



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, tests publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE REVIVAL OF THE MANCHU MONARCHY
IN EARLY REPUBLICAN CHINA WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION
MOVEMENT OF CHANG HSUN

by

HO MAN CHAN

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1988

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-45561-6

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR

HO MAN CHAN

TITLE OF THESIS

THE REVIVAL OF THE MANCHU MONARCHY
IN EARLY REPUBLICAN CHINA WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION
MOVEMENT OF CHANG HSUN

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED 1988

Permission is hereby granted to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

(SIGNED)

Chen Ho Man

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

83 PERCIVAL ST.

5/F, FLAT C

HONG KONG

DATED 5 OCT 1988

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "THE REVIVAL OF THE MANCHU MONARCHY IN EARLY REPUBLICAN CHINA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT OF CHAN HSUN" submitted by HO MAN CHAN in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

Paul L. Chan

Supervisor

J. H. Munro

J. H. Munro

J. H. Munro

Date...5., Oct., 1958.....

*Dedicated
to
My Parents*

ABSTRACT

On October 10, 1911 a revolution broke out in China and the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911), which had been founded by the Manchus in 1644, was overthrown by the Chinese revolutionaries. The Ch'ing emperor abdicated on February 12, 1912. After the abdication, loyalists to the Ch'ing dynasty who attempted to restore the deposed emperor to the throne became known as "restorationists". A number of abortive movements were launched between 1913 and 1916 designed to restore the Ch'ing dynasty. A further attempt was made in 1917 when Chang Hsun, a warlord from Anhwei, took advantage of the conflicts between President Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan Ch' i-jui to enter the political situation as a mediator. His real intention was to restore the Ch'ing emperor which he did on July 1, 1917. This restoration movement, however, came to an end after twelve days when Chang Hsun was defeated by the anti-restoration army led by Premier Tuan.

This thesis discussed restoration movements from the beginning of the republic with an emphasis on Chang Hsun's movement of 1917. In the historiography of modern China the success of the nationalist revolution and later of the communist revolution overshadows and trivializes the various restoration movements. Restoration is regarded as a "heresy" and as counter-revolution. The objective of the thesis is to attempt to discern the historical value of the restorationists and their movements within republican

history. An additional objective is to give a balanced historical treatment. The thesis reveals that the restoration movements are a reflection of the incompleteness of the Chinese revolution and of the resulting instability of the Republic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Brian L. Evans, for his guidance and support throughout the process of research and writing of the thesis, and to Dr. Jennifer Jay for her encouragement and help. In addition, I want to thank the members of the committee: Professor Stanley R. Munro of the Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures, and Dr. Kenneth J. Munro, Dr. Brian Evans and Dr. Jennifer Jay of the Department of History. I wish to thank Kam-yuan Fung who helped me in gathering useful information and Jenny Lay who assisted me with photocopying and categorizing the research material. I would also like to express my thanks to David A. Kales for typing and proofreading this thesis, and Allan Kwong, Peter Leung, Loi-tat Liu, Jimmy Mok, and Siu-hung Wong for helping to solve technical problems associated with the final production of the thesis. I am indebted to the Library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the University of Toronto Library, and the University of Alberta Library for their assistance in gathering information. Finally, I wish to thank my family, and in particular, my parents, for their support and encouragement.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

- Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao 近代史資料
[Material on Contemporary Chinese History] CTSTL
- Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shi lun-chi 中國現代史論集
[Critical Essays on Modern Chinese History] CKHTS
- Hsin-ch'ing-nien 新青年
[The New Youth] HCN
- I-chiu-i-ch' i-nien ting-ssu Ch'ing-ti fu-p' i shih-liao
hui-pien 一九一七年丁巳清帝復辟史料彙編
[Documentary Collection of the Historical Materials
regarding the Restoration of the Ch'ing Emperor in
1917] TSCT
- Jen-wen yueh-k'an 人文月刊
[People's Literary Monthly] JWYK
- K'ang Yu-wei cheng-lun-chi 康有為政論集
[Critical Essays of K'ang Yu-wei] KYC
- Ko-ming wen-hsien 革命文獻
[Documents of the Revolution] KMWH
- Kuo-li Tai-wan ta-hsueh li-shih hsueh-hsi hsueh-pao
國立台灣大學歷史學系學報
[Journal of the Department of History of National
University of Taiwan] KLTW
- Pei-yang chun-fa shih-liao hsuan-chi 北洋軍閥史料選輯
[Selected Historical Materials of the Peiyang
Warlords] PYCF
- United States Military Intelligence Reports China USMI

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE REVOLUTION AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE DYNASTY ...	19
III. FACTIONS WITHIN THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT	47
IV. THE RESTORATION MOVEMENTS BEFORE 1917	79
V. THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT OF CHANG HSUN AND ITS AFTERMATH	108
VI. CONCLUSION	150
BIBLIOGRAPHY	161
APPENDIX	180

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Republican Revolution of October 10, 1911 overthrew the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911) and ended two thousand years of imperial rule in China. On February 12, 1912, Hsuan-t'ung¹, Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty (r. 1908-1912), who was only six years old, abdicated after accepting the Articles of Favourable Treatment granted by the provisional republican government.² The most drastic upheaval of the revolution was the replacement of the monarchy by a new republican system that had no precedent in Chinese history.

Yuan Shih-k'ai, the provisional president of the new Chinese Republic, made the following speech on the day of the Manchu abdication:

The Republic is universally [sic] recognized as the best form of state ... Now that the Ch'ing emperor has clearly announced his abdication in a rescript which has been countersigned by me, the date of such announcement is the end of the Imperial administration and the beginning of the Republic. Let us henceforth forge ahead and endeavour to reach a state of perfection. Never shall we allow the monarchical system to reappear in China.³

The idea of a republic was challenged by the monarchists after the proclamation of the Republic in 1912. Ironically, one of the challenges came from Yuan Shih-k'ai, the president of the republic, who sought to proclaim himself in 1915. The loyalists of the Ch'ing dynasty were another reactionary force who attempted to restore the deposed emperor to the throne. Historians give

these loyalists the name "restorationists". They came from different backgrounds, such as nobles of the Imperial family, former Ch'ing officials and intellectuals. The restoration movement, however, is usually considered by historians to be less significant than the monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-k'ai. When people talk about the revival of monarchy in China in 1910s, it is Yuan's monarchical movement that they recall.

The concept of restoring the old autocratic monarchical system is usually regarded as conservative and reactionary because of the progress of the Chinese society in the early twentieth century. The ideas and actions of the restorationists were laughable and untenable judged from a modern point of view. Therefore, discussion of restoration movements has been neglected by scholars, or held to be of trivial interest.⁴

In this thesis, I propose to discuss the second reactionary force -- the activities of the restorationists from 1912 to 1917 with special reference to Chang Hsun's restoration movement in 1917. I chose to emphasize Chang Hsun restoration because it was the only restoration movement to be successful. Furthermore, the Chang Hsun restoration can be said to be the culmination of repeated abortive restoration movements from 1912 to 1917.

Chang Hsun was a warlord from Anhwei and maintained his loyalty to the Imperial house after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty. Not only did Chang retain his queue, but he

Although he was also loyal to Yuan Shih-k'ai, this loyalty was only conditional and not absolute.³⁶ To show his loyalty to the imperial family, Chang continued to defend the interests of the imperial house. His troops still wore the queues, thus gaining him the nick name, "Pigtail General". With the death of Empress Dowager Lung Yu, Chang announced national mourning and went on saying that "all we republican officials are the subjects of the Great Ch'ing."³⁷ Chang Hsun had connections with the restorationists like Liu T'ing-shen and Hu Ssu-ching and had participated in the restoration movement in 1913 and 1916.

Chang Hsun was regarded as an important ally in the restoration camp because of his strong military power and his loyalties to the Ch'ing Court. Chang's troops were stationed in Hsuchow in Anhwei province. His troops were not great in number, in fact only around twenty thousand, but they were equipped with modern weapons and possessed a good reserve of ammunition.³⁸ Furthermore, Chang had significant influence on other military Governors. For instance, Chang and Chang Tso-lin, the military Governor of Fengtien, were relatives and good friends. Ni Ssu-ch'ung,³⁹ the inspector general of Anhwei, and Lu Jung-t'ing,⁴⁰ inspector general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, were sworn brothers of Chang Hsun and called him "big brother." With strong military power, Chang Hsun was always thinking of the restoration of the Manchu emperor. But when Yuan Shih-k'ai was still alive, Chang had scruples. When Yuan died on 1916, Chang was set free and

waited for his chance to come.

The Moderate sub-group was led by Hsu Shih-ch'ang. They were very careful in promoting the restorationist cause. They did not like the radical faction which only depended on military power. They hoped to get assent from various segments like political and foreign supporters before the restoration movement could be carried out.

Hsu shih-ch'ang⁴¹ was a native of Tientsin. He received a traditional education in his home province. At the age of twenty-five, Hsu worked as a tutor in the family of a district magistrate in Honan. It was at that period that he met Yuan Shih-k'ai and they became good friends. Receiving financial help from Yuan, Hsu finally went to Peking and passed the Civil Service Examination and became a compiler in the National Academy in 1889. In 1896, he worked under Yuan Shih-k'ai and became Chief of Staff in the new army in Hsiao-chan. From the 1900's onward, Hsu's fortunes came and he went from the position of a subordinate official to the post of associate premier and member of the Grand Council. When the revolution broke out, Hsu succeeded in helping Yuan come out of retirement. When Yuan forced the Ch'ing emperor to abdicate, Hsu was in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, Hsu was grateful to the Ch'ing Court for promoting him from a subordinate official to a high official. On the other hand, Yuan was his most intimate friend, and he could not go against him. As a result, Hsu was trapped between the Ch'ing court and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Therefore, after the abdication,

Hsu resigned from office in order to please both parties.

In May 1914, Hsu Shih-ch'ang came out of retirement and agreed to become the Secretary of State, but he resigned from the post in 1915 because of his opposition to Yuan's monarchical movement.⁴² Nevertheless, Hsu Shih-Ch'ang would never forget the benevolence of the former Ch'ing dynasty. In 1916, when Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement failed, Hsu became Secretary of State again. Thereupon, Hsu then conspired with Chang Hsun for the restoration of the Manchu emperor but the plan was repudiated by the Ch'ing court.⁴³ In June 1916, Hsu advocated the restoration idea at Yuan's funeral without success.⁴⁴ Hsu also attempted to get support from the Japanese by sending a delegate to test the response of the Japanese government to the restoration. It was not successful. Hsu was a secure man and never did things which had no chance of success. Hsu would never carry out the restoration movement unless he was sure that he could gain support from various other sectors.

The Hesitant sub-group consisted of the Old Bureaucrats who had the intention of restoring of Manchu emperor, but they would never play the role of initiator and would not sacrifice their present wealth and power for the restoration movement. They would join the restoration movement only when they thought that it had a chance of success and would bring them power. This group can be represented by Feng Kuo-chang.

Feng Kuo-chang was a native of Chihli.⁴⁵ In 1890, Feng graduated from Military Academy at Tientsin. In 1896, Feng

served Yuan Shih-k'ai in Hsiao-chan as head of the training section of staff. From then on, he became a loyal supporter of Yuan. After the outbreak of the revolution, he became the commander of the First Army, and later the commander of the Imperial Guard. Feng did not favour the abdication of the Manchu emperor; however, he had to give in under the pressure of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Instructed by Yuan, Feng persuaded the Imperial Guard to accept the abdication of the emperor under the offer of favorable treatment and he used his life as an assurance that the promise of the republican government would be kept.⁴⁶ After the establishment of the republic, Feng was appointed Chief of the Military Council and then military Governor of Chihli province. In 1913, Feng again replaced Chang Hsun as the military Governor of Kiangsu.

Feng Kuo-chang, like Chang Hsun and Hsu Shih-ch'ang had sentimental ties to the Ch'ing court. He did not favour the abdication of the emperor, but he could not disobey Yuan Shih-k'ai's order. After the abdication of the Ch'ing dynasty, Feng ordered the people living in the Southern Garden (close to the Forbidden City) not to raise the republican flag because it might make the dowager sad.⁴⁷ Again in 1912, Feng wrote a letter to Yuan hoping that he could protect the imperial family.⁴⁸ Feng had connections with many restorationists and employed Hu Chih-yuan, a famous I-lao, as secretary. Feng also participated in the restoration movement of 1913 and 1916.

Forbidden City Faction

The Forbidden City faction was composed of former Ch'ing officials who continued to serve in the small imperial court in the Forbidden City after the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty. This group was represented by Chen Pao-shen, a Fukienese who had been a sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat and Vice-President of the Board of Rites. After the establishment of the Republic, Chen became the tutor of P'u-yi.

Chen Pao-shen, like other restorationists, was loyal to the Ch'ing dynasty and hoped the idea of restoration would come true. Chen frequently mentioned to P'u-yi the golden age of the reigns of emperor K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung and the magnificence of the Tung-chih Restoration.⁴⁹ Chen always denounced the evil of the republic and reminded P'u-yi that

"The Republic has only been in existence for a few years, but both heaven and the people have from the beginning been angry ... the people think of the Ch'ing in their hearts: heaven and the people will inevitably end by returning it to power."⁵⁰

Chen Pao-shen was a cautious man. He did not want to carry out the restoration in a rash manner. He wanted to wait until the people's hatred for the republican government grew stronger and the warlords were weakened by internal struggle. Furthermore, Chen and his collaborators always wanted to find a military strongman to carry out the restoration movement. Therefore, they had put their hopes on Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Hsun and other military leaders like

Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Jung-t'ing and Chang Tso-lin.

Constitutional Monarchy Faction

The Constitutional Monarchy faction was led by K'ang Yu-wei. Although the Constitutional Monarchy faction and other factions had the same goal of Manchu restoration, they were different in the political ideas. The Tsung-she Tang, I-lao and the Old Bureaucrats were aiming at the restoration of the monarchy under the same autocratic system. K'ang, however, advocated the restoration monarchy under a new system called "titular monarch republicanism" (Hsu-chun k'ung-ho), that was the same as a constitutional monarchy.

K'ang Yu-wei was born in Canton.⁵¹ Although he received a traditional education, he devoted time to the study of western ideas after being inspired by the British administrative method when he visited Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1879 and 1882. Afterwards, K'ang wrote many articles advocating westernization of China to save it from foreign aggression. His ideas of reform finally attracted the Kuang-hsu emperor. Under the support of the emperor, K'ang began to put his ideas into practice and to carry out a series of reforms in 1898 which were later known as the "Hundred Day Reform". From then on, K'ang was grateful to the Emperor and became a life-long loyalist. The reforms were opposed by the conservatives led by the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi. The Empress Dowager then staged a coup d'etat in September and imprisoned the emperor. K'ang then fled first

to Hong Kong and then to Japan. In 1899, K'ang left Japan for Canada and founded the Pao-huang hui (Society to protect the Emperor) in Victoria, British Columbia.⁵² The Pao-huang hui developed very quickly and by 1903, there were branches of Pao-huang hui in one hundred and seventy cities in the United States, Canada, Hawaii, Panama, Australia, Mexico, Peru and Japan.⁵³ In July 1906 when the Ch'ing dynasty determined to adopt the Constitutional Monarchy, K'ang changed the name of Pao-huang hui to Ti-kuo hsien-cheng-hui (Imperial Constitutional Association).⁵⁴

When the revolution broke out in October 1911, K'ang did not want to see the revolutionaries succeed. K'ang had written an article called "Chiu-wang lun" (On Salvation from disaster) in September 1911 which expressed the idea of a Constitutional Monarchy.⁵⁵ After the revolution he re-emphasized the idea in an article titled "Kung-ho cheng-ti lun" (On the republican system of government). In this article, K'ang again advocated the idea of "titular Monarchy Republicanism". He argued that the monarchical republic was the best form of government and China could only avoid disaster and chaos by adopting it. Under the system of a monarchical republic, the emperor was powerless. he was "no more than a temple idol, a thing of mud and wood, no more than the bearer of an august but empty title."⁵⁶ The real power was to rest in parliament. The presence of the monarchy would only act as a symbol of cohesion, to preserve order and to avoid anarchy in the state.⁵⁷

The success of the revolution and the establishment of the republic in 1912, however, was a blow to K'ang Yu-wei. He then expressed his anger and dissatisfaction through his writing. In February 1913, he ordered his students Mai Ting-hua and Chen Hsun-i to publish a monthly magazine called Pu-jen (I Cannot Bear).⁵⁸ From then on, Pu-jen collected most of K'ang's political essays such as "Chung-kuo i-ho fang-fa chiu-wei lun" (Formula for the salvation of China) written in 1913 and "Chung-kuo shan-hou I" (Proposal for the reconstruction of China) written in 1916. These articles expressed the same idea of "titular monarchy republic" and the restoration of the Manchu emperor.

Why did K'ang Yu-wei insist on the idea of a titular monarchy republic when the idea of republicanism was so popular? K'ang was stubborn in character and it was hard for him to compromise or adapt to any change. Once he regarded the Constitutional Monarchy as the best form of government, apparently, nothing could change his ideas.⁵⁹ In addition, K'ang's was suspicious of the idea of republicanism. This feeling could be seen from his preface in the Pu-jen magazine.⁶⁰ Finally, as mentioned before, K'ang was grateful to the benevolence of Kuang-hsu Emperor. After the emperor died, K'ang transferred his loyalty to P'u-yi.⁶¹

K'ang Yu-wei returned to China in June 1914. He resided in Shanghai and interacted with some I-lao like Shen Tseng-chih.⁶² K'ang also spent most of his time writing

essays advocating the restoration of the Manchu emperor. K'ang's student, Pan Jo-hai served in the office of Chang Hsun and Feng Kuo-chang respectively in order to influence them with the idea of restoration.⁶³ After the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916, K'ang began to communicate with Chang Hsun in letters and encouraged him to restore the Manchu monarchy.⁶⁴

Japanese Ronin

The Japanese Ronin faction was represented by Kawashima Naniwa, Mumekata Kotaro, and Tsukuda Nobuo. The Ronin were of the opinion that the security of Japan lay in the conquest of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The restoration movement was very helpful for the Ronin to achieve their plan. Once Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were segregated from China, Japan could then control the area by establishing a puppet government. At the same time, the restorationists in China hoped for help from Japan; as a result, the collaboration between the Japanese Ronin and the Chinese restorationists seemed natural and reasonable.

Kawashima Naniwa came from samurai origins and served as interpreter in the army during the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war.⁶⁵ When the Boxer Rebellion broke out in 1900, Kawashima became the head of the police in the Japanese-occupied zone of Peking. At that time, Kawashima came to the acquaintance of Shan-chi and they became good friends. Kawashima succeeded in convincing Shan-chi about the benefits of

pan-Asianism.⁶⁶ Later, Kawashima was employed by the Ch'ing government to organize a school to train the Chinese police in the Japanese model. Subsequently, on the recommendation of Shan-chi, Kawashima became the highest advisor to the Chinese police force. In February 1912, when the Ch'ing emperor abdicated, Kawashima helped Shan-chi escape from Peking to Japanese-occupied Lushun. Shan-chi was one of the chief opponents to the abdication of the emperor. After the establishment of the republic, he and other restorationists tried to gain the support of the Japanese government to establish Manchu rule in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.⁶⁷ Under the guidance of Kawashima and with the collaboration of the Chinese restorationists, the Manchuria and Mongolian Independent Movement was launched in 1912 and 1916.

Mumekata Kotaro was also a Japanese Ronin who had been working as a spy in gathering information at the naval bases in Weihaiwei and Lushun in China during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. After the revolution of 1911, Mumekata was very active in China and made contact with restorationists such as Cheng Hsiao-hsu and Hu Chih-yuan. He also participated in the 1916 restoration movement and provided financial support to the restorationists.⁶⁸

Tsukuda Nobuo was a Japanese Ronin and had worked with Uchida Ryohei⁶⁹ and Miyazaki Toten⁷⁰ in helping the Chinese revolutionaries overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty. After the revolution, Tsukuda became alienated from the revolutionaries. This change, due to the turmoil of the

Chinese republic, made him lose confidence in the republican system and he gradually became a monarchist.⁷¹ In 1916, Tsukuda participated in the campaign against Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement and gave support to the Manchuria and Mongolia Independent Movement. Tsukuda then returned to Japan and became an enthusiast of the restoration movement. He wanted to use it as a means to turn Manchuria and Mongolia over to Japanese control.⁷² In January 1917, Tsukuda went to China to have an interview with Chang Hsun in Hsuchou of Anhwei. Tsukuda and Chang soon became good friends. From then on, Tsukuda served as a bridge between the Chinese restorationists and the Japanese government in the restoration movement.

From the above introduction of the factions of the restorationists, one can see that the restorationists came from different backgrounds. They included intellectuals like Cheng Hsiao-hsu, political idealists like K'ang Yu-wei, nimble diplomats and administrators like Hsu Shih-ch'ang, and military strong men like Chang Hsun. If they could really work together, the future of the republic would have been dim. But, there were many conflicts among the restorationists. Although they had the same goal of restoration, they did not really co-operate but always tried to win out over each other for power.

There were underlying conflicts within the I-lao faction. Before the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty, Lao Nai-hsuan, Hu Ssu-ching and Liu T'ing-shen originally

belonged to the conservative group which opposed reforms. Shen Tseng-chih and Cheng Hsiao-hsu belonged to the group of reformers.⁷³ Although they were to co-operate under the same goal of restoration, their fundamental differences made it hard for them to form genuine alliances. For instance in the March of 1917, Cheng Hsiao-hsu and Sheng-yun planned to make a loan from Germany; however, Liu T'ing-shen, Chang Hsun's subordinate official, knew of the plan and tried to hinder it. He hoped that Chang Hsun would get the loan.⁷⁴

The Constitutional monarchy faction led by K'ang Yu-wei also had conflicts with other restorationists. K'ang advocated the idea of a titular monarchic republic while other factions advocated the idea of an autocratic monarch. Before the restoration movement was put into reality, K'ang and other factions were still able to work together. But when the restoration movement was put into practice, the question of what system would be implemented after the Manchu emperor was brought back to the throne divided them. Furthermore, some conservatives in the I-lao group like Hu Ssu-ching were prejudiced against K'ang. The reason had to date back to the Hundred Day Reform in 1898 when K'ang's reform ideas created discontent among the conservatives. Hu was very opposed to K'ang's interaction with other I-lao and tried to persuade them not to deal with him.⁷⁵

In the Old Bureaucrats group, Hsu Shih-ch'ang and Chang Hsun were not on good terms. They each wanted to become the initiator of the restoration movement and hoped to dominate

the government after the restoration. Hsu even made a proposal for restoration with himself as regent and his daughter as P'u-yi's wife.⁷⁶ When the plan became known to Chang Hsun, he became angry and refused the proposal. This was the beginning of the struggle between Chang and Hsu.

Chang Hsun was not only in conflict with Hsu Shih-ch'ang, but he also engaged in a power struggle with Sheng-yun of the Tsung-she Tang. Chang and Sheng-yun both hoped to control the restoration movement. The members of Tsung-she Tang like Shan-chi and P'u-wei offered their support to Sheng-yun. In the restoration movement of 1917, Chang Hsun only gave Sheng-yun the empty title of "Grand Secretary" and Sheng-yun and his colleagues did not support Chang.⁷⁷

From the above, one can see that among within the restorationists, there were many conflicts and problems. The restorationists did not have perseverance nor a spirit of sacrifice. Although the restorationists had the common goal of restoration, they did not co-operate genuinely and still wanted to win control over each other and acquire personal power and status. Furthermore, many restorationists also held a wait-and-see, hesitant attitude toward the restoration movement. If the restoration movement had shown any signs of success, they would support it, otherwise, if it looked as though it would fail, they would withdraw their support and turn against it.

REFERENCES

1. In the translated work of Li Chien-nung's The Political History of China Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls translated I-lao as "remaining officials of the Manchu dynasty"; p. 309. W.J.F. Jenner in her translation From Emperor to Citizen - the Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, translated Wei-lao as "elder statesman of the later dynasty." See vol. 1, p. 82.
2. The Japanese adventures who went into China or elsewhere in Asia considered themselves the heirs of patriots who had opposed the Tokugawa rule in the feudal age. Like these men, they called themselves "shishi" (loyalist samurai with a high purpose). Most of them added to the title rojin (literally translated as unemployed samurai or wave men). They considered that they had a responsibility to see that loyalist national goals were carried out. For details please see Marius B. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
3. Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, translated by p. 262.
4. Chang Kuo-kan, Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-liao, p. 310.
5. B.L. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic of China (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.), p. 46.
6. "Since the great [redacted] in the autumn, ... the dynasty suffered from both internal conflicts and external threat and the fall of the state [redacted] be soon. I noticed the desperation of the [redacted], therefore I organized the Tsung-she Tang." Ch'a Shih-chieh, "Ch'ing mo te tsung-she tang (The Imperial Clan Society in the Late Ching) Kuo-li Tai-wan tai-hsueh li-shih hseuh-hsi hseuh-pao No. 5 (June 1978), p. 127. Hereafter cited as KLTW.
7. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 310.
8. Prince Kung was the brother of the Ch'ing Emperor Hsien-feng. He was well known for his open minded character. When Emperor Hsien-feng died in 1861, he worked as co-regent with the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi. He was also the Chief initiator and supporter of the Self-Strengthening movement. However, he lost to Tz'u-hsi in a political struggle and his influence in the Court vanished.
9. Ch'a Shih-chieh, "Ching mo te tsung-she-tang", KLTW No. 5 (June 1978), p. 138.
10. Hu Ping-sheng Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i ti fu-pi-pai p. 36.

ordered his troops to do also. Because of that, Chang was called the "Pig-tailed general." In June 1917, the conflict between President Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui over the issue of joining the Allies in the World War finally led to a military coup d'etat. Chang Hsun, acting as mediator, went to Peking and forced the president to dissolve parliament. On July 1, Chang restored the deposed emperor to the throne. The restoration was, however, opposed by most of the military governors in China. Under Tuan Ch'i-jui's leadership, an anti-restoration army was organized and defeated Chang's army within a few days' time. Thus the restoration movement came to an end.

Although Chang Hsun's restoration in 1917 has been regarded as the most significant of the restoration attempts of the 1910s, it is not considered important within contemporary Chinese history. The description of the whole event does not exceed two or three paragraphs in standard Chinese history texts.⁵ The reasons are not hard to understand. Firstly, the restoration movement seemed to have happened spontaneously, without any signal or warning. Its conclusion was just as swift as its initiation. The whole incident took place over twelve days from the first to the twelfth of July, 1917. Therefore, the movement is usually described as "a semi-farcical escapade" or "a midsummer madness."⁶ After the restoration, the republican government resumed immediately. It is apparent that the movement did not cause any far reaching effects except for a temporary

interregnum of twelve days.

It is important to delineate the meanings of the word "restoration" before indicating the research value of the restoration movement in 1917. In the Oxford English Dictionary, "restoration" refers to the "action of restoring to a former state or position" and "the re-establishment of the monarchy in England with the return of Charles II in 1660".⁷ In addition, the term refers to the reinstatement of the Bourbons in the sovereignty of France following the abdication of Napoleon. The word also has the meaning of restoring something to an unimpaired or perfect condition.⁸ Therefore, the western interpretation of the word "restoration" is the return of power of a deposed emperor or a ruling house.

In Chinese history, however, the word "restoration" has two meanings. The first meaning is "fu-p' i" which refers to a monarch returning to the throne after being deposed.⁹ Its meaning is similar to the western interpretation of "restoration". The second meaning of the restoration is "chung-hsing" which means the revival of a nation after decline, or rejuvenation of a country.¹⁰ Mary C. Wright refers to chung-hsing as "late flowering". It was a period of temporary stabilization following a period of "domestic catastrophe and foreign calamity."¹¹

The phrase "fu-p' i" was first used in the Book of Document¹² to record the restoration of emperor T'ai-chia (r. 1753-1720 B.C.) in 1756 B.C.¹³ T'ai-chia was the fourth

emperor of the Shang dynasty (1766-1122 B.C.), and was very young when he came to the throne. He soon became evil because of the inducements of bad ministers. A coup d'état was therefore initiated by I Yin, the prime minister, who exiled the emperor. I Yin then became the regent. After three years, T'ai-chia was rehabilitated and restored to the throne by I Yin.¹⁴ Other examples of successful "fu-p'i" that can be discerned in Chinese history are those of Emperor Chung-tsung (r. 705-710) of the T'ang dynasty (618-906) in 705.¹⁵ and Emperor Ying-tsung (r. 1436-1450, 1457-1465) of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) in 1457.¹⁶

¹⁴ The term chung-hsing was first used in the Book of Poetry¹⁷ to describe the restoration of Emperor Hsuan (r. 827-781 B.C.) of the Western Chou dynasty (1122-771 B.C.).¹⁸ Emperor Li (r. ?-842 B.C.), Emperor Hsuan's father, can be described as an evil man who ruled the country badly. In 842 B.C., a rebellion overthrew the emperor. Emperor Li, therefore fled to a place called Chih in Shensi. Due to the absence of the emperor, the loyalists Duke Chou and Duke Chao temporarily held responsibility for the country. In 827 B.C., Emperor Li died and the people restored his son, Prince Ching (Emperor Hsuan) to the throne. Unlike his father, Emperor Hsuan was a very capable man and a good ruler. Internally, Emperor Hsuan treated the people benevolently and brought reforms to improve their life. Externally, he expelled the Jung barbarians from China and extended his empire to the south of Yangtze.¹⁹ There are

other "chung-hsing" examples such as Emperor Kuang-wu of the Eastern Han dynasty²⁰ and the T'ung-chih Emperor (r. 1862-1874) of the Ch'ing dynasty.²¹

In terms of the Manchu restoration movement of the early twentieth century, does "restoration" refer to "fu-p' i" or "chung-hsing"? P'u-yi, the Hsuan t'ung Emperor, indicated in his memoirs that:

restoration, in the language of the Forbidden City, was "recovery of ancestral heritage"; in the language of the former officials of the Ching it was "the glorious return of the old order" or "returning government to the Ching."²²

From this statement, one can see that the restoration movement was more like a "fu-p' i" than a "chung -hsing"; it was designed to put P'u-yi back on the throne and to revive the Ch'ing dynasty. Although it is true that some restorationists were hoping for a "chung-hsing" of the Ch'ing dynasty, "fu-p' i" was still the most urgent task before them. In essence, no "chung-hsing" was possible, unless a successful "fu-p' i" movement could be carried out.

