he was not alone in his assessment about their needs, Svarich set out aggressively to secure gains on each front: establishing a series of co-operative stores; pressing the provincial government to provide the necessary legislation, positions and institutions to ensure an effective system of English-Ukrainian bilingual education in the public schools; and urging Ukrainians in the province to enter the political arena and elect their "own" legislators who could represent their interests specifically.

Svarich quickly ran into opposition from the province's Liberal administration which did not wish to give in to the Ukrainian demands, particularly in the field of education. When finally pressed by the continued Ukrainian efforts, the Liberals revealed their true colours and emerged strongly against the Ukrainians' political and educational aspirations. They were aided in their efforts by a group of Russophiles whose interests did not coincide with those of the general Ukrainian populace. The Ukrainian initiatives were soundly routed, and Svarich was personally disgraced. In turn, the entire idea of populism along Old World lines, although not eliminated completely, suffered a severe setback.

Ironically, this had occurred at the same time that populism was spreading among Canadian farmers in general. Moreover, Ukrainians displayed a considerable sympathy for the Canadian agrarian movement as it developed. This raised the intriguing question of how Ukrainians, whose own populist tradition had not developed fully in the New World, would reconcile themselves with a North American brand of populism. In Alberta this was a particularly pressing issue, for the representative agrarian organization, the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), had decided to enter the electoral arena at the end of the decade and had actively solicited Ukrainian participation in the movement.

Ukrainian support for the UFA never came even close to realizing its tremendous potential. The major reason, simply stated, was that Ukrainians found it difficult to reconcile themselves with the strongly English, Protestant, and assimilationist philosophy of the UFA. They did try to come to terms with the organization by forming an autonomous "Ukrainian Section" of the UFA in 1923, but this initiative quickly floundered. The remaining ties between the Ukrainians and the UFA were dictated by convenience. This was particularly true in the realm of electoral politics, where Ukrainians could realistically expect to nominate one of their own kind under the UFA banner sooner than they could under that of the traditional parties (more importantly, to have him elected), and the UFA could expect fairly solid support from Ukrainian farmers -- especially if it ran a Ukrainian candidate. In almost every other respect (excluding co-operative ventures), the UFA was virtually moribund in the Ukrainian bloc district.

The superficial integration of Ukrainians into the UFA had little consequence while times were still good. However, the outbreak of the Depression revealed this to be a significant fact. Ukrainians, generally regarding the UFA as a status quo body from which they had by and large been excluded, tended to turn to alternative means of expressing their discontent with the existing state of affairs. In particular, the pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour Temple Association (ULFTA) gathered a great deal of support in the Ukrainian bloc district during these years, despite the fact that it had been ostracized by the mainstream Ukrainian community for its support of the Soviet Union.

The ULFTA was used by the Communist Party of Canada as a springboard to establish a radical alternative to the UFA -- the Farmers Unity League (FUL) -- in the bloc district during the early years of the Depression. From there, it was to expand into other parts of the province. This, however, failed to occur, giving Ukrainians a very high profile in the FUL and a reputation for being prone to radicalism. Many Ukrainians responded with vitriolic denunciations of the Communists among them, although this did not address the major question as to why the ULFTA had been able to gather considerable support for the FUL. A few Ukrainians, led by Tomáš Tomashevsky, attempted to revive earlier efforts to establish representative agrarian organizations among Ukrainians in order to counter the growing Communist activities. These efforts met with some success, but not enough to erode the Communists' base of operations. The situation in the bloc district finally ended in a deadlock as each party had established its own cadre of supporters by about 1933. The rest of the Depression years became largely a series of highly-charged meetings and counter-meetings

with one notable exception, a farmers' strike in Myrnam during the winter of 1933. The election of a Social Credit government in Alberta in 1935 and the disbanding of the FUL in 1936 finally brought an end to this sort of politicking.

Notes to Chapter One

¹ This definition is adapted from Geoffrey K. Roberts, A Dictionary of Political Analysis (London: Longman, 1971).

² This approach is used in J.B. Allcock, "Populism: A Brief Bibliography," Sociology 5 (September 1971): 371-387; and E. Gellner, ed., Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969).

³ Throughout this thesis, the situation among Ukrainians in Galicia is referred to specifically. However, it can be understood that generally the same economic, political, and social conditions were prevalent among Ukrainians in Bukovina. Two notable exceptions to this rule are the fact that Bukovinian Ukrainians were usually Orthodox, not Catholic, and the fact that the Rumanians, not the Poles were the dominant nationality in Bukovina.

CHAPTER TWO

The Populist Legacy of the Galician Ukrainian Movement

For the Ukrainian peasants of Galicia, life held a number of brutal truths: ever-increasing poverty caused by a rapidly-growing population and shrinking land holdings, and callous exploitation by the province's predominantly Polish nobility. This situation became particularly severe during the latter half of the nineteenth century when Galicia had neither industrialized nor improved her agricultural productivity at a time of rapidly-changing market conditions, leading to a prolonged economic depression. As a result, most peasants found that they could no longer maintain themselves even at a subsistence level, and became increasingly receptive to taking drastic measures in order to deal with their desperate situation.

It was at this time that a populist "Ukrainian movement" led by the intelligentsia emerged around a program of education, economic self-aid, and political reform. The movement had two fundamental aims: to improve the material lot of Ukrainian peasants and to challenge the Polish monopoly of power in the province. In the eyes of the intelligentsia these two currents were linked by the manner in which social stratification in Galicia had left Ukrainians on the very bottom rung of the province's economic and political hierarchy. Any attempt to improve conditions among the Ukrainian peasantry required an assault on Polish political hegemony, because the vested interests represented by the latter required a maintenance of the status quo and were set squarely against any substantial changes in the province. Any movement

which challenged Polish political control directly required the full support of Ukrainian peasants who, in turn, could be mobilized only if they recognized that their interests were being served in a concrete manner.

By 1914, the Ukrainian movement had made tremendous strides forward, largely due to the phenomenal efforts of its leaders. Nevertheless, it had not yet succeeded in radically changing the Polish-controlled political system in Galicia, although a noticeable shift in the balance of power had occurred and the achievement of parity seemed possible in the foreseeable future. Nor had the movement been able to eliminate the poverty at the root of Galicia's woes, although it had been able to ameliorate some of its conditions. Meanwhile, many peasants had found a solution to their problems in emigration to such countries as Brazil, the United States, and Canada.

In leaving the Old Country the emigrants did not cut themselves off completely from the aims and methods of the Ukrainian movement. They simply brought it with themselves to the New World as part of their "cultural baggage," a political tradition which reflected the civic legacy of Galicia.

I

The partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 allowed the Habsburg Empire to annex a territory situated on its northeastern border between 19° and $26^{\circ}15'$ east longitude and $47^{\circ}45'$ and $50^{\circ}48'$ north latitude. It was christened Galicia, the Latinized name of the main town (Halych) in a Ukrainian principality of the same name dating back to the eleventh century. The new territory was

approximately 450 km. long (east-west) and 80 km. wide (north-south) in its western portion and 250 km. wide in its eastern part. A vast expanse of flat land covered with a layer of rich soil superbly suited for agriculture was its outstanding geographical feature. It was by far Austria's largest province with a total area of 78,497 square kilometres, and its population formed about one-quarter of the empire's total.¹ Galicia remained an integral part of the empire until the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1918. It then fell into the orbit of the inter-war Polish state. After the Second World War it was divided almost evenly along ethnic lines between the Polish People's Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This is where it remains today.

Its physical dimensions, the size of its population, and the fertility of its arable lands would suggest that Galicia should have been one of the more prosperous parts of the Habsburg realm. Yet this was hardly the case, for despite its natural endowment and its considerable population, Galicia was stuck in the quagmire of poverty. This study focusses on the situation at the turn of the twentieth century.

In Galicia over 75 per cent of the population made their living by agriculture, and over 70 per cent of the land area was devoted to agricultural production. Yet Galician agriculture was so notoriously inefficient that the province was often forced to import grain. Between 1896 and 1905, the Galician population produced 48 kilograms of wheat per capita in comparison to 130 for Russia, 190 for England, and 240 for France.² The reason was two-fold: the province's larger agricultural enterprises were labour-intensive and poorly

managed, while its smaller ones were usually too small to sustain a peasant family at even a subsistence level. Galicia had a surplus population relative to its immediate agricultural productivity. As a result, the vast majority of the population was extremely poor.

Industry might have alleviated this problem by helping peasant farmers to find alternate occupations or to generate supplemental incomes. But it was virtually non-existent. Only 5 to 7 per cent of the province's population was engaged in industrial work at that time compared with 36.7 per cent of the Austrian population as a whole. What little industry did exist was mainly of an extractive nature -- salt-mining, lumbering, oil-production, textiles, breweries, mills, and alcohol production. Generally these were small-scale enterprises, over 80 per cent of which employed fewer than 20 workers.³ Not surprisingly, the main cities in Galicia, L'viv and Cracow, reflected the effects of these figures by their own lack of growth. At a time when many cities in Europe were transforming themselves into major industrial centres, L'viv and Cracow remained provincial centres for administration, commerce, and small-scale artisan production.

Much of the blame for the wide-spread poverty resulting from this situation can be directly attributed to a small group of large landowners. This noble class clearly held the reins of power in the province, and its rule was marked by a lack of social responsibility. The gentry's success in defending its own vested interests was a major cause of Galicia's severe economic problems. In order to retain its privileged status as an agriculturally-based ruling class, the gentry required a large pool of cheap labourers to work

on its manors. In political terms, this meant that Galicia pursued a policy which aimed to preserve the status quo -- an economy based on agriculture and domestic production -- by not developing industries which would employ the surplus labour used in agricultural work. However, this situation could not withstand the incursions of expanding market economies. The coming of the railroad into Galicia in the late 1850s undercut many regional artisans whose products could not compete against goods manufactured in the more industrialized portions of the empire. Likewise, the rise of overseas grain producers which used capital-intensive means of production undercut the relative position of Galician landowners on the European grain market. These factors also contributed to a prolonged economic depression in Galicia.

The gentry exacerbated the economic situation by its callous exploitation of the peasantry, using its political privileges and superior economic position to the fullest. Several examples of its actions should establish this fact. With the abolition of serfdom in 1848, peasants were given clear title to lands which they had previously used as tenants and were freed from the system of panshchyna, a corvee-like duty which required peasants to perform certain non-remunerative tasks on the lords' estates. In return, the gentry received a very generous monetary compensation which was raised by special supplementary taxes imposed directly upon only the peasantry. From 1858 to 1898, 121 million gulden were collected for this purpose, a staggering amount when one considers that a single gulden could easily support a peasant for two days. A second remunerative tax was imposed on the peasantry in the

mid-1870s when the lords' monopoly over the production and sale of alcoholic beverages (propinatsiia) was abolished. In this case, an outright sum of 66 million gulden was paid to them. Finally, after the emancipation of the peasantry, the lords laid claim to the numerous forests and pastures which had previously been considered and used as common lands. In return for allowing peasants to use these lands, they now demanded a payment in cash or in kind.⁵

The lords' real strength, however, lay in their landholdings, which they used to the fullest extent. Immediately after the emancipation proclamation in 1848, peasants had been very reluctant to work on the lords' estates, even for relatively good wages. But over the course of several decades, the population had increased rapidly and the amount of land held by each peasant family had shrunk proportionately. In order to survive, peasants now desperately required supplementary incomes. Many sought employment on the manors. In turn, this expansion in the size of the labour force encouraged the lords to hire hungry peasants to work their lands for wages much lower than they had been previously. Backed into a corner, peasants seemed to have no choice but to accept these unfavourable terms. Many did, however, migrate in search of jobs elsewhere (especially after 1890), particularly to Prussia and the United States. These peasant labourers often accumulated a significant amount of savings with which they intended to purchase more lands when they returned to Galicia. Nobles took full advantage of the possibilities this situation offered by dividing portions of their estates in a process called "parcellation" and then selling them at premium prices. These prices were often far in excess of the value of the land in

terms of its economic potential. In fact, it had become more profitable for many lords to sell a part of their surplus lands than to cultivate them.⁶

In contrast to the lords, who could be said to be holding their own despite the unfavourable economic circumstances, the peasants of Galicia were finding themselves in an increasingly desperate situation. This could be directly attributed to population growth, for as the number of agriculturalists expanded, peasant land holdings were being sub-divided into ever-shrinking parcels which increasingly were unable to sustain the small landowners. The figures cited by Ivan Franko, a renowned writer and publicist of the period, in a classic study of land ownership are very revealing.⁷ Franko tabulated official statistics to show that from 1819 to 1859 to 1876 the number of small land holdings in Galicia had increased at a ratio of 100: 154: 275, while their size had shrunk from 100: 67: 37. In human terms, these figures meant absolute ruin for thousands of peasant families.

As long as Galicia's population continued to grow, so did the extent of the tragedies; and the population did grow, from 4.6 million in 1857, 5.4 million in 1869, nearly 6.0 million in 1880, 6.6 million in 1890, to 7.3 million in 1900.⁸ The lot of the average Galician peasant grew steadily worse. It was estimated that a minimum of 5 hectares was needed to provide a bare subsistence living for a peasant family of five people. Over 80 per cent of all agricultural enterprises in Galicia were either just approaching or below this level.⁹ Peasants tried coping with the situation as well as they could, but these efforts often amounted to little more than

stop-gap measures; the ranks of the dispossessed grew steadily in Galicia towards the turn of the century and afterwards.

Those who managed to hold onto their meagre plots faced bleak prospects. In many cases it seemed only a matter of time before family plots would become so small that further sub-division would be futile. Moreover, an increase in their productivity was unlikely for several reasons. Farms were worked with such rudimentary implements as wooden plows. Machinery of any kind was almost non-existent. Until after the turn of the century the three-field system was used because the idea of crop rotation was virtually unknown. The soil was sorely depleted of nutrients after centuries of almost constant use. Land holdings were usually not in a single bloc, but in small pieces spread out in the vicinity of a village, making effective farming even more unlikely.¹⁰ Finally, the very hunger from which most Galician peasants wished to escape simply perpetuated their condition because their own malnourishment made it even more difficult for them to produce enough to feed themselves and their families. One nineteenth century publicist noted that "the Galician works poorly (i.e., produces poorly) because he eats poorly (i.e., consumes insufficiently) and he cannot feed himself better because he works (i.e., produces) too little."¹¹


For most peasants in Galicia, the economic situation was truly desperate, and there seemed no way for them to find justice in their homeland. Politically, the gentry had a stranglehold on the province because of an electoral system structured to serve its interests in the provincial legislature (Diet) and the imperial parliament (Reichsrat), and because the imperial authorities had tacitly

consented not to challenge its rule.¹² In addition, the judiciary tended overwhelmingly to favour the nobility over the peasantry. This is illustrated dramatically by the fact that by 1881, in over 32,000 cases involving land claims to the once-common forests and pastures, peasants were successful in only 2,000.¹³

Such brutal conditions affected the Galician peasant, providing a basis for his proverbial "weakness" of character. Suspicion, envy, fatalism, deference to authority and superstition all were the natural by-products of a view that fate had allowed him only so much -- if he were to be cautious and offend no terrestrial or extraterrestrial power. Moreover, the worsening economic conditions were having a marked demoralizing effect on the peasantry, perhaps best illustrated by a concomitant increase in alcoholism during the last half of the nineteenth century.¹⁴ Yet, the peasantry was not blind to the source of its problems; it simply saw no way of fighting back.

II

The situation in Galicia was complicated not only by the presence of three major ethnic groups, but also by the extent to which social stratification had reinforced ethnic divisions. The nobility and the larger land owners were Poles or Polonized Ukrainians; Jews tended to dominate the small middle class of merchants, businessmen, and inn-keepers; and Ukrainians were overwhelmingly peasants. Such an absolute and unnatural division caused considerably strained relations between the groups, particularly among Poles and Ukrainians.



In absolute numbers, Galician Poles and Ukrainians formed nearly equal portions of the population -- 42 per cent (in 1900). Jews formed about 12 per cent of the population, and the remaining 4 per cent consisted of Germans and Armenians. The Poles formed nearly 90 per cent of the population in Western Galicia (about one-third of the province's territory) and about 23 per cent of the population in Eastern Galicia (the remaining two-thirds); the Ukrainians were found almost exclusively in Eastern Galicia, where they formed about 62 per cent of the population; and the Jews formed about 12 per cent of the population in each part of the province (with a slightly greater concentration in the eastern part).¹⁵

The political dominance of the Poles was assured by the social advantages derived from forming the two most influential sectors of Galician society: the nobility and the upper bourgeoisie. It was true that the majority of Poles were agriculturalists (77 per cent), but this portion was not nearly as great as that portion of the Ukrainian population which was peasant (95 per cent).¹⁶ Moreover, the imperial government had turned over nearly complete control of Galicia to the Polish nobility during the 1867-1868 reorganization of the Empire. This state of affairs had dire consequences for Ukrainians, for they had almost no political power, fewer (usually inadequate) educational institutions, and fewer charitable resources. Accordingly, Eastern Galicia received a much smaller share of state benefits than the predominantly Polish western part of the province -- despite the former's greater size and considerably larger population.

The severity of the Ukrainians' plight is illustrated well by a study of Galician mortality rates conducted by V. Okhrymovych in 1892.¹⁷ Using figures from the first two volumes of the Rocznikow Statystyki Galicyi (Galician Statistical Yearbook) which were published in 1887 and 1888, Okhrymovych established that the mortality rate among Ukrainians in Galicia was significantly higher than that of their Polish counterparts. Furthermore, the basis for this difference could be correlated with markedly less favourable economic conditions among Ukrainians. First, he showed that mortality rates were significantly greater in the eastern portions of Galicia. Then he noted that mortality rates were significantly higher among Ukrainians, than Poles (using religious affiliation as a basis for this differentiation). He then collated these factors to show that the ten districts of Galicia with the greatest number of Ukrainians had a significantly higher mortality rate than those ten districts with the greatest proportion of Poles. The ratios were 36.4 per 1,000 compared to 29.9 per 1,000. In individual districts with a wholly- Ukrainian population, the mortality rate could exceed 44 per 1,000. Such figures were then correlated with a whole set of unfavourable economic circumstances: a large proportion of landed gentry, small peasant land holdings, few pasture lands, little cattle, high illiteracy, few commercial centres, and so forth. In effect, Okhrymovych showed that Polish economic and political dominance had produced conditions which were literally killing the Ukrainian peasantry.

The situation between these two peoples was complicated, further by historic and political circumstances. It was by no means a simple case of oppressor versus the oppressed. In fact, it is essential

to keep in mind the differing natures of Polish and Ukrainian society, and their differing ambitions in order to appreciate the complexity of their relationship.¹⁸

The Poles were the heirs of the legacy of a great Polish state which had been partitioned in the late eighteenth century between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In Galicia, the Austrian portion of the traditional Polish homeland, the Poles had managed to accommodate themselves and their aspirations much better than in the Polish lands under Russian and Prussian control. The Hapsburg Empire, by principle, was a multi-national state, and the Poles had managed to make themselves one of the dominant nationalities in the empire (after the Germans and the Hungarians). Since the 1860s their control over the province of Galicia had been virtually complete, and they had had continued representation in the Austrian government at the ministerial level. Under these relatively favourable circumstances, Galicia provided a basis for Polish aspirations of a future, restored, fully-independent Poland.

However, the numerous Ukrainians in Galicia represented a substantial threat to what Poles perceived to be their national interests. The reason should be self-evident: Ukrainians had a disproportionately small share of the power and opportunity offered by Galician public life relative to their numbers, and any increase in their share of power in the province would be clearly at the expense of the Poles' virtual monopoly. From the Polish perspective, there was no easy "solution" to this "problem". It was obviously unrealistic to attempt the outright assimilation of the Ukrainians, and it was impossible to deny their existence

as a separate people because they had been legally recognized as one of the empire's nationalities in 1848. The Polish position with respect to Ukrainians, accordingly, aimed at what was possible in terms of the existing social and political situation: keeping the Ukrainians permanently in a socially, economically, politically, and culturally subordinate position from which they could not threaten the Polish ruling class.

The truncated social development of Ukrainians made it very difficult for them to challenge the Poles. In the mid-nineteenth century they scarcely had the human resources needed to make a case for their existence as a people, let alone to fight for their group rights.¹⁹ The Polish saying, "There is no Ruthenia (Ukraine); there are just priests and peasants," could claim a certain credibility.

The bulwark of Ukrainian consciousness in Galicia was, in fact, the peasants, who tended to differentiate themselves from their Polish counterparts on the basis of their adherence to an Eastern-rite church, and the Greek (i.e., Ukrainian) Catholic clergy. The clergy in particular had played a crucial role in promoting a distinctive consciousness among Ukrainians. In the absence of a Ukrainian aristocracy or bourgeoisie -- the latter classes having by and large been Polonized over several centuries of Polish rule -- the clergy assumed a quasi-aristocratic position. The clergy was by far the most influential force in Galician Ukrainian society, both in direct terms, i.e., where a priest would "guide" his parishioners in a proper manner; and indirect terms, i.e., by giving what few non-peasant secular forces there were among Galician Ukrainians (particularly lawyers and teachers) a strongly clerical bent to their

mode of thought. But other than the peasantry, the clergy, and a few secular representatives, the Ukrainians had no forces they could muster together to try and force a change in their lot. Moreover, the clergy was not sure that the situation required adjusting. Its own position in society had been assured by privileges granted to it by the Hapsburg realm and its control over its "flocks" was very strong; from its perspective, everything was fine.²⁰

Between 1860 and 1914 the situation among Galician Ukrainians changed phenomenally. In the broadest terms, this can be attributed to the potentially explosive situation caused by the close alignment of the national and social questions: any movement which would be seeking to redress the imbalance of power among the ethnic groups of Poland would ipso facto have to represent the true interests of the mass of Ukrainians, and conversely, any movement to improve the lot of the mass of Ukrainians would have to address the question of the disproportionately small share of power held by them as a legitimate grievance. Several specific currents set these latent forces into motion: a Ukrainian national revival influenced strongly by a similar movement in Russia; the growth of a vibrant secularly-minded intelligentsia; and the emergence of movements -- initially conservative and clerically-led, but becoming increasingly radical and secular in nature -- dedicated to improving the lot of the peasantry. Within a half-century, these forces which constituted the so-called "Ukrainian movement" (Ukrains'kyi narodnyi rukh) fundamentally altered the nature of Galician Ukrainian life. In the words of one observer, "a tremendous change took place," as "in the place of a depressed peasant mass arose a politically-conscious peasant nation."²¹

III

The Ukrainian movement emerged in Galicia during the latter half of the nineteenth century as Ukrainians attempted to correct the perceived shortcomings of their situation in both economic and political terms. It was not conceived or developed by any single party or group, though two outstanding features characterized it. First, the movement, although led by a secular intelligentsia, was based mainly upon the peasantry. Second, it pursued a very practical program centred on education, mutual aid, and political reform. Its aim was to give the peasantry a means by which it could improve its own lot. Simultaneously, the movement tried to produce political changes which would improve the climate in which peasant self-sufficiency could be achieved. In short, it was a populist movement, if one accepts the definition of populism as a broadly-based movement which mobilizes the rural lower classes around a program of economic action and political reform intended to improve its general lot in society.²² The nature of social stratification in Galicia had combined with the peasant character of most Ukrainians to converge into a determined political quest for social and national emancipation. This inextricable fusion of ideas is reflected well by the standard phrase used to designate the Ukrainian movement, "narodnyi rukh", which literally translates as both a "national" and a "people's" movement.

The growth of a full-fledged movement was preceded by an intellectual and political awakening on the part of Ukrainians in Galicia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ukrainians had no clear conception of who they were. Consequently, the possibility of any

broadly-based action on their part was unlikely until they had developed a collective consciousness of themselves. They thought of themselves as Ruthenians, descendants of the ancient Rus'ian people who had formed a great state centred on the city of Kiev in the eleventh century. Simultaneously, they might be Galicians, Bukovinians, Lemkos, Boykos, and so forth, according to their geographical derivation. In either case, they attributed no specific value to their ethnic distinctiveness; their adherence to the Greek Catholic Church actually was considered to be of greater importance. Nor did they (excluding some better educated individuals) identify themselves with the millions of their countrymen under Russian rule, who they considered "Ukrainians", not "Ruthenians".

The first signs of an emerging national consciousness among Galician Ukrainians occurred during the 1830s and 1840s.²³ During the 1830s, some romantically-inspired Greek Catholic theology students became interested in the folk culture of the peasantry, and decided to publish a volume of folk poetry and original verse. After considerable difficulty with censorship, they published a slim volume called Rusalka Dnistrova (The Nymph of the Dneister) in 1837. It caused a great controversy because it used Ukrainian vernacular language in print. Ecclesiastical authorities denounced it as undignified and possibly subversive; they managed to have general distribution of the work delayed until 1848. Such notoriety did not stop the young seminarians. They pursued their interest in the language and folklore of their people, established contacts with scholars who had a similar interest in their fellow countrymen across the border in

Russia, and followed the achievements of the emerging Czech national movement with great interest. More importantly, they infected others with their enthusiasm. By the mid-1840s a definite current of "national" thought had established itself among clerical circles in Galicia. As a result, in the wake of the 1848 revolution, Ukrainians, led by the Greek Catholic clergy, formed a Central Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rus'ka Rada) and petitioned the emperor for a recognition of their nationality and a guarantee of equal rights with the Poles of Galicia.

Though the Council's petition did not raise any social or economic questions, it was still a very significant document. This was the first time that Galician Ukrainians had asserted their distinctiveness as a people. However, the initiative started by the Council floundered during the 1850s as overt political action moved to the background while Ukrainians faced the problem of further redefining their quest for identity. If they were a distinct entity (i.e., different from the Poles), then how were they so? During the next two decades, two main currents of thought emerged in response.

The first current emerged during the 1850s, maintaining that the Ukrainians were a part of the Russian people. This was the so-called Russophile movement, a conservative, clergy-led, anti-Polish trend which wished to differentiate Ukrainians by emphasizing their connections with the Eastern Slavic world in general, and to endow them immediately with what was regarded as a great and genteel cultural heritage. The deep contradictions inherent in their movement were especially evident in their much-heralded claim to be developing

a new Russian literary language when in fact they were using an unlikely, irregular mixture of Ukrainian, Old Church Slavonic, and Russian (commonly referred to as iazychie by their opponents) for their own publications. Nevertheless, Russophilism had considerable support among Galician Ukrainians, particularly well-placed "establishment" figures.

The second current to emerge after 1848 was a wholly Ukrainian one. This is usually associated with a group known alternately as the Ukrainophiles or the narodovtsi (national populists). The narodovtsi formed in 1860 as a group of young Ukrainian intellectuals inspired by the patriotic poetry of Taras Shevchenko. Their ranks were reinforced by some remnants of the generation of 1848 who had been alienated by the increasingly reactionary policies of the Russophiles. In many respects, the narodovtsi resembled the earlier group of young romantics who had idealized the peasantry in the Rusalka Dnistrova. Yet, there were important differences: the narodovtsi were mainly a secular party; they were steadfast in their conviction as to the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and the affinity between Austrian and Russian Ukrainians; and they were considerably more numerous, more active, and more established than the earlier idealists. In 1868 they organized the Prosvita (Enlightenment) Society, the institution with which they have become most closely associated. This was an adult educational body whose aims were to establish Ukrainian reading clubs at the village level and to publish popular literature in the vernacular.

With the establishment of the narodovtsi around the Prosvita,

one could say that a specifically Ukrainian consciousness began to entrench itself in Galicia. Ukrainians in the province were awakened to the point where a Ukrainian identity had become an integral part of their intellectual life. However, one could hardly call this a mass movement. Nor did it seem likely that it would become one in the foreseeable future. The major reasons for this were three-fold. First, the outlook of the narodovtsi was limited largely to cultural and linguistic matters, and its base of support was limited to the intelligentsia. One contemporary observer noted: "Being excessively concerned with developing a distinct Ruthenian-Ukrainian literature, they did not even have time to consider how important it was to educate the masses."²⁴ In effect, they had become a "professors' party". Second, the narodovtsi found their efforts being hampered continually by the Russophiles. Any Ukrainophile efforts to work through existing channels were stone-walled because the Russophiles were so well entrenched in the major Ukrainian institutions of Galicia. Furthermore, the Russophiles started their own reading club in 1874, the M. Kachkovsky Society, using a large legacy left by the deceased for whom the organization was named. Finally, there was no appropriate institutional basis for organizing the peasantry per se. At the village level, the church was usually the only "national" institution which existed, and its primary function was religious, not social in nature.

A convergence of forces and events over the following decades changed the situation in Galicia fundamentally, and a vibrant Ukrainian movement based upon truly populist principles finally emerged.

