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SPANISH STATE POLICY, BASQUE NATIONALISM AND ETA TERRORISM

by

J. Macdougall Hislop



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

Spring 1995



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


J. Macdougall Hislop
P.O. Box 745
Cranbrook, B.C.
VIC 4J5


University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, a thesis entitled Spanish State Policy, Basque Nationalism and ETA Terrorism submitted by J. Macdougall Hislop in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.


Professor Robert Gilsdorf


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16 December 1994

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the political dynamic binding the Spanish state and Basque nationalist forces, in both their violent and non-violent manifestations, from the late franquist dictatorship through fifteen years of democratic rule. The thesis defines and assesses the policies developed by the Spanish state and Basque nationalist forces to advance their particular political interests. The effect of terrorism on the political dynamic is described and analyzed. The argument that is advanced is that the policies of successive Spanish governments contributed powerfully to the political instability that they sought to overcome. It is argued that with the election of a Socialist government to power in Spain in 1982, substantial gains were made in neutralizing the violent, Basque nationalist forces through political and policial means and normalizing political relations with non-violent Basque nationalist forces.

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Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis is about the Spanish state's response to the challenge posed to its authority by Basque nationalism in both its democratic autonomist and violent independentist forms. Of particular relevance is the relationship between the strategies of the violent nationalist and democratic nationalist forces and their effect on the political dynamic with the Spanish state in transitional and democratic Spain. The Spanish-Basque political dynamic which binds the central political actors operates on three planes. One is described by the relations between the state and democratic nationalism, the second by those between the state and violent nationalism and the third by those between democratic nationalism and violent nationalism. A fourth element which has had a tremendous impact on the Spanish-Basque dynamic has been the statist Socialist party in Euskadi. The Spanish case is important since it offers interesting insight not only into the dynamics of ethno-nationalist politics but of state-centric policy making. The state's policies to confront the nationalist challenge often complemented the nationalist programme and therefore seriously undermined its political position. Today, despite substantial gains in satisfying the demands of the democratic, autonomist Basque nationalists, neither the state nor the violent, radical, independentist nationalists have been willing to meet the essential demands of the other, and they remain locked in a political stalemate. The steps taken by the state to define and then transform its relationship with Basque nationalism will occupy the bulk of the analysis in this study. It is hoped that what is learned about the dynamics between the Spanish government and Basque nationalist forces can increase our understanding not just of this particular case but of state responses to ethno-nationalist political movements.

There is a broad literature on Spanish and Basque politics with a number of exceptionally useful books on various aspects of the Basque question, and much useful and insightful material in journals, magazines and newspapers. In the literature a number of different approaches have been taken to study the "Basque problem." Some studies have regarded the "Basque problem" as merely one problem among many others facing the Spanish state. Others have viewed it as either simply a problem of public order or of ethno-nationalist rights. Still others assess in depth the Basque political milieu and the consequences of various policies followed by both Basque and Spanish political forces. However, a more comprehensive dynamic treatment of Basque-Spanish relations is lacking. The perspective taken here is that the policies and actions taken by Basque and Spanish political forces were conditioned by the political, economic and social constraints under which they laboured. It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue whether one of

the actors was more or less just than the others; rather, analysis will turn on the actual policies each of the important actors pursued, why they pursued them and their effect on the political dynamic. While the treatment of this question here is hardly comprehensive, it should illuminate the particular character of the Spanish-Basque political dynamic.

In the body of this study, analysis will concentrate on those factors which had a direct bearing on the political dynamic. In the interest of brevity only limited attention will be given to such important questions as language, culture, society, the structure and sociological support of the important political forces, analysis of Spanish politics, etc., and only to the extent that it will elucidate the problem. Much of the material presented in this study will be historical, since I am following the dynamic over time. However, only the salient features of the historical context of Basque-Spanish relations will be addressed to introduce the subject and to define the problem being studied. Some material is presented for the sake of completeness. Much detail will be omitted to emphasize the broad trends and cumulative effect of the policies and actions pursued.

Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of Basque nationalism in Spain is the violence which has convulsed not just País Vasco (the Basque region) but to some degree the entire Spanish state. Nineteen years have passed since the death of General Franco and the withering away of his dictatorship. The political environment of Spain has undergone a fundamental transformation. Paradoxically, the departure of Franco and franquism, the institutionalization of effective democratic government and devolution of wide-ranging powers to the autonomous Basque parliament have not brought ETA violence to an end. It is this paradox that leads us to the purpose of this study. Over time the political positions of the essential political forces have changed. The rise of modern radical Basque nationalism in the 1950s and, eventually, of ETA transformed the entire character of the Basque nationalist movement. If franquism was essential to ETA's rise and conditioned its armed component, then the emergence of democratizing governments in Spain was believed to be the necessary antidote. This would not transpire as there was nothing inevitable about the democratization of the post-Franco state. Caught between the symbiotic forces of *terrorismo* and *golpismo*^{*}, the democratizing governments frequently found their efforts to institutionalize democratic rule frustrated. ETA's escalating violence in the transition to democracy overshadowed positive political advances in dealing with the question of Basque autonomy; and democratic Basque nationalism not only did nothing significant to attempt to stay its influence, but cultivated it in order to increase its political leverage in negotiating first the Constitution and then the essential autonomy statute. In this environment the attempted *golpe* of February 1981 was no great

* The threat of a *golpe de estado* (*coup d'état*) by the right and security forces.

surprise. If its defeat moderated the radicalized political discourse of the democratic nationalist parties, it did nothing to still ETA. The disintegration of the centre-right UCD (*Unión Centro-democrática*) coalition and government opened the way for the Socialists to win a majority in the October 1982 general elections. The new Socialist government then transformed the Spanish-Basque political dynamic and took strong measures to pacify País Vasco and normalize the Basque political discourse. Its policies probably would not have been as effective in the absence of the profound changes which occurred in the Basque polity, particularly between the years 1984 and 1986. These changes allowed the process of pacification and normalization to advance. With this background in mind, the analysis shall then concentrate on the play of political forces among the four primary actors: the central government, moderate Basque nationalism, the Basque socialist party and ETA.

In the remainder of this chapter, a short description of País Vasco will be presented. This will be followed by a brief outline of the rise of Basque nationalism, its emergence as a political force, the eruption of the Civil War, the emergence of the Franco dictatorship and the rise of ETA. The transition to democracy will then be sketched out, as will the general character of the Spanish-Basque political dynamic in democratic Spain. The chapter will conclude with an outline of the body of the thesis.

Physical and Cultural Setting of the Basque People

The Basque region is situated in the southeast corner of the Bay of Biscay and is divided by the Spanish-French border. Covering an area of 20,600 square kilometres, 85 percent of the Basque territory lies on the Spanish side of the frontier.¹ Nearly 2.7 million people live in the four Basque provinces in Spain - Alava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Navarra - accounting for 7 percent of the Spanish population.² About 65 percent of these are indigenous to the Basque provinces. The heavily industrialized provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa contain populations of 1,179,130 and 689,222, respectively, the less industrialized Alava hosts 267,728 people, and the most rural province, Navarra, has 525,900 people.³ In a 1986 census, those born in a Basque province accounted for 67.5% of Alava's population, 68.8% of Vizcaya's and 83.4% of Navarra's.⁴ Of Basques in the three provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, only 13.4% in Alava, 57.6% in Guipúzcoa and 28.2% in Vizcaya had some understanding of the Basque language, *Euskera*.⁵ In these three provinces, in 1994, only 23% of Basques claimed to know *Euskera*, a number unchanged from 1983.⁶ It will be argued below that the question of Navarra's integration in what would become the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (CAV) was cause for serious disagreement among Basques. The Comunidad Foral de Navarra is legally and politically distinct from the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca. Basque nationalist sentiment in Navarra, in the sense of identification with a larger

Basque political community, has been weak, largely due to its distinct historical experience as a former principality with its own particular foral rights.*

The Basque people have inhabited the region defined by the modern borders of País Vasco for over twelve hundred years. Einhard makes note of the Basques in his history of Charlemagne's military campaigns when he refers to the 778 A.D. ambush of Charlemagne's rearguard at Roncevalles, an attack later immortalized in *Le Chanson de Roland*. It would do violence to historical fact to argue that Basque and Spanish relations have been traditionally acrimonious. Rather, their relations were reasonably amicable until the end of the 19th Century. Until 1876, Basques enjoyed economic privileges and retained the right to govern themselves according to a system of local medieval laws, or *fueros*. As well, the Basque people as a whole were granted *hidalgo* (noble) status by the Spanish crown for their reliability, and perhaps for their racial purity, such as it was.* It may be inappropriate to consider the Basque people a race in the conventional biological sense. A description that many observers would accept is that

The historic Basque people are evidently an amalgam of several early ethnic groups in the western Pyrenees area; their unity is based on language and culture rather than biology, even though they exhibit certain somewhat distinct physical characteristics.†

Although a number of dialects exist, some mutually incomprehensible, the most distinctive shared characteristic of the Basques is their language, *Euskera*.‡ A language unique to Basques, *Euskera* and its preservation have been one of the principal rallying points of Basque nationalism.

The Basque Nationalist Movement

Basque nationalist sentiment emerged from a definitive set of conditions which obtained in the Basque country during the 19th Century. It is argued that, "Until the 1890s the social distinctiveness of the four Basque provinces had produced no nationalist consciousness."⁹ However, at this time the onset of massive and rapid industrialization occasioned an equally massive degree of social dislocation. The socially disorienting effect of industrialization was enhanced by the enormous influx of impoverished Spanish immigrant families seeking work in the new Basque factories. The existence of a large

* Basques governed themselves from the 11th century until 1876 according to ancient laws recognized legally, by the Spanish crown in the provisions of its foral system - a system of rule by *fueros*. A *fuero* was "a custom that became recognized by law." (Stanley Payne, *Basque Nationalism*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975. p.17.) The institution derived from the socio-political experience of the seven hundred years of the *Reconquista*. The insecurity of life in medieval Spain made centralized political rule impractical. Throughout Castilla "Strong and precise local autonomies developed... [which] were explicitly recognized by the Castilian crown from the eleventh century on by the granting or codification of *fueros*." (Payne, *Basque Nationalism*, p.5.) For pledging loyalty to the Castilian crown and the Church, local councils were granted responsibility for local affairs according to tradition.

† It is argued that since the Basques had not been as subject to intermingling with the Moorish and Jewish peoples as were other Iberian peoples, Basques were considered by the crown to be more trustworthy for the affairs of the state than were other Spanish peoples. They were considered truly Spanish.

population of Spanish-speaking, apparently atheistic, and "morally licentious" Spanish industrial workers threatened the Catholic, conservative, Euskera-speaking, ethnically Basque population."¹⁰ To protect themselves from the "savage exploitation and harsh working conditions"¹¹ of their new Basque employers, the Spanish workers were quick to organize themselves in socialist and anarchist industrial labour unions which were both anti-clerical and decidedly Spanish in orientation. This only confirmed the worst fears of their new employers and neighbours. Denied the means to resolve in relative isolation the social problems caused by industrialization, urbanization and modernization, Basques reacted to the assault on their traditional values by seeking solace in their ethnic group and identity. Inspired by the writings of Sabino Arana, the first Basque nationalist, Basque sentiments of cultural distinctiveness acquired a sense of theoretical legitimacy which led to calls for some degree of political autonomy, and even outright independence, for País Vasco. These vague sentiments were given political form in the institution of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco - PNV) at the end of the 19th Century.

The Basque nationalist movement and ideology were essentially the creations of Sabino Arana. Fears of the disappearance of the Basque language and culture motivated Arana to assume his activist rôle. Arana demanded a return of the *fueros*, a system of traditional laws and institutions which were abolished by Madrid both as punishment for Basque support of the Carlists who fought two wars against the Spanish government and in response to the demands of liberal, capitalist and modernizing Basques. He eventually would argue that the purpose of the PNV, his political creation, was to fight for the most radical degree of autonomy possible within the totality of the Spanish state. Various autonomy projects launched in the 1920s and 1930s failed to win either constitutional approval or sufficient popular approval. However, in 1936, with Spain embroiled in a civil war, the Republican government granted autonomy to Basques in Vizcaya and in those areas of Guipúzcoa which had not been overrun by Franco's rebel Nationalist forces, in exchange for Basque commitment to fight them. País Vasco quickly succumbed to franquist forces and the new regime set out to crush Basque nationalism and severely restricted popular manifestations of Basque culture. The repression was harsh until the mid-1940s. In the mid-1950s, the regime began to liberalize somewhat. The PNV maintained a very low profile, content to participate in cultural activities as a component of its strategy of cultural defence. However, for young radicalizing Basque nationalist youth, this was not enough.

Concerned that the Basque people would lose their culture due to franquist oppression, ETA was formed in 1959 when radical nationalist youth broke with the PNV and its cautious and unambitious programme of resistance. ETA's militants pursued an aggressive, and eventually violent, resistance to the Franco regime with the intention of winning independence for Euskadi from Spain. To subdue ETA the franquist regime launched a severe repression of the Basque population. ETA's adoption of the "action-

reaction-action spiral" strategy in the mid-1960s guided its armed actions. Initially ETA hoped to create an ascending spiral of violence which would be embraced by the Basque people and cause them to take up arms against the Spanish state. Franquism's policy of general repression played into ETA's strategy and permitted it to emerge at the centre of the Basque nationalist struggle. Since 1974, the purposes of ETA's escalating armed action have been two-fold. On the one hand, with armed attacks its militants have sought to expose the "truly coercive" base of the Spanish state and its "occupying forces" in Euskadi. On the other hand, by means of armed action ETA has attempted to compel the Spanish state to negotiate the terms of its five-point *la Alternativa KAS* programme. ETA has been an intransigent nationalist military organization dedicated to the liberation of Euskadi from Spanish "oppression" by means of armed struggle. While many accounts of ETA pay lip-service to its nominally "Marxist" programme, few serious accounts would describe ETA as a marxist organization. ETA's level of violence has varied with political events in both País Vasco and Spain. From June 1968 to December 1973 ETA killed 11 people. From 1974 until the new Spanish Constitution was promulgated in December 1978 ETA killed 93, wounded 98 and kidnapped 5 victims.¹² From January 1979 until December 1982 during which the Basque Autonomy Statute was negotiated, the first Basque parliamentary election was held, a *golpe* attempt was launched and the PSOE (*Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles*) won the elections in 1982, ETA killed 232 people, wounded 222 others and kidnapped 15.¹³ From January 1983 to December 1992 ETA killed at least 292 people. In all, to December 1992, ETA violence claimed at least 660 lives.¹⁴

Democratization in post-Franco Spain

The death of Francisco Franco in November 1975 marked the essential starting point of the Spanish transition to democracy. Reformist forces had been active for some time in preparation for the moment. The reformers, who would control the transition, were primarily franquists and moderate Spaniards who realized that traditional franquist policies were insufficient to address the needs of Spain's changing social and economic circumstances. They advocated a gradual liberalization of the regime to broaden its political and social support base. Not only did they face the opposition of authoritarian, arch-franquists who attempted to maintain the status quo, using all means necessary, but that of the rupturists who had little faith in the reformist franquists and advocated an immediate democratic rupture with the franquist state. The play of these three forces was modulated by the Spanish head of state, King Juan Carlos III, who would prove to be much more of a democrat than anyone had suspected. The King's displeasure with Franco's appointed Prime Minister Arias led to his eventual resignation and replacement by Adolfo Suárez. Under Suárez the transition to democracy proceeded gradually. Like Arias, Suárez operated under political constraints imposed by the military and the right who viewed accommodation with separatist forces as the preliminary step in the Balkanization of Spain.¹⁵ Given the very real danger

of a military coup, both the Arias and Suárez regimes had to move carefully on these questions. As well, the policies of both were plagued by the fact that the security forces were not always under their control.

In spite of its erratic progress in País Vasco, democratization proceeded in Spain and in 1977, Spain's first democratic elections since the civil war were held. Suárez's UCD party won the plurality of the vote and of the seats and Suárez was named Prime Minister with the King's blessing. In País Vasco,

Table I.a. Position of Basque Parties on Key Nationalist Questions

	language	ethnicity	political organization	economic organization	political means	inclusion of Navarra
PNV	Euskera	Basque	autonomy	capitalist	democratic	democratic
PSE	Both	Spanish	autonomy	socialist	democratic	democratic
HB	Euskera	Basque	independence	socialist	violence	annexation
EA	Euskera	Basque	independence	capitalist	democratic	democratic
EE	Both	Basque	autonomy	socialist	democratic	democratic
PP	Spanish	Spanish	centralism	capitalist	democratic	democratic
CDS	Spanish	Spanish	autonomy	capitalist	democratic	democratic

the political parties and formations sought to represent two ethnic communities, two languages, three views on political organization, two political means, and two conceptions on the composition of the Basque political community, as Table I shows. The political parties which contested the elections in País Vasco were the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco - Basque Nationalist Party) formed in 1895, the PSE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi - Socialist Party of Euskadi) formed pre-1895, HB (Herri Batasuna - United People) formed in 1978, EA (Eusko Alkartasuna - Basque Unity) formed in 1986, EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra - Basque Left) formed in 1977, PP (Partido Popular née Coalición Popular née Alianza Popular) formed in 1977 and the CDS (Centro-Democrático Socialista née UCD) formed in 1977. The nationalists, the majority of whom were represented by the PNV, tended to be ethnically Basque and many spoke Euskera. The majority of the statist tended to be Spanish immigrant workers living in Euskadi and were represented primarily by the FSE.

In response to a radicalization of the Basque polity caused by ETA's violence and police responses, by actions taken by the central government to marginalize Basque nationalism and by popular frustration with the pace and character of the reform process, moderate Basque nationalist parties radicalized. The PNV adopted a maximalist political position in its dealings with the Spanish state. The streets of País Vasco became *fora* of political dialogue rather than Basque and Spanish political institutions. The moderate nationalist programme dove-tailed nicely with the escalation of radical nationalism's verbal and violent attacks on the Spanish state and its institutions. In a rarefied atmosphere, the terms of the Spanish constitution were negotiated. The situation only deteriorated following the 1979 general elections in which radical nationalism won an important electoral success in País Vasco. Negotiations began on the terms of the Basque Autonomy Statute between a conciliatory central

government taken aback by the rise of radical nationalism and a confident PNV. The central government was prepared to accommodate the moderate nationalists in a move to stabilize the Basque and Spanish polities. During this period the two branches of ETA escalated their violence. The successful negotiations and popular approval of the autonomy statute prepared the way for the 1980 elections to the Basque Parliament. However, the radicalized Basque nationalist discourse failed to moderate. Pressured by ETA\HB, and its own radicalizing support base the PNV espoused an aggressive nationalist rhetoric as a mechanism for extorting greater political concessions from an increasingly recalcitrant central government. The 23 February 1981 attempted *golpe de estado* caused the democratic Basque nationalist parties to moderate their political discourse. This would not last long. The decision of the weak UCD government to implement a restrictive autonomic policy with the support of the PSOE, in order to pacify the right and military, outraged moderate Basque nationalists.

The October 1982 elections returned a majority PSOE government to the Cortes.* The PSOE implemented a considered political programme to achieve its three over-riding goals for Euskadi: pacification, normalization and economic reconversion. This programme would occupy the PSOE's political energy and dominated the play of the Spanish-Basque political dynamic. By 1985, under pressure from the PSE and the central government, the PNV began to distance itself from ETA. The PSOE's concerted strategy to eliminate ETA and to cause its political and social isolation would have considerable success. The relative decline of the PNV and relative strength of the PSE, led to a series of coalition governments in Euskadi which had an enormous effect in moderating the Basque political discourse. With ETA's adoption of the tactics of diffuse terrorism, it became increasingly alienated from its support base. In this new political climate, agreement was reached among all the parties with seats in the Cortes to accept the terms of the *Pacto de Moncloa* of November 1987 which committed all Spanish and Basque political parties, EA and HB excluded, to repudiate terrorism unequivocally. This process repeated itself in January 1988 when all Basque parliamentary, political parties agreed to the terms of an historic agreement, the *Pacto de Ajuria Enea*, which condemned terrorism and terrorists.

Thesis Outline

The body of the thesis will be structured in the following way. Chapter Two will describe the roots and evolution of Basque nationalism, and touch on the various key events in the history of the movement which have affected its evolution. Chapter Three will analyze and describe ETA's ideological evolution beginning in 1959 to 1977 and will account for ETA's emergence as the single most important

* The bi-cameral Spanish Parliament composed of a 350-seat *Congreso de Diputados* and a 208-seat *Senado*.

actor in the Basque nationalist movement in the 1970s. ETA's programme and strategy will be investigated with the specific intent of determining its effect on nationalist politics. Chapter Four will analyze the Spanish transition to democracy from 1974 to 1977, the year of the first post-Franco democratic election, with particular focus on the situation in País Vasco. Chapter Five will analyze the process which resulted in the promulgation of the Constitution of 1978, the promulgation of the Basque Autonomy Statute and the first election to the Basque Parliament. Chapter Six will focus on the last years of the UCD government, the attempted *golpe de estado* on 23 February, 1981 and the emergence of the PSOE as a dominant political force. Chapter Seven will analyze the development of PSOE policy, its success in combatting ETA, the political process which led to the normalization of the Basque political discourse, negotiations with ETA and the anti-terrorism pacts of 1987 and 1988. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Throughout this analysis emphasis will be on studying the government's Basque policy as a response to ETA terrorism specifically and in the wider context of Basque nationalism. Chapter Eight will conclude this study by analyzing those policy mixes which have worked to facilitate the realization of the government's objectives in the conflict's various phases.

Notes

1. Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 (Madison: The University of Madison Press, 1984), p. 8.
2. Clark, Insurgents, p. 10.
3. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Padrón Municipal de Habitantes, 1 de abril 1986. Características de la población, Navarra, Alava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística), pp. 100-101.
4. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, pp. 100-101.
5. Dirección de Estadística del Gobierno Vasco, 1983 Anuario Estadística Vasca (Bilbao: Artes Gráficas Grijelmo, S.A., 1984), p. 205.
6. Michel Bole-Richard, "Les Basques, fatigués du terrorisme, vont élire leurs représentants," Le Monde, 22 Oct. 1994, p. 7, col. 2, Dirección de Estadística del Gobierno Vasco, p. 201 and Patxo Unzueta, La sociedad vasca y política nacionalista, (Madrid: El País Aguilar, 1987), p. 57.
7. Stanley G. Payne, Basque Nationalism (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975), p. 9.
8. Clark, Insurgents, p. 11, Payne, Basque Nationalism, p. 9 and John Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi, 1890-1986 (Routledge: New York, 1988), p. 1.
9. Sullivan, p. 1.
10. Sabino Arana, in Sullivan, p. 1.
11. Sullivan, p. 1.
12. Clark, Insurgents, pp. 292-3.
13. Clark, Insurgents, p. 293.
14. "The terror of 1992," The Economist, 1 December, 1990, p. 55.
15. Meir Serfaty, "Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition," Current History, 80, No.466 (1981), 227 and Stanley Payne, "Spain's Political Future," Current History, 81, No.479 (1982), 420.

Chapter Two: The Rise of Basque Nationalism

The rise of Basque nationalist sentiment emerged from the particular experience of the Basque ethno-nation in the course of the tremendous social, political and economic upheavals it experienced during the 1800s and 1900s. The antecedents to the emergence of the Basque nationalist movement are to be found in the 1830s and 1870s. In 1833, Carlists, strongly supported by conservative, Catholic Basques, waged a six-year war against the Spanish state. The Carlists hoped to place their namesake Carlos on the Spanish throne and that he would overturn the reforms of a modernizing, anti-clerical, liberal government set on instituting the terms of the liberal Constitution of 1812 and its provisions for secularizing the state, limiting the power of the Catholic Church, placing concrete limits on state power and modifying Spain's economic structure. The government defeated the Carlists and reduced but did not abolish the Basque *fueros*. In 1873 the Carlists went to war again. The Second Carlist War was a "counterrevolutionary movement" of conservative, ultra-Catholic, royalists launched against the liberal government in Madrid and its programme of liberalizing the absolutist, ultra-Catholic state,

The issue in the Carlist War was the continuation of traditional Spanish institutions - governmental, social and religious - or their replacement by a centralized parliamentary constitutional monarchy and an individualistic, capitalist society.¹

The Second Carlist War ended with the government's victory and the *fueros* were abolished under provisions of the Constitution of 1876, except in Navarra.* However, the Basque business elite - generally, urban liberals and supporters of the Madrid liberals - managed to negotiate a *concierto económico* which left local councils with control over certain economic matters.

Nationalist sentiment arose in País Vasco as a consequence of two factors: "the definitive abolition of the *fueros* in 1876 and, above all, the extremely rapid and spectacular process of industrialization that the Basque region experienced after this year".² The punitive abolition of the *fueros* was the first and necessary step sparking the large-scale industrial expansion which described the Basque economic boom. Basque economic growth was also facilitated by the modernizing principles of the liberal democratic regime. In fact, historically, the Basque, liberal bourgeoisie favoured dismantling the restrictive elements of the exigent customs structure defined by foral law "which made impossible their

* "[A]bolition of the *fueros* was a consequence, not a cause of the Carlist war." (Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, *El País Vasco: Pluralismo y nacionalidad*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1984, p.163.)

integration in the national market - and, in general, those foral regulations which hindered the creation of a modern economic system."³ With abolition of the *fueros*, the ban on exporting Basque iron ore was lifted and Spanish customs posts were moved to the French border.⁴ The first act opened Basque mineral production to the British market. The British, hungry for high quality iron ore, injected massive amounts of investment capital into mining operations, railroads and housing. The second eliminated the Basques' duty-free status which left Basque business free to expand in Spain's highly protected market.

Stanley Payne argues: "The origins of Basque nationalism can be best explained by a peculiar variation of the thesis of modernization marginality and the crisis of the intelligentsia."⁵ Unlike most ethno-nationalist movements launched in economically depressed regions by impoverished people seeking access to the wealth enjoyed by economically advanced regions, it was the very economic success of the Basques and, most importantly, the subsequent waves of immigration which fostered the development of Basque nationalist sentiment. Precisely when the Basque economy began to boom the rest of Spain floundered in a lengthy recession. Poor Spanish migrant workers left impoverished regions in Spain's south to seek a better life. The massive invasion of Spanish immigrants ultimately cultivated a powerful consciousness among Basques of their distinctiveness, as this "foreign" influx seemed to represent a frontal attack on the very cultural foundations of traditional Basque society - itself under pressure from the stresses of urbanization and industrialization. Said differently, Basque nationalism

was basically the reaction of a cultural identity threatened by the deep social perturbations produced by rapid industrialization and the massive immigration of foreign workers in a community with an acute particularist conscience and with ways of life and habits profoundly conservative and traditional.⁶

Effectively, it was the case that

The very process of economic and social modernization was a challenge to Basque identity, institutions and values for it brought industry, major urbanization, large scale non-Basque immigration (at least in Vizcaya) and growing atomization of society.⁷

Modernization and industrialization imparted on Basque society stresses which Basques were unable to address since they had lost effective control over local affairs. Insofar as Madrid was unwilling to tackle, or incapable of tackling, the problems País Vasco faced - and to which Madrid's policies were thought to have contributed - the state's ability to "perform the duties that justified its existence"⁸ was questioned.

The loss of special privileges also fuelled Basque nationalism's growth. Traditionally Basques were a privileged group in Spain. They were exempt from obligatory military service, customs and taxes, and had enjoyed effective self-government and full participation in the very highest levels of Spanish political and bureaucratic life. For example, customs exemption, while unpopular among Basque manufacturers seeking protection from European competition for their products, was popular among

Basques, and "resentment at its abolition was one of the factors that encouraged the growth of nationalism in the late nineteenth century."⁹ Payne writes that País Vasco: "had never been a "normal" or regular part of Spain... On the other hand, neither had it ever been oppressed. Even after 1876 [the end of the Second Carlist War] it enjoyed greater privileges than any other part of the peninsula."¹⁰

Sabino Arana and the Basque Nationalist Ideology

While the situation after 1876, "was excellent for Vizcayan economic interests... it disconcerted a few elements of the younger intelligentsia searching for identity and meaning in the shipwreck of royalist-apostolicist foralism."¹¹ Sabino Arana was at the forefront of this search for identity. The founder of the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco), he transformed "a latent cultural sense of ethnicity to an overt political and territorial consciousness of nationality."¹² His development of the Basque nationalist ideology was influenced ultimately by the sense of cultural identity which emerged in the aftermath of renunciation of the *fueros* and the Basque experience of industrialization and Spanish centralism.

Arana's original followers were the Basque rural gentry, the *juantxos*. Staunchly Catholic and Carlist, the *juantxos* lost their place in Basque society following the abolition of the *fueros* and the transformation of the Basque mercantile, farming and fishing economy into a capitalist industrial economy. By the century's end, the power of the industrial, urban-based, capitalist oligarchy of Bilbao was firmly entrenched. The new dominant class would "support the consolidation of the Spanish nation-state as an appropriate structure for the development of its economic activities to the detriment of the foralist and nationalist options."¹³ Therein, "Nationalism is, in reality, the swan song of a class condemned to extinction."¹⁴

One of Arana's tasks was to "construct an ideology which would justify the region's claim to independence from Spain."¹⁵ Influenced by the Catalanist movement and moved by his Basque identity, Arana reworked history to establish some sort of historical legitimacy for his claim that the Basque people had federated themselves with Spain without relinquishing their claim to prior independence.¹⁶ In the view of Arana, it was by force of arms alone that the Spanish state laid claim the Basque provinces and incorporated them in the Spanish state in 1839. Therefore the Spanish state ruled País Vasco as an occupier. As the Basques had never ceded their independence to Spain and given the growing threat to Basque identity posed by Spanish culture, Arana argued it was crucial for the survival of the Basque race that Basques expel the Spanish occupier and reinstitute the system of foral rule which obtained prior to 1839. The heart of his argument was: "Until 1839, País Vasco was absolutely independent. After this year, it finds itself conquered and occupied by Spain. It is necessary that it expels the invader and

recuperates its political independence."¹⁷ Sabino Arana "reduce[s] this relation of dependency to a war of conquest on the part of Spain."¹⁸ Although Arana's claims may be subject to considerable historical criticism,* the question of the validity of his claims have not crippled the nationalist movement.

According to Arana, five elements constituted the Basque nation: i) race; ii) language; iii) government and laws; iv) character and customs, and; v) the historic personality of the Basque people.¹⁹ For Arana, the racial purity of the Basque people was of central importance with language and linguistic preservation a secondary concern: his "overriding concern was his belief that the Basque race was in danger of extinction because of an invasion of immigrants whom he considered to be racially degenerate, immoral, non-Catholic and socialist."²⁰ His rejection of the Spanish immigrants was based first on their ethnicity and second on their culture. Euskera would become a tool of social segregation, a means to keep immigrants socially isolated in the Basque territory.²¹ In fact, "[f]ar from wishing that the immigrants would become culturally assimilated, Arana thought that now [sic.] worse disaster could befall the Basque race."²² He went on to state that "if Spanish immigrants were to learn to speak [Euskera], it would be better that the Basques adopt another language."²³ While these viewpoints were extreme, "the nationalist ideology would evolve sensibly until it... shed its initial xenophobia and racism."²⁴

Arana originally believed that only with complete independence could the Basque people fulfil their national aspiration. In 1895, the PNV vowed to reestablish the fueros and separate the Church and state with the "complete and unconditional subordination of... the state to the church".²⁵ The party held that the "necessary basis for solid and lasting national unity are: unity of race in so far as possible and Catholic unity."²⁶ However, as his end loomed, discouraged by the resilience of the Spanish state in the face of the disasters of 1898 - military defeat in Cuba, loss of the Philippines and a prolonged economic recession - and ignoring the reservations of its intransigent elements, Arana committed the PNV to fight for "the most radical degree of autonomy possible in the Spanish state, better yet, to an autonomy, whatever its extent, which includes the recognition of the Basques' historical rights."²⁷ Its subsequent political course has been shaped by the quest for a satisfactory autonomy accord with the Spanish state.

Basque Nationalism as Political Force

The PNV's political success was modest in the first years of its existence, and was constrained to the municipal electoral contests. As Table II.a. shows, between 1918, when the PNV first won

* In this vein, Sullivan argues that "Not only had the Basque provinces been an integral part of Spain, but they had taken a leading part in creating the Spanish state." (John Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi, 1890-1986* (Routledge: New York, 1988), p. 3.

parliamentary representation, and 1923, the PNV's support declined due to disunity in the PNV's ranks. Between 1931 and 1936, the PNV became the dominant political force in País Vasco. In the Basque polity, a tripartite division of electoral support was registered as the Civil War drew nearer. In 1933 right-wing parties in País Vasco won 25.9% of the vote and 3 seats, the socialist republicans won 27.1% and 2 seats and the PNV 47.0% and 12 seats. In 1936 right wing parties won 31.7% of the vote and only 1 seat, the socialist republicans won 33.2% and 7 seats and the PNV 35.2% and 9 seats.

Table II.a Seats Won in General Elections in País Vasco, 1918-1936

	1918	1919	1920	1923	1931	1933	1936
Carlists	2	2	2	3	3	2	1
Catholic	-	1	1	1	1	-	-
Alfonsin	4	7	9	8	-	1	-
Centre Republicans	1	-	1	1	1	-	-
Left Republicans	-	-	-	-	3	1	3
PCE	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
PSOE	1	1	1	1	3	1	3
PNV	6	3	-	-	6	12	9
Total	14	14	14	14	17	17	17

Source: José Miguel de Azaola, "El hecho vasco," in *La sociedad*, Vol. I of *España: un presente para el futuro*, (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1984), p. 273.

Basque Nationalism and Autonomy

Divisions within Basque society have been as great a hinderance to the achievement of the PNV's goals as have the very policies of Madrid. These divisions caused the failure of the Basque plebiscites on autonomy of 1920, 1931 and 1933. Appeals to Basque ethnic values failed to unite them behind these autonomy projects. Fusi suggests that:

[p]erhaps the fundamental reason that explains the failure of Basque autonomy is that there existed neither a unanimous conception of the Basque fact nor a basic political accord among the political and social forces of País Vasco on the geographical and historical conception of Euzkadi and over the character and attributes of the future autonomous institutions.²⁸

To speak of a Basque national territory incorporating Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Alava and Navarra was to confuse the apparent with the real, "Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa did not constitute ever either an independent political entity or even an administrative unit."²⁹ Navarra's independent political history ensured that its aspirations differed from the Vizcayans' and Guipúzcoans'. Rural Alava's fears of domination by the industrialized provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa undermined their commitment. The "combined action of a problematic and questionable nationality, essential ideological and political differences, immediate strategic errors and the interests of the party made Basque autonomy impossible until October 1936."³⁰

On 17 May 1936 the right-wing Nationalist military rebellion, eventually led by Franco, was launched against the left Republican government. The Basque country was embroiled immediately in the mess. There, however, "[the] civil war was not merely an internecine conflict between Spaniards as a whole, but also a civil war between Basques of the four Basque provinces."³¹ The governing Carlists in Navarra supported unreservedly the Nationalist coup of General Mola and there the PNV announced that it "[did] not support the Republican Government".³² Alava came to a similar decision. In Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya the PNV governments remained true to the historical goal of winning autonomy. On 1 October 1936, the Popular Front government in Madrid granted Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa autonomy in exchange for continued Basque support in the fight against Franco. The PNV ruled the autonomous Basque provinces until June 1937, when Bilbao fell to the franquist Nationalist army. Franco's Nationalists moved quickly to crush the Basque nationalist movement in País Vasco. Basque nationalist leaders and activists were rounded up and those that were not shot were sent to forced labour camps or prison.

Basque Nationalism During the Franco Dictatorship

It was during the Franco dictatorship that Spanish-Basque relations assumed their contemporary form. The experience and myth of the Franco years has been etched deeply into the collective consciousness of the Basque people and have been perhaps much more fundamental in shaping the Basque psyche than the pre-war years. This is not to say that Basque nationalism's early years are unimportant, but that the effect of franquism on the Basque nationalist movement is probably much more relevant in understanding the contemporary Basque political environment. In consolidating its hold on power, purging the state of its real or imagined enemies and destroying Spanish regional movements, the brutality of the franquist dictatorship's repression was for many a grim foreboding. Use of Euskera in public, including in schools and the media was officially prohibited, celebration of the Basque nationalist holiday outlawed, nationalist priests arrested, nationalists' property confiscated and many Basques arrested.³³ The regime's attempt to crush nationalist sentiment in País Vasco was ultimately counterproductive since "[the] aggression displayed by the dictatorship had the opposite effect of what was intended".³⁴ The repression "galvanized anti-Spanish feeling in the Basque country"³⁵ and spawned the growth of new forms of resistance to the franquist Spanish state.

The effectiveness of the regime's policy of cultural attack was questionable. In many rural areas of Euskadi, the people spoke solely *Euskera*. The language of social discourse, of business and of the pulpit was necessarily *Euskera*; the actual ability of the regime to enforce its own laws was problematic. Some argue that, "Contrary to the claim made by some nationalists, there was never any serious attempt to prohibit the use of spoken Basque."³⁶ Perhaps the spirit of the law was its most galling feature.

Franquism's hostility towards Basque nationalism, like that towards other regionalist movements, nurtured feelings of nationalist identity in people "who had not previously cared about it."³⁷ As a result,

[the] regime's actions in the conquered regions were designed to stamp out Basque and Catalan nationalism once and for all. But they were often so petty and vindictive that they merely irritated the population and made it more determined to resist.³⁸

The attack on Basque culture was an absurdity, but a brutal absurdity.

Initially the prognosis for Basque nationalism was bleak. However, while, "the Civil War crushed the nationalist movement as an open political force... it completely failed to eradicate nationalist sentiment."³⁹ In fact, Franco's repressive policies almost encouraged it. The preservation of Basque culture was a task undertaken by the PNV, and one for which the party was ideally suited, for it "had always had a conception of politics which included social life and culture."⁴⁰ The PNV's activists

were involved in efforts to preserve Euskera, and they encouraged Basque customs and folklore through participation in popular festivals, dance groups and choirs. They worked actively in the *Ikastolas*, the illegal Basque language schools, while sympathizers among the clergy used the opportunities provided by the Church's relative freedom to promote Basque culture.⁴¹

The PNV, recognizing the regime's political strength and Franco's will to impose his vision on Spain, adapted to the prevailing realities:

PNV supporters had fought and died for their cause in the Civil War when that had been the realistic and appropriate thing to do. In the different circumstances of the 1950s, when armed struggle was no longer possible, the PNV worked in a less dramatic, but equally committed, patient and tenacious way.⁴²

The PNV's programme of cultural defence was a touchstone for Basque nationalism and its strategy of passive resistance to Franco allowed it to transform anti-Francoist sentiment into support for nationalism.

It would be wrong to assume that harsh political and cultural repression characterized the entire period of Franco's rule. Until the early 1950s, his regime had indeed been savage in its repression of dissent from whatever quarter. However, the 1950s and 1960s were times of change in both Spain and País Vasco. At the heart of the changes were two factors: one, the police measures adopted by the state had crushed organized opposition to the regime and feeling "more secure than ever before... [it] was able to permit a relaxation of repression";⁴³ and, two, the new global political environment of the Cold War. Spain's political isolation was lifted in the period between 1951-1953 as the West sought allies in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. As well, compelled by "the extreme exhaustion of the productive apparatus"⁴⁴, the franquist regime abandoned its autarkic economic policies in favour of an economic strategy which would integrate Spain into the world economic system and open the economy to foreign investment and trade. With the arrival of large-scale foreign investment beginning in 1953, Spain experienced a tremendous economic boom which gave the regime further room to manoeuvre. The

regime's economic successes, which were felt much stronger in País Vasco than elsewhere in Spain, helped to stifle dissent, especially in the middle class. País Vasco's relatively high standard of living "functioned as a mechanism of compensation" for the loss of cultural liberties.⁴⁵ Moreover, "many Basques, including traditional PNV supporters, were prospering under Franco. Such people retained a cultural identification with the nationalist movement, although they had long ago abandoned any kind of struggle against the Franco regime."⁴⁶ For nationalists, "[these] economic and political developments presented grave problems".⁴⁷ While they viewed the PNV-dominated Basque government-in-exile as their legitimate representative, its failure to convince the West to maintain the economic blockade of Spain, its weak response to the Francoist regime, and Franco's harsh repression of them disheartened many committed Basque nationalists. This is not to discount the nationalist movement, but to argue that the profound contradictions within the nationalist community did not necessarily augur well for its cause.

If the central thrust of Franco's economic policy was to preserve the political stability of Spain while expanding Spain's industrial output, in País Vasco its effect was to destabilize Basque society. Massive immigration, the extension of industry into agricultural regions and the departure of young Basques from their natal *caserios** to the new enterprises awakened the relatively dormant nationalist sentiments of the newly-enriched, urban, middle class and the traditionalist, agricultural class. As Table II.b shows, in the 1950s, immigration to Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa and Alava rose dramatically, while Navarra's population declined. In the 1960s, by comparison, immigration rose almost 150% in the first three Basque provinces and slightly in Navarra. To the two most advanced provinces, 275,883 Spanish immigrants moved in these twenty years. In the years between 1945 and 1968, the population in the Basque country almost doubled. In addition to the increased levels of pollution and urban overcrowding, the capacity of the region's infrastructure to absorb this mass of new arrivals meant that the very worst aspects of rapid economic growth befell Basque society once again.

This second wave of migration was greatly resented in the Basque nationalist community; "Immigration, nearly habitual in some zones, struck profoundly in those recently industrialized zones, contributing in some measure to this crisis of traditional values already described."⁴⁸ To seek solace and to locate themselves, Basques turned to their ethnic community. In the new climate occasioned by the regime's cultural liberalization País Vasco was host to an "authentic revitalization of the national fact: *ikastolas* emerged [and] there was a linguistic and literary renaissance."⁴⁹ The regime's liberalization of

* Caserios were traditional Basque farms.

its repression of *Euskera* failed to erase Basque opposition as it "provided a focus for Basque resistance while stopping far short of redressing legitimate grievances."⁵⁰ In addition to the affronts Basques

Table II.b Total Immigration to Basque Provinces, 1901-1969

Province	1910-20	1921-30	1931-40	1941-50	1951-60	1961-69	Total
Alava	-17,126	-5,210	-1,350	203	7,073	32,653	16,243
Guipúzcoa	14,322	12,732	3,964	16,567	48,754	59,909	156,258
Vizcaya	16,039	18,290	-1,350	18,988	96,399	127,821	276,187
Navarra	-40,444	-21,182	-10,300	-16,836	-20,499	2,655	-106,606
Total	-27,209	4,630	-9,036	18,922	131,727	223,038	342,082

Source: Payne, *Basque Nationalism*, p. 234.

experienced at the hands of Franco, Basque nationalist sentiment "revived in the 1950s, because of the threat which the immigrants were seen to present to the Basque culture and way of life, as it had arisen in the late 1890s."⁵¹ The Basques reaction was heightened by suspicion that immigration was a franquist plot to dilute the Basque race. While this belief was far-fetched, Basques feelings of disempowerment and resentment were no less valid and influenced a new generation of nationalists who were to go to extreme lengths to tackle the oppressive Spanish state.

Conclusion

Central to the rise of Basque nationalism was the effect of the Carlist, anti-liberal wars and the abolition of the *fueros* coupled with the effects of the Basque industrial revolution at the nineteenth century's close. While on one hand the Basque country's economic boom was a consequence of the Spanish state's effort at modernization, on the other hand, this process and the Spanish state's centralizing thrust left the Basques administratively and symbolically ill-equipped to respond to the challenges Basque society faced. In addition to the effects of industrialization and urbanization, the enormous influx of ethnic Spaniards contributed to the rise of Basque nationalism. In the reactive process of self-identification, Basques gleaned a greater sense of their own distinctiveness by means of comparison with the beliefs and behaviours of the Spanish immigrants. Thus Arana's political ideology - an agglomeration of racist beliefs, Basque mythology, self-serving historiography, messianism and myopia - brought a sense of coherence to the Basque peoples' experience and attempted to explain their historical relationship both to Spaniards and the Spanish state.

The modern generation of Basque nationalists, while influenced ideologically, to varying degrees, by Basque nationalism's primitive Aranist ideology, justifies its modern grievances in its claims for the regeneration of the "traditional rights" which it claims successive Spanish central governments, of which franquism was only an extreme form, have denied Basques since either 1839 or 1876, depending on their historical perspective. That is, although these Basque nationalists base many of their grievances on their

treatment under Franco and his suppression of their liberties, they argue politically for the reinstatement of traditional rights which they allege Basques enjoyed freely prior to what they refer to as Spanish colonization of the Basque people and Basque country. Today, the devolution of powers by Madrid to the Basque autonomous government seated in Vitoria is appreciated in nationalist circles as the reinvestment in the Basque people of powers they claim to have enjoyed historically. Politically this distinction is most important for Basque nationalists, for if the Spanish government can be depicted as devolving to the Basques rights that they claim never to have ceded to Madrid, it would affirm the legitimacy of their claims of prior independence and would bring into question the historical legitimacy of Spain's rule over the Basque people.

Notes

1. Payne, Basque Nationalism, p. 40.
2. Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, El País Vasco: Pluralismo y nacionalidad, (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1984), pp. 193-4.
3. Fusi, El País Vasco, pp. 162-3.
4. Clark, Insurgents, pp. 15-16.
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Chapter Three: ETA's Ideological and Organizational Evolution to 1975

The first effective break with the nationalist tradition which bears on contemporary Basque politics, occurred long before the return to democracy in Spain. At the time, the decision of a small group of nationalistic Basque youth to split with the PNV in 1958 seemed rather less than monumental. Their consequent decision to form ETA provoked a renaissance within the nationalist movement, for ETA redefined the dialogue of resistance and the parameters within which the nationalist struggle would unfold.* Not only was the formation of ETA and the development of a progressively more intransigent nationalist platform a clear break with the apparently moribund, introspective PNV and its moderate, revanchist programme aimed at preserving Basque identity and traditions, it was also a clear break with the PNV's tactics. As ETA matured ideologically, it distanced itself from the autonomist position on Basque nationalism it shared with the PNV and the Basque government-in-exile to advocate complete independence and armed struggle. This chapter will trace the ideological, strategic and political evolution of ETA from its roots through to the end of the franquist regime. ETA's essential ideological conflicts will be studied as will the transformations it has undergone both as an organization and in its programme. The nature of the political dynamic which bound it and the Spanish state will be revealed as will the effect of radical nationalism on the Basque polity. To understand the nature of the debate which shaped ETA it is important to keep in mind the influence of three important concepts: nationalism, socialism, and the role of armed struggle. Individually, and collectively, the play of these three factors marks the milestones of ETA's development as a principal Basque political actor.