The "fu-p' i" of the Manchu monarchy, however, is different from that of its predecessors, like Emperor Chung-tsung of the T'ang dynasty and Emperor Ying-tsung of the Ming dynasty. In the first place, both emperors lost their titles as emperor when they were deposed. P'u-yi never lost his title as emperor. Although he was not the political emperor of China, he was still the hereditary emperor of the Ch'ing court.²³ What P'u-yi had to do was to get back the political and administrative power from the republican

government.

To some restorationists, the Manchu restoration movement was not just a conflict between the Ch'ing dynasty and the republican government; it was also a conflict between traditional Confucianism and new western ideas. To the restorationists, the removal of the monarchy was a rebellion against tradition and a threat to Confucianism. Since the monarchy was replaced by the republican system which was imported from the west, they regarded the republican system as a triumph of western ideas over traditional Chinese thought dominated by Confucianism. Therefore the restoration movement also involved a mission of reviving traditional Confucianism.²⁴ It is not strange to find that one of the activities of the restorationists was to worship Confucius and to advocate the revival of Confucianism. For this reason, Chinese Marxist historians usually link the restoration movement with Confucianism.²⁵

Research on the restoration movement is important for several reasons. First, from the viewpoint of modernization, the restoration movement can be seen as a counter attack of conservatism against modernization. It is a normal phenomenon in the transition period between the old and new.²⁶ C. E. Black, in his book The Dynamics of Modernization, indicates that when political power is transferred from the traditional leader to the modernizing leader, the leader of the old regime resists bitterly.²⁷ This is exactly what the restorationists were doing.

Therefore, the study of the restoration movement can be used to understand the dynamics of the conflicts between the old and new systems in the early republic.

Second, the restoration movement maintains that the 1911 revolution was not only a compromise but also an incomplete revolution. In essence, the Ch'ing dynasty was not overthrown by the revolution but rather by the compromise made among the Manchus, the revolutionaries and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Through the compromise, the Manchu received favourable treatment, the revolutionaries obtained a republic without Civil War, and Yuan Shih-k'ai became president. As a result, there were unique elements that did not have any precedent in Chinese history. Under the Favourable Treatment Clause, the deposed Manchu emperor was permitted to maintain the title of emperor. Furthermore, after the revolution, Yuan's loyal subordinates maintained their high positions within the government alongside other former Ch'ing officials. Thus, the old imperial elements before the revolution became incorporated completely into the new system.²⁸ This raises a unique problem of defining the Republican revolution of 1911. How could one expect a new republican government under the administrative management of the old imperial element to bring reform to the country? Does the revolution merely mean a change of the title from the "Ch'ing" to "Republic"? If the revolution can not bring reforms, how can we call it a revolution? Thus, with an emperor in the Forbidden City and the old and

traditional atmosphere still manifested within the republican government, the restorationists found a good breeding ground for their schemes.

The continuing restoration conspiracies also indicated the relative instability of the Republic. Initially, conflict existed between President Yuan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries. This conflict eventually led to the Second Revolution in 1913 which brought increased instability to the country. Three years later, in 1915, China was again driven into turmoil because of the monarchical movement of Yuan. After Yuan's death in 1916, new conflicts developed between President Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui that finally led to a militarist coup in 1917. The restorationists saw the instability of the republic as a means to bring about the restoration. Thus, there were successive abortive restoration attempts in 1913 and 1916 respectively and a relatively successful restoration movement in the 1917.

In addition, the restoration movement did not cease after 1917. According to P'u-yi:

Activities with this aim in view did not begin with my brief restoration in 1917, nor did they end with my flight to the Japanese Legation in 1924. One would be safe in saying that they did not cease for a day from the abdication proclamation in 1912 to the establishment of the empire of Manchukuo in 1933.²⁹

Therefore, there is a significant research value to investigate why there were endless restoration movements.

Finally, there are a number of misconceptions and prejudices about the restoration movement. Most Chinese historians discuss the movement in a negative manner and deny its historical value. The historians, who regard the Nationalist revolution as the mainstream of Chinese history, criticize the restorationists' ideas as heretical and their actions as ridiculous and insignificant. The Marxist historians go even further in their analysis. They regard the restoration movement as the continuing legacy of Confucianism and feudalism. The movement, therefore, was a conspiracy between the anti-revolutionists and the imperialists to enslave the Chinese people.³⁰ The restoration movement was, however, not as bad as the historians describe. The restorationists were not crazy and had their own developed ideas. They should have a place in the contemporary history of China. In this thesis, I endeavour to investigate the value and the significance of the restoration movement and to give it a more balanced appraisal. Since there are no special books about the restoration movement in English, I hope this thesis can serve the purpose of introducing the restoration movement to non-Chinese readers and inform them about the "restoration movement", which has been neglected by the historians.

The thesis is divided into six chapters, beginning with this introductory chapter. The second chapter discusses the situation within China from the 1911 revolution through to the Manchu abdication and the establishment of the Republic

in 1912. Emphasis is put on the compromises and the incompleteness of the revolution to show how the seed for the restoration movement was nurtured.

The third chapter deals with the different factions within the restoration movements. The origins and the ideologies of the different factions are discussed along with the fundamental differences and similarities. The conflicts between factions and within factions are touched upon.

The fourth chapter discusses the restoration movement before 1917. Emphasis is put on the problems facing the republic under the presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai and how they constituted a beneficial environment for the activities of the restoration movement. This chapter also includes the monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1915 and shows how the restorationists placed their hopes in Yuan for the restoration before Yuan's real intentions were revealed. The unsuccessful restoration movement of 1913 and 1916, and the first and second Manchuria and Mongol independent movements are discussed.

The discussion of the restoration movement of Chang Hsun in 1917 and its aftermath forms the fifth chapter. The first part of the chapter treats the four Hsuchow Conferences that led to the restoration attempt. The second part examines the movement including its immediate causes, progress and consequences. The third part discusses the continuous restoration activities after 1917 until the

establishment of Manchukuo in 1933.

The final chapter is a conclusion in which an overall evaluation of the restoration movements is made.

A NOTE ON THE SOURCES

The sources used in this thesis include about two hundred items, the majority of which are written in Chinese or English. The primary sources are diverse. They include letters, memoirs, autobiographies, year books, magazines, newspapers and archival documents. Primary sources in English include the autobiography of P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen,³¹ and Twilight in the Forbidden City by Reginald Johnston, private tutor to the Hsuan-t'ung emperor from the 1910s to 1920s. More valuable are the Confidential Prints on China by the Foreign Office of Great Britain, the North China Herald, and the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States regarding the activities of the restorationists.

Among the Chinese sources, the single most valuable source is the I-chiu-i-ch'i-nien ting-ssu ch'ing-ti fu-pai shih-liao hui-pien [Documentary collection of the historical materials on the restoration of the Ch'ing Emperor in 1917] compiled by Tsun-ts'ui hsueh-she, a collection of primary materials on the restoration movement.³² The manifestos and telegrams of the restoration movement are available in Ko-ming wen-hsien [Documents of the Revolution] and Tung-fang tsa-chih [The Eastern Miscellany]. Further information was obtained from the newspapers, magazines and the Government Gazette.

With regard to secondary sources, there is no book written in English directly dealing with the restoration movements. Some information, however, can be obtained from The Last Emperor written by Arnold C. Brackman and The Last Emperor: The Life of the Hsuan-t'ung emperor Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi written by Neville John Irons. Regretably, these two books are more descriptive than analytical. They are based on the works of P'u-yi and Reginald Johnston and, except for providing some background information, they do not have much research value. In fact, most of the English sources, except for some general Chinese history books, do not deal directly with the restoration movements. Nonetheless, they are very useful in supplying general information about the restorationists.

Secondary works in Chinese are more plentiful, but they are not without their biases concerning the restoration movement and have to be handled carefully. A comparatively objective view of the restoration movement can be found in Min-Kuo ch'u-ch'i ti fu-p'i-p'ai [The Restorationists in the Early Republic] written by Dr. Hu Ping-seng. The book, however, is more narrative than analytical. Nevertheless, Dr. Hu breaks with the traditional view on the restoration movements and tries to describe them in a balanced and objective manner.

REFERENCES

1. Emperor Hsuan-t'ung was best known to the foreigners in the name of Henry P'u-yi. He is the grand nephew of the Dowager Empress Tz'u-hsi. After the death of the Kuang-hsu Emperor in 1908, P'u-yi became the emperor and his father, Prince Chun, became regent. P'u-yi was only six years old when he stepped down from the throne. For details please see Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, translated by W.J.F. Jenner (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1979); and Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howards, editors, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), Vol. 3, pp. 80-86.
2. Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 473-474.
3. Ibid., p. 474.
4. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i ti fu-p'ai [The Restorationists in the Early Republic] (Taiwan: Hsueh-sheng shu-tien, 1985), pp. vii-viii.
5. In the Chung-kuo t'ung-shih (A General History of China) written by Lo Hsiang-lin the restoration movement of Chang Hsun is only described in one short paragraph. Fu Lo-cheng in his book Chung-kuo t'ung-shih (A General History of China) did the same. In the English written Chinese history books, the description is in more detail. In Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 Marius B. Jansen used two paragraphs to describe the restoration while Immanuel Hsu used one large paragraph in The Rise of Modern China to describe the restoration movement.
6. Reginald Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, (London: Victor Gollanz, 1934), p. 141.
7. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), p. 1719.
8. Ibid.
9. Liang Shih-ch'iu, ed.; A New Practical Chinese-English Dictionary (Taiwan: The Far East Book Company, 1984), p. 305.
10. Ibid., p. 25.
11. Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 4.

12. The Book of Documents is one of the five Confucian classics which contains semi-historical documents and speeches, oaths and injunctions from the early to the middle of the Chou period (1122-771 B.C.).

13. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u ch'i ti-fu-p'i-pai, p. vii.

14. Li Ung-bing, Outlines of Chinese History (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1914), p. 17. Edited by Joseph Whiteside.

15. Emperor Chung-tsung was the fourth emperor of the T'ang dynasty. In 690, he was deposed by his mother, Empress Wu. After deposing the emperor, Empress Wu declared the replacement of the T'ang dynasty by the Chou dynasty and she became the emperor. In 705, the loyalists of the T'ang dynasty started a coup and overthrew the Chou dynasty. Emperor Chung-tsung was put back to the throne again and the dynastic name was changed back to T'ang.

16. Emperor Ying-tsung was the sixth emperor of the Ming dynasty. In 1441, he was kidnapped by the Mongols during a war between the Chinese and the Mongols. Emperor Ying-tsung's brother, prince of Ch'eng then became Emperor Ch'ing. In 1450, Ying-tsung was finally set free by the Mongols and returned to China. In 1457, Ying-tsung started a coup and deposed Ch'eng and regained the throne.

17. The Book of Poetry, one of the five Classics, is a collection of folk songs, love songs, political poem and long ritual hymns dating from the 11th to the 6th century B.C.

18. Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, p. 46.

19. Li Ung-bing, Outlines of Chinese History, p. 7.

20. In 8, Emperor P'ing of the Han dynasty was overthrown by the regent, who was also his uncle, Wang Mang. After deposing the emperor, Wang assumed the title of emperor and changed the dynastic name to Hsin. Wang then carried out a lot of reforms which brought no good result but a series of peasant uprisings against him. Wang Mang was finally overthrown by the rebels. Liu Hsiu, a descendant of the Han royal family, defeated all the rebels and re-established the Han dynastic name in 25. He became Emperor Kuang-wu of the Han dynasty (Later Han or Eastern Han). He brought stability and peace to the people and created a powerful central administration. Externally, Emperor Kuang-wu reconquered South China and northern Vietnam and reasserted Chinese power over these places. The name of the Han dynasty was once again used.

21. In the mid-nineteenth century, China which was ruled by the Ch'ing dynasty was under the pressure of foreign threat and internal rebellion. However, during the T'ung-chih period, the internal rebellions were crushed and local administrations were rebuilt. In addition, reforms in economic, military and foreign relations were carried out. The relationship between China and the foreign countries was sound and no war occurred in that time. Therefore, the Chinese referred this period as "T'ung-chih chung-hsing" or "T'ung-chih Restoration". See Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism.

22. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, Volume 1, p. 77.

23. According to the Article of Favourable Treatment, Hsuan-t'ung was allowed to retain the title of emperor and "will be treated by the Republic of China with the courtesies which it is customary to accord to foreign monarchs."

24. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i ti-fu-p'i-pai, p. 54.

25. Chang K'ai-yuan, "K'ung-chia-tien yu Chang-hsun fu-p'i" Wen Wu (1974), vol. 5.

26. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u ch'i ti-fu-p'i-pai, p. 47.

27. Please see Ibid., p. 81, and C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 71.

28. Harold R. Issacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938), p. 22.

29. Aisin Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, Vol. 1, p. 77.

30. Ibid., pp. 58-59. Please see Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai ko-ming hou ti-chih fu-p'i ho fan fu-p'i tou-cheng [The Rivalries between the Restorationists and the Anti-Restorationists after the 1911 Revolution] (Peking, 1975), and Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling, Lun Chang-hsun fu-p'i ti li-shih chi-yuan ho shih-pai ti pi-j'an-hsing [A Discussion of the Historical Chance of Chang Hsun's Restoration and His Doom] by Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling.

31. P'u-yi was under the strict supervision of the Chinese Communist government when writing this autobiography. Some of the information in the book is controversial and must be handled carefully.

32. It includes Hu Ssu-ching's letters, the "Restoration in 1917" by Chen Leng-tai, "An Account of our Suffering in 1917" by Cheng Yi, Diary of Cheng Hsiao-hsu in 1916 and 1917, Chang Hsun and Tsukuda Nobuo, the Conspiracy of the Restoration of Sheng-yun, and a collection of Chang Hsun's seventy-nine letters.

Chapter II

THE REVOLUTION AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE DYNASTY

From the mid-nineteenth century onward, the glorious age of Imperial China began to pass away and a period of national humiliation began. Since the conclusion of the Opium War with the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the door of China was forced open.¹ Thereafter, under the Manchus of the Ch'ing dynasty, China faced successive defeats in war, unequal treaties, the loss of the tributary states, and the scramble for concessions and economic exploitation by foreign powers. China was reduced to semi-colonial status. After 1860, reforms like the Self-strengthening Movement² and the Hundred Days Reform³ were undertaken to strengthen China in order to end foreign exploitation. These reforms, however, proved to be failures because of hesitant support or outright hindrance by the Ch'ing government. In the end, a substantial number of people were convinced that reforms were impossible under the Manchu Government. They felt that the ruling elite were not genuine reformers.⁴ As a result, they began to look upon the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen as the answer to their problems.

Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 in Canton. At the age of thirteen he went to Hawaii to study in a missionary school. Three years later he returned to China and enrolled in a medical college in Hong Kong in 1886. After graduation he practiced in Macao and Canton. During this period, Sun

developed revolutionary ideas. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 Sun founded a revolutionary society, the Hsing-chung hui (Revival of China Society). In 1895 Sun and his followers instigated a revolt in Canton but without success. Sun escaped abroad and his exile began. In 1897, he stayed in Japan and developed his "Three People's Principles": nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. In 1905 Sun organized the T'ung-meng hui (Chinese Revolutionary League) in Japan and instigated many insurrections in China. Although all of them failed, their activities aroused many sympathetic and encouraging responses from the people.

After the Boxer uprising in 1900,⁵ the Ch'ing government, under the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi,⁶ in order to regain people's support, carried out some reforms including the westernization of the army, the abolition of traditional Civil Service Examinations, the setting up of a national school system and industrial promotion. All these reforms had their origins in the Hundred Days Reform in 1898.⁷ The lack of sincerity on behalf of the Ch'ing regime towards the progressive reforms hindered the process.⁸

The defeat of Russia by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 convinced many Chinese of the power of constitutionalism over autocratic monarchy. The idea of a constitutional monarchy spread rapidly throughout literary classes of Chinese society.⁹ In 1905, an official mission, headed by Duke Tsai-tse, a Manchu noble, was sent abroad by

the Ch'ing Government to study constitutional government. The mission visited Japan, France, Britain, Belgium, the United States, Germany, Austria and Italy. They recommended the advantages of constitutionalism to the Ch'ing court when they returned in July 1906. On August 27, 1908, the Ch'ing Government under Tzu-hsi bowed to popular pressure and issued a document called "Outline of Constitution."

The Empress Dowager never genuinely desired to introduce a constitutional monarchy in China. The "Outline of Constitution" stated that the Emperor was sacred and inviolable, and had executive, legislative and judicial powers. The Parliament could only consider the questions of government but did not possess decision-making power. Unless approved by the Emperor, laws and regulations passed by Parliament could not become effective.¹⁰ Although the "Outline of Constitution" was beneficial to the Manchu Court, the Empress Dowager did not want to put it into practice. She declared a nine-year preparational period for constitutional reform.¹¹ She did not have to see whether her delaying tactics were successful. On November 15, 1908 she died just one day after the death of the Kuang-hsu Emperor.¹² P'u-yi, the two year old heir, succeeded and became the Hsuan-t'ung Emperor. His father, Prince Chun, became regent. As regent Prince Chun was determined to concentrate power in the central government and to eliminate those Chinese officials who could threaten Manchu authority. The first victim was Yuan Shih-k'ai, the most powerful

Chinese military official, who had control of the **Peiyang** army (Northern Army), the most elite troops in China.¹³ Prince Chun's reasons for dismissing Yuan were not hard to understand. Yuan, according to Chun, was a Chinese, who posed a threat to Manchu rule.¹⁴ Secondly, Prince Chun could not sanction Yuan's betrayal of his brother the Kuang-hsu Emperor in the Hundred Days Reform in 1898.¹⁵ The dismissal of Yuan indicated discrimination and animosity leveled against the Chinese by the ruling Manchus. In fact, the discrimination was deep rooted and grew worse after the Hundred Day Reform in 1898, a movement headed by the Chinese statesmen.¹⁶ The dismissal of Yuan was only a part of the wider sense of alienation being felt by the Chinese officials at the Imperial Court.¹⁷ It was this sense of alienation from power that induced many Chinese military leaders and Governors to defend the Ch'ing dynasty with indifference in the Revolution of 1911.¹⁸

The pace of constitutional reform under the promise of 1908 accelerated in 1909 when assemblies were established in all provinces. In 1910 a National Assembly was convened in Peking. On November 4, 1910, as a result of pressure from the representative of the provincial assemblies, the Regent agreed to shorten the period of constitutional preparation from nine years to six years.¹⁹ This constitutional progress was cut short, however, by the formation on May 8, 1911 by the Regent of a "Royal Cabinet" consisting of thirteen appointed members. The Manchu retained a majority of eight

members, five of which were members of the Imperial family. The remaining five vacancies were filled by one Mongol bannerman and four Chinese.²⁰ The provincial assemblies protested against the royal domination of the cabinet without success.²¹ The Chinese were soon convinced that adoption of constitutionalism by the Ch'ing Court was a trick played on the Chinese. Genuine constitutionalism could not be possible under the Manchu leadership. The demands of the revolutionaries for authentic constitutional reform and the narrow conservatism of the Manchu rulers quickened the pace for revolutionary change.

The immediate cause for the outbreak of revolution was the railway dispute between central government and provincial authorities. In 1911, Sheng Hsuan-huai, the Minister of Post and Communications, announced the nationalization of all major railways.²² Foreign loans were drawn from a Four-Power Banking Consortium (France, Britain, Germany and the United States) for compensation to the provincial authorities for giving up the control of railways. When the Imperial authorities tried to nationalize the Szechwan-Hankow railway in May 1911, the local elite charged the government with selling Szechwan to the foreigners.²³ Railway Protection Societies were formed to prevent the nationalization and serious unrest broke out.

The disorder in Szechwan could have provided the revolutionaries with the opportunity they were seeking to overthrow the regime except that they had severe problems of

their own. There were no appropriate leaders at the moment to lead the uprising. Sun Yat-sen was, at that time, in North America while Huang Hsing²⁴ was in Hong Kong. Other leaders were scattered throughout the provinces.²⁵ Moreover, in the aftermath and defeat of the Canton uprising in April 1911²⁶, the morale of the revolutionaries had still not recovered.²⁷ Thus, the revolutionaries had decided on October 7, 1911, to temporarily slacken the preparations for the general revolution.²⁸

Two days later, however, a bomb accidentally exploded in the revolutionary headquarters in Hankow, Hupeh Province. The explosion aroused the attention of the Ch'ing officials and thus a wave of persecutions began. Many revolutionaries were arrested and a list of the revolutionaries in the New Army²⁹ was found. Faced with this situation, the revolutionary leaders within the New Army decided to initiate the revolution in order to protect themselves.³⁰

On the morning of October 10, the New Army revolutionaries attacked the office of the Governor-General in Wuchang. The Governor-General Jui-cheng and the Military Commander Chang Piao fled. Li Yuan-hung, the Ch'ing brigade commander, was chosen by the revolutionaries to be the military governor of Hupeh in lieu of revolutionary military leaders.³¹ Telegrams were then sent out by the revolutionaries to other provinces to persuade them to declare their independence from the Ch'ing Government. Within a month and a half, the revolution had spread to most

of the provinces.³² Only Chihli, Honan, Shantung and Manchuria remained loyal to the Ch'ing government.³³ On December 4, 1911, the revolutionaries took Nanking and established a provisional government. On December 29, Sun Yat-sen was named Provisional President of the Nanking Government.

After the outbreak of the revolution, Yin-chang, the Imperial Minister of War, was ordered by the Ch'ing Government to suppress the revolutionaries. At the same time, the Manchus ordered the reinstatement of Yuan Shih-k'ai as Governor-General of Hunan and Hupeh. Yuan's reappointment was initiated by Prince Ch'ing, the Premier and an old friend of Yuan (Prince Ch'ing's idea was soon supported by the foreigners in Peking. The Regent, although opposed to the idea, was forced to summon Yuan, a man whom he could never trust.³⁴

Since his dismissal, Yuan Shih-k'ai had lived in his native community, Changteh in Honan, enjoying "retirement". Yuan, however, maintained contact with his former subordinates in the Peiyang army. Yuan's eldest son, Ke-ting, remained in Peking and regularly sent information back to Changteh.³⁵ Yuan bided his time waiting until his services were needed by the Imperial Government.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's chance finally came when the revolution broke out. His reappointment as Governor-General of Hunan and Hupeh by a reluctant regent was due to his influence within the New Army. Six divisions of the

modernized Northern Army were still under the command of Yuan's former subordinates, including Feng Kuo-chang, Wang Shih-chen and Tuan Ch' i-jui.³⁶ When the imperial edict announcing his reappointment reached Changteh, Yuan refused to come out of retirement on the ground of sickness. There were two reasons for Yuan's refusal. He wanted to use this opportunity to take revenge on the Ch'ing government for his dismissal.³⁷ Secondly, he decided to hold out until the situation grew worse and warranted his appointment to a post with high political and military power.³⁸ Through his friend, Associate Premier Hsu Shih-ch'ang, Yuan's rejection of the offer was taken to the Ch'ing government. Yuan was so firm in his decision that the Regent went personally to persuade him without success. But, after repeated urging from the Ch'ing government, Yuan, through Prince Ch'ing and Associate Premier Hsu, presented six demands in return for his resumption of his duties:

1. the opening of parliament in the following year
2. the organization of a responsible cabinet
3. amnesty for all those who were connected with the revolution
4. the granting of legal recognition to the revolutionary party
5. the granting to himself of full authority over, and the power to reorganize all the armed forces
6. guarantee of adequate military funds.³⁹

Yuan Shih-k'ai was personally ambitious and this can be seen through the demands. The first four demands were mainly designed for the purpose of obtaining the attention of the revolutionaries and the good will of the people in order to become mediator. Yuan's ambition to obtain total military

power in the crisis situation was signified by the last two demands.⁴⁰

The Regent was first unwilling to agree to Yuan's demands and Yuan refused to come out of retirement to take the post. The situation, however, had become so desperate that the Regent had to reconsider Yuan's demands. The revolution was spreading and more provinces were declaring their independence from the Ch'ing Government.⁴¹ The army of Yin-chang suffered repeated defeats at the hands of the revolutionaries because of his incompetence and of his inability to control Peiyang army officers, who were loyal only to Yuan.⁴² Under these two pressures the Regent on October 27, 1911, appointed Yuan Shih-k'ai Imperial Envoy and granted him full power of command over the army and navy.⁴³ The Ch'ing regime, however, did not agree completely to the six demands, and Yuan remained in self-imposed retirement. Nevertheless, in order to reveal his strength to both the Imperial Government and to the revolutionaries, Yuan ordered Feng Kuo-chang, the commander of the First Army, to attack the revolutionaries in the South.⁴⁴

Two incidents occurred late in October 1911 which forced the Ch'ing Government to capitulate to Yuan. On October 29, 1911, the Shansi Provinces turned to the revolutionaries, thus posing a direct threat to Peking.⁴⁵ On the same date, Chang Shao-tseng and Lan T'ien-wei⁴⁶, leaders of the 20th Division stationed at Luanchow, Hopei Province, issued a telegram demanding that the Ch'ing

Government summon parliament and reorganize the Cabinet. If the request was not fulfilled, they threatened to march on Peking.⁴⁷ In order to back up their demand with force, they detained a train load of arms and ammunition being transported from Russia to the Imperial army in Hupeh.⁴⁸ The Ch'ing government, which had no alternative, finally bowed to their demands.

The spread of the revolution and the mutiny of the army created panic among the aristocracy. Even though they distrusted Yuan Shih-k'ai, the nobles saw him as their sole protector against the revolutionaries and they were willing to hand over power to him.⁴⁹ On October 30, the Imperial cabinet dissolved itself and Prince Chun and Prince Ch'ing resigned from their respective positions of Regent and Premier.⁵⁰

Two days later, Yuan Shih-k'ai was appointed Premier. Coming out of retirement, he ordered the Peiyang army to head south against the revolutionaries. On November 2, Hankow was recovered by Yuan's henchman, Feng Kuo-chang, the commander of the First Army. On November 14, Yuan returned to Peking and formed his cabinet consisting of his supporters including Chao Ping-chun as Minister of Civil Affairs, T'ang Shao-i as Minister of Posts and Communications and Wang Shih-chen as Minister of War.⁵¹ Feng Kuo-chang was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guard. The new Premier, having full control of the Capital area, requested control of the palace treasury in order to meet

military expenses. Requests were made to the Empress Dowager and the other members of the royal family for funding of the army.⁵² With political, military and economic power in hand, Yuan had full control of the government.

Yuan Shih-k'ai realized that he held the balance of power between the Imperial Court and the revolutionaries. Yuan was the most important man at that time and each faction was trying to influence and buy him off.⁵³ Yuan, however, was more inclined to the revolutionaries than to the Ch'ing Court. He knew that the Ch'ing dynasty was no longer popular. The dynasty had become decadent and was destined to be overthrown. Yuan realized that he could not accomplish that feat by himself and that, although the Peiyang army had won some military victories over the revolutionaries, the long term military outlook was not encouraging. While the Peiyang army was superior in military tactics, its numbers were inferior to those of the revolutionaries in the rest of China. If Yuan was forced to continue the war, he would eventually fail.⁵⁴ Furthermore, Yuan was using the Peiyang army as his political tool; he did not want to sacrifice it in order to rescue the Ch'ing dynasty. In addition, he realized that the Imperial aristocracy was hostile to him. The nobles surrounding Prince Chun could not forgive Yuan's betrayal of Kuang-hsu Emperor in the Hundred Day Reform in 1898, nor his threatening demands for the return of his post. The Manchu nobles would undoubtedly attempt to eliminate him even if he

helped them defeat the revolutionaries.⁵⁵

In spite of these factors, Yuan Shih-k'ai continued to encourage the Peiyang Army to fight against the revolutionaries. On November 27, Hanyang was regained by Feng Kuo-chang. This show of force by the Peiyang army was followed by the proposal by Yuan of a temporary cease-fire. Negotiations were opened between Yuan in Peking and the Nanking Government of the revolutionaries. T'ang Shao-i, Minister of Posts and Communications, was sent to Shanghai by Yuan Shih-k'ai to negotiate with Wu T'ing-fang from the revolutionary government in Nanking.⁵⁶

To most revolutionaries, Yuan was the only person who could force the Ch'ing emperor to abdicate and thus save the country from a prolonged civil war.⁵⁷ This feeling became stronger especially when Yuan demonstrated his strength in recovering Hankow and Hanyang. Even though there were more revolutionary troops than in the Peiyang army, the latter was better trained and equipped. The revolutionary leaders were fearful of a long protracted military struggle.

Sun Yat-sen, the provisional president of the Nanking government, did not favour compromise. Sun faced pressure from other revolutionaries who favoured compromise. As a revolutionary idealist, Sun was willing to hand over the presidency to Yuan if the latter could help overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty.⁵⁸

When Sun Yat-sen became the provisional president on December 29, 1911, Yuan Shih-k'ai angrily broke off

negotiations with the revolutionaries. Events were moving quicker than Yuan could control. On January 3, 1912, a group of Ch'ing diplomats under the leadership of Lu Cheng-hsiang, Ambassador to Russia, demanded the abdication of the Emperor. Yuan knew that there was no hope for the dynasty.⁵⁹ He informed the provisional government that in return for the future presidency of the republic he would induce the Ch'ing Emperor to abdicate.⁶⁰ The Nanking government accepted Yuan's offer.

