TERMINATION THEORY AND NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION PROGRAMS: THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND

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In 2008 New Zealand (NZ) changed from a Labour-led to a National-led Government, and this resulted in a shift to Government's carbon emission mitigation strategy, including the abandonment of the Communities for Climate Protection and the Carbon Neutral Public Service programs. Using deLeon's (1982) seminal model for program termination, the objective of this research is to determine why NZ's newly elected Government discontinued these initiatives. This empirical research is investigative and probing, and comprises a series of semi-structured interviews with senior managers responsible for the delivery of the respective program within their organization. The architects of each program are also investigated. In the end, this study finds that while economic constraints and programmatic inefficiencies may have played a contributing role, political ideology is the primary rationale for the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs.

Key words: New Zealand, Public sector, Government organizations, Termination theory, Carbon management, Carbon Neutral, Climate change policy

INTRODUCTION

Termination theory is a framework employed to rationalise or better understand the purposeful ending of specific government functions, programs, policies or organizations (e.g. deLeon, 1978; Daniels, 1995; Sato, 2002). These targets (government functions, programs, policies or organizations) range from services provided to the community by the government, to strategies aimed at solving particular problems, to actual government agencies. Regardless of the target of termination, the essence of the theory and the results of it application can be applied across all four. This is particularly the case for programs as the termination of organizations or policies will likely trigger program termination as well (e.g. Bardach, 1976). Further, programs are typically easier to observe, and thus more prone to critique (Sato, 2002).

Though there is debate and discussion surrounding the ending of government organizations, policies and programs (Kaufman, 1976, 1985; Peters & Hogwood, 1988; Frantz, 1992; 2002), termination has remained an understudied field since its first application by Biller in 1976 (Graddy & Ye, 2008). And while the extant literature provides little attention to understanding the factors influencing termination (Kirkpatrick et al. 1999), suggesting that "a theory of organizational mortality is still in its infancy" (Adam et al., 2007, p. 226), it remains a potentially important component of the public policy process (e.g. deLeon, 1997).

Adam et al., (2007) indicate that academic attention to termination research remains of low priority, particularly with regard to public sector institutions, policies and programs, because it tends to be hidden in policy literature. And as Biller (1976, p. 134) explained in an historic work: "a terminated policy or organization is no longer of direct consequence to anyone's action... it is no longer purported to, nor is it associated with, the production of any outcomes" and thus tends to avoid attention given that "to study those [programs] that have ended is to study the inconsequential." Frantz (1992) posits that the field has remained largely untested because of the position that program termination is the result of (or lack of) luck (see also Kaufman, 1985), and therefore is not productive for scientific inquiry.[i] According to Bardach (1976), another influential work in this area, termination remains a neglected field simply because of its infrequency of occurrence; social scientists thrive on generalisations, not idiosyncrasies.

Despite its obscure location in policy literature, over the decades termination theory has been applied to an array of public sector organizations, policies and programs, and while the literature has been dominated by US studies (e.g. Bardach, 1976; Behn, 1976; Cameron, 1978; deLeon,

1982; Frantz, 1992; Daniels, 1995; Kirkpatrick et al., 1999; Harris, 2001; Carpenter & Lewis, 2004; Graddy & Ye, 2008; Shockley, 2012),[ii] recent scholarship has expanded to include a more global application (e.g. Dery, 1984; Sato, 2002; Botterill, 2005; Hsu, 2005).[iii] Building on this trend, the aim of this article is to contribute to termination theory literature in the context of New Zealand's (NZ) national climate change policy.

Climate change is one of the most important and difficult challenges facing modern society. Given that warming is attributed to, in large part, anthropogenic carbon emission increases (e.g. IPCC, 2007; Hansen et al., 2012), governments and organizations from around the globe are mobilising to reduce their atmospheric carbon contribution, some with the goal of achieving carbon neutrality.

NZ ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, committing to prudent carbon emission reductions. In an effort to promote public sector carbon management, in 2004, Clark's Labour-led Government funded local government membership in ICLEI's[iv] Communities for Climate Protection - NZ (CCP-NZ) program. In 2007 the same Government, in tandem with efforts to price carbon and develop an Emissions Trading Scheme, through the Carbon Neutral Public Service (CNPS) program, sought to move the core public sector towards carbon neutrality (Clark, 2007).

While the core public sector accounts for only 2% of NZ's total greenhouse gas emissions (NZ Govt., 2007),[v] the goal of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs was to elevate NZ's international profile as a leader on sustainability in general and climate change mitigation and carbon neutrality in particular. Led by the Ministry for the Environment, the CNPS initiative involved

NZ's 34 core public service departments, representing in the order of 159,000 t-CO2e for base year 2006/07 (NZ Govt., 2008). The CCP-NZ program was the NZ arm of ICLEI's Cities for Climate Protection campaign, and included 34 councils, representing approximately 83% of the NZ population (CCP-NZ, 2009).

In November 2008 NZ underwent a shift in leadership, from a Labour-led to a National-led Government. Following, Labour's climate change agenda was reconsidered and the CNPS and CCP-NZ programs were subsequently terminated.[vi]

Employing deLeon's (1982) seminal theory for program termination, this article argues that NZ's newly elected National-led Government cancelled the CNPS and CCP-NZ programs for reasons of political ideology. As deLeon (1982) notes, government administrators tend to cite, even without evidence, cost overruns and programmatic inefficiencies as sufficient cause for program termination. DeLeon maintains "however convenient and defensible the pleas of economy and efficiency might be, in terms of termination, they are in practice much less important juxtaposed to the third criterion, political ideology" (deLeon, 1982, p.9). Though elements of economic and programmatic inefficiencies were present to varying degrees, and likely would have had a deleterious affect on CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs in the long run, program termination was the result of the new Government's desire to distance itself from the previous Government's climate change agenda.

In order to assess whether obstacles hindered the termination of these programs, this study also considers deLeon's early model for termination resistance (deLeon, 1978). While deLeon's

obstacles are usually explored when a program continues to persist beyond its purpose or value, it is nonetheless instructive to consider the presence of the obstacles when a program has been dismantled. For example, did deLeon's obstacles exist, and if so in what capacity? While the obstacles were obviously insufficient to hinder program termination, were they in fact a barrier, if only a temporary one? This line of inquiry may shed light on the embeddedness of climate change thinking within the NZ public sector and provide insights for further investigation into organizational resolve for carbon mitigation - i.e. how important is Government support in the determination of whether an organization will pursue (potentially costly) carbon mitigation actions?

