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### THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE SCOPE OF BARGAINED ITEMS

UNDER DECENTRALIZED AND CENTRALIZED

FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

, by

C G.R. (Gus) ROZYCKI

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
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# FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersited certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE, SCOPE OF BARGAINED ITEMS UNDER DECENTRALIZED AND CENTRALIZED FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING submitted by G.R. (Gus) ROZYCKI in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Educational Administration.

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The purpose of this study was to investigate whether centralized and decentralized collective bargaining resulted in differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as pursued in Alberta (decentralized) and Saskatchewan (centralized) respectively.

The method of investigation was that of documentory analysis. Data were collected from the Alberta Teachers' Association and the Saskatchewan TEachers' Federation consisting of all collective bargaining agreements for the year 1978. The Ontario Education Relations Commission's Instrument was utilized in order to quantify the data from collective bargaining agreements to reveal the scope of bargained items.

Johnson's model based on an adaptation of Dunlop's conceptualization of "Industrial Relations Systems" was accepted as a frame of reference within which the investigation was conducted. The results are stated in terms compatible with the terms used in the model.

This study found that Alberta average salaries for the majority of teachers were higher than Saskatchewan salaries and that the spread in salary differences in the two provinces had remained relatively unchanged when compared to 1968-69 figures cited by Muir.

The analysis examined provisions in seven clusters or related groupings. The Direct Salary Related Cluster

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showed six provisions appearing in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Seven provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Ten provisions in the Health and Welfare Cluster appeared in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements and four provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

The CSL, Retirement Gratuity Cluster revealed that in Alberta no Cumulative Sick Days and Retirement Gratuity provisions appeared in a greater percentage of agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements while fourteen such provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

In the Leaves Cluster thirty three provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Alberta than Saskatchewan agreements. Twenty one Leave provisons appeared in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Twenty seven provisions dealing with Working Conditions appeared in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements while only three such provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

The Job Security Cluster indicated that/eleven provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Alberta

agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements and that six such provisions appeared in a greater percentage of Sask-atchewan collective bargaining agreements than in Alberta agreements.

The General Cluster showed that six provisions were present in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements while thirteen such provisions were present in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta collective bargaining agreements.

The results of the investigation suggest that there is a greater scope of bargained items in Alberta collective bargaining agreements than in Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. It was, therefore, recommended that Alberta teachers continue to bargain at the local level rather than to pursue provincial bargaining as is practiced in Saskatchewan.

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# CHAPTER I

# Introduction to the Problem

At the International Conference on Trends In Industrial And Labour Relations held in Montreal in 1976, one of the main themes was that of "centralized" collective bargaining. Jacob Finkelman in his address on "Public Sector Bargaining and the Democratic Process" (Finkelman, 1976:33 - 35) noted the centralization of the ". . . employer in the collective bargaining relationship". Employers bargaining with the same union found it unsatisfactory to bargain individually with a union which seemed to play one company against the other in order to secure gains for its members. Thus employers banded together to bargain as a group with the union representing their employees. Finkelman also onoted the trend in which public service bargaining units are "predetermined" in law on the basis of service-wide occupational groups.

Dunlop, Harbison, Kerr and Meyers (Dunlop et al, 1975) in <u>Industrialism and Industrial Man</u>

Reconsidered also contend that as industrialization proceeds, systems of industrial relations become

increasingly tri-partheid (involving the state, management and labour). The authors generalize that:

- each nation will develop a "system" of industrial relations;
- this system will be generally consistent with the basic arrangement in the larger society;
- the system will become increasingly tripartheid; and
- 4. within this tri-partheid arrangement, the state tends to become more influential (Dunlop et al, 1975:18).

Paul Weiler in his "Fragmented or Centralized Bargaining" (Weiler, 1976:132 - 140) champions centralized bargaining. Moreover, he argues that a decentralized bargaining structure can be highly unstable. Weiler criticized decentralized bargaining as not beneficial to employers!

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In a number of bargaining units, there must be a number of negotiations. Each set of negotiations runs the risk of an impasse and a strike. As I said earlier, each such strike can escalate into a total shutdown of the employer's operations. Moreover, a union may be tempted to do this step by the assumption that, in sacrificing its own earnings, it can inflict on the employer the cost of a total shutdown, and thus make a quick and favorable settlement with the striking union look cheap by comparison. However, employers who look beyond the short term will resist that effort because they know that eventually they will have to pass the extra gain on to the other unions: indeed in the long term, they will pay a lot more if the practice of "leap-frogging" becomes habitual (Weiler, 1976:135 - 136).

Weiler states that the main virtue perceived by the public in centralized bargaining is that one overall settlement in the industry is achieved and multiple strikes in an industry are avoided. He notes as well that if an industry-wide strike does occur, the government through "popular pressure" can intervene with back-to-work legislation and an imposed settlement.

Douglas Muir contends that from an economic standpoint "it appears hardly worth the time, effort or cost involved for teachers and trustees to go through the collective bargaining ritual each year at the local level" (Muir, 1971a:143). Muir's conclusion is based on his research into the "structural" issue in collective bargaining in education. The structural issue involves the question of whether teacher bargaining is to be conducted at the local level; at the zone or area level; or at the provincial level. In this progression, the bargaining becomes more and more centralized.

Muir's extensive work and research in collective bargaining in Canadian education led him to believe that two forces are presently exerting pressure upon the industrial relations systems. One

force results from the rapid increase in educational costs and the pressure being developed by ratepayers to shift much of this burden to provincial governments who in the past had little control over the level of these expenditures. The second pressure in the system results from the narrowing of the intra-provincial differences in the level of teachers' salaries. Muir indicates that this means that local conditions play a relatively minor role in the determination of teachers' salaries and therefore weakens the justification for locally determined salaries.

He further contends that this is leading to "a greater financial responsibility for education . . to the provincial governments" and "there will be a greater move toward 'area' or province-wide bargaining" (Muir, 1971a:143).

Such a situation presents serious questions to students of industrial relations. A major consideration would be whether centralization or decentralization of the bargaining structure makes any real difference in the actual outcome of the bargaining relationship. Or, does centralization of the bargaining structure merely expedite the process of collective bargaining without affecting

the actual outcomes?

### Background to the Problem

In the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, teachers are empowered by legislation to bargain collectively with their employers. In both provinces, the respective teachers' organization is the sole bargaining agent for teachers. Bargaining in the last decade or more has become difficult in times of economic restraints (due to provincial guidelines, Anti Inflation Board (A.I.B.) and post A.I.B. guidelines).

Over the years two schools of thought have developed regarding how best to conduct collective bargaining. One approach, decentralized bargaining or use of the "leap-frog" method is a long, standing practice. This is accomplished by using gains made in one bargaining jurisdiction as a lever for gaining similar conditions of employment in another jurisdiction at a later date. Another method is centralized bargaining or using the "concentrated power" approach. This arguement follows the dictum "United we stand, divided we fall". Bargaining in this fashion pits the entire teaching force against those who control the purse

strings and decision-making powers (Provincial government) and is viewed by many as a more fruitful approach than bargaining individually at the local level with the various school boards.

In 1968 the Province of Saakatchevan adopted "zone bargaining" in place of local bargaining. province was split into thirteen (13) bargaining zones and the various school boards bargained as employers' organizations with their teachers. Nineteen seventy-three (1973) saw a further centralization when Saskatchewan once again opted for change in the bargaining structure and adopted a bi-level (or province-wide) form of collective bargaining with teachers. In Alperta on the other hand, teachers and their employers continued to bargain at the local level (zone bargaining is permitted but is not mandatory). By \$ at the great majority of Alberta teachers bargain at the local level with their employers (A.T.A., Teacher Welfare Department, 1978).

## The Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study were to investigate whether any relationship existed in the negotiated items in written collective pargaining

agreements between teachers and school boards in a province where bargaining was pursued at the local or decentralized level (as in Alberta) and a province where bargaining was pursued at a more centralized level (as in Saskatchewan).

It was determined that a study of this type was needed and that it might contribute empirical know-ledge to the current controversy over centralized versus decentralized approaches in collective bargaining.

# Specific Statement of, the Problem

Are there any differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as bargained under the decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978 respectively?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

# Contribution to Industrial Relations Theory

The field of industrial relations is characterized by a multiplicity of partial theories which, according to Dunlop (1958), tend to explain observed phenomena in isolation from each other and from the larger society within which employeremployee relationships are established. Dunlop

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attempted to draw together these partial theo/ $f^{\beta}$ , which have their roots in such diverse fields  $f^{\beta}$  study as law, sociology, economics and psycho/ $f^{\beta}$ y, to contribute to a general theory of industriy relations.

It is J. T. Dunlop's work that Johnson ( $\sqrt{11}$ ) chose as being useful in " . . . describing, analyzing and predicting the complex of interv relations among managers, workers and agencie government" (Johnson, 1971:4). Johnson's investigation attempted to operationalize som aspects of Dunlop's conceptual framework and 4 apply them in an educational setting. Dunlop. theory is principally concerned with the strugg the of the industrial relationship, and Johnson's / tudy did give some indications of the usefulness of  $^{\mathfrak{t}}\mathfrak{h}\mathtt{e}$ theory in analyzing the educational system. approach allowed Johnson to develop hypothese concerning the inter-relations among teachers trustees and government agencies (Johnson, 19) $^{1}$ , In like manner the present study may derive in the on the effects of two different structural vely class (decentralized and centralized forms of collery bargaining) on the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements.

8

"Education in Canada is big business" (Muir, 1971b:1) reads the TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS. Salaries paid to teachers account for almost seventy (70) percent of the operating budgets of the public schools in Canada. As a result there has been a great deal of concern expressed over the level of teachers' salaries in all provinces. This has led to a number of attempts on the part of the provincial 80 vernments,  $l_0 cal$  school boards and citizens' committees to restrain or restrict teachers' collective bargaining activities (Muir, 1971b:2). Be that as it may, collective bargaining has proven to be a viable method of determining teachers' salaries and condition of employment as shown by the fact that the various provincial governments over the years have produced legislation to govern the bargaining relationship of teachers and school boards in their respective jurisdictions. Johnson (1971) suggests as does Muir (1971a) that diversity exists in the type of bargaining structure employed by each province. It is possible that studies focusing on this diversity may be of value in better understanding the operation of the bargaining system.

### Significance to Teachers' Professional Organizations

The analysis of collective bargaining agreements from Alberta and Saskatchewan may provide insights into teachers' salary and conditions of employment (under decentralized and centralized forms of bargaining structures) and help unravel signs of possible future trends utilizing results from the 1978 collective bargaining agreements. Also the results of this study may aid the Alberta Teachers' Association in a fuller understanding of an A.R.A. resolution (see Appendix A), which was discussed at the A.T.A.'s Spring Annual Convention in 1980, dealing with the question of province-wide collective bargaining (Berlando, Interview, 1979).

#### ASSUMPTIONS

- 1. It is assumed that the "technological and market or budgetary context" in Alberta's and Saskatcheway's educational industrial relations system, do in fact have the same type of common characteristics as revealed in Dunlop's work (Dunlop, 1958:129 263,384).
- 2. It is assumed that the agreements to be studied were, the result of bargaining in good faith and thet

the terms of the agreements were acceptable to both parties (at the time of the agreement under the respective structural constraints in Alberta and Saskatchewan).

### DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Collective Agreement (or Collective Bargaining

Agreement) - an agreement in writing between school

boards (in Saskatchewan includes government) and the

A.T.A. or S.T.F., acting on behalf of teachers

employed by the boards, containing provisions with

reference to conditions of employment.

Collective Bargaining (or Bargaining) - the formal process of negotiation between employers and employees (teachers representatives and school board and government) which results in the conclusion, the revision or the renewal of a collective agreement.

Conditions (or Items in a Collective Bargaining

Agreement) - the specific terms or arrangements of
the provisions in a collective agreement.

Non-Salary Provisions - those provisions which do not involve the regular remuneration of teachers.

As defined here many non-salary provisions deal with remunerative issues.

Provisions - statements in a collective agreement.

Salary Provisions - those provisions which refer to the regular salaries, rates of pay and allowances payable to teachers.

Scope of Bargaining (or Scope of Collective

Bargaining) - Scope is defined in this study as the range of subjects which are negotiated in a collective bargaining relationship. Gerhart uses the terms "Scope of Bargaining" and "Bargaining Outcomes" interchangeably (1976:331)

Working Conditions of Teachers or Conditions of

Employment - the conditions (agreed between teachers

and shool boards) under which teachers render

service.

A.T.A. - Alberta Teachers' Association

A.S.T.A. - Alberta School Trustees' Association

S.T.F. - Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation

S.S.T.A. - Saskatchewan School Trustees' Association

### **DELIMITATIONS**

The analysis of written collective bargaining agreements will not include the actual process of collective bargaining nor most of the other aspects of the conversion process through which the agreements were achieved.

The study will be restricted to the 1978 written collective bargaining agreements for Alberta and Saskatchewan.

#### LIMITATIONS

This study is limited in the following manner:

1. The study is limited by the nature of the instrument to be used (the instrument does not differentiate between quality of clauses present in an agreement). The presence or absence of specific items is recognized without assigning a value for such an item.

2. The study represents a relationship as it existed at a specific point in time.

- 3. The study applies only to the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan.
- 4. The study is only indicative of what was negotiated and not of what may have been possible.
- 5. The study is limited by the parameters of a single year as a basis for analysis:

### ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

In this chapter the main research problem was presented and explained. The justification for this study, the definitions and terms as used in the study and the underlying assumptions were also presented. The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:

CHAPTER II - Review of Related Literature

CHAPTER III - Related Research

CHAPTER IV - Research Methodology

CHAPTER V - Presentation and Analysis of the Data

CHAPTER VI - Summary, Conclusions, Implications and

Recommendations

#### CHAPTER II

#### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

### Collective Bargaining Defined

0

According to Dunlop the actors in given contexts

and the work community, including those governing the contacts among the actors in an indutrial relations system. This network or web of rules consists of procedures for establishing rules, the substantive rules, and the procedures for deciding their application to particular situations (Dunlop, 1958:13).

In a slightly different and Canadian version

Carrothers states that collective bargaining may be

described as the process or activity between

employers and employee representatives "...

conducted with the object of concluding an agreement

regulating the relationship between both the

employer and his employees and the employer and the

union" (Carrothers, 1965:3).

Shister in his essay on Collective Bargaining
(1958:26 - 56) reviews several attempts at the
conceptualization of the collective bargaining

chamberlain at the forefront. "Chamberlain has moved the field more than a small step forward with his analysis" claims Shister (Shister, 1958:27). This view is upheld by Flanders when he states that Chamberlain's three theories of collective bargaining are "The outstanding attempt to produce a 'generic definition' of the institution, encompassing twentieth-century developments in its character" (Flanders, 1971:31).

Chamberlain held that the various theories about the nature of collective bargaining could be reduced to three. These are that collective bargaining is "(1) a means of contracting for the sale of labor, (2) a form of industrial government, and (3) a method of management" (Chamberlain, 1951:121).

The marketing theory suggests that collective bargaining may be viewed as the process which determines under what terms labour will continue to be supplied to an employer by his present employees and those hired later as well. Chamberlain also suggests that although this theory generally emphasized a money exchange as the most prevalent

basis for contract, other terms may also be insisted upon. By being bound to and protected by his union, this collective action of labour results in an increase in the bargaining power of the worker relative to that of his employer. "The object of trade union policy . . . has been to give to each individual worker something of the indispensability of labor as a whole" (Chamberlain, 1951:124). This has sometimes been loosely referred to as "restoring" the bargaining equality of workers. Such a statement seems to be a gross assumption of some prior equality between employers and employees. Chamberlain stresses, aside from the tenuity of such an assumption there is little to suggest that collective bargaining has "established (or re-established) an equality of advantage between management and workers" (Chamberlain, 1951:125). The statement as such could only be made in terms of the difficulty in which employers find themselves in trying to "duplicate" their entire work force and thus collective bargaining is "necessitous" for the employers.

The governmental theory suggests a contractual nature which acts as a "constitution" a sort of an industrial government for the plant or company or

industry. The need for some balance of bargaining power is accepted. Chamberlain sees this balance as resting on the mutual dependency of the parties and on the power of each party "to veto" the acts of the other. It is a political relationship in which the union and the employer jointly share sovereignty over the employees and the union uses that power in the interest of its members (Chamberlain, 1951:137).

In his managerial theory, Chamberlain states,

"the nature of the bargaining process is explainable
in terms appropriate to its business decisions"

(Chamberlain, 1951:130). It is a functional
relationship in which the union joins with the
company officials in reaching decisions on matters
in which both have vital interests.

Chamberlain suggests that the three theories are not mutually exclusive "... it would be erroneous to consider these three approaches as sharply distinguished from each other" (Chamberlain, 1951:138).

To some extent these three views of the nature of collective bargaining suggest different emphases on concomitant phases of collective bargaining. In the usual bargaining relationship today, as we have seen, a contract does link the two parties

together and establishes the terms on which that link is maintained. The bargaining process is a species of group government suggestively analogous to the modern state. The union does join with company officials in making managerial decisions. All three aspects of collective bargaining can thus be simultaneously maintained (Chamberlain, 1951:138).

CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A vital part of the bargaining process has to do with determining the structure and the procedures through which discussions will take place. Dunlop states that this is particularly significant in any negotiations that affect more than one place of work (Dunlop, 1973:12). In such a situation, as suggested by Dunlop, the parties must decide which issue should be agreed upon in a master agreement and which should be left for local negotiations. Dunlop argues that as technological and market changes take place, it may be necessary to alter such arrangements and provide for more centralization on some issues and greater decentralization in other instances (Dunlop, 1973:12).

In recent years, there has been a strong drive toward centralization of collective bargaining

(Bairstow and Bochner, 1976:132 - 140). Chamberlain suggests that this is partly due to the fact that organized labor in the past bargained on behalf of its members with individual employers in a particular industry (such as coal mining or steel industry). Perhaps because all these employers bargained individually with the same union, they banded together for mutual advantage (Chamberlain, 1951:161).

The advent of large and even multinational corporations has had its impact on the structure of collective bargaining. Unions have had to follow by shaping their strategy in accord with the structure and policies of major business firms. Chamberlain posits that,

One further outgrowth has been the contrapuntal play of centralization and decentralization of authority and functions. With growth, certain major decisions (especially those relating to finance) were spun upwards to the national headquarters, in order to maintain control over and cohesiveness within the corporate system. Other decisions - too detailed to be handled effectively at the center - were left or spun downwards to the operating units (Chamberlain, 1973:20).

However a point of past and present debate is the concern as to the nature and scope of the resultant collective agreements. "The questions of who

occupies the more strategic position and who possesses the greater bargaining power remain to be answered, however" (Chamberlain, 1951:126). As collective bargaining followed the corporate path in structure, negotiations moved up to the national level, supplemented by a council of representatives from local unions of a company's constituent plants. In substance, issues like wages and pension plans were hammered out at the national level, leaving subsidiary details to local bargaining (Somers, 1973:20).

Nault also forsees such a change of bargaining structure in Canadian education. He is quite emphatic in his statement that centralization of the collective bargaining process is both desireable and on its way. "Centralized structures are more conducive to national negotions" (Nault, 1969:192) he claims. The logic for such a turn of events is derived from the fact that educational budgets are for the most part funded through provincial grants. Thus, Nault argues "Local school boards' importance will decline, and consolidation of school districts will come more naturally" (Nault, 1969:192).

Although Nault does not address himself fully as to what will be bargained for at the provincial

level and what will be bargained at the local level, his thinking seems to be in line with that of Chamberlain (1973) and Somers (1973) when he states:

While local bargaining is maintained, in small school districts the . . [provincial] . . . organization will play an important role; in large districts, the local organization will retain full control (Nault, 1969:192).

The difficulty with such a two tier system of collective bargaining as discussed above, is Dunlop's contention in his landmark work of <u>Industrial</u> Relations Systems:

Wage rules and other rules are not two separate boxes; there is a single highly inter-related body of rules in an industrial relations system. The actors are frequently concerned with the internal consistency and the internal inter-dependence among rules. It is well known that there are substitutions in bargaining, in national industrial relations systems with collective bargaining, between wage rules and other rules (Dunlop, 1951:387).

# SCOPE OF BARGAINED ITEMS OR SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

The scope of negotiations, which involves the number and types of items that may be subject to employer-employee discussions and negotiations, is one of the most critical issues in contemporary labour-management relations in the public sector (Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations, 1969:76).

The range of subjects which are negotiated in a collective bargaining relationship is a matter of great interest to the bargaining parties. In the private

sector, the scope of bargaining has been categorized into three major areas: mandatory, permissive and prohibited (Stinnett, 1966:11). Mandatory areas are those in which the law requires both the employers and employees to negotiate in good faith; such as salaries and insurance benefits, among others. The permissive area is that in which the employer and employee organizations may agree to negotiate; such as production standards and output. An example of a subject of bargaining prohibited by law would be an agreement to discriminate because of race or sex. In other words, law takes precedence over any agreement.

The issue of what is negotiable and what is not, has been an endless controversy in the private sector, and the controversy is even more vexing and more emotional in the public sector because some unions see limitations on negotiability as an attempt to frustrate the unions, by management hiding behind such limitations.

Giandomenico's study found that such a narrowing of the scope of collective bargaining through limitations on negotiability as discussed above, tends to contribute to teacher frustration and militance (1973:258)

Restricting the scope of bargaining may not 49 permit teachers to develop their individual discretionary judgement but instead relegate them to status as bureaucratic functionaries and force them to find means ... to satisfy their needs for autonomy and self-actualization.

Collective bargaining could be viewed as a tool by which obstacles preventing higher and lower order need-fulfillment among teachers were removed (Giandomenico, 1973:259).

Underlying the difficulty in defining the scope of bargaining for professional employees is the problem of distinguishing between "policy matters" and "salary and working conditions". No less difficult is the differentiation between "policy" matters and "professional" issues. In education, decisions about curriculum, textbooks, and methodology are simultaneously "policy" issues for the school board and "professional" questions for teachers (Weitzman, 1975:217). The issue of teacher transfers for example raises particularly thorny problems because it involves working conditions, policy decisions and the public interest.

Neither the two teachers' associations (S.T.F. and A.T.A.) nor the two trustees' associations (S.S.T.A. and A.S.T.A.) have published exhaustive lists of what is or is not negotiable. Little, if any, law exists to shed light on the topic of "scope of bargaining". In Alberta and Saskatchewan some

management rights areas might not be negotiable per se, but "their impact on teachers' working conditions most, certainly is" (Anderson, Interview, 1979).

The scope of bargained items in a collective bargaining agreement is by no means perfectly reflective of the range of subjects actually brought to the bargaining table. However, Dunlop's "web of rules" might be investigated from collective bargaining agreements because these form the basis of the relationship which exists between employers and their employees (Carrothers, 1965:Chapter I).

The individual items in a collective bargaining agreement represent an area referred to by Johnson (1971) as a field of analysis. Examples of items in a field of analysis are particular types of leaves. Items under leaves represent categories with specific references to such leaves as sabbatical, maternity and sick leave among others. Leaves per se represent a cluster of fields and items represent each individual field. Different dimensions of scope are thus revealed. Not only does scope show the presence of leaves, but also serves to differentiate among the kind of leaves existing in a negotiated contract. It is thus possible to quantify the scope of bargaining items from the various collective bargaining agreements.




FIGURE 1
CLUSTER OF FIELDS

Muir (1970) points out that the scope of bargaining as defined by Alberta statutes is quite open. Teachers bargain under a rather liberal definition of "tates of pay, hours of work and other terms or conditions of employment" (Muir, 1970:207). In Saskatchewan a similar condition prevails. Although Saskatchewan attempted to restrict the scope of negotiable items through statutory provisions (only matters of salaries and benefits were negotiable) they seemed to have little or no effect (Muir, 1970a:210).

Muir cites evidence that backs his claim, in that
Saskatchewan teachers bargained over remunerative issues
as well as "matters relating to professional practices,
conditions of employment, curriculum, preparation
periods, teacher load, class size, teacher aides" (Muir,
1970a:210) among other things.

Since the advent of bi-level (centralized bargaining in Saskatchewan in 1973 there seems to be a consensus that "having had five (5) years of experience with the new legislation, . . . the bi-level system is working and working exceptionally well" (McDowell, 1978 - 1979:39).

Although the Teachers' Collective Bargaining

Act has language which seems to place a restriction

on some areas of bargaining, the president of the

Saskatchewan School Trustees' Association stated

quite unequivocally that "it does not clearly define
the scope of bargaining" (Egnatoff, 1975:3). Due to

the fact that bargaining seems to be wide open as

substantiated by Muir (1970b), Egnatoff argued in 1975,

Our Association recognizes some of these deficiencies and has again begun the process of placing the issue before its member boards . . . personally I cannot subscribe to the concept that all matters are negotiable (Egnatoff, 1975:4).

If collective bargaining is to be viable, the scope of negotiation must include subjects that are relevant to employees. "Placing excessive restrictions on the scope of bargaining limits the institution of collective bargaining as a means of guaranteeing public employees a voice in the determination of their working conditions." (Weitzman, 1975:5).

Muir's (1970b) passing reference to the scope of bargained items suggests that the bargaining activity in Alberta and Saskatchewan appears to have been quite similar. His findings ind cate that in the three prairie provinces (Alberta baskatchewan and Manitoba) teachers' salaries were roughly comparable, especially those of Alberta and Saskatchewan (Muir, 1970b:305 - 319).

In the light of Dunlop's claim that "identical technologies" tend to create "quite similar rules" his general formulation of industrial relations systems (as operationalized by Craig and utilized by Johnson (1971)) has the "merit of facilitating comparisons (and contrast) within a country, between comparable sectors of different countries, and between industrial relations systems of countries taken as a whole" (Dunlop, 1958:24). It is conceivable that the difference in the bargaining relationship structure as practiced by Alberta and Saskatchewan may show some of

Dunlop's rule différences as a result of differences reflecting the influence of each distinctive provincial educational industrial relations system.

Not all industries or sectors compared among countries would show the same relative importance of the technological and market contexts in the determination of substantial rules. In some sectors the technological and market contexts prescribe a high proportion of rules reflecting common technological and market features or those which vary in a recognized fashion. In other sectors the technological and market factors will be subordinate to a more dominant influence of the respective national industrial relations systems.

(Dunlop, 1958:130).

## A GENERAL THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS-

John T. Dunlop's general theory of industrial relations provides useful conceptualizations of an industrial relations system. In fact, the concepts developed by Dunlop have had a wide influence on writing and research in labor and industrial relations (Dunlop, Harbison, Kerr and Meyers, 1975:17). Dunlop in Industrial Relations Systems declared that a systematic and theoretical discipline of industrial relations had not yet been developed (1958:vi). His book, therefore, was an attempt to fill this gap by providing: (1) a general theory of industrial relations, (2) a research

model for further studies, and (3) a furion of experience and theory. He viewed industrial relations as a system and collective bargaining as a subjeystem. The industrial relations system is comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology, and a body of The actors are (1) a hierarchy of managers and rules. their representatives in supervision, (2) a hierarchy of workers (non-managerial) and their spokesman, and (3) specialized governmental agencies concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationship. He refers to a hierarchy among workers and their spokesman because the workers will either be formally organized in a union, or an informal organization will exist. The context consists of: (1) the technological characteristics of the work place and the work community, and (2) the market or budgetary constraints which impinge on the distribution of power among the actors within the system. The actors establish a network or "web of rules" which consist of (1) procedures for establishing rules, (2) substantive rules, and (3), procedures for applying the rules. establishment and administration of these rules is the major concern or output of the industrial relations system. Rules are changed by the actors as a consequence of changes in the context or in the relative status of the actors. It is this "web of rules" which establishes the inter-relationships in an industrial

relations system and thus are the subject of analysis.

Dunlop's attention focused on the body of rules which governs the work community. The rules are viewed to be not only an element of the structure, but they are also the major output of the system. They define the status of the actors and govern their actions in the work place and community. As such they (the rules) are of prime concern to the actors for they subsequently guide further activities of the work group. In the course of time the rules may be expected to be altered as a consequence of changes in the context and in the relative statuses of the actors. "In a dynamic society the rules, including their administration, are under frequent review and change" (Dunlop, 1958:13). Johnson adap ad Lunlop's conceptualizations and applied the concepts to education. The définition of "rules" includes all agreements, statutes, orders, decrees, regulations, awards, policies, practices, customs and wage rates which circumscribe the relationship between the actors in the system (Johnson, 1971:15).

The structural elements of an industrial relations system (certain actors, certain context, ideology and body of rules) may be described at a point in time as static components, but they are

essentially dynamic. As Johnson (1971:15) so aptly put it, "Every system is in a state of continual change in response to the fluctuating pressures of its environment".

In Saston's view it is important to trace out the complex exchanges of a system and its environment in order to arrive at theoretically and empirically manageable proportions. It is Easton's premise, that if one could devise a way for generalizing the method for handling the impact of the environment on the system, there would be some hope of reducing "the enormous variety of influences into a relatively few, and therefore . . . manageable number of indicators" (Easton, 1965:25 - 26). This is precisely what he sought to effect through his use of the concepts of "inputs" and "outputs".

THE CONCEPT OF AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

Dunlop's theory describes the industrial relations system as a middle order social system with a high degree of openess.

An industrial relations system is to be viewed as an analytical sub-system of an industrial society on the same logical plane as an economic system is regarded as another analytical sub-system (Dunlop, 1958:4).

An industrial relations system is logically an abstraction just as an economic system is an abstraction. Neither is concerned with behavior, as a whole . . both are abstractions designed to highlight relationships and to focus attention upon critical variables and to formulate propositions for historical enquiry and statistical testing (Dunlop, 1958:6).

In Johnson's view, "the rejection of the 'natural system' view eliminates many of the difficulties of system identification, minimizes the problem of reification and permits one to proceed to the discussion of the actual variables" (1971:16). This procedure avoids the conceptual roadblocks caused by the search for "natural" boundaries and permits the development of researchable propositions.

There are, however, criticisms of Dunlop's structural model. Craig suggests that the "context, the actors, the ideology and the rules" cannot be regarded as the system, rather the "interaction between the actors" constitute the system; apart from such interactions he claims there is no system (Craig, 1964:Chapter II).

The second criticism might be that,

of the system tends to confuse the two types or variables. Contextual variables are by nature, parameters, affecting the events within the system by boundary contact and penetration but they are not subject to regulation by the system and, therefore, cannot be satisfactorily regarded as system elements. They are of course, vitally important in defining the boundaries and scope of the system (Johnson, 1971:17).

Although the two points of criticism raised present barriers to satisfactory operationalization of Dunlop's descriptions they do not detract from his attempted description of variables. Johnson (1971:17 - 19) suggests a refinement of Dunlop's three contexts in order to get around these barriers. It is Johnson's suggestion that the three contexts of "technological, market and power constraints" be regarded as parameters rather than as system variables (which would be the independent and/or joint actions of the three actors).

Figure 2 gives a graphic portrayal of how the contexts are balieved to define the system boundaries. The outer circle represents society within which lower order systems are operative. Dunlop's three contexts are represented by the smaller circles — with the area shared by all three contexts being the boundaries of the industrial relations system within society.