After receiving reassurances from the Nanking government, Yuan began to plot against the Ch'ing Court in return for the position of president of the newly established republic. The first tool that Yuan Shih-k'ai used in his conspiracy was Prince Ch'ing. Repeatedly Yuan indicated to Prince Ch'ing that the voluntary abdication of the Emperor was the best way to save the dynasty. It would be wiser to abdicate under the conditions granted by the revolutionaries before it was too late.⁶¹

The proposal was placed before a secret meeting of the nobles by Prince Ch'ing on January 12, 1912, but it was opposed by most of them.⁶² Four days later, Yuan Shih-k'ai presented a memorial to the Empress Dowager in the name of the whole Cabinet. It threatened that "there was no hope for the dynasty even in flight and that delay in abdicating might lead to a fate similar to that suffered by Louis XVI and his family in the French Revolution."⁶³ On the same day an attempt was made on Yuan's life as he was leaving the

Court. Three suspects were arrested who declared that they were members of the Revolutionary Party. The revolutionaries initiated the murder attempt because, though the news of a possible abdication had been widespread, it had not been brought to reality. Some revolutionaries did not know about the secret negotiations between Yuan and the Nanking Government regarding the abdication. Therefore, they blamed Yuan for perpetuating the dynasty. In order to hasten the abdication, they thought that the best way was to eliminate him.⁶⁴

The plot gave some unexpected assistance to Yuan Shih-k'ai. The Empress Dowager believed that Yuan was a loyal and trustworthy official and there was no truth to the rumour that Yuan had made a compromise with the revolutionaries.⁶⁵

Between the seventeenth and nineteenth of January, there were three imperial conferences, held to discuss the question of abdication, chaired by the Empress Dowager. At the first Imperial Conference, Prince Ch'ing and Prince P'u-lun advanced the arguments for the abdication of the Emperor and the proclamation of the Republic to no avail. The idea was rejected by a group led by P'u-wei (Prince Kung), and Shan-chi (Prince Su). Other nobles remained silent. The meeting was then adjourned without any decision.⁶⁶

The next day, Prince Ch'ing was absent and Prince P'u-lun had changed his mind.⁶⁷ According to the memoirs of Hu Wei-te⁶⁸, these changes were due to the threatening actions

of the Tsung-she Tang (The Imperial Clan Society).⁶⁹ Again, no conclusion was reached during the conference.

At the third conference held on January 19, all the Manchu and Mongolian nobles participated. Yuan Shih-k'ai was represented by Chao Ping-chun, the Minister of Civil Affairs, Liang Shih-i, Vice Minister of Post and Communications, and Hu Wei-te, the Minister in charge of the Foreign Office.⁷⁰ During the Conference, Chao Ping-chun suggested, as instructed by Yuan, that the monarchical government in Peking and the revolutionary government in Nanking could be dissolved at the same time and a provisional integrated government established in their place in Tientsin.⁷¹ His idea, however, was fiercely opposed by the nobles. Thus, as instructed, Chao played Yuan Shih-k'ai's trump card noting that if his suggestion was not accepted, the entire cabinet would resign. This would effectively dismember the Ch'ing Government.⁷² Liang Shih-i pointed out that the government had no money to meet military expenditure, especially in the event of civil war. The meeting was adjourned again.

After the conference, Liang-pi⁷³, Army chief of staff, planned a new cabinet headed by Duke Tsai-tse. He also arranged to have Tieh-liang⁷⁴, a Manchu general, be appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchu army in order to fight the revolutionaries in the South.⁷⁵

At the same time, Wu Ting-fang, the representative of the Nanking Government presented Yuan Shih-k'ai with the

following demands:

1. The Manchu emperor should abdicate and relinquish all powers.
2. The Manchu emperor should not interfere in any matters concerning the organization of the provisional government
3. The location of the provisional government should be in Nanking
4. President Sun's resignation should come only after the provisional government had been recognized by all powers, the domestic reforms had been achieved, and peace well established; Yuan Shih-K'ai should not interfere in any matters of the provisional government before the resignation of President Sun.⁷⁶

On January 20, 1912, Wu T'ing-fang telegraphed Yuan the conditions for "favorable treatment" of the Manchu Emperor after his abdication, as well as the treatment of the Manchus, Mongolians, Mohammedians and Tibetans.⁷⁷ Two days later, President Sun Yat-sen instructed Wu T'ing-fang to present the same demands to Yuan Shih-K'ai:

1. The Manchu emperor must abdicate, and Yuan must at the same time inform all foreign ministers in Peking, asking them to convey the news to the Republican government, or to transmit it directly through the consuls of the various nations in Shanghai;
2. Yuan must at the same time announce his political position, and he must declare absolute support of republicanism;
3. When Sun Wen has received assurance of the abdication of the emperor from the legations or from the consuls in Shanghai, he will resign from the provisional presidency immediately;
4. Yuan will be elected provisional president by the senate
5. After his election, but before he is given actual power and authority, Yuan must swear to observe the constitution prepared by the senate.⁷⁸

Due to pressure from the Nanking government, Yuan Shih-K'ai had no alternative other than to use military

power to force the abdication of the Ch'ing emperor.⁷⁹ The assassination of Liang-pi, Chief of Staff, on January 26 by a revolutionary, tempered the anti-republican convictions of the nobles.⁸⁰ It was widely suspected, although unprovable, that Liang-pi's murder was motivated by his opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai.⁸¹

On January 27, Yuan Shih-k'ai made his move and instigated fifty of the Peiyang generals to demand the immediate adoption of a republican government.⁸² General Tuan Ch'i-jui threatened the Court that if the republic was not accepted by the nobles he would march on Peking.⁸³ Feng Kuo-chang, the Commander of the Imperial Guard, resigned from his post and spoke openly to his troops that he favoured the establishment of a republic.⁸⁴ In order to enhance his political position, Yuan Shih-k'ai appealed directly to the Empress Dowager through emissaries to agree to the abdication.⁸⁵ He reminded her that the constitutional movement was initiated by her husband, Emperor Kuang-hsu, and that the time had come to accept a republican system.⁸⁶

This appeal worked, for another Imperial Conference was called for January 29. Prince Ch'ing and Yuan Shih-k'ai were absent from the proceedings and no decision was yet made.⁸⁷

The next day, Princes Chun and Ch'ing advised the Dowager that abdication was the only option. She was informed that government troops would not fight to ensure the continuity of the dynasty, and the new republican

government would grant "favourable treatment."⁸⁸ Weakened by defections, the Dowager agreed.

On February 1, 1912, the Dowager summoned Yuan to the palace and announced: "I leave the various matters to your judgement and have no request other than the preservation of the dignity and honour of the emperor."⁸⁹ On February 3, Yuan sent a telegram to Wu T'ing-fang stating that "I now have the power to negotiate the matter of favourable treatment of the royal family."⁹⁰ The negotiation did not take long. The compromise was finally reached three days later. On February 12 the Imperial Edict of Abdication was proclaimed in the name of the emperor who was six at the time:

We have today received from the Dowager Empress Lung-yu an edict stating that because of the uprising by the Army of the People, with the cooperation of the people of the provinces, the one answering the other like an echo, the whole empire is in turmoil and the people have endured much tribulation As long as the form of government remains undecided, unrest will continue in the country. It is clear that the majority of the people favour the establishment of a republican form of government ... and it is not for us to oppose the desires and incur the disapproval of millions of the people. ... We, with the Emperor at our side, hereby hand over the sovereignty to the people as a whole and declare that the constitution shall henceforth be republican ... Yuan Shih-k'ai, having been elected Prime Minister some time ago by the Political Consultative Council Let him then, with full power so to do, organize a provisional republican government. the Dowager Empress and the Emperor, will retire into a life of leisure, free from public duties ... watching with satisfaction the glorious establishment of the perfect government.⁹¹

The Edict finally brought the end of the Manchu dynasty, the last in Chinese history. In return, the Manchu received the "Favourable Treatment" granted by the Republican Government. The Article of Favourable Treatment began with the following significant preamble:

In consideration of the fact that the Great Ch'ing Emperor has publicly announced his approval of the establishment of a republican form of government, the following Articles relating to the Favourable Treatment of the Great Ch'ing emperor after his abdication are hereby set forth.

The eight articles followed:

1. After the abdication of the Great Ch'ing Emperor, his title of dignity is to be retained and will not be abolished; and he will be treated by the Republic of China with the courtesies which it is customary to accord to foreign monarchs.
2. After the abdication of the Great Ch'ing emperor, he will receive from the Republic of China an annual subsidy of Tls. 4,000,000. After the reform of the currency this amount will be altered to \$4,000,000 (mex.)
3. After the abdication of the Great Ch'ing Emperor, he may as a temporary measure continue to reside in the Palace (in the Forbidden City), but afterwards he will remove to the Yi-Ho Park (the Summer Palace). He may retain his bodyguard.
4. After the abdication of the Great Ch'ing Emperor, the temples and mausolea of the imperial family with their appropriate sacrificial rites will be maintained in perpetuity. The Republic of China will be responsible for the provision of military guards for their adequate protection.
5. As the Ch'ung mausoleum of the late emperor Te Tsung has not yet been completed, the work will be carried out according to the proper regulations (relating to imperial tombs). The last ceremonies of sepulture will also be observed in accordance with the ancient rites. The actual expenses will all be borne by the Republic of China.
6. The services of all the persons of various grades, hitherto employed in the Palace may be retained; but in future no eunuchs are to be added to the staff.
7. After the abdication of the Great Ch'ing emperor, his private property will be safeguarded and protected by the Republic of China.

8. The Imperial guard corps as constituted at the time of the abdication will be placed under the military control of the War Office of the Republic of China. It will be maintained as its original strength and will receive the same emoluments as heretofore.⁹²

It seems that the abdication of the Manchu emperor satisfied everyone. To P'u-yi and the Ch'ing Court, they got "favourable treatment". Yuan Shih-k'ai obtained the position of President of the new republic. Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries secured a republic without prolonged civil war and foreign intervention. However, looking carefully at the Edict and the Articles of Favourable Treatment, a number of problems will be perceived.

Firstly the word "abdication" is not used in the Edict. Instead, it uses the words "retire into a life of leisure." In the opinion of certain Chinese scholars, it implied the possibility of a return to the throne by the Manchu.⁹³ Secondly, the imperial edict stated that since "the majority of the people favour the establishment of a republican form of government" the Court would "hand over the sovereignty to the people and declare that the Constitution shall henceforth be republican." In the Articles of Favourable Treatment of the Ch'ing Dynasty, granted by the republican government, the Manchu Emperor was still allowed to maintain the monarchical title. Some questions must be asked. Did the abdication mean the end of the monarchy or the end of the Ch'ing rule? Was the Ch'ing dynasty overthrown by the revolution, or did it voluntarily "retire into life of

leisure" because of popular demand? Was the republic created by an Imperial Edict or by the revolutionaries? ⁹⁴

The London Times reflected the view of the British Foreign Office that "the Manchu Edict, which notified that the dynasty had ceased to rule, never constituted complete abdication. Loopholes were always left for a possible restoration." ⁹⁵ Immanuel Hsu makes the following comment:

Their (the Republicans) readiness to cooperate with the old elements, and their favourable treatment of the deposed emperor, paved the way for future attempts to revive the imperial system - by Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1915 and by Chang Hsun in 1917. ⁹⁶

The monarchists never retreated from their positions following the abdication of the Manchu in 1912. After the fall of the dynasty, they became "restorationists." They continued to look for "loopholes" that offered a chance at a restoration. The instability of the Republic and the division of the country finally provided the restorationists with a good opportunity.

REFERENCES

1. The Opium War occurred between China and Britain in the mid-19th Century. The immediate cause of the war was due to China's attempt to prevent the English merchants from exporting Opium to China. The key cause was rooted in Britain's desire to increase trade with China. For details please see Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842.
2. There was a series of reform movements in China during the period from 1860 to 1894 designed to stop foreign aggression and to consolidate Manchu rule. However, these movements were not concerned with fundamental political and social reform. The reforms were concentrated in the military and technological fields. Since the reforms failed to see that the strength of the west lay also in its social and political foundations and heritage, the reforms were finally proved to be a failure. For more information, please see "Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology" by Kuo T'ing-i in the John Fairbanks, ed. Cambridge History of China Volume 10 (Late Ch'ing 1840-1911), Part 1, and Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism.
3. In 1898 reforms were carried out by the Kuang-hsu Emperor, helped by K'ang Yu-wei and other reformers to bring fundamental reform to China. The movement failed due to the opposition from the Empress Dowager and conservative officials in the government, and the inexperience of the reformers. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), and Compilation Group for the History of Modern China Series, The Reform Movement of 1898 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976).
4. "Reform and Revolution in China: Political Modernization" by Michael Gasster in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 67-68.
5. The Boxers, or I-ho-t'uan (the Righteous and Harmonious Corps) was a confused mixture of anti-dynastic and anti-foreign rebellions at the end of the 19th century. In the beginning, the corps was an anti-dynastic organization. But in 1890s its policy became primarily anti-foreign. Because of its anti-foreign policy, some local officials sanctioned its presence, and some even supported it. Their teachings found favour with the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi who was bitterly anti-foreign. In June 1900 the Boxers were summoned to Peking and besieged the Foreign Legation District. On June 21, Tzu-hsi believed the Boxers to be the weapon to be used against the foreigners and declared war

against the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan, Austria and Italy. China was totally defeated in the war by the powers and was forced to sign the Boxer Protocol in 1901. The terms were severe and humiliating, and the Manchu disgraced themselves before the people. For details see The Boxer Catastrophe by Chester C. T'an.

6. After the Hundred Days Reforms in 1898 the Kuang-hsu Emperor was imprisoned by the Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi. The entire government was, therefore, now in the hands of Tzu-hsi surrounded by conservative nobles and officials.

7. Fu Lo-ch'eng, Chung-Kuo t'ung-shih General History of China (Taipei: Tai Chung Book Company, 1972), Vol. 2, p. 717.

8. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 412.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 416.

11. Ibid. For more details please see "The Constitutionals" by Chang P'eng-yuan in China in Revolution: The First Phase edited by Wright, and The Emergence of Constitutional Government in China (1905-1908) by Norbert Meinenberger.

12. There was a rumour that Emperor Kuang-hsu was poisoned by the Empress Dowager because she did not want to die before him.

13. The Peiyang Military Academy was founded by Li Hung-chang in 1885. In 1896, Yuan Shih-k'ai was ordered to train a new Imperial Army. He recruited the graduates from the Peiyang Military Academy like Feng Kuo-chang, Wang Shih-chan and Tuan Chi-ju as training officers. Later Yuan established a military academy at Hsiao-chan. The people involved in various aspects of the Hsiao-chan program together with the graduates formed the Peiyang group, or Peiyang Army. For details please see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), and Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912.

14. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace, p. 179.

15. During the Hundred Days Reform in 1898 Yuan Shih-k'ai was instructed by Emperor Kuang-hsu to arrest the Empress Dowager and Jung-lu (the Manchu military commander) in an inspection of the army in Tientsin. Yuan, however, betrayed the Emperor and reported to the Empress Dowager. The Emperor was then imprisoned until his death in 1908. See Kuo

T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang An Outline History of Contemporary China (Honk Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), Vol. I, p. 390.

16. Ibid., pp. 408-409.

17. During the Revolution in 1911, only two Chinese officials fought loyally to death. They were Lu Chung-ch'i, the Governor of Shensi, and Feng Yu-kwei, the Governor of Kiangsi. Ibid., vol. I, P. 409.

18. Ibid.

19. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 417.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. China began to build railways during the Self-Strengthening Movement in the 1860s. However, most of the railways were built by the provincial authorities and the central government did not give much support to their construction.

23. Jansen, Japan and China, p. 180.

24. Huang Hsing was a revolutionary who helped form the Hua-hsing hui (China Revival Society) in 1903. In 1905 he incorporated his organization into the Tung-meng hui (Chinese Revolutionary League) led by Sun Yat-sen. After the failure of the Canton uprising in April 1911, he fled to Hong Kong.

25. Jansen, Japan and China, p. 181.

26. The Canton uprising was led by Huang Hsing in April 1911. The insurrection failed and eighty-five revolutionaries were killed.

27. Jansen, Japan and China, p. 181.

28. Ibid.

29. During the modernization movement, the New Army was built on the western model, trained in western military tactics and equipped with modern weapons. its first unit was produced around 1894-5. The New Army was more educated and could easily accept revolutionary ideas, especially the returned student officers from Japan. Some of them later joined the revolutionary party and participated in the revolutionary activities. For details please see the Rise of Chinese Military Power by Powell.

30. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 468.
31. Ibid., p. 469.
32. Hunan and Shensi declared their independence on October 22, Shansi on October 29, Kwangtung and Yunnan at the end of October, Kweichow and Kwangsi at the beginning of November, Kiangsi on November 2, Kiangsu on November 3, Chekiang on November 4, and Szechwan joined on November 27. Only within one and a half months, the Ch'ing government had lost fifteen provinces.
33. Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1929, translated by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), p. 248.
34. Ibid., p. 249.
35. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, Vol. 1 p.409.
36. Group for the "History of Modern China" Series (compilers), The Revolution of 1911 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976), p. 119.
37. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 250.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 471; and Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 250.
41. In October 27, 1911, Hunan, Shensi and Kiangsi joined the revolutionaries.
42. Group for the "History of Modern China", Revolution of 1911, p. 120.
43. Ibid.
44. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 471.
45. Group for the "History of Modern China", Revolution of 1911, p. 120.
46. Both Chang Shao-tseng and Lan T'ien-wei was graduates of a Japanese Military Academy and secret member of Tung-meng hui (China Revolutionary League).
47. Please see Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, Vol. 1, p. 410; and Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 471

48. Group for the "History of Modern China", Revolution of 1911, p. 120.

49. Ibid., p. 121.

50. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 471.

51. Group for the "History of Modern China", Revolution of 1911, p. 123.

52. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, Vol. 1, p. 35.

53. Not only did the Ch'ing Court have to buy off Yuan Shih-k'ai, the revolutionaries also did the same. After Yuan showed his strength in recovering Hankow and Hanyang from the revolutionaries, the revolutionary army commander Huang Hsing cabled Yuan that they were willing to grant Yuan the post of presidency if he could force the abdication of the emperor.

54. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, Vol. 1, p. 411.

55. Please see Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 35; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 411.

56. Ibid., p. 422.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 261.

63. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, Vol. 1, p. 35.

64. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 262.

65. Ibid., p. 261.

66. Chao Kuo-kan, Hsin-kai ko-ming shih-liao (Historical Materials of the 1911 Revolution) (Shanghai, 1959), p. 309.

67. According to Li Chien-ning's The Political History of China 1840-1928, Prince Ch'ing did participate in the Conference. However, according to the memoirs of P'u-Yi and Hu Wei-te, Prince Ching was not participated in the conference. In this situation we use the source of P'u-yi and Hu Wei-te since they are primary sources. For details see Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, Vol.1, p.36, and Chang Kuo-kan, Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-liao, p. 309.

68. Hu Wei-te was the Foreign Minister of the dynasty at that time. He also participated in the Third Imperial Conference held in January 19, 1912.

69. According to Li Chien-ning, nobles like Liang-pi and T'ieh Liang grew angry with Yuan Shih-k'ai after they knew that the abdication idea was proposed by him. The direct result of this discontent was the appearance of the Tsung-she Tang (The Imperial Clan Society). Please see Li Chien-ning, Political History of China, p. 262.

70. Ibid., p. 262. However, in Hu Wei-te's memoirs, he said that they were participated in the conference because they had presented memorial to the court demanding the establishment of the republic. Hu did not mention they were the representatives of Yuan Shih-k'ai. For details, please see Chang Kuo-kan, Hsin-kai ko-ming shih-liao, p. 309.

71. Ibid, p. 309; and Li Chien-ning, Political History of China, pp. 262-3.

72. Ibid., p. 263.

73. Liang-pi (1877-1912) was a Manchu and was well known for his intellectual and smart character. In 1899, he went to Japan to study military affairs. He became the Chief of Staff of the Army. He was very anti-republican and opposed the abdication of the Ch'ing emperor.

74. T'ieh-liang (? - 1963) like Liang-pi, was a Manchu and had studied military affairs in Japan. He had helped Yuan Shih-k'ai in training of the New Army. In 1906, he was appointed as Minister of Army. In 1908, he was responsible for training of the Imperial Guard. In 1909, he resigned from the post but was soon reappointed as Commissioner of Navy and then General of Kiangning.

75. Li Chien-ning, Political History of China, p. 263.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 264.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 265.
80. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo, vol. 1, p. 442.
81. See Jerome Chen, Yuan Shih-k'ai 1859-1916 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 100; and Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 265.
82. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 473.
83. Ibid.
84. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo, vol. 2, p. 442.
85. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 473.
86. Ibid.
87. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 266.
88. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 473.
89. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 101.
90. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 266.
91. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 101.
92. Reginald Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City (London: Victor Gollancz, 1934), p. 96.
93. The China Year Book, 1925, p. 620.
94. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 108.
95. Arnold C. Brachman, The Last Emperor (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), p. 93.
96. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 475.

Chapter III

FACTIONS WITHIN THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT

The restorationists in the early republican period can be divided into five factions. The first faction, called the Tsung-she Tang (Imperial Clan Society) was formed by Manchu nobles like Shan-chi and P'u-wei and officials like Sheng-yun (former Governors-General of Kansu and Shensi). The second faction was composed of former Ch'ing government officials. This faction was divided into two groups. In the first group were the officials who refused to serve in the new republican government and named themselves I-lao-- the loyal officials of the late dynasty. This group was represented by Lao Nai-hsuan, Hu Ssu-ching, Liu T'ing-shen, Sheng Tseng-chih, and Cheng Hsiao-hsu. The other group, the old bureaucrats was composed of old Ch'ing officials who continued to serve in the new republican government. Chang Hsun, Hsu Shih-ch'ang and Feng Kuo-chang belonged to this group. The third restorationist faction was called the "Forbidden City faction" and was composed of Ch'ing officials who continued to serve in the imperial court in the Forbidden City. They were represented by Chen Po-shen, tutor of P'ü-yi. The fourth one, called the Monarchy Republican faction, was led by K'ang Yu-wei. The final restorationist faction was the Japanese Ronin (unemployed samurai), represented by Kawashima Naniwa, Mumekata Kotaro, and Tsukuda Nobuo.²

Tsung-she Tang

As mentioned in the introduction, the Tsung-she Tang was formed by the nobles of the Imperial Family and former officials of Manchu origin. The origin of the name of Tsung-she Tang (Imperial Clan Party) is not clear. Sources provide limited background of the Tsung-she Tang. Li Chien-nung's The Political History of China, 1840-1928 describes the origins of Tsung-she Tang as follows:

As the rumour of the emperor's possible abdication spread, some of the nobles, especially Tsai-t'ao, Liang-pi and T'ieh-liang grew angry with Yuan. The direct result of this discontent was the appearance of the Imperial Clan Society (Tsung-she Tang).³

Chang Kuo-kan's Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-liao records "As the news of the abdication of the emperor spread, the members of the imperial family became very angry. Therefore, they grouped themselves together and came into being as the Tsung-she Tang."⁴ Some sources simply recorded the name Tsung-she Tang without mentioning its origin. For instance, B.L. Putnam Weale in his book The Fight for the Republic of China states that "In the North Western Provinces, and in Manchuria and Mongolia, the so called Tsung-she Tang or Imperial Clan Society intrigued perpetually to create risings which would hasten the restoration of the fallen house."⁵ With the lack of explanation in sources, one must infer the origin from the term. Literally, Tsung-she implies loyalty to the Imperial clan and Tang means party. Cha Shih-chieh gives an inference of the origin of Tsung-she Tang from the term itself: "In the late Ch'ing dynasty, the

members of the imperial family hoped to protect the political power of the Manchus and maintain the monarchical system. They could not tolerate the forced abdication of the Ch'ing emperor and with a hope of restoring the glory of the Ch'ing dynasty, they formed this political organization."⁶

After the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, the Tsung-she Tang became the main obstacle to the abdication of the Manchu emperor. During the imperial conferences in January 1912, Liang-pi, P'u-wei and Shan-chi were the chief opponents of the abdication of the Manchu emperor. No conclusion could be reached because of their opposition. The assassination of Liang-pi by a revolutionary on January 26, however, dealt a blow to the Tsung-she Tang. Many of its members became concerned for their safety and fled Peking or went into hiding.⁷ The remainder remained behind in the court and kept silent.

Yuan Shih-k'ai succeeded in persuading the Ch'ing Court to abdicate after the removal of the opposition from the court. The members of Tsung-she Tang were not despondent. Under the leadership of P'u-wei, Shan-chi and Sheng-yun, a series of conspiracies were planned aimed to overthrow the republic and restore the Manchu emperor. In order to better understand the Tsung-she Tang, it is necessary here to make a brief introduction of the prominent members of the society.

P'u-wei was the grandson of Prince Kung⁸ and shared his open mind. In his early years, P'u-wei had been involved in

the affairs of opium prohibition. After the outbreak of the revolution, he became a central figure within the Tsung-she Tang and fiercely opposed the abdication of the emperor. When the Ch'ing court finally decided to use Yuan Shih-k'ai in order to compromise with the revolutionaries, P'u-wei left Peking for German-occupied Tsingtao in Shantung because he was afraid for his safety.⁹ P'u-wei soon became the leader of the restorationists in Tsingtao because of his honorable status.

Shan-chi was a Manchu noble and succeeded to his father's rank as Prince Su in 1898. He was also well known for his open mindedness and virtue. Shan-chi was serving in the Civil Affairs Department when the revolution broke out. During the Imperial Conferences, he and P'u-wei were the most reactionary figures in opposing the abdication. After the abdication, Shan-chi escaped with the help of his Japanese friend Kawashima Naniwa, a Ronin, and went to Japanese-held Lushun in Liaotung Peninsula.¹⁰ After the establishment of the republic, Shan-chi remained faithful to the idea of the restoration. With the help of Kawashima Naniwa, Shan-chi co-operated with the Japanese to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from China.

Sheng-yun was the Governor-General of Shensi and Kansu at the outbreak of the revolution. During the revolution, he fought bitterly against the revolutionaries in Shensi. After the announcement of the abdication of the emperor in February 1912, Sheng-yun went to Manchuria and Mongolia and

worked for the restoration.¹¹ In 1913, Sheng-yun conspired with Russia to set up a Manchu government in Ulan Bator with himself as Prime Minister. The plan was aborted because the Russian government was too busy in the war in Europe.¹²

The members of the Tsung-she Tang were scattered over Manchuria, Hupei, Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and Fukien.¹² Many small uprisings were arranged by them, all of which ended in disaster due to poor organization and lack of military power. The only large scale military action prepared by the Tsung-she Tang was the Manchuria and Mongol Independent Movement organized with the help of the Japanese in 1916.

FORMER CH'ING OFFICIALS

(a) I-lao

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the Former Ch'ing Officials faction was divided into I-lao (the loyal officials of the late dynasty) and the old bureaucrats. The I-lao group consisted of former Ch'ing officials who had refused to serve in the republican government. This group was represented by Lao Lai-hsuan, former minister of Board of Civil Service, Liu T'ing-shen, former supervisor of the Capital School, Shen Tseng-chih, former Commissioner of Education of Anhwei and Cheng Hsiao-hsu, former Governor of Hunan province. The I-lao had received traditional Confucian education and were significantly influenced by Chinese culture and tradition.

Most of the officials held the status of intellectual with a high social status in the society and were thus respected by the populace.¹⁴

Surprisingly, most of the I-lao were Chinese. It is strange that while one of the missions of the 1911 revolution was to expel the Manchu, there were Chinese who conspired against the republican government, run by their compatriots, working towards the restoration of an alien Manchu monarchy. How can one explain this contradiction?

From a political point of view, the Manchu were conquerors and faced violent opposition from the Han Chinese, especially from the intellectuals. In coping with this opposition, the Ch'ing government used bloody repressive methods, including massacres¹⁵ and literary persecutions.¹⁶ In addition the Ch'ing dynasty used the Civil Service Examination to neutralize the Chinese intellectual opposition. Therefore, on the one hand, the Ch'ing dynasty suppressed the opposition, but on the other hand used high office and peerage to tempt the intellectuals. Gradually, the intellectuals' consciousness of Chinese identity dissipated and they began to co-operate with the Manchu, the source of power and wealth. Gradually, the Manchu and the Chinese intellectuals formed a mutually beneficial relationship. As time passed Chinese officials obtained the same opportunities as the Manchus, to become high officials. Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang¹⁷ and Yuan Shih-k'ai were good examples of this process. The Han

Chinese officials, therefore, felt gratitude to the grace of the Manchu house and owed spiritual debt to it. The Manchus, to Chinese officials, were no longer an alien or conqueror but rather the legal master of China and the source of power and wealth. Therefore, when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, their sorrow and anger were not less than those of the Manchus.¹⁸

From the cultural point of view, although the Manchus were aliens, they were soon sinicized and assimilated into Chinese culture. The Manchu began to lose their identity and began to speak Chinese and to think Chinese. This is a natural phenomenon that often occurs during an encounter between a high civilization and a low civilization happened. In order to stabilize their political power, the Manchus advocated Confucianism because the ideas of loyalty, obedience, duty and morality were very useful to an autocratic government to control the people. The influence of western ideas in the nineteenth century menaced traditional Confucianism and many intellectuals rose up against western learning. To these officials, the establishment of a republic was not only a transfer of political power but also a symbol of the triumph of westernization over traditionalism.¹⁹ After the establishment of the republic, the I-lao never ceased to attach evil to the republican period. The I-lao's idea of restoration also had an inclination of restoring traditional Confucianism. It is not strange that a Marxist historian

made the following comment: "Restoration needs to respect Confucius and the respect of Confucius is aimed at restoration."²⁰

The I-lao were scattered throughout large cities such as Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peking and Nanking and participated in various restoration movements.²¹ One of the activities of the I-lao was the organization of poetry societies. Among them, the Sung Society, the Hsi and Yat Society were the most famous.²² The I-lao used the gathering of the poetry societies to express their memory of the former Ch'ing dynasty and resentment against the republican government. For instance, Hu Ssu-cheng in his poem "The Chant of Snow" insinuated that the snow was the republic and the sun the Manchu dynasty, and used the symbolism of the melting of the snow and the return of the sun to infer that the republic would finally collapse and the Ch'ing dynasty would be restored again.

