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FROM "HARD FRAGMENTS" TO FUEL FOR FLIGHT: THE ROLE OF IMAGE IN THE WRITING OF VIRGINIA WOOLF

BY

RENATE KRAUSE

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND
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SUBMITTED BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Virginia Woolf's convictions that narrative fiction must express a "true reality," and that the novel designed to make the reader want to "do something" does not serve this end, were the motivations for her novelistic experiments. She argues that a writer of fiction must be interested in "things in themselves," not in some social or political agenda. That this interest led her to challenge received cultural codes is paradoxical.

This thesis explores Woolf's images as linguistic signs that are concretizations of abstractions. As a linguistic sign, images function not only on the syntagmatic level as parts of particular speech acts or utterances, they are also part of pre-utterance systems of relationships on the paradigmatic level by virtue of their resemblances and differences to other signs. As concretizations of abstractions, images are referential in that they point to objects within an empirical world--a notion explained by I. A. Richards' description of thinking as a "sorting process" which is a movement from the general and abstract to the specific and concrete.

The first chapter argues that while literary images have historically been defined as mental pictures and "vestigial representatives of sensations," these definitions do not acknowledge their potential. Woolf's writing encourages reading an image as a linguistic product of a dynamic process. As this product becomes part of the syntagm, it interacts with that structure not only to mirror the process that gives shape to the image, but to question in a reflexive manner the paradigms generating it. The remaining chapters, using and modifying terminology and theories from contemporary poetics, test this understanding of 'image' in Woolf's narrative fictions and demonstrate that Woolf's image patterns communicate meaning through the

relations between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures, the paradigmatic structure and perceived reality, and the syntagmatic structure and perceived reality.

The thesis thus demonstrates that images create a space from which Woolf discovers and explores gaps which acculturation had concealed--a space enabling her to express her vision of "life," "reality," and "truth."

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Introduction

> "Why not simply say what one means and leave it?" . . . "The sky is blue," he said, "the grass is green." Looking up, he saw that, on the contrary, the sky is like the veils which a thousand Madonnas have let fall from their hair; and the grass fleets and darkens like a flight of girls fleeing the embraces of hairy satyrs from enchanted woods. . . . "I don't see that one's more true than another. Both are utterly false." And he despaired of being able to solve the problem of what poetry is and what truth is and fell into a deep dejection.
>
> (Virginia Woolf, Orlando 63-64)

One of the most basic observations about the writing of Virginia Woolf is that it is 'different.' From what it is different appears readily evident as well. Joan Bennett (1945) was not the first to note Woolf's "rejection of existing conventions" by means such as the elimination of "narration and comment," which she attributes to Woolf's "will to discover and record life as it feels to those who live it" (107). And from whom it is different seems to be firmly established by Virginia Woolf herself. In her 1924 essay "Character in Fiction," she places her contemporaries into two camps: the "Edwardians" and the "Georgians." The former, she explains, include Arthur Bennett, John Galsworthy, and H. G. Wells; the latter, E. M. Forster, D. H. Lawrence, Lytton Strachey, James Joyce, and T. S. Eliot. The Edwardians, Woolf claims, "were interested in something outside" the "book in itself." Consequently, "their

books . . . were incomplete as books, and required that the reader should finish them, actively and practically, for himself."

> In order to complete them it seems necessary to do something--to join a society, or, more desperately, to write a cheque. That done, the restlessness is laid, the book finished; it can be put upon the shelf, and need never be read again. But with the work of other novelists it is different. Tristram Shandy or Pride and Prejudice is complete in itself; it is self-contained; it leaves one with no desire to do anything, except indeed to read the book again, and to understand it better. The difference perhaps is that both Sterne and Jane Austen were interested in things in themselves; in character in itself; in the book in itself. (McNeillie Essays III:427-28).

Like Sterne and Austen, Woolf implies, the Georgians were interested "in things in themselves." While these 'explanations' appear to provide a toehold, the issue of Woolf's difference is, of course, not quite that simple--as evinced by the numerous studies of Virginia Woolf's work.

Early critics unabashedly evaluated Woolf's writing in terms of their own expectations of what novels ought to be, and their comments reveal their resistance to the differences they found in Woolf. John Carruthers' expectations of what "concrete pattern" and "orderly progression" consist of are not met, and so he calls for a return to "story" to "make life real and significant in the way it has been made real and significant in the past" (83-84). Richard D. Charques does not find "commonplace reality" in Woolf's writing either, and

attributes that lack to the "decadence" and "decay" of the "governing class in English society" to which he assigns Woolf (114). J. W. Cunliffe finds The Waves "elusive in its significance" and explains that perhaps the form of the novel is inadequate for conveying the "intellectual content" with which Woolf attempts to charge it (252). Herbert J. Muller, although praising Woolf for her "exquisite artistry," discredits her work for its "insubstantiality." He claims that it lacks "elemental force," "intensity and glow"; that it has "no real passion or energy" (321). Muller explains this lack by pointing to what he perceives as "delicate" characters who live in a world "too finespun to contain any big emotions, any violent conflicts, any profound or tumultuous experience" (323-24). And Benjamin Gilbert Brooks comments that Between the Acts was Woolf's attempt "to write one understandable book before she ended" (340).

Later critics, many with different sets of readerly expectations, focus on possible reasons for the perceived differences of Woolf's writings from those of her contemporaries. Some have considered the impact her milieu--the "Bloomsbury influence," the modernist movement, Victorian ideals and mores--had on Woolf's writing.[1] Others have done psychological studies and have attributed the differences they found to sexual inhibitions, insanity, a preoccupation with death, and more.[2] Still others, using A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas, have explained Woolf's differences in terms of gender.[3] Some critics have attempted to establish an aesthetic and/or philosophical genealogy by tracing Virginia Woolf's 'origins' to Jane Austen, Walter Pater, Henry James, G. E. Moore.[4]

A focus on differences might be misunderstood as simply reiterating a characteristic of much, if not all, modernist writing. Perry Meisel defines modernism as "a calculated, if often unconscious, strategy of artists and institutions" (Myth 4) that attempted to clear away the "inescapable wake of precedent or influence" (Myth 55). Modernist claims such as T. E. Hulme's assertion that "the new art differs not in degree, but in kind, from the art we are accustomed to" (76), or that implied in Ezra Pound's admonition to 'make it new' (Make It New 1934) are calculated to raise eyebrows (and backs) during discussions of the differences of modernist writing from what went before. These claims of 'newness' and 'difference' can be countered by T. S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," to be sure. Eliot asserts "the importance of the relation of the poem to other poems by other authors" and has "suggested the conception of poetry as a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been written" (53). This study does not intend to claim for Virginia Woolf an originality isolated from 'tradition.' But if a recognition of differences is a means to the perception of similarities, as philosophers suggest, then perhaps this focus is requisite to understanding any writer's craft, not only Virginia Woolf's.

This study of the role images play in the writing of Virginia Woolf begins with the recognition that, to use C. Day Lewis's phrases, "the image is the constant in *all* poetry" (17, emphasis supplied); it is at the "core of the poem" (18). That images have long been thought central to literature is evidenced by the many studies lining library shelves. A study such as Caroline Spurgeon's that analyzes and classifies Shakespeare's images is only one of many on

Shakespeare alone. Virginia Woolf's images, even though they have not drawn as much attention as Shakespeare's, have received much scrutiny. Varying degrees of iconographic analysis and iconological interpretation appear in almost all Woolf criticism. This study, however, attempts to reach beyond iconography and even iconology. It evolves from Virginia Woolf's review of E. M. Forster's Aspects of the Novel, in which she makes the following observation:

> Though it is impossible to imagine a book on painting in which not a word should be said about the medium in which a painter works, a wise and brilliant book, like Mr. Forster's, can be written about fiction without saying more than a sentence or two about the medium in which a novelist works. Almost nothing is said about words. (Essays II:54)

Woolf's complaint may seem eccentric. After all, is it even possible to discuss fiction and say "almost nothing . . . about words?" Forster addresses story, character, plot, "fantasy," "prophecy," and even pattern and rhythm in Aspects. So what is it about *words* that has not been said? Furthermore, is it not belaboring the obvious to insist on "saying more than a sentence or two" about the "medium in which a novelist works?" An author may choose from a range of devices of narration, but how is one writer's *medium* different than another's?

Few studies on Woolf, however, address her concern with Forster's Aspects. Yet Woolf's regard for words as the medium of literature is not confined to this instance. Her entire *oeuvre* challenges the established

conceptions of how words, phrases, and sentences 'ought to work.' E. L. Bishop perhaps expresses this most forcefully when he identifies "the problem of how words can encompass and communicate human experience" as "a persistent theme in *all her works*" ("Toward the Far Side" 343, emphasis supplied). Reference to this problem appears not only in her expository essays, but is also often voiced by characters in her fiction. In To the Lighthouse, Lily Briscoe felt something, but "nothing that she could express at all" (217); "words fluttered sideways a ! struck the object inches too low" (265). Sara, Rose, and Maggie's conversation in The Years addresses the same problem, but Rose recognizes that though "all talk would be nonsense . . . if it were written down . . . it's the only way we have of knowing each other" (132). Lily's and Rose's frustrations with speech are also apparently Woolf's with writing. In 1909, for example, Woolf writes to her sister Vanessa, "The truth is, I am always trying to get behind words; and they flop down upon me suddenly" (Letters I:408). The frustration appears to be one of expectations. Words behave in unexpected ways. That which is supposedly exact, erect, and solid turns out to be protean: it "flops." Other passages also suggest that Woolf's comments on this subject address not so much the limitations of words as the limitations of the conventions shaping the use of words.

Lily and Rose fail in their attempts to describe what Woolf's 1926 essay on De Quincey, "Impassioned Prose," calls "states of mind" (171). Yet, Woolf claims, such states can be described. De Quincey's prose is evidence of it. So why do Lily and Rose fail where he succeeds (though perhaps Woolf, describing Lily and Rose's dilemma, is, like De Quincey, successful)? Is it because he

writes and Lily and Rose talk? If that were so, it would imply that Woolf conceives of the medium of prose as being inherently different from the medium of talk. And that does not seem to be the case. The emphasis in Woolf's explanation is on usage, not on medium. Not only does Woolf introduce De Quincey as a descriptive writer "with *only* prose at his command" (emphasis supplied), but she describes prose as "an instrument hedged about with restrictions, debased by a thousand common uses." The use of prose to describe a state of mind evidently lies outside the "thousand common uses" that have debased it, for Woolf tells the reader that De Quincey ventures into "shadowy regions"--a description that precludes any suggestion of common usage. She explains that De Quincey succeeds because he recognizes that what words 'can do' depends upon the expectations and skills of the user:

> The breakfast table, he seems to say, is only a temporary apparition which we can think into non-existence, or invest with such associations that even its mahogany legs have their charm. To sit cheek by jowl with our fellows cramped up together is distasteful, indeed repulsive. But draw a little apart, see people in groups, as outlines, and they become at once memorable and full of beauty. Then it is not the actual sight or sound itself that matters, but the reverberations that it makes as it travels through our minds. These are often to be found far away, strangely transformed; but it is only by gathering up and putting together these echoes and fragments that we arrive at the true nature of our experience. (Essays I:172)

"Gathering up" and "putting together" suggest not a difference in medium, but rather a difference in approach to the medium. De Quincey "altered slightly the ordinary relationships. He shifted the values of familiar things." What he accomplishes, may be accomplished by anyone. His success was in his *use* of prose,

> which makes us wonder whether, then, is it quite so limited as the critics say, and ask further whether the prose writer, the novelist, might not capture fuller and finer truths than are now his aim. (Essays I:172).

One's aim cannot be true when one is unfamiliar with, or has mistaken expectations of, the medium one uses.

Woolf's appreciation of her medium is also demonstrated by the skill with which she 'gathers up' and 'puts together.' She perceives an enormous potential in the power of words to suggest--"one of the[ir] most mysterious properties" ("Craftsmanship" 1937, Essays II:248). The art of writing, Woolf explains to her nephew, is "having at one's beck and call every word in the language, of knowing their weights, colours, sounds, associations, and thus making them . . . suggest more than they can state" ("A Letter to a Young Poet" 1932, Essays II:193). Again referring to words, she asserts that "it is their nature not to express one simple statement but a thousand possibilities" ("Craftsmanship," Essays II:246).

Thinking of words as exact, erect, and solid, Woolf claims, results in writing that is flat, that does not take into account words' suggestibility. She criticizes Ralph Waldo Emerson's sentences for being "made up of hard

fragments each of which has been matched separately with the vision in his head" ("Phases of Fiction" 1925-28, Essays II:88). These "hard fragments," Woolf implies, are as impossible for the mind to digest as pebbles are for the stomach. Words derive their power to communicate not so much from their semantic meaning as from what they are able to suggest to the senses, the imagination, and the emotions.[5] Although her questioning of words' exactness is also evident in the work of other modernists such as Gertrude Stein's interest in words that could be 'mistaken' and in James Joyce's continual punning that depends on words' polyvalence, Woolf's repeated coupling of words with suggestibility intimates the possibility that she recognized meaning to be a matter of what semioticians now call "syntagmatic" and "paradigmatic" function.[6]

On the syntagmatic level, suggestibility is a function of the act of writing. The context of a given word, as much as its denotation and connotation, influences its potential to suggest. The beginning of The Waves clearly demonstrates the potential of that influence. The third sentence of that novel reads:

> Gradually as the sky whitened a dark line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky and the grey cloth became barred with thick strokes moving, one after another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing each other, perpetually. (5)

The word 'waves' is not yet mentioned in the text--except, of course, in the title. Nevertheless, here Woolf introduces this dominant textual image through the syntax. The beginning of this sentence shows us the wave

gathering force through the assonance of *sky, whitened, line, horizon, dividing* and the alliteration of *line lay*. Assonance and alliteration are followed by the repetition of *sky*, which adds to the swell. Then we come to the *and* that introduces the crescendo. Another alliteration, this time of the plosive 'b' in *became barred*, anticipates the water rising to a crest with the repetition of four three-word phrases--*one after another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing each other*. The break occurs with the word *perpetually*, its alliteration with *pursuing* creating the effect of a wave spending itself upon the beach. The reader's apprehension of the title image thus dynamically evolves through the integrally unified syntax, and it becomes quite obvious that the writer's choices in the process of narration influence the degree of the word's suggestibility on the syntagmatic level.

On the paradigmatic level, however, suggestibility is a function of the linguistic medium which is part of a system of signs and belongs to a pre-utterance system of relationships by virtue of resemblances and differences to other signs. Suggestibility is, in this sense, a result of the resonances within the paradigm. Thus, the context supplied by the syntagmatic structure does not supply the only "governing conditions of an interpretation," to quote I. A. Richards. In fact, Richards' assertion that "what a word means is the *missing* parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy" (Philosophy 33-35, emphasis supplied) extends 'context' beyond the linguistic paradigmatic as well as the syntagmatic structures. The claim that a word "means" its "missing parts" is not as strange as it may appear if one follows Richards' reasoning. He argues that 'context' on the pre-utterance level

> is a name for a whole cluster of events that recur together--including the required conditions as well as whatever we may pick out as cause or effect. . . . In these contexts one item--typically a word--takes over the duties of parts which can then be omitted from the recurrence. (34)

A word, therefore, is an abridgement, and the "missing parts" of the abridged contexts are the 'gaps' or lacunae that result in suggestibility. The greater the gaps, the higher the degree of suggestibility. If Virginia Woolf did indeed recognize these various possible contexts--even if only intuitively--then the manner in which she tells a story should give some indication of such a recognition. I find this indication in her prolific use of images.

Beginning a discussion of images, one must concede, with W. J. T. Mitchell, that images comprise "a far-flung family which has migrated in time and space and undergone profound mutations in the process" (9). The Oxford English Dictionary confirms the validity of Mitchell's warning. The OED gives 1225 A.D. as the first recorded use of 'image.' Derived from the French and having the same root as 'to imitate,' 'image' was apparently used at this time primarily in the same sense as 'icon,' as representational artifact. Even though Chaucer used it in 1374 to mean a *mental* picture or an impression, and even though the OED cites an instance of 'image' being used in 1522 to mean "a representation of something to the mind by speech or writing; a vivid or graphic *description*" (emphasis supplied), Nathan Bailey's 1737 Universal Etymological English Dictionary, perhaps in an attempt to retain what were perceived as essential divisions between the arts, limits 'image' to icons that

are artifacts when it defines the term as "a natural or artificial Representation or Semblance of a Thing; a Picture or Statue." This definition obviously ignores the *ut pictura poesis* theory on which the pictorialist aesthetic of neoclassicism is grounded. That image is a mental reality transcribed in literature for Alexander Pope is clear in "An Essay on Criticism" (1711):

> True wit is Nature to advantage dress'd;
> What oft' was thought, but ne'er so well express'd;
> Something, whose truth convinc'd at sight we find,
> That gives us back the image of our mind.
>
> (Lines 297-300)

The discrepancies between 'dictionary definition' and poetic practice are not resolved even 100 years later. Christopher Wordsworth recollects William Wordsworth defining 'image' as follows: "Sensible objects really existing, and felt to exist, are *imagery*; and they form the materials of a descriptive poem, where objects are delineated as they are" (487). This definition implies that a literary image is a description of some physical perception, with emphasis on the sense of sight, which has an empirically mimetic reality within the context of a given work. If William Wordsworth did in fact define 'image' in this manner (and we have only Christopher Wordsworth's recollection of it), then his definition ignores not only the images in his poetry that are more than verbal mirrors of reality,[7] it also ignores his 'manifesto' of poetry in the "Preface to the Lyrical Ballads."

The "Preface" defines poetry as "the *image* of man and nature" in that "its object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative" (340,

emphasis supplied). Wordsworth's truth is "the image of things" (341). But that "image" is not a representational description of a physical reality as Christopher Wordsworth's definition suggests. Rather, it has to do with relationships existing between "things" (primarily, it seems, ideas)--relations the poet must discover by thinking "long and deeply. For our . . . feelings are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings" (337). The resulting "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" (337, 344) is evinced in poetic images that "originate in that sane state of feeling which arises out of thought" (345). Samuel Taylor Coleridge explains that their (i.e. his own and William Wordsworth's) project was to direct the mind to the "loveliness and wonders of the world before us" by "awakening the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom," because "in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand" (376). Poetic images, one might assume from Wordsworth as well as Coleridge, are not so much faithful representations of an empirical reality as instruments that, when balanced with ideas (Coleridge 379), "lead to the discovery of the indwelling *law*, which is the true being of things" (Coleridge 384).

Neither Wordsworth nor Coleridge make 'image' a primary concern in their poetics. While both expound their understanding of 'poetry' and 'poet,' Wordsworth's emphasis is on what he calls the "language of men" as opposed to "poetic diction," and Coleridge's is on the "poetic imagination." Nevertheless, both the "Preface" and Biographia Literaria indicate that the literary image by the early nineteenth century has been assigned an epistemological function not

accorded it previously. Yet the reductiveness of Christopher Wordsworth's explanation suggests that Chaucer's 1374 definition of 'image' as a mental picture is still operative in 1851.

During the latter part of that century, writers such as Honoré de Balzac advocated 'scientific' accuracy for literary description. This encouraged a realism that finds its roots in pragmatism, a verisimilitude that expresses nineteenth-century bourgeois values with emphasis on the immediate and verifiable, a one-to-one correspondence between the representation and its subject. While one cannot assume that the way Virginia Woolf *speaks* of images is necessarily the way she uses them in her texts, she clearly opposes literature's attempt at what she calls "photographic realism" (1940, Diary V:273).[8] At times Virginia Woolf does give the impression that she wants to create mental pictures for her readers, to use words as a painter might use paints for 'showing' the reader a specific scene. At times, she even seems to accept the *ut pictura poesis* pictorialist aesthetic. In, for instance, "A Sketch of the Past" (1939) she prefaces a description of a childhood experience: "If I were a painter . . ." and then continues briefly as if she in fact *were* a painter using images to recall childhood memories from the 'storehouse of the mind.' Woolf writes:

> If I were a painter I should paint these first impressions in pale yellow, silver, and green. There was the pale yellow blind; the green sea; and the silver of the passion flowers. I should make a picture that was globular; semi-transparent. I should make a picture of curved petals; of shells; of things that were semi-

> transparent; I should make curved shapes, showing the light through, but not giving a clear outline. Everything would be large and dim; and what was seen would at the same time be heard; sounds would come through this petal or leaf--sounds indistinguishable from sights. Sound and sight seem to make equal parts of these first impressions. When I think of the early morning in bed I also hear the caw of rooks falling from a great height. The sound seems to fall through an elastic, gummy air; which holds it up; which prevents it from being sharp and distinct. The quality of the air above Talland House seemed to suspend sound, to let it sink down slowly, as if it were caught in a blue gummy veil. The rooks cawing is part of the waves breaking--one, two, one, two--and the splash as the wave drew back and then it gathered again, and I lay there half awake, half asleep, drawing in such ecstasy as I cannot describe. (Moments 76-77)

An analysis of the passage, however, reveals how misleading her subjunctive 'if' is. Woolf's images never attempt to present 'things as they are.' In fact, she explains already in 1917 that "the best descriptions are the least accurate, and represent what the poet saw with his eyes shut when the landscape had melted indistinguishably into the mood" ("Flumina Amem Silvasque," Books 192). To use 'image' as a representational mirror of some empirical reality in a discussion of Woolf's art would ignore Woolf's own understanding of the term.

It would also ignore current literary studies. Some twentieth-century critics such as P. N. Furbank have attempted to purge literary vocabulary of the term 'image' altogether, arguing that the "irrelevant implications from painting and sculpture" (4) rob the word 'image' of its usefulness in discussing literature. They suggest that 'metaphor', as specific to literature and without the painterly denotations that make 'image' such a weak term, is stronger and more accurate. Furbank's suggestion that we abolish the term 'image' in favor of 'metaphor' is limiting since the initial supposition upon which he builds his case is the assumption that literature and painting are irreconcilable opposites--"literature is always general, though with strong yearnings towards the concrete and particular, just as painting is always particular, though with strong yearnings towards the general" (7)--and that therefore 'image' in a literary context is worse than misleading. The "general/particular" dichotomy has merit only, of course, if one thinks of a painting as a likeness to a perceived 'reality' that everyone agrees upon.

Moreover, substituting 'metaphor' for 'image' is not possible when working with Woolf. For instance, the substitutionist reading of Aristotle's understanding of metaphor as the rhetorical device that compares one thing to another (e.g. old age to a withered stalk) and thereby facilitates a new concept (the notion of lost bloom, common to both) would severely limit one's discussion of Woolf's writing (Rhetoric 1410^{b}). The substitutionist model accommodates comparisons such as those implied in "flashes of poetry," "questions far flung and unanswered," and "stretching every phrase to the utmost" from Woolf's

essay "On Not Knowing Greek" (Essays I:7). This same essay, however, also contains the following:

> For Plato, of course, had the dramatic genius. It is by means of that, by an art which conveys in a sentence or two the setting and the atmosphere, and then with perfect adroitness insinuates itself into the coils of the argument without losing its liveliness and grace, and then contracts to bare statement, and then, mounting, expands and soars in that higher air which is generally reached only by the more extreme measures of poetry--it is this art which plays upon us in so many ways at once and brings us to an exultation of mind which can only be reached when all the powers are called upon to contribute their energy to the whole. (9-10)

E. L. Bishop, demonstrating the inadequacy of the substitutionist model, explicates this passage as follows:

> [Plato's art] "insinuates" itself into the coils of the argument, and it does so "with perfect adroitness" and "without losing its liveliness and grace." The action and the qualities imply something animate or possibly even human, though there is no indication of what specifically is to be imagined. Yet in the next phrase it "contracts" to bare statement and then, "mounting," it "expands and soars." The implied noun is now certainly not something human, and it seems to be passing out of the realm of the animate, able as it is to "contract" then "expand" as it "soars." Do we then move from a conduit, a hose, say, to a snake ("coils"

> prompts that association), to a bird to a hot air balloon or a bubble, before it (the art, remember) becomes perhaps a sun--for finally it "plays upon us."? The suggestions are absurd. ("Metaphor" 11)

Modern theories of metaphor do not supply any more suitable models. Max Black's interaction theory, pioneered by I. A. Richards, is not any more helpful than is the substitution theory. That Woolf's most powerful 'metaphors' are often not metaphors according to the interaction theory is quickly evident after just a brief analysis of her work. What "two thoughts of different things active together" (Richards, Philosophy 93) function, for instance, in her "fin in a waste of waters?" It has no "primary subject" and "secondary subject" (Black, "More About Metaphor" 29). Even within its broader context, it contains no "literal frame." The fin, perhaps the best-known and briefest of such Woolfian 'metaphors,' is not an isolated example; Woolf's *oeuvre* is filled with 'metaphors' that defy unravelling into two analogous subjects. A more serious objection to 'metaphor' is that it is generally classified as a rhetorical figure of speech. Woolf's images are often not figures of speech. Rather than substituting 'metaphor' for 'image,' we might do better to let 'image' subsume 'metaphor'--a suggestion made by J. Middleton Murry which shall be taken up shortly.

Other twentieth-century critics and theorists have worked at refining the definition of 'image' in the literary context rather than at attempting to purge our literary vocabulary of it. René Wellek and Austin Warren define images as "the vestigial representatives of sensations" (187) in their 1947 Theory of Literature in which they quote I. A. Richards' 1924 assessment that

> the sensory qualities of images, their vivacity, clearness, fullness of detail and so on, do not bear any constant relation to their effects. . . . Too much importance has always been attached to the sensory qualities of images. What gives an image efficacy is less its vividness as an image than its character as a mental event particularly connected with sensation. ("The Analysis of a Poem" 119)

Richards' explanation of image as event is significant, and shall be referred to again. At this point, though, the emphasis on *sensation*, not just visualization, needs to be addressed. This emphasis allows the literary image a significantly greater scope than what Furbank is willing to grant it when he confines it to literary icon. After all, whether the reader 'sees' a roller blind or a venetian blind, five cawing rocks or twenty in Virginia Woolf's passage that begins, "If I were a painter . . . ," is totally immaterial. Even the images of a passage that appears to promise a 'picture' do *not* embody a once-observed reality which memory now releases into a language conduit to be apprehended in the reader's 'mind's eye' as a picture. However, one cannot think of Woolf's images as "vestigial representatives of sensation" either, if that phrase implies an attempt to read 'image' as literally representational of sensation or emotion. T. S. Eliot postulates the possibility of a "set of objects, a situation, a chain of events" serving as the "exact equivalence" of a "*particular* emotion" when he talks of finding an "objective correlative" to express emotion in art ("Hamlet and His Problems" 100). But 'image' as non-discursive, as belonging to some permanent realm of symbols that has an objective, one-to-one relationship with

anything, even emotion, would ignore Woolf's emphasis on the suggestibility of words. As Wayne Booth points out, there is no "natural poetic object which will serve, in itself, as a formula for particular emotions" (97). Context is needed for emotion to be evoked (Booth 115). A linguistic image does not have a single context, though. Its linguistic dimensions demand a recognition of both the syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures within which images are situated. This approach allows a movement from sign to sign. Furthermore, I. A. Richards' definition of image suggests that the referential dimensions of an image expand 'context' to include a movement from sign to object as well.

Richards defines 'image' as a "mental event particularly connected with sensation." This definition is suggestive because he explains 'sensation' as the product of "perceptions, responses whose character comes to them from the past as well as the present occasion." For these perceptions to become sensations, a sorting process--thinking--has to take place (Philosophy 30). If, as Richards claims, this sorting process is a movement from the general and abstract to the specific and concrete, then an image, by virtue of its concreteness, is the product of a refining process--a product that is made physically perceptible by the word, or complex of words, on the page and can move from concrete to abstract as readily as from abstract to concrete. Since a word has a "delegated efficacy" (Richards, Philosophy 32), however, the movement from concrete to abstract varies from reader to reader. This hypothesis, it seems to me, goes far in explaining what an image is. It suggests that from the reader's perspective, a written 'word' (extended here to include a complex) signals its special status

of 'image' by its evocativeness, or, to return to Virginia Woolf's term, suggestiveness.

Richards' theory reminds us that 'image' cannot be limited to its syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects--that the referential dimensions of an image must also be recognized. This understanding becomes particularly important when one acknowledges that figures of speech are also images--an acknowledgement that has a long and honorable history despite Furbank's objections. Ray Frazer's essay "The Origin of the Term 'Image'" attributes the confluence of 'image' with 'figure of speech' to Dryden's description of Cowley's metaphors (158). Dryden quotes the two lines from Cowley's Odes that recount the biblical story of David and Goliath:

> The valley, now, this monster seem'd to fill;
> And we, methought, look'd up to him from our hill;

Dryden explains that

> the two words, *seemed* and *methought*, have mollified the *figure*; and yet if they had not been there, the fright of the Israelites might have excused their belief of the giant's stature. (184-85, emphasis supplied)

He rejects any criticism of Cowley's poetry and counters that "nothing can appear more beautiful to me, than the strength of those *images* which they [critics] condemn" (186, emphasis supplied), using the term 'image' here to refer to what he earlier identified as a figure. Frazer claims that one reason for this conflation is that figures of speech were associated with otiose or even unscrupulous use of rhetoric.[9] However, conflating 'image' and 'figure of

speech' does not solve the problem; it merely transfers the negative perception of 'metaphor' to 'image.' That vestiges of this negative perception still colour twentieth-century perceptions of 'poetic language' are obvious in Orlando's demand, "Why not simply say what one means and leave it?" (63).

Nevertheless, the early twentieth century saw much argument in favor of including figurative language in the definition of 'image.' In fact, as pointed out earlier, J. Middleton Murry suggests that the term 'image' *subsumes* 'metaphor' and 'simile' since the latter two belong to "formal classifications" that find their commonality in the more basic 'image.' He explains that

> if we resolutely exclude from our minds the suggestion that the image is solely or even predominantly visual, and allow the word to share in the heightened and comprehensive significance with which its derivation 'imagination' has perforce been endowed--if we conceive the 'image' not as primary and independent, but as the most singular and potent instrument of the faculty of imagination--it is a more valuable word than those which it subsumes: metaphor and simile. (87)

Murry's suggestion moves the theoretical discussion of image, and of metaphor and simile, from mimesis to semiosis.

That Virginia Woolf's own *theoretical* conception of 'image,' like Murry's, includes metaphor and simile, and is semiotic as well as mimetic, is evident in her essays. A study of Woolf's essays can also address the *practical* problem of recognizing an image. They affirm that a literary image on the syntagmatic level must be mimetically concrete for the reader to perceive it. For instance,

Woolf talks of the need for "stretching every phrase to the utmost, by sending them floating forth in metaphors" ("On Not Knowing Greek" 1929, Essays I:7). This same metaphor of language as floating occurs in her essay "Phases of Fiction" (1926-29). Here she explains that Proust often presents a dual vision to the reader: "On the heel of some fanatically precise observation, we come upon a flight of imagery--beautiful, coloured, visual . . . " (Essays II:85). Note that 'metaphor' has shifted to 'imagery,' and also that an image, from the reader's point of view, 'speaks' to the senses; it is a representational sign. In "Reading" (1941) Woolf also explicitly identifies what is classified as metaphor as image. She writes:

> What is it that happens between the hour of midnight and dawn, the little shock, the queer uneasy moment, as of eyes half open to the light, after which sleep is never so sound again? Is it experience, perhaps--repeated shocks, each unfelt at the time, suddenly loosening the fabric? breaking something away? Only this image suggests . . . (Essays II:25)

These samples are not isolated ones of Woolf's conflation of image with rhetorical figure. In her essay "A Sketch of the Past," for instance, she writes: "A great hall I could liken it [i.e. childhood] to; with windows letting in strange lights; and murmurs and spaces of deep silence." This comparison of childhood to a great hall is technically a simile. Yet, as interesting and suggestive as the comparison of childhood to a hall is, her interest is obviously in something other than the insight which that comparison generates, for she continues:

> But somehow into that picture must be brought, too, the sense of movement and change. Nothing remains stable long. One must get the feeling of everything approaching and then disappearing, getting large, getting small, passing at different rates of speed past the little creature; one must get the feeling that made her press on, the little creature driven on as she was by growth of her legs and arms, driven without her being able to stop it, or to change it, driven as a plant is driven up out of the earth, up until the stalk grows, the leaf grows, buds swell. ("Sketch" 1939, Moments 92)

The passage that began with a comparison of childhood to a hall that is a "picture" becomes a comparison of childhood to a plant that is a "feeling." One might criticize Woolf for mixing her figures. But, more productively, the intervening description can be read as exploration ending in revelation. No longer is it possible to compare childhood simply to a static object: it must also be understood as a dynamic process. Neither comparison is adequate in itself; one must be juxtaposed with the other so that they may interact, for, she continues (placing *all* of the above under the 'image' umbrella), "that is what is indescribable, that is what makes all images too static, for no sooner has one said this was so, than it was past and altered" ("Sketch" 1939, Moments 92). This sentiment that individual images are too "static" is also expressed by Orlando in his attempt to communicate truthfully his experience in the epigraph to this chapter. Orlando discovers that it is not enough to "simply say what one means and leave it" (Orlando 63). Meaning lies not in the literal

expression, "The sky is blue." Nor does it lie in the figurative expression, "The sky is like the veils which a thousand Madonnas have let fall from their hair."

'Image' defined merely as a concretization of an abstraction would seriously limit one's perception of Virginia Woolf's medium as she uses it to share her experience of childhood. Analysis and interpretation of *individual* images is inadequate for an understanding of what is happening. Woolf's 'imaging' in this instance is obviously much more than an evocative word or group of words. An analysis of the images here (which obviously *do* signal their presence), would require first isolating each. Then one would need to distinguish among the types of images--for instance, is a particular image visual or is it gustatory? Perhaps it is olfactory or even kinaesthetic, haptic, or emphatic. Maybe the image is synaesthetic such as Keats's "touch of scent." But, as important as iconography is, the significance of what is happening in this passage cannot be determined by counting or even classifying the images that construct it. Nor may the significance of Woolf's 'imaging' be determined by counting or classifying the figures of speech that are present. Even an iconological approach would not suffice. While one may discuss the motifs in each sentence that combine for theme to emerge and may consider the presence or absence of symbolic meaning, that discussion, too, would only partially address the issue.[10] Full recognition of Woolf's use of her medium requires an understanding of 'imaging' as a heuristic process, and that process does not come under either the iconography or the iconology umbrella. It is a process by which an abstract concept is tested and refined by a concrete particular that works in conjunction with other concrete particulars. In this particular

instance, the heuristic process by which we learn that childhood is static/dynamic is analogous to the static/dynamic character of the text itself. This reflexivity Woolf achieves with 'image': a linguistic product of a dynamic process. As this product becomes part of the syntagmatic structure, it interacts with that structure to engender not only a mirroring of the process that gives shape to the image, but to question in a reflexive manner the paradigms generating it.