The structure of the Galician Ukrainian village was the first stumbling block to be removed. During the 1870s, a clerically-led movement was in the forefront of establishing new institutions in Ukrainian villages: reading clubs, choirs, sports societies, church brotherhoods, and the like. The starting point for these efforts came in 1869, when Father Stepan Kachala wrote a widely-read and very influential booklet, Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochy mozhe (What is Destroying Us and What Can Help Us). In it he charged that the origin of the peasants' increasing woes lay in their ignorance, laziness, and intemperance. He suggested that they would be better off if they spent their free time listening to public readings or being active in a "useful" organization. At worst, this would keep them from wasting away in the church's main competitor in the village, the tavern. Kachala's ideas sparked a great deal of excitement and activity, especially among clergymen. They set about transforming the Ukrainian village with a great, almost missionary-like zeal. Ironically, once the clergy set in motion the process of developing new social institutions at the village level, these took on a life of their own. The new societies, especially the reading clubs, quickly developed far beyond their original intentions and became a network of institutions which could link the urban-based intelligentsia with the rural peasantry. In the process they shed their quasi-religious character. 25

The weakening of the Russophiles was a second major change during this period which helped the populist ideal to reach ascendancy. The Russophile party received a devastating blow in 1882 when some of its most influential members were tried for treason. Until that year,

some inroads had been made in discrediting the Russophiles' views, but these were minor in comparison to the effect of the trial and the subsequent emigration to Russia of Rev. Ivan Naumovych, a leading Galician Russophile. The party never recovered, and by 1890, it was in complete disarray. Consequently, undisputed leadership of the Ukrainian community passed into the hands of the narodovtsi.²⁶

Finally, the emergence of a new group of younger and more fervent Ukrainian populists -- the "radicals" -- during the 1870s helped to maintain the integrity of populist ideals in Galicia and to expand their parameters. The radicals included such outstanding figures as Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk. Their ethos had been shaped by the positivist and socialist, but nonetheless patriotic, ideas of Mykhailo Drahomanov, a professor at the University of Kiev and a prominent political theorist.²⁷ They firmly believed that the intelligentsia had to break beyond the bonds of its cultural and linguistic fixations. The idea that "the intelligentsia had to serve the people, not the people the intelligentsia," in fact, might be understood as their crie de coeur. Pavlyk wrote:

This was a movement which was no longer satisfied with the observation that "We are Ruthenians, a people distinct from the Poles and the Muscovites." Instead, it attempted to focus attention on questions such as how this people lived, what were the reasons for its ignorance and poverty, and how it could manage to elevate itself.²⁸

In 1890, the radicals formed their own Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party and started the influential newspaper Narod (The People).

The radicals' ideas were very much in the tradition of national populism, although the radicals differentiated themselves from the narodovtsi because of what they considered to

be the latter's limited viewpoint and growing conservatism. But these two streams of thought were not so far apart that they could not speak a common language. In fact, the radicals' legitimate criticism during the 1890s helped to rejuvenate the narodovtsi. By the end of the decade there was a general regrouping of Ukrainian political forces as the narodovtsi merged outright with the more nationalistically-oriented wing of the radicals to form the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, the mainstream Ukrainian political party in Galicia until the First World War. The radicals regrouped as a party which, although still critical of the narodovtsi, would support them in concrete actions on matters of mutual concern.²⁹

Beginning in the 1880s, the Ukrainian movement started to gain momentum. It began to develop its specific characteristics, to expand the scope of its activities, and finally to reach out to the mass of the Ukrainian people, the peasantry. It set out on several levels and in many directions simultaneously with the aim of developing Ukrainian strength in the educational, economic, and political spheres, and of producing political changes which would aid the Ukrainian people.

Education was perhaps the most wide-ranging activity undertaken by the Ukrainian movement. This must be understood in the broadest context, for a great deal of stress was placed upon educating the Ukrainian peasantry outside conventional educational institutions. Adult peasant education took the form of a wide-spread campaign based on the network of reading clubs throughout rural areas. On Sundays or other holidays, a literate person would read excerpts from a newspaper or booklet to a group of peasants which had come to listen. In turn, they would discuss and assimilate the information being

conveyed. Thus, although they might technically be classified as illiterate because they lacked formal education and were unable to read or write, these peasants could not be dismissed outright as being uneducated. Over a period of several years, they would have learned about a host of wide-ranging topics, from socio-political analysis to technical matters of immediate applicability such as hygiene, medical advice, and farming methods.³⁰

In the realm of formal education, Ukrainians waged a constant battle. The problem, simply stated, was that there was not enough Ukrainian-language education in Galicia. There were too few schools; there was a lack of teachers; rural schools in Ukrainian areas often did not have more than two grades; the number of Ukrainian-language secondary schools (gymnasiums) was totally inadequate; and Ukrainian-language instruction at the university level was virtually non-existent. As a result, Ukrainians sought to expand the scope of Ukrainian-language education in every direction.³¹

In the economic realm, the intelligentsia established a host of self-help institutions: co-operative stores, credit unions, land banks, marketing agencies, communal granaries, and so forth. These were often developed in conjunction with a local reading club. A survey done in 1907 showed that there were 450 stores, 250 granaries, and 200 credit unions affiliated with the Prosvita in Galicia. More often than not, this affiliation was informal. If the institutions were spawned by or developed in conjunction with the Prosvita, they might co-exist as separate entities. They could even detach themselves with no animosity felt by either agency -- as in the case of the Narodna Torhovia (National Trading Company), a co-operative store venture, and

Sil's'kyi Hospodar (Village Farmer), an agrarian organization. By the First World War, the co-operative movement had made spectacular gains in Galicia, although it was beset with organizational problems which prevented it from becoming as effective a vehicle for change as it might have been.³²

Political action on the part of Galician Ukrainians ran the full gamut of possibilities. At a fundamental level, this involved the politicization of the peasantry and its development as a political force. This was done largely through the regular Sunday gatherings of reading clubs, where polemical articles and economic studies published in newspapers would be discussed, and through an innovation on the part of the radicals, the open mass meeting (narodne viche), where matters of public concern would be debated openly and resolved in the most direct manner possible.³³ The entire morass of electoral politics wallowed at a more involved level. Ukrainian efforts were largely aimed in two directions: increasing their representation in legislative bodies and forcing the most concessions possible from them. Ukrainians worked to maximize their existing electoral power by voting for their "own" (candidates); then they had these co-operate in unison (like a "club") despite party differences. One of the major aims of these elected deputies was to try to force electoral changes which would extend the franchise to a broader segment of the population and redistribute electoral boundaries to reflect the demographic realities of Galicia.³⁴ Such changes would guarantee an increased Ukrainian representation in the legislative bodies.

The Ukrainians were relatively successful in achieving this goal by the eve of the First World War. They had actually forced electoral changes which would assure them a greater share of the power in Galicia, though it was still less than that to which they would have been entitled on a simple demographic basis. In pursuit of concessions from the legislatures, the Ukrainians valiantly employed a host of obstructionist tactics. Still, they were limited in what they could achieve simply because of their relatively small numbers. With the electoral reform of 1914, this situation would have likely changed somewhat as Ukrainian representation in the provincial Diet would have increased at the expense of the Poles. However, these changes were not implemented before the outbreak of the war.³⁵

By 1914, the Ukrainian movement in Galicia could be judged to have been "successful". It had produced some reforms in the province; it had improved the economic conditions of the peasantry somewhat and its moral condition immensely; it had maintained its integrity; and it had not fallen apart but actually grown. Still, the movement had not achieved all that it had set out to do, which in turn reflected the magnitude of its goals, the resistance it faced from Polish and Austrian officials, opposition from internal sources such as the Russophiles, and the weakness of its own resources. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian movement had managed to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and the peasantry, in itself a major feat. This fact is noted very well by the sociologist Samuel Koenig:

Whatever success was registered in arousing the people to national consciousness was due to the extraordinary understanding of the peasant by his leaders. Practically

all of them were men of wide learning who rose from the peasant class, and consequently could speak to them in their own language. They approached them as one of them, were listened to and obeyed. Moreover, these leaders understood that an appeal on an economic rather than a political basis was a wiser course. Hence a systematic endeavor to organize the peasant into co-operatives of all sorts was started. The peasants were instructed how to work more efficiently, how to produce better and larger crops, how to buy and sell their products, and incidentally to recognize that they are a nation with a culture of their own. . . . (The peasant) became much more conscious than ever before of his economic and political status, as well as more prepared to lend his assistance to what the leaders demanded of him.³⁶

IV

The Ukrainian movement in Galicia, despite its remarkable achievements, was nevertheless cursed with a fatal flaw. Although it could force certain political reforms and help the peasantry to become more self-sufficient, it could not eliminate the root causes of Galicia's economic malaise. In particular, it was helpless in the face of the crushing poverty which was caused by the province's overpopulation relative to its immediate productive capacity.

The crux of this economic problem was documented in a study done by Dr. Josef Oleskow, an agronomist at the Teachers' Seminary in L'viv.³⁷ According to Oleskow's estimations, the average agricultural family of five people possessed about three hectares of land. This was only half the amount needed for subsistence under ideal conditions. These ideal conditions, however, did not exist. A great deal of the modest amounts produced from these small plots were used to pay various taxes and duties. Moreover, it was only a matter of time before many already-marginal plots would be sub-divided even further. Even if the Ukrainian movement had somehow managed to redistribute all property

in Galicia, individual land holdings would still have been less than the size needed for self-sufficiency.

Oleskow proposed emigration as a remedy for the overcrowding. In 1895 he travelled to Western Canada at his own expense to investigate its suitability for settlement. He was pleased with what he saw. Upon returning to L'viv he published a booklet, O Emigratsii (About Emigration), in which he gave a detailed account of his tour, information about how peasants could set out for Canada, and practical advice about some problems which the prospective emigrants might face.³⁸

Oleskow's work caused a considerable stir among the Ukrainian peasants in Galicia. Yet in a way, it simply supported a conclusion many peasants had reached earlier. As early as the 1870s, an increasing number of Ukrainians had been going further afield in search of employment, especially to the United States. Many finally decided to abandon their homeland completely. By 1891, the first Ukrainians had arrived in Canada, searching for the fabled "free lands" of the West.³⁹ Their glowing reports of Canada sparked a movement of emigrants to go to Canada. However Oleskow's influence should not be underrated, for it was largely through his efforts that the small trickle of humanity that had already started coming to Canada in 1891 was turned into a mass movement by the end of the decade.

Once they had arrived in Canada, the emigrants became immigrants. They started a new life in a new world. Nevertheless, they brought with them certain values and perceptions from the "Old World" they had left behind, "traditions" in the non-folkloric sense of the

word. These were their guideposts to the type of social organization with which they were familiar, and which they often would hope to perpetuate in the New World. The populist legacy of the Galician Ukrainian movement can be viewed as one of these. Certainly, this was the case in Alberta, the final destination for many Ukrainian immigrants.

Notes to Chapter Two

¹ Galicia had 5,444,689 of Austria's total population of 20,396,630 in 1869 and 6,607,816 of 23,895,413 in 1890. These population figures and relative land size statistics do not include the lands and peoples in the Hungarian part of the empire (which would bring Galicia's share of the population and land size down to approximately 15 per cent). See John-Paul Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867-1890" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977), p.4.

² L. Blumenfeld, "Grossgrundbesitz und Auswanderung in Galizien," *Der österreichische Volkswirt*, 6 Jahrgang (Vienna 1914), pt.1, no. 33, p.609, cited by Johann Chmelar, "The Austrian Emigration 1900-1914," in *Dislocation and Emigration: The Social Background of American Immigration*, Perspectives in American History Series, vol.7, eds. D.Fleming and B.Bailyn (Cambridge: Charles Warner Center for Studies in American History, 1974), p.324; Franciszek Bujak, *Galicya*, 2 vols. (Lwow: H.Altenburg, 1908-1910), I: 19, cited by Samuel Koenig, "The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia: A Study of Their Culture and Institutions" (Ph.d. dissertation, Yale University, 1935), p.24; and Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," p.5.

³ Orest Martynowych, "Village Radicals and Peasant Immigrants: The Social Roots of Factionalism Among Ukrainian Immigrants in Canada, 1896-1918" (M.A.thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978), p.17; and F.Bujak, *Poland's Economic Development* (London, 1926), p.53, cited by Koenig, "Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia," p.30.

⁴ For a discussion of the political situation in Galicia during this period, see Ivan L.Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," *Austrian History Yearbook*, III (1967), pt.2: 394-425; the economic policies pursued by the nobility are described in Benjamin P. Murdzek, *Emigration in Polish Social-Political Thought, 1870-1914*, East European Monographs no.33 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp.79-81 and 96-99.

⁵ Martynowych, "Village Radicals and Peasant Immigrants," pp. 13-14; and John-Paul Himka, "Western Ukraine on the Eve of Emigration," in *Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*, ed. Manoly Lupul (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, forthcoming), pp.2-3 [of original manuscript].

⁶ Murdzek, "Emigration in Polish Thought," pp.96-97.

⁷ Ivan Franko, "Zemel'na vlasnist' u Halychyni," pp.278-304 in *Ivan Franko: Tvory*, 20 vols., eds. O.Ie.Korniichuk et al, vol.19: *Filosofs'ki, ekonomichni ta istorychni statki* (Kiev 1956), 278-304.

⁸ Himka, "Western Ukraine," p.22.

⁹ Blumenfeld, "Grossgrundbesitz," p.609, cited by Chmelar, "Austrian Emigration," p.324. Himka, "Western Ukraine," p.6 cites figures which are only slightly different; and Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), p.138 supports the observation that the vast majority of peasant land holdings in Galicia were 5 hectares (12½ acres) or smaller.

¹⁰ One Polish scholar estimated in 1909 that there were approximately 18 million plots of land in Galicia -- many of them separate and non-contiguous -- held by one million land owners. In other words, the average land owner's holdings were spread out over eighteen small parcels. This provided a considerable problem, for a good part of a peasant's day might be spent travelling between plots rather than actually working on them. Moreover, boundaries between neighbours were usually not clearly delineated, and squabbles over land rights were a constant source of conflict and frequent litigation. See Murdzek, Emigration in Polish Thought, p.144.

¹¹ S.Szczepanowski, Nedza Galicyi w cyfrach i program energicznego rozwoju gospodarstwa krajowego (L'viv 1888), p.22, cited by Murdzek, Emigration in Polish Thought, p.140.

¹² Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia," pp.405-408; and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History," in Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp.18-19.

¹³ Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," p.377.

¹⁴ See Martynowych, "Village Radicals and Peasant Immigrants," p.14 for a description of increasing alcohol consumption at this time.

¹⁵ Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, p.122.

¹⁶ Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," p.10.

¹⁷ Volodymyr Okhrymovych, "Pro smertel'nist' v Halychyni i iei prychyny," Narod, 8-22 November 1892 (double issue) to 1 August 1893.

¹⁸ See Rudnytsky, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations," for an overview of historical relations between these Poles and Ukrainians. For a discussion of the unique role of Galicia in Polish cultural life during the nineteenth century, see Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp.53-57.

¹⁹ The question of a "non-historical" nation, i.e., a people without a developed state tradition, is discussed at greater length in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Role of Ukraine in Modern History," in The Development of the USSR, ed. Donald W. Treadgold (Seattle, 1964), pp.211-212.

20 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia," pp.394-396 discusses both the social composition of Galician Ukrainians and their loyalty to their Hapsburg overlords; John-Paul Himka, "The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society, 1772-1918" (unpublished paper, University of Alberta, 1981) provides an overview of the role played by the clergy in Galician Ukrainian society.

21 Wasyl Kutschabsky, Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918-1923 (Berlin, 1934), p.14, cited by Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia," p.416.

22 Despite its frequent usage, "populism" is actually a very loosely defined term. Two approaches can be taken in seeking a suitable definition, either defining the phenomenon in dictionary terms, or by examining the context in which it is used. The first can be found in Geoffrey K. Roberts, A Dictionary of Political Analysis (London: Longman, 1971), and the definition cited in the text is derived from it. The second can be found in J.B.Allcock, "Populism: A Brief Bibliography," Sociology 5 (September 1971): 371-387; and E.Gellner, ed., Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969).

23 The following discussion about the emergence of a Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia is based mainly on Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia"; and Mykhailo Pavlyk, "Pro rus'ko-ukrainins'ki narodni chytal'ni," pp.416-549, in M.Pavlyk, Tvory (Kiev 1959).

24 Pavlyk, "Narodni chytal'ni," p.531.

25 John-Paul Himka, "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900," Canadian Slavonic Papers 21 (March 1979): 1-14 provides a good account of this process.

26 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia," p.413. One should note that although the Russophiles had been given a permanent setback, they had not collapsed completely. There continued to be a substantial Russophile presence in Galicia until after the First World War.

27 Regarding Drahomanov's ideas and his impact on Galician Ukrainian politics, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., Mykhailo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 2 (Spring 1952); Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, and the Relations Between the Dneiper Ukraine and Galicia in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century," Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 7 (1959): 1542-1566; Ivan Franko, "Molođa Ukraina," in Vybir iz tvoriv, ed. Kost' Kysylevsky (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1956), pp.348-351; Pavlyk, "Narodni chytal'ni," pp. 539-543; and Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," pp.163-178 and 193-236. Drahomanov's own recollections of Galicia can be found in his "Avstro-rus'ki spomyny, 1867-1877," in M.P.Drahomanov: Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi, vol.2, ed. O.Lysenko (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1970), pp.151-288.

- 28 Pavlyk, "Narodni chytal'ni," p.544.
- 29 Rudnytsky, "Ukrainians in Galicia," pp.422-424; and Matviy Stakhiv, "Drahomanov's Impact on Ukrainian Politics," in Mykhailo Drahomanov, ed. I.L.Rudnytsky, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States (Spring 1952); 58-59.
- 30 Himka, "Western Ukraine," pp.14-16.
- 31 Ann Sirka, The Nationality Question in Austrian Education: The Case of Ukrainians in Galicia, 1867-1914, European University Studies, Series III, no. 124 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang Ltd., 1980) provides an overview of Ukrainian efforts in the area of formal education.
- 32 The best source for information about the Ukrainian co-operative movement is undisputedly Illia Vytanovych, Istoriia Ukrainiis'koho ko-operatyvnoho rukhu (New York, 1964). The figures cited in this paragraph can be found on p.137 of this work.
- 33 Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," pp.399-424 gives a number of good case studies of the politicization of Ukrainian peasants in Galician villages. Nonetheless, it should be noted that by the outbreak of the First World War this process had not been completed, though its gains had been substantial. Koenig, "The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia," p.105 notes this fact and the reason for it quite astutely: "The peasant was yet far too ignorant; too much engrossed in his struggle for daily existence, to become politically minded."
- 34 A good description of Ukrainian electoral and legislative efforts until 1900 can be found in Matviy Stakhiv, Foreword to Na narodni sluzhbi by Ivan Makuch (Detroit 1958), pp.20-55; Rudnytsky, "Ukrainians in Galicia," pp.424-427 capsulizes the subsequent period when the entire question of electoral reform came to the fore quite well.
- 35 The process of electoral reform had actually started in 1907 with the introduction of universal suffrage for men to the Reichsrat (Parliament). Because of gerrymandering, however, Ukrainians received less benefit from this reform than might have been expected.
- 36 Koenig, "Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia," ppp.105-106.
- 37 Josyf Oleskow, Pro vil'ni zemli (L'viv: Prosvita, 1896; reprint ed., Winnipeg: UVAN, 1975), pp.4-6.
- 38 The authoritative account of Oleskow's work is V.J.Kaye, Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada: Dr. Josef Oleskow's Role in the Settlement of the Canadian Northwest (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).
- 39 Ivan Pillipiiv and Wasyl Eleniak are commonly regarded as being the "first" Ukrainians to immigrate to Canada. An account of their historic journey can be found in William A.Czumer, Recollections About the Life of the First Ukrainian Settlers in Canada, trans. L.T.Laychuk (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1981), pp.12-22.

CHAPTER THREE

Ukrainian National Populism in Alberta: A Model for Social Organization.

A Ukrainian movement in Alberta could be said to have begun in 1909 when education, mutual economic aid, and political representation were articulated as the basis of a program for Ukrainian social development in the province. At the centre of these efforts was Peter Svarich, an Old Country "radical" working as a notary public in Vegreville. Because of his education, his numerous contacts, and his considerable personal effort, Svarich was able to establish the principles of the Ukrainian movement's populist program in a New World setting.

Svarich's views on two crucial questions, education and political representation, did not coincide at all with those of the province's Liberal administration. In fact, the latter's assimilationist bent was openly hostile to the pro-Ukrainian character of the former's brand of populism, and a conflict between the two was almost inevitable. This finally occurred in 1913 when the Liberals firmly rebuffed the growing Ukrainian desire for political representation and then followed with decisive action which solidly established the principle of unilingual English-language education over Ukrainian hopes for effective English-Ukrainian bilingual education. The Liberals were aided in their campaign by a small group of anglophiles acting as spoilers against the Ukrainian efforts and as token representatives of Ukrainian opinion. In the process, Svarich was disgraced, and he retreated

from the centre stage of the province's Ukrainian politics. Roman Kremar, a recently-arrived newspaper editor, replaced him as the leading figure in the Ukrainian movement, and launched a long and bitter, but ultimately futile campaign in an attempt to rectify the situation.

The events surrounding this initial attempt to implement a populist program among Ukrainians in Alberta left two legacies: first, the knowledge that Canadian society was adamantly set against any notion of "rights" for its Ukrainian settlers; and second, a considerable distrust by politically-conscious Ukrainians of the traditional Canadian political parties. Moreover, they established a precedent which would place any further attempts to link Ukrainian ethnicity with concrete social and material needs at a distinct disadvantage.

The first Ukrainian settlement in Canada was established in the Edna-Star region northeast of Edmonton in 1892-1894. It quickly grew around this nucleus to include approximately 9,000 people by the turn of the century and over 35,000 by 1914.¹ By that time, the settlement stretched in a long, continuous bloc across fourteen townships, varying in width from ten townships at its western border to five at its eastern one.

Upon settling, the primary concerns of Ukrainians were physical survival and the development of their homesteads. The peasant immigrants usually arrived with very little capital, so they had to transform this uncut wilderness into fertile fields mainly by pure manual labour. Under these harsh conditions of pioneering,

they could expect at least five years of hardships even greater than any they had experienced in the Old Country. After that time, they would have developed their lands at least to a point of self-sufficiency. Within another five years, they could claim to be relatively comfortable according to their Old Country standards. It was usually only then that they would consciously address the question of developing social institutions for themselves. Churches and community halls (narodni domy) were the most common institutions of their homeland, so these were usually the first community structures to be erected. But establishing institutions or organizations which would reflect Ukrainian group interests in a broader perspective was beyond the scope of people who were only starting to emerge from pioneering conditions.

One of the first Ukrainians in Alberta to start thinking in these broader terms was Peter Svarich (Petro Zvarych), a notary public living in Vegreville. For several years, Svarich had been developing an awareness of the social needs of Ukrainians during his extensive travels through the bloc district as an agricultural lecturer, school trustee, weed inspector, and Liberal organizer. By 1909, he had focussed in on three major concerns: education, economic self-aid, and political representation. He then started working toward concrete gains in each area. At a Liberal constituency convention in Vegreville, he put forth a resolution calling upon the provincial government to adopt certain measures which would eventually assure children in the bloc settlement effective bilingual English-Ukrainian education: to allow bilingual teachers

from Manitoba and Saskatchewan to teach in Alberta; to establish an institute which would train qualified bilingual teachers; to change the School Act in order to allow one hour a day for Ukrainian-language instruction; and to hire a Ukrainian school organizer for the bloc district. Shortly after the provincial election that year, he called upon Ukrainians in Alberta to start preparing their "own" people to stand as candidates during the next election (presumably as Liberals). He also developed plans for a network of co-operative stores to serve the Ukrainian area of the province.² In effect, Svarich began to espouse some basic tenets of Ukrainian national populism as a program for the development of social institutions among Ukrainians in Alberta.

Considering Svarich's highly-motivated character and his personal background, it is hardly surprising that he should emerge as an important Ukrainian leader, and that he should display such a remarkable affinity for the idea of national populism.³ Svarich was born in the Galician village of Tulova in 1877, the first child of relatively well-to-do peasants. After the family had finally grown in size to include five children, Svarich saw that there was no future for him on their modest parcel of land and left for the neighbouring town of Sniatyn to go to school. With some financial assistance from his parents, money he earned from tutoring his classmates, and fierce determination, Svarich managed to survive comfortably and to do well in his studies. As the years passed and he grew more comfortable in his role as a student, Svarich began to indulge in the social and political life of the times to the detriment of his formal education. He read radical and socialist pamphlets printed in

Ukrainian, Polish, and German; he came into contact with the ideas of Marx, Drahomanov, and Franko; and he took some preliminary steps towards joining the Radical Party. Before he became a full-fledged member, however, Svarich's energies were diverted in other directions. First, he had to finish what amounted to three years of schooling in one year in order to reduce his term of duty in the army from three years to one by obtaining an officer's rank; and second, he joined his family in their plans to emigrate to Canada after he had completed his army duty. Svarich had no trouble justifying this latter decision when his colleagues chided him about it. Not only could he make a comfortable living for himself in Canada, but he could also perform a valuable service for his people. He explained that "our people will not fare well without leaders, without its intelligentsia, without guidance and counsel." When he arrived in Canada, Svarich set out to fulfill both his claims. He worked at various jobs in Edmonton, mined at Rossland, B.C., went to Alaska to join the gold rush, and finally settled down with his substantial earnings in the Kolomea district northeast of Vegreville. He then started his organizational work among the Ukrainians of the area.

Judging from the outcome of a large gathering of prominent Ukrainians held in Edmonton on December 27 and 28, 1909, considerable support existed for Svarich's ideas.⁴ In fact, the questions of education, economic co-operation, and political action dominated the agenda. The viche (public meeting) had been convened to establish a program for future social development among Ukrainians

in Alberta, and it may be viewed justifiably as the start of major organizational efforts in the province. The preparatory work for it had been done by an ad hoc committee headed by Zigmunt Bychynsky, a Ukrainian Presbyterian minister then working as a teacher in Kolomea.⁵

The reasons for convening the viche, were stated as being those of organizing in general: to provide cohesion among the Ukrainian settlers of Alberta; to develop a Ukrainian-Canadian society in an effective manner; and to form a representative body which could articulate Ukrainian demands to the government. Underlying these, however, was a darker, deeper concern. Prominent Ukrainians throughout Alberta were starting to worry that their people were falling short of the promise which the New World had held for them. Svarich explained this feeling even more bluntly when he stated that not only had Ukrainians in Alberta failed to make significant "progress" during the previous decade in such non-economic activities as education and community development, but they had actually "slipped behind" other peoples. This was especially irksome when compared to the immense social gains which had been made by Ukrainians in Galicia during the same period despite internal difficulties and opposition from officialdom. "In general," noted Svarich, "they live there with at least a semblance of dignity."⁶

Approximately 200 people both from Edmonton and the outlying rural areas attended the meeting. The first speaker, Bychynsky, addressed the education question. He concluded with several recommendations: that a delegation visit the premier, A.C. Rutherford, that very day to remind him of certain election promises he had

made concerning Ukrainian education; that Ukrainians strive to place their own teachers in their schools, and have them give lessons both in English and Ukrainian; that Ukrainians set up a bursa, or student residence, in Edmonton in case the provincial government should fail to live up to its earlier commitment to provide a teacher training school for Ukrainians; and that those present form a Narodna Rada, or National Council, consisting of representatives from every area of the province where Ukrainians lived. Ten school trustees were then chosen to meet with the premier. They reported the following day that Rutherford had received them cordially, but had been non-committal, stating that no students had yet applied for bilingual teacher training and that he could not authorize a translation of the School Act until this matter had been approved by the legislature. A confused discussion then followed the report, ending with a decision that prospective candidates for the teachers' training school should submit their applications as soon as possible.⁷

The second presentation of the viche concerned organization, but it was very tedious and any reference to its contents has been omitted from accounts of the meeting. Svarich followed with a presentation concerning economic affairs. He recommended that a co-operative store or a series of co-operative stores be established in Alberta to service Ukrainian areas. These could provide an important institutional base for the Ukrainian movement in the province. The proposal generated considerable interest among the delegates, but it did not spark much discussion. So, the matter was referred to the National Council for further inquiry.⁸

Finally, Dmytro Solanych, a prominent local leader, spoke about politics. He noted that the political strength of Ukrainians in the province was negligible, though they formed over 7 per cent of the population and were concentrated in specific areas. As a means of rectifying this situation, he proposed forming a non-aligned Ukrainian 'democratic' party which would seek to elect officials to the legislature outside the rubric of the Canadian party system. Some Ukrainian socialists in the audience objected strongly to this proposal, saying that a 'democratic' Ukrainian party already existed (the Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats) and that there was no need for another one. The meeting immediately collapsed into chaos. Order was not restored until long afterwards, and Solanych's concept was never resolved.⁹

The meeting ended with the election of members and representatives of a newly-formed National Council. F. Lemishka was chosen as president, Svarich as secretary, and about two dozen individuals as organizers for the various communities in the bloc district. However, once these representatives returned home, they lost the enthusiasm they had displayed at the convention. The delegates from only one community, Myrnam, actually called a follow-up meeting in their vicinity, formed a local branch of the National Council, and then forwarded membership dues according to the organizing plan agreed upon. It was a classic case of the inability to sustain an initiative at both the grass-roots and co-ordinating level.¹⁰ The viche of December, 1909 thus failed to produce an immediate impact because of elementary organizational problems. Still, it had not been a completely futile exercise, for at least it had established some

"guideposts" for further social development among the province's Ukrainians. Perhaps even more importantly, the viche confirmed Svarich's ideas. He seems to have interpreted its results as a mandate to proceed with his organizing activity along the lines he had been developing. During the next four years he addressed the questions of education, economic self-aid, and political representation in a substantive manner.