This paper is organized around six substantive sections. The first section highlights the study's theoretical and policy context and states the article's argument. The second section provides an overview of termination theory literature. Section three explains the research approach. Sections four and five present the study's findings, and discuss the findings in the context of deLeon's models for program termination and termination resistance. The final section summarizes the article and provides concluding thoughts.

AN OVERVIEW OF TERMINATION THEORY LITERATURE

Early termination studies postulated that while organizational termination is expected to be widespread in the private sector, the opposite is true for public sector organizations, where an organization can persist even beyond its *raison d'être*.[vii] An influential, and well cited example of such is Kaufman (1976) where the author suggests that public sector organizations are immortal (e.g. Adam et al., 2007). As Peters & Hogwood (1988) point out, however, Kaufman's study

sample was biased towards durable organizations and because the study was limited to two points in time, failing to capture the period between these two points in time, the author underestimated the rate of actual termination. Following on, and contrary to Kaufman's work, Lewis (2002) argues that public sector agencies are not immortal,[viii] and suggests that the myth of organizational immortality is due to the dearth of academic debate on termination.

Following from his earlier article, Kaufman (1985) goes on to argue that the termination or persistence of an organization (private or public) is a function of chance. According to Adam et al. (2007), while this line of debate implies that organizational termination is distributed randomly, empirical study, however, failed to support this hypothesis (e.g. Woywode, 1998).

In Kuipers & Boin (2005), four key variables from the literature are demonstrated to influence the longevity (survival) of an organization: (1) Newness - older organizations are more likely to survive; (2) Size - budget/personnel is positively correlated with survival; (3) Political autonomy - will increase organizational performance and public reputation; and, (4) Professionalism - positively correlated with survival. Their study failed, however, to prove that organizational characteristics do in fact influence termination or persistence (e.g. Adam et al., 2007).

Adam et al. (2007) agree that an organization's age is positively related to its chance of survival,[ix] and that the general performance of an organization does affect its likelihood of termination; the probability of termination increases as an organization becomes less efficient and effective at achieving its objectives. But while earlier studies suggest that smallness will increase the likelihood of organizational termination (e.g. Aldrich & Auster, 1986), more recent

research shows a non-monotonic correlation between organizational size and hazard of termination (e.g. Kieser, 2002).

Another classical line of inquiry postulates that termination is "exceedingly difficult," is rarely attempted, and when attempted is rarely successful (Bardach, 1976, p. 123). When termination does occur, however, it occurs with either a bang or a whimper. In the case of the latter, termination is characterised by a long-term decline in resources. Termination with a bang, on the other hand, while similar, and more common, tends to result following a lengthy political struggle, followed by a shift in power (change in administration) and a single authoritative decision to terminate (e.g. Sato, 2002).

This is demonstrated in Sato (2002) where the isolation of leprosy patients continued to occur long after it was scientifically known to be unnecessary for the majority of cases. Isolation persisted as a result of bias in expert opinion (conservative scientist advocated for isolation; social protection), ambivalence among patients and the policy's low priority among policymakers. As the literature has shown, while a shift in ideology or scientific understanding can lead to termination (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Daniels, 1994; deLeon, 1982), scientific evidence on its own tends not to be a sufficient rationale for termination. In this case, policy termination ultimately occurred as a result of the skilful leadership of the terminator, who was in the end able to achieve consensus with key actors and thus abolish the Leprosy Isolation Policy.

In some cases, as Daniels (1995) indicates, programs can end with both a bang and a whimper: while Oklahoma's program of public training schools ended with a bang, the essence or the

mandate of the training schools shifted to psychiatric hospitals, and as a result the policy continues with a long whimper. Similarly, termination can be viewed as a 'special case of the policy adoption process,' or as a critical component in correcting a flawed policy (i.e. Sato, 2002). In other words, as Bardach's (1976) early work suggests, policy or program 'A' must be terminated or curtailed in order for policy or program 'B' to flourish. This is not without its challenges, however, as inertia and other obstacles must first be overcome before termination can occur. Botterill (2005) concurs, indicating that termination is more likely in an environment that fails to demonstrate strong networks. In their study of network termination in Australia's agriculture sector, Botterill (2005) shows that established policy, characterised by weak networks, was terminated and replaced by stronger policy capable of withstanding external shocks.

Building on the existent research on termination of public organizations, Adam et al. (2007) identify two key causal factors that influence program termination: (1) organizational stickiness (resistance); and, (2) political incentives. Adam et al. (2007)'s typology suggests that in a scenario of high stickiness and high political incentive for organization termination, despite the high political will to terminate, because of support within the organization, the whole organization will not likely be terminated, but instead reformed or restructured. In the case of low stickiness and high political incentive for organization termination, because of little organizational resistance and high political will, termination will likely result. In terms of a high stickiness and low political incentive for organization termination scenario, termination is not likely, given that there is little political incentive to terminate and strong organizational capacity to resist demands of termination, and as a result the status quo will persist. The final scenario,

low stickiness and low political incentives for organization termination, results in a precarious status quo; instability and risk of potential termination persist because of the organization's low capacity to resist should termination become a threat.

A common thread in this literature is deLeon's model for program termination (e.g. Graddy & Ye, 2008). According to deLeon (1982), a seminal work in policy literature, program termination is considered to have three rationales: Economics (cost reduction); programmatic inefficiencies; and, political ideology. Though sometimes considered individually, "a comprehensive examination of most termination decisions will reveal them to have aspects of – or at least nominal allusions to – all three" (deLeon, 1982, p. 7).

As Graddy & Ye (2008) suggest, given that public programs are supported by public funding it is not beyond expectation that budgetary stresses can cause program termination (e.g. Kirkpatrick et al., 1999). But while this implies cost savings will be incurred following termination, it does not address how a specific programs is selected for termination. Further, according to Graddy & Ye (2008), compensatory costs may be large depending on the obligation to those affected by the termination (e.g. Frantz, 1997). For example, as deLeon (1982) notes, while the termination of projected nuclear power stations in the Pacific Northwest led to short-term saving for the state public utilities, the forecasted 700-800 % increase in electricity rates necessary to cover the bonds issued to purchase the reactors, make the economic argument for termination weak (see also Redburn, 1982; Wilhelm, 1982).

