

A Landmark Celebration: Canada 150, Settler-Colonialism, and the Politics of Diversity &  
Reconciliation

by

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## ABSTRACT

My dissertation analyzes the politics of settler-colonial national celebrations through an analysis of Canada 150, marking the sesquicentennial of Confederation. Landmark celebrations like Canada 150 are milestones marking intervals along a journey of supposed national progress. Yet, landmark celebrations, I argue, are also *land* celebrations – events aimed at storying Canadian state sovereignty claims and producing and reproducing settler attachments to Indigenous land. Land is simultaneously central to landmark celebrations and fundamentally obscured as contested territory over which the nation-state requires control in order maintain its legitimacy. ‘Feel good’ discourses of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation underwrite the re-narration of ‘Canada’ as a happy project, worthy of celebration.

Drawing upon critical-race feminist, settler-colonial studies, and Indigenous theory and scholarship, I unmap Canada 150 in three stages. First, I analyze former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s “Road to 2017”, which begins with the commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. Canadian Political Science (CPS) scholars tend to read the 1812 commemoration as one component of Harper’s effort to “rebrand” Canada as a white, British Warrior Nation. I complicate this understanding by highlighting the ways the commemoration emphasizes discourses of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation. The 1812 monument, “Triumph Through Diversity”, for example, portrays 1812 as a project of mutual cooperation amongst diverse peoples. By starting with Harper’s “Road to 2017” narrative, I demonstrate that Conservatives and Liberals alike mobilize diversity as Canada’s strength.

From Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee territory on whose land British, French, American, and Indigenous peoples fought the War of 1812, this dissertation travels north of the tree line to examine Canada C3, a reconciliatory expedition through the Northwest Passage marking Canada’s sesquicentennial. The C3 Expedition, I argue, is a project of storying

Canadian sovereignty that obscures Inuit sovereignty by positioning them as diverse Canadian people. In fact, narratives of reconciliation and diversity slide together in southerners' stories of the C3 Expedition, as if encounters between diverse peoples are themselves a form of reconciliatory work. This slippage signals a need to critique the emergence of diversity and reconciliation as interrelated discourses that support Canadian state-making.

Finally, my dissertation travels to the heart of the settler-colonial imagination and the centre of Canada Day celebrations – Parliament Hill – on Algonquin territory in Ottawa. This chapter compares Indigenous and non-Indigenous occupations of urban public space during Canada 150 celebrations. On one hand, the City of Ottawa turned city parks and parking lots into campgrounds to manage the anticipated influx of visitors to Ottawa during the celebrations, inviting settlers to occupy public space. On the other hand, the settler-colonial state identified Algonquin water protectors as public safety threats for raising a tipi on Parliament Hill in a reoccupation of traditional, unceded Algonquin territory. Comparing these two examples side-by-side demonstrates the ways settler-colonial national celebrations such as Canada 150 rely upon and reinforce settler relations to land, at the same time as Indigenous resistance successfully undermines the Canadian nation-state's claims to territory and legitimacy.

## PREFACE

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## **DEDICATION**

To anyone who has ever struggled to finish their dissertation.

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## CHAPTER ONE: BEGINNINGS

*“The University of Alberta respectfully acknowledges that we are located on Treaty 6 territory, a traditional gathering place for diverse Indigenous peoples including the Cree, Blackfoot, Métis, Nakota Sioux, Iroquois, Dene, Ojibway/Salteaux/Anishinaabe, Inuit, and many others whose histories, languages, and cultures continue to influence our vibrant community.”*

### **Feeling Territorial**

Introducing a dissertation is a peculiar task. Having written each chapter, I now arrive back at the beginning to introduce a project that is about beginnings – an examination of the 2017 celebration of the 150th anniversary of the founding of the Canadian settler-colonial nation-state. Canada 150, like Canada 125, the Centennial Celebrations of 1967, and the Diamond Jubilee of 1927, are landmark celebrations when Canada paused to mark its founding, reflect on its progress, and signal a turning point toward a more mature, more independent, and more *Canadian* country. On 1 July 2017, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau declared, in his speech marking 150 years since Confederation, that it was a day to “chart a path forward”, setting “a new course for the next 150 years” characterized by a nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous peoples. The geographical language of his Canada Day 2017 address, mapping Canada’s next steps, is significant. Landmark celebrations like Canada 150 are milestones marking intervals along a journey to a nation’s supposed collective actualization. Yet, landmark celebrations, I argue, are also *land* celebrations – events aimed at narrating Canadian state sovereignty claims and producing and reproducing settler attachments to Indigenous land. Land is simultaneously central to landmark celebrations and fundamentally obscured as contested territory over which the state seeks control in order maintain its legitimacy. Trudeau’s (2017) Canada 150 address to the crowd gathered on Parliament Hill in Canada’s national capital reveals the paradox of a landmark celebration. Beginning with an acknowledgment to the crowd on that “we are on the ancestral lands of the Algonquin people”, Trudeau (2017) commences a

celebration of settler-colonial nation-building with an acknowledgement that the land is of another nation – it is Algonquin land. What to make of beginning with a territorial acknowledgment?

In an essay titled “Beyond Territorial Acknowledgements”, University of Alberta Métis scholar Chelsea Vowel (2016a) writes that territorial acknowledgments can be a form of recognition, a powerful assertion of Indigenous presence, and a critique of ongoing settler-colonialism.<sup>1</sup> Yet, in privileged, progressive, and urban spaces, Vowel cautions that territorial acknowledgments can become repetitious, an item on a checklist that must be ticked off before the event can begin. When territorial acknowledgments become routine and repetitive statements, offered without consideration of the content of what follows the acknowledgment – like Trudeau’s, above – they fail to become a starting point for changing relationships. In contrast, when accompanied by meaningful questions about non-Indigenous obligations to Indigenous peoples, land, and water, Vowel argues that territorial acknowledgements can *unsettle* – which is to say, they can shake loose – settler-colonialism as a structure of dispossession (Regan 2010, 13). I begin by offering an acknowledgement that I am a non-Indigenous person on Treaty 6 territory writing about settler colonialism without any illusions

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<sup>1</sup> Patrick Wolfe (2006) summarizes his theory of settler-colonialism as a structure of elimination when he asserts that “settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event” (2006, 388). Wolfe differentiates settler-colonialism from other colonial regimes, such as British colonization of India between 1858 and 1949, because of its permanency (see also Moreton-Robinson 2015, 10). In settler-colonial regimes, the settler never leaves. While European colonial regimes extract resources from land until the peripheral economy is no longer viable or the administration of colonies too expensive, what underpins settler-colonial regimes is the drive to access and control land itself (Wolfe 2006, 388). To that end, settler-colonialism involves a drive to eliminate Indigenous peoples and their political, economic, legal, and social structures in order to establish colonial political, legal, economic, and social structures on Indigenous land. This is what Wolfe means when he says that settler-colonialism “destroys to replace” (2006, 388). Unlike British rule in India, which has a beginning and end date, settler-colonialism in the Canadian context is ongoing.

that this frees me from the culpability of being a settler on Indigenous land.<sup>2</sup> Rather, I offer this in order to tell you a bit about where my knowledge is situated (Haraway 1988).

At its core, this dissertation is about the stories that underpin settler nationalism and Canadian state claims to sovereignty. In *Métis*, Chris Andersen (2014) writes that most state-sanctioned claims to national unity are quite fragile, weakened by “internal points of strain, stress, and tension” (96). Canada’s own state-sanctioned claims to national unity are indeed quite tenuous, since Confederation in 1867 did not manufacture a straightforward relationship between the state, land, and ‘a people’ (Brodie 2002, 43). A nation-state’s fragility, Andersen writes, is “never more marked than when we catch it in the act of its composition” (2014, 96). The dissertation catches Canada in the act of storying its own sovereignty. Nations, states, and people are composed of stories, which emerge from and reproduce particular ontologies or ways of being. “Imagine,” Gordon Christie (2011) asks his readers, “a people living within a self-contained normative universe” (337). As a people, they derive meaning from unique epistemologies, or ways of thinking, which give rise to a distinct ontology, shaping their ways of

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<sup>2</sup> Michael Asch (2014) defines settlers as descendants of those “who arrived here” from elsewhere (8). Matt Wildcat (2015) prefers a definition of “settler” that resists flattening diversity among non-Indigenous peoples, using “settler” to “refer exclusively to populations that propagate settler colonialism” (394). While whiteness and settler identity often overlap, Wildcat argues that “‘settler’ is not applicable to all non-Indigenous peoples, even those who are white/European” because he is focused on “processes and practices” as opposed to ‘race’ (2015, 394). Yet, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012) argue that people of colour, and even people “from other colonial contexts” are settlers (7). Likewise, Bonita Lawrence and Ena Dua (2005) explain that, while white settler nationalism marginalizes and racializes immigrants and non-white people, racialized people “are settlers” (134). Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2015) conceptualizes settler relations to the nation as operating through a logic of white possession. White possessive logics, as I discuss in Chapter Two, reproduce commonsense ideas about who legitimately owns the nation (Moreton-Robinson 2015, xii). While these conceptualizations of who or what constitutes a *settler* diverge over questions of race, each of these definitions have in common a focus on processes and relations; that is, they each advance definitions of settler subjectivity that emphasize processes of racialization and relations to land, people, and the nation-state. I understand the term *settler* to mean, following Asch, descendants of those “who arrived here” from elsewhere (8) and, following Moreton-Robinson (2015), those who benefit from whiteness and experience the nation as a white possession. Like Wildcat, I also understand *settlers* as those invested – tacitly or overtly – in maintaining settler colonial structures and processes (2015: 395). I am sympathetic to the arguments of Tuck and Yang (2012) and Lawrence and Dua (2005) that racialized and immigrant populations are settlers, albeit whose experiences of the nation-state are also shaped by the white possessive. However, when I use the term settler, I typically use it to refer to white people, unless otherwise indicated.

being in the world. Stories, as expressions of distinct epistemologies and ontologies, are “world-creating and world-maintaining” for the people within this imagined normative universe (Christie 2011, 337). It was from within such a normative universe that the concept of state sovereignty emerged, institutionalized in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Defined as a state’s authority without interference from other states over a bounded territory, this conception of sovereignty – though based on one, partial view of the world (Haraway 1988) – has become universal, structuring the rules of interaction by which all distinct peoples must engage. In this sense, this particular view of sovereignty has a “magical” quality (Christie 2011, 334).

This conception of sovereignty is “but one way of making sense of how people can think of themselves in relation to one another and to land” (Christie 2011, 339). Imagining that all interactions between peoples and lands must be governed by such a narrowly defined set of rules limits the potential to imagine alternative relationships (Christie 2011, 339). Indigeneity, Christie argues, entails different knowledges and ways of being, and thereby offers different stories and ways of relating with humans and the non-human environment. As such, Indigeneity not only reveals imperial and colonial stories *as* stories, but opens up possibilities for resistance and alternative world-making (Christie 2011, 340). Indigeneity exceeds Canada’s literal and imagined national boundaries, which is one reason Canada has never been successful at constraining Indigenous sovereignties. Audra Simpson’s (2014) concept of “nested sovereignty” challenges the view that “multiple sovereignties cannot proliferate robustly or equally” (12), and accounts for the prevalence of Indigenous sovereignties within and across settler nation-state borders (7-10). Though political scientists tend to divide the nation and state into two separate conceptual categories – the former imaginary, invented, mythical, or affective and the latter rational, bureaucratic, technical, and administrative – these scholars ask political scientists to

consider the ways that the state, like the nation, is actually underpinned by stories (Christie 2011; Simpson 2014, 16). This acknowledgment opens up the possibility of meeting one story with another – just “storytellers meeting storytellers” (Christie 2011, 344).

The Canadian state continues to use force to gain access to and control over territory it already claims to control legitimately, presenting a paradox in need of a narrative. For example, on 7 January 2020, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), armed with assault rifles, invaded Wet’suwet’en territory to enforce a British Columbia Supreme Court injunction permitting development of the Coastal GasLink liquefied natural gas pipeline.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Jaskiran Dhillon and Will Parrish (2020), reporting for *The Guardian*, provide evidence that RCMP commanders, acting in the interests of the Canadian state and Trans Canada, prepared snipers to “shoot-to-kill” and advised officers to “use as much violence toward the gate as you want”. The RCMP invasion gave way to a coordinated, international Indigenous effort led by the Tyendinaga Mohawks in solidarity with the Wet’suwet’en nation to disrupt the Canadian economy. On 24 February 2020, the Ontario Provincial Police, in coordination with CN Rail and the Government of Canada, arrested and charged ten land defenders who were blocking railway

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<sup>3</sup> There are debates about resource extraction in First Nations, Métis, and Inuit (FNMI) communities. Divisions over resource extraction among Indigenous peoples and their leaders must be understood in the context of ongoing settler-colonialism and the disruption of Indigenous governance and leadership structures. In the case of Wet’suwet’en, for example, Shiri Pasternak (2020) explains that the elected band council negotiated an Impact and Benefit Agreement (IBA) with Coastal GasLink, which “positions the band as paid informers to quell internal dissent within the First Nation”. As a creation of the *Indian Act*, band councils are “purely Canadian creations” (Vowel 2016b, 265). Doug George-Kanentiio (2020), vice-president of the Hiawatha Institute for Indigenous Knowledge, explains that band councils are devoid of power to exercise Indigenous laws because they are accountable to the federal government. Similarly, George-Kanentiio (2020) describes the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), dependent upon federal funding, as “an extension of the agents of suppression”. In short, among grassroots Indigenous activists, elders, water protectors, and land defenders, there is considerable distrust and suspicion of band council and AFN chiefs, who support resource extraction. Sharon Venne (1997) and Chelsea Vowel (2016b) provide descriptions of traditional, hereditary governance structures versus band councils. The complex factors underpinning diverse Indigenous perspectives on resource extraction is actually a separate issue from the point I want to make here, however. That is, regardless of diverse Indigenous perspectives on resource extraction, what I want to emphasize is the settler-colonial state’s use of force to gain access to territory it claims to control. If the settler-colonial state did, in fact, legitimately control this territory, then the use of force would be unnecessary.



traffic (Tunney 2020). The police invasion of Mohawk territory, for many, invoked memories of the 1990 “Oka Crisis”, when the *Sûreté du Québec*, the RCMP, and the Canadian Armed Forces worked in conjunction to remove a blockade established by Mohawk warriors of Kanasatake, Kahnawake, and Akwesasne constructed to prevent the development of a golf course and townhouses on sacred burial ground (Tunney 2020). That ‘two founding nations’ – Québec and Canada – converged to quell Indigenous sovereignty in 1990 is illustrative of Patrick Wolfe’s (2006) point that the settler-colonialism’s primary motive “is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory” (388). In the Unist’ot’ten camp raid and the Oka Crisis – plus Elsipogtog, Ipperwash, and Burnt Church – Canada depended upon police and military intervention to secure access to territory it claims to control legitimately. Given this paradox, landmark celebrations like Canada 150, I argue, seek to narrate stories of Canada’s legitimate control of land. In this sense, a landmark national celebration like Canada 150 is not only an exercise in nation-making, but also a form of state-making (Becker and Lentz 2013, 1).

In “The State is a Man”, Simpson (2016) argues that, as a white settler society, an honest narrative of Canada’s founding would describe histories of dispossession, slavery, and a contemporary project of capitalist accumulation giving rise to deep social and economic inequalities. These are forms of “un-narratable violence”, Simpson writes (2016, 2). In other words, telling the truth does not produce a deep investment in the Canadian settler-colonial project. Instead, settler-colonial states manufacture their own truths through legal discourses and stories (Lugosi 2011). Canadian storytelling emphasises multiculturalism, democracy, economic liberalism, and, increasingly, apologies, redress, and reconciliation as “performance[s] of empathetic, remorseful, and fleetingly sorrowful states” (Simpson 2016, 2).

To critique Canadian national narratives implies that there is, perhaps, an alternative story Canada might embrace, particularly on the occasion of a landmark like the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation. The Final Reports of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2015) and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) demonstrate that Canada is, in fact, genocidal. In this context, how does Canada go about marking a moment like Confederation? My contention, which I return to in the conclusion to this dissertation, is that if Canada is serious about establishing nation-to-nation relationships with Indigenous peoples – which implies a respect for Indigenous sovereignties – then Canada should discontinue the practice of landmark celebrations. This argument for ‘cancelling Canada Day’ is not my own. On 1 July 2020, as governments cancelled Canada Day across the country to limit the spread of COVID-19, the Idle No More movement called to permanently “Cancel Canada Day” and the hashtag #CancelCanadaDay went viral on social media (CTV News 2020). Far from a radical proposition, the notion of cancelling the annual celebration of Confederation is very much in step with calls to take down statues to Canada’s “Founding Father” Sir John A Macdonald.

Lynn Caldwell and Darryl Leroux (2017) write that studying the ways Canada is “remembered and currently imagined” provides “critical insight into ongoing contentions about the constitution of Canada as [w]hite settler society” (2). A white settler society is one “established by Europeans on non-European soil” (Razack 2002, 1). Traditionally the domain of geologists and geographers, Sherene Razack (2002) and Wolfe (2006) remind social scientists that *soil*, and the air and water that nurture it, the subsoil, and the rocks and minerals below the subsoil, are worthy of political and social analysis. Razack calls upon social scientists to follow the “geographical turn”, thinking about land and place by mapping and unmapping “how white supremacy works” (2002, 6). Making geography social requires acknowledging ways “the

physical landscape is peopled” and the ways peoples give meaning to land and space through social and political processes (Frankenberg 1993, 43). To “unmap” is to unravel European epistemologies that underpin geographies of inclusion and exclusion (Razack 2002, 6).

Unmapping involves critiquing the structures of white settler societies, whose “origins lie in the dispossession [...] of Indigenous populations” (Razack 2002, 1). This project participates in a broader effort to unmap Canada by revealing the ways landmark celebrations like Canada 150 aim to reproduce settler-colonial claims to Indigenous land. If a state with a claim to sovereignty over a bounded territory gives meaning to those claims through stories, then unmapping Canada 150 involves deconstructing and analyzing those stories and their relationships to the land in question.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is threefold. First, this chapter places Canada 150 within historical context as part of an ongoing project of Canadian settler-colonial nation building and national identity construction occurring in four stages: first, the consolidation of the settler-colonial project post-Confederation; second, a period of intense, state-led national identity construction following the Second World War; third, a shift towards a populist and decentralized approach to nation-building via heritage policy in the 1980s and 1990s; and finally, the present moment of nation-building through reconciliation and the language of diversity. Each of these periods corresponds with landmark celebrations, including: the first Dominion Day, the 1967 centennial celebration, Canada 125 in 1992, and Canada 150 in 2017. Thus, my second aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how Canada Day celebrations are a form of national storytelling, but also a form of state-making. Third, this chapter provides background on Government of Canada planning for Canada 150, comparing the approaches of former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government commenced planning, and Liberal Prime Minister

Justin Trudeau, whose government took over planning in 2015. To this end, I analyze Government of Canada documents, including Trudeau's Canada 150 speech and House of Commons Heritage Committee meeting minutes and reports.

### **1867: “as good a date as any”**

*150 years since Confederation.*

*A nice, round number that's as good a reason as any to celebrate. To throw a massive party and invite the friends and neighbours. To reflect on our past, to cheer on today, and to recommit ourselves to the future. But let's not kid ourselves: this isn't really our 150th birthday.*

*We're much older than that: Canada, and the idea of Canada, goes much further back than just 150 years. For thousands of years, in this place, people have met, traded, built, loved, lost, fought, grieved. They built strong communities, worked hard to build better lives for their kids, and learned to lean on their neighbours to get through our long cold winter nights, to thrive in the daunting landscapes that stretch across Turtle Island. (Trudeau, 2017)*

National mythologies in settler-colonial nation-states are spatial and territorial stories. In settler-colonial contexts wherein Indigenous relations to land that predate European occupancy undermine state claims to sovereignty over land, the state weaves symbols of landscapes and geography into national narratives as a way of manufacturing a story of legitimate occupancy. It makes sense that settler state narratives are geographical, because it is land, primarily, that the settler state seeks (Wolfe 2006). Trudeau's story begins with a description of place that recognizes Indigenous legal and political sovereignty before Europeans arrived on Turtle Island – a name many Indigenous peoples give to the land now called North America. Trudeau acknowledges Indigenous sovereignty pre-contact – a move that should bring Canada's very legitimacy into question. As Adam Gaudry (2016) writes, if we accept that Indigenous peoples had complex political and legal systems pre-contact – as Trudeau's speech does – then we must

also question “how Canadian sovereignty became ascendant” (47). Trudeau’s speech, and Canada 150 more generally, makes the first move but not the second.

As a landmark celebration – aimed at producing and reproducing the state’s claims to Indigenous land – Canada 150 reproduces the Doctrine of Discovery and the European legal concept of *terra nullius*. When Europeans arrived in North America, they knew that “the lands they discovered were long inhabited”; however, the Doctrine of Discovery held “that Indigenous peoples possessed an inferior relationship to their territory” (Gaudry 2016, 48). European powers relied on the principle of *terra nullius*, which deemed Indigenous land – and bodies – “empty” of sovereignty. By this logic, “civilized” powers gained immediate authority over lands occupied by Indigenous peoples, whether or not Indigenous peoples consented – and they did not (Venne 1997, 185). A 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision ruled that “terra nullius, discovery, and conquest were not legitimate doctrines to assert sovereignty over a territory” (Venne 1997, 186). Yet, as Gaudry (2016) demonstrates with meticulous detail, the principles of *terra nullius* and discovery continue to underpin Canadian sovereignty to this day. At the same time, British, and later Canadian, assertions of law and sovereignty on these bases have never been able to withstand Indigenous resistance, requiring the Crown to acknowledge Indigenous sovereignty and negotiate treaties.

The historic North-West – a vast region spanning the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains and comprising “over half of Canada’s current land mass”, was transferred to the Crown without the consent of Indigenous peoples (Gaudry 2016, 67). Having “discovered” the North-West in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, King Charles II, gave his cousin, Prince Rupert and members of the British aristocracy portions of land in the region in 1670 via the Hudson’s Bay Company (the Company) Charter (50). The Charter’s “power and legal force,” Gaudry explains, “originated in

Europe, and flowed from the king's sovereign will"; thus, when the Charter gave the Company legal and political power over the North-West and established "underlying Crown title to Indigenous lands", it did so under British law (50-1). During the fur trade (1670-1870) the Charter provided a *de jure* basis for British trade in the region in the minds of the British, but the realities "on the ground" evidenced their *de facto* respect for Indigenous laws (53). Gaudry writes:

[T]he Charter served more to motivate Europeans to trade on Indigenous lands, not settle them, and trade occurred largely on Indigenous terms. Despite the lofty claims of the Charter, the British in the drainage were more than willing to live by Indigenous protocols, practice Indigenous kinship obligations, and participate in Indigenous diplomacy, as was often necessary to engage in the fur trade. (2016, 51)

In addition to facilitating trade, the British needed alliances with Indigenous peoples in North America in order to maintain power vis-à-vis the French. To this end, the *Royal Proclamation of 1763* affirmed Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty, establishing the basis for nation-to-nation relationships and precipitating the need for treaties with Indigenous nations in the nineteenth century (Venne 1997, 185). As Nehiyaw legal scholar Sharon Venne (1997) writes, "the Royal Proclamation clearly spelled out that Indigenous nations had an inalienable right to their lands" (185).

As such, when the Company transferred land in the Red River region to the Earl of Selkirk in 1811, Métis soldiers resisted (Gaudry 2016, 52). With British authority over the Red River Settlement in question, Selkirk was forced to negotiate a treaty. From the perspective of the British, the resulting Selkirk Treaty of 1817 entrenched British authority over the Red River region, in Selkirk's mind extinguishing Indigenous title. Saulteaux and Cree leaders, on the other hand, maintained that they agreed not to a cessation of their title, but to a rental agreement in which the Cree and Saulteaux were essentially the "landlords of the Red River region", an

interpretation consistent with the treaty's language and historical context (55). That the first attempt to establish a permanent European settlement positioned Indigenous peoples as, essentially, landlords, puts the basis for Canadian sovereignty today in question, and complicates settler notions of the primacy of British law in Canada.

Eager to establish a colonial union in British North America, Canada's "Founding Fathers" John A. Macdonald and George Étienne Cartier travelled to London in 1865 to make their case to the British government. The expansion of the union westward via the appropriation of the North-West from the Company, they argued, was necessary to counter American expansion and to maintain "law and order" in the region (Gaudry 2016, 62). In 1870 the British Parliament passed the Rupert's Land Act to appropriate the North-West as a "new territory in the Dominion of Canada" (63). In order to take such a decision without the consent of the Indigenous peoples who lived there, the Crown necessarily must have believed that its "discovery" of Rupert's Land gave the Crown underlying title (Gaudry 2016, 64; McNeil 2018, 279). In essence, the Crown could assert British law over Indigenous lands because it said so. Suffice it to say, the Crown's appropriation of the North-West from the Company did not provide the emerging Canadian state with legitimacy among Indigenous peoples (Gaudry 2016, 66). In Gaudry's words:

Whatever the justificatory narratives used in the Imperial Rupert's Land Act and BNA Act, as well as Canada's Act for the temporary government of Rupert's Land, Canada very quickly found out what the Company had known for decades, that it could not do much in the North-West without the blessing of Indigenous peoples. (2016, 66).

In short, "Canada's claim to have purchased the North-West – over half of Canada's current land mass – is premised on a legal fiction" (67).

As a celebration of the sesquicentennial of Macdonald's 1867 pact uniting the Colony of Canada (Ontario and Québec), and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Canada Day is a

celebration of the consolidation of a settler-colonial regime and the intensification of processes of elimination and genocide (Wildcat 2015). “What began as a partnership between four provinces,” Trudeau says, “became something much greater; a country that is extraordinary, prosperous, and generous. A land of possibility”. The *British North America Act* constructed a “land of possibility” by subsuming “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” under exclusive federal jurisdiction. The period following Confederation, between 1869 and 1885, saw “the rise of a settler colonial regime on the northern plains” (Wildcat 2015, 398). Trudeau’s characterization of Confederation reflects dominant interpretations in the field of Canadian Political Science, which tend to describe Confederation as either a conservative political-economic deal (Fowke 1952, 274-75; Graham 2012, 7-8) or as a compact between two founding nations, the French and English (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007, 70). Trudeau’s speech appeals to both of these characterizations of Confederation. He nods to French and English as founding nations when he points to “the compromise and vision of people like John A. Macdonald and George-Étienne Cartier” (Trudeau 2017). He also notes Confederation’s political-economic significance when he celebrates leaders who “built railways and highways and seaways to connect us to each other” – in other words, “the backbone of Canada; infrastructure worthy of a great nation” (Trudeau 2017).

James Muir (2017) calls attention to several things Confederation did *not* do: Confederation did not establish the first governance system in Canada, it did not create an independent country, and it did not even create the version of Canada that appears on maps today. As such, Muir argues that Confederation is an arbitrary date – one of many constitutional moments Canada could mark as moments of founding, including: 1142, when five Iroquois nations formed the Haudenosaunee Confederacy; 1791, when the *Constitution Act* created Upper



and Lower Canada; 1840, when the *Act of Union* united Upper and Lower Canada; 1931, when the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster, or 1982, when Canada patriated the constitution. When Trudeau describes 150 years as “as good a date as any”, he acknowledges that 1867 is limited in terms of its national significance. The *British North America Act* was an act of the British Parliament, which sat in the “dusty vaults of Imperial Britain” until 1982 when Canada consolidated its independence from Britain by patriating the constitution (Brodie 2015, 25). The *BNA Act* (1867) was not the document that gave way to ‘Canada’, but one of several instruments to enable national policymaking (Fowke 1952). As Brodie (2009) writes, Confederation did not mark a precise transition from a British colony to a sovereign, legitimate, and territorially bounded nation-state:

[Canada’s] coming-out party was confounded by several key limitations: its final territorial limits were yet to be established; it had only partial political and juridical autonomy from Great Britain; its inhabitants remained subjects of the British Empire; and its national community rested on fragile negotiations between anglophone and francophone white settlers and the racialization and infantilization of [I]ndigenous peoples. (693-94)

Although 1867 did not see the development of a pan-Canadian national identity or a territorially bounded sovereign state, Confederation and the *BNA Act* did have far-reaching consequences. Brodie (2015) writes that constitutions “are both nouns and verbs” (41). They are “celebrated public documents that set out the supreme rules and fundamental values by which we govern ourselves”; yet, at the same time, constitutions *do things*, which is to say they “actively constitute and reconstitute” (Brodie 2015, 41). As it sat in that dusty vault until 1982, the *British North America Act* shaped “political mobilization and claims making”, articulated ideas about who constitutes the “public body”, and gave life to national imaginaries (Brodie 2015, 41-42).

Politicians and policy makers, Malinda S. Smith (2003) writes, applied the *BNA Act* in ways that reproduced in Canada “the ‘race’ and gender inequalities of Britain and its empire”

(116). In the post-Confederation moment, Macdonald's First National Policy (FNP) settled the west and linked the economy from east to west through the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Fowke 1952). This required attempts to eliminate Indigenous peoples, because in the late-nineteenth century, Indigenous peoples – including the Anishinaabe, Nehiyaw (Cree), Métis, Niitsítapi (Blackfoot), and Sioux peoples – were a majority on the plains, representing an “obstacle to colonization schemes” (Treaty 7 Elders with Sarah Carter 1996, xiii, 197). In the Red River region, the Métis mounted considerable resistance to Macdonald's National Policy, forming a provisional government in 1869 in order to demand that their historic presence in the region be accounted for (Andersen 2014, 113-14). As a result, the *Manitoba Act* (1870) allocated 1.4 million acres of land to the Métis in the region, but as non-Indigenous peoples settled there, the Government of Canada failed to follow through on its promise to implement a Métis land base, resulting in a second Métis uprising (1885) ending with Canada's execution of Louis Riel (Andersen 2014, 115). At the time, non-Indigenous peoples (with the exception of French Canadians) rallied against Riel, who resisted “the emerging Canadian project, and who fought for Métis political independence”; today, however, “Canadian identification with Louis Riel has created a mythological cult” (Gaudry 2013, 66). In fact, Manitobans take a day off in February to “celebrate Louis Riel's vision” (Manitoba 2020). After 1885, the Government of Canada intensified its attempt to extinguish Métis claims to a land base via the “scrip” system, a complex and terribly mismanaged system that effectively “divested Métis grantees of their birthright” (Andersen 2014, 41).