Svarich approached the matter of economic self-aid first. He called a public meeting in Vegreville for January 27, 1910 to discuss the formation of a co-operative store, the Ruthenian National Trading Company (Narodna Torhovlia).¹¹ The prospects for success were very good. Five hundred people from every segment of the Ukrainian community came to listen attentively as Svarich repeated the presentation he had given at the December viche in Edmonton. As well, the local Ukrainian Catholic priest, Rev. Navkraty Kryzhnovsky, added a strong plea that people not allow religious differences stand in the way of establishing this venture. The only stumbling block was a technical detail: how shares would be sold and votes would be cast. After a protracted debate, a scheme for \$25.00 shares with equal voting privileges for all shareholders was devised. But because of a lack of knowledge about rudimentary business procedures, the majority of those present were still not clear about this scheme. So, the Torhovlia organizing proceeded slower than might have been expected.¹² Nevertheless, there was enough support for the idea to establish the first branch of the Narodna Torhovlia in Vegreville later that year. It proved to be an immediate success, and soon other branches were

opened in Edmonton, Chipman, Innisfree, and Lamont.¹³

Educational matters were Svarich's second major concern. It could be said that he was even obsessed by the idea that education, in the formal or informal sense, was of paramount importance for the Ukrainian settlers of Alberta. Accordingly, Svarich devoted much time, energy, and money towards this aim. He was instrumental in forming several reading clubs (even donating the books or property needed to establish them); he wrote regular articles in the press which gave practical advice about ~~and~~ diverse matters as farming methods, choosing homesteads, legal procedures, and even building a Canadian-style home; he organized several school districts and served as their trustee for many years; and he turned his own home into an educational institute more than once, be it to hold Ukrainian-language classes in mechanics and farm machinery operation or to provide space for a Presbyterian mission school.¹⁴

However, it was with the question of establishing effective English-Ukrainian bilingual education in the province that Svarich was most concerned. He recognized the potential of the public schools as an agent for improving the lives of the children of Ukrainian immigrant settlers. Yet he also realized that unilingual English-language education was not an effective means of educating such pupils. He noted his misgivings in a letter to the Vegreville Observer:

... it is impossible that out in the country among almost a solid mass of (Ukrainian) settlers where they are habituated to the use of the (Ukrainian) language, the children would, in the brief 80 school days or so for a year or two, gain much knowledge of the English language when all the rest of the time they are using the (Ukrainian). . . where not a single scholar is familiar with English, a whole term may be wasted before the children make even a start in the comprehension of English . . .¹⁵

In other words, Svarich felt that if Ukrainian children in Alberta were to receive a real education, Ukrainian-language instruction would have to be a necessary part of this process. At the same time, he realized it was essential for the students to learn the English language, and to be taught by qualified teachers. Consequently, he saw a pedagogically-sound system of bilingual education as the best means of dealing with this situation, and persistently sought changes in the province's educational structure to make this a reality -- a teacher training institute, a school organizer for the bloc district, a translation of the School Act into Ukrainian, and legislation permitting Ukrainian-language education in the public schools.

These educational concerns had been expressed publicly by Svarich first in 1909 during the provincial election campaign and at the December viche. The matter then lay dormant, though quiet lobbying for it was carried on by Svarich.¹⁶ Svarich decided to bring the matter out into the open once more and called a meeting of Ukrainian school trustees for February 15, 1912 in Vegreville. The 95 trustees and 66 other delegates who attended passed resolutions similar to those made in 1909; they then formed a provincial school council (shkil'nyi soiuz) to follow up on these.¹⁷

The council quickly began discussions with Alberta government officials. On February 22, 1912, it met briefly with C.R. Mitchell, Minister of Education. This inconclusive discussion was followed by an exchange of correspondence with the minister, but again no commitments were made. Mitchell then resigned from his position and was replaced by J. Boyle, an MLA from Sturgeon, whom Svarich believed

would be more favourably disposed to the Ukrainians' demands.¹⁸

After Boyle's installation as minister, the school committee once more exchanged correspondence. This time, the minister, seemed more positive, stating that a 'school for foreigners' was being planned. Soon thereafter, an official announcement was made that such an institution would be opened soon in Vegreville.¹⁹

Svarich was pleased with this announcement, although he had, in fact, been outmanoeuvred politically. First, the Liberals' proposed "English School for Foreigners" amounted to little more than a centre for remedial training. Its intention was "not to conduct the teaching in Ruthenian (Ukrainian), but to take greater pains with the students." Those finishing the program at the Vegreville school would not be qualified to teach. They would have only the pre-requisites to go on to the Normal School in Calgary from which they could then acquire recognized certification. The school council had been seeking a facility similar to one set up in Brandon. There subjects were taught both in English and Ukrainian, and the program was geared towards producing fully-qualified bilingual teachers. Second, the Liberals in Alberta had already made up their minds to proceed with the school well before the Ukrainians had increased their pressure for it. By the end of January, 1912, they had introduced a motion in the legislature for a \$3,000 grant to fund it.²⁰ Svarich and the council had either missed this move completely or had been convinced that in light of Conservative opposition to the motion, their best course of action would be to reiterate their basic demand for a training facility. In either case, the thrust in their demands was placed upon the establishment of a training institute rather than upon its specific

character. Finally, by isolating the training centre issue, the Alberta Liberals had managed either to ignore the other Ukrainian demands or to address them with half-measures: bilingual teachers from Saskatchewan and Manitoba were allowed to teach in the province, but without certification for their qualifications (they were issued permits to teach); a school organizer was appointed (Theodore Nemirsky), but he was a most inappropriate person for the job; and the question of changing the province's language legislation was ignored completely.

Svarich approached the matter of political action by giving a high profile to the idea that Ukrainians should unite as a political force in the province. Like many other capable, promising immigrants, Svarich had been recruited into the ranks of the Liberal party not long after his arrival in Canada.²¹ For years he served it loyally and helped to bring in almost solid blocs of Liberal votes from Ukrainian ridings in successive election campaigns. In return, Svarich secured certain concessions for the bloc area -- roads, post offices, telegraph offices, and the like.²² Eventually, Svarich began to feel that the Liberals owed the Ukrainians something far more substantial for their consistent support. After the 1909 election, he called upon his people to prepare to run four candidates (presumably as Liberals) during the next provincial election in the ridings where they constituted a considerable electoral force.²³ He felt that there was no reason why the Liberal government should not like and accept the idea gracefully. In effect, Svarich was "raising the ante" for Ukrainian political support.

Svarich felt so strongly about this issue that he seriously considered the possibility that if Ukrainians could not elect their "own" people to the legislature as Liberals, then they should try to

elect them as independents. He even suggested forming a Ukrainian caucus in the legislature similar to the one in the Austrian parliament:

Let us finally establish ourselves and see if we cannot form an independent Ruthenian (Ukrainian) democratic party. We could then cease being the pawns of foreign parties and elect our own representatives who would form their own club in the legislature and parliament. It would be weak initially, and thus, have to support whichever party seemed more favourable to our people's interests. But then it could grow in strength until they would have to deal with us seriously.²⁴

However, Svarich's posturing did not amount to open infidelity. He could still be persuaded to work within the existing political framework. During the by-election in mid-1912 needed to install J. Boyle as Minister of Education, Svarich campaigned on the Liberals' behalf for weeks on end in the belief that certain educational concessions for Ukrainians would be gained by his efforts.²⁵ Nevertheless, Svarich's increasing disillusionment with the Liberals was expressed clearly in his articulated misgivings about their good faith towards their Ukrainian supporters.

Svarich finally moved aggressively towards realizing the sorts of Ukrainian political gains that he had been advocating for several years. In conjunction with a number of other prominent Ukrainians in the province, he called for a public meeting (viche) to be held in Vegreville on January 14, 1913, to discuss a Ukrainian strategy for the forthcoming elections. Because of his ambiguous political loyalties at this time, one cannot be certain whether Svarich hoped to use the meeting to

establish a Ukrainian Liberal caucus or to declare the Ukrainians' independence from the traditional Canadian political parties. But this question is strictly academic, for the viche set in motion a chain of events which eventually thwarted its original, albeit unclear intentions. It also buried whatever ambition Svarich may have had to become a kingpin in the Ukrainian community.

II

The Vegreville viche of January 14, 1913, represented a second major attempt to bring the province's Ukrainians into a common front which would represent their interests. It differed from its predecessor (the viche of December 1909) in two important respects. First, the gathering had been organized with previously established objectives in mind, so more emphasis could be devoted to the crucial question of organizing per se. Second, it was being held on the eve of a provincial election, so discussions about strengthening Ukrainians politically were not wholly theoretical.

The viche was organized by Svarich and four other prominent Ukrainians: Roman Kremar, Michael Gowda (Mykhailo Govda), Paul (Pavlo) Rudyk, and Gregory Krickersky (Hryhoryi Kraikivs'kyi). The latter group, all from Edmonton, had just returned from a Winnipeg meeting concerning the very issue of Ukrainian participation in electoral politics.²⁶ The idea of increasing Ukrainian political strength in Alberta had been discussed for several years, but it was only after a Redistribution Bill which would increase the number of electoral seats in the

Alberta house from 41 to 56 and which would change existing constituency boundaries was introduced into the legislature late in 1912 that Ukrainians finally organized. But now they also had to contend with obvious gerrymandering by the Liberals; the proposed electoral boundaries for the bloc area had minimized the effectiveness of the Ukrainian vote by concentrating it in one riding (Whitford) and then splitting the remainder among three others.²⁷ Ukrainian hopes for electing as many as four MLAs diminished accordingly. The implications of the bill needed to be challenged directly.

The viche itself was attended by about 200 people. After two days of discussion, they decided to form a Narodnyi Komitet, translatable in the same manner as its predecessor, the National Council. Its aims were:

- 1) to assure the proper development of the concerns of Alberta's Ukrainians, which would necessarily require political organization and the defence of Ukrainian political rights.
- 2) to represent Alberta Ukrainians regardless of religious affiliation.
- 3) to link up with similar bodies (not yet established) in Saskatchewan and Manitoba in order to form an All-Canadian National Council.

Krickersky, Gowda, Rudyk, Kremar, and Svarich were all elected as executive officers, and Novyny (The News), Kremar's Edmonton-based newspaper, was chosen as the organization's official organ. The executive was granted a broad mandate in interpreting what the council's program should be, although it was directed specifically to meet with the premier, A.L. Sifton, to discuss

changes to the electoral redistribution proposal.²⁸

Despite what might have been a modest, but hopeful beginning, the fledgeling council was soon faced with a number of serious problems. First, the legitimacy it would have acquired as a representative Ukrainian body from successful dealings with the government never materialized. The Alberta Liberals insisted upon keeping the electoral boundaries as they had delineated them, and they could easily withstand any political muscle the Ukrainians could muster. When the National Council executive met with Sifton on January 21, its petition was categorically rejected.²⁹ Second, the council's leading figures, Svarich and Kremar, were becoming increasingly antagonistic to one another. Svarich was critical of Kremar's alleged lack of tact and complete disregard for legal procedures, citing Kremar's attempts to ram through a ready-made slate of executive officers and resolutions at the January viche as a prime example. In turn, Kremar was more than willing to assume the role of community spokesperson unilaterally, and he dismissed Svarich's misgivings as nothing more than the snipes of a Liberal hireling.³⁰ Finally, the council had its own Ukrainian opponents. It had failed to gain the support of the Catholic camp (which saw it as little more than a Liberal front) and it had to deal with open attacks by local Russophiles.³¹ (Russophilism was another current of thought which had crossed the ocean with Ukrainian immigrants.)

Ultimately the council faced an even more fundamental problem -- the opposition of English-Canadian society in general

to the notion of special "rights" for Ukrainian settlers and its hostility to any person attempting to represent Ukrainian interests per se in the political arena. The council had been established to defend such Ukrainian political rights as bilingual English-Ukrainian education. Moreover, by its formation, the council raised the possibility that a number of Ukrainians who strongly supported the cause of bilingual education might be elected to the legislature, where they could make their demands felt more effectively. Such posturing was diametrically opposed to the ideas of most English-Canadians, particularly in regard to bilingual education. Public schools were an agency of socialization striving to assimilate (or Canadianize) the "children of the foreign-born" by enforcing a unilingual English mold to their education. They were not to allow Ukrainians to perpetuate their distinct identity and their own language. It follows, then, that Canadian society was opposed philosophically to the election of public officials who would represent Ukrainian interests in general and bilingual education in particular.³²

Almost immediately after the National Council's formation, the forces working against its success converged simultaneously. The Russophiles (who will be dealt with at length shortly) launched an all-out effort to discredit the Council in order to establish themselves as the representative party of Ukrainian interests in Alberta; the National Council executive responded very weakly to this challenge because of poor co-ordination and internal division; and Ukrainian Catholics did not come to the Council's aid because

of their misgivings about it. Predictably, the National Council quickly collapsed in all but name. In its wake, the Liberals abandoned Svarich as the recognized spokesman for Ukrainian interests.

The opening salvo in this course of events had come shortly after the National Council's unsuccessful meeting with the Premier on January 22. Thousands of anonymous pamphlets claiming that the Council's leading figures were Conservative hirelings who had agreed to deliver the Ukrainian vote in return for a low price on 50,000 acres of crown land in the Peace River area appeared throughout the Ukrainian bloc district. Then, a group of Russophiles announced its own mass meeting of Ukrainians to be held in Mundare on February 10.³³ The legitimacy of the council had been challenged even before it had had a chance to establish itself.

In order to counter these unfounded charges of profiteering and to reassert its authority, the National Council announced that its own mass meeting would be held on February 7 in Chipman. This turned out to be an absolute debacle. Krickersky, the president, could not be there; Kremar missed his train from Edmonton; and the Russophiles showed up in full force and effectively took over the viche. The existing council was cashiered and a new one formed consisting of "individuals who are honest and reliable to the people's (Ukrainians') cause." At the same time a very flattering letter "approving the Sifton administration" was sent to the Alberta government and it was decided that a

delegation should approach the Premier to see "if the government would accept a Ukrainian candidate into the Liberal party." The Russophiles' meeting in Mundare on February 10 confirmed the events which had taken place in Chipman. Kremar attended this gathering in a desperate attempt to recoup the loss of the council, but his efforts failed completely.³⁴

When the smoke had settled from this series of rallies, Svarich resigned from the National Council executive because he now saw that a non-sectarian Ukrainian-Canadian political organization was not viable. Still, he did not abandon the notion that Ukrainians should attempt to field candidates during the next provincial election. He even drew up a list of likely prospects which included the members of the National Council executive -- Kremar, Krickersky, Gowda, and Rudyk -- as well as Andrew Shandro, a well-to-do farmer from the Whitford district who had been the head of the Ukrainian school committee.³⁵ Svarich failed to realize, however, that with the collapse of the National Council, his role as a mediator between the Ukrainian community and the Liberal party had suffered a major setback; he had been abandoned by the Liberals as the recognized spokesman for Ukrainian interests in favour of Andrew Shandro. In turn, Shandro, who had recently gained the Russophiles' backing could look forward to almost certain Liberal nomination and election in the Whitford constituency, where he had influential connections through his extensive family ties.

This turn-about represented a conscious decision on the part of the Liberals to recognize, or accept, one group over another as the legitimate voice of Ukrainian aspirations. Yet, some key questions concerning it, namely how did it come about and what were the Liberals' motives in this move, cannot be answered with complete certainty because of the fragmentary nature of the existing evidence. Nevertheless, certain reasonable speculations about this matter can be made.

Russian Orthodox missionaries had been visiting the Ukrainian bloc district in Alberta since before the turn of the century, establishing churches and generally attempting to expand their influence over the settlers. In the somewhat chaotic conditions of the times, when Ukrainian communities often were lacking their own priests to administer to their religious needs, they enjoyed some success.³⁶ This was particularly true among Ukrainian settlers from Bukovina, who had been Orthodox rather than Catholic in the Old Country. It is reasonable to assume that on the basis of this common religious affiliation, Russian Orthodox missionaries could have convinced Shandro, who was from Bukovina, that he was a Russian, not a Ukrainian, and that he should support them.³⁷

At the same time, the missionaries also sought influence in government circles. It is very possible -- perhaps even very likely -- that they presented themselves to the Liberals as the true leaders of the Ukrainian people, or at least better representatives than the ones they had been dealing with. Their offer could not but look tempting to the Liberals: the

Russophiles claimed that the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) were not a separate people, but a sub-section of the Russians; they had absolutely no educational demands -- in fact, they even supported unilingual education; and they were not as politically volatile as the Ukrainians, asking probably only for Shandro's election and funding for a newspaper. In effect, they offered to solve the growing "Ukrainian problem" which faced the Liberals for a meagre price. The Liberals, in turn, were hardly well versed in the complexities of Ukrainian history. They might well have believed what the Russophiles had told them -- at least it did not contradict anything they may have wanted to believe. As a final consideration, there was no reason to believe that the Russophiles could not deliver the "Ruthenian vote" while keeping a lid on the school question. Within these parameters, the two parties came to an accord.

With the National Council in shambles, the possibility of a co-ordinated Ukrainian counter-offensive to the Russophiles' actions seemed unlikely. For Svarich personally, it was an impossibility. A series of personal attacks on him had caused a serious decline in his credibility, especially among those in the Ukrainian Catholic camp. First, the Vegreville English School for Foreigners with which Svarich was closely identified, was criticized for being assimilationist and anti-Catholic almost from the day of its opening in February, 1913. Svarich was criticized for his role in its establishment, and for good measure, he was also charged with having profit-motivated interests behind his efforts.³⁸ Second, Svarich was criticized

for being overbearing in his role with the Narodna Torhovia, especially after the controversial dismissal of a branch manager, V. Kyryliuk, early in 1913.³⁹ Finally, since late 1912 a growing number of anonymous poison-pen letters had appeared in the Ukrainian Catholic newspaper, Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn (The Canadian Ruthenian), attacking Svarich for his past Liberal and Presbyterian affiliations. Initially editorial judgement on this matter was declined. But after Svarich wrote a somewhat tactless rebuttal to his critics in the Presbyterian-backed Ranok (The Dawn), Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn condemned him for having gone "into the service of those traitors and Janissaries."⁴⁰ The most concrete action Ukrainians could muster, accordingly, was a series of strongly-worded attacks against the Russophiles in Novyny, Kremar's newspaper.

Nevertheless, the idea of putting one or more of their "own" into office was still very much in the minds of Ukrainians. When a provincial election was finally called for April 11, serious consideration was given to nominating candidates in various ridings, and a truce among the warring Ukrainian factions was called for by Kremar.⁴¹ Shandro easily won the Liberal nomination in Whitford, although by this time, many Ukrainians had rejected the idea that he was one of "theirs" (Novyny even went so far as to state that his true lineage was Rumanian). In other Liberal contests, Ukrainians failed to run any nominee except a dark horse in Vegreville, Hryhorii Mykhailyshyn, who lost by a very wide margin.⁴² This left any hope of nominating a "truly Ukrainian"

candidate with the Conservatives. Upon Kremar's recommendation, a concerted attempt was made to nominate Peter Kulmatycky (Petro Kol'matyts'kyi), a prominent local Catholic leader, in the Vegreville riding.⁴³

About 200 Ukrainians packed the Vegreville town hall March 31 to nominate Kulmatycky as their Conservative candidate. Since there were only about 60 non-Ukrainians present, their chances seemed certain. However, they were outmanoeuvred. A motion was raised to strike a committee which would nominate the party's candidate: the Ukrainians in the hall, lacking any proficiency in the English language, voted blindly in favour of it. The committee which was established consisted of only three Ukrainians and eight non-Ukrainians. After an hour of deliberation it returned to announce that F.A. Morrison, a local lawyer, would be the Conservative candidate for the Vegreville riding. The Ukrainians were outraged. Many stood up and shouted for an open vote while others stormed out of the hall in disgust. One enterprising delegate from Innisfree, A. Zygmant, decided enough was enough, sprang out of his chair, grabbed the register from the front of the hall, and started to flee. The convention secretary and the town constable were hot in pursuit. Before he left the hall, Zygmant turned, swore at his pursuers, and threw the register at them. This was the spark needed to start a melee. A brawl between the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian delegates broke out, lasting up to an hour and spilling out onto the street. After it had been cleared up, a warrant for Zygmant's arrest was issued.

The Ukrainians reconvened in the marketplace, where Kulmatycky, Svarich, and others made a number of speeches. They decided that the "shameful actions" and "abuse" of the English "chauvinists" had left them no recourse but to form their own Independent Ruthenian Party (Rus'ka Samostiina Partiiia). Svarich was nominated as its candidate in the Vegreville riding. Others were later found for the surrounding constituencies: Rudyk in Whitford, Gowda in Victoria, and Krickersky in Vermillion. An organizational committee headed by Kulmatycky was formed and \$600.00 was collected for Svarich's campaign (\$500.00 from the candidate himself). An additional \$28.50 was collected for Zygmant's defense.⁴⁴

The independent Ukrainian candidates ran enthusiastic campaigns, but considering their limited appeal to the non-Ukrainian electorate, it is not surprising that none of them were elected. Svarich confidently proclaimed that he would get the entire Ukrainian vote and also a portion of the English one. He did well enough, losing to his Ukrainian-speaking Liberal opponent, Joe McCallum, by a margin of 812 to 544, that the pro-Liberal Observer admitted its surprise with his respectable showing. Rudyk financed a large campaign out of his own pocket. He even brought in T.D. Ferley, a prominent Ukrainian leader from Winnipeg, to campaign on his behalf. In the end, he lost to Shandro by a margin of 499 to 312. Gowda and Krickersky ran less extensive campaigns, and polled poorly in their respective ridings.⁴⁵

The most enthusiastic campaigner for the Ukrainian cause was not even a candidate. It was Kremar, who threw the full

weight of Novyny behind the Ukrainian upstarts. He saw this so-called "revolt" in a very positive light. It was a sure sign of the Ukrainians' improved self-esteem. Instead of sitting by passively or waiting for party heelers to hand out cigars and whiskey, they were taking their own destiny into their hands. By defending their own interests in this bold way, they had virtually been "reborn".⁴⁶

In the final analysis, these efforts were somewhat quixotic. The Ukrainians faced an impossible task. The well-oiled traditional Canadian political machines were in a different league. The Ukrainians had neither the funds nor the political "savvy" to compete against these "English" parties -- especially the Liberals, who had cultivated the immigrant vote carefully for many years. As well, Ukrainians took on this formidable challenge while deeply divided. The Russophiles, acting virtually as Liberal surrogates, were sure to split the Ukrainian vote, and the Catholics did not support the Independent candidates. If anything, the actions of the independent Ukrainian candidates can be seen as a measure of Ukrainian desperation, and the most surprising aspect of their campaigns was that they actually received the amount of support they did.

III

The Ukrainian insurgency during the 1913 provincial elections set in motion a new wave of troubles in the bloc district. The Liberals were convinced that a number of allegedly pro-Conservative

Ukrainian school teachers, who had recently come to Alberta from Manitoba, had been at the root of the unrest. Consequently, they took retribution by cancelling permits for about a dozen Ukrainian teachers on the grounds that they lacked the necessary formal "qualifications" needed for their positions.⁴⁷

The Liberals were quite within their legal rights to dismiss them because the teachers were not qualified in a technical sense. They were in the province on special permits granted by the Department of Education, and none had completed the requirements needed for full professional certification in Alberta. However, the Liberal action hardly took into account the reality of the educational situation among the Ukrainians. First, there were no fully-qualified Ukrainian teachers in the province. In fact, there was a shortage of qualified teachers generally, and very few accredited "English" teachers were willing to venture into the "foreign" districts in search of employment. Second, although the Ukrainian teachers' pedagogical competence may have been questionable, and their knowledge of the English language sometimes sparse and invariably "faulty in idiomatic expression," they could at least communicate easily with their charges, and they were more than qualified to teach the elementary grades (which would be the limit of the education received by the majority of their pupils). Moreover, the teachers were usually well-liked and respected by the communities in which they taught.⁴⁸ Therefore, the Liberals' ill-considered action was hardly likely to be well received.

Ukrainian school districts responded to the situation with varying degrees of resistance. Some refused outright to replace

their "own" teacher with a "qualified" (English) one. They would then be visited by the Department of Education's Supervisor of Foreign Schools, Robert Fletcher, who made it clear that if the school board did not relieve the "unqualified" teacher of his position, it would be cashiered and replaced by a single trustee (usually Fletcher himself). This usually sufficed to assure the reluctant co-operation of the local school trustees at least temporarily. But once Fletcher had left, there was no specific legislation to prevent the school trustees from re-hiring their own teacher or hiring another "unqualified" Ukrainian teacher. Three school districts, Vladymir (near Mundare), Kolomea (also near Mundare), and Lwiw (near Lamont) refused to meet Fletcher's demand that they replace their teacher and were promptly put under his trusteeship. Their appeals to the Department of Education for a reversal of this action were rejected, and eventually they were forced to comply with the new state of affairs.⁴⁹

Fletcher met his most serious opposition in the Bukowina school district north of Vegreville. As in the case of the Vladymir, Kolomea, and Lwiw S.D.s, the Bukowina school board had refused to comply with Fletcher's ordinance, so the school district was put under his trusteeship. Fletcher immediately hired a fully-qualified teacher, a certain Mr. Armstrong, who assumed his duties, but in an empty classroom. The "English" teacher was being boycotted. At the same time, the Bukowina ratepayers built their own private school right beside the one where Armstrong was spending his solitary days. When it was completed, they staffed it with their

former teacher, William Czumer (Vasyl' Chumer). Czumer was one of the out-of-province teachers who had "raided" Alberta. He was also guilty of having been the official agent for Rudyk's election campaign in Whitford. But because of a quirk in the existing education legislation, Czumer could not be ousted from his position as a private school teacher by legal means.⁵⁰

The recalcitrance of the Ukrainian school districts in general and the Bukowina district in particular, prompted a declaration of war by the Department of Education. On August 19, 1913, both the Edmonton Bulletin and the Edmonton Journal carried front-page stories about Education Minister J. Boyle's resolve to see the matter through to the end. He promised in no uncertain terms that "vigorous measures" would be adopted to ensure an "English education" for "children of foreign parents" because Alberta was, after all, "an English province".⁵¹ In other words, Boyle promised to solve the school question in Alberta once and for all.

A confrontation of this kind was inevitable. Ukrainians in Alberta had been seeking educational concessions from the Liberals for years. No attempt was made to mask their desire to have bilingual schools in the province along the lines of those which existed in Manitoba. Meanwhile, the Liberals had been playing politics with them by promising nothing too specific while delivering hardly anything at all. However, the Ukrainians had persisted with their demands until they finally forced the Liberals to "show their hand" and to be very specific about the type of education which would be allowed for the province's Ukrainians.

To understand the significance of the events which followed, one must realize that the education of "foreigners" was not just a pedagogical question, but also a social and political concern. At no time had Ukrainians in Alberta denied the desire that their children learn the English language. The educational demands they put forward did not call for unilingual Ukrainian instruction in schools, but for the means to establish a system of bilingual education by qualified teachers. Nevertheless, the rallying cry of the various forces in favour of enforcing unilingual English education was that Ukrainian children in Alberta would grow up unable to speak a word of English if any Ukrainian-language education were allowed in the province.⁵² English Canadians did not wish the children of Ukrainian immigrants to be fluent in their ancestral tongue because they believed that this would impede their assimilation into Canadian society. The question of their education per se was only a secondary concern. This observation is strengthened by the fact that at the same time that the school question was coming to a head in Alberta, a "reform" campaign calling for the abolition of bilingual schools on the ground that they were pedagogically unsound and ineffective in teaching "foreign" children the English language had begun in Manitoba.⁵³ There, too, the question of education per se was subordinated to the perceived need to effectively "Canadianize" the "children of the foreign-born". Ultimately, the host society could dictate its desires quite forthrightly because Ukrainians were almost defenceless in the face of its complete monopoly of political power.

Nevertheless, bilingual education was a crucial social and national concern for Ukrainians. They knew that without any instruction in their own language, Ukrainian children would receive an inferior education. At the height of the school question, Novyny noted:

In those schools where there are English teachers, our children gain neither a moral training nor any real knowledge. They waste entire years learning several hundred English words and nothing else.