Although this definition of 'image' acknowledges and uses what Woolf asserts about the medium of literature, it is not a synthesis of Woolf's view. It functions in this study primarily as a tool to discuss and evaluate the role images have in Virginia Woolf's writing. Another illustrative passage can serve to demonstrate that though the image has been read--and used--as a pictorial unit, a rhetorical device, and a linguistic convention, its potential is much greater than any of these. For this next example, I shall return to the passage used earlier from Moments of Being. Woolf writes:

> (1) If I were a painter I should paint these first impressions in pale yellow silver, and green. There was the pale yellow blind; the green sea; and the silver of the passion flowers. (2) I should make a picture that was globular; semi-transparent. I should make a picture of curved petals; of shells; of things that were semi-transparent; (3) I should make curved shapes, showing the light through, but not giving a clear outline. Everything would be large and dim; and what was seen (4) would at the same time be heard; sounds would come through this petal or leaf--sounds

> indistinguishable from sights. Sound and sight seem to make equal parts of these first impressions. (5) When I think of the early morning in bed I also hear the caw of rooks falling from a great height. (6) The sound seems to fall through an elastic, gummy air; which holds it up; which prevents it from being sharp and distinct. (7) The quality of the air above Talland House seemed to suspend sound, to let it sink down slowly, as if it were caught in a blue gummy veil. (8) The rooks cawing is part of the waves breaking--one, two, one, two--and the splash as the wave drew back and then it gathered again, (9) and I lay there half awake, half asleep, drawing in such ecstasy as I cannot describe. (Moments 76-77)

The section designated #1 gives the reader the first impression--almost as if it were seen from a distance. Then the naming of the objects brings the 'picture' closer. Any formulation of a mental 'picture' at this point, though, must be revised to include the description section 2 presents. Section 3 calls for more revision and by the time part 4 has been read, the painting analogy ceases to function. Suddenly that which began as literary icon transforms itself into figure. Moreover, Woolf's images have effected a neat sleight of hand as well: what convention has taught us to think of as material--blinds, sea, flowers--has an ethereal quality, and the ethereal--air and sound--now assumes material qualities in sections 5 through 7. Section 8 merges the material and the ethereal--sound and sea--and section 9 concludes by pointing to the inability to communicate experience. Yet the passage has communicated. The reader is at

the summit of the imagistic structure Woolf has erected at the moment she declares failure. But perhaps Woolf is not pronouncing failure, perhaps she is drawing attention to the fact that if the passage works, it does so because she, like De Quincey before her, has "altered slightly the ordinary relationships" and has "shifted the values of familiar things" with her images. The alterations and shifts draw attention to and question the ordinary and the familiar in a reflexive manner that is again the process engendered by the interaction of image with image.

This reading of image is quite different from those given Woolf's images by most critics. Many discuss Woolf's images as tools, or narrative devices. Joan Bennett, for one, points out that "certain images, phrases and symbols bind the whole together" (112); in other words, they function as motifs to communicate an "impression of life" (123). Susan M. Squier, focusing on Woolf's use of the city as a narrative device, notes in her introduction that Woolf "attain[s] an authentic voice as a woman writer" by her "treatment of the city in her fiction and essays, where it appears as setting, image, and symbol" (3).[11] Jane Novak credits Woolf's "fresh examples" and lack of jargon to a "brilliant use of metaphor" which helps "create a tone . . . uniquely her own" (43). Elizabeth Pomeroy talks of the "polishing of an image which casts light in different directions like a prism" (504); these "different directions" represent the various influences on Woolf's life, including those of the literature she has read. Providing a complete list of critics who have recognized (either explicitly or implicitly) the significance of Woolf's images to her fiction and essays is beyond the scope of this study. Few Woolf scholars would *not* appear on such a

list. The work that has been done in classifying and interpreting Woolf's images is extensive, but comparatively few critics have addressed Woolf's images as medium, as words--perhaps because our inherited modes and categories have limited that discussion.[12]

Jean Alexander's claim that "the vocabulary of Virginia Woolf is one of images" (222) suggests a semiotic relationship between image and thought. She explains:

> The vocabulary of her thought, beginning with "Kew Gardens," is the primitive and universal vocabulary of image, and the conceptual world of each work is built of these images, the space in which they are contained, and the rhythm of relationships of color and space. (223)

However, she does not develop this claim to any significant degree. It is an outgrowth of her discussion of what she perceives to be Woolf's refusal of conventional forms, and she uses it in conclusion to stimulate further thought and study. It seems to be founded as much on Alexander's interest in Woolf's 'difference' as it is in the relationship of Woolf's writing to Roger Fry's theory of art. Alexander's description of Woolf's images as the building blocks of the "conceptual world" which consists of "the rhythm of relationships of color and space" borrows much from Roger Fry's "The Artist's Vision." Fry claims that the meaning of a picture resides in "apprehending the relation of forms and colours to one another, as they cohere within the object" (Fry 49).[13]

A somewhat earlier study than Alexander's is Harvena Richter's discussion of "The Shapes of Feeling" (180) which implies a semiotic

relationship between image and emotion. In this section of Virginia Woolf: The Inward Voyage, Richter explains that image, metaphor, and symbol are "units of subjectivity" or "pictorial means of presenting emotion" (180). These "units of subjectivity" are synonymous with "primitive subjective modes"--primitive because "the processes which convert feeling into image are generally considered to precede those of conceptual thought" (180). The image becomes an "objective correlative" for feelings because it can both explain and translate them (181). In other words, the processes of concretization, abstraction, expansion, contraction, transformation, and compression which Richter identifies (180) function not only in converting the writer's feelings into images, but they serve to communicate emotion to the reader as well.

While her theoretical framework is weakened by some rather obvious lacunae,[14] the modes of operation that Richter attributes to images give some interesting readings to familiar passages. Referring, for instance, to section eight of To the Lighthouse, Richter summarizes the scene: James, sitting at the tiller on the way to the lighthouse, feels an irrational antagonism toward his father. He thinks of taking a knife and striking his father with it, not in an attempt to destroy his father, but to destroy an intangible something he cannot name, only visualize: "He sought an image to cool and detach and round off his feeling in a concrete shape" (Lighthouse 275). The subsequent image is one of a wheel crushing someone's foot. Richter asserts that this image is used by Woolf not only to concretize abstract ideas or feelings, but that the image is part of an expanded pattern which is able to intensify the reader's emotions by compressing an entire complex of images into a single phrase (181-85).

The classifications Richter assigns to the various processes and the readings she gives Woolf's texts are helpful in considerations of the relationship of image to text. So is Richter's primary agenda of demonstrating that the literary image can reveal the dynamic process that shaped it. But that process, according to Richter, must originate within an *emotional* paradigm. Richter implies that, in a sense, a reader may use the image to 'read backward' to apprehend the "operation of a dreaming mind" which images "reproduce" (180).

Many studies trace images back to the paradigmatic structures engendering them. For instance, Jane Wheare takes the position that

> Woolf recognised that the novelist can never--as the term 'realist' erroneously implies--capture the complexity of experience in language. Through formal innovation, however, and notably metaphor, the author can reveal hitherto neglected aspects of that experience. (16)

Wheare's interest lies in the "'feminine' tendency"[15] in Woolf's fiction that serves to "undermine habitual modes of articulating experience" (17). Few critics, however, explore Woolf's texts as artifacts making accessible the linguistic interactions of these "modes" with the experiences that they "articulate."[16]

One of these few is E. L. Bishop who has probed Woolf's writing for the relationship between her images and semantic meaning. In an explication of Woolf's assertion that meaning is to be found on the "far side of language" (Essays I:7), Bishop writes in "Metaphor and the Function of Language in the Essays of Virginia Woolf":

> Her figure "the far side of language" suggests a boundary or a barrier, and in her essays she attempts to . . . launch the reader toward a meaning beyond language. But she is also quite consciously extending the frontier, for if she is successful, the meaning, heretofore inaccessible to language, will now have been brought (both created and described) within its province. In addition to whatever immediate purpose she may have, this *extending of language* is always her larger aim, and it is as strong an impulse in the essays as it is in the novels. (19, emphasis supplied)

Bishop considers the structures of Woolf's paragraphs, her design of metaphors, and her structures of series to show how "language push[es] against its own boundaries, [and] words test . . . their connections with things" in Woolf's essays (15). For Bishop, the "far side of language" seems to be the sensory experience that the writer is attempting to communicate with words. He explains in an earlier article that

> language operates as an extension of the emotions, not a superfluous adjunct, and the logical quality of language forms an essential complement to the intuitive. For the word in *evolving toward greater abstraction*, from its initial fusion with sensory experience, enables one to consciously know the experience in a way that is impossible when one is immersed in it. ("Toward the Far Side" 353, emphasis supplied)

Bishop sees Woolf's "struggle" with writing as her attempt to "restore language to its metaphorical intensity" (359). An image, Bishop claims, is a "channel" rather than a product.[17]

Particularly useful to my understanding of image as the linguistic product of a dynamic process is Patricia Clements' "Virginia Woolf's Art of Narrative Fusion." Clements' subject is Woolf's combination of thematic concerns with structural characteristics by juxtaposing the image of the flowing stream with that of the frozen, glacial stream. This article clearly demonstrates the interaction of the paradigmatic with the syntagmatic structure through the mediation of the literary image in Woolf's fiction. The implications in Clements' assertion that "the image is an integral part of the whole" (19) reverberate loudly with those in Virginia Woolf's demand that the medium in which a writer works deserves attention. Clements suggests that image as part of the narrative design is not only motif that serves to bind the narrative together, but that it also serves as a focalizer. She explains:

> In the description of the pirate ship [in Mrs. Dalloway], the narrator is submerged in the character's fantasy; in the description of the glacial stream, the voices of character and narrator are blent; in the description of the misty pyramids, the voice is the narrator's alone. The *distance is signalled* by the stages in the development of the metaphor, which also represents three temporal orientations. (21, emphasis supplied)

The images themselves appear to be a form of narration here as they function to signal distance. Yet image as an aspect of narration (not only as a device of

narration) has received surprisingly little attention in studies done on Virginia Woolf. One reason for this silence might be that the subject appears too obvious--what can be said about it that cannot be said in a sentence or two?

Because twentieth-century studies in narratology have developed vocabulary and classifications (such as 'focalization' and 'distance') that have facilitated close examinations and analyses, I propose to use Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan's Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (1983) as a means by which to explore the role images play in Virginia Woolf's narrative fictions.[18] She synthesizes "Anglo-American New Criticism, Russian Formalism, French Structuralism, the Tel-Aviv School of Poetics and the Phenomenology of Reading" (5) to address basic issues for a poetics of narrative that answers questions such as, "What are the features that turn a given discourse into a narrative text?" "What are the basic aspects of narrative fiction and how do they interact with each other?" and "How does one make sense of a specific narrative text, and how can it be described to others?" (2).

Rimmon-Kenan develops her system by a classification of the basic aspects of narrative fiction as 'story,' 'text,' and 'narration' in "the spirit of Genette's distinction between *'histoire,' 'récit'* and *'narration'*" (3). "'Story' designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events." 'Text' is "what we read," and 'narration' is "the act or process of production" (3). In Rimmon-Kenan's system the non (or pre-) verbal abstraction called 'story' is of primary significance. While story, text, and narration are interrelated--story and narration "may be seen as two

metonymies of the text, the first evoking it through its narrative content, the second through its production" (4)--these classifications allow her to analyze each aspect in isolation. Her analysis of 'text' is perforce largely in relation to 'story.' Only 'focalization,' or "the angle of vision through which the story is filtered in the text, and . . . is verbally formulated by the narrator" (43) can be studied in relation to narration.

Rimmon-Kennan's system provides a direct and formal approach to the study of narrative fiction. If, however, the category of 'narrative fiction' is limited to "a succession of fictional events" with 'event' "as something that happens, something that can be summed up by a verb or a name of action" (2), then Virginia Woolf's fiction, which is concerned with matters other than what happens, yet still 'tells' a story, must be precluded. Rimmon-Kenan's system requires therefore some modifications for it to be applied profitably to Woolf's work. If one were to study characterization and time in relationship to the aspect of 'narration' rather than in relationship to the aspect of 'story,' one could redefine 'story' to designate not that which *happens* to a *character*, but that which is perceived *to be*. This modification, although it does have some far-reaching implications, does not greatly affect the methods of inquiry outlined by Rimmon-Kenan. The object of the text remains its 'story' with 'narration' as the process of its production, and the reader's part remains the reconstruction of 'story' and an evaluation of its production. Thus, the model of narrative poetics outlined by Rimmon-Kenan can function to account for 'being' as well as 'happening.'

Using Rimmon-Kenan's system of contemporary poetics (with some modifications), I propose to test my hypothesis that image in Virginia Woolf's fiction is an aspect of narration by considering character as image in Chapter Two, order through images in Chapter Three, and focalization by means of images in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will examine the apparently 'emptied' category of 'story' and its relation to 'narration.' Virginia Woolf's insistence on *words* as the medium of literature, and on the largely untapped potential that words have, will remain the focus of this study, with image defined as a linguistic product of a dynamic process.

Chapter II

Character: The Primary Image
Jacob's Room and The Waves

> Fiction is like a spider's web, attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still attached to life at all four corners. Often the attachment is scarcely perceptible; Shakespeare's plays, for instance, seem to hang there complete by themselves. But when the web is pulled askew, hooked up at the edge, torn in the middle, one remembers that these webs are not spun in midair by incorporeal creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings, and are attached to grossly material things, like health and money and the houses we live in.
>
> (Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own 41)

Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan begins her chapter "Story: characters" by noting that

> whereas the study of the story's events and the links among them has been developed considerably in contemporary poetics, that of character has not. Indeed, the elaboration of a systematic, non-reductive but also non-impressionistic theory of character remains one of the challenges poetics has not yet met. (29)

Her own contributions, she warns, also fall short of such a goal. Nevertheless, some of the theories she discusses and the solutions she advances offer some exciting possibilities for reading character in Virginia Woolf's writing.

Impeding the full development of a theory of character, Rimmon-Kenan suggests, is first the question regarding the nature of character, and second, the question regarding the relation of character to action. The first problem

she attempts to resolve by pointing out that the two seemingly extreme positions on the nature of character are actually two sides of the same coin. Mimetic theories ("theories which consider literature as, in some sense, an imitation of reality" [33]) equate character with people; semiotic theories insist that character is no more (nor less) than a verbal construct. However, she explains, when one separates narrative fiction into the aspects of 'story,' 'text,' and 'narration,' it becomes clear that the apparently irreconcilable may, after all, be reconciled: within the aspect of text, characters are "nodes in the verbal design"; within the aspect of story, characters are "non (or pre-) verbal abstractions, constructs." These constructs, "*by no means human beings* in the literal sense of the word," are "partly modelled on the *reader's* conception of people and *in this they are person-like*" (33, emphasis supplied).

Rimmon-Kenan's suggestion is a logical extension of her stance on the nature of story.[1] She explains that two "intuitive" positions are available to the critic: The first is that story is "autonomous" (6), and the second is that story is "style-, language-, and medium-dependent" (8). The first is implied in Russian formalist Vladimir Propp's Morphology of the Folktale and developed further by French structuralists Claude Bremond [2] and A. J. Greimas. Greimas posits a "fundamental distinction between two levels of representation." These two levels he calls the "*apparent*" and the "*immanent*" levels of narration. The first is that "at which the manifestations of narration are subject to the specific exigencies of the linguistic substances through which they are expressed," and the second constitutes a "sort of common structural trunk, at which narrativity is situated and organized prior to its

manifestations" (23). Because Rimmon-Kenan adopts Greimas's hypothesis rather than the one advanced by Tzvetan Todorov which posits the existence of meaning as dependent upon its articulation, she concludes that "story is an abstraction from: (1) the specific style of the text in question . . . , (2) the language in which a text is written . . . , and (3) the medium" (7). This conclusion is the foundation of her claim that character, a part of story, is "non (or pre-) verbal" (33). That is, characters are part of archetypal story patterns belonging to the culture which writer and reader share--patterns that form the "deep narrative structure" for the immanent level of a given story (11). Events and personages can, consequently, be "partly modelled on the reader's conception of people" (33). This notion is a corrective for reading characters as people inhabiting books. While the textual constructs we call characters are "person-like" (33) because they are modelled on archetypal cultural patterns, the text that permits access to these patterns is linguistic. Therefore, character within a text is a verbal construct.

The second problem, that of the relation of character to action, also arises out of two apparently polarized positions. One claims that character is subordinated to action, the other, that character is relatively independent of action. Rimmon-Kenan attempts to reconcile these oppositions as well. She suggests that the problem may be resolved by thinking of character and action as interdependent rather than insisting that character be subordinated to event[3] or event to character.[4] In support of her suggestion, Rimmon-Kenan evokes Henry James's dictum: "What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?" ("Art" 174).

While Rimmon-Kenan is not prepared to state what the forms of this interdependence are, she does suggest that "the opposed subordinations can be taken as relative to types of narrative rather than as absolute hierarchies" (35).

This suggestion is particularly helpful in analyzing Woolf's fiction. Some fictions lend themselves readily to "content-paraphrases" that consist of successions of events organized chronologically (14). Woolf's often do not. Character in Virginia Woolf's fiction cannot be subordinated to event even with event defined as "a change from one state of affairs to another" (15) rather than simply as 'an action.' Jacob's Room, for instance, reduced to such a content-paraphrase, would be largely meaningless.

What seems less helpful is Rimmon-Kenan's assertion that

> the reversibility of hierarchies may be postulated as a general principle extending beyond the question of genres or types of narrative. . . . Depending on the element on which the reader focuses his attention, he may at various points subsume the available information under different hierarchies. (36)

Thus, the "predominance" of either character or action in a given text (or part of a text) would determine which should be subordinated. This suggestion requires that the reader assist in constructing the systematic model Rimmon-Kenan believes necessary for rigorous analysis: the model asks, On which of the two elements is the reader's attention focussed? An obvious problem with such a question as the basis for formulating a systematic approach to Virginia Woolf is its dependence on reader reaction. Trivializing the reader's role in the production of the text would be foolish; it is of utmost importance in the

production of meaning. But reader response to Woolf's texts has been proven insufficiently uniform to aid in the formulation of the systematic model Rimmon-Kenan claims is needed in contemporary poetics. That readers' expectations determine their reactions is quite readily seen in the early critical responses to Virginia Woolf's writings cited in my first chapter. Not only do expectations vary depending on a reader's experience with literature, but even readers with the same experience do not read in the same way since other variables--such as race, gender, class, personal inclinations and interests, etc.--all influence reader response.

Nevertheless, Rimmon-Kenan's mediations among the theories on the nature of character are very suggestive. If character is (at least partially) part of a verbal design to which the text permits access, then one should be able to develop an approach with which to determine the processes, attributes, and construction of character. By synthesizing the theories of Seymour Chatman, Roland Barthes, Benjamin Hrushovski, and James Garvey, Rimmon-Kenan outlines how this task may proceed. The over-all objective is to translate textual elements ("nodes") into abstracted "traits"--with trait defined as a "'relatively stable or abiding personal quality'" of character after Chatman (Chatman 127, Rimmon-Kenan 37). Making the transition from textual "node" to abstract trait requires, first of all, an understanding of character as a "tree-like hierarchical structure" (37) that permits the subordination of individual details to a variety of patterns. These details may be classified as physical attributes, psychological attributes, and a combination of physical and

psychological attributes. All these, she explains, adhere to or find their unity in a proper name (36-40).

This methodology is persuasive in its simplicity. It appears to give access to a discussion of a character's attributes and even seems to open the door to an analysis of its construction. What it requires is a belief in the existence of a stable set of traits that are agreed upon as signifying 'person'--a requirement that ought not pose any problem. Ferdinand de Saussure pointed out long ago that all communication depends on agreed-upon meanings assigned arbitrarily to specific signs. He identifies language as consisting of vocal signs "in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings and sound-images." These linguistic signs denote concrete 'realities' which may be reduced to "conventional written symbols," for "language is a storehouse of sound-images, and writing is the tangible form of those images" (15). So whether the linguistic sign is 'horse' or 'house' or 'Horace' (or even simply 'he'), the very sign itself stimulates an acculturated response.

The methodology synthesized by Rimmon-Kenan, then, makes a reader's recognition of character dependent upon the possibility of converting textual "nodes" into abstracted traits. When applied to Virginia Woolf's novel Jacob's Room, however, the system does not prove explanatory. One could conclude that A) the novel is defective, B) the system is defective, or C) the system cannot be applied to this novel because it is not the only one a writer may choose to use in the portrayal of character.

Option 'A' has been taken by several readers. While a few early readers viewed Jacob's Room as highly successful (e.g. Lytton Strachey and E. M.

Forster), others, such as Rebecca West and Arnold Bennett, faulted the characterization. Even later critics (for example, Joan Bennett and J. K. Johnstone) found it mystifying and frustrating in its approach to character.[5] Alex Zwerdling attempts to explain the "obvious fragmentation" and the "inscrutability of its central character" as "a means" (64) to a satiric and "revisionist" portrait of a "paradigmatic young man of his class" (73). He argues that Woolf *needs* to present the reader with an "inchoate personality" because

> a person in this position [i.e. the 'rebellious adolescent'] remains in some sense a blank--undefinable, unknowable--and [is] therefore not an easy subject for fiction. We expect a novel to give us characters who have an identity or whose progressive change we can follow sequentially, as in the Bildungsroman. In Jacob's Room, however, Woolf was faced with the problem that this fictional convention does not hold good for all human beings at all stages of life. (68)

This view is shared by others (for example, Judy Little in Comedy and the Woman Writer) to a greater or lesser degree. Taking this stance, however, requires ignoring much of the novel, such as Woolf's running commentary regarding the impossibility of truly 'knowing' anyone.

Option 'B' does not seem entirely suitable, either, since the illustrations Rimmon-Kenan provides (37-40) demonstrate that the system is useful for at least some novels. Option 'C' raises two questions: What method does Woolf use? and What does she accomplish with that method? An answer to the

second question suggests itself quite readily. Our inability to satisfactorily apply Rimmon-Kenan's methodology to Jacob's Room raises the same questions addressed in Contemporary Poetics: What is the nature of character? and, How may character be known? Rimmon-Kenan's suggestion that character is a verbal construct modelled on cultural patterns common to both reader and writer underscores Woolf's rejection of those patterns. With this novel, Woolf denies the very notion that people may be 'known.' Although she does supply the reader with a proper noun (Jacob), few physical, psychological, or even combinations of physical and psychological attributes adhere to that noun to be abstracted by a reader in order to 'know' Jacob.

Woolf's assertions and demonstrations regarding the impossibility of knowing another person--even though he may be 'only' a fictional one--point to and demolish the fictional *and* societal construction of the socialized self that is known by a father, a hot water bottle, and a house. The question, "Can I never know, share, be certain?" (90) echoes throughout the pages of Jacob's Room. Though people attempt to communicate--with letters, with the telephone, with appointments--"the journey is a lonely one, and if bound together by notes and telephones we went in company, perhaps--who knows?--we might talk by the way." But, no. "People have tried. Byron wrote letters. So did Cowper. . . . Were it possible!" (90). We might see the "pattern on [Jacob's] trousers; the old thorns on his stick; his shoe laces; bare hands; and face" but "whether we know what was in his mind is another question" (91). "The strange thing about life is that though the nature of it must have been apparent to every one for hundreds of years, no one has left any adequate account of it" (92). Again and

again Woolf demonstrates the foolishness of depending upon another's report (98). One simply does not tell the things that are of greatest importance so that others may report them; in fact, what is of greatest importance at one moment may not be at another (126-27).

When Mrs. Norman is worried about being shut up alone with a young man (who, we learn, is Jacob) in the empty railway carriage, Woolf comments, "Nobody sees anyone as he is. . . . They see a whole--they see all sorts of things--they see themselves." And then, as Mrs. Norman observes Jacob, the reader is reminded, "It is no use trying to sum people up. One must follow hints, not exactly what is said, nor yet entirely what is done . . . " (28). Later, as we 'stand' at Jacob's window to consider the London scene of post-office vans and motor omnibuses and people rushing past one another, Woolf comments:

> Each had his own business to think of. Each had his past shut in him like the leaves of a book known to him by heart; and his friends could only read the title, James Spalding, or Charles Budgeon, and the passengers going the opposite way could read nothing at all. (62)

Observing the bustle in the Opera House, one is reminded, "In short, the observer is choked with observations. Only to prevent us from being submerged by chaos, nature and society between them have arranged a system of classification"--in this case, stalls, boxes, amphitheatre, and a gallery. So "there is no need to distinguish details. But the difficulty remains--one has to choose" (66). And then, when the textual spotlight is turned on those who love Jacob so that they may share their knowledge of him with the reader, Woolf

finally concludes, "It seems that a profound, impartial, and absolutely just opinion of our fellow-creatures is utterly unknown." We see each other as types, and "life is but a procession of shadows. . . . Such is the manner of our seeing. Such the conditions of our love" (69). It is impossible to 'know' Jacob. "Even the exact words get the wrong accent on them. . . . [It] is mostly a matter of guess work" (70).

Greimas' hypothesis of archetypal patterns within the deep narrative structure of a text appears to be seriously questioned by Jacob's Room. If the conventional *methods* of knowing character prove inadequate to this novel, then the patterns woven from such methods prove inadequate as well. Jacob's Room demonstrates that the "four corners" to which the "web" of fiction is attached (Woolf, Room 41) are not a "limited number of basic structures" which are capable of generating an "infinite variety of stories" (Rimmon-Kenan 10). Furthermore, this novel discounts not only the conventions of knowing character, but also events as a succession of changes "from one state of affairs to another" (Rimmon-Kenan 15). There is no exposition, no incentive moment, no rising action allowing the identification of first the crisis (is there even one?) and then the climax. One cannot ask the usual questions concerning who did what, when, with what results. Can one accept a proper noun as a central character? How does one read this novel?[6] What systematic, non-reductive, non-impressionistic approach can one take to Jacob's Room?

Woolf's essay "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (which came out under the title "Character in Fiction" in the July 1924 Criterion after Jacob's Room was published) might serve, at least indirectly, as Woolf's own commentary on

character in this novel.[7] Virginia Woolf approaches the issue of character (and thereby also that of story) by asking, What is the 'real' reality, and what is 'truth'? How may they be communicated in literature? Because Virginia Woolf believes that the "four corners" to which the "web" of fiction is attached is 'life' (Room 41), 'truth' and 'reality' are her primary concerns not only in this essay, but throughout her work. Even an essay 'about' character does not directly address the nature of character.

The following excerpt from a June 19, 1923 diary entry, for instance, illustrates her concern that her own writing should express the "true reality":

> I daresay its true . . . that I haven't that 'reality' gift. I insubstantise, wilfully to some extent, distrusting reality--its cheapness. But to get further. Have I the power of conveying the true reality? (Diary II:248)

That she fails to find what she understands as the "true" reality in the writing of some of her contemporaries such as Wells, Galsworthy, and Bennett is obvious in her refutation of Bennett's charge that the "young novelists [i.e. Forster, Lawrence, Strachey, Joyce, and Eliot] . . . are unable to create characters that are real, true, and convincing." Woolf asks, "What is reality? And who are the judges of reality? A character may be real to Mr. Bennett and quite unreal to me" ("Character," McNeillie Essays III:421, 426). In the same essay, Woolf concedes that it is "hard for novelists at present to create characters which seem real, not only to Mr. Bennett, but to the world at large" ("Character" 427). That difficulty, she explains, is partially the result of not knowing *how*, of experimenting with methods. According to Woolf, the

Victorian conventions have ceased to work,[8] and the conventions writers such as Wells, Galsworthy, and Bennett developed, while they have allowed those writers to look "very powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically" at various things, have never allowed them to look "at life, never at human nature" ("Character" 430). The existing conventions, Woolf explains, have ceased "to be a means of communication between writer and reader"; they have become "an obstacle and an impediment" ("Character" 434). Therefore, a writer who desires to "look at life" must attempt to change conventions so that they will "not seem to you too odd, unreal, and far-fetched to believe in" ("Character" 432). The writer thereby "stimulates [the reader's] imagination," to make him or her "willing to co-operate in the far more difficult business of intimacy" ("Character" 431) for the "truth" to be told ("Character" 435).

But the difficulty novelists have with character is not only attributable to novelists' experimentation, Woolf claims. It is also attributable to novelists misdirecting readers by setting up false criteria and expectations. Characters in fiction are recognized and evaluated in much the same way that people met on the street are recognized and evaluated. When that process is reduced to the recognition and evaluation of belongings such as houses and gloves in order to determine the 'reality' of a character, the notion of character has become a figment of a fiction--and a pernicious fiction at that. It becomes all the more pernicious when one realizes that many people also hold the converse to be true: if one can test the reality of a fictional character by testing it against people, then the 'reality' of a person may be tested against 'real' fictional characters. Woolf writes:

> Here is the British public sitting by the writer's side and saying in its vast and unanimous way, 'Old women have houses. They have fathers. They have incomes. They have servants. They have hot water bottles. That is how we know that they are old women. Mr. Wells and Mr. Bennett and Mr. Galsworthy have always taught us that this is the way to recognise them. But now with your Mrs. Brown--how are we to believe in her? We do not even know whether her villa was called Albert or Balmoral; what she paid for her gloves; or whether her mother died of cancer or of consumption. How can she be alive? No, she is a mere figment of your imagination.' (433)

According to Woolf, this pernicious fiction regarding character evolved out of an artificial and fatal division between reader and writer. Readers have trusted writers to interpret 'life' for them--a trust that, Woolf claims, is misplaced. A writer is not some superior being imparting information to inferiors; writer and reader are equals exploring and discovering together. Woolf explains:

> In the course of your daily life this past week you have had far stranger and more interesting experiences than the one I have tried to describe. You have overheard scraps of talk that filled you with amazement. You have gone to bed at night bewildered by the complexity of your feelings. In one day thousands of ideas have coursed through your brains; thousands of emotions have met, collided, and disappeared in astonishing disorder. Nevertheless, you allow the writers to palm off upon you a version

> of all this, an image of Mrs. Brown, which has no likeness to that surprising apparition whatsoever. In your modesty you seem to consider that writers are of different blood and bone from yourselves; that they know more of Mrs. Brown than you do. Never was there a more fatal mistake. It is this division between reader and writer, this humility on your part, these professional airs and graces on ours, that corrupt and emasculate the books which should be the healthy offspring of a close and equal alliance between us. ("Character" 436)

This misplaced modesty has entrapped not only the reader, but also the writer, Woolf charges in an essay written during the same period as "Character in Fiction." She writes in "Modern Fiction":

> . . . if a writer were a free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must, if he could base his work upon his own feeling and not upon convention, there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe *in the accepted style*, and perhaps *not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors would have it.* (Reader I:149-50, emphasis supplied)

Virginia Woolf's call for personal experience to provide the criteria by which to evaluate the 'reality' of character might cause one to conclude that what she advocates is a change in the conventions dictating the enumeration of details such as 'fathers," "houses," "servants," and "hot water bottles"; that what she wants are details portraying people in fiction more 'accurately.' After

all, Woolf elaborates, "They [i.e. Bennett *et al*] have looked very powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically out of the window; at factories, at Utopias, even at the decoration and upholstery of the carriage; but never at her [Mrs. Brown]" ("Character" 430). So one may assume that what is needed is simply a shift in focus. When one reads "Character in Fiction" a little more closely, however, it becomes evident that Woolf's subject is not so much character as 'life.' "Mrs. Brown" is not so much a "she" (although Woolf does use that pronoun to refer to "Mrs. Brown"), as an "it." Woolf seems to understand character to be part of what Rimmon-Kenan calls the aspect of narration when she writes that character

> has the power to make you think not merely of it [character] itself, but of all sorts of things through its eyes--of religion, of love, of war, of peace, of family life, of balls in county towns, of sunsets, moonrises, the immortality of the soul. . . . And in all these novels [i.e. War and Peace, Vanity Fair, Tristram Shandy, Madame Bovary, Pride and Prejudice, The Mayor of Casterbridge, Villette] all these great novelists have brought us to see whatever they wish us to see through some character. ("Character," McNeillie Essays III:426)

As part of the aspect of narration, the significance of character cannot be held to inhere in its relation to story events. Woolf forestalls the conclusion that it does when she elaborates further and presents "Mrs. Brown" as

> an old lady of unlimited capacity and infinite variety; capable of appearing in any place; wearing any dress; saying anything and

> doing heaven knows what. But the things she says and the things she does and her eyes and her nose and her speech and her silence have an overwhelming fascination, for she is, of course, *the spirit we live by, life itself.* ("Character" 436, emphasis supplied)

What is particularly suggestive to me is Woolf's choice of a character ("Mrs. Brown") in an essay purportedly discussing character in fiction, but actually discussing the problem of reality. Mrs. Brown is obviously not a person walking the pages of a book. She is a linguistic concretization of an abstract concept. By extension, it seems entirely possible that Jacob is also such a concretization of "the spirit we live by, life itself." I would suggest, therefore, that the "deep narrative structure" of Jacob's Room consists not of established cultural story patterns, but of the paradigms activated by Virginia Woolf's perception of 'life.' That perception is to a large degree culturally determined, to be sure. But if character on the syntagmatic level is a linguistic concretization of 'life,' rather than a verbal representation modelled on an archetypal pattern, then its import reaches beyond its involvement in story events. Rather than reading and evaluating 'Jacob' on the basis of its physical and/or psychological "person-like" attributes, one needs to ask, What does this proper noun (within the context of the fictional text) communicate about 'life,' about 'truth,' about 'reality'? The paradigmatic structure, therefore, becomes as significant as the syntagmatic structure which provides access to it. Nevertheless, the question, How does one read? is still unanswered.

Rimmon-Kenan's postulation of character as, at least in part, a verbal design within the text suggests that William H. Gass's understanding of

character as constructed of words may be helpful. Gass points out that character in fiction is many things: It is

> (1) a noise, (2) a proper name, (3) a complex system of ideas, (4) a controlling conception, (5) an instrument of verbal organization, (6) a pretended mode of referring, and (7) a source of verbal energy.