Whereas the Government of Canada attempted to dispossess the Métis one-by-one through scrip, treaty making with collective First Nations was a means to secure access Indigenous lands, “pav[ing] the way to nationhood” (Treaty 7 Elders 1996, 195-98). In *On*

*Being Here to Stay*, Michael Asch (2014) argues that treaties negotiated in the post-Confederation moment provide the foundations for a nation-to-nation relationship, provided that settlers learn that their legitimate occupation of Indigenous lands is contingent on Canada keeping promises made to Indigenous peoples in treaties. In Treaty 6, the commissioner requested three things: “use of the land to the depth of the plough for the Queen’s subjects to farm, trees to construct houses, and grass for the animals brought by the settlers” (Venne 1997, 194). According to Treaty 6, the Nehiyaw would retain their relationships with water, land, and mountains, and would maintain their fishing, hunting, and trapping practices. In return for sharing the land with settlers, the Crown agreed to provide the Nehiyaw with health care, education, agricultural assistance, social assistance, and treaty money (Venne 1997, 194-202).

Canada has not fulfilled the treaty obligations made by the Crown, instead engaging in an organized process of dispossession and genocide. To construct the CPR, for example, the Government of Canada evicted the Nakota from their homelands within what is now known as Banff National Park, and nationalized the area to create a tourist attraction for wealthy railway travellers (Binnema and Niemei 2006, 728; Kopas 2007, 8; see also Youdelis 2016 on Jasper National Park). In 1886, the federal government introduced a pass system, preventing First Nations peoples from leaving reserves to hunt and fish. Under the pass system on Treaty 6 land, the Government of Canada forced Nehiyaw parents to choose between “allowing the children to starve or sending them to [residential] school where they would be fed” (Venne 1996, 195). The *Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (2015) describes residential schools as a form of cultural genocide intent on eliminating Indigenous languages, spiritual practices, cultural transmission, and collective identity. The *Indian Act* (1876), which created the legal category of the “status Indian,” provided the infrastructure that has enabled

genocide and dispossession. As a “discourse of classification, regulation, and control,” the *Indian Act* is not just a set of policies, but a system that has produced “ways of thinking – a grammar” so insidious that it “embeds itself in every attempt to change it” (Lawrence 2003, 4). Classifying Indigenous people according to a European racial logic as ‘Indian’, Canada has attempted to sever Indigenous people’s connections to their own sovereign nations, each with their distinct languages, political systems, laws, cultures, and ways of life (Lawrence 2003, 5). The *Indian Act* has been described as a form of “cultural genocide” (Lawrence 2003, 9). Yet, Wildcat (2015) encourages those studying genocide to think about the direct connections between cultural genocide, physical genocide, and Canada’s project of land theft and elimination; that is, severing a people’s traditional ways of life and relationships to land, he writes, has “a direct impact on that people’s capacity to stay alive” (394).

As both a set of policies and a discourse, the *Indian Act* targets Indigenous women most forcefully, institutionalizing patriarchy in Indigenous communities in order to disempower Indigenous women (Lawrence 2003; Tsosie 2010). Indeed, settler colonialism is a *gendered* structure, imposing a European patriarchal gendered order inside of Indigenous communities, profoundly disrupting Indigenous women’s lives (Altamirano-Jiménez 2010, 114; Simpson 2014). For example, the *Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls* (2019) explains that residential schools attempted to entrench Western Christian gender norms through: sexual abuse; the segregation of students according to sex, resulting in the separation of brothers and sisters; the imposition of a Western, Christian gender binary; homophobic and transphobic lessons about gender and sexuality; and the prevention of access to traditional Indigenous teachings about their bodies, sexualities, and respectful gender relations (264-65). Furthermore, until 1985, section 12.1.b of the *Indian Act*

stripped an Indigenous woman of her “Indian” status if she married a man who did not have status. Because their children would not be able to claim status, section 12.1.b was effectively genocidal, disconnecting Indigenous women from their identities and communities, and, importantly, from land (Lawrence 2003, 9).<sup>4</sup> By dispossessing Indigenous women who married non-status men, section 12.1.b was a form of anti-miscegenation legislation in all but name, the result of a political-economic shift from the fur trade era, wherein intermarriage was common and beneficial to Europeans, to settlement, when anti-miscegenation policies became a tool to distinguish “between ruler and ruled” (Thompson 2009, 361).

The same colonial racial and gendered logic also structured Canada’s approach to immigration and maintaining white supremacy. The First National Policy focused on attracting immigrants of the ‘right stock’ from particular parts of the world – ‘hearty’ people from Britain, the US and Europe, deemed uniquely able to withstand Canada’s harsh climate, take up the life of a pioneer, and exploit Canada’s natural resources (Brodie 2002, 47; Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995, 111; Thobani 2007, 90). During the post-Confederation nation-building moment, Canadian politicians proclaimed the superiority of the ‘Aryan’ race to justify immigration policies designed to keep racialized migrants from settling in Canada (Smith 2003, 113-14). For example, construction of the CPR depended upon the temporary labour of racialized migrants – particularly Chinese men – who Macdonald’s Canada cast as “inassimilable and degenerate

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<sup>4</sup> Bill C-31 created new problems for Indigenous women and their descendants, stipulating that those with 6(1)(c) status can pass status on to their descendants, while those with 6(2) status cannot. Sharon McIvor, whose son would not be able to pass status on to his descendants, mounted a nearly 20-year legal battle to ensure that her grandchildren would have status. As recently as January 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Commission found that the *Indian Act* continues to discriminate against Indigenous women. In August 2019, the government fully implemented Bill S-3 to remove sexism from the *Indian Act* and restore status to those whose status has been stripped from them (Geens 2019).

stranger[s]” (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995, 112; see also Sharma 2006). The *Chinese Immigration Act, 1885* was designed to restrict Chinese men recruited to build the railway from settling in Canada permanently (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995, 112; Thobani 2007, 90). Canadian governments restricted Chinese, Japanese, and Indian women from migrating to Canada in order to discourage Chinese, Japanese, and Indian men from settling. Between 1867 and 1920, fears about miscegenation gave way to debate among Canadian politicians about whether to permit Asian women to immigrate so that Asian men did not marry white women (Dua 2007). The 1910 *Immigration Act* sanctioned the exclusion of “any nationality or race of immigrants... because such immigrants are deemed unsuitable” (quoted in Smith 2003, 116). Belief in ‘Aryan’ superiority permeated both sides of the House of Commons in the post-Confederation moment; while Macdonald professed his belief in ‘Aryan’ superiority, so too did Liberal MP R.G. Macpherson, who argued that Canada could “never expect to maintain a high standard of nationality unless we kept the strain white” (quoted in Smith 2003, 117). This kind of race thinking underpinned Canada’s decision to refuse entry to 340 Indian migrants who arrived on the *Komagata Maru* in 1914 (Bhandar and Dhamoon 2019, 5). As opposed to a “dark spot” in Canadian history – a mistake from which Canada has learned – Davina Bhandar and Rita Kuar Dhamoon (2019) explain that the *Komagata Maru* event is consistent with global imperial and colonial regimes and the Canadian settler-colonial project of peopling the West with ideal (white) Imperial subjects (9-10). Instead, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology delivered from the “back of a pickup truck at a community barbecue in Surrey” and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s official apology from the House of Commons in 2016 depict Canada’s utter inhumanity towards the *Komagata Maru*’s passengers as an isolated incident – a

“dark spot” in Canadian history on the path “toward an inclusive multicultural future” (Bhandar and Dhamoon 2019, 14).

The Harper Conservative government’s early plans for celebrating the sesquicentennial harken back to these post-Confederation constructions of ideal white citizenship, which exalted the “loyal subject of the British Empire”, erased French Canadians, and constructed “the immigrant and the Indian” as objects of imperial governance (Brodie 2002, 456-57). As a prelude to 2017’s Canada 150 celebrations, the Harper Conservative government engaged Canadians in commemorating a series of “incredible milestones” along the “Road to 2017” – events the Harper Government argued “shaped our history and contributed to our national identity” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a). Former Heritage Minister James Moore identified the themes that would permeate the “Road to 2017” commemorative milestones including:

responsible government, democracy, and freedom; strong symbols and solid institutions, rights and duties of citizenship, a shared commitment to fellow citizens and the rule of law; our veterans, a proud military history rooted in sacrifice and service to our country; and ourselves as everyday Canadians who make contributions every day in every way to the evolution of our country.

Save for the overt reference to the British Empire, the Harper Government’s priorities for the “Road to 2017” resemble those described by Governor General Lord Earl Grey in an Empire Day speech nearly a century earlier in 1909:

Empire Day is the festival on which every British subject should reverently remember that the British Empire stands out before the whole world as the fearless champion of freedom, fair play and equal rights; that its watchwords are responsibility, duty, sympathy and self-sacrifice; and that a special responsibility rests with you individually to be true to the traditions and to the missions of your race. (quoted in Mann 2014, 254)

Centring the “ordinary”, hardworking, law-abiding Canadian who sacrifices for his country, Harper’s story of the “Road to 2017” reflects what Staring (2013) and Whitaker (2014) label

“Harper’s History” – a pan-Canadian national narrative emphasizing loyalty to Britain and military tradition (see also Frenette 2014; Tonon and Raney 2013; Sjolander 2014, 153-55).<sup>5</sup> Ian McKay and Jamie Swift (2012) argue that, under Harper, a “right-wing elite” attempted to “rebrand” Canada, replacing Canada’s reputation as a peaceful, liberal progressive nation to one “created by wars” and “defended by soldiers” (xi). As part of this rebranding, the Harper government spent \$28 million commemorating the bicentennial of the War of 1812, arguing that the war was the starting point on the “Road to Confederation”, because, according to former Heritage Minister James Moore, “Without the War of 1812, Canada as we know it would not exist as it does today” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a, 3). Even “pre-1867”, Moore argued, the War of 1812 was “pan-Canadian in consequence” – a claim that illustrates the slippery relationship between history, time, and nation in commemorative practices (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a).

It was not until World War I that Canada experienced a “subtle transition in thinking from colony to statehood and from loyal imperialist subject to national citizen” (Brodie 2002, 48). In particular, the Battle of Vimy Ridge has achieved mythical status in the Canadian national imagination, coming to signify the birth of a nation through war (Teigrob, 2016). This emergent Canadian national identity remained rooted in “British race patriotism”, as the French Canadian opposition to conscription illustrates (Mann 2014, 257). During WWI, government speeches celebrated young men’s sacrifices for their country (Brodie 2002, 49). Trudeau’s

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<sup>5</sup> Harper emphasized the importance of the Queen in his first address to Parliament, reinstitutionalized the “Royal” status of Canada’s Armed Forces, hung a portrait of the Queen in the Foreign Affairs building, and highlighted the Crown in his government’s new citizenship guide, *Discover Canada* (Frenette 2014, 53-55; Tonon and Raney 2013, 202-15; Whitaker 2014, 219). *Discover Canada* also emphasized Canada’s military history, and uniformed soldiers replaced RCMP officers at citizenship ceremonies; the Harper government adorned loonies with red poppies and replaced Bill Reid’s celebrated Haida Gwaii art with a depiction of Vimy Ridge on the twenty-dollar bill (Frenette 2014, 55; McKay and Swift 2012, 9-14).



(2017) Canada Day speech also celebrates those who sacrificed their lives at Vimy Ridge, connecting this battle to a longer military tradition:

many people will tell you that our nation was only truly born a hundred years ago, when for the first time Canadians of all backgrounds were joined, to fight and die and win together at a faraway place called Vimy Ridge. The valour we defined that day would echo through names like Dieppe, Juno, Kandahar, and so many others.

Whereas Trudeau (2017) celebrates people “of all backgrounds”, Canadian policy during WWI remained grounded in white supremacy. For example, during WWI, the Canadian state interned Ukrainian Canadians in concentration camps, declaring them “enemy aliens” (Smith 2003, 110).

In the decades following Confederation, Canadians commemorated their “devotion to Queen and country” on Empire Day (23 May), a celebration proposed in 1897 by Ontario Minister of Education George Ross and taken up across English Canada (Mann 2014, 255). Empire Day, Jatinder Mann (2014) writes, was “an unapologetic display of the freedom of the British race, a day on which English-speaking Canadians basked in their inclusion in the greatest empire the world had ever seen” (255). Likewise, Dominion Day on the 1 July, officially renamed Canada Day in 1982, was an occasion to commemorate Confederation and, until the mid-century, “offered an opportunity to express sentiments of British race patriotism in English-speaking Canada” (262).

## **Warfare & Welfare**

After the First World War, Canada gradually began articulating a national identity that was distinct from Britain, using broadcasting as a means to create a “national imagined community” (Anderson 1983). For example, the first pan-Canadian, federally coordinated commemoration of the anniversary of Confederation in 1927 – the Diamond Jubilee – featured a celebration in Ottawa and a simultaneous national radio broadcast (Hayday 2010, 289). In 1929

the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (the Aird Commission) recommended the creation of a national radio broadcaster in order create “national unity” through “inter-regional communication” in a geographically dispersed population and to counteract American cultural influence (Tinic 2005, 61-2). In 1932, Prime Minister R. B. Bennett argued, “Canadians have the right to a system of broadcasting from Canadian sources” (Raboy 1990, 39). The *Canadian Broadcasting Act* (1936) created Canada’s public broadcaster, CBC Radio (Raboy 2011).

While Canadian national identity gradually became distinct from Britain following the First World War, the race-thinking that underpinned the state’s construction of the ideal citizen as the loyal Imperial subject persisted well into and after the Second World War (Mackey 2005, 63-4). During the war, ideas about white superiority grounded in dubious ‘scientific’ racial classifications animated Canadian discourse and policy. For example, racial classifications underpinned Canada’s internment of over 20,000 “persons of Japanese race” in forced labour camps following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 170). Dhamoon and Abu-Laban (2009) argue that Japanese internment “served to reinstate the desire for a preference for a white nation” within its borders, even as Canada joined the fight against Hitler abroad (171). They quote Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, who argued in 1944 that:

the government is of the view that, having regard to the strong feeling that has been aroused against the Japanese during the war and to the difficulty of assimilating Japanese persons in Canada, no immigration of Japanese into this country should be allowed after the war. (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 171)

Rita Dhamoon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (2009) emphasize that it was race-thinking, not national security, that underpinned the construction of Japanese-Canadians as “internal dangerous foreigners” (171).

This race-thinking in Canada did not end with the Allied defeat of the Nazis abroad (Dhamoon and Abu-Labann 2009, 171). Although Canadians remained “British subjects” during WWII, Canada’s involvement in WWII demonstrated independence from Britain (Brodie 2002, 49). In this context, post-war Liberal governments embarked upon a second period of nation-building, introducing Canada’s *Citizenship Act* (1946), enabling Canadians, for the first time, to say, in Paul Martin Sr.’s words, “I am a Canadian citizen” (quoted in Brodie 2002, 50). Yet, the first *Canadian Citizenship Act* maintained ties to the commonwealth, specifying that “Canadian citizens are British subjects” (Martin quoted in Mann 2014, 260). Even after signing the UN Charter in 1944, Canadian immigration policy continued to rely upon the racialized logic of assimilability, while “moral panic” permeated public discourse as Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians left Eastern Europe for Canada (Mackey 2005, 66). Canadian citizenship continued to be tied to whiteness.

The decades following WWII featured a growing “cultural nationalism” focused on producing a pan-Canadian national identity, a project that was virtually all consuming for successive federal governments (Mackey 2005, 67). In Eva Mackey’s (2005) words, the post-WWII era represents “an unprecedented increase in state intervention, control, and surveillance of culture, and the state-sponsored production of national identity” (67). In 1949, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government established the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (the Massey Commission) in order to develop a national television policy. The Massey Commission re-emphasized the importance of public broadcasting to the development of a pan-Canadian national identity. In 1957, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (the Fowler Commission) identified American cultural influence as a threat to Canadian national identity, asking “Can we resist the tidal wave of American cultural

activity? Can we retain a Canadian identity, art, and culture – a Canadian nationhood? (quoted in Mackey 2005, 67). In this context, John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative federal government began "deliberately using Dominion Day as a tool for nation-building and identity construction" (Hayday 2010, 289). Under Diefenbaker and his Secretary of State Ellen Fairclough, the first televised Dominion Day celebrations on Parliament Hill emphasized two founding nations, English and French, supplemented by "folk performances" from diverse First Nations, non-British, non-French, and non-Indigenous ethnic communities (Hayday 2010, 297).

At the same time that successive federal governments promoted 'Canadian' cultural unity to resist American cultural dominance, Québec nationalism simmered during the Quiet Revolution, a period of rapid secularization and modernization. It was in this context of simmering Quebec nationalism that Lester B. Pearson's Liberal government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963) and pursued the production of new 'unifying' national symbols, including a new flag and anthem – a project that proved fraught and divisive. The flag debates became "a battle between old and new Canada, between history and future, and between Empire and nation" (Mackey 2005, 68). As Mackey writes, "The manipulation of symbols of nationhood was essential for the survival of the project of nation-building in Canada at a moment of perceived crisis" (69). In this moment of perceived crisis, Pearson's Liberal government used Dominion Day celebrations to emphasize a bilingual and bicultural national identity, while maintaining the popular "folk performances" of the Diefenbaker years (Hayday 2010, 298). The Government of Canada included Indigenous peoples in Dominion Day celebrations to the extent that they conformed to the assimilatory logic of the era. For example, Father H. O'Connor of the St. Joseph's Mission residential school petitioned to

the federal government for his students to play bagpipes at Dominion Day celebrations on the basis that they represented “the better side of our Indian people” (quoted in Hayday 2010, 299).

In the aftermath of the Great Depression and two world wars, liberal-progressivism gradually replaced laissez-faire capitalism and the social citizen gradually replaced the loyal Imperial Subject (Brodie 2002, 59-60; see also Brodie 1997). The idea of the “social state” acknowledged that the state had a responsibility to provide a “cushion” against “poverty and insecurity” (Brodie 2018, 11). The welfare state’s social citizenship “deepened the meaning of ‘belonging’ to the national community” for exalted (white) subjects (Thobani 2007, 118). Meanwhile, the Canadian welfare state depended on “the unpaid reproductive work of women, the exploitation and marginalization of racialized minorities and immigrants, and [...] the ongoing oppression of Indigenous peoples” (Brodie 2018, 12). In fact, as Sunera Thobani (2007) points out, at the same time that the Keynesian welfare state was being consolidated in Canada, and exalted Canadians latched on to their new “compassionate and caring” national identity, the Sixties Scoop continued the residential school system’s project of extinguishing Indigenous children’s identities, languages, and cultures (127). For Aboriginal peoples, Thobani writes, welfare was tantamount to “warfare” (2007, 125). It was only in the late 1960s, in response to emerging Québec nationalism, the emergence of immigrant communities as the third force, and in the context of growing pan-Indigenous resistance to settler-colonialism that Canada began its experiment with racial equality (Smith 2003, 109)

### **1967: The Last Great Year?**

This fraught national context set the stage for the celebration of the centennial of Confederation in 1967. The 1967 celebrations had two main components: first, a national celebration led by Ottawa in cooperation with provincial and municipal governments; and

second, the 1967 World Fair, Expo '67 in Montreal. The former emphasized spending on public buildings and infrastructure, including the National Arts Centre in Ottawa (Mackey 2005, 71). These buildings and monuments serve as “permanent memorial[s] to the centennial” – they are, effectively, commemorations of a national celebration, an example of the peculiar nature of collective memory projects (Aykroyd 1992, 77). The Centennial celebrations emphasized travel and tourism via projects like: the Confederation Train, “pilgrimages of patriotism” for school children to Expo '67, and a Voyageur canoe festival (Mackey 2005, 71-72).

Expo '67 was the “centerpiece of the celebrations”, a “site in which Canada could elaborate its emerging national identity” (Mackey 2005, 72). Expo '67's location on the banks of the St. Lawrence Seaway illustrates the ways landmark national celebrations are quite literally a means of securing access to Indigenous land. Constructed in 1957, the St. Lawrence Seaway is symbolic of attempts to destroy Indigenous lifeways in order to build settler societies (Simpson 2014, 51). Simpson writes that its construction “embodies the experience of the intrusion of Canada into the territory and minds of Kahnawa'kehró:non” (the People of Kahnawà:ke) (2014, 51). In fact, Expo '67 is not only an example of Canadian settler-colonialism, but of European imperialism and colonialism in the global context. Since the 1851 London Exhibition, world fairs have been part of a project of articulating an Enlightened, progressive, Western “civilized” subject against an “uncivilized” Other locked in a state of nature (Mackey 2005, 71-72). World fairs exerted an imperial and colonial gaze at non-European peoples, putting their cultures, traditions, and even their bodies on display (Mackey 2005, 72). The Expo '67 theme “Man and His World” invokes Enlightenment notions of a universal subject with the capacity to know and possess his world (Kenneally and Sloan 2010, 5). In this man's world, white women served as Expo '67 hostesses, “fashionably attired in sky-blue miniskirts and white go-go boots”

(Kenneally and Sloan 2010, 6). Unlike white women hostesses, Indigenous hostesses representing diverse nations at the “Indians of Canada Pavilion” underwent “4 months of instruction in ‘language training, personality development, and Indian culture’” (Griffith 2015, 182). These examples serve as a reminder that Western nations are gendered, with women’s bodies often linked to tradition and submission (Nagel 1998; McClintock 1995; Yuval-Davis 1993, 628-29).

The state used the Centennial and Expo ‘67 as an opportunity to promote what Mackey calls “pedagogies of patriotism”, educating citizens – especially children – about “the nation, its relationship to the world, and one’s role as a citizen and national subject” (2005, 72). A key part of this national education, given Canada’s emerging identity as a multicultural society, included learning about “cultural pluralism and tolerance” through songs, dances, and food (72). The state’s approach to Indigenous inclusion provides important historical context for understanding the Government of Canada’s approach to Canada 150. Mackey demonstrates how the Canadian state’s recognition of Indigenous peoples in the centennial celebrations and Expo ‘67 was a means through which it sought to manage and contain Indigenous difference (75).

The “Indians of Canada Pavilion” at Expo ‘67 offered a counterpoint to Canadian pedagogies of patriotism, presenting a “critique of historical and present-day settler colonialism” (Griffith 2015, 171). Jane Griffith (2015) writes that the Indians of Canada Pavilion was “an Indigenous-led celebration of survivance and a mounted critique of historical and present-day settler colonialism nestled within the Centennial’s unabashed patriotism” (172). Yet, non-Indigenous visitors resisted learning the pavilion’s message about colonial violence. Griffith attributes this to the pavilion’s inconsistency with the Centennial celebration’s broader “pedagogies of patriotism” (Mackey 2005, 72), which were “steeped in colonial understandings

of Canada” (Griffith 2015, 198). For example, whereas the Indians of Canada Pavilion presented histories of colonial violence, the Canada Pavilion showcased Indigenous art and culture as a marker of Canada’s diversity (Griffith 2015, 187). The Canada Pavilion appropriated Indigenous art as part of Canadian identity and history by presenting it as an artifact of colonial expansion; for example, the Pavilion’s narrator introduces Indigenous artifacts in the following manner, before presenting the stories of explorers Cabot, Cartier, and Champlain:

Canada is a complex country, diverse in heritage, and the pavilion is a reflection of this diversity. It doesn’t tell the whole story of what we are, but it shows something of our culture, our traditions, and our place in the twentieth century. Here are cultural contributions from the first Canadians. (quoted in Griffith 2015, 187)

These kinds of national narratives of cultural difference, also present in speeches and government texts from Canada 150, locate difference in “culture”, obscuring structural racism and settler-colonialism (Dhamoon 2009; Nath 2011).

Certainly, the state understood its inclusion of Indigenous peoples as “benevolent” (Mackey 2005, 75). In fact, broadly speaking, 1967 left Canadians with “a sense of national self-congratulation: ‘we’ Canadians had a kinder, better, more international, more inclusive nation than the United States” (Mackey 2005, 76). Unlike Canada 150, the Centennial Celebrations did not provoke much controversy regarding the notion that “the state would support and promote national identity”; rather, citizens tended to see this kind of spending as legitimizing Canadian national identity (Mackey 2005, 76).

Pierre Berton’s (1997) *The Last Good Year* exemplifies the ways 1967 has been incorporated into the Canadian national mythology. As *The Last Good Year*, Berton argues that 1967 was the year “before all Canadians began to be concerned about the future of our country” (1997, 364). Easily mistaken for a story from Stephen Leacock’s (1912) parody of small-town life in post-Confederation Canada, *Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town*, Berton opens *The Last*



*Good Year* with the story of the Bowsman “biffy burning” of 1 January 1967 (1997, 10-11).

Recently equipped with indoor plumbing and a sewage treatment plant, Bowsman, Manitoba residents marked the Centennial by setting their backhouses ablaze in a great celebratory bonfire that “lit the winter sky and warmed the hearts of five hundred citizens”. For Bowsman residents the biffy burning was an effigy to the “dying frontier,” marking their transition to a new, more civilized way of life (10-11).

For Berton, 1967 was a year of progress on all fronts: Canada released the *Report of the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* and launched the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; Pierre Elliot Trudeau liberalized the Criminal Code; governments spent money; and while other countries experienced civil strife, “in Canada, peace and prosperity reigned” (1997, 17). As a “civilizing year”, 1967 was said to mark progress (363). As “the women, the aboriginals, the homosexuals, and, yes, the French Canadians” demanded “their place in society”, Canada became a more inclusive nation (360). “In 1967,” Berton writes:

A better world seemed to beckon – a world no longer uptight, where marriage ceased to be slavery, where birth control was everybody’s right, where the social services were expanding and universal medicare was just around the corner – a more tolerant world that treated women and minorities with respect, in which everybody could do his own thing without attracting the police. (1997, 366).

In that “golden year”, Canada finally recognized its maturity: “Canada was no longer a young country” and “Canadians began to realize that they had a past” (40). Meanwhile, Charles de Gaulle’s 1967 “Vivre le Québec libre!” speech captured the spirit of an emerging Quebec sovereignty movement. René Lévesque left the Quebec Liberal Party in 1967 to form the Parti Québécois in 1968 as “Trudeaumania” swept Canada (Graham 2012). Pierre Elliot Trudeau, elected Prime Minister in 1968, rejected Lévesque’s Quebec nationalism as inward looking, “chauvinistic”, and “intolerant” (Trudeau quoted in Graham 2012, 54). “A fresh wind was blowing across the land” that year, Berton writes (359).

For Berton, Trudeau epitomized Canada's new sense of national confidence. He embodied the new "Canadian attitude that, with Expo under our belts, we didn't have to take a back seat in the world community" (Berton 1997, 359). Berton's characterization of Trudeau as the embodiment of Canadian unity erases the fact that Trudeau's articulation of a "Just Society" composed of rights-bearing individuals could not capture feminist, anti-colonial, and queer visions of social justice. Indeed, Berton's description of an emerging sense of inclusion, racial and gender harmony, and national progress is itself a form of national mythmaking. The 1969 *Criminal Code* reforms, which Berton argues exemplify progress on sex and gender relations did not, in fact, liberate "the women" and "the homosexuals". Lesbian and gay rights activists actually mobilized *against* the 1969 reforms, demonstrating on Parliament Hill in 1971 to challenge its homophobic conceptualization of gay sex and ongoing police surveillance of and violence against queer and trans people (Hooper et al. 2019). As far as women's reproductive autonomy is concerned, the 1969 reforms loosened restrictions on access to abortion only slightly; it was not until 1988 that the Supreme Court of Canada decriminalized abortion (Hooper et al. 2019). Finally, the *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969*, was widely read as a unilateral attempt to extinguish Indigenous rights. The White Paper ignited a new stage of resistance, this time to the Canadian state, in the form of a pan-Indigenous sovereignty movement under the banners of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC) (Ladner 2009, 233-34).<sup>6</sup> Harold Cardinal's *The Unjust Society (1969)* and the Indian Association of Alberta's (IAA) *Citizens Plus (1970)*,

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<sup>6</sup> Proponents of Berton's "Last Great Year" argument, on the other hand, argue that it was the centennial itself – as opposed to resistance to the Canadian nation-state project – that produced pan-Indigenous unity. Peter Aykroyd (1992), Director of Public Relations of the Centennial Commission, for example, argues that the Centennial brought "native Canadians together as a unified group... providing them with increased confidence and hope for self-determination (113-14).

also known as the Red Paper, rejected the White Paper as an attempt at assimilation, and outlined a vision for self-determination (Ladner 2009, 234).<sup>7</sup>

Trudeau's solution to Canada's diversity was the policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" and a made-in-Canada constitution for the people, with a charter of individual rights (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 108). In his Canada 150 speech, Justin Trudeau (2017) muses about his father's legacy, suggesting that Canada became a nation when "we brought home the Constitution and defined ourselves through the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*". In fact, this moment precipitated "many of the most significant and often antagonistic developments in Canadian politics in the past thirty years" (Brodie 2015, 30). At stake in the constitutional politics of the 70s and early 80s was "the nature of Canada" (Chrétien quoted in Brodie 2015, 26). The patriation of the constitution without Québec's consent in November 1981 plunged Canada into fifteen years of fraught negotiations to try to bring Québec into the constitution and a very close referendum on Quebec secession in 1995 (Brodie 2015, 37). Mega-constitutional politics characterized the 1980s and 1990s as governments, policymakers, lawyers, citizens, and social movements engaged in the fraught and emotional process of negotiating Canada's very essence and purpose (Russell 1992, 86; see also Brodie 2015). In this context, Indigenous articulations of sovereignty did not compute with Canada's "new liberal rights regime", evidence that "the patriation of the *BNA Act* from the dusty vaults of Imperial Britain did not sever Canada from its colonial past" (Brodie 2015, 44). Indeed, the mythology of 1967 as the pinnacle of Canadian nationalism – the moment before which Québec

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<sup>7</sup> Importantly, Ladner explains that pan-Indigenous resistance to the Canadian state pre-dates the NIB and NWAC, emerging in the post-WWI era when Mohawk veteran Frederick Loft founded the League of Indians of Canada (1918) to advocate for better living conditions on reserves and traditional Indigenous governance systems (Ladner 2009, 231). Nehiyaw leaders were inspired by Loft's "vision of international mobilization" when they allied with their historic enemies the Kainai to form the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) (Ladner 2009, 232).

and Indigenous nationalism caused disunity – ignores the extent to which Canadian national politics have *always* been “fractious” (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995). As opposed to a moment of national unity, the centennial celebrations of 1967 represent the state’s temporary and fragile management and containment of national difference through discourses about diversity and inclusion (Mackey 2005).