This is not schooling! This is a mockery of it! These sorts of schools will produce only moral and spiritual cripples! Teaching a child how to speak with an English accent does not constitute an education! Does a parrot benefit from the ability to recite several hundred words in English? Neither do our children benefit from mindlessly learning to say a number of English words.⁵⁴

Ukrainians also realized that without knowledge of their own language, their integrity as a group would be compromised. A cartoon from Novyny, "The Role of Schools According to the Liberals' Way of Thinking", illustrates this point.⁵⁵ A young Ukrainian pupil is shown going to a pharmacist (J. Boyle) for a bottle of knowledge. Instead, he is handed an English tongue and a flask full of assimilation. Behind the boy stands a death figure. If he takes the prescription given to him, he will be lost to his people -- metaphoric "national death".

Despite the strength of the Ukrainians' case (in abstract terms), the outcome of the school question would be determined politically. As noted earlier, Ukrainians stood little chance of victory. The Liberals were adamant about the need for unilingual

education, and the Conservatives would back them on this issue. The mass of public opinion in Alberta was with them. Moreover, they could point to a "prominent Ruthenian" like Andrew Shandro and say that Ukrainians themselves did not wish bilingual education. The pro-Liberal Ukrainian-language newspaper, Kanadyis'kyi farmer, aped the Liberal party line, which claimed that the entire controversy was only about the qualifications of the Ukrainian teachers. The Russophiles also joined the ranks of Boyle's supporters. In fact, they even staged a rally near Edmonton to proclaim their satisfaction with the Alberta schools and to assure the government that "only a few" Ukrainians were opposed to its actions.⁵⁶ Against such a formidable array of opponents, the Ukrainians' strength was meagre: Kremar, Novyny, Svarich, a few Ukrainian-language newspapers, a dozen dismissed school teachers, and a weakly-organized public which had not even managed to elect a single representative of its "own" to the legislature.

Kremar spearheaded a passionate defence of the bilingual teachers and the cause of English-Ukrainian bilingual education in Novyny. He was also instrumental in forming a fourteen-member Committee for Native Language Schools in Alberta (Komitet Ridnoii Shkoly v Al'berti). The committee sponsored speaking tours about this matter and lobbied the Alberta government to change its stand on the school question. Svarich, too, protested the actions of the Liberals, but he did not join the language defence committee -- probably because of outstanding differences with the tempestuous Kremar.

Ironically, the very intensity of Kremar's defence of the bilingual cause in Alberta worked against it in the long run. Novyny had become so vociferous and anti-Liberal that it was being dismissed as a Conservative broadsheet. The paper's seemingly pro-Conservative posture became even more pronounced towards the end of 1913 when it started pointing regularly to the bilingual education situation in Manitoba under the Roblin Conservatives as an ideal, while ignoring the fact that it was partisan politics and not any specific concern for the welfare of Ukrainian students which was responsible for that state of affairs.⁵⁷ This perception hurt the credibility of Novyny's arguments. Kremar also tended to take considerable liberty in interpreting things. For example, when census figures released for 1911 showed a much lower number of Ukrainians than there actually were in the country, Novyny took great offence. It attributed this to a plot concocted by the English to downplay the strength of Ukrainians rather than to a more plausible reason such as the inefficiency with which the figures had been gathered, particularly in rural areas where most Ukrainians lived. Such faux pas served only to discredit Novyny's legitimate arguments and to isolate people like Svarich, who would point them out in good faith and be attacked for having done so.⁵⁸ This sort of infighting, however, was only a sideline to the main contest.

In October, 1913, the Liberals added a pair of sub-sections to the School Act which made it a summary offence for a person to teach in an Alberta school without a valid certificate. This closed the loophole which had allowed Ukrainian teachers ejected from one school

to move on to another without fear of retribution. It also made Czumer's employment illegal. Armed with this big new stick, Fletcher moved in on the Bukowina situation.⁵⁹ He ordered the ex-treasurer of the school board to stop collecting taxes to pay the "unqualified" Czumer and demanded that "five of the leading belligerents" pay their taxes directly to him within ten days under the threat of seizure. None of the latter complied with Fletcher's ultimatum. On December 15, a horse was seized from each of them. After obtaining legal counsel, the five decided finally to submit to the supervisor's will. Likewise, the ex-treasurer handed over the funds he had collected as well as the school's financial records. Fletcher poured over these carefully and discovered that Czumer had received \$65.00 in salary four days after the Bukowina district had gone into trusteeship. Fletcher promptly initiated a court action to recover this amount from the ex-treasurer. He was successful, even though the presiding judge indicated while passing judgement that the Department had carried the day only because of the letter of the law.

For all intents and purposes, this meant the end of English-Ukrainian bilingual education in Alberta until the 1970s. The Ukrainians had been soundly defeated. Their defence campaign, now without a focal point, soon dissipated. Only Kremar refused to let the issue die. He ran in a March 1915 by-election in the Whitford riding against Andrew Shandro (the 1913 decision had been invalidated because of gross procedural irregularities), largely on the school question. He lost by 211 votes, 683 to 472.⁶⁰ The Liberal press lost no time in crowing over his defeat, proclaiming that the election

had proven once and for all that "the Ruthenians themselves do not want bilingual schools." The Conservatives, under whose banner Kremar nominally had been running, wasted no time in disowning him. On March 16, they stated in the legislature that they disclaimed "all sympathy with any candidate who is opposed to the present educational system of Alberta." Two weeks later, the Conservatives introduced a resolution against bilingual education into the house, wishing to state publicly "that the opposition is one in supporting the policy of the government and the Minister of Education on this question."⁶¹ It passed unanimously, driving the last nail into the coffin of bilingual education in the province.

IV

The economic, political, and educational initiatives of the Ukrainian movement did not die out altogether, though the latter two were set back greatly. The Narodna Torhovia continued operating successfully until it went bankrupt in 1921 because of an overly-ambitious plan to expand its operations. Ukrainian hopes for political representation could bounce back to a degree because the concentration of Ukrainians in the bloc district made it only a matter of time before they would elect one of their "own" to the legislature. The events of 1913, however, demonstrated clearly that Ukrainians had not been granted political rights per se -- such as representation in legislative bodies -- but that they would have to fight for them tooth and nail. This lesson was driven home even more profoundly during the First World War, when Ukrainians were branded as enemy aliens without just cause and disenfranchised. Finally, the cause of bilingual

education was defeated thoroughly. Ukrainians would not raise it as a possibility again until the 1960s because they knew it had no chance whatsoever of being accepted. More modest educational activities were undertaken: holding Ukrainian language classes outside regular school hours, maintaining residences for Ukrainian students in Edmonton, and so forth. Within a few years, a new wave of Ukrainian teachers with full professional certification appeared on the scene, although their classes were held in English only. They often took over the functions of the earlier bilingual teachers as community organizers and cultural activists.

Still, the setbacks suffered by Ukrainians throughout 1913 in their educational and political ambitions did mark a failure to adapt key elements of their Old World populism to New World conditions. Moreover, the likelihood of implementing a populist program among Ukrainians in Alberta along Old World lines became increasingly unlikely after 1913. The precedent of failure loomed large on the horizon; the nativism fostered by the First World War put Ukrainians in Canada in a very defensive position vis-a-vis any notion of group rights; and an internal religious controversy (resulting in the formation of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada in 1918) pre-occupied and polarized the community to such an extent that non-sectarian representation became impossible.⁶² As well, the events surrounding the Ukrainian Revolution and the subsequent failure to establish a fully-independent Ukrainian state had an undeniable effect on the outlook of many Ukrainian community leaders in Canada; strictly nationalistic concerns were now usually given a higher priority over

social ones, whereas the concept of national populism (narodovstvo) did not really differentiate between the two.⁶³

Several reasons for this initial failure may be cited. First and foremost was the open hostility of the host (Canadian) society to the idea that Ukrainians should retain -- in whole or in part -- a separate identity. Consequently, Ukrainians were denied a voice in determining the type of education (and teachers) they desired for their children. Furthermore, they were excluded -- not in theory but in practice -- from a share of the political power of Canadian society with which they could voice their concerns. Second was the fact that Ukrainians themselves were in no position to resist these incursions of their theoretical rights effectively. The factionalism which had developed among the immigrant community during its early years in Canada provided a major obstacle to effective organizational work.⁶⁴ Likewise, the Ukrainian-Canadian leadership faced multiple tasks to perform simultaneously, often with neither the experience nor the education to handle many of these.

Finally, there were material bases which either modified the Galician experience of Ukrainians or made it irrelevant in the New World. Although they had settled in a fairly large and compact bloc area, Ukrainians were immigrants who could not claim a specific territoriality like, for example, the Quebecois could. They could not claim that the area they inhabited was their "own" through the fact of history as they could in Galicia. This weakened their case for such specific group rights as bilingual education. As well, it probably weakened their resolve to pursue this matter as fervently as they

would have in Galicia. Many Ukrainians would agree that they were immigrants and that they should follow the norms of the society into which they were entering. The Ukrainian immigrant situation was also modified by the fact that the material prosperity of Canada contrasted to the poverty of Galicia. As a result, many Ukrainian settlers did not feel themselves to be in dire straits, and were less inclined to regard the organizational activity of their leaders as the same life-or-death issues they often were in the Old Country. It follows, then, that the same strong bond between leaders and followers never developed in Alberta, making an already difficult organizing situation even worse. Certainly, it made the sort of grassroots organization which Ukrainians had developed in Galicia unlikely in Canada.

The very fact that Ukrainians had been able to attempt the sort of organizational activity envisaged by Svarich is in itself significant. It indicated a belief that a complex social form could be transferred from Ukraine to Canada in toto or in adaption, and that a Ukrainian-Canadian society could be organized around it. Given the Old World's belief in 'North American democracy' and the Canadian pride in its 'democratic character', the English Canadian resistance to these efforts should hardly have been expected. But given the fact that these ideas deviated considerably from the narrow contemporary notions about the Canadian character, it is not surprising that they were.

Notes to Chapter Three

¹The earlier figure is based on correspondence from J. Obed Smith, Commissioner of Immigration (Winnipeg) to the Department of the Interior, February 1, 1901, cited in V.J.Kaye, Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada, 1895-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p.372; the 1914 figure is based on a calculation in J.S.Woodsworth, Ukrainian Rural Communities (Winnipeg: Bureau of Social Research, 1917), p.3.

²Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 26 February, 12 March, 2 April 1909; and Vegreville Observer, 31 March 1909.

³Svarich gives a detailed account of his own early years in P.Svarich, Spomyny, 1877-1904 (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1976).

⁴Notice about the viche was given in a letter from Svarich to Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 1 December 1909, and in an appeal from Z.Bychynsky in ibid, 15 December 1909. The basic account of the viche appears in Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 5 January 1910. It is written by Svarich.

⁵Bychynsky had been advocating a gathering of this sort on a national level early in 1909, but it never materialized. See Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 1 February and 21 May 1909. M.Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians: A History (Winnipeg, 1970), p.305 provides a brief biography of Bychynsky.

⁶Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 1 December 1909; and Ukraiins'kyi holos, 8 March 1911.

⁷The full text of Bychynsky's presentation appears in Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 26 January, 2 February 1910.

⁸Svarich's presentation is reprinted in Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 9 February to 9 March 1910.

⁹In addition to the basic account of the viche, see Solanych's specific comments in Ukraiins'kyi holos, 1 June 1910.

¹⁰Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 19 January, 2 February 1910; and Novyi krai, 10 December 1910.

¹¹The basic accounts of this meeting can be found in Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 9 February 1910; and Ukraiins'kyi holos, 15 June 1910. Additional information appears in P.Svarich, "Istoriia, rozvii i uprava Rus'koi Narodnoi Torhovli v Al'berty," Al'manakh Ukraiins'koho holosu (1916), pp.136-145.

¹²Svarich noted these organizing difficulties in Ukraiins'kyi holos, 20 April 1910, saying that "we lost the entire winter explaining to people in Alberta what a share is."

- ¹³ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 1 June 1910, 13 March 1913.
- ¹⁴ Further insights into Svarich's concern for education may be gained from P.Svarich, "Urivky zi spomyniv P.Zvarycha z Vegrevyl, Alta.," in Propamiatna knyha Ukraiins'koho Narodnoho Domu'u Vinnypegu, ed.: D.Doroshenko (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1949), pp.661-680.
- ¹⁵ Vegreville Observer, 3 September 1913.
- ¹⁶ Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 24 August 1912.
- ¹⁷ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 28 February 1912.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, 1 May, 5 June 1912. Svarich was so convinced that Boyle would be well disposed to the Ukrainian educational demands that he campaigned furiously for him in the by-election needed to install him as minister.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, 10 July 1912; and Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 6 July 1912.
- ²⁰ Edmonton Bulletin, 31 January 1912; and Edmonton Journal, 31 January 1912.
- ²¹ The Liberal party had a well-organized and very effective system for recruiting potential leaders among immigrants. Immigration officials would tend to isolate likely candidates and proceed to give them an elementary lesson in the value of belonging to the party. In this way, the Liberals could then cultivate the sympathy they had already developed among immigrant groups for their seemingly-liberal immigration policy. See D.J.Hall, "Clifford Sifton: Immigration and Settlement Policy, 1896-1905," in The Settlement of the West, ed. Howard Palmer (Calgary: Comprint Publishing, 1977), pp.80-81.
- ²² Svoboda, 3 October 1901; and Der Nordwesten, 25 December 1900. The latter was obtained by the author as a translation (into Ukrainian) done by A.Malycky.
- ²³ Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 2 April 1909.
- ²⁴ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 18 May 1910.
- ²⁵ See footnote 18 above.
- ²⁶ Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 19 February 1913 tells about this gathering in an oblique manner, and charges that it had been organized as an attempt to draw Ukrainians into the Conservative fold.
- ²⁷ Edmonton Bulletin, 19 March 1913 gives details about the redistributed electoral boundaries in the province; Novyny, 12 March 1913 is the most explicit Ukrainian charge of Liberal gerrymandering.
- ²⁸ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 5 February 1913.

²⁹ Ibid, 12 February 1913.

³⁰ Svarich's misgivings about Kremar are openly revealed in Ukraiins'kyi holos, 19 March 1913. Kremar's feelings about Svarich are implicitly stated in Novyny, 9 April 1913. By the end of the year, relations between the two have completely fallen apart, as can be seen in Novyny, 13 December 1913; and Ukraiins'kyi holos, 3, 10 December 1913.

³¹ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 19 March 1913; Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 25 January, 15 February, 8 March 1913; and Novyny, 12, 19 March 1913.

³² The fact that at the turn of the century Canadians strongly perceived themselves to be the successors of a Nordic heritage is undeniable. This theme is dealt with very well in Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in Nationalism in Canada, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966), pp.3-26. The wider implications of this sentiment in regard to its impact on the nature of the social relationship between Ukrainian immigrants and representatives of their host society, however, has not been examined closely. Two notable exceptions to this rule are J.E.Rea, "The Roots of Prairie Society, in Prairie Perspectives I (1970): 46-57; and D.J.Bercuson, "Regionalism and 'Unlimited Identity' in Western Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 15 (Summer 1980): 121-126. The dynamics of "Canadianization" through the public schools is explored in a variety of essays in Martin Kovacs, ed., Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education, Canadian Plains Studies no.8 (Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1978).

³³ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 19 March 1913; Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 5, 19 February 1913; and Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 1 March 1913. A group of Russophiles eventually admitted to the printing and distribution of these pamphlets.

³⁴ Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 2 March, 2 April 1913; Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 1 March 1913; Novyny, 12 March 1913; and Edmonton Bulletin, 12 March, 1913.

³⁵ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 19 March 1913.

³⁶ The first report of Russian Orthodox missionary activity among Ukrainians in Alberta can be found in Svoboda, 12 August 1897. After this sporadic references to their activities continue to be made. A celebrated court case in the Edna-Star region between the Russophiles and Ukrainian Catholics starting in 1901 (for control over a disputed church) brought the former to prominence. Further details about Russophile activities in Alberta can be found in V.Havrysh, Moia Kanada i ia (Edmonton: By the author, 1974), pp.98-104.

³⁷ This is what Shandro claims to have happened in a subsequent recantation of his Russophilism in Ukraiins'kyi holos, 7 February, 1917.

³⁸ Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 17 August, 5 October, 23 November 1912, 1 February 1913. In his own defence, Svarich wrote two letters to Rusyn on 7 September and 12 October; P. Kulmatycki (Kol'matyts'kyi) also wrote one on 24 August 1912.

³⁹ Ibid, 15 February, 1 March 1913.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 17 August, 7 December 1913.

⁴¹ Novyny, 9 April 1913.

⁴² Ukrains'kyi holos, 10 December 1913, 21 February 1917. The latter source also reveals that Svarich had considered running for the Liberal nomination in Vegreville in 1913.

⁴³ Ibid, 26 March 1913.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 19 April, 1913; Vegreville Observer, 2 April 1913; Czumer, Recollections, pp.101-102; and Joseph Lazarenko, "Ukrainians in Politics," in Ukrainian Pioneers in Alberta, ed. J. Lazarenko (Edmonton: Ukrainian Pioneers' Association, 1970), p.43.

⁴⁵ Vegreville Observer, 2, 23 April, 25 June 1913; Ukrains'kyi holos, 30 April, 7 May 1913, 1 February 1922; and Kanadyis'kyi Rusyn, 24 May 1913. The election results are noted in William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), p.361.

⁴⁶ Novyny, 9 April 1913. To a lesser extent, Svarich in Ukrains'kyi holos, 23 April 1913 also saw the election results as a test of Ukrainians' will to stand up for their rights.

⁴⁷ Ukrains'kyi holos, 11 June 1913; Czumer, Recollections, p.103; and Alberta Department of Education, Annual Report 1913, p.39.

⁴⁸ These points are made most emphatically in Manoly Lupul, "The Ukrainians and Public Education," in Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, ed. M.R. Lupul (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, forthcoming), pp.40-41 [of original manuscript].

⁴⁹ Department of Education, Report, 1913, pp.41-42.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp.42-43; Lupul, "Public Education," pp.41-42; Czumer, Recollections, p. 104; Novyny, 5 August 1913; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 30 July, 6 August 1913.

⁵¹ Edmonton Bulletin, 19 August 1913; and Edmonton Capital, 19 August 1913.

⁵² Note the discrepancy between the demands put forth by Svarich and others and Boyle's comments as per footnote 51.

⁵³ Regarding bilingual education in Manitoba, see Lupul, "Public Education"; T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba," in Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party System of the Ten Provinces, ed. Martin Robin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1972), pp. 69-115; S.T. Rusak, "Archbishop Adelard Langevin and the Manitoba School Question, 1895-1915" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1975); and P. Melnycky, "A Political History of the Ukrainian Community in Manitoba, 1899-1922" (M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1979).

⁵⁴ Novyny, 21 October 1913.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 3 January 1913. Although somewhat melodramatic, this cartoon was in line with Kremar's belief that the bilingual school question was a "matter of life or death" for the Ukrainian community in Alberta. See ibid, 19 September 1913.

⁵⁶ Edmonton Bulletin, 18, 19 September 1913, 13 April 1914; Vegreville Observer, 27 August, 10 September 1913; Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 27 August, 17 September 1913; Russkii golos, 25 September 1913; and Novyny, 19 September 1913, 11 April 1914.

⁵⁷ Novyny, 2, 13, 20 December 1913.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 29 July, 25 December 1913; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 3, 10 December 1913.

⁵⁹ Lupul, "Public Education," pp. 43-47; Czumer, Recollections, pp. 114-121; and Department of Education, Annual Report 1913, pp. 44-45.

⁶⁰ Vegreville Observer, 25 June, 11 November 1914, 2 February 1915; and Darcovich and Yuzk, Statistical Compendium, p. 361.

⁶¹ Vegreville Observer, 17 March 1915; and Edmonton Bulletin, 16, 31 March 1915.

⁶² For an account about the controversy surrounding the religious question, see Yuzk, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1891-1915 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981), pp. 79-98.

⁶³ Rusak, "The Influence of the Ukrainian Revolution on Ukrainians in Canada, 1917-1922," Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies (Spring 1979), p. 60.

⁶⁴ This is a major focus of O. Martynowych, "Village Radicals and Peasant Immigrants: The Social Roots of Factionalism Among Ukrainian Immigrants in Canada, 1896-1918" (M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978).

CHAPTER FOUR

Ukrainians and the UFA: Hope Against Hope

The concept of populism may have become a dead letter among Ukrainian farmers in Alberta had it not been revived by a new force -- the Canadian farmers' movement. Since the turn of the century, Western Canadian farmers had been creating organizations to defend their vital economic and political interests in a manner which had striking parallels to the Ukrainian national populist movement in Galicia. Since most Ukrainians in Alberta were farmers who had brought with them a populist political legacy, it is not surprising that they should have displayed considerable sympathy with the aims and objectives of the Canadian farmers' movement in general and its representative provincial organization, the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA). There was, in fact, a groundswell of Ukrainian support for the UFA during the 1918-1921 period, and an attempt by Ukrainian UFA supporters to establish an autonomous Ukrainian section of the organization in 1923.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian support for the UFA never came even close to realizing its tremendous potential. Numerous reasons may be cited for this, although the most outstanding one is the incompatibility of Ukrainian aspirations with the strongly English, Protestant, and assimilationist bent of the UFA. Ukrainians found it difficult to reconcile themselves with this New World brand of populism. At the same time, their efforts to develop an alternative, a Ukrainian section of the UFA, fell by the wayside because of a lack of sustained organizational effort.

Despite the obstacles in the way of full Ukrainian participation in the UFA, there was some scope for co-operation between the agrarian movement and Ukrainian populist aspirations, particularly in the economic and political spheres. Ukrainians were quick to support co-operative economic ventures administered by the UFA and to give solid support to the UFA's electoral attempts. In return, the UFA provided an alternative to the established political parties, a means of electing Ukrainian representatives to legislative positions. The 1926 election of Michael Luchkovich as the first Ukrainian Member of Parliament was the height of such co-operation. By this time, however, it was clear that Ukrainian support for the UFA was a matter of convenience, not of conviction. Any attempt at sustained UFA activity in the Ukrainian bloc district became a thing of the past.

I

After the turn of the century, disgruntled farmers in Western Canada organized to fight the "vested interests" of Central Canada -- banks, railroads, manufacturers, and the traditional political parties that served their interests -- which they perceived to be at the root of their frustration as an occupational group. Their efforts consisted initially of lobbying the provincial and federal governments through representative organizations; slowly they added economic co-operation and self-education to the scope of their activities. The whole movement finally culminated in the so-called "agrarian revolt", in which farmer parties took over three provincial legislatures and gained a substantial presence in Parliament.

The source of Western farmers' grievances were manifold. They have been cited most commonly as official negligence, discrimination in an economic system which favoured the interests of Central Canadian manufacturers, and frustration with what farmers considered to be their political impotence. Some historians, particularly the late W.L. Morton, have developed this theme of Western alienation even further, and have invested it with both a genealogy and historical justification. From this point of view, the subordination of the West began the moment Canada acquired the North West Territories from the Hudson's Bay Company in 1870. In fact, Morton explained the agrarian revolt in terms of a "colonial society" seeking equality within Confederation.¹

This element of alienation doubtlessly fanned the flames of Western discontent, but one can still safely say that its root cause was economic in nature -- the tariff issue, discontent with emerging grain marketing and elevator monopolies, inefficient railroad transportation of goods to market, and ubiquitous high interest rates backed by unsympathetic bankers. As a frontier area, the West was far removed from any centre of capital or manufacturing. In many cases, Westerners had no choice but to comply with faits accomplis thrust upon them, despite their personal misgivings. Moreover, this situation was not one that had simply "evolved" by chance. It was in line with the so-called National Policy, a developmental program designed for Canada in the late 1870s with a view to stimulate the growth of the country as a whole by opening the West -- at considerable expense if necessary -- in order to create an internal market for Central Canadian manufacturing.²

As events bear witness, Prairie farmers were not about to accept this scheme of things passively. They responded with the farmers' movement. The first volley in this protracted struggle came from the Indian Head district of present-day Saskatchewan. The 1901 crop had been the largest ever produced in Canada, yet because of a railroad policy requiring loading from elevators only -- in an effort to establish monopoly conditions for the handling of grain -- elevators became backlogged, grain moved very slowly, and much of the harvest rotted as farmers were unable to get their goods to market. In frustration, a number of local farmers formed the Territorial Grain Growers' Association (TGGA) with William Motherwell as provisional president. The TGGA quickly lobbied successfully for changes in legislation which would compel the CPR to speed up the tempo of grain handling and which would prevent the emergence of grain handling monopolies. The TGGA then forced the CPR's compliance to the new legislation by taking the railroad to court in a successful and much-celebrated Sinaluta case. This struggle, and its eventual victory, publicized the TGGA's name widely and legitimized it as a representative agrarian body. Its membership grew quickly and by 1903 it gave birth to a similar body, the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association. After this, the number of agencies serving the interests of Prairie farmers began to multiply, and the farmers' movement started to expand. By the First World War, agrarian interests in Canada were represented by farmers' organizations in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario; a Canadian Council of Agriculture which attempted to co-ordinate lobbying efforts; the Grain Growers' Grain Association, the farmers'

"own" grain company; and the Grain Growers' Guide, a publication coming out of Winnipeg which spoke for the interests of farmers' organizations specifically, but generally for farmers at large.

The farmers' campaign for more equitable treatment had turned into a full-fledged crusade by this time. But, although they did not altogether lack political or economic clout with which to combat the forces of the "East", Western farmers were at a disadvantage: they simply could not match the numerical or political strength of their opponents. It is hardly surprising, then, that they should supplement their real power with the one force they could muster in great quantities: moral righteousness. Farmers' rights became not only a political issue, but a moral one as well. In turn, their campaign for specific political and economic changes linked up with the groundswell of moral reform sentiment then engulfing the English-speaking world, typified by the idea of the social gospel. This phenomenon could be best described as the widespread popularization of the notion that salvation was to be achieved not by the contemplation of an ideal afterlife, but by the building of a better terrestrial existence.⁴

The role played by the social gospel in the farmers' movement should be neither over nor underestimated. Farmers' grievances were real, and some sort of occupational representation would have developed with or without the tenets of the social gospel. Nevertheless, the social gospel and the Protestant churches in which it found its spiritual home were instrumental in shaping the nature of the agrarian movement and in sustaining it over an extended period of time. Its contributions might be best summed up as vision, ideology,

and people: vision provided by the utopian image of a perfectible world; ideology in the form of panaceas for the world's problems, such as direct democracy, the single tax, women's suffrage, municipal ownership, prohibition, sexual purity, compulsory education, and assimilation, almost all of which were adopted by farmers' groups as part of their social or political programs;⁵ and people in the form of frequent dual affiliations between social gospel and farm movement supporters, especially among the leadership of both movements.⁶ In short, the relationship between them was symbiotic. Although the social gospel had not brought about the farmers' movement, it had become a major sustaining force for it during the course of its development. In turn, the farmers' movement became a major focus of attention in the social gospel crusade for social improvement.

By 1910, the institutional structures of the farmers' movement were in place. One could say that they constituted a very powerful lobbying force, especially at the provincial level.⁷ Nevertheless, organized farmers were still unable to effect changes on certain issues, in particular the tariff structure. As a result, they became increasingly skeptical about the possibility of the traditional political parties representing their fundamental interests. Over the course of the next decade, they considered increasingly the possibility of direct, independent political action. The precedent of the "non-partisan" war-time Union government was probably the final obstacle to fall before the farmers of Canada committed themselves to the idea of electing their own representatives to legislatures and Parliament. In the first round of elections held after the Great War, they captured 65 seats in Parliament -- enough to make them the

official opposition party, if they desired to be such -- and majorities in the legislatures of Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta.⁸

After this heyday, the movement started to flounder. The realities of coping with public office drained many capable leaders and brought a sharper focus to the movement's idealism; victory itself had removed a great amount of the impetus carrying the movement along; and the social gospel ideology which had sustained the movement for many years itself was losing prominence in a post-bellum world which had grown cynical because of the gap between hopes and realities. By the mid-1920s, a certain weariness of spirit overtook the agrarian movement, and it was primarily the true believers and the institutional structure built up in an earlier age which now carried it along.

II

At first glance, there would seem to be great potential for close co-operation between the Ukrainian movement and the Canadian agrarian movement. They were both populist in their orientation, reformist in their aims, and dedicated to improving the lot of farming people. In many ways, this possibility seemed to be borne out in the attitudes expressed by Ukrains'kyi holos, perhaps the most strongly populist-oriented Ukrainian newspaper in Canada. Almost from the day of its inception in 1910, Holos noted that the various Canadian farmer organizations had done much good for their members and that over the years they had gained strength and respectability. It urged Ukrainians to support the farmers' movement because "this matter is neither partisan nor ethnic, but a general one which is

equally important to all farmers."⁹ In order to keep its readers informed about the movement, Holps printed articles about the activities of farmers' groups as well as cartoons and other items from the Grain Growers' Guide as a supplement to its regular diet of advice about practical, modern husbandry.