DeLeon (1982) explains that governmental inefficiencies, in other words the government's inability to deliver on objectives in an efficient and timely manner, may also lead to program termination. In this case, if a program is shown to be too expensive in its delivery of products and/or service, then the program is deemed inefficient and is terminated. For example, in the US, Government held that there was a more effective and efficient method for maintaining the country's military deterrence in the air, and thus the Skybolt missile project was terminated (e.g. Enthoven & Smith, 1971). Additionally, federal programs are often cancelled with the belief that state or local government can deliver the program more effectively and efficiently because of their proximity to the population (deLeon, 1982; see also Stanfield, 1981).

Political ideology, or political orientation as it relates to specific programs, as deLeon's third rationale suggests, "necessarily influences the termination decision" (deLeon, 1982, p. 8). Even in time of economic prosperity, political ideology will lead to the termination of programs that do not align with political interest. As Lewis (2002, p. 91) adds, termination to improve economy or efficiency tends to have political overtones, "what one party views as frivolous expense or unforgivable error, another party views as an indispensable component of its program. Perceptions of success or failure hinge on political predispositions."

Typically, economics and inefficiencies are cited openly by government as motivating policy and program termination – as deLeon (1982, p. 8) suggests, "fiscal and operational responsibility is a virtual catechism in government offices; no agency wishes to be accused of wasting money or acting in an inefficient manner." In practice however, political ideology seems to be responsible

for the majority of government terminations (deLeon, 1982; see also Behn, 1976; Cameron, 1978; deLeon, 1987; Frantz, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Adam et al. 2007).

On the other end of the spectrum, deLeon's (1978) classical model for termination resistance posits that rational, deliberate termination may be hindered by six obstacles: (1) Intellectual reluctance; (2) Institutional permanence; (3) Dynamic conservatism; (4) Anti-termination coalitions; (5) Legal obstacles; and, (6) High start-up costs. The first obstacle to program termination, intellectual reluctance, refers to the notion that people, given their vested interest, tend not to like to discover that the underlying thinking behind a policy or program is flawed or out of date (see also Daniels, 1995); Government's are reticent to admit that they have made a mistake (e.g. Sato, 2002). In the case of Japan's Leprosy Isolation Policy, for example, as Sato (2002) describes, because many experts were unwilling to accept international recommendations to redirect leprosy policy toward outpatient service, intellectual reluctance served to obstruct the dismantling of a policy that was no longer scientifically necessary. Frantz (1992) adds that this obstacle also refers to the idea that government's avoid dealing with endings, preferring beginnings, i.e. new and exciting actions or programs.

DeLeon's second obstacle to termination relates to institutional permanence. This obstacle suggests that organizations and programs are designed to endure political shifts. As Lewis (2002) adds, those in power will often anticipate the loss of their influence and insulate new programs against future termination should the eventuality occur. While this notion accepts that political ideology is an important factor in program termination, it also implies that programs are created to perpetuate a value-laden (if partisan) service (e.g. Sato, 2002).

DeLeon's third obstacle to termination is dynamic conservatism, or a program's ability to change its *raison d'être*. In this instance, programs that are able to evolve their objectives and respond to changes in their environment, are able to elude termination (e.g. Frantz, 1992; Daniels, 1995): "when struck with the realisation that the goals which originally justified their existence are no longer meaningful, all [programs] alter those goals" (Frantz, 1992, p. 182). For example, as Kirkpatrick et al. (1999) describes, instead of becoming redundant once the Salk vaccine was developed, the March of Dimes shifted their attention to diseases other than polio.

DeLeon's fourth obstacle refers to groups or networks of people that take action to resist the termination movement. As Frantz (1992) notes, these coalitions usually have a vested interest in the program and tend to counter evidence contrary to their cause. This was the case in Frantz (1992), where despite the rationality of the Government's position, the US Government was stymied by a strong anti-termination coalition (community, patients, staff) for nearly 50 years before they were able to terminate the National Hansens Disease Centre.

DeLeon's fifth barrier to termination relates to legal obstacles. Legal ramifications and the need for due process has the effect of postponing program termination. As Frantz (1992) describes, legal obstacles played a significant role in the impediment of the National Hansens Disease Centre closure.

Under deLeon's model, the last barrier to termination relates to high start-up costs. This obstacle has two distinct but related prongs. The first prong relates to the sunk costs of the program to be

terminated. In this instance, because sunk costs will be lost following termination, termination may be avoided or only partial termination may occur, i.e. the cancelling of some components of a policy or program. Moreover, terminating a program implies that Government made a mistake in launching the program in the first place, and government's avoid admitting their errors (Daniels, 1995).

The second prong associated with this barrier relates to the high start-up cost of a replacement/ alternative program (e.g. Daniels, 1995) and the political liability this may present. In either case, compensatory costs, which may be large depending on the obligation to those affected by the termination (e.g. Frantz, 1997; Graddy & Ye, 2008), can serve as an effective barrier to termination.

METHODS

Narrative analysis was chosen for this study because it allows for the interpretation of rich evidence from the everyday experience, an exploration of meaning and context. Analysis of data, in the context of termination theory, in turn provides insight into the dynamics leading to the dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs.

From a design perspective, this study included two distinct case studies, Case Study 1 (CS1) which focused on the six lead-core departments involved in the CNPS program (Table 1); and Case Study 2 (CS2) which explored 16 councils involved in the CCP-NZ program. Each case study included semi-structured interviews with senior managers responsible for the delivery of the program in their respective organization. Additionally, each case study also included semi-

structured interviews with the program architects that were involved in the creation and macro level delivery of the respective program. In total, 26 interviewees participated in the research.