The I-lao also advocated the revival of Confucianism in order to protect traditional culture. As mentioned before, I-lao regarded the establishment of the republic as the triumph of western ideas and the decline of traditional Confucian ideas. In order to combat the heresy, it was important to rejuvenate Confucianism. In 1912, Shen Tseng-chih and other I-lao leaders organized K'ung-chiao hui (the Society of Confucian Study) in Shanghai. Later, other study societies such as K'ung-she (Confucius Society), K'ung-tao hui (Society of Confucius Way) and Tsun-K'ung wen-she

(Confucius Worshipping Society) were formed.²⁴

The I-lao were also involved in writing essays attacking the republican government and praising the glory of the Ch'ing dynasty. Many I-lao members did not hide their intention of restoring the Manchu monarch. For example, Lao Nai-hsuan in June 1914 published a book called Cheng-hsu K'ung-ho chieh (An Explanation of Republic, with a Supplement), advising Yuan Shih-k'ai, the president of the Republic, to return the political power to the Ch'ing dynasty. Others like Liu T'ing-shen's Fu li-chih-kuan Shu (An Essay for the Restoring of the Ritual Institute) and Sung Yu-yen's Wen-cheng Ch'ing-shih (Return of the Administrative Power to the Ch'ing Court) also advocated the restoration of the Manchu emperor.²⁵

Apart from intellectual activities, the I-lao also tried to put their ideals into practice. Wen Su, the former Grand Historian and famous I-lao member, went to Manchuria in June 1912 to persuade the Chao Erh-shun (former Ch'ing Governor-General of Manchuria) to help restore the Manchu monarch by military action. Chao, however, refused Wen's suggestion. In 1913 Wen again conspired with Liu T'ing-shen, P'u-wei and Chang Hsun to overthrow the republic and to restore the Ch'ing. In 1916, Liu T'ing-shen, Hu Chih-yuan²⁶ conspired with Feng Kuo-Chang and Chang Hsun planned another attempt at restoration.²⁷ The details of these two abortive restoration movements will be discussed in the next chapter.

(b) Old Bureaucrats

The Old Bureaucrats were composed of the former Ch'ing officials who compromised with the revolutionaries and continued to serve in the new republican government. This was an abnormal and strange phenomenon in history. Usually, when transfer of political power occurs in a revolution, power will be in the hands of the revolutionaries. The old administrative class has to withdraw from the political arena. Even when some members of the old administrative power compromise with the new power, they cannot take posts that are powerful or influential. This was not the case in China. After the establishment of the Republic in 1912, the revolutionaries gradually lost control of the government. The government was actually in the hands of the "old bureaucrats" led by President Yuan Shih-k'ai. In the first coalition government, all of the powerful ministries went to Yuan's supporters and the revolutionaries obtained minor positions.²⁸ Furthermore, most of the provinces in China were under the control of the former Ch'ing officials who were willing to make compromises with the revolutionaries after the outbreak. A large proportion of them were Yuan's henchmen.

This abnormal phenomenon was a result of an "incomplete revolution". As mentioned in the last chapter, most revolutionaries, except for some intellectuals like Sun Yat-sen, thought that the most important mission of the revolution was the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty.

Therefore, they were willing to compromise with the old officials headed by Yuan Shih-K'ai for a peaceful transfer of power. As a result, the creation of the republic was not effected by the revolution but by the compromise between the revolutionaries and the old officials.²⁹ Therefore, after the establishment of the republic, the Old Bureaucrats were incorporated into the new system. The situation was wonderfully illustrated in Lu Hsun's Story of Ah Q which records that "the revolutionaries had entered the city; there were no great changes in the tenor of things. The Chih-hsien-ta-lao-yeh (the magistrate) still remained the same official. The name of the official having merely been changed to such and such "an office".³⁰

The Old Bureaucrats came from traditional Chinese society and the idea of monarchy had already been rooted deeply within their hearts.³¹ They did not favour the republican system, but, in order to preserve their power and wealth, they were willing to make compromises with the revolutionaries. Nonetheless, they continued to feel grateful to the former dynasty. As a result, many of them had, to a certain extent, restorationist inclinations.

The Old Bureaucrats groups can also be divided into three sub-groups: the radicals, the moderates and the hesitants. The Radical group was composed of the former Ch'ing officials who had considerable military power and hoped to use it to bring about the restoration. This group was represented by Chang Hsun, the main actor of the

restoration movement in 1917.

Chang Hsun came from a poor family of the Southern province in Kiangsi.³² He joined the army during the Sino-French War in 1884. In 1895, he helped Yuan Shih-k'ai train the New Army at Hsiao-chan in Chihli.³³ From then on, he became one of Yuan's most loyal supporters. During the Boxer uprising in 1900, Chang Hsun helped crush the rebels. After the restoration of order in 1901, Chang was ordered to command his troops in escorting the imperial family from Sian back to Peking. During the trip, Chang won the special favour of the Empress Dowager. After the imperial family reached Peking, Chang Hsun was granted special honors by the imperial family, and his troops became part of the imperial guard. From then on, Chang Hsun rose rapidly and became a high official. This can explain why Chang Hsun was so loyal to the imperial family even after its abdication in 1912.³⁴ At the time of the 1911 revolution, Chang was Governor-General of Liang-Kiang (Kiangsi and Kiangnan) and high commissioner of military and foreign affairs in southern China. Chang held this position until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. After the establishment of the Republic, Chang Hsun was given the rank of general. In 1913, he was made military Governor of Kiangsu province, but this was later changed to the title of inspector general of Yantze provinces.³⁵

After the establishment of the republic, Chang Hsun's primary allegiance still remained with the Imperial family.

11. Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling "Lun Chang-hsun fu-fu-p'i ti li-shih chi-yuan ho shih-pai ti pi-jan-hsing" (A Discussion of the Historical Chance of Chang Hsun's Restoration and his Doom) in Hsin-chien-she vol 65, No. 3, March 1965 p. 32.

12. Chung-hua shu-chu Chung-kuo chin-tai shih (A History of Contemporary China), Peking, 1977, p.521.

13. For details, please see Pai Chiao "Tsung-she Tang" (The Imperial Clan Party) in Jen-wen yueh-k'an (hereafter cited as JWYK) vol 6, No. 7, September, 1935 and Hu Ping-seng, pp. 4-32.

14. In traditional China, the intellectual was ranked first in the social ladder, followed by the farmer, worker and finally the merchant.

15. In the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, there were many massacres. For instance, in 1645 when the Ch'ing army captured Yangchow, there was an order of massacre for ten days in order to punish the Chinese resistance. In the same year, the Ch'ing dynasty promulgated an hair-cut ordinance which ordered the Chinese to shave their forehead and wear queues. This order was specially designed to destroy the morale of the educated. The result of this ordinance was a large amount of Chinese intellectuals was killed.

16. Literary persecution was very popular in the early Ch'ing. In the era of K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Chien-lung, there was a record of seventy to eighty cases. If the content of an article or a poem was found memorizing the former Ming dynasty, or libelling the Ch'ing dynasty or the emperor, not only the writer but also his family could be persecuted.

17. Tseng Kuo-fan was a late Ch'ing scholar and a military man. He was famous in suppressing the Taiping rebels and rose to high office in the civil service. Li Hung-chang also promoted to high post because of military merit. He defeated the Taiping and Nien rebellions respectively. From 1870, he was Governor-General of Chihli and High Commissioner of the Northern Ports.

18. Hu Ping-seng, p. 54.

19. Ibid.

20. Chang K'ai-yuan, "K'ung-chia-tien" Wen-wu No. 5 (1974), p. 45.

21. Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling, "Lun Chang Hsun fu-fu-p'i", p. 33.

22. The initiators of the Sung Society was Liu Shing-chao and Cho Hsing-wei. Jih Society was organized by Shen Tseng-chih and Hsi Society was initiated by Chou Hsing-wun and Yao Wen-chao. For details please see Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai ko-ming hou ti-chih fu-p'i ho fan-fu-p'i tou-cheng (The Rivalries between the Restorationists and the Anti-Restorationists after the 1911 Revolution) Peking, 1978, p. 72.

23. Ibid.

24. K'ung-she (Confucius Society) was formed by Hsu Ch'i and Kung-tao hui (Society of Confucius Way) was organized by K'ang Yu-wei. Tsun-K'ung wen-hsi (Confucius Worshipping Society) was first initiated by a German Richard Wilhelm and formed by Lao Nai-hsuan. For details please see Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai ko-ming, p. 73, and Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 58.

25. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

26. Hu Chih-yuan was a former official of the National Academy (Hanlin Yuan). After the establishment of the republic, he refused to work in the republican government. However, he worked as the secretary of Feng Kuo-chang, the military governor of Kiangsu.

27. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, pp. 60-61.

28. In the first coalition government, the revolutionaries could only take second place. All the powerful minister like foreign affairs, army, interior, finance and communication all went to Yuan Shih-k'ai's supporter. The revolutionaries only got the ministries of agriculture and forestry, justice, education and industry and commerce.

29. Lin Ming-te. "Jih-pen yu Hung-hsien ti-chih" (Japan and the Hung-hsien Monarchical System) in Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shi lun-chi edited by Chang Yu-fa (Hereafter cited as CKHTS), vol. 4, Taipei, 1980, p. 203.

30. Lu Hsun, "The Story of Ah Q" in The War Cry by Lu Hsun, compiled and annotated by Jorgensen. (Honk Kong, 1960), p. 265.

31. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 82.

32. For details of Chang Hsun's life history, see his autobiography "Autobiography of the Old Man of the Pine-Tree" Transl. by Reginald Johnston in Twilight in the Forbidden City, and Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China.

33. Please see footnote 15 in Chapter 2.

34. Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 1, p. 69.

35. During the second revolution in 1913, Chang Hsun was ordered to fight against the Kuomintang force and defend Nanking. Chang won the battle and was appointed as the military governor of Kiangsu province. However, when Chang's troops entered Nanking, some of them looted the city and injured some of the personnel of the Japanese consulate. Under the pressure of the Japanese government, Yuan Shih-k'ai then replaced Chang by Feng Kuo-chang as the military governor of Kiangsu.

36. Johnson, Twilight in the Forbidden City, p. 119.

37. Chiang Ching-kuo, Kuo-min ko-ming chan-shih (A Military History of the Nationalist Revolution) (Taipei, 1976), p. 88.

38. When Chang Hsun entered Nanking in 1913, he got all the ammunition left by the Kuomintang. Also, he deprived all the weapons from the Kiangning Arsenal. He also imported ammunition from Germany. See Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling, "Lun Chang Hsun fu-p'i", Hsin-chien-she 65 (March 1965): 31.

39. Ni Ssu-chun was one of the prominent leaders of the radical faction. He also belonged to the Peiyang clique. In 1913, he defeated the Kuomintang in Anking and was appointed military governor of Anhwei, but was then transferred to the title of Inspector General of Anhwei.

40. Lu Yung-t'ing belonged to the hesitant faction. He was appointed as Inspector general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi after the establishment of the Republic. In March 1917, he went to Peking to visit P'u-yi and was granted special favour of riding horse in the Forbidden City. From then on, he was also looked on as comrade by the restorationists. For details please see Wo-ti chin-pan seng [My First Part of Life] by Asisin-Gioro P'u-yi, Peking, 1965, p. 447.

41. On Hsu Shih-ch'ang, see Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2, pp. 136-138. For a critical biography of Hsu Shih-ch'ang, please see Shen Yun-lung Hsu Shih-ch'ang P'ing-chuan (A Critical biography of Hsu Shih-ch'ang) Taipei, 1979.

42. Ching-min, Hsu Shih-chang (Central Book Store, 1969), p. 184.

43. Sun Yu-yun, "Fu-p'i yin-mou chi-shi" [A True Account of the Restoration Conspiracy] KMWH vol. 7, p.48.

45. For Feng Kuo-chang's life, see Boorman and Howard,

Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2,
pp. 24-28.

46. Ibid., p. 26.

47. Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai ko-ming, p. 319.

48. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 47.

49. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen vol. 1,
p. 60.

50. Ibid.

51. For details of K'ang Yu-wei's life, see Boorman and
Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China vol. 2,
pp. 228-232.

52. K'ang Yu-wei went to Japan in order to gain Japanese
support to rescue the emperor. However, five days after his
arrival, the Okuma ministry fell. Kang therefore decided to
seek help from America.

53. Lo Jung-pang, ed., K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and a
Symposium (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967),
p. 181.

54. Ibid., p. 204.

55. When "Chiu-wang lun" was sent to China for publishing,
there was no publisher agreed to print it. Finally in
October, the Ch'ing government promulgated its 19 Articles
of Faith, Kang's essay was finally accepted for publication.
Please see Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 204.

56. Ibid., pp. 218-219.

57.

58. K'ang Yu-wei in the preface of Pu-jen explained the
reasons of publishing this magazine: "I cannot bear to see
the sufferings of the people ... the gradual alienation of
our country ... the decline of morality ... the corruption
of the government ... the abandonment of our cultural
heritage ... the chaos of partisan strife ... and the danger
of national extinction." Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 225.

59. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 75.

60. Please refer to footnote 58.

61. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 75.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 78.

64. Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 233.

65. For detail of Kawashima's life history, see Jansen, Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese, p. 138.

66. Japan was the chief advocate of Pan-Asianism. It is a concept which stresses the uniqueness of the Asian geographical or ethnic entity. According to a Pan-Asianist, there are distinguishing characteristics that constitute Asia. Pan-Asianism is based on the idea that the people of Asia, who have the "same race and same writing system" can unite and cooperate together under Japanese dominance. The cooperation will be due to the common fear of Western imperialism.

67. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen, p. 139.

68. Hu Ping-seng, Min-Kuo ch'u-ch'i, pp. 106-107.

69. Uchida Ryohei belonged to the expansionist faction of the pan-Asianism. He was the president of Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) which aimed at preventing Russia's penetration into Manchuria and made it a Japanese territory.

70. Miyazaki Toten belonged to the idealist faction of the pan-Asianism. He was a good friend of Sun Yat-sen and helped the revolutionaries in the Chinese revolution of 1911.

71. Tsou Nien-chih, transl. "Chang Hsun Yu Tsukuda Nobuo" (Chang Hsun and Tsukuda Nobuo) in I-chiu-i-ch'i-nien ting-szu ching-ti fu-p'i shih-liao lui-pien compiled by T'sun-ts'ui hsueh-she (Hong Kong: 1977) (Hereafter cited as TSCT), p. 176.

72. Ibid.

73. Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling, "Lun Chang Hsun fu-p'i", p. 32.

74. Cheng Hsiao-hsu "Cheng Hsiao-hsu ping-t'ing jih-chi" (Diary of Cheng Hsiao-hsu in 1916 and 1917) in TSCT, p. 128.

75. Hu Ping-seng, Min-Kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 76.

76. In February 1917, Lu Chung-yu went to Japan bearing Hsu Shih-chang's proposal of restoration in order to test the attitude of the Japanese government. Hsu's proposal was to select a regent from the high rank Chinese official who had held the position not lower than member of Grand Council. At that time, only Hsu had this qualification. Another proposal was that to select a queen from the daughters of the Han Chinese officials. If Hsu was appointed as regent, it was

natural that his daughter, would become the queen. For detail please see Li Shou-k'ung, Kuo-min ko-ming shih (A History of the Nationalist Revolution) (Taipei, 1966), p. 295.

77. Chang K'ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling, "Lun Chang Hsun fu-p'i", p. 39.

Chapter IV

THE RESTORATION MOVEMENTS BEFORE 1917

As mentioned in the last chapter, the revolutionaries could not control the government after the success of the revolution. They took second place in the first coalition government.¹ Yuan Shih-k'ai, the president of the republic, however, soon found that he was no better off than the revolutionaries. Although he could control the central government in Peking, he could not solve the problem of the autonomy of the provinces that had existed in the late Ch'ing period, especially after the Boxer uprising of 1900.² After the revolution, the provinces were controlled by local military leaders who had declared independence or neutrality during the revolution.³ The republican government had no choice but to re-appoint them as military governors. They then became "local emperors" in their territories and controlled political, economic and military affairs.⁴ They submitted to the central government as long as their powers were not disturbed. Among the provinces in China, those that were controlled by the revolutionaries - such as Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Anhwei - were highly independent and did not want central governmental interference in their internal affairs. They probably did not trust Yuan Shih-k'ai. The provinces that were controlled by Yuan's henchmen were no different. These provincial leaders, like Feng Kuo-chang in Chihli, and Chang Hsun in the Hwai River region also

maintained their spheres of influence.⁵ The country was unified in name but divided in fact. As described by Ernest P. Young, the early republic was only a "de facto confederation of provinces."⁶

The autonomy of the provinces not only created administrative problems for the central government, but also brought financial difficulties. The newly established republic inherited an empty treasury from the Ch'ing dynasty. The taxes raised by the central government were limited. Some taxes, like the maritime custom revenues and part of the land tariff, were under control of foreigners as security against indemnities and loans.⁷ Other taxes, such as salt, gabelle and the likin (Internal tax on goods in transit) were poorly administered and, therefore, could not be relied upon as a principal source of revenue.⁸ The central government had to rely on taxes from the provinces. The provinces tried to evade tax responsibility because they needed the money to support their armies.⁹ According to H.G.W. Woodhead, no province remitted the land tax to Peking.¹⁰ The republic needed about 23 million dollars a month, but the monthly income was only about eight million dollars, creating a deficit of about 15 million dollars.¹¹ Therefore, the government had to rely on loans to survive:

Yuan Shih-k'ai exhausted all means to regain the power already lost from the provinces. In the autumn of 1912 Yuan attempted, with little success, to repossess the authority of appointing civil officials in the provinces. In November

1912, Yuan again requested the provincial governments to submit the appointments of county magistrates to the central government for approval. There was, however, no response from the provinces.¹² Yuan gradually lost patience with the division of the country; he desired to unify the country under his personal control.¹³ Despite the selfish purpose, Yuan's monarchical movement was due partly to his idea of national unification and stability.¹⁴

The condition of the central government was far more discouraging than the situation in the provinces. According to the provisional constitution, there was to be a parliament elected within six months of the formation of the government. In August 1912, under the leadership of Sung Chiao-jen¹⁵, the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) was formed by the amalgamation of the T'ung-meng hui and other small parties to participate in the election.¹⁶ In the election of 1912, the Kuomintang gained a majority over the opposition parties - the Republican Party, Unification Party and the Democratic Party.¹⁷

Sung Chiao-jen did not oppose Yuan Shih-k'ai becoming president, but wanted the country to be guided into a constitutional and parliamentary form of government in order to check the possible abuse of power of the president.¹⁸ Yuan was extremely upset by the results of the election. From his point of view, the control of the parliament by the Kuomintang was a hindrance to his efforts at strengthening the central government and unifying the country.¹⁹ On March

20, 1913, Sung was murdered at the Shanghai Railway Station. The plot had been initiated by Yuan.²⁰

The removal of Sung Chiao-jen did not end Yuan Shih-k'ai's concerns because the power of the Kuomintang grew day by day. In order to check the Kuomintang, on April 26, 1913, Yuan negotiated, without the consent of the parliament, a "reorganization loan" of 25 million from the Five Power Banking Consortium.²¹ The members of the Kuomintang arose in an uproar and requested that parliament not pass the bill. Parliament finally had to pass the bill after being threatened by Yuan's military power.²²

Yuan's dictatorial rule finally aroused opposition from the Kuomintang. In July 1913, Sun Yat-sen launched a revolution in the south against Yuan to protect democracy within the country. This was later known as the "Second Revolution". Yuan's military strength was far superior to that of the southern revolutionaries.²³ The revolutionaries were defeated within a few months and the ring-leaders, including Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, were exiled again.

The instability and division of the republic thus provided a good chance for the restorationists. After the abdication of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1912 with the country still in turmoil, P'u-wei, a member of the Tsung-she Tang, conspired with Chang Hsun and Sheng-yun to activate a restoration movement in Tsinan, Shantung province. According to the record of Wen Su, a famous I-lao, the day of the restoration was set for April 9th, 1913.²⁴ K'ang Yu-wei

participated in the plot by persuading the military governors to join the restoration attempt. Among them, Feng Kuo-chang was most fascinated by the idea.²⁵ The conspiracy became known to Yuan and he blocked the railway line to Tsinan in order to stop Chang Hsun's army from going north.²⁶ The restoration was then temporarily shelved.

The Second Revolution in 1913 provided a new chance for the restorationists to bring about a counter-revolution. During the Second Revolution, Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered Chang Hsun to attack the revolutionaries in Nanking. Chang then proceeded to use this opportunity to carry out the restoration. His plan was to occupy the area north of the Yangtze river, join with the forces of Feng Kuo-cheng and to bring the Manchu emperor back to the throne.²⁷ Chang captured some zones such as Ching-kiang and Yang-chou north of Yangtze, but he did not wait for Feng before he attacked Nanking because he wanted first honours in the restoration movement.²⁸ When his army left the captured zones north of the Yangtze, Yuan's army immediately moved in. Even though Chang successfully captured Nanking, all of the zones north of the Yangtze were already in the hands of Yuan.²⁹ The restoration movement was quickly aborted.

At the same time as Chang Hsun's restoration plot in 1913, the members of the Tsung-she Tang were also planning a restoration. It was called the Manchuria and Mongolian Independence Movement. The chief conspirator of this movement was Shan-chi. When the Ch'ing emperor abdicated in

1912, Shan-chi was in Lushun with Kawashima Naniwa. He was so angered by the abdication that a plan was worked out, with the help of Kawashima, for the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia. Shan-chi would set up a regime in Manchuria while two Mongol princes would establish a regime in Mongolia.³⁰ Kawashima sought further help from Japanese Army headquarters in Tokyo. The General Staff gave tacit permission and sent out several officers to assist in the project.³¹ A treaty was then signed with one of the Mongol princes indicating that Japan would give economic and military support to the restorationists in return for ensured Japanese primacy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.³²

At the end of February 1912 Kawashima received a wire from the Assistant Chief of the General Staff requesting his return to Japan. In Tokyo he was told that the Japanese cabinet had discovered the plan and had ordered it to be stopped at once.³³ Kawashima interviewed Foreign Minister Uchida in an effort to persuade him to sanction the plan. Uchida, however, told Kawashima that Japan was entering the international loan consortium to make a loan to the newly established republic. Thus, the restoration was inappropriate at that time.³⁴ Uchida further indicated that an official prohibition would be issued if Kawashima insisted on carrying out the movement.³⁵

Nevertheless, the independence movement in Inner Mongolia intensified, even with the absence of Kawashima. On May 24, 1912, weapons were sent over the mountains of Jehol

to prevent their detection by the Chinese and Japanese governments.³⁶ The rebels went with the weapons in order to protect them. The plan became known to Chao Erh-shun, the military governor of Fengtien, who sent an army to crush the rebels. After several battles, the rebels were defeated.³⁷

The failures of the restoration movements of 1912 and 1913 discouraged the restorationists temporarily. They knew that, although the country was still separated and unstable, their military power was too weak to carry out a counter-revolution. They had to find a military strongman. Surprisingly, their first choice was Yuan Shih-k'ai, the president of the republic.

After the defeat of the Kuomintang in the Second Revolution, Yuan Shih-k'ai easily won the election on October 10, 1913, and formally became president. The Parliament, dominated by the Kuomintang members, was still a threat to his dictatorial form of rule. On October 21, 1913, the parliament promulgated the Constitution which adopted the Cabinet system instead of the presidential system in order to check the power of the president. In response, Yuan outlawed the Kuomintang on November 14 and revoked the qualification of the Kuomintang members as parliamentarians on the excuse of their conspiratorial involvement in the Second Revolution. At the beginning of 1914, parliament was finally dissolved and replaced by the National Conference, dominated by Yuan. In March the National Conference revised the 1912 provisional constitution and promulgated the

Constitutional Compact two months later, extending the presidential term to ten years and permitting the president the right to nominate his own successor. From then on, Yuan became a dictator.

From 1913 to 1914, especially in 1914, Yuan Shih-k'ai carried out a series of actions that made the restorationists think that he was a closet restorationist.

After the establishment of the republic in 1912, Yuan repeatedly assured the Ch'ing court that the republican government would abide by the Article of Favorable Treatment.³⁸ On P'u-yi's birthday, Yuan sent special envoys to convey his congratulations. Upon the death of the Dowager Lung-yu on February 22, 1913, Yuan wore a black arm band and instructed officials to wear mourning clothes for twenty-seven days. All official buildings had to lower the flag for a period of commemoration.³⁹ After winning the election of 1913, Yuan Shih-k'ai sent a report to P'u-yi explaining that he would lead a good government and strictly enforce the Article of Favorable Treatment.⁴⁰

Yuan Shih-k'ai's actions provided an illusion to both the Manchus and the Chinese restorationists that Yuan was still loyal to the Ch'ing court and would restore the Manchu monarch given the chance. As recalled by P'u-yi, the Manchus in the Ch'ing court thought that:

Yuan agreed to a republic as a trick to defeat the south, that the term used for my abdication might really only mean a temporary retirement, and when he referred to "running a republic" it meant that it was only an experiment.⁴¹

In 1914, Yuan Shih-k'ai's actions further created excitement among the restorationists. At the New Year reception of 1914, Yuan's chief officials wore court robes formerly used for Manchu ceremonies.⁴² Yuan also reverted to the use of feudal administrative titles. The government officials were to be classified into nine grades -- three grades of Lords (President) (Ch'ing), three of Secretaries of State (Ta-fu) and three of Honorable Companions (Shih).⁴³

According to the I-lao, Yuan Shih-k'ai's revival of old customs was aimed at paving the way for the Manchu restoration. They thought that Yuan had compromised with the revolutionaries in 1912 in order to reserve his military strength and protect the Imperial House. They thought that when his military power was sufficient to control the country, Yuan was going to restore the Manchu monarchy.⁴⁴

Yuan Shih-k'ai also established an institute to compile the official history of the Ch'ing dynasty. Chao Erh-shun, the former Ch'ing Viceroy of Manchuria, was appointed head of the institute. Chao had said publicly, "I am a Ch'ing official. I edit the Ch'ing history. I eat the Ch'ing rice, and I do the Ch'ing business [sic]."⁴⁵

The restorationists, especially the I-lao, did not know the real intentions of Yuan Shih-k'ai, but in response to Yuan's loyal actions, the I-lao began to write essays advocating the idea of restoration. In June 1914, Lao Nai-hsuan published his short book, An Explanation of Republic, with a Supplement [Cheng-hsu kung-ho chieh].⁴⁶ In the book,

Lao indicated that people did not really know the true meaning of "kung-ho" and mistakenly thought that it meant "republicanism". In fact, "kung-ho" was a monarchical system and had a long-term history in China. In the Western Chou dynasty, Dukes Chou and Chao ruled the country for Emperor Hsuan⁴⁷ when the latter was too young to run the government. In Chinese history, this period was regarded as the years of "kung-ho". Therefore, the "kung-ho" system in China was a form of monarchical system rather than a democratic system. The system meant that the minister temporarily ruled the country for the emperor when the latter was still young. After explaining the meaning of "kung-ho", Lao further advised Yuan Shih-k'ai to follow the example of Dukes Chou and Chao and return the administrative power to P'u-yi when the latter was old enough.

Lao Nai-hsuan requested Chao Erh-shun to send the book to Yuan Shih-k'ai. He also wrote letters to Chou Fu and Hsu Shih-chang asking them to persuade Yuan to follow his advice. When the book and the letters reached Yuan, he simply instructed Hsu to invite Lao to come to Peking to serve in the government as an advisor.⁵⁰

Encouraged by Yuan Shih-k'ai's action, Liu Ting-shen, a famous I-lao, published in July 1914 an article called "Fu li-chih-kuan shu" [An Essay for the Restoration of the Ritual Institute] which denounced the weakness of the republic and advocated the restoration of the Manchu monarchy.⁵¹ Sung Yu-jen, member of the Editorial Board of

National History, made a speech entitled "Wen-cheng Ch'ingshih" [Return of the Administrative Power to the Ch'ing Court] which advocated the same idea.⁵²

Because of the actions of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the I-lao, the restoration idea was popular in China in 1914. Even the Japanese newspapers predicted the coming of the restoration.⁵³ It was not strange, therefore, that people called 1914 "the year of restoration".⁵⁴

Widespread rumours of the restoration caused concern among national government officials. On November 13, 1914, Hsi Shou-kang, an official of the Inspectorate, proposed that the rumours should be investigated in order to avoid instability.⁵⁵ Yuan Shih-k'ai instructed the Home Ministry to look into the matter. The investigation was carried out, and the first victim was Sung Yu-jen. After interrogation, Sung was sent back to his own town as punishment.⁵⁶ The Sung incident created widespread horror among the restorationists. Lao Nai-hsuan decided not to come to Peking.⁵⁷ The Ch'ing court at the Forbidden City was also in panic and anxious that there would be no link between the court and the restorationists. Court officials were asked to cut queues and change the court uniforms. The Manchus also requested that republican troops be stationed in the Forbidden City to intercept the suspected restorationists.⁵⁸

Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, did not want to dig into the matter. On an investigation report, Yuan wrote the enigmatic words, "Rumours about a restoration are severely prohibited,

but do not go into them thoroughly."⁵⁹ Yuan knew that a deep investigation would bring harm to his own monarchical movement.⁶⁰ Yuan further indicated that the rumours about the restoration were created by the nationalists instead of the I-lao, because the former wanted to create instability in the country.⁶¹

Yuan Shih-k'ai knew that his monarchical movement could never succeed if it was opposed by the Japanese government. Japan, therefore, used Yuan's ambitions to further its own demands on China. At that time, Japan had declared war on Germany and seized German spheres of influence in China - the Kiaochoy Bay. Observing that the Great Powers were occupied with World War and Yuan's personal ambition in the monarchical movement, Japan found that it was a golden opportunity for her to exploit China. On January 18, 1915, Kato, the Japanese Foreign Minister presented the Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shih-k'ai which enabled Japan to control Shantung, Southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the Yantze valley. The fifth group was Japan's attempt to control China's politics and economy which included employing Japanese political, military and economic advisors, controlling police administration and purchasing at least 50% of her ammunition from China.⁶² The Japanese government threatened Yuan that it would support the Kuomintang if Yuan did not accept the demands. Yuan, in order to obtain support from Japan, finally yielded to the demands, only with the exclusion of the fifth group. Yuan's acceptance of the

demands led to the collapse of his credibility and eventually brought about his downfall.

