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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

KANT'S *Second Analogy*

by

ALICE LINDA LAHEY



A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled, *Kant's Second Analogy*, submitted by Alice Linda Lahey in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to present and examine Kant's argument for the synthetic *a priori* status of the Principle of Causality. Hume had argued that the Principle of Causality was an inductive generalization based upon the empirical observation of events. It is Kant's position that the observation of events is itself impossible without our being in prior possession of the Principle of Causality.

By way of introduction the thesis begins with Hume's position on the nature of causality. The main text of the thesis is concerned with Kant's argument for the synthetic *a priori* status of the causal principle. Kant's argument, however, is not to be found solely in The Second Analogy. The argument begins in the Transcendental Aesthetic with a discussion on the nature of time. Furthermore, The Second Analogy can only be fully understood if it is seen in relation to the Analytic as a whole. Of special importance to The Second Analogy is the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, in order to fully present Kant's argument this thesis will include discussions dealing with time together with arguments throughout the Analytic which have an important bearing on The Second Analogy.

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I

INTRODUCTION

It might be profitable, by way of introduction, to discuss the philosopher who first interrupted Kant's "... dogmatic slumber...."¹ The philosopher which Kant refers to is, of course, David Hume. Although there is much in Hume's writing which might be discussed with particular reference to Kant the discussion will be restricted to Hume's treatment of the Principle of Causality and of the nature of causality itself.

Hume's general empiricist position is evident in the following quotation:

... there is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it; and, that even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience....²

Hume divides all "philosophical relations"³ or

¹Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, trans. by Peter G. Lucas (Manchester: University Press, 1971), p. 9.

²David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Biggs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 139.

³Ibid., p. 69.

"objects of human reason or inquiry"⁴ into two basic categories "Relations of Ideas" and "Matters of Fact."⁵ It is to the latter category which the Principle of Causality (every effect must have a cause) belongs. Generally, Relations of Ideas express propositions which cannot be denied without contradiction, e.g. a bachelor is an unmarried man. Matters of Fact, on the other hand, are based on experience and may be denied without contradiction, e.g. the sun rises every morning.

In the *Treatise* Hume argues that the Principle of Causality, which he states as "... *Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence*"⁶, is incapable of being demonstrated. He writes that the "... proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain."⁷ And since the proposition, when denied, does not yield a contradiction it is therefore "... utterly incapable of a demonstrative proof."⁸

... as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct,

⁴David Hume, "Sceptical Doubts About Inductive Inference," in The Problems of Philosophy ed. by William P. Alston and Richard B. Brandt (Boston: Albyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 551.

⁵Ibid., p. 551.

⁶David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 79.

⁷Ibid., p. 79.

⁸Ibid., p. 79.

'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which 'tis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause.⁹

Furthermore, one cannot demonstrate the necessity of the Principle of Causality by arguing, that since the idea of an effect implies the idea of a cause the proposition "every effect must have a cause" must be true. This no more follows, Hume states, "... than it follows because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be marry'd."¹⁰

However, Hume must now deal with the problem of explaining our belief in the truth of the Principle of Causality. In the *Treatise* Hume argues that the idea of causation is built up through a "relation among objects..."¹¹ This relation is two-fold. Firstly, we observe that two objects are contiguous in space and time and secondly, that one object, the cause, is prior to the second, the effect. These two relations Hume terms "... contiguity and

⁹ Ibid., pp. 79-80.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 82.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 75.

4
succession ...¹²

In the case of sequences termed causal, we discover that two ideas, e.g. fire and heat, are constantly conjoined and related by contiguity and succession. Thus these two ideas become associated¹³ and on our awareness of one our imagination gives rise to the idea of the other. These ideas, then, become related by association and not by reason.

The causal explanation may thus be explained by a double association of ideas - the impression calls up the idea of a similar impression in the past; this idea calls up the idea of an impression conjoined with the previous impression in experience - two stages which custom makes us resolve into one.¹⁴

Hume also attempts to account for the popular belief in the necessity of a causal connection and this he does by way of an ingenious appeal to custom. He reasons that since all ideas are copies of impressions¹⁵ and since we have no impression of necessity,¹⁶ but only an impression of the cause and then the effect; the idea of necessary connection must arise from some alternative source.

¹² Ibid., p. 76.

¹³ Ibid., see pp. 10-11.

¹⁴ A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment of Causality, (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 9.

¹⁵ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 163.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 155.

We observe that two ideas, e.g. fire and heat, are constantly conjoined and related by contiguity and succession. The impressions giving rise to their corresponding ideas are two and we are not aware of a third impression, namely necessary connection. However, after numerous repetitions of this conjunction we find that when a further impression of fire gives rise to an idea of fire this idea in turn gives rise to an idea of heat.

... after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is *determin'd* by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or *determination*, which affords me the idea of necessity.¹⁷

It is this tendency of the mind which produces the idea of necessary connection. Since the idea of necessary connection is produced by a tendency of the mind it is frivolous to suppose, for example, that fire and heat are in some mysterious manner connected. However, it is from the resemblance of these instances of constant conjunction "... that the ideas of necessity, of power and of efficacy, are deriv'd,"¹⁸

Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another... There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 164.

produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity.¹⁹

One of the consequences of Hume's analysis is the removal of physical necessity from the empirical world. Physical necessity is according to Hume "... the game thing with chance,"²⁰ and therefore it is ~~impossible~~ to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity."²¹

This analysis also brings to light Hume's epistemology. We observed that Hume believed that only Relations of Ideas give us *certain* knowledge. These propositions are true in virtue of the meaning of the concepts involved and hence cannot be denied without contradiction. They are not based on experience and hence cannot be proven false by experience. In other words these propositions are known *a priori*. On the other hand, there are Matters of Fact. Unlike Relations of Ideas they are not true in virtue of the meaning of the concepts involved but are based on experience, e.g. observation. Furthermore, they can be denied without contradiction and hence can be refuted by experience. These propositions do not give us *certain* knowledge.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 165.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 171.

²¹ Ibid., p. 171.

Ignoring any fine distinctions which some philosophers may wish to draw, there are basically two categories in modern philosophy into which propositions fall - the analytic and synthetic categories. These two categories are often stated in alternative ways, but generally speaking an identification is made so that we are left with only two categories which are believed to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. A table might be similar to the following -

Propositions

I	II
Relations of Ideas	Matters of Fact
analytic	synthetic
<i>a priori</i>	<i>a posteriori</i>
necessary	contingent

Kant is often dismissed out of hand by philosophers on the grounds that only someone totally ignorant of basic logical distinctions would ever claim that another category of propositions, synthetic *a priori* propositions, existed. Kant is accused of believing, for example, that mixing black and white will result in blue, instead of a no-man's-land of grey. However, as we are aware, Kant does in fact claim to have established another category of statements - synthetic *a priori* propositions, and it is to this category to which we will now turn. A full

discussion of this subject would take us deep into the Transcendental Deduction. Rather than spend a great deal of time on such an enterprise I will attempt to give a general overview, perhaps not at times overly complete.

In the Introduction to the Critique Of Pure Reason Kant distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgments. This distinction comes at A7 = B11.

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought ... this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic.²²

As examples of analytic and synthetic judgments respectively Kant uses "All bodies are extended"²³ and "all bodies are heavy."²⁴ What then are the characteristics of synthetic *a priori* judgments? In such a judgment the predicate is "not contained in the other"²⁵ and "yet belongs, and indeed necessarily belongs, to it."²⁶ As an example of such a judgment we are given, "Everything

²² Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 48.

²³ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

which happens has its cause'". But how is such a judgment possible?

What is here the unknown = X which gives support to the understanding when it believes that it can discover outside, the concept A a predicate B foreign to this concept, which it yet at the same time considers to be connected with it. It cannot be experience, because the suggested principle has connected the second representation with the first, not only with greater universality, but also with the character of necessity, and therefore completely *a priori* and on the basis of mere concepts.²⁷

Secondly, Kant distinguishes between the synthetic or progressive method and the analytic or regressive method of argumentation.