FIGURE 2
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
(Johnson, 1971:18)

Figures 3 and 4 show Johnson's conceptualization quite in line with Dunlop's original thoughts;

The concept of an industrial relations systemis deliberately variable in scope; it may be used to characterize an immediate work place, an enterprise, a sector, or a country as a whole. The grouping cannot be arbitrary or capricious; the work place and the actors, at varying levels, that are grouped together must reflect a considerable degree of cohesiveness and formal or informal interdependence (Dunlop, 1958:385 - 386).



A
B The Contexts
C

1=Management

2=Labour

3=Government

X three areas of unilateral action
Y=three areas of bi-lateral action
Z=one area of tri-lateral action



The System

### FIGURE 3

INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM (Johnson, 1971:19)

## System Outputs

The outputs of the industrial relations system are "rules" which govern the interactions of the actors (within any given system) whose behavior is governed by the rules of the industrial relations

stem and which distinguish one system from another (Dunlop, 1958:13 - 15).

Just as the satisfaction of wants through the production and exchange of goods and services is the locus of analysis in the economic subsystem of society, so the establishment and administration of these rules is the major concern or output of the industrial relations sub-system of industrial society (Dunlop, 1958: 13).

Dunlop further proposes that,

. . . identical technological environments in quite different (national) societies may be regarded as exerting a strong tendency upon the actors (modified by other factors) to create quite similar sets/of rules (Dunlop, 1958:10).

Dunlop claims that the common elements in these rules across countries were attributed largely to the common characteristics of the technological and market or budgetary contexts (Dunlop, 1958:384).

Johnson (1971:10) perceives these rules to be all agreements, statutes, orders, decrees, regulations, awards, policies, practices, customs and wage rates which circumscribe the relationship among teachers and their employers. The rules may be expressed in a variety of forms among which are the output rules of "collective bargaining agreements" which result from the interaction within the system.


### A System Analysis Model

The model portrayed in Figure 4, was borrowed

and adapted by Johnson from the work of Alton Craig (Johnson, 1971:23). The Craig model seems to have been "freely" adopted from the political systems analysis model of Easton (1965a:30). Easton's model depicts demands (inputs) in a political system as "key indicators of the way in which environmental influences and conditions modify and shape the operations of a political system" (Easton, 1965a:27). Craig's view as depicted in his model, shows the emphasis to be on the conversion process that takes place within the system.


#### ENVIRONMENT

# INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM



AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS MODEL
(Johnson, 1972:23)

Upon a close examination of the Craig model,
Johnson's adaptation seems acceptable. The logic is
that the way in which Craig drew his model disguises
the fact that in actuality he is proposing a five



A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EDUCATION

Figure 5

Johnson (1971:24)

stage model. Two stages of the model deal with the conversion process and the other three with sets of variables. Figure 5 presents a modified version of Craig's model with terms appropriate to the educational settings substituted for the more general terms in Figure 4.

The implication of the model is that measures of I, environmental variables are converted into III, the input variables of goals, values and power, along with knowledge of IV, the conversion process that takes place within the industrial relations system which would enable explanation and prediction of V, the output variables. Johnson's (1971) study demonstrated the operationalization of the five stage model - specifically the conversion of stage III through stage IV into stage V. It was found that variables in stage III found expression in stage V.

# The Concept of Goals, Values and Power

Although this study is proposing to come to grips with stage V of the model above, it seems imperative to address oneself briefly to the input stage III. The model uses the terms "goals", "values", and "power" to describe the inputs of the industrial relations system.

Perrow (1961:854) maintains that stated organizational goals cannot be accepted uncritically

as the real goals of an organization. Etzioni (1971:104), however, suggests that it is difficult to get beyond stated organizational goals other than by examination and extrapolation of ongoing organizational processes, especially production. He insists that stated goals of an organization can serve as clues to the actual goals of the organization.

The definition of goals accepted in the development of the model in Figure 5 was devised from the conceptualization of Davis, who while recognizing the dangers of regarding all behavior as though it were directed towards some end, takes the point of view that it is useful for the purpose of analysis to assume that it is (Davis, 1950:123). The end, strictly defined, is that part of the future state of affairs which would not occur if the actor did not want it and did not exert himself to attain it (Davis, 1950:123 - 124). This goal definition includes the notion of instrumental goals as well as non-instrumental goals as an elaboration of Davis's work by Loomis and Loomis suggests (1961:Chapter 3).

The short term goals or "instrumental" goals are seen as means to the attainment of the non-instrumental goals which are based on values. These instrumental goals are a partial achievement of the more ultimate goals. Perrow sheds some light

on this subject by his distinction between "official goals" and "operative goals". He states that the "official goals are purposely vague and general" (Perrow, 1961:855). These official goals are statements of the general purpose of the organization as put forth in an organization's charter or annual reports. Perrow distinguishes the explicit or "operative goals" as "... the host of decisions that must be made among alternative ways of achieving official goals and the priority of multiple goals" (1961:855). These conceptualizations of Perrow and Davis seem to form the basis of "goals as input" by Craig as utilized by Johnson (1971) in the operationalization of their models.

The operationalization of the models in Figures 4 and 5 accepts values as almost synonymous with ends as proposed by Loomis and Loomis (1961:118).

Loomis and Loomis borrow from Davis's work when they suggest that social scientists are more inclined to analyze instrumental social systems which involve phenomena which can be "deliberately manipulated" to achieve accepted ends. They further suggest that the education system and the political system being of such an instrumental nature, have ends which are more readily identifiable than some other social systems, such as the family (Loomis and Loomis, 1961:119).

In his struggle to come to grips with the source of a social system's common wiltimate ends, Davis expounds that common ends orientated with reference to the action of others are virtually identical with mores.

They are simply the manifestations of the mores in the subjective sphere of individual action. The behavior called for in the mores and the enforcement of the mores by the member of the community at large would not take places unless the mores stood in the minds of the people as ends to be achieved. Common ends orientated with reference to a future state of the group as a whole simply express how the people think the group should be organized and what results it should produce as a corporate entity (Davis, 1950:148).

Johnson, (1971:26) in tune with the thinking of
Davis and Loomis, recognized the importance of
values as preferred states toward which bargaining
parties were working and also realized that this obviates
the problem of making distinctions between "goal"
and "value" statements in research procedures.

A definition of power was devised from Chamberlain's concept of bargaining power. "Bargaining power is here defined as the ability to secure another's agreement on one's own terms" (Chamberlain, 1965:231). To put it in another way, one's bargaining power is another's willingness to agree on the first party's terms. It is actually that the willingness to agree to another's terms depends on the cost of disagreeing with those terms, relative to the cost of agreeing.

Dunlop's concept of power is much broader than that of Chamberlain. It involves the idea of status conferred by society. In Dunlop's words, "...in addition to the technical contest and the market or budgetary constraints, the third analytical dimension to the environment of an industrial relations system is the locus and distribution of power in the larger society" (1958:94).

Dunlop argues that the complex of rules established for the work place,

"...particularly those defining formal inter-relations among the actors and those providing arrangements for setting new rules and procedures for administering old ones, are often substantially shaped by this feature of the total context (1958:94.)."

Dunlop's above concept of power "includes" the more restricted concept of Chamberlain which Johnson maintains was also consistent with the definition suggested by Craig in his attempt to operationalize Dunlop's theory.

The power of any one of the actors,

"...may be defined as the ability of that actor to obtain his objectives despite the resistance of others. The power of any one of the three actors will vary according to conditions in the environment as well as conditions within the industrial relations system itself (Johnson, 1971:27)."

## SUMMARY

In this chapter the literature concerned with the development of a model of industrial relations was reviewed. The present study did not attempt to deal with all five stages of the linear model presented in this chapter. The purpose was to examine the relationship between stage III (input variables), and stage V (output variables) since the work of Gerhart (1976), Kochan and Wheeler (1975) and Johnson (1971) indicated that such input variables found definite expressions in the output variables of collective bargaining agreements. Such an examination was deemed necessary in order to carry out the present study of analyzing the bargaining outcomes of two distinct industrial relations systems. Chapter III reviews related literature and makes a case showing the similarities of the Alberta and Saskatchewan industrial relations systems.

# CHAPTER III RELATED RESEARCH

## The Alberta Scene

University of Alberta (specifically in the Department of Educational Administration) in the area of organizational behavior and various aspects of organization of structure of collective bargaining for per se. One study did address itself exclusively to the subject of collective bargaining. Bruce Kilgour Johnson in 1971 produced a study entitled AN INVESTIGATION OF TEACHERS' SALARY AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN SELECTED SCHOOL JURISDICTIONS IN ALBERTA 1960 - 1969.

Using a model based on J. T. Dunlop's conceptualization of "industrial relations systems" as a frame of reference within which the investigation was conducted, Johnson (1971) set out to trace the "input stage" III of goals, values and power which through the process of the industrial relations system (not the object of the study) was converted into stage V the "output stage" of (a) broad policies (b) collective bargaining

agreements, and (c) changes in legislation. Since
the Johnson study, no significant changes have
occurred in Alberta legislation regarding the
collective bargaining process (Muir, 1976). As far
as board policies are concerned, Johnson stated that
copies were difficult to obtain and even more difficult
to assess since policies had a tendency to change "at
will" (Johnson, 1971). Thus the Johnson study
concentrated primarily on legislation and collective
bargaining agreements in the "output" stage of the model
utilized.

Johnson found that the Alberta Teacher's
Association goals were at least partially achieved
in twelve (12) areas, while the Alberta School
Trustees' Association in the same time span was able
to achieve six (6) of its goals. The findings
indicate the strongest relationship between
teachers' goals and collective bargaining outcomes
were in the areas of salary, leave and to some
extent/bargaining rights.

Kratzmann (1963) addressed a full chapter to the topic of collective bargaining in terms of goals and achievements. It was noted that security and economic goals were the outstanding achievements of the A.T.A.. Collective bargaining as reviewed by

Kratzmann was recognized as a vehicle through which to achieve some of the A.T.A.'s goals. Kratzmann also predicted that the 1960's would see a more balanced industrial relations system with the Alberta School Trustees' Association becoming a more organized and potent force aiming at counter-balancing the efforts of the A.T.A..

## The Saskatchewan Scene

In 1965 McDowell duplicated Kratzmann's study in Saskatchewan. McDowell noted that among the S.T.F.'s outstanding achievements were gains in the areas of security and economic goals; very much along the lines of the Kratzmann findings. The most interesting revelation in McDowell's study was the fact that Saskatchewan teachers at one time bargained with the Provincial Government over salaries and in the 1950's went back to local bargaining as an outgrowth of a strong belief that they would occupy a more equitable "bargaining position locally, than provincially" (McDowell, 1963:139). McDowell's momentary brush with the topic of centralized versus decentralized bargaining and his equally brief treatment of the pros and cons of one or the other bargaining structure is nevertheless important in that it indicates a

historical dilemma as to what bargaining structure is to be most viable in securing the appropriate collective agreement as perceived by the teachers' organization.

## The American Scene

Two studies carried out in the U.S.A. seem worthy of note. The work of Andrews (1968) concentrated on the scope of collective bargaining agreements. His work could be labelled as "pioneer", since collective bargaining/in the A erican field of education is a relatively new phenomenon. His main objective was to analyze the content of collective bargaining agreements in order to assess what kind of subjects were in fact negotiated by teachers. His major contribution was de dayelopment of an item classification system which has provided a basis for contract analysis to substrates tudents of collective bargaining. of the significant findings of the Andrews study was that legislative provisions for collective haveaining or the absence of such provisions had very little effect as teachers' organizations seemed to bargain just as effectively with or without such legislátive provisions (Andrews, 1968:208).

The second study (Kalish, 1968) also dealt with

the scope of bargained items and is useful in its development of a measuring device for scope.

Borrowing from fields outside of education he melded a "yardstick" against which to measure the various agreements (Kalish, 1968:67). The major finding was that the presence or absence of covering legislation regarding collective bargaining showed no significant differences in "the scope of megotiated items" (Kalish, 1968:103).

The data did show that the scope of bargained items varied greatly in various school districts in both states (one with and one without covering legislation regarding collective bargaining) but at no time did the researcher address himself to the structure of the bargaining procedures and its possible impact upon some of the reported differences.

## A.T.A. AND S.T.F. GOALS

Since the input stage III of Johnson's model
has a definite impact on stage V, it seems
appropriate to briefly examine the goals of the two
teachers' and trustees' organizations which are party
to the collective bargaining agreements to be

studied. Kratzmann's (1963) and McDowell's (1965) studies indicate a historical similarity between the Alberta Teachers' Association and the Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation and their goals. This is borne out by the similarity of the statutes which brought the A.T.A. and SAT.F. respectively into being:

The objectives of the Association shall be:

(a to advance and promote the cause of

ducation in the province;

- to improve the teaching profession:

  (i) by promoting and supporting recruitment and selection practices which ensure capable candidates for teacher education,
  - (11) by promoting and supporting adequate programs of preservice preparation, internship and certification,
  - (iii) by promoting the establishment of working conditions that will make possible the best level of professional service,
  - (iv) by organizing and supporting groups which tend to improve the knowledge and skills of teachers,
  - (v) by meetings, publications, research and other activities designed to maintain and improve the confidence of teachers, and
  - (vi) by advising, assisting, protecting and disciplining members in the discharge of the professional duties and relationships.
- (c) to arouse and increase public interest in the importance of education and public knowledge of the aims of education, and other education matters, and
- (d) to cooperate with other organizations and bodies in Canada and elsewhere having the same or like aims and objectives (Government of Alberta 1970, c. 362 s. 4).

. (1) The object of the Federation shall be:

13

- (a) to promote the cause of education in Suskatchewan;
- (b) to raise the status of the teaching profession;
- (c) to propote and safeguard the interiors of teachers and to secure conditions which will make possible the best professional service;
- (d) to influence public opinion regarding educational problems;
- (e) to secure for teachers a greater influence in educational affairs:
- (f) to afford advice, assistance and legal protection to members in their professional duties and relationships.
- (2) The Federation may take any measure, not inconsistent with this Act, that it deems necessary in order to give effect to any policy adopted by it with respect to any question directly or indirectly affecting teachers. (Government of Saskatchewan 1965, c. 199, s.4)

An examination of the 1978 MEMBERS' HANDBOOK OF
THE ALBERTA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION and the 1978
STATEMENT OF POLICY AND BYLAWS OF THE SASKATCHEWAN
TEACHERS' FEDERATION, indicates a striking resemblance
between the two teachers' organizations in their
bylaws and policies. Personal discussions with
Sterling McDowell (S.T.F., March, 1979) and Joseph
Berlando (A.T.A., April, 1979) reinforced the
conclusion that the two teachers' organizations had
highly similar goals and objectives.

## S.S.T.A. AND A.S.T.A. GOALS

A similar examination of the A.S.T.A. and S.S.T.A. handbooks for 1978 indicates that the trustees' organizations like the teachers' organizations, bear a striking similarity to one another. The policies and annual convention resolutions of the two trustees' associations give strong indications that indeed these two organizations seem to be travelling the same path. Interviews with Garry Knight (S.S.T.A., March, 1979) and with Stan Maertz (A.S.T.A., April, 1979) support the above conclusions that in fact the two organizations were quite similar if not identical in their general goals and objectives.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ALBERTA

Muir's (1970) work indicated that Alberta teachers bargained for "salaries and conditions of employment" under the ALBERTA LABOUR ACT. The scope of bargaining is defined very broadly, giving teachers the same rights and privileges as industrial employees. In an update on the Alberta bargaining process Muir (1976) enumerates the steps in the teachers' collective bargaining

#### structure:

- (1) local negotiations;
- (2) local negotiations with provincial teachers' and trustees' association participation;
- (3) conciliation commissioner:
- (4) conciliation board and if necessary,
- (5) a strike vote and a strike (Muir, 1976:4)

In looking at the bargaining procedures as they existed in 1978 (Government of Alberta 1973, with amendments up to and including November 10, 1977), it becomes evident that little has changed since Muir's (1970) original work with the exception that several school boards may form an employer organization in order to bargain with their employees. This however is strictly a voluntary membership and opting out of such arrangements is permissible (Maertz, 1979) \$2

With the exception of "opening" and "closing dates" which is a condition of employment (The School Act, R.S.A., 1970 with amendments up to and including May 16, 1978) there seems to be no restriction on the scope of bargaining. As Joe Berlando of the Teacher Welfare Department of the A.T.A. puts it "everything is negotiable" (Berlando, 1975): Indeed, Johnson's (1971) and Muir's (1970, 1976) research offers a similar conclusion.

#### SASKATCHEWAN

The Province of Saskatchewan follows the centralized bargaining procedure known as "bi-level" bargaining. The Teacher Collective Bargaining Act, 1973 (with amendments up to and including April 11, 1975) makes provisions for province-wide negotiations for remunerative items to be conducted among four (4) representatives of the S.T.F., four (4) representatives of the S.S.T.A. and five (5) representatives from the Government of Saskatchewan. Items such as sick leave, sabbatical leave, educational leave, pay periods, etc., continue to be negotiated at the local level.

The Act also provides the ention for other parties to consent or agree to negotiate additional matters of mutual concern. The only restriction as to scope of bargaining seems to appear in The Teacher Collective Bargaining Act 1973 as,

(4) no collective agreement shall contain terms regulating the selection of teachers, the administrative and instructional duties of teachers or the nature or quality of an instructional program (Government of Saskatchewan 1973, c. 112, s. 4. - 4).

The Saskatchewan School Act (Government of Saskatchewan 1965) like the Alberta School Act also

removes the length of the school year from the bargaining process.

Prior to 1973 Saskatchewan had similar restrictions to the scope of bargaining, but Muir (1970b) argued and presented evidence that teachers and boards in fact bargained on "all" matters of mutual concern and that the restrictive legislation in fact did nothing to prevent the parties from bargaining in areas which were considered "extra legal" (Muir, 1970b:210).

The negotiation procedures established in the statute allow the teachers (provincially and locally) to select and follow either conciliation and binding arbitration or conciliation and strike. In the number of steps available in the bargaining process, the two / provinces seem to offer similar roads for the actors to travel upon.

#### Implication

The foregoing brief review of goals and statutory provisions seems to suggest that the Alberta and Saskatchewan educational industrial relations systems reveal a striking similarity. It seems logical to assume that on comparing two educational industrial relations systems which sunction in "identical technological contexts" and

whose actors seem to hold compatible organizational goals, any differences in the scope of bargained items found would be more apt to be due to the impact of the bargaining structure than to differences at the input stage III of the educational industrial relations systems model.

If indeed Barlando (1979) is correct in stating that "everything is negotiable" in Alberta and credence is given to Egnatoff's (1975) claim that scope is not really defined in Saskatchewan coupled with his conviction that teachers in that province in fact do bargain under the premise that "all matters are negotiable", then one could expect that the terms (items) of the collective bargaining agreements in the two provinces would show a great degree of similarity in what has actually been bargained, unless there is an impact from structural differences.

On the other hand; an investigation of the scope of bargained items contained in the 1978 Teachers' Collective Bargaining Agreements in Alberta and Saskatchewan could reveal differences due to "...a more dominant influence of the respective ... industrial relations systems" (Dunlop, 1958:130).

An extensive search in the literature on industrial relations and collective bargaining in the field of education failed to yield any studies which this study was replicating. The research studies reported above addressed themselves to aspects of collective bargaining which the present study is not pursuing.

Evidence was presented in this chapter that the two provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan are quite similar in the path they prescribe for teachers to follow in the collective bargaining process.

Similarities between the aims of the two teacher organizations and the two trustee associations respectively were also examined in order to determine if examination of the bargaining outcomes as reflected in the Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements was warranted. It was determined that such an examination was a worthwhile effort.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The review of literature in the preceding chapter seems to support the assumption that the Alberta and Saskatchewan educational industrial relations systems are within Dunlop's elaboration of "identical technological context" (Dunlop, 1958). Muir's study (1970) bore out Dunlop's (1958) premise that "similar technologies" tend to create "similar rules". An examination of Muir's data from 1968-1969 Indicates that both Alberta and Saskatchewan bargained locally with individual school boards. The extensive data which is presented by Muir, substantiates Dunlop's contention that "...similar technologies in different societies ..." exercise a strong tendency upon the actors "...to create quite similar sets of rules" (Dunlop, 1958:10). Not unlike Dunlop, Germant argues that,

It is difficult to discern the persistent and underlying forces at work in the bargaining process yet the provisions of agreements - the policies agreed upon by unions and managements-fundamentally reflect the more enduring features of the environment of the collective bargaining relationship (Gerhart, 19 6:331).

Kochan and Wheeler (1975) also emphasize that the outcomes of the collective bargaining process are of central interest in the field of industrial relations. They point out that "in most bargaining models, outcomes serve as one of the principal dependant variables, and yet there has been a paucity of empirically-based research on this

subject" (Kochan and Wheeler, 1975:46). A major obstacle to empirical research according to the authors is that many formal bargaining models are normative, rather than descriptive or explanatory" (Kochan and Wheeler, 1975:47). Another major problem concerns the specific independent. variables utilized in these models. In almost all of them, the concept of union bargaining power enters at some point. "Yet none of the formal models have developed a definition of this elusive concept that captures the complexity of the institutional bargaining relationship" (Kochan and Wheeler, 1975:47). It seems therefore that the Craig model as adapted by Johnson for use in education is most appropriate for a comparison of bargaining outcomes between Alberta and Saskatchewan. An analysis of the content of all 1978 co tive bargaining agreements from Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining units will indicate the bargaining outcome's established under centralized and decentralized forms of collective bargaining (as practiced in the two provinces) at a particular point in time.

# Question to be Studied

The purpose of this study is to compare the 1978 outcomes of the collective bargaining process in education as successfully negotiated in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Specifically the question is: Are there any differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as bargained under the decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces

of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978 respectively?

Sampling Procedure

Collective bargaining agreements of all one hundred thirty six (136) teacher locals in the Province of Alberta for the year 1978 were obtained from the Alberta Teachers' Association. One hundred and nine (109) local agreements plus the master agreement from Saskatchewan were obtained from The Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation. Six Saskatchewan locals had no local agreement, but were of course covered by the provincial or master agreement. In effect two hundred and forty five (245) sets of collective bargaining agreements, representing the total number of agreements concluded in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978, were obtained for the purpose of this study. The study sample thus included the entire population of agreements.

### The Instrument

In order to quantify the data from the written collective bargaining agreements, it was necessary to devise an instrument, or utilize an existing instrument. An examination of the NEGOTIATED WORKING CONDITIONS IN ALBERTA COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 1978 (Labour Research Services, 1978), the CODING MANUAL AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT ANALYSIS (Research Branch Alberta Department of Labour, June 1978), the STANDARD CODING PLAN FOR ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS (Government of Canada, 1977), and the instrument developed by the Ontario Education Relations Commission which appears in Appendix C, led this researcher to

the conclusion that the Ontario instrument would be the most useful for investigating the scope of negotiated items in collective bargaining agreements in education.

A careful examination of the instruments devised by Kalish (1968), Andrews (1978), Johnson (1970), Neiner (1971), and the revised Ontario Education Relations Commission (1980) coding instrument made it quite obvious that the latter instrument was by far the most refined and appropriate. The Kalish and Johnson instruments identified ninety-four (94) and ninety-six (96) items respectively, while the Neiner and Andrews instruments recognized sixty-six (66) and thirty-two (32) items respectively. The Ontario Education Relations Commission instrument recognizes three hundred and five (305) items which proved to have more than ample range when tested wenty-six (26) collective agreements chosen at random from the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan.

The Ontario Education Relations Commission utilized the 1974-1975 collective bargaining agreements in education from the province of Ontario in order to devise an instrument for quantifying the outcomes of collective bargaining agreements. By utilizing the Government of Canada's Standard Coding Plan for Analysis of Collective Agreements as well as the Government of Ontario's Standard Coding Plan: 1974-1975 (Butler, 1980), the resultant instrument provided a unique and exhaustive analysis of the different type of clauses or items found in teachers' contracts. "The instrument is regularly undated and is therefore indicative of the

range of bargaining outcomes of teacher contracts" (Butler, 1980).

After five (5) years of use and refinement the Ontario Education Relations Commission instrument seems to have met the test of time and was therefore chosen for the present study. The instrument consists of an identification section which contains items V1 through V12. For the purpose of this study, only items V1 (which assigns an identification number to each collective agreement), V5 (which identifies public and separate school locals), and V9 (which identifies number of teachers covered by each collective agreement) were used since neither Alberta nor Saskatchewan perform detailed nor consistent systematic analyses of collective bargaining agreements (as is the case in Ontario).

The second section consists of a grid distribution of salaries. For the purpose of this study only Part I was used (from S1 - S105).

The third section of the instrument consists of seven clusters of fields of analysis. The clusters are coded D, F, R, L, W, J and P.

# Cluster D: Direct Salary Related

D1 to D35 encompasses the following fields of nalysis: teacher placement on a salary grid, determination whether grid placement is an area for teacher/board discussion, consideration of lump sum payments other than COLA, recognition of COLA or Cost of Living Adjustment, allowances for graduate degrees, allowances for principal's or vice-principal's salaries, expense and travel allowances, consider-

ations whether allowances are an area for teacher/board discussion, concern with grandfathering graduate degrees, allowances for positions of responsibility, and allowances for other training.

### Cluster F: Health and Welfare

Fl to F33 encompass the following fields of analysis: hospitalization and medical health plans. drug plans, vision care plans, dental plans, provisions for long term disability, group insurance plans, provisions which deal with whether insured employee benefits are an area for teacher/board discussion, and benefit limitations.

R1 to R17 encompass the following fields of analysis: cumulative sick leave, retirement gratuity provisions consideration of retirement gratuity as an area for teacher/board discussion, and limitations an retirement gratuities.

L1 to L63 encompasse the following fields of analysis: sabbatical and education improvement leaves, consideration of sabbatical leave as an area for teacher/board discussion, provisions for leaves of absence, maternity leaves, adoption leaves, paternity leaves, leaves for teacher association/federation activities, provisions allowing leaves for negotiations, compassionate/bereavement leaves, miscellaneous leaves, and consideration of leaves as an area for teacher/board discussion.

### Cluster W: Staffing/Workload

The fields of analysis W1 to W53 encompass the following: pupil-teacher ratio/staffing formulas, pupil/teacher fatio a forea for teacher/board discussion, proclaions for class size and class size as an area for teacher/board discussion, teacher workload provisions and whether teacher workload is an area for teacher/board discussion, allocation of workloads for specialists and positions of responsibility, teacher evaluation and whether evaluation is an area for teacher/board discussion; and whether evaluation is an area for teacher/board discussion; and provisions for dealing with teacher access to their personnel records.

### Cluster J: Job Security

J1 to J79 encompass the following fields of analysis: vacancies, postings and transfers, and tenure;

### Cluster P: Other Provisions

The fields of analysis P1 to P19 encompass the following: grievances, Anti-Inflation Board provisions, remegotiation of contract clauses, and general aspects of the collective bargaining agreement. This instrument lends itself to a computerized method of handling such data as present in the three hundred and five (305) fields of analysis (not including the seven in the salary grid.) This scheme enabled the coder to represent each of the possible alternatives within each field. A computer program was developed to read the coded informatio: and tabulate it. Permission to

Relations Commission (see Appendix B1).

### Coding Procedure

ment was originally designed in order to utilize a completer to quantify and analyze the data found in teacher/school board contracts. In this study each collective agreement was scrutinized and all items were recognized by the instrument and given numerical values of the teacher of three steps:

- (1) The coder read through the agreement to obtain a perspective on the format and the rields of analysts included.
- Each agreement was searched for related clauses.

  Each clause was coded by placing the appropriate code number in the correct column on the coding form.
- (3) (a) All clauses in such agreement were coded and marked off.
  - (b) Clauses which the instrument failed to recognize were to be analyzed separately.
- (4) The resulting coded information was transferred onto I.B.M. data punch cards.

### Content Validity -

Content validity of the instrument was established through the use of Part I and Part II Summary and Analyses

Department, 1978 and 1979) and the Summary of Local Agreements Settled: 1977-1978 (Saskatcheven Teachers Federation,
1980). The Ontario Education Relations Commissions instrument recognized all items found in Alberta and Saskatchewan
collective bargaining agreements. It was deemed that the
instrument had content validity.

### Coding Reliability

Using twenty six (26) agreements (thirteen from Alberta and thirteen from Saskatchewan) each chosen randomly the coder coded the same agreements after a one month interval invorder to test reliability.

Of the four hundred and eleven (411) coded items on the instrument only thirteen (13) items differed from the first coding. With 96.84 percent of the items consistently marched and only 3.16 percent not matching it was judged that the coding results were adequately reliable (see Appendix D).

The thirteen stems in question were checked to determine the nature of the inconsistency in matching the items. Item D31 had to do with mileage allowance. The language used in the collective agreements was not specific enough to match the requirements of the instrument. The coder did indicate in each and every case that an amount was present, but he was unable to specify the exact amount as required by the instrument format.

Items F1, F5, F19, and F25 are found in the Health and Welfare Cluster. The language found in collective bargaining agreements makes it sometimes necessary to make judgements. The instrument recognizes three possible responses and assumes one will be utilizied. Some collective agreements have provisions combining two or even all three possiblities. This led to some of the coding difficulties ted.

Item R2 deals with maximum accumulated sick leave days. Some contracts used a percentage of unused sick days that could be accumulated each year while not restricting the maximum number of days allowed to accumulate. Other tracts contained language allowing 100 percent accumulation of unused, sick days per pear with no maximum and while still other contracts allowed for no accumulation at all.

Some agreements had several possibilities regarding maximum accumulation of sick days. It was thus difficult to comply with the instrument and judgements were required.

Items L4 and L5 appear in the Leaves Cluster. The language in some of the contracts was of such a nature that lesser or greater as well as flat and percentage dollar amounts were indicated. A combination of such language sometimes appeared in a single provision and judgements had to be made. Item L36 deals with the maximum days leave for adoption purposes and items L18, L49 and L50 deal with minimum, days of Compassionate Leave. Contract language in such provisions is sometimes quite vague or implies

several possibilities thus requiring the coder to make judgement calls.

P8 has to do with provisions for grievance procedures pertaining to interpretation committees. Some collective bargaining agreements were vague and referred to provincial statutes or previous agreements, while others were quite specific. The coder made judgements for P8 provisions which contained grievance procedures but were vague, on the question of interpretation committees.

The detail supplied here indicates something of the nature of the coding problem so that the relatively high coder reliability on a re-coding basis indicates a satisfactory level was achieved.

Statistical Procedure

Data were compared and an led by the use of frequency distributions, percentages and means on a provincial basis. Since all contracts for the year 1978 from Alberta and Saskatchewan were used, it was assumed that any differences found were indeed real differences. Tests of statistical significance of the inferential type were, therefore, not used.

Since the Ontario Education Relations Commission instrument recognized all items in the Alberta and Saskat-chewan summaries of collective agreements, it was reasoned that the presence or absence of tems as shown by frequencies, percentages and means would be indicative of the 1978 scope of bargaining items as negotiated in Alberta and Saskatchewan.