ETA's roots were innocuous enough. A circle of university students, from nationalist, middle-class families, studying in Bilbao, undertook to publish in 1952 a clandestine journal dedicated to the discussion of nationalist issues. Taking the name *Ekin* (Arise) for their group, they established a small reputation for themselves. "The *Ekin* group, while not challenging the principles of the tradition of the PNV, were highly critical of its conduct of the struggle against Spanish oppression."¹ *Ekin's* lack of confidence in the PNV-dominated government-in-exile was shared by many Basques.* *Ekin* believed that

* The various offshoots produced by ETA's splits have referred to themselves as "ETA". In the body of this thesis, only where it is impossible to identify particular branches or where reference is being made to the collective of ETA groups, will the term ETA alone be used.

* With the outbreak of the Cold War, in its search for anti-communist allies, the West, which had maintained close ties with the PNV during its anti-fascist years, forsook the PNV to win Franco's support. The PNV and Basque

the PNV's response to "the imminent danger of cultural extinction," rising both from franquist policy and renewed Spanish immigration, could not stave off that threat.² Although critical of one another, on the deeper question of País Vasco's future relationship to Spain, the two groups were not far apart. *Ekin* joined the PNV's youth wing in 1956 only to break with it in 1958. In mid-1959 *Ekin* formed ETA as irreconcilable differences arose between the *Ekin* militants and the PNV. At the time, "ETA saw itself confronted with the necessity either to accept the PNV's strategy (and with it the inactivity) or to act alone."³ The split "was caused, not by disagreement over whether violent methods were justified or not, but by incompatibility between a group of activists and a party which saw Basque festivals and cultural events as, in themselves, directly political activities."⁴ Initially, ETA did not challenge the dominance of the PNV over the nationalist movement. Later its theoretical efforts were "directed at the elaboration of ideological bases that will permit it to present itself as an alternative ...to the PNV."⁵

In his definitive work, Gurutz Jáuregui argues that ETA's emergence:

is the resultant of the combination or interaction of two factors; namely, sabiano nationalist ideology and Francoism... ETA can neither be understood nor explained if not with respect to these two forces: sabiano nationalism, whose fundamental axis is the consideration of Euskadi as an occupied country, and Francoism, which makes this occupation effective and real.⁶

Influenced by Arana's theory of Basque prior independence and the post-WWII anti-colonial struggles for national liberation waged in Algeria, Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam, unlike other European national minorities which sought "a restructuring and remodelling of the actual European nation-state"⁷, ETA opted for the third world path of national liberation based on "a radical and absolute antagonism between the metropole and colony to such a degree that its solution demands necessarily, and as a basic premise, the colonizer's expulsion and the disappearance of all vestiges of colonization."⁸ In adopting this model País Vasco's actual situation was ignored and ETA looked for a means to transform it. Consistent with its ideals ETA launched its armed struggle by attempting to derail a train in July 1961. It was both a technical failure and a political disaster. Unprepared to sustain the counterblows struck by the police, much of ETA's organizational apparatus was destroyed. ETA was forced to reexamine its strategy for winning independence.

ETA's First Assembly and Organizational Steps

ETA's First Assembly in May 1962 marked the "rediscovery and recovery of the original Sabinian nationalism," including its stress on regenerating the Basque spirit, its fierce rejection of all

Government-in-exile lost their credibility. (Gurutz Jáuregui Bereciartu, *Ideología y estrategia de ETA: Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968*, (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores, 1981), p.59).

things Spanish, its acceptance of the Basque historical myth, its "visceral anti-communism", and some of its theocratic ideals.⁹ Aconfessional, independentist, and anti-communist, ETA accepted the following points as true: Euskadi was an occupied country, the Basque people had a right to full self-determination, autonomy was a possible intermediate step to full independence, and immigrants were foreigners and "a clear danger to the Basque cultural and ethnic identity."¹⁰ In rejecting race in favour of culture as the basis of Basque identity, ETA believed Euskera constituted the "primordial factor of Basque nationality",¹¹ and defined the Basque nation as those who speak Euskera. Therein, "if it is true that ETA rejects biological racism as a political element, it establishes nevertheless a form of ethnocentric racism as a defence against elements foreign to the Basque community."¹²

ETA believed that independence would arrest "the imminent disappearance of the Basque people, or the Basque soul".¹³ ETA's objective was not simply independence. ETA hoped that with independence Basque culture would regain the vitality it enjoyed prior to the industrial revolution. Independence then was "the realistic means to reinvigorate and develop the Basque nation in all its manifestation."¹⁴ ETA did not seek social transformation, but to arrest the process of denationalization which threatened the survival of Basque culture. Therein, "to realize the renationalization all means are acceptable, including, a revolution, but revolution is not the objective of the armed movement, but one of the possible means."¹⁵

ETA and Armed Struggle

In the wake of its initial attempt to define itself ideologically and politically ETA came under the influence of Federico Krutwig, who provided an essential justification for armed struggle. In a tract published in 1963, he argued that, "all national struggles for independence have without exception always gone through a process of violence and armed conflict."¹⁶ He believed that in Euskadi "all political means and possibilities for dialogue had been exhausted."¹⁷ Since the Spanish state under Franco continued subjugating the Basque people, as evidenced by its repression of Basque culture, it was incumbent upon Basques to liberate themselves.¹⁸ Building on Krutwig, ETA's theorists at the III Assembly in 1964, accepted the position that "Euskadi constitutes a nation that was in its day annexed violently by two foreign states which still oppress it".¹⁹ They argued that ETA had to lead the fight to liberate Euskadi from French and Spanish oppression and challenge the right of conquest by which the two states ruled the Basque territory.²⁰ Their proposed military strategy, a revolutionary war of national liberation, was never

* ETA understood revolution to be the destruction of "the structures considered unjust from a Basque point of view". ETA's concept of "revolutionary" was limited to "the national liberation of the Basque people and not with respect to profound changes in the social and economic structure of Basque society." (Jáuregui, *Ideología*, p.142.)

** No dialogue had been initiated between the franquist state and Basque nationalism.

launched. The Assembly's key long-term influence has probably been its mystical treatment of the guerrilla,²¹ and its messianic ideology, "which attributes an absolute value to the political objective of national independence."²² Jáuregui writes: "Mythification of the armed struggle and mythification of nationalism constitute the two ingredients which are going to mark profoundly the future development of ETA and the immediate future history of not only the Basque people but of Spain."²³ He goes on to argue that: "Revolutionary revelation will constitute from this moment one of ETA's constant characteristics; but it shows itself as a tragic enlightenment tied to the idea of sacrifice and death as conditions indispensable for the realization of a happy future."²⁴ ETA's ideology permits it to explain heinous actions as not only justifiable but necessary to realize Euskadi's national liberation.²⁵

The Action-Repression Spiral Theory

In the Spring of 1965 ETA adopted two strategic principles: i) the action-repression spiral theory, and ii) the organization of ETA into four fronts: a) Military, b) Activist, c) Information, and, d) Political Office. The action-repression-action spiral theory was an insurgency strategy which sought to compel the Spanish state to use force against the civilian population in its efforts to eradicate ETA and thereby involve them in the struggle for Basque independence. The spiral theory had two phases: an initial phase of popular mobilization against the state's violence, and a final phase of direct armed confrontation between the people and the state leading to the latter's annihilation.²⁶ The spiral theory

held that, where popular protest against injustices met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressors. The occupying forces would ...retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protests and support the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship.²⁷

The military defeat of the state was not ETA's direct intent. ETA sought both to "create chaos and destroy the legitimacy of the oppressor rather than physically drive the enemy troops out of Euskadi";²⁸ and to foster popular identification with ETA. ETA defined the "Basque revolutionary war" as "the political and military process leading to the goal of self-determination of the Basque people."²⁹ In practice the spiral theory worked as follows: i) ETA attacks the state, i.e. kills a policeman; ii) the state cracks down in País Vasco to find the perpetrators; iii) the police abuse the Basque people, i.e. summary arrest, beatings and torture; 4) the Basque people react by protesting; v) the police forcibly suppress the demonstrations; vi) the Basque public protests again; vii) ETA attacks again, and; viii) the spiral of action-reaction-action continues its upward march of politicization and mobilization to create an insurrectionary situation. Central to ETA's formulation were its three assumptions: i) it could sustain militarily the police counterblows; ii) Basques "would react with more defiance and rebellion than panic",³⁰ and; iii) the franquist state would strike out blindly at ETA and antagonize the entire Basque population.

ETA and the Working Class Struggle

Although consumed with its efforts to define a strategy for national liberation, in the strikes of 1961 and 1962 against the Spanish government's Stabilization Plan "ETA discovers the importance of the working class struggle to the degree it signifies an important challenge to the established regime."³¹ ETA's interest was not based on the actual struggle of the working class for decent wages, living conditions and security, but "the usefulness of the workers' conflict as an element of anti-regime radicalization."³² ETA would attempt "to connect the working class struggle with the nationalist struggle".³³ In a November 1963 article, ETA argued: "Our patriotic movement establishes our firm determination to fight on two fronts: that of the national liberation of Euskadi and that of the social liberation of Basques in the face of capitalist oppression."³⁴ However, since the clandestine labour movement did not "prioritize nationalist demands as a key objective of the working class ... [ETA] found itself faced with the enormous task of 'nationalizing' the workers' movement."³⁵

In the period from 1963 to 1966 an ever more sophisticated socialist analysis of the situation in Euskadi emerged within ETA under the guidance of the Workers' Front (*obreristas*). The *obreristas* observed that, "[if] the working class was the key force in society, ETA had to accept the fact that the core of it was either immigrant or culturally Spanish, and did not, for the most part, see ETA as relevant to its struggle."³⁶ The socialists concluded, "[a]s Euskadi was an industrial society, class struggle was more relevant than guerrilla war."³⁷ Since it was "impossible to overthrow the regime which oppressed the Basque people unless there was a revolution throughout Spain" immigrants had to be accepted as full members of Basque society.³⁸ They not only proposed to substitute mass mobilization for armed struggle, but supported a policy of bilingualism and cultural parity.

Socialism Versus Nationalism in ETA

ETA's socialists were opposed by the nationalist faction. Their quarrel rested on their respective interpretation of the character of the principal contradiction facing the Basque people. Since both believed Euskadi was a colony of Spain (and France), the argument centred on whether ETA should work to create an inclusive national front of patriotic Basques or a mass movement of revolutionary workers. For the nationalists, "to establish in a colonized people an antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie constitutes an absurdity. There is a principal contradiction represented by the metropole oppressor that constitutes in itself a group absolutely impermeable to the colonized."³⁹ For socialists, the principal contradiction is not that between colonized and colonizer but between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The former contradiction is based on the existence of the latter. They recognized that, "a

movement whose base was confined to the ethnically Basque part of Euskadi's population, and which looked on the 'Spanish' opposition to Franco as an enemy, condemned itself to a permanent minority position".⁴⁰ Efforts to synthesize socialism and nationalism failed.⁴¹ Members of tendencies which attempted to bridge the two concepts were obliged ultimately to choose between them.⁴²

In 1966, the socialist Workers' Front left ETA at its V Assembly, as a result of the nationalist *tercermundistas'* opposition to their attempts to generate a working class following. The nationalist *tercermundistas'* who took control of ETA committed it to a "strategy of guerrilla war and to an ideology of Marxism-Leninism."⁴³ Their practical objectives included "building a workers' party, constructing a National Front, and launching a guerrilla war."⁴⁴ ETA was divided into four fronts which engendered once again the difficulties that the pre-1966 ETA leadership encountered. ETA's Workers' Front immersed itself in the ever more prickly and activist environment of industrial conflict while the Military Front prepared itself for armed struggle as prescribed in the Fifth Assembly.

The Launch of the Action-Repression Spiral

In the first notable action which launched the action-repression spiral, on 7 June 1968, a leader of ETA, *Txabi* Etxebarrieta was stopped for a routine traffic matter. Fearing arrest for carrying a pistol, he shot dead a *Guardia Civil* officer. Later *Txabi* was in turn shot and killed at a *Guardia Civil* roadblock. It is alleged that he was dragged from his car and summarily executed. Popular reaction was overwhelming.⁴⁵ The celebration of masses in honour of *Txabi* throughout País Vasco by the Church, a bastion of Basque nationalism during the Franco years, was the initial act of protest.* Popular outrage transformed these masses "into anti-franquist and pro-ETA demonstrations"⁴⁶ which the police attacked. Weeks later the life sentence of his companion Sareketa was overturned by a military tribunal in favour of a death sentence.⁴⁷ Large demonstrations called to protest the sentence turned into popular *fora* of anti-franquist condemnation. In the two months following *Txabi's* death ETA appeared at the "centre of nationalist and revolutionary action."⁴⁸ As *per* ETA's spiral theory, every reaction provokes another action. On 2 August 1968, ETA struck back to unleash the spiral.⁴⁹ Irún's notorious chief of police, Melitón Manzanás, was shot dead on his doorstep.** A state of exception was declared in Guipúzcoa, and later extended to all of Spain, lasting from August 1968 to March 1969.

* Those *etarras* who embraced the third-world models of revolutionary insurrectionary war.

* The intervention of Basque clerics indicated a new willingness of the Basque Church to defy Franco openly. (Francisco Letamendia, *Historia de Euskadi: El nacionalismo vasco y ETA*, (France: Ruedo Ibérico, 1975), p.340.)

** The murder of Manzanás was "popular among large sections of the population." (John Sullivan, p.72.)

The state's reaction to Manzanas' killing was enormous and was "the catalyst of the most massive crackdown by the Spanish police on ETA that had yet been seen."⁵⁰ The arrests produced suspects in the Manzanas murder and almost destroyed ETA. The repression was "brutal and indiscriminate [leading to] the reestablishment of military tribunals, States of Exception, massive arrests, torture, long sentences, etc."⁵¹ Police arrested thousands of Basques⁵², and "[t]he repression is extended to social strata which had remained relatively immune to it."⁵³ By making the entire Basque population pay for ETA's attacks, the state helped ETA link the Basque population to its struggle.⁵⁴ ETA believed that,

The people must react. ...There is only one way to provoke this reaction; by making the full weight of Franco's repression fall on the people. It is necessary to awaken the totalitarian monster that for the time being is only uneasy; to jolt it sharply to force it to discharge all of its aggression on the people that still remain uninvolved.⁵⁵

The state's behaviour politicized many Basques who did not necessarily support ETA's violence nor were disposed to engage in overt nationalist agitation but who felt compelled to act in defence of ETA's prisoners and martyrs.⁵⁶ ETA also won new recruits.⁵⁷

The repression directed against ETA left it too weak to maintain the spiral. Many of the *milis* either fled into exile or were captured. With the *milis'* decline, in the Spring of 1969 the socialist Workers' Front took control of ETA.⁵⁸ The failure of the military offensive led the new leaders to reconsider the *milis'* programme of action. ETA's leadership "tried to reconcile Marxist doctrine with the heritage of Sabino Arana" in a doomed effort to transform ETA into a workers' party.⁵⁹ To appeal to the largely immigrant working class, the leadership identified the Basque proletariat as "he who works in Euskadi"⁶⁰, called for bilingualism in Euskadi, advocated the right of self-determination instead of independence, proposed a socialist revolution, and favoured creating "both a revolutionary party and a National Front".⁶¹ ETA's increasingly socialist analysis and programme, and its rejection of their key precepts caused ETA's nationalist *milis* in France to condemn the leadership in Spain. ETA's nationalists believed that the socialists' programme violated the elemental values of Aranist tradition. They complained that the *obreristas* were attempting to transform ETA from a "patriotic movement dedicated to national liberation, into a dogmatic communist party,"⁶² which would alienate not only Basque nationalists as a whole,⁶³ but outrage the simple patriotism of the average ETA member. The chauvinistic *milis* rejected absolutely all things Spanish, were vehemently anti-socialist and firm advocates of a united front of all patriotic Basques to prosecute better the fight for the Basque ethno-nation's independence.⁶⁴ Never "particularly fond of theoretical digressions", the *milis* considered "armed activity to be the driving force behind Basque resistance [sic]."⁶⁵

By the early autumn of 1970, ETA had split into three hostile groups, the *milis* in ETAv, the "españolista" ETAvi and the communist *Celulas Rojas* (see Appendix). The split was again caused

principally by the nationalist-patriotic/socialist-*españolista* division within ETA. A contributing factor was the leadership's lack of control over the nationalist *milis* led by Etxabe in France.⁶⁶ While ETAv accused the former leadership, now ETAvi, of *españolista* deviationism, socialism and rejecting nationalism⁶⁷, the *Celulas Rojas*, led by Escubi, accused them of being chauvinistic, nationalistic and bourgeois.⁶⁸ ETAvi had been too socialist for the nationalists and too nationalist for the communists. At this time there was talk of dissolving ETA, but franquism rescued the organization.⁶⁹

The Burgos Trial and Social Mobilization

On 3 December 1970, the public trial began in Burgos for sixteen members of ETA accused of murdering Melitón Manzanas. The trial was an essential point of inflection in ETA's trajectory as a key Basque political force. It undermined seriously the state's attempts to halt ETA violence and thwart the spread of radical nationalism. The regime hoped to convince the Basque public and the global media that the accused "were terrorists, rather than Basque patriots"⁷⁰; and to portray Spain as a "normal western country which was gradually liberalising and qualifying for eventual membership of the Common Market."⁷¹ Unfortunately for the state the prisoners and their lawyers used their statements of defence to argue that the Spanish state oppressed the Basque people. The military tribunal found fifteen of the accused *etarras* guilty of crimes against the state and absolved one. Nine were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences and six were sentenced to death.

The sentences sparked massive popular mobilizations in defence of the six condemned *etarras*: "Not only did ordinary Basques demonstrate and fight back against attacks by the police, but the struggle took spontaneous form involving people who had no connection with illegal organizations."⁷² The popular reaction defied franquist attempts to isolate ETA socially:

[t]he enormous public response to the trial, which included strikes, demonstrations and occupations of churches, showed that the accused were not simply isolated members of a terrorist band, ...[rather] ETA-VI's activists enjoyed the sympathy of large numbers of people who did not share all of their ideas.⁷³

The ideological convictions of ETA's activists were much less relevant than their ethnicity. The trial and popular protests created an insurrectionary situation in País Vasco.⁷⁴ This and fears that ETAv would kill a German Consul held hostage if the sentences were not commuted⁷⁵ likely convinced Franco to relent.

After Burgos, the situation never did return to normal and,

the action-repression-action spiral would spin always to ETA's benefit... successive states of exception succeeded in alienating from the regime ...an important part of

* To assert its claim to ETA's legacy, on 2 December 1970, comandos of the minority faction, ETAv, kidnapped the honorary West German consul to San Sebastián. ETAv threatened to kill him unless the military court commuted the six death sentences. (Sullivan, p.104).

Basque opinion and in generating a tense division between the forces of public order and the Basque population.⁷⁵

After Burgos "ETA will convert itself into the indisputable centre of the Basque struggle."⁷⁶ ETA and its prisoners "initiate an unstoppable ascent in popularity throughout Spain, which served to legitimize in many eyes its actions during the years that passed until Franco's death."⁷⁷ The mass mobilization campaign let ETA transcend its image as an armed band to symbolize an active Basque resistance to franquist oppression. As well, it showed that "the really important effect of ETA's actions was to provide heroes and martyrs to whom the people could rally."⁷⁸

The mass mobilizations so critical to ETA were successful not only because of their spontaneous component but also due to the PNV's efforts.⁷⁹ While "ETA's militants participated in it naturally, in vanguard positions and with great courage; ...as an organization, ETA shone by its absence."⁸⁰ The PNV had little to gain politically by supporting ETA's campaign against the sentences, but "in spite of its misgivings about giving support to an organization which had now become a serious rival, it really had no choice but to mobilise its members in support of ETA's prisoners."⁸¹ It was ironic that the PNV, which had inculcated the belief that devotion to the nationalist cause was a superior value transcending all other political and social values, became enmeshed in the logic of its own doctrine and was forced to commit acts of political self-immolation. ETA would use violence to "substitute the influence of the PNV for its own in nationalist circles."⁸²

ETA's *Milis* Take Control of ETA

Initially, as the dominant faction, ETAvi won public support as a consequence of its efforts to save ETA's prisoners. However, the repression ETAvi endured as a result of its activism in the Burgos Trial "made it impossible to maintain a continuous leadership in the interior and ...for the exiled leadership to keep in touch with the rank and file inside Spain."⁸³ ETAvi fell prey to Marxist temptation and gradually distanced itself from ETA's nationalist roots.⁸⁴ Clark argues that ETAvi's leaders either

overestimated the strength of the revolutionary sentiment within the working class... or they erred in their belief that Basque workers forced to choose between class and ethnicity would support a class-based struggle in preference to a national one.⁸⁵

Although ETAvi's prestige was considerable, its supremacy would be challenged successfully by the ultra-nationalist and chauvinistic *mili* faction of ETAv. ETAvi's abandonment of armed struggle for mass activity "prejudiced [its] attempts to recruit members, as young people found ETA-V's efforts to continue guerrilla activity much more romantic and exciting."⁸⁶ Its efforts to mesh the struggles of the working class in Euskadi and of the Spanish workers led it to depart from the radical nationalist fold. By late 1972

"ETA-VI had effectively destroyed itself as a major force in Basque politics,"⁸⁷ and merged with Luciano Rincón's Liga de Communistas Revolucionarios (LCR).

Under Etxabe's guidance ETAv took control of the radical nationalist movement. His "primitive nationalism proved, in the long run, more in tune with ETA's traditional social base than was ETA-VI's Marxism."⁸⁸ In defence of armed struggle, ETAv declared: "The end of the Basque revolutionary struggle in South Euskadi is the destruction of the Spanish state apparatus in the Basque national territory."⁸⁹ Etxabe saw himself as "a patriot fighting for the liberation of Euskadi from Spanish rule. Talk of class struggle smacked of treason to him, as it threatened to divide the Basque people."⁹⁰ ETAv's programme was rooted in the history of radical nationalist tradition with its chauvinistic elements intact:

- [i] the Basques' enemy was Spain, not capitalism in general,
- [ii] Euskera was the only genuine language of the Basque country,
- [iii] there was a need for a National Front of patriotic Basque of all social classes, and
- [iv] the violent action of an armed vanguard was a vital part of the national liberation struggle.⁹¹

ETAv's definition of Spain as the enemy rather than franquism was a key innovation.⁹² The growing support ETAv received from ETA's prisoners, the PNV's youth wing, and nationalist youth placed it well to launch another armed campaign at the end of 1971. After Burgos, "ETA had arrived at the definitive consolidation of a tendency which exalted the strategy of armed conflict to the point of converting it into an end itself rather than a means of attaining political objectives."⁹³ ETA's evolution after 1970 was determined by the "absolute priority of praxis and activism over theory and doctrine."⁹⁴ ETA's political goals seemed limited and its violence an independent end.⁹⁵ Jáuregui argues: "The anti-colonialist tendency has since served as nothing more than an instrument for providing minimum ideological support to the armed conflict and the actions of the activists of the organisation."⁹⁶ The *milis'* consistent pursuit of radical nationalism's doctrinal precepts and their internal agreement on the nature of the Spanish threat and the means of realizing its objectives allowed this tendency to persist long after the socialist tendency gave up nationalism for socialism and armed struggle for conventional parliamentary politics.

In ETAv there coexisted socialist rhetoric and pragmatic, nationalist, armed action. While ETAv "was at great pains to stress the socialist nature of its activities... it saw the workers' agitation as a mere adjunct to the military struggle."⁹⁷ Following the death of ETAv's leader *Txikia* in a shootout with the *Guardia Civil*, pressure rose in the organization to give priority to "political as well as military activities."⁹⁸ By September 1973, tensions arose within ETAv as the Workers, Political and Social Fronts, which wished to develop mass activity, "found themselves at the mercy of whatever action the Military Front might undertake."⁹⁹ They bore the brunt of the police actions directed at the *milis*. The *obrerista* labour organizers had trouble cultivating a following since police repression of ETA made participation in

an ETA-backed union highly risky.¹⁰⁰ For the *milis'* part, since their operations depended on extremely tight security, they were sure the *obreristas* put them at risk because their openness made infiltration by police easier. ETA was "faced with the perennial problem of the conflict between a highly secretive armed vanguard and those of an organisation trying to encourage mass activity."¹⁰¹ The *milis* were not opposed to political activities in principle, but they questioned the tactic of combining the two functions in the same organization. The question of who should control the *milis'* operations was not resolved. The *politicos* argued that military operations should realize their political aims. The *milis* argued that since they were at risk of sudden and violent death, they should control the armed campaign.¹⁰² Disagreement over ETA's goals - elitist armed struggle versus mass activity - would cause its split in 1974.

Through the period spanning 1970 and 1975, ETA maintained its programme of armed violence and popular mobilization. With its level of activity ETA dominated the nationalist movement, but failed to sustain an ascending spiral of violence sufficient to provoke the active, armed participation of the Basque people. Popular reaction to the repression meted out by the security forces "heightened Basque nationalist consciousness... establishing in this way a mutual and reinforcing relationship between ETA and the masses."¹⁰³ Franco's regime was "the soundest collaborator of ETA's strategy... making valid and real all ETA's precepts."¹⁰⁴ Effectively,

the historical error of the franquist regime - an error for its own interests and an error for the national interest - was to treat the problem of ETA only as a problem of public order and not to anticipate the mutations that the repressive action would cause in Basque society.¹⁰⁵

While most Basques disapproved of ETA's violence it was seen as a natural reaction to the repressive franquist regime and caused some satisfaction among Basques who defended ETA's activists' not as terrorists, Marxists, Maoists or murderers, but as patriotic idealist Basque fighters. ETA coopted the PNV to support its campaigns, which lent credence to ETA's independentist platform. A strong link of identification was created between ETA and the Basque people and mobilized them to identify with nationalism's most extreme branch.

Assassination of Prime Minister Admiral Carrero Blanco

If Burgos was the single most important political event in ETA's history, then the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, Spain's Prime Minister and Franco's anointed political heir was its most important military operation. On 20 December 1973, an ETA *comando* operating in Madrid detonated an explosive charge under Carrero Blanco's car which

blew the prime minister's heavy Dodge car over a five-storey building [and] removed the man who was both principal author and executor of Franco's succession plan and

brought to power a new team which - however nervously - allowed Spaniards to consider alternatives to franquismo after Franco.¹⁰⁶

ETA broke through "the mediated isolation in which Basque nationalism had enclosed itself and eclipsed somewhat the action of the PNV".¹⁰⁷ The PNV was appalled by the bombing. While the regime's opponents were shocked, their indignation was tempered by hopes that thirty-four years of franquismo would end. ETA had "resolved... the main problem of the opposition: the problem of 'franquismo after Franco'".¹⁰⁸ The assassination occurred in a climate of tension between ETA's Workers' and Military Fronts.¹⁰⁹ Since ETA "could not find a way to combine military actions with mass activity",¹¹⁰ both the Workers' and Cultural Fronts left ETA (see Appendix).

ETA in Post-Carrero Spain

When Arias, who replaced Carrero as Prime Minister, announced a series of mild reforms in February 1974, most opposition groups received the news warmly and prepared to exploit the expected climate of political tolerance.¹¹¹ ETA's response was distinct. ETA saw "the vacillating policy of the Arias government as a sign of weakness... which increased the scope for armed struggle."¹¹² It hoped to "destabilize the declining franquist state, provoking with its actions internal tensions, serious contradictions between diverse dominant groups in power, and in this way discover the most revolutionary exit possible from franquismo."¹¹³ Therein, ETA followed up Carrero's assassination with

a campaign of violence which was more intensive than anything which it had achieved in the past. In doing so, it was to draw further away from most of the opposition, which put its hopes in a peaceful dismantling of the dictatorship and a gradual transition to parliamentary democracy.¹¹⁴

In 1974 ETA killed 19 and wounded over 70 people. Having used relatively discriminatory methods to combat ETA after 1970, the FSE reverted to indiscriminate means which "produced increased repression, arrests, States of Emergency, and more brutality by police and *incontrolados*."^{115*} While the police killed, captured or forced into exile many of ETA's *comandos* and weakened the organization, the repression hardened the leadership and led it to consider any member of the security forces as a legitimate target.¹¹⁶ In April 1974 ETA shot dead a *Guardia Civil* corporal. In its first indiscriminate attack, on 13 September, twelve people died and over forty were wounded when ETA detonated a bomb in a crowded café filled with lunching police officers and civilians near the headquarters of the National Police in Madrid. The bombing was condemned universally; yet "[despite] all the evidence pointing to ETA, they denied responsibility, perhaps having realised the serious mistake they had made."¹¹⁷ It appears that the ETA faction which produced ETAp was responsible for the bombing.¹¹⁸

* *Incontrolados* were extreme right wing terrorists, linked to the right, the FSE and FAS, who were responsible for attacks on leftists, Basques and Basque exiles in France.

ETA's Splits to Produce ETAp and ETAm

The Café Rolando bombing likely determined the timing of ETA's split into ETAp and ETAm. At the time of the excision, ETAp had a few hundred militants and was the dominant tendency. ETAp's political-military ideology was inspired by *Pertur*, former leader of ETA's Political Office, and captured in his work *Otxagabia*. *Pertur* recognized that "powerful forces within the Spanish ruling class were eager to dismantle the structures and institutions of the Franco regime"¹¹⁹ and argued that ETA should prepare for the democratic transition by creating its political party. He believed in socialist revolution and a "peculiar version of Marxism-Leninism"¹²⁰ and proposed the creation of two dependent organizations, a political party competent to transform ETA's prestige into votes, and an armed wing to "support the mass movement and to act when popular action failed to achieve its objectives."¹²¹ ETAp proposed "the creation of a front of the Basque left with the following programme: independence and national reunification, Euskerization, implantation of socialism and proletarian internationalism... to realize the objectives of the Basque revolution."¹²² For *Pertur*, "the separation of the armed struggle and the political struggle was essential. ...[I]t is the political organization which must assume the directive rôle over the Basque revolution."¹²³ ETAp wished to convert itself into the armed wing of the working class. During the phase of bourgeois democracy, the mass struggle would have priority over the armed struggle, which constituted a "dissuasive force which would guarantee the popular conquests and to serve a supporting role and oversee the mass struggle."¹²⁴ ETAp would separate into two organizations: Euskal Iraultzale Alderdi (EIA - Basque Revolutionary Party), which would guide the political struggle; and, ETAp which would lead the armed struggle. According to the manifesto of the Sixth Assembly of ETAp which validated *Pertur's* model, EIA would be "[a] political party without organic links with the armed organization, but with identical objectives."¹²⁵ EIA would be a Marxist *abertzale* political formation charged with representing the *abertzale* left vision of an independent, unified, *euskaldun*^{*}, socialist Euskadi and to translate the radicalized nationalist consciousness generated by ETAp's armed actions into parliamentary support for it. The armed organization, ETAp, divided its militants into two organizations. The *Bereziak* were to undertake difficult armed actions both within Euskadi and beyond. The remaining *liberados*, operating solely in Euskadi, were charged with lower profile armed actions. The rôle of the armed organization was not only to secure popular conquests, but to win concrete political victories in a "war of attrition - based on the impossibility of succeeding in defeating the enemy militarily and with the objective of forcing a political negotiation whose terms would be determined by the correlation of forces."¹²⁶

* This is distinct from ETAm's theory whereby it is the armed organization directs the Basque revolution and the political party. (Luciano Rincón, *ETA (1974-1984)*, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1985), p.50.)

* * Basque-speaking.

ETAm would eventually emerge as ETA's, though with thirty members, mostly *liberados* based in southern France, it was much smaller than ETAp. ETAm was well organized, had strong social support and confined itself to armed struggle.¹²⁷ ETAm refused to participate in "democratic legality" to avoid having to compromise on its goals and avoid ETA's perennial problem: the difficulty of combining armed and mass struggle.¹²⁸ The *milis* viewed armed activities as "in and of themselves political"¹²⁹ and necessary to win independence for Euskadi. In Francisco Letamendía's (Ortzi) view, "the armed organization converted itself into the last redoubt of revolutionary strategy."¹³⁰ ETAm's strategy was a product of the *milis'* almost "blind faith that armed violence is the only way of attaining the objective sought after."¹³¹ The *milis'* declared in 1974 that, [Violence] is necessary to realize two functions:

- to eliminate the limitations of bourgeois democracy...
- to guarantee the realization of the final objective... "the Constitution of a Basque socialist state".¹³²

The *milis* believed mass activity "should be carried out by bodies which were organisationally separate from those involved in the military struggle."¹³³

At the heart of ETAm's ideology was the belief that Franco's death, and the transition to democracy had changed nothing in Euskadi,

The theoreticians of ETAm, giving the term theoretician a very broad and summarily generous sense, do not perceive the possibility that a true opening can take place if franquism is overthrown peacefully. ...The thesis is that there is no possible continuum which ends in democracy. Therefore, there is no democracy. ...ETAm will become prisoner to its own theory. Since theoretically franquism could not evolve, it did not evolve. Since dictatorships either fall or survive, but do not evolve, since it had not fallen, it survived.¹³⁴

ETAm held that franquists ruled Euskadi behind a democratizing facade. It searched for the means to force the *ruptura democrática* it deemed necessary to achieve broad self-government for Euskadi.¹³⁵ Believing "armed activity must accelerate the systemic crisis",¹³⁶ ETAm escalated its armed actions to achieve the universal destabilization of the regime. It stated in its programmatic declaration, which serves as its *magna carta*, "we cannot gamble on democracy... because it would mean liquidating the sole element truly unassimiliable by the bourgeoisie, the sole guarantee of achieving our final objectives: the armed struggle."¹³⁷ ETAm's essential goal was to develop an armed policy to make its violence effective following the stagnation of the spiral. It settled on a strategy of negotiation as a means to realize its goal of independence for an *euskaldun*, socialist Basque state. ETAm hoped that by killing high-ranking military officers, *Guardia Civil* troopers and policemen in an ascending spiral of violence it could make the government's rule so untenable that, threatened by an involuntarist-minded army, it would negotiate the terms enshrined in its programme *la Alternativa KAS*. With its strategy of negotiations, ETAm hoped to validate itself as the "true, legitimate voice of the Basque people". Therein,

almost even more important than the content of the negotiation is the *very fact* of the negotiation. If ETA were to manage to sit down with the State at a negotiating table (even if for five minutes) it would have obtained something decisive for the future: the *recognition* of being a representative political force. And, at the same time, the recognition that its violence is *political*, and, for that, legitimate.¹³⁸

After ETAv's split, much energy was expended attempting to coordinate the political activities of the disparate *abertzale* political forces. In spite of their programmatic differences ETAm and ETApM agreed to create an *abertzale* political organization to represent their respective visions of an independent and socialist Euskadi. In August 1976, EHAS (later HASI), ETAm's political wing; LAIA, ETApM's political wing; LAB, ETApM's labour union; LAK and ETApM, with ETAm's support, created the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS) as a forum for debating the *abertzale* left's agenda and generating coherent policies to develop them (see Appendix). Participants in KAS articulated a political programme, *la Alternativa KAS*, whose terms were:

1. Amnesty understood tactically as the liberation of all Basque political prisoners;
2. Democratic liberties: legalization of all independentist political parties, without necessarily moderating their statutes;
3. Expulsion from Euskadi of the [*Guardia Civil, Policia Armada and Cuerpo General de la Policia*];
4. Improvement of the living and working conditions of the popular classes and especially for the working class;
5. An autonomy statute enacted in South Euskadi's four historic regions which fulfils minimally the following requirements:
 - recognition of Euskadi's national sovereignty, the right to self-determination including the right to create an independent state;
 - the forces of citizen defence substitute for current forces, to be created by the Basque Government and responsible only to it;
 - the armed forces barracked in Euskadi be placed under the control of the Basque Government;
 - the Basque people be granted powers sufficient to create... the economic structures it considers socially and politically most appropriate for its progress and well-being;
 - Euskera be made the official and dominant language of Euskadi.¹³⁹

In time KAS became increasingly identified with ETAm as ETApM and the organizations within its orbit withdrew from KAS in 1977.¹⁴⁰ With the departure of ETApM, LAIA and LAB, KAS was not so much "a table of debate and tactical accords - or even strategies - ...but more of an amalgam of programmatic principles whose immodifiability has been and is overseen and assured by a military organization."¹⁴¹

Attempting to exert control over the radical nationalist movement both ETAm and ETApM launched ambitious armed campaigns shortly after ETAv's break. The *polimilis* believed military actions would overcome political inertia when political means proved inadequate. The *milis* held that escalating military actions would force the state to accept direct negotiations. Both strategies

are directed at the same goal whether by paths along which violence predominates and the political organization serves solely to justify and protect the armed organization [as

per] ETA-militar, or whether in the belief that armed actions and political actions can simultaneously... produce reinforcing phenomena and calculated popular responses, as in the theory - not always related to reality - of the *polimilis*.¹⁴²

The level of ETA violence was defined both by the fight against Spanish oppression, and the struggle for dominance within the Basque political milieu vis-à-vis the PNV and competing ETA offshoots.

Violence in ETA's Evolution

There are two main schools of thought concerning ETA's decision to launch its armed struggle. One, that ETA's violence was a response to a lack of political liberties in País Vasco and to serious police repression. Two, that serious police repression in País Vasco was the state's response to ETA's violence. Following ETA's failed attempt to derail a train in 1961, ETA claimed "it is the path of violence which we must follow from now on. This is the path followed by all the world's people."¹⁴³ Prior to ETA's formation the armed presence of the franquist security forces itself had not been a sufficient cause for organized violence. Aranzadi denies ETA's resort to violence was a response to "an *especially intense* repression" under Franco and takes issue with Jáuregui's contention to that effect.¹⁴⁴ Rather, "before ETA's appearance ...Francoist repression was probably less harsh and brutal [in País Vasco] ...than in places like Granada and Badajoz, for example."¹⁴⁵ He argues ETA's violence was a symbolic act which manifested its fear of the

symbolic death ...of an idea rooted in sabiano ideology which arose in their minds, the death of Euskadi, of an ideal Basque people which only existed in the books they read and of whom there exists no vestige in their daily reality - the fault of Franco to be sure, but *not only* because of Francoism, as could be shown... with a simple chronological chart of the retreat of Euskera.¹⁴⁶

In September 1964, an article appeared in *Zutik* stating that "Anti-franquism fights against Franco as if there were no Spanish oppression in Euskadi. We fight against Spanish oppression in Euskadi as if there was no Franco."¹⁴⁷ Like Jáuregui, Aranzadi argues that ETA "first opts for violence and only afterwards justifies this option by some means and rationalizes its practice more in terms of theory than practice."¹⁴⁸ From its inception ETA maintained an armed wing. ETA "accepted as given the validity of such a method without the need to analyze it; and that which was really studied was the means to put it in practice."¹⁴⁹ Although ETA had committed itself ideologically to violence long before it had launched its first attack and had suffered its first serious repression, the failure of the effort caused it to develop an

* Carr and Fusi argue that "[p]olice repression was no more brutal in the Basque country than in Asturias or Madrid. ETA was not a product of repression; rather, repression came as a result of the activities of ETA." (Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpuria, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), p.159) This is not to imply that the Basque nationalists were not subject to serious repression, but that until ETA launched its first major action in 1968, this repression, in its more extreme forms, was not unlike that experienced by all Spaniards. Franquism's abhorrence of socialism was greater than its revulsion toward nationalism. Basque nationalists were generally at least conservative, Catholic and capitalist.

ideological basis for its violence and a political strategy to make it more effective. It was as a consequence of its violence that the police became aware of ETA and escalated their repression in País Vasco. ETA's armed actions transformed the relationship between ETA and the Spanish security forces: "ETA's violence is not essentially a response to franquist violence... more than a *cause*, franquismo is [its] *necessary condition*."¹⁵⁰ ETA's violence was independent of the state's violence; it needed the state's violent reaction to affirm its argument that Spanish rule in País Vasco was illegitimate because it governed by armed force alone. Viewed in these terms, "*ETA violence sprouts and develops as an authentic ritual of self-affirmation in the abertzale community*."¹⁵¹ As long as the dictatorship appeared to exist, as the sole nationalist organization capable of tackling the franquist state frontally, ETA's existence was necessary. Violence "came to be seen as the only valid form of response to Franco's dictatorship."¹⁵²

Nationalism and Socialism in ETA's Evolution

ETA's organizational problems were rooted in the profound differences which emerged with respect to ideology and nationalism. These differences centred on whether it should pursue a nationalist programme based on armed action or a socialist programme with an armed component and reliance on mass mobilization. Rincón views ETA's essential political problem in this way:

ETA's traditional problem as a populist and non-worker movement with strong... sabiano components remained the difficult attempt to homogenize elements as disparate as Aranismo and Marxism, which are fundamentally contradictory, and a social revolution with an armed component which rejected the workers.¹⁵³

Organizationally, the Front structure led to specialized interests. ETA was incapable of resolving internal ideological differences without causing profound splits in the organization. In Jáuregui's analysis

throughout its history one of ETA's constants is its eternal fear of dealing with the spinier problems at its core and in which are [rooted the] different philosophies within it. When any type of question emerges about which...there are antagonistic conceptions, it opts to ignore them, to cover them up, to put its head in the sand, and to resort to activism and the practical struggle as a safety valve. But this resolves nothing, since sooner or later, the antagonisms and the conflicts reappear with a greater intensity in a tenser environment which impedes in any case a positive solution, thereby leading to a rupture and splits.¹⁵⁴

Therein "ETA's historic nucleus walks the warpath of nationalism, a nationalism shared with other theoretical options which are abandoned each time they enter into conflict with [it]."¹⁵⁵ Relatedly, as in the case of ETAv's split into ETAm and ETAp, questions arose regarding the end for which violence was employed and, who should control the armed *comandos*, the tempo of armed activity and the choice of targets. Nevertheless,

A minimum definition of ETA with pretensions to be valid for all the distinct ETAs that have existed from 1959 until today would have to limit itself to its two unique

characteristic features: the independence of Euskadi as a final objective and its resort to violent activism.¹⁵⁶

Even its splinters never forsook independence *per se*; they merely challenged the organizational means of its realization. ETA demonstrated an exceptional capacity for action which would permit it to overcome its successive internal divisions and the harshest repression of the police.¹⁵⁷

Conclusions

ETA's distinguishing political attribute has been its armed violence which catapulted it from the fringes of the nationalist movement to its status as the essential nationalist political formation in the period from 1968 to 1980.¹⁵⁸ By means of its violence, ETA transcended its status as an armed band to symbolize Basque opposition to franquism. With its activism ETA sought to animate the Basque people and involve them in their culture's regeneration and the struggle for independence. ETA's incessant political and military action caused "the mobilisation and reactivation of Basque nationalist sentiment."¹⁵⁹ Therein ETA's political emergence can also be attributed to its ability to cause the Basque people to identify, if not with its cause, then with its militants, as patriotic, idealist Basque youth. Visceral identification with ETA permitted it to survive serious police repressions. Mass popular mobilizations in its defence transformed crushing military defeats into political victories. As much as it adapted to exigent political circumstances, ETA created the political circumstances necessary to its own perpetuation. ETA managed to determine the tone and content of political debate on the Basque problem first by means of its violent actions and second by means of its political mouthpieces whose credibility rested in varying degrees on the existence of the armed *comandos*. ETA was uniquely positioned to generate for itself the political and social support necessary to its organizational survival.

The Spanish state showed an adaptive failure to perceive the effects of its repressive violence on ETA's political growth. The comprehensive policy failures which attended its strategy did not cause substantial policy changes. The regime's resort to indiscriminate repression - including mass arrests, torture and violent intimidation - prejudiced its efforts to destroy ETA and control the growth of the radical nationalist movement. The techniques it needed to employ to crush ETA demanded a degree of sophistication which the franquist regime, arrogant in its seat of power, was not likely to acquire.

Through the franquist phase, ETA's political and military strategies enjoyed the success they acquired by anticipating correctly the character of the political dynamic its programme of violence would create. The limitations on its actual capacity to achieve the political conditions its strategy predicted emerged from its failure to foresee the subjective character of Basque resistance to franquism. This

ameliorated its military effect. However, the political component of its programme enjoyed great success in creating a radical *abertzale* nationalist constituency. ETA's attacks on the franquist state cultivated a strong popular sense of identification with ETA, not simply as an armed organization, but as the caretaker of a new Basque nationalist ideal. Basques were much less interested - if not singularly disinterested - in ETA's ideological contortions, than in ETA's nationalist vision. ETA's position was given greater sway since it was a vision for which its militants were not only willing to kill, but for which they were willing to risk being killed. The concept of sacrifice, which resonated powerfully within ETA, had reverberations in the Basque population and informed its perception of ETA and its goals. Reliance on franquist public order policies in the transition to democracy ensured not only that ETA would retain its influence but that radical nationalist political organizations would create *foci* of political power beyond the orbit of conventional political organizations. These organizations would not be easily integrated into the emergent institutions of democratic politics and would secure a political base for ETA in democratic Spain. This state of affairs would have serious implications for the Spanish state as will be shown in the following chapter.

Notes

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3. Garmendía, p. 19.
4. Sullivan, p. 31.
5. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 461.
6. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 460.
7. Jáuregui, Ideología, pp. 189-90.
8. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 198.
9. Gurutz Jáuregui, "National identity and political violence in the Basque country," European Journal of Political Research, 14 (1986), 593.
10. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 101.
11. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 135
12. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 135.
13. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 92.
14. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 141.
15. Luciano Rincón, ETA (1974-1984) (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1985), p. 33.
16. Jáuregui, "National," pp. 595-596.
17. Jáuregui, "National," p. 217.
18. Jáuregui, "National," pp. 595-596.
19. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 226.
20. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 228.
21. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 223.
22. Fernando Reinares, "The Dynamics of Terrorism During the Transition to Democracy in Spain," in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 121.
23. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 235.
24. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 235.
25. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 234.
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29. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 247.
30. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 247.
31. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 170.
32. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 170.
33. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 171.
34. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 175.
35. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 77.
36. Sullivan, p. 48.
37. Sullivan, p. 48.
38. Sullivan, p. 48.
39. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 427.
40. Sullivan, p. 38.
41. Sullivan, p. 79.
42. Sullivan, p. 272.
43. Sullivan, p. 55.
44. Sullivan, p. 69.
45. Letamendía, Historia, p. 385.
46. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 247.
47. Sullivan, pp. 70-71 and Clark, Insurgents, p. 48.
48. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 457.
49. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 69.
50. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 50 and Letamendía, Historia, p. 341.
51. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 75.
52. Clark, Insurgents, p. 49.
53. Letamendía, Historia, p. 343.
54. Txiki Benegas, Euskadi: sin la paz nada es posible (Bilbao: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1981), p. 34.
55. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 69.
56. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 75.
57. Sullivan, p. 101.
58. Letamendía, Historia, p. 256.
59. Sullivan, p. 75 and Letamendía, Historia, p. 356.
60. Letamendía, Historia, p. 358.
61. Sullivan, pp. 82 and 78.
62. Sullivan, p. 49.
63. Sullivan, p. 39.
64. Jáuregui, "National," p. 597.
65. Jáuregui, "National," p. 602.