Analytic method, in so far as it is opposed to the synthetic method, is something quite different from an aggregate of analytic propositions. It means that one starts from what is being looked for as if it were given, and ascends to the conditions under which alone it is possible. In this method one often uses nothing but synthetic propositions ... and it might be better to call it the *regressive* method, in distinction from the synthetic or *progressive* method.²⁸

In the Critique Of Pure Reason I went to work with regard to this question synthetically, namely by inquiring within pure reason itself, and trying to determine in this source itself according to principles, both the elements and the laws of its pure employment.²⁹

Any attempt to describe the difference between these two methods is difficult, to say the least. Kant does not take pains to explain the difference and while

²⁷ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁸ Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, trans. by Peter G. Lucas (Manchester: University Press, 1971), see note p. 31.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

he claims to have employed the synthetic or progressive method in the *Critique* this method of argumentation often appears to be just the opposite. Although the difference between these two methods may forever remain an enigma, Robert Paul Wolff has attempted to state the difference and much of what will be said on the subject can be found in his book Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity, pages 44-56.

Wolff describes the synthetic or progressive method as "... simply the familiar deduction of conclusions from premises."³⁰ An example of the progressive method would be -

Major: all animals are mortal
 Minor: all men are animals
 Conclusion: all men are mortal.³¹

On the other hand, if we were employing the regressive method we would assume the conclusion and seek for premises from which it followed. Employing the synthetic method we already have in our possession the premises and merely draw the conclusion. Here we discover one important difference between the two methods. In the synthetic method the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion so that if the argument is valid and the premises true then the conclusion is also true. However,

³⁰ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 45.

³¹ Ibid., p. 45.

when we employ the regressive method, although the argument may be valid and the conclusion true, the truth of the premises is not thereby guaranteed. Furthermore, although the conclusion may indeed follow from the premises this does not demonstrate the truth of the conclusion. That is, two premises can always be found from which the conclusion will follow. For example - all doors are mortal, all men are doors, etc.; in short, any middle term will do - clouds, chairs, etc. Wolff therefore claims to have discovered two characteristics of regressive arguments -

(1) "... unless you have some independent justification for the two premises, a regressive analysis will not increase the credibility of the conclusion."³²

(2) "... even if you are certain of the truth of the conclusion, a regressive argument does not increase the credibility of the premises."³³

However, it is precisely at this point that a problem arises. Kant claims to have employed the regressive method in the *Prolegomena* while in the *Critique* the progressive method was employed.³⁴ In the *Prolegomena* he asks the "... main transcendental question..."³⁵ That is,

³² Ibid., p. 46.

³³ Ibid., p. 46.

³⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena*, trans. by Peter G. Lucas (Manchester: University Press, 1971), pp. 28-29.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

how is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible? The main transcendental question is further divided into four other questions.

- 1) How is pure mathematics possible?
- 2) How is pure natural science possible?
- 3) How is metaphysics possible in general?
- 4) How is metaphysics possible as a science?³⁶

To show the possibility of knowledge of these subjects, taking into consideration the preceding discussion, we assume its truth, and by employing the regressive method show that its existence can be deduced. However, this does not show that the premises guarantee (the truth of) the conclusion but only that the conclusion can be deduced, i.e. is possible. In order to demonstrate the actuality or truth of the conclusion we must independently justify the premises.

The relation of the *Prolegomena* to the *Critique* can be represented in the following catechism:

Question: How are mathematics and natural science possible?
(or, Under what conditions are ... possible?)

Answer: Mathematics and natural science are possible if the validity of their concepts (space, time, cause, substance, etc.) is a necessary condition of consciousness in general.

Question: Is the validity of the concepts of mathematics and natural science a necessary condition of consciousness in general?

Answer: Yes, as the argument of the Transcendental Analytic proves.³⁷

³⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁷ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 47.

In the Introduction to the *Critique* Kant writes "How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?"³⁸ And later he writes -

Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite proper to ask *how* they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist.³⁹

However, it is just this actuality which is to be proved in the *Critique*; to assume the validity of the concepts of space, time, etc. in order to prove just this is a begging of the question. Kemp Smith has described the relationship between the two methods as follows -

By a preliminary regress upon the conditions of our *de facto* consciousness it acquires data from which it is enabled to advance by a synthetic, progressive or deductive procedure to the establishment of the validity of synthetic *a priori* judgments.⁴⁰

Kemp Smith is claiming then that in the first stage Kant begins with the fact of subjective consciousness and regresses or ascends to

... their conditions or premises, namely the whole machinery of categories and syntheses and forms of intuition. Then in the second stage, he begins with that transcendental machinery,

³⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Critique Of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 55.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴⁰ Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary To Kant's "Critique Of Pure Reason"* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 44.

and deductively *descends* to the validity of physics and mathematics.⁴¹

But, as we have observed, Hume can accept the fact of subjective consciousness but deny the truth of the premises discovered by the regressive method. If these are the premises to be used in the second stage Hume need not accept the truth of the conclusion, and therefore Kant has not answered Hume.

~~Therefore, it appears that Kant must either be begging the question against Hume or he begins from the fact of subjective or self-consciousness and deduces the Principle of Causality. It is the second alternative which I have opted in favour of. I hope to demonstrate that the argument begun in the Aesthetic finds completion in the Transcendental Analytic. This thesis, then, attempts to exhibit such an argument while arguing for the truth of its premises, and it is to this argument which we will now turn.~~

⁴¹Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 50.

II

Initially, I would like to begin this discussion of Kant's Second Analogy by considering the Kantian concept of an object or objectivity. It is not insignificant that Kant begins the Second Analogy with such a discussion.

Everything, every representation even, in so far as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper inquiry what the word 'object' ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object.⁴²

Kant has found himself in a quandry due to his phenomenalism. For a Kantian the empirical world is a phenomenal world, a world whose *form* is imposed by man. However one word of warning must be issued. A Kantian does not claim that the contents of the empirical world are mind dependent in a Kantian sense; however the general structure or form of empirical intuition is determined. For example, it is not only a matter of empirical fact that objects exist in space and time, but rather it is a necessary fact. Therefore it is not sufficient to merely say that objects, or objective representations, are empirical objects such as tables and chairs since these objects are to a certain, although limited, extent mind dependent. We do not perceive objects as they are in-themselves since they take a necessary form imposed by us.

⁴² Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 219.

It is now very tempting for those of a non-Kantian philosophical bent to simply deny, for example, that space and time are necessary forms by arguing that the nature of space and time is dependent on the nature of matter. Or they argue that it would not be possible for us to be in a position of empirical knowledge if all our perceptions were of the Kantian variety. The empirical world, they argue, is the objective world, the world independent of man. Much to their surprise a Kantian does not radically disagree with this position. For a Kantian also the empirical world is the objective world, a world containing objects which are independent of us. The empirical world is not a fairyland which we arbitrarily create. What Kant took issue with was the claim that the empirical world is a noumenal world, a world of things - in-themselves.

In discussing this aspect of Kant's thought it is often beneficial to remind ourselves of the title of the Second Critique - Critique Of Pure Reason. Kant sought to set the bounds or limits to what reason, in the broad sense of the term, could possibly know. He felt that since we could not perceive objects not in space or time, e.g. God, space and time were necessary forms to which all possible objects conformed. To say that we do not perceive objects as they are in-themselves is not to imply that all intuitions are illusions; it is to say that we cannot perceive, for example, an object which is non-spatial and non-temporal.

Kant believed that his table of categories was a table of necessary categories. To illustrate my point I will assume that it is. If in fact it is impossible for us to perceive objects which are not in space and time and do not conform to the categories, since we cannot free ourselves of this conceptual apparatus and look upon the world as perhaps only God does, we do not know if empirical objects really are, for example, in space and time. That is, we do not have experience of objects in independence of the categories and forms of empirical intuition.

It is the previous considerations which force one to hold that we do not perceive things - in-themselves. What I am suggesting, then, is that the problem of the thing-in-itself is not a problem. The concept has merely negative employment. The concept of the noumenon, in the negative sense, is not an object about which we may ask questions. Rather, it serves as a reminder that our experience and knowledge are limited.

The concept of a noumenon is, therefore, not the concept of an object, but it is a problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our sensibility...⁴³

But in what manner does the concept of a noumenon tie in with the concept of objectivity? Most importantly we are left with a phenomenal world, a world in part dependent on the faculty of synthetic imagination. However,

⁴³Ibid., p. 293.