Yet few Ukrainians became involved with the Canadian agrarian movement in more than a superficial manner, especially during its most dynamic period before the mid-1920s. Initially, this could be attributed to historical factors. The mainstream Canadian agrarian organizations were developed primarily by English-speaking farmers far removed from the Ukrainian bloc settlements.¹⁰ Several years of development were required before the movement had become strong enough to consider expanding to include "foreign" elements. At the same time, Ukrainians generally were not yet farming commercially. They may not have felt a pressing need for occupational representation, or they may have been satisfied simply to attempt to develop an occupational grouping among their own people.

Towards the end of the First World War, however, conditions had changed and a point of convergence was reached. The Canadian agrarian organizations were quickly expanding the scope of their activities and contemplating entering the political arena while at the same time an increasing number of Ukrainian farmers had developed their operations beyond the point of self-sufficiency during the recent period of prosperity. Attempts were then made to bring Ukrainians into the mainstream of the agrarian movement. After a brief period of success, this initiative collapsed almost completely, revealing what was, in fact, an insurmountable barrier between Ukrainians and the Canadian agrarian movement.

Whereas the Ukrainian populist tradition was, to a degree, nationalistic, the Canadian movement as a whole was anti-Ukrainian; the latter was far more likely to stress the need for the moral reform and the assimilation of Ukrainians than any desire to help them in immediate, concrete terms. This frame of mind was an integral part of the social gospel ideology which had helped to sustain the agrarian movement over a long period of time. In fact, one of the "reforms" often advocated by proponents of the social gospel during the period from 1900 to 1920 was the more effective assimilation of "foreign" elements into Canadian society. The implications of this state of affairs for full Ukrainian participation in the agrarian movement are self-evident and confirmed by the events of history. A social distance kept Ukrainians out of the mainstream of the movement, perhaps because farmer leaders may have not made the extra efforts needed to understand the particular needs of their Ukrainian constituents and/or because Ukrainians themselves may have shied away from making a full commitment to what they understood to be "English" organizations.

The situation in Alberta illustrates these points very well. Like other farmers in Western Canada, Alberta farmers felt they were being treated unjustly because of forces beyond their control. They created the United Farmers of Alberta as an organization which could articulate their demands. When they felt these were not being achieved through lobbying efforts, Alberta farmers took more direct political action by sponsoring candidates for the 1921 provincial election.¹¹ The UFA emerged victorious with a large majority.

Meanwhile, in the process of its evolution, the UFA had developed a close affiliation with the tenets of the social gospel. This fact is

particularly well reflected by the numerous resolutions passed at the annual UFA conventions which supported common social gospel concerns, particularly prohibition; the annual observance of UFA Sunday as "a kind of religious rally day on which to measure up the aims and objects of [the] association as well as to investigate the ability of the [Protestant] church to help . . . in [the] upward struggle"; and the close affiliation of the UFA with organizations which were strong proponents of the social gospel, such as the Moral Reform League and the Social Services League.¹²

The UFA had not actively sought to incorporate Ukrainians as a group before 1911. Meanwhile Ukrainian farmers in Alberta had already attempted to develop some form of occupational representation of their own.

The first such effort was the formation of the Organization of Ruthenian Farmers in Alberta (Organizatsiia Rus'kykh Farmeriv v Al'berti) in July 1912 after meetings held in Uhryn and Myrnam. The principal aim of the organization was to help improve the lot of Ukrainian farmers in Alberta in the same manner agrarian organizations had improved conditions in the Old Country. Significantly, its mandate was very much in the populist tradition: sponsoring educational activities (concerts, lectures, libraries); setting up a co-operative marketing and buying system; and electing Ukrainian political representatives. The organization quickly grew to include about 300 members, but it floundered because of a lack of direction and leadership, and was virtually nonexistent by the end of the year.¹³

A second, more substantial attempt at organization was tried in 1917 when 50 Ukrainian farmer delegates formed the Ukrainian Farmers'

Union of Alberta (Soiuz Ukrainiis'kykh Farmeriv Al'berty) in Vegreville on January 22. The driving force behind the gathering which had formed the new organization was a locally-published Ukrainian pro-farmer newspaper, Postup (Progress), which had been particularly strong in expressing its conviction that Ukrainian farmers in Alberta required some form of occupational representation. The final push for the organizational gathering came from the man who became the Union's secretary, Dmytro Prystash. In September 1916, he wrote a long article about Ukrainian farmer organization, ending with a call for a convention to be held once the harvest was in.¹⁴

After several days of discussion, the delegates developed a set of aims which were typically populist in their orientation: educating Ukrainians about modern mechanized agriculture; developing an economic union, specifically through co-operative stores and common marketing; and undertaking political organization as an attempt to increase the impact Ukrainians could have on political affairs. An executive was elected on paper, but the structure and functioning of the Union was never discussed specifically. It was assumed that Postup would provide the necessary cohesion for the group, particularly since a dynamic personality, Toma Tomashevsky, had recently taken over as editor.¹⁵

Although the fledgling organization had some minor success with its co-operative and political ventures, it quickly ran into problems. Distressed by the nearly complete lack of response to his organizational circulars, the recently-elected president, Tymko Goshko of Borshchiw, resigned without appointing anyone to take over from him. This threw the organization into a chaos from which it never recovered. Postup continued publishing until July 1917, when it, too, expired.¹⁶

The fact that these organizational efforts had been unsuccessful did not eliminate the need for Ukrainian farmer organization. In fact, these attempts may have been premature, for it was not until after the First World War that Ukrainians were starting to practice commercial agriculture in significant numbers. A series of good harvests at this time had combined with premium prices to provide the extra push needed to integrate Ukrainians into the mainstream of Canadian agriculture. They now started buying machinery extensively and expanding the size of their farms.¹⁷ This, in turn, produced a greater need for their occupational representation.

Accordingly, a potentially very strong relationship between Ukrainians and the UFA started to develop from this time until 1921. The former started becoming active in UFA affairs, forming locals, attending district and annual conventions, and expressing their concerns both as farmers and as an ethnic group.¹⁸ The latter, in turn, now sought to expand its membership, and in 1918 made a conscious effort to recruit Ukrainian farmers as part of the first membership drive it had ever undertaken. At the 1920 UFA Annual Convention, F.W. Smith, Director of the Victoria District UFA reported:

One notable feature about this year has been the organization of Ukrainians in the Northern part of the Division. This organization is the outcome of years of work of the organization as a whole. In some cases they organized largely to enable them to take advantage of the co-operative shipping of cattle and grain through the United Grain Growers' Limited, and all the advantages of co-operative buying which the U.F.A. gives them. In some cases it was a spontaneous effort to organize themselves. This speaks well for the untiring efforts of those engaged in organizational work in the early days of the U.F.A.¹⁹

The visible proof of this process was the entry of such wholly-Ukrainian locals such as Zhoda, Yaroslav, Prawda, and Kiew into the

UFA. Smith's successor as district director, G.E. Roose, continued these efforts, using the former secretary of the short-lived Ukrainian Farmers' Union, Dmytro Prystash, and a number of other Ukrainians as sub-organizers. The results were substantial: Prystash estimated in 1921 that there were 3,000 Ukrainian UFA members organized in 47 locals.²⁰

More importantly, the UFA began to consider seriously the entire question of involving non-English farmers in the organization's activities. In 1920 the executive approved funds for projects such as the translation of the constitution into French and the publication of a basic information pamphlet, "What Has the UFA Done?", into French, German, and Ukrainian. A "Foreign-Born Committee" was formed in 1921 to help involve peoples of various backgrounds in UFA activities. That same year, the Executive and the Board of Directors endorsed a proposal by Prystash to publish an organizational paper in Ukrainian, and donated \$400.00 to get this project off the ground.²¹

For their part, Ukrainians gave fairly solid support to the UFA in whatever way they could. As mentioned earlier, sub-organizers were active putting new locals on the map. Prystash started publishing his UFA paper, Farmers'ke Slovo (The Farmer's Word) in March, 1921, although the venture folded not long thereafter.²² Two consecutive Ukrainian "all-people's" (vsenarodni) conventions held in Edmonton took very favourable positions toward the farmers' movement.²³ When the election finally came, Ukrainians were solidly behind the UFA, both as campaigners and as voters. Two of them, William (Vasyl') Fedun and Michael (Mykhailo) Chornohus, even emerged as triumphant UFA candidates in their respective ridings of Victoria and Shandro.²⁴ (Chornohus was

actually not elected until a by-election in 1922.)

After the 1921 elections, relations between Ukrainians and the UFA disintegrated rapidly. Despite their strong support for the UFA's election campaign and their general agreement with the aims and programs of the organization, Ukrainians deserted the UFA in droves. By 1924, their membership had fallen to between 200 and 300, clearly underlining the fact that the potential for their real co-operation or participation in the UFA had not been realized. To a certain degree, this collapse of an artificially-inflated membership was part of the general decline in the UFA membership after its 1919-1921 peak. But the drop in Ukrainian participation was almost absolute and much greater in relative terms than that in the province as a whole.²⁵ This points to the obvious conclusion that there must have been specific reasons for this state of affairs.

The first two reasons can be gleaned from a debate which arose in the Ukrainian press relating to the unsatisfactory relationship between Ukrainians and the agrarian movement per se. The different material needs of Ukrainian and English farmers were cited as a barrier to co-operation. Despite the material progress they had made in Canada, Ukrainian farmers still tended to have relatively small farms and to practice mixed farming (in preference to concentrating on cash crops). Consequently, they required basic information and literature about modern farming methods rather than immediate political clout.²⁶ They were more likely to find this sort of information in the pages of their own press than in any farmer organization publications; in fact, the latter published virtually no promotional or instructional materials in non-English languages. One Ukrainian farmer from Chipman

noted in 1920:

I have been a member of the farmers' union and for three years I have been receiving its organ, The Grain Growers' Guide. But, even though I have been diligently studying the English language, I can do little more than look at the pictures because I cannot make out anything else.²⁷

The second reason cited in this debate was the social distance between Ukrainians and the English:

It is an indisputable fact that an English organization, no matter how exemplary, cannot satisfy fully the needs of Ukrainians in the same way that a Ukrainian organization could. Likewise, only their own organization could satisfy the needs of the English.²⁸

The inevitable misgivings Ukrainians had about the strong assimilationist bent of the agrarian organizations added to this sort of sentiment. As their contact with these "English" bodies increased, some Ukrainians even expressed a desire to separate from them:

In this way we could relieve the English farmers' unions from their eternal trouble with teaching us the English language and ideals in order to make us like regular folk. . . . We will no longer be an albatross around their necks, and we will not wait for them to organize us because we ourselves are aware of where we stand and of the work that lies ahead of us.²⁹

Such strongly-felt sentiments did not exclude altogether the possibility of co-operating with the English; they simply wished to ensure that Ukrainians would participate in farmer affairs as equals.³⁰

A third reason might be cited as the late and superficial introduction of the UFA into Ukrainian districts. This meant that there was less grassroots support for the UFA there than in areas where it had been in existence for a decade or longer and had been able to

establish a solid core group of members. It also meant that the UFA had not been able to integrate itself into the social fabric of the bloc district. This might be best illustrated by the almost complete absence of the UFA's auxiliary organizations, the United Farm Women of Alberta (UFWA) and the Junior UFA, in Ukrainian districts.³¹

The fact that the UFA, even in the face of a serious decline in Ukrainian membership, made no special effort to impress upon Ukrainians that it was not an "English" organization but that it represented their specific interests as well, constitutes a fourth potential factor in the drop. Even before the 1921 election, Ukrainians had held misgivings about the motives behind farm organization recruitment in the bloc district, and subsequent events seemed to confirm these:

. . . for a long time now the farm unions have said and written that they need our people in their organizations. This is a fact. But as far as we can see, they have not gone out of their way to help our people improve their farmsteads. Their basic concerns are membership dues and electoral support.³²

Likewise, requests for a paid Ukrainian organizer and funding for Ukrainian-language literature, both of which would have done much to establish the UFA's bona fides among Ukrainians, were never dealt with in a wholly satisfactory manner.³³

To be fair to the UFA, the chronic inability of Ukrainians to organize themselves can be cited as a fifth factor. Even if the UFA had provided Ukrainians with their own organizer, there still was no guarantee that it would have had greater success among them. In fact, two prominent Ukrainian UFA supporters charged that their people were shedding crocodile tears about the organization's lack of material

support. They added that if Ukrainians were actually active members of the UFA, literature and an organizer would follow.³⁴ This matter is debatable, but it does highlight one fact: the lack of capable leaders who might have organized Ukrainian farmers. After the failure of Farmers'ke slovo, Prystash removed himself from any further activity in the farmers' movement in Alberta, and became extremely defensive about his earlier efforts.³⁵ The other most likely candidates for organizing Ukrainian farmers, the two MLAs, simply serve as a good indication of the extent of the leadership problem. Despite his goodwill and his numerous epistles calling upon Ukrainians to involve themselves in the UFA, Fedun was not an especially compelling figure. Moreover, he could hardly speak English, virtually disqualifying him from the role of intermediary between Ukrainians and the UFA and severely curtailing his effectiveness as a politician.³⁶ Chornohus was even less inspiring. He was elected and rarely heard from again.³⁷

Ultimately it may be the sixth factor which may have been the most crucial-- the inability of the UFA to assume the same social function in Ukrainian districts that it had in other parts of the province. The UFA's "English" and "Protestant" nature made it almost inevitable that it would be more interested in the assimilation or "Canadianization" of Ukrainian farmers than in providing them with immediate concrete aid in improving their condition. At a bare minimum, it would mean a latent hostility to certain Ukrainian concerns. This can be seen consistently in UFA convention resolutions: fraternal greetings to the Great War Veteran's Association sent shortly after a large number of veterans had played a very active role in fostering the wave of nativism which swept through Canada after the Great War (often

coming down upon Ukrainian heads)³⁸; consistent cries against opening the doors to further immigration into Canada throughout the 1920s when many Ukrainians wished to see an increased immigration of their countrymen to Canada³⁹; and, most revealing, resolutions passed at the 1929 and 1930 conventions calling for strictly selective immigration on the basis of assimilability and for legislation which would "not allow. . . the people from Central European countries. . . to settle in blocks."⁴⁰ As a result, it was almost inevitable that Ukrainians would see little use in the UFA for other than political or economic reasons. They understood that their successful integration depended far more upon their ability to adapt themselves to the dominant group's ideology than the latter's willingness to make itself flexible enough to incorporate diverse interests.

Furthermore, one must remember that Ukrainian farmers in Alberta had already developed institutions which fulfilled the sorts of social and educational roles played by the UFA in other parts of the province--narodni domy (literally "people's" halls, but better understood as Ukrainian community halls). These had become almost a standard feature of every Ukrainian-populated area before or during the 1920s. In them a host of lectures, discussions, concerts, political meetings, dancing classes, and social events were held. Although they could potentially have provided the UFA with a grassroots connection to Ukrainians communities in Alberta, the narodni domy ultimately downplayed the importance of the UFA in the bloc district by making its auxiliary social programs irrelevant to the needs of the local inhabitants.⁴¹

The UFA was a dead letter in the Ukrainian bloc district

by late 1922. Certain individual branches continued to function, but these were usually fronts for a co-operative or an election committee. On the whole, one could safely say that the UFA had failed to leave its mark on this area.

III

It is very likely that the entire matter of Ukrainian farmer organization would have fallen into oblivion had not Toma Tomashevsky (Tomashevs'kyi) intervened. Tomashevsky, a former editor of Postup, started publishing a pro-farmer Ukrainian newspaper called Nash postup (Our Progress) out of Edmonton late in 1922. It quickly became the focal point of information and discussion concerning Ukrainian farmer affairs in Alberta, and it gave new hope to the idea of organizing. Ultimately this attempt failed as had all previous ones. Nevertheless, it is very significant because it gives perhaps the best indication of how Ukrainians may have hoped to involve themselves in the Canadian agrarian movement.

Tomashevsky was admirably suited to the task which faced him. He had had considerable newspaper experience in Canada and his sympathies were clearly with the common person. Moreover, he was unaffiliated politically, having broken with the socialist camp and never having found a new home. The banner across the top of Nash postup proclaimed that this was a newspaper for all Ukrainians in Alberta; Tomashevsky made a valiant effort to fulfill this mandate in a non-partisan manner.

What made Nash postup unique among Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers, however, was its strong commitment to the immediate, practical,

and economic betterment of Ukrainians. This was very much a reflection of Tomashevsky's belief that the role of the intelligentsia should be to help its people materially rather than concentrating exclusively on the humanistic concerns of its Old World liberal arts training. In terms of the Ukrainian movement, noted Tomashevsky, this should have been self-evident: how could Ukrainians support the sorts of ventures needed for their spiritual survival in the New World -- reading halls, student residences, etc. -- if they were still farming by Old World methods and hardly able to support themselves?⁴²

Tomashevsky's views represented an attempt to reconcile the Galician Ukrainian concept of populism with its North American counterpart. They resulted from his solid schooling in two different realms -- humanism and practicality.⁴³ Tomashevsky was born on May 15, 1884, in the Galician village of Stetseva. His father was a peasant farmer who had served in the imperial army both in Vienna and Budapest. He had an obsessive desire to see his eldest son (Toma) well-educated and drove him continually in his studies -- especially of the German language -- in preparation for university. Fearing that this obsession would ruin his father financially, Tomashevsky decided to fend for himself. At the age of thirteen he left home, found a job as a secretary in a district court, and continued his studies on the side. Meanwhile, his father, whose financial status had been getting increasingly worse, decided to emigrate with the entire family to Canada. Toma joined them and they arrived in 1900, eventually settling near Chipman, Alberta. In order to raise some much-needed capital for the farm, Toma set out as a migrant in search of work. Here Tomashevsky received his second schooling. By 1904 he had finally

settled in Lethbridge where he worked in the coal mines. There he became active in organizing Ukrainians, first as an executive member of a strongly pro-labour reading society and later as an organizer in the Crow's Nest Pass area for the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party of Canada. He was involved with the Ukrainian-Canadian Left for several years, but moved on after an internal dispute had split the party in 1911-1912. Meanwhile, he had gained a certain amount of experience working with the press and this was to become his full-time profession.

Nash postup's first major concern was educational in the broadest sense of the word. It beseeched Ukrainians to improve their farming methods. Toward this goal numerous articles concerning "scientific" agriculture, many of them written in an official or semi-official capacity by George (Iurii) Syrotiuk, an agronomist employed by the Alberta Department of Agriculture, were printed. Nash postup also carried notices of any public lectures given by Syrotiuk or other Ukrainian agronomists in the bloc district.⁴⁴

As mentioned earlier, the rationale for Ukrainians to practice modern agriculture was so that they could support both themselves and the national movement. But a second, perhaps even more pressing aspect came into this question: it was potentially ruinous for Ukrainians to continue farming by Old World methods. Syrotiuk noted that Ukrainians generally had raised their own standard of living by the 1920s -- wearing store-bought clothes and daring to purchase the various amenities of modern life -- while not always increasing their productivity enough to support such habits. Moreover, many had bought more land and/or machinery than they could handle

after the wartime bonanza, and they now found themselves in a tight bind after prices had fallen. As a result, the number of bankruptcies among Ukrainian farmers was increasing. Ukrainians had to realize that "in addition to working hard, they must obtain information . . . about the most fruitful methods of production and marketing" if they were to obtain the maximum benefit from their land.⁴⁵

A second major focus for Nash postup was co-operative action. The Narodna Torhovia had gone bankrupt late in 1921 because it had over-expanded its operation at a most inopportune time. This set the entire matter of co-operative action among Ukrainians back considerably.⁴⁶ In the wake of the Torhovlia's demise, a number of local co-operative stores were organized by Ukrainians, but their scale of business was small and their success minimal. The major co-operative efforts among Ukrainian farmers, accordingly, moved into other areas (such as grain and livestock marketing) which were integrated into a more general framework.

Co-operative livestock marketing was conducted in the bloc district under the auspices of the Alberta Livestock Marketing Board. Ukrainian participation in this body was largely the result of the formal incorporation of previously-existing Ukrainian marketing societies which had been started upon local initiative during the early period of contact between Ukrainians and the UFA. A good example of this type of a society was the Farmers' Marketing Society in Smoky Lake, which had been formed in 1922 after a series of lectures on agricultural themes given by Y. Syrotiuk in the area. By 1924, it had developed into a model body with 150 members, and it sponsored ambitious marketing, breeding, and educational programs.

Similar bodies were also organized in Myrnam, Fedorah, Redwater, Innisfree, Vilna, and Bellis.⁴⁷

Co-operative grain marketing among Ukrainians in Alberta was carried out under the rubric of Shapiro's Wheat Pool idea. Nash postup carried articles which told of the rise of the pool-idea, and it was quick to endorse the concept. Fedun, the Victoria MLA, was an especially vocal supporter of the pool idea, and wrote continually to the paper about this matter. After 1925 the Pool finally set out to organize in the bloc district, hoping to use the existing marketing organizations as a springboard. Initially, these efforts met with failure because the Pool had sent out only English-speaking organizers; after this, Syrotiuk was brought in as an organizer/translator, and the recruitment drive met with considerably more success.⁴⁸

Nash postup's rationale in advocating co-operative action among Ukrainians was once again the farmers' economic improvement, which happened to be linked symbiotically as a cornerstone of the Ukrainian movement. On this particular issue it could point to the remarkable improvements made in the Old Country during the 1920s as a direct result of the co-operative movement there, and its concomitant strengthening of the Ukrainian movement.⁴⁹

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Nash postup faithfully informed its readers about the state of the agrarian movement in general and organizational activity in particular. This might be understood as part of the political component of its populist stance. The paper was hardly a passive observer; like so much of the Ukrainian press in Canada, Nash postup found itself being the chronicler of events in which it had been a lead actor. Its coverage of events

related generally to the agrarian movement was fairly straightforward: Crerar's resignation as de facto head of the Progressives, UFA conventions, the rise of the wheat pool idea, the demand for a railroad route to Hudson Bay, etc. However, it could hardly conceal its passionate zeal for the question of Ukrainian farmer organization: it was quite aware of its role as the catalyst for a latent movement.⁵⁰

Almost immediately after its appearance, Nash postup found itself involved with this issue. Toward the end of 1922 a Ukrainian Communist organizer named Stepan Vaskan had set off from Edmonton for the area near Vermillion to urge local farmers to form a new Ukrainian farmer federation in opposition to the UFA. He claimed that nothing had changed under the new farmer government. Furthermore, since the English members of the UFA did not treat Ukrainians as equals, the organization could not serve the interests of Ukrainian farmers.⁵¹ Responses to Vaskan's organizational efforts were very quick in forthcoming from the two individuals about whom he had been most critical. Dmytro Prystash wrote to Nash postup saying that he felt Vaskan's called-for dictatorship of the proletariat in Alberta was not only unfeasible, but even somewhat pretentious. Tomashevsky added to this criticism by noting that the "comrade" organizer had had no practical experience with the UFA -- not even as a member. So, he was hardly in a position to pass judgement upon it.⁵² Vaskan's foray did stimulate a practical response to his efforts: a new Ukrainian farmer federation consisting of five locals centred around Fedorah. But this new group was hardly the radical alternative to the UFA which Vaskan had hoped to form. Its statement of principles contained only the three-pronged

populist" approach -- education, economics, and politics -- and it made no gesture of hostility toward the UFA.⁵³

This organizational initiative of the Fedorah farmers received very strong support from both Fedun and Tomashevsky. The latter even suggested that this might simply be the first step toward organizing all Ukrainian farmers in Alberta into one central body. Since no one else seemed either willing or capable enough at that moment, he announced that he would send out letters to certain individuals urging them to set a date when farmers could gather to discuss this matter.⁵⁴ By May, Tomashevsky's plan saw fruition. Nash postup announced a conference of all Ukrainian farmers to be held June 8-10 in Edmonton.

Even before the conference was held, two things became obvious. First, Ukrainians reckoned that their own gathering would not hurt the UFA because few of them knew English well enough to really benefit from the UFA and its primarily English-language publications. The fear of being labelled as "separatists" actually may have kept them from holding their own convention earlier. Second, they realized that this would be a critical gathering if a "movement" was to be established among Ukrainian farmers. A month before the convention, Tomashevsky printed a long history of the earlier efforts to establish Ukrainian farmer organizations in which he pointed out some of their outstanding mistakes. Implicitly he noted that Ukrainians could not afford to repeat them.⁵⁵

The conference itself was reasonably successful as 80 farmer delegates came for the three days of intense discussion. In addition, a truly distinguished figure, Osyph Nazaruk, the foreign minister of

the National Republic of Western Ukraine (in exile) agreed to give the keynote address at the gathering on a topic concerning co-operatives.⁵⁶

The main item of debate throughout the conference was the manner in which Ukrainian farmers should organize themselves. A consensus had been reached very quickly about the need for Ukrainians to belong to a farmers' organization whose business and publications would be in their own language. Only the question of what sort of body this should be and whether it should be affiliated to or a part of the UFA remained to be decided. One faction argued strongly against any ties with the UFA, citing the fact that "other than our membership dues and the fact that we all belong to a large UFA organization, we have nothing in common." However, this argument was tempered by the realization that setting up a completely separate farmer organization which duplicated many of the UFA's functions would be foolish, especially since the Ukrainian human and financial resource base was small.

"Separatism" was rejected as unworkable and a compromise was worked out; after considerable deliberation the convention decided to organize a Ukrainian "section" of the UFA. Ukrainians would take on the responsibility of organizing and maintaining their own locals (which would be located in five districts co-ordinated by a central organizer) as well as passing on membership dues to the UFA executive in Calgary. In turn, the UFA would be responsible for representing their interests as farmers at the various levels of government, printing literature in Ukrainian, and hiring an organizer for them.

The matter of a press organ was not resolved in a definitive manner. Tomashevsky suggested that the UFA Ukrainian Section

(UFA [US]) take over Nash postup. He even offered to publish it gratis if they would hire a full-time editor. When the convention declined his suggestion, he indicated his willingness to set aside a full page in every issue for their business affairs if they would supply him with ready copy. This matter was debated, but resulted in no final resolution.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Tomashevsky did open up a page in Nash postup to the new UFA(US).

The convention ended with a formal resolution forming the UFA(US), which was forwarded to the Calgary-based executive and reprinted in full in Nash postup. An executive headed by a Mr. Iuskiv of Wostok and five district representatives (whose work would be co-ordinated by a central organizer, Dmytro Sorochan of Zawale) was also elected.

Despite the efforts to organize the UFA(US) on a solid base, it was still-born. The executive forwarded the resolution proclaiming the organization's formation, then waited for a reply. When no response was forthcoming, it did not pursue the matter. The page set aside for the UFA(US) in Nash postup was discontinued very quickly because of a lack of submissions. Finally, Sorochan, the central organizer, sent out a circular asking for specific information concerning the location of facilities in which to hold meetings in rural areas, whether UFA locals existed in certain centres, and what sort of support might be expected for any organizational efforts or speaking tours. He seems to have gotten no response to his requests and did not himself then pursue the matter any further.⁵⁸ As a result, the newly-founded UFA(US) was left in limbo.

Nash postup was not silent about this state of affairs. Two months after the June convention, it urged the Ukrainian Section

executive either to confront the UFA on the matter of a response to their resolution or to demonstrate the Ukrainians' independence by going on with their activities as if Calgary did not exist — to follow through with the organizational initiative. Passivity could only cause a further decline in activity.⁵⁹

In fact, the UFA had received the notice about the formation of a Ukrainian Section. It replied to the UFA(US) executive that the entire matter rightfully should be introduced by the interested parties at the next UFA Annual Convention. This matter was completely ignored by the Ukrainian branch executive until almost the very last moment. Then, Dmytro Sorochan sought and received permission to include a discussion about the UFA(US) on the agenda. But for reasons unknown, he failed to attend the convention, and the issue was never raised. Moreover only a handful of Ukrainian delegates were there, and they failed to participate actively in the proceedings because of their difficulty with communicating in English.⁶⁰ The Ukrainian UFA organization was now dead.

Tomashevsky responded to this turn of events with an editorial which once more reviewed the well-intentioned but poorly-executed attempts to organize Ukrainian farmers in Alberta. He was very critical of the UFA for what he termed its English-only policy and for its abandonment of Ukrainians after the 1921 election. But he did not spare Ukrainians any criticism for their lack of effort in organizing themselves after the June 1923 Convention which had formed the UFA(US). A week later Tomashevsky essentially repeated the editorial. Only in the following week did he finally resign himself to the fact that there would be no strong farmers' movement among Alberta's Ukrainians.

He could reconcile himself with this fact, however, because he believed that Nash postup had actually broadened the base for discussion about farmer affairs among Ukrainians in the province. His efforts had not been entirely in vain.⁶¹

IV

After the failure of the UFA(US) experiment, a noticeable change took place in the character of Nash postup. It seemed to have lost its crusading spirit, preferring instead simply to chronicle and comment upon the significant events of the day -- the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, the revival of immigration to Canada, the situation in Ukraine, and so forth. All this changed early in 1925 when the paper took up the challenge of electoral politics with both federal and provincial contests looming on the horizon. For almost the next two years, Nash postup pursued this matter doggedly until its efforts bore fruit with the election of Michael (Myhkailo) Luchkovich as the first Ukrainian MP in September, 1926.