66. Letamendía, Historia, p. 337.
67. Letamendía, Historia, p. 362.
68. Letamendía, Historia, p. 361.
69. Jáuregui, "National," p. 598.
70. Sullivan, p. 93.
71. Sullivan, p. 93.
72. Sullivan, p. 102.
73. Sullivan, p. 92.
74. Sullivan, p. 108.
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79. Letamendía, Historia, p. 373.
80. Letamendía, Historia, p. 373.
81. Sullivan, p. 102.
82. Garmendía, p. 19.
83. Sullivan, p. 113.
84. Sullivan, pp. 114 and 116.
85. Clark, Insurgents, p. 88.
86. Sullivan, p. 120.
87. Clark, Insurgents, p. 59.
88. Sullivan, p. 129.
89. Letamendía, Historia, p. 381.
90. Sullivan, p. 128.
91. Sullivan, p. 130.
92. Sullivan, p. 132.
93. Jáuregui, "National," p. 598.
94. Jáuregui, "National," p. 602.
95. Reinares, "The Dynamics," p. 127.
96. Jáuregui, "National," p. 598.
97. Sullivan, p. 137.
98. Sullivan, p. 140.
99. Sullivan, p. 141.
100. Francisco Letamendía (Ortzi), Breve historia de Euskadi: De la prehistoria a nuestros días (Barcelona: Ruedo Ibérico, 1980), p.327 and Sullivan, p. 162.
101. Sullivan, p. 154.

102. Sullivan, pp. 155-156.
103. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 458.
104. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 247.
105. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 225.
106. "How the Murder Your Prime Minister", The Economist, 29 June 1974, p.
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108. Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 160.
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110. Sullivan, p. 149.
111. Sullivan, pp. 151-152.
112. Sullivan, p. 152.
113. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 93.
114. Sullivan, p. 144.
115. Sullivan, p. 154.
116. Sullivan, p. 138.
117. Leinares, "The Dynamics," p. 124.
118. Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 174
119. Sullivan, ETA, p. 154.
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121. Sullivan, p. 191.
122. Francisco Letamendia, in Rincón, ETA, p. 27.
123. Rincón, ETA, p. 45 and Letamendia, Breve, p. 351.
124. Letamendia, Breve, p. 351.
125. Rincón, ETA, p. 50.
126. Letamendia, Breve, p. 329.
127. Rincón, ETA, p. 157 and Sullivan, p. 156.
128. Letamendia, Historia, p. 415 and Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 471.
129. Rincón, ETA, p. 28.
130. Letamendia, Historia, p. 353 and Ibarra, La evolución, p. 108.
131. Jáuregui, "National," p. 601.
132. ETAm, in Ibarra, La evolución, p. 107.
133. Sullivan, p. 156.
134. Rincón, ETA, p. 57.
135. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 109.
136. Letamendia, Historia, pp. 412-413.
137. ETAm, In Ibarra, La evolución, p. 105.

138. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 103.
139. Ibarra, La evolución, pp. 99-100.
140. Ibarra, La evolución, pp. 111-112.
141. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 113.
142. Rincón, ETA, p. 138.
143. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 138.
144. Juan Aranzadi, "Sangre simbólica: Raíces semióticas de la violencia etarra," in Ideas y debate: para la democracia, Tomo II (Madrid: Cambio 16, 1985), p. 231.
145. Aranzadi, p. 232.
146. Aranzadi, p. 232.
147. Alejandro Muñoz Alonso, "Golpismo y terrorismo en la transición democrática española," Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas, No. 36 (1986), p. 30.
148. Aranzadi, p. 234.
149. Jáuregui, Ideología, p. 137.
150. Aranzadi, p. 234.
151. Aranzadi, p. 235.
152. Jáuregui, "National," p. 600.
153. Rincón, ETA, p. 27.
154. Jáuregui, Ideología, pp. 258-259.
155. Rincón, ETA, p. 12.
156. Aranzadi, p. 227.
157. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 211.
158. Sullivan, p. 56.
159. Carr and Fusi, p. 159

Chapter Four: The Spanish Transition, 1974-1977

The Spanish transition to democracy was notable for its relatively peaceful transformation of a dictatorship into a democratic state. The period lasting from November, 1973 when Carrero Blanco was murdered to December, 1978 when the Constitution was approved in a national referendum was a remarkable time in Spanish political history. Spaniards transformed their political system without the bloodshed which had characterized previous experiences. The process was fraught with political dangers and its success far from certain. In this chapter the dynamics of the transition between 1974 and mid-1977 will be set out with a focus on the Basque question. First the political character of the late franquist regime will be described and the motivations for reform will be outlined. Second, the contending actors, their programmes and their effect on the transition will be studied. Third, the first phase of the transition under Arias will be analyzed and the political dynamics his programme prompted will be assessed. Fourth, Suárez's programme for reform and his successes in democratizing the regime will be spelled out. Fifth, the question of the "Basque problem" will be assessed and its effect on reform analyzed. Sixth, the interplay of these various political forces leading to the 1977 elections will be analyzed. The goal of this chapter is to assess the political forces and the political dynamic which emerged during this critical period in Spanish history to understand the persistence of the "Basque problem" in the transition.

Reformism and Immobilism in Late-Franquist Spain

For nearly forty years Franco ruled Spain with the support of the Church, the military and a broad spectrum of social, political and economic forces. The political vehicle Franco used to generate political and social support for his regime, the *Movimiento Nacional* (MN) was not a unified amalgam of coherent social, economic and political forces, but a coalition of jealous political and social forces bound by self-interest and loyalty to Francisco Franco, El Caudillo de España. As the *sine qua non* of Spanish political life, he played an adjudicating rôle in the internecine political struggles among the various political forces represented in his coalition. In 1969, Franco had named Prince Juan Carlos to be his heir as head of state and arch-conservative and immobilist Admiral Carrero Blanco to serve as Prime Minister and to head the MN. Franco placed enormous faith in Carrero and his ability to control the various *familias* of the *Movimiento* which proposed markedly different solutions for overcoming the social, economic and political problems facing Spain. Although during his tenure Carrero held in check the

centrifugal tendencies within the MN, his conservative policies were opposed by important franquist political figures who believed them detrimental to franquism's political future.

ETA's assassination of Carrero on 23 December 1973 eliminated the man most capable of preserving the franquist system and precipitated an inevitable and barely concealed successionist struggle within the MN. With Franco's health declining and Carrero dead there was no one to control the Movimiento and its factions, termed *familias*. Pressure for reform mounted within the regime and in Spanish society both among the disorganized opposition and in certain sectors of the Spanish business and social elite. In the late 1960s, it was apparent to politically astute franquists that the regime's institutions were inadequate to resolve the conflicts of Spain's industrial society.¹ Rapid economic growth and prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s appeared to reinforce the social peace which was central to Franco's rule. However, "the growing rewards of a consumer society were proving to be insufficient compensation for the dictatorship's political constraints."² The factors which explain the motivations for reform were: i) working class agitation for a "credible response" to its demands; ii) student dissent which was symptomatic of the middle class' growing impatience with the lack of liberties under franquism; iii) the revival of strong regional opposition to the regime, especially in País Vasco, and, iv) the Church's growing "acceptance of a pluralistic model of politics".³ While these factors described the environment of the transition and shaped its course, its motor resided in the heart of Franco's ruling coalition.⁴ The MN's *familias* gravitated to one of its two primary ideological poles defined by *aperturismo* and *inmovilismo*, which fought for control of it and the state. The *aperturistas* believed the regime's political base needed to expand, which required increasing participation in decision-making and opening up the resources of power to a greater number of people. The process of liberalization and reform would generate popular support for the regime and revitalize it.⁵ However, the reformers were far from a cohesive political force.

Although few in the MN refused to acknowledge the inevitability of a certain liberalization, those few held powerful posts both in its apparatus and in the franquist state. Their objective was to retain power after Franco's death.⁶ The Bunker,^{*} which enjoyed Franco's confidence,⁷ was supported by elderly, hard-line franquists, arch-conservatives and the leaderships of the military and security forces. The Bunker equated liberalization with the social, political, economic and moral anarchy of the 1920s and 1930s Republican governments and aspired to reverse the pallid reforms already undertaken. It believed that a return to the elements of authoritarian franquism was necessary to maintain the franquist system, the sacred unity of Spain and to preserve the forty years of "peace" that franquism claimed to have delivered Spain. In the Bunker resided an alternate government which had the institutional means, if not

* Popular name for the *inmovilista* faction.

the moral prerogative, to cause its rule to be respected. It was a concrete threat to Spain's post-Franco governments and constituted a serious brake on policy-making.

Arias Navarro and the Reform Process

Franco's decision to name Arias Navarro Prime Minister resolved the question of Carrero's replacement but failed to bring to an end successionist political intrigue. A Franco loyalist, Arias was charged with resolving the crisis of the regime prompted by expectations of Franco's death. Seeking to buttress the regime's legitimacy, on 12 February 1974, he announced a series of mild political reforms which threatened to revitalize Spanish political life.⁸ The reforms, dubbed "El espíritu del 12 de Febrero", envisioned a limited liberalization of the Spanish polity in which political associations could be formed under the aegis of the MN and the press was permitted to exercise a degree of freedom it had not known for years. Arias' reforms were initially welcomed by reformers, but enthusiasm waned as with every reformist step forward, he took one immobilist step backward to placate the Bunker. They lost faith in his ability to solve the regime's crisis of legitimacy.⁹ Arias was "unable to present a reform that could appeal to either the bunker or regime reformists, and the result was a failed reform that exacerbated the crisis of franquism."¹⁰ Residual intra-regime cohesiveness was eroded by "the inability of any *familia* to gain political hegemony, and the regime's increasing difficulty in maintaining a balance among them."¹¹ Arias appeared to be more preoccupied with holding on to power than a man with a vision of Spain's future. His reform project was complicated by five factors: i) fears generated by the Portuguese revolution of April 1974; ii) ETA, left-wing and right-wing terrorism; iii) labour discontent; iv) student unrest; and, v) Arias' own lack of confidence in reform.¹² On the eve of Franco's death franquism was in its death throes and "the government was floundering in a vain attempt to contain within the political system severe conflicts, knowing that if it failed it was doomed; yet, paralyzed by fears of the bunker, it was unable to move."¹³

Basque Politics in Late-Franquist Spain

In País Vasco, the PNV, the PSOE and the PCE readied themselves for a democratic opening and launched important mass mobilizations to question Arias' waning legitimacy as much as that of the liberalization process itself. In early 1975, it appeared that "[t]he violence of the police state had given way to the violence of anarchy."¹⁴ Student unrest and labour strikes backing demands for greater political liberties were common. ETA violence was causing serious political instability and was creating the impression Arias was losing control. Arias reacted to ETA's provocations initially with aplomb to undermine its popular support.¹⁵ The Bunker pressured Arias to crush ETA and the increasingly brazen Basque opposition. To avoid being replaced he realized he would have to destroy ETA.¹⁶ In April 1975,

after a serious wave of ETA violence in which two policemen were killed, Arias declared martial law in País Vasco and "unleashed a repression whose violence exceeded anything seen so far in the Basque region."¹⁷ However, "the sharpening repression of the governing apparatus, the growing self-confidence of ETA and the benevolent indifference of the majority of the democratic opposition prompted an increase in violent activities".¹⁸ In August, Arias announced anti-terrorist measures inspired by the Bunker, which gave police broad powers to act against suspected terrorists. This legislation was used in September 1975 to execute five convicted terrorists, two of them *etarras*. Hundreds of thousands of Basques, Spaniards and other Europeans protested the state's decision. The day after the executions the police heightened popular anger by wounding six demonstrators in Algorta.¹⁹ Madrid's "refusal to modify the laws of assembly and demonstration in a time of intense mass mobilisation"²⁰ created conditions favourable to violent confrontations and ETA's recruitment of new militants. On 1 October, as over 100,000 people gathered in Madrid to give their "vivas" to Franco, ETAm killed three policemen and wounded another seriously. Four days later ETAm killed three *Guardia Civil* and seriously wounded two others near Aranzazu. The next day *incontrolados* killed the brother of ex-ETA leader Etxabe in Mondragón.

ETA in Late-Franquist Spain

ETAm's attacks represented a clear challenge to the state and undermined the reformers in the Arias government. The situation in País Vasco seemed to lend credence the right's position that liberalization encouraged terrorism and that democracy would bring chaos to Spain. The regime's methods for imposing public order augmented its declining popular legitimacy and generated new grievances; "[m]ost people in the Basque country saw the violence of both branches of ETA as much less of a threat than the behaviour of the security forces".²¹ In the last two years of the franquist regime, while ETA killed 35 people and wounded 63 others, the security forces killed 22 people and wounded over 105.²² The victims of the police "were sometimes sympathisers of one of the branches of ETA, but more often than not they were people unfortunate enough to be in the vicinity of a trigger-happy policeman."²³ The Arias regime, like that of Carrero before him, was "a victim of its own strict conception of public order" and was equally "[u]nable to distinguish a political problem from one of public order".²⁴ He failed to understand that he was locked into a struggle with ETA for the loyalty of the Basque people and that the *state's* behaviour was being scrutinized seriously, not ETA's.

In spite of their political incompetence, the Spanish police had some success in repressing ETA, and ETAp in particular. ETAp's ambitious armed campaign in 1975 with operations in Madrid, Barcelona, Galicia and Segovia was hugely unsuccessful.²⁵ Between July and September 1975, four *comandos* were dismantled and three *etarras* were killed by police acting on intelligence gleaned by

infiltrating ETAp^m.²⁶ By the year's end 500 ETAp^m militants were in prison, its exiled supporters in France were threatened, and its infrastructure in Spain was seriously damaged.²⁷ ETAm criticized ETAp^m for undertaking a "bigger armed campaign than it could sustain" and for adopting a political-military structure which was "unsuited to a group engaged in armed struggle."²¹ ETA articulated its goal clearly; the destabilization of the Spanish state by violent means. ETAm chose actions consistent with its goals and within its organizational limitations. While ETAm suffered losses, its effectiveness was not nearly so impaired as was ETAp^m's. ETAm was tightly organized in cells which made its disarticulation difficult. As well, with its *comandos* based in France ETAm suffered less repression than did ETAp^m. As Table IV.a. shows, ETA violence escalated during the transition.

Table IV.a. ETA's Violence in País Vasco, 1973-1980

Year	Victims Killed by ETA				Wounded Total	Kidnapped Total	Actions Total	Arrests Total
	Civil	FSE	FAS	Total				
1973	1	4	1	6	1	1	43	572
1974	14	5	-	19	58	0	113	1116
1975	6	11	-	17	5	0	262	4625
1976	8	8	-	16	0	2	87	?
1977	5	8	-	13	7	1	146	Amnesty
1978	28	33	4	65	91	4	270	287
1979	33	32	10	75	141	8	1471	561
1980	-	-	-	88	81	7		2140

Source: Francisco José Llera Ramo, "ETA: Ejército secreto y movimiento social," *Revista de estudios políticos*, NS 78 (1992), 165, 170, 173 and 211, Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 133 and José Manuel Arija, "Los españoles ante el terrorismo," in *Ideas y debate para la democracia*, Tomo II, ed. Juan Tomás de Salas, (Madrid: Cambio 16, 1985), p. 211.

Golpismo and Terrorismo in Post-Franco Spain

Franco died on 20 November 1975. In a move which surprised many, the head of state, King Juan Carlos, appointed Arias to another term in office in order to maintain a degree of continuity in post-Franco Spain. If Juan Carlos hoped Franco's death would free Arias from his inhibitions, then he would be disappointed. The political struggle between the reformers and the Bunker became even more fierce. Not only was Arias caught between these two forces but he continued to suffer from the effects of the *golpismo-terrorismo* dynamic. The symbiotic relationship between the Bunker, with its *golpista* agenda, and ETA, with its terrorist agenda, facilitated the destabilization of the post-Franco state: "Basque terrorism dovetailed with the civilian right's campaign to incite the military to intervene in political matters."²⁹ Confident the Bunker would pressure the reformers mercilessly ETA launched provocative attacks on key individuals and symbols of the regime to convince the reformers they could hope for no vestige of stability until the Basque question was resolved to ETA's satisfaction. In this vein, days after Franco died, ETA assassinated the rightist mayor of Oyarzun as a signal it would continue its fight.³⁰ The

Bunker cooperated by arguing that "any opening of the system would make it incapable of dealing with terrorism."³¹ The Bunker's ally, the military, was consumed by its preoccupations with "a separatism which sought to shatter the unity of the fatherland" and "above all, ...the intense terrorist activity."³² Fusi argues, "it was not the offensive capacity of ETA as such that made Basque terrorism the most serious factor in the crisis of Spanish democracy" but that, "[i]t was only because terrorism was linked to the regional question that it became a threat to the stability of Spanish democracy."³³ The military defined itself as "the pillar of the patriae" and the guarantor of Spain's "sacred unity" and its national virtue.³⁴ Paradoxically, the military was also a victim of the political programmes of both ETA and the Bunker as

[the] two threats -separatism and terrorism- amplified by persons, political groups and certain media of communications, were catapulted insistently against the minds of the professional corps of the FAS and FSE*, to try to compel them to cede to the temptations to intervene directly, if necessary by overreaching the law, to resolve, among others, these two serious problems.³⁵

The Bunker argued that a return to authoritarian franquism was necessary to halt terrorism and end the prevailing political instability. Terrorist attacks heightened pressures for a military intervention under the Bunker's control³⁶. Either to compel Arias to launch a serious crackdown on ETA,³⁷ or to create sufficient political instability to justify the intervention of the armed forces,³⁸ the Bunker mobilized *incontrolados* - ultra right-wing terrorist groups composed of off-duty policemen, ultras and hired mercenaries - to carry out attacks against its enemies in País Vasco and southern France. The appearance of these groups "showed the fear of the more reactionary supporters of the regime that they were being betrayed by a [reformist] government."³⁹ The most active of the various *incontrolado* groups was BVE (Batallón Vasco Español) - predecessor to GAL. They attacked *etarras*, Basque leftists, Basque nationalists, Basque exiles and opposition members. Their actions,

far from dissuading ETA or intimidating its social base, would favour... the organization's propagandistic objectives and helped reinforce Basque nationalist sentiment. For example, ETA capitalized on the attacks against Basque refugees in France by making their funerals massive acts of exultation of the armed struggle.⁴⁰

Incontrolados committed 85 attacks in Spain and 35 in France killing 3 and wounding 20 in 1975 "without a single arrest... on the part of the French and Spanish security services."⁴¹

The situation in País Vasco deteriorated as Arias' rule dragged on. Tensions with the Basque population sharpened significantly. ETA's violence achieved a greater political effect. Police violence in País Vasco ensured that "for a large portion of the Basque population ETA is at this time more than an armed organization - on occasions, when someone felt badly treated, vexed or suffered the violence of the

* FAS (*Fuerzas Armadas* - Armed Forces), FSE (*Fuerzas de Seguridad de Estado* - State Security Forces) and FOP (*Fuerzas del Orden Público* - Forces of Public Order).

'*incontrolados*', it is 'his armed force' - an invocation."⁴² Attacks by *incontrolado* "combined with the panic-stricken behaviour of the police... create[d] a climate of insecurity which... seemed worse than the situations before Franco's rule had been seriously challenged."⁴² In March 1976, during massive pro-amnesty demonstrations, the *Guardia Civil* killed six demonstrators. These protests were transformed into massive anti-government demonstrations which involved hundreds of thousands of people. In fact, "[b]y March 9, an estimated two-thirds of the Basque population was on strike in protest over police repression in the region."⁴⁴ To exploit public sympathy and provoke the FSE to commit further atrocities, ETAm shot dead three members of the security forces. The process of separating ETA from its support base among disaffected Basques was undercut by the behaviour of the state, the FSE, the right, the *incontrolados* and even the democratic opposition. Consequently, it would be "a difficult evolution that would lead from consideration of ETA as an agent of liberating violence to the actual image of ETA as an agent of oppressive violence; from ETA as a supposed bastion of liberty sought to ETA as a possible cause of the loss of liberty scarcely achieved."⁴⁵

Adolfo Suárez and Democratization

As a consequence of the *Guardia Civil* killings the King lost confidence in Arias and three months later he resigned. Adolfo Suárez was named Prime Minister by the King who judged him more competent to lead the transition than Arias had been. The King's choice of Suárez, a relative unknown in the franquist regime, was another surprise. Suárez was a technocrat. As head of RTVE, the public radio and television network, and minister responsible for the Movimiento, he seemed more concerned with the efficient governance of Spain than with the politics of the regime he served. He did recognize, though, that democracy was the logical next step for Spain after Franco, and he committed himself to its institutionalization. In office Suárez moved with considerable political skill to win the confidence of the major political players and to implement his political programme through adroit negotiation, political compromise and effective *fait accomplis* which left his opponents off guard and with few options save accepting his terms.

Suárez's success in leading the democratic transition depended largely on five factors: i) the weakness and disarray of the Movimiento as a political force; ii) the explicit support he enjoyed from King Juan Carlos as both the head of state and Commander of the Armed Forces; iii) his ability to mobilize influential latent sources of support behind his programme; iv) the military's receptivity to his programme of reform based on the King's support for him, and; v) the willingness of the opposition parties to cooperate with him. Suárez always held the political initiative. He managed to have his Law of Political Reform passed by the franquist Cortes - which stripped it of its power and declared Spain a democratic

state - on 16 November 1976 and get it approved by the military and ratified overwhelmingly in December 1976 in a national referendum. Popular support for his reform law strengthened his political hand with the opposition which had called for an abstention in the referendum. In February 1977, political parties were legalized, except for the PCE* - which would be legalized in April; the Movimiento was dissolved in April as were state-controlled labour unions; national elections, which were won by his coalition were called for 15 July 1977; and, political prisoners were amnestied prior to the elections and a final amnesty on 15 October, which emptied Spain's jails. Suárez created an electoral coalition, the UCD (Unión Centro-Democrático) to represent the centre-right and reformist franquists in the pluralist Spanish democratic state.⁴⁶ Given the constraints under which he operated, it was a testament to his political skill and good fortune that Suárez fulfilled his reformist programme.

Suárez and the Strategy of *Ruptura Pactada*

Suárez rejected the democratic opposition's demands for a *ruptura democrática* and pursued a strategy of *ruptura pactada* whereby the terms of Spain's democratization would be negotiated freely with those political forces willing to see the dictatorship transformed by evolutionary rather than by revolutionary means. Moreover, Suárez was adamant that reformist sectors of the *ancien régime*, and not the opposition, would lead the reform process. Suárez believed that the stability of the future democratic regime depended on its success in overcoming the historical legacy of "the two Spains", and normalizing the political relations among those ideological and political formations which had fought one another in the civil war. He sought to reach a "general consensus, to isolate the bunker and open a dialogue with the democratic opposition."⁴⁷ The disunited opposition was ill-prepared to oppose Suárez.⁴⁸ His eventual success in winning over the democratic opposition strengthened his position *vis-à-vis* the Bunker. Its threat to democratization augmented Suárez's control over the process since the opposition, fearing a *golpe de estado*, moderated its demands to stabilize the political situation. The violence in País Vasco also "frightened opposition leaders leading them to approximate the position of the regime reformers."⁴⁹

Suárez and the Basque Problem

In País Vasco, Suárez had inherited a political problem which was worse than that which Franco had left. Franquist repression had been "seriously counterproductive" to the regime's political and public order interests, and had "discredited *españolismo* in País Vasco".⁵⁰ There,

* The decree legalizing the PCE surprised the military since Suárez had assured them that the PCE would not be legalized without its express approval. The military in collusion with the bunker prepared to launch a *golpe de estado*, but the King intervened and defused the crisis.

the repression was brutal... [The] errors committed in matters of public order have been extremely serious with truly disgraceful consequences. It is important to remember the successive states of exception, the practice of torture, the death of innocent people in demonstrations and roadblocks, the indiscriminate attacks on the population, the acts of vandalism by supposed ultra right-wing groups with the participation of some members of the FOP.⁵¹

Arias' policies worsened the situation. His declaration of martial law in País Vasco in April 1975 turned his government into "a symbol of repression and systematic violence against the Basque people."⁵² The "poisoned and explosive" legacy Suárez inherited consisted of a community convinced of having been victimized, an extremely active terrorist movement, a collective psychology radicalized by violence and tension and the rupture of the links which bound the Basque people to the national community.⁵³ In these conditions the reforming regime was hard pressed to establish the legitimacy of its rule in País Vasco.

Suárez's treatment of the Basque question was quite at odds with the vision he showed in addressing Spain's other political problems. Suárez pursued a state-centric Basque policy to avoid provoking a destabilizing right wing reaction. His government's initial refusal to grant Basques less risky but symbolically important concessions concerning repeal of the franquist decree labelling Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa traitor provinces, devolution of fiscal privileges to the Basque province and legalization of the *ikurriña*^{*} manifested the political inappropriateness of its Basque policy. The conservative presidents of the Basque provincial councils of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa and the leadership of the *Guardia Civil* favoured these measures.⁵⁴ Madrid's numerous delays, about-faces, contradictory statements and reluctant concessions in acting on these questions "fuelled popular discontent and maintained an explosive climate where violence could prosper."⁵⁵ Raphael Zariski argues that

concessions granted in deliberate and timely fashion, before a pattern of violence has become firmly established, are likely to succeed in their purpose of restoring stability, whereas concessions granted in haste under pressure of violence are apt only to fan the flames of extremism.⁵⁶

At a time of great flux in political opinion in País Vasco political concessions were refused which would have "cost the government a little and mollified] the Basques a lot".⁵⁷ Suárez's Basque policy, such as it was, was led by events and represented a series of capitulations to mass pressure.⁵⁸ His policies failed to assure Basques that he was serious about reversing the franquist legacy; "[since] each Basque demand had to be wrestled [from Madrid]... the methods of mass mobilization and including violence took absolute precedence to the detriment of institutional, negotiated and parliamentary means."⁵⁹ "By retreating in disarray after a long period of uncompromising repression, the central government ha[d] in effect encouraged the use of [ETA's] strategy and helped it to succeed."⁶⁰ Worse yet, the state's inconsistent policies undermined the policies the regime did implement.

* The Basque national flag.

Actions undertaken by the government to address particular problems were generally counter-productive to achieving the desired objectives. This was especially so in matters of public order. The climate of social divisiveness and serious political tension created by mass mobilizations and ETA's violence led the government to believe that "the stability of democracy demanded an energetic defence of public order."⁶¹ Suárez tried to impose order with a police force singularly incapable of doing so. Rather than resolve crises police actions tended to inflame them. "[T]rained in authoritarianism and with no clear orders from the government"⁶², the police used the repressive methods to which they had become accustomed during the dictatorship. Police actions "eroded the democratic credibility of the government without building a compensating image of authority and strength."⁶³ Their "lack of success in combating ETA-M's activities provoked it to resort to an indiscriminate repression against the Basque population," which tended to make "ETA-M's actions legitimate in many people's eyes",⁶⁴ and lent credence to its claims that nothing had changed. With democratic, paradoxically, in País Vasco, "police violence was seen as more of a threat that it had been under Franco, when, as demonstrations were generally forbidden, there was less likelihood of the clashes which became common in 1977 and 1978."⁶⁵ Police actions became a great liability for the democratic regime in Madrid eager to distance itself from the preceding regimes.⁶⁶ However, in spite of strong opposition calls to discipline the police and remove ultra-right officers, given the weakness of its authority prior to the 1977 elections Suárez was reluctant to reform the police's *modus operandi* lest this alienate it and "leave it at the mercy of the extremists".⁶⁷ A reform/repression trade-off faced the government. Forced to choose between a probable immediate coup or a possible future coup prompted by terrorists exploiting previous grievances, Madrid would accept the lower long-term risk to reduce the higher short-term risk.

Notwithstanding effective constraints on its policy-making authority, clearly it was the government's responsibility to harmonize the practices of its agents with its political goals. However,

the new regime did not succeed in isolating terrorism emotionally and politically and maintained a policy of public order hardly differentiated from that of the previous regime which contributed to the sustenance of a climate of tension and impeded the possibility of a pacification and understanding.⁶⁸

Seeking to implement political and repressive policies which would isolate and eventually defeat ETA,⁶⁹ Suárez lacked the means to do so on a controlled basis. Throughout the years of repression the Basques

had maintained a capacity for indignation and at the same time [repression] had created, in a sector of the population, an incapacity to pursue a politics which did not depend on it and had to provoke repression to survive ideologically. In such a situation no changes emerged, nothing was transformed except that the tragic stalemate of repression and armed action persisted.⁷⁰

Succinctly, Suárez's handling of political questions pertaining to País Vasco contributed to the political instability the regime sought to end.

Suárez, Basque Nationalism and the Amnesty Issue

ETA did not rely on violence alone to generate political and social support for itself and the goals of radical nationalism. The political growth of radical nationalism after 1975 depended significantly on the manipulation of the issue of amnesty. The key lesson of Burgos was that ETA could generate broad social support by exploiting the issue of the state's treatment of its imprisoned militants. In the radicalized environment of post-Franco País Vasco, ETAm and ETApM demanded an unconditional amnesty for all Basque political prisoners and won the support of the Basque population and elements of the democratic opposition, including the PSOE and PCE. As the amnesty movement grew to involve hundreds of thousands of people,⁷¹ its organic form was transcended and popular energy was directed into radical left abertzale political formations like the ETAm-controlled *Gestoras pro-amnistia*.⁷² The *Gestoras* were ETAm's first real mass popular organization. As extra-systemic, mass, popular organizations, ETAm understood that they were uniquely positioned to challenge the political *status quo* without being obliged to accept the compromises attendant on regime-sanctioned political forces.

Ostensibly, the amnesty campaigns were designed to win the release of Basque prisoners. Effectively, "the pro-amnesty campaigns were one of the axes for the magnification of ETA's image."⁷³ They maintained a dynamic of permanent destabilizing social mobilization,⁷⁴ which challenged the regime's rule directly and caused serious social polarization. To reassert the state's authority the FSE often repressed pro-amnesty demonstrations brutally. ETA retaliatory attacks on the FSE caused further political destabilization, which caused increased police repression. FSE arrests generated more prisoners; thus, "as the function creates the organ, the committees came to generate prisoners [necessary] for the political function that they had been assigned."⁷⁵ In time it was not clear whether "the prisoners needed pro-amnesty committees or the pro-amnesty committees needed prisoners to maintain [their] political life".⁷⁶ By keeping its actions and struggles in the forefront of the Basque political equation, to the virtual exclusion of other important issues, País Vasco remained in a state of "permanent turmoil",⁷⁷ and ETA was left in control of the political agenda.

The amnesty question assumed the force that it did because the Arias and Suárez governments were reluctant to concede amnesties while ETA's violence continued for fear of the reaction of the right and the security forces. ETA's maximalist demand of full amnesty was an essential part of its strategy;

Given the concrete links between the demand for an amnesty and continuance of the armed struggle... [t]he amnesty demand is nothing more than another point of abertzale

radicalism's petitions such as they take form in the repeated call to arms of *la Alternativa KAS*. Being that this is one of its points and armed struggle is proposed as the sole means for realizing [its negotiation], the amnesty [demand] would only entail the point zero from which a [terrorist] campaign would be initiated.⁷⁸

The government's piecemeal approach to declaring amnesties under mass pressure was a mistake. The declaration of "[a]n early and full amnesty in the Basque country might have deprived ETA terrorists of most of their case and of the public support they continued to enjoy."⁷⁹

ETA and the PNV Vie for Dominance in País Vasco

From the transition's beginning it was apparent that the struggle for control of the nationalist movement and its objectives would consume Basque nationalism. ETA was more than a terrorist group; it was "an organization... with enormous support and acceptance in Basque society."⁸⁰ In fact,

[d]uring most of the transition period, terrorism enjoyed considerable support from the Basque population, especially as the cycle of violence between suspected terrorists and the security forces spilled over to the Basque population at large.⁸¹

ETA's nationalist legitimacy at this time was perhaps greater than that of the PNV. This is not to say that ETA was necessarily the more important political formation, but rather that the PNV would be "forced to define its own policy in relation to questions which form part of ETA's symbolic universe (and later that of ETA-HB)."⁸² The PNV could not insulate itself from the political and ideological effects of ETA's activism for three reasons: i) ETA had carried out a high-profile resistance to franquism's attacks on Basque culture, while the PNV had organized cultural festivals. Since the PNV had rallied its activists to defend ETA's militants in certain important instances it could not deny ETA and the legitimacy of its struggle. ii) Elements within the PNV viewed with admiration ETA's struggle and its "uncompromising, radical, independentist nationalism",⁸³ even if they opposed armed struggle in principle. iii) The PNV and ETA had "numerous and important familial connections."⁸⁴ ETA emerged from the PNV and "its members were linked to PNV sympathisers by ties of blood and friendship."⁸⁵ The PNV knew "that both branches of ETA had wide support among the Basque population... [making] them reluctant to condemn either branch of ETA too harshly"⁸⁶, or to be seen to curry the favour of Madrid. Hoping to usurp ETA and take control of the new Basque nationalism forged by ETA, the PNV accommodated rhetorically, if not ideologically, ETA's radicalized independentist discourse.⁸⁷ The PNV was convinced that since Madrid would not meet the radical nationalists' minimum demand of a negotiation which meant "the Basque problem had to be resolved with the PNV and not without it or in spite of it."⁸⁸ By raising its stature and popularizing Basque nationalism, paradoxically, ETA had buttressed the PNV's position as the sole political force capable of negotiating with the Spanish government on behalf of the Basque people. ETA violence had made resolution of the Basque nationalist question essential to the reforming regime, while the PNV was the force capable of resolving it.

The First Democratic Elections in Post-Franco Spain

Suárez's announcement that general elections would be held 15 June 1977, to elect a parliament charged with writing a new constitution, provoked a serious debate among Basque political formations. The PNV approved of electoral participation in principle, but was "reluctant to participate in the elections while there were still Basques in prison for political crimes."⁸⁹ It felt that "if the party stood in elections which were boycotted by other nationalists, its credibility might be damaged."⁹⁰ On the other hand, the PNV was reluctant to pass on the chance to write the new Spanish constitution, and in particular the promised articles pertaining to the terms of regional autonomy. The Basque statist parties were willing to participate in the elections although the right wing parties, and in particular Fraga's Alianza Popular (AP), were loath to support the release of ETA's prisoners. Suárez needed "a diminution of armed violence in order to make the elections in the Basque country plausible."⁹¹ He approved secret meetings with ETAp and ETAm to sound out their positions on a ceasefire to last through the elections. Eager to contest the elections to test its *poli-mili* theory, ETAp demanded a total amnesty for all its prisoners which it needed to organize and to lead its political wing EIA.⁹² It also hoped the ceasefire would allow it to rebuild its weakened organization.⁹² In defence of its decision to contest the elections ETAp argued that "since people were going to participate massively in the elections, [abstention] would imply leaving the way open to the PNV and PSOE, [thereby] separating the national struggle from the social."⁹³ In ETAp's view, "amnesty was going to stop constituting the principal motive for popular mobilization and.. in its place it was going to launch large pro-statute mobilizations."⁹⁴ The government demanded a truce since "it would have been difficult simply to grant an amnesty while violence continued".⁹⁵ The government accepted an amnesty which included those convicted of murder providing they accepted exile. It refused to legalize EIA, ETAp's political arm, but permitted it to contest the elections as part of the political coalition, EE (*Euskadiko Eskerra* - Basque Left). Madrid refused to negotiate the dissolution of the FSE and the terms of governance of País Vasco.⁹⁶ The government benefitted from the deal as not only did it stabilize the Basque polity, but it divided the *abertzale* left and prompted the *Bereziak* split with ETAp.⁹⁷ Madrid likely sought to cultivate ETAp/EIA's participation in the hope that it would have a proprietary interest in the system and would avoid destabilizing it.

* There was some concern that if the ETA prisoners were not released, the nationalist political formations would announce a boycott to force Madrid to concede to these terms.

** In meetings between two military officers and the two branches of ETA in late 1976, they advised the *etarras* that the political instability caused by their terrorism "was creating pressures from the Bunker to abort the reforms and they told them that to halt the process it [was] necessary that a ceasefire be produced." (Francisco Letamendía (Ortzi), *Breve historia de Euskadi: De la prehistoria a nuestros días*, (Barcelona: Ruedo Ibérico, 1980), p. 371.)

** In fact, "the enormous prestige of ETA-PM's former prisoners would be EIA's main asset." (Sullivan, p.186.)

*** It had been ETAp's goal to mould the two struggles into one.

ETAm refused to accept Madrid's terms and launched an immediate offensive which increased political tensions. In favour of freeing ETA's prisoners, ETAm held that ceasefire negotiations should have been conducted by KAS and on the terms of *la Alternativa KAS*. ETAm was opposed to contesting the elections believing, **** that only a complete rupture with the regime would bring true democracy to Euskadi and that only armed violence could cause this rupture.⁹⁸ ETAm believed there existed

a correlation of forces adequate to force a rupture sufficient to obtain in little time a radically distinct goal; the proposals of *la Alternativa KAS*. Therefore... it [was] not necessary to offer *anything* in order to achieve that goal; neither truce nor ceasefire.⁹⁹

ETAm's abstention was not predetermined. It might have participated through EHAS if two conditions were met: that Suárez announced a full amnesty for all ETA prisoners and agreed to the terms of *la Alternativa KAS*.¹⁰⁰ The government could not and would not accept these terms.

After the 1977 general elections, as Table IV.b. shows, with 34.4% of popular vote and 165 seats of the 350 in the Congress of Deputies the UCD would control the national political agenda. The UCD position was further strengthened by the personal stature of Suárez himself. The PSOE under Felipe González won 29.2% of the popular vote and 118 seats, the Alianza Popular under Manuel Fraga Iribarne won 8.3% of the vote and 16 seats and the PCE did poorly with only 9.2% of the vote and 20 seats. Although the dominant political force, the UCD's was a minority government. However, no party was prepared to challenge Suárez. Suárez initiated discussions with all parties represented in the Cortes to generate the widest possible consensus on the proposed democratic constitution. He created a social and political environment favourable to the consolidation of the democratic regime by negotiating the *Pactos de Moncloa* with labour unions and the opposition. The pacts were agreements which bound the signatories to avoid political and strike actions which threatened the democratic system.

The First Democratic Elections in Post-Franco País Vasco

In País Vasco, as Table IV.b. shows, the election returns gave the PNV a slim plurality of the votes with 28.8% of the popular vote and 8 seats and identified it as the dominant Basque political force. PSOE-PSE won 28.1% of the popular vote and 7 seats making it the second political party in País Vasco. To complete the tripartite division of the Basque polity, in a reflection of the political situation of the 1920s and 1930s, the centre-right parties UCD and AP together won 24.4% of the popular vote and 5 seats. The radical nationalist coalitions EE and HB won 10.6% of the vote and EE received 1 seat in

**** As well, perhaps ETAm feared ETAm's participation would be viewed as radical nationalism's endorsement of the elections, the Suárez regime and its reform effort.

Congress. The electoral results affirmed the PNV's leading rôle in Basque society and manifested the new and obvious importance of nationalism in Basque political life. However, the historic division of the Basque polity into left statist and right nationalists was reproduced and the rivalry between the PNV and PSE would become ever more marked. The electoral support received by EE and HB was a measure of the influence of ETA's activism.¹⁰¹ The fact that there existed a nucleus of nationalist support beyond the PNV orbit which favoured radical programmatic ends transformed the Basque polity.

Table IV.b. General Elections to the Congress of Deputies, 1977

	In Spain			In País Vasco		
	Votes	% Vote	No. Seats	Votes	% Vote	No. Seats
UCD	6,310,151	34.7	165	129,000	12.8	4
PSOE	5,367,951	29.2	118	283,000	28.1	7
PCE	1,716,810	9.2	20	46,000	4.6	-
AP/CD*	1,516,831	8.3	16	117,000	11.6	1
PNV	290,297	1.6	8	290,000	28.8	8
EE	63,000	0.3	1	63,000	6.3	1
HB	43,000	0.2	-	43,000	4.3	-
Other	3,010,895	16.7	22	36,000	3.6	-
Total	18,318,935	100.0	350	1,042,000	100.0	21

Sources: Francisco J. Llera Ramo, "La estructura electoral y el sistema de partidos políticos en las Comunidades Autónomas del País Vasco y Foral de Navarra después de las elecciones generales de 1982," *Revista de estudios políticos*, NS 34 (1983), 155, Donatella della Porta and Liborio Mattina, "Ciclos políticos y movilización étnica: El caso vasco," *Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas*, No. 35, (1986), p. 144, Rafael López-Pintor, "The October 1982 General Elections and the Evolution of the Spanish Party System," in *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979 and 1982: A Study of National Elections*, eds. Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, (U.S.A.: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 298 and John F. Coverdale, "Regional Nationalism and the Elections in the Basque Country," in *Spain at the Polls*, p. 235.

Both ETAp/EIA and the PNV, believed that the election results justified their participation.¹⁰² Contrarily, ETAm condemned both ETAp/EIA and the PNV for standing in the elections arguing this "gave credibility to the fraudulent dictatorship of Suárez and Juan Carlos, while doing so in the company of 'Spanish' parties offended against nationalist principles."¹⁰³ ETAm considered the elections a sham and claimed that the strong police presence and the threat of a military coup "prevented people from exercising their real choice."¹⁰⁴ This was a disingenuous argument since the strong police presence in País Vasco and the military's jitteriness were largely products of ETAm's violence. As well, radical nationalist formations which would integrate in HB and were ideologically aligned with ETAm participated in the elections and received significant electoral support. However, the 1977 elections presented ETAm with a serious problem. Thus,

[i]f the electoral result implied a serious failure for ETA, it is the *fact of the electoral participation* that brings into question its strategy and the purpose of the armed struggle. Effectively, after the elections, the emerging political system acquires a high degree of legitimization, of popular recognition, which is based in the popular will. ...And it shows unquestionably that very broad segments [of the Spanish population]... and a majority in

Euskadi acquire in the 1977 elections the conviction of being citizens or subjects of a democratic political power.¹⁰⁵

If before, although ETA's violence "was questioned, it could be understood and justified given the popular delegitimization of the franquist State, after the 1977 elections, it is neither justifiable nor even less understood."¹⁰⁶

The return to democracy in 1977 unglued the Basque polity as many more political parties, primarily splinters of ETA, entered the fray to represent the Basque people's political interests and to stake out their own political turf. The internal cleavages of the Basque nationalist community became manifest. With the looming breakdown of the nationalist consensus, the unity of the PNV was threatened. As a catch-all-party, the matrix which bound the party's diverse and conflictual factions and base of support was the nationalist call to arms. In the environment of open political participation occasioned by the return to democracy and the push to redefine the nature of the Basque polity itself, the new political parties struggled to diminish the PNV's hegemonic control of the nationalist discourse.

Conclusions

The political situation which obtained in Euskadi after the elections emerged as a result of political misapprehension by successive Spanish governments. The government's response of harsh repression to ETA's political and armed activism ensured the success of its action-reaction-action spiral. The worsening political climate in País Vasco was caused in part by the

the witlessness and senselessness of those responsible for Spanish policy... [who were] incapable of responding to ETA's activism with a policy other than that of policial action - on occasions indiscriminate - and the declaration of states of exception. The only tangible results of this policy were ETA's strategic success; the creation of tension between the Forces of Public Order and the Basque population; the resurgence of nationalist sentiment and the progressive rise in tension in the Basque community.¹⁰⁷

By failing to attempt policies which might have exploited Basque discomfort with ETA's violence and led to the its social and political isolation, the state's repressive actions against ETA and, against the Basque population, strengthened the uneasy link between ETA and the Basque people. The process of political reform begun under Arias had failed ignominiously due to his unwillingness to commit to his own reforms. As a result, the Bunker, which exploited Arias' insecurity deftly to advance its own interests, was left with considerable influence over domestic policy. The political inadequacy of Arias' policies became patently obvious and he resigned. It was apparent that the impasse between reformers and the Bunker had to be broken. Under Suárez the process of reform was carried forward, in spite of the Bunker's opposition. His Basque policy did little to stabilize the political situation in País Vasco nor in Spain.

The articulation of a concrete and comprehensive plan with a fixed timetable which outlined the government's intentions for País Vasco and addressed important Basque demands likely would have contributed significantly to the rationalization of both political relations between the government and important Basque political formations and the character of the political discourse. Not only would this have marked a decisive break with the Arias years but it would have introduced a certain degree of predictability to the emergent political dynamic binding País Vasco and Madrid. The *ad-hoc* improvisation which characterized Suárez's Basque policy, while providing a certain degree of flexibility, failed to introduce stability to a turbulent political situation. State efforts to rationalize its relations within the Basque polity might have compelled the PNV and the opposition to moderate their own rhetoric and engage in a responsible political discourse with Madrid. Instead, the PNV found itself moving along the spectrum of political extremism in its efforts to keep up with the nationalist mood. The general climate of political maximization and intransigence was especially deleterious to political normalization in País Vasco. It must have been clear to all interested parties that the Bunker represented the end of democratic ambitions in Spain. Yet the democratic opposition persisted with demands which the government could not meet for fear of provoking a *golpe*. By attacking the legitimacy of the government the democratic opposition strengthened the Bunker's position considerably and appeared to legitimize ETA's claims.

Suárez failed to take full advantage of the political resources at his disposal to generate popular legitimacy for the regime in País Vasco and did little to combat the effect produced by police actions. While the government had to take a clear law and order position to appease the right, it did not have to address itself solely to that aspect of the situation in País Vasco, for it had the support of the centrists and the moderate left - by default if not by choice¹⁰⁸ - and the King's committed support. Limited concessions to Basque nationalism which would have done much to appease the moderate nationalists were not made until the positive benefits from making them had vanished. Suárez was in a position to tackle the Basque problem more imaginatively and he failed to do so.

Notes

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23. Sullivan, p. 161.
24. Carr and Fusi, p. 160.
25. Sullivan, p. 160 and Letamendía, Breve, pp. 353-354.

26. Letamendía, Breve, pp. 331-335.
27. Letamendía, Breve, p. 349.
28. Sullivan, p. 161.
29. Share, The Making, p. 170.
30. Rincón, ETA, p. 31.
31. Carr and Fusi, p. 206.
32. Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, "El ejército en la transición," Cuenta y Razón, No. 41 (1988), p. 24.
33. Juan Pablo Fusi, "Spain: The Fragile Democracy," West European Politics, 6, No. 3 (1983), 226.
34. Muñoz Alonso, "Golpismo," p. 27.
35. Gutiérrez Mellado, p. 25.
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40. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 231.
41. Rincón, ETA, pp. 37-8.
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62. Carr and Fusi, p. 219.
63. Carr and Fusi, p. 219.
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68. Fusi, El País Vasco, pp. 208-209.
70. Rincón, ETA, p. 43.
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78. Rincón, ETA, p. 58.
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85. Sullivan, p. 213.
86. Sullivan, p. 209.
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89. Sullivan, p. 177.
90. Sullivan, p. 177.
91. Sullivan, p. 186.
92. Sullivan, p. 177.
93. Letamendía, Breve, p. 365.
94. Letamendía, Breve, p. 365.
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96. Letamendía, Breve, pp. 371-373.
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98. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 116.