Kant also wishes to hold that the phenomenal world is independent of our representations of it: It is not mind independent so far as its form is determined but the order, e.g. whether the forest fire had already begun before the thunder storm or was started by lightning, is an order of its own and not mind dependent. In other words, we want to be able to draw the distinction between the order of our apprehension of the manifold and the order of the manifold. To use Kant's example - we apprehend the parts of a house successively but at the same time do not also hold that the parts of the house exist successively. We require a distinction between representations qua mental contents and representations which are representations of objects. It might be thought that if all objects are phenomenal then the manner in which we apprehend them is the manner in which they exist.

For instance, the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of the house is also in itself successive. This, however, is what no one will grant.⁴⁴

But given the previous analysis how will we be capable of drawing a distinction between representations of objects and objects while simultaneously claiming that all objects belong to the phenomenal world, the world of appearance? In other words, does this analysis preclude

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 220.

the drawing of a distinction between our perceptions and the perception of objects - between the objects of perception or consciousness and the perception or consciousness of *objects*?

We might begin by saying that the term "object of perceptions" is really a misnomer. One cannot simply perceive *objects*. We may term our perceptions objective but in so doing we are not merely saying that they are objective, rather we are judging our perceptions to possess a certain status. Secondly, if a person claims that he has seen an object we are justified in asking him for reasons which support his claim - e.g. were the lighting conditions good?, did anything interfere with his view?, did anyone besides himself see the object? etc. However, as regards a person's objects of perception no one can deny that a person is conscious of these perceptions. And neither does it make sense to ask for justifications. In this context, to ask a person if anything obscured his view strikes us as absurd. One does not make a judgment when one says that one is conscious of X, one just is conscious of X. A judgment is only made when a person claims that his perception is objective or, on the other hand, a hallucination. Objectivity is not a perceptual given rather it is characteristic of knowledge, for all *objects* are objects of knowledge.

... cognition is not a matter of mental picture-building,
(in which internal images are fitted into a replica of an

object.) It is the formulation of judgments, whereby a connection is asserted between the representations named by the subject and predicate terms.⁴⁵

Before we enter into a fuller discussion of objectivity there is one objection which must be dealt with. It is objected that the problem Kant presents (p. 18) is a pseudo-problem. What we mean when we refer to something as objective is that it has a correspondence in the empirical world. If I have a representation of a table then in order to deem my representation objective it is sufficient that there is in the empirical world a table of which my representation is a representation of. And accordingly if I form the judgment 'there is a table at place p at time t' my judgment possesses objective validity if in fact there is a table at place p at time t.

Now, I do not deny that this is in fact the manner in which we operate, but I do deny that this is the solution to the problem as posed by Kant. The problem as presented by Kant takes the following form - 'given that the empirical world is a phenomenal world and given that all we can ever be aware of are our representations, what means enable us to decide which representations are representations of objects, possess objective validity, and which do not?' The question takes the paradoxical form - how do we distinguish mind dependent representations which are

⁴⁵ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 139.

also mind independent from those representations which are merely mind dependent?

Objective meaning cannot consist in the relation to another representation (of that which we desire to entitle object), for in that case the question again arises, how this latter representation goes out beyond itself, acquiring objective meaning in addition to the subjective meaning which belongs to it as determination of the mental state.⁴⁶

It might be objected that if we are, in doubt we need only ask other persons. Barring mass hallucinations this method is usually a reliable one. But this only avoids the problem, it does not present a solution. For, how do other persons know that their representations are representations of objects? It seems that there is something more basic to objectivity than the taking of a Gallup-poll.

It may be objected that Kant's position is beginning to look very similar to Berkeley's. However, I wish to defend the thesis that an objective world is a necessary condition for consciousness of a subjective world.

It has been argued by philosophers that the objective world is a construct out of the subjective world and that experience of the objective is not a necessary condition for experience of the subjective. They may argue, for example, that those items in our subjective experience which occur with regularity come to be regarded as objective, and we thereby construct the objective world out of

⁴⁶ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 224.

our subjective experience.

But let us ask ourselves what type of world a wholly subjective world would be. For one thing, in such a world there would be no distinction between what seemed to be the case and what was the case, for in such a world there would be no basis for the distinction. But, if one was going to argue that the objective world is one in which items occur with regularity one needs some means of *establishing* regularity. This will involve the concept of the past; since to claim that X occurs regularly is at least to claim that X has occurred with regularity in my past. Therefore, we require some means of distinguishing the past from the present in a purely subjective stream of consciousness. What is required therefore, is a basis for the distinction between what one remembers being the case and what was the case.

But a person whose experience is solely subjective has in his possession no means of objectively dating his past experiences. What he claims to have been the case consists solely in what he presently remembers to have been the case. In this world there are no objective checks. The past just is what he presently remembers, that is, what he remembers and what he experiences blur into one.

However, would it be possible for such a person to have the concept of the past? For him there is no

difference between what he experienced at past time t and what he now remembers to have experienced. The concept of the past -

... does nothing for him, since there will at any given time be a one-one relation between what he can say about his past states and what he can say about his present recollections. ... For him, the distinction between 'I was ...' and 'I recollect ...' is literally idle.⁴⁷

It seems, then, that a wholly subjective experience will not provide a basis for the distinction between the past and one's remembrances of it. The concept of the past adds nothing to one's conceptual framework, since it does not allow of describing experiences which are not now describable within the present framework.

However, a person who has at his doorstep an objective world has a need for the distinction between what he remembers to be the case and what is the case. There is not a one-one relationship between his present memories and what objectively happened. For this person, the distinction is not idle. If the person remembers, for example, seeing one person shoot another he has access to many data other than this one remembrance. The person may remember screaming or feeling faint while witnessing the act, or remember just coming out of a particular store and dropping the parcel in a mud-puddle, or remember that it was

⁴⁷ Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), p. 207.

the longest day of the year. In short, there are a great many considerations or data which a person may draw upon when judging that something is objectively the case, and which are absent when one merely remembers. For such a person there is a basis for a distinction between what was the case and what one remembers to be the case. The concept of the past is necessary to a description of all of this person's experience while it was purely superfluous to the concepts already employed by a person living solely in a subjective world, if that is possible.

I said at the beginning of this discussion that in a subjective world there would be no distinction between what was the case and what seemed to be the case. Let us fill in some of the details of what it could possibly be like to live in a wholly subjective world.

For such a person, we have said, there would be a one-one relationship between what he remembers to have been the case and what was the case. And because of this it was concluded that he would have no use for the concept of the past. This person seems to be preoccupied with the present, so to speak. But, for him, what could the present possibly mean other than 'what is experienced *now*'? He cannot think of the present as this century or this day except in so far as they could be defined in terms of a number of experiences. For this person no distinction can be made between the world and experiences of it. There is

no question of distinguishing his experiences from other experiences for all experiences are, by definition, his. He cannot see himself as possessing one unique history or of mapping one experiential route in the world; for him there is no objective world which is distinguishable from different histories or experiential routes. In his world there is no basis and indeed no use for a distinction between experiences and the things that have them, and the world and experiences of that world.

Therefore, he has no concept of himself as a distinct owner of experiences, that is, as a distinctive person. He cannot be conscious of himself as possessing a distinct history of experiences and thereby lending some weight to the distinction between yours and mine. For him there is no *other* and therefore no yours or his etc. It seems that a concept of self as distinct from other selves is rather improbable if not impossible for our fictitious person. Because he has no concept of anything other than himself it is rather doubtful that he will have a use for the concept of himself, where that marks him off from other selves. Therefore, once we fill in some of the background, we can see that such a person would not have a concept of a self or person who is the owner of specific experiences and the possessor of a distinctive history. In short, he would not, due to the nature of his world, either have the basis or the need for a concept of selfhood.

If our person has no concept of himself as a person or self, where does that leave us? It seems that he is not capable of articulating the difference between being conscious of experiencing something now, and being conscious of it as an experience of himself. In other words, his condition appears to rule out the possibility of the employment of the pronoun 'I'. Empirical self-consciousness is ruled out. However, now it seems that consciousness itself has been swallowed up.