The core departments were selected based on their lead role in the CNPS initiative and because they represent a good cross section of core NZ ministries in general (NZ Govt., 2007). As for the CCP-NZ program, council selection was based on a range of factors, including the type of council (regional, district or city), year of initial membership, the milestone achieved while participating in the program, the council's population and location (i.e. north v. south island). Ultimately, the councils selected for this research represent a good multi-level cross section of NZ councils.[x]

In order to increase the validity of the study, unsanitised interview transcripts were returned to the interviewees for their approval. Following approval, the transcripts were manually coded (using a highlight and cut and paste method) around themes relating to termination theory.[xi] In order to maintain transparency, and to ensure that what is "claimed to analysed is being analysed" (Pepper & Wildy, 2009, p. 23), the theme development process was well documented. Themes are expressed in the Findings section as rationale for termination; opposition to termination; and, program evaluation. Later in the Discussion section, the data is discussed in the context of deLeon's (1982) rationales for program termination. And, to increase rigour, deLeon's (1978) obstacles to program termination are also explored.

In addition to the semi-structured interviews with the senior managers and program architects, this study was also informed by publicly available information relating to Government's

rationale for discontinuing the CNPS and CCP-NZ programs (i.e. information disclosed on government websites and media releases).

<place Table 1 here>

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FINDINGS

Case study 1 - CNPS program

      Rationale for Termination.[xii]

Given the political climate following the Government's transition from Labour to National, the consensus among the lead-core departments was not that of surprise with regard to the termination of the CNPS program. Four of the six (67%) lead-core departments believed that program termination was strictly politically motivated; Ministry for the Environment B (Table 1) explained that the CNPS program did not resonate as a priority for the new National-led Government.

Moreover, as Department of Conservation (Table 1) indicated:

      [National] knew that sustainability had been one of Helen Clarke's showcases and as she said, "Through vindictiveness they have terminated it." So yes, clearly it was I think politically motivated. Clearly [National] do not see climate change as a serious threat. It is ideology.

In addition to political ideology, an economic imperative for program termination was indicated as well, as suggested by Treasury (Table 1): "I am guessing that our gut feel was cost, central government did not see the value for the money." Along this line, Ministry of Health A (Table 1) explained that program termination related to onerous cost associated with achieving carbon neutrality:

> The country does not have the money to support offsetting all the public sector's carbon emissions. The big thing I guess going back to carbon neutral by 2012, is the fact that to offset it, it was going to cost around $300,000 - $400,000 a year. Treasury were very much painting a gloom and doom picture around 2012-2015 time economically.

As indicated by Ministry for the Environment B (Table 1), according to Nick Smith, Minister for Climate Change Issues and the Environment, the initiatives involved in the CNPS program should occur without requiring a costly program:

> [The Minister's] view was that a lot of the initiatives – you know, the good cost benefit initiatives that were being undertaken in the Carbon Neutral Public Service could easily be undertaken – should be undertaken by government departments anyway.

In contrast with the Minister's belief however, Ministry for the Environment A (Table 1) was of the opinion that without the CNPS program, these initiatives would not have occurred: "I think that the key point behind that was that the Minister's understanding that CNPS would happen anyway because it is a good idea. That is not the case."

Ultimately, there did exist an underlying dislike of the program prior to the shift in Government:

I think that the Minister [(Smith)] had been explicit in his dislike of the program when he was in opposition and the communication that he did not believe that it was necessary to have this program… so it was not a complete surprise (Table 1, Ministry for the Environment A).

Opposition to termination.

Five of the six lead-core departments believed that the Ministry for the Environment, in particular, actively opposed the decision to terminate the program:

[The Ministry for the Environment] put some thoughts together about the success of the program and then tried to get that in front of the Minister. My understanding is that it did not get looked at (Table 1, Ministry for Economic Development A).

In spite of this belief, however, Ministry for the Environment A (Table 1) revealed that it is not the role of the Ministry for the Environment to oppose Government decisions:

It is not our job as officials to fight …when there is a new government, they quickly move – they change gear to align themselves with the new government. It is their job to support the government.

Moreover, following the dismantling of the program, there was a sense of relief among the lead-core departments, particularly with regard to the compliance reporting component of the program (Table 1, Treasury).

Interestingly, the data also suggested that the public were not fully aware of the program: "[the public] did not know before and they probably do not know now" (Table 1, Ministry of Health B). This may have played a role in easing program termination:

> Well, one of the things that I thought that they did not do very well was to sell it. So I think that there were not a lot of people out in the public who actually understood what we were doing. It was very hidden. There probably was not a large public support base there which is why they probably felt comfortable axing it (Table 1, Department of Conservation).

Program evaluation.

No formal evaluation of the program's efficiency and/ or effectiveness occurred prior to its discontinuation, as suggested by five of the six lead-core departments. As Department of Conservation (Table 1) indicated, the decision to terminate was too quick to allow for an adequate evaluation of the program. Moreover, as suggested by Treasury (Table 1), "I think anecdotally, the impression that people got was that there was not [an evaluation]."

Case study 2 - CCP-NZ program

Rationale for termination.

Councils indicated three primary rationales for program termination: political ideology, economics or cost, and programmatic ineffectiveness and design. 10 of the 16 (63%) councils interviewed suggested that political ideology was the primary cause of program termination. According to Southland District Council (Table 2), despite the worth of the CCP-NZ program, the new government did not support the initiative. Nelson City Council (Table 2) concurred,

adding that the National government saw CCP-NZ as a "nice to do' rather than a need to do";
Kaikoura district council B (Table 2) explained that "[National] just didn't see green programs as
a priority." This sentiment is mirrored by Auckland Regional Council A (Table 2):

> So [central government] made a pretty clear message really that they didn't
> think [climate change] was particularly a priority… they expected the councils
> to either pick up the funding or for the programs to collapse and they were fine
> with that…. I think political.

Far North District Council (Table 2) cautioned, however, "that it's not as straight forward or
black and white as [a shift in government]." Waitakere City Council (Table 2) added that
regardless of the government in power, the expectation was that the CCP-NZ program should run
on its own merit, without Government financial support:

> I don't think that it coincided with the change in government - in fact. They
> often put funding to start programs off, but no one expects them to keep on
> funding forever, the programs should have their own momentum.

Along this line, four of the 16 councils indicated that program termination was the result of the
need to cut costs: "It's probably more about financial savings in my mind… a cost saving
exercise" (Table 2, Wellington City Council); "I mean I think that [central government] felt that
there was probably better bang for their bucks elsewhere" (Table 2, Hawkes Bay Regional
Council).

And while Rotorua District Council (Table 2) conceded that a political element does exist, the
CCP-NZ program was ultimately dismantled for economic reasons: "There's an element of

political ideology, some of the elements of the National Government feeling like this is not core philosophy, but its more financial."