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101. Carr and Fusi, p. 160.
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103. Sullivan, p. 186.
104. Sullivan, p. 194.
105. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 117.
106. Ibarra, La evolución, p. 117.
107. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 208.
108. Share, The Making p. 108.

Chapter Five: The Transition to Democracy, 1977-1980

With its newly won democratic legitimacy, the Suárez government moved ahead with its constitutional project and programme for dismantling the final vestiges of the franquist system. The process developed in an environment of extreme political insecurity caused largely by a precipitous escalation of terrorist attacks, mostly emanating from ETA. In País Vasco the serious deterioration of political, economic and social conditions created a crisis which was exploited by the PNV and ETA to delegitimize Spanish policy and by ETA to delegitimize the entire democratic transition and the democratic institutions in País Vasco. As a consequence, while it was possible to speak of a democratic transition in Spain, the mechanisms which had produced it failed to have the same effect in País Vasco. This chapter's objective is to explain the events of the period from June 1977 to March 1980 and to present a coherent analysis to account for them. The process leading to the promulgation of the Basque autonomy statute (*Estatuto de Autonomía* or *Estatuto de Guernica*) which gave Basques substantial political autonomy had three phases: 1) a pre-autonomy phase from late 1977 to 30 December 1977; 2) a constitutional phase from 1 January to 31 December 1978; and, 3) an autonomic phase from 1 January 1979 to 9 March 1980. Analysis will focus on the distinct perspectives and political strategies of the essential political forces of the constitutional process.

The Strategy of the UCD Government, 1977-1978

The UCD government had a considerable political agenda to fulfil. It had to: i) get the constitutional process underway and write a new Constitution which would break with the "two Spains" legacy; ii) demonstrate that it was serious about changing its image among the Basque people; iii) it had to find a means to end ETA terrorism and pacify País Vasco, iv) come to terms with the Basque and Catalan caucuses on the structure and content of the pre-autonomous governments accorded them; v) find means to exert greater control over the security forces and make them more effective; vi) address the economic crisis which had contributed to Spain's social and political disorder; and vii) reduce the threat of a right-wing/ military coup. Bedeviling the government at every turn would be its lack of internal cohesion and its position as a minority government without a stable legislative partner. The first factor meant that given the plethora of opinions and policies advanced by the various factions within the UCD coalition, the government's policies were constantly being undermined.¹ The opposition parties took

advantage of the UCD's internal turmoil to weaken it. The second factor meant that the government had to secure the support of at least one of its legislative opponents to pass its legislation.² This "engendered an instability which transmitted a sensation of improvisation."³

Most of the government political energy was consumed with drafting a constitution acceptable to all political parties and the electorate, and confronting the challenge posed by violent Basque separatism which conditioned powerfully the national political dynamic and almost determined the politics of the Basque region. The government's overriding objective was to win for the nascent democratic institutions and its constitutional project an unquestionable legitimacy. Its policy of including all democratic, parliamentary forces in the constitutional process was an integral part of its strategy.⁴ To oversee the progress of the Constitution, a thirty-five member Constitutional Committee was created in which were represented all the parliamentary political parties. A sub-committee was struck to negotiate its actual terms. The two committees met throughout 1977 and 1978 to produce the final constitutional document.

Aware that the government's image had suffered seriously in País Vasco, to win some Basque good-will, to relegitimize the regime, to show that it had broken with the franquist past and to quell the pro-amnesty demonstrations which ETAM was using to delegitimize the regime, Suárez declared a series of amnesties. By December Spanish jails were emptied of all ETA's prisoners.⁵ Nevertheless, in the latter half of 1977, ETA's attacks increased. Suárez's concessions had failed to halt ETA's terrorism nor to initiate the process of pacification in País Vasco.⁶ ETA continued to control the political agenda by means of its escalating armed attacks and ability to generate popular support for its imprisoned activists, as the case of *Apala* proved.* ETA's destabilizing violence gave the UCD pause to reconsider its pledge to treat the terms of regional autonomy generously in the constitution, which caused worry among Basques. At least as worrying was evidence of a new UCD belligerence in dealing with Basque nationalist forces.

In the aftermath of the 1977 elections, it became ever more apparent that the UCD accepted "the illusion that nationalism could not achieve a clear electoral hegemony [in País Vasco]."⁷ Analysis of the election returns from 1936 and 1977 general elections in País Vasco gave support to the UCD's conclusions. In the 1936 elections the nationalist forces won 34.7% of the popular vote and 39.3% in 1977; whereas the left statist parties won 33.2% in 1936 and 32.7% in 1977; and the right statist forces won 31.7% in 1936 and 24.4% in 1977.⁸ Given the degree of political mobilization managed by nationalist forces, the nationalist vote in 1977 was unexpectedly low.⁹ The results were interpreted as a

* In August 1977, a massive protest movement was launched to fight French extradition of ETAM's leader *Apala*, who eventually fled France. He was later implicated in a 6 October 1977 attack which killed the Civil Governor of Vizcaya and his two police escorts.

grave setbacks, especially for ETA.¹⁰ In spite of signs in late 1977 that Basques were radicalizing in response to a political crisis prompted by unrealistic expectations and real government policy, the UCD, and the PSOE concluded that "they could divide Euskadi's political scenario between two imminently statist forces, marginalizing the nationalist forces"¹¹. The UCD would deny the PNV representation on the key sub-committee of the Constitutional Committee and later, the presidency of the pre-autonomy CGV (*Consejo General Vasco*).¹² If it hoped to delegitimize the PNV and replace its authority with its own, the UCD's policy was tragically flawed. The PNV's marginalization did little to stabilize the Basque polity nor to generate support for the constitutional project.

The Pre-Autonomous *Consejo General Vasco*

In País Vasco an Assembly of Basque Parliamentarians (Assembly) composed of fifteen Basque deputies to the Cortes representing all Basque political parties with parliamentary representation was convened. Its first duty was to negotiate with the UCD Minister of Regions, Manuel Clavero, the form and content of the proposed CGV, the body which was mandated to govern País Vasco as a form of executive committee. The Assembly would later draft the statute of autonomy and negotiate its terms with the central government.¹³ On 2 January 1978, the Cortes extended pre-autonomy powers to the CGV and provision was made for Navarra's possible inclusion in the CGV. On 17 February 1978, the CGV, which was composed of the members of the Assembly, was convened. An immediate difficulty emerged from its inability to agree on a suitable President. A second difficulty arose over misunderstandings of the breadth of the powers to which it could aspire. On the first point, in a move which enraged the PNV, the Socialist Ramón Rubial was elected president of the CGV at the urgings of Suárez and Abril Martorell "who preferred a socialist to head the CGV to a nationalist".¹⁴ This was a serious political mistake, for

The nationalist presence at the head of the pre-autonomous Basque [government] probably would have raised the prestige of the institution putting to rest its political arguments concerning independence, obliged the PNV to assume the responsibilities of government *à propos* the pacification of País Vasco, and broken down in part the existing separation of the nationalist parties and "Madrid."¹⁵

On the question of the CGV's policy entitlements, the UCD, the PSE and PNV had radically different conceptions of its rôle. The UCD viewed the CGV as a mechanism to demonstrate that it *had* broken with the franquist regime - to buy time while the constitution was negotiated. In the opinion of Clavero, the goal of extending pre-autonomous powers to Spain's regions was "intimately linked to the unusual process of the Spanish political transition in which it was necessary to extend provisionally democratic and autonomic institutions... as a form of guaranteeing democratic life while the Constitution was developed."¹⁶ Clavero argues that the function of the pre-autonomy governments was more symbolic than real, for in reality their function "was the initiation of an administrative decentralization insofar as

the powers transferred gradually to the regions did not include any legislative authority nor even any regulatory power, but only administrative control over the services transferred."¹⁷ The government did not want the pre-autonomy statutes' terms to pre-determine the content of the constitution.¹⁸ It was committed to the CGV and wished ardently for its success. The PSE was convinced that with the rise of ETA's terrorist violence failure to imbue the democratic regime with some degree of legitimacy would cause the democratic experiment in País Vasco to fail. If the PNV ever harboured positive intentions for the CGV, they waned when the UCD government, with the PSOE's complicity, moved to marginalize it. The CGV would fail to secure sufficient consensus to institutionalize political rule in Euskadi, far from being a model of democratic functioning, "the various enemies disengaged only long enough to catch their breath and rest to continue fighting fanatically to impose their points of view and interests on the rest of Basque society... denying the adversary bread and the [Basque] citizenry salt."¹⁹ Each party attempted to determine the tone and content of the debate and pass itself off as "the sole representatives of the entire Basque people."²⁰ Little room was left for compromise.²¹

The Strategy of the PNV, 1977-1978

The PNV responded to the government's strategy of marginalization with a tactics of withdrawal from Spain's democratizing institutions. Its goal was to compel the central government and the statist parties to take serious note of its objections to their policies and establish for the PNV a legitimacy independent of the CGV; in fact, its dealings with the CGV was usually motivated more by political opportunism than conviction. Alienation from the CGV and the constitutional process would contribute to its radicalization.²² However, probably more important to the party's radicalization was that of the Basque electorate. If in 1936, the PNV controlled the Basque nationalist movement absolutely, by 1977, it controlled only 70% of the nationalist vote. In 1979 its share would slip to 56%. The electoral strength of radical nationalism showed that Basques would support political agendas more radical than the PNV's. The radical nationalists' political advances exacerbated ideological and programmatic differences within the PNV and threatened its internal stability by serving as a pole of attraction for both the PNV's radical wing and its youth wing. To secure its radicalizing support base, to attempt to usurp ETA's position,²³ to increase its negotiating strength and to express the vision of its aggressive new leader, Carlos Garaikoetxea, the PNV adopted an intransigent political position. To increase its effect, the party called for independence sporadically and attacked "Madrid's" democratic legitimacy. The party's radicalizing rhetoric enhanced the radicalization of the Basque polity.

The PNV went to great pains to define itself not only as the nationalist hegemon, but as the Basque political hegemon. Challenged frontally by the PSE and on its flank by radical nationalism, the

PNV took its distance from Madrid to validate its nationalist legitimacy and to belie left *abertzale* accusations that it was *españolista* because of its autonomism. The PNV refused to condemn ETA, arguing that it did not differ with ETA on its ends but on its means. While this was interpreted by its opponents as an apology for ETA terrorism, many in the PNV who viewed it as a legitimate statement since they had an inclusivist conception of the nationalist community. The PNV's accommodating attitude toward ETA was also a *realpolitik* move. Its argument that ETA violence was the direct offspring of Spanish oppression of Basques - a view endorsed by ETA - discredited the Spanish state and permitted it to avoid confronting ETA by focusing attention on Madrid's policies, not ETA's. Therein, the PNV "on one side, questions the democratic constitutional setup constantly, stimulating therein the political instability that ETA needs for its programme; and, on the other side, it offers itself politically and electorally as the principal barrier to this wave of radicalism that it feeds."²⁴ The PNV hoped to increase its leverage over Madrid by exploiting political tensions created by ETA violence. By denying the legitimacy of the Spanish political system, not only did the PNV hope to "maintain the indefinability of its objectives,"²⁵ but to "maintain the moderate nationalism [-] radical nationalism dialectic to the benefit of the former: the definition of Euskadi's problems in nationalist terminology buttresses the PNV's posture as the sole representative qualified to resolve the problems of the region."²⁶ Effectively, "without sharing or supporting [ETA's violence], the PNV will be the moderate and democratic alternative in the eye of the storm of violence and counter-violence, the beneficiary of negotiations provoked by the mortiferous actions of the *etarras*."²⁷ The PNV was aware that since it represented the largest bloc of Basque voters it was uniquely positioned to win concessions from Madrid.

The Strategy of the PSOE, 1977-1978

The PSOE was firmly committed to participating fully in the construction of the new democratic regime.^{*} Its electoral success in 1977 gave the party "an indisputable stake in the emerging democracy."²⁸ The PSOE worked to reconcile its policies with the stringent political realities of transitional Spain. At the national level, the PSOE adhered loyally to the rules of the political game and avoided postures which would weaken the position of the UCD or Suárez. At the regional level the PSE took a more aggressive stance toward the government. The PSE believed that the state's efforts to confront "the Basque problem" and the behaviour of its security forces contributed to the radicalization of the Basque population.²⁹ Pacification, normalization, *convivencia*^{*} and economic recovery were key PSE issues. The PSE

^{*} During the dictatorship the PSOE had maintained a revolutionary socialist platform. After 1977, it moderated its stance to broaden its appeal and adopted a federal structure. In País Vasco the federal PSOE and the regional PSE retained congruent policies, such that the policies of the regional party reflected largely those of the federal party.

^{*} *Convivencia* was a catch-phrase to refer not only to the peaceful coexistence of the Euskadi's two ethnic communities but also to encourage tolerance for ideological differences.

identified three primary causes for the political problems of País Vasco: i) franquist repression; ii) the persistence of armed violence in País Vasco; and, iii) the mistakes of successive Suárez governments.³⁰ PSE analysis noted that in Euskadi "the process of the democratic transition was distinct from that of the rest of Spain" and that there "the democratic reconciliation apparent throughout Spain had not occurred."³¹ To explain these differences, the PSE argued that the Basque community was: i) internally divided; ii) lashed by violence; iii) suffered a profound socio-economic crisis; iv) plagued by a public order problem; and, v) endowed with a democratic institution, the CGV, which lacked the prestige and powers necessary to be effective.³² To create a cohesive Basque community and prepare the region for autonomous government, the PSE proposed the negotiation of inclusive social, political and economic pacts among all Basque political forces, including ETA.³³ The socialists believed that by failing to devolve effective, if limited, powers to the pre-autonomous bodies, the government lent credibility to the PNV's claims that Madrid was not serious about breaking with the franquist regime and "appears to give credence to those who... say that by this means [dialogue] nothing will be achieved, and to those who continue using violence, terrorism and machine guns."³⁴ The PSE argued that ETA was the greatest beneficiary of the government's obstructionist policies:

at this time [the situation] begins to spin out of control. The protagonist is terrorism, and the national government proceeds without a programme, without knowing what to do, without taking the initiative and is always forced to concede to terms defined as fundamental demands... [i]nstead of having confronted the problem in a resolute manner and having resolved it at the most opportune moment.³⁵

The party criticized ETA's terrorism and its extortionist "*impuesto revolucionario*"³⁶ and those who extended explicit or implicit support to its various branches. The PSOE, like the PCE, believed that "[if] ETA would cease its attacks on the police, and there was a purge of ultra-right officers, combined with an exercise of discipline by the government ...the spiral of violence and reprisals would be broken."³⁷ They agreed with the PCE that "Not only are certain heads of the police not democrats, but they are not effective."³⁸ The PSE also accused the PNV of "playing at a double game, in presenting a public face of a moderate, conservative party, anxious to play its part in building a democratic Spain, while at the same time acting as a respectable cover for ETA terrorism."³⁹

Points of Congruence in the PNV and PSE Programmes

While the PSE and PNV were often at odds, there were some points of conjunction in their programmes. Initially both parties favoured Navarra's full integration in Euskadi. The PSE, like the PNV, believed that political negotiations between ETA and the government were necessary to discover "a dignified... and negotiated end [to the violence] which would permit... [ETA] to justify the abandonment of that which had been their strategy."⁴⁰ While both the PNV and PSOE called on the government to

control the FOP operating in País Vasco, they were convinced that the creation of an autonomous Basque police force was a necessary part of any policy to normalize and pacify País Vasco. In their estimation, the problem of public order had two vertices: the security forces could not enforce the government's public order laws and the government's refusal to devolve police powers contributed to the spiral of violence which increased ETA's relative influence. They also argued that "Spain's infant democracy faced a very real problem in having a police force bitterly distrustful of democracy"⁴¹ and, by extension, that the police force was little interested in securing a regime with which it was at ideological odds. The PSE initiated discussions with the government on the creation of an autonomous police force in País Vasco.⁴² On one hand the government was inclined to accept the argument that by making Basques responsible for policing their own community ETA would become their problem. On the other hand, to have devolved police powers to what would become a PNV-dominated government which attempted to justify ETA terrorism when military officers and scores of policemen and *Guardia Civil* were being killed would have caused a serious police rebellion, if not a *golpe de estado*.

The Strategy of ETAm and the Creation of Herri Batasuna, 1977-1978

Although popular participation in the 1977 elections brought into question its strategy and the rôle of the armed struggle,⁴³ ETAm maintained that "[e]ven with its popular legitimacy, still the political power is weak and its lack... of a Constitution and Statute leaves open the avenues for a negotiation of *la Alternativa KAS*."⁴⁴ ETAm's armed actions were to prove that "at least in Euskadi the governing political system is not really a democracy, but a hidden dictatorship of the military and oligarchy."⁴⁵ To exploit the government's weak political state, ETAm increased its actions "with the end ...of 'animating' the repression and, concomitantly and in particular, forcing the realization of *la Alternativa KAS*."⁴⁶ ETAm wished to present Madrid with only two choices "[e]ither negotiation or outright military occupation."⁴⁷ In July 1977, ETAm announced its two-step military strategy,

- 1) ETA... would continue developing the armed struggle until it achieved for Euskadi the minimum democratic objectives contained in the programme of *la Alternativa KAS*, and...
- 2) posteriorly, would maintain and develop its organization to sustain these conquests and any others that Basque workers obtain afterwards up until the achievement of independence and socialism for Euskadi.⁴⁸

ETAm's violence was thus geared both to pressure the government to negotiate and to guarantee "the permanence of the final objectives [of ETA]" - "the constitution of a Basque socialist state."⁴⁹ Even if the terms of *la Alternativa KAS* were met ETAm believed that continued armed struggle was necessary to guarantee their enactment.⁵⁰ Madrid's ability to withstand its attacks caused ETAm to change its strategy in 1978. It abandoned the second phase of its plan and sought only a "negotiation of *la Alternativa KAS* and a truce."⁵¹ Its argument that the democratic transition had changed nothing in Euskadi with was the

essence of what Rincón refers to as its "creation and re-creation of a permanent franquismo."⁵² ETAm demanded a negotiation with *los poderes fácticos* (the real powers), "to justify its continued existence [as a reaction to] the continuity of the military dictatorship."⁵³

In the aftermath of ETAm\ETA's decision to leave KAS in May 1977, radical nationalists in ETAm's orbit organized to represent the left, rupturist, independentist, *abertzale* constituency created by ETA.⁵⁴ In November 1977, curious amalgam of radical nationalist forces composed of HASI, LAB, LAIA, ESB and ANV, formed the core of what would become Herri Batasuna (HB - United People) in April 1978 (see Appendix 1). HB's mission was to provide the political means to permit the realization of "the national and social reconstruction of the Basque people" by institutionalizing the terms of *la Alternativa KAS*.⁵⁵ Since this required a negotiation between ETAm and the Spanish military, HB was formed to generate the political means necessary for ETAm to force a negotiation, assume the rôle of "representative of the Basque people" and negotiate on its behalf.⁵⁶ As a strictly military organization, ETAm was ill-suited to political activism.⁵⁷ As an electoral coalition configured as a mass popular movement HB's political actions aimed to mobilize popular support for its counter-institutional strategy.⁵⁸

Within HB are two dominant groups: a militant sector drawn from the "most radical group or vanguards in the anti-franquist national and social struggle"⁵⁹, and "a sector of more attenuated militancy" representing HB's support base among Euskadi's disaffected.⁶⁰ As the most confrontational political coalition ETAm\HB was a "pole of attraction... [for] those who felt impotent to convince by any other methods" than violence.⁶¹ Although HB's composite groups were "organizationally independent of ETA, they consider themselves members - and representatives - of a new nationalist community whose principal pole of reference [was]... ETA[m]."⁶² Although ostensibly democratically structured,⁶³ as ETAm's political isolation grew, "the relations of ETAm with KAS and ETAm with HB (through KAS) have evolved progressively from less to more mutual interdependence [and] from less to more dependence of the civil organizations on the military organization."⁶⁴ ETAm determines HB's agenda, announces its

* The relationships among KAS, HB and ETAm are as follows:

[KAS] has had in the organization [ETAm] its axis and base pillar... KAS has concrete political projects which include the tactical alternative of a democratic rupture and the strategic objective of a Basque-speaking, reunified, independent and socialist Euskadi. [KAS] believes that the armed struggle, inter-related with the mass struggle and the institutional struggle in the service of the latter, by the two former, constitutes the key to progress and revolutionary triumphs; that the mass struggle requires... a historic alliance of popular unity whose real consolidation is Herri Batasuna and that the growth and revolutionization of the mass struggle entails the growth of the labour and popular counter-power. (ETAm, In Pedro Ibarra Guell, *La evolución estratégica de ETA (1963-1987)*, (Donostia: Kriselu, 1987), pp.142-143.

The armed organization, ETAm is

the highest expression of the class struggle [and seeks] the realization of political objectives such as those set out in the tactical *la Alternativa KAS* in response to an elemental principle... the harassment of... the Spanish forces of military occupation in Euskadi Sur... to the point of forcing them to reconsider the insecurity and

decisions and informs it of its tasks.⁶⁵ The function of the various organizations within ETAm's orbit is to "justify and protect the armed organization - ETA militar."⁶⁶ Like most other observers, Ibarra argues that the essential function of HB and KAS, and the popular organization in their orbit, has been "the unconditional defence of the armed organization... [and] its armed policy."⁶⁷ While this would serve ETAm well and secure its survival, ETAm's absorption of the true, Basque revolutionary forces caused their social and political marginalization due to their association with ETA terrorism.⁶⁸ ETAm/HB's critics agree that they are anti-democratic forces and argue: "The political practice of Herri Batasuna is not democratic insofar as it assents to the pretensions of which by its stated reasons *as well* as by ETA's force of arms, it has the right to impose its own points of view on the entire population of Euskadi."⁶⁹

The Strategy of ETAp and EIA, 1977-1978

ETAp/EIA differed with ETAm/HB in its belief that the 1977 elections marked the regime's break with the franquist past.⁷⁰ EIA's Bandrés contradicts ETAm/HB's view that *no cambia nada*:

When Franco was alive the problem was black and white. It was us against a fascist national Government. Since Franco's death, the colors have faded, and now we have to learn to distinguish the grays. Our radicals are deforming reality when they insist nothing has changed. The fact that ETA members who were once sentenced to death or long prison terms have been amnestied and are now walking around the streets - that's real change. The fact that as a parliamentarian I have complete freedom to say anything I want also means things are very different today.⁷¹

EIA was the meeting point of two mutually irreconcilable subcultures: a socialist statist solitude and a conservative nationalist solitude.⁷² EIA was an independentist party which accepted that autonomy was an intermediary step to full independence. The party "realized that a revolution which would establish an independent socialist Euskadi was unlikely in the foreseeable future," and believed that in democratic Spain "it was possible to obtain a substantial statute of autonomy and to build a Basque socialist party."⁷³ EIA was prepared to contribute to the construction of the political institutions necessary to rationalize Basque politics,⁷⁴ but not at any cost. The party would reject the Constitution for failing to include independence as one of the political options available to Spain's regions.

The relationship of ETAp to EIA remained problematic, for whatever credibility the *pollmill* theory may have had was undermined by efforts to implement it. ETAp/EIA failed to resolve the

(...continued)

discomfort of their presence in Basque territory as a result of force them to abandon this [territory]... We must continue fighting against the oppressive Spanish state without a truce... so that they have no other remedy but to accept *la Alternativa KAS*. (ETAm, in Ibarra, *La evolución*, p.145)

** By 1983, a new *abertzale* left umbrella organization, the *Movimiento Vasco de Liberación Nacional*, was created which included all the *abertzale* left forces - KAS, HB, *Gestoras Pro-Amnistia*, etc. While a theoretically elaborate construction, the MVLN failed to emerge as more than a programmatic ideal.

question of "the function of an armed organization in a democracy... [and] its relationship with its political association."⁷⁵ ETApM was unable to find appropriate targets and its "efforts to maintain a profile of armed struggle and... differentiate itself from ETA-M... led to a vacillating and incoherent policy and to actions which were often bizarre."⁷⁶ They were often brutal. EIA was caught in a paradox: by participating in the democratic system, and its institutions, the party had accepted their legitimacy, yet its nationalist legitimacy derived in part from ETApM's destabilizing terrorism. ETApM's military policy was inconsistent with EIA's political objectives since it endangered EIA's democratic *raison d'être*. EIA's increased moderation and ETApM's increased radicalization led to their progressive divorce.⁷⁷

Constitutional Negotiations Between the UCD Government and the PNV

The constitutional negotiations concerning País Vasco were conducted solely by the UCD government and the PNV. The PSOE was in general agreement with the UCD on the general structure of the state and the degree of autonomy to which its "historic regions" could aspire. The PNV demanded constitutional recognition of the ancient Basque *fueros* as the basis for Basque self-government.⁷⁸ It wanted the "express and definitive recognition of the particular and original rights to self-government of the four Basque regions... [and] a broad autonomy framework with devolution of the *Conciertos Económicos* struck down in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya in 1937."⁷⁹ Although the PNV's autonomism

would not aspire to the creation of an independent Basque state... [it] would aspire to the formation of a Basque political unit associated voluntarily with Spain, but endowed with... "de facto sovereignty", a "sovereignty" not emanating from nor dependent on Spanish legislation, but born out of the historic rights of the Basque people and a "sovereignty" capable of granting to País Vasco the capacity of self-government necessary to the Basque national affirmation proposed by the PNV.⁸⁰

The PNV's demands were "a means to recognize retrospectively the supposed historic sovereignty of the Basque people, [and] to legitimize therefore, the nationalist interpretation of the Basque nationality."⁸¹

The PNV's position was conditioned powerfully by three factors:

- 1) The fear of seeing its position... eroded by criticism of excessive collaboration with Madrid which would have benefitted the abertzale left.
- 2) The need to maintain the party's internal unity given the orthodox "sabiano" sector's criticism of the autonomist option.
- 3) Confrontation with Madrid has always had an important political rôle in the strategy of nationalism. Tension with Madrid was... an important factor in mobilizing Basque opinion and an important element of ideological and emotional cohesion in [the PNV].⁸²

To control the nationalist agenda, the PNV had to contain radical nationalism⁸³ and knew it could not do so by accepting the proposed constitutional text. The PNV was convinced that recognizing publicly that Euskadi was to be permanently denied independence "would have been opposed by the intransigent nationalists among its own members, and would have... strengthened the appeal of Herri Batasuna among sectors of the population who might otherwise vote for the PNV."⁸⁴ The PNV's maximizing political

strategy was "condemned to clash not only with the unitary and centralist conceptions of the State, but as well with its autonomist and regionalist conceptions".⁸⁵

Madrid's refusal to grant the Basques autonomy in terms of a restoration of their *fueros* was based on its opposition to the implicit recognition of the right to independence included in the PNV's formula: The Government... held that any formula for the recognition of Basque rights must include express mention that... [it is] made within the framework of the Constitution... [T]he Government could not admit to any legitimacy which did not derive from the constitutional text.⁸⁶ While the government was committed to accommodating regional autonomy in the Constitution,^{*} it wished to limit its legislative breadth. This represented "the fear Spaniards have of History which made them reject the PNV's position in the proceedings of the Constitutional committee."⁸⁷ The state also faced other concrete worries. The evolution of Spain's infant democracy was overseen by a jealous, vindictive right and a reactionary officer corps. Committed to the defence of Spain's national unity and "fundamental essence", they believed autonomy would lead to independence.⁸⁸ Three other factors influenced the state's position: i) it feared that a "poorly defined 'state of autonomies' could lead to the Balkanization of the State"; ii) it was leery of granting autonomy to a Basque government "controlled and hegemonized by the PNV"; and, iii) the PNV's stance failed to resolve the question of Navarra's relationship to País Vasco.⁸⁹ The position of the PNV was especially disagreeable to Madrid because "it appeared to link defence of the historic rights of the Basque people...to a nationalist conception inseparable... from [ETA's]".⁹⁰ Anti-Basque sentiment generated by ETA terrorism also influenced the government's position.⁹¹

Intense negotiation between the PNV and UCD ensued in the midst of a brutal terrorist offensive. On 14 September, a Senate constitutional committee passed an amendment to the Constitution which recognized the foral rights of the Basque provinces.⁹² The government overturned the amendment which had been warmly received by the PNV.⁹³ UCD efforts to strengthen the Constitution's centralist content provoked the PNV's unremitting hostility.⁹⁴ A UCD compromise formula to recognize Basque autonomy was rejected by the PNV,⁹⁵ an act which concluded "the dialogue of the deaf."⁹⁶ There was no agreement for two reasons: "because of the PNV's inflexibility... although the PNV proclaimed its will to negotiate... it rejected formulas very close to its own proposals - and the negotiating ineptitude of the Government... by which it rescinded on... formulas which it advanced and the PNV accepted."⁹⁷ The PNV, aware that it would be unable to convince the Cortes to accept its demands, was placed in a delicate position. It could choose: 1) to accept the Constitution, forsake its historic goals and leave the nationalist stage to radical

^{*} In its centrepiece reform legislation, the government committed itself to the "institutionalization of regional peculiarities as an expression of the diversity of peoples that constitute the unity of the Kingdom and the State." (J.A. González Casanova, "Nacionalidades y Autonomías," in *Revista de Occidente*, 54 (1985), p. 78.)

nationalism; 2) to vote "No" and maintain its nationalist legitimacy but leave the moderate political space to the PSE; and, 3) to abstain and maintain its nationalist legitimacy without wholly compromising its commitment to democratic Spain. On 31 October 1978, the PNV abstained in the vote which passed easily in the Cortes. The PNV maintained that it was "prepared to work within the boundaries of the political system set by [the Constitution]".⁹⁸

The PSE and the UCD were incensed by the PNV's stand. The PSE became more bellicose in attacking the PNV. Benegas argued that the PNV's position indicated its desire to delegitimize the Constitution,⁹⁹ and had the effect of polarizing Basque society between "the *abertzale* front united against the Constitution and the statist parties... defending the constitutional project" and "educated the people in rejection of democratic institutions".¹⁰⁰ He criticized it for failing "to take into account that the transition in País Vasco was not being shaped by the [CGV], the advance of democracy or [the vision] which the new democratic institutions represented, but by ETA and terrorism."¹⁰¹ PNV deputies "denied that their abstention showed an unwillingness to work for an end to violence in Euskadi and argued that pacification could not be achieved by the police methods employed by the UCD government."¹⁰² The PNV's abstention was the logical extension of its maximizing strategy by which the Constitution's delegitimization was one possible consequence of the government's rejection of its terms.

The Referendum on the Constitution of 1978

Following the final vote on the Constitution in the Cortes the penultimate step in the constitutional process was the national referendum on the Constitution. The referendum campaign developed in an environment conditioned by ETA violence and the discovery of a right-wing/military coup plot code-named *Operación Galaxia*. The coup plotters led by Colonel Antonio Tejero - who would reappear in February 1981 - planned to kidnap the King and the PM on 18 November and create a "government of national salvation".¹⁰³ In País Vasco the statist political parties campaigned for the Constitution, while the nationalist forces, led by the PNV, mounted a "visceral campaign against it."¹⁰⁴ On 6 December, Spaniards went to the polls and voted solidly in favour of the Constitution. The result was not so clear in País Vasco. Of the votes cast 71.4% in Alava, 63.9% in Guipúzcoa and 70.9% in Vizcaya voted in favour of the Constitution. The issue of the referendum centres on interpretation given to abstention. In all, nearly 54.5% of the Basque electorate abstained in the referendum, in Alava 40.8% of the eligible voters abstained, 46.5% in Guipúzcoa and 56.1% in Vizcaya.¹⁰⁵ John Coverdale calculates

* The EE members and the extreme right voted against the Constitution.

* In elections to the Basque parliament in March 1980, 41.2% of the population abstained. (Patxo Unzueta, *La sociedad vasca y política nacionalista*, (Madrid: El País Aguilar, 1987), p.62.)

the positive abstention rate^{**} at 11.2% in Alava, 28.4% in Guipúzcoa and 24.2% in Vizcaya; numbers which correlate strongly with the PNV's electoral support of 14.1% in Alava, 24.9% in Guipúzcoa and 24.0% in Vizcaya.¹⁰⁶ By calling for abstention rather than a negative vote in the referendum, as ETAm had demanded, the PNV hoped to increase the apparent effect of its abstention campaign by interpreting natural abstention and abstention on the part of those voters in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya inclined to vote for the statute who feared ETA's violence¹⁰⁷ as support for its position. The true character of the abstention *per se* is indeterminate, but it was high relative to the Basque vote in favour of the Constitution.

The PNV's abstention campaign in conjunction with ETAm's violence destabilized the Basque polity. This was not necessarily the PNV's goal, but it was willing to run this risk to maintain control over its own political base and increase its bargaining power in preparation for negotiations of the autonomy statute.¹⁰⁸ Using the data on abstention in the referendum, the PNV argued "Euskadi has rejected the Spanish Constitution".¹⁰⁹ ETAm held that "since *the Constitution does not satisfy the democratic aspirations of Basques*, and... *the people have rejected it*, ETA is legitimated to act extra-Constitutionally, without excluding a recourse to force."¹¹⁰ Ibarra argues that the vote in the referendum is one of the factors "that will permit ETA to confront the future in more favourable conditions".¹¹¹ The abstention campaign permitted ETAm to be identified as a legitimate part of the larger nationalist community and allowed ETA to "relegitimize its activity in new social terrain."¹¹² Moreover, the PNV's tacit or inadvertent contribution to ETAm's anti-systemic offensive legitimized ETAm's "fantasy according to which it acted in the name of the entire nationalist community, and, therefore, the majority of the Basque population... ETA counted on the *explicit* support of a minority... [and] the *implicit* support of the majority."¹¹³ ETAm presumed to voice "the true aspirations" of the PNV's base.¹¹⁴

ETA Terrorism in the Development of the Constitution

If up to 1977, ETA terrorism had maintained a tempo similar to that of the preceding years, it changed in 1978. To disrupt the constitutional process, ETAm launched a frightening "strategy of provocation directed against the army and aimed at feeding the involuntarist temptations which nestled in certain sectors of the army bureaucracy."¹¹⁵ Even ETAm, complained that ETAm's goal was "to destabilize the entire system",¹¹⁶ there is strong evidence to indicate that ETAm's goal was not a *golpe*.¹¹⁷ While ETAm claimed to be "indifferent to the nature of the Spanish state, democratic or non-

^{**} Positive abstention refers to the difference between the natural abstention rate in a particular election and that produced by the nationalists' abstention campaign as a measure of its effectiveness. (Coverdale, "Regional," p.242.)

^{*} When Alava's abstention in the 1931 referendum on autonomy was higher than the votes in favour, the PNV's leaders "said that the only thing that counts in a Referendum, in an election, are the votes and not the abstentions." (Txiki Benegas, *Euskadi: sin la paz nada es posible*, (Bilbao: Editorial Arges Vergara, 1981), p. 90.)

democratic",¹¹⁸ it wished to force Madrid to choose between a continuation of ETA's violence and face the spectre of a *golpe*, or negotiate ETAm's platform, *la Alternativa KAS*. While ETAm was by far the most active, lethal and effective of the various ETA offshoots, ETApm and the CAA (*Comandos Autónomas Anticapitalistas*)^{**} would contribute their share to the carnage. ETAm operated with relative impunity throughout Spain, while ETApm encountered serious problems in its efforts to mount a sustained campaign of violence. The FSE were largely ineffective in preventing ETAm's attacks, arresting the perpetrators or destroying its infrastructure. In the first third of 1978 eight people died in ETA terrorist violence and forty-six were wounded. In the second third of the year ETAm and ETApm together killed eleven, wounded twenty-two and kidnapped one.¹¹⁹ In the final third of the year, ETAm, ETApm and CAA killed forty-five people and wounded at least twenty-one others. In total, ETA killed 64 people, most of whom were victims of ETAm, and kidnapped 4. The BVE killed 4 Basques.¹²⁰

At most critical junctures of the constitutional process, by varying the level of violence and by virtue of its choice of victims, ETAm placed itself at the centre of the political debate. This manifested its "political necessity of impeding any solution whatsoever to the Basque problem which would mean its marginalization".¹²¹ It was ETAm's belief that since the state lacked a Constitution it was vulnerable to its armed pressure, for once the constitution was approved the Spanish government would have no incentive to negotiate.¹²² In mid-1978, as constitutional negotiations proceeded on the question of regional autonomy, the political situation began to spiral out of control.¹²³ ETAm rejected the treatment of the regional autonomy in the Constitution and concluded that "parliamentary tactics had failed and a new offensive of armed attacks was necessary".¹²⁴ On 21 July, during Congress' final deliberations on the Constitution, ETAm killed General Sánchez Ramos, the first attack of its kind on a general.¹²⁵ Suárez believed that ETAm aimed to "provoke the armed forces and the police".¹²⁶ In August, as the Senate approved the draft constitution, ETAm killed 4 policemen in a "rear-guard attempt to derail the nation's progress toward firmly rooted democratic institutions."¹²⁷ In October, with final approval by a joint session of the two houses of the Cortes set for 31 October, ETAm and CAA killed 13 people.¹²⁸

ETA's threat to the democratic state caused the PNV to organize a 28 October demonstration in Bilbao October against political violence in País Vasco. It had to condemn "a campaign which had reached frightening proportions."¹²⁹ Vice-President Mortorell's statement that "no autonomy statue would be granted while the violence continued"¹³⁰ increased pressure on the PNV. While ETAm, HB and KAS

^{**} The CAA operated solely in Euskadi and little was known about the organization. The CAA was thought to undertake actions ETAm was unwilling to accept responsibility for them in its name. (Rincón, *ETA*, p.137)

^{*} The PNV condemned terrorism but "made the intransigence and "violence" of Madrid equally responsible for the deterioration of the situation." (Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpuria, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979) p. 247.)

demanded its cancellation and condemned the PNV's decision, Garaikoitxea, in a rare public challenge to ETA, argued that "those who wanted the demonstration to be cancelled should demand that ETA-M... call a ceasefire."¹³¹ The march was a success for the PNV. Not only did 60,000 people march through Bilbao under the banner "Por una Euskadi libre y en paz",¹³² but the march demonstrated publicly the party's political strength.¹³³ It was also "the first step in the [PNV's] definitive rupture with ETA... [for if] until this time... [it] considered ETA's armed activism mistaken but legitimate, after this time it sees it as totally illegitimate."¹³⁴ ETAm/HB, which launched a counter-demonstration, viewed the PNV as

finally having become a 'Spanish' party, by having come out against ETA-M's struggle... It seemed to ETA-M supporters that as the PNV had definitively abandoned the struggle for Basque independence, and the political formations inspired by ETA-PM were fragmenting, Herri Batasuna and ETA-M were the only legitimate heirs of the nationalist tradition.¹³⁵

In the five weeks following the final vote on the Constitution ETAm killed 14 more people and wounded 19.¹³⁶ The day before the national referendum on the Constitution ETAm shot dead 3 policemen in San Sebastián to intimidate voters.¹³⁷ To underline the seriousness of their demands and their disdain for the democratic system, ETAm killed 12 more policemen and a judge to the year's end. Its range of victims grew with the number of its victims. Initially ETA killed only those people who had enforced Franco's repression of the Basque people. By 1978 ETA's list of victims included military men, journalists, political activists, engineers, construction workers, judges, municipal politicians, drug dealers, businessmen and relatives of security forces' personnel. "Before ETA chose its victims on the basis of their presumed socio-political characteristics, now these characteristics are attributed to their victims because ETA has killed them."¹³⁸ "ETA has moved bit by bit down the slope that leads from confused, but sincere, moral compromise against franquist authority to the suspension of *all* morals."¹³⁹

Popular Reaction to ETA's Violence, 1978

Reaction to ETA's violence was varied. If it was generally condemned and its practitioners vilified, expressions of condemnation were not always unqualified. Popular antipathy to ETA was expressed following especially grotesque actions. In 1978 two ETAm actions outraged Basque popular opinion. Its bomb attack on the Lemóniz nuclear power plant which killed two workers in March prompted Basque unions to condemn ETAm unanimously and qualify its methods as the tactics of "reactionary elements... [hoping] to provoke a return to the days of the dictatorship."¹⁴⁰ ETAm claimed that the deaths were accidental, that it had given warning in advance of the blast,¹⁴¹ and that it would "join in a sentiment of solidarity with the families of the dead workers."¹⁴² The substance of the workers'

* ETAm's denial of responsibility for its accidental killings caused J.M Bandrés, to state "the only bombs that don't explode are the ones that it does not place." (Rincón, ETA, p.159.)

condemnation was given form in anti-ETA demonstrations, which attracted 10,000 marchers.¹⁴³ In late June, ETAm shot dead J.M. Portell, a prominent Basque journalist, "alleging that he was "an agent of the Spanish government".¹⁴⁴ The outrage generated by Portell's murder consumed all Basques and their political parties. While the PNV condemned ETAm for the murder, it refused to join "Spanish" parties in protesting ETAm's outrage.¹⁴⁵ ETApm was unequivocal in its denunciation, although it later recanted.¹⁴⁶

The Strategy of the Government to Combat ETA Terrorism, 1978

The government attempted to exploit popular reaction to ETA to refurbish its own image as the bulwark against extremist violence, to enact measures to better arm the FSE in their fight against ETA,¹⁴⁷ and to remove incompetent police officials. Recognizing that its anti-terrorist measures had failed to thwart ETA's capacity to operate with virtual impunity the government moved to make its security forces more effective. The government recruited German help to create an effective, elite, anti-terrorist force and develop a congruent anti-terrorism policy. However, the government not only failed to eliminate *incontrolado* violence directed against ETA and Basque nationalists, but it was incapable of forcing its security forces to exercise discipline. These failures plagued Madrid's efforts to tackle ETA militarily and politically. If ETA's violence seemed to be a threat to the wider Basque community and its political goals, Madrid could legitimize its rôle in Euskadi as a bulwark against it. Contrarily, as long as it remained incapable of preventing atrocities by *incontrolados* and its own security forces, ETA's violence was viewed by many Basques as a legitimate response to state actions. Forced to choose among ETA, the FSE or the *incontrolados* - since ETA's violence was not generally directed against the Basque population - Basques were more likely to forgive it than the state. For example, with anti-ETA sentiment high after ETAm's 29 June assassination of J.M. Portell, on 1 July the government passed harsh anti-terrorist legislation giving police far-reaching powers.¹⁴⁸ The next day, the BVE machine-gunned former ETAv leader Juan José Etxabe and his wife in St. Jean de Luz. Etxabe was severely wounded and his wife was killed.* The attack was politically disastrous, undermining efforts to isolate ETA in the Basque community.

There was more to the government's effort to combat ETA than repression. In mid-1978, convinced "some of ETA's leaders wished to abandon the violence by a dignified means",¹⁴⁹ important Basque political and police figures agreed to attempt negotiations with ETA insofar as they did not threaten to undermine the democratic system.¹⁵⁰ ETA accepted the idea of a negotiated solution, but

** Portell had served as an intermediary between the Spanish government and ETA in the cease-fire negotiations prior to the 1977 elections and was writing a second book on ETA.

* In August 1978, in retaliation for BVE attack, ETApm killed a policeman in Fuenterrabía, thereby ending its 1977 truce. (Clark, *Insurgents*, p.110.)

demanded that the negotiations be made public as *per* its strategy of negotiations. ETAm's demands and its murder of Portell caused the attempt to fail. The route of negotiation would be blocked after December 1978, when ETAm leader *Argala* was killed by the BVE. *Argala* possessed "the historic legitimacy and political authority to undertake a negotiation."¹⁵¹ He was "the person within ETA who tried hardest to find a way out [of the violence]".¹⁵² The killing strengthened ETAm's intransigent hard-line.¹⁵³

Political Events of Early 1979

The conclusion of the constitutional process opened the way for the development of the Basque autonomy project. On 30 December 1978, having won the approval of all Basque parties including those without parliamentary representation, except HB, the Assembly of Basque Parliamentarians presented a draft autonomy statute for consideration by the Cortes. Suárez's decision to call a national election to legitimize the new, constitutional regime and strengthen both his own and the UCD's leadership position delayed debate of its terms. ETAm launched an immediate offensive to bring into question the government's capacity to hold the elections in País Vasco. In the two months prior to the elections, ETAm killed nineteen people and ETAm kidnapped and "kneecapped" three more.¹⁵⁴ *Incontrolados* shot dead an ETAm leader in France in retaliation for ETA's attacks. The violence "strained relations between the military and civilian authorities in Spain more than at any other time since the death of Francisco Franco."¹⁵⁵ Demonstrations by rightists erupted and armoured vehicles appeared on the streets of various Spanish cities. The King called on the military to maintain its discipline. Interior Minister Martín Villa stated in a TV interview, "Either ETA finishes us off, or we finish off ETA."¹⁵⁶ In Bilbao counterterrorist units launched an immediate operation against ETA¹⁵⁷ which eased pressures on Madrid. In light of its tactical goal of a negotiation, in February, "ETA[m] proposed publicly for the first time a *truce*", if Madrid would accept the terms of *la Alternativa KAS*.¹⁵⁸ The government rejected ETAm's offer and saturated País Vasco with police to provide security for voters, and French officials removed ETA sympathizers from the border area. The elections proceeded normally despite ETAm's threats of retaliation against those who voted. Four days after the elections, ETAm shot dead a retired general.

The 1979 General Elections

In the 1979 election campaign a "normal" political discourse emerged between the UCD and PSOE. With polls indicating a close race between the two parties, both went on the offensive to win votes, which eroded the consensus which had characterized Spanish politics to this point. As Table V.a. shows,

¹⁵¹ Ibarra argues that this offer was a legitimate and substantial offer. (Ibarra, *La evolución*, p.121.)

when Spaniards went to the polls on 9 March 1979, the UCD won 35.0% of the popular vote and 168 seats in the Congress of Deputies. It would rely on the support of various opposition parties to maintain

Table V.a. General Elections to Congress of Deputies, 1977-1979

	Results in Spain				Results in País Vasco			
	June 1977 General		March 1979 General		June 1977 General		March 1979 General	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
UCD	34.7	165	35.0	168	12.8	4	16.9	5
PSOE	29.2	118	30.5	121	28.1	7	19.2	5
PCE	9.2	20	10.8	23	4.6	-	4.7	-
AP/CD	8.3	16	6.0	9	7.0	1	3.4	-
PNV	1.6	8	1.7	7	28.8	8	27.6	7
EE	0.3	1	0.5	1	6.3	1	8.0	1
HB	-	-	1.0	3	4.3	-	15.1	3
Other	16.7	22	14.6	18	8.2	-	5.5	-
Total	100.0	350	100.0	350	100.0	21	100.0	21

Sources: Llera, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema de partidos," p.279 and Coverdale, "Regional," pp.235 and 246.

its governing position. In País Vasco where the PNV had turned the campaign into a contest for political supremacy, the statist parties suffered an important defeat. The nationalist parties increased their share of the total vote from 39.3% to 50.5%. The electoral strength of Basque nationalism, particularly that of HB and EE, and the decline of the statist vote, inverted the strategy of marginalization of the state.¹⁵⁹ The electoral result extended implicit support to ETAm and ETApM through their respective political arms. HB refused to take its seats in both the Cortes and the CGV to challenge the legitimacy of these institutions and to avoid "the problems which could have arisen from the coalition's disparate composition and the lack of agreement on political issues other than Basque independence."¹⁶⁰

Table V.b. General and Provincial Election Results in País Vasco, 1977-1979

	June 1977 General		March 1979 General		April 1979 Provincial	
	No. Vote	% Vote	No. Vote	% Vote	No. Vote	% Vote
PNV	290,000	28.8	277,000	27.5	349,000	36.9
PSOE	283,000	28.1	192,000	19.1	147,000	15.6
UCD*	129,900	12.8	170,000	16.9	115,000	12.2
HB	43,000	4.3	152,000	15.1	186,000	19.7
EE	63,000	6.3	80,000	7.9	69,000	7.3
PCE	46,000	4.6	47,000	4.7	42,000	4.4
AP/CD	70,000	7.0	34,000	3.4	-	-
Other	83,000	8.2	55,000	5.5	37,000	3.9
Total	1,007,000	100.0	1,007,000	100.0	945,000	100.0

Sources: Llera, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," pp.270-280 and Jorge Benedicto Millan and Miguel Requena, "Las terceras elecciones al Parlamento vasco," *Leviatán: Revista de hechos y ideas*, NS 26 (1986), 30.

* The AP/CD vote is included with the UCD vote in the 1979 provincial elections.

The general elections were followed by provincial elections in April 1979, in which councillors to provincial assemblies and municipal governments throughout Spain were chosen. It was expected that the

Nationalists would do particularly well in País Vasco since they fielded stronger candidates and had better local policy programmes than the statist. As well, statist party supporters were generally more interested in national politics than regional politics. Not only did the nationalist parties perform well, but HB surpassed the PSE to become the second political force in Euskadi, as Table V.b. shows.

Negotiation of the Basque Autonomy Statute

As the government prepared to consider the terms of the draft autonomy statute originally presented to the Cortes on 30 December 1980, the political situation in País Vasco had changed greatly. In an environment conditioned by extreme ETA violence and social radicalization, HB's electoral strength threw a scare into the government. In Madrid, the PNV came to be seen not as its "principal antagonist... but as a mediator, as a force of moderation in the face of the incomprehensible phenomenon that ETA... earned the electoral support that it did."¹⁶¹ The government was persuaded to end its strategy of marginalization, and moved to win the PNV's support for the autonomy process. Questions which in 1978 were treasonous were cause for only limited argument by 1979.¹⁶² For Madrid, the danger of the PNV's radicalization and the displacement of moderate nationalism by the radical variety was balanced by the fear that too much movement on its part could provoke a *golpe*. Therein,

Suárez, with a weak minority Government, was disposed to make all kinds of concessions without measuring their true political and historic consequences. In part, it was motivated by the false belief that the autonomic leap forward was decisive in ending ETA terrorism.¹⁶³

As the negotiations on autonomy proceeded, the PNV progressively increased its autonomic demands.¹⁶⁴

The PNV adopted a more confrontational political style which reflected not only its growing self-confidence.¹⁶⁵ but its fears of being surpassed by HB. The fact that the real, legal terms of the autonomy statute were on the table also spurred this change. The PNV's political manoeuvrability was strengthened by the PSOE's decision to leave the nationalist party free to negotiate the autonomy statute as a means to cause its "incorporation ...in the juridical system of democratic Spain."¹⁶⁶ A certain unity of opinion among the statist parties had emerged on issues concerning autonomy, the need for a reform of the police and other questions of particular relevance to País Vasco.¹⁶⁷ The PNV won the support of the full spectrum of Basque political parties, except HB, for the proposed autonomy statute. The PNV organized an assembly of provincial and municipal councillors, mayors and deputies to the Cortes in a show of political support for the proposed autonomy statute. This increased its bargaining power and political stature.¹⁶⁸ The PNV became the voice of the Basque people.¹⁶⁹ The party regarded the draft autonomy statute as virtually sacrosanct,¹⁷⁰ while Madrid viewed it as a discussion paper open to negotiation. ETAPm threatened violence if the government tampered with the statute.¹⁷¹ Although most problems

pertaining to the devolution of powers over language, education, tax collection, and radio and television were resolved, tensions arose between the PNV and the government over the constitutionality of some of the draft statutes terms.¹⁷² Negotiations initiated between Suárez, Garaikoitxea and opposition leaders in mid-1979 opened the way for the autonomy pending final approval in a referendum in País Vasco. Concessions by the central government to Basque demands for control over policing duties in País Vasco were met. While the central government maintained overall responsibility for matters of internal security, the Basque government won the right to form its own autonomous police force, the *Ertzaintza*. As the force became more technically competent it would assume responsibilities in the ultra-sensitive area of counter-terrorism. The *conciertos económicos* were reestablished which extended responsibility for tax collection to the Basque government. It would have broad powers over the disbursement of these monies, however it would transfer a portion of the tax revenue, a *cupo*, to the central government.

One of the most significant issues broached in the development of the autonomy statute was the question of Navarra. Unification of all Basques in a single Basque state was a historic nationalist goal. Under Garaikoitxea, the PNV pushed aggressively for the province's democratic integration in the CAV under the slogan "*Nafarroa Euskadi da*" - (Navarra is Euskadi). History was against inclusion. As a former kingdom, Navarra had never had a mediated relationship with Madrid.¹⁷³ As well, Basques had never formed a unified political community. Identification with nationalist parties was weak and the PNV's influence was limited in Navarra. In the 1977 and 1979 general elections and 1979 provincial elections nationalist parties polled 7.0%, 17.4% and 16.2% respectively.¹⁷⁴ Rejection of incorporation by Navarra's political parties stemmed from popular reaction to ETAm/HB's exhortations to annex Navarra forcibly;¹⁷⁵ fear of endangering its historic relationship to Spain;¹⁷⁶ and fear of having its autonomy reduced and personality subsumed by the larger Basque community. Navarra's inclusion was an irrefutable precept of ETAm/HB's nationalist dream. HB argued "Euskadi is a nation that has rights which cannot be forfeited or decided by voting"¹⁷⁷ meaning that "the political unity of the Basque nation [could not] depend on a vote".¹⁷⁸ The PNV could not divest itself of the issue of Navarra, given its symbolic importance to nationalists and to Garaikoitxea personally* and the party's fear that radical nationalists and its aranist faction would accuse it of *españolismo*.

ETA Terrorism during the Autonomy Negotiations

The tremendous progress in negotiating an acceptable autonomy statute for País Vasco in 1979 was threatened seriously by ETA violence. ETAm and ETApn pressed home their attacks to bring into

* His support in the PNV derived from its desire to win Navarra's adhesion to the Basque political community. (Conversation with Andres de Blas Guerrero, 2 March, 1992.)

question the viability of a negotiated solution between the PNV and UCD governments. As long as independence was excluded from the autonomy statute, Navarra remained beyond its pale, the FSE remained stationed in País Vasco and Basques remained in jail - in other words, as long as *la Alternativa KAS* remained un-negotiated - the violence would continue. The summer offensive peaked both in July and September as ETA gunmen acted first to impede the development of the autonomy process and later to provoke the government to renege on its terms and to crackdown in País Vasco.

To show signs of life, to differentiate itself from ETAm, to capture some of the political prestige heretofore monopolized by ETAm\HB, and to lend credibility to the socialist content of its *polimili* strategy¹⁷⁹, ETApM took aim at the UCD government and so-called economic targets. In June, as EIA/EE and the PNV organized massive demonstrations to protest UCD moves to limit the breadth of autonomy, ETApM waded into the fray when it kidnapped UCD deputy Gabriel Cisneros.¹⁸⁰ Cisneros escaped his captors but was gravely wounded in the course of his flight. The attack was severely embarrassing to EIA/EE's moderating deputies.¹⁸¹ ETApM's summer bombing campaign began with bomb attacks at Spanish tourist resorts, which damaged a number of hotels and killed and injured some foreign tourists. As well, ETApM (and ETAm) bombed French-owned businesses and banks to intimidate the French government into refusing to cooperate in the Spanish government's anti-terrorism effort. On 29 July, two weeks after Suárez and Garaikoitxea successfully negotiated a solution to the outstanding problems facing the autonomy statute which won EIA/EE approval, an ETApM *comando* detonated three bombs simultaneously in two train stations and at the airport in Madrid. Five people were killed and over 100 were wounded. ETApM argued these actions were necessary to pressure Madrid to move Basque prisoners from Soria to a Basque prison, and to protest police use of torture. The murder of civilians in indiscriminate bomb attacks provoked popular revulsion which discredited the organization, its strategy and its alienated political wing, EIA/EE. The attacks incensed EIA/EE and its most prominent spokesman Bandrés, who stated that "Apart from any other consideration, this action is politically inexplicable."¹⁸² In response to EIA/EE's criticisms ETApM called off its campaign, which pacified EIA/EE temporarily. However, the "rapprochement could only be temporary as an armed group could not justify its existence while maintaining a permanent ceasefire."¹⁸³ In November 1979, ETApM would kidnap another UCD deputy, Javier Rupérez. This "placed EE's members of parliament in an impossible position".¹⁸⁴ Politically disastrous to EE, ETApM managed to attain its ends when 26 ETApM prisoners were freed in January 1980.¹⁸⁵ The political impact of ETApM's attacks was limited, as the government used them to weaken support for ETApM and ETAm. But they did have a significant economic effect and their kidnappings won concessions from Madrid and ransoms provided much of the ETPM's finances.

ETA, too, escalated its armed offensive and by sticking to its strategy of murdering policemen, alleged informers and leading members of the armed forces, it contained the number of civilian casualties, which gave them a more benign image with the public.¹⁸⁶ However, ETA's campaign was much more threatening to the regime than was ETA's. ETA's attacks "produced enormous resentment among the officer corps, and inevitably raised the spectre of an armed coup."¹⁸⁷ ETA also carried out attacks to support HB's abstention campaign against the referendum, to undermine the Basque Autonomy Statute and to demonstrate that it was a force to contend with. Succinctly, in addition to its positive goal of forcing a negotiation of *la Alternativa KAS*, ETA had escalated its violence for fear that resolution of the conflict between Euskadi and Madrid would reduce it to an armed group representing the rump of the Basque population within HB's orbit.¹⁸⁸ After having killed four people in early October, ETA declared a "technical truce" for the two weeks leading to the referendum on the Statute.¹⁸⁹

The Referendum on the Autonomy Statute

The autonomy statute went to a referendum in País Vasco on 25 October 1979. It was approved overwhelmingly by Basque voters with 50% of the votes cast in favour and 3% opposed.¹⁹⁰ Abstention was extremely high at over 40%.¹⁹¹ While ETA\HB led an aggressive campaign against the autonomy statute, the PNV did not consider the abstention a serious obstacle to legitimizing it. Rather, it was endorsed enthusiastically by Arzalluz, the president of the PNV, who stated that it was superior to that of 1936 and that the Basque people "Enjoy a level of autonomy unequalled in any European country."¹⁹²

With the autonomy statute, País Vasco obtained institutions

which it had never had in its history... a unitary government for Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya (the 1936 Government only governed in Vizcaya); a democratic Parliament (non-existent in 1936); Juntas Generales, restored as a tribute to the foral tradition (non-existent as well in 1936)... In sum, in 1979, a Statute infinitely superior on every count to that of 1936 was approved. Compared to the present Basque autonomy statute, the foral regime prior to 1839 is reduced to a sporadic assembly of villagers.¹⁹³

Although the statute granted Basques a wide range of powers, it would later become apparent that it is one thing to be entitled to powers and quite another to have them devolved with the means to implement them.

The achievement of an autonomy statute acceptable to all democratic Basque political forces "broke the unity of the nationalist community."¹⁹⁴ Even ETA's stated that while the autonomy statute did not mean "either democracy or freedom... it was a good instrument to reach them".¹⁹⁵ While in the PNV and EIA\EE strong disagreements arose between advocates of autonomy for Euskadi and those of independence,¹⁹⁶ the moderates persevered. ETA condemned the statute and all political parties which accepted it. ETA argued it was "merely a measure of decentralisation which did nothing to advance the cause of independence."¹⁹⁷ Not only was this a direct attack on ETA's but an appeal to the PNV's

independentist factions which it wished to recruit for HB. HB's campaign of political mobilization and ETAm's armed offensive composed ETAm\HB's strategy of tension to overturn the autonomy statute, which further divided Basque society into two antagonistic camps.¹⁹⁸ This strategy was motivated by fears that improvements to the autonomy statute: "narrowed the gap between the PNV and the government," and would weaken support for independence.¹⁹⁹

The State's Policies to Combat ETA Terrorism

Throughout 1979 ETA's violence became an increasingly greater problem for the government. However, Practically, between 1977 and 1979 nothing was accomplished to address the problem of violence.²⁰⁰ In 1979, Basque terrorists killed 78 people in Spain, while the BVE killed 7 *etarras*. The government's problem was to find a policy mix which would allow it to "placate the army and... come to terms with mainstream nationalism, as a means of isolating both branches of ETA."²⁰¹ Particularly serious outbreaks of terrorist violence precipitated meetings with the security forces and political leaders, during which the government advanced increasingly severe counter-terrorist measures to silence ETA and win the security forces' support. The government was hard-pressed to isolate ETA politically or socially since its security forces not only failed to obey the operational strictures imposed on them, but demonstrated their unfailing penchant for committing atrocities. As the level of ETA violence escalated, police crackdowns on ETA produced increased numbers of prisoners which caused allegations of police torture to multiply²⁰² and not only did this feed the spiral, but so too did "police harassment of peaceful activities."²⁰³ For example, on 3 June police shot dead a woman at a peaceful anti-nuclear demonstration in País Vasco. The next day ETAm killed two police officers in Madrid in retaliation,²⁰⁴ and HB organized strikes and demonstrations which "won support from a wider range of people than those who would generally support Herri Batasuna."²⁰⁵ The Basque people generally failed to believe that the government was able, or willing, to control the police.²⁰⁶ ETAm exploited the security forces' atrocities to breath new life into the action-reaction spiral. The years of ETA violence and police counter-violence had produced a phenomenon by which "violence was transformed, in a particular social sector, as an almost essential constitutive element of Basque nationality."²⁰⁷ The behaviour of the FSE fuelled PNV demands that control over the police should be devolved to the Basque parliament. This did little to still the fears of the FSE. While ETAm remained as committed as ever to its armed struggle, there was evidence that Basques were tiring of both the violence and the conditions of economic decline to which the violence had contributed significantly. Capital flight, a flight of entrepreneurs, bankruptcies, a profound crisis in the heavy industry base of the Basque economy and high unemployment characterized País Vasco at the year's end. Hopes were high that the situation would improve with the elections of a new Basque parliament and the implementation of the terms of the autonomy statute.

The government and the opposition parties hoped that by accommodating the PNV in the autonomy statute it would assume its responsibilities as a moderate leader of the Basque nationalist community. Yet this would not happen. Inasmuch as it had been uniquely competent to address itself to the preservation of Basque culture during franquism, it was poorly suited to articulate a new nationalist vision. Part of its problem was that ETAm had impeded its full development as a catch-all political party. The other part was that the PNV's internal contradictions made its ideology "more apt to act as a flag of resistance than as a cohesive cement for the construction of a political community."²⁰⁸ Effectively, having once won power in Euskadi, the PNV, which had placed a premium on its achievement, did not know what to do with it.²⁰⁹ Garaikoitxea stated that should ETA not abandon its violent strategy, "we could be forced to settle this problem in our own home, among Basques."²¹⁰ He implied that with the full implementation of the autonomy statute, the PNV would be prepared to combat ETA violence. Yet it appeared that País Vasco lacked a political leadership competent to confront the problem of violence and the mutations it was producing in Basque society.²¹¹ In fact, shortly after the referendum on the autonomy statute, Garaikoitxea stated: "This statute is not only ours, but also [ETA's]... because they have had an influence, direct or indirect, and they have also struggled for the people."²¹² Moreover,

the PNV will never -or, at least, has not done it up to now- adopt attitudes that go further than condemnations and on to an open and clear confrontation with ETA. At its root [the *etarras*] are their children. They are considered to be mistaken nationalists. They form part of the nationalist community. They are *abertzales* who fight for the ideas of Sabino Arana. The PNV has complexes about nationalists who are more radical than themselves. Therefore, they are afraid to ally themselves with the statist political parties, *españolistas* - as they say - to bring ETA to an end.²¹³

The PNV "wished to bring an end to the terrorism without the help of anyone... [knowing] this would be politically very profitable and fear[ing] that others would perceive the gains."²¹⁴ Effectively, ETA's ideological intransigence. "fanaticized by violence feeds off the protection of traditional nationalism's exclusivism... continues being the unifying element in the confrontation with the "foreigner", which is not only, symbolically, Madrid, but also and above all, in the heart of Basque society itself."²¹⁵

The PSE became a more committed champion of pacification, normalization and coexistence, and its attacks on ETA achieved a more ferocious character. When Germán González, a PSOE militant in Guipúzcoa who had campaigned in favour of the autonomy statute, was shot dead by a CAA *comando* two days after the 25 October referendum, the PSE's hostility to ETA welled up. It called for a general strike in Euskadi which was supported by the PCE and CCOO. A PSE leader called the assassination a "declaration of war" against the PSOE.²¹⁶ Benegas qualified the PSOE and popular response as "one of the most important reactions against ETA in País Vasco,"²¹⁷ when 250,000 people demonstrated against ETA.²¹⁸ While EIA/EE condemned the murder and HB stated it considered the murder "a grave political error",²¹⁹ Ramón Rubial's suggestion that the government might retaliate employing similar methods

incensed nationalists.²²⁰ The PNV condemned Rubial and the PSE for its statement and the CAA claimed González was murdered for being a police informer*, and not for being a socialist.** The CAA then warned the party that it did not rule out further actions against the PSOE or its leaders.²²¹

Elections to the First Basque Parliament

Elections to the Basque Parliament were held on 9 March, 1980. The campaign unfolded in the midst of a savage terrorist offensive worsened by *incontrolado* violence. ETA violence, which generated 19 victims in the first two months of 1980, spawned an *incontrolado* reaction which killed 8 people. New anti-terrorism police units were dispatched to País Vasco following the massacre of 6 *Guardia Civil* on 1 February, 1980. New outbreaks of military unrest by right-wing officers upset with ETA terrorism and the autonomy statute created new tensions. The PNV added to the mix in January 1980 when it withdrew its members from the Cortes to protest the Government's handling of particular transferences to the still-functioning CGV in Vitoria. This action was a component of the PNV's new strategy of confrontation with Madrid which would be electorally profitable for it. The PNV's decision was likely motivated by fears that HB would capitalize electorally on the region's discontent and portray it as Madrid's toady for supporting the autonomy statute.²²² The PNV's withdrawal had at least two negative long-term effects: one, it gave weight to ETA's claim that "no cambia nada," which helped it to justify its argument that the statute was meaningless since it had excluded the terms of *la Alternativa KAS*; and two, it deprived Basques of any good will the Suárez government may have retained.

The results of the first elections to the CAV Parliament represented a concrete victory for Basque nationalism, especially the radical variant, and "showed the advantage which Basque nationalism derived from the polarisation produced by the confrontation with the Spanish state."²²³ As Table V.c. shows, not only did the overall nationalist vote increase from 39.3% in 1977 and 50.5% in 1979 to 64.4% in 1980, but the significance and composition of the vote did as well. The PNV gained support based to some extent on its success in negotiating the Autonomy Statute and its radicalizing nationalist posture. The PNV's posture had validated the goals of radical nationalism, if not its means. HB's firm support confirmed its status as the second Basque political formation. The PSE lost votes due to weak confidence in its leader and higher abstention which hurt it more than others. EE's electoral support grew as did its share of the vote. The two right wing parties increased their vote marginally. The results were a serious defeat for statist political forces and gave fresh impetus to the nationalist formations, especially HB.

* No evidence was produced.

** The CAA's attacks on PSOE, CCOO, UGT and PCE headquarters and personnel gives lie to these claim.

Table V.c. General, Provincial and Autonomic Elections in Euskadi, 1977-1980

	January '77 General		March '79 General		April '79 Provincial	February '80 Autonomic	
	% Vote	No. Seats	% Vote	No. Seats	% Vote	% Vote	No. Seats
PNV	28.8	8	27.5	7	36.9	38.0	25
PSOE	28.1	7	19.1	5	15.6	14.2	9
UCD*	12.8	4	16.9	5	12.2	8.5	6
HB	4.3	-	15.1	1	19.7	16.6	11
EE	6.3	1	7.9	1	7.3	9.8	6
AP/CD	7.0	1	3.4	-	-	4.8	2
PCE	4.6	1	4.7	-	4.4	4.0	1
Oñer	8.2	-	5.5	-	3.9	3.3	-
Total	100.0	21	100.0	21	100.0	100.0	60

Source: Llera, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," pp.279-280, Coverdale, "Regional," p.235 and 246, and "Así se vota en Euskadi," *Cambio* 16, 5 Nov. 1990, p.30.

* In the 1979 provincial elections the UCD and AP/CD result is combined.

Conclusions

Although Suárez managed to dismantle the essential franquist political institutions and transform the regime into a democratic state, he was not able to eradicate Franco's legacy. Franquism had created stark tensions between Madrid and the Basques which were not about to disappear with the promulgation of the Constitution. ETA had been permitted to attain a remarkable degree of influence during franquism. Not only did the democratizing regime fail to break with franquism's public order policies but Suárez refused to rid the security forces of their franquist "old-guard".²²⁴ The regime was neither able to isolate ETA politically nor to defeat it militarily. Basques remained "convinced that their common enemy [was] the forces of public order - and that they should be made to leave,"²²⁵ a position which reinforced ETAm's. The UCD's policy went through two phases defined by the effects of the elections of 1977 and 1979. Between 1977 and 1979 the UCD government pursued a maximalist, aggressive policy which sought to marginalise Basque nationalism and strengthen the statist parties in País Vasco. The Suárez government hoped this would strengthen its position with the right and the military. After the 1979 elections the UCD's policy changed in response to the radicalization of the Basque polity and the electoral success of HB. Madrid had recognized that tensions between Basque nationalism and the government created a climate in which ETA violence could prosper. During both these periods the government's programme suffered from serious inconsistencies due to its unique political position. As a minority government without a stable legislative partner the UCD had to secure the support of some of its legislative opponents to pass its legislation.²²⁶ Suárez's refusal to act resolutely to meet moderate nationalism's demands caused serious disenchantment in País Vasco. While the threat of a *golpe de estado* was very serious, by mobilizing fully his political resources Suárez might have widened his field of political manoeuvre and diminished the readiness of the Bunker and the military to ponder a *golpe*.

If the period spanning Carrero's death and the ratification of the Constitution of 1978 was politically dangerous and violent, it was not only the problem of terrorism and counter-terrorism which impeded resolution of Spain's essential political problems. The positions adopted by key political actors contributed to the region's political instability. More particularly, the mutual distrust which separated the UCD government and the PNV in the constitutional negotiations was at the heart of the matter: "If the cause of the difficulties of Basque autonomy between 1975 and 1980 must be summed in only one phrase, it would say that the PNV lacked a sense of state and the UCD a sense of history."²²⁷ The PNV had evolved to become as much an anti-centralist nationalist coalition as anything else. If its diverse factions agreed on one thing it was that Euskadi's ills stemmed from Madrid's policies. While reasons for this disaffection were legion, whether this was sufficient to provide substance to a coherent political programme remained problematic. The compromises attendant the PNV made it difficult to develop a coherent political programme; seen from within its policies represent understandable compromises, but seen from without the party's agenda appears to lack conviction. Deference to the different political objectives of its composite factions had led to policy positions which are ambiguous and contradictory. In the aftermath of approval for the *Estatuto de Guernica*, ETAm's continued violence belied the PNV's assertion that it was "a response to national oppression and would cease when steps were taken to end that oppression, starting with the granting of an adequate Statute of Autonomy."²²⁸ ETAm was not interested in independence but autonomy. ETA did not view the terms of the Autonomy Statute as sufficient to end the Basque people's national oppression.

The PSE's defeats in 1979 and 1980 were grave setbacks for a party which had played a leading role in producing the draft autonomy statute and in attempting to pacify Basque society. With no end to ETA's violence in sight, in spite of popular acceptance of the Constitution and the *Estatuto de Guernica*, the PSE realized it would have to go further in condemning ETA's escalating violence and those nationalists who provided the terrorists with the political cover necessary for their survival. The party argued that there could be no realistic political transformation of Basque society, nor embodiment of its larger social, economic and political objectives, as long as it remained subjected to violent upheavals; and Basque political energy was consumed waging a hopeless if unrelenting battle of attrition against the Spanish state. To recapture the political ground it lost to Basque nationalism, the PSE became the most vociferous critic of the PNV and ETA.

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Chapter Six: Spanish-Basque Relations March 1980 to October, 1982

In the period spanning the CAV elections and the general elections on 28 October 1982, the political environment in Spain changed substantially due to two factors: the internal crisis of the UCD leading to Suárez's resignation in January 1981, and ETA's continued terrorist offensive. Contributing to the level of political tension were fears of a military-civilian *golpe*, a growing economic crisis and an increasingly combative PSOE opposition. In conjunction these pressures generated a crisis of authority that was manifested in the abortive *golpe* led by Colonel Antonio Tejero on 23 February 1981. The politics of consensus which had characterized the play of Spanish politics gave way to a normal adversarial political discourse, the tone of which was flavoured by the political ambitions of the PSOE and an aggressive PNV attack on the Suárez government. In Euskadi popular expectations were high that the central government would devolve rapidly to the new Basque government the extensive powers set out in the Autonomy Statute. Madrid assumed that the PNV would work to normalize Basque politics, contribute to Euskadi's pacification and assume the responsibilities its dominant position demanded. These hopes would be disappointed. The attempted *golpe* cast a long shadow over the Spanish polity. The new PM, Calvo Sotelo, with the cooperation of the opposition took steps to stabilize the Spanish polity. His policies, LOAPA (*Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico*) and increased repression of ETA, created new tensions in Euskadi. Incapable of stemming the UCD's internal chaos, and conscious that the government was failing to maintain the confidence of the people, Calvo Sotelo called elections for 28 October 1982.

The object of this chapter is to explain the political events of the last years of UCD government and the persistence of the denominated Basque problem after the autonomy statute was approved. It will begin with analysis of the UCD's political travails prior to the *golpe*. The PSOE programme will then be set out before attention is turned to the strategies of the PNV, PSE, ETAp\EIA and ETAm\HB. Events leading to the attempted *golpe* on 23 February 1981 will then be analyzed. The political relations binding the political forces will be assessed as will the policies each pursued leading to the October 1982 elections.

The UCD was a broad coalition of disparate political parties arranged roughly around the centre-right of the Spanish political spectrum. Through adroit manoeuvring, Suárez had managed to hold the coalition together by force of personality, his own popular legitimacy and his electoral successes. It was

Suárez who had steered the country through the democratization process and it was to him that credit for its success accrued. By 1980 the political tensions created in negotiating the economic pacts, the Constitution and the autonomy statutes began to manifest themselves within the UCD.¹ The problem was exaggerated by the fact that the intended breadth of the autonomy provisions enshrined in the constitution was unclear; in fact under the terms of the Constitution "there was no ceiling on the degree of autonomy to which a Comunidad Autónoma could aspire."² To win the UCD right's adhesion to the autonomy project Suárez had expended a great deal of his political capital and it was unhappy with the result. The expected political dividend, a diminution of ETA terrorism failed to materialize and the short-term prospects for a ceasefire were dim.

The Government's Autonomic Policy

The government's possibilist Basque policy geared to appeasing moderate nationalism and isolating radical nationalism was replaced by a defensive strategy. Suárez decided to slow down the process of transferring powers to Euskadi in early 1980. This was probably not so much a part of an integrated strategy as a political move to decrease pressures from the military and UCD right to halt the autonomic process while ETA violence continued.³ Another factor motivating this change was the PNV's radicalization and refusal to confront ETA. However, Suárez's autonomy policy "undercut the very people in Euskadi who have placed their bets on the kind of democracy Madrid says it wants."⁴ Arguably, while concessions would have helped defuse tensions in País Vasco, Madrid believed itself in no position to grant them. ETA's escalating violence was a serious impediment to the timely development of the autonomy statute, especially in matters concerning the devolution of police powers to the nascent CAV government. The Suárez government was caught in a conundrum. Internal security questions were sensitive to the FSE, FAS and right and the Basques. For the former, to give these powers to a nationalist government with an ambiguous conception of the Spanish state would seem to confirm their fears that Suárez was bent on destroying the unity of the Spanish state. To do so during a brutal terrorist offensive which had killed scores of policemen and a number of military officers would have seemed criminal. Failure to devolve police powers to the CAV generated strong anti-Madrid sentiment in Euskadi which ETA exploited to make Madrid's position even more untenable.

The PSOE's Strategy for Power

The UCD's growing internal disarray and rightward shift "opened up an important political space for the Socialist Party."⁵ After the 1979 elections, embittered by the UCD's harsh attacks on it, the PSOE launched a two-part political strategy to lead it to power: i) "the destruction of the moderate centre and the

division of the right" implying the dethroning of Suárez; and ii) "the consolidation of the leadership of Felipe González as 'Statesman' with the credibility and image of moderation and efficiency."⁶ Abandoning the prevailing code of political ethics, the PSOE "sustained an aggressive attack on Suárez and skilfully exploited the growing internal crisis of the UCD by siding with UCD social democrats on a number of issues (even raising the possibility of a coalition between the PSOE and UCD social democrats)."⁷ The PSOE's bifurcation, or "bipolarization", of the Spanish polity was aided by the UCD right. Not only did the UCD right drag the party further from the essential political centre, but its acerbic attacks on Suárez isolated him further. In mid-1980, the PSOE took advantage of the UCD's disarray to raise a motion of censure against Suárez which was only narrowly defeated. Its offer to serve as a partner in a government of national consensus was subsequently rejected by Suárez. The PSOE's programme weakened the UCD and elevated its own status as a government-in-waiting. At the end of 1980, aware the regime was becoming unstable, the PSOE moderated its attacks.

The PNV in Government

The PNV's victory in the 1980 CAV elections confirmed its position as the Basque political hegemon. The PNV had a majority in the Basque Parliament and full control of the legislative agenda since HB's deputies refused to take their seats until the Basque Government declared a rupture with Madrid.⁸ The PNV campaigned aggressively for the full and timely transfer of the autonomic powers to which the CAV was entitled. The PNV failed to convince Madrid that it was in its political interest to make important transfers to the CAV government. To bolster the seriousness of its demands in the face of the UCD's obstructionist policy, the PNV chose the exclusivist path of radicalization and turned the autonomy question into a battle of wills between itself and the central government. Cognizant that ETA's violence had increased its bargaining power⁹, the PNV refused to condemn ETA violence outright, viewing it as "a warning to 'Madrid' that peace could not be achieved unless nationalist aspirations were met, and a dangerous provocation which could unleash a military coup."¹⁰ The PNV's policy was crucial to ETA since in the wake of popular approval of the autonomy statute ETA needed the PNV's tacit protection to stave off its isolation in the Basque community.¹¹ The PNV was aware that this was a politically risky strategy, but faced with ETAm\HB's challenge for control of the nationalist political agenda it accepted the risks. This confrontational posture did little to facilitate the devolution process. Moreover, the PNV attempted to broaden the content of the Autonomy Statute at a time when not only were the primary transferences hardly begun, but Madrid was under great pressure to limit them.¹² Under pressure from radical nationalism, "the PNV's incessant clamour for greater powers, for 'the deepening of autonomy,' is employed as a substitute for its non-existent programme which would give content to its social and cultural ideals."¹³ The PNV wanted to put its own stamp on the process and accrue all political

capital to be won from a good autonomy statute. It was reluctant to include other political forces in the development of the CAV since it did not want to be held to any compromise, particularly with statist parties, which would have opened it to criticism from radical nationalist opponents.

While mutually beneficial at particular junctures, the relationship binding the PNV and ETA was costly to the PNV. On the one hand, the nationalist agitation of ETA and the Basque political debate on nationalist terms which permitted the PNV to avoid having to address itself to Euskadi's spiny and divisive social and economic problems.¹⁴ On the other hand, Garayalde* argues that "ETA has been... a powerful brake on the PNV."¹⁵ ETA's violence impeded the PNV's development as a non-violent, virulent opposition force to "Madrid". The violence was seriously prejudicial to the autonomic process; "the dynamic of terrorism and violence overshadowed the political process on numerous occasions succeeding in blurring the notable advances made"¹⁶. While ETA did not manage to cause the breakdown of the political process, ETA violence "would impede the full realization of many of the possibilities contained in the autonomic solution."¹⁷ This harmed the PNV greatly since its political stature depended on the autonomy statute being successful, and being seen to realize the goals the moderate nationalists sought. It maintained an acerbic attack on the PNV's autonomic policy and contested the PNV's control of the nationalist agenda "with the advantage of not having any adversaries at its back and above all".¹⁸ As well, ETA could call "on the heroes of the national liberation struggle in their double facet as martyrs and avengers"¹⁹ to increase its relative advantage over the PNV. ETA's violence dulled the lustre of the PNV's nationalist dream. In other circumstances perhaps the Basque people would have attained greater powers at a lesser economic, social, and political cost. More than creating sharp antagonisms in the Basque population, ETA's violence exacerbated the economic decline of the Basque region as capital, entrepreneurs, intellectuals and skilled workers left País Vasco to seek a new prosperity elsewhere in Spain far from the bombs, the shootings and the "*impuesto revolucionario*". However, the PNV could not condemn ETA nor approach the symbolic constellation of the PSE for fear of validating ETA's claims that it was an "*españolista*" political force. Instead, the PNV opted to attack the central government vehemently, and condemn it for all the failings of the state of Basque autonomy. Many of these imputed failings were the result of ETA's violence.

The PSE accused the PNV of concerning itself with crafting a Basque nationalist state rather than building an autonomous Basque community. In addition to its control of the CAV, the PNV controlled the three provincial foral *diputaciones* and almost all of the *ayuntamientos*, in Euskadi including those of Bilbao, San Sebastián and Vitoria. With its hegemonic control of virtually all levels of

* Erreka, a former leader of ETAp and then of EIA.

institutional rule, the PNV used this power to create an organic communitarian political structure which would ensure its control of the Basque polity. Effectively, the PNV was "trying to mould a society in the image and form of the nationalist ideology."²⁰ While the PNV used the good offices of the various Basque political institutions to expand its political influence, the PSE advocated instead an inclusivist, negotiated process involving all democratic political parties, to increase the legitimacy of Basque democratic political institutions in the deeply divided Basque society. Especially irking to the PSE was that the PNV "monopolized" the autonomy statute as if it were its own creation, when in fact it was the product of the efforts of all Basque political parties and the Basque people.²¹

ETA's Strategy and Terrorist Violence

The circumstances of Basque society, internally divided and devoid of a politics of consensus at both the legislative and social levels, created "a panorama favourable to violent organizations whose objective during the long transition has been precisely that of permitting the perpetuation of violence as a form of political confrontation."²² As Basque society moved to implement the terms of autonomy statute, the possibility of compromise posed a serious threat to ETA's programme.

ETA's response to this situation of encirclement which threatened to become permanent was to try to force the credibility and limits of reform by provoking with more brutality each time the State's military and police apparatus in the hope of a destabilization by the most reactionary rightists or, in its absence, that it would arrive at an acceptable negotiation.²³

ETA's objective was to demonstrate that the Statute of Autonomy would not serve to pacify País Vasco and that all hopes placed in it as a first step to peace were useless.²⁴ ETAm's campaign of terror became more alarming as the year wore on. However, as the State's anti-terrorism programme became more effective in attacking ETA selectively, the generation of significant social support was increasingly important to ETA if it were to prove its objectives were shared by many Basques.

To justify ETAm's sustained armed violence, HB's political activity was structured to prove its thesis that the new regime was the same dictatorship as before with new political trappings. HB has been ETAm's essential political prop without which ETAm would have been politically marginalized. Through provocative and often violent demonstrations HB has attempted to create a centre of "popular" political power beyond the constitutional orbit. These demonstrations facilitated the re-creation of the action-reaction-action spiral and were cause for police repression, which created a situation ripe for ETAm's armed intervention.²⁵ In essence, "ETA-M and Herri Batasuna had created an extremely effective strategy of tension which helped to ensure that the political demobilisation which had been achieved throughout the rest of Spain did not occur in Euskadi."²⁶ The quest of ETAm/HB has been to define the very

character of the nationalist debate. It has attempted to usurp the legitimate function and power of the democratic political formations and to impose on the Basque people, by means of its political postures and mobilizations and in a hypothetical negotiation with the central government, its own terms of autonomy in spite of the existence of the *Estatuto de Guernika* - in which of those who had voted, 90.2% voted in favour. Since 1977, and in particular after 1980, ETA's strong influence in Basque politics "was possible because its violence, both discriminate and diffuse... broke the solidarity of the democratic forces and created the conditions for discrediting autonomy and for permanently destabilizing political and social life."²⁷ In its programme, ETAm/HB has exploited its suasive power to convince the PNV in particular, and Basques generally, that the freedoms that they enjoyed were the result of ETA's armed struggle. As noted in the previous chapter, Garaikoitxea noted publicly that the autonomy statute was partially a product of ETA's struggle.²⁸ HB's obstructionist politics and incessant popular mobilizations disrupted the political, social and economic functioning of Basque society. Its political values divided the Basque community into *abertzales* and traitors, *abertzales* and *españolistas*, Basques and Spaniards, socialists and fascists, etc., causing a polarization of Basque society determined by individual and collective identification with either left *abertzale* nationalism or *españolista* statism. The social, economic and political implications of this polarization have been immense. It is interesting to note that many of the most vociferous supporters of radical nationalism and ETA "were known for their peaceful coexistence with the *ancien regime*,"²⁹ or their "passivity under franquism."³⁰

In 1980, terrorist violence claimed 124 lives in Spain, a substantial increase over 1979. ETAm was the most active of the terrorist groups, accounting for 85 victims, of whom 21 were policemen, 23 *Guardia Civil*, 20 military personnel and 21 civilians. In addition to bombing tourist resorts, ETAm shot dead a manager of the Michelin plant in Vitoria in "an unsolicited contribution to the workers' struggle",³¹ and killed two UCD leaders in País Vasco in a display of "mindless brutality, as the UCD had very little strength in the Basque country; neither were its activists extreme right-wingers."³² CAA *comandos* killed 1 retired *Guardia Civil* and 2 civilians. In all, Basque terrorists killed 93 people.³³ As well, ETAm kidnapped 9 businessmen for ransom and shot 4 of them in the knee.³⁴ The *incontrolado* group BVE killed 21 Basque activists, two of whom were killed in Venezuela.³⁵ The intensification and expansion of ETA violence prompted a tremendous escalation in police actions directed against ETA. Taking advantage of counter-terrorist legislation enacted to eliminate ETA, which Clark contends approximated the character of Franco's internal security policy,³⁶ the FSE arrested 2,130 people, up from 1979 when 561 were arrested on suspicions of ETA-related crimes.³⁷ Although allegations of police torture would not go away,³⁸ at least in public the police began to restrain themselves, killing only one person, a suspected *etarra*, in the first six months of 1980.³⁹ By the year's end, although the FSE killed 6 *etarras*, they were not able to crush ETA or impede too greatly its capacity for action.

French Government Cooperation Against ETA

To combat ETA, the Spanish government turned to France for help. However, relations with France remained problematic for the Spanish regime. France only cooperated minimally with the UCD government in the latter's efforts to eliminate the terrorist threat. The French viewed ETA as a distinctly Spanish problem. Hoping to avoid provoking ETA, Paris left it alone. Scrupulously avoiding committing acts of violence in France, ETA hoped Paris would remain reluctant to act against it. The reputation of the Spanish police for torture made compliance with Spain's extradition requests even less savory to the French. Spanish frustration with French refusals to crackdown on Basque terrorists in France may have led Spanish counter-terrorist forces to try to compel France to cooperate by making violence its problem. In late November, after an unsuccessful attempt to win French cooperation against ETA, Spanish agents machine-gunned a bar in Hendaye, killing 2 and wounding 9 people believed to be nationalist activists. France "protested the cross-border operations while the Spanish Government maintains that the French authorities have not cooperated in extraditing E.T.A. killers."⁴⁰ Counter-terror groups operating in France were believed to have been paid and briefed by Spanish police to kill members of ETA.⁴¹

Popular Reaction to ETA's Escalating Violence

The escalation of ETA terrorist violence and HB's demonstrations generated a popular reaction against both organizations. By mid-1980, anti-ETA opposition was growing. In the first half of 1980, of the 62 people who died in terrorist violence, about 50 died in Euskadi. ETA killed about 44 people and the BVE killed 6. While more people had been killed in 1979 during the same period (75), in 1980 the violence seemed less understandable. "Alarm at the escalation of violence led to the growth of a movement for peace which drew from a wider section of the population than ETA's usual opponents."⁴² In May, 33 Basque intellectuals wrote a letter harshly condemning ETA's violence. In July a growing anti-terrorism movement led by the statist parties took to the streets to condemn ETA. Confrontations with pro-ETA militants were common. Tensions between ETA and the PNV were heightened when ETAm bombed PNV offices and the PNV threatened to mobilize para-military forces to attack ETA should it kill leading PNV members.⁴³ With ETA a more apparent threat to the internal political stability of Euskadi, the PNV was prepared to adopt a position against it. On 14 November, the PNV, EIA, PSE, PCE, AP, UCD and other parties, except HB, "issued a call for peace and reconciliation."⁴⁴ ETAm's mindless and brutal attacks caused EIA to loosen its ties with the armed organization and to condemn its violence.⁴⁵ On 2 November, 20,000 people marched in San Sebastián to protest against terrorism and for peace.⁴⁶ In mid-December Suárez met with Garaikoitxea in Euskadi to speed up negotiations on establishing a Basque police force. On 31 December 1980, the UCD and PNV agreed to restore tax

powers to País Vasco in a move Garaikoitxea termed "enormously positive".⁴⁷ Whether these accords were a means to reward the PNV and EE for taking a stance against ETA is not clear. On 9 January 1981, the Spanish and Basque governments reestablished the *conciertos económicos* which manifested both parties' willingness to facilitate the autonomy process in País Vasco.⁴⁸

Events Leading to the 1981 *Golpe de Estado*

If 1981 began with much optimism that the democratic transition in Euskadi would proceed normally and the terms of the autonomy statute would be fulfilled, by the end of January, these hopes disappeared. On 19 January, Adolfo Suárez resigned as Prime Minister. Noting that his political power had eroded during his tenure, Suárez stated that "I do not wish to see this democratic coexistence become, once again, a parenthesis in the history of Spain." There was strong reason to suspect that the military high command, greatly perturbed by Suárez's regional policy and the UCD's incapacity to halt ETA terrorism, had asked King Juan Carlos for Suárez's resignation.

In January 1981, ETAm kidnapped José María Ryan, the chief engineer at the Lemóniz nuclear power plant. In exchange for Ryan's life, ETAm demanded Lemóniz's destruction. Massive popular reaction to ETAm's action saw the Lemóniz workers, labour organizations (UGT, UGT, ELA-STV and CCOO) and the bishops of Bilbao call for Ryan's release.⁴⁹ 100,000 people marched in silence in an anti-ETA demonstration organized by the PNV, PSOE, UCD, AP, EE, UGT, ELA-STV and CCOO behind a single banner "Euskadi, paz y libertad".⁵⁰ In this climate, on 4 February, King Juan Carlos went to Guernica to swear his allegiance to the Basque *fueros*, as was the custom in monarchial Spain. HB's deputies attended his speech to the assembled Basque government and used the event to shout down the King. While the King took the offence in stride, the Spanish right was furious. Two days later, on 6 February, ETAm terrorists shot Ryan in the back of the head and dumped his body in the Vizcayan countryside. Condemnation of ETAm was vociferous. The PNV criticized ETAm in "some of the harshest terms ever."⁵¹ ETAm termed the killing "fascist".⁵² Popular reaction to Ryan's death showed that ETAm's leaders had "seriously miscalculated the effect of killing a person not involved in political activity or linked to the security forces."⁵³ With ETA seriously isolated, one week later, José Ignacio Arregui, a presumed member of ETAm accused of a number of murders, died in police headquarters in Madrid. Evidence indicated that he was tortured to death. Massive demonstration in Euskadi and public condemnations of the police and their tactics followed the news of Arregui's death. The action-reaction dynamic still worked. The police outrage showed that the FSE could be counted on to "do something grotesque which would give Herri Batasuna [and ETAm] another break."⁵⁴

The 23 February 1981 *Golpe de Estado*

Ten days after these events, on 23 February, 1981, as Calvo Sotelo was being confirmed as PM, Civil Guard units led by Colonel Antonio Tejero seized control of the Cortes and held its members hostage. Troops captured some TV and radio stations on the outskirts of Madrid. In Valencia, Lt. Gen, Jaime Milans de Bosch declared martial law in the city. The intervention of King Juan Carlos, who demanded and won the loyalty of the military high command, the *Guardia Civil* and *Policia Nacional* brought the attempted *golpe* to an end. Direct talks between the King and coup leaders led to their surrender on 24 February. The *golpe* failed because "in the face of the King's firm reaction, most Army officers believed that their responsibility lay with the defence of a constitutional order voted for by a majority of Spaniards."⁵⁵ On 27 February, under pressure from EIA/EE,⁵⁶ ETAp declared an unconditional ceasefire stating that continued armed struggle would "multiply the evils of militarism" and isolate ETA in País Vasco.⁵⁷ Millions of Spaniards protested the attempted *golpe* and demonstrated in favour of democracy and the Constitution.⁵⁸

While clearly the events of early 1981 created a crisis of authority which sparked the *golpe* attempt, planning for the *golpe* had begun long before, perhaps in May 1980.⁵⁹ Military disaffection with the democratic regime had grown between 1975 and 1981 due to the problems posed by: i) its sense of deception and frustration with Suárez's handling of the reform process; ii) ETA violence as a singular manifestation of the regional question; iii) the regional question itself, and; iv) popular disenchantment with the democratic government. The strategy of manoeuvre Suárez used to enact the reform agenda led him to renege on deals he made with the FAS high command to win their support for the reform project.⁶⁰ Military resentment of Suárez and his programme caused its leaders to petition Juan Carlos repeatedly to ask for his resignation. However, Basque terrorism "and its connection with that most sensitive of Spanish problems, the regional question" provided the essential provocation for the *golpe*.⁶¹ With the regime bent on creating a State of Autonomies, high abstention rates in the referenda on autonomy in Euskadi, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalucía meant only 48.3% of these regions' people had voted for autonomy, "despite living in the four regions with a strong regional consciousness."⁶² To the Spanish right not only was regional autonomy seen as a threat to Spanish unity "but also a project lacking in genuine, legitimate popular support."⁶³ Popular disaffection with the UCD government was a consequence of perceptions that the government was not only unprepared or incapable of addressing the problems of unemployment and inflation, and unable to stop ETA terrorism, but its leader was uninspired to lead.⁶⁴ Tired, disillusioned, and fearing assassination by ETA,⁶⁵ Suárez became increasingly reclusive and appeared to lack the will to resolve the problems facing the regime and the UCD.