In the autumn of 1915, the true intention of Yuan Shih-k'ai was gradually exposed. Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, the president of Johns Hopkins University and an advisor of Yuan's, presented Yuan with a memorandum discussing governmental systems. It was published in the newspaper Asia on August 11. Goodnow indicated that China, which had been accustomed to autocratic rule for so many years, was not suited to the republican system. In order to save China, it was necessary for it to return to the monarchical system. Upon receipt of Dr. Goodnow's memorandum, Yuan instructed Yang Tu, the director of the National History Bureau, to organize the Ch'ou-an-hui⁶⁴ (The Society of Planning for Peace and Security) with the aim of putting the President on the throne.]

The Imperial House in the Forbidden City finally discovered that Yuan Shih-k'ai was planning for his own enthronement. Threatened by Yuan's intention to become emperor, the Ch'ing court then compromised with Yuan. The Manchus agreed to support Yuan in becoming emperor in return for Yuan's guarantee to enforce the Article of Favorable Treatment.⁶⁵

On December 11, 1915, representatives from all provinces petitioned, in the name of the people, that Yuan Shih-k'ai become the Emperor of China in order to save the country. Yuan refused at the beginning but then

"reluctantly" accepted for the benefit of the people. Yuan declared that the next year, 1916, was the beginning of his new reign. The title of the dynasty was proclaimed to be Hung-hsien (Glorious Constitution).

Nevertheless, Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement soon faced opposition from several quarters. The first opposition came from Ts'ai O - the former military governor of Yunnan, helped by his teacher Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,⁶⁶ who declared the independence of Yunnan on December 25, 1915, and assigned an army called the National Protection Army to fight against Yuan. Following Yunnan's example, Kweichow declared independence. In coping with the situation, Yuan delayed his enthronement which had been scheduled for January 1, 1916. However, the situation gradually fell out of Yuan's control when Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng Kuo-chang, on the excuse of sickness, refused to become commanders of the expedition against the National Protection Army.⁶⁷ On March 15, Kwangsi declared independence and other provinces such as Kwangtung, Chekiang, Shensi and Hunan followed suit. On June 6, 1916, Yuan suddenly died of uremia. The monarchical movement came to an abrupt end.

What role did the restorationists play in the anti-Yuan movement? Did they use the instability of the republic to achieve their goal of restoration? These important questions will be discussed next.

In 1914, the restorationists were fascinated by the loyal action of Yuan Shih-k'ai and changed their attitude

from anti- to pro-Yuan. Once Yuan's real intention became known, the restorationists turned against him and worked for his destruction along with the revolutionaries.

When Yuan Shih-k'ai proclaimed his Hung-hsien dynasty in December 1915, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Ts'ai O were hesitant in declaring their anti-Yuan campaign because they were waiting for the response of Feng Kuo-chang, the military governor of Kiangsu. Feng's support was crucial and decisive in any anti-Yuan campaign because of his strong military power and status. If Feng helped Yuan, the future of the National Protection Army was uncertain. Hu Chi-yuan, a famous restorationist within the I-lao faction and Feng's secretary, told Liang that Feng was opposed to Yuan's monarchical ambitions and desired to support the anti-Yuan campaign. This was communicated to Liang by P'an Jo-hai, K'ang Yu-wei's student. Liang then wired Feng and got his confirmation. Liang, therefore, instructed Ts'ai to declare independence, and the anti-Yuan campaign began, Feng did not respond to the campaign. Liang finally found out that the whole incident was a deception. Feng knew nothing about the campaign and the telegram had been sent by Hu.⁶⁸ Hu's deceptive action was very important in the campaign against Yuan; it led to its early promulgation. After Yunnan declared independence, other provinces soon joined and thus constituted the certain downfall of Yuan.

K'ang Yu-wei of the monarchy republican faction began to intrigue against Yuan Shih-k'ai immediately after the

proclamation of the Hung-hsien dynasty. K'ang sent his student P'an Jo-hai to Nanking to persuade Feng Kuo-chang to remain neutral. K'ang also wrote to Ts'ai O and advised him to build up a strong base in Széchwán before taking any military action.⁶⁹ To alienate Yuan, K'ang wrote to the military governors of Kiangsu, Shangtung, Chekiang, Hupeh, Hunan and Fukien, urging them to maintain neutrality. K'ang also tried to dissuade Yuan Shih-k'ai from continuing along the monarchist path.⁷⁰

In April 1916, when Yuan Shih-k'ai tried to obtain a loan from Lee Higginson and Company of the United States, K'ang Yu-wei wrote to Thomas Sammons, the American consul-general in Shanghai, to advise him to forbid the loan.⁷¹ In the actual action, K'ang Yu-wei sent his student Hsu Ch'in to Canton to take part in the campaign against Yuan Shih-k'ai. K'ang's wife even mortgaged her house and property in Hong Kong and raised twenty-thousand dollars as a military fund.⁷²

K'ang Yu-wei's anti-Yuan action was, however, not to protect democracy but to create the conditions for a Manchu restoration. The instability within the republic enabled K'ang to advocate his concept of a titular republican monarchy. On April 4, 1916, K'ang published an essay with the title "Wei kuo-chia ch'ou-an ting-ts'e" [A Plan for National Security] in the Shanghai Weekly News. In this essay, K'ang pointed out the deficiencies of republican politics and advocated that only the adoption of a titular

republican monarchy would restore stability to China.⁷³

K'ang Yu-wei's essay raised widespread discussions. K'ang's student, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, wrote an article called "P'i fu-p'i lun" [A Refutation of the Idea of Restoration] to counteract his teacher's idea. In the article, Liang denounced K'ang's notion of restoration and indicated that the monarchy was no longer suitable for China. The idea of a restoration was not advantageous to the Ch'ing court for it put the Manchus in a dangerous position.⁷⁴ Why did Liang, as a student of K'ang, oppose K'ang's ideas? In fact, the division between K'ang and Liang occurred after the success of the 1911 revolution. K'ang still insisted on the idea of a titular monarchy republicanism after the republic was proclaimed. Liang, however, shifted to the republican camp, entered the political arena, and became the leader of the Progressive Party. According to Chang P'eng-yuan, there were two reasons for Liang's change of attitude. First, Liang trusted the democratic republican idea and thought that it could bring democracy to the country. Second, the idea of constitutional monarchy was no longer popular and most constitutional monarchists had already become republicans. If Liang continued to follow K'ang's ideas, he would become as isolated as K'ang.⁷⁵ In order to subdue his teacher, Liang again requested the military governors of the four provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung⁷⁶ to issue a telegram denouncing K'ang's plan. The telegram read:

Refusal to change the national polity is the unanimous determination of the people. They did not

permit Yuan, the traitor, to become emperor. Would they permit another to do so? ... If there is anyone who still wishes to restore the Manchu emperor, T'ang Chi-yao and others will consider him a common enemy and a traitor and he will be treated as such.⁷⁷

Because of the fierce opposition from the military governors, K'ang temporarily stopped advocating the idea of restoration.

During Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement, the members of the Tsung-she Tang and the Old Bureaucrats became restless. They wanted to exploit the situation to bring about the restoration. Through their efforts, the second Manchuria and Mongolia Independence Movement and Restoration Movement of 1916 occurred.

At the time Yuan Shih-k'ai proclaimed his dynasty, Shan-chi was in Dairen conferring with Kawashima Naniwa about how to exploit the instability and bring about the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia. Kawashima knew that the Japanese government was opposed to Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement. Thus, when Kawashima told the Japanese government about the independence plans, the latter thought that it would be useful to strike at Yuan's monarchical movement and set up Japanese spheres in Manchuria and Mongolia. A special foreign office representative, Morita Kanzo, was sent out to take responsibility for the plan.⁷⁸ The foreign minister also issued an order to the officials in the northeast that the Japanese government was going to give tacit permission to Japanese civilian activities in the

area to operate against Yuan's monarchical system. Japanese officials were to turn a blind eye to the activities, unless they became too extreme.⁷⁹

Through Kawashima's help, Shan-chi obtained a loan of a million yen from the Zaibatsu named Ohira Kihachiro in exchange for the lumbering rights in Kirin and the Sungari River zone in Fengtien if the restoration movement was successful.⁸⁰ Shan-chi used half of the money to purchase arms from the Taihei Company in Japan. Shan-chi then used the rest of the money to bribe Babojab⁸², a Mongol loyalist and a leader of bandits, to participate in the movement.

At the end of March 1916, the Japanese government sent a military delegation to Manchuria to supervise the plan. The delegation consisted of an Army Paymaster, Colonel Doi I Chinoshin, and Captain Koiso Kuniaki. Many members of Kokuryukai also went to Manchuria to help.⁸³

The rebels consisted of Babojab and his three thousand Mongolian cavalymen, Japanese officers and members of Kokuryukai. In July 1916, the rebels began to move south and west from their encampment at Hai-la-erh. On July 23, the rebels attacked T'u-chuan county in Manchuria but were defeated by the troops from Fengtien. The rebels retreated from the county and went north.⁸⁴

At the same time the policy of the Japanese government changed again due to Yuan Shih-k'ai's sudden death in June 1916. The Japanese government decided to help the Peking government headed by Li Yuan-hung,⁸⁵ the new president of

the republic.⁸⁶ Assistance to the restoration movement in Manchuria and Mongolia was halted. Kawashima Naniwa fiercely opposed the decision when informed by the Japanese government and rejected it. Undeterred, the Japanese government ordered the prohibition of military supplies to the rebels.⁸⁷

By August the rebels had already reached Kuo-chia-tien on the South Manchuria Railway Line about two hundred kilometers north of Mukden. The rebels fought there with the troops from Fengtien. Several battles occurred and the rebels suffered serious casualties.⁸⁸ The Japanese military authorities then proposed a ceasefire to both sides and agreed to supervise the rebels' retreat to Mongolia. On September 2, the Mongols retreated from Manchuria to Mongolia under the supervision of the Japanese army.⁸⁹ However, when the rebels returned to Mongolia, Babojab again attacked Limhsi county in Inner Mongolia. During the fighting Babojab was killed and the rebels completely dispersed.⁹⁰ The second Manchurian and Mongolian independence movement thus came to an end.

At the same time as Shan-chi's restoration movement in Manchuria and Mongolia, members of the old bureaucrats' faction also engaged in restoration activities. The chief initiators of the restoration movement in 1916 were Chang Hsun, the inspector general of Yangtze, and Feng Kuo-chang, the military governor of Kiangsu province.

The movement originated with Hu Chih-yuan, Feng Kuo-chang's secretary. In April 1916, the anti-Yuan movement was at its peak, and the independent provinces refused to recognize Yuan Shih-k'ai's presidency. Hu used this chance to persuade Feng to co-operate with Chang Hsun to bring about the Manchu restoration. Sheng-yun granted help to the movement by arranging financial support from Mumekata Kotaro.⁹²

Feng Kuo-chang, however, changed his attitude, and declared that he still recognized Yuan's presidency. The reason for Feng's change of attitude is not clear. It is probable that Feng was fearful of the increased popularity of the Kuomintang during the anti-Yuan campaign. If Yuan Shih-k'ai were to be expelled by the Kuomintang, Feng's position would be precarious. Feng also believed that the restoration would be more difficult to carry out than first expected. Thus, he finally decided to support the president. This decision stalled the restoration movement.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's death on June 6, 1916 opened the door to new restorationist intrigues. The initiation of the new movement came from Chang Hsun. According to a letter from Hu Ssu-Ching to Liu T'ing-shen, Chang Hsun felt isolated after the death of Yuan. Furthermore, the power of the Kuomintang, having increased during the anti-Yuan movement, already constituted a threat to Chang.⁹³ Contact was made with the rebels led by Babojab in Manchuria through the commander of the Japanese garrison in Tientsin. It was arranged that

republic would have been looked at differently, for example, if it had been led by Sun Yat-sen rather than Yuan Shih-k'ai.

Another mistake that the restorationists committed was their incorrect choice to restore the discredited Manchus back on to the throne. According to the analysis of Chien Mu, the Manchus were no longer good leaders of the country. The whole family system was in decay; they would never support a constitutional monarchy wholeheartedly since they were seeking power.¹¹ If the Manchus after 1911 were the same Manchus as before 1911, why would the people take away their power in 1912 only to return it to them thereafter? The London Times in 1917 expressed the opinion that: "What China really needs is a stable, incorruptive, and progressive government, and this is not likely to be satisfied under the discredited Manchus."¹²

The third reason for the failure of the restorationists had to do with the presence of the anti-restoration forces. The first opposition came from rampant warlordism. At that time, the provincial government was controlled by the military governor who held combined political, military and economic power. They ruled like local emperors in their own provinces. When Yuan was still alive, the country was unified. After Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, the country rapidly shifted into the age of warlordism. Most of the warlords, except some restorationists like Chang Hsun and Feng Kuo-chang, did not favour the idea of restoration. Its

success would place restraints on their power and independence.

Another anti-restoration force came from the idea of Chinese nationalism which had already taken shape at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, developed through the revolution and matured after the success of the unification of China by the Kuomintang in 1928. The idea of Chinese nationalism and the republic was a political tide at that time and could not be turned back. Under its pressure, there was really no room for the restorationists' idea of restoring a foreign emperor.

The restoration movement in early republican China did create a cross current of opinion in the country. The restorationists were not crazy and, except for some selfish purposes, they really desired to bring unification and end the turmoil within the country. The restoration idea, however, was regarded as an adverse current in Chinese history and could not combat against the main stream of revolution and nationalism.

After the failure of the restoration movement of 1917, there were some restorationists still endeavouring to carry it out. The prestige and power of the movement, however, declined day by day. In the next two decades, it suffered from the deaths of its prominent leaders: Chang Hsun died in 1923, K'ang Yu-wei in 1927, and Sheng-yun in 1931. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the unification of China by Chiang K'ai-shek of the Kuomintang in 1928 led to the

spread of revolutionary and nationalistic ideas. There was no room for the restorationists. The restorationists finally, therefore, had to rely on Japan. In 1933 P'u-yi was named the chief executive of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Here, the total image of the restoration movement was distorted. The original spirit of the restoration disappeared. The Ch'ing dynasty had not been recovered and P'u-yi was not the emperor of China but only the chief executive of Manchukuo. When Japan surrendered in 1945, P'u-yi and other restorationists were captured, charged as war criminals and sent to a military prison in Fushan.¹³

P'u-yi was the last emperor of China. He came to the throne three times but also resigned three times. Still, none of the revolutionaries, neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists, desired the blood of the emperor on their hands. The Communists, in order to eradicate the feudal roots of China, tried to remould P'u-yi's thinking and mode of living by sending him to a military prison in Fushun to reform. On September 24, 1959, P'u-yi was pardoned by the Chinese government and declared genuinely reformed. Thus P'u-yi was released and granted the qualification of citizenship by the People's Republic of China.¹⁴

The failure of the 1917 restoration movement was a turning point for the restorationists in the process from boom to depression. The establishment of Manchukuo further depreciated the image of the restorationists. The Chinese people began to associate the restorationists with treason.

Had P'u-yi not co-operated with the Japanese, but joined the Kuomintang against the Japanese invasion instead, the image of the restorations would be far more generous. P'u-yi's non-cooperation, however, with the Japanese would deprive the restorationists with the badly needed military power to ensure the restoration. This is a controversial issue that can not be solved easily.

REFERENCES

1. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, pp. 77-78.
2. According to Sun Yat-sen's theories of revolution, the first stage was a military government for six years. The second stage was a provisional constitutional government for another six years. The final stage was a constitutional government which would run for six years and then a formal constitution would be drawn up to rule the country.
3. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 257-258.
4. Apart from the land tax there were other taxes which covered every single activity of the peasant down to the killing of his own chickens. Many of the taxes were levied in advance, in some cases for as much as ten, twenty, or even thirty years.
5. The White Wolf was bandit group from Honan which composed of landless peasants and demobilized soldiers. It was a response of the people to the desperation of the condition and disappointment of the republic. For further information, please see Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, pp. 240-241.
6. Ibid., p. 241.
7. John Neville Irons, Last Emperor: The Life of the Hsuan-tung Emperor Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, 1906-1967 (London: House of Fans, 1983), pp. 10-11.
8. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, p. 102.
9. Fukuzawa Yukichi, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1973), p. 44.
10. Ibid., p. 39.
11. Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih [On the Successes and Failures of the Chinese Government in the Past] (Hong Kong, 1952), p. 136.
12. Brackman, Last Emperor, p. 93.
13. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 2, pp. 333-334.
14. Ibid., p. 472.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(CHINESE)

Books

- Chang Chuang-an 張慧盒 Fu-p' i ch' un-chih 復辟群志
(A Record of the Restorationists.) Taiwan, 1973.
- Chang Kuo-kan 張國淦 Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-liao 辛亥革命史料
(Historical Materials of the 1911 Revolution)
Shanghai, 1958.
- Chang P' eng-yuan 張朋園 Liang ch' i-ch' ao yu min-kuo cheng-chih 梁啟超與民國政治
(Liang Ch' i-Ch' ao and the Politics of the Republic) Taipei, 1978.
- Chang Po-chen 張伯楨 Nan-hai K' ang-hsien-sheng chuan 南海康先生傳
(A Biography of K' ang Yu-wei of Nan-hai) Peking, 1932.
- Chao I-p' ing 趙一平 Chung-kuo min-chu hsien-cheng yun-tung-shih 中國民主憲政運動史
(History of the Chinese Democratic and Constitutional Government Movements) Shanghai, 1946.
- Ch' en Hsi-chang 陳錫璋 Hsi-shuo Pei-yang 細說北洋
(A Detailed Account of the Peiyang Clique)
Volume 2. Taipei, 1971.
- Ch' en Po-ta 陳伯達 Ch' ieh-kuo ta-tao Yuan Shih-K' ai 竊國大盜袁世凱
(Yuan Shih-K' ai, the Great Thief Who Stole the Country) Peking, 1962.
- Chiang Wei-kuo 蔣緯國 Kuo-min ko-ming chan-shih 國民革命戰史
(A Military History of the Nationalist Revolution) Taipei, 1976.
- Ch' ien Mu 錢穆 Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih 中國歷代政治得失
(On the Successes and Failures of the Chinese Government in the Past)
Hong Kong, 1952.
- Chin Liang 金梁 Kua-p' u shu-i 瓜圃述異
(An Account of the Peculiarity of the Melon Garden) Taipei, 1975.

- Ching Min 警民 Hsu Shih-Ch'ang 徐世昌
Shanghai, 1922.
- Chou Chun-shih 周君適 Wei-Man kung-t'ing tsai-i 偽滿宮庭雜憶
(Rambling Memories of the Palace in the Manchukuo) Szechwan, 1980.
- Chu Ch'uan-yü 朱傳纓 Li Yuan-hung chuan-chi tzu-liao
黎元洪傳記資料 (Documents on the Biography of Li Yuan-hung) Taipei, 1979.
- Chung-hua shu-chu (comp.) 中華書局 Chung-kuo chin-tai shih
中國近代史 (A History of Contemporary China) Peking, 1977.
- Yuan Shih-k'ai ch'ieh-kuo chi 袁世凱竊國記
(Record of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Usurpation) Taipei, 1954.
- Fei Ching-chung 費敬仲 Tuan Chi-jui 段祺瑞
Taipei, 1921
- Fei Hsing-chien 費行簡 Hsu Shih-ch'ang 徐世昌
Shanghai, 1919.
- Fu Ch' i-hsueh 傅啟學 Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan-hsien-sheng
Chuan 國父孫中山先生傳
(A Biography of the Father of the Republic - Sun Yat-sen) Taipei, 1965.
- Hsien-tai ch' u-pan-she 現代出版社 Hsuan-t'ung huang-ti i-shih
宣統皇帝遺事 (The Obscure Events of the Hsuan-tung Emperor) Hong Kong, 1960.
- Hu P'ing-sheng 胡平生 Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i te fu-p' i-p' ai
民國初期的復辟派 The Restorationists in the Early Republic) Taiwan, 1985.
- Huang I 黃毅 Yuan-shih tao-kuo chi 袁氏盜國記
(A Record of Yuan's Plunder of the Country) Taipei, 1964.
- Kao Lao 高勞 Ti-chih yun-tung shih-mo chi 帝制運動始末記
(The Monarchical Movement of China in 1915) Taipei, 1966.
- Kuo T'ing-i 郭廷以 Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang 近代中國史綱
(An Outline History of Contemporary China) 2 Volumes. Hong Kong, 1980.

- Li Shou-kung 李守孔 Kuo-min ko-ming shih 國民革命史
(A History of the Nationalist Revolution)
Taipei, 1966.
- Min-ch'ü chih kuo-hui 民初之國會
(National Assemblies in the Early Republic)
Taipei, 1977.
- Li Shu 黎澍 Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'ien-hou te Chung-kuo
cheng-chih 辛亥革命前後的中國政治
(Chinese Politics before and after the 1911
Revolution) Peking, 1954.
- Lin Ming-te 林明德 Chin-tai Chung-jih kuan-hsi shih
近代中日關係史 (A Contemporary History of
the Sino-Japanese Relations) Taipei, 1984.
- Liu Wang-ling 劉望齡 Hsin-hai ko-ming hou ti-chih fu-p'ü
ho fan-fu-p'ü tou-cheng 辛亥革命後帝制復辟和反復辟鬥爭
(The Rivalries between the Restorationists and
the Anti-Restorationists after the 1911
Revolution) Peking, 1975.
- Liu Yen 劉彥 Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih 中國外交史
(A Diplomatic History of China) 2 Volumes.
Taipei, 1973.
- Du-chan ch'ü chien Chung-jih chiao-she shih
歐戰期間中日交涉史 (A History of the Sino-
Japanese Negotiations During the First World
War) Taipei, 1973.
- San-lien shu-tien 三聯書店 Chung-kuo chin-tai jen-wu
lun-ts'ung 中國近代人物論叢
(Collected Studies on Contemporary Personalities
of China) Peking, 1965.
- Shen Yun-lung 沈雲龍 Hsu Shih-ch'ang p'ing-chuan
徐世昌評傳 (A Critical Biography of Hsu
Shih-ch'ang) Taipei, 1979.
- K'ang Yu-wei p'ing-chuan 康有為評傳
(A Critical Biography of K'ang Yu-wei) Taipei,
1978.
- Li Yuan-hung p'ing-chuan 黎元洪評傳
(A Critical Biography of Li Yuan-hung) Taipei,
1963.

- Sun Yueh (comp.) 孫耀 Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao
中華民國史料 (Historical Material on the
Republic of China) Taipei, 1967.
- Sun Yun-pin 宋雲彬 K'ang Yu-wei 康有為
Shanghai, 1951.
- T'ao Chu-yin 陶菊隱 Ch'ou-an-hui liu-chuen-tzu chuan
籌安會六君子傳 (Biographies of the Six
Gentlemen of the Society of Planning for Peace
and Security) Peking, 1981.
- Pei-yang chun-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch' i shih-hua
北洋軍閥統治時期史話
(Historical Tales about the Period of Rule by
the Peiyang Warlords) Volumes 1-2. Peking, 1983.
- Tu-chun-t'uan Chuan 督軍團傳
(Chronicle of the Association of Warlords)
Taipei, 1971.
- Ting Chung-chiang 丁中江 Pei-yang chun-fa shih-hua 北洋軍閥史話
(History of the Peiyang Warlords) Taipei, 1972.
- T'ien Pu-i Pei-yang chun-fa shih-hua 北洋軍閥史話
(History of the Peiyang Warlords) Volume 3.
Taipei, 1965.
- Wang Yun-sheng (comp.) 王芸生 Liu-shih-nien-lai chung-kuo
yu jih-pen 六十年來中國與日本
(Sino-Japanese Relations during the Last Sixty
Years) Volume 7. Peking, 1981.
- Wu Hsien-tzu 伍憲子 Chung-kuo min-chu hsien- cheng-tang
tang-shih 中國民主憲政黨黨史
(The Official History of the Chinese Democratic
Constitutional Party) San Francisco, 1952.
- Wu Tse 伍澤 Kang Yu-wei yü Liang Ch' i-ch' ao 康有為與梁啟超
(Kang Yu-wei and Liang Ch' i-ch' ao), Shanghai,
1948.
- Yu-yen-chü-shih 姚燕居士 Chung-hua min-kuo wu-ta tsung-t'ung
ta-shih chi 中華民國五大總統大事記
(A Brief Record of the Five Presidents of the
Chinese Republic) Peking, 1925.

Articles

Aida Tsutomi 會田勉著 translated by Ch'en Chung-yen 陳仲言譯
 "Kawashima Naniwa yu Man-Mang tu-li
 Yun-tung." 川島浪速與滿蒙獨立運動
 (Kawashima Naniwa and the Independent Movement
 of Manchuria and Mongolia) Chin-tai-shih
tsu-liao 近代史資料
 Vol. 48, 1982. (Hereafter cited as CTSL.)

Ch'a Shih-kit 查時傑 "Ch'ing mo te tsung-she-tang."
 清末的宗社黨
 (The Imperial Clan Society in the Late Ch'ing)
Kuo-li Tai-wan ta-hsueh li-shih hsueh-hsi
hsueh-pao 國立台灣大學歷史學系學報
 5 (June 1978).

Chang Chin-kuei (comp.) 張錦貴 "T'ui-lu chien-tu." (Hu
 Sse-ching's letters) I-chiu-i-chih-nien ting-ssu
Ch'ing-ti fu-p'i shih-liao hui-pien
 一九一七年丁巳復辟史料彙編
 Compiled by T'sun-ts'ui hsueh-she 存萃學社
 Hong Kong, 1977. (Hereafter cited as ISCT.)

Chang K'ai-yuan 章開沅 "K'ung-chia-tien yu Chang Hsun
 fu-p'i" 孔家店與張勳復辟
 (Confucius and the Restoration of Chang Hsun).
Wen-wu 文物 No.5 (1974)

Chang K'ai-yuan 章開沅 and Liu Wang-ling 劉望齡 "Lun
 Chang Hsun fu-p'i te li-shih chi-yuan ho
 shih-pai ti pi-jan-hsing." 論張勳復辟的歷史機緣和失敗的必然性
 (A Discussion of the Historical Chance of Chang
 Hsun's Restoration and his Doom). Hsin-chien-she
新建設 65:3 (March 1965).

Chang Kuo-kan 張國淦 "Chung-hua min-kuo nei-kuo pien"
 中華民國內閣編
 (The Cabinet of the Chinese Republic) Pei-yang
chun-fa shih-liao hsuan-chi 北洋軍閥史料選輯
 By Lin Ch'un-ho 林春和 et al. Vol. 1.
 (Hereafter cited as PYCF.)

 "Pei-yang chun-fa chih-wan-hsi chih tou-cheng
 chi ch'i mo-lo" 北洋軍閥直皖系之鬥爭及其沒落
 (The Rivalry between the 'Chihli Clique' and the
 Anhwei Clique' of the Peiyang Warlords and their
 Downfall.) PYCF Vol. 2 (1981)

- "Sun Chung-shan yü Yuan Shih-k'ai te tou-Cheng" 孫中山與袁世凱的鬥爭
(The Rivalries between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-k'ai) PYCF Vol. 1.
- Chang Po-feng 章伯鋒 ed., trans. "Jih-pen yü tsung-she-tang te kuan-hsi" 日本與宗社黨的關係
(The Relations between Japan and the Imperial Clan Society) CTSTL 28 (1965)
- Chang Ta-hsiang 張達驤 "Wo-men so chih-tao te Hsu Shih-ch'ang" 我們所知道的徐世昌
(Our Knowledge of Hsu Shih-ch'ang) PYCF Vol. 2.
- Chang Yu-fa 張玉法 "Min-kuo ch'u-nien te nei-kuo."
民國初年的內閣
(The Cabinet of the Early Republic) Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shi lun-chi
Edited by Chang Yu-fa Vol. 4. Taipei, 1980. Hereafter cited as CKHTS.
- Ch'en Hsu-lu 陳旭麓 "Wu-ssu ch'ien-yeh cheng-chih ssu-shian te ni-liu" 五四前夜政治思想的逆流
(The Adverse current of political thought before the eve of the May Fourth movement) Hsueh-hsu yueh-kan 學術月刊 No. 3 (1959).
- Ch'en Leng-t'ai 陳冷汰 "Ting-ssu fu-p'i chi" 丁巳復辟記
(The Restoration in 1917) ISCT Pp. 42-53.
- Ch'en Wen-yun 陳文運 "Fu-p'i chih-i ma-ch'uang shih-shih ch'in-li chih" 復辟之後馬倣誓師親歷記
(A Personal Record in the Military Expedition in Ma-ch'uang during the Restoration) PYCF vol. 1.
- Ch'en Yi 陳毅 "Ting-ssu tung-nan t'u-chi" 丁巳同難圖記
(An Account of Our Suffering in 1917) ISCT Pp. 151-154.
- Cheng Hsiao-hsu 鄭孝胥 "Cheng Hsiao-hsu ping-ting jih-chi"
鄭孝胥西丁日記
(Diary of Cheng Hsiao-hsu in 1916 and 1917) ISCT Pp. 120-141.
- "Ch'ing-shih shih-chien chih sh'e-ti p'i-p'ing" 清室事件之徹底批評
(Detailed Comments on the "Ch'ing Court Affairs") Kuo-wen chou-pao 國聞週報 V.2-39 (1925).