But, Gass emphasizes, it is "not a person" ("Concept" 44); "characters in fiction are mostly empty canvas" (45). He explains that "normally, characters are fictional human beings, and thus are given proper names" (50), but they need *not* be confined to that role since

> characters are those primary substances to which everything else is attached. Hotels, dresses, conversations, sausage, feelings, gestures, snowy evenings, faces--each may fade as fast as we read of them. Yet the language of the novel will eddy about a certain incident or name. . . . Anything . . . which serves as a fixed point, like a stone in a stream or that soap in Bloom's pocket, functions as a character. Character, in this sense, is a matter of degree, for the language of the novel may loop back seldom, often, or incessantly. But the idea that characters are like primary substances has to be taken in a double way, because if any thing becomes a character simply to the degree the words of the novel qualify it, it also loses some of its substance, some of its primacy, to the extent that it, in turn, qualifies something else. In a

> perfectly organized novel, every word would ultimately qualify one thing. (49-50)

Thinking of Woolf's Mrs. Brown as a "primary substance" to which "everything else is attached," may seem unusual, perhaps even offensive. Yet, as has been noted, "Mrs. Brown" is "life itself"--not some person incarnate who lives in the pages of a book rather than next door. Moreover, Virginia Woolf herself already implies in The Voyage Out, her first novel, that character is "substance" rather than person.[9]

Character, however, is a *particular* linguistic "substance" in that it is 'fictional person' in the same sense that any other words (or signs) signifying an object in the 'real world' may be thought of as 'fictional rocks' or 'fictional water' or 'fictional houses.' It is a literary sign which serves to "remind" the reader of the empirical reality within which he or she lives and which it signifies or images (Gass 40-49). But character is never the verbal equivalent of a specific person or object--it is not a window through which readers are shown a view that is somehow able to enhance sensory experience.[10] Rather, as we have seen with Mrs. Brown, image concretizes an abstraction. When an image draws too much attention to itself for whatever reason, it limits its reflexive potential. Woolf appears to recognize this when she explains that a writer is most successful when he or she is able to blur the outlines of images. "It is not the actual sight or sound itself that matters, but the reverberations that it makes as it travels through our minds." Only when the writer has succeeded in "gathering up and putting together these echoes and fragments [is it] that we arrive at the true nature of our experience" (Essays I:172).

Character as image, then, permits access to the paradigmatic structure engendering it. Woolf writes in "Character in Fiction" that the writer must

> get into touch with his [or, in Woolf's case, her] reader by putting before him [i.e. the reader] something which he recognises, which therefore stimulates his imagination, and makes him willing to co-operate in the far more difficult business of intimacy. (431)

A writer may accomplish this by means of an entity that is not an "obstacle and an impediment" ("Character" 434). In a literal sense, the "something" put before the reader is, of course, the text, although Woolf is referring to character. So if one thinks of character as a verbal construct, following Gass, then it follows that as words on the page that have designated efficacy, character can be thought of as "fictional human being," or (to use Rimmon-Kenan's term) "person-like"; as linguistic product of a dynamic process, character is evidence of a paradigm--that "business of intimacy" to which Woolf refers. Through the "eyes" of character, the writer acquires "the power to make you think not merely of it itself, but of all sorts of things" ("Character" 426).

The potential of image, therefore, is manifold. On the level of the verbal sign, images interact with other verbal signs as part of the syntagmatic structure of the text. An image as a sign can be recognized by its 'concreteness.' It suggests an apprehendable 'reality' in the world because readers (and writers, of course) have invested it with an agreed-upon linguistic meaning. If one thinks of image in this context only, however, one ignores its much greater potential. The proposition that character, the "primary substance" in the verbal design of the text, is image implies that while it is a

sign within the text, that sign is the product of a dynamic process beginning on the paradigmatic level for the writer and on the syntagmatic level for the reader.

Such an understanding means that the efficacy of character does not depend on descriptive details. This is significant because if it did depend on description, character would change every time the conventions dictating the use of details change. This is *not* to say that description or convention are insignificant. What it does say is that character as a literary image is language dependent. As a literary image, character is an integral part of the aspect of narration. 'Narration,' the expression of 'story,' needs character as its principal element to give structure to the entire text. In other words, "what is proper to narrative is not action but the character as a Proper Name" (Barthes, S/Z 131). Thinking of character as the structuring element of the aspect of narration places it where it ought to be--as an integral part of the aspect of text which consists of both a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic level.

Rimmon-Kenan's assertion that the two positions on 'story' (i.e. 1. autonomous [6]; 2. "style-, language-, and medium-dependent" [8]) are both "intuitive" (8) is understandable given the lack of irrefutable evidence for either position. Even Gérard Genette, though his system is so all-encompassing that it is too cumbersome for most readers, is strangely silent on the definition of his "récit première" of which character is a primary component. When theorists have addressed the issue of origins, their discussions have often led to greater obfuscation.[11] Gass's explanation of how character may "come into being" can be misconstrued quite easily, for instance, despite his firm

declaration that character is a verbal construct. He explains that characters may "come into being from the world's direction" where he or she "once existed outside language" (with that existence either 'real' or in the writer's imagination). If the text merely "renders" a character, then one may assume that indications are dispersed throughout the text for the reader to assemble and reconstruct into whatever original entity inspired the linguistic construct. That gloss, however, is not supported by the rest of Gass's discussion. While character *may* be a "reality rendered," th[illegible] is merely one possible source, for, Gass continues:

> Mr. Cashmore might ha[illegible]ther parents. Meanings in the stream of words before his appearance might have suggested him, dramatic requirements may have called him forth, or he may have been the spawn of music, taking his substance from rhythm and alliteration. Perhaps it was all of those. (52)

The 'reality' that is rendered through character can therefore be glossed also as a part of the paradigmatic structure--a part of that which is perceived to be. In Gass's words, it is rendered "to embody a controlling 'idea'" (53).

I would therefore posit that the 'story' of which a given character is the linguistic product is a particular perception of life. A recognition of the potential of image and a redefinition of 'story' as *that which is perceived to be* effectively assigns a dual role to character: that which it plays as an aspect of narration, and also that which it plays as an aspect of story. Character grasps empirical reality with both hands. On the level of story, human beings perceive what *is* largely in terms of their own humanity. So the object of the

act of perception is apprehended through the 'I' that is doing the perceiving. Both subject and object are part of the paradigm that sets into motion the dynamic process which results in the literary image.

Readers are so used to thinking of plot as not only the organizing principle, but also the wellspring of narration, that it will take some real adjustment, and perhaps even a shift in allegiance, to redefine story. Yet I am certainly not the first to question the role assigned to character. Debates over character as person or word, as doing or being,[12] indicate a growing concern with the inadequacies of existing interpretive systems. One example of this is Roland Barthes' change of mind, within four years, as to the status of character in fiction. Rimmon-Kenan writes that whereas in 1966 he

> clearly subordinates character to action . . . in 1970 he gives character a separate code (the semic code) and even ponders the possibility that 'what is proper to narrative is not action but the character as a Proper Name.' (35)

This reconception of character on the part of critics and theorists did not arise suddenly out of nowhere. Indeed, its seeds can already be found in traditional approaches to story as event and character. Erich Auerbach, for instance, writes in Mimesis that in Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse "the picture of Mrs. Ramsay's face," not some exterior event, is the structural element that gives coherence to the "two excursuses" which are concurrent with the telling of Mrs. Ramsay's knitting the stocking for the lighthouse keeper's boy (539-40). Auerbach's observation effectively undermines the dependence on plot as the structural element of narrative fiction. Narrative fiction, as Auerbach points

out, does not need to depend upon "a planned continuity of action" to provide its structure. It may exploit the random moment "in itself" (552).

This redefinition of story as that which is perceived to be rather than as that which happens, and of character as image helps in answering the question, How does Jacob's Room mean? It enables one to view the system of notation and reference in Jacob's Room not as a descriptive supplement for more important elements, but as primary and elemental to an understanding of the novel. Jacob's Room *does* have a central character that is more than a proper noun. As she does in her other novels, in Jacob's Room, Virginia Woolf creates what Gass calls a primary substance, a focal point. That focal point is the object around which the images in the novel eddy so that every word ultimately qualifies what becomes the central image called Jacob.

Within the opening pages, the reader discovers that Jacob is lost. One place Jacob is found in this novel is at King's College Chapel. The chapel service is significant because the images connected with it form a nexus between images already encountered and images about to be encountered. The description of the light filtering through the stained-glass windows (29) reverberates with earlier images connected with butterfly hunting. Woolf writes:

> The tree had fallen, though it was a windless night, and the lantern, stood upon the ground, had lit up the still green leaves and the dead beech leaves. It was a dry place. A toad was there. And the red underwing had circled round the light and flashed and gone. The red underwing had never come back though Jacob

> had waited. It was after twelve when he crossed the lawn and saw his mother in the bright room, playing patience, sitting up. (21)

Compare this sketch with that of the King's College Chapel:

> As the sides of a lantern protect the flame so that it burns steady even in the wildest night--burns steady and gravely illumines the tree-trunks--so inside the Chapel all was orderly. . . . The white-robed figures crossed from side to side; now mounted steps, now descended, all very orderly.
>
> . . . If you stand a lantern under a tree every insect in the forest creeps up to it--a curious assembly, since though they scramble and swing and knock their heads against the glass, they seem to have no purpose--something senseless inspires them. One gets tired of watching them, as they amble round the lantern and blindly tap as if for admittance, one large toad being the most besotted of any and shouldering his way through the rest. Ah, but what's that? A terrifying volley of pistol-shots rings out--cracks sharply; ripples spread--silence laps smooth over sound. A tree--a tree has fallen, a sort of death in the forest. After that, the wind in the trees sounds melancholy.
>
> But this service in King's College Chapel--why allow women to take part in it? (29-30)

This intratextuality, this overlapping, of images serves as a commentary and at the same time creates a collage, at the centre of which is Jacob's presence.

Virginia Woolf demands that the reader "look steadily" so that "multiplicity becomes unity" (127) and directs him or her to the need for that steady gaze already on the first page of the novel. When Betty Flanders' eyes filled with tears, "the entire bay quivered; the lighthouse wobbled; and she had the illusion that the mast of Mr. Connor's little yacht was bending like a wax candle in the sun." Only when her gaze steadied was the mast straight, the water regular, and the lighthouse upright (5). The reader's gaze must also be steady, for at the 'deep structure' of Jacob's Room is a philosophy of character very different from one signified by the mask into which society has carved its expectations of stability, cause and effect, sequential progression, and a host of other features.

But let us return to King's College Chapel. We need to fix our gaze because the connections are numerous; our collage is multi-dimensional. The "thick wax candles" that "stand upright" in King's College Chapel (29) remind us of Betty Flanders' illusion (5). Here Jacob is present; there, he was lost. But was he lost? Is he ever lost in this novel? Even when he is absent, the images point to him, making him the "primary substance." As we return to the Chapel scene, we might note Woolf's imperative,

> Look, as they pass into service, how airily the gowns blow out, as though nothing dense and corporeal were within. What sculptured faces, what certainty, authority controlled by piety, although great boots march under the gowns. (29)

The "playful tone" Howard Harper comments upon somewhat dismissively (Language 91) is very obvious in this passage. The ethereal quality of the

billowing gowns juxtaposed with the solidly material quality of "great boots" is funny--until the march of the great boots with the "terrifying volley of pistol-shots" is connected to it (30). It becomes less funny yet with the Dantean procession of the old man who has been "crossing the Bridge these six hundred years" leading a "rabble of little boys at his heels, for he is drunk, or blind with misery. . . He shuffles on. No one stands still. It seems as if we marched to the sound of music" (110). All these images converge as another procession is watched

> passing down Whitehall, and elderly people were stiffly descending from between the paws of the slippery lions, where they had been testifying to their faith, singing lustily, raising their eyes from their music to look into the sky, and still their eyes were on the sky as they marched behind the gold letters of their creed. (167)

The "playfulness" noted earlier has by now taken on the character of bitter satire.[13] But these fragments do not stand by themselves. Jacob, again, is the "primary substance" in which all find their unity.

Speaking of character as a "primary substance" may give the impression that when one conceives of character as a verbal construct, one loses the emotional appeal that is inherent in the understanding of character as fictional person. But that is the argument addressed earlier. What is a 'real person'? And what is realism in literature? Jacob's Room demonstrates that an omission of 'personal traits' which usually aid readers in 'knowing' a character does not minimize emotional appeal. As I shall demonstrate, some of the most

touching and sensitive scenes of Woolf's entire *oeuvre* are to be found in Jacob's Room. And the point to be made here is that the emotion is engendered *not* by what happens, or by the appealing 'personality' or 'traits' of the character to which it happens, or even by situation. Rather, it is engendered by the juxtaposition of images. At the risk of seeming to advocate an impressionistic reading, let me illustrate:

The scene following Jacob's betrayal by Florinda has every potential for engendering an emotional response. The "light from the arc lamp drenched [Jacob] from head to foot" so that even the "old thorns on his stick" can be seen. His face, too, is more clearly visible than ever before as we are told

> it was as if a stone were ground to dust; as if white sparks flew from a livid whetstone, which was his spine; as if the switchback railway, having swooped to the depths, fell, fell, fell. This was in his face. (91)

Yet the metaphor, symbol, and similes, powerful though they are, do not carry the emotional potential of the following series of images that, while unrelated on the surface, all find their common focus in Jacob: "He has turned to go. As for following him back to his rooms, no--that we won't do. Yet that, of course, is precisely what one does" (91-92). And then, after Jacob shuts the door behind him, the reader is made aware of the clocks striking, of Mrs. Wagg's vigil on her doorstep, of a barrel-organ playing like "an obscene nightingale beneath wet leaves," of children running across the road--"yet all the while having for centre, for magnet, a young man alone in his room" (92). Not Jacob, but Rose Shaw cries out, "'Life is wicked--life is detestable'" (92). The scene

that could easily have turned melodramatic (particularly when one recalls that Florinda is a prostitute) is made one charged with sensitivity.

There is no attempt at emotional distance here. Instead, this scene is as evocative as any in Woolf's novels, and more so than most found in other novels. Even more powerful is the last scene of the novel. While a lesser writer might have sentimentalized the situation by describing the emotional state of secondary characters (Betty Flanders and Bonamy), Woolf brings together again the images that have made Jacob the "primary substance" in the text, and the present/absent Jacob assumes much greater potential to evoke an emotional response in the reader.

Woolf uses repetition as her primary device. An earlier description of Jacob's room is rendered here word for word:

> The rooms are shapely, the ceilings high; over the doorway a rose, or a ram's skull, is carved in the wood. The eighteenth century has its distinction. Even the panels, painted in raspberry-coloured paint, have their distinction. (67; cf. 172)

The images in these scenes serve to bring together individual fragments from the entire text, making the structure of syntagmatic meaning extremely complicated. Recalling the scene that the earlier description is a part of, one is reminded of Jacob's high spirits and his sense of possibilities. He had finished reading his essay to Bonamy and his euphoria was boundless. One also recalls the child Jacob finding the skull on the beach, taking it home and going to bed with it. One recalls looking at Jacob asleep with the sheep's jaw at his feet where he had kicked it when he threw the covers off (12). Now Bonamy is

alone, looking at Jacob's belongings. The unpaid bill for the hunting crop takes one back to the boy Jacob "switching off a thistle's head" after he and Archer playfully sprang upon their mother unexpectedly (17). It also takes one back to his hunting experience (97). The letters from Sandra bring to mind Greece. The invitations from Mrs. Durrant and Lady Rocksbier are also calculated to trigger memories: Jacob sailing with Jimmy Durrant and diving naked into the ocean (45-47); Jacob at Mrs. Durrant's dinner party (54)--which reverberates with another memory of Jacob late for the Plumer's luncheon party (31-32). Every individual image teams with other images in the rendering of Bonamy's sorrow. Woolf seemingly turns away from that sorrow to record things outside the room: Pickford's van, omnibuses, voices. Even these, however, recall Jacob. They have been seen before through his eyes.

Woolf's image: "Suddenly all the leaves seemed to raise themselves" (172) is calculated to engender an emotional response in the reader. Our hearts, too, raise themselves and Bonamy voices our "'Jacob! Jacob!'"--a call that releases the emotions only to have Woolf build them again with Betty Flanders' demand, "'What am I to do with these?'" as she holds out an old pair of Jacob's shoes (173). There is no Rose Shaw now to cry out, "Life is wicked--life is detestable!" Woolf assigns that role to the reader. And, as I enter into that role, I *do* know Jacob. If I were asked to encapsulate Jacob's 'self' in a few, well-chosen words, however, I would be as incapable as were Clara Durrant, Betty Flanders, and all the rest. Yet Woolf has constructed a fictional being--albeit in a manner that breaks all the rules. Bringing the reader to the place where he or she cares about the character, however, is not Woolf's

ultimate goal. Her ultimate goal is "intimacy" ("Character" 431) so that the reader may be made to see "all sorts of things"--"life itself" ("Character" 436) through the character's 'eyes' ("Character" 426).

I pause here to observe that I have been treading on dangerous ground. A discussion of emotion in literature must, by its very nature, reflect a subjective response. The point is, however, that this subjective response is based on objective data. The objective data here consist of images that combine to elevate one central image: Jacob. How these images combine is discussed by Rimmon-Kenan (although her subject is "elements"). She explains that the "main principles of cohesion . . . are repetition, similarity, contrast, and implication (in the logical sense)" (39). Admittedly, one cannot take the images from Jacob's Room and categorize them according to physical attributes, psychological attributes, and a combination of physical and psychological attributes. Classification by attribute makes a systematic reading quite simple. But a system of "notation and reference,"[14] though much more involved, is still a system. It still permits a methodological approach to character.

Most of Virginia Woolf's novels present challenges in their characterization. Graham Greene, for instance, believes that the world of fiction, represented by writers such as Woolf, seems to have lost a dimension. He writes, "The characters of such distinguished writers as Mrs. Virginia Woolf and Mr. E. M. Forster wandered like cardboard symbols through a world that was paper-thin" (115-16). The challenges a reader finds in Jacob's Room are not specific to that novel despite its wide acclaim as "the first of Woolf's longer fictions to break with conventional narrative technique," as her "first

consciously experimental novel" (Zwerdling 62; cf. the publisher's foreword to Jacob's Room). While this novel repeatedly gives reasons for Woolf's rejection of the fiction known as 'character' and openly defies expectations, Woolf's other work (though never consistent in the manner by which it questions conventions of character) presents Woolf's concerns with 'reality,' 'truth,' and 'life' just as uncompromisingly as does Jacob's Room. For instance, where Jacob's Room seems to render character in absence, The Waves seems to render character by stressing presence through its dramatic monologues.

The Waves has drawn much greater critical attention than Jacob's Room; the problem of character has been addressed particularly.[15] Does Woolf depict six (or seven) characters, or does she create only one? Viewed through the glass of Woolf's implied directives at the conclusion of The Voyage Out, her treatment of character in Jacob's Room, and her essay "Character in Fiction," the solution seems obvious. Woolf depicts not six (or seven) individuals, but rather a series of images all related to one another as petals are to a flower. Bernard tells us, "There is a red carnation in that vase. A single flower as we sat here waiting, but now a seven-sided flower, many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded" (85). After Percival's death, Bernard explains further, "The flower . . . the red carnation that stood in the vase on the table of the restaurant when we dined together with Percival, is become a six-sided flower; made of six lives" (154). How abstractable is a flower from its petals? The question is foolish. They must, of course, be one entity.

One might remind oneself here of Gass's definition of character. If character is understood to be a "fixed point" which the words of the novel

qualify by gravitating toward, then that fixed point becomes a "primary substance," or character (50). This concept of character seems apparent in a diary entry on the status of these characters. Woolf writes, "I think it possible that I have got my statues against the sky" (III:300). The metaphor contains several interesting implications. First, the statement suggests that Bernard and Susan, Neville and Rhoda, Louis and Jinny, and Percival are constructs, not persons. Second, Woolf appears to be comparing her art to that of a sculptor, and seems to think of it as a plastic art, existing in space. The underlying assumption is that characters are made and shaped. Third, the mention of a horizon raises the question, What is the ground that the horizon defines? It may be that the ground Woolf has in mind is the imposed social self from which she has freed her characters so that they *may* be visible "against the sky."

Gass's concept of character seems to be supported by The Waves as it was by Jacob's Room. Woolf creates six proper nouns surrounded by a complex system of images. While these proper nouns 'speak'--or more properly, have speech acts attributed to them--they are not "lifelike." If Jacob seems to some readers an enigma because he has insufficient presence, the character(s) in this novel seem to be enigmas despite their so obvious presence. But, then, 'character' does not equal 'person' in Woolf. This is not only supported by the novel itself, but also by a diary entry after the publication of the novel: "Odd, that they (The Times) should praise my characters when I meant to have none" (Diary IV:47). As in Jacob's Room, in The Waves character is not an emergent, coherent, and totally comprehensible personality.

In The Waves, Woolf underscores the artifice through which her characters are projected even more than she does in Jacob's Room. At the same time, she creates characters that seem easier to 'define' than Jacob. The noun *Jacob* does not cohere into one single memorable image. The nouns *Jinny, Rhoda, Neville*, and the rest do, as I shall demonstrate shortly. Yet, on the other hand, if one is to think of all seven as one entity as Bernard suggests, then how can one even pretend to the existence of a single, stable identity in The Waves? The main principle of cohesion in Jacob's Room is repetition and logical implication; in The Waves, Woolf adds to these similarity and contrast.

The similarities between the interpolations and the characters in the episodes are very strong. There is similarity in the rhythm of the soliloquies and that of the waves. There is also similarity in the changes that the characters make and in the changes connected with the waves and the sea--both are superficial and suggest changelessness beneath flux. This image of stasis in the midst of flux can also be discovered in the language the various characters use. Their language is formal and sophisticated right from the beginning. They seem immune to time. The images connected to the noun *Bernard* encourage the reader to see him as a phrase-maker from the time he tells us, "'I see a ring . . . hanging above me. It quivers and hangs in a loop of light'" (6) to his last words:

> "And in me too the wave rises. It swells; it arches its back. I am aware once more of a new desire, something rising beneath me like the proud horse whose rider first spurs and then pulls him back. What enemy do we now perceive advancing against us, you

> whom I ride now, as we stand pawing this stretch of pavement? It is death. . . . Against you I will fling myself, unvanquished and unyielding, O Death!" (200)

While his reaction to life is more complex at the end, he still attempts to have words separate him from experience (20) until he finally realizes that even words must merge into experience. The proper name *Susan* permits the reader to label her earth-mother right from the beginning. She says, "I think I am the field, I am the barn, I am the trees . . . " (65). Even while she is at school, she lives for her return to the country (27, 30, 36). Louis tells us, "To be loved by Susan would be to be impaled by a bird's sharp beak, to be nailed to a barnyard door" (80-81). To *Rhoda* one can ascribe the designation 'outsider.' She wishes to belong, yet is unable to find her place. One of her first soliloquies consists of a startling and memorable image: "The world is entire, and I am outside of it, crying, 'Oh save me, from being blown for ever outside the loop of time!'" (15). Her painful alienation--'"Here I am nobody. I have no face'" (22)--is never relieved and she finally chooses death, to be '"lost in the abysses of time, in the darkness'" (152). Each separate character has images associated with it that permit this kind of labeling.

But the images in The Waves cohere through contrast as well. Many of these contrasts can be attributed to change. True, some change serves primarily to illuminate stasis just as the sun serves to illuminate the surface of the sea, but other changes point to modifications in the characters themselves. These basic modifications seem results of images signalling *anagnorisis*, or moments of 'epiphany.' Jinny says,

> Here I stand . . . In the Tube station . . . there is my body in that looking glass. How solitary, how shrunk, how aged! I am no longer young. I am no longer part of the procession . . . who will come if I signal?
>
> Little animal that I am, sucking my flanks in and out with fear, I stand here, palpitating, trembling. But I will not be afraid, I will bring the whip down on my flanks. (130)

These images of terrible realization, despair and courage, seem to indicate a basic change. Bernard, too, appears to experience deeper than surface change. He tells us,

> My book, stuffed with phrases, has dropped to the floor. It lies under the table, to be swept up by the charwoman . . . . I need a howl; a cry. When the storm crosses the marsh and sweeps over me where I lie in the ditch unregarded I need no words. Nothing neat. Nothing that comes down with all its feet on the floor. . . . I have done with phrases. (199)

The apparent contradictions within the text, the concurrent emphasis on movement and stasis, on separateness and unity, are made possible not only by images of similarity and contrast, but by the coherence of these images through similarity and contrast to present the reader with "a many-sided substance cut out of this dark; a many-faceted flower" (155).

To return then to the issues of character started with, it is possible to conclude that character in Virginia Woolf's writing is a verbal construct of a particular kind: an image. Although its specific attributes are varied, character

is directly related to whatever underlying abstract paradigmatic structure engendered it in a particular text. On the syntagmatic level, character is determined by the degree that the "words of the novel qualify it" (Gass 50). The construction of character can be traced by examining the images that give it primacy in terms of a system of notation and reference; this would include noting and tracing repetition, similarities, differences, and logical inferences. Finally, character functions as part of the medium of narration. This means that whatever else exists and can be examined within the text is related to character. This would include events,[16] time, and also focalization.

The language and concepts developed by contemporary poetics can clearly provide an unprecedented access to Virginia Woolf's work. These forged the key which opened the door to thinking of character as image, and 'story' as that which is perceived to be. While the transition from 'story' to the linguistic product called 'image' can be hypothetical only, yet that hypothesis facilitates an understanding of how the writing process can be a process of creativity and discovery for the reader as well as for the writer. As Woolf points out, narrative fictions are not "spun in midair by incorporeal creatures." They are "the work of suffering human beings, and are attached to grossly material things, like health and money and the houses we live in" (Room 41). Jacob, Bernard, Susan, Percival, and Mrs. Brown (to mention but a few) are not only *made*; they can be seen to be firmly *attached* to Woolf's perception of 'truth,' 'reality,' and 'life.' As one image interacts with other images within Woolf's narrative fiction, it becomes reflexive. By mirroring the process that shaped it, an image questions the paradigm engendering it and thereby serves to give rise

to new images. In this sense, one may think of the literary image as having a vertical function. But it has a horizontal function as well when the new image, in its turn, contributes to the creation of the primary substance called character.

Chapter III

Image and Order:
To the Lighthouse, Mrs. Dalloway, and The Waves

> As for the novel itself, the whole conception, the way one's seen the thing, felt about it, made it stand in relation to other things, not one in a million cares for that. And yet I sometimes wonder whether there's anything else in the whole world worth doing.
> (Terence Hewett in Virginia Woolf's The Voyage Out 220)

It has been argued that time and space are the most obvious classifications by which to order observations (including those embodied in and engendered by literary texts) because they are basic to human experience. Historically, time and space have been dichotomized to establish the differences between literature and music and the plastic arts--to avoid what Richard Wagner called *Gesammtkunst*.[1] For example, G. E. Lessing's influential Laocöon (1766) argues that literature exists in time, unlike sculpture which exists in space, because language consists of "articulated sounds in time" which can "represent only objects existing side by side, or whose parts so exist" (248). Speech, and also writing, the argument goes, demand that the sounds of language must be articulated (or represented by writing) one by one in sequential fashion. Because 'sequence' need not be temporal, but may also be 'linear' or spatial, the dichotomy seems rather artificial.

That it still appears useful in the twentieth century, however, is evident in Joseph Frank's article "Spatial Form in Modern Literature." Frank's subject

is what he perceives to be modernists' attempts to eliminate the sequence imposed by linguistic signifiers, to circumvent the temporality of literature with images that (here Frank quotes Ezra Pound) present "an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time." According to Frank, modernists thought it

> necessary to undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the elements of the poem juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time.
>
> This is precisely what Eliot and Pound attempted in their major works. ("Spatial Form" 227)

But this attempt, Frank reiterates in his later "Answer to Critics," could only partially succeed because the "temporality of language" imposes limits which, if not honored, would culminate "in the self-negation of language and the creation of a hybrid pictographic 'poem' that can only be considered a fascinating historical curiosity" ("Answer" 233). It appears then that one cannot deny the temporality that the very medium of literature demands--unless, perhaps, one uses images. But even that attempt, at least in Frank's estimation, is bound to fail since images are linguistic and as such are still ruled by the "inherent consecutiveness of language."

Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan's position, even though radically modifying G. E. Lessing's, is that time is essential to order in a literary text (43-58). As does Frank, she argues that one cannot ignore the inherent sequentiality that the linguistic signifier imposes on the text. Gérard Genette also points out that

this sequentiality is "easier to deny in theory than eliminate in fact" (34). While the literary text as artifact of production exists in space, of course, the act of reading progresses in time. Moreover, what Susan Lanser calls the "text-in-process in its context as a social, communicative act" (32) seems to demand that one think of it as existing in time. Rimmon-Kenan, paraphrasing Gérard Genette, writes:

> Strictly speaking, it [text-time] is a spatial, not a temporal, dimension. The narrative text as text has no other temporality than the one it metonymically derives from the process of its reading. (44, Genette 34)

Thus time, according to Rimmon-Kenan, is a metonymic derivation in the aspect of text as well as an inherent quality in the aspect of story. Nevertheless, she concedes that "both story-time and text-time may in fact be no more than pseudo-temporal" because the first is a "conventional, pragmatically convenient construct," and the second "derives from the process of its reading" (44). Yet her commitment to studying story-text relations (with story as pre-verbal construct of event and personages) demands foregrounding time as a major constituent factor of both story and text even when that requires an acceptance of the notion of a 'pseudo'-time.

Rimmon-Kenan's use of time to establish not only order, but also duration and frequency--to establish a 'degree zero,' a norm, by which one may identify, analyze, and classify the text--seems a logical and useful systematic approach. However, it poses some challenges to my suggestions in the previous chapter that one should think of characters in Virginia Woolf's narrative

fictions as images and of story as that which is perceived to be. One challenge is that if "time in narrative fiction can be defined as the relations of chronology between story and text" (Rimmon-Kenan 44), then conceptualizing character (and, by extension, event) in terms of narration seems to invalidate that relationship since 'text' is simply a manifestation of the aspect of narration. In other words, if order, which gives rise to 'when?' questions, is analyzed in terms of possible relationships that exist between story and text, then both story and text must have events in common happening in time. Another challenge is that if frequency, which gives rise to 'how often?' questions, represents "repetition-relations between story events and their narration in the text" (Rimmon-Kenan 57), then a reading of event as subsumed by character, which removes it effectively from the aspect of story as perception, leaves one with apparently no way to measure frequency. The "working hypothesis" that "story-structure or narrativity is isolatable" (Rimmon-Kenan 8) from the text permits the postulation of two orders and two frequencies; a denial of story as isolatable appears to deny the postulation of relations between two orders and two frequencies.

Rimmon-Kenan's discussion of duration offers a possible solution to the dilemma. She points out that whereas both order and frequency "can be quite easily transposed from the *time* of the story, regardless of the conventional nature of this time, to the linearity (*space*) of the text," duration is "much more difficult to describe in parallel terms" of story to text simply because there "is no way of measuring text-duration" (51). There is no way to transpose *erzählte Zeit* (story time) to *Erzählzeit* (narrative time).[2] The solution Rimmon-Kenan

adopts from Gérard Genette is to think not of the relationship of two durations, but of one between "duration in the story (measured in minutes, hours, days, months, years) and the length of text devoted to it (in lines and pages)" (52)--in other words, a time/space relationship. So one obviously does not need two parallel relationships. The temporal/spatial relationship Genette and Rimmon-Kenan suggest uses constancy as its norm, one that permits identifications of acceleration and deceleration (51-56).

Classifications based on time and space relationships seem necessary to textual analysis. They are clearly needed for analyses of Daniel Defoe's Moll Flanders, Henry Fielding's Tom Jones, Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities, William Makepeace Thackeray's Vanity Fair, Thomas Hardy's The Mayor of Casterbridge, etc. Narratives using plot as their organizing principle require some reference to order, frequency, and duration for an analysis of the succession of events that structure them. But an analysis of Virginia Woolf's fictions, such as the two discussed in the previous chapter which are not structured by what is traditionally termed 'plot,' cannot avoid questions of 'When?' 'How often?' and 'How long?,' either.

If one defines 'story' as that which is perceived to be, then, instead of positing relationships between story events and their disposition within the text, one needs to think of these relationships as existing between the textual evidence of events of perception and events as they are perceived to occur within the empirical world. This set of relationships is significant for even those narrative fictions using plot as their organizing principle when one recognizes that the time in which literary events occur is modelled on an

empirical time that is at least in part conceptualized rather than experienced or innate. While the relationships Genette posits are supposedly contained within the literary artifact itself, the relationships I posit admittedly exist between the literary artifact and an empirical reality. And that, Genette claims, must perforce contribute to a lack of objective, rigorous textual analysis (28). Yet, if the literary image can be said to be the linguistic product of a dynamic process, the relationships facilitating discussion of time and space *cannot* be confined to the literary text any more than can be 'story' defined as that which is perceived to be.

One's agenda definitely seems to influence the position one takes with regard to classifying the various observations a narrative fiction records and stimulates. A commitment to image as non-discursive demands a denial of time and an emphasis on space (at least in poetry). A commitment to maintaining the separation of the arts demands dichotomizing time and space. A commitment to studying story-text relations (with story as pre-verbal construct of event and personages) demands foregrounding time as a major constituent factor of both story and text even when that requires an acceptance of the notion of a 'pseudo'-time. A commitment to rigorous and systematic analysis of a literary text requires accepting the text as a more or less autonomous entity that embodies both temporal and spatial relations by which one may order observations. And my commitment to image as a linguistic product originating in one's perception of an empirical reality requires recognizing that not only the text but also its frame must be examined in order to establish relationships of time and space.

Because my agenda is to make Virginia Woolf's narrative fictions more accessible, and because my definitions of both image and story developed out of a need created by those fictions, a brief reminder of Woolf's agenda seems appropriate. Woolf's primary agenda throughout her career was to communicate her perceptions of reality. Documented extensively in Chapters I and II, this agenda caused her to question not only the conventions of characterization and plot, but also the limitations imposed on language. To account for this agenda, Rimmon-Kenan's system outlined under the heading of "Text: time" (43 ff) must be modified primarily with regard to 'story.' The challenges arising out of redefining story may quite readily be met, however, when one thinks of image as a linguistic product of a dynamic process. According to Rimmon-Kenan, her position on the nature of event and character as independent of style, language, and medium (7-8) is only one of two. One can as readily take Tzvetan Todorov's position that a story is not a story until it is told. Both positions are intuitive. Following Todorov, one can argue that a story exists in a pre-verbal state only as potential in the sense that events happen in the empirical world to people who live within that world. If story is defined as *that which is perceived to be*, the act of perception produces story on the paradigmatic level.[3] It transforms the pre-verbal potential of story to be story, even though audience and teller are one. On the syntagmatic (or apparent) level, that story may be expressed as either fiction or non-fiction depending upon the writer's choices of the various rhetorical strategies made available by his or her culture. This process of articulating the perception of that which is culminates in the linguistic product called the literary image.[4]

Since the paradigmatic structure is a realization of a potential originating in the perception of the empirical world, fictional text-time finds its parallel within that world. Moreover, since the image is linguistic, and therefore is a culturally determined sign denoting a recognizable signified within the context of the empirical world, the literary image connects narrative fiction to this world not only on the paradigmatic level, but on the syntagmatic level as well. Understanding event and character as verbal constructs, therefore, does not eliminate a systematic analysis of time. True, one can no longer define time in narrative fiction as "the relations of chronology between story and text" (Rimmon-Kenan 44). Instead, one has the much stronger connection between text and empirical reality of which time and space are two constituents.