## **Canada 125**

Canada approached 125 years since Confederation in 1992 as a divided nation facing economic recession. Whereas the Centennial celebrations featured a consensus on the role of the state in producing a coherent national identity, oil shocks and stagflation in the 1970s undermined post-war social liberalism such that by 1992 the dominant neoliberal political rationality entrusted the market with producing national unity through economic growth and prosperity (Brodie 2002, 62; Mackey 2005, 76). In this dramatically changed political, economic, and national context, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government’s approach to Canada 125 emphasized minimal government spending, corporate partnerships, and nationalism from the bottom-up (Mackey 2005, 127). Elected in 1984, Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives inherited a country divided by the process of constitution-making in a multinational, settler-colonial state. His attempt to bring Québec into the constitution through the Meech Lake Accord in 1987 failed when Oji-Cree Member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly Elijah Harper, in an act of resistance to settler-colonial nation-making, prevented Manitoba from ratifying the accord (Coulthard 2014, 115-16). Harper’s eagle feather, raised each time he voted “no”, represented widespread Indigenous opposition to yet another constitutional negotiation without meaningful opportunities for Indigenous peoples to

contribute to constitutional renewal and institutionalize self-government and self-determination (Coulthard 2014, 115-16).

The Canadian state's response to the Oka Crisis in the summer of 1990 exacerbated a prevailing sense of disunity, as competing claims to sovereignty— Canadian, Quebecois, and Mohawk – collided when Mohawk warriors protected sacred land from local development (Coulthard 2014, 116; Mackey 2005, 123). On 11 July 1990 when the SQ invaded Mohawk territory, what was a peaceful blockade became a site of “domestic warfare” (Simpson 2014, 148). SQ Corporal Marcel Lemay died, and a seventy-eight-day crisis ensued (Simpson 2014, 147). Pan-Indigenous solidarity movements mobilized to disrupt the settler-colonial economy, forming blockades on roads and railways to prevent the flow of goods and resources (Coulthard 2014, 116).

The combination of a weak economy, national fragmentation, and a settler-colonial state in crisis informed the Mulroney government's approach to promote local celebrations aimed at producing national unity and managing difference (Mackey 2005, 123). In order to manufacture a perception that Canada 125 was “*not organized by the government*”, the federal government contributed \$50 million – “a miniscule amount compared to the immense government investment in the Centennial celebrations” – to create the “Canada 125 Corporation”, a public/private partnership with financial support from Imperial Oil (Esso) Canada (127, emphasis original). The Canada 125 Corporation focused on supporting local festivals and community events, creating the perception that Canada 125 was a depoliticized celebration of individuals, families, and communities, as opposed to a top-down political process of national identity construction (128-9). These local celebrations, Mackey argues, tended to centre “unmarked and yet normative local white identity, seen as *Canadian-Canadian* identity” (145). That is, local

celebrations perpetuated a sense that *true* Canadian identity sprung from small communities – the heartland – as opposed to increasingly diverse urban centres. Though the Mulroney government provided the legislative framework for Canadian diversity policy through the 1988 *Multiculturalism Act*, by the late 1980s, the newly established Reform Party, seizing on emerging populist sentiment, had begun to successfully construct multiculturalism as divisive (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 111). By the 1990s, critics of multiculturalism policy focused on its perceived costs, implying that immigrants were a drain on the economy (Abu-Laban 2009). “Ordinary Canadians” – “white, ‘non-political’ Canadians” – did not embrace multiculturalism, immigration, and diversity in 1992. Upon assuming the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1993, Prime Minister Kim Campbell embedded multiculturalism policy within her newly created Department of Canadian Heritage – designed to provide machinery to generate among Canadians an “attachment to Canada” through national celebrations and commemorations like Canada 150 (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 112-13).

By 2017’s Canada 150 celebrations, diversity appeared to have replaced multiculturalism as the language of difference. Canadian political scientists describe Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s 2015 election win, with 39.5% of the popular vote and a majority government, as – at least in part – a rejection of his predecessor Prime Minister and Conservative Party of Canada leader Stephen Harper’s divisive “zero tolerance” politics (see for example Brodie 2018, 152; Macklin 2017). While in government from 2006-2015, Harper’s Conservatives enacted changes to Canada’s citizenship and immigration policy which made Canadian citizenship “harder to get and easier to lose” and associated the “good citizen with the loyal soldier” and the “bad citizen with the disloyal enemy” (Macklin 2017, 285-88). In the 2015 election, for example, Harper campaigned on the promise to establish a “barbaric cultural practices” tip line, an idea

underpinned by Islamophobic discourses stoked by the West in the context of the War on Terror (Macklin 2017). Trudeau's campaign refrain that "Diversity is Canada's strength" and his pledge to support the resettlement of 25,000 Syrian refugees, on the other hand, appealed to progressive voters (Brodie 2018).

### **The Confederation Debates: Take Two**

It was under these two ideologically distinct prime ministers that planning for Canada 150 took place, commencing under Harper's leadership and continuing under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The Harper Government referenced the sesquicentennial of Confederation for the first time in its Speech from the Throne opening the first session of the 41<sup>st</sup> Parliament in June 2011. Speeches from the Throne, Brodie (2002) writes, not only outline the government's legislative agenda, but also evidence the government's "perception of the 'state of the nation'" (44). In 2011, three years after the Great Recession forced governments around the world to reckon with economic crisis, the Government of Canada described "families and children", volunteers, law-abiding citizens, and hardworking, "ordinary Canadians" as the centre of a strong, prosperous, and stable nation (Canada 2011). The Government of Canada outlined a legislative agenda focused on: economic growth through job creation, tax cuts, free trade, digital innovation, deficit reduction, and reducing government spending; defending sovereignty and national security, strengthening Canadian claims to sovereignty in the North; celebrating "our shared history", protecting law and order, and integrating "Canada's Aboriginal peoples" into the economy (Canada 2011).

The Government of Canada officially commenced planning for Canada 150 on 27 September 2011 when it gave the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage a mandate to study Canada's 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations and consult with "the

Minister of Canadian Heritage and stakeholders from across Canada” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012). Appearing before the Heritage Committee on 20 October 2011, Heritage Minister James Moore outlined the Government of Canada’s plans to “celebrate major events that have shaped our history and contributed to our national identity”, celebrations that will “culminate in Canada’s 150<sup>th</sup> birthday in 2017” (Canadian Heritage 2011). In addition to commemorating the bicentennial of the War of 1812, Moore listed a number of anniversaries the Government of Canada would mark along the “Road to 2017”:

Next year, we will celebrate the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s ascension to the throne – her diamond jubilee.

In the coming years, we will also remember the participation of Canadians in the First and Second World Wars, the creation of several Canadian regiments, and major battles that have punctuated Canadian military history.

We will mark the birthdays of such architects of our country and Confederation as Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir George-Étienne Cartier. We will commemorate key events that allowed our ancestors to lay the foundations of our country, such as the Charlottetown and Quebec City conferences and the establishment of the first responsible government in Canada. And we will celebrate great achievements that have changed the face of our country and our society, like the establishment of a colony near Red River, the Canadian Arctic Expedition, granting women’s right to vote, and adopting our national flag. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a)

Reflecting on the Harper Government’s decision to mark historic milestones in the lead up to the sesquicentennial, the CBC’s Kady O’Malley (2014) accused the Harper government of “reveling in a sepia-toned, distant past”.

The Harper Government tried to counter the perception that its approach to the sesquicentennial was disconnected from the present by explaining that the Road to 2017 was fundamentally about diversity. In remarks to the Heritage Committee, Minister Moore argued that, under a Conservative government, celebrating Canada’s diversity and promoting a pan-Canadian understanding of history would be fundamental to the sesquicentennial. “This is a



country where we actually celebrate and promote our diversity, and this is a good thing,” Moore argued in front of the committee (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a). He continued:

We’re well aware of the diversity that exists across the country and certainly, we don’t want 2017 to just be about looking back 150 years and saying ‘French, English, aboriginal’. It’s also multicultural, and new Canadians are the backbone of so many communities across the country. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a)

At the same time, Moore repeatedly stressed the need for celebrations that would be “pan-Canadian” in their appeal – arguing that the celebrations should generate an appreciation for a pan-Canadian understanding of history. While “people know their local history very well”, Moore lamented that “we don’t teach a pan-Canadian narrative of Canadian history” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a, 13). Moore asked the Committee to consider what they can learn from the centennial celebrations in 1967, the commemoration of the 400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of Quebec City, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and Paralympic Games, and recent royal visits. Using the colonial language of “discovery” and drawing a connection between people, land, and identity, Moore argued that each of these events:

allowed people across the country and visitors from around the world to discover Canada and its history, landscape, and culture, our artists, our communities, and our official languages. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a)

Moore goes on to proclaim that 2017 will “inspire just as much pride and national sense of identity and belonging as the centennial celebrations in 1967 and Vancouver 2010 put together” (4).

Following a study that included 18 meetings and consultations with 54 individuals and groups, the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage issued a September 2012 report reviewing successes and lessons learned from 1967, Canada 125, and Vancouver 2010 (Canadian

Heritage Committee 2012).<sup>8</sup> Among five practical recommendations, such as “beginning preparation well in advance of the celebration” and “establishing an organizing body with a clear mandate”, the Committee offers one abstract lesson from these three celebrations, which is: “encouraging the participation of diverse groups” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 15). In particular, the report evaluates how each national event included Indigenous peoples, arguing that Vancouver 2010 represents the benchmark for Indigenous inclusion. For example, the report quotes Moore, who argued:

The involvement of Aboriginals was unparalleled in such a large event. It was higher than in 1988 or 1976. In my opinion, it was a benchmark for this type of event. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 12)

Likewise, Peter Dinsdale, former Chief Operating Officer of the Assembly of First Nations, said: “When people think of the 2010 Olympics, they think of the participation of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit in those celebrations” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 14). Yet, while the Committee stresses the need for inclusion of Indigenous peoples in “the entire process, from planning to delivery”, it offers a limited, depoliticized form of recognition (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 38). For example, quoting Australia’s High Commissioner to Canada, His Excellency Justin Hugh Brown on the involvement of Aboriginal peoples in Australia’s Centennial celebrations, the report recommends an explicitly “depoliticized” version of inclusion:

A big feature of the year was to try to involve all of the Aboriginal communities and to put our political differences, if you like, to one side, and celebrate what we’ve achieved as a country. To depoliticize the process was a prominent thing. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 38)

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<sup>8</sup> The Committee heard from, among others, representatives of: Parks Canada, the National Film Board, the National Capital Commission, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, the City of Ottawa, government consulting firm MASS LBP, the Métis National Council, the National Association of Friendship Centres, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Ontario Black History Society.

The report's summary of testimony from prominent Indigenous leaders evidences a depoliticization of Indigenous presence in the sesquicentennial. For example, the Committee heard from President of the Métis National Council, Clément Chartier, on 22 November 2011, who reminded Members of Parliament that Confederation, for the Métis nation, represents the land theft of 1.4 million acres and the suppression of Métis resistance. Conservative MP Terence Young asked Mr. Chartier how the 2017 sesquicentennial celebration might highlight Indigenous peoples' relationships to land, to which Chartier responded:

Of course, for us, the biggest thing that could happen is if we signed a massive land claim treaty with the government that would enable some of the returns of our land within that year. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011b)

In his testimony, Mr. Chartier's recommendations to the committee continually came "back to the need for a land base and the opening of the space for self-government" (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011b, 19). Yet, the following quotation from the Committee's final report says nothing of Chartier's testimony about land or Métis resistance, instead emphasizing his concerns about heritage and commemoration:

The Métis National Council hopes the Métis Nation's contribution to the development of western Canada will be showcased. The Council President, Mr. Chartier, would like the Department of Canadian Heritage to support 'the development and expansion of Métis Nation heritage sites' and hopes that a national museum of Métis culture will be built. There is also an expectation that the Department of Canadian Heritage will provide funding to preserve and promote the Michif language. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 27)

Whereas the Committee's report omits Chartier's calls for a Métis land claim settlement, it emphasizes the importance of developing settlers' attachments to land. That is, when the Heritage Committee's report and recommendations do broach the topic of land and peoples' relationships to land, they prioritize tourism for settlers and international visitors, using the language of exploration and discovery. For example, the Committee's report quotes at length Mr.

William Thorsell, a political consultant and manager of the Western Canada Pavillion at Expo 67, on Canadians' relationships to land:

We now realize here that competent management of our territory is of exploding significance for us and to the entire world. We are going to be famous in history, unavoidably, for how we manage the Canadian equation alone: very few people, much land, the capacity as rich people to do something about it.

To do it well, a great many more Canadians need to get out and actually experience the breadth and depth of the land. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 18)

The Heritage Committee implements Thorsell's argument that the sesquicentennial "should be about movement among places", recommending that:

The Government of Canada or any agency authorized to undertake the organization of Canada's 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations explore incentives to encourage all Canadians to explore their country during 2017. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 53)

Themes of exploration and discovery permeate Canada 150. I argue that the colonial logic underpinning the goal of encouraging settlers to explore and discover Canada is evidence of the superficial nature of the theme of reconciliation and the erasure of Indigenous relationships to land. For example, the Heritage Committee emphasized Thorsell's argument about "the need to recognize the close bond that exists between this land and the people who live here" (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 18).

In offering a depoliticized form of inclusion and obscuring conflict over land, the Committee repeats the state's approach to Vancouver 2010, which included the "imprisonment of Indigenous activists, continued land theft, and irreversible ecological and cultural destruction of Indigenous territories" (Dhoot 2015, 50). Indeed, while the Committee suggests that Vancouver 2010 is an example of Indigenous inclusion, Sonny Dhoot (2015) reminds his readers that the Secepmc and St'at'imc First Nations "protested the destruction of Indigenous territories taking place to accommodate the Olympics" (51). Dhoot's anti-colonial queer critique of Pride House is a reminder of the need to continually come back to the centrality of land in research on

national celebrations and commemorations, and to prioritize questions of securitization. In fact, at the same time as the Heritage Committee report emphasizes the need for Indigenous inclusion and diversity, it also includes a warning to anniversary planners about threats to the celebration: “Analyze destructive forces that may be present: thoughtfully plan how to aggressively oppose them” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 55).<sup>9</sup>

The election of the Trudeau Liberals in 2015 prompted debates in the House of Commons over the nature of the celebration and the relationship between past and present. The Trudeau Liberals subtly obscured the celebration’s relationship to John A. Macdonald and Confederation, renaming the “150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation” “Canada 150” and announcing four new themes reflective of their successful election campaign: youth, the environment, diversity and inclusion, and reconciliation. In the House of Commons, Conservative Party MPs accused the Liberals of “cutting Confederation out as the theme of the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary” (van Loan, 2016). On 18 October 2016, for example, Conservative MP Peter van Loan argued that the Liberals were engaged in an “ongoing war on history”: “The government is taking the absurd position of not including Confederation or history as the theme of the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation”. Tensions over the degree to which the past should figure in present celebrations are illustrative of ways commemorative practices disrupt linear time – momentarily asking a collective to reflect on time passed (Zlizer 1995, 221; see also Olick and Robbins 1998, 108; Rothberg 2009, 4). These Conservative and Liberal Canada 150 “Confederation debates” reveal that what is being celebrated is not, in fact, about any particular event, but a structure. That is, despite the

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<sup>9</sup> This is the fourth principle from Director of Public Relations of the Centennial Commission, Peter Aykroyd’s “Anniversary Axiomatique” – ten principles to guide planning for national anniversaries. This is a direct response to Indigenous resistance to the Centennial (Griffith 2015, 173-4).

Liberals' best attempts to detach the celebration from Confederation, Canada 150 is nonetheless a celebration of settler-colonial ascendancy.

### **Outline of Chapters**

After outlining the theory, concepts, and methodology that guide my research in Chapter Two, I embark on three case studies. From Parliament Hill on 1 July 2017 where Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivers his Canada 150 speech, my research travels to Iroquois homelands during the War of 1812. Next, aboard a Canadian icebreaker in the summer of 2017, my dissertation departs from Tkarotonto, home of the Huron-Wendat, Seneca, and Mississaugas of the Credit River along the St. Lawrence, and North through the lands and waters of Inuit Nunangat. Finally, my research arrives back on unceded Algonquin territory where the Bawating water protectors raised a tipi on Parliament Hill, an act of resistance to the Canada 150 celebrations. Each of these case studies demonstrates distinct ways that Canada 150, as a settler-colonial national celebration, utilizes the language of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation in an attempt to incorporate Indigenous sovereignty and national difference and shore up settler attachments to land.

In Chapter Three, I analyze the Government of Canada's commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812, a moment Harper described as a story of "the origins of the Canada we know today" and the starting point on the "Road to 2017" (Government of Canada 2015). Whereas Canadian political scientists and Canadian studies scholars have identified this commemoration as an example of the Harper Government's attempt to "rebrand" Canada as a white, British "Warrior Nation" (McKay and Swift 2012), I demonstrate that the 1812 commemoration emphasizes Indigenous contributions to the war, incorporating Six Nations warriors' fights to protect their land from American encroachment within the "fight for Canada".

While typically understood as an expression of a white, British Canadian identity, the 1812 commemoration portrays the war as “the origins of Canadian diversity”, obfuscating racial inequality by narrating Canada as always, already embracing of racial difference. Beginning with this analysis of the Harper Government’s plan to celebrate milestones along the “Road to 2017”, my research shows that both Conservative and Liberal governments mobilize the progressive language of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation in distinct ways. This analysis identifies the limitations of more inclusive commemorations when led by the state.

Canada C3 – a Canada 150 Signature Project and the subject of Chapter Four – evidences ways that these progressive discourses are easily co-opted. The Canada C3 Expedition, a 150-day expedition through the Northwest Passage led by “one of the top 100 Canadian Explorers,” Geoff Green, (Students on Ice 2016), is an example of one way Canadian Heritage “encourage[d] all Canadians to explore their country during 2017” (Canadian Heritage Committee 2012, 52). I argue that the Canada C3 Expedition is a project of storying Canadian sovereignty that obscures Inuit sovereignty by positioning them as diverse Canadian people. In fact, narratives of reconciliation and diversity slide together in southerners’ stories of the C3 Expedition, as if encounters between diverse peoples are themselves a form of reconciliatory work. This slippage signals a need to critique the emergence of diversity and reconciliation as interrelated discourses that support Canadian state-making.

Finally, Chapter Five travels to the heart of the settler-colonial imagination and the centre of Canada Day celebrations – Parliament Hill on Algonquin territory – to compare Indigenous and settler occupations of urban public space during Canada 150. In the lead up to 1 July, the City of Ottawa turned city parks and parking lots into urban campgrounds to manage an anticipated influx of visitors, inviting settlers to occupy public space. This kind of state-

sanctioned dwelling in the national capital was unprecedented. The National Capital Commission (NCC) and the City of Ottawa ordinarily prohibit dwelling in public space. Meanwhile, the Canadian state identified Anishinaabe water protectors, who raised a tipi on Parliament Hill on 28 June 2017, as threats to public safety, inadvertently constructing a respectable urban camper against a dangerous Indigenous subject. Contrasting the City of Ottawa's urban camping initiative with the state's response to the Algonquin reoccupation of Parliament Hill reveals that dwelling in public space is apparently acceptable only if it is in the spirit of expressing celebratory feelings about the nation-state. Drawing upon Mark Rifkin's (2013) concept of settler common sense and Mackey's (2016) discussion of settler certainty, I argue the state's paradoxical approach to public occupations during Canada 150 both rely upon and actively reproduce taken-for-granted feelings and logics about non-Indigenous claims to land and place. This chapter hones in on the power and potential of Indigenous resistance to and refusal of the Canadian nation-state project, identifying ways water protectors and land defenders unsettled settler common sense and disrupted the co-optation of Indigeneity as a mark of Canada's diversity, inclusion, and commitment to reconciliation.

In Chapter Six, the conclusion, I argue that Canada should take seriously Indigenous calls to cancel Canada Day. Indigenous peoples make similar demands in other settler-colonies to end annual celebrations of invasion. Cancelling Canada Day is a move that would be consistent with recent decisions to take down statues to John A. Macdonald outside of Victoria City Hall and find new namesakes for schools named after Canada's first Prime Minister (CBC 2018; MacDonald 2020). Narrating a new story of Canada is crucial, but given the limitations of more inclusive national celebrations and commemorations in the context of ongoing settler-colonialism, I argue that stories of grassroots resistance are the stories worth telling.



## **Contribution to Canadian Political Science**

Studies of settler-colonial national celebrations have emerged from the fields of sociology (Caldwell and Leroux 2017; Elgenius 2011; Leroux 2010; Mackey 2005; Nadeau 2013; Spillman 1997), History (Morgan, 2015; 2016); Cultural Studies (Nicol 2001); and Gender Studies (Dhoot 2015). Searching for mentions of “celebration” or “commemoration” in the *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, on the other hand, reveals that either Canadian Political Scientists are not engaging in studies of the politics of celebration and commemoration, or the field’s top journal does not publish these studies. Why aren’t CPS scholars interested in the politics of commemoration and celebration? Below, I offer three reasons for studying the politics of celebration and commemoration – or “heritage” policy – in Canadian political science. I begin with the argument that heritage is political. Second, I argue that studying the politics of heritage provides insight into important debates about the relationship between settler-colonialism, white supremacy, multiculturalism, and diversity. Third, I argue that research into the politics of settler-colonial national celebrations responds to Kiera Ladner’s (2017) call in the *CJPS* to shift CPS from its traditional focus on the “Indian problem” to the “Canadian problem” by naming and deconstructing settler-colonialism.

Rituals, myth, memory, symbols, traditions, and customs are, traditionally, the purview of anthropologists. When we study rituals, such as marking the date of a national founding with a celebration, Peter Aykroyd argues “What we are dealing with lies principally in the field of anthropology” (3). Late historical sociologist Anthony D. Smith argues that myth, memory, tradition, values, symbols, rites, and rituals create and sustain feelings of attachment to a national community. These sets of traditions – or, what has become known as *our heritage* in Canada – supposedly “serve to unite a group of people with shared experiences and memories” (Smith

1998, 187). Is the nation the domain of anthropologists and sociologists? Despite the fact that political scientists study nation-states, Canadian political science scholarship focuses disproportionately on *state* institutions as opposed to questions of *nation*, with the exception of the work of Indigenous political scientists whose conceptions of nations are not necessarily linked to state sovereignty in the Eurocentric Westphalian sense (Ladner, 2017). In *Reproducing the Nation* Jacqueline Stevens (1999) calls attention to the ways Political Science -- focused on the study of policy, law, elections, and democratic institutions -- and Anthropology -- focused on culture, heritage, tradition, and kinship -- overlap (51).

Given that Canadian political science scholarship examines multiculturalism, affirmed as part of Canadian heritage in the 1988 *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, it is surprising that Canadian Political Scientists have devoted scant attention to the politics of heritage, celebration, and commemoration more broadly. Studying the politics of commemoration and celebration -- designed to generate “attachment to Canada”, per Canadian Heritage’s mandate -- provides insight into the affective dimensions of belonging in a political community. As Sara Ahmed (2014) argues, emotions shape “the boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside” (10). Analyzing the politics of heritage, including celebration and commemoration provides insight into the relationships among settler-colonialism, white supremacy, multiculturalism, and diversity, since the state production of celebration and commemoration practices involve storytelling about the boundaries of belonging to and exclusion from the national community. Whereas liberal theorists argue that multiculturalism policy accommodates Canadian diversity, gives substance to individual rights, and provides vital forms of recognition (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994), critical-race feminist theorists argue that multiculturalism reproduces difference without attending to systemic racism (Bannerji 2000; Dhamoon 2009;

Thobani 2007). To capture these kinds of racist and colonial power dynamics, Dhamoon argues that scholars should analyze culture “in the historical context of nation and nation-building, colonialism, white supremacy, patriarchy, capitalism, and heteronormativity, as well as anti-colonialism and decolonization,” a recommendation my dissertation takes seriously (2009, 17). Yet, studies of culture in Canadian political science have typically neglected analyses of race, racism, and colonialism (Nath 2011; Dhamoon 2009; Abu-Laban 2014).

Research into the politics of settler-colonial national celebrations helps shift CPS from investigations into Indigenous politics which focus on the “Indian problem” as opposed to the “Canadian problem” (Ladner 2017, 175). In her 2017 review of scholarship on Indigenous politics in CPS, Ladner argues that the field’s focus on the Westphalian state system creates a prevailing disconnect between CPS and Indigenous politics (175). Ladner urges CPS scholars to sever sovereignty from states, allowing political scientists to see Indigenous sovereignty (164). CPS produced by non-Indigenous scholars has tended to erase Indigenous sovereignty by implicitly or explicitly affirming French and English constitution-making as the natural starting point, erasing Indigenous constitutional and legal orders pre-dating the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*, the *Quebec Act*, the *Act of Union*, or the *British North America Act* of 1867 (167). CPS has traditionally studied Indigenous peoples through the lens of “cultural difference” or as special interest groups interacting with the Canadian state, obscuring Indigenous sovereignty by assimilating Indigenous peoples within the broader Canadian political sphere (164-70). Instead, Ladner encourages CPS scholars to engage in non-assimilatory scholarship by studying sovereign Indigenous nations with distinct political systems, challenging CPS scholars to disrupt “disciplinary boundaries and what our discipline teaches us to see” (168-70). There is, Ladner writes, a “need to engage in research which not only acknowledges but also confronts issues of

colonialism, oppression, racism, and erasure” (175). Importantly, she urges CPS scholars to “address the fact that [Canada] exists on someone else’s land” (176). Likewise, the CPSA Reconciliation Committee, co-chaired by Dr. Joyce Green and Dr. Peter Russell, engages with the TRC’s Calls to Action by urging CPS scholars and students to engage in scholarship by Indigenous scholars about Indigenous sovereignty in order to challenge the canon and engender “new political possibilities” (CPSA Reconciliation Committee 2019).

### **Writing Inside of Settler-Colonialism and Indigenous Sovereignty**

In engaging in a study of settler-colonialism, however, I am mindful of Ladner’s critique of scholarship on Indigenous politics produced by non-Indigenous scholars, and her emphasis on political science scholarship on Indigenous politics from within. Cory Snelgrove, Rita Dhamoon, and Jeff Corn tassell (2014) offer the following words of caution about studies of settler-colonialism by non-Indigenous scholars:

Without centring Indigenous peoples’ articulations, without deploying a relational approach to settler colonial power, and without paying attention to the conditions and contingency of settler colonialism, studies of settler colonialism and practices of solidarity run the risk of reifying (and possibly replicating) settler colonial as well as other modes of domination. (1)

Whereas settler-colonial studies scholar Mark Rifkin (2013) argues for shifting “the analytical focus such that Indigenous sovereignties are not at the centre of critical attention”, Snelgrove et al. remind those interested in settler-colonial studies of the pitfalls of shifting too far away from Indigenous sovereignty. Citing Fiona Nicoll (2004), Rifkin (2013) calls upon non-Indigenous scholars to start from the position that we already exist within Indigenous sovereignty (323). Then, we can take up the “political and intellectual responsibility to analyse and evaluate the innumerable ways in which [w]hite sovereignty circumscribes and mitigates the exercise of Indigenous sovereignty” (Nicoll 2004, 19). These conversations among scholars like Nicoll

(2004), Rifkin (2013), Snelgrove et al (2014), and Ladner (2017) regarding non-Indigenous studies of Indigenous politics and settler-colonialism signal the limitations of the kind of inquiry in which I engage. While I try to take care to engage in the kinds of “relational” analyses Snelgrove et al (2014) recommend, I do not want to pretend to have completely resolved the dilemma of engaging with work by and about Indigenous peoples as a settler scholar. Rather, I want to acknowledge that my dissertation is, in fact, produced in the context of settler-colonialism and as such is complicit in settler-colonial power dynamics. Meanwhile, I keep in mind Nicoll’s point that as a non-Indigenous scholar I also cannot produce scholarship that is outside of Indigenous sovereignty. I write inside of both settler-colonialism and Indigenous sovereignty.

In beginning this chapter with a land acknowledgement, I want to challenge the traditional story of CPS, typically commencing with Confederation in 1867. One of my contentions in this dissertation is that Canada 150 is a form of settler-colonial state storytelling, despite its resistance to acknowledging that its stories about sovereignty are *stories*. Expert on Indigenous law Louise Mandell describes Canadian legal traditions as rooted in the first European settlers’ myths and illusions about land, law, and Indigenous peoples, such as the myth that Europeans brought law to North America and the illusion that “by planting the flag, the Crown claimed complete ownership and jurisdiction over everything” (Mandell and Hall Pinder 2015, 121). The legal stories of the first European settlers are ghostly, she contends, continuing to haunt Indigenous peoples to this day as they assert their inherent sovereignty over land, which, even by Canadian legal standards, is not clearly Canadian (127). In the 1997 *Delgamuukw* case, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Indigenous peoples in British Columbia had never given up their title to land, rejecting the ghostly Doctrine of Discovery and *terra*

*nullius* (127).<sup>10</sup> Yet, Val Napoleon (2005) argues that the interpretation of Gitksan *adaawk* (oral histories) in *Delgamuukw* circumscribes the potential for Indigenous oral histories to decolonize because of the court's interpretation of *adaawk* as "cultural artefacts" as opposed to legal traditions (123). Canada's engagement with Indigenous oral histories falls short of establishing legal pluralism, meaning "two legal orders operating on the same landscape" (Mandell and Hall Pinder 2015, 1289). Instead, the incorporation of Indigenous oral tradition and culture on Canadian judicial terms is a form of reconciliation that attempts to square Indigenous and Canadian legal traditions meanwhile maintaining Canadian legal supremacy (Coulthard 2014, 123-24).

Indigenous oral history is, in fact, a robust form of evidence. Venne explains the importance of storytelling to Cree law and history. In Cree political and legal structures, Elders share information through stories and hold collective memory:

When the Elders come together, the stories begin to flow. One Elder alone has many stories, but when a number of Elders are placed in the same room, the stories multiply. One Elder may know part of a story and another will know the rest of the story. Together, the Elders tell the history of the nation. (1997, 17).

The strength of Cree oral history is in its detail and precision; not only do details give life to stories, they also provide specific examples that others verify (Venne 1997, 175). Indigenous storytelling is resistance to settler-colonialism, exposing "Canadian secret[s]" (Thomas 2005, 239).

The Canadian state's stories about sovereignty – ideological, fictional, even fantastical, narratives that support settler-colonialism – comprise its own political and legal tradition, too,

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<sup>10</sup> Before *Delgamuukw*, in *R. v. Van der Peet* (1996) the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that Indigenous peoples have their own political, legal, and cultural systems pre-dating contact, but privileged Canadian law over Indigenous law its approach to pre-contact pre- Indigenous legal and political orders as cultural traditions frozen in time (Christie 2003, 483; Coulthard 2014, 124).

even if Canada does not acknowledge them as such. Canadian stories describe discovery, peaceful settlement and cooperation, treaty-making and constitution-making, interspersed with “mistakes”, “dark spots” lessons learned, and official apologies, followed by reconciliation and a path forward. Such settler-colonial state narratives aim to manufacture a sense of legitimate state sovereignty and national unity in the context of dispossession (Yuval-Davis 1993, 623). Indeed, the state is a storyteller (Simpson 2014, 17). In the next chapter, I present theories describing the relationship between the nation, the state, people, land, and stories.