#### SUMMARY

This chapter posed the specific research question along with a description of the sampling procedure employed. The rationale for selecting the instrument was detailed and the instrument was presented explaining how it quantifies the data obtained for this study.

A detailed explanation was given about the coding procedure and a case for content validity of the instrument was made. Evidence was also presented that the coding results were adequately reliable. In addition this chapter dealt with the statistics employed, which were description in nature and the procedure whereby scope of bargained items was obtained.

### PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

As stated in Chapter I, the objectives of this study were to investigate differences in the scope of negotiated items in written collective bargaining agreements derived from two provinces with differing structural arrangements for collective bargaining. In one province bargaining is pursued at the local or decentralized level (Alberta) and in the other province bargaining is pursued at a more centralized level (Saskatchewan). This chapter presents data for the study. The presence or absence of particular items in colditive bargaining agreements as well as the frequency of a trace of such items in collective bargaining agreements is presented. The data presented in this chapter in this manner reveal the scope of bargained items in teachers' collective bargaining agreements for Alberta and Saskatchewan as negotiated in 1978. The presence and the frequency of specific items in collective bargaining agreements are indicating of the scope of bargaining and of its results.

The data is presented in tables representing the fields of analysis in the instrument. When ever a field of analysis does not record a particular response possibility, that item is not included in the table reporting the results. Also the term "missing" is used frequently in reporting data. "Missing" means that a "no such provision" response was not

available in the instrument since the field of analysis was identifying specific characteristics and that such characteristics were not present in a collective bargaining agreement.

### The Salary Cluster

All Alberta and the Sask tchewan collective bargaining agreements contain six distinct salary categories.

Each category represents one year of academic teacher training or its equivalent. In Alberta, more than eighty three percent (83.45) of the collective bargaining agreements contain ten (10) increments (one for each year of recognized teaching experience or its equivalent; to a maximum of ten such increments). Over sixteen percent (16.55%) of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements have eleven (11) salary increments in categories IV, V and VI, while just over two percent (2.16%) of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements on all six salary categories.

The Saskatchewan province-wide salary grid features nine (9) increments in Category I, and ten (10) increments in Categories II through VI inclusive. Saskatchewan 21so has a class "C" category which was omitted from this study since it affects only a "minute fraction" (McDowell, 1980) of the Saskatchewan teaching force.

An examination of salary Category I (Table 1, page 74 ) indicates that mean Alberta salaries are lower than mean Saskatchewan salaries. Mean Alberta salaries fall below.

each of the Saskatchewan levels. A rank ordering of all alberta salary theis established the more than eightyleven percent (87.78%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective agreements have lower salaries than the Saskatchewan salary levels for this category. Over twelve pertent (12.22%) of the Alberta salary levels are higher than the Saskatchewan salary level in Category I.

that mean Alberta salaries are lower than mean Saskatchewan salaries on six of the eleven Saskatchewan levels.

Rank ordering the Alberta salary levels established that over fifty-three percent (53.21%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective bargaining agreements are below Saskatchewan salaries. Over fourty ix percent (46.79%) of Alberta salary levels in the Category II.

Salary Category III (Table 3, page 76) indicates that mean Alberta salaries are higher than mean Saskatchewan salaries. Mean Alberta salaries are all higher than mean Saskatchewan levels. Rank ordering the Alberta salary levels established that more than five percent (5.68%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective bargaining agreements in this category are below Saskatchewan salaries, while over ninety four percent (94.32%) of Alberta salary levels are higher than the Saskatchewan level in Category III

TABLE 1

Salary Category

S.	· Minimum ·	Maximum	/ Mean Winimum	Maximum	Mean
	0.0067	13000.	9104.5		10380.
S2	84.75.0	13000.	9566.2		10775.
83	9050.0	13000.	.10034.	•	11170.
. 7 S	9625.0	13000.	10507		11565.
S 5	10200.	13000.	10983.		11960.
86	.10739.	13000.	11455.		.12355.
87	11262.	13310.	11938.		12750.
œ •	1177	14003.	12454	<b>.</b>	13145.
. S9	12195	14250	12		13540.
810	12614.	16422.		3	13935.
811	13000.	159	1385		
\$12	14796.	14930.	148	**	

steps on the salary scale, while Alberta (2.16%) of the collective bargaining agree steps or increments two percent has only but about has cleven (11) for all ments which have twelve \*Saskatchewan Category

TABLE 2

Salary Category II

AN*	Mean	10600.	11092.	11584.	12076.	12568.	13060.	13552.	14044.	14536.	15028.	155.20.
SASKATCHEWAN*	Maximum		•	An An				•	•		•	•
	Minimum		*			• •		<b>\$</b> 1			•	
, 8	Mean	10492.	10990.	11483.	11982.	12492.	13041:	135.97.	14153.	14709.	15230	15792.
<b>A</b>	Maximum	13300.	13300.	13610.	14045.	14480	14915.	15350.	15785.	16229.	16195.	17300.
ALBERTA	Minimum	9655.0	10260.	10800.	11265.	11880.	12420.	12960.	13500.		-14580.	15120.
	Variable	\$16	\$17.5	\$18.	615	\$20*	\$21	\$22	\$23	\$24	\$25	. \$26

the salary scale, while Alberta collective bargaining agree two percent (2.16%), of has eleven

7.5

TABLE 3 W

SASKATCHEWAN*	Minimum. Maximum Mean	11475.	12074.	12673.	13272.	13871.	14470.	15069.	15668.	16267.	16866.	17465.	
	Mean	11762,	12330.	12905.	13520.	14134.	14754.	15377.	16002.	16628.	17237. *	17838.	17900.
A.A.	Maximum.	15750.	15750,	15750.	15750.	15750.	15755.	16560.	17380.	18200.	18455	19130.	17900.
ALBERTA	Minimum	11223.	11882,	12504.	13126.	13748.	14370.	1075.	15560.	16145.	16730.	17315	17900.
	ardab le	831	\$32	833	753	835	. 836	837	538	8.39	S40	841	542

steps on the salary scale, while Alborta Saskatchewan Category III has only eleven (11

Salary Category IV (Table 4, page 78) indicates that mean Alberta salaries are higher than mean Saskatchewan salaries. Mean Alberta salaries are all higher than mean Saskatchewan levels. Rank ordering the Alberta salary levels established that less than one percent (.07%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective bargaining agreements are below Saskatchewan salaries, while almost one hundred percent (99.93%) of Alberta salary levels are higher than the Saskatchewan level in Category IV.

Salary Category V (Table 5, page 79) indicates that mean Alberta salaries are higher than mean Saskatchewan salaries. Mean Alberta salaries are all higher than the Saskatchewan level, A rank ordering of the Alberta salary levels established that about two percent (2.14%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective bargaining agreements are below Saskatchewan salaries, while almot ninety-eight percent (97.86%) of Alberta salary levels are higher than the Saskatchewan level in Category V.

Salary Category VI (Table 6, page 80 ) indicates that mean Alberta salaries are lower than mean Saskatchewan salaries. Mean Alberta salaries are higher on the first five levels than Saskatchewan salaries and lower on the six upper salary levels. A rank ordering of Alberta salary levels (Table 7, page 81 ) established that more than fifty-seven percent (57.42%) of the Alberta salary levels in the collective bargaining agreements are below Saskatchewan salaries, while more than fourty-two

`	r
<u>.</u>	
AB	

Salary Category IV

•	Mean		13570.	14489.	15408.	16327.	1/246.	18165.	19084.	20003.	20922.	21841.	.09/77
SASKATCHEWAN*	Naximum		,	4 · ·	13	7 .	/1	18	19		20		77
8	Minimum		,										•
	Mean	14079.	14999.	15920.	16840.	17761.	18682.	19603.	20524.	21445.	22366.	23287.	
V	Maximum	15170.	16147.	17124.	18101.	19100.	20100.	21100.	22100.	23100.	24100.	25100.	
ALBERTA	Minimum	13867.	14733.	15599.	16465.	17 3	.8197.	19063.	19929.	20795.	21661.	22527.	73652
	Variable	S 4 6	. 847	848	849	850	. 851	\$52	\$53	S 5 4	855	856	S 5 7

\*Saskatchewan Category IV has only eleven (11) steps on the salary scale, while Alberta has eleven (12) for all but about two percent (2.16%) of the collective bargaining agreements which have twelve (2) such steps or increments

TABLE

Salary Ca egory

	ALBERTA	V			SASKATCHEWAN*	
Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Minimum	Maximum · Mean	·
861	14531.	16200.	14906.		. 14400.	.0
S 6 2	15421.	17200.	15829.	٠	15355.	
863	16311.	18786.	16766.		16310.	
798	17201.	19200.	17674.		17265.	
865	18091;	20200.	18596.		18220.	
998	18981.	21200.	19518.		19175.	
298	>19871.	22200.	20441.		20130.	
8.9S	20761.	23200.	21364.		21085.	
>698	21651.	24200.	22285.	.*	22040.	
8.70	22541.	25200.	23208.		22995	
871	23431.	26200.	24130.		23950.	
372	24663.	27150.	25116.			

collective bargaining agree-\*Saskatchewan Category V has only eleven (11) steps on the salary state, while Alberta has eleven (11) for all but about two percent (2.16%) of the collective bargaining agreements which have twelve (12) such steps or increments

Ţ,

TABLE 6

Salary Category VI

	ALBERTA	A			SASKATCHEWAN*	
Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
876	15225	17250.	15733.			15400
877	16115.	18250.	16660.	<i>,</i>		16400.
S 7 8 .	17005.	19250.	17584.	5	٠	17400.
879	17895	20250.	18509.	Q		18400.
S 8 0	, 18785.	21250.	19435.	•		19400.
S81	19675.	22250.	20360.	•		20400.
S82·	20565.	23250.	21285.			21400.
S83 <sub>.</sub>	21455.	24250.	22210.		3	22400.
` \$8\$	22345.	25250.	23136.	ø		23400.
S85	23235.	26250.	24061.			24400.
286	24125.	27250.	24976.			25400.
287	25630.	28200.	26099.		•	

collective bargaining agree-\*Saskatchewan Category VI has only eleven (11) steps on the salary scale, while Alberta has eleven (11) for all but about two percent (2.16%) of the collective bargaining agree-- ments which have twelve (12) such steps or increments. percent (42.58%) of Alberta salary levels are higher than the Saskatchewan level in Category VI.

The rank ordering becomes significant when the distribution of teachers over the salary categories is recognized. Table 8 shows that the majority of teachers in Alberta and Saskatche rank fall into three categories. Over eighty-one percent (81.35%) of the Alberta teachers and nearly seventy-three percent (72.92%) of Saskatchewan teachers are in Categories III, IV, and V.

An examination of collective bargaining agreements revealed that those contracts which have an eleventh increment were in jurisdictions which affected the greatest number of teachers in the province of Alberta. By inquiring as to which jurisdictions were involved, it was found that more than sixty percent (60.76%) of all teachers in Alberta were covered by collective bargaining agreements that contain eleven (11) increments in Categories IV, V and VI. With slightly over ninety-one percent (91.02%) of Alberta teachers in Categories IV, V, and VI, this eleventh increment becomes significant.

#### TABLE 7

Results Of Rank Ordering Of Alberta Salary Levels By Categories

# AS A PERCENTAGE BELOW SASKATCHEWAN SALARY LEVELS

<b>T</b>		C	A	T I	Ξ (	3 0	R	I	E	S	1	<del></del> .
	<u>II</u>			_ I	I					IV	V	VI
87.78%	53.21%	-		5.6	87		·			07%	2.14%	57.42%

TABLE 8

1978 Distribution Of Teachers
In Each Salary Category In Percent

ALBERTA		•		•	<del></del>	
' I	II	C A	T E G O R Y	٧	VI	TOTAL
2.63%	2.93%	3.42%	58.37%		13.09%	100%
SASKATC	HEWAN*	,			<del></del>	
.6,1%	21.39%	13.55%	40.27%	19.10%	4.65%	99.57%

\*A special "C" Category in Saskatchewan accounts for the missing .43% of the Saskatchewan teaching force.

TABLE 9

Percentage Of Teachers At Maximum Salary
In Each Category

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_ ,			
II	C A T	E G O R Y	v	VI
77.30%	63.04%	96.00% 19.21%	96.00%	96.00% 53.23%
HEWAN**		~	ı\$	
58.36%	44.38%	38.54%	57.47%	74.76%
	II 77.30% HEWAN**	C A T III 77.30% 63.04% HEWAN**	CATEGORY II III IV  77.30% 63.04% 96.00% 19.21%	CATEGORY III IV V  77.30% 63.04% 96.00% 96.00% 19.21% 30.99%  HEWAN**

- \* Figures were obtained from the salary survey 1978 (Alberta Teachers' Association, 1979c). The two figures in Categories IV, V, and VI indicate percentages of teachers at maximum in contracts with ten (10) increments and those at maximum in contracts with eleven (11) increments respectively.
- \* Figures were obtained from the Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation (McDowell, 1980).

The average Alberta and Saskatchewan salaries based on the six categories fall at sixteen-thousand-six hundred and eighty one dollars and thirty eight cents, (\$16,681.38)

and sixteen-thousand-two-hundred and thirty seven dollars and ninety two cents, (\$16,237.92), respectively. The spread between the two provincial average salaries is over two percent (2.67%).

A comparison with Muir's findings indicates that a partial historical link between Alberta and Saskatchewan still exists. Borrowing Muir's data it was found that there was more than a two percent (2.68%) salary spread between Alberta and Saskatchewan average salaries in urban centres (Muir, 1970b:305). Using the same set of data, it was found that more than three percent (3.32%) salary spread existed between Alberta urban and Alberta rural salaries. However, quite a large spread existed between Saskatchewan urban and rural salaries. An even larger spread was evident when Alberta urban and Saskatchewan rural average salaries were compared. The last two comparisons were over twelve percent (12.87%) and fifteen percent (15.20%) respectively.

The 1978 average salaries in Alberta and Saskatchewan indicate that an extremely small percent (.01%)
shift has occurred in the Alberta and Saskatchewan salary
relationship since the Muir study. Muir's contention that
the salaries in Alberta and Saskatchewan are quite similar
(Muir, 1970b:Chapter VI) saems to be also borne out by the
present study.

A major objective of the Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation throughout the 1960's was to bring about an equality based on a link between teacher training and

teacher salary throughout the province (McDowell, 1978-79). Once a single provincial salary grid was achieved in Sask-atchewan, the urban/rural inequity was removed. However, when provincial average salaries are compared, it becomes evident that the gap between Alberta and Saskatchewan has really not changed significantly. In 1968 the difference between Alberta and Saskatchewan was more than a two percent (2.68%) spread in Alberta's favour. The 1978 difference likewish amounts to more than a two percent (2.67%) spread in Alberta's favour. It thus seems, that a historical relationship has withstood the test of a ten year time span.

The research question in terms of differences in the salary grid can be answered by stating that there are no differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as bargained under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in these provinces in 1978.

The differences seem to have a historical relation-ship rather than resulting from differences due to bargaining structure. In salary terms, Saskatchewan teachers have removed an internal inequity but the data for this study do not reveal relationships between the collective bargaining structure and salary differences.

Following is the presentation of the data organized by the clusters designated in the analysis instrument. In

cases where neither province makes provisions, that field is omitted from the discussion. Where only one province makes provisions, the data will be reported on that basis.

CLUSTER D:

₩

### Direct Salary Related Cluster

This cluster represents items which Mave a direct affect on teachers' salaries. The fields of analysis are D1 through D35.

D3 examines whether there is recognition for related experience.

TABLE 10
D3: Recognition For Related Experience

	No.	Teaching Only	Non- Teaching	Both	None
ALBERTA	136 '	42		93	, 1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	1.	3		105

Table 10 indicates that Alberta recognizes teaching experience for placing teachers on salary grids in 42 jurisdictions while 93 jurisdictions recognize both teaching and non-teaching experience for placement of salary grid. Only one collective bargaining agreement in Alberta did not recognize previous experience. In Saskatchewan one agreement provides for recognition of teaching experience and three jurisdictions recognize non-teaching experience for placement on the salary grid. One hundred and five Saskatchewan agreements had no provisions for related experience which would affect placement on salary grid.

D4 determines whether teacher placement on grids is

an area for teacher/board discussion.

TABLE 11

D4: Flacement Discussion	D4:	Placement	Discussion
--------------------------	-----	-----------	------------

·	⇒No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA _	136	5 3	83	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	8 .,	101	•

Table 11 indicates that a substantially greater number of Alberta collective bargaining agreements contain items which give teachers an opportunity to discuss placement on salary grids than is the case in Saskatchewan. In Alberta 53 agreements made provisions for grid placement discussions while only eight Saskatchewan agreements made such provisions.

payments to teachers for services rendered. It was found that five Saskatchewan jurisdictions could provide teachers with lump sum payments for services rendered (over and above the regular remuneration). In Alberta no such items are present in any collective bargaining agreements.

D22 and D23 recognize method of payment for principal and vice principal salaries.

TABLE 12
D22 and D23: Principal and
Vice Principal Salaries

	No.	Missing	Grid a	nd Allowances	
ALBERTA	136	22	-	114	•
SASKATCHEWAN	109			109	

Table 12 shows that 22 Alberta agreements made no mention of how principal and vice principal salaries

were determined, while 114 Alberta agreements and all Saskatchewan agreements based such salaries on grid plus an allowance.

D24 and D25 differentiate between several allowance formulas used to remunerate principals and vice principals.

	D24 and D25: Criteria For Allowance					
	No.	No Difference	School and/or	Type Size	Size and Qualification	Other
ALBERTA	136	7	٠ ر 119	=	9	1
SASKATCHEWAN	109		109			

In Alberta, seven collective bargaining agreements pay principals and vice principals a dollar amount regardless of the situation. One hundred and nineteen agreements base the administrative allowance on school type or size. Nine contracts provide for administrative allowances based on both factors, size of school and the administrator's qualifications, while one agreement used a formula which fell into the 'other' criteria. All Saskatchewan agreements had provisions which specified school type or size criteria.

In Alberta none of the agreements contained expense/travel allowance items for principals or vice principals.

Five Saskatchewan agreements, however, did contain items regarding expense/trave<sup>1</sup> allowance for principals while 104 did not.

D29 recognizes expense/travel allowance items for teachers in a position of responsibility or special designation.

TABLE 14 D29: Expense/Travel Allowance

	No.	Yes	No .
ALBERTA	136	2 3	113
SASKATCHEWAN	109	26	83

Items covering expense/travel allowances for positions of responsibility or special designation were found. in 23 and 26 collective bargaining agreements in Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively.

D30 recognizes expense/travel allowance items for all teachers.

D30: Expense/Travel Allowance For All Teachers

	No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	34	102	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	98	11	<b></b>

Items covering expense/travel allowances for all teachers were found in 34 and 98 collective bargaining agreements in Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively.

D31 recognizes mileage allowance provisions when a teacher is required to use his/her own vehicle.

TABLE 16
D31 Mileage Allowance

	No.	Missing	¢ per Mile	13.	15	18	19	20	21	22	24	25
ALTA.	<b>1</b> 36	132	<i>,</i>					2	1	1		
SASK.	109	75	,	.1	2	8	. 1	14.	3	3	1	1

As can be seen in Table 16, about 97 percent (97.06%) of the Alberta agreements contained no mileage allowance provisions, while over 68 percent (68.81%) of Saskatcheware

agreements also failed to show the presence of mileage allowance provisions. When mileage allowances were made there was a broad range among the agreements concerning the amount allowed.

\_\_ D32 recognizes items which make allowances an area for teacher/board discussion.

TABLE 17
D32: Allowance Discussion

			NO	2
ALBERTA	136	17	119	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	71	38	, ,

In Alberta only 17 agreements contained allowance discussion items and in Saskatchewan 71 agreements contained such items.

D33 recognizes the presence of grandfatheringgraduate degrees items in collective bargaining agreements.

Seven jurisdictions in Alberta had grandfathering-graduate degrees items. These came about because at one time school boards offered an incentive to their teaching staffs to complete a graduate degree. These incentives had a life span of a fixed number of years after which such incentives were phased out or retired-hence the term "grand-fathering". Saskatchewan had no such provisions in the agreements

D34 recognizes allowances for position of authority such as department heads, curriculum directors, etc.

		TAE	BLE	18	•
D34:	,`	Position	0 <b>f</b>	Responsibili	t y

	No:	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	115	21	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	79	30	

In Alberta 115 collective bargaining agreements contained items which provided for allowances for positions of responsibility, while in Saskatchewan 79 such items appeared in collective bargaining agreements.

D35 shows the presence of items which recognize other than teacher training backgrounds for allowance purposes.

D35: Other Training

		ner training		
	No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	. 136	42	94	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	4	105	*

Forty two collective bargaining agreements in Alberta had recognition for experience outside of teaching which was recognized for allowance purposes. Saskatchewan had only four collective bargaining agreements which recognized such experience.

## Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster D

Several D fields of analysis were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan agreements. This is suggested as indicating that the instrument provided ample scope for direct salary related items for both Alberta and

Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements, since all provisions found in the agreements were appropriately placed in fields provided by the instrument.

TABLE 20
Percentage Of Agreements Containing Cluster D Items

A	LBERTA	SASI	CATCHEWAN	v
D 3	99.26%	D 3	3.67%	
D4	38.97%	<b>*</b> D 4	7,34%	٧.
<b>D</b> 5	6.62%	D 5	4.59%	
D 2·2	100.00%	D 2 2	100.00%	
D 2 3	83.82%	D 2 3	100.00%	مہ
D 2 4	100.00%	D 2 4	100.00%	
D25	83.82%	D 2 5	100.00%	
D 28	0.00%	D 28	4.59%	
D29	16.91%	D29	23.85%	
D30	25.00%	D30	89.91%	
.D31	2.94%	D31	31.19%	•
D32	12.50%	D32	65.14%	
D33 🔩	5.15%	D33	0.00%	
D34	84.56%	D34	72.48%	
D35	30.88%	D35	3.67%	

Table 20 shows the presence of Cluster D items in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. The Alberta figures indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating D3 (Recognition For Related Experience), D4 (Placement Discussion), D5 (Lump Sum Payment), D33 (Grandfathering-Graduate Degrees), D34 (Position Of Responsibility) and D35 (Other Training) than their Saskatchewan counterparts. Saskatchewan teachers were more successful than Alberta teachers in bargaining for D23 (Vice Principal Salaries), D25 (Criteria For Allowance), D28

(Expense/Travel Allowance For Principals And/Or Vice Principals), D29 (Expense/Travel Allowance For Positions Of Responsibility Or Special Designation), D30 (Expense/Travel Allowance For All Teachers), D31 (Mileage Allowance) and D32 (Allowance Discussion).

The Direct Salary Related Cluster shows a greater scope of bargaining in Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements based upon presence or absence of provisions only. Seven fields of analysis found more provisions in collective bargaining agreements from Saskatchewan than from Alberta, while six fields of analysis found a greater number of provisions in agreements from Alberta than from Saskatchewan. Two D provisions were equally present in both provinces. It should be noted, however, that provisions which appear more frequently in Alberta than in Saskatchewan agreements are such that they affect a greater number of teachers than those which appear more frequently in Saskatchewan agreements, with consequent implications for scope when based upon numbers affected by the provisions.

Overall, the results indicate that each province's agreements contained fourteen D provisions. The research question can nevertheless be answered by stating that there are differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as bargained under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978 respectively. Those

teachers who bargained under a more centralized bargaining structure were more successful than those who bargained at the local level in achieving a broader range of provisions. Cluster D item differences may be the result of the bargaining structure employed.

## C ter F: Health and Welfare Cluster

The F Cluster represents items which recognize health and welfare provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Fl examines employer contributions to Alberta Health Care and Saskatchewan Hospitalization plans.

Forty four Alberta collective bargaining agreements had no employer contributions toward Alberta Health Care coverage but for those that did the percentage covered ranged from 50% to 100%, with 29 at the maximum and another 29 paying on a flat grant basis. Saskatchewan teachers do not bargain for such benefits due to Saskatchewan's universal Hospitalization Plan which was not achieved through collective bargaining in the education sector.

F2 recognizes provisions for hospital semi-private accomodation. This item was difficult to identify since Alberta collective agreements usually do not go into detail of the type of coverage that is involved, in fact only one of 136 agreements covered this provision. The Saskatchewan agreements mad no provision regarding semi-private hospital accomodations.

With respect to extended health plans, 126 juris-dictions in Alberta have plans toward which the school boards

make contributions on a percentage or flat amount basis. In Saskatchewan, none of the collective bargaining agreements have extended health plan provisions.

F4 recognizes the type of participation stipulated for F3: Extended Health Plan.

All but 10 Alberta collective bargaining agreements had provisions stipulating the type of participation open to teachers under extended health plans. There were no provisions for F4 in the Saskatchewan agreements.

F5 examines board contribution to extended health plans in percentage terms or on a flat amount basis.

The Alberta school boards contribution toward extended health plans varied from nothing (one case) to one hundred percent (49 instances): Ten collective bargaining agreements had no such provisions. There were no provisions under F5 in any of the Saskatchewan agreements.

F12 recognizes dental plan provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Thirteen Alberta collective agreements had dental plan provisions, while none of the Saskatchewan agreements did so.

F13 differentiates among the types of teacher participation in such dental plans. Eight of the 13 Alberta dental plan programs were compulsory for all teachers, while five did not specify. It should be noted that both teachers' locals and school boards favour compulsory participation requirements since the overall cost of such coverage is lowered significantly when 100 percent of a

particular group participates. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had F13 provisions.

F14 recognizes percentage or flat dollar amounts that school boards pay toward dental plans.

The school board contribution toward dental plans varied from zero to 100 percent in eight collective agreements while five agreements provided that school boards pay a flat dollar amount. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had F14 provisions.

F17 addresses itself to the presence of long term disability plans in collective bargaining agreements. Long term disability coverage is provided in 134 Alberta agreements while only two agreements do not provide for such coverage. None of the Saskatchewan agreements provide long term disability coverage.

F18 differentiates among the types of participation in the long term disability plans open to teachers.

F18 revealed that 127 Alberta collective bargaining agreements made participation in long term disability
plans compulsory for teachers, while five were unstated
and two made participation voluntary. In Saskatchewan all
109 collective bargaining agreements had no F18 provisions.

F19 recognizes the kind of contribution school boards make toward teachers' long term disability plans.

Two Alberta jurisdictions had no such plan. Sixteen collective bargaining agreements showed that there was no school board contribution toward long term disability plans. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had F19 provisions.

 $\mathsf{F21}$  deals with group insurance plan provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

TABLE 21 F21: Provisions

	No.	Yes	None
ALBERTA	136	134	2
SASKATCHEWAN	109	109	

Two Alberta collective bargaining agreements have no provisions for group insurance plans while 134 have such provisions. All Saskatchewan teachers are covered under the provincial agreements.

F22 examines the type of participation open to teachers under group insurance plan provisions.

: •	F22:	TABLE 22 22: Participation			
	No.	Missing	Voluntary	Compulsory	Unstated
ALBERTA	136	2	2	126	6
SASKATCHEWAN	109			109 °	

Table 22 reveals that two Alberta agreements did not have such items, while two were voluntary, 126 were compulsory and six had unstated requirements for teacher participation in group insurance plans. All Saskatchewan teachers were under a compulsory group insurance plan.

F23 deals with who selects the group insurance plan.

Two Alberta collective agreements had no group insurance plan provisions. One agreement called for bi-lateral decision on the choice of group insurance plan while 133 agreements

left this item unstated. All Saskatchewan teachers were covered by a provincial plan under which both teachers and employers made a joint decision.

		BLE 23 elector(s)	-	÷
•	No	Missing	Bi-lateral	Unstated
ALBERTA	136	2	1.	133
SASKATCHEWAN	109		109	

F24 considers whether the group insurance plan includes coverage for dependant life and/or accidental death and dismemberment.

TABLE 24 (F24: Coverage

)	Ne	Missing	Accidental Death and Dismemberment	No Mention
ALBERTA	136	2	24	110
SASKATCHEWAN	109			109

Two Alberta collective bargaining agreements had no group insurance plan. Twenty four collective bargaining agreements specified accidental death and dismemberment items while 110 made no mention of the type of coverage provided. The Saskatchewan provincial agreement made no mention of the type of coverage provided for teachers in the 109 locals.

F25 reports the school board contribution toward group insurance plans.

Table 25 reveals a wide variation in school board contributions toward teachers' group insurance plan premiums. All Saskatchewan teachers are covered by the provincial agreement with the employer paying 100 percent of the premiums,

but Alberta has a large range with 35 agreements paying 100 percent.

TABLE 25 \* F25: Board Contribution

ALBERTA	- No	. 136		•				a · · ·	3		
Missing	0.%	25%	50%	55%	60%	65%	70%	75%	907	. 100%	Flat \$Amt.
2	6	1	16	1	. 3	32	1	23	1	35	15
SASKATCH	EWAN	- No	. 109			(		,		100%	
										109	•

F26 examines the cellings to basic coverage under the group insurance plans.

TABLE 26 F26: Ceilings to Basic Coverage

	No.	Missing	Flat Dollar Amount
ALBERTA	136	135	1
SASKATCHEWAN	109		109

One hundred and thirty five of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements had no items for such provisions, while only one had such a provision. All of the Saskatchewan teachers are covered by the provincial agreement which provides for a flat dollar amount of coverage.

F27 recognizes the dollar amount of basic coverage. None of the Alberta agreements showed the presence of F27. In Saskatchewan the provincial agreement stipulated that seven thousand dollars was the maximum coverage that the employer would supply.

F29 looks for additional coverage options available

to teachers under group insurance plans. None of the Alberta agreements went into such detail so the extent of the provision is uncertain. The Saskatchewan provincial agreement provided for additional coverage at the teacher's expense.

 $${\tt F33}$$  examines limitations to an employee's insured benefits.

TABLE 27
F33: Employee Benefit Limitation

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	40	96
SASKATCHEWAN	109	109	

Of all the collective bargaining agreements, 40
Alberta and all Saskatchewan agreements had provisions limiting an employee's insured benefits.

### Scope of Bargaining in Cluster F

Several F fields of analysis were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan agreements indicating that the instrument contained ample scope for the Health and Welfare and other insured benefit items present in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements.

Saskatchewan social legislation providing for universal health care programs make Fl through F5 provisions
unnecessary. However, Table 28 shows a distribution of
Cluster F items in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements which indicate that there are differences
in the benefits portion of collective bargaining agreements.
Disregarding Fl through F5 (due to Saskatchewan social leg-

islation) Table 28 reveals that Alberta collective bargaining agreements reflect a greater scope of bargaining in Cluster F than Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements,
based upon the range in covered items.