Chronological relationships, as we have seen, have a major impact on both creating and reading the text. Questions such as 'When?' 'How long?' and 'How often?' are invaluable to a discussion of plot--particularly when it is foregrounded by the writer. A text that presents to the reader a verbal construct of events which begins at the beginning and ends at the end; that arranges 'important' external events in a chronological sequence which identifies crucial turning points, and that omits anything deemed insignificant to a more comprehensive understanding of consequential human experience, seems to require an analysis of the relations between the succession of events in the text and their relations to empirical time. Even the text that does not foreground external events, that does not present events following a continuum, or that foregrounds internal rather than external action--even this text still encourages one to note at least the interior relations among the events in terms

of 'when?' Time, however, may not be nearly as crucial; space (or 'where?' questions) will often figure more largely.[5] Other factors besides time and space also become important to ordering one's perception of a narrative text. For instance, causality gives rise to 'Why?' questions; cause and effect give rise to 'How?' questions.

The recognition that order may be achieved by a writer in a variety of ways and is not dependent upon a strong plot line is vital to an appreciation of Virginia Woolf's fiction, as is the acknowledgment of the relationship of the text to its frame. While images implying spatial and temporal order clearly have a major role in Woolf's novels such as To the Lighthouse, Mrs. Dalloway, and The Waves, an analysis in terms of events unrolling in time and existing in space is not nearly as rewarding as an analysis of how images order the reader's perception in other ways. My discussion of To the Lighthouse is divided into three parts: 1) it examines the manner by which images serve to order the relationships between the narrative and the empirical world; 2) it examines the order that images establish in terms of their relationships within the narrative; and 3) it examines the manner by which images modify the inherent linearity of the text as well as the sequentiality of the act of reading.

The mandate for producing order within a narrative does not rest with the writer alone.[6] Because human experience exists within time and space, and because humans are accustomed to arrange their experience accordingly, readers bring to a literary text a willingness--even a need--to collaborate with the writer in creating order. One cannot ignore this collaborative process in a discussion of how images order the relationship between the text and 'reality.'

The central character, or the primary image, in To the Lighthouse has the proper name 'Mrs. Ramsay' attached to it. A proper name is an invitation from the writer to the reader. Because readers know that *people* have proper names, and because they know that *people* have certain recognizable constitutive characteristics, they are prepared to fill in gaps; that is, readers supply for the verbal construct that consists of a mere nine letters whatever is needed to make the proper name 'Mrs. Ramsay' into a fictional person. Readers order by filling in gaps. The opening sentence, "'Yes, of course, if it's fine tomorrow,' said Mrs. Ramsay" (Lighthouse 9), exists partly by virtue of the linear print on the page within a segment of time that varies from one reader to another. But it also exists in the mind of the reader who attributes to 'Mrs. Ramsay' a presence in space--a space that exists as much in time as does the empirical world within which people live.[7]

"'Yes, of course, if it's fine tomorrow'" are not merely words on the page. They are understood by readers as being spoken by a fictional someone to another fictional someone, by Mrs. Ramsay to her son James. These fictional beings have fictional voices coming from fictional bodies. Before completing even the second sentence of the text, readers assume that the schemata with which the text opens are persons. If pressed, they are prepared to concede that these two characters have all the anatomy needed to communicate verbally with one another. Even though, as William H. Gass points out, "characters in fiction are mostly empty canvas" (45), that emptiness is not perceived by readers. Not only are they prepared to attribute physical characteristics to

characters but also personality traits that match their own perceptions of a mother and her son and their relationship.

The reader begins, then, with the need to order his or her experience of the narrative as great as the need to order any other experience. As the narrative unfolds, subsequent images encourage supplementation, deletion, and revision of original constructs. This process is a temporal one. It is diachronic and has traditionally been guided dramatically by the events in which the characters are involved. Generally these events are external to the characters and influence the choices made. They give rise to conflicts, crises, and often catastrophes which finally all culminate in a climax.[8] So when one reads the first sentence of To the Lighthouse, one enters into a contract with the writer: one's culture has taught one how to perceive not only one's own 'reality,' but, by extension, the fictional text in relation to it.

As demonstrated, one needs very few cues from a writer to engage in the ordering process. Although events in To the Lighthouse may differ from those the reader expects in that internal rather than external events dominate and even those that are described seem fragmented or at best loosely joined, Virginia Woolf collaborates with the reader by shaping a perception of coherence with images of chronological recurrence and progression. One of the most dominant ones is the title image. The pulsing rays of the lighthouse--one, two, three--are part of a pattern that supports the temporal divisions in the text. The darkening window, the weather holding tomorrow's promise (and lack of promise), the disintegration and decay of a house that is correlative to the disintegration of the family, the eventual trip itself, Lily's act of painting

culminating in success, and the effects of time on the family all facilitate a discussion of 'When?' questions of awareness of prolepses and analepses. As part of the entire complex held together metonymically by the central image, Mrs. Ramsay, they support and accentuate the linearity and temporality of the narrative and thereby encourage the reader to draw parallels between the fictional world and the empirical one. However, without wishing to minimize the importance of chronological succession in terms of syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationships, I suggest that this focus becomes significant primarily when the text deviates from the expected. Even in texts that encourage questions of frequency and duration which address ellipses, descriptive pauses, and summaries as well as unique or repetitive forms, a focus on the relationship between textual elements seems much more productive. For texts that do *not* foreground a definite thread of action, such a focus is all the more important.

Images not only order the relationship between the narrative and the empirical world, they also establish order among the various constructs within the narrative. In To the Lighthouse, the images that qualify Mrs. Ramsay as the central character include those attached to other proper names.[9] Thinking of the image pattern within a text as consisting of concentric circles will perhaps clarify the notion that one may speak not only of patterns within a pattern, but that the image pattern accreting to any one proper name is specific to that name. Each pattern existing in both time and space serves to order the reader's perception of the text. Not event, but character, provides the structural framework whereby intratextual order may be determined.

A passage from To the Lighthouse demonstrates how images produce order within the text. This section is from "The Window" (quite a random selection; others would have served as well). The label Rimmon-Kenan would give this passage is "pause" which she defines as the place in the narrative "where some segment of the text corresponds to zero story duration" (53). I would argue that a text has no pause--unless one considers pauses to be chapter endings or any other actual breaks within the physical artifact. Because an act of perception is necessary for 'even' description, and because description is not random but has a definite paradigmatic relationship to the entire narrative, the term 'pause' is misleading. This passage is an internal event. James, after cutting pictures out of a catalogue and listening to the story "The Fisherman and his Wife," is carried off to bed. Mrs. Ramsay is sitting by the window, knitting:

> 1. Not as oneself did one find rest ever, in her experience 2. (she accomplished here something dexterous with her needles) but as 3. a wedge of darkness. 4. Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir; and 5. there rose to her lips always some exclamation of triumph over life 6. when things came together in this peace, this rest, this eternity; and pausing there she looked out 7. to meet that stroke of the Lighthouse, the long steady stroke, the last of the three, which was her stroke, for watching them in this mood always at this hour one could not help 8. attaching oneself to one thing especially of the things one saw; and this thing, the long steady stroke, was her stroke. (96-97)

This short passage is a representative sample of Woolf's manipulation of images. Many strands converge; in this single passage can be traced the concentric circles of various character patterns. The pattern known as 'Mr. Ramsay' can be discovered in the sections designated one and four. Mr. Ramsay's frustrations with his inability to reach the letter 'R' (for Ramsay? for reality?) in his study of the nature of reality (53-55); his need for "sympathy" that is described as the "beak of brass, the arid scimitar . . . which smote mercilessly, again and again, demanding sympathy" (59); and his demand of Lily that culminates in the scene wherein his boots figure as the dominant image (223-31)--all these converge in the statements, "Not as oneself did one find rest ever" and "losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir" (96). Moreover, these statements--by logical inference--serve as commentary on Mr. Ramsay.

Another character pattern evident in these same two statements is that connected with Lily. Lily cannot complete her painting until she "loses personality" and thereby the "fret" that has prevented her from reaching her goal. Section three contains an image that is repeated in Lily's painting: the "wedge-like purple shape." The "triangular purple shape" that represents Mrs. Ramsay in Lily's painting (81) becomes part of Lily's vision as "an odd-shaped triangular shadow" (299). Not until after Lily and Mr. Ramsay have reached the "blessed island of good boots" (230) does Lily experience her epiphany.

Finally, the passage alludes to several of the dominant images that directly qualify Mrs. Ramsay as the primary substance within the narrative. One of these is the image of Mrs. Ramsay knitting, an image one first

encounters on page eleven,[10] but which is repeated here as well as at various other times throughout the narrative (e.g. 178). This image is quite directly related to Mrs. Ramsay thinking of herself as "woven" into the fabric of life--even in death (170). The image of time in section six thus merges with that of knitting because Mrs. Ramsay, despite her death, becomes part of the present in "The Lighthouse." Largely responsible for our recognition of the past as part of the present in that 'chapter' is the image contained in the sections designated seven and eight.

This brief exercise demonstrates that for narratives that do not foreground external action, a discussion of order should not be limited to establishing relationships between narrative *events* and *events* in the empirical world. Focus on order can also reveal relationships of character to character, and character to event.

The third aspect of order one might trace in To the Lighthouse is the manner in which images modify the inherent linearity of the text and the sequentiality of its reading. Rimmon-Kenan implies the importance of images in an endnote commenting on what she calls the "irreversibility of text-time." This "irreversibility" is "toned down" by two factors:

> (a) the fact of writing and hence the possibility of *re*-reading; (b) the existence of quasi-spatial patterns which establish supra-linear links, e.g. analogy. (137)

When one recalls, however, that "text-time" is already a construct that has a "'pseudo' nature" (45), any claim of irreversibility (even one followed by a partial disclaimer) seems somewhat over-stated.

As one of the moderns, Virginia Woolf was highly attentive to time and to the contemporary philosophical debates about it.[11] A discussion of order in relation to text as literary artifact is highly revelatory of her perception of 'reality'--a perception that forms the paradigmatic structure of the narrative. Woolf circumvented, at least to a degree, the emphasis on linearity and sequentiality with images of recurrence that point to circularity rather than linearity. This notion is confirmed by Perry Meisel's suggestion that Woolf's "reflexive realism" allows for a reading of To the Lighthouse starting with part III rather than with part I (Myth 184-92). Woolf exploits both temporal and spatial order with images--an exploitation that recognizes the past as part of the present, and the present as modifying the past.

Images of recurrence in To the Lighthouse seem to be repeatedly foregrounded: the pulsing light, for instance--Mrs. Ramsay "looked at the steady light, the pitiless, the remorseless, which was so much her, yet so little her" (99). Recurrence is also evident in the rise and fall of the fountain image (33-34, 58), as well as in the long progression of domestic images ordering the events of the day. These images stand in contrast to those connected with Mr. Ramsay which underscore temporal progression, particularly the already noted temporal linearity of his thought (from A to Z). To that one can add other memorable images such as his reading pattern which is described as "tossing the pages over" (176) and finishing the chapter feeling he "had been arguing with somebody, and had got the better of him" (180). Temporality is juxtaposed with recurrence in the entire section entitled "Time Passes." Yet the images foregrounding temporality are muted with spatial order when one considers the

text in its entirety. Consequently, the over-all effect is one of recurrence and timelessness.

The balance of temporal with spatial order is particularly noticable in the images associated with Mrs. Ramsay. While the comparison of her emotions with eddies (125) functions primarily in a spatial manner, in general, the images associated with Mrs. Ramsay seem to feature temporal order as much as spatial order. As they do in the "Time Passes" part where time is evident primarily by images depicting its effect on space, often the two orders converge within the same image we have learned to connect with Mrs. Ramsay, such as that of Mrs. Ramsay knitting. Just as often, however, one is juxtaposed with the other. For instance, in direct contrast to the linearity of the lighthouse beam associated with Mrs. Ramsay is a description of her reading:

> And she opened the book and began reading here and there at random, and as she did so she felt that she was climbing backwards, upwards, shoving her way up under petals that curved over her, so that she only knew this is white, or this is red. She did not know at first what the words meant at all.
>
> Steer, hither steer your winged pines, all beaten
>
> Mariners
>
> she read and turned the page, swinging herself, zigzagging this way and that . . . . (179)

This image implies progression, but that progression is not an orderly one; moreover, words, for Mrs. Ramsay, seem to generate meaning more in the spatial realm than in the temporal one.

A reading of temporal/spatial images can be augmented exponentially by noting the reverberations set into motion by juxtaposed images. For example, we are told that "the whole of the effort of merging and flowing and creating rested on her" (126). A part of Mrs. Ramsay's creativity lies in her ability to procreate. Although one would usually think of the concern for procreation as an emphasis on progression, the weaving image attributed to Mrs. Ramsay in this context again melds the spatial with the temporal: children are of great significance to Mrs. Ramsay because "however long they lived she would be woven" (170). This merging of time and space seems to give a wholeness to Mrs. Ramsay that Mr. Ramsay lacks. To the Lighthouse constantly accents his lack by repeatedly drawing attention to Mr. Ramsay's dependence on his wife. Mr. Ramsay's needs range from the seemingly superficial (such as the success of the dinner-party) to the profound: he needs her for sympathy, for making his barrenness fertile, for "all the rooms of the house [to be] made full of life" (59). These temporal and spatial images all contribute to the 'wholeness' theme of which the character Mrs. Ramsay is the linguistic manifestation.

It is not at all surprising in this context that Mrs. Ramsay meets Mr. Ramsay's need (as well as that of others) more completely in death than in life: she is, in fact, "woven." This is evident in the last section of the text. Though she has been dead for years, her memory brings the family and their guests back and restores life (at least temporarily) to the house. Her memory

motivates people to action that can be viewed as helping to organize life on the temporal and linear plane: Mr. Ramsay proposes and insists on a trip to the lighthouse--even though it has been ten years since Mrs. Ramsay had promised it to James. Her memory also allows Lily Briscoe to transcend her hostility and to complete her painting. A closer look reveals the 'timelessness' of both the pilgrimage and the painting. Just as the memory of Mrs. Ramsay allows Lily to reach her desire for unity (79), for shape in the midst of chaos (241), for "balance between two opposite forces" (287), so the trip to the lighthouse becomes a negation of time--it becomes the trip promised for the next day; despite Cam's and James's initial resistance, they are satisfied (301, 306-08). Balance and wholeness are attained in the merging of the temporal with the spatial.

Another image strand that contributes to the wholeness of the interlocking web Woolf weaves in time is distance and the change in perspective it creates. In fact, this image strand is one of the most important ones in this novel. To the Lighthouse points out that "waves shape themselves symmetrically from the cliff top, but to the swimmer among them [they] are divided by steep gulfs, and foaming crests" (235). While these waves are presented here spatially, they are, of course, also a powerful temporal image. Distance is an image that serves to underscore the merging of temporal with spatial ordering since distance may be spatial as is implied in the comparison of the view from the cliff top with that in the sea, or it may be temporal as is the distance created by death. The need for distance with its resulting change in perspective is foregrounded especially in the last part of the text as Cam

watches the island grow smaller and smaller until it finally is not more than a leaf "stood on end" (280, 284). So much depends on distance, especially in human aspirations and relationships. Only with the temporal distance death forces on humans, can Mrs. Ramsay help Lily achieve her vision. Woolf juxtaposes the immediate with the distant in both space and time so skillfully that this reader feels she, herself, has been both the swimmer amidst the waves and the gazer from the cliff top in a timeless, epiphanical instant.

The attempt to trace the image strands in the completed web requires at least "fifty pairs of eyes to see with" (294). Mrs. Ramsay, for example, not only exists in Lily's picture as a triangular purple shape (81), but thinks of herself as "a wedge-shaped core of darkness" (95). The leaf image is used to describe the island as Cam looks back, but it is also connected with both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay (177).[12] The ticking of a watch ("one, two, three, one, two, three") is compared to a human pulse; this comparison brings to mind the pulsating light of the lighthouse (126), its third stroke being associated with Mrs. Ramsay. This intricate interplay (of which but a few examples have been given) tantalizes but often leaves no more than a flash of something--some understanding suggesting that which eludes paraphrase.[13] Yet, the overall pattern allows one to perceive the novel from not only a spatially ordered horizontal and vertical perspective but also from a temporal one that moves into the atemporal. The lens that an awareness of Woolf's agenda provides permits one to focus on her melding the temporal with the spatial dimensions through images to create order with recurrence and circularity rather than with linearity.

This circularity contributes to what Perry Meisel calls "reflexive realism." Meisel explains in "Imitation Modernism" that the "aesthetic of obfuscation," so obvious in Joyce's Ulysses, Eliot's Waste Land, and Pound's Cantos which are "thick with learning and dense in surface texture" is not "paradigmatic to all literary experience" (86). He expands upon this point in The Myth of the Modern when he posits that

> the will to modernity that we commonly equate with the structure of modernism as a whole is largely a defensive response to the increasingly intolerable burden of coming late in a tradition. (2)

Modernism, "a calculated, if often unconscious, strategy of artists and institutions" (4) is, according to Meisel, a response to the debate between Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater. Arnold's is a search for origins, for a recovery of "original voice." It is founded upon

> the notion of an origin before the birth of custom in both life and poetry, and the notion of originality in the present that would allow the latecomer the freshness and directness denied him by the determinations of culture and its prefiguring of identity. (41)

Meisel explains that while Pater's musical metaphor in The Renaissance (see "The School of Giorgione") echoes his wish for Arnold's "original expression" to be a possibility, he criticizes this ideal in his other work. Quoting from Pater's Marius the Epicurean, Meisel claims that Pater sees Arnold's quest as impossible; that Pater is convinced that

> there can be no such thing as pure or original signification, since signification as such emerges only differentially--by the contrast

> and comparison of one thing with another, and, in the process, the production of each thing in turn. (56)

Meisel connects Joyce's, Eliot's, and Pound's density in surface structure, their aesthetic of difficulty, with their search for (and disillusionment with) originality.

The role the Bloomsbury group plays in this debate is that of mediation, Meisel claims. Virginia Woolf, as part of the Bloomsbury group, developed a "deliberate form of prose that silently identifies the story it tells with the way it tells it" (Myth 161). This merging of "form" with "content," Meisel claims, is most perfectly developed in To the Lighthouse (Myth 7-8). The hypothesis of a paradigmatic structure revealed in the syntagmatic structure by image, the linguistic product, questions even the possibility of separating form from content, to be sure. Nevertheless, Meisel's recognition of a narration that "silently identifies the story" is suggestive. Although Meisel does not define "story" directly, he talks of the Bloomsbury "notion that the world it represents is itself a tissue of representations in the first place"; Bloomsbury strategy

> lies in the development of a prose that catalogues and interrogates the guiding and unconscious ideological systems embedded in common speech through the resources of a literary language. . . . This Bloomsbury accomplishes technically by joining a language of Joycean "scholarship" with a language of traditional representation, thereby identifying by means of its reflexive realism the structures of the world it represents with the structures that represent it. (Myth 162)

The "language of Joycean 'scholarship,'" according to Meisel, is a "garrulous intertextuality in which representation itself runs riot in a ceaseless recoil or reflexivity that eventually unhinges it" (Myth 161). Bloomsbury avoids this aesthetic of obfuscation by combining "literary language" with "traditional representation."

Meisel's discussion of *reflexive* realism (i.e. that which represents the world not as a representation of empirical reality, but as a system of representations) in Walter Pater, Matthew Arnold, Thomas Hardy, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, Lytton Strachey, etc. hinges on identifying and explicating literary images within specific texts. The "metalinguistic inclinations" he ascribes to both Woolf and Pater in The Absent Father are a result of artistic concerns with the "languages of sense and perception" and simultaneous critical concerns with the "languages of art and literature" (43-44). Woolf's "figures or, really, metalanguages . . . suggest [in Mrs. Dalloway] a vision of life as a pattern of connections" (Father 176).

Meisel's work is particularly helpful in demonstrating the integral position images hold within Woolf's narration, as well as their potential for reflexivity. It enables one to take the discussion of order begun with To the Lighthouse one step further to demonstrate that the relationship of the narrative to empirical reality, the relationship of elements within the text to each other, and the relationship of images to the spatial and temporal dimensions of the text as artifact all have an ultimate connection to the paradigmatic structure. While Meisel confines tracing the "pattern of connections" in Mrs. Dalloway to establishing the notion of "the common life"

(Father 171-83), I shall explore this connection by examining specifically the order within the text as it is related to its paradigm by focus on the tension between stasis and flux suggested by images that meld the spatial with the temporal dimension.[14]

Mrs. Dalloway foregrounds the chronological time setting of one day through the clock motif.[15] Big Ben, the clocks in Harley Street, the "Commercial" clock--all give a "sense of proportion" (89) to the novel. They measure out the day--if not the narrative--into even segments, one following the other, with which readers are able to orient themselves. This practical aspect of temporality, however, is overshadowed by the moral implications of "proportion." In the visual arts, the laws of proportion specify that which is considered 'pleasing.' Showing how proportion has permeated every-day life (from the clocks of London to the Dr. Bradshaws of the world), Woolf utilizes the duality of this image to stress the damaging effects of expectations of uniformity when she attributes to the order of proportion a moral imperative.

The conflict between the temporality of the clocks and Mrs. Dalloway's objective "to combine" and "to create" (109) with her party is foregrounded when the clocks are assigned human motives in their apparent desire to circumvent Clarissa's reminder to Peter. Clarissa calls after Peter, "'My party! Remember my party tonight.'" But the clocks prevent her voice from ringing clear. With the "sound of all the clocks striking," in fact, it is almost lost. It sounds "frail and thin and very far away" (44). This seemingly whimsical reading is validated when we are reminded that human beings have given clocks the power to exert authority over them: Clarissa is watching her

neighbour when she hears Big Ben strike the half hour. And as she watches, she sees her neighbour

> move away from the window, as if she were attached to that sound, that string. Gigantic as it was, it had something to do with her. Down, down, into the midst of ordinary things the finger fell, making the moment solemn. She was forced, so Clarissa imagined, by that sound, to move, to go. . . . (113).

The image of the clocks imposing action on the old woman suggests that an emphasis on temporal order is not necessarily beneficial. While this type of order may effect harmony, that effect is not inevitable; it may also prove mechanical, tyrannous, and stifling. One can infer that, by permitting temporality to regulate human action, by allowing objects to exercise power, humanity has diminished itself. The doctors of Harley Street and their patients--in fact, all of English society--are controlled by their clocks as much as is the old woman:

> Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the clocks of Harley Street nibbled at the June day, counselled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of proportion . . . (91)

While the world of Mrs. Dalloway presents a society that, in its need to convert chaos into harmony, worships the order represented by Big Ben and by Sir William Bradshaw of Harley Street, whose goddess is "proportion," Woolf, who guides the reader in this world passes judgment on it as she explains satirically that

> worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade child-birth, penalized despair, made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion. (89)

Sir William's sense of order is rooted in the same order that is symbolized by Big Ben; for instance, he allows each patient precisely three-quarters of an hour. Rezia Smith intuitively knows that Sir William has failed her and Septimus (88), that her husband must be protected from him as well as from Dr. Holmes (132). And Septimus's suicide is, at least in part, an attempt to escape their power (130). He is betrayed by his doctors just as he has been betrayed by all of society in its insistence on "proportion" as a moral 'order'--an order that seems to make its disciples powerful.

Mrs. Dalloway is partially about power and coercion--both individual and corporate--and, as we have seen, Septimus Smith is not the only one in conflict with the order of proportion. Some, such as Lady Bradshaw, have capitulated. Yet that capitulation has as surely effected her destruction as Septimus's rebellion effects his. Even willing discipleship, however, is damaging. As one considers the world of Mrs. Dalloway, it seems that most characters met throughout the day desire power over others and are blind to the destructive effects of that power. Sir William Bradshaw, the most obvious example, appears to have lost his humanity. But others, too, have been diminished as they try to impose their perception of "proportion" on others. One of these is Miss Kilman, who attempts to manipulate Elizabeth and thereby to triumph

over Clarissa (114-19). Peter Walsh admits to himself that "all this pother of coming to England and seeing lawyers wasn't to marry her, but to prevent her from marrying anybody else" (72). Even the seemingly innocuous Hugh Whitbread proudly ruminates that

> he had been afloat on the cream of English society for fifty-five years. He had known Prime Ministers. . . . One or two humble reforms stood to his credit . . . servant girls had reason to be grateful to him; and his name at the end of letters to The Times . . . commanded respect. (92)

The destructiveness of 'imperialism' in private life is demonstrated in public life as British imperialism raises its head repeatedly, particularly in the effect it has had on Septimus Smith. Their authority upheld by the clocks of Harley Street (91), both individuals and society in general seem to oppose Clarissa's objectives for her party.

Yet in the world of Mrs. Dalloway, temporality, though important, is never allowed to succeed in its divisiveness. Though Big Ben *et al* are able to impose conceptualized time on London life periodically, the "leaden circles" they give birth to "dissolved in the air" (6). Juxtaposed with the clock motif, for instance, is the old woman Peter sees in the vicinity of Regent's Park Tube Station. "Like a funnel, like a rusty pump, like a wind-beaten tree for ever barren of leaves," the ancient crone is, as Shirley Neuman points out, "explicitly associated with Death." Yet "if she is Death, she is also Life" (Neuman 67), for she is singing "the old bubbling burbling song, soaking through the knotted roots of infinite ages, and skeletons and treasure . . .

fertilising, leaving a damp stain" (73-74). Against her, the leaden circles of temporality have no effect, for she has been doing this "through all ages" (73) and "would still be there in ten million years" (74). All time--even all experience, past as well as future and Life as well as Death--is gathered up into a single moment with this image with the result that it stands outside of time, unable to be affected by Big Ben.

Another image pattern, that connected with water, is also juxtaposed with the clock motif. Woolf adapts the water image to life in the city of London. She uses it, for example, as a metaphor to describe Mrs. Dalloway's delight on the morning of her party. Her outing is a "plunge"; the air is "like the flap of a wave" (5). Professor Brierly is called a "queer fish" (156), and Clarissa, in a "silver-green mermaid's dress" is "lolloping on the waves . . . a creature floating in its element" (154). The numerous water images, although developed much more in Woolf's next novel, The Waves, foreground the convergence of the temporal with the spatial, as does the party itself. Mrs. Dalloway's party, which Clarissa envisions as her attempt "to kindle and illuminate" life (7), is her sacrifice, her "offering; to combine; to create" (109). And it does succeed. The epiphanic quality of these images suggests that they serve in the same manner as the old woman at the Regent's Park Tube Station. By gathering up time, they stand outside of time. These configurations of time and timelessness amplify Clarissa's goal to combine, to eliminate divisions.

Clarissa's victory is foreshadowed already in the minor skirmishes between the clocks announcing the present and the bubbles of experience that regularly ignore the "leaden circles." For example, Clarissa's and also Peter's

minds take us repeatedly into the past at Bourton (5)[16]--a past that is as much present as past. We are asked to enter the past and present experience of Miss Kilman (110-11, 117), of Millicent Bruton's youth superimposed on the present by a dream (99-100), of Daisy's future as conceptualized by Peter (140), of Clarissa's failings with Richard (29-30), of Septimus's war experience, his courting of Rezia, and his madness.

However, the novel does not completely resolve the conflict between temporality and spatiality. Septimus, eventually driven to suicide, has no conceptualized time, no past, no present, no future. Time for him is poised on the "whip" the world has raised (15). He lives in a world that has no divisions. He thinks of "leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his own body" (21-22), of a sparrow chirping in Greek (23), of a dog turning into a man (61-62), and of red flowers growing through his flesh (62). Woolf suggests that this lack of division is terrifying, that it is the result of madness. One seems to need divisions of time and, as these images imply, of space to organize and focus experience. That unordered experience, such as Septimus's perception of Rezia's conversation, is chaos, is suggested by comparing it to the sparks of a rocket. Her words are described as being

> robbed of colour, blank of windows, they exist more ponderously, give out what the frank daylight fails to transmit--the trouble and suspense of things conglomerated there in the darkness; huddled together in the darkness; reft of the relief which dawn brings when, washing the walls white and grey . . . all is once more decked out to the eye; exists again. (23)

Balancing the linear with the simultaneous, the "moments of being" with those of "non-being," the fluid with the static, amounts to ordering and classifying, to shaping experience. So the apparent emphasis on spatial ordering is misleading. Even Clarissa's party, dedicated to "combining" and "creating," must exist through the divisions of conceptualized time. Temporality may be compared to the dawn that brings relief, that makes things exist--as it does in The Waves. This need for temporality is amplified with another image in the novel: Peter sees in Clarissa "a thread of life" which he admires for its "toughness, endurance, power to overcome obstacles and carry her triumphant through" (138, compare Peter's dream of death 51-53). The image of the thread of life is linear in its allusion to the Three Fates who spin, measure, and cut the time of life allotted to each person. As long as the thread is not cut, one is "woven," as Mrs. Ramsay would say. But the temporality of this image stands juxtaposed to the very allusion itself to the Three Fates who exist in a timeless dimension. On the one hand, the function of strings and threads is a condition of human mortality. As long as they connect, provide a sequencing, a linearity, life is possible. Septimus, having lost that connection, that thread,[17] must choose suicide--he seems to have no alternative. On the other hand, a slavish attention and obedience to conceptualized time, to "proportion," results in a life of what Woolf in another context calls moments of "non-being" (Moments 81).

The supporting paradigmatic framework stands revealed: conceptualized time ought not be allowed to dominate life as does Big Ben, "whose stroke was wafted over the northern part of London" (84) with "overpowering directness" (105). Woolf juxtaposes Big Ben with the little clock

> which always struck two minutes after Big Ben, [and which] came shuffling in with its lap full of odds and ends, which it dumped down as if Big Ben were all very well with his majesty laying down the law, so solemn, so just, but she must remember all sorts of little things besides . . . all sorts of little things [that] came flooding and lapping and dancing in on the wake of that solemn stroke which lay flat like a bar of gold on the sea. (114)

The implication of the juxtaposition is strong: perhaps greater harmony would result from having conceptualized time represented by the St. Margarets, the ones busy with life's lapfulls; perhaps people, and life in general, cannot be dealt with by "Acts of Parliament" (6); perhaps the solution to the problem of "here was one room; there another" (114) would never be offered by the Big Bens that shred and slice, divide and subdivide (91).

The novel ends in a series of epiphanies: Clarissa's as she gazes at the woman opposite, Richard's as he voices his love for Elizabeth, and Peter's as he exclaims, "There she was" (172). These epiphanies are the culmination of the issues introduced with the first sentence of the novel: "Mrs Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself" (5), issues that focus, as we have seen, on the results of societal and personal conflicts generated by a "Big Ben" type of mentality. That these epiphanies are possible in the atmosphere of Mrs. Dalloway's party--a party that, while striving to combine, must exist in time--seems to give credence to the conclusion that one's vision must be informed by linear progression as well as spatial stasis; though at war, they are both necessary to life.

As Perry Meisel has already demonstrated, Virginia Woolf's prose "catalogues and interrogates the guiding and unconscious ideological system" (Myth 162) embedded in her culture. Accepting this means accepting the hypothesis that the syntagmatic structure of the text can be traced to the paradigmatic structure engendering it. In To the Lighthouse, we have seen that the relations between images and the empirical world establish temporal and spatial order. We have also seen that relations of images within the aspect of narration establish order by qualifying the primacy of one image pattern over another. Our brief study of images in Mrs. Dalloway demonstrates the relationship of images to their underlying paradigmatic structure. Images implying temporal and spatial qualities establish points of reference that have relations to the empirical world, and thus confer qualities that may be ordered not only by time and space, but also by primacy, causality, and cause and effect.

This is evident in The Waves even more than in Mrs. Dalloway. On the level of narration, images in the interpolations quite obviously provide the structural framework. The archetypal image of the sun about to rise, rising, slowly moving through its accustomed arc, and then setting is a correlative of the linear movement of the characters from childhood into adulthood. Both sun and sea dominate the short italicized interpolations which are the primary means by which one may orient oneself in the world of The Waves through the course of the day/life. The images Virginia Woolf chooses for this novel are not unusual--both the sun and the sea have been freighted with symbolic meaning in Western literature. In The Waves, however, the symbolic values

traditionally attached to sun and sea are questioned by the images themselves. In both of these functions (i.e. structural and reflexive), the images in The Waves clearly demonstrate their potential.

The interludes, then, provide a structure for temporal orientation in that the sun image gives a diachronic ordering to the text. The movement of the sun allows Woolf to provide a type of linearity for the novel--a convention with which readers are comfortable because it is familiar. Even the scene the sun illuminates is conventional. The descriptions of the water--dull greyness transformed to sparkle--of the trees and the house, of the birds' activity, seem to indicate a close relationship between the world we encounter in The Waves and the world with which we are familiar. Because they are 'mimetic,' they permit readers to orient themselves in conceptualized time.[18]

Yet the imagistic 'framework' of the interpolations is amazingly unstable, despite its apparent rigidity. One reason is that the sun's temporal movement through the heavens is juxtaposed with the sea--the other dominant image in the italicized interpolations. While one would expect the sun to establish primarily a temporal order, the sea image ought to emphasize mainly a spatial order. Interestingly enough, however, at the same time that Woolf gives us these separate images, she encourages us to think of them converging. The title, it is true, suggests dominance of the wave image, but because the sun illuminates, the waves may be perceived only as the sun comes into contact with them. Although Woolf does merge these images into each other, we are able to conceptualize each image as separate; this is probably outside the world of The Waves. We have, after all, learned to perceive sun and sea as two

separate entities--a perception strengthened in the novel with the conventional descriptions I have already pointed out. Yet, discussing the relationship that the sun and the sea have to each other and to the world created in The Waves becomes difficult. The difficulty in separating the two seems odd. But when we notice how closely Woolf has interwoven these two dominant images with related image patterns, the instability of the linguistic signifier to the signified is quite readily explained, as a brief examination can establish.

A comparison of the italicized interpolations leaves the impression that the scene is always changing. This diachronic change, however, is superficial only. True, the sun "began to bring out circles and lines" (50) and "gave to everything its exact measure of colour" (99). But the sun which appears to rise out of the sea (5) at the beginning, sinks at the end so that "sky and sea were [again] indistinguishable" (159). The cycle just noted may be traced in other images as well. Woolf introduces images, allows them to metamorphose, and then has them revert to their original form. One example is the fan image. This image is applied to both sun and sea: the sun "rested like the tip of a fan" (5-6), the waves "swept a quick fan over the beach" (19), and again "raced fan-shaped over the beach" (49). This same fan image is transmogrified into "sharp-edged wedges of light" (101) that become "daggers of light" (112). As time continues, the daggers are transformed into "a single darting spear of sunshine" (141). Finally the fan image is reintroduced: "The waves breaking spread their white fans far out over the shore" (159). The fan image is only one of many that function in this manner; another example is that of the "turbaned warriors" to which the waves are compared. The "muffled thuds, like logs

falling" (20), become "turbaned warriors, like turbaned men with poisoned assegais who, whirling their arms on high, advance upon the feeding flocks, the white sheep" (51). Both the log and warrior images are fused in the next description of the waves: "They fell with a regular thud. They fell with the concussion of horses' hooves on the turf. Their spray rose like the tossing of lances and assegais over the riders' heads" (72-73). Then Woolf drops the warrior image but picks up on the horse image:

> The waves were steeped deep-blue save for a pattern of diamond-pointed light on their backs which rippled as the backs of great horses ripple with muscles as they move. The waves fell; withdrew and fell again, like the thud of a great beast stamping. (101)

Suddenly, Woolf superimposes the warrior image indirectly onto the sun: the waves become "arrow-struck with fiery feathered darts that shot erratically across the quivering blue." The horse image, however, is continued: "The waves massed themselves, curved their backs and crashed. . . . They swept round the rocks, and the spray, leaping high, spattered the walls . . . " (111-12). The final impression of the waves that we are left with is the same as the one at the beginning--a sigh (5, 159). Change occurs. Significantly, however, that change occurs only on the surface; the convergence of temporality with spatiality establishes an archetypal cyclic pattern--one that occurs over and over again. Because all time--past, present, and future--is represented in this pattern, it is 'timeless.'

These complex image patterns effect a counterpoint that achieves its full significance only in the realization that the sun and the sea, while two separate entities, are unmistakably fused in this text--a fusion that combines the temporal with the spatial form. Woolf begins her narrative with the sentence, "The sun had not yet risen" but moves immediately to the sea and implies that sea and sky seem one before the sky lightens the horizon sufficiently to divide the two. So strongly does this implication reverberate with the opening statement of Genesis 1, that the move from timelessness to time and back again is anticipated by anyone familiar with Scripture. This anticipation is strengthened by Woolf's allusion to the presence of--if not the Spirit of God--some consciousness, some controlling mind. The sea is described as "slightly creased as if a cloth had wrinkles in it," suggesting a garment cast off, or even a bed covering--an image that meshes with the personification of a wave, "sighing like a sleeper." The human element, rather than some mythical spiritual one, is emphasized when the sun is compared to a lamp held by a woman's arm, rising from "beneath the horizon"--a horizon formed by the sea. As the arm raises this lamp higher and higher, "a broad flame became visible; an arc of fire burnt on the rim of the horizon, and all round it the sea blazed gold" (5).

The close relationship between sea and sun and both to some central consciousness is emphasized by the images with which Woolf constantly connects them, especially with implied or stated personification. The sea, as noted, is wrinkled like a garment (5)--later we find the cloth image applied to

shadows and thus indirectly to light, to the sun (122)--the waves sigh, they are compared to plumed horsemen. Woolf tells us,

> The sun sharpened the walls of the house, and rested like the tip of a fan upon a white blind and made a blue finger-print of shadow under the leaf by the bedroom window. (5-6)

The personification of "sharpened" is compounded by the image of the "blue finger-print of shadow." The conscious entity is stressed not only with similes and personification, but again and again it is introduced on the human level both implicitly (in the houses, windows, and curtains, for example) and explicitly (in the girl [49]) into the descriptions of sun and sea. Even the birds assume human characteristics which are echoed by the speakers in this novel. But the final description of the seascape is one of gathering darkness rather than the eternal light of a New Jerusalem. Words such as "fell," "silent," "dark," "empty," "melted," and "pale" do not substantiate expectations encouraged by the resonances with Biblical imagery. This world does not take on substance; rather,

> the substance had gone from the solidity. . . .
>
> As if there were waves of darkness in the air, darkness moved on, covering houses, hills, trees, as waves of water wash round the sides of some sunken ship. Darkness washed down streets, eddying round single figures, engulfing them; blotting out couples clasped under the showery darkness of elm trees in full summer foliage. Darkness rolled its waves . . . and met the fretted and abraded pinnacles of the mountain where the snow

> lodges for ever on the hard rock even when the valleys are full of running streams and yellow vine leaves, and girls, sitting on verandahs, look up at the snow, shading their faces with their fans. Them, too, darkness covered. (160)

The opening description of the world in The Waves echoes the description of the earth before creation, but the last description of that world echoes the story of the flood (Genesis 6-8) rather than that of a new heaven and a new earth. The symbolic meaning of these archetypal images is constructed and at the same time undermined by the very images themselves. They suggest a recurrence, a circularity, moving from timelessness to time and back again to timelessness into the spatial dimension, but that movement is not part of a mythical and cosmic 'reality.' Rather, the human factor is a constitutive and essential ingredient. The implication is that both stability and flux are pointless without human perception.

While the movement of the sun allows readers to orient themselves in conceptualized time, the sea is unchangeable *and* ever changing. Its waves break "with muffled thuds" (20) on the shore, but the sea itself remains in a state of stasis. Human perception of it gives it life. It changes in the light. Rather than symbolizing the kind of comprehensive apprehension that transcends time, the fusion of the sea with the conventional symbol of time, the sun, seems to suggest that even the sea is subject to time--that it, in fact, could represent time as well. But it cannot represent conceptualized (or linear) time since in the world of The Waves it has neither beginning nor end--not even an ebb and flow. As experienced time, though, the image is apt. What could

better represent this flow than waves washing back and forth, the form of one becoming the substance of another? Moreover, the merging of the sun with the sea points to a complexity of image that resists the separation of conceptualized time from experiential time, of diachronic order from synchronic order, of the temporal from the spatial.

Woolf's success in The Waves lies as much in the interpolations as in the episodes, even though most of the critical attention accorded this novel focuses on the episodes. The interpolations demonstrate that Woolf does not "undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 227); on the contrary, she exploits it by transcending the relationship of linguistic signifiers to their signifieds through an instability achieved through patterns that merge the temporal with the spatial dimensions of images. This instability on the syntagmatic level has its roots in the paradigmatic structure. While it is possible to partially separate the two dominant images of the interpolations as I have done here, the one cannot 'exist' without the other--and neither can exist without human perception. Through both sun and sea, archetypal images and their culturally determined symbolic meanings are questioned by a system of reference and notation which serves to infer that 'reality,' whether fictional or empirical, is elusive. We, like Susan, "gape . . . like a young bird, unsatisfied, for something that has escaped" (157)--something that will continue to escape because the cycle of merging and diverging progresses with such finesse that any separation of images as attempted here for purposes of analysis will never be totally successful in answering all questions.

Woolf's images are effective because they defy an either/or dichotomy. Woolf shapes and structures her narrative so that the referents of images transcend the temporal boundaries usually associated with literary texts. Images prompt the reader to experience not only the product of literature, but also its process, which, as Woolf puts it, is on the "far side of language."[19] Because images have the potential to evoke emotional, sensual, and intuitive responses, Woolf explains (Essays I:9), intellectual apprehension can follow so that images may stimulate the "flight of the mind." This potential is realized only by a multiple focus on the relationship of the text to the empirical world, on that of images within the text, and on that which exists between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic structures. And that multiple focus requires reading a text within its frame.

Chapter IV

The Focalizing Image in Between the Acts

> What a pity there aren't accents to convey tone of voice ~ and so on, to mean I'm laughing, I'm ironical, I'm glum as the grave.
> (Virginia Woolf, Letters IV: 225-26)

'Story' defined as that which is perceived to be implies a subject as well as an object: some*one* perceives some*thing*. Within the text, this someone can be a character. For instance, Rhoda's perception of herself is that she has "no face" (Waves 150); Orlando's perception is that "nothing is any longer one thing" (Orlando 190); Clarissa Dalloway's perception is that it appeared as though "the whole panoply of content were nothing but self love" (Dalloway 13). The recognition that these characters are technically images within the aspect of narration does not deny their capabilities (by analogy) to perceive and to communicate that perception since both the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic structures of images are grounded in an empirical reality.[1] The resulting relationships are, therefore, available for analysis and classification. However, when the perceiving subject is *not* a character, the issue becomes more complex. For instance, who 'tells' Orlando's story? And from what space comes the narrating 'voice' of Between the Acts?

The relationship between the narrator and his or her narrative has drawn increasing attention in contemporary poetics. Douglas Messerli comments:

> If there is any one formal concern that can be said to characterize most modern fiction, it is the emphasis authors and critics have put on the relationship between the narrator and his narrative, on the role of voice. Even the rubric under which this issue generally is discussed, "point of view," predicates a differentiation between the voice of the creator and his creations.[2] (281)

Seymour Chatman charts his understanding of the semiotic process from the initial act of perception by the writer to the final act of perception by the reader as follows:

Real author ⇢ *Implied author* ⟶ *(Narrator)* ⟶ *(Narratee)* ⟶ *Implied Reader* ⇢ *Real Reader*

Like Wayne C. Booth, Chatman places the real author and the real reader outside the narrative transaction inscribed in the text. However, where Booth's 'implied author' appears to be an anthropomorphic entity,[3] Chatman's appears to have no definitively human property. For one thing, it is voiceless. Chatman writes:

> He is not the narrator, but rather the principle that invented the narrator, along with everything else in the narrative . . . Unlike the narrator, the implied author can *tell* us nothing. He, or better, *it* has no voice, no direct means of communicating. (148)

Rather than living and speaking through the text (Booth 71), Chatman's implied author is an "it." Yet Chatman attributes choice as well as instruction

to that textual entity (148). Moreover, Chatman explains that within the text, communication moves from the implied (voiceless) author to the implied reader--sometimes directly, sometimes through the mediation of a narrator and/or a narratee which may be either present or absent. Narrator and narratee are optional, as the parentheses indicate. Chatman's implied author which "instructs us silently, through the design of the whole, with all the voices, by all the means it has chosen to let us learn" (87) presents at least two difficulties. First, it demands that one accept the notion of a non-narrated text because if the implied author is voiceless, and if the narrator is optional, then the text that has no narrator is not narrated. As Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan points out, however: "Any utterance or record of an utterance presupposes someone who has uttered it" (88). A 'non-narrated narrative' seems to be a contradiction in terms. Second, Chatman's notion of the implied author requires an acceptance of a *directing* subject other than the real author and is thereby still reducible to anthropomorphic representation. Rimmon-Kenan writes:

> My claim is that if it is to be consistently distinguished from the real author and the narrator, the notion of the implied author must be de-personified, and is best considered as a *set of implicit norms* rather than as a speaker or a voice (i.e. a subject). It follows, therefore, that the implied author cannot literally be a participant in the narrative communication situation. (88, emphasis supplied)

The first modification she suggests to Chatman's scheme is to eliminate both the implied author and reader from the model of communication. The second is to remove the parentheses from narrator and narratee; that is, to include both "as constitutive, not just optional, factors in narrative communication" (88). Rimmon-Kenan defines the narrator "minimally, as the agent which at the very least narrates or engages in some activity serving the needs of narration" and the narratee as "the agent which is at the very least implicitly addressed by the narrator" (88-89). Although Rimmon-Kenan does not diagram her model of the communication situation, it can be set up as follows:

Real author ⇢ *Narrator* ⟶ *Narratee* ⇢ *Real Reader*

She limits the narrative transaction proper to the narrator and narratee. Rimmon-Kenan explains that although her conception of narration includes the real author and reader, "the empirical process of communication between author and reader is less relevant to the poetics of narrative fiction than its counterpart in the text" (89).

Rimmon-Kenan discusses this counterpart in the text primarily with the help of Gérard Genette's classifications. Her system is one of analyses and classifications of the narrative levels and the relationships among the narrators and their narrations. The various accounts of events are arranged in a hierarchical structure. This arrangement accounts for texts that embed one series of events within others. For instance, Geoffrey Chaucer's The Canterbury Tales is a collection of narratives by various narrators. These

narratives represent the 'norm' or the main level (Genette's term is "diegetic level"). The narration that provides the 'frame' for "The Pardoner's Tale" and "The Miller's Tale," etc., represents the level 'above' the diegetic, i.e. the "extradiegetic level." On this level is the host's introduction of the different speakers.

Like events, narrators, too, can be diegetic--or, more properly speaking, intradiegetic. This term refers to the narrator who is also a character "in the first narrative told by the extradiegetic narrator" (94). An extradiegetic narrator is on a level 'above' the diegetic; a hypodiegetic narrator is on a level 'below' the diegetic. The narrator who participates in the events he or she is recounting is "homodiegetic"; one who does not participate in the events is "heterodiegetic" (Genette 245, Rimmon-Kenan 95). The Pardoner is therefore an intra-homodiegetic narrator, and the host is an extra-homodiegetic one. Rimmon-Kenan argues that the adult Pip who recounts the events that happened to young Pip in Charles Dickens' Great Expectations is an extra-homodiegetic narrator because "he tells a story in which a younger version of himself participated" (96). On the other hand, "the extradiegetic narrators of Tom Jones, Père Goriot, and Sons and Lovers are in no sense participants in the stories they narrate (hence they are both extradiegetic and heterodiegetic)" (95). For Rimmon-Kenan, while the degree of perceptibility of the narrator's role depends on his or her covertness or overtness, the *space* from whence a voice speaks is always located *within the text*, though not necessarily within the story the narrator narrates. The higher the level of narration, the greater its authority.

While Rimmon-Kenan's schema appears to address both character and non-character narrators as textual factors by virtue of their relationship to story and narration, the implications of a non-character narrator are troubling. A speaking subject interior to the text but exterior to its main events is still participating in a story; it is still a character. A disembodied smile is curious even in Alice's wonderland; a disembodied voice is more than curious in contemporary poetics. Genette's systematic approach, after which Rimmon-Kenan's is to a large degree modelled, does not define the "récit première" or first narrative.[4] Can one really claim that the space from which Virginia Woolf's narrator of Orlando's story is speaking is *text*? The same question can be asked of numerous other narrators such as the one in Vanity Fair. These 'extra-heterodiegetic' narrators are not only actively engaged, but engaging as well. The act of telling becomes a tale in itself as the narrator/biographer in Orlando relates her perception of various topics including time (61), truth (120, 161), and biography in general. This narrator is clearly not a participant in the story she narrates, but she *is* a participant in her own story--the story that frames the text.

Rimmon-Kenan's suggestion that the implied author be considered as other than speaker or voice (88) seems necessary for the 'non-character narrator' as well. Just as the implied author "cannot literally be a participant in the narrative communication situation" (88), so the 'narrator' at the extradiegetic level, or at the top of the hierarchical structure, cannot be a subject within that narrative communication situation either if it is confined to text. 'Voice' can be attributed to a character by analogy, but not to a non-

character. Yet Ferdinand de Saussure's position that writing is simply transcribed speech is evident in our most basic critical terms such as 'narration,' 'narrator,' and 'voice.' While no one would deny that these are conventions, that the 'voices'--whether of character or non-character narrators in a text--are written rather than oral, a systematic approach to literature seems to demand that one deny the active role of the writer in the narrative transaction proper. And so we 'objectify,' we disembody--we speak of the 'narrative voice' in Orlando rather than of Virginia Woolf's rhetorical stance and leave the origin of that 'voice' masked. We seem to pretend that a literary text, unlike any other communication, does not require a context.

The hypothesis that 'voice' is a textual construct to be confined to character narrators is suggested by John N. McDowell in an unpublished dissertation. His postulation of the term 'accent' replaces what has been discussed here as the implied author's voice (Booth), the extra-heterodiegetic narrator's voice (Genette, Rimmon-Kenan), or simply the narrative voice. McDowell explains his choice of 'accent':

> Accent allows for a greater choice as to whether or not one chooses to postulate a human subject created by language. With the term *voice*, the problem is not only that a human subject (the anthropomorphic problem) is postulated but that it is a *necessary* postulation . . . Where it is appropriate to discuss a character speaking in a text, accent allows in its range of meanings for such a discussion. The reference in the Oxford English Dictionary

> states that the word means to "pronounce," to "utter," to "lay the vocal stress upon." It thus affirms the idea of orality.
>
> At the same time accent also suggests the characteristics of writing because it also means "to mark" and to mark "emphatically or distinctly." The word contains within it the kind of double value that is needed to be both faithful to the act of grammar and what we make that language mean when talking about what takes place in the construction of meanings in narrative. (82-83)

Because 'accent' affirms both orality *and* writing, it seems more useful than 'voice' in discussing the various perceptions embodied within the text. It unmasks characters as linguistic constructs to which both writers and readers attribute 'voices' by analogy in the same manner that they also attribute all the physical characteristics necessary to the production of those voices. Furthermore, it unmasks the producer of the accent as the writer in the sense that it emphasizes the writer's choices which are embedded in the language of the text. These choices are discernible on the syntagmatic level in much the same manner as are those which have been classified under the rubric of 'style.' Because 'style' has been traditionally confined to a writer's choices, 'accent' has the advantage of a double valence.[5] It highlights the interaction of the paradigmatic with the syntagmatic level, as well as their relationships to an empirical reality.

Therefore, when a writer marks an image emphatically or distinctly, or 'accents' it, that image becomes a 'lens' within the text. It directs the focus.

'Focalization' is an extremely useful term introduced by Genette and taken up by Rimmon-Kenan. It differentiates the *seeing* subject from the *speaking* subject. A focalizer is the subject that sees; a narrator is the subject that speaks. While the same subject may do both, these classifications permit a discussion of the separation when appropriate. Genette's system of hierarchies among narratives and narrators and his division of the speaking subject from the seeing subject are helpful in establishing the varying degrees of authority among the narrators within a given text for the reader to determine meaning. And Rimmon-Kenan's extension of focalization into perceptual, psychological, and ideological facets is also important since "cognitive, emotive and ideological orientation" (Rimmon-Kenan 71) influences all acts of perception. However, the term is limiting in its *requirement* of (fictional) human subjects to 'see' and to 'speak.' I propose to extend the potential of 'focalization' to all images--not just character. While an image (unless it is character) cannot be said to 'see,' to be sure, it *can* be a 'lens' for the writer as well as for the reader. That is, it can attract and direct the focus; it can be a 'focalizing' agent.

In all of Virginia Woolf's fiction, perhaps the most appropriate novel with which to demonstrate this function of the image is Between the Acts because it frustrates one's expectation of narrative levels. While Miss La Trobe's pageant may appear to be the hypodiegetic narrative embedded in the diegetic narrative of life at Pointz Hall, that conclusion is called into question by the title Between the Acts. The title destabilizes expected relationships. Its announcement that the text is 'about' gaps is unsettling. What are the acts framing those gaps? And why are the gaps so much more significant than the

acts, or are they? Who are the participants in the acts? And when is the frame ever more important than that which it frames? All these call into question a hierarchical ordering of narrative levels. Nor does the text postulate a central human subject created by language. In fact, the dialectic within this novel appears to question the very possibility of a centred subject.[6] While Virginia Woolf does populate this world with characters, 'character' is conspicuously absent. That is, no single image is qualified by the language in this novel to be the central controlling substance--not even the noun 'Isa.' Meaning is difficult to fix. True, Woolf attributes much to this character: a figure that is "thick of waist, large of limb" (16), children, a husband, a father named Sir Richard (16), an aptitude for writing poetry, even a "heavily embossed silver hairbrush that . . . had its uses in impressing chambermaids in hotels" (13). The list could continue. Moreover, throughout the novel Woolf attributes numerous speech acts (or, more properly speaking, thought acts) to this character we know as Isa. Yet she cannot be 'known' in the sense that, for example, Jacob is known--despite the fact that Isa's 'voice' is heard much more often in Between the Acts than Jacob's 'voice' is heard in Jacob's Room.

Perhaps one reason for this lack of fixed knowledge is that the 'room' Woolf gives Isa is not Isa's in the sense that Jacob's 'room' is his.[7] Isa's own room in Pointz Hall appears to consist of a wash stand, a dressing table, a mirror and a window (13-16). The narrative gives more details about the rest of the house, but Pointz Hall itself does not 'belong' to any one of the other characters either--it does not reflect any one character's personality. If it does 'belong' to *anyone*, it belongs to "the Warings, the Elveys, the Mannerings or

the Burnets; the old families who had all intermarried, and lay in their deaths intertwisted, like the ivy roots, beneath the churchyard wall" (7)--not to the Olivers "who had bought the place [only] something over a century ago" (7), and certainly not to Isa, who had married into the Oliver family. Even Lucy and Bart, born and raised in this house, appear to belong to the house rather than the house to them; they act as guides for strangers. For instance, readers are told that

> the Master (his drawing-room name; in the kitchen they called him Bartie) would bring gentlemen sometimes to see the larder--often when cook wasn't dressed. Not to see the hams that hung from hooks, or the butter on a blue slate, or the joint for tomorrow's dinner, but to see the cellar that opened out of the larder and its carved arch. If you tapped--one gentleman had a hammer--there was a hollow sound; a reverberation; undoubtedly, he said, a concealed passage where once somebody had hid. (32)

In the kitchen, the "Master" becomes "Bartie," and the hidden passages in the house have more significance than do the provisions for the family. When Lucy shows William Dodge the house, she knocks before entering a bedroom:

> "One never knows," she murmured, "if there's somebody there." Then she flung open the door.
>
> He half expected to see somebody there, naked, or half dressed, or knelt in prayer. But the room was empty. The room was tidy as [a] pin, not slept in for months, a spare room.

> Candles stood on the dressing-table. The counterpane was straight. Mrs. Swithin stopped by the bed.
>
> "Here," she said, "yes, here," she tapped the counterpane, "I was born. In this bed."
>
> Her voice died away. She sank down on the edge of the bed. She was tired, no doubt, by the stairs, by the heat.
>
> "But we have other lives, I think, I hope," she murmured. "We live in others, Mr. . . . We live in things." (69-70)

Again, people seem to belong to the house, to flesh out *its* personality. But even this is not a stable, lasting relationship. Mirrors reflect characters--but only partially, only momentarily (13-14, 71). And as the mirror image disappears and leaves no trace when the object it reflects is removed, so the characters who inhabit this house seem to leave no lasting impression on Pointz Hall. The counterpane is straight--no trace of the birth struggle that had once taken place remains.

Another reason for the lack of 'fixed knowledge' may be that in Between the Acts Woolf creates characters that exist in their own bubbles of experience with little connection between one another. Unlike Betty Flanders, Sandra Wentworth Williams, Bonamy, Fanny, Clara Durrant, or even Captain Barfoot (to mention only a few of the numerous characters that populate the world of Jacob's Room) who all have "for centre, for magnet" the young man Jacob (92); Isa, Bart, Lucy, Giles, William, George, Mrs. Manresa, Miss La Trobe and others do not serve to amplify other fictional beings in the world we find in the gap that is Between the Acts. For example, one does not 'know' Isa better for

'knowing' even Mrs. Swithin, the 'one-maker.' Lucy's "one-making" takes her away, "off . . . on a circular tour of the imagination" (175); it does not take her *into* the world of Between the Acts. It is, therefore, limited in its power to affect anyone but herself. While her "cross gleaming gold upon her breast" comforts her (10; see also 215), her vision of unity may be transferred to another only through the medium of illusion--the mirror (73). She, however, is unaware of the mirror's significance, and her lack of awareness limits her effectiveness. Her vision is a "private vision" (205), a spiritual vision, having only a tenuous connection with the perceived reality of Pointz Hall. The limitations of Lucy's vision extend not only to others, but even to herself. She is unable to connect that "unacted part" of her 'self' with the acted part--to do that, she would have to descend from her "one-making" to engage in the "battle in the mud" (203). Woolf leaves it to Miss La Trobe's art to twitch "the invisible strings" (153), to create a sense of community--albeit out of fragments. No fictional human being in this world helps the reader to 'know' any other one, only art does.[8]

Until Miss La Trobe reveals the fragmented 'selves' named Isa, Bart, Giles, and Mr. Umphelby in the cracked mirrors, tin cans, old jars--"anything that's bright enough to reflect, presumably, ourselves"--it seems as though death has been the only unifying force. When the players hold up their reflectors, however,

> out they leapt, jerked, skipped. Flashing, dazzling, dancing, jumping. Now old Bart ... he was caught. Now Manresa. Here a nose ... There a skirt ... Then trousers only ... Now perhaps a

> face. ... Ourselves? But that's cruel. To snap us as we are, before we've had time to assume ... And only, too, in parts. ... That's what's so distorting and upsetting and utterly unfair. (184)

Detached yet combined in the reflectors, the characters briefly become a meld. But never does the 'knowledge' of one aid in the 'knowledge' of another; never does one become the focal point that the others qualify.

The conclusion that no central character exists in this novel is unavoidable. Two questions come to mind when one considers this absence of character: first, If the language of the novel is not focussed by a single image, then how does Woolf create the obvious unity? and second, What does Woolf accomplish with her lack of a central character?

The first question can be answered quite readily. For illustrative purposes, let us think of Woolf's technique as holding up a curved mirror.[9] Whereas in earlier novels (such as in Jacob's Room) Woolf has exposed the concave side to focus all images so that one central image could come into being, in Between the Acts, she has turned the concave mirror around so that a convex surface scatters the 'light.' At the same time, however, she has contained that dispersal within the boundaries implied in the title image. The result can be demonstrated by briefly tracing the accent on the fish image--an image that clearly focalizes by virtue of repetition.

This image first appears when Isa abruptly turns from her mirror to order fish for dinner. In the depths of the mirror, she had "groped . . . for a word to fit the infinitely quick vibrations of the aeroplane propeller" which she associates with her feelings for Rupert Haines (15). Inexplicably, her mind

shifts from the image of the plane to that of fish for dinner. The paradox is cleared up, however, with the explanation more than thirty pages later that

> they [Isa and Giles] had met first in Scotland, fishing--she from one rock, he from another. Her line had got tangled; she had given over, and had watched him with the stream rushing between his legs, casting, casting--until, like a thick ingot of silver bent in the middle, the salmon had leapt, had been caught, and she had loved him. (48)

The association Isa makes (unconsciously, it would seem) between Rupert Haines and Giles, her husband, appears to indicate a convergence toward a focus. However, Woolf avoids this connection. The reader has encountered the fish image repeatedly in contexts that imply divergence rather than convergence: first one finds the fish image in the context of lunch when Isa tells Bart that she has ordered fish because "veal is dear, and everybody in the house is sick of beef and mutton" (18), then in the context of a childhood fishing expedition involving Lucy and Bart when "he had made her take the fish off the hook herself. The blood had shocked her--'Oh!' she had cried--for the gills were full of blood" (21), and finally in the context of lunch again (28). The first instance connects the fish for lunch with mutton--the significance of which becomes clearer later with the information that the pool by the house "had been dredged and a thigh bone recovered. Alas, it was a sheep's, not a lady's. And sheep have no ghosts, for sheep have no souls. But, the servants insisted, they must have a ghost" (44).

The second context in which the fish image is encountered is in Lucy and Bart's fishing experience which reverberates with that of Isa and Giles's expedition. The blood so shocking to Lucy at that time also reverberates with the blood on Giles's shoes after he had killed the snake and the toad (99) by stamping on the "monstrous inversion" (which echoes his reaction to Dodge as a "toady" [60] and Dodge's own opinion of himself as a "snake in the grass" [73]). Mrs. Manresa, too, is drawn in with her thought of Giles as her hero when she notices his blood-stained shoes: "Vaguely some sense that he had proved his valour for her admiration flattered her. If vague it was sweet" (107). The implications of the fish image associated with Isa, Giles, Bart, Lucy, Haines, Dodge and Mrs. Manresa assume even greater significance with the addition of the lily pool where Lucy meets first with Bart and then with Dodge after the play. The lunch *of* fish turns into lunch *for* fish when Lucy resolves to go to the house for a biscuit to feed them (206). This rather humorous inversion is not at all trivial, though, for Lucy's resolution is formed as she sees the fish (including the "great carp himself" [205]) coming to the surface from the mud underneath the water--mud that Woolf first associates with the "human heart" (203, 206) and then with the primeval as Miss La Trobe drowses in the tavern:

> Words of one syllable sank down into the mud. She drowsed; she nodded. The mud became fertile. Words rose above the intolerably laden dumb oxen plodding through the mud. Words without meaning--wonderful words" (212).

As Woolf implicates Miss La Trobe with the fish and the mud in the lily pool, all of which reverberate with blood (Miss La Trobe's reaction to what she

perceives as failure comes here to mind: "Blood seemed to pour from her shoes" [*80]), the net is drawn tighter and tighter around what Woolf calls by various names: the "unseizable force" (Jacob's 152), the "spirit we live by, life itself" ("Character," McNeillie's Essays III:436), the revelation in a "moment of being" ("Sketch").

The third context bounces the image of fish for lunch off Lucy Swithin's reading her Outline of History when Isa asks "whether, coming from a distance, it would be fresh" (28) and the discussion moves to how far from the sea the house is.

> "Once there was no sea," said Mrs. Swithin. "No sea at all between us and the continent. I was reading that in a book this morning. There were rhododendrons in the Strand; and mammoths in Piccadilly [*sic*]." (29-30, cf.8)

As the conversation eddies, other images interact with this one until finally Mrs. Swithin stops to summarize:

> "How did we begin this talk?" She counted on her fingers. "The Pharaohs. Dentists. Fish . . . Oh yes, you were saying, Isa, you'd ordered fish; and you were afraid it wouldn't be fresh. And I said, 'That's the problem . . . .'" (31)

These images--rhododendrons and mammoths, savages (a prominent image associated with dentists) and fish--reverberate with the primeval image of mud and all the other images we have learned to associate with it.

Tracing this one image 'pattern' that consists of so many fragments and noting how the identity of each image remains intact even as it functions as

part of a whole, requires the reminder that what Woolf does here, she multiplies many-fold with other images. Every one of the major images in the novel reverberates with and bounces off the images in the scene at the lily pond (202-207). Yet there is no merging of images to qualify any one character as the "primary substance" as there is in Jacob's Room, To the Lighthouse, or Mrs. Dalloway.

A central character need not be a fictional human being, of course. Since primacy is a "matter of degree" (Gass 50), an object will do as well. But the images in this novel do not come together to qualify even an object as the primary image by which one might rank others to determine meaning. Isa's luncheon fish, for instance, does not converge with the fish in the lily pool nor with the fish caught in Scotland. Nor does Pointz Hall qualify. Originally used by Woolf as the title for this novel, Pointz Hall is prominent, but it is not more so than Isa. The images in Between the Acts form a collage; they do not merge as do those in The Waves.[10]

A collage demands not only that objects composing it work together by complementing each other. It also demands that those images work together in a given space. One might suppose that such an observation is belaboring the obvious. After all, do not all texts define the space in which images work? Yet in Between the Acts Woolf overtly draws the reader's attention to the fact that that space reaches *beyond* the written text. The frame for this novel is emphatically marked by the title image which is alluded to at the end as well. Somewhat like Jacob, this image is an absent presence. But unlike Jacob, who is very much a part of the aspect of narration, the image of the gap has very

little textual presence. Because the impending war outside the novel bounds the gap that is the world created in Between the Acts, this image becomes the lens that provides a double focus. Directed at the syntagmatic structure of the text, it gives unity to images that are distinctly detached one from the other. Concurrently, it directs the reader's attention to the historical reality just prior to World War II. With this focalizing image, Virginia Woolf creates a unity in midst of dispersal. To return to the original illustration, Woolf turns the mirror around so that its convex surface scatters the images at the same time that the title image contains them and, if you will, causes them to bounce off one another.

The title image sets up a dialectic that can best be illustrated in miniature with the butterfly image (17). The earliest extant draft, written May 11, 1938, and entitled "Scene 5" reads:

> The yellow blind, rising and falling in the wind, merely produced on the backs of the books a toss of light, then of shadow; the fire greyed, then glowed; and the tortoiseshell butterfly, beating on the lower pane, might beat itself to death, for, in default of human life, what help, what comment, what action was there? In ten years, left to themselves, the books would be mouldy; the butterfly dead; and the fire out. (Pointz Hall 52)

The butterfly image might be easily overlooked in this draft despite the question it gives rise to: "In default of human life, what help, what comments, what action was there?"

For the alert reader, however, the narrative accent on the butterfly image is multiple. It is part of a dialectic between the need for boundaries and the desire for the absence of boundaries. It questions Lucy Swithin's "one-making" in a way that neither the servant's ridicule in calling her "Batty" (9) and "Old Flimsy" (27), nor Bart's teasing and criticism do. On the one hand, Lucy is immersed in a past that has become her present. That past consists of swamps and swallows, mammoths and rhododendrons. Lucy's vision is reinforced by images that break down the boundaries with which society has separated the past from the present and the future. Isa, for instance, is a "diminutive mammoth" (174). The observation that "had Figgis been there in person and called a roll call, half the ladies and gentlemen present would have said: '*Adsum*; I'm here, in place of my grandfather or great-grandfather'" (75), as well as the descriptions of the barn (99) and of the teacup (60), to mention only a few, seem to suggest that the past, present, and future coexist. On the other hand, the vision foregrounded by this melding of history with pre-history, of the human with the non-human, and of the past with the present and future is questioned by the images communicating Isa and Giles's relationship. By analogy, the domestic quarrel is extended first, to World War II and second, to the entr'actes between moments of civilization. (Conversely, the entr'actes can also be read as the moments between the 'play' of war since the novel opens and closes with a marital quarrel.) The dialectic between Lucy's vision of one-making and the forces opposing it is contained in the butterfly image--although it is much clearer in Between the Acts than in the typescript considered above.

That clarity is achieved by a stylistically re-structured syntax. The novel reads:

> The light but variable breeze, foretold by the weather expert, flapped the yellow curtains, tossing light, then shadow. The fire greyed, then glowed, and the tortoiseshell butterfly beat on the lower pane of the window; beat, beat, beat; repeating that if no human being ever came, never, never, never, the books would be mouldy, the fire out and the tortoiseshell butterfly dead on the pane. (17)

To begin with, the introduction of the weather expert into the revision reinstates the human element missing in the library. The revision still vibrates with the series of three, but that vibration is increased with the almost onomatopoeic "beat, beat, beat." But most significantly, the emphasis to which the syntax contributes is now on the image of the butterfly; first, the rhythm, second, the repetitions, and third, the end focus draw attention to this image. We might also note that the more discursive, "In default of human life, what help, what comment, what action was there?" is changed to the poetic "if no human being ever came, never, never, never . . . " The image of the trapped butterfly, needing human aid for release, contributes to the dialectic between concurrent image patterns--the human and the non-human, civilization and anarchy, unity and dispersal--which flow toward each other. The butterfly image prefigures the "orts, scraps and fragments" (188) dominating the text which must be brought together (albeit briefly) with art, with words bubbling out of a pre-historic, fertile mud to effect a new beginning (212). Without

human presence, books will moulder, fires will go out, and the struggles of the non-human world for existence will lack meaning.

Virginia Woolf achieves unity within the text not through the usual central character (be it person-like or object-like). Nor does she encourage readers to establish a system of hierarchies by noting various levels of narrative. Instead, she provides a focalizing title image as a frame that directs one's attention to both the syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures of the text.

That brings me to my second question, What has Woolf accomplished by *not* using a primary character within the text to focus the work, by creating unity with the reverberation of images within the boundaries of the title image? A 23 November 1940 diary entry suggests that Woolf believed her accomplishment to be worth celebrating. She wrote, "I am a little triumphant about the book. I think it's an interesting attempt at a new method." One critic who has addressed this "new method" of Between the Acts in some detail is James Naremore. He lauds the book as a "successful experiment which contains some of Mrs. Woolf's best writing." Although he perceives a "somewhat disjointed quality," he feels that this is "characteristic of modernist classics" (220). What he finds remarkable and explores at some length is the "effect of neatness" (222) that has been accomplished despite the 'fragmentation' by the rhythm Woolf creates with the syntax (222-23), with the "peppering of fragmentary quotations" (224), with the combination of "everything, inside and out, in this person and that" (225), and with "conversation [that] has doubled back upon itself" (228). Naremore compares

Woolf's artistry to La Trobe's theatrical which "merges people, brings the fragments together and makes them 'all one stream'" (229).[11]

I, too, believe this text to embody a successful experiment. However, I believe that its success can be attributed primarily to the manner with which Woolf "brings the fragments together and makes them 'all one stream'" *despite* her deletion of the centred subject which normally provides unity.

Traditionally, a subject is centered by a consciousness of self, of being 'separate' and human. It is also centred by its relationship to time and space. And finally, it is centred by its social role. Between the Acts is an able demonstration that the necessity of the centred subject in fiction is a myth. As I have shown, Virginia Woolf deletes the central character, yet achieves cohesion from which meaning evolves by accenting specific images (such as the fish image). The accented focalizing title image denies the myths that depict the individual as a 'whole,' master of self and nature, as 'belonging' in marriage to her partner, as 'belonging' to society that celebrates its myth of continuity with its own version of history based upon 'significant events.'[12] The validity of this reading of the title image is affirmed by the recognition that the narration questions even the possibility of the centred subject in denying the autonomy of the self: language creates characters. For instance, Isa's repetition of the phrase "Giles, the father of my children" endows him with 'substance' for Isa as well as for the reader.

The world that Virginia Woolf creates in Between the Acts does not revolve around the success and/or failures of 'significant' human endeavors. P. H. Fussell notes that

> unlike Joyce and Eliot, she [Woolf] eschews the mythic and portentious for the common and domestic within a narrowly prescribed social scene. Accustomed to the scale and grandeur of Joyce's Ulysses or Eliot's Waste Land, readers are apt to overlook Woolf's tough-mindedness because her scale is so small and her setting so ordinary, but she does in little what they do at large. (265)

Woolf establishes her "narrowly prescribed social scene" in the opening pages of Between the Acts with the accents she places on seemingly trivial images. The novel opens on neighbors discussing the new cesspool. We are told that the site chosen for it is on the Roman road, but that is all we find out about the main agenda item. The meeting disintegrates into apparent trivia--a coughing cow, a chuckling bird, childhood memories--all take precedence. And this first 'event' sets the pattern for all others. Although the day supposedly revolves around the pageant, the preparations and even the pageant itself do not take centre stage. Lucy's book, Isa's fish dinner, the view from Pointz Hall, the lily pond, the nursemaids taking the children for a walk--all "fall upon the mind" in similarly random fashion to trace, as Virginia Woolf explains in her essay "Modern Fiction," "the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness" (Reader I:150). This fictional world of non-events finds its parallel in Miss La Trobe's pageant, which supposedly enacts the history of England. But Miss La Trobe's type of 'history' requires an adaptation to the text without the aid of a guidebook outlining conventions. The audience has problems adapting. The

baffled Colonel Mayhew becomes its spokesperson when he demands, "'Why leave out the British Army? What's history without the Army, eh?'" (157). (And if his query strikes a sympathetic note in the reader, the question arises, Who is the audience?)

But, we are reminded, this is the world located in the gap *between* the acts, a world not restricted to human concerns. In fact, the *human* is apparently not even of primary importance, it is not elevated above nature. This world intertwines the ordered human environment with the "sub-human" and "sub-moral" (to use Northrop Frye's terms [131]). The actors in Miss La Trobe's pageant are cows and swallows, rain and wind, as much as Albert, the village idiot, Eliza Clark, Hilda, the carpenter's daughter, and Mrs. Otter of the End House. The images in the 'real' world in Between the Acts also conflate the human with the non-human. The opening passage of the novel compares Mrs. Haines to a goose "with eyes protruding as if they saw something to gobble in the gutter" (3); Isa "came in like a swan swimming its way" (4). When Bart quotes a line of poetry,

> Isa raised her head. The words made two rings, perfect rings, that floated them, herself and Haines, like two swans down stream. But his snow-white breast was circled with a tangle of dirty duckweed; and she too, in her webbed feet was entangled, by her husband the stockbroker. (5)

Mrs. Haines, "aware of the emotion circling them . . . would destroy it, as a thrush pecks the wings off a butterfly" (5-6). The conflation in this passage is given another dimension when animal noises such as a cow coughing and a

bird chuckling appear to release human speech (3). Again and again the "barriers which should divide Man the Master from the Brutes" (184) are dissolved. Mrs. Swithin is a canary (27), a swallow (116), and a "diminutive mammoth" (174). Mrs. Manresa is an owl (44), and Lady Haslip "resembled an uncouth, nocturnal animal" (93). Bart is a dog (218), and his Afghan hound his "familiar spirit" (116).

Also dissolved in this world are the barriers between past and present by which the centred subject is usually oriented. When Mrs. Swithin tells Bart and Isa of the book she is reading about "'rhododendrons in the Strand; and mammoths in Piccadilly [*sic*],'" Isa responds, "'When we were savages.'" But her next thought is of her dentist telling her that "savages could perform very skilful operations on the brain. Savages had false teeth, he said" (30). Lucy and Bartholomew remember butterfly catching by the lily pool, an activity which had taken place there "for generation after generation" (57). Lucy thinks of the time when "the Barn was a swamp" (103). And when she sees the swallows, she tells Mrs. Manresa, "'They come every year. . . the same birds,'" denying a progression of time (101-102, 108). She also muses, "'The Victorians . . . I don't believe . . . that there ever were such people. Only you and me and William dressed differently'" (174-75).

Although the merging of past and present is ostensibly attributed to Lucy, the "one-maker," other images take up the burden as well. For instance, anonymous voices in the audience add to this dissolution of established temporal boundaries. We hear questions and comments such as, "'D'you think people change?'" (120-21); and "'And what about the Jews? The refugees . . .

the Jews . . . People like ourselves, beginning life again . . . But it's always been the same'" (121); and "'They say there's been a garden here for five hundred years'" (151). Past is merged with present with the information that had Figgis, the author of an 1833 Guide Book, called a roll call at the pageant held in June of 1939,

> half the ladies and gentlemen present would have said: '*Adsum*; I'm here, in place of my grandfather or great-grandfather,' as the case might be. . . . Again, had Figgis called the names of the villagers, they too would have answered. (75)

Pointz Hall has not changed, either. The description in Figgis's 1833 Guide Book would not need to be changed in any revised edition: "1830 was true in 1939" (52). And the 1760 coffee cup is still in use in 1939 (60). This dissolution of temporal boundaries is also reflected in Miss La Trobe's pageant as, for instance, present-day villagers play the roles of peasants still performing their daily tasks of "digging and delving, ploughing and sowing" (124).

Another convention the focalizing images address with their role in the denial of the myth of a centred subject is that of social roles. The world of Pointz Hall attempts to fix its subjects by assigning them specific roles to which they are expected to adapt. For instance, while Between the Acts does not ignore the particular conventions surrounding marriage, it does question them by demonstrating Isa's resentment and unhappiness at its restrictions. Marriage in this world is not the 'and-then-they-lived-happily-ever-after' fairy-tale romance. It does not affirm the myth of the 'one-and-only love of one's life'

nor does it affirm the myth that marriages are made in heaven. Between the Acts questions the myth that proclaims families as separate little realms where Father is king and Mother the angel in the house.

The first introduction to Isa is "Isa, his son's wife" (4), and then she is formally referred to as "Mrs. Giles Oliver" (6, 13). But though she is Mrs. Giles Oliver, Bartholomew's daughter-in-law, and mother of two, we find she resents her role. She feels trapped. Marriage has "entangled" her (5), she feels "pegged down on a chair arm, like a captive balloon, by a myriad of hair-thin ties into domesticity." She "loathed the domestic, the possessive, the maternal" (18-19). The "leaden duty she owed to others" (67) is given form when she thinks of herself as the

> last little donkey in the long caravanserai crossing the desert. 'Kneel down,' said the past. 'Fill your pannier from our tree. Rise up, donkey. Go your way till your heels blister and your hoofs crack.'"
>
> . . . "That was the burden," she mused, laid on me in the cradle; murmured by waves; breathed by restless elm trees; crooned by singing women; what we must remember: what we would forget." (155)

The narrative accent implies that Isa's is the burden of all women. From birth women have been told to "kneel down." They have learned to read their assigned roles in nature. And so they will not be tempted to ignore the message, culture constantly provides reminders. Isa attempts to find release in her poetry. But her poetry, which voices her desire to "'lose what binds us

here'" (15), has to be written in an account book for fear of her husband who might suspect that she is not the person he thinks her (50). And Rupert Haines, her "inner love" (14) whose words while he handed her a teacup and a tennis racquet "lie between them like a wire, tingling, tangling, vibrating" (15), is "only a man in grey" (83; see also 103, 154, 208)--a shadow.

Torn between love and hate for Giles, Isa sees herself as "abortive" (15): she does not buy the clothes she wants, she does not look like the photographs she admires (15-16), she does not speak her thoughts. Her thoughts about '"the donkey who couldn't choose between hay and turnips and so starved'" (59) imply her own dilemma. She is "entangled by her husband, the stockbroker" (5)--the same man who, ironically, won her love when her fishing line had become tangled in Scotland. The reflexive role that images such as the starving donkey and the tangled fishing line play in clarifying and formulating Isa's feelings is obvious in this passage. Isa's "outer love" (14) needs to be sustained by words and even (though she fights against them) social roles. '"The father of my children,'" she thinks, and "felt pride; and affection; then pride again in herself, whom he had chosen" (48).

Giles, too, feels himself trapped by others' expectations in a life he does not want:

> Given his choice, he would have chosen to farm. But he was not given his choice. So one thing led to another; and the conglomeration of things pressed you flat; held you fast, like a fish in water. (47)

And so he is a stockbroker in the city, buying and selling (not only commodities but also his soul, the images suggest), and comes home for the week-end. He feels like an audience rather than an actor in his own home. Farmer Pinsent is an actor, and Giles thinks bitterly that "a fish on a line meant the same to him and Pinsent; also jays and magpies. Pinsent stayed on the land; Giles went to an office. That was all" (108).

Giles is trapped by his work; he is also trapped by convention. He is angry at what he considers to be petty social expectations, for "had he not read, in the morning paper, in the train, that sixteen men had been shot, others prisoned, just over there, across the gulf, in the flat land which divided them from the continent?" (46). Yet despite his anger, he conforms and changes his clothes. But his conformity only intensifies his anger at being a stranger in his own home. He feels "exiled from its festivities" (85, 96), "manacled to a rock . . . and forced passively to behold indescribable horror" (60). The allusion to Prometheus in this image not only invests Giles's 'voice' with a certain authority, it also extends his feelings of entrapment beyond this novel--it points to social myths of the world outside the gap.

Between the Acts demands attention to its frame. One cannot limit one's discussion to the accents of the 'voices' within the various levels of narration in the text since the frame strongly implies a relationship between the characters' acts of perception and their narration and Virginia Woolf's acts of perception and her narration. The title image announces Woolf's role as the extra-heterodiegetic narrator. Therefore, as Susan Lanser points out in establishing the structure of authority in narration, the "voices that the text

creates are subordinate" to what she calls the "extrafictional voice" (128).[13] She does not attribute that voice to the writer of the text, to be sure. But in Between the Acts, the highest textual authority is Virginia Woolf herself. One 'reads' her story (and also the narrator's of Orlando, among others) by combining the accents of interpretive voices that issue from fictional human beings (as well as those that issue from mechanical devices such as the megaphone and the gramaphone) with the accents created by other image patterns. Yet despite this somewhat hierarchal structure, one can still not expect fixed authoritative meaning inherent in the text. The reader must note how meaning is released in the process of reading by a system of reference and notation.[14]

The importance of recognizing the writer as producer of the linguistic accents embedded in the text and the text as written rather than 'narrated' is emphasized in Between the Acts by the lack of a centred subject in the position Rimmon-Kenan would identify as the highest level of narration. There is no "I" that observes and describes the silence in the dining room:

> Empty, empty, empty; silent, silent, silent. The room was a shell, singing of what was before time was; a vase stood in the heart of the house, alabaster, smooth, cold, holding the still, distilled essence of emptiness, silence. (36)

Obviously the terms 'narrator' and 'focalizer' describing a subject within the text are inaccurate here. Yet, despite the recognition that the paradigmatic structure of the text has its roots in the writer's act of perception, one can still talk of meanings established in the process of reading the text. The accents of

the image patterns support the conclusion that the text consists of a dialectic between the desire to efface boundaries and the need for them.

Effacement is accented by the absence of a central character and by the many images already traced that deny the myth of the essential centred subject. On the other hand, the need for this centred subject is stressed by images, such as the butterfly image already discussed, which point out that "if no human being ever came, never, never, never, the books would be mouldy, the fire out and the tortoiseshell butterfly dead on the pane" (17). There must be human beings; there must be voices; there must be society. The images connected with Mrs. Manresa's arrival accent these needs:

> Coming out from the library the voices stopped in the hall. They encountered an obstacle evidently; a rock. Utterly impossible was it, even in the heart of the country, to be alone? That was the shock. After that, the rock was raced round, embraced. If it was painful, it was essential. There must be society. (37)

At the same time that these needs are affirmed, however, they are also undercut. The passage continues:

> Coming out of the library it was painful, but pleasant, to run slap into Mrs. Manresa and an unknown young man with tow-coloured hair and a twisted face. No escape was possible; meeting was inevitable. Uninvited, unexpected, droppers-in, lured off the high road by the very same instinct that caused the sheep and the cows to desire propinquity, they had come. (37)

So the need for society is not purely human. It does not define 'humanness'; all creatures share this need. Not until the end is the dialectic between the desire for "one-making" and the need for "the human element" resolved. And then the resolution is not fixed. The image patterns that eventually 'resolve' the dialectic are those accenting Lucy Swithin's "one-making" and Miss La Trobe's attempts at "unity." Lucy's and Miss La Trobe's objectives, though they may appear identical on the surface, are diametrically opposed, as is evident in the images used to depict their individual visions.

Lucy's vision is one "of beauty which is goodness; *the sea on which we float*"; it is "mostly impervious, but surely every boat sometimes leaks?" (205, emphasis supplied). Miss La Trobe's vision, on the other hand, is unlike Lucy's; it does not allow her to float on the surface, "impervious" to the "battle in the mud." Like Lucy, she is able to share that vision momentarily with the illusion of mirrors. Unlike Lucy, however, Miss La Trobe recognizes that illusion as a necessary one. When her art failed, "panic seized her. Blood seemed to pour from her shoes. This is death, death, death . . . . Unable to lift her hand, she stood facing the audience" (180). Her vision is her life only when it is shared; without that shared vision, she has no life. If we can trust the mirrors even partially, Miss La Trobe's vision (as shaped by the pageant which renders the world of the novel) is *not* that we are part of the whole, but that even while we are detached, we need not be separated. The instinct to gather in groups may limit our freedoms (37, 65), but it is a need humans share with the non-human world (94-96).

At the same time that the world in Between the Acts respects Lucy's vision, it sees it as private, unable to affect anyone else because it is separated from "the battle in the mud." Lucy's "one-making" allows her to order her day, but she is imperceptive of 'life.' Bart muses, "The fumes of that incense [religion] obscured the human heart. Skimming the surface, Lucy ignores the battle in the mud" (203). Because her days are informed by her private vision, she has nothing to offer. This is accented by the incident at the lily pond. When the fish come to the surface, "she had nothing to give them--not a crumb of bread" (206). Miss La Trobe, on the other hand, does not skim the surface; her vision does not require "hours of kneeling in the early morning" (204). Instead, she needs "like that carp . . . darkness in the mud; a whisky and soda at the pub; and coarse words descending like maggots through the waters" (203). Only then can change occur: "The mud became fertile. Words rose above the intolerably laden dumb oxen plodding through the mud. Words without meaning--wonderful words" (212). Although the novel does not affirm the "one-making" of the Lucy Swithins, it does affirm the momentary unity created out of fragments by the Miss La Trobes. This interplay of images denies any 'absolute' reading because it emphasizes the multiplicity of 'life,' 'reality,' and 'truth.'

Virginia Woolf describes her work on Between the Acts as "*playing with words*" (Diary V:290, emphasis supplied). Another diary entry recorded Saturday, November 23 is also significant. Between the Acts is completed and she comments on the novel's 'purity': "I think it's more quintessential than the others," she writes (V:340). Why she believes it to be more quintessential is

difficult to ascertain. One clue, however, might reside in an entry she wrote a few days previously. She explains that she is

> carrying on, while I read [the 'queer little sand castles' that autobiographers build], the idea of women discovering, like the 19th century rationalists, agnostics, that *man is no longer God*. . . . It is essential to *remain outside; & realise my own beliefs*: or rather not to accept theirs. A line to think out. (Diary V:340, emphasis supplied)

Contemporary poetics has supplied the tools with which one can conjecture that the focalizing images in Between the Acts which do not "shut out," which do not become authoritative by defining a centre (Diary IV:127), possibly contribute to Woolf's triumph. Perhaps she discovered that "playing with words"--making the accent fall on the language--lets her "remain outside" to "realise [her] own beliefs" in the space that is the gap between the acts. Woolf's desire for "accents" to convey meaning (Letters IV: 225-26) draws attention to the fact that we have no ready-made system of signs to be superimposed on the linguistic elements of a text to convey what Charles Bally calls "expressivity." Such a system, if there were one, would admittedly make reading less challenging. It would communicate an objective, stable, fixed meaning.[15] Perhaps we do not have such as system because meanings can never be stable and fixed; they must always be dynamic--ever changing for both writer and reader. Between the Acts, read through a dialogue with contemporary poetics, demonstrates that while the accents which images give a

narrative text can never be reduced to a stable and fixed system, they do testify to the dynamic process of which they are the product.

Chapter V

Virginia Woolf's "Figure in the Carpet": The Voyage Out

> "It governs every line, it chooses every word, it dots every i, it places every comma."
>
> I scratched my head. "Is it something in the style or something in the thought? An element of form or an element of feeling?"
>
> (Henry James, "The Figure in the Carpet" 284)

Gérard Genette argues that a fictional 'narrative' "constantly implies a study of relationships" (27). His development of a system based on such a study privileges the fictional text. He explains that the events recorded in a *historical* text, such as Michelet's Histoire de France, can be analyzed in relation to those recorded in various other documents external to it. And anyone interested in the actual writing of this text has available resources supplying information on Michelet's life and work. These are also external (27-28). Because Genette confines himself to *fictional* texts, he takes the position that narrative content cannot be analyzed in relation to any other documents. Inherent relationships must be discovered within the text under consideration, making the text (in this sense) autonomous. Furthermore, Genette disallows any consideration of the life of the writer in textual analysis. Although he admits to the connection of a given fictional text to its author, he claims that

analysis of that relationship lacks rigor just as an attempt to analyze the writer's life by means of his or her text would lack rigor (28).

The intratextual relations Genette delineates are those between the text and its content, between the text and the act of narrating, and "(to the extent that they are inscribed in the narrative discourse)" between the content and the act of narration (29). Although Genette conflates story with content early in his discussion, I have used 'content' rather than 'story' in listing these relations because it seems significant that the relationships basic to Genette's system depend upon his definition of content as "the succession of events, real or fictitious, that are the subjects" of narrative discourse (25). To this "succession of events" he assigns the term "story" (27). Genette's position as outlined above provides the ground upon which Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan constructs her poetics. Like Genette, Rimmon-Kenan makes narrated events basic.

The 'modifications' to Rimmon-Kenan's model of contemporary poetics that I have suggested in my discussion of the role of images in Virginia Woolf's writing, therefore, seem to question the very assumptions upon which that model is erected. I have apparently emptied the category 'story' of "the narrated events and participants" (Rimmon-Kenan 6) when I redefined it as that which is perceived to be. I have also questioned the act of narration of the "récit première," suggesting that while one might (by analogy) think of characters as narrators able to see and speak, the text itself is not narrated. It is written.[1] Consequently, one might ask, What is left? If a study of relationships is necessary for textual analysis as Genette claims, then related

elements become essential to that analysis. The answer an analysis of Virginia Woolf's fiction suggests is that what is left is the text: the relations for analysis are those existing first, between the paradigmatic structure and the syntagmatic structure; second, between the paradigmatic structure and perceived reality; and third, between the syntagmatic structure and perceived reality. All of these relationships are embodied within Woolf's texts by images. Rather than emptying the category 'story,' I have invested it with Woolf's emphasis on 'life,' 'reality,' and 'truth.'

Analysis of the third set of relationships (i.e. between the syntagmatic structure and perceived reality) is served very well by Rimmon-Kenan's revisions and adaptations of Genette's system. Part of the textual contents of any fiction are its characters and their perceptions communicated either directly or indirectly. Readers can analyze both of these by relating them to their own perceived reality. The second set of relationships (i.e. between the paradigmatic structure and perceived reality) can be examined by ascertaining connections between the text and the writer. Admittedly, one needs extratextual documentation to establish these connections. Documentation of this nature is sometimes not available, and when available, it is often unreliable. Both unavailability and unreliability unquestionably contribute to a lack of rigor. But complete 'objectivity' in literary analysis is often attained at the price of considerable reductiveness. When Genette limits "signified or narrative content" (27) to a succession of events, he imposes severe limitations necessitated primarily by the attempt to develop a 'scientific' system. Moreover, the very insistence upon an objectivity that expects precise and exact

results implies an expectation of meaning that is precise and exact. I question the advisability of such an expectation. As much as one might wish it to be otherwise, a text is not a jigsaw puzzle that simply needs to be systematically assembled by readers who are rewarded for their painstaking labor with the 'truth' which they can then display over the mantlepiece.[2]

An analysis of the relations between the paradigmatic structure and perceived reality can take various forms. Of these, this study has addressed itself to Virginia Woolf's concern for the medium of fiction. It has explored the relationships between Woolf's statements regarding medium and her fiction. While one cannot assume that the comments Woolf makes in her essays, letters, and diaries are operative in her fiction, the evidence in the fictional text can be profitably related to these other documents and vice versa. Another form of the relationship between the paradigmatic structure and perception which this study has addressed is that which every thematic study on Woolf has demonstrated when it establishes the textual evidence of Woolf's perceptions.[3] However, one other form which this study has *not* addressed is the textual evidence of the relation between the paradigmatic structure and specifically direct influences on Woolf by contemporary writers, situations, and philosophies. It is indisputable that these influences not only exist but can be traced in Woolf's fiction. Virginia Woolf did not live in an ivory tower, much less in a vacuum.[4] Textual analysis, while it *begins* with the text, cannot be confined to the text.[5] The text itself has no inherent meaning; meaning is part of the process of writing and reading, and this process draws upon all sorts of prior experiences and perceptions.

The first set of relations, that between the syntagmatic structure and the paradigmatic structure, is perhaps the most difficult to establish because I take as its *a priori* assumption I. A. Richards' contention that word meanings are based upon the dynamic process of "sortings, recognitions, laws of response, [and] recurrences of like behaviors" (Philosophy 36) that evolve from the general to the specific.[6] The specific is, of course, the text. One can theorize about this dynamic process of which images are the literary product. But how does one go about tracing [illegible]nal text? One perhaps more 'objective' method than that of [illegible] notation used in previous chapters is the method used by a number of feminist critics. Louise DeSalvo and Jane Marcus, among others, have compared segments of Woolf's various drafts with published texts to establish relationships between textual evidence and Woolf's perception. This method appears promising for establishing paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations as well--particularly if the literary image is acknowledged as having reflexive properties. If an image, interacting with the syntagmatic structure, can be said to 'mirror' the process that shaped it and to question the paradigm generating it, then noting the compositional changes Woolf made should permit some conclusions regarding the paradigmatic structure.

Comparing part of the section Woolf entitled "The Terrace" in the earliest extant typescript available of Pointz Hall with the same section in the revised text (published as Between the Acts) suggests the paradigms underlying the syntagmatic structure. The basic images--except for two which I shall discuss later--are identical. Woolf revises the original with shifts from

active to passive voice to alert readers to the significance of what is to come, euphony and cacophony to orchestrate emotions, repetition to frame and underscore the images, and changes in supporting imagery to harmonize and clarify. The passage from Pointz Hall (with my numeration of each sentence for easier reference) reads as follows:

> 1. The little boy had lagged and was grouting in the grass. 2. And then the baby suddenly thrust its fist out over the counterpane, and the furry bear was jerked overboard. 3. Amy had to stoop. 4. George grubbed. 5. The flower blazed between the angles of the roots. 6. It blazed a soft yellow; a lambent light under a film of velvet. 7. It blazed. 8. It tore membrane after membrane. 9. It filled the caverns behind the eyes with a soft yellow light; a light that was warm and sweet honey-smelling; all that inner darkness was made a hollow ball of yellow light. 10. And he looked at the tree beyond; and the whole was stamped out on the ground; the whole flower; that is, the flower and the grass and the bole of the tree. 11. Down on his knees on the grass he held that completeness. 12. Then there was a roar and a hot breath; a stream of coarse grey hair rushing past between him and the whole flower; a terror. 13. A great wild beast; rushing, destroying, terrifying. 14. He leapt up; toppling in his fright, and then saw coming towards him a terrible peaked eyeless monster moving on legs; brandishing arms. (Earlier Typescript 19, as quoted in Leaska 44-45)

The same passage in Between the Acts reads:

> 1. The little boy had lagged and was grouting in the grass. 2. Then the baby, Caro, thrust her fist out over the coverlet and the furry bear was jerked overboard. 3. Amy had to stoop. 4. George grubbed. 5. The flower blazed between the angles of the roots. 6. Membrane after membrane was torn. 7. It blazed a soft yellow, a lambent light under a film of velvet; it filled the caverns behind the eyes with light. 8. All that inner darkness became a hall, leaf smelling, earth smelling, of yellow light. 9. And the tree was beyond the flower; the grass, the flower and the tree were entire. 10. Down on his knees grubbing he held the flower complete. 11. Then there was a roar and a hot breath and a stream of coarse grey hair rushed between him and the flower. 12. Up he leapt, toppling in his fright, and saw coming towards him a terrible peaked eyeless monster moving on legs, brandishing arms. (11-12)

With the exception of a deleted *and* and *suddenly*, the addition of the baby's name and the resulting change in the possessive pronoun, and the use of *coverlet* in place of *counterpane*, the first five sentences in Between the Acts are identical to the typescript. After an initial eleven-word sentence, followed by an eighteen-word sentence, the reader's attention is arrested by two unusually short clauses in both the original and the revised versions of this passage. *George grubbed* is succeeded by a sentence whose nominal focus is an object rather than a fictional human being.

The opening sentence focuses on what is analeptically identified as Isa's perceptions as she watches the tableau from her window (Leaska 46-47; Acts 14). So far, the emphasis has been on the action: the little boy lagged, the baby thrust out a fist, Amy stooped, and then George grubbed. But now, we are told, "the flower blazed." This extraordinarily fluid transition closes the distance by shifting from Isa as focalizer to George. With the beginning of sentence #6, however, Woolf's revisions become indicative of first, the need to shape the images more precisely--a need one can conceivably relate to Woolf's perception. Second, the revisions imply that when an image becomes part of the syntagmatic structure of the text, it is able to interact with other images and either affirm or deny their effectiveness.

Sentence #6 of the revision was originally #8. Moreover, Woolf changes it to a passive voice construction. Although the passive voice was used earlier in the passage (the second clause of sentence #2), the intercalation of *Membrane after membrane was torn* seems particularly notable--partly for its repetition, but primarily for its violence. Logically, George is doing the tearing of the membrane. But the syntax minimizes the perpetrator; instead, the accent on the focalizing image created by the syntactical arrangement remains clearly on George's awe as the blazing flower fills "the caverns behind the eyes with light." The typescript confirms that Virginia Woolf never intended to stress the flower's violation. Because the violation is minimized and the blazing is accentuated, this transition closes not only the physical gap between the house and George, but it also gives the reader direct access to George's sensuous impressions.

Woolf retains the euphonious, liquid 'l' sound in sentences 7 and 8 of the revision (formerly sentences 6 and 9) which stress the beauty of the experience; moreover, the definite articles in the addition, *it filled the caverns behind the eyes*, have a 'you-know-what-I-mean' tone. They 'universalize' George's private image in that they compel our recognition of a specific meaning. Sentence #10 in the section from Between the Acts shifts from George's perception and returns to his act of grubbing, thereby framing the 'completeness' of the moment.

The changes in sentences 6-10 (originally 6-11) also clarify George's perception. The image of *caverns behind the eyes* amplified by that of *a hall, leaf smelling, earth smelling of yellow light* is much more harmonious within the context of George grubbing than the image of the cavern becoming "a hollow ball of yellow light" that is "honey-smelling." Moreover, the concreteness of the clause *he held the flower complete* (sentence 10) clarifies Woolf's original *he held that completeness.*

Sentence #11 (original #12), abruptly, in a rush of unaccented syllables (*Then there was a*), changes the gentle rhythm to a strident, cacophonous spondee: ". . . roar and a hot breath and a stream of coarse grey hair rushed . . ." The synecdoche contributes to the terror George feels. The revised sentence #12 begins with an inversion that focuses on that terror: *Up he leapt*, rather than *he leapt up*. Taken as a whole, these revisions clearly indicate a movement between the paradigmatic structure and the syntagmatic structure. The emphasis on "wholeness" and "completeness," so effectively communicated

by the images in this passage, also indicates relationships between the fictional text and Virginia Woolf's perception of "life," "truth," and "reality."[7]

She wrote about her need to communicate this perception early in her writing career. In September 1909, Virginia Woolf traveled to the continent with her sister and brother-in-law, Vanessa and Clive Bell. Quentin Bell, Woolf's nephew, quotes from a notebook in which she recorded her impressions of this tour. Her attention captured by a fresco in the Collegio del Cambio in Perugia, Woolf wrote:

> I look at a fresco by Perugino. I conceive that he saw things grouped, contained in certain and invariable forms . . . all beauty was contained in the momentary appearance of human beings. He saw it sealed as it were . . . His fresco seems to me infinitely silent; as though beauty had swum up to the top and stayed there, above everything else, speech, paths leading on, relation of brain to brain, don't exist.
>
> Each part has a dependence upon the others; they compose one idea in his mind. That idea has nothing to do with anything that can be put into words. A group stands without relation to the figure of God. They have come together then because their lines and colours are related, and express some view of beauty in his brain.
>
> As for writing--I want to express beauty too--but beauty (symmetry?) of life and the world, in action. Conflict?--is that it? If there is action in painting it is only to exhibit lines; but with

> the end of beauty in view. Isn't there a different kind of beauty? No conflict.
>
> I attain a different kind of beauty, achieve a symmetry by means of infinite discords, showing all the traces of the mind's passage through the world; achieve in the end, some kind of whole made of shivering fragments; to me this seems the natural process; the flight of the mind. (Bell 138)

Achieving the "whole" noted here as well as in the excerpt from Between the Acts is Virginia Woolf's aim throughout her lifetime. What wholeness consists of, what it refers to (aside from "shivering fragments"), she does not reveal discursively until she writes her essay "A Sketch of the Past" shortly before her death. This essay provides indisputable evidence of Woolf's concern with what she calls "two sorts of being": "being" and "non-being." To define and describe what she means, she again resorts to images. "Non-being" she finds much easier to define than "being." It is "a kind of nondescript cotton wool" that consists of "what has to be done; the broken vacuum cleaner; ordering dinner; writing orders to Mabel; washing; cooking dinner; bookbinding" (Moments 81-82). This "cotton wool" of routine activities is undeniably important: "It has to be done." But it is not the 'whole of life.' Life's routine demands must be met, but they are not all there is to life--they are merely surface, appearance. Yet they not only claim so much attention and time that people tend to focus on the part and lose sight of the whole, but (as the image "cotton wool" suggests) they also muffle "being."

However, once in a while, Woolf claims, a "sudden violent shock"--so violent that she remembers it all her life--rips through this cotton wool and reveals "the whole" of life (82). She explains that she has learned to value these shocks. In fact, she conjectures that "the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer" (83) because she interprets the shock as a "token of some real thing behind appearances; *and I make it real by putting it into words. It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole*" (84, emphasis supplied).[8] The act of putting it into words enables Woolf to name the experience and naming gives identity to 'reality.' Naming brings it into the universe of discourse so that it can have meaning for a reader--even if that reader is only herself. Naming adds logic and reason to the sensory impression of the shock itself and thus permits the objective approach necessary for putting together "the severed parts"--severed, one might assume, by the shock that has torn the "two sorts of being" asunder. The pleasure she receives from writing, Woolf explains, lies in "discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a character come together" (84). Or, to use her 1909 notes again, to achieve "some kind of whole made of shivering fragments."

Woolf's explanation of the "two sorts of being" leads up to a basic point in any discussion of Woolf's images. She writes:

> From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern . . . that we are parts of the work of art. . . . We are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. And I see this when I have a shock. ("A Sketch of the Past" 1939, Moments 84)

These comments were written not long before Virginia Woolf's death. While Woolf articulates her "philosophy" late in her writing career, her entire *oeuvre* is a record of her attempts to get behind the "cotton-wool" at the pattern, at the "thing itself." George's perception in the brief scene from Between the Acts is a naming and affirmation of Woolf's own perception of the reality of a 'moment of being.' The connection between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic structures observed above is extended to that which is perceived to be.

Other novels also confirm this connection between the fictional text and Woolf's 'moment of being.' 'Wholeness' is one significant theme in Mrs. Dalloway, written fifteen years before Between the Acts. The entire novel is structured to accentuate the perception that measuring devices such as Big Ben (which, like the clock in Edgar Allen Poe's "The Masque of the Red Death," brings all life to a momentary halt as it measures out time in precise segments) are the attempts of man to impose an order on 'reality'--an order somewhat like the one Woolf saw in the fresco by Perugino. But Woolf's own perception of 'life' consisting of the "two sorts of being" is unlike Perugino's.[9] She communicates this conviction through the macrostructure of the novel: sensing that the surface of life, measured out in coffee spoons (or by the leaden circles of Big Ben) is spiritually deadening when it is separated from "being," Clarissa ordains her party an "offering; to combine, to create" (109). Yet the wholeness which Clarissa seeks and which George experiences with such delight in Between the Acts makes Septimus react with intense horror. Using Woolf's memoirs as a gloss, one is able to account for this horror. Woolf writes that the

"moments of being" that she experienced were also potentially horrifying (Moments 83)--a potential mitigated by naming the experience. Unlike Woolf, however, Septimus is unable "through reason to provide an explanation" and thus "blunt the sledge-hammer force of the blow." She explains:

> I feel that I have had a blow; but it is not, as I thought as a child, simply a blow from an enemy hidden behind the cotton wool of daily life; it is or will become a revelation of some order; it is a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real by putting it into words. (Moments 83)

Septimus is unable to "put it into words" and can therefore react only in horror. He has been robbed of the reason that makes it possible for language to mediate the horror of his perception.

Images throughout Mrs. Dalloway stress the need for community and 'at-one-ment.' Yet the routine activity of daily life muffles the "thing itself." Few characters experience a 'moment of being.' Briefly Clarissa's guests are drawn together by their common experience of the party; briefly the characters on Bond Street are drawn together by their common experience of street or park. They stop and look--at Clarissa or the billowing drape, at the movement of a car or the flight of an airplane. They look, but they do not see. Septimus is one of the few who do see, and he is horrified.

The image pattern Woolf creates in communicating Septimus's perception is a carefully crafted one. The novel opens on Mrs. Dalloway, but the explosion serves as a focalizing image to shift the reader's attention from Mrs. Dalloway to Septimus. Septimus Warren Smith sees a world that

"wavered and quivered and threatened to burst into flames" (15). Woolf contrasts the terror of his experience with Mrs. Dalloway's "arms full of sweet peas" and her "little pink face pursed in inquiry" (15). She accents this shocking contrast with a pointed syntactical arrangement. The asyndeton in "Every one looked at the motor car. Septimus looked. Boys on bicycles sprang off. Traffic accumulated" (15) prepares for the cessation of movement when everything and everyone is synthesized into a common entity introduced with the coordinating conjunction *and*. Immediately following these short principal clauses without connectives is this sentence:

> *And* there the motor car stood, with drawn blinds, *and* upon them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, *and this gradual drawing together of everything to one centre before his eyes*, as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames, *terrified him*. (15, emphasis supplied)

The initial coordination renders the immediacy of the experience, an immediacy Woolf prolongs by repeating the conjunction. She accomplishes this despite the subordination ("as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames") that might imply order. The coordination over subordination is not only strengthened by embedding the dependent clause as well as repeating the conjunction *and*, but gives the illusion of objectivity as well. Subordination means ranking. By placing everything on the same grammatical plain, Woolf first emphasizes her refusal to 'tell,' to explain, to interpret; and second, she effects the relation between the experience common to all those on the street and the experience that is private to Septimus.

The first two times the *and* is used, it creates unity as it configures the people in the street (i.e. 'images' them) by relating them to the focalizing image, the car. This configuration sums them up. The third *and* summarizes the configuration but then shifts back to the individual perceiving the merging with the phrase, *before his eyes*. The coordination registers first the group, then the individual within the group, and finally his emotion. The individual within this group is Septimus, whom the group's acceptance of imperialism has indelibly stamped with the mark of Cain for his obedience to his country's call to arms--Septimus, who has discovered the lethal veneer of civilization but has been unable to extricate himself from his guilt. The most sensitive to what is happening, Septimus perceives this merging as a kind of horror to which he reacts with terror. It seems ironic that Clarissa has dedicated her party to becoming a force that will combine when here Septimus is filled with such terror as he perceives the merging of individuals into a group. The idiosyncrasy of his perception is questioned, however, when one recalls that Septimus's view of a world that "wavered and quivered and threatened to burst into flames" (15) has a very tangible correspondence with the world at war--a war that united people under the ideologies of imperialism and nationhood. For Septimus, all merging is fraught with danger and horror. The repetition of the phrase *to burst into flames* underscores the immediacy already noted. This group's unconsciousness of the needs of the individual, its insensitivity, becomes very clear when carried to the extreme in Sir William Bradley's cold-blooded insistence on "proportion" (88-91). Perhaps the explanation for the apparent irony is that a distinction must be made between the danger of the

individual's being absorbed by the group and the need for the individual to be part of the group while at the same time being detached from the group--a distinction Septimus is unable to make because he is unable to name and therefore unable to conceptualize. The repeated *and* serves to illuminate and thereby helps to demolish the acculturated story that celebrates war--the story that converts every cause into a crusade and every soldier into a heroic servant of the Most High.

The full significance of this scene from Mrs. Dalloway may be apprehended only as we become aware of the reflexive relationships established by the images of horror and destruction that Septimus experiences--the relationship between the lethal stories honored by society and the individual who has been poisoned by them. But this relationship cannot begin to be apprehended in its entirety without admitting the relationship the text has to the perceived reality existing outside of the text. Ignoring Virginia Woolf's concern for communicating the "true reality" in her fiction seems misdirected. Yet that is what is required when one limits textual analysis to relationships thought to be established *within* the text rather than *by* the text. Hugh Vereker's description of his elusive "figure in the carpet" appears to apply quite accurately to the role of images in Virginia Woolf's writing. They, too, might be said to influence Woolf's choice of every line and word, the dotting of every i and placement of every comma. They are an element of style *and* an element of thought (Henry James, "Figure" 284). The relationships textual images have to the paradigmatic structure and to the reader's/writer's perception of reality undoubtedly affect the syntagmatic structure.

While one might argue that Virginia Woolf's appreciation of the potential of literary images grew during her writing career as a result of her experimentation, her first novel, The Voyage Out, clearly demonstrates her dependence on them for communicating her perception of life and truth. They accent her conviction that the syntagmatic structure ("form") must witness to the intensity of her "gaze, meant to sever" her subject "from the past and the future" (Letters I:356). That is, images have the potential to expose the ideological gaps that have been filled by the debris of custom and convention. The liberating quality of Woolf's "gaze" and her work with images--even in her first novel--can be appreciated to a much greater degree now that Louise DeSalvo's transcription has facilitated a comparison of Woolf's manuscript, Melymbrosia, with The Voyage Out.

The Voyage Out begins with images that first focus the reader's attention on the narrow streets "that lead from the Strand to the Embankment" (5) and then shift to Helen and Ridley Ambrose, Rachel's aunt and uncle-by-marriage, making their way through London streets to join the Vinrace party on the *Euphrosyne*. Most of the changes Woolf made in this section before publication are regarding Helen. The manuscript is much more explicit about the reason for Helen's grief. It clearly explains her sense of loss in having to leave her children behind. Yet at the end of the first chapter, the accent has moved away from Helen in Melymbrosia; it remains on Helen in the revised text. Melymbrosia reads:

> Suddenly Helen felt, "Of course one loves Theresa's child."
>
> Yes, but that did not mean that one could show it. "Good night"

> she said, without even shaking hands. An hour later all the passengers lay horizontal upon their ledges, hearing noises that told them that the voyage was begun, and resigned, for nothing they could do would make any difference. The eye of Heaven could see the Euphrosyne moving slowly up a gash in the land, through the rippling silver spaces and the black shadows, until she came out into a wide breadth of the sea, and her reds and yellows began to shine in the dawn. (7)

The revision as it appears in The Voyage Out (Chapter 1) reads:

> Mrs Ambrose's worst suspicions were confirmed; she went down the passage lurching from side to side, and fending off the wall now with her right arm, now with her left; at each lurch she exclaimed emphatically, 'Damn!' (19)

This shift in accent appears to make a connection between the narrow street with which the revision opens and the narrow passage with which that chapter closes. The text also implies a relationship between those two images and Rachel's dream in which she is "walking down a long tunnel, which grew so narrow by degrees that she could touch the damp bricks on either side" and at the end of which is waiting a gibbering, deformed little man with long nails (74)--an image worded almost identically in both versions. Furthermore, these associated images imply a strong connection between Helen and Rachel.

Prior to any consideration of that connection, though, is the claim of another issue regarding the relationship between Richard Dalloway, the politician who joins the party on the *Euphrosyne* with his wife, and Rachel.

The impact of images on thematic concerns becomes startlingly clear when one considers the questions they give rise to, questions such as: What happens to the "infinite possibilities" Rachel feels life holds after she has been kissed by Richard Dalloway? Why should these possibilities be translated into the horror of her nightmare? Why do the emotions she then attempts to calm by concentrating on the sea and the birds, now became fear of persecution? What brings about the shift from Rachel's feeling that "something wonderful had happened" (73) to her lying sleepless, hearing "barbarian men" harassing the ship (74) that is "a bride going forth to her husband, a virgin unknown of men" (28)?

Reading the text through its images raises the possibility that at least a partial answer to these questions might be found first in Richard's accusation, "You tempt me" (73), and then in his attempt to deny the sexual attraction that had sprung up between them. When Rachel and Richard meet again at dinner, "Richard slid his eyes over her uneasily once, and never looked at her again" (74). Furthermore, Woolf's use of the passive voice underscores Richard's discomfort: "Formal platitudes were manufactured with an effort," and "wonderful masculine stories followed . . . which made the people at the dinner-table seem featureless and small." Here the implication is that the debasement of a "moment of being" by "wonderful masculine stories" reduces *Rachel*--not just "people"--to being "featureless and small" (74). That Rachel feels insignificant, small, and featureless is evident in her demeanor: Helen is "struck by her pallor" (74). Rachel's education has begun--the kiss initiates the first lesson, Richard's accusation fleshes it out, and his implicit denial finally

completes it. Rachel learns not only that men such as Richard desire women, but also that they are ashamed of that desire. They blame women for it, they impute their shame to women, they diminish women so that their own egos may remain intact--so that they can continue telling wonderful men's stories.

Now to return to the relationship the associated images suggest exists between Helen and Rachel. Helen knows what it is to be a woman in a man's world. Reading the novel through its images and comparing Melymbrosia to The Voyage Out make one aware of Helen's resentment and of her mourning her separation from her children. The image of her progress down the passageway of the *Euphrosyne*, read in the context of Rachel's experience, makes the walls Helen is fending off assume symbolic significance; they become the walls of her female existence--the unspoken social contract that says a woman's place is by her husband. And if her husband requires a sea voyage to restore his health, then she must accompany him and be prepared to leave her children behind; a woman's self-sacrifice to the needs of her husband is a crowning virtue. Nevertheless, though Helen knows her defeat is inevitable, she fights. She fends off the walls, damning them even as she staggers. Unlike naive Rachel who announces that she will go to "triumph" in the wind, Helen *knows* that women cannot triumph. Yet she fights.

This brief and partial survey of only a few images in The Voyage Out demonstrates that a conscious reading of the text through repeated and interlocking images is essential to one's understanding of Woolf's perception. The questions raised in the opening pages by images (such as the tunnel) are taken up by other images much further into the text. One major difference

between Melymbrosia and The Voyage Out, it must be noted, is textual ambiguity in the revised version. For example, Woolf diffuses the anger against men Rachel voices in Melymbrosia (151) through the image of imprisonment. In The Voyage Out, Terence, Rachel's fiancé--not Rachel--is given the task of explaining the differences between the lives of men and women in English society. Terence's tone is far from the impassioned one of Rachel's voice. When Terence explains St. John Hirst to Rachel, he reasons that of course St. John is as he is--he has been brought up to it. He says, "'Can't you imagine the family conclaves, and the sister told to run out and feed the rabbits because St. John must have the schoolroom to himself,'" and Rachel responds with a simple, "'Yes. . . . I've fed rabbits for twenty-four years'" (213). Revisions such as these contribute to greater ambiguity; they also demonstrate Woolf's awareness of the influence of images on the syntagmatic structure.

Interlocking image patterns (such as that which the tunnel image gives rise to) give a complex intratextuality to this book. It may be that this, together with a melding of the conventional with the unconventional, has given rise to some rather curious readings.[10] However, a careful reading of the ending of The Voyage Out reveals that the conclusion is sufficiently direct to clear up any misconceptions these difficulties might have generated. This ending provides clear insight into Woolf's understanding of the potential of images and her application of this understanding in The Voyage Out.

A comparison of the last five hundred words (approximately) of Melymbrosia with The Voyage Out reveals the major change between the two to be an emphasis on pattern. Both conclusions have St. John Hirst sinking

exhausted into a chair in the hotel lobby. Rachel is dead. And St. John "was terribly tired, and the light and warmth, the movements of the hands, and the soft communicative voices soothed him; they gave him a strange sense of quiet and relief." The published text is almost identical to the manuscript--except for the following sentence in The Voyage Out:

> The movements and the voices seemed to draw together from different parts of the room, and to combine themselves into a pattern before his eyes; he was content to sit silently *watching the pattern build itself up*, looking at what he hardly saw. (381, emphasis supplied)

The pattern Hirst observes without seeing consists of movement: the chess game between Mr. Pepper and Mr. Elliot; Mrs. Thornbury knitting; Mrs. Flushing watching the lightning; people stirring, rising, dropping balls of wool and searching for them, and finally picking up books, cards, wool, workbaskets, and going to bed. The pattern also consists of voices: Mrs. Flushing exclaiming over the lightning and calling to her husband, Mrs. Allan's echo of Lady Macbeth's "To bed--to bed," Mr. Elliot's analysis of the chess game, and Arthur Venning's, "What? Pepper beaten?" Human movement and voices are interwoven with and punctuated by the action of nature (a technique Woolf subsequently explores in "Kew Garden" and develops further in other novels, including The Waves and Between the Acts).

On one level, St. John Hirst draws comfort from the pattern he intuitively absorbs; on another level, the pattern coming together here is a summary of the entire text. The last sentence reads:

> Across his eyes passed a procession of objects, black and indistinct, the figures of people picking up their books, their cards, their balls of wool, their work-baskets, and passing him one after another on their way to bed. (382)

"Figures of people" have passed before the reader's eyes throughout the text. Most of them are "b[illegible] indistinct." And many critics follow David Daiches' criticism by pointing to this procession as a weakness in the novel. Some of the individuals in The Voyage Out seem to be names only, others, like the Dalloways, are introduced more thoroughly, but are deserted just as abruptly. Some appear to have little connection to the plot, and even when they do function as part of the conflict upon which rising action is normally built, they never become part of the resolution. Even Helen Ambrose simply disappears at the end. Daiches concludes that the narrator flits from one thing to another, including individuals, as soon as she is bored with someone or as soon as her attention is drawn somewhere else (11).

If, however, *people* is read not as *representations of individuals* but as *objects* and *figures*, a reading the concluding sentence of this novel authorizes, then a thematic pattern *does* emerge--a pattern whose existence depends upon every image in the text furnishing the context for every other image--including the images of characterization. Raymond Oliver and Alfred Perrott, Mrs. Thornbury and Mrs. Paley, even St. John Hirst, Richard and Clarissa Dalloway, Mr. Pepper, Helen and Ridley Ambrose and Rachel herself--all become figures in a pattern. This pattern is not a decorative one; nor is it static or sterile: it is a pattern depicting a dynamic process, depicting Virginia

Woolf's vision of 'reality' Woolf juxtaposes images contextually to tear aside the "cotton wool." At the same time, though, she weaves patterns that interlock these images to reveal 'moments of being.'

Art allows the reader the distance a perception of pattern requires. Lily Briscoe explains in To the Lighthouse that the swimmer amidst cresting ocean waves is not aware of the pattern seen by a distant gazer from the cliff tops (235). In The Voyage Out this pattern is composed of images as transient as red flowers placed on cold graveyard ledges by old women or as Clarissa Dalloway merging briefly with the party on the *Euphrosyne*, and as enduring as the tunnel image modified from London streets to the ship hallway to the nightmare tunnel to the jungle paths to Rachel's delirium-inspired hallucinatory tunnel under the Thames in which old women play cards.

The interlocking images--whether transient or enduring--are not significant in themselves as much as in the pattern they form. For instance, the tunnel image helps to reveal the relationship between Rachel and Helen. So when Terence and Rachel walk down a twisting forest path that does not allow them to walk side by side because it is too narrow (223, 279), the pattern already developed by images imputes much larger significance to the information that Terence takes the lead than what the weight of this single image would demand. It suggests, among other things, that Rachel will soon be in the position of Helen, putting her husband first. Moreover, the *Gestalt* whose properties are not derived from its individual parts informs us that Terence is as much trapped by the social and political conventions of a masculine society as are Helen and Rachel. Terence may vow to keep Rachel

"free like the wind or the sea." But the facts are that they cannot be "free together" (250). Terence tells Helen, "I intend to allow Rachel to be a fool if she wants to" (295). The implication that *Terence* will define "fool" is clear. So it is not surprising that when he reflects that "she seemed to be able to cut herself adrift from him, and to pass away to unknown places where she had no need of him," "the thought roused his jealousy" and he accuses her, "I sometimes think you're not in love with me and never will be" (309). "Love" for Terence means dependence; being "free" means being "a fool." Because he intuitively recognizes the double-edged sword hidden in his definition of 'love' (i.e. not only Rachel's dependence on him, but also his dependence on Rachel), he is determined to "allow Rachel to be a fool." But his ego cannot allow him the actualization of that decision. She must attend, she must submit, she must recognize his importance. And when Rachel refuses to do all this, when she complains, "I can't play a note because of you in the room interrupting me every other second," Terence must belittle her and her talents:

> "I've no objection to nice simple tunes--indeed, I find them very helpful to my literary composition, but that kind of thing is merely like an unfortunate old dog going on its hind legs in the rain." (299)

Image patterns continue to converge, the 'net' becomes denser and denser: Just as Helen has sacrificed her life to Ridley, Rachel is expected to sacrifice hers to Terence. Terence, assuming the role assigned to him by society, leads the way through the forest. But he does not know the way. He is himself lost. Again an image forges the link that aids in the revelation and clarification of the

pattern. The more one examines individual images, the more clearly is revealed the fact that Woolf's images are centripetal in that they lead the reader away from the individual image and deeper into the rest of the text.

I suggested earlier that the pattern comforting St. John at the end of the novel summarizes the entire novel. Part of Hirst's pattern consists of Mr. Pepper's defeat at chess. The chess image reverberates with an earlier one. Rachel and Helen are "going to see life"--"the phrase they used for their habit of strolling through the town after dark" (96). As they walk, Rachel reflects on life in England:

> "Just think of the Mall tonight!" she exclaimed at length. "It's the fifteenth of March. Perhaps there's a Court." She thought of the crowd waiting in the cold spring air to see the grand carriages go by. "It's very cold, if it's not raining," she said. "First there are men selling picture postcards; then there are wretched little shop-girls with round bandboxes; then there are bank clerks in tail coats; and then--any number of dressmakers. People from South Kensington drive up in a hired fly; officials have a pair of bays; earls, on the other hand, are allowed one footman to stand up behind; dukes have two, royal dukes--so I was told--have three; the king, I suppose, can have as many as he likes. And the people believe in it!"
>
> Out here it seemed as though the people of England must be shaped in the body like the kings and queens, knights and

> pawns of the chessboard, so strange were their differences, so marked and so implicitly believed in. (97)

Rachel's image of the chessboard of life manufactured and played upon by men according to men's sumptuary laws, rules, and social conventions reveals her own awakening. As yet, she can take a somewhat superior attitude toward that chessboard. As yet, she is looking in from the outside. As yet, she doesn't know that "seeing life" is insufficient. But she cannot remain the gazer on the mountain top (or at the ship's railing) forever--she must become the swimmer amidst the waves. When she does become a participant, she finds herself trapped in the "dark, sticky pool" of her fevered imagination (353).

Now again the chess image rises to the surface. It is of great importance that Mr. Pepper loses the game. Mr. Pepper, we know, had not married "for the sufficient reason that he had never met a woman who commanded his respect" (21). Now he is defeated. Elliot exclaims triumphantly, "It was the move with your Queen that gave it away" (382). The implications are ambiguous, and any attempt to articulate them would reduce them to banality. But one might note that Mr. Pepper is defeated at the game of chess which has in other contexts signified the game of life; Terence, too, is defeated. By asking questions, we might open the text even more: What connection, if any, is Woolf drawing between Rachel and the chess queen? Although Pepper's own move loses the game for him, his wrong move is with the chess queen. In one sense, then, his mistaken judgement defeats him; in another sense, the queen defeats Pepper. Yet the same queen that defeats him is, of course, herself defeated. Is Rachel defeated? Can Pepper's defeat be read as a bright thread in an

otherwise dark pattern? Again, these questions defy closure; nevertheless, the possibilities they suggest demonstrate the powerful potential of these images. While The Voyage Out has some traditional closure, even in this first novel resolutions are not complete.

The human pattern formed by the "figures," for both St. John and the novel, is more clearly delineated and defined by being juxtaposed with the nonhuman pattern. The novel concludes with a thunderstorm--one that has passed. The lightning which gives color to this world is "only the reflection of the storm which was over." First of all, it is of interest to note that the rhythms of the human and nonhuman world merge; readers are told that "the d[illegible] the drone of the trees, and the flashing light . . . filled Mrs. [illegible]th exultation. Her breast rose and fell" (381). The rising and fal[illegible]g of the human breast in response to the rhythms in nature recalls other similar images throughout the text. The movement of Rachel's mind, for example, from one thought to another is described as "the rising and falling of [a] ball of thistledown" kissing the sea, rising, and kissing it again (33)--a movement in harmony with the rhythm of the waves as they lift and lower the *Euphrosyne*. Later on, when Hewett's party makes its way down the mountain, we are told that as dusk was "filling up with darkness" the hollows of the mountains, silence fell upon the group and human minds, too, spilled "out into the deep blue air" (147). And still later we follow the Flushing party down the river. Hewett feels that the boat

> in some strange way . . . became identified with himself. . . . He was drawn on and on away from all he knew. . . . He lay on deck

> watching the tree-tops change their position slightly against the sky, and arch themselves, and sink and tower huge. (273)

His own thoughts and metabolism merge with this rhythm. Numerous other examples could be cited from the text--all of which underscore the merging of patterns in the conclusion.

Of greater significance yet seems to be the description of the earth as "visible at the bottom of the air." This image resonates strongly with the "bottom of the sea/world" imagery that permeates the novel. On the one hand, "seeing to the bottom" is frightening. Terence Hewett reflects that people, whenever their attention is not distracted by the superficialities of living, draw together so that they might prevent themselves from "seeing to the bottom" (126). And Mr. Pepper explains that life at the bottom of the sea is incompatible with life at the surface. Should whatever lives at the bottom decide to come to the top, it could not survive. But the "bottom of the world" attracts Rachel; at the same time that it attracts, though, it also threatens as she gazes from the ship into the depth of the sea. "One could scarcely see the black ribs of wrecked ships . . . or the smooth green-sided monsters" (23).

On the other hand, "the bottom of the world" becomes a place of privacy for Hewett and Rachel, a different layer of existence that permits unity (281-82). It also becomes a place of freedom and delight for Rachel: "To be flung into the sea, to be washed hither and thither, and driven about the roots of the world" means not being subjugated because "I'm a mermaid! I can swim" (305). But eventually, it becomes the place of total stasis. In her delirium, Rachel

> fell into a deep pool of sticky water, which eventually closed over her head. She saw nothing and heard nothing but a faint booming sound, which was the sound of the sea rolling over her head. While all her tormentors thought that she was dead, she was not dead, but curled up at the bottom of the sea. (348)

This place is unquestionably desirable to Rachel. But it leads to death. First Terence accepts death as "perfect happiness." The union he tried to effect before by insisting on Rachel's total dependence upon him has now been effected by death. And he was so determined on union--at any price--that he accepts even death for Rachel as a necessary condition to his happiness: "It seemed to him that their complete union and happiness filled the room with rings eddying more and more widely" (360-61).

The irony undergirding Terence's satisfaction at this point negates readings of Woolf as fascinated with death. While a "moment of being" rises out of a vision of "the whole" of life, a whole that includes death, yet a "moment of being" does not consist of merging with that vision, but of allowing it to inform the level of existence Woolf calls "non-being." Terence quickly realizes that the eddying rings he envisions exist on a level where other people and things like hallways and teacups and plates and tables--and human personality--do not exist, that union would require his own death. As attractive as union first appears to him, Terence must reject death. But that rejection means also a severance of the "complete union and happiness" he had felt momentarily. That which he had required of Rachel (death to self, to personality, to ambitions and desires), he must now reject for himself. And so,

in a double sense, Rachel's death becomes unbearable for him, for it not only reminds him of his loss, it also reminds him (at least on a subliminal level) of his own injustice. He is made to face the truth that death, whether physical or spiritual, is not a solution.

That death is not a solution for Woolf, either, is clear when his protest against it is picked up by other voices in the text, including that of nature. But the result of the storm is greater clarity and a reestablishment of the rhythms uniting human life and the rest of nature. Woolf's vision is not that of death as unifier, but rather that of a need to recognize the affinities that exist between people as well as those that exist between human and non-human nature. The meaning of life is a recognition of this underlying pattern of affinities. St. John's recognition of pattern at the end of the text is similar to one Rachel had earlier--also in the hotel lobby. Rachel felt as if "she had been turning in the fog for a long time, and could now see exactly where she had turned. . . . One thing led to another and by degrees something had formed itself out of nothing" to create a pattern. "And in that pattern lay satisfaction and meaning" (321).

This reading of The Voyage Out tests and validates my hypothesis of image as the linguistic product of a dynamic process. As this product becomes part of the syntagmatic structure, it interacts with that structure to engender not only a mirroring of the process that gives shape to the image, but to question in a reflexive manner the paradigms generating it. Reading this novel through its images demonstrates not only the potential of the image, but the potential of narrative fiction. Content is not merely a "succession of events" (Genette 25)--even with 'event' defined as "a change from one state of affairs to

another" rather than as a dynamic action (Rimmon-Kenan 15). Content consists of images which form a pattern whose meaning is generated by the relations between the paradigmatic structure and the syntagmatic structure, the paradigmatic structure and perceived reality, and the syntagmatic structure and perceived reality--relations established *by* the text, but not limited to existing *within* the text.

Virginia Woolf's art is a woman's attempt to express her own experience in a male-choreographed world. The many images of women knitting, sewing, and stitching in Woolf's novels are not accidental. Like Rezia Smith who "built it up; first one thing, then another, she built it up, sewing," Woolf "stitches" the "design" together (Dalloway 129, 127). The completed web consists of images interacting with each other to form patterns consistent with Woolf's vision of the "true reality" (Diary II:248) which lies "behind the cotton wool" of routine activities, complacency, and acculturation (Moments 84).

* * * * *

Hélène Cixous 'retells' Franz Kafka's story "Before the Law" which begins with, "Before the law, there stands the doorkeeper." Once a peasant came to ask for admittance to the law, but the doorkeeper informed him that he could not go in. The humble little man from the country, in awe of the bearded, fierce, and large doorkeeper, humbly asked when he would be able to enter, and was told, Perhaps later. The man waited and waited. As he waited and waited, he grew smaller and smaller while the doorkeeper grew larger and

larger. The years passed. And as the man rapidly changed from the size of a pea to that of a pinhead, he suddenly realized that during all the time he had been waiting, he had seen not one other person aside from the doorkeeper. Quickly, before shrinking into nothingness, he addressed the doorkeeper once more to ask why no one else had come. Shouting very loudly, because the man now was dead, the doorkeeper answered, "Because this was your own door." Cixous, commenting on this story, points out that

> we behave as country people when we read Kafka's fable. Because we read "Before the law stands the doorkeeper," and we go on reading and staying in the front of the door of the text, and go on and die. And suddenly we can ask, we can wonder, But what is the law? The text-as-law functions the moment the sentence starts; we are in front of the sentence exactly as in front of a door, and we don't move. We don't even think about it. (5)

The reason we don't think about it is that there is apparently nothing to think about. Law is law. One doesn't question law--or does one? One must obey the law--or must one? Kafka's little country man spent his life in obedience to what he was told. He sacrifices his life to a story--a story of the law's immutable omnipotence.

Storytelling has long been recognized to be an essential human activity. We tell (and write) stories in an attempt to order the world; to understand and make ourselves capable of action by, as Peter Brooks observes, "reassessing the meaning of our past action" so that we may plan future projects and anticipate their outcomes (3). Stories both determine and reflect our expectations of what

life is, or ought to be, and thereby aid in forging societies from individuals. While the act of storytelling is essential to shape the surface of 'life,' yet the stories we have told ourselves may be pernicious. The individual who refuses to model his or her behavior to conform to the basic stories of a particular society, is threatening to that society unless some sort of adaptation or modification takes place--either on the part of the individual or on the part of the society. And history demonstrates that society usually changes not only very slowly, but very reluctantly. The list of martyrs is long.

The process of acculturation begins at infancy for the individual as well as for a culture. As a society develops, its absorption of the basic narratives that have given birth to it will breed additional ones which not only shape further development, but also reflect it. In Northrop Frye's terms,

> mythology tends to become encyclopaedic, expanding into a total myth covering a society's view of its past, present and future, its relation to its gods and its neighbours, its traditions, its social and religious duties, and its ultimate destiny. (Path 36)

As individuals develop, their absorption of these acculturated stories shapes their acquisition of that society's culture. Because acculturated stories are so basic to the philosophy of a culture (in both the collective and individual sense), most people do not recognize them as being stories, much less question them. Breaking out of the mental habits formed by the framework of acculturated stories is difficult if not impossible. There will always remain some blindness in the midst of the insight we achieve. "One cannot be without . . . preconceptions" (Frye, Path 43).

Like Kafka's peasant, we accept the 'universality' and immutability of the stories we have been told--even the stories about stories. Not only ought we to question the stories we tell ourselves, however, but we ought also to question the manner in which we tell them, for they can blind us to the possible validity (perhaps even existence) of other stories or of other ways of telling. They may also blind us to the consequences of our own stories on others. (One telling example is the series of stories that united the Germans under Hitler after their defeat in the First World War.) Another reason for questioning our stories is that they may blind us to limitations such as a story's inability to recount the elements of life that resist its telling--for example, the elements whose existence is revealed during, to use Virginia Woolf's term, "moments of being."

Virginia Woolf challenges the received cultural codes; she questions the stories Western society has told itself. She does not accept the story of 'text-as-law.' She is not intimidated by the doorkeeper; she does not stand waiting in front of the door. *Nor does she make herself a doorkeeper.* Her perception of the function of literature is that it must tear aside the cotton-wool by which our acculturated stories have muffled our understanding of 'life.' By asking questions such as, "Is life like this?" and "Must novels be like this?" (Essays II:106), and then by demonstrating that No, life is not necessarily like this, nor must novels be like this, Virginia Woolf rends the surface of social and literary conventions.

Her narrative fictions allow the reader the distance a perception of pattern requires. But unlike the pattern in the web woven by Tennyson's Lady

of Shalott, the pattern in Woolf's text does not depict any "mirror's magic sights" (l. 65). Woolf is not "imbowered" on a "silent isle" (l. 17) isolated from life. The images that reveal the pattern in the web of Virginia Woolf's narrative fiction delineate her vision of 'life,' 'reality,' and 'truth'--"we": "We are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself" (Moments 84). We are the "figure in the carpet."

Notes

Chapter I

[1]One of the first important works on Virginia Woolf's Bloomsbury connections and influences is Irma Rantavaara's Virginia Woolf and Bloomsbury (1953). See also Leon Edel's Bloomsbury: A House of Lions (1979), especially pages 85-94, 148-57, and 175-86. More recently, Alex Zwerdling addresses the impact of Woolf's milieu on her writing in Virginia Woolf and the Real World (1986). For additional examples see Perry Meisel's The Myth of the Modern (1987), and Roger Moss's "Jacob's Room and the Eighteenth Century: From Elegy to Essay" (1981).

[2]James Naremore (The World Without a Self, 1973) contends that the "world" of Woolf's fiction is composed of images and themes that are primarily erotic, despite Woolf's reticence about sex. He also connects what he calls her search for some "permanent union" to a death-wish culminating in her suicide. Mark Spilka's Virginia Woolf's Quarrel with Grieving (1980) gives readings to Woolf's novels that focus on her attempts to come to terms with the series of deaths in her family during her adolescence and early adulthood. Virginia Woolf: Reflections and Reverberations (1990), by Marilyn Kurtz, traces the transformation of Woolf's vision from hope and transcendence to fragmentation and apocalypse through images of glass and sound in her work. For other examples, see also Betty Kushen, "The Psychologenic Imperative in the Works of Virginia Woolf" (1977); and Howard Harper, "Mrs. Woolf and Mrs. Dalloway" (1972).

[3]The most recent extensive work in this area has probably been done by Jane Marcus as both editor and writer: New Femisist Essays on Virginia Woolf (1981), Virginia Woolf: A Feminist Slant (1983), Virginia Woolf and Bloomsbury (1987), and Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy (1987). But other significant critical contributions have been made by Patricia Clements and Isobel Grundy, editors of Virginia Woolf: New Critical Essays (1983). See also Judy Little (Comedy and the Woman Writer 1983). Little attributes Woolf's use of the comic mode to her desire to undermine by mockery the established patriarchal norms, literary traditions, and institutions. A special issue on Virginia Woolf by Women's Studies (1977) is also of note. Articles by Margaret Comstock, Lucio P. Ruotolo, Madeline Moore, Brenda R. Silver, and Jane Marcus all address the political overtones traced in Woolf's writing. The following are additional examples of criticism with this focus: Elizabeth Hardwick's "Bloomsbury and Virginia Woolf" (1974); Beverly Ann Schlack's "Virginia Woolf's Strategy of Scorn in The Years and Three Guineas" (1977); and Diane F. Gillespie's "Virginia Woolf's Miss LaTrobe: The Artist's Last Struggle against Masculine Values" (1977).