Opposition to termination.

Of the five councils that discussed opposition to program termination, three councils indicated that stakeholders were unaware of any organised opposition. Had they had an opportunity, Dunedin City Council (Table 2) explained that council would have lobbied in favour of the program's continuation:

> So there was no opportunity [for opposition]. There was no awareness on our
>
> part that the funding was going to be withdrawn or the program was going to
>
> fall over. It was just bang… otherwise we would have – through the local
>
> government and all the CCP people would have lobbied for it.

In the end, though ICLEI was indeed "lobbying quite hard" (Table 2, Wellington City Council) and encouraged councils to present the value of the CCP-NZ program to Government, termination met little resistance.

Program evaluation.

Nine of the 16 councils interviewed believed that Government did not perform a formal review of the CCP-NZ program's effectiveness, with three councils adding that they were never consulted, as confirmed by Kaikoura district council B (Table 2): "I don't think that it was [evaluated], no. No, we certainly weren't contacted."

While four of the 16 councils believed that a formal review may have or did occur, three of the four councils acknowledged that they were not involved in the review. In a similar vein, and equally tentative, Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 2) admitted that council assumed that the Ministry for the Environment had performed an evaluation and determined the program to be ineffective:

> Well, I think probably MFE – they must have done some analysis and decided you know its all very well saying that we've got 80 percent of the population, but what are they doing – not enough or they are not getting very far? I suspect that [Government] just saw it as ineffective really.

DISCUSSION

Early work on termination theory suggested that public sector programs commonly persisted beyond their *raison d'être* (Kaufman, 1976). Lewis (2002), however, argues that the myth of immortality is largely the result of a lack of academic debate on termination theory in general. Lewis (2002) adds that scholars have failed to adequately connect with the 'widespread' occurrence of termination, particularly with regard to termination associated with changing ideologies.

Rationales for program termination

As discussed earlier, deLeon (1982) argues that program's are abandoned for three key rationales: economics (cost reductions); programmatic inefficiencies; and, political ideology.

Financial or budgetary constraints are typically highlighted for prompting program termination or retrenchment (e.g. Levine, 1982; Behn, 1980; Graddy & Ye, 2008). Budget deficits, be it actual or projected, spur policy makers to enact austerity measures and reduce programs where possible.

Unfortunately, due to limited access to expense information, it is not clear whether savings will result from the discontinuation of the CNPS and CCP-NZ programs, nor is it possible to critically assess the cost/benefit relationship of the programs.[xiii] With that said, as for the CNPS program, it is possible to glean potential costs from existing data, including lead-core departments emission reduction projections as published in their emissions reduction plans (DOC, 2007; IRD, 2008; MED, 2008; MFE, 2008; MOH, 2008; Treasury, 2008). As Birchall et al. (2013) highlight, while savings were anticipated by the lead-core departments, given that estimated program costs, including offsetting the lead-core departments' emissions for the 2008-2012 period were NZ$10.4 million (NZ Govt., 2007), it is not likely that savings from the lead-core agencies would exceed the initial program expense. Further, since the lead-core six departments, by weight, represented only 16% of the 159,000 t-CO2e for the total 34 core public service departments (NZ Govt., 2008), Government's post-2012 offset liability was potentially quite large. Exacerbating the problem further, the Department of Conservation had identified only 50,000 hectares of land suitable and available for offset needs (NZ Govt., 2007). If offsetting requirements for the six lead-core departments necessitated between 10,000 and 27,000 hectares, post-2012 needs most certainly would have exceeded the Department of Conservation's capabilities, thus requiring what would likely have proven a more expensive option.

Ultimately, despite Smith's (2009a) assertion that the CNPS program's only accomplishment was "...to cost this country millions of dollars," the initiative was not promoted as a short-term cost saving exercise. Instead, Labour recognised that "without commitment to greater sustainability, we risk not only damaging our environment, but also exposing our economy to significant risk" (Clark, 2007). Having economics as the central thread in a climate mitigation strategy, tends to miss the significance of sustainable development and the need to address associated environmental issues and their economic causes. However, this highlights another important consideration, the value of carbon offsetting, particularly in terms of the manage-mitigate threshold (e.g. Ball et al., 2009a, 2009b).

Compared to the CNPS program, Government's financial obligation for the CCP-NZ program was relatively minor, with participant councils receiving funding to cover annual membership and NZ$4000 to cover the cost of the intern (who's role was to assist with the completion of Milestone 1). Unlike the CNPS program, the CCP-NZ program was not a Government mandated carbon neutral program and as a result Government was not responsible for council offset requirements.

While annual membership fees were not disclosed, if we liberally calculate the possible obligation for the period between 2004 and 2009 at the maximum rate of NZ$3000 per council per year, based on the revised fee structure, for 6 years and 34 councils, the total is NZ$612,000. Given that not all councils were members of the CCP-NZ program 2004-2009 (some started earlier while others started later), and not all councils had a population greater than 100,000, this

figure is a crude approximation. Additionally, since this is based on the revised fee structure, it may have been a greater sum for the noted term. As for the cost of the intern for each council, at NZ$4000 per council, Government expended approximately $136,000 to assist with the completion of Milestone 1.[xiv] Total expenditure for the CCP-NZ program is thus liberally estimated to be approximately NZ$748,000 for the period 2004-2009. Moving forward, using the revised fee structure, Government's obligation would have been approximately NZ$102,000 per year, plus an additional NZ$4000 for an intern and NZ$3000 per year for every additional council that joined the program. Again, this is based on the highest possible membership fee category, and thus would likely be a lesser sum.

With the expressed aim of the CNPS program being global leadership and long-term economic resilience in a carbon constrained world, and the minimal cost associated with the CCP-NZ program, economics does not scan as the primary driver for program termination. Had the National-led Government rationalised the termination of these programs by suggesting that they were inefficient at achieving their aim, they would have had a more compelling case.

According to Adam et al. (2007), the general performance of an organization does affect its likelihood of termination; the probability of termination increases as an organization becomes less efficient and effective at achieving its objectives. Both the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs suffered from a range of programmatic inefficiencies (e.g. Birchall et al., 2013). While programmatic inefficiencies were not cited by the senior managers as being the rationale for program termination, it is clear, while admittedly speculative, that had the programs continued

(beyond 2009) without modification, these inefficiencies would have likely caused their abandonment.