III

In the last section we discussed the Kantian concept of an object and problems resulting from that position. Also, there was an attempt to demonstrate that without an objective world, which was distinguishable in important respects from the subjective world, a concept of the self or of an individual consciousness would not exist. From this we may conclude, however tritely, that consciousness in general is a necessary condition for consciousness of anything. Let us now retrace our steps to resume a fuller discussion of the Kantian concept of an object in conjunction with the Second Analogy.

It has been argued that the traditional view, that correspondence between the object of which we are conscious and an object in the empirical world is the criterion of objectivity, does not possess the force that it is usually credited with.

... since ... we cannot, so to speak, step outside of our knowledge, i.e. (our representations), in order to compare it with an object, the meaning of this correspondence, the conditions of its possibility, and the criteria for determining its presence all become problematic.⁴⁸

What, then, are we to understand by an object? Or, what are the characteristics of objectivity and/or of an object?

⁴⁸H.E. Allison, "Kant's Non-Sequitur," Kant-Studien, LX 11 (1971), 369.

Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them *a priori* in some definite fashion. For in so far as they relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representativeness, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations - the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.⁴⁹

In the second paragraph quoted above we find what Allison terms "... Kant's subjective or transcendental turn."⁵⁰ Kant asks himself what must be characteristic of our judgments if they are to possess objective validity. His answer is that if a representation is to possess objective validity its unity must be a necessary unity. All representations possess a unity but it is only a representation which is a representation of an *object* which possesses a necessary unity.

However, now we must deal with Kant's "subjective or transcendental turn". It is in the Transcendental Deduction that we find the previous quotation. In the

⁴⁹ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 134-135.

⁵⁰ H.E. Allison, "Kant's Non-Sequitur," Kant-Studien, LX 11 (1971), 371.

Transcendental Deduction Kant advances the thesis that all empirical consciousness involves a pure self-consciousness (the self-identical 'I Think' of the Second Paralogism),⁵¹ termed "... *transcendental apperception* ..."⁵² Transcendental apperception provides the basis of the unity necessary for all consciousness of objects.

The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the *a priori* ground of all concepts, ...⁵³

Kant's reasoning is, very crudely, similar to the following. If we were not in possession of one identical consciousness our representations would not possess objective validity. Indeed representations of objects would itself be impossible. Let us assume that we are not in possession of a numerically identical consciousness at all times. Now, for example, let us try and form the judgment 'The green grass is wet'. If there is no unity of consciousness the preceding activity becomes impossible. The representation of wet green grass involves the unification of three concepts. If we do not possess a numerically identical consciousness, one consciousness will represent wet, another green and so on. But a unification is

⁵¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique Of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 336.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

impossible from three unconnected consciousnesses. Three such consciousnesses cannot unify unless there is a basis for their unification. Consequently, if there is to be a unification there must be one numerically identical consciousness which provides the basis for their unification, and thereby makes possible the unification of a multitude of concepts in one judgment. Therefore, only if we are in possession of a unified, numerically identical consciousness is consciousness of *objects* at all possible. And if experience of the objective is a necessary condition for experience of the subjective it appears that a numerically identical consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness in general, i.e. self-consciousness.

That Kant's thesis could be argued for in terms of making judgments about the past is clear. For, if we were not in possession of one numerically identical consciousness the past could not be remembered, since one consciousness would replace another unconnected to it, with every 'experience'.

In what manner, we must ask, does necessity relate to the unity of consciousness? And if all consciousness involves a unity are not all unities necessary? If this is the case, then there are no grounds on which to distinguish a unity which is a representation of an object and unities which are merely subjective. There is, for example, no basis provided for distinguishing a

representation of Parliament Hill from a representation of a centaur. It is the Subjective Deduction, also, which offers a solution to our dilemma.

... the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. ... But this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold *a priori* necessary, and renders possible a concept in which it is united. Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This *unity of rule* determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apperception possible....

All knowledge demands a concept ... a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule.⁵⁴

Thus it seems that objective unities, in contradistinction to subjective unities, involve the employment of universal rules necessary to a correct representation of the object. All unities, involve concepts but "... only some concepts bring with them a consciousness of necessity, and therefore of an object or objective connection."⁵⁵ These concepts or rules are necessary for consciousness of an object, that is, the manifold must be combined according to these rules if one is to be conscious of an *object*. These rules must condition everything that appears insofar as it appears. For Kant, then, the characteristics of knowledge are universality and necessity.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 135.

⁵⁵ H.E. Allison, "Kant's Non-Sequitur," Kant-Studien, LXII (1971), 372.

Given the preceding analysis it is not surprising for Kant to claim that -

... the concept of a cause is nothing but a synthesis (of that which follows in the time-series, with other appearances) *according to concepts*; and without such unity, which has its *a priori* rule, and which subjects the appearances to itself, no thorough-going, universal, and therefore necessary, unity of consciousness would be met with in the manifold of perceptions.⁵⁶

The concept of a cause is a universal rule which is necessary for consciousness of an event. It is incumbent upon a Kantian to show that this rule is necessary for consciousness of the objective. And if it has indeed been shown that consciousness of the objective is a necessary condition for consciousness in general then, if the former thesis can be demonstrated, it follows that the Principle of Causality is itself necessary for consciousness in general.

Perhaps at this time a word in defence of synthetic *a priori* propositions would be in order. Empiricists often react violently to the suggestion that one could seriously consider the possibility of such propositions. Their possibility, they believe, could only be considered by one ignorant of fundamental logical distinctions - the distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* and between the analytic and the synthetic. If we look at Kant's statement of the concept of causality we may see

⁵⁶ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 139.

some justification for regarding the Principle of Causality as synthetic *a priori* and not contingent. Firstly, if the principle is necessary for experience it cannot be derived from experience. Since it says something about the form of the empirical world, and the empirical world acts uncommonly like a causal world, it cannot be merely a truth of logic or an arbitrary definition. Its status seems to be neither solely *a priori* nor synthetic but possesses aspects of both.

With some of the preliminaries out of the way, perhaps we can now enter into a fuller discussion of Kant's Second Analogy. At the beginning of the Analogies [in A] we are told -

The general principle of the analogies is: All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject *a priori* to rules determining their relation to one another in one time.⁵⁷

And later in the Analogies -

three modes of time are *duration, succession, and co-existence*. There will, therefore, be three rules of all relations of appearances in time; and these rules will be prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible. By means of these rules the existence of every appearance can be determined in respect of the unity of all time.⁵⁸

The Second Analogy is the analogy which deals with succession in time. Therefore it appears that in the Second Analogy, we are dealing with a rule necessary for

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 208.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 209.

determining the temporal succession of appearances.

Strawson has charged Kant with committing a non-sequitur in the Second Analogy. Kant argues that in the perception of an event, an objective happening, the order of our perceptions is determined or irreversible. We see a ship upstream and later downstream; in this case the order of our perceptions is bound down, is irreversible. Whereas, in the case of Kant's notorious house, we may either perceive it from the top to the bottom or from the bottom to the top. In this case the order of our perceptions is reversible. In the first example, the perception of the change A-B is necessary, insofar as A must be perceived before B. This is a conceptual necessity. Kant, however, concludes that the sequence is causally necessitated. Strawson argues that Kant's argument is based on a shift in meaning of 'necessity' - from a conceptual necessity to the notion of causal necessity. Kant's error results from believing that -

... to conceive this order of perceptions as necessary is equivalent to conceiving the transition or change from A to B as *itself* necessary, as falling, that is to say, under a rule or law of causal determination; ...

... the necessity invoked in the conclusion of the argument is not a conceptual necessity at all; it is the causal necessity of the change occurring, given some antecedent state of affairs. It is a very curious contortion indeed whereby a conceptual necessity based on the fact of a change is equated with the causal necessity of that very change.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ P.F. Strawson, The Bounds Of Sense (London: Mathuen & Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 138.

Strawson describes this alleged argument of Kant's as a "... non sequitur of numbing grossness."⁶⁰

In the following section I will argue that this alleged non-sequitur is non-existent. A reconstruction and interpretation of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy will be undertaken, in an attempt to demonstrate that the non-sequitur charge is not justified. I will argue, however, that what the Second Analogy proves is that the principle of causality is tied to time determination, namely determining the order of objective succession, and if the principle is necessary for determining objective time it follows that it is necessary for consciousness in general.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 137.