Luchkovich's election under the UFA banner represented a major breakthrough in terms of Ukrainian political representation and UFA co-operation. During the previous decade Ukrainian leaders working within the established political parties (especially the Liberals) had been frustrated completely as their demands for political representation were rebuffed. But with the rise of the UFA as a political alternative, there was scope for co-operation between Ukrainians and the UFA in the electoral sphere. Despite their differences and their history of lost opportunity, both could satisfy their particular interests by the election of Ukrainians as public officials: Ukrainians

would break out of their political isolation and the UFA would capitalize on a stable base of political support.

The incident which sparked Tomashevsky's concern for electoral matters was a Liberal nominating convention held by the Vegreville constituency organization in Lamont on January 22, 1925. Because the riding had a very high percentage of Ukrainians in it, Tomashevsky reckoned that a Ukrainian should have been nominated by the party, or that Ukrainians should at least have had a decisive influence in choosing the local candidate.⁶² However, the reality of the situation did not facilitate this at all. It was doubtful whether any party might nominate a Ukrainian because, despite their numbers, they did not constitute a real political force. Just how weak they really were truly shocked Tomashevsky. At the Liberal convention in Lamont, there were 91 English delegates, 55 Ukrainian ones, and 8 German ones. Yet, not one Ukrainian was elected to either an executive or a committee position. Nash postup noted this fact in the bold headline banner to the article covering the convention: "A FINE EQUALITY". To this Tomashevsky added a three-part article cum harangue based on his recollections of the event. He followed up on this shortly thereafter with an editorial stating that the reluctance of Ukrainians to exercise their electoral power was a major part of the reason they had been discriminated against in Canada, and that it was high time for this situation to change.⁶³ The call for Ukrainian power in Alberta had been made.

Tomashevsky's newly-found concern was in line with a general trend of soul-searching among Ukrainians -- especially the intelligentsia -- about their role in Canadian politics. Ukrainians had

virtually opened the West and received no credit for their efforts. This was especially obvious in politics, where they had not risen above the level of political agents. Certainly, they had not elected the number of representatives their numbers warranted. In light of the events of recent history, the intelligentsia viewed this as an acute problem. The failure to establish an independent Ukrainian state in the wake of the Revolution had resulted in a strong belief among them that they must build up all Ukrainian strengths in Canada, including their political power. An ethos of svii do svoho or "support your own kind" developed at this time, and elections started to be viewed as a periodic test of the intelligentsia's work.⁶⁴

The rise of non-traditional or so-called third parties in Canadian politics at this time was fortuitous. The doors to power through both the Liberal and Conservative routes had been shut quite firmly before Ukrainians, and they were painfully aware of this. Yet they realized that under the Canadian political system, they could not run independents as had the majority of Ukrainian candidates during the previous decade.⁶⁵ These facts seemed to tie their political fortunes to groups like the UFA.

Two characteristic points of view were taken by the Ukrainian intelligentsia about this state of affairs. The first, perhaps best represented by Tomashevsky himself, saw this as an ideal situation. Ukrainians could vote for a candidate who would represent them both as an ethnic and an occupational group. A second, somewhat more cynical view, was sometimes expressed in Ukrains'kyi holos, especially as the Progressive movement started falling into disarray. The involvement of Ukrainians with third parties was strictly a temporary

state of affairs. Through them, Ukrainians would receive an elementary schooling in Canadian politics, and the general public would be accustomed to the idea that one of "theirs" should be elected in an area heavily populated by Ukrainians. But there was no real basis for a long-term relationship.⁶⁶

Beyond the question of party affiliation, Ukrainians also faced a serious problem finding qualified candidates among their own people. After the 1921 elections, Svarich wrote a long article in Ukrains'kyi holos noting that the majority of Ukrainians who had run for public office during the previous decade had lacked even the elementary qualifications needed for such positions.⁶⁷ As well, as the possibility of electing their own public officials became more realizable, Ukrainians generally began to recognize the futility and the potential embarrassment of running underqualified candidates.⁶⁸

It was in this spirit that Tomashevsky approached the 1925 federal election. Although he realized that no Ukrainian would likely be nominated in Alberta, Tomashevsky hoped that Ukrainians would at least participate actively -- even decisively -- in the various nominating conventions which would be taking place, especially in the Ukrainian stronghold of Vegreville. But these hopes were quickly dashed. Even at the UFA Vegreville constituency nominating convention held in Mundare on September 25 there was no sign of a strong Ukrainian presence. Of the 71 delegates present, 24 were Ukrainians. They, in turn, were hardly a dynamic force. A Nash postup editorial wondered why they had bothered showing up at all. They were led through the proceedings like sheep and their only "concrete" action was to "find" a likely Ukrainian candidate shortly after the conclusion of the convention.

Tomashevsky noted that this was not sufficient, and that preparations should have been made months earlier. After the elections he relented to a certain degree, saying that even though it was entirely predictable that Ukrainians would not have a significant political voice even in their own stronghold, there had been a genuine growth of interest among them in the affairs of party politics.⁶⁹

Tomashevsky's hopes for Ukrainian political "progress" had an even greater setback during the June 1926 provincial elections in Alberta. Despite an incredible flurry of activity in political affairs, Ukrainians failed to elect even one MLA of their own. In Whitford the lacklustre Chornohus failed in his bid for renomination; in Vegreville the incumbent, Art Matheson, was hardly likely to be challenged; and in Victoria, Fedun not only failed to be renominated, but set in motion a first-rate fiasco. He had been inaccurately informing his constituents about the qualifications needed by delegates to the UFA nominating meeting, assuring them that membership in the UFA political organization was sufficient when membership in the UFA itself was a necessary prerequisite. As a result the majority of Ukrainians who arrived at the party's nomination convention in Lamont suddenly discovered themselves ineligible to vote. They were so incensed that they stormed out of the gathering and nominated their own candidate, G. Moisey of Mundare. At the official convention Fedun claimed to be the official "government" candidate endorsed by then-premier J.R. Brownlee himself.⁷⁰

This situation did not sit well with Nash postup.⁷¹ Even though a total of seven Ukrainians were running in the three Ukrainian ridings, none could be considered serious candidates. Once again Nash postup resigned itself to the fact that Ukrainians would be unable to elect their

own public officials.⁷² Interestingly, in light of its former defence of the organization, Nash postup put the blame for this situation directly upon the shoulders of the UFA. A series of editorials criticized the UFA for not having even lifted a finger "to help organize Ukrainians" and for having "constantly ignored their pleas for Ukrainian-language materials and organizers"; all this was done in spite of the fact that Ukrainians had faithfully supported the UFA through a series of elections. Nash postup did not let the matter stand there. It closely examined the entire record of the UFA government and found it to be lacking. Predictably it failed to endorse UFA candidates during the provincial elections, although it did not challenge the UFA's legitimacy as the vehicle for farmer action. After the election Nash postup relented somewhat and even credited the UFA with having succeeded in expanding the occupational consciousness of Alberta farmers. Nevertheless, it continued to view the election results as a sad indication of Ukrainians' powerlessness and their lack of political organization.⁷³

The surprising resignation of the Liberal government in Ottawa almost immediately thereafter provided an opportunity to rectify this situation. A pair of editorials in Nash postup, "Will We Be Able to Realize Our Dreams" and "One More Chance", stressed the fact that Ukrainians could not let this opportunity to elect their own MP slip by; a suitable person had to be found and nominated as a farmer candidate so that he would have the best chance of being elected.⁷⁴

A most suitable candidate was found when Michael Luchkovich, a teacher from Innisfree, agreed to contest the UFA nomination. Luchkovich, who was born in the heavily Ukrainian populated coal-belt region of Pennsylvania in 1893, had moved to Canada to train as

a teacher in 1907 and had established a good reputation for himself among Ukrainians in Alberta as an intelligent and moderate person.⁷⁵

He also had a significant advantage in that he could speak equally well in both English and Ukrainian. Finally, Luchkovich had long before established that he was genuinely concerned about the plight of farmers, Ukrainian ones in particular. In 1921 he had addressed the UFA Annual Convention on behalf of all Ukrainians in the province and asked for support, tolerance, and an understanding of their problems. As well, he had written periodically to the Ukrainian language press stating his views about the farmers' lot, saying that it was neither realistic nor fair to expect them to work like human oxen in difficult and monotonous conditions; farm life had to be made more liveable.⁷⁶ Luchkovich's sympathy for farmers extended to his support for the UFA. Already in 1925 he had declined a proposition from the Liberals to run federally, citing his preference for the UFA.⁷⁷

The Vegreville UFA nomination convention was set for early August and it promised to be an interesting contest. Luchkovich faced an impressive array of opponents, including the incumbent, Herb Boutillier, and another Ukrainian teacher, Peter Miskiw (Petro Mis'kiv). After the first ballot, four of the seven contestants were eliminated, leaving only the three aforementioned frontrunners. On the second ballot, Boutillier received 75 votes, Luchkovich 49, and Miskiw 39. The latter was forced out of the race, but he threw his support behind the other Ukrainian candidate. As a result, Luchkovich won the nomination on the third ballot by the narrow margin of 85-81. The announcement of this result was followed by five minutes of thunderous applause by the Ukrainian delegates who had nominated "their" candidate.⁷⁸

Luchkovich's nomination was a considerable shock to some of the non-Ukrainian delegates. Shortly after it was announced that he had won the contest, a number of them stated outright they would not vote for their party's candidate, while some women even broke down and cried. Not long thereafter there were rumours that the UFA district executive had advised Luchkovich to resign because it doubted whether he could get the party's English vote in the riding.⁷⁹

Nash postup was understandably ecstatic about Luchkovich's nomination. "Finally", it proclaimed, a fully-qualified Ukrainian candidate had been found and nominated. Now it was necessary to have him elected. This fact was presented in no uncertain terms: Luchkovich's election was a test of Ukrainians' strength, whether they actually were the equals of anyone in the country. For good measure the paper threw in an element of political revenge into its call for Luchkovich's election. For years "English" politicians had solicited the Ukrainian vote with a standard "gospel" to the effect that "we are all Canadians." It was high time to discover just how truthful their pronouncements were. Certainly, the initial reaction of the English farmers was not a promising indication. It simply demonstrated what Ukrainians had known all along -- that the English cared more for their supremacy over other peoples than they did about the district or the Dominion. When put into terms like these, a failure to elect Luchkovich would be the greatest possible shame. Consequently, Nash postup urged Ukrainians "for once to show that you are not 'Bohunks' but citizens of a free country who have, in addition to civic duties, certain rights, equal privileges, and respect."⁸⁰

The fact that Luchkovich actually was a very qualified candidate defused a potentially explosive situation. The UFA executive endorsed his nomination and English farmers generally were impressed with his performance at election rallies. Soon he was joined on the circuit by Art Matheson, the Vegreville M.L.A. Luchkovich's Ukrainian machine, likewise, was a great asset. Nash postup thundered with its support and a host of Luchkovich's fellow teachers combed the countryside "like lions" campaigning for him. Even the clergy, both Catholic and Orthodox, supported the Ukrainian candidate.⁸¹

Luchkovich won the election with a healthy, if not overwhelming margin of 4,106 to 3,378. Ukrainians were ecstatic. Nash postup printed a predictable editorial under the banner of "A Memorable Day", which carried a curious subtitle, "Praise the Lord That Finally We Too Have Become Real People"; Tomashevsky added a short article which noted that September 14, the date of the elections, had been a red letter day for him previously (as the date he had arrived in Canada and had bought the printing presses which eventually put out Nash postup); and many Ukrainians agreed that Luchkovich's election as the first Ukrainian MP in Canada was the highlight of the year.⁸²

V

After Luchkovich's election there was a feeling that this may have been the spark needed to revive the agrarian movement among Ukrainians. Nash postup once more called for the formation of some kind of a provincial organization to represent Ukrainian farmers. Even the UFA director for the Vegreville District joined in the call for greater Ukrainian participation in farmer affairs.⁸³ These

efforts bore no fruit. The spark had gone out in Ukrainian areas before the movement caught fire.

What remained of any sort of lingering connection with the UFA was dictated by expediency. Economic ventures -- co-ops, the Wheat Pool, livestock marketing -- remained active in Ukrainian areas. But local organizations remained largely in a state of limbo -- at least until shortly before and shortly after an election.⁸⁴

It is perhaps in electoral politics that the greatest amount of co-operation took place between Ukrainians and the UFA. In 1930, Luchkovich was returned, and two more Ukrainians were elected under the UFA banner in the provincial elections, Isidore Goresky (Whitford) and Peter Miskiw (Vegreville). The UFA was seeking control of legislative bodies while Ukrainians were seeking to elect their "own" into office. In the latter case, having a candidate run under the UFA banner was recognized to be a great asset. Whether this amounted to true Ukrainian support for the UFA per se or a convenient way to slip into the corridors of power through the doors of least resistance cannot be ascertained unqualifiedly. But one very concrete result of Ukrainian participation in the UFA was the successful establishment of the legitimacy of the concept of ethnic politics in the electoral field. By 1934 even the staunchly Anglo-Saxon Vegreville Observer had recognized this fact:

Within recent years, the Ukrainians have developed a "race" consciousness which must be disconcerting to the old-line party men, who for years directed the affairs of the Liberal party round these parts and were followed meekly enough, by the docile Ukrainian voters. The first of the upsets came in 1926 when Mr. Luchkovich was first elected. That was the time for the Anglo-Saxon wing of the party to see whither they were heading. Mr. Luchkovich's re-election in 1930 gave additional warning of the fact that the

Ukrainians knew their strength and intended to use it. . .

All this points to the fact that the next member for Vegreville will be a Ukrainian. It rests with the party to see that this member is a Liberal.⁸⁵

This sort of politicking, however, did little more than to mask the lack of Ukrainian participation in the UFA. Ultimately the two had been able to co-operate in certain spheres of common interest, particularly in economic and electoral matters, but no basis for a lasting relationship between them had developed.

The superficial integration of Ukrainians into the UFA had little consequence while times were good. However, the Depression now loomed on the horizon. The fact that Ukrainians generally regarded the UFA more as a status quo party than a protest body would now become significant, for they were more likely to seek other means of expressing their discontent. The pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, already active in the bloc district for several years, provided such an outlet, and it made considerable organizational gains during this period by leading a protest campaign against the UFA.

Notes to Chapter Four

¹W.L.Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).

²This thesis is best developed in Vernon C.Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957).

³For basic narratives concerning the rise of the agrarian movement, see S.M.Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Hopkins Moorhouse, Deep Furrows (Toronto: George J. McLeod Ltd., 1918); L.A.Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements, reprint ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); W.K.Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); and Paul Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

⁴For a standard interpretation of the role played by the social gospel in Canada during this period, see Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).

⁵See, for example, the UFA Annual Report for the years 1915-1921, which contains the official minutes of UFA conventions. In 1922, The United Farmer started publication as an official UFA organ. It took over the task of providing convention coverage from the separate annual booklets.

⁶To point out some obvious examples: James Woodsworth was at one time an organizer for the UFA in southern Alberta, and a frequent speaker at farmers' conventions; R.G.Henders, long-time president of the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association was also a Presbyterian minister and an executive member of the Manitoba Social Service Council; Salem Bland, a leading proponent of the social gospel, penned a regular column for the Grain Growers' Guide; and farmer leaders such as Henry Wise Wood, Percival Baker, Norman Smith, and William Irvine openly acknowledged that they had been affected by social gospel ideals.

⁷Morton, Progressive Party, p.27.

⁸R.C.Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1914: A Nation Transformed, The Canadian Centenary Series no.14 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp.315-320.

⁹Ukrainians'kyi holos, 15 June 1910.

¹⁰This fact is noted well in Thomas Flanagan, "Political Geography and the United Farmers of Alberta," pp.136-169 in Susan Trofimenkoff, ed., The Twenties in Western Canada (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1972).

¹¹ For a general history of the UFA before its entry into the political arena, see David G. Embree, "The Rise of the United Farmers of Alberta" (M.A.thesis, University of Alberta, 1956); and W.A.McIntosh, "The United Farmers of Alberta, 1909-1920" (M.A.thesis, University of Calgary, 1971).

¹² See the Official Minutes of the Seventh Annual UFA Convention (1915), p.41; and Official Minutes of the Tenth Annual UFA Convention (1918), p.139. The quote concerning UFA Sunday is from Grain Growers' Guide, 18 April 1917, cited in McIntosh, "United Farmers," pp.78-79.

¹³ Ukrains'kyi holos, 26 June, 4 September 1912, 14 May 1913.

¹⁴ Postup, 8 September 1916.

¹⁵ Ibid, 15 March 1917; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 28 March 1917.

¹⁶ Postup, 15 March, 10 May, 3 July 1917.

¹⁷ Andriy Makuch, "The Economic Activities of Ukrainian Canadians During the First World War" (unpublished paper, University of Alberta, 1980); T.C.Byrne, "The Ukrainian Community of North-Central Alberta" (M.A.thesis, University of Alberta, 1937), pp.35-37; and C.Young, The Ukrainian Canadians (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1931), pp.80-81.

¹⁸ Note, for example, that during the 1920 UFA Annual Convention, the Victoria District UFA made a number of resolutions dealing with Ukrainian concerns of that time such as franchise and naturalization legislation. See Official Minutes of the Twelfth Annual UFA Convention (1920), pp.53-54.

¹⁹ UFA, Annual Report (1919), p.17

²⁰ Farmers'ke slovo, 10 March 1921. These same figures are cited in Nash postup, 11 May 1923 and 12 February 1924. In all likelihood they are inflated, but nevertheless indicative of widespread support for the UFA in the bloc district at that time.

²¹ UFA, Official Minutes of the Executive and Board, January 1 and 22, 1921, deal with the newspaper grant; June 9 and November 27, 1920 deal with the translations grant; and January 19, 1922 with the Foreign-Born Committee. The latter is also discussed at the 1921 and 1922 conventions. See the UFA Annual Report (1920), pp.48, 49, and 65; and Annual Report (1921), p. 44.

22 Five issues of Farmers'ke slovo were published. Of these, only the second one (dated 10 March 1921) remains in existence.

23 Ukrains'kyi holos, 21 January 1920, 12 January 1921. The former convention passed a resolution calling for Ukrainian participation in the farmers' movement, while the latter devoted an entire morning to this question (with Dmytro Prystash as a guest speaker).

24 W. Darcovich and P. Yuzyk, eds., A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981), p. 361.

25 Nash postup, 12 February 1924; and Carl Betke, "Farm Politics in an Urban Age: The Decline of the United Farmers of Alberta After 1921," in L.H. Thomas, ed., Essays in Western History (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1976), pp. 177-179. The latter source notes that the overall UFA membership had dropped from a high of approximately 28,000 to 32,000 in 1919-1920 to about 15,000 in 1923-1924.

26 Ukrains'kyi holos, 5, 26, January 1921; John Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), pp. 85-87 examines the farming practices of groups like the Ukrainians at this time.

27 Ukrains'kyi holos, 5, 19, January 1921.

28 Ibid, 14 April 1920.

29 Ibid, 15 December 1920.

30 Ibid, 14 April, 15 December 1920; and Nash postup, 19 February 1924.

31 For example, membership lists for the UFWA and the Junior UFA in the 1919, 1920, and 1921 Annual Reports mention only one Ukrainian local -- Vilna.

32 Ukrains'kyi holos, 5 January 1921.

33 Other than the organizational pamphlet, "What Has the UFA Done?" and the grant to Prystash for Farmers'ke slovo, there is no evidence to suggest that the UFA published any materials in Ukrainian.

34 Nash postup, 26 February 1924, 28 March 1925. The authors were James Krett (Iakiv Kret) and Prokop Magera. Krett later changed his mind and became very critical of the UFA for "abandoning" its Ukrainian members. See Nash postup, 26 May 1926.

³⁵ Nash postup, 23 January 1923.

³⁶ Fedun's lack of proficiency in the English language is noted in Vegreville Observer, 20 July 1921; and Lazarenko, "Ukrainians in Provincial Politics," p.47. There is virtually no record of Fedun's role in the legislature. His only noteworthy moment seems to have been his maiden speech when he made several "shocking" revelations about the seriousness of the drinking problem in the province (an obsession with him). These were severely misconstrued in the English-language press. See Edmonton Bulletin, 10 February 1922; and Edmonton Journal, 10 February 1922. Fedun attempted to correct these misconceptions by publishing the full text of his speech in Ukrains'kyi holos, 22 March 1922. Otherwise, little is mentioned of his activities. The most interesting exception to this is a comment he made in Ukrains'kyi holos, 16 August 1922, claiming that he had demanded that the UFA sponsor a public health nurse (Ukrainian-speaking) in the bloc district, and would soon be forwarding requests for a Ukrainian-speaking home economist and an agricultural lecturer.

³⁷ Chornohis' maiden speech is covered in Edmonton Journal, 29 July 1922; and Edmonton Bulletin, 29 July 1922. After this, there is no mention of his activities in either the English or the Ukrainian-language press.

³⁸ UFA Annual Report (1918), p.77. Regarding the hostility of returning veterans to "foreigners", see Donald Avery, "The Radical Alien and the Winnipeg General Strike," in The West and the Nation, eds. Carl Berger and Ramsay Cook (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp.174-186.

³⁹ Note the anti-immigration resolutions from the Official Minutes of the following UFA conventions: 1924 (p.192); 1927 (p.112); 1928 (pp.157-158); 1929 (pp.10-12); and 1931 (p.166). Compare these to the presentation made by Ukrainians at a 1925 conference on immigration held in Edmonton or to the activities of the Ukrainian Immigration and Colonization Association, which are noted in Nash postup, 28 March, 11 April 1925.

⁴⁰ Official Minutes of the Twenty-first Annual UFA Convention (1929), p.90; and Official Minutes of the Twenty-second Annual UFA Convention (1930), p.166.

⁴¹ Significantly, narodni domy are suggested (and used) frequently as touchstones for Ukrainian farmer organization. See Nash postup, 15 August 1923; 13, 27 December 1924; and 10 January 1925. However, they never realized their potential in this area. Nash postup, 3 February, 28 July 1926, 15 August, 9 November 1927 is particularly critical of this fact, as if to underline that narodni domy in Canada had failed to assume the same functions they had played in the Old Country.

⁴² Nash postup, 11 December 1923, 11 February 1925.

⁴³ The following biographical information comes from Tomashevsky's biographical sketch in 60 Litiv Kanady (Toronto, 1951), pp.24-30; M. Marunchak, V zustrichi z Ukraïns'kymy pioneramy Al'berty (Winnipeg, 1964), pp.48-59; and Osyp Nazaruk, Toma Tomashevs'kyi: Robitnyk-pioner Ukraïns'koi presy v Amerytsi (Chicago, 1924). The author wishes to thank Dr. I.L. Rudnytsky for bringing the latter item to his attention.

⁴⁴ Syrotiuk's first article appears in Nash postup, 20 November 1923. After this he is a regular contributor.

⁴⁵ Nash postup, 25 December 1923, 1 January, 8 April, 27 December 1924.

⁴⁶ Ukraïns'kyi holos, 21 September 1921; and Vegreville Observer, 20 July, 3 August 1921.

⁴⁷ Nash postup, 3 April 1923; 5 February, 4 March, 20, 27 December 1924; 23 December 1925; 30 June 1926.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 10 September 1923; 9 September 1925; 10 March, 30 June, 7 July 1926. Ukraïns'kyi holos, 10 September 1923 was wary of the Wheat Board proposal, although on 6 February 1924 it did offer the pool idea its support.

⁴⁹ Nash postup, 14 July 1926.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 25 March, 20 December 1924, 28 March 1925.

⁵¹ Ibid, 4 December 1922, 2 January 1923.

⁵² Ibid, 20 November, 4 December 1922.

⁵³ Ibid, 4 January 1923; and Ukraïns'kyi holos, 31 January 1923.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 22 January, 5 February 1923.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 3 April, 11 May 1923.

⁵⁶ Two accounts exist about the viche, Nash postup, 3 July 1923 and Ukraïns'kyi holos, 4 July 1923. Although the two do not contradict one another factually, the Nash postup coverage seems to have a strong anti-UFA sentiment to it.

⁵⁷ Nash postup, 15 August 1923; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 4 July 1923.

⁵⁸ Nash postup, 15 August 1923.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 15 August 1923.

⁶⁰ UFA, Official Minutes of the Executive and Board, January 12 and 19, 1924; and Nash postup, 5, 12 February 1924.

⁶¹ Nash postup, 12, 19, 26 February 1924.

⁶² Ibid, 17 January 1925.

⁶³ Ibid, 24 January to 25 February, 14 March 1925.

⁶⁴ Ukrains'kyi holos, 23 August 1922; 2, 23 May, 28 November 1923; 9 January 1924.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 1 February 1922; 21 October 1925; 15 September 1926.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 30 January, 17, 24 June, 30 September 1924.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 1 February 1922.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 24 June, 30 September 1924.

⁶⁹ Nash postup, 30 September, 11 November, 30 December 1925.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 23 June 1926.

⁷¹ At this time a new editor had taken over Nash Postup, James Krett (mentioned previously in footnote 34). He stayed on for about a year, and Tomashevsky's company, Alberta Printing, continued to publish the newspaper. Still, Nash postup continued to bear Tomashevsky's unmistakable stamp. Krett was not the first, nor was he the last person to be drawn into the production of Nash postup, for the paper was a money-losing proposition, and Tomashevsky was constantly on the lookout for co-workers who would shoulder the burden. One of these notes his experiences in his autobiography. See Vasyl' Havrysh, Moia Kanada i ia (Edmonton: By the author, 1974), pp.80-81.

⁷² Nash postup, 19 May 1926. None of the Ukrainian candidates received over 375 votes. See Darcovich and Yuzyk, Statistical Compendium, p.361.

⁷³ Nash postup, 26 May, 2, 9, 23, 30 June 1926.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 7, 21 July 1926.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 21, 28 July 1926. Luchkovich's autobiography was published as A Ukrainian Canadian in Parliament (Toronto: Ukrainian Research Foundation, 1965); a short biography by Walter Sharek is included in Isidore Goresky et al, eds., Ukrainians in Alberta, vol. 2 (Edmonton: Ukrainian Pioneers' Association of Alberta, 1981), pp. 89-102.

⁷⁶ Kanadyis'kyi farmer, 11 February, 23 June 1921; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 3, 10 August 1921.

⁷⁷ Nash postup, 18 August 1926.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 25 August 1926.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 25 August, 1926 and Isidore Goresky, "Memoirs" (typewritten, n.d.), p. 82.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 25 August 1926.

⁸¹ Ibid, 1, 8 September 1926.

⁸² Ibid, 15 September 1926; and Ukrains'kyi holos, 12 January 1927.

⁸³ Ibid, 10 November 1926.

⁸⁴ Tomashevsky expresses this opinion in Farmers'kyi holos, 10 April 1933.

⁸⁵ Vegreville Observer, 10 October 1934.

CHAPTER FIVE

Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Depression in the Bloc District

After the UFA had failed to establish itself firmly in the Ukrainian bloc district, the Ukrainian-Canadian Communist Left began a campaign to expand its influence there through the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association and its own farmer-oriented Ukrainian-language newspaper. Several years of energetic activity succeeded in establishing a relatively strong ULFTA presence. However, the Communists could not hope to attract a majority of Ukrainians into their ranks because a pro-Soviet posture had caused them to be ostracized by the mainstream community.

With the start of the Depression, the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) decided to form the Farmers' Unity League (FUL) as a radical alternative to the existing agrarian organizations in Canada, including the UFA. In Alberta, the new organization established itself first in the Ukrainian bloc district, partly because of the base for operations provided by the ULFTA network and partly because of the weak UFA presence there. However, the FUL did not develop as strongly in any other part of the province, giving Ukrainians a highly visible profile in it and a general reputation for being prone to radicalism. Many Ukrainians retaliated by strongly proclaiming their loyalty to Canada and mercilessly denouncing the Communist agitators among them.

This sort of response to the challenge posed by the Communists did not and could not come to grips with a fundamental problem: there seemed to be no alternative to the FUL. The UFA had long ago

been discarded as a credible vehicle for farmer action in the bloc district and Ukrainian community organizations did not deal with these sorts of questions. There was one effort made by Toma Tomashevsky to direct this protest into constructive channels, but this was very limited in scope and started much too late to have any real effect. Consequently, the Depression years in the bloc district degenerated into a series of campaigns and clashes.