Yet during the operation of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs, results were realised. In addition to cost and emission reductions, organizations experienced an increase in senior management awareness with regard to operational carbon mitigation and importantly, broadened their network base for sharing of best practices in the area of energy management and sustainability.

Whether the Government was aware of the programs' inefficiencies and successes when the decision to terminate was made, remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that a formal evaluation into the effectiveness of the two programs did not in fact occur prior to their termination, as is evident from the senior managers narratives, and in the case of the CCP-NZ program, confirmed by Local Government New Zealand (Table 2), and ICLEI B (Table 2). Had a formal evaluation occurred, the new National-led Government would have discovered that in spite of a plethora of pitfalls, both the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs had merit and were indeed achieving their goals.

As the literature demonstrates, evaluation is a critical component of the termination process (e.g. deLeon, 1982; Dery, 1984). Whether or not a given program undergoes an evaluation prior to its termination can provide insight into the rationale for the termination. From the perspective of deLeon's model for program termination, National's failure to demonstrate, or even claim in this instance, the inefficiencies of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs detracts from their assertion

that the programs were too expensive. As deLeon (1982) explains, if Government suggests that a program was terminated on the grounds of economics or efficiencies, it would imply that an evaluation would be imperative to the determination of this rationale; "how else can one arrive at program costs or benefits lacking skilled evaluations and the evidential base they provide?" (deLeon, 1982, p.22). If an informal assessment of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs did occur, what criteria was used in the decision to terminate? What role did the targeted agency play, and how involved were the stakeholders? While this research cannot speak to the criteria used to assess the effectiveness of these programs, the findings certainly demonstrate that the organizations and stakeholders involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs played no role whatsoever in the formal determination of the respective initiatives' effectiveness.

If political ideology is the motivation for termination, an evaluation of program effectiveness may be redundant. As explained by deLeon (1982, p.14): "Critical decisions are made on the basis of political expediency and beliefs... they are far removed from rigorous program evaluation and analytic influence." With this in mind, along with the timing of program termination relative to the shift in Government, and with the evidence from the research which demonstrates that 67% of CS1 and 63% of CS2 interviewees believed that program termination was politically motivated, it is convincingly clear that political ideology was the dominant rationale for the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs. This is consistent with the literature (e.g. Behn, 1976; Cameron, 1978; deLeon, 1982; Frantz, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Adam et al. 2007), after all as deLeon (1982, p.14) suggests: "ideology is, of course, the lifeblood of politics."

As Moloney (2010) contends, ideology plays a critical role in crafting meaning and identity, and determining political behaviour. Since its inception in 1916 (Aimer, 2010), when its goals were driven by the industrial labour movement, humanitarian issues and strong anti capitalist/ state controlled economic socialist ideology, Labour has transformed into an "ideological coalition of liberals and socialists," a social democratic centre-left party known as the "third way." Combining traditional humanitarian concerns with free market reforms, contemporary Labour ideology rejects the notion that the economy should be "kept largely subordinate to government" (Giddens 1998, p. 99, in Aimer, 2010), while remaining committed to key social issues such as environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation.

It is here where Labour, centre-left, and National, centre right, diverge. National's economic policy reflects individual freedom, and private enterprise in the economy, a support base that is largely farmers, industrialists, merchants and the upper-middle classes (James 2010). For Key's National-led Government, action on sustainability and climate change mitigation seems to be contingent on cost neutrality, or at the very least low cost/ low commitment. Clark's Labour-led Government, on the other hand, understood that early investment in sustainability and climate change mitigation is not only economically prudent (e.g. Stern, 2006; 2008), it is necessary for NZ to remain globally competitive in a carbon constrained economy.

While National continues to assert that "tackling climate change is the Government's number one environmental priority" (Smith, 2009b), it identifies that "it is unrealistic to continue to pretend we are, or can be, world leaders in reducing emissions" (Smith, 2009b). And to

emphasise the lack of value in the CNPS program, Smith (2009a) denounced it as "just a feel good slogan."

In Clark's (Table 1) view, "tackling climate change is not a major priority for the NZ Government now… they will put any growth ahead of the environment." And while Smith (2009b) acknowledges that "it was the policy of the previous Government for NZ to lead the world on climate change," in reference to the CNPS program, Clark (Table 1) reiterates that "[National's] canning it would have absolutely nothing to do with whether it was succeeding or not. Canning it would be simply pure politics." This sentiment was echoed by Local Government New Zealand (Table 2) and reinforced by Birchall (2013b), where it is suggested that initiatives of the past Government, for example the CCP-NZ program, were rejected for reasons of political ideology.

In the end, the findings suggested that while the National-led Government is not prepared to fund public sector climate control efforts, it does believe that the good cost benefit initiatives should occur anyway, without costly programs such as CNPS and CCP-NZ. Ministry for the Environment A (Table 1) explained, however, that this is not the case: "…I think that the key point behind that was that the Minister's (Smith) understanding that CNPS would happen anyway because it a good idea. That is not the case." Indeed, the lead-core departments have ended their goal of carbon neutrality and scaled back efforts to manage carbon in general.

As for the actions associated with the CCP-NZ program, as ICLEI A indicated:

The big cry and the clear message [from Government] was… that now is the time for local government to take responsibility for [CCP-NZ] – in other words to pay for it; 'they should be doing it anyway and they should be paying for it.'

With the ideological shift towards strong neoliberal market environmentalism, Government support for initiatives like the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs has declined. The National-led Government's expectation is that public sector organizations should endeavour to explore climate mitigation on a cost analysis basis, without support from Government.[xv] As indicated previously, Government's desire to demonstrate leadership on climate mitigation ended when National took office.

Moving forward, while the National-led Government has adopted the target of 50% reduction in CO_2e, as compared to 1990 levels, by 2050, the target's legitimacy is undermined by the fact that it is contingent "upon an effective global agreement" (NZ Govt., 2009), which in coming years may in fact prove elusive given the resistance of critical emitters such as China and the USA. Hobbling National's commitment further, Government recently announced that instead of signing onto the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which began 1 January 2013, NZ will make a voluntary pledge under the Convention Framework (NZ Govt., 2012). Though Government justified the decision by explaining that a pledge under the Convention Framework will align "its climate change efforts with developed and developing countries which collectively are responsible for 85% of global emissions" (NZ Govt., 2012), it nevertheless demonstrates National's lack of commitment to climate change mitigation.

Obstacles to program termination

DeLeon (1978) posits six obstacles to program termination: intellectual reluctance; institutional permanence; dynamic conservatism; anti-termination coalitions; legal obstacles; and, high start-

up costs. The first obstacle, intellectual reluctance, refers to the notion that those involved in a program tend to avoid the truth of their error - Government's tend not to like admitting that they made a mistake in promoting (and funding) an ineffective or poorly conceived program (e.g Daniels, 1995). Notwithstanding the inefficiencies associated with these programs, had the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs been dismantled by a succeeding Labour led-Government, then perhaps this barrier would have been sufficient to block termination. However, in the case of a shift in Government party leadership, intellectual reluctance is not a barrier, but instead can be used by the new Government to demonstrate the previous Government's failings.

As Frantz (1992) adds, this obstacle also refers to the idea that government's avoid dealing with endings, preferring beginnings, i.e. new and exciting actions or programs. In the case of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs, following their termination the National-led Government diverted attention towards its new climate change agenda, namely the re-conceived emissions trading scheme. As Bardach (1976) indicated, program A must be terminated in order for program B to flourish. While Labour embraced both global leadership on carbon neutrality and an all-sector (and all-emission) emissions trading scheme, because of National's resistance to Labour initiatives, particularly those that placed short-term costs on Government, it abandoned the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs full-stop. As a result of its international obligation to the Kyoto Protocol, Government was not in a position to terminate the emissions trading scheme, so instead National revised the scheme's approach and delayed sector compliance.[xvi]

The second obstacle is institutional permanence. This obstacle speaks to the notion that programs are designed to endure political shifts, with those that are obscure or old, and well entrenched

being particularly good at avoiding termination. Though early scholarship on termination theory argues that public sector programs (and or organizations) are virtually immortal (e.g. Kaufman, 1976), more recent research suggests otherwise (e.g. Lewis, 2002). And while it has been demonstrated that a program's age is positively correlated to its chance of survival, Sato (2002) explains that when termination does occur, it occurs with either a bang or a whimper. In the case of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs, given the paradigm shift in political ideology following the 2008 election, the programs' relative newness, and having been the flagship initiative of the previous Prime Minister, termination was swift.

The third obstacle is dynamic conservatism. According to the literature, if a program is able to evolve its *reason d'être*, it can avoid termination (e.g. Frantz, 1992; Daniels, 1995; Kirkpatrick et al., 1999). The ending of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs was swift, and though National suggested that the good cost-benefit initiative should carry on, without Government support efforts were significantly scaled back. Perhaps instead of outright termination, National should have evolved the programs into Government mandated and supported carbon management strategies.[xvii] This would remove the offset requirement and allow Government to benefit from the investment already incurred.

The fourth obstacle relates to the presence of anti-termination coalitions. Organised groups or networks, typically those with a vested interest in the program's continuation, will take action to resist termination (e.g. Frantz, 1992). As the research demonstrated, though organizations participating in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs were well networked, organised resistance to termination did not exist. In fact, in the case of the CNPS program, while five of the six lead-

core agencies believed that the Ministry for the Environment was working to oppose program termination, Ministry for the Environment A (Table 1) indicated: "it is not our job as officials to fight…when there is a new government, they quickly move – [the ministry] change gear to align themselves with the new government. It is their job to support the government." In the end, as Adam et al. (2007)'s typology suggests, when low stickiness (lack of resistance) is correlated with high political incentive (shift in government), program termination is more often than not the outcome.

DeLeon's final two obstacles to program termination relate to legal barriers and high start-up (or sunk) costs. In terms of the former, while legal discussions were beyond the scope of this research, neither the former Prime Minister of NZ nor the CEO of ICLEI, mentioned any legal ramifications associated with the termination of their respective program. As for high start-up costs, because the new National-led Government was not interested in proceeding with Labour's ambition to lead the world on carbon neutrality, believing that Labour's efforts were too costly to Government, termination of Labour's programs was seen as a cost saving exercise instead of costing Government further. The lack of an evaluation of the programs' effectiveness is further evidence that the National-led Government was not interested in assessing the value of the programs, financial or otherwise. National's ideological desire to distance itself from Labour initiatives thus further supports the notion that regardless of funds spent, sunk costs were not a barrier to program termination.

CONCLUSION

Using deLeon's classical model for program termination to explore the dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs, this study finds that though economic constraints and programmatic inefficiencies may have played a role, political ideology was the primary rationale for program termination.

NZ's newly elected National-led Government indicated that the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs were terminated for reasons of conventional neoliberal economic ideology; despite the sunk costs, immediate termination of the programs was considered a sound method to stem further expense. Unfortunately, due to limited access to expense information, it was not possible to critically assess the cost/benefit relationship of the programs beyond insights gained from the participants. As for programmatic inefficiencies, it is clear from the narratives that programmatic challenges were endemic. The initiatives nevertheless enjoyed some success, with senior managers from both programs indicating that emission reductions and cost savings were experienced, along with several non-financial benefits such as increased awareness around climate change and carbon mitigation, and improved network circles (e.g. Birchall et al., 2013; Birchall, 2013a).

Ultimately, given the preponderance of evidence from the data, it is clear that the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programs were both abandoned for reasons of political ideology. Sustainability and the desire to demonstrate leadership on carbon mitigation was a cornerstone of Clark's Labour-led Government. Key's National-led Government expressed a need to get beyond unrealistic aspirations and to give NZ's climate agenda a reality check, citing the gap between Labour's

ambition to lead the world on carbon neutrality and NZ's increasing contribution to global GHG emissions as justification for the shift in policy.

Program termination has remained an understudied field since its first application by Biller in 1976 (Graddy & Ye, 2008), yet it remains a potentially important component of the public policy process (e.g. deLeon, 1997). This research demonstrates that the application of deLeon's model for program termination is appropriate for exploring the contemporary topic of public sector organizational carbon mitigation. DeLeon's approach has proven sufficiently robust to tease out the nuances of vested interest (program architects) and experience (senior managers). Though deLeon's theory for program termination is useful on its own, the inclusion of deLeon's obstacles to program termination provides more depth to the analysis and can help in the final development of a conclusion vis-a-vis the rationale(s) for program termination. In the end, the theoretical implications of the study's findings support the notion that "what one party views as frivolous expense or unforgivable error, another party views as indispensable" (Lewis, 2002, p.91).

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[i] While Kaufman (1985) argues that organizational survival is a matter of luck, and that there are no patterns in the process, Kirkpatrick (1999), on the other hand, notes that while there is indeed a paucity of theory-generating case studies from which to draw, there nevertheless exists sufficient examples to establish patterns among cases.

[ii] These studies range from research and development programs, to the D.C. motorcycle squad (Bardach, 1976) and public training schools in Massachusetts (Behn, 1976; Bardach, 1976), to the California Mental Health system (Cameron, 1978), the U.S. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (deLeon, 1982), the U.S. National Hansen's Disease Centre (Frantz, 1992, 2002), Oklahoma's State training schools (Daniels, 1995), the U.S. Federal Revenue Sharing Program (Kirkpatrick et al. 1999), term limits in the Michigan legislature (Harris, 2001), through a range of US agencies (Carpenter & Lewis, 2004; Shockley, 2012), and hospitals in California (Graddy & Ye, 2008).

[iii] For example: Project Renewal in Israel (Dery, 1984), Leprosy Isolation Policy in Japan (Sato, 2002); network termination in Australia's agriculture sector (Botterill, 2005), Taiwan's nuclear program (Hsu, 2005).

[iv] The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, today known as ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), was founded in 1990. ICLEI is an international, not-for-profit association of local governments and local government organizations, with 1105 members in 66 countries (CCP-NZ, 2009)

[v] For clarity, the core public sector/service refers to the 34 departments (government agencies) that were mandated to participate in the CNPS program, but does not include the broader state sector (e.g. Crown entities, schools, district health boards) (NZ Govt., 2007).

[vi] The National-led Government also modified the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme, transforming it into an arguably weaker form; National's Energy Strategy shifted from Labour's focus on sustainability to one centered around economic development (e.g. Birchall et al., 2013).

[vii] A bureaucracy is characterized by permanence and continuity, while a market is characterized by change; markets are designed to tolerate termination (Biller, 1976).

[viii] While the Kaufman (1976) study consisted of two points in time,1923 and 1973, the Lewis (2002) study looked at agency mortality between two points in time,1946 and 1997.

[ix] According to Adam et al. (2007), once an organization reaches a certain critical age threshold, its chance of survival becomes high.

[x] Because many senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CCP-NZ program were disestablished following program termination, access for interviews was limited, and became increasingly more limited as time passed.

Acknowledgments

About the Author

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Termination Theory and National Climate Change Mitigation Programs: The Case of New Zealand

Table 1

Case Study 1 - CNPS program interviewees (September 2009 - April 2010)

Department	Interviewee(s)	Location	Date	Duration
Senior Managers				
Department of Conservation	Sustainability Manager	Wellington, NZ	25-Sep-09	1hr 47 min
Inland Revenue Department	Sustainability Manager	Wellington, NZ	22-Sep-09	1hr 38 min
Ministry of Economic Development	(A) Procurement and Sustainability Advisor (B) Group Manager for Performance Governance and Assurance (C) Manager of Facilities Management	Wellington, NZ	24-Sep-09	60 min
Ministry for the Environment	(A) Manager, Carbon Markets and Emissions Trading Group (B) Senior Analyst	Wellington, NZ	22-Sep-09	1hr 07 min
Ministry of Health	(A) Senior Advisor, Procurement and Contracts (B) Project Leader, Procurement and Contracts	Wellington, NZ	25-Sep-09	55 min
Treasury	Facilities Manager, Sustainability Manager	Wellington, NZ	24-Sep-09	60 min
Program Architect				
Former Prime Minister	Helen Clark	New York City, USA	6-Apr-10	38 min

Termination Theory and National Climate Change Mitigation Programs: The Case of New Zealand

Table 2

Case Study 2 - CCP-NZ program interviewees (January 2010 - July 2011)

Council	Interviewee(s)	Location	Date	Duration
Senior Managers				
Regional				
Auckland	(A) Project Leader, Sustainability (B) Senior Policy Analyst, Corporate Sustainability Manager	Auckland, NZ	23-Feb-10	1hr 5 min
Environment Canterbury	Energy Policy Analyst	Christchurch, NZ	11-Jan-10	44 min
Greater Wellington	Regional Climate Response Coordinator	Wellington, NZ	8-Feb-10	1hr 21 min
Hawke's Bay	Group Manager Assets Management	Napier, NZ	15-Feb-10	55 min
District				
Far North	Senior Planner	Kerikeri, NZ	26-Feb-10	32 min
Kaikoura	(A) District Planner (B) District Planner	Kaikoura, NZ	3-Feb-10	52 min
Kapiti Coast	Senior Advisor, Climate Change and Energy	Paraparaumu, NZ	11-Feb-10	56 min
Rotorua	Business Manager	Rotorua, NZ	16-Feb-10	1hr 5 min
Southland	Assistant Corporate Planner	Invercargill, NZ	25-Jan-10	47 min
City				
Auckland	Senior Sustainability Policy Analyst	Auckland, NZ	23-Feb-10	55 min
Christchurch	Principal Advisor, Sustainability	Christchurch, NZ	22-Jun-10	1h 20 min
Dunedin	Energy Manager	Dunedin, NZ	27-Jan-10	1h 14 min
Hamilton	Energy Manager	Hamilton, NZ	18-Feb-10	1h 4 min
Nelson	Senior Policy Planner	Nelson, NZ	5-Feb-10	53 min
Waitakere	Energy Manager	Henderson, NZ	24-Feb-10	45 min
Wellington	Senior Advisor	Wellington, NZ	11-Feb-10	54 min
Program Architects				
Local Government New Zealand	Senior Policy Analyst	Wellington, NZ	22-Jul-11	56 min
ICLEI	(A) CCP-NZ National Program Manager	Wellington, NZ	12-Feb-10	54 min
	(B) CEO ICLEI, Director ICLEI Oceania	Melbourne, AUS	6-Jul-10	1h 27 min