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORY & METHODS

### Introduction

“If this is your land, where are your stories?”, a Gitksan elder asked Government of Canada officials, as they claimed the land they were on was Canadian (Chamberlin 2003, 1). The elder’s question preceded the *Delgamuukw* case. This question, J. Edward Chamberlin writes, illustrates:

how stories give meaning and value to the places we call home; how they bring us close to the world we live in by taking us into a world of words; how they hold us together and at the same time keep us apart. (2003, 1)

As the expression of distinct epistemologies and ontologies, stories give meaning to relationships between peoples, lands, and places – they are world-making (Styres 2019, 25). The elder’s question interrupts Canadian narratives and reaffirms Gitksan sovereignty, rooted legal tradition documented by oral histories (Napoleon 2005). When confronted with Indigenous oral histories that form the basis of sovereignty, Canada’s response has typically been to define Indigenous oral histories as merely *cultural*, and therefore irrelevant to the political questions of land and sovereignty (Andersen 2014, 100). This is consistent with Canada’s interpretation of its own cultural stories as *apolitical* – as separate from questions of power, sovereignty, and land. By unmapping Canada 150, I demonstrate that Canadian cultural stories are actually political. They are stories that exert symbolic and material power, seeking to constrain Indigenous sovereignty.

Employing theory by critical-race feminist, settler-colonial studies, and Indigenous studies scholars, this chapter theorizes relationships between nations, states, national celebrations, settler-colonialism, peoples, land, and stories before turning to methodology and methods. Who or what gives rise to the nation in settler-colonial contexts, and how is the nation connected to the state? Are national celebrations in settler-colonial contexts the expression of unity emerging from a distinct people? Or an exercise in state-building? How does land figure in



settler-colonial state stories? How are settler subjects constituted by nation-state stories, and how do they participate in dispossession? The stories advanced through settler-colonial national celebrations like Canada 150, I argue, have a constitutive function – they do things, actively shaping national belonging and exclusion, and coming to form part of subjects’ very understandings of themselves (Brodie 2015, 41). Subjects are made up of the stories that shape their very existence in the places they call home.

### **National Imaginations and State Stories**

Since Canada 150 is ostensibly a national celebration, I begin with the question of the nation in settler contexts. Mainstream theories of nation explain nations as: perennial collectives, the inevitable result of ancient ethnic allegiances (Özkirimli and Grosby, 2007); collective identities resulting from the continuation of longstanding myths, traditions, and symbols (Smith 1998); modernist “imagined communities”, the result of the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Anderson [1983] 2006); and/or modern constructions manufactured by elites (Conversi 2007; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). None of these theories easily explain either settler nations, which Audra Simpson (2014) argues are, in fact, “states that call themselves nations” (10), or Indigenous nations, which are not “imagined” in the same sense that modernist nations are imagined, nor are they essentially ancient or “pre-modern” (Andersen 2014, 97-98).

Some Indigenous scholars have identified common principles that tend to shape Indigenous nationhood and governance. For example, Hayden King (2018) writes that the principles of reciprocity and sustainability have governed Indigenous relations internally and internationally since before Europeans arrived on the continent. Sustainability means that “everything taken from the land must be given back, in one form or another,” while reciprocity

emphasizes the interdependence and interconnectedness of all living things (King 2018, 109-14). Andersen adds that Indigenous nations are generally more egalitarian, and conceive of the potential for shared jurisdictions and sovereignties (2014, 98).

Yet, attempting to define “Indigeneity” is itself an exercise fraught with power and contradiction, risking essentializing diverse Indigenous peoples and inadvertently reinforcing internal and external gendered power structures. That is, defining Indigenous nations as continuous reduces Indigeneity to something essentially pre-modern or inherently ethnic, and linking Indigeneity with particular traditions risks emphasizing a “logic of *preservation*” of such traditions above all else, leaving little room for dynamism, creativity, and new forms of resistance (Altamirano-Jiménez 2010, 112 emphasis original). As Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez (2010) writes, defining “Indigeneity” can help Indigenous peoples achieve recognition of their identities and ways of life; yet, it is crucial to emphasize that “Indigenous political identity neither results from the prior existence of an ancient culture nor from the set of traditional practices that bound people together” (113). Indigenous feminists stress the need for an analysis of nationalism that confronts the ways in which settler-colonialism is a gendered structure. A feminist analysis of Indigenous nations and nationalism, Altamirano-Jiménez argues, opens up the potential for a “more expansive notion of nationhood, one that goes beyond preservation” of a supposedly essential past (117). Relatedly, queer Indigenous approaches highlight “supportive, reciprocal, generative relationships” among genders, relationships that evade European and settler national imaginations (Simpson 2017, 134), structured as they are by patriarchy, heteronormativity, and trans-exclusion (Aizura, 2006; McClintock 1995; Nagel 1998; Stychin, 1998; Vacante, 2006; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989).

“Indigenous nations,” Simpson writes, “are enframed by settler states that call themselves nations” (10). Certainly, settler nations – if one can call them that – are rather fractious, fragile things (Andersen 2014, 96; Stasiulus and Jhappan 1995). There is very little that actually unites settler nations; diversity is “hard-wired into [Canada’s] settler-colonial foundations” (Brodie 2018, 21). Indeed, nation-ness in settler contexts is said to emerge from difference, a rhetorical strategy that obscures “points of strain, stress, and tension” (Andersen 2014, 96). While theories of the nation and nationalism diverge over the question of whether nations are modern creations of a political elite or more timeless expressions of ethnic commonalities (Conversi 2007), settler nations are most certainly modern, and most definitely imagined (Anderson [1983] 2006).

The term “nation-state” identifies a link between members of a national community and the institutions which govern them, but as Nira Yuval-Davis (1993) writes, this “overlap” is partial – not all citizens of a state ‘belong’ to the national community, the state does not confer citizenship equally, and not all citizens identify the state as legitimate (625). Without founding myths, settler-colonial nation-states lack the glue to “adhere[s] the citizen to the state” (Brodie 2002, 45). As such, the state becomes a storyteller, working to “reproduce the apparent naturalness of settler nations as culturally unified forms of individual and collective self-identification” (Andersen 2014, 93).

Its fragility notwithstanding, the Canadian nation-state has, like most modern states, both “material and symbolic authority” (Andersen 2014, 94). That is, states are not just defined by their monopoly over the use of force (Weber 1978), but by their capacity to govern the conduct of conduct or to shape ways of thinking and being (Rose and Miller 1992). Pierre Bourdieu (1991) adds that states are capable of “symbolic violence”, possessing “a singular ability to legitimize, as obvious or natural, what are in fact historical and thus ultimately arbitrary visions

of the world” (Andersen 2014, 95). The Canadian state’s violence is both material and symbolic, and Canadian landmark celebrations demonstrate the ways symbolic and material violence are intertwined.

National celebrations and commemorations like Canada 150 are events through which the settler state advances its normative national vision, often through the invention of traditions that seek to draw a direct line between a supposed shared past and a national present (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; see also Elgenius 2011, 94). Through the production of cultural memory – a form of collective memory constructed from the top-down – the state deploys the past selectively in service of its present aims (Assmann 2008, 106). As examples of cultural memory, national celebrations and commemorations often involve “active forgetting” through the erasure of histories of persecution and dispossession (Assmann 2008, 106).

In her study of national days in Europe, Gabriella Elgenius (2011) classifies national days as either pre-modern, modern, or post-imperial. Pre-modern national days, though transformed by modernity, have foundations in religious celebrations that pre-date the nation-state system. For example, St. Patrick’s Day began as a religious holiday in the eleventh century and transformed into a national day in the early twentieth century after Irish independence. Modern celebrations, emerging after the French Revolution, tend to celebrate republicanism (for example Bastille Day in France), constitutions (for example Constitution Day in Norway), or independence (for example Belgian Independence Day). Finally, post-imperial national days in Europe emerge after the First World War and tend to celebrate independence or commemorate war dead (for example Remembrance Sunday in Britain) (Elgenius 2011, 96-104). What all of these types of national days share is that they express “complex meanings related to nationhood

and are for this reason challenged, contested, disrupted, negotiated, mobilized and replaced during socio-political conflicts” (Elgenius 2011, 2).

In post-colonial contexts, national days tend to focus on marking independence; in Africa, for example, Independence Days are powerful symbols of nationhood and decolonization that few citizens ignore (Becker and Lentz 2013). National celebrations in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana, for example, evidence “a self-conscious and proud understanding of national days as celebrations that permeate the entire national territory” (N’Guessan, Lentz, and Gabriel 2017, 686). Indeed, while studies of national celebrations and commemorations tend to focus on their role in constructing links between a national past and present, Konstanze N’Guessan (2017) and her colleagues emphasize the need to study the ways that national celebrations and commemorations “bring into being national space” (687). National celebrations in Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso construct a national space by creating cohesive celebrations that occur simultaneously in distinct regions, symbolizing “the permeation of the national territory by the state” (N’Guessan, Lentz, and Gabriel 2017, 700).

While further comparative research is necessary in order to identify the differences between national celebrations in European, post-colonial, and settler-colonial contexts, research suggests that the themes of land and diversity take on increased symbolic importance in settler-colonial celebrations and commemorations. In her comparison of bicentennial celebrations in Australia and the United States, for example, Lynn Spillman (1997) notes that bicentennial celebrations in both countries mobilized the language of diversity as a “rhetorical strategy” to address differences that threatened national unity (Spillman 1997, 126). Land also featured in both bicentennial celebrations. The Australian bicentennial, for example, emphasize “epic and unlikely circumnavigations, voyages, and journeys” (Spillman 1997, 124). In the American

context, land and geography featured in local community celebrations, reflecting the importance of nature and wilderness in American vernacular, though land and geography were virtually absent in celebrations organized by governments (Spillman 1997, 124-25). National celebrations in settler-colonial contexts are events that reveal contestation over both material and symbolic aspects of nationhood. For example, Sam Hitchmough (2013) writes that Indigenous resistance to Columbus Day in Denver evidences intense conflicts “over identity and historical memory” (266). Yet, also at stake is land. Demand for land rights and treaty rights accompany activists’ calls to abolish Columbus Day (279).

### **Settler Structures of Feeling**

Among settlers, common-sense uses of the word “land” as a noun refer to: solid ground, its soil, and its resources; a portion of the former that one can purchase or own, especially a farm or ranch; or a country’s people (see for example Merriam-Webster 2021). In “Literacies of Land”, Kanien’kehá:ka (Mohawk) scholar Sandra Styers (2019) writes that, from an Indigenous perspective, Land is not just a physical, material, or geographical concept, but an epistemological and ontological concept *and* a living being (27).<sup>11</sup> Indigenous conceptions of and relations with land conceive of land as a source of knowledge, pedagogy, spirituality, and the subject of stories that teach people how to be:

Traditional knowledges were and continue to be transmitted through storying; shared values and beliefs, as well as land-centred activities, reflections, and observations – they are woven out of individual and collective experiences. (Styers 2019, 28).

For example, the Cree/Métis legal principle of *wahkohtowin* governs relations among all living things. *Wahkotowin* means that all are related, that all are animate and spiritual, and that it is

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<sup>11</sup> Styers capitalizes “Land” as a way of recognizing that Land is a living, knowing being to whom peoples are related (27).

important to maintain good relationships with all of existence, since all of existence is living and spiritual (Wildcat 2018, 14).

If relations are fundamental to Indigenous conceptions of land, then *non*-relations characterize settler conceptions of land. Mark Rifkin's (2011) concept of settler structures of feeling captures the ways that settler-colonialism as a structure of dispossession and elimination gives rise to particular "modes of feeling" among settlers regarding their entitlement to Indigenous land.<sup>12</sup> Settler structures of feeling are both a product of the settler colonial state and a reason the settler-colonial state persists. In Rifkin's words, "non-Native feeling takes shape within and helps naturalize the exertion of US imperial authority over Native peoples" (2011, 344). The concept of settler structures of feeling captures the ways structures of dispossession produce certain emotional orientations to the world, shaping individuals' ideological and political commitments (Mackey 2016, 19). Understanding settler feelings as structural means noticing the ways that settlers understand their "entitlement" to Indigenous lands as normal and natural, even when history demonstrates otherwise, and the ways that the state reinforces these feelings through assertions of control over Indigenous land (Rifkin 2011, 342). Rifkin summarizes settler structures of feeling as follows:

Processes and institutionalized frameworks of settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – gives rise to certain modes of feeling, and, reciprocally, particular affective formations among non-Natives normalize settler presence, privilege, and power. Understanding settlement as a structure of feeling entails asking how emotions, sensations, and psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of

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<sup>12</sup> I am interested here in settler structures of *feeling*, as opposed to settler *affect*. Whereas affect theorists understand affect as a "pre-cognitive sensory experience" – a bodily experience that is distinct from both thought and emotion – I am focused on discernable feelings and their social and political implications (Gregg and Seigworth 2010, 1-4). In *Depression: A Public Feeling*, Ann Cvetkovich (2012) explains that those interested in the social and political implications of feelings use the word feeling according to its commonsense usage (4). Whereas affect theorists, who understand affect as pre-cognitive "intensities", want to study affect as something separate from cognition, and therefore separate from ideology, I am interested in feelings and their relationships to ideology, and the ways in which feelings and emotions shape and are shaped by the social and political world (Ahmed 2014a, 8; Cvetkovich, 2012, 4; Leys, 2011).

exerting non-Native authority over Indigenous peoples, governance, and territoriality. (2011, 343)

State-led settler national celebrations like Canada 150, I contend, are primarily about storying settler non-relations to Indigenous land through the reproduction of settler structures of feeling about non-Indigenous entitlement to Indigenous land.

To say that feelings are structural is to acknowledge that feelings are not simply a product of the individual. In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Ahmed (2014a) argues that “emotions are not simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have”; rather, emotions shape the very constitution of the individual and the collective, not in the sense that all members of a group have “the same relationship to the feeling”, but in the sense that particular objects become imbued with emotions and circulate among groups (2014a, 10-11). Ahmed argues that emotions are world making, attaching to political and social structures and either keeping them in place or effecting transformation such that new worlds take shape. In Ahmed’s words: “Attention to emotions allows us to address the question of how subjects become invested in particular structures such that their demise is felt as a kind of living death” (2014a, 12). For settlers in Canada, this structure is the structure of settlement, which is presently giving way to Indigenous resistance and resurgence.

Moreton-Robinson (2015) explains that settler-colonial regimes, which she terms “postcolonizing” regimes, aim to sever Indigenous “ontological belonging”, rooted in “the inalienable nature of [their] relation to land”, in order to structure the nation as a distinctly *white* possession (10-11).<sup>13</sup> White possessive logics, Moreton-Robinson argues, produce and

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<sup>13</sup> Moreton-Robinson’s definition of “postcolonizing” regimes is similar to Wolfe’s conceptualization of settler-colonial regimes in that she uses it to “distinguish between the specificities of Indigenous/white settler societies such as Australia and those countries such as India and Algeria where the different specificities of historical experience are theorized within postcolonial studies” (10).



reproduce “commonsense knowledge” about who owns and belongs to the nation (2015, xii). The logic of the nation as a white possession is evident in discourse, ideology, and in policies that shape material relations, structuring race power relations and subjects’ identities (Moreton-Robinson 2015, xii). White people come to understand themselves as the rightful owners of the nation, because discourse, ideology, and policy conceive of white people as such – as owners and defenders of property, for instance. It is the white possessive, for example, that compelled Gerald Stanley to reach for a pistol when Colten Boushie and his friends arrived at his farm. White settlers feel the white possessive or “the right to be here and the sense of belonging it creates” on a deep and personal level, a feeling “enabled by structural conditions” (Moreton-Robinson 2015, 18).

Moreton-Robinson’s conceptualization of the settler-colonial nation as a white possession helps explain the relationship between settler-colonialism and race. Wolfe (2006) writes that “the primary motive for elimination is not *race* [...] but access to territory” (388). Yet, he notes that settler-colonialism employs “the organizing grammar of race” (Wolfe 2006, 387). The meaning of *race* has shifted over time and place, emerging in the eighteenth century as an account of supposedly essential differences among peoples, whereby European thinkers presumed that physical differences corresponded with innate differences in character, civilization, morality, and reason (Smith 2003, 110). In the nineteenth century, proclamations about the superiority of the “English race” collapsed race into nation, enabling European imperialism and colonialism (110-11). Such notions of “‘race’ difference and racial superiority,” Malinda S. Smith (2003) writes, were central to nation-building in nineteenth and twentieth-century Canada” (111). For example, the *Indian Act* creates the category of the “status Indian”, which flattens diversity among Indigenous peoples and enables genocide (Lawrence 2003, 5).

Whereas Indigeneity is defined and regulated in the *Indian Act* in order to enable elimination and access to territory, slavery, rooted in anti-Black racist beliefs about Black inferiority, has structured settler economies, shaped segregationist policies, and enables ongoing state violence through police brutality and incarceration (Cooper 2007; Maynard 2017). Fears of the so-called “yellow peril” shaped policies promoting Asian exclusion in the late-18<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (Smith 2003, 111). These racist and white supremacist power relations, which equate whiteness with superiority, remain “at the very heart of the white national imaginary and belonging” (Moreton-Robinson 2015, 18).

In the Canadian context, Thobani argues that the white national subject is “exalted above all others as the embodiment of the quintessential characteristics of the nation and the personification of its values, ethics, and civilizational mores” (2007, 3). The national subject’s exaltation is achieved in contrast to “dangerous internal foreigners” (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009) – the racialized immigrant and the “Indian” – who are conceived as threats to the nation (Thobani 2007, 4-5). Immigrants, living on contested Indigenous lands, occupy a complex position – not quite Canadian enough but also complicit in the dispossession of Indigenous peoples (Lawrence and Dua 2005, 134; Mackey 2016, 4; Thobani 2007, 94-95). Similarly, Moreton-Robinson argues that while non-white migrants’ understandings of their relationships to settler-colonial nations as home are shaped by the same logic of *terra nullius* that structures white settlers’ relations to home, ideas about home are also always shaped by “legal and social status” and “economic and political relations” that invest power in white subjectivity (Moreton-Robinson 2015, 9). Processes of racialization produce whiteness “as the pinnacle of its own racial hierarchy” (Moreton-Robinson 2015, xx).

Thobani's differentiation between citizenship *rights* – which define one's formal, legal relationship to the nation – and citizenship *rites* – affective expressions of belonging to/within the nation – is useful for understanding how subjects come to perceive of their own identities through these racial and colonial logics, and how the nation-state is an object imbued with feelings. Citizenship *rites* are repetitious, subtle, mundane, and banal expressions of attachment to the nation, such as national celebrations, national anthems, national holidays, and citizenship ceremonies (Thobani 2007, 79-80; see also Billig, 1995). In her study of disputes over land rights, Mackey (2016) asks: “Why do protesters against Indigenous land rights, in Canada and the United States, so often sing the national anthem? How do warlike images of ‘standing on guard’ for the nation [...] figure in anti-land rights sentiment?” (3). Thobani would describe these as expressions of citizenship rites. Yet citizenship rites include more “malevolent” rituals of racialized violence or expressions of hatred (Thobani 2007, 79). While such exclusionary citizenship *rites* are often “treated as isolated, unrelated, and based largely in individual ignorance”, these rites are actually “repetitive”, “ritualized” and state-sanctioned aspects of citizenship that are consistent with the broader project of Canadian nation-building (Thobani 2007, 79-80). “Identifying these practices as *rites* of citizenship”, which coexist with the various citizenship *rights*, according to Thobani, “directs attention to their important function in reinforcing notions of legitimate belonging” (2007, 80, emphasis added). These rights and rites of citizenship shape individuals' subjectivities, with individuals “com[ing] to conceive of their humanity largely within the context of this paradigm” (Thobani 2007, 78).

Tasha Hubbard's (2019) documentary *nîpawistamâsowin: We Will Stand Up* illustrates how settler-colonialism is a structure of elimination rooted in and productive of a logic of white possession. *nîpawistamâsowin* documents the aftermath of Colten Boushie's murder at the hands

of Gerald Stanley. Hubbard locates Boushie's tragic death within the long history of Indigenous dispossession and land theft at the hands of settlers, beginning the film with a representation of Cree history of Treaty 6, explaining how settlers have come to inhabit Saskatchewan. The film, told primarily through the lens of Jade Tootoosis, Boushie's cousin, is an indictment not only of the Canadian state, but also of the white possessive. In one scene a white man stands up at an RCMP-led townhall on rural crime and proclaims that rural white farmers are the true victims:

It doesn't matter if you're red, white, blue, green! Who cares what colour you are? It's not a race issue! It's a criminal against a victim, and we're victims and we can't do anything about it! That's what I'm trying to say. You know what, I'll spell it out right now, right here and everything. Probably 80% of us, farmers here, will do exactly what Gerald Stanley did. That's how it's gotta be. I gotta protect my stuff no matter what!

The farmer argues that settler-colonialism does not care about race, while at the same time arguing that his right to defend property is more important than Indigenous life. His ritual enactment of white possession – which he conceives as his citizenship right – evidences the interconnections between racism, settler-colonialism as a project of elimination, and the production of settler feelings in the form of anger that his property is apparently under threat (Moreton-Robinson 2015, xii; Wolfe 2006). In *Unsettled Expectations: Uncertainty, Land and Settler Decolonization*, Mackey (2016) asks: “how, on what grounds, do settlers feel entitled, settled, and certain about their right to own and control the territory?” (8). Mackey's research into movements to protect settler property from Indigenous land claims reveals that settler land defenders, such as the farmer who proclaims he will kill to defend his land, rely upon settler-colonial epistemologies about land and property and produce settler feelings of anger, fear, and uncertainty. Mackey writes that Indigenous land rights generate feelings of anger because of settlers' settled expectations: “settlers and the settler nation-state did, or believed it did, have certain and settled entitlement to the land taken from Indigenous peoples” (2016, 8). In other words, settlers believed in the white possessive.

## Multiculturalism and Diversity

Multiculturalism fits comfortably with the white possessive, since it is rooted in the notion that white people have a natural mandate to tolerate, regulate, and govern non-white citizens, demarcating the acceptable limits of difference (Brown 2008; Hage 2000, 17-18; Thobani 2007, 143; Moreton-Robinson 2015, 9). I travelled to Ottawa to observe the Canada Day celebrations on Parliament Hill in 2017. A settler there to take in the celebrations told me she objected to Indigenous acts of resistance and protest, such as die-ins and chants of “Home on Native Land” that she accurately recognized as hostility to Canada. Gesturing to the Indigenous dancers performing on stage during one of the moments designed to showcase Canadian diversity, she said: “*This*, I’m okay with”, highlighting settler tolerance for depoliticized representations of Indigeneity. Rifkin (2013) argues that these kinds of “tropes of Indianness” enable “Native presence to ‘figure’ in settler phenomenologies without ‘completely disrupting’ them” (332).

Settler colonial studies, critical-race, and critical whiteness approaches to multiculturalism challenge the conventional wisdom espoused by liberal multicultural theorists such as Will Kymlicka (1995) and Charles Taylor (1994) who argue that multiculturalism policy accommodates Canadian diversity, gives substance to individual rights, and provides vital forms of recognition. Ultimately, liberal multicultural theorists view multiculturalism policy as a sign of national progress. Contra Kymlicka and Taylor, critical-race feminist theorists argue that multiculturalism policy and diversity talk reproduces difference without attending to systemic racism (Bannerji 2000; Dhamoon 2009; Thobani 2007). For example, Thobani (2007) writes that multiculturalism policy is, in effect, appropriative, enabling “the nation-state to claim as part of its rightful property the cultural heritage and identity of every other nation in the world from which immigrants had arrived” (153). Richard Day (2000) argues that diversity discourse and

multiculturalism policy are not a “generous gift of liberal democracy”, but an attempt to produce a “fantasy of unity”; in other words, if ‘unity’ is not a goal, diversity “could not be a problem” in need of solving (9). In fact, Day locates attempts to theorize the ‘problem’ of diversity in ancient Greek thought. By tracing diversity’s journey to North America via the British and French, Day undermines the notion that diversity discourse and multiculturalism policy represent “a break with Canada’s colonial past” (2000, 7). As Brodie explains, it is “irrefutable” that Canada is diverse: over 600 distinct First Nations are at home on the land now known as Canada, and the settler-colonial national project has required waves of immigration to create an independent economy (2018, 21). So, as opposed to “a new solution to an ancient problem of diversity”, multiculturalism policy is actually “the most recent mode of reproduction and proliferation of that problem” (Day 2000, 3).

Ahmed also traces the work diversity does for institutions. Through diversity talk, Ahmed (2012) argues, bodies marked as *diverse* get assigned the work of making institutions more diverse. Diverse bodies always already embody diversity, doing the work of “providing an institution of whiteness with color” (4). This is very much the case in Canada Day celebrations, whereby “cultural” performances are juxtaposed with “Canadian” content, providing evidence of the nation’s tolerance for difference. In this sense, diversity gets stuck to certain bodies, helping shape institutions as bodies (4-9). When diversity is merely descriptive it does not do inclusive, anti-racist, or decolonial work (Brodie 2018, 22). Diversity-talk in historically white institutions – of which Canada is one – tends to maintain “white normativity” and race power structures (Smith 2018, 65). When diversity talk is not accompanied by meaningful challenges to systemic racism, and without changes in the composition of institutions reflective of the composition of the population, it has the effect of merely “diversifying whiteness” (Smith 2018, 65). Without

analyses of racism and colonialism, diversity has no “performative capacity” (65). Rita Dhamoon (2009) argues for a shift away from a depoliticized focus on culture, exemplified in the liberal multicultural theory of Taylor and Kymlicka, towards an analysis of identity and difference that takes unequal power relations rooted in race, class, colonialism, gender, and heteronormativity seriously (2). Otherwise, diversity talk could be characterized as a “settler move to innocence”: attempts to “reconcile settler guilt and complicity” without threatening “settler futurity”, which is rooted in the white possessive (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1).

Canada 150, I argue in the chapters that follow, manufactures strange encounters between national subjects and those marked as diverse, constituting national subjects and others: “given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject’s existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered” (Ahmed 2000, 7). The concepts of space and place, which are distinct from but related to land, pinpoint the ways geographies, in which people invest complex meanings, constitute and differentiate subjects. Whereas space refers to an empty, abstract, unoccupied area, place “is concrete, sensed, and grounded in lived experiences and realities” (Styres 2019, 26). The term “place” implies a space embedded with meaning, stories, and histories (26). The process of inhabiting or occupying a space and imbuing it with meaning, stories, relations, and knowledge renders it “*placeful*” (27). In *Strange Encounters*, Ahmed (2000) theorises a dual process of self- and stranger-making whereby the identification of strangers as those deemed out of place also makes some bodies “feel at home”; bodies, Ahmed writes “can extend themselves into spaces” but spaces also can become “extensions of bodies” (3). Strange encounters, Ahmed argues, define “the boundaries of who ‘we’ are in their very proximity” (3). In Chapter Four I argue that the Canada C3 expedition constructs a contact zone, which Mary Louise Pratt (1992) defines as the:

space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict. (6)

The concept of the “contact zone”, Pratt argues, “emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relationships to each other” (7). The notion of contact is fundamental to Ahmed’s theory in *The Promise of Happiness*: “we might say,” she writes, “that happiness is an orientation toward the objects we come into contact with” and that “[w]e move toward and away from objects through how we are affected by them” (2010, 24). This is what Ahmed means when she says that “[h]appiness shapes what coheres as a world” (2). In the case of the C3 Expedition, as I discuss in Chapter Four, diversity and reconciliation offer the promise of happiness.

In the following chapters, I argue that Canada 150 creates “contact zones” that invite settler subjects to imagine themselves relative to national ‘Others’ and create and determine the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the national community (Pratt 1992). Just as “[h]appiness shapes what coheres as a world,” these strange encounters and the feelings that circulate around them are world making. For example, as I discuss in Chapter Five, the reoccupation of Parliament Hill was a form of decolonial world-making, but on the lawn of Parliament Hill another world cohered at the same time – a world governed by settler structures of feeling.

### **Reconciliation as Restor(y)ing Happiness**

In *The Promise of Happiness*, Ahmed (2010) discusses the ways nations become happy objects – objects wherein happiness is expected to be found. Indices create representations of national happiness, an illusion that it is attainable. According to the 2020 *World Happiness Report*, for example, Canada is the eleventh happiest nation in the world (Helliwell et al. 2020, 20). Measurements of happiness tend to “[locate] happiness in certain places” such as marriage, families, and communities (Ahmed 2010, 7). The location of happiness within the nation implies



that to be affiliated with the nation is to be closer to happiness. If the nation is a happy object, then to find happiness the nation “is a way of belonging to an affective community” (Ahmed 2010, 38). Of the ways in which the affective value of happy objects can produce feelings of belonging or exclusion, Ahmed writes:

the social bond is binding insofar as feelings are deposited in the same object, which may then accumulate value as happy or unhappy objects: a group may come together by articulating love for the same things, and hate for the same things, even if that love and hate is not simply felt by all those who identify with the group. (2010, 38)

The notion that social bonds cohere through the collective attribution of happy feelings towards happy objects is useful for understanding national celebrations like Canada 150, which construct a happy imagined community (Anderson 1983). Happiness is “imagined as a social glue, as being what sticks people together” (Ahmed 2010, 121).

Even the history of empire is imagined as a happy history, according to Ahmed. Liberal philosophers justified British imperial pursuits through liberal utilitarian appeals to the principle of the “greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Ahmed 2010, 4). For example, John Stuart Mill argued that “the happiness of the human race would thus be prodigiously augmented” by the British colonial mission in India, because British ‘civilization’ would bring happiness to colonial subjects (124). By this logic, the “civilizing mission can be redescribed as a happiness mission”; that is, “in making happiness our end, we can impose our end” (125). Reimagining empire as a history of happiness – a history of diversity, intercultural contact, and collaboration – obscures its violence (130). Discourses of diversity enable the representation of histories of British imperial projects as happy histories, wherein “empire itself becomes a sign of a British tendency toward happy diversity; toward mixing, loving, and cohabitating with others” (130). Paradoxically, through these narratives, diversity “becomes a way of remembering empire” (131). In Ahmed’s words: “This memory of empire as happiness has even become a form of

nation building. To be a national subject might involve expressing happiness *about* imperial history” (130). As “a way of being aligned with others, of facing the right way,” happiness is a governing technique (45). Not only does the state remember empire happily, but citizens are socially compelled to do so as well: there is, Ahmed writes, “a social obligation to remember the history of empire as a history of happiness” – to refrain from being a feminist killjoy or an affect alien (130). Whereas Ahmed describes diversity as a discourse used to remember the British empire happily, in the Canadian context the discourse of diversity becomes a way of concealing ongoing colonialism. For example, in the next chapter I demonstrate that former Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812 portrays the war as symbolic of the origins of Canadian diversity, using the language of diversity to mask what was, in fact, an event preceding the adoption of a deliberate policy of settlement.

Ahmed argues that particular citizens have a particular duty – a “happiness duty” – to adhere to the nation-state (2010, 158). Migrants “as would-be-citizens,” she argues, are “increasingly bound by the happiness duty,” a duty:

not to speak about racism in the present, not to speak of the unhappiness of colonial histories, or of attachments that cannot be reconciled into the colorful diversity of the multicultural nation. The happiness duty for migrants means telling a certain story about your arrival as good, or the good of your arrival. The happiness duty is a positive duty to speak of what is good but can also be thought of as a negative duty not to speak of what is not good, not to speak from or out of unhappiness. (Ahmed 2010, 158)

National celebrations like Canada 150 provide an opportunity for national subjects and immigrants to perform the happiness duty, perhaps serving a function similar to citizenship ceremonies according to Bonnie Honig’s (2001) theorization of the role of performances of immigrants’ naturalizations. In fact, Canada Day 2017 featured a citizenship ceremony on Parliament Hill, a performance of national legitimacy. Because natural born citizens never express consent to be governed in a formal, legal process, Honig theorizes that the immigrant’s

naturalization through a citizenship ceremony serves as a “mechanism of legitimation” for the nation-state (75). Honig writes: “the liberal consenting immigrant addresses the need of a disaffected citizenry to experience its regime as choiceworthy, to see it through the eyes of still-encharmed newcomers” (75).

In Canada, the state’s project of compelling citizens to imagine national history happily is complicated by residential schooling, defined as a manifestation of genocide, and resulting intergenerational trauma (TRC 2015). One of the core themes guiding the Government of Canada’s approach to Canada 150, the Canadian state’s project of reconciliation acknowledges that Canada has periods of history that invoke trauma, sadness, grief, and pain and imagines that, through reconciliation, the nation can become happy once again. Glen Coulthard (2014) identifies three distinct ways that the language of reconciliation is used in the Canadian context: first, the process by which an Indigenous person re-establishes “a positive relation to self”; second, the process of “restoring estranged or damaged social and political relationships”, working “to overcome the debilitating pain, anger, and resentment that frequently persist in the wake of being injured or harmed by a perceived or real injustice”; and third, to refer to a process of rendering competing realities consistent with one another (107). The Canadian state’s reconciliatory project, Coulthard argues, takes the third form, focusing on the process of rendering “consistent Indigenous assertions of nationhood with the state’s unilateral assertion of sovereignty over Native peoples’ lands and populations”, because the state pursues reconciliation without decolonization (107). On this, Audra Simpson’s powerful words imprint on my brain: “The state is asking to forgive and to forget, with no land back, no justice and no peace” (2016, 7). In this context, Coulthard argues that *resentment* – not reconciliation – enables

decolonization, which I understand, following Tuck and Yang (2012), as a process that “brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (1). Coulthard writes:

Indigenous peoples’ individual and collective expressions of anger and resentment can help prompt the very forms of self-affirmative praxis that generate rehabilitated Indigenous subjectivities and decolonized forms of life in ways that the combined politics of recognition and reconciliation has so far proven itself incapable of doing. (2014, 109)

As “a politicized expression of Indigenous anger and outrage”, Coulthard argues that resentment is an appropriate response to ongoing settler-colonialism (109). It is fair to say that reconciliation does more for settlers than it does for Indigenous peoples. For settlers, reconciliation holds the promise of happiness, through a process of coming to terms with our “guilt and complicity” without threatening “settler futurity” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 3).

When Indigenous peoples embody and enact resentment, they become what Ahmed calls “affect aliens”, “out of line with an affective community” because they “do not experience pleasure from proximity to objects” – such as Canada – “that are attributed as being good” (2010, 41). The Affect Alien, Ahmed writes, “converts good feelings into bad” (49). Affect Aliens do this by turning happy objects like the nation-state into unhappy ones by naming national histories of colonial and racist violence (158).<sup>14</sup> Affect aliens are willful, when willfulness is defined “as the possibility of not being compelled by an external force” (Ahmed 2014b, 15). Willful subjects shape alternative worlds and futures. “Wishing, desiring, and willing,” Ahmed writes, “are activities that face a future in a certain way or even as the aim to bring something about” (2014b, 32). What kind of future to will, and how? This is a question to which I return in the conclusion to my dissertation. For now, I turn to questions of methodology and methods.

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<sup>14</sup> Ahmed traces the etymology of the word *unhappiness* to theorize the affect alien. Whereas *unhappiness* originally meant “causing misfortune or trouble,” it transformed to mean “‘miserable in lot or circumstances’ or ‘wretched in mind’”. The wretched, Ahmed notes, is a “stranger, exile, or banished person” (2010, 17).

## Unmapping Canada 150

These theorists inform my approach to unmapping Canada 150. Unmapping is an approach that seeks to denaturalize settler-colonial understandings of geography (Leroux 2016). If to *map* has been an imperial and colonial pursuit of representing geography such that Europeans can traverse, know, claim, and exploit land, *unmapping* disrupts this process, troubling imperial and colonial epistemologies about land, which underpin celebrations like Canada 150. As he deconstructs Canada's claim to sovereignty over the North-West, for example, Gaudry (2016) describes how explorers mapped Indigenous lands in order to support their claims:

In terms of the discovery of the North-West, it was first claimed by the British upon the formal discovery of the shores of Hudson Bay in 1668 by two French explorers, men commissioned by the English king to sail into the Bay and map the surrounding lands and river mouths. Medard des Groseilliers and Pierre-Esprit Radisson's act of mapping these shores and waterways constituted the ceremonial act of discovery and claimed underlying Crown title to the lands they contained. Although this initial mapping 'yielded no understanding of the interior or of the Native peoples who lived there,' the act of rendering unknown lands cognizant to European empires and renaming the landscape after British people and places provided the basis for claims of underlying title to the drainage under English law. As it was practiced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the discovery of the mouth of a river was equated with the discovery of all of the river's tributaries and the lands that drained into them. This ceremony of discovery, then, also resulted in a discovery claim to all lands that drained into these rivers, including those far away in the interior, most specifically, the North-West. (49-50)

Cartography was a means through which imperial powers supported their narratives of discovery and conquest. As Darryl Leroux (2016) explains, "maps are not simply transparent reflections of space", but a means through which imperial mapmakers objectify land, turning it into a thing that can be possessed (409). Maps, in this sense, are representations of "territories and tricks and lies of history" (Hogan quoted in Hunt and Stevenson 2017, 372). They are made up of stories that help settlers "avoid calling ourselves thieves" (Asch 2014, 73). Maps represent not just geography, but distinct "epistemological and ontological conceptions of land-use" (Hunt and

Stevenson 2017, 375). Today, mapmaking continues to serve as “a fundamental technique of shoring up dominant conceptualizations of the Canadian landscape” (Hunt and Stevenson 2017, 374). Through her analysis of Joy Harjo’s “cartographic poetry”, Mishuana Goeman (2012) demonstrates that stories, narratives, and language are forms of map-making themselves. Perhaps, then, Canada 150 can be understood as itself a form of map-making that seeks to reinforce settler conceptualizations of Canadian geography, and therefore state sovereignty. Unmapping Canada 150 requires “denaturaliz[ing]” its stories, documenting the “important relationship between identity and space” (Razack 2002, 5). However, as Dallas Hunt and Shaun A. Stevenson (2017) argue, to problematize “dominant cartographic discourses”, challenging settler geographies through “alternative mapping discourses”, is “necessary and yet insufficient” for decolonization (373). In the concluding chapter to this dissertation, I discuss the potential for willing decolonial worlds and alternative futures. Before turning to a discussion of the precise ways I unmapped Canada 150 and state stories, I unmap my father’s cartography through an autobiographical exercise – a way of situating myself in my research and of illustrating the ways that maps and their associated stories not only underpin Canadian claims to sovereignty, but come to constitute settler subjects.

In a letter dated 29 August 1990 to our relatives and close friends at home in England, my father wrote of our new life in the small, farming town of Shaunavon, Saskatchewan. His letter is a narrative of a new life in an idyllic place, containing vivid descriptions of the landscape; it is a happy story to which my family often turns to find meaning about why we call Canada home. His letter describes our arrival by plane in Saskatoon, from where we travelled by van to my aunt Jane’s home in Lafleche, arriving “at teatime after traversing high plains and an undulating –

almost lunar – landscape, dimpled with lakes frozen with twelve feet of ice”.<sup>15</sup> After a weekend in Lafleche, we drove in an old Buick to “our pretty town” by which my mother, apparently, “was very impressed”. “Like all prairie towns,” he writes, “it is visible from 10 miles away on the highway because it is punctuated on the landscape by huge, brightly painted orange grain elevators”. Only twenty minutes away, he writes, “is Pine Cree country park for camping fishing, hunting, and hiking” – a place my family spent many Saturdays, sledding in the winter, and playing hide and seek in the summer. Challenging the myth of a flat Saskatchewan he writes of “the Cypress Hills, 4500 feet up”, a place “for winter sports with cabins, chalets, hotel, indoor swimming, golf, and amusements”. He also boasts to my family at home in England of our view of the “mountains due west” and the sunsets, which “are always spectacular”. Interspersed among his vivid description of the landscape are accounts of his attempts to take up rural life by learning to hunt and fish, a summer outing to a lake, and trying new sports like “American football” and baseball. He describes my mother’s homesickness, and writes of how my brothers and I quickly found our place among the “hoards of itinerant children [who] flit from house to house”. “They are totally unbridled,” he writes, “and the mothers – known locally as ‘Moms’ keep vigil over the wandering bands”.

The map depicted on the next page is my father’s view of our town. It is an idyllic view, as his description of the town and the landscape demonstrate, and it is an orderly view, with each quadrant neatly demarcated by evenly spaced lines. His view of the town is a partial view from above (Haraway 1988). It is a view shaped by histories of contact, attempted conquest, settlement, and Indigenous resistance, though these histories are not represented. In a gesture

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<sup>15</sup> I have taken some editorial license, adding punctuation where my father did not.




Figure 1: Illustration, Map of Shaunavon, Saskatchewan



meant to be playful, he signs the map “John Speed, Anno 1610”, a reference to the English mapmaker.

He documents how we tried to settle in to life in Shaunavon, describing a transition from busy, industrial city life in England to small-town life in Saskatchewan. In *If This is Your Land, Where Are Your Stories*, Ted Chamberlin (2003) describes the mythology of North American “cowboy” life – the kind of life my father craved when he moved our family to Canada:

Those of us who wanted to be cowboys when we grew up didn’t simply want to be part of colonial expansion or frontier violence. We wanted something else, something much more deeply engrained not in the history of the West but in the imaginations of children. We wanted lives that were both determined and free, both defined by necessities and defiant of them, both middle class and outcast [...] And knowing in our souls that we lived in some story or another, we wanted to live in that story. Cowboy songs and stories were our constitutions. (36)

Shaunavon and the people who call it home are very much constituted by these cowboy stories “about ranchers and rodeos, pioneers and bootleggers, hardship and adventure” (Shaunavon 2020). Each summer we celebrated “Boomtown Days”, marking the year of Shaunavon’s founding when ambitious folks saw an opportunity to settle along the Canadian Pacific Railway. “When the CPR put land up for sale on the new town-site, men lined up for hours in Gull Lake,” according to the town’s website (Shaunavon 2020). Shaunavon’s settler-colonial mythology is right on the surface in this description of its history:

The establishment of the Town of Shaunavon is a tribute to the early settlers and entrepreneurs who had the foresight and courage to venture into unknown territory. Along with their desire to establish a new community, they brought along with them their own stories and adventures. Their spirit and faith helped to create a thriving community. Shaunavon continues to be a great place to live!

This settler-colonial mythology is constitutive of my own identity, because, indeed, Shaunavon was a great place for me to live. The Shaunavon Rodeo, which dates back to 1914 as a way for cowboys to “show off their skills”, was the highlight of our summers as children (Shaunavon

2020). To impress upon our relatives Shaunavon's importance in the world of cowboys, my father often bragged that the cowboys come to the Shaunavon Rodeo straight from the Calgary Stampede. Ted Chamberlin explains that such stories provide people with a narrative in which to "live" (2003, 36).

It was not until I read Kiera Ladner's (2009) "*Aysaka 'paykinit'*", which recounts the story of Mistahimaskwa's (Big Bear) resistance to the Canadian state in Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban's Canadian politics course that I really learned that my home was not mine. For example, Mistahimaskwa (Big Bear) envisioned a home for his people in the Cypress Hills, which for me were a place of recreation. Like many of my Canadian politics students today, learning that the "cowboy" narratives on which I was raised are stories which enable dispossession shook my identity and sense of self. One of my students recently described her own revelations about settler-colonialism as "disorienting" – a perfect description, I think, because learning that one is implicated in land theft shakes one's sense of relation to place and space.

Paulette Regan (2010) argues that it is possible to "unsettle the settler within" by looking "closely at ourselves and the collective responsibility we bear for the colonial status quo" (11-12). With Tuck and Yang's (2012) argument that decolonization is not a process of individual – or even collective – psychological or intellectual transformation in mind, I disagree with the notion that settlers can decolonize through critical self-reflection. Situating myself in my father's settler geography demonstrates that settler identity is not just state of feeling or way of thinking; though settler-colonialism does give rise to certain feelings, a settler is not defined by how they think or feel, but is a non-Indigenous person living on Indigenous land (Tuck and Yang 2012).

I locate myself within a settler geography because I subscribe to Donna Haraway's (1988) argument that feminist research and theorizing should proceed from the premise that it is always inevitably "partial" and "locatable" (584). That is, all views are views from somewhere. Beginning social science research with an acknowledgment of one's location has the potential, Haraway argues, to produce new forms of "critical knowledges sustaining webs of connections", which is to say, forms of solidarity (1988, 584). Scholarship rooted in situated knowledge provides "hope for transformation of systems of knowledge and ways of seeing" (Haraway 1988, 584). Fundamental to Haraway's thesis in "Situated Knowledges" is the argument that no researcher is distanced from that which they study. No human, and in fact no non-human, no matter their lens, can see the world with accuracy, objectivity, or precision. Just as there is no coherent definition of "Life", but only "ways of life", there are "specific *ways* of seeing" (Haraway 1988, 583, emphasis original).

Haraway argues for "politics and epistemologies of *location, positioning, and situating*" and of rejecting the pretention that one can "be *from everywhere* and so *nowhere*", that one can be "at a *distance* from that which they study", or that knowledge is "unlocatable" (1988, 581; 583; 589, emphasis added). I take Haraway's emphasis on location quite literally as a call to reflect on the ways that relationships to place shape ways of seeing. My own view is inevitably patriarchal – shaped by my father's – and colonial, shaped by the place I learned to call home, and my knowledge, in many ways, remains rooted in Saskatchewan, with its stories of cowboy life. Like Chamberlin, who writes of his own experience growing up in a frontier town on Blackfoot territory where the "ghosts of the past – cowboys and Indian, the broncs and the buffalo that were part of their story – were all around", my knowledge has been shaped by a "conquering gaze" (2003, 33). My autobiography is not intended as settler move to innocence,

but as an acknowledgment of my irreconcilable complicity in settler structures (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1). Yet, I pursue Haraway's call to try to reject the patriarchal and colonial gaze of the unmarked who is "Man and White", and instead adopt views from different angles, including from the periphery and from below, which are more likely to be "in on the god trick" – the notion that one can perceive the world objectively, with accuracy, and with precision (1988, 581-4).

The theories with which I am working are not straightforward, nor was my research process. Stéphanie Gaudet and Dominique Robert (2018) describe this kind of research as "iterative" and "nonlinear", wherein the problem, the question, and the hypothesis shift and change along the way. Certainly, my research does not follow a linear path of problem/question/hypothesis. I began in 2015 with a proposal to study the Harper Government's commemoration of the sesquicentennial of Confederation, very much concerned by its embrace of whiteness and militarism as Canadian symbols. At the time, the Harper Government was wrapping up a three-year long commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812, which it positioned as the starting point on the "Road to 2017". Under Harper, preparations for the sesquicentennial were animated by the theme "Strong, Proud, and Free" (Heritage Canada, 2015b). The official sesquicentennial website emphasized the North and Canada's "Founding Fathers". For example, visitors to the site were invited to explore the mysteries of the 1845 Franklin Expedition through a game called "Journey to the Arctic", and a government television advertisement emphasized the expedition's importance to Canadian collective memory and identity:

170 years ago, the inhabitants of the Arctic encountered explorers from another world, embarked on a quest to find the Northwest Passage. Sir John Franklin's expedition was lost. But his disappearance launched an era of exploration unparalleled in Arctic history. Franklin's legacy is one of perseverance, discovery, and innovation that lives

on today and has helped to keep our True North strong, proud and free. As we prepare to mark the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation, join us in celebrating Canada's North and our great legacy of discovery. (Canadian Heritage 2015c)

A Social Media hub featured links to more YouTube videos, including a television advertisement titled "Moments Frozen in Time" which portrayed a dramatized re-enactment of the Founding Fathers forming Confederation. As the images change from citizens celebrating the completion of the CPR to real footage of the men's gold medal hockey win in Vancouver 2010, the narrator asks, "how would they feel?" if they could see the country they built (Canadian Heritage 2015c).

The election of Trudeau's Liberals in 2015 on a platform celebrating diversity suggested a change of research direction, but I was skeptical that Trudeau's diversity narrative represented a fundamental departure from Harper's image of a white Canada. This skepticism led me to ask: are there any continuities in these national visions? How would Trudeau's government seek to transform Canada 150 to meet its pledges to celebrate diversity as Canada's strength, achieve reconciliation, and establish nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous peoples? Since settler-colonialism as a structure of dispossession persists even with the election of a government committed to diversity and reconciliation, I asked: how are discourses of diversity and reconciliation incorporated into state narratives in national celebrations despite ongoing colonialism? Given that settler-colonialism's primary motive is access to territory, I reflected on how land might figure (or not) in Canada 150, and how the language of diversity might actually enable settler-colonialism. Analyzing Harper's commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812 and its monument, *Triumph through Diversity*, located on Parliament Hill (Chapter Three), provided insight into the ways the language of diversity is mobilized in service of obscuring processes of settlement, merely diversifying whiteness (Smith 2018a).

Under Harper's leadership, the Government of Canada established funding for several "Signature Projects", participatory events with national scope. From these events, I purposively

selected the Canada C3 Expedition, an icebreaker travelling through the Northwest Passage on a journey of reconciliation in celebration of Confederation, as a case study. Studying this reconciliation icebreaker peopled with diverse Canadians seemed like a good way to analyze the transition from Harper's story of Canada as the Great White North to Trudeau's themes of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation. Chapter Four unmaps the Canada C3 Expedition, following the expedition from its inception, through its departure along the St. Lawrence River, north along the shores of Newfoundland, Labrador, and Nunavut, and finally, through the Northwest Passage. Unmapping the expedition illustrates that this "voyage of reconciliation" (Leblanc and Hannay, 2017) deploys discourses of diversity and reconciliation in service of the Canadian state. Chapter Five turns to the day itself, 1 July 2017, analyzing urban public space in Ottawa during the Canada 150 celebrations, asking: how does the state encourage and prohibit the occupation of public space during national celebrations? On what basis is one allowed to occupy public space during a national celebration? I demonstrate that through its approach to bodies occupying public spaces, the state constructed a *respectable* national subject against *dangerous* Indigenous subjects (Abu-Laban and Dhamoon 2009).

### *Discourse analysis*

To study how it is that national subjects come to understand themselves as legitimately occupying public space is to study governance, which occurs "whenever individuals and groups seek to shape their own conduct or the conduct of others" (Walters 2011, 11). The study of discourse is integral to understanding governance (Dean 2010, 37; Rose and Miller 1992). Discourse analysis is concerned with demonstrating and critiquing the ways language structures power relations and resistance, proceeding with skepticism regarding the ability of language to describe reality objectively (van Dijk 1993, 249; Wodak 2001, 2-3). I conducted discourse

analysis of government documents including: Speeches from the Throne, committee meeting minutes, ministry reports, Question Period debates, websites, videos, and documents acquired through access-to-information (ATI) requests. I regularly archived the Government of Canada's War of 1812 commemoration website, the "Road to 2017" website, the Canada 150 website, and the CanadaC3 website on the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, where users can save websites via their Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) to see how a website looked on any particular given day. Where relevant I also examined publicly available texts produced by affiliated organizations, such as the Canada C3 book, *Connecting Canadians: Coast to Coast to Coast* (2018), which includes photographs and essays from the expedition.

Following Trimble et al. (2015), I analyzed texts in three stages: first, I read documents and websites closely, paying particular attention to references to diversity, reconciliation, and land; second, I took notes identifying themes and questions emerging from the texts; third, I synthesized what I found. Adopting a flexible and iterative approach, I went back to the original texts and my notes over and over again throughout the process. When relevant, I supplemented and contextualized my own analysis by reading news media texts and social media posts to try to grasp how others read the same information. I have cited those news articles and social media posts throughout.

Speeches from the Throne, which summarize the Government of Canada's "perception of the 'state of the nation'" and present, in broad strokes, its plans and priorities (Brodie 2002, 44), provided context for making sense of each government's approach to Canada 150. Committee meeting minutes, ministry reports, and Question Period debates provide insight into government planning. To that end, I gathered and analyzed 468 pages of Standing Committee of Canadian Heritage meeting minutes from the 1<sup>st</sup> session of the 41<sup>st</sup> Parliament, wherein committee

members studied the sesquicentennial, hearing witness testimony. The committee summarized their findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a 74-page report, “Canada’s 150<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in 2017”. Yet, reading the raw committee notes was helpful because those notes showed me what the summary report omitted or emphasized. Next, reports on departmental plans and priorities (RPPs) and departmental performance reports (DPRs) provide insight into how government plans for the sesquicentennial materialized, and how Heritage Canada sought to translate its mandate into outcomes. I gathered DPRs and RPPs from the period I studied (2011-2017) as supplementary texts to account for the ways the ministry identified priorities and assessed outcomes. Meanwhile, searching for references to “1812”, “Confederation”, “sesquicentennial”, and “Canada 150” in Hansard provided insight into the partisan debates that structured commonsense understandings of the sesquicentennial. Yet, I found the carefully crafted messaging of government websites, advertisements, and speeches the most important for understanding how the language of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation are mobilized in the service of the settler-colonial nation state.

### *Access to Information*

Whereas public documents enable an analysis of the “front-stage” of governance via “carefully crafted” messaging, access to information (ATI) research provides insight into its “backstage” processes (Walby and Luscombe 2017, 624). Kevin Walby and Alex Luscombe (2017) describe ATI research as a way of getting “dirty data” – information typically concealed from public view, which could be embarrassing or scandalous (623). ATI documents are quasi-public; citizens and organizations can access documents from their governments – typically for a small fee – as such, data from ATI requests are “neither subject to extraordinary concealment efforts nor deliberately released” (Walby and Luscombe 2017, 624). At first glance, much of the



information contained in ATI documents is “seemingly innocuous”, but when subject to careful analysis and placed in broader context, they can reveal noteworthy patterns (Walby and Luscombe 2017, 624). ATI research should be informed by rich theory, conducted systematically, and with reflexivity, meaning with insight into one’s purpose and goals and with transparency about challenges and limitations (Walby and Luscombe 2017, 543).

ATI requests provide data for Chapters Four and Five, revealing government approaches to planning events, constructing key messaging, and managing resistance. I searched for relevant documents from different departments, including Canadian Heritage, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Public Safety, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Privy Council Office. I started by searching for requests already completed in order to expedite the process and gather existing data, using the search terms: “Canada 150”, “sesquicentennial”, “Signature Projects”, “Canada C3”, and “reoccupation”. In order to ensure that I did not miss available data, I also used terms I would not normally utilize, like “teepee protest” – a term used by settler journalists to describe the reoccupation of Parliament Hill between 28 June and 2 July 2017.

In total, I analyzed 2204 pages of ATI research, although most contain heavy redactions. This is one of the limitations of ATI research. The federal *Access to Information Act* (1985) promises “to enhance the accountability and transparency of federal institutions in order to promote an open and democratic society and to enable public debate on the conduct of those institutions”. Yet, Chapter 11 details reasons a ministry may deem specific information or documents exempt from disclosure (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2018). Redactions in the documents I obtained tended to be labeled either section 15(1), 19, or 21. Chapter 11, section 19 is straightforward, dealing with personal information, stipulating that information about an

identifiable individual shall be removed. Chapter 11, section 15(1) of the *Access to Information Act* deals with matters of defence, stipulating that information may be redacted if it negatively impacts “the conduct of international affairs”, “the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada”, or “the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities” (Information Commissioner of Canada 2020). Chapter 11, section 21 deals with “discretionary exemptions” (Information Commissioner of Canada 2020), stipulating that the head of a government institution may withhold records containing “advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of the Crown” (Canada 1985). While I find it troubling that some documents came back almost entirely redacted, I find redactions themselves illuminating. For instance, that documents concerning a peaceful demonstration by Indigenous peoples contains section 15(1) redactions, indicating that the demonstration was subject to analysis based on national security, is telling of the ways the Canadian state treats Indigenous peoples when they challenge narratives of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation. In fact, as I discuss in Chapter Five, discourses of security and diversity slide together as if seamlessly in government communication about the reoccupation of Parliament Hill.

### *Observation*

Because public texts and “dirty data” obscure so much, I also conducted public observational research in Ottawa during the Canada 150 celebrations between 28 June and 2 July 2017. I did not really have a plan when I landed in Ottawa, except to observe Canada 150 in Ottawa through the theory I had been reading. I had a sense that being in Ottawa, and on Parliament Hill specifically, would provide a different perspective than I would glean from being in Edmonton or watching the live show on CBC. Indeed, because I was in Ottawa I was able to observe firsthand the state’s securitization of Parliament Hill in general and willful subjects in

particular (Ahmed 2014). Observational research involves, quite simply, “monitoring and noting conditions as they exist in the field” (Allen 2017). I spent four days observing Parliament Hill as musicians rehearsed, tourists milled about the area with cameras, security officials erected barricades, and as people organized in resistance. I spent 1 July on the Hill, observing the space, the securitization of Indigenous water protectors within it, and the development of two crowds: a crowd there to celebrate, and a group gathered in resistance. This kind of observational research enabled me to capture the ways people moved through space, such as: two white women clad in red t-shirts taking each other’s photos in front of the tipi and then returning to the party; or, a settler woman who supposed the tipi was a tourist attraction and tried to enter without invitation or permission. Because my observational research was public, it meets the criteria outlined in Article 2.3 of the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* describing research that is not subject to research ethics board review.<sup>16</sup> To be sure, however, I have taken care not to write about anything related to any particular individual or group that is not already documented in publicly available sources. That is, observational research informs thick descriptions of space and place, whereas publicly available documents and ATI requests comprise the bulk of my analysis of what happened on Parliament Hill.

## **Conclusion**

In the sense that landmark celebrations provide stories to shape state claims to sovereignty and settlers’ understandings of home, they are constitutions – not in the sense, of course, of being legal texts that establish a nation’s governing rules, but in the sense of shaping

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<sup>16</sup> According to Article 2.3 of the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* (TCPS 2) (2018), “REB review is not required for research involving the observation of people in public places where: a) it does not involve any intervention staged by the researcher, or direct interaction with the individuals or groups; b) individuals or groups targeted for observation have no reasonable expectation of privacy; and c) any dissemination of research results does not allow identification of specific individuals”.

worlds, people, and their relations to each other (Brodie 2015, 42). The chapters that follow provide different examples of ways landmark celebrations articulate settler stories. In the present moment, these stories focus on diversity, multiculturalism, peaceful contact, and inclusion. In the next chapter, I study the Harper Government's commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812, positioned as the starting point on the "Road to 2017". I demonstrate that, under Harper, the Government of Canada told a story of the War of 1812 as the origins of Canadian diversity, providing a lens through which settlers can view what was, in fact, the beginning of a deliberate policy of settlement.

### CHAPTER THREE: “TRIUMPH THROUGH DIVERSITY”? THE WAR OF 1812 COMMEMORATION AND SETTLER-COLONIAL MYTHMAKING

The way a nation remembers is as much about shaping the present and future as it is about commemorating the past (Whitaker 2014, 218). In present debates over memorializing figures like John A. Macdonald, conservatives tend to argue that removing statues and renaming buildings represents an erasure of his role as a nation builder and founder. Critical perspectives on Macdonald, in contrast, demand an acknowledgement that his role as a founding father is inseparable from his role as an architect of genocide against Indigenous peoples (Gaudry 2017). In the aftermath of the TRC’s final report, debates about memorializing Macdonald tend to focus on how to square Macdonald’s legacy with truth and reconciliation. This chapter engages in debates about commemoration, reconciliation, settler-colonialism, race, space, and national identity by analyzing former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s \$28 million commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812 from 2012 to 2015, which his government positioned as the starting point on the “Road to 2017”. Ian McKay and Jamie Swift (2012) situate the 1812 commemoration as part of a broader attempt by the Harper government to “rebrand” Canada as a white, British “Warrior Nation,” overwriting Canada’s national identity as peaceful, tolerant, and multicultural (see also Macklin 2017).<sup>17</sup> For Conservatives, the Warrior Nation narrative, McKay and Swift (2012) argue, served as the antidote to a nation that had supposedly become obsessed with human rights, diversity, and inclusion. As I show in this chapter, however, the 1812 commemoration incorporated that very language. That is, the 1812

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<sup>17</sup> Robert Teigrob’s (2016) intervention makes the case convincingly that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Warrior Nation narrative is not new but, rather, a continuation of long-held attitudes toward the importance of war to Canadian nation making. That is, Teigrob (2016, 303, emphasis original) identifies a paradox: on the one hand, English Canadians are invested in a national mythology of peacekeeping, viewing Canada as less hawkish than their American neighbours, while, on the other hand, Canadian historians, politicians, journalists, and poets seem to engage in a perpetual quest to identify “the” war that “*made* Canada.”

commemoration relied upon discourses of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation at the same time as it told a story of Canada as a white settler-colonial nation-state. In the context of intense debates about race, nation, and commemoration, this finding indicates that attempts at more “diverse” and “inclusive” commemorations may nonetheless perpetuate settler-colonial logic, and end up only “diversifying whiteness” (Smith 2018a).

Through the 1812 commemoration, the Harper government told a story of the ways in which “those of diverse backgrounds and various regions came together to fight for Canada” (Canada 2011). Emphasizing the contributions of English, French, First Nations, Métis, and Black soldiers, Harper described 1812 as a story of “the origins of the Canada we know today: an independent and free country united under the Crown with a strong respect for diversity” (Canada 2015). At the same time as the commemoration shored up a white, British, masculine identity, then, it folded Indigenous people and people of colour into the national narrative as founders, portraying diversity as a defining and ever-present feature of the Canadian nation-state. Implying that the War of 1812 not only “made Canada” but that it *made Canada diverse*, the commemoration erased processes of settler-colonial violence and anti-Black racism (Teigrob 2016, 303–8; emphasis in original). While studies of the 1812 commemoration have critiqued its characterization of Canada as fundamentally white, British, and militaristic (see, for example, Frenette 2014; McKay and Swift 2012; Macklin 2017; Sjolander 2014; Staring 2013; Whitaker 2014), few have examined the story that the commemoration tells about people of colour and settler-Indigenous relationships. Mackey’s (2005) examination of local 1812 re-enactments in 1992 provides important context for understanding the bicentennial commemoration: 1812 re-enactments, she argues, evidenced a “paradox of shifting back-and-forth between the erasure and

the appropriation of Native people and culture, in the service of the project of nation-building and identity construction” (111).

While the commemoration’s steep price tag and Warrior Nation narrative sparked controversy, public opinion research on the 1812 commemoration shows that only 20 percent of Canadians and 31 percent of Québeckers opposed the commemoration. That said, an overwhelming majority expressed a preference for a commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* or the centennial of women’s suffrage (Wallace 2013). As Canadians reflect on the nature of national commemorations, this chapter asks whether commemorations can be more diverse, inclusive, or reconciliatory in the context of ongoing colonialism.

This chapter proceeds in three stages. First, I consider the Conservative government’s narration of 1812 as a Canadian origin story portraying French, English, First Nations, Métis, and Black soldiers as united in a common goal—a narrative that, I argue, obscures colonization in its emphasis on collaboration. Acknowledging the inseparability of settler-colonialism and anti-Black racism in Canada (Maynard 2017), I then turn to representations of Black soldiers and Canada’s “strong respect for diversity” (Canada 2015). Drawing upon critical-race feminist critiques of diversity discourses, I note that representations of Black soldiers in the 1812 commemoration narrate a vision of racial harmony while obscuring racist power structures. I follow this critique of discourses of racial harmony into an analysis of the 1812 monument, “Triumph through Diversity,” unveiled in late 2015 on Parliament Hill. The first monument to feature non-white figures on Parliament Hill, I read this sculpture within the racialized and gendered national memorial landscape, arguing that it fails to unsettle settler colonial whiteness despite its depiction of diverse figures. My analysis of “Triumph Through Diversity” in its

racial-spatial context sets the stage for the following chapter, which considers the ways that these feel-good nationalist discourses of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation in Canada 150 circulate alongside settler-colonial understandings of space and land. Studying Harper's 1812 commemoration provides a reference point for Trudeau's iteration of Canada 150, focused as it was on diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation.

### **War of 1812: Collaboration or Colonization?**

Remarks from then-Heritage Minister James Moore in an October 2011 meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage illustrate the ways the commemoration at once erases and appropriates Indigenous peoples, portraying them as subordinate to Canadian state sovereignty, meanwhile implying that, to use Harper's own words, "Canada has no history of colonialism" (quoted in Coulthard 2014, 106):

Without the War of 1812, Canada as we know it would not exist. Without the War of 1812, the French fact in our country would not exist as it does today. Without the War of 1812, the identity of our aboriginal population would have been fundamentally changed. The War of 1812 paved the way for Confederation. (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011)

According to 1812.gc.ca, the war "helped define who we are today, what side of the border we live on, and which flag we salute" (Canada 2015). Of course, this notion does not withstand scrutiny if we consider that "Canada" did not exist as it does today in 1812; rather, it consisted of two British-governed colonies, Upper and Lower Canada. To claim otherwise overstates the importance of British and American nationalism in the war, according to Alan Taylor (2010, 8). National loyalties on both sides of the border were in flux in 1812. With similar languages and cultures, Taylor argues convincingly that the war can be characterized as a civil war between the Americans and the British, who were nationally similar, but ideologically divided, peoples (7–8;



see also Morton 2012, 321).<sup>18</sup> While the reasons behind America’s decision to invade British North America are complex, America did not invade to quell growing linguistic and ethnic diversity, as the Government of Canada’s narrative implies. Rather, the war was—like most wars—about land, as two colonial powers—Britain and America—fought for colonial control of North America. In particular, the Americans sought to prevent the formation of a proposed Indigenous confederacy on the traditional territory of the Cree, Algonquin, Mohawk, Onodaga, Oneida, Cayuga, Seneca, Shawnee, and Métis peoples, a movement led by Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa (Brownlie 2012).<sup>19</sup>

Identifying 1812 as a war between Canadians and Americans over ideas about diversity is a distortion of history in service of the present. While Canadian memory of 1812 shifts according to the present political context, 1812 has tended to function as a “usable past” that reinforces colonial, gendered, and racialized power structures (Coates and Morgan 2002; Knowles 1997).<sup>20</sup> For example, in the decades following the war, Shawnee warrior Tecumseh, who died in 1813 defending Indigenous land, was celebrated by the British, who appropriated him as a national hero and depicted him through the colonial gaze as a “Noble Savage” (Brownlie 2012, 40). Ideas of military service as inherently masculine meant that Laura Secord, on the other hand, did not experience recognition for her contribution. It was not until 1861 that members of the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire and the Women’s Canadian Historical Society argued

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<sup>18</sup> The reasons for the American decision to wage war on the British in North America are complex. The American invasion was, for some, a reaction to British attempts to impede European access to the American market and a protest of the British naval practice of impressment, wherein British soldiers would forcibly recruit men by boarding merchant ships and “pressing” men into naval service (Hickey 2012, 969–70; Taylor 2010, 102–6).

<sup>19</sup> The website [Native-land.ca](http://Native-land.ca) represents multiple traditional territories in this region, documenting the ways they overlap each other and the Canada/US border.

<sup>20</sup> An example from the summer of 2018 offers further evidence of the ways Canadians continue to deploy memories of 1812 in service of present politics. In the midst of North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations, *former* US President Donald Trump identified Canada as a security threat, asking: “Didn’t you guys burn down the White House?” Canadians were quick to retort that it was, in fact, the British who had done so. Paradoxically, just a few years prior, Canada’s prime minister was commemorating that very war as a national origin story.

successfully for her commemoration on imperialist feminist grounds (Coates and Morgan 2002, 131; Knowles 1997, 125–30). Meanwhile, the United Empire Loyalist Association seized on the mythology that Loyalist men, despite comprising a small proportion of Upper Canada’s population in 1812, “provided the backbone of the country’s defense” (Coates and Morgan 2002, 121; Knowles 1997, 160). The war provided a “usable past” for United Empire Loyalists to create cohesion and perpetuate conservative ideology (Knowles 1997, 20). Alan Gordon’s (2015) examination of historian Ernest A. Cruikshank’s work in the early twentieth century reveals that the “English-Canadian imperialist” attributed national significance to local Niagara battles, laying the groundwork for Harper’s narrative that the War of 1812 led directly to Confederation (24).

In fact, as Alan Gordon (2015) points out, the Harper government’s narrative repeated early twentieth-century mythologies popularized by Cruikshank. According to Harper, “June 2012 will mark 200 years since the declaration of the War of 1812—a war that saw Aboriginal peoples, local and volunteer militias, and English and French-speaking regiments fight together to save Canada from American invasion” (Canada 2015). This origin story about diverse peoples coming together to face a common enemy is an inspiring one, but, devoid of context, it oversimplifies the alliance between Six Nations warriors and the British military, a temporary alliance that was the result of particular historical, political, and economic conditions that predated the war and that remained grounded in Indigenous sovereignty.<sup>21</sup> Assimilating the Six Nations mission to protect Indigenous land from American encroachment, a television

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<sup>21</sup> In their quest to control North America, the British were constrained by Indigenous sovereignty. In the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the British recognized Indigenous sovereignty and agreed to a nation-to-nation relationship (Borrows 2010, 133). In 1812, the British were a minority in North America and therefore depended on First Nations leaders like Tecumseh as both British and First Nations resisted American expansion (Taylor 2010, 15–28).

advertisement that ran throughout the bicentennial commemoration depicts Six Nations warriors and British soldiers fighting “side-by-side” to win “the fight for Canada” (Canada 2012).

By emphasizing the collaboration between Indigenous peoples and the British during 1812, the commemoration overlooks the immediate post-1812 context in which the British pursued settlement and assimilation. As Robin J. Brownlie (2012, 43) writes, widespread acknowledgement of the crucial Indigenous alliance led by Tecumseh “did nothing to save their lands from the settlers” after the war. By arguing that “Without the War of 1812, aboriginal Canadians [sic] would have probably suffered the same future as the American Indians did,” former Heritage Minister James Moore implies that Indigenous peoples in Canada did not experience the same settler-colonial violence and attempts at total assimilation that Indigenous peoples did south of the border (Canadian Heritage Committee 2011a). In fact, as the British and Americans negotiated the Treaty of Ghent to end the war, the British abandoned their First Nations allies and agreed with the Americans to re-establish the pre-war border, reneging on their support for an Indigenous “buffer state” (Taylor 2010, 415–17). By 1830, Upper Canada had an “Indian department,” and church missions encouraged Indigenous peoples to “abandon their lifeways in favour of Christianity” (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996, 213–14). By 1847, Upper Canada’s school superintendent, Egerton Ryerson, was recommending the removal of Indigenous children from their homes and placing them into residential schools (TRC 2015, 54). In 1850, the newly founded province of Canada institutionalized the reserve system (Lawrence 2003, 7).

In its throne speech to introduce the first session of the forty-first Parliament in 2011, the Harper government uncritically positions 1812 as the natural precursor to settlement by following the announcement of the 1812 commemoration with a promise to celebrate “the 200th

anniversary of the Selkirk Settlement, which marks the founding of Manitoba and the early days of the modern West” (Canada 2013). The Hudson’s Bay Company’s transfer of 116,000 square miles in the Red River region to the Scottish Earl of Selkirk in 1811 represents “a first attempt at settler-colonial ascendancy in the North-West” (Gaudry 2016, 52). While the Harper Government traces a linear history of national progress from the War of 1812 to the emergence of the Canadian West, Gaudry (2016) demonstrates that the Selkirk Settlement represents a very weak claim to legitimate European governance in the Red River region. Métis resistance to Selkirk’s colonial incursions into their homeland forced Selkirk to enter into a treaty relationship with Saulteaux and Cree bands on whose lands he sought to govern. The resulting 1817 Selkirk Treaty was, from Saulteaux and Cree perspectives, a rental agreement, and from Selkirk’s perspective an agreement on British sovereignty in the region (Gaudry 2016, 53). Historical records reveal more support for the notion of a rental agreement establishing “the Cree and Saulteaux signatories as the landlords of the Red River region” (Gaudry 2016, 55). Canada must have understood the weakness of the Selkirk Treaty from a settler-colonial perspective when it negotiated Treaty 1 in 1871, Gaudry points out, because Canada “chose to negotiate as if there was no prior treaty relationship”. If the Selkirk Treaty had “extinguished Indian title and asserted Crown sovereignty in the Red River valley”, then Treaty 1 would have been redundant (Gaudry 2016, 55). All of this is to say that the narrative the Harper Government weaves about 1812 as a natural precursor to the legitimate ascendancy of Europeans in Western Canada is quite dubious – in Gaudry’s words, a “fantasy” (2016, 47). Placing the Selkirk Settlement on the “Road to 2017” fits within a broader Canadian narrative claiming that all Canadians are essentially Métis, a story that depends upon the racialization of Métis as ‘mixed’ and erases Métis identities, histories, resistance to the Canadian state, and, ultimately *Metis Indigeneity*

(Anderson 2014; Gaudry 2013). The narrative that Canada is essentially a Métis nation, exemplified in John Ralston Saul's *A Fair Country*, emphasizes stories of "cultural mixing in the early moments of Canadian history", incorporating Métis identities into the Canadian project and bypassing the uncomfortable fact of colonial exploitation (Gaudry 2013, 67). Claims that Canada is the result of 'mixing' between Europeans and Indigenous peoples function to:

re-imagine the history of Canadian colonialism as a series of Canadian-Indigenous interactions that built a *new society*, prefiguring, or even avoiding, an exploitative colonial relationship. (Gaudry 2013, 67, emphasis original)

Resisting incorporation into the Canadian project, Indigenous peoples have asserted their own stories about their roles in Canadian history. Importantly, Cecilia Morgan (2015) demonstrates that Six Nations leaders' demands for inclusion in Canadian national commemorations have served as a form of resistance to the *Indian Act*. In fact, Haudenosaunee leaders have been using 1812 commemorations as opportunities to resist settler colonialism since the war's centennial (Young 2015). At the 1912 centennial commemoration of the Battle of Queenston Heights, for example, Mohawk leader Alexander G. Smith reminded the audience, "part of the reason the Six Nations had sided with the British was the promise of 'perpetual independence and self-government'" (quoted in Young 2015, 274). One hundred years later, on the occasion of the bicentennial, the Six Nations Legacy Consortium partnered with Heritage Canada and the Niagara Parks Commission to create the *Landscape of Nations: The Six Nations and Native Allies Commemorative Memorial* at Queenston Heights. The Six Nations criticized the intensification of settler-colonial processes following 1812. The website notes, for example, that, following the war, Indigenous peoples "faced neglect and ... practices and policies designed to strip them of their lands, resources, and cultures" (Landscape of Nations 2018). At an October 2012 ceremony at Rideau Hall honouring First Nations and Métis contributions to the war, Ontario Regional Chief Isadore Day, who was then chief of Serpent River First Nation, spoke

back to the government and the Crown: “It is you that we struggle against, the Crown, in many cases, and the federal government. It is you we now fight in order to eliminate poverty and pain in our people” (Aboriginal Peoples Television Network 2012).

As Morgan (2015) writes, demands for recognition of Six Nations’ contributions to Canadian history call for more “intricate” understandings of nationhood and respect for treaties (89). Harper’s reduction of Indigenous history to Canadian history, on the other hand, erases colonization. Of course, this narrative is consistent with Harper’s assertion that “Canada has no history of colonialism” (quoted in Coulthard 2014, 106). Stories that depict Indigenous peoples in “supportive roles in defining Canada” make “*Canadian-Canadians*” feel good, however, because they tell a story of a Canada that is “tolerant, just, and impartial” and more benevolent than its southern neighbour (Mackey 2005, 51).

### **The Origins of Diversity?**

Black Lives Matter activists across Canada challenge this myth of Canadian racial harmony and benevolence. Desmond Cole opens *The Skin We’re In* (2020) with a quotation from fifteen-year-old Michelle Erin Hopkins, who had recently migrated to Toronto from Tanzania:

People who refuse to acknowledge the fact that Canada has its race problems compare us a lot to America. [...] They say, ‘Canada’s not like America. Why are you bringing American problems into Canada? Why are you crossing borders? But that’s the thing – Black lives have no borders. We exist everywhere regardless of the fact they may not want us to. (3)

Here, Hopkins diagnoses Canadian “race manners”, a polite reluctance to talk about racism in general, and anti-Black racism in particular, rooted in the myth that, unlike the United States, Canada does not have a racism problem (Smith 2003, 123). The War of 1812 commemoration reflects Canadian race manners, mobilizing the story of Richard Pierpoint as evidence that 1812 represents the origins of Canada’s “ethnic diversity” (Canada 2015), invoking Blackness and

diversity meanwhile erasing any evidence of racism. Because settler colonialism as a structure of dispossession cannot be detached from anti-Blackness, overwriting settler colonialism as a structure requires erasing slavery and its legacies of anti-Black racism (Maynard 2017). In Canada, this has occurred through the production of the myth of Canada as a “safe haven” for former slaves fleeing the United States, a narrative that plays out in the 1812 commemoration through the Pierpoint’s story (Cooper 2007).

Addressing the House of Commons in February 2013, for instance, then Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Michael Chong (2011) asked his peers to recognize Black History Month by “salut[ing] black heroes like Richard Pierpoint, who so long ago made great contributions to Canada to make us the nation we are today.” Chong’s (2011) account of Pierpoint’s life and contributions is typical of the government’s narrative, which is also featured on the government’s 1812 website and in a Heritage Minute:

Mr. Speaker, in 1760 a 16 year-old boy who would become a Canadian hero was captured in Senegal and sold as a slave to a British officer in New England.

When Americans rose against the Crown in 1775, Richard Pierpoint joined the Loyalists, serving in the Butler’s Rangers Regiment in Fort Niagara, where hundreds of black volunteers fought for Canada in decisive battles like the battle for Queenston Heights.

During the War of 1812, Major General Sir Isaac Brock approved Richard’s request to form an all [B]lack army. More than 30 of the 100 free [B]lack men in Upper Canada joined the Colour Corps to protect Canada. With courage and under danger they built Fort Mississauga. For his war contribution Richard was given 100 acres in Wellington County, next to my hometown of Fergus, where he lived until his death in 1837.

As we celebrate Black History Month, we all salute black heroes like Richard Pierpoint, who so long ago made great contributions to Canada to make us the nation we are today.

By celebrating Pierpoint’s loyalty to the British Crown, the government perpetuates the image of an ideal racialized subject who is faithful to the Empire. Further, government narratives about Pierpoint describe conditions of racial harmony and Canadian benevolence. Research into Pierpoint’s life reveals a more complex picture of his experience. After settling in Upper Canada

at the end of the American War of Independence, the Upper Canadian government denied a request by Pierpoint and his peers to establish Black communities, encouraging Black people to disperse in order to prevent the emergence of “Black enclaves” (Newfield 2009, 32). Moreover, Brock actually denied Pierpoint’s initial proposal for a “Coloured Corps” to fight in 1812, a fact either downplayed or erased in government representations of him (Newfield 2009, 32). When Brock did approve the formation of a “Coloured Corps” following the American invasion, the role of commander went not to Pierpoint himself but, rather, to a local white man (Newfield 2009, 32). Further, when the war ended, the one hundred acres that the government offered Black soldiers was half of what white soldiers received. Once again, the government prevented Black veterans from establishing Black communities, making life in Upper Canada a struggle. This led Pierpoint to ask the government for permission to return to Senegal in 1821 (Newfield 2009, 38–39). He was denied.

By erasing particular elements of Pierpoint’s experience, the government narrates a feel-good story, reinforcing the myth of Canada as a haven for former slaves, popularized through tales of the Underground Railroad. The Harper government’s 1812 narrative implies that the war’s outcome allowed diversity to flourish in British North America. According to the 1812.gc.ca website, “under the Crown, Canada’s society retained its linguistic and ethnic diversity, in contrast to the greater conformity demanded by the American Republic” (Canada 2015).

Though Canadians tend to imagine that anti-Black racism is an American problem, Cooper (2006) writes that “slavery was as Canadian as it was American”. For example, the 1790 *Imperial Act* encouraged Brits living in America to move to British North America by allowing the importation of Black people as slaves “duty free” (Cooper 2006, 100, 91). After Lieutenant



Governor John Simcoe's unsuccessful attempt to abolish slavery in Upper Canada in 1793, some Black people fled south to America in a reverse underground railroad, eventually fighting against Canada in the War of 1812 (Cooper 2006, 86–103). The story of a Black man who found freedom in British North America, fought in defence of that land, and was rewarded for his loyalty does much more to legitimize the settler-colonial nation-state than the more complex and violent reality, though. After the war, many Black refugees settled in Nova Scotia, where white politicians attempted to contain, regulate, and displace African Nova Scotian communities (Nelson 2002, 215). At the federal level, politicians aimed to limit Black immigration in 1910 on the grounds that some immigrants may be “deemed unsuitable” due to their “peculiar customs, habits, [or] modes of life” (Smith 2003, 116). Former New Democratic Party MP Megan Leslie (2011) critiqued the irony of the government's commemoration of 1812 in a 2011 speech in the House of Commons: at the same time that the Government of Canada commemorated 1812 as the “origins of Canadian diversity”, it passed an omnibus crime bill that would increase the over-incarceration of Black people in Canadian prisons. Examining the government's selective deployment of Pierpoint's story draws attention to the ways in which diversity can serve the purpose of legitimizing institutions without addressing racism (Ahmed 2012) – merely “diversifying whiteness” (Smith 2018a, 55). Mobilizing Pierpoint as representative of “a model Blackness” (Clarke quoted in Smith 2018b), the Government of Canada's representation of Pierpoint tells a single story, erasing “Black multiplicity” (Smith 2018b). In the next section, I study the 1812 monument, *Triumph through Diversity*, unveiled on Parliament Hill in 2015, demonstrating how it diversifies Ottawa's national symbolic landscape, leaving whiteness intact.



Figure 2: Photo, *Triumph Through Diversity*, credit: Richard Pilon

### **The Monument: *Triumph through Diversity***

Ottawa’s symbolic landscape conveys a relationship between state and nation; it is both the centre of state power and a “national sacred space” (Osborne 2001, 55–56). In the heart of Ottawa, monuments are pedagogic, dynamic, and affectively loaded sites, teaching visitors about dominant national narratives (Davidson 2014). In its call to artists to submit designs for the 1812 monument, the National Capital Commission emphasized its affective potential: “The monument will be compelling and moving for visitors and residents alike.” That Canadians find themselves in the midst of debates about monuments and their roles in shaping the national community is suggestive of their affective, pedagogic, and political significance. As activists call for monuments to perpetrators of colonial violence like John A. Macdonald and General Charles Cornwallis in Halifax to come down, it is worth examining what kinds of monuments are going up. The 1812 monument, *Triumph through Diversity*, promotes an image of Canada as racially

and culturally harmonious, but, drawing upon Mary Jo Nadeau's (2013) reading of the Famous Five monument, I argue that it must be read within the racialized and gendered landscape that is Parliament Hill and within the broader context of ongoing colonialism. In this context, as well as in the context of the 1812 commemoration more broadly, the monument, depicted above, arguably fails in the same way that monuments to Macdonald fail, by obscuring the colonial past and present.

The monument, according to its sculptor, Adrienne Alison, "depicts ordinary people who defended Canada, allowing it to become the country it is today" (Canada 2017c). Unlike other 1812 monuments, then, it does not celebrate the typical 1812 heroes such as Sir Isaac Brock, Tecumseh, Laura Secord, and Charles de Salaberry. The monument is the only one on Parliament Hill to depict "ordinary" people. A "veritable national pantheon of heroes," Parliament Hill is home to monuments to former prime ministers, founding fathers, former prime ministers, Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth II, and, with the addition of the Women Are Persons monument in 2009, mothers of confederation (Gordon and Osborne 2004, 619; see also Nadeau 2013, 186). Monuments on "the Hill" are mostly white and male. *Triumph through Diversity*, on the other hand, depicts seven figures—a Mohawk warrior, a Royal Navy sailor, a French-Canadian militiaman, a woman nurse, a Métis fighter, a British regular, and a Canadian militiaman—who represent the diverse people who worked together in the "fight for Canada." "This," Alison says, "is the true meaning of triumph through diversity" (Canada 2017b).

Yet, by examining the ways in which dominant perspectives on the Famous Five monument "neutralized" their racist legacy, Nadeau invites readers to consider the ways in which gestures toward a more inclusive national symbolic landscape can function to uphold gendered whiteness (2013, 178). While controversy has circulated around the monument given that the

members of the Famous Five were vocal proponents of eugenics, Nadeau documents the ways that present multicultural discourses were invoked as a means of “cleansing the colonial present”—that is, the logic goes that the Famous Five were racist because the past was not multicultural (178). *Triumph through Diversity* and the 1812 commemoration take this multicultural logic a step further by rewriting the past according to present multicultural scripts. By implying that Canada has always been embracing of diversity and unified in a common goal, the monument erases racist power structures and white washes the past. At the same time, the monument normalizes white masculinity. In her artist’s description, Alison notes that the monument reaches “its crescendo with the Canadian militiaman, who expresses his triumph by raising his arm in a victory salute” (Canada 2017c). By elevating the Canadian militiaman above all others in a monument about diversity, the monument sets “diverse” figures apart from “Canadian-Canadians” (Mackey 2005). In its exaltation of the white national subject, the monument fails to unsettle settler-colonial whiteness at the same time as it purports to celebrate diverse figures. Examining the monument within its racial and spatial context in the centre of Ottawa’s symbolic national landscape punctuates this point.

Ottawa’s symbolic national landscape combines commemorations of “the ‘bleeding’ of the nation” with symbols of state power (Gordon and Osborne 2004, 620). The 1812 monument overlooks Confederation Square and the National War Memorial, which Gordon and Osborne argue is the “symbolic centre of an imagined and performed Canada” (619). Like *Triumph through Diversity*, the National War Memorial depicts ordinary people—in this case, young men—defending Canada. As the soldiers pass through the memorial’s impressive twenty-one-metre arch, they represent Canada’s birth as a nation; below, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier lies on what is considered “sacred ground” (Szpunar 2010, 382–83).

Capital cities like Ottawa, Tonya Davidson and Nicolas Scott (2016) write, “are designed to act as metonyms for their nations” (2). Gordon and Osborne (2004) similarly argue that nation builders design capital cities to convey the relationship between state governance, citizens, and the national community (621). As Julie Tomiak (2016) reminds her readers, however, Ottawa’s city space evokes a particular kind of governance— settler colonial governance. Atop Nepean Point overlooking Parliament Hill and the Ottawa River, for example, a statue to French explorer Samuel de Champlain offers “a visual endorsement of the narrative of Canada as terra nullius” (Davidson 2014, 113). From 1924 until its removal in 1996, a small statue of an unnamed Indigenous scout sat at its base, evidencing a sense of “colonial nostalgia,” which was defined as a simultaneous “longing for an imagined past of White supremacy” and a fear that “this supremacy is slipping away” (111). At the same time as the scout symbolized Indigenous presence, a plaque below Champlain’s monument informs visitors that he was the “first great Canadian” (111). In 1996, then Assembly of First Nations Chief Ovide Mercredi organized a successful campaign to move the scout on the basis of his subordinate position at the feet of Champlain. The scout has since been relocated to Major’s Hill Park and named “Gichi Zibi Omaami Winini Anishinaabe” (“The Algonquin People”) (Tomiak 2016, 124). This example serves as a reminder that Ottawa is “contested racial-colonial space” on Algonquin territory (Nadeau 2013, 191).

Indeed, as I discuss in Chapter Five, Indigenous resistance demonstrates that Ottawa, including the *Triumph through Diversity* monument, cannot be read singularly as “settled, stable and knowable” space (Tomiak 2016, 9). Ottawa’s national memorial landscape is “the terrain of persistent anti-colonial Indigenous struggles for life, land, and self-determination,” and it remains to be seen how the 1812 monument might be taken up as a site of resistance (Tomiak

2016, 9). In fact, on 28 June 2017, just days before Canada's 150th anniversary celebrations would commence, the Bawating Water Protectors of Sault Ste. Marie organized a reoccupation of Parliament Hill. As water protectors, elders, and allies carried tipi poles through the east gates of Parliament Hill, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) met them with violence. Just steps from the 1812 monument, which commemorates their ancestors' roles in the "fight for Canada" (Canada 2012), the RCMP arrested ten people, eventually releasing them with trespassing notices—an accusation that did not hold up given that Parliament Hill is on unceded Algonquin land. In this context, the water protectors succeeded in asserting their sovereignty over this symbolically dense settler-colonial nationalist space by raising the tipi on the lawn of Parliament Hill where it stayed throughout Canada's 150th anniversary celebrations.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has raised the question of whether a commemoration that purports to be diverse, inclusive, or reconciliatory can achieve those values and goals when that commemoration is led by a settler-colonial nation-state. In reflecting on the 1812 commemoration, the Canadian Heritage Committee (2015) identified its "inclusivity" as a good practice to carry forward into future commemorations. According to the Canadian Heritage Committee, the 1812 commemoration gave "Aboriginal and other Canadians the chance to add their own history to the national narrative" (iv). This identification of inclusion as a good practice demonstrates the ways in which moves toward inclusive nationalist practices add "diversity" without challenging the fundamental structures that create national exclusion. Can a monument succeed at promoting diversity on stolen land? Indeed, the question of land is central to current debates around nation and commemoration. In the context of contestations over land, *Triumph through Diversity* arguably represents a move to settler innocence, appropriating the

histories of sovereign Indigenous nations in the service of producing collective Canadian identity (Tuck and Yang 2012).

The 1812 commemoration, I contend, is illustrative of the ways in which conservatism deploys progressive language in order to remain relevant (Saurette and Gordon, 2016). Thinking about the ways conservative national narratives mobilize the language of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation troubles attempts to distinguish clearly between conservative and liberal progressive stories of Canada. That is, the 2015 Canadian federal election has been read as a rejection of Harper's xenophobia in favour of Trudeau's celebration of diversity as Canada's strength (Brodie 2018; Macklin 2017). For Audrey Macklin (2017), the shift from a liberal progressive narrative to a white Warrior Nation narrative and back again raises questions about "the durability of the nation-building narrative" (303). Macklin (2017) asks, "Do the Conservative deviations expose its fragility, or do the Liberal restorations speak to its resilience?" (303). I demonstrate here that, in fact, Harper's conservative narrative reflects *continuities* as well as deviations from Canadians' self-image as a liberal multicultural nation, speaking to the resilience of the settler-colonial national narrative. In making this argument, I indicate the importance of looking beyond ideology and the Liberal/Conservative alteration that has characterized the Canadian party system since Confederation, and instead for examining closely the stickiness of settler-colonial affects that together comprise citizenship and belonging in settler-colonial societies such as Canada. Very ordinary settler states of feeling are what comprise the "glue" that adheres the citizen to the nation-state (Rifkin, 2011). In the next chapter, I consider how colonial logics of discovery and exploration and narratives of diversity and reconciliation coalesce in the Canada C3 expedition, a Canada 150 "Signature Project", funded under the Harper Conservatives and executed by the Trudeau Liberals. As my research

demonstrates, the language of diversity and reconciliation can easily be grafted onto projects conceived in the service of settler nationalism and state sovereignty.



## CHAPTER FOUR: “WE THE NORTH? DIVERSITY & RECONCILIATION IN THE ARCTIC”

“There have been moments [...] when I feel like I am a token here. And it's no different from when I went to high school in Ottawa.’ At the same time, she went on, ‘every time I wake up and get up, it’s an act of resistance. Because I am the face of resisting colonialism.”

Aluki Kotierk, Nunavut Tunngavik President and C3 participant (quoted in Brown 2017)

Canada C3 Expedition participants were gathered to talk about reconciliation in the Downie/Wenjack Legacy Room aboard the Polar Prince icebreaker when Aluki Kotierk shifted the conversation to racism and resistance.<sup>22</sup> Tense discussions ensued, in which some C3 participants refused to admit they had white privilege (Brown 2017). In response to this conflict, Inuit and people of colour (POC) participants held their own closed-door meeting to write a manifesto forming “a list of instructions for white Canada” that they read to the rest of the ship (Brown 2017; see also Thein 2017).<sup>23</sup> Kotierk’s comments evidence the distinction critical Indigenous scholars make between reconciliation on one hand, and anti-racism, resistance, and decolonization on the other (Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014). Like Kotierk, Inuk lawyer and Leg 8 C3 participant Robert Comeau also refused the language of reconciliation:

I do not get up in the morning wondering how I will achieve this reconciliation, because every part of my life is reconciliation. In the North, we have other priorities: to put food

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<sup>22</sup> Canada C3 was a Canada 150 “Signature Project” created by Students on Ice (SOI). The Department of Canadian Heritage set aside \$79-million of the \$200-million in government funding allocated for Canada 150 to fund 38 “Signature Projects”, defined as “large-scale, participation-oriented activities, of national scope and with high impact” (Government of Canada, 2016; Leblanc and Hannay 2017). The Canada C3 Expedition is the lengthiest of the Canada 150 Signature Projects, lasting a full 150 days, embarking from Toronto, proceeding down the St. Lawrence River on 1 June 2017 and arriving in Victoria’s Inner Harbour on 28 October 2017. The Downie/Wenjack Legacy Room, named after Chanie Wenjack and Gord Downie, provided a dedicated space for conversations about reconciliation. I return to a more thorough discussion of the room towards the end of this chapter.

<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, the list did not make it into Geoff Green’s (2018) Canada C3 coffee table book, *Canada C3: Connecting Canadians Coast to Coast to Coast*.

on the table, increase our education rates, help to be proud of being Inuit. (quoted in Green 2018, 155)

Evidently, some of the expedition's Inuk and POC participants found it difficult to square C3's reconciliatory mission with the realities of ongoing racism and colonialism, including aboard the ship itself, where, Ian Brown (2017) reports, some white settlers left the room when discussions of racism, colonialism, and genocide entered. Madeleine Thein writes of conversations in the Downie/Wenjack room:

the inequities and the deep untruths of our larger society do not disappear once we step onto a ship in the Arctic; we bring them with us, consciously or not, and they set down roots in this new space." (quoted in Green 2018, 153)

This chapter analyzes discourses of reconciliation and diversity when South meets North on the Canada C3 Expedition, led by the Students on Ice Foundation (SOI).<sup>24</sup> Described by its creator, Canadian explorer Geoff Green (2018), as a "voyage of reconciliation", the C3 Expedition is a rich case study for analyzing the complex relationships between Canadian storytelling and state-building and Indigenous sovereignty. Mapping Canada literally and metaphorically, SOI invited Canadians to follow along C3's journey via the C3 Interactive Map as it navigated Canada's coastlines, but it also mapped Canada through stories and photographs shared on social media and compiled in a book, *Canada C3: Connecting Canadians Coast to Coast to Coast* (2018). Canada C3 is not just a celebratory boat trip around the country for Canada's sesquicentennial – it is an act of storying Canadian sovereignty.

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<sup>24</sup> According to its mandate, SOI "educates the world's youth about the importance of the Polar regions, supports them in their continued personal and professional growth and inspires and catalyses initiatives, that contribute to global sustainability" (SOI 2020). Embarking on regular scientific expeditions to the Arctic, SOI "takes youth from around the world on life changing journeys to the polar regions" (SOI 2020). SOI expeditions seek to introduce students to "a broad spectrum of dialogue related to these regions ranging from arts and culture, history and politics, science and sustainable development, glaciology and climate change, economy, governance, and geopolitics and many other polar topics" (SOI 2020). SOI seeks to "engage in processes of discovery, fact-finding, analysis, synthesis, reflection, and idea development", connecting "youth to peers, elders, scientists, experts, artists, musicians, photographers, journalists, business and opinion leaders, and many others" (SOI 2020).

As I demonstrate in this chapter, the C3 Expedition was conceived as a project supportive of the Harper Government's Arctic sovereignty agenda. Designed to tell a story of Canadian sovereignty in a contested region, the expedition was rebranded as a "voyage of reconciliation" only after the election of the Trudeau Liberals, reflecting the new government's emphasis on diversity, reconciliation, and inclusion. That the language of reconciliation could be appended to a project designed to tell a story of Canadian sovereignty is indicative of the Canadian state's approach to reconciliation as a discourse that evades reimagination of Canadian statehood or material change (Coulthard 2015). The language of diversity is, likewise, an afterthought incorporated into the C3 Expedition after the change in government. Indeed, reconciliation and diversity discourses slide together in southerners' stories told from aboard the C3 Expedition, as if encounters between diverse peoples are themselves a form of reconciliatory work. This slippage signals a need to critique these as interrelated discourses that eschew systemic transformation. Indeed, I understand the expedition as productive of a "contact zone", which Mary Louise Pratt (1992) defines as a space "where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination" (4). The "contact zone", Pratt writes, denotes "the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect" (1992, 7).

Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships in the North are not characterized by the same settler-colonial structures that underpin relations in the South. Inuit have leveraged their authority as inhabitants of the Arctic since time immemorial, supporting Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic but also negotiating and asserting self-governance through, for instance, the Government of Nunavut, wherein Inuit are a political majority (Christie 2011; Hicks and White 2015). As opposed to "storytellers meeting storytellers", to quote Gordon Christie (2011,

344), however, the Canada C3 Expedition, as an act of storying sovereignty, positions Inuit as a diverse Canadian people, subsuming Inuit sovereignty. As I discuss below, southerners' stories of the expedition describe Inuit knowledges and ways of life as "strange" or exotic objects for consumption (Ahmed 2000; hooks 1992), a trope consistent with southern Canadians' approaches to Inuit and their knowledge more broadly. Positioning Inuit as a diverse Canadian people and emphasizing a narrative of reconciliation told from the perspectives of non-Indigenous southerners, C3 obscures stories of Inuit sovereignty, which arises from "their status as separate meaning-generating communities" and provide an alternate understanding of relations between humans and non-humans (Christie 2011, 340). Focusing on narratives is important, Christie argues, because stories provide the frameworks through which people act. Today, as Arctic states grapple for power in Inuit homelands, deconstructing competing stories of sovereignty is not just a creative intellectual exercise, but a vital political act necessary for resisting a potential second stage of colonization in the North (Christie 2011).

## **Historical Context**

Inuit and *qallunaat* interactions in the Arctic do not "fit neatly into existing models of colonial dominance" (Davis-Fisch 2012, 23). European explorers made contact with Inuit in the sixteenth century, but contact varied from place to place, and tended to be focused on "trade and curiosity" (Mitchell 1996, 49-50). In the eighteenth century, the "international scientific expedition" became "one of Europe's proudest and most conspicuous instruments of expansion" (Pratt 1992, 23). Explorers' letters, essays, and narratives produced the genre of travel writing, capturing the attention of the European upper class and offering "powerful ideational and ideological apparatuses through which European citizenries related themselves to other parts of the world" (Pratt 1992, 23). Although it had clear ideological, political, economic, and cultural

implications, early Arctic exploration was “discursively constructed as a purely scientific enterprise, not explicitly linked to the colonization of the region’s peoples or to the extraction of natural resources” (Davis-Fisch 2012, 23). Explorers told stories of “the Arctic as both the home of howling, exotic wilderness (the source of ‘strange’ knowledge and ancient wisdom) and a semi-domestic, ‘friendly’ space” (Pálsson 2004, 381). They wrote of “an Arctic terra incognita”, representing the North as “isolated and inhospitable”, and depicting Inuit communities as “primitive” (Stuhl 2016, 3).

Meanwhile, navigational expeditions sought to chart new shipping routes. In particular, the search for the Northwest Passage “captured the imagination of the Western public until the twentieth century” (Pálsson 2004, 367). Determined to chart a shipping route through the Arctic towards Asia, the British government commissioned the Franklin Expedition under the leadership of Sir John Franklin in 1845 (Pálsson 2004, 367). The Expedition’s two ships *HMS Erebus* and *HMS Terror* became trapped in ice sometime between May 1847 and April 1848. All of the crew members perished and left few written records behind (Davis-Fisch 2012, 8-9).

European whaling began in the region in the eighteenth century, but it was not until the late-nineteenth century, with the emergence of the Victorian whalebone corset, that the colonial government in Canada began to see the Arctic as home to potentially valuable resources (Pálsson 2004, 365; Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 3). As in the South, the presence of European explorers and whalers in the Arctic impacted Inuit women’s lives in particular, as European men depended on Inuit women for survival and companionship (Pálsson 2004). Canada began, albeit slowly and reactively, to assert sovereignty claims in the Arctic in the nineteenth century (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 14; Stuhl 2016, 3). For Canada in the post-Confederation moment, the North was a perceived as a wasteland; as such, the land and its original inhabitants were an

afterthought. At the same time, the presence of European whalers and explorers had “disastrous consequences” for Inuit communities (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 14; see also Stuhl 2016, 54). Macdonald was focused on expanding Confederation westward, and when the Hudson’s Bay Company transferred the Northwest to Canada in 1870, the commissioner of the Northwest Territories governed from afar, leaving the job of colonial governance to the Royal North-West Mounted Police (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 14; see also Gaudry 2016). After Britain transferred the Arctic Islands to Canada in 1880, the government reacted to the presence of (other) ‘foreigners’ in the region, using expeditions designed to “show the flag” as a means to assert sovereignty (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 14-15).

In the early twentieth century, American and European geographers and explorers raced to discover “unclaimed” lands: “Redrawing maps to display their discoveries, they sprinkled the names of [expedition] sponsors on bays, islands, straits, and narrows” (Stuhl 2016, 3). In 1913, as the Americans rushed for gold, Canada sponsored the Canadian Arctic Expedition, the “largest and most expensive government-sponsored scientific expedition ever to study northern North America”, and a moment the Harper Government marked on the “Road to 2017” (Stuhl 2016, 39-45). The Arctic Expedition is one example of the ways science has supported colonial ambitions in the Arctic, with scientific “concepts and research practices [accompanying] efforts to conquer, cajole, civilize, capitalize, consume, and conserve the far north” (Stuhl 2016, 2-3). Early-twentieth century scientific expeditions to the Arctic incorporated “social concerns, political dreams, [and] academic interests” (Stuhl 2016, 40). In the early twentieth century, “imperial development hinged on territorial expansion”, so expeditions like this one “became, for the Dominion, another means of ascension” (Stuhl 2016, 40). As the international community

began to reject outright conquest after the First World War, “expeditions gave new meaning to the ways southern bureaucracies acquired the Arctic” (Stuhl 2016, 58).

By the 1920s, the Canadian government sought to confirm its control over the North, expanding the RCMP north in an effort to establish colonial governance and “buttress sovereignty” (Shackleton 2012, 5; see also Hird 2016). The Canadian government established RCMP posts across the Eastern Arctic in the Baffin Region in the 1920s, announcing “its presence to Inuit, traders, explorers, and foreigners” and expanding “the moral and civil codes of Canada north” (Shackleton 2012, 6). The RCMP remained the primary colonial administrators in the Eastern Arctic until the 1960s (Shackleton 2012, 5-8).

Following the discovery of oil in the Mackenzie Delta in the Northwest Territories, the Canadian state and oil companies came to view the Arctic as a potentially lucrative zone. In the post-war period until the 1960s, the Canadian state sought to expand its “involvement in the lives of Inuit” to justify oil exploration and mining, increasing its military, government, and police presence (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 4; Stuhl 2016, 91; see also Qikiqtani Inuit Association 2013, 19). In the 1950s, the Government of Canada relocated Inuit families from their homes in Inukjuak and Pond Inlet to remote settlements in the High Arctic in order to serve as “human flagpoles” symbolizing Canadian sovereignty (Wakeham 2014, 85; see also Qikiqtani Inuit Association 2013, Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 7). While the government justified the relocations as a response to genuine concerns about Inukjuamiut welfare, Tester and Kulchyski (1994) conclude that the government was motivated by a complex combination of concern for asserting sovereignty in the uncertain Cold War era and colonial attempts at assimilation via ‘welfare’ (see also Qikiqtani Inuit Association 2013). In relocating Inuit communities and implanting paternalistic colonial governance schemes, the Canadian state attempted to “organize Inuit life

according to Western ideas about the family, work, community, and social relations” (Qikiqtani Inuit Association 2013; Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 3). The state separated families, supplanting people in a different climate with improper shelter and clothing, little food, and colonial conservational regulations which forbade Inuit from hunting musk ox and placed restrictions on hunting caribou (Wakeham 2014, 91).

In 1953, the federal government institutionalized colonial governance North of 60 through the creation of an “Eskimo Branch” in the Department of Indian Affairs and Natural Resources (Hird 2016, 27; Mitchell 1996, 151). Canada established Inuvik in 1959 as an administrative centre, linking “the country’s northern oil resources and its southern-based population to create a more expansive geographic and political territory” (Stuhl 2016, 106). Generally, though, in the mid-century Canadian national policy in the North was incoherent, and Inuit wellbeing was not considered a priority (Mitchell 1996, 152). The Canadian state was ambivalent about whether to pursue a policy of assimilation in order to make Inuit more productive subjects according to a Western, capitalist logic, or to “subsidize” Inuit so that they may continue to “occupy” land Canada deemed barren (Mitchell 1996, 154). The United States pursued a policy of assimilation in Alaska, while Denmark viewed Inuit as unassimilable. As Marybelle Mitchell (1996) writes, Canada:

wavered somewhere between these two ideals, believing on the one hand that the culture was doomed and that the people must be assimilated, and, on the other, that they should be helped to live off the land in ways that would not unduly violate the traditional culture and the romantic illusion of the ‘noble savage’. (154)

Top of mind for government officials, however, was how to keep welfare spending down. The solution was the creation of cooperatives, which came to support Canadian national identity construction and the formation of Inuit political organizations.



The logic guiding the Canadian state's formation and funding of Inuit cooperatives was to introduce Inuit to a capitalist mode of production in order to reduce their state dependence (Mitchell 1996, 154). Arts and crafts cooperatives proved important for Inuit and Canada. Inuit art, very popular with southerners, became a "central feature of Canadian national identity" just as Canada was in the midst of trying to find symbols to represent itself to the world (Mitchell 1996, 174). Coops were both a source of conflict and empowerment for Inuit. As a source of conflict, they have led to economic disparity among Inuit, emphasized the nuclear family unit, and changed food systems (Mitchell 1996, 299). Moreover, as soapstone carvings "quickly became an icon of Canadian nationalism," Inuit became dependent on the whims of a southern market (Mitchell 1996, 330). As a source of empowerment, art coops have provided a sense of collective identity a "power base" for organizing for self-government (Mitchell 1996, 178-80).

The first time Inuit from across the Arctic came together in one place, for example, was the Frobisher Bay Cooperative Conference in 1963, an event Mitchell calls the "birth of a pan-Arctic movement" (1996, 323). In the 1970s, Inuit began forming formal political organizations, like the ITK in 1971, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) in 1977. In 1973, the Government of Canada acknowledged its responsibility to negotiate treaties where no agreements existed, leading to the negotiation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in Nunavik in 1975, the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act in Inuvialuit in 1984, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in 1993, and the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement in Nunatsiavut in 2005. The Canadian state was highly motivated to reach these settlements, given competing claims to the region and its potential for lucrative resource development (Mitchell 1996, 343). In the case of Nunavut, Inuit achieved a "'public' government structured and operating according to Inuit ways and values" (Hick and White 2015, 3). As Jessica Shadian

(2014) explains, Inuit sovereignty is not dependent on secession, statehood, or ownership of land, but in the creation of an Inuit polity, a “political collectivity” informing decision-making “across state borders” (16). Shadian argues that as a polity with self-determination, Inuit challenge political scientists’ definitions of what counts as sovereignty (2014, 10).

Yet, the extractive industry and neoliberal forces complicate Inuit self-government and self-determination in the Arctic (Altamirano- Jiménez 2004; Kuokkanen 2018). Resource development pressures from governments and industry place Northern Indigenous peoples in a bind, leaving them asking how they can “be faithful to their cultures and integrated to the global market at the same time?” (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004, 358). In the early 2000s, pressure to participate in the global energy market threatened to reconfigure Indigenous citizenship (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004, 359). Today, the pull towards “market citizenship” is great as the world identifies the Arctic as “one of the last energy frontiers” (Kuokkanen 2018, 1).

Inuit feel the intergenerational impacts of coerced relocations and residential schools. Inuit suicide rates are between six to eleven times higher than the rest of the Canadian population, and infant mortality rates exceed non-Indigenous averages by about 1.7 to 4 times (TRC 2015, 208). Inuit are concerned about the future of the Inuktitut, Inuvialuktun, and Inuinnaqtun languages, as federal funding for Inuit-language initiatives averages about \$44 per person per year, compared to approximately \$4000 per francophone living in Nunavut per year (TRC 2015, 203). An urgent fresh water supply crisis could compound social and health issues facing Inuit communities (Bakaic and Medeiros 2016), and country food systems have been disrupted by capitalism and climate change (Christie 2011, 330). Christie warns of the “looming threat of a second stage of colonization” in the North given these complex domestic and international factors (2011, 330).

### **C3, Arctic Sovereignty, Reconciliation, and Diversity**

Indeed, the C3 Expedition occurs in a moment of renewed international interest in the Arctic as sea ice and permafrost thaw, opening up the Northwest Passage to shipping and making crude oil and natural gas reservoirs accessible (Hird 2016, 35). In this context, the Harper Conservative government promoted a renewed Canadian Arctic sovereignty agenda focused on militarizing the region through a deep-water port at Nanisivik, an army training base at Resolute Bay, and Operation Nanook, an annual military exercise established in 2007 to showcase “control over the air, land and sea” (Department of Foreign Affairs quoted in Wakeham 2014, 102; Simon 2007). Once a year, Harper took a weeklong publicity tour around the North in which he posed for photographs “riding an ATV, hiking on the tundra, and supervising military training from the top of an iceberg” (Erickson 2021, 68). Through these photo ops, Bruce Erickson (2021) argues, Harper attempted to embody “conservative myths of the nation” and demonstrate Canadian power in the region through “white masculinity” (71-2). However, Mary Simon (2007) argued that Harper seemed to forget about Inuit, who are fundamental to Canada’s sovereignty claims in the region.

As it commenced preparations for the “Road to 2017”, the Harper Government reinforced the importance of the North in the national imaginary. For example, in the throne speech introducing the second session of the 41<sup>st</sup> Parliament in 2013 the Government outlined its approach to celebrating the sesquicentennial of Confederation, declaring:

We are a northern country. We are a northern people. Canada’s greatest dreams are to be found in our highest latitudes. They are the dreams of a North confident and prosperous, the True North, strong and free. (Canada 2013)

Very much in keeping with the Harper Government’s Arctic sovereignty agenda, the Government stated that “The story of the North *is* the story of Canada”, which might be

confusing for Canadians who thought 1812 was the story of Canada (Canada, 2013, emphasis original). Establishing its claim to a distinctly northern national identity, the Government commemorated the British Franklin Expedition with television advertisements linking it directly with Canadian sovereignty claims in the present:

Franklin's legacy is one of perseverance, discovery, and innovation that lives on today and has helped to keep our True North strong, proud and free. As we prepare to mark the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation, join us in celebrating Canada's North and our great legacy of discovery. (Government of Canada 2013)

In a *Globe and Mail* editorial following the location of the HMS *Erebus* in 2014, Harper argued that: "The story of [Franklin's] exploration and discovery of Canada's North is also our story." The story of Franklin's expedition is, in fact, also Britain's story, according to a formal agreement between Canada and the United Kingdom which formally transferred the HMS *Erebus* and HMS *Terror* from the UK to Canada and the Inuit Heritage Trust but permits the UK to "keep all 65 artifacts discovered by Parks Canada's diving teams" (Harris 2018). Harper commissioned a public-private partnership composed of Parks Canada, the Royal Canadian Geographical Society, Shell Canada, and Jim Balsillie's Arctic Research Foundation to find the two lost Franklin ships. Notably, the two doomed ships were "found" precisely where Inuit oral historians said they would be (Haupt 2014; see also Davis-Fisch 2012, 10-12). That Inuit held knowledge about what happened to the men trapped in the Arctic "generated considerable cultural anxiety for the British" at the time (Davis-Fisch 2012, 22). As such, Inuit oral histories "disappeared from the 'official' record, overwritten by narratives that reiterated British cultural superiority over [Indigenous] others" (Davis-Fisch 2012, 26). Heather Davis-Fisch (2012) writes that the story of the failed Franklin Expedition is just as much a story of Inuit sovereignty and self-determination – not only did Inuit hold knowledge about what happened, but "[for] Inuit, the appearance of strangers in their land" led to social and economic change (22).

The Harper Government asserted Canadian Arctic sovereignty claims at the same time as reconciliation emerged as a dominant national discourse, a convergence Pauline Wakeham (2014) critiques in her analysis of the Government of Canada's 2010 official apology for the High Arctic Relocations of 1953 and 1955. Operation Nanook's scale increased dramatically in 2010 – the same year the Government of Canada issued its official apology for the High Arctic relocations (Wakeham 2014, 102). In fact, just two days after the Harper Government acquiesced to mounting pressure from Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) to deliver an official apology for the High Arctic relocations (18 August 2010), the Government of Canada released its *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad* (Wakeham 2014, 101). This convergence of reconciliation with sovereignty, Wakeham argues, indicates “ways that settler-state apologies may be mobilized to manage unruly histories of colonial violence and to augment settler-state sovereignty” (2014, 86). The recognition afforded Inuit by the Canadian state, Wakeham argues, “implicitly enfolds Inuit within a homogenizing national body politic” and “discursively appropriate Inuit land and bodies” (2014, 99). By calling for the strengthening of Inuit/Canadian relations, Wakeham argues, the 2010 apology uncritically portrays “Inuit as ‘partners’ in Canadian nation-building” (100).

The complex history of colonial incursions into the North complicate Wakeham's argument, since there is some convergence between Inuit sovereignty and Canadian sovereignty and Canada has never pursued a policy of settlement in the North as it has in its southern territories (Mitchell 1996, 342). For example, former ITK President Mary Simon (2012) argues that Inuit presence in Inuit Nunangat “is of central importance to the future of the Canadian Arctic”. Indeed, Inuit “generally welcome their status as Canadian citizens and do act willingly

to assist in strengthening Northern claims” (Christie 2011, 330). Inuit have leveraged their occupation of the Arctic since time immemorial to secure rights of self-government and autonomy. Yet, Harper’s Arctic sovereignty agenda, guided by the motto that Canada must “use it or lose it” when it comes to the North, did overlook Inuit who have used and continue to use the land (Simon 2007).

Erickson argues that Harper’s northern tours signal a performative conception of sovereignty (2021, 72), as opposed to one rooted in multiple sovereignties – Inuit and Canadian (Shadian 2014). SOI’s C3 Expedition (originally “SEA3”) proposal, submitted 29 May 2015 to Heritage Canada, appealed to the former – a performative sovereignty designed to “show the flag” in the Arctic, as Figure 3, below, portrays (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 14-15).<sup>25</sup> The proposal reflected the Government of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty approach:

SEA3 will help showcase Canada’s leadership in the Arctic and build on the Government of Canada’s actions and investments to assert national sovereignty over the Arctic [and] defend Canada’s territory. (Students on Ice 2015, 26)

“Canada’s Sovereignty and Leadership Role in the Arctic” is one of five guiding “outreach themes” SOI identified, in addition to: “History and Great Canadian Achievements”, “People of the North”, “Canada’s Coastal and Ocean Environments”, and “Canada’s Cultures, Arts, and Music” (5). Arctic sovereignty was fundamental to the expedition from the beginning:

SEA3 will be a journey of discovery and celebration that will showcase our country’s three oceans and coasts, communities, cultures, conservation, sovereignty, history, challenges, opportunities, and future. (Students on Ice 2015, 26)

Emphasizing Canadians’ interests in “securing sovereignty over its Arctic territory”, SOI proposed a partnership with the Royal Canadian Geographic Society (RCGS) to visit “sites

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<sup>25</sup> Through an ATI request, I secured a 1273-page document including SOI’s funding proposal, budgets, and email exchanges between Geoff Green, SOI staff, and Heritage Canada personnel.

related to important symbolic claims, celebrating the origins of Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic” (Students on Ice 2015, 21). This partnership, SOI argued, would “help infuse the celebrations of Canada’s 150 with an understanding of how Canada came to exercise sovereignty over it’s [sic] Arctic territory” (Students on Ice 2015, 21).<sup>26</sup> Further, SOI promised to showcase “People of the North”, providing Inuit “a platform through which they can share their accomplishments, stories, history, and traditional knowledge with the rest of Canada” (Students on Ice 2015, 27). To emphasize Canadian history and “great achievements”, linking southern Canada to the North, SOI proposed to stop at historic sites associated with Canadian sovereignty, places that “have formed the backdrop to many of Canada’s most important historic events and great Canadian achievements” (Students on Ice 2015, 25). C3’s interactive expedition map details stops along the expedition’s route from its departure along the St. Lawrence to its arrival at the Victoria Harbour.<sup>27</sup> C3’s first stops included Kingston, “home of Sir John A. Macdonald”; Québec City, where Samuel de Champlain founded one of the first European settlements in North America in 1608; and L’Anse aux Meadows National Historic Site, described as “the earliest known European settlement in the New World” (C3 2020). The C3 Expedition map contains descriptions of sites associated with discovery and settlement, presenting images of “peaceful encounter”, belying the ways contact and settlement in southern Canada involved

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<sup>26</sup> SOI also lists the following partners: Canada Goose, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), Parks Canada, the Canadian Museum of Nature, Polar Knowledge Canada, TakingITGlobal (TIG), the Canadian Wildlife Federation (CWF), Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), the Alliance of Natural History Museums (ANHM), the Walrus, Canadian Ice Service, Community Foundations of Canada, ArticNET, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Council for the Arts, and the Canadian Rangers (69-70).

<sup>27</sup> SOI proposed a potential alternate route for the “SEA3” expedition, departing from the west coast heading north, and then east-bound through the Northwest Passage, along the same route the RCMP schooner St. Roch travelled on a mission during the Second World War to assert Canadian sovereignty and defend Greenland in case of invasion (Grant, 1993).

violence and dispossession (Leroux 2010, 21). Further, the expedition map erases Indigeneity and colonialism when it describes the Mi'kmaq as "early settlers" in Nova Scotia, followed by the British who settled in Halifax in 1749 (Canada C3, 2020). The map's description of St. John's, Newfoundland, identifies the "now extinct Beothuk" as Newfoundland's original inhabitants and identifies St. John's as "one of the oldest English-founded cities in North America", making no connection between processes of English settlement and violence in Newfoundland, which Ingeborg Marshall (1996) documents so carefully. By attributing meaning to places based on their significance within histories of settlement, without naming practices of violence and dispossession, the C3 Expedition normalizes settler-colonialism. To normalize settlement is unsurprising in an expedition designed to celebrate the entrenchment of the Canadian nation-state, but in apparent contradiction with the expedition's claim to be reconciliatory.

At which point does the C3 expedition transform from an expedition focused primarily on Arctic sovereignty to one focused on reconciliation? In the introduction to his edited coffee-table book about the expedition, Green describes submitting the proposal in May 2015 and waiting for news amidst an election and eventual transition from Harper to Trudeau:

Months ticked by. News filtered in that our project was in the running. We were optimistic. But then, in the summer of 2015, the federal election was called and everything went on hold. A new government was elected in the fall, but the wait for a decision on Canada 150 projects continued. (2018, 17)

The first discussion of C3 as a reconciliatory project occurs after Trudeau's election, in a 20 May 2016 email from Geoff Green to a Heritage Canada bureaucrat, after C3 had progressed to the second round of the grant competition:

Our initiative will also showcase many other 150 initiatives and the key themes of 150, in particular youth, environment, TRC and Diversity & Inclusion. The project legacies in science, music, art, environment, Truth & Reconciliation, ongoing educational resources and more are off the charts exciting! (Students on Ice 2015, 170)



Green quite unreflexively adds the Trudeau government's four key Canada 150 themes after the Liberal Party's win in 2015. Geoff Green's 27 May email to Heritage Canada describes his approach to ensuring a diverse subsection of Canadians participate in the expedition, breaking down the participants:

Artists – 15

Musicians – 15

Youth – 15

Scientists – 15

Business leaders and Innovators – 10

RCMP NAVY COAST GUARD – 10

Political leaders – 15

Partner organization representatives – 10

Indigenous leaders, elders – 15

Celebrities – 15

Representatives of other groups, such as new Canadians, seniors, people with a disability, people living with mental illness, educators, truck driver, construction worker, nurse, etc.  
– 15

SOI's approach to ensuring diversity is descriptive, conceived as boxes that must be ticked.

Indigenous and POC participants came to understand their presence on the icebreaker as just that, a sentiment Kotierk expressed when she said in the Downie/Wenjack room: "There have been moments [...] when I feel like I am a token here" (Brown 2017). Of course, this is not a problem of the C3 project in particular, but the broader "non-performative" use of diversity in

the Canada 150 celebration. Could Canada 150 – a celebration of Confederation – ever incorporate these themes meaningfully? This is a question for the concluding chapter.

Trudeau’s Liberal government released *Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* in 2019, the result of policy co-development with Inuit governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As the result of engagement with Inuit leaders, the framework is a departure from Harper’s Arctic policy, replacing Harper’s emphasis on Arctic sovereignty through military exercises with an emphasis on people, infrastructure, communities, economic development, counteracting climate change, and reconciliation (Canada 2019). Critics argue, however, that the new framework is “light on concrete policy action” (Kikkert and Lackenbauer 2019). For example, Jessica Shadian (2020) writes that investments and policy change since the introduction of the new framework have been “piecemeal”. Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (2019) imply that the government’s approach to co-development is superficial, pointing out that chapters by Northern governments and NGOs are appended to the framework as separate documents, with a footnote that “they do not necessarily reflect the views of either the federal government, or of the other partners” (Canada 2019). The Trudeau Liberal government’s September 2020 Speech from the Throne reflected ongoing policy co-development via the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee (ICPC), including commitments to: end food insecurity, provide culturally relevant mental healthcare, build critical infrastructure, take action on in response to the findings of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, implement UNDRIP, and exceed Canada’s 2030 climate goals (ITK 2020). In light of these commitments, it remains important to analyze how the government – and Canadians more broadly – imagine and narrate their relations to Inuit, since, as Christie writes, stories not only

“define who we are and how we think of the world” but also shape “what can be thought (and so what we can see as ‘possible’ action” (2011, 338).

Under Trudeau, the Government of Canada provided a total of \$6.8 million in funding for Canada C3 (Leblanc and Hannay 2017), and gave the expedition visible support, including visits from Prime Minister himself, who boarded the Polar Prince when it docked at Prince Edward Island, and Minister of Environment and Climate Change Catherine McKenna, who swam one kilometer to board the ship as it approached the Victoria Harbour. Beyond those participating directly, Green promised that C3 would engage “20 million plus Canadians” through community events, museum exhibits, an education program, and a communication plan including interactive social media content on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat, and a partnership with the *Globe and Mail* to document the voyage (Students on Ice 2015, 166). Participants included artists, actors, athletes, and politicians, including: Olympic kayaker Adam van Koeverden, Green Party Leader Elizabeth May, *Globe and Mail* columnist Margaret Wentz, Inuit leader Mary Simon, comedian Shaun Majumder, and The Hon. Senator Murray Sinclair.

Stories from the expedition suggest that Inuit/*qullunaat* interactions aboard the C3 took two main forms: learning about *Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit* (IQ) and talking about reconciliation in the Downie/Wenjack room. Excerpts from the C3 website’s account of Leg 7 provides a glimpse into the ways the expedition offered participants opportunities to learn about IQ:

A few of the team was [sic] also lucky enough to hear from Annie Petaulassie, a friend of Students on Ice who welcomed us into her home to discuss Inuit culture. Participants also made their way to Nunavut Arctic College to visit the Nunavut Research Institute, a facility that fosters scientific research in Iqaluit which in turn promotes the well-being of community residents. They toured the facility and discussed the critical importance of traditional knowledge in Nunavut. Finally, participants made their way to Inuksuk High School to visit with youth members of the Qayait Society, a group teaching youth the art of kayak building. The youth spoke of the empowerment of building their own kayaks and how they plan to follow ancestral traditions by using materials such as bone, driftwood, and recycled cedar and white oak boat remnants. (Students on Ice 2020)

Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez and Nathalie Kermoal (2016) are skeptical about non-Indigenous consumption of Indigenous traditional knowledges. Non-Indigenous peoples, they argue, often lift traditional knowledges from their social, political, cultural, and environmental contexts, make them digestible for non-Indigenous peoples, and apply them without fundamentally altering imbalanced power structures (Altamirano-Jiménez and Kermoal 2016, 6-7). Likewise, Keavy Martin (2009) describes IQ as a form of critical social theory, but questions whether the Canadian state values IQ as the powerful tool of decolonization: “IQ may be tolerated for its romantic appeal,” she writes, “but it has yet to be taken seriously as an intellectual tradition” (186). Beyond sources of practical and theoretical knowledge, traditional knowledge systems are sources of “resistance and decolonization”, but they can lose that power when stripped from their contexts and applied by settlers (Altamirano-Jiménez and Kermoal, 2016: 8). Examples from the C3 story suggest that the organizers understand IQ through a colonial gaze. For example, at the same time that C3 centred “traditional knowledge”, SOI describes C3 as an expedition along “lesser known areas of Canada’s coastline”, evidencing epistemic ignorance. If C3 recognizes IQ as an important way of knowing, then the North is not lesser known, but lesser known to southerners or *qallunaat* in particular. Such discursive moves present European scientific knowledge as *the* “tradition of facts and reason, of documentation and empirical truths” (Martin 2009, 184). Whereas Canada C3 is discursively positioned as a neutral scientific excursion into the Arctic, Martin (2012) explains that some Inuit elders are critical of scientific interventions into Inuit land which promise to “protect the ‘fragile’ Arctic environment” but actually break Inuit laws (2). Accounts of C3 reflect the same kind of narrative produced via Harper’s Northern tours, which presented “the North as both a playground for southern desires and a place in danger that needs to be saved through those very same desires” (Erickson 2021, 60)

It is important to ask: for what purpose does C3 invite participants to consume IQ? In “Eating the Other”, bell hooks (1992) argues that white folks find pleasure in consuming bits and pieces of “racial difference”:

mass culture is the contemporary location that both publicly declares and perpetuates the idea that there is pleasure to be found in the acknowledgment and enjoyment of racial difference. The commodification of Otherness has been so successful because it is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling. Within commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture. (366)

Writing of white men who crave sex with racialized women, hooks explains that what these men ultimately seek is their own self-transformation through consumption of the Other. When a white man has a “taste” of the other, he participates in:

a ritual of transcendence, a movement out into a world of difference that would transform, an acceptable rite of passage. The direct objective [is] not simply to sexually possess the Other; it [is] to be changed in some way by the encounter. (1992, 368)

Canada C3 participants’ stories, which document eating in the North and learning about IQ, evidence this kind of desire to consume and thereby transform. For example, Marta Thorpe, from Brampton, describes trying to “digest” the stories she’s learned, and how she will share them (quoted in Green 2018, 168). Hillary Inwood explains her transformative encounters with Inuit:

The Inuit’s warmth, hospitality, and acceptance of all of us – despite this challenging history – is a rich life lesson about diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation, one that I will take with me long after this journey is finished. (quoted in Green 2018, 171)

C3 participants’ stories of consuming Inuit food reaffirm boundaries of what is familiar and unfamiliar. For examples, Chef Michèle Genest writes of learning to cook seal:

Seal! I had never seen seal meat, let alone cooked it. Jason pulled out a box filled with frozen, vacuum-packed pieces of meat so dark it was almost black. They were half-kilo portions of seal loin, a choice cut. I decided seal was on the menu. (quoted in Green 2018, 202).

Genest writes of canvassing northerners on how to cook seal, settling on the following recipe:

I sprinkled salt and pepper on each piece and melted butter and oil on the flattop until it was smoking. I seared each loin for one minute and thirty seconds, flipped it and seared the other side for one scant minute. I cut into a loin. Nicely browned, and the inner meat so rare it was practically raw.

Kitchen volunteer Gee [...] sliced each loin into thin slices. We arranged the slices on a bed of boiled and buttered, edible but barely palatable *kivik* (rockweed), and scattered deep-friend *tinguajak* (tundra herbs we'd collected on land) over top. (quoted in Green 2018, 203)

At the end of the expedition, amidst plans to put together a C3 cookbook, Natan Obed said:

Okay, I have an Indigenous recipe for seal from Pond Inlet for your cookbook. Here it is: First you catch the seal. Then you eat it." (quoted in Green 2018, 204)

Obed's interjection is a reminder that eating seal is unremarkable for Inuit, whereas Genest describes her experience preparing seal as a venture into the unfamiliar. Such strange encounters, or interactions with the unfamiliar, are actually productive of difference because they tend to reaffirm what's 'normal' or familiar. Strange encounters, like *Globe and Mail* columnist Margaret Wente's (2017) descriptions of tasting Maktaaq and air-dried char, using an ulu, and listening to throat singers, do not happen outside of colonial power relations (Ahmed 2000). The desire to consume 'the Other' tends to be focused on digestible and commodifiable forms of difference; resistance to racism and colonialism, on the other hand, tend to meet resistance, causing indigestion (hooks 1992).

Like imperial travel writing, settler descriptions of their participation in the expedition incorporate themes "of hardship and danger on the one hand, and marvels and curiosities on the other" (Pratt 1992, 20). On board the Polar Prince icebreaker as it navigated the Northwest Passage, Wente (2017) wrote of the expedition's inherent dangers. "These waters are not for the faint-hearted. The strait is 20 nautical miles long and one mile wide, and the current is brutal." In her reflections on the expedition, Wente imagines "the early explorers who were at the mercy of the ice", the potential of entrapment in "impenetrable ice", and how long it might take to

summon the Coast Guard for their rescue (2017). Wente (2017) writes of Inuit traditional lifeways as both egalitarian and anti-feminist:

Traditionally, Inuit people shared everything they had - food, stories, music, caribou hides to sleep under, children. They owned nothing. What's the point of hoarding stuff when you're on the move? Sharing is essential when life is nomadic, resources are scarce and everyone is mutually dependent.

It was a harsh life - often dark and cruel and violent. If local conditions changed and the seals couldn't break through the ice, people starved. Young men went out onto the ice to hunt and drowned or froze. Girl babies were abandoned on the ice because too many girls meant too many unproductive mouths to feed.

For Wente, the Arctic is characterized by “stark duality”: “dark and light, isolation and community, cold and warmth, the fragility and tenacity of life” (2017, F7). She oscillates between reverence for Inuit – their communalism, the cultural richness, their food, their resilience – and simultaneously describes Inuit life as backwards, violent, and incomprehensible. In fact, in addition to consuming IQ, settlers also write of their fear that the landscape will consume them. Of her walk on Baffin Island, for example, Lorna Crozier writes: “Every time my legs sink into the tundra, I feel as if the earth is about to swallow the lower half of my body” (quoted in Green 2018, 139). Crozier anthropomorphizes the landscape, writing of the ways “icebergs that shouldn’t be here watch us as we stare wide-eyed” (quoted in Green 2018, 140). Then, she constructs an image of the Arctic as *terra nullius*, imagining herself as one of the first people the icebergs have seen: “Could we be the first humans many of them have come across?” (quoted in Green 2018, 140).

Simpson (2014) argues that the kind of cultural recognition described above is a “‘multicultural’ solution to the settlers’ Indian problem” (20). The convergence of reconciliation and cultural recognition, Simpson argues, produce a sense of “democratic inclusion” in the midst of ongoing colonialism (2014, 20). On the C3 Expedition, the Downie/Wenjack Legacy Room, named after Chanie Wenjack and Gord Downie, provided a dedicated space for conversations

about reconciliation. The story of Chanie Wenjack's death in 1966 as he tried to escape Cecilia Jeffrey Residential School to return home to his family 600 kilometers away has become part of the Canadian liberal political consciousness due, in part, to Gord Downie, the late lead singer of the Tragically Hip. Diagnosed with terminal brain cancer in 2016, Downie devoted his final year to telling Wenjack's story in a graphic novel and accompanying musical album *The Secret Path*. In a statement from the *Secret Path* website dated 9 September 2016, Downie (2016) announced that proceeds from *Secret Path* would accumulate in The Gord Downie Secret Path Fund for Truth and Reconciliation. The Fund's goal is to "continue the conversation that began with Chanie Wenjack's residential school story and to aid our collective reconciliation journey through awareness, education, and action" (Downie/Wenjack Fund, 2019). The Fund sponsors Downie-Wenjack Legacy Spaces, such as the room on board the Polar Prince. These spaces are "dedicated to providing accurate information regarding Indigenous history and our journey of reconciliation" (Downie/Wenjack Fund, 2019).

An iconic "Canadian-Canadian", Downie authored quintessentially Canadian songs about small towns, Canadian history, and national politics. Canadian fans, devastated by Downie's terminal diagnosis, were affected by his message about the importance of reconciliation. In the Tragically Hip's final concert in Kingston, which opened "with flag-waving fans singing *O Canada*," Downie demanded action from the prime minister on the goals of truth and reconciliation as 11.7 million viewers tuned in from across the country (CBC News 2016a; CBC News 2016b). For his efforts to guide "the country along the path to reconciliation", former Governor General David Johnston appointed Downie a member of the Order of Canada (CBC News 2017a). For writer and land defender Clayton Thomas-Müller of the Mathias Colomb Cree Nation, however, Downie's recognition obscures Indigenous survivors' voices



(CBC News 2017a). Praise for Downie, Thomas-Müller argues, signals that Canadians are more comfortable hearing about residential schools from “a non-native intermediary” (CBC News 2017a). *The Secret Path*, some argue, positions Downie quite problematically as a white savior (Kloke 2016). Canadians seem to gravitate towards stories of Indigenous trauma and tragedy like Wenjack’s, Thomas-Müller argues, but turn away from expressions of Indigenous survival and resistance (CBC News 2017a).

For the purposes of this analysis, I am less interested in critiquing Downie’s willingness to take on the role of spokesperson for residential school survivors, since Indigenous critics have made that point clearly, and more interested in what Downie’s example means in relation to a broader pattern in which reconciliation has become a Canadian national narrative describing Canada’s good intentions. Satirical headlines from *Walking Eagle News* demonstrate the extent to which Canada’s approach to reconciliation has become a laughing matter for many Indigenous people: “After major Trans Mountain setback, furious Trudeau threatens First Nations with ‘fiery reconciliation’” (*Walking Eagle News* 2018); “Trudeau updates mandate letters: ‘No relationship is more important to Canada than the one with Indigenous peoples and our lawyers, police’” (*Walking Eagle News* 2019); and, “Reconciliation now includes heavily-armed police: Canada” (*Walking Eagle News* 2020).

The Downie/Wenjack Legacy Room creates close encounters between settlers and Indigenous peoples in which settlers are invited to consume Indigenous peoples’ stories of trauma, further entrenching settlers’ self-understandings of their own benign and peaceful coexistence in a context of ongoing colonialism. Critical Indigenous scholars express concern about the ways that reconciliatory discourses require Indigenous peoples to bare their experiences of trauma to settlers, an experience that can be re-victimizing and disempowering on

a collective level (Belcourt 2016; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2018; see also James 2012). In this manner, the C3 expedition engages in this form of anti-conquest or colonial encounter by inviting Inuit – and Indigenous peoples of the nations it visits – to share their stories of trauma with settlers as a means of promoting healing. Settler participant Johanne McInnis writes of her emotional state after participating in a KAIROS Blanket Exercise in Kingston:

I, for one, have made a promise to myself that I can and will do better. Although emotionally exhausted from the blanket experience, I felt closer to Leona Humchitt (C3 participant from the Heiltsuk First Nation of Bella Bella, BC) and feel like she's a sister to me now. It was a fairly early evening for all of us, and as we said goodnight we all knew we were changed individuals. (quoted in Green 2018, 43)

McInnis's desire "to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting" is a settler move to innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012, 9). Drawing upon Ahmed's *Strange Encounters* (2000) Tuck and Yang describe such settler responses which attempt to "take the place of the other" or take on "the other's pain" as a way to become closer to Indigeneity – and therefore affirming one's own innocence – without threatening settler futurity (Tuck and Yang 2012, 14). Though this C3 participant has good intentions based on her vow to "do better", she misses the point of the blanket exercise, which is to demonstrate that settler-colonialism is systemic and operates to destroy the collective; as such the process of reconciliation articulated in the TRC *Final Report* (2015) is focused on systemic, not just individual, action.

C3 Creator Geoff Green writes that the Legacy Room is:

a place that has a special energy and spirit. And you feel that the moment you step through that door. We've heard some very difficult stories, personal stories, stories of residential schools, of relocation of communities, of the sixties scoop, of suicide; stories about so many of the other traumas that have been a result of badly failed government policies. But the whole idea of this space – and we're hoping there will be more legacy rooms right across the country – is to honour those stories with empathetic listening, but also with conversation and, ultimately, action or, using a term that popped up right here, 'reconciliation'". (Green 2018, 191).

The C3 book, a product of blogs, photographs, and artwork by expedition participants presents its reconciliatory mission as a success in the sense that people learned from one another through conversation. But *Globe and Mail* coverage documents conflicts and fractures glossed over by C3's accounts of the voyage, conflicts rooted in questions about C3's own grounding in imperial and colonial logics. For example, in Clyde River, Nunavut, C3 leaders gifted hockey sticks to the community representing "a gift from Canada, from the South, a gesture of reconciliation" (Brown 2017). This gesture, however, raised questions among Leg 8 participants about the ethics of their interactions with communities. Tensions on board the Polar Prince culminated in a group on board the ship asking "the expedition's organizers to admit they were supporting the status quo and perpetuating the paternalistic attitudes of the North's colonizers" (Brown 2017). Amidst these discussions, Kotierk, quoted in the introduction, emphasized Indigenous resistance over reconciliation. Steering conversations from reconciliation to resistance is a move Simpson would call an act of refusal, defined as a:

political and ethical stance that stands in stark contrast to the desire to have one's distinctiveness as a culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the requirement of having one's political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld. (2014, 11)

Kotierk also took issue with C3's portrayals of Inuit life, particularly the ways that settler participants complimented her on "the Inuit ability to survive the harsh Arctic" (Brown 2017).

Brown (2017) of the *Globe and Mail*, who travelled with C3 on Leg 8, recounts Kotierk's refusal to accept cultural recognition as opposed to respect for political sovereignty:

'Inuit had a good life. They had food and water. And even the intricate combs they made, from ivory – if you were struggling to survive, would you make such a beautiful thing?' But, she went on to add, 'people need to have that narrative. Because it justifies the settlers' decision to come and 'save' us. It can't be that colonizers arrived in a land that was thriving.'

Simpson argues that the recognition of diverse cultures and of historical wrongs provided by spaces like the Downie-Wenjack Legacy Room is merely a "gentler" form of settler governance,

“the least corporeally violent way of managing Indians and their difference, a multicultural solution to the settlers’ Indian problem” (2014, 20).

For his part, ITK President Natan Obed seemed to grapple with the competing realities of cultural recognition and the need for recognition of Inuit sovereignty. For example, like Kotierk, he expressed skepticism at the ways his participation –one of a few Inuk people on board – might add diversity without challenging the status quo:

‘I was worried... that I was going to be used in a performative manner. I didn’t want to be a tour guide or the colour’ – he chuckles – ‘to go along with the environment’. (Madwar, 2018)

In a foreword to the C3 book, Obed affirms ITKs support for Canada C3, with the qualification that “incorporating Inuit respectfully into a non-Inuit initiative that spent over half of its journey in Inuit Nunangat proved to be difficult at many junctures” (quoted in Green 2018, 14). While Obed ultimately expresses confidence “that many Inuit people felt pride in sharing our culture, language, traditions, and homeland with the participants” (quoted in Green 2018, 14), Obed also refuses recognition without respect for sovereignty. In a speech on forced relocations, for example, Obed argues:

Canada doesn’t have the infrastructure to call itself a true country since the Canadian public and lawmakers often forget about the 35 percent of Canada’s land mass called Inuit Nunangat, the Inuit homeland. (quoted in Green 2018, 127)

Declaring that Canada cannot “call itself a true country” without Inuit, Obed not so subtly refuses a Canada that fails to recognize Inuit as a sovereign people on whom it is dependent.

### **The North in the Canadian National Imaginary**

The fact that the North becomes the place of contact for this particular reconciliatory project confirms Canadians’ broader understandings of themselves as a Northern people. By assimilating the project of reconciliation within a project of shoring up Canadian sovereignty

claims in the Arctic, C3 participates in a Canadian tradition of appropriating of Inuit cultural symbols as representative of national identity. For instance, Canadians embraced the inuksuk as the official logo for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, co-opting and misrepresenting this symbol used to mark bountiful hunting grounds, or, when resembling a human form, to indicate that a murder has taken place (Wakeham 2014, 120). The Vancouver Olympics utilized the inuksuk as its logo even as First Nations, upon whose stolen land the games were held, opposed the Olympics (Dhoot 2015, 51; Francis 2011, 14). Indeed, *Canadian*-Canadians are encouraged to imagine themselves as Northerners. Yet, as Tomson Highway pointed out in his 2017 Hurtig Lecture on “The North”, many southern Canadians do not understand Northern geography, cultures, histories, and languages. Despite being one of the southernmost cities in the country, for example, in 2014 the Toronto Raptors adopted the slogan “We the North”, a branding approach that took off across Canada, with millennials wearing “We the North” merchandise to represent their national pride. In this sense, of course, southern Canadians are only Northern vis-à-vis Americans.

In Canada 150 events, Heritage Canada also presented the North as emblematic of Canadian national identity. The 2017 iteration of Ottawa’s annual Winterlude celebration focused on celebrating Canada 150 where SOI and Heritage Canada promoted the C3 Expedition in a \$7855 rented inflatable igloo. To close out the sesquicentennial year, New Year’s Eve celebrations on Parliament Hill featured the theme “Celebrating Canadians – a diverse northern people” – portraying the North and winter as key aspects of Canadian identity, and highlighting “the diverse identities which flourish within the greater national context of Canada” (Heritage 2017). Ironically, given that the closing event planned to celebrate Canadians’ collective “resilience and ability to embrace winter through northern activities that bind us”, the

government cancelled the party when temperatures fell to -30 (Canadian Heritage 2017; CBC 2017b). Juxtaposing diverse Others with the “*Canadian-Canadian*” (Mackey 2005), these Northern themed Canada 150 closing events were set to feature quintessentially Canadian symbols: including a hockey game on an NHL-sized rink, “Tim Hortons on the Hill”, and “Roaming Referees”, as well as Algonquin language learning in a tipi and concerts by PowWowStep artist DJ Shub and hip-hop artist Kardinal Offishall (CBC 2017). Interested in this sort of blend of Indigenous and kitschy *Canadian-Canadian* symbolism that forms Canada’s national iconography, Margot Francis (2011) examines the ways “whiteness and Indigeneity are both occluded and conjured up in the visual emblems of Canadian social life” (6). The blend of “kitschy” images of Canadian-ness in the closing celebration – Tim Hortons and a hockey rink mixed with Indigenous cultural symbols like PowWow music – is meant to invoke “Canada’s commitment to the values of justice and racial harmony” (Francis 2011, 14).

These attempts to portray Canada as a diverse Northern people must be understood in the historical context of Canadian colonial policies in the Arctic, present reconciliatory projects that coalesce with Canadian state goals, and critiques of the Canadian state project of reconciliation more broadly. As I have shown in this chapter, the C3’s reconciliatory mission, which began as an Arctic sovereignty project, is consistent with the Canadian state’s approach to reconciliation as a project of attempting to make Indigenous sovereignty compatible with the Canadian state’s interests (Coulthard 2014, 107). In fact, I surmise that reconciliation has become a new Canadian national narrative – a means through which Canadians understand themselves in the present moment as restor(y)ing a happy nation. Compiling a diverse “cross section” of Canadians to journey through the Northwest Passage, I show that the C3 Expedition invited settlers to consume Inuit food, knowledge, and stories of trauma and transform their own

subjectivities in the process. Coming into close contact with and having a taste of the Other enables white settlers to understand themselves at a distance from structures of white supremacy and colonialism (Ahmed 2000; hooks 1992; Tuck and Yang 2012). Yet, Indigenous C3 participants, at times, refused to be the objects of consumption or conceived as merely diverse Canadian people. Inuit participants asserted their political sovereignty relative to settlers and told alternative stories of sovereignty in relation to their homelands, challenging Canada's singular narrative (Christie 2011). In the next chapter, I examine the way the Canada 150 story unfolded on Parliament Hill during the sesquicentennial celebrations of 1 July 2017.

## CHAPTER FIVE: (UN)SETTLING URBAN PUBLIC SPACE DURING CANADA 150: FROM PARKS AND PARKING LOTS TO PARLIAMENT HILL

### **Introduction**

Illuminated tipis on Parliament Hill and at the Canadian Museum of History shone each night throughout the Canada 150 closing celebrations. Presenting “images of Indigeneity” as representative of Canada, Francis argues, allows settlers to, quite literally, “bask in the warm glow of being from a nice country that is innately given to tolerance and civility” (2011, 14). Meanwhile settlers and the state continue to express “antipathy towards actual Indigenous people” (Francis 2011, xi). When Algonquin water protectors raised a tipi on Parliament Hill on 28 June 2017, the state treated them as threats to public safety and national security, because the settler-colonial state reserves the authority to determine what kinds of representations of Indigeneity are compatible with Canadian state sovereignty (Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014). In this chapter, I analyze the ways the state, settlers, and Indigenous people reinforced and subverted colonial relationships to land in urban public space during Canada 150. My analysis is focused on the City of Ottawa – Canada’s national capital, located on traditional, unceded Algonquin territory.

For Canada 150, the City of Ottawa turned city parks and parking lots into campgrounds to manage the anticipated influx of visitors to Ottawa during the celebrations. Contrasting the City of Ottawa’s “urban camping” initiative with the Canadian state’s response to the Algonquin reoccupation of Parliament Hill during Canada 150, reveals that occupying public space is acceptable only if it is in the spirit of expressing happiness about the nation-state. What Rifkin calls “settler common sense” is at work here (2013, 322-23). Settler common sense is a product of “legal and political structures” that enable settlers to understand their occupation of Indigenous land as “given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions” that shape their lives



(Rifkin 2013, 322-23). Given that both the National Capital Commission (NCC) and the City of Ottawa ordinarily prohibit dwelling in NCC or City space, it is noteworthy that the state invited Canadians to occupy public space during the sesquicentennial celebrations. At the same time as Canada 150 celebrants set up campsites in downtown Ottawa parks and parking lots, on 28 June 2017, Parliamentary Protective Services (PPS), under the command of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), arrested nine Indigenous water protectors and one white accomplice for bringing tipi poles to Parliament Hill to hold ceremony during the Canada 150 celebrations. Comparing these two examples side-by-side reveals the state's production of a *respectable* Canadian partygoer against a *dangerous* Indigenous subject. During Canada 150 – a moment centred on good settler feelings – water protectors and land defenders unsettled settler common sense, disrupted the co-optation of Indigeneity as a mark of Canada's diversity, inclusion, and commitment to reconciliation, and rejected respectability politics by refusing Canada. Whereas the state's invitation to exalted subjects and national Others to occupy public space in celebration reinforces settler feelings of belonging, I argue that the reoccupation of Parliament Hill engaged in refusal and decolonial world making.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Algonquin relationships and non-Indigenous *non*-relationships with Ottawa. With these (non)-relationships in mind, I turn next to the question of how to define urban public space in Ottawa. Samira Kawash (1998) rejects the public/private spatial distinction, instead arguing that public space is discursively constructed in opposition to the homeless body. I find Kawash's (1998) definition useful for thinking about Indigenous and non-Indigenous occupations of public space during Canada 150 because of the notion that public city space is not where one lives – unless, apparently one is celebrating the nation-state. Third, I analyze Canada 150 urban campgrounds, arguing that they are an example

of what Rifkin (2013) calls non-Indigenous peoples' "everyday experiences of non-relation" to land, space, and Indigenous peoples – or settler common sense (323). I situate this analysis within a history of white settler camping as a recreational activity involving bringing private practices and normative relationships outdoors. By turning downtown parks into campgrounds for Canada 150, the City of Ottawa embraced a form of respectable "urban camping" available to those wishing to celebrate the nation-state. In the final section, I compare Canada 150 "urban camping" as a form of settler occupation of public space with the Algonquin reoccupation of Parliament Hill from 28 June – 1 July, 2017. I provide evidence from observational research, media, and Access to Information (ATI) analysis that the state treated peaceful Indigenous ceremony as a security threat.

### **(Un)Settling Ottawa**

Rifkin asks settler-colonial studies scholars to consider how feelings of attachment to "place as citizens of the state actively efface ongoing histories of imperial expropriation and contribute to the continuing justification of the settler state's authority to superintend Native peoples" (2011, 342). In this section, I present a brief history of colonial dispossession and Algonquin connections to Ottawa in order to show later in the chapter how settler entitlement to public space in Ottawa aims to erase this history. Founded in 1826 with the construction of Colonel John By's canal, the City of Ottawa now sits where the Kiji Sibi (Ottawa River) bends and meets the Gatineau, where Algonquins once gathered to network and trade (Lawrence 2012, 260-61). Prior to European invasion and settlement, the Kiji Sibi was central to Algonquin ways of life economically, politically, and spiritually. Algonquins fished, gathered, and traded along the river, which was governed by the Kichespirini Algonquins, "before canals bypassed its rapids and dams eliminated its steep falls" (Lawrence 2012, 259). Europeans' gradual theft began in

the mid-seventeenth century, when the French – armed with guns and an alliance with the Iroquois – waged war against the Kichespirini, seizing control of the Kiji Sibi and establishing fur trade posts along the river. In the Constitution Act of 1791, the British invoked the Ottawa River – named erroneously after the Odawas – as the dividing line between Upper Canada on the north side and Lower Canada on the south, transforming the Kiji Sibi from a source of life, spirituality, and identity to a line on a map asserting a provincial boundary, fracturing Algonquin identity and nationhood in the process (Lawrence 2012, 34-46; see also Majaury 2006).

As Bonita Lawrence (2012) writes in *Fractured Homeland*, because of the central place Ottawa holds within Canadian government and national identity, this history of the Ottawa River is central, not just to Ottawa, but to “the formation of Canada itself” (21). Indeed, as the national capital, Ottawa’s symbolic and political power extends beyond the city itself (Tomiak 2016, 10). Capital cities such as Ottawa, John R. Parkinson (2012) writes, are symbolic of “national institutions, values, myths, and norms” (194). As I discussed in Chapter 3, Algonquin history is quite literally erased in Ottawa’s national symbolic landscape (Lawrence 2012, 275). In fact, Canada’s capital city is built on ancient Algonquin burial grounds. In 1840, the remains of approximately twenty Algonquin ancestors were found in the earth where the Canadian Museum of History now welcomes tourists. Because the same earth was used in the construction of the Parliament Buildings in 1916, “Many Algonquins believe that the Parliament Buildings include fragments of Algonquin bones in their structure” (Lawrence 2012, 313). “[T]his is a mausoleum,” Ian Campeau said as he pointed to the Peace Tower while speaking with a crowd gathered around the tipi during the reoccupation of Parliament Hill in 2017 (Barrera 2017).

While Tomiak reads Ottawa as a settler-colonial city, she cautions against reading Ottawa as: “a settled, stable and knowable social, spatial, and scalar constellation” (2016, 9). Likewise,

Tonya Davidson and Nicholas A. Scott's (2016) special issue of the *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* on Ottawa Studies calls attention to Ottawa's settler-colonial landscape, but also points to the many communities of resistance and belonging that envision a more socially, economically, and environmentally just Ottawa. Scholars interested in race and space should avoid the urge to read Ottawa singularly as emblematic of settler-colonial national identity – it is much more than that. For example, Tomiak notes that Ottawa is the centre of formal settler-colonial state power, but also acknowledges that Ottawa has been the centre of anti-colonial political movements and actions:

The city is not only on deeply contested ground, but also the terrain of persistent anti-colonial Indