

**University of Alberta**

**The Creation of the United Nations Organization as a Factor in Soviet  
Foreign Policy, 1943-46**

by

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**This thesis is dedicated to all of those without whom  
it never would have been completed**

## **Abstract**

The thesis explores in depth the negotiations to create the United Nations Organization through which Stalin sought to enhance the USSR's power and prestige via traditional, military-oriented means. Although the Kremlin was relatively successful at maximizing Soviet power within the structure of the UNO, its inflexibility on issues such as Poland, Latin American membership, and other issues antagonized its wartime allies, the USA and Britain. This developing fracture seriously undermined cooperation among the victorious great powers both within the new organization and more broadly. As a result, the process of founding the UNO proved to be both a significant cause and reflection of the degeneration of the wartime Grand Alliance into the Cold War.

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## **Introduction**

After the Great War shattered Europe, the League of Nations was created at the behest of American President Woodrow Wilson. This organization was founded with a grand purpose – to prevent a repetition of the horrors of World War I, and usher in a new age of international peace and prosperity, based on the principles of collective security and the rational resolution of disputes. The League failed to achieve this aim, with World War II breaking out less than two decades later. Despite this disappointment, during the Second World War another American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), revived the idea of an international organization dedicated to protecting peace and security for all nations. FDR thought that he was able to identify the causes of the League's failure, and how its new counterpart, the United Nations, could avoid the mistakes of the past.<sup>1</sup> He concluded that the League had failed primarily because power and responsibility had been spread too thinly among the organization's member countries, which left it indecisive and irresolute in times of crisis. Roosevelt's solution for overcoming this problem in the new organization was to concentrate power in the states that had both the greatest industrial and demographic power, and also an ability, proven by their cooperation in defeating the Axis, to work together politically and militarily in the interests of the collective good – the United States of America, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Republic of China. These powers came to be known as the

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'United Nations' (UN) can be a source of confusion. Originally, it was the collective name for the wartime alliance fighting Nazi Germany and its confederates. This usage of the term was first coined by FDR after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and then the name was formally adopted by twenty-six nations following the acceptance of the Declaration by United Nations on 1 January 1942, with several other nations joining later. Therefore, while the later United Nations Organization (UNO), the creation of which is the subject of this study, has been commonly referred to simply as 'the United Nations' in English, not all uses of the term from the period are related to the UNO. In accordance with common English usage, in this study the terms 'United Nations' and 'UN' will be used to refer to the United Nations Organization, not the wartime alliance, except in circumstances which could result in confusion, where 'UNO' and 'wartime alliance' will be used to differentiate the two.

‘Big Four.’<sup>2</sup> If these four acted in concert, no state or other force on earth would be able to resist their joint action, and thus they could serve as the guarantors of a new world order.

Of course, in order for this vision to become reality, Roosevelt needed to convince the other countries of the world to participate in it. Most notably, his plan required the active support of the other members of the Big Four. The consent of the Chinese was not difficult to obtain, as their relative weakness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made them eager to be accepted as leaders in this organization. Similarities in culture and political outlook, as well as Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s realization that the power of the British Empire was being eclipsed, meant that British support was also granted without serious difficulty. However, differences in ideology between the Soviet Union and the capitalist Western powers, as well as different wartime experiences which led to the USSR placing a higher priority on traditionally-defined military security, meant that winning the support of Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union was considerably more problematic. Stalin’s personal paranoia, fed by his Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, and combined with his Marxist-Leninist assumption of socialist-capitalist hostility, meant that the Soviet leader initially responded coolly to FDR’s endeavour. As the world’s only socialist state, the USSR would obviously be isolated within any global organization, which meant that it could potentially serve as a tool for the capitalist world to oppose and frustrate Soviet interests.

However, the new organization could also have several benefits to the Kremlin.

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<sup>2</sup> The term ‘Big Four’ is variously used, depending on the context, to indicate the states of the USA, UK, USSR, and China, or their respective leaders at the time, Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek respectively. Since the Chinese government played a smaller role in the war and in the founding of the new organization, sometimes the term ‘Big Three’ is used instead, to reflect the differences in geopolitical power. By the same token, once France was accepted in principle as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in the summer of 1944, the corresponding term ‘Big Five’ is sometimes used, although such usage was rare during the time and events that are the focus of this study, since France played very little role in founding the

Most notably, if it was effective in its mandate, it could help protect the USSR from future attack. A preoccupation with security was the driving force in Soviet foreign policy during the 1940s, as the country had been devastated by the Great Patriotic War. Twenty-five million Soviet citizens, two-thirds of them civilians, are estimated to have died, with some scholarly estimates ranging as high as 35 million.<sup>3</sup> Large areas of the western USSR were occupied and laid waste by the enemy – 70,000 Soviet cities, towns and villages were destroyed, along with 6 million houses, 98,000 farms, 82,000 schools, 43,000 libraries, 6,000 hospitals, and thousands of kilometres of roads and railway tracks.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, in a 6 September 1944 report, Nikolai Voznesensky, the chairman of the State Planning Committee (more often referred to as Gosplan), told Stalin and Molotov that the direct and indirect costs of the war totaled 3,047 billion 1941 rubles.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, any organization with the goal of preventing the repetition of such a catastrophe could benefit the USSR tremendously, and thus be of great interest to the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, feelings of being ‘backward’ compared to the West, and corresponding concerns regarding international prestige, were a significant issue in the Russian Empire, and were reinforced by the exclusion of the USSR from the ‘community of nations’ after the Bolshevik seizure of power. A leadership position in the new international security organization would serve as strong “empirical evidence,” which “confirmed for Stalin that his country had been fully recognized as a partner in managing the world.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, Roosevelt’s plan for a new international security organization, based on the cooperation of the Big Four, held both dangers and opportunities for the USSR. If the capitalist world turned the new body against the USSR, it could be used as a forum

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UN and determining its structure.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>5</sup> Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to*

for heaping abusive rhetoric on the Soviet Union, and possibly even constitute the foundation of an anti-Soviet alliance. However, if the great powers truly were able to work together, with mutual respect for each other's legitimate interests, it could serve as a useful vehicle for promoting the safety, prestige, and power of the USSR. As will be seen below, Roosevelt was able to convince Stalin to participate in the UN by persuading him that the latter would be the case.

However, once the USSR decided to support the endeavour, the Kremlin expressed several ideas for ensuring that the new organization was effective in achieving its purpose. These views did not always correspond with FDR's expectations and beliefs, which were evolving as the war progressed, and differing ever more markedly from those of Stalin, who remained committed to the conception of the organization that was first presented to him by Roosevelt during the Teheran Conference. Thus, the structure of the new organization had to be negotiated to accommodate these divergent conceptions. In contrast to Roosevelt's increasingly idealist vision of an organization that would be equipped to settle all possible sources of international tension, be they political, military, social, or economic, Stalin took a more hard-nosed view, whereby the UN would exist in order to forestall any attempts at aggression by a resurgent Germany or any other state. The Soviet leader believed that assigning the organization any other responsibilities would distract it from its true purpose, and thus weaken it. Stalin also tied the organization to the wartime alliance more closely than the British or Americans, consistently advocating that those states that bore the greatest burden in the war (i.e., the USSR) should be rewarded with commensurate power in the postwar world, which would be institutionalized in the UN. Thus, the Soviets showed little regard for the wishes of smaller nations, and sought to concentrate power in the hands of the Big Four to an even

greater extent than Roosevelt. As well, fears of isolation, or a breakdown in amity among the Allies, influenced Soviet attitudes towards the creation of the UN. While Roosevelt seemed to assume that harmonious relations among the victorious great powers would continue in the postwar period, Stalin sought to guarantee that if they did not, the organization could not be turned against the USSR.

These differing concerns and priorities were manifested by different stances on a wide range of specific questions during the successive rounds of negotiations to establish the UN in the period from the October 1943 Moscow Conference until the Iranian Crisis in the spring of 1946, which served as the organization's first test case. For example, the Soviets sought to counter their numerical inferiority relative to the capitalist states by obtaining membership for all sixteen of the USSR's constituent republics, and by retaining an absolute right of veto on all of the organization's activities, which would serve as an ultimate fail-safe if the organization ever proved hostile to Soviet interests. The organization's military effectiveness was to be supported by its own air force, and by giving the Security Council, dominated by the Big Four, the right to compel smaller states to provide strategically valuable territory for bases, from which the great powers could launch military action against an aggressor. The Western Allies held different views on all of these issues, which necessitated a process of mutual concessions and compromise in order to create the UN. Analysis of the degree to which the Soviet government was willing to depart from its positions or hold firm on these major issues, and a myriad of smaller ones, combined with archival records of instructions to the Soviet officials involved in the negotiations, paint a clear picture of Soviet concerns and wishes regarding the new international security organization. Stalin sought to create a body through which the victorious great powers could act quickly and decisively to crush any

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33.

state that threatened international peace and stability, without becoming involved in the internal affairs of its members, since the Big Four had different priorities.

These in turn reflect more general Soviet foreign policy attitudes and priorities for the postwar world. They illustrate that the Stalin régime was committed to indefinite cooperation with the other victorious great powers, which would be enshrined in the UN Security Council. The Soviet stance on different issues likewise show a utilitarian vision of the new international security organization, wherein its value would be measured by the extent to which it supported the Soviet goals of security and prestige and at what cost, in contrast to the more idealistic vision of Roosevelt. Frustration over these different conceptions of the new body would contribute significantly to hardening American attitudes toward the USSR as the end of war in Europe was drew near. Furthermore, while Stalin viewed the UN as a potentially valuable asset to the USSR, he was not willing to hand over full responsibility for Soviet security to an untested body. Therefore, he continued to pursue more traditional means of protecting his country, most importantly, the occupation of a series of buffer states in central and eastern Europe, which would serve as the battleground in a future conflict, sparing Soviet territory. While Stalin did not see these two approaches to enhancing Soviet security to be mutually exclusive, the USA did. The American government interpreted Stalin's policies as aggressive expansionism reminiscent of Hitler, particularly after the death of FDR and his replacement by Harry Truman. Soviet-American relations became increasingly strained, until the new international security organization became the anti-Soviet body that Stalin had originally feared. Thus, the process of creating the UN was both a cause and a reflection of the deterioration of the wartime Grand Alliance into the mutual hostility of the Cold War, which dominated the international arena for four decades.

Until now, academic scholarship has not examined Soviet views on the key issue

of the creation of the United Nations systematically or in depth. Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley provided a thorough examination of the American side in their 1997 book FDR and the Creation of the U.N., but this otherwise excellent monograph presents the Soviet perspective in an oversimplified manner.<sup>7</sup> The same is true of Ruth B. Russell's landmark study of the American perspective on the creation of the UN, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945.<sup>8</sup> The cursory glances that do exist in Western historiography are relics of the Cold War, which maintain a basic viewpoint that the Soviet Union joined the UN only with reluctance, in order to ensure that the USSR would not be diplomatically isolated by self-exclusion, or because making concessions to Roosevelt on the UN seemed to present a cost-effective alternative to compromises on more important disputes such as Poland. For example, Alexander Dallin's 1962 book The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives concludes that Stalin thought that the UN was of little importance, and joined it primarily "to avoid the stigma of nonparticipation and to prevent the body from becoming a hostile instrument."<sup>9</sup> This book remains the most specific study of the relationship between the USSR and the UN yet published in English, but aside from being out-of-date, it is also focused on Soviet behaviour within the organization, not during the crucial period of its inception. Most historians of Soviet foreign policy have traditionally taken a similar line to that of Dallin. For example, Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson maintain that after securing veto power, Stalin "showed relatively little interest" in the other organizational questions regarding the new body, a claim that this

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<sup>7</sup> Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

<sup>8</sup> Ruth B. Russell, Assisted by Jeannette E. Muther, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958).

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 25.

study will conclusively prove false.<sup>10</sup> Though he dedicates an entire chapter to “Soviet Diplomacy in International Organizations,” Alvin Z. Rubinstein expresses a comparable position, writing:

As World War II drew to a close, the enthusiasm of the Western powers for a new international organization was not shared in Moscow... The Soviet Union joined the United Nations as an act of accommodation, not conviction. Its aim was to ensure that the League’s successor would not become an anti-Soviet alliance... Stalin’s only interest in the United Nations was to ensure that it did not serve an anti-Soviet function or interfere with the realization of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe.<sup>11</sup>

The work of historians of the United Nations portrays Soviet participation in the creation of the UN in a similar fashion. For example, the 1993 Second Edition of Amos Yoder’s influential The Evolution of the United Nations System states that “During World War II Stalin decided to support the idea of the United Nations with the aim of maintaining the wartime alliance to prevent a resurgence of Germany and probably to prevent the capitalist nations from ganging up on Russia.”<sup>12</sup> While this statement is valid, it fails to appreciate the depth of Soviet interest in the new organization or the great importance that Stalin attached to it.

By the same token, scholars focusing on the UN have failed to integrate Soviet perspectives on the new organization into the broader picture of Soviet foreign policy during the transition from the Grand Alliance to the Cold War. In recent years, there has been a growing understanding that Stalin hoped to maintain a cooperative relationship with the West after the end of the Second World War, a view promoted ably by Geoffrey Roberts, most notably in his 2006 book, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War,

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<sup>10</sup> Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Second Edition* (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1984), p.70.

<sup>11</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, Fourth Edition* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 284-85.

<sup>12</sup> Amos Yoder, *The Evolution of the United Nations System, Second Edition* (Washington: Taylor and Francis, 1993), p. 5. Other notable works which take a similar line include Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), and Norrie MacQueen, *The United Nations Since 1945*

1939-1953.<sup>13</sup> My study supports this trend in the historiography. In addition, although none have pursued this subject in depth, several scholars of Soviet foreign policy have recognized its importance. Vojtech Mastny has gone so far as to claim that “Indeed, the Soviet handling of the United Nations project gives the best insight into the question of how the men in the Kremlin handled their critical choices.”<sup>14</sup>

Thus, in this study I will correct this longstanding oversight, and provide further insight into Soviet behaviour during the critical period 1943-46. Chapter One will set the stage for the creation of the new international security organization by exploring Soviet attitudes towards the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). This was a predecessor to the United Nations Organization (the ‘UN’ in UNRRA referring to the wartime alliance, not the security organization). In its dealings with UNRRA, the régime displayed a pattern that would be repeated throughout the building of the UN – hard-nosed negotiating and a brusque attitude (even with supposed allies) in order to gain as much as possible while conceding little, which resulted in tangible short-term victories but generated very little goodwill. This approach to world affairs would complicate inter-Allied relations in the longer term, most significantly, in the creation of the new international security organization. Chapter Two will examine the initial Soviet response to the president’s ambition to create the UNO, up to and including the time of the November 1943 Teheran Conference. While initially wary of an idealistic-sounding American proposal, Stalin began in this period to warm to the idea of the UN. However, this warming was based very much on the manner in which FDR initially presented the organization to Stalin at Teheran. The UNO was understood by Stalin as essentially a

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(London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-53* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

<sup>14</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *Russia’s Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 218.

vehicle for perpetuating three-power cooperation in maintaining international security after the war – in other words, a tool of three-power global military hegemony, albeit with democratic trappings to placate world opinion. The Soviet government would remain attached to this vision of the organization, and use it as the basis of their platform regarding the creation of the UN.

Chapter Three will discuss the development of the UN from December 1943 until the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in the late summer of 1944. In the course of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, most of the more mundane labour of preparing the UN was performed by representatives of the Big Three (with Andrei Gromyko heading the Soviet delegation), and all but the most controversial issues regarding the new organization were resolved. The Soviet positions taken at Dumbarton Oaks clearly illustrate their attitude to the UN – in brief, that it should be focused on international security, with effective power concentrated into the hands of the Big Three to the greatest extent possible, with as little concern for the smaller powers as was practicable (though some was needed to achieve an agreement with the more idealistic Americans and British and to ensure worldwide acceptance). As Roosevelt's views were clarified and modified, and the UN started to take a more concrete shape at Dumbarton Oaks, it began to depart increasingly from this Soviet vision of the body. Nonetheless, the Kremlin clung to its particular conception of the organization, focusing on a small number of issues on which it placed a very high priority, including membership for the Soviet Union's constituent republics, and unrestricted veto power for the victorious great powers. Chapter Four examines from the Soviet perspective the development of the UN from the autumn of 1944 until the end of the February 1945 Yalta Conference. During the Crimea meetings, agreements were reached on the most controversial organizational issues left over from Dumbarton Oaks, namely, the scope of the veto power for the

permanent members of the Security Council (the Big Four plus France) and the inclusion of two Soviet republics (Byelorussia and Ukraine) in the General Assembly. The Soviets were seemingly successful in gaining acceptance of their stance on specific issues, and Soviet optimism regarding the UN reached its zenith.

However, the actual utility of these negotiating victories was soon revealed to be limited, as illustrated by Chapter Five, which explores the rapid deterioration in Soviet-Western relations in the two months after the Yalta Conference and then analyzes in detail the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco from April to June 1945. In this conference, all those states deemed worthy of UN membership were invited to take part in discussions to create officially the new international security organization. However, by the time that it opened, inter-Allied relations were already becoming increasingly problematic, due to FDR's death and disputes over issues such as Poland. Though the Americans and British usually (but not always) adhered to the previous UN-related agreements made with the Soviets at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, this cooperation took on a somewhat grudging tone. The Big Four did not in any practical sense present a 'united front' of leading powers working in cooperation, as Moscow had previously hoped. Molotov's highly abrasive attitude at San Francisco compounded this problem significantly. Upon Molotov's departure partway through the conference, this attitude was softened only moderately by Gromyko, who in turn was hamstrung by a longstanding unwillingness to depart a hair's breadth from his instructions, which were often slow in arriving from Moscow. Thus, on a wide range of issues (such as the chairmanship of the conference, and disputes over the acceptance of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, and Argentina as participants in the conference) the Soviets became increasingly isolated and were subjected to extensive criticism by most of the world. Tensions rose, goodwill diminished and Soviet obduracy grew as the UN seemed

not to be delivering what the Kremlin had hoped. Chapter Six will conclude this study with an examination of the first ‘test case’ of the new body, the Iran Crisis of 1946. The dispute centred on the Soviet failure to withdraw their occupation forces from Iran as scheduled after the war’s conclusion.<sup>15</sup> The UN was used to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet occupation, and Stalin blamed this mobilization on American scheming. The USSR was subjected to abundant criticism and strong pressure backed by the overwhelming majority of the UN, and Moscow’s fears regarding the new organization appeared to come true. This very distinctly illustrated the Soviet failure to obtain what they had sought through the UN, and again tied in to the Kremlin’s concerns of isolation and their heavy-handed responses that developed into the Cold War.

This study utilizes a variety of different sources. Official American, Soviet and UN records of the Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco conferences provide a detailed picture of the evolution of Soviet stances on issues related to the creation of the new international security organization, which in turn reveal Soviet foreign policy priorities for the postwar world. Archival research, including the *fonds* of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov from Moscow’s Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) sheds further light on these questions. In particular, earlier drafts of Soviet platforms, and instructions from Moscow to its representatives, show the Kremlin’s motives, as well as its ideal vision of the organization, before concessions and compromises had to be made. Correspondence between the governments involved – sometimes through diplomatic channels and at other times, direct communication between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill - add considerable depth to this picture, illustrating not only what was most valued by the Soviet leadership, but also how the

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<sup>15</sup> With (somewhat reluctant) US acceptance, the Soviets and British formally agreed to jointly occupy Iran during the war to stifle pro-Axis sentiment and safeguard oil supplies. After the war, the British withdrew from their sector as scheduled, while the Soviets did not, and also sought oil

Kremlin chose to portray the interests of the USSR to the outside world. The diaries, memoirs, and personal papers of numerous participants in the UN negotiations from all sides are available, including works by Andrei Gromyko, the chief representative of the USSR during the UN negotiations, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., the American Under Secretary of State and one of the primary forces in the organization of the UN, Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador to the USSR during the critical latter stages of the war, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, the chief British negotiator at Dumbarton Oaks. These personal accounts add significant nuance to our understanding, by revealing unofficial discussions and issues of personality and diplomatic style that official records fail to capture. When analyzing these documents, this study examines not only what the documents say explicitly, but also what they suggest regarding Soviet attitudes towards the new organization, incorporating an awareness of the broader international and political context, and of the perceived interests of the Soviet régime, as shaped by Marxist-Leninist ideology and Stalinist modes of governance. Careful consideration of how the Soviets presented their demands will be instrumental in gauging Moscow's attitudes towards questions broader than those related strictly to the founding of the UN. Since many of the personal accounts were written during the Cold War, caution has been exercised when using sources by Westerners who may have held a strong bias against the USSR.

In summary, this study will add a thorough, Soviet-focused counterpart to the existing literature on the origins of the United Nations. It will address not only the key Soviet role in shaping the organization, but also what the process of the UN's creation reveals about the hopes, fears, expectations, and most importantly, priorities of the Stalin régime during the crucial period 1943-46. The negotiations that created the UN both

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concessions and supported communist and Azeri separatist movements.

influenced and reflected the gradual degeneration of wartime cooperation into suspicion and then hostility, so this study will add directly to our understanding of the origins of the Cold War. It will likewise significantly complement our analysis of other Soviet foreign policy decisions during that dramatic era, such as the occupation of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the UN is increasingly active as a mediator in world conflicts, and this study will help to clarify the extent to which the USSR was responsible for the current structure of the UN, which could inform the ongoing debates regarding UN reform. Thus, this project hopes to contribute to current scholarship in a variety of ways.

## Chapter One – Soviet Relations with UNRRA

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was founded on 9 November 1943, primarily on the initiative of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. According to the preamble of its founding agreement, UNRRA was created to ensure that:

Immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services.<sup>1</sup>

The American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt summed up UNRRA's primary function more succinctly, saying the organization "shows we mean business in the war in a political and humanitarian sense, just as surely as we mean business in a military sense."<sup>2</sup>

The creation and operation of UNRRA clearly illustrate the attitude of the Soviet government towards participation in international organizations with its wartime allies. The Kremlin's posture regarding this body closely paralleled the Soviet outlook towards the later United Nations Organization (UNO, or more often, just the UN). Both UNRRA's official history and the archival records of Molotov's Secretariat show that throughout its tenure, the Soviet régime treated UNRRA as essentially a vehicle to promote Soviet interests in a very direct manner. In other words, the Soviets wished to get as much material from the body as possible, while contributing as little as was

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<sup>1</sup> "The Agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 9 November 1943," in United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, under the direction of Chief Historian George Woodbridge. *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Three Volumes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), Volume One, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Radio bulletin concerning the official creation of UNRRA, 11 November 1943, in Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter AFPRF), Fond of the Secretariat of V.M.

feasible. At the same time, the Soviets strongly pushed for a power structure within UNRRA that maximized the influence of the USSR. Establishing a pattern that would be firmly adhered to in the UNO, with regard to UNRRA the Soviets expressed a desire to share power only with their two most significant Allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, while seeking to limit the voice of the other, smaller Allies. In the short term, this approach evidently led to the Soviet Union and its closest comrades of the period (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) obtaining larger amounts of material aid than they would have otherwise. However, despite often heartfelt efforts by UNRRA's other member states to maximize cooperation, the brusque and transparently cynical attitude consistently displayed by Soviet officials undermined inter-Allied goodwill, and significantly lessened the likelihood of more heartfelt cooperation over an extended period of time, and thus likely detracted from Soviet prosperity and security more than it contributed.

In this case of UNRRA, as with the later United Nations Organization, the Soviet régime jealously guarded its status as a great power. In the organization's preliminary stages, the Soviets treated the new body warily, as it was at the outset solely under British control. When on 24 September 1941 the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden presented to the other Allies a resolution proposing that a bureau be established by His Majesty's Government to collate and coordinate estimates of postwar needs, with the intention of provisioning Europe in the most efficient manner possible, the Soviets were the only participating government to oppose parts of the resolution.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet government objected to the enterprise being under the auspices of the British government,

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Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 116.

<sup>3</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 10. The other participating states were Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, as well as representatives of Charles de Gaulle's 'Free French'. The US joined shortly after their entry into the war in December 1941.

and proposed instead that it be placed under inter-Allied control, with equal representation for all governments. Thus, they never sent a representative to the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (more commonly referred to as the Leith-Ross Committee, after its Chairman, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British government) or submitted estimates of postwar needs to this body.<sup>4</sup> Instead, in January 1942, they formally proposed the establishment of an international organization in place of the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau, which succeeded the Leith-Ross Committee, and was staffed entirely by British officials.<sup>5</sup> While the details of the proposed organization were never worked out, the proposed international organization would not have been under exclusive Soviet, or even necessarily exclusive great power control. However, an international organization in which all Allies had representation would still have given the USSR more power than it had in the exclusively British-controlled Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau, so was preferable to the Stalin régime.

As the international organization to replace the Bureau began to take shape, the Soviet desire to keep as much control in the hands of the Big Four as possible became clearer, illustrating a very similar approach to that which they would take to the UNO. In a conversation dated 15 December 1942, therefore, shortly before the detailed negotiations that led to the founding of UNRRA, Molotov indicated to the US Ambassador to Moscow, William H. Standley, that the Soviets supported the idea of an aid organization in principle, but also that the leadership of any such body was of prime importance to the Soviet régime.<sup>6</sup> When significant negotiations between representatives of the Four Powers (USSR, UK, US, and China)<sup>7</sup> got underway in January 1943, the

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Extract from the Journal of V.M. Molotov, 29 January 1943, in AFPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> While generally accepted as one of the Four Powers, China made few demands or even

British suggested that the four-power Executive Committee that they had previously proposed lead the organization be expanded to a seven-member Policy Committee. This was primarily intended to appease the smaller countries, and to give more formal power to Canada, which was a key provider of the supplies that were to be distributed.<sup>8</sup> Under direct instructions from Moscow, the Soviet delegation opposed this revision of the leadership, citing a concern for efficiency.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the Soviets sought to ensure that the composition of the Policy Committee would not be considered a precedent for the executive body of any future United Nations bodies, where more controversial issues could be addressed.<sup>10</sup> The Soviets were successful in preventing the broadening of the Executive Committee as membership in what was eventually named the Central Committee was limited to the Four Powers, although the Canadian chair of a newly-formed Committee of Supplies was permitted to attend those meetings on policies affecting the provision of materials.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, the Soviets (for the most part unsuccessfully) advanced the idea that decisions be made in the Central Committee by unanimous decision, thus giving them *de facto* veto power.<sup>12</sup> Whatever its gains in efficiency, a power structure centred on a relatively small executive body that also required the consent of all participants would have maximized the level of Soviet authority. Under Stalin's instructions, the Soviets also sent representatives to all four major advisory committees, and all five technical advisory committees, one of only eight

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substantive proposals throughout the creation of both UNRRA and the UN, and thus influenced the respective organizations very little.

<sup>8</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Memorandum from office of V.M. Molotov to Soviet Embassy in Washington, 5 February 1943, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 6, and message to Soviet Embassy in Washington, dated 5 February 1943, AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora No. 100, Papka No. 11, p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16. Canada and France were eventually given membership in the Central Committee in August 1945, and Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia were added in March 1946.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17. However, despite unanimity not being required, for most of its existence decisions were reached by unanimous consensus, or else decisions on controversial issues postponed. *Ibid*,

countries to do so – and two others were the close Soviet allies Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.<sup>13</sup> This of course would similarly allow the Soviets to voice their opinion as much as possible, and thus, the Kremlin's attempt to exercise as much control as possible over the new body was apparent.

Again, in a manner consistent with their later actions regarding the UNO, the USSR expressed a wish for UNRRA to be a very narrowly focused organization, with a firm respect for national sovereignty. Initially, the Soviet proposals did not even envision a formal operating organization, presumably simply seeking the transfer of goods on a state-to-state basis.<sup>14</sup> The USSR even went so far as to propose that the activities of what would become UNRRA be limited to Europe only, which would logically increase the amount that they received by excluding the huge amounts allocated to China and other Asian nations from full consideration.<sup>15</sup> On the sovereignty issue, the Slavic nations successfully lobbied to include a provision in the UNRRA agreement whereby UNRRA activities would only be carried out “after consultation with and with the consent of the member governments.”<sup>16</sup> This Stalinist preoccupation with ensuring that the new international organization in no way posed a threat to Soviet sovereignty would be similarly displayed during the negotiations to create the UNO.

Once the organization was in place, the USSR simply used it to obtain as many resources as possible for themselves, demonstrating little concern for the needs of other countries. To a large extent, this was certainly easy to understand given the desperate

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pp. 54-56.

<sup>13</sup> Draft of Instructions to the Soviet Delegation to the First Session of UNRRA, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 128, Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 76. The main advisory committees were regional committees to deal with Europe and the Far East, as well as one for Financial Controls, and one for Supplies. The technical advisory committees were assigned to the areas of agriculture, displaced persons, health, industrial rehabilitation, and welfare. The other five states to join all of these were Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, the US, and the UK.

<sup>14</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 30.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

need for postwar reconstruction in the USSR. A draft of instructions from Molotov's office to the Soviet delegation to UNRRA's first session clearly states that aid should be made available based first of all on membership in the United Nations alliance, and secondly based on the needs of countries that suffered most from enemy occupation, and who were actively involved in fighting.<sup>17</sup> These instructions were carried out faithfully during UNRRA's first session and thereafter.<sup>18</sup> This principle - that nations should be given influence or support based on their wartime performance - was likewise advocated very frequently by the USSR during the negotiations to create the UNO. However, the callous attitude of the Soviets and general disregard for smaller states displayed by the USSR was problematic to the other UNRRA participants. It should be noted that assistance to the Soviet Union was actually, and uniquely, divided into two separate assistance missions - one to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and one to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The precise reasons for this are unclear. However, since the Soviet request for assistance took place after the San Francisco Conference (see Chapter Five) the precedent of separate membership for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs had already been established. In fact, the preference of the American government was that all participants in the San Francisco Conference also be entitled to membership in UNRRA, despite the latter's distinct status.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs were accepted as UNRRA members in their own right in August 1945.

This Soviet disposition to pursue their own ends with little regard for other nations or even efficiency was illustrated in a number of ways. For example, in July 1945, the Soviet Union, along with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, criticized UNRRA

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<sup>16</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> Draft of Instructions to the Soviet Delegation to the First Session of UNRRA, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 127.

<sup>18</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 338.

<sup>19</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 233.

for having shown discrimination in favour of Greece, despite the fact that Greece had a more serious food shortage than any other liberated country, and that most of the aid assigned to Greece consisted of foodstuffs.<sup>20</sup> The ‘Slavic Group’ (consisting of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland)<sup>21</sup> dubiously but repeatedly complained of being discriminated against at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council (the highest policy-making body within UNRRA, consisting of one representative from each member country, which met six times during the period 1943-46) held in London, England 7-25 August 1945.<sup>22</sup> In July 1946, UNRRA’s Program Subcommittee, which was primarily responsible for ensuring that contributions to and distributions by UNRRA were made on an equitable basis, recommended an increase in the amount of aid provided to Austria. The Soviet Union and its Yugoslav ally (which consistently supported the USSR on controversial issues) as well as China (which tended to vote unpredictably, with frequent abstentions) opposed this.<sup>23</sup> By the same token, the Soviet delegation repeatedly opposed a downward revision of the proposed aid to Czechoslovakia.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, it was noted that the representatives of the Eastern European states frequently used their reports to the Committee of the Council for Europe (the broadly-based main advisory body to UNRRA for European affairs) to criticize the Administration. Aside from complaints about UNRRA’s handling of the displaced persons (to be discussed below) the main theme of these complaints was that UNRRA was giving too much aid to Greece and Italy, while the aid to the Slavic Group was too little and too slow.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Food aid constituted \$39.2 million of the \$56.8 million in assistance received by Greece in the period. Woodbridge, Volume One, pp. 351-52.

<sup>21</sup> It was the policy of UNRRA to work with whatever authority actually exercised administrative control over a given area, hence they worked with the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin Committee) without formally supporting them (or the London-based Government-in-Exile recognized by the western Allies) as the legitimate régime.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 353.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

<sup>24</sup> The USSR was supported on this issue by France, but not China. *Ibid*, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 64.

In addition, the Soviet appeal for assistance came comparatively late, which made its provision more troublesome, a problem amplified by a Soviet expectation of rapid delivery.<sup>26</sup> Just before the August 1945 Third Council Session, the Soviet delegates presented a very large and detailed request for \$700 million in aid, while the total needs for UNRRA programs that year were estimated to be \$1.5 billion before the Soviet request.<sup>27</sup> This amount proved to be impossible to provide. On 24 August 1945, an agreement was reached to provide \$250 million in aid to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs.<sup>28</sup> To begin the agreed provision of supplies, ships bearing UNRRA goods had to be diverted to Odessa from other recipient nations.<sup>29</sup>

Though these amounts were fairly small relative to other UNRRA programs (see Appendix B) and the Administration acknowledged that these programs alleviated “only a small part” of their needs, ultimately, the two UNRRA missions contributed significantly to the USSR.<sup>30</sup> By the time that the two missions closed (most deliveries were complete by March 1947) the programs had been 99.61% fulfilled.<sup>31</sup> This aid took a wide variety of forms. As shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below, and in more detail in Appendix B, food was the most significant component of the goods received, accounting for roughly half of the total value of goods received (approximately 48.7% of the supply shipments to the Byelorussian SSR, and 52.8% of the shipments to the Ukrainian SSR).<sup>32</sup> Meat and meat products were in very short supply in these regions in the period, and constituted the largest share of the food allocation. Fats and oils, fish and fish products,

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<sup>26</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 236.

<sup>27</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 41.

<sup>28</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 233.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 234.

<sup>30</sup> Records of the Program Subcommittee of the UNRRA Central Committee, 28 January 1946, quoted in Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 378.

<sup>31</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 256.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 250.

and dairy products were also important elements of the food aid programs.<sup>33</sup> Surplus US Army Quartermaster supplies (mostly canned meat, stabilized butter, cheese, sugar, jams, and peanut butter) were also present in large quantities, as they could be obtained at a very low cost by the Administration.<sup>34</sup>

**Table 1.1 – UNRRA Supply Deliveries to the Byelorussian SSR<sup>35</sup>**

| Categories                         | US<br>Equivalents   | Dollar | Gross Long<br>Tons |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------------------|
| Food                               | \$29,591,800        |        | 101,396            |
| Clothing, Textiles and<br>Footwear | 7,044,200           |        | 5784               |
| Medical and Sanitation             | 991,100             |        | 646                |
| Agricultural<br>Rehabilitation     | 5,412,100           |        | 8,050              |
| Industrial Rehabilitation          | 17,780,800          |        | 25,977             |
| <b>Total</b>                       | <b>\$60,820,000</b> |        | <b>141,853</b>     |

**Table 1.2 – UNRRA Supply Deliveries to the Ukrainian SSR<sup>36</sup>**

| Categories                         | US<br>Equivalents    | Dollar | Gross Long<br>Tons |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|--------|--------------------|
| Food                               | \$99,437,700         |        | 315,748            |
| Clothing, Textiles and<br>Footwear | 17,207,700           |        | 16,225             |
| Medical and Sanitation             | 2,445,500            |        | 1037               |
| Agricultural<br>Rehabilitation     | 16,988,900           |        | 38,069             |
| Industrial Rehabilitation          | 52,119,500           |        | 95,970             |
| <b>Total</b>                       | <b>\$188,199,300</b> |        | <b>467,049</b>     |

As can be seen from the tables, the second most important category of goods provided to the Soviet republics was industrial rehabilitation supplies. The largest component of the assistance provided under this category consisted of electrical power

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 251.

<sup>34</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 431.

<sup>35</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 250.

stations, a form of assistance not provided to other nations. The Soviet republics desired these so acutely that they sacrificed the receipt of other supplies in order to get them.<sup>37</sup> The United Kingdom had already agreed to provide these to the USSR under a separate agreement, however, both the British and Soviet governments found it convenient to reclassify these as UNRRA supplies, as a means to expedite their completion and ease the Soviet difficulties with payment.<sup>38</sup> Aside from these, the most important industrial rehabilitation supplies consisted of building supplies (tools, lumbering and construction equipment) valuing \$2,691,200 for Byelorussia and \$11,003,300 for Ukraine and of a combined total of \$3 million worth of raw metals (mainly lead, copper, and zinc) which were primarily used to rebuild the telecommunications and electrical infrastructures.<sup>39</sup>

Clothing, textiles, and footwear comprised the third most important category of supplies for both missions, by value. For both of the Soviet republics, footwear constituted the largest segment of this category, in terms of both value and tonnage. Woolen textiles were next in importance, followed by raw wool and leather for footwear soles and uppers.<sup>40</sup> Finished clothing and footwear (which were often second hand) was generally provided free of charge through local soviets and welfare institutions, whereas raw materials tended to be processed in small cooperatives and sold inexpensively within the rationing system.<sup>41</sup>

Agricultural rehabilitation supplies were of slightly less value but composed a greater tonnage of the supplies provided. The most urgent agricultural need was for seeds, mostly vegetable seeds, supplemented by grass and clover seeds needed for

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 472. The need for these power stations was extreme, given the wartime damage to existing facilities, including the destruction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station near Zaporozhe, which was the largest hydroelectric dam in Europe and the largest power plant in the USSR at the time of its completion in 1932.

<sup>38</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 398, 471; Volume Two, p. 252.

<sup>39</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 252; Volume Three, p. 441, p. 493.

<sup>40</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, pp. 439, 491.

effective crop rotation in the absence of artificial fertilizers. UNRRA contributed 5,276 and 18,240 gross long tons of seeds to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs respectively.<sup>42</sup> The other urgent need for the agricultural sector was tractors. UNRRA estimated that only 25-30% of the tractors in the Byelorussian SSR and 34,000 out of 90,000 tractors in the Ukrainian SSR were still in usable condition after the war, and many of those that did remain functional were in significantly sub-optimal condition.<sup>43</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the war, Nikita Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars for the Ukrainian SSR, initially estimated that the Ukrainian grain harvest for 1946 would be less than 40% of prewar production.<sup>44</sup> Though many other countries received far more agricultural machinery than the USSR, tractors were in very high demand and short supply the world over. Nonetheless, UNRRA provided 780 and 1500 for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs respectively, even going so far as diverting some from Italy and Greece to do so. This diversion of resources from other programs to the USSR was again indicative of the lack of concern by the Soviets for the reconstruction needs of other countries when in conflict with their demands. Taking tractors which were originally designated to Italy is especially exemplary of Soviet attitudes, as Italy was already slated to receive significantly fewer tractors than the USSR, but the Soviets continually showed even less sympathy for the needs of former enemy states than for the other Allies.<sup>45</sup>

Perhaps the most bizarre incident in the UNRRA missions to the two Soviet

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<sup>41</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 255.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 254.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>44</sup> Sergei Khrushchev, ed. *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 2: Reformer (1945-1964)* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), pp. 5-6.

<sup>45</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 255. By value, Italy received less than half as much agricultural machinery as the two Soviet republics combined, but Austria and China each received approximately 1.5 times more, Greece slightly less than twice as much, Czechoslovakia more than twice as much, Yugoslavia almost four times as much, and Poland more than four times as much. Woodbridge, Volume Three, pp. 436, 440, 444, 448, 464, 472, 484, 492, 496.

republics also occurred in the agricultural category. UNRRA provided a small amount of seed-cleaning equipment to various countries. Three general types were given – hand, power, and electrostatic. Electrostatic seed cleaners were a comparatively rare phenomenon (UNRRA noted that before the war, Czechoslovakia's highly developed seed industry featured only three) and were not mass-produced, but rather, made to order.<sup>46</sup> UNRRA was able to obtain a total of eight of these devices, and three were slated for delivery to Czechoslovakia, and five to Yugoslavia. However, Soviet officials at UNRRA's European Regional Office (ERO) in London and those working with the Mission in Minsk strongly insisted that they needed two of these machines in order to clean 400 tons of timothy-grass seed provided by UNRRA, which the Soviets claimed were contaminated with noxious weeds. Eventually, two of the eight available to UNRRA were diverted from Yugoslavia and given to the Byelorussian SSR. Shortly thereafter, a request was received by ERO from Soviet officials seeking instructions for the operation of the electrostatic seed cleaners. ERO responded with an offer to send an experienced operator to Minsk. The Soviets declined this offer, and UNRRA officials never received more information on these devices, and were left wondering if they were in fact even used at all.<sup>47</sup> The combination being illustrated here of Soviet behaviour being highly demanding with regard to their own perceived needs, callous or indifferent towards the needs of other receiving nations, and uncommunicative when questions arose, was very emblematic of Soviet behaviour towards both UNRRA and the UNO.

The final category, medical and sanitation supplies, constituted the smallest portion of both the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs, measured both by volume and by value. UNRRA observers found the Soviet medical system to be very well organized despite wartime disruptions, and found no serious epidemics in either republic. Thus, the

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<sup>46</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 486.

amounts were also proportionally small relative to other recipient nations, though some drugs and chemicals, hospital and dental equipment, and the major components of a penicillin production facility were all provided through UNRRA.<sup>48</sup> A thorough and detailed study of the goods received and their usefulness is outside the scope of this study. The main point of relevance is that the USSR very clearly did receive significant quantities of sorely needed supplies through the organization, and thus did benefit from it materially.

At the same time, while the organization was operating, the Soviet government consistently sought to restrict its contributions to UNRRA by every means possible. While this attitude was certainly comprehensible, continual insistence on special treatment in this regard, while successful in assisting domestic reconstruction in the immediate term, did little to promote inter-Allied goodwill. When combined with general Soviet attitudes of secrecy and indifference to the interests of others, which will be amply discussed below, Soviet policies and representatives tended to frustrate British and American officials a great deal. These frustrations in turn increased the level of tension within the alliance, and hampered efforts to build the new international security organization that would be the UNO. Numerous examples from UNRRA's experience support this contention. Neither the Soviet republics themselves (which was not surprising, as constitutionally they lacked foreign exchange assets of their own) nor the USSR as a whole made any contributions to UNRRA for aiding other nations, either in cash or in kind, beyond the administrative expenses allotted to them.<sup>49</sup> This policy of avoiding contributions was in accordance with instructions from Molotov to the Soviet

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 486.

<sup>48</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 256.

<sup>49</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 234, Volume Three, p. 500.

delegation issued before the first UNRRA Council meeting.<sup>50</sup> Of the total membership of 48, the only other UNRRA members who made no non-administrative contribution were China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia.<sup>51</sup> The Administration had hoped that the USSR would provide petroleum from facilities they had control over in Romania and in newly-Soviet territory that had been Polish before the change in borders, particularly as the intended recipients were Czechoslovakia and Poland, but the Soviets refused.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, as per Molotov's instructions, the Soviet delegation sought and obtained a post on the Committee of Supplies, giving Moscow a greater say in the procurement and provision of goods.<sup>53</sup> It was standard UNRRA practice for nations to pay for the goods they received if they were able, so that UNRRA funds could be preserved for use in the cases where the recipients were unable to pay. The Slavic and Balkan countries (that is, except for Greece, the USSR, and its closest collaborators) all sought to avoid paying anything for goods received, the only European countries to do so.<sup>54</sup> Yugoslavia and the USSR both treated the receipt of aid through UNRRA as a right and argued that they had consumed their own resources more rapidly during the war due to the promise of relief assistance from their Allies.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the Soviet contributions to UNRRA were negligible.

The Soviets even received exceptional treatment in this regard. In the autumn of

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<sup>50</sup> Draft of Instructions to the Soviet Delegation to the First Session of UNRRA, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, pp. 127-128.

<sup>51</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 500.

<sup>52</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 470.

<sup>53</sup> Draft of Instructions to the Soviet Delegation to the First Session of UNRRA, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 128.

<sup>54</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 95.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. From the time of the German invasion in June of 1941, until the end of the war, the USSR had received considerable aid from the Western Allies, mostly through the US Lend-Lease program, but also from Britain and Canada. In total, the USSR received over fifteen million tons of goods, including food, clothing, medical supplies, and raw materials in addition to military equipment. Approximately 10-15% of the planes and tanks as well as vast numbers of trucks and jeeps used by the Red Army were likewise provided free of charge. Alexander Werth, *Russia at*

1946, UNRRA faced a budgetary crisis in its supply programs, and judged it unlikely that it would be able to fulfill the deliveries to which they had committed. In response, they adopted what was called the 'two percent freeze' –that is, two percent of the supplies scheduled for delivery to all recipient countries were to be held back until it became more clear whether or not the Administration would be able to meet its agreements. To the dismay of UNRRA's Director-General's office, the Central Committee accepted the Program Committee's recommendation that the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs would be exempted from this 'two percent freeze'.<sup>56</sup> The basis of the Soviet claim for special treatment was that the goods that were to be affected by this freeze were already supposed to have been delivered. However, while UNRRA had pledged to attempt to deliver the goods as quickly as possible, rapid delivery had never been a firm commitment. The organization had simply stated that they would do their best to fulfill the plans by 30 June 1946 if the procurement and shipping of supplies could be arranged.<sup>57</sup> The only other programs to escape this obligation were relatively small emergency missions to Hungary and Korea, while similar emergency missions for China and Finland had to be dropped entirely due to a shortage of resources.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, it was UNRRA policy to divide shipping costs among receiving countries, so that recipients would cover the costs of the goods that they obtained, but those further from the point of origin would not pay more for shipping. However, in the case of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs, the Administration paid the shipping costs, thus resulting in a combined additional \$42 million worth of supplies being delivered.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, once again the Soviets received extraordinary treatment, which resulted in them receiving more

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*War, 1941-1945* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers Inc., 1964), pp. 625-627.

<sup>56</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, pp. 369-370.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p. 370.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, p. 369.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, p. 378.

goods and contributing less money than the norm.

The Soviet attitude towards the budget caused further friction within UNRRA. The 1944 administrative budget assigned the USSR 14% of the organization's administrative expenses, but in 1945 this was reduced to 10% due to Moscow's claims of difficulty in paying.<sup>60</sup> More harmfully, in September 1947, Soviet representatives protested against a \$5,000,000 liquidation budget set up and approved on 23 May 1947 to cover the final expenses involved before the organization became defunct. Instead, the Soviets proposed that these be transferred to other organizations along with the rest of UNRRA's assets. The issue was referred to UNRRA's Committee on Financial Control. Discussion of the issue in this committee was postponed twice because of the absence of the Soviet representative, likely a stalling tactic by the USSR, since there was little international support for the Soviet stance. On 23 March 1948 the matter was referred to the Central Committee, as the Soviet representative remained absent from the Financial Control Committee. The dispute was brought before the Central Committee on 8 April, at which time the Soviet representative successfully sought to have the item stricken from the agenda, as he had received no instructions in the matter. Finally, the matter was settled when the Soviet position was defeated by a majority vote on 2 June 1948.<sup>61</sup> The Soviet government still did not abide by this decision, and in protest, refused to pay the full amount of the administrative expenses allocated to them, becoming the only country other than Iraq (whose membership status was unclear after October 1946) to do so.<sup>62</sup> By the time of UNRRA's final termination in June of 1948, out of a total administrative budget of \$44,976,400, the USSR had paid \$3,046,000, (in addition to \$153,000 and

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p. 134.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 137. By this time the western Allies were already preparing their currency reform for Germany and the Berlin blockade was mere days away, as animosity between the USSR and the western powers had risen dramatically since the end of the war.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 138.

\$460,500 considered to be Byelorussian and Ukrainian contributions, respectively) in administrative expenses.<sup>63</sup> By comparison, the US paid \$19,280,000, the UK \$7,230,000 and China \$2,410,000.<sup>64</sup> Thus, while the USSR made a significant but fairly small contribution to the UNRRA budget, its stingy attitude toward contributing to the organization's expenses, and moreover, the months-long clash over what appeared to be an inconsequential matter regarding the liquidation of the organization, exemplified the uncooperative behaviour frequently displayed by the Soviet régime towards UNRRA.

Not only were the Soviets parsimonious regarding material contributions to UNRRA, they were similarly miserly in giving credit to the organization for its efforts. In addition to the criticism in Council for Europe reports mentioned above, the Soviets also frequently clashed with UNRRA over its attitude towards displaced persons (DPs). The Soviet régime, along with the other Slavic nations, tended to divide DPs into two categories: those who were 'good' and therefore worthy of assistance, and those who were 'bad' and therefore unworthy. The criterion for worthiness was whether or not the DPs wished to return to their home country, as the Soviets recognized no legitimate motive for not wishing to return, instead taking the stance that any reluctance to return could only be based on a desire to avoid the consequences of wartime collaboration with the Axis.<sup>65</sup> Thus, in many different instances and forums, they vociferously criticized the Administration for its perceived willingness to provide aid to collaborators.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, both the Soviets and Yugoslavs were highly critical of UNRRA providing aid to Yugoslav DPs who had made their way to Italy, and from there opposed the new

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<sup>63</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 500.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 500.

<sup>65</sup> Mark Elliot, *Pawns of Yalta* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 30-2; Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 486. Elliot's book provides a very thorough study of Soviet attitudes towards this issue, in particular, Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 8.

<sup>66</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 292.

Yugoslav régime.<sup>67</sup>

Also, UNRRA had a Public Information program that went to considerable lengths to communicate to the receiving public the source of the distributed supplies. Notes, posters, leaflets, and explanations on ration cards, labels on machinery and even brands on livestock were all utilized in various countries to accomplish this. However, in neither the Byelorussian nor the Ukrainian SSRs were these measures undertaken, as government officials claimed that the source of these supplies was well-known. Likewise, on the second anniversary of UNRRA's founding (9 November 1945) several prominent leaders from recipient countries offered "enthusiastic testimonies" regarding the Administration, which had a notable effect on US public opinion. Even though some of her closest allies followed this practice, the USSR was not among those who took part in praising the Administration.<sup>68</sup> In the autumn of 1946 Administration officials sought to increase the publicity of the two missions in the Soviet republics. However, Soviet officials persistently adhered to the view that the goods supplied by UNRRA constituted only a small portion of what was available, and of the goods needed, and thus, UNRRA deserved little credit or public gratitude.<sup>69</sup> In summary, the Soviet stance was very clearly one of seeking as much as possible from UNRRA, while contributing as little as possible, even in terms of positive rhetoric.

By the same token, from the time that UNRRA was established, the Soviet régime consistently treated the organization in a distant and disinterested manner sometimes almost bordering on the hostile. Under the Stalin régime, the USSR was reluctant to communicate readily and openly with UNRRA, or to provide information to

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<sup>67</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 259.

<sup>68</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 286. The leaders that did so were Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China, Regent Archbishop Damaskinos of Greece, President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, President Boleslaw Bierut of Poland, Prime Minister Ferrucci Parri of Italy, Prime Minister General Colonel Enver Hoxha of Albania, and Nikola Petrovic, Minister of

the organization, a pattern which was made clear from the outset. In the first place, the negotiations toward a formal agreement for the provision of assistance by UNRRA were extremely slow in making progress. As noted above, the Soviets first requested aid in August 1945, and by 4 October UNRRA's Director-General, Herbert H. Lehman, had approved a \$250 million assistance package, and accepted the Soviet republics as 'unable to pay' for the goods received. Plans for procuring the supplies had already begun a few weeks earlier, as soon as the Soviets had made clear what sorts of assistance they saw as most vital, and by the end of November 1945, UNRRA goods were on their way to the USSR, as noted above, in some cases having been diverted from other destinations.<sup>70</sup> However, despite the flow of goods, the Soviets were reluctant to sign a formal agreement with the Administration, due to disagreements to be discussed below. Only when Lehman threatened to stop the movement of goods unless a formal agreement was reached did the Soviets relent, and virtually identical agreements were signed with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs on 18 December 1945.<sup>71</sup>

The chief obstacle to a formal agreement was aligned with the general pattern of Soviet behaviour toward both UNRRA and the UNO, insofar as it was based on an aspiration to avoid scrutiny by outsiders. In this case, this meant that the number of UNRRA staff and their activities in the USSR were major sources of contention. The Soviets proposed that the size of the missions be limited to no more than ten people (from as few as five). While Lehman proposed staffs of about fifteen persons each (plus clerical personnel and a representative at seaports where goods would be arriving) and these numbers were only rarely reached in practice, the Administration opposed any fixed

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Commerce and Supply for Yugoslavia.

<sup>69</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 249-250.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, p. 234.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235.

limit on the number of staff.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, the Soviets continually rejected offers by UNRRA to provide industrial or agricultural rehabilitation specialists. The stated reason for this was that Soviet experts were suitably trained and far better accustomed to Soviet conditions – a claim that may have held considerable truth, but nonetheless still projected an image of indifference to the Administration.<sup>73</sup>

Similarly, visas for UNRRA personnel were consistently difficult to obtain. Initially, Lehman was forced to threaten the stoppage of supplies until entry visas were issued to the Ukrainian Mission, the first of the two to be undertaken. This firm response improved the visa situation only for a short time. Increasingly after the mission's first few months, staff members who left the country, even if for only a very short time, had difficulty securing permission to return.<sup>74</sup> In an even more disturbing effort to utilize UNRRA to meet its own ends, the Soviet government delayed issuing necessary transit visas for the separate Mission to Poland for several weeks, until after the US and UK governments extended formal recognition to the slightly reconstituted Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in July 1945.<sup>75</sup> This was in keeping with Soviet attempts to use both UNRRA and the UNO to compel Western acceptance of the Polish régime preferred by the USSR.

Furthermore, the Soviets strongly resisted allowing UNRRA personnel to travel in Soviet territory to observe the distribution of goods supplied by the organization.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204. Throughout the war the Soviet Union had a very troubled relationship with the Polish Government-in-Exile, and relations were formally severed after the Katyn Massacre was revealed by the Germans in March 1943. As a result, the Soviets backed an alternative régime, officially called the Polish Committee of National Liberation, but more commonly referred to as the Lublin Committee, from its creation in July of 1944. Soviet efforts to obtain Western recognition of the Lublin Committee as the legitimate authority in Poland were a significant source of friction among the Allies in the last months of the war, as will be discussed below, particularly in Chapter Five. Mastny, pp. 179-180.

<sup>76</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 236.

Although the final text of the agreement stated that the governments of the Soviet republics would “afford the mission opportunity to observe such distribution at all necessary stages” this was put into practice only reluctantly.<sup>77</sup> Firstly, the Soviets, led by Michail (*sic*) Menshikov, the Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas from 17 January 1944 until 30 April 1946 had sought to simply have the goods turned over to them by the Administration.<sup>78</sup> This again was in accordance with the instructions from Molotov’s office cited above.<sup>79</sup> Obviously, this would have effectively given them exclusive control over distribution. Once the missions were in place, they were treated well materially, but also subjected to “reserve and suspicion”.<sup>80</sup> Personal relations did improve somewhat over subsequent months of working together; however, disagreements remained frequent, though they came to bear less animosity.<sup>81</sup>

Furthermore, UNRRA staff members were also frequently frustrated by the need to get Soviet government approval for even seemingly insignificant policy matters.<sup>82</sup> Once the missions were in place, the Soviet authorities took responsibility for arranging transportation for UNRRA observation visits, but the Administration was sometimes able to arrange its own transport, which gave it greater flexibility.<sup>83</sup> By the same token, Administration staff had full freedom to interview anyone – officials or ‘men in the street’ – and never detected any evasion or reluctance to provide information among these lower levels.<sup>84</sup> Still, these successes for UNRRA in this regard came only after several months and firm insistence.

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<sup>77</sup> Byelorussian SSR, Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 258; Ukrainian SSR, Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 335.

<sup>78</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 9.

<sup>79</sup> Draft of Instructions to the Soviet Delegation to the First Session of UNRRA, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 127.

<sup>80</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 242.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p. 241.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, p. 243.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 243-244.

At both the top and lower levels, communication was an incessant difficulty for UNRRA. On 11 October 1943 (less than a month before the ceremony officially creating UNRRA and its first Council Session), the Soviet government still had not reported the composition of the Soviet delegation to the American hosts.<sup>85</sup> Once the organization was functioning, the bases for allocating UNRRA food supplies was treated by the Soviet régime as highly sensitive strategic data, and therefore never shared with the Administration.<sup>86</sup> Uniquely, the discussions leading to the aid programs for the Soviet republics were not held in regular Council Sessions. Not even the Director General's office was privy to these discussions, as they were conducted on a political level between the governments of the US, UK, Canada, and the USSR.<sup>87</sup> This stance was repeated in February 1946, when the USSR opposed an American resolution calling on recipient countries to provide information to UNRRA concerning their trade agreements, imports, and exports – the first significant instance when unanimity could not be achieved within the Central Committee.<sup>88</sup> This Soviet insistence on secrecy surrounding any information that could be even remotely considered to have strategic value would similarly cause complications in the creation of the UNO.

On a more day-to-day level, UNRRA found communications within the USSR to be a significant irritant. The Mission in Kiev received no mail for the first five weeks of its operation, despite the use of the Soviet Government diplomatic pouch. Eventually, the Administration switched to using British and American diplomatic channels, and even found international airmail to be a more effective conduit by the end of the Mission.<sup>89</sup> Likewise, UNRRA staff in Kiev cited experiencing substantial frustration at having to

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<sup>85</sup> Memorandum from the American Embassy to V.M. Molotov, 11 October 1943, in AVPRF, Fond of the Secretariat of V.M. Molotov, Opis no. 5, Pora no. 100, Papka no. 11, p. 94.

<sup>86</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, pp. 247-248.

<sup>87</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 101.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

wait several days to put through urgent telephone calls to Moscow or the primary receiving port of Odessa.<sup>90</sup> UNRRA also never used its standard in-house code for its Mission in Minsk, due to concerns of possibly jeopardizing the host government's goodwill if its delegates were behaving secretly.<sup>91</sup> While some of these difficulties can logically be attributed to a ruined transportation/communication infrastructure, it is plausible to suggest that the organization's communications could have been made more efficient if the Stalinist régime was determined to do all in its power to provide assistance.

Thus it is clear that in many respects, the Soviet positions taken on various issues facing UNRRA were illustrative of more general Soviet attitudes towards cooperation with their wartime allies in an international organization. The actions of the USSR continuously exhibited a narrowly self-interested approach, with little effort expended on maintaining even a façade of goodwill, let alone magnanimity. The Kremlin nakedly sought to obtain as much as possible, both in terms of goods and of power, while providing as little as practicable, both materially and with regard to openness. Furthermore, the archival record likewise shows that these actions were not unintended consequences of inefficiency or the lingering effects of wartime devastation, but were in fact in line with the deliberate policies of the régime. This posture, while perhaps beneficial to the USSR in the short term, certainly diminished the level of harmony among the Soviet Union's most powerful partners, which would have more serious effects in the case of the much broader and more powerful UNO.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 275-276.

<sup>90</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Two, p. 241.

<sup>91</sup> Woodbridge, Volume One, p. 275.

## **Chapter Two – Initial Soviet Reactions to the American Proposal for a New International Security Organization**

Soviet behaviour with regard to UNRRA illustrated general Soviet attitudes towards international organizations formed by the Allies. These same modes of behaviour – that is, seeking to obtain as much for the USSR as possible, while conceding as little as possible to the desires of other nations, even when these desires possessed considerable justification – would similarly dominate Soviet policy towards the broader and much more influential United Nations Organization. This chapter will examine Stalin's first reactions to the American initiative to create the new international security organization that would become the UNO, up to the conclusion of the 1943 Teheran Conference. Though initially wary of making open-ended commitments to cooperate with capitalist states in a new organization, by the end of the Conference Stalin saw the new body as a useful means to enhance the power, prestige, and security of the USSR. Over time, though, Western conceptions of the new body's role in the international arena would evolve, while Soviet priorities remained essentially constant, which would prove to be a source of considerable inter-Allied conflict, and have a substantial impact on the form that the new organization took, as later chapters will demonstrate.

One of the dominant pillars of the international community, the United Nations Organization, more frequently referred to simply as the UN, was the brainchild of the American President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and his longtime Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. They envisioned a new international security organization to replace the failed League of Nations. As the idea took shape, Roosevelt's basic strategy for making the UN more effective than the League was to concentrate authority in the hands of the great powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and, somewhat more problematically, the Republic of China – what he termed the 'Four Policemen'.

Roosevelt's thinking was that if those four nations stood united against a threat, they would hold sufficient power to defeat any adversary, regardless of the stance the rest of the world took. At the same time, FDR expected the UN to serve as a fair arbiter for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and as a forum wherein the small nations of the world could air their legitimate grievances to gain protection from intimidation by stronger adversaries. Convincing the British and Soviets to accept his vision involved complications. British PM Winston Churchill showed some initial reluctance, and, while, somewhat surprisingly, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin overcame his skepticism quickly, his vision of the organization's role and purposes differed significantly from FDR's, a difference which would become increasingly apparent over time as the organization took on a more detailed shape. To the Soviet leader, the concept of a privileged position for the USSR among a small handful of great powers who took a leading role in global affairs was attractive. However, any world organization would have a membership composed overwhelmingly of non-Marxist states, thus potentially leading to isolation and vulnerability for the USSR within the new institutional structure. Therefore, from the earliest talks, the Soviets sought to keep the organization's power as concentrated as possible and they sought to avoid the sharing of power with anyone other than the British and Americans, thereby excluding the Chinese. Nevertheless, the Americans were able to win some formal acceptance of the organization at the October-November 1943 Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference. Foreshadowed during Molotov's trip to Washington in late May 1942, and the October 1943 Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, at the November 1943 Teheran Conference Roosevelt shrewdly presented the UNO to Stalin as a mechanism to ensure the political and military dominance of the 'Big Three' in the postwar world. This approach ensured that the Soviets took great interest in the project. However, it was this particular aspect of the organization to which the Soviets remained

attached, since it seemed like a very straightforward and effective way to reinforce their leading power status. Therefore, as the American, and to a lesser extent, British attitudes towards the UN evolved and broadened, the Soviet view did not, which both created and fostered tension with their Western allies, thus playing a part in the origins of the Cold War and the shaping of the United Nations Organization.

The Soviet reaction to the American plan to create a new international security organization was influenced by their historical experience – both Marxist-Leninist ideology, and past events in the international arena. Ideology constituted an obstacle to Soviet participation in the endeavour. While Marx had sought the eventual formation of a voluntary commonwealth of socialist states, in his writings this presupposed the prior emergence of an alternative world order.<sup>1</sup> However, the notion of a socialist state entering into an organized community with capitalist governments was theoretically problematic. Lenin, whose interpretations and extrapolations from Marx's original teachings provided the foundation for the official doctrines of the USSR, provided no direct guidance on the subject. He discussed the feasibility of international organizations of capitalist states, and of socialist states, but not of an organization with the two types co-existing.<sup>2</sup> However, in his April 1917 Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution, Lenin contended that the Great War was not simply the result of capitalist greed, but in fact the inevitable result of the international capitalist order.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, as Fuller contends, it would seem that under Marxist-Leninist thinking, any international organization based on capitalist states was objectively bound to fail.<sup>4</sup> By the same token, Fuller also cites several of Lenin's writings to show that while Lenin neither affirms nor

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<sup>1</sup> Dallin, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> C. Dale Fuller, "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organization for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1917," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 64, No. 2 (June 1949): 257.

<sup>3</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works Volume XX, Part One* (New York: International Publishers, 1929), p. 138.

denies that capitalist states could cooperate with socialist ones, he was very clear that such cooperation would be both unlikely and unwise.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the conclusion reached by both Fuller and Dallin - that for the USSR, joining the UN marked an ideological departure - appears to be tenable.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, Soviet skepticism towards the new body seemed likely from an ideological standpoint.

Still, the UN was not the first attempt to create an international security body, and the USSR *had* already made a similar ideological departure by joining the League of Nations on 18 September 1934. However, the Soviet experience with the League was primarily a negative one, and therefore would only have increased Stalin's initial wariness. Lenin condemned the organization at the time of its formation in 1919, portraying it alternately as a coalition of bourgeois powers to protect their capitalist system and its interests, or as a sham that would in time collapse due to the inherent feuds and contradictions of capitalism.<sup>7</sup> It is therefore unsurprising that in December 1925, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin stated to the German Communist paper *Rote Fahne* "Never, under any circumstances, will Russia join the League of Nations [which is] an instrument of capitalist machinations against the weak countries and the colonial peoples."<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, a new Soviet stance towards international cooperation was adopted in the mid-1930s. Fears of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, combined with a need for external stability due to the internal upheavals of the early part of the decade, made membership in the League a logical step. After the USSR joined the League in 1934, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim Litvinov became one of the world's leading champions of collective security, and he even pressed for greater power

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<sup>4</sup> Fuller, p. 258.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 258-260.

<sup>6</sup> Dallin, p. 13; Fuller, p. 261.

<sup>7</sup> Dallin, p.14.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 15.

for the League to enforce its decisions.<sup>9</sup>

However, as is well known, the League of Nations proved to be a failure. It was not effective in preventing German, Italian, or Japanese aggression in the 1930s, which lowered the Soviet estimation of the organization in particular and the concept in general.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, while all three of these states voluntarily withdrew from the League,<sup>11</sup> none of them was actually expelled from the body, despite Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. The USSR, on the other hand, was formally expelled from the League on 14 December 1939, over the issue of the Soviet war with Finland. Latin American states, led by Argentina, took a leading role in the demand for expulsion, an action which would likely play a part in later tensions during the 1945 San Francisco Conference wherein the UN was founded.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, both the League's failure to prevent a new world war, and the organization's apparently discriminatory attitude toward the USSR, could naturally be expected to cause the Soviet régime to be cautious when the Americans proposed a similar body.

Inter-Allied relations were also an important aspect of the Soviet attitude towards the proposed new organization. US-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet relations fell to a nadir as a result of first the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and then the Soviet invasions of Poland (September 1939) and Finland (November 1939). The British press heaped praise on the Finnish 'David' resisting the Soviet 'Goliath' while the government sold some thirty warplanes to the Finns, and there was support in the Cabinet for even stronger action, such as sending British troops.<sup>13</sup> The Americans went further than the British,

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> Japan in March 1933, Germany in October 1933, and Italy in December 1937.

<sup>12</sup> Michael T. Florinsky, "The Soviet Union and International Agreements," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 61, No. 1 (March 1946): 73; Mario Rapoport, "Argentina and the Soviet Union: History of Political and Commercial Relations, 1917-1955," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Volume 66, No. 2 (May 1986): 244.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman, eds. *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War*

imposing what they called a 'moral embargo' on the USSR. The US government prohibited trade with the USSR, and provided economic, military, and diplomatic aid to the Finns.<sup>14</sup> However, the invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany in June of 1941, followed by the US entry into the war in December 1941, forced a coincidence of interests between the three states. Thereafter, there were reasons for optimism regarding the possibility of genuinely cordial relations. Still, the Soviet attitude to their main Western allies was markedly ambiguous in the time leading up to the November 1943 Teheran Conference, which improved their rapport substantially. This conference was also the first direct discussion of the creation of the UNO between FDR and Stalin.

To understand the Soviet stance during the period mid-1941 until late-1943, one must consider Soviet goals. These were revealed by the Soviet proposal of an Anglo-Soviet Treaty pursued in late 1941, through which the USSR sought recognition of their June 1941 borders, thus including the Baltic states, western Byelorussia, western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and North Bukovina, in addition to the territory gained in the March 1940 Treaty of Moscow that ended the Winter War. Furthermore, the USSR also sought the Petsamo area of Finland, the right to have military bases in Finland and Romania, the disarmament and dismemberment of Germany, and a postwar military alliance, in addition to other territorial adjustments to reward or punish various states for their wartime actions.<sup>15</sup> However, as the Soviet military position continued to deteriorate in the spring of 1942, particularly before Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943, the primary Soviet goal became simple survival, and all other concerns were of secondary importance. Thus, the many Soviet demands for British recognition were dropped in

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(Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), p. xxii; Alexander Cadogan, with David Dilks, ed. *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan* (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 247.

<sup>14</sup> Chubaryan and Shukman, p. xxii.

<sup>15</sup> Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia were to be restored, Turkey was to be given the Dodecanese islands, and territory from Bulgaria and possibly Syria as a reward for

favour of a simple wartime military alliance with only vague references to the postwar order.<sup>16</sup> The question of postwar borders was simply excluded from the agreement.<sup>17</sup>

According to Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time, who carried out most of the negotiations (until Molotov's arrival in May of 1942) American objections to any discussion of postwar borders were a factor in blocking British acceptance of Soviet demands, although the extent of this may have been exaggerated.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, the correspondence between FDR and Churchill makes it clear that the British did not wish to accept Soviet boundaries in the face of American disapproval.<sup>19</sup> Thus, while a treaty was achieved, the unwillingness of the West to recognize the Soviet Union's 1941 borders – an issue that Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to the USSR at that time, called the “acid test” of relations – meant that considerable ambiguity remained in the Soviet-British relationship, and, by extension, the Soviet-American relationship as well.<sup>20</sup> As well, while the British accepted minor modifications to the treaty proposed by Stalin to emphasize postwar cooperation, there was little firm commitment in this regard beyond vague statements of cooperation and assistance, which is unsurprising given the anticipated British needs for postwar reconstruction.<sup>21</sup> What all of this makes clear is that the Soviets had both minimum

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maintaining their neutrality, and Britain would be awarded an alliance with Belgium and the Netherlands, and military bases in Western Europe. Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 114.

<sup>16</sup> Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 382; Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 115.

<sup>17</sup> Ivan Maisky, Andrew Rothstein, transl. *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p. 267.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 260.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Document C-40, Telegram from Former Naval Person [Churchill] to the President, March 7, 1942, 12:38 p.m. / TOR 8:05 a.m. in Warren F. Kimball, ed. *Roosevelt and Churchill, the Complete Correspondence* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), Volume I, p. 394.

<sup>20</sup> W. Averell Harriman, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 135.

<sup>21</sup> Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Two Volumes* (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1948), Volume II, p. 1173; Telegram from London. Received in Moscow at 2:35 p.m., 28 May 1942, in Oleg A. Rzheshesky, ed., *War and Diplomacy: The Making of the Grand*

(survival) and maximum (confirmed territorial expansion and enhanced postwar security, the specific tenets of which varied over time) foreign policy goals, and that the British and Americans were factors in the pursuit of these goals, as their support was considered valuable, if not indispensable. However, the failure to achieve Western recognition for their new borders was an impediment to closer relations.

Other events also caused Stalin to be suspicious of his Western Allies (never a difficult thing to achieve in any case). Aside from traditional Marxist fears of the capitalist world, compounded by the interventions in the Russian Civil War and then the supposition that the Western European nations were trying to deflect German aggression towards the USSR (before the Nazi-Soviet Treaty), the Atlantic Charter was a more acute cause for concern. This was an agreement reached between Roosevelt and Churchill during shipboard meetings off the coast of Argentia, Newfoundland, and issued on 14 August 1939. Essentially, Roosevelt's purpose was to make US war aims clear to their Allies, as even though the US had not yet entered the war by that time, Lend-Lease supplies were playing an important role in the war effort.<sup>22</sup> Since Stalin received no advance notice of this meeting, he suspected that this document was directed against the USSR.<sup>23</sup> In particular, passages condemning the pursuit of territorial aggrandizement, and supporting "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" seemed troublesome to the Soviet régime, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the USSR delayed several weeks before endorsing the agreement, and even then, only with the proviso that "the practical application [of the Atlantic Charter] must necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances,

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*Alliance*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 155-156.

<sup>22</sup> Amos Perlmutter, *FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943-1945* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), p. 50.

<sup>23</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 40.

<sup>24</sup> United States Government, *US Department of State's Bureau of International Information*

needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries.”<sup>25</sup>

Even several months after the document was issued, Stalin remained wary of the declaration. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden’s record of his conversations with Stalin during his December 1941 visit to Moscow, shows Stalin stating explicitly “It now looks as if the Charter was directed against the USSR.”<sup>26</sup> The situation improved once the US had entered the war, and the Atlantic Charter was succeeded and re-affirmed by the January 1942 Joint Declaration of the United Nations, initially signed by twenty-six countries, with twenty-one more joining later.<sup>27</sup> Litvinov, at that time the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, expressed surprise and pleasure that the US sought Soviet opinion on the Joint Declaration before it was transmitted to the other countries that would eventually sign it. The Soviets suggested some minor revisions of wording, centering on the fact that the USSR was not at war with Japan, and thus calling for the elimination of references to belligerence against the Tripartite Pact. The US accepted these revisions, and thus the Soviets signed the Joint Declaration, instead of making a similar but separate commitment to the same principles.<sup>28</sup> This illustrates that differences in circumstance and outlook did at times lead to difficulties in Soviet-Western relations, but also that the tensions therein were not necessarily insurmountable.

In addition, it is worth noting that the four countries that would form the cornerstone of FDR’s proposed organization (USA, UK, USSR, and China) signed the Joint Declaration at the top, in that order, while the other signatories were listed alphabetically. This was a deliberate initiative by the American President, which

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*Programs, Basic Readings in US Democracy, the Atlantic Charter (1941)*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm> (accessed 26 May 2007).

<sup>25</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 40.

<sup>26</sup> Eden, p. 343

<sup>27</sup> Center for the Public Domain and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ibiblio Online Library and Digital Archive, *WW II Resources, Treaties, Declarations, Instruments of Surrender Etc., 1942, Declaration by United Nations*, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420101a.html> (accessed 30 May 2007).

attempted to both emphasize the special status of these future ‘Four Policemen’ and to appeal to Stalin’s desire for prestige.<sup>29</sup> Hull quotes FDR as saying “I have a feeling the USSR would not be pleased to see their name following some of the countries which realistically are making a minor contribution.”<sup>30</sup> This notion of exclusive status for these four nations would prove to be an integral part of Roosevelt’s plan for the United Nations, and an aspect that was particularly important to the Soviets.

Aside from concerns about the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations Declaration of January 1942 that affirmed it, Stalin also had lingering suspicions that the West was seeking to use Germany and the USSR as cat’s paws to weaken each other, to the ultimate benefit of the capitalist order. Probably the most notable expression of this opinion from the West was when Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri publicly stated on the day after the Nazi invasion: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstances.”<sup>31</sup> By the same token, powerful voices, most notably in the State Department, opposed FDR’s preferred policy of open-handed, non-reciprocal generosity to the USSR.<sup>32</sup> On 11 September 1941, the President “frankly explained” to the Soviet Ambassador at the time, Konstantin Oumansky, that it was difficult to get appropriations from Congress due to the unpopularity of the USSR.<sup>33</sup> Thus, Stalin’s government perceived legitimate reasons to be wary of the US government.

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<sup>28</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1122.

<sup>29</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 46.

<sup>30</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1120.

<sup>31</sup> Quoted in Mastny, p. 39.

<sup>32</sup> Mary E. Glantz, *FDR and the Soviet Union* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 5; Perlmutter, p. 75.