TABLE 28
Percentage Of Agreements Containing
Cluster F Items

		orașter i ife	ешь	•	
	ALBERTA	•	<u> </u>	SASKATOHEWAN	
F 1	67.65%		F 1	0.00%	
F <sub>.</sub> 2	0.74%		F 2	0.00%	
F 3	92.65%		F 3	0.00%	
F 4	77.94%		F 4	0.00%	
F 5	77.20%		F 5	0.00%	
F12	9.56%		F12	0.00%	
F13	9.56%		<b>F</b> 13 .	0.00%	
F14	6.62%		F 1/4	0.00%	
F17	98.53% j		$_{\mathtt{F1}}\rangle$	0.00%	
F18	98.53%	4	F18	0.00%	**
F.19	86.76%	•	F19	0.00%	_
F21	98.53%		F21	100.00%	
F22	98.53%		F22	100.00%	
F23	0.04%	erioria de la composición dela composición de la composición de la composición dela composición dela composición dela composición de la composición dela composición de la composición dela composición dela compo	F23	0.00%	
F24	17.65%	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	F24	0.00%	
F25 ×	94.12%		F 2,5	100.00%	
F26	0.74%	· c•	F26	100.00%	.,
F32	1.47%		F32	0.00%	
F33	29.41%		F33	0.00%	
				• .	

The figures indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating F12 (Dental Plan Provisions), F13 (Type Of Participation In Dental Plan), F14 (Board Contribution to Dental Plan), F17 (Long Term Disability Plan), F18 (Type Of Participation In Long Term Disability Plan), F19 (Board Contribution To Long Term Disability Plan), F26 (Selectors), F24 (Type Of Coverage In Long Term Disability Plan),

F32 (Health And Welfare Discussion) and F33 (Employee Benefit Limitation) than their Saskatchewan counterparts.

Saskatchewan teachers were more successful than Alberta teachers in bargaining for F21 (Group Insurance Plan), F22

(Type Of Participation In Group Insurance Plan), F25 (Board

Contribution To Basic Health And Welfare Coverage) and F26

(Ceiling To Basic Coverage).

The Health And Welfare Cluster viewed as the range of covered items, shows a greater scope of bargaining in Alberta than in Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. In Alberta, fields of analysis found more provisions siops in collective bargaining agreements than in Saskatchewan, while four fields of analysis found a greater number of provisions in Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements. (However, it should be noted that in three of the four fields of analysis Alberta figures were quite close to the Saskatchewan figures). In all, Alberta agreements contained fourteen F provisions and Saskatchewan agreements contained four F provisions.

**(**)

The Health And Welfare Cluster is of a remunerative nature in that it results in giving teachers protection from certain types of expenditures should the need arise. Alberta teachers were thus deemed to have been more successful in bargaining with their employers for insured benefits than were Saskatchewan teachers.

The results from Table 28 on page indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful than Saskatchewan

teachers in bargaining for the Health And Welfare Cluster. The research question can be answered by stating that there were differences in the scope of bargained items, defined as the range of items covered, under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures as used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively in 1978.

Cluster R: Cumulative Sick Leave And Retirement Gratuity

#### Cluster

The R Cluster represents cumulative sick leave provisions which are part of teachers' benefit packages. Each year teachers are entitled to a specific number of sick days with full pay. The accumulation of the unused portion of those sick days varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Retirement gratuity is also represented in the R Cluster. A retirement gratuity represents a payment to an employee for long service rendered an employer.

R1 examines the percentage of unused number of sick days which can be accumulated.

TABLE 29
Rl: Percentage Of Unused Sick Days

	No.	100%	
ALBERTA	136	136	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	109	

Both Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements provide for 100 percent accumulation each year of the unused portion of sick leave entitlement.

R2 examines the maximum number of days a teacher can

accumulate from his unused portion of sick days over the years.

	TABLE	30
R2:	Maximum	Accumulation

	No.	60	65	90	100	1/1	0 1	15	120	125
ALBERTA	136	1	1	195	4		2	. 1	5 4	18
,	130	140	145	5 15	<i>L</i> 0	60	180	20	00 :	no. max.
	. 1	4	3	3 1	6	2	` 4		5	· 1
SASKATCHEWAN	No.		*				180			
	109	·		Ω .			109		•	3,

Table 30 reveals a wide range in the number of accumulated sick days allowed by Alberta collective agreements. More than 93 percent (93.38%) of the Alberta agreements allow for an accumulation that is lower than the Saskatchewan stipulation of 180 days.

R3 deals with provisions for retirement gratuities in collective bargaining agreements.

TABLE 31 R3: Provision

	No.	All	Certain	None	
ALBERTA	136	2	1	133	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	16	2	91	

Two collective bargaining agreements in Alberta have provisions for retirement gratuities for all teachers, one has provision for certain designated teachers and 133 have no provisions at all. In Saskatchewan 16 agreements provide for retirement gratuities for all teachers, two provide for gratuities for certain teachers and 91 provide for no gratuities.

R4 examines whether retirement gratuities are linked to cumulative sick leave provisions.

TABLE 32 R4: Link To Cumulative Sick Leave

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	133	· 72		1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	91 👡	1	15	2

One criterion often used for determining retirement gratuities is a specific number of accumulated sick leave days. In Alberta two of the three collective bargaining agreements which contain provisions for a retirement gratuity do link the gratuity to accumulated sick leave days, the third one did not specify. In Saskatchewan one collective bargaining agreement linked retirement gratuities to the unvested portion of the accumulated number of sick leave days. Fifteen agreements used a criterion which linked the retirement gratuity to years of service and one did not specify.

R5 through R11 determine when gratuities become pay-

TABLE 33
R5 Through R11: Gratuity Payout\*

-	ALE	ERTA		SASKATCHEWAN							
R	No.	Missing	Yes	No	No.	Missing	Yes	No			
5	136	133		. 3	109	91	6	12			
5	136	سلسم 133		3	109	<b>9</b> 1	5 ·	13			
7	136	133	2	1	109	91	3	15			
8 ·	136	133.		3	10°9	91	3	15			
•9	136	133		<b>`</b> 3	109	91		18			
10	136	133		3	≤ 109	91	. 3	15			
11	136	133	1.	3	109	91	4	14			
		· / / · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				,					

4 7

R5 shows that the retirement gratuity is payable at superannuation time in six Saskatchewan jurisdictions. indicates that five Saskatchewan collective agreements stipulate that payment comes at the school board's discretion. R7 indicates that two Alberta and three Saskatchewan jurisdictions pay the retirement gratuity when teachers leave the profession. R8 indicates that three Saskatchewan collective agreements stipulate a gratuity payout at a specific age. R9 indicates that neither Alberta hor Saskatchewan provide payouts on retirement gratuities when a teacher leaves for employment with another board. R10 shows that three Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements provide retirement gratuity payout due to health reasons. Rll indicates that four Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements use criteria other than those provided for by the instrument. is a tally of the total number of "yes" responses and indicates that three Alberta and 18 Saskatchewan jurisdictions provide for retirement gratuity payouts.

R13 recognizes items about retirement gratuity payout to teachers' estates or beneficiaries.

TABLE 34
R13: Retirement Gratuity To Estate Or Beneficiary

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	t Specified
ALBERTA	136	- 133		, ,	3
SASKATCHEWAN	109	91	1		17

Three of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements do not specify whether a retirement gratuity can be paid out to an estate or beneficiary and 17 Saskatchewan agreements do not specify as well. One Saskatchewan agreement has a provision allowing payout of a retirement gratuity to an estate or beneficiary.

Minimum years of service required to qualify for retirement gratuities is covered by R14.

TABLE 35 R14: Years Of Service

	No.	Missing	_ 1	3	.4	5	10	15	20
ALBERTA	136	133	2	,					1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	91	6	1	1	2	5	2	1

Table 35 indicates that the range for both Alberta and Saskatchewan was from one to 20 years to qualify for a retirement gratuity. Three Alberta and 18 Saskatchewan jurisdictions made such provisions.

The number of consecutive years required to qualify for retirement gratuities is covered by R15:

TABLE 36 R15: Consecutive Years

	No.	Missing	4	5	10	20	a
ALBERTA	136	135			. ·	1	•
SASKATCHEWAN	109	105	1	1	1	1	

One Alberta and four Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had items dealing with consecutive years of service requirements to qualify for a retirement gratuity.

The Alberta agreement required 20 years of service while the Saskatchewan agreements stipulated 4, 5, 10 and 20 years of service respectively.

R16 checks for provisions which show that retirement

gratuities are an area for teacher/board discussions. Only one Saskatchewan agreement specifically indicated that retirement gratuities were an area for teacher/board discussion. All Alberta and 108 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had no such provisions.

R17 shows any limits placed on retirement gratuities.

TABLE 37
R17: Retirement Gratuity Limitation

	No.	Missing	4	5	-10	20
ALBERTA	136	135				1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	105	1	. 1	1	1

One Alberta and four Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements indicated limits to retirement gratuities. Alberta had a 20 year limit while the four Saskatchewan agreements had four, five, ten and twenty year limits respectively for retirement gratuities.

# Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster R

Table 38 gives an indication of the frequency of R items in the collective bargaining agreements. Several R fields of analysis were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan agreements.

Table 38 shows the distribution of Cluster R items in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. The results reveal that Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater scope of bargaining in Cluster R. Both Rl and R2 show that 100% of Alberta and Saskatchewan

agreements contained provisions which allowed accumulation of unused sick days. None of the other R items were found in any of the Alberta agreements at frequencies equal to or greater than those found in Saskatchewan agreements.

R3 (Retirement Gratuity), R4(Link To Cumulative Sick Leave), R5 to R9, R10 and R11 (Gratuity Payout), R12 (Total Number Of Payouts), R13 (Retirement Gratuity To Estate Or Beneficiary), R14 (Years Of Service), R15 (Consecutive Years), R16 (Retirement Gratuity As Area For Discussion), and R17 (Retirement Gratuity Limitation) were all present in Saskatchewan agreements more frequently than in Alberta agreements.

Cluster R provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained 16 Cluster R provisions. Of the 16 provisions present in collective bargaining agreements in the two provinces, 14 provisions were found more frequently in Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements. Although Table 38 on page indicates that Alberta and Saskatchewan agreements stipulated maximums for accumulating sick days, only 10 Alberta agreements were at or above the Saskatchewan provincial maximum and thus R2 provisions gave a greater benefit to a larger number of Saskatchewan teachers than to Alberta teachers.

Saskatchewan teachers were apparently able to negotiate more successfully with their employers for cumulative sick leave and retirement gratuity provisions than

their Alberta collegues. Cluster R items, however, do not represent high costs to school boards and Retirement Gratuities (which are the majority of R items) do not represent high bargaining priorities for either Alberta or Saskatchewan teachers.

In terms of the research question it can be stated that there were differences—in the scope of bargained items under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures as used in 1978 in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively. These differences favored the Saskatchewan bargaining efforts.

 $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{TABLE 38} \\ \textbf{Percentage Of Agreements Containing R Cluster Items} \end{array}$ 

	ALBERTA		SASKATCHEWAN
R1	100.00%	R1	100.00%
\$ 2	100.00%	. R 2	100.00%
R 3	2.21%	R 3	16.51%
R 4	2.21%	R 4	2.75%
\$5	0.00%	R5	5.50%
.R6	0.00%	R6	4.59%
R 7	1.47%	R 7	2.75%
R 8	0.00%	R 8	2.75%
R10	0.00%	R10	2.75%
R11	1.47%	R11	3.67%
R12	2.21%	R12	16.51%
R13	ð 2.21%	R13	16.51%
R14	2.21%	R14	16.51%
R15	1.47%	R15	3.67%
R16	0.00%	R16	0.92%
R17.	1.47%	R17	7.34%

### Cluster L: Leaves Cluster

The leaves cluster represents items which concern

themselves with various leave provisions and related matters. L1 through L63 represent the fields of analysis which recognize the various leaves items in collective bargaining agreements.

L1 through L19 are fields of analysis which deal specifically with sabbatical/education improvement leaves and the related items.

L1 examines the collective bargaining agreement for provisions granting sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 39 L1: Provision

	 No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	132	4	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	105	4	

Table 39 reveals that 132 Alberta and 105 Saskat-chewan collective bargaining agreements provided for sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

L2 specifies the minimum number of years of service required to be eligible to apply for a sabbatical/education improvement leave.

TABLE 40 L2: Minimum Years Of Service

	No.	Missing	0	1	2.	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ALBERTA	136	31	2 ·	1	2	14	7	72	1	5	1		
SASKATCHEWAN	109	73		ist.	9	5	1	6	2	9		1	3

The large number of "missing" items reflects a lack of formal agreement as to who was eligible to apply for

sabbatical/education improvement leaves. Table 40 portrays a situation in which the majority of Alberta collective bargaining agreements had provisions varying from zero to eight years of experience in order to be eligible to apply for such leaves. The Saskatchewan situation reveals that the majority of agreements had no formal stipulation as to minimum requirements to qualify for sabbatical/education improvement leaves. Those Saskatchewan

cal/education improvement leaves. Those Saskatchewan agreements which did require minimum years of service, ranged from two to ten years.

L3 examines the minimum number years of service that are required with the present school board.

L3: Minimum Years Of Service With Present School Board

<u> </u>	No.	Missing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 .	. 8 <sup> </sup>	9	10
ALTA.	136	31	2	1	2	14	7	72	1	5	1		
SASK.	109	73			. 9	. 5	1	6	2	9	<del>``</del> _	1	3

The large number of "missing" items reflects a lack of formal agreement as to who is eligible to apply for sabbatical/education improvement leaves. Table 41 portrays a situation in which the majority of Alberta collective bargaining agreements had provisions varying from zero to eight years of experience with the present school board in order to be able to apply for such leaves. The Saskatchewan situation reveals that the majority of agreements had no formal stipulation as to minimum requirements with the present school board to qualify for sabbatical/education improvement leaves. Those Saskatchewan agreements which did contain

minimum years of service, ranged from two to ten years.

L4 takes note of the basic salary provided to teachers who accept sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 42 L4: Basic Salary

								Flat	•		,
	No.	Missing	0%	50%	65%	70%	75%	\$Amt	. 0	ther	
ALTA.	136	7 .	4	23	9	1	. 4	79	• ,,	9	
	No.	Missing	0%	15%	. 25%	30%	33%	35%	40%	46%	50%
SASK.	109	10	3	- 1	2	1	8	2	1	1	15
		51%	55%	60%	65%	66%	67%	70%	71%	75%	80%
SASK.(	cont'	d) 19	3	4 .	1	1	21	2	1	2	1
	<del></del>	·	Flat	\$ Am	ount		0	ther	· · ·	<b>\$</b>	
SASK.(	cont'	d)		. {				5			

Table 42 reveals a wide range of basic salaries paid to teachers on sabbatical/education improvement leaves. The obvious differences are that Alberta basic salary provisions for sabbatical/education improvement leaves fell into seven categories while Saskatchewan provisions fell into 21 such categories. Alberta results showed that 79 (the majority) collective agreements had provisions which fell into one category. None of the Saskatchewan categories represented a clear majority of the basic salaries teachers received while on sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

 $_{\text{\tiny C}}$  The maximum salary provided to teachers on sabbatical/education improvement leave is covered by L5.

L5 results indicated that there was a wide range of maximum salary provisions for sabbatical/education improvement leaves. Alberta had seven categories and Saskatchewan

had 14 categories of maximum salary provisions. One hundred and seven Alberta collective agreements (the majority) had items which fell into one maximum salary category. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had a category which represented the majority of agreements.

TABLE 43 L5: Maximum Salary

·.,	No.	Missing	50°	659-	~ <del>~ ~ 7</del> ~	70%	75%	Flat		 h a **
ALTA.	136	7	3	6		1		107		
	No.	Missing	45%	50%	51%	60%	65%	66%		0 %
SASK.	109	<b>&gt;</b> 10	1	4	2	2	3	1	26	ç
1.		71%	75%	80%	100%	Fla	t \$ A	mt.	0the:	r;
SASK.	(cont	'd) 1	32	7	7	•	2		5	1
							<del></del>			

L6 examines provisions which specify what criteria are used for determining sabbatical/education improvement leave salaries, when the maximum available is greater than the basic salary of an individual.

TABLE 44
L6: Maximum Greater Than Basic Salary'

	No.	Missing	Years Exp.	Board Discretion	Other
ALBERTA	136	9 4	31	1	. 10
SASKATCHEWAN	`109	47	. 5	32	2 5

Ninety four Alberta and 47 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had no provisions for dealing with such an eventuality. Both Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements (which had provisions) had the same type of mechanism for determining how to deal with situations where maximum salary was greater than the basic

salary.

L7 focuses on age limit qualifications which would prohibit certain teachers from applying for sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 45 L7: Age Limit

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Period Before Retirement
ALBERTA	136	4		97	35
SASKATCHEWAN	109	. 4		105	

Both Alberta and Saskatchewan had four collective bargaining agreements which had no age limit provisions.

Ninety seven Alberta and 105 Saskatchewan agreements had no limitations based on an applicant's age. Thirty five Alberta collective bargaining agreements qualified no age limit items by stating that sabbatical/education improvement leaves had to be taken before a specified period of years prior to retirement.

If recognizes items which stipulate required years of subsequent service following sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 46 L8: Years Of Subsequent Service

	Ñо.	Missing	1	2	3	4	Twice	Scale
AI BERTA	136	. 8	, 1	121	4	2	- ·	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	10	8	70	13	1	1	6

The majority of L8 items fell into categories of from one to four years of required subsequent service in

both Alberta and Saskatchewan. In both provinces the majority of collective bargaining agreements required two years of service following a sabbatical/education improvement leave. One Saskatchewan agreement stipulated twice the length of the leave and six collective bargaining agreements used a sliding scale to determine the length of required subsequent service.

the presence of a pecified method for determining the number of leaves allowed per year.

TABLE 47
L9: Number Of Leaves

	No.	Yes	No ~
ALBERTA	136	129	7
SASKATCHEWAN	109	105	. 4

The results from Table 47 indicate that the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan had seven and four agreements respectively which had no specified method for determining the number of sabbatical/education improvement leaves granted each year. Alberta had 129 agreements with such provisions and Saskatchewan had 105.

L10 recognizes how the number of sabbatical/education improvement leaves is determined.

TABLE 48 Determining Number Of Annual Leaves % of Flat Number. Missing Board No. Staff Budget \$Amt. Of Staff ALTA. 136 87 27 15 SASK. 109 74 18. Other 1

lective bargaining agreements respectively which did not address items in L10. Eighty seven of the Alberta agreements called for the school board to determine the number of sabbatical/education improvement leaves, 27 agreements had a formula based on a percentage of staff and 15 used a formula based on the number of staff. The Saskatchewan agreements indicated that 74 jurisdictions had such numbers determined by school boards, 18 were based on a number of staff, three used a formula based on appercentage of the budget, nine used a flat dollar amount and one fell into the 'other' category.

TABLE 49
L14: Mandatory Minimum Number Of Leaves

	Ňo.	Missing	Yes	. No	
ALBERTA	136	4,	29	103	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	5	10	94-	<del></del>

Twenty nine Alberta agreements and ten Saskatchewan agreements contained a mandatory number of sabbatical/ education improvement leaves to be awarded each year.

L16 addresses the accumulation of sick leave credits during sabbatical/education improvement leaves as stated in collective bargaining agreements.

TABLE 50
L16: Accumulation Of Sick Leave Credits

·	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specifi	e d
ALBERTA	136	4 .	<b>4</b>	42	89	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	4	10	17	88	<del></del>

Only one Alberta agreement allowed for sick leave credit accumulation during sabbatical/education improvement leave, while 42 specifically stated that such an accumulation was not possible and 89 collective agreements refrained from specifying such items. In Saskatchewan four agreements allowed for sick leave accumulation during sabbatical/education improvement leave, 17 collective bargaining agreements specifically stated that no accumulation was possible and 88 agreements refrained from discussing such items at all.

L17 examines school boards' contributions toward employee insured benefits during sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 51
L17: Continuation Of Board Contribution Toward
Employee Insured Benefits

	No.	Yes	No	Qualified	Yes	Not Specifi	ed.
ALTA.	رىن 136	2 ~	6	1		132	0
SASK.	109		4 %			104	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Four Alberta and four Saskatchewan jurisdictions did not address L17. Two Alberta collective bargaining agreements indicated that school boards would continue with contributions to employee insured benefits while six others specifically state that they would not. One collective bargaining agreement gave a qualified yes to L17 and 132 agreements did not specify. In Saskatchewan 104 collective bargaining agreements did not s ecify whether school boards would continue to contribute toward employee insured

benefits during sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

L18 checks for ensured re-employment for teachers returning from sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 52
£18: Ensured Re-Employment

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specified	Surplus Redundancy
ALBERTA	136	. 4	48	1	80	3
SASKATCHEWAN	109	. 4	86	1	16	2

Four Alberta and four Saskatchewan agreements had no L18 provisions at all. Forty eight Alberta agreements ensured re-employment of teachers returning from sabbatical/education improvement leaves, one agreement did not, 80 agreements did not specify and three would only ensure reemployment if positions were available. Eighty six Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements ensured re-employment, one did not, 16 did not specify and two would only ensure re-employment if positions were available.

L19 examines collective bargaining agreements for accrued experience during sabbatical/education improvement leaves.

TABLE 53
L19: Accrued Experience

	No.	Missing	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	4	17	115
SASKATCHEWAN	109	. 4	•	105

Four Alberta and four Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had no L19 provisions at all. Seventeen Alberta agreements allowed for accrued experience for those on sabbatical/education improvement leaves and 115 did not.

In Saskatchewan 105 agreements did not allow for accrued experience while on sabbatical/education improvement leave.

L20 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions making sabbatical/education improvement leaves an area for teacher/board discussions.

TABLE 54 L20: Discussion

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	1,11	2.5
SAKATCHEWAN	109	93	16

One hundred and eleven Alberta collective bargaining agreements made provisions for discussing sabbatical/ education improvement leaves and 25 did not. In Saskatchewan 93 agreements made such provisions while 16 did not.

L21 through L27 are fields of analysis which concern themselves with leaves of absence other than sabbatical/education improvement leaves or miscellaneous leaves.

L21 checks for leave of absence provisions.

TABLE 55 L'21: Provisions

( <del>1</del>	No.	Yes	No
*ALBERTA	136	18	128
SASKATCHEWAN	109	47	62

Eighteen Alberta agreements had provisions for leaves of absence while 128 did not make such provisions. Forty seven Saskatchewan agreements had leave of absence

provisions and 62 did no permit such leaves.

L22 deals with Minimum years of service required for leaves of absence.

TABLE 56
L22: Minimum Years Of Service

·	No.	Missing	2	3	4	5_	6_	7	8	Not Specified
ALTA.	136	116	1		9	1				. 18
SASK.	109	6 2	1	1	1	, 1	1	1	2	39

One hundred and sixteen Alberta and 62 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not address L22 provisions. Twenty Alberta agreements which had minimum years of service provisions fell into categories of two years, five years, or they did not specify. In Saskatchewan the range of minimum years of service required to qualify for leaves of absence was two to eight years with 39 agreements having no specific minimum requirement.

L24 checks for accumulated sick leave credits during leaves of absence.

TABLE 57
L24: Accumulated Sick Leave

	No.	Missing	No	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	117	3	16
SASKATCHEWAN	109	62	10	37

One hundred and seventeen Alberta and 62 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not contain L24
provisions. Three Alberta agreements did not allow accumulation of sick leave credits and 16 did not specify. Ten

Saskatchewan agreements did not allow accumulation of sick leave credits while 37 did not specify.

L25 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions in which school boards continue their contributions toward insured employee benefits.

TABLE 58 | L25: Insured Employee Benefits

	No.	Missing	No	pů.	Qualified	Yes	Not Specified
ALTA.	136	116	• 1		1		18
SASK.	109	62	•				4.7

One hundred and sixteen Alberta and 62 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had no L25 provisions. One Alberta agreement specifically did not provide for board contribution to insured employee benefits, one agreement had a qualified provision and 18 did not specify. Forty seven Saskatchewan agreements did not specify whether such contributions were continued.

L26 examines collective bargaining agreements for ensured re-employment provisions.  $^{\circ}$ 

TABLE 59
L26: Ensured Re-Employment

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specified	·
ALTA.	136	116	1	1	18	·
SASK.	109	62	14	3	30	

One hundred and sixteen Alberta and 62 Saskatchewan agreements did not have L26 provisions. One Alberta
agreement ensured re-employment, one did not and 18 did not
specify. Fourteen Saskatchewan agreements had ensured reemployment provisions for teachers returning from leaves of

absences, three did not ensure re-employment and 30 agreements did not specify.

L28 through L32 are fields of analysis which cover maternity leave provisions and related items.

L28 checks collective bargaining agreements for maternity leave provisions.

TABLE 60 L28: Provisions

	No.	Yes	No.
ALBERTA	136	111	25
SASKATCHEWAN	109	ı <b>8</b> 4	25

One hundred and eleven Alberta agreements had maternity leave provisions and 25 did not. Eighty four Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements provided for maternity leaves while 25 agreements did not make such provisions.

L29 examines the maximum period of maternity leave permitted.

TABLE 61
L29: Maximum Period Of Maternity Leave Permitted

	No.	Missing	Remainder Of Year	One Year	Other
ALBERTA	136	25	. 1	35	75
SASKATCHEWAN	109	2 4	• 1		84

Twenty five Alberta and 24 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have L29 provisions. One A1-berta agreement provided for maternity leaves for up to the remainder of the school year, 35 agreements provided one full year of maternity leave and 75 agreements provided maternity Leaves which varied from six weeks or more but less than one year and therefore were lumped under the 'other'

category. One Saskatchewan agreement provided maternity
leave for a period of up to the remainder of the school
year and 84 agreements had provisions which were lumped under the 'other' category.

L30 checks for accrued experience during the mat-

None of the 11 Alberta collective bargaining agreements allowed for the accrued experience during maternity leaves. One Saskatchewan agreement allowed for accrued experience during maternity leave, but only for a period six weeks after confinement while 108 collective bargaining agreements in Saskatchewan did not allow for accrued experience during maternity leaves.

L32 examines provisions dealing with ensured reemployment following maternity leave.

TABLE 62
L32: Ensured Re-Employment

	•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Not	
	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Specified .	
ALBERTA	136	25	60	2	49	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	. 24	43	1 .	41	

Twenty five Alberta and 24 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have L32 provisions. Sixty Alberta agreements ensured re-employment following maternity leave, two did not and 49 did not specify. Forty three Saskatchewan agreements ensured re-employment, one did not and 41 agreements did not specify.

L33 through L37 are fields of analysis which deal with collective bargaining provisions concerned with adop-

tion leave.

L33 recognizes adoption leave provisions.

TABLE 63
L33: Adoption Leave Provisions

	<del></del>	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	· · ·	136	17	119 6
SASKATCHEWAN		109	44	65

Seventeen Alberta collective bargainin, agreements provided for adoption leave and 119 did not make such provisions. Forty four Saskatchewan agreements provided for adoption leave and 65 did not.

L34 checks for preplacement items under adoption leave provisions.

TABLE 64
L34: Preplacement Leave For Adoption

	No.	Yes	, No	
ALBERTA	136	2	134	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	3	106	

Two Alberta agreements stipulated that preplacement leaves were available while 134 did not permit such
leaves. Three Saskatchewan agreements called for preplacement leaves and 106 did not allow such leaves.

 $\,$  L35 checks for maximum days permitted for preplacement leave.

One hundred and thirty four Alberta and 106

Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have

L35 provisions. One Alberta agreement provided a one day leave.

and one provided for a two day leave. In Saskatchewan one agreement provided for a one day preplacement leave for purposes of adoption, one provided for up to ten days and one provided for up to sixty days of preplacement leave.

TABLE 65 L35: Maximum Preplacement Leave

	No.	Missing	1	2	10	60	
ALBERTA	136	134	1	1			
SASKATCHEWAN	109	106	1		1	1	<del></del>
	5)						

L36 examines maximum days of adoption leave permit-

TABLE 66
L36: Maximum Days Of Adoption Leave

No.	Missing	11	2	3 10	20	30	98	Same As Maternity	Leave
ALBER	RTA						- - -		
136	120	1	2				3	10	
SASKA	TCHEWAN		1						
109	74	3	. :	2 2	4	5	•	19	

One hundred and twenty Alberta and 74 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had no L36 provisions. One Alberta agreement provided one day adoption leave, one had a two day provision, three had provisions of 98 or more days of leave and ten had provisions identical to maternity leaves. Saskatchewan had three agreements providing a one day leave, two provided three day leaves, two had ten day leaves, four had 20 day leaves and five had 30 day leaves for adoption purposes.

L37 checks for ensured re-employment of teachers returning from adoption leave.

TABLE 67
L37: Ensured Re-Employment

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specified	
ALBERTA	136	119	2		15	· · · · · ·
SASKATCHEWAN	109	6.5	11"	1	32	

One hundred and nineteen Alberta and 65 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not contain L37
provisions. Two Alberta agreements provided for ensured
re-employment and 15 did not specify. Eleven Saskatchewan
agreements ensured re-employment, one did not ensure re-employment and 32 did not specify.

L38 and L39 recognize paternity leave provisions and related items.

L38 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions granting paternity leave.

TABLE 68
L38: Provisions For Paternity Leave

•	No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	35	101	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	19	90	

Thirty five Alberta agreements had paternity leave provisions and 101 agreements had no such provisions. Nineteen Saskatchewan agreements provided paternity leaves while 90 did not.

L39 determines the maximum number of days permitted for paternity leaves.

One hundred and one Alberta agreements and 94 Saskatchewan agreements did not have L39 provisions. Thirty four Alberta collective bargaining agreements provided a one day paternity leave and one agreement provided a two day paternity leave. In Saskatchewan 11 jurisdictions provided a one day paternity leave, three provided for a three day leave and one provided for a five day paternity leave for teachers.

TABLE 69
L39: Maximum Days For Paternity Leave

·	No.	Missing	1	2	3	5	 ·	
ALBERTA	136	101	34	- 1	•			
SASKATCHEWAN	109	° 94	11		3	1	•	

L40 through L42 are fields of analysis which deal with leaves for Alberta Teachers' Association and Saskatche-wan Teachers' Federation business and/or activities.

L40 checks for long term leave provisions of six or more days for local or provincial officers.

One Alberta collective bargaining agreement had no L40 provision. Three Alberta agreements had long term leave provisions for local or provincial officers and 132 did not have such provisions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had any long term leave provisions for local or provincial officers.

L41 examines long term leave provisions for reimbursements to school boards for local or provincial officers taking such leaves.

One hundred and thirty three Alberta collective agreements had no L41 provisions while three collective agreements did provide for reimbursement to school boards for leaves taken by local or provincial officers of the

Albertal Teachers' Association. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had L41 provisions.

L42 examines short-term leave provisions of five...
days or less for teachers' organizations business/activities
by local or provincial officers.

TABLE 70 L42: Short-Term Leaves

	No.	Yes	) No
ALBERTA	136	31	10.5
SASKATCHEWAN	109	11	98

Thirty one Alberta agreements had short-term leave provisions and 105 did not. Eleven Saskatchewan agreements had short-term leave provisions while 98 collective bargaining agreements did not have such provisions.

L43 through L47 are fields of analysis dealing with provisions regarding leaves for teachers involved in the collective bargaining process.

L43 searches for provisions specifying the number of days leave granted for negotiation and related aspects of the collective bargaining process.