I

In 1924 the Ukrainian-Canadian Communist Left began a concerted campaign to extend its influence into the farming communities of Western Canada. This policy development was in direct response to a directive from the Communist International (Comintern) for the party faithful in Canada to expand their influence by "burrowing from within" farmer organizations. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association (ULTA) was transformed into the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULETA; in Ukrainian: Tovarystvo Ukrainins'kykh Robitnychykh Farmers'kykh Domiv, or TURF Dim) and a "wholly farmer" newspaper edited by Dmytro Prystash, Farmers'ke zhyttia (The Farmer's Life), was added to the list of publications sponsored by the ULFTA.

The speed with which the ULTA responded to the new Comintern line indicates the extent of its connections with the CPC, even though it was nominally an autonomous body. These ties were based on the use of the ULFTA as a front organization for the CPC. Over the years it provided the party with a constant source of revenue and manpower as well as with a means of transmitting information

to the Ukrainian masses.²

The ULTA had managed to gain a toe-hold in Alberta before the establishment of the new Comintern line through the presence of local chapters in the province's lumbering and mining regions and through the sympathies of farmers who had had previous contact with the ULTA while working in these regions seasonally in order to establish themselves. Thus, it had a small but secure base from which to start its recruitment drive among the farmers of the bloc district.

Internally, the ULFTA sought to build up its organizational strength in the province in terms of both physical holdings and membership. It started a campaign to incorporate local narodni domy or to build new facilities in areas where it had support.³ Energetic cultural and educational programs were then instituted in these halls in order to attract potential recruits to them. Organizers were sent through the bloc district on regular speaking tours. Conferences, likewise, were frequent, and members were always urged to attend. This high pace of activity quickly showed results; the initial handful of contacts with which the ULFTA had started its organizing in 1925 had grown to a network of 50 or more locations by late 1929.⁴

The immediate reaction to the ULFTA drive was one of concern, especially about its appropriation of property. Tomashevsky was particularly distressed by this, and compared it in a Nash postup editorial to the same sort of a grab for property attempted by the Ukrainian Catholic bishop, Nykyta Budka, a decade earlier. He

urged local farmer and/or labour halls to retain their autonomy by not signing over their wealth to the ULFTA's Winnipeg-based directorate.⁵ In several locations, the ULFTA efforts met with stiff resistance, and bitter struggles for the control of properties ensued. In other places, considerable sympathy for the ULFTA already existed, and the change of affiliation was nothing more than a formality.⁶

Externally, ULFTA members generally followed the party line and increased their influence by "burrowing" into the generally weak UFA locals, often occupying leadership positions.⁷ The ULFTA even started to present itself to the UFA and other bodies as the legitimate representative organization for the interests of Ukrainian-Canadian farmers.⁸ In the realm of electoral politics, the Ukrainian Communists did not run their own candidate in either the 1925 or 1926 elections for strategic reasons. Nor did they attempt to contest any local UFA nominations, mainly because of the lack of a suitable candidate; Dmytro Prystash (a recent convert) had been considered for this rôle, but his services had been required more urgently in Winnipeg. They did support Luchkovich's election bid in 1926 (and in 1930), but only half-heartedly in token recognition of the CPC's tenuous support for the UFA.⁹

The entry of the Communists into the arena of Ukrainian farmer politics ended any lingering hopes of a vibrant Ukrainian association with the UFA. ULFTA members were occupying key positions in whatever UFA locals were left in the bloc district, and using

these as a platform for expounding pro-CP views. Second, the ULFTA's property grab had eroded (to a certain extent) the most likely base for UFA locals in the bloc district — the network established by a string of narodni domy. In other instances, ULFTA halls were built near existing narodni domy, ipso facto challenging the legitimacy of the latter to organize Ukrainian farmers around the traditional populist program of education, economics, and politics.

It is impossible to gauge accurately how much support the ULFTA really had in the Alberta bloc district. In all likelihood, it was probably very small relative to the total Ukrainian population. A letter in Nash postup from Bellis noted that the accounts of local Communists in Farmers'ke zhyttia would make anyone think that every person, cow, chicken, etc. in the Bellis area was a Bolshevik. The truth was that there were seven, of whom only three were actually farmers.¹⁰ The author was probably not far off the mark about their size: the Communists' strength lay not in numbers, but in tight organization, innovation, and incredible dedication to the proverbial cause.

Still, the ULFTA was alienated from the Ukrainian community and it was unlikely that it could ever have become a major party. Catholic and conservative Ukrainians had long viewed the Communists and their socialist predecessors as anathema; more liberal elements viewed them with considerable skepticism. Part of the problem between the Ukrainian community and its Communists was the latter's

avowedly revolutionary posture; but its crux really lay in attitudes towards the Soviet Union. From the Communist point of view, the revolution had succeeded completely. Tsarist Russia had suppressed outright any indications of national identity or proletariat consciousness; in its wake the Soviets had established a Ukrainian workers' state.¹¹ This was markedly different from the situation in Canada where Ukrainian workers were being persecuted. Thus the Ukrainian Communists looked to the Soviet Union for inspiration in their revolutionary struggle over the ocean, and filled the pages of their press with tracts about the building of the workers' "paradise." The majority of Ukrainians in Canada, however, did not share these sympathies. In fact, they viewed the incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1923 as the greatest tragedy of all times. Ukrains'kyi holos even went so far as to present the editorial reacting to this news in heavily-lined black borders, and to note that socialistic views were "unwise" and "unhealthy" for the Ukrainian people.¹²

The truth about the situation in Ukraine probably lies somewhere between these extremes. The incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union has been called "a compromise of history." Despite a valiant effort to establish a fully-independent state, Ukrainian nationalists simply did not have the necessary strength to succeed in their task. At the same time, the new Soviet regime did not have the strength to incorporate Ukraine outright. As a result, a Ukrainian Bolshevik state was formed, which during the 1920s seemed to waver neither in its Ukrainian nor its Communist consciousness.¹³

As long as the situation in Ukraine remained stable, and as long as the Communists kept largely to themselves after their initial foray into the bloc district during the mid-1920s, a "truce" of sorts existed between Ukrainian Communists and the rest of the community. Nevertheless, a certain element of informal social ostracism did exist. Communists were persona non grata, and their sympathizers or regular visitors to their halls risked also being labelled as "Bolsheviks" or "reds."¹⁴

It did not take long for the events of history to upset this delicate equilibrium. Early in 1930, a major show trial of 45 Ukrainian writers and intellectuals was held at an opera house in Kiev. The accused faced trumped-up charges of belonging to an organization aiming to overthrow the Soviet state. In fact, the trial was a major purge, the first dramatic sign that the Ukrainian Bolshevik experiment was being terminated by a new centralist policy under Stalin.¹⁵

Non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians were shocked by the news about the trial. Their worst fears and doubts about the outcome of the Revolution had now been realized. They called upon ULFTA members to abandon their fealty to the Soviet Union:

Once it could be said that Ukrainian Bolsheviks in Canada stood on ideological grounds. People of a narrow Bolshevik outlook could believe sincerely that saintly people who wished only good things for the world ruled in the Bolshevik land. But after more than ten years of their overlordship, even the most stunned Bolshevik should understand that the Bolsheviks are nothing more than the fiercest hangmen. No matter how blind one's faith, he cannot deny the living facts staring him in the eyes and contradicting his beliefs on every count.¹⁶

The Communists, in turn, responded that the trial was justified because the accused were obviously guilty. They even published the transcripts of the hearings in their press.¹⁷ This was too much for non-Communist Ukrainians, who now called for an absolute ostracism of their "comrades."¹⁸

The situation steadily deteriorated during the early 1930s as the sins of the Soviets mounted. Among these were a continued cultural purge, the arrest and execution of prominent Western Ukrainian intellectuals who had gone to the Soviet Union after the Revolution, and finally the engineering of an artificial famine which killed at least three million Ukrainians in 1933.¹⁹ Even loyal Ukrainian Bolsheviks were victims of this early Stalinist terror. The most prominent of them was Mykola Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian SSR's one-time Commissar for Education, who saw that soon his time would come and chose to commit suicide instead.

Because of their staunch defence of the Soviet Union even in the light of such revelations, Ukrainian-Canadian Communists were labelled as paid agents of Moscow. Moreover, the curbing of much of their organizational autonomy by the CPC in 1930 added even more fuel to this already roaring fire.²⁰ Yet, despite much discontent within the ranks over such issues, party discipline and solidarity managed to bury it. It was not until 1935 that any sort of an open break occurred in the ULFTA over these issues, and even then it was limited to a small group of former party loyalists led by Danylo Lobay.²¹

In the midst of these growing tensions, the Comintern announced

that it was abandoning the "burrowing from within" line established in 1924 and replacing it with a new policy of militant class action. This meant that the Ukrainian Canadian Communists, as the party's most dependable lieutenants and foot soldiers, would be moving out of their ULFTA halls and out onto the streets. This would be sure to give them a very high profile in Canadian society at large. Moreover, in light of the recent events in Ukraine and the steadily-deteriorating relationship which had followed among Ukrainians in Canada, it would surely be considered a provocation. It seemed -- and was -- almost certain that tumultuous years lay ahead because of this volatile mixing of forces.

II

The Farmer's Unity League (FUL) was to be the Communists' vehicle for waging a militant class struggle among Canadian farmers. It was to provide a radical alternative to old, outdated, and conservative agrarian organizations such as the UFA. Because the Communists had a connection to the Ukrainian bloc district through the ULFTA (and because the UFA was unlikely to provide resistance), they decided to establish the FUL there first. This could then be used as a base of operations for expanding into other parts of the province.

The necessary preparatory work for the new organization had been very well orchestrated. Towards the end of 1929, Farmers'ke zhyttia was carrying editorials noting the ever-worsening plight of indebted farmers and calling upon them to organize in a fight

for their very existence. However, it advocated no open break with the UFA, only that efforts continue "to change this organization (the UFA) into a militant defender of poor indebted farmers' right to a decent living and a fair return for their work."²² As the economic depression grew, it was linked increasingly to the "world-wide crisis of capitalism." Farmers were told that their discontent, too, was growing. By August, 1930, farmers were being reminded that the CPC was the only defender of their rights and that the hard times were forcing them to organize in self-defence. By the end of September, Farmers'ke zhyttia announced that the CPC was planning to hold a farmers' convention in Saskatoon in a month's time.²³ There the earlier decision to form the FUL was announced. To help start a provincial organizational structure, two Ukrainian organizers were sent out on the speaking circuit urging people to come to a District Convention to be held early in December in Edmonton. There the UFA was finally denounced outright as a "reactionary farmer organization . . . which does not tolerate radical views" and the need for a militant alternative to it was reaffirmed.²⁴

Carl Axelson, a Swedish-born Communist, emerged as the main figure in the provincial FUL. This was hardly surprising. Axelson had been the leading light in the radical Prairie Farmer Educational League (a CPC front for those critical of the existing agrarian organizations' policies) and a constant thorn in the side of the UFA. At the 1930 UFA Annual Convention in Calgary he ran against Henry Wise Wood for the presidency, grated delegates'

nerves with his unrestrained salvos, and managed to be expelled from the gathering (ostensibly on a technicality). Soon afterwards, the UFA Board of Directors passed a resolution noting that Axelson's actions were "inimicable to the aims and objects of the UFA." He was then expelled from the organization.²⁵

Axelson's first major full organizing effort was, appropriately enough, in the Ukrainian bloc district, where the Communist party's greatest strength among the province's farmers lay. He spent over two months, from the end of December to the end of February, travelling with an interpreter and delivering speeches almost daily.

The very formation of the FUL and its organizational drive in the bloc district quickly became a major concern for both Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike. It was not long before they started to voice their opinions. For example, a convention of Ukrainians held in Edmonton in mid-January, 1931, denounced the FUL efforts as an attempt to spread Communist propaganda "under the guise" of a new farmers' organization; this was followed up by a call in the press for Ukrainians to adhere to the traditional agrarian organizations.²⁶ Moreover, meetings to counterbalance those of the FUL were held in a number of Ukrainian communities. One especially important gathering of this type was held in Andrew on January 24, 1931. Premier J.R. Brownlee, the two Ukrainian MLAs, Isidore Goretsky and Peter Miskiw, and the MP Luchkovich addressed an audience of over 600 people. Brownlee made it perfectly clear that the FUL was not in the good graces

of the government:

No good will be accomplished by obeying some who are coming among you asking you to refuse to obey the laws, trying to raise disturbances by introducing untried methods and trying at this time to cause unrest among you. . . . If you want to change the laws, you must have enough people thinking your way. We must remember that we have ten millions in Canada, and we here are but a small part of the great Dominion. There is nothing to be gained by disturbances.²⁷

Goresky, Miskiw, and Luchkovich each followed suit and advised their fellow countrymen to co-operate with the government during these hard times.

The Premier's remarks did not fall on deaf ears. In fact, "official" opinion seems to have underestimated the actual extent of support among Ukrainians for the existing regime.

For example, a meeting of Ukrainian Catholics in Mundare shortly after the Andrew meeting passed the following resolution:

We, the loyal citizens of Canada, of Ukrainian race, assembled to the number of about 700 people at a mass meeting at the Ukrainian Catholic Hall, at Mundare, Alberta, this 8th day of February, 1931, for the purpose of protesting against the propaganda of Bolshevism and Communism among our people in Canada, hereby register our most vigorous protest against the agitation of paid Communist agents and their efforts to undermine our confidence in Canadian democratic institutions, and call to our brethren in Canada to demonstrate their loyalty to this, our adopted land, by similar protests and active support of all our Canadian institutions.

Furthermore, we petition the government of Alberta and the government of the Dominion of Canada, to prohibit the publication in Canada of all the Bolshevistic revolutionary literature and cause the deportation of all those foreigners and to suspend the naturalization of all those citizens of foreign birth who propagate and who follow the radical teachings intended for the destruction of our democratic system of government.²⁸

The only comment made in the local English press about this fairly demonstrative type of gathering was a brief note:

A false impression has been corrected by the citizens when they declared themselves anti-Communists at one of the meetings held here. A prominent man at Edmonton writing to one of our merchants here says: "We are pleased to know that there are some Ukrainian people who support our government."²⁹

Even the Premier seemed more relieved than convinced by the Mundare resolution. He replied to the organizers of the gathering, "I am glad to note the attitude of the people present at the meeting," and added that "I am taking the liberty of forwarding a copy of the resolution to the prime minister of Canada."³⁰

Meanwhile, as Axelson continued his tour, opposition to the FUL efforts increased, although in a more direct and physically violent way. A FUL meeting in Willingdon during the early part of February was disrupted by a barrage of eggs; soon this practice became so common the Farmers'ke zhyttia labelled these eggs as their opponents' most potent (but only) "arguments." This phrase may have given the organizers some moral satisfaction, but it did not prevent meeting after meeting from being thrown into chaos.³¹

Such "ovations" and the fact that Ukrainians were calling upon the government to deport or disfranchise "foreigners" who stepped out of line was a source of wonder and merriment to the English residents in or near the bloc district. The Vegreville Observer noted that at least it "diverted attention" from the

"awful cry of 'Depression'." Nevertheless, underlying such joviality was a very real concern that Ukrainians not step out of line. The staunchly Anglo-Saxon Observer, in a grand display of paternal concern, defended Ukrainians who "as a whole (are) not in any sense Communists." Yet, at the same time it could not but help noting the fact that the FUL was not making any converts except among Ukrainians. Even though these were the "rag-tag and bob-tail" elements of that community, which were "cordially despised" by their law-abiding countrymen, they were still a menace.³² Furthermore, the Observer noted that although Axelson generally "comes suspiciously close to making himself a public nuisance," this was "especially (true) when he ventures into the Ukrainian districts."³³ The obvious implication was that Ukrainians, despite their professed loyalty to Canada and fervent opposition to the Communists, could not handle the situation.

On February 25, 1931 the English demonstrated how they reckoned the Communists should be handled. At a meeting in Vegreville scheduled for 8:00 P.M. in the ULFTA hall, Ivan Klybanovsky and Joe Bolton of Edmonton were to address a largely Ukrainian-speaking audience. The hall filled up completely, and part of the audience spilled out onto the street. The first speaker, Bolton, had only started his address when he was suddenly interrupted with a question from the floor. The chair refused to recognize this interjection, setting off a loud murmur from a certain section of the audience. This signal started a shower of eggs and other objects through the side windows. The lights were immediately

cut and the front door blocked, forcing those inside to remain under fire for an extended period of time. After the hall was finally cleared, a crowd of loyalists assembled outside it and sang "God Save the King", "Rule Britannia", and "O Canada". They then raised the Union Jack and paraded along Main Street in triumph.³⁴

In the wake of this affair, it became obvious that the attack had had some sort of tacit sanction. The very day of the meeting, an editorial in the Observer had warned that "if any Communist demonstration or parade is held in Vegreville . . . (it stands) a good chance of being completely obliterated." The next week an editorial opened somberly with the statement that the paper "cannot help but deprecate the turmoil which took place," but concluded on a lighter note -- as if to agree that the melee was necessary -- that "locally the matter is a theme for laughter" and that "a very pleasant time was had by all."³⁵ Finally, a court case launched by the Communists against two individuals alleged to have willfully damaged property by their participation in the disruption was railroaded in a manner which strongly suggests some form of manipulation. In fact, the presiding magistrate, while passing sentence, concentrated much more upon the demeanour of the trial participants than upon the facts of the case.³⁶ The Communists lost.

With the clash in Vegreville on February 25, the struggle with the Communists took on more overtly racial overtones. In numerous ways, all Ukrainians were now suspect because of an unspoken equation between themselves and radicalism. The English in the area were reported to have started "looking down their

noses" at Ukrainians once more; during the preliminary hearing for the court trial mentioned above, the presiding magistrate noted that the British "are still the bosses here"; and the most common cure suggested for Communist agitators was always a one-way ticket to their Russian paradise.³⁷

It soon became clear that the FUL would have only a minimal influence beyond the Ukrainian districts. In fact, Elmer Roper, the editor of Alberta Labour News, noted early in 1934 that "the average Alberta farmer hasn't even heard of the FUL."³⁸ The CPC again faced a situation where it had unsuccessfully sought to establish mass support, leaving only the foreign-language branches to hold the fort.

In a desperate bid to expand and diversify its membership, the FUL announced late in 1932 that a "Hunger March" on Edmonton would take place on December 21. This demonstration was called such by the organizers to emphasize the fact that participants would be coming in from all parts of the province, many of them on foot, and that by the time they arrived in the capital, they would be "hungry." The organizers expected to draw several thousand worker and farmer demonstrators. They were to gather in a public square and then parade to the Legislative Buildings to present a list of demands in person to the premier. Throughout most of the fall the FUL conducted an energetic campaign to attract people to this event.

A substantial crowd of about 2,000 people did appear in Market Square in Edmonton on December 21 with up to 10,000

onlookers peering from the sides, from windows, and from rooftops. But this was hardly what the FUL had hoped for. First, the numbers were low, largely because of a reluctance by people to support the Communist-initiated venture. Second, a majority of the demonstrators were Ukrainians. Finally, the march itself was unsuccessful. After listening to a number of rousing speeches, the crowd started moving to the Legislature, only to discover that their path had been blocked by a wall of mounted policemen backed by reinforcements on foot. A number of minor scuffles ensued, a few heads were clubbed, and the crowd dispersed without a great deal of violence. Plans were made to try again the next day, but many demonstrators had already set off for home and the organizers were arrested in a police raid that evening.³⁹

The Edmonton Hunger March became fresh grist for the Communists' propaganda mill. "Bennett's Cossacks" were denounced in a broadsheet commemorating the event; a figure of 12,000 demonstrators was claimed in the Communist press; the Communist-led Canadian Labour Defence League rushed to the defence of the arrested organizers; and the event was relived at numerous subsequent meetings attended by those who, for one reason or another, had not been at the march. The busy campaign before and after the Hunger March had an effect. According to the Communists' own figures, FUL membership rose nation-wide from 1,000 to 3,500 within a single year. Moreover, morale was high.⁴⁰ Yet there was no indication that the hoped-for breakthrough to

the general Canadian farming community had occurred. To a great extent, the FUL was still better known by its Ukrainian name, Liga Farmer'skoi Tiednosty.

III

The FUL agitation among Ukrainian farmers and its relative success posed a problem for non-Communist Ukrainian leaders in Alberta: it would be very difficult to counter the work of the FUL with another body. The UFA had failed to integrate itself in the bloc district and the other existing Ukrainian organizations had failed to develop a body of socially-relevant, progressive ideas which could channel the discontent of Ukrainian farmers through less radical channels. The best advice they could offer was to "see it through" and "keep your noses clean." Such standbys, however, could not last forever.

Meanwhile, the extent of Ukrainian participation in the CPC was, in their eyes, absolutely ruinous, both for those involved personally and for the already-blemished reputation of Ukrainians in Canada as a whole. These fears were not entirely groundless. A common CPC tactic during the Depression was to instigate direct and sometimes violent conflicts, then to step in under the guise of the "defender" of the working class and/or poor farmers.⁴¹ Since Ukrainians were among the most stalwart of the CPC's rank and file membership, they often acted as the footsoldiers in these battles. Ukrainian leaders began arguing that the CPC really did not have the interests of their Ukrainian members at heart. It was simply using them as cannon fodder for

the revolutionary struggle. They cited the Estevan strike of 1931 as the most dramatic example of this practice. An Ukraiins'kyi holos editorial after this incident noted that "the Communists led them (the miners) into the line of fire, like a flock of sheep to the slaughter," and then drew attention to the fact that:

Forkin, Sloan, and Scarlett were the names of the agitators who "organized" the miners in Bienfait, but, after blood had been shed in Estevan, they disappeared without a trace of their existence. For their efforts, Nicholas Narvan and Julian Hryshko lay on the street as corpses. Among the wounded, not a single English name appears, for most are Ukrainian ones.⁴²

The second major concern of Ukrainian leaders was the question of the general status of Ukrainians in Canada. They felt that because of a highly-visible involvement by a Ukrainian minority in the CPC, all Ukrainians were now being linked in a rather arbitrary manner with the twin bogey-men of disloyalty and radicalism. As a result, Ukrainians were "getting the black eye again" whereas they had earlier been gaining a "good reputation."⁴³ This was in striking contrast to what many Ukrainian leaders, who were usually the most upwardly-mobile members of their community, had been hoping for (perhaps even expecting).⁴⁴ For years they had been urging their people to adopt Canadian ideals, to learn English, to educate themselves and their children, and to work hard and live soberly -- in other words to become model Canadians -- so that as a group they would be accepted as equals in Canadian society.

The blatant "disloyalty" of the Ukrainian-Canadian Communists, especially at such a tense juncture, seemed to shatter everything which they had been striving for. The Communists knew this and in a perverse way even prided themselves upon the fact that their very existence was "salt" in the "eyes" of many conservative Ukrainian leaders.⁴⁵

In fact, Ukrainians, like all "foreigners", were being linked with radicalism and a host of other ills, including unemployment. What most Ukrainian leaders failed to realize was the fact that this resulted not from the Communist agitation among their people, but from from a growing nativism which required highly-visible scapegoats. The fear inspired by worries about social position also served as a means of social control over Ukrainians as a group, particularly when it was linked with the threat of deportation.⁴⁶

Generally speaking, this form of social control over Ukrainians worked well -- perhaps even too well. The expressions of loyalty to Canada by Ukrainians at this time were overwhelming -- not at all unlike the Mundane resolution urging the government to deport radical "foreigners". Although seemingly contradictory, this phenomenon can be easily understood if one considers that Ukrainians were trying to act more Canadian than Canadians themselves.⁴⁷ Perhaps somewhat more subtle, but ultimately no different in intention, was the reaction of the intelligentsia. They denounced Communism as a Russian disease, the result of a fatal psychological flaw in the Russian character. In contrast to this, the Ukrainian character -- or at least the way it was perceived by the intelligentsia -- was not at all unlike the English character, and consequently fundamentally,

opposed to Communism.

This perceived need by Ukrainians to express their loyalty to Canada and to fight actively against any Communist activity in their midst can be explained only as a reaction to feelings of insecurity and inferiority. As a result, most Ukrainian leaders were incapable of addressing the major social and economic questions of the day. They did not offer any viable alternatives, only hope in the status quo. Under these circumstances, many Ukrainian farmers were caught between "the devil and the deep blue sea": stay with an unsatisfactory state of affairs or side with the Communists.

It was at this point that the lack of a "legitimate" vehicle to handle Ukrainian farmer discontent was most sorely felt. It was hardly fortuitous that Toma Tomashevsky should once more venture into the realm of Ukrainian farmer journalism; with the UFA moribund in the bloc district, he had perceived the need for some sort of concrete action to counter the growing FUL activity.

Late in 1932 the first issue of Farmers'kyi holos (The Farmer's Voice) appeared in Alberta. It was published and edited by the same duo responsible for Nash postup, Ivan Solianych and Tomashevsky. Farmers'kyi holos had an obvious pro-CCF bias. It heralded J.S. Woodsworth as the future prime minister of Canada; it closely monitored the CCF's development; and it defended the fledgling organization from its numerous critics. This dissociation from the UFA government gave the newspaper considerable leeway in viewing events in Alberta, allowing for criticism of the administration for sitting on both sides of the fence, while not disowning it altogether. In fact, Farmers'kyi holos rightfully could be said to be pro-UFA,

willing to admit that the current administration had severe weaknesses, but still willing to stand up for it when it was blamed unjustly for every and any problem.⁴⁹

More significantly, Farmers'kyl bolos represented an honest attempt to provide an outlet for Ukrainian farmer discontent which was not associated with the Communist camp. Tomashevsky himself had considerable misgivings about Communist influence among Ukrainians. These came out in a series of articles and editorials written by him shortly after the Hunger March in Edmonton. In dealing with the demonstration itself, Tomashevsky noted that although the majority of the participants were Ukrainian farmers, many were not especially sympathetic to the Communist cause: they simply desired an opportunity to express their grievances. Meanwhile, the Communists' agitation was not at all healthy. Eventually, it could lead to a full suspension of Ukrainians' citizenship rights and their deportation in substantial numbers.⁵⁰ Likewise, a second editorial bemoaned the uncivilized manner in which the Communists conducted themselves, particularly their unrestrained grandstanding at meetings of any sort. He added that this could still be tolerated if it were limited to all-Ukrainian meetings, but the Communists "cannot control themselves even when we have invited guests of other nationalities to be among us." Their inability to distinguish between argumentation and criticism under these latter circumstances "gave a bad name not only to themselves, but also to the people from which they came." It also achieved absolutely nothing.⁵¹

To a degree Tomashevsky's criticisms reiterated the most developed line of the Ukrainian intelligentsia: that the CPC did not care

about its Ukrainian members and that Ukrainian involvement in its ranks was dangerous and foolish. However, a very important difference existed in the basis of this critique. Tomashevsky was not concerned just with the social position of Ukrainians in Canadian society, but also with the Communists' negative effect upon the broader labour and farmer movements. After the Hunger March he made his views very explicit in a long essay dealing with "The Labour Movement and Bolshevism."⁵² Here he examined the gradual development of an indigenous labour movement in Canada and the Bolshevik's later efforts to impose their own brand of socialism upon it without regard for its unique characteristics and traditions. He concluded that the Communists were doing little more than smashing the unity of the movement. This had become particularly obvious since the Comintern had abandoned its policy of "burrowing from within" for militant class action. As evidence, Tomashevsky noted that during the 1930 federal elections the Communists had fielded candidates only in ridings where there already was a labour or farmer candidate. Consequently they split the "progressive" vote to the benefit of the traditional political parties. Moreover, their foray into electoral politics was difficult to justify in the first place, given their self-proclaimed disbelief in the parliamentary system. In effect, concluded Tomashevsky, the Communists were far more interested in establishing their hegemony over the workers' and farmers' movements than they were in actually helping workers or farmers.

Another important difference between Tomashevsky and the other Ukrainian intellectuals was his willingness to take up the challenge of channelling Ukrainians' discontent into what he considered to be

constructive avenues. He had no qualms whatsoever about the right of Ukrainians, "who are mainly labourers and farmers," to criticize the existing order. Rather than a policy of inaction, Tomashevsky suggested that Ukrainians once more consider organizing to defend their vital interests.⁵³ In April 1933, he called for a convention of Ukrainian farmers similar to the one which had been held a decade earlier. Circumstances, however, dictated that a different strategy be used. Because of the devastating poverty caused by the Depression, many Ukrainian farmers were not in a position to travel to such a gathering. Consequently, Tomashevsky suggested that farmers start by forming local chapters of an Organizatsiia Ukrainins'kykh Farmeriv or Ukrainian Farmers' Organization. At a future date he would then be willing to visit as a lecturer in order to speak to them about labour-farmer problems and to aid local organizing efforts.⁵⁴

The question of whether such an organization as the one proposed would be completely independent, pro-CCF, a UFA affiliate (i.e., an autonomous section), or simply UFA played a minor role in the discussions about organizing. All four approaches were suggested at one time or another in Farmers'kyl holos, but this issue remained at the speculative phase because of more pressing concerns.⁵⁵ It was generally agreed, though, that the UFA had largely been a failure in the bloc district. This gave little incentive for people to make the effort to revive it, especially in view of the open antagonism of the FUL. What form of organization was needed was never spelt out in uncertain terms. Tomashevsky seemed more interested in the idea that Ukrainian farmers establish local bodies as alternatives to the FUL for their occupational representation.⁵⁶

It is impossible to judge the success of Tomashevsky's efforts, although it is certain that they had an impact. Throughout 1933 there was a definite movement by Ukrainian farmers to re-establish defunct UFA locals or to revive tenuous ones, as well as to form their own non-aligned farm organizations outside the FUL.⁵⁷ However, these efforts were plagued with problems. Only a minority of Ukrainians were active in farm organizations; existing Ukrainian community organizations were usually indifferent to such efforts because of their own pre-occupations (or even antagonistic if they saw any "red" element in the move to organize); and local Communists did their share to disrupt attempts to organize alternates to the FUL.⁵⁸

In any case, Tomashevsky's efforts did have one effect: they opened up an avenue to voice discontent which had either been blocked or closed completely. Doubtlessly, a good portion of the support which might have gone to the FUL was siphoned off. Nevertheless, Tomashevsky's was but "a voice in the wilderness." His ideas never saw fruition and he remained "a general without an army."⁵⁹ He did manage, however, to provide some form of an alternative for Ukrainian-Canadian farmers at a time when there seemed to be no choice at all. This in itself was a notable achievement.

