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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

D.H. LAWRENCE AND AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS: A STUDY OF *WOMEN IN LOVE*, *AARON'S ROD*, *KANGAROO* AND *THE PLUMED SERPENT*

by

BARBARA ANN MENSCH

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1988

ISBN 0-315-52768-4

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
RELEASE FORM

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TITLE OF THESIS: "D.H. Lawrence and Authoritarian Politics: A Study of *Women in Love, Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*"

DEGREE: Doctor of Philosophy

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1988

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "D.H. Lawrence and Authoritarian Politics: A Study of *Women in Love, Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*"
submitted by Barbara Ann Mensch
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisor

Date: April 21, 1988

This thesis is dedicated to my husband and my son, Fred and Julian, without whose steadfast help and support the work could never have been completed. A special thanks, Julian, for all the thesis "tips" you so thoughtfully provided.

ABSTRACT

Numerous critics have pointed to fascistic elements in some of the works of D.H. Lawrence. This thesis represents, in part, an attempt to categorize the various points of view and to analyze their validity. The terms "fascism," "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism" are then defined comprehensively, and a psychological profile is drawn of what would constitute an authoritarian – and ultimately a fascistic – personality.

This psychological profile is then used to analyze a number of representative characters in some of Lawrence's novels, namely *Women in Love, Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*. Results of the analysis indicate that in all of these novels the protagonists cannot be viewed as authoritarians, while some of the secondary characters portray definite authoritarian-fascistic traits. In *Women in Love*, Gerald Crich manifests virtually all the characteristics of the authoritarian personality, while Rupert Birkin is characterized by a lack of authoritarianism. Aaron and Lilly of *Aaron's Rod* are again non-authoritarians, while some of the minor characters like Jim Bricknell and Captain Herbertson exhibit strong authoritarian characteristics. In *Kangaroo*, Richard Somers is the non- authoritarian, while Jack Callcott again exhibits a strong authoritarian personality. *The Plumed Serpent*, finally, posits an utopian environment in which the leader,

Don Ramon, is non-authoritarian, but maintains control of the utopia largely through the authoritarian arm of his chief lieutenant, Don Cipriano.

While none of the protagonists of these novels exhibit authoritarian-fascistic traits through their psychological profile, they do act as spokesmen for a new world, in some ways a world that can only come to be if the old world is first eliminated. This puts into focus Birkin's speech on the annihilation of the species near the end of *Women in Love*, Lilly's call for a strong leader and willing subjects in *Aaron's Rod*, and the emphasis on strong leadership in *The Plumed Serpent*. In all these instances, Lawrence is not applying authoritarian or fascistic principles, but is postulating an utopian concept as a reaction to the rigid authoritarianism and mechanization that dominates the world of these novels.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As is the case in most scholastic efforts, this thesis is the product of more than one mind. The thesis was originally begun under the supervision of Dr. Shirley Rose, and while it is now a significantly different work from what was first envisaged, her influence is nevertheless evident. Suggestions for further reading from Dr. Jerald Zaslove at Simon Fraser University also had their influence. A reading course from Dr. Chris Bullock on Lawrence and fascist ideology helped establish the basis for the thesis as it now stands.

A very special thanks goes to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Fred Radford, whose patient guidance and thoughtful suggestions made the whole venture possible. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Nora Stovel for her careful reading of the work and her help with regard to style, and Dr. Gary Watson for his valuable insights into Lawrencian scholarship. The suggestions made during the thesis oral by Dr. George Zytaruk and Dr. M. Van de Pitte were also much appreciated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will consider possible fascist themes in some novels by D.H. Lawrence, primarily *Women in Love* and the three "leadership" novels: *Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*. In order to examine the fascist concept, analogous concepts such as "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism" also need to be defined. A focal point of the thesis will be to define the terms as completely and accurately as possible, and then to determine where, and how, they may be applied in an analysis of Lawrence's work.

It is also necessary to understand the attitudes towards fascism within Lawrence's milieu. If fascism is a difficult concept to deal with in the 1980s, it is doubly difficult to ascertain correctly what was understood as fascism within Lawrence's own time. Those early years of fascist development were predominantly a time of extreme confusion. In 1900, Winston Churchill, elected to Parliament as a Conservative, crossed the floor to join the Liberals instead (he was accused of "socialist" leanings for this move). England, like other European countries, had coteries of socialist movements since the late nineteenth century, and the real fear in the English "establishment" of this time was not of authoritarianism, but of socialism. Roy Jenkins, in his biography of Asquith, states:

> in the first years of his reign King George V thought of any individual or movement tinged with "socialism" as inimicable to the throne. In February, 1911, ... a letter which the Home Secretary had written [stated]: "The King thinks that W. Churchill's views ... are very socialistic." (235)

These views would be reinforced by conservatives throughout Europe after the 1917 revolution in Russia, with its attack on the aristocracy and established order. On the other hand, Mussolini's "fascism" attracted amused, but rarely fearful notice, as Lawrence himself notes as late as 1928:

> I don't care about right and wrong, politics, Fascism, abstract liberty or anything else of the sort... Why do modern people almost invariably ignore the things that are actually present to them? Why, having come out from England to find mountains, lakes, scythe-mowers and cherry trees, does the little blue-eyed lady resolutely close her blue eyes to them all, now she's got them, and gaze away to Signor Mussolini, whom she hasn't got, and to Fascism, which is invisible anyhow? (*Phoenix II* 533)

There was very little negative reaction to fascism at first because no one seemed to view it as the regressive tyranny it turned out to be; no one seemed to protest actively against the dangers of this kind of authoritarian order until the time of the Spanish Civil War. By then, the protesters were a curious blend of ardent socialists, people like Nancy Cunard, the model for Lucy Tantamount in Aldous Huxley's *Point Counter Point*, who worked as a war correspondent in the Spanish civil war (Fielding 121). Many writers of the twenties were apathetic – or contemptuous – toward existing political systems. Virginia Woolf is a good case in point; her view of politicians was: "... what humbugs they all are! – or rather hypnotised by the incantation of some siren quite invisible to the outside world..." (*Letters* 283). Lawrence's battles with political criticism centered primarily around the censoring of erotica in his works; no critic assailed *The Plumed Serpent*

with accusations of a fascist theme at that time. It was three years after Lawrence's death that T.S. Eliot wrote:

> A man like Lawrence ... with his acute sensibility, violent prejudices and passions, and lack of intellectual and social training, is admirably fitted to be an instrument for forces of good or for forces of evil; or as we might expect, partly for one and partly for the other. A trained mind like that of Mr. Joyce is always aware what master it is serving; an untrained mind, and a soul destitute of humility and filled with self-righteousness, is a blind servant and a fatal leader. (*After Strange Gods* 58-59)

Eliot here accuses Lawrence of promoting evil through his art, but Eliot would not necessarily have argued that authoritarian systems are evil. In the same lectures he emphasizes that:

> the struggle of our time [is] to concentrate, not to dissipate; to renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connexion between the individual and the race; the struggle in a word, against Liberalism. (48-49)

Eliot's belief in a renewed classicism is not an antithesis to an authoritarian order, but one approach toward it. Peter Ackroyd, in his recent biography of Eliot (1984), states:

> by his twenties, Eliot had attached himself to an intellectual movement, which existed in America, England and Europe, the main tenets of which were an attack upon humanitarianism and liberal democracy, the espousal of a hard classicism after the flatulence of Rousseauist "self-expression," the affirmation of absolute and objective values, and the recognition of the need for order and authority to discipline man's fallen state. (76)

If Eliot disapproves of Lawrencian artistry, it is because he feels that Lawrence lacks any "moral or social sense" (Ackroyd 36-37), not because of any specific political philosophy that Lawrence endorses.

The focus of this study, then, is first of all to define the terminology as accurately as possible, clearly distinguishing between authoritarianism, totalitarianism and fascism. With these definitions established, the social

milieu of Lawrence's time will also be considered; then, the definitions will be applied to the actions and behavior of specific characters in Lawrence's novels, to determine whether or not these characters display authoritarian, totalitarian or fascist attributes. In *Women in Love,* Gerald Crich is portrayed as an authoritarian personality, and the novel ends with Birkin's unfulfilled desire for an intimate community of people that extends beyond the marriage bond; Lawrence also expresses this desire outside the fictional world in his ideal of Rananim.[1] After *Women in Love*, Lawrence moves toward a further examination of communal relationships and the need for a leader. *Aaron's Rod* may be seen as Lawrence's attempt to be a leader, *Kangaroo* as his trial at being a follower, and finally, *The Plumed Serpent* as a futuristic attempt on his part to imagine the perfect relationship between leader and follower.

---

1 This is most clearly expressed in a letter of January 1915 to Koteliansky, in *The Quest for Rananim.* (Zytaruk 22)

CHAPTER 1

LAWRENCE CRITICISM RELATING TO FASCISM

One of the first of Lawrence's critics to address the fascist issue was Christopher Caudwell, who, in his *Studies in a Dying Culture* (1938), accuses Lawrence of producing "fascist" art. Caudwell defines fascist art as:

> [going] back to old primitive values, to mythology, racialism, nationalism, hero-worship and *participation mystique*. This Fascist art is like the regression of the neurotic to a previous level of adaptation. (56)

Caudwell points to the contradictory nature of fascist artistry in Lawrence's work:

> If therefore we are to cast off intellectualism and consciousness we must abandon all symbolism and rationalism *tout court*, we must *be* and no longer think, even in images. Yet on the contrary Lawrence again and again *consciously* formulates his creed in intellectual terms or terms of imagery. But this is self-contradiction for how can we be led intellectually and consciously *back* from consciousness? It is our consciousness that Lawrence attempts to extend and heighten even at the moment he urges us to abandon it. (59)

Caudwell denies that thinking and feeling are equal to consciousness and unconsciousness in Lawrencian theory. Feeling, he insists, is as conscious as mental thought, and what Lawrence advocates is really a return to an instinctual primitive level of behavior – in fact, to a grossly insensitive state of regressive being. He concludes that Lawrence has romanticized "the old bourgeois pastoral heaven" (70).

Lawrence's early champion was F.R. Leavis, who, from 1930 on, evaluates Lawrence's art within the framework of an established literary tradition, and compares him favorably within that tradition. While Leavis was scholastically courageous enough to begin scholarly criticism on Lawrence as early and continuously as he did, having only books such as Middleton Murry's *Reminiscences of D.H. Lawrence* to refer to at that time (*D.H. Lawrence: Novelist* 10), his study of Lawrence's art evades or ignores the more serious leadership themes of the "leadership novels." He summarizes *The Plumed Serpent* as an "attempt to prove, in imaginative enactment, that the revival of the necessary religion is possible" (10). This summation of Lawrence's controversial novel is, in retrospect, both too kind and too short-sighted.

In 1939, William York Tindall finds that Lawrence's anti-intellectualism and primitivism resemble that of the Nazis, but feels that Lawrence is "more sentimental than any except the earliest of the Nazis; he wanted to destroy machines and money, not control them" (178). Lawrence's religiosity leads Tindall to categorize him finally as a theocratic fascist. In a similar vein, Bertrand Russell's well-known comment that Lawrence's theory of blood consciousness "led straight to Auschwitz" (115), appeared in his autobiography in 1968. Russell felt that:

> Lawrence, though most people did not realize it, was his wife's mouthpiece. He had the eloquence, but she had the ideas. She used to spend part of every summer in a colony of Austrian Freudians at a time when psychoanalysis was little known in England. Somehow, she imbibed prematurely the ideas afterwards developed by Mussolini and Hitler, and these ideas she transmitted to Lawrence, shall we say, by blood consciousness. (115)

In 1950, Lionel Trilling, in *The Liberal Imagination*, sums up the anti-liberal bias of many western artists (he includes Lawrence in this anti-liberal category): :

> If ... we name those writers who, by the general consent of the most serious criticism, by consent too of the very class of educated people of whom we speak [i.e. of the liberals], are to be thought of as the monumental figures of our time, we see that to these writers the liberal ideology has been at best a matter of indifference. Proust, Joyce, Lawrence, Eliot, Yeats, Mann (in his creative work), Kafka, Rilke, Gide – all have their own love of justice and the good life, but in not one of them does it take the form of a love of the ideas and emotions which liberal democracy, as known by our educated class, has declared respectable. So that we can say that no connexion exists between our liberal educated class and the best of the literary mind of our time. And this is to say that there is no connexion between the political ideas of our educated class and the deep places of the imagination. (98-99)

In 1955, Mary Freeman attempts to refute the charge of fascism in Lawrence's art in her study, *D.H. Lawrence: A Basic Study of His Ideas*. She is right to note the complexity and multi-faceted nature of this concept; she finds that "[f]ascism is a massive loose-jointed composite" (191). She qualifies the charge of fascism equally well:

> No one element abstracted from the fascist composite makes fascism or a fascist. Even a cluster of similar elements organized differently, or in a different context, may have a different meaning. (192)

The problem with Freeman's attempt to vindicate Lawrence is that she deals solely with the actual historical practice of fascism, and not at all with fascist ideology. Her point that "fascism was the complete subjugation of men to the productive machine" (200) is true in the actual practice of fascism in Germany in 1941, but would the German populace have been so enraptured by a political ideology that openly espoused this at the beginning? Nazi propaganda took great care to romanticize and disguise these harsh facts.

The myths and religiosity that were used in the presentation of fascist ideology must be evaluated, and their appeal must be better understood in order to decide whether a writer is finally fascist or not. It is too narrow to focus only on the actual events (although they must be considered fully as part of the examination of fascism), without recourse to the elemental reactionism of the movement itself.

The 1960s offer a brilliant plethora of stimulating and insightful critics who attempt to understand the relationship of fascism and art. In 1963, Julian Moynahan is highly critical of the political solutions that Lawrence offers in *Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo*, and *The Plumed Serpent*:

> The leadership novels reflect a temporary breakdown in Lawrence's morale.... The chief characters of these novels are, overwhelmingly, self-exiles from the European bourgeoisie who fall into positions of political and social extremism from despair at finding anything tenable to cling to. The same formula may cover Lawrence himself during some of those years. (113-14)

In 1967, Laurence Lerner calls *The Plumed Serpent* "the worst of all:...it is the most ambitious (and the most fascist)" (173). Lerner pinpoints the cruelty of the ritual sacrifices as the most undigestible element:

> It is perhaps not necessary to demonstrate at length how pernicious the message of this book is: so I will only briefly mention the murder of the traitors, the long ritualistic slaying that would be frightening if it were not ludicrous. What is frightening is Kate's subsequent reaction:... There is no such thing, we see, as rising above morality. The ecstasy which drives Kate to feel "what do I care," drives her to condone very specific acts that exist on a down-to-earth level. It is never safe to say of any man "he is of the gods." (176)

John Harrison parallels these sentiments, which are perhaps intrinsically part of the sixties' ethos of moral-political consciousness. In *The Reactionaries* (1966), published a year before *The Truthtellers*, Harrison agrees with Lawrence that modern civilization is in need of change: two world

wars only twenty years apart are not indicative of health, but Harrison chides Lawrence for childish irrationality in his vehement response to the first world war: "... to rage and stamp one's foot at being medically examined does not do much good" (166). Like Lerner, Harrison focuses on the sacrificial murders in *The Plumed Serpent*, which he finds an example of how Lawrence is fascinated "by the idea of blood-sacrifice, even human sacrifice" (184). Harrison states that:

> Lawrence's views on social leadership are inherently close to the fascist conception of society.... Lawrence anticipated the fascist emphasis on ritual and symbols. In *The Plumed Serpent* the semi-religious, semi-political movement seems to consist of ritual and symbols, and very little else. In politics, the casting off of mental consciousness leads straight to the mass hysteria of the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. Belief in the power of a natural leader, in "dark gods," in irrationalism and racialism, had disastrous results in the 1930s, when Nazism gave them perverted political forms.
>
> Lawrence wanted society to be organized in a rigid hierarchy – in the shape of a cone or a pyramid – the fascist conception of society.... There is no doubt that Lawrence's homicidal tendencies and his belief in "blood" are reminiscent of the worst features of German fascism. He deserves sympathy when he struggles to describe entirely new and much better personal and social relationships, but a certain viciousness of temperament, together with the evasiveness of his style, do much to counteract the sympathy. (188-89)

In 1970, Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* designates Lawrence's art as fascist, but more as a sideline than as the central issue: her primary purpose is to uncover male dominance and female exploitation. Nevertheless, she finds in Lawrencian art "the political structure of patriarchy itself, and Lawrence's fine new talk of dark gods, his jargon about spontaneous subordination, is simply a very old form of bullying, which in other contexts we are accustomed to call fascistic" (269). Millett finds that fascism and

male supremacy go hand-in-hand in Lawrence's works, much as they did in actual practise in Nazi Germany:

> *Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo,* and *The Plumed Serpent* ... are unquestionably strident, and unpleasant for a number of reasons, principally a rasping protofascist tone, an increasing fondness of force, a personal arrogance, and innumerable racial, class, and religious bigotries.... With *Kangaroo's* heavy emphasis on masculine privilege, politics, and the public life, from which females, citizens or not, are jealously excluded, come a whole series of other attitudes which we have come to know in this century as particularly dangerous and unpleasant: racism, a lust for violence and for totalitarian authority and control, a hatred for democracy, and a contempt for Christian humanism as a despicably "Jewish" weakness. (281-82)

In 1971, Norman Mailer wrote *The Prisoner of Sex* as a rebuttal to Millett's work. Mailer presents a strong case for Lawrence's art as being an endorsement of sexual love between man and woman – difficult as that love may be to achieve. But his endorsement of Lawrence's political stance is more evasive:

> There is a stretch in the middle of his work, and in such unread tracts as *Aaron's Rod* and *Kangaroo,* when the uneasy feeling arrives that perhaps it was just as well Lawrence died when he did, for he could have been the literary advisor to Oswald Mosley about the time Hitler came in, one can even ingest a comprehension of the appeal of fascism to Pound and Wyndham Lewis, for the death of nature lived already in the air of the contract between corporate democracy and technology, and who was then to know that the marriage of fascism and technology would be even worse, would accelerate that death. Still, such fear for the end of Lawrence is superficial. (136-37)

Mailer concludes, finally, that "Lawrence was not only trying to sell dictatorial theorems, he was also trying to rid himself of them" (139), much as he attempted to overcome the Oedipal complex in *Sons and Lovers.* Mailer feels that the ideas presented in Lawrence's art are presented to be tested, lived through vicariously as it were, and then discarded:

> ...his ideas cannot simply triumph, they have to be tried and heated and forged, and finally be beaten into shapelessness against the anvil of his profound British skepticism which would not buy his ideas, not outright, for even his own characters seem to wear out in them. (138-39)

Lawrence criticism after the 1960s seems to label his work fascist under varying degrees of censure, dependent upon whether or not the critic is finally pro Lawrence or anti Lawrence. The 1970s critics are more given to a qualification of the term; K.K. Ruthven argues that the term "fascism" meant something different to Eliot, Yeats, Lawrence, Pound and Lewis than it means to us – that, in fact, the political programme of fascism should be strictly distinguished from the actual political activities pursued. Earlier, in 1956, Graham Hough had argued that, although Lawrence's leadership phase embodied many fascist ideas, "Lawrence died too early to be put to the only really diagnostic test" (239). Similarly, Ruthven feels that Lawrence and other artists of the twenties have been labelled "fascist" or "proto-fascist" not because they endorsed Mussolini, but because of certain attributes they applauded, such as strong-arm government, racism, and an élitism based on social standing or circumstances of birth: these attributes *are* proto-fascist, independent of a particular political creed. Ruthven feels that:

> Lawrence's fascination with vigorous alternatives to wimbly-wombly young men brought him to the attention of more sinister believers in *Blutgefühl*, but he would have laughed at the idea of *The Plumed Serpent* being recommended as reading suitable for British Fascists, as it was by Rolf Gardiner in *World Without End* [1932]. (225-30)

But how can one be sure that Lawrence would have laughed; Ruthven's assertion is hypothetical. Ruthven does, however, recognize that art may influence actual events. He cites W.B. Yeats as an example, suggesting that

some of Yeats's plays and poetry actually helped instigate the Easter uprising of 1916 (227).

In 1970, Baruch Hochman's study, *Another Ego*, presents the main thesis that:

> Lawrence moves from a radical individualism to what I term a radical (if qualified) communalism – not out of waywardness, but out of a sustained engagement with the issues and observations that underlie his initial individualism. (xi)

Hochman finds that Lawrence anticipates both Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse in finding "no necessary conflict between nature and civilization or between culture and the instincts. Hence, [Lawrence] can argue so vehemently for enactment of man's spontaneous desires without threat to the civilized community" (19). Hochman's examination of Lawrence's critique of democracy is helpful, pointing out Lawrence's recognition that "the 'world' of modern group-life is, paradoxically, an amorphous realm that, for all its chaos, is absolute (totalitarian) in its demands" (187). Despite this, Hochman finds that the charge of fascism in Lawrence's work is basically unjustified, because "'the personal-passional' relationship to a leader [is] so different from the mechanism of fascist self-subordination, yet formally so like the formulation of the leadership principle in fascist ideology" (221). Hochman does admit that Lawrence's "need for socially sanctioned outlets for repressed blood lust comes close to fascism" (220); Hochman's conclusion, however, is that Lawrence's "later reversion to what I have termed communalism represents a capitulation, an acknowledgement that the pains of individuation are too keen, that the candle is not worth burning" (258). Hochman's conclusion is refuted by Jerald Zaslove, who, in reviewing the book, states:

> what is not seen is that [Lawrence] is, however idealized, an anarchist, an asocial being more like the Cezanne who could paint an apple, a man who had learned the "reciprocity of tenderness." (62)

In 1973, Scott Sanders finds Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent* to embody a "totalitarian social order" (167). He cites Wilhelm Reich's analysis of the authoritarian patriarchal family to be the basis of authoritarian political receptivity and asserts that Lawrence, "proceeding along the same psychological path but in the reverse direction, ... embraced an authoritarian model for the state because it assured male dominance in marriage" (227). Sanders falls on one side of a division amongst various critics in his conclusion that Lawrence was, finally, a political thinker, or rather that Lawrence's works embrace political stands:

> Defenders of Lawrence ... often argue that we must distinguish the mythic visions of a writer from the political shapes they take. On these grounds, Mary Freeman, L.D. Clark, Eugene Goodheart, Keith Sagar and M. Jarret-Kerr, among others, have eloquently defended him against political criticism. Thus in *The Plumed Serpent*, one might argue, Lawrence is imagining a reintegration of the self, or a rediscovery of the religious faculty, not a revival of some neo-fascist pre-Columbian state. But men's imaginings about nature, personality and society *do* take political shapes, which often mirror personal anxieties and desires. (170)

Paul Delaney's vivid account of the war years in Lawrence's life, published in 1978, presents the view that Lawrence was "too naive and wilful" (135) to understand or construct a viable political program. Recently, Keith Sagar's study, *D.H. Lawrence: Life Into Art*, argues with Raymond Williams' earlier charge that Lawrence ends *Women in Love* with an evasive flight from society, from social reality. Sagar finds the "star-polarity" balance proposed by Birkin to be the start of the social impulse in Lawrence's art. Daniel J. Schneider's *D.H. Lawrence: The Artist as*

Psychologist takes this view further through his analysis of Lawrence as a self-psychoanalyst – one who:

> in his thinking about the social causes of neurosis, never persuaded himself that personal therapy, or "mind-cure," is enough, or that freedom is within the reach of most men. A healthy humanity, he knew, cannot exist in a sick society. Social and political rebellion are a precondition of psychic health. (4)

Two recent studies, Judith Ruderman's *D.H. Lawrence and the Devouring Mother* and Sheila MacLeod's *Lawrence's Men and Women*, parallel each other in determining that Lawrence is primarily motivated throughout his career and his life by the dominance of females in his life; the political side of the novels is scarcely mentioned and certainly not emphasized by either critic. Ruderman does examine the formation of the totalitarian personality in chapter ten of her study. But her opinion that "... political programs in and of themselves never interested Lawrence..." (7) coincides with Delany's viewpoint. These opposing viewpoints bring into focus a problem that is significant within the context of this study: how consciously – or self-consciously – must a political stance be assumed by an artist before he is said to be "political" (whether liberal, conservative, socialist or fascist)?

Sheila MacLeod, a year after Ruderman's study, argues that "...Somers is not much of a political animal..." (62).[1] Anthony Burgess, in *Flame into*

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1 Brian Moore has commented that one need not *be* overtly or even strongly political for one's political and social prejudices to show. Moore points out that this is especially so in the case of the artist: "*Ginger Coffey* was highly successful, I hate to tell you, as a film, in Russia, of all places, because the Russians saw it as an attack on migration to capitalist countries. I didn't think of that. Still, if you look at it that way, the book is totally critical of the Canadian system. But that criticism isn't stated in political terms. I'm not saying that I am political, but I think deep down, buried in every writer, his prejudices show, even if they're not directly visible" (74).

Being, is evasive about Lawrence's political proclivities: he concludes that "...the political theme had best be ignored: this philosopher writer can rarely be swallowed whole" (124). Furthermore, he asserts that Lawrence "...was not as anti-democratic as he liked to think; he was merely honest enough to state openly that we all need living models of superior energy and genius, that there is a *canaille* around, and that politicians are, for the most part, inferior animals" (204). Burgess, himself a highly socialized, urbane novelist, is assuming that Lawrence will define "politics" and political issues from a similarly "socialized" perspective. Lawrence, however, examines a more profound, or "primal" psychological reality through his novels; this reality nevertheless embodies strong social/political repercussions. Like Burgess, Ross Parmenter, in his study of *Lawrence in Oaxaca*, admits that "Huitzilopochtli's Night" is "a stumbling block" (304). His apologia for Lawrence as a possible fascist is bewildering:

> Lawrence, then, did not preach ... fascism personally, and he saw his religion as anti-fascist in spirit. His Ramën, too, tries to insure that his religion will not become fascist. Yet such is the honesty of the novel that its religion takes the step of public murders as a fascist means to frighten the villagers from further attempts on their lives. (304)

This seems to be an attempt to exonerate the ideology, but it finally exonerates nothing; to adopt fascist or totalitarian methods is to err, finally, where fascism did.

Peter Scheckner's book *Class, Politics, and the Individual* analyzes Lawrence's awareness of class differences, and by extension, illuminates the milieu of Lawrence's time. His conclusion is that the "ghost that most haunted Lawrence was neither sexual nor psychological but social" (19). It is interesting to note that both Paul Delany and Scheckner point out that Lawrence began as a socialist; both critics cite Lawrence's letter to Bertrand

Russell in which he states: "It is no use saying a man's soul should be free, if his boots hurt him so much he can't walk." Still, socialism in England in 1915 had a hazy, undefined, all-encompassing aura, evolving as it had from a pastoralized guild system. On the other hand, the term "fascism" had not even been coined at the time, but extreme conservatism is virtually indistinguishable from authoritarianism, and these political platforms were the precursors to the fascism of the 1930s.[2]

When an awareness of fascism did emerge, the radical connotations attached to both socialist and fascist ideologies made them almost indistinguishable political alternatives to many people. Churchill's famous walk across the floor of parliament to switch from conservative to liberal has already been cited as a parallel example of the unstable political affiliations – or distinctions – that characterized the period. An even more ironic example is found years later in Lawrence's letter to Koteliansky (Feb. 1, 1929), in which he refers to Sir Oswald Mosley as "the Socialist" (Zytaruk 47). Two years later, Mosley headed the British Fascist movement. Mercurial transformations of political stands such as these are evidence that the terms "fascist," "socialist," etc. were neither clearly understood nor agreed upon. Another example is found in Germany in the early 1920s, when Moeller van den Bruck, the writer of the reactionary right, drew fatefully close to negotiating with German Communists:

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2 It is interesting to note that Mussolini too began his political career as a socialist. George Watson maintains there was little awareness of fascist ideology in England until the 1930s, even by the intelligentsia. In fact, he states that "[b]efore 1933 intellectual fascism is scarcely to be seen or heard in Britain" (72).

> For a brief moment, in the streets, in meeting halls and in the columns of party newspapers, German nationalists and fascists collaborated with the Communists. (Stern 308)

Clearly, neither side understood the other, nor even, perhaps, itself; the possibility of such a merger now seems ludicrous, but we have a retrospective vision to aid us. It was difficult for artists in the 1920s to understand these terms, especially since the politicians themselves could not adequately define them. If most English intellectuals became aware of fascism as late as the 1930s, however, Lawrence's recognition of this ideology came ten years earlier, since he was in Italy at the time of Mussolini's ascendance to power. But Lawrence's estimation of fascism at this early date was that "[i]t was an anti-socialist movement" that was reduced only to "another kind of bullying" (*Movements* 316).

If the terms "fascism" and "socialism" were confusing during the '30s, they are no less confusing now, with socialists defining fascism as a reactionary or right-wing program that is inherently anti-socialist, while conservative critics like George Watson claim that fascism is essentially socialism and that "the myth of fascism as a conservative force ... [is] fundamentally a Marxist myth" (94).

Perhaps one of the strongest approaches to Lawrencian political ideology is by John Carey in his essay "D.H. Lawrence's Doctrine." Carey pleads for honesty in looking at Lawrence's art; apologetics from narrow points of view, whether from politics, psychology, sociology or Christianity, are not, he feels, facing the dilemma squarely. Neither is "the pretence that really he was a decent, moderate sort of fellow, almost a Christian" (133), much of an insight. Carey states, however, that "it is in the final paradox of Lawrence's thought that, separated from his warm, intense, wonderfully articulate being, it becomes the philosophy of any thug or moron" (134). What

is very important about Carey's essay is that he recognizes the shallowness and superficiality of some of the charges of fascism against this particular author. This, he says, is not the first artist who appears at times authoritarian. Thus, why is there such a "hue and cry" about Lawrence in particular:

> An alternative manoeuvre is to link Lawrence causally with phenomena generally agreed to be horrible, like concentration camps. Lawrence's "mystical philosophy of 'blood'," according to Bertrand Russell, "led straight to Auschwitz." Even granted that the beliefs of Lawrence and the Nazi killers coincided to some degree (and it would be futile to deny this), Russell's way of putting the case glosses over the plain fact that Lawrence's beliefs did not issue in mass murder but in writing novels. Unless life is to be deprived altogether (and how could it be deprived?) of violent and destructive and irrational ways of feeling, it is ludicrous not to distinguish between people who can bring these feelings to a life-enhancing end in great literature, and people who can produce only a pile of corpses. As well blame stabbings on cutlers. Besides, the Russell faction has to reckon with a third set of Lawrence's detractors who contend that a good many previous or contemporary writers – Carlyle, Nietzsche, Yeats – thought much as Lawrence did. If the responsibility for Auschwitz is to be transferred to men of letters, it will need to be thinly spread. (133)

This review of Lawrence criticism relating to fascism, then, has revealed two major flaws in many of the critical works. One flaw is that the critics' definitions of "fascism" are often fuzzy and inadequate. This inadequacy is further exacerbated by the problem of perspective. Contemporary critics tend to view Lawrence's works from the contemporary perspective; this includes a recitation of all the atrocities committed in the name of fascism, even though none of these atrocities were actually committed during Lawrence's lifetime. Nazism never became a reality until three years after Lawrence's death. The retrospective vision has tended to cloud Lawrence

criticism with emotional connotations that are confusing and often detract from the integrity of the critical analysis.

The second flaw in criticism to date is that critics appear too anxious to praise or damn Lawrence unconditionally. This is due, in part, especially with respect to the early critics, to Lawrence's own personality, which, like his writings, seemed to invite either outrage or idolatry. Clearly, a need still exists for an objective analysis of fascist, and accompanying authoritarian and totalitarian, elements in Lawrence's works. This analysis must also be based on an adequate definition of these political stands, and a comparison of how they relate to each other.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

The major problem regarding Lawrence criticism to date, as it relates to fascism, would seem to be a lack of authoritative definition of the term. What does the word "fascism" really mean: the historical factors leading to the development of fascism, the methodology or actual practice of fascism, the ideology of fascism as a political program, or the psychological make-up of the fascist mass, or the fascist individual? Some critics have adopted a very narrow definition, often resulting in political condemnation of much of Lawrence's art. Others have defined fascism so nebulously that it becomes a simple matter to distinguish "art" from "politics" and thus exonerate Lawrence of virtually any charge. It is especially difficult to define aesthetics in relation to a fascist perspective, unless one clearly understands what is meant by the term itself.

The subject becomes all the more complex when other terms that are almost analogous, but not equal to the word "fascist," are used. The concepts of "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" are often incorrectly used as synonyms for "fascism." Nor can these concepts be ignored, since they *are* all interrelated, and more importantly may, within the context of this study, all define various aspects or nuances of Lawrence's work that need to be differentiated from the term fascist.

The complexity of the terminology makes it necessary to refer to the

works of established authorities on the subjects of fascism, totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Some of the authorities to be considered here will be Ernst Noltë, Hannah Arendt, T.W. Adorno, Fritz Stern and Wilhelm Reich. These scholars have examined at length and from various perspectives the issues that this thesis attempts to define. Even with this intimidating body of scholarship devoted to an understanding of authoritarian politics, fascism and totalitarianism, no clear and simple theoretical definition exists. A summation might be that fascism consists of a reactionary force which, growing slowly in cultural and intellectual milieus, and abetted by certain historical conditions in both politics and economics, finally emerges with a simplistically idealistic program. This program is emotionally and pseudo-religiously served to the masses, until the power of the reactionary force is complete and, in certain cases, enforced through totalitarian means.

At this point the problem of perspective becomes significant as well. The fascist issue has been defined from sociological, moral-philosophical, historical and psychological perspectives. Each perspective has its own level of significance, and the differing viewpoints may, in fact, be of critical significance in analyzing Lawrence's progress as a writer. Terry Eagleton has pointed to the fact that Lawrence started writing from a "social" or proletarian perspective (157). A possible hypothesis regarding the leadership novels would be that they chronicle a change in Lawrence's art from a social to a continuously more individual/psychological perspective. Defining the terms from various, interrelated perspectives may therefore uncover a richness in these novels that would otherwise be lacking.

Lawrence's art does not reveal human nature in terms of simplistic categories, such as political disposition, psychological makeup or erotic appetite. The power and success of his writing at its best is based on a portrayal

of the interrelated aspects of these different areas of human experience. Thus, an approach that can achieve a composite or multi-layered interpretation is essential to understand Lawrence's relationship to fascism fully. Superficially, his outward, conscious and rather flippant response to the theory was a guffaw. Mussolini, he claimed, should wear a ring through his nose (Barr 23), but, in the leadership novels, one finds a closer entanglement with "fascist" concepts: it is this area that requires examination.

One approach to the central political-historical-ideological and psychological concept of "fascism" is found in Ernst Noltë's *The Three Faces of Fascism* (1963), which considers the political theory of fascism in the 1920s and '30s. Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) examines another kind of political structure that is often confused with fascism, and which emerges alongside of fascism in Germany. Wilhelm Reich's *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (1933) is a historical-psychological study of the specific characteristics that contribute to the rise of fascism, while T.W. Adorno et al., in *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), present a psychological study of the reactionary personality. This study is particularly useful in determining authoritarian/fascist characteristics in some of the characters of Lawrence's novels. Finally, Fritz Stern's valuable study, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (1961), offers insight into the historical-ideological trends that, beginning in the early nineteenth century with three specific ideologists (Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck), led to the ideology of fascism. Other studies will be referred to where applicable, but the above-mentioned works are the primary sources used to reach an interrelated definition of what is meant by fascism.

A look at the phenomenon of fascism necessitates consideration not

only of its specific political practice in the 1920s to '40s (although this is definitely part of the definition), but also of its historical base, its ideological approach, and the psychological make-up of the kind of personality attracted to fascism, as well as a psychological "profile" of the whole population or mass of people under fascist rule. Obviously, several approaches toward learning are present here; equally obvious is that one single approach (for example, a specific political theory, without recourse to an understanding of the historical milieu, the economics, the psychological climate of the time, and the time immediately preceding it) is inadequate because it is too narrow.

Because fascism, once established, so brutally controls individual freedoms, especially when it is also a totalitarian system, it becomes necessary to understand how such a power evolves and succeeds. Fascism effectively blocks every area of human thought, so the political theory alone cannot define the term adequately, cannot explain such complete control. An individual supporting fascism may rationalize his position on grounds of anti-socialism, considering that an authoritarian system will politically block the advance of socialism, and that this is why it is desirable. Implicit in the appeal of fascism, however, is also a psychological impulse away from the burden of responsibility toward total submission and suspension of responsibility. This shifting of responsibility from the individual to an authoritarian ideology appears as a relief, especially in an environment already dominated by confusion and widespread dissatisfaction. Politically, the support for fascism may appear to the voter to be a strong response to a desperate situation, yet psychologically, it is regressive, even childish.

At the same time, one must consider the "Zeitgeist" or climate of thought – that reaches backwards and thus becomes a historical view –

which begins the receptivity towards fascism. The ideological motifs may have been present a hundred years before, although not immediately recognizable as such. Many critics who lay the charge of "fascism" in the field of aesthetics offer no comprehensive definition of the term. At most, they pinpoint coincidental attributes between fascist regimes and the artist's work. Ernst Noltë cites the example of President Roosevelt being charged with fascism and compared to "Mussolini as long ago as 1934" (8-9). Yet it becomes obvious, when examining Roosevelt's career, that the charge is undeserved:

> ...it is precisely from this example of Roosevelt that we see how careful we must be not to infer fascism from isolated "fascist" traits. There is no doubt whatever that in his ideas and personality Roosevelt was fundamentally opposed to fascism (and not only to Hitler and the fascism of Germany). Apparently there must be a "fascist minimum" without which the noun would be meaningless and even the adjective "fascist" doubtful (9).

It becomes necessary, therefore, to approach the political phenomenon of fascism from various points of view. The harmony between ideological viewpoints varies, yet each may be truthful in its own distinct sense. Fascism is a reality that existed in parts of Europe from the 1920s to '40s: the definitions of this phenomenon are varied, sometimes contradictory, because the approach "does not merely 'double' ... [fascism's] self-understanding, but constructs an interpretation of that self-understanding, an ideology of that ideology" (Noltë 68). The ideological approach here connotes a complex structure: "an inherently complex formation which, by inserting individuals into history in a variety of ways, allows of multiple kinds and degrees of access to that history" (Noltë 69).

At one point in this multi-levelled approach to fascism, it becomes necessary to deal with Noltë's definition, that fascism is a direct response

to the rise of socialism. This is an apparent contradiction to Hannah Arendt's assertion that totalitarianism is characterized above all by genocide. The two writers almost seem to be discussing different methodologies, and yet we know that in the case of Nazi Germany they are certainly speaking of the same model. Each theorist, because of the inherent value of his ideological approach, is capable of articulating a particular reality that is not uncovered by other approaches. On this basis, then, the most ideal and honest approach is a multi-layered combination, bringing to light its own truths about fascism.

The term fascism was coined by Mussolini (about 1920), and defined loosely, evasively, and attractively as an all-encompassing ideology: "organized, concentrated, authoritarian democracy on a national basis" (Noltë 7). Noltë pinpoints a more concise definition of the term:

> Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy. (20-21)

Noltë is primarily interested in establishing fascism as a specific political revolutionary *reaction* to certain conditions of the times during and between the two world wars:

> The war, the revolution, imperialism, the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States, were not locally confined phenomena. Neither could a movement which came into being as an outcome of the war, a movement which fought revolution with revolutionary methods, which radicalized imperialism, and which saw in the Soviet Union ... the greatest of all threats, be called a locally confined phenomenon, no matter how many differences might be attributable to it due to local conditions. *This movement would have found its place in the Europe of the postwar period even if Mussolini and Hitler had never lived.* No term other than "fascism" has ever been seriously proposed for it. [italics mine] (6)

Noltë defines the term "fascism" with regard to the political *theories*, the "ideas and values" that it embodies. The leaders, he says, might have been different people, but the essential political movement would have occurred regardless, because of the special set of circumstances of that time.

Noltë isolates many characteristics of fascism, which he alternately (and erroneously, if we accept Arendt's distinction) calls totalitarianism. First and foremost, he cites the establishment "of an ideologically oriented single party" which enforces strict uniformity, "if necessary by terroristic methods" (12). Under such rule, the individual's "religious and moral obligations toward God" (Noltë 12) are dissolved, and the state has total claim over the individual. Three further characteristics that Noltë cites as attributes of totalitarianism are:

> terrorism, which proceeds with extreme harshness against the familiar and the traditional; ... universalism, which aims at world domination; ... [and] perversion, which demands those very things which are contrary to the laws of God and humanity. (18)

Finally, Noltë finds that fascism is characterized by: "The unshackling of primitive instincts, the denial of reason, the spellbinding of the senses by pageantry and parades" (20). He acknowledges that, in practice, "ideology [is] of a secondary and instrumental nature in fascism" (70). Noltë diagnoses the fear expressed by Maurras and Hitler, the feeling that "culture" would be lost, drowned in the mediocrity of the rise of the masses. This theory was prevalent at the time, and is also expressed by Ortega y Gasset, in his *The Revolt of the Masses* in 1932:

> There is no culture where there are no standards to which our fellow men can have recourse. There is no culture where there are no principles of legality to which to appeal. There is no culture where there is no acceptance of certain final intellectual positions to which a dispute may be referred. There is no culture where economic relations are not subject to a regulating principle to

> protect interests involved. There is no culture where aesthetic controversy does not recognise the necessity of justifying the work of art.
>
> When all these things are lacking there is no culture; there is in the strictest sense of the word, barbarism – properly speaking, there are no barbarian standards. Barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be made. (79)

But Ortega has no sympathy with fascism, and holds liberal democracy to be the only possible political salvation from socialism. At any rate, one finds people as different in their political sympathies as Maurras and Ortega y Gasset expressing the same concern over the stultifying power of the conformist masses. In the western world, the 1920s and '30s represent a time when men from all backgrounds and callings rebelled against such mass-produced mediocrity in a mood of bitter post-war disillusionment. Certainly, British literature alone gives ample evidence of such a mood.

Noltë traces the fascist concept of "liberty" to the early Rousseauian idea; by restricting *all* levels of choice and experience in an individual's life, and by substituting complete obedience to, and the total domination of one ideal, Rousseau – and later, the fascists – offer man the illusion of "complete" liberty:

> Since human and social conditions must mean restriction and dependence, a form of dependence would have to be found, the nature of which would no longer be particular but total, and which in its very totality would coincide once again with the nature of original liberty. If each person surrenders himself completely, that is, uniformly, to the law of the *volonté générale*, total obedience is equivalent to total liberty, since each human being no longer faces another human being, or a chance institution, but only the universality of his own self. (32-33)

This concept of total domination is in line with Mussolini's notion:

> Fascist man does not lead a life apart from all others, independent, self-indulgently following the whim of the moment: instead he personifies 'nation and *patria*,' moral law which links individuals and generations together in tradi-

tion and vocation. (Noltë 245)

Such a theory of "unfreedom" is idealized most at times when the individual has little power to change existing conditions, for example, during the labour unrest in Britain at the time, or during the period of weak hypocrisy of the Weimar Republic in Germany in the 1920s. The democracy of the western world is equally blemished, as John Harrison points out: "the men who possess the real power are not the elected delegates, but the men who control the purse strings, the financiers and the controllers of big business" (207).

Noltë analyzes the three models of fascism that were dominant in Europe for a time: Action Française, Italian Fascism and National Socialism. His approach is to analyze the phenomenon from a political-theoretical perspective. Hannah Arendt, in her three-volume study, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, offers an historical-sociological approach to a definition, not of fascism, but rather of the specific term "totalitarianism." Unlike Noltë, who does not differentiate fully between the terms fascism and totalitarianism – indeed, at one point he defines totalitarianism as simply "a secularized theocracy" (36)[1] – Arendt is very clear in her distinction between the two terms. Fascism exists as a political movement in Germany, Italy and France, yet Italy and France do not evolve into *totalitarian* regimes, while Germany does. Arendt agrees with Noltë's view that ideology is of secondary importance in fascism, although she identifies the ideol-

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1 Noltë's definition of "totalitarian" is extremely loose and all-inclusive; at another time he states that "[t]he word 'totalitarian,' in the sense of laying full claim to, and obligation on, a human being, is applicable to every religion, every outlook on the world and on life, even the liberal. But only in the eyes of liberalism is this form really purely formal – that is, not ultimately concretizable..." (219).

ogy within the context of the totalitarian movement. She finds that "adherence to a totalitarian movement ... did not depend upon an ideological consensus, upon rigid devotion to racial or class credos" (Whitfield 26). She also agrees with Noltë's notion that the individual under a fascist regime is totally dependent on the state. Human spontaneity and diversity are restricted so completely that the void left in the individual "soul" is easily converted, trained or terrorized into belief in a rigid ideology:

> Total domination, which strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual, is possible only if each and every person can be reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so that each of these bundles of reactions can be exchanged at random for any other. The problem is to fabricate something that does not exist, namely, a kind of human species resembling other animal species whose only "freedom" would consist in "preserving the species." (Arendt, III 136)

Arendt underscores this substitution of total bondage for total freedom by quoting Hitler's assertion that the fascist strives "for a condition in which each individual knows that he lives and dies for the preservation of his species" (III, 136). The fact that Arendt is talking about concentration camp prisoners and Noltë about the general populace in a fascist state does not deny their agreement here: the two kinds of victims differ only in the degree of the intensity of the control that is exercised over their lives, although that control at its most intense often resulted in the death of the victim.[2]

Noltë points to the *kind* of violence used in the fascist state, which "is organized, not elemental; brutal not wildly passionate" (70). Arendt paral-

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2 Reich's theory that fascism is not a surrender to an authentic, spontaneous emotion, but a surrender to a super-imposed abstract myth, an artificial "liberty" from self, is also a parallel that might be noted here.

lels this definition through her description of the tactics used by Hitler's SA troops and later the SS troops in their administration of the concentration camps. She relates how the early SA administration used perverse, impassioned, spontaneous brutality, which was later changed, under the SS troops, to efficient indifference:

> The real horror began ... when the SS took over the administration of the camps. The old spontaneous bestiality gave way to an absolutely cold and systematic destruction of human bodies, calculated to destroy human dignity.... (III 151-52)[3]

In exploring his theory of fascism, Noltë cites many characteristics that parallel much of what Arendt is saying. Noltë, however, has established a link between three primary models of fascism, and has tried to show how they exemplify the theory. While much of Arendt's work coincides with Noltë's, she does not define fascism as such. In fact, she has little interest in the Action Française or Italian Fascism as embodying the heart of the problem. Arendt has distinguished not theory, not "ideas and values" as peculiar to fascism, but *method*, the means and ways of enactment, and she defines these as "totalitarian," rather than as fascistic. She finds only two models, Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, to be strictly totalitarian, since the one overriding characteristic of totalitarianism is the mass extermination of human beings.

Again, Noltë's central thesis is that:

> Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement

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3 Arendt's later study of Eichmann on trial in Jerusalem supplements this aspect of totalitarian violence: what she found in Eichmann was a man who was "coldly efficient, indifferent, and 'banal' in his evil" (Whitfield 210). What would have bothered Eichmann's conscience most was the feeling that he had failed or disappointed his superiors as a bureaucrat (Whitfield 226).

> of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy. (20-21)

This represents a strong *theoretical* assessment and definition of the growth of fascism as the simple polarization of authoritarianism versus socialism, but utilizing basically the same methods as socialism. Arendt, however, makes a critical distinction in the methods used: "the difference between Fascism and totalitarianism might be summed up in one word: genocide" (Whitfield 39). While Noltë defines fascism as an authoritarian reaction *to* Bolshevism, Arendt isolates Stalinist Russia (*not* Bolshevism as such) and Nazism as parallel examples of totalitarian rule.

When we examine literary works for possible "fascist" theories and motifs, how do we distinguish between a "fascist" theory and a "totalitarian" method? Does Céline, for example, illustrate traits that are characteristic of fascism or totalitarianism? More specifically, when Birkin entertains the possibility of the annihilation of man in *Women in Love*, is this a fascist trait, or a possible example of totalitarian method, or an artistically objective vision of man's decline? Charles Maurras, theoretician of the Action Française, shows a fear of annihilation of the species that may be somewhat parallel to Lawrence's articulation:

> For Maurras, the swamp, the power which destroys life and beauty, and liberalism, the dominating thought pattern of the modern age, are identical. And at this point it becomes clear that in his fear – a fear which may seem purely political – Maurras is in the last resort concerned with himself and mankind: "Should the liberal lie spread over the earth, should anarchism and universal democratism spread the 'panbeotie' announced by Revan, should the barbarians from the depths, as predicted by Macaulay, appear at the appropriate time, then man will disappear as a human being, just as he will have disappeared in the form of Frenchman, Greek, or Latin" (Noltë 103).

As stated earlier, there is some confusion of terminology amongst the theorists themselves. Noltë talks about the "totalitarian" character of Mussolini's Italian Fascism, and even of the "partial totalitarian" nature of the Roman Catholic Church. Arendt would say the twentieth-century Catholic Church could not possibly be called totalitarian, because no mass extermination of sectors of the populace was committed. Furthermore, the authoritarian hold that Italian Fascism had on its people, although repellent to a liberal, was never as complete and total as the totalitarian power of Nazism and Stalinism over its people. The power of Nazi Germany was due partly to the *terror* inculcated through mass exterminations, "known but not known" by the populace. The presence of the Vatican in Italy may have had a mitigating effect on the Italian movement. At any rate, Italian Fascism may be characterized as "authoritarian," while German fascism and Stalinism is characterized as "totalitarian." Towards the end of his book, Noltë states:

> The poles of authoritarianism and totalitarianism bracket a span ranging from Pilsudski's regime, via the political totalitarianism of Falangist Spain, to the all-encompassing totalitarianism of Mussolini and Hitler. (460)

In the light of Arendt's more specific definition of totalitarianism as always accompanied by genocide, Noltë's above statement makes little sense; the terminology is too abstract and undefined. Noltë does, however, establish fascist theory as a direct reaction to Marxism. This is significant, as Hitler, in calling his ideology "National *Socialism*," insidiously incorporated the illusion of significant socialistic content into his program. Where Marxism uses slogans like the "brotherhood of man," National Socialism refers to the "Volk," a nationalistic form of brotherhood. But socialism was never truly a part of the fascist doctrine. As David Schoenbaum states:

> "Socialism" in its conventional senses was difficult, if not impossible, to lo-

> cate in Nazi practice. But as an effective concept it had a very real meaning in Nazi attitudes. It was hortatory and defined a state of mind. (56)

Marxist-related ideology was "typically modified," to suit fascistic purposes. This again reinforces the most vital distinction between the varying forms of fascism, the distinction of the *methods* adopted to enforce the ideology. The fascist methods practiced in Italy, France, and Franco's Spain were clearly different from those practiced by the two totalitarian models that Arendt defines: National Socialism and Stalinism. Because only one of the totalitarian models is coincidentally fascist as well, it must be stated that totalitarian regimes are not necessarily fascistic regimes, and conversely, fascist regimes are not *necessarily* totalitarian. By extension, then, the charge of fascism should not instantaneously conjure up the image of genocide, which is solely the attribute of totalitarian systems.

Reconsidering Bertrand Russell's remark that Lawrence's theories of blood-consciousness "led straight to Auschwitz" reveals some over-generalization of thought. Is Russell accusing Lawrence of fascism or totalitarianism? Probably Russell himself would be unaware of the difference.

While Noltë and Arendt examine fascism from a historical-political-sociological base, Wilhelm Reich analyzes the psychological elements of the German fascist regime in an attempt to understand the masses' unquestioning acceptance of this reactionary political program. In *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (1946), he defines the concept as:

> characterized by metaphysical thinking, unorthodox faith, obsession with abstract ethical ideals, and belief in the divine predestination of the fuhrer. These basic features are linked with a deeper layer, which is characterized by a strong authoritarian tie to the fuhrer-ideal or the nation. The belief in a "master race" became the principal mainspring of the tie to the "fuhrer" on the part of the National Socialist masses, as well as the foundation of their voluntary acceptance of slavish submission. (80)

Reich sees the authoritarian family structure as the mainspring of fascism. This emphasis of Reich on an authoritarian patriarchal family structure as a primary source of fascism will be vital to the study of Lawrence's leadership novels. For Reich, authoritarian families were dominated by "compulsive" marriage and family ties, as well as by a heavy reliance on mysticism:

> The greater part of this mysticism and what is most important about it is a biological energy process, an extreme expression of reactionary sexual ideology, irrationally and mystically conceived. *The creed of the "soul" and its "purity" is the creed of asexuality*, of "sexual purity." Basically, it is a symptom of the sexual repression and sexual shyness brought about by a patriarchal authoritarian society. (84)

Reich perceives fascism as a universal psychological quality, potentially active in all people. In an attempt to assess it objectively, he finds that:

> wherever we encounter authoritarian and moralistic suppression of childhood and adolescent sexuality, a suppression backed up by the law, we can infer with certainty that there are strong authoritarian-dictatorial tendencies in the social development, regardless of which slogans the ruling politicians use. (215)

Reich is more concerned about the personality of the fascist and the mass appeal of the ideology than he is about actual ideological or political platforms:

> The word fascism is not a word of abuse any more than the word capitalism is. It is a concept denoting a very definite kind of mass leadership and mass influence: authoritarian, a system in which power takes priority over objective interests, and facts are distorted for political purposes. Hence, there are "fascist Jews," just as there are "fascist Democrats" (214).[4]

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4 Elspeth Cameron, reviewing some of Timothy Findley's novels, likewise suggests that fascism is a common psychological propensity that one must recognize within oneself in order to defeat it. Findley, she states, "manages to have his fascism and beat it too" (33).

More specifically, Reich finds the rise of fascism in Nazi Germany to be due to the unshakeable belief in the *state*, rather than in the mass of individuals themselves. The form of the state becomes, in such a situation, invested with more importance, security and hope than does the *essence*, the people. Reich cites the multitude of weak political parties in Germany between the wars as an essential cause of the German populace turning to fascism (280). His final analysis, however, is that the mass of people themselves act *irresponsibly* when they turn power over to the state, rather than retaining it as their own right:

> If we take *"freedom"* to mean first and foremost the *responsibility of each individual to shape personal, occupational, and social existence in a rational way*, then it can be said that *there is no greater fear than the fear of the creation of general freedom.* (320)[5]

Such an analysis is innately revolutionary;[6] this view of freedom as social responsibility would require a complete transformation of self and society in order to work. Reich's theory also ignores, or makes meaningless, the specific rise of reactionary politics in the 1930s. Fascism and totalitarianism may be the outcome of a long trend toward authoritarian self-definition, but why, at that particular time in history (1930s), did it gain such prominence – not in an isolated instance, but in many countries and parties?

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5 Erich Fromm, in *Escape From Freedom*, also deals with the ambiguous, often frightening elements of freedom and the appeal of an authoritarian structure that represents an "escape" from the responsibilities inherent in "freedom."

6 Reich does not desire immediate sexual transformation or social freedom such as the 1960s "free love" generation attempted to enact. He cautions that "We have to be on our guard against allowing our wishful revolutionary thinking to get the best of us and regarding as a realistic possibility that which is only right 'as such'" (200), the "as such" meaning that the desire for change is evident, but the necessary social conditions have not yet been met.

As an actual governing power, fascism was successful in only three countries. In this sense, it would appear to be an isolated phenomenon of the 1920s to '40s. In a less rigid sense, authoritarian trends, or elements of psychological readiness for authoritarianism, have been found in the western world long before this period. It is notable that the 1960s were also a time of heightened political and moral awareness. But only the intellectual strata, a fairly narrow fraction, of the "hippie" movement were probably truly politically sophisticated. The majority of the young represented a dangerous wish to be free of middle-class North American conventionality, without any real awareness of their ideological vulnerability. Joan Didion describes such innocence in her essay "Slouching Towards Bethlehem" (1967):

> Anybody who thinks this is all about drugs has his head in a bag. It's a social movement, quintessentially romantic, the kind that recurs in time of real social crisis. The themes are always the same. A return to innocence. The invocation of an earlier authority and control. The mysteries of the blood. An itch for the transcendental, for purification. Right there you've got the ways that romanticism historically ends up in trouble, lends itself to authoritarianism. (125)

Didion's description of the migration of the masses of flower children to Haight-Ashbury parallels the young German drifters whom Stern analyzes in Moeller van den Bruck's milieu and time. Thus, the possibility of authoritarian control over such rootless, valueless and hopeless groups is underlined by their break with reality and by their naiveté.

Reich's theory must be examined in comparison with the more precise political, historical theories of fascism offered by Noltë and Arendt, defining the fascism of the period from 1920 to 1945.

A comparison of Reich's theories to Lawrence's belief in the rejuvenation of man through sexual fulfillment affirms the fact that both point to the

tie between sexuality or unconscious life and political/social life. The similarity between Reich's theories and Lawrence's art is striking, in that both emphasize the need for sexual fulfillment as indicative of self-integration, as well as the integration of the self with others and within society. For Reich this integration would define the individual as a free, *responsible* political entity as well, the opposite pole to the fragmented, unwholesome, *irresponsible* authoritarian personality that chooses to serve blindly, rather than to exercise the option of freedom. Some critics have found that Lawrence's art defines an authoritarian male as compatible with sexual fulfillment, and even essential to the integration of self and society. While this is the message that Lawrence seems to proclaim in his leadership novels, one intent of the present study is to examine the validity of this assumption, which has caused a great deal of critical controversy.

Two critics who deal very specifically with these questions of integration and authoritarianism in Lawrence's works are David Boadella and Scott Sanders; they are consequently dealt with here, rather than in the preceding chapter.

Boadella finds a close similarity between Reich's theory of orgonotic energy (Sharaf 280) –the spontaneous flow of energy, within and without the body – and Lawrence's recognition of the need "of the right kind of contact between men and women, the restoration of the capacity for merging" (134). Where Lawrence talks about the counterfeit nature of modern love, Reich analyzes "substitute contact." Lawrence, says Boadella, "is aware of the extent to which, since genuine feelings so often do not exist, they have to be faked and are faked on a mass scale, as well as in individual lives" (40). Boadella compares Lawrence's recognition of "sentimentality and counterfeit feeling" (Boadella 40) to Reich's theory of "substitute contact":

> It is a major part of the work of an orgone therapist to recognise the false, artificial feelings for what they are – substitutes for orgonotic contact, which prevent any strong excitations taking place.... Reich gives some everyday examples of artificial and ungenuine contact: "loud obtrusive laughter; forced rigid handshake; never-changing lukewarm friendliness; ... stereotyped portrayal of surprise or delight; rigid sticking to certain views, plans or goals; ... exaggerated hail-fellow-well-met behavior; rigid conversational way of talking" (Boadella 40).

In contrast to this empty, artificial form of contact, Lawrence and Reich both emphasize their reverence for individual life and freedom. Boadella quotes Lawrence's advice on educating a child: "First rule, leave him alone. Second rule, leave him alone. Third rule, leave him alone. That is the whole beginning" (63). Reich's dictum is synonymous: "remove every obstacle in the way of this naturally given productivity and plasticity of the biological energy.... The newborn child is first of all a piece of living nature (61,63).

Both Reich and Lawrence recognize that true sexual fulfilment is rare and not to be confused with, in Reich's words, "the various mechanical substitutes" (Boadella 41) that pass for normal in society. True sexuality is whole-person involvement, as well as whole-body involvement.[7]

Boadella also challenges Caudwell's assertion that Lawrence demands "we must *be* and no longer think," that "intellectualism and consciousness" (Caudwell 56) must be abandoned. Both Reich and Lawrence emphasize a different, more whole knowing than that offered by the western rational "in-

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7 Myron Sharaf notes the criticism these theories of Reich's have received. One interesting comment is by James Baldwin: "There are no formulas for the improvement of the private, or any other, life – certainly not the formula of more and better orgasms (who decides?). The people I had been raised among had orgasms all the time and still chopped each other up with razors on Saturday nights." Sharaf rightly finds this criticism the usual misinterpretation of Reichian "orgiastic potency" (102).

tellectualism":

> Truth is not something to be learned or imparted to the organism. It is born as a crucial function within the organism, and it develops as long as the organism maintains its unitary functioning, which means full orgonotic sensing. (Boadella 50)

Boadella finds that Lawrence's perception of truth closely resembles this kind of knowing, when he quotes Lawrence's statements: "The profoundest of all sensualities is the sense of truth ... if you can't feel truth you can't have any other satisfactory sensual experience" (Boadella 50). Caudwell's intellectualism, however, "is mental, and reflects the rigidity of machine civilization. It is the kind of knowledge which kills the thing it is trying to know" (Boadella 51).

Boadella does not remain totally uncritical of Lawrence's theories; the Lawrencian theory of the polarities of destruction and creation make "hate ... fundamental" (Boadella 26) in the psyche, and Boadella denies that this is so. Boadella instead believes in the negative character armor which is *acquired* through social and familial pressures, and which must be broken through to achieve a creative existence. His strongest argument against Lawrence – and this is predictably the greatest difference between Lawrence and Reich as well – derives from Lawrence's emphasis on authoritarian discipline. Boadella feels Lawrence's attitude towards the sexual education of children is too puritanical and rigid, "an example of precisely how *not* to educate children sexually" (70). Similarly, Lawrence's dictum that "whipping, beating, yes, these alone will thunder into the moribund centres and bring them to life" (Boadella 74) is one that repels Boadella:

> ... but no, Lawrence, children do not need rage from their parents. They do not need beatings, in order to grow healthy. They may need to express rage, and the more vital they are, the more readily they will express it, against their

parents often. (75)

In advocating violence to educate children, Boadella asserts, Lawrence approaches "complete agreement with the authoritarian educator" (76). The study finally, however, establishes many more points of similarity between the ideas of Reich and Lawrence than it does differences: both held the tenet of a central life force that must be preciously guarded against repression and distortion.

Scott Sanders finds that Lawrence's art focusses on the unconscious part of the human psyche, what Lawrence himself termed the "carbon" of humanity. Traditional personality portrayals are, for Lawrence, too manipulated, too contrived in their cerebral presentation of self. They confuse the truer issue of self-understanding:

> To use Freud's terms, he set the ego against the id. But the id is not an identity at all, rather a name for the unknown, a territory of obscure forces, the dark and silent basement of the self. All of Lawrence's works exhibit a greater interest in the shadowed basement than in the sunlit house. (16)

Lawrence's greatest contribution to literature may well be, as Anthony Burgess has asserted, his portrayal of the human unconscious, the underlying emotional states of being that comprise the essence of the human makeup. Burgess compares the respective approaches that Joyce and Lawrence take in their artistic analysis of the unconscious:

> There is more "fine writing" in Joyce than in Lawrence (look at the first chapter of *Ulysses*), and Lawrence's exploi on of the ill-formed sentence – a high poetic content qualified by a deliberate looseness of shape – is in the service of rendering the jerky illogicality of life. The poetic subject-matter itself is a deeper layer of human consciousness than fiction had previously been equipped to admit. Lawrence's contribution to the novel lies in his having found a technique for such deep-level mining. Joyce in *Ulysses* touches preverbal areas of consciousness and shows the naked libido at work. In *Finnegan's Wake* he dares to dive into the sleeping mind. But he is committed to human

> identity in a way that Lawrence is not, and it is probably fair to say that his experimentation has been acceptable only because of that solid traditional element in his work. Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker's initials are stitched into the fabric of Joyce's dream-prose like a desperate monogram, a gesture of fear of the loss of identity. Lawrence's characters sink easily into the world of "otherness," where human life accepts that it is also natural life, and identity – "the screaming of the ego," as Huxley puts it – is quelled. (208)

Lawrence's focus on the significance of the unconscious was, to some extent, coincidental with his milieu's growing fascination with psychoanalysis; there existed a growing recognition that the conscious mind, the "tip of the iceberg," was no longer adequate to understand human behavior. Lawrence's emphasis on human sexuality as the purest extension of the unconscious into daily life simultaneously imbues sexuality with positive, creative, life-enhancing power. Sanders thus finds Lawrence's portrayal of the unconscious as a positive force to parallel Wilhelm Reich's theory of sexual fulfillment as the source of creative living:

> Psychoanalysts have consistently distinguished this social self, the being-in-the-world, from some primary natural self. For Freud of course the socially-imposed self was the superego; for Jung it was the *persona*; for Wilhelm Reich the "character defense structure"; and for R.D. Laing the "false-self system." Lawrence's own view was closest to that of Reich, who considered the social self a crippling and vicious imposition upon the spontaneous, animal self.... Lawrence, ... like the Romantics before him and like Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse since, held that man is not inherently corrupt, but is corrupted by his institutions, particularly by those which repress his sexual impulses. For Lawrence this did not mean wholly ignoring Darwin's "nature red in tooth and claw" – after all in *The Rainbow* there are the stampeding horses and the wild beasts wheeling in darkness – but it did mean claiming that men were capable of living much more freely and finely and peacefully than their present society permitted. (Sanders 68, 84)

Lawrence's art parallels Reichian theory until the leadership novel phase,

where Sanders criticizes Lawrence's inversion of the Reichian theory that the authoritarian state was based on the authoritarian-patriarchal family pattern. Sanders refers to "lower-middle-class and peasant families" (161-62) as being the most authoritarian in structure, and is concerned with the patriarchal authority Lawrence deems necessary in the home. Lawrence's extolling of a strong male image is not, however, only due to traditional patriarchalism; it also derives from the lack of authority and dignity in males in his own life and in the lives of many of his fictional characters. Walter Morel was not a dominant father figure in Paul's family, nor was Lawrence a dominant husband in his own marriage. Sanders agrees with Reich that authoritarian families produce authoritarian states and concurrently finds Lawrence at fault for wanting more male authority. Lawrence's own experience, however, had been that of too little rather than too much male authority. Admittedly Walter Morel is brutish at times, and a wife-batterer, but *Sons and Lovers* also presents a clear portrait of a father who skulks and cringes under his wife's morally indignant eyes.

This is not to say that the lot of the female in England in 1911 was enviable. Lack of education and profession did often make her home a prison, her life empty of ambition except for the goals of her children. Lydia Lawrence, when strapped for money, opened the front room of the family house as a crafts shop (genteel women have been doing this for many years: witness Hepzibah's cent-shop in Hawthorne's *The House of the Seven Gables*). Lawrence's emergence from a mother-oriented home helped him to be as resourceful and "domestic" as his own mother had been; Frieda Lawrence was bilingual, but Lawrence was the one who "translated" for money. Whether sexual discrimination or lack of status are connected to these facts of Lawrence's existence, one must appreciate the feminist view-

point and also Lawrence's opposite view; had Lawrence come from a truly authoritarian household like, for example, that found in Samuel Butler's *The Way of All Flesh*, he might easily have condemned patriarchalism as heartily as Butler does.

The Plumed Serpent presents a portrait of the supposedly authoritarian leader who is also a father. Don Ramón is hardly very authoritarian in his fatherhood, and cannot be said to be a strict, puritanical disciplinarian. He shines more as a loving father than he does as a husband, leader, or friend. A truly authoritarian "paterfamilias" would have absolute obedience from his children, most often obtained through violent punishment. One cannot imagine one of his boys saying to him what Cyprian does: "Never, ... never can we love you, papa. You are our enemy. You killed our mother" (388). How does this authoritarian father respond? "'Come to me, little one!' said Ramón softly, holding out his hands" (388). A cornerstone of authoritarian fatherhood is to show no tenderness, no open declarations of caring or love; to do so is to risk jeopardizing the "masculinity" of the boy. Ramón certainly does not personify such an authoritarian pattern as a father.

Authoritarianism is just one of the attributes examined by Adorno et al. in their study of the reactionary personality as a psychological profile of a specific type of political personality. This profile will be extremely significant in determining authoritarian and fascist elements in Lawrence's fictional characters, as it presents a total interrelated approach to fascism. It is a lengthy, complex analysis of reactionary attitudes found within a wide variety of topics. The analysis is based on extensive testing of various groups of people in an objective and scientific manner. Topics examined include attitudes towards stereotyping, superstition, aggression, sexuality, power and "toughness," destructiveness and cynicism. The results of these

studies are predictable at times; in other instances they are surprising.

Leading up to a definition of authoritarianism or "pseudo-conservatism," the authors try to outline the major trends in liberalism and conservatism. Conservative trends include (1) support of the American *status quo*, (2) resistance to social change, and (3) support of such conservative values as practicality, ambition, and upward class mobility. With regard to this last tendency, it should be noted that:

> The values for practicality and rugged competitiveness stand in rather marked contrast to other, psychologically related, values for charity and community service.... [In contrast], [f]rom the "liberal" point of view charity is mainly a soothing of conscience and a means of maintaining an unjust state of affairs. (Adorno 155)

In summary, then:

> liberals tend to view social problems as symptoms of the underlying social structure, while conservatives view them as results of individual incompetence or immorality. [For Conservatives] political problems tend to be seen in moral rather than sociological terms. (155)

It becomes clear in the study that the authoritarian does not evolve naturally out of the conservative personality. What the authors call the "genuine conservative" refers to a personality that supports the democratic tradition in specific elements of competitiveness and economic mobility.

The authoritarian personality, on the other hand, evolves from a political-psychological makeup that masquerades as conservative, but is in fact opposed to the tenets of democracy. Such a stance is called the "pseudo-conservative" and, in its *reaction* to democracy, can be said to incorporate fascism:

> It is, rather, a totally new direction: away from individualism and equality of opportunity, and toward a rigidly stratified society in which there is a minimum of economic mobility and in which the "right" groups are in power, the outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term "reactionary" fits this ideology best.

> Ultimately it is fascism. (182)

This study does not offer a definition of "reactionary" or "fascism" as such. The term reactionary, however, is assigned to "the relation between ethnocentrism and 'conservatism'" (183). It is to be distinguished from conservative in the sense that it is a "distortion of conservatism – a distortion which retains certain surface similarities but which changes the basic structure into the antithesis of the original" (182). With regard to a definition of fascism, the authors simply use "anti-democratic propaganda" to assess "the *potentially fascistic* individual" (1). The key discovery of this study parallels Fritz Stern's psychological-political type of personality which emerges from his examination of Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck. Jean-Paul Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew* (1948) parallels the findings of the Adorno team as well, albeit written in less scientific, more emotionally touching, terms. Reich's description of authoritarian familial structures is echoed throughout this study as well. Finally, some of the basic themes of Noltë's definition of fascism and Arendt's definition of totalitarianism are also found in the reactionary personality. Thus, Adorno states that:

> ... it is one of the major findings of the present study that individuals who show extreme susceptibility to fascist propaganda have a great deal in common. (They exhibit numerous characteristics that go together to form a "syndrome": although typical variations within this major pattern can be distinguished.) Individuals who are extreme in the opposite direction are much more diverse. ... Nevertheless, it was possible to distinguish several types of personality structure that seemed particularly resistant to anti-democratic ideas. (1-2)

The authors carefully, chapter by chapter, elucidate characteristics that pertain to the authoritarian personality. Briefly, these attributes can be summarized in the portrait of an individual who identifies with the form of organized, conventional, socially-accepted religion (209). Such a personality does not recognize or exhibit the self-questioning, evaluative attitude that

is often indicative of true belief; rather, he is likely to adhere blindly to the "familial or maternal choice of religion" (215). The elements of the religious ideology which most serve to reinforce reactionary attitudes, which the authoritarian personality will hold to most strongly and unquestioningly, are firstly, a "complete faith in some supernatural force," and secondly, the conviction that man can never understand everything (321). This belief rests on superstition and the sense of man's ultimate frailty and insecurity, rather than in a hope for the progress of reason. Such assumptions imply the individual's submissiveness and willingness to surrender the control and autonomy of his individual choice. This personality is characterized by strongly conventional values, specifically those of the middle classes. People who fit this description possess a "[s]ubmissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup" (228), and strongly condemn and reject those who flout convention. They exhibit an "[o]pposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tenderminded" (228). They believe in fatalistic determinism and are inclined to think in stereotypes, for example, anti-Semitism. They are preoccupied with:

> the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. (228)

The authoritarian personality, characterized by this emulation of power, is finally both cynical and destructive – anti-utopian, with a consequent "vilification of the human" (228). There is a proclivity within such a make-up to believe in the lurid perversity of man's true nature or, as Adorno says, a "projectivity" of "wild and dangerous things go[ing] on in the world" (228). Such projectivity extends to an "exaggerated concern" with sexual depravity and perversity. (Adorno defines this projectivity psychologically as "...the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses" [228].)

Predictably, the authoritarian personality is likely to be less intelligent and less educated than his opposite, the liberal thinker (287). Further, he espouses overly idealized parental stereotypes and is either unable or unwilling to analyze "conflicts in inner experiences" (342-43). Because this personality type appears intimidated by self-questioning, he is "[f]earful of any reproach or hostility felt towards authority-parent figures" (343). The authors stress that the domination of parental authority, especially a harsh and unbending authority, is often evident in the background of the authoritarian personality, and that the reverse is true of the non-authoritarian:

> For the establishment of the psychology of the unprejudiced man a non-threatening father figure may indeed be of great importance. It makes it possible for the son to include in his conception of masculinity some measure of passivity. (364)

Finally, the authors find, as Reich did in theory, that homes of authoritarian personalities tended to be father-dominated, "or just dominated" (370). This last phrase suggests inclusion of a form of maternal domination that also results in authoritarian conditioning. In contrast, the liberal personality very often comes from a background that is "mother oriented." It is essential to establish the difference between domination and maternal orientation in the conditioning of personality; as Judith Ruderman has shown, the female may be defined as simultaneously succouring and devouring.

The childhood of the non-authoritarian personality is often oriented "*toward the adult and the espousal of internalized standards* as manifested in reading a lot, an interest in school and teachers, and in achievement striving" (439). In addition to this, non-authoritarians were often found to have reported "relative *isolation* in childhood, while the authoritarian types refer to what may be defined as gang-sociability, including such aspects as

popularity and the holding of offices in clubs and high school fraternities and sororities" (439). Lawrence admitted his own lack of popularity, describing himself as "a delicate brat with a sniffy nose" (Spender 15).

The study stresses that the unprejudiced or non-authoritarian individual will readily examine psychological hostilities and "conflicts ... where they originate: with their parents and with themselves" (485). Lawrence, as a young artist, certainly grappled with the possessive hold his mother had on him, and reached a clearer understanding of this relationship through his art in *Sons and Lovers*.

Chapter XVII of Adorno's study describes the political attitudes of the high scorers, the authoritarians: "ignorance and confusion" characterize the content of their thought on the whole, although this is covered up by an "official optimism." They assume a "'practical' bias" (658) to hide their emotional detachment from everything that is beyond their well defined range of action.

In general, pseudo-conservatism is defined by Adorno as "conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness on the ego level, with violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere" (675). Fear of politicians and bureaucrats occurs in both the authoritarian and non-authoritarian personality types (693), but the strong anti-utopian element is a form of "realistic" thinking that exists only in the authoritarian (695). Similarly, authoritarian personalities do not sympathize with the under- privileged or poor: to do so would imply an identification with weakness on their part.

Adorno, then, has provided a very rich, research-oriented definition of authoritarianism. Together with the work of Arendt, Noltë and Reich, this study is critical in providing the multi-faceted approach to fascism that is

necessary to understand the fascist/authoritarian elements in Lawrence's work. The scholastic work done by Arendt and Noltë is necessary to understand the fascist and totalitarian ideologies and their relationship to each other. This ideological comprehension will be important when determining what the fascistic elements in Lawrence's works are, and how significantly they relate to the ideologies and to the actual events these ideologies led to. The work done by Reich and Adorno, especially that by Adorno, provides the tools that allow for a critical assessment of many of the characters in Lawrence's novels. One of Lawrence's remarkable strengths as a novelist turns out to be the sharpness and validity of the psychological portraits he creates; whether these characters prove to be "authoritarian" or "liberal" in their approach to life, they demonstrate a psychological integrity that says much for the author.

CHAPTER 3

"THE PATHOLOGY OF CULTURAL CRITICISM"

The previous chapter has established the ideological basis for an analysis of fascism in Lawrence's works and the psychological profile that will be applied to some of Lawrence's fictional characters. When determining the nature of the "fascist personality," however, it is also interesting to look at some of the "proto-fascist" ideological/artistic figures that actually preceded the period of National Socialism in Germany. The following analysis of the philosophies and personalities of three German theorists, who led to the rise of fascism in that country, will therefore represent the final approach within this thesis toward a multi-faceted definition of fascism and authoritarianism.

Fritz Stern, in *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, examines the lives and works of these writers: Paul Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck. The analysis of these personalities will invite some comparisons between them and Lawrence, especially since none of these writers lived to witness the implementation of National Socialism; therefore, none of them have a retrospective vision. These comparisons between Lawrence and the German writers, where applicable, will form part of the conclusion to this thesis. Lawrence's works are certainly complete in themselves, and do not require a psychological analysis of the artist for clarification. However, once analysis of the novels

is complete, a fuller perception of Lawrence as artist and ideologist may be achieved through such comparisons.

The objective of Stern's study is to examine "the pathology of cultural criticism [in which] ... the dangers and dilemmas of a particular type of cultural despair" (1) are isolated. After the turn of the century in Germany, as in England, an intellectual rebellion is evident against the progress of science and commercialism and the belief in rationality and intellect. This new *Weltanschauung*, is characterized by a growing philosophy of despair and protest against the mechanized, solely rational character of the society of this period. The proponents of this philosophy "detested the growth of mechanization and equated it with arid intellectualism" (Harrison 20). Such a protest was not peculiar to Germany alone: D.H. Lawrence and W.B. Yeats, among others, also protested the growing mechanization of society (Harrison 20).

Stern considers Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck to be the philosophers of "cultural despair." Although Paul Lagarde began writing in the early nineteenth century, while Moeller van den Bruck's *Das Dritte Reich* was published in 1931, strongly similar motifs are evident amongst all three writers. Above all, they shared an intense hatred of liberalism, which they blamed for all that was wrong in their time:

> They attacked liberalism because it seemed to them the principal premise of modern society; everything they dreaded seemed to spring from it: the bourgeois life, Manchesterism, materialism, parliament and the parties, the lack of political leadership. Even more, they sensed in liberalism the source of all their inner sufferings. Theirs was a resentment of loneliness; their one desire was for a new faith, a new community of believers, a world with fixed standards and no doubts, a new national religion that would bind all Germans together. All this liberalism denied. Hence, they hated liberalism, blamed it for making outcasts of them, for uprooting them from their imaginary past, and from their

> faith.... They sensed that liberalism was the spiritual and political basis of modernity and they sought to equate liberalism with...the acceptance of economic selfishness and exploitation, with the *embourgeoisement* of life and morals. They ignored – or maligned – the ideal aspirations of liberalism, its dedication to freedom, the hospitality to science, the rational, humane, tolerant view of man. For what they loosely called liberalism constituted little less than the culmination of the secular, moral tradition of the West. (Stern 10)

Moeller van den Bruck, the last of the German critics that Stern deals with, wrote the famous *Das Dritte Reich*, which the Nazis used extensively as an endorsement of their ideas after his death. Stern emphasizes that "the red thread that ran through all [van den Bruck's] thought and wishes was his loathing for what he had come to identify as the decadent West, with its philosophy of right and reason, its liberalism, its dull and unheroic life" (295). From an examination of the lives of these three critics, Stern uncovers an underlying philosophy, which he calls the "Ideology of Resentment," and which is not only found in recent German cultural history, but everywhere in the Western world. This "rebellion against modernity," states Stern:

> lies latent in Western society and its confused, fantastic program, its irrational and unpolitical rhetoric, embodies aspirations just as genuine, though not as generous or tangible, as the aspirations embodied in other and more familiar movements of reform. (13)

He cites McCarthyism as one recent example of such a philosophy.

Paul (Botticher) de Lagarde was born in 1827, and his writings, warning the German people of the doom they faced, became popular in the mid and later eighteen-eighties. Lagarde can be defined as a moralist and scholar, who was primarily nationalistic in espousing his theories for Germany's rebirth.

Lagarde believed in a rebirth of Germany, and he sought to bring to the people the vision of a Germany reborn. He himself would guide his people to the new Germany. Only a national religion, a Germanic-Christian faith, could effect Germany's spiritual regeneration: "Only the extirpation of liberalism in all its guises, only the inclusion of the Austrian empire – a radical *grossdeutsche* solution – would permit Germany's continued life and growth" (Stern 26). Lagarde's early life is characterized by alienation from his father and dissatisfaction with his scholastic milieu; brilliant as a thinker, he was often erratic and arrogant, argumentative and suspicious of those around him. Lagarde's "loner" stance corresponds to a similar motif in the lives of Julius Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck. Lagarde's personality cost him the chance of ever attaining the university positions that he desired as a scholar; he spent much of his professional life teaching at the secondary school level.

Lagarde viewed himself as the prophet of a Germany reborn, "of the *Volkstum* that was still unspoiled..." (Stern 53):

> Lagarde believed man to be a creature of will and energy and sentiment, for whom reason was of secondary importance: "The core of man is not his reason, but his will.... For like everything that is good, knowledge also enters through the will, whose wings are sensibility and imagination, and whose driving force is love." Man was a spiritual being, and the needs of his soul were far more important and irrepressible than the needs of his body. When Lagarde insisted that he was the last defender of German individualism, he was not thinking of political rights at all; he thought of himself as the last champion of the German character. (Stern 53)

Lagarde idealized suffering and work: the threat of material comfort in the new commercial age was that it would make individuals self-indulgent and lazy. Stern is careful to note that this idealization of adversity and hardship is not original to Lagarde; the German "traditional fusion of Protes-

tantism, especially Lutheranism, and the Prussian ethos" (54), also carries such a moralistic theme. Lagarde carried it further, when established as a writer of repute, by his venomous critique of the German educational system. His proposed new curriculum is a forecast of Hitler's youth programs:

> The state would impose the most rigorous intellectual and moral standards. These schools were not to be polluted by the greatest evils of student life, smoking and drinking. This appeal to abstinence and hardiness underlines the similarity of conception and purpose between Lagarde's dedicated school for potential rulers and the later *Ordensburgen* which combined National Socialist ideology and Spartan discipline to train National Socialist leaders. (Stern 108)

In a similar vein, Lagarde repeatedly reiterated the great need for an all-powerful *Fuhrer*, who would unite the people and represent their united wishes so completely that his absolute command would simply be the expression of the people (Stern 88). The "people," in Lagarde's view, did not include the Jews, "who were a terrible misfortune for every European people" (Stern 91); in Lagarde's mind, the Jews increasingly came to represent everything that was wrong with the modern age and liberalism itself. The beginning of his career was marked by mild eruptions of anti-Semitism, but these hardly resembled the vicious rhetoric he developed as he grew older. Regarding this later anti-Semitism, Stern notes that "few men prophesied Hitler's work with such accuracy – and approval" (93).

All these themes found in Lagarde's writing recur one hundred years later in National Socialism; such a phenomenon is not surprising, but rather shows that the growth of a particular frame of mind, a specific theory, begins in this way. He *was* popular and able to carry his ideas to the academic public first, and finally to the people themselves:

> After his death, the soft Lagarde began to appeal to a growing number of educated Germans. To invoke Lagarde in those years was to attest one's patriotic idealism, to prove one's hatred of everything un-Germanic, to take a stand for

> the 'yea-saying,' the irrational, the creative forces of culture against the negativism and materialism of mere intellectualism. In many circles, Lagarde was turned into a comfortable substitute for Nietzsche, who to so many Germans seemed abstruse and dangerous. Lagarde, moreover, had the inestimable advantage of being a nationalist, whereas Nietzsche, his bourgeois readers thought, was at best ambivalent on that score. (Stern 117-18)

Stern next examines the writer Julius Langbehn, whose book *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (1890), created a tremendous stir and was hugely successful, much to Stern's bewilderment. The book is not a carefully wrought study of the wrongs of the age, but an erratic, emotional vision, for Langbehn saw himself as the prophet of the age. The 1890s were, in Germany as well as in many other countries, years of instablity and disquiet: the approach of the twentieth century, amidst all of the changes wrought by science and Darwinist theory, and in the newly urban environment of the machine age, led many European people to a premonition of disaster ahead:

> The decade was one of strife and unrest, when the cultural discontent which previously had been the complaint of a few artists and intellectuals became the faddish lament of the many. The revolt against modernity, the attack on civilization, gathered force, hundreds of voices inveighed against all sorts of evils and repressions, and multitudes of people everywhere were repeating these imprecations. Nietzsche, ignored during his creative period, was suddenly read and admired, Ibsen was played and praised, Nordau's *Degeneration* vehemently debated. Everywhere, and not only in Germany, sprang up the cry for greater freedom, for self-expression, for more experience and less theorizing, for a fuller life, for the recognition of the tortured, self-torturing individual. The intensity of this awakening in Germany can be gauged by the instantaneous success of Langbehn's book. The decade that ended with the exuberant fling of the German Youth Movement began with this wild book, this breathless tirade, this rhapsody of irrationalism. (Stern 131-32)

The book portrayed Rembrandt as Germanic, as what is finest in Langbehn's ideal of German character. It simultaneously attacked

liberalism, science and rationality. Creativity would only be rediscovered with a return to the latent Germanic qualities of "childlike simplicity, subjectivity, individuality" (Stern 132). But it was primarily the intense, visionary style with which Langbehn wrote that captured the imaginations of his readers. It "provided the Germanic ideology at the moment of its widest appeal with a conservative, idealistic, and thoroughly acceptable guise" (Stern 199).

Langbehn lived alone for long periods of time, without a set of social contacts or a professional identity to secure his stability; at one point he cultivated an obsession with self, which became a morbid narcissism. Stern mentions that "he could sit for hours before his own portrait, caressing it" (138). While he might have been described as an egoist, his character is also embedded with the kind of self-denying romanticism of the *Welltschmerz* or brooding despair of earlier periods. His loneliness led him to desire human relationships which he would then repudiate. He appears to have taken a perverse joy in cutting himself off from the mainstream of life. During the height of his later popularity, however, the German public compared him to Nietzsche, misunderstanding the few surface similarities as a deeper likeness. Stern refutes any resemblance between the theories of the two:

> Although Langbehn's intellectual relation to Nietzsche is obscure, there is no doubt that he felt a particular affinity for the lonely prophet. Langbehn expected to play a role analogous to Nietzsche's, only greater, purer, and more constructive. I think it probable that Langbehn thought his *culte du moi* and his idiosyncrasies of style were Nietzschean, just as later on young would-be geniuses mastered the gestures, but not the qualities, of Nietzschean greatness. (144)

Langbehn's revolt against a new age of science corresponded superficially to a wider, international anti-scientific stance as represented by such lead-

ing figures as Nietzsche, James, Bergson and Freud, and it was in this latter theoretical position that the narrow rationalism of the late nineteenth century was essentially defeated. But Langbehn had nothing in common with these men, save that all attacked late nineteenth-century science; Langbehn's intent, temperament, training, and above all, the quality of his mind, set him apart:

> Nietzsche attacked science because of the increasing narrowness of this particular generation of scientists. He was anti-Darwin because the Darwinists violated his view of human freedom, and he was critical of mechanistic, soulless science. But his roots were deep in the Western humanistic and scientific tradition, and he sought to preserve the freedom and intellectual vitality of that tradition from the dogmatism of an ephemeral aberration. Langbehn's attack, on the other hand, was the irritated gesture of a man unwilling to admit the validity of science, unwilling to recognize the supremacy of intellect, unwilling even to study the findings of science. His was the prototype of the modern antiscientific temperament, yearning for mystery and religion, and disdainful of intellectual effort. (Stern 163)

Langbehn used a mythical basis in his pursuit of the true Germanic character: he idealized the German peasant in his uncontaminated simplicity and subservience; this was where the genuine *Volk* could be found. Similarly, like Lagarde before him, he turned to the youth of the nation as the source of salvation. His book's publication and consequent popularity coincided with the beginning of various arts and crafts societies and youth organizations designed to strengthen and unite Germany's young. The German Youth Movement was headed by Karl Fischer, who was hailed by his students with "heil":

> [It] erupted like a great phenonmenon of nature. Out of unsuspected depths leapt forth defiance, hate, yearning, love, all the hopes and fears that for decades had been repressed, denied, forcibly sublimated. The movement was spontaneous, translating sentiment directly into action, with thought as a kind

> of intermittent and subordinate guide. Even the briefest description of the Youth Movement will demonstrate its close affinity, historical and psychological, to Langbehn. What he had confusedly articulated, the youths exuberantly acted out; they heeded his message, as they willingly acknowledged, and the few indispensable adults who helped and protected them, had also been followers of the Rembrandt-deutsche. (Stern 223)

Another central tenet of Langbehn's thought was the necessity of spreading German culture, which, in its innate superiority, could save other related *Niederdeutsche* countries. He writes of the necessity of annexing Holland and Denmark:

> for their own sake, "so that they will not dullen because of the narrowness of their horizons." Germany must establish an empire from Amsterdam to Riga, and "she must collect all her children around her. That is the best policy of state and spirit. It is a family policy." (Stern 194)

Some critics find that *Rembrandt als Erzieher* contains the first sign of the imperialistic policies that guided the Germans in the two world wars, but Stern finds the irony in Langbehn's policy to be that his book is devoted to a critique of present German culture, yet he proposes an annexation of other countries because of the superiority of German culture; thus, as Stern states:

> It seems incongruous for Langbehn to justify German imperialism by appealing to German culture when the rest of the book proclaimed the decline of that culture. To understand this apparent paradox, to understand this leap from despair to aggression, is to probe deeply into the roots of what I have here called the politics of cultural despair. (195)

Nevertheless, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* became the handbook of future German right-wing political movements, and the key tenets found within it relate directly to the development of National Socialism.

The third theorist Stern examines is Moeller van den Bruck, and Stern finds him "in some ways the most admirable of the Germanic critics" (231).

Moeller began adult life as a drifter and rebel. He was expelled from school at an early age and broke away from his family. The isolationist position that he adopted was romanticized by him and many other young, rootless men:

> How many youths of his time dignified their retreat from life by invoking Zarathustra, as if that superb self-conqueror had preached resignation and passivity in the face of an uncongenial culture. (Stern 233)

Moeller personified what Stern calls "the familiar German theme, the *Generationsproblem*, the struggle of the young against the old" (233), and it is interesting to note that later in his life, at the height of his influence in forming a right-wing reactionary movement, he and his fellows "called themselves the *young* conservatives, the voice of the young..." (Stern 278). He produced an exorbitant amount of writing in his lifetime, which Stern says was characterized by "his relentless seriousness":

> ... in 1902 ... his *Die Moderne Literatur* [was published], an 800-page critique of contemporary prose and poetry. For a man so young – he began the book when he was 22 – this critical survey of German literature after Nietzsche was an impressive achievement. (235)

Much of Moeller's writing was concerned with "hero-worship" of leading figures in Germany's past, such as Goethe. Stern notes that both Carlyle's *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroes in History* and Emerson's "On Representative Man" were popular in Germany. One of Moeller's basic themes was to point to the "antithesis between civilization and culture" (246), of which Germany had too much of the first and too little of the second. Moeller viewed civilization – under liberalism – as mechanical mass-conformity – deadening to the senses and the soul. Stern comments that:

> [t]his antithesis between civilization and culture was a favorite subterfuge of German "idealists"; it expressed in an unexceptionally cultured manner their

> resentment against modernity, democracy, and the West. During both world wars German intellectuals pictured the Allied Powers as the protagonists of civilization, and as the enemies of culture, represented chiefly by Germany.... [I]t is beyond doubt that the idea of establishing a sharp dichotomy between civilization and culture was born at the time of German idealism, and has played an important and pernicious role in German thought ever since.... It is therefore disheartening to find the same vacuous antithesis prominently used in a recent American study, Amaury de Riencourt's *The Coming Caesars*. "Culture predominates in young societies awakening to life, grows like a young organism endowed with exuberant vitality, and represents a new world outlook. It implies original creation of new values, of new religious symbols and artistic styles, of new intellectual and spiritual structures, new sciences, new legislations, new moral codes.... Civilization aims at the gradual standardization of increasingly large masses of men within a rigidly mechanical framework – masses of 'common men' who think alike, feel alike, thrive on conformism, are willing to bow to vast bureaucratic structures, and in whom the social instinct predominates over that of the creative individual." (Stern 246)

Such civilization is produced, in Moeller's view, by liberalism – the source for all that was wrong in the world. It is important to note that Moeller never actually defines liberalism – "What liberalism is, we are not told" (Stern 247). Christianity is similarly refuted, and Moeller, as a Darwinian, thanks science for the downfall of established religion. What Moeller fervently hoped for was a new religion, "a Germanic *Weltanschauung*," to fill the void created by liberalism and Christianity. Stern notes that "[i]n his uncritical critique of philosophy, as in his veneration for Dostoevski, Moeller anticipated the mood of modern existentialism" (249).[1]

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1 Moeller interpreted Dostoyevsky as a conservative revolutionary who hated western liberalism as much as he himself did. Stern states that "[n]o other modern writer save Nietzsche had as great an impact on German thought as Dostoevski, and the character of that impact was to some extent shaped by Moeller" (261-62).

Stern suggests that the three German writers, Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller, share a highly similar countenance, that, in fact, they belong to the same "type" of personality: "the portrait of this type emerges now with some clearness; certainly isolation, alienation, and self-hatred are the outstanding characteristics" (335). He examines their utter negation of any modern social, political or religious institution. [2] They "felt and were awed by a mysterious power, inexplicable and yet immediately real to them, which they believed to rule the fate of man and the laws of nature" (334). All of these characteristics correspond closely to the personality traits that Adorno has found to define the authoritarian personality.

It is interesting to find that Fritz Stern mentions D. H. Lawrence in the context of the "type" of personality that he is trying to define. Lawrence is not placed in the tradition, but one of his characters is:

> The type clearly emerged in the 1880's, and ranged from Charles Maurras, Maurice Barres, and Knut Hamsun to the poet Miguel de Unamunno. It thus included men of diverse interests and unequal talents who were linked by a feeling of alienation in the modern world and an attendant search for a new faith. The type was also depicted in a long line of fictional characters from *The Possessed* to D. H. Lawrence's James Sharpe in *Kangeroo* "who is half an artist, not more, and so can never get away from it or free himself from its dictates".... This type dominated the literature of the *fin de siecle* and of the German Expressionists. Philip Wylie's *Generation of Vipers* may be taken as a contemporary instance of the enduring quality of this genre. Note his bombast: "We have cancer – cancer of the soul. Religion has failed." (Stern 328)

Stern himself also acknowledges the resemblance of the three Germans he has analyzed to the authoritarian type propounded by Adorno: "I should

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2 Langbehn's conversion to Catholicism is an exception, which it appears was accomplished only by his gross misunderstanding of the concepts involved.

also mention the similarities between my views of these men and the authoritarian personality as defined by T. W. Adorno and his collaborators" (335).

The following four chapters, then, will be devoted to an analysis of a number of characters from *Women in Love, Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent.* This analysis will not only consider the theories of Arendt and Noltë, or the psychological profile drawn by Adorno, but will also, in a number of instances, draw upon the study by Stern to further elucidate fascist and authoritarian elements in some of these characters. Once analysis of the fictional characters is completed, comparisons can also be made between Lawrence and three men that Stern analyzes. How closely do Lawrencian ideas resemble the ideological platforms proposed by Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck? This analysis should, in turn, help to define the degree of fascism in Lawrence's thought.

CHAPTER 4

AUTHORITARIAN, TOTALITARIAN AND UTOPIAN ELEMENTS IN *WOMEN IN LOVE*

The passage in *Women in Love* that has most often been singled out for critical commentary regarding fascism is that in which Birkin, after Gerald Crich's death, contemplates the annihilation of the human species (538). This passage may, at the most extreme, be viewed as representative of the final, destructive urge that is an inherent part of the totalitarian ideology, where the need to purge supposed imperfections, through genocide, becomes so powerful that it ends in universal destruction. Birkin's reflections on the passing of mankind may, however, be viewed from other perspectives as well; certainly it is more a prophecy of doom than a call for human extermination. The other element that Birkin represents in this novel is the urge toward a utopian society. Birkin's love for Gerald was based on the need for more than one single satisfying relationship. He wants, as he tells Ursula, "a perfected relation between you and me, and others ... so that we are all free together" (356). Together with Lawrence's emphasis on rebirth, this indicates a strong feeling for a utopian community of some kind.

One of the strongest features of this novel, however, is the thoroughly convincing and clearly-drawn authoritarian personality of Gerald Crich. The fact that Gerald dies because of his inadequacy as an individual, his in-

ability to love in a reciprocal way, also indicates clearly that Lawrence views authoritarianism as a fatal flaw, not, as some critics have indicated, as a desirable trait.

Women in Love in many ways portrays the inhabitants of a wasteland, the most central metaphor for the twentieth century western world in literature. If there is an "antagonist" in the novel, it is Gerald, the exponent of mechanical order, who feels he must rigidly control all that is spontaneous in the human being. The novel portrays Gerald in strong contrast to his liberal-humanist father, who represents the old order of failed Christian and democratic idealism.

The portrait of Gerald is remarkable in its precise detail and farsightedness from the perspective of 1915. Now, with modern hindsight, we can see the parallels between Gerald's streamlined, impersonal operation of the mines and the workings of capitalistic bureaucracies that culminated in the fascism of the '30s and '40s. Further, Gerald's psychological makeup is delineated so definitively that he resembles very closely the "type" of psychological authoritarian personality defined by Adorno and his collaborators in *The Authoritarian Personality*. After the early triumphs and subsequent defeats of some of the major authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century, various studies have been written assessing the kind of human personality most susceptible to authoritarian systems. As early as 1933, Wilhelm Reich produced his analysis of the authoritarian patriarchal family structure; he views the authoritarian family as the cornerstone of authoritarian society. Focussing specifically on fascism, he finds the ideology characterized by abstract, mystical, metaphysical irrationalism and produced by the repression of human spontaneity and creativity. The conclusions that Reich draws rest finally on the element of repression in

authoritarian systems – where the human personality is not allowed freedom to be and to act spontaneously. An irrational compensatory gratification is substituted for spontaneity and a corresponding irrational self-image is projected by the individual within the system.

Adorno's study carries Reich's theory of repression (as productive of authoritarianism) further, by separating specific personality traits that are more concrete and precise than the all-encompassing term repression. Gerald Crich's character in *Women in Love* may be analyzed as a specifically authoritarian personality of the type suggested by both Reich and Adorno. While one may well agree that repression is indeed the general malaise in Gerald's personality, Adorno's more specific qualities are needed to analyze his character more precisely and fully. Gerald is recognizable at the end of the novel as a human being who can neither love nor wholely live a spontaneous, creative existence; instead, he substitutes his ideal of mechanized organization, creating for himself a mystical, abstract "harmony" that is his basic irrationality.[1] If repression of the whole sexual being is present here, which is what Reich means, Gerald's promiscuity is indicative of such repression:

> ... all forms of fascistic, imperialistic, and dictatorial mysticism can be traced back to the mystical distortion of the vegetative sensations of life, a distortion that results from a patriarchal and authoritarian organization of the family and state.... In fact, it is precisely this *inhibition* of the capacity for orgastic experience that lies at the basis of many pathological manifestations that occur

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1 This is similar to the stress within fascistic systems on the abstract ideal of "patriotism." Reich notes that "despite all hypocrisy, the ecstasy derived from the notions of 'honor' and 'duty' is genuine" (52).

> in later sexual life, such as indiscriminate choice of partners, sexual restlessness, proclivity to pathological extravagances, etc. (Reich 136)

Thus, Reich's central tenet is that an individual's "*authoritarian structure* – this must be clearly established – *is basically produced by the embedding of sexual inhibitions and fear in the living substance of sexual impulses*" (30). This may well be the cause of Gerald's stultification of inner growth.

Gerald is certainly repressed in terms of an instinctual, spontaneous being; this repression is described in detail throughout the novel. The element of stealth in his personality has often been noted, most critics relating this to the mythical northern wolf-imagery that Lawrence interweaves into Gerald's, as well as into his mother's, character. A psychological interpretation of this quality, however, qualifies its "animalistic" connotation; the "significant, sinister stillness in [Gerald's] bearing" (15) suggests an inner emptiness that has developed through a fear of the surrounding world. Such hyper-awareness of the environment comes about only through a fear of one's surroundings, so that human nature is never really able to feel freely: "there was a strange stealth glistening through his amiable, almost happy appearance" (24). Gerald fears spontaneous emotion, perhaps more than any other single quality:

> "You think people should just do as they like... And I," said Gerald grimly, "shouldn't like to be in a world of people who acted individually and spontaneously as you call it. We should have everybody cutting everybody else's throat in five minutes." (36)

His response here is far too vehement to be in proportion to the situation. A young couple about to be married have made a run for the church door; that is all. At another point in the novel, his stealth is described clearly as an abnormal suspiciousness:

> From time to time, in a manner characteristic of him, Gerald lifted his head and looked around. Even though he was reading the newspaper closely, he

> must keep a watchful eye on his external surroundings. There seemed to be a dual consciousness running in him. He was thinking vigorously of something he read in the newspaper, and at the same time his eye ran over the surfaces of the life round him, and he missed nothing. ... Gerald seemed always to be at bay against everybody. (58)

In Adorno's study of the authoritarian personality, the authors point to how the high scorer (strong authoritarian element) projects his internal fears onto the outside environment:

> Projection of one's inner impulses, particularly of aggression, onto others will naturally lead to a conception of a dangerous and hostile world and consequently to a general suspiciousness of others. Thus, it was found that typical high-scoring subjects tend to manifest *distrust and suspicion* of others. Theirs is a conception of people as threatening in the sense of an over-simplified survival-of-the-fittest idea. Feelings of victimization are often connected with such notions. The opposite variant was defined as *trustingness and openness*, as manifested by seeing people as essentially "good" until proved otherwise.... (411)

The authoritarian personality tends to perceive the environment around him as hostile. Adorno states that this attitude represents the "'jungle-character' of the world ... in which one has to destroy others to prevent them from destroying oneself" (411). Such an analysis closely parallels the passage in *Women in Love* where Birkin chastizes Gerald for his "cut-throat" philosophy:

> "That means *you* would like to be cutting everybody's throat," said Birkin....
>
> "It's a nasty view of things, Gerald," said Birkin, "and no wonder you are afraid of yourself and your own unhappiness."
>
> "How am I afraid of myself?" said Gerald, "and I don't think I am unhappy."
>
> "You seem to have a lurking desire to have your gizzard slit, and imagine every man has his knife up his sleeve for you," Birkin said. (36-37)

Gerald is not afraid, or perhaps not consciously aware, of his own underlying aggression. It is that force in other human beings that he fears. Adorno would no doubt agree that this is a good example of projection of one's inner fear onto the external world:

> "It's quite true," said Gerald, "it never is *quite* the same in England. But perhaps we don't want it to be – perhaps it's like bringing the light a little too near the powder-magazine, to let go altogether, in England. One is afraid what might happen, if *everybody else* let go." (444)

Gerald's readiness to react to a hostile environment distinguishes him as a character in this novel; it is an underlying suspiciousness and fear that neither Gudrun nor Birkin shows.

Adorno's authoritarian personality type exhibits high scores in "moralistic condemnation" of other people or human groups. The need to morally condemn segments of humanity appears to be a means of reassuring oneself of belonging to the right group and having moral rightness on one's side. Alternatively, Adorno notes that, "while rejection of other people is more common in high scorers [authoritarians], low scorers tend more toward self-rejection" (409). Gerald's attitude was superficially shaped by his university training, but the "sociological ideas, and ideas of reform" do not really enable him to view humanity *en masse* sensitively:

> ...he found humanity very much alike everywhere, and to a mind like his, curious and cold, the savage was duller, less exciting than the European. So he took hold of all kinds of sociological ideas, and ideas of reform. But they never went more than skin-deep, they were never more than a mental amusement. Their interest lay chiefly in the reaction against the positive order, the destructive reaction. (249)

People assume the stature of playthings in Gerald's thought; only their oddities or inferiorities distinguish them enough to make them interesting to him. The excitement engendered by the more primitive African sculpture

wanes because the primitive itself is no improvement over civilized humanity. Gerald finds that:

> There aren't many fierce things, as a matter of fact. There aren't many things, neither people nor animals, that have it in them to be really dangerous.... They are over-rated, savages. They're too much like other people, not exciting, after the first acquaintance. (73)

Civilization itself neither intrigues him, nor does he possess a healthy openness toward humanity. At one point he states that "every civilized body is bound to have its vermin" (180). Such a comment echoes an assumption of innate superiority over segments of the human mass, which closely parallels Adorno's authoritarian personality type, who exhibits "a great deal of indulgence in what is seen as 'righteous indignation' about people considered as inferior" (406).