<sup>33</sup> FDR tied this unpopularity to the issue of religious persecution in the Soviet Union, and suggested that a publicity campaign in the US that highlighted the religious freedoms permitted in the USSR before the next Lend-Lease appropriations bill came before Congress would be helpful. Hull, Volume II, p. 977.

Chuev's interviews with Molotov resoundingly confirm that even while getting much-needed supplies from the Western Allies, the Soviet régime harboured significant suspicions toward them. In a conversation dated June 9, 1976, Molotov stated "To expect help from them [the Allies] in defense of socialism? We would have been idiots!"<sup>34</sup> Similarly, on June 16, 1977, Molotov told Chuev "Not without reason did England lose a little more than 200,000 people while we have more than twenty million victims. That's why they needed us. That man [Churchill] hated us and tried to use us."<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, obtaining tangible gains from the eventual defeat of Germany seemed to be a particular preoccupation of Stalin's. Molotov also stated "Stalin often said that Russia wins wars but doesn't know how to avail itself of the fruits of victory. Russians fight magnificently, but don't know how to conclude a peace; they are always passed by, never get their due."<sup>36</sup> Thus it can be clearly seen that even though they were Allies in the largest war in human history, the Stalinist régime nonetheless did not necessarily expect that wartime cooperation would be either heartfelt, or, more importantly, long-standing after the crisis posed by the war was past.

However, there were some reasons for optimism regarding the possibility of postwar cooperation. In fact, aside from any sort of 'momentum' gained from wartime cooperation, there were also soundly logical reasons for both sides to seek to continue their camaraderie. As Stalin's long-time interpreter, Valentin Berezhkov, noted, Stalin supported postwar cooperation from the outset, at least in principle. In economic terms (which, of course, Marxism considered to be of prime importance) the USSR constituted a very large potential market for American goods after the war, and Stalin would explicitly state later at Teheran that the USSR had abundant natural resources that could

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<sup>34</sup> Felix Chuev, *Molotov Remembers* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), p. 46.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, p. 49.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53.

be provided in exchange.<sup>37</sup> Even more importantly, for obvious reasons, security in the postwar period was the foremost objective of the Soviet régime. As Geoffrey Roberts notes, American, and to a lesser extent, British, assistance could play an important role in the prevention of a resurgence of German (or Japanese) power and the postwar repair of the physically devastated USSR. It could also contribute to the Soviet desire for international prestige, another prime Soviet aim.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, an effective postwar international security organization could in principle support these objectives as well. Thus, extensive postwar collaboration was from the outset a serious possibility, but far from a certainty.

While the focus of this study is the USSR, a brief comment on the perspective of the US, which was driving the process, serves to clarify the background. In 1933, in the teeth of domestic public opinion, the Roosevelt administration was the first American government to grant formal diplomatic recognition to the USSR, a move which was strongly supported by Secretary of State Hull. Official recognition and FDR's ongoing efforts to build closer diplomatic, military, and economic ties with the USSR promoted the possibility of substantially improved relations, although the issue of Tsarist-era debts continued to dog the relationship even after recognition.<sup>39</sup> Also, many American officials who were posted to Moscow formed a very negative impression of the Stalin régime, and sought to undermine what they regarded as the naïve and overly optimistic stance coming from the White House, and cooperation remained limited.<sup>40</sup> Relations deteriorated further with the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, and the

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<sup>37</sup> Valentin Berezhkov, *Teheran: Lessons of History. On the 45<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Teheran Conference* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1988), p. 19.

<sup>38</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold War, 1945-1991* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 17.

<sup>39</sup> Glantz, pp. 17-23. Though Tsarist Russia's main creditors had been France and Germany, the repayment of debts owed to the US (estimated in 1934 to be between \$75 and 150 million) was still an issue of major concern to Hull and Roosevelt, as well as the American Congress. Hull, Volume I, p. 297, pp. 303-304.

Soviet invasion of eastern Poland the following month. After the Winter War of November 1939 to March 1940, Soviet-American tension reached its highest point since the American intervention in the aftermath of the October Revolution, but then the “moral embargo” placed on the USSR at that time was lifted by the US on 21 January 1941.<sup>41</sup> In practice, it had already been abandoned, and in fact American exports to the USSR increased by 54% in 1940, making the US the second largest exporter to the USSR after Germany.<sup>42</sup> Several trade disputes did flare up between then and the launching of Operation Barbarossa (the US limited exports to the Soviet Union due to fears that materials were then being sold to Germany) but the US nevertheless maintained a policy of “firmness but friendliness” with the principle of reciprocity as the basis for day-to-day relations.<sup>43</sup> On 21 January 1941 Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State and FDR’s close personal friend, who in fact likely wielded greater influence over US foreign policy than Hull, told Oumansky “Should the USSR find itself in the position of resistance to an aggressor, the United States would render it help.”<sup>44</sup>

Once the Soviet Union entered the war, both Hull and FDR favoured material assistance to Russia.<sup>45</sup> Echoing Churchill’s views, on 24 June Roosevelt stated in a press conference that “...this country is going to give all the aid it can to the Soviets.”<sup>46</sup> After the visit by Harry Hopkins, head of the Lend-Lease Administration, to Moscow in late

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<sup>40</sup> Glantz, pp. 29-35.

<sup>41</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 969.

<sup>42</sup> Rzheshesky, p. 165.

<sup>43</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 973.

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Rzheshesky, p. 166. Hull’s ill health meant that he was frequently away from the State Department for weeks or months at a time. As well, Hull had been in office since 1933, and displayed little initiative or attention to detail during the war, beyond the issue of the UN. Welles, on the other hand, had similarities in background to FDR (both were products of the ‘Eastern seaboard aristocracy’) and personal friendship (Welles had served as a page at Roosevelt’s wedding) Welles had far greater access to the President, thus enhancing his influence. Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 34. Hull, on the other hand, was even excluded from FDR’s war councils, despite repeated requests. Hull, Volume II, pp. 1109-1110.

<sup>45</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 976.

<sup>46</sup> *The New York Times*, 25 June 1941, quoted in Rzheshesky, p. 169.

July 1941, and further talks on the subject in the Soviet capital from 28 September to 1 October, 1941, on 7 November Roosevelt announced the formal inclusion of the USSR into the Lend-Lease program, and the provision of an interest-free loan worth \$1 billion. In February 1942 the Soviet Union was given a further \$1 billion, again as an interest-free loan to be repaid in ten years, beginning five years after the war's end.<sup>47</sup> This assistance provided a firm basis for improved relations through to the US entry into the war, which obviously bound the countries together even more closely. Moreover, the American government perceived that the ultimate defeat of the Axis would leave the USSR in a powerful position. Thus, constructive relations between the US and the Soviet Union would be a logical necessity for preservation of peace. In the words of FDR's close confederate Harry Hopkins, Russia's "postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one... every effort must be made to obtain her friendship."<sup>48</sup> In October 1941, Welles was chosen by FDR to head a panel of experts charged with preparing for the postwar period, and the panel began meeting in February 1942. Welles viewed Woodrow Wilson's failure to settle postwar issues during the conflict as a cardinal error. Thus, he attempted to strike an agreement with the USSR over issues such as the USSR's new western borders, while the US had maximum leverage – in 1942, a time when the US was rapidly re-arming while the USSR remained under strong military pressure.<sup>49</sup> Clearly, the influential Welles also viewed a positive relationship with the USSR as vital goal, but one that could have been threatened by Soviet behaviour. Furthermore, in the spring of 1943, Czechoslovakian President Eduard Beneš toured the US and in many public speeches and private meetings with prominent Americans, stressed his confidence in the benign nature of Soviet power. As Beneš was the leader of a small nation victimized by

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<sup>47</sup> Glantz, p. 86; Rzhesheshevsky, p. 169.

<sup>48</sup> From a memo dated August 2, 1943 – thus, even before the Teheran Conference. Quoted in Mastny, p. 341.

Germany, his words may have held considerable sway during this vital period leading up to the Teheran Conference.<sup>50</sup> Therefore US policy sought cooperation with the USSR for the postwar period, but did not accept it as a given. In Hull's opening words of the 90<sup>th</sup> chapter of his memoirs, aptly titled *Stalin the Sphinx*:

Russia offered to the United States and to all the United Nations [wartime Allies] in 1943 the most puzzling problem in international relations. What could be expected of her in the postwar world? Would she cooperate with the Western nations and with China? Would she join an international organization to keep the peace? Would she insist on territorial expansion at the expense of her smaller neighbours? Would she go to the opposite extreme, and retire to strict isolation within her old borders?<sup>51</sup>

This statement illustrates the American perceptions of Soviet foreign policy on the eve of FDR's first discussions of the UNO with Stalin at Teheran. Therefore, care would have to be taken in seeking Soviet support for a leading role in a new international organization.

The position of the UK was similar to that of the US.<sup>52</sup> Eden's memoirs quote a memorandum he wrote for his colleagues on 28 January 1942 "On the assumption that Germany is defeated and German military strength is destroyed and that France remains, for a time at least, a weak power, there will be no counterweight to Russia in Europe... Russia's position on the European continent will be unassailable."<sup>53</sup> Thus, like the Americans, the British recognized that the USSR would be a very powerful player in the

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 48-49.

<sup>50</sup> Mastny, p. 101.

<sup>51</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1247.

<sup>52</sup> Initially, the British had wanted to give even greater power to the new international security organization in the postwar period than the US. When negotiating the Atlantic Charter, Churchill sought to incorporate the phrase "They [US and Britain] seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective international organization will afford to all states and people the means of dwelling in security." Quoted in Yoder, p. 26. However, the President preferred at least at first to leave international policing powers in the hands of Britain and the US, not a reborn League of Nations, and thus the phrase 'by means of an effective international organization' was dropped. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 359-360.

<sup>53</sup> Eden, p. 370.

postwar diplomatic arena. The British response, however, was aimed more at attaining paper commitments from the USSR, which would provide some protection against more inflated demands being raised later.<sup>54</sup> Thus, Western Powers foresaw valuable opportunities for benign relations with the USSR after the defeat of Germany, but potential difficulties in achieving that goal. Western attitudes were therefore in many respects the mirror image of the Soviet attitude towards the British and Americans at the time that a new postwar international security organization began to be discussed.

This American proposal for a new postwar international security organization was first brought to the attention of the Soviet leadership during Molotov's visit to Washington in 1942. The Foreign Affairs Commissar went to Washington to consult with the American President after visiting London to sign the aforementioned Anglo-Soviet treaty. The primary purpose of Molotov's visit was to discuss the USSR's military situation and seek both material assistance and the launching of a second front against Germany in Western Europe. The first discussion of what would eventually take shape as a new international security organization took place at the second meeting between Molotov and the president, which occurred before dinner on the day of Molotov's arrival in Washington, 29 May 1942. Excepting interpreters, the only person present other than the two principals was Hopkins.<sup>55</sup> This initial presentation of the project is key to understanding the Soviet attitude towards the UN. The Soviet understanding of the body's functioning, and hence the role it would play in the world, was based on the way that the UN was described initially, rather than the way that it would actually take shape. After a very brief chat regarding the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, FDR "said that he wanted to

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<sup>54</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 48.

<sup>55</sup> Derek Watson, "Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front, 1939-1942," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (June 2002): p. 71, Record of Talks with Roosevelt (29 May 1942: Before Dinner), in Rzheshesvsky, p. 173.

put one important question to Molotov.”<sup>56</sup> He proceeded to say that “in order to prevent a war in the next 25-30 years, it was necessary to establish an international police force of three or four States” and then asked what would be the Soviet attitude to this proposal.<sup>57</sup> Molotov’s response was positive but guarded, maintaining “It was certainly necessary to take maximum or adequate steps to secure the peoples against a new war. For this it was necessary to unite the forces of several decisive states.”<sup>58</sup>

FDR went on to say that the police force should consist of the USA, Britain, the USSR, and China, and that these four should maintain their arms, while “the aggressor countries and their accomplices – Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Romania, and in addition, Poland and Czechoslovakia” should be disarmed, and subject to inspections by neutral parties to prevent their covert rearmament.<sup>59</sup> If any of these states did begin to arm secretly, the offender would be blockaded (here FDR recalled his 1937 speech in Chicago calling for a quarantine of aggressive states) and if this was insufficient, the offender would be bombed by the four police Powers.<sup>60</sup> Thus, the four great Allied powers (which FDR cited as representing half the world’s population) would maintain peace by force. FDR concluded this portion of the conversation by saying “Of course, we could not announce it openly before the end of the war, but we had to reach an understanding on this matter beforehand.”<sup>61</sup> Molotov again demurred, replying that “this question had not been put in such a form before and therefore it required consultation” and he promised to pass it along to Stalin.<sup>62</sup> Roosevelt described how he and Churchill had reached an agreement on principles for the postwar world in the Atlantic Charter, but that Churchill’s only idea for implementing these principles was a new League of

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<sup>56</sup> Record of Talks with Roosevelt (29 May 1942: Before Dinner), in Rzheshesvsky, p. 173.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

Nations. FDR felt that the League had proven itself to be too inefficient to preserve peace effectively. Disarmament was a laudable goal, but inadequate by itself, despite Soviet support, as opposition to it from subjected powers would be too great. An international police force was the only viable option. FDR also claimed that Churchill would be obliged to accept such a force if the Soviets and Americans both insisted upon it.<sup>63</sup>

Molotov was cautious, asking if the President's proposal was in its final form, or just in an early stage of discussion. He wondered whether the Chinese had been informed of this project, and whether it was correct to believe that France would not be a participant in this venture.<sup>64</sup> Roosevelt replied that China would only be consulted when the feasibility of Chinese participation in this venture was made more evident by events, i.e. whether China could establish an effective centralized government and demonstrate an ability to police Japan. As for France, she would initially be excluded, but the four Powers could by common agreement allow others to join, although there was a danger that if there were too many partners, the police could fall out among themselves.<sup>65</sup> Molotov remained characteristically noncommittal – he had not yet discussed these ideas with Stalin - commenting only that the devastation that the USSR experienced in the war would ensure that “Roosevelt's proposal will receive great attention in our country.”<sup>66</sup>

Roosevelt concluded the meeting by saying that for ten or twenty years, peace would have to be maintained by force, until all countries understood the need for an end to war and would maintain international harmony without the threat of coercion. In the meantime, the proposed association would prevent aggression by Germany and Japan,

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

which may take 25 years to “understand that they must not attack their neighbours.”<sup>67</sup> The meeting then ended, although the records also explicitly note that after this conference the first telegram composed by Molotov was sent to Moscow.<sup>68</sup> The significance of this will be discussed below. This meeting, like the first time that FDR explained his idea for the UN to Stalin himself at Teheran, is absolutely crucial to understanding the Soviet perceptions of the UN, and thus the role that they envisioned for it. Over time, the US would move further away from the notion of a strictly security-oriented organization wholly dominated by the three or four most important allies, which would have exclusive access to military force to ensure that their collective will be enforced. However, the USSR would not move so far beyond this conception. This ever-increasing divergence in views would cause considerable friction within the alliance, and significantly impact the form that the UN would take, as well as playing a part in shaping the world through the Cold War.

After the above meeting, Molotov sent his first telegram back to Stalin reporting on his mission. The telegram’s primary passage stated “Roosevelt suggested that I should talk with Hull about Iran, Turkey, and the application of the Geneva Convention to Soviet prisoners of war in Germany [all briefly mentioned at Molotov and Roosevelt’s first meeting]. I agreed and gave some explanations. Roosevelt invited me to dinner in the evening. He wanted to talk about the second front.”<sup>69</sup> Thus, for reasons that remain unclear, despite the assurances that Molotov gave to Roosevelt, and the fact that the records clearly suggest that the message was sent after the second meeting, Molotov made no mention of the proposed international police force, or in fact of the second

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<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Telegram from Washington. Received in Moscow at 11:55 p.m., 20 May 1942, in *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

meeting at all. This could be an indication that Molotov was at first skeptical of either the sincerity or value of Roosevelt's idea, and therefore he did not think it a high enough priority to deal with by telegram, believing the matter could wait until his return to Moscow.

Over the next several days, neither Molotov nor Roosevelt returned to the topic of the proposed international force in detail. Sherwood notes that after dinner on the first day of the visit, the president briefly raised the question of disarmament again, stating his belief that military spending by all nations great and small would be an obstacle to world economic recovery.<sup>70</sup> However, military questions – particularly supplies and the second front – dominated the discussions for most of Molotov's visit.<sup>71</sup> Molotov's second telegram, received in Moscow at 7:20 a.m. on 31 May 1942, likewise failed to mention FDR's project, and again mentioned the post-dinner discussion, but not the pre-dinner one where the future UN was discussed.<sup>72</sup> Only in his third telegram, dated 31 May 1942 and received in Moscow at 00:50 am, 1 June 1942, did Molotov mention FDR's concept. The relevant portion dominated this message, reading:

Notable from conversation with Roosevelt is his statement concerning the maintenance of peace between nations after the war. Roosevelt is elaborating an idea that a sort of police force is needed to safeguard peace, and he sees this police force in the form of the combined troops of three or four States: the USSR, the USA, Britain, and, probably, China (provided China manages to establish a central government). In Roosevelt's opinion, all other countries, including France, Poland, not to speak of Germany, Italy, and Japan, must be disarmed.<sup>73</sup>

Molotov continued by stating that his reply was that “we had not heard considerations on this question in such a concrete form before and that I had doubts about the attitude to this question some countries, for instance, France, Poland, and Turkey, would take, but

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<sup>70</sup> Sherwood, p. 560.

<sup>71</sup> Derek Watson, *Molotov: A Biography* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 71.

<sup>72</sup> Rzheshesky, pp. 192-193.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, p. 194.

that the question is important and requires further deliberation.”<sup>74</sup> He then noted that the subject had not been developed any further, before ending the telegram.<sup>75</sup> Thus, Stalin in turn was first introduced to the future UN in the guise of an authoritative ‘club’ of victorious powers that would wield military power to preserve peace, the conception that he would continue to pursue thereafter.

Stalin sent a reply on the same day that the message was received in Moscow, 1 June 1942. Stalin opens his telegram to Molotov with the declaration “Roosevelt’s considerations about peace protection after the war are absolutely sound. There is no doubt that it would be impossible to maintain peace in future without creating a united military force by Britain, the USA, and the USSR, capable of preventing aggression.”<sup>76</sup> Stalin goes on to support unambiguously the inclusion of China (somewhat perplexingly, as later he would argue against this, especially during the October 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers) stating “It would be good to include China here.”<sup>77</sup> Stalin then claims that three or four states would be sufficient, so therefore Poland, Turkey, etc. would not be needed. He concludes by instructing Molotov: “Tell Roosevelt that you have communicated with Moscow, thought this matter over and come to the conclusion that Roosevelt is absolutely right and that his position will be fully supported by the Soviet Government.”<sup>78</sup> Thus, despite later apprehensions about the form that the UN would take, at the outset Stalin strongly supported the organization, at least in the form that it was originally presented. Molotov’s next message to Stalin

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* This message was not signed by Stalin personally, but by the pseudonym ‘Instance’. Officially, this term signified the Central Committee of the Communist Party, but since all of the Central Committee’s decisions would have been initiated or approved by Stalin himself, this signature can be equated with Stalin personally. Moreover, even in documents signed ‘Instance’ Molotov is addressed in the familiar first person singular form, further indicating that Stalin was the author. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

confirms that he obeyed these instructions. He had informed Roosevelt that he had thought the issue over and received a message from Moscow that:

allowed me [Molotov] to inform the President that the Soviet Government supported Roosevelt's point of view with regard to safeguarding the peace after the war by way of creating a united military force of three countries and possibly China, as well as by establishing proper control to prevent rearmament by Germany and Japan.<sup>79</sup>

On 3 June 1942 Stalin sent a telegram to Molotov complaining about the "terseness and reticence of all your [Molotov's] communications."<sup>80</sup> Perhaps this was the motivation behind a section in Molotov's telegram to Moscow dated 4 June 1942 which described the first discussion of the proposed body by Molotov and Roosevelt more fully, in many cases using the same phrasing as the Soviet records of the meeting. This time, Molotov mentioned that Roosevelt referred to the idea of quarantines, as per his 1937 Chicago speech and that:

if a country that has been disarmed after the war (Germany, for instance) started to rearm, it had to be blocked, and that if this measure [quarantine] was insufficient, the "four policemen" must bomb that country. Of course, we cannot declare this openly before the war ends, but we should agree on this matter between us beforehand.<sup>81</sup>

Furthermore, Molotov cited FDR's comment that Churchill had wanted something similar to the League of Nations, but FDR wanted a police force of three or four nations to safeguard peace after the war "for at least 10 to 20 to 30 years" and that Churchill would have no choice but to accept the plan if the US and USSR insisted.<sup>82</sup> Molotov also related his question and FDR's response regarding the inclusion of China, and Roosevelt's assumption "that later on other peoples would similarly understand the need to safeguard peace by the forces of three or four powers and would join them. Then

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<sup>79</sup> Telegram from New York. Received in Moscow at 1:30 p.m., 2 June 1942, in *Ibid*, p. 205.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, p. 210.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p 223.

France and other States would accede to the joint agreement of the policing states.”<sup>83</sup> Thus, even when Stalin received more information from Molotov, the core principle that the leader supported – power in the hands of the Big Three or Big Four – remained central to the project.

At this stage, the subject remained confidential, and the concept of a new international security organization was not mentioned in the official Soviet-American communiqué regarding Molotov’s visit, dated 12 June 1942. However, Molotov did stop in London on his way back to the USSR, where he discussed the topic with Churchill. When relaying FDR’s idea to the Prime Minister, Molotov stressed that not only were the defeated powers to be disarmed, but also all states other than the Big Three and possibly China. Molotov went on to explain that this exclusive power could form the basis for an international police force to preserve lasting peace.<sup>84</sup> Clearly, these two aspects of the proposed postwar order – a police force of the principal allies and the disarmament of all others - were considered the most salient to Soviet postwar planning. Furthermore, Molotov told Churchill “the Soviet government is in full support of this idea of Roosevelt’s and finds it appropriate.”<sup>85</sup> However, when Churchill made a stridently hostile response, questioning the feasibility of disarming allies like France and Norway while allowing neutrals like Spain and Sweden to preserve their forces, Molotov’s response was muted. The Soviet Commissar replied that Roosevelt suggested that all states other than the Big Four be disarmed, and that he was simply passing along information to Churchill regarding his conversations with Roosevelt.<sup>86</sup> Thus, he did not go to great lengths to defend the project, and the conversation then moved on to the

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>84</sup> Record of talks with Churchill, (9 June 1942), in *Ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 270.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

disposition of former colonies in the Pacific.<sup>87</sup> Later in the conversation Churchill raised the subject again, to say that FDR's "utterances about post-war issues only showed how important it was to win the war as soon as possible, rather than share out the fruits of a victory as yet ungained."<sup>88</sup> Churchill's sole statement regarding the postwar order was that it was necessary "to make it impossible for Germany to harm the world again" – hence Germany must be disarmed, and border changes at least considered.<sup>89</sup> Molotov's lack of any recorded response indicates that while the Soviets may have been drawn to FDR's proposal, Soviet support for it was not so strong that Molotov deemed it expedient to express disagreement with his host.

Molotov's telegram to Stalin dated 10 June 1942 provides more information on the discussions. Aside from citing Churchill's negative reaction for the reasons mentioned above, Molotov added "As for Roosevelt's idea of setting up a police force to maintain peace, Churchill accepted it more or less sympathetically, with the proviso that all democratic countries should take part in creating such a force."<sup>90</sup> This is the last mention made of the issue in the records of Molotov's trip. Overall, therefore, one can sum up the Soviet response as being favourably disposed to the idea of an international police force under the joint leadership of the Big Three, but that the idea remained an essentially abstract one that was bound to be problematic in actual implementation, given the different attitudes of the USSR's two principal allies.

The autumn and winter of 1942-43 saw a significant improvement in the USSR's military position, most notably due to the Red Army's counterattack at Stalingrad. Launched in November 1942, this operation culminated in the shattering of the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army in February 1943, and proved to be a key turning

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

point in the war. This allowed Stalin's régime to begin to give greater consideration to less immediate concerns, such as the shape and structure of the postwar world. Most notably, in May of 1943, the USSR's two most prominent ambassadors, Maxim Litvinov in Washington and Ivan Maisky in London, were recalled to Moscow to assist Molotov in preparing for the postwar world as deputy foreign affairs commissars. Maisky's portfolio was to deal with the issue of reparations, while Litvinov was assigned greater responsibility as head of the Commission on Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order.<sup>91</sup> Litvinov was a natural choice for this role, since he had been the unequivocal champion of collective security in the 1930s prior to his replacement by Molotov in the Foreign Commissariat. Litvinov heavily emphasized tripartite cooperation. His report titled U.S. Policies, prepared for the Soviet leadership and declared Top Secret on 2 June 1943, cited FDR's idea of "the directorship of four powers" and recommended "a body for permanent military-political contact with the president and the War Department in Washington" as well as "participation in an Anglo-American commission for discussion of the military-political items springing out of our common struggle against the Axis countries of Europe."<sup>92</sup> Stalin's acceptance of this viewpoint is illustrated in his message to Churchill and Roosevelt of 22 August 1943, wherein the Soviet leader wrote:

I think that the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries – the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR – for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany. To date it has been like this: the USA and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the USSR is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, p. 282.

<sup>91</sup> Maisky, p. 381, Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 174. In addition, a third Commission, dealing with armistice terms, was created under the chairmanship of Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.

<sup>92</sup> The report is reprinted in a translated form in Perlmutter, pp. 230-246. The first passage quoted above is located on p. 240, the latter two on p. 245.

<sup>93</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman 1941-1945* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1958), p. 149; Roberts, *Stalin's War*, pp. 174-175.

Under Litvinov's tutelage, two briefing papers were produced in September 1943, in preparation for the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference the following month. In one of them, Litvinov argued that any postwar international security organization would need to divide the world into areas of American, British, and Soviet responsibility, though the USSR should avoid openly stating this.<sup>94</sup> This is the viewpoint that the Soviets would maintain during the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers held on 19-30 October, 1943, although later Stalin would overrule this position.<sup>95</sup>

The issue of a postwar international security was discussed further at Moscow, and the Soviet government expressed a clear desire to continue exploring the issue with the other two Allied great powers. However, it remained only one of many issues addressed, and military questions remained paramount, and the main intent of the meeting was to prepare for the leaders meeting in Teheran which occurred a few weeks later. The conference was given great importance by the Soviet government. Diplomatic uniforms, taboo since the revolution, were re-introduced at this time, presumably to add greater dignity to the Soviet delegation, although many foreigners found them fairly ridiculous and they were in fact gradually abandoned over the next few years.<sup>96</sup> Since it was a meeting of Foreign Ministers, Stalin was not officially a participant in the conference, but he monitored developments closely, meeting privately with Molotov after each session that the Commissar had with his foreign counterparts.<sup>97</sup> Therefore it is reasonable to assume that Stalin himself had a significant influence on developments during the Moscow Conference.

Stalin was clearly focused on the war, and in principle the Moscow meeting of

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<sup>94</sup> Watson, *Molotov: A Biography*, p. 206.

<sup>95</sup> Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 178.

<sup>96</sup> Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 130.

Foreign Ministers was to pave the way for a smooth meeting in Teheran. However, Hull, perhaps seeking to leave a legacy as he anticipated a departure from public life, strongly sought to go a step further, through the issuing of a new declaration by the four powers.<sup>98</sup> According to both Hull's memoirs and the Soviet records, this item was initially not even included on the Soviet agenda for the Moscow meetings, despite the US providing a draft of the intended declaration, and the British proposing their own amendments to it, before the conference began.<sup>99</sup> However, Molotov himself pointed out the omission, explaining that it was unclear to him whether or not this was intended to be part of the formal discussions, and asking if the others desired its addition. Hull replied resoundingly in the affirmative, and so with Eden and Molotov's full support the Four Power Declaration (also referred to as the Moscow Declaration) was made the second item on the agenda, after discussions on measures to shorten the war in Europe.<sup>100</sup>

It was through the negotiations on the Moscow Declaration that the intentions and goals of Soviet foreign policy, including their stance regarding the postwar international organization, were revealed most clearly. Here again, the cardinal point of the Soviet authorities' attitude was the desire to maximize their own power by sharing leadership with as few states as possible – in practical terms, with only the British and Americans. The topic of the international organization was first raised, as one of the points in the Four Power Declaration, on 21 October. Hull introduced the subject of the declaration, saying that not only the war itself, but the postwar world must be considered, and that cooperation in the economic, social, and political spheres was in everyone's best interest. While the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations contained

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<sup>97</sup> Watson, *Molotov: A Biography*, p. 94.

<sup>98</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 88.

<sup>99</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1279. For the text of the American and British drafts, see Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, ed., *Moskovskaia konferentsiia Ministrov inostrannykh del SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii: 19-30 oktiabria 1943 g.: sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 46-

the principles under which the postwar world would be managed, concrete actions, including an international body to preserve peace, were needed.<sup>101</sup> After a lengthy speech on these issues, Hull asked Molotov for his response. Molotov demurred, asking if the British had anything to add.<sup>102</sup> Eden simply replied that the British had proposed two amendments already, contained in the pre-conference message mentioned above (these were fairly minor in nature, and will be discussed further below).<sup>103</sup> Molotov remained non-committal, claiming to desire a spirit of cooperation and understanding, a wish to study measures to resist aggression and threats to peace in the postwar world, and suggesting that a commission be established to study this issue further.<sup>104</sup>

There appear to be two primary reasons for Molotov's hesitancy. First of all, discussions of principles, particularly those proposed by liberal-democratic states with possibly restrictive implications for the USSR, could hardly be assumed to be likely to receive unqualified support from the USSR. Moreover, Molotov's further response is similarly in line with broader Soviet attitudes. He declared that while the principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations were acceptable, concrete questions had to be decided before the matter could proceed.<sup>105</sup> The "concrete question" that Molotov chose to raise, was whether or not China should be included in this declaration, or whether instead it should simply be issued as a three-power declaration.<sup>106</sup> Molotov inquired how the Chinese could take part in the discussions on the declaration, in the absence of their Chinese counterpart at the

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47, 61-62.

<sup>100</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 89, Hull, Volume II, p. 1279.

<sup>101</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 109; Hull, Volume II, p. 1280.

<sup>102</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 110.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

meeting.<sup>107</sup> Hull replied that the Chinese were already well informed, and therefore the three present could simply work things out amongst themselves, and then send it to the Chinese for their accord before announcing it, assuming that the Chinese would not propose any substantive changes.<sup>108</sup> Molotov responded by saying that if the declaration was only negotiated between the three, then things could be decided without further complication. While claiming that he did not in fact oppose Chinese participation, Molotov stressed that he would prefer that it remain a three-power declaration.<sup>109</sup>

Hull, with Eden's mild support, continued to insist that obtaining Chinese consent to what was agreed by the three principals would not be problematic, and by the same token that a four-power declaration would be preferable as it would have a greater psychological impact on the world at large and prevent any doubts regarding the unity among the most important powers fighting the Axis.<sup>110</sup> Neither side was willing to give way and so a recess was called.<sup>111</sup> Hull maintains in his memoirs that during the recess, he took a walk in the garden with a surprisingly and increasingly affable Molotov, during which Hull convinced the Soviet Commissar of the importance of China's signature to the Americans.<sup>112</sup> This may well be true, but if it is, the Soviet reversal of position was not immediate, as after the recess ended, it was simply decided to delay a final decision on the issue of China's signature, and the discussion moved on to other questions.<sup>113</sup>

One of these other issues was similarly illustrative of the USSR's desire to keep many options regarding postwar conduct open. The original American draft had included

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<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* Due to the strong Soviet desire to avoid war on their eastern front with Japan, the USSR was very careful to avoid any provocation that could justify a Japanese abandonment of their mutual non-aggression pact, signed in April 1941. Hence, great pains were taken to keep Soviet-Chinese relations from becoming too close.

<sup>108</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 112; Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 89.

<sup>109</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 113.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>112</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1282.

<sup>113</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 114.

a point whereby the signatories would act together in the occupation of both enemy states, and other states liberated from the enemy.<sup>114</sup> At Molotov's insistence, this point was debated, then postponed and eventually dropped entirely, as Molotov argued that it could interfere with needed military operations.<sup>115</sup> The removal of this point would ultimately result in a freer hand for the Soviet Union and demonstrates that Stalin's approach to security included the possibility of deploying forces in smaller states to protect Soviet security, by serving as a 'buffer' in central and eastern Europe.

The discussion of the declaration continued, with all parties agreeing to the proposed British amendments, which were both essentially matters of language. The first dealt with the enforcement of treaty terms after the eventual defeat of the enemy, while the second dealt with the international organization. The Americans had initially suggested that the declaration refer to the establishment of a new international security organization which would be open to all states, while the British suggested it be limited to all "peaceloving" states.<sup>116</sup> The US had no objection, while the USSR supported the British, but proposed a minor rewording that inserted the phrase "peaceloving" in a different place than in the British version, in order to make the language less awkward. The Soviet suggestion was promptly accepted.<sup>117</sup> Thus, the fourth point of the Moscow Declaration read in its final form:

4. That they [the signatories] recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 46; Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 89.

<sup>115</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 116; Hoopes and Brinkley, p.89.

<sup>116</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 117.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> Center for the Public Domain and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ibiblio Online Library and Digital Archive, WW II Resources, Treaties, Declarations, Instruments of Surrender Etc., 1943, Moscow Conference October 1943 Joint Four-Nation Declaration,

This is significant insofar as it illustrates that the USSR did in fact give attention to the American proposal and the British amendments regarding the international security organization, again affirming its interest in the concept. As well, this became the first public statement wherein the principal Allies promised a new international organization.

However, it was also decided that until the re-establishment of order in the international arena, the signatories of the declaration would consult with each other in order to maintain international peace and security. The British had proposed that the Big Three should include language about consulting with other members of the alliance as circumstances required, and the Soviets accepted this without dissent, showing a willingness to accept at least the trappings of a broader distribution of power.<sup>119</sup> However, the language chosen “as occasion demands” clearly left the three principals in primary control, and thus did not conflict with Soviet desires to limit the sharing of power as much as possible.

During a recess on 25 October, Hull and Molotov had a short conversation without Eden. The primary topic was the Soviet proposal to pressure Turkey into joining the Allies, but postwar planning was also discussed briefly, as Hull stated the necessity of formulating fundamental principles for the postwar world before the war was over.<sup>120</sup> Molotov inquired what sort of principles Hull had in mind, and among others, such as the promotion of international economic cooperation, Hull listed “cooperation to preserve peace permanently” and “to preserve world order under law, so as to avoid international anarchy.”<sup>121</sup> Molotov expressed agreement, reflecting again the Soviet desire for postwar

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[www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html) (accessed 21 June 2007).

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 117-118.

<sup>120</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, Moscow, October 25, 1943 – 5:00 p.m., in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 40.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid*, p. 118.

cooperation regarding international security issues.<sup>122</sup>

Matters related to the creation of a new international security system were discussed in detail again the next day. Hull opened the discussion by expressing the American view that first the Big Three should agree on broad principles, which could then be used to guide further discussion.<sup>123</sup> Molotov found this approach somewhat unclear, again characteristically displaying a preference for concrete suggestions over abstract ideas, but accepted Hull's suggestion (which Hull claimed was supported by Eden, though the Soviet records do not show this) to utilize this method.<sup>124</sup> The first opinion that Hull sought was whether the other powers favoured joint responsibility for Europe after the war, or a division into separate areas of responsibility. All three powers claimed a desire for the former.<sup>125</sup> This illustrates the decisive marginalization of the views of Litvinov – even when the door was opened to suggest some sort of division into spheres of interest, the Soviets made no effort to even consider the possibility as worth discussing.<sup>126</sup>

The next issue related to postwar security was raised by Molotov, who read a prepared statement opposing federations of small states in central and eastern Europe, claiming that they undermined the sovereignty of small nations, and smacked of the prewar *cordon sanitaire* that had previously isolated the USSR.<sup>127</sup> It was suggested by Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's newly appointed Ambassador to the USSR, that Stalin may have opposed federations out of a desire to have small and weak neighbours in central and eastern Europe that could therefore be easily dominated. Harriman recalled "I gained the impression that Stalin wanted a pulverized Europe in which there would be no

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p 176; Hull, Volume II, p. 1298.

<sup>124</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 177; Hull, Volume II, p. 1298.

<sup>125</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 177-178; Hull, Volume II, p. 1298.

<sup>126</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 178.

strong countries except for the Soviet Union. It seemed to me that the Russians were determined to control the smaller countries and they could do so more easily if they remained apart.”<sup>128</sup> This hypothesis does not contradict the broader pattern of Soviet behaviour, namely the desire to hold as large a share of power as possible.

Later in the discussion, after a recess, the question of China’s participation was raised again. Hull claimed that he had initiated the conversation, while the Soviet records of the meeting indicate that it was Molotov who did so.<sup>129</sup> The American Secretary continued to insist on the importance of the Chinese signature to the Americans, while the Soviet Commissar replied that although he did not oppose the declaration being issued by all four powers, he still questioned whether it would be possible to obtain informed consent from China before the end of the conference.<sup>130</sup> Only when Hull insisted that the Chinese could provide their consent rapidly did Molotov finally accept the inclusion of China as a signatory.<sup>131</sup> Harriman maintains that a veiled threat issued privately by Hull (which is not present in the Soviet records) that US Lend-Lease aid being sent to the USSR could be diverted to China if the latter’s status were undermined also played a role in the Soviet acceptance of China.<sup>132</sup> While, as noted above, Molotov repeatedly claimed that he did not oppose the participation of Chiang Kai-shek’s régime, it was certainly the impression of Hull that in fact the Soviets strongly wished to exclude China, but were reluctant to say so openly.<sup>133</sup> While he kept insisting that it was a practical desire to avoid unnecessary complications, Molotov’s strong resistance to China’s inclusion reinforces the pattern of a Soviet desire to keep power and control, to the maximum practical extent, in the hands of only the three states participating in the Moscow

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 179-180, Hull, Volume II, pp. 1298-1299.

<sup>128</sup> Harriman, p. 244.

<sup>129</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p 182; Hull, Volume II, p. 1299.

<sup>130</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 182.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid*, p. 183.

Conference.<sup>134</sup>

The next major relevant issue to be tackled that day involved what was to become the sixth point of the final declaration, “That after the termination of hostilities they [the signatories] will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.”<sup>135</sup> On 24 October, Molotov had already read a prepared statement declaring that there could be no question of consultation on issues concerning the security of boundaries and correspondingly, agreements with states on those boundaries, such as Czechoslovakia.<sup>136</sup> In fact, the USSR was close to reaching an agreement with Czechoslovakian President Eduard Beneš which would grant the Soviet Union considerable latitude to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia in the interests of international security.<sup>137</sup> Thus, the issue was by no means academic or hypothetical. Therefore, on 26 October, Molotov inquired whether or not the restriction proposed in the Four Power Declaration included bases for naval or air forces.<sup>138</sup> Hull said that the issue had not been considered, but that he believed that naval and air bases could be excluded, and Eden added that he agreed with Hull, since he could not conceive of any of the signatories establishing air or naval bases except for mutually acceptable purposes embodied in the declaration.<sup>139</sup> These answers did not entirely satisfy Molotov, as he proceeded to ask straightforwardly whether or not the establishment of a naval or air base on the territory of another state would require

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<sup>132</sup> Harriman, p. 236.

<sup>133</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1299.

<sup>134</sup> The Soviet stance also reflects Stalin’s low estimation of the likelihood of Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party taking power in the China in the foreseeable future.

<sup>135</sup> Center for the Public Domain and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ibiblio Online Library and Digital Archive, WW II Resources, Treaties, Declarations, Instruments of Surrender Etc., 1943, Moscow Conference October 1943 Joint Four-Nation Declaration, [www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html) (accessed 21 June 2007).

<sup>136</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 158-159; Harriman, p. 246.

<sup>137</sup> Mastny, p. 134, Watson, *Molotov: A Political Biography*, p. 208.

<sup>138</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 183.

<sup>139</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 183; Hull, Volume II, pp. 1299-1300.

consultation with the other signatories.<sup>140</sup> Eden replied that in his opinion, it would require consultation with the other members, though not consent.<sup>141</sup>

Molotov still did not drop the issue, inquiring whether or not it would still be required if the base were established under an agreement of mutual assistance with a third party. Molotov went on to state that he wished this point to be clarified, or at least for there to be agreement that they would leave it somewhat vague.<sup>142</sup> Hull asked what remained vague, and Molotov again asked directly whether or not this article would impede the organization of naval or air bases by one of the signatories on the territory of another state.<sup>143</sup> In response, Hull explained that the article was intended to illustrate for the smaller states self-restraint on the part of the great powers, and that it should not be separated from the declaration as a whole. Hull went on to outline his vision of the broader declaration, which was concerned with the three goals of defeating the common enemy, the application of measures to prevent renewed aggression by the enemy, and to maintain other measures to ensure peace and security. In sum, the declaration meant that only in accordance with these goals could military force be used.<sup>144</sup> Molotov finally accepted this explanation, and the discussions moved on to other topics.<sup>145</sup> However, Molotov's insistence on clarifying the rights to establish bases on the territory of other states shows that the Soviet régime anticipated the possibility of taking such actions. As will be seen below, this approach to international security, based on the establishment of military bases around the world, was very much in accordance with the content of the first discussion between FDR and Stalin at Teheran regarding what would become the UNO. The combination of this pre-existing Soviet viewpoint with the perceived support

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<sup>140</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 184; Hull, Volume II, p. 1300.

<sup>141</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 184.

<sup>142</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 184; Hull, Volume II, p. 1300.

<sup>143</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 185.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

by the American leadership for it would have a potent effect in the longer term. Not only did it eventually make the Soviet positions on the establishment of the new organization clear, they remained wedded to the idea of maintaining military forces in other states after the Americans had moved away from it, thus fostering dissent within the Grand Alliance.

Before the discussions on the 26<sup>th</sup> ended, the subject of the international security organization was dealt with directly, at Molotov's initiative. He brought up the subject shortly before the end of the discussion, and said that he had a proposal, but did not feel that it necessarily needed be included in the broader declaration.<sup>146</sup> Molotov proposed "To form a commission consisting of representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union for the preliminary joint investigation of the issues connected with the establishment of the general international organization indicated in the 4 Power Declaration."<sup>147</sup> Molotov went on to explain that this was an attempt to address the concrete issues raised in point four of the Declaration, and that as far as he was concerned, the commission could meet in Washington, London, or Moscow. He further suggested that other members of the alliance could be invited to send representatives to the discussions, "after some time and a definite stage of work."<sup>148</sup> Hull immediately praised this as "a practical step towards the matter of international cooperation."<sup>149</sup> However, Hull preferred to exclude the small states. Eden likewise accepted the idea in principle, but they both sought more time to consider the Soviet proposal, with Eden asking for it in written form, and the Soviet Commissar assuring him that it would be forthcoming.<sup>150</sup> Molotov was satisfied that they accepted the spirit of the Soviet

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<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 186.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*; Hull, Volume II, p. 1300.

<sup>149</sup> Gromyko, *Moskovskaia konferentsiia*, p. 187.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

proposal, and agreed to postpone discussion of details.<sup>151</sup> All three men agreed that, in Hull's words, "the main burden of all of this work [creating the international security organization] falls on the shoulders of our three governments."<sup>152</sup> The meetings for the day ended with this understanding. This attitude, that the new international security organization would be first and foremost a creation of the Big Three powers, would, as above regarding bases, align very closely with Soviet desires, and the USSR would hold firmly to this conception of the new body, as will be seen in later chapters of this study.

On 29 October, the second last day of the conference, and again, shortly before the conclusion of the day's discussion, Molotov raised this issue once more, asking the others if they had a response to the proposal to appoint representatives. Hull again took the lead in responding. The American repeated that he favoured the idea of discussions to found the new body, but that due to "politicians and demagogues" who could create unnecessary problems, it was preferable to keep the talks informal.<sup>153</sup> Molotov's response was that he did not intend to publish the proceedings of the meetings, but Hull was firm that he preferred to keep the discussions out of the public eye, saying that the appointment of representatives and choosing of any place (alternating between the three capitals was his thought) was the first step to be taken.<sup>154</sup> Molotov, somewhat incomprehensibly, did not reply directly to this suggestion, instead abruptly changing the subject to relations with Italy.<sup>155</sup> However, the fact that the records do not indicate any further substantive discussion regarding the new international organization, and that following Roosevelt's direct discussion of the matter with Stalin below, private

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<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.* Molotov's apparent belief that not publishing the proceedings would be sufficient to keep the talks out of the public eye, in contrast to Hull's insistence on the informality of the talks, appears to reflect a difference in the relationship between the state and the media between the two countries, more than a difference in attitude towards the discussions themselves.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

negotiations among the Big Three did begin several months later at Dumbarton Oaks, essentially signifies the Soviets accepted the American wishes. The Soviets on their own initiative pursued the creation of an international security organization further, which indicates that they attached some importance to the idea. By the same token, the limitation of participation to the three principals likewise matches the pattern of Soviet thought on the issue.

In summary, the Moscow Conference was an integral step on the road to building a new international security organization. Not only did the Four Power Declaration bring the proposal to the attention of the public (at least in the West – in the Soviet Union it received little press coverage)<sup>156</sup> it also provided many demonstrations of Soviet views regarding postwar security. The Soviet stances and behaviour during the Moscow negotiations began to illustrate the Kremlin's conception of the new organization in their postwar planning – namely, that it would serve as a vehicle to preserve their relationship with the British and Americans and enhance Soviet power. At the same time, it remained clear that Stalin's régime still expected to project military force in the postwar world on its own initiative, and that at best the new body could buttress the unilateral power of the USSR, not replace it.

The success of the Moscow conference in terms of both a general improvement of relations and broad support for the specific issue of the new international security organization paved the way for further discussion of the subject at Teheran the following month. The Teheran Conference was the first face-to-face meeting between the American president who initiated the project, and Stalin, without whose support it was bound to fail. As will be seen below, FDR's shrewdly calculated presentation of the UNO ensured Stalin's support for the initiative. However, those aspects that FDR chose

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<sup>156</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 93.

to emphasize when appealing to Stalin would gradually lose dominance as the American and British perspectives of the organization evolved, while they remained absolutely central to the Soviet view. Thus, the initial warm acceptance contained the seeds of later dissent.

The Teheran Conference was another initiative of the American president. Roosevelt felt strongly that if he had the opportunity to meet Stalin face-to-face, relations could be improved significantly, and any difficulties in the relationship could be smoothed out.<sup>157</sup> Winning Stalin's support for his idea of 'The Four Policemen' was another major goal of Roosevelt – though he found the Soviet attitude toward the concept as stated in the Four Power Declaration encouraging, he still wanted to see Stalin's response in person.<sup>158</sup> In fact, Roosevelt had been trying for some time to arrange a meeting with Stalin, preferably without Churchill. In May 1943, FDR had sent a message to Stalin through a special envoy, former American Ambassador to the USSR Joseph Davies, requesting a meeting in the summer, perhaps in the area of the Bering Strait.<sup>159</sup> However, Stalin's preoccupation with military matters, and unwillingness to leave the Moscow area for any significant amount of time, resulted in a meeting by all three leaders taking place in late November 1943. The Soviet régime strenuously objected to any participation by the Chinese government, again to avoid complications in relations with Japan, and perhaps to keep China as only a marginal member of the Allied great powers.<sup>160</sup>

Stalin himself likewise attached a great deal of importance to the meeting. After

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<sup>157</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1249. FDR told Hull that he believed that a personal appeal to the Soviet leader on the grounds of high morality could be effective in resolving some issues, such as the Soviet takeover of the Baltic States, and there is no reason to doubt that FDR had similar self-confidence in reaching understanding over other issues. *Ibid*, p. 1266.

<sup>158</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 94.

<sup>159</sup> Personal Note from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin, from Washington, May 5, 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>160</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 95.

insisting on the location of Teheran for the meeting, the Soviets then expressed concern over the fact that the American compound was located a long way from the Soviet and British ones, thus leaving them vulnerable to “accidents” or “an unhappy incident.”<sup>161</sup> Therefore, the Americans moved into a section of the Soviet compound, which was, unsurprisingly, bugged with listening devices, and the staff of servants was infiltrated by the NKVD.<sup>162</sup> Stalin personally asked Sergo Beria, son of secret police head Lavrenty Beria, to monitor the listening devices, and the leader showed great interest in their content. Not only did Stalin meet with Sergo every day to receive summaries of what had been said by the Americans, Stalin made his inquiries in great detail, asking questions not only about what was said, but also about tones of voice, etc.<sup>163</sup> Stalin also prepared himself for the meetings with far more thoroughness than was his norm, which caused his interpreter, Valentin Berezhkov, to believe that ‘the Boss’ was very nervous about meeting Roosevelt.<sup>164</sup>

Stalin had indicated in August that he did not want this meeting “to have a purely

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<sup>161</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 97; William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 203, President’s Log at Tehran [*sic*], November 27-December 2, 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 463. The Americans had strenuously objected to the meeting being in Teheran, for several reasons. First of all, the journey to such a distant location was difficult for the ailing Roosevelt. Secondly, the city was known to be significantly infiltrated by German agents, though the British and Soviets made a concerted joint effort to sweep the city clean of them shortly before the conference. Furthermore, since Congress was in session, the president was required to either accept or veto any legislation passed in his own hand, and the distance to Teheran made it impossible to ensure that this could be achieved within the constitutionally allotted time. In the many communications between the Soviets and Americans regarding the choice of location, much ado was made by the Americans of the poor weather that made flying in and out of Teheran difficult. However, Harriman points out that under closer examination, only two of the many regularly scheduled Cairo-Teheran flights (the route being taken by the Americans) were seriously delayed by the weather in November 1941 and 1942, and neither of those by more than 24 hours. Sergo Beria, Françoise Thom, ed., Brian Pearce, transl., *Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin* (London: Duckworth, 2001), p. 78; Susan Butler, ed., *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 172-175, p. 182; Harriman, p. 241, Hull, Volume II, p. 1303; Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President, Moscow, 7 November 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 70.

<sup>162</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 97-98.

<sup>163</sup> Beria, p. 93.

<sup>164</sup> Valentin M. Berezhkov, Sergei Mikheyev, transl., *At Stalin’s Side* (New York: Carol

exploratory character” but instead wanted a very practical meeting that would be well-prepared and would achieve concrete decisions.<sup>165</sup> Therefore, Molotov had anticipated that the meetings at Teheran would be formally structured as they had been at Moscow, but Roosevelt strongly opposed any official agenda or even official delegations, thus a much looser format was followed.<sup>166</sup> In fact, many of the most serious discussions took place during meals.<sup>167</sup> From the outset, the meetings of the leaders were notably unrestrained, according to Berezhkov, who speculated that their frequent correspondence may have contributed to an atmosphere of familiarity.<sup>168</sup> Hull’s assurances that Stalin had been favourably disposed to the idea of an international security organization during the Moscow Conference may have given FDR greater confidence in his approaches to the Soviet leader.<sup>169</sup> Furthermore, Harriman had earlier expressed similar confidence in the likelihood of Soviet cooperation, believing that Stalin had experimented with working with the Western powers at Moscow, and had been pleased with the results, evidenced by the Soviet acceptance of China as a signatory to the Moscow Declaration.<sup>170</sup>

During their talks, FDR stressed the private nature of his discussions with Stalin.<sup>171</sup> Moreover, the President went to great pains to prevent the Soviet leader from forming the impression that the two capitalist powers were working in concert against him, annoying Churchill by refusing to have any private meetings with him, while conducting such rendezvous with the Soviet leader.<sup>172</sup> In addition, as will be seen below,

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Publishing Group, 1994), pp. 237-238.

<sup>165</sup> Telegram, Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Moscow, 24 August 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 22.

<sup>166</sup> Harriman, p. 263.

<sup>167</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 98.

<sup>168</sup> Berezhkov, *Teheran*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>169</sup> Telegram, The Secretary of State to the President, Moscow, 31 October 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 58.

<sup>170</sup> Telegram, Ambassador Harriman to the President, Moscow, 4 November 1943, in *Ibid*, pp. 152-153.

<sup>171</sup> Berezhkov, *Teheran*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>172</sup> Keith Eubank, *Summit at Teherah* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1985), p.

the American President seemed to deliberately distance himself from the views of Churchill, and disagreement with the British PM seemed to become a friendly reference point between the Soviet and American leaders.<sup>173</sup>

A great many issues were discussed at Teheran, such as how to handle the occupation and future of Germany, which illustrated the Kremlin's continued consideration of military control of strategic sites as the key to future security.<sup>174</sup> By the same token, this was precisely how FDR would raise the subject of the new international security organization with Stalin. The first private meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin took place on 28 November 1943, the day after the President's arrival in the city, at 3:15 p.m. and lasted approximately 45 minutes.<sup>175</sup> The matter of the new international organization was not discussed at all. However, Roosevelt did raise the possibility of giving part of the American-British merchant fleet to the Soviet Union after the war, as these ships would no longer be needed by the Western Allies. Furthermore, the president expressed a clear desire to keep France weak after the war by refusing to assist the French in regaining control over their Empire or treating them as equal to the Big Four. By the same token, FDR indicated that he would not overlook the significant collaboration with Germany on the part of the French.<sup>176</sup> These statements, as expected, pleased Stalin, and appear to have been a calculated attempt by Roosevelt to 'butter up' the Soviet leader and thus set the stage for a positive reception when FDR presented his idea of the 'Four Policemen' to Stalin the next time they met privately.

The second private meeting between FDR and Stalin took place in the afternoon of the following day, Monday, 29 November 1943. Only FDR, Stalin, and their two

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<sup>173</sup> Andrei Gromyko, with Harold Shukman, transl., *Memories* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 84.

<sup>174</sup> Mastny, p. 127.

<sup>175</sup> President's Log at Tehran [*sic*], November 27-December 2, 1943, in *FRUS, Conferences at*

interpreters, Bohlen and Berezhkov, were present. According to the President's Log, the meeting began at 2:45 P.M. and lasted approximately 45 minutes, while the Soviet records have a 2:30 start and the duration approximately 70 minutes.<sup>177</sup> This discussion is absolutely pivotal to this study, since it was the first time that the two leaders discussed the idea of a new international security organization directly. The way in which Roosevelt explained his vision and responded to Stalin's comments on it profoundly shaped later Soviet behaviour involving this issue, as will be seen in the following chapters. FDR deliberately highlighted those aspects which the president calculated would be most attractive to Stalin – that is, the president implied that the new organization would serve primarily as a vehicle to institutionalize the postwar military dominance of the Big Four, who would work in concert to prevent another war. Roosevelt's approach was successful in shoring up Stalin's support for the endeavour, but also fostered the development of mutual misunderstandings regarding the new organization's role, which would in time cause considerable difficulties in both its formation and functioning.

While this study primarily utilizes Berezhkov's minutes of the relevant discussion from Molotov's papers in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF, from the transliteration of its Russian name, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii) because this record is the most detailed, and this was the version that could reasonably be expected to have been most heavily utilized by the Soviet régime, there are numerous other accounts of this discussion.<sup>178</sup> The primary

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*Cairo and Teheran*, p. 464.

<sup>176</sup> In *Ibid*, pp. 483-484.

<sup>177</sup> Andrei Andeevich Gromyko, ed., *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia rukovoditelei trekh soiuznykh derzhav--SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii : 28 noiabria-1 dekabria 1943 g. : sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1984), p. 101, 105, *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 466.

<sup>178</sup> AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora. no. 138, Papka no. 13, pp. 1-8. The same record can be found in Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 101-105, although the

American one, based on minutes taken by Chip Bohlen, later Ambassador to the USSR who served as a translator at Teheran and later Yalta, had only minor differences from the Soviet minutes.<sup>179</sup> Harriman's and Hopkins' accounts, while less detailed, again do not differ significantly in substance; as neither man was present, they relied on Bohlen's summary.<sup>180</sup> Thus, it is safe to treat Berezkhov's record as accurate.

The second meeting of the two leaders began with a brief mention of American support for Tito in Yugoslavia, the question of Anglo-American use of Soviet air bases, and the president's pleasure at Stalin's most secret assurance that he would bring the USSR into the war with Japan once Germany had been defeated.<sup>181</sup> However, the president soon moved on to his primary purpose, saying that he wished to discuss other matters before he left Teheran, including the necessity of a new international organization to provide lasting peace in the postwar world. FDR continued by saying that the creation of such a body was a necessity, which is why he had included it as a point in the Moscow Declaration.<sup>182</sup> Stalin replied that there was nothing to stop them from discussing anything they wished.<sup>183</sup> The president then outlined his plan, saying that it was his understanding that after the war, a new world organization, based on the principles of the United Nations alliance (i.e. the Atlantic Charter, Declaration by United Nations and Four Power Declaration) would need to be founded. It would not have to resemble the League of Nations. Instead, it would consist of 35, perhaps 50, members of the United Nations, and would give recommendations. The organization would not meet in one place, but

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Gromyko version is not complete, as it excludes Stalin's full comments on China, and Stalin's use of the example of the occupation of the Suez Canal to forestall Italian aggression.

<sup>179</sup> *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, pp. 529-533.

<sup>180</sup> Harriman, pp. 270-271, Sherwood, pp. 785-787.

<sup>181</sup> Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia*, p. 101, *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 529.

<sup>182</sup> Berezkhov's minutes of conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt, on the international security organization, 29 November 1943, in Teheran, can be found in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Por. no. 138, Papka no. 13, p.3.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

instead change locations for each meeting, as was the practice with conferences of the American republics.<sup>184</sup>

At that point, Stalin interrupted to ask if FDR was speaking about a European or a world organization, and Roosevelt replied that it had to be global.<sup>185</sup> Stalin next asked if there was to be any executive organ in this organization. Roosevelt replied that while he had not worked out the details, he supposed that the executive would consist of the USSR, the United Kingdom, the US, China, two European countries, one South American country, one Middle Eastern country, one Asian country other than China, and one British Dominion.<sup>186</sup> Roosevelt claimed that Churchill was unhappy with this proposal, as it gave the British Empire only two votes. He went on to say that the Executive could deal with non-military questions such as agriculture, health, and economic issues. In addition, there would be a 'police committee' of countries which could preserve peace and halt any renewed attempt at aggression by German or Japan. This would be the third organ of the organization.<sup>187</sup> Stalin asked if the decisions of this committee were binding, and what would happen if a country refused to accept the committee's decisions. Roosevelt said that in that event, the offending country would face the possibility of further action by the police committee.

Stalin responded by inquiring whether this police committee would be part of the general organization, or a separate body.<sup>188</sup> FDR then summed up by saying that there would be a general organization consisting of 35 UN members, an executive committee of ten or eleven, and a police committee formed by the USSR, US, UK, and China. Roosevelt continued by saying that if there was the danger of aggression or another

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<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

breach of international peace, this organ could respond rapidly if the executive organ had insufficient time to discuss it. Stalin remarked that this would be an enforcement organ.<sup>189</sup> Already it can be seen that the American proposal to ensure international peace and security had evolved; from the starting point of an exclusive military capability for the Big Four, it had become envisioned as a three-part organization, with an interest in non-military questions. However, the most salient aspect of the original project – dominance by the Big Four, who could use their power to crush any threat to the peace with relative speed and ease – remained unchanged.

Roosevelt resumed the explication of his idea to Stalin, raising the recent historical example of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. According to FDR, he had at the time urged the British to close the Suez Canal, so that the Italian Navy could not continue their attack. However, the British and French did nothing except pass the issue on to the League of Nations, and the League's ineffectiveness allowed the Italians to continue their aggression. Roosevelt said that the organization that he was proposing would have been capable of taking quick and decisive action, closing the canal and thus saving Abyssinia.<sup>190</sup> Stalin commented that he understood, and FDR then summarized again his proposed three-tier structure, of a police committee composed of the Big Four, an executive committee to deal with all non-military issues, and a general body, wherein small nations could talk about what they want and express their opinion.<sup>191</sup>

Stalin, content mostly to listen up until that point, then began to elucidate his views more fully. The Soviet leader's approach to the project was very practical, seeking answers to more concrete questions and examining potential problems that would need to be resolved. Stalin began by expressing his doubts that the small European nations would

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<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5.

be satisfied with this plan. First of all, they would be unable to understand why China was given such a decisive role in relations among European countries, and he expressed doubts regarding China's strength and consequent ability to function in a leading capacity.<sup>192</sup> Stalin therefore politely proposed that it might be better if there were two organizations – one for Europe, which included the USA, England, Russia, and perhaps another European country, and another for either the Far East or the entire world. The Marshal then asked the President what he thought of this idea.<sup>193</sup> FDR responded by pointing out there was a great deal of similarity between Stalin's idea and Churchill's, except that Churchill favoured three organizations – one for Europe, one for the Far East, and one for the Americas. In this plan, the US would not be a member of the body for Europe. Roosevelt went on to say that only a huge breakdown, such as the present war, could get the US to send forces across the ocean, and expressed doubt that Congress would have approved the sending of US forces to Europe if there had been no Japanese attack in 1941.<sup>194</sup>

Stalin next asked whether the Americans anticipated sending forces to Europe if the world organization suggested by the President was created.<sup>195</sup> Roosevelt replied that if it was necessary to act against the possibility of aggression, the US would provide naval and air forces, but that he anticipated the British and Soviets providing land forces. The president continued by saying that he proposed dealing with threats to the peace in two ways. If there was a threat of revolution or aggression against another state, the offender could be subjected to quarantine, in order to prevent the disturbance spreading to other territories. The second way was for the Four Policemen to issue an ultimatum to

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<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.* These comments on China are excluded from the version published by Gromyko.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6. This approach suggests that Roosevelt felt confident that the Soviet leader would regard a withdrawal of the US from European affairs as something to be avoided – otherwise, his statement could hardly be expected to adjust Stalin's attitude.

stop a potential breach of the peace, and if this was not sufficient, the offender would be subjected to bombardment or even occupation. At that point, Roosevelt ended his explanation, adding that he would consider the proposals of the Soviet leader.<sup>196</sup>

Stalin's following lengthy reply is a very good indication of Soviet security concerns and proposed means of dealing with them in the postwar world. The Soviet leader began by saying that at the previous day's lunch, while Roosevelt was absent, Stalin had a conversation with Churchill regarding the preservation of peace in the future. Stalin said that Churchill regarded the issue lightly, and thought that Germany would take a long time to recover. Stalin said that he did not agree, and felt that Germany could recover quickly, anticipating that this would take 15-20 years. If nothing was done to contain Germany, Stalin feared that Germany would restore itself in only a few years. The first major war begun by Germany in centuries began in 1870. There were 42 years until 1914, when Germany started a new war, and after 21 years, in 1939, Germany again began a major conflict.<sup>197</sup>

Stalin continued [my translation]:

It can be seen, then, that the time needed by Germany to recover is growing shorter, and in the future will continue to be so. If restrictions are placed on Germany, the Germans will have the possibility of getting around them. If we ban the construction of aircraft, but we cannot close the furniture factories, it is well known that the furniture factories can quickly be converted to the production of aircraft. If we ban the construction of shells and torpedoes, but cannot close the watch factories, then each watch factory can quickly be converted to the production of the most important parts of shells and torpedoes. Therefore Germany can again rise and begin aggression. In order to prevent aggression, this body which we are contemplating founding, will be insufficient. It is necessary to have the opportunity to occupy the most important strategic points so that Germany cannot seize them. [At this point, Bohlen's minutes say that Stalin indicated that these points could be within Germany, on

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<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 6-7.

Germany's borders, or even further away.<sup>198]</sup> These points would have to be occupied not only in Europe, but also in the Far East in order that Japan cannot begin new aggression. For example, it is necessary to occupy the Suez Canal in order to prevent the possibility of aggression, for example, on the part of Italy, as occurred in 1935, and also other places.<sup>199</sup> This body, which we are going to create, must have the right to occupy important strategic points. In the event of the threat of aggression on the part of Germany or Japan these points must be quickly occupied in order to surround Germany and Japan and suppress them. It would be good if we could make the decision that the organization which we are going to create, will have the right to occupy points that are important in a strategic sense.<sup>200</sup>

This passage clearly illustrates Stalin's view on postwar security. While he apparently envisioned continued cooperation with at least the principal allies through the format of an international organization, he also viewed that organization as a vehicle for military-strategic supremacy. The next line in Berezhev's minutes is Roosevelt's response that he agreed with Marshal Stalin "100 percent" and Stalin remarked that "in that case, all is secure."<sup>201</sup> Thus, Stalin would have certainly received the impression that FDR accepted his vision of the proposed international organization, and therefore the Marshal had a positive attitude toward it. However, as work on the development of the new organization progressed, this vision of the body changed substantially, which would prove to be problematic for the UNO in particular, and Soviet-Western relations in general.

Before this meeting concluded, Roosevelt said that he would like to see China included in the organization not because it appeared to be a great power at the time, but because it had 400 million people, and he did not want this country to become a source of

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<sup>198</sup> *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 532.

<sup>199</sup> AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Por. no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 7. Stalin's use of the Suez example is not included in the version published by Gromyko. Bohlen's version does not mention Suez as an example, but does cite Dakar as an example provided by Stalin. *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 532.

<sup>200</sup> AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opice no. 6, Por. no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 7.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*

trouble or aggression.<sup>202</sup> Concerning Germany, of course the Germans could rebuild their factories for military production, but in this event it would be necessary to act quickly, and if they took decisive measures, then Germany would not have sufficient time to rearm. Roosevelt added that that situation would have to be taken care of by the commission of the four powers that he had mentioned.<sup>203</sup> Berezikov's minutes, which he verified with his signature, end there, although Gromyko's version includes a comment by Stalin that it was time for the ceremonial giving of the Sword of Stalingrad from King George VI, and FDR's final comment that he and Stalin were making great progress in their talks.<sup>204</sup> Thus it can be seen that from his first direct introduction to the subject, Stalin favoured the idea of the body proposed by FDR. However, this positive response was significantly influenced by the president's apparent full acceptance of the Soviet plan for the body serving primarily as a tool for the armed enforcement of peace, with the power to take control of strategically crucial points. On the following day, there was a meeting of foreign ministers, at which Hopkins and Molotov extensively discussed what some of these strategic points could be, with Bizerte and Dakar being mentioned.<sup>205</sup>

There was little further discussion of this issue during the Teheran Conference, and unlike at Moscow, the subject of the international organization was not mentioned in the Teheran Declaration.<sup>206</sup> According to both Bohlen and Harriman's recollections, the president seemed satisfied with Stalin's loose acceptance of the concept.<sup>207</sup> It is significant, though, that during dinner on the evening of the discussion analyzed above, Stalin reiterated the importance of the occupation of important strategic points.

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<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.* Again, this comment on China's participation is excluded from Gromyko's published version of the document.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>204</sup> AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Por. no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 8, Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia a*, p. 105.

<sup>205</sup> Watson, *Molotov: A Biography*, p. 213. Once again, the French were not treated with high regard, as both of these ports were under French control before the war.

<sup>206</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 106.

According to Bohlen's minutes of the dinner meeting, Stalin said that in order to prevent the resurgence of Germany and a new war,

two conditions must be met:

(1) At least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated.

(2) The victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

Marshal Stalin added that similar strong points now in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies.<sup>208</sup>

While the angry response that the first point provoked from Churchill, and the extent to which Stalin meant it earnestly has been described and debated repeatedly, the second point, central to this study, has been generally overlooked. Once again, it illustrates the Soviet view of postwar international security, a view which would shape the creation and very early days of the future UN.

The only other recorded mention of the issue of the international organization occurred at the last private meeting of Stalin and Roosevelt, which took place at 3:20 P.M. in Roosevelt's quarters on 1 December 1943. Both the Soviet and American records show that shortly before parting, when asked about the international organization, Stalin told FDR that they had not finished the discussion on this issue. He added, without any further explanation, that he had considered the issue and that he supposed that it was better to have one world organization.<sup>209</sup> Molotov then pointed out that, as per the agreement at Moscow, the matter would be given further study with the goal of making concrete proposals for the creation of a world organization and the provision of a leading role in it for the four powers.<sup>210</sup> Thus, at the Teheran Conference the creation of the

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<sup>207</sup> Bohlen, p. 153, Harriman, p. 279.

<sup>208</sup> *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 554.

<sup>209</sup> *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, p. 595, Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia*, p. 152. Stalin's reasons for this reversal were never made explicit, but possible explanations will be discussed in Chapter Three.

<sup>210</sup> Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia*, p. 152.

United Nations took another important step forward, as Stalin gave his full and explicit personal approval to the plan. However, the project he believed that he was approving at Teheran would turn out to be quite different from the organization that was eventually created.

In summary, for historical and ideological reasons, the USSR could have been expected to oppose membership in an international security organization which would be dominated by capitalist states. However, due significantly to Roosevelt's chosen manner of presenting the concept, the organization seemed to promise a number of benefits to the USSR. When Molotov visited Washington, the project was sold as a very exclusive right to possess a strong military. Then, at Moscow and even more so at Teheran, the project appeared to be a vehicle for consolidating cooperation with the British and Americans to keep Germany contained and to police the globe through military dominance and the occupation of key strategic points. Thus, the Soviets readily accepted the notion of the new organization, though, as the body began to receive a concrete shape during the August 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it began to move further away from the initial Soviet conception, and thus seemed less useful to the USSR and less supportive of Soviet interests.

### Chapter Three – The Dumbarton Oaks Conference

While the first direct discussion of the new international security organization between Roosevelt and Stalin took place during the Teheran Conference, the issue was addressed only at a very basic level, as noted in the previous chapter. However, having secured the agreement in principle personally and from the highest Soviet authority, as Roosevelt desired, the US decided to press on with the creation of the new body. To this end, they sought to hold a conference of the ‘Four Policemen’ which would be the leaders of the new organization: USA, UK, USSR, and China. This conference was eventually held from August to October 1944, at the Dumbarton Oaks estate outside of Washington, D.C.<sup>1</sup> It was during this series of meetings – deliberately referred to as “conversations” in order to downplay their significance and avoid stimulating press speculation and isolationist sentiment in the US Congress – that much of the planning of the new international security organization was done.<sup>2</sup> While the most serious divergences of views towards the new body could not be resolved without expending a great deal of time and effort at the highest levels, most of the basic groundwork for the new organization was laid at Dumbarton Oaks. The positions held by the Soviet government going into the conversations provide perhaps the best illustration of its intentions and desires regarding the endeavour, before compromises had to be made during the course of the negotiations. By the same token, the degree of willingness (or lack thereof) to compromise on or even withdraw entirely various proposals illustrates which priorities were deemed most vital,

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<sup>1</sup> The site was formerly owned by one-time U.S. Ambassador to Sweden and Argentina Robert Woods Bliss, who bequeathed it to Harvard University for use as a centre for Byzantine Studies. Its selection for the conference was proposed by State Department planning group member and later infamous alleged Soviet spy, Alger Hiss. Hiss was an active participant in the US efforts to create the UN, though it should be pointed out that there is no evidence of clandestine action on his part to assist the Soviets in relation to this endeavour. Aside from providing a dignified setting, Dumbarton Oaks offered spacious buildings, many trees, and extensive gardens that offered some respite from the heat of Washington, at a time when few government buildings were equipped with air-conditioning and private-sector office space was unavailable. Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 130.

with the most important priority for the USSR being an unrestricted right of veto power. Thus, while the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was only the first stage of concrete planning for the new body, this stage is extremely significant in illuminating Soviet hopes for, and expectations of, the new international security organization that became the United Nations. These talks clearly show that the Soviets wanted the new organization to be controlled as much as possible by the victorious great powers that made the largest contributions to the defeat of Nazi Germany. This principle would maximize Soviet authority in a variety of ways. At the same time, the Soviets remained highly conscious of their relative isolation as the world's first and only socialist power. Thus, while the Soviet government put a strong effort into creating the new organization and making it effective, it also remained preoccupied with a perceived need to protect the status of the USSR within the new body.

During the time between the Teheran Conference and the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, the Soviet government gave considerable attention to the concept of a new organization. Stalin reportedly stopped at the ruined city of Stalingrad en route back to Moscow, and it is claimed that his visit there reinforced his desire to prevent another catastrophe of such magnitude, and in turn, his aim to build strong relations with the Allies, of which the future UN was a cornerstone. Furthermore, participation in postwar planning would serve as a clear manifestation of Soviet prestige in the international arena, which had been a longstanding concern in Russian foreign policy, particularly after the diplomatic exclusion that followed the Bolshevik seizure of power.<sup>3</sup> There is a great deal of testimony that substantiates the importance that the USSR attached to the UN in the period between Teheran and Dumbarton Oaks conferences. Ambassadors Maisky and Litvinov discussed the postwar world extensively by cable from their posts in London

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<sup>2</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 131, Yoder, p. 27.

and Washington respectively during 1943. In January 1944, Maisky summed up their discussions in a memo sent to Molotov, who in turn passed it on to Stalin and the Politburo. The memo contained a variety of postwar goals, including expanding the Soviet borders perhaps even beyond those of 1941 in the west and in the far east, and the extension of military and political influence over most of Europe. While these goals were ambitious to the point of being unrealistic, the memo did recognize that the “probable and desirable foreign policy” would be “strengthened friendship with the United States and England” as there was little hope of achieving these aims without their cooperation.<sup>4</sup> Litvinov was even more vociferous in advocating postwar cooperation with the Western Allies, at least for a considerable period. In July 1944 he wrote to Molotov that “We must seek some kind of cooperation, in order to have at least a few decades of peace.”<sup>5</sup>

Evidence indicates that these goals were sincere. Stalin appears to have already been oriented toward seeking postwar cooperation since Teheran. Immediately after the conference, on 6 December, 1943, Stalin responded to a message from Roosevelt with the words “I agree with you that the Tehran Conference was a great success and that our personal meetings were, in many respects, extremely important... Now there is confidence that our peoples will harmoniously act together during the present time *as well as after this war is over.* [My italics]”<sup>6</sup> A similar message dispatched by Stalin to Roosevelt on the 20<sup>th</sup> of the same month reiterated “I also attach important significance to our meeting and to the conversations taken place there which concerned such substantial questions of accelerating our common victory *and establishment of future lasting peace between the peoples.* [my italics]”<sup>7</sup> While the creation of the UN was certainly not the

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<sup>3</sup> Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 27, 33.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, pp. 28-30.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> Butler, p. 194.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 196.

only means of pursuing this postwar cooperation, it was a natural vehicle for doing so, and the correlation is substantiated by further evidence.

Andrei Gromyko, who had taken over Litvinov's post as Ambassador to the US in the summer of 1943, was appointed to head the Soviet delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. He supported postwar cooperation with the US, in his 32-page memo titled "On the Question of Soviet-American Relations" written in July 1944, just a few weeks before the talks began.<sup>8</sup> In this report, Gromyko stated that after the war the US "would be interested in political and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union" and that this cooperation would "greatly determine the nature of post-war international relations."<sup>9</sup> More importantly, Gromyko reported that the Soviet government supported the initiative to create a new international security organization. When recalling the conference in his memoirs, Gromyko wrote "I represented the Soviet Union and our approach was clear: we were determined to create such an organization and we were determined that it should be effective."<sup>10</sup> While Gromyko's memoirs are unfortunately not renowned for their candor, this assertion is supported by Gromyko's repeated insistence both in public and in private that Stalin attached great significance to the body.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, Stalin himself praised the new organization in very clear and strong language. In a conversation with Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, on 9 August 1944 (just as the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was beginning) the Soviet leader showed his support for the project. His choice of language

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<sup>8</sup> Vladimir Olegovich Pechatnov, *The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking About Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain (Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 13)* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Gromyko, *Memories*, p. 115.

<sup>11</sup> Georgi Kornienko, *Kholodnaya Voina: Svidetelstvo i Uchastnik* (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2001), p. 43.

was remarkably similar to that used when he first discussed it with Roosevelt at Teheran, which tellingly reflects his primary attitude to the proposed body. Stalin told Mikolajczyk:

Germany will rise again. It is a strong nation... Who knows whether within 20 or 25 years they will not again be ready for a new war. Yes, indeed Germany is a strong nation. Although Hitler has now enfeebled it, the military and economic framework will survive Hitler. In our view the German danger may reappear. *For this reason the question of the conditions of mutual security now under discussion in Washington is an urgent matter.* [my italics]<sup>12</sup>

Again, before concluding his discussion with Mikolajczyk, Stalin reiterated:

I stand for all possible and impossible repressive measures against Germany. But, in spite of everything, Germany might rise again. It is a strong nation and *we must prepare a weapon for such an eventuality. Our alliance will be that weapon, and also the forces available for the machinery of world security.* [my italics]<sup>13</sup>

Thus in the period between the Teheran and Dumbarton Oaks Conferences, the Soviet government in general and Stalin in particular viewed the prospective international security organization as a vital component of Soviet postwar security. Also, the Soviet vision of the endeavour was focused on a fairly narrow, militarily-oriented definition of security, and thus Moscow would consistently attempt to shape the new organization to reflect this focus.

Despite strong support for the proposed organization, there was considerable difficulty and delay in arranging the talks, which has often been taken as indicative of a lack of interest.<sup>14</sup> As will be seen below, the Soviets were generally very slow to reply to American proposals regarding the conference to discuss the project. However, somewhat

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<sup>12</sup> Note on the conversation between M. Mikolajczyk and Marshal Stalin relating to the renewed attempts at an understanding between M. Mikolajczyk and the Polish Committee of National Liberation and to assistance for fighting Warsaw, Moscow, August 9, 1944, 9-11:20 p.m., in The General Sikorski Historical Institute, ed., *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II, 1943-45* (Toronto: Heinemann, 1967), p. 334.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 335.

paradoxically, the delay was not because the new organization was seen as insignificant; instead, the delays are much more likely to have stemmed from the fact that the Kremlin viewed the matter as relatively important. Molotov and Stalin both paid detailed attention to the founding of the new body, but the military situation continued to consume the bulk of their time. Thus, the creation of the new international security organization, while not of such immediate significance to displace attention away from pressing wartime concerns, was considered too important to be delegated to subordinates.

By the summer of 1944 some strains were already developing within the Grand Alliance. Developments in Poland were central to these difficulties. The German disclosure of the Katyn Massacre in April 1943, followed quickly by the Soviet government's severance of formal relations with the London-based Polish government-in-exile over the latter's call for an independent inquiry into the matter, dismayed the British and the Americans, as did their fruitless efforts to achieve reconciliation between the two parties. The USSR's sponsorship of an alternative provisional Polish régime, the Polish Committee for National Liberation (more commonly referred to as the Lublin Committee or Lublin Poles, after the city in which it was established) exacerbated the difficulties. Differences in the Soviet and Western reactions to the Warsaw Uprising by the Polish resistance (the *Armia Krajowa*, associated with the London Poles) that coincided with the Dumbarton conversations further undermined the spirit of cooperation established at Teheran. In addition, the Kremlin's unilateral dictation of surrender terms to the former Axis states of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which likewise occurred while the conference was taking place, rankled London and Washington, though the Soviet actions did not significantly deviate from the precedent set by the Americans and

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<sup>14</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 121, is a recent example from an otherwise excellent monograph, but the same opinion is widespread in older sources, such as Dallin, p. 23, and Geoff Simons, *The United Nations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 41.

British in Italy a year earlier.<sup>15</sup> However, the Normandy landings of June 1944 provided the second front in Europe that Stalin had been urging for so long, and took considerable military pressure off of the Red Army, resulting in an upswing in inter-Allied unity, that at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks talks still largely balanced these other concerns.<sup>16</sup> By the same token, FDR, firmly supported by the less influential Hull, remained strongly supportive of long-term postwar cooperation, thus the position of the US towards the creation of the UNO remained essentially unchanged in the summer and fall of 1944.<sup>17</sup> Despite Churchill's "cynically jocular" attitude towards the new body, Foreign Secretary Eden's championing of the project ensured continued British support as well.<sup>18</sup>

Again, the US took the initiative in the period leading up to Dumbarton Oaks. It proved to be difficult to arrange Soviet participation. The US set to work on defining its views on the proposed new body in the immediate aftermath of Teheran, with Secretary of State Hull presenting to the president an outline plan, intended to be the basis for future negotiations with the other three 'Policemen', on 29 December 1943.<sup>19</sup> FDR approved the document's use for this purpose on 3 February 1944, and thereafter the State Department worked on refining and expanding the details of Hull's work.<sup>20</sup> The same document was also used as the basis for preliminary discussions with the British

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<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that the German takeover of Hungary prevented the imposition of the terms regarding Hungary until early in 1945. Glantz, p. 157, Roberts, p. 170.

<sup>16</sup> Glantz, p. 157.

<sup>17</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 141-142, Hull, Volume II, p. 1470, pp. 1634-1635. In an effort to avoid causing tensions with the Soviets, the Americans even removed a portrait of the Polish composer and statesman Ignacy Jan Paderewski from the Dumbarton Oaks estate before the conference. Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 133.

<sup>18</sup> Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and British delegation head Sir Alexander Cadogan related in his diary a Cabinet meeting to discuss the new international security organization on 4 August 1944, in which Churchill proclaimed "There now: in 25 mins. we've settled the future of the World. Who can say that we aren't efficient?" Cadogan went on to note that despite Churchill's opinion, he had the sympathy of the Cabinet. Cadogan, pp. 653-654.

<sup>19</sup> The outline can be found in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1944 Volume I, General* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 614-615.

<sup>20</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 111.

and Russians. An exchange of views on the new international security organization was proposed to the British and Soviet Ambassadors orally in Washington less than a week later on 8 February, though the actual draft was not forwarded to the respective embassies until 17 February.<sup>21</sup> The British similarly wished to capitalize on the momentum generated by the Teheran Conference by pursuing the new international security organization.<sup>22</sup> Thus, they responded promptly, with a proposal that was highly similar to that of the US, received in Washington on 15 February.<sup>23</sup>

The Soviets, on the other hand, did not reply until 4 April, and then only to the British (in response to a British draft sent to the Soviet government on 16 March) who passed on the main Soviet points to the US government the following day.<sup>24</sup> The reply sent at that time by Molotov contained only comments on the British and American proposals, with no substantive additions from the Soviet side. Limited as the Soviet response was, it clearly indicated that the USSR sought only a military and security function for the new organization. Molotov's primary point was that before the exchange of documents on the project, the three governments should clarify the main questions, which should then be settled first. As examples of primary issues, Molotov cited: "the relationship between the general organization and its directing organs; the procedures for decision-making by both the general organization and the directing organs;" and the relationship between mutual defence arrangements, any eventual regional security

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<sup>21</sup> Initial proposal referred to in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, p. 622. Also referred to in Andrei Andeevich Gromyko, ed., *Konferentsiia predstavitelei SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii v Dumbarton-Okse, 21 avgusta-28 sentiabria, 1944 g.: sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), p. 34. The text of the dispatched draft can be found in Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>22</sup> This was communicated personally by Eden to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., the US Undersecretary of State, who would later become Secretary of State, who was on a diplomatic mission to London at the time. Stettinius diary entry for 10 April 1944, in Stettinius, Edward R., with Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring, eds. *The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1975), p. 48.

<sup>23</sup> *FRUS 1944 V.1*, pp. 624-625.

<sup>24</sup> Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, pp. 38-40, *FRUS 1944 V.1*, p. 635.

systems, and the general global security system.<sup>25</sup> This leadership and security-focused stance differed distinctly from the British and American proposals that had by that time come to include not only measures for the peaceful resolution of disputes, but also the incorporation of specialized agencies dealing with matters such as economic and social development, health, and labour.<sup>26</sup> This Soviet emphasis on traditionally-defined security and active desire to prevent the new body from taking on activities in other spheres would prove to be a major source of debate and disagreement in the upcoming negotiations.

On 30 May 1944 the US took the next step, and through their Ambassadors in Washington, invited representatives of Britain, the USSR, and China, to talks on the international organization. Both Hull and the British government wanted to hold the talks as soon as practicable.<sup>27</sup> Again, the British responded affirmatively and quickly, as did the Chinese. The Soviets, however, only responded to the British and the Americans on 8 and 9 July respectively<sup>28</sup>. Even this response only came after many further inquiries by the US through diplomatic channels.<sup>29</sup> For example, a telegram from Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to Molotov, dated 28 June 1944, cites instructions directing him to press the Soviets to open the talks as soon as possible.<sup>30</sup> Finally, on 8 July Molotov sent a message to Harriman stating that the USSR would be ready to begin negotiations on 1 August.<sup>31</sup> On the following day, in a considerably lengthier and more detailed message

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<sup>25</sup> Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 40.

<sup>26</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 121.

<sup>27</sup> Gromyko's report is in Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, pp. 44-45. It simply states that Hull asked Gromyko and his British counterpart, Lord Halifax, when it would be possible to begin negotiations. In his own memorandum of the conversation, Hull says that he "asked that they [Gromyko and Halifax] request their Governments to fix a date, as early as might be convenient, for these conferences to begin." *FRUS 1944 V.1*, p. 637. A message to Molotov from Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador to the USSR, dated 8 June 1944 which indicates the British (and American) desire, can be found in Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 45.

<sup>28</sup> Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 47, 48.

<sup>29</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 121.

<sup>30</sup> Telegram from the US Ambassador to V.M. Molotov, Moscow, 28 June 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Telegram from V.M. Molotov to the US Ambassador, Moscow, 8 July 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 13.

to Hull, the Soviets indicated a willingness to open the discussions, without a preliminary exchange of documents, at the start of August. In the same message, they re-iterated their desire that the upcoming discussions focus on broad issues related to the proposed organization, rather than detailed aspects of it, as well as a traditional, militarily-oriented vision of security.<sup>32</sup>

Another issue that complicated the opening of the discussions was the Soviet relationships with China and Japan. The USSR was not at war with the latter, having signed a neutrality pact with the Japanese in April 1941. In 1944, they were still highly reluctant to get involved in the Pacific theatre until Germany had been defeated, and so they were likewise wary of cooperating too closely with the Chinese government for fear of compromising their neutrality. Since the Americans wanted both China and the USSR as ‘policemen’ and leaders of the organization, Hull wanted to conduct four-power negotiations, and “made a most earnest appeal” to the British and the Soviets to allow the Chinese to take part in the discussions.<sup>33</sup> However, the Soviets would not agree to this.<sup>34</sup> On 19 July Harriman communicated a proposed compromise to Molotov, whereby they would hold two officially separate sets of negotiations, which would nevertheless occur concurrently at the same time and place.<sup>35</sup> Two days later, Molotov rejected this idea, and, showing the high value the Soviet régime placed on correct relations with Japan, insisted that the negotiations occur in two phases: first, between the British, Americans and Soviets, to open on 10 August, with a second round of talks between the British,

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<sup>32</sup> Telegram, the Soviet Chargé (Kapustin) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 9 July 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, pp. 15-16.

<sup>33</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, May 30, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, pp. 637-638.

<sup>34</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 121,

<sup>35</sup> Telegram from Harriman to Molotov, Moscow, 19 July 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 27.

Americans, and Chinese to begin after the conclusion of the Soviet phase.<sup>36</sup> By the time that the British and Americans had both agreed to this, six more days had passed, and so it was 27 July.<sup>37</sup> The tenth of August was the date set for the start of the talks, but the meetings were pushed back by the British until 14 August because they elected to travel by ship instead of by air.<sup>38</sup> The talks were postponed further because the Soviet delegation, traveling by air, was delayed over Siberia by fog, and then again during a refueling stop in Fairbanks, Alaska. Thus, the discussions did not open until 21 August.<sup>39</sup>

The Soviets were also slow to name their delegation. The Americans communicated the composition of their delegation on 19 July, and the British theirs on 1 August. The Soviets did not send their list until 10 August. However, again this should not necessarily be considered as an indication of Soviet indifference. The composition of the delegation was of sufficient importance that it was sent to Stalin for his personal approval on 5 August, and thereafter two names were added to the list (Semen Zarapkin and Grigori Dolbin) in blue coloured pencil, presumably by the leader himself.<sup>40</sup>

The Soviet delegation was headed by Andrei Gromyko, who had become the Soviet Ambassador to the US in the summer of 1943. His comparative youth (he was thirty-four years old when the conference opened) and commensurate lack of seniority and influence has been seen as another indication of the low priority that was assigned to the new international organization.<sup>41</sup> However, Gromyko was little more than a mouthpiece for the Kremlin, and the Politburo, particularly Molotov and Stalin, took a very active interest in the course of the negotiations, frequently relying upon Litvinov's

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<sup>36</sup> Telegram from Molotov to Harriman, Moscow, 21 July 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>37</sup> Telegram from Harriman to Molotov, Moscow, 27 July 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 31.

<sup>38</sup> 'Urgent' Telegram from Harriman to Molotov, Moscow, 29 July 1944, and Telegram from Molotov to Harriman, Moscow, 29 July 1944, in *Ibid*, pp. 33-4.

<sup>39</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 132.

<sup>40</sup> Memorandum from Molotov to the Politburo of the Communist Party, 5 August 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 136, Papka no. 13, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 131-132.

expertise to guide their decision-making. Throughout the negotiations, the Soviet delegation was given virtually no leeway to make concessions and reach compromises, and acceptance of even minor changes needed the approval of Moscow. Gromyko frequently delayed responding to various proposals while awaiting instructions. On the opening day of the conference, Sir Alexander Cadogan, head of the British delegation, took Gromyko aside for a friendly chat about procedures. While personally impressed by Gromyko, Cadogan noted in his diary that the Soviet Ambassador was “obviously terrified of departing a hair’s breadth from his instructions.”<sup>42</sup> By the same token, Major-General John C. Deane, an important and generally sympathetic American wartime liaison in the USSR, noted that Soviet diplomats were “specialized messengers” who tended to be highly attuned to the wording of agreements, not their spirit.<sup>43</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, head of the American delegation, noted the same attitude during the Dumbarton Oaks talks.<sup>44</sup>

This hyper-centralization of authority was a longstanding feature of Stalinist foreign policy. It was illustrated in the summer of 1941, when FDR’s right-hand man Harry Hopkins visited Moscow to investigate Soviet war needs, and had ‘technical discussions’ with a Soviet artillery expert, recorded only as General Yakovlev. Yakovlev was unable to comment on Hopkins’ suggestion that the Soviets provide a permanent mission to Washington in order to discuss any supply issues that arose on a day-to-day basis. He was similarly unable to share the weight of Soviet tanks, or the effectiveness of Russian artillery against German armour, and even told Hopkins “I am not empowered to say whether we do or do not need tanks or anti-tank guns.” Hopkins formed the distinct impression that Yakovlev was in possession of all the pertinent information, but had been

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<sup>42</sup> Cadogan, p. 656.

<sup>43</sup> John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The story of our efforts at wartime cooperation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 301.

instructed not to reveal it.<sup>45</sup>

Foreign policy was no less tightly controlled by the Soviet leadership. Shortly before leaving Washington in May 1943, Litvinov vented his frustration with Molotov's tight grip on foreign policy to US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.<sup>46</sup> Molotov himself openly acknowledged this rigid control, and was typically unapologetic for it. In Molotov's own words:

Who was a diplomat? An able one? We had a centralized diplomacy. Ambassadors had no independence... Stalin and I kept a tight hold on everything – we couldn't do it any other way at the time. On the whole we quite confidently directed our centralized diplomacy. "Centralized" meant dependent on the center, on Moscow, for everything... Our diplomacy was not bad. But it was Stalin, not some diplomat, who played the decisive role in it... The ambassadors were merely executors of specific instructions. That kind of diplomacy was necessary in our situation, and it achieved positive results.<sup>47</sup>

Even acknowledging Molotov's exaggerated praise for Stalin, the lack of negotiating freedom for the Soviet delegation would be made very clear at Dumbarton Oaks. Gromyko also maintained that Stalin gave him very strict (and constructive) instructions before the opening of the talks.<sup>48</sup> Thus, Gromyko's appointment as head of the Soviet delegation should not be viewed as indicative of the UNO being a low priority for the Soviet government.

From the outset, the Soviet position on the new organization was made very clear: its purpose was to provide a mechanism for the Soviets, British, and Americans to act jointly, quickly, and decisively in order to block any threat of aggression from a revived Germany or any other challenger in the postwar world. Any other function was considered to be a harmful distraction. In addition, the Soviets were very sensitized to

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<sup>44</sup> Stettinius, p. 119.

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in Sherwood, p. 330.

<sup>46</sup> Mastny, p. 219.

<sup>47</sup> Quoted in Chuev, pp. 69-70.

<sup>48</sup> Kornienko, p. 43.

the possibility that the new body could provide a forum for criticism of the USSR, and at worst perhaps even infringe on its domestic sovereignty. Thus, the rights and responsibilities of small nations, championed by the British (under pressure from the Dominions) and the American desire for the same thing, and additional wish to promote peace indirectly through economic and social development, received reactions ranging from indifference to outright hostility from the USSR.

The Soviet Union had started formulating its policy towards the new organization early in 1944, with Litvinov playing the leading role. The former Foreign Affairs Commissar and Ambassador, transferred in 1943 to the post of Chairman of the Commission on Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order, wrote several reports for Molotov on the subject. Litvinov's early views received a mixed response from the higher leadership. He stressed that unanimity among the great powers was necessary for the organization to operate effectively. He also emphasized that the organization's main purpose needed to be the preservation of peace and security. The USSR would adhere firmly to both of these principles, particularly the latter, throughout the process of founding the UN. However, Litvinov's vision also included a series of bilateral agreements among the great powers to reinforce and underpin the broader structure of the organization. These were not achieved, which paved the way for the eventual degeneration of the alliance into the Cold War. More importantly, Litvinov argued in favour of a series of regional sub-organizations under the UN umbrella, which would have amounted to a *de facto* division of the world into spheres of interest between the UK, USA, and USSR.<sup>49</sup> This idea never appeared in the actual Soviet proposals, perhaps because of Stalin's unexplained rejection of regional organizations at the close of the Teheran Conference. As well, the Soviet Ambassador in Japan, Yakov Malik, believed

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<sup>49</sup> Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 196.

that any division of the world into spheres would leave the USSR in a relatively weaker position. The USSR would only have membership in regional organizations for two regions, Europe and Asia, while the Americans could expect membership in three (Europe, Asia, and the Americas) while the British Empire could reasonably count on four (Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa).<sup>50</sup>

The Kremlin's proposals for the new organization illustrate their priorities. They were not communicated to the Americans and British until 12 August, but they were accepted as the basis for the negotiations at the outset of the talks.<sup>51</sup> The Soviet draft plan was substantially shorter than that of the British or the Americans, reflecting a narrower vision of the organization to be created, and an attitude that the current talks were only to address basic principles, not construct the organization in its entirety. The first line of the Soviet memorandum put forth one of the limitations on the new organization that the Soviets saw as vital: "The new international organization should be based on the principle, as expressed in the declaration of the Moscow Conference on general security, "of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states."<sup>52</sup> Thus from the start the Soviets made it expressly clear that they would tolerate no infringement on their sovereignty, although the notion of equality was given little attention. Also, the inclusion of the word "peace-loving" in front of the word "states" provided a justification for the exclusion of countries that the Soviets considered repugnant – not only the Axis states, but also the informally pro-Axis neutrals, Argentina and Spain.<sup>53</sup> In addition, the specific reference to the Moscow Conference can be considered as both a deliberate attempt to glorify the

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 196-197.

<sup>51</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, by the Soviet Union, Washington, 12 August 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, p. 706.

<sup>52</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 2, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 102.

Soviet role in the international arena, and to emphasize the issue of security in the new organization, a notion from which the Americans and British were starting to depart.

The second paragraph of the Soviet memorandum read:

The task of the new international security organization should be the effecting of measures directed toward the prevention of aggression and preservation of peace and also toward the suppression of aggression. Such an international organization can perform its task, if, when determining its constitution, powers, conditions, and method of activity, the nations [*sic*] members of the organization, and particularly those initiating its foundation, base themselves on the necessity of effective cooperation in measures capable of ensuring the security of peace-loving peoples.<sup>54</sup>

Again, the emphasis on security is made abundantly clear, as is the firm, if diplomatically worded, belief in the importance of the great powers being able to take decisive action and act in concert.

The next wish that the Soviet proposals addressed was that the organization should have a clearly defined and narrow scope, expressed by a desire to limit the present negotiations to a small range of issues. The Soviet proposal stated that it was not “expedient” to discuss all the issues related to the organization, but that they should be confined “to discussion of the most important questions and of the principles which should form the basis of the organization”. These were listed as:

- A. Aims and Tasks of the Organisation;
- B. Composition of the Organisation;
- C. Principal Organs – General Assembly, Council, International Court, Secretariat General (their competency, functions, and duties);
- D. Means of Prevention of Aggression and Means of Suppression of Aggression.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> The debate over the inclusion of Argentina during the UN’s founding conference at San Francisco would turn out to be a source of considerable tension, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.

<sup>54</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 2, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 102.

<sup>55</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 2, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 102.

Other issues were shunted aside. The idea of regional spheres was deflected as “subject to further study”.<sup>56</sup> Cooperation in technical, economic, and social spheres, was stated to be of “great benefit” and “great importance” but the Soviets wished to address these issues in a completely “separate international organization not connected with the international security organization,” which would be discussed “when this should appear necessary.”<sup>57</sup> The Soviets appeared to be very satisfied with the project as originally proposed to Stalin at Teheran, and stuck firmly to this outline, despite American and to a lesser extent British desires to extend the new body’s mandate beyond narrowly-defined security. Such an attitude was consistent with Soviet policies toward the League of Nations. The Marxist-Leninist worldview saw economic reform as a palliative at best, and a distraction from more important and fundamental issues at worst. However, while the Kremlin showed little enthusiasm for broader cooperation, a deeper concern for other issues, such as those related to the powers of what would become the Security Council, led them eventually to accept a broader mandate for the new organization. In practice, most of the economic provisions of the new body had little applicability to the Soviet command economy anyway.<sup>58</sup>

Again, the Soviets re-iterated their emphasis on the first of their specific proposals, which read: “The principal aims of the organization are: 1) Maintenance of general peace and security and adoption for this purpose of collective measures for the prevention of aggression and organizing the suppression of aggression which had already

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<sup>56</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 3, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 103.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Harold Karan Jacobson, *The USSR and the UN’s Economic and Social Activities* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 8-10.

taken place.”<sup>59</sup> The rest of the Soviet section on “Aims of the organization” talked about the peaceful resolution of conflicts and “The adoption of any other measures concerning the strengthening of universal peace and the development of friendly relations among nations” but their secondary listing appears to be indicative of their lower status in Soviet thinking.<sup>60</sup> Also, the desirability of a separate organization “to promote international cooperation in the economic, commercial, financial, technical, social, and health spheres and other humanitarian activities” was restated in this section, reinforcing the primacy of security for the UN itself.<sup>61</sup> This exemplified the Soviet attitude that the new organization was to serve a specific and tightly focused purpose, rather than be a ‘bridge’ between systems or basis for any future closer union.<sup>62</sup>

The second section of the Soviet proposals, dealing with the composition of the organization, showed Moscow’s desire to limit membership to those who had taken an active role in the war. The Soviets proposed that only those countries that had signed the Declaration by United Nations (subscribing to the principles of the Atlantic Charter) of January 1942 could be founder-members, with other ‘peace-loving’ members being accepted on a case-by-case basis under regulations to be decided later.<sup>63</sup> In this way the organization could exclude some of the world’s capitalist states, and possibly accord higher regard to the USSR due to her dominant role in the war, exemplified by the battle of Stalingrad and steady progress toward Berlin. It tied in well with the more general Soviet attitude towards the proposed organization as a ‘victors’ club’ whose defeat of the Axis and demonstrated power and capacity for cooperation justified the USSR’s leading

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<sup>59</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 3, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 103.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Dallin, p. 22.

role in the postwar world.

Unsurprisingly, the Soviet proposals gave relatively little power to the General Assembly (GA), which would consist of representatives of all member states. Throughout the negotiations the Soviets simply took it for granted that the GA would be overwhelmingly capitalist and critical of the USSR. Thus, their proposals demanded that the GA refer to the much more exclusive Council any issue if action was being considered. Also, the General Assembly could approve the acceptance or expulsion of members of the organization only on the recommendation of the Council. In addition, General Assembly decisions were to require a two-thirds majority on all substantive issues, thus making it more difficult for a conclusion to be reached.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, it is clear that the Soviets wished to ensure that the Assembly amounted to no more than a talking-shop.

The Soviet plan vested all significant power in the Council (it would subsequently become the Security Council), rather than the GA, because the USSR had a much more influential voice there. Aside from an unspecified number of additional members elected by the GA for an as yet undefined limited term, the Council was to consist of FDR's 'Four Policemen' plus, eventually, France. The latter country was apparently accepted to help maintain a good relationship with the US, although a desire to use France as a counterweight to Britain in the postwar world may have been a factor as well.<sup>65</sup> The Soviet desire for the Council to dominate the organization was made very clear. In the words of the Soviet proposal:

2) The Council, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it and

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<sup>63</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 4, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, pp. 103-104.

<sup>64</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 5, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 104.

<sup>65</sup> Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 197.

its ability to take urgent decisions, shall have primary responsibility for ensuring general peace and security of peoples. Accordingly the Council shall be authorized to act when necessary on behalf of the whole international organisation, and decisions of the Council shall be binding on all States members of the organisation.

3) The Council shall be entitled to take all necessary measures provided by the [organization's] statute to settle any disputes and conflicts arising among States. The Council shall determine the existence of a threat to peace and decide what measures should be taken or recommended for the maintenance or restoration of peace.<sup>66</sup>

The next clause likewise gave the Council the power to apply armed force, using troops provided by the organization's member states under an agreement to be determined later and assisted by a military committee.<sup>67</sup> Thus, the Soviet aspiration for an organization over which the great powers had practically unlimited authority, is made very clear. Notably, such a proposal did not differ drastically from the way in which FDR originally presented the project to Stalin at Teheran, which anticipated that the Big Four would have decisive control over the new organization.

The Soviets similarly sought to ensure that the practical functioning of the Council would likewise protect their interests. First of all, the Council would "subject to preliminary investigation all questions pertaining to the preservation of universal peace and security which are subject to inclusion in the agenda of the general assemblies [sic]."<sup>68</sup> In this way, the USSR could plausibly shield itself from criticism expressed by a hostile GA. Secondly, all decisions of the Council except for those of "an organizational character" were to require the consent of all the Council's permanent members.<sup>69</sup> Crucially, this proposal did not prevent permanent members of the Council from exercising their power of veto even if they were a party to a dispute. As discussed below,

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<sup>66</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 5, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 105.

<sup>67</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 6, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 105.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

the Americans fought very hard to limit the veto power of a permanent member in cases wherein it was a party to a dispute. This disagreement was the most difficult issue to resolve during the creation of the UN, not only during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, but also through subsequent negotiations and conferences. In addition, the proposal that the Council make its decisions by a simple, rather than a two-thirds majority (assuming, of course, acceptance by all of the permanent members) illustrates the Soviet view that in order for the new organization to be effective, it needed to be decisive, and that small countries might prove obdurate when pursuing future action.

The following Soviet proposals contained little more of substance, again reflecting Moscow's priorities. The next section consisted of only one line, stating that an International Court of Justice should be established under a special statute. The Secretariat likewise received brief attention. The USSR proposed only that there should be a general secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, who would be elected by the GA but again on the recommendation of the Council, thus ensuring veto power for the Soviet Union over any nomination.<sup>70</sup>

In an approach not taken by the British or Americans, the final section of the Soviet proposals listed fairly detailed and graduated steps to be taken by the Council for preventing or combating aggression. The first step was to appeal to the "disputants" for a pacific settlement of the dispute or conflict. The second was a similar appeal, but this time accompanied by a warning that the Council could use other means of pressure against the states involved. The next phase was to be the application of economic pressure against the disputants by some or all of the organization's members. If this was ineffective, it was to be followed by the severance of diplomatic relations with the

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

“aggressor” (note that the term “disputants” is replaced by the term “aggressor” at this stage) by all members of the organization. The fifth step was the severance of commercial, financial, and other economic relations, and the interruption of postal-telegraphic, rail, and air communications with the aggressor. If this was still ineffective in suppressing the undesired action, military preparations were to begin. The first military phase (sixth step overall) was the provision of strategically important territory by those states possessing insufficient armed forces to make a direct military contribution. It could then be used to set up bases to conduct military operations against the aggressor. This proposal in particular illustrated once more the Soviet desire for an organization that gave free rein to the great powers, with little choice for smaller countries but to accept their decisions. However, again, this was how FDR had first presented the idea to Stalin. If the setting up of strategically located bases did not cow the aggressor into submission, the next step was to be sea and land blockade. This measure was to be followed by naval and air force “demonstrations” and then if necessary “air raids on particular military objectives of the aggressor state.” Finally, if all else failed the tenth and final step was to be “Military operations by members of the organization against the aggressor.”<sup>71</sup> Some or all of the organization’s members were to be employed to implement these steps.

Furthermore, to further ensure its potency, the organization was to have its own international air force corps, of a strength determined by the Council assisted by a commission of military experts. This international air force corps was to be composed of contingents of members’ national air forces, the size of which was to be determined by

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<sup>70</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 6, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 105.

<sup>71</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, pp. 6-7, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 106.

the organization.<sup>72</sup> This unique Soviet notion of delineating specifically-defined steps for action by the organization was not supported by the Americans or the British, and ended up being dropped fairly quickly. However, its inclusion in the Soviet proposals is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, it shows that the Soviets sincerely wished the organization to be decisive and effective. The blueprint for action would have made it virtually impossible for the new organization to take a half-hearted response to aggression, as the League of Nations had against Japan and Italy in the 1930s. Also, some of the concepts raised in the graduated steps remained important to the USSR. The Soviets were strongly attached to the idea of an international air force to enhance the organization's effectiveness throughout the negotiations. Also, their proposal that small states (i.e. those with small armed forces) provide territory in lieu of men and machines would prove to be another idea that they would not part with easily, and the subject of considerable controversy.

Therefore, the Soviet proposals sought an organization in which the USSR would have the maximum authority possible, with little regard for small states, or minor or regional powers. However, the Soviet proposals also reflected a willingness to work in concert with the US and UK (and also France and China) for the long term. Furthermore, the USSR wanted an effective body, resolutely able to prevent aggression by a resurgent Germany or any other power, which is hardly surprising considering the level of devastation the Soviet Union suffered in the Second World War.

While the Soviet proposals provide a good illustration of the Kremlin's viewpoint on the project, a secret memo of orders from the Soviet government to the delegation demonstrates Moscow's position even more explicitly. The first point in the instructions

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<sup>72</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, 22 August, 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 124, Papka no. 12, p. 7, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 106.

to the Soviet delegation was the same as the first point in the Soviet proposals presented to the British and Americans: that the present negotiations should deal with fundamental principles only.<sup>73</sup> The rest of the directives tell the delegates to avoid intense detail, reflecting the lack of time that Stalin and Molotov were able to devote to this endeavour during the latter stages of the war. This secret memo also informed the delegates to maintain a “private agenda” apart from their official duties. However, this private agenda turned out to be quite mundane – simply to meet with the American and British delegations privately to try to ascertain their attitudes on the issue of regional sub-organizations under the UN banner. The issue did not arise during the talks, rendering this point superfluous.<sup>74</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the Soviet government instructed the delegation that it attached “the greatest importance” to unanimity among the four powers in the Council – in effect, the USSR’s ability to veto any action that it opposed.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, as could be expected from the general tenor of the Soviet proposals, the document stressed the importance of the Council as the main instrument of the new organization: the most effective means of preventing and suppressing aggression. This theme continued with the statement that the organization or any of its organs should never under any circumstances be capable of reaching a decision binding on the four permanent members without their unanimous agreement. The language employed on this point is direct and explicit: “this principle (the agreement of all the permanent representatives on the Council) *is of the highest importance*, and the Soviet representative *must insist* on its acceptance [my italics].”<sup>76</sup> The only small concessions that the Soviets were willing to accept on this point were that

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<sup>73</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 82.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

organizational matters could be decided by a simple majority, and that a special procedure could be sought for voting on an issue of immediate interest to one or more of the permanent members.<sup>77</sup> Here the Soviets referred to a clause from the American proposals, which said that there should be an unspecified “special procedure” in that circumstance.<sup>78</sup> As the discussions progressed, the Americans were unable to put forth a special procedure, and instead simply insisted that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting. The Soviets found this to be patently unacceptable, as they firmly adhered to the principle of unanimity among the Big Four in all substantive matters.

Continuing their focus on the importance of the Council, the Soviet instructions discussed its desired composition. The Council needed to balance a guarantee of the leading role of the five (here France is included) “which carried the main burden of the struggle against aggression and have the greatest possibility for providing peace and security” with representation for other states that demonstrated “democratic principles in international relations.”<sup>79</sup> Thus, other members could be elected to the Council for a limited term of one or two years, but, in accordance with an American proposal, they should not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their term.<sup>80</sup> Presumably this ban on immediate re-election was to prevent any state outside of the five permanent members from getting too entrenched on the Council, which would both increase that state’s power and influence, and exclude other states (i.e. Soviet allies) from

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83, United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 658.

<sup>79</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 84. A permanent Security Council seat for France, to be assumed at an unspecified later date, was not officially agreed upon until 28 August, during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. However, by the time the talks opened, all three participants, for their own reasons, supported setting aside a seat for France. The Soviet reasons are cited above. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt, Washington, August 28, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V.I*, p. 737.

participation.

The next point in the instructions to the delegates was that the Soviet government attaches great importance to the establishment of a procedure for determining whether or not a given issue is addressed by the Council or the General Assembly. It was explained that this procedure needed to be multi-faceted. First of all, it must ensure that the Council deals with matters of security, maintaining at all times the unanimity principle. However, at the same time, it needed to prevent wasting the Council's time with the examination of secondary matters, "which, in reality, are not actually connected with the threat of a breach of the peace" and thus have only "incidental importance."<sup>81</sup> The same mechanism also had to preclude the organization from examining and thus expanding into matters other than those that present the threat of a breach of the peace.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, it needed to ensure that if an issue of lesser importance does make it through to examination, it leads to a fair decision.<sup>83</sup> There is no suggestion of what form this rather complex procedure should take, except for the creation of a commission to oversee the study of issues, which would have the power to present reports, draft decisions, etc.<sup>84</sup> This issue again turned out to be an unimportant one once the discussions began.

The next instruction to the Soviet delegation regarded what was to be, along with the Council voting formula, the most contentious issue (as discussed later in this study).

It read:

9. While discussing issues related to the composition of the organization, it is necessary to announce, at the appropriate moment, that it goes without saying that amongst the founding members of the organization must be included all of the Soviet [constituent]

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<sup>80</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 84, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 656.

<sup>81</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 84.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

republics.<sup>85</sup>

That this suggestion would be met with great opposition seems to have been anticipated by the Soviet government, as the final line of the directive tells the delegates that they must not, at this stage of the negotiations, insist on this issue to the point of forcing a final decision on it.<sup>86</sup>

The next question addressed in the instructions similarly dealt with the composition of the organization. The delegates were told to maintain the position, clearly stated in the Soviet proposals, that only those states that had signed the Declaration of United Nations of 1 January 1942 and supported it were to be accepted as founding members. Other states could be accepted on an individual basis later. As well, the delegates were to be positive towards the acceptance of France as a permanent member of the Council.<sup>87</sup> Regarding the International Court of Justice, the Soviet proposals simply stated that one should be established under a statute to be determined later, and that the delegates should postpone discussion on the issue if it were raised.<sup>88</sup>

The next point reiterated that the new organization be tightly focused on security. The delegates were reminded of their government's position that economic, social, technical, humanitarian etc. issues should be excluded from the competence of the international security organization. Thus, they were correspondingly instructed to support the creation of a different organization or series of organizations to cover the non-security forms of international cooperation. The new body discussed at Dumbarton Oaks had to be totally dedicated to the cause of peace and security, and not get distracted by other matters unrelated to the organization's main goals.<sup>89</sup> While the Soviet delegation

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<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

did not consist of senior members of the Soviet régime and thus would not have been privy to state secrets beyond a necessary level, this aspect of the instructions is still potentially very enlightening. If taken at face value, (which seems reasonable given the close correspondence between the instructions to the delegates and the Soviet government's actual positions on other issues) it indicates that the Soviet government was genuine in its desire to preserve international peace, and furthermore that it saw the future UN as a useful means for doing so. It also suggests that the proposal for other organizations to promote cooperation was not necessarily a disingenuous attempt to bury the idea of collaboration beyond matters of security entirely, but that the Soviet régime thought it indispensable for the organization to be tightly focused on preventing future conflict.

Instructions regarding the chairmanship of the Council followed. The Soviet delegation was told to support a chairmanship that rotated among the permanent members of the Council after a very limited term, suggested to be six months.<sup>90</sup> Under this schema they would hold the chairmanship frequently, and it would reinforce the status of the permanent members as the directors of the organization. As well, the Soviet delegation was instructed to oppose the creation of any sort of chairman or president of the organization as a whole.<sup>91</sup> This was in line with the general desire to enhance Soviet control by preventing anything that could lead to a rival power base, though again, the issue was eventually left unresolved at Dumbarton Oaks. Leadership of the General Assembly received less thorough treatment, with the statement that the GA could be led by a single chair or a council, or simply be chosen on a session-by-session basis.<sup>92</sup>

In something of a non sequitur, the next point dealt with the concept of regional

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

organizations. As mentioned above, the Soviet delegates had a secret mandate to probe into the British and American positions on this issue. The representatives were informed that the USSR opposed the concept in general, and that they were to oppose actively the creation of regional organizations with wide-ranging powers.<sup>93</sup> Again, this point illustrates the Soviet plan to treat the UN as a vehicle for joint leadership of the world among the victorious great powers, by attempting to block potential rivals. Furthermore, it could be indicative of the high level of suspicion displayed by Stalin, and his concern that regional organizations could somehow subvert the global international organization in which the USSR was to play a leading role.

The next issue covered in the instructions dealt with trusteeships. Citing a memo written by Hull at the time of the Moscow Conference, the Soviet delegation was told that the US sought to create a trusteeship system for nations that, due to wars past or present, were or would be released from their previous political ties – in other words, colonies that lost their relationship with the motherland. Hull's apparent proposal for this trusteeship system was the creation of regional commissions of states, including interested colonial states, to oversee the preparation of colonies socially, politically, and economically for independence, while attempting to assist the progress of the colonies and strengthen peaceful relations between countries. The Soviet delegation were informed simply that the USSR viewed this project in a positive light, and would participate in it, with more detailed instructions to follow once a better understanding of the American position had been gained.<sup>94</sup> Though this was a departure from the Soviet position that the organization should stick closely to issues of security, it was in line with the Soviet anti-imperialist stance, while at the same time providing a possible means by which the Soviet Union could expand its global power and influence.

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<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 86-87.

The final directives were more general. First of all, the Soviet representatives were bluntly reminded of their lack of plenipotentiary power as discussed above – they were not to accept or even engage in discussion on any other proposals without prior authorization from the Soviet government.<sup>95</sup> Secondly, they were told to avoid disagreement and controversies over secondary issues, details, the formulations and wording of positions, etc. as long as any proposed revisions did not change that meaning of the proposals that concerned the Soviet régime.<sup>96</sup> The Soviets thus sought an effective working relationship with the other victorious powers through the new organization, provided that it was sufficiently well-designed to accomplish its primary purpose. Taken together, the Soviet proposals for the new organization and the related directives to their delegation confirm the following: First, the Stalinist régime was concerned above all with security, reflecting the wartime experience of the USSR. Second, the Soviets envisioned the new body essentially as a clique of the victorious powers, which would enshrine both their own primacy and perpetuate cooperation with the US and Britain. Third, the Kremlin hoped to create a UN that would quite nakedly enhance its power as much as possible, with little regard shown for the smaller nations, let alone the defeated powers.

The Americans had anticipated that most discussions would take place between all members of the three delegations. However, this was impractical, as the Americans designated eighteen people for this project, led by Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary of State. The British delegation had eleven members, headed by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.<sup>97</sup> Even the smallest delegation, that of the USSR, had 8 members: Gromyko; Arkadi Aleksandrovich Sobolev, Minister

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in London, who served as deputy Chair of the Soviet delegation; Semen Konstantinovich Zarapkin, Chief of the American Section of the Soviet Foreign Office; Major General Nikolai Vassilievich Slavin of the Soviet General Staff; Rear Admiral Konstantin Konstantinovich Rodionov, Chief of the Administrative Division of the Navy Commissariat; Professor Sergei Aleksandrovich Golunsky; Professor Sergei Borisovich Krylov, Professor of Law at Moscow State University; and Grigori Georgievich Dolbin, Counselor, Soviet Foreign Office. Mikhail Mikhailovich Yunin was also named as the Secretary of the Delegation, with Valentin Mikhailovich Berezhkov listed as “Secretary-interpreter.”<sup>98</sup> Even excluding the support staff, this mass of people was deemed far too large and unwieldy for frank and effective discussions by both the Soviets and the British. Therefore, the talks were divided into various committees dealing with specific issues and aspects of the organization, while the most important discussions were carried out by what was dubbed the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), consisting of the leaders of the three delegations (Stettinius, Cadogan, and Gromyko) who were usually accompanied by one or two other delegates, Sobolev being the main one from the Soviet delegation.<sup>99</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the Soviets were unable to gain acceptance of their proposals in full, and the ‘give-and-take’ of the negotiations revealed their top priorities for the new organization and its expected place in the postwar international arena. The formal opening went smoothly, though the differences of opinion were clear from the outset. In his diaries, Stettinius noted that:

Mr. Hull especially stressed the necessity of justice to all nations while Ambassador Gromyko placed especial emphasis on the greater responsibility of the Great Powers [*sic*] in maintaining peace and

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<sup>97</sup> Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 69, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 697.

<sup>98</sup> Memorandum, A Vyshinsky to US Ambassador Harriman, Moscow, 10 August 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 90.

<sup>99</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 137.

security. Sir Alexander's [Cadogan, head of the British delegation] remarks followed a middle course between the views just mentioned.<sup>100</sup>

However, these differences were not an obstacle to generally amicable discussions. Cadogan noted that Gromyko was "personally very reasonable" though he questioned whether or not that would be significant, as the Soviet government gave Gromyko virtually no leeway.<sup>101</sup> Hull more optimistically noted that Gromyko and the rest of the Russian delegation displayed an "admirable" level of cooperation.<sup>102</sup>

After the speeches and other formalities were concluded, the actual business of the conference began to be addressed on the afternoon of 21 August, with a meeting of the JSC. After settling basic procedural issues, it was decided to use the Soviet draft as the basis for the discussions, with the American and British delegations making comments as the Soviets presented their views.<sup>103</sup> Due to the firm insistence of Gromyko, it was also agreed that the conference would begin by seeking agreement on broad principles first, leaving details for later.<sup>104</sup> This was very much in line with the general Soviet priorities for the organization and the government's instructions to their

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<sup>100</sup> Stettinius, p. 105.

<sup>101</sup> Cadogan, p. 656, p. 658.

<sup>102</sup> Hull, Volume II, p. 1681.

<sup>103</sup> Informal Record of the First Plenary Session, Assembly Hall, Dumbarton Oaks, 22 August 1944, 10:30 a.m. to 11:40 a.m., in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 82. In terms of basic procedural issues, Stettinius was chosen as permanent Chairman, and Russian and English were officially given equal status as languages, though with the recognition that English would likely be used more widely. Informal records were to be kept, which would be subject to the approval of all of the delegation chairs. In addition, it was agreed that no statements would be made to the press without the approval of the delegation chairs. However, a member of the Chinese delegation, incensed at being excluded from the first phase of the talks, leaked the opening positions of all four participants to the *New York Times*. The source of the leak was not discovered for some time, and speculation and accusations surrounding the issue was a source of considerable tension, particularly between Stettinius and the British, whom he accused of providing the unauthorized information. Informal Record of the First Plenary Session, Assembly Hall, Dumbarton Oaks, 22 August 1944, 10:30 a.m. to 11:40 a.m., in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 82, Hoopes and Brinkley pp. 134-135.

<sup>104</sup> Cadogan, p. 656, Informal Record of the First Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations held at 3 p.m., August 21 at Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 194.

delegation, as outlined above.

There was general agreement on many points, such as the basic structure of the organization and its primary organs, including a General Assembly and a Council, as well as an international court and an international secretariat.<sup>105</sup> However, the variance in attitudes towards the organization's role and functions left many issues open to negotiation. The most fundamental of these issues was the organization's scope. The Americans and British favoured a grander body that took what they saw as a more proactive approach to ensuring peace, by addressing economic and social matters that they believed could be the root causes of future conflict. As noted above, the USSR leaders sought a body that would be narrowly focused on issues of security, though they held open the possibility of creating a second organization to build cooperation in these other spheres.

This difference was manifested during the talks in a number of ways. In the first plenary meeting, after accepting procedural matters decided the afternoon before in the JSC, Cadogan proposed that economic and social matters, as well as the concept of regional organizations, be deferred until later.<sup>106</sup> However, the delegates were unable to avoid such issues entirely. One of the most active American delegates, Leo Pasvolsky, while accepting the deferment of further discussion, stated the official American view that the new organization should consider questions related to the creation of the conditions necessary for peaceful relations, hence diplomatically stating that the US would not abandon their position lightly.<sup>107</sup> When talks resumed that afternoon, after appointing various subcommittees, the British raised the point that it would be practically

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<sup>105</sup> Informal Record of the First Plenary Session, Assembly Hall, Dumbarton Oaks, 22 August 1944, 10:30 a.m. to 11:40 a.m., in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 85.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

impossible to stop the General Assembly from discussing any issue it saw fit, including economic and social issues.<sup>108</sup>

However, the question of scope was not addressed in earnest until the fifth meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, on 25 August. Cadogan indicated that the British government supported the American proposal for the creation of an Economic and Social Council under the aegis of the assembly, because economic and social questions could lead to sharp disagreements, which could in turn lead to war.<sup>109</sup> Gromyko opposed this proposal firmly and at great length. He pointed out that while the public had believed that the League of Nations had been constantly examining vital issues of peace and security, in fact, by Soviet government estimates, 77% of the questions the League had addressed had been secondary matters of general welfare.<sup>110</sup> He went on to quote Litvinov's article published in *Zvezda*, which stated that "It will be much easier to observe the success or failure of an organization for security if it not burdened with an endless number of superfluous functions."<sup>111</sup> Instead, Gromyko suggested it would be

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<sup>108</sup> Informal Record of the Second Plenary Session, Assembly Hall, Dumbarton Oaks, 22 August 1944, 2:30 p.m. to 3:50 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 78. The Subcommittees created were: 1. Drafting, for determining the precise language to be used after agreements had been reached. 2. Legal, to discuss the international court. As indicated in the Soviet proposals and the directives to the Soviet delegation, the government lacked an official position on this question beyond agreeing that a court should be created. Thus, the Soviet representatives on this body participated little, reserving the right to comment later. 3. General, for "general questions of the international organization, to deal particularly with the composition and powers of the assembly, the council and the secretariat." 4. Security "to deal particularly with technical questions relative to the maintenance of international security." Informal Record of the Second Plenary Session, Assembly Hall, Dumbarton Oaks, 22 August 1944, 2:30 p.m. to 3:50 p.m., in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 77.

<sup>109</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 173, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 5 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 25, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 735.

<sup>110</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 173, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 5 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 25, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 735.

<sup>111</sup> Quoted in Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 143.

preferable to “the public” to have an organization that focused on the single task of preserving peace. While a liaison between the UN and the Soviet-proposed other body for economic and social issues was possible, this was as far as the USSR was willing to go.<sup>112</sup>

The Americans were no less firm, with Stettinius claiming that the American public strongly preferred that all international affairs be kept under “one tent.” His advisor Leo Pasvolsky added that if economic and social matters were dealt with by the assembly, they would not serve as a distraction to the more action-oriented Council. Pasvolsky also argued that the Soviet proposal for a separate organization or series of organizations would be less effective in achieving international harmony because these would lack the high level of prestige and authority that the UN auspices would confer.<sup>113</sup> Cadogan added his support for the American position, stating that the new organization would need to take affirmative action to promote peace, and would be less efficacious if they had an exclusively negative function.<sup>114</sup> Gromyko responded that it would be difficult for the assembly to isolate economic and social functions from their other duties, unless these issues were handed over to a different body.<sup>115</sup>

Gladwyn Jebb, a prominent member of the British delegation, then raised two

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<sup>112</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 173, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 5 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 25, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 735. Whether Gromyko referred to the Soviet public, or that of the whole world, and his basis for the assertion that this was their desire, were never made clear, either at Dumbarton Oaks or afterwards, although the Soviets frequently claimed to be representing the desires of this unspecified public.

<sup>113</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 173-174, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 5 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 25, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 735-736.

<sup>114</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 175.

related concerns. First, he suggested that it would be difficult to convince small nations to join the UN given the dominant role played by the Council, and even more difficult if the assembly had little power over economic issues. He then raised the practical matter of where the other organization would be seated, saying that if it was in the same place as the UN, it would appear to be unnecessary duplication, but if it was headquartered in a different place, liaison would be made more difficult.<sup>116</sup> Gromyko's response was that the small nations of the world saw the need for an effective international security organization, and asserted that this would best be achieved through a narrowly-focused organization. Cadogan retorted that effectiveness did not necessitate separate organizations, and went on to suggest that in the "modern world" people would not take the international organization seriously if it failed to address economic concerns. He also said that since the assembly had the right to discuss anything that it chose, they could not be stopped from considering economic matters, and questioned the point of having a duplicate organization to achieve the same purpose.<sup>117</sup> The American Pasvolsky kept up the pressure, stating that the Soviets had already accepted the principle that one of the organization's aims was "the maintenance of conditions conducive to peace."<sup>118</sup>

Gromyko did not waver. He responded by saying that even ideal economic conditions were not a guarantee of peace, which the others acknowledged as true. He then wondered aloud whether or not the American public would still oppose the creation of two separate organizations if they understood that there would be an effective liaison between them.<sup>119</sup> Pasvolsky responded that the public saw the security and economic/social matters as mutually reinforcing, and that cooperation in the latter would

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, p. 175.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, p. 176.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, p. 177.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, p. 178.

strengthen the former.<sup>120</sup> Jebb went back on the offensive, asking Gromyko if he wished to prevent the assembly from discussing economic questions.<sup>121</sup> Gromyko responded that he did not oppose the discussion of these questions if they were related to security, but such a forum would be poorly suited to discussing complex economic matters.<sup>122</sup>

At this point Stettinius suggested that Gromyko communicate to his government the importance that the US and Britain ascribed to the issue, and that they could discuss it again the following Monday. Gromyko assured him that he would do so, but stated that the Soviet position on the issue was firm.<sup>123</sup> He also indicated that this desire to include economic and social issues alongside security in the new organization seemed to mark a change in the American attitude since it had issued its proposals.<sup>124</sup> Pasvolsky said that this was not the case – the US was not suggesting that the new organization engage directly in economic and social matters, just that it would provide a forum for coordination and the promotion of cooperation in such issues, as they were an important component of peace. He went on to explain that the proposed economic and social council (ECONSOC) would have no executive powers, but would simply study issues and provide recommendations as a service to the council and/or the assembly.<sup>125</sup> Soviet delegate Sobolev then pointed out that if ECONSOC could only issue recommendations, then it could easily be ignored or otherwise be ineffective. Furthermore, this ineffectiveness could discredit the entire organization if it seemed to promise prosperity and then fail to deliver on that promise. The maintenance of peace, on the other hand, would be a promise that the organization would be able to deliver.<sup>126</sup>

Pasvolsky and Jebb both expressed disagreement, stating that different functions

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<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

required different approaches. This was the last word on the subject at that meeting.<sup>127</sup> This discussion demonstrates that the Soviet leadership was firm in its belief that the new organization should be focused on promoting narrowly-defined international security. The traumas of the wartime experience of the USSR made it clear why making the new body effective in this purpose needed to be their first concern. Furthermore, the Kremlin felt that having the international security organization get involved in secondary issues could both weaken its primary function by diffusing its aims, and increase the isolation of the USSR within the body, since coordination and cooperation with capitalist states on economic and social matters was assumed to be highly problematic.

However, the Soviets gradually dropped their opposition to the broader scope of the organization in an attempt to obtain agreement on issues that the Kremlin considered to be more important. At a private meeting on 29 August, Gromyko told Stettinius that he was impressed by the arguments in support of an economic and social council and would be happy to discuss the issue in more detail at Stettinius' convenience.<sup>128</sup> Stettinius does not record whether or not this later discussion actually took place, but at the 31 August meeting of the JSC the Soviets were willing to discuss some issues of language related to the Economic and Social Council, though they withheld a decision as to whether or not the council would actually be accepted as part of the organization.<sup>129</sup> By 6 September the Soviets were participating fully in discussions regarding the size and functions of ECONSOC, though still officially reserving their position on the entire question.<sup>130</sup> Likewise, with respect to the Economic and Social Council Stettinius'

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<sup>125</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 179-180.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 180-181.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, p.181.

<sup>128</sup> Stettinius, p. 116.

<sup>129</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 31, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 755.

<sup>130</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Fifteenth Day, Wednesday, September 6, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 772.

progress report to Hull dated 7 September read:

The Soviet representatives maintained their reservation as to this point. However, it is significant that they have participated fully in the drafting of the provisions covering this point so that only the matter of inclusion or exclusion of these provisions remains open.<sup>131</sup>

On the following day, Gromyko, Stettinius, and FDR held a private meeting in the President's bedroom at the White House. While there, Gromyko told the President that he could approve the American proposal for an economic and social council.<sup>132</sup> Later that morning, in a meeting between the three delegation heads, the Soviets more formally accepted the inclusion of the negotiated Economic and Social Council in the organization.<sup>133</sup> Thus, the Soviets eventually conceded that the new organization would address issues beyond security. However, their considerable resistance clearly illustrates that the Soviet régime saw the new international organization as serving a very narrow purpose – the immediate and forcible suppression of aggression. Stalin preferred that economic and social matters be relegated to a second organization. However, he believed that the valued project should not be scuttled over this issue, when there were more important questions regarding the new organization still outstanding.

Another contentious issue that arose in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations related to the powers of what was to become the Security Council, though at the time it was simply referred to as 'the Council'. Here the Soviets consistently sought a Council with very broad powers, as this would preserve a leading position for the USSR and provide a mechanism for ongoing cooperation with the other victorious powers. This attitude was reflected in the Soviet stance on a variety of issues related to the Council.

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<sup>131</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 7, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 776.

<sup>132</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth Day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 785.

<sup>133</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 8, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 783.

First, while the Soviets accepted France's permanent seat on the Council as mentioned above, they (as well as the British) strongly resisted US pressure to give the same status to Brazil. Stettinius raised the possibility of a permanent seat for Brazil on 23 August during the first meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, when, after it was agreed that the US, USSR, UK, China, and in time France, would be permanent members of the Council, he asked whether or not the Soviets and British thought that more permanent members could be added to the Council in the future. Gromyko responded in the negative, saying that the Soviets thought that the permanent membership should remain the same indefinitely, and Cadogan proceeded to support Gromyko on this point.<sup>134</sup>

The Americans were not immediately dissuaded, however. At the 6<sup>th</sup> JSC Meeting on 28 August, Stettinius raised the issue again, noting that the permanent membership in the Council had already risen from four to five, and suggested that perhaps a Latin American state could be added in the future. The Soviets were resistant, asking which Latin American state the Americans had in mind (Brazil) and when it might be added. Stettinius replied that it was not a formal proposal as such, and no definite time had been determined, but continued by saying that Brazil was very important to Latin American affairs, and so its membership should be considered. Gromyko continued to be hesitant, asking if this suggestion was contained in the American Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and Stettinius admitted that it had not been, although the provision had been made for the addition of other permanent members in the future. Gromyko then stated unequivocally that the USSR opposed enlarging the Council, indicating that it had only accepted France with reluctance, and that it opposed further expansion. Cadogan put

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<sup>134</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 10:35 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 73.

forth his support for the Soviet position, saying that he thought that having more than five members on the Council would “put our head into a hornet’s nest.”<sup>135</sup> Gromyko then asked if he was correct in his understanding that the Americans were not submitting this as a formal proposal, and when Stettinius confirmed that they were not, the matter was put aside.<sup>136</sup> Within a few days, Stettinius with some difficulty convinced FDR not to press the issue.<sup>137</sup>

It was almost a week later, during the 3 September meeting of the JSC, that Stettinius officially withdrew the request that the British and Soviets consider permanent membership for Brazil. He also accepted that no procedure for adding permanent members to the Council would be discussed, though Cadogan conceded that a process for amending the organization’s charter could potentially be used for this purpose. Thus, the Soviets and British defeated the Americans on this question, although Stettinius made a point of indicating that he hoped that the others would similarly make concessions on issues of continued disagreement.<sup>138</sup> However, the strong Soviet resistance to the inclusion of Brazil as a permanent member of the Council reflects the Soviet desire to use the UN as a vehicle for great power dominance, and cooperation solely among the principal wartime allies.

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<sup>135</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 160-161, Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Sixth Day, Monday, August 28, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 744, Stettinius pp. 111-112.

<sup>136</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 161.

<sup>137</sup> Stettinius, p. 118. Roosevelt also made it clear that he was pleased at the general acceptance of France, indicating that he felt that the French would not actually take up their permanent seat until all of the other permanent members felt the time to be right.

<sup>138</sup> Informal Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 3 September 1944, 12:05 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 141, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 3, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 765.

By the same token, the Soviets wished to limit the influence of the non-permanent members of the Council, as explained above in the instructions to the Soviet delegation. Thus, at the second meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee on 24 August, the Americans proposed a one-year term for non-permanent members of the Council, and the British responded with a plan for a three-year term to allow different countries' representatives to gain more experience, but the Soviets proposed a two-year term for the non-permanent members. This notion was accepted in the JSC on 28 August by the US, and Britain agreed to proceed on that basis, though Cadogan reserved the right to re-open the issue for discussion later, as he had been instructed to press for a three-year term.<sup>139</sup> This outcome can be seen as another victory for the Soviet delegation, as it aligned closely with its goals, although it was not a crucial issue.

The Soviet delegation attached great importance to the new organization's capability to take decisive action. One means the Kremlin proposed at Dumbarton Oaks was the creation of an international air force directly under UN command. The issue was raised by Gromyko at the first meeting of the Security Subcommittee on 23 August. Both the British and the Americans responded cautiously, asking for clarification of the Soviet proposal.<sup>140</sup> Gromyko admitted that not all the details had been worked out, but emphasized that an air force under United Nations' command would facilitate prompt and decisive action. He suggested that perhaps planes and their crews could be provided based on a system of national quotas, and subsequently made it clear that the Soviets

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<sup>139</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 24 August 1944, 10:50 a.m. to 12:10 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 58, Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 162, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 740.

<sup>140</sup> In their initial proposals for the discussions, the British had explicitly opposed the creation of an "International Police Force," deeming the practical difficulties and inherently implicit threat to sovereignty to outweigh such a proposal's "theoretical merits." Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 686.

were not proposing constituting a completely independent 'mixed' force. This statement assuaged the primary concerns of the Americans and British, who were skeptical of the viability of a supranational military force. However, the prospect would require the successful resolution of a number of important technical questions, such as the size of each nation's contribution and who would exercise operational control over their use. Thus, the issue was referred to a Special Military Subcommittee composed of active Army, Navy, and Air Force members who served on the various delegations, and were to investigate and discuss these crucial details.<sup>141</sup> On a related point, it was decided the next day during a meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee that forces for the new organization would be provided under a special agreement to be negotiated later.<sup>142</sup>

On the afternoon of the same day, 24 August, the first meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee took place, with the stated purpose "to gather points of view regarding the constitution of forces to enforce peace and security, with particular reference to the last paragraph of the Soviet memo regarding an international air force."<sup>143</sup> The meeting began with Major-General Slavin of the Soviet General Staff reiterating the Soviet position: in order to be effective, the new organization's Council would need to have a military force readily available in order to prevent and suppress aggression. An air force was deemed the best method to punish or impede an aggressor until national forces could be brought into action. It would also provide protection for small states, such as Czechoslovakia, which were unable to defend themselves.<sup>144</sup> In addition, Slavin contended that a standing air force under UN command would "create

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<sup>141</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the Security Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 3:17 p.m. to 4:45 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 66.

<sup>142</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 24 August 1944, 10:50 a.m. to 12:10 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in *Ibid*, p. 55.

<sup>143</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 30 August 1944, 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in *Ibid*, p. 40.

fear in potential aggressors which would make them think twice before undertaking acts of aggression.”<sup>145</sup> However, he did acknowledge that several technical aspects of the proposed force, such as its organization, command, training, and location would need further study.<sup>146</sup> The British and Americans responded by asking if the operational units were to be combined from troops from different nations, or if separate national contingents were to be brought together under an international corps.

Another issue they raised was whether this force would be limited to the air, or whether similar naval and/or land forces were envisioned by the Soviets as well.<sup>147</sup> While again acknowledging the need for further study, Slavin responded that the Soviets had in mind a mobile air force capable of prompt effective action, but did not envisage trying to create an integrated force with land and sea capabilities. He stated that a system wherein various nations would provide planes and crews through a system of quotas would be less effective, as there would inevitably be delays if individual governments needed to approve the use of their forces. Slavin also suggested that an international force would be more mobile.<sup>148</sup>

The British stated that they preferred a quota system, supplemented by joint training to improve the effectiveness of combined action in an emergency, a notion that they had included in their original Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The British saw the problems of supplying and reinforcing a permanent international force as substantial, and compounded by the fact that such a force would have to be extraordinarily large if it was to operate effectively on a global scale. They also argued that the same purpose could be

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<sup>144</sup> There is no indication whether or not the example of Czechoslovakia was chosen deliberately to highlight the failures of the British during the 1938 Munich Crisis and afterwards.

<sup>145</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee, 24 August 1944, 3:00 p.m. to 4:28 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 40.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

achieved if national contingents were kept in effective readiness to be passed over to the control of the new organization as the Council required. They saw the provision of these quotas, supplemented by an agreement to employ these forces at the call of the Council, as a more effective means of providing a rapid reaction force that could operate anywhere in the world.<sup>149</sup> The Americans added little to the conversation beyond stating their preference for a quota system as well.<sup>150</sup> After further discussion which was not recorded in detail, Sobolev suggested that the arguments regarding the concept of an international air force had been fully explored, and that it would be best to adjourn to consider the matter further, to which there was general agreement.<sup>151</sup>

However, before another meeting was held Gromyko and Stettinius discussed the issue during their private conversation on 29 August, the same conversation where Gromyko reversed his stance on the inclusion of economic and social affairs as outlined above. Gromyko indicated that the matter of the air force was of secondary importance, unlike some other issues discussed during that conversation, such as Council voting (covered below). Still, he commented that the Soviets would continue to press for an international air force, and Stettinius asked him to explain exactly what the Soviets had in mind. Gromyko said that each of four powers would provide planes and crews, which would be at the disposal of the Council without needing to secure further authorization from their home government. Stettinius then sought to further clarify the issue, asking:

“Mr. Ambassador, you don’t mean a new uniform with a special insignia on the plane under the command of some officer of the council” and he replied “Not at all.” I then went on and said in effect “I understand you mean joint operations with a plane of the RAF and a plane of the Red Army and a plane of the USAF all operating together under same [*sic*] Allied command.” The Ambassador agreed and added that the Soviets think of troops and naval vessels in the

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

same way.<sup>152</sup>

However, Stettinius still demurred, telling Gromyko that under the American Constitution, this could be problematic with regard to the powers of the Senate. Gromyko stated that he understood the US position, and knew that the Americans were studying the issue. The discussion ended there.<sup>153</sup>

The matter was next addressed in the Special Military Subcommittee meeting held on the afternoon of the 30<sup>th</sup>. Before the meeting, the Americans had proposed a text wherein national forces would be designated as “immediately available on the call of the Council” and the Soviets asked what this meant in practice. The Americans responded that such designated forces would be ready in terms of both equipment and placement at the disposal of the council. This stance seemed to meet the primary Soviet criteria for the force, and the British also indicated that they wanted to ensure that there would be no political procedure between the Council’s call and action. The US assured the others that the designated forces would have already been made available on call, so that the only thing necessary to put the force to use would be their physical movement to the theatre of operations. Sobolev then asked if this proposal aligned with the British position, and the British responded affirmatively. Rodionov then asked on behalf of the USSR if this proposal would therefore exclude the Soviet proposal for an international air force. In the discussion that followed, the British and Americans informed the Soviets that the US position excluded the creation of a permanent, separate international air force, at the same time assuring the Soviets that this plan would meet the substantive aims of the Soviet proposal. Sobolev pressed further, noting that the Americans viewed the Council as having a limited role in peacetime, and again, the Western Allies responded that the

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<sup>152</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 29, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, p. 749.

proposal would allow for the use of designated forces during peacetime or war. Sobolev then asked for time to study the issue further, most likely to seek instructions from Moscow.<sup>154</sup>

A draft of directives to the delegation, written by Litvinov, and which was effectively accepted as the basis for Soviet policies at Dumbarton Oaks, appears to shed some light on the Soviet response. Dated 1 September, Litvinov advised that the USSR had sought to create an international air force in order to ensure that the organization had a means of taking prompt and decisive action. However, if this purpose could be achieved through other means, the Soviets would not insist on its creation if opposed by the Americans and British.<sup>155</sup> The actions of the Soviet delegation reflect this viewpoint.

The issue of an international air force was next addressed in the JSC at that grouping's eleventh meeting on 7 September. The British opened by saying that they agreed with the substance of what the Soviets were trying to achieve, but questioned the effectiveness of the means proposed. They suggested that the question be studied further by the Council and its advisory military staff after the organization was created. The US delegate James Dunn agreed immediate availability to the Council was vital to the air force's effectiveness – to which Gromyko expressed agreement – but Dunn went on to question the practicality of setting up such a force during the Dumbarton Oaks talks. Other American delegates added that their initial hesitancy was simply based on opposition to creating an entirely new military force with its own uniform, insignia, etc. Gromyko restated that this was not what the Soviets were proposing. The Americans desired different national contingents operating under combined command, and Cadogan

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<sup>153</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 29, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, pp. 748-749, Stettinius p. 116.

<sup>154</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee, 30 August 1944, 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, pp. 35-36.

added that the British sought the same, with the addition that the forces should be physically located with each other as well. The Americans Dunn and Pasvolsky added that they realized that the organization was lacking a provision to provide forces for immediate use, which would be helpful. Sobolev concurred, although he added that a provision in itself was insufficient. The issue was then referred to the joint formulation group, as the different sides were substantively close enough to make the primary issue one of language.<sup>156</sup>

While the Soviets appeared willing to concede the point, the idea of an international air force almost reappeared on the agenda. Both Churchill and Roosevelt, when they became better informed of the Soviet proposal for an international air force, supported the idea. However, Cadogan and Stettinius respectively talked them out of pursuing it further, noting its technical complications.<sup>157</sup> On 7 September, at the meeting in FDR's bedroom mentioned above concerning the economic and social council, Gromyko acted in accordance with Litvinov's advice. He told FDR that he understood that all three powers favoured the same principles, and it was simply a matter of finding the correct drafting language. Gromyko also said that if the term "international air force" or the wording of the original Soviet proposal was problematic to the Americans, they were willing to discard it. Stettinius was reassuring, agreeing that they all had the same intent, which could be achieved without much difficulty with a single clause in simple

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<sup>155</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, pp.10-11.

<sup>156</sup> Informal Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 7 September 1944, 10:00 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 118-120.

<sup>157</sup> FDR was particularly hard to convince, and only grudgingly dropped his support for the plan when Stettinius pointed out to FDR that he had already gone on record as being against it. Cadogan p. 660, Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Fourteenth Day, Tuesday, September 5, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, pp. 769-770, Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Fifteenth Day, Wednesday, September 6, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V.1*, pp. 772-773.

language.<sup>158</sup> The Soviets formally withdrew their proposal for an international air force at the JSC meeting on 12 September. Echoing Litvinov's words almost exactly, Gromyko

said that the Soviet purpose in making this proposal had merely been to ensure the effectiveness of the organization. He said that the Soviet Government had no greater interest in this matter than did the other two Governments and that in view of the attitude of the other two Governments toward the proposal he was now withdrawing it.<sup>159</sup>

Thus the idea of an international air force was dropped, although its spirit was maintained to a very real extent by Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5 of the joint recommendations issued by the great powers after the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations (discussed below). Nevertheless, the Soviet government's attempt to create an international air force under the auspices of the UN underscores both its intention to work cooperatively with the other victorious powers in the postwar world, and its wish for the UN to have effective enforcement power.

Section VII, Paragraph F of the initial Soviet proposals expressed a similar desire to enhance the strategic power and significance of the UN, this time more distinctly favouring the demands of the great powers at the expense of smaller countries. This point, a provision for states not possessing sufficient armed forces to provide bases for UN use on their territory, proved to be highly controversial. A set of corrected instructions sent by Molotov to Gromyko on 9 August, shortly before the conference opened, emphasized the importance of this question to the USSR.<sup>160</sup> From the outset,

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<sup>158</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth Day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 785.

<sup>159</sup> Informal Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 12 September 1944, 11:15 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 72, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 12, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 795.

<sup>160</sup> Memorandum by V.M. Molotov for I.V. Stalin, Regarding Correction of Documents for the Forthcoming Conversations of the USSR, US and Great Britain on the Creation of an International

both the Americans and British treated it with suspicion. In their initial proposals, the US had proposed that the organization's members should provide forces and facilities under a general agreement regarding the size and type to be supplied, saying that "Such an agreement should be concluded among the member states at the earliest possible moment after the organization comes into existence."<sup>161</sup> They also indicated that factors such as geography and the population and relative resources of the country in question should be taken into consideration when calculating what each country should contribute. Furthermore, the US proposals said that the executive Council should have the power to call on member states to provide needed facilities, including bases.

However, the US proposal differed from the Soviet one insofar as it repeatedly stressed the need for a separate agreement to be ratified by each member state.<sup>162</sup> The British similarly stressed the importance of voluntary contributions, basing their proposal for the provision of armed force on the concept of countries "earmarking" a quota from their national forces to be put at the disposal of the Council.<sup>163</sup> These views contrasted significantly with the Soviet view that small states should simply be required to meet whatever demands the Council saw fit, and was highly indicative of the different attitudes towards the organization. The issue was addressed initially at the first meeting of the Security Subcommittee, held on the afternoon of 23 August. Gromyko inquired whether or not the British concept of earmarked forces was the only contribution that could be expected from member states. There was a general agreement that it was not, but it was noted that other steps (i.e. for American forces, the approval of Congress) may be needed to increase contributions beyond this level. The Soviets voiced support for the US

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Security Organization, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 74.

<sup>161</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 661.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 661-662.

proposal that all member states should keep armed forces ready for international cooperative action, again highlighting their primarily martial perspective of the organization.<sup>164</sup> Gromyko then addressed the provision of facilities and bases by member states. He reserved his government's position on a US proposal that pending the completion of a general agreement, the Big Four "and other states in a position to do so" should provide forces and facilities for establishing and maintaining peace and security.<sup>165</sup> He then discussed the American proposal that the Council be empowered to call upon member states for rights of passage and the furnishing of facilities. Gromyko asked whether or not this call would be binding, or if it could be ignored. The American Major General George V. Strong responded that a more general provision that no member of the organization should act to obstruct its enforcement actions would make it binding. Gromyko noted that this statement appeared to be in harmony with the Soviet proposal outlined above, and assented to its inclusion. Cadogan stated that the British accepted the idea in principle as well. Thus, there was little initial disagreement on the issue of the provision of forces and bases, although Gromyko noted that the language chosen in the final document would need particular scrutiny.<sup>166</sup>

The question was next addressed at the second meeting of the Security Subcommittee, held on 31 August. The discussion was brief, as there was a general consensus that, in accordance with the initial US proposal, all member states would make designated facilities available for use by the organization's forces to maintain peace and

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<sup>163</sup> Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 687.

<sup>164</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the Security Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 3:17 p.m. to 4:45 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 64.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid*, p. 64, United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 662.

<sup>166</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the Security Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 3:17 p.m. to 4:45 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 64.

security, under the direction of the Council. When facilities were deemed essential for enforcement action, the general charter of the new organization would be supplemented by a more specific arrangement for their provision. With a general agreement in principle, the issue was then passed to the Formulation Group, which would determine specific language before the document went to the JSC for approval.<sup>167</sup>

However, there was no smooth transition to a resolution. In his diary entry of 4 September, Stettinius notes that Gromyko “was much more insistent than he had previously been in preserving intact the exact language contained in the Soviet document,” even backing away from previous modifications.<sup>168</sup> This attitude was the result of the aforementioned instructions received from Moscow, which indicated that the Soviet delegation should insist upon strong language regarding the necessity of contributions from member states.<sup>169</sup> When the formulation group met to discuss exact wording, the Soviet delegation took the stance (echoing their original proposal) that nations with insufficient armed forces to carry out enforcement action should provide bases for this purpose. The US and British representatives thought this to be overly harsh, suggesting alternate wordings.<sup>170</sup> Discussion on the point was resumed at the eleventh meeting of the JSC on 7 September. Cadogan noted that the Soviet proposal limited the provision of bases to those unable to provide military forces, and suggesting dropping this proviso. Stettinius more actively opposed the Soviet idea, stating that members should not be compelled to give up territory against their will. Sobolev, speaking for the USSR, said that he did not think that the obligatory provision of bases

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<sup>167</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the Security Subcommittee, 30 August 1944, 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 24.