IV

Because of the large number of divergent political forces at work, the political situation in the Alberta bloc district during 1933 and 1934 sometimes approached absolute bedlam. Meetings and counter-meetings were held frequently, and they were usually well-attended. It was not uncommon for rival groups to attempt "interventions" at

these, often turning them into extremely lively gatherings. As a rule of thumb, one could divide these forces into two camps: the Communists and their opponents. The latter were hardly a homogeneous unit. Among them was a farmer group, attempting to battle the Communists over the same issues they had raised; an Orthodox group, which included the bulk of the intelligentsia, particularly the school teachers whom the Communists found particularly reprehensible; and the Catholics, very conservative, loyal to Canada, and perhaps the bulwark of opposition to the Communists.⁶⁰ The fact that both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics had finally organized lay bodies also tended to strengthen the depth of ingrained opposition to the Communists. Moreover, the worsening situation in Ukraine provided the most compelling evidence of the "need" to combat Bolshevism in Canada. Many meetings which were held to protest the fruits of Stalinism in the Soviet Union also passed resolutions condemning the local "comrades".⁶¹

The situation might be best described as a stalemate. Despite the opposition to them, the Communists still retained a solid core group and a large number of sympathizers. Moreover, the state of affairs which had propelled them into their campaign of militant class action -- rural impoverishment and increasing bankruptcy -- had gotten worse, not better. FUL meetings continued to be held fairly regularly and with a good degree of success. Campaigns to send protest petitions for a host of causes, to stop sheriff sales, to organize the masses, and to support the Communist press were all waged at a fervent pitch. On the other hand, the sheer bulk of opposition to the Communists assured that they would never be more than a minority force. Moreover,

the Communists faced a rather ironic problem in the Ukrainian districts: how could they organize the majority of the farmers, even if they were oppressed, when they felt that their lot was still a vast improvement over what it had been in the Old Country?⁶²

In practical terms this alignment of forces had two effects. The first was that the Communists could act as spoilers in campaigns which they felt worked against their interests or impinged upon territory which they had claimed as their own. The attempt to introduce the CCF into the Ukrainian bloc district is a very good example of this. Second, the Communists could play an instrumental role in cultivating and channelling existing dissent. This has been illustrated already by the Hunger March of 1932, but can be best seen in the Myrnam farmers' strike of 1933-1934.

During the latter half of November 1933, the farmers around Myrnam noticed that their grain was being graded much lower than it had been previously. All evidence pointed to collusion between the five elevators in the area, because the quality of the grain had not changed overnight. Consequently a meeting of local farmers was held on December 4. The 150 farmers who attended decided to withhold all further grain deliveries to the elevators until they had been inspected thoroughly. If irregular grading practices were revealed, the farmers then wanted the elevator operators dismissed.⁶³ A protest message to this effect was sent to the Board of Grain Commissioners. The Board responded rather tactlessly by saying that it was too awkward to send an inspector to Myrnam, and that in all likelihood, the farmers probably did not know what they were talking about.⁶⁴ The Myrnam farmers responded with a second meeting attended

by over 200 people. Here the farmers reaffirmed their willingness to continue withholding grain until their demands were met. This moved the Board to send out a district representative to examine the situation, although he was not invested with any power to act. It almost appeared that he had been sent to dissuade the farmers from continuing their strike.

By this time the strike had been gaining momentum. A third meeting on December 18 was attended by 250 farmers. More importantly, the strike action had succeeded in actually uniting farmers of various political and religious affiliations, even though the local Communists had been the key instigators behind it.⁶⁵ Meetings were being held alternatively at the ULFTA hall and the narodnyi dim, and vocal opposition to the strike was almost non-existent. A fourth meeting on January 4, 1934, produced a decision to start open picketing and to try to spread the strike to surrounding communities.⁶⁶ This decision prompted the Alberta government to step into the matter. Premier Brownlee wrote to the Board of Grain Commissioners recommending that it resolve the affair before the situation got out of hand.⁶⁷ As a result, the Board finally sent a responsible inspector and his assistant, although they did not negotiate with the strike committee. Meanwhile, the farmers continued their campaign. A number of surrounding communities went out on sympathy strikes, while others sent petitions of support. As well, a delegation from Myrnam went to the UFA convention in Edmonton and presented the facts of the case. It received a favourable hearing and the convention's support.⁶⁸ Further mass meetings were held in order to keep the strikers' spirits high.

The strike came to a head at the seventh meeting held by the strikers on February 15. The district agronomist for the Department of Agriculture, John Charnetski, had arranged a meeting between the Board's representatives and the strike committee for that date. The Myrnam group understood this to be an open meeting and informed the public about it. Over 400 farmers -- including representatives from other towns out on sympathy strikes -- showed up to hear the Board's proposals. A scene was unavoidable. The farmers were asked to leave the hall. For two hours the Board representatives negotiated with the strike committee behind closed doors. They offered a number of compromises if the farmers would start delivery to two of the elevators, but the strike committee rejected these, stating that this would be tantamount to capitulation without having had its basic demands met. The negotiations broke off and the farmers were called back into the hall, where the strike committee informed them of the substance of the talks which had just transpired.⁶⁹ Less than ten days later, the Board gave in to the strikers' demands, confirmed their charges of unfair grading practices, and removed the delinquent operators. The Myrnam farmers were pleased, but sobered by the realization that even success had not improved their condition considerably.⁷⁰

The Communists had a field day using the strike for propaganda purposes. They called for a "united front" of farmers to fight their "common enemy". The Myrnam strike was cited as demonstrative proof of farmer power. The entire history of the strike was serialized in the Ukrainian Communist press, and later published as a booklet.⁷¹ Moreover, the success of the strike lifted Communist morale considerably, reflected by the success of May Day celebrations that year in Myrnam,

Spedden, and Smoky Lake.⁷²

The Myrnam strike had been a winner which the Communists sorely needed. Nevertheless, the FUL was still plagued with organizational problems which made another victory of the same sort necessary to keep momentum going.⁷³ The Communists turned once more to the idea of a farmers' strike.

The first sign that this sort of action was being contemplated came in early September 1934 when the District Bureau of the FUL sent out a notice that "Alberta Farmers May Go Out on a General Strike."⁷⁴ This circular noted that this would be the fifth year in a row of unbearable conditions for farmers, a situation which desperately needed to be changed. The strike became a reality early in November when farmers in the Mundare area complained of unfair grading practices and threw up a picket line. Their timing was more than coincidental, for the Board of Grain Commissioners was in the Vegreville area at that time conducting hearings about that very matter.

Before the strike could gather any momentum, the RCMP intervened. On the second day of the strike, the Mounted Police broke up a picket line and arrested 15 people, among them the main instigators. This effectively nipped the entire affair in the bud.⁷⁵ The FUL called for a general strike of all farmers in the area, alluding constantly to the solidarity of the Myrnam effort. However, it received only lukewarm support. The strike idea faced considerable resistance: strike committees were denied access to halls; counter-meetings were held; a Communist speaker on the circuit was tarred and feathered; the Communists' intentions were "revealed" in non-Communist Ukrainian newspapers; farmers themselves were reluctant to risk setting up

picket lines; and strike-related meetings were not particularly well-attended.⁷⁶ As a result, whatever support existed for the strike was spent within a month.⁷⁷ The Communists turned their agitation away from the strike itself in order to concentrate upon a defence campaign for the arrested picketers. They rationalized this move by claiming that the strike had been successful in raising the grade of wheat throughout Canada.⁷⁸

Actually, the Mundare strike had been an absolute failure. The immediate intervention of the authorities had been one of the reasons for this. However, the Mundare strike had none of the solidarity of the Myrnam strike upon which it had obviously been modelled. The Myrnam strike had been a spontaneous affair into which the Communists had been able to insinuate themselves successfully. The Mundare effort was largely a contrived attempt by the FUL to orchestrate a confrontation. It had absolutely no base of support, although it may have had a certain sympathy from surrounding farmers.

The strike at Mundare was the last major action undertaken by the FUL in their Alberta stronghold. War clouds loomed over Europe, and the Comintern had decided that a "united front" against fascism was now more important than militant class action. Accordingly, the FUL was dissolved at the 1936 convention of the CPC.

V

It cannot be said with certainty how "successful" the Communist agitation in the bloc district during the Depression had been. However, results from both the federal and provincial elections in 1935 clearly show that the Communists had been strong enough to swing at least two

contests. Isidore Goresky, in his bid for re-election in Whitford (now under the UFA-CCF banner), was outpolled by the CP candidate, Mike Novakowsky, by a margin of 966 to 940. The winner in the race was a Social Credit candidate, Wasyl Tomyń, who pulled in 1,265 votes. Michael Luchkovich lost his bid for re-election in the Vegreville federal riding to another Social Credit candidate, W. Haywurſt, by a 500 vote margin, 4,124 to 3,628. Matthew Popovich, the CP candidate, polled 2,001 votes, considerably more than the deciding margin.⁸⁰ In other ridings the Communists may also have influenced the outcome of contests, for it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of their supporters voted Social Credit in ridings where no CP candidates ran.⁸¹

With the 1935 elections and the disbanding of the FUL, a chapter in history closed. Although the Social Credit in Alberta did attempt to organize among Ukrainians and even published a Ukrainian-language newspaper, it did not claim to represent their interests as farmers per se. Moreover, a demographic change was taking place as the older, immigrant generation started to fade away, and a Canadian-born generation of Ukrainians -- usually fluent in English -- rose to prominence. As a result, the isolation caused by the language barrier started to diminish. Finally, the complete rout of the UFA as an electoral force signalled the long-coming end to the agrarian political movement per se, and left the question of farmer political organization as an issue of secondary importance in society at large.

Notes to Chapter Five

¹Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), p. 36.

²The most extensive examination of the relationship between the ULFTA (later known as the AUUC) and the CPC is John Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1979). This study, however, concentrates mainly on the 1940s and 1950s.

³Farmers'ke zhyttia, 22 April, 13 May, 7 October 1925; 13 January 1926; and Nickolas Buk and Stephen Urchak, The History of Two Hills (n.p., 1980?), pp. 47-48.

⁴Compare the list of stops for speaker-organizers in Farmers'ke zhyttia, 1 April 1925 and 13 November 1929.

⁵Nash Postup, 11 April, 20 May 1925.

⁶Ibid, 24 February, 20 May 1926; ; and Ukraiins'kyi holos, 24 June 1925, 15 December 1926, 26 January, 20 July 1927.

⁷Farmers'ke zhyttia, 11 November 1925; Nash postup, 26 January 1927; and Farmers'kyi holos, 10 January 1933.

⁸After 1925 there is a fairly steady stream of requests and resolutions for more Ukrainian literature from the UFA. In most cases, these can be traced to the Communists. These requests are supplemented with suggestions that some accord be made with the publishers of Farmers'ke zhyttia for ongoing input and financial Assistance. See UFA, Official Minutes of the Executive and Board, March 24, 1928; UFA, Official Minutes of the Eighteenth Annual Convention (1926), pp. 15-16; and Official Minutes of the Nineteenth Annual Convention (1927), p. 67.

⁹Farmers'ke zhyttia, 14 October 1925, 8 September 1926. The Communists felt that Luchkovich's campaign was being run by pany (literally, "lords," but in this case referring to the teachers working for him), and consequently gave it only a nominal endorsement at the very last possible moment.

¹⁰Nash postup, 12 July, 1925.

¹¹Charles Young, The Ukrainian Canadians (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1931), pp. 146-147.

- ¹² Ukraiins'kyi holos, 17 January 1923.
- ¹³ Ivan L. Rydnytsky, "The Soviet Ukraine in Historical Perspective," Canadian Slavonic Papers 14 (1972): 235-249.
- ¹⁴ Myrna Kostash, All of Baba's Children (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1977), p. 239.
- ¹⁵ Rydnytsky, "Soviet Ukraine," pp. 241-242.
- ¹⁶ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 19 March 1930.
- ¹⁷ Farmers'ke zhyttia, 26 March 1930.
- ¹⁸ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 2 April 1930.
- ¹⁹ Rudnytsky, "Soviet Ukraine," pp. 241-242.
- ²⁰ For a treatment of the tightening of party control over the ULFTA, see William Rodney, Soldiers of the International (Toronto: University Press, 1968), pp. 147-158. The Archives of Ontario has a fascinating and very revealing series of documents in its Communist Party of Canada papers (MS 367) which were seized by the Attorney General in preparation for the 1931 Rex vs Tim Buck et al trial. These include: "The Right Danger in the Ukrainian Mass Organizations of Canada," "Resolution on the Work of the Communist Party of Canada in the Ukrainian Mass Organizations," and "Statement of the Political committee on the Results of the Meeting of the Party Fraction of the ULFTA on Feb 13th, 1930" (9 C 1294-1306).
- ²¹ Lobay recalls these events in "Kommunistychnyi rukh sered Ukraiintsiv Kanady," pp. 749-763 in D. Doroshenko, ed., Propamiatna knyha Ukraiins'koho Narodnoho Domu v Vinnypegu, (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1949).
- ²² Farmers'ke zhyttia, 16 September, 2 October, 13 November, 11 December 1929, 12 March 1930.
- ²³ Ibid, 24 September 1930.
- ²⁴ Ibid, 17 December 1930.
- ²⁵ For further biographical details about Axelson, see Ivan Avakumovic, "The Communist Party of Canada and the Prairie Farmer: The Interwar Years," Western Perspectives (1973), pp. 78-87.

- ²⁶ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 21, 18 January 1931.
- ²⁷ Vegreville Observer, 28 January 1931.
- ²⁸ Ibid, 11 February 1931.
- ²⁹ Ibid, 11 February 1931.
- ³⁰ P.A.A., Brownlee Papers, file 162, Brownlee to G. Franko, March 3, 1931.
- ³¹ Farmers'ke zhyttia 4 March 1931; and Vegreville Observer, 11 February 1931.
- ³² Vegreville Observer, 25 February 1931.
- ³³ Ibid, 4 February 1931.
- ³⁴ Ibid, 4 March 1931; Ukraiins'kyi holos, 11 March 1931; and Farmers'ke zhyttia, 29 April 1931.
- ³⁵ Vegreville Observer, 25 February, 4 March 1931.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 6 May 1931; and Farmers'ke zhyttia, 27 May 1931.
- ³⁷ Ukraiins'kyi holos, 11 March 1931; and Vegreville Observer, 15 April 1931.
- ³⁸ Canadian Forum, February 1934.
- ³⁹ Farmers'kyi holos, 25 December 1932; and Farmers'ke zhyttia, 28 December 1932. Additional accounts of this event can be found in Kostash, Baba's Children, pp. 241-244; Vasyl' Havrysh, Moia Kanada i ia (Edmonton: by the author, 1974), pp. 118-120; Anna Woywitka, "Recollections of a Union Man," Alberta History (Autumn 1975), pp. 19-20; and Andrij Makuch, "The 'Kryza' in Alberta" (Undergraduate thesis, University of Alberta, 1978), pp. 51-53.
- ⁴⁰ The Furrow, March-April, 1933.
- ⁴¹ J. Petryshyn, "A.E. Smith and the Canadian Labour Defence League" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1977), p.162.
- ⁴² Ukraiins'kyi holos, 7 October 1931.

- 43 Ibid, 29 July 1931.
- 44 Ibid, 30 July 1930 states outright that "Ukrainians in Canada...stand a little lower than they rightfully belong."
- 45 Farmers'ke zhyttia, 29 July 1925, and Ukraiins'kyi holos, 4 November 1931.
- 46 Canadian Forum, May 1931 and January 1932.
- 47 Oversubscription to the norms of the host society is a common feature among immigrant groups, especially the second generation which has already been born in the new place of residence.
- 48 Ukraiins'kyi holos, 23 September, 8 October to 5 November 1930.
- 49 Farmers'kyi holos, 10 February 1933.
- 50 Ibid, 25 December 1932.
- 51 Ibid, 25 December 1932.
- 52 Ibid, 10 February 1933.
- 53 Ibid, 10 April 1933.
- 54 Ibid, 25 April 1933.
- 55 Ibid, 25 March, 10, 25 April 1933.
- 56 Ibid, 11 April 1934.
- 57 Ibid, 10, 25 May, 25 July 1933, 5 January 1934; and Vegreville Observer, 11 January 1933.
- 58 Vegreville Observer 15 March 1933, 10 January 1934; and Farmers'ke zhyttia, 29 March 1933.
- 59 Farmers'kyi holos, 11 April 1934; and personal interview with Isidore Goresky, July, 1981.
- 60 Myroslav Irchan, a noted Ukrainian-Canadian Communist playwright, acknowledged openly that "the mass of the politically unenlightened and culturally backward (Ukrainian) farmers and

workers are under the influence of the Catholics." See O. Martynowych, "Ukrainian Catholic Clericalism in Western Canada, 1900-1932 (unpublished paper: University of Manitoba, 1974), p. 1.

⁶¹Vegreville Observer, 4 October, 15 November 1933.

⁶²J.M. Clarke, "Memo on the Agricultural Proletariat," p. 199 in Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism, ed. Howard Palmer (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1975) notes that "to many of them their position as agricultural labourers...is an immense improvement on the conditions they left behind them in Europe, and they feel no urge to struggle for more..."

⁶³Farmers'ke zhyttia, 20 December 1933.

⁶⁴Ibid, 20 December 1933.

⁶⁵Ibid, 27 December, 1933.

⁶⁶Ibid, 10 January 1934.

⁶⁷P.A.A., Brownlee Papers, Brownlee to Ramsay, January 10, 1934.

⁶⁸UFA, Official Minutes of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention (1934), pp. 61 and 106; Farmers'ke zhyttia, 31 January 1934; and Farmers'kyi holos, 25 January 1934.

⁶⁹Farmers'ke zhyttia, 21 February 1934.

⁷⁰Mykola Davidiuk, "Spohady Pionera" (typewritten, n.d.), p. 51.

⁷¹Farmers'ke zhyttia, 27 June 1934.

⁷²Ibid, 16 May 1934.

⁷³Ibid, 8 August 1934 deals in general terms with the state of the movement.

⁷⁴Ibid, 12 September 1934.

⁷⁵Ibid, 14 November 1934.

⁷⁶Ibid, 14 November 1934, 2 February 1935.

- ⁷⁷ Vegreville Observer, 12 December 1934.
- ⁷⁸ Farmers'ke zhyttia, 26 December 1934, 2 February 1935.
- ⁷⁹ Avakumovic, "C.P.C. and Prairie Farmer," p. 80.
- ⁸⁰ Darcovich and Yuzyk, Statistical Compendium, p. 362.
- ⁸¹ Helen Potrebenko, No Streets of Gold (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977), p.224; and personal interview with Matt Hnydyk, January, 1978.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

This account of political development among Ukrainians in Alberta during the early twentieth century can be read and interpreted in several ways. Primarily, it is a history of the failure of both Old and New World populist movements to establish deep roots among Ukrainian settlers in Alberta. But it is also an account of the encounters between Ukrainian rural communities in the bloc settlement area and a hostile, assimilationist Alberta society. The interaction between these two themes is reflected in the central focus of this study: the inability of Ukrainians to overcome the hurdles which they faced in the New World to the adaptation of the populist political legacy of Galicia. Ukrainians were unable to transfer their populist institutions to the New World in such a way as to make them a vibrant part of the fabric of their daily lives as they had been in Galicia. At the same time, they had not been able to adapt their concept of populism to the new political current of populism which was developing among North American farmers. Consequently, when they were most in need of a means of expressing themselves politically during the Depression, they found it difficult to find a political party in Alberta which was prepared to deal with their specific concerns. As a result, the Communist Party -- on the fringe of the political spectrum -- became the most attractive focus of their discontent. To use something of an analogy, they had forgotten how to speak Ukrainian and had not yet learned how to speak English; in a time of crisis, they had no way of expressing themselves.

The fact that Ukrainians had been unable to re-establish a populist tradition in Alberta along either Old or New World lines can be attributed directly to two factors that have been mentioned as sub-themes of this thesis: the hostility of the host (English-Canadian) society to specifically Ukrainian concerns and severe internal organizational problems among Ukrainians in Canada. The entire question of the hostility of English-Canadian society to Ukrainians must be understood in context. On the whole, English Canadians were not anti-Ukrainian in the personal sense that one might dislike a person of a particular race -- such as a Semite -- simply because of their background. They were, however, adamant about the fact that Ukrainians must adapt to "Canadian" norms, even if this meant that Ukrainians would have to discard their language, their culture, and their worldview. In Canadian terms, this amounted to "assimilation"; for many Ukrainians, however, this was vynarodovlennia or "de-nationalization". In either case, it is obvious that this was not a two-way process, for the expectation of change was clearly aimed at Ukrainians and not at Canadian society at large. The pro-assimilationist bent of most English Canadians was not necessarily malicious in intent. It can be viewed more as an unquestioned cultural assumption, or in some cases, as a genuine belief that Ukrainian immigrants would benefit positively by divesting themselves of their Old World ways and adapting to English-Canadian norms.

The implications of this hostility towards Ukrainian concerns can be seen throughout the course of events covered in this thesis. The Liberal Party's rejection of Ukrainian demands for bilingual education and proportional political representation is perhaps the

most blatant example of this. The most telling aspect of this attempt by Ukrainians was the fact that they were willing to adapt themselves to Canadian conditions. They were willing to work through a party system of politics which cut across ethnic lines even though in the Old Country they were used to distinctly ethnic political groupings (which might work in concert). More importantly, they were willing -- even eager -- for their children to learn how to speak English, although they also wished that they retain a knowledge of Ukrainian at the same time. In both instances, it was Canadian society which proved inflexible, responding with a clear rejection of Ukrainian aspirations for legislative representation and bilingual education. Shandro was accepted by the Liberal Party only because he was the least threatening token Ukrainian representative available at the time; Svarich actually would have been a more representative and logical candidate, but his record proved that he was too strongly pro-Ukrainian to be acceptable to the Liberals in Alberta. On the school question, no consideration was given to the fact that Ukrainian children were learning the English language, and that Ukrainian ratepayers who were funding schools in their respective areas should have been able to determine the type of education they desired for their children as long as it met basic pedagogical criteria. The issue was instead decided arbitrarily by the existing powers in the province.

In terms of the UFA's attitude towards Ukrainians, this hostility was not overt, but it existed as a fundamental inability to perceive Ukrainian farmers as a distinct group in the province which might desire -- and deserve -- a special status within the

organization's structure and work. In other words, Ukrainian participation in the UFA was far more dependent upon the ability of Ukrainians to adapt themselves to an organization which they perceived to be foreign to their ethnic interests rather than upon any active and sympathetic attempts by the UFA to involve Ukrainian farmers in the organization. If the UFA genuinely desired to represent all the farmers in Alberta, it logically would have been the body which would have proposed structuring the organization to allow for a "Ukrainian Section". Failing this, it could have cultivated the Ukrainian support for the organization in a more active manner, be it by nominating a Ukrainian representative to the Board of Directors (Tomashevsky was elected to the Board as the first Ukrainian representative only in 1935) or by following up on or even participating in the attempt to develop a Ukrainian Section in 1923-1924. Failing even this, it could have at least reconsidered its strongly assimilationist stance, but even this was hardly likely to happen. Consequently, although it seems almost self-evident that Ukrainians should have been actively involved in the agrarian movement in Alberta because of their populist heritage and the fact that they were subject to the same general economic and political circumstances as all Canadian farmers, their participation remained minimal.

In the face of these general forces, Ukrainians had a formidable task if they wished to organize themselves to overcome them. However, Ukrainians faced several fundamental organizational problems. First was the fact that Ukrainian-Canadian society had become factionalized to an extreme degree. Svarich's attempt to establish a National Council as a representative body of Ukrainian interests illustrates

this fact quite well. Within a month of its formation, it had been victimized by Russophile opponents and a lack of support from a large segment of the Ukrainian community. Subsequent events such as the Ukrainian Revolution and the formation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada simply tended to make these existing divisions even stronger. To add to this sense of divisiveness was the fact that the common bonds that might have provided a certain cohesion to villages in the Old Country had been disrupted by the fact of emigration, so that in Canada "unity" of any kind among Ukrainians was never obtained (perhaps to a degree in local areas under pioneering conditions, but certainly never in the organizational sense of the word).

A second major weakness in terms of organizing Ukrainian Canadians is found in the Ukrainian-Canadian leadership. Despite laudable efforts and often phenomenal personal integrity, Ukrainian-Canadian leaders usually were not the most capable of individuals. To compound their problems, they faced an overwhelming task with few financial or human resources to back them. Regarding the two central figures in this study, Svarich and Tomashevsky, one should keep in mind that neither had come to the New World with any practical political or organizational experience, yet both soon rose to positions of prominence within the Ukrainian-Canadian community. In fact, Ukrainian leaders in Galicia and Bukovina who had practical experience with the Ukrainian movement were generally reluctant to emigrate simply because of the strong commitment they had already made to the struggle there; they felt they would be "abandoning the cause" if they left for the New World. Specifically, one should note

that Svarich personally may have been overly ambitious in his plans and too confident of his own abilities. In 1909, when he proposed a three-pronged approach towards Ukrainian community development in Alberta, he was still in his early thirties. He had not yet established the strong bonds in the Ukrainian community and with the Liberal Party which would allow him to come out so forthrightly with such a plan, and to pursue it with as much vigour as he did. Consequently, things fell apart and Svarich was personally discredited, much to the detriment of his future work within the Ukrainian community. Tomashevsky, on the other hand, faced a different problem: he lived such a hand-to-mouth existence (largely because of the extent to which he subsidized his own publishing ventures) and was so tied up with his publishing work per se that he had neither the time nor the financial stability to be able to undertake any major organizing effort among Ukrainians. Yet Svarich and Tomashevsky were two of the more capable individuals to emerge among Ukrainian Canadians as leaders. Other local leaders had considerably less ability than these two men, and often were not wholly reliable in terms of their consistency of action. Consequently, one initiative after another in the Ukrainian community floundered because of a lack of sustained effort to see them through to fruition.

The fact that Ukrainians attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to implement a program of social development along Old World populist lines and to accommodate themselves to a New World brand of populism is in itself significant. The very fact that they were not successful may explain why these efforts have been overlooked in the past. Yet their very existence raises certain questions about

our understanding of Canadian history and Canadian society.

First and foremost, we must recognize that Ukrainians came to Canada with distinctive political and intellectual traditions, and that they used these as a guide to the sort of society they wished to develop in the New World. Consequently, their perceptions of North America and their political aspirations were not always the same as those of Canadian society at large. In many cases, they were quite different.

This leads to a second point. Because Ukrainians had specific concerns of their own, particularly the desire for bilingual education and Ukrainian political representation, they came into conflict with their host society. However, they hardly stood a chance of realizing their goals. In this respect, the quality of the freedom they found in the New World might be brought into question. Even though Ukrainians were not victims of overt oppression as they had been in the Old Country, they were still not "free" to choose their own destiny in Canada because they were constrained by the power structure of their host society. Accordingly, they remained second-class citizens in Canada until they were able to develop a certain degree of political and economic clout of their own.

Considerations of this nature suggest that historians should examine further the implications of the exclusion of Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities from the mainstream of Alberta politics. The hostile reaction of political parties to the initial involvement of Ukrainians in politics reveals how negatively they viewed the notion that Ukrainians should have a significant voice in the distribution of power and opportunity in the province. That this attitude was

also extended towards the aspirations of other minorities in the province indicates a certain deliberateness on the part of the Anglo-Celtic ruling elite to make Alberta an "English" province. This has had a very significant impact on the evolution of Alberta society. Further studies of the relationship of ethnicity to politics in Alberta are needed. Ethnicity has been a factor in the province's political history, yet its full significance has not yet been assessed nor appreciated.

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