[4]The following are some examples of this focus: Perry Meisel's The Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and Walter Pater (1980) traces commonalities in "metalinguistic inclinations" and their recurrent tropes (e.g. crystals and houses), philosophical and critical stances such as the notion of art as a sacred object and a belief in the value of the moment, as well as a "Keatsian fascination with death, decay and dissolution" (46) to establish Pater as Woolf's mentor. James Hafley (The Glass Roof 1954) has an excellent discussion of

Woolf's adaptation of the Bergsonian notion of time in Mrs. Dalloway. On Woolf and Moore, see Gabriel Franks' "Virginia Woolf and the Philosophy of G. E. Moore" (1969) for a discussion of Moore's ethical principles and their influence on Woolf's fiction; and Stanford P. Rosenbaum, "The Philosophical Realism of Virginia Woolf" (1971). On Woolf and James, see Joyce Carol Oates, "The Art of Relationships: Henry James and Virginia Woolf" (1964); also Vivien Jones, James the Critic. (Although Jones's primary subject is James, she does draw some significant conclusions about James's influence on Woolf.) On Woolf in the tradition of Austen, see Katherine Mansfield, "Night and Day" (1919); and Conrad Aiken, "Virginia Woolf" (1927).

[5]See, for instance, Woolf's essay "On Not Knowing Greek" which talks of Plato's *dramatic* genius in recounting Socrates' minute consideration of the "exact meaning of words." While that consideration in itself is painful and exhausting, Plato's report gives life to Socrates by involving the senses and thus allows us to "love knowledge better." This love, however, is stimulated more by emphathy than intellect as we feel "the indomitable honesty, the courage, the love of truth" in Plato's vision of the "whole of Greece" that "heap[s] itself behind every line of its literature." Obviously, then, what is operative here is not so much the dichotomy between denotative and connotative meaning as Woolf's concern for 'truth.' For, Woolf insists, "truth is various; truth comes to us in different disguises; it is not with the intellect alone that we perceive it." Our western custom of quoting and extracting from the Greeks does damage to them, she claims. "We have to stretch our minds, to grasp a whole devoid of the prettiness of detail or the emphasis of

eloquence," for "*truth is to be pursued with all our faculties*" ("On Not Knowing Greek," Essays I:1-13, emphasis supplied).

[6]Robert Scholes defines 'syntagm' as "a word's relation to other words (or a grammatical unit's relation to other units) within a particular speech act or utterance." "In post-Saussurean linguistics this word is opposed to paradigm (paradigmatic)" (149). A paradigm is a "system of relationships that connect [every sign] to other signs by resemblance and difference, before the sign appears in an utterance." The "paradigmatic structure offers the potential field for substitutions that result in metaphors, puns, metonyms and other figures. The notion of paradigm, if pushed far enough, yields unlimited semiosis" (146).

[7]See for example William Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey":

> And I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things. (Lines 93-102)

Another example is found in "Ode: Intimations of Immortality":

> Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
> The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,

Hath had elsewhere its setting,

And cometh from afar:

Not in entire forgetfulness,

And not in utter nakedness,

But trailing clouds of glory do we come

From God, who is our home:

Heaven lies about us in our infancy! (Lines 58-66)

[8]Woolf's conception of literary images was in all probability influenced by Roger Fry. In her biography of him, she quotes him demanding in 1910, "Why were they [i.e. English novelists] all engrossed in childish problems of photographic representation?" (Fry 164).

[9]Whatever the reasons were for the conflation of 'image' with 'figure of speech,' Frazer is certainly correct in pointing out that after the mid-seventeenth century, for various reasons (including the influence of philosophic empiricism with its emphasis on 'truth'), rhetoric and figures--particularly metaphor--were viewed with intense suspicion. One does not need to read much in the criticism of that time to find a strong irritation with rhetorical language and its use. Thomas Hobbes, the father of modern analytic philosophical thought, for instance, finds absurdity in

> the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, the Proverb sayes this or that* (whereas wayes cannot go,

> nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted. (36 [pt. 1, chapt. 5])

"Figures" only please the imagination, according to Hobbes; they cannot satisfy reason. Samuel Parker, too, complains in 1666: "All those Theories in Philosophy which are expressed only in metaphorical Termes, are not real Truths, but the meer products of Imagination, dress'd up (like Childrens babies) in a few spangled empty words." In other words, only minds too immature or feeble--minds that need crutches--will use "metaphorical Termes" as visual aids in their attempts to think about abstractions. (Parker seems not to be aware of his own wonderful use of figures in his diatribe against them!) John Locke's charge is more serious yet. He writes that "if we would speak of things as they are,"

> all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or person that makes use of them. (411 [book 3, chapt. 10]).

One result of the insistence on "perspicuity" (i.e. 'unadorned' speech, clarity and precision in expression) was that the term 'figure' (including

'metaphor') fell into disrepute. Frazer claims that 'image' was therefore substituted for 'metaphor.'

[10]One iconological study is Theodore Ziolkowski's Disenchanted Images. Ziolowski's objective is to demonstrate that the image as literary icon may *be*, that it may *do*, and that it may *mean*--it may be a theme, it may function as a motif, and it may mean as a symbol. Because Ziolkowski limits his use of 'image' to refer to specific objects within literature (i.e. actual icons: statues, portraits, and mirrors) the application of his work is restricted as well. Nevertheless, he does demonstrate that an image, within a given literary context, may be a theme when that theme is tied to a specific object which it constructs as well as defines. An image may also function as a motif when it becomes a part of a larger situation, and it may mean as a symbol when it signifies something other than itself; that is, when its presentation is concurrent with its representation.

[11]Squier's definition of 'image' implied in the separation of setting, image, and symbol is quite common. Ziolkowski, for instance, explains that one view of image in a literary context is image as a reference to a specific object other than that figuring on the level of furniture or landscape required by the narrative, but not carrying the meaning of what is generally called a symbol.

[12]The medium of literature has generally been discussed as 'form.' Evaluation of art on the basis of "an indissoluble bond between form and substance [or content]" (Valéry 157) has influenced criticism for over one hundred years. It is not only evident in Walter Pater's "artistic ideal" of a "perfect identification of matter and form" (Renaissance 111-14), and in Roger

Fry's theory of "pure form" (Vision and Design), as well as in T. S. Eliot's "objective correlative" ("Hamlet"), but is also still operative in Jane Novak's evaluation of Woolf's "balance between plot and structure" (62) and in Perry Meisel's assessment of To the Lighthouse as Woolf's greatest novel because distinctions between form and content cannot be drawn since form becomes content, and content form (Myth 8, 184). However, after this nod to traditional vocabulary, Meisel obviously finds the critical vocabulary of contemporary poetics much more useful in discussing the reality he finds in Woolf's texts. Using Gérard Genette's terms *récit* and *histoire* allows him a specificity that the inherited classifications of *content* and *form* lack.

[13]The question of how much Woolf's writing was influenced by the theories of art critics such as Roger Fry has drawn much critical attention. See John H. Roberts' "'Vision and Design' in Virginia Woolf" (1946), Carole O. Brown's "The Art of the Novel" (1977), and C. Ruth Miller's Virginia Woolf: The Frames of Art and Life (1988).

[14] One of these is Richter's apparently unquestioning acceptance of T. S. Eliot's concept of an "objective correlative." She builds her discussion upon it without testing its underlying suppositions or implications.

[15]Wheare implies that metaphor can be as circumspect as tea-table manners: through indirection, it finds direction out. This becomes evident particularly in her conclusion. Countering Elaine Showalter's criticism of what she perceives to be Woolf's timidity, Wheare writes:

> As we have seen . . . it was Woolf's view that the theoretical ideas which are embodied in a work of fiction are the more likely to be

taken on board by the (possibly skeptical) reader if he or she does not feel that they are being foisted upon them. (172)

[16]Perry Meisel's is one of these. His demonstration of "reflexive realism" in Woolf's fiction has direct implications for this study and will be discussed in some detail in Chapter III.

[17]See "Toward the Far Side" 357. Bishop explains that the word becomes a "channel for feeling." In a later article, Bishop adopts Michael J. Reddy's metaphor of language as a blueprint, rather than as a channel ("Metaphor" 26 ff).

[18]Compare Mieke Bal on focalization as determinative for the meaning of a text--particularly her discussion of Madame Bovary.

Chapter II

[1]Rimmon-Kenan's definition of story is "the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events" (3). This definition, of course, is a 'reader's definition' since the text must already be written before story can be "abstracted." A 'writer's definition' conceives of 'story' as a "non-verbal construct which narratology abstracts from the verbal text as well as from other sign-systems." It is the "common denominator of various types of narrative"--a "'pre-medium' aspect" (131).

[2]"Le message narratif," Communications 4: 4-32.

[3]Propp subordinates character to seven possible "spheres of action" within a narrative, and categorizes it according to its role as villain, donor, helper, sought-for-person and her father, dispatcher, hero, and false hero. Greimas, for whom characters are *actants*, also subordinates them to events (Rimmon-Kenan 34-35).

[4]Rimmon-Kenan points out that because action seems more "amenable to the construction of 'narrative grammars,'" formalists as well as structuralists often subordinate character to action (34). However, not only "so-called traditional critics . . . tend to reverse [this] hierarchy between action and character" (35). Roland Barthes, although he subordinates character to action in his 1966 "Introduction a l'analyse structurale des récits," considers the possibility of character central to narrative "as a Proper Name" in his 1970 S/Z (translated into English in 1974. See page 131). Fernando Ferrara, another structuralist, also makes character the central notion in his analysis (see 252, for instance).

[5]See the following:

--Virginia Woolf and Lytton Strachey, Letters 103.

--Selected Letters of E. M. Forster, eds. Lago and Furbank, II:32.

--Rebecca West, "Jacob's Room," New Statesman 4 Nov. 1922: 142.

--Arnold Bennett, "Is the Novel Decaying?" 87-89.

--Joan Bennett, Virginia Woolf: Her Art as a Novelist 107-10.

--J. K. Johnstone, The Bloomsbury Group 332, 334.

[6]Howard Harper's reading of Jacob's Room is inevitable for one who approaches this novel with the traditional expectations of story as that which

consists of a succession of significant events and incidents happening to someone. Harper's frustrated expectations of 'significance,' 'order,' 'knowledge,' 'stability' and 'human community' lead him to conclude that the novel is communicating an existentialist *Angst*--a "cry of despair" (Language 91).

[7]Historically, it *was* a direct commentary written in response to Arnold Bennett's "Is the Novel Decaying."

[8]The only 'explanation' Woolf offers for this claim is her now famous statement, "On or about December 1910 human character changed" ("Character" 421). What this statement 'means' is open to conjecture--but the essay is not without help on this. Since Woolf asserts that 'reading' character in fiction is analogous to 'reading' character in life (421), it would seem logical to extend that reasoning to imply that the way people interpret character in fiction informs the way people interpret character in life and vice versa. If that is true, then character in fiction must, of necessity, have some relation to the 'reality' of character in life. And therefore, to return to the "change" Woolf announces, it would appear that the change is one of perception. This conjecture assumes even more plausibility in the context of the rest of the essay "Character in Fiction," particularly with Woolf's questions, "What is reality?" and "Who are the judges of reality?" (426). The very fact that she can question reality implies that a universally agreed-upon reality has ceased to exist. Furthermore, Woolf's answer ("A character may be quite real to Mr. Bennnett and quite unreal to me") to the question, "Who are the judges of reality?" implies that the *individual* determines 'reality.' And the individual

determines reality, Woolf suggests, by actual observation and experience (see 433, 436).

[9]The last sentence in The Voyage Out reads:

> Across his eyes passed a procession of objects, black and indistinct, the figures of people picking up their books, their cards, their balls of wool, their work-baskets, and passing him one after another on their way to bed. (382)

If "people" is read not as 'representations of individuals' but as 'objects' and 'figures,' a reading the concluding sentence of this novel authorizes, then the pattern that emerges is the product of something other than of a story consisting of people involved in significant events. The emerging syntagmatic pattern is the product of a dynamic process grounded in a paradigmatic structure and depends upon every image in the text furnishing the context for every other image--including the images of characterization. See my Chapter V for a fuller discussion.

[10]See Gass. He challenges the notion that words are transparent windows with his claim that they are "opaque as my garden gloves and trowel, objects which, nevertheless, may vividly remind me of spring, earth, and roses" (48-49). As do the actual objects, their literary re-presentations as images may serve to "remind." Gass objects to the definition of a literary image as "sensation"; he asserts that an image is "general schema, indistinct and vague" (47) and should remain such in the reading process so that images, which are words, may function as "signposts, handles, keys . . . [to] express, instruct, command, inform, exhort . . . serve" (47-48).

[11]Rawdon Wilson, at least in part, addresses the question of how characters come into being with his classifications of that which has been written on character. His discussion is organized under four headings:

> (1) that characters are products of the author's mind--memories, encapsulations of his experience or else, (one might say) split-off slivers of his mind or self; (2) that characters are functions of the text in which they appear--embodiments of theme and idea--to be considered much as tokens, pieces, or counters in a game; (3) that characters are entirely artificial, constructs to be analyzed in terms of the compositional techniques that have gone into their making; (4) that characters are, for the purposes of critical reading, to be considered *as if* they were actual persons, and the emphasis in criticism--its sole business, in fact--to discuss the response they engender in an intelligent reader. ("The Bright Chimera" 730)

Wilson points out that the four positions described above are not "mutually exclusive nor, given a critic's desire to hold a synoptic position with respect to character, does there seem to be a necessary order among them" (737). While a synoptic position that allows for eclectic choices in character analysis may seem to give the most freedom, it does nothing to establish the systematic approach Wilson calls for in an earlier article. He writes:

> Characters, like theme, like metaphor, like plot, like all content and technique, are there to be analyzed. Their natures, their processes, their attributes, their construction (let it be said) are

> open to intelligent discussion and, as a possibility at least, collegial conclusion. ("On Character" 193)

If one allows image to be the linguistic manifestation of a process, and if character is image, then the process that brought the product into being must be acknowledged despite the resistance of that process to rigorous and objective analysis.

[12]See Rimmon-Kenan 31-36.

[13]I am indebted to Shirley Neuman for calling my attention to the fact that "this whole conflation of 'procession' is an extraordinary prefiguring of passages in Room of One's Own and Three Guineas." E. L. Bishop's "Metaphor and the Functions of Language in Virginia Woolf's Essays" draws attention to the extent of Woolf's own intertextuality. Bishop writes: "Not only do phrases and sentences flow into new combinations through successive drafts, complete paragraphs slip their moorings and drift into different essays" (7-8).

[14]This is the expression used by Martin Price to describe E. M. Forster's method of characterization in A Passage to India.

[15]For examples, see Michael Boyd's "Virginia Woolf's The Waves: A Voice in Search of Six Speakers," Bonamy Dobrée's Modern Prose Style; Susan Gorsky's "'The Central Shadow': Characterization in The Waves"; and Keith M. May's Out of the Maelstrom.

[16]The primacy I am giving character does not ignore event. Although external events have been largely replaced in twentieth-century fiction by internal events, action is still very much a part of the text. Yet it seems to me that the category of event is largely meaningless: within the aspect of text,

event is subsumed within character; within the aspect of narration, the very act of perception engendering story makes event part of the impetus of writing and reading.

Chapter III

[1]W. J. Bate explains that the underlying concept of *Gesammtkunst* is exemplified in the

> eagerness to compose music that conveys a picture; in the desire to paint in such a way as to incite feelings ordinarily aroused by music; or in the use of . . . imagery that usually appeals to one sense but is also made to address another sense. (243)

[2]See Gérard Genette 33.

[3]Rimmon-Kenan points out that "modern self-conscious texts often play with narrative levels in order to question the borderline between reality and fiction or to suggest that *there may be no reality apart from its narration*" (94, emphasis supplied).

[4]Literary images are obviously not limited to narrative fiction. The fact that they can be found in all types of discourse (spoken and written) testifies to their culturally agreed-upon efficacy as words. Their *usage* determines how thoroughly their potential is exploited. As I pointed out in Chapter I, Virginia Woolf writes of prose being "debased" by a "thousand common uses" but claims that De Quincey demonstrates with his images that prose is not "quite so limited as the critics say" (Essays I:172). So while an image may simply be a

sign in a given discourse, its potential is much greater. What this 'much greater' is, is, of course, the discussion of this entire thesis.

[5]Although most novelists have not confined themselves to describing external events and their effects on characters, until Henry James, interiority was generally deemed less important in the novel. Some notable exceptions to this observation are represented in the works of Laurence Sterne and Jane Austen. By the time Virginia Woolf writes, many writers were exploring the possibility of structuring the novel on descriptions of internal events supplemented to a greater or lesser degree with exterior events. For instance, Dorothy Richardson's Pilgrimage and the short stories of Katherine Mansfield, James Joyce's work and that of E. M. Forster--all question the notion that 'reality' is best portrayed by a chronological arrangement of 'significant external events.'

[6]For a more detailed explanation of the notion that the reader actively participates in the production of textual meaning, see Wolfgang Iser's "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach."

[7]Roland Barthes explains in S/Z:

> The proper name enables the person to exist outside the semes, whose sum nonetheless constitutes it entirely. As soon as a Name exists (even a pronoun to flow toward and fasten onto, the semes become predicates, inductors of truth, and the name becomes a subject. (190-91)

[8]Erich Auerbach's Mimesis, tracing the consistent adherence to this pattern in Western literature from the time of Homer to the mid-nineteenth

century, finds a "shift in emphasis" occurring at the beginning of the twentieth century. Auerbach writes:

> In Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks we still have a novel structure consisting of the chronological sequence of important exterior events which affect the Buddenbrook family; and if Flaubert--in many respects a precursor--lingers as a matter of principle over insignificant events and everyday circumstances which hardly advance the action, there is nevertheless to be sensed throughout Madame Bovary . . . a constant slow-moving chronological approach first to partial crises and finally to the concluding catastrophe, and it is this approach which dominates the plan of the work as a whole. But a shift in emphasis followed . . . (547)

[9]A reader's perception of any one character progresses proportionately to the character's name drawing other images toward it. This view of character is expounded by William H. Gass. Its implications are discussed in much greater detail in my Chapter II.

[10]Erich Auerbach's "The Brown Stocking" in his Mimesis also attributes order in this section of To the Lighthouse to images.

[11]See, for instance, Perry Meisel's The Myth of the Modern in which he discusses the problem of precedence and the search for immediacy.

[12]See Elizabeth Abel's essay "'Cam the Wicked': Woolf's Portrait of the Artist as her Father's Daughter" for an erudite discussion of the connection of this image with both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay.

[13]See To the Lighthouse 33, 194, 196, and 240.

[14]Patricia Clements' article on Virginia Woolf's juxtaposing the image of a flowing stream (i.e. one of flux) with that of a glacier (i.e. stasis) is discussed briefly in Chapter I.

[15]I am indebted to Jorg Hasler's article "Virginia Woolf and the Chimes of Big Ben" for this conclusion. He writes that Big Ben functions in three significant ways: 1. it provides a "concrete spatial and temporal point of reference"; 2. it effects "transitions from one consciousness to another"; 3. it "constantly reminds us of the contrast between the external, quantitative time and the inner, qualitative time" (148-49).

[16]See also Mrs. Dalloway 8, 31-34, 54-58, etc.

[17]See also Mrs. Dalloway 100, 102.

[18]Rimmon-Kenan explains that Socrates' use of the term in the third book of Plato's Republic is in opposition to 'diegesis' with both refering to the representation of speech. 'Mimesis' is in reference to the illusion the poet tries to create "that it is not he who speaks." Aristotle "includes in it the notion of 'an imitation of an action.'"

> The polarization of diegesis and mimesis reappears under the names of 'telling' and 'showing' or 'summary' and 'scene' in Anglo-American criticism of the end of the last century and the beginning of this. 'Showing' is the supposedly direct presentation of events and conversations. . . . 'Telling,' on the other hand, is a presentation mediated by the narrator. (Rimmon-Kenan 106-107)

Erich Auerbach defines 'mimesis' as "the interpretation of reality through literary representation or 'imitation'" (554). Auerbach traces what he

calls the "levels" of literary representation from the classical Greek to the modern, implying a kind of evolution of realistic modes. While Auerbach recognizes the "constantly changing and expanding reality of modern life" (554), and the ambiguity of the term 'realism,' his expectations of 'mimesis' are rooted in empiricism. I am using the word 'mimesis' in this sense here, although I am well aware that the 'realism' of Virginia Woolf's novels cannot be judged by empiricist literary conventions. They simply do not 'measure up.' Thus, Graham Greene points out that the world of fiction, represented by writers such as Woolf, seems to have lost a dimension (115-16).

[19]Twentieth-century Reader-Response Criticism has stressed the need to remove the text from the centre of critical theory and to replace it with the reader. But critics have disagreed on the role of the reader and the locus of meaning (supposing meaning *has* a locus). While George Poulet sees the reader as being primarily passive and extracting meaning from the text, Wolfgang Iser sees the reader as actively aiding the writer in the construction of the text by filling in the 'gaps.' The reader becomes co-creator of the text, but, for Iser, meaning still resides in the text, even though that text is created jointly by writer and reader. Stanley Fish, on the other hand, argues that literature is not an object but an event and that meaning is what happens to the reader as he participates in the event. He writes, "The place where sense is made or not made is the reader's mind rather than the printed page or the space between the covers of a book" (134). Woolf's images appear to demonstrate Fish's model in that they facilitate a movement between the

printed word in its syntagmatic environment and the reader's mind to establish that which is perceived to be.

Chapter IV

[1]See my Chapter 2.

[2]Messerli's conflation of "point of view" (which connotes perception) and "voice" is quite traditional. (See Rimmon-Kenan 71-72.) Following Gérard Genette, Rimmon-Kenan separates 'point of view' into 'focalization' and 'narration.' The perceiving subject is the focalizer. While the focalizer may also narrate, focalizer and narrator are not necessarily the same.

[3]Booth explains:

> Whether we call this implied author an "official scribe," or adopt the term recently revived by Kathleen Tillotson--the author's "second self"--it is clear that the picture the reader gets of this presence is one of the author's most important effects. However impersonal he may try to be, his reader will inevitably construct a picture of the official scribe who writes in this manner. (71)

This explanation could be read to imply that the reader, rather than the author, thinks of the implied author as an anthropomorphic entity in the same manner in which the reader constructs "a picture" of character. However, a footnote cites a quotation from Tillotson's inaugural address at the University of London. Booth seems to agree with Tillotson's understanding of "the author's 'second self.'" Tillotson, adopting Dowden's discussion of George Eliot's

novels, explains: "'The second self . . . writes her books, and lives and speaks through them. . . . Behind it lurks well pleased the veritable historical self secure from impertinent observation and criticism'" (Tillotson, The Tale and the Teller 22; Booth 71).

[4]Because Rimmon-Kenan is highly dependent upon Genette's model for her synthesis, she must make a truce with him on the (more or less) autonomous nature of story (i.e. successive events) despite her claim that story has no "undisputed priority, whether logical or ontological" over text (8). Working through Propp and Greimas, she attempts to bridge Genette's lacuna, but she is quick to point out that her acceptance of the notion of autonomy is theoretical only (8). That she is uneasy with her mediation can be detected in her emphasis on the reader with which she concludes her poetics. She writes:

> Whereas the Anglo-American New Critics and the French Structuralists treated the text as a more or less autonomous object, the new orientation stresses the reciprocal relations between text and reader. (117)

[5]Charles Bally, one of Saussure's students, was the first to connect what is now stylistics with the science of language. Comparing Bally's theory with that of John Locke, Talbot J. Taylor writes that for Locke, "words are the names of thoughts, or through thoughts, of that which is represented in thought. Bally argues that thought is communicated in other ways besides naming" (28). What this "other" is has been the focus of stylistics since Bally. However, stylistic theories, whether they are based on Roman Jakobson's poetics which conceive of style as a structure *superimposed* on a linguistic

method, or on Michael Riffaterre's affective stylistics which holds that stylistic function consists of the 'differences' apprehended by the reader--style is generally considered an adjunct. That is, at least theoretically, stylistic features are deemed different from linguistic features. This separation, even though 'only' theoretical, poses real problems to my discussion of image as a reflexive linguistic product that testifies on the syntagmatic level to the paradigmatic structure that engendered it. An image defined thus cannot be separated from linguistic functions--not even theoretically. For this reason, as well, the term 'accent' is more consistent than 'style.'

[6]Jean Alexander attributes the form in Between the Acts to "Woolf's altered conception of character," but she defines this altered perception as one "which permits the simultaneous experience of two or more states of being without a wrench of transition from inner to outer. . . . the separateness of human individuality has been radically modified" (202). Alexander concludes her discussion by pointing out that

> while human life contains the potentiality of all the brutality of past life, and indeed must preserve the power of animal ferocity, it moves unconsciously towards what it must inevitably desire, an approximation to the all-inclusiveness of the universal mind. (220)

Although my contention is altogether different from Alexander's, it is interesting to note her attribution of the difference to characterization.

[7]Woolf carefully weaves images in Jacob's Room so that they qualify Jacob as the primary substance within the novel. For instance, Mrs. Durrant

is reported to have applied the noun 'distinction' to Jacob, to comment that he "was 'distinguished-looking'" (68). Immediately prior to this report is a description of Jacob's room: "The eighteenth century has its distinction," we are told. "Even the panels, painted in raspberry-coloured paint, have their distinction" (67). For a fuller discussion of Woolf's technique in accenting images to establish Jacob as the central object, see my Chapter III.

[8]Compare Woolf's comments in "A Sketch of the Past":

> Behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we--I mean all human beings--are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. (Moments 84)

This statement implies that Virginia Woolf questioned "the borderline between reality and fiction." While Rimmon-Kenan explains that some moderns texts seem "to suggest that there may be no reality apart from its narration" (94), Woolf appears to suggest that there may be no reality apart from its reading.

[9]I recognize the risks of using the mirror metaphor given that the position that language *mirrors* a universal and agreed upon 'reality' is now contested. Yet the image is attractive particularly in the context of this novel since Woolf 'resolves' (at least briefly) the unity/dispersal paradox primarily with emphasis upon this image. The grammaphone still sputters

"Un . . dis . . ." (201) as the people leave, but this image is contrasted with nature's applause: "The tree became a rhapsody, a quivering cacophony, a whizz and vibrant rapture, branches, leaves, birds syllabling dicordantly life, life, life, without measure, without stop" (209).

[10]See my Chapter III for a discussion of The Waves, especially the convergence of the sun and sea imagery.

[11]Generally speaking, until recently Between the Acts has had little favourable review. F. R. Leavis's comments on the "extraordinary vacancy and pointlessness" of this novel in his article "After To the Lighthouse" seemed to have set the tone for many subsequent reviews of this novel.

[12]James Naremore explains that "the novel places the reader in a kind of limbo between historical events, and between two sexual acts as well" (232). He explains that "we are between wars and between two decisive acts in the lives of an archetypal male and female" (234), but sees the form as primarily reflecting the "great problem that animates this novel"; i.e. Woolf's "anxiety that grows from an effort to discover a continuity and unity in life" (234). Woolf's "terrible sense of separation" is evinced, according to Naremore, in the tension of doubt reflected in plot, style, and structure (237). While Naremore convincingly supports his reading with details from the novel, the notion of the centred subject and its possible absence encourages another reading.

[13]Lanser equates this entity with the "'implied author'" (131).

[14]See Catherine Belsey: "Meanings are not fixed or given, but are released in the process of reading, and criticism is concerned with the range of possible readings" (20).

[16]Such a system would make Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, etc. as specific to twentieth-century life as is an eighteenth-century encyclopedia.

Chapter V

[1]Rimmon-Kenan's avoidance of this issue makes for some curious wording in Narrative Fiction. For instance, she writes that "the text can direct and control the reader's comprehension and attitudes by positioning" (120). Since the verbs 'to direct,' 'to control,' and 'to position' imply a conscious strategy (and thus a conscious subject), the attribution of these activities to 'text' makes that term a metonymy of the writer. Because the writer is not included in her description of the communication situation, she resorts to various tactics of which the above example is merely one. Another one is the use of a gerund in a statement such as: "Thus, placing an item at the beginning or at the end may radically change the process of reading as well as the final product" (120). Who but the writer would do the placing? The metonymy and the gerund mask the writer's involvement in the communication process, but they do not delete the writer from it.

[2]Woolf writes:

> I should never be able to fulfil what is, I understand, the first duty of a lecturer--to hand you after an hour's discourse a nugget of pure truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantelpiece for ever. (Room 5)

Her fiction is not any more amenable to 'wrapping up between pages' than is the discourse of her lecture.

[3]It is interesting to note that neither Genette nor Rimmon-Kenan discuss theme in their poetics. Yet theme has traditionally been considered an element of literature. A discussion of theme, of course, necessitates broadening the concept of "narrative content." Content cannot be confined a succession of events if theme is to be discussed. Surely it is as much a part of content as is event even though it cannot be reduced to a system.

[4]Textual evidence for the relationship between the paradigmatic structure and the empirical reality that influenced Virginia Woolf's perceptions have been studied by many. See my notes 1-4 for Chapter 1. That this study has not addressed itself to these issues does not mean to imply that they do not exist, nor does it mean to imply that they are insignificant. What this omission does recognize is the impracticability of any one study maintaining its focus when diversity becomes too great.

[5]This is true also for Genette. Only exclusion enables one to postulate an enclosed textual space; such a space is not intrinsic to any text. Even Genette's system has meaning only as it is related to a human reality outside of it. Rimmon-Kenan writes:

> Whereas the Anglo-American New Critics and the French Structuralists treated the text as a more or less autonomous object, the new orientation stresses the reciprocal relations between text and reader. (117)

She quotes from Wolfgang Iser's "Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response to Prose Fiction": "A text can only come to life when it is read, and if it is to be examined, it must therefore be studied through the eyes of the reader" (Iser 2-3; Rimmon-Kenan 117). She comments that "the written text is conceived of as having a virtual dimension which calls for the reader's construction of the unwritten text" (117). It seems to me that this "virtual dimension" can be conceived of as the relation between the syntagmatic structure and the writer's/reader's perception of an empirical reality.

[6]For greater elaboration on I. A. Richards' position, see my Chapter 1.

[7]That Woolf views these terms as synonymous is evident in her main criticism of Galsworthy: she writes that in his work, "whether we call it life, or spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off" (Essays II:105). A 1918 diary entry also equates reality with truth, and truth with life: "My theory is that for some reason the human mind is always seeking what it conceives to be the centre of things; sometimes one may call it reality, again truth, again life" (Diary I:205). If, as it appears from these examples, life, truth, and reality are, in fact, synonymous for Woolf, then her diary entry of December 31, 1932 is helpful. She writes of her wish to "sum up the whole of life" and defines that phrase as "a picture of all my friends, thoughts, doings, projects at this moment" (Diary VI:134)--in other words, "life" is a process, not a product. So are, by implication, "truth" and "reality."

[8]Woolf does not claim special powers or gifts as a writer; this "shock-receiving capacity" is not as much a quality as a desire to reconcile and bring together the two "sorts of being."

[9]In "Modern Fiction" (1924), Woolf questions Henry James's image of the circle in his Preface to The Awkward Age. James describes the "conceived arrangement" of his "material" in terms of a

> neat figure of a circle consisting of a number of small rounds dispersed at equal distances about a central object. The central object was my situation, my subject in itself, to which the thing would owe its title, and the small rounds represented so many distinct lamps . . . the function of each of which would be to light with all due intensity one of its [i.e. the central object's] aspects. (Art 110)

Virginia Woolf cannot agree with the "arrangement" this image suggests. Literature must reveal 'life.' And, she writes, "Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end" (Reader I:150). Just as Woolf cannot adapt Perugino's notion of beauty to her art because it does not relate to her own understanding of 'life,' so she revises James's image of the circle. The concern that her writing be faithful to her perception of 'reality' would be ludicrous if she did not believe that perception to bear directly on the dynamics inscribed in the text.

[10]Woolf's concern for communicating her perception of life and reality is evident already in this fictional text. This fiction is not organized by a carefully controlled plot structure that features exposition, incentive moment, complications, crisis, resolution, climax, and dénouement--all flavored with (if not built upon) a love interest. Consequently, this novel (as well as Night and

Day) has often been relegated to an inferior position in the Woolf canon. Critical texts, if they have included it at all, have included it as a foil to illustrate the extent of Woolf's development as novelist. It has not been considered part of the 'real' Virginia Woolf. Clive Bell (1924) calls the book a "remarkable failure"--an evaluation that has set the tone for many subsequent evaluations (454).

Concurring with Bell, David Daiches, for instance, criticizes the novel in 1942 for its apparent randomness. Daiches explains that The Voyage Out does have a plot of sorts:

> Characters are brought into relations with each other and in the process things happen, complications arise and are resolved, and in the course of this personalities are described and analyzed. (9)

But even though he is willing to concede that perhaps Woolf is doing something other with plot than what is usually done (12), his focus appears to be on the "somewhat lumpish exercises in observation and psychological analysis" (11) rather than on possible innovations. Primarily, he seems to be disturbed by what he considers to be lack of unity. The unity Rachel Vinrace provides is tenuous at best, according to Daiches. One gets the idea, he observes, that Woolf is more concerned with the quality of observation brought to bear on various subjects than with plot.

Daiches states that the form Woolf uses in this book, "the record of a series of events that happened to a number of people during a selected period of time" (13), is not the "proper form for the content." In Tom Jones, for instance, the novel is what happens. But here, the time-sequence seems

incidental--Woolf "could have illuminated her subject just as well by standing still" (13):

> Rachel Vinrace develops from immaturity to experience, and thence quietly to death, but the kind of meaning that Virginia Woolf is trying to get across to the reader does not really derive from that development, though at first sight it appears to. (14)

Just what "the kind of meaning" is that Woolf "is trying to get across to the reader," Daiches only implies with his observation that Woolf is not concerned with "timeless entities," but with creating "patterns within time" that are not chronological (14). Yet, he finds, "the world of shifting and dissolving things is continually being pushed away to make room for the more solid march of events." The result, he observes, is that the "reader wonders which he ought to believe--chronology, or the luminous fog that keeps interrupting it" (14). Daiches, therefore, finds The Voyage Out wanting--a struggle between form and content (16).

Mitchell A. Leaska describes it in 1977 as "a strange, difficult, and still unpopular book" (12). See also Frederick P. W. McDowell (1980) and David Dowling (1985).

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