<sup>168</sup> Stettinius, p. 119.

<sup>169</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 4.

<sup>170</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 5, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 768.

was going too far, a sentiment with which Cadogan agreed, though he again questioned the restriction of the policy to those states that lacked armed forces. Sobolev and Gromyko then clarified the Soviet position, noting that the Big Four were obliged to provide forces, and so it seemed fair that while they and other large countries could do the same, other states could provide bases, as this was their only means for making an effective contribution.

The discussion then moved on to whether or not a contribution could be compelled under agreements already in place. Gladwyn Jebb of the UK said that it could be, under the powers of the Council, and the American Pasvolsky concurred, though he noted that such powers should only be exercised in the event of war or a similar emergency. Cadogan then stated that he agreed that it was unreasonable to expect states to meet unlimited demands for forces or bases, hence some sort of an agreement would be needed on this point. Gromyko insisted that there be an explicit reference to the provision of bases (or sites for bases) but that in itself was not sufficient to satisfy the Soviet view, that the Council should decree what level and type of cooperation it saw fit. Unable to reach agreement, the issue was sent back to the Formulation Group, to see if it could find wording that would satisfy all sides, though there is no record of it doing so.<sup>171</sup> On 8 September, the issue was addressed in a private meeting of Stettinius, Cadogan, and Gromyko, held at the latter's initiative.

Though the matter was not resolved, Stettinius noted that the "topic appears to have somewhat diminished in importance in the opinion of the Soviet group."<sup>172</sup> While there is no clear explanation for the Soviet change of behaviour, Stettinius' diaries

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<sup>171</sup>Informal Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 7 September 1944, 10:00 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 116-118.

<sup>172</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 8, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 784.

suggest that the Soviets were willing to make concessions on virtually all points provided that they were able to get approval for their position on voting in the Council, to which they attached overarching importance (see below).<sup>173</sup> The Soviets formally dropped their call for an explicit requirement that member states provide bases at the sixteenth meeting of the JSC on 19 September, receiving assurances that states would in all likelihood be willing to provide them, even if not specifically compelled to do so.<sup>174</sup> Thus, Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5 of the final recommendations of the conference stated that all members of the organization should make forces, facilities, and other assistance available to the Security Council, under the terms of a special agreement to be reached as soon as possible.<sup>175</sup> Overall, the Soviet push for an explicit requirement that small states provide bases exemplifies their attitude towards the organization: it was to be dominated by great powers, taking whatever measures they saw fit in order to secure peace through the military suppression of any potential opposition. Small states were expected to simply accept the prerogatives and dictates of the Council, ceding sovereignty in exchange for security. However, Soviet flexibility on this point shows that they did not see this particular aspect of the organization as indispensable, even if it was distinctly preferable.

A similar issue, but one that would provoke far less controversy, was whether or not the Council would have the power to impose the settlement of a dispute, i.e. whether or not the Council's decisions should be binding. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet view on the

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<sup>173</sup> Stettinius, p. 130.

<sup>174</sup> Informal Record of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 19 September 1944, 4:30 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 26.

<sup>175</sup> Press Release Issued by the Department of State, October 9, 1944, including Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 896-897. My inquiries to the UN Reference Team at the Dag Hammerskjold Library at the UN headquarters in New York confirmed that in fact, this agreement was never reached, and was not in fact discussed after 1947, another casualty of the disintegration of relations among the victorious great powers in

issue was that the Council should be the dominant body, and should have full power to make a decision and subsequently enforce a settlement. The British, on the other hand, feared most small states would be unwilling to accept such an arrangement, and thus would not join the new international organization, and so while they supported the principle, they were reluctant to make this power by the Council too explicit.<sup>176</sup> The US similarly advocated the organization's right to impose a settlement, but anticipated that this would rarely be used, as the organization's moral force would lead most nations to accept the Council's decisions 'voluntarily.' Thus the language they used in their initial proposals on this matter was indirect and implicit.<sup>177</sup> Since there was general consensus on this point, it was not discussed at length, essentially being settled in the Formulation Group of the General Organization Subcommittee on 1 September. The Council was granted the power to impose a settlement, but only if the greatly preferable option of voluntary acceptance was rejected, and the issue constituted a threat to the peace.<sup>178</sup> Nonetheless, it bears mention because the Soviet desire to ensure that the Council's decisions could be made mandatory again illustrates the Kremlin's view that the Council should hold primacy, while other nations merely carried out its edicts.

By the same token, the Soviets likewise sought to limit the powers of the Assembly. At the first meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee on 23 August, Gromyko clarified the Soviet position in broad terms. He stated that the Assembly should have the right to discuss issues but only the Council would have the power to act, to which there was general agreement. It was likewise agreed that "the Council would

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the period (see below). Peacekeeping and other military actions of the UN are conducted on an *ad hoc* basis.

<sup>176</sup> Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 678, Hull, p. 1677.

<sup>177</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 658-659.

<sup>178</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 1, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 761.

not have to take cognizance of matters referred by the Assembly.”<sup>179</sup> The matter was addressed by the JSC’s seventh meeting on 31 August, which noted a prior agreement that the Assembly would not on its own initiative deal with any issue that was being addressed by the Council.<sup>180</sup> On 9 September, at the twelfth meeting of the JSC, Gromyko got further clarification on the question. It was agreed by all that the Assembly would be able to discuss issues and records would be kept. They could then be presented to the Council, but there would be no mechanism for the Assembly to express formally a collective opinion or recommendation.<sup>181</sup> Thus, the Soviets were able to successfully limit the power of the Assembly to mere discussion, and furthermore even to block debate by referring a matter to the Council. This tied in well with the primacy they wished to give the Council in the new organization, and the likewise limited role they envisioned for the small (and predominantly capitalist) countries who would dominate the Assembly. This again was in line with Litvinov’s 1 September memo, which reflected the expectation that the USSR would rarely get support in any future controversies, an expectation that would have more substantial impact on the Soviet platform.<sup>182</sup>

Another issue that reflects broader Soviet attitudes towards the organization is the name that was chosen for it. FDR wanted to use the name ‘United Nations,’ which was also the name for the wartime alliance against Germany, and does not appear to have

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<sup>179</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 10:35 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, pp. 71-72, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 23, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 717.

<sup>180</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 31, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 755.

<sup>181</sup> Informal Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 9 September 1944, 3:00 p.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 87-88.

<sup>182</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 11.

received any dissenting opinion from his advisers.<sup>183</sup> Initially it did not appear that this would be controversial, especially given the fact that the British proposals for the talks addressed the question directly, noting “The term ‘United Nations’ is now in general use and there does not seem to be any strong reason to substitute any other for it.”<sup>184</sup> However, when the naming of the organization was addressed explicitly on 4 September by the General Organization Subcommittee, the Soviets were unprepared, with Gromyko claiming that the question was not in either the American or British proposals (at which point Jebb pointed to the aforementioned clause in the British proposals). Thus, the Soviet delegation simply agreed to take the matter under consideration. This stance is somewhat perplexing, because at that meeting, the General Organization Subcommittee received a report from the Nomenclature Group, a body which was established on 23 August, specifically tasked with determining names for the various offices and organs of the new organization. Later during the same meeting, when discussing the name to be given the Council, Gromyko said that if the organization ended up being called ‘United Nations’ then the Council would need to be called the ‘Security Council’ as the Soviets felt strongly that the word ‘security’ should feature prominently (though he also noted that if ‘security’ appeared in the organization’s name, it would be repetitious to use it in the name of the Council). Again, Gromyko reserved the position of the Soviet

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<sup>183</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Fourth Day, Thursday, August 24, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 731. Pasvolsky of the American delegation also noted that in the body’s charter the word “Organization” would be used in most places to avoid awkwardness in drafting. Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 2 [Anglo-American-Chinese Phase] of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 4 p.m., October 2, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *Ibid*, p. 857.

<sup>184</sup>Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 676. Thus, on 28 August, Stettinius told the President that though the question had not been formally discussed, he did not expect any difficulty in adopting the name ‘United Nations’. Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Sixth Day, Monday, August 28, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 746.

delegation.<sup>185</sup>

The meetings of the Nomenclature Group were informal and no minutes were kept, so there are few insights into what went on there beyond the aforementioned report, and thus there are no clues regarding Gromyko's seeming ignorance, since there were two Soviet delegates (Golunsky and Krylov) who participated in the Nomenclature Group.<sup>186</sup> The Nomenclature Group's report of 4 September indicated that unspecified other names were considered. The report also stated that the Americans continued to favour the original name, though it was noted that its wartime connotation could pose an obstacle to accession for countries that sought to preserve their neutrality. At the same time, the Soviet group expressed a clear preference for the name 'International Security Organization' – unsurprising given the Soviet overwhelming preoccupation with the directly security-related aspects of the body.<sup>187</sup>

The situation remained unresolved on 9 September, when it was addressed again, this time in the JSC. Gromyko stated that the Soviet delegation still did not accept the name United Nations. He suggested that since it was the name for the wartime alliance, it could be confusing, and proposed instead the name 'World Union.' Cadogan, somewhat surprisingly, also claimed at that time that British support for the name United Nations was limited, adding that at one time they had considered proposing a name that incorporated the word 'Union.'<sup>188</sup> However, ultimately the US did get its way on this

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<sup>185</sup> Informal Record of the Fourth Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 4 September 1944, 3:05 p.m. to 3:55 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 11.

<sup>186</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 5, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 767.

<sup>187</sup> Annex I to Informal Record of the Fourth Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 4 September 1944, 3:05 p.m. to 3:55 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks, Preliminary Report of Nomenclature Group in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, pp. 16-17.

<sup>188</sup> Informal Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 9 September 1944, 3:00 p.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 80-81, Memorandum by the Under

issue, when on 12 September the Soviets accepted the name 'United Nations' and the British followed suit.<sup>189</sup> The Soviet position reveals two important facts. First of all, it illustrates once again the primary Soviet concern with the security aspects of the new body. Secondly, it shows that though the Soviets wanted to use the organization to enshrine their privileged position and relationship with the other victorious powers, they did not view the body as a mere extension of the wartime alliance, but rather as a significant component of the postwar world in its own right.

The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks also discussed the Secretariat, and specifically its leadership. While the British did not address the issue in their initial draft, the Americans called for a Director-General who would serve a five-year term and be eligible for re-election. This Director-General was to be elected by the General Assembly.<sup>190</sup> The Soviets, in tune with their negative view of the Assembly, indicated that the position they dubbed Secretary General should be elected by the Assembly, but on the recommendation of the Council.<sup>191</sup> The matter does not seem to have been debated at length, but was discussed in the General Organization Subcommittee on 30 August. In the course of this discussion, the Americans and British indicated that they would prefer a Director-General who would have the right to bring issues to the Council's attention on his own authority.<sup>192</sup> Gromyko initially reserved the Soviet position on this question, perhaps due to a lack of explicit instructions, though it was later accepted without

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Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 9, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 789-90.

<sup>189</sup> Informal Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 12 September 1944, 11:15 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 69, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 12, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 795.

<sup>190</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 667.

<sup>191</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, by the Soviet Union, Washington, 12 August 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 710.

apparent argument.

Next, Sobolev inquired how the Secretary-General was to be selected. The American Pasvolsky said that the General Assembly would select someone, who would then be confirmed by the Council. Sobolev then put forth the Soviet position that it should be the other way around – the Council would nominate someone, who would seek the Assembly's approval. The British supported the Soviet position, and the matter was officially referred to the Formulation Group.<sup>193</sup> The set of instructions from Moscow written the following day informed the delegates that they should accept the initiative of the Secretary-General, although his authority should be limited by his being ineligible for re-election after a five-year term. The duration of the Secretary-General's tenure and eligibility for re-election were left undecided at the end of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.<sup>194</sup> Thereafter, the matter was not discussed further at length, as the Americans accepted the Soviet and British desire to give the Council primary power over the appointment of the Secretary-General, hence the Formulation Group produced a statement to that effect on 6 September.<sup>195</sup> While the choosing of the Secretary-General proved to be a matter of little dispute, the Soviet position again illustrates the desire to concentrate power in the Security Council, where their influence was the greatest.

The question of trusteeships was not addressed in detail during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, illustrating that the USSR attached overwhelming importance to issues

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<sup>192</sup> Trygve Lie would exercise this prerogative during the 1946 Iran Crisis, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.

<sup>193</sup> Informal Record of the Third Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 30 August 1944, 3:10 p.m. to 4:10 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 31.

<sup>194</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 3.

<sup>195</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 6, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 771. Neither the published American documents, the published Soviet documents, Stettinius' published diaries, Cadogan's published diaries, nor any archival documents shed any light on the American reversal on this issue, so it appears to have been of little interest to the US.

of military security, even at the expense of a potential opportunity to expand its power. The initial American proposals called for a new system of international trusteeships under the organization's purview, both to replace the system of trusteeships administered by the League of Nations for dependent territories stripped from the defeated powers in 1919, and to take effect in "certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states."<sup>196</sup> The actual formation of this system was not discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, primarily because it was originally an American initiative, which was put aside due to internal divisions regarding the stance to be taken.<sup>197</sup> The Soviets did not even mention it in a brief memorandum of their positions before the conference opened, while the British were very reluctant throughout the negotiations to discuss any issue that could interfere with their imperial prerogatives. Thus, it was not discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, despite the fact that the American and Soviet delegations agreed that it would not likely be a difficult point on which to reach agreement.<sup>198</sup> This was a missed opportunity for the Soviets, since, as noted by Sobolev, the Soviet government had no experience in colonial administration, and therefore a mandate over even a small territory or participation in a joint governance effort would mark an increase in its power.<sup>199</sup> Thus, Sobolev suggested that the Soviet government would like to at least open discussions with the US before the general founding conference of the organization, though the US could take the lead on this question.<sup>200</sup> Also, the instructions to the Soviet delegation cited above indicated that it should support a mechanism to oversee the preparation of dependent territories socially,

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<sup>196</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 665.

<sup>197</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Thirty-fourth Day, Wednesday, September 27, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 843.

<sup>198</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 28, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 847.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid*, p. 848.

economically, and politically for independence.<sup>201</sup> Thus, the Soviet delegation indicated its interest in discussing the subject of trusteeships, and later events would demonstrate the Kremlin's interest in obtaining trust territories.<sup>202</sup> However, the fact that the Soviets were not prepared to discuss the trusteeship issue thoroughly, and did not press the Americans to do so with any vigour, once again illustrates the sincerity of the Soviet statements that they saw the organization's main focus as military security, with all else being secondary or a matter for later discussion.

The discussion at Dumbarton Oaks on membership in the new organization illustrates the Soviet view of the UN as a 'club of victors.' In their draft proposals for the conference, the Americans did not address the issue of who could or should join the organization in detail, stating simply that it should be open to all "sovereign and peace-loving states."<sup>203</sup> This was a direct quotation from the fourth point of the Moscow Declaration regarding the creation of the new organization.<sup>204</sup> The British took the issue further, stating in their proposals an assumption that all of the United Nations (that is, signatories of the January 1942 Declaration of United Nations mentioned previously) would be invited to be members of the organization. Enemy states were not to be admitted until they had demonstrated their willingness and ability to act in accordance

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<sup>201</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 87.

<sup>202</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 28, 1944, in *1944 V. I.*, p. 847, Telegram, the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson), Washington, December 30, 1944, in *1944 V. I.*, pp. 922-923.

<sup>203</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I.*, p. 653.

<sup>204</sup> The exact wording of the Moscow Declaration reads as follows: "4. That they [the signatories – the USA, UK, USSR and China] recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.." Quoted from Center for the Public Domain and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ibiblio Online Library and Digital Archive, WW II Resources, Treaties, Declarations, Instruments of Surrender Etc., 1943, Moscow Conference October 1943 Joint Four-Nation Declaration, [www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html) (accessed 26 April 2008).

with the organization's aims, and the acceptance of neutral states and timing thereof was a point which the British proposed to discuss during the talks.<sup>205</sup> While the Soviets employed less explicit language in their proposals, they too cited the Moscow Declaration's formula of the organization being open to all "peace-loving states, large and small."<sup>206</sup> However, they noted that the organization would only be able to function effectively if, "the nations members [*sic*] of the organisation, and particularly those initiating its foundation, base themselves on the necessity of effective cooperation in measures capable of ensuring the security of the peace-loving peoples."<sup>207</sup> In practice the Soviets defined this "effective cooperation" as taking an active part in the struggle against Germany (or Japan). Again, this stance was in accordance with their perspective that a country's participation in the new organization should be tied directly to their participation in the war effort. For example, at the twelfth meeting of the JSC on 9 September, Gromyko expressed his hope that wartime contributions should be taken into account when choosing the temporary members of the Council.<sup>208</sup>

The draft of instructions to the Soviet delegation illustrated this viewpoint. The delegates were told to take the position that initial membership should be limited to those states that had signed the Declaration of United Nations and their supporters. The only "supporter" deemed eligible for founding membership was France.<sup>209</sup> The Americans seemed to support the same principle; however, they attempted to define wartime participation more broadly than the Soviets, to include not only signatories to the

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<sup>205</sup> Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 673.

<sup>206</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, by the Soviet Union, Washington, 12 August 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 706.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid*, p. 707.

<sup>208</sup> Informal Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 9 September 1944, 3:00 p.m.. Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 87.

<sup>209</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 85.

Declaration of United Nations but also non-signatories that supported the Allied cause in other ways, such as participation in UNRRA, the Hot Springs Conference, or the Bretton Woods Conference, which they referred to as ‘Associated Nations.’<sup>210</sup> The US took this position since Hull considered founding membership status in the new organization for the Associated Nations to be an essential element in its relations with Latin America.<sup>211</sup>

The Soviet response to the American desire to include the Associated Nations was predictably cautious. On 23 August, Gromyko stated in the General Organization Subcommittee that while it was theoretically possible to admit “other peace-loving” states, this statement referred to unnamed neutral states, whose potential admission should be studied separately and individually.<sup>212</sup> When the issue was first raised by the American delegation at the sixth meeting of the Joint Steering Committee meeting on 28 August, it received little discussion. Gromyko inquired whether or not the US sought to include Denmark as a founding member, and Pasvolsky simply said that they might, and indicated that the US had a tentative list of potential states to invite, which would only be finalized when invitations to the organization’s general founding conference were issued.<sup>213</sup> The question was simply passed on to the General Organization

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<sup>210</sup> Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 742.

<sup>211</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Twenty-third day, Friday, September 15, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 814. On 31 August the US distributed a list of Associated Powers that could potentially be invited to join as founding members of the organization, with six of the nine authorities mentioned being Latin American states. The authorities listed were Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, the French Committee of National Liberation, Iceland, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Also, the “Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity” was listed as an official “observer” to the aforementioned conferences, leaving Denmark’s status as an ‘Associated Nation’ unclear. Annex to Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 8 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 12:15 p.m., August 31, at Dumbarton Oaks in *Ibid*, p. 758. The Hot Springs Conference, formally called the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture was held from May to June 1943. The Bretton Woods Conference, formally called the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, was held in July 1944.

<sup>212</sup> Informal Record of the First Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 23 August 1944, 10:35 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 71.

<sup>213</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in *Ibid*, p. 168.

Subcommittee.<sup>214</sup> The formulation group of the latter body addressed the matter the following day, 29 August. This body adopted the formulation “Membership should be open to the United Nations and all other peace-loving states” with the Soviet delegation reserving judgment as to whether this phrase included not only the United Nations but also “the nations associated with them.”<sup>215</sup> During their private talk on 29 August, Gromyko indicated that he would agree to define the initial membership as consisting of both the signatories of the United Nations Declaration and the Associated Nations.<sup>216</sup> Still, he did not formally accept the American proposal and the Soviet position remained guarded. In the eighth JSC meeting on 31 August, Gromyko responded to the list of possible Associated Nations by saying that it was his country’s understanding that only the principles for membership would be established at Dumbarton Oaks, without finalizing an actual list of who was to be invited to initial membership. It was established that those proposed as founding members had to be actively supporting Allies, and that a country’s severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers was not in and of itself enough to achieve Associated Nation status.<sup>217</sup>

However, the memo from Litvinov to Molotov dated 1 September hardened the Soviet position. This document stated directly that the Soviet delegates should continue to oppose any widening of the organization’s initial membership. Maintaining their stance that the wartime record of an authority should be the decisive factor, they continued to support the acceptance of France. However, they steadfastly opposed the

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<sup>214</sup> Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 742-743.

<sup>215</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 29, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 747.

<sup>216</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *Ibid*, p. 749.

<sup>217</sup> Informal Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 31 August 1944, 12:15 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 148, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 8 of

inclusion of former German allies Italy and Romania, which had belatedly joined the Allied side, as well as stating that it would be “very strange” to include Denmark, which “was subjugated by Hitler without a shot [being fired].”<sup>218</sup> In accordance with these instructions, in the 11<sup>th</sup> JSC meeting held on 7 September the Soviets adopted the stricter official position that only the United Nations signatories be accepted as initial members. They did concede that some other nations could join “immediately thereafter.”<sup>219</sup> The next day in a progress report to Hull, Stettinius noted that although the Soviets maintained this stance, he did not expect this issue to be a difficult one, yet in an informal conversation with Gromyko and Cadogan on 8 September, the Soviet position remained unchanged.<sup>220</sup>

When the matter was raised again during the fourteenth meeting of the JSC on 13 September, resolution remained elusive. The US made a concession, suggesting the formulation for initial membership consist of the United Nations signatories “and such other states as the United Nations may invite.”<sup>221</sup> However, the Soviets still did not accept this amendment, with Sobolev asking if it included new signatories of the Declaration of United Nations, and upon receiving an affirmative reply, Gromyko stated

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the Joint Steering Committee Held at 12:15 p.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 757.

<sup>218</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 8.

<sup>219</sup> Informal Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 7 September 1944, 10 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 110, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 7, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 776-777.

<sup>220</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 784, 788.

<sup>221</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 55, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 13, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 796.

that the issue would require further study.<sup>222</sup> On 19 September at the sixteenth meeting of the JSC, Gromyko further elucidated that Soviet position on the issue of membership, by stating his presumption that states “of a fascist type” would be excluded from membership in the organization. When pressed to define this phrase more precisely, Gromyko stated that it would be up to the Council to decide to which states that applied.<sup>223</sup> However, as the membership question as a whole remained unresolved, this point was not taken up at length, though it is again indicative of Soviet expectations towards the new organization.

Since no compromise could be found, on 20 September it was agreed to shelve the issue and limit the clause on membership to the statement that the organization would be open to all peace-loving nations.<sup>224</sup> The Soviet desire to restrict initial membership in the organization once again reflected a desire to have it reflect wartime contributions, a stance that would in general enhance their own power and accord with their broader attitude towards the new organization. However, the weight of this issue was considerably less than another one raised by the Soviets, also related to membership in the new organization. The Soviets surprised the other delegations at Dumbarton Oaks by casually suggesting that all sixteen of the Union’s constituent republics should be given membership in the General Assembly. This proposal was deemed to be so potentially offensive to the American public that it was kept highly secret, and generally referred to only as the ‘X-matter.’ Only two or three members of the American delegation were

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<sup>222</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 55.

<sup>223</sup> Informal Record of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 19 September 1944, 4:30 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 26-27, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 19, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 825.

<sup>224</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 20, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 829.

even made aware of it, with a special secondary set of minutes being taken when it was discussed, which were kept in Stettinius' safe in order to avoid any chance of a leak to the media.<sup>225</sup>

To the Soviets, there were a number of potential advantages to the inclusion of all sixteen republics. First, there was the obvious advantage of the addition of sixteen votes in the Assembly, where the USSR's position was weak. Since the later bloc of East European satellites was not yet in place, the USSR was relatively isolated within the organization and could readily expect to be outvoted on most issues by an English-speaking bloc acting in concert with a number of Latin American states highly subject to US influence. Second, it is notable that the sixteen additional representatives would each be entitled to all of the procedural privileges and opportunities that accompanied membership, such as committee participation and the right to be heard in debates. Third, obtaining Assembly membership status for the constituent republics could potentially have served as a precedent for any other international gatherings wherein the USSR sought a louder voice.<sup>226</sup>

As per the directives of the Soviet government outlined above, Gromyko first raised the issue in an easy, almost off-hand manner, perhaps with the hope that it was simply going to be taken for granted if he treated it as such.<sup>227</sup> During the sixth meeting of the JSC on 28 August, after discussing various points such as the thorny issue of Council voting when a permanent member was a party to a dispute, and the question of initial membership in the organization, Gromyko remarked, in what Stettinius later described to Hull as a "definitely casual manner," that it was the Soviet government's

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<sup>225</sup> Stettinius, p.111.

<sup>226</sup> Konstantyn Sawczuk, *The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 8-10.

<sup>227</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 85

understanding that all sixteen republics were to be accepted as members of the organization.<sup>228</sup> Cadogan replied first, saying simply that he had no comment at the present time but believed that the British government would likely wish to contact the Soviet government directly in order to discuss the international status of the Soviet constituent republics. The Americans likewise said that they would need to consider Gromyko's proposal further.<sup>229</sup> Privately the American response was much more emphatically opposed. According to Stettinius' diary "The president said "My God," and went on to instruct me to explain to Gromyko privately and personally and immediately that we could never accept this proposal" while speculating that it could destroy the entire endeavour.<sup>230</sup> Stettinius did explain FDR's viewpoint the following morning. In his diary Stettinius wrote that he told Gromyko that:

pressing the point at this time might jeopardize the success of the conversations. I said it... should be more properly presented to the international organization in due course after its creation. The ambassador [Gromyko] was most cooperative and indicated that he... would agree in the present meetings at Dumbarton Oaks that there should be no further reference whatsoever to the subject.<sup>231</sup>

This response again was in accordance with the directives laid out by the Soviet

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<sup>228</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 169, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 743, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 29, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 751.

<sup>229</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations , 29 August 1944, 3 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 169, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 743.

<sup>230</sup> Stettinius, p. 113. The British response was much more restrained, perhaps in fear of provoking a comparison to seats for their Empire and Commonwealth, which maintained close links with the UK in the sphere of foreign policy. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, an official historian of Britain's experience in WW II, noted that "on paper" the Soviet republics had greater autonomy in foreign affairs than India, which was accepted as a founding member. Sawczuk, p. 7.

<sup>231</sup> Stettinius, p. 116.

government.<sup>232</sup> That afternoon, there was another meeting of the JSC. At the outset, Stettinius asked Gromyko if in view of their conversation that morning, it might be possible to exclude the Soviet proposal from the official minutes. Gromyko, noting the very limited circulation of the minutes, replied in the negative. However, he added that he raised the point merely to bring it to the attention of the other governments, and it was not necessary for the issue to be discussed fully at Dumbarton Oaks, and the records indicate that it was not raised again among the delegations.<sup>233</sup> The draft of instructions dated 1 September confirmed the previous directive that the issue of membership for the constituent republics should be deferred.<sup>234</sup> Litvinov's memo to Molotov provided more detail. He clearly recognized that the Soviet proposal for inclusion of the republics had no chance of acceptance at Dumbarton Oaks or at any time before the fall Presidential election, therefore it was not worth holding up the conference on this point. Litvinov also expected that the increased prestige accrued for the Soviet republics as the Red Army secured the Baltic region and continued its advance would strengthen the Soviet position in all respects, and so time was on the side of the USSR.<sup>235</sup>

Thus, the issue was not discussed further in any detail, though Gromyko did mention on 19 September in the JSC his hope that the British desire to include contributions to peace and security as a criterion for membership as a non-permanent member of the Council would work in favour of acceptance of the Soviet republics. However, neither the British nor the Americans were willing to pursue this idea further,

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<sup>232</sup> Directives for the Talks on the Creation of an International Security Organization, undated, in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 28, Pora no. 41, Papka no. 159, p. 85.

<sup>233</sup> Informal Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 29 August 1944, 3 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 153, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 7 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 750-751.

<sup>234</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13., p. 5.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

and the point was not followed up by any of the delegates.<sup>236</sup> Nonetheless, the X-matter remained of central importance and thus the subject of direct communication between Roosevelt and Stalin during the conference. This exchange of telegrams reiterated the importance that the Soviet government attached to the question, and by extension, the organization and the USSR's position within it. On 31 August, FDR sent a personal message to Stalin, stating that he was "much concerned" by the Soviet proposal, adding:

I must tell you that to raise this question at any stage before the final establishment and entry into its functions of the international organization would very definitely imperil the whole project, certainly as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly other important countries as well. I hope that you will find it possible to reassure me on this point.<sup>237</sup>

The American President concluded with a statement he supported the State Department's attempt to shelve the issue by saying "This would not prejudice later discussion of the question after the organization came into being. The Assembly would then have full authority to act."<sup>238</sup>

Stalin, however, while willing to defer the matter, was not content to let the question rest until after the organization was in place, perhaps realizing the unlikelihood of acceptance for the Soviet republics later.<sup>239</sup> The Soviet leader's reply to Roosevelt showed the importance he attached to this effort to strengthen the USSR's position within the new body. In a telegram sent on 7 September, the Generalissimo wrote:

I attach exceptional importance to the statement of the Soviet delegation on this question. After the known constitutional reforms in our country in the beginning of this year, the governments of the Union Republics are extremely alert as to what attitude the friendly states will take toward the adopted [*sic*] in the Soviet Constitution

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<sup>236</sup>Informal Record of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 19 September 1944, 4:30 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 30, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 19, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 825.

<sup>237</sup> Butler, p. 255.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid*, p. 255.

<sup>239</sup> Sawczuk, p. 10.

broadening of their rights in the sphere of international relations. You, of course, know that for instance the Ukraine, Byelorussia, which are constituent parts of the Soviet Union, by the number of their population and by their political importance are surpassing certain countries in respect to which all of us agree that they should belong to the number of initiators of the establishment of the International Organization.<sup>240</sup>

Stalin then concluded that he hoped to explain the political importance of this question to the President in the future.<sup>241</sup>

The “constitutional reforms” to which Stalin referred formed the legal basis for the X-matter. Most notably, the Supreme Soviet approved an amendment to the Soviet Constitution on 1 February 1944. This amendment added Article 18a, which read “Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.”<sup>242</sup> Simultaneously, the Supreme Soviet decreed that the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would be transformed from an All-Union to a Union-Republican People’s Commissariat.<sup>243</sup> The domestic significance of these reforms is highly questionable. Alexander Werth’s landmark history of the Great Patriotic War describes the amendment thusly: “This was an obvious device to get extra seats at UN. I remember visiting the improvised “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Georgian SSR” [*sic*] at Tbilisi in 1946. None of its officials took it in the least seriously. It consisted of only three or four rooms.”<sup>244</sup>

While there is no direct evidence to support Werth’s contention that the amendment was taken solely with reference to the UN, Stettinius’ diaries note that the Soviets mentioned the idea of membership for each of the sixteen republics in February

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<sup>240</sup> Butler, pp. 255-256.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>242</sup> Quoted in Sawczuk, p. 6.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>244</sup> Werth, p. 978.

1944, shortly after the amendment was made, so a degree of linkage between the two is plausible.<sup>245</sup> The fact that the Soviet leadership would amend the constitution to strengthen its position in the new organization clearly demonstrates that they saw the project as very important, while also demonstrating Soviet anxieties regarding vulnerability in a capitalist-dominated system. While the question was put on hold until after Dumbarton Oaks, it remained of paramount significance to the Soviet régime. This is best illustrated by Gromyko's statement on 27 September, during the final formal meeting of the JSC, the day before the Soviet delegation departed. Gromyko stated explicitly that any general conference to found the new organization would be contingent on the British and American acceptance of the Soviet republics as initial members of the organization, as well as Soviet veto power in the Council, to be discussed below.<sup>246</sup> These stances show how the Soviet government intended to redress its anticipated minority status in an organization dominated by non-socialist states.

Since the USSR considered the Council the primary vehicle for exercising power, it is unsurprising that the Kremlin attached tremendous importance to its voting procedures. The critical question was whether one of the permanent members of the Council could exercise veto power if it was a party to a dispute that constituted a threat to general peace. A less weighty aspect of the issue was how many votes were needed for the Council to pass a resolution, provided that the Big Five did not veto it. The British firmly maintained that any resolution needed the support of two-thirds of those present and voting, which in effect meant eight affirmative votes out of the eleven states on the Council (it having been agreed that the five permanent members would be joined by six

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<sup>245</sup> Stettinius p. 110. It is also therefore somewhat surprising that the Americans and British were so shocked by a notion that had in fact been raised previously.

<sup>246</sup> Informal Record of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 27 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 7, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of

non-permanent members) since the British were acutely concerned with winning support for the new organization from smaller states, such as the Dominions. Thus, they were wary of creating the impression that the UN would be dominated by the great powers.

The Soviets, on the other hand, thought that this two-thirds requirement would make it more difficult for the Council to make decisions and hence impair its ability to act quickly and decisively, which they perceived as the primary purpose of the organization. Thus, they pushed for resolutions to be passed by a simple majority. This would make it easier for the Council to act, and also enhance Soviet power by requiring only the additional support of one non-permanent member, instead of three as per the British view. The British made their standpoint clear in their opening proposals, while the Soviet position paper clearly showed the desire for a powerful and unhindered Council in general and called for a simple majority “on questions pertaining to the prevention or suppression of aggression” provided that all of the permanent members concurred. The original US proposals also called for a simple majority, and although they later for unspecified reasons reversed this position to adopt the British stance, in general they attached less importance to the question than the other two powers and played a minor role in the discussions of the subject.<sup>247</sup>

The British first formally proposed that voting in the Council be by a two-thirds majority at the second meeting of the JSC on the morning of 22 August. The bulk of the meeting was spent by the Soviet delegation formally presenting its views, although Cadogan noted for the record his specific instructions to propose that voting in the

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State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 27, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 839.

<sup>247</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 658, Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 674, 678, Memorandum on an International Security Organization, by the Soviet Union, Washington, 12 August 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 710, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 24, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 729.

Council be on the basis of a two-thirds majority, with the unanimous votes of all permanent members, unless one of those was a party to the dispute in question. There does not appear to have been further discussion at that time.<sup>248</sup> Two days later, at the second meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, the question was brought up again. Cadogan restated the British position, claiming that it would make little practical difference in the functioning of the Council, but would nonetheless give more voice to the small powers. Gromyko demurred, saying that the Soviet delegation would prefer a simple majority, but would consider the matter further.<sup>249</sup> The following day, 25 August, at the fifth meeting of the JSC, the US announced that it agreed with the British proposal of a two-thirds majority for substantive decisions. Gromyko responded that he would report this to his government.<sup>250</sup>

However, the Soviets were highly displeased by this notion. Gromyko informed Stettinius on the 29<sup>th</sup> during a private talk that the USSR was “very discouraged” by the American reversal and that “He [Gromyko] was afraid that this would cause great difficulty with his government” and urged Stettinius to reconsider the American position, which he assured Gromyko he would.<sup>251</sup> Likewise at a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy on 5 September, Gromyko told Stettinius “I am ready to start to concede but I want you to know that we attach big [*sic*] importance to the voting procedure both on the majority and

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<sup>248</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 22, 1944, in *Ibid*, pp. 715-716.

<sup>249</sup> Informal Record of the Second Meeting of the General Organization Subcommittee, 24 August 1944, 10:50 a.m. to 12:10 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 130, Papka no. 13, p. 55, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 24, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 729.

<sup>250</sup> Informal Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 25 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 182, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 25, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 733.

<sup>251</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 748, Stettinius p. 115.

the matter of [when a permanent member was party to a] dispute.”<sup>252</sup> Both the Soviets and British remained firm during the eleventh meeting of the JSC on 7 September, and neither was willing to accept a proposed American compromise that decisions should be approved by seven of the Council’s eleven members.<sup>253</sup> The following day Stettinius indicated to Gromyko the American willingness to accept a simple majority, but since the British did not make the same concession, and the USSR remained unwilling to concede the closely related issue of veto use, this mediation had little effect.<sup>254</sup> By the time of the fourteenth meeting of the JSC on 13 September, even the British were willing to accept a simple majority voting procedure in the Council if the Soviets in turn would accept that a party to a dispute could not exercise a veto.<sup>255</sup> However, this proposal was patently unacceptable to the Soviet government, and so the issue was ultimately left unresolved at Dumbarton Oaks. Nonetheless, the Soviet firmness on a simple majority voting formula for the Council once again displayed their desire for an organization that was effective and would simultaneously enhance the power of the USSR.

The overall importance of simple majority voting within the Council was considerably less than the issue of unrestricted use of the veto for the permanent members, or as the Soviets preferred to frame the issue: the importance of unanimity in all cases. As the instructions to the Soviet delegation cited above illustrate, this privilege

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<sup>252</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Fourteenth day, Tuesday, September 5, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 769, Stettinius, p. 121.

<sup>253</sup> Informal Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 7 September 1944, 10:00 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 113, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 7, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 777.

<sup>254</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 8, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 783.

<sup>255</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 65, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 802.

was regarded as absolutely indispensable by the USSR, because it would both increase its power in general and, more importantly, would be the ultimate form of protection in a capitalist-dominated organization. The initial US proposals declared that “Provisions will need to be worked out with respect to the voting procedure in the event of a dispute in which one or more of the members of the council having continuing tenure are directly involved.”<sup>256</sup> The British were at the outset more resolutely opposed to the notion, stating simply “In any event, the votes of the parties to the dispute should not be taken into account.”<sup>257</sup> The Soviets, on the other hand, did not make any provision for a special procedure, and insisted that the concurrence of all permanent members of the Council was needed for Council decisions.<sup>258</sup>

These divergent views were first addressed at the sixth meeting of the JSC on 28 August. Stettinius stated that the “guilty” party should have no right to vote in a dispute, no matter who it was, and the British supported this notion. Gromyko responded that a special procedure was necessary if one of the great powers was a party to a dispute, as noted in the initial US outline. Gromyko expressed hope and expectation that such a special procedure had either been found by the USA, or that one of the governments would manage to do so before the end of the discussions.<sup>259</sup> Cadogan responded that

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<sup>256</sup> United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18, 1944, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 658.

<sup>257</sup> Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization, July 22, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 678.

<sup>258</sup> Memorandum on an International Security Organization, by the Soviet Union, Washington, 12 August 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 710.

<sup>259</sup> The Soviets never proposed such a special procedure, and it is unlikely that much effort was expended on finding one, as it was contrary to their desire for unrestricted veto power. The American delegation did not propose any potential special procedure during the Soviet phase of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, but later mentioned to the Chinese two possibilities that had been considered within the State Department but rejected. The first idea was for a formula whereby the Council might be authorized to request that a party to a dispute not vote. The second idea was that if a member of the Council was a party to a dispute, unanimity among the remaining Council members would be necessary before action could be taken. Neither of these ideas was considered to have much merit and they were not pursued seriously. Informal Minutes of Meeting

international acceptance of the new organization would be too difficult to obtain if the great powers could vote on issues to which they were a party, and some way must be found to reach agreement on this point. Gromyko countered that “large countries should have a special position consonant with their responsibilities” and therefore a special procedure was in order.<sup>260</sup> Pasvolsky responded that the US had given up trying to find a special procedure. Continuing, he added that since the US government would never use force unilaterally (ergo, they would never need to use their veto in a dispute to which they were a party), the Americans had no fear of accepting the “same plane” as other states.<sup>261</sup> Thus, the US reached the conclusion that it had little to fear from being limited in its use of the veto, and therefore it was best to strengthen the organization by restraining the great powers within it, though the Americans were still willing to consider any formula that the Soviets might offer. The Soviets, obviously much more concerned about the possibility of being in conflict with the rest of the Council, did not accept this position. Sobolev asked if it violated the principle that all decisions within the Council be taken jointly by the great powers. Pasvolsky answered that for the US government and the American people the principle of unanimity was not unlimited but had in fact two provisos, as decisions would not be taken jointly if a great power abstained from taking

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No. 2 [Anglo-American-Chinese Phase] of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 4 p.m., October 2, at Dumbarton Oaks, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 855.

<sup>260</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 162-163, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 740-741.

<sup>261</sup> Furthermore, “He [Pasvolsky, speaking for the US delegation] said that the American group had felt that if the United States were ever to conclude that it was not willing to listen to the Council in the event of a dispute in which it might be involved such a conclusion would be practically tantamount to a decision that the United States was ready to go to war with all the rest of the world.” Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 163, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 741.

part in a decision, or if they were a party to a dispute. Gromyko commented that this US proposal seemed to be a retreat from unanimity. The British and Americans argued that it was in the greater interest of justice, but, since a fundamental divergence of views was apparent, the issue was not discussed further at that time.<sup>262</sup>

That same evening Stettinius met with the President, who instructed him to tell Gromyko that the US would be consistent on this matter, and also to express hope that the Soviet government “would find it possible to agree with us.”<sup>263</sup> The following day Stettinius had the aforementioned private chat with Gromyko. In the course of their conversation, Gromyko, apparently not waiting for Stettinius to raise the issue, told him “that he [Gromyko] had a firm feeling which was also the official view of his [Gromyko’s] government that the unanimity of the four powers must be preserved and he hoped it would be possible for us [the US] to reconsider our position on this matter.”<sup>264</sup> Stettinius was equally firm, saying that the question had been considered thoroughly by the US, and that the President and Hull concurred that the new organization would not be accepted by the American public if a party to a dispute could vote on its own case. Gromyko’s response was that this would be a “point of actual disagreement but that perhaps we could find some general language to cover it so that it could be dealt with at a later date and that a definite position would not have to be arrived at during these conversations.” Stettinius maintained that the USSR’s position would be a great disappointment to the US government.<sup>265</sup> Thus it was clear from the first period of

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<sup>262</sup> Informal Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 28 August 1944, 11 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 163-165, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 11 a.m., August 28, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 741-742.

<sup>263</sup> Stettinius, p. 114

<sup>264</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 748, Stettinius, p. 115.

<sup>265</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 748, Stettinius, pp. 115-116.

discussion that neither side was willing to yield on this point. The Soviet insistence on veto power even if they were a party to a dispute would be a longstanding difficulty during the negotiations to create the new organization.

That evening, after the day's JSC meeting, Stettinius met with Gromyko and Cadogan for tea. During the course of this informal conversation, the Soviet Ambassador summarized what he thought were the important outstanding points: the two-thirds voting question, "the question of voting when a big power was involved in a dispute," the international air force, the economic and social council, and the military committee.<sup>266</sup> Cadogan and Stettinius both spoke "very frankly" to Gromyko on the issue of a party to a dispute voting, stressing that "among other things" such a procedure would be considered unacceptable by the smaller nations. However, Gromyko remained absolutely resolute, again illustrating the intransigence of the Soviet stance.<sup>267</sup>

The aforementioned memo from Litvinov to Molotov dated 1 September, advised holding fast on this point, and continuing to seek a special procedure.<sup>268</sup> Thus it is unsurprising that at the tenth JSC meeting on 4 September when Stettinius again raised the question and stressed its importance, Gromyko agreed that it was a priority, but that he had no proposal beyond his earlier recommendation that a special procedure would be

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<sup>266</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 750, Stettinius, p. 117. It is somewhat curious that the X-matter was not included in this list. The 'military committee' refers to what turned out to be only a minor issue, related to the primarily British concern over who would sit on the committee designated to advise the Council on military matters. The British position related to the concerns of Commonwealth states such as Canada that were reluctant to promise a military contribution to the new organization without a sufficient degree of consultation regarding its use. The point was essentially resolved by the Special Military Subcommittee on 30 August when it was agreed that the four principal powers would all be continuously represented on this advisory committee along with representatives of other states on a basis to be determined later. Thus, even on this minor issue the Soviets again displayed their view of the organization as militarily-oriented and great-power led. Cadogan, p. 660, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 30, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 754.

<sup>267</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventh day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 750, Stettinius, p. 117.

needed when a great power was a party to a dispute.<sup>269</sup> There is no clear indication why the Soviets now attached greater urgency to settling the matter at Dumbarton Oaks. At the eleventh meeting of the JSC on 7 September, the question was raised again, and again the Soviets proved obdurate.<sup>270</sup> That afternoon, in a private and informal meeting of Stettinius, Cadogan, and Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador said that he was ready to try to resolve all outstanding points. However, while Gromyko agreed on resolution during the current round of talks, the Ambassador also told Stettinius and Cadogan “I am 99% sure I could clean up everything except the voting procedure and this is a serious matter with us.”<sup>271</sup> Cadogan recorded that during that meeting “Ed [Stettinius] and I tried to hammer him [Gromyko] on the main point – the Great Power Veto. But he [Gromyko] was quite wooden on that.”<sup>272</sup> His intractability shows that this question was of cardinal importance to the USSR.

That evening, in an effort to break the impasse, FDR, acting on Hull’s advice, politely requested that Gromyko join him to discuss the matter personally. A meeting was arranged for the following morning, and a telegram to Stalin himself was also prepared.<sup>273</sup> During the meeting, after an initial exchange of pleasantries and discussion of military progress, Roosevelt stated that he believed that there was only one fundamental issue that remained unsolved, that of voting by a party to a dispute.

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<sup>268</sup> Draft of Directives to the Washington Delegation, Litvinov, 1 September 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 11.

<sup>269</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 5, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 766-767.

<sup>270</sup> Informal Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 7 September 1944, 10 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 114, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 7, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 777.

<sup>271</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Sixteenth day, Thursday, September 7, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 780, Stettinius pp. 128-129.

<sup>272</sup> Cadogan, p. 661.

<sup>273</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Sixteenth day, Thursday, September 7, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 780-782, Stettinius p. 129.

Gromyko concurred that all other questions seemed to be solvable.<sup>274</sup> FDR conceded that the US would accept a simple rather than two-thirds majority vote if it would allow the Soviets to concede the larger issue. The President then spent a great deal of time (what Stettinius called a “beautiful story”) outlining his view of the “American concept of fair play,” citing the example of frontier husbands and wives having been able to state their case when in a dispute, but not being allowed to vote on it.<sup>275</sup> The President emphasized how much difficulty he would face in the American Senate if a party to a dispute could vote, at the same time expressing confidence that if he got a concession on this issue, he would be able to overcome Congressional difficulties he might otherwise face regarding the immediate use of force by the organization. According to Stettinius’ diaries, “Gromyko did not seem at all depressed by what the President said. He [Gromyko] accepted the remarks gracefully, asked a number of questions about it, and discussed the way in which he could explain our position clearly to his people at home.”<sup>276</sup> Nevertheless, the Ambassador refused to yield, and when the President asked Gromyko if he thought that it would be helpful to send a message directly to Marshal Stalin, Gromyko replied that it would best be left to the Americans’ own judgment.<sup>277</sup>

Shortly thereafter, a private meeting of Gromyko, Stettinius, and Cadogan was held on the Soviet Ambassador’s initiative. While agreement on some minor points was reached during this discussion, including the Soviet acceptance of an economic and social council mentioned above, the main issues of membership in the organization and voting in the Council remained at an impasse.<sup>278</sup> The Soviets were desperate to protect their

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<sup>274</sup> Again, this shows how little attention was given to the X-matter at this time.

<sup>275</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 785-6, Stettinius pp. 130-131.

<sup>276</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 786, Stettinius p. 131.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Seventeenth day, Friday, September 8, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 787-788.

interests in the new organization.

Having failed to reach a solution, Roosevelt on 8 September sent a telegram to Stalin on this question, which outlined briefly the American position, saying that they and the British:

feel strongly that parties to a dispute should not vote in the decisions of the Council even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council... Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have never voted in their own case and I know that public opinion in the United States would neither understand nor support a plan of international organization in which this principle is violated... and I am entirely convinced that the smaller nations would find it difficult to accept... They would most certainly see in that an attempt on the part of the great powers to set themselves above the law. *Finally, I [Roosevelt] would have real trouble with the Senate* [italics in original]. For these reasons I hope you will find it possible to instruct your delegation to agree with our suggestion on voting. If this can be done the talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily concluded with complete and outstanding success.<sup>279</sup>

However, these pleas fell on deaf ears. At the fourteenth meeting of the JSC on 13 September, Gromyko announced that after consultation with Moscow, the Soviet position on the issue of voting in the Council remained unchanged. Stettinius asked if this was the final word of the Soviet government on the subject, and Gromyko replied that it was. Furthermore, Gromyko repeated that the British and American position represented a retreat from the principle of unanimity, which the Soviets considered to be a matter of “very greatest importance” from the outset of the endeavour to create a new international organization.<sup>280</sup> Stettinius responded by saying that it was a matter of “overriding importance” to the US, and that Gromyko’s view was “a great disappointment” and “a great blow” since Stettinius doubted that the US public, US

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<sup>279</sup> Butler, pp. 256-257..

<sup>280</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 59, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 798.

Senate, world public, or small nations would accept the notion that a party to a dispute could vote, and thus no general conference to create the new body could ever be held.<sup>281</sup> Gromyko retorted that the small nations desired to live in peace and security, which would require an effective security organization. Stettinius reiterated the American belief that they could not imagine needing to use the veto, and was then supported by Cadogan, who said that none of the British Dominions and probably few other small states would join if the Soviet proposal was accepted.

Stettinius then asked whether or not Stalin had replied to Roosevelt's telegram, and Gromyko said that he did not know, but when pressed, responded that he thought any reply would have come through the Embassy, so likely not.<sup>282</sup> Thus the deadlock remained. When asked again by Stettinius, Gromyko restated that this was the final position of the Soviet government, and that it was in accordance with the view expressed from the outset and often repeated that the Soviets saw the unanimity principle as absolutely indispensable. He reiterated his beliefs that the large countries needed special powers because of their special responsibilities for maintaining peace, and that the small countries would consent to these privileges of the great powers in order to achieve a viable security organization.<sup>283</sup> When the other delegations indicated that they did not know how to proceed given the impasse, Gromyko stated that he would be glad to meet at

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<sup>281</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 60, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 798.

<sup>282</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 60-61, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 798-799.

<sup>283</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 61, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of

any time the others saw fit, if they thought that further discussion would be beneficial, but both the American and British delegations were pessimistic.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that he felt it was not necessary to point out that the Soviet group had in the course of the conversations made a number of concessions, if the word “concessions” could appropriately be used in connection with conversations in which all are working toward common agreement. He said that on several matters of importance to it, the Soviet Government had made concessions because of its realization of the great importance of reaching agreement with the other groups.<sup>284</sup>

The flexibility on other questions again shows that this issue was of critical importance to the Soviets, as it was so closely tied to their view of the new organization, so they could not give ground on it. As well, Sobolev pointed out that thus far during the war decisions had been made on the basis of unanimity, and so he was confident that this practice would continue, and reiterated that this would be accepted by the smaller states. He followed with the vaguely threatening suggestion that if the British and Americans wished to abandon the principle of unanimity, it would represent a substantial change in relations among the Allies – in effect, implying that it could undermine the Grand Alliance.<sup>285</sup> Subsequently, Stettinius repeated to Gromyko that the US position was equally firm, as it was held strongly by Roosevelt, Hull, and the military Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cadogan added that Eden was firm on this point as well. Gromyko responded coolly, saying that he had kept his government aware of the British and American positions.<sup>286</sup> Recognizing the deadlock, the rest of the meeting was spent discussing how

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the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 799.

<sup>284</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 63, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 800-801.

<sup>285</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 63, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 801.

<sup>286</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 65, *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 802.

the plan for the new organization could be presented to the media with this vital component missing. It was agreed that none of the delegations would reveal this disagreement to the public, and that it would have to be settled before the general conference to found the new organization.<sup>287</sup>

The Kremlin continued to hold firm, as shown by Stalin's reply to FDR's telegram, dated 14 September. In this missive the Generalissimo shows clearly that the Soviets regarded veto power as an indispensable part of an organization wherein the great powers would act in concert to thwart any future breaches of the peace, and that the veto was also perceived to be necessary to protect Soviet prestige from unfair attack. In Stalin's words:

I must say that for the success of the activities of the international security organization of great significance will be the order of voting in the council, having in mind the importance that the council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the council, who have the statute [*sic* – 'status' in original Russian text] of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Tehran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, *the unanimity of agreement of four powers* [italics in original] necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future. Such a unanimity proposes [*sic* – 'presupposes' in original Russian text], of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which *often* [italics in original] hinder an actually objective attitude toward the USSR. And the other nations also should weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about. I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find

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<sup>287</sup> Informal Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 13 September 1944, 10:30 a.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, pp. 64-67, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 802-804.

a harmonious solution of this question as well.<sup>288</sup>

Thus the Soviets were motivated both by a desire to make the Council as powerful as possible and to protect themselves in a hostile international community. Certainly these fears were not groundless. For example, during the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, former US Ambassador to the USSR William C. Bullitt wrote an article in *Life* magazine, condemning the evil and atheistic USSR and urging war with them at the earliest opportunity. This article was noticed by the Soviet leaders who expressed considerable concern, and wondered how influential Bullitt was and how widespread his views were.<sup>289</sup>

On his own initiative, Stettinius had informally suggested a possible compromise to Gromyko on 14 September (before he had knowledge of Stalin's telegram), whereby a permanent member could exercise their veto to prevent "enforcement action" but not a "pacific settlement" of a dispute. This idea was not favourably received by the Soviet side, though Gromyko promised to report it to his government, and did so the same day.<sup>290</sup> This potential compromise went nowhere as Roosevelt opposed it when it was suggested to him. So too did Churchill, who argued that "this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations' meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us in some other point."<sup>291</sup> Thus, the point was somewhat moot when Gromyko informed Stettinius privately on 16 September that his government would not accept the

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<sup>288</sup> Butler, pp. 257-258, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 10:30 a.m., September 13, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 802-803, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 201.

<sup>289</sup> Bohlen, p. 160.

<sup>290</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Twenty-second day, Thursday, September 14, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 809, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 202.

<sup>291</sup> Churchill and Roosevelt were at this time meeting in Quebec for the Octagon Conference to discuss the various war-related issues. Telegram, President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Quebec, September 15, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 814.

amendment, and confirmed the same the following day, having received official instructions.<sup>292</sup> At the fifteenth meeting of the JSC on 17 September, Gromyko officially announced that the Soviet position on the voting issue remained unchanged, and could not be altered. Thus it was his “raw idea” to announce at the close of the conference that certain points remained in need of further consideration, without indicating that there was any actual disagreement.<sup>293</sup>

On the following day, in another informal meeting of the three delegation heads, Gromyko told Stettinius and Cadogan “the position of his [Gromyko’s] Government on this question is final and would not be changed regardless of whether the conversations were prolonged for a week or a year” and reiterated that they would not join an organization wherein a great power could not vote if they were involved in a dispute.<sup>294</sup> Gromyko told Stettinius that no compromise would be considered by the Soviet government, and that there was “no chance whatsoever” that would change as the organization would be fundamentally unviable if the unanimity of the great powers broke down.<sup>295</sup> This firmness illustrates the importance that the Soviet régime attached to the veto power. By the same token, the fact that Stalin regarded it as necessary to have this power in all cases, not only when military action was being considered, showed he was acutely aware of the USSR’s relative isolation, and fearful of being outvoted if it did not retain this prerogative. Notably, the following day (19 September) the Soviets dropped

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<sup>292</sup> Memoranda by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 7 and 8, 1944, in *Ibid.*, pp. 815-816.

<sup>293</sup> Informal Record of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 17 September 1944, 4:00 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 41, Informal Minutes of Meeting No. 15 of the Joint Steering Committee Held at 4:00 p.m., September 17, at Dumbarton Oaks in *FRUS 1944 V. I.*, p. 818, 820.

<sup>294</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 18, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I.*, p. 821, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 205.

<sup>295</sup> Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), Twenty-sixth day, Monday, September 18, 1944 in *FRUS 1944 V. I.*, p. 823, Gromyko, *Dumbarton-Okse*, p. 206, Stettinius, p. 139.

one of their primary demands – namely, that small states should be explicitly and specifically obliged to provide bases and transit facilities. The proposition would have extended Soviet and Council power, but was deemed less crucial than the question of voting in the Council.<sup>296</sup>

Also on 19 September, Ambassador Harriman sent a very perceptive telegram from Moscow attempting to explain the Soviet firmness on this issue to his government. First of all, he noted that the uncompromising line taken by Stalin in his telegram was shared by Molotov. He went on to explain that the Soviets regarded it as their right to take whatever action they felt necessary with regard to their neighbours. As evidence, Harriman cited several examples of the Soviet expectation of a ‘free hand’ on their borders, such as Litvinov’s statements that Polish interests would have to give way if in conflict with Russian interests, the Soviet refusal to allow observers to study the Soviet zone of occupation in northern Iran, and other actions taken unilaterally with regard to Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and China. Harriman went on to write that:

I believe we have thus sufficient evidence to foresee that... [if given the power to do so] the Soviet Government will ruthlessly block consideration by the Council of any question in which it considers its interests affected and will insist that the matter be settled by the Soviet Union within the other country or countries involved particularly any disputes with their neighbours... Stalin and his principal advisers place the highest importance on the association of the Soviet Union in a major way with the three great powers in world affairs but have expected that their political and military strength would enable them to dictate the conditions. There is no doubt the Russian people crave peace and have been led to believe that the intimate relationship developed during the war with the British and ourselves will continue after the war and will be a guarantee of lasting peace... [but the Soviet government will at the same time be] unwilling to give up [the] right of independent action where Russian’s [*sic*] interests are affected and to see Russia depend solely on an untried world organization with

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<sup>296</sup> Informal Record of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Washington Conversations, 19 September 1944, 4:30 p.m., Dumbarton Oaks in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 126, Papka no. 11, p. 26, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 19, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, p. 826.

associates none of whom do they fully trust. As Stalin traditionally likes to have two strings in his bow, it has not appeared to him inconsistent to pursue these two methods at the same time to obtain security for the Soviet Union and to advance its national interests as he sees them.<sup>297</sup>

This missive accurately describes the Soviet attitude towards the new organization, as Soviet behaviour at Dumbarton Oaks and afterwards would demonstrate.

In the course of discussions over the next two days the Soviet position emerged in greater detail. The Soviets expected power to exercise their veto on the question of whether or not a dispute could even be considered in the Council.<sup>298</sup> This stance again illustrates Soviet sensitivity to the possibility that the new organization could be used as a forum for criticizing and embarrassing the Soviet Union, even if action contrary to Soviet interests could be blocked.

Like Harriman, Churchill also perceived the importance of this issue to the Soviets, and in fact reversed the British position. In a telegram to Roosevelt on 25 September, the Prime Minister told the President:

At first I thought Russian attitude absurd and their contention one not to be conceded by other great Powers and inevitably to be turned down by smaller Powers also. But second thoughts have tended the other way. I assume that the Russian attitude is sincerely stated by Mr. Molotov and correctly interpreted by [His Majesty's Embassy in] Moscow and Cadogan as one involving honour and standing of Russia amongst her Allies. She asks whether she is trusted and treated as an equal or is still an outlaw and Pariah... If a World Organisation is formed with Russia out of it she will become the power centre of another group and we shall be heading for World War 3. If no such organisation [as that proposed by Roosevelt] is formed by the United Nations [military grouping] they will stand stultified before history... In view of these dangers smaller Powers should be prepared to make concessions to Russian's [*sic*] *amour propre* and should not on this matter insist on theoretical equality of status... On merits there is much to be said for unanimity amongst the Great Powers at least for

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<sup>297</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 19, 1944, in *FRUS 1944 V. I*, pp. 826-828.

<sup>298</sup> Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 21, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 835.

the year [years?] immediately following on this War.<sup>299</sup>

Thus Churchill recognized some of the reasons why the USSR felt it necessary to hold onto veto power in the new organization.

Since the Soviets refused to modify their stance on this issue, which they saw as fundamental to their view of the organization, the question remained unresolved at the end of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. It was thus agreed by both the Americans and the Soviets to discuss the issue at a higher political level, possibly by the chiefs of state themselves.<sup>300</sup> *The Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization*, which was the 7 October public release of the agreements reached during the discussions, simply included a bracketed note that “The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.”<sup>301</sup> This key issue and the X-matter (the other major issue left unresolved), were in fact addressed by Roosevelt and Stalin during the Yalta Conference, at which time they were able to break the impasse.

In summary, the Dumbarton Oaks conversations are illustrative of both the importance the USSR attached to the new international security organization, and the Soviet vision of the form that the organization should take. The Soviet platforms on diverse issues including its scope, its name, the powers and membership of the Secretariat, Assembly, and Council, the military forces available to the organization, and most crucially of all, the voting procedures within the Council, were all united by a common attitude towards the new body. The USSR was clearly hoping that the UN organization would provide an effective means of preserving both world peace and close collaboration with its co-victors, the Americans and British, by focusing the organization

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<sup>299</sup>Telegram, The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt, London, September 25, 1944, in *Ibid*, pp. 836-837.

<sup>300</sup>Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Leo Pasvolksy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 28, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 847. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 21, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 883.

on narrowly-defined security threats, ensuring that it would be able to act rapidly, and promoting the power of the Council wherein the USSR had much greater likelihood of being influential, while still looking for other means to expand Soviet power where possible, and retaining veto power to protect Soviet interests.

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<sup>301</sup>Press Release Issued by the Department of State, October 9, 1944, including Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, in *Ibid*, p. 894.

#### Chapter Four – Developments in the Creation of the UN at the Yalta Conference

While agreement on a number of issues was reached at Dumbarton Oaks, several key issues remained unresolved, most notably the voting procedure within the Council, and the possible inclusion of the Soviet constituent republics as initial members of the organization (referred to as the 'X-matter'). Less weighty but still significant questions remained as well, such as the inclusion of the associated powers as initial members, and the matter of international trusteeships.<sup>1</sup> All sides recognized the importance of settling these outstanding questions before the other nations of the world could be invited to a general conference. Thus, the international organization was among the most important of the issues addressed when Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill met to discuss the war and the postwar world for the second time, from 4 to 11 February 1945 at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference.<sup>2</sup> These discussions dealt with the remaining issues, and laid the foundation for the general conference to follow. At Yalta, the Soviets were essentially successful in protecting what they saw as their most vital interests regarding the new organization, and so the conference could be considered a success from that narrow standpoint. However, the general conference held a few months later in San Francisco would reveal that the apparent victories won at Yalta were not effective in establishing the new organization as a vehicle for great power cooperation and increasing Soviet influence, thus the apparent gains proved illusory.

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<sup>1</sup> A memorandum prepared for Roosevelt dated 15 November 1944 also listed a few other unresolved issues, such as the location of the organization's future offices, the statute for founding the international court, and the procedure for terminating the League of Nations. However, none of these issues shed any particular light on Soviet attitudes towards the organization or the Allies, and so fall outside the scope of this study. Memorandum, the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President, Washington, November 15, 1944, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), 49.

<sup>2</sup> Other key matters discussed at Yalta included the treatment of Germany after the completion of the war in the European theatre, the Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific theatre, and the status of Poland. Furthermore, a few months previously, Churchill and Stalin had met for the second

Though the difficulties in Soviet-American relations outlined in the previous chapter continued to gradually undermine inter-Allied relations, the Soviets remained oriented toward maintaining a friendly and cooperative relationship with the USA and Britain after the end of the war. In his speech marking the celebration of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin made what Vojtech Mastny called “his most eloquent public homage ever to the alliance.”<sup>3</sup> The Soviet leader declared his praise for the Allies, and while he noted that there were differences in opinion among them, they did not affect their friendship and commitment to future cooperation through the international security organization. In Stalin’s words:

Just as vivid an indication [as the Teheran Conference] of the stability of the front of the United Nations is to be seen in the decisions of the conference at Dumbarton Oaks on the question of organizing security after the war. There is talk of differences between the three Powers on some questions of security. There are differences, of course, and they will still arise on a number of other questions... The surprising thing is not that differences exist but that they are so few, and that as a rule they are settled almost always in a spirit of unity and co-ordination of action by the three Great Powers. What matters is not that there are differences, but that the differences do not go beyond the bounds of what is tolerable in the interests of unity of the three Great Powers, and that in the long run they are settled as the interests of that unity require... The same can be said of the differences at the Dumbarton Oaks conference. What was characteristic at that conference was not that some differences were revealed there, but that nine-tenths of the questions of security were settled at that conference in a spirit of complete unanimity. That is why I think that the decisions of the Dumbarton Oaks conference should be regarded as one of the vivid indications of the stability of the front of the anti-German coalition...<sup>4</sup>

After praising the progress made at Dumbarton Oaks in this manner, the Soviet leader went on to express his belief in the importance of maintaining security in the postwar world through amicable relations with the principal Allies and a new international

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time in Moscow without Roosevelt. However, the new international security organization was not a topic of discussion there.

<sup>3</sup> Mastny, p. 233.

organization dedicated to that purpose:

the foundation for the alliance of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the U.S.A. lies not in chance and passing considerations, but in vitally important and long-term interests... The war with Germany will be won by the United Nations; of this there can no longer be any doubt... The problem is not only to win the war, but to make impossible the outbreak of new aggression and a new war – if not for ever, then at all events for a very long period... And so, what means are there to avert a new aggression on the part of Germany and, if war nevertheless arises, to stifle it at the very beginning and prevent it from developing into a great war? For this purpose, apart from the complete disarmament of the aggressor nations, only one means exists – to set up a special organization for the defence of peace and the safeguarding of security, composed of representatives of the peaceable nations: to place at the disposal of the controlling body of that organization the minimum quantity of armed forces essential and requisite for averting aggression: and to oblige that organization in case of necessity to make use of those armed forces without delay, to avert or liquidate aggression and to punish those guilty of aggression. This must not be a repetition of the League of Nations of melancholy memory, which had neither the rights nor the means for averting aggression. It will be a new, special international organization with full powers, having at its disposal all that is necessary to defend peace and avert a new aggression. Can one reckon upon the actions of such an international organization proving sufficiently effective? *They will be effective if the Great Powers, who have borne on their shoulders the main burden of the war against Hitlerite Germany, will continue to act in the future in a spirit of unanimity and agreement. They will not be effective if this essential condition is infringed* [my italics].<sup>5</sup>

The Soviet leader was clearly still oriented towards cooperation with the Western Allies after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, while at the same time elucidating what he regarded as the key functions of the new organization, and positioning the USSR for future negotiations on the new body.

Nonetheless, several issues remained unsettled after the Dumbarton Oaks discussions.<sup>6</sup> In the period before the start of the Yalta Conference, the Soviets

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War, Volume II* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1946), pp. 30-31.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

<sup>6</sup> The second phase of the Dumbarton Oaks talks, wherein the British and Americans discussed the agreements reached and outstanding issues with the Chinese, lasted from 29 September until 7 October. The Chinese delegation had been kept briefed throughout the Soviet phase of the talks, and the Chinese understood that the Americans and British would not willingly re-open

continued to study these outstanding questions. A People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs document, prepared for Molotov and dated 1 November, addressed the issue of membership. It pointed out first of all that several states maintained an "openly hostile" stance towards the USSR, that these states could constitute an antagonistic bloc within the Assembly, which would be able to defeat reasonable proposals put forward by the Soviet representatives.<sup>7</sup> It was also noted that the organization would accept many colonies, such as India, which were expected to vote in the best interests of the mother country. Thus, it was advised that the Soviet Union take the stance that the new organization should not accept members which did not have normal relations with all of the great powers. Furthermore, though it was noted that a specific, positive-sounding formula had not been found, it was suggested that in principle colonies should not be accepted. The memo went on to state that the case of India was a delicate one, but precisely because of this fact, the Soviets should use it to press for some significant compensation in return for support for India's membership.<sup>8</sup> Though these suggestions were not pressed vigorously during the Crimea Conference, the goal to deny membership to potentially hostile states proved to be an enduring one for the Soviets both at Yalta and even more so later at San Francisco. By the same token, the Soviet leaders' preoccupation with isolation within the new organization influenced their attitudes towards it in a number of ways.

The issue that received most attention was the question of voting in the Security

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agreements which had been reached with the Soviets through considerable effort. Therefore, there were no substantive changes to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in the second phase of talks, hence they are of little relevance to this study. Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 156.

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum from S. Lozovski to V.M. Molotov, General Questions Regarding the International Security Organization, 1 November 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 17. These were listed as Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, ending with an 'etc.'

Council. The Soviets wished to have a completely unrestricted right to exercise veto power, though both the Americans and British had strongly opposed this notion at Dumbarton Oaks and afterwards. Essentially, the Soviet authorities wished to be able to veto not only any action taken by the organization, even if they were a party to the dispute in question, but also any discussion of an issue, as they were wary of providing a forum for capitalist states to heap abuse on the USSR.<sup>9</sup> At Dumbarton Oaks the US had explored an informal idea for a compromise, whereby the great powers would not vote on measures to resolve peacefully a dispute to which they were a party, but would retain the right to veto any enforcement action. Though this idea initially received a chilly reception from Roosevelt, Churchill, and Gromyko, the US State Department remained attached to this concept as a means of breaking the deadlock, despite FDR's initial misgivings. Thus, a few weeks after the end of the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, a more detailed form of this compromise was designated by Roosevelt as the official US position on 15 November.<sup>10</sup> The Americans communicated their compromise formula to Ambassador Harriman on 5 December 1944, with specific instructions to pass it along to Stalin in person.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviets gave this proposal very detailed attention after the meeting took

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<sup>8</sup> The reason why the situation of India was 'delicate' was not made explicit, but presumably its size and strong desire for self-rule made it difficult to exclude from the organization, though since it was still formally a colony its membership was problematic in principle. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>9</sup> This desire to block even discussion was strongly opposed by both the US and UK. For example, in late November prominent British diplomat Gladwyn Jebb had met with Sobolev and reiterated the British position that a veto on discussion was impermissible. Lord Gladwyn Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 150-151.

<sup>10</sup> Roosevelt said he reversed his position on the compromise because he realized that the American public would never accept the possibility of being unable to exercise veto power on a dispute in which American interests were concerned. Thus, Roosevelt's eventual analysis did not differ drastically from Stalin's – namely, that the veto was a necessary fail-safe to protect his country's vital interests. The American acceptance of some limitations on veto power can be attributed to their expectation that they would rarely if ever not be in agreement with the majority – an expectation that Stalin did not share. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky), Washington, November 15 1944, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 56.

place on 14 December, though they continued to oppose it and remained unwilling to accept any limitations whatsoever on veto power. On 18 December, in a memo to Molotov, Litvinov noted that there appeared to be a drafting error in the message (regarding the possible use of regional organizations to seek a peaceful resolution to a dispute) and this question was one of many addressed to the American Embassy about the proposal.<sup>12</sup> Litvinov had remained very interested in the idea of regional organizations, which was likely a factor in these inquiries. This was illustrated by an article he wrote under the pseudonym N. Malinin which appeared in the journal *Voina i rabochii klass* in the same month. In the article, Litvinov dismissed the idea of 'spheres of influence' but called for similar-sounding 'security zones,' which would involve mutually beneficial agreements between small states and great powers.<sup>13</sup> A principal element of these 'security zones' was that a great power would have the guaranteed right to representation if its interests were involved. Thus, they could not be used as a starting point to create a regional organization that could later be turned against the USSR. Nevertheless, as in the past, the idea was not pursued by the Soviet government, as it appears to have been primarily a defensive measure, in order to counter any proposals for regional sub-organizations within the general security organization.<sup>14</sup> As outlined in Chapter Three, this notion was feared by the USSR, but was never pursued by the British or Americans. Thus, when the latter did not push for regional organizations, Litvinov's idea became moot, while the USSR remained wedded to the idea that the new organization should be

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<sup>11</sup> Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Washington, December 5, 1944, in *Ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>12</sup>Memorandum, M.M. Litvinov to V.M. Molotov, Regarding Message to President Roosevelt from Comrade Stalin, 18 December 1944, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 22, Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, 19 December 1944 11 a.m., in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>13</sup> Cited in Mastny, pp. 231-232.

<sup>14</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, 10 January 1945, 1 p.m., in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 451.

based on the great powers collectively exercising hegemony over the world in matters of peace and international security.

After considerable study and careful drafting, Stalin sent a personal reply to Roosevelt on 27 December. As late as 26 December, Molotov had consulted Harriman in order to understand the US proposal better.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet leader's response again indicated the importance the USSR attached to the unanimity principle. After acknowledging the importance of solving the voting dispute and a few other minor points, the Soviet leader's response read:

I have to remind you that in the original American draft was specially marked the necessity to work out special rules in regard to the procedure of voting in case of a dispute which involves directly one or [misprinted in Butler as 'of'] several permanent members of the Council. In the British draft it is also stated that the general order of settlement of disputes between great powers, should such disputes arise, may prove unfit...

I have, to my regret, to inform you that with the proposed by you wording of this point [regarding the American proposed compromise on voting in the Security Council] I see no possibility of agreeing. As you yourself admit the principle of unanimity of permanent members is necessary in all decisions of the Council in regard to determination of a threat to peace as well as in respect to measures of elimination of such a threat or for suppression of aggression or other violations of peace. Undoubtedly, that when decisions on questions of such a nature are made there must be full agreement of powers which are permanent members of the Council bearing upon themselves the main responsibility for maintenance of peace and security.

It goes without saying that the attempt to prevent, at a certain stage, one or several permanent members of the Council from participating in voting on said questions, and theoretically it is possible to assume also a case when the majority of the permanent members will find themselves prevented from participating in making decisions on a question, can have fatal consequences for the cause of preservation of international security. Such a situation is in contradiction with the principle of agreement and unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and *can lead to a situation when some great powers are put in opposition to other great powers* [italics indicate revisions made in Stalin's hand] and this may undermine the cause of universal security. *In prevention of this small countries are*

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<sup>15</sup> Memorandum, From the Embassy of the USA to Comrade V.M. Molotov, 26 December 1994, in AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, p. 107.

*interested not less than great powers since a split among great powers, united for tasks of maintenance of peace and security for all peace-loving countries, is pregnant with the most dangerous consequences for all these nations.*

Therefore I have to insist on our former position on the question of voting in the Security Council. This position, as it seems to me, will provide the new International Organization with the unanimity of four powers, *contributing to avoiding of attempts to put certain powers in opposition to other great powers* which (unanimity) is necessary for their *joint* fight against aggression in the future. Naturally, such a situation would secure the interests of small nations in the cause of preservation of their security and would correspond to the interests of universal peace.

I hope that you will estimate the importance of the above-stated view in favor of the principle of unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and that we shall find an agreed upon decision of this question as well as certain other questions which remain still unsolved.<sup>16</sup>

Thus the Soviet leader demonstrated both the importance that he attached to unrestricted veto power, and his understanding that the great powers would continue to act in concert to preserve international peace and security after the war.