IV

Like the majority of Kant's claims, the thesis of the Second Analogy is much more modest than usually supposed. At no time does Kant argue that the laws of science can themselves be decided *a priori* or that the laws, once discovered, are unalterable and hence, in this sense, necessary. The laws of nature are a purely empirical concern since the objects which we are dealing with are sensible objects. One can see how this problem arises though. If the Principle of Causality is synthetic *a priori* and if it finds application in the empirical world, then when we judge two entities to be causally related it appears that we are also judging them to possess a necessary causal relation to one another. However it is not Kant's thesis that if A & B are causally related this relation is a necessary causal relation, but that if A & B are *events* they must be causally related to something. For example, if a person's death is an objective happening there must be some causal explanation for their death but the occurrence of the cause in the future does not necessarily mean that another person will die. If a person died from a heart attack we are not warranted in concluding that if anyone experiences a heart attack in the future then necessarily that person will die. The only conclusion which is warranted and which I propose to defend is that if a person's death is an event in our public, objective, world

then that person's death has a causal explanation, i.e. has some cause.

First of all, a rough characterization of the Kantian method of argumentation may be in order. Transcendental arguments, as they are sometimes referred to, begin by asking what is true of our conceptual scheme and proceed by asking what must be true, i.e. necessary in order for us to possess the scheme which we in fact possess, and therefore what must necessarily hold of this scheme in order for us to draw the distinctions which we in fact draw. We might begin by observing that we do draw a distinction between the objective world and the subjective world; between the world of illusions and dreams, and the world governed by the laws of nature. Furthermore, we draw a distinction between objective time, e.g. clock time, and subjective time. We say, for example, that the lecture seemed to drag on for ages although it really lasted one and one-half hours. For all persons attending the lecture the actual time which it occupied of their day is one and one-half hours, although one person may feel that it dragged on for ages while another may feel that time flew while she attended the lecture.

It is characteristic of Kant and many of his followers that they do not question the validity of the distinctions we make. It has been argued by his opponents that objective time is a construct out of subjective time and that, therefore, subjective time is basic and objective.

time not a necessary condition for consciousness. Strawson has described such philosophers as revisionary metaphysicians and those of a Kantian bent as descriptive metaphysicians.⁶¹ However, in order to defend a conceptual scheme it is not sufficient merely to describe it. It is, I feel, incumbent upon those who regard themselves as descriptive metaphysicians to argue for the validity of the distinctions inherent in our conceptual scheme. If one is going to argue for necessary categories on the basis of those distinctions, then if one's distinctions are of questionable validity the certainty of the categories deduced from them will never be free from suspicion. Taking this into consideration I would like to proceed by arguing for the validity of the distinction between objective and subjective time. That is, the thesis at hand is that subjective time is only possible and explicable in reference to objective time, and therefore objective time cannot be constructed from subjective time.

An objective world, however, goes hand-in-hand with objective time. It makes no sense to talk of an objective world which is necessarily only accessible to me, for the reason that events do not occur in anyone's time except my own. There is no public background against which events occur, so one person cannot ask another when

⁶¹p.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 9-10.

a specific event occurred. All we are in possession of, on this thesis, are our own private experiences. We might number our experiences but another person cannot comprehend this system since he is, by definition, excluded from sharing this temporal system. It is only if these persons are in possession of a public or common temporal system does talk of objective happenings become meaningful. Objective happenings which do not occur at a specific time regardless of the time of their apprehension are not objective since they would actually occur at different times. It makes no sense, either, to say that something occurred but was not apprehended, since only if it is apprehended, becomes a number of a subjective series, does it acquire temporal properties. However, to term a happening objective whose temporal existence is dependent on its apprehension is merely to play with words.

We have seen, then, that objective happenings must possess temporal properties in independence of the order of their apprehension if we are to speak meaningfully of an objective world. That is, they must possess an order of their own. An objective world appears to be inseparable from an objective temporal order. And since consciousness of the objective is a necessary condition for consciousness of the subjective, consciousness of an objective temporal order is, *a fortiori*, also a necessary condition for consciousness of subjective time.

Subjective time can only be explicated against a temporal system which is objective. It is empty to talk of lectures dragging on for ages or seeming to last only minutes, unless we know what it is for something to last an age or a minute. It is only by reference to objective time that one understands subjective time. Similarly, it is only by reference to an objective world that we can comprehend what it is for a person to retreat into a world of fantasy. It only makes sense to speak of illusions against a background which is non-illusory.

There is a feature of objective time which is a concomitant of its being objective, that is, it is a unitary system.

A unitary time-system is one in which all temporal ascriptions - all dates and durations - are directly relatable; it makes sense inside such a system to ask of every supposed happening whether it preceded, followed or was simultaneous with anything else which is taken to happen.⁶²

A temporal system which was not a unitary system would never completely fulfill the requirements of being objective. For, in such a system it is possible for events to occur which neither precede, follow or occur simultaneously with other events. That is, they occur but possess no temporal position in regard to other

⁶²W.H. Walsh, "Kant On The Perception of Time", in The First Critique, edited by Terence Penelhum and J. J. MacIntosh (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1969), p. 70.

events. Indeed, in such a system it would appear that all events which have occurred, are occurring and will occur possess no temporal properties with respect to each other. In this system we are not allowed to ask, for example, whether the Great Depression preceded the Second World War. But, we may ask, in such a temporal system is there a present where the present is distinguishable from what was and what will occur? Perhaps we should conclude that there is no time if a temporal system is a system where we may ask if X occurred before, simultaneously with or after Y.

In a temporal system which was not a unitary system, if that is possible, some of our means of verifying the occurrence of events would not be at our disposal. Firstly, the verification of an order of happenings vis à vis causal laws would be impossible, indeed causal laws would themselves be impossible. For, if nothing ever precedes, follows or occurs simultaneously with another event it is impossible to establish the existence of a causal law by reference to a constant conjunction of two variables in the past (to borrow Hume's description). Therefore, we could not order two events, e.g. the water boiling on the stove and the heat being turned on, on the basis of causal laws. In answer to the question which happening preceded the other the answer is that neither did and nothing else did either. But a world in which there are no means of

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determining objective temporal positions is a world in which there is no objective time. However, since objective time is a necessary condition for consciousness of subjective time and further since we are, in fact, conscious of the subjective it follows that we must be in possession of a unitary objective temporal system.

It has been argued, then, that an objective unitary temporal system is a necessary condition for consciousness. This may not appear to be of significant importance to the status of the Principle of Causality which is, after all, the issue at hand. However as has been previously stated, the question of determining temporal relations among objective happenings and the status of the Principle of Causality are not wholly divorced by Kant. At the beginning of the Analogies Kant informs us that

The general principle of the analogies is: All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject *a priori* to rules determining their relation to one another in one time.⁶³

And later he states that -

Since time, however, cannot itself be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can take place only through their relation in time in general, and therefore only through concepts that connect them *a priori*. Since these always carry necessity with them, it follows that experience is only possible through a representation of necessary connection of perceptions.⁶⁴

⁶³ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 208.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

And since there are three modes of time, Kant concludes that there will be three rules determining the "... existence of every appearance ... in respect of the unity of all time."⁶⁵

Later in the Second Analogy we are told -

If, then, it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and therefore a *formal condition* of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the succeeding (since I cannot advance to the succeeding time save through the preceding), it is also an indispensable law of *empirical representation* of the time-series that the appearances of past time determine all existences in the succeeding time, and that these latter, as events, can take place only in so far as the appearances of past time determine their existence in time, that is, determine them according to a rule. *For only in appearances can we empirically apprehend this continuity in the connection of times.*⁶⁶

This argument for the *a priori* status of the Principle of Causality is regarded by most critics as unfortunate, to say the least. Kant has been criticized on the grounds that in this argument he transfers the properties of time to the appearances, appearances becoming exemplars of moments of time. He is criticized for claiming that time is composed of indivisible moments and hence that moments are what they are in virtue of their place in the temporal order. This leads to a spatialization of time and therefore allows one to ask, for example, where two o'clock is located.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

Kemp Smith correctly observes that this fourth proof differs from all remaining arguments for the *a priori* status of the Principle of Causality. However, this proof when integrated with the remainder of the Second Analogy and with the Analogies as a whole might not be the faux pas that the critics usually suppose it to be. Kemp Smith correctly observes that

... despite the artificial character of the standpoint, the argument serves to bring prominently forward Kant's central thesis, viz. that the principle of causality is presupposed in all consciousness of time, even of the subjectivity successive. Also, by emphasizing that time in and by itself can never be 'an object of perception,' and that the relating of appearances to 'absolute time' is possible only through the determining of them in their relations to one another, it supplies the data for correction of its own starting-point.⁶⁷

In the following pages I will attempt a reconstruction of the fourth argument in order to demonstrate that this argument does, in fact, support Kant's "central thesis." It will be argued that the Principle of Causality is a necessary condition for consciousness of temporal succession and therefore of time. For, if time is the form of inner sense, that is of consciousness, then if the employment of the Principle of Causality is necessary for consciousness of time it is *a fortiori* a necessary condition for consciousness in general.