TABLE 71
L43: Leave For Negotiations

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	75	61
SASKATCHEWAN	109	62	47

Seventy five Alberta agreements had leave for negotiations provisions and 61 did not. Sixty two agreements

in Saskatchewan had provisions for negotiation leaves and 47 agreements did not have such provisions.

L44 examines collective bargaining agreements for the number of days granted to teachers involved in the collective bargaining process.

TABLE 72 L44: Number Of Days For Negotiation Leaves

	No.	Missing	1	2	3	4 5	6	70 8	Not Specified
ALTA.	136	61	43	1		8 18		10	5
SASK.	109	4.7		2	6	2, 8	5	2 1	36

Sixty one Alberta and 47 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have L44 provisions. Forty three Alberta agreements had one day negotiation leaves, one had a two day leave, eight had four day leaves, 18 had five day leaves, and five agreements did not specify the duration of such leaves. Saskatchewan agreements showed two districts with two day leaves, six with three day leaves, two with four day leaves, eight with five day leaves, five with six day leaves, two with seven day leaves, one with eight plus days leave and 36 did not specify the length of leaves.

L45 checks for maximum length of negotiation leave per teacher.

TABLE 73
L45: Maximum Length Of Leave

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	•
ALBERTA	136	61	1	74	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	47	1	61	•

Sixty one Alberta and 47 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have L45 provisions. One Alberta agreement had a maximum provision for negotiation leave and 74 had no such provision. Saskatchewan had one maximum length of negotiation provision and 61 agreements were without such provisions.

L46 examines collective bargaining agreements for specific number of days determining the maximum length of negotiation leave.

TABLE 74
L46: Number Of Days Negotiation Leave

	No:	Missing	. 3	5
ALBERTA	136	135		1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	O 8	1 .	

One hundred and thirty five Alberta and 108 Sask-atchewan agreements did not have L46 provisions. The one Alberta provision which set a maximum number of days for negotiation leave had a five day maximum while the one Sask-atchewan agreement had a three day maximum for negotiation leave.

L47 examines collective bargaining agreements for reimbursement to school boards for salary costs for teachers on negotiation leave.

TABLE /5
L47: Reimbursement For Salary Costs

	No.	Missing	Yes	No	Not Specified	Qualified Yes
ALBERTA	136	61	32	. 2		41
SASKATCHEWAN	109	47	<i>D</i>	2	55	5 ,

Sixty one Alberta and 47 Saskatchewan agreements did not contain L47 prosions. Thirty two Alberta agreements had reimbursement provisions, two called for no reimbursement and 41 gave a qualified response to the question of reimbursing school boards for negotiation leaves. Two Saskatchewan agreements called for no reimbursement to school boards, 55 collective bargaining agreements did not specify whether school boards were reimbursed, while five Saskatchewan agreements qualified reimbursements to school boards.

L48 through L50 are fields of analysis dealing with leaves providing time off for teachers, in periods of personal and family difficulty (or death) near to the teachers in question.

L48 deals with compassionate/bereavement leave

TABLE 76
L48: ompassionate/Bereavement
Leave For Immediate Family

en e	No	Missing	1	3	. 4	5	_7	Unspecified
ALBERTA	136	13		25	• 4	88	2	4
SASKATCHEWAN	109	34	1	10	3	46		15

Thirteen Alberta and 34 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not have L48 provisions. Twenty five Alberta agreements made a three day leave available to teachers, four agreements made a four day leave available, 88 agreements made a five day leave available, two made a seven day leave avilable, while four did not specify the length of such a leave. In Saskatchewan, one jurisdic-

5

tion provided a one day leave, ten offered a ten day leave, three offered a four day leave, 46 offered a five day leave and 15 did not specify the duration of compassionate/be-reavement leaves.

L49 searches for compassionate/bereavement leaves for extended family.

TABLE 77
L49: Compassionate/Bereavement Leave
For Extended Family

	No.	Missing	1	2	<b>-3</b>	4		Uns	pecif	ied
ALBERTA	136	52	17	11	51	. ,	1	15	4	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	86	4	, <b>2</b>	9	1	1		6	

Fifty/two Alberta and 86 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not contain L49 provisions. Seventeen of the Alberta agreements proveded a one day leave, ll provided a two day leave, 51 provided a three day leave, one provided a five day leave and four did not specify the length of leave. Four of the Saskatchewan agreements made provisions for a one day leave, two made provisions for a two day leave, nine made provisions for a three day leave, one provided for a four day leave, one agreement provided for a five day leave, while six did not specify the length of compassionate/bereavement leave for extended family.

" L50 examines collective bargaining agreements for compassionate/bereavement leaves for other than teachers, families or extended families.

Ninety two Alberta and 55 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not contain L50 provisions. Seventeen Alberta agreements provided one day leaves,

provided two day leaves, 20 provided three day leaves and five agreements did not specify the length of such leaves. Sixteen of the Saskatchewan agreements made a one day leave available, three made a three day leave available, three made a five day leave available and 32 collective bargaining agreements did not specify the duration of compassionate/bereavement leaves for other than teachers' families or extended families.

TABLE 78
L50: Compassionate/Bereavement
Leave For Others

and a	No.	Missing	1_	2 .	3_	5	Unspecified	•
ALBERTA	136	92	17	2	20		5	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	55	16		3	3	32	1

L51 through L62 are fields of analysis examining miscellaneous leave provisions.

L51 checks for provisions for miscellaneous leaves.

TABLE 79
L51: Provision For Miscellaneous Leave

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	129	7
SASKATCHEWAN	109	98	11

One hundred and twenty nine Alberta agreements had miscellaneous leaves provisions and seven did not allow such leaves. Ninety eight Saskatchewan agreements provided miscellaneous leaves, while eleven did not permit such leaves.

L52 differentiates between types of discretionary

eaves.



Discretionary Leaves

	No.	Paid	Unnaid	Both	No Provision	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	5		117	11	3
SASKATCHEWAN	109	44	1	40	23	1

Five Alberta agreements had provision for paid discretionary leaves, 117 had provisions for both paid and unpaid leaves, 11 agreements did not allow such leaves and three did not specify if such leaves were paid or unpaid. Saskatchewan had 44 agreements which provided for paid discretionary leaves, one agreement provided for unpaid leaves, 40 agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leaves, 23 did not allow such leaves, while one did not specify whether discretionary leaves were of the paid or unpaid variety.

L53 examines leaves for school board or school basiness activities.

TABLE 81 L53: School Board Or School Business

	No.	Paid	Unpaid	Both	No Provision	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	5		36	95	-
SASKATCHEWAN	109	64		3	41	1

Five Alberta agreements provided for paid school bord or school business leaves, 36 agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leaves and 95 agreements did not provide for such leaves. Among the Saskatchewan agreements 64 provided for paid leaves, three made provisions for both both paid and unpaid leaves, 41 agreements made no such

provisions and one did not specify if school board or school business leaves were paid or unpaid.

L54 recognizes leaves for attending courses.

TABLE 82 L54: Leaves For Courses

	No.	Paid	Unpaid	Both	No Provision	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	13	121 '	opecified
SASKATCHEWAN	109	5		3	100	1

Two Alberta agreements provided for paid leave, 13 agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leave and 131 agreements did not make such provisions. In five of the Saskatchewan agreements paid leave was provided to teachers taking course work, three agreements provided paid and unpaid leaves, 100 agreements made no leave provisions and one agreement did not specify if paid or unpaid leave was provided.

L55 determines if emergency or personal leaves were present in collective bargaining agreements.

TABLE 83 L55: Emergency Or Personal Leave

	No.	Paid	Both	No Provision	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	5	120	10	1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	18	53	38	

Five Alberta agreements provided emergency or personal leaves, 100 agreements provided both paid and unpaid leaves, 10 did not allow such leaves and one agreement did not specify whether such leaves were paid or unpaid. Eighteen Saskatchewan agreements provided paid leaves, 53 provided

both paid and unpaid leaves and 38 agreements did not allow leaves for emergency or personal reasons.

L56 looks for provisions which grant leaves to teachers for purposes of taking examinations so that they may complete a course or some other endeavour.

TABLE 84
L56: Examination Leaves

	No.	Paid.	Both	) No	
ALBERTA	136	54	12	70	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	2	1	106	

Fifty four Alberta collective bargaining agreements provided for such paid leaves, 12 agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leaves and 70 did not allow such leaves. Two Saskatchewan agreements provided for paid leaves, one agreement provided for both paid and unpaid leaves for examinations while 106 did not allow such leaves.

L57 checks for leaves allowing teachers to attend their own graduations or convocations.

TABLE 85
L57: Graduation Or Convocation Leaves

	No.	Paid	Both	No	
ALBERTA	1-36	49	34	53	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	32	3 ′	73	-

Forty nine Alberta agreements provided for paid leaves, 34 provided for both paid and unpaid leaves, while 53 agreements did not provide for such leaves. Thirty two Saskatchewan agreements had provisions for paid leaves, one agreement provided for unpaid leaves, three agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leaves and 73 made no such

provisions.

L59 addresses leaves given to teachers for public office duties.

TABLE 86
L59: Public Office Duties Leaves

·	No.	Paid	Both	No	Not Specified
ALBERTA	136	7	11	118	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	21	7	80	1

Seven Alberta collective bargaining agreements had paid provisions for public office duties leaves, 11 had provision for both paid and unpaid leaves, while 118 agreements did not have such provisions. Twenty one Saskatchewan agreements had paid leaves, seven agreements provided for both paid and unpaid leaves, 80 agreements made no mention of such leaves, while one Saskatchewan agreement did not specify if such leaves were paid or unpaid.

L60 examines collective bargaining agreements for leaves respecting teacher observance of religious days.

None of the Alberta agreements had religious days leave provisions. Only one Saskatchewan agreement had provisions for religious days leaves but it did not specify if such leaves were with or without pay.

L61 searches for weather or "Act of God" leaves.

Such leaves are meant to excuse teachers from their teaching duties if, due to circumstances beyond their control, they are physically detained.

Sixty three Alberta collective bargaining agreements provided for such leave with pay, 13 agreements had

provisions which covered such leaves with or without pay and 60 Alberta agreements did not make such provisions. Thirty two agreements from Saskatchewan provided for paid leave for weather and "Act of God" conditions, three made provisions for both paid and unpaid leaves, while 74 Saskatchewan agreements made no such provisions.

TABLE 87
L61: Weather Or "Act Of God" Leaves

1	No. Paid		Both	Nc	
ALBERTA	136	63	13.	60	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	3.2	3	74	

L62 examines provisions which grant leaves to attend weddings.

TABLE 88
L62: Weddings Leaves

	No.	Paid	`Unpaid	Both	No	Not Spe	cified
ALBERTA	136			30	105	. 1	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	2	1	2	103	1	

Thirty Alberta collective bargaining agreements' provided for both paid and unpaid weddings leaves, 105 agreements did not have such provisions, while one agreement did not specify if such leaves were with or without pay. Two Saskatchewan agreements provided such leaves with pay, one agreement allowed for unpaid leaves, two agreements made provisions for both paid and unpaid leaves and 103 Saskatchewan agreements made no provisions allowing teachers to attend weddings.

L63 checks for provisions which made miscellaneous

leaves a matter for teacher/board discussion.

TABLE 89 L63: Leaves Discussion

	No.	Yes	No.
ALBERTA	136	47	89
SASKATCHEWAN	109	82	27

Forty seven Alberta referents stipulated that miscellaneous leaves provisions were a matter for teacher/board discussion and 89 agreements had no such provisions. In Saskatchewan 82 jurisdictions made miscellaneous leaves provisions a matter for teacher/board discussions while 27 did not make such provisions.

## Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster L

Table 90 indicates the frequency of L items in the collective bargaining agreements. Several L fields of analysis were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan agreements indicating that the instrument contained ample scope for Leaves Provisions.

Table 90 shows the distribution of Cluster L items in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. The results reveal that Alberta agreements contain a greater scope of bargaining in Cluster L. L1 (Sabbatical/Education Improvement Leave Provision), L2 (Minimum Years Of Service Required), L3 (Minimum Years Of Service With Present Board Required), L4 (Basic Salary Provided), L5 (Maximum Salary), L7 (Age Limit), L8 (Years Of Subsequent Service), L14 (Mandatory Minimum Number), L16 (Accumulation Of Sick Leave Credits), L17 (Continuation Of Board Contribution Toward Emplo-

yee Benefits), L19 (Accrued Experience), L25 (Insured Employee Benefits), L28 (Maternity Leave Provisions), L29 (Maximum Period Of Maternity Leave Permitted), L32 (Ensured Re-Employment), L38 (Paternity Leave Provisions), L39 (Maximum Days For Paternity Leave), L40 (Leave Provisions For Local Or Provincial Officers), L41 (Reimbursement To Local Boards), L42 (Short Term Leaves), L47 (Reimbursement For Salary Costs), L48 (Compassionate/Bereavement Leave For Immediate Family), L49 (Compassionate/Bereavement Leaves For Extended Family), L51 (Miscellaneous Leave Provisions), L52 (Discretionary Leaves), L53 (School Board Or School Business Leaves), L54 (Leaves For Courses), L55 (Emergency Or Personal Leaves), L56 (Leaves For Examinations), L57 (Leaves For Graduation Or Convocation), L59 (Public Office Duties Leaves), L61 (Weather Or "Act Of God" Leaves) and L62 (Weddings Leaves) were present more frequently in Alberta than Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements.

Saskatchewan teachers were able to negotiate a greater number of L6 (Maximum Greater Than Basic Salary),
L9 (Number Of Leaves), L10 (Determining Number Of Leaves),
L18 (Ensured Re-Employment), L20 (Sabbatical/Education
Leaves Discussion), L21 (Leave Of Absence Provisions), L22
(Minimum Years Of Service), L26 (Ensured Re-Employment),
L30 (Accrued Experience During Maternity Leaves), L33 (Adoption Leave Provisions), L34 (Preplacement Leave For Adoption),
L35 (Maximum Preplacement Leave), L36 (Maximum Days Of Adoption Leave), L37 (Ensured Re-Employment Following Adoption
Leave), L43 (Leave For Negotiations), L44 (Number Of Days

TABLE 90
Percentage Of Agreements Containing
Cluster L Items

					1
. <del></del>	ALBERTA		SAS	KATCHEWAN	,
L1	97.06%		, <b>L1</b>	96.33%	
L 2	77.21%		L 2	33.03%	
L3	77.21%		L3	33.03%	
L 4	94.85%		L4	90.83%	
L5	94.85%		L5	90.83%	
L6	30.88%	• •	, L6	56.88%	
L 7	25.74%		L 7	0.00%	•
L8	94.12%		L8	90.83%	
L9 .	94.85%		L9	96.33%	
L10	94.85%		/ L10	96.33%	
L14	21.32%	· ·	L14	9.17%	ŧ.
\r16	0.74%		L16	0.00%	
T/f 2	2.20%		L17	0.00%	<i>l</i> .
L18	37.50%		L18	80.73%	
L20	81.62%	•	L20	85.32%	
L21	13.24%	15	L21	43.12%	:
L 2 2	1.47%	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	L22	43.12%	
L25	0.74%	· Arg. 1	L25	0.00%	
L26	0.74%		L26	12.84%	
L28	81.62%		L28	77.06%	
L29	81.62%		L29	77.98%	
L30	0.00%	and the same of th	L30	77.98%	
L32	44.12%		L32	39.45%	
L33	12.50%		L33	40.37%	-
L34	1.47%		L34	2.75%	
L35	1.47%		L35	2.75%	•
L36	11.76%		L36	32.11%	* * *
L37	1.47%		L3,7	10.09%	
L38	25.74%		L38	17.43%	
L39	25.74%		L39	13.75%	•
L40	2.21%		L40	0.00%	,
L41	2.21%		L41	0.00%	1
L42	22.79%	r	L42	10.09%	!

TABLE 90 (continued

L43	55.15%			L44	56.88%
L44	55.15%	•		L44	56.88%′
L45	0.74%			L45	.92%
L46	0.74%			L46	.92%
L47	53.68%		•	L47	4.59%
L48	• 90.55%	•		L48	68.81%
L49	61.76%	•	,	L49 ·	21.10%
L50	32.35%	-	~	L50	49.54%
L51	94.85%			L51	89.91%
L 5 2	92.65%	who are	· !	L52	89.91%
L53	94.85%		÷ .	L53	89.91%
1,54	94.85%	•		L54	89.91%
(55)	94.12%			L55	90.83%
L 56	94.85%	,		L56	90.83%
L57	94.85%	1		L57	90.83%
L59	94.85%			L59	89.86%
<b>L60</b> /	0.00%			L60	. 92%
L61	94.85%			L61	90.83%
L62	94.12%	•		L62	89.91%
L63	34.56%			L63	75.23%
			'	:	

For Negotiation Leave), L45 (Maximum Length of Leave), L46 (Number Of Days Negotiation Leave), L50 (Compassionate/Bereavement Leaves For Others), L60 (Religious Days Leaves) and L63 (Miscellaneous Leaves Discussion) than did their Alberta counterparts.

Out of fifty four Cluster L provisions present in Alberta and Saskatchewan agreements, thirty three found greater expression in Alberta collective bargaining agreements while twenty one L provisions found greater expression in Saskatchewan agreements. The figures in Table 91 thus

suggest that Alberta teachers were more successful in bargaining for Leaves than Saskatchewan teachers.

Cluster L found fifty four provisions in Alberta and Saskatchewan agreements with a thirty three to twenty one edge in Alberta's favour. In answer to the research question it can be stated that there were differences in the scope of bargain as under decentralized and centralized bargaining as used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskata spectively in 1978.

## Cluster W: Staffing kload Claster

Cluster W examines staffing and workload provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Wl through W54 recognize teacher-pupil ratio staffing formulas (or PTR), Class size, teacher workloads, staff allocation, teacher evaluation and access to teacher records.

W1 through W8 are fields of analysis which deal specifically with teacher-pupil staffing formulas.

W1 examines the collective bargaining agreement for provisions stating pupil teacher ratios.

One Alberta collective bargaining agreement contained a W1 provisions, while 135 agreements from Alberta and none of the 109 Saskatchewan agreements had W1 provisions.

W2 reveals whether the term "teacher" is defined in the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of determining teacher-pupil ratios.

One Alberta agreement had a W2 provisions while 135 agreements from Alberta and none of the Saskatchewan agree-

ments had a W2 provision.

W3 examines the criteria on which teacher-pupil ratios are based.

One Alberta agreement had a W3 provision which stated that the PTR was based on the actual enrolment.

None of the Saskatchewan agreements had any W3 provisions.

W4 examined collective bargaining agreements for provisions making PTR mandatory or just a guide line.

One Alberta agreement contained mandatory pupilteacher ratios while none of the Saskatchewan agreements addressed W4.

W5 identifies how PTR is applied in a school system.

The one Alberta collective agreement which contained pupil-teacher ratios applied such ratios on a system-wide basis and not on a school, classroom or division level basis.

', W6 identifies seven different types of pupil-teacher ratios which can appear singly or in multiples.

The one Alberta agreement containing a W6 provision was of the "One Fixed Ratio" type. None of the Saskat-

W7 identifies the precise ratio of pupils per teacher.

The one Alberta agreement containing a W7 provision put the PTR at 22.83 pupils per teacher on a system-wide basis. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had W7 provision.

W8 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions which make PTR an area for teacher/board

discussions.

One Alberta agreement made PTR an area for teacher/board discussions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had W8 provisions.

W9 through W12 were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. These fields of analysis examine collective bargaining agreements for items dealing with class size.

W13 recognizes provisions which make class size an area for teacher/board discussion.

Although none of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements had any provisions regarding class size, one agreement nevertheless did contain wording which allowed for teacher/board discussion regarding class size. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had W13 provisions.

W14 examines agreements for teacher work load pro-

TABLE 91 W14: Teacher Work Load Provisions

<u> </u>	<u> </u>	No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA		136	50	86	/
SASKATCHEWA	AN	109	15	94	

Fifty Alberta collective bargaining agreements contained provisions stating teacher work loads while 86 agreements had no such provision. In Saskatchewan 15 agreements stated teacher work loads while 94 agreements did not have such provisions.

W15 through W32 identify provisions dealing with

instructional loads.

W15 examines whether collective bargaining agreements, contain instructional load provisions.

TABLE 92 W15: Instructional Load Provisions.

Λ,	No.		Y es	No
ALBERTA	136	i e	25	111
SASKATCHEWAN	109		2	107

Of the 50 Alberta collective bargaining agreements which 'ad W14 provisions, 25 agreements specifically allocated instructional loads while 25 did not stipulate what the actual load was. Only two Saskatchewais jurisdictions made W15 (instructional load provisions) items part of the collective agreement.

W16 differentiates between the variations in teaching load provisions.

TABLE 93
W15 Teaching Load Variation

No.	Missing	Teaching	Frei	paration	Both
ALBERTA 136	111	21	4	2	2
SASKATCHEWAN 109	107	•		2	

On hundred and eleven Alberta and 107 Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements did not contain W16 provisions. Twenty one Alberta agreements had provisions which dealt with teaching load specifications only, two dealt with teacher preparation time only and two dealt with both teaching and preparation time loads. In the Saskatchewan agree-

ments only two had provisions specifying preparation time loads for teachers.

W19 searches for provisions which allocate a specific number of minutes of instructional load per teacher in collective bargaining agreements.

One hundred and thirty three Alberta and all Saskatchewan agreements had no W19 provision while three of the Alberta agreements specified teacher's instructional loads.

W23 deals with instructional loads for teachers that fall into "other" than W17 through W22 provision.

One hundred and sixteen Alberta agreements had no W23 provisions, 20 agreements defined pecific teaching loads which were "other" than those in W17 phrough W22 and three gave no specific definitions of other teaching loads. None of the Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had W23 provisions.

W28 deals with the average number of lesson preparations per cycle.

None of the Alberta agreements had W28 provisions.

One hundred and eight Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements as well had no W28 provisions while one agreement and specify lesson preparation time.

W32 recognizes "other" than W25 through W31 provisions respecting the definition of preparation time for

definitions of what constituted a teacher's preparation time while 132 did not specify. One Saskatchewan agreement

defined what preparation time was and 108 did not elaborate what preparation time meant.

TABLE 94 W32: Other

	No.	Yes	No	
LBERTA	136	. 4	132	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	, 1	108	

W18 recognizes provisions dealing with noon-time

TABLE 95
W33% Noon-Time Supervision

	No.	Required	Both	No	
ALBERTA @	136	1	<b>2</b>	133	· ·
SASKATCHEWAN	109	4	3	102	·

One Alberta agreement specified that teachers were required to offer their services for noon-time supervision, two agreements stipulated that such service was required but it was only to be rendered where expected (giving some degree of choice at the school-level), and 133 agreements specified that no such service was required. Four Saskatchewan agreements required teachers to provide noon-time supervision, three agreements required provision of such service but only where expected and 10% agreements did not require teachers to render such service.

W34 recognizes other forms of supervision which teachers have to perform as part of their work load.

Twenty one Afberta agreements required teachers to perform supervisory duries, two expected teachers to perform

such duties, two other agreements required teachers to perform such supervisory duties where expected and 111 agreements did not require teachers to perform such duties at all. In Saskatchewan ten agreements required teachers to perform such contact to perform such duties, one a sent required teachers to perform such duties where expected and 98 did not require teachers to perform such duties.

TABLE 96 W34: Other Supervision

· ·	No.	Required	Expected	No	Both
ALBERTA	136	21	2	111	2
SASKATCHEWAN	109	10		98	ſ

W35 recomplizes provisions which make teacher workload an area for teacher/board discussion.

TABLE 97
W35: Teacher Workload Discussion

	No.		Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	·	4.5	91	
SASKATCHEWAN	109-	: :	1	10.8	<del></del>

Forty five Alberta agreements made teacher workloads. an area for teacher/board discussion and 91 did not. One Saskatchewan agreement made teacher workloads an area for teacher/board discussion and 108 did not.

W36 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions which allocate workloads for principals.

Four Alberta collective bargaining agreements had provisions assigning workloads for principals while 32 did not have such provisions. One Saskatchewan collective

agreement had provisions assigning workloads for principals while 108 did not.

TABLE 98
W36: Workloads For Principals

<u> </u>	No.	Yes	No.
ALBERTA	136	•4	132
SASKATCHEWAN	109	1	108

W37 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions which allocate workloads for vice-principals.

TABLE 99
W37: Workloads For Vice-Principals

1	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTÀ	136	1	135
SASKATCHEWAN	109	1'	108

One Alberta agreement had provisions assigning work-loads to vice-principals while 135 did not. In Saskatchewan one collective bargaining agreement provided for workloads for vice-principals while 109 did not have such provisions.

W38 recognizes provisions assigning workloads for positions of responsibility.

TABLE 100
W38: Workloads For Positions Of Responsibility

•	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA .	136	4	132
SASKATCHEWAN	109	2	107

Four Alberta collective bargaining agreements contained provisions assigning workloads to teachers in positions of responsibility while 132 did not specify the workloads for such designation. Two Saskatchewan agreements

stipulated what the workloads for teachers in positions of authority were, while 107 did not have such specific provisions.

W39 through W48 are fields of analysis which recognize staff allocation provisions.

W41 examines collective bargaining agreements for staff allocation regarding principals.

One Alberta agreement provided for specific allocation of principals to schools, 34 agreements mentioned such provisions but did not make any specific allocations, 31 agreements made both provisions and 70 agreements did not make any staff allocation provision at all. None of the Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements had a W41. provision.

W42 identifies provisions regarding the allocation of vice-principals to schools.

TABLE 101
W42: Staff Allocations Vice-Principal

	No.	No Speci Allocati	Both	No	
ALBERTA	.1/36	2	81	53	
SASKATCHEWAN	109	1.	1	107	

such provisions but no specific staff allocation for the position of vice-principal, bl made both provisions and allocations and 53 agreements did not make such provisions. One Saskatchewan agreement made provision but no specific staff allocation for the position of vice-principal. Another

as allowing for no specific allocations for the position of vice-principal (depending on the merits of the situation), while 107 agreements did not have W42 provisions.

W43 recognizes provisions which deal with staff allocation for the position of department head.

Four Alberta agreements made provisions but no specific allocation for positions of department head, three agreements had provisions for both specific and non-specific staff allocation for the positions of department head and 129 agreements had no such provisions.

W47 examines provisions in collective bargaining agreements which deal with staff allocation for "other", positions.

TABLE 102
W47: Staff Allocation-Other Posttions

	No.	No Specific Allocation	Specific Allocation	Both	No
ALBERTA	136	1 8		94	34
SASKATCHEWAN	109	2	2	2	103

Eight Alberta agreements had provisions dealing with staff allocation for "other" positions but no specific allocations were outlined. Ninety four Alberta agreements made provisions for staff allocation for "other" positions which included specific and non-specific allocations, while 34 agreements did not have W47 provisions. Two Saskatchewan agreements had provisions dealing with staff allocation for "other" positions which were specific, two had provisions

which made no specific allocations, two had both specific and non-specific allocations while 103 agreements had no W47 provisions.

W48 through W52 are fields of analysis which deal with provisions regarding teacher evaluation in collective bargaining agreements.

W48 examines collective agreements for general provisions outlining methods for evaluating teachers.

Two Alberta agreements had provisions outlining teacher evaluation methods while 134 ddd not have such provisions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had W48 provisions.

W49 recognizes provisions which allow for withholding of increments for salary purposes resulting from teacher evaluations.

Five Alberta collective bargaining agreements provided for withholding of increments as a result of unsatisfactory evaluation results while 131 agreements did not contain W49 provisions. None of the Sakatchewan agreements had W49 provisions.

W51 recognizes provisions in collective agreements which deal with specified teacher disciplinary provisions.

TABLE 103 W51: Teacher Disciplinary Provisions

	No.	811	Yes	Ne
ALBERTA	136		1 ,	135
SASKATCHEWAN	109		3	106

One Alberta collective agreement contained items

which dealt with teacher disciplinary provisions while 135 agreements did not contain such items. Three Saskatchewan agreements had disciplinary provisions and 106 did not contain W51 provisions.

W52 recognizes provisions which make teacher evaluation an area for teacher/board discussion.

One Alberta agreement had a W52 provision while 135 did not. W52 was not present in Saskatchewan agreements.

Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster W

Table 104 indicates the frequency of W provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Several W fields of analysis were not present in either Alberta or Saskatchewan agreements, indicating that the instrument contained ample scope for the Staffing/Workload Provisions (Working Conditions).

Thirty fields of analysis recorded Cluster W provisions in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. Table 104 shows that Alberta agreements contained a greater scope of bargaining in Cluster W than did those from Saskatchewan W1(Pupil-Teacher Ratio/Staffing Formula Provisions), W2(Definition of Teacher), W3(Criteria For PTR), W4(PTR Conditions), W5 (Application of PTR), W6 (Types of Ratios), W7 (PTR), W8 (PTR Discussion), W13 (Class Size Discussion), W14 (Teacher Workload Provision), W15 (Instructional Load Provisions), W16 (Teaching Load Variation), W19 (Minutes of Instruction Load), W23 (Other Provisions), W32 W0ther Preparation Provisions),

W33 (Noon-Time Supervision), W34 (Other Supervision), W35 (Teacher Workload Discussion), W36 (Workloads For Principals), W38 (Workloads For Positions Of Responsibility), W41 (Staff Allocation-Principals), W42 (Staff Allocation - Vice-Principals), W43 (Staff Allocation - Department Heads), W47 (Staff Allocation - Other Positions), W48 (Teacher Evaluation Provisions), W49 (Withholding of Increment Provisions) and W52 (Teacher Evaluation Discussion were present in a greater number of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements.

Saskatchewan agreements showed a greater scope of bargaining in three fields of analysis. W28 (Preparation Per Cycle), W37 (Workloads For Vice-Principals) and W51 (Teacher Disciplinary Provisions) were present in a greater number of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

In all, twenty nine fields of analysis recorded Cluster W provisions in Alberta agreements while eleven Cluster W provisions appeared in Saskatchewan agreements. Of the thirty Cluster W fields of analysis, twenty seven found a greater number of provisions in Alberta agreements while only three fields of analysis recorded a greater number of such provisions in Saskatchewan agreements.

The research question can thus be answered by stating that there are differences in the scope of bargained Cluster W items under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively in 1978. Results indicate that Alberta teachers, who bargained under a decentralized bargaining

TABLE 104
Percentage Of Agreements Containing
Cluster W Items

	ALBERTA	/	SASKATCHEWAN
√ W1	.74%	W1·	0.00%
W 2	.74%	W2	0.00%
w 3	.74%	w3	0.00%
<b>W</b> 4	.74%	w4	0.00%
W 5	.74%	₹ <b>₩5</b>	0.00%
W6	.74%	W6	0.00%
<b>W</b> 7	.7 <b>4%</b>	w7	0.00%
<b>8</b> W	. 7.4%	w8	0.00%
W13	.74%	W13	0.00%
W14	36.76%	W14	12.84%
W15	18.38%	, W15	1.83%
W16	18.38%	W16	1.83%
W19	2.21%	<b>W1</b> 9	0.00%
W23	14.71%	w 2 3	0.00%
W28	0.00%	W 2 8	.92%
W32	2.94%	w32	0.00%
W33 .	2.21%	w33	0.00%
W34	18.38%	₩34	0.00%
W 3.5	33.09%	w35	.92%
W36	2.94%	w 3 6	.92%
W3 <u>7</u>	.74%	w37	.92%
W38	2.94%	w38	1.83%
W41	48.53%	<b>w</b> 43	0.00%
W42	61.03%	W42	1.83%
W43	5.15%	W4:	0.00%
W47	75.00%	w4:	5.50%
W48	1.47%	W48	3 0.00%
W49	3.68%	W49	0.00%
W51	.742	W5:	2.75%
W52	.742	W5:	2 0.00%



structure for Staffing/Workload provisions, were more successful than their Saskatchewan collegues who bargained under more centralized bargaining structure.

## Cluster J: Job Security Cluster

Cluster J represents job security provisions in collective bargaining agreements. J1 through J16 recognize provisions regarding vacancies, postings and transfers. J17 through J79 are fields of analysis recognizing tenure, surplus and redundancy items in collective agreements.

Jl examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions regarding vacancies, postings and transfers affecting teachers.

TABLE 105
J1: Vacancies, Postings And Transfers
Affecting Teachers

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	10	126
SASKATCHEWAN	109	5	104

Ten Alberta agreements contained provisions regarding vacancies, postings and transfers affecting teachers
while 126 did not have Jl provisions. Five Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements contained Jl provisions while
104 did not contain such provisions.

J2 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions regarding vacancies, postings and transfers affecting positions of responsibility.

Eleven Alberta agreements contained provisions regarding vacancies, postings and transfers affecting positions of responsibility, and 125 did not have J2 provisions. Nine Saskatchewan agreements contained J2 provisions while 100 agreements did not have such provisions:

TABLE 106

J2: Vacancies, Postings And Transfers
Affecting Positions of Responsibility

	No.	Yes	N o		
ALBERTA	136	• 11	125		
SASKATCHEWAN	109	9	100		

J3 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions regarding the necessity to advertise vacant positions internally first, giving teachers already employed a chance to apply for such openings.

Eight Alberta collective bargaining agreements had provisions making the internal advertising of vacant positions first within a school board's jurisdiction, a requirement while 128 agreements from Alberta and all of the Saskatchewan agreements had no such provisions.

J4 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions regarding the necessity to advertise vacant positions internally first - giving teachers in positions of responsibility already employed (by a school board) a chance to apply for such openings.

Eight collective bargaining agreements in Alberta specified that vacancies in positions of responsibility were to be advertised internally first while 128 Alberta collective bargaining agreements had no J4 provisions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had J4 provisions.

J9 examines promotional transfer provisions in col-

Two Alberta agreements contained provisions regarding promotional transfers while 134 agreements made no such provisions. None of Saskatchewan agreements addressed J9 provision.

J10 recognizes provisions pertaining to teacher initiated transfers.

Thirty one collective bargaining agreements from Alberta contained provisions dealing with teacher initiated transfers while 105 made no such provisions. Saskatchewan agreements failed to address the J10 field of analysis.

Jll examines provisions in collective bargaining agreements which deal with administrative transfers which school board initiated.

TABLE 107
Jll: Board Initiated
Administrative Transfers

	No.		Yes		No	
ALBERTA	136	10	86	•	50	
SASKATCHEWAN	109		3	0	106	

Eighty six Alberta agreements contained provisions regarding administrative transfers initiated by school boards while 50 agreements had no such provisions. Three of the Saskatchewan agreements had J11 provisions.

J12 addresses provisions dealing with creation of new positions.

TABLE 108
'J12: Creation Of New Positions

	No.	Yes	3		No a	
ALBERTA	136	88	3	<u>.</u>	48	
SASKATCHEWAN	109		5		104	- <del></del>
			····			~~~~

Eighty eight collective bargaining agreements in Alberta contained provisions regarding creation of new positions and 48 agreements contained no such provisions. Five Saskatchewan agreements had J12 provisions, while 104 did not have provisions regarding creation of new positions.

J14 searches for provisions which cover travel and refocation costs.

TABLE 109
J14: Travel And Relocation Costs

0	·	No.	·	Yes		Nc	
ALBERTA		136	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	68	•	68	,
SASKATCHEWAN	ن.	109	Ŷ	1	4	108	ا ميد ( د ميد

Sixty eight Alberta agreements had provisions reimbursing teachers for travel and relocation costs while
68 agreements did not have such provisions. Only one Saskatchewan agreement had J14 provisions and 108 agreements did
not.

J16 examines collective bargaining agreements for provisions which deal with discussions about the creation of new positions,

	Ńо.		Yes	No No	
AI BERTA	136		87	49	à :
SASKATCHEWAN	109	6.	2 -	107	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Eighty seven collective bargaining agreements from Alberta contained provisions calling for discussions or negotiations regarding the creation of new positions while 49 agreements did not require school boards to discuss or nego-

tiate the creation of new positions with the teachers' local association. Two collective agreements from Saskatchewap had J16 provisions and 107 did not

117 examines collective agreements for the presence of tenure, surplus and redundancy provisions.

J17: Tenure Surplus And Redundancy Provision

	No.	Yes		No '
ALBERTA	136	1		135
SASKATCHENAN	109		1	104

One Alberta agreement had tenure, surplus and redundancy provision while 135 agreements had no J17 provisions. Five agreements from Saskatchewan had J17 provisions while 104 did not have such provisions.

J18 examines the status of tenure, surplus and re-

J18: Tenure, Surplus and Redundancy
Provisions-Status

	No.	Missing	New 8	Unchanged	
ALBERTA	136	135-	1		
SASKATCHEWAN	109	104		5	

One hundred and thirty five Alberta and 104 Saskatchewan agreements had no Tenure, Surplus And Redundancy Provisions-Status provisions. One Alberta agreement had a new
Tenure, Surplus and Redundancy-Status provisions and Five
Saskatchewan agreements had retained their provisions unchanged.

J23 recognizes provisions which make school board

discretion the criteria for applying surplus/redundancy.

J23: Surplus And Redundancy Provisions-School Board Discretion

No.		Missing	Yes	, No
ALBERTA 13		135	1 ,	
SASKATCHEWAN 109	<b>ø</b> ·/	104	3	2

One handred and thirty five Alberta and 104 Saskatchewan agreements had J23 provisions missing. One Alberta
agreement stipulated that the surpfus/redundancy provisions
would be applied at the school board's discretion. Three
Saskatchewan agreements gave the school board the right to
use its discretion in applying surplus/redundancy provisions,
while two agreements did not give such adjscretionary powers
to school boards.

J24 examines "other" considerations which apply when surplus redundancy provisions are high into effect.

"other" than J19 through J23 provisions. One hundred and thirty five agreements had no such provisions and none of the Saskatchewan agreements had J24 provisions.

J47 examines provisions for weighting or priority scheme in determining surplus/redundancy decisions.

JA7: Weighting Or Priority Scheme

	No.	Missing	Yes
ALBERTA	136	135	1
SASKATCHEWAN	109	104	

One hundred and therety five Alberta and 104 Saskarchewan agreements had \$47 provisions missing. One Alberta agreement had Items specifying the weighting of priority scheme for determining surplus/redundancy decisions, while five Saskatchewan agreements had such provisions.

J67 examines provisions which provide for separation allowances for teachers affected by surplus/redundancy.

None of the Alberta agreements had any J67 provisions. Four Saskatchewan agreements provided for separation allowances while 105 agreements de la language J67 provisions.

J79 Ecognizes provisions which make surplus/re-

One Alberta collective bargaining agreement made surplus/redundancy an area for teacher/board discussion while 135 did not have such provisions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had J79 provisions.

# Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster J

The requency of Cluster J provisions in Alberta and Saskatchewan agreements is presented in Table 115. Several Cluster J fields of analysis provided by the instrument were not present in either province, a greements.

Seventeen fields of analysis recorded Cluster J provisions in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining
agreements. Table 115 shows that Alberta agreements contained
a greater scope of borgaining in Cluster J than did Saskatchewan agreements. Alberta teachers negotiated a greater number
of provisions in Jl (Vacancies, Postings And Transfers Affecting Teachers), J3 (Internal Advertising For Teachers Positions),

J4 (Internal Advertising For Positions Of Responsibility), J9 (Promotional Transfers), J10 (Teacher Initiated Transfers), J11 (Board Initiated Administrative sfers), J12 (eation Of New Positions), J14 (Travel and Relocation Costs), J16 (Creation Of New Position Discussions), J24 (Surplus Redundancy-Other Considerations) and J79 (Surplus/Redundancy Discussion) fields of analysis.

Saskatchewan teachers negotiated a greater number of provisions in J2 (Vacancies, Postings And Transfers Affecting Positions Of Responsibility), J17 (Tenure, Surplus And Redundancy Provisions), J18 (Tenure, Surplus And Redundancy Provisions-Status), J23 (Surplus And Redundancy Provisions-School Board Discretion), J47 (Weighting Or Priority Scheme), and J67 (Separation Allowance) fields of analysis.

Alberta agreements showed a greater scope of bargaining in eleven Cluster J fields of analysis while Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater scope of bargaining in
six Cluster J fields of analysis. In all, Alberta agreements
showed the presence of sakteen Cluster J provisions while
Saskatchewan agreements showed the presence of eleven Cluster
J, provisions.

The research question in reference to Cluster J items can be answered by stating that there were differences in the scope of bargained items under decentralized and c ralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978. Results indicated that Alberta teachers who bargained under a decentralized bargaining structure for Job Security And Tenure, Surplus And Redundancy Provious

TABLE 115
Percentage Of Agreements Containing
Cluster J Items

	ALBERTA	ago ano e no antigado actual a	and the second of	SA	SKATCHEWAN
J1	÷	7.35%		J1	4.59%
J2 :		8.09%		J2	8.26%
J3		5.88%		J3	0.00%
<b>4</b> 4		5.88%	900	J4 ,	0.00%
J9		1,.47%		Ј9	0.00%
, J10		22.79%		J10	0.00%
11.1	•	63.24%	<b>(2)</b>	<b>51,1</b>	2.75%
Jiz		64.717	***	J12.	4.59%
J14		50.00%	A C	J14	.92%
J16		6,3.97%	· day	<b>J</b> 16	1.83%
J17		.74%		J17	4.59%
J18	•	.74%		J18	4.59%
J23		. 74%	$\bigotimes_{i=1}^{n}$	♥ <sub>J23</sub>	2.75%
J24		. 74%		J24	0.00%
J47		.74%		J47	4.59%
J67		.00%		J67	3.67%
J79		.74%	<b>k</b> ,	J79	0.00%

were more successful than their Saskatchewan counterparts who bargained under a more centralized bargaining structure. Alberta agreements contained a greater scope of bargained items in the Cluster J field of analysis than Saskatchewan agreements.

# Cluster P: Other Provisions

Cluster P represents four distinct categories. Pl through P9 are fields of analysis which recognize grievance provisions. Pl0 through P13 recognize provisions which deal with anti-inflation board regulations. P14 through P18 are fields of analysis which deal with re-negotiation of collective bargaining clauses. P19 through P25 deal with general aspects.

Pl recognizes provisions which deal with the presence of a grievance procedure.

TABLE 116
P1: Grievance Procedure

	No.	Yes	No '
ALBERTA	136	133	3
SASKATCHEWAN	109	-58*	51

\*These grievance procedures appear in local agreements even though there is such a provision in the Saskatchewan provincial agreement.

One hundred and thirty three Alberta agreements had grievance procedures and three did not. Fifty eight Saskat-chewan agreements had grievance procedures while 51 did not (However, the Saskatchewan provincial agreement does provide grievance procedures for all Saskatchewan teachers).

P2 searches for specified time limits during which

grievances have to be filed.

TABLE 117
P2: Time Limits

	No.	Yes	No.	•
<b>A</b>	16	120	- 136	ALBERTA
	82	27*	109	SASKATCHEWAN
	82	27* greement sets a be presented f		SASKATCHEWAN "

One hundred and twenty Alberta agreements had specified time limits for grievance procedures while 16 did not.

Twenty seven of the Saskatchewan agreements had time limits evance procedures while 82 did not ( the Saskatchewan evance procedures while 82 did not ( the Saskatchewan evance procedures while 82 did not ( the Saskatchewan evance) be processed ).

P3 recognizes provisions which specifically provide for final arbitration and binding settlement of disputes.

TABLE 118
P3: Arbitration

	Bands aprec	Act.		
		No.	Yes 🤏	No
:	ALBERTA	136	124	12
	SASKATCHEWAN	109	29*	80
i	* The Saskatch	ewan provincial a ment of disputes.	greement provides	for final and

One hundred and twenty four Alberta agreements provided for final and binding settlement of disputes while 12 did not. Twenty nine Saskatchewan agreements called for binding arbitration while 80 did not (the Saskatchewan provincial agreement provides for binding arbitration.).

P4 is a field of analysis which recognizes three general types of grievance procedures.

# TABLE 119 P4: Type Of Grievance Procedure

	No.	Missing	Provincial Statute	Other Procedure		Reference gislation Regulation	Or
ALTA.	136	<b>12</b>	2	3	***	19	<del></del>
SASK.	109			109	-		* (

Twelve Alberta agreements did not have P4 provisions two followed procedures laid out in Alberta statutes, three agreements followed a procedure arrived at through collective bargaining and 119 agreements made reference to procedures set out in the Alberta Labour Act. All Saskatchewan teachers are covered by the Saskatchewan provincial agreement which sets down the arbitration procedure.

P7 is a field of lysis that recognizes provisions which provide for group grievances.

TABLE 120 P7: Group Grievances

-	No n	Yes	No
ALBERTA-	136	88	48
SASKATCHEWAN	109	27	82

Eighty eight Alberta agreements had provisions which allowed for group grievances and 48 did not have such provisions. Twenty seven Saskatchewan agreements allowed for group grievances while 82 had no P7 provisions.

P8. is a field of analysis that recognizes provisions which provide for grievance or interpretation, committees.

One hundred and thirty two Alberta collective bargaining agreements had grievance or interpretation committees while four agreements had no P8 provisions. Forty seven Saskchewan agreements confirmed grievance or interpretation committees while 62 agreements did not have such provisions.

P8: Grievance Or Interpretation Committees

1	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	132	4
SASKATCHEWAN	109	47	62,

P9 is a field of analysis that recognizes provision which have procedures for settling disputes outside the scope of the collective agreement.

P9: Settlement of Disputes Outside Collective Agreement

	₩	No.	Yes .	σ No
	ALBERTA	136	1	135
" -	SASKATCHEWAN	109	2	107

One Alberta agreement had provisions which set out procedures for settling disputes outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement while 135 did not have such provisions. Two Saskatchewan agreements had P9 provisions and 107 failed to show the presence of such provisions.

P10 is a field of analysis that recognizes the presence of provisions dealing with the A.I.B.

None of the Alberta agreements had P10 provisions. Four Saskatchewan agreements had provisions dealing with the A.I.B. while 105 collective bargaining agreements contained no provisions dealing with the A.I.B.

P12 recognizes provisions requiring reporting to the A.I.B.

None of the Alberta agreements 12 P12 provisions.

Only skatchewan agreement had reporting to the A.I.B. provisions while 108 did not have such provisions.

P13 field of analysis examines collective bargaining agreements for other than P11 and P12 provisions.

P13 field of analysis failed to discover any A.I.B.-related procedures in Alberta collective bargaining agreements. Three Saskatchewan agreements had "other" A.I.B.-related procedures in their provisions while 106 did not have P13 provisions.

P14 recognizes re-negotiation olauses in collective bargaining agreements.

None of the Alberta Llective argaining agreements had any P14 provisions. One Salatchewan agreement had renegotiation provisions and 108 agreements did not have P14 provisions.

P18 is a field of analysis which examines other than P15 through P17 provisions which are subject to re-negotiation.

The P18 field of analysis failed to discover any provisions in Alberta agreements. One Saskatchewan agreement had provisions other than P15 through P17 while 108 had no P18 provisions.

P19 examines collective bargaining agreements for management right provisions.

Fifty seven Alberta agreements had management rights provisions while 79 did not have such provisions. None of the Saskatchewan agreements had management rights provisions.

teacher/board liaison committees.

TABLE 123 P20: Teacher/Board Liaison Committees

	No.	Yes	No
ALBERTA	136	. 43	93
SASKATCHEWAN	109	6	103

Forty three Alberta agreements had provisions for teacher/board liaison committees while 93 agreements did not have such provisions. Six Saskatchewan agreements had teacher/board liaison committee provisions whate 103 agreements did not provide for such committees.

p P21 is a field of analysis which eight ex collective bargaining agreements for letters of interior memos of understanding.

TABLE 124
P21: Letters Of Intent/Memos
Of Understanding

No.	Yes	2	No	
ALBERTA 136	39	•	97	
SASKATCHEWAN 109	. 2		• 10.7	

Thirty nine Alberta collective bargaining agreements contained letters of intent/memos of understanding while 97 agreements did not have P21 provisions. Two Saskatchewan agreements had letters of intent/memos of understanding while 107 agreements did not address the P21 field of analysis.

P22 is a field of analysis which deals with commitments beyond the term of agreement.

TABLE 125
P22: > Commitment Beyond Term Of Agreement

<u> </u>	No.	Yes	No	
ALBERTA	136	16	120	•••••
SASKATCHEWAN	109	4	105	

The P22 field of analysis found provisions in 16

Alberta agreements and failed to discover any such provisions in 120 collective bargaining agreements. Four Saskatchewan agreements contained a commitment beyond the term of the agreement while 105 agreements did not contain P22 provisions.

P23 recognizes provisions which specify the method of payment.

P23: Method Of Payment

	No.		Yes	· •	Ν̈́ο	<b>A</b>
ALBERTA	136		6 9.		57	10/2 -
SASKATCHEWAN	109	g.	,109	/ <sup>U</sup>		,

Seventy nine Alberta agreements contained methods of payment provisions while 57 had no P23 provisions. All 109 Saskatchewan agreements had method of payment provisions.

P24 is a field of analysis which deals with professional development days provisions.

P24: Professional Development Days

•	_		•		No.		Ye	3	N	0	#
	ALB	ERTA	^	0	136		2.	•		113	
	SAS	KATĊI	HEWA	N ,	109		109	)			

Twenty three Alberta agreements had specific provisions allowing for professional development days while 113 did not have P24 provisions. (All 109 Saskatchewan agreements

had P24 provisions.

P25 is a field of analysis dealing with local check-off dues.

None of the Alberta collective bargaining agreements contained P25 provisions. Five Saskatchewan agreements had provisions dealing with local check-off dues while 104 Saskatchewan agreements did not compain P25 provisions.

Scope Of Bargaining In Cluster P

The frequency of Cluster P provisions in Alberta and Saskatchewan agreements is presented in Table 128. Several fields of analysis available in the instrument were not present in either province's agreements.

visions in Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. Table 128 indicates that Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater scope of bargaining in Cluster P than did Alberta agreements. Saskatchewan teachers megotiated a greatinumber of provisions in Pl (Grievance Procedure), P2 Limits), P3 (Arbitration), P4 (Type Of Grievance Procedure), P9 (Settlement Of Disputes Outside Collective Agreement), P10 (A.I.B. Provisions), P12 (Reporting of A.I.B.)
P13 (Other A.I.B. Related Procedures), P14 (Re-Negotiation Clauses), )18 (Other Re-Negotiation Provisions), P23 (Method Of Payment), P24 (Professional Development Days), and P25 (Local Check-Off Dues) fields of analysis.

Alberta teachers negotiated a greater number of provisions in P7(Group Grievance), P8 (Grievance Or Inter-pretation Committees), P19 (Management Rights), P20 (Teacher/

TABLE 128
Percentage Of Agreements Containing
Cluster P Items

	ALBERTA	SA	SKATCHEWAN
P 1	97.79%	P1	100.00%
P 2	88.24%	P 2	100.00%
P 3	91.18%	P 3	100.00%
P 4	91.18%	a P4	100.00%
P 7	64.71%	P 7	24.77%
P8 🕈	97.06%	Р8	43.12%
P 9	.74%	Р9	1.83%
P10	0.00%	) P10	3.67%
P12	0.00%	P12	.92%
P13	0.00% ÷	P13	2.75%
P14 ·	0.00%	P14	.92%
P18	0.00%	P18	.92%
P19	41.91%	P19	0.00%
P20.	31.62%	P 2 0	5.50%
P 2 1	28.68%	P21	1.83%
P 2 2	11.76%	P 2 2	3.67%
P 2 3	,58.09%	P 2 3	100.00%
P 2 4	16.91%	P 2 4	100.00%
P 2 5	0.00%	P 2 5	4.59%

Board Liaison Committees), P21 (Letters Of Intent/Memos) Of Understanding) and P22 (Commitment Beyond Term Of Agreement) fields of analysis.

Alberta agreements showed a greater scope of bargaining in six Cluster P fields of analysis while Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater scope of bargaining in 13 Cluster P fields of analysis. Alberta agreements showed the presence of thirteen Cluster P provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained eighteen such provisions.

The research question can thus be answered by stating that there were differences in the scope of bargained items under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978. Results indicate that Saskatchewan teachers who bargained under a more centralized bargaining structure for general or other provisions were more successful than their Alberta collegues who bargained under a decentralized bargaining structure. Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater scope of bargained items than did the Alberta agreements.

gained as concluded for the 1978 period of employment by Alberta and Saskatchewan teachers. The figures indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating items in Clusters F, L, W and J, while Saskatchewan teachers were more successful in Clusters D, P and P. An examination of the provisions also revealed that provisions negotiated by Alberta teachers affect, both potentially and actually, a greater number of teachers than provisions negotiated by Saskatchewan

TABLE 129
Summary: Number Of Provisions Recognized
By Fields Of Analysis In Each Cluster

Cluster	Alberta	Total	Saskatchewan
	a b	С	a b
D	6(14)	<b>19</b>	7 (14)
F	10*(14)*	19	4 ( 4)
R	0(11)	16	. 14(10)
L	33(52)	5 4	21(47)
W	27(29)	30	3(11)
J	11(16)	17	6(1,1)
P	6(13)	19	13(18)
Total	83 149	174	68 121

- Greater percentage of agreements containing such provisions.
- Number of such provisions in each province's agreements.
- c) Total number of such provisions in collective bargaining agreements from Alberta and Saskatche-wan.
- \*) Provisions which were not present in Saskatchewan agreements due to that province's universal health and welfare programs were also not counted in the Alberta totals.

teachers. Indeed, provisions found in Clusters F, L and W represent greater cost items than those found in Clusters D, R and P.

The research question can be answered by stating that there were differences in the scope of bargained items under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978. Overall results indicate that Alberta teachers who bargained under a decentralized bargaining structure were more successful than Saskatchewan teachers who bargained under a more centralized structure. Alberta agreements overall contained a greater scope of bargained items than did Saskatchewan agreements.

#### SUMMARY

In the presentation and anlysis of data, Chapter V offers evidence that there were differences in the Salary Cluster of Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. The majority of Alberta teachers were covered by collective bargaining agreements which gave them higher salaries than those provided by the Saskatchewan provincial agreement. Indeed, average salaries were more than two percent (2.67%) higher in Alberta than in Saskatchewan. This figure reflects a historical relationship in that a study utilizing 1968 collective bargaining agreements indicated more than a two percent (2.68%) difference in Alberta's favour (Muir, 1970b:305).

Cluster D results indicated that Saskatchewan teachers were more successful in negotiating Direct Salary Related items.

Six direct salary related provisions were found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements and seven direct salary related provisions were found in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements. Agreements from both provinces showed that they contained 14 direct salary related provisions respectively. In Cluster D. 19 provisions were recorded in the collective agreements from Alberta and Saskatchewan.

Cluster F fields of analysis indicated that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating Health and Welfare items. Ten insured benefit provisions were found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements and four such provisions were found in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements. The collective bargaining agreements indicated that 14 insured benefit provisions were successfully negotiated by Alberta teachers while Saskatchewan teachers were able to negotiate four such provisions. In all the agreements for the two provinces contained 19 F provisions.

The R Cluster revealed that no R provision was found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Fourteen Saskatchewan agreements had a greater percentage of R provisions than Alberta agreements. Saskatchewan teachers were more successful in negotiating Cumulative Sick Leave/Retirement Gratuity items than Alberta teachers. Overall, the collective bargaining agreements indicated that eleven R provisions were found in Alberta agreements and sixteen R provisions were found in Saskatchewan provisions.

Overall, 16 R provisions were recorded in the collective agreements.

1:

Cluster L results indicated that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating Leave items. Thirty three leave provisions were found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements and 21 such L provisions were found in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements. The collective bargaining agreements also indicated that Alberta agreements had 52 L provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained 47 L provisions out of 54 L provisions found collectively in the agreements.

Cluster W results indicated that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating Staffing/Workload items.

Twenty seven W provisions were found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements and three W provisions were found in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements. The collective bargaining agreements overall results indicate that Alberta agreements contained 29 W provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained 11 such provisions. In all 30 W provisions were found in the two provincial sets of agreements.

Alberta collective bargaining agreements contained a higher percentage of 11 Cluster J provisions while Saskat-chewan agreements contained a higher percentage of six other Cluster J provisions. Of the seventeen Cluster J provisions Alberta agreements had 16 provisions and Saskatchewan agreements had 11 such provisions appear in the agreements. Alberta teachers were more successful in achieving a greater scope of bargained items in Cluster J than their Saskatchewan

counterparts.

chers were more successful in bargaining for general or Other items. Six Cluster P provisions were present in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Thirteen Cluster P provisions were present in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements. Of the nineteen P provisions found in the collective bargaining agreements, Alberta agreements contained 13 while Saskatchewan contained 18 such provisions.

This study's overall results show that there were differences in the scope of bargained items under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures used respectively in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978. The analysis of salaries and the seven clusters of fields indicates that teachers'who bargained under a decentralized structure were more successful than those who bargained under a more centralized structure.

Of the 174 provisions in the collective agreements, Alberta teachers successfully negotiated 149 provisions as opposed to the 121 provisions negotiated by Saskatchewan teachers. Alberta agreements also contained a greater percentage of 83 provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained a greater percentage of 68 other provisions. It therefore seems that the decentralized bargaining structure used in Alberta is a more appropriate bargaining method for teachers than the more centralized bargaining structure used in Saskatchewan.

Chapter V presented the findings of the investigation. The main purpose of this chapter is to draw together the most important points from the findings and to discuss their meaning and significance in terms of the research model and the problem:

Are there any differences in the scope of bargained items in collective bargaining agreements as bargained under decentralized and centralized bargaining structures in the probinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978 respectively?

This Chapter presents a summary of the study, conclusions reached from it and recommendations regarding decentralized and centralized bargaining procedures.

#### I SUMMARY

Chapter I presented the problem from which the research question was generated. Chapter II set down a conceptual framework which facilitates a logical plane from which this study proceeded. Chapter III presented evidence compatible with the model discussed in Chapter II in order to offer defendable positions for examining the bargained outcomes of the Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements. Chapter IV presented the research methodology employed. In the presentation and analysis of the data, Chapter V offers evidence that decentralized and centralized collective bargaining as pursued in Alberta and Saskatchewan does show differences in the bargained outcomes. Decentralized bargaining seems to be more conducive in effecting a broader scope of targained

items than 'centralized bargaining.

## The Objectives Of The Study

The objectives of this study were to investigate whether any relationship existed in the negotiated items in written collective bargaining agreements between teachers and school boards in a province where bargaining was pursued at the local or decentralized level (as in Alberta) and a province where bargaining was pursued at a more centralized level (as in Saskatchewan).

## Sampling Procedure

Collective bargaining agreements of all one hundred and thirty six (136) teacher locals in the Province of Alberta for the year 1978 were obtained from the Alberta Teachers' Association. One hundred and nine (109) local agreements plus the master agreement from Saskatchewan were obtained from the Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation. Two hundred and fourty five (245) sets of collective bargaining agreements, representing the total number of agreements concluded in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1978, were obtained for the purpose of this study. The study sample thus included the entire population of agreements.

#### The Instrument

The instrument used in this study was the Ontario Education Relations Commission instrument which was specifically developed for analysis of collective bargaining agreements in education. An extensive review of literature and research convinced this researcher that the Ontario instru-

ment was appropriate for the purpose of this study. This conviction was strengthened when the instrument recognized all items in the summaries of Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements for the year 1978.

# Analysis Of Data

Minimum, maximum and mean salary levels in six categories, as well as over all provincial average salaries (percentages) are contrasted and compared in order to discern
whether any differences existed between Alberta and Saskatchewan teachers' salaries.

Frequency distributions and percentages were used to report the findings of the seven Clusters of fields of analysis which comprise the "Non-Grid Substantive Elements" of collective bargaining agreements.

## Findings

The results of the investigation are as follows:

- 1. The Salary Cluster revealed that a historical relationship between Alberta and Saskatchewan "average" salaries was maintained overea ten year time span. The fact that Alberta uses decentralized bargaining and Saskatchewan uses centralized bargaining has not resulted in changing the relationship between teachers' salaries in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Over all Alberta average salaries were 2 point six seven percent (2.67%) higher than Saskatchewan salaries.
  - 2. Cluster D Direct Salary Related Cluster results

revealed that six Cluster D provisions (D3 through D5, D33 through D35) appeared in a greater percentage of collective bargaining agreements in Alberta than in Saskatchewan. Seven other Cluster D provisions (D23, D25, D28 through D32) appeared in a greater percentage of collective bargaining agreements.

Cluster D: Direct Salary Related Cluster results indicate that Saskatchewan teachers were more successful than Alberta teachers in negotiating with their employers. However, the majority of teachers do not benefit from such provisions which deal with allowances for positions of responsibility. Cluster D results also indicate that the two provinces are not really far apart in teachers' ability to negotiate such provisions.

3. Cluster F: Health and Welfare Cluster revealed that in Alberta ten Cluster F provisions (F1 through F5, F12 through F14, F17 through F19, F23, F24, F32 and F33) are present in a greater percentage of collective bargaining agreements than in Saskatchewan. In Saskatchewan four F provisions (F21, F22, F25 and F26) are present in a greater percentage of agreements than in Alberta.

Cluster F: Health and Welfare Cluster results indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful

than Saskatchewan teachers in negotiating with their employers. Cluster F items represent provisions which cover all teachers party to a collective agreement. Insured benefit programs such as extended health plans and long term disability plans were completely void in Saskatchewan agreements.

4. Cluster R: Cumulative Sick Leave and Retirement Gratuity Cluster indicate that 14 Cluster R provisions (R3 through R8, R10 through R17) were present in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Cluster R: Cumulative Sick Leave And Retirement Gratuity Cluster results indicate that Saskatchewan teachers were more successful than Alberta teachers in negotiating with their employers. Cluster R items represent provisions which cover all teachers.

5. Cluster L: Leaves Cluster indicates that 33
Cluster L provisions (L1 through L5, L7, L8, L14, L16,
L17, L19, L25, L28, L2, L32, L38 through L42, L47
through L49, L51 through L57, L59, L61, and L62) found
greater expression in Alberta agreements than in
Saskatchewan agreements. Twenty one L provisions (L6,
L9, L10, L18, L20 through L22, L26, L30, L33 through
L37, L43 through L46, L50, L60 and L63) were found in
a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than
in Alberta agreements.

**(** 

Cluster L: Leaves Cluster results indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful than Saskat-chewan teachers in negotiating with their employers. Cluster L items represent provisions which cover all teachers under contract.

6. Cluster W Staffing/Workload Cluster revealed that 27 Cluster W provisions (W1 through W8, W13 through W43, W47 through W49 and W52) found expression in a greater percentage of Alberta collective bargaining agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Three W provisions (W28, W37 and W51) found expression in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Cluster W: Staffing/Workload Cluster results indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful than Saskatchewan teachers in negotiating with their employers. Cluster W items represent provisions which cover all teachers under contract.

7. Cluster J: Job Security Cluster indicated that 11 Cluster J provisions (J1, J3, J4, J9 through J12, J14, J16, J24 and J79) found greater expression in Alberta collective bargaining agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Six J provisions (J2, J17, J18, J23, J47 and J67) were present in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Cluster J: Job Security Cluster results indicated that Alberta teachers were more successful than Saskatchewan teachers in negotiating with their employers. Cluster J items represent provisions which cover all teachers under contract.

8. Cluster P: Other Provisions Cluster found that six Cluster P provisions (P7, P8, P19 and P20 through P22) found expression in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements than in Saskatchewan agreements. Fourteen P provisions (P1 through P4, P9, P10, P12 through P14, P18 and P23 through P25) were found in a greater percentage of Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements than in Alberta agreements.

Cluster P: Other Cluster which deals with general provisions showed that Saskatchewan teachers were more successful than Alberta teachers in negotiating with their employers. The majority of Cluster P items are procedural in nature dealing mostly with such provisions as grievance process, liaison committees and other general provisions.

Most provisions found in Cluster P seldom affect a large number of teachers in any jurisdiction.

9. The instrument recognized 174 provisions in the agreements from Alberta and Saskatchewan. Eighty three provisions were found in a greater percentage of Alberta agreements while 68 provisions found a greater

expression in Saskatchewan agreements. Alberta agreements contained a total of 149 provisions while Saskatchewan agreements contained a total of 121 provisions.

# II CONCLUSIONS

Muir's contention that "it appears hardly worth the time, effort or cost involved for teachers and trustees to go through the collective bargaining ritual each year at the local level" (Muir, 1971a:143) seems to have been in part substantiated by this study. Percentage figures indicate that in 1968-69 Alberta average salaries for teachers were two point six eight percent (2.68%) higher than in Saskatchewan (Muir, 1970b: 305). In 1978 Alberta average salaries were two point six seven percent (2.67%) higher than Saskatchewan salaries. In other words, Alberta teachers have been no more successful in negotiating salaries at the local levels than Saskatchewan teachers have been at the provincial level (yet retaining the traditional percentage difference in Alberta's favour).

Muir's argument however, seems to hold true for salary matters only. Upon examining the seven clusters which deal with non-salary matters, differences between Alberta and Saskatchewan collective bargaining agreements become apparent. Four of the seven clusters indicate that Alberta teachers were more successful in negotiating with their employers.

Clusters F, L, W and J provisions (more successfully negotiated by Alberta teachers) covered a greater number of

teachers than did provisions found in Cluster D, R and P (more successfully negotiated by Saskatchewan teachers). The findings also indicate that the Alberta set of Clusters mentioned above represent greater cost items or cover larger number of teachers than the Saskatchewan set of clusters.

wan teachers barely do better in negotiating with their employers than Alberta teachers and that Cluster R (with the exception of Cumulative Sick Leave) represents items which neither Alberta nor Saskatchewan teachers consider paramount in their bargaining outcomes take on a greater significance.

Alberta teachers have consistently been able to negotiate greater benefits than their Saskatchewan counterparts. This study has substantiated Dunlop's argument that "...wage rules and other rules are not two separate boxes; there is a single highly inter-related body of rules in an industrial relations system" (Dunlop, 1951:387). It seems that once salary and related matters are negotiated at the provincial level, Saskatchewan teachers are less able to negotiate separately for provisions found in the seven clusters at the local level. Alberta teachers on the other hand have not separated their bargaining efforts into "two separate boxes" and seem to have thereby, been more successful in negotiating for a greater scope of bargained items.

The findings of this study do not support province-wide bargaining, as practiced in Saskatchewan, a consideration worthy for the A.T.A. to pursue. Weiler's prediction that

decentralized bargaining is not beneficial to employers and "...indeed in the long term, they will pay a lot more if the practice of 'leap-frogging' becomes habitual" (Weiler, 1976: 136) seems to have been demonstrated by the present study.

Since, the scope of negotiations, which involves the num and types of items that may be subject to employer-employee discussions and negotiations, is one of the most critical issues in contemporary labour-management relations in the public sector (Advisory Commission on Inter-Governmental Relations, 1969:76), it would be advisable to heed Giandomenico's warning (1973:258) that teachers become increasingly militant as the scope of collective bargaining is narrowed or limited.

"Restricting the scope of bargaining may not permit teachers to develop their individual discretionary judgement but instead relegate them to status as bureaucratic functionaries and force them to find means...to satisfy their needs for autonomy and self-actualization.

Collective bargaining could be viewed as a tool by which obstacles preventing higher and lower order need-fulfillment among teachers were removed (Giandomenico, 1973:259)."

If bargaining activity is evidence of an areas' importance, then Alberta teachers found Health and Welfare, Leaves, Staffing/Workload and Job Security provisions more important than Saskatchewan teachers. Saskatchewan teachers seem to have found Direct Salary Related, Cumulative Sick Days and Retirement Gratuity, and General provisions more important than Alberta teachers. It should also be noted that the four sets of clusters more successfully negotiated by Alberta teachers cover a greater number of teachers than the three sets of clus-

ters more successfully negotiated by Saskatchewan teachers.

In his managerial theory, Chamberlain states,
"...the nature of the bargaining process is explainable in terms appropriate to its business decisions" (Chamberlain, 1951:130).

It is a functional relationship in which the union joins with the employer in reaching decisions on matters in which both have vital interests. Since the scope of bargained items is more narrow in Saskatchewan teachers in that province seem to have less control over "decisions...(of) vital interests" than Alberta teachers.

## III RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of this study seem to indicate that decentralized collective bargaining is a more viable method, in terms of scope of bargained items, than centralized collective bargaining. If Muir's (1970b) study was correct, in stating among other things, that Alberta and Saskatchewan teachers were able to secure highly similar collective bargaining agreements in 1968 when both teachers' organizations bargained with their employers at the local level, then the results of this study may indeed be the consequence of a change in the Saskatchewan bargaining structure.

An interpretation of this research is that teachers in Alberta ought to continue to bargain in a decentralized fashion since Alberta collective bargaining agreements show the presence of a greater scope of bargained items than was achieved by Saskatchewan teachers (who bargain in a more centralized fashion). Also the framework utilized in this study seems to provide theoretically and operationally useful

guidelines for further research in this area.

Further research along the lines of the present study seems imperative. A replication of this study in 1982 might reveal trends in the scope of bargained items as negotiated over a five year period. This seems necessary since the Muir study (1970b) did not utilize any instrument because its main objective was to compare teachers salaries and results of non-salary provisions were based on the researchers general interpretation of his data.

Further research is also needed in order to assess Giandomenico's (1973:258) warning that teachers become increasingly militant as the scope of collective bargaining is narrowed or limited. A five year study (1978-1982) of teachers' strikes and arbitration, mediation and conciliation cases in might shed additional light on the importance of scope of bargained items to teachers.

The outcome measure used in this study is measured at one point in time, but it reflects the accumulated outcomes of all previous bargains between the parties. An important issue for future research, therefore, is the extent to which this type of model is capable of predicting changes in the terms of a collective agreement that occur in any single round of negotiations.

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# APPENDIX A

# Letter From Joe Berlando



June 29, 1979

Mr Gus Rozycki 94 Glamorgan Drive Sherwood Park T8A 2Y8

Dear Mr Rozycki,

This is further to discussions which we have had respecting the study you are doing.

The 1978 ARA referred two resolutions to Provincial Executive Council respecting working conditions for Alberta teachers. A decision was made by Council that we proceed to do a survey to determine such things as class size, instruction time, split grades and supervision time.

There is a distinct possibility that the results of your study may appreciably add to the information which we receive. We look forward to your completed document.

Sincerely yours,

J F Berlando Coordinator

Teacher Welfare

jfb/vl

APPENDIX B1
Letter From Dr. Ed Aim



Education Relations Commission

Telephone 416/922-7679-

111 Avenue Road Suite 400 Toronto, Ontario M5R 3J8

1979 06 27

Mr. G. Rozycki
Department of Educational Administration
College of Education
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta

Dear Mr. Rozycki:

Enclosed please find a copy of each of the coding forms presently used to analyze teacher/school board collective agreements in this Province.

I trust these will be of assistance. I also wish you well in your academic undertaking and would appreciate being able to include a copy of your dissertation in our library upon its completion.

Sincerely yours,

EM. Cei

E. M. Aim Director Research Services

/ag Encls.

# APPENDIX B2

Letter From Sharon McElroy



Education Relations Commission

Telephone 416/922-7679

111 Avenue Road Suite 400 Tóronto, Ontario M5R 3J8

1980 01 23

Mr. Gus Rozycki 94 Glamorgan Drive Sherwood Park Alberta T8A 2Y8

Dear Mr. Rozycki:

As requested, I have enclosed a copy of the User's Guide to ERCFILEA and ERCFILEB. I apologise for the condition of the guide - the files are being modified on a regular basis to keep pace with the trends in bargaining.

Please note that ERCFILEA has been expanded to include A, Y and B variables. These data have been acquired from the Ontario Ministry of Education's June Board Report, reporting information (\$ and number of recipients) relating to salaries for "off-grid personnel, allowances recâdved by "on-grid" personnel and employee benefits. I have attached a copy of Page Type 7 of the June Board Report which details the type of information collected, and a copy of the Education Relations Commission's Monograph #12: Compensation Statistics which has been generated from the 1978-79 data.

I hope this information helps to clarify matters for you. If you have any question or wish additional information please do not hesitate to call.

Yours sincerely,

Shaw In Elevy

Sharon McElroy Research Specialist

/ag Enclosures

# APPENDIX C

Ontario Education Relations Commission

Forms For Coding Grid and Non-Grid

Substantive Elements of Collective Agreements Between Teachers and School Boards

(1) · · · · ·	214
SPSS Var.	IDENTIFICATION COLUMN NO.
Name	
	Card #
v1	
. V.L	SCHOOL BOARD 4.5
N.	
V 2	AIB Status: Pre 1
	Post 2
· ·	(no modifications) Post 3
•	(modifications) 8
•••	
<b>V3</b>	Term: 1 Year
	2 Years-Yr. 1 2 2 Years-Yr. 2 3
!	3 Years-Yr. 1
L.	3 Years-Yr. 2 5
•	3 Years-Yr. 3 6 8 Months 8
	8 Months 8 20 Months 9
<b>V</b> 4	Agreement
	Year: 1975-76 1 1976-77 2
-	1977-78
	1978-79
	1979-80
•	© 1980-81 6 1981-82 7
	1982–683
	1983-84 9 10/
<b>V</b> 5	Board
<b>+ -</b>	Type: Elementary 1
	Secondary 2
	RCSS 3
<b>c</b>	Other 4 11
<b>V</b> 6	Ministry Northwestern 1
,	Region Midnorthern 2
• 1	1969-1977 Northeastern 3
	Western 4 Midwestern 5
	Niagara 6
•	Central 7
	Eastern 8
	Ottawa Valley 9 12
,	

<b>v</b> .7	Economic			•
•	Region	Eastern	0	•.
		Lake Ontario	, ĭ	
	-	Central .	2	
<u>.</u>	F	Niagara	3	
-		Lake Erie	4	
	*	Lake St. Clair	5	
	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	Midwestern	6	1
•		Georgian Bay	7	,
	•	Northeastern	8	•
•		Lakehead-	ŭ	0
		Northwestern	9	13
	•		€3.	. 13
₹8				16-20
	Enrolment	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	•	•		
V 9		·-	,	22-25
	No. of Tes	chers		
V10	Grid Týpe:	Single	1	
	,,	Sept-Dec/Jan-Aug	2	*
•		Sept-Jan/Feb-Aug	<u> </u>	•
•		Sept-Feb/Mar-Aug	4	•
		Other	5	
		Sept-Mar/Apr-Aug	· 6	21
r				
V11, V12	•			
· 9 V 1 4	Date Agree	mont Stoned	Year	31
	Angre WRies	ment Signed	Month	32, 33
•	• •			

105		Column No.	1-5	٠ ١.	6-10	11-15	16-20	21–25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	76-50	51-55	26-60	,
numbers:S1-S105		ر (Card 8)		Cat.A4												
Variable	(	(Card 7)		Cat.A3	•				;						-	
-	S	(Card 6)		Cat.A2										0		٥
	, o	Card	10.	Cat.Al												•
•	d Distribution	(Card 4)	W.	Cat.B		d										
y	Grid D	2) (Card 3)		Cat.C								March 1				
		(Card 2)		Cat.D											-	

			9
02-99	71-75	76-80	u
			2013 64 103
			861 10 875 876 10 890
	6		861 10 875
			S46 to S60
	,		S31 to 845
			S16 to S30
			S1 to S15
12	13	14 ,	
/			

SPSS Var. • Name	DIRECT SALARY RE	LATED (Card 2)	COLUMN NO.
A		Board # Card #	1-3 4,5
	Placement		•
<b>D1</b>	l. If elementary QECO designating.	or RCSS agreemen	t, tion
	QECO 2 or 2 r	evised 2	
•	QECO 3	3	* *
4	QECO 3 with \$		•
4	qualificatio	ns 4	7
*	Outlined in a	greement 7	,
	Both 2 and 3	8	
	Not specified	·	
D 2	2. If secondary certification  OSSTF 3 OSSTF 4 OSSTF 5 Outlined in a Not specified	3 4 5 greement 7	, 8
<b>D3</b>	3. Is there recor	gnition for relate	ed .
	Tagahina1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•
	Teaching only		
4	Non-teaching of Both Teaching	only 2	
•	Non-teaching	• • <u> </u>	9
÷	Non-teaching	3	
	No	4	
D4	Placement Discussi	on	
	1. Is placement a	n area for	
	teacher/board	discussion?	
			***
		Yes 1	No 10
		ī	10

```
D5
             Lump Sum Payment (other than COLA)
                 Is there a provision for a
                 lump sum payment (other than
                 COLA)?
                                               Yes
                                                               11
 D6
             COLA
                 Is there a Cost-of-Living
                 provision (COL)?
                                               Yes
                                                    No
                                                    2
                             Not in effect
                                                    3
                                                               12
D7
                 If yes, does the provision contain
                 a cost-of-living allowance (COLA)?
                 Lump Sum
                                                amt.
                 Variable .amount
                                                 9998
                 Combination
                                                9999
                 No allowance provided
                                                            13-16
                                                8888
D8
                Does the COLA have a "fold-in"
                 feature?
                Yes - no trigger, no cap
                Yes - cap, but no trigger
Yes - trigger, but no cap
                Yes - both trigger and cap 4
                /No
                                                               17 -
D9
                Does the COLA have a trigger?
                                                              18
D10
            5.
                If yes, and trigger is CPI
                percentage increase, what
                is it?
                                                           19-22
D11
                If yes, and trigger is CPI
                points increase, what is it?
```

23 - 26

D12	7. Is there a "cap"?	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Yes (ind., incl. lump sum) 1 Yes (group) 2 No 3	27
D13	8. If yes, and cap is a CPI percentage, what is it?	
4		28-31
D14	9. If yes, and cap is CPI points, what is it?	32-35
D15	10. If yes, and cap is a dollar amount, what is it? (\$)	32-33
		36-39
D16.	<pre>11. Does the COLA apply to    items other than salary    grid? (eg. allowances)</pre>	
	Yes 1 No, or not specified 2	40
	COLA Discussion	
<b>D17</b>	1. Is COLA an area for teacher/ board discussion?	
	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}  \frac{\text{No}}{2}$	41

63,64

# Graduate Degree Allowances (highest \$ amt. paid)

D18, 19 1. Can graduate degree allowance pierce salary category maximum?

Other

,	Tchs. Prin/VP's	
, ,	Yes 1 1	•
	No 2 1 2	•
	Not spe ified 3	
	Agreement does	
	not contain	
	allowance or it	
٥	does not apply	
•	to principals/	
	vice/prin. 4 4	42-43
D20	2. Master's Degree	54-57
D21	3. PHD or Second Master's	58-61
	Principal and Vice Principal Salaries	`
D22 22	1 Nothed of nevert for Bringing!	
D22, 23	1. Method of payment for Principal and Vice Principal salaries	
	Princ. V.P.	
1	Teacher grid plus	
	allowance 1 1	
	Separate grid	,
	(incl. fixed grid,	
	position plus	
	allowance) 2 2	
	Combination of	<b>.</b> .
	above 3 3	
	(V.P.) Percent of	
	Principal - 4	
	Flat \$ amount 5 4	
•		(0 (1

6

D24, D25 2. If teacher grid, criteria for allowance

	Princ.	<u>v.p.</u>	
No differentiation			
in \$ amount	1	1	
Years of experience			
only	2	2	• 1
Years exp. and		<b>-</b>	
qualifications			
(excl. graduate		ø	•
degree)	3	. 3	+ 1,
School type and/or	J		$\cdot$ . The second secon
size	4/	4	
School type/size	7	4	
and years exp.	5	5	•
School type/size	ر	)	
and qualifications	4	6	
School type/size,	Ų	O	
years experience			
and qualifications	7	-	
Other	. /	<u>/</u> .	
ocher.	8	8	65,66
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			·

#### D26, D27

# 3. If separate grid, criteria for placement

	Princ.	<u>V.P.</u>
Years of experience		
only	1	1
Years of experience		,
and qualifications	2	2
Years of experience		
and school type/siz	e 3	3
Years of experience		
school type/size an	đ	
qualifications	4	4
Years of experience		
and per class/per		
teacher/per school		:
allowance	5	<b>5</b> )
Years of experience		
per class/per		
teacher/per school	, n ,	
allowance and		
qualifications	6	6
ther	7	<b>`</b> 7

67,68

#### Expense/Travel Allowances

D28, D29,

1. Is there an expense allowance provision for:

	Yes	No	
Principals and/or V.P's	$\overline{1}$	2	6.9
Responsibility or			
designated positions	ĺ	2	70
All teachers	1	2	71

D31

2. If there is a mileage allowance provision, what is it (\$\per mile)\$?

72,73

#### Allowance Discussion

D32

1. Are there allowances (other than COLA) an area for teacher/board discussion?

$$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1} \frac{\text{No}}{2} \qquad \qquad 74$$

#### Grandfathering-Graduate Degrees

D33

1. Is there a provision for phasing out the payment of any or all Graduate Degree Allowances?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$   $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

75

#### Position of Responsibility

D34

 Is there provision for allowances for administration positions (ie. dept. heads, curricular directors, etc)

$$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$$
  $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

76

### Other Training

D35 Is there provision for recognition of other forms of formal training for allowance purposes?

Yes	No	
1	2 ~	7

SPSS	HEALTH AND WELFARE	• .	(Card 10)
Var. Name		(	COLUMN NO.
7	Board # Card #		1-3 4,5
•	AHC or SASK. HOSPITALIZATION		•
F1	1. Board contribution (%) (200 = flat \$ amt./ind.) (400 = flat \$ amt./group)		8-10
	Semi-Private		· ·
F2	2. Board contribution (%) (200 = flat \$ amt./ind.)		11-13
	(300 = no coverage) (400 = flat \$ amt./group)	· ·	
	Extended Health Plan		<b>à</b>
F3	1. Provision		
	$\frac{\mathbf{Y} \mathbf{\epsilon}}{1}$	No 2	15
F4	2. Participation		
	Voluntary 1 Compulsory 2 Unstated 3		16
F.5	3. Board Contribution (%) (200 = flat \$ amt./ind)		
	(400 = flat \$ amt./group)		17-19

```
Drug Plan
                Rrovision
F6
                                              Yes
                                                              21
                Participation
F7
                                 Voluntary
                                Compulsory
                                              2
                                  Unstated
                                                              22
F8
            3. Board Contribution (%)
                (200 = flat $ amt./ind.)
                (400 = flat \$ amt./group)
                                                           23-25
            Vision Care Plan
                Provision.
                                             Yes
                                                    2
                                                             27
F10
            2.
                Participation |
                                Voluntary
                                             1
                                ompulsory
                                             2
                                 Unstated
                                                              28
                                             3
F11
                Board contribution (%)
                (200 = flat $ amt./ind.)
                (400 = flat \$ amt./group)
                                                          29 - 31
            Dental Plan
F12
                Provision
                                      Yes
                                             1.
                                       No
                     Under consideration '
                                                             33
              Participation
F13
                                Voluntary
                               Compulsory
                     Under consideration
                                                             34
F14
                Board Contribution (%)
                (200 = flat $ amt./ind.)
                (400 = flat $ amt./group)
                                                          35 - 37
```

```
F15
                 Is institution of plan related
                 to some other plan agreement?
                                                             38
 F16
                 Name of Plan
                               not selected)
            Long Term Disability Plan (LTDP)
 F17
            1. Provision
                                                             42
 F18
                Participation
            2.
                                Voluntary
                               Compulsory
                               Unstated
                                                             43
F19
                Board contribution (%)
                (200 = flat $ amt./ind.)
                (400 = flat $ amt./group)
                                                          44-46
F20
                Name of Plan
                         (99 = not selected)
                                                          47,48
            Group Insurance Plan
F21
                Provision
                                                            50
F 2 2
                Participation
                                Voluntary
                              Compulsory
                                            2
                                 Unstated
F23
           3.
               Selector(s)
                             - Board
                                            1
                              Teachers
                                            2
                              Bilateral
                                            3
                              Unstated
                                                            52
```

```
F24
                  Does the Group Insurance Plan
                   include coverage for Dependant
                  Life (D.L.) and/or Accidental
                  Death and Dismemberment (A.D.D.)?
                                  D.L. Only
                                  A.D.D. Only
                                                2 .
                                  Both D.L.
                                   and A.D.D.
                                                3
                                 D.L. is
                                   covered
                                  elsewhere
                                 A.D.D. is
                                  covered
                                  elsewhere -
                                 Both are
                                  covered
                                                             م ال<sub>يان</sub>ية
مارين
                                  elsewhere
                                 No mention
                                  of either in.
                                  agreement
                                                               . 53
 SPSS
             HEALTH AND WELFARE
                                                         (Card 11)
 Var.
                                                         COLUMN NO.
 Name
                                       Board .#
                                                               1-3
                                        Card #
                                                               4,5
F25
                 Board contribution to basic
                 coverage (%)
                 (200 = flat $ amt./ind.)
                 (400 = flat $ amt./group)
                                                             8-10
F26
                 Is the ceiling to basic
                coverage a:
                           Flat $ amount
                                              1.
                           Salary factor
                                              2
                           Combination
                                              3
                           Sliding Scale
                                                               11
F27
               If ceiling to basic coverage
                is a $ amount or combination,
                what is it?
                                                           12 - 17
F28
                If ceiling to basic coverage
                is a salary factor or
                combination, what is it?
                                                           18-20 4
```

F29	9. Is there an additional coverage option?		,	
		Yes 1	<u>No</u>	21
F30	10. If yes and ceiling is \$ amount or combination, what is it? (999999 = not specified)	7.		22-27
F31	11. If yes and ceiling is salary factor, what is it (9.9 = not specified)	?		28-30
	Health and Welfare Discussion	, b	•	
F32	1. Are insured employee bene an area for teacher/board discussion?			
		Yes 1	<u>No</u>	31
-	Employee Benefit Limitation		4	

T 2 2

1. Does the agreement limit (eg. "current" costs, specific fee schedule) any or all of the insured employee benefits in terms of school board subsidization other than fla. dollar amount per individual or group?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$   $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

32

	′ \	$\mathbf{V}_{i} = \mathbf{v}_{i}$		•	•			220
	•			`	,			229
							v * '	
					•		,	
• '	SPSS	CSL, R	ETIREME	NT GRÁTU	ITY			(Card 11)
	Var.	/	4	<u> </u>				COLUMN NO.
	Name		•	1	,		•	/
					Board			-
		4			Card	l #		
	٠ .	Cumula	tive Sid	k Leave				
	<b>n</b> 1	×						
6	R1 .	l. Pe	rcentage	of unu	sed days	;		
	~ í	ac	cumulate	: <b>d</b> ?				_ 33-35
, 1	R 2	2. Ma	ximum ac	cumulat:	ion	•		•
•	•	<b>a</b> l	lowed (d	ays)	LOII			•
L	:	( v.	aries:	998; no	max.: 9	99)		36-38
						· <del></del>		
		Ketire	nent Gra	tuity				
. 1	R3	1. Is	there a	provisi	on?		,	
	•	0	<b>∳</b> ′	P101101	. 011 1			229
	4	Yes	s, all b	ranch af	filiate	3	Ċ.	The state of the s
			mbers .			1	I <sub>1</sub>	•
		Yes	fillerta:	in branc members	h			$\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot = i$
	•	No No	riitafe	members		2 3		
					1	3	•	40
R	4	2. Is	it relat	ted to C	SL?		<b>'</b>	
3		W	•			•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
•		Yes		elated t	_	1	,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	¢.	χe.	ars of e	xperien	ce)	2		
	•		specifi		CL)	3		41
-	/	• •	**		4	41		41
R.	5-R11	3. Is	it payab	le to t	he teach	er ´		<b>⊅</b> +
		upo	ייו	•			7.	grand and the second se
٠.	<i>₩</i>			:	Yes No			•
		Sup	erannuat	ion		, ,		
٥		on.	ly	+ 7	1 2			. 42
			rd Discr		1 2			43
•	*		ving the fession					•
			cified A		1 2 1 2			44
	\$	Tran	sfer to	another	<b>- - - -</b>	*	•	4 5
•	1. • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	boa	erd -		1 2		, .	46
	•	Heal		٥ .	1 2	•		47
•	,	Othe	er .	*	2	٠. ٠		48
R1	. <b>2</b>	Total No	. of "v	eg" reen	ODSAS			
			, - J	reop	- 119 - 9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		49
		•	•			•		

R13 5. Upon death, is the retirement gratuity payable to the estate or a beneficiary? Yes No 2 No, a death benefit is paid in lieu of gratuity 3 Not specified 50 R14 Minimum years of service required to qualify (01 = not spec., no min., or l year) 51-52 R15 No. of consecutive years of service required to qualify 53,54 Retirement Gratuity Discussion R16 Is retirement gratuity an area for teacher/board discussion?

# Retirement Gratuity-Limitation

R1-7

1. Does the agreement limit in any way, other than by phasing out or the 50% statutory limit, the payment of the gratuity for any Branch Affiliate member?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1} \qquad \frac{\text{No'}}{2}$ 

56

55

		a ·		
SPSS	TEAUEG			
Var.	<u>LEAVES</u>			(Card 12)
Name				COLUMN NO
Hame	3			. · · · · · · · · · · ·
		rd #		1-3
1	Ca	rd #		4,5
	Sabbatical/Education Improv	amant Ta		
	Taddedtion improv	ement Le	ave	
L1	1. Is there a provision?			
•	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	* .		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Yes	No	*
	•	1	No 2	8
			~	O
L2	<ol> <li>Minimum years service</li> </ol>	· , ,		. •
. /	required?		•	10,11
				,
L3	<ul> <li>3. Minimum years service</li> </ul>	6		
· ·	with board required?			13,14
· ·		• -	,	,
. <u>Б</u> 4 _	4. Basic salary provided:		,	
	7 061			
•	% of salary			
	Flat \$ amount Other	200		
	other	300		16-18
L5	5. Maximum salary provided:			
•				1
c	% of salary	1 44	•	
)	Flat \$ amount	200		
	Mag Other	300		20-22
L6 1	£ 75 4-1		u u	
10	6. If maximum salary is			
	greater than basic, what			×
•	is the criterion for	•	,	
•	deterimining maximum?			
	No. of dependents	1		
,	Scholarship	1 2	<b>₹</b>	
	Years of experience	3		
	CSL credits	. <u>.</u>	a	
	Board discretion	<del>7</del> 5		_
:	Other	-6		24
				24
L7 💭	7. Is there a specified		•	
	age limit?		*	
	Yes	1	•	
	No	•2		
	No, but must be taken in			
	specified period before	•		• •
• ••	retirement	° <b>3</b>		25
•,			•	7

	•		•
L8	<ol><li>Years subsequent service</li></ol>		
<u></u>	required:	•	
	1		
	No. of years	<del></del>	
	6 or more		
	Twice length of leave 7	•	
	Equal to leave 8	26	6
-	Sliding scale 9		•
	ici il manhad		
L9	9. Is there a specified method		
	for determining the number		
	of leaves allowed per year?		
•	Yes	No	
	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$	2	7
		-	
	10. If yes, how is the number		
L10	determined?		
	deferminea.	•	
	Board discretion		
•	7 of staff 2		
•	Number of staff		
	7 of budget 4	• •	
	Find of flat S amount 5		
	Other 6	2	8
L11 .	11. If method is % of staff,	30-3	12
	what is it?		, 2
L12	12. If method is number of		
	staff, what is it?	33-3	3.5
	(9.9 = 9.9 or more)		
	and the first term of hudget		
L13	13. If method is % of budget,	36-3	38
•	what is it?	<del></del>	
•	14. Is there a mandatory		
L14	minimum number or percentage		
	established?	` '	
•	68640110.000		
	Yes	$\frac{No}{2}$	
•	1	2	40
1.15	15. Does Board contribute to		
	tuition costs?		
	<u>Yes</u>	$\frac{No}{2}$	<i>l</i> . 1
	1	2	41

, L16	16. Do sick leave credits accumulate?			
•	accumulate;			
	Yes	· 1	<i>J</i> .	
•	No	2		
	No, but may be used to	- 2	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•
	supplement sabbatical salary	3		
	Not specified	4		42
5.		~	•	72
L17	17. Does Board continue to			
	contribute its portion o	f		
•	insured employee benefit	- в?		
	'/			
	Yes	1		•
	No .	2		
	Qualified yes	3	-	
	Not specified	4		43
L18	18. Is re-employment ensured	?		•
	Yes	· 1		
	No	2		
	Not specified	3		
	Subject to surplus/		$\gamma$ .	
•	redundancy procedure	4	,	44
· ·		. •		
L19	19. Is teaching experience		*	,
	accrued during sabbatical	L?	•	
				٠
•		Yes	No	
		Yes 1	$\frac{No}{2}$	45
			- · ·	.,
	Sabbatical Leave Discussion			. :
L20 ~	1. Is sabatical leave an area	1 .	Ci	
	for teacher/board discussi	on?		
• • •				<u>.</u>
		Yes	No	•
		1	2	′ 46
	and the second s	, ,	. •	
•	Leave of Absence (Other than s	abbat	ical,	
	miscellaneou	s lea	ves)	
"L21	1. Is there a provision?	·	•	•
,				•
		Yes	$\frac{No}{2}$	
		1	2	48
- 0.5				
L22	<ol> <li>Minimum service required t</li> </ol>	0	•	<b>ģ</b>
	qualify (years)		•	•
	(9 = not specified)			49
			•	

L23	3. Is a salary allowance given?				
•		Yes	$\frac{No}{2}$	50	
L 24	4. Do sick leave credits accumulate?			٠.	
	Yes No Not specified	1 2 3		51	
L25	5. Does Board continue to contribute its portion to insured employee benefits?			•	
	Yes No Qualified yes Not specified	1 / 2 3 4	• .	52	
L26	6. Is re-employment ensured?		•	<b>3</b>	
	Yes No Not specified Subject to surplus/	1 2 3			
1.26	redundany procedure 7. Is teaching experience	.4	<b>,</b>	<b>53</b>	
	accrued during leave?			÷ .	
		Yes 1	No 2	54	

•			
SPSS var.	LEAVES	•	(Card 13) COLUMN NO.
Name		•	:
	Board #	<b>)</b>	1-3
•	Card #	£ ·	4,5
			, 5
	Maternity Leave		:
L28	1. Is there a provision?		
		Vec No	**.
š	•	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ No	
•	•	1 2	. 8
L29	2. If yes, what is the maximim		
	, , ciic maximim	·. · · · · · ·	• •
•	period of leave permitted?		
		•	
7 .	Remainder of school year?	1	- - 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	One school year	2	
* .	Remainder of school year		· · · · · ·
	plus one additional school		
		3	
ų.			
		4	
	Other	5	9
L30	2	_	
7.30	3. Is there a specified period		
	of leave during which a	•	
	teacher accrues experience?		
	Yes	1	•
	Yes, with conditions	2	
	•	3	10
		,	10
L31	4. If yes, what is it? (days)		
	(00 = 00 == 1t! (days)		$(x_1,x_2,\dots,x_n)\in \mathbb{R}^n\times \mathbb{R}^n\times \mathbb{R}^n$
	(99 = 99 or more)		11,12
7.00			•
L32	5. Is re-employment ensured?		
	Yes		
	No 2		
	Not specified 3		
	Subject to surplus/		
•	redundancy procedure 4	n'	
	4 to the state of		13
•	Adontson Towns	•	
•	Adoption Leave		
T 00			•
L33	1. Is there a provision?		
•	v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v	es' No	•
, .	**************************************	$\frac{es}{1}$ $\frac{No}{2}$	
		Δ	14

1			
		•	
			236
L34	2. Is yes, is there a preplacement leave?	/	
		<b>.</b>	•
en e		$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	
L35	3. / If there is a preplacemen	ıt	
	leave, what is the maximule leave permitted? (days)	ım	16,17 ~
L36	4. What is the maximum leave permitted? (days)	· •	
<b>.</b>	(98 = 98 days or more)	, ; · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	(99 = same as maternity)		18,19
L37	5. Is re-employment ensured?		۵
	Yes	1	•
	No Not appointed	2	
	Not specified Subject to surplus/	3	
	redundancy procedure	4	20
	Paternity Leave		
L38	1. Is there a provision?		
		Yes No	
		1 2	21
L39	2. Is yes, what is the maximum	ıım	
	leave permitted? (days)	<b>О</b> ДЦ	22,23
	Leaves for Federation or Assoc Business/Activities	ciation	
L40	1. Is there a long-term leave (6 or more days) for Branc	provision Affiliate	
	representatives/officials,	, etc.	
		Yes No	
		$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	26
L41	2. If yes, is the Board reimb salary costs?	ursed for	
	Yes	1	
	No	2	
	Not specified Qualified yes	3	
	Xunitied yes	<b>.</b>	27
		•	
en e			

. L42	3. Is there a short-term leave provision (5 or fewer days) for federation activities? (i.e. committees, conferences,	
	etc)	
	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	28
	Leaves for Negotiations	
L43	1. Is there a specific leave for negotiations/fact finding/mediation?	
	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	32
L44	2. If yes, how many teachers may be granted such leave?	•
	(8 = 8 or more) (9 = unspecified)	33
L45	3. Is there a specified maximum length of leave per teacher?	
	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	34
L46	4. Is yes, what is it? (days)	35,36
L47	5. Is the Board reimbursed for salary costs?	
	Yes No	
	Not specified 3 Qualified yes	38
	Compassional/Bereavement Leave	
L48-L50	<ol> <li>For immediate family, minimum number of days per occasion</li> </ol>	
•	(9 = unspecified)	46
	2. For extended family, minimum number of days per occasion	
	(9 = unspecified)	47
	3. Other (minimum number of days per occasion)	
	(9 = unspecified)	48

## Miscellaneous Leaves

L51 f. Is there a miscellaneous leaves provision?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1} \quad \frac{\text{No}}{2} \quad 50$ 

L52-L62 2. Is yes, types of leaves:

	Yes, Paid	Yes, Unpaid		No	Not Specified	•
Discretionar	y 1	2	3	4	9	52
* * * * * *		* *	,		*	
Board or School	•			о,		
Business	1	2	3	4	9	53
Courses	1.	2	3	4	9	54
Emergency or personal	1	2	3	4	9	55
Examinations	1	2	3	4	9	56
Graduations	<b>5</b>					
Convocation	1	2	3	4	9	57
Moving	1	2	3	4	9	58
Public Office Duties	e 1.	2	3 .	4	9	59
Religious Days	1	2	3	4	9	60
Weather or "Act of God'	<b>.</b> 1	2	3	4/	9	61
Weddings	1	2	3	4	\ <b>9</b>	62

Leaves Discussion

1. Are deaves (other than sabbatical) an area for teacher/board discussion?

L63



 $t_J$ 

SPSS Var. Name	STAFFING WORKLOAD			2	64 (Card 14) COLUMN NO.
		Board Card			1-3 4,5
	Pupil-Teacher Ratio/Staf	fing F	ormu	la /	•
W1			7		
# 1	1. Is there a provision	?			·
			Yes 1	$\frac{No}{2}$	8
W2	2. Is the term "teacher	" defi	ned?		
4 · *	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				•
			Yes 1	$\frac{No}{2}$	9.
W3	3. Is the PTR based on:				
	Projected enrolment Actual enrolment Both Not specified		1 2 3 4	•	10
W4	4. Is it a mandatory PTF a guideline?	Ror	·		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Mandatory, no conditions	i de	1		
•	Mandatory, with condition	18	2		
	Guideline, no conditions		3		
	Guideline, with condition	s	4		11 .
W5	5. Is the PTR:			•	
· ·	System-wide	•.	1		
	By school	a	1 2		
	By region		3		
	Combination	•	4		
	Other		5 .		
	Not specified		6	* .	12

		•		
	One, fixed	1		
	More than one, fixed	2		
0	One, with a tolerance	2		
	(eg. range)			
•		3		
	More than one, with tolerance	4		
	Unspecified, based on		*	
•	statement of intent	5		
	Unspecified, based on past			
	practice	6		
	Not specification	7		13
-		•		
W7	7. If on a RTR is speci	fied		
· >	What y		•	14-18
		***************************************	-	. 14-10
	PTR D1	•		-
•	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	*		
W8		,	٠ ;	
₩0	1. Is PTR an area for teache	r/		•
<i>₹.</i> , "₩.,	board discussion?			**
	, - 1, - 1, - 1	• • •		.*
		Yes	No 2	
		1	2	19
		•		
•	Class Size	•		, . , <b>.</b>
	1	*	,,	
W9 ·	1. Is there a provision?		. 1	
	A	Vac	No	- `
		Yes	$\frac{N_0}{2}$	0.1
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 1	Z	21
W10	2. Is it a mandatory class			• .
#10			٠	~
	size or a guideline?			
• •				. *.
	Mandatory, no conditions	1		
	Mandatory, with conditions	2	•	
	Guideline, no conditions	3	-y	•
•	Guideline, with conditions	4 /	• ,	22
		,		4.4
			•	

How many ratios are there?

W6 -

	•			
W11	3. How many class sizes are specified?	• •		
	•			
	One average	•	•	
. *	One range	• 1		
	One class size maximum	2		No. of the second second
• •	More than one carried	3	•	•
	More than one average	4		
	More than one range	5	انگری: « هرانهاست	•
	More than one size maximum	6	$\mathcal{A}_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_{m_$	
· ·	Combination of 4, 5, and/or			,
	6 above	, 7	•	
a	Unspecified, based on			•
,ii	statement of intent	8		
	Unspecified, based on past			
	practice	9		<i>2</i> 3
ar .		-		<b>2.3</b>
W12	4. If one average class size	ź		
,	is specified, what is it?		5.	24-27
## # 1 T	i and any middle in the			24-21
	Class Size Discussion/			٠.
		•		•
W13	1. Is class size an area for			
	teacher/board discussion?			
	teacher/board discussion?			
•	•			
		Yes	No 2	
		1	2	28
	<b>.</b>		,	· , / · · · · · · ·
	Teacher Work Load	•		
****		* "		
W14	1. Is there a work load provi	sion		
	for teachers?			,
		`		
		Yes	No	
•		1	2	- 30
		•	2	30
	(a) Instruction	•	•	
•			•	
W15	2. Is there an instructional	T		
	provision?	TORU		
· v	Provibion.	•	+ 1	
•			· .	
		Yes	No	
	, o	1,	2	31
W1 4	2 76	•	•	· / · · · ·
W16	3. If yes, does the provision	deal	•	(
•	with:			
			•	$\sim$
,	Teaching only	1		<b>k</b>
	Preparation only	2	n 3	}
	Both	3		32
• •		-		34 4

W17-W23 4. If instructional load deals with teaching, how is teaching load defined?

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Yes No	10
<u>~</u>		
No. of teaching periods	·	•
per day	<b>-1</b> 2	. 33
No. of teaching periods		
per week	1 2	34
No. of minutes per day	1 2	35
Percent of school time/	a e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
tabled time	1 2	36
No. of credits per year	1 2	37
Pupil-teacher contact	1 2	38 x
Other	1 2	39

W24

5. Is there a limit to the number of consecutive teaching periods a teacher is required to teach?

Yes	· No	No.	
1	2 •		40

W25-W32

6. If instructional load deals with preparation, how is preparation time defined?

	Yes	No	
No. of minutes per day	1	2	41
No. of minutes per week	1	2	42
No. of desireable preparations per day Average no. of lesson	1	· <b>2</b>	43
preparations per cycle	1	2	\$ 44
Percent per day	1	2	45
Percent per week	1	2	46
Percent of unassigned	, .	• •	
time	1 .	2	47
Other	1	2	48

(b) "Non-instruction

55

W33-W34	7 •	Ιs	there	а	provision	for:
---------	-----	----	-------	---	-----------	------

	Yes Req'd	Yes Expt.	Both	No	**	•• •
.**	med a	Expt.				
Noon-time				•		
supervision Other forms of	`1	2	3	4		51
supervision	1	2	3	4	. 4	52

# Workload Discussion

W35

 Is teacher workload an area for teacher/board discussion?

Staff Allocation/Workload for Specialists, Positions of Responsibility etc.

W36-W38

1. Is there a workload provision for:

	•	Yes	NO	
Principals		1	2	56
Vice-Principals		1	2	57
Other Positions of		•	· -	3,
Responsibility	•	1	2	58

W39-W47 2. Is there a staff allocation provision for:

8	Prov. Spec: Alloc.	Prov. No Spec. Alloc.	Both	No .	•,
Clerical/	·				•
secretarial					•
support	1	2	3	4	59
Paraprofess <b>£</b>	bnal	•	_		
support/tead		•	· ·		
aide	1	2	3	. 4	60
Principals	1	2	3	4	61/
Vice-				•	
Principals	· <b>1</b>	2	3	4	62
Dept. Head/					,
Chairman	1	2	<b>5</b> ₀	14	63
Guidance	1	2	.3	4	64 -
Librarians	1	. 2	3	4	65
Social/				•	,
Psychologica		/_		_	
Services		2	<b>. 3</b>	4	66
Other	N .	2	3	4	67

## Teacher Evaluation

W4.8

l. Is there a general provision outlining a method for evaluating teachers? (outside of surplus/redundancy)

2. Is there a "withholding of increment" provision?

$$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$$
  $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

W50,

3. Is there a provision concerning complaints against a teacher? \_\_\_\_\_\_ (e.g. from parents)

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$   $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

71

W51

Is there a apecified teacher disciplinary procedure? (toginelude just cause?

Yes No

72

# Evaluation Discussion

77.50

1. Als evaluation an area for teacher/board discussion?

Yes No

73

#### Teacher Records

W53

Is there a provision dealing with a teacher's right to examine personal records?

Yes No

74

		•	
SPSS	JOB SECURITY		(Card 15)
Var.			COLUMN NO.
Name	:	• ' .	
	Board #		1-3 _ ′
₩	Card #		4,55,5%
Σ. Ψ.	Vacancies, Postingo, Transfers	•	
	ransiers, rostings, transiers	•	400
J1-J2	1. Is there a Procedure for fil	1400	<b>Y</b> :
· •	vacant positions?	TINE	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
	•		•
	Y	es No	
<b></b> .	Teachers	<u>es</u> <u>No</u> 2	8
•	Positions of Responsibility	1 2	9
J3-J4			•
33-34	2. Must vacant positions be		
	first advertised internally?		
			•
	Teachers	es No	
•	Do of his office.	$\frac{\overline{1}}{1}$ $\frac{\overline{2}}{2}$	10 📲
ranger (* 1865)	a kesponsibility	1 2	11
J5- <b>J</b> 6	3. If yes, number of days	•	
	before Board can advertise		<b>*</b> • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	outside the system		•
	(unspecified: 99)		
			•
	Teachers		12,13
* *	Positions of Responsibility		14,15
J7-J8	4. Is seniority a factor in		
3, 30	4. Is seniority a factor in determining voluntary		· `{;
	transfer within the system?		-4
₩.	cranster within the system?	<b>6</b> 0.	
	Ye	C NO	
		NO NO	
	Teachers	2	1.6
	Positions of Responsibility 1	2	16
•		_	, / 1,
34		* .	
~	•		

J9-J12	5. Is there a provision for:	:	,	
		Yes	No	<u>.</u>
	Promotional transfers	1	2	18
	Teacher initiated transfers	•.	-	
	(i.e. request to be			
~	transferred)	1	2	19
. ,	erunsierieu,	-	<b>-</b>	
•	Administrative transfers			
	(i.e. board-iniated)	1	2	20
		• • •	-	<b></b> _,
•	Creation of new positions	. 1	2	21
J13-J15	6. If there is a provision f	or	•	
313-313	adminstrative transfer, d		***	
•	provide the teacher with:			41,2
	provide the teacher with:			
		Yes	No	2 × .
,	Grievance (eg for "undue	168	<u>110</u>	
•	hardship")	· 1	2	22
	Travel-relocation costs paid	" <b>-</b>	7	22
	by board	1	2	23
	Priority relocation to		2	23
	original school	1	2	24
	original school	· · · ,	2	27
J16	7. If provision includes cre	ation		· ·
5.0	of new positions, is ther			
	discussion/negotiation wi			* *
	branch affiliate?		· ************************************	
· · .	branch dirittate.			
		Yes	No	•
•		1	$\frac{30}{2}$	25
			a	<b>.</b>
•	Tenure/Surplus/Redundancy			
J17	1. Is there a tenure/surplus	1 .		
	redundancy provision?	•	I = I	•
-				
		Yes	No	
•		1	2	28
		_		<del>-</del> , <del>-</del>
J18	2. If, yes, is the provision	:		
	Unchanged	1.	· .	
	Revised	2		
	New	3		28
			୍ କ୍	
			•	

J19-J24

3. Which of the following factors are considered in the declaration of surplus/redundant teachers?

		Yes	No		
Seniority		1	2		29
Qualifications		1	2		
Type of contract		1	2		30
	5.1	1	Z	. •	31
Teaching Effectiveness		. 1	2		32
Board Discretion	COL	1	.2		. 33
Other		1	2		34

J25-J31 4. If seniority is a factor, which of the following criteria are used:

	Yes	No.	
Consecutive years with Board Total years with Board Total elementary experience Total secondary experience Total experience	1 1 1	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	35 36 37 38
Other Other Conteria specified	1 1 1	2 2 2	39 40 41

Ó

I and

J32-J38 5. Which of the following factors affective seniority are specified in the provision?

		Yes	No	•
	Probationary contract teachers			
	do not have seniority and are			
	excluded from consideration	1	2	42
	Probationary contract teachers			
	are included in seniority		•	÷
	considerations according to		2.3	
U	experience (eg. 1st year of		. 3	
	2-year contract, etc)	1	2	43
	Part-time teachers have		•	
	seniority prorated	1	2	44
	Part-time teachers receive	٠.		
	full-time seniority credit	1 ,	2	45
	Seniority is uninterrupted			
	but not accumulated during			
	period of leave	1	2	46
	Seniority is accumulated during	" .		- <b>-</b>
	period of leave	1	2	, 47
	Seniority is "bridged" if		••	
	teacher is reinstated during		•	2
	recall period	. 1	2	48
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			

J39-J46 6. Which of the following "special considerations" are specified in the provision?

	Yes	No		
Teachers holding positions of			:	
responsibility are exempted			* .	
(protected)	1 .	2		49
Teachers holding positions of				
responsibility are given				
priority consideration	1	2		50
There are separate and distinct	t	-	*	
surplus/redundancy procedures		*	•	
for teachers holding position	8 .			
of responsibility (principals				
vice-principals)	1	2 .		51
Teachers possessing special		_ ,		
instructional skills are exemp	D E	•		
if declaration would mean -	;)			
melimination of program	1	2	4.	52
Teachers possessing special			100	<i>-</i>
instructional stills are			•	
exempt unless more senior	٠,			
teacher declared redundant		1.		
would qualify for position	1	2		53
Sufficient qualified teachers				7.2
must be retained to maintain	•			•
viability of program	1	2		54
Teachers returning from leaves	7	<b>-</b> .		34
are subject to the surplus/		•		
redundancy procedures	1	2		55
Teachers returning from leave		4		رر
are protected from the surplus				
redundancy procedures	1	2		56
	_	<b>-</b>		סכ

J47 Which of the following best describes the manner in which the various factors are considered  No weighting or priority scheme (the following shall be considered)  Junplied priorities or tiebreakers (factors considered in following order)  Specific successive tiebreakers (two or more teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  J48 8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?  J48 8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?  J48 9. If yes how is the tie broken?  Board decision  Teacher decision  Joint decision  Teacher decision  Joint decision  Random selection technique  Other  J50-J54 10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system deplaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position transfer 1 2 61  Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62  Unlimited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 63  Priority relocation (to original position, school, municipality) 1 2 64					<u>.</u>		J <sub>0</sub>	
J47  Which of the following best describes the manner in which the various factors are considered  No weighting or priority scheme (the following shall be considered)  Implied priorities or tiebreakers (factors considered in following order)  Specific successive tiebreakers (two or wore teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  J48  8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?   Yes No.  1 58  J49  9. If yes how is the tie broken?  Board decision Teacher decision Joint decision Random selection technique 4 Other  J50  J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position Cross-panel transfer 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,					· .			
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the manner in which the various factors are considered  No weighting or priority scheme (the following shall be considered)  Implied priorities or tiebreakers (factors considered in following order)  Specific successive tiebreakers (two or more teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  J48 8 Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?  Yes No.  1 1 58  J49 9. If yes how is the tie broken?  Board decision 1 reacher decision 2 Joint decision 3 Random selection technique 4 Other  J50-J54 10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position  Cross-panel transfer 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,			•			(		. د ع
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Specific successive tiebreakers (two or more teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  J48  8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes No   1   58  J49  9. If yes, how is the tie broken?    Board decision   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1			ere <b>¢</b> in fo	ollowing				•
tiebreakers (two or more teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  3		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		. /	. 2		,	
teachers considered equal or relatively equal)  Factor weighting (point system)  3  Factor weighting (point system)  4  57  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  57  3  58  59  59  59  59  59  59  59  59  59				/	.*			
relatively equal) Factor weighting (point system)  3 Factor weighting (point system)  4 57  J48 8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes   No   1					0.5			٠.
Factor weighting (point system)  3. J48. 8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes   No.   1   58					3			+
J48 8. Does the provision include an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes No   1   58							)	•
an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes   No   1   58   J49   9. If yes, how is the tie broken?    Board decision   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	-			/·	4.			57
an "ultimate tiebreaker"?    Yes   No   1   58   J49   9. If yes, how is the tie broken?    Board decision   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	7/0		1	,		•		
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Board decision 1 Teacher decision 2 Joint decision 3 Random selection technique 4 Other 5  J59  J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	The second secon				1	$\frac{NO}{1}$ .		58
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Teacher decision 2 Joint decision 3 Random selection technique 4 Other 5  J59  J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	J49	9. lf y	yes∫ how i	s the tie	broken?		·	
Teacher decision 2 Joint decision 3 Random selection technique 4 Other 5  J59  J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,		Poord do			•			
Joint decision Random selection technique Other  5  J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Yes No  Priority transfer to vacant position Cross-panel transfer Limited displacement (least senior teacher) (less senior teacher) Priority relocation (to original position, school,			/ '		7		*	
Random selection technique 4 Other 5  J50-J54 10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	3 %		/		3		fact.	
J50-J54  10. Which of the following mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,			,	technique	4	, · · •	18	
mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	<i>,</i>	Other			5	. / "	4	59 ·
mechanisms for accommodating teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	***					4	•	
teachers prior to system declaration are included in the provision?  Yes No  Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,	J50-J54					1 .		
declaration are included in the provision?    Yes No	Ð	mec tea	chere ori	or accommod	asting	,	• • • • • •	
the provision?    Yes No   Priority transfer to vacant   1 2 60   2   61   1 2 61   1 2 61   1 2 62   1 2 62   1 2 62   1 2 62   1 2 62   1 3		dec	laration	are include	ed in			
Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,								
Priority transfer to vacant position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,				<i>J</i>				
position 1 2 60 Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,					Yes	No		
Cross-panel transfer 1 2 61 Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,				to vacant		_		· ^
Limited displacement (least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,				fer	1			-
(least senior teacher) 1 2 62 Unlimited displacement (less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,					, ÷	2		. ,
(less senior teacher) 1 2 63 Priority relocation (to original position, school,		(least	senior te	acher)	1	2	•	6.2
Priority relocation (to original position, school,						•		
(to original position, school,					1	2		63
	•				1			
64				rrion, scho	101,	· •		<i>4 1</i>
		P			<b>1</b>	<b>-</b>	*	<del>04</del>
				144				
				1				_
			7. The state of th	1		**	•	`

i K

J55 11. Does, the provision specifically provide for appeal, grievance or review of seniority position or redundancy declaration?

J56-J69

Yes	No	
1	2	6.5

12. Which of the following options are available to the teacher declared surplus/redundant?

Prior to or in lieu of contract termination

	Yes	No	
• •	100 mg	, ´	66
Permanent supply pool	1	2	67
Retraining	<b>L</b> .	£	07
Regular sabbatical leave		<u>.</u>	68
plan (paid)	1	. 2	
Special assignment	1	2	69
Branch Affiliate financially			
supported plan (add. position	ıs,		
sabbatical)	1	2	70
Leave of absence	1	2	71
Deferred salary plan		•	
(eg. "four-over-five")	1	2	72
Leg. Iour-over-rive	1	. 2	73
Reduced teaching	/	/ -	The state of the s
During layoff period or	at 🖊	•	
contract termination	/ .		
- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1			
Priority summer/night	1	2	74
occasional/driver education	1	$\bar{\mathbf{z}}$	7.5
Priority supply	1	2	76
Priority recall	. 1	- 5 /	77
Separation allowance	, i	12	78
Early retirement incentives	1	2	79
Other	1	Z	19

	<b>K</b> ,			e en en e <mark>sta</mark> n en e <mark>stande e</mark> en
		•		
•		. \		253
SPSS Var.	JOB SECURITY			(Card 16) COLUMN NO.
Name				COLUMN NO.
	Board	#		1-3
	Card			4,5
				,,,
J70-J78	13. Which of the following a specified in the provisi	re on?		
				· ·
		Yes	No	
	Probationary teachers are			
• * * .	specifically excluded from		•	
- i - i	exercising any or all option Options may be exercised in	8 1	2	8
• • •	sequence			
	Options may be deferred	Ţ	2	9
•	Teacher forfeits rights to	1	2	10
	Coptions if he declines to			•
	accept offer(s) of alternate			•
	position(s)	. 1	2	4.1
	Onus is on teacher to apply	-	<b>.</b>	11
	for vacant positions during			
	period of recall	1	2	12
	Onus is on Board to contract	*	. 4	12
	teacher re vacant positions	• .	•	I
	during recall period	1	2	13
	Teacher may continue benefit	~35 <sup>-</sup>	•	1.3
	coverage at own expense		٠.	
	during recall period	1	2	14
	All teachers are provided with	r Æ 🛴		
	letter specifying reason for			: · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	termination	1	2	15
• *	Only permanent contract		:	
	teachers are provided with			<b>6</b>
	reason for termination	1	2	16
J79	14. Is surplus/redundancy an for teacher/beard discuss	area ion?		•
	and the state of t			
		Yes	No.	17
		_		±,



SPSS Var. Name

#### OTHER PROVISIONS

(Card 16) COLUMN NO.

Board # Card #

### Grievance

P 1

1. Is there a grievance procedure?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$  No

.25

P 2

Is yes, are any time limits specified?

 $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$   $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$ 

26

P3

3. Does the procedure specifically provide for final and binding settlement of disputes? (arbitration)



Yes No

27

P4

4. If an arbitration procedure is specified what type is it?

As outlined in Provincial
Statutes
1
Some other procedure with no
stated Commission involvement 2
Some other procedure with
stated reference to
legislation or regulation 3

. \_ .

P5-P9	P 1-		
r J-ry	5. Does the grievance proc	edure	
	provide for:		
•			
		Yes No	
		100 110	
	Time off with pay	1 2	1
	Time off without nev	1 2 1 2	29
	Group (board/branch	4 4	30
*, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	affiliate) grievance	′ <b>1 2</b>	
•	Grievance or Interpretation	<b></b>	31
	COMMITTEE	1 2	
	Complaint procedure for	· • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	32
	settlement of disputes out-	ri do	• • •
	ene scope of the collective	1446	• •
	agreement	_	
		1 2	33
	Anti-Inflation_Board		
P10	1. Is there a provision dea	1 · a	
•	with the AIB?	ring	3)
•			
,			
		$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	
		1 2	35
P11-P13	2. If yes, does it concern:		
•	, and it concern:		
	Effectiving an AIB rollback	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}  \frac{\text{No}}{2}  .$	
	Reporting to the AIB	_	36
	Other )	1 2	37
		1 2	38
`. 	Re-Negotiations Clause		
•	CIRUBE	, n	
P14	1. Is there a provision for		
4	re-negotiation other		
	re-negotiation other than mutual consent?	bу	
	consent!		•
		$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	<b>t</b> 1
		1 2	40
P15-P18°	2. If vest do the drawn is		
	con be the Items which		·
	can be re-negotiated inclu	de: °	•
	Salaries	Yes No	
	Employee Benefits	$\frac{\text{Yes}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{No}}{2}$	41
•	Working Conditions	1 2	42
	Other (include:	1 2	43
	Other (includes leaves)	1 . 2	44
			<b>चित्र</b>
			- 5.7

# General Aspects

P19-P25 1. Does the agreement provide for:

) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	A STATE OF THE STA		,		
-		Yes	No	, 3	•
Management rights				•	0 .
(specific clause)		1	2	. ب	46
Teacher/Board Liason	Committee	1	2		
Letters of intent/Mem	os of	1	۷ .		47
understanding		1	2 '		48
Committments beyond to Agreement	erm of	4	٤.		40
		1	2 2		49
Method of Payment	۵	1	" '	•	
Professional Developme	ent/	•	4		50.
Activity Days or Inst	rutional		1		
Days	7	1	2		51
Local check-off	had.	1	~	•	) I
		T .	- 2		52

# APPENDIX D

)Instrument Coding Reliability Results

(MCORR VAR=1-411:301-911)
MISSING DATA CORRELATION

	VARTARIR	2	د	STANDARD			•	
	- andana	MEAN		DEVELOPMENT	<b>E</b>	NUMBER	CORRELATION	
	1. Division	107.50		78.027		26	1.0000	
	501. Division	107.50	. :	78.027	_	· ; .		
	2. Type	1.4118	•	.50730		17	1.0000	7
	502. Type	1.4118		.50730		<b>S</b>		
•	3. SI	9.484.6	•	775.36	11	22	1,000	., .,
· . · · ·	503. 81	9.484.6	ું હૈ	775.36		,	1	
5	4. 82	9405.8		178548	"%	13	000	1
<b>3</b>	504. 82	9405.8	Region of	178.48	به بن	,	0000	
	5.83	9955.4		175.02		14	, CO C	
	505. 83	9955.4	*	175.02	- <b>.</b>	•	) )	
	6. 84	10489.		180.44		14	7000	
	506.84	10489.	ā	180.44	÷		0	
•	7. 85	11023.	ني	196.75	g <sup>3</sup> ~	14	1.0000	
: <i>,</i>	507. 85	11023.		196.75	• ·			
							1	

2	1.0000	***	1.6000		0000		000		1 50000		0000						(如此)	j.	
	221,55	221.55	252. 6	252.45	287.33	287.33	.325.83	325.83	197.42	197.12	211,39	211.39	0						
	11557.	11557.	12090.	12090	12624.	12624.	.13160.	13160.	.13282.	13282.	13843.	13843.							**
	88.	. 508. S6	9.87	509.87	10. \$8	510. 38	11. 89	511. 89	12. 510	512. 810	13. 811	513 811	14. 812	514. 312	15. 813	515. 813	. S14	516 814	

e. El

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• 0		26		26		26		26	•	26				26		. 66.	•	•		•
								9/1				***	(		<b>G</b>				<b>*</b>	
		149.54	149.54	124.13	124.13	142:83	142.83	1.93004	193.04	257.04	2547:04	326.80	326.80	399.26	399.26	473.30	473.30		>	3.
4	. 4		•		-													9	3	c.
٠	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	10277	10277	10775	10775	11272	11272	11770	11770	L¢ 12267	12267	12765	12765	13262	13262	13760	13760	,	<b>1</b>	N <sub>a</sub> •
S15	\$15	\$16	S16	\$17	\$17	S18	\$18	819	\$19	\$20	\$20	\$21	\$21	\$22	\$22	\$23	\$23	+	,	
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3.0476	3.0476	3.6190	3.6190	3.2857	3.2857	2.5238	2.5238	2.2381	2.2381	4.0000	4.0000	3.6667	3.6667	4.0000	4.0000	2.2857	2.2857
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243.L53	743.L53	244.L54	744.L54	245.L55	745.L55	246.L56	746.L56	247.L57	747-L57	248.L58	748.L58	249.L59	749.L59	250.L60	750.L60	251.L61	751.161
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