An examination of prior drafts from the Soviet archives adds to our understanding of the Soviet position. A draft of the reply was sent to Stalin by Deputy Foreign Affairs Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky on 22 December, and the annotations made by the Soviet leader in red coloured pencil reveal which points he deemed necessary to emphasize or add. Firstly, as indicated in the quotation above, he underlined the words “in the original American [draft]” and “In the British draft it is also” indicating that he remained closely tied to the conception of the organization as it was originally presented, and opposed the creeping changes that had arisen in the American and British thinking. He also may have considered drawing attention to this fact as a useful

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<sup>16</sup> Butler, pp. 279-280, Telegram, Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt, 27 December 1944, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 63-64. While I did not obtain a copy of the final form of the message from the archives, two Soviet drafts and FRUS attest that the word ‘of’ in Butler should be ‘or’ and was misprinted in Butler. Memorandum for Comrade Stalin, Draft Reply to President Roosevelt, 23 December 1944, in, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov’s Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, pp. 22-26, Memorandum from A. Vyshinsky for Comrade Stalin, Draft Reply

negotiating point.<sup>17</sup> The leader's notations also stressed the importance of the issue of voting in the Council, as could be expected, and the importance of the unanimity principle not just on action, but also on determining which issues required the Council's attention. Stalin also underlined the importance of maintaining the former Soviet position and finding a resolution to the issue.<sup>18</sup>

The additions made by the leader to the draft are similarly revealing. They seem primarily directed to providing reasoning to support the Soviet stance. Just as Stalin's speech outlined above, his revisions indicate that cooperation was, in the Soviet view, the key to preserving international peace through the new organization. It showed the Soviet position that full veto power was considered vital in order for the organization to operate effectively, since if it took a stance contrary to wishes of all of the great powers, a decision made by the Council could split the organization. Furthermore, they reiterate the position taken at Dumbarton Oaks that an effective international organization is in the best interests of small states, even if they may appear to be disadvantaged by the powers given to the Council.<sup>19</sup>

Harriman attempted to explain the Soviet response to his superiors the following day. His analysis corresponds well to the actual behaviour of the Soviet Union on the voting issue. The American Ambassador cited a number of reasons for the Soviet firmness:

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to President Roosevelt, 22 December 1944, in, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, pp. 108-110.

<sup>17</sup> It is curious to note that the line referring to the original American proposal was absent from a draft submitted by Molotov the following day, though it was included again in the final message. The other suggested changes to the draft of 22 December were all included. Memorandum from A. Vyshinsky for Comrade Stalin, Draft Reply to President Roosevelt, 22 December 1944, in, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, p. 25, Memorandum for Comrade Stalin, Draft Reply to President Roosevelt, 23 December 1944, in, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 138, Papka no. 13, pp. 109-110.

<sup>18</sup> Memorandum from A. Vyshinsky for Comrade Stalin, Draft Reply to President Roosevelt, 22 December 1944, in, AVPRF, Fond of Molotov's Secretariat, Opis no. 6, Pora no. 137, Papka no. 13, pp. 25-26.

One. On analyzing reactions of the Soviets, one must bear in mind that since the revolution the nations of the world have been hostile to or suspicious of them and their objectives. *Although the Russians realize that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most of the nations toward them. Thus they lack confidence that the members of the council would be impartial in dealing with disputes in which the Soviet Government might be involved* [my italics].

Two. The Soviets have definite objectives in their future foreign policy, all of which we do not as yet fully understand. For example, while they have recognized the right of the states bordering the Soviet Union to have their independence, they insist upon 'friendly' governments. From Soviet actions so far, the terms "friendly" and "independent" appear to mean something different from our interpretation. It is interesting to note that in Iran they appear to justify their recent actions [to be discussed in Chapter six] by explaining that they know better what the Iranian people want than the Iranian government, which does not represent the majority of Iranian opinion. Any political figure, in Iran and elsewhere, who disagrees with Soviet policies is conveniently branded as a "Fascist". The same sort of thing can be said about the Polish situation. It would seem probable that the Russians are as conscious as we are of the difference of interpretation of terms and concepts. *They thus probably come to the conclusion that if their actions are subjected to scrutiny by the representatives of nations with different concepts, their actions and objectives will in all probability be condemned and they will therefore be subjected to public criticism supported by the world's highest authority* [my italics].

Three. It would appear that they look upon the international security organization as a method by which the Soviet Union can be protected against aggressor nations, but it seems doubtful whether they believe that it can be useful to them in settling disputes between them and other countries through mediatory or judicial processes. *The court, they believe, is packed against them* [my italics]. They appear, therefore, to be insisting upon the right of unilateral action in settling disputes of this character.

Four. I fear that we are faced with a very fundamental question of what the effect on the international security organization will be with most of the nations looking to it to develop mediatory or judicial procedures in the advancement of international relations, *whereas the Soviet Union appears to view it from a much narrower perspective* [my italics].<sup>20</sup>

Harriman concluded by arguing that the Soviet stance was adamant and the only chance to alter it would be if the Americans and British took an equally hard line. The American

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.

Ambassador's examination of the USSR's position on the issue of voting in the Security Council thus reaches the same broad conclusions as this study, namely that the USSR sought to use the UN as a means to strengthen its security position by finding a framework to cooperate with the other victorious powers, while still seeking to enhance unilaterally its own interests in an international arena assumed to be largely hostile.

The issue of Council voting was discussed further by the US and Soviet governments in the lead up to the conference, though with little progress. On 11 January, Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, who had been a prominent member of the American Dumbarton Oaks delegation, met with Soviet Ambassador Gromyko in Washington to discuss the question. Gromyko asserted and defended the Soviet position in the same ways as before, stressing the importance of complete unity among the great powers and the avoidance of even the appearance of disagreement. Having taken part in several top-level discussions, Pasvolsky summed up the many issues on which a party to a dispute could exercise its veto under the American proposal:

decisions relating to admission, suspension, and expulsion of members; restoration of privileges of suspended members; determination of a threat to the peace or breaches of the peace; the taking of measures to maintain or restore the peace; approval of special agreements for the provision of armed forces and all matters relating to regulation of armaments.<sup>21</sup>

He went on to say that given the immense powers that would be concentrated in the hands of the permanent members, a few concessions would ensure acceptance of the new organization by small states.

Gromyko predictably responded that the small states' greatest interest was in an effective organization, which in turn required strict adherence to the unanimity principle.

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<sup>20</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President, Moscow, December 28, 1944, 5 p.m., in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 65.

<sup>21</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky), Washington, January 11, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 69.

The Soviet Ambassador went on to contend that any cleavage of opinion between the great powers impaired the crucial principle of unity. Furthermore, Gromyko suggested that the US was overemphasizing moral and juridical concerns, “and paying too little attention to the political side of the question.”<sup>22</sup> Pasvolsky argued at length that while political questions were important, it was chimerical to suggest that disagreement could be precluded even with full use of the veto power. The only way that could be prevented would be if the President of the Council had the authority to decide whether or not there would be great power unanimity before an issue could be discussed, and neither the US nor the USSR would support placing such power in the hands of the Council President. Gromyko conceded that the President of the Council should not be given such authority but resolutely maintained that the “unrealistic” wish of the small powers (that parties to a dispute could not freely exercise their veto in all circumstances) cast aspersions on the trustworthiness of the great powers, thus increasing suspicions and discrediting the entire organization. Pasvolsky responded by saying that suspicion was more likely to result if the great powers were above public scrutiny, and that he considered this to be a valid concern of the small nations and the American public. Here again we see the Soviet expectation that the new organization’s membership would be biased against the USSR, while the Americans had fewer reservations about being judged by the majority of the membership.

Uncharacteristically, Gromyko responded by informally raising an idea which he said occurred to him during the course of the discussion, that perhaps a procedure could be found wherein any issue could be freely discussed in the Council, though full unanimity would be necessary in order to reach an official decision. Pasvolsky admitted that this idea had merit, but still suggested that it “go one step further” in the manner of

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 70.

the American proposal as it was impossible to avoid registering some disagreement. Gromyko's response was cautious, and he said simply that the idea would require further consideration.<sup>23</sup> Thus the Soviet stance on the issue of voting in the Council was firm at that time, although it they had not fully explored all of the ramifications of their stance, and thus were perhaps willing to modify it. Nonetheless, Stalin still considered the absolute protection for Soviet interests provided by full veto power to be vital.

Shortly before ending the meeting, Gromyko also inquired whether or not the US had given further thought to the inclusion of the sixteen Soviet constituent republics. He repeated the Soviet stance that they were more important than many states, such as Guatemala and Liberia. He also pointed out that they had their own constitutions, and, somewhat dubiously, that the republics dealt independently with their own foreign affairs, despite their intimate federal ties. Pasvolsky suggested that the issue be put off until the upcoming conference, and Gromyko seemed satisfied to have stated for the record that the Soviet government still saw the matter as "extremely important."<sup>24</sup> Clearly the Soviets still hoped for American acceptance of their position on that highly controversial issue. Pasvolsky also observed that the conversation was "extremely friendly" and concluded by noting that Gromyko expressed interest in pursuing the discussions further at a later date.<sup>25</sup> This reinforces the impression that the overall Soviet attitude to the new organization was positive.

Gromyko and Pasvolsky met again on 13 January, at the Ambassador's request, since he wanted to clarify a number of points before his upcoming departure for consultations in Moscow. Once again they discussed the Council voting issue, although Pasvolsky's record indicates that no new ground was covered, and that Gromyko seemed

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 70-72.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 73.

to be firming up his understanding before his return. They spent more time on other issues at this meeting. First of all, Gromyko indicated that he did not expect that the International Court of Justice would prove to be a difficult issue on which to reach an agreement, and it never did prove to be a major point of contention during the negotiations.<sup>26</sup>

A second question, which received more detailed attention, was that of international trusteeships for dependent territories. Gromyko indicated, as Sobolev had at Dumbarton Oaks, that the Soviet government was very interested, but lacked experience on such matters and therefore sought American guidance as to the problems involved. Pasvolsky outlined some of these briefly, stressing the importance of preparing these areas for independence. Gromyko asked whether the issue would be addressed at the founding conference for the international organization, and Pasvolsky responded that international trusteeships under the UN would be discussed, but other colonial issues would not be pursued in detail. Perhaps fearing that the Soviet Union would be excluded from these discussions, Gromyko then inquired whether these questions would be addressed by the colonial powers only or also other important powers. The Ambassador continued, attempting to ensure that Soviet interests in this matter would be addressed, by suggesting that the issue should be dealt with by the new international organization, since he claimed that it could easily come up in the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly anyway. Pasvolsky acknowledged the likelihood of these possibilities. Gromyko maintained that the Charter of the new organization should include some type of trusteeship arrangement, since as a victorious power the Soviet Union expected to have responsibility with regard to Italian colonies, and possibly in the future colonies to be detached from Japan. He asked if the Americans had any

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<sup>26</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky),

arrangements with the British or any other countries in this regard. Pasvolsky told him that the US had tentative plans to exchange documents with the British on the subject, and that they also planned to make American documents available to the USSR. Gromyko evidently wished to ensure that the British and Americans were not collaborating against the USSR, while at the same time introducing the notion that the Soviet government would be seeking a significant role in any new trusteeship system.<sup>27</sup> His comments were consistent with the Soviet stance on the issue, and broader attitude towards the new organization.

Later in the conversation, Gromyko repeated the Soviet position that the Soviet republics should be included as initial members of the organization, while the associated nations who had not taken an active stance during the war and the neutrals should not be invited. Pasvolsky did not argue the point, but Gromyko's raising of it again reveals the Soviet desire to tie membership to wartime participation on the Allied side.<sup>28</sup> The same criterion was applied to the next question raised, namely where the seat of the new organization would be located. The issue had only been touched upon briefly at Dumbarton Oaks. Gromyko expressed his disdain for Switzerland, saying that a neutral state should be ineligible to be the home of the United Nations Organization.<sup>29</sup> This focus on wartime performance proved it to a recurring theme for the Soviets throughout the discussions and conferences related to the UN's founding. Acceptance of this principle by other states was expected to bolster Soviet influence because of the Red Army's outstanding achievements against the Wehrmacht, and indirectly by limiting the number and power of small capitalist states which were presumed to be anti-Soviet.

The final point addressed was the Soviet response to several proposals put forth

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Washington, January 13, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 74.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 75.

by a number of Latin American governments relating to the new organization. Gromyko maintained that power should be concentrated in the Council, not the Assembly or the International Court. Pasvolsky reassured him that the US would not support the strengthening of one of the other bodies at the expense of the Council. Several Latin American states had voiced opposition to the use of veto power by a great power which was a party to the dispute in question. Gromyko continued to dismiss such a position as “unrealistic.” Just before concluding the meeting, Gromyko asked if the Americans could provide the Soviet government with their analysis of the functions of the Council from the point of view of the proposed compromise. Pasvolsky replied by saying that he would be glad to record on paper the relevant points which had been discussed. Once again, Pasvolsky noted that the meeting had been friendly, with Gromyko expressing satisfaction with the information and improved understanding gained.<sup>30</sup> Thus, though discussions continued, the Soviet stance towards the new organization remained fixed.

Gromyko’s request for the American analysis of the proposed voting formula was provided on 15 January. The list of questions to which the veto power would apply was the same as those mentioned by Pasvolsky to Gromyko on 11 January, with a few additions. As well as those situations mentioned above, full unanimity would also be required for the election of the Secretary-General, agreements not only for the provision of armed forces but also for the provision of facilities, whether or not regional agencies or organizations were consistent with the principles and purposes of the general organization, and likewise if those agencies or organizations should be authorized to take measures to enforce the peace.<sup>31</sup> Thus, the Soviets would be able to exercise their veto power on most organizational issues, and, crucially, what military or other coercive

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.

action should be taken in a dispute, as well as the creation of regional sub-organizations. This formula gave the permanent members of the Council tremendous power, and seemed to ensure that the organization could not block the Soviet pursuit of perceived vital interests.

However, these extensive powers still failed to assuage the Soviet sense of vulnerability and expectation that they would be frequently subjected to criticism and hostile treatment from a prejudiced capitalist world. A party to a dispute would not be able to exercise veto power in cases related to:

III Promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, including the following questions:

1. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
2. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
3. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;
4. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
5. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, there would still be many ways in which the Council could express an official opinion explicitly or implicitly critical of the USSR. Thus, the Soviet side remained concerned that its interests and prestige could be attacked from a very high authority. It is worth bearing in mind that Marxist-Leninist ideology and, as Harriman mentions in the memo cited above, Soviet perceptions of post-revolutionary history, left the Soviet régime with a strong sense that its positions would not be treated impartially or fairly, since 'the court was stacked against them' as Harriman had put it.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Briefing Book Paper, Principal Substantive Decisions on Which the Security Council Would Have to Vote, 15, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 89.

<sup>33</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President, Moscow, December 28, 1944, 5 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 65.

Gromyko's inquiries were primarily exploratory, and little progress was made on either of these issues until they were addressed during the Crimea Conference. In the time leading up to the summit, tensions between the Soviets and the Americans, while still muted, were nevertheless building. Most notably, despite Roosevelt's urgings in a personal message to Stalin dated 16 December not to take action on the issue until after the planned upcoming meeting, the Soviet government announced its recognition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin Committee) on 4 January 1945.<sup>34</sup> Also, Major General John R. Deane, Commanding General of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union, wrote a message on 2 December 1944 to the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General George C. Marshall, in which he complained of a lack of appreciation and corresponding friendliness from the Soviets for the war materiel provided by the US. Deane contended that while the US should continue to support the Soviet war effort in any way that would contribute to the final victory, the US would not obtain anything in return unless they insisted upon it as a condition for granting aid. In Deane's words, "they [the Soviets] are no longer back on their heels; and, if there is one thing that they have plenty of, it's self-confidence" and "Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union."<sup>35</sup> Therefore he suggested that the Americans should not be excessively eager to provide assistance, and should demand a *quid pro quo* for any Soviet requests deemed not to contribute to the war effort. Deane did still note, however, that the two countries had few competing interests, and friendly relations for the foreseeable

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<sup>34</sup> Butler, p. 275. As noted in Chapter One, after July 1944 the Soviets supported the Polish Committee of National Liberation, more commonly referred to as the Lublin Committee, as the legitimate authority in Poland, while the western Allies backed the 'London Poles' derived from prewar Poland's government-in-exile. The dispute was a source of considerable inter-Allied tension, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.

<sup>35</sup> Telegram, The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall), Moscow, 2 December 1944, attached to Memorandum, The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President, Washington, January 3, 1944, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 448.

future could be expected.<sup>36</sup>

A few weeks later, on 10 January, Harriman sent a message from Moscow similarly urging a harder line. The Ambassador said that the Soviets were starting to pursue their political aims more vociferously and, as the Red Army advanced, appeared to be seeking hegemony in both defeated and liberated states through a variety of means. Harriman noted that this did not mean a disregard for the proposed international organization. On the contrary, he described the Soviet interest in the new organization as “keen” though they still remained “wary” as it was still seen as a means to an end.<sup>37</sup> In Harriman’s words:

The overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the preoccupation with “security” as Moscow sees it. This objective explains most of the recent Soviet actions which have aroused criticism abroad: the demand for unanimity of decision in the council of the security organization; the opposition to regional blocs; [etc.]... The Soviet conception of “security” does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries and of Russia’s obligations to accept the restraints as well as the benefits of an international security system.<sup>38</sup>

This comment again recognized that the Soviet perspective towards the new organization was oriented towards enhancing the power and security of the USSR in military and political terms, with little regard for other aspects of the body, or for the rights of lesser powers.

Despite these growing concerns, the American President, with a new mandate after handily winning the November 1944 election, and with 60% public approval for the project, still remained wedded to the new organization, a fact which was readily apparent

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<sup>36</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 10, 1945, 1 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 449.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 451.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 450-451.

to those around him.<sup>39</sup> So did his new Secretary of State. Stettinius officially replaced Hull on 27 November 1944, four days after the former's resignation was accepted by Roosevelt. By this time Hull had become increasingly irrelevant in American foreign policy decision-making, and he was not even consulted in the lead up to or during the Yalta conference.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, though there were some changes taking place within the American camp, these had little impact on the Soviet perspective, as their major points of contact on the issue – Roosevelt, Stettinius, Harriman, and Pasvolsky – all remained constant.

The Yalta Conference opened on 4 February, 1945. During this meeting Stalin's statements and decisions once again illustrated the Soviet commitment to creating the new international security organization, while still emphasizing those aspects of it deemed most important. Though the project was not officially discussed on the first day of the talks, Stalin raised the issue at the opening dinner. For most of the meal, political and military issues were not discussed, until the Soviet leader began by going on the offensive, effectively summing up the Soviet attitude towards the new organization and thus framing the initial discussion of the outstanding issues. Stalin had repeatedly indicated that since the Great Powers had been the most instrumental in defeating the Axis, they had an incontestable right to take responsibility for peace after the end of the fighting. He said that it was "ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three Great Powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner."<sup>41</sup> He added that he was thus prepared to act in concert with the Americans and British to protect the small powers as they had done during the war, but that "he would

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<sup>39</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 172. Several of FDR's advisers noted his extreme attention to the new organization, including Harriman, and Roosevelt's Chief of Staff William D. Leahy. Harriman, p. 399, Leahy, p. 267.

<sup>40</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 167, Hull, Volume II, p. 1720.

never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers” – a clear reference to the issue of voting in the Security Council.<sup>42</sup> Both Roosevelt and Churchill acknowledged the leading role to be played by the great powers in preserving peace, but the latter went on to emphasize that they should exercise their prerogatives with moderation and respect for the rights of small nations. Referring to this principle, the British Prime Minister stated “The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefore they sang.”<sup>43</sup> The discussion of this subject was not continued thereafter among the leaders at this meal. Nonetheless, by putting forth the Soviet attitude so boldly, Stalin demonstrated how crucial an issue he considered the Council voting procedure to be.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky similarly stated to Assistant Secretary of State Charles ‘Chip’ Bohlen, who was serving as FDR’s translator during the conference, that the Soviets would never accept the judgment of the small powers, and that if the American public felt differently, they should learn to obey their leaders. Bohlen retorted that Vyshinsky should come to the US and try to tell the American people that, to which Vyshinsky replied that he would be glad to. This appears to have been the sharpest exchange on the subject at this particular meeting.<sup>44</sup> Again, this is indicative of the differing perspectives of the Soviets and Americans to the new organization, with the USSR placing its security interests above all else.

Of the outstanding issues, the voting formula in the Council was considered by all sides to be the most important. It was formally addressed for the first time at the third

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<sup>41</sup>Tripartite Dinner Meeting, February 4, 1945, 8:30 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 589

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 590.

<sup>44</sup>Bohlen, p. 181, Tripartite Dinner Meeting, February 4, 1945, 8:30 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 590.

plenary session, held in the afternoon of 6 February.<sup>45</sup> The discussion opened with Stettinius formally presenting the American compromise position. After he concluded, Stalin asked if anything in the American proposal differed from what was included in Roosevelt's message of 5 December. The American President responded that it was the same, although Stettinius pointed out a minor drafting change. Molotov seized on this to delay discussion of the issue, saying that this was a matter of great importance to the Soviet government, so they would need to study the effects of the drafting change before discussing the issue the next day.<sup>46</sup> As noted by Vojtech Mastny, this response seems somewhat disingenuous, as the Soviet authorities had been presented with the American proposal two months earlier, and the Foreign Affairs Commissariat had clarified their understanding of it through inquiries to Harriman and Gromyko's conversations with Pasvolsky described above.<sup>47</sup> Thus, the Soviet leaders should have been able to comment, particularly since the revision did not affect the substance of the proposal. Nevertheless, Stalin seemed satisfied to let the Western powers put forth their views at greater length, limiting his own responses.

Churchill took up the issue, stating the British government's support for the American proposal. The Prime Minister said that he recognized that world peace

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<sup>45</sup> Since it was a plenary session, the three leaders and the three foreign ministers (Molotov, Stettinius and Anthony Eden) were all present. Other significant Americans present included Harriman, Leahy, and Hopkins, as well as Alger Hiss and Chip Bohlen, who both recorded minutes of the conversations, Bohlen's being far more thorough. The British delegation included among others Cadogan, who had headed the British Dumbarton Oaks delegation, Gladwynn Jebb, a high-ranking Foreign Office official who would later serve as the first Acting Secretary-General of the UN, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the serving British Ambassador to the USSR. Despite being the hosts, the Soviets had the smallest delegation. In addition to Stalin and Molotov, it included Gromyko, Deputy Commissars for Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky and Ivan Maisky, Ambassador to the United Kingdom Fedor Gusev, with Vladimir Pavlov serving as Stalin's personal secretary and interpreter.

<sup>46</sup> Third Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 660-663; Andrei Andeevich Gromyko, ed., *Krymskaia konferentsiia rukovoditelei trekh soiuznykh derzhav--SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii, 4-11 fevralia 1945 g.: sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), 91.

<sup>47</sup> Mastny, p. 245.

ultimately rested on the cooperation of the great powers, but wanted to avoid the appearance that they were trying to rule the world. He went on to cite the possibility of China seeking the return of Hong Kong as an example of an issue to which members of the Big Five were parties, in order to explain how the organization might operate. Churchill said that if the Chinese raised this question, both the British and Chinese, as permanent members of the Council, would abstain from voting on a possible settlement of the dispute. However, if the proposed resolution was deemed to be contrary to British interests, they could use their veto power to prevent the implementation of any decision. Stalin interrupted at this point, asking if Egypt would be a member of the Assembly, receiving an affirmative reply from Churchill. The Soviet leader then suggested that a better example might be to suppose Egypt raised the issue of the return of the Suez Canal. Churchill resumed his discourse, saying that he thought that the Chinese had a right to express their viewpoint though the British could block a handover if they felt it to be necessary, and the same principle applied to Egypt and the Suez Canal. Roosevelt then jumped in, citing the statement from the Teheran Declaration that “We [the great powers] recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world...” and claiming that it applied to the issue at hand.<sup>48</sup>

Stalin remained firm. First, he indicated that he would like to study the document more thoroughly. He went on to say that while the Dumbarton Oaks proposals protected the right to discussion in the Assembly, he doubted that the Chinese or the Egyptians in the examples cited above, would be satisfied with merely expressing an opinion, but would want a concrete decision. Stalin then used humour to try to win over his opponents. He returned to Churchill’s statement that the great powers needed to avoid

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<sup>48</sup> Third Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS*,

the appearance of trying to rule the world. The Soviet leader asked which country was thinking of ruling the world – the United States? He thought not. England? Again, he thought not (the respective leaders both laughed when their country was mentioned). Did this mean that the USSR was striving to rule the world? This question provoked general laughter. Or perhaps China? More general laughter. Thus, the Soviet leader argued, it could be seen that the great powers were not attempting to rule the world.<sup>49</sup> Churchill responded that the great powers collectively might seem to be ruling the world. The Soviet leader replied that Churchill seemed to perceive the situation as one where two of the great powers had agreed to a plan to ensure that would not occur, while the third one had not. Stalin countered that he recognized that the leaders present would be effective in preventing war as long as they lived. However, he pointed out, in ten years time, they could all be gone. Thus, the founding charter of the new organization had to take measures that would also ensure the peace fifty years later. Stalin contended that the best way to do that would be through the unity of the three powers, aided in time by China and France. If they all could work together, there would be no need to fear a resurgent Germany. Therefore, the greatest long-term threat to peace was a divergence between the great powers, and preventing this needed to be the top priority. The Soviet leader then apologized for his lack of familiarity with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and Stettinius' proposed compromise, claiming that he had been too busy to deal with them fully.

Roosevelt and Churchill replied that they understood, but stressed the importance of the Soviet leader studying the matter. Stalin then asked if it was correct that there would be two categories of disputes – those settled by peaceful means, in which a party to a dispute could not vote, and those involving economic, political, or military action. The

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*Malta and Yalta*, pp. 664-665, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 91-92.

<sup>49</sup> Third Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 665, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 93.

two Western leaders replied in the affirmative. Stalin then admitted that the Soviet Union regarded the decision-making process as vital, and that would inevitably involve a voting process, as discussion alone could not reach a decision.<sup>50</sup> Again returning to the examples of Hong Kong and the Suez Canal, Stalin noted that China and Egypt could count on support within the Assembly if they sought the return of these territories. Churchill responded by saying that if one of these countries made such a demand, the British could vote 'no'. Thus, the organization could not be turned against one of the great powers. Stalin asked if this was truly the case, and Eden assured him that no action could be taken without the consent of all the three powers. Stalin then asked *again* if this was truly the case. Both Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative.<sup>51</sup>

The Soviet leader then took a slightly different line. He reminded the others of the British and French-led mobilization of public opinion against the USSR in 1939 and the resulting Soviet expulsion from the League of Nations due to the Soviet-Finnish War. Stalin wanted a guarantee that such drastic action could not be repeated in the new organization. Eden, Churchill, and Roosevelt all attested that the American draft compromise allowed the Soviets to block any expulsion. This did not satisfy Stalin, who asked what could be done to stop the mobilization of public opinion. Churchill answered that the friendship of the great powers would ensure that this would not happen. Stalin continued to press the issue, asking if, perhaps, Maisky would be able to block an attack on England.<sup>52</sup> Roosevelt then responded with the blandishment that the US saw the unity of the great powers as their primary aim, and that the proposed compromise was intended to strengthen, not weaken this principle. There would be no voting formula that could prevent a disagreement among the great powers or means of preventing differing opinions

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<sup>50</sup> Third Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 664-665, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 93-95.

<sup>51</sup> Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 95.

from being expressed in the assembly. Still, the draft proposal would demonstrate the confidence that the great powers had in each other, and hence build unity. Stalin then concluded the discussion by acknowledging the validity of Roosevelt's point regarding disagreement, and suggesting that the matter be discussed again the next day. The talks then shifted to issues regarding Poland.<sup>53</sup> Stalin's statements, in particular his strong emphasis on the Soviet Union's veto power clearly demonstrated Soviet anxieties at being isolated in a hostile world.

As promised, the Americans submitted their proposal (with commentary) in writing that evening.<sup>54</sup> It appears to have addressed the Soviet concerns, as the next day, 7 February, during the fourth plenary session, the Soviets accepted the compromise, demonstrating their positive attitude towards the new organization. After some discussions regarding France and Poland, Stalin suggested that they return to the topic of the international security organization. He then handed the floor to Molotov, who said that the Soviets had studied the Dumbarton Oaks proposals carefully, and the American compromise, as well as considering thoroughly the opinions voiced by Churchill. The Soviet government felt that in sum, these effectively preserved allied unity and thus addressed their main concerns and set the foundation for an effective organization. Therefore, they accepted the American proposal.<sup>55</sup> By accepting this compromise without further discussion, the Soviets indicated their commitment to cooperation with the victorious great powers once their anxieties were examined and assuaged. Stalin

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, p. 96.

<sup>53</sup> Third Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 667, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 97.

<sup>54</sup> United States Delegation Memorandum,, Proposed Formula for Voting Procedures in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and Analysis of the Effects of that Formula, Undated, Authorship not indicated, Distributed to the British and Soviet Delegations at the Plenary Meeting on February 6, 1945, available in AVPRF, Fond of Summaries on the USA, Opis no. 24, Pora no. 44, Papka no. 171, pp. 57-59, *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 682-686, and Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 104-107.

judged that this proposal allowed the Soviets to protect their interests, which was crucial to his acceptance of the new organization.

However, Molotov immediately raised the other main Soviet concern, namely, their isolation within the UN. Logically expecting a *quid pro quo* from the Soviet acceptance of the American compromise, Molotov pointed out that there was another key issue that remained outstanding after Dumbarton Oaks: the participation of the Soviet republics as initial members of the organization. He drew attention to the constitutional changes that had taken place in the USSR a year earlier, and stated the prime importance this issue carried for the USSR.<sup>56</sup> Molotov proceeded to soften the Soviet stance by not demanding that all the republics be admitted, but he anticipated that three, or at least two, would be accepted as initial members. Molotov named Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania as candidates. He went on to remind the others of the population and resources of the Ukrainian Republic, then continued, as Soviet representatives had in other cases, to tie the idea of membership as closely as possible to wartime sacrifices. Molotov pointed out that in addition to their importance due to their size and population, these republics had been among the first to be invaded by the enemy, had suffered tremendously, but had nonetheless contributed a great deal to the war effort. Thus, he urged Churchill and Roosevelt to accept all three states as founding members of the new organization. Roosevelt sought clarification as to whether Molotov was speaking of membership in the General Assembly, and Molotov replied affirmatively.<sup>57</sup> According to the American

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<sup>55</sup> Fourth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 711-712, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 120.

<sup>56</sup> As discussed at greater length in Chapter Three, in February 1944 the Soviet constitution was amended to allow constituent republics to conduct their own foreign relations. However, little effort was put into exercising this power, supporting the notion that it was primarily a means to justify the Soviet demand for separate seats in the new organization for the sixteen republics.

<sup>57</sup> Fourth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 712, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 120-121. Western Ukraine was also experiencing guerrilla attacks from the pro-independence Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya, or UPA) and therefore awarding the Ukrainian SSR a seat in the

minutes of the meeting, Molotov then cited the example of the Dominions of the British Commonwealth gradually achieving their own places in international affairs.<sup>58</sup> He restated the Soviet position that the wartime sacrifices of the named republics entitled them to membership. He reminded the others that the Soviets had accepted the American voting compromise fully and without amendments, and expressed hope that three or at least two of the Soviet republics would be accepted as members of the new organization, tying the Soviet concession on the voting issue to the membership question under discussion.<sup>59</sup>

Roosevelt responded first by stating his pleasure at the Soviet acceptance of the voting formula, but then tried to deflect the discussion. He said that the next step would be to consider the calling of a general conference to organize and found the new international security organization, digressing into a discussion of the historical and constitutional differences between the three powers. He stated that Molotov's proposal was interesting, but could prejudice the principle of one country, one vote. He also brought up the unresolved issue of states associated with the wartime alliance that had broken ties with Germany but not declared war. While he was speaking, Hopkins passed him a note suggesting that the matter should be diverted to discussion by the Foreign Ministers as quickly as possible. FDR then suggested that at the aforementioned

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UN may have been a concession to Ukrainian (as well as Byelorussian and Lithuanian) nationalism. In his 1970 monograph on Ukraine and the United Nations, Konstantyn Sawczuk emphasizes the likelihood of this possibility. However, while this rationale would have been compatible with Stalin's other motives for seeking membership for these republics, it is unlikely that Stalin deemed pacifying the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalists to be worth risking cooperation with the US and UK to the extent displayed by the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference, which will be discussed below. Furthermore, given the highly centralized decision-making structure of the Stalin régime, any such concession could only have been symbolic at best, and throughout the Soviet period, the policies of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian delegations were indistinguishable from those of USSR delegation, both at the San Francisco Conference and within the organization once it had been established. Sawczuk, p. 140.

<sup>58</sup> Fourth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 712.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*; Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 121.

conference or afterwards membership for countries who were not signatories to the Declaration of the United Nations could be considered. He proposed passing the issue of membership for the Soviet republics to the foreign ministers, who could discuss where and when such a conference could be held, as well as who was to be invited.<sup>60</sup>

Before Molotov or Stalin could respond, Churchill weighed in with his support for the Soviet proposal. In florid language that must have been very pleasing to his Soviet hosts, Churchill praised the military accomplishments of the USSR. He also compared the situation of the Soviet republics to that of the Dominions, and remarked that it was unjust that the USSR would have only one voice, while the British Empire would have several, despite a smaller population “if only white people were considered.” Churchill stated that he was therefore becoming increasingly sympathetic to the Soviet request, though he still needed to consult with his advisers before making his change of stance official. He noted that the foreign ministers could discuss the issue of membership, but nevertheless regarded the question as one of great importance. Stalin assented to referring the question to the Foreign Ministers, though he expected them to report back to the Conference before any decisions were made.<sup>61</sup> The X-matter was not discussed further at that meeting. Thus, the fourth plenary session of the Yalta conference was pivotal with regard to the Soviet attitude towards the international security organization. First, they accepted that the proposed Council voting formula would allow them to protect their interests while strengthening their relationship with the other victorious powers. Secondly, the Soviets voluntarily reduced their demand for Assembly membership from all sixteen constituent republics to two or three. This was a

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<sup>60</sup> Fourth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 712-713, Private Note, The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, Yalta, February 7, 1945, in 729, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 121-122.

<sup>61</sup> Fourth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 713-715, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 123-125.

more realistic aim given the stiff American and British opposition to the inclusion of all the constituent republics, since insistence on the acceptance of all sixteen constituent republics would likely have blocked further progress on the creation of the UN. Taken together, these two Soviet concessions indicate a very strong commitment to the new organization, and confidence that they could work effectively with the British and Americans.

As directed, the Foreign Ministers addressed the issue of Assembly membership for two or three Soviet republics the next day. Stettinius opened the discussion with a broad acceptance of allowing membership for some Soviet republics, saying that the US would treat the issue sympathetically at the organization's founding conference, despite concerns that it might violate the policy of one vote for each sovereign state. As well, he announced that the Americans had reversed their policy from Dumbarton Oaks, and agreed that only signatories to the United Nations Declaration should be founding members of the organization. The Americans dropped their prior demand for the inclusion of states which had severed relations with Germany or supported the Allies indirectly, but had not signed the United Nations Declaration, which represented a victory for the Soviet position. It supported their twin goals of limiting membership within the Assembly as much as possible and tying status within the organization to contributions to the war effort. Still, at the time the inclusion of the Soviet republics was given far greater attention, and the American decision was not made official until the plenary meeting later the same day. Molotov merely pointed out that there were still countries who would be invited that did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR. Therefore, he sought a list of which states would attend the conference, and Stettinius provided it.<sup>62</sup> It was agreed

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<sup>62</sup> Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 8, 1945, Noon, Vorontsov Villa, Page Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 735-737; Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 132-133. The provided list of United Nations members included Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,

that the founding conference would be held in the United States and begin on 25 April.<sup>63</sup>

When asked to respond to Stettinius' statements, Molotov deferred to Eden, who said that the British government supported the acceptance of two or three Soviet republics, and would be ready to say so at the appropriate moment. Molotov interrupted by saying "the sooner the better."<sup>64</sup> Upping the ante, he noted that Stettinius had expressed concern that the inclusion of Soviet republics might violate the principle of one vote per country. However, Molotov argued, Canada and Australia were components of the British Empire but were entitled to vote. He likewise again drew attention to the aforementioned Soviet constitutional reforms, which gave the republics the right to develop their own foreign relations, and claimed that they were already starting to do so in a democratic manner. He restated his belief in the political, economic, and military importance of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian Soviet republics. Finally, he concluded that it would be desirable to reach a decision that day. His speech still failed to carry the day. Eden suggested that the United Nations Declaration signatories meet and that the inclusion of two Soviet republics be put on the agenda. Molotov also suggested an amendment to Eden's proposal stating that the three Foreign Secretaries concurred that it was advisable to include two or three Soviet republics. Stettinius stalled further, saying he was impressed with the idea, but needed to discuss the issue with Roosevelt; however,

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China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. States 'associated' with the United Nations members were Chile, Ecuador (which had declared war on Germany shortly before the conference but had not yet signed the Declaration by United Nations), Egypt, France – Provisional Government of the French Republic, Iceland, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Turkey was added to the list of associated states in longhand, but does not appear on the Soviet copy of the list, and presumably was added later, as per the discussion below. The Danish Minister at Washington was also included as an observer attending in a personal capacity. *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 747-748, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 138.

<sup>63</sup> Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 8, 1945, Noon, Vorontsov Villa, Page Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 736, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 132-133.

he hoped for a favourable reply before the end of the day.<sup>65</sup> The discussion then moved on to other matters. In summary, the Soviets tenaciously applied pressure for the admission of two or three republics as a means to enhance their power within the new organization.

Later that afternoon at the fifth plenary meeting, the issue of initial membership in the new international security organization was resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviets. Discussion began with more general questions of membership. The USSR's stance that wartime participation should be a crucial factor in determining eligibility for Assembly membership meant that it was willing to accept states that did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR. By the same token, the Soviets were willing to accept Turkey as well as Egypt, which had made significant non-military contributions to the Allied side, and any Latin American states who declared war on the Axis powers. Nonetheless, they argued against the inclusion of Argentina and Ireland, which had displayed a friendlier attitude towards the Axis, as well as Denmark, which Stalin said "had let the Germans in." Furthermore, the Americans officially reversed their previous desire to include associated states that had not signed the Declaration on United Nations, calling their former position a "mistake." Roosevelt suggested that only countries that had declared war by 1 March 1945 (excluding former Axis adherents such as Italy) should be invited to the founding conference, and this proposal was accepted without difficulty.<sup>66</sup> This remit represented a victory for the USSR, as it reflected the acceptance of two goals. First, to limit Assembly membership to reduce the Soviet numerical disadvantage there; and second, that the new organization be based on those who had

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 8, 1945, Noon, Vorontsov Villa, Page Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 736-737, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 132-133. The Soviet version excludes Molotov's interruption, but the substance of the conversation is the same.

contributed most to the war.

The discussion continued seamlessly into the issue of the membership of the two Soviet republics. First of all, it was accepted that only the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics would be discussed (no explanation was given for excluding Lithuania), and as per the proposed agreement of the foreign ministers that afternoon, both the US and British governments would support their inclusion at the founding conference. Stalin and Churchill pointed out that it would be illogical to accept many small nations that had made comparatively small contributions to the war effort, while excluding these two Soviet republics that had made such enormous wartime sacrifices. Stalin indicated that it would be easily possible for representatives of the named republics to accede officially to the United Nations Declaration by the required deadline, but Roosevelt argued that this could set a bad precedent, and Stalin withdrew the proposal, having received the American assurance that Ukraine and Byelorussia's failure to sign the declaration would not be used later as a means to block their membership. This satisfied the most crucial Soviet demands and discussion proceeded to issues related to Poland and other questions.<sup>67</sup> Thus, the USSR was successful in increasing its voice in the new organization, limiting that of others, and reinforcing the principle that it was based on the primacy of those nations which contributed to the war effort.

The Soviet leader was in very high spirits as a result of the day's progress, and the informal discussions at dinner that evening were particularly cordial. According to Bohlen's minutes, no less than 45 toasts were drunk, most of a mundane character, saluting the victories and generals among the three powers. The Soviet leader also toasted both Churchill and Roosevelt personally, in very fulsome terms, and was likewise

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<sup>66</sup> Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 773-775; Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 146-149.

praised by the other two leaders.<sup>68</sup> Later, Stalin proposed a further toast to the alliance of the three great powers.

Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said that the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.<sup>69</sup>

Thus the Soviet leader explicitly stated his support for the continuance of cooperation among the Big Three, and also implicitly showed his confidence in the new international security organization. Stalin was to all appearances well satisfied with the outcome of the discussions regarding those issues which had been left unresolved after Dumbarton Oaks.

Two days later, on 10 February, Roosevelt appeared to have second thoughts about the acceptance of the Soviet republics. Fearing public opposition to US support for the idea, he sent a somewhat concerned note to the other two leaders, asking if the US could likewise be given three votes in the Assembly, if he deemed it necessary in order to obtain public and Congressional approval for the new organization. Stalin, as well as Churchill, promptly accepted this request, despite Roosevelt's failure to provide any significant justification for it.<sup>70</sup> The USSR appeared confident at Yalta that its interests would be sufficiently protected within the new organization.

Having settled the main points, on 9 February, the Foreign Ministers and a related subcommittee focused on technical issues such as the exact language to be used in the invitations to be issued. The question of trusteeships for dependent territories,

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<sup>67</sup> Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 775-776, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 149-150.

<sup>68</sup> Tripartite Dinner Meeting, February 8, 1945, 9 P.M., Yusupov Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 797-798.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 798.

<sup>70</sup> Series of Personal Notes Between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, 11-12 February, 1945, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 966-968, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 259-260.

similarly left open after Dumbarton Oaks, was also raised, but not addressed in detail. Since major difficulties were not anticipated it was decided that all five permanent members of the Council would agree on a jointly held position through diplomatic-level negotiations before the founding conference.<sup>71</sup> Later that day, Churchill reacted very harshly to the proposed mention of trusteeships, blustering at length on his refusal to yield any part of the British Empire. However, he was assured that the proposed trusteeship machinery would only apply to those territories liberated from enemy control, and the Foreign Ministers revised the language of their recommendations to reflect this.<sup>72</sup> On 11 February the Foreign Ministers clarified that it would only apply to existing League of Nations mandates, territories detached from the enemy powers during the war, or those offered voluntarily for trusteeship. It was also agreed that at the founding conference, no specific territories would be mentioned, the talks would be limited to devising a machinery to be used for this process later.<sup>73</sup> Thus, while the USSR did not obtain any direct gains through the issue of trusteeships, the Yalta Conference still left open the possibility of future benefits. The unquestioned and unreserved Soviet acceptance of the inapplicability of the future trusteeship mechanism to the British Empire shows that their interest in this matter was not based on any ideological anti-imperialism, but rather on increasing Soviet geopolitical influence.

In summary, the USSR was very successful in pursuing its goals at Yalta. On the crucial voting issue, a formula was found whereby the Soviets could assuredly protect their most vital interests, while continuing warm relations with the Americans and

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<sup>71</sup> Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, February 9, 1945, 11 a.m., Livadia Palace, Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes, in *FRUS, FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 810, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 164.

<sup>72</sup> Sixth Plenary Meeting, February 9, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 844, Revised Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting, Yalta, February 9, 1945, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 859, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, pp. 175, 185.

British. On the membership issue, the Soviets gained the inclusion of two constituent republics, and general membership was successfully tied to wartime participation. Furthermore, the possibility of the Soviets obtaining trusteeship power over liberated dependent territories remained open. Thus, Stalin had good reason to be satisfied with the results of the Yalta conference. However, Yalta would mark the zenith of Soviet confidence in the new international security organization. A few weeks later, at the founding conference of the United Nations Organization in San Francisco, the reappearance of issues which the Soviets thought had been settled to their satisfaction, as well as the surfacing of new problems, severely dampened Soviet expectations for the UNO. This led to significant disillusionment, paving the way toward Cold War confrontation.

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<sup>73</sup>Working Draft of the Protocols of the Proceedings, Revised by the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 935; Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 242.

## **Chapter 5 – The United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco**

By the end of the discussions at Yalta, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had reached a consensus on all significant questions related to the new international security organization. The final step was to invite the other participating nations to a conference to obtain their consent for the proposed structure and then formally draft and adopt its Charter, thus officially founding the United Nations Organization. A little over two months after the Yalta Conference, the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) convened in San Francisco, California so that all members of the wartime alliance could discuss the proposals of the Big Four and negotiate the founding charter of the body. During the San Francisco Conference, the Soviets adopted a combative attitude towards the capitalist countries and aggressively sought to defend their interests, seemingly heedless of the impression that their attitude created. Questions related to the chairmanship of the San Francisco Conference, and the contentiously debated participation of the two Soviet republics, Poland, and Argentina were particularly controversial and substantially undermined the sense of unity. Thus, though the Soviets were not forced to make any major concessions at San Francisco regarding the structure or functions of the UN, the discussions there were both a cause and reflection of the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations. Ultimately, despite their apparent successes on specific questions, the Soviets left the conference in a weaker and more isolated position.

After Yalta, the Soviet government appeared to have achieved its primary objectives regarding the planned structure of the new international organization. While a certain degree of compromise was inevitable, the model that the Americans, British, and later the Chinese agreed upon had concentrated power in the Security Council, as the

Soviets had wished, which enhanced their power and reinforced their relationship with their major allies. Within the Council, the Soviets could protect their interests in a hostile international arena, having successfully retained veto power over any action by the Council, even if a permanent member was a party to the dispute in question. As well, the Soviets had managed to reduce their relative isolation within the General Assembly by obtaining membership for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. At Yalta the criteria for membership had been defined in a manner that aligned with Soviet ambitions, with participation being linked to contributions to the war effort, a stance which favoured the USSR. A trusteeship council was to be set up to deal with dependent territories liberated from wartime enemies, and the Soviet government would have representation on it, expanding its influence geographically. Furthermore, it was accepted at Dumbarton Oaks that although the UNO would have a council to deal with economic and social affairs, it would nonetheless have a strong, though as yet undefined, military component to which the Soviets attached great importance.

Nevertheless, though the Soviets had won support for their most vital interests at Yalta, disillusionment and disappointment set in within a matter of weeks. In the interim between the Crimean and San Francisco Conferences, relations between the USSR and the USA deteriorated considerably. The death of President Roosevelt and the accession of Harry S. Truman coincided with a broadly-based shift in American attitudes towards the USSR, which was far less conciliatory and more openly critical of Soviet policies in areas liberated from Axis control in central and eastern Europe. By the time that the San Francisco Conference opened, tensions within the Grand Alliance were considerable.

Inter-Allied relations cooled rapidly for a number of reasons. Initially, all three governments were pleased with the success of the Crimean Conference. On 1 March 1945, in a speech to Congress, President Roosevelt spoke of the Yalta meetings in

glowing terms, describing them as:

a turning point – I hope in our history and therefore in the history of the world... [the Yalta agreements] ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed.<sup>1</sup>

Churchill spoke in similarly fulsome terms, telling the House of Commons on 27 February, “The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leadership wish to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond.”<sup>2</sup> The Soviet leadership likewise were pleased with the success of the Crimean Conference. A confidential telegram, prepared by Maisky and signed by Molotov then sent to Soviet embassies, stated “in general the atmosphere at the conference had a friendly character and the feeling was one of striving for agreement on disputed questions. We assess the conference as highly positive.”<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in 1975 Molotov told Chuev that after Yalta, the Kremlin continued to see the positive relationship with the US as vital.<sup>4</sup> These hopes would dwindle dramatically in the upcoming weeks.

Within days of these two speeches, and less than a month after the talks in the Crimea, Soviet-Western relations became much more difficult, and dramatically influenced the proceedings at San Francisco. In August 1944, King Michael I of Romania had engineered the dismissal of the pro-Axis government of Marshal Ion Antonescu, and offered to join the Allied side. However, the country was subjected to occupation by the Red Army, thus rendering impotent the Allied Control Commission on which the other great powers had representation. Thereafter, continued Soviet pressure undermined the coalition government led by General Nicolae Radescu, and instability had

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Harriman, p. 418.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 419.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, pp.242-243.

reached a crisis level by late February 1945. On 1 March, Radescu resigned, with the high-ranking Soviet diplomat Andrei Vyshinsky exerting heavy pressure on King Michael to ensure he stepped down, and on 6 March, the Soviet-supported Petru Groza became Prime Minister. Thereafter, Groza consolidated communist power. This pattern of behaviour is exactly what US Ambassador to the USSR Harriman had predicted. Both he and British Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr filed formal protests at the absence of Western-style democratic elections they believed had been promised in the Atlantic Charter/Declaration by United Nations, and re-affirmed at Yalta in the Declaration on Liberated Europe. Initially, both the US and British governments refused to grant formal recognition to the new régime (granted in February 1946) and were concerned about Soviet behaviour in Romania. Nevertheless, Roosevelt felt that the Western position there was too weak to take a strong stand. As he told Churchill on 11 March:

It is obvious that the Russians have installed a minority government of their own choosing, but... Rumania [*sic*] is not a good place for a test case. The Russians have been in undisputed control from the beginning and with Rumania lying athwart the Russian lines of communications it is more difficult to contest the plea of military necessity and security which they are using to justify their action. We shall certainly do everything we can, however, and of course will count on your support.<sup>5</sup>

Thus events in Romania contributed to the deterioration of Allied relations in the period between the Yalta and San Francisco Conferences.

More important to the increase in tensions was the situation in Poland. Harriman wrote to Secretary of State Stettinius on 14 March:

I recognize that the Rumanian [*sic*] situation is in many ways secondary in importance to Poland and if we come to a point in our relations with the Soviet Government where we have to make a major

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<sup>4</sup> Chuev, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup> Extract from Telegram, President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister, Washington, 11 March 1945, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1945 Volume V, Europe* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 509-510.

issue I believe that we would be on firmer grounds to do so in connection with Poland. Also, a serious and public issue over Rumania might prejudice our chances of a reasonable settlement regarding Poland.<sup>6</sup>

Plans for postwar Poland had been the subject of serious discussion at Yalta. After much wrangling, it had been agreed that the Provisional Government in Poland, installed in Warsaw and based on the Soviet-backed Committee of National Liberation (commonly referred to as the Lublin Committee) would be “re-organized,” not merely “expanded” – the precise terminology had been a matter of substantial discussion. The reorganization would enlarge the Lublin Committee by including other representatives from within Poland and abroad, most notably the Polish government-in-exile in London. Molotov, Harriman, and Clark Kerr were to compose a commission to meet in Moscow and work with the Provisional Government and other Polish leaders in this process. This reorganized régime, to be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, would then pledge to conduct free elections with universal suffrage and a secret ballot, in which all democratic parties would be free to participate.<sup>7</sup>

However, by late February Molotov was resisting this reform and pressuring the British to initiate direct contact with the Soviet-backed régime. First of all, he wanted representatives of the Provisional Government to be invited to Moscow for consultations before any other Polish authorities, and more importantly, he proposed to give them effective veto power over which other potential leaders would be included in the Government of National Unity. The participation of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, whom the Western powers deemed an indispensable figure, was strongly resisted by the Provisional Government. When Harriman and Clark Kerr protested this obduracy, Molotov tried to get them to direct their complaints to the Provisional Government, thus increasing its

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 14, 1945, Midnight, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 511-512.

legitimacy. A joint memorandum delivered by Harriman and Clark Kerr on 19 March citing Soviet diversions from the Yalta agreements received a sharp rebuff from Molotov.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, after consultation with Churchill, Roosevelt made a personal appeal to Stalin regarding Poland and urged him to allow the tripartite commission to deal with all potential candidates equally.<sup>9</sup>

On 10 April Roosevelt received the Generalissimo's reply. Though Stalin told the President that "a harmonious decision on the Polish question can be reached in a short time" and in a separate message to Churchill accepted the participation of Mikolajczyk (provided he declared himself to be in favour of good postwar relations with the USSR, which he did promptly), the overall tone of the message to FDR was quite harsh.<sup>10</sup> Stalin insisted that the Provisional Government in Warsaw serve as the "kernel" of the Government of National Unity, and accused Harriman of seeking to exclude members of the Soviet-backed Warsaw régime entirely, which the Ambassador denied.<sup>11</sup> Stalin insisted that the new government only include those Polish leaders who accepted the country's new borders, (in which Poland lost territory in the east which was compensated in the west), and who were "really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union."<sup>12</sup> Stalin explained that "The Soviet Government insists on this as blood of the Soviet troops abundantly shed for the liberation of Poland and the fact that in the course of the last 30 years the territory of Poland has been used by the enemy twice for attack upon Russia."<sup>13</sup> He accused Harriman and Clark Kerr of ignoring this

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<sup>7</sup> Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 980.

<sup>8</sup> Telegrams, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, March 18, 1945, and The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 172-178, Harriman p. 429.

<sup>9</sup> Butler, pp. 310-312.

<sup>10</sup> Harriman, p. 431.

<sup>11</sup> Butler, p. 318.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 319.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

imperative, and hence blocking the formation of a mutually acceptable Polish régime.<sup>14</sup> The postwar government of Poland would continue to be a matter of major dispute between the Western Allies and impede cooperation as the war came to a successful conclusion.

In addition to tensions regarding the postwar governments in countries liberated by the Red Army, the treatment of Americans liberated by the Red Army from POW camps in East Prussia and western Poland became a matter of great concern to the US authorities. At the behest of General John R. Deane, head of the US military delegation in the USSR, it had been agreed at Yalta that American repatriation officials would have access to their citizens who were in pre-evacuation camps and collection centres. However, Soviet officials ignored or refused repeated requests to grant such access, except for a small team that was allowed to visit Lublin under onerous restrictions. The Soviets similarly refused to allow the US to use their own planes, based at Poltava, to evacuate the POWs, as previously agreed. The Red Army also violated the provisions of the agreement by not promptly informing US authorities when American prisoners were found. The Americans were also upset that the USSR refused to hand over the prisoners until they reached Odessa, hundreds of miles and a difficult journey from their points of liberation.<sup>15</sup> The President appealed directly to Stalin in this matter. In a message of 3 March 1945, FDR urged the Generalissimo to allow American planes to deliver supplies and evacuate Americans using their ten aircraft at Poltava.<sup>16</sup>

Two days later, Stalin assured Roosevelt that American intervention was not necessary as the POWs were well taken care of by the Soviet authorities, and being

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<sup>14</sup> Butler, pp. 319-320; Harriman, p. 431.

<sup>15</sup> Deane, pp. 182-201; Harriman, pp. 419-423.

<sup>16</sup> Butler, pp. 298-299.

brought to Odessa.<sup>17</sup> However, the testimonies of Americans who managed to reach Moscow (by hitch-hiking with the assistance of Polish and Soviet citizens) contradicted these assertions, so Deane pressed for access to the areas of Poland where prisoners were located to investigate the question first-hand. This permission was refused, and on 14 March Molotov suggested to Harriman that the obstacle was not the Soviet régime, but the Polish Provisional Government. Harriman interpreted this subterfuge as another attempt to force the US to legitimize the Lublin Committee. He cabled Roosevelt, telling him “The Soviet Government, I feel, is trying to use our liberated prisoners as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Polish Provisional Government by dealing with it.”<sup>18</sup> On the 17<sup>th</sup>, FDR appealed to Stalin more emphatically.<sup>19</sup> However, Stalin told him that the few Americans left in Poland were being well treated and would promptly be evacuated to Odessa. In the meantime, the officers of the Red Army did not need the distraction of dealing with American officers. More ominously, he accused the Americans of mistreating Soviet POWs who had been liberated on the Western front, saying that Red Army men had been housed alongside German POWs (contrary to their agreement) and even in some cases subjected to beatings.<sup>20</sup> Though all liberated Americans were eventually evacuated from Soviet territory, this unfounded accusation was typical of the new rancour which was emerging between the Crimean and San Francisco Conferences, and would play a prominent role at the founding conference of the UNO.

The Soviet attitude on all of these issues, as well as developments in Italy to be discussed below, had a substantial impact on Harriman’s views on the USSR and the likelihood of postwar cooperation. In response, by late March, he started urging FDR to

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 299-300.

<sup>18</sup> Harriman, p. 421.

<sup>19</sup> Butler, p. 300.

take a harder line, or what he termed a “firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude” towards Russian demands.<sup>21</sup> For example, he backed Deane’s suggestion that Soviet planes based in Fairbanks, Alaska, be grounded in response to the grounding of American flights from Poltava after a young Pole was smuggled out disguised as an American soldier.<sup>22</sup> In a cable dated 2 April, Harriman cited recent difficulties obtaining access to the USSR and territories controlled by the Red Army to better coordinate the war effort, even in cases specifically agreed to at Yalta. Harriman recommended a firmer stance by the US:

I feel certain that unless we do take action in cases of this kind, the Soviet Government will become convinced that they can force us to accept any of their decisions on all matters and it will be increasingly difficult to stop their aggressive policy. We may get some temporary repercussions, but if we stand firm I am satisfied it is the only way we can hope to come to a reasonable basis of give and take with these people... The Soviets decide to do things not to obtain our goodwill but because they think their interests are being served. Conversely, the things we do to assist or please them do not obtain good-will from them. Failure to stand our ground is interpreted as a sign of weakness. We will get them to recognize our point of view only if we show them specifically that their interests are being adversely affected. It is my belief that if we adopt firm measures in several cases such as those Deane has proposed the Soviets will pay more attention to our requests in *other matters of a more fundamental nature, such as those that may arise at the San Francisco Conference* [my italics]. I am convinced that we will have greater difficulties as time goes on if we delay adoption of this policy.<sup>23</sup>

There is some indirect evidence to show that Roosevelt was heeding this advice. According to Harriman, at a luncheon on 23 March, the President told the public official Anna Rosenberg “Averell [Harriman] is right. We can’t do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta.”<sup>24</sup> Journalist Anne O’Hara McCormick later recalled this same conversation, and confirmed that Roosevelt had concluded that Stalin was either dishonest or could not control the more baleful

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<sup>20</sup> Butler, pp. 300-301.

<sup>21</sup> Harriman, p. 422.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 449.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 423.

influences within his government.<sup>25</sup> Thus, a mere seven weeks after the seemingly successful Yalta Conference, the deterioration of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies was well underway, and the situation would only worsen thereafter.

23 March was also the day Roosevelt revealed to the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference (whose composition had already been decided) that the US had agreed to support the Soviet desire for General Assembly membership for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. This caused considerable consternation among the delegates. As one of them, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of North Dakota, recorded in his diaries, “This will *raise hell* [Vandenberg’s italics].”<sup>26</sup> Within a few days the still-secret information had been leaked to the press, and was the headline story of the *New York Herald-Tribune* on 29 March. Roosevelt confirmed the story, although he emphasized that the “ultimate decision” rested with the upcoming conference, and that the US could claim two additional seats as well. Instead of dampening the feeling of disillusionment, the latter claim actually fuelled the outrage of the American public, as it appeared to be a cynical attempt to make the new security organization a tool of the great powers, with other states reduced to secondary status. Furthermore, a significant popular fear developed that there might be other unpalatable secret agreements made at Yalta.<sup>27</sup> This is precisely what Vandenberg had anticipated in his diaries, and it fed his growing concerns regarding the Soviet Union. As he recorded in his diaries on 2 April, “There is a general disposition to *stop this Stalin appeasement*. It has to stop *sometime*. Every new

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<sup>24</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 444.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>26</sup> Arthur H. Vandenberg, with Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr., and Joe Alex Morris, eds., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 159.

<sup>27</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 180-181.

surrender makes it more difficult [Vandenberg's italics]."<sup>28</sup> Although the specific matter of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian seats had largely fallen out of public attention by the time of the conference, it added negative sentiment towards the USSR in the US in general and with regard to the new security organization in particular. This in turn put greater pressure on the US delegation to resist any perceived Soviet attempts to obtain privileged treatment or status, complicating efforts to reach compromises when problems developed.

Events in Italy led to the most acrimonious dispute between the Soviet and American leaders in the period between the two conferences. In late February, it became known to the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that General Karl Wolff, the ranking SS officer in Italy, had been trying to make contact with the Allies to discuss an end to the fighting in that country. At a short meeting in Zurich between Wolff and Allen Dulles, head of the OSS in Switzerland, the latter told Wolff that the Allies insisted on nothing less than unconditional surrender. Wolff assured Dulles that he would do his best to persuade Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring to surrender. Without waiting for Kesselring's response, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre, sent his American deputy chief of staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer, and his British chief intelligence officer, General Terence Airey, to Switzerland in order to follow up on the Dulles-Wolff meeting with further talks with Wolff in Berne.<sup>29</sup> On 12 March, three days before Lemnitzer and Airey were to sneak into Switzerland disguised as civilians, Harriman provided Molotov with a copy of Alexander's message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and sought immediate comments from the Soviet government. Molotov responded later that day that the Soviets did not object to the proposed negotiations with Wolff, but requested the

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<sup>28</sup> Vandenberg, p. 161.

inclusion of Soviet military officers. This would have required American or British assistance as the USSR had no diplomatic relations with Switzerland. Harriman, supported by Deane, argued against acceptance of Molotov's request, believing the Red Army would never permit American or British officers to participate in a similar military surrender on the eastern front. He also feared that the Soviets would jeopardize the possible surrender with unreasonable demands. The Combined Chiefs in Washington agreed, and informed Molotov through Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, that the Switzerland meetings were only to arrange a meeting at Allied headquarters in Caserta where any actual surrender could be worked out. Thus, there was no need for Soviet representation in Switzerland. Moscow would be welcome to send representatives to Caserta, although Alexander would have exclusive responsibility for conducting negotiations and reaching decisions.<sup>30</sup> Molotov's response was rapid and furious. Apparently fearing that a separate peace was being discussed, which would undermine the prestige of the Soviet victory and possibly even result in the transfer of troops from Italy to the Eastern Front, he called for an immediate end to any discussions without Soviet participation.<sup>31</sup>

A few days later, on 24 March, after he became apprised of the events in Italy FDR contacted Stalin directly in order to assuage the Soviet fears. He suggested that the problem was simply a "misunderstanding" as the facts had "not been correctly presented" to the Soviet leader.<sup>32</sup> The President reassured Stalin that the Berne contact was only for the purpose of exploring Wolff's statements and if they were supported, to arrange for a meeting at Caserta where Soviet representatives would be present. He also tried to flatter Stalin by telling him "You as a military man will understand the necessity for prompt

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<sup>29</sup> Harriman, p. 432.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 432-433.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 433.

action to avoid losing an opportunity” to save lives by attaining a surrender as quickly as possible.<sup>33</sup>

On the same day that Roosevelt sent this message to Stalin, Gromyko informed the US government that he rather than Molotov would be representing the USSR at the upcoming San Francisco Conference, citing the Foreign Minister’s busy schedule. The Americans interpreted this news as retribution for the exclusion of Soviet representatives from the Berne meeting, and much of the existing secondary literature on the conference accepts this questionable view, as will be discussed below.<sup>34</sup> In response to the Soviet action, Roosevelt sent another message to Stalin the same day, politely registering his dismay. In the President’s words:

While we have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko’s character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent his country, I cannot help being deeply disappointed that Mr. Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Stettinius, I know the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing his joint work in the same spirit at San Francisco for the eventual realization of our mutual goal, the establishment of an effective international organization to insure a secure and peaceful future for the world. Without the presence of Mr. Molotov the Conference will be deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I very much hope that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. Since all sponsoring powers and the majority of other countries will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I am afraid that Mr. Molotov’s absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest on the part of the Soviet Government in the great objectives of this Conference.<sup>35</sup>

On 27 March the Soviet leader reassured Roosevelt:

We extremely value and attach great importance to the forthcoming Conference in San Francisco, called to found the international organization of peace and security for peoples but circumstances have

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<sup>32</sup> Butler, p. 303.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 304.

<sup>34</sup> Sherwood, pp. 875-876.

<sup>35</sup> Butler, pp. 302-303.

developed in such a way that Mr. V.M. Molotov, really, is not able to participate in the Conference. I and Mr. Molotov regret it extremely but the convening, on request of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, in April, of a session [sic] of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR where the presence of Mr. Molotov is absolutely necessary, is excluding the possibility of his participation even in the first meetings of the Conference. You also know that Ambassador Gromyko has quite successfully accomplished his task in Dumbarton Oaks and we are confident that he will with great success head the Soviet delegation in San Francisco. As regards various interpretations, this cannot determine the decisions which are to be made.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, Stalin was quite conciliatory on this point, and later events to be discussed below suggest that the American interpretation of Molotov's intended absence was not directly related to the Italian situation.

However, two days later (29 March) Stalin sent another message to Roosevelt, this time directly replying to Roosevelt's message regarding the "misunderstanding" surrounding the Berne meetings related to Italy. This message was more strident in tone, and displayed Stalin's extreme reluctance to rely too heavily on his Western Allies. While Stalin did not oppose the Berne meetings outright, he accused the Americans and British of allowing the Germans to use these negotiations to transfer troops from Italy to the eastern front, thus making the Soviet war effort more costly. The relevant passage from Stalin's message read:

But I agree to negotiations with the enemy on such matter [sic] only in the case when these negotiations will not make the situation of the enemy easier, if there will be excluded a possibility for the Germans to maneuver and to use these negotiations for shifting of their troops to other sections of the front and, first of all, to the Soviet front. Only with the purpose of creating such a guarantee was the participation of representatives of the Soviet Military Command in such negotiations with the enemy considered necessary by the Soviet Government, no matter where they take place – in Bern [sic] or Caserta. I cannot understand why representatives of the Soviet Command were refused participation in these negotiations and in what way could they cause inconvenience to the representatives of the Allied Command. For your information I have to tell you that the Germans have already made use of their negotiations with the Allied Command and during

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 305.

this period have succeeded in shifting three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front. The task of coordinated operations with a blow upon the Germans from the West, South, and East, announced at the Crimea Conference is to bind the troops of the enemy to the place of their location and not to give the enemy any possibility to maneuver and shift troops in to the necessary for him direction. This task is being carried out by the Soviet Command. This is being violated by Fieldmarshal Alexander. This circumstance is irritating to the Soviet Command and creates ground for mistrust... They [the German troops in North Italy] are not surrounded and they do not face annihilation. If the Germans in Northern Italy, in spite of this seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to Allied troops, this means that they have different, more serious aims relating to the fate of Germany.<sup>37</sup>

Roosevelt was stunned by Stalin's harsh tone, even to the point of asking Harriman if this message had in fact been written by Stalin. He was assured by the Ambassador that it had.<sup>38</sup>

Nonetheless, there was still some reason for optimism. On 31 March, Harriman had a meeting with Stalin wherein he explained General Eisenhower's plan to divert Allied forces to central Germany in order to cut the country in half, thus leaving the capture of Berlin to the Red Army. This evidently pleased the Generalissimo, though it considerably upset the British, who admitted the strategic skill of Eisenhower's plan but thought that it paid insufficient attention to the political significance of capturing Berlin, indicating London's growing worries about the USSR.<sup>39</sup> The same day, Roosevelt had written a response to Stalin regarding the Wolff affair, although it arrived in Moscow after Harriman's meeting with the Soviet leader, to the Ambassador's disappointment.<sup>40</sup> Roosevelt's warm reply attempted to reassure Stalin on a number of points. Regarding the possible surrender of German troops in Italy, it stated "that although both of us are in agreement on all the basic principles, the matter now stands in an atmosphere of

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 306-307.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 307.

<sup>39</sup> Mastny, pp. 263-264.

regrettable apprehension and mistrust.”<sup>41</sup> Roosevelt reiterated that the intended Berne meetings were only in order to establish contact with competent German officers, not to conduct any negotiations, and that he would keep the Soviets informed of any progress. He also insisted that the Western Allies would not accept any German terms except unconditional surrender. They would not permit the transfer of German troops from Italy to elsewhere, and explained that the slowing of the Allied offensive in Italy was due to the transfer of British and Canadian troops to France. FDR also told Stalin that the transfer of German troops had begun more than two weeks before Wolff’s initial approach, therefore was unrelated to the Allied response. Roosevelt pleaded with the Soviet leader not to allow the incident to foster bad feeling, saying:

This entire episode has arisen through the initiative of a German officer reputed to be close to [SS and Gestapo chief Heinrich] Himmler and there, of course, is a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to create suspicion and distrust between the Allies. There is no reason why we should permit him to succeed in that aim. I trust that the categorical statement of the present situation and of my intentions will allay the apprehensions which you express in your message of 29 March.<sup>42</sup>

In the meantime, the contact with the Germans was becoming increasingly problematic. Kesselring was transferred to command of the western front, and Wolff had to travel back to Germany to meet him before talking to his successor, General Heinrich von Veitinghoff, therefore he was out of contact with the allies from the middle to the end of March. While in Germany, Himmler personally warned Wolff that he and his family were under surveillance, and thus even after his return Wolff had no opportunity to meet in Berne. At the same time, German military resistance was disintegrating on the western front, while still offering fierce resistance on the eastern front. Thus, Harriman concluded that Stalin’s intelligence network had learned of Wolff and Kesselring’s travels and

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<sup>40</sup> Harriman, pp. 436-437.

<sup>41</sup> Butler, p. 307.

suspected they planned to surrender on the entire western front, not just Italy. This fed Stalin's general paranoia and his ideological assumptions regarding the hostility of the capitalist world, prompting another telegram to Roosevelt on 3 April.<sup>43</sup> In this message, Stalin accused the Western Allies of seeking a separate peace with Germany at the expense of the USSR, though evidently he had still not abandoned hopes for future cooperation. After a brief opening, Stalin wrote:

You [FDR] wrote that there have been no negotiations yet. It may be assumed that you have not been fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of data which they have on hand, do not have any doubts, that the negotiations have taken place and that they have ended in agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German Commander on the Western front – Marshal Kesselring, has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms.

I think that my colleagues are close to the truth. Otherwise one could not have understood the fact that the Anglo-Americans have refused to admit to Bern representatives of the Soviet Command for participation in the negotiations with the Germans.

I also cannot understand the silence of the British who have allowed you to correspond with me on this unpleasant matter, and they themselves remain silent, although it is known that the initiative in this whole affair with the negotiations in Bern belongs to the British.

I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or in some other place since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to advance into the heart of Germany almost without any resistance on the part of the Germans, but why was it necessary to conceal this from the Russians and why your Allies – the Russians, were not notified?

As a result of this at the present moment the Germans on the Western front have in fact ceased the war against England and the United States. At the same time the Germans continue the war with Russia, the Ally of England and the United States. It is understandable that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of preservation of the strengthening of trust between our countries.

I have already written to you in my previous message and consider it necessary to repeat it here that I personally and my colleagues would never have made such a risky step, being aware that

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<sup>42</sup> Butler, p. 308.

<sup>43</sup> Harriman, p. 437.

a momentary advantage, no matter what it would be, is fading before the principle advantage on the preservation and strengthening of trust among the Allies.<sup>44</sup>

This message and the direct implications that either Roosevelt was secretly working against the USSR or being duped by trusted aides shocked and wounded the President.<sup>45</sup> He responded the following day with a telegram to Stalin, expressing his “astonishment” at the General Secretary’s missive and the allegations it contained. He again reiterated that there would be no such discussions of a general peace or even regional surrender without a Soviet presence and an insistence on unconditional surrender. He praised the Red Army and cited military factors alone as the reason for the speed of the German collapse on the western front. Roosevelt concluded by attempting to rebuff firmly but diplomatically the Soviet leader’s accusations, saying:

With a confidence in your belief in my personal reliability and in my determination to bring about together with you an unconditional surrender of the Nazis, it is astonishing that a belief seems to have reached the Soviet Government that I have entered into an agreement with the enemy without first obtaining your agreement. Finally, I would say this, it would be one of the great tragedies of history if at the very moment of victory now within our grasp, such distrust, such lack of faith should prejudice the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, matériel and treasure involved. Frankly I cannot avoid feeling a bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates.<sup>46</sup>

The Soviet leader’s response on 7 April maintained the same general attitude, although with a more conciliatory tone. He told Roosevelt that he “never doubted your honesty and dependability, as well as the dependability of Mr. Churchill.”<sup>47</sup> He cited cultural differences regarding mutual responsibilities among allies as the key to the dispute.

Stalin told FDR:

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<sup>44</sup> Butler, pp. 312-313.

<sup>45</sup> Harriman, p. 437.

<sup>46</sup> Butler, pp. 314-315.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 315.

We, Russians, believe that in the present situation at the fronts when the enemy is confronted by the inevitability of capitulation, at any meeting with the Germans on questions of capitulation by representatives of one of the Allies arrangements have to be made for the participation in this meeting of representatives of the other Ally. At any rate this is absolutely necessary if this Ally is seeking participation in such a meeting. Americans, however, and the Englishmen think differently, considering the Russian point of view wrong. Proceeding from this fact they rejected the Russians the right of participation in the meeting with the Germans in Switzerland... I continue to consider the Russian point of view as the only right one as it excludes any possibility of mutual distrust and does not permit the enemy to sow distrust among us.<sup>48</sup>

Stalin went on to say that there must be more than military factors involved in the Wehrmacht's actions. He claimed that the Germans had 147 divisions on the Eastern front, and suggested that they could easily afford to transfer 15-20 of these to the Western Front without a deterioration of their overall position, but nonetheless failed to do so. Stalin also noted the difference in the Wehrmacht's ferocity between the two fronts, saying:

They [the German army] continue to fight savagely with the Russians for some unknown junction Zemlianitsa in Czechoslovakia which they need as much as a dead man needs poultices, but surrender without any resistance such important towns in Central Germany as Osnabrück, Mannheim, Kassel. Don't you agree that such a behaviour of the Germans is more than strange and incomprehensible.<sup>49</sup>

He cited his faith in his informers, who had uncovered a German offensive in the Lake Balaton region of Hungary, which the American Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had warned would come elsewhere.<sup>50</sup> By that time it was apparent that Wolff sought concessions that the Allies were unprepared to grant.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, on 11 April Roosevelt he thanked Stalin for his "frank explanation of the Soviet point of view" and noted that the affair "now appears to have faded into the past without having

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 316.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

accomplished any useful purpose.” Roosevelt also expressed hope that “mutual mistrust and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future.”<sup>52</sup> Showing evidence of his growing frustration with the Soviet government, Harriman did not forward the message directly to Stalin, but awaited a reply to his suggestion that Roosevelt remove the word “minor” before the word “misunderstanding” and to ensure that the American line was in concert with the British one.