⁶⁷ Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary To Kant's "Critique Of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 375-376.

First of all we should observe that our consciousness is temporal. It might, however, be supposed that consciousness need not be temporal but could be of the non-temporal variety. But what is usually involved in talking, for example, of God's consciousness being non-temporal? It is, not, I submit, implied by such talk that to God temporal concepts possess literally no meaning. What is usually meant is that to God everything is known at once there is no development of his knowledge. He knows at once, all true propositions. We, however, cannot conceive of a world in which the concepts of the past, the future and the present had no place. In short, we cannot conceive of a world in which there was no temporal system.

We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself; though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may, one and all, vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot itself be removed.⁶⁸

However, since time itself cannot be perceived and since time is the form of inner sense or consciousness, we must have at our disposal some means of representing the temporal order. Kant's answer is that it is the principles of the three Analogies which are the requisite principles. In the case under consideration it is the

⁶⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Critique Of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 75.

principle of the Second Analogy, the Principle of Causality, which makes possible the representation of objective succession.

The Principle of Causality is the principle we must employ in any activity of establishing the objective order of successive events. However, as Kant is continually reminding us, "time itself cannot be perceived." Events do not come with their dates stamped on them. The temporal position or date of an event is not a perceptible feature of it, and neither can we match events to moments of time since moments are themselves not perceptible.

... an event's date is a logical construct out of its temporal relations with other events. One can no more recall an event's date by recalling what *it* was like than one can recall what forebears and progeny a man had by recalling what *he* was like. It follows that we cannot establish the temporal order of past events by recalling their dates and ordering them upon that basis; rather we must establish their order, and then date them.⁶⁹

The clause "rather we must establish their order and then date them" is the key to Kant's argument. As has previously been stated, dates of events are not perceptible features, and hence there is nothing in the order in which events are apprehended which guarantees that the order of apprehension is the order of their objective occurrence.

I perceive that appearances follow one another, that is, that there is a state of things at one time the opposite of which was in the preceding time. Thus I am really connecting two perceptions in time ... But imagination can connect these two states in two says, so that either the

⁶⁹ Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), p. 226.

one or the other precedes in time. For time cannot be perceived in itself, and what precedes and what follows cannot, therefore, by relation to it, be empirically determined in the object. I am conscious only that my imagination sets the one state before and the other after, not that the one precedes the other in the object. In other words, the relative relation of appearances that follow upon one another is not to be determined through mere perception. That this relation be known as determined, the order between the two states must be so thought that it is empirically determined as necessary which of them must be before, and which of them after, and that they can be placed in the reverse relation.⁷⁰

This argument for the necessity of the Principle of Causality has been termed, by Bennett, Kant's ordering argument.⁷¹ Obviously, this argument is concerned with the objective ordering of events while calling our attention to the problems inherent in this ordering. There must be features of a succession which we appeal to if we are to deem this succession objective, since time itself cannot be perceived.

For example, if I am first conscious of observing some one baking bread and later conscious of seeing bread fully baked and wish to claim that the order of apprehension was the order of occurrence I must be able to appeal to other considerations since "... an event's date is not perceptible it is not recollectable either."⁷² I must

⁷⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 218-219.

⁷¹ Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), p. 224.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 225.

be able to remember, for example - that the clock read eleven o'clock, that it was still morning, that it takes approximately four hours to make bread and that it was late afternoon when I returned and saw that the bread-making had been completed. To date the order of occurrence of the two events one must be able to refer or have recourse to other objective considerations or facts. It is by taking into consideration these facts concerning the objective world that we may establish or verify the order in which these events occurred.

However, it may be objected⁷³ that on this account we have not established that objective happenings are causally determined. It is sufficient that we can appeal to objective considerations over and above our perception of an event. To this it must be objected that the principle of causality is necessary not only for our establishing the order of events but also for establishing the occurrence of *events*, of objective happenings.

For example - it might be argued that we can well imagine an objective but non-causal world. In other words, an objective world is not necessarily a causal world. Although it may be true that objective time is a necessary condition for consciousness, this does demonstrate that events occurring in objective time are causally related,

⁷³ Ibid., p. 229.

and it certainly does not prove that they *must* be so related. However, if it can be shown that it is only by employing the causal principle that we are able to establish objective succession then we may conclude that an objective world is of necessity a causal world.

It has been said before that Bennett's phrase "... rather we must establish their order and then date them"⁷⁴ is the key to Kant's argument. The problem is how we are able to establish events, i.e. public objective happenings. We are unable to simply perceive events since, firstly, time is not perceivable and secondly, events do not come with their dates engraved upon them. But in the apprehension of an event the succession is a necessary succession in that the order is the same for all who perceive it. However, one does not just perceive a necessary succession. For example, it may be the case that due to special circumstances the succession may be perceived in the order B-A when actually the event occurred in the order A-B. What then allows us to draw a distinction between the order of occurrence and the order in which the occurrence was perceived or entered consciousness? Kant's answer to the question just raised is, of course, that a sequence A-B is objective if the events are connected in accordance with a rule, the rule of necessary succession in time.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 226.

In order to get a grip on this problem I would like to return to a discussion of objectivity. We find in the Critique Of Pure Reason that Kant turns from discussing the nature of an object to exploring the characteristics of objectivity. Representations lead a double life, as objects of consciousness or alternatively, as representations of *objects*. But in what manner, Kant asks, can *objects* exist in a world of mere appearance.

What, then, am I to understand by the question: how the manifold may be connected in the appearance itself, which yet is nothing in itself?⁷⁵

Two characteristics of knowledge are universality and necessity. For example, if one knows that 'All S's are P's' then one cannot change that fact by simply tearing it up and re-writing it to suit one's fancy. In order to correctly represent the state of affairs one's judgment must conform to it. The object forces or coerces one's mind to connect S and P in a definite manner, if one is to correctly represent, in a judgment, a certain state of affairs.

... a proposition is true precisely if it connects in judgment what is connected in the object. Now, if the object cannot be a distinct entity from the representations of it, and if at the same time it must serve as the ground for their objective connection, then the object must be simply a *special way of organizing the representations....*

... Our problem, then, is not to find some entity on which we can pin the label 'object,' but rather to find

⁷⁵ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 220.

some order of the manifold which is different from the order of subjective consciousness and has the requisite marks of objectivity.⁷⁶

Before discussing this further I would like to take the liberty of quoting from Kant at length.

The principle of the analogies is: Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.⁷⁷

Experience is an empirical knowledge, that is, a knowledge which determines an object through perceptions. It is a synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions.... In experience,⁷⁸ however, perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity determining⁷⁹ their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves.⁸⁰

However,

... since experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation [involved] in the existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it comes to be construed⁸¹ in time but as it exists objectively in time.⁸²

⁷⁶ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 264.

⁷⁷ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 208.

⁷⁸ Read intuition or consciousness.

⁷⁹ Read "necessity determining" as objective judgment.

⁸⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 208-209.

⁸¹ Read as it is apprehended.

⁸² Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 209.

In other words, experience of objective succession is only possible by employing the Principle of Causality. And since consciousness of the objectively successive is a necessary condition for consciousness of the subjectively successive, therefore the Principle of Causality is, *a fortiori*, a necessary condition for consciousness of succession in general. However, this is merely the short answer so let us delve into this matter in more detail.

First of all, we began by noticing the shift in talking of objects to that of objectivity. Since we are conscious only of our representations we must draw the subjective-objective distinction within those representations. Thus the *object* becomes a special way of organizing the manifold as apprehended. Therefore, we are searching for modes of organizing the manifold that will enable us to distinguish representations of *objects* as opposed to representations *qua* mental contents.