Similarly, Gerald's strong sense of a "hierarchical conception of human relations" coincides with the authoritarian's belief in the "right kind of people" (Adorno 418), and in "accepted or even 'admired' social status" (419). The authoritarian personality must of necessity identify himself with the right group, the "winning side." Thus, when Birkin, deploring the plunder of Britain by industrialism, asks Gerald, "Don't you feel like one of the damned?" (67), Gerald replies "no." His denial of being any part of a losing or weakened group shows how constantly necessary it is for him to align himself with the powerful and the "righteous"; it exhibits a lack of compassion for the new urban poor, since Birkin and he are facing a "hideous great street" (67) when the remark is made.

Gerald's awareness of, and insistence on, his upper-class status is evidenced when he meets the Brangwen sisters:

> "Who are those two Brangwens?" Gerald asked.
>
> ... "Teachers in the Grammar School."
>
> There was a pause.

> "They are!" exclaimed Gerald at length. "I thought I had seen them before."
> "It disappoints you?" said Birkin.
> "Disappoints me! No – but how is it Hermione has them here?"
> "And what's the father?"
> "Handicraft instructor in the schools."
> "Really!"
> "Class barriers are breaking down!"
> Gerald was always uneasy under the slightly jeering tone of the other. (104)

Gerald becomes attracted to Gudrun on an unconscious Lawrencian level, presumably because consciously he is reluctant to endorse his attraction to a "town girl." This social snobbery is further emphasized when Lawrence notes, regarding Gerald, "In his world, his conscious world, she was still a nobody" (133). Gerald's insecurity leads him to rely on external order: the class system defines the individual's behavior and dress codes and simplifies life by the assertion of rigid levels of status. The fact that class snobbery is beginning to break down during Gerald's lifetime causes him insecurity, rather than a sense of true indignation, as when he asserts his social ascendency:

> "... because I don't think teachers as a rule are my equal." ... He did not *want* to claim social superiority, yet he *would* not claim intrinsic personal superiority, because he would never base his standard of values on pure being. So he wobbled upon a tacit assumption of social standing. (235)

This is not intrinsic snobbery; rather, it is the need of an insecure individual to have an external crder within which to define himself; his inner emptiness is incapable of providing him with a sense of self-definition.

In a similar vein, Gerald also rejects the liberal-Christian humanism of the Victorian era, which is exemplified in the older Mr. Crich's idealism. Possibly Gerald is only more honest here than his father, since the old, monied class system inherently denied true equality and humanism. Mr.

Crich's efforts to placate the poor are in no measure an equalizing force: his benevolence is finally hypocritical. Gerald merely makes his upper-class managerial position more blatantly powerful:

> Gerald ... did not care about equality. The whole Christian attitude of love and self-sacrifice was old hat. He knew that position and authority were the right thing in the world, and it was useless to cant about it. They were the right thing, for the simple reason that they were functionally necessary. (255)

Another trait exhibited by the authoritarian personality in Adorno's study is the emphasis upon conventionality:

> Conformity is one of the major expressions of lack of an internal focus in the high scorer. One of the most outstanding characteristics ... is the adoption of conventional values and rules. High scorers generally seem to need external support – whether this be offered by authorities or by public opinion – in order to find some assurance concerning what is right and what is wrong. (476)

Gerald's concern with a conventional self-image is carefully underlined by Lawrence. Beginning with the young couple's race to the church door in chapter one of *Women in Love*, Gerald's disapproval of spontaneous or uncustomary behavior is manifest: "Birkin told him about the race of the bride and the bridegroom. 'H'm!' said Gerald, in disapproval. 'What made you late then?'" (34). After the ceremony, the guests gather at Shortlands to celebrate; the usual gaiety and banter common to weddings is highlighted in a specific scene between Gerald and one of the brothers-in-law, Marshall, who jokingly ridicules the abstract nature of the conversation he overhears: "'You don't want a soul today, my boy,' said Marshall [to the young bridegroom]. 'It'd be in your road'" (35). Gerald immediately recoils, conventionally puritanical about his sister's wedding night and her honor being joked about in a slightly ribald manner: "'Christ! Marshall, go and talk to somebody else,' cried Gerald with sudden impatience ... staring after him with angry eyes" (35). There is a lack of self-knowledge here that is

astonishing: Gerald's treatment of women clearly indicates their pure instrumentality for him; consequently, his squeamishness over Marshall's teasing is hypocritical.

Gerald throughout the novel embodies a rigid sense of decorum, of what is "correct" for the occasion. Birkin asserts, at one point, that "Gerald stickles for convention," to which Gerald retorts: "'I don't stickle for it.... But if you'd got as sick as I have of rowdy go-as-you- please in the house, you'd prefer it if people were peaceful and conventional, at least at meals'" (259). The elder Mr. Crich notes the same quality in his son; Gerald sits with his dying father, the appropriate behavior of a son, but he feels no real compassion or grief. Gerald will perform his duties in accordance with conventional behavioural formulas, but he resembles Eliot's "hollow men" because he is "form without essence." Mr. Crich, acutely assessing his son's lack of essence, of the ability to care, "... would have liked to cry aloud to Gerald, so that his son should be horrified out of his composure" (321). After Mr. Crich dies, the family assembles together to mourn, praising their father as a worthy man. While Gerald cannot feel sorrow over his father's death, or enough love to want to praise him posthumously, he feels secure and relieved that the appropriate behavior for such an occasion is being carried out: "Gerald acquiesed in all this. It was the right conventional attitude, and, as far as the world went, he believed in the conventions" (380).

Gerald feels annoyance at Gudrun's attire when she arrives at Shortlands shortly after the funeral. She "came dressed in startling colours, like a macaw, when the family was in mourning. Like a macaw she was!" (269). A person's choice of dress is an indication to Gerald of how well they fit in with the established order. Gudrun clearly has no desire to be a part of custom and predictability. Her colourful stockings reflect the avant-

guarde bohemian lifestyle she has come to identify with; she is conforming as well, but to a different, anti-"establishment" sub-group; hence her stockings are a symbol, to Gerald, of the disruption of convention. It is not only the colliers and their wives who are shocked by the brazen colour of Gudrun's stockings; Gerald especially finds that "[h]er stockings always disconcerted him" (266). Gudrun's colorful bohemian style contrasts sharply, in his mind, to the dress style of the French governess, whose correctness of apparel pleases him, even though he recognizes the ugliness of it:

> ... he was finely and acutely aware of Mademoiselle's neat, brittle finality of form. She was like some elegant beetle with thin ankles, perched on her high heels, her glossy black dress perfectly correct, her dark hair done high and admirably. How repulsive her completeness and her finality was! He loathed her. Yet he did admire her. She was perfectly correct. (268-69)

Gerald's own attire is meticulously chosen; his rigid sense of what is fitting for his station in life is reinforced in expansive detail. The luxurious apparel is not so much indicative of a sensuous love for silk finery in Gerald as a symbol of what class he belongs to: "... how scrupulous Gerald was in his attire, how expensive too. He wore silk socks, and studs of fine workmanship, and silk underclothing, and silk braces" (308). His clothing simply symbolizes externally what Gerald feels inwardly: an earlier exposure to liberal education and theories of reform cause him to embrace them superficially and temporarily, but such a liberal openness and flexibility finally prove frightening and insecure. Gerald reverts to ideologies that are commonly considered safe, supported by the *status quo*, and unlikely to cause disruption or change. He finally wants "to go back to the dullest conservatism, to the most stupid of conventional people. He wanted to revert to the strictest Toryism" (249). Gerald's inflexibility is reflected in his emphasis on conventionally appropriate behavior, a rigidly

simplistic political-social philosophy and strictly correct style in dress and personal appearance.

Thus, it is understandable that, upon meeting Halliday and his fellow bohemians in London, Gerald experiences a sense of release from the self-imposed strictures of his conventional existence. Such a sense is all the more violent because of the enormous repression which precedes it. At Halliday's flat, he self-consciously walks nude from his bath:

> When Gerald went back to his room from the bath, he also carried his clothes. He was so conventional at home, that when he was really away, and on the loose, as now, he enjoyed nothing so much as full outrageousness. So he strode with his blue silk wrap over his arm and felt defiant. (88)

But such defiance is not usual in Gerald's life, and when dressed for breakfast, he once again reverts to a "correct and *comme il faut* ... appearance and manner" (88). Together with the correctness of manner and dress, an overwhelming desire exists in Gerald to be identified as a member of the right group, to belong to the strongest side. The handsome, powerful figure he portrays is at times undercut by pathos: his strength is external only. Here is a gentleman whose managerial power in the England of the time is awesome, yet he does not know how to dance the new ragtime:

> Gerald was marvellously exhilarated at finding himself in motion, moving towards Gudrun, dancing with feet that could not yet escape from the waltz and the two-step, but feeling his force stir along his limbs and his body, out of captivity. He did not know yet how to dance ... their convulsive, rag-time sort of dancing. (102-3)

Here too, is a man who delights in "loose" women, but afterwards feels soiled by them, someone who sleeps with a pregnant Minette while simultaneously withdrawing in horror and indignation over an African statue depicting a female in the throes of childbirth: "He hated the sheer barbaric

thing ... Gerald resented it. He wanted to keep certain illusions, certain ideas like clothing" (87).

Strictly conventional individuals like Gerald do not simply decide to adopt such an attitude midway through their lives: such conventionality is the external enactment of a set psychological personality structure, formed in childhood and carried into adulthood. For such a personality, Adorno emphasizes that "conformity ... [is] an all-or-none affair" (481). Although Wilhelm Reich's study of *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* offers the more thorough examination of the authoritarian family structure, Adorno also analyzes the childhood of such a personality:

> ... we find reports of a tendency toward rigid discipline on the part of the parents, with affection which is conditional rather than unconditional, i.e., dependent upon approved behavior on the part of the child. Related to this is a tendency apparent in families of prejudiced subjects to base interrelationships on rather clearly defined roles of dominance and submission, in contradistinction to equalitarian policies. Faithful execution of prescribed roles and the exchange of duties and obligations is, in the families of the prejudiced, often given preference over the exchange of free-flowing affection. The hypothesis may be offered that some of the traits of the prejudiced personality are an outcome of this family situation. (482)

Adorno shows that:

> The functioning of his superego is mainly directed toward punishment, condemnation, and exclusion of others, thus mirroring the type of discipline to which he himself was apparently exposed.... The difficulty which children growing up in such an environment as that pictured by our prejudiced subjects, seem to have in developing close personal relationships may be interpreted as one of the outcomes of the repression of hostile tendencies, which are not integrated or sublimated, but which become diffuse and free-flowing. (483)

One is reminded of Gerald's early experience at school, presumably an upper class boys' school, in which both discipline and competition are

encouraged.[2] Well-integrated children will form friendships that overcome or compensate fo the harshness of such an environment. But it seems that Gerald was unable to establish such relationships; Birkin deftly pinpoints this flaw when he asks: "You never really mixed, did you?" (230). Gerald's experience of school was a painful one, yet he is unable to view it with the appropriate bitterness, substituting instead a belief in the necessity of a life of discipline:

> School had been torture to him. Yet he had not questioned whether one should go through this torture. He seemed to believe in education through subjection and torment.
>
> "I hated it at the time, but I can see it was necessary," he said. "It brought me into line a bit – and you can't live unless you do come into line somewhere." (230)

The authoritarian personality type that emerges from Adorno's study exhibits the same belief in rigid discipline that Gerald does. The inability to be at all introspective or to analyze problems within the self leads the authoritarian personality to project much of his fear and hostility onto the outside world. This tendency, combined with the inability to connect to other human beings in a direct, meaningful way, forces him to cope with situations and experiences in an indirect, often tortuous manner. The rigidity of the personality structure precludes the development of close bonds to others; Adorno finds that the authoritarian's "comparatively impoverished potentialities for interpersonal relationships may exhibit themselves either in a relatively restricted, conventional, but dependable approach to people

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2 Mary Eagleton and David Pierce define such an atmosphere as representative of "the repressive and philistine middle class, quintessentially expressed in the English public school, whose key characteristics are dogged industry, respectability and narrow snobbery" (94).

... or in a ruthless, manipulative approach" (475). Gerald certainly utilizes both methods in his dealing with others: hosting his sister's wedding dinner would be indicative of the rigidly conventional code in a leadership role, while his treatment of the colliers and of Minette illustrates his more extreme manipulative kind of approach.

The two characters in the novel who become most involved with Gerald are Birkin and Gudrun; both describe the underlying rigidity and inflexibility of Gerald's character. Birkin attempts to pledge love and lifelong loyalty to Gerald, but is rebuked; Gerald evasively pretends not to understand what such a pledge means. And these two male characters are subtle contrasts to each other throughout: Birkin's spontaneity and anti-conformity are capsulized in his belief that, "Instead of chopping yourself down to fit the world, chop the world down to fit yourself" (230). Birkin's spontaneous, "off-the-cuff" visit to the Brangwen home to propose marriage (and the incredulity with which Ursula's father receives the proposal) is singularly amazing to Gerald, who would never approach a marriage proposal in so haphazard and impulsive a fashion himself. He is open-mouthed at the unconventional oddity of both Birkin's approach and Ursula's lackadaisical reception.

Lawrence's artistic portrait of Gerald has an uncanny truthfulness and recognizable reality: he exudes an assertive, confident man-of-the-world air: "...his eyes with their humorous kind twinkle, which was so deceptive," or "... his voice, sudden and mechanical and belonging to the world of man" (203), and "... the decisive, instrumental voice that was full of the sound of the world" (204). The stealth of his stance has already been examined as an indicator of the underlying fear with which Gerald approaches the environment around him, but the same quality may also be seen as the strong-willed

competitiveness of the successful power figure. A description such as the following is a good example: "He was looking fixedly into the darkness, very keen and alert and single in himself, instrumental" (200). Similarly, Gudrun recognizes a type personified by:

> ... the Geralds of this world. So manly by day, yet all the while, such a crying of infants in the night. Let them turn into mechanisms, let them. Let them become instruments, pure machines, pure wills, that work like clockwork, in perpetual repetition. Let them be this, let them be taken up entirely in their work, let them be perfect parts of a great machine, having a slumber of constant repetition. (524)

But such a strongly-controlled will coupled with such underlying hostility leads to highly rigid behavioral patterns. Adorno's definition of such rigidity clarifies objectively what Lawrence portrays fictionally in Gerald:

> In order to keep unacceptable tendencies and impulses out of consciousness, rigid defenses have to be maintained. Any loosening of the absoluteness of these defenses involves the danger of a breaking through of the repressed tendencies. Impulses and inclinations repressed too severely, too suddenly, or too early in life do not lose their dynamic strength, however. On the contrary, abrupt or unsuccessful repression prevents rather than helps in their control and mastery. An ego thus weakened is more in danger of becoming completely overwhelmed by the repressed forces. Greater rigidity of defenses is necessary to cope with such increased threat. In this vicious circle, impulses are not prevented from breaking out in uncontrolled ways. Basically unmodified instinctual impulses lurk everywhere beneath the surface, narrowing considerably the content of the ego so that it must be kept constantly on the lookout. Rational control extends to a small sector of the personality only. As long as situational conditions of life draw on this sector only, and as long as our culture provides socially acceptable outlets for suppressed impulses, smooth functioning and fair adjustment can be achieved within the given framework. (Adorno 480)

Gerald *appears* to function rationally and powerfully in his world, the outside, everyday world of enterprise and profit. When emotional demands are made, however, in the few interpersonal relationships he has tried to establish, a lack of reciprocal sensibility is evident. Birkin loves Gerald, but is clearly aware of this dearth of spontaneous feeling in his friend:

> It was the insistence on the limitation which so bored Birkin in Gerald. Gerald could never fly away from himself, in real indifferent gaiety. He had a clog, a sort of monomania. (233)

Gudrun's contempt for Gerald is finally due to the predictability of his responses:

> Gerald is so limited, there is a dead end to him. He would grind on at the old mills for ever. And really, there is no corn between the millstones any more. They grind on and on, when there is nothing to grind – saying the same things, believing the same things, acting the same things. Oh, my God, it would wear out the patience of a stone. (521)

Gerald enacts the correct forms, but there is no "corn" left to grind; the forms so rigidly enacted are without essence or life. Instead the surrounding universe is perceived by Gerald as hostile and threatening; his sharpened wits, rather than his ability to introspect and understand self, or even to approach the unknown with concrete rational logic, are kept in readiness: "... he always kept such a keen attentiveness, concentrated and unyielding in himself.... He had been so insistent, so guarded, all his life" (199).

Lawrence draws a portrait of a character who on the surface is powerful, authoritative, highly energetic and resourceful, the world's "successful man," yet such a character is subtly but repeatedly shown to embody an inner psychological vacuum. Lawrence's characterization is parallel to Adorno's findings once again. The authoritarian personality in Adorno's study is characterized by a "compulsive drive for power, strength, success, and self-determination" (474). Gudrun's early impression of Gerald's

remarkable force and energy are qualified ominously as undirected and eruptive:

> "Certainly, he's got go," said Gudrun. "In fact I've never seen a man that showed signs of so much. The unfortunate thing is, where does his *go* go to, what becomes of it?" (53)

Gerald originally directs his force, his "go," to refining the efficiency and production of his father's business, but one has the distinct impression that the energy he expends so successfully on the business might as easily have been applied elsewhere; ambitiousness on the scale of Gerald's efforts would usually indicate a love of wealth or position. Such, however, is not his goal:

> It was not for the sake of money that Gerald took over the mines. He did not care about money, fundamentally. He was neither ostentatious nor luxurious, neither did he care about social position, not finally. (251)

What Gerald wants to achieve is a compensation for the inner emptiness in soul or psyche with which he is burdened. By achieving power in the outside environment, such a person attains a sense of self-worth, of meaningfulness and accomplishment, where only confusion and emptiness reigned internally and hostility and fear seemed represented externally.

Adorno's study of the authoritarian personality shows a similar emphasis on the aspects of power and success, while the nature of the actual work is regarded arbitrarily or indifferently:

> Similarly externalized is the relationship to work, as manifested in indifference toward its content and in the emphasis on work as a mere means to success and power. To succeed in the struggle of competition by roughness and by "out-smarting" the competitor seems often an important component of the ego-ideal. (420)

The individual case study of "Mack" is a portrait of what the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* call a typical high scorer, or a typical author-

itarian. Mack's parallel with Gerald can be seen clearly in the following summary:

> His emphasis upon practicality, efficiency, and diligence as ends in themselves, his tendency to ignore social and psychological determinants of human characteristics and human events, his failure to take into account possible inner sources of his opinions, the discrepancies between his expressed values and what appears to be his real motives, were outstanding features of his interview. (Adorno 273)

Gerald's ideal of efficiency is translated finally into power; the resultant ugliness and inhumanity he considers unimportant: "The sufferings and feelings of individuals did not matter in the least. They were mere conditions, like the weather. What mattered was the pure instrumentality of the individual. As a man as of a knife: does it cut well? Nothing else mattered" (251). The ugliness produced by mining, the stripping away of the natural forests and vegetation, was "hideous and sordid, during his childhood they had been sores in his consciousness" (250), but now cause him no qualms or ambivalence; in fact, "he saw them with pride" (250), because they have come to symbolize the power of the system he has so successfully inaugurated.

Lawrence adeptly shows Gerald's sense of growing purpose in refining the management of the mines, his enormous satisfaction with the new mode of efficiency and centralized power, when suddenly, in the midst of his apparent success, he falls into fits of despondent inertia, of confused restlessness. Birkin observes Gerald's desperate attempts to fill this void of inner emptiness within himself and quite correctly criticizes such a superficial grasp of psychological reality. There is a dearth of self-knowledge, of self-sufficiency in Gerald's character that contrasts sharply with the mag-

netically powerful figure he cuts in the outside world. He is almost childlike in his confusion over Birkin's critical attitude toward him:

> "I can't see what you will leave me at all, to be interested in," came Gerald's voice from the lower room. "Neither the Minettes, nor the mines, nor anything else.... What am I to do at all, then?" came Gerald's voice. (108)

Gerald is incapable of realizing that his approach to "the Minettes" and "the mines" is so coldly and objectively instrumental that they afford no genuine emotional engagement of his self. His narrow approach to living affords him little satisfaction, a temporary reward at best, because so little of his self is involved with such human activities as interacting with other human beings and finding fulfillment in creative labour. Lawrence frequently describes the automaton quality of Gerald's existence; the *mechanical* wilfulness evident in his forceful personality simultaneously attests to his lack of introspection and self-examination. Like a human animal in whom some central sensibility has failed to develop, Gerald swings between obsessive, mechanized wilful activity and a crippling psychological atmosphere of boredom, emptiness, and meaninglessness. The latter extreme, always underlying and latent in Gerald, is evident in this passage:

> "Sometimes I think it is a curse to be alive," said Gerald, with sudden impotent anger.
>
> "Well," said Birkin, "Why not! Let it be a curse sometimes to be alive – at other times it is anything but a curse. You've got plenty of zest in it really."
>
> "Less than you'd think," said Gerald, revealing a strange poverty in his look at the other man. (234)

While Birkin exhibits a spontaneous tolerance of the vicissitudes and joys of human existence, evincing an immediate sense of his involvement in all experience, Gerald's reaction is mechanical, tired and characterized by a sense of emptiness, of the poverty of his involvement with living experience. Lawrence describes him elsewhere in the novel as "completely

and emptily restless, utterly hollow" or "suspended motionless, in an agony of inertia" (300). A momentary self-realization of this lack of emotional involvement in life does occur to Gerald himself at one point, although he appears to view it as a familial trait, rather than a psychological quality within himself. He says of the Crich family that "We're all of us curiously bad at living. We can do things – but we can't get on with life at all" (229).

Gerald's relationship with Gudrun is based on a contest of wills, but it is finally Gudrun who dominates; while Gerald is master of force, Gudrun has the artist's advantage of standing apart from the life around her, of remaining independent of other individuals. Although Gerald and Gudrun's relationship is not successful in fulfilling either partner, it is all Gerald has to cling to and identify with at the brink of a psychological void. Once more, he is quite satisfied to substitute "form" for essence – the outwardly conventional "couple" in appearance and behavior for the fulfilment of a truly intimate interpersonal relationship. Gudrun's gradual rejection of Gerald compounds his already desperate, pathetic sense of loneliness. When they look at the alpine scene from their hotel window, Gudrun is transported into a separate world of her own. Gerald finds being left alone behind insufferable:

> Already he felt he was alone....
>
> "Do you like it?" he asked in a voice that sounded detached and foreign. At least she might acknowledge he was with her. (451)

Gudrun's increasing involvement with Loerke forces Gerald to realize that the relationship is ending between Gudrun and himself. He knows that for his own survival he should leave her, yet to be utterly alone again is what he fears most: "But then, to have no claim upon her, he must stand by himself, in sheer nothingness.... Why did she leave him standing there, with the ice-wind blowing through his heart, like death ...?" (501-2).

Our compassion goes to Gerald at this point in the novel: loneliness such as this is a horrible phenomenon to contemplate. Possibly it is the "do or die" situation in which Gerald finds himself that prompts compassion for him: he is destroyed if he stays with Gudrun, and he is annihilated into loneliness and finally death without her. Yet one must assess Gerald's personality acutely before allowing compassion for him to blind one to his flaw; the most overwhelmingly negative trait that flaws Gerald's personality is his inability to love or care for another human being.

How is it possible to be unable to love? References to Gerald's infancy and childhood carry hints of both neglect and abuse, despite the privileged luxury of the upper class setting. The passage in the novel in which Gudrun talks with Mrs. Kirk, the Crich children's old nurse, has a curious resemblance to certain parts of *Wuthering Heights*, perhaps especially where Nelly Dean and Mrs. Earnshawe are forced to accept the orphan, Heathcliff, into the family. Nelly refers to the small waif as an "it" and treats him cruelly: it is hard to believe that the motherly soul presented as narrator throughout Brontë's book can be as coldly cruel to a child as this. She remembers that:

> [h]e seemed a sullen, patient child; hardened, perhaps, to ill-treatment: he would stand Hindley's blows without winking or shedding a tear, and my pinches moved him only to draw in a breath and open his eyes, as if he had hurt himself by accident and nobody was to blame. (36)

It is worth noting that Nelly's malicious abuse (as well as Mrs. Earnshawe's) has been attributed to the possibility that Heathcliff is, in fact, the bastard offspring of Mr. Earnshawe. But whatever actually does occasion such malice, it is paralleled here in the portrait of Mrs. Kirk, as she tells Gudrun:

> "I nursed three of her children. And proper little terrors they were, little fiends – that Gerald was a demon if ever there was one, a proper demon, ay, at six months old!" A curious, malicious, sly tone came into the woman's voice. "... Kick, and scream, and struggle like a demon. Many's the time I've pinched his little bottom for him, when he was a child in arms." (231)

When she describes whippings the children received from the elder Mr. Crich (saintly liberal-humanist Mr. Crich?), she adds: "And didn't we used to be thankful when one of them caught it" (231). Catherine Earnshawe was similarly viewed as an innately bad child, the "changeling" superstition of Victorian times. But what such a view, and treatment, finally result in is child abuse: rebellious children rebel for a reason; they are not simply born that way. According to Mrs. Kirk, Mr. Crich's whippings were in contrast to Mrs. Crich's attitude of ultra-leniency: "she wouldn't have them corrected – no-o, wouldn't hear of it" (239). But Mrs. Kirk also states that Gerald's mother was otherwise totally disinterested and neglectful of the children: "she wasn't going to be bothered with them herself. No *she* took no trouble for them" (239). Mrs. Crich's behavior towards her son appears cold and yet intuitively knowledgeable of his nature. Early on she declares that Gerald is "... the most wanting of them all" (28). As the elder Mr. Crich lies dying, she warns her son to keep himself in control; her words once again refer to some psychological flaw or imbalance in Gerald:

> "You mind *yourself* – ... You mind yourself, or you'll find yourself in Queer Street, that's what will happen to you. You're hysterical, always were." (369)

Knowledgeable of her son's nature she may well be, but her tone toward him is neither warm, affectionate nor loving. The element of human warmth appears to be curiously lacking in both Gerald's parents. Regarding the relationship between Gerald and his father:

> [t]here had always been opposition between the two of them. Gerald had feared and despised his father, and to a great extent had avoided him all through

> boyhood and young manhood. And the father had felt very often a real dislike of his eldest son, which, never wanting to give way to, he had refused to acknowledge. He had ignored Gerald as much as possible, leaving him alone. (245)

Perhaps the most damning comment Gerald's mother makes about Gerald is when she notes to Birkin that "[h]e has never had a friend" (28). The inability to connect, or the lack of desire for contact, for human companionship is a paralyzing psychological flaw in a child. In Gerald's case, the cold, uninvolved familial atmosphere in which he grew up could be responsible for his inability to form close bonds with others. He certainly carries this trait into adulthood; the closest union he forms appears to be with Birkin, but even this relationship remains on the brink of real liking: one can never feel certain that they become "friends" reciprocally. The relationship could not develop because Gerald was unable to truly care for another human being. He tells Birkin that he does not understand it just yet, but one realizes that Gerald will never fully understand the nature of a committed relationship. Adorno's study isolates this same quality, the inability to care for another, in the authoritarian personality:

> There also seems to be relatively little enjoyment of sensuality or of passive pleasures, such as affection, companionship, or art and music on the part of the typical high scorer. Instead of these internalized pleasures, there is an inclination toward mobility and activity, and a striving for material benefits. (475)

Gerald's involvement with women before meeting Gudrun was largely mercenary: his life centers around the running of the mines, he occasionally finds relief from the intensity of work and pressure with an easily available female, paralleling here the behavior of the Prussian Officer in Lawrence's story of that name. Gerald's ties to the women have been temporary and emotionally uninvolved. The brief heterosexual interactions he

indulges in appear to signify no more to him than a good meal or some other sensual pleasure imbibed. Such an encounter offers a temporary release and a tranquillizing effect against the daily tensions he has accumulated. Thus, Gerald's attitude toward women is established at the novel's outset; it is their instrumentality in his life that matters; their function is to provide him with a sense of release: "After a debauch with some desperate woman, he went on quite easy and forgetful" (262). This use of the opposite sex is paralleled in Adorno's definition of the authoritarian personality:

> [a] lack of individuation and of real object relationship can be found in the field of sex.... the relative isolation of sexual impulses from the rest of the personality, the paucity of affection, and the somewhat exploitive, manipulative approach in the choice of a mate. (404)

These are all characteristics found in people with an authoritarian nature. Adorno becomes even more precise about the role of the female as viewed by the authoritarian male:

> [t]he role of the woman, as seen by the high-scoring man, is one of passivity and subservience. She ... offers the high scoring man the much needed opportunity of asserting his superiority. There is, however, *ample evidence that the high-scoring man wants to be on the receiving end in his relation to women*; from them he wants material benefits and support more than he wants pure affection, for it would be difficult for him to accept the latter. There is relatively little genuine affective involvement in his non-marital sex relations, and of his wife he tends to require the conventional prerequisites of a good housewife. On the whole, sex is for him in the service of status, be this masculine status as achieved by pointing toward conquests, or be it social status as achieved by marrying the "right kind" of woman. (Adorno 477) [italics mine]

Gerald's treatment of women resembles closely the attitudes Adorno has described here. The character of Minette is introduced early in the novel at least partly to illustrate what Gerald's attitudes are. Minette is not a fully developed, complex character; she is a typical "loose" female who catches

Lawrence's disillusionment with socialism is not difficult to understand within the context of the novel. Mexican socialism is a nationalistic socialism -- a contradiction in terms -- and Lawrence's utopian ideal extends beyond national borders at the very least:

> "When they forget all about the Patria and Mexico and all that stuff, they're as nice a people as you'd find. But as soon as they get national, they're just monkeys." (36)

Mexican nationalism hardly resembles "the brotherhood of man," as the Major's experience in the National Museum illustrates:

> "I walked into the National Museum the other day," said the Major quietly.... "I'd been there about ten minutes when somebody suddenly poked me on the shoulder. I turned round, and it was a lout in tight boots. *You spik English*? I said yes! Then he motioned me to take my hat off: I'd got to take my hat off. *What for*? said I, and I turned away and went on looking at their idols and things: ugliest set of stuff in the world, I believe. Then up came the fellow with the attendant -- the attendant of course wearing his cap. They began gabbling that this was the National Museum, and I must take off my hat to their national monuments. Imagine it: those dirty stones! I laughed at them and jammed my hat on tighter and walked out. They are really only monkeys, when it comes to nationalism." (36)

The absolutist bullying of such nationalism is repugnant to Kate, who wonders, "What does nationalism and all that rubbish matter, really!" (182). The criticisms found throughout the novel are aimed directly at the nationalism that masquerades as socialism, while implicitly denying the idealism of the program.

Lawrence also establishes the atmosphere of constant insecurity and chaos that accompanies the inauguration of the new Socialist regime. Montes, the Laborite leader, attempts to gain support, while General Angulo tries to gain control of the army (35). That such a political situation is fearsome and threatening is clear, but Lawrence especially underlines the violent na-

ture of such regimes. A labour victory is "just freedom to commit crime" (30), since the absolute nature of national socialism will not tolerate dissenting views: "The Labourites ... marched to the Hotel Francia to shoot all the gringoes and the Gachupines. The hotel manager had pluck enough to harangue them, and they went off to the next hotel. When the man came out there to talk to them, they shot him before he got a word out" (35-36). Bolshevism is clearly tied to chaotic violence throughout the novel, recalling the fearful "male slashing sound" of the socialist mob in *Aaron's Rod* (220). It "smashes your house or your business or your skull" (*Plumed Serpent* 44).

The high-flown slogans of equality and brotherhood are not achieved in practice. Instead, such a regime manipulates the masses of people with "pious catchwords, to catch the poor" (*PS* 111). The socialist agitators "all talk so nobly beforehand. If only their deeds followed their words" (34). But the spiritual emptiness created by such a regime is especially criticized. The artist in Lawrence finds the propagandistic art of the Mexican socialists repugnant, since the common people are used as symbols for "these maniacal ideas of socialism, politics, and La Patria" (55). The young didactic artist "was as mechanical as a mousetrap. Very tedious" (55). He has adopted the abstract idealism of socialism but no longer recognizes the intrinsic value in either the human being or in art itself. Thus, his work portrays "flat Indians" as:

> symbols in the great script of modern socialism, they were figures of the pathos of the victims of modern industry and capitalism. That was all they were used for: symbols in the weary script of socialism and anarchy (54).

The central dilemma presented in the novel is voiced by Kate: "'How can you make a people free, if they *aren't* free'" (183). Socialism, nationalism, western democracy all attempt to improve the lot of mankind ex-

ternally – socialism especially promises freedom from poverty and an equal distribution of goods. But Kate's point – and Lawrence's – is once again that an external reconstruction of life styles will not and cannot work unless there is a corresponding *internal* change in the human consciousness. Lawrence's underlying utopian tenet is that freedom cannot be imposed on masses of people if the individuals who comprise the mass are not intrinsically free. Don Ramón states this concept clearly, and in doing so dissociates his attempt to form a utopian society from the world of politics:

> "Politics, and all this *social* religion that Montes has got is like washing the outside of the egg, to make it look clean. But I, myself, I want to get inside the egg, right to the middle, to start it growing into a new bird." (210)

Such a transformation of human nature is utopian in origin: it relies on the belief that man's potential for a full, creative existence has been limited and repressed by external forces throughout the ages. Reich parallels Lawrence's belief that the potential for this kind of transformation is latent within the human consciousness, and that it must be reborn for man to survive. Kate rediscovers this latent creativity when she looks at Don Ramón, partly undressed, and extends her perception beyond the external appearance to his inner being: "forever still and clothe-less, and with another light about it, of a richer day than our paltry, prying, sneak-thieving day" (201). Don Ramón embodies the utopian goal that succeeds, at least in part, within this novel. Thus, Lawrence describes "a new world ... unfolding ... we turn to life; and from the clock to the sun and the stars, and from metal to membrane" (393-95). The new world as Lawrence describes it is an unreal, idealized pastoral, but no sooner does he envision this world positively, than he undercuts it with Kate's sometimes cynical and always independent view. Cipriano's instructions to his men also illustrate the basic contradiction inherent in utopian enactment: "Each company of a hundred

must learn to act in perfect unison, freely and flexibly" (402). Human individuals acting in "perfect unison" are neither free nor flexible as individuals; rather, the individual resembles the bull let out into the ring at the beginning of the novel:

> He ran out, blindly, as if from the dark, probably thinking that now he was free. Then he stopped short, seeing he was not free, but surrounded in an unknown way. (11)

Lawrence tries, within the novel, to justify the loss of individuality by having Cipriano and Don Ramón admonish Kate for her strong ego and self-will: "'The individual, like the perfect being, does not and cannot exist, in the vivid world'" (426). But such a rationale breaks down when it leads to Kate's amoral assumption of individual irresponsibility. Finally, if the individual does not have to make decisions and bear the burden of responsibility for his actions in life, all becomes relative, and consequently meaningless. Thus, Kate wonders: "What do I care if he kills people?... What do I care, what Cipriano Viedma does, or doesn't do? Or even what Kate Leslie does or doesn't do?" (431). Had Lawrence ended the novel at this point, with this denial of individual human worth, the utopianism embodied within the work would have remained absolute, irresponsible and finally immoral. But he did not end there, and in the remaining fifty-six pages, Kate constantly criticizes the utopia.

Kate senses the underside of the hero-worship amongst the Mexican people toward Ramón:

> Kate somehow felt their latent grudging. Perhaps they took more satisfaction in ultimately destroying their heroes, than in temporarily raising them high. The real perfect moment was when the hero was downed. (442)

Further, the Quetzalcoatlian utopia seems to work, but it takes constant preoccupation and will power to keep it working. Once again, Kate:

> wondered at the steady, urgent, efficient *will* which had to be exerted all the time. Everything was kept going by a heavy exertion of will. If once the will of the master broke, everything would break, and ruin would overtake the place almost at once. No real relaxation, ever. Always the sombre, insistent will. (444-45)

In an ironical reversal of authoritarian personality traits, Lawrence here portrays the utopian concept in the same terminology he earlier used to describe the repressed personalities of Gerald Crich, Jack Callcott and others. The utopia is held together entirely by the force of the will, or the superego; if the underlying violence of the repressed society should burst out, it would do so in a perverse and utterly destructive form. The individual microcosm has, in a sense, become the macrocosm in this novel.

Toward the end of the novel, Kate feels pressured to choose between her individual existence and a communal life with Cipriano and Ramón. She concludes that "I must have both" (484), which is, of course, the underlying contradiction in utopian practice, as she finds out. She *cannot* have both without counterfeiting something in herself:

> *What a fraud I am! I know all the time it is I who don't altogether want them. I want myself to myself. But I can fool them so they shan't find out.* (486)

Ramón recognizes her duplicity, and she reverts to the irresponsible plea with which the novel ends: "You won't let me go!" (487). But Kate is an individual, and therefore not a good follower; consequently, her submission to the communal utopia of Quetzalcoatl is unconvincing. True, unthinking followers inevitably take on the qualities that Adorno has defined as authoritarian. Kate utterly fails to do this. Rather than approaching life with stealth and hostility, she views it with "disinterested amusement" (42). She experiences three of the most vibrant, spontaneous exhibitions of emotion in the novel. She suffers over and identifies with the hurt, tortured bird, not, as others, "Blind to the creature as a soft, struggling thing finding its

own fluttering way through life" (241). She feels the spirit and enjoyment of the horse dancing in the lake (357), and takes great pleasure at discovering the newly born baby donkey (477). Such spontaneity suggests a full, creative individual capable of both affection and love. Kate's natural vivacity constantly struggles to emerge, and she feels especially claustrophobic around "these mechanical connections. Every one of them, like Villiers, was like a cog-wheel in contact with which all one's workings were reversed" (113). Kate's central tenet becomes:

> *"Let me still believe in some human contact. Let it not be all cut off for me! ...Give me the mystery and let the world live again for me!... And deliver me from man's automatism."* (113-14)

Kate does not desire the "mystical" as much as the joyful recognition of genuine "human contact." Such a "mystery" is identified with vitality and creativity.

Kate's spontaneous response to the life around her is gradually restricted more and more by the wilfulness of Ramón's utopia. She protests that there is, "at the centre of all things, a dark, momentous Will sending out its terrific rays and vibrations, like some vast octopus" (423). Lawrence has previously used the image of the octopus in *Kangaroo* to describe the too-demanding absolutist idealism of western democracy, "the *almost* automatic white octopus of the human ideal" (272). In both that novel and in *The Plumed Serpent*, the octopus is a negative image that indicates the grasping, possessive nature of repressive, conventional idealism, and its deadening effect on the individual, cancelling any expression of spontaneity. Kate cannot reconcile her refreshing desire for the "mystery" of renewed human contact with the restrictiveness of "the Godhead as a sheer and awful Will" (*PS* 424).

Kate is also characterized – repeatedly – as a non-conformist strong enough to stand apart from conventional standards. Lawrence describes her variously as having "her own unconventional way.... She was never *in* any society" (42); "She was never 'smart'" (63). During the Rain Dance, she is the one individual who, however much intrigued, does "not lift her arms" (217). The whole communal role urged upon her is distasteful to her because of her strongly individualistic stance: "'I dislike the masses of people – anywhere .... So how could I pretend to join any – any – any sort of Salvation Army?'" (274). She exhibits a healthy rational skepticism and sensitivity throughout the book, being suspicious of supernatural beliefs: "I never understood mystical things. They make me uneasy" (406). She is not readily gullible, finding that "people – yes, they are all monkeys to me" (275). Most of all, she quickly perceives manipulation by others, especially by the men in her life. She rebelliously states at one point: "I am sick of these men putting names over me" (407). Obviously, she is angered by such names that serve only to identify her as a possession or property of the male. The Quetzalcoatlian utopia similarly demands the submission of the female, a demand that Kate finds hard to swallow: "Where was the woman, in this terrible interchange of will? Truly only a subservient, instrumental thing" (424). Kate's reaction to the absolute demands of the Quetzalcoatlian utopia is one of indignation; she views it as coercive and deceptive and decides that she "would not have this thing put over her! She would break free, and show them!" (472). Although she appears to adore Don Ramón, she decides finally that he is "too abstract and overbearing for me.... Ramón needs far too much submission from a woman, to please me" (475).

Two incidents in the novel do portray Kate as exhibiting authoritarian traits. At one point the narrator points out Kate's élitist pride in her aristocratic birth:

> Kate was of a proud old family. She had been brought up with the English-Germanic idea of the *intrinsic* superiority of the hereditary aristocrat. Her blood was different from the common blood, another, finer fluid. (456)

Yet this élitist pride – needing to belong to "the right sort" – is directly contradicted by the narrator earlier in the novel when he asserts that "Kate was no snob. Man or woman, she cared nothing about the social class" (87). When she encounters an inebriated group of natives, she is "a bit afraid" (48) of them, but feels more sympathy with them than with the Burlaps, that "bloodless, acidulous couple from the Middle-West, with their nasty whiteness" (48), whom she has just left. The pride she takes in her aristocratic birth does not prevent her from relating to the human beings around her, irrespective of class.

The second authoritarian trait she exhibits, at least at one point, is an underlying desire for violence. She is simultaneously attracted and repelled by Don Ramón, as she stares at the "soft, cream-brown skin of his back!" (201). Attracted by the sensual nudity, she finds herself repelled by his remote arrogance:

> In spite of herself, she could not help imagining a knife stuck between those pure, male shoulders. If only to break the arrogance of their remoteness. (200-201)

While the underlying, repressed violence breaks through Kate's consciousness, this in itself is not necessarily authoritarian. The importance of self-understanding, of questioning and examining the source of the eruption of crude violence differentiates the "liberal" from the authoritarian personality. Jim Bricknell, in *Aaron's Rod*, immediately covers up the violence of

his punch at Lilly by protestations of affection for Lilly, thus projecting the violent act onto the victim ("it's all his fault"). Kate does not react in this projective way; she is suffused with guilt and shame and accepts fully the enormity of her aggression:

> The moment Kate had imagined a knife between his shoulders, her heart shrank with grief and shame, and a great stillness came over her. Better to take the hush into one's heart, and the sharp, preying beams out of one's eyes. Better to lapse away from one's own prying, assertive self, into the soft, untrespassing self, to whom nakedness is neither shame nor excitement, but clothed like a flower in its own deep, soft consciousness, beyond cheap awareness. (201)

Kate experiences the moment of aggression as a cheapening of the self, of the human soul's sensitivity and awareness of a fellow human. She exhibits complete awareness of her aggression and consciously feels shame. Such ability to self-question and self-admonish is a liberal trait, as defined in Adorno's study:

> the extremely unprejudiced individual tends to manifest a greater readiness to become aware of unacceptable tendencies and impulses in himself. The prejudiced individual, on the other hand, is more apt not to face these tendencies openly and thus to fail in integrating them satisfactorily with the conscious image he has of himself.... The low scorer is apt to waste energies by indulging in often unfruitful introspection and by placing the blame for mishaps too much upon himself. In contrast to the high scorer's tendency toward externalization, the typical low scorer is prone to internalize in an excessive manner, and this in turn may lead to open anxiety, feeling of guilt, and other neurotic features. (474-75)

Kate's momentary aggression at this point must also be placed against another incident in the novel. Her agony over the Mexican boy's torture of a crippled bird shows her fine sensitivity to all living creatures outside of herself. Here she offers a damning criticism of human beings who are only "extraceptive" or insensitive:

> The curious void.
>
> He could not see that the bird was a real living creature with a life of its own.... Blind to the creature as a soft, struggling thing finding its own fluttering way through life. (241)

Kate's sensitivity is supported by a good deal of common sense. Upon seeing the Mexican peasants throwing stones at cattle to make them move, she retorts: "Drive it sensibly" (241). Above all, her clear thinking reiterates a basic Lawrencian tenet found throughout his works, namely that "One must keep a certain balance" (55), which asserts the necessity of individual responsibility and rational sense. She preserves a healthy skepticism, a sense of balance and fear of extremism amidst the absolute demands of Ramón's regime:

> At the same time, as is so often the case with any spell, it did not bind her completely. She was spell-bound, but not utterly acquiescent. In one corner of her soul was revulsion and a touch of nausea. (423)

Her intrinsic self remains questioning, non-conforming and never totally subservient. She "would always be a good deal alone" (460). These characteristics certainly place Kate much more in Adorno's "liberal" category than in an authoritarian profile.

There are characters in *The Plumed Serpent* who do fit Adorno's authoritarian profile, however, and Kate, through her commonsensical astuteness, discerns who they are:

> Kate sat by the window, and laughed a little. The primeval woman inside her laughed to herself, for she had known all the time about the two thieves on the cross with Jesus; the bullying, marauding thief of the male in his own rights, and the much more subtle, cold, sly, charitable thief of the woman in *her* own rights, forever chanting her beggar's whine about the love of God and the God of pity. (381)

Kate here pinpoints Dona Carlota and Don Cipriano as the "bullies" of the novel, and so they do appear when they are examined, using Adorno's study as a frame of reference.

Dona Carlota is, on the surface, the conventional wife and mother, submissive, timid and eager to please. She is a "good" woman, a devoted Christian and intimidated by Ramón's attempt to begin a new, strange religious movement. She is not a full character in the sense that Kate is; Lawrence does not develop her as fully or with the same complexity; more to the point, there is not much substance to develop in a character like Carlota's. Her strong adherence to the conventional is indicative of the inner dearth of creative life in this woman. The established, institutionalized religion *must* be right; she refuses to entertain more flexible theories of rebirth, and instead condemns her husband's eccentricity as "such *nonsense*. How dare he!" (180). Her sense of conventionality is outraged as well by her husband's new peasant attire. The Carrascos are landowners, and Carlota's need to be differentiated as "the right sort" is foiled by her husband's humble costume:

> "You didn't know my husband had become one of the people – a real peon – a Senor Peon, like Count Tolstoy became a Senor Moujik?" said Dona Carlota, with an attempt at raillery. (184)

Later she asks Kate whether "Ramón is wise, to wear the peasants' clothes, and the huaraches?" (189). The word "wise" has two connotations here: on the surface, Dona Carlota seems fearful that her husband's attire may incite the surrounding peasantry to revolt. Her real outrage, however, is the pseudo-righteous indignation of the smug upper class, the outrage against her husband identifying himself, and by association her, with the peasantry.

While Carlota is extremely "moral," her religiosity is not accompanied by true compassion or flexibility; she exhibits, instead, a fanatical, absolutist

tone: "'Could *you* give up the Blessed Virgin? – I could sooner die!'" (207). Kate's earliest impression of Carlota was of "an intense, almost exalted Catholic. She exalted herself in the Church, and in her work for the Cuna" (172). The word "exalted" implies Carlota's hunger for power rather than religious ecstasy. Indeed, Carlota's emphasis on the need for charity becomes a disguise for her desire for power. There is little spontaneous compassion in her. Instead, "she loved now with her *will*: as the white world now tends to do. She became filled with charity: that cruel kindness" (228). Cipriano sees through the charitable image when he later taunts her as "you impeccable wife, you just woman" (381). Similarly, he equates charity with a *lack* of compassion, as if the two go together naturally: "'You have been charitable and compassionless to the man you called your own'" (380). Adorno's perception of this form of charity has already been described. Charity maintains the status quo; by helping only a little, the lower classes are kept in their place and the real problems of poverty are ignored. Kate is initially impressed with Carlota's orphanage work, but she senses the futility of it:

> Kate listened with uneasy interest. She felt there was so much real human feeling in this Mexican charity: she was almost rebuked. Perhaps what Dona Carlota was doing was the best that could be done, in this half-wild, helpless country. At the same time, it was such a forlorn hope, it made one's heart sink. (172-73)

Dona Carlota is further characterized as willful; even her love "was now nearly all will" (171). She is described as totally lacking in spontaneity, substituting instead her willfulness: "Even as the spontaneous mystery died in her, the will hardened, till she was nothing but a will: a lost will" (228). And again:

> Life had done its work on one more human being, quenched the spontaneous life and left only the will. Killed the god in the woman, or the goddess, and left only charity, with a will. (229)

Even Carlota's love for Don Ramón is presented as willful and manipulative. He is her property, her possession. When she visits him in his room, "she sat down on the unmade bed, as if asserting her natural right. And in the same way she glanced at his naked breast – as if asserting her natural right" (229). Ramón feels her manipulative treatment of him, as if he were an object that she owned; there is no genuine interaction or equality in their meetings:

> She claimed him and he restrained himself in resistance. Even his very naked breast, when Carlota was there, was self-conscious and assertively naked. But then that was because she claimed it as her property. (278)

Carlota's perception of Ramón as her property is further borne out in her disillusionment with him: "He was not what I would have him be" (380), she states, and reveals simultaneously her inability to recognize him as an individual human being in his own right.

That such a moralistic, conventional and seemingly timid character should conform to the pattern of Adorno's authoritarian personality is further supported by the surprising element of repressed violence and hatred present in Carlota. Ramón bears the primary brunt of her manipulation, and he best senses the deadly anger in her toward him. If she cannot have an obedient, conformist, Christian Ramón, she would rather negate him. Ramón senses this death-wish in her: "'Carlota ... how happy you would be if you could wear deep, deep mourning for me. – I shall not give you this happiness'" (229).

When Carlota breaks down into insanity, she betrays her violent hatred of Ramón by asking God to kill him:

> Her voice had gathered strength till it rang out metallic and terrible.
> "Almighty God, take his life from him, and save his soul." (376-77)

Carlota is self-righteous even in her hatred, believing that she alone understands what goodness and love are; Ramón is better off dead so he can no longer upset the established and conventional order of her life. Ramón sees through Carlota's hypocrisies and realizes the aggression underlying her surface charity:

> "the white Anti-Christ of Charity, and socialism, and politics, and reform, will only succeed in finally destroying [Mexico]... – You, Carlota, with your charity works and your *pity* ... surcharged with pity for living men ... but really with hate." (230)

While Carlota is a stereotyped pattern of fanaticism, rather than a complex human being, Lawrence creates a more subtle and complex character in Don Cipriano. Cipriano is a foil to Don Ramón, and assures a Lawrencian balance of opposites in the novel. Ramón resembles a meek and gentle Jesus too much to achieve this balance by himself; he shows very little human ambivalence and primality, and would simply become another strangling "white octopus of the human ideal" (*Kangaroo* 272), another form of moralistic aggression were it not for Cipriano's countering force. Cipriano ostensibly represents or provides the power/strength leadership polarity to counterpoise Ramón's altruism and love, though Ramón remains Cipriano's superior and always has the final word. If these two characters create the balance of love and power for the utopian society that is formed in *The Plumed Serpent*, they also embody very different, though still opposite, psychological characteristics.

Lawrence introduces Don Cipriano in a way that is reminiscent of his initial portrayal of Gerald Crich in *Women in Love*. Gerald's stealth and instinctive hostility to the world around him were symbolized in the image of the northern wolf. Cipriano, portrayed throughout the novel with the same qualities of stealth, is symbolically identified with the image of the southern snake. Both characters exhibit the underlying hostility and violence of the wild animal carefully repressed under a strong will and conventional exterior. Cipriano, says Lawrence:

> spoke in a peculiar quiet voice, rather suppressed, and his quick eyes glanced at her, and at his surroundings, like those of a man perpetually suspecting an ambush. But his face had a certain silent hostility, under his kindness. (20)

He is described at different times as having "watchful, calculating eyes ... opposing her in an animal way" (40), and a pleasant conventional expression which does not really reflect any inner warmth: "An amused little smile quickly lit his face, though his eyes did not smile. They looked at her with a black, sharp look" (41). Like Gerald's conventional sense of decorum, Cipriano observes social etiquette, but observes only the form without being truly involved in the essential human interaction:

> Cipriano, on the other hand, remained mute and disciplined, perfectly familiar with the tea-table routine, superficially quite at ease, but underneath remote and unconnected. (42)

His eyes are especially indicative of the way in which he views his outside environment, alternately described as "wary" (87), "insolent black eyes" (88), "a curious, lurking sort of insolence" (205), or "the black eyes of Cipriano glanced at her in hostility" (280). At times Kate is repelled and frightened by his presence, which "seemed sinister to her, almost repellent" (260). The inner fear with which he approaches life lies just beneath his wilfully composed exterior. Kate feels that "he seemed to be watching, watch-

ing for something" (338). Even in the midst of a group of people, Cipriano, although conventional and proper in his behavior, "stayed outside the conversation altogether, in a dusky world of his own, apart and secretly hostile" (344). The atmosphere of human interchange does not touch his essence; his projected image is, like Gerald's, solely concerned with form. His conventional self-image functions mechanically, repressing the emotional turbulence within him:

> Curious he was! With a sort of glaze of the ordinary world on top, and underneath a black volcano with hell knows what depths of lava. And talking half-abstractedly from his glazed, top self, the words came out small and quick, and he was always hesitating, was saying: No? It wasn't himself at all talking. (339)

Adorno has emphasized that conventionality is an authoritarian attribute because authoritarians or "high scorers generally seem to need external support – whether this be offered by authorities or by public opinion – in order to find some assurance concerning what is right and what is wrong" (476). Conventionality in this context includes "[g]ood manners, attainment of success and status, self-control, and poise" (478). Cipriano clearly exhibits these conventional attributes, yet Kate senses the inner psychological vacuum underlying the correct exterior. It is equally important for Cipriano to be identified on the "right" or winning side. He is the élitist out of a necessity for survival, or so he thinks. He projects himself as a leader of the masses, but at the same time, his contempt for the people is noticeable in his comment that "[t]hese people are nothing if not perverse, nowadays" (272).

This comment is made in response to Don Ramón's worry that the Quetzalcoatlian hymns will not be read by the people because the priests are forbidding them. Cipriano's response shows a contempt for the perver-

sity of the people who will read the hymns, rather than a positive belief in their courage to disobey the priests. His view of the peasants is negative and pessimistic. Kate recognizes Cipriano's negativism and cynicism. It is, in fact an ironic inconsistency of this novel to find Kate, a life-affirming individual, aligning herself with a man who is so much her opposite, especially since she so often and consistently exposes his psychological deficiencies. Some of her remarks and thought patterns regarding Cipriano are framed in the weary, cynical tone that in itself connotes a negative character. Kate thinks to herself with some wryness that "Here at last he was not a *will*" (430), but this comment merely points out that wilfullness is his usual mode. Similarly, she notes that "Cipriano, for once, was faithful" (442), which does not sound as if loyalty is his usual behavior. In fact, at this particular point, he is faithful only to himself as the semi-divine Huitzilopochtli.

Cipriano initially makes a statement in support of rational sense and scientific knowledge in his explanation of why he rejected Roman Catholicism:

> "I used to think it was the images of Jesus, and the Virgin, and the Saints, that were doing everything in the world.... Only in England I learned about the laws of life, and some science. And then when I knew why the sun rose and set, and how the world really was, I felt quite different." (73)

Here Cipriano offers a valid argument against his former religious belief in a supernatural agency. In the same passage, he tells Kate about his godfather, Bishop Severn, Bishop of Oaxaca, who looked after Cipriano's education. Cipriano describes the bishop in highly positive language: he is "a very well-known man ... very rich, too" (72). Again, "[t]he Bishop was a very good man, very kind" whom he liked "very much" (73). There is clearly a glorification of the bishop's character offered here, as well as a

superstitious belief in his supernatural power, even as Cipriano explains how he has rejected religion in preference for "the laws of life, and some science":

> "When I was a little boy I came running to my father, when the Bishop was there, with something in my hands – so!" – and he made a cup of his hand. "I don't remember. This is what they tell me. I was a small child – three or four years of age – somewhere there. What I had in my hands was a yellow scorpion, one of the small ones, very poisonous, no?... Well, the Bishop was talking to my father, and he saw what I had got before my father did. So he told me at once, to put the scorpion in his hat – the Bishop's hat, no? Of course I did what he told me, and I put the scorpion in his hat, and it did not bite me. If it had stung me I should have died, of course" (72-73).

Cipriano's life is, thus, saved by the Bishop's magical power. There is a ready submissiveness to the bishop's command to put the scorpion into his hat. While the incident itself happened to a three or four-year-old child, and thus would not necessarily carry any external significance, it attains an importance and carries emotional connotations through Cipriano's memory, which embues the occurrence with the magical elements that he has since come to identify with Catholicism and with the bishop. Throughout his later life, he tells Kate, "I felt I must do what my god-father wished" (73), and "I couldn't marry, because I always felt my god-father was there, and I felt I had promised him to be a priest – all those things, you know" (74). Cipriano has submitted fully to the bishop until the latter's death, which makes it all the more astonishing later on in the novel to witness the vituperative hatred Cipriano exhibits towards Roman Catholicism:

> "The old Jesuit, he only wants to keep his job and his power, and prevent the heart's beating. I know them. All they treasure, even more than their money, is their centipede power over the frightened people, especially over the women."
>
> "I didn't know you hated them," laughed Ramón.

"Waste no more breath on them, my dear one," said Cipriano. (292)

Cipriano's glorification of the Bishop and his willing submission to his wishes during his life seem inconsistent with this later outburst. Under the auspices of the church, the bishop *has* helped Cipriano, saving him from a life of peasant drudgery. But Cipriano exhibits only the extremes of stereotyped glorification/obedient submission on the one hand, and violent hatred on the other. Adorno's study sheds some understanding on the psychological workings of Cipriano's mind. The authoritarian, Adorno finds:

> [uses] superlatives in the description of parents, such as "excellent man in every way," "best in the world," "most terrific person," etc. If more detailed and specific elaborations are made at all, they refer to material benefits or help given by the parents. Where there is no readiness to admit that one's parents have any weakness in them it is not surprising to find later an indication of repressed hostility and revengeful fantasies behind the mask of compliance.... (343)
>
> On the surface theirs is a stereotyped, rigid glorification of the parents, with strong resentment and feelings of victimization occasionally breaking through on the overt level.... Usually, however, only admiration for the parent is accepted by the subject. The underlying hostility has to be kept ego-alien for several reasons: it is too strong to be fully admitted; and it interferes with the desire to be taken care of by the parents. This conflict leads to a submission to parental authority on the surface and a resentment underneath which, although not admitted, is the more active under the guise of mechanisms of displacement. (357)

Cipriano's intense ambivalence towards his god-father is another area of his psychological make-up that he seems unable to question or understand. The extremes in his personality point out his inability to examine his own personality and think rationally or clearly. Combined with this inability is Cipriano's need for a strong leader or authority. Kate goads Cipriano into

admitting that his submission to Ramón is not based on love or on the belief in Ramón's mission; Cipriano's submission is based on one factor only, and that is power:

> " ... you don't believe in him. You think it is like everything else, a sort of game.... You don't *really* believe, in anything."
>
> "How not believe? I not believe in Ramón? – Well, perhaps not, in that way of kneeling before him and spreading out my arms and shedding tears on his feet. But I – I believe in him, too. Not in your way, but in mine. I tell you why. Because he has the power to compel me. If he hadn't the power to *compel* me, how should I believe?"
>
> "It is a queer sort of belief that is compelled," she said.
>
> "How else should one believe, except by being compelled? I like Ramón for that, that he can compel me. When I grew up, and my godfather could not compel me to believe, I was very unhappy. It made me very unhappy. – But Ramón *compels* me, and that is very good. It makes me very happy, when I know I can't escape." (224)

Adorno cites the need for submission to power figures as exclusively characteristic of the high-scoring authoritarian personality:

> If dependency promotes a concern with love in the lows, it promotes a *concern with power* in the highs. One of the more direct forms in which high dependency is expressed is *submission to power figures*. Whereas the ego-assimilated dependency of the lows is expressed in their value for equalitarian relationships and social structures, the ego-alien dependency of the highs leads to the acceptance of absolute authority and to a value for authoritarian forms of social interaction ... what the highs admire most in others is power, strength, authority, rugged masculinity. While the aggressive-assertive needs of authoritarian individuals are the most conspicuous one, the dependent-submissive needs are equally if not more important. (599-600)

Cipriano's real preoccupation in the novel is not so much with Kate; it is with his glorification of Ramón as his leader.

Ramón himself is not emphatically authoritarian with his own sons, nor is the Ramón-Carlota marriage exclusively patriarchal. The emphasis on patriarchal authority is, therefore, most evident in Don Cipriano's intense need to "be compelled," to submit to a power figure above him. Cipriano has, in essence, projected his need for an authority figure, which was previously fulfilled by the bishop, onto Ramón. Wilhelm Reich points to this same pattern in his *Mass Psychology of Fascism*:

> In the figure of the father the authoritarian state has its representation in every family, so that the family becomes its most important instrument of power. The authoritarian position of the father reflects his political role and discloses the relation of the family to the authoritarian state. Within the family the father holds the same position that his boss holds toward him in the production process. And he reproduces his subservient attitude toward authority in his children, particularly in his sons. Lower middle-class man's passive and servile attitude toward the fuhrer-figure issues from these conditions. (53)

The true authoritarian patriarchal pattern of submission to a dominating power figure is very evident in Don Cipriano. Don Ramón *as* a leader is not harshly strict, nor aggressively masculine. In fact, Ramón as a natural father is gentle, teasing and patiently resigned in face of his sons' condemnation, hardly the typical authoritarian disciplinarian.

Cipriano, on the other hand, exhibits an intense and slavish desire to be dominated by a higher, more powerful figure, one that *compels* his loyalty and behavior which, in turn, relieves him of the burden of responsibility and decision-making. Also, such compulsion *must* be controlled by a *more* powerful authority than his own – this coincides exactly with his enormous respect *for* power and authority. The bishop's authority is shaken for him by an English education, and he ends by vehemently rejecting his fallen idol. Similarly, Don Ramón is astute enough to realize how, as Cipriano's superior, he had better guard against revealing any human vulnerability,

since this would disillusion Cipriano, who would reject him just as decisively as he did the bishop; Ramón admits to himself that "Cipriano would betray him. Given one little vulnerable chink" (212). Ramón simultaneously reveals the quality of intraception here when he acknowledges to himself, "what man can be invulnerable?" (212).

Don Cipriano's respect for power and authority are in direct relation to his own desire for power; it is difficult, in fact, to understand what other benefits the Quetzalcoatlian movement has for him. Like Jack Callcott before him, he enjoys being boss:

> "he wants to be in command of the soldiers.... He has great power with his regiments.... He has that power ... to make many others want to follow them and fight for them." (173-74)

Lawrence emphasizes Cipriano's military characteristics throughout the novel, but the military image is not of a patriot so much as of a mercenary. Personal ambition and willfulness are the primary motives driving this soldier:

> Cipriano ... slipped back into the inevitable Mexican General, fascinated by the opportunity for furthering his own personal ambition and imposing his own personal will. (278)

Even in his treatment of the Roman Catholic bishop of the West, he asserts his power through the thinly veiled threat of physical violence: "'Adios, Senor!' said Cipriano, clicking his spurs, and putting his hand on his sword as he turned to the door" (292).

Cipriano's total presence as a military general "exude[d] pride and arrogant authority" which "were not to be laughed at" (293). The underlying stealth with which Cipriano moves within his environment is supported by a wilfulness that controls his reactions in all situations. As it is for Gerald Crich before him, the universe is a hostile place for Cipriano; his "self" is

an unknown reservoir of confusing emotions, which threaten to break out in aggressive ways. His conventional image and surface control are enforced by the constant strength of his will. The power that he achieves is felt by Kate to be a product of this unrelenting and watchful will: "he had a curious power. Almost she could *see* the black fume of power which he emitted ... the heavy power of the *will* that lay unemerged in his blood" (340). His relationship with Kate bears out his willfulness; he must be the undisputed boss, the dominant partner at all times. She views him at various times as "the old dominant male" (341) or "the master" (343). In their relationship, she soon realizes that his attitude to her as the female is totally unbending, demanding complete submission: "[h]e would never woo; she saw this" (342). Their heterosexual relationship demands "submission absolute ... the supreme passivity" (342) on Kate's part. Such submission is really unquestioning obedience, and recalls again Reich's emphasis on fascism beginning in and constantly being reinforced by the patriarchal family unit. The blind obedience of the woman to the man is a microcosmic version of Cipriano's own need to submit to an absolute system of leadership. With Kate, however, "[h]e could not bear even to be the least bit thwarted" (365). At other times Lawrence describes him as "very sharp and imperious in his orders" (352). Altogether, Cipriano is very often described negatively – as a thoroughly unlikable person:

> Kate looked at him, and mistrusted him. In the long run he was nobody's man. He was that old, masterless Pan male, that could not even conceive of service; particularly the service of mankind. He saw only glory; the black mystery of glory consummated. And himself like a wind of glory. (344)

This description pinpoints Cipriano's utter selfishness and self-absorption. He is not truly interested in the idealism of the utopia; unlike Ramón, his concern is not with improving man's nature and creative life; rather, it is

with the amount of power and glory he can accumulate. Such a megalomaniacal personality exhibits surprising pettiness in asserting his power. The smallest occurrences *have* to be under his control; he virtually *cannot* recognize another human being's feelings. Kate's agonizing decision to escape from Mexico for awhile angers him so – since she is acting independently of him – that he thinks of using police force to stop her:

> He was thinking, superficially, that if he liked, he could use the law and have her prevented from leaving the country – or even from leaving Sayula – since she was legally married to him. (479)

The fact that such physical force would not really change or control her feelings and thoughts is immaterial to Cipriano. He views Kate solely as an instrument for his own use. Throughout the novel, Kate feels treated as an object, manipulated and coerced by Cipriano: "Kate could not help feeling that it was a sort of intense, blind *ambition*, of which she was partly an object" (258). Their interpersonal connection is solely physical – Cipriano is incapable of recognizing another human individual's nature outside of himself. Kate perceives that "[h]is desire seemed curiously impersonal, physical, and yet not personal at all" (259). She is at times mesmerized by his dominant attitude towards her, but because of her strong sense of self, she can recognize the manipulation: "Yet surely, surely he was only putting his will over her?" (260).

Ramón likewise discerns Cipriano's manipulative use of other human beings. His analysis of Cipriano's "attraction" to Kate is acute, and it illustrates neither love nor affection on Cipriano part: "'He will let you go when you've had enough; and he's had enough. He is a *general* and a very great *jefe*'" (280). When Kate admits to Don Ramón that Cipriano "just wants something of me ... he would never meet me. He would never come forward himself, to meet me. He would come to take something from me

and I should have to let him" (297), Ramón immediately understands what she means. The area where Cipriano would not "meet" her is the psychological-spiritual realm of human interconnectedness, and Cipriano has nothing in this realm with which to connect. Ramón here sums up his staunch disciple as the person he really is: "a man who wants just to take, without giving, ... a creature of prey" (298). He exposes Cipriano's inability to love and simultaneously admits his own cynicism toward Cipriano.

By implication, then, if Ramón recognizes Cipriano's inability to care for Kate in a strong, mature way, he is certainly aware of the superficial level of Cipriano's devotion towards himself. Kate's disillusionment with the absolute demands of the utopia is precisely reflected in her discomfort under Cipriano's domination. At one point, she says: "You treat me as if I had no life of my own" (406-7). At another point in the novel, the narrator tells us that "Cipriano could not see Kate as a being by herself" (425). Her instrumentality to Cipriano is underlined and emphasized in passages such as the following:

> The tiny star of her very self he would never see. To him she was but the answer to his call.... Alone, she was nothing.... As an isolated individual, she had little or no significance. (425)
>
> The little general, the strutting little soldier, he wanted Kate: just for moments. He did not really want to marry her. He wanted the moments, no more. She was to give him his moments, and then he was off again, to his army, to his men. (437)

This description of Cipriano is especially derogatory.[1]

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1 Adjectives like "strutting" and "little" are almost caricatural, and in fact bear a strong resemblance to Ravagli, the man Frieda Lawrence married after Lawrence's death. One may well wonder if Lawrence, in drawing Cipriano's portrait, was imbuing it with a future warning to Frieda.

While Cipriano's manipulative use of Kate is underlined throughout *The Plumed Serpent*, Lawrence also presents Kate herself as manipulative, using the male as instrumentally as he uses her. This female quality is similarly perceived in Lottie and Fanny in *Aaron's Rod*. But in *The Plumed Serpent*, Lawrence distinguishes between two kinds of manipulation. While Kate acutely recognizes and resents the way Cipriano coldly uses her, Cipriano only *partially* acknowledges his use of Kate. Lawrence indicates here that Cipriano's egotism and self-centeredness prevent him from perceiving someone else's manipulation. Thus, Cipriano "knew this too: though perhaps not well enough" (425).

There are other gaps in Cipriano's thinking. While he praises the British education that helped to de-mystify religion for him, his thought processes are never clearly rational or questioning. He is described as "indifferent and fatalistic" (75). In a discussion with Kate about the desirability of peace, Cipriano questions its value. Kate replies:

> "... there is another peace: the peace that passes all understanding. Don't you know that?"
>
> "I don't think I do," he said.
>
> "What a pity!" she cried.
>
> " Ah!" he said. "You want to teach me! But to me it is different. Each man has two spirits in him. The one is like the early morning in the time of rain, very quiet, and sweet, moist, no? – with the mocking bird singing, and birds flying about, very fresh. And the other is like the dry season, the steady, strong hot light of the day, which seems as if it will never change."
>
> "But you like the first better," she cried.
>
> "I don't know!" he replied. "The other lasts longer."
>
> "I am sure you like the fresh morning better," she said.
>
> "I don't know! I don't know!"
>
> He smiled a crumpled sort of smile, and she could tell he really did *not* know. (204)

Cipriano has very limited ability to examine and understand himself; he has no desire to probe his inner nature, and categorizes the time spent with a female as the "time of rain"; conversely, the "dry season" in his dichotomy is illustrative of power, of when he "wants to be a very big man, and master of all the people" (205). What is interesting about Cipriano's "rainy" and "dry" seasons is that the personality here is so strictly dichotomized into extremes of tenderness and succour versus a harsh self-control and disciplined abstinence exercised to attain power. A more balanced psychological make-up would at least include overlapping areas and boundaries. A creative, fulfilled personality would certainly have the two extremes permeating each other throughout, so that there is discipline with tenderness. Cipriano's confusion finally resolves into a greater trust in the "dry season," where no respite exists, nor succour, but where the intensity of his primal unconscious – carefully and constantly repressed – is the ever-present reality. Because he lacks self-understanding, his primal urge for power is the over-riding reality and value in his life. As with Gerald Crich before him, the female is a relief from such internal psychological pressure, but the recognition of her as a distinct individual is beyond both Gerald and Cipriano. The narrator describes Cipriano as totally impervious to human contact: "Nothing came forth from him to meet with one outside. All oblivious of the outside, all for himself" (222).

Another example of Cipriano's lack of intraception and affection is given in the blunt statement, "There was no kindness in Cipriano" (343). The lack of human compassion is evident throughout Cipriano's relationship with Kate. He feels no desire or need to communicate with her; she is an object at his disposal. In this inability to love, he again resembles Gerald, although Lawrence seems to be even more definite and damning in his

presentation of Cipriano's character. The reader may sympathize with Gerald at the end of *Women in Love*; Gudrun's viciousness helps to ensure such sympathy. But nowhere does the reader feel sorrow or sympathy for Cipriano. Lawrence has not made him attractive as a character, either physically or psychologically. One can only wonder how Kate *can* like him, because Lawrence – perhaps only unconsciously – does not like him and consistently portrays him as lacking or limited. It is possible that Lawrence attempts to punish the domineering independence of the modern woman in Kate by coupling her with this very rigid and limited male. Kate actually respects Ramón far more than she does Cipriano, admitting to herself that "Ramón [was] a greater man than Cipriano" (449). Cipriano blatantly uses Kate for his own satisfaction, never troubling about her feelings or responses: "His words said nothing; would never say anything ... impersonal.... Cipriano hardly talked to her at all" (352-3). At another point, Cipriano "did not look very definitely at Kate, or even take much definite notice of her. He did not like talking to her, in any serious way" (462). In fact, right near the end of the novel, she is still lamenting the fact that Cipriano "is such a stranger to me" (452). Kate ends by pleading with him to compel her to stay and to believe, but the reader feels extremely uneasy with her behavior. It does not correspond to her perceptions of Cipriano throughout the novel. The following ironic thought sums up her estimate of him as a human being: "'Ah!' said Kate to herself. 'I'm glad Cipriano is a soldier, and doesn't get wounds in his *soul*'" (446). The implication is clear: he *has* no soul.

Lack of a soul is simply another way of stating the quality of inner emptiness and confusion which the authoritarian personality embodies. Cipriano is characterized throughout as an empty mind, conventionally con-

trolled on the surface, but hiding a confused turmoil of aggressive emotion underneath:

> He relapsed into blank silence. Peculiar how his feelings flushed over him, anger, diffidence, wistfulness, assurance, and an anger again, all in little flushes, and somewhat naive. (21)

The emptiness in Cipriano seeks reassurance and succour in Kate. Much like Gudrun's recoil from Gerald's incessant need of her ("Had she asked for a child, whom she must nurse through the nights" [*WL* 524]), Kate also senses that "[i]t was the incompleteness in Cipriano that sought her out, and seemed to trespass on her" (*PS* 207).

Such inner emptiness characterizes the authoritarian personality's hunger for identity and meaning through identification with power and authority figures. Cipriano turns to Ramón to satisfy this need, much as he turns to Kate; there is no strong individualistic self in him that can think independently. Because of the hyper-masculine aggressive stance a personality of this kind assumes, one tends to overlook the underlying childish desire for submission. Submission to a leader is virtually the only sense of safety possible for him. Thus, Cipriano turns to Ramón in order to relieve the psychological void within himself:

> Cipriano, still gazing into the other man's face with black, wondering, child-like, searching eyes, as if he, Cipriano, were searching for *himself*, in Ramón's face. (200)

Like Jack Callcott, Cipriano's demeanor is often blank and "so still, so unnoticing" (349). The following description could serve to describe Jack Callcott as well: "The range of him was very limited, really. The great part of his nature was just inert and heavy, unresponsive, limited" (340). Cipriano's superficial conventionality ensures that his behavior and social responses will be correct and appropriate, yet Kate senses their falsity.

Cipriano never truly feels what his social actions portray; he is devoid of the compassion that would help him to empathize:

> How curious Cipriano was! He stated things as if they were mere bare facts with no emotional content at all. As for its being painful to Kate to go to Jamiltepec, that meant nothing to him....
>
> "They might have killed me too," she said.
>
> "Yes! Yes! They might!" he acquiesced.

Cipriano exhibits the authoritarian qualities enumerated in Adorno's study so well that he can be classified as a well-delineated authoritarian personality – perhaps the fullest portrait of the authoritarian that Lawrence offers. But no quality indicative of authoritarianism shines through in his character as completely and emphatically as his underlying violence and aggression. His superficial gentility is constantly belied by the threat of repressive aggression. He is by far the most violent character in *The Plumed Serpent*, probably because he is totally unaware of his aggression. Lawrence alternatively describes him as having "quietness, and his peculiar assurance, almost aggressive" (22). At his most charming, however, Kate is still not fully relaxed and trustful around him, and what seems to frighten her the most are his eyes, signalling that the gaiety and charm are only on the surface. Even when he impresses her, "speaking Oxford English in a rapid, low, musical voice, with extraordinarily gentle intonation" (28), she is not fooled, but notes "those black, inhuman eyes" (28). Her perception of him is almost like that of an animal, acting instinctively rather than rationally:

> the movement of his hand was so odd, quick, light as he ate, so easily a movement of shooting, or of flashing a knife into the body of some adversary, and his dark-coloured lips were so helplessly savage, as he ate or briefly spoke, that her heart stood still. There was something undeveloped and intense in him, the intensity and the crudity of the semi-savage....

> So that unconsciously she shrank when his black, big, glittering eyes turned on her for a moment.... They were black, as black as jewels into which one could not look without a sensation of fear.... She felt somewhat as the bird feels when the snake is watching it. (71)

At another point, Kate admits to herself that "Cipriano made her a little uneasy, sitting beside him" (340). Fear plays a definite role in her attraction to Cipriano, and the fear is due to her recognition of his latent aggression, so the relationship takes on a perverse slant. Like Victoria Callcott, Kate "was a bit afraid of him too" (487). Cipriano, as the typical authoritarian, wants to inspire fear in the people he deals with; his primary goal is not to connect but to control. Thus, it is not surprising to find him saying:

> "Get used to it that there must be a bit of fear, and a bit of horror in your life.... The bit of horror is like the sesame seed in the nougat, it gives the sharp wild flavour. It is good to have it there." (259)

Once again the association of fear with a sensual image – food – gives Cipriano's interpretation a perverse implication. Jack Callcott's thrill over killing would be the extreme of such perversity, one which Cipriano seems to share.

Cipriano is the only character in the novel who glorifies aggressive violence and force. He is consistently the first to propose coercion as a means to an end. Ramón notes this quality in his disciple: "Already he saw in Cipriano's eye the gleam of the Holy War" (272). At another point, he notes Cipriano's love of violence when he explains that he is "'[c]hasing rebels in the State of Colima.... Anyhow, Cipriano will enjoy chasing them" (319). Cipriano "was for meeting metal with metal" (394), and the purpose of such aggression would be, ironically, to enforce the Quetzalcoatlian religion. His absolute devotion to Ramón causes him to erupt in blind fury at the suggestion that Ramón could be assassinated. Cipriano seems to take

leave of all rational sense at moments like these. This incident illustrates the primal rage underlying his self-control:

> The volcano was rousing.... His eyes took on that fixed glare of ferocity, staring her down.... the ferocity melting in a strange blind, confiding glare, that seemed sightless, either looking inward or out at the whole vast void of the cosmos, where no vision is left. (340)

Such violent anger resembles ecstasy; Cipriano at such moments is lost in blind primal rage. Kate senses that underneath the conventional character armour lies "a black volcano with hell knows what depths of lava" (339).

Because of his primal nature, Cipriano is unaware of and uninterested in the human beings around him. It is as if some part of his self – as a child, autistically or retardedly – has not matured, but remains in a world of the child. Just as earlier he entertains, quite coldly and dispassionately, the possibility that Kate might have been killed, so he views the act of killing itself. When questioned about how many lives he has taken after chasing the rebels, he shows little interest or concern: "'Some! Not many, no? Perhaps a hundred.... Maybe two hundred?' He waved his hand vaguely" (338). This kind of attitude is examined by Hannah Arendt, who analyzes the "type" of the "totalitarian murderer." Stephen Whitfield summarizes the results of her research, and the resulting personality portrait bears an uncanny resemblance to Cipriano:

> The brutality of the interior life sometimes claimed for Eichmann resembles less that of typical party functionary than of the especially violent criminal whose multiple murders, as in Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood*, constitute "virtually an impersonal act." No hatred, no hard feelings. "I didn't want to harm ... [Herbert Clutter]," Perry Smith recalled, as Capote listened. "I thought he was a very nice gentleman. Soft-spoken. I thought so right up to the moment I cut his throat." Between the Clutters' killers and Eichmann, some resemblance can perhaps be traced in terms of the absence of any human connection, any emotional bearing to be attached to their crimes.... The differences however

may be more striking ... murderers like Smith and Dick Hickok wanted only to disguise their own identities and cover their tracks, whereas totalitarian executioners seek to obliterate all trace of their victims. Eichmann could not be regarded as a psychopathic killer writ large: he was not simply an ordinary criminal who had been given an S.S. colonel's uniform and some railroad schedules and allowed to gratify his lust for blood. Arendt argued on the contrary that, under happier circumstances, Eichmann was very unlikely ever to have been a defendant in a criminal court. ... Unlike Shakespearean villains, for example, Eichmann "certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post." In that respect he fit successfully into a totalitarian universe noteworthy for its immunity from coup d'états, for its dutiful police chiefs. Eichmann was peculiarly scary because of his diligence and devotion, which safeguarded him against the realization of his own wickedness.... "the Nazi destruction of Jewry could be so thorough and so effective in part because its instruments were not rampaging Cossacks but clerks scrupulous in their obedience to the law.... It was preponderantly a credulous normality ... that stamped the features of this horror. It has shattered the image of man more lastingly than ever the collective outbreak of base passions could have done." Though Arendt herself completely resisted psycho-analytic interpretations of totalitarianism, it can be noted how fully both id and superego were involved. Not only primitive hatreds were expressed, but devotion to duty and authority was demanded. Had Eichmann *not* obeyed his Fuehrer, his conscience would have troubled him.... While it would be preposterous to suggest that anyone would be capable of doing what Eichmann did, a willingness to commit abhorrent acts under cover of authority can hardly be said to be confined to the small minority who may be psychopaths. That, at any rate, was the point of the experiments performed under the supervision of Stanley Milgram, in which "scientists" ordered unwitting subjects to administer shocks to ostensible participants in a learning test. Drawn from the ranks of ordinary people, almost two-thirds of the subjects showed an "extreme willingness ... to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority," even when the maximum voltage was supposed to be highly painful and very dangerous.... Milgram felt obliged to "conclude that Arendt's conception of the *banality of evil* comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine. The ordinary person who

> shocked the victim did so out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies." Without feeling "any particular hostility," a representative group of Americans might be willing to serve as guards in a concentration camp, might become "agents in a terrible destructive process" under political conditions ripe for totalitarianism. (Whitfield 224-27)

It is not surprising, while assessing how well Cipriano fits this type of "totalitarian killer," to find him the official executioner in the Quetzalcoatlian movement. The executions are of traitors and, in themselves, not as shocking as they may seem at first. Few democracies – especially during war time – could be exempted from executing traitors. But the personality of the executioner in this case is well suited to his line of work.

Finally, Cipriano's underlying violence shows up the utter futility and pessimism that he feels. Supposedly an integral figure in a new utopia bent on the rebirth of man, Cipriano exhibits little hope or belief in such idealism. Like Jack Callcott, he is involved in the movement for the excitement, the personal gain, and because it offers a socially acceptable means of venting all the accumulated violence that he must repress on a daily basis. Ideologically he remains uninvolved and uninterested. In fact, his truest ideology reduces to the opposite of a rebirth of the human spirit. It is the annihilation of the human world that he truly desires, as his comment to Ramón clearly indicates: "wouldn't it be good to be a serpent, and be big enough to wrap one's folds round the globe of the world, and crush it like that egg?" (211). Such pessimism fits very well into Adorno's profile of the high scorer. This attitude makes up the base of authoritarian psychology. Adorno finds that, "[i]n addition to an element of overt antipacifist opinion, there is contempt for men and acceptance of the 'survival of the fittest' idea as a rationalization for aggressiveness" (246). Such contempt precludes any

utopian goal; an authoritarian like Don Cipriano desires only the destruction and eventual annihilation of man.

In sharp contrast to the authoritarian nature of Cipriano, is Don Ramón. As the leader of the utopian Quetzalcoatlian religion, his altruistic desire for the rebirth of mankind is intrinsic to his character. Lawrence portrays him so positively, in fact, that he becomes a little boring. However, he exhibits none of the qualities of the authoritarian personality. There is no lack of an inner life in Ramón; the blank emptiness which Cipriano embodies contrasts to Ramón's ability for creative thought. His stance as the new utopia's leader is definitely anti-conformist; Carlota is bothered as much by Ramón's lack of conventional clothes as by his lack of conventional beliefs.

The power that Cipriano desires so absolutely is not reflected in Ramón's definition of leadership. He states firmly, instead:

> "We will be masters among men, and lords among men. But lords of men, and masters of men we will not be.... I will not command you, nor serve you.... Yet I will be with you, so you depart not from yourselves." (196)

This definition of leadership sounds more democratic than authoritarian. His statement that "I will be with you" implies his presence "in spirit" or "in essence," rather than in terms of harsh discipline. Similarly, Ramón does not manipulate the individuals around him. Instead he declares: "'The men and women of the earth are not manufactured goods, to be interchangeable'" (273). Ramón admits to an earlier manipulative use of women, but intraceptively indicates that he has outgrown such a superficial approach to mere sensuality: "'Wine, woman, and song – all that – all that game is up. Our inside won't really have it any more'" (300). There is a self-realization here that questions and admits to error; Cipriano is incapable of such insig

Ramón is characterized by clear, rational thought. He praises the socialist leader as "sensible" (210), indicating his predisposition for rational, objective knowledge. When Cipriano indicates his desire to "crush ... [the world] like that egg" (211), Ramón for a moment is humourously in agreement, but the primal emotive impulse does not win out. Instead,

> he checked himself, and gathered himself together.
>
> "What would be the good!" he said heavily. "If the egg was crushed, and we remained, what could we do but go howling down the empty passages of darkness. What's the good, Cipriano?" (211)

Ramón quickly recognizes the death-headedness in Cipriano's suggestion. Similarly, when Kate passes off Carlota's death with the conventional superstition that "her hour had come!" (469), Ramón immediately questions her lack of rational objectivity. He replies: "Can you set one's hour as one sets an alarm clock?" (469). He is not given to either superstition or, ironically, to a belief in the supernatural.

This is one of the most interesting qualities that Ramón possesses. He is the leader of a new religious utopia and yet he does not himself believe in the religion. He uses religion as the only possible means to change men's hearts and minds, to effect the most complete rebirth. He states that "Only religion will serve; not socialism, nor education, nor anything" (289). Religion is for him the tool to bring about the transformation of human nature, but unlike an authoritarian, he does not really believe in a higher supernatural power that has infinitely greater understanding than his own. It is somewhat shocking to realize that Ramón does not really believe in Quetzalcoatl, that he is deliberately and rationally mythologizing to achieve the rebirth of the masses:

> "Quetzalcoatl is to me only the symbol of the best a man may be, in the next days. The universe is a nest of dragons, with a perfectly unfathomable life-mystery at the centre of it. If I call the mystery the Morning Star, surely it

> doesn't matter! A man's blood can't beat in the abstract. And man is a creature who wins his own creation inch by inch from the nest of the cosmic dragons." (299)

Clearly, Ramón has invented a new religion in order that, as Reich and Lawrence would both agree, the latent human potential for creative life may be achieved. He states firmly to Kate that "I am a man who has no belief" (299). And in a similar vein, he admits his pretense – a necessary life-giving pretense – very honestly to his son. The elder boy says:

> "They say, also, that you pretend to be the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl."
>
> "Not at all. I only pretend that the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl is coming back to the Mexicans." (295)

Ramón's desire to create a new religion is in good part based on his disgust with and skepticism of the established conventional religions in Mexico. Don Ramón is critical of the Mexicans' superstitiousness and fatalism; he desires that each man develop greater responsibility and realistic awareness:

> "when the child dies, the parents say: *Ah, he will be an angel!* So they cheer up and feel as if they had been given a present. Sometimes I think they enjoy it when their children die. Sometimes I think they would like to transfer Mexico *en bloc* into Paradise." (66)

The emphasis that the Christian religion places on heaven as the only happiness to be achieved has led the peasantry to a hopeless fatalism that Ramón would willingly erase. Thus, his new utopia has "no Before and After, there is only Now" (193). True reactionary and authoritarian stances never condemn established conventional religion. In fact, the strong pressure to conventionality and obedience within the church coincides with the same pressures in a fascist program. In *The Plumed Serpent*, the reactionary forces, the Knights of Cortes, join the church in a fight against Ramón, who hopes to be aligned with the socialists. Ramón distinguishes his program

from Montes' socialism, but it would seem that they can work side-by-side without interference or rancour, although Ramón remains suspicious. The Quetzalcoatlian movement is explicitly defined by Ramón as non-political, *outside* the extremes of the right-wing Roman Catholic Church, the Knights of Cortes, or even Montes' left-wing socialism (271). Throughout the novel, in fact, Lawrence makes it very clear that Ramón is, in the first place, *not* political, secondly, that his movement is religious in name only, and finally, that he is attacked and hated far more by the reactionary right than by Montes on the left. The one portrait of a fascist in the novel is little more than a caricature; Lawrence ridicules his pretentious, overly-ceremonious behavior – which may, in part, be based on the strutting arrogance of Mussolini:

> [Kate saw] the stout figure of her landlord on the walk outside the window, taking off his cloth cap and bowing low to her. A cloth cap! – She knew he was a great Fascista, the reactionary Knights of Cortes held him in great esteem.
>
> Kate bowed coldly.
>
> He bowed low again, with the cloth cap.
>
> Kate said not a word.
>
> He stood on one foot, then on the other, and then marched forward up the gravel walk, towards the kitchen quarters, as if he had not seen either Kate or General Viedma. In a few moments, he marched back, as if he could not see either Kate or the General. (338-39)

Ramón bears no resemblance whatsoever to such a character. Ramón has little sense of his own self-importance and superiority as he interacts with those around him.

Above all, Ramón possesses the ability to analyze himself and question his own motives. At one point – in despair – he admits that he is mistaken and feels a fool for having begun the new religion:

> "I don't know who is prince. But in the kingdom of fools, I believe it is I." ... "I am a prince of fools!" Why have I started this Quetzalcoatl business? Why? Pray tell me why?" (296-97)

Similarly, though he fears appearing vulnerable in front of a blind follower like Cipriano, he knows readily enough that he *is* vulnerable, and sometimes wrong: "'Who am I, even to talk about Quetzalcoatl, when my heart is hollow with anger against the woman I have married and the children she bore me?'" (299). Such self-reproach not only illustrates intraception; there is considerable humility in forcing oneself to look this closely at the discrepancy between self-image and actuality. The sensitivity with which Ramón approaches his sons also illustrates a more humble mien than Cipriano would ever use. Far from being the authoritarian disciplinarian, Ramón is a gentle, affectionate father whose "heart yearned over them" (391).

Ramón, lastly, is the greatest of contrasts to Cipriano in his consistent avoidance of violence. Unlike Cipriano's readiness to fight – for whatever cause – Ramón tries to avoid aggression:

> Mexico is not Mexico for nothing, however, and already blood had been shed on both sides. This Ramón particularly wanted to avoid, as he felt that violent death was not so easily wiped out of the air and out of the souls of men, as spilt blood was washed off the pavements. (287)

Whereas Cipriano's impulse is to destroy – "My hand is to hold a gun" (396) – Ramón recognizes that aggressive power is nullifying, that the only real value in life is to awaken the human spirit, rather than to batter it into submission: "'It's never half so brave, to carry something off, and destroy it, as to set a new pulse beating'" (319). Ramón, unlike Cipriano, will use diplomacy and kindliness; he is willing to negotiate rationally rather than use force: "[a]ll the time, Ramón tried as far as possible to avoid arousing resistance and hate" (394). His dictum to his people is sensible, being neither

so meek as to elicit inhuman repression – which the "turn the other cheek" demand finally does in Christianity – nor at all aggressive: "'Lay forcible hands on nothing, only be ready to resist if forcible hands should be laid on you'" (396). This is a psychologically healthy attitude that contains reverence for creative life, while retaining a rational sense of "individualistic" self-respect. The greatest difference between Cipriano and Ramón is drawn by Teresa: "a man like [Ramón] is more gentle than a woman. He is not like Cipriano. Cipriano is a soldier" (476).

What Lawrence finally illustrates in *The Plumed Serpent* is that the leader of the utopian religion *is* a genuinely altruistic, disinterested and compassionate human being. There are no grounds at all for labelling Ramón as an authoritarian leader. However, Lawrence also shows – perhaps inadvertently – that such a leader would only be supported truly and absolutely *by* an authoritarian, in the character of Cipriano. Kate, as a questioner and individualist, would be a poor follower. Further, Lawrence's portrait of Cipriano is a negative one; while the goals of Ramón's utopia remain praiseworthy and desirable, the type of personality that would follow is proven to be undesirable and destructive. Utopia in itself is not reprehensible, but the kinds of absolutist followers that it attracts can be said to be destructive.

Given Ramón's life-affirming personality, however, the novel also illustrates the need, even within a utopian framework, for the authoritarian, enforcement role that Cipriano occupies. Lawrence could not envision a utopia without an enforcement arm, and enforcement inevitably carries with it an authoritarian element. Whitfield pointed out the authoritarian quality of average Americans in the way they knowingly applied electric shocks to others when asked to do so by an authority figure. The leader/follower con-

cept is integral to any social system, and with this concept there must necessarily exist a measure of authoritarianism. In *The Plumed Serpent*, Lawrence envisions a balance between the life-affirming leadership of Don Ramón and the authoritarianism of Cipriano. Should this balance shift, however, putting the Ciprianos in control, then the spectre of fascism or totalitarianism quickly becomes a realizable possibility.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the novels within the terms of this study has indicated that Lawrence was certainly very aware of authoritarianism as a negative element within the human personality. Gerald Crich dies when, feeling the need for love, for a reciprocal relationship, he is unable to achieve it because of his inner emptiness, his inability to share any part of his life with others. Characters like Jim Bricknell, Jack Callcott and Cipriano simply do not understand themselves; neither do they feel any need to examine the motives behind any of their actions. Their lack of introspection, and their unthinking adherence to specific programs, make them destructive individuals. These are the strong adherents of the *status quo*, the unthinking followers of convention, of religion, or of any reactionary movement such as Kangaroo's. These are also the individuals who will make up the body of any totalitarian or fascist force, because they live their lives in accordance with authoritarian principles. On the other hand, the Lawrencian heroes who think and feel, characters like Rupert Birkin, Lilly, and Richard Somers, are intense and passionate in their denial of an empty life. These are the people who, though often stumbling, at times making ridiculous statements and proclamations, nevertheless lead society toward regeneration.

If Rupert Birkin, Lilly and Somers are regenerative forces, how should Lawrence himself be viewed? From a negative perspective, he has been variously characterized as reactionary, authoritarian, and even fascistic – note Russell's view that Lawrence's theory of "blood-consciousness" led "straight to Auschwitz." But he is undoubtedly also, in Fritz Stern's definition of the term, a "cultural critic." How closely, then, does he resemble the personalities that Stern defines, and where would this place him with regard to the political spectrum of "Left" and "Right?"

Stern, in *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, formulates "a particular type of cultural despair," which indicates that not all cultural criticism is identical. Stern's study isolates the specific type of personality that exhibits a "mixture of cultural despair and mystical nationalism" (3), which he finds particularly personified in the three figures he examines: Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck. These men are credited as being at times incisive and just in their criticism of German culture (1). Their thought, however, finally resembles the authoritarian attitudes of some of the Lawrencian characters examined in this study; Langbehn, Lagarde and Moeller share a world with Gerald Crich, Jim Bricknell, Jack Callcott and Cipriano, insofar as "their reforms as well as their criticisms reflected the strong subjective element of their thought" (Stern 3). Like the authoritarian characters in Lawrence's novels, the men studied by Stern made a "leap from despair to utopia across all existing reality" (1). Gerald Crich's translation of mechanical order into "harmony" represents this kind of warped thinking, irrational in its subjectivity and the need to obtain self-approval, while ignoring the reality of the miners who suffer because of his actions. The way Stern describes Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller resembles Lawrence's descriptions of Gerald, Cipriano, Jim Bricknell and Jack Callcott much

more closely than it does a description of Lawrence himself. Stern identifies Lagarde as "a lonely, embittered man" (2), who was characterized by "his crabbed manner and his extravagant presumption" (113).

Stern pinpoints the flaw in Lagarde's thinking:

> The form of Lagarde's attack, as always, consisted of three parts: the statement of extravagant expectations and ideals, a distorted and hypercritical view of actual conditions, and a prescription of concrete reforms. (104)

His first two steps are the crux of his irrational thought; the utopian ideal he holds is blatantly unrealistic and is further undercut by any practical view of the existing reality.

Lawrence's emphasis on "blood intimacy" in his writing has led many critics to assume that he forsakes a rational approach to reality, yet this thesis has demonstrated that Lawrence recognizes very clearly the distinction between the rational and irrational in thought processes. Lawrence does not resemble Lagarde, except perhaps for the superficial label that characterizes each of them as "cultural critics."

Stern introduces Langbehn in a similar manner to Lagarde, as "a failure and a psychopath" (2). Langbehn's personality, although remembered by many as charming and intelligent, is dominated by an ego-centered perception of reality that is very similar to that of Gerald Crich or Jack Callcott. At one point in his life, Langbehn "went to absurd lengths to conceal his obscure identity, to disguise what no one was particularly anxious to discover. He alternately cherished and resented his self-centered isolation" (138). There is little resemblance to Lawrence here, whose own isolation from his fellows and country was the result of being ostracized, rather than a romanticized self-imposition. Neither is there any similarity between the two men's thought. Langbehn's writing, states Stern:

> leapt from laments to prophecies, from wild charges against the present to sublime visions of the future. But no argument, no bridge of reason that could be challenged or discussed – nothing, except an occasional foe or scapegoat that accounts for the presence of evil. (154)

Stern's study illustrates a central irrational element in the personalities of both Lagarde and Langbehn. The third theorist he examines is, however, more complex and, in Stern's words, "the most admirable" (231) of the three men. Stern typifies Moeller van den Bruck as:

> an outsider who made a Nietzschean virtue of having drifted into isolation. How many youths of his time dignified their retreat from life by invoking Zarathustra, as if that superb self-conqueror had preached resignation and passivity in the face of an uncongenial culture! The abstract and fanciful quality of Moeller's thought was undoubtedly conditioned by his prolonged loneliness, as was his passionate desire to lead his people to a new community. (232-33)

Moeller stands solidly, however, as "a talented *litterateur*" (2), whose "critical survey of German literature after Nietzsche is an impressive achievement" (235), and who translated a twenty-three volume collection of Dostoyevsky's works (260). These are laudable achievements for any intellectual and give Moeller van den Bruck a certain credibility. The flaw in his thought, however, occurs when he applies his aesthetics to external reality:

> Actually, Moeller intended to be more than a critic of literature; he sought to discover the spirit of his age in its esthetic creations. Accordingly he wrote a kind of didactic, subjectivist history – a willfully self-created past as a guide to an imaginary, ideal future. (236)

Moeller subjectively reinterprets historical fact and political reality as a myth of aristocratic, heroic greatness that never actually existed. Lawrence's Ramón does this as well, but he does so consciously, in order to promote the rebirth of the spirit in his people. He does not really believe

in his own myth-making. Most importantly, Ramón's rewriting of history is done within a fictional context, while Moeller rewrites history in actuality, offering it as truth. Lawrence's own history book, *Movements in European History*, certainly carries his own imaginative interpretation of history, but does not use the presentation of historical fact to promote a rigid platform for utopian reform. Stern criticizes van den Bruck's hazy irrationality:

> His politics were never the result of an analysis of existing historical conditions or of actual need, but always a projection of an esthetic judgment and a criticism of culture. (251)

Stern asserts that Moeller "was no armchair strategist, but a kind of metaphysician of crisis, a searcher after the deeper causes and prospects of the great trial" (266). While both Lawrence and Nietzsche could also be considered "metaphysicians of crisis," their theories remain grounded in reality and rational fact. As Moeller aged, he "preserved an exasperating indifference to fact or historical complexities" (302). One example of this tendency in his thought was his adoration of Dostoyevsky, who simply came to symbolize Russia in van den Bruck's mind; this unrealistic and unquestioning view of Russia as a positive force therefore became part of his thought. Such a subjective, irrational flaw in thinking – "because he mistook his abstract ideal of Russia for the live concrete society" (302) – is very similar to Gerald's translation of concrete, mechanized order into an abstract, mystical harmony.

While Lawrence's characters, Gerald Crich, Jim Bricknell, Jack Callcott, and Cipriano, all parallel Stern's three figures because of their irrational subjectivity, Lawrence himself cannot be accused of thinking irrationally, as his portrayal of the authoritarian personality in his novels shows. Some confusion regarding Lawrence may exist because he *can* be grouped with

Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck as being *anti*-rational in his role as a cultural critic, but that does not mean his thought is *ir*rational. Lawrence's life simply does not resemble the romanticized, tortured, self-imposed isolation of Stern's three theorists. Lawrence's vivid mimicry of propriety, his love of nature and spontaneity, his humble pleasure in simple work and living an ordinary, unostentatious life are all part of a more concrete and realistic approach to reality. There is a commonsense tone in Lawrence's memoirs, as in all his writing, that precludes the dominance of a subjectively mystified self-image.

Another stereotype that is often applied to Lawrence is that of the "right-wing" artist. George Watson places Lawrence on the "Right" side of the political spectrum. Watson's over-riding criterion for this placement seems to be that Lawrence was a writer of the 1920s decade, rather than the 1930s, the era that Watson believes ushered in the proponents of the "Left." Watson's chart reads as follows:

RIGHT	LEFT
W.B. Yeats, 1865-1939	Bloomsbury, etc.: Leonard and Virginia
P. Wyndham Lewis, 1882-1957	Woolf, Maynard Keynes, Lytton Strachey,
T.E. Hulme, 1883-1917	E.M. Forster, Bertrand Russell ...
D.H. Lawrence, 1885-1930	Cecil Day Lewis, 1904-72
Ezra Pound, 1885-1972	Christopher Isherwood, b. 1904
T.S. Eliot, 1888-1965	William Empson, B. 1906
T.E. Lawrence, 1888-1935	W.H. Auden, 1907-73
Roy Campbell, 1901-57	Louis MacNeice, 1907-63
Evelyn Waugh, 1903-66	Stephen Spender, b. 1909 (Watson 88)

Watson's categorizations allow him to isolate some characteristics that are common to the members of each group, for example, the youthfulness of the literary Marxists in the '30s in contrast to the members of the Right in the '20s. He also points out that the people on the "Left" are "more upper-

class in origin than the Right" (90). The artists belonging to the Right were "of barely middle-class parentages" (90). Finally, he notes that the Left comprises more native Britons than does the Right:

> The Left, then, was not only socially superior to the Right, and younger, and more of a kind; it was also more British. If you were fairly well-bred and expensively educated, born in the first decade of the twentieth century and of a literary bent, then your chances of not being a Marxist by the mid-Thirties were low. (91)

This is a fairly superficial categorization that does not really represent the complexity of many of the artists Watson discusses.

Lawrence was not preoccupied with right-wing politics; rather, his recognition of the authoritarian personality enabled him to portray it as a destructive force, and to prophesy the totalitarian-fascistic society that it could lead to. Lawrence cannot, therefore, justly be labelled as right-wing or authoritarian. Instead, he possesses the characteristics of the "genuine liberal" in Adorno's sense of the term:

> The subject in whom it [liberalism] is pronounced has a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence. He cannot stand any outside interference with his personal convictions and beliefs, and he does not want to interfere with those of others either. His ego is quite developed but not libidinized – he is rarely "narcissistic." At the same time, he is willing to admit id tendencies, and to take the consequence – as is the case with Freud's "erotic type." One of his conspicuous features is moral courage, often far beyond his rational evaluation of a situation. He cannot "keep silent" if something wrong is being done, even if he seriously endangers himself. Just as he is strongly "individualized" himself, he sees the others, above all, as individuals, not as specimens of a general concept. He shares some features with other syndromes found among low scorers [liberals]. Like the "Impulsive," he is little repressed and even has certain difficulties in keeping himself under "control." However, his emotionality is not blind, but directed towards the other person as a *subject*. His love is not only desire but also compassion – as a matter of fact, one might

> think of defining this syndrome as the "compassionate" low scorer. He shares with the "Protesting" low scorer the vigor of identification with the underdog, but without compulsion, and without traces of overcompensation: he is no "Jew lover." Like the "Easy-Going" low scorer [liberal] he is antitotalitarian, but ... consciously so, without the element of hesitation and indecision. It is this configuration rather than any single trait which characterizes the "Genuine Liberal." Aesthetic interests seem to occur frequently. (781)

Certainly there are some very close similarities between Adorno's description of the liberal and Lawrence (as well as some of his "liberal" protagonists like Rupert Birkin and Richard Somers). As the English cultural critic and prophet of the 1920s, Lawrence's outspoken chastisement of his countrymen is well-known. His independent sojourn throughout Europe and America, and his willingness to stand apart from conventional society are also well documented facts.

Whereas a theorist like Langbehn is easily recognized as being narcissistic, the writer of poetry such as Lawrence's "New Heaven and Earth" is hardly so. Here, he shows a hatred of solipsism, where "everything was tainted with myself" (*Complete Poems* 256). The rebirth of the spirit is achieved only when "I put my hand out further, a little further / and felt that which was not I ..." (*Poems* 259).[1] Lawrence's belief in the redemptive power of human sexuality asserts his "willingness to admit id tendencies, and to take the consequences" (Adorno 781). The compassionate expressions of love in his writing are always directed toward another human being as a "subject," rather than an object. This is perhaps the very basis of Lawrence's message. Most of all, Lawrence embodies the "moral courage"

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1 See also Pritchard, *D.H. Lawrence: Body of Darkness* 19.

that also characterizes the genuine liberal; he could never "keep silent" where he saw social wrongs committed, regardless of the cost to himself. His lifetime was spent decrying the wrongs he saw. Lawrence is not always a *nice* author to read; no doubt he was also not always easy to live with. In describing the "genuine liberal," Adorno also draws a portrait of a personality that would not always be "nice," or "easy-going." This individual demonstrates a healthy anger toward injustice, and a strong sense of his own personal rights.

The results of this study, then, would indicate that Lawrence is, indeed, a deeply "committed" artist. He sees clearly the wrongs, the injustices that exist, and points the way toward the rebirth of society through the regeneration of the self. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this artist is the clarity with which he views the threat of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and fascism within his time, and the precision with which he documents these perceptions within many of his characters.

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