The following morning, 12 April, Roosevelt rejected Harriman’s revisions, saying that he had already discussed the matter with Churchill, and that he deliberately had used the word “minor” in order to downplay the incident.<sup>53</sup> The same day, Roosevelt told Churchill “I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible, because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out, as in the case of the Berne meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.”<sup>54</sup> By the time that this instruction had been sent to Harriman, and the message then forwarded to Stalin, Roosevelt was dead, though news had not yet reached Moscow. Just after lunchtime, the President lost consciousness and died at 3:30 pm. Thus, the Wolff affair undermined mutual desires for cooperation during Roosevelt’s last days.

Roosevelt’s strong commitment to the new organization survived these growing difficulties, although the American attitude gradually shifted after his death. On 24 March, in a conversation with his close advisor Harry Hopkins, FDR confided that he had received advice to take a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude regarding the upcoming conference, but that he intended to ignore it and tie himself closely to the effort from start to finish.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Harriman, p. 439.

<sup>52</sup> Butler, p. 321.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p. 322.

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Harriman, p. 440.

<sup>55</sup> Sherwood, p. 879.

Chief of Staff Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy also recorded FDR's continued confidence in the new organization as late as the last week of March.<sup>56</sup> On 6 April the President suggested issuing a stamp to commemorate the upcoming conference, containing simply the date April 25, 1945, demonstrating the gravity he expected that day to carry in world history.<sup>57</sup> On the morning of his death, Roosevelt's desk was covered with papers dealing with the conference agenda, seating arrangements, train routes, and airport security problems. He was planning to attend the opening personally and preparing his speech at the time of his death.<sup>58</sup> Thus his continued commitment to the success of the new organization is unquestionable.

Truman's attitude was less enthusiastic, though initially he allayed fears about his commitment, and Roosevelt's careful arrangement of bipartisan support for the project helped to ensure that Congress would not be an obstacle.<sup>59</sup> However, events played directly into Stalin's preconceived suspicions and fostered his distrust, significantly hurting the relationship between the great powers. Whereas Roosevelt's patient attitude towards the USSR pacified Stalin to some extent, the new administration took a firmer stance towards the Soviet Union which increased the level of antagonism. Nonetheless, Truman privately affirmed the necessity of Soviet participation in the new international security organization despite Harriman's wishes to the contrary, so there was still cause for hope in the success of the San Francisco Conference.<sup>60</sup>

Initially, the death of Roosevelt led to an improvement of relations. The sadness of both Molotov and Stalin was sincere, although this sincerity was partly fueled by anxiety that the new President would not continue FDR's policy of unlimited

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<sup>56</sup> Leahy, pp. 341-342.

<sup>57</sup> Simons, p. 44.

<sup>58</sup> Butler, pp. 321-322.

<sup>59</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 184, MacQueen, p.8.

<sup>60</sup> Harriman, p. 448.

cooperation.<sup>61</sup> The news arrived at the American Embassy in Moscow well after 1:00 am. However, once informed, Molotov insisted on coming to Harriman immediately, despite the hour, and his sorrow seemed genuine. Harriman also did his best to reassure the Soviet leadership that Roosevelt's policies, including his strong support for the San Francisco Conference, scheduled to open on 25 April, would be continued.

In Harriman's words:

He [Molotov] said that all Russia would mourn his [Roosevelt's] death and that the world had lost a great leader to guide the way in peace. He seemed deeply moved and disturbed. He stayed for some time talking about the part President Roosevelt had played in the war and in the plans for peace, of the respect Marshal Stalin and all the Russian people had had for him and how much Marshal Stalin had valued his visit to Yalta. I encouraged him to ask questions about President Truman and assured him that President Truman would carry on President Roosevelt's policies. Molotov on leaving said that the Soviet Government would have confidence in President Truman because he had been selected by President Roosevelt. I have never heard Molotov talk so earnestly.<sup>62</sup>

Stalin was equally moved at Roosevelt's passing, as was made evident when Harriman visited him the following evening. Before making the visit, the Ambassador decided that he would again ask that Molotov represent the USSR at San Francisco, to signal Soviet support both for the new organization and as assurance of continued collaboration with the US under Truman. Harriman recalled "Before I went over to see Stalin I had thought hard about what I might ask him to do. So it was no accident."<sup>63</sup> When Harriman made his visit to Stalin that evening, the Soviet leader greeted him in silence, and held his hand for about thirty seconds before asking him to sit down. Harriman wrote "he [Stalin] seemed deeply distressed and questioned the Ambassador

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<sup>61</sup> Watson, p. 217.

<sup>62</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 13, 1945, 11 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 826.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Harriman, p. 441.

closely about the circumstances of Roosevelt's death."<sup>64</sup> Stalin stated his expectation that Truman would continue Roosevelt's policies, and Harriman said that in areas such as the war and foreign policy, he would certainly do so. The Ambassador then seized the opportunity to obtain Stalin's decision to send Molotov to the US to attend the world meeting at San Francisco. He portrayed it not merely as a symbol of support for the new body, but also as a means of boosting the prestige of the new president, and assuaging concerns that FDR's death would lead to instability in the relations of the great powers. According to Harriman's account:

When I entered Marshal Stalin's office I noticed that he was obviously deeply distressed at the news of the death of President Roosevelt... I said that President Truman naturally could not have the great prestige that President Roosevelt enjoyed at the time of his death. Until he had become Vice President he was not especially well known in the United States because he had never sought publicity. The same was true abroad. This, in my opinion, could not help but cause a certain period of uncertainty, both internally and externally, not necessarily about the conduct of the war but on all foreign and domestic policy questions. The San Francisco Conference, for example, might well cause more difficulties. The American people did not know whether President Truman could carry through President Roosevelt's program as the late President would have done...

I said that I believed that Marshal Stalin could assist President Truman at this time: this would facilitate in stabilizing the situation in the United States in solidifying him with the American people. The American people knew that President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin had close personal relations and that this relationship had a great effect on United States-Soviet relations. Marshal Stalin interjected, "President Roosevelt has died but his cause must live on. We shall support President Truman with all our forces and all our will." The Marshal then requested me to inform President Truman accordingly.

I stated that I was going to make a suggestion which might be impossible to realize. I was thinking of what Marshal Stalin might do to help President Truman, to stabilize the situation in America and reduce the disturbances which had been caused by the death of President Roosevelt. I said that I believed that the most effective way to assure the American public and the world at large of the desire of the Soviet Government to continue collaboration with us and the other United Nations would be for Mr. Molotov to go to the United States at this time. I suggested that he might stop in Washington to see the President and then proceed to San Francisco even though he might

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 441.

remain there only for a few days...

I could not find the words to express too strongly what it would mean to the American people and to President Truman, what it would mean to our overall relations, especially at this time in our great tragedy if Mr. Molotov could come to the United States. The entire world would regard his visit as a great stabilizing influence.

After a brief discussion between Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin as to the dates of the San Francisco Conference and the convening of the Supreme Soviet... Marshal Stalin then stated categorically that Mr. Molotov's trip to the United States, although difficult at this time, would be arranged. He made it clear, however, that this decision was based upon my assurances that the President and the Secretary [of State] would renew the hope that it would be possible for Mr. Molotov to come to Washington and San Francisco as they considered his presence there at this time of real importance.<sup>65</sup>

The formal invitation from Stettinius mentioned in the last line of Stalin's reply came quickly.<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless, Stalin's closing statement perhaps indicates that even then the Soviet leader considered the sending of Molotov to be a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from the US or the other conference participants. During the discussion of Molotov's visit to the US, the Foreign Affairs Commissar kept muttering "time, time, time" under his breath, suggesting that time pressures really were the reason why he was not planning to attend the conference.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden also told Stettinius that Molotov had opposed traveling to San Francisco from the outset.<sup>68</sup> In addition, after his arrival in the US, at a pleasant first meeting between the two men, Molotov told Truman that he only expected to remain in San Francisco for a few days.<sup>69</sup> Later in life, Molotov likewise told Felix Chuev that he would have preferred not to go to the US, and wanted to send Gromyko instead, although he agreed to go since

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<sup>65</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Moscow, April 13, 1945, 8 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 826-828.

<sup>66</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 187-188.

<sup>67</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Moscow, April 13, 1945, 8 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p.828.

<sup>68</sup> Stettinius, p. 325.

<sup>69</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 22, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p.236.

the Americans attached such importance to his presence.<sup>70</sup> Hence, his proposed absence was not retaliation for the Berne affair nor did it indicate worsening relations. Molotov was sent to the US both to talk directly to Truman, and to support the founding of the new international organization. However, while his presence was of substantial symbolic importance, as Harriman himself noted at the time, it did not resolve any of the disputes that were weakening the inter-Allied relationship.<sup>71</sup>

The official Soviet delegation came to include eleven delegates. In addition to Molotov, Gromyko, A.A. Sobolev, S.K. Zarapkin, Professors S.A. Golunsky, and S.B. Krylov, and Rear Admiral K.K. Rodionov, all members of the delegation to Dumbarton Oaks, were present. They were joined by Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov, Chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, in an apparent bid to associate the USSR with labour movements throughout the world more closely, A.I. Lavrentiev, People's Commissar of the RSFSR, and Kirill Vasilievich Novikov, Chief of the British Department of the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as Lieutenant General A.F. Vassiliev as delegates. In addition, A.A. Roschin, A.A. Arutiunian, and Georgy N. Zarubin were listed as advisers, with G.P. Arkadiev named as the sole Adviser-Expert. K.V. Novikov was also listed as Secretary-General of the delegation, while F.T. Orekhov was the Press Relations Officer. Vassily N. Demchenko was the interpreter. Zarubin and Demchenko were added to the list by hand, suggesting that they were late additions.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Chuev, p. 44.

<sup>71</sup> Harriman, p. 443.

<sup>72</sup> Document 49 G/3(1), "The United Nations Conference on International Organization, Officers of the Conference, Committees and Commissions of the Conference, Members of the Delegations, Officers of the Secretariat, Revised to May 4, San Francisco, California," May 4, 1945, in file Credentials - Full Powers: Authorized Signers of Conference Documents, also "Expected Signers, in series UNCIO Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives. All names are spelled in correspondence with the list of delegates of the USSR, published in United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume I, General*, (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), p. 37. In addition, there were approximately 100 correspondents, cinema

Molotov presided over the Soviet delegation until 8 May, at which point he handed responsibility to Gromyko. While there were fears expressed at the time that Molotov's departure would interfere with the Conference's work, this did not prove to be the case.<sup>73</sup> Gromyko was somewhat more amiable and better liked on a personal level, but more importantly, as had been the case at Dumbarton Oaks, neither Molotov nor Gromyko was willing to depart from Moscow's strict instructions to any significant degree.<sup>74</sup> As at previous discussions, the Soviet delegation were essentially figureheads for the Stalin Politburo and therefore the issue of who was formally in charge of the Soviet delegation was essentially symbolic.

While the Americans had attached great importance to Molotov's presence, in fact, his visit to the US only exacerbated the corrosion of relations with the USSR. Difficulties arose first when Molotov stopped in Washington to meet with Truman before heading to San Francisco. Harriman had already been planning to return to Washington for consultations as well. His departure was delayed for a few days after Roosevelt's death; however, he took a shorter route than Molotov and therefore reached Washington on 19 April. The next morning, in a meeting with Truman and other senior White House officials, Harriman presented Poland as the most important issue that was damaging US-Soviet relations, although Soviet conduct in Romania and other occupied countries was a problem as well.<sup>75</sup> The Ambassador contended that the Soviet leadership seemed to believe that it could simultaneously pursue a policy of unilateral extension of control over

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experts, assistants, secretaries, and other staff, according to a report by Gromyko dated 17 March. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), Washington, March 17, 1945, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1945 Volume I, General: The United Nations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 133.

<sup>73</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Member of the United States Delegation, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, May 8, 1945, 8:30 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 650-652, Watson, p. 218.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, Cadogan, p. 747.

neighbouring states and continued cooperation with the US and Britain. He characterized this takeover as a “barbarian invasion of Europe” and thus recommended that the US take a firmer stance in opposition, though he still sought a “workable relationship” with the USSR.<sup>76</sup>

After further discussion, the ambassador asked the president how important he thought the dispute regarding Poland was in relation to the San Francisco Conference and American participation in the endeavour. The President without hesitation replied that Congressional approval for membership in the new organization would require the settlement of the Polish issue in accordance with the American interpretation of the Yalta Agreements, and that “he intended to tell Molotov just this in words of one syllable.”<sup>77</sup> Truman ended the meeting by announcing his intention to be firm with the Soviet government.<sup>78</sup> Privately afterwards Harriman confided to Truman that one reason he had hurried back to Washington was to make sure that the new President realized, as Roosevelt had, that the Soviets were not living up to their agreements. However, he was pleased to discover that Truman had already reached that conclusion.<sup>79</sup> Harriman’s actions reflect the longstanding tension within the American camp between the undying optimism of Roosevelt regarding US-Soviet relations, and the more critical attitude of the State Department and other officials charged with implementing the President’s directives. Thus, after FDR’s death, the State Department’s wish for greater reciprocity was realized, and the Americans had decided to adopt a less tolerant line towards the

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<sup>75</sup> Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee, Friday Morning, April 20, 1945, Extract, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp.839-842; Harriman, pp. 445-450.

<sup>76</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 232; Harriman, p. 448.

<sup>77</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 233; Harry S Truman, *Memoirs: Volume I, Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), pp. 71-72.

<sup>78</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 233, Truman, p. 72.

<sup>79</sup> Harriman, pp. 448-449; Truman, pp. 72-73.

USSR in general and to link the founding of the new international security organization to resolution of outstanding disputes regarding Poland.<sup>80</sup> This decision undermined the Soviet-Western relationship once the conference got underway.

On 21 April, Harriman reiterated to Truman his belief that the USSR was attempting to reduce Eastern Europe to the status of satellite states, and that the claims of guarding against a resurgent Germany were merely a veil for self-interested expansionism. He again urged the President to adopt a *quid pro quo* attitude towards the USSR, with American economic assistance as the main bargaining chip.<sup>81</sup> The next day Molotov arrived in Washington, and Truman came to meet him at Blair House, the official guest house for the President of the United States. This first meeting was cordial, with Molotov acknowledging Truman's intention to continue Roosevelt's policy of friendship towards the USSR, and the president reassuring Molotov that he intended to stand by all of FDR's commitments.<sup>82</sup> Molotov and Truman agreed that the Polish issue should be settled on the basis of the Yalta agreements, without addressing the thorny question of what that meant in practical terms. The foreign affairs commissar also asserted that the USSR attached great importance to the upcoming San Francisco Conference, and he anticipated easy agreement on the outstanding points. However, this encounter was essentially a polite formality, and there was no serious discussion of political matters. The meeting ended with toasts to Stalin, Churchill, and Truman.<sup>83</sup>

However, a few days after Roosevelt's death, the USSR had sought to obtain diplomatic recognition from the US for the Polish Provisional Government and an invitation for it to participate in the San Francisco Conference, on the grounds that Poland

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<sup>80</sup> Glantz, pp. 176-177.

<sup>81</sup> Harriman, p. 450.

<sup>82</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 22, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 235.

was a member of the United Nations and entitled to representation there. The US refused to do so until the Polish government was reorganized. Nonetheless, on 22 April, the same day that Molotov arrived in Washington, the USSR signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the Provisional Government.<sup>84</sup> That same evening and again the following morning, in talks with Stettinius and Eden, relations were noticeably chillier and the deadlock remained in force. Molotov's attempts to establish the expansion of the Yugoslav government as a precedent for Poland (which would have substantially favoured the Lublin Poles) were soundly resisted.<sup>85</sup> Cadogan, who remained an important figure in the British delegation to the San Francisco Conference, recorded in a letter to his wife that this discussion "lasted until about midnight, and got us *nowhere* at all [Cadogan's italics]. M.[olotov] appears to have no instructions from Stalin – or pretends to have none – and is simply mulish on every point."<sup>86</sup> The day before Truman had told Stettinius it would be "good psychology" if Truman and Molotov could have a short meeting, and then Stettinius "could be just as firm with Molotov as he was going to be with us."<sup>87</sup> Thus, an improvement of relations was increasingly unlikely. The US and Britain refused to accord any legitimacy to the Polish Provisional Government until it was reorganized, and the Soviets insisted that the Lublin Committee-based Polish régime serve as the nucleus of any adjusted government.<sup>88</sup> Another meeting the next morning similarly failed to make any progress, with Cadogan recording in a personal letter

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<sup>83</sup> Bohlen, p. 213, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 22, 1945, in *FRUS FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 235-236; Harriman, p. 451; Truman, p. 76.

<sup>84</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 188.

<sup>85</sup> Minutes of First Meeting Regarding the Polish Question, Washington, April 22, 1945, 9:50 p.m. to 11:40 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 237-251. In February, the Yugoslavian communist government led by Tito was joined by Dr. Ivan Subâsič, the Premier of the erstwhile Royalist government. Tito and his supporters retained 21 government posts, and were joined by six others, including Subâsič. Harriman, p. 451.

<sup>86</sup> Cadogan, p. 732.

<sup>87</sup> Stettinius, p. 324.

<sup>88</sup> Harriman, p. 451; Stettinius, pp. 328-329.

“Molotov as hopeless as ever, and we got *nothing* out of him [Cadogan’s italics].”<sup>89</sup>

That afternoon, (23 April) Truman prepared to speak more forcefully to Molotov while meeting with Harriman and his other advisers. The President intended to make it clear that continued cooperation in the international security organization and elsewhere was contingent on an agreement regarding Poland. Truman told his advisers that he “intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell.”<sup>90</sup> This was contrary to Truman’s statement to Harriman on 20 April that the new international organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation. According to the Bohlen’s minutes of the meetings, Truman said that “the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be much of a world organization.”<sup>91</sup> Possibly Truman intended this threat as a bluff, but was sincerely doubtful that he could obtain Congressional approval for the new organization without a change in Soviet policies towards Poland, and assumed that his stance would impel the Soviets to make the desired changes.<sup>92</sup>

Although the official record is somewhat more diplomatic, according to the eyewitness accounts of Harriman, Leahy, and Chip Bohlen (the latter serving as Roosevelt’s translator in the meeting), which vary slightly in detail, Truman’s attitude towards Molotov was brusque and direct. In the afternoon, when Molotov arrived, Truman came quickly to what he regarded as the main point. He expressed his regret that the Foreign Ministers had made no progress on the Polish issue, and insisted that the US had been as flexible as possible toward Soviet demands, but could not recognize any Polish government that did not represent all democratic elements. He was prepared to go

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<sup>89</sup> Cadogan, p. 732.

<sup>90</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting at the White House, April 23, 1945, 2 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 253; Truman, p. 77.

<sup>91</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 233; Harriman, p. 453.

forward with the new international security organization regardless of any other outstanding issues, but failure to resolve the Polish issue in accordance with what had been agreed at Yalta would cast doubt on the viability of postwar cooperation. Truman also pointed out that he needed public support for any American action, and only Congress could appropriate the funds necessary to provide assistance to the USSR. Molotov responded that Allied cooperation required the three powers to treat each other as equals, without one or two of them trying to impose their will on the third. He also accused the London Poles and their followers of working against the Red Army.<sup>93</sup>

Truman replied that he was not interested in hearing propaganda, and maintained that the USSR should fulfill the Yalta agreements regarding Poland. Molotov reiterated the Soviet government's support for the Yalta agreements but stated that the USSR should not be blamed if the agreement had been abrogated by others. He also noted that the USSR had a particular interest in the Polish question given its location directly on the Soviet border.<sup>94</sup> As tension increased, Truman retorted that the US was prepared to carry out the Yalta agreements, and sought nothing more than the same from the USSR. Although he desired friendship with the USSR, it would require mutual observance of the Yalta agreements, and the relationship could not continue to be a "one-way street."<sup>95</sup> Molotov angrily protested "I have never been talked to like that in my life" to which Truman fired back "Carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to like that."<sup>96</sup> During this exchange Molotov's face became "a little ashy" and when he attempted to

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<sup>92</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 233.

<sup>93</sup> Bohlen, p. 213, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 256-257; Harriman, p. 453.

<sup>94</sup> Bohlen, p. 213, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, pp. 257-258.

<sup>95</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 258; Harriman, p. 453.

<sup>96</sup> Quoted in Harriman, p. 453; Truman, pp. 80-82.

divert the conversation to the war effort in the Far East, Truman abruptly dismissed him, ordering him to transmit the President's views to Stalin.<sup>97</sup> Harriman had urged Truman to take a hard line with the USSR, but regretted his superior's bluntness, as it allowed Molotov to claim that Truman was departing from Roosevelt's policies towards the USSR.<sup>98</sup> This was the final meeting between Truman and Molotov before the San Francisco Conference, and further hastened the deterioration of the Soviet-American relationship, which darkened the prospects for the new international security organization.

However, Truman's concerns did not cease with Molotov's departure. On the day of this final meeting with Molotov, the president sent a message to Stalin. After urging him to reorganize the Polish government on a far broader basis, Truman closed by saying:

The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three Governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.<sup>99</sup>

This comment clearly shows the influence of the Polish dispute on the Soviet-American relationship, with its grave implications for the UNO. Meanwhile, on 24 April Prime Minister Churchill assured Truman of continued support on the matter.<sup>100</sup> He also kept Stalin informed of this stance in a message transmitted the same day directly to the Soviet leader, which read:

I have seen the [23 April] message about Poland... and I have consulted the War Cabinet on account of its special importance. It is my duty now to inform you that we are all agreed in associating

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<sup>97</sup> Bohlen, p. 213; Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 188.

<sup>98</sup> Harriman, pp. 453-454.

<sup>99</sup> Telegram, President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin), Washington, April 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 259.

<sup>100</sup> Telegram, The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman, London, April 24, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 262.

ourselves with the President in the aforesaid message. I earnestly hope that means will be found to compose these serious difficulties, which if they continue will darken the hour of victory.<sup>101</sup>

Thus, the Western-Soviet relationship was becoming increasingly problematic.

Stalin's response to both leaders, also sent on 24 April, the day before the opening of the San Francisco Conference, was diplomatic in tone but maintained the Soviet position. In his reply to the two leaders, Stalin cited the agreement at the Crimea Conference that the Polish Provisional Government based on the Lublin Committee would constitute "the kernel, i.e. the main part of the new reorganized government of nation unity."<sup>102</sup> He argued that the Soviet Union had a legitimate interest in having a friendly government in Poland, given the length and importance of their border. Thus, it was indispensable that the Lublin-based régime remain the core of any reorganized government. In Stalin's words:

The question on Poland has the same meaning for the security of the Soviet Union as the question on Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

You, apparently, do not agree that the Soviet government has a right to make efforts that there should exist in Poland a government friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet government cannot agree to existence in Poland of a government hostile toward it. Besides everything else, this is demanded by the blood of the Soviet people abundantly shed on the field of Poland in the name of liberation of Poland [*sic*]. I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a really representative government, and whether the government in Belgium is really democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were being established there. The Soviet government did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

It is not clear why, while the question on Poland is discussed it is not wanted to take into consideration the interests of the Soviet Union from the point of view of security.

3. Such conditions must be recognized unusual [*sic*] when two governments – those of the United States and those of Great Britain –

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<sup>101</sup> Quoted in Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 492.

<sup>102</sup> Telegram, The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman, Moscow, 24 April 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 5*, p. 263.

beforehand settle with the Polish question in which the Soviet Union is first of all and most of all interested and put the government of the USSR in an unbearable position trying to dictate to it their demands.

I have to state that such a situation cannot favor a harmonious solution of the question on Poland.

4. I am ready to fulfill your request and do everything possible to reach a harmonious solution, but you demand too much of me. In other words, you demand that I renounce the interests of security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot turn against my country.

In my opinion there is one way out of this situation; to adopt the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland. I believe this would allow to come to a harmonious solution [*sic*].<sup>103</sup>

Clearly, the Polish issue continued to poison the Soviet-Western relationship, hampering cooperation in other fields, most notably the new international security organization. Thus in the roughly ten weeks between the Yalta and San Francisco conferences, tensions among the great powers increased markedly due to disputes regarding eastern Europe, prisoners of war, and the events in Italy, among others. This confrontational attitude was then carried across the continent to San Francisco, wherein the ongoing decline in cooperation continued, fundamentally altering Soviet perceptions of and attitudes towards the UNO.

In fact, competition for power within the upcoming conference began even before it opened. A number of matters had been arranged at informal meetings of the four sponsoring powers in Washington in early April. Here, Gromyko had received explicit assurances that not only would the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as amended and expanded by mutual agreements such as those at Yalta, be the basis for Conference discussions, but also none of the sponsoring powers would propose or support any amendments without consulting the others.<sup>104</sup> In practice, much decision-making was completed in private, informal discussions of the four great powers, later joined by

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<sup>103</sup> Telegram, The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman, Moscow, 24 April 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 263-264.

France.<sup>105</sup> This was in line with the Soviet desire to give primacy to the victorious great powers (except for France, of which Stalin had a low opinion), with little regard for the medium and small powers.

The four sponsoring powers had agreed that in addition to the plenary sessions there would be four commissions to address specific areas of discussion. Commission I dealt with General Provisions such as basic principles and purposes, and membership. Commissions II, III, and IV were assigned to issues surrounding the General Assembly, Security Council, and Judicial Organization respectively. Each of these commissions was further subdivided into committees and later subcommittees for specific tasks and issues. Every delegation was entitled to send a representative to each commission and committee, although the subcommittees were smaller bodies of states with the greatest interest in the specific issue. Relatively little would be done in plenary sessions, given their unwieldy size, so a Steering Committee (SC), composed of the heads of all delegations, was formed to allow more efficient discussion while simultaneously preserving universal representation. However, the key decision-making organ for the conference was expected to be the smaller Executive Committee (EC). Initially it was intended to have eleven members – representatives of the five permanent members of the

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<sup>104</sup> Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 10, 1945, 3 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V.1*, p. 238.

<sup>105</sup> It had been expected at Yalta that France would join the others as the fifth sponsoring power. However, Charles de Gaulle was offended at his exclusion from the Crimea Conference and refused to join as a sponsoring power unless French amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were accepted on an equal basis to the proposals themselves. The USSR and other sponsors rejected this demand, since re-opening difficult issues and hard-won compromises was likely to be highly problematic. For a period there was a fear that France would boycott the organization entirely, which was a cause of considerable anxiety, but they did participate, only not as one of the sponsors. The French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, on 3 May was granted the opportunity to take part in private discussions with the other four permanent members of the Security Council at San Francisco. This action was expected to be of little significance, since the sponsors anticipated (somewhat mistakenly) that there would be few substantive meetings by that time. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by Acting Secretary of State, Washington, February 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 77, Minutes of the Third Four-Power Consultative

Security Council, plus six more. The Americans proposed that the Big Five be joined by Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, the Netherlands, and Mexico. With the Soviets unable to count on support from any of these states except Czechoslovakia, they sought to obtain membership for Yugoslavia, their other ally at the conference.<sup>106</sup> At a meeting of the informal organizing group on 13 April Gromyko suggested substituting Yugoslavia for the Netherlands.<sup>107</sup> At a further meeting on 23 April in Washington with Stettinius, Eden, and T.V. Soong, head of the Chinese delegation and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov repeated the request, which was turned down. However, it was agreed that the Executive Committee would be expanded to a membership of fourteen (thirteen being considered unlucky) – the aforementioned plus Yugoslavia, Australia, and Chile, who would also be joined when needed by the chairmen of the four commissions, who were expected to be representatives of South Africa, Belgium, Norway, and Venezuela. At the same time Molotov called for reserving commission and committee membership appointments for representatives of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics once they were admitted. After reminding Molotov that their admission was ultimately up to the upcoming conference, Eden and Stettinius agreed to find positions for the Soviet republics if they were accepted, a pledge later fulfilled.<sup>108</sup> While these changes only slightly improved the proportion of allies of the USSR in the EC, they could be considered a minor victory. Both of its principal allies would have representation in what

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Meeting on Charter Proposals, Held at San Francisco, May 3, 1945, 9:40 p.m., in pp. 581-582; Luard, pp. 38-39.

<sup>106</sup> An alliance had been established in December 1943 between the USSR and the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile of Edvard Beneš, which gave considerable influence over that country's foreign affairs to the USSR. For more information, see Mastny, pp. 133-142. As mentioned above, the Yugoslav government was firmly under the control of Tito, who was still a willing ally of the USSR in the spring of 1945.

<sup>107</sup> Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 13, 1945, noon, in *FRUS 1945 V. I*, pp. 285.

<sup>108</sup> Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 368-370.

was theoretically the most important body, though it did not always exert as much influence as larger or smaller groupings.

At the same meeting, Molotov put forth the proposal, suggested a few weeks earlier by Gromyko in Washington, and to Harriman while in Moscow, that representatives of international organizations which had been invited to take part in the upcoming conference as unofficial advisers and observers, such as the International Labour Organization, be limited to persons from countries that were members of the United Nations alliance. This was opposed by both the British and the Americans, on the grounds that these individuals were not representing their countries of origin. The issue was discussed a second time on 25 April at an informal planning meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers just before the conference opened. There it was revealed that two Irish nationals and one Spanish national were members of the unofficial observing non-governmental delegations, two of whom were already in San Francisco. Molotov did not force a vote on this issue, but registered his opposition to their acceptance for the record, as he would do during the Conference itself.<sup>109</sup> Once again, the Soviet stance on this trivial matter shows Moscow's view that status in the new organization should be closely tied to wartime activities, and illustrates how the USSR sought to gain advantages before the Conference opened.

The goodwill displayed at Tehran, Dumbarton Oaks, and Yalta by the USSR was

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<sup>109</sup> Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 13, 1945, noon., in *Ibid*, p. 285; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, April 18, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 352-3; Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *Ibid*, 371-372; Minutes of the Second Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at San Francisco, April 25, 1945, 11 a.m., in *Ibid*, p. 404; Minutes of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, April 30, 1945, 6:20 p.m., in *Ibid*, 502. The five organizations thus invited were the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which has been discussed in Chapter One of this study.

absent from the San Francisco Conference. Almost from the outset, disputes broke out among the Big Three, which were magnified and exacerbated by the involvement of other states in the negotiations. When the San Francisco Conference officially opened on 25 April 1945, with 282 delegates representing 46 different countries, the overall mood was very subdued. Though crowds had gathered outside of the San Francisco Opera House, they were quiet and solemn. There were no bands, no gala, and President Truman decided not to attend the opening, limiting his involvement to a radio address.<sup>110</sup> The only other speeches that day were from the Governor of California Earl Warren and the Mayor of San Francisco Roger Lapham. However, given the wartime record of the USSR, the Soviet delegation was initially very well received, especially by members of the public. Molotov was at times besieged by crowds seeking his autograph, much to his apparent pleasure, despite the chagrin it inflicted on his NKVD bodyguards.<sup>111</sup>

The principal figures, including Molotov, made their opening speeches at the first plenary session of the conference, on 26 April. Molotov put forth once again Soviet perceptions of the new organization, but spoke also about negative relations between the great powers. Predictably, he stressed the Soviet contribution to the war effort, the role of the great powers, and the importance of security in narrowly military terms, all Soviet priorities with regard to the endeavour. He likewise called on the smaller states to accept a dominant role for the great powers to enhance the organization's decisiveness and the USSR's status. After stating the Soviet commitment to the project, the most relevant aspects of Molotov's words were:

The country of Soviets, which has saved the European civilization in bloody battles with German Fascism, with good reason reminds now the governments of their responsibility for the future of peace-loving nations after the termination of the war. This is all the more necessary to do, that before this war the warning voice of the Soviet republic

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<sup>110</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, pp. 184-185.

<sup>111</sup> Watson, p. 218.

was not heard with due attention...

The coalition of great powers, with their inflexible will to defend their national interests and to promote the liberation of all the other nations which fell victim to sanguinary aggression, is consummating the task of defeating the enemy of all the United Nations. This coalition would accomplish it because it was conscious of its historic mission and because it possessed immense manpower and material resources which were invariably used in the interests of the struggle against the enemy...

If the leading democratic countries show their ability to act in harmony in the post-war period as well that will mean that the interests of peace and security of nations have received at last a firm basis and protection. But that is not all. The point at issue is whether other peace-loving nations are willing to rally around these leading powers to create an effective international security organization, and this has to be settled at this Conference in the interests of the future peace and security of nations. An international organization must be created having certain powers to safeguard the interests of the general peace. This organization must have the necessary means for military protection of the security of nations. Only if conditions are created such as will guarantee that no violation of the peace or threat of such a violation shall go unpunished, and the adoption of necessary punitive measures is not too late, will the organization of security be able to discharge its responsibility for the cause of peace.

Molotov concluded that there would be difficulties ahead, but the Soviet government and Stalin personally were committed to overcoming them. Thus, the Soviets emphasized their view of the new international organization, first outlined at the Teheran Conference, as a framework for the victorious great powers to exert global control to ensure military security. This perspective would be heavily contested during the conference, and result in a number of specific disputes.

The conference ran into difficulties almost immediately. Since the other 42 countries were officially the guests of the four sponsoring powers, Molotov asserted that the conference should have four presidents, a premise suggested before the conference opened. On 31 March, in a conversation with James C. Dunn, the American Assistant Secretary of State who would serve as an important official Adviser to the US delegation,

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<sup>112</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, pp. 131-136.

Gromyko had suggested that the conference should have four chairmen. On 3 April at the first meeting of the informal group on arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, consisting of Stettinius, and the ambassadors and advisors of the other three sponsoring powers, Gromyko again raised the idea. Both the British and the Americans unofficially discouraged the notion.<sup>113</sup> Gromyko made the same comment in a private discussion with Stettinius on 8 April and received little sympathy, and the British also opposed the Soviet initiative.<sup>114</sup> The next day, 9 April, the Soviets proposed a rotating chairmanship of the multinational Committee of Jurists, which was meeting in Washington the same day to prepare a working document for the organization's international court (discussed below). Although the USSR conceded this point quickly with respect to the Committee of Jurists, Gromyko did send a formal letter of protest to Stettinius over the matter on 11 April. The Soviets were very attached to the importance of equality among the sponsoring powers, and its reflection in the office of chairman.<sup>115</sup>

At the San Francisco Conference, the Soviets were not so easily dissuaded, and the issue came up again at the second meeting of the informal organizing group on April 10. Lord Halifax, representing the UK, raised the issue first, stating his government's support for Stettinius as chair of the conference. The Chinese Ambassador, Tao-ming Wei, supported Stettinius as well, but Gromyko stood firm. The Soviet Ambassador maintained that it was necessary to have four chairmen to demonstrate the equality of the four sponsoring powers, and that he did not anticipate any negative practical effects.

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<sup>113</sup> Minutes of the First Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 3, 1945, 2:45 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 190.

<sup>114</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss), Washington, April 8, 1945, in *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

<sup>115</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 9, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 214-215; Memorandum, From the Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 11, 1945, in *Ibid.*, p. 269. United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations*

Halifax unofficially posited the idea that there be one 'active' president, Stettinius, and 'honorary' presidents from the other three powers. Gromyko promised to forward this idea to his government.<sup>116</sup> However, the matter remained unsettled through 14 April, when a representative from the Soviet Embassy, referred to in the American documents only as "Mr. Kapustin of the Soviet Embassy," passed along a proposal that not only the chairmanship of the conference, but also the chairmanships of the Executive and Steering Committees should rotate among the sponsors. Kapustin was unclear how this would work in practice, and was evidently just a messenger for the Kremlin, lacking any real understanding of the proposal he delivered.<sup>117</sup> The situation remained unresolved through 18 April, when Gromyko communicated to Stettinius an official message that the Soviet government would not agree to any list of candidates for official posts in the commissions and committees until the issues of chairmanship, as well as the precise status of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian republics (to be discussed below), were settled.<sup>118</sup>

On 23 April, at the first preliminary meeting of the four foreign ministers mentioned above, Molotov contended that as the principle of equality regarding invitations to the conference, should likewise be applied to the conference proceedings. He claimed that the USSR was not seeking any special or privileged treatment and he trusted that none of the other sponsors were either. Thus, the delegation heads of the Big Four countries should serve as chairmen in rotation, aided by four vice-chairmen chosen from other countries, as this formula would best reflect the principle of equality. Both

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*Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 14, Committee of Jurists* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 52-53.

<sup>116</sup> Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 10, 1945, 3 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 236-237.

<sup>117</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Cabot Coville of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Washington, April 14, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 291-292.

Stettinius and Eden insisted that it would be confusing and impractical to have four chairmen. Dr. Soong was more cautious, and said that anyone could be elected as Chairman, but it should only be one person. Neither side was willing to give way and the matter was left for discussion in the Steering Committee of the 46 delegation heads at the conference itself.<sup>119</sup> On the eve of the conference, Molotov and Gromyko paid a visit to Stettinius and Harriman to discuss a number of issues, including the chairmanship. Molotov brusquely indicated that the Soviet position remained firm, and that honorary chairmanships for the other three heads of sponsoring delegations were insufficient.<sup>120</sup>

The situation remained unresolved when the conference opened, although it was agreed that Stettinius would preside as temporary President of the Conference for the opening session. At 10:37 am on 26 April, the real work of the conference began, with a meeting of the Steering Committee (that is, the heads of all the delegations) to work out procedural issues. During the opening discussion of some minor practical issues, Molotov abruptly raised the issue of the presidency of the Conference, and throughout the meeting adopted an attitude that Cadogan described as “most tiresome”.<sup>121</sup> Once the actual discussion began, Eden spoke first, arguing that while it should be made clear that the sponsoring powers were acting in unity, it would be impractical to have more than one person direct the work of the conference, and Stettinius was the most suitable candidate. Therefore, as per prior arrangement with Stettinius, Eden proposed a compromise formula whereby the four sponsoring delegation chiefs would rotate the chairmanship of public sessions, with Stettinius serving exclusively as the head of the

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<sup>118</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, April 18, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 353.

<sup>119</sup> Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 365-367.

<sup>120</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, April 24, 1945, 5:45 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 381.

<sup>121</sup> Cadogan, p. 734; Luard, p. 40.

Steering and Executive Committees.<sup>122</sup> Molotov used flattering terminology to describe Stettinius' technical competence, but said that it was a point of principle to the Soviet government that the four sponsoring powers be treated as equal, as exemplified by having four Co-Presidents. He went on to contend that this would allow other nations to have their delegates serve as Vice-Presidents, and the USSR was not seeking any special status. Any technical concerns regarding the orderly conduct of the Conference with four Co-Presidents could be easily arranged, Molotov argued, and were less important than the principle of unity among the sponsors. Sr. Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexican delegation Chairman, commented that it was a well-established norm for the host country to provide the President of a Conference, and thus proposed Stettinius. This exacerbated the pessimistic view of the Soviet government that the Latin American states would act as peons of the American government. Molotov responded that the chairmanship of such a momentous conference could not possibly be held by a single person, and that if he had been offered a sole presidency he would have turned it down. He then threatened that if the Soviet proposal was not accepted, the USSR would withdraw its 'sponsor' status and participate in the conference on the same basis of the other non-sponsoring countries.<sup>123</sup>

While the official records are more discreet, Senator Vandenberg noted in his diary that Molotov's attack on Padilla, who was popular among the Latin American delegations, was shockingly vicious and mocking, denouncing Mexico as a puppet of the United States. This account is very plausible given the general attitude displayed by Molotov at the Conference. It failed to have the desired effect of intimidation, and in Vandenberg's estimation fueled anti-Soviet feeling and the unity of the Latin American

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<sup>122</sup> Harriman was unaware of this private arrangement and later diplomatically chided Eden for "letting Ed down" on the chairmanship issue. Cadogan portrayed this disorganization within the American delegation as typical. Cadogan, p. 734.

<sup>123</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 5, Chairmen, Steering*

states thereafter.<sup>124</sup> Padilla refused to back down, likewise claiming it to be a matter of principle, but Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of South Africa, who would play a prominent role in the conference, took a more diplomatic line. He pointed out that given the unprecedented nature of the conference and “almost accidental” nature of the fact that the meetings were in San Francisco, traditional precedents need not apply. Also, matters of fundamental principle to the sponsoring powers should not be ignored. However, he continued, in order for the conference to carry out its great task, considerable speed and efficiency would be needed, therefore he supported Eden’s proposal.

After others followed suit, Molotov made a formal proposal that the Steering Committee support the election of four Chairmen, “in observance of the principle of equality between the four sponsoring states which have borne and are bearing the main burden of the struggle for the defeat of the common enemy.”<sup>125</sup> These exchanges again illustrate the Soviets’ attempt to translate their wartime sacrifices into sympathy for their positions in the international security organization. When further discussion revealed the weakness of Molotov’s position, he attempted to split Eden’s compromise, agreeing in principle to a rotating chairmanship for the plenary sessions, but postponing settlement of the chairmanship of the Steering and Executive Committees. His maneuver failed to receive support from any but the Czechoslovakian delegation. Eden’s proposal was then put to a vote and accepted. Molotov registered his dissent, and called for his own motion to be put to a vote, but his request was denied by Stettinius as the matter had already been ruled on. The issue did not end there, however, as after a recess Eden posited that a unanimous resolution would be preferable, and could be reached with further discussion.

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*and Executive Committees* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 55-58.

<sup>124</sup> Vandenberg, p. 179.

Molotov again called for a resolution of the issue of the plenary sessions and a deferral of the issue of the Steering and Executive Committees, but after a vote Stettinius ruled against it, and the dispute was put on hold until the next morning, when the Steering Committee would meet again in place of a plenary session previously scheduled for that time.<sup>126</sup> Strident opposition to the Soviet line by both Latin American states and members of the British Commonwealth no doubt increased the anxiety of the Soviet delegation. Since the USSR generally regarded these states as ‘cat’s-paws’ of the Americans and British, it seemed that their erstwhile allies were turning against them. Nonetheless, despite the rising tension, an atmosphere of collegiality had not yet been entirely abandoned. When Eden proposed his resolution, he prefaced it by saying “I believe the British are supposed to have something to do with compromise,” which provoked general mirth. Furthermore, after Stettinius made two direct and personal pleas to Molotov to accept Eden’s proposal, he received from Molotov “a really friendly, cordial smile” and left the meeting with the feeling that difficulties could be worked out.<sup>127</sup> However, this optimism soon dissipated.

At the next Steering Committee meeting, the following morning (27 April) the chairmanship question was the first item, although Molotov objected to the agenda, and Gromyko sought to raise the issue of an invitation to the World Trade Union Conference (to be discussed below). Both attempts to forestall the discussion were brushed aside by Stettinius. The discussion of the chairmanship began with Eden reiterating his proposal. First, the Conference should have four Presidents and the plenary sessions be chaired by the four sponsoring powers in alphabetical order. However, the other three sponsors

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<sup>125</sup> *UNCIO Documents*, V. 5, p. 58.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55-62. Steering Committee Document 29, Provisional, UNCIO Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Organize the Conference, April 26, 1945, 10:37 AM, in file Organization of the Conference (3), in series UNCIO Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

would delegate to Stettinius the right to preside over meetings of the four sponsoring powers, and the Steering and Executive Committees. Molotov then said, as he had indicated in a private four-power meeting earlier that day, that he would accept Eden's suggestion with some minor, "insignificant" changes. His only modification was that the other three sponsors' delegation heads also be formally recognized as chairmen of the Steering and Executive Committees, though delegating the actual power to Stettinius to conduct the practical business of the Conference. When Dr. Soong, as well as the representatives of Cuba, New Zealand and the Philippines (perhaps not insignificantly, two American allies and one British Dominion) urged Molotov to drop his amendment, he did so. Thus, the issue was resolved by a vote of unanimous support for Eden's compromise.<sup>128</sup> That afternoon, the Plenary Session made acceptance of Eden's compromise official.<sup>129</sup> Though the Soviets achieved a considerable boost in prestige and some practical power by recognition of Molotov's status as a Co-President of the Conference, this outcome could hardly be considered a success for the Soviet delegation. Aside from the ill feeling and resentment generated by Molotov's pedantic and belligerent attitude, the Soviets clearly could not count on the support of either of the other sponsoring powers on the principle of unity alone. Similarly, except for Czechoslovakia the rest of world aligned themselves with the Americans and British, or remained mute. Thus, the USSR was indeed isolated within the organization.

Another issue that similarly illustrated Soviet isolation was the attempt to obtain

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<sup>127</sup> Stettinius, p. 338.

<sup>128</sup> Minutes of the Third Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, April 27, 1945, 10:00 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 472, *UNCIO Documents*, V. 5, pp. 82-83. Provisional, UNCIO Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Organize the Conference, April 27, 1945, 10:45 AM, in file Credentials - Full Powers: Authorized Signers of Conference Documents, also "Expected Signers", in series UNCIO Proceedings - Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

for the World Trade Union Conference (WTUC) the right to participate in the San Francisco proceedings as an adviser in a capacity similar to that of the ILO. The WTUC had opened in London on 6 February 1945, and had voted to direct one of its leaders, the prominent Chicago activist Sidney Hillman, to make a formal request for such representation. Perhaps influenced by the widely held belief that the WTUC was Communist-dominated, Stettinius rebuffed Hillman's request, saying instead this organization's views could be submitted to the secretariat of the conference for distribution to the delegations.<sup>130</sup> However, the request was nevertheless brought up at the meeting of the informal organizing group on 13 April, at which time Gromyko asserted that he would ascertain his government's position.<sup>131</sup> Hillman's petition evidently was viewed sympathetically by the USSR, as was made evident by Molotov's stance when the issue was raised in the four-power preliminary meeting on 23 April. Here, Molotov supported the idea that the WTUC be invited as an official adviser, a status not granted any organizations other than governments. Stettinius and Eden both felt this proposal would be impractical and set an undesirable precedent. They similarly opposed Molotov's suggestion that the matter be left up to the Steering Committee at the upcoming conference, as it was not the prerogative of the SC to issue invitations. The question remained unresolved by that meeting.<sup>132</sup> At the second meeting on 25 April at

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<sup>129</sup> Minutes of the Third Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, April 27, 1945, 10:00 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 472, *UNCIO Documents*, V. 1, pp. 166-167.

<sup>130</sup> Telegram, The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, Washington, April 10, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 240, Tom Connally, with Alfred Steinberg, *My Name is Tom Connally* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 281.

<sup>131</sup> Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 13, 1945, noon., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 287.

<sup>132</sup> The discussion is recorded in Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *Ibid.*, p. 372. In this record, the WTUC is incorrectly referred to as the International Labour Organization. The fact that the request so mentioned came from Hillman, that the USSR was not represented by the ILO, the index to the volume, and the general context and tone of the

San Francisco, Molotov said it would be an embarrassment to the USSR if the WTUC was not invited. However, it was decided that the question could be discussed in the Steering Committee, but with the clear recognition that the sponsors were not in agreement on the matter.<sup>133</sup>

After first being mentioned on 27 April by Gromyko as stated above, the matter was raised in the Steering Committee on 30 April. Vasili Kuznetsov, a Soviet delegate who was also the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of the Trade Unions of the USSR, and a member of the WTUC's Administrative Committee, made an impassioned plea for the organization's official representation at San Francisco. He claimed the WTUC represented 60 million workers, and, characteristically, the importance of their labour to the defeat of the Axis. He therefore urged that the WTUC be represented in an official capacity, and that countries choose to nominate a member of the WTUC to their delegation.<sup>134</sup> However, while gratitude for the work of the WTUC's members was expressed, several states opposed the precedent of representation by non-governmental bodies, including other labour organizations, private organizations, armed forces, and representatives of capital. Recognizing that any motion on the matter would be defeated, Molotov did not call for a vote on the question. Francis V. Forde of Australia then suggested that a personal invitation to the WTUC to express its views in writing be issued

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discussion (including the fact that the ILO had been discussed earlier in the meeting in a very different manner) make it clear that this was either a misprint in publication or an error on the part of those keeping the records, and when this discussion refers to the ILO they are in fact referring to the WTUC. The issue was raised by the meeting's secretary, the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Alger Hiss. A member of FDR's staff at Yalta, Hiss served as the Secretary-General of the San Francisco Conference, the head of the meeting's secretariat. Of course, his tenure in the State Department would become most famous due to his controversial 1950 conviction for perjury related to accusations of espionage for the USSR. Regardless of the veracity of these accusations, there is no apparent evidence that Hiss served in anything other than a competent bureaucratic capacity at San Francisco, and more detailed investigation lies outside the scope of this study.

<sup>133</sup> Minutes of the Second Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at San Francisco, April 25, 1945, 11:00 a.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 404-405.

<sup>134</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, pp. 58-60.

by the conference, so that the rejection of their plea for admittance did not seem like a harsh rebuff, but this idea failed to gain significant support. Thus, it appeared that the matter was closed.<sup>135</sup>

However, on 9 May, Committee 3 (Economic and Social Cooperation) of Commission II (the General Assembly) – commonly referred to in the Conference’s parlance as II/3 – decided to seek an opinion from the five ‘observing’ non-governmental organizations, plus the WTUC.<sup>136</sup> Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar of India, who was the Chairman of II/3, ruled that this invitation was within the committee’s powers. The acceptability of this decision was discussed by the Steering Committee the following day, particularly in the light of Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia’s decision as Chairman of III/4 (Commission III dealt with the Security Council, Committee 4 with Regional Arrangements) that committees did not have the right to do this. Aside from the USSR, New Zealand and China also officially supported the initiative of II/3. However, the UK, the two Dominions of Canada and South Africa, Belgium, Egypt, and Syria all went on the record in opposition and when the issue was put to a vote, it was decided explicitly that non-governmental representation would be limited to the five organizations mentioned previously, which included the ILO but excluded the WTUC.<sup>137</sup> This was a defeat not only for the WTUC, but also its champion the USSR. The fact that the ILO, which did not have the support of the USSR, was invited to the Conference, while the Soviet-backed WTUC was explicitly rejected, was a glaring illustration of Soviet isolation within the United Nations. The lack of support from the British and Americans similarly weakened Soviet hopes of continued great-power unity in discussions with the

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<sup>135</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 152-154.

<sup>136</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 10, Commission II, General Assembly* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), p. 16.

<sup>137</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 207-212.

rest of the world. Thus, Soviet assumptions regarding the hostility of an organization of states in a capitalist-dominated world were being confirmed, and the optimism built through the Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, and Yalta conferences was steadily disintegrating.

The issue which dealt the most serious blows to the Allied relationship, and thus the effective functioning of the new international security organization, related to membership. First of all, the decision to include the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics continued to cause difficulties, as did the failure to invite representatives of the Provisional Polish government. Furthermore, the American desire to gain admittance for Argentina despite that country's Axis sympathies, and in contravention of the Yalta agreements regarding membership, was also a matter of significant contention. These issues, which became strongly linked at San Francisco, showed that the great powers would not work together harmoniously in the manner Stalin had hoped. Thus, they contributed substantially to the deterioration of Soviet-Western relations and the dawn of the Cold War.

Even though it had appeared to have been resolved at Yalta, the 'X-matter', the Soviet Union's highly controversial desire for representation for its constituent republics, continued to be a source of tension. Within weeks of the Crimean Conference, disagreement broke out between the Soviet and American governments on what had been agreed. As discussed in Chapter Four, the US and the UK had agreed to support membership in the new international security organization for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet republics. However, the Soviets assumed that the great powers could impose their will on the other members of the organization, and so membership for the two republics was already secured, and began to act accordingly. On 17 March, Gromyko informed the US government that a delegation with support staff, totaling approximately thirty persons, would be representing the Byelorussian and Ukrainian

Republics at San Francisco.<sup>138</sup> A similar message was passed along to the British.<sup>139</sup> In neither case was it made entirely clear whether these delegations would take part in the proceedings from the outset, or merely be on hand in anticipation of their invitation. In response, two days later Roosevelt drafted a message to Stalin indicating that this action was inappropriate, particularly given the difficulties that FDR was anticipating in convincing his people to support the agreement. This message was never sent, although the substance of it was passed along through Gromyko.<sup>140</sup> In a message passed to Stettinius through Gromyko on 25 March, the Soviet government explicitly stated that the Byelorussian and Ukrainian delegations should be on hand, as it had been agreed at Yalta that they should be accepted as founding members of the organization. Their invitation should therefore be dealt with early in the conference, so that the two delegations could participate in most of the talks and thus give their charter status substantive meaning, as a comment from Churchill at the time seemed to recognize. At the same time, Gromyko once again reminded the Americans of the wartime contributions of the two republics, in contrast to that of many of the small states that had been invited.<sup>141</sup>

The US adopted an unyielding attitude toward the Soviet position. Stettinius replied to Gromyko on 29 March that while the US and Britain supported Ukrainian and

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<sup>138</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), Washington, March 17, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 133-134.

<sup>139</sup> Discussed in Telegram, The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States, London, March 21, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 143.

<sup>140</sup> Draft Message from the President to Marshal Stalin, Undated, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, pp. 990-991, Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, March 23, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>141</sup> Gromyko paraphrased Churchill's statement made at the fifth plenary meeting of the Yalta Conference, held on the evening of 8 February, that it would be illogical to include small states that had contributed little to the war effort to the organization's founding conference while excluding the Byelorussian and Ukrainian republics which had sacrificed so much in the struggle against Germany. Memorandum, From the Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 25, 1945, in *Ibid, FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 158-159. Bohlen's minutes of the meeting record "The Prime Minister remarked that it would not seem quite right to him to take in small countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet republics from the meeting. He said that he had very much in mind the

Byelorussian *initial membership*, the issue of their *participation* in the Conference had not been explicitly discussed, thus the American side would not be bound by the Soviet interpretation.<sup>142</sup> The text of the agreement did not offer any help to resolve this dispute. The relevant protocol simply read (with no deviation in the English or Russian texts) “When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.”<sup>143</sup> Thus, the actual agreement did not contradict the logic of the Soviet viewpoint, but it did not specify any details or oblige the British and Americans to accept it.

In the third meeting of the informal organizing group on 13 April, Gromyko raised the point again, saying that he could not agree to the assignment of officers for the commissions and committees as they did not include the Byelorussian and Ukrainian delegations. Stettinius, supported by Halifax, reminded him that the American and British commitment was only to support the Soviet request when it was made, and nothing more. Therefore, participation for the delegates of the republics could not be guaranteed.<sup>144</sup> On 18 April Gromyko made the statement to Stettinius mentioned above, that the USSR would not complete an agreement regarding the names of Commissions and Committees until the matters of chairmanship for the Conference and the status of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian republics was resolved.<sup>145</sup> On 21 April, Stettinius and Eden agreed in a private meeting to limit their support for the Soviet initiative to an affirmative

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martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.” Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 775.

<sup>142</sup> Memorandum, From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko), Washington, March 29, 1945, in *Ibid, FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 163.

<sup>143</sup> Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 976, Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 274.

<sup>144</sup> Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 13, 1945, noon., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 286.

vote and a short statement, rather than a strong campaign that could risk scuttling the Conference.<sup>146</sup> US and British support for the USSR would thus prove to be lukewarm at best.

On 23 April Molotov brought up the issue again. He stated that since there had been both a conference of Inter-American countries and of the British Dominions, he assumed that the support of these nations for the inclusion of the two Soviet republics would be forthcoming. Both Eden and Stettinius replied that they did not control the votes of any country other than their own, and their only pledge was to support the proposal themselves. This was in line with the text of the agreement, but undermined the Soviet assumption that the US and UK could exercise decisive influence over these delegations, and would use it to support the Kremlin. Molotov indicated his displeasure, and made a vague threat that “the Soviet Government would form its own judgment as to how well we [the USSR, US, and UK] can carry out joint agreements by the success that is achieved in electing these two Republics as initial members of the world organization.”<sup>147</sup> When Eden replied that only the American and British votes could be spoken for, Molotov replied that he had nothing further to say on the subject.<sup>148</sup>

The following day Molotov and Gromyko paid Stettinius a visit to discuss outstanding issues. Molotov expressed grave concerns over the failure to come to an agreement regarding the seating of the two republics; Stettinius bemoaned the failure to reach an agreement regarding Poland. They both feared that unless a closer degree of cooperation could be achieved, collaboration among the great powers in general and the new international security organization in particular was threatened. The conversation

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<sup>145</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, April 18, 1945, in *Ibid.*, p. 353.

<sup>146</sup> Stettinius, p. 326.

<sup>147</sup> Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 365.

did not make any progress on either issue, and Molotov repeatedly expressed a belief that the US had changed its attitude towards the USSR since Yalta. He accused the Americans and British of trying to dictate policy to the Soviet Union, and treat the USSR as a second-rate power.<sup>149</sup>

At the next informal planning meeting in San Francisco the day of the formal opening, Molotov pushed successfully to include the question of invitations for the two Soviet republics on the agenda of the first Steering Committee meeting.<sup>150</sup> At a short meeting the next day Stettinius informed Molotov that after an informal investigation he expected the two Soviet republics to be readily accepted. However, Stettinius did not have any informative reply when Molotov inquired about their actual participation in the Conference.<sup>151</sup> Thus the situation remained unresolved until it was dealt with by the Steering Committee and became intertwined with arguments over the status of Poland and Argentina.

The dispute among the great powers over the reorganization of the Polish government was continued at San Francisco and further contributed to the decline in relations. While the Lublin Committee-based Provisional Government remained unchanged, the British and Americans refused to allow this government to represent Poland at the San Francisco Conference. On 9 March the Soviet government informed the Americans and British through their respective embassies in Moscow that the matter required additional discussion. The Soviets acknowledged that if the Polish Government of National Unity was established before the Conference, it would certainly be

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<sup>148</sup> Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Monday, April 23, 1945, 9:35 p.m., in *Ibid.*, pp. 363-365.

<sup>149</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, April 24, 1945, 5:45 p.m., in *Ibid.*, pp. 380-384.

<sup>150</sup> Minutes of the Second Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at San Francisco, April 25, 1945, 11 a.m., in *Ibid.*, pp. 405-406.

<sup>151</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Member of the United States Delegation, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, April 26, 1945, 10:20 a.m., in *Ibid.*, p. 444.

represented there. However, if this reorganization was not successful before the Conference ended, the Provisional Government should then provide representatives. The Soviet memo argued that it would be inexplicable if Poland was not represented at the upcoming meeting given the scale of that country's wartime suffering and fierce partisan movement, and that the Provisional Government exercised exclusive power in the territory of Poland with broad popular support.

As well, the Soviets reminded the British and Americans of their acceptance of several states at the meeting which did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR. Thus, it would not be unprecedented or unfair to include a Polish authority that lacked diplomatic relations with the British and Americans.<sup>152</sup> By 17 March the British and Americans had agreed to resist this Soviet demand.<sup>153</sup> However, while Stettinius made the American stance clear to the media, the US government did not officially notify the USSR of its position, prompting an irritated further message on the question from Moscow on 22 March.<sup>154</sup> A formal message stating the American position – namely that Polish participation was desirable but only possible after the Government of National Unity was formed – was sent on 29 March.<sup>155</sup> The Soviets refused to let the matter drop so easily, however, and sent another memo maintaining their position on 17 April.<sup>156</sup> A week later on 24 April the Americans made an official reply to this memo similarly refusing to back down.<sup>157</sup> On the same day, Molotov and Gromyko met with Stettinius

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<sup>152</sup> Memorandum, From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Aide-Memoire, Washington, March 9, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>153</sup> Telegram, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, March 17, 1945, in *Ibid*, 139-140.

<sup>154</sup> Memorandum, From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Delivered in Washington, March 22, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 147-148.

<sup>155</sup> Memorandum, From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Aide-Memoire, Washington, March 29, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 164.

<sup>156</sup> Memorandum, From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Delivered in Washington, April 17, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 330.

<sup>157</sup> Memorandum, From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Delivered in Washington, April 24, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 379-380.

and Harriman as described above, but only deepened the animosity.<sup>158</sup> The issue remained a highly contentious one when the conference opened.

The other major membership-related dispute related to Argentina. Despite considerable American and British pressure, Argentina had remained neutral throughout the war, and had even maintained diplomatic ties with the Axis until 1944. The military régime that took power in 1943 displayed considerable pro-Axis sympathies. Argentina did not declare war on Germany until 27 March 1945, thus well after 1 March, which was the cutoff date for admission to the San Francisco Conference agreed upon at Yalta. However, at the Conference of American Republics, held in Mexico City 21 February – 8 March 1945, several Latin American states supported Argentina's membership. The Americans anticipated that this would provoke strong Soviet resistance. Aside from the broader Soviet emphasis on wartime contributions, Argentina and the USSR had negative relations dating back many years. In September 1930 a right-wing coup in Argentina installed a government hostile towards the USSR. Trade between the two countries dropped sharply.<sup>159</sup> Relations declined further in December 1939. When the USSR launched the Winter War against Finland on 30 November, Argentina was at the forefront of the movement to expel the Soviet Union from the League of Nations.<sup>160</sup> Reports from the communist movement in Argentina repeatedly exaggerated the pro-Axis feeling in the country, adding to the difficulties.<sup>161</sup> Thus, the inclusion of Argentina would be highly inflammatory to the USSR because it would undermine the principle that the new organization should be controlled by the victors of the war. At Yalta, Stalin had explicitly named Argentina as a country that should not be invited to the Conference, and Roosevelt

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<sup>158</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, April 24, 1945, 5:45 p.m., in, *Ibid*, pp. 382-384.

<sup>159</sup> Rapoport, pp. 243-244.

<sup>160</sup> Florinsky, pp. 72-74.

<sup>161</sup> Rapoport, p. 249.

assured him that it was not even subject to consideration.<sup>162</sup>

At the same time, the American government wished to make concessions to the numerous Latin American governments, which at the Mexico City Conference lobbied hard for the acceptance of Argentina as an adherent to the United Nations Declaration. Hence, the Americans reached an agreement at Mexico City that they would support Argentine admission to the United Nations alliance once a number of diplomatic criteria were met. However, some of the criteria were vague, and so the US State Department decided that they could if necessary use this lack of precision to withhold their country's sponsorship of Argentina's adherence until it was generally accepted by "the world," not just the Americas.<sup>163</sup> The US leaders were faced with a dilemma. While they wanted to build on the wartime improvement in hemispheric relations, they realized that offering Argentina membership in the United Nations alliance would entail major difficulties. It would offend Soviet sensibilities, and contravene explicit agreements signed by President Roosevelt at Yalta. In a meeting with Stettinius on 17 April Eden urged the US not to push for Argentine adherence to the Declaration by United Nations, though he nonetheless pledged British support if the Americans chose to do so. When Stettinius pointed out that allowing Argentina to join the alliance formally in this way would thus raise the question of membership in the new international security organization, "Mr. Eden seemed somewhat surprised at this and wondered what would happen in that event."<sup>164</sup> Nelson Rockefeller, the Assistant Secretary of State who oversaw inter-American relations, was the most militant proponent of acceptance for Argentina. Recognizing the highly negative effect that such a stance would have on the relationship

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<sup>162</sup> Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 7, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 773; Gromyko, *Krymskaia konferentsiia*, p. 147.

<sup>163</sup> Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, April 5, 1945, 5 p.m. in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 199-200.

with the USSR, Harriman strongly opposed him. The level of disagreement became so sharp that at one point Harriman asked him bluntly “Nelson, are you the ambassador to the Argentine or the ambassador of the Argentine?”<sup>165</sup>

Argentina’s official request on 15 April to sign the Declaration by United Nations made the issue increasingly difficult to leave unresolved. When the matter was discussed among the Executive Committee of the American delegation on the morning of the San Francisco Conference’s opening, Rockefeller suggested offering membership for Argentina as a *quid pro quo* to the Latin American states in exchange for their support for acceptance of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics. This proposal won little support initially, but it was clearly recognized that to invite Argentina while excluding the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics would gravely offend the Soviets and possibly lead to the USSR abandoning the entire enterprise. Harriman pointed out that the matter had not been discussed officially with the Soviets, and it would come as a rude shock to them. To complicate matters further, the Americans realized that if the Soviets called for an early vote on allowing their two republics to attend, the motion may well be defeated due to Latin American opposition. The Soviet side would likely then accuse Rockefeller of deliberately using Latin American states as cutouts to circumvent prior agreements and disregard legitimate Soviet concerns. As no firm consensus was found at that meeting, or in a very similar discussion which took place that evening, and without the approval of Truman (who was also described as “dead set” against the inclusion of Argentina), no decision was reached at that time.<sup>166</sup> However, the linkage of participation by the Soviet republics and membership for Argentina became more firmly established in US thinking.

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<sup>164</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, April 17, 1945, in *Ibid.*, p. 329.

<sup>165</sup> Harriman, p. 455.

<sup>166</sup> Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation (B), Held at San Francisco, Wednesday, April 25, 1945, 9:30 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 389, pp. 396-

The following day, after discussing the matter further among the American delegation and with Truman, Stettinius achieved acceptance of a stance wherein the US would support the seating of Argentina in the Conference, but not its adherence to the United Nations Declaration, as well as the seating of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian delegations at a later date.<sup>167</sup> The decision was based on a perceived need to placate the Latin American republics with regard to Argentina in order to obtain their support for the inclusion of the Soviet republics.

Ultimately, however, this concession by the US to its neighbours appeared to the USSR as prioritizing Latin American feelings over legitimate Soviet interests. This viewpoint was substantially reinforced by the accurate Soviet accusation that the Americans were violating the Yalta agreements on membership in the new international organization, whereas the Soviets were merely requesting the fulfillment of prior agreements on the two Soviet republics and Poland. The American reversal of position, however benignly motivated, significantly undermined Soviet-American cooperation within the new organization. The following day, 27 April, after further discussions among the delegation and with Truman, Stettinius was empowered to take whatever action he saw fit in the matter.<sup>168</sup> However, by that point the linkage between seating the delegations of the Soviet republics and the acceptance of Argentina had been inextricably linked.

Earlier that day, the first phase of the issue, membership (but not participation) for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, had already been addressed by the Conference's Steering Committee. The topic was discussed after the Soviet defeat on the

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398, p. 401; Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Wednesday, April 25, 1945, 8:40 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 411-413.

<sup>167</sup> Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, April 26, 1945, 9:30 a.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 416-418.

chairmanship issue discussed above and the settling of less controversial administrative questions, including the formal election of the Executive Committee, which did not vary from that previously agreed upon by the sponsoring powers. Molotov opened by saying that he spoke on behalf of the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, which had instructed him to represent them, thus emphasizing the alleged sovereignty of the Republics. Perhaps attempting to present the issue as a *fait accompli*, Molotov began by reading verbatim the text from Yalta wherein the US and UK agreed to support the request for membership, and called upon the states present to associate themselves with the Crimea decisions. He then went on to explain the constitutional status of the republics, including their right to secede from the Soviet Union and to conduct foreign relations, including making treaties, participating in international acts and conferences, and establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Molotov spoke in glowing terms of the contributions of these republics towards the war effort, noting that they provided at least one million soldiers each for the Red Army, and had suffered acutely. This account may have fallen on particularly receptive ears, as just minutes earlier the meeting had been interrupted for a special announcement that the Soviet, American, and British armies had met in the heart of Germany, presaging the defeat of the Axis. Molotov closed by reiterating that those present should accept what had been decided at Yalta. This short speech was characteristic of the Soviet attitude that status should be closely tied to wartime performance, and the victorious great powers should hold a dominant position that the rest of the world would then be compelled to accept.

After Molotov spoke, Stettinius made a short plea in support of Molotov's proposal, citing Roosevelt's reasoning that the wartime sufferings and contributions of

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<sup>168</sup> Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation, Held

these two republics justified their admission. Eden was even more terse, stating that he supported what Molotov and Stettinius had said. Dr. Soong of China also went on the record in favour of the proposal. No opposition was expressed openly. Iran, France, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, and Australia all supported to the Soviet proposal. Then, the Steering Committee voted unanimously to admit the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics as initial members of the organization.<sup>169</sup> Thus, the Soviets won a victory and reduced their isolation within the new international security organization by adhering to the literal interpretation of the Crimea agreement.

However, this victory was only a small one, as by that time the question of the two delegations being invited to participate in the Conference carried much greater political importance than mere membership. This participation question was the next item on the agenda, and, hoping to maintain the momentum generated by the broad support for the acceptance of the republics, Molotov then proposed that the Conference accept the request of the governments of the two republics that they be invited to take part in the Conference. Unsurprisingly, it was a Latin American state that rebuffed this proposal. Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia stated that while he was pleased by the inclusion of the two republics, he was concerned that their participation could lead to public confusion over a perception of the Soviet delegation having more than one vote. Thus, he suggested that the matter be referred to the Executive Committee. In general throughout the Conference, when they feared broad opposition, the Soviets displayed a preference to discuss issues in the Executive Committee over the Steering Committee, and when possible preferred discussion among the Big Four only. However, in this case

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at San Francisco, Friday, April 27, 1945, 8:55 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 483-485.

<sup>169</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 85-92, Provisional, UNCIO Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Organize the Conference, April 27, 1945, 10:45 AM, in file Credentials - Full Powers: Authorized Signers of Conference Documents, also "Expected Signers", in series UNCIO

Molotov was cautious towards this recommendation, evidently fearing that it was a stalling tactic. Still, when Stettinius moved that the Executive Committee make a report on the matter for the next meeting of the Steering Committee, hence reducing this concern, Molotov dropped his opposition and there was unanimous support for the motion.<sup>170</sup>

After a brief talk about administrative matters, Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia opened discussion on the agenda's next item - the issue of Polish representation – by calling for an invitation to the Polish Provisional Government, a stance which coincided with that of his country's Soviet hegemon. Molotov supported Masaryk's call. However, Stettinius stated that Poland could not be represented until the government was reorganized in line with the Yalta agreements. He was immediately supported by Eden. Perhaps hoping to avoid a dispute, Victor Andrade of Bolivia pointed out that since Masaryk had only made a statement, not a formal motion, there was nothing specific for the Steering Committee to debate and the matter should be passed on to the Executive Committee. Molotov voiced his support for this suggestion with a formal motion, in accordance with the general Soviet policy of making decisions in the smallest body possible to increase their relative strength. Dr. Ivan Subâsič of Yugoslavia spoke next, pointing out the unfairness of the absence of Poland from the Conference, and inquiring why Poland, the first victim of German aggression, was not receiving the same rights as the other United Nations. Again, this was in accordance with Soviet policy, illustrating the close mutual sympathy between the two states, despite the absence of an agreement which tied the hands of the Yugoslav delegation as was the case with the Czechoslovaks.

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Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

<sup>170</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 92-93, Provisional, UNCIO Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Organize the Conference, April 27, 1945, 10:45 AM, in file Credentials - Full Powers: Authorized Signers of Conference Documents, also “Expected Signers”, in series UNCIO

When Hector David Castro of El Salvador raised a procedural objection, Molotov reacted harshly. Stettinius then stepped in to support Molotov's motion that the matter be referred to the Executive Committee, who would issue a report at the next session of the Steering Committee, though Prime Minister Peter Fraser of New Zealand questioned whether or not the issue could be decided so quickly. Caracciolo Parra-Pérez of Venezuela stated that while Poland's participation was indisputably desired, this was a matter for the Yalta signatories to settle. Perhaps expecting support for his position, Molotov then made a tactical blunder by inquiring whether or not the French delegate Georges Bidault had something to say, which, after an awkward and embarrassed pause, he did not. Masaryk, seemingly grudgingly, also spoke out in favour of the Soviet position.

At that point, Stettinius as temporary chairman ruled that the Conference had no right to consider the matter until the Polish government was reorganized in alignment with the Yalta decisions. Molotov retorted that this step was an abuse of Stettinius' temporary authority, no doubt reinforcing Soviet attitudes regarding the importance of the chairmanship dispute, which at that time remained unresolved. He noted that as a sponsoring power, the USSR was well within its rights to ask the Conference to consider the matter, and that Stettinius could not use his position to block discussion of an issue because it did not correspond with the American viewpoint. Eden commented cautiously that an agreement regarding the Polish government had been made at Yalta, and expressed surprise that the issue of participation would even be raised before it had been carried out. He asserted that His Majesty's Government had to that point, despite its best efforts, been unable to ascertain whether or not the Polish Provisional Government was truly representative of the Polish people, and thus it could not yet be invited. Fraser of

New Zealand declared that the issue should not be referred to the Executive Committee because it would only sow division, but that it should still be discussed. Stettinius then clarified that he had not made an official ruling as Temporary Chairman, but had only stated the position of the US government.

Molotov spoke up again, claiming that the USSR was seeking to implement the Crimea agreement regarding Poland, but was unable to do so single-handedly, and he hoped that he, Eden, and Stettinius would be able to resolve the issue. He pointed out that there was nothing in the Yalta agreement that excluded Polish participation in the Conference until after the reorganization of its government and thus reiterated the Soviet right to raise the issue, again suggesting that it should be dealt with by the Executive Committee. In what would prove to be a common pattern, self-appointed mediator Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium sought a diplomatic compromise. He presented a motion that expressed sympathy and admiration for the Polish population, and hope that the sponsoring nations would be able to reach an agreement amongst themselves as soon as possible that would allow Poland to participate in the Conference. Field Marshal Smuts expressed his support for the motion, noting that the sponsoring powers had the right to consider invitations, observing that raising delicate diplomatic problems without more careful preparation would have a very negative effect on the Conference.

Molotov, correctly seeing that Spaak's notion could remove the issue from the formal consideration by the Conference, suggested that the Belgian motion be postponed while revisions to it were considered. Stettinius then called for an immediate vote on Spaak's motion. It was passed with no dissenting votes, but several abstentions, with Molotov noting the Soviet abstention for the record, and reserving the right to raise the

issue in the Executive Committee.<sup>171</sup> This decision can only have been considered as a defeat for the USSR. A further blow occurred later that day when the same resolution on Poland was formally adopted in the Conference's Second Plenary Session.<sup>172</sup> Furthermore, Molotov's aggressive and arrogant demeanour during the discussion dumbfounded many of the delegates from smaller countries, and severely dampened hopes of a new era of international harmony and cooperation. In Spaak's words,

To those who, like myself, still believed in good faith and understanding among the great allies, the violence of the discussion came as a genuine surprise. These were not friends who were locked in debate; this was a confrontation of adversaries. Molotov was particularly aggressive.<sup>173</sup>

Even the Soviet Union's close ally Czechoslovakia was ambivalent in its support. At the bar after the meeting, Bohlen encountered the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister drinking whiskey and soda. Masaryk rhetorically asked Bohlen "what can one do with these Russians?" He told Bohlen that he had received a note from Molotov "out of the clear blue sky" informing him that his country must vote in favour of the Soviet proposal for the seating of Poland or forfeit Soviet friendship. Masaryk mused "What kind of a way is that to behave to a country that is trying to be friendly?... You can be on your knees and this is not enough for the Russians."<sup>174</sup> Similarly, Masaryk later told Harriman to "pay no attention" to Czechoslovakian support for Soviet positions at San Francisco, as Beneš' agreement with the USSR was that he would support their foreign policy

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<sup>171</sup> Paul-Henri Spaak, with Henry Fox, transl., *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 101-102; *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 93-97, Provisional, UNCIO Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Organize the Conference, April 27, 1945, 10:45 AM, in file Credentials - Full Powers: Authorized Signers of Conference Documents, also "Expected Signers", in series UNCIO Proceedings - Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

<sup>172</sup> Minutes of the Third Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, April 27, 1945, 10:00 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 472, *UNCIO Documents, V. 1*, p. 168.