Spanish and Basque Politics After the Attempted *Golpe*

The attempted *golpe* was a great disaster for the UCD and AP. It helped destroy the centre-right and severely limited the right's political space. Moreover, it was shown to be "incapable of preventing a military uprising, and then, after the attempt failed, to eliminate the *golpista* intrigue, and recuperate at that time the country's political pulse."⁶⁶ Badly shaken by the *golpe* and conscious of the democratic regime's fragility, the political parties made a concerted effort to stabilize the system by moderating their political rhetoric substantially. To stabilize the regime, both major parties returned to the consensual politics of pacting which characterized the earlier phase of the transition. The UCD and PSOE signed pacts to establish a common policy on the country's essential problems of terrorism and regional autonomy. A PSOE proposal to form a coalition government was rejected. The PSOE strategy for winning power did not change greatly after the *golpe*; the party was merely less vocal. In its relations with the UCD government, the PSOE "did not desire [to do] more than maintain a consensus in case of an extremely grave situation and... all the while, opted to maintain an attitude of *armed truce*, which implied an even greater weakening of the adversary."⁶⁷ While maintaining a façade of cooperation the PSOE strategy was to "wear down its adversary until it was placed in a condition of notable inferiority and use it... as an advantageous interlocutor."⁶⁸ The Socialists aspired not only to destroy the centre-right, but to push the Fraga's AP further right into a political space offering limited growth potential. While the PNV "remained dissatisfied with the pace of the transfer of powers... the coup attempt was a reminder that the Spanish governments were not free agents and that fear of military reactions was a powerful factor in inhibiting the transfer of regional autonomy."⁶⁹ EIA, which would merge with a Basque communist faction later in 1981 to form the party, EE,⁷⁰ was starkly aware of the situation pertaining in Spain. The failed coup underlined the necessity of ETAp's disbandment. HB remained quiet through the period of the coup and its aftermath; it was ill-prepared to face a military coup.⁷¹ PM Calvo Sotelo took steps to exercise greater control over the UCD party apparatus and heal the internal fissures which had paralyzed Suárez's regime. Nevertheless, the UCD stumbled from crisis to crisis and into oblivion.

According to Ibarra, ETAm responded to the *golpe* by arguing: "There was no military *golpe* against the government, but a self-*golpe*."⁷² Since the military governed Spain behind a democratic façade, "that which is produced is a readjustment among the different tendencies of the military bloc in favour of the hard-liners."⁷³ Contrary to ETAm's declarations that it was indifferent to the character of the Spanish state, democratic or non-democratic, Ibarra postulates that

ETA did not *really* bet on, nor bets on, involutionist means... but believed that contradictions and tensions produced in the dominant bloc could not resolve themselves in a step backwards. For ETA, the purpose of the real powers' objective interests did not

proceed by way of a new '*franquismo*' but they would be better served if the terms of *la Alternativa KAS* were conceded.⁷⁴

ETAm increased pressure on the regime by ambushing a police car in Euskadi and wounding three policemen on 1 March, one day after ETAm announced its ceasefire.⁷⁵ Four days later ETAm shot dead Bilbao's police chief. PM Calvo Sotelo, Minister of Interior Rosón* and Basque *lendakari* Garaikoitxea attended the funeral.⁷⁶ On 21 March, two colonels, known as liberals, were killed in actions claimed by ETAm. ETAm attacked the chief of the King's military household, General Joaquín de Valenzuela. He was wounded and three of his companions were killed. "ETAm's ability to operate with impunity in Madrid enraged army officers and encouraged fears of another coup."⁷⁷

The Calvo Sotelo Government's Programme

The Calvo Sotelo government gave priority to addressing the related problems of the regional question and the fight against ETA terrorism. Pressured by the military, on 29 September 1981, the UCD government presented the *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico* (LOAPA) to the Cortes for consideration.⁷⁸ The objective of LOAPA was to rationalize the autonomy process and to limit the breadth of autonomy to which a Comunidad Autónoma (CA) could aspire and limited the avenues by which a CA could win autonomy. It was also an attempt to undo the harm done by an autonomic process characterized not by a clear vision but by improvisation.⁷⁹ LOAPA was opposed vigorously by Catalan and Basque nationalists, and was the cause of massive protests in Euskadi. Police measures to combat ETA received a boost after the *golpe*. In addition to committing more resources, the UCD committed elements of the FAS to the battle against as a means to quell its discontent. The anti-ETA effort benefitted from the PNV's condemnation of ETAm for trying to provoke another *golpe* and implied that it would be prepared to cooperate with the FSE in combatting ETA.⁸⁰ Escalation of anti-ETA measures provoked no great alarm or protest in País Vasco. Before the *golpe* ETAm had killed five people. In the following five months ETAm killed about twenty-five more. Efforts proceeded apace to win french cooperation in the fight against ETA. In early June France gave signs that it was willing to extradite *etarras* to Spain. A dearth of high-profile killings in July encouraged speculation that ETAm had toned down its campaign to avert French repression.⁸¹ In 1981, police arrested 1300 people in anti-ETA operations in Euskadi.⁸² Increased discipline in the FSE caused the repression to fall with greater precision on ETAm and its political arm HB. ETA's social isolation accelerated after the *golpe*, but expansion of the anti-ETA security operations increased the chances of a serious backlash against the FSE and the Spanish state. Still, "[the] death or arrest of leading members of the group rarely braked ETA-M's

* UCD Minister of Interior Rosón was the brother of a leading General.

activities for the time it took to rebuild its organisation."⁸³ Sufficient social and political support remained to ETAm which drew its recruits from the radical nationalist organizations in its orbit.

If the LOAPA legislation was as much designed to provide a more logical and consistent basis for the development of the State of Autonomies and to guarantee the military a "redirection of the autonomic process along more reassuring paths,"⁸⁴ it provided a new well of tensions from which Basque nationalism could draw. The PNV was incensed. It argued that failure to embody the terms of the autonomy statute gave credence to ETA's argument that the autonomy statute served no purpose, that the government was not serious about autonomy and that the PNV had not only made a mistake when it accepted the terms of the autonomy statute, but that it had showed a traitorous indifference to the welfare of the Basque nation. The minority faction of ETApM, ETApM VII, which left ETApM for democratic politics in 1982, claimed that Javier Arzallus, the PNV's president, encouraged ETApM's activists to continue their armed struggle as a means to win more transfers from the central government to the Basque government.⁸⁵ According to Ardanza, Arzallus denied doing so.⁸⁶ Unzueta believes it is "unimaginable" that Arzallus encouraged ETApM to break its truce. However, he argues,

the real question consists of elucidating if the policy practised by the PNV gave reason or not to [ETApM's] interpretation... of the message transmitted by [Arzallus]... In my judgement the answer is, yes; that the attitude of the PNV with respect to some of the basic problems of the political transition in País Vasco has had, among others, the effect of giving ideological cover to those who practice political violence.⁸⁷

While the PNV's frustrations with the process were likely heartfelt, so too were the state's concerns about persevering with a regional policy which could easily provoke the right or military to try another *golpe*. It was evident to most that something would have to be done to rationalize the autonomic process. Whether LOAPA was the ideal mechanism is another question.

ETApM Splits

In early 1982, ETApM celebrated its VIII Assembly in France. ETApM was deeply divided by disagreements over the utility of the armed struggle, the question of social reinsertion and a permanent truce. ETApM would split into ETApM VII and ETApM VIII. On one side stood the minority *politicos*, who would remain in ETApM-VII (the *septimos*), who favoured social reinsertion as a means to begin peaceful political activism in the belief that EE was the logical vehicle to advance ETApM's original objectives: amnesty, Navarra, withdrawal of security forces, referendum on Lemóniz and derogation of anti-terrorist legislation. They believed that continued armed struggle served no purpose and impeded the realization of the goals which the organization sought. The *septimos* "wished at all costs to escape from the cycle of action-repression-action" and were waiting until "the good offices of EIA's leaders made it

possible for its members to be given guarantees which would allow them to re-enter Spain and incorporate themselves into normal political life."⁸⁸ In mid 1982, Interior Minister Rosón entered into negotiations with ETApM VII to address the question of social reinsertion of these *etarras*. Rosón offered them social reinsertion providing they renounced armed struggle forever and disbanded their organization.

On the other side stood the majority *milis* who would form ETApM-VIII (the *octavos*) and who remained convinced that the enactment of their platform could only be ensured by the threat of violence. In February 1982, they took up their guns, breaking a one year truce, to force negotiations on "pending themes" of ETApM's programme.⁸⁹ They explained their return to armed activism in this way: "the continuation of the truce had no sense since we do not believe that revolutionary violence had no rôle to play."⁹⁰ The *octavos* had to demonstrate that anything achieved in negotiations was "an effect of the armed struggle and the existence of the organization which practices its."⁹¹ The *septimos* accused the *octavos* of "falling into this fetishism of violence which consists of considering it as something almost miraculous, capable of unblocking any political situation."⁹² On 30 September 1982, convinced the social reinsertion of its exiles and prisoners was proceeding apace, ETApM-VII dissolved itself. By 23 October 1983, the day ETApM-VIII murdered Captain Martín Barrios - in part to discredit the *septimos* and to hinder the social reinsertion of *octavo* prisoners - 83 ETApM-VII *etarras* had been reinserted. The cases of 28 others awaited the mediation of EE deputy Bandrés and the then-PSOE Minister of Interior Barrionuevo. Fourteen *octavos* applied for social reinsertion with the help of the PNV.

If efforts to negotiate terms with ETApM were generally successful, the same could not be said for ETAm. The reason for this was that ETApM was subject to considerable political pressure, as distinct from control, from EIA\EE. EIA\EE was a participatory, democratic party and ETApM an organization which employed anti-systemic methods, terrorism, to have "a multiplier effect on popular mobilizations"⁹³ to advance what could be called systemic ends. Between 1979 and 1981, as EE moderated its position, ETApM's violence became increasingly counter-productive to the realization of the goals for which it claimed to act. As the political cost of its actions to EE rose, EE increased pressure on ETApM to find a negotiated solution to the violence. This helped cause ETApM's political isolation and tipped the relative balance of negotiating power in the government's favour. The same pressures were not at work within ETAm\HB. ETAm has been from its inception in 1974 a military organization. ETAm is an anti-systemic organization which controls an anti-systemic party, HB, whose rôle has been to muster social and political support for ETAm to stave off the armed organization's social and political isolation. Thus, given the political objectives of the two formations - EE\ETApM's possibilist participatory autonomism and ETAm\HB's rejectionist, anti-systemic independentism - the political distance separating the state and

EE/ETAm was less than that separating it and ETAm/HB. In ETAm's perspective the only means to close the gap was through the accumulation of ever more atrocities and cadavers to "force" negotiations.

ETA's Violence and the October 1982 General Elections

Through 1982 the level of violence remained relatively constant with 44 deaths in terrorist actions, and 31 of those by ETAm. Terrorist activity peaked first in March and then in September and October, prior to the 28 October elections. Obviously ETAm aspired to disrupt the elections and demonstrate that it was a force to reckon with come what may on 28 October. The elections were announced on 27 August, when Calvo Sotelo dissolved his internally divided UCD government.⁹⁴ The PSOE's message of moderation and the UCD's total collapse permitted the PSOE's landslide election victory. Table VI.a. shows the general election results for the 28 October 1982 contest. The popularity of

Table VI.a. General Elections to Congress of Deputies in Spain, 1977-1982

	June 1977 General		March 1979 General		October 1982 General	
	% Vote	# Seats	% Vote	# Seats	% Vote	# Seats
UCD	34.7	165	35.0	168	7.3	12
PSOE	29.2	118	30.5	121	46.1	202
PCE	9.2	20	10.8	23	3.9	4
AP/CD	8.3	16	6.0	9	25.4	106
PNV	1.6	8	1.7	7	1.9	8
EE	0.3	1	0.5	1	0.5	1
HB	-	-	1.0	3	0.9	2
Other	16.7	22	14.6	18	7.3	15
Total	100.0	350	100.0	350	100.0	350

Sources: Llera, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," p. 279, López-Pintor, pp. 291-313. and Jonathan Marcus, "The Triumph of Spanish Socialism: The 1982 Election," *West European Politics*, 6, No.3, (1983) 282

Table VI.b. General, Provincial and Autonomic Elections in Euskadi, 1977-1982

	June 1977 General		March 1979 General		April 1979 Provincial	March 1980 Autonomic		October 1982 General	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
PNV	28.8	8	27.5	7	36.9	38.0	25	32.0	8
PSOE	28.1	7	19.1	5	15.6	14.2	9	29.4	8
UCD*	12.8	4	16.9	5	12.2	8.5	6	11.7	2
HB	4.3	-	15.1	1	19.7	16.6	11	14.8	2
EE	6.3	1	7.9	1	7.3	9.8	6	7.7	1
AP/CD	7.0	1	3.4	-	-	4.8	2	-	-
PCE	4.6	1	4.7	-	4.4	4.0	1	1.8	-
Other	8.2	-	5.5	-	3.9	3.3	-	2.8	-
Total	100%	21	100%	21	100%	100%	60	100%	21

Sources: Llera, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," pp.279-280, Coverdale, "Regional," p.235 and 246, and "Asi se vota en Euskadi," *Cambio* 16, 5 Nov. 1990, p.30.

* In the 1979 provincial and 1982 general elections the UCD and AP/CD result is combined.

Felipe González and the party's considered strategy for addressing Spain's problems were primary factors in the PSOE's victory. In Euskadi, the PSE rebounded from its dismal showings in the 1979 general and

provincial elections and the 1980 CAV election, as Table VI.b. shows. The PSE gained votes, popular vote and gained 3 seats. The PSE's political strength was likely a function of its articulation of a considered programme for addressing Basque concerns and its emergence as the most powerful representative of statist interests in Euskadi, following the collapse of the UCD. The PNV's continued strength was noteworthy as was the relative decline of HB's support.

Conclusions

The importance of the period 1980 to 1982 was that it preceded the electoral rise of the PSOE. The decline of the UCD and the creation of a political vacuum following Suárez's resignation permitted Tejero the opportunity to launch his coup attempt. The political response to the *golpe* by all political parties stabilized the regime, but Calvo Sotelo was incapable of preventing the progressive self-destruction of the UCD. This process was encouraged by the PSOE, which actively and successfully courted the UCD's social democratic wing. Concurrent with these difficulties were those posed by the Basque question and ETA terrorism. The Basque problem remained at the core of the Spanish political agenda through the symbolic effects of the PNV's policies and ETA's violence. The PNV government was dismayed by the central government's decision to implement LOAPA and viewed it as a direct attack on the autonomy statute which it had worked hard to negotiate. The PNV's attacks on the central government and its institutions, and the inadequacies of the autonomy statute fit nicely with ETAm's frontal assault on the democratic system. The election of the PSOE in October 1982, caused a profound change in the character of Basque-Spanish relations.

ETAm benefitted from the UCD's obstructionist stand. Not only could it criticize the PNV and ETAm\EIA for being duped by the Spanish government - thereby discrediting both accommodationist, moderate Basque nationalism and its radical nationalist opponent - but it could validate its form of struggle as the only means to win concessions from Madrid. The declarations of Javier Arzallus, president of the PNV, that "if it had not been for that which the existence of ETA implies we [Basques] would not have this Statute [of Autonomy]", and, "the day that the bombings cease, so too will the autonomic content [of the Statute of Autonomy],"⁹⁵ gave credence to ETAm's claims. By taking advantage of the government's internal crisis to escalate its violence, ETAm believed that it was in a strong position to force negotiations. In this way, the UCD's move right to the right and ETAm's escalating violence exacerbated tensions within the party and the government.

Notes

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3. James M. Markham, "Spain's Powerful Regions Weaken the Center," The New York Times, Late City Ed., 16 Mar. 1980, Sec. IV, p. 3, cols. 1 and 4.
4. Carlos Garaikoitxea, in Markham, "Spain's Powerful," p. 3, col. 4.
5. Share, Dilemmas, p. 59.
6. Sarasqueta, Franco, p. 30.
7. Share, Dilemmas, p. 58.
8. James M. Markham, "Basques in Northern Spain Vote for Home-Rule Legislature for First Time," The New York Times, Late City Ed., 10 Mar. 1980, Sec. I, p. 8, col. 5.
9. José Antonio Ardanza, in Antonio Aradillas, El Reto de las Autonomías, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1987), p. 253.
10. Sullivan, p. 241.
11. García de Cortázar, Fernando, "Lo soñado y lo acontecido," Cuadernos de Alzate: Revista vasca de la cultura y las ideas, No. 12 (1989), p. 83.
12. Sullivan, p. 241.
13. Unzueta, Los nietos, p. 205.
14. Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 45.
15. Garayalde, "Es posible," p. 33.
16. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 227.
17. Fusi, El País Vasco, p. 227.
18. Garayalde, "Es posible," p. 32.
19. Garayalde, "Es posible," p. 32.
20. Benegas, Euskadi: sin, p. 145.
21. Benegas, Euskadi: sin, p. 144.
22. Markiegi, p. 55.
23. García de Cortázar, "Lo soñado," p. 84.
24. Benegas, Euskadi: sin, p. 127.
25. Sullivan, p. 227-228.
26. Sullivan, p. 228.

27. Unzueta, Los nietos, p. 197.
28. Markham, "Basque Rule Gains," p. 4, col. 3.
29. Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 132.
30. Rincón, ETA, p. 113.
31. Sullivan, p. 243.
32. Sullivan, p. 243.
33. Llera Ramo, "ETA: Ejército," p. 165.
34. Rincón, ETA, pp. 205-206.
35. Clark, Insurgents, p. 269.
36. Clark, Insurgents, p. 257.
37. Llera Ramo, "ETA: Ejército," p. 173.
38. Clark, Insurgents, p. 260-262.
39. James M. Markham, "Some Basques Predict Civil War as Whiff of Autonomy Fails to Stem Violence," The New York Times, Late City Ed., 16 July, 1980, Sec. I, p. 9, col. 2.
40. James M. Markham, "Bomb Kills Basque Guerrilla Chief," The New York Times, Late City Ed., 31 Dec. 1980, Sec. I, p. 2, col. 4.
41. Markham, "Guerrilla Chief," p. 2, col. 4.
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43. Markham, "Whiff of Autonomy," p. 9, col. 1.
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56. Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 175.
57. ETApM, in Markham, "Basque Guerrilla Faction," p. 3, col. 3.
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59. Fusi, "Fragile," p. 233.

60. Share, The Making, pp. 169-171.
61. Fusi, "Fragile," p. 244 and Share, The Making, p. 170.
62. Fusi, "Fragile," p. 227.
63. Fusi, "Fragile," p. 227.
64. Stanley G. Payne, "Terrorism and Democratic Stability in Spain," Current History, 77, No. 451 (1979), 417, Fusi, "Fragile," pp. 224; pp. 229-230 and James M. Markham, "Spain's Prime Minister Beset by Problems, Slides into Political Isolation," The New York Times, Late City Ed., 16 Mar. 1980, Sec. I, p. 14, col. 1.
65. Sarasqueta, Franco, p. 43. and Markham, "Spain's Prime Minister," p. 14, col. 2.
66. Sarasqueta, Franco, p. 31.
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71. Conversation with Andrés de Blas, Madrid, 11 Mar. 1992.
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83. Sullivan, p. 248.
84. Sarasqueta, Franco, p. 205.
85. Aradillas, p. 248, Sullivan, p. 247 and Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 61.
86. Aradillas, p. 248.
87. Unzueta, La sociedad, pp. 61-62.
88. Sullivan, pp. 246-247.
89. Unzueta, La sociedad, p. 168.
90. ETApM-VIII, in Unzueta, Los nietos, p. 195.
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Chapter Seven: The Socialists in Power

The PSOE election victory heralded a new era in Spanish politics. With its absolute legislative majority, internal coherence and broad electoral base the PSOE commanded the necessary authority to tackle the social and economic problems left unresolved by the UCD. Its strategy for addressing the Basque problem departed significantly from that of the UCD. It had a considered political plan for País Vasco, to which it stuck firmly, which drew heavily on the PSE's platform of pacification, normalization, *convivencia* and economic reconversion. In the PSOE's view, concessions made to democratic nationalism to marginalize ETA had failed to normalize the Basque polity.¹ The PSOE believed pacification was a pre-condition to Euskadi's political normalization and economic recuperation since ETA violence impeded the normal development of relations with the Basque government, among Basque political parties and within Basque society. Pacification entailed eradicating ETA terrorism and required increased police efficacy in arresting its *comandos* and dismantling its infrastructure in Spain, eliminating its base in France, and extending social reinsertion to *etarras* wishing to abandon violence. To accomplish these goals Madrid required the political and social isolation of ETA to deny it a pretext for maintaining that it acted with the tacit support of the Basque majority. The objective of *convivencia* referred to the need of the Basque government to account politically for the plural nature of Basque society. Economic reconversion demanded the integration of national and regional economic programmes to overcome Euskadi's serious economic problems.

The PSOE Government's Basque Policy

The new government's initial policies reflected its interest in securing the democratic regime. The regime's gravest threats were the dual forces of *golpismo* and *terrorismo*. To their eradication González would dedicate much of his political energy.² During his first term "the spectre of *golpismo*, a phenomenon of the entire transition period, appeared to be definitively removed from the Spanish political panorama".³ The government sought to finish off ETA "as a first step to centre the consequent debate on a merely political plane".⁴ It held that in democratic Spain, where parties could advocate independence by democratic means, there was no justification for violence.⁵ The government endeavoured to eradicate ETA terrorism to normalize relations between the Spanish state and the Basque government.⁶ Minister of Interior Barrionuevo spelled out PSOE's policy:

Having achieved the termination of violence, we can listen to however many political arguments they would care to present, within the confines of Spanish democracy. This Government... has had enough of the permanent blackmail that has tried to pressure the National Government to implement what political analysts call political measures, which are nothing more than concessions to independentist nationalism in País Vasco ...[T]hose who think this Government is going to make concessions as a consequence of violence or intimidation are making serious strategic mistakes.⁷

The government proffered: "Maximum severity with those who persist in the use of violence and flexibility, within the Law, with those who abandon and reject it".⁸ While ETA bore the brunt of the PSOE's repressive programme, the PNV faced the its political onslaught. The PSOE viewed the PNV as a large part of the "Basque problem" and had concluded that "the satisfaction of nationalist aspirations in País Vasco have been directly proportional to the increase in the terrorists' criminal acts."⁹

The PSOE's initial policy for addressing the Basque problem was outlined by Felipe González at an electoral address in Euskadi. He argued that ETA terrorism was essentially *a* Basque problem, as distinct from *the* Basque problem, and that the Basque and central governments would have to take collective action to bring it to an end.¹⁰ He believed Euskadi could be pacified by political means, but this required the PNV's full cooperation, since "the political forces of Euskadi are those who are capable of initiating the recuperation of co-existence in Euskadi."¹¹ González vowed to accelerate the transference process and rejected political negotiations with ETA.¹² The PSOE would however negotiate with ETA "the pacification of País Vasco and the future situation of ETA terrorists in prison or in exile in France" in exchange for a ceasefire and the dissolution of the armed organization.¹³ Shortly after the elections, the PSOE released a ten-point plan for combatting ETA which committed the government to work to:

- 1) Convince ETA's supporters that armed struggle could not succeed.
- 2) Encourage an inclusive political pact among all Basque political forces to find a solution to ETA.
- 3) Offer social reinsertion to *etarras* who renounce violence.
- 4) Negotiate the PSOE programme with the Basque government.
- 5) Legalize independentist parties which renounce armed struggle.
- 6) Negotiate the consolidation of the Statute and País Vasco's future self-government with the PNV and Basque institutions.
- 7) Solicit French cooperation in tackling ETA in France and imposing a six month truce to permit negotiations.
- 8) Secure extradition of terrorists seeking political asylum abroad.
- 9) Reorganize Spain's police and judicial apparati and create a new office to unify and strengthen all State intelligence services.
- 10) Join in international efforts to combat terrorism.¹⁴

The PSOE's ten point programme contained five over-riding policy goals: i) political isolation of the terrorists by negotiating inclusive political pacts against violence among all democratic political forces in Spain and País Vasco; ii) policial repression of the terrorists; iii) social reinsertion to *etarras* prepared to renounce violence; iv) elimination of ETA's base in France by means of deportation and extradition; and,

v) autonomic development. The PSOE confronted the terrorist challenge with a totalizing strategy which included the full employment of political, diplomatic and police measures.¹⁵

The PNV's Position on PSOE Policy

Reaching an agreement with the PNV would initially prove impossible. Frustrated by years of promises, the PNV argued that political means were the key to ending ETA violence and that the full, unconditional embodiment of the autonomy statute would demonstrate that Madrid was serious about resolving the "Basque problem".¹⁶ The PSOE government demanded that the PNV commit to its plan for normalization¹⁷ as a condition for advancing the transference process. This was unacceptable to the PNV which believed that no conditions should be attached to transfers which the government was legally bound to institute. The PNV was also unwilling to commit to a plan which denied political negotiations with ETA, which it believed, then, to be essential to end the violence. Garaikoitxea argued that Madrid's refusal to embody the *Estatuto de Guernica* demonstrated its historic disdain for Basque rights and provided ETA with a pretext for its violence. To increase political pressure on the central government, the PNV publicly denied the legitimacy of both the Constitution and the Spanish state and called for independence for Euskadi. As well, although the party criticized ETA's means, it claimed to

"understand" its actions given the central government's incomprehension of the "Basque problem"... This posture aspires to maintain the moderate nationalism-radical nationalism dialectic to the benefit of the former: the definition of Euskadi's problems in nationalist terminology buttresses the PNV's posture as the sole representative qualified to resolve the region's problems.¹⁸

In this vein, "The PNV's refusal to use its influence over the nationalist movement to accredit the validity of the *Estatuto de Guernica* as a framework for self-government and civil coexistence was a decisive factor in the permanent destabilization of Basque politics."¹⁹ However, the PNV could not very well embrace a programme which impeded the transference process and had allowed the torture of *etarras* to continue. The PNV was ready to accept the risk that its position would extend "a certain legitimacy to those who attack the system with arms in the name of independence and socialism".²⁰ This facilitated ETA's efforts to create horizontal linkages with democratic nationalism.²¹ The PNV's programme reflected Garaikoitxea's belief that it was possible to integrate radical nationalist forces within ETA's orbit to build a Basque nationalist movement united in the PNV.²² By implementing a politics of maximization predicated on a strategy of tension with Madrid the PNV aspired to appease its ultra-nationalist factions and contain the political growth of radical nationalism. The effect was to drive a wedge between Basques and the central government which impeded the full and timely development of the Autonomy Statute and the process of creating an autonomous Basque community.

ETA's Violence

ETA's war against the Spanish state continued relentlessly after the Socialist victory. Three groups were responsible for ETA violence: ETAm, ETApM-VIII and the CAA, although ETAm led the way in accumulating atrocities. ETAm continued to believe that by "fighting against the Spanish state without a truce... [it would have] no other choice but to accept the *la Alternativa KAS*."²³ ETAm hoped to shift the "correlation of forces" in its favour and reactivate the action-reaction spiral to demonstrate that Spain was ruled by the same dictatorship as before.²⁴ ETAm's theory had two roles: i) to "find support in nationalist and radical democratic sector [by convincing] them that they live in a dictatorial regime, therefore there will only be democracy... and peace, when ETA wins its objectives of the platform KAS" and, ii) "a deeper function: the ethical justification of the armed struggle."²⁵ Although its strategy of negotiation remained largely the same, pressured by the PSOE strategy, ETAm's tactics became increasingly indiscriminate. J.M. Zabarte, the leader of ETAm's *Comando Donosti*, who was captured in June 1984, noted that 60% of his *comando*'s victims were old, retired and defenceless persons and stated:

We did these sorts of attacks because a fundamental theme in the strategy of prolonged war like ours is to realize the maximum effect with the minimum possible risk for the *comando* and for the organization... After December [1983]... I began asking myself if the armed struggle served any purpose, and on various occasions, I was at the point of abandoning everything including Euskadi.²⁶

If in the 1960s and early 1970s ETA's activists went to great lengths to avoid harming innocent persons, after this time ETA's killers would turn their guns on Portell, *Yoyes*, the fiancée of a *Guardia Civil*, a wounded *Guardia Civil* in an ambulance and kill and mutilate scores of people, including many children and others, in car-bomb attacks, etc.

The PSOE Strategy for Combatting ETA

There were two facets to the PSOE's effort to destroy ETA, one which can be explained in political terms and another in military terms. One of the government's largest problems in attacking ETA was the state's lack of popular legitimacy in Euskadi. Onaindia argues that to sustain its violence and popular appeal, ETA exploited the fact that in Euskadi "the Spanish state did not establish its legitimacy among the entirety of Basque citizens."²⁷ Of course ETA's action had contributed to that lack of legitimacy. As has been stated elsewhere, the state's lack of legitimacy was seen by ETA as a *carte-blanche* to act extra-constitutionally. Eguigaray, arguing for strong state action against ETA, maintains that "it was not the State's deficit of legitimation which permitted the persistence of ETA terrorism, but [terrorism] which impeded the State's full social legitimation."²⁸ While this suggests a strong case for tackling ETA terrorism, it understates the connection between the two forces. That is, while ETA

violence impeded the state's social and political legitimation, its lack of legitimacy had been instrumental to ETA's political and military longevity. This case is made by Unzueta, who contradicts Eguigaray in part, when he writes that "the State's lack of legitimacy in País Vasco is surely the cause which explains the destabilizing capacity remaining to ETA even though the potential political support upon which the said organization can count does not exceed 10% the population of Euskadi."²⁹ He stresses that for many nationalists, "ETA has signified historically, the sharpest and most heroic example of Basque resistance in its fight against Spanish 'oppression'."³⁰ The Spanish state needed to have its political authority recognized popularly. If the state's *raison d'être* is minimally that of keeping the peace and providing good government, it failed by these measures to justify its rule in Euskadi. The PNV's relativization of the Constitution and Autonomy Statute imperilled the state's institutional and symbolic authority. Its refusal to meet the state's minimal terms, for reasons discussed above, left to the state the means of public order to legitimize its rule in Euskadi. Since it alone controlled the security forces authorized to act against ETA, and since ETA's existence was a direct challenge to its authority, to the extent it could destroy ETA, it could hope to increase its legitimacy.

By late 1983, with ETA violence showing no sign of abating, and faced with the PNV's stony recalcitrance, Madrid concluded that the political means of combatting terrorism were exhausted.³¹ While the government believed the problem of ETA violence could be resolved through a process of political compromise with democratic nationalism, it concluded that a political strategy alone would take too long.³² The political costs of accommodating Basque nationalism were great, while repression did not entail conceding powers and promised to enhance the PSOE's image as a government prepared to tackle terrorism.³³ While trying to change the way the Basque people perceived it,³⁴ the Spanish state launched a concerted effort to destroy ETA's armed capacity. First, it increased police pressure on ETA in Euskadi and, second, it developed a covert capacity to strike at ETA in its sanctuary in France. In May 1983 the government launched its ZEN [Zona Especial del Norte] plan which gave the security forces greater powers and resources to combat ETA to invert its strategy of negotiation. The government strove to prove that it had the will to defeat terrorism,³⁵ and "close the page of political negotiation ...to demonstrate publicly that the only political alternative to the terrorist organization [was] already defeated."³⁶

Concomitant with the launch of the ZEN plan, the PSOE created the GAIQE (Gabinete de Información y Operaciones Especiales) composed of the Minister of Interior, his anti-terrorist functionaries and representatives of the FSE, to define a new strategy to combat ETA.³⁷ The GAIQE believed it was impossible to negotiate with ETA except from a position of strength, and that given France's hesitancy to confront ETA it was necessary to combat ETA in its sanctuary using ETA's methods and arms.³⁸ In early 1983, in a meeting of police, intelligence and political figures, the decision was

taken to form a covert counter-terrorist organization, financed by the Ministry of Interior out of its infamous "reserved funds", to act against ETA in France.³⁹ The product of this effort was GAL (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación), a group which remained in existence from October 1983 to June 1986. GAL's mission was to destroy ETA's French sanctuary and "surround, corral and exterminate, if necessary, ETA and its chief leaders."⁴⁰ GAL's handlers sought to punish ETA for attacks in Spain; to cause "the rapid decapitation of ETA... to dismantle... its consolidated leadership";⁴¹ to strike at the near-mythical leaders who symbolized ETA's armed struggle; to deny ETA a safe haven; to compel it to devote its energies to protecting its organization and the refugee community; to turn French public opinion against Spanish Basques; to convince France to implement a deportations policy; and, to satisfy public opinion that something was being done to strike at ETA.* Since GAL intended that ETA "would provoke incidents, confrontations with the French police and above all, panic among the peaceful citizens of [France]".⁴² GAL hoped "to convince French authorities... [to] remove the principal heads of ETA from the French-Spanish border."⁴³ GAL's actions represented the pursuit of diplomacy using other means.

Perhaps having concluded that the ZEN legislation was insufficient to halt ETA's violence and was generating opposition in Euskadi, in the autumn of 1983 counter-terrorism officials prepared to launch their covert operation against ETA in France. The emotional trigger for the State's new, illegal, aggressive, anti-terrorism policy was ETAPm-VIII's kidnapping of Captain Alberto Martín Barrios, an Army pharmacist in Bilbao, on 3 October 1983. His captors demanded the release of eight *etarras* and transmission of their manifesto for his release. The kidnapping and subsequent murder of Captain Martín on 19 October shocked Spaniards and enraged the military. While more than 100,000 Basques walked through Bilbao in silence behind the banner "Con el pueblo contra ETA",⁴⁴ their reaction was tempered by revelations of a failed FSE operation to kidnap a CAA leader in France as a counter-hostage and reports that on 17 October, in retaliation for the kidnapping, two *etarras* in France had been kidnapped and killed.⁴⁵ Over 500,000 people attended a rally in Madrid to protest the "criminal terrorism" of ETA.⁴⁶ In early November, González met with an Army general who stated, "The situation had become unbearable. We cannot continue being ETA's objective nor are we going to permit these gunmen to continue intimidating the country. Either you resolve it or we will do it."⁴⁷

The PSOE government escalated the ideological war against ETA to win political support for its counter-terrorist strategy. It aimed to "depoliticize" ETA's struggle "making it appear as an anti-social

* One GAL informer, *Kinito*, was an HB leader and alleged member of an ETAm comando. He was killed by ETAm in September 1989. (Antonio Rubio and Manuel Cerdán, "ETA hace desaparecer al confidente de Amedo", Cambio 16, 26 Feb. 1990, p. 34, col. 1.)

group, as a band of 'private persons,' dedicated to crime and extortion."⁴⁸ On 3 November, Felipe González addressed the Cortes and stated:

This government will not permit those who hide behind terror and crime to live peacefully.... I will not rest until those Spanish citizens who cannot in any way, with our Constitution, with our legislation, consider themselves delinquents for political reasons, disappear from French soil.⁴⁹

González continued his address stating that since the terrorist behaviour was "exceptional", likewise, "I will apply exceptional means to combat these groups and those that support them. The Government, in defence of democracy and peace, has decided to bring the violence to an end".⁵⁰ He appeared to disagree with the PNV's position that "We cannot combat ETA terrorism with revolvers".⁵¹ His aggressiveness was reflected by Barrionuevo who stated: "It is necessary to impede the *etarras* that walk about on French soil like Pedro to his house, while in Spanish País Vasco the leaders of the Socialist Party go about surrounded by police for their protection."⁵² González had by then reached an agreement with Manuel Fraga on a plan to combat ETA terrorism.⁵³ The leader of the right-wing AP had called for a "dirty war" against ETA,⁵⁴ "using all *available* means."⁵⁵ He believed: "There is only one way to fight terrorism: direct and efficient action against the leaders and units of the revolutionary groups that commit it."⁵⁶ Three weeks later, GAL kidnapped a Basque exile in France who was later released with a note stating:

Because of the increased murders, kidnappings and extortions committed by the terrorist organization ETA on Spanish soil, programmed and directed from French territory, we have decided to end this situation... Each murder by the terrorists will have its necessary response.⁵⁷

On 19 December, GAL killed an ETAm *etarra*, Ramór. Oñaederra and on 28 December, murdered ETAm's third in command, Mikel Goikoitxea, *Txapela*.⁵⁸ As well in December, the government began drafting harsh new anti-terrorism legislation which recalled the days of franquism.

During its four years of existence, GAL killed 27 people, most of them *etarras*. GAL weakened ETA's leadership and forced it to dedicate much of its energies and resources to defending its leadership, militants and supporters or some 1000 people.⁵⁹ In this respect alone, "it is not proved... that the actions of GAL were counter-productive from a point of view of the logic of military confrontation."⁶⁰ Felipe González noted other effects of GAL's actions in a 1984 interview,

I believe that just like certain terrorist actions produce some degree of satisfaction among a minority of people, as well the antiterrorist actions undertaken by GAL, produce satisfaction in certain segments of the Spanish population. The phenomenon of GAL is a phenomenon that is intimately tied to ETA's action-reaction dynamic.. an ETA action produces a GAL reaction. It is imaginable ...that if the actions of ETA diminish or are suspended, the actions of GAL would have to diminish or be suspended.⁶¹

Given the pressure of the military, the right and the Spanish public to stop terrorism, Madrid benefitted from GAL's activities. Significantly, the spread of political violence to France caused Paris to take serious

note of the problem and to act against ETA.⁶² But, GAL's actions created strong opposition to the government in Euskadi where it was believed that if GAL was not its creation, it acted with its complicity.

The PSOE government's resolve to combat ETA was hardened further on 23 February 1984. Three days before the CAV election, PSE senator, and the party's leading candidate in Guipúzcoa, Enrique Casas, was shot dead in San Sebastián by a CAA *comando*. Spanish newspapers alleged that Casas was assassinated for "the supposed complicity that the abertzales claim existed between the Spanish government and the anti-terrorist groups operating in the south of France against Basque refugees."⁶³ Unlike the UCD which failed to punish ETA for attacks on its members, the PSOE, which had been outraged by the CAA's murder of Germán González in December 1979, prepared to notify ETA that it would not suffer its attacks passively. Barrionuevo stated "the police had a moral obligation to detain quickly the authors of the socialist leader's assassination ...[so that] the death of the Senator ...would not transform itself, once again, ...from a "hunt of the politician" to a "hunt of the socialist"."⁶⁴ González met with Fraga again, according to Miralles and Arques, and in this meeting he stated to Fraga, "ETA has gone too far, and it is necessary to finish them off somehow. It does not matter to me if it is GAL, France, the Police or whoever, but we cannot permit them to continue murdering."⁶⁵ On 25 February, GAL killed an ETAm member in southern France. On 22 March, 1984 the GEOs, acting on fortuitous intelligence, ambushed and killed four of the CAA terrorists responsible for Casas' assassination,⁶⁶ they were not given a chance to surrender.⁶⁷ Felipe González's comment on this event "[The police] is fighting, is combatting, murderers who operate with total coldness and the Police must react with toughness."⁶⁸

That the PSOE's strategy for combatting ETA was distinct from that of preceding governments is suggested by data on ETA's dead. In fourteen years, between 7 June, 1968, and 1 May, 1982, 53 *etarras* were killed by *incontrolado*, *Guardia Civil* and police units.⁶⁹ A further 9 *etarras* died in accidents and 2 were executed by the franquist state.⁷⁰ In 1983, 11 *etarras* were killed by police and 18 more by mid-August 1984.⁷¹ As well GAL killed 4 *etarras* and by mid-1984 7 more, bringing to 15 the number of *etarras* killed in 1983 and 25 by mid-1984.⁷² In less than two years of PSOE rule, the FSE and GAL killed 40 *etarras*.⁷³ It appears that even if the police operated against ETA with increasing efficiency,⁷⁴ the number of dead *etarras* indicates that the state was indeed serious about ending ETA's violence, "using all means necessary". For its part ETA killed 93 people in 1980, 30 in 1981, 31 in 1982, 34 in 1983 and 24 in 1984. In all, between June 1986 and June 1984, ETA had killed 428 people and 124 *etarras* had been killed.⁷⁵ While it was prepared to use deadly force to stop ETA, the government was also prepared to show generosity and leniency to those who abandoned the armed struggle. In the first

* Five months later, a *Guardia Civil* patrol killed the *etarra* who shot Casas. (José Oneto, El secuestro del cambio: Felipe año II, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1984), p. 183.)

two years of PSOE rule, more than 150 *ex-etarras* took advantage of the means of social reinsertion to legalize their situations and return home.⁷⁶

French Cooperation Against ETA

While GAL's actions and improved training for and control over the security forces increased the state's effectiveness in combatting ETA, in the long run winning French cooperation in denying ETA sanctuary would be decisive. In November 1982, the French government pledged to arrest ETAm's leadership following the assassination of General Lago Román.⁷⁷ Fears of stoking the fires of Basque nationalism in France, continued allegations of torture in Spanish jails, repeated violations of French sovereignty by Spanish police, and popular sympathy for "the Basques' armed struggle"⁷⁸ made France reluctant to expand its rôle in the battle against ETA. In December, 1983, Felipe González and François Mitterrand met to renew their efforts against ETA. The two socialist leaders worked out a deal by which Spain would eliminate police use of torture, offer ETA social reinsertion and end GAL's attacks, and France would either extradite to Spain, or deport to Latin American and African countries, *etarras* responsible for serious crimes.⁷⁹ ETA, HB and the PNV condemned the new French policy. In January 1984, French police arrested twelve ETAm and ETApM-VIII *etarras* and deported six to Latin America. This action drew plaudits from the national statist parties. The harsh condemnation registered by the nationalist parties - the PNV, HB and EE - was likely conditioned by the imminence of the autonomic election campaign.⁸⁰ Further operations against ETA were frustrated by a fishing dispute between the two countries.⁸¹ In July, Spanish and French officials met again. France began a new process of extradition from France.⁸² The Basque nationalist parties launched a massive protest movement in August against the new policy and ETA took aim at French businesses and tourism. It appeared that French commitment to extradition was met by a commitment by Spain to increase security for French interests in Spain.⁸³ There is strong reason to suspect that French cooperation was secured by signs France was becoming a key battleground for Spanish terrorism. In this regard GAL recorded "great political success".⁸⁴ Evidence that ETA and its offshoots were at war with a democratic, Spanish, government not a disguised francist state contributed to Paris' resolve.⁸⁵

Negotiations Between Madrid and ETA

Efforts to find a negotiated solution to ETA's violence began in 1976. Between 1976 and 1981, negotiations failed to find a solution to the violence although certain limited political objectives were realized. Meetings between ETApM and Minister of Interior Juan José Rosón led to a negotiated settlement in 1981. Although Madrid was necessarily pleased to find a solution to ETApM's violence,

even though ETApM-VIII would persist for over a year, ETAm was its central worry. In the spring of 1983, a proposed *Mesa para la paz* composed of the PNV, PSOE and HB was struck, but it failed to meet due to HB's demands and ETAm's murder of two *Guardia Civil* troopers and three bank employees in Bilbao.⁸⁶ It was not until mid-1984, after a series of police successes against ETA and France's new deportations of *etarras* that Barrionuevo offered to meet with ETA "whenever and wherever ETA wished". The PNV, which had been an intermediary, was cut out of the political picture with Barrionuevo's offer of a direct negotiation with *Txomin*. This was possibly in retaliation for its stance on extradition of known ETA terrorists. He offered social reinsertion to *all* members of ETA and excluded political negotiations, which won the support of the FSE and eventually even Garaikoitxea. Tensions welled up within ETAm between *Txomin* and the recently deported *duros* and number two man in ETAm, *Antxon*. *Txomin* represented ETA's most nationalist faction which favoured negotiations and *Antxon* represented the most Marxist-Leninist faction which rejected negotiations.* The nationalists in ETAm "would distinguish themselves for formulating *la Alternativa KAS* in terms of *democratic* objectives, as opposed to the [the Marxist-Leninist's] revolutionary [terms]."⁸⁷ ETAm refused the offer, but the Spanish government maintained its contacts with *Txomin*. In the fall of 1984, France's ambassador to Spain met with HB's Santi Brouard and Jokin Gorrostidi to discuss a truce for which France would halt extraditions. Two months later, Santi Brouard, who advocated a negotiated end to the violence, was shot dead by gunmen from a faction of GAL, thereby "[closing] one of the doors to dialogue and the contacts were broken off for some time."⁸⁸ Within ETAm an internal debate raged on the question of negotiations. The *duro* faction headed by *Antxon* and supported by *Artapalo*, *Josu Ternera* and *Santi Potros*, believed they would only progress when the government's back was to the wall.⁸⁹ ETAm's so-called "moderate sector" headed by *Txomin* Iturbe and composed of ETAm's *históricos** wished to find end the cycle of violence.

ETAm was in trouble in 1984. France had extradited over 175 *etarras* to Spain, the police had arrested its principal *comandos* in Spain and had made communication with its *comandos* difficult.⁹⁰ Extraditions from France became habitual and popular interest faded as it became apparent that only ETA and its supporters were affected. Speaking with an ETApM leader, *Txomin* acknowledged that things were going badly for ETA and stated: "The thing is to find a way out."⁹¹ He added, "If we do not negotiate now, within a year, the French will have... decimated us, captured the arms and the money, and we will have nothing to negotiate."⁹² If in 1984 he understood this, it was "only when he was imprisoned in... Burdeos, at the end of April, 1986, he raised, through the PNV, the possibility of a negotiation."⁹³ By late 1985, pressured by France, its internal unity threatened by the process of social reinsertion, aware that the

* The Marxist-Leninists in ETAm were not so much inspired by revolutionary socialist ideas as by Lenin's conception of the right of nations to self-determination.

* Long serving militants.

destabilizing effect of its violence had declined "after the relative neutralization of *golpismo*," its "defenceless before GAL terrorism - a mirror which reflected the image of its own horror," and "difficulties in recruitment, etc." had destabilized ETA and raised hope for a new negotiation.⁹⁴ In fact, negotiations "previously a mere rhetorical reference, came to convert themselves into the central strategic axis of both ETAm and HB."⁹⁵ However, negotiations would not prosper.

Basque Politics during the PSOE's First Term

The year 1984 was germinal in the development of Basque politics due to political changes in País Vasco. The PNV called elections for 26 February. The election campaign, marked by provocative terrorist attacks by ETAm, CAA and GAL, was a caustic, virulent contest between the PNV and PSE-PSOE. The PNV campaigned for the full devolution of autonomic powers and launched a visceral attack on PSOE government policy and its refusal to revoke LOAPA. The PNV argued that the pacification of Euskadi demanded resolution of problems which originally gave rise to ETA violence, and that the political and juridical measures which facilitated social reinsertion and the full development of the autonomy statute were key to ending the violence.⁹⁶ The PSE argued that in the four years of PNV rule "the extraordinary possibilities for the capacity of self-government the Statute of Autonomy offered were not used by the PNV government."⁹⁷ The PSE platform emphasized three points: pacification, the necessity of achieving broad political accords to resolve Euskadi's problems and of cooperating with Madrid.⁹⁸ The PSE argued not only that "sin la paz nada era posible" but implicitly that "without the defeat of the PNV peace was not possible."⁹⁹ ETAm called on nationalists to vote for HB. Integral to the platforms of all the nationalist forces, except EE in its more mature stage, was disqualification of the moral legitimacy of the "*españolista*" statist parties to speak on "Basque" matters. The effect of this strategy was to exaggerate the obvious ethnic divisions of Basque society and consolidate the divisiveness of Basque society.¹⁰⁰ When Basques went to the polls, three days after CAA's murder of Casas and the day after GAL killed an ETAm *etarra* in France, as Table VII.a shows, they voted strongly for the PNV, which won 42% of the popular vote and 32 seats, its best result ever. The PNV's increased strength was largely due to the "attraction for the party of the moderate non-nationalist vote which saw the institutional and political reinforcement of non-violent nationalism as a barrier to the ascent of ETA and HB."¹⁰¹ The PSE-PSOE won 23% and 19 seats, HB won 14.6% and 11 seats, CP won 9.3% and 7 seats and EE won 8% and 6 seats. Of 75 CAV seats, the PNV held 32 and the opposition 32. HB, which continued its boycott, held the balance of the seats. The PNV governed as a minority government as it would not share power and encumber itself with any programmatic compromises.

Table VII.a. Legislative and Autonomic Elections in Euskadi, 1977-1984

	1977 General		1979 General		1980 Autonomic		1982 General		1984 Autonomic	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
PNV	21.3	8	27.5	7	38.0	25	32.0	8	42.0	32
PSE	20.8	7	19.1	5	14.2	9	29.3	8	23.0	19
UCD	12.8	4	16.9	5	8.5	6	-	-	-	-
HB	3.2	-	15.1	3	16.5	11	14.8	2	14.6	11
EE	4.6	1	7.9	1	9.8	6	7.7	1	8.0	6
CP/AP	7.0	1	3.4	-	4.7	2	11.7	2	9.3	7
PCE	3.3	1	4.7	-	4.0	1	1.8	-	1.4	-
Other	2.6	-	5.5	-	-	-	2.7	-	1.7	-
Total	100	21	100	21	100	60	100	21	100	75

Sources: Llera Ramo, "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," pp. 279-280, "Así se vota en Euskadi," p. 30 and Coverdale, "Regional," p. 235 and 246.

* In the 1982 General and 1984 Autonomic Elections the UCD and AP/CD results are combined.

The strong nationalist victory convinced the PSOE government "to change its strategy given the evidence that... the PNV was the hegemonic force and... to reach an agreement with it."¹⁰² González offered Garaikoitxea a political pact contingent upon his "rigorous respect for the State and Constitution... personal and institutional loyalty."¹⁰³ Garaikoitxea refused this offer, although some in the PNV, including Arzallus, favoured it.¹⁰⁴ He argued that the autonomy statute was a programme of minimums and his ultimate end was independence in an effort to pressure Madrid to restart the transference process.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, he saw no need to compromise with an opposition composed of parties as diverse as EE, PSOE and CP, in the belief that they would be unable to mount a cohesive challenge to his programme. In this he was wrong. In the late autumn of 1984, the PNV government searched for an end to the legislative impasse which had blocked its programme.

The Crisis of the PNV and Garaikoitxea's Defenestration

The legislative impotence of the PNV was exaggerated by a dispute which raged within the PNV, ostensibly over differing perspectives within the party on the "distribution of political power derived from the *Estatuto de Autonomía* among the different institutions of the *Comunidad Autónoma*,"¹⁰⁶ primarily the Basque Parliament and the three *Diputaciones Forales*. Since the PNV controlled all four governments, the issue had to be resolved by the party itself. A grave battle for control of the PNV was joined by Garaikoitxea and Arzallus. Garaikoitxea believed decision-making should be centralized in the Basque Parliament, which pitted him against Arzallus, the PNV executive and the *diputaciones forales*.¹⁰⁷ As Javier Arzallus argued: "In this which is called the crisis of the PNV, the important thing is not the [legislation] nor the structure of the region, but the structure of the party and power of the party [over the Government]."¹⁰⁸ The government's efforts to confront Euskadi's problems had produced friction within a

party apparatus committed to ensuring that its doctrinal precepts were observed and its internal accords respected. Lacking a parliamentary majority and faced with the opposition of the party the government was unable to govern Euskadi effectively.¹⁰⁹

The crisis of the PNV "emerged as a consequence of its inability to translate its ideology into the practice of political leadership having once achieved institutional hegemony."¹¹⁰ Euskadi's political, economic and social problems demanded resolution, and the PNV's "permanent reproach *against Madrid* became ever more insufficient."¹¹¹ Onaindia notes that Madrid "could not count on a credible interlocutor in Euskadi because of the PNV's zigzagging policy full of ambiguity".¹¹² The thrust of the PNV's policy had been to "maintain the ambiguity of its objectives" to give it the broadest possible room for political manoeuvre, to secure its political base.¹¹³ If "terminological ambiguities" were "verbal resources to cover and legitimize, under radical language, a flexible and possibilist politics",¹¹⁴ there had not been much evidence of a possibilist politics under Garaikoitxea. An ever more isolated Garaikoitxea¹¹⁵ met with Txiki Benegas in early November 1984, to find an end to the legislative paralysis. They discussed a pact to bring stability to the Basque Parliament and end the lack of communication between the Basque and central governments.¹¹⁶ Under the terms of a tentative agreement worked out between them, Garaikoitxea agreed to renounce demands for political negotiations with ETA and moderate its platform in exchange for the PSE's legislative support and cooperation in unblocking the transference process.¹¹⁷ He needed this agreement to end the parliamentary blockade, strengthen his image as an able representative of Euskadi's interests and win control of the PNV.¹¹⁸ The internal troubles of the PNV interfered with the negotiations and Garaikoitxea was forced to resign.

The PSOE welcomed Garaikoitxea's departure. The Socialists regarded him as a radical nationalist who was always hostile to Madrid.¹¹⁹ Barrionuevo argued that "in the twenty-five years of the tragic existence of ETA, 62% of its murders in the three Basque provinces were recorded during the mandate of Carlos Garaicoechea."¹²⁰ During his tenure, "In [Euskadi's] relations with the Spanish state, there was not a moment's truce nor practically a point of agreement, whether with the UCD government or socialist administration."¹²¹ The PNV government had demonstrated "indifference after terrorist actions"; and displayed "attitudes that implied clear support for ETA",¹²² which frustrated government efforts to isolate ETA. While the PNV's crisis leading to Garaikoitxea's defenestration had its own history and the PSOE did not have the direct means to provoke such a crisis,¹²³ the party was very interested in the end result. Garaikoitxea was defenestrated with the "opportune aid of the PSOE".¹²⁴ Gloria Lomana

* The PNV *apparat* had hoped to forge limited pacts with the CP and EE to break the parliamentary deadlock. (Patxo Unzueta, "Garaikoitxea and Benegas, escépticos sobre la posibilidad de alcanzar acuerdos a corto plazo", *El País*, 10 Nov. 1984, p.18, cols.4.)

argues that Garaikoitxea's defenestration was "confirmed by his own party and the PSOE which had not forgiven him for his unfriendly policy."¹²⁵ The PNV's pragmatic wing, linked to the centres of economic power in Euskadi, had "viewed with distrust Garaikoitxea's policy of systemic confrontation with the national government and the absence of a clear and firm opposition to ETA terrorism [which maintained] ...an unbearable insecurity in public life and private business."¹²⁶ The PNV's slide into moderation was effected in part by its understanding that Euskadi needed Madrid's money to finance institutional development and reindustrialization.¹²⁷ Garaikoitxea's aggressive rhetoric and maximizing policies had undermined Madrid's confidence in its autonomic policy which first led to LOAPA, then to obstruction of the transference process and then to efforts to limit the Basque legislature's legislative competence.

The 1985 Legislative Pact Between the PSE and PNV

José Antonio Ardanza became the new *lendakari*. Believed "conservative" and a "radical nationalist",¹²⁸ Ardanza was more conciliatory than his critics imagined. He declared that Euskadi "cannot be governed by the PNV alone" and that while favouring a monocolour PNV government, he was "open to negotiations with the PSE on a legislative pact."¹²⁹ Meetings with the PSE resulted in a political accord which was signed formally on 30 January, 1985. The accord was "the most important achieved in Euskadi since the elaboration of the *Estatuto de Autonomía de Guernica*".¹³⁰ The PSE's claims that "the Legislative Pact was not related with the fall of Garaikoitxea more than in its timing",¹³¹ were spurious.¹³² The accord, and other measures taken by the PNV and the PSE with Madrid's backing, hinted at a new political will to address Euskadi's problems.¹³³ It showed that the PSOE government wanted a new relationship with democratic nationalism, that it was prepared to extend to Ardanza a political victory to legitimize his leadership both in the PNV and among the Basque electorate, and to give Ardanza and him time to win the battle against Garaikoitxea for control of the party.¹³⁴

The legislative pact ended the lack of dialogue between Madrid and Vitoria. It was a victory for the PSE, which placed particular importance on the PNV's renunciation of political negotiations with ETA and its condemnation of violence.¹³⁵ The pact stated that "there is no justification for violence"; that the political problems of Euskadi "must only be negotiated among Basque political forces with parliamentary representation, the Basque Government and... the State"; that social reinsertion was available for those who abandon violence; and it confirmed Madrid's exclusive domain over international relations.¹³⁶ Benegas states that the pact "guarantees that we are going to support a Government which complies with the Constitution and fights against terrorism in País Vasco."¹³⁷ It was a victory for the PNV, which "succeeded in maintaining a monocolour government and breaking the deadlock in Parliament, established a series of mechanisms for dialogue and opened up the possibility of advancing

the autonomic process."¹³⁸ The PNV party itself refused to sign the pact to maintain its programmatic ambiguity on political negotiations and protect its internal cohesion.¹³⁹ Statements by the party's president, Jesús Insausti, to the effect that his "true aspiration is the creation of an independent Basque state",¹⁴⁰ and "a negotiation with ETA could be a necessary exit [to the violence]"¹⁴¹ were not surprising.

With the legislative pact the PNV could begin to govern Euskadi. Ardanza was committed to decreasing friction with Madrid and de-dramatizing Basque political life.¹⁴² His "deference to the Constitution, constant offers of dialogue with Madrid and non-intervention in international affairs,¹⁴³ was aimed at overcoming the legacy by which "the constant and prolonged opposition between the central and Basque governments had ended up affecting the image of compatibility between the nationalist project and the Spanish political system."¹⁴⁴ The pact permitted important transferences to the Basque government,¹⁴⁵ and Vitoria showed greater zeal in confronting ETA. ETAm's assassination of the head of the *Ertzaintza* (the autonomous Basque police force), Díaz Arocha, on 7 March 1985 convinced the PNV government to take a definitive stand against ETAm. Building on two previous propositions for pacifying Euskadi adopted by the Basque Parliament in 1980 and 1982, parliamentarians approved unanimously a third, the 14 March 1985 "Declaration on Violence", which stated:

We denounce ETA's lack of legitimacy to express the popular will of the Basque People and, consequently, we reject its pretensions of negotiating the political problems of the Basque People, which can only be negotiated among political parties with parliamentary representation, the Basque Government, and... the Government of State.¹⁴⁶

Achieving this accord was essential to isolating ETA politically. In November, the PNV government, publicly rejected political negotiations with ETA arguing that "to adopt the proposition would be to grant ETA a representation which it lacked."¹⁴⁷ The PNV later recanted.

The Two Elections in 1986 and the PNV's Split

Against this backdrop of congruence and understanding, the PNV's internal disputes raged. The PNV remained bitterly divided between those who were personally loyal to Garaikoitxea, the *críticos*, and Arzallus, the *oficialistas*.¹⁴⁸ By mid-1986, tensions between the two factions resulted in the exclusion of *críticos* from the party's list of candidates in the 22 June 1986 general elections. The *críticos* called for popular abstention and the PNV's share of the popular vote fell dramatically, as Table VII.b shows. The 1986 general elections marked a turning point in Basque politics. While the PNV won a plurality of the vote it lost 2 seats, leaving it with only 6 compared to the PSE's 7 seats. This was the PNV's lowest return since 1979. In Eguiguren's analysis, the PNV's strategy was to prop up HB as a means to stymie the growth of the PSE in the belief that HB would steal votes and seats from the PSE.¹⁴⁹ The strategy backfired and HB ended up winning seats from the PNV. By giving credibility to HB, the PNV extended

ETAm implicit legitimacy. The electoral result broke the PNV's hegemony and opened the way for a coalition government in the 1986 autonomic elections.

Table VII.b Legislative and Autonomic Elections in Euskadi, 1980-1986

	1980 Autonomic		1982 General		1984 Autonomic		1986 General		1986 Autonomic	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Votes	Seats
PNV	38.0	25	32.0	8	42.0	32	28.0	6	23.7	17
PSE	14.2	9	29.3	8	23.0	19	26.	7	22.0	19
HB	16.5	11	14.8	2	14.6	11	17.8	4	17.5	13
EA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.9	13
EE	9.8	6	7.7	1	8.0	6	9.1	2	11.0	9
CP/AP	13.2	8	11.7	2	9.3	7	10.5	2	4.8	2
PCE	4.0	1	1.8	-	1.4	-	1.2	-	-	-
Other	-	-	2.7	-	1.7	-	6.9	-	3.5	2
Total	100	60	100	21	100	75	100	21	100	75

Source: Llera "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema," pp. 279-280, "Así se vota en Euskadi," p.30, Coverdale, "Regional," p. 235 and 246 and Millán and Requena, p. 30.

* In the 1982 General and 1984 Autonomic Elections the UCD and AP/CD results are combined.

As the bifurcation of the PNV became manifest, Garaikoitxea, who was believed a modernist, moderate and liberal in the PNV, "discovered in the depths of his wounded heart the radical nationalist that he had never been."¹⁵⁰ Arzallus, who was viewed as a conservative identified with archaic foralism, recouped "his interrupted modernizing discourse."¹⁵¹ In September the PNV split when the *critico* wing led by Garaikoitxea left it. Eleven deputies joined Garaikoitxea to form a new political party, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA - Basque Solidarity). Although the PNV was left with only 21 seats, the PSE, with its 19 seats, reiterated its support for Ardanza and the PNV government. Ardanza promptly dissolved the Parliament and called elections for 20 November 1986, to defeat EA convincingly before it could gather its forces and make a serious run for power.¹⁵² The split of the party was perhaps timely and useful to the PNV. A large part of the PNV's political difficulties had arisen over its self-definition as *the* Basque nationalist political party. As a hegemonic, catch-all party, and the patron of Basque nationalism, the PNV believed that it had to represent within its organization the full diversity of nationalist opinion. Independentist sabiano currents within the party had struggled with moderate autonomist tendencies for control of the party's agenda. With the departure of the sabianos, the PNV was able to define a more coherent political programme. As Table VII.b show, in the elections the PNV won a plurality of the vote with 23.7% of the vote but only 17 seats. The PSOE polled only 22.0% of the popular vote but won a plurality of the seats with 19. The PNV's split adjusted the political balance in the PSE's favour. The newly formed EA won 15.8% of the vote and 13 seats, HB won 17.5% and 13 seats and EE won 10.9% and 9 seats. The CP won 4.8% and 2 seats and the CDS 3.5% and 2 seats. The fragmentation of the Basque party system after 1986 generated coalition governments and a contest for the political centre.¹⁵³

The First PNV-PSE Coalition Government

The PSE and PNV signed a second pact on 3 February 1987, which deeply affected the posterior development of the Basque community and transformed the relationship between Madrid and Vitoria. The legislative pact permitted the formation of a coalition government between the two parties in which each shared equally in Cabinet. Four challenges faced the government: 1) "the permanent tension over autonomic development"; 2) "the partial assumption of responsibilities for public order on the part of autonomic institutions"; 3) "the ambiguity, when not alignment, of traditional nationalism regarding... ETAm's wished for political negotiation with the State", and; 4) "the policy of imposition or confrontation in the mechanisms of institutional construction [which] sharpen the tensions of precarious integration in a highly fragmented society".¹⁵⁴ The coalition defined its agenda as "economic recuperation, peaceful coexistence and the consolidation and development of self-government" and resolved to maintain a positive dialogue with Madrid.¹⁵⁵ It agreed to develop a coherent strategy to combat violence which included: renewal of the 1985 parliamentary declaration on violence; total rejection of violence and its justifications; consolidation of Basque political institutions through autonomic development; promotion of social reinsertion; support for and protection of victims of extortion; expansion of the *Ertzaintza's* policing duties; and, agreements with the central government to define a new strategy against terrorism.¹⁵⁶

The coalition government worked well. Both the PNV and PSE were pleased with its operation, the political programme it instituted and its effect on the Basque polity. A new tone of moderation permeated the Basque political debate and relations with the central government normalized. In a speech in 1988, Jesús Eguiguren, President of the Basque Parliament, stated, "in my opinion, Basque political parties are starting to understand that it is useful to compete for moderation, to abandon radicalization which divides society, and to develop ties of union."¹⁵⁷ Arzallus recognized the compatibility between the programmes of the PSE and PNV and alluded to the PSE-PNV pact as a factor which prompted a "gigantic leap forward in the advancement of the autonomy programme."¹⁵⁸ Eguiguren believed the coalition government had achieved: stability and leadership of autonomic institutions, de-dramatization of autonomic demands, programmatic moderation of the parties and preeminence of economic problems.¹⁵⁹ He noted that "today, the institutions have recuperated the leadership that the climate of violence had disputed since their very birth."¹⁶⁰ The PNV-PSE political pacts changed the process of devolving powers and resources from Madrid to Vitoria from a contest of political wills into an administrative procedure. With its loss of hegemony, the PNV's exclusivism gave way to possibilism under Ardanza's prodding.

In this climate of moderation and understanding, the PNV, supported by the nationalist parties, announced its intention to win parliament's approval of Euskadi's "right to self-determination". The PSE

believed the initiative "contradicts the expressions of moderation and pragmatism which had started to exist in Basque society",¹⁶¹ and would nurture EA's radicalism and erode ETAm\HB's political isolation.¹⁶² Arzallus defended the PNV's decision as "part of a dynamic process of national construction,"¹⁶³ without defining the party's concept of self-determination. The democratic nationalist parties defended the proposal, arguing that it was well within their rights and it was a mechanism which "recovers for discussion in the institutions, a standard which until now, had been in the hands of the terrorists."¹⁶⁴ In declaring self-determination, the PNV's possible intentions were fourfold: i) to unify its bases; ii) to capture the key issue separating the PNV and EA, to weaken it; iii) to capture for democratic Basque nationalism ETAm's sole remaining effective demand; and iv) to pressure the PSE to leave the coalition to bring on early elections. The PNV may have hoped to force an election on the issue of self-determination, to win a majority by winning over the support bases of EA and HB. The motion on self-determination was passed in Parliament on 15 February 1990 by the 38 votes of the PNV, EE and EA and opposed by the 23 votes of the PSE, UA, CDS and PP.¹⁶⁵ Attempts by HB's deputies, who attended the Parliament for the second time ever, to hijack the debate, were parried successfully by the other Basque parties. With the approval of the motion normalcy returned to the Basque political debate. Prior to its dissolution at the end of its term, the Parliament approved a new accord with Madrid on the replacement of *Guardia Civil* by units of the *Ertzaintza*.

The Basque Economy from the Transition to the PSOE's Second Term

The Basque economy, which specialized in sectors in global decline, entered into a serious recession in the mid-1970s, from which it has yet to recover.¹⁶⁶ The pillar of the Basque economy was its antiquated and inefficient steel industry which required an urgent restructuring to become competitive as Spain dropped its tariff barriers in preparation for integration in the EEC. Policies to address the economic crisis were stymied by ETA terrorism.¹⁶⁷ In Euskadi ETA bombed businesses, kidnapped managers who were either shot in the knee or murdered, and demanded "contributions" to its "revolutionary tax". As well, labour militancy and violence was common, the economic infrastructure was decayed, integration in the Spanish state and market was questioned, emigration of Basque entrepreneurs and skilled labour was on the rise, etc. In all, Euskadi offered few inducements for investment, especially from foreign sources.¹⁶⁸ The unemployment rate in Euskadi leapt from 5.4% in 1977, to 14.2 % in 1980, to 24.0% in 1985, and dropped to 18.5% in 1991.¹⁶⁹ Labour force growth rates were negative from 1980 to 1985, but climbed in 1986. Between 1975 and 1981, País Vasco lost 131,900 jobs, between 1981 and 1985 it lost another 33,500 jobs, but between 1985 and 1988, these losses were offset by the gain of 55,000 jobs. Of the net jobs lost 75% were in industry.¹⁷⁰ Between 1980 and 1991, employment grew 3% in Euskadi compared to a national average of 8.8%.¹⁷¹ Similarly, the labour force grew by 9.4% compared to

a national average of 14.8%.¹⁷² After 1977, an average of 6,000 people emigrated from Euskadi annually.¹⁷³ Basque economic growth averaged 0.2% from 1975 to 1987, whereas nationally economic growth averaged 2.8%. In 1975, investment in Basque industry accounted for 13.6% of the total new investment in Spain; by 1983 Euskadi's share had fallen to 4.7%.¹⁷⁴ These statistics point to a serious economic decline in Euskadi after 1977. Payne argues that in the early 1980s, "The Basque economy... suffered greatly from the stagflation of the post-Franco years. ...Euskadi, which relies almost exclusively on the Spanish market and Spanish energy, needs the rest of Spain even more than Spain needs Euskadi."¹⁷⁵ Unzueta writes that "Without access to the Spanish market, the Basque economy would manage to realize in record time a level of development equal to Zambia."¹⁷⁶

PSOE economic policy exacerbated Euskadi's economic crisis. The PSOE government was faced with its own economic crisis caused by the stagflation of the late 1970s which the UCD governments had done little to address. The PSOE's economic policies were unexpectedly austere and conservative, but were considered policies designed to curb inflation, reduce the public debt, increase economic growth and maintain a positive balance of payments. As a result of these measures, unemployment climbed during the first four years of the PSOE's austerity programme. The government's reindustrialization programme for heavy industry was geared to increase the sector's efficiency and competitiveness. Between 1982 and 1984, 72,000 jobs were lost in the textiles, metallurgy and ship-building sectors, many of these in already hard-hit Euskadi.¹⁷⁷ At the same time these policies were being implemented, relations between Madrid and Vitoria had become increasingly acrimonious and the channels of communications were all but closed. It appeared that the central government had been prepared to let the economic crisis mount in Euskadi as a means to pressure the PNV government to moderate its programme and condemn ETA. While evidence to prove this is hard to find, there is little indication that the central government was greatly worried about the PNV government's economic travails, as its refusal to advance the transference process and funds for economic reconversion shows. For its part, the PNV believed "*el fuero y no el huevo*" was truly important, meaning that "it was preferable to sacrifice the... Basque economy ...than to cede an iota of its nationalistic pretensions."¹⁷⁹ Javier Arzallus stated in an interview: "We are prepared to pay any price to end the Spanish occupation. We would even accept a decline in our standard of living."¹⁸⁰

ETA and the Second PSOE Government

ETAm underwent a series of changes as well. Most notably, ETAm adopted the tactics of diffuse terrorism as increased police efficiency put serious strains on the organization. This trend would be

^{*} Spain consumed 45% of Euskadi's output, Euskadi 40% and others 15%. (Unzueta, *La sociedad*, p. 151.)

confirmed when *Artapalo*, *Santi Potros* and *Josu Ternera* took over ETAm after France deported the "moderate" *Txomin* to Gabon. The three represented a highly unified command which was "ideologically anchored in 1975, when Franco was still alive" and they had joined ETA.¹⁸¹ Their "unreal vision" of Spain's political reality "converted them into hard-line activists capable of carrying-out the most horrible crimes."¹⁸² To increase the effect of its actions and decrease the risk to its militants the new leadership embraced the car-bomb. Its first act in July 1986, was to explode a car-bomb in Madrid killing 11 *Guardia Civil* recruits and wounding many civilians.¹⁸³ The attack came as the newly elected Cortes prepared to sit. ETAm maintained an aggressive offensive in Madrid and Euskadi which was a bitter blow to government anti-terrorism efforts. On 25 October 1986, ETAm bombed the car of Guipúzcoa's Military Governor, General Rafael Garrido Gil, in San Sebastián, killing him, his wife, his son, his chauffeur and a bystander.¹⁸⁴ The action "showed an indifference to the lives of bystanders unusual hithertofore in actions undertaken within Euskadi."¹⁸⁵ These attacks, like another car-bombing in Madrid which killed a *Guardia Civil* and wounded 11 civilians,¹⁸⁶ showed that innocent persons were increasingly at risk with ETAm's generalized terrorism. This was an augur of things to come.

ETAm's leadership was not only eager to launch an aggressive armed campaign but to exert full control over the organization and its activists. On 10 September 1986, *Yoyes*, a former ETAm leader who had accepted social reinsertion with *Txomin*'s blessing, was shot dead as she walked with her child in Ordizia.¹⁸⁷ She was murdered because her acceptance of social reinsertion "was equivalent to proclaiming that the armed struggle is no longer necessary."¹⁸⁸ This jeopardized the iron discipline ETAm needed to survive and legitimized the state's policy for weakening ETA.¹⁸⁹ The legitimacy of the armed struggle was "the only thing that cannot be put into question."¹⁹⁰ ETAm was not deterred by the outcry, believing "the loyalty of its social base and HB's votes... [were] not going to rise nor decline because of its action [and] that its image in other social sectors was already so awful that it was politically indifferent if it were to deteriorate a bit more."¹⁹¹ This was not ETAm's first attack on social reinsertion; in February 1984 Mikel Soluan was murdered by ETAm. The murders showed that social reinsertion was not only a serious threat to ETAm but that it was prepared to retain the commitment of its militants through all means. Five years after *Yoyes*' death, ETA prisoners refused to accept social reinsertion for "fear of ETA's revenge."¹⁹² ETAm's violence was a form of ritual suicide; by committing atrocities ETA hoped to close the channels of reinsertion, thereby making prisoners' exits from prison depend entirely on the decisions of ETAm's leadership.¹⁹³ As well, those guilty of most of ETAm's blood crimes "know that the only possibility to avoid rotting in prison can solely result from a tough negotiation between ETA and the Government."¹⁹⁴

The problem of reaching a negotiated solution to ETAm's violence was not that posed by its demands but by its violence. If Basque opinion had been firmly behind ETA, perhaps the content of its

agenda and the question of independence would have been the issue. But Basque opinion was not in the main in favour of ETA, so the question turned on the symbolic content of its negotiating platform. Ostensibly, ETAm's programme remained that of amnesty, legalization of all political parties, removal of all Spanish security forces, improved conditions for working people, and Navarra's integration.¹⁹⁵ In the view of the government, the terms of *la Alternativa KAS* "are objectives which depend before anything on ETA stopping killing."¹⁹⁶ By fulfilling some of the terms of *la Alternativa KAS* the central government had relativized the content of ETA's "unnegotiable" programmatic principles. Amnesty was accommodated by social reinsertion, HB was legalized,¹⁹⁷ and the government would reduce state security forces in Euskadi by 60% in the absence of terrorism and full deployment of the *Ertzaintza*.¹⁹⁸ Madrid and the PNV had agreed that Navarra's integration in the CAV was for the people of Navarra to decide.¹⁹⁹ ETA's sole effective demand was self-determination.* In 1985 an ETA spokesman stated that a permanent ceasefire could be arranged if the Spanish government accepted the "theoretical recognition of the right to self-determination".²⁰⁰ Full acceptance of the terms of *la Alternativa KAS* had always been ETAm's precondition to a ceasefire. Later it stated that it searched for "some formal concession from the Spanish government so it could abandon its arms and affirm that the struggle was not useless."²⁰¹ By 1986, it demanded negotiation of *la Alternativa KAS*, at the conclusion of which it would establish a ceasefire.²⁰² By late 1987, ETA proposed a ceasefire as a precondition to a negotiation of *la Alternativa KAS*,²⁰³ thereby recognizing "that a truce is previous to a negotiation, not the result".²⁰⁴ While ETAm's concessions demonstrated a more realistic political analysis, it appeared that ETA's stated objective of negotiating *la Alternativa KAS* was incidental to its true aim of finding a means to justify its years of armed struggle and the hundreds of deaths and thousands of maimings its violence had caused.

The state and the democratic parties wished to force ETA to end its violence unconditionally. Ramón Recalde, PSE Minister of Justice in the Basque government, criticized ETAm's strategy, stating the apparent military coherence of provoking a negotiation by means of a demonstration of force is purely incoherent politically from the moment in which it fails to take into account [that] *at this price*, for any Government is it more profitable to bear the terrorist onslaught, as it does now, than to initiate a process as risky as that of negotiations. This is not only for the obvious reactions of the involutionist sectors, etc., but as well for the practical impossibility of negotiating in these conditions.²⁰⁵

ETA's efforts to increase its bargaining power raised the cost to the state of negotiations. Thus, to the extent "it tries to negotiate from positions of strength which in fact block the path to any dialogue, [ETAm] almost [seems] not to wish to negotiate at all."²⁰⁶ In August 1987, Felipe González stated:

I believe that the democratic State cannot negotiate politically with terrorists. Or said in different terms, a democratic State if it wishes to survive as such, cannot acquiesce to the

* It is difficult to determine clearly ETAm's position on various issues because its *duros* and its *moderados* proclaimed different goals at different times.

blackmail of violence. Therefore...the hypothesis of a political negotiation is excluded. If one encounters, through whatever procedure... a way which would allow the eradication of terrorism to accelerate without a political negotiation, that is to say, without political compensation, naturally we would favour its eradication... [But] nothing [will be done] to eradicate terrorism [solely] to eradicate terrorism.²⁰⁷

The government's message to ETA was "You are not going to win, and we are not going to concede anything."²⁰⁸ Its posture indicated it understood ETAm's programme. According to Unzueta, ETAm views negotiation as a stage on the path to its ultimate goal of independence.²⁰⁹ Political concessions would have validated the armed struggle and given ETAm more reason to pursue it for it could then argue that armed means are achieving their desired ends.²¹⁰

At the forefront of the government's battle against terrorism was increasingly effective police repression of ETA. Strong anti-terrorist legislation to extend the police greater powers was supported by the majority of Spanish political parties.²¹¹ The security forces benefitted greatly from improved intelligence, superior training and coordination with other European and international intelligence services to make their repression fall on ETAm selectively. Its elite special intervention forces became more sophisticated and able. The FSE were tightly controlled and infrequently appeared to exceed their authority. However, allegations of torture and abuse of ETA prisoners failed to disappear. Barrionuevo stated that "to speak of the existence of systematic torture and mistreatment, by police... is as unjust as it is incorrect."²¹² But he recognized that "the functioning of democratic institutions does not impede irregular actions by some of the functionaries that serve them".²¹³ By late 1987 the government took steps to incorporate the *Ertzaintza* in the counter-terrorism effort. Madrid had been reluctant to involve them previously due to concerns about it as an operational force. The *Ertzaintza* were recruited from among ethnic Basques with ties to the PNV; so too were the *etarras*. Discovery of ETA operatives within the *Ertzaintza* did little to build Madrid's trust. As well, Felipe González had argued that the battle against ETA was "an unalienable and untransferable obligation of the National Government."²¹⁴ He believed that anti-terrorism was a question of state policy and was leery of extending to Vitoria powers which were exclusive to the state. With its changed policy the government sought Basque cooperation against ETA by transferring to the *Ertzaintza* the responsibilities of an integrated police force.

ETAm suffered serious reverses in late 1986 and early 1987, as Spanish and French police captured a number of its *comandos*, including the important *comando España* and a large cache of weapons and extensive documentation on the collection of the *impuesto revolucionario*. Another setback for ETA was the death of Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, *Txomin*, on 27 February 1987, reportedly in a traffic accident in Algeria. Authorities feared that without *Txomin*, ETA would drift into a frenzy of indiscriminate attacks.²¹⁵ Under pressure in Madrid and Guipúzcoa, and with its infrastructure in ruins in

Vizcaya, Alava and Navarra, ETAm took its terrorism to Cataluña where Barcelona had been awarded the 1992 Summer Olympic Games, and where in regional elections HB had won 45,000 votes. Between November 1986 and March 1987, 3 people died and over 60 were wounded in a string of car-bombings. On 19 June 1987, a car-bomb exploded in a subterranean parkade at the Hipercor supermarket in Barcelona. The explosion killed 21 people and wounded many more:

There is no doubt that... the time and day were chosen to cause the greatest number of victims... There were no *Guardias Civil*, no military personnel of the so-called "army of occupation", no alleged informers or fascists; only working class families preparing for the weekend.²¹⁶

According to two *ex-etarras*, with this action ETAm wished to say, "we are capable of anything; and we will crush anyone unceremoniously."²¹⁷ Ibarra argues that ETAm hoped "to terrorize, and... pressure the civil population... to force the State to concede to its demands for a negotiation."²¹⁸ Thus, "the direct objective is the civil population itself... to generate a deep, real fear in society; and for this a certain number of deaths is necessary."²¹⁹ Felipe González stated, "The terrorists think that with actions like this they will force the Government to change its attitude. They will not succeed. We are going to maintain our firmness in the fight against terrorism... We will not cede a millimetre."²²⁰ ETAm was condemned universally, even by HB. 750,000 Catalans marched through Barcelona in a silent protest. Calling the attack an "error", ETAm blamed the police for failing to evacuate the store and proclaimed its "solidarity with the people of Cataluña and... the victims' family members."²²¹ *Josu Ternera* replaced *Artapalo*.²²²

Political Initiatives Taken Against ETA After Hipercor

ETAm did not anticipate the magnitude of the reaction to the Hipercor bombing. The government launched a comprehensive strategy to defeat ETA which included securing France's cooperation against ETA, facilitating a split in ETA between the *duros* and *moderados*,²²³ and securing ETAm's social and political isolation. In an August meeting which was a turning point in five years of talks between them, Felipe González met with François Mitterrand to discuss combined operations against ETA. González promised to declare publicly his willingness to find a negotiated end to ETA's violence in exchange for a French commitment to "hit ETA hard."²²⁴ With its new script, the government offered ETAm a negotiation. Days later, its counter-terrorism officials met with exiled *etarra*, *Antron*, in Algiers.²²⁵ ETAm was offered social reinsertion for those *etarras* not guilty of blood crimes and foreign exile for up to fifteen years for the rest. ETAm was to surrender its arms, halt its violence and destroy information on its targets.²²⁶ Cambio 16 reports that the Government sought to cause a split between

those 80 activists who are always disposed to commit attacks, and the organization's 800 members - 400 of whom are in prison - who are not *operatives*. The former are in no condition to integrate themselves easily into Spanish society because of the type of

crimes they have committed... The rest know that if it were not for this group the solution would already have been reached.²²⁷

The negotiations did not lead to an accord, but had placed Madrid in a win-win situation - something ETAm acknowledged in an internal document:

For the State and social democracy, the conversations are instruments to weigh our positions, our level of security and confidence in our forces, etc. The conversations are a useful element of the strategy of "confusing, dividing, intoxicifying", as well as being a card to play with public opinion as proof of our intransigence and their generosity.²²⁸

On 30 September, 2,000 French police launched an operation against ETAm's base. A similar operation was launched in Spain.²²⁹ Fifty *etarras* were arrested, among them were *Santi Potros*, José Ignacio Picabea, an *etarra* and former HB deputy in Alava; and key militants. Police also seized personal papers of *Santi Potros* and dismantled ETA's infrastructure in Madrid, Barcelona and Euskadi. The operation netted hard intelligence about ETA which contributed much to the counter-terrorist effort, including the names of its members and collaborators, the structure of the organization and its list of targets. The military and political reverses ETAm suffered as a result of police repression and popular reactions to the murder of *Yoyes* and the Hipercor massacre weakened ETAm seriously, but not mortally. ETAm offered a ceasefire in exchange for a negotiation in late October. Negotiations were begun between ETAm and the Government in Algiers. The ended in December 1987.

French Cooperation Against ETA

Under socialist regimes, French cooperation in denying ETA a sanctuary in the south of France was generally difficult and irresolute at best. The conservative Chirac government of 1986-1988, which suffered a proliferation of terrorist bombings and killings, proved cooperative, and its efforts were applauded by Felipe González.²³⁰ Terrorism had become an important issue in the European community where France was accused of serving as a base for terrorist attacks on other EC members.²³¹ To convince France that ETA was its problem too, Madrid revealed the extent of the relations between ETA and the French *Iparretarrak*^{*} and ETA's plans to attack French businesses in Spain.²³² Chirac favoured cooperation with Madrid, but in the same vein he demanded GAL's dissolution as a condition for France's cooperation.²³³ His Minister of Interior, Robert Pandraud, struck hard at ETA's base and deported many *etarras* under provisions for "emergency extradition".²³⁴

The defeat of the Chirac government in June 1988 brought the Socialists to power again. The new Minister of Interior, Pierre Joxe, was reticent to cooperate with Spain and inconsistent in following

* The French version of ETA which killed a French policeman in August 1984, to ETAm's chagrin.

the accords reached between the two countries. French hesitancy to detain or extradite leading *etarras* and its sloth in passing on important captured documents caused serious frustration among Spanish counter-terrorists and judicial authorities. It was popularly believed that "French solidarity appeared only when Madrid stepped on its foot."²³⁵ A French counter-terrorism official complained "That which is lacking is the political will. My government does not want to behead ETA by policial means. It aspires to arrive at a negotiated solution; and of course, that the peace is signed in Paris."²³⁶ Commercial interests were also a factor in French cooperation. In a March 1987 meeting, France appeared to demand "compensation" for cooperation in the form of a Spanish commitment to purchase French armaments.²³⁷

The Anti-terrorism Legislative Pacts

After Hipercor, the government moved to get the democratic parties to sign a pact to condemn terrorism. Charged with negotiating its terms was Txiki Benegas, who explained the logic of the effort:

terrorism is a problem of State and must not be an object of inter-party conflict, whomsoever is in government. There must be a minimum agreement among parties so that the attacks, the possible errors of the... [FSE], etc., are not converted into weapons wielded in inter-party or electoral contests.²³⁸

Ardanza lobbied Basque parties to support the effort.²³⁹ The central government with the support of the Basque government sought to challenge frontally ETAm's argument to justify its violence that while it counts on the explicit support of 10% of the Basque population, its agenda is supported implicitly by the nationalist majority of the Basque population.²⁴⁰ On 5 November, Spain's parliamentary parties, with the exception of EA and HB, agreed to an accord against terrorism which was signed formally on 10 November. EA refused to sign the accord for procedural reasons. Signatories to the accord adopted the principles contained in the Declaration on Violence of 14 March 1985 and other measures including: derogation of the anti-terrorism law, European cooperation against terrorism, cooperation and information sharing between the Government and Opposition to help eradicate terrorism, and an open process of inter-party consultation.²⁴¹ This accord was the basis for a future accord among Basque political parties.²⁴²

Following their agreement, with negotiations continuing in Algiers between the Spanish government and ETAm, Ardanza began discussions on the elaboration of an inclusive Basque accord against terrorism. HB excluded itself and condemned the effort. As the Basque effort to marginalize ETAm politically gathered momentum, on 11 December 1987 ETAm detonated a car-bomb outside a *Guardia Civil* barracks in Zaragoza. The explosion killed 11 people, five of them young girls and wounded 36 others.* 200,000 people walked through Zaragoza behind a banner "Zaragoza for peace and

* On the same day, a *Guardia Civil* was shot dead and a policeman wounded in a bomb attack.

against terrorism" to protest ETAm's attack. Madrid suspended contacts with ETAm in Algiers.²⁴³ The attack was condemned by all political parties, except HB, who also reaffirmed their commitment to sign a pact for peace in Euskadi.²⁴⁴ The government's strategy of isolating ETA received a tremendous boost following Hipercor and Zaragoza. In fact, Ardanza stated:

The violence of ETA, far from constituting an alternative path to self-government and liberty, represents the maximum obstacle which the majority of this society faces in achieving the self-government and freedom they demand.²⁴⁵

In a *comunicado* to Basque media, ETAm noted the "high number of losses" caused to the state security forces and "lamented the death of family members of the agents."²⁴⁶ Its motives for the attack were likely fourfold: i) to increase its bargaining power even if this endangered negotiations in Algiers; ii) to demonstrate that in spite of its serious reverses, it was still capable of serious and bloody attacks; iii) to cause a rupture of the 5 November accord and negotiations aimed at uniting Basque political parties against ETA; and iv) to prevent its prisoners from accepting social reinsertion. ETAm killed 49 people in 1987, 32 of them in two car bomb attacks in Barcelona and Zaragoza.

ETAm's massacre in Zaragoza gave further impetus to Ardanza's efforts to negotiate a Basque accord against violence. Negotiations concluded on 12 January 1988 when the parliamentary parties, except HB, signed the *Acuerdo of Ajuria Enea*. The pact was a historic and extremely important political achievement for Basques and Spaniards alike. The accord condemned the use of violence to achieve political ends and rejected the pretensions of violent groups to negotiate political terms. The political institutions of Euskadi and Spain were recognized as legitimate and adequate to address Basque needs. A concerted and coordinated effort by the Basque and Spanish governments to combat terrorism was accepted. The signatories accepted as necessary policial action to eradicate terrorism. International collaboration in the anti-terrorism effort, social reinsertion, freedom to express democratically any idea whatsoever, derogation of special anti-terrorism legislation, economic development to improve the Basque social and economic situation, and tolerance, were endorsed as essential to pacify and normalize Basque society. Each of the parties agreed to abide by its terms and avoid political actions which would threaten the accord. Its end was to unite Basques against ETA and pressure the terrorist organization to find a negotiated end to its violence while denying it the possibility of political negotiations. It also gave the state the freedom to treat ETAm as a policial problem, thereby inverting its strategy of negotiations. The accords helped overcome the "political impasse characterized by the state's incapacity to obtain the necessary legitimacy to finish off ETA and ETA's incapacity to increase its armed influence and its sphere of ideological influence."²⁴⁷ After the accord was signed, Benegas stated that "from now on, ETA and HB are alone in Basque society."²⁴⁸ Ardanza believed that the contents of the pact were a "permanent defence of democracy and the marginalization of violent and rupturist factions, of the primacy of civil society over all intents of militarization and the imposition of minority demands on this society."²⁴⁹ To Arzallus, the

spirit and the content of the pact "is a message to our society and as well to those who are determined to go alone against life and against everyone."²⁵⁰ HB believed the accord was "disdainful of the majority's will."²⁵¹ Unzueta notes that "this accord has come to mean, by its content and the support on which it counts, the political defeat of ETA."²⁵²

ETA's Offer of a Truce and the 1988 Negotiation Attempt

By 1988 ETA would find itself seriously accosted on all sides. Its massacres first at Hipercor and then in Zaragoza, mobilized political support for *Ajuria Enea*, and popular opinion demanded an end to ETA terrorism as never before. Basque politicians, especially those in the PNV and EA, who had been somewhat reluctant to condemn ETA without palliates, recognized that their positions were indefensible. The central government pushed its strategy to force ETAm's dissolution by 1992 when Spain would host the Olympics in Barcelona, the World's Fair in Sevilla and Madrid would be Europe's Cultural Capital. Two weeks after *Ajuria Enea* was signed, on 28 January ETAm offered Madrid a "partial truce" of 60 days as a "demonstration of our disposition to dialogue."²⁵³ ETAm demanded a "cessation of police hostilities" in the Basque regions of France and Spain and "conversations" with government officials at the "highest level" to reach "a negotiated political solution to the conflict" through the mediation of Algeria's government.²⁵⁴ Its position appeared to be a compromise "between those who view the offer as a way to gain time to reorganize and those who believed sincerely that the truce was the sole possibility to achieve an honourable end [to the violence]."²⁵⁵ The political isolation *Ajuria Enea* threatened and police effectiveness on both sides of the border changed the correlation of forces in the contest between ETA and the state.²⁵⁶ ETAm's offer of negotiations showed Rincon "the weakness of a people's army which is being deprived of its army and could remain with few people."²⁵⁷ He believed negotiations were "necessary and even urgent" to the organization, which seemed to be seeking "the return home of its battered combatants in the most dignified manner possible... without recognizing that formally."²⁵⁸ The negotiations began and ended badly with misunderstandings separating the Government and ETAm.²⁵⁹ Madrid would only discuss a ceasefire and matters relating to ETA. ETAm demanded a negotiation on political terms. The government failed to understand the terms of the text and sub-text of ETAm's offer, and ETAm failed to clarify them. The talks lasted until 24 February 1988 when ETAm launched a new campaign of violence. ETAm would discover that social tolerance of its violence had changed with *Ajuria Enea*.

Effect of *Ajuria Enea* on Basque Society

The political fact of *Ajuria Enea* had a profound effect on the subsequent development of the Basque political discourse. The maximalist discourse which had characterized discussions on ETA was,

for once, largely absent from the Basque political debate. There existed unanimous political and social agreement on the vigent rules of the political game. In a sharp break with past ambiguity, the re-elected President of the PNV stated in early January 1988, that "Euskadi is for all Basques" and criticized the party's past policies of considering Euskadi its own creation and its equation of the concept "Basque" with that of "nationalist."²⁶⁰ The social and political inhibitions which had constituted a subculture of fear in Basque society²⁶¹ were somewhat overcome. Peace groups and an association of victims of terrorism were formed, which led serious campaign against ETA and in favour of peace. A new willingness to speak out against ETA led to a moral regeneration in Basque society. On 2 June 1989, thousands of residents of Eibar marched through their city behind a banner "Eibar contra ETA",²⁶² to protest ETAm's killing of a restaurateur on 25 May. Four days later, in nearby Elgoibar, ETAm murdered his close friend. With the full support of Basque political institutions and social organizations, thousands demonstrated against ETAm. For Eguiguren, "the Ajuria Enea accord had been taken to the streets."²⁶³

Popular Perceptions of ETAm/HB

Despite its atrocities and broad opposition to the organization, through HB ETA has maintained a significant base of social support. While some of supporters were attracted to its radicalism or its socialism, given HB's stated support for ETA, it would require a certain degree of mental gymnastics to ignore the HB-ETAm connection. Certainly ETAm viewed a vote for HB as being synonymous with support for it and its armed struggle. Even so, ETA's "murderous and destabilizing capacity is relatively independent of the political support it tallies."²⁶⁴ In Basque elections from 1977 to 1993, while HB's share of the popular vote averaged about 13%, only about 10% of Euskadi's population could be termed loyal.²⁶⁵ Of these 25%, or 30,000 to 50,000 people were prepared to support ETAm's terrorism.²⁶⁶ As political and police pressure on ETAm mounted, the terrorist organization needed HB to devote its energy and resources to defending it. While this helped to sustain ETAm, "it also formed the strategy of the political power in isolating ETA socially and in defining the nationalist left as the internal enemy to beat."²⁶⁷

Table VII.c. Basque View of ETA

Etarras are	1978	1979	1987
Patriots	13	17	5
Idealists	35	33	18
Manipulated	33	29	11
Crazy	11	8	16
Criminals	7	5	16
DK/NA	1	8	34

Source: Francisco J. Llera, "Conflicto en Euskadi Revisited," in *Politics, Society and Democracy: The Case of Spain*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 192.

Although HB maintained a relatively solid support base and opinions concerning ETA are influenced strongly by political events, as Table VII.c shows, between 1979 and 1987 Basque popular opinion shifted significantly in favour of moderation. The number of voters who maintained positive images of ETA fell

from up to 50% in the late 1970s to 23% in 1987 and the number having negative images of ETA remained steady at over 40%. The number who did not know or had no answer rose greatly to 34%.

Table VII.d. Form of Basque State

	1977	1981	1982	1983	1987
Centralism	9	4	7	2	3
Some Autonomy	29	33	37	34	34
Much Autonomy	32	13	18	24	20
Independence	24	21	17	26	31
DKNA	6	29	21	14	12

Source: Llera Ramo, "Conflicto," p. 188.

Generally nationalist supporters had a more positive image of ETA - HB, 71%, EE, 31%, EA, 27% and PNV, 16%; although some statist party voters had a positive image of ETA - CP, 13% and PSOE, 10%.²⁶⁸ On the other hand, statist

supporters had a strongly negative view of ETA - CDS 80%, PSOE 74% and CP 74% - while nationalist voters were generally more negative than positive to ETA, with a negative view held by PNV, 54%, EA, 53%, EE, 39% and HB, 7%.²⁶⁹ As Table VII.d indicates, the preferred political organization of the Basque polity evolved between 1977 and 1987, with a significant support for independence (31%) and strong support for autonomy (54%) in 1987.

ETAm's Offer of a Truce and the 1989 Negotiations

On 8 January 1989, under pressure from Madrid, ETAm announced a 15-day truce to restart negotiations.²⁷⁰ Three days later, French police arrested ETAm's leader, *Josu Ternera*, in Bayonne. In spite of the arrest and with *Artapalo* again at the helm, ETAm extended the truce to 26 March. Madrid was prepared to negotiate only terms related to the organization and to offer a pardon to ETA's 400 prisoners and social reinsertion for its prisoners in France.²⁷¹ ETA demanded the right to self-determination and an accord of intent on Navarra.²⁷² If Madrid accepted these terms, ETAm would abandon its arms and leave it to the Basque political parties, i.e. HB, to negotiate the details of this agreement.²⁷³ Madrid would "converse" on these matters, but not negotiate. On 18 March, 250,000 Basques marched in Bilbao behind a single banner "La paz ahora y para siempre." Their call for peace and an extension of the truce strengthened Madrid's hand. As the deadline drew nearer tensions rose. The Government and ETA were not far apart. Madrid was prepared to note publicly that their conversations had a political character, which HB's Idigoras called "highly positive".²⁷⁴ Tensions within ETAm were great. Although it agreed to extend the truce by 72 hours, when the new deadline passed ETAm broke off talks. On 10 April, ETA renewed its armed campaign, thereby torpedoing a fair and dignified exit from the path of violence. ETAm never did raise the issue of its prisoners.

The reasons for the failure of the negotiation, which had done much to bridge the differences between Madrid and ETA, are legion and generally contradictory. ETAm had argued that "the prolongation of the truce depends on whether [the two sides] begin to discuss concrete political questions -

Navarra and self-determination.²⁷⁵ ETAm knew Madrid's manoeuvrability was limited on these matters given the "constitutional and statutory framework and the political accords among the democratic parties."²⁷⁶ The decision to end negotiations showed that the *duros* won the power struggle within the organization.²⁷⁷ Perhaps they believed that in a future negotiation they could strike a better deal confident that Madrid would be increasingly vulnerable as 1992 approached. PSE *vice-lendakari* Ramón Juaregui stated that ETAm's decision reflected its "fanaticism".²⁷⁸ Arzallus believed ETAm failed to appreciate "sufficiently" the opportunity for peace, and blamed HB for "maintaining intransigent postures so that things were made more difficult."²⁷⁹ He believed "the process that resulted in Algiers will not be repeated."²⁸⁰ According to Eguiguren, "ETA could not admit that the sole objective of the conversations in Algiers was to try to find a solution to the problem of violence."²⁸¹ In HB's view "the Algiers process had a great importance in breaking the ice between ETA and the Spanish government and... establishing the bases for a second negotiation."²⁸² In a poll published in March, Spaniards were asked what the government should negotiate with ETAm: 38% stated only ETAm's unconditional surrender, 19% only social reinsertion for those without blood crimes, 12% a referendum on self-determination in Euskadi, 3% integration of Navarra in País Vasco and 2% conversion of ETA into a political party.²⁸³ The basic theme was Madrid "must not cede anything to ETA concerning political terms."²⁸⁴

The 1989 Spanish Legislative Elections

On 29 October 1989 Spaniards elected a new government. It was no great surprise that the PSOE won the election with 39.6% of the popular vote and 175 seats in the 350 seat Congress of Deputies. The right-wing Partido Popular won 25.8% and 106 seats. The PSOE's victory manifested the lack of a competent second party in Spain. The Socialist government had weathered a broad-based labour onslaught from 1987 to 1989, but the party's growing social opposition was not prepared to support the government's opponents. In Euskadi the PNV won 5 seats, EE won 2 seats and EA won 2 seats. The PSOE-PSE won 24.4% of the vote and at least 6 seats and HB won 18% and 4 seats. The strength of the PSE's vote appeared to show that its image had been improved significantly by the PSE-PNV legislative pact.²⁸⁵ While the strength of HB's popular vote appeared to demonstrate that in Euskadi the effects of *Ajuria Enea* had not yet been felt, its voter base declined.

The State's Strategy to Combat ETA After 1989

A stalemate emerged in the political dynamic between ETAm and the Spanish state following the breakdown of negotiations in Algiers. The government was convinced that if there were those in ETAm who were sincerely interested in a negotiated settlement, they lacked sufficient influence to force the *duros*

to accept its terms. Madrid settled in to grind ETA down using repression, international pressure and social reinsertion. The integrated efforts of the *Guardia Civil*, *Policia Nacional* and *Ertzaintza* demonstrated an increased level of operational sophistication and efficacy in arresting ETAm's militants, dismantling its organization and denying it the money and materiel it needed. While the French effort lacked the zeal Madrid desired, French police operated against ETAm with success. The government mounted a quiet offensive against ETAm by dispersing the 485 imprisoned *etarras* through 60 prisons to diminish its control over them.²⁸⁶ The government began to permit day leave to *etarras* with jobs and vacation leave to others to "facilitate contact with the Basque social reality and... a rupture in the... isolation that ETA tries to impose on its prisoners."²⁸⁷ ETAm counter-attacked on 28 June 1991 when a parcel bomb exploded in a prison in Sevilla killing four people. Influenced strongly by the position of Minister of Interior Corcuera and his counter-terrorism advisors, the government believed that it was important to keep bridges open to ETAm to find a solution to the violence.²⁸⁸ While it maintained sporadic contacts with ETAm, it refused to negotiate political terms. Serious police actions against ETAm inspired Madrid to offer ETAm negotiations. Madrid's message was that unless ETAm moved on negotiations, it would soon have nothing to negotiate. ETAm took advantage of these contacts to keep up the morale of the prisoners and *comandos*.²⁸⁹ In addition to these measures, the government lobbied the other democratic political parties tirelessly to keep the accords against terrorism. Its position was strengthened by a poll taken in late 1991 which indicated that of those polled, 94% believed that ETA had to end its violence, 85% believed that the existence of ETA had been negative for Euskadi and although 33% favoured independence, 44% were opposed.²⁹⁰

ETAm's Strategy After 1989

ETAm's strategy after the breakdown of negotiations in 1989 was to sustain a sufficiently high level of violence to force a negotiation by threatening the peaceful celebration of the events of 1992. ETAm remained insistent that "[t]here is no way out [of the violence] except by political negotiations" and demanded "the right of self-determination for Euskadi and the release of [ETA] prisoners."²⁹¹ Practically, ETAm's programme remained "negotiations or more deaths".²⁹² Its selective attacks were geared to show a certain level of activity and often occurred in Euskadi. Its indiscriminate attacks aimed to cause serious public alarm and usually occurred in and around Barcelona and Madrid. For example, in Euskadi where ETAm was strongest, its *comandos* used selective means "so as not to scandalize the population."²⁹³ Twelve of ETAm's 25 victims in 1990 were shot dead and all of them in Euskadi, mostly in Guipúzcoa.²⁹⁴ Beyond Euskadi, ever harder-pressed to sustain its level of activity, ETAm relied on car-bombs and other indiscriminate actions, and on self-reliant itinerant *comandos* to produce the public consternation its strategy demanded. Following a series of police successes, on 8 December 1990 ETAm detonated a

remote-control car-bomb in Sabadell, a town near Barcelona.²⁹⁵ A van carrying 8 policemen *en route* to a soccer match was blown up killing six. On 29 May 1991 in Vic, a town 70 km from Barcelona and an Olympic venue, an ETAm *comando* rolled a car-bomb into a *Guardia Civil* barracks. The subsequent explosion killed five children, three troopers and one trooper's mother-in-law and wounded 35 others. According to *Cambio 16*, "That there were children in the patio was not an accident but an objective."²⁹⁶ In car-bomb attacks to the end of 1991 ETAm killed two more children and maimed a number of others.

ETAm's actions were designed to achieve at least four functions: i) to demonstrate to its supporters that it was capable of bloody operations; ii) to demonstrate to the government that it could hope for no vestige of normalcy until its demands were met; iii) to maintain control over its prisoners and deny them access to social reinsertion; and, iv) to intimidate the Spanish people and "create a climate in the public opinion by which a negotiation is the solution."²⁹⁷ However, car-bomb attacks caused popular revulsion and dismay among its *comandos*, its prisoners and HB's militants. In late 1991, in a conversation taped illegally by prison officials, two imprisoned *históricos* condemned ETAm's campaign of car-bombings, which had killed seven children and maimed a number of others that year. They referred to ETAm's leadership as a "*cuadrilla* of idiots" and queried "if the national sport of the bunch of imbeciles up there [in France] is to kill youngsters."²⁹⁸ Later in the month, an ETAm internal document noted that there existed divergent views in the organization concerning "the armed struggle".²⁹⁹ *Artapalo* believed that the armed struggle was necessary and its prosecution should remain under ETAm's control. The circular also noted that some of its members opposed means such as "car-bombs, letter-bombs, etc." ETAm called them "defeatist" and insinuated that they were traitors. In January 1992, *Artapalo* sent his *comandos* new orders to use car-bombs with these words, "we are already in 92 and we must not limit our methods and risk unnecessarily the lives of our fighters which are worth one hundred times more than the child of *txakurra* [dog, ETAm's terms for a policeman]."³⁰⁰ In documents captured in 1992 ETAm's brutal *itinerant comando* questioned *Artapalo's* sanity and his commitment to car-bombs.³⁰¹

Corralled by the police on both sides of the frontier, bereft of an experienced second-tier leadership, hard-pressed to recruit new activists and faced with severe financial problems, morale in ETAm was low. Denied access to social reinsertion, aware of the hopelessness of negotiations³⁰² and indoctrinated in a messianic ideology "which attributes an absolute value to the political objective of national independence,"³⁰³ a nascent fanaticism emerged in ETAm's ranks. In the past *etarras* rarely resisted arrest when escape was hopeless. In June 1990, following a shoot-out with a *Guardia Civil* unit in which one trooper was killed, two *etarras* committed suicide and a third was wounded in his attempt "to avoid torture" in case of capture.³⁰⁴ The day after the Vic car-bombing elite counter-terrorism units surrounded the safe house of the *comando Barcelona*. The *comando* opted to fight back; two *etarras* were

shot dead and the third was wounded and captured. In August 1991, surrounded by police, the *comando Donosti*, "preferred to die, trying to kill, to surrendering."³⁰⁵ All three were killed.

Relations Between ETAm and Herri Batasuna

Increasingly isolated socially and politically, with its infrastructure under incessant attack, ETAm relied more heavily on HB to generate social and political support for its independentist objectives. As its dependency on HB increased, so too did its operative control. ETAm placed a premium on HB's ideological orthodoxy and commitment to the armed struggle. In the new political climate occasioned by *Ajuria Enea*, the total number of HB voters had declined (see Figure VII.a.), even if its popular vote remained steady.³⁰⁶ Cracks appeared in the public unanimity of the coalition on the question of the armed struggle and negotiation. An internal battle between the *duros* of HASI and HB's moderates, led to a purge of the coalition.^{**} Control of HB was assumed by members with close ties to ETAm. With its dearth of personnel, limited resources and difficulty communicating from deep clandestinity with its *comandos*, ETAm prepared its legal, political organizations to undertake logistical duties which it found difficult to carry out. In early 1992, the *Ertzaintza* linked HB, KAS, LAB, and *Egin* directly to ETAm's collection of the *impuesto revolucionario*, a function formerly carried out by the armed wing. ETA was in a position in which it "cannot yet renounce armed activity without endangering its own subsistence as a focus of adhesion (nor can it increase this adhesion without renouncing armed activity)."³⁰⁷

The 1990 Autonomic Elections in Euskadi

In October 1990, Basques went to the polls to elect a new autonomous government. As Table VII.e shows, the PNV won 28.5% of the vote and 22 seats to emerge as Euskadi's dominant political force. Most of its gain appeared to come from EA's loss of 4 seats. With 19.4% and 15 seats the PSE lost 3 seats. The PSE's loss probably contributed to the PP's gain as the statist vote which "had drifted to the Socialist Party on previous occasions... [returned] to its natural political space."³⁰⁸ High abstention at 40% was particularly costly to the PSE.³⁰⁹ EE lost ground as it struggled to differentiate itself from the PSE and maintain control over its nationalist wing. The emergence of the *Unidad Alavesa* (UA) party - a fraction of the AP in Alava - which won 3 seats in Alava increased the complexity of the Basque polity.

* High abstention in elections after 1987 affected the political fortunes of the statist parties more than the nationalist parties, especially in local or autonomic elections.

** On 20 November, 1990, two rightist gunmen fired on HB's parliamentary delegation killing Josu Muguruza an ETAm supporter and seriously wounding Iñaki Etxeola a moderate.

Of greatest concern was the continued strength of HB which improved its popular vote and retained all its seats in spite of the influence of *Ajuria Enea*.

Table VII.e Elections to the Basque Parliament, 1980-1994

	March 1980		February 1984		November 1986		October 1990		October 1994	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
PNV	38.0	25	42.0	32	23.7	17	28.5	22	29.8	22
PSE	14.2	9	23.0	19	22.0	19	19.4	16	17.0	12
HB	16.5	11	14.6	11	17.5	13	18.4	13	16.3	11
EA	-	-	-	-	15.8	13	11.4	9		8
EE	9.8	6	8.0	6	10.9	9	7.8	6	-	-
PP	13.3	9	9.3	7	4.8	2	8.3	6	14.4	11
IU	4.0	1	1.4	-	-	-	1.4	-	9.1	6
CDS	-	-	-	-	3.5	2	0.7	-	-	-
UA	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	3		5
Oth.	8.4	6	1.7	-	1.7	-	-	-	-	-
Tot.	100	60	100	75	100	75	100	75	100	75

Sources: "Asi se vota en Euskadi," p. 30; Michel Bole-Richard, "Les socialistes et des nationalistes radicaux sont en net recul aux élections basques," *Le Monde*, 25 Oct. 1994, p. 8, cols. 1-4 and "Pays Basque: Victoire des modérés," *Le Devoir*, 24 Oct. 1994, p. 5, col. 5.

Unable or unwilling to find accommodation with the PSE, the PNV formed a nationalist coalition government with EA and EE. The PNV was attracted to this configuration in the hope it could absorb EA.³¹⁰ The electoral result indicated the PNV had already absorbed much of EA's support. As Ramón Jáuregui predicted, a pact among the nationalist parties was not viable since their differences "are too profound and their competition for the same electorate visceral."³¹¹ The coalition government collapsed in late 1991, without accomplishing much, after EA had introduced a motion for independence to Parliament with HB's support. This manifested EA's "enormous difficulty in finding a political space between the PNV and HB" as a democratic non-violent independentist party.³¹² With the government's dissolution, the PNV and PSE reached an agreement permitting them to enter into a coalition government with EE. EE had for all intents split with the radical nationalist faction allied with EA while the moderate wing allied with the PSE while maintaining an independent existence.³¹³ The PNV-PSE-EE coalition government functioned well. In addition to carrying forward its social and economic programme, it worked to ensure that the terms of *Ajuria Enea* were respected. Their task was complicated by EA which threatened to leave the accord as part of its programme to challenge HB politically.

ETAm/HB's Effect on the Basque Political Discourse

Through HB, ETAm maintained a powerful capacity to determine the terms of political debate on a wide range of issues. ETA cast a long shadow over the Basque polity,³¹⁴ by assuming for itself the rôle

of final arbiter of that which is truly in the interest of the Basque people. Both by force of its armed attacks and HB's obstructionist politics, it destabilized the Basque and Spanish politics with the intent of situating itself as the *sine qua non* political actor in important, and not so important, political debates. Whether the relevant political question regards an amnesty for ETA prisoners, the route of a proposed highway, the construction of a nuclear power plant, the placement of a historic antique table, elections to a town council, etc., by becoming involved ETAm/HB made themselves the essential political actor. Their influence did not emanate from their measured arguments, but either by force of ETA's willingness to commit violence or HB's capacity to portray nationalist parties opposed to its practices as unpatriotic. The thrust of its strategy was to create tensions which it is positioned uniquely to resolve, thereby leaving the political initiative in its hands. Its strategy of permanent mobilization meant that Basque society lived in a state of fluctuating tension, and political energy was exhausted on the resolution of false issues, leaving pressing political, economic and social problems unresolved, or unresolvable. To outline this strategy, in effect, "If autonomy is conceded, [ETA] will ask for independence; if some liberties are conceded, it will demand terms which can never be conceded."³¹⁵

The "Armed Struggle", 1992

With Spain poised to host the world in the summer of 1992, ETAm prepared an aggressive campaign of terror attacks which killed 18 people in the first three months of the year. Initially, it seemed that ETAm had renounced the use of car-bombs. Its first five victims, three military officers in Barcelona, a policeman in Bilbao and in Valencia a law professor were shot dead. From mid-January to early February, police arrested about thirty *etarras* in an effort to halt ETAm's offensive. On 1 February 100,000 to 250,000 people marched in Bilbao to protest ETAm's campaign of violence behind the banner "*Ya es hora de vivir en paz*". On 2 February, ETAm notified Madrid that it was prepared to announce a truce of two months as a step to re-open dialogue with the government. ETAm later declared that it would not cease its terrorist activity "as long as [Madrid and Euskadi's democratic parties] continue denying Euskal Herria the political, social and cultural rights owed them."³¹⁶ Five days later, ETAm killed five military men in a car-bombing in central Madrid. Over 8,000 people protested the attack, and the Defence Minister met with the JUJEM^{**} to quell their outrage. Two days later HB held a demonstration in Bilbao on the theme "La paz es posible" which attracted tens of thousands of demonstrators. It was essentially a pep rally for ETAm. Demonstrators demanded political negotiations, self-determination and peace and shouted "Gora ETA militarra" (Long Live ETA militar).³¹⁷ The next

^{*} Euskal Herria is defined by ETA as the entire Basque ethno-region.

^{**} *Junta de Jefes del Estado Mayor* - Committee of the Chiefs of the High Command

day ETAm's itinerant *comando* shot dead a policeman in Murcia. Ten days later in Santander, ETAm detonated a car-bomb killing three pedestrians. 40,000 people gathered in the main plaza in Santander in protest.³¹⁸ To the end of March, ETAm killed three more members of the security force, the son of a retired air force officer and a carpenter who accidentally jostled a car bomb in Barcelona. On 29 March 1992, in a raid on a house in Bidart, French police, pressured strongly by Madrid, arrested ETAm's high-command composed of *Artapalo*, *Txelis* and *Fittipaldi*. This was the most serious blow ETAm experienced and appeared to have decapitated it. The government recognized that this would not result in ETAm's demise, but believed it was a step in that direction.³¹⁹ HB noted prudently that "the leadership of the movement always regenerates itself."³²⁰ ETAm continued to operate following the blows struck in 1992 but in a reduced form. ETAm's threatened offensive against the Olympics failed to materialize. Not only was ETAm hard-pressed to recover from blows struck by the police, but it likely believed that it had little to gain in international opinion by pursuing its armed strategy. ETAm observed an effective truce in Barcelona and Sevilla for the duration of the celebrations of 1992. The government had launched a massive security operation to protect the Games and Expo. The French agreed to assist in sealing the Franco-Hispanic border. However, in Euskadi and Madrid ETAm still managed to show limited signs of life by shooting a policeman in Euskadi and wounding five policemen in a car-bombing in Madrid. Police operations against ETAm's infrastructure were especially damaging, especially with regard to the collection of the *impuesto revolucionario*.

Conclusion

The PSOE governments of Felipe González departed markedly from the path of the UCD governments. They were committed to confronting the most obvious manifestations of the denominated "Basque problem" using the full resources of the Spanish state. The PSOE was willing to go to extremes to convince ETA that it would not bow to its armed pressure and that it was determined to eliminate not only the organization's threat to Spanish democracy, but the organization itself. Concomitantly, the PSOE governments were determined to impress upon the PNV that it would not concede any transferences insofar as the party refused to condemn ETA and continued to extend ideological cover to the terrorists. To make its programme effective, the Socialists defined their strategy clearly and directed their energies consistently to its fulfilment. The government's totalizing strategy was geared to make its repressive means effective, to cause the political moderation of the PNV, to weaken ETA's base of support, to threaten ETA's military and organizational integrity, to force France to cooperate in denying ETA a safe haven and to cause ETA's social and political isolation. Not only was the PSOE government prepared to employ the full means of the state, it was also prepared to create other means, such as GAL, to increase its effectiveness in operating against ETA. To increase pressure on the PNV, the government appeared ready

to let Euskadi's social, economic and political crisis mount. By refusing to advance the autonomic process and extend to the Basque government resources necessary to finance Euskadi's economic reconversion, the central government demonstrated it was serious about transforming the Basque political discourse. While a politically risky programme, the PSOE strategy appeared to pay off. While certainly the central government was the object of much odium, generated as much by HB as by the PNV, the nationalist response was partially offset by strong support among Spaniards, especially among the right, and Basque statisticians on the left and right who saw the PSOE as the defender of statist interests in Euskadi.

The PSOE programme sharpened a growing political crisis within the PNV between its possibilist and aranist factions represented, by Arzallus and Garaikoitxea. As much as their dispute was a contest for political supremacy, it also sprang from distinct visions of the construction of the Basque polity and the existing political situation in Euskadi. Political changes (coalition government, a fractious nationalist movement), an alarming economic crisis (emigration, industrial decline, brain drain, capital flight) and grave social crisis (high unemployment and the culture of fear generated by ETA terrorism) were factors behind the transition to moderation. The Socialist strategy had convinced both factions of the need to meet the central government's conditions. Garaikoitxea's defenestration which led to 1985 PSE-PNV legislative pact could be viewed as the victory of the PSOE programme and of the moderate, democratic Basque nationalists. The fragmentation of the Basque party system in 1986 obviated the rise of coalition governments which transformed Basque politics. The natural coalition partners would be the PNV and PSE. At the same time the Basque polity was moderating, faced with increased repression from the state, ETAm escalated its terrorist campaign qualitatively. Its tactics of diffuse terrorism galvanized strong popular and political opinion against ETA. The central government took advantage of public outrage to cause ETAm's political isolation. With the cooperation of democratic Basque nationalist parties, Madrid managed to have the *Pacto de Moncloa* and *Acuerdo de Ajuria Enea* signed. This process had a tremendous effect on the posterior development of the Basque political dialogue and symbolized the political defeat of ETA. In the words of Eguiguren and Arzallus, as a result of the pacts the Basque political parties would find it electorally profitable to compete for moderation and confront ETA. However, if ETAm appeared defeated politically, it was a long way from being defeated militarily. After the signing of *Ajuria Enea* ETAm killed over 128 of its more than 700 victims.

The problem of ETA has centred on its willingness to use violence to force a hypothetical negotiation on political terms and consisted of the political impossibility for the state to negotiate political terms. Therein, ETAm's refusal to accept anything less than acknowledgement that its violence was necessary to achieve some sort of political end or another was at the heart of the matter. ETAm's violence appeared increasingly anachronistic as it became apparent that Basques could achieve their goals and

aspirations within the institutions of Basque and Spanish democracy. ETA could claim victory for having placed these on the national and nationalist agenda. Of vital importance to ETAm has been the contemporary and historic significance of its violence. ETAm understands that the terms that it accepts to end its existence will determine its political legacy. An *etarra* deported to Venezuela after negotiations broke-down in Algiers in 1989, stated: "We are not going to forget our historic demands after so many years of fighting."³²¹ The questions arises: What is at issue, the historic demands or the years of fighting? Was ETA trying to justify its murders or to justify the accumulation of further victims? If Unzueta is correct then "ETA does not still aspire to independence for Euskadi or socialism, but that someone, perhaps the Spanish Army, admits retrospectively the legitimacy of its actions, the heroic nature of its past, the nobility of its cause."³²² The same deported *etarra* asks, "What importance do some deaths have if the Government does not want to negotiate?"³²³ What?, indeed. If the accumulation of cadavers would not produce a negotiation, what *was* the sense of continuing the violence? In ETA's logic, the issue was self-evident. Unzueta spelled out ETAm's conundrum as follows: "How will ETAm's militants return to their villages, as murderers or heroes? If they can get a political negotiation which justifies their years of violence then they can claim political victory and justify the deaths."³²⁴ There appears to be no grounds to conclude that "ETA strives for something more than killing when it kills - that is, something more than to affirm its own existence".³²⁵

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Chapter Eight: Conclusions

It has been the purpose of this thesis to analyze the character of the political dynamic binding the Spanish state and the various Basque nationalist forces, but from the perspective of the state's political capability rather than its political rectitude. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that the policies and actions taken by both Basque and Spanish political actors were conditioned by the political, economic and social constraints under which they laboured. The analysis has concentrated on those factors which had a direct bearing on the political dynamic and only limited attention has been paid to such important questions as language, culture, society, or the structure and social support of the important political forces. Only the salient features of the historical context of Basque-Spanish relations have been addressed.

The essential character of the Spanish-Basque political dynamic has revolved around the issue of regime legitimacy. Efforts by the democratic governments to assert their authority in Euskadi, where it had been gravely eroded by the policies of the franquist state, were rebuffed by Basque nationalist forces intent on buttressing their own nationalist legitimacy by undermining the central government's position. The willingness of the democratic Basque nationalist parties to sustain a destabilizing political strategy and the central government's incapacity to exert control over its security forces together facilitated ETA's armed strategy which sought the regime's destabilization as a pre-condition to force negotiations. The inability of the UCD governments to confront this problem, among others, led to the UCD's political destruction and occasioned the rise of the PSOE. The transformation of Spanish policy and the Basque political climate under the first Socialist government was momentous. Its firmness in pursuing a comprehensive and politically risky programme to pacify and normalize the Basque polity advanced the process of political transformation in Euskadi. Changes in the PNV, in the Basque polity, in popular conceptions of ETA's "armed struggle" and in the social and economic conditions in Euskadi permitted a new, moderate Basque nationalism to emerge. In this final chapter, the character of these changes will be analyzed in order to draw general conclusions from the Basque-Spanish political dynamic through the transition to 1992. More precisely, the goal of the analysis will be to determine the character of the political resources the Spanish government employed to implement its programme, why it was successful, and how the changes in the Basque polity and society permitted a new political relationship to emerge between Madrid and Vitoria.

It has been argued that the policies pursued by the franquist state, namely, the repression of manifestations of Basque culture, were instrumental to the rise of ETA as a radical nationalist political force. In particular, franquism's response to the rise of ETA and its violence was especially disastrous to its own interests. The inappropriateness of the state's response rested not on its willingness to use force to crush ETA, but on the character of that repression. Basques did not generally favour ETA's violence. However, the state's abuse of the Basque people during operations against ETA and the states of exception called to destroy ETA, extended to people who had not experienced the harsh repression of the late 1930s and the 1940s, and this created tremendous animosity to the franquist state. Popular reaction to this exercise in repression created an atmosphere of resistance in País Vasco. Basques were ready to defy the franquist state to protect the *etarras*, who had become heroes to many of them. The trials of Sarasketa and the Burgos 16 were instructive as they caused enormous demonstrations of support for ETA and condemnations both of franquist repression and the Spanish state. The Basques' strong identification with ETA's struggle lent credibility to its action-reaction spiral theory and gave new life to the Basque nationalist movement. Spain's political interests would have been much better served by a discriminate repression of ETA rather than one in which all Basques were made to pay for the crimes of a few.

Arias' failure to break with franquism, while motivated by serious political considerations, was a grave political mistake. So too was his decision to continue to pursue public order policies which had done so little to bring peace and order to País Vasco, had betrayed popular expectations of the liberalization which he had promised on 12 February 1974, and had reinforced the popular identification with ETA in broad sectors of the Basque population. Although Arias' replacement by Suárez produced a sea change in the reform effort, there is no evidence that Suárez really understood the character of the "Basque problem," for he failed to implement policies which might have distanced his regime symbolically from that of his predecessor. Suárez's lack of a clear Basque policy lent an air of improvisation to his policies. They seemed to represent a series of capitulations to popular demands as a means to vent immediate pressure, thus to stave the need to make definitive political choices. The behaviour of the security forces did not change much for Suárez lacked the political resources to reform them and control their actions. The central government's policy of maintaining a hard-line law and order policy in País Vasco may have been not only a reaction to the real challenges to its authority posed by ETA and popular anti-regime agitation, but as much an attempt to ward off political pressure from the right, to derail the right's equation of democratization with political chaos and to demonstrate the UCD commitment to law and order and national unity. Whatever the truth of the matter, not only did the regime fail to convince Basques that it was serious about transforming the franquist political legacy, which alienated Basque moderates and strengthened the voice of radical nationalists, but it broadened the scope for destabilizing popular protests.

ETA's escalating violence between 1977 and 1980, and the efforts of the security forces to crush it, contributed to the spiral of political tension. Radical nationalists took advantage of popular disaffection with Suárez to generate support for independence, which left moderate nationalists in the position of appearing to be traitors for pushing only for autonomy. The Suárez government's treatment of Basque demands regarding the constitution was used by the PNV to undermine support for it in País Vasco. Efforts by the UCD government to marginalize the PNV, with the PSOE's support, in a climate of serious political radicalization in País Vasco, was an ill-considered policy. The PNV reacted by withdrawing from a responsible political discourse and launched a radical political offensive against Madrid to expand its influence. The PNV's refusal to support the Constitution of 1978, and its campaign against it in the national referendum, did not bode well for efforts to transform Spanish-Basque relations. Declarations by the PNV to the effect that it differed with ETA not on its ends but on its means, did little to stay the political rise of the radical nationalists nor to contain ETA's violence. The ideological cover that the PNV extended to violent radical nationalism, allowed ETA legitimize its armed struggle in new social terrain.

ETA's true effect on the Basque nationalist movement has been complex. It has been perhaps the fiercest expression of nationalist sentiment. After Burgos it was instrumental in reinvigorating what had been a moribund nationalist sentiment. Although its violence had an especially deleterious effect on the Basque economy and Basque society, the existence of ETA and its willingness to pursue armed means was politically useful to moderate Basque nationalism as a mechanism of political leverage. The extent of autonomy granted to Basques reflected the tremendous bargaining power extended to democratic nationalism by the mortiferous threat to Spain's political stability by ETA. ETA imposed a new vision on the nationalist movement and replaced the PNV as the focus of nationalist orthodoxy. To retain its internal coherence and popular appeal the PNV was forced to define itself according to ETA's programme. The challenge to the Spanish state ETA presented was not only the fact of its terrorism but its significance. Other terrorist groups in Spain remained fringe organizations with little popular support. Based on HB's vote, ETAm could count on the firm support of about 10% of the Basque population. ETA's uncompromising nationalism was admired by many nationalists who could not forget its "heroic" defence of the Basque patriae during the dictatorship. The experience of the franquist dictatorship and the persistence of the policies which originally served as a justification for its violence permitted ETA to legitimize its ends and its means among some Basques. However, after the autonomy statute was signed and the first CAV election - and certainly following the attempted golpe - ETA's violence was the greatest obstacle to the realization of the objectives in the interest of which it claimed to act. ETA's battle against the Spanish state started to lose any instrumental sense.

The generosity of the terms of the Basque autonomy statute represented the central government's efforts to accommodate democratic Basque nationalism following the failure of its policy of marginalization. The escalation of ETA's violence (which claimed 12 victims in 1977, 64 in 1978, 78 in 1979 and 93 in 1980), the high level of abstention in the referendum on autonomy, the growing strains in the UCD coalition and accumulating evidence that the PSOE was positioned to win the next elections caused serious worries on the right and among the security forces. The attempted golpe on 23 February 1981, was the response of the extreme right. In post-golpe Spain, all political parties, except HB, moved to stabilize the Spanish polity by taking steps to moderate their political discourse and to avoid antagonizing the right. To consolidate the regime, the UCD government under Calvo Sotelo instituted restrictive policies including LOAPA (*Ley orgánica para la armonización del proceso autonómico*) and new anti-terrorist policies. If these policies helped to overcome some of the right's opposition, they did little to win broad support in Euskadi. Calvo Sotelo failed to resolve the UCD's internal problems and the coalition disintegrated in the summer of 1982, precipitating the elections of 28 October 1982.

That the transformation of the political dialogue and relations between the central and Basque government's corresponded to the rise of the PSOE government is not coincidental. The PSOE government's policies represented a clear and distinctive response to the problems facing the Spanish state compared to those of its predecessors. Its programme was aided tremendously by its success in forcing the PNV to assume the full political responsibilities its dominant legislative and political position demanded. The political leverage exercised by the PSOE emanated from its maximalist political programme vis-à-vis the "Basque problem". Refusing to compromise with democratic nationalism insofar as it refused to take clear steps to pacify and normalize Euskadi, the PSOE government shut down the devolution of powers to the autonomic government under Garaikoitxea's control. The PNV's demands for independence, its permissive attitude to ETA terrorism and its refusal to condemn ETA - in other words, its extension of ideological cover to ETAm - enraged Madrid. As Euskadi's social and economic problems began to mount, pressure built within the PNV and Basque society to force changes in the party's policy. While Garaikoitxea's radical rhetoric and policies had a strong resonance in the party, they alienated important sectors of its base. In this regard, Garaikoitxea's failure to cause Madrid to devolve "pending" powers and to finance Euskadi's economic rationalization mobilized strong pressures for a change in PNV policy from its moderates and its business supporters. Garaikoitxea was forced to resign. Under Ardanza, the PNV took a stand against ETAm, which helped it to win Madrid's cooperation. After the 1985 legislative pact and then the 1986 autonomic elections a new possibilist political climate emerged in Euskadi, and the resources to address Euskadi's social and economic problems slowly found their way to Vitoria. The political dialogue became institutionalized and the Parliament its focus rather than the streets of Euskadi.

Euskadi's political institutions assumed the function they had been assigned, and proved adequate. The new possibilist political climate benefitted all in Euskadi, except those within ETAm's orbit.

The success of the PSOE government's programme rested on its capacity and willingness to use selective repression to strike at ETA. The broad expansion of the state's means to combat ETA reduced its operative capacity. The use of selective means of repression eliminated the spiral of violence which had bound ETA and the Basque people. Improved training and intelligence, international cooperation, the measures of social reinsertion and the judicious offer of negotiations increased the state's effectiveness against ETA. The Socialists understood that the battle against ETA was an especially political contest and that it was essential to avoid actions which would place non-combatants at risk. ETA's atrocities could therefore be exploited to cause popular revulsion toward the terrorist organization and to cause Basques to take their distance from it. The conflict was turned into a "private war" between ETAm and the Spanish state. While its alleged involvement in GAL and its programme to eliminate ETA's base in southern France paid certain political and military dividends, the gains were offset somewhat by the delegitimizing popular reaction in Euskadi. In a similar vein, Madrid's success in winning France's grudging cooperation in arresting etarras and extraditing them was a serious threat to ETA. But, radical nationalist reaction, supported at times by the democratic parties, offset these gains somewhat. However, the regime's openness to social reinsertion legitimized Madrid's programme in some sectors of Basque society. This effect was strengthened by popular revulsion at the murders of Mikel Soluan and Yoyes. ETAm's turn to more indiscriminate tactics in 1986 and 1987 would be the organization's undoing.

Hipercor and Zaragoza were gross and extremely costly mistakes for ETAm. It was clear that it attempted to transform its battle against Spain into one in which the Spanish people had a greater stake. It was fighting a losing battle since the government had essentially already won the ideological war. The central government was aware of the tremendous political value of ETAm's atrocities and exploited them to discredit it and radical nationalism. The government transformed popular revulsion of ETAm into positive, political and social support for the anti-terrorism accords and for its counter-terrorism policies. It became increasingly obvious that ETAm's military campaign was creating greater distance between itself and the Basque people HB's declining popularity after 1988 shows. In the aftermath of Hipercor, the government immediately undertook three important initiatives : i) it escalated its ideological offensive against ETA; ii) it began generating political support for an inclusive political pact against ETA violence and won Ardanza's support and commitment to launch a similar effort in Euskadi; and, iii) it moved to win French cooperation against ETA. The result was eminently successful. Following the failure of negotiations, the French hit ETAm hard. ETAm was subsequently isolated politically by the political pacts signed in November 1987 and January 1988.

It has been argued in the body of this thesis that the PSOE governments succeeded where the UCD governments had not in causing the state's rule to be respected in Euskadi. Five factors had particular bearing on the success of each of the UCD and PSOE governments: i) their democratic legitimacy; ii) their structure and parliamentary position; iii) their control over the instruments of state power; iv) their programmes to address the "Basque problem" and ability to communicate it; and v) the legacy of political rule each inherited. Each of these factors will be analyzed briefly below.

The UCD governments had a difficult time establishing the legitimacy of their rule in País Vasco for a number of reasons. Many UCD members, deputies and cabinet ministers, including Suárez, had ties to the franquist regime and were suspected of harbouring anti-democratic attitudes. The UCD government's public order policies, which were virtually indistinguishable from those of the preceding regime, caused its serious delegitimization in País Vasco; and with it, that of the state. The Basque right had been tainted by association with the franquist regime. By comparison, the first PSOE government marked a decisive break with the dictatorship as it was an opposition party which was severely repressed by Franco. The PSOE had a long history in Euskadi, which exceeded even that of the PNV, and a strong and loyal support base. Its social and political legitimacy in Euskadi was relatively strong.

The UCD was a political coalition containing disparate political elements. The leaders of its composite political parties retained considerable political autonomy. Even when Suárez was at the height of his power and popularity, he could not act without due consideration of implications of policy decisions for the UCD's internal cohesion. As well, and importantly, the UCD never did win a parliamentary majority and was obliged to negotiate the passage of all legislation with the other parties with seats in the Cortes. Its policies were therefore subject to considerable external and internal pressures which made policy-making inconsistent and reactive. In the PSOE power was concentrated in the party's highest echelons, in the hands of persons loyal to Felipe González. The PSOE governments from 1982 to 1992 had absolute majorities and were theoretically free to see their programmes through without compromise.

Committed to evolutionary means of regime transformation, under the UCD governments control over the essential instruments of state power, particularly the FSE and FAS, was permitted to remain in the hands of generally authoritarian, anti-democratic officers who had little interest in securing the democratic regime. These hard-liners, strongly supported by the Bunker, pursued policies in País Vasco which fed the fears of the Basques and seemed to validate ETAm's declarations that with Franco's death no cambia nada. ETA's escalating violence and the growing threat of a golpe de estado destabilized the Spanish polity and the UCD government. The PSOE took direct aim at the problems of *golpismo* and *terrorismo*. It took deliberate steps to exert its control over the FAS and FSE and denied them the

autonomy to which they had been accustomed under Franco. Under tough and combative Ministers of Interior, first Barrionuevo and then Corcuera, the PSOE governments moved aggressively to eradicate ETAm and improve the FSE's effectiveness against the terrorist organization. The PSOE's tough and uncompromising stand against ETA and its full deployment of the state's means to combat ETA won it the respect of the FSE and the right.

The UCD governments did not appear to understand the Basque problem. The most obvious manifestation of the Spanish state's authority in País Vasco was its security forces. While the UCD government understood that popular opinion in País Vasco was decidedly opposed to the FSE and its modus operandi, it failed to transform them and their image. Thereafter, the behaviour of the FSE and the state's obvious incapacity to control them caused the regime's stature to decline as popular odium of the FSE rose. If the first UCD government was ill-prepared to force comprehensive changes to the security forces, there is no obvious, profound political reason why it was unable to make popular, symbolic concessions to Basques until it was far too late. This was a clear mistake and heightened popular disaffection with the UCD governments and the democratic regime. The PSOE's understanding of the Basque problem was distinct from the UCD's. The PSOE had a clear programme for addressing Euskadi's problems: pacification, normalization and economic rationalization. Whereas the UCD justified its public order policies as a necessity to sustain democratic rule, the PSOE defined pacification as the necessary step to the normalization and economic rationalization of the Basque community. The Socialists articulated a comprehensive Basque policy which underlined the importance of pacification, using all the state's resources and to rationalize the anti-terrorist effort. The PSOE government's firm determination to defeat ETA, and its toughness in facing terrorist atrocities and its counterattack, including using GAL; its absolute determination to win France's cooperation by all means necessary, including using GAL; its ability to communicate its determination to defeat ETA; and its ability to win the confidence of a broad range of political parties to secure ETAm/HB's political isolation were instrumental to the success of its programme. Threats of ETA terrorism ceased to extort concessions from the PSOE government, which refused to be intimidated by ETA's blackmail and the PNV's ploys to exploit it. The consistent application of its programme and willingness to adopt increasingly tough policies to overwhelm its opposition spoke volumes for the government's ultimate success in facilitating the process of political change in Euskadi.

The success of the PSOE governments in tackling the "Basque problem" depended to a great extent on the experience of the UCD governments and the obstacles they overcame. Not only did the Socialists learn from the UCD's mistakes but, more importantly, they benefitted from the limited success the UCD had in depoliticizing the FSE and FAS, democratizing them and making them increasingly effective. The PSOE programme also benefitted from the fact that the golpe had neutralized the extreme

right and had permitted the UCD to remove anti-democratic officers from the security forces. Euskadi's growing dependence on Madrid's finances, given the devastation wrought on its economy by recession and terrorism, also contributed to the PSOE's bargaining power.

The question remains: With the virtual pacification of Euskadi and normalization of the play of Basque politics, what is the future of ETAm? If there was one thing pre-ordained in the political dynamic, it was that ETAm was not about to disappear with a cough and a sputter. ETAm has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt to changing political and social circumstances and to sustain itself operationally and politically. But, given the Spanish state's firm refusal to negotiate political terms with ETAm, reaffirmed in August 1994, there is little reason to suspect that ETA can continue for long. Election returns from the 1993 general elections and 1994 autonomic elections show that HB's popularity is waning. ETAm's kidnapping of a Basque industrialist shortly before the 1993 elections, was extremely unpopular and caused violent confrontations between Basque moderates and radical nationalists in Euskadi. With the broad autonomy and political institutions in Vitoria, which have been effective in permitting Basques to govern themselves ably, there would appear to be no grounds for ETAm to hope that it can sustain sufficient popular support to justify a continuation of its violence. It thus appears to exist solely to justify its years of armed struggle. Madrid has appeared to be willing to rehabilitate those duros who accept the terms of its social reinsertion programme. The persistence of ETAm remains the greatest obstacle to the liberation of the majority of its prisoners. Government policy after 1989 has insisted that negotiations were possible only when ETAm stopped killing. Its refusal to stop the killing means that only the avenue of repression remains open to the state. When asked in an interview what would be necessary to bring ETA terrorism to an end, Patxo Unzueta replied that only police repression will achieve that end.¹ Similarly, in an article in late 1991, Gurutz Jáuregui stated that he believed that ETA "will be extinguished as a consequence of pure and simple policial action, without even having resolved its most acute problem, that of its prisoners and exiles."²

Before generalizations are made about the findings of this study, it is important to define the distinctiveness of the Basque case. Basque nationalist sentiment was regionally contained and shared by only one, albeit large, part of the Basque population. The existence of violent radical nationalist and non-violent democratic nationalist forces in Euskadi profoundly affected the character of the political dynamic. If until the Autonomy Statute was signed ETA terrorism had served as a mechanism to extort concessions from the central government, in the period following it impeded the devolution of political and financial transfers to the autonomous Basque government. The number of Basques involved in the nationalist violence was small and at no time was the risk of a civil war significant. As the social and economic malaise of Euskadi deepened, and Basque dependence on the resources and markets of the Spanish state

grew, political pressures built on the non-violent, democratic nationalists to come to terms with the central government. The non-violent nationalists proved to be capable interlocutors with whom the Spanish state could negotiate. The state's political influence increased in these circumstances. The argument presented in this thesis has been that until the early 1980s, the state had squandered its political resources and made policy decisions which facilitated the strategy of the violent, radical nationalist and weakened both its own political position and that of the non-violent, democratic nationalists. The articulation of a comprehensive and coherent strategy to confront the political challenge of the terrorist threat under the Socialist regimes led to the progressive isolation of the violent radical nationalists and the non-violent democratic nationalists' approximation of the position of the central government.

The implications of the Basque case for understanding state responses to ethno-nationalist movements are significant. Ethno-nationalist movements present states with difficult political challenges since they call upon political resources which the state is hard-pressed to neutralize. Popular identification with the nationalist ideal caused by acceptance of the nationalist myth and past or present state abuse of the aspirant ethno-nationalist group can make this problem especially complex. In a climate conditioned by political violence emanating from a small group of militants, any state decision to repress the armed militants forcibly requires the use of selective means. The objective would be to isolate the armed militants socially and politically. The use of indiscriminate means provides the militants with new grievances to exploit which further undermines the state's legitimacy. To the non-violent nationalists, the state must present its programme clearly. Where possible, symbolic compromises which would not endanger the integrity of the state should be made. Decisions to accommodate nationalist demands coinciding with those of the armed militants should be presented as deliberate state policy to eliminate impressions that they are concessions made to violence. Effectively, policies to address the ethno-nationalist challenge must reflect the particularly political character of this threat to the state's integrity.

Notes

1. Interview with Patxo Unzueta in Madrid, 14 March 1992.
2. Gurutz Jáuregui, "ETA-HB: La imposible cuadratura del círculo", Cambio 16, 16 Dec. 1991, p. 38, col. 2.

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
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Appendix: Organization and Evolution of ETA



Source: Llera Ramo, Francisco José, "ETA: Ejército secreto y movimiento social," *Revista de estudios políticos*, NS 78 (1992), 161.