- Ch'iu T'ung 秋桐 "Fu-p' i p'ing-i" 復辟評議 (Critique of the Restoration) Chia-yin tsa-chih 甲寅雜誌, Vol. 1, No. 5.
- "Fu-p' i wen-tien" 復辟文電 (Telegrams and Essays on the Restoration) Ko-ming wen hsien 革命文獻 Edited by Lo Chia-lun 羅家倫 Vol. 7. (1955). (Hereafter cited as KMWH.)
- "Fu-p' i wen-tien" 復辟文電 (Telegrams and Essays of the Restoration Movement) Tung-fang tsa-chih 東方雜誌, Vol. 14, No. 8 (1974).
- "Hsu-chou hui-i chih shih-mo" 徐州會議始末 (The Story of the Hsuehou Conference) Hsin-ch'ing-nien 新青年 Vol. 2, No. 3 (November 1916). Hereafter cited as HCN.
- "Hsuan-chan yü cheng-ch'ao" 宣戰與政潮 (The Declaration of War and the Political Tide) HCN Vol. 3, No. 4 (August 1917).
- Hu Ping-seng 胡平生 "Fu-pi-pai te pei-ching chi ch' u-ch' i huo-tung" 復辟派的背景及其初期活動 (The Background of the Restorationists and Their Early Activities, 1912-1915) KLTW No. 7 (December 1980)
- K'ang Yu-wei 康有為 "Chih Feng Kuo-chang tien" 致馮國璋電 (A Telegram to Fung Kuo-chang) K'ang Yu-wei Cheng-lun-chi 康有為政論集 Edited by T'ang Chih-chun 湯志鈞 Peking, 1981. (Hereafter cited as KYWC.)
- "Chung-hua chiu-kuo lun" 中華救國論 (On China's Salvation) KYWC
- "Hsu-chun Kung-ho lun" 虛君共和論 (Titular Monarchical Republic) KYWC
- "Kung-ho cheng-ti lun" 共和政體論 (The Political Structure of a Republic) KYWC
- Kuan Ko 關戈 "Chang Hsun fu-p' i" 張勳復辟 (Chang Hsun's Restoration) Jen-min jih-pao 人民日報 July 1982.

- Kuei Ch'ung-chi 桂崇基 "Chang Hsun fu-p'i yü Tuan Ch' i-jui"
張勳復辟與段祺瑞
(The Restoration movement of Chang Hsun's
Restoration and Tuan Chi- jui) IFTC Vol. 14, No.
8 (1974)
- Lao Nai-hsuan 勞乃宣 "Cheng-hsu kung-ho chieh" 正續共和解
(An Explanation with a Supplement) Tung-
hsiang-lao hsien-sheng i-kao 桐鄉勞先生遺稿
(1927)
- Liang Ch' i-ch' ao 梁啟超 "P' i fu-p' i lun" 辟復辟論
(A Refutation of the Idea of Restoration)
Shun-pi-chi 荀彘集 (1978)
- Lin Ming-te 林明德 "Jih-pen yü Hung-hsien ti-chih"
日本與洪憲帝制 (Japan and the Hung-hsien
Emperor) CKHTS Vol. 4.
- Liu Feng 劉鋒 ed. "Sheng-yun fu-p' i yin-mou" 胤復辟陰謀
(The Conspiracy of the Restoration of Sheng-yun
TSCT, P. 203.
- Lu Tan-lam 陸丹林 "Tsung hu-fa chih-i t' an-tao fu-p' i
an-chien" 從護法之役談到復辟案件
(From the Constitution Protection Movement to
the Restoration) KMWH Vol. 49 (1969)
- Lu Tsung-yü 陸宗輿 "Fu-p' i wen-t' i hsiao-chi" 復辟問題小記
(A Little Account of the Restoration Problem).
CTSTL No. 38
- Mumekata Kotaro 宗小太郎 Translated by Chang Po-feng 章伯鋒
"Tsung-she-tang ti fu-p' i huo-tung"
宗社黨的復辟活動
(The Restoration of the Imperial Clan Society)
CTSTL Vol. 48 (1982)
- Nan-Hua chü-shih 南華居士 "Kuo-t' i wen-t' i chi-wen"
國體問題記聞 (The Problem of the National
Polity) In Chung-kuo t' ung-shih ts' an-k' ao
tzu-liao 中國通史參考資料
ed. by Chien Po-tsan. 翦伯贊 Peking, 1980.
- Nishihara Kamezo 西原龜三 "Ti-ssu-tzu Chung-Kuo chih-hsing"
第四次中國之行 (The Fourth China Tour)
CTSTL No. 38.

- Pai Chiao 白蕉 "Hsuan-tung f u-pi" 宣統復辟
 (The Restoration of the Emperor Hsuan-tung)
Jen-wen yueh-k'an 人文月刊
 Vol. 6, No. 7 (September 1935). Hereafter cited
 as JWYK.
- "Tsung-she-tang" 宗社黨 (The Imperial Clan
 Society) JWYK Vol. 6, No. 9 (November 1935).
- P'eng Ming 彭明 "Pu-tuan fu-p' i te ch' ou-chu" 不斷復辟的丑劇
 (The Continuous Comedies of the Restoration) In
Chung-kuo chin-hsien-tai-shih lun-wen-chi
 中國近現代史論文集
 by P'eng Ming 彭明 Canton, 1982.
- Shih Hua 史華 ed. "Chang Hsun ts'ang-cha ch' i-shih- chiu
 t'ung" 張勳藏札七十九通
 (A Collection of Chang Hsun's Seventy-nine
 Letters) Pp. 58-119.
- So Yu-ming 索子 "Fu-p' i chih wen-cheng" 復辟文文證
Ku-kuo wen-wu yueh-kan 故宮文物月刊
 Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1983).
- Ssu-ma Chang-feng 司馬長風 "Chung-kuo min-chu hsien- cheng
 chih p'o-mieh" 中國民主憲政之破滅
 (The Destruction of Chinese Democracy and
 Constitutional Politics) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih
 chi-yao 中國近代史輯要
 Hong Kong, 1978.
- Su Hsi-lin 蘇錫麟 "Wo tsai fu-p' i chih- i te ch' in-shen
 cheng-li" 我在復辟文役的親身經歷
 (My Personal Experience in the Restoration
 Movement) PYCF Vol. 1.
- Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 "Kuo-min-tang chin-hou fen-tou
 fang-chen" 國民黨今後奮鬥方針
 (The Future Struggling Policy of Kuomintang)
KMWH Vol. 8, 1955
- Sun Yu-yun 孫毓筠 "Fu-p' i yin-mou chi-shih" 復辟陰謀記實
 (A True Account of the Restoration Conspiracy)
KMWH Vol. 7 (1945)

Chang and the other military governors would march on Peking on the pretext of defending the capital against the rebels.⁹⁴ This arrangement fell through when the independence movement in Mongolia and Manchuria collapsed. As result, the restoration movement of 1916 also came to an end.

REFERENCES

1. In the first coalition government, all the powerful ministries went to Yuan Shih-k'ai's supporters. The revolutionaries got the ministries of agriculture and forestry, justice, education, and industry and commerce.
2. During the Boxer uprising in 1900 some provinces, such as Shantung, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, refused to obey the orders of the Ch'ing dynasty and made arrangements with the foreigners that they would crush the rebels in exchange for the foreigners not to attack their cities. After the uprising, the Ch'ing government never won back control of these provinces. From then on, the tendency toward independent action and self-government started.
3. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 115.
4. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Pt. 1, p. 217.
5. Chen, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 115.
6. Fairbank, Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Pt. 1, p. 213.
7. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 117.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 208.
10. H.G.W. Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic (London, 1925), pp. 124-125.
11. Ibid., p. 117.
12. Fairbank, ed., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Pt. 1, pp. 217-218.
13. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 208.
14. Ernest P. Young, "The Hung-hsien as a Modernizing Conservative" in Political Modernization against Revolutionary Politics: The Limits of Change. Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China edited by Charlotte Furth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 181.
15. After the establishment of the republic, the revolutionaries tried to co-operate with Yuan Shih-k'ai, the president of the republic. In the spring of 1912, Huang

Hsing disbanded his force and Sun Yat-sen was placed in charge of a plan for railway development. Sun Chiao-jen, one of the founding members of Tung-meng hui, therefore carried on the main job of political organizing and electioneering.

16. Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, p. 277.

17. In the first election, the Kuomintang gained 360 seats in the House of Representatives, the Republican Party got 250 seats and the Unification Party had about 100. The Democratic Party also claimed to have more than 100 seats.

18. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 477.

19. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 114.

20. The investigation of Sung's murder revealed that the assassins were hired by Yuan Shih-k'ai's henchman, Chao Ping-chun. However, the captured assassins were quickly murdered in jail. Chao Ping-chun also died suddenly. It was believed that the deaths of the assassins and Chao were perpetrated by Yuan in order to cover the plot of Sung's murder. For details see *Ibid.*, pp. 160-163.

21. The Five Power Banking Consortium was organized by five countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan.

22. When the parliament was discussing the bill of loan, Tuan Ch'i-jui, the acting Premier and Yuan's supporter, surrounded the parliament building with troops and declared, "It being a fait accompli, there is no need for further discussion." Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 478.

23. The Kuomintang was not in a good position to fight against Yuan Shih-k'ai at that time. The number of provinces that were still controlled by the Kuomintang were far less than that of Yuan's henchmen. However, with all the Kuomintang controlled provinces, only Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kwangtung were willing to fight for democracy. The military power of the Kuomintang was so weak that its failure was predictable.

24. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 60.

25. Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai Ko-ming, p. 89.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese, p. 139.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 37.
34. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen, p. 140.
35. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 38.
36. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen, p. 134.
37. Aida Tsutomu, "Kawashima Naniwa yu Man-Meng tu-li yu-tung" [Kawashima Naniwa and the Independence Movement of Manchuria and Mongolia] translated by Cheng Chung-yen, in Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao (hereafter cited as TSTL), Vol. 48 (1982), p. 108.
38. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch'i shih-hua [Historical Tales about the Period of Rule by the Peiyang Warlords] Volume 1 (Peking, 1983), p. 318.
39. Chen Hsu-luk, "Wu-ssu ch'ien-yeh cheng-chih ssu-hsian ti ni-liu" [The Adverse Current of the Political Thought before the eve of the May Fourth Movement] in Hsueh-shu Yueh-kan No. 3, 1959, p. 73.
40. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, pp. 80-81.
41. Ibid., p. 81.
42. Jansen, Japan and China, p. 194.
43. Chen, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 199.
44. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 321.
45. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 82.
46. For details please see "Cheng-hsu kung-ho chieh" (An Explanation of Republic, with a Supplement) by Lao Nai-hsuan in T'ung-hsiang lao-hsien-sheng i-kao (Peking, 1927).
47. For the story of Emperor Hsuan, please see Chapter 1, pp. 4-5.
48. Chou Fu was a relative of Yuan Shih-k'ai by marriage. Chou's son, Chou Hsueh-hsi was ex-Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. For the content of the letter see Peking Daily News 19 November 1914,

reproduced in "Monarchical Movement in China" U.S. Military Intelligence Reports -- China 1911-1941 edited by United States Military Intelligence (hereafter cited as USMI).

49. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 324.
50. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 82.
51. Hu Ping-seng, Min-Kuo ch'u-ch'i, pp. 62-63.
52. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 324.
53. Chung-hua shu-chu, Yuan Shih-k'ai ch'ieh-kuo-chi off>[Record of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Usurpation] (Taipei, 1954), p. 195.
54. Ibid., p. 194.
55. Peking Daily News 19 November 1914, reproduced in USMI.
56. When Sung Yu-jen was sent back to his home town, Yuan Shih-k'ai gave him 3,000 Mexican dollars and arranged that government officials on his route should feast him. Therefore, it was hard to say whether Sung was punished or rewarded. Please see Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 83.
57. Ibid., p. 83.
58. For details please see Ibid., p. 75 and T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 325.
59. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 83.
60. Ibid.
61. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 325.
62. For details of the Twenty-one demands, see Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 186-190.
63. Ibid., p. 167.
64. Ch'ou-an-hui was founded by Yang Tu, Hu Ying, Sung Yu-yun, Li Hsieh-ho, Yen-Fu and Liu Shih-p'ei. For details, please see T'ao Chu-yin, Ch'ou-an-hui liu-chuen-tzu chuan [Biographies of the Six Gentlemen of the Society of Planning for Peace and Security] (Peking, 1981).
65. Brackman, The Last Emperor, p. 88.
66. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was a student of Kang Yu-wei and was a

leader of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898. Upon the establishment of the republic, he abandoned the idea of constitutional monarchy and broke with his teacher, Kang Yu-wei. He then entered politics and became the leader of the Progressive Party and supported the president, Yuan Shih-k'ai, against the Kuomintang. However, when Yuan's conspiracy to become emperor was exposed to the public, Liang turned against Yuan immediately. For details of Liang's life, please see Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2, pp. 346-351.

67. Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch' i-jui had gradually become alienated from Yuan Shih-k'ai before the monarchical movement. During the summer of 1915, when Feng Kuo-chang heard about the monarchical movement, he went to Peking to see Yuan, but the president denied the rumours. Therefore, when Yuan proclaimed the Hung-hsien dynasty, Feng had a feeling of deception and refused to support. The relationship between Tuan Ch' i-jui and Yuan grew worse due to the struggle of military power. At that time, Tuan was the Minister of War. In May 1914, Yuan transferred a number of powers from the Minister of War to a new office under his personal control. Therefore, Tuan began to absent himself from the office and again on May 1915 resigned from the office in opposing Yuan's monarchical movement. Both Feng and Tuan had long term hoped to succeed Yuan's post after he died. If Yuan became emperor, his son Ke-ting would become his successor and they (Feng and Tuan) would be left out. Because of personal ambition, Feng and Tuan did not support Yuan's monarchical movement.

68. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, pp. 91-93.

69. Lo Jung-pang, ed., K' ang Yu-wei, p. 229.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. 230.

72. Ibid., pp. 229-231.

73. For details see Huang I, Yuan Shih-k'ai tao-kuo chi [A Record of Yuan's Plunder of the Country] (Taipei, 1964), pp. 94-99.

74. For detail, please see "P' i fu-p' i lun" [A Refutation of the Idea of Restoration] in Shun-pi Chi by Liang Ch' i- chao (Taipei, 1966), p. 38.

75. Chang P' eng-yuan, Liang Ch' i-chao yu min-kuo cheng- chih [Liang Ch' i-chao and the Politics of the epublic] (Taipei, 1978), p. 8.

76. The four military governors were T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan, Liu Hsien-shih of Kweichow, Lu Yung-ting of Kwangsi and Lung Chi-kuang of Kwangtung.
77. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 367.
78. Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China 1911-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 28.
79. Chang Po-feng, ed., "Jih-pen yu Tsung-she Tang ti Kuan-hsi" [The Relations between Japan and the Imperial Clan Society] in CTSTL, p. 162.
80. Ibid., p. 168.
81. Albert A. Altman and Harold Z. Schiffman, "Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese, 1914-1916" in Modern Asian Studies 6 (April 1972), p. 395.
82. Babojab was a bandit of Mongol origin. He had helped the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War and was rewarded by the Japanese government with weapons and money. After the establishment of the republic, he disturbed the border area in Inner Mongolia.
83. Jansen, Sun Yat-sen, p. 196.
84. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, p. 30.
85. Li Yuan-hung was vice-president of the republic before Yuan Shih-k'ai's downfall. After Yuan's death in June 1916 Li became the president, with Feng Kuo-chang as vice president and Tuan Ch'i-jui as premier.
86. Wu Ju-wen, "Jih-pen lang-jen yu Tsung-she Tang ti Man-Meng tu-li yung-tung" [The Japanese Ronin and the Manchuria and Mongolia Independence Movement of the Imperial Clan Society] in Chung-jih Kuan-hsi-shi lun-chi, Vol. 1 (Liaoning, 1982), p. 22.
87. Ibid., pp. 222-223.
88. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 127.
89. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, p. 30.
90. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 131.
91. Ibid., p. 104.
92. Ibid.
93. For details, please see Wu Chi-ping (comp.), "Hu Ssu-

ching chi Liu-T'ing-chen hsien" [Hu Ssu-ching's Letters to Liu T'ing-chen] in TSLT, p. 62.

94. Li Shou-hung, Kuo-min ko-ming shih, p. 294; Aisin Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 97.

Chapter V

THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT OF CHANG HSUN AND ITS AFTERMATH

The failure of Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement and his death in 1916 did not bring success to the restoration movement, but it did provide a new stimulation to the Ch'ing court in the Forbidden City. According to the memoirs of P'u-yi, the following opinions were widespread in the Forbidden City:¹

"Yuan died because he wanted to usurp the throne."
"It's not that a monarchy is impracticable; it's just that the people want their old sovereign."
"Yuan Shih-k'ai was different from Napoleon III: he had no such ancestry on which to rely for support."
"It would be much better to return things to the old sovereign than to have a Mr. Yuan as emperor."

P'u-yi's tutor, Chen Po-shen of the Forbidden City faction, made the remark that "because of the great goodness and rich benefit conferred by our dynasty, the people of the whole country are thinking of the old order."²

The Household Department in the Forbidden City was busy conferring honours: posthumous titles, permission for riding a horse in the Forbidden City, or wearing a peacock's feather.³ More eunuchs and ladies-in-waiting were recruited despite the prohibition in the Articles of Favourable Treatment.⁴ Furthermore, more contacts were made between the Ch'ing court and the members of the Republican parliaments through private dinners or public banquets.⁵ The popularity of the Forbidden City made the people believe that a restoration was near. It is interesting that at that time

Lenin, the head of the government of the Soviet Union, reached the conclusion that the advisors around P'u-yi "will probably unite the feudalists, bureaucracy, and Chinese clergy [sic] and prepare for a restoration."⁶ Lenin's prediction was correct because in 1917 P'u-yi's chief advisor, Chen Po-shen, conspired with Chang Hsun of the old bureaucratic group to launch a restoration movement.

As mentioned in the last chapter the restorationists, especially the Forbidden City faction, had hoped for a long time to find a military strongman to carry out the restoration movement. In 1916 they mistakenly picked Yuan Shih-k'ai. In 1917 they made another choice - Chang Hsun, the military governor of Anhwei.⁷ One could ask the question why, when a military strongman like Yuan Shih-k'ai failed to restore the monarchical system, did Chang Hsun still have the courage to try reviving it?

First, Chang Hsun thought that the failure of Yuan Shih-k'ai was due to the lack of support of Feng Kuo-chang, military governor of Kiangsu and vice-president of the republic, and Lu Jung-t'ing, inspector-general of Liang-kwang (Kwangtung and Kwangsi). To Chang, if Feng had continued to support Yuan, other Peiyang leaders would have continued to obey Yuan's orders to unite against the National Protection Army led by Ts'ai O.⁸ If Lu had not gone against Yuan and joined the National Protection Army, the rebels would have been crushed by Yuan's Army.⁹ Therefore, Chang thought that if he could get support from Feng and Lu,

he could carry out the restoration movement without difficulty.

How would Chang Hsun obtain the support of Lu Jung-t'ing and Feng Kuo-chang? In March 1917, Lu went to Peking and stopped at Hsuchow to visit Chang. He was told that the republic was no better than the Ch'ing dynasty and that the republican system was worse than the monarchical system.¹⁰ Lu listened without giving any opinions. Chang misinterpreted Lu's silence as meaning tacit approval.¹¹ When Lu reached Peking, he had an audience with P'u-yi and donated 10,000 dollars to the Ch'ing court for the planting of trees in the mausolea. Lu was awarded by the Ch'ing court with the honour of riding a horse in the Forbidden City.¹²

Chang Hsun had more confidence in Feng Kuo-chang's support in the restoration than Lu's. Feng had already shown his interest in the restoration movement and had actually co-operated with Chang in the restoration attempts of 1913 and 1916. Feng's change of attitude in the 1916 restoration movement, however, made Chang suspect his sincerity towards the restoration. Chang wrote to Feng again concerning his opinion about the restoration. Feng's reply was positive, stating that he was willing to help.¹³ The result of this exchange was that Chang thought that Feng would not oppose the restoration. The entire incident, however, was fraudulently masterminded by Hu Ch'i-yuan, Feng's secretary. The reply was not written by Feng himself but by Hu in order to strengthen Chang Hsun's confidence in restoration.¹⁴ This

was not the first time that Hu had played this kind of trick. He had done the same to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao during the anti-Yuan movement.¹⁵ Nonetheless, Chang was deceived by Hu and thought that Feng would support the restoration whenever Chang initiated it.

In addition, the condition of the republic after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai was beneficial to Chang Hsun's restoration movement. When Yuan was alive, he controlled the military governors, especially the Peiyang clique, and preserved a semblance of national unity. After Yuan's death, nobody had the status or power to control the military governors. They began to show schismatic tendencies. The new president, Li Yuan-hung, did not possess military power nor was he supported by any military governors. It was really beyond his capacity to control a fragmented republic. Furthermore, Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui, who possessed the actual power of the central government, disagreed with Li. Feng Kuo-chang, the vice-president, was an ambitious man and always sought chances to obtain more power. The instability and fragmentation of the republic thus provided a good chance for Chang Hsun. Finally, Chang used the conflict between President Li and Premier Tuan to bring about the restoration movement of 1917.

Chang Hsun's intention for restoration was greatly influenced by two prominent figures. K'ang Yu-wei of the Constitutional Monarchy faction and Tsukuda Nobuo of the Japanese Ronin faction. After the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai,

K'ang Yu-wei wrote several letters to Chang Hsun.¹⁶ In one of the letters, he stated,

In the five years since the system of presidential republics have been [sic] in existence, there have been three civil wars, and these internecine strivings will continue. What is your view regarding the restoration of the former emperor?¹⁷

K'ang also encouraged Chang to use his military strength to restore the emperor to the throne and create distinctive honours.¹⁸ Thus, when Chang convened the second Hsuchow Conference in 1916, K'ang praised Chang as a "military sage."¹⁹ Although K'ang and Chang had fundamental differences about the restoration, their co-operation enriched the fame of the restorationists.

Tsukuda Nobuo was a member of the Kokuryukai and hoped to use the restoration movement to bring Manchuria and Mongolia into Japan's sphere of influence. In 1916, Tsukuda went to Hsuchow to see Chang Hsun. They soon became good friends and comrades because they had the same ideas about restoration. Through Tsukuda, Chang felt confident of obtaining Japan's assistance.²⁰

The restoration movement of 1917 originated from the Hsuchow Conferences, held four times between 1916 and 1917 under the leadership of Chang Hsun and attended by several military governors, mostly of Peiyang origin.²¹ After the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Peiyang system was on the verge of dissolving because no military governors had the status or power of Yuan to lead the Peiyang clique. However, when the Peiyang power was fragmented, other new powers began to

rise. A struggling force came from the provinces in the southwest, including Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Szechwan and Hunan. These six provinces had declared independence during the anti-Yuan movement. After the downfall of Yuan, however, they united in order to struggle against the Peiyang clique for power. The southern part of China was the base of the Kuomintang. Although the Kuomintang had been defeated by Yuan in the Second Revolution in 1913, they still preserved their power in the south. During the anti-Yuan movement, the Kuomintang joined with the southwestern provinces and increased their strength day-by-day. The power of the Kuomintang was further strengthened when the old parliament was restored.²² This parliament, dominated by the Kuomintang members, had been illegally dissolved by Yuan in 1914. The power of the southwest provinces and the Kuomintang alarmed the Peiyang leaders. They hoped to form an alliance to combat the new forces. The Hsuchow Conference was called in order to bring solidarity to the Peiyang leaders and to work out tactics for political survival.²³ The Hsuchow conference was more than that to Chang Hsun. He hoped to use it to build a foundation of power and strength in order to restore the Ch'ing dynasty.²⁴

The first conference was summoned by Chang Hsun on June 9, 1916 with the assistance of Ni Ssu-Ch'ung, governor of Anhwei. It was attended by the military governors (or their personal representatives) of Chihli, Fengtien, Kirin,

Heilungkiang, Honan, Shensi and Jehol.²⁵ Chang proposed a ten-item agenda, the first of which was to respect the Article of Favourable Treatment. The other items were aimed mainly at forming alliances against the Kuomintang and the southwestern provinces and controlling the central government.²⁶ According to Sun Yu-yun²⁷, the idea of restoration was also discussed during the conference.²⁸ Hu Ping-seng indicated that the restoration was the chief purpose for Chang Hsun convening the Hsuchow Conference. Other proposals were only a cover to pave the way for the restoration.²⁹

In July 1916, Chang Hsun of Anhwei formed an alliance with twelve other provinces called the Interprovincial Association.³⁰ In September, Chang, acting as chairman of the thirteen provinces Interprovincial Association summoned the second Hsuchow conference.

The second conference was held on September 20, 1916 and was attended by representatives of thirteen provinces. The items proposed at this conference were more or less the same as the items advocated at the first conference. They were, however, more radical and sweeping. The conference decided to combat the Kuomintang and the southwestern provinces, and baited the central government by claiming that the conference could decide what was good for the country as a whole.³¹

The first action of the second Hsuchow Conference against the threatened central government was to oppose

T'ang Shao-i, a Kuomintang supporter to become foreign minister in the new cabinet of Tuan Ch' i-jui.³² On September 25, a telegram was sent to the central republican government in the name of Chang and thirty-four other militarists opposing T'ang's appointment as foreign minister. This angered T'ang and he declined the appointment.³³

The conference continued to advocate the restoration. K'ang Yu-wei of the Constitutional Monarchy faction attended the conference for reasons that are not known.³⁴ But one can infer from K'ang's past that his attendance was more or less related to the restoration.

According to the memoirs of Sun Yu-yun, the most radical proponent of the restoration during this conference was Ni Ssu-ch'ung, not Chang Hsun. Chang had been scolded by Ni for his hesitant attitude in the past.³⁵ During the conference the representatives determined to get the support of Japan for the restoration movement.³⁶ After obtaining approval from the Japanese garrison in Tientsin, Chang conspired with Babojab to bring about the restoration movement in 1916. When Babojab was killed, the whole plan came to an end.

The third Hsuchow Conference originated because of the conflict between President Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan Ch' i-jui. Upon the death of Yuan, Tuan supported Li for president. Li had no military power and he was easily manipulated by Tuan. The president was to be used as a puppet by Tuan in the transition period.³⁷ Conflict

originated from the arrogant behaviour of Hsu Shu-cheng, Tuan's secretary. The nature of his arrogance can be seen in the letter of resignation by Ting Shih-i, Li's secretary, who decided he could no longer work with Hsu.

Before the meeting of the cabinet there is no agenda, and after it there is no report to the president, who therefore has to sign orders without knowing their meaning and who must approve an official appointment without knowing anything about the appointee.... The president is limited in his contacts with the people and he is not well informed.... For instance, when Ts'ao Ju-lin was to be appointed Chinese minister to Japan, the choice had been accepted and announced by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs one month before, but even when the appointment was made, our president knew nothing of the matter.³⁸

Li Yüan-hung became more confident in his struggle with Tuan Ch' i-jui when he received support from a political party called the "Discussion of Constitutional Government" formed from the Kuomintang. This party was headed by Sun Hung-i, minister of domestic affairs. The party supported Li because it wanted to restrain the power of the premier and to suppress his supporting party, the Research Clique headed by Liang Ch' i-ch' ao.³⁹

On September 15, 1916, the Research Clique and the Discussion of Constitutional Government parties struggled over the issue of whether the provincial system should be defined in the constitution. The discussion ended with a fight between the members of the two opposing parties.⁴⁰ The Research Clique, supporting the premier, wired all military governors to attack the opposing party.⁴¹ Most of the military governors of Peiyang origin lent their support to

the premier's party. They wired the president and parliament in the name of the twenty-two provinces headed by Feng Kuo-chang.⁴² The telegram stated:

The president should have confidence in the premier who should manage state affairs, while the parliament should decide on the constitution at an early date and should not meddle in administrative affairs.⁴³

In supporting the premier, the provincial military governors threatened the president.

Driven by the ensuing political unrest, Chang Hsun summoned the third Hsuchow Conference on January 9, 1917. During the conference the military governors requested that the central government dismiss undesirable members of the president's personal staff and unworthy cabinet ministers, and restrain the power of parliament.⁴⁴ Although the idea of restoration was not discussed during the conference, Chang wanted to use the conference as a tool against both the president and parliament to produce further political turmoil. This would bring about a favourable situation for the restoration.

Continuing political unrest in 1917 presented Chang Hsun with a chance to hold a fourth Hsuchow Conference on May 23, 1917. At that time, World War I was still in progress and became an issue. The American government had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany for its part in submarine warfare and put pressure on the Chinese government to follow its example.⁴⁵ Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui supported the action in order to obtain material advantages from the

Allies, especially the Japanese.⁴⁶ President Li Yuan-hung opposed Tuan's idea stating that the issue had to be decided by parliament.⁴⁷ The premier resigned in protest. After persuasion by vice-president Feng Kuo-ch'ang, Tuan resumed the office. Facing strong pressure from Tuan, parliament on March 3rd approved the bill breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany.⁴⁸ During this incident, Li was further angered by Tuan's tyrannical attitude and the relationship between the president and the premier further deteriorated.

In April 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Tuan Ch'i-jui, with the support of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao hoped to enter the war on the side of the allies in order to enhance China's international position both during the war and in the peace settlement.⁴⁹ Tuan also wanted to use the war to get help from Japan to stabilize his political power and suppress the opposition.⁵⁰

The premier's idea was opposed by the president, backed up by parliament.⁵¹ In order to strengthen his bargaining position, Tuan summoned the military governors to Peking.⁵² On April 25, a conference of military governors was convened under the chairmanship of Tuan. He succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the military governors in declaring war on Germany.⁵³

On April 10, when parliament was discussing the issue of war declaration, the parliamentary building was surrounded by crowds who named themselves "Citizen

Groups."⁵⁴ The "Citizen Groups" declared that they would not disperse until the declaration of war was passed. Some members from the "Citizen Groups" even entered the building and fought with parliamentarians.⁵⁵

After this incident, the members of parliament were angry and suspended the meeting. Some of the cabinet members, including Wu T'ing-fang, minister of foreign affairs, Chang Yao-tseng, minister of justice, Ku Chung-hsiu, minister of agriculture and commerce, and Ch'en Pi-Kuang, minister of the navy, resigned from their offices. Tuan wanted to resign at the beginning but was convinced to carry on the political struggle through the persuasion of his close associates.⁵⁶ Tuan, therefore, on one hand, forced the parliament to discuss the issue of the war declaration, and on the other hand, requested the intervention of the military governors.