<sup>173</sup> Spaak, p. 101.

<sup>174</sup> Quoted in Bohlen, p. 214.

initiatives in exchange for domestic autonomy.<sup>175</sup> Molotov's highly abrasive attitude, instead of successfully prodding the small states to accept Soviet wishes, instead left the USSR even further isolated within the new organization. Soviet ignorance regarding the rest of the world, coupled with its leaders' generally xenophobic attitude towards foreigners, and consequent insensitivity to the negative effects of a high-handed attitude, had a detrimental impact on the USSR's foreign policy aims.

Further consultation that evening confirmed Stettinius' fear that the Latin American states would not accept Byelorussian and Ukrainian participation without that of Argentina, as well as the fact that he would not be able to postpone the issue either. The next evening, a Saturday, an informal meeting of the four sponsors took place with the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, who represented the rest of their Latin American counterparts. The question was thoroughly discussed, but no progress was made as Molotov would not permit Argentina to join if Poland could not.<sup>176</sup> According to Cadogan, who was participating in the meeting in place of Eden, the Latin American states were refusing to accept the participation of "Molotov's 2 sham Republics, unless Molotov agreed equally to admit Argentina... [and] Molotov wouldn't admit the Argentines unless we admitted his beastly sham Polish government."<sup>177</sup> Thus it is unsurprising that no agreement was reached. The same day, the Soviet government sent a message through normal diplomatic channels reiterating its insistence that the Polish Provisional Government be represented at San Francisco.<sup>178</sup>

Thus, the stage was set for a tumultuous meeting of the Executive Committee, which gathered for the first time on the morning of Monday, 30 April. On the agenda

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<sup>175</sup> Harriman, p. 454.

<sup>176</sup> Minutes of the Fourth Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, Held at Washington, Saturday, April 28, 1945, 6:45 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 486-488.

<sup>177</sup> Cadogan, p. 736.

were three questions: inviting the delegations from the Soviet republics; the nationality of representatives of non-governmental organizations; and whether an invitation should be extended to Argentina. As the meeting began, Molotov attempted to strengthen the Soviet position, by striking item three (Argentina) from the agenda, and replacing it with preparations for that day's Steering Committee meeting and Plenary Session. Pedro Leão Velloso of Brazil immediately objected to this. A discussion regarding the agenda ensued, in the course of which it was revealed that the item regarding Argentina had been placed on the agenda the previous day at the request of Molotov, but just before the meeting he sought to drop it in favour of the other questions. Why Molotov had added the item to the agenda in the first place is unclear. Perhaps he was anticipating stronger support for the Soviet position on the matter, and then realized that he would not obtain it. After some discussion, it was decided to proceed with the original agenda, therefore the EC turned to the participation of the two Soviet republics.

Dr. Herbert Evatt of Australia moved that the Executive Committee formally recommend that the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics be invited to take their seats at the Conference. Czechoslovakia, less surprisingly, seconded the motion. Sr. Padilla of Mexico interjected, raising the issue of Argentine representation, and emphasizing the importance of hemispheric solidarity. He rather spuriously linked invitations to the Soviet delegations and Argentina on the grounds that they were both at war with the Axis and both entitled to one vote in the Assembly. Therefore, Padilla contended, the three should be invited as part of a single motion. This ignored the fact that the two Soviet republics had already been formally accepted as members of the organization, and that Argentina's participation in the war was purely nominal. Padilla added that the issue of Argentine membership was of fundamental importance to the

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<sup>178</sup> Telegram, The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Washington, April 28, 1945, in

Latin American countries, and that Argentina had fulfilled the conditions laid down by twenty states at Mexico City to regain acceptance into the community of American nations. Dr. Evatt of Australia was the first to oppose this attempt to tie the two issues together, stating that the Conference should proceed in an orderly manner and thus deal with the issues one by one. Molotov added that while the Argentine question could be considered, the question of the two republics had been specifically referred to the Executive Committee by the Steering Committee, and thus they were obligated to deal with it. A vote was then called on Evatt's motion that the two republics be invited, which was approved unanimously. On the one hand, this decision could be seen as a significant victory for the USSR, as it allowed the delegations from the two republics to take part in the Conference and the organization. On the other hand, the Soviets felt that this was a concession already negotiated and promised, so its actual fulfillment may have led to a greater sense of relief than joy.<sup>179</sup>

The next item on the agenda was the nationality of representatives on inter-governmental organizations. Molotov asked Gromyko to speak on behalf of the USSR. Gromyko put forth before the Conference the Soviet position that only persons who were citizens of the United Nations wartime alliance should be allowed to take part in the Conference. Eden replied that since these persons were not representing their countries, the matter was unimportant, and that since the invitations had already been sent without this qualification, it would be best to leave matters be. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation would not make any further statement, or vote on the question. After further discussion, Stettinius as Chairman ruled that no formal motion to amend the invitations

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*FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 488.

<sup>179</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 375-377, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 30, 1945, 9:25 AM, in file Reports on Credentials and Full Powers, in series UNCIO Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

had been made, and so the issue was then dropped.<sup>180</sup> The USSR, clinging to the notion of the new organization as a club of victors, thus went on the record on this issue to reinforce this position. However, the Soviet delegation seems to have accepted that the participation of non-United Nations citizens was inevitable, and as it only involved a small number of people (two Irish nationals and one Spanish national) and a *fait accompli*, to pursue this issue vigorously would have been a waste of time with the potential to engender increased hostility.

According to the diaries of Stettinius, at this time, or perhaps before the discussion on the nationality of IGO representatives, the meeting discussed the question of an invitation to Poland.<sup>181</sup> This issue was important to all three of the victorious great powers, and so further discussion seems plausible. However, neither the published nor unpublished minutes of the meeting record this discussion and so the content of the discussion of Poland, if it took place at all, remains unknown. Both sets of minutes record the last item on the agenda as the question of Argentina. Molotov again tried to forestall discussion by pointing out that he had proposed other items to precede it, but when Secretary-General Hiss ruled that the Argentine issue was next on the agenda, Molotov dropped his objection. At that point, Joaquín Fernández of Chile supported Padilla's earlier plea and asked that Argentina be granted the same consideration as the two Soviet republics. Padilla reiterated the Chilean statement in the form of a formal motion to issue an invitation to Argentina. Molotov again stated that it was misguided to compare Argentina, which had supported the Axis during the war, to the two Soviet republics that had fought so hard against Hitler. He then complicated the issue by stating

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<sup>180</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 377-378, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 30, 1945, 9:25 AM, in file Reports on Credentials and Full Powers, in series UNCIO Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

<sup>181</sup> Stettinius, p. 344.

that it would be “incomprehensible” if Argentina was invited while Poland was not. Tying membership for Argentina to that of Poland was a shrewd strategy for the USSR, as if the linkage was accepted, it would virtually guarantee that either Poland would be accepted or Argentina would not be, and either of these outcomes was desirable from the Soviet point of view. However, none of the other delegations acknowledged a connection between the two, and the Soviet gambit failed.

Molotov warned that the USSR would vote against an invitation to Argentina, and noted that this would be the first time a country would be invited to take part in the Conference without the unanimous support of the four sponsors. Evatt attempted to rebuff the Mexican motion as well, by proposing an amendment to postpone the issue. He softened this by making a distinction between allowing Argentina to participate if the government formally requested that they be permitted to do so, and specifically issuing an invitation, suggesting that his country would support the former but oppose the latter. He also urged patience, stating that Australia would oppose Argentine membership at present because of its wartime record, but accepted the eventual inclusion of Argentina. Stettinius then formally declared American support for the acceptance of Argentina, based on the country’s acceptance of the criteria laid out at the Mexico City Conference, most notably, the declaration of war against the Axis. This official position was in direct and explicit contradiction to the protocols signed at Yalta. Molotov protested against Stettinius’ statement with the rather disingenuous rejoinder that the USSR was not informed regarding the resolutions related to Argentina made at Mexico City, to which Stettinius replied that the information had been publicly available and specifically communicated to the USSR through normal diplomatic channels.

Padilla again took the floor, stating the importance of continental unity, and denying the linkage of the Argentine question to Poland, noting that the Steering

Committee had decided that the Polish question needed to be worked out among the sponsors. Padilla argued that although the Argentine government had been pro-Axis, its eventual acceptance of the Mexico City Conference's requirements was proof that the government now accepted the will of the Argentine masses. Molotov responded with a formal motion that the issue be referred to the four sponsors for consideration, and was duly supported by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. However, further discussion revealed that in the wake of the US statement, support for Padilla's motion was strong, while support for Molotov's motion was weak, and Evatt formally withdrew his amendment proposing postponement. The two motions were then put to vote. Despite (or perhaps because of) Molotov eyeballing each delegate as they voted, Padilla's motion was passed 9-3 with two abstentions, while Molotov's was defeated 3-8 with three abstentions. Thus, the Executive Committee formally agreed to recommend the acceptance of Argentina, against the direct objections of the sponsoring USSR. The other two agenda items raised by Molotov at the beginning of the meeting were resolved very quickly, with no opposition from the Soviet delegation, thus implying that they had only been intended to forestall discussion on Argentina.<sup>182</sup>

A meeting of the Steering Committee was next. The recommendation of the Executive Committee regarding the participation of the two Soviet republics was unanimously approved without any recorded further discussion. The participation of Argentina was more complicated, as Molotov contested it. First of all, he suggested that as a matter of procedure, the four powers should discuss the issue before it was addressed by the Steering Committee. He questioned the character of the Argentine government, and reiterated his proposal that the issue be postponed. Ponce Enríquez of Ecuador led

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<sup>182</sup> Stettinius, p. 344-345, *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 378-382, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 30, 1945, 9:25 AM, in file Reports on Credentials and Full Powers, in

the opposition to Molotov on this occasion. Hoping to forestall prolonged debate, Enríquez briefly noted the Argentine government's fulfillment of the requirements stated at Mexico City, and then called for an immediate vote on a motion to admit Argentina to the Conference. Fraser of New Zealand inquired whether or not this action might establish a precedent for Spain, Iceland, and Ireland, which were all neutral states. No answer to this is recorded in the minutes, but as Argentina had declared war on the Axis powers before the Conference opened, the issue of precedent did not seem to apply. Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba all supported the Ecuadorian proposal, again illustrating the cohesion of the Latin American bloc on this question. Subâsić of Yugoslavia obediently supported Molotov's motion. At the USSR's request, Molotov's motion for postponement was voted on first, and defeated 25 to 7. A vote on the motion to support the Executive Committee's recommendation that Argentina be accepted followed immediately thereafter, and was carried 29 to 5.<sup>183</sup> Thus, Soviet hopes to delay Argentina's presence at the Conference were dealt another blow, again revealing the USSR's lack of influence.

The recommendations of the Executive and Steering Committees to invite the delegations of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics to take their seats immediately were accepted unanimously at that afternoon's plenary session.<sup>184</sup> Thus, the final obstacle to their membership was overcome. The Ukrainian delegation was chaired by Dmitry Z. Manuilsky, who would take an active role at the Conference after the two delegations arrived on 6 May, and in the United Nations Organization itself, for many years thereafter.<sup>185</sup> Ivan S. Senin was named Vice Chairman, and the other

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series UNCIO Proceedings – Working Papers, General, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0029, United Nations Archives.

<sup>183</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 155-156.

<sup>184</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, p. 344.

<sup>185</sup> Sawczuk, pp. 40-43.

delegates were Alexander Palladin, Vladimir G. Bondarchuk, Peter S. Pogrebniak, and Nikolas N. Petrovsky. Alexei Voina was listed as Secretary, Peter P. Udovichenko as Assistant to the Chairman, Leonid N. Novichenko as Correspondent, Fedor E. Parhomenko as Interpreter, Miss Maria L. Shapareva as Assistant Interpreter, and Nikolas Ya. Lukin as Private Secretary to the Chairman.<sup>186</sup>

The Byelorussian Delegation was chaired by Kuzma V. Kiselev, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and also consisted of Professors Anton R. Zhebrak and Vladimir N. Pertsev, both of the Academy of Sciences of the B.S.S.R., Georgy I. Baidakov, People's Commissar of Building Materials, and Frol P. Shmigov, Chief of the Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who was named Secretary of the Delegation. Viacheslav I. Formashev, Assistant of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Leonid I. Kaminsky, were listed as experts. Mikle T. Linkov, Chairman of the Writer's Union of the B.S.S.R. was named as official correspondent, with Miss Maria I. Petrova serving as Technical Secretary.<sup>187</sup> Thus, the USSR achieved a specific goal for the new organization, but the difficulties that entailed could only have been disconcerting to Stalin's hopes for the new organization.

The acceptance of Argentina did not go nearly so smoothly. When the item was raised, Molotov laid out several reasons why Argentina should not yet be accepted. He contended that since the issue had not been discussed among the four powers the USSR was unprepared, thus delaying discussion for a few days would be appropriate. He quoted statements by Hull and Roosevelt from September and October 1944 respectively

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<sup>186</sup> All spellings are in accordance with *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, p. 36, Ukrainian SSR Credentials, May 6, 1945, in file Reports on Credentials and Full Powers, in series UN Conference on International Organization Records, Proceedings, Representatives and Observers, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0027, United Nations Archives.

<sup>187</sup> All spellings are in accordance with *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, pp. 16, Byelorussian SSR Credentials, May 6, 1945, in file Reports on Credentials and Full Powers, in series UN Conference on International Organization Records, Proceedings, Representatives and Observers, United Nations Conference on International Organization Fonds, S-0538-0027, United Nations Archives.

(hence, just a few months prior), which branded Argentina a fascist state. He then stated that while the situation may have changed, the Soviet Union would like to take some time to examine whether or not this actually was the case. He again linked Argentina and Poland, arguing that it would be a grave error for the Conference and insult to the Polish people to invite Argentina, which had supported the Axis, while Poland, which had sacrificed so much during the war, was absent. Molotov defended the Polish Provisional Government, and noted that its reorganization was ultimately a question for the Yalta signatories, and hence not relevant to the UNCIO. After again praising the wartime record of Poland, he commented on the presence of India and the Philippines in the Conference. The USSR had accepted the membership of these two countries, despite their “imperfect status” as colonies of the UK and US respectively. He also mentioned Soviet willingness to accept states that had no diplomatic relations with the USSR, which he pointed out was a concession to the other sponsors. The lack of unanimity on Argentina would be harmful to unity. For all these reasons, “a few days” of further study were in order.<sup>188</sup>

When he finished, Dr. Camargo of Colombia took the floor. He contended that the Argentine government’s domestic policies were a question of national sovereignty, but its foreign policy had met the criteria for acceptance laid out at Mexico City, most notably, a declaration of war on the Axis. He distanced the issue from that of Poland as a matter for the three Yalta signatories to work out. He also refuted the applicability of the comparison with India and the Philippines, suggesting that situation was more analogous to the inclusion of the two Soviet republics. Padilla of Mexico was next, and expressed similar points to those of Camargo, as well as the belief that Argentina’s pro-Axis stance had been contrary to the wishes of its population. Spaak of Belgium, once again

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<sup>188</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, pp. 345-348.

portraying himself as a conciliator, went next. He supported Molotov's call for postponement, expressing similar regret at Poland's absence but indicating it was a matter for the sponsors, and arguing that it was "logical" that every effort to preserve unanimity should be made with regard to Argentina as it was being applied to Poland. Eden, whose turn it was to chair the plenary session as per the prior agreement, diplomatically urged greater brevity, noting that there were still five speakers who had indicated a desire to speak. This did not dissuade Victor André Belaunde of Peru from making another lengthy defence of Argentina, and arguing that postponement would present a pointless obstacle to Argentine membership.

Stettinius took the floor next. He first cast veiled aspersions on Molotov's honesty by mentioning the informal discussion of the issue in his living quarters two nights earlier. He noted Argentina's compliance with the conditions imposed (by the US and Latin America, whose authority to do so was dubious at best) for acceptance and thus the US supported Argentine membership. He concluded that the issue had thereafter been "thrashed out" in both the Executive and Steering Committees earlier that day, and thus no more time should be spent on it before inviting Argentina. Eden then took the floor in his capacity of Chairman. He asked the delegates whether they supported Molotov's proposal for postponement, or whether they were ready to render a decision on the matter without further speeches. The suggestion to proceed immediately was readily accepted. The Soviet motion for postponement was supported by seven states, and opposed by twenty-eight, thus the matter was finally decided. Georges Bidault of France noted his country's abstention for the record. The Ecuadorian proposal for immediate acceptance of Argentina was then accepted, with thirty-one votes in favour, and four against.<sup>189</sup>

Thus, only one state supported the USSR aside from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

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<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 348-359.

This setback could only have reinforced Soviet concerns of isolation within the new organization, and of being forced to survive in an ideologically hostile international arena. The importance of Washington's reversal and subsequent support for Argentina should not be underestimated. Since it was contrary to both the spirit and the explicit letter of the protocols reached at Yalta, it implicitly cast doubt on all other wartime agreements. It was the first matter on which consensus among the sponsors was not eventually reached, and the Kremlin was forced to accept a formal defeat at the hands of a majority regarded as subservient to American interests. This undermined the entire UNO project, since in the Kremlin's view, the principle of long-term cooperation among the victorious great powers was vital to its success.

The Americans did attempt to soften the blow of the acceptance of Argentina by agreeing to give officerships in the Commissions and Committees to the two Soviet republics. The Byelorussian SSR was given the rapporteurship of Committee 1 (Structure and Procedures) of Commission II (General Assembly) while the Ukrainian SSR was given the Chairmanship of Committee 1 (Preamble, Purposes, and Provisions) of Commission I (General Provisions). Argentina was not given an officership, the only participating country to be snubbed in this way. At Rockefeller's insistence, one position - the rapporteur of Commission IV (Judicial Organization) was left blank, in the apparent hope that some country, probably a Latin American ally, would propose Argentina for this position.<sup>190</sup> However, when the list of commission and committee assignments was brought before the Executive Committee for approval, there was little discussion of the content.<sup>191</sup> The Steering Committee and Plenary Session then likewise accepted the list

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<sup>190</sup> Minutes of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, April 30, 1945, 6:20 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 503.

<sup>191</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 397-400.

without complaint, and the vacancy on Commission IV was left unchanged.<sup>192</sup> The issue of Poland did not crop up again in the official meetings of the Conference, save for a message from Stettinius on 23 June, three days before the official conclusion of the conference, and after all substantive issues had been resolved, that an agreement had been reached creating a Government of National Unity, and thus by unanimous agreement, a space was left for the new Polish government to sign the Charter.<sup>193</sup>

On 3 May the British discovered that sixteen Polish leaders from the London Government-in-exile who had gone to Moscow to take part in the reorganization negotiations had been arrested by the Soviet government for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Their whereabouts was a subject of inquiry for several weeks prior, and the USSR's admission of their arrest further hardened Western attitudes towards the Soviet Union.<sup>194</sup> On 5 May Eden and Stettinius had a frank conversation with Molotov on the subject. According to Cadogan's letter to his wife of that day "There was some quite plain speaking and Molotov looked more uncomfortable than I've seen him look before." Cadogan continued, lamenting "How can one work with these animals? [the Soviets] And if one can't, what can one hope for in Europe?"<sup>195</sup> Thus, the dispute over Poland continued to exercise a harmful influence on the Allied relationship.

There were several other issues at San Francisco that revealed how the Kremlin intended to use the organization as a vehicle for domination of the world by the victorious great powers. One was regional organizations. Given the devastation of the USSR during Great Patriotic War, its leaders were not willing to entrust their security entirely to the untested UNO. In the informal sponsor consultative meetings on 4 May Molotov expressed hope that regional arrangements (like the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet

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<sup>192</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, pp. 418-20; *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 169-174.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>194</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 191.

treaties) would allow states to retain their right to military action outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council, if directed against German aggression.<sup>196</sup> Accordingly, the USSR formally proposed an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals seeking this explicit exemption on 8 May.<sup>197</sup> This notion was not opposed by the US or Britain in principle, though they wanted the Security Council eventually to have sole responsibility for preserving peace through force of arms. However, the matter became problematic when the Latin American nations, fearing Communist subversion, sought a similar right to free action for an Inter-American alliance system, as had been discussed at the Mexico City Conference, though no formal arrangements for this system had been made.<sup>198</sup> Molotov's abrasive attitude and disregard for the smaller states at San Francisco compounded Latin American concerns.<sup>199</sup>

While willing to tolerate the Latin American request, the Americans were afraid it would provide a precedent for the USSR to seek a similar arrangement to exclude the Security Council – hence, the US – from action in Europe.<sup>200</sup> In retrospect, these fears were exaggerated, as the Soviets still preferred American cooperation to keep the peace on the continent. The issue was still under discussion when Molotov departed, although it exercised a far less baleful influence on inter-Allied relations than matters such as those related to membership. In his final conversation before leaving San Francisco, Molotov characteristically told Stettinius, Dunn, Bohlen and Harriman that the concerns of the

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<sup>195</sup> Cadogan, p. 739.

<sup>196</sup> Minutes of the Fourth Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals, Held at San Francisco, May 4, 1945, 12:15 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 600; Minutes of the Fifth Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals (Part I), Held at San Francisco, Friday, May 4, 1945, 6:43 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 605-606; Minutes of the Fifth Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals (Part II), Held at San Francisco, Friday, May 4, 1945, 10 p.m., in *Ibid*, 610-612.

<sup>197</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 3*, p. 601.

<sup>198</sup> Telegram, The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius) to the Acting Secretary of State, San Francisco, May 6, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 614.

<sup>199</sup> Stettinius, p. 355.

<sup>200</sup> Minutes of the Thirty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, May 7, 1945, 6:18 p.m., *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 632-640.

Latin American states should not be given particular consideration, but this statement did not receive support from the US.<sup>201</sup> The logjam was broken on 10 May when the American delegation agreed to recognize each state's inherent right to individual or collective self-defence. This formulation was accepted without serious dispute by the USSR and the Latin American states, and thereafter by the Conference. While not a major source of controversy, the Soviet stance illustrates the ambivalent attitude of the USSR towards the new international security organization. Although the Soviets hoped that the new organization would serve to prevent future war, they were unwilling to entirely entrust their security to an unproven body dominated by a potentially hostile capitalist world, and it was not an effective substitute for friendly régimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

The results of negotiations on the trusteeship issue might have brightened the USSR's hopes for the new organization, although the significance of the San Francisco Conference discussions on this matter were severely limited by agreements made at Yalta, so any gains for the Kremlin were very marginal. At the Crimea Conference this question was left unresolved, save for an agreement that the five permanent members of the Security Council would determine a plan for including a mechanism to replace the League of Nations Mandate system in the new international security organization. It was explicitly agreed that this discussion would be limited to agreeing on principles and machinery to oversee colonies and would not deal with any specific territories. At Churchill's insistence, it was also accepted that this new machinery would only apply to territories that were either existing League of Nations mandates, territories detached from the Axis in the course of the war, or voluntarily placed under UN trusteeship, so that this

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<sup>201</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Member of the United States Delegation, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, May 8, 1945, 8:30 p.m., in *Ibid.*, pp. 650-652.

would not pose any threat to the existing British Empire.<sup>202</sup> However, despite the designation of representatives by mid-April, the discussions did not take place before the San Francisco Conference opened, as the US had difficulty determining its position. The US Navy under Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Secretary of War Henry Stimson both wished to ensure continued American control over strategic territories in the Pacific, a viewpoint at odds with the anti-colonial stance favoured by the Roosevelt administration. Furthermore, it was feared that any discussion of these issues would inevitably lead to jockeying for position in the Pacific, which would be detrimental to the most effective prosecution of the war.<sup>203</sup> Thus, the trusteeship question was largely ignored, and on 4 May, Stettinius, Eden, Molotov, and Soong agreed that each sponsor could submit proposals to be discussed while the Conference was in session, to avoid the impression that they were hiding something from the other participants.<sup>204</sup>

A thorough American draft followed on 6 May, and five days later the Soviets proposed amendments that illustrate their attitude towards the issue. The primary goal was to use trusteeship to proclaim Soviet anti-imperialist credentials while attempting to maximize Soviet influence in dependent territories. Since it had been previously agreed that no discussion of specific territories would take place at San Francisco, this meant ensuring that the USSR had a significant position within the planned Trusteeship Council, which could be fostered by giving the Security Council as much control as possible over the organ. Furthermore, in accordance with their emphasis on military security, the Soviets sought a guarantee that strategically-important dependent territories could be used

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<sup>202</sup> Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 977.

<sup>203</sup> Minutes of the First Meeting of the Informal Organizing Group on Arrangements for the San Francisco Conference, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 3, 1945, 2:45 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 190; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), Washington, April 16, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 295; Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation, Held at Washington, Tuesday, April 17, 1945, 9 a.m., in *Ibid*, p. 312.

<sup>204</sup> Minutes of the Fourth Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals, Held at San Francisco, May 4, 1945, 12:15 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 602.

by the victorious great powers if war threatened. In response to the US draft on promoting the social, economic, and political development of trust territories, with the goal of self-government, the Soviet amendments proposed “full national independence” as an explicit goal. The Soviet representatives also sought wording that recognized that all of the victorious powers had an interest in trusteeship over dependent territories liberated from the enemy and gave all permanent members of the Security Council automatic membership on the Trusteeship Council. Furthermore, while the US plan had included Security Council oversight for strategically important trust territories with General Assembly authority over the others, the Soviets sought to make this division clearer, and explicitly gave the Security Council the authority to designate areas as strategically important.<sup>205</sup>

The primary forum for the discussion of this issue at San Francisco was Committee II/4, that is, Committee Four (Trusteeship System) of Commission II (General Assembly), which began meeting on 5 May. The Soviets made a statement before this Committee on 14 May in support of independence as a goal, asserting the interests of all the permanent members of the Security Council in trusteeship, and emphasizing the importance of strategic factors in any trusteeship system.<sup>206</sup> However, as there were no concrete Dumbarton Oaks proposals to use as a basis for discussion, II/4’s work made little progress until 17 May when it began using (as per an agreement made at the previous meeting on 15 May) an American working paper as a starting point.<sup>207</sup> The Soviets had submitted proposed amendments to this working paper, identical in spirit and often in language to the amendments that the USSR suggested to the American proposal

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<sup>205</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 3, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), p. 618-619.

<sup>206</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 10*, p. 441.

<sup>207</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 10*, p. 447.

of 6 May. They had little success in gaining support for their recommended changes.<sup>208</sup> However, just before his departure on 8 May, Molotov held a press conference calling on the Conference to promote the self-government of dependent peoples, which caused the Americans to fear that the USSR would surpass them as the foremost champion of anti-colonialism.<sup>209</sup> At the 17 May meeting of the Committee, the USSR successfully lobbied for the inclusion of “political” advancement of trust territories as a goal for the Trusteeship Council alongside “economic and social advancement” in the preamble regarding the Council’s general principles, in keeping with the Soviet goals for the Council.<sup>210</sup> After informal consultation with the USSR and other states, on 8 June an American amendment was unanimously accepted whereby the Trusteeship Council’s goals for mandates would include “progressive development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”<sup>211</sup> This was a minor victory for the Soviet side, although its significance was muted by the low priority the Soviet delegation assigned to the issue, as evidenced by the low level of participation of the Soviet delegations in the workings of II/4.

While the USSR proposed amendments to the US working paper, none of them save the small item mentioned above were formally raised by the Soviet delegations in the Committee’s discussions. The final agreements were mostly in line with wishes of the Soviet delegation. Most prominently, the Security Council retained the power to designate areas as strategically important, and to thereby control them. This authority would enhance the military effectiveness of the new international security organization.

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<sup>208</sup> Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Friday, May 11, 1945, 2:30 p.m., *Ibid*, p. 671-673.

<sup>209</sup> Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius), San Francisco, May 8, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 652.

<sup>210</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 10*, p. 453.

As well, independence for dependent territories was accepted as a goal, though not the only one. However, due primarily to strong opposition from the French, independence for territories not liberated from the Axis (that is, the British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese Empires) was not even an optional goal.<sup>212</sup> Likewise, numerous provisions inserted at British and French insistence ensured that the UN Trusteeship system could not impose its will against the wishes of the administering power. In general, on the issue of dependent territories the British and French were resolute in defending their imperial interests.<sup>213</sup>

Thus, Stalin's desire to use the new organization to proclaim the Soviet Union's anti-colonial stance while simultaneously seeking an overseas foothold for the USSR brought few immediate rewards. The question of specifically-designated strategic territories, which the Soviet government deemed an important asset to the organization's military effectiveness, similarly became irrelevant. This status was only ever applied to the Pacific island chains of Micronesia, which were mandated to US administration in accordance with their wartime occupation (the US having wrested them from Japanese control), and in practice received treatment that differed little from that of any other area.<sup>214</sup> More favourably, Soviet representation, as well as the representation of other permanent Council members (whether they were mandated to administer a trust territory or not) was guaranteed. The final agreement was that the Trusteeship Council would be composed of an equal number of states administering trust territories and not administering trust territories, with the permanent Council members being automatically entitled to sit as non-administering states if they had not received any mandates. In

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<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 513-514.

<sup>212</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 10*, p. 443; Luard, p. 61.

<sup>213</sup> Minutes of the Thirty-fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Wednesday, May 9, 1945, 5:30 p.m., *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 656.

<sup>214</sup> Luard, p. 60.

practice, however, the issue became essentially moot, as the Trusteeship Council came to exercise little actual authority.<sup>215</sup>

In addition, on 9 June Gromyko was able to obtain an informal pledge from Stettinius that if the USSR was proposed as the administering authority of a “suitable” trust territory (claiming to have no specific territory in mind), the US would support the Soviet Union’s eligibility. Stettinius re-affirmed this promise on 23 June, with the proviso that no discussion of specific territories would take place at San Francisco.<sup>216</sup> Overall, the Conference’s decisions on this issue were not of great significance to the USSR. The new organization provided a forum for anti-colonial rhetoric, as at the press conference held by Molotov on 7 May just prior to his departure from San Francisco mentioned above.<sup>217</sup> At the same time there was no requirement for the USSR to back up this rhetoric with action, or means for the organization to impose its will on the Soviet Union if the outside world came to regard areas such as Central Asia or the Soviet Far East as dependent territories. Thus, the USSR won a very modest victory on the issue of dependent territories at San Francisco, obtaining agreement to their most important priorities at that stage.<sup>218</sup>

The Soviet Union’s desire to increase its power through the Security Council became increasingly problematic at San Francisco. Understandably, the rest of the world

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<sup>215</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 58-62.

<sup>216</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. O. Benjamin Gerig, Member of the United States Delegation, San Francisco, June 9, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 1236; Memorandum, The Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko) to the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius), San Francisco, June 20, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 1399; Memorandum, The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius) to the Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko), San Francisco, June 23, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 1428-1429.

<sup>217</sup> Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius), San Francisco, May 8, 1945, in *Ibid*, p. 652.

<sup>218</sup> However, later developments would render the Soviets unable to translate this gain at San Francisco into significantly enhanced power through the acquisition of mandates over liberated colonies. Most notably, in 1946 the USSR failed to obtain a UN mandate to administer all or part of former Italian colony of Libya, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. Simons, pp. 101-102; Vandenberg, p. 267.

was reluctant to cede too much authority to an organ over which they would have little control. Nevertheless, the Soviets still attempted to pursue this aim. For example, on 3 May, at a private meeting of the four sponsors to discuss possible revisions to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Gromyko, with Molotov's backing, proposed an amendment regarding the Secretary-General. At Dumbarton Oaks it had been agreed that this official should be elected by the General Assembly on the nomination of the Security Council, largely at the insistence of the Soviets, while the terms and conditions of the position (notably, length of tenure and eligibility for re-election) were left open. At San Francisco, Molotov made a bid to use this office to further enhance the power of the USSR and other permanent members of the Council. The Soviet government's suggestion was that based on the Council's recommendation, the General Assembly should elect a Secretary-General and four deputies, for a total of five persons, one from each of the permanent members. The Secretary-General would serve a two-year term, with no eligibility for re-election, and at the end of his (or her) term, step down in favour of one of the deputies.<sup>219</sup> This process would be repeated so that over a ten-year span each of the representatives of the Big Five would serve as Secretary-General for two years. This mechanism would guarantee greater control over the organization for the permanent Security Council members. Furthermore, it would ensure that a Soviet representative would periodically serve as the organization's head, which would have been unlikely without this process.

Molotov's proposal was firmly opposed by the other three sponsors, who maintained that the Secretary-General and deputies should be chosen based on personal

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<sup>219</sup> The equal entitlement of women to hold all positions in the new organization was formally recognized, but the prevailing atmosphere and very small number of women participating in the Conference made it much more likely that the Secretary-General would be a 'he' than a 'she'. United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations*

merit, not nationality, and should not be considered representatives of their home country. Molotov was not insistent, and that evening, he withdrew his proposal and accepted the position that the Secretary-General would serve a three-year term with the possibility of re-election.<sup>220</sup> Nevertheless, the Soviet proposal illustrates how Moscow's attitude towards the new organization continued to be out of step with the rest of the world. Many countries sought to change the process of electing the Secretary-General to give the General Assembly greater authority while reducing the influence of the Security Council, but the sponsors held firm and no concessions were made, although it was agreed that the Secretary-General would be free to choose his/her own deputies. The term of tenure, left indeterminate at San Francisco, was later set at five years.<sup>221</sup>

In summary, the USSR was successful in its aim to preserve Security Council control over the selection of the Secretary-General, though the attempt to use the issue to boost Soviet power failed. Though the Soviet delegation repeatedly raised the issue of electing deputies as well as the Secretary-General during the course of the conference, the relative ease with which it conceded the point in the private Big Five discussions displayed a willingness to accept some defeats gracefully when lacking broader support.<sup>222</sup> This good will was demonstrated in several small issues after the high tension surrounding the key early issues of chairmanship and participation for the two Soviet republics, Argentina, and Poland. However, the Soviet persistence in raising the matter of electing deputies in the appropriate technical committee (I/2 – General Provisions - Membership, Amendment and Secretariat) by the Soviet, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian delegations with minor modifications could only have been a matter of considerable

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*Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 6, Commission I, General Provisions* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 169-173.

<sup>220</sup> Minutes of the Second Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals, Held at San Francisco, May 3, 1945, 10 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 571.

<sup>221</sup> Luard, pp. 65-66.

irritation to the other delegations as it dragged on for several weeks.<sup>223</sup>

The great powers similarly held together on the general issue of membership in the new organization, despite the sharp differences over the inclusion of specific states as discussed above. At Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta the great powers agreed that the Assembly could accept new members on the recommendation of the Council and that the sole criterion for membership was that the state be “peace-loving”. Thus, the USSR and other permanent SC members had an effective veto over which states could join since they could define “peace-loving” however they saw fit. When discussion of the matter began on 8 May in Commission I (General Provisions) Committee 2 (Membership, Amendment, and Secretariat) several states, most notably Australia, Norway, and Uruguay, all spoke up for universal membership in the new organization without qualifiers.<sup>224</sup> France and the Netherlands, however, took a stance more similar to the Soviet view that the organization should be limited in membership to those with “common ideals” and shared political principles, and thus, for example, neutrals should be excluded.<sup>225</sup> On 10 May, with the support of the USSR, the British proposed an amendment whereby membership would be open to all states that the organization (in effect, the Council) judged to be willing and able to accept the relevant principles and obligations. This aligned closely with the Soviet view that the new organization should be controlled by the great powers, and tied to wartime participation. When this proposal met opposition, the issue was passed on to a special subcommittee, which approved the British text a few days later, and it was duly included in the UN Charter.<sup>226</sup> Thus, the

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<sup>222</sup> Minutes of the Seventy-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, June 18, 1945, 9 a.m., *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 1345.

<sup>223</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 7, Commission I, General Provisions* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 390-391.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-173.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25, pp. 36, 41.

sponsors protected their authority over membership, a key Soviet priority, although the USSR's lack of cooperation in exercising this power undermined relations considerably.

The issue of membership was further complicated by the question of a country's right to withdraw from the organization, and the latter's right to suspend temporarily or permanently expel a state. In accordance with Moscow's desire to create a highly efficient organization, on 6 June, at an informal five-power consultative meeting, Gromyko proposed a provision for states to withdraw from the organization, based on the idea that reluctant members could hamper its effectiveness.<sup>227</sup> At a subsequent meeting on 8 June, Gromyko expounded the Soviet viewpoint that a withdrawal provision should be tied to any formula for amending the UN Charter. The Soviets may have been keeping this option open should future amendments to the structure of the organization affect their veto, or if the organization proved ineffective or a platform for criticism of the USSR. Withdrawal was a final fail-safe measure if states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, as well as some Latin American states, were successful in their determination to circumvent the veto power of the Security Council's permanent members. The Soviet proposal was opposed by the British and Americans, who contended that states would be free to withdraw under extraordinary circumstances even without an explicit provision. They feared that the inclusion of a specific withdrawal statute would then raise the complex issues of whether or not the Big Five and the smaller states should have different criteria for secession. In addition, if the standards for withdrawal were too vague or lenient, this could weaken the organization by making withdrawal too easy.<sup>228</sup>

At the nineteenth informal five-power consultative meeting on 11 June Gromyko

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<sup>227</sup> Minutes of the Sixteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 6, 1945, 4:40 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, p. 1185.

continued to insist on the inclusion of a withdrawal provision, though he did not tie it so directly to the amendment process.<sup>229</sup> Failing to receive backing from the other sponsors, the Soviets thereafter primarily pursued the issue in the broader forums of the Conference. On 22 May, I/2 had already formally recommended that withdrawal should neither be provided for nor regulated, while recognizing the inherent right of states to withdraw if the organization failed in its mission.<sup>230</sup> However, many other states linked the provision for withdrawal with the amendment process. Over several weeks, the Soviets held their ground, using both the USSR and Ukrainian SSR delegations to express their views. Nonetheless, ultimately, the decision of 22 May was re-affirmed on 17 June, with minor revisions, to indicate that while there would be no specific provision for withdrawal in the UN Charter, an inherent right to do so could be exercised if the organization failed in its purpose or amendments were made to the Charter which a state is unable to accept.<sup>231</sup> While largely an issue of phrasing, this outcome showed the lack of influence wielded by the USSR.

The issue of expulsion was a source of similar controversy. While the subcommittee charged with discussing suspension and expulsion rapidly agreed on a formula covering temporary suspension for violating the principles of the Charter, it was unable to reach a consensus on whether full expulsion should be permitted. Six states voted against permanent expulsion and five voted in favour, in accordance with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.<sup>232</sup> On 25 May the issue was discussed at length in Committee I/2 as a whole. Several states contended that to expel a state would violate the principle of universality, release an expelled state from its Charter obligations, impair the

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<sup>228</sup> Minutes of the Eighteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 8, 1945, 9:30 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 1216-1222.

<sup>229</sup> Minutes of the Nineteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 11, 1945, 3 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 1260-1263.

<sup>230</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 7*, pp. 87-88.

likelihood of reconciliation with a recalcitrant state, and perhaps prove less effective in curbing antagonistic behaviour than suspension. On the other hand, those states such as the USSR that favoured expulsion contended that the organization should prioritize peace and security over universality. Action against aggressors should not be limited by a state's continued membership in the organization. They also argued that expulsion could still allow the possibility of readmission, and not release states from their obligations to uphold international peace. When put to a vote, nineteen states voted in favour of the inclusion of a provision for expulsion, with sixteen opposed. Since a two-thirds majority was needed on all substantive questions, the provision was therefore not included.<sup>233</sup>

However, because the vote was so close, the issue did not die there. On 7 June, as promised, the Soviets raised the matter in the Executive Committee.<sup>234</sup> With the support of the British and the Americans, the Soviet view that the vote had violated the principles of proper procedure was upheld by the Executive Committee, which thus decided to refer the issue to the Steering Committee, with the recommendation that it be then handed back to Committee I/2. The British and American support was significant, because the extensive informal talks clearly showed that neither delegation attached much importance to the expulsion issue, and thus their support was a demonstration of great power cooperation. On 12 June, the Chairman of I/2, Henri Rolin of Belgium, in accordance with the EC's recommendations, formally moved that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals be amended to delete the provision on expulsion. He explained that if this amendment failed to attain the required two-thirds majority, there would need to be a similar vote to ratify the expulsion provision. After considerable debate, the proposed

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 262-267.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 99-100.

<sup>233</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 6*, p. 6; *UNCIO Documents V. 7*, pp. 123-124.

<sup>234</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 7*, p. 132.

Belgian amendment to remove the expulsion provision was defeated.<sup>235</sup> On 17 June, the issue of expulsion was voted on again in I/2. This time, Rolin noted that Belgium, though opposed to the inclusion of a provision for expulsion, would abstain, and urged other delegations with similar views to do so as well, in order to finally resolve the matter. When the vote was taken an expulsion provision was accepted (in accordance with Soviet wishes) by a margin of 23 to 3, with 14 abstentions.<sup>236</sup> The unyielding Soviet attitude gave the question of expulsion far greater attention than its objective significance deserved. Despite the ultimate satisfaction of Soviet wishes, the cumbersome process and firm opposition illustrated the unrealistic nature of the Kremlin's view of the new organization as a tool of the victorious great powers, while fostering animosity toward the USSR.

Fears that an anti-Soviet majority in the new organization could subject the USSR to unfair criticism or even intervention were manifested also in the discussions on domestic sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). While no explicit statement of domestic sovereignty was included in the original Dumbarton Oaks proposals, early in the San Francisco Conference (5 May) the four sponsors proposed a joint amendment to insert a provision in the chapter relating to the principles of the new organization. The new clause recognized each state's sovereignty in matters that were "essentially" within domestic jurisdiction and forbade mandatory submission of an internal matter to the scrutiny of the organization, provided it did not constitute a threat to international peace and security.<sup>237</sup>

When raised on 17 May in Committee I/1 (General Provisions – Preamble, Purposes and Principles) which was chaired by Manuilsky, the clause sparked debate.

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<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 193-196.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

<sup>237</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 3*, p. 623.

Led by Norway, some states expressed concern that it would block necessary action under the guise of domestic jurisdiction, whereas others felt it necessary to protect states from undue interference.<sup>238</sup> Delineating which matters were subject to international jurisdiction and which to domestic was problematic. The suggestion that the ICJ should be empowered to rule whether an issue was “domestic” in effect gave that body overarching jurisdiction, which was opposed by the USSR. On 13 June, the amendment of the sponsors was accepted, albeit with some clarifications of language proposed by Australia.<sup>239</sup> The Soviet delegations did not take an active part in the debate over this clause, as it dealt with conflicting Soviet objectives for the new organization. The USSR jealously guarded its sovereignty in domestic matters, while also repeatedly advocating a strong and effective international organization.

However, the Soviet Union firmly opposed a broad definition of the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were vague regarding the ICJ, other than agreement that the court would be part of the new organization. Therefore, it was informally decided at Dumbarton Oaks and affirmed at Yalta that an International Committee of Jurists would meet just prior to the San Francisco Conference to prepare a draft text from which to work during the UNCIO. On 13 March, the US invited the other sponsors to convene this committee in Washington around 9 April.<sup>240</sup> By 22 March the British and Chinese had communicated their acceptance of the proposed American outline for the discussions, and after prompting from Harriman, the Soviets also replied in the affirmative, appointing Nikolai Vasilievich Novikov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington with the rank of Minister as their representative on the

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<sup>238</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 6*, pp. 310-311, 430-432.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311, 494-499.

<sup>240</sup> *UNCIO Documents V 14*, pp. 118-120.

committee, with Professors S.A. Golunsky and S.B. Krylov as advisers.<sup>241</sup>

The United Nations Committee of Jurists discussed the question of the Court's jurisdiction. Many nations, including China, argued in favour of compulsory jurisdiction. Golunsky, however, argued that jurisdiction needed to be voluntary, as imposing a settlement on countries that did not freely accept the court's jurisdiction would place an undue burden on the new organization, and could prevent some states from joining it.<sup>242</sup> This stance reflected the Soviet emphasis on security functions of the new organization, and the need to protect the USSR from an international court dominated by capitalist states. The British and Americans both supported this view, whereas most of the smaller states favoured compulsory jurisdiction. In a 13 April meeting, it was decided, over Novikov's protests on both substance and procedure, to send two drafts to San Francisco, drawn up by two subcommittees, one calling for compulsory jurisdiction and one for voluntary, which were completed by the following day.<sup>243</sup> The subcommittee proposing compulsory jurisdiction was composed of China as well as Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela. The Soviets were joined on the voluntary jurisdiction subcommittee by the USA, UK, and Greece.<sup>244</sup> The two drafts were duly passed onto the San Francisco Conference on 27 April.

There the question was dealt with in Committee IV/1 (Judicial Organization – International Court of Justice) most notably on 28 May. Soviet opposition to compulsory jurisdiction was supported by the USA, while the British maintained that compulsory jurisdiction was advisable, but to impose it against the desires of the US and USSR would weaken both the court and the organization. The issue was then passed to a subcommittee composed of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, France, Mexico, New Zealand,

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<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147, p. 154.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-160.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163-170.

Netherlands, the USSR, and the USA, as well as the Peruvian Chairman of IV/1 and the Iraqi Rapporteur.<sup>245</sup> Ultimately, this subcommittee recommended that the proposal for voluntary jurisdiction be accepted as the working basis for further discussion in IV/1.<sup>246</sup> However, when it was brought back to Committee IV/1, its acceptance was only supported by 26 out of 42 voting countries, one shy of the two-thirds majority needed for adoption. However, a roll call vote accepted it 31 to 14, with all three Soviet delegations plus Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia supporting the motion.<sup>247</sup> US-Soviet cohesion on this issue, which held together in the face of concerted and strong opposition, showed that cooperation between the two delegations was still possible, while it also showed the importance that the USSR attached to a broad definition of sovereignty, as well as the significance of the inclusion of the two Soviet republics.

As previously discussed, the two cardinal aims of the USSR for the new organization were the strengthening of security and the increase in Soviet power and prestige. The Soviet reaction to a Norwegian proposal related to the international court suggests that security took priority. The Norwegian plan envisaged making the Security Council responsible for enforcing the judgments of the court. The Kremlin felt this amendment distracted from the organization's primary purpose, and fundamentally changed the nature of the Security Council, a view supported by the USA. Thus, the final resolution adopted merely gave the SC the power to enforce the Court's judgments if it was deemed necessary for international security.<sup>248</sup> While this was in keeping with

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<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 286-289.

<sup>245</sup> *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 13, Commission IV, Judicial Organization*. (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 224-227.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid*, p. 523.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 246-251.

<sup>248</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 12, Commission III, Security Council* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 396-397; Luard, p. 68.

Stalin's focus on using the organization to prevent a future war, enforcement power would have boosted the USSR's stature. However, it could have proven problematic to make the USSR and other Security Council members responsible for enforcing decisions over which they had little direct power, as the court's judges were selected irrespective of nationality and similar political factors.

Soviet sensitivity to criticism was again revealed at San Francisco. As the conference seemed to be reaching its conclusion, its success was endangered when the question of the circumstances under which veto power could be used, seemingly resolved at Yalta, came back to the fore. As anticipated, many smaller powers, most notably Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, took exception to the veto prerogative of the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, there were several amendments proposed to the voting formula for the Security Council agreed upon by the great powers at Yalta, primarily in Committee III/1 (Security Council – Structure and Procedure).<sup>249</sup> In the face of this criticism, the four sponsors remained united in opposition to substantive revisions of the voting formula discussed in Chapter Four, whereby a permanent member of the Security Council could exercise its veto to block any action, but not the recommendation of a peaceful settlement to a dispute.<sup>250</sup> However, under an agreement reached on 21 May in Committee III/1, the smaller countries put together a list of inquiries (usually referred to as 'the questionnaire') regarding how the voting formula would work in different circumstances. The different answers to the questionnaire revealed important discrepancies in interpretation between the USSR and the other great

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<sup>249</sup> See for example United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 11, Commission III, Security Council* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 317-25, 347-352, 471-476, 486-496, 693-708.

<sup>250</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 12*, p. 523.

powers.<sup>251</sup>

Under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as supplemented by the agreements made at Yalta, procedural decisions made by the Security Council would require the acceptance of *any* seven of its eleven members. All other questions (usually referred to as ‘substantive’) would require seven affirmative votes *including* all of the permanent members, unless they abstained from the vote for being party to the dispute.<sup>252</sup> In response to the questionnaire, it was revealed in the ninth five-power informal consultative meeting held on 26 May that the USSR considered whether or not an issue could be brought before the Security Council as a substantive question, thus allowing the veto to be used. The other sponsors strongly opposed this interpretation, as it arrogated to the Big Five the power to block consideration of an issue, and would therefore prevent the recommendation of a peaceful solution, which violated the spirit of the hard-won compromise.<sup>253</sup> Further discussion in the same forum on 29 May and 1 June and at a private meeting on 31 May between Stettinius and Gromyko, joined by Sobolev and Golunsky from the Soviet delegation and Pasvolsky and Dunn from the USA, merely served to sharpen the cleavage. The Soviet arguments were similar to those put forth at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, that scrutiny by the Security Council could both be a source of unfair criticism and serve as the first step in a chain of events that could lead to conflict between the great powers. Moreover, the USSR regarded the formula agreed at Yalta as an unalterable commitment made by the deceased Roosevelt.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 11*, pp. 699-708.

<sup>252</sup> For the precise wording, see for example *UNCIO Documents V. 1*, p. 10.

<sup>253</sup> Minutes of the Ninth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 26, 1945, 9:15 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 927-935, Stettinius p. 382.

<sup>254</sup> Minutes of the Tenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, May 29, 1945, 11 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 970-971; Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stettinius) of a Conversation With the Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko), Held at San Francisco, Thursday, May 31, 1945, 12:25 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 1018-1019; Minutes of the Eleventh Five-Power Informal Consultative

The American and British governments feared the impasse would lead to the total collapse of the Conference and the organization. Soviet-Western relations were already tense because of disputes over Poland and other occupied territories. Therefore, on 9 May while the two men were returning to Washington, Bohlen proposed to Harriman that FDR's close confidante and adviser Harry Hopkins, well-received by the Soviet government in past discussions, be dispatched to Moscow as a special envoy in a bid to improve relations. Harriman greeted this suggestion enthusiastically, and the two men went to see Hopkins immediately after their arrival in Washington, to ascertain his willingness before consulting Truman. Hopkins was very weak from stomach cancer, which had taken an increasing toll on his health for several years, and caused his death in January 1946. However, according to the accounts of Harriman and Bohlen, "Hopkins' response was wonderful to behold. Although he appeared too ill even to get out of bed and walk across 'N' Street, the mere intimation of a flight to Moscow converted him into the traditional old fire horse at the sound of the alarm."<sup>255</sup> Truman accepted the suggestion after a few days of consideration. Stalin greeted the proposal with enthusiasm, and Hopkins arrived in Moscow on 25 May and began meetings with Stalin the following day.<sup>256</sup> The main topic of the conversations was expected to be Poland, and the San Francisco Conference was not on the original agenda. However, desperate to break the deadlock, Lord Halifax, who became head of the British delegation after Eden's departure in mid-May, suggested that Hopkins raise the question of the voting formula directly with Stalin. Stettinius received Truman's support for this suggestion, which was communicated to Hopkins in Moscow on 2 June, with considerable additional

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Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 1, 1945, 9 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 1073-1075; Stettinius, p. 380.

<sup>255</sup> Sherwood, p. 887.

<sup>256</sup> Bohlen, p. 215; Harriman, p. 459; Sherwood, p. 887; Truman, p. 258.

information provided the following day at Harriman's request.<sup>257</sup> Meanwhile, the debate raged behind closed doors in San Francisco, with no apparent end in sight. To make matters worse, on 2 June the *New York Times* ran an article on the previously secret deadlock, which publicly embarrassed the USSR.<sup>258</sup>

Hopkins' discussions with Stalin centred around the reorganization of the Polish government, but included other issues such as the occupation of Germany, continuing war with Japan, and the upcoming Big Three meeting (in Potsdam). At the first meeting, Stalin blamed the worsening of relations on a new attempt by the Allies to construct a *cordon sanitaire* around the USSR.<sup>259</sup> At the second meeting, Stalin accused the United States of casting aside Soviet concerns since the Red Army was no longer needed now that Germany had been defeated. As evidence of this, Stalin cited several issues, leading with American support for the acceptance of Argentina into the San Francisco Conference. He pointed out that this move was in direct contravention of the Yalta agreements, and questioned the value of inter-Allied unity and cooperation if American commitments "could be overturned by the votes of such countries as Honduras and Porto Rico [*sic*]."<sup>260</sup> Harriman, who with Bohlen accompanied Hopkins to most meetings, portrayed the American support for the acceptance of Argentina at San Francisco in an apologetic manner, though he blamed Molotov's attempt to tie Argentine membership to Poland's for complicating the situation. Stalin dismissed the issue by noting that what

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<sup>257</sup> Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, June 2, 1945, 6 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 1117-1119; Telegram, The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Settinius) to the Acting Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 3, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 1131-1136; Telegram, The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Settinius) to the Acting Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 3, 1945, in *Ibid* pp. 1136-1137.

<sup>258</sup> Cadogan, pp. 747-749; Memorandum by Mr. Robert W. Hartley of the United States Delegation, of a Conversation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, June 4, 1945, 3:30 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 1153-1158; Stettinius, p. 385.

<sup>259</sup> Sherwood, p. 890.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 893-894.

had been done could no longer be put right and thus belonged to the past.<sup>261</sup>

On 6 June, at Hopkins' final meeting with Stalin and Molotov, he raised the question of the veto dispute at San Francisco. Hopkins and Harriman contended that the Soviet stance was contrary to the Yalta agreements, wherein only enforcement action could be vetoed while free discussion was permitted. Molotov resisted this interpretation, insisting that whether or not the Security Council would take up an issue was a separate question. According to Bohlen, Stalin then turned to the Foreign Affairs Commissar and said gruffly, "What is this all about, Molotov?" When Molotov attempted to explain the issue to Stalin as an aside, Harriman eavesdropped and got a strong sense that Stalin had not been fully informed about the controversy. When Molotov suggested to Stalin that the first step was critical in any decision process, Stalin retorted "Molotov, that's nonsense" and stated that he would accept the interpretation of the other sponsors after checking to ensure that there were no less obvious concerns. Hopkins pressed him to make a decision quickly, given the urgency of the matter to the San Francisco Conference, and later that night a cable confirming the Soviet acceptance was sent. Stalin went on to portray the entire dispute as a trifle, probably concocted by one or more small states to encourage trouble and sow disunity.<sup>262</sup>

Stettinius learned of the decision before Gromyko, who received the news graciously. The next day, 7 June, at the seventeenth informal consultative meeting of the sponsors, Stettinius immediately turned the floor over to Gromyko, whereupon the Soviet Ambassador announced the USSR's commitment to the Yalta agreement, and willingness to accept the other sponsors' interpretation of it on the voting question. He described his government's reversal as a concession to promote unity. This was received with great relief and duly communicated to Committee III/1 the same day, and thereafter the great

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<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 897-898.

powers held together in the defence of their Security Council voting prerogatives as previously agreed.<sup>263</sup> This dispute is significant for a number of reasons. Aside from the danger it posed to the successful founding of the new international security organization, it once again displayed the Soviet concern that somehow the new organization would be turned into a weapon against the USSR. Furthermore, the fact that Stalin apparently had little knowledge of such a serious situation suggests that his degree of control over foreign policy was limited, with Molotov exercising considerable latitude. However, Stalin's reversal of the Soviet stance still underlines his ultimate authority.

Aside from trying to block discussion in the Security Council, this Soviet sensitivity to criticism was likewise displayed with regard to the General Assembly. Many small and medium-sized countries, led by Australia, sought to expand the powers of the General Assembly through giving it the unlimited right of discussion, and the power to make recommendations on any issue not under consideration by the Security Council. The Soviets resisted this effort, stating that unlimited discussion could foster dissent by criticizing a country's domestic prerogatives, and that interference in issues of international security would only undermine the effectiveness of the organization. The other sponsors grudgingly supported the USSR, but privately pressured the USSR to accept the desires of the majority.<sup>264</sup> After much discussion, Committee II/2 (General Assembly – Political and Security Functions), the primary forum wherein the matter was addressed, decided on 29 May that the General Assembly had the right to discuss “any matter within the sphere of international relations” unless it was under consideration by

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<sup>262</sup> Bohlen, p. 220; Harriman, pp. 473-474; Sherwood, pp. 910-912.

<sup>263</sup> Minutes of the Sixty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Wednesday, June 6, 1945, 9:03 a.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. I*, p. 1171; Minutes of the Seventeenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 7, 1945, 3 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 1190; Stettinius, pp. 391-392, *UNCIO Documents V. 11*, pp. 710-714.

<sup>264</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 202; Luard, p. 56; Stettinius pp. 395-397.

the Security Council, and to make recommendations based on those discussions.<sup>265</sup>

However, on 17 June, when the official report of Committee II/2 was brought forth for approval, shortly before the Conference was expected to conclude (with Truman coming to San Francisco to make a final speech) the USSR renewed its objection to this broadly inclusive language. This Soviet protest was carried out in both the Executive and Steering Committees, and Gromyko indicated that the USSR attached great importance to the matter and was not willing to reconsider its views. On the recommendation of Stettinius, a tiny subcommittee consisting of Gromyko and Evatt of Australia, chaired by himself, was assigned the task of resolving the impasse.<sup>266</sup> After considerable wrangling, which delayed the end of the Conference by three days, this subcommittee agreed upon a compromise formula whereby the General Assembly was entitled to discuss and make recommendations on “any matters within the scope of the [United Nations Organization] Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided in the Charter” except for those being considered by the Security Council.<sup>267</sup> The Soviet firmness on a relatively minor point of language once again showed the Soviet fear that the new organization’s General Assembly would serve as a forum for criticism of the USSR, and consequent desire to concentrate power in the Security Council.

The aforementioned questions were not the only issues on which the USSR expressed significant interest during the San Francisco Conference, but an exhaustive list is outside the scope of this study. It is noteworthy that the USSR suffered defeats on other minor issues without serious protest. For example, Denmark was accepted as a

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<sup>265</sup> United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Volume 9, Commission II, General Assembly* (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), pp. 108-110, p. 203, pp. 407-408.

<sup>266</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, pp. 264-267, 522-527.

<sup>267</sup> Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 202; *UNCIO Documents V. 9*, pp. 233-235.

member of the organization despite Stalin's wishes, specifically expressed at Yalta.<sup>268</sup> A Ukrainian bid to include the "right to work" among the list of inherent human rights similarly failed and was not pursued vigorously.<sup>269</sup> The Soviet Union was not merely behaving in a pedantic manner, but genuinely attached importance to certain matters. Its attitude towards the new body was not completely inflexible, and cooperation with the other victorious great powers within it remained an important goal, provided this did not conflict with perceived Soviet vital interests.

By the same token, the USSR was not always out of step with the rest of the world during the Conference. For example, the Soviet desire to censure the Franco régime in Spain was energetically echoed by many delegations, including several Latin American states that were often in conflict with the USSR.<sup>270</sup> More importantly, the Soviet insistence on military domination by the permanent members of the Security Council was not substantially contested. Great power preeminence in the Military Staff Committee was not strongly challenged.<sup>271</sup> Despite the controversy surrounding the issue at Dumbarton Oaks, the provision of troops and bases under the terms of a future agreement was accepted virtually without question, and some states such as Greece favoured the original Soviet desire to make the provision mandatory.<sup>272</sup> Such support ensured that one of the cardinal objectives of the USSR regarding the structure of the new organization was met. The Soviet Union was able to preserve those priorities it saw as most vital, including the ability to protect Soviet interests through Security Council veto power, a somewhat limited scope of power for the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice, as well as the inclusion of Byelorussia and Ukraine.

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<sup>268</sup> Minutes of the Eleventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 1, 1945, 9 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. 1*, pp. 1084-1086; *UNCIO Documents V. 5*, p. 460.

<sup>269</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 10*, p. 27.

<sup>270</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 6*, pp. 124-136.

However, overall, the depth and rancour of the disputes over the participation of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, Argentina and Poland, and lack of support for the Soviet Union from the other sponsors in those disputes and other questions such as those related to the chairmanship of the Conference, the WTUC, the selection of Deputy Secretaries-General, and the inclusion of withdrawal and expulsion provisions in the UN Charter, dealt a heavy blow to Stalin's conception of the organization as a vehicle for the cooperative domination of the victorious great powers. This outcome heightened Soviet insecurities, providing an additional impetus for increasingly tight Soviet control over the areas of central and eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army. Nevertheless, the difficulties at San Francisco did not entirely crush Soviet optimism regarding the new organization, and the level of tension between the USSR and the USA was lower in June 1945 than it would be a few months later. Gromyko noted in his memoirs that the Soviet Union's main adversaries at San Francisco were not usually the other great powers, but the smaller states he labeled their "dependents."<sup>273</sup> It was not until the UN's handling of the Iranian Crisis of 1946 that the new body would incontrovertibly prove itself to be the obstacle to Soviet aspirations and forum for anti-Soviet rhetoric that Stalin had feared.

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<sup>271</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 12*, pp. 361-362.

<sup>272</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 12*, pp. 391-392, 432-434.

<sup>273</sup> Gromyko, *Memories*, pp. 117-118.

## **Chapter Six – The Impact of the 1946 Iran Crisis on Soviet Attitudes towards the UN**

The United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), held at San Francisco from 25 April – 24 June 1945, was a source of serious disillusionment for the USSR. Despite some hard-won successes, it shattered Soviet hopes that the new organization would serve as a means of institutionalizing great power dominance over the postwar world. Instead, the organization became a forum for mobilizing a majority, instead of building consensus based on mutual respect for each of the permanent members' interests. Given the Soviet Union's relative isolation in contrast to the overwhelming number of Western-leaning countries, many of which were Latin American states subject to strong American influence, this majoritarian approach was bound to be disadvantageous to the USSR.

In the weeks and months following the Conference, world events were sharpening the tensions between the Soviet Union and the American-led capitalist world further. Soviet attitudes towards the UN correspondingly became increasingly negative and obstructionist, as it seemed increasingly to serve capitalist ends against the Soviet Union. The UN's response to the Iranian Crisis of 1946 crystallized this tendency into indisputable fact. The Security Council was highly critical of the USSR on an issue that did not present a serious threat to general peace, before other methods of resolution had been exhausted. To make matters worse, in the course of the Security Council's handling of the matter, the USSR's erstwhile allies Britain and the US at times took a more strident stance than Iran itself, the alleged victim. This event illustrated that instead of the United Nations Organization serving as a tool for continuing the cooperation of the great powers to ensure a peaceful world, it would instead be used as a weapon against Soviet interests, and in so doing finally destroy any hopes to which the USSR may have still clung that their original vision of the organization would be fulfilled.

In the weeks and months following the San Francisco Conference the Soviet-Western relationship continued to deteriorate over a number of issues, including Soviet support for leftist forces in eastern and central Europe, particularly Romania and Bulgaria, Soviet disappointments at the abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease and lack of Western support for Soviet reparation demands, and the inability to find a common agreement regarding Germany. The American monopoly on the atomic bomb substantially heightened Soviet insecurities both militarily and through a new concern that the American invention would rob the USSR of its just share of the spoils of victory. New personnel in the US and Britain deepened the growing rift.

At the end of the San Francisco Conference, Stettinius resigned his post as Secretary of State, and was replaced by the much more anti-communist James F. Byrnes. Stettinius assumed the post of US Ambassador to the United Nations. In line with the high expectations Roosevelt held for the new organization, Stettinius hoped he would be a virtual co-equal of Byrnes, and received assurances from Truman that this would be the case.<sup>1</sup> Gromyko maintained that the USSR's viewpoint was very similar. It was fundamental to the Soviet conception of the organization that Security Council representatives have the authority to act quickly and decisively, or else "the whole conception of the UNO, as worked out at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, would be destroyed."<sup>2</sup> However, this would not prove to be the reality. Truman and Byrnes acted increasingly independently, leaving Stettinius without any real authority. While by no means a Soviet sympathizer by ideology, Stettinius' strong pragmatism and personal charm allowed him to have a positive and constructive relationship with the USSR. With his departure, not only had the more sympathetic Roosevelt been replaced by the inexperienced and less diplomatically skilled Truman, a powerful guiding and moderating

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<sup>1</sup> Stettinius, p. 404.

voice was removed from the State Department. Byrnes was ideologically incapable of providing the same voice of restraint. As a result, antagonism between the US and USSR increased sharply. Furthermore, after the Labour Party's victory in a July election in Britain, the hard-nosed trade unionist Ernest Bevin became the British Foreign Secretary. He also held a strong ideological bias against the Soviet Union, which the new Prime Minister Clement Attlee failed to curb. Thus, the lack of cordiality at the Potsdam Conference, also held that July, was readily understandable, and though the United Nations Organization was not discussed directly, the ill feelings generated there nonetheless affected the organization.

At Potsdam it was agreed that a Council of Foreign Ministers, with representation from the USSR, USA, UK, China, and France, would meet to discuss the issues left outstanding by the completion of the war, including peace treaties with the Axis states. The first such meeting opened in London on 11 September 1945. The Soviets were rebuffed in their attempt to gain a voice in control over Japan, which boded ill for Allied cooperation with respect to the occupation of major enemy states. Also, while Soviet behaviour in Romania and Bulgaria was heavily criticized, the British steadfastly refused to discuss their support for Royalist forces in Greece. Molotov argued that it was a double standard to criticize the Soviet Union for its policies on what were internal matters in Romania and Bulgaria while ignoring British intervention in Greece's similarly internal affairs. However, the Soviet Union continued to be subjected to greater criticism for domestic interference than the UK, on the grounds that the British government was acting in accordance with the wishes of the legal Greek government, while the USSR was working against the legitimate authorities.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Record of the First Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m., in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United*

On the next day, 12 September, discussions began with regard to a peace treaty with Italy, and with it, plans for Italy's African colonies – Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. Byrnes proposed that they be placed under a collective United Nations trusteeship, but this met with a cool reception. France argued that Italy was best suited to serve as trustee, while the Soviets maintained, as per a study by Litvinov completed in June, that the UNO's trusteeships for the colonies should be divided among the four powers, with the USSR receiving control over Tripolitania, the western part of Libya.<sup>4</sup> The British wanted these trusteeships, but Bevin cannily took no open position on the issue, neither openly supporting the US proposal nor rejecting the Soviet one.<sup>5</sup>

On 14 September, Molotov met privately with Byrnes, and made his case for Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania, based on two principles. First of all, as a victim of Italian aggression and a powerful force in the defeat of the Axis, the USSR was entitled to receive compensation at Italy's expense. Secondly, the Soviet Union's multinational nature had given the USSR the skills and experience to effectively promote inter-ethnic harmony and national development, so that the territory would be prepared for independence within ten years. When Byrnes countered that a neutral administrator under the auspices of the UN would be preferable to a single administering state, to avoid the appearance of aggrandizement by the great powers, Molotov argued that this would be far less efficient and more prone to conflict, as the administrator would necessarily have to be a citizen of some state, and therefore either subject to influence from his or her government or continually buffeted by appeals from a myriad of sides.<sup>6</sup> Later that day

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*States, Diplomatic Papers: 1945 Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 118; James L. Gormly, *The Collapse of the Grand Alliance, 1945-1946* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), pp. 58-59.

<sup>4</sup> Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 96.

<sup>5</sup> Record of the First Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. II*, p. 121; Gormly, pp. 61-62.

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 14, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. II*, pp. 163-166.

the issue was raised again in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Here Molotov argued his claim to a broader audience in largely the same terms, reminding the others of the USSR's wartime sacrifices and experience in dealing with different nationalities. He revealed his suspicions of British imperial greed, stating that at the same time he recognized the British right to similar compensation. However, this appeal failed to rally support for the Soviet position.<sup>7</sup>

When the Foreign Ministers addressed the matter again the following day, 15 September, none of the parties had changed their position. Molotov spoke at length about respecting the claims of the British Empire, the Soviet need for a merchant port in the Mediterranean to facilitate greater participation in world trade, and Soviet expertise in managing nationalities, as well as pledging not to impose a Soviet-style economic and political system. Still, no progress was made. It was decided to refer the issue to their deputies, who would consider a wide range of proposals and report back.<sup>8</sup> However, Andrei Vyshinsky was similarly unable to win support for the Soviet position among the deputies, and so by the end of April 1946, when the Council of Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, the issue remained deadlocked, and by 10 May, the USSR had given up its claim to Tripolitania or any of the Italian colonies.<sup>9</sup> This failure to obtain a foothold in the Mediterranean through the UN's trusteeship system was a considerable blow to the USSR's foreign policy hopes.

As mentioned in Chapter Five, near the end of the San Francisco Conference,

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<sup>7</sup> Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 14, 1945, 4 p.m., in *FRUS 1945 V. II*, pp. 170-175.

<sup>8</sup> Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 15, 1945, 3 p.m., in *Ibid*, pp. 189-194.

<sup>9</sup> United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fourth Meeting, Paris, April 29, 1946, 4 p.m., in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1946 Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 155-63; United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Third Informal Meeting, Paris, May 10, 1946, 4 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 334.

Gromyko had obtained Stettinius' promise to support a Soviet claim to a liberated dependent territory. Byrnes had reneged on this pledge, claiming that the American commitment had only been to recognize the USSR's right to *seek* a territorial mandate, not to support any actual claim.<sup>10</sup> While his position was technically correct, the Soviet government was justified in its disappointment and feeling of betrayal. In a memo from Gromyko sent to Stettinius on 20 June, the Soviet Ambassador showed that his government clearly understood Stettinius' assurance to mean that the USA would support Soviet attempts to gain control over a trust territory. Gromyko expressed a desire for further discussions to "concretize" the American promise by discussing to which territory it could be applied.<sup>11</sup> Three days later, Stettinius replied to Gromyko's memo without correcting the Soviet misunderstanding. He confirmed US support for the USSR's eligibility as a potential administering authority, and stated a willingness to hear Soviet views on the subject, though he pointed out that such talks might have wait until they returned to Washington, since it had been agreed at Yalta that there would be no discussion of allocating specific territories at San Francisco.<sup>12</sup> Added to the growing tensions between the US and the USSR, this setback on the trusteeship issue further reduced Soviet respect for the entire endeavour of the UNO.

In addition, while it was outside the official auspices of the United Nations Organization, in the same period the USSR sought to improve its security by revising the Montreux Treaty to obtain greater control over the Dardanelles. This notion had previously been treated sympathetically by Churchill in his October 1944 visit to Moscow and again at Yalta, where Roosevelt agreed in principle as well. However, at

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<sup>10</sup> James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 96.

<sup>11</sup> Memorandum, The Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko) to the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius), San Francisco, June 20, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. I*, p. 1399.

Potsdam and in the September meetings in London, American and British support for the idea was dropped, largely as a result of the Soviet Union's high-handed pressure on Turkey in the matter, which Molotov later acknowledged as a mistake.<sup>13</sup> This Anglo-American rebuff of what the Soviets perceived as their legitimate and vital security interests, and their just due given their wartime sacrifices, was not as forceful as the one that would occur in August 1946, when the issue led to a major crisis and American warships were sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to intimidate the USSR.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, it wounded Soviet pride and fed Soviet insecurities, and was directly contrary to Soviet hopes for the postwar relationship of the victorious powers, and thus indirectly weakened the United Nations Organization further.

Pending the ratification of the United Nations Charter by the member states and other organizational issues, the transition from the San Francisco Conference to a fully functioning organization was placed under the responsibility of a Preparatory Commission.<sup>15</sup> Gladwyn Jebb, a British Delegate at the UNCIO, was Executive Secretary of the Commission. All signatories had representation on the Preparatory Commission, but again it was guided by an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the same fourteen countries that composed the Executive Committee at San Francisco. The Preparatory Commission recommended that the General Assembly have its first meeting in London in January 1946, but that the first meeting be organizational in character, and that substantive issues be delayed until the Assembly's

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<sup>12</sup> Memorandum, The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Stettinius) to the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko), San Francisco, June 23, 1945, in *Ibid*, pp. 1428-1429.

<sup>13</sup> Chuev, p. 73.

<sup>14</sup> Byrnes, pp. 77-78; Record by the United Kingdom Delegation of a Meeting at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 19, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. II*, pp. 690-691; Simons, p. 102; Zubok and Pleshakov, pp. 92-93.

<sup>15</sup> Formal acceptance of the Charter required the submission to the USA of a formal ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus a majority of other member states. This was achieved on 24 October, 1945, when the Soviet Union, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR and

second meeting to be held in the spring.<sup>16</sup>

With no headquarters or other physical facilities, or agreement regarding where the UN would be located, much practical work remained to be done before the organization could begin its substantive work. The eventual selection of the site in the Turtle Bay area of New York City, after American businessman and philanthropist John D. Rockefeller, Jr. donated the land, took a considerable amount of time and negotiation. Fortunately, the USSR favoured an American site over a European one, and exerted pressure on the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian governments to support this position.<sup>17</sup> This stance reflected both the negative Soviet attitude towards the League of Nations, which of course proved to be a failure and a source of resentment for the USSR after its expulsion, and a desire to sideline Britain and continental Europe, which were no longer dominant powers in international affairs. For practical geographic reasons, the Soviets demanded that the location be on or near the Atlantic seaboard, and the US was willing to accept this condition. Gromyko said at the time, “The Soviet Government considers that the United States would be the proper place for the United Nations Organization. The United States is located conveniently between Asia and Europe. The old world had it once, and it is time for the New World to have it.”<sup>18</sup> Though the British and French strongly preferred placing the headquarters in Europe, they could not impose their will against a united Soviet Union and USA.<sup>19</sup> Hence, it had already been considered highly likely that the organization would be located in the vicinity of New York City well before Rockefeller’s donation in December 1946. However, the cooperative resolution of this practical problem took a backseat to more overtly political concerns, and was not able to

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Poland all submitted their ratifications together. Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), p. 20.

<sup>16</sup> Luard, p. 72.

<sup>17</sup> Stettinius, p. 433.

stem the growing tide of animosity in the latter part of 1945.

Overall, however, the commanding majority the USA held in the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission gave Western states little incentive to seek consensus or compromise, especially since, as at San Francisco, the USSR could only reliably count on support from the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as Poland.<sup>20</sup> The Soviets seemed unable to accept the neutrality of the Secretariat, and continued to see its personnel as representatives of their individual governments, not impartial civil servants. Furthermore, Soviet representatives still clung to their emphasis on the organization's role in traditionally defined military security, and won agreement among the Big Five that the Assistant Secretary General for the Security Council's Political Affairs Department would be a Soviet citizen. Arkadi Sobolev, the prominent participant in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, was chosen for this post, and was praised for his ability to balance the demands of his government with his role as international civil servant.<sup>21</sup> Beyond this, however, the Soviets displayed little interest in much of the Commission's work, and accorded a low priority to the provision of Soviet personnel to the Secretariat beyond that related to the work of the Security Council, as well as the appointment of officerships in the various committees, both in accordance with common Soviet practice.<sup>22</sup>

When the General Assembly met on 10 January, the USSR's isolation within the new organization was soon evident. At the time, the post of President of the General Assembly was expected to be among the most prominent representatives of the

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<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1987), pp. 97-98.

<sup>19</sup> Gromyko, *Memories*, p. 129; Stettinius, p. 415; Yoder, p. 27.

<sup>20</sup> Luard, p. 89.

<sup>21</sup> Urquhart, p. 103.

organization, (although it quickly became apparent that the Secretary-General would be more far more prominent). Thus, the Soviet Union attached great importance to ensuring that the GA President be sympathetic to the concerns of the USSR. However, the General Assembly was able to choose its own President without the participation of the Security Council, so the USSR had little direct control over the selection. The Russians understood that a candidate from a communist country would never be accepted by the General Assembly, so Trygve Lie, a Norwegian social democrat, was the Soviet government's preferred choice. The US was similarly willing to accept Lie as the most viably neutral candidate. However, the Americans also liked Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, who was favoured by the British as well as having commanding support from Latin America, and was the candidate most prominently named in the media. The Soviet government strongly opposed Spaak, with Gromyko claiming at a five-power informal meeting on 9 January that he "could not accept Spaak" since he was too closely identified with the failed League of Nations.<sup>23</sup>

At the opening meeting of the General Assembly, the Chairman, Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia opened the floor for discussion regarding the Presidency, and Gromyko immediately spoke up and enthusiastically endorsed Lie for the post, noting both his personal merits and, in line with the Soviet mindset, Norway's sterling wartime

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<sup>22</sup> Jebb, p. 174, pp. 178-179; Urquhart, pp. 96-97.

<sup>23</sup> Secretary's Staff Committee Working Paper (SC-171/8), Tentative United States Slates for Secretary-General and Members and Officers of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Committee, the Preparatory Commission, and the General Assembly, November 15, 1945, in *FRUS 1945 V. I*, p. 1478; Telegram, The Acting United States Representative on the Preparatory Commission (Stevenson) to the Acting Secretary of State, London, December 27, 1945, 7 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 1509; United States Delegation Working Paper, Assignment of Positions in the General Assembly, Transmitted to Mr. Stettinius on January 4, 1946 (En Route) in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1946 Volume I, General; The United Nations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 134; Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Foreign Office, January 9, 1946, 3:30 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 142; Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Foreign Office, January 10, 1946, 10 a.m., in *Ibid*, p. 149.

record. This was something of a shock to the delegates, as it had been anticipated that the President would be chosen by secret ballot without explicit nominations. Nevertheless, Wincenty Ryzmowski of Poland dutifully supported the Soviet proposal, and then Dmitri Manuilsky of the Ukrainian SSR took the podium, noted the absence of any other proposed candidates, and suggested that Lie be accepted by acclamation. Byrnes, representing the US, remained silent throughout, giving the negative impression that Lie was Moscow's man, even though he had the support of the US government. Dr. Zuleta Angel ruled that this call for acclamation was contrary to the rules of procedure laid out by Jebb, but nevertheless allowed a vote on whether or not to accept Lie without a secret ballot.

However, the Chairman's choice of wording was confusing, a problem compounded by Manuilsky making a comment between Dr. Zuleta Angel's calling the vote and the vote itself. Thus, few of the representatives understood what their vote meant, and so many did not vote at all, while Manuilsky voted both for and against his own proposal. The result was that fifteen states accepted a secret ballot, while nine supported the acclamation. The vote was then conducted, with delegates writing the name of their choice on a private ballot. Spaak, despite his name never having being raised at the meeting, defeated Lie 28 votes to 23. Though Lie was then chosen two weeks later as Secretary-General with little fuss, this was still another defeat for the USSR. The American silence, combined with the Soviet conviction that the Latin American states were under the control of the USA, convinced the Soviets that the Americans were not acting in good faith. This impression was strengthened by the fact that Spaak was elected without having even been mentioned in the meeting, while there were no votes for anyone other than Lie and Spaak, despite it being a write-in ballot. To the Soviets, this outcome was a gross violation both of informal agreements with the

USA and the spirit of cooperation and respect for the interests of the victorious powers that was so integral to the Soviet perception of the organization.<sup>24</sup>

However, events in the Security Council (SC) were of greater significance to the USSR than those of the General Assembly, and what transpired there finally destroyed any remaining Soviet belief that the UN could be used as a tool for great power cooperation. On 17 January, the Security Council was formally constituted, with Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Poland joining the Big Five. However, two days later on 19 January, before the Council even met for the first time to address practical matters such as the rules of procedure, Iran launched an official complaint against the USSR. This was quite a shock to most participants, with Jebb describing it “rather as if a rabbit had bitten a stoat.”<sup>25</sup> The complaint involved the Soviet occupation of northern Iran. Fearing Reza Shah Pahlavi’s amity with Nazi Germany, on 25 August 1941, the USSR and UK invaded Iran from the north and south respectively. Iranian resistance was defeated in a matter of days, and the more pliable Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi replaced his father on the throne. In January 1942, a formal alliance was signed, wherein Iran pledged to join the war on the side of the Allies, though its assistance was to be non-military in nature. This secured an important source of oil for the Allied cause, as well as providing a highly useful route for delivering supplies to the Soviet Union and British forces in the Middle East. Under the January 1942 agreement, Soviet forces were to occupy the northern part of the country, and British forces the south, for the duration of the war, but the troops were to be withdrawn within six months of the end of the fighting. Thereafter, Iran posed no serious obstacle to the plans of the Allies, and in September 1943, Iran formally declared war on Germany, and officially

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<sup>24</sup> Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, London, January 10, 1946, Midnight, in *FRUS 1946 V. I*, pp. 152,-153; Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 7-10; Meisler, pp. 21-23; Spaak, pp. 107-108.

became a member of the United Nations.

From the onset of the Soviet occupation, the Red Army had used their position to interfere with the control of the Iranian government, whose hold over the Azerbaijani and Kurdish populations in northern Iran was weak already. The areas under Soviet occupation were traditionally a very important grain-producing region of the country, and the USSR used its control over the food supply to enhance its standing, by making this zone appear as a land of abundance, while conditions elsewhere in the country deteriorated, nearly to the point of famine in the south. Soviet leaders also supported regional demands for autonomy, as well as the communist Tudeh Party. They worked to reduce the presence and influence of Iranian military and civil officials, as well as representatives of the USA, who had a consulate in the Soviet zone. At the same time, the USSR enjoyed considerable support from the local population.<sup>26</sup>

When the first of the Big Three conferences was held in Teheran in November 1943, the USSR and UK, joined by the USA, made a formal declaration affirming their acceptance of Iran's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.<sup>27</sup> In 1944, the Soviets became aware of American and British negotiations for oil concessions from Iran, and obtaining a similar agreement for the USSR then became an important Soviet goal. Still fearing the pressure that accompanied foreign occupation, the Iranian government decided in October 1944 to grant no oil concessions until after the war. However, the Kremlin continued to seek one, and launched a propaganda attack against the Iranian government.<sup>28</sup> Locally, there was virtually no resistance to granting oil concessions to the USSR, which were rumored to be highly advantageous, providing sorely needed

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<sup>25</sup> Jebb, pp. 183-184.

<sup>26</sup> Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 87-93.

<sup>27</sup> Gromyko, *Tegeranskaia konferentsiia*, p. 176; Harriman, p. 282.

employment with 50% of the profits going to the Iranians. The Iranian government's opposition to this popular Soviet initiative fueled demands for regional autonomy. In the autumn of 1944, the Soviets also stepped up propaganda efforts, opening a school in the regional capital Tabriz where the Azeri and Russian languages were taught, while also establishing newspapers in the local languages and promoting cultural links. The Soviet constitutional amendment discussed in Chapter Three with regard to the X-matter was also seen as providing a means for building closer ties to the USSR, as the Foreign Affairs Department of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan could provide a direct link between the Iranian Azeri population and the Azerbaijani SSR.<sup>29</sup>

Soviet pressure on Iran and support for the breakaway regions against the Iranian government were discussed at Yalta. However, no conclusion or decision was reached, with Molotov even rejecting Eden's request for a formal affirmation of the agreement reached at Teheran.<sup>30</sup> At San Francisco, discussion of specific concerns such as this did not take place, though it is notable that in Commission III, dealing with the Security Council, the Iranian government proposed that an attempt to violate or infringe upon a nation's territorial integrity be automatically considered as a threat to international peace and security. It was widely agreed at the time that this principle would be accepted, and the Iranian delegation did not press the pursuit of specific language in the matter.<sup>31</sup> Still, this may have indicated Iranian concerns of a possible threat to the country's borders.

By the summer of 1945, through numerous appointments and similar pressures, Soviet Azerbaijanis and their sympathizers were firmly in control of Iranian Azerbaijan's

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<sup>28</sup> Memorandum, The Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State, Washington, December 28, 1944, in *FRUS Malta and Yalta*, p. 335; Telegram, Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, London, 15 January 1945, 7 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 337; Stettinius, p. 176.

<sup>29</sup> Fawcett, pp. 96-97.

<sup>30</sup> Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 10, 1945, Noon, Vorontsov Villa, in *FRUS Malta and Yalta*, p. 877.

<sup>31</sup> *UNCIO Documents V. 12*, pp. 66-67, 289.

administration.<sup>32</sup> At the Potsdam Conference, no agreement regarding Iran was reached except a pledge that the occupying powers would withdraw immediately from the capital Teheran, while the six months allowed for withdrawal from the rest of the country would commence from the end of the war with Japan, not the European conflict. At Soviet insistence, the affirmation of this commitment was kept secret.<sup>33</sup> On 26 August 1945, the Tudeh Party, led by the pro-Soviet Ja'far Pishevari, took temporary control of Tabriz, with the Red Army presence reinforced to ensure that he was not challenged. In September, the Iranian situation was discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, but the Soviets refused to make any pledge beyond respect for their previous agreements.<sup>34</sup> In November the Iranian government attempted to send troops into the Soviet zone to restore control, but they were stopped by the Red Army. On 12 December, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed in Tabriz, with Pishevari as Prime Minister. Three days later, a similar Kurdish People's Republic was announced in the western part of Iranian Azerbaijan.<sup>35</sup>

On 19 December, during the Moscow meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Byrnes raised the question of Iran directly with Stalin, pointing out that if the Iranian delegation to the United Nations decided to bring the question before the Security Council, the US would support its right to be heard. He also questioned why the USSR had needed to repel the 1,500 Iranian troops sent to the region in November, given the 30,000 Red Army soldiers present. Stalin replied that Byrnes did not properly understand the situation. First of all, the oilfields on the Soviet side of the border were close and vulnerable to sabotage, and the Iranian government could not be trusted to keep the

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<sup>32</sup> Fawcett, p. 98.

<sup>33</sup> Martin Sicker, *The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 67-68.

<sup>34</sup> Fawcett, p. 95.

<sup>35</sup> Sicker, pp. 70-71.

border secure. Stalin noted that the USSR had the right to maintain troops in Iran until 15 March 1946, and at that time the situation would be examined to see whether or not evacuation was possible.<sup>36</sup> As well, he claimed that under a treaty signed in 1921 the Soviet Union had the right to station troops in northern Iran to prevent danger from an outside source. Byrnes raised the issue with Stalin again the following day, once more reiterating the American position that if Iran raised the matter in the UNO, the US would be obliged to support them. In Byrnes' recollection, Stalin dismissed a suggestion from Bevin for a joint British-American-Soviet Commission to investigate the situation, and Byrnes expressed hope that the USSR would not do anything in Iran to cause friction between the US and USSR. Stalin replied "We will do nothing that will make you blush."<sup>37</sup> Bohlen recalled the statement differently, claiming that Stalin said that if Iran chose to raise the issue in the Security Council, "this will not cause us [the Soviets] to blush."<sup>38</sup> Bohlen's version seems more likely to be accurate, given the Soviet leader's preference for displaying coolness when pressured by the Americans. The issue remained unresolved at the end of the Moscow discussions.

Since 2 September 1945, the date of Japan's formal surrender on the deck of the *USS Missouri*, was accepted as the end of the war, the Soviets were obliged to withdraw from Iran by 2 March 1946. Thus, the Iranian complaint, made on 19 January, could be seen as premature. However, by that time Iranian fears of Soviet annexation of the regions in question were running rampant, and these concerns were shared by the British and Americans. Nevertheless, Britain strongly urged restraint on the Iranian government, while Byrnes and the US did not actively encourage the Iranians to raise the matter, but

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<sup>36</sup> The reason why Stalin said 15 March instead of 2 March is unclear, and was perhaps a reflection of the low priority Stalin gave the issue.

<sup>37</sup> Byrnes, pp. 118-120.

<sup>38</sup> Bohlen, p. 250.

decided not to recommend caution either.<sup>39</sup> The high level of media attention the matter received in the USA heightened Soviet embarrassment.<sup>40</sup> The Iranian delegation made its complaint in a letter to the Security Council, charging the USSR with interference in the internal affairs of Iran.<sup>41</sup> The Soviets immediately assumed that the action was at the behest of the US and Britain, and on 21 January launched a counterattack, accusing Britain of interference in Greek affairs due to their troop presence in that country.

At the same time, Manuilsky, on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation, charged the British with interference in the Dutch East Indies, for the same reason. These charges were largely dismissed by all but the Soviet Union and her allies, as these troops were present at the request of the legal authorities of the countries involved, but they did divert attention away from the accusations against the USSR.<sup>42</sup> When the Security Council met on 25 January it merely took note of the Iranian complaint, while private discussions took place in order to defuse the dispute. On 27 January, V.K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese representative to the United Nations, met with the Soviets and then visited Stettinius, telling him that the USSR and the Iranian government were both willing to seek a bilateral negotiated solution to the problem and urging the US not to weaken the organization by taking action in the Security Council that would be injurious to great power cooperation.<sup>43</sup> However, Bevin met with Stettinius the following morning, before a scheduled meeting of the SC, to ensure that the issue would not be removed from

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<sup>39</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), Washington, January 3, 1946, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and Africa* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 293-294; Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, January 10, 1946, 5 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 301.

<sup>40</sup> Yoder, p. 40.

<sup>41</sup> For the text of the letter, see Memorandum, The Head of the Iranian Delegation at the United Nations (Taqizadeh) to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations (Jebb), London, 19 January 1946, in *FRUS 1946 V. VII*, p. 304.

<sup>42</sup> Lie, pp. 29-30.

<sup>43</sup> Telegram, The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, London, January 28, 1946, 4 p.m., in *FRUS 1946 V. VII*, pp. 316-317.

international scrutiny so easily, as it would have, in his words, “left Britain to stand alone in the dock on the Greek and Indonesian matters.”<sup>44</sup>

At the SC meeting on 28 January, the Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinsky urged the Council to put aside the matter while bilateral negotiations were conducted, but after discussion the meeting was adjourned without a resolution, as neither the British nor the Americans would accept this step.<sup>45</sup> The next day, the American delegation met and agreed to recommend to the Iranians that they open the 30 January Council meeting with the statement that they were willing to negotiate, while at the same time accusing the Soviets of bad faith in past negotiations.<sup>46</sup> The Iranian representative Hossein Ala did so, but despite this charge, progress was made. At this meeting it was unanimously decided to pass a resolution, proposed by Stettinius, that recognized the willingness of both the USSR and Iran to negotiate, and requested that they do so and report back on their progress. The SC officially retained the right to seek information on the progress of the negotiations. Bevin was appeased with a supplementary statement that the Council could consider the matter further at any time.<sup>47</sup> This appeared to be a compromise that was satisfactory to all sides. However, the American and British willingness to allow Iran to use the Security Council to attack the USSR was disconcerting to the Soviets, who were constantly suspicious of the US and Britain using Iran as a cat’s paw. Meanwhile, the Soviet countercharges against Britain only raised the tension further, particularly given Vyshinsky’s skill at harsh invective and Bevin’s tendency to react with patriotic emotion.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Telegram, The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, London, January 29, 1946, 2 p.m., in *Ibid*, p. 320.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 321.

<sup>46</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius), London, Undated, in *Ibid*, pp. 323-324.

<sup>47</sup> Telegram, The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, London, January 30, 1946, in *Ibid*, p. 325.

<sup>48</sup> Lie, p. 30-33.

Over the next month the Soviet-Iranian negotiations made little progress, with the Soviets demanding autonomy for the Azerbaijani and Kurdish regions, oil concessions, and a permanent Soviet occupation force as the price of withdrawal, although the US recognized that the Soviets may have been willing to concede the last point.<sup>49</sup> On 9 February 1946, Stalin announced the USSR's Fourth Five Year Plan, which once again placed a high priority on the production of armaments over consumer goods. At the same time, the Soviet leader announced that the USSR needed to prepare to defend itself against "all kinds of eventualities" and "no peaceful international order is possible" between socialist and capitalist-imperialist states.<sup>50</sup> On 22 February, George Kennan's famous 'Long Telegram' urging a policy of containment was received in Washington, and on 5 March, Churchill gave his 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri. Thus, the disintegration of the Grand Alliance continued to accelerate.

By the time of Churchill's speech, the deadline for the Soviet withdrawal had passed, but the Red Army remained in place. The Soviet press announced that it would continue to do so until the situation gained greater clarity.<sup>51</sup> On 18 March, Ala met with Lie, who continued to counsel direct negotiation with Moscow, noting that if the Security Council were used to place pressure on the USSR, this would in turn press the Soviets to defend their cause, and hamper the possibility of a discreet withdrawal.<sup>52</sup> However, with strong backing from Byrnes, Ala renewed the Iranian complaint against the USSR in the Security Council on 25 March, despite confusion regarding his authorization from Teheran to do so.<sup>53</sup>

The following day, Gromyko, the head of the Soviet delegation to the UN,

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<sup>49</sup> Fawcett, p. 102; Telegram, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 22, Noon, in Footnote #96, *FRUS 1946 V. VII*, p. 337.

<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Meisler, p. 24; Zubok and Pleshakov, p.35.

<sup>51</sup> Fawcett, p. 102.

<sup>52</sup> Lie, pp. 74-75.

angrily attempted to downplay the controversy, saying that an agreement had been reached in principle, and that the Soviet troops would begin withdrawing in five or six weeks. Thus, he urged that the issue not be placed on the agenda. Byrnes, supported by Cadogan, who was representing the UK on the Security Council at the time, refused to accept this postponement. This obduracy provided a clear-cut example of the US attempting to use the Security Council as a forum for anti-Soviet rhetoric, which was a direct affront to the Soviet conception of the organization. When his proposal for non-inclusion on the agenda was not accepted, Gromyko stated that the Soviet government would be unable to participate in Council discussions of the matter until 10 April, which Lie correctly interpreted as a threat to withdraw from further SC participation. When the debate nevertheless raged on, Gromyko walked out of the meeting, despite Lie's private pleas that he remain. This caused a great shock, with some fearing that the Soviet boycott would be permanent.<sup>54</sup>

On 29 March, Byrnes defused the situation somewhat by proposing a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to make inquiries and report back on 3 April, which was accepted. Lie's investigation received a positive response from both countries that agreement was close, and, more dubiously, Soviet assurances that the troop presence was in no way related to the course of the negotiations. Ala indicated a willingness to accept deferral of the issue until 6 May, the date by which the Soviets pledged to complete the withdrawal. Gromyko resumed his seat, but on 6 April, demanded that the item be removed from the agenda, not merely deferred, illustrating the Soviet preoccupation with prestige. Ala initially opposed this, but, on instructions from his government, accepted it

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<sup>53</sup> Lie, p. 76; Stettinius, p. 460.

<sup>54</sup> Lie, p. 77, Stettinius, p. 461. Lie's memoirs note that though the tension was high, there was a lighter moment here, as Frank Begley, the head of security, stopped Gromyko with the warning that press photographers were waiting for him at the foot of the staircase. When Gromyko indicated his willingness to face them, Begley gently pointed out to Gromyko that his pants zipper

on 15 April. However, led by Byrnes, the Council decided in a vote of eight to three to maintain the deferred status of the issue, with only Poland and France sympathizing with Gromyko's position. Lie strongly opposed this, and, despite some opposition, attempted to set a precedent by exercising his privilege as Secretary-General to state his position before the Security Council, as per Article 99 of the UN Charter.<sup>55</sup> In Lie's corresponding memorandum, he argued that once a complainant had withdrawn a complaint, the issue should be automatically dropped from the Security Council's agenda, unless the Council ordered an investigation, or another SC member chose to raise the same issue.<sup>56</sup> Lie desired to have the question treated impartially as a legal issue, and it was duly referred to a committee consisting of the legal experts of each of the Security Council's eleven members. However, this so-called Committee of Experts rejected Lie's position by a vote of eight to three, with each of the delegates voting to accept or reject Lie's desire to establish a formal precedent based on whether or not their country supported the Soviet call for removal.<sup>57</sup> This vote glaringly reinforced the highly partisan nature of the Security Council, again in direct contradiction to the Soviet perception of its role.

The Iranian Crisis of 1946 petered out in subsequent weeks, with the Red Army withdrawing by the revised deadline of 6 May. An agreement in principle granting the Soviet Union oil concessions was reached in the interim, but the Iranian government never ratified it, and thus it never took effect. After a few months, the Iranian army had re-established central control over the breakaway regions, with Stalin withdrawing

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was undone, and was rewarded with a wide smile. Gromyko corrected the problem and resumed his stony countenance before proceeding down the stairs to face the press.

<sup>55</sup> Lie, pp. 78-80.

<sup>56</sup> Legal Memorandum on Question of Retaining Iranian Case on Security Council Agenda, April 16, 1946, in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume I: Trygve Lie, 1946-1953* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 42-43.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p. 40.

assistance to the separatists and telling Pischevari that continued support would provide justification for protracted British and American troop presences in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece, and China, Denmark, and Iceland respectively.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the issue itself turned out to be relatively minor. However, the American, and to a lesser extent British, responses to the controversy were to have a much more far-reaching impact. The American willingness to use the Security Council as a rostrum for criticism of the USSR dramatically underlined the different perceptions of the organization between the USSR and the West. The American insistence on leaving the issue on the agenda (it remained so until the end of Lie's tenure in 1953) demonstrated to Stalin that the Americans would use the new organization as a tool to promote the USA's perceived interests, including the isolation of the USSR. While many, such as Byrnes, applauded this stance, it was directly contrary to the Soviet expectation that the organization to serve as a club in which the victorious powers would operate in concert to ensure peace and security in the postwar world.<sup>59</sup>

It is noteworthy that the USSR did not launch its harsh invective against the British for their troop presence in Greece and the Dutch East Indies until *after* the Iranian complaint, and, for a time, the Soviets ignored similar French intervention in Lebanon and Syria because of the friendly attitude France displayed towards the USSR.<sup>60</sup> However, the Kremlin did not receive reciprocal respect for what they perceived to be legitimate Soviet security interests. Thus, it is unsurprising that the USSR lost interest in the creation of a UNO military force, a concept to which it had previously attached great importance.<sup>61</sup> The Soviet delegations thereafter adopted an obstructive attitude in the

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<sup>58</sup> Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, p. 309.

<sup>59</sup> For examples of Western support for the UN's handling of the Iran Crisis of 1946 see Byrnes, p. 295; Connally, p. 293; Yoder, p. 40.

<sup>60</sup> Luard, p. 113.

<sup>61</sup> Jebb, p. 186; Luard, pp. 93-105; Urquhart, p. 105.

General Assembly, and a willingness similarly to impede the work of the Security Council through liberal use of their veto power. This was first exercised a few weeks after the conclusion of the Iranian Crisis, in a situation wherein the Soviets thought that a resolution used insufficiently strong language when calling for the withdrawal of British and French troops from Lebanon and Syria.<sup>62</sup> The Iranian Crisis of 1946 made it clear that the organization would be the tool of the imperialist powers that Stalin, reinforced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, initially feared it would be before Roosevelt convinced him that it could be used to build Soviet prestige and serve as a useful means of protection for the USSR. Neither the Soviet expectations for the organization, nor the United Nations itself, ever recovered to fulfill the vast hopes placed in it during the long process of its creation.

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<sup>62</sup> Harriman, p. 547; Jebb, p. 195; Luard, p. 112; Spaak, pp. 110-111.

## **Conclusion**

The pivotal role the USSR played in the creation of the United Nations Organization had a number of important effects. First of all, the particular function that the Soviets envisioned the new body fulfilling would have a significant long term impact on the basic structure of the UNO, which in turn would influence the world as a whole. Roosevelt blamed the impotence and ultimate failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations, on the difficulties in reaching a consensus before taking action, and so he put his trust in the four most powerful Allies acting to police the postwar world to prevent any renewed aggression by the Germans, the Japanese, or any other state that eventually pursued a policy of territorial aggrandizement. This conception was predicated on the assumption that these Four Policemen would be able to act in concert, since the power that they would collectively wield would have been more than ample to crush any potential threat to a peaceful international order. This in turn reflects FDR's optimistic belief that the cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union he had pursued throughout his administration would continue after the defeat of the common enemy. At the time, Roosevelt was frequently criticized, often by the officials in his own State Department, for being blind to the malevolence of the Stalin régime. Numerous historians, particularly those who sympathized with the central and eastern European populations stifled behind the Iron Curtain, have echoed this refrain ever since.

What is perhaps more notable than the American President's sanguine opinion in itself is the high degree to which Stalin reciprocated this confident

attitude. Despite the lengthy list of accusations justly levelled at the Soviet leader, naiveté is rarely among the criticisms. However, Stalin's participation in FDR's endeavour also required a leap of faith. A profound suspicion of relations with the capitalist world is inherent in the Marxist worldview. Both Lenin's interpretation of Marx and the USSR's deeply negative experience as a relatively brief member of the League of Nations would have reinforced a skeptical attitude. However, FDR won over Stalin's support for the project with relative ease. During Molotov's visit to Washington in the late spring of 1942, Roosevelt proposed that the USA, USSR, United Kingdom, and China be given an exclusive right to maintain significant military forces after the defeat of the Axis. Not only were the primary enemy states of Germany, Italy, and Japan to be disarmed and subjected to international inspections, but so also were smaller countries such as Romania and Czechoslovakia, and those Allies that proved to be less successful in containing fascist aggression, such as France and Poland. While the feasibility of the president's scheme was highly questionable, it nonetheless appealed to the Soviet leadership. First of all, such a system would provide an unequivocal guarantee against the USSR's European territory suffering another German attack like the one that had brought down the Tsarist system, or the Nazi invasion which inflicted such colossal ruination. While this factor alone would have been enticing to the Kremlin, FDR's plan would also have demonstrated incontestably the general acceptance of the Soviet Union as a leading player on the postwar international scene, in contrast to its experience of isolation behind a *cordon sanitaire* during the interwar period.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that at the October 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Soviets firmly supported the American initiative, as championed by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to establish a new international security organization. It was during the Moscow Conference as well that the Soviets first began to reveal their perspective of how the new body should be organized. Holding fast to the idea that it would grant substantial prerogatives to its leading members, as originally indicated by the first discussions on the subject, Molotov tried but failed to reduce the number of leading members from four to three by excluding China. At the same conference, the Soviets also made it clear that while they firmly supported the creation of the United Nations Organization, they were not about to abandon the more traditional means of protecting the USSR from future attack. This stance was indicated by Molotov's efforts to get clear assurances that the USSR would not require the consent of the other great powers to establish military or naval bases on the territory of neighbouring states. From the outset, Stalin firmly supported the creation of the United Nations Organization, but was unwilling to entrust his régime's safety entirely to a body that was both ideologically questionable and practically untested. This attitude did not change, and the later Soviet attempt to pursue security through both the UNO and the establishment of a series of buffer states in central and eastern Europe undermined the viability of the organization. Still, at the Moscow Conference the USSR supported further discussions to begin the process of founding the UNO.

By the time of the November 1943 Teheran Conference the notion of

complete disarmament of all but the Big Four had been abandoned, but FDR's modified plan still promised the same key advantages for the Soviet Union – security and prestige. In his face-to-face meetings with Stalin, the American president presented his enterprise as a means of ensuring international stability through direct measures to counteract hostile action before it could pose a serious challenge to the peace. While the military situation had improved dramatically for the Red Army by this time and an eventual Allied victory appeared likely, Stalin remained deeply concerned by the possibility of a German resurgence. He spoke with Roosevelt at some length about Germany's history of aggression, and of the rapidity with which German civilian industries could be converted to produce materials for another war. Stalin clearly wanted the new international security organization to prevent any German rearmament before it posed a serious threat. He contended that this could be accomplished most effectively by occupying vital strategic points at the first hint of any renewed belligerence. When Roosevelt expressed complete agreement with Stalin's elucidation of his concerns and his proposed means of using the new international security organization to neutralize them, the Soviet leader readily threw his support behind the new body.

It is simplistic to characterize this apparent readiness to work closely in harmony with the leading capitalist powers as the Stalinist state prioritizing the demands of *realpolitik* over ideology. The longstanding Stalinist doctrine of 'socialism in one country' held that the best means of promoting socialism in a capitalistic international climate was to strengthen the USSR as a fortress of world

socialism that would remain intact until the geopolitical correlation of forces became more favourable. This policy effectively blurred, or even erased, any distinction between a hardnosed, practical, approach to building the power of the Soviet state, and the more overt promotion of ideological goals, since by the Stalinist rationale anything that strengthened the fortress was *ipso facto* in the greater interest of socialism. Thus, under Stalinist doctrine the Kremlin was not hindered in the pursuit of a long-term cooperative relationship with the capitalist powers.

The three Allied great powers began the practical work of creating the new international security organization a few months later, during the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, which ran through the late summer and early fall of 1944. These talks also brought attention to a relatively new figure on the international diplomatic scene, Andrei Gromyko. Appointed as the Soviet Ambassador to the United States a year earlier, Gromyko began his involvement with the UNO at Dumbarton Oaks. His career remained closely linked to it for several years before his eventual promotion to Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post which he held for almost three decades. During the various UNO-related negotiations Gromyko exhibited the hard-headed stubbornness that typified his reputation in later years, yet many of his counterparts at Dumbarton Oaks, and later during the San Francisco Conference, emphasized how much more pleasant he was to deal with than most other Soviet officials, such as Molotov.

However, the significance of this relative affability was fairly minimal. One thing that was readily apparent throughout the multiple rounds of talks in the

process of creating the UNO was that the Soviet representatives had very little freedom to make compromises or pursue original attempts to overcome the various impasses. All the Soviet representatives, with the partial exception of Molotov, were little more than mouthpieces for the Kremlin, and in every round of talks the other delegations often had to wait for the Soviet delegates to receive instructions from Moscow. In later years Molotov was characteristically unapologetic for this attitude, and cited it as a necessity given the lack of personnel with diplomatic experience. Overall, the Soviet approach to the negotiations to establish the UNO illustrates a strong centralization of authority, and close attention by Stalin himself to issues of foreign relations.

Aside from these points, the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks negotiations help to clarify our understanding of Soviet foreign policy in the late wartime period in a number of ways. It was here that the Soviets outlined how they thought the UNO should be structured, essentially presenting a blueprint of the Kremlin's conception of an ideal international security organization, before compromises had to be made to reach agreement with the other great powers. The Soviet draft plan was considerably shorter than that of the British or the Americans, a reflection of Moscow's view of the far more limited scope of the organization's role in the postwar world. By the time of Dumbarton Oaks, the Americans and British had both begun to attach great importance to the new body taking on a proactive role in promoting international peace and stability by getting involved in economic and social affairs. The USSR fought hard, albeit ultimately without success, to avoid broadening the new project, which Moscow continued

to see as a means of enshrining collaboration among the victorious great powers to prevent another major war. The Soviet delegations repeatedly blamed the failure of the League of Nations on that organization's getting bogged down in secondary concerns, and they were determined to avoid a repetition of this mistake. Therefore, though they did not oppose the creation of a second international organization to promote economic and social development, the USSR tried to keep the focus at Dumbarton Oaks on its primary purpose. In addition, the Soviet draft sought to guarantee that the UNO would not trespass on the domestic sovereignty of the great powers, and the USSR later sought to limit the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the same reason. In combination, the Soviet views on these two issues exemplified the more general Soviet stance that cooperation with the other victorious powers in the geopolitical realm would be a useful means of bolstering Soviet power and security, although this cooperation was based wholly on perceived interest, and did not represent a retreat from Marxist-Leninist ideology or desire for closer integration in other spheres.

By the same token, the Soviet 'ideal' draft laid out at Dumbarton Oaks illustrated the close linkage that the new organization had to the wartime alliance (which, confusingly, was also referred to as the 'United Nations'). Membership was to be restricted to those states that had taken an active role in the struggle against the axis, while states that did not contribute to the war effort directly were to be excluded, even if they were informally friendly to the Allies, as was the case with several Latin American states. This linkage was important to the Kremlin

for several reasons. First of all, as the state that played the leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, the association between the war effort and the new organization would serve to justify the primacy of the great powers, which were to serve as permanent members of the UNO Security Council. The Soviet vision arrogated a tremendous degree of control to the Big Five (by the start of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it had been agreed that France would in time become another permanent member of the Security Council). Most notably, the Soviets wished the Council to have the power to compel member states to provide territory and/or facilities to serve as military or naval bases for the troops of the great powers, without a need to reach any additional agreements. A similar lack of concern for the wishes of small countries was likewise displayed by Soviet behaviour in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization, in which the Kremlin brazenly sought to obtain as much material assistance as possible, while contributing as little as it could to meeting the needs of others. This conviction – that the new organization should be a vehicle for the victorious great powers to protect international peace and stability without interference from the lesser countries of the world - was fundamental to the Soviet vision.

Secondly, despite the amicable relationship with the USSR that Roosevelt repeatedly sought, and the view that indefinite postwar cooperation with the Americans and the British would be expedient, the Soviet régime never relinquished the assumption that the capitalist world was irrevocably hostile to the self-proclaimed socialist state. Therefore, throughout the discussions that established the UNO the Soviets took it for granted that there would be a strong

inherent bias against the USSR among its members. While this bias could be set aside when necessary by the Americans and British for practical reasons, it was still anticipated that the wider membership would use the new organization to express antipathy towards the USSR through any means that the structure permitted. Therefore, Moscow had to ensure that the structure kept such criticisms in check. Limiting the number of potentially unfriendly states by excluding those who did not take a direct part in the war was just one way to achieve this. Later, at San Francisco, the Soviets opposed citizens from neutral countries like Ireland participating in any capacity at the conference to found the new organization, even if acting on behalf of non-governmental organizations, which demonstrated how closely attached Moscow was to this principle. The Soviet draft tried to curb the powers of the General Assembly, which the Kremlin expected would be packed by hostile states. Though the USSR's attempts to restrict what subjects the Assembly could discuss were mostly unsuccessful, the Soviets did not encounter noteworthy opposition from the British or the Americans in ensuring that any serious action required the consent of the Security Council.

At the same time, the Soviet desire to make certain that the new collective security organization would be more effective than its predecessor was emphatically illustrated. First of all, the Soviet draft envisioned having an air force at the disposal of the UNO, so that there would be no delay between a call for action and the use of force if the Security Council mandated it. While the Soviets were willing to show some flexibility regarding the organization of this

rapid reaction strike force, they adhered firmly to the principle that the Council should have a means to take immediate decisive joint action against any rogue state. Only when the Cold War was well underway was this endeavour finally abandoned. In addition, the initial Soviet proposals tried to ensure that the new organization would not behave as irresolutely as the League of Nations by prescribing a series of specific, graduated steps for action against an aggressor. While this notion did not receive support from the other Allies, it provides another example of Moscow's hopes that the new organization would not hesitate to use force when necessary. Although this initial Soviet view of the organization was modified in countless ways over the course of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and subsequent months, the original Soviet draft plan for the creation of the UNO reveals a firm belief that the victorious powers should continue to act in concert in the postwar world to ensure peace and stability by forcefully suppressing aggression before it could gain momentum. These hopes would gradually be whittled down during the San Francisco Conference, before they were dashed completely by the 1946 Iran Crisis.

While agreement on most questions was achieved during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, thornier issues also arose there. One of these was the Soviet demand that all sixteen constituent republics of the USSR be entitled to membership in the General Assembly, which was yet another means of softening the disparity between socialist and capitalist states in the organization's ranks. At the same time Stalin sought to guarantee that the new body could not interfere with domestic sovereignty, and would never be turned into a means for blocking

their foreign policy interests. This concern, as well as the recognition that the organization would be useless if the Big Five were divided, was illustrated by the Soviet attempt to make the veto power possessed by the five permanent members of the Security Council applicable in any situation. These proposals were strongly resisted by the Americans and the British, who feared that they would prove unpalatable to the rest of the world and scuttle the project entirely. However, the Soviets held firm, particularly on the latter point, and Moscow was willing to make concessions on virtually all other questions in order to preserve unrestricted veto power, the ultimate insurance against the new body ever being turned against the USSR's vital interests. The Western Allies were equally adamant in their refusal to allow a permanent member of the Security Council to exercise a veto in a dispute to which they were a party. Therefore, while most of the necessary groundwork to set up the UNO was accomplished at Dumbarton Oaks, important questions remained unresolved at the conclusion of the discussions.

Attempts to break the impasse on these outstanding issues between the end of the Dumbarton Oaks talks and the opening of the Yalta Conference in February 1945 bore little fruit. However, when Stalin met with Roosevelt and Churchill face-to-face again in the Crimea, these final issues were resolved to Soviet satisfaction. By this time, the Americans had adjusted their views on the question of whether or not permanent members of the Council could exercise veto power when they were a party to a dispute, partly out of a desire to find a compromise that would be acceptable to Stalin, but primarily because sober reflection convinced Roosevelt that such a limitation would not be in the US interest either.

Therefore, at Yalta FDR argued in favour of a formula whereby the Council could not be prevented from making suggestions on how to resolve a dispute peacefully, but unanimity was required before any such recommendations could be turned into concrete action. Stalin examined the formula closely, and questioned Roosevelt and Churchill rigorously on their interpretations of what this would mean in practice. Only when he was absolutely satisfied that opposition within the UNO to the pursuit of Soviet interests could be kept limited to rhetoric alone did he accept the compromise.

This was still not an easy thing for the Soviet leader to accept; fears of unwarranted criticism and unfair treatment at the hands of the capitalist majority remained substantial. However, the fact that he did yield on the vital issue of unanimity in all cases demonstrates Stalin's recognition of the benefits of prestige and enhanced security for his country through creating the UNO. Furthermore, at Yalta the Soviets reduced their demand for membership in the General Assembly from all sixteen constituent republics to only the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs. Churchill readily accepted their inclusion, leading FDR, more reluctantly, to follow suit, and both Western Allies pledged to support extending membership to these two republics at the organization's founding conference. Resolving these major problems left over from Dumbarton Oaks paved the way for reaching agreement on some less troublesome outstanding issues, such as which other states would take part in the talks to begin the formal establishment of the new organization, scheduled to open in San Francisco on 25 April. It was decided that only those states that had declared war on the common enemy by 1 March 1945

would be eligible to participate, which again pleased the Soviets who wanted the new organization to be closely linked to the fighting alliance. Thus, the Soviets succeeded in protecting what they regarded as their most important interests in the new organization at Yalta.

The cordiality of the Crimea Conference marked the high point of camaraderie among the victorious great powers. As the defeat of the common enemy came closer, questions regarding the postwar order gained prominence. Differences regarding the treatment of freed Allied prisoners of war, and the occupation of liberated territory, in particular Poland, came increasingly to the fore, and sharply diverging expectations came into focus. The bizarre incident known as the Berne Affair, wherein Stalin accused the British and Americans of conducting secret negotiations with the German forces in Italy that would allow the Nazis to transfer additional troops to the eastern front, further undermined goodwill within the Grand Alliance. However, the secret negotiations the Generalissimo feared never took place. Furthermore, when FDR died on 12 April 1945, the world lost both the driving force behind the creation of the UNO and the strongest proponent within the US government of friendly ties with the USSR. His successor, Harry Truman, possessed less diplomatic experience and skill, and by temperament was less inclined to compromise. In addition, his inexperience led him to rely heavily on the opinions of FDR's advisers, most of whom, like the Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman, were far more critical of the Soviet Union and pessimistic towards the viability of cooperation than the departed Roosevelt. Thus, the new president took a much harder line and in the ten weeks

between the end of the Yalta Conference and the opening of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), when delegations from fifty Allied countries came together in San Francisco to negotiate the international security organization's founding charter and formally create the UNO, US-Soviet relations deteriorated drastically.

The chill in US-Soviet relations after Truman took office was first exhibited when he met with Molotov in Washington before the latter travelled to San Francisco. The Soviet Foreign Minister's presence at the opening of the San Francisco Conference had been highly sought after by the American government, which saw his attendance as an indication of Soviet commitment to the endeavour. In late March, at the height of the Berne Affair, the Soviet government announced that contrary to previous arrangements, Gromyko, rather than Molotov, would take part in the talks in California, since the Foreign Minister's presence was required in Moscow for the upcoming session of the Supreme Soviet. It was widely assumed by the Americans that this was a deliberate snub by the Soviet government in retaliation for the secret negotiations with the Nazis that the Americans and British were allegedly conducting, and this assumption has been perpetuated ever since in scholarly literature. The Americans were somewhat dismayed by this apparent rebuff, and appealed earnestly to Stalin to send Molotov to San Francisco, but to no avail.

However, when Roosevelt died, both Stalin and Molotov expressed very deep and apparently sincere grief at the president's passing. When Stalin asked if there was any way that he could contribute to a smooth transition to Truman

taking office, Harriman, on his own initiative, replied that Molotov's attendance at the San Francisco Conference would shore up both the legitimacy of the new administration and assuage fears that the commitment of the great powers to the new international security organization had died with Roosevelt. Despite Molotov's muttered objections over the time that it would entail, Stalin immediately ordered Molotov to journey to San Francisco. Unless the opposition to the long journey that the Foreign Minister expressed at that meeting was feigned, which seems doubtful, scholarly works that link Molotov's backing out of the trip to the US to the Berne Affair are mistaken. In fact, there was no malign intention behind the plan to replace Molotov with Gromyko, and the former's presence in Moscow really was desired for domestic reasons. In addition, since every Soviet delegate was a spokesman for Stalin's Politburo, the Kremlin likely attached less importance to who that delegate was. Molotov was unable to stay for the entire UNCTO, and although his successor Gromyko was felt to have a less abrasive personality, Soviet policy remained unaltered, again illustrating the centralized nature of authority over foreign affairs in the Stalin régime. It is somewhat ironic that the Americans desired Molotov's visit so strongly, since his visit led directly to a further cooling of relations. During the first substantive face-to-face meeting the new president had with a senior Soviet official, when Molotov stopped briefly in the American capital before continuing to San Francisco, Truman bitterly accused the Soviet régime of violating commitments made at Yalta regarding the reorganization of the Polish government, and refused to listen to Molotov's attempt to explicate the Soviet position.

The rancour had not healed when the Soviet, British, Chinese, and American delegations headed across the country to San Francisco. This boded ill for the success of the project, because the Soviet conception of it relied heavily on close cooperation among the Big Five in the postwar world, at least in matters related to the preservation of global peace. This round of negotiations immediately got off to an inauspicious start, as Molotov insisted that since the UNCIO was formally sponsored by the USSR, United Kingdom, and China as well as the USA, the delegation heads of these four countries should rotate the Chairmanship of the major sessions. Most other states found this suggestion to be a ridiculous violation of established diplomatic norms, and moreover, were disgusted by the aggressive and mocking language that the Soviet Foreign Minister used when seeking support for his agenda. The harsh manner in which he sought this post reduced sympathy for the Soviet Union at San Francisco, and undermined the Soviet position overall. In addition, while the Soviet government felt that the right of Ukraine and Byelorussia to participate had been obtained at Yalta, in fact the US and Britain had only agreed to support a call to extend an invitation to these two republics during the UNCIO. While they did not renege on this pledge when the question came up early on in the conference, their support was clearly half-hearted, and it was only with considerable difficulty that the Soviet delegation managed to obtain membership for the two republics. The Soviets perceived this lack of enthusiasm as a withdrawal by the Americans and British from the spirit of great power cooperation.

To make matters worse, opposition to the inclusion of the two Soviet

republics was led by several Latin American states, which Stalin regarded as lackeys of the US, hence he felt their attitude reflected that of the Americans. In truth, Latin American resistance was tied closely to the countervailing Soviet resistance to the membership of Argentina in the UNO. Soviet-Argentine relations had been poor since the start of the 1930s, and during the war Moscow accused the ostensibly neutral Argentine government of covertly sympathizing with the Axis. During the discussions in the Crimea and elsewhere, Stalin had specifically sought to exclude Argentina from membership in the UNO, and that country did not qualify for an invitation to San Francisco under the terms of the Yalta protocols. However, as Argentina did belatedly declare war on the Axis (well after the March 1 deadline) out of a spirit of solidarity with its neighbours, other Latin American states argued that this should suffice. Somewhat perplexingly, the US government decided to support this request, despite the agreement with the Soviets and British regarding which states were eligible for membership. The hemispheric bloc was able to use its numbers to force and win a vote to extend an invitation to Argentina, despite the strenuous objections of the Soviet delegation.

If there was one key turning point in the evolution of the Soviet attitude towards the UNO from high hopes to bitter disillusionment, it was the acceptance of Argentina. In all prior disputes, including very difficult ones such as the chairmanship of the UNCIO and the inclusion of the two Soviet republics, consensus had always been achieved eventually, even if it was often after a great deal of *in camera* wrangling and sometimes animosity. The acceptance of

Argentina was the first issue in which one of the sponsors was forced to accept defeat by majority vote, without having conceded the matter already in private talks among the Big Four delegations. When the American representative Stettinius supported the acceptance of Argentina, contrary to the Yalta protocols, and the spirit of the discussions with the deceased Roosevelt, it signaled to the Kremlin that the US had all but abandoned efforts to work in unison with the USSR in the postwar world through the UNO. Therefore, the inclusion of Argentina carried a baleful symbolic importance that far outstripped the actual geopolitical significance of that country or the particularities of Soviet-Argentine tensions.

The harm this decision inflicted on US-Soviet relations, and on the Soviet attitude towards the new organization, was compounded by the unwillingness of the conference participants to issue a similar invitation to Poland. The *de facto* Polish régime at that time was not officially recognized by the British or American governments, as it had not been significantly reorganized as per the Yalta agreements, and was based overwhelmingly on the Soviet-backed Lublin Committee. Since it was under Soviet tutelage, it would have been one of the only delegations to reliably support Soviet positions in the UNCIO negotiations. In addition, Molotov and Gromyko deplored the exclusion of Poland, one of the first victims of fascist aggression and a nation that had suffered grievously under the Nazi yoke, while the Axis sympathizers from Argentina took part. This exacerbated the wound of the American reversal regarding UNO membership for Argentina.

This combination of factors dealt a blow to the Soviet hopes for the UNO from which Moscow never entirely recovered. While the Soviet delegations continued to participate in the negotiations, they almost caused the entire endeavour to fail as the conference was nearing its conclusion. They argued that the veto power wielded by the Big Five could be used to block discussion of a dispute by the Security Council if any of the permanent members so desired, which was entirely unacceptable to most of the Allies, and the standoff lasted for well over a week. However, despite being near death from stomach cancer, FDR's close confederate Harry Hopkins had recently been dispatched to Moscow to meet with Stalin in a bid to repair US-Soviet relations. At the suggestion of the British, Stettinius appealed to Truman to instruct Hopkins to discuss the deadlock in San Francisco with the Soviet leader. When Hopkins raised the matter with Stalin, the Generalissimo sought clarification from Molotov, who was also present. Hopkins and the other Americans in attendance, Harriman and Charles E. Bohlen, all got the impression that until that moment, the Soviet leader had not been fully informed that such a serious crisis was taking place in San Francisco. When Molotov explained the situation, Stalin openly scoffed at the Foreign Minister, and within a few hours reversed the Soviet position and ended the impasse. Aside from the significance that this held for the UNCIO, this volte-face suggests that Molotov possessed some latitude in his post as Foreign Minister, and that Stalin did not always monitor every aspect of that sphere. However, the rapidity with which the situation was ultimately resolved once Stalin changed the Soviet stance shows that his ultimate authority was unquestioned, even in matters

of foreign policy.

While the UNCIO did not fail entirely and the United Nations Organization was established, the lack of cohesion and amity among the sponsoring powers throttled the hopes of the Soviet government for an organization that would institutionalize and perpetuate close cooperation among the victorious great powers in matters of international security. This disappointment was underlined by the handling of the UNO's first test case, related to the Soviet occupation of northern Iran. In the course of this dispute, all the worst Soviet fears were confirmed: the American government displayed no willingness to support or even seriously address the interests of the USSR, and instead mobilized the majority that it commanded in the UNO to heap criticism on the Soviet Union. This attitude demonstrated once and for all that the pattern set at San Francisco was not an isolated error, and that long-term collaboration was not going to materialize. Thereafter, the Soviets adopted a cantankerous and obstructive stance within the UNO, and the power of the organization was greatly reduced for four decades, since authority was concentrated in the hands of five states that could rarely reach the required consensus.

The process of the creation of the UNO is historically significant both as a cause and a reflection of the transition from the collaborative spirit of the Grand Alliance to the antipathy of the Cold War. While disputes over Poland and eastern Europe, the repatriation of liberated prisoners of war, the occupation of Germany, the issue of reparations payments, and several other factors that contributed to the breakdown of US-Soviet relations have received considerable

attention, until now the San Francisco Conference and the 1946 Iran Crisis have too often been overlooked. Stalin's pragmatic realism played a central role in ensuring that the Security Council would dominate the General Assembly, while unanimity within the Council would be a prerequisite for action. While divisions in the latter effectively hamstrung the UNO during the Cold War, the significance of this should not be exaggerated, since the organization had no means to impose its will on a recalcitrant power anyway. In today's international climate, with its frequent calls for reform of the UNO, it is well worth re-examining the original aims and hopes for the body from the perspective of its leading founders, to understand better why it has taken on its current shape. Most notably, impartiality was never a goal of any of the Big Four, who all anticipated that they would identify an aggressor, be it Germany, Japan, or any other state that threatened war, and inflict punitive measures on that country accordingly. By the same token, the primary founders all recognized that the organization's policing duties required placing corresponding military might at the disposal of the Security Council, which has still not been accomplished, so that even when the organization wishes to act, it often lacks the means to do so, as exemplified by the horrors of Rwanda and East Timor.

While full-scale war has not broken out among the great powers since 1945, the UNO can claim little credit for this outcome, since for most of the period its security functions were paralyzed by the veto power brandished by the two main Cold War adversaries. Mikhail Gorbachev's revolution in Soviet foreign policy, followed by the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union,

led to renewed hopes for the organization in the 1990s. However, by that time, it had diverged from both the American and Soviet original visions in multiple ways. Many now would regard the notion of the American, British, French, Russian, and Chinese armies (perhaps all decked in blue helmets) fighting side-by-side in the Middle East, or other regions endangering international peace and security, as ludicrous. Nonetheless, the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations reads:

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends, to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.<sup>1</sup>

Certainly these goals remain no less valid today.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Russell, p. 1035.

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**Appendix A - List of Important Persons**

**Ala, Hossein** – Iranian Ambassador to the US and UN at the time of the Iran Crisis in 1946. He sought UN assistance in ensuring the withdrawal of the Red Army from northern Iran, although his government was more willing to discuss the issue directly with the Soviets than Byrnes, who insisted on addressing it through the UN Security Council.

**Berezhkov, Valentin** - Stalin's longtime interpreter, who most notably served in that capacity at the November 1943 Tehran Conference, about which Berezhkov has written extensively. He also served in this capacity for the Soviet delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

**Bohlen, Charles E. 'Chip'** – American career diplomat, who worked for the State Department on various aspects of Soviet relations during the war. He served as Roosevelt's translator at the Teheran and Yalta Conferences and in 1953 became Ambassador to the USSR.

**Byrnes, James F.** – He took over from Stettinius as the American Secretary of State in July 1945. His antipathy to the USSR hastened the deterioration of US-Soviet relations, particularly during the 1946 Iran Crisis, during which Byrnes attempted to use the UN as a tool to coerce the Soviet government into withdrawing the Red Army from northern Iran.

**Cadogan, Alexander** – Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and head of the British delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, as well as a participant in the San Francisco Conference. His diaries offer particular insight into some of the personality factors that influenced the negotiations to create the UN.

**Camargo, Dr. Alberto Lleras** – a prominent Colombian politician, he held a variety of posts, including Ambassador to the US in 1943, and Minister of Foreign Affairs from

February-August 1945. He chaired the Colombian delegation to San Francisco, and was a frequent spokesman on behalf of all the Latin American states. He later served as Colombian President and the first Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

**Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)** – Generalissimo and undisputed head of the Nationalist Chinese Government. As leader of one of the Big Four, Chiang's consent was needed on all formal agreements, but this was rarely problematic as the Chinese generally accepted without significant negotiation the agreements forged by the other great powers.

**Churchill, Winston** – Long-time politician and British Prime Minister from May of 1940 until July of 1945 (and again from 1951-55). Despite concerns that it could be too idealistic, Churchill was for the most part a firm believer in the new international security organization. However, he was also a staunch defender of British imperialism, thus he went to considerable lengths to ensure that the UN would not pose a threat to the maintenance of the Empire.

**Clark Kerr, Archibald** – A career diplomat who served as British Ambassador to the USSR from 1942 until 1946 when he became Ambassador to the US. A noted wit, Clark Kerr served as the British mouthpiece in Moscow for most of the period of this study, and hence participated in several important discussions related to the founding of the UN.

**Cripps, Stafford** – British Ambassador to the USSR from 1940 until 1942 and strong supporter of socialism. At times too radical for the Labour Party, Cripps was the most vehement Soviet sympathizer in the wartime British government, and while he enjoyed considerable popularity during the period, he exercised little influence over British policy vis-à-vis the negotiations to create the UN.

**Deane, John R., Major General** – Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union. His increasing frustration with his Soviet counterparts hardened the US

government's attitude toward the USSR as WW II neared its conclusion.

**Dunn, James C.** – An American career diplomat who took part in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences.

**Eden, Anthony** – British Foreign Secretary from December of 1940 until July of 1945 (and later again 1951-55, then Prime Minister 1955-57), and an eager supporter of the new international security organization, despite Churchill's occasionally lukewarm enthusiasm for it.

**Evatt, Dr. Herbert** – An Australian jurist and politician, he served as a delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Evatt emerged as one of the main champions of the rights of the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council, but made little headway against the united stance of the conference's four sponsors.

**Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich** – Soviet Ambassador to the US from the summer of 1943, Gromyko would be the primary Soviet mouthpiece during the negotiations to create the UN. He headed the Soviet delegation to Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco after Molotov's departure, as well as the Soviet delegation to the United Nations during the 1946 Iran Crisis. He was generally viewed at the time as personally friendly but unable to display significant flexibility, as Moscow's instructions had to be sought and followed to the letter, even on minor issues. He would later serve as Soviet Foreign Minister (1957-87) and for a brief period, hold the presidency of the USSR.

**Lord Halifax (Edward Wood)** – Former British Viceroy to India and Foreign Secretary from 1938-40, he then served as Britain's Ambassador to the US until May of 1946. Thus, he was present for many critical phases of the UN's creation, including leading the British delegation after Eden's departure partway through the San Francisco Conference.

**Harriman, W. Averell** – Scion of a wealthy and influential family, Harriman left a thriving business career to work for Roosevelt in a number of different capacities. Most

notably, he served as US Ambassador to the USSR from October of 1943 until January of 1946. During his time in Moscow, he became increasingly frustrated with his Soviet counterparts, and his correspondingly increasingly negative reports and hardening attitudes played a role in deteriorating US-Soviet relations towards the end of the war and in the immediate postwar period.

**Hiss, Alger** – A prominent US State Department official. Hiss served in numerous capacities related to the creation of the new organization, and was involved in the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco Conferences, the latter as the head of the International Secretariat. After the war, Hiss would be accused of espionage for the USSR, and convicted of perjury associated with those charges. However, with regard to the UN negotiations, Hiss served in an essentially clerical capacity, for which his competence was praised by all sides, and there is no evidence that he undertook any clandestine activity at this time.

**Hopkins, Harry** – One of Roosevelt's closest confidantes and most trusted advisers. He fulfilled many duties at the president's request, often serving as Roosevelt's personal emissary. His visit to Moscow in June 1945 helped to solve the dispute over veto power which threatened to derail the San Francisco Conference.

**Hull, Cordell** – US Secretary of State from March 1933 to November 1944. Though a strong proponent of the new international security organization, Hull's significance in the creation of the UN was muted by the low esteem and influence which Roosevelt accorded him.

**Jebb, H.M. Gladwyn** – Career civil servant who attained the rank of Counsellor in the British Foreign Office. Jebb was a member of the delegations to the conferences at Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco, before being appointed Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, and then in August 1945

the Acting Secretary-General of the UN until Trygve Lie assumed the post in February 1946.

**Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilievich** – A member of the Communist Party from 1927, he went on to hold various government and Party posts from 1940, including in 1945 the chairmanship of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions. He was a delegate to San Francisco, in an apparent attempt to associate the USSR more closely with the world labour movement, and promote the acceptance of the communist-backed World Trade Unions Conference as an official participant in the conference. Kuznetsov eventually served as acting chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (thus, head of state) after the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko.

**Leahy, William D.** – A career naval officer, he served as Roosevelt's Chief of Staff during the war, so was present at many important occasions, but exercised little influence on the creation of the UN.

**Lie, Trygve** – A Norwegian social democratic politician, he served as Foreign Minister in the wartime government-in-exile, then headed his country's delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Seen as a relatively 'neutral' figure, he was the Soviet choice for President of the General Assembly, but after being defeated by Paul-Henri Spaak, became the first Secretary-General of the UN.

**Litvinov, Maxim** – Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1930 until May of 1939. Best known as a strong proponent of international collective security, Litvinov was appointed Ambassador to the USA in December 1941. He served in that capacity until May of 1943, when he was recalled to Moscow to be a Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and head of the Commission on Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order. Litvinov was the most important early architect of the Soviet plans regarding the new international security organization, although his preference for a series of regional

organizations was rejected by Stalin. Litvinov remained significant in formulating Soviet policy during the negotiations to create the UN, although his influence was less than that of Molotov and Stalin.

**Maisky, Ivan** - Longtime Soviet Ambassador to the Court of St. James, until his recall to Moscow in May of 1943 to serve as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, with special responsibility for the issue of reparations. He participated in the Yalta Conference, but had little influence on the creation of the UN.

**Manuilsky, Dmitri (Dmytro)** - A prominent Ukrainian Bolshevik, he held a variety of posts in the USSR, including head of the Ukrainian SSR from 1921-23. He served as Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1928-43 and participated heavily in the purges of that organization. Manuilsky headed the Ukrainian delegation to the San Francisco Conference, and was an active participant in UN affairs for many years thereafter as the representative of the Ukrainian SSR.

**Molotov, Vyacheslav** – Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs from May of 1939 until after Stalin's death. Though skeptical towards the new international security organization, he dutifully obeyed Stalin's instructions during the negotiations to create the UN.

**Oumansky, Konstantin** - Soviet Ambassador to the US until his replacement by Maxim Litvinov in December 1941.

**Padilla, Ezequiel** – Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1940-45, he led his country's delegation to the San Francisco Conference. He frequently served as a spokesman for the Latin American delegations, particularly on the issue of Argentina's membership.

**Pasvolsky, Leo** – Special Assistant to Secretary of State Hull from 1939, he stayed in this post under Stettinius, and was also appointed Executive Director of the Advisory

Committee on Postwar Programs in 1944. Though he has been largely forgotten, Pasvolsky was deeply involved in the US State Department's planning for the UN, and heavily influenced US policies regarding its creation. Born in the Russian Empire (he emigrated to the US with his family in 1905, at the age of twelve) his fluency in Russian, firm anticommunism, and strong grasp of the US government's plans for the new international security organization made him a natural choice for conducting difficult negotiations with USSR on various issues related to the UN.

**Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR)** – President of the United States from 1933-45 and the most important driving force behind the new international security organization that would become the UN, and winning Stalin's support for the project.

**Smuts, Jan Christiaan** – A prominent South African military and political figure for half a century, he served as Prime Minister from 1939-48. He led South Africa's delegation to the San Francisco Conference, where his insight and moderation earned him great esteem.

**Sobolev, Arkadi Alexandrovich** – Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in London, Deputy Chair of the delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and a delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Aside from Gromyko and Molotov, Sobolev was the only Soviet delegate who frequently engaged in substantive discussions on the UN. After the organization's creation, Sobolev became the first head of the Security Council's Political Affairs Department, which was considered to be a victory by the Soviet government. He won consistent praise from all sides for his conduct in this post.

**Soong, Tse-ven (Tzu-ven)** – A successful businessman prior to his entry into the KMT-controlled Chinese government in 1928, he served as Foreign Minister from 1942-45, and chaired the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Representing the weakest of the victorious Allied powers, he exercised little influence over the course of

events.

**Spaak, Paul-Henri** – Belgian Foreign Minister from 1939-49, and head of his country's delegation to San Francisco, where he sought to temper the growing animosity between the American and Soviet delegations. His election as the first President of the UN General Assembly in January 1946 was strongly opposed by the USSR and contributed to the deterioration of Western-Soviet relations.

**Standley, William H.** – Career naval officer who served as American Ambassador to the USSR from April of 1942 until September of 1943. Unhappy in this post, Standley exercised little influence over US-Soviet relations.

**Stalin, Joseph** – Generalissimo, leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and undisputed head of the Soviet government. His attitude towards the new organization was at the same time cautious and optimistic, and his strong focus on narrowly-defined military security and a leading role for the victorious great powers fundamentally shaped the UN.

**Stettinius, Edward R.** – A successful American businessman of Lithuanian extraction, Stettinius gained increasing importance in the State Department over the course of the war. He headed the US delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and went on to become Secretary of State, and then the first US Ambassador to the UN, which was considered at the time to be a post of equivalent importance. Though he harboured personal reservations about the USSR, and exercised little influence over FDR, Stettinius' charisma, friendliness and pragmatic professionalism were instrumental in overcoming several obstacles during the negotiations to create the UN.

**Truman, Harry S.** – Senator from Missouri and then President of the United States after Roosevelt's death in May 1945. Truman came to office with little experience in foreign affairs and a determination to compel the Soviet Union to accept his government's vision

of the postwar world, which caused considerable friction with the Soviets in many respects related to the creation of the UN.

**Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarevich** – After infamously serving as prosecutor during the show trials of the 1930s, Vyshinsky became Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1940. He participated in the Yalta Conference, and, as Molotov's deputy, took an active role in the postwar Council of Foreign Ministers, and was serving in London at the outset of the 1946 Iran Crisis. Eventually, in 1949, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs and the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations, though his tenure there is outside the scope of this study, and he exercised little influence on the organization's creation.

**Welles, Sumner** – US Under Secretary of State from 1937 until 1943 and one of Roosevelt's closest friends and advisers in the realm of foreign affairs. Welles served as an important architect of the new international security organization in its early stages, but was compelled to leave government work in September 1943 to avoid a scandal linked to his homosexuality.

## Appendix B – Supplies Provided to the USSR by UNRRA

Part A: Total UNRRA Shipments Summary, Value and Tonnage, by Country<sup>1</sup>

| Country Programs   | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalentents | Gross Long Tons   |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|
|                    |                                       |                   |
| Albania            | 26,250.9                              | 130,048           |
| Austria            | 135,513.2                             | 1,114,461         |
| Byelorussian SSR   | 60,820.0                              | 141,853           |
| China              | 517,846.7                             | 2,360,915         |
| Czechoslovakia     | 261,337.4                             | 1,619,627         |
| Dodecanese Islands | 3,900.4                               | 33,122            |
| Ethiopia           | 884.9                                 | 1,551             |
| Finland            | 2,441.2                               | 5,623             |
| Greece             | 347,162.0                             | 2,830,138         |
| Hungary            | 4,386.5                               | 19,127            |
| Italy              | 418,221.1                             | 10,225,450        |
| Korea              | 943.9                                 | 6,424             |
| Philippines        | 9,880.2                               | 47,160            |
| Poland             | 477,927.0                             | 2,241,889         |
| San Marino         | 30.0                                  | 260               |
| Ukrainian SSR      | 188,199.3                             | 467,049           |
| Yugoslavia         | 415,642.0                             | 2,693,796         |
|                    |                                       |                   |
| <b>TOTALS:</b>     | <b>2,871,386.7</b>                    | <b>23,938,493</b> |

<sup>1</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 275.

## Part B – Details of Goods Received by the Soviet Republics

Table 2.1 Byelorussian SSR Food Shipments by Major Categories <sup>2</sup>

| Commodity Program                                    | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Grain and Grain Products                             | 109.7                              | 894             |
| Soya Products  |                                    |                 |
| Animal Feeds   |                                    |                 |
| Meat and Meat products                               | 9,402.2                            | 18,699          |
| Dairy Products                                       | 4,780.5                            | 11,896          |
| Soup, Dried  | 538.0                              | 1,851           |
| Fish and Fish Products                               | 1,323.8                            | 7,108           |
| Codliver Oil   |                                    |                 |
| Fats, Oils, and Soap                                 | 2,378.4                            | 9,051           |
| Sugar  |                                    |                 |
| Pulses   | 1,423.1                            | 13,159          |
| Vitamins   |                                    |                 |
| Vegetables   |                                    |                 |
| Fruit and Fruit Products                             |                                    |                 |
| Beverages  | 440.5                              | 1,127           |
| Other Foods (incl. condiments)                       | 56.7                               | 138             |
| Quartermaster Corps Foods                            | 8,838.2                            | 36,288          |
| USDA Surplus Foods                                   | 181.5                              | 801             |
| Overseas Surplus                                     |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Foods                                  |                                    |                 |
| Cigarettes and Tobacco                               |                                    |                 |
| Red Cross Parcels                                    |                                    |                 |
| Lend Lease Food                                      |                                    |                 |
| US Army PX Supplies                                  | 84.5                               | 384             |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial and Administrative Charges | 34.7                               |                 |
|  |                                    |                 |
| TOTAL  | 29,591.8                           | 101,396         |

Table 2.2 Byelorussian SSR Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies Shipments by Major Categories<sup>3</sup>

| Commodity Program                    | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                                      |                                    |                 |
| Transportation and Telecommunication | 184.5                              | 155             |
| Public Utilities                     | 7,997.8                            | 9,790           |
| Building Industry                    | 2,691.2                            | 3,723           |
| Mining Industry                      | 848.8                              | 1,073           |
| Machine Repair Industry              | 1,098.3                            | 545             |
| Processing Industry                  | 208.4                              | 70              |
| Fuels and Lubricants                 |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Consumers Goods        |                                    |                 |
| Raw Materials                        | 2,425.6                            | 5,461           |
| Ind. Rehab. Services                 |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges    | 630.1                              |                 |
| Overseas Surplus (Unclassified)      | 1,696.1                            | 5,160           |
|                                      |                                    |                 |
| <b>TOTAL:</b>                        | <b>17,780.8</b>                    | <b>25,977</b>   |

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<sup>2</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 438.

Table 2.3 Byelorussian SSR Clothing, Textiles, and Footwear Shipments by Major Categories<sup>4</sup>

| Commodity Program                 | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Finished Clothing                 | 317.2                              | 220             |
| Blankets and Comforters           | 230.4                              | 147             |
| Cotton Textiles                   | 290.4                              | 121             |
| Woolen Textiles                   | 1,198.0                            | 494             |
| Cotton Yarn                       |                                    |                 |
| Woolen Yarn                       |                                    |                 |
| Raw Cotton                        |                                    |                 |
| Raw Wool                          | 1,120.1                            | 1,244           |
| Miscellaneous Textile Material    |                                    |                 |
| Footwear                          | 2,436.0                            | 1,820           |
| Upper Leather                     | 388.4                              | 230             |
| Sole Leather                      | 573.2                              | 1,142           |
| Hides                             |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Footwear Material   | 147.2                              | 366             |
| Unclassified Overseas Surplus     |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges | 343.3                              |                 |
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| <b>TOTAL:</b>                     | <b>7,044.2</b>                     | <b>5,784</b>    |

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<sup>3</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 441.

Table 2.4 Byelorussian SSR Agricultural Rehabilitation Supplies Shipments by Major Categories<sup>5</sup>

| Commodity Program                 | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| Agricultural Training             | 0.1                                |                 |
| Bagging                           |                                    |                 |
| Dairy and Poultry                 | 281.2                              | 231             |
| Drainage and Irrigation           |                                    |                 |
| Farm Machinery                    | 1,028.3                            | 1,737           |
| Fertilizer                        |                                    |                 |
| Fisheries                         | 99.8                               | 316             |
| Food Processing                   | 128.6                              | 282             |
| Hand Tools and Materials          | 21.5                               | 14              |
| Harness                           |                                    |                 |
| Livestock                         |                                    |                 |
| Pesticides                        |                                    |                 |
| Seeds                             | 3,615.8                            | 5,276           |
| Veterinary                        |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges | 139.3                              |                 |
| Overseas Surplus (Unclassified)   | 97.5                               | 194             |
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| <b>TOTAL:</b>                     | <b>5,412.1</b>                     | <b>8,050</b>    |

<sup>4</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 439.

<sup>5</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 440.

Table 2.5 Ukrainian SSR Food Shipments by Major Categories<sup>6</sup>

| Commodity Program                                    | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Grain and Grain Products                             | 516.8                              | 4,095           |
| Soya Products  | 23.2                               | 180             |
| Animal Feeds   |                                    |                 |
| Meat and Meat products                               | 32,508.1                           | 58,155          |
| Dairy Products                                       | 13,280.6                           | 33,790          |
| Soup, Dried  | 2,727.4                            | 9,800           |
| Fish and Fish Products                               | 7,010.2                            | 41,214          |
| Codliver Oil   | 36.0                               | 0               |
| Fats, Oils, and Soap                                 | 13,062.4                           | 44,727          |
| Sugar  |                                    |                 |
| Pulses   | 625.1                              | 5,936           |
| Vitamins   |                                    |                 |
| Vegetables   |                                    |                 |
| Fruit and Fruit Products                             |                                    |                 |
| Beverages  | 1,473.0                            | 4,567           |
| Other Foods (incl. condiments)                       | 112.8                              | 441             |
| Quartermaster Corps Foods                            | 27,134.2                           | 109,054         |
| USDA Surplus Foods                                   | 807.9                              | 3,689           |
| Overseas Surplus                                     |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Foods                                  |                                    |                 |
| Cigarettes and Tobacco                               |                                    |                 |
| Red Cross Parcels                                    |                                    |                 |
| Lend Lease Food                                      |                                    |                 |
| US Army PX Supplies                                  | 43.5                               | 100             |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial and Administrative Charges | 76.5                               |                 |
|  |                                    |                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b>   | <b>99,437.7</b>                    | <b>315,748</b>  |

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<sup>6</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 490.

Table 2.6 Ukrainian SSR Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies Shipments by Major Categories<sup>7</sup>

| Commodity Program                    | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                                      |                                    |                 |
| Transportation and Telecommunication | 178.8                              | 119             |
| Public Utilities                     | 24,383.0                           | 33,192          |
| Building Industry                    | 11,003.3                           | 12,227          |
| Mining Industry                      | 590.1                              | 590             |
| Machine Repair Industry              | 1,467.4                            | 807             |
| Processing Industry                  | 596.2                              | 220             |
| Fuels and Lubricants                 |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Consumers Goods        |                                    |                 |
| Raw Materials                        | 9,908.0                            | 43,886          |
| Ind. Rehab. Services                 |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges    | 2,372.7                            |                 |
| Overseas Surplus (Unclassified)      | 1,620.0                            | 4,929           |
|                                      |                                    |                 |
| <b>TOTAL:</b>                        | <b>52,119.5</b>                    | <b>95,970</b>   |

<sup>7</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 493.

Table 2.7 Ukrainian SSR Clothing, Textiles, and Footwear Shipments by Major Categories<sup>8</sup>

| Commodity Program                 | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Finished Clothing                 | 689.3                              | 384             |
| Blankets and Comforters           | 842.7                              | 536             |
| Cotton Textiles                   | 600.1                              | 233             |
| Woolen Textiles                   | 3,291.5                            | 1,293           |
| Cotton Yarn                       |                                    |                 |
| Woolen Yarn                       |                                    |                 |
| Raw Cotton                        |                                    |                 |
| Raw Wool                          | 2,205.3                            | 3,719           |
| Miscellaneous Textile Material    |                                    |                 |
| Footwear                          | 5,497.8                            | 4,317           |
| Upper Leather                     | 559.6                              | 316             |
| Sole Leather                      | 1,505.6                            | 2,738           |
| Hides                             | 228.7                              | 342             |
| Miscellaneous Footwear Material   | 667.7                              | 2,347           |
| Unclassified Overseas Surplus     |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges | 1,119.4                            |                 |
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| TOTAL:                            | 17,207.7                           | 16,225          |

<sup>8</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 491.

Table 2.8 Ukrainian SSR Agricultural Rehabilitation Supplies Shipments by Major Categories<sup>9</sup>

| Commodity Program                 | Thousands of US Dollar Equivalents | Gross Long Tons |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| Agricultural Training             | 1.3                                | 1               |
| Bagging                           | 1,671.8                            | 8,813           |
| Dairy and Poultry                 | 623.4                              | 802             |
| Drainage and Irrigation           |                                    |                 |
| Farm Machinery                    | 1,857.2                            | 3,064           |
| Fertilizer                        |                                    |                 |
| Fisheries                         | 633.3                              | 1,837           |
| Food Processing                   | 1,389.4                            | 4,280           |
| Hand Tools and Materials          |                                    |                 |
| Harness                           |                                    |                 |
| Livestock                         |                                    |                 |
| Pesticides                        |                                    |                 |
| Seeds                             | 9,701.0                            | 18,240          |
| Veterinary                        |                                    |                 |
| Miscellaneous Accessorial Charges | 592.0                              |                 |
| Overseas Surplus (Unclassified)   | 519.5                              | 1,032           |
|                                   |                                    |                 |
| TOTAL:                            | 16,988.9                           | 38,069          |

<sup>9</sup> Woodbridge, Volume Three, p. 492.