In order to correctly represent the manifold we must connect the manifold in accordance with these modes or rules. Experience of objective happenings, events, is only possible if we submit our apprehension of the manifold under the rule of the Principle of Causality.

... appearance, in contradistinction to the representation of apprehension, can be represented as an object distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object

is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension.⁸³

Since the order of the subjective series is the order in which the sequence entered consciousness, or was experienced, we are not forced to adjust to it. However, this is not the case with regard to the objective series. This is the series which possesses an order in independence of the order of apprehension. Although one person may perceive it in the order A-B and another person in the order B-A, due to lighting conditions, perspective, reflection of light etc., the objective order is either A-B or B-A and not both. There is *one* order of connection in the objective series. If we are to have experience (empirical knowledge of an object) we must see the sequence as falling under a rule of necessary connection, i.e. we must see the sequence as determining itself. Only in so doing can we be in possession of an object which coerces our mind to judge its order in one particular fashion. If we fail to do so we will have not met the requirements of objectivity (universality and necessity); therefore objectivity, and empirical knowledge will have fallen by the wayside.

In the apprehension of a house, for example, we may apprehend the house either from the roof to its foundations or vice versa, and we are not compelled to view

⁸³ Ibid., p. 220.

either sequence as the objective sequence. However, in the perception of an event A-B we cannot reverse the order. We are forced to regard or conceive the order as itself necessary, as possessing an order in independence of how we may have perceived it. Both Norman Kemp Smith and Robert Paul Wolff have stated this point succinctly.

... the mind is compelled to view the order of succession, in terms of the category of causality, as necessitated, and therefore as objective. The order is a necessary order not in the sense that A must always precede B, that A is the cause of B, but that the order, if we are to apprehend it correctly, must in this particular case be conceived as necessary. The succession, that is, need not be conceived as a causal one, but in order to be conceived as objective succession it must be conceived as rendered necessary by connections that are causal.⁸⁴

The real point of the argument ... is not that we must *perceive* B after A, but that we must represent or *think* B after A. Objectivity is a characteristic of cognition, not of apprehension. It is therefore expressed in judgments which assert a connection of representations. However the representations enter consciousness, they must be thought in the order AB.⁸⁵

Let us for a moment consider Hume. As we saw in the Introduction,⁸⁶ Hume denies that there exists any necessary connection between two objects since it is the mind alone which supplies this connection as a result of

⁸⁴ Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary To Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 369.

⁸⁵ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 268.

⁸⁶ See pp. 1-6.

repeated associations of two objects succeeding and contiguous to one another. The mind, after repeated associations of two objects, acquires a tendency to immediately think of B when perceiving A, a propensity so strong that it gives rise to the idea of necessary connection.

An event, however, is not a succession of representations (qua mental contents). To speak of objects or events, as opposed to mental contents, commits one to an objective world, and therefore objectivity. An event, not being "... a mere succession of perceptions in consciousness..."⁸⁷ but "... a happening ... the succession of one state upon another in objective time"⁸⁸ therefore involves objective succession. And since objectivity involves necessity any objective succession involves necessity. But what is necessary succession in time but causation?

Even to speak of a sequence of events is to presuppose a causal order of which they are a part, for the causal order is the objective temporal order.⁸⁹

Furthermore, the repeated associations of two events related by succession and contiguity does not seem to give sufficient grounds for saying that A causes B. For example - in the past we have always found that

⁸⁷ Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 271.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

lightning is succeeded by and is contiguous to thunder, however we do not conclude that lightning causes thunder. Rather, they are different aspects or effects of the same phenomena, an electrical discharge.

Hume's next move is to straightforwardly deny that we have any rational basis for believing in objects.⁹⁰

... there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently *object* or *perception* ... understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses.⁹¹

Opting for this position leaves unexplained the distinction drawn between objective and subjective succession. Let us look again at the previous example regarding lightning and thunder. If we identify objects of perception and our perceptions of them we must conclude that lightning causes thunder. Any attempt to extricate ourselves from this difficulty will immediately involve a commitment to objectivity. To say that we know that lightning and thunder occur at the same time would involve saying that the two events possess an order which is independent of the perceived order. This position does not explain how we can perceive two events or the parts of a

⁹⁰ For an account of how we come to believe in objects which exist in independence of our perception of them see David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 213-216.

⁹¹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 202.

house successively, but assign them to the *same* time.

... objective co-existence is even more puzzling than objective succession, for the latter at least finds it exemplar in subjective consciousness.⁹²

For a moment let us view this problem from the perspective of the verification of *events*. That is, how does one verify that one has experienced the occurrence of an event, as opposed to an illusion?

Usually, when we embark upon a course of action to verify the occurrence of an event we search for a cause or causes which would explain our experience of it. We normally will only allow that B is an objective happening if we can find some evidence for the operation of a cause or causes to which B is causally connected.

For example - the majority of us annually experience that horrendous task of filing one's income tax, based on the somewhat obscure information released by the Federal Government. Suppose that you have just spent the greater part of an evening attempting to complete your income tax form. Further suppose that you have a friend with a penchant for practical jokes whom you had earlier informed of your task that evening. Some hours later your friend drops in armed with a magnet. While he is sitting across from you at your desk you notice paper clips and

⁹²Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory Of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 271.

pins begin to move apparently of their own accord. Your first reaction would probably be to think that you must be mentally exhausted to imagine such happenings. However, as you begin to appear more and more distressed by these happenings your friend laughs and produces his magnet.

The upshot of this example is, of course, that if we cannot discover at least an apparent cause for our perceptions our initial reaction is to reject them out of hand as figments of our imagination. That is, we reject the perception as a perception of an objective happening occurring in independence of us. On the other hand, when we are made aware of a cause capable of producing this occurrence we immediately regard our perception as a perception of an event. Alternatively, when a person holds to the belief that X is an objective happening when we have searched for a cause or causes and found no indication of the existence of any, we usually regard this person as one who rejects rationality. Such examples do not prove conclusively that all objective happenings possess one or more causes but they do bring to the surface the extent to which the Principle of Causality is embedded in our conceptual scheme.

A philosopher who believes that we first observe events and then establish in what manner, if any, they are causally related has, unwittingly, put the cart before the horse. Rather, the converse of this position is true. In order to establish that an event has indeed

occurred we must be able to connect it causally with another event. That is, if A-B is an event A & B must be causally related or alternatively, the occurrence A-B causally related to another event or events.

In order to see a happening as possessing an order of its own we must see it causally necessitated. It is a matter of contingency the manner in which the event is causally related but, one thing that is not a matter of contingency is that if the occurrence A-B is an event it is causally related in some fashion to another event or events.

We do not know that we are cognizing events except when we know that events are causally related in a way in which simultaneous states of affairs are not causally related.⁹³

⁹³Lewis White Beck, "The Second Analogy/ And The Principle Of Indeterminacy," in The First Critique ed. by Terence Penelhum and J.J. MacIntosh (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1969), p. 91.

V

I do not intend to present and discuss all of the common objections raised against Kant's analysis in the Second Analogy. In the preceding pages we have had occasion to discuss objections raised against Kant, however at this point perhaps a discussion of some of the objections raised by Shopenhauer would be profitable.⁹⁴

Kant has argued that in the perception of an event, as opposed to the subjectively successive, the order of our perceptions is bound down, is irreversible. For example - in the perception of a house, we may either perceive the house from its foundations to its roof, or alternatively from the roof to foundations. Whereas in the perception of an event, e.g. a ship sailing downstream, we cannot perceive the event except in that very order. Shopenhauer has objected that the two examples are analogous; if we could drag the ship upstream we could reverse this order just as we can reverse the order of our perceptions of a house. In both of the examples the -

... change in our perceptions is necessarily determined by the movement of a body, only in the case of a house it is our eyes that move relatively to surrounding objects, in

⁹⁴ See A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment Of Causality (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1969), pp. 86-90.

the other case it is the ship. Hence one succession is quite as objective as the other.⁹⁵

Shopenhauer's objection is a result of a blatant misunderstanding of the point of these examples. However, Shopenhauer is correct in thinking that if subjective and objective succession are to be contrasted then there is not sufficient reason to regard the movements of a ship as objective. For, in the case of the house we do not in an important sense reverse the perception; there are two events as there would be if we were to drag the ship upstream. This objection though does not possess the force it may initially appear to. Kant would not claim that if one were observing the eye movements we would *ipso facto* regard them as subjective. In the case of the house our eye movements are subjective in the sense that our perceptions are determined by them and not by the object of our perceptions. However, in the example of the ship our eye movements do not determine the manner in which the ship sails - upstream or downstream. Rather, it is the movement of the ship which determines the order of our perceptions. We cannot reverse the order of our perceptions merely by looking upstream. It is the object which determines the order and in these

... cases we apprehend the subjective order of our experiences as corresponding to, and explicable only through, the objective sequence of events. In holding to this distinction

⁹⁵A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment Of Causality (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1969), pp. 86-87.