When Tuan Ch'i-jui summoned the military governors' conference in Peking, Chang Hsun remained in Hsuehchow because he did not want to become an instrument of Tuan.⁵⁷ After the "Citizen Groups" incident, there was a deadlock between the president, supported by parliament, and the premier, supported by the military governors. The military governors did not know how to resolve the deadlock, and they finally decided to go to Hsuehchow to ask Chang what to do. The military governors, therefore, headed by Ni Ssu-chung, Li Hou-chi, Wang Chan-yuan, and Chao T'i, went to Hsuehchow on May 23; thus came into existence the fourth Hsuehchow

Conference. During this conference, Chang showed an apathetic attitude and did not respond well because he wanted to press the military governors into supporting his restoration movement.⁵⁸ On the same day, Li Yuan-hung dismissed Tuan Ch' i-jui from the post of premier and made Wu T' ing-fang acting premier.⁵⁹ Tuan's dismissal horrified the military governors and they finally yielded to Chang's demands and signed an oath.⁶⁰ According to Tseng Yu-chun, Tuan's representative at the conference, Hsu Shu-cheng, Tuan's secretary, attended the conference and did not oppose Chang's idea of restoration. Hsu's intent was to make Chang destroy parliament and then restore Tuan to power.⁶¹ In fact, the military governors did not really want to help Chiang. They wanted to use him to defeat the president and parliament.

During the conference, an overall plan was worked out: parliament had to dissolve first, followed by the forced abdication of the president, and then the restoration of the Manchu emperor to the throne.⁶² To achieve this, all the military governors except Chang Hsun would declare independence. Then Chang would go to Peking as a mediator and carry out the plan step by step.⁶³

On May 28, 1917, Li Ching-hsi, a former associate of Yuan Shih-k' ai, was appointed premier by the president. The next day, Ni Ssu-chung declared his independence and the other governors - such as Chao T' i of Honan, Chen Shu-fan of Shensi, Yang Shan-te of Chekiang, Chang Tso-lin of Fengtien,

Chang Huai-chih of Shantung, Li Hou-chi of Fukien, Ts'ao K'un of Chihli, Pi Kuei-fang of Heilungkiang and Yen Hsi-shan of Shensi - soon followed.⁶⁴

When news of the independence of the military governors arrived at Peking, President Li Yuan-hung had no alternative but to obtain a mediator. He asked Hsu Shi-chang and Liang Ch' i-ch' ao to become mediators, but both men declined.⁶⁵ Because of the threat from the military governors, Li Ching-hsi did not assume the post of premier. As predicted by Chang and the military governors, President Li finally wired Chang on June 1st and requested his mediation. Chang instructed his secretary, Liu T'ing-shen to go to Peking first and discuss the restoration movement with the Ch'ing court.⁶⁶ Then Chang led a force of 4,300 men to Peking.⁶⁷

Before Chang Hsun went to Peking, he worried about the attitude of the Japanese government toward the restoration. Early in January 1917, Chang had contacted Japanese government officials through Tsukuda Nobuo. Their reply was that they did not oppose the restoration and they agreed to protect the emperor in the Forbidden City.⁶⁸ In March 1917, however, the Japanese Army Headquarters suddenly warned the restorationists to defer their conspiracies. The reason behind this change in attitude was a change in Japanese policy toward China. The Japanese government was implementing a policy of support for Tuan's cabinet.⁶⁹ Chang, therefore, instructed Tsukuda to return to Japan to persuade the Japanese government to change its policy.

Before Tsukuda's mission was completed, the political unrest in Peking provided Chang with an opportunity for restoration. Without waiting for Tsukuda's reply, Chang set the wheels in motion for a restoration.

As Chang Hsun approached Peking with his troops, the independent military governors held an assembly at Tientsin. They decided to organize a new government with Tuan Chi-jui as premier and Hsu Shih-ch'ang as generalissimo.⁷⁰ However, Hsu opposed the idea because he thought that the foreigners would not allow them to set up a new government.⁷¹ When Chang Hsun learned about the plan, he immediately opposed it because he was afraid that his honour would be taken by Hsu if the latter became generalissimo.⁷²

On June 8, Chang Hsun reached Tientsin and wired the president to advise him to dissolve parliament as a precondition for mediation.⁷³ Because of Chang's pressure, President Li Yuan-hung decided to dissolve parliament. Acting premier Wu T'ing-fang, however, refused to co-sign the order. Li Ching-hsi also refused on the pretext of his not yet having assumed the office. Finally, Li Yuan-hung had to dismiss Wu and appoint Chiang Chao-tsung, an army commander, as acting premier. After Chiang co-signed the document on June 13, parliament was dissolved.⁷⁴ Two days after the dissolution, Chang Hsun reached Peking. He went to see President Li the same day to discuss the political situation. On June 16, Chang had an audience with P'u-yi.⁷⁵

Chang Hsun's audience with the emperor aroused excitement among the restorationists. Cheng Hsiao-hsu, a famous I-lao, wrote a letter to Chang urging him to bring about the restoration immediately.⁷⁶ Hu Ssu-ching, also a I-lao, warned Chang that the chance would pass if he hesitated.⁷⁷ K'ang Yu-wei travelled to Peking with Sheng Tseng-chih, a famous I-lao on the invitation of Chang Hsun.⁷⁸

On June 18, Chang Hsun wired the military governors to ask them to retract their declaration of independence. They obeyed the order. Li Ching-hsi thought that the crisis was over, assumed the premiership and organized a new cabinet.⁷⁹ A number of military governors such as Chang Huai-chih and Chang Tso-lin, however, opposed Li's premiership on the grounds that he was a collaborator of the revolutionaries in the south because he refused to co-sign the order of the dissolution of parliament.⁸⁰ They proposed to restore the old cabinet organized by Tuan Ch'i-jui. Li disregarded the opposition and continued to form his own cabinet, thinking that it would be supported by Chang Hsun.⁸¹ Chang, however, was not about to support Li; he was working on his own restoration movement.

According to the North China Herald of July 7, 1917, the restoration conspiracy was planned at 12:30 a.m. on the first of July at Chang Hsun's house. The meeting was chaired by Chang and attended by all commanders of Peking's garrisons such as Wang Shih-chen, minister of the army, and

Chiang Chao-chung, acting premier and army commander. During the meeting, the military commanders were asked to support the restoration movement. Chang threatened them to "either stay and support him or return in their motor cars and prepare for fighting in the city of Peking in the morning."⁸² The military commanders had no choice but to yield. After obtaining the consent of the military commanders Chang Hsun, accompanied by K'ang Yu-wei, Wang Shih-chen, Chiang Chao-chung, Liu T'ing-shen, and fifty other restorationists, went to the Forbidden City to restore P'u-yi to the throne.

Chang Hsun, in the names of Feng Kuo-chang and Lu Jung-t'ing, issued a long manifesto to the nation explaining why a restoration was necessary:

Ever since the uprising at Wuchang and the establishment of the republic, peace and order have been cast to the winds and good reliable people have been nowhere to be seen. Anarchists have been holding sway while unscrupulous people have been mobilizing power.... Parliament relied on rebels for support while Cabinet Ministers used biased parties as their protection... Oppression of innocent people is considered self-government; and defaming old scholars is considered civilisation... All this is the result of the bad form of government.... Look at the matter at its root, we find that Republicanism is the source of all the evil... Compare this with the continuous reign of a monarchy, wherefrom the people may enjoy peace for tens or hundreds of years.... Recently His Majesty has made marked progress in his sacred studies and his virtuous reputation has spread far and wide.... Heaven has smiled on the Ch'ing dynasty by conferring His Majesty with unusual wisdom so that he might be able to rise at the proper moment to stop disorder and revert to right.... On this day we have jointly memorialised His Imperial Majesty to again ascend the throne in order to establish the foundation of the country and to consolidate the minds of the people.⁸³

An Imperial edict was also issued on the same day:

At the outbreak of the revolution in the Hsin Hai year (1911) the Ch'ing Empress Dowager [Lung Yu], being benevolent and compassionate, could not bear to witness the suffering of the people and so turned over the great heritage of our ancestors and the myriads of her people to the former Minister Yuan Shih-k'ai, allowing him to organize a provisional government ... hoping that strife would cease and the people would live in peace. But from the time of the change in the form of government, there was no cessation of strife, but there was continual clashing of spears....

Chang Hsun, Feng Kuo-ch'ang, Lu Yung-t'ing and others, because of this trembling of the foundations of the nation, had because the minds of men were turning towards the old system, memorialized together for the reestablishment of the monarchy, in order to save the lives of the people.... After careful weighing and consideration of duty to Heaven and to men, we had no alternative but to consent to the memorialists. On the 9th year of Hsuan Tung, the 5th moon, 13th day [July 1, 1917], we have ascended the Throne, assumed the government, resumed our powers, and made this radical change for the people.⁸⁴

More edicts were issued on the same day for the appointment of officials in the name of the Ch'ing dynasty but in fact appointed by Chang Hsun. Chang was made Chung-yung ch'in-wang (Prince of Loyalty and Bravery), Governor-General of Chihli, and High Commissioner of Military and Foreign Affairs for North China. In order to obtain the support of Feng Kuo-chang and Lu Jung-t'ing, Chang made the former the Governor-General of Liang-kiang (Kiangsi and Kiangnan) and the latter Governor General of Liang-kwang (Kwangtung and Kwangsi). Hsu Shih-Chang was appointed the director of Pi-te yuan (Emperor's Advisory Council) and K'ang was appointed his deputy. Provincial

governors retained their hold on the provinces.⁸⁵ No appointment was given Tuan Ch' i-jui. Chang thought that Tuan was unimportant because he did not have any military power.⁸⁶ Chang's negligence towards Tuan's potential power contributed to his failure.

After the success of the restoration movement on July 1, 1917, President Li Yuan-hung refused to accept the title of honorary Duke of First Class and escaped to the Japanese legation.⁸⁷ Li then wired Vice-president Feng Kuo-chang and asked him to become acting president of the republic.⁸⁸ Li also telegraphed Tuan to resume the premiership.⁸⁹

Tuan ch' i-jui, before receiving the wire from Li Yuan-hung, had determined to oppose Chang Hsun's restoration. Tuan's determination, according to Kuo Ting-i, was based on three reasons. After the restoration, Chang did not give any posts to Tuan, and this made the latter angry. Furthermore, Tuan was afraid that the Ch'ing court would have revenge on him for forcing the abdication of the Ch'ing emperor. Finally, Chang's defeat would provide Tuan with a good chance to control the government again.⁹⁰

Tuan Ch' i-jui had difficulties in raising the banner against Chang Hsun because he did not have any troops. He then sent his henchman Tuan Chih-Kuei to see Chu Ka-po governor of Chihli, and Yang Ti-teh, commissioner of Police of Tientsin, to obtain military support. Both Chu and Yang refused.⁹¹ Fortunately, Tuan finally obtained help from the Eighth Division Army commanded by Li Chang-tai, and the

Sixteenth Mixed Brigade, headed by Feng Yu-hsiang.⁹² Further, through the manager of the Communications Bank, Ts'ao Ju-lin, Tuan succeeded in securing a loan of one million dollars from the Mitsubishi Company as a military fund.⁹³

On July 3, Tuan Ch'i-jui was elected commander-in-chief of the anti-restoration army and proclaimed a manifesto in Ma-chang in Chihli to combat Chang Hsun's restoration.⁹⁴

Heaven is chastening this place by the series of disturbances that have taken place. Chang Hsun, filled with sinister designs, has occupied the capital by bringing his troops under the pretext of effecting a compromise with the astounding result that last the Republican form of government was overthrown.... Five years have already passed since the friendly powers according their recognition of the Chinese Republic and if we think we could afford to amuse ourselves with changes in the national fabric, we could not expect foreign powers to put up with such childishness. Internal strife is bound to invite foreign intervention and the end of the country will then be near.

Can it be possible that Chang Hsun has acted in the interest of the Ch'ing house? The young boy-emperor lives in peace and contentment and has not the slightest idea of ever ruling China again.... That the boy-emperor has been dragged on the throne entirely against his own wishes is undeniable.... In face of this extraordinary crisis, our indignation must be one. For the interest of the country we should abide by our oath of unstinted loyalty ... I feel you will put forth every ounce of your energy and combine your efforts to combat the great danger.

Tuan Ch'i-jui then set up headquarters in Tientsin. At that time, Ts'ao K'un, military governor of Chihli, came and joined the anti-restoration army. Tuan had, therefore, more confidence about crushing Chang Hsun's "pigtail army."

Before discussing the actual fighting between the two parties, it is necessary to mention the responses of the various provinces to the restoration movement. Among them, Chihli, under the leadership of Ts'ao K'un, was the first province to oppose the restoration; Ts'ao also participated in the anti-restoration army. Another major opponent was Feng Kuo-chang, the vice-president of the republic and military governor of Kiangsu. Feng did not oppose the restoration per se as he was a restorationist, but he was angered that Chang Hsun had not informed him of the plan. Furthermore, Feng was jealous of Chang's success.⁹⁵ Feng, therefore, sent out telegrams to oppose Chang's abrupt action. On July 2, Feng was appointed acting president of the republic by Li Yuan-hung. It strengthened his confidence in opposing Chang because he saw the anti-restoration movement as a chance to bring him the position of president.⁹⁶ On July 4, Feng and Tuan declared a joint manifesto denouncing Chang's treason. Other provinces controlled by the Peiyang leaders, including Shantung, Shensi, Shansi and Chekiang, soon followed suit. The southwestern provinces also strongly opposed the restoration. Yunnan was the first to send a telegram of opposition, followed by Kweichow, Szechwan, Hunan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

The Kuomintang members in the South were also upset. At that time, Sun Yat-sen was living in Shanghai after returning from Japan in April 1916. He sent telegrams of

opposition and convened a conference to discuss the resolution.⁹⁷ During the conference held on July 3rd, it was decided that a provincial government would be established in Shanghai and the president, Li Yuan-hung, would be welcomed in the south to run a new government. However, Li declined the offer.⁹⁸

At the beginning of the restoration, there were many provinces which held an attitude of neutrality. They neither agreed with nor went against the restoration. These provinces included Hupeh, Honan, Kansu and Fengtien.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, when Chang Hsun was on the edge of collapse after the fifth of July, all these provinces sent out their own telegrams of opposition.

There were also some military governors who agreed to the restoration at the beginning but soon opposed it when signs of failure were seen. During the restoration, Ni Ssu-chung was given the rank of governor of Anhwei and had presented a memorial to thank the grace of the Ch'ing court. But when the restoration was on the eve of failure, Ni turned against Chang and joined the anti-restoration army.¹⁰⁰ Other military governors such as Li Hou-chi of Fukien, Hsu Lan-chou of Heilungkiang and Meng En-yuan of Kirin first advocated the restoration but soon deserted it when it showed signs of failure.¹⁰¹

If the opposition from the provinces served to harass Chang Hsun, the army led by Tuan Ch'i-jui presented an immediate threat to his restoration movement. On July 5, the

anti-restoration army led by Li Chang-tai and Feng Yu-hsiang encountered Chang's army in Meng-chuang (midway between Tientsin and Peking). After a short fight, Chang's army was defeated and retreated to Fengtai. On July 7, Chang's army again lost a battle and retreated to Peking. The anti-restoration army linked with the force of Ts'ao K'un and surrounded the city of Peking.¹⁰²

During the fighting, the anti-restoration army got the support of the Nanyuan School of Aviation in sending airplanes to detect the actions of the "pig-tail army". In the middle of the war, the planes also carried bombs. On July 7, a plane flew over the Forbidden City and dropped bombs.¹⁰³ The members of the imperial family and the Ch'ing officials were in a state of terror. As P'u-yi recorded in his memoirs, "nobody came to kowtow to me any longer, there were no more imperial edicts, and all my regents had disappeared except for Chen Po-shen and one other, Wang Shih-chen."¹⁰⁴ However, after the bombing, even Wang and Chen "did not come to court and the palace."¹⁰⁵ On July 8, K'ang Yu-wei and Shen Tseng-chih escaped for political protection to the American legation.¹⁰⁶

After Chang Hsun lost the battle in Fengtai, he resigned all his posts. On the same day, Feng Kuo-ch'ang, now acting president of the republic, dismissed Chang as military governor of Anhwei. Facing such a desperate situation, Chang wired Hsu Shih-ch'ang for assistance, but Hsu refused to come.¹⁰⁷ In a letter to his brother, Shih-hsu

(the minister of internal affairs of the Forbidden City), Hsu instructed him to protect the emperor and to watch out for the "outside officials." The term "outside officials" probably referred to Chang Hsun.¹⁰⁸ Chang was angered with Hsu's action and prepared to fight.

The ambassadors of the different countries represented in Peking did not want to see the city destroyed by battles. They tried to mediate between the two hostile parties. On July 7, the ambassador of Britain in Peking proposed to the ambassador of Japan, Hayashi Gonsuke, that Britain would help spare Chang Hsun's life and property if Chang were willing to surrender.¹⁰⁹ Hayashi then presented the idea to Tuan Ch'i-jui. Tuan Ch'i-jui requested that Chang Hsun abolish the monarchy and disarm his soldiers in exchange for his life.¹¹⁰ Chang agreed to abolish the monarchy but refused to disarm his soldiers. He still wanted to bring his troops back to Hsuchow.¹¹¹ The negotiation was a failure.

The anti-restoration army attacked Peking at 4:00 a.m. on July 12. During the long fighting, Chang's troops suffered many casualties. They finally surrendered at 3:00 p.m. the same day, when the anti-restoration army agreed to pay them three months' salary and send them home.¹¹² Chang Hsun, after losing the war, fled to the Dutch legation, escorted by two foreigners.¹¹³ The restoration movements which had lasted for twelve days, had come to an end.

The reasons why Chang Hsun failed in the restoration movement have been the subject of much disagreement. Many

historians explain that Chang's failure was due to his military weakness. Chang brought only 4,300 troops; therefore, he was easily crushed by Tuan Ch' i-jui's anti-restoration army. The argument seems reasonable, but in fact it is not.

Chang had a total of twenty thousand troops stationed at Hsuehchow and he had already brought one-fourth of his military power to Peking. He went to Peking in the name of mediation: could he bring all his soldiers from the home province to Peking on the pretext of mediation? Did Chang appear to be a mediator or a fighter? Moreover, he thought that the Peiyang leaders would not oppose his restoration movement and that he could summon his troops to Peking any time without being afraid that the military government would stop them from coming north.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, Chang's restoration movement was opposed by all the military governors of China. Even if Chang had taken all his army to Peking, could it have withstood the army united by Tuan Ch' i-jui and other military governors?

Some historians suggest that Chang Hsun's failure was due to his selfishness and dictatorial ways. After the restoration, Chang took all the important posts and only granted posts of secondary importance to the military governors. The military governors were not satisfied and therefore opposed Chang's restoration.¹¹⁵ This factor sounds reasonable, but was it decisive? In the monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-k'ai, Yuan gave high and honoured titles to

every military governor, but they still opposed him.

Therefore, this was not likely the real problem.

Some suggested that Chang Hsun's failure was due to his incapable leadership. A newspaper in Shanghai, Hsin Wen Pao, made the following comment:

Had the restoration been managed by Hsu Shih-chang, it would certainly not have been so clumsily handled; had it not been the work of Chang Hsun, the Commanders of the Peiyang clique would have soon acknowledged themselves the emperor's subjects.¹¹⁶

Is the comment justified? It is to be remembered that just a few months before the restoration, Chang Hsun had been elected leader of the Thirteen Provinces Interprovincial Association and had successfully convened four Hsuchow Conferences. Was it possible that only a few months later his leadership ability could vanish?

In fact Chang Hsun's failure, as suggested by Reginald Johnston, a tutor of P'u-yi, was that he had too much confidence in his military prestige and was too naive in believing that the military governors would keep their promises to support his restoration idea.¹¹⁷ The military governors had never seriously intended to restore the Manchu emperor. They just wanted to use Chang to achieve their different political purposes. Chang mistakenly thought that he was the leader and all the military governors would listen to him. The military governors really did not want anyone to control the emperor from behind the scenes and thus give orders to them.

Furthermore, Chang Hsun's failure was due to his conflicts with other factions, thus isolating him. Chang struggled with Hsu Shih-ch'ang for the first honours of the restoration movement. They struggled for the post of regent. In 1917, Chang again opposed Hsu becoming generalissimo. After the success of the restoration movement, Chang gave Hsu the empty title of Director of Pi-te yuan. Hsu, thus, did not support Chang.

Chang Hsun's relationship with the members of the Tsung-she Tang was not a good one. After the restoration, Chang excluded Pu-wei and Shan-chi from membership in the cabinet. Sheng-yun obtained the worthless title of Grand Secretary. The military power of the Tsung-she Tang in Manchuria and Mongolia thus did not support Chang Hsun in the restoration movement.

Chang Hsun also had conflicts with K'ang Yu-wei because of their fundamental different ideas of the monarchy. K'ang advocated a system of constitutional monarchy, while Chang insisted on autocratic monarchy. Chang maintained a good relationship with K'ang because he thought that he could use K'ang's influence to bring about the restoration. However, when Chang succeeded in the restoration, he alienated K'ang immediately by giving him the meaningless title of Deputy of Pi-te yuan.

It is clear that Chang Hsun's failure was a result of his naivete with regard to the military governors and of his failure to unite the restoration factions. One further

matter requires some attention and that is the relationship between the restoration movement and Germany. After the restoration, there were strong rumours that Germany had participated in the conspiracy. Many newspapers revealed that Chang Hsun had actually received money and weapons from Germany.¹¹⁸ It was also said that the foreigners who took Chang Hsun to the Dutch legation were Germans.¹¹⁹ The Germans, in fact, had good reasons to support Chang. Chang was opposed to China's participation in the First World War,¹²⁰ and Germany also hoped that China would retain its neutrality. Their co-operation seemed to be a reasonable assumption. The Germans, however strongly denied any participation in the restoration movement.¹²¹

Chang Hsun's contact with the Germans started when he worked in the military school in HsiaoChan. Here he knew quite a number of German military advisors.¹²² After the establishment of the republic, the ammunition that Chang's army used was made in Germany.¹²³ During the World War, Chang Hsun's opposition to China's participation again won the favour of the Germans. Germany was prepared to help in the restoration in exchange for the new government's neutrality.¹²⁴ At the time of the restoration in 1917, Germany was war-weary and could not give any help to China.¹²⁵ A report on July 7, 1917, from the ambassador of Great Britain in Peking, records:

It is quite possible that some German money may have been put up to support Chang Hsun and that later a German Minister encouraged him to try the coup before he left, but I do not think arms were

supported by Germany, or that any considerable sums would have been advanced by banks once the minister's influence was moved.¹²⁶

From the above, one can see that Chang did have contact with the Germans before 1917. In 1917, China broke off relations with Germany and the ambassador had to leave. This cut the contact between Chang and the Germans. In fact, Germany was too busy in the European war to supply extra resources to help the restorationists.

After the restoration movement, all the arrows pointed to the Ch'ing court for its participation in the restoration. Parliamentarians, led by Ma Chun-wu, suggested cancelling the Article of Favourable Treatment as a punishment.¹²⁷ The republican government under President Feng Kuo-chang and Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui, however, tried to relieve the responsibility of the Ch'ing court by placing all the guilt on Chang.¹²⁸

Not only was the Ch'ing court relieved from punishment, but Chang Hsun, the main conspirator, was also treated leniently by the republican government. Chang told the military governors that he possessed valid document¹²⁹ that could prove that they had originally supported the restoration movement; therefore, Chang was allowed to remain in the Dutch legation and was given freedom in secret.¹³⁰ When Hsu Shih-chang became president in 1918, the warrant for Chang's arrest was withdrawn.¹³¹ Warrants against the other restorationists, such as K'ang Yu-wei, Liu Ting-shen and Hu Chi-yuan were also withdrawn the same year.¹³²

What were the influences of the restoration movement on the republic? After the restoration, Li Yuan-hung refused to become president again and Feng Kuo-chang became president. Tuan Ch' i-jui resumed the premiership and also became minister of war. From then on, the central government was controlled mainly by Peiyang leaders. Tuan, now free from opposition, finally on August 14, 1917, declared war on the central powers. The restoration movement, therefore, had some influence on China's foreign policy. China's entry into the world war had far reaching effects. Her international image increased when it was involved in the Versailles Conference in 1919 and became a member of the League of Nations. The peace settlement after the war, however, led to the May Fourth Movement when a great protest erupted in China against the allies' support of Japanese rights over Shantung.¹³³

The restoration movement also led to the division of the country. When Tuan Ch' i-jui resumed the premiership, he called for a new parliament instead of reconvening the old parliament dissolved by Li Yuan-hung on June 12, 1917. Tuan's action was opposed by the Kuomintang in the south, who hoped to bring back the old parliament. Tuan, however, turned a deaf ear to their opposition. Hence the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, made alliances with the military governors of five southwestern provinces including Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan, who declared their independence from Peking. Sun Yat-sen, with

the support of the navy, then went south and set up a military government in Canton to launch a Constitution Protection Movement (Hu-fa yun-tung). This led to the division of the country which lasted more than a decade.¹³⁴

After the failure of the restoration movement of 1917, the restorationists were not discouraged. Restorationists such as K'ang Yu-wei and Sheng-yun still gave their efforts to the restoration, and the Forbidden City still looked for a military strongman to restore the Ch'ing emperor to the throne.

After the failure, K'ang Yu-wei hid in the American legation. During this period, he wrote a book called Kung-ho p'ing-i [Dispassionate Discussion of the Republic] and again pointed out the danger of a republic and the advantage of a titular monarchical republic.¹³⁵ In December 1917, K'ang finally left the American legation and went to Tsingtao and Lushun to visit Pu-wei and Shan-chi.¹³⁶ He returned to Shanghai and resided there. During this period, K'ang communicated with prominent administrative figures such as Feng Kuo-chang, Hsu Shih-ch'ang, Chang Tso-lin and Lu Jung-t'ing to incite them to restore the Manchu monarchy.¹³⁷ No positive response, however, was received.

Apart from K'ang Yu-wei's endeavours, Sheng-yun of the Tsung-she Tang also worked hard towards the restoration. After the failure of the 1917 restoration, Sheng-yun went to Kansu in 1918 in order to find allies for the conspiracy. He went to Kansu because he had been the Governor-General there

in the former Ch'ing dynasty and most of his subordinates had become the military commanders in Kansu under the republican government. Sheng's attempt, however, was known to the military governor Chang Kwang-kin, and he succeeded in persuading the military commanders to reject Sheng-yun's idea of restoration.¹³⁸ Sheng-yun returned to Tsingtao without achieving his goal.

Apart from K'ang Yu-wei's and Shen-yun's efforts, the Forbidden City was also working for the restoration. They still followed the old plan and searched for a military strongman to carry out the restoration. They first placed hope in Feng Kuo-chang, the new president of the republic. When Feng lost the presidency to Hsu Shih-ch'ang in 1918 their dream soon vanished. They then placed their hopes in Hsu.

The choice of Hsu Shih-ch'ang as president in 1918 brought excitement to the Forbidden City. P'u-yi in his memoirs recorded that "Many Manchu carriages and women's hairstyles appeared in the streets of Peking.... There were even amateur nobles' drama groups and clubs."¹⁴⁰ Hsu, however, did not carry out the restoration as the restorationists expected,¹⁴¹ and the Forbidden City was once again disappointed.

The Forbidden City was quick to pick another military strongman, Chang Tso-lin, military governor of Fengtien. The contact between the Ch'ing court and Chang Tso-lin became close during the second half of 1919. It started when Chang

helped the Ch'ing court to sell the imperial property in Fengtien, and the Ch'ing court sent an official to Fengtien with gifts to thank Chang.¹⁴² As an aftermath, more contacts were made between the two parties. When Chang Tso-lin went to Peking in 1919, he had an audience with P'u-yi. Thus, rumours that Chang was planning a restoration were, therefore, widespread. The Peking Leader, dated December 27, 1919 recorded, "According to current allegations, the monarchy this time will be started by general Chang Tso lin with the co-operation of certain monarchical and military leaders of northwest China, and ex-general Chang Hsun ... will play a very important part in it."¹⁴³ At that time, however, Chang was too busy preparing for war with the Chihli Clique therefore he could not have given any help to the Forbidden City even if he had wanted to carry out the restoration.

Five years later in October 1924, a military coup was started by Feng Yu-hsiang in Peking, and President Ts'ao K'un was forced to resign.¹⁴⁴ Feng then dominated the central government. He had long been dissatisfied with the articles of Favourable Treatment and with P'u-yi's remaining in the Forbidden City.¹⁴⁵ On November 5, he sent troops to drive P'u-yi from the Forbidden City.¹⁴⁶ P'u-yi lived temporarily in the Japanese legation before leaving to take up residence in the Japanese zone in Tientsin, where he remained for seven years.

During this time, P'u-yi continually tried to get help from the military governors. Contacts with governors such as Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tsung-ch'ang resulted in no positive responses.

After P'u-yi was driven out of the Forbidden City, the restorationists became very depressed about the future of the restoration. They gradually realized that the old method of picking a strong military man to help the restoration was not practical. They then tried to obtain foreign help. This time their choice was Japan.

Japan had a long-time ambition to obtain Manchuria from China. On September 18, 1931, Japanese launched a successful attack in Manchuria and conquered it within a hundred days. To cope with the denunciation from other countries, the Japanese government tried to set up a puppet regime with a Chinese as the head of the government, but controlled by the Japanese. They finally chose P'u-yi for the plan. First contact with P'u-yi actually began in 1925 when Tsukuba + Nobuo had an audience with him.¹⁴⁷ the Japanese conquered Manchuria, P'u-yi, on persuasion by pro-Japanese restorationists such as Cheng Hsiao-hsu, escaped from Tientsin and went to Lushun in November, 1932.¹⁴⁸ On March 1, 1933, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established with P'u-yi as the chief executive. To the restorationists, P'u-yi's becoming chief executive meant the success of the restoration that they had dreamed about for twenty years.

REFERENCES

1. Ibid., p. 86.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Brackman, Last Emperor, p. 90.
7. Chan Hsun was the inspectorate general of the Yantze region, but on July 6, 1916 he was appointed military governor of Anhwei.
8. Although Lu Jung-t'ing was one of Yuan Shih-k'ai's supporters, he was never regarded as one of Yuan's trusted subordinates because he was not from the Peiyang clique. In 1913 he helped Yuan suppress an uprising in Liuchow, but highest honours still went to Yuan's henchmen of Peiyang origin. Lu was very angry about that slight. Furthermore, Lu had a son in Peking serving as a hostage to ensure his loyalty to Yuan. When Ts'ai O declared the independence of Yunnan, Lu requested Yuan to release his son in the pretext of his sickness. However, Lu's son died enroute and it was suspected that Yuan had him poisoned. Therefore, Lu did not support Yuan during the anti-Yuan movement and even turned against him.
9. Tao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 474.
10. Ibid., p. 475.
11. Ibid.
12. Aisin Gioro P'u-yi, Wo-te chin-pan seng [My First Part of Life], (Peking, 1965), p.72.
13. Tao chu-yun, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 576.
14. Ibid.
15. For details please see Chapter IV.
16. For details of the letter please see Shih Hua, ed. "Chang Hsun ts'ang-cha ch' -shih-chiu-t'ung" [A Collection of Chang Hsun's Seventy-r e Letters] TSCI pp. 72-73, 92-93.
17. Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 233.

18. Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2, p. 231.

19. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 159.

20. For details of Chang Hsun and Tsukuda Nobuo's interaction, please see Tsou Nien-chih, transl. "Chang Hsun Yu Tsukuda Nobuo" [Chang Hsun and Tsukuda Nobuo] ISCT pp. 174-193.

21. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, p. 135.

22. After Yuan Shih-k'ai's death there was a disagreement over whether the government should operate according to the old constitution of 1912 or the constitution designed by Yuan in 1914. The revolutionaries in the south favoured the former while premier Tuan Ch'i-jui insisted upon the latter. However, when the navy threw its support to the revolutionaries, the government finally yielded to the demand of the south.

23. Chi Hsi-cheng, Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1976), p. 17.

24. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 368.

25. Tseng Yu-chun, "I-wu sui-pi" [Miscellaneous Notes of Reminiscences] in PYCF vol. 1, p. 267.

26. Ibid.

27. Sun Yu-yun was the advisor of Yuan Shih-k'ai and helped in founding Ch'ou-an-hu⁷ for Yuan's monarchical movement.

28. Sun Yu-yun, "Fu-p'i yin-mou chi-shih" KMWH 7 (1955), pp.47-48.

29. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 144.

30. The provinces included Kiangsi, Hupeh, Honan, Shangtung, Fentien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Shensi, Shansi, and Kiangsu. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

31. Tseng Yu-chun, "I-wu sui-p'i", PYCF No. 1, p. 268.

32. Tang Shao-yi was originally Yuan Shih-k'ai's henchman, head of the imperial delegation which negotiated with the revolutionaries during the 1911 revolution. In 1912 he was appointed as the premier. However, he gradually became alienated from Yuan because of the latter's dictatorship. He finally resigned from Yuan's government in June and joined the Kuomintang during the anti-Yuan movement.

33. Tseng Yu-chun, "I-wu sui-p'i", PYCF No. 1, 268.

34. Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 233.
35. Sun Yun-yun, "Fu-p' i yin-mou", KMWH 7 (1955), pp. 47-50.
36. Ibid.
37. Chu Ch'uan-chien, Li Yuan-hung chuan-chi tzu-liao [Documents on the Biography of the Li Yuan-hung] (Taipei, 1979), p. 147.
38. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 262.
39. In 1916 Liang and his followers formed the research clique in order to influence the government in determining constitutional revision and forming the cabinet and foreign policy. Liang and the research clique supported premier Tuan Ch' i-j' ui.
40. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 262.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Chi Hsi-cheng, Warlord Politics in China , p. 17.
45. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, p. 466.
46. Chu Ch'uang-chien, Li Yuan-hung , p. 150.
47. Ibid.
48. W. Reginald Wheeler, China and the World War (New York: Macmillan Co., 1919), pp. 76-77.
49. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 365.
50. Lin Ming-te Chin-tai Chung-Jih kuan-hsi shih [A Contemporary History of the Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taipei, 1984), p. 140.
51. Chu Ch'uan-chien, Li Yuan-hung, p. 150.
52. These included Chang Huai-chih of Shantung, Wang Chan-yuan of Hupeh, Ts'ao K'un of Chihli, Li Ch'un of Kiangsi, Chao T' i of Honan, Yeh Hsi-shan of Shenshi, Li Hou-chi of Fukien, Meng En-yuan of Kirin, Tien Chung-yu of Chahar, and Ni Ssu-chung of Anhwei. Tao Chu-yin, Tu-chun t'uan-chuan, (Taipei, 1971), p. 58.
53. Ibid.

54. The "Citizen Group" consisted of "Citizen's Petition Corps", "Five Races Petition Group", "War Petition Corps of Peking Citizens", and the "Petition Corps of Military, Political and Commercial Circles". According to Shun-tien shih-pao [Peking Times], May 11, 1917, the Citizen Group was initiated by Tuan Ch' i-jui and composed of coolies and beggars.

55. T' ao Chu-yin Tu-chun t' uan-chuan, p. 63.

56. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

57. T' ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 577.

58. Ch' en Leng-t' ai "Ting-szu-fu-p' i", ISCI, p. 43.

59. Chu Chuan-hsien, Li Yuan-hung, p. 151.

60. Ch' en Leng-tai, "Ting-ssu fu-p' i". ISCI, p. 43.

61. Tseng Tu-chun, "I-wu sui-pi", PYCF, vol. 1, p. 268.

62. Ch' en Leng-tai, "Ting-ssu fu-p' i", ISCI, p. 43.

63. T' ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 478.

64. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-chi, pp. 169-170.

65. Ibid.

66. Sun Yueh (comp.) Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao [Historical Material on the Republic of China] (Taipei, 1967), p. 347.

67. There is a disagreement about how many soldiers that Chang brought to Peking. Immanuel Hsu in his book The Rise of Modern China stated that the number was around 5,000. Reginald Johnston stated that the number was only 2,000. However, Hu Ping-seng, a modern historian, claimed that the number was around 4,300. Among those arguments, only Hu indicated the source of evidence (in Chung-hua sun-pao, June 10, 1917). Therefore this thesis will use the figures of Hu.

68. Tsou Nien-tzu, transl., "Chang Hsun Yu Tsukuda Nobuo", ISCI, p. 123.

69. Ibid. Japan at that time desired that China join the allies in the war against Germany. Tuan, at that time, favoured a war policy. Therefore, Japan was willing to support Tuan.

70. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, p. 209.

71. Sun Yu-yun, "fu-p' i yin-mou" in KMWH, vol. 7, p. 43.

72. Ibid.
73. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, p. 211.
74. Ibid.
75. Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 90.
76. Liu Wang-ling, Hsia-hai Ko-ming, p. 94-95.
77. Ibid.
78. Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 233.
79. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 599.
80. Ibid.
81. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 370.
82. North China Herald, July 7, 1917.
83. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, p. 137.
84. United States. State Department., Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 82. Hereafter cited as FRUS.
85. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 624.
86. Ibid.
87. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, pp. 230-231.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, p. 468.
91. Tao Chu-jin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 430.
92. Boorman and Howard, eds. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 3, p. 332.
93. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'u-ch'i, pp. 232-233.
94. Wang Yun-seng, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yu Jih-pen [Sino-Japanese Relations during the last Sixty years] (Peking, 1981), vol. 7, pp. 364-365.
95. Tao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 635.

96. Ibid.
97. Chiang Wei-kuo, Kuo-min ko-ming chan-shih [A Military History of the Nationalist Revolution] (Taipei, 1976), pp. 149-150.
98. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, pp. 275-276.
99. T' ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 635.
100. Ibid., p. 636.
101. Ibid.
102. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, pp. 237-244.
103. For details please see the North China Herald July 14, 1917.
104. Aisin-Giro P' u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 93.
105. Ibid., p. 94.
106. Lo Jung-pang, K' ang Yu-wei, p. 235.
107. Tao Chu-jin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 61.
108. Great Britain. Foreign Office. Confidential Print of China, September 1919, Part LXXVIII, p. 70B. Hereinafter cited as CPC.
109. T' ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, p. 640.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid. For details of the letter please see Shen-chung Pao, July 31, 1917.
112. Tuan Ch' i-jui obtained the money from the loan of Yokohama Specie Bank through the help of Japanese ambassador Hayashi Gonsuke. For details please see "Hayashi Gonsuke pi-hsia ti Chang-Hsun Fu-p' i" [Hayashi Gonsuke's Description of Chang Hsun's Restoration], translated by Yang Fan in ISCT, pp. 165-173.
113. Shun-tien shih-pao [Peking Times], July 13, 1917.
114. Shen Yun-lung, Hsu Shih-ch' ang p' ing chuan [A Critical Biography of Hsu Shih-chang] (Taipei, 1979), p. 310.
115. Ti' en Chung-kuang Pei-yang chun-fa shi-wa [History of the Peiyang Warlords] (Taipei, 1932), p. 490.

116. Aisin-Giuro P' u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 98.
117. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, p. 136.
118. For details please see Shih-pao July 4, 1917; Shun-tien shih-pao, July 12, 1917; and Ta Kung-pao, July 21, 1917.
119. North China Herald, July 21, 1917.
120. T'ao Chu-yin Tu-chun tuan-chuan, p. 103.
121. Germany made a declaration in the Min-kuo jih-pao [National Daily] on July 12, 1917 that the rumours were created by the allies to create difficulties in the relationship between China and Germany.
122. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, p. 180.
123. North China Herald, July 21, 1917.
124. Chung-hua Shu-chu (comp.) Chung-kuo chin-tai shih [A History of Contemporary China] (Peking, 1977), p. 521.
125. Chang K' ai-yuan and Liu Wang-ling "Lun Chang-hsun fu-p' i", p. 38.
126. PC, p. 72A.
127. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, p. 327.
128. Aisin-Giuro P' u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1., p. 96.
129. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch' u-ch' i, p. 347.
130. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 654.
131. Aisin-Giuro P' u-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1., p. 98.
132. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chun-fa, vol. 1, p. 655.
133. The May Fourth movement had far reaching effects in China. in the intellectual arena, it led to the New Cultural Revolution. In the political arena some people who were disappointed with the republic gradually shifted to the idea of marxist socialism and thus breded the seed for the development of communism in China. For details please see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Révolution in Modern China.
134. Kuo T' ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang, p. 470.

135. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 236.
136. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'ü-ch'ü, p. 367.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid., p. 365.
139. Aisin-Gioro P'ü-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, p. 98.
140. Ibid., p. 99.
141. The political situation in China really did not allow Hsu to carry out the restoration. He could no longer control the Peiyang leaders and he was disturbed with the fighting between the Chihli Clique headed by Feng Kuo-ch'ang and the Anhwei Clique led by Tuan Ch'ü-jui.
142. Aisin-Gioro P'ü-yi, From Emperor to Citizen, vol. 1, p. 105.
143. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, p. 260.
144. Feng Yu-hsiang was an army commander. In 1918 he joined the Chihli Clique headed by Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-fu. In 1921, with Wu's help, he was made military governor of Shensi. Feng and Wu's relationship grew worse when a power conflict arose between them. In 1922, Feng was deprived of his base at Shensi and was ordered by Wu to come to Peking as inspecting commissioner of the army. Feng resented Wu's actions. In 1923, Ts'ao K'un was elected president. In 1924, the second Chihli-Fengtien war began and Feng was assigned responsibility for the military action at Jehol. Seeing that Wu was too occupied in the war, Feng occupied Peking on October 23, 1924, forcing Ts'ao K'un to dismiss Wu.
145. According to the terms of abdication, the imperial house had to leave the Forbidden City and move to the Summer Palace. However, the imperial house never took the abdication seriously, and continued to live in the Forbidden City.
146. China Year Book, 1925, p. 843.
147. Hu Ping-seng, Min-kuo ch'ü-ch'ü, p. 467.
148. Lin Ming-te, Chin-tai Chung-jih, p. 324.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

From the Manchu abdication in 1912 until the establishment of Manchukuo in 1933, attempts for restoration did not cease. The restoration movement of 1917 created the first peak, while the establishment of Manchukuo was the second. As P'u-yi stated in his memoirs:

Activities with this aim in view did not begin with my brief restoration in 1917, nor did they end with my flight to the Japanese legation in 1924. One would be safe in saying that they did not cease for a day from the abdication proclamation in 1912 to the establishment of the "Empire of Manchukuo" in 1933.¹

The most important reason for the endless attempts at restoration was the incomplete revolution. In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the republic was established not by revolution, but by a compromise between the revolutionaries - the old bureaucrats and the Ch'ing court. Most of the revolutionaries did not agree with Sun Yat-sen's theory of revolution that would lead them gradually to constitutional government.² They thought that the main aim of the revolution was to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty and establish a republic. In order to achieve this goal, they compromised with Yuan Shih-k'ai and made him first president of the republic. Sun Yat-sen was very disappointed in his comrades:

At the beginning of the first year of the Republic I resolutely watched over the revolutionary process in order to achieve the goal of revolution and reconstruction... but most of my comrades did not agree with me. Even though I repeatedly explained matters to them and argued with them, it was of no avail. Most of them thought my ideas were too advanced. Alas, was it really that my ideas were too advanced or was it that the knowledge of my comrades was too limited?³

After the establishment of the republic, the government was controlled by the old bureaucrats of the former Ch'ing dynasty, and the revolutionaries had no power. The government continued within the atmosphere of the old bureaucracy and that created a situation beneficial to the restorationists.

Furthermore, the instability of the government provided a good breeding ground for the restorationists. There was never a stable government. At the beginning, there were conflicts between the president Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Kuomintang. These conflicts finally led to the outbreak of the Second Revolution in 1913 which brought more instability to the country. Again, in 1915, the monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-k'ai brought the country back into turmoil. After Yuan's downfall, new conflicts arose between the president, Li Yuan-hung, and the prime minister, Tuan Ch'i-jui, which finally led to a militarist coup in 1917. The instability of the government thus provided continuous chances for the restoration movement. During the conflict between the president and the Kuomintang from 1912 to 1913, there was an abortive restoration movement and the first Manchuria and

Mongolia Independent movement. During the anti-Yuan movement in 1916, there were the second Manchuria and Mongolia Independence Movement and the abortive restoration movement. In 1917, the restorationists used the conflict between the president and the premier to bring about the restoration of the Ch'ing emperor. Therefore, the instability of the republic gave the restorationists a chance; or perhaps the chances of the restorationists really showed the instability of the republic.

In addition, after the establishment of the republic in 1912, little attention was paid to the problems of the people and there were no social reforms. The provinces were controlled by military governors who wished only to enlarge their territories and to increase their wealth and power. Not only did they not improve the people's lives, but they tried to squeeze every penny from the peasants.⁴ Millions of peasants were driven off the land and many of them starved to death. Some peasants became bandits. The most famous group to ferment unrest was the White Wolf, which was anti-republican and pro-Manchu. In Ernest P. Young's analysis, their disaffection was primarily social rather than political.⁵

To the ordinary people, the idea of a republic was totally new; they did not understand what a republic was. Some even thought the "president" was another name for the emperor. Nevertheless, they knew that the republic did not bring stability or prosperity to them. Usually, under a

system of monarchy, a new dynasty brought at least a few decades of stability and prosperity. Such was the case with the Han dynasty, the T'ang dynasty, and even the Ch'ing dynasty. The new republic did not bring this. Some people began to think that it had been a mistake to change the system. They began to blame the Republic and to think about the old monarchical system. In fact, the people at that time had more belief in the monarchy than in the republican system which they did not totally understand. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a professor at Peking University and later a leader of the Chinese Communist Party, made the following comments:

People's minds are still obsessed with the old monarchic notions... The great majority of the people of China still believe in a monarchy and had no faith in a republic.... If we want to stabilize our republic, there is only one thing to be done... We must clear out our people's minds of every trace of the antiquated monarchic ideas that still possess them.⁶

Sun Yat-sen criticized the people's dependence on monarchy as a reflection of their slavish mentality. He used an analogy of the blacks in the United States. Before emancipation, the blacks depended on their masters for lodging and food. After emancipation, the blacks had a difficult time, since nobody was going to feed them or provide lodging for them. They began to blame the liberator. The Chinese in 1911 had the same problem. They were seeing the Republic not as liberator but as something which brought turmoil and poverty to the country.⁷ Sun's argument, to a certain extent, was not fair to the people, because no

"liberation" was given to them, and they suffered under the republic. Their recall of the old days was not totally based on a slave attitude but on disappointment with the republic. As P'u-yi stated in his memoirs, "Why some people were talking about the 'former Ch'ing' was, of course that they were sick of the disasters inflicted by warlordism."⁸ The people's lives in the old days might not have been so good, but life in the republican era was even worse.

From above, one can see that the situation of the early republic really provided a good breeding ground for the restoration movement. The restorationists were further encouraged by the presence of the Manchu emperor in the Forbidden City as a figure-head. These beneficial situation also accompanied the strength of the restorationists themselves. There were idealists like K'ang Yu-wei and Lao Nai-hsuan, who provided ideas and platforms for the restoration movement. In the military area, there were Tsung-she Tang and the "Old Bureaucrats" such as Chang Hsun who held considerable military power. Furthermore, there was Japanese military and financial assistance provided by the Japanese Ronin. With all these beneficial factors, why did the restoration repeatedly fail in the early republican period?

The first reason for the failure of the restorationists can be laid on their lacking strong and stable military power. The military power of the Tsung-she Tang was not stable because it relied on banditary and Japanese

assistance. Bandits were not real restorationists and were merely concerned with material advantages. They were not dependable. If the banditry was not reliable, the attitude of the Japanese government was worse. There was never a consistent policy of the Japanese government towards the problem of China. The restorationists, especially the Tsung-she Tang suffered failure due to the continuous shifting in Japanese policy towards the Republic.

The military power from the "Old Bureaucrats" faction, like Chang Hsun, was comparatively dependable. The military strength of Chang Hsun was not enough to bring a restoration movement to fruition. It had to rely on the support and co-operation of the military leaders, who were mostly opportunistic and could not be relied upon. The lacking of stable and strong military power constituted a major factor in the failure of the restoration movement.

The second reason for the failure of the restorationists were the mistakes in their conceptual framework. The restorationists always thought that the turmoil of China was brought about by the republican system. In fact, it was the opposite. As Fukuzawa Yukichi stated in his book An Outline of Theory of Civilization, monarchy is not necessarily good, but neither is a democratic government necessarily good."⁹ Furthermore, Fukuzawa indicated that "if convenient for a country's civilization, the form of government can be a monarchy or it can be a republic."¹⁰ The turmoil within China was created by the men who led it. The

T'ang Tsai-li 唐在禮 "Hsin-kai i-hou te Yuan Shih- k'ai"
辛亥以後的袁世凱
(Yuan Shih-kai After the 1911 Revolution) PYCF
Vol. 1.

Tseng Yu-chun 曾毓雋 "I-wu sui-pi" 憶悟隨筆 (Miscellaneous
Notes of Reminiscences) PYCF Vol. 1

----- "Li-Tuan mao-tun yü fu-yuan ts'ung t'u."
黎段矛盾與府院衝突
(The Contradictions and Rivalries between
President Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan
Chi-j'ui). PYCF Vol. 1.

Tsou Nien-tzu 嚴念茲 trans. "Chang Hsun Yu Tsukuda Nobuo"
張勳與佃信夫
(Chang Hsun and Tsukuda Nobuo). ISCT Pp. 174-193.

Ts'un-hs'ui hsueh-she 存萃學社 "Ting-ssu ch'ing-ti fu-p'i
shih-chi" 丁巳清帝復辟事記
(An Account of the Restoration of the Ching
Emperor in 1917) ISCT Pp. 1-41.

"Tu-chun ch'eng-ping yü fu-p'i" 督軍稱兵與復辟
(The Mutiny of the Warlords and the Restoration)
Hsin-ch'ing-nien 新青年
Vol. 3, No. 6 (August 1917)

"Tu-chun-t'uan wen-tien" 督軍團文電
(Telegrams and Essays on the Association of
Warlords) KMWH Vol. 7 (1955)

Tu Yung-chen 杜永鎮 "Tuan-ming te Chang Hsun fu- p'i"
短命的張勳復辟
(The Short Life of the Chang Hsun Restoration)
Kuang-ming jih-pao 光明日報
Vol. 47 No. 5 (1976)

Wang Yih-chih 王益知 (comp.) "Shen Tseng-chih han-kao"
沈曾植函稿
(Sheng Tseng-chih's Letters) ISCT Pp. 142-147.

- Wu Ju-wen 武育文 "Jih-pen lang-jen yu tzung-she- tang ti Man-Meng tu-li yung-tung"
日本浪人與宗社黨的滿蒙獨立運動
(The Japanese ronin and the Imperial Clan Society's Independent Movement of Manchuria and Mongolia) Chung-Jih kuan-hsi shih lun-chi
中日關係史論集 Vol. 1, Liaoning, 1982..
- Wu Ling-Chun 吳翎君 "K'ang Yu-wei yu fu-pi yun- tung"
康有為與復辟運動
(Kang Yu-wei and the Restoration Movement)
Shih-Yuan 史源, Vol. 15 (April 1975)
- Yang Fan 楊凡 (comp. and trans.) "Hayashi Kensuke pi-hsia ti Chang Hsun fu-p' i chih
林權助筆下的張勳復辟
(Hayashi Gonsuke's Descriptions of Chang Hsun's Restoration) ISCI Pp. 165-173.
- Yeh Kung-ch' o 葉恭綽 "T' ao-fa Chang Hsun fu-p' i chih
討伐張勳復辟之回憶
hui-i" (Reminiscences of the Military Expedition Against Chang Hsun) CTSTL Vol. 50 (1984)

NEWSPAPERS 報刊

- Cheng-fu kung-pao 政府公報 (Government Gazette), 1917.
- Chung-hua hsin-pao 中華新報 (China News), July 1917
- Min-kuo jih-pao 民國日報 (National Daily), July 1917
- Chen-chung pao 晨鐘報 (Morning Bell News),
April-August 1917
- Shen pao 申報 (Chinese Daily News), June-July 1917
- Shih pao 時報 (Eastern News), July 1917
- Shun-tien shih-pao 順天時報 (Peking Times), July 1917

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(English)

- Aisin-Gioro, P'u Yi. From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi. Translated by W.J.F. Jenner. Volume 1-2. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1979.
- Bianco, Lucien. The Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Translated by Muriel Bell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Black, C. E. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Boorman, Howard L., and Howard, Richard C., eds. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. Volumes 1-5. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Brackman, Arnold C. The Last Emperor. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975.
- Chen, Ts'ome. Yuan Shih-k'ai 1859-1916. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.
- Cheng, Ronald Ye-lin. The First Revolution in China. New York: Vantage Press, 1973.
- Ch'i Hsi-sheng. Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Clubb, Edmund. Twentieth Century China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
- Compilation Group for the "History of Modern China Series". The Revolution of 1911. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976.
- Dillon, Michael. Dictionary of Chinese History. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1979.
- Fairbank, John K., ed. The Cambridge History of China: Republican China 1912 - 1949, Volume 12 Part 1. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Fan, Ping. "Political Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1966.

- Fitzgerald, C. P. Revolution in China. London: The Cresset Press, 1952.
- Fukuzawa Yukichi. An Outline of a Theory of Civilization. Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1973.
- Houn, Franklin W. "Central Government of China 1912-1928." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1959.
- Hsiao, Kung-chuan. A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian 1858-1927. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
- Hsu, Immanuel. The Rise of Modern China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Hu Sheng. Imperialism and Chinese Politics. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1985.
- Huang, Philip C. Liang Chi-chao and Modern Chinese Liberalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972.
- Irons, Neville John. The Last Emperor: The Life of the Hsuan-tung Emperor Aisin-Gioro P'u-yi 1906-1967. London: The House of Fans Ltd., 1983.
- Issacs, Harold R. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938.
- Jansen, Marius B. Japan and China: From War to Peace 1894-1972. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1975.
- Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- Johnston, Reginald. Twilight in the Forbidden City. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1934.
- Kent, Percy Horace. The Passing of the Manchus. London: Edward Arnold, 1912.
- Li Chien-ning. The Political History of China 1840-1928. Translated by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956.
- Li, Ung Bing. Edited by Joseph Whiteside. Outlines of Chinese History. Shanghai: 1914.

- Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony. Government in Republican China. Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press Inc., 1973.
- Lo, Jung Pang, ed. K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and a Symposium. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1967.
- Macgowan, J. The Imperial History of China. London: Curzon Press, 1973.
- McAlevy, Henry. A Dream of Tartary: The Origins and Misfortune of Henry P'u Yi. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963.
- The Modern History of China. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- McCormack, Gavan. Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China 1911-1928. Standard: Standard University Press, 1977.
- Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Pye, Lucian W. China: An Introduction. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984.
- Rodzinski, Witold. A History of China. (Vol. I) New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.
- Sheridan, James E. China in Disintegration. New York: The Free Press, 1975.
- Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.
- Spence, Jonathan D. The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution 1895-1980. New York: Viking Press, 1981.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam. The Fight for the Republic of China. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.
- Wheeler, W. Reginald. China and the World War One. New York: Macmillan Co., 1919.

Wright, Mary C. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung Chih Restoration 1862-1874. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Young, A. Morgan. Japan In Recent Times 1912 - 1926. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Young, Ernest P. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.

Articles

- Altman, Albert A., and Schiffrin, Harold Z. "Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese 1914-16." Modern Asian Studies (April 1972).
- Blakeney, Ben Bruce. "P'u-Yi." Life July 16, 1945.
- Chang Hsun. "Autobiography of the Old Man of the Pine-Tree." Trans. by Reginald Johnston. In Twilight in the Forbidden City, by Reginald Johnston. London: Victor Gollancz, 1934.
- Chen, Jerome. "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions." London University School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin 31 (1968) Part 3.
- "The Last Emperor of China." London University School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin 28 (1965) Part I.
- "China's Outcast Emperor." Literary Digest October 12, 1929.
- Feuerwerker, Albert. "Aspect of the Transition from Qing to Republican China." Republican China 10, No. 2 April (1935).
- Hoh Chih-hsiang. "P'u Yi, the Betrayer of China and Puppet of Japan." China Weekly Review June 11, 1932.
- "The Plot to Restore the Imperial Dynasty in China." Current Opinion July 1914.
- Reid, John Gilbert. "The Young Manchu Emperor." The Open Court 49 July (1935).
- "The Return of the Manchus." London Times 5 July 1917.
- Tam Yue-him. "An Intellectual's Response to Western Intrusion: Naito Konan's View of Republican China." In The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interpretations. Edited by Akira Iriye, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Tsai T'ao. "Recent Conditions of P'u Yi and P'u Chieh." Survey of China Mainland Press April 10, 1961.

Yim Kwanha. "Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese." Journal of Asian Studies 24 November (1964).

Young, Ernest P. "The Hung-hsien as a Modernizing Conservative." In Political Modernization Against Revolutionary Politics: The Limit of Change. Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China. Edited by Charlotte Furth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

"Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution China in the Early 20th Century." In Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation. Edited by James B. Crowley. New York: Harcourt Brace and World Inc., 1970.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND NEWSPAPERS

Government Publications

China. The China Year Book. 1925.

Great Britain. Foreign Office. Confidential Print on China.
September 1919, Part LXXVIII.

United States. State Department. Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1919.

United States. Military Intelligence. "Monarchical Movement
in China." U.S. Military Intelligence Reports -
China 1911-1941.

Newspapers

North China Herald (Shanghai). June-July 1917.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

Chang Hsun	張勳
Chang Tso-lin	張作霖
Chao Erh-shun	趙爾巽
Chao Ping-chun	趙秉鈞
Ch' en Pao-shen	陳寶琛
Cheng Hsiao-hsu	鄭孝胥
Chung-hsing	中興
Feng Kuo-chang	馮國璋
Fu-p' i	復辟
Hayashi Gonsuke	林權助
Hsing-chung hui	興中會
Hsu Ch' in	徐勤
Hsu Shih-ch' ang	徐世昌
Hsuan-t' ung	宣統
Hu Chi-yuan	胡嗣瑗

Hu Ssu-ching 胡思敬

Huang Hsing 黃興

lao 遺老

K'ang Yu-wei 康有為

Kawashima Naniwa 川島浪速

Kuang-hsu 光緒

Kuomintang 國民黨

Lao Nai-hsuan 勞乃宣

Li Yuan-hung 黎元洪

Liang Ch' i-ch' ao 梁啟超

Liang-pi 良弼

Liu T'ing-shen 劉廷琛

Lu Jung-t'ing 陸雲廷

Manchukuo 滿洲國

Mumekata Kotaro 宗方小太郎

Ni Ssu-ch'ung 倪嗣冲

Pan Jo-hai 潘若海

Peiyang 北洋

P' u-wei	溥偉
P' u-yi	溥儀
Shan-chi	善耆
Sheng-yun	升允
Sheng Tseng-chih	沈曾植
Sun Yat-sen	孫逸仙
T' ang Shao-i	唐紹儀
T'ieh-liang	鐵良
Ts' ao O	蔡鐸
Tsukuda Nobuo	佃信夫
Tsung-she Tang	宗社黨
Tuan Ch' i-jui	段祺瑞
T' ung-chih	同治
T' ung-meng hui	同盟會
Tz' u-hsi	慈禧
Wang Shih-chen	王士珍
Wu T' ing-fang	伍廷芳
Yuan Shih-k' ai	袁世凱