Kant is not concerned to deny that even in the order which is determined by the subject's purposes or caprice objective factors are likewise involved. The fact that the foundations of a house support its roof, and will therefore determine what it is that we shall apprehend when we turn the eye upwards, does not render the order of our apprehensions any the less subjective. But that this order is *purely* subjective, Kant could never have asserted.⁹⁶

A second objection raised by Shopenhauer is that succession in time is not sufficient to establish the existence of a causal sequence. If we identify the objective sequence with the causal sequence then, for example, because night succeeds day we are forced to conclude that day causes night. Or, if a person leaves a house and a tile falls from the roof then, according to Kant's analysis, it is the person's leaving the house which causes the tile to fall. Shopenhauer, then, is charging that Kant's analysis leads to absurdities.

In answer to this objection we may say, firstly, that Kant never claims that the lesson to be learned from the example of the sailing ship was that the ship upstream caused the ship to be downstream. The force of the example is to make us aware of the way we in fact operate. That is, in the apprehension of an event we *ipso facto* regard it as a causal sequence. However, the "... objective relation of appearances that follow upon one another is not.

⁹⁶ Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary To Kant's "Critique Of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 367.

to be determined through mere perception."⁹⁷ The cases just cited are merely more complicated versions of a simple cause-effect relationship, e.g. the red hot stove being the immediate cause of a child's burnt hand. In the other examples the relationship is not quite so straightforward, since we must look for other conditions which make the sequence a causal sequence. It is not sufficient merely to say that if B succeeds A then A causes B. It is the duty of a scientist to discover other conditions x, y, z ... (for example - a loose tile, high winds, the slamming of a door, gravitational forces) which make that sequence a causal sequence, as a result of the sum total of all relevant causal conditions. Kant is not claiming that if B succeeds A then A causes B, but that if the sequence A-B is an event then in addition to all other relevant conditions, if any, A causes B.

A further objection which Shopenhauer raises is that we are capable of *distinguishing* an event from a subjective sequence without being aware of the cause or causes determining the event. In addition, he argues, Kant's claim that particular causal laws can only be *discovered* by experience of the objectively successive conflicts with his claim that we can only *recognize* a succession as objective by discovering which causal laws operate in

⁹⁷ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 219.

its determination.

Perhaps the key to answering this objection is in becoming aware of the difference between words like distinguish and those like recognize or discover. Whereas, in this context *distinguish* is usually used in the sense of perceiving clearly by one of our sense, i.e. being aware or conscious of, the words *recognize* or *discover* have more in common with cognitive abilities - to learn that X is a fact, to claim that X is a fact, to identify as ____, etc. Shopenhauer seems to confuse our being aware of events with our establishing that an event has occurred. To quote A.C. Ewing's succinct statement on this point -

Such objections seem to confuse the consciousness of an event as causally determined by some, as yet unknown, law with the discovery of particular causal laws. Kant's contention is that, when we recognize a succession as objective, we, *ipso facto*, recognize it as causally determined by some unspecified and unknown antecedents, not that, before we can recognize it as objective, we must first find the particular causes by which it is actually determined.⁹⁸

Throughout the Second Analogy Kant argues that event-consciousness, if not equivalent to, at least implies consciousness of a necessary order in time. Consciousness of this irreversibility is the type of consciousness bound up with event consciousness.

... consciousness of necessary order in time and so of causality is found to be implicit in human consciousness from the beginning. But this is not the same as saying

⁹⁸ A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment Of Causality (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1969), p. 88.

that to be conscious of a given event as objective we must first come to know the particular causes which determine it. The point is not that objectivity is inferred from the discovery of a particular causal connection, but that it is simply another aspect of the same concept as necessity.⁹⁹

At this point it might be valuable to set out the major steps of Kant's argument for the synthetic *a priori* status of the Principle of Causality. Firstly, from the Transcendental Deduction it was concluded that consciousness of the objective was a necessary condition for consciousness of the subjective, i.e. consciousness in general, and since we cannot deny that we are conscious it follows that we are conscious of the objective. Secondly, one of the two major conclusions to be drawn from the Transcendental Aesthetic was that time is the form of consciousness. By combining the conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction we may infer that consciousness of objective time is a necessary condition for consciousness of subjective time, i.e. consciousness in general. Finally, in the Second Analogy it has been argued that objective time implies a necessary order in time which in turn is equivalent to a causally necessitated order in time. An argument stating the basic steps of Kant's complex argument might be similar to the following.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| (1) X is conscious \supset X is conscious of time | TA* |
| (2) X is conscious of time \supset X is conscious of objective time | TD** |
| (3) \therefore X is conscious \supset X is conscious of objective time | (1), (2) |
| (4) the concept of objective time \supset the concept of a necessary order in time | Second Analogy |
| (5) the concept of a necessary order in time = a causally necessitated order in time | Second Analogy, TD |
| (6) \therefore the concept of objective time \supset a causally necessitated order in time | (4), (5) |
| (7) X is conscious \supset X is conscious of objective time | (3) |
| (8) the concept of objective time \supset a causally necessitated order in time | (6) |
| (9) X is conscious of objective time \supset a causally necessitated order in time | (7), (8) |
| (10) \therefore X is conscious \supset a causally necessitated order in time | (7), (8), (9) |

* TA = Transcendental Aesthetic

** TD = Transcendental Deduction

The previous discussion brings us to a serious objection which I would like to consider. In the Second Analogy Kant claims that "The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive."¹⁰⁰ This statement could be interpreted to mean that we can only apprehend

¹⁰⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 219.

the successive and never the co-existent or permanent. In the following quotation A.C. Ewing charges Kant with committing a formal fallacy - the fallacy of circular argument.

Kant denies it to be possible to distinguish the co-existent and the sequent in any single case by simply having representations that co-exist as opposed to representations that follow each other, and denies it on the ground that our apprehension is always successive.¹⁰¹

To such an argument it has been straightforwardly denied that all apprehension is successive. Cognitive psychologists have claimed to have discovered what they term *visual fields*. They claim that the model of a person's consciousness of his environment being a one dimensional succession of objects is much too crude. Rather, they claim to have found *fields* of perceptions where we apprehend not only the successive but also objects which co-exist and endure. If we appeal to introspection this is certainly borne out, for not only are we conscious of the successive but also of the co-existent and permanent.

In defense of Kant it must be pointed out that Kant never claimed that the apprehension of the manifold is *merely* successive, so that awareness of the co-existent becomes impossible.

Our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. Through it alone we can never determine whether this manifold, as

¹⁰¹ A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment Of Causality (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 82.

object of experience, is coexistent or in sequence.¹⁰²

The Second Analogy is not dependent on the claim that all our apprehension is by nature successive; indeed it may be that such a claim, if true, would undermine the thesis of the Second Analogy. For, the lesson to be learned from the Second Analogy and the Analogies is that the Principle of Causality is needed not only to distinguish objective succession from subjective succession but also objective succession from objective co-existence. For example - because we can reverse our order of perceptions of a house we know that they are not governed by the law of necessary succession in time.

Considering Kant's argument with reference to visual fields we would say that in a visual field we may be subjectively conscious of the co-existent, however any change in this visual field involves succession. I would submit then that Kant does not wish to deny that we can perceive, be subjectively conscious of, two co-existent objects. Rather what he wished to bring to prominence was the rather uncontroversial claim that change involves succession.

¹⁰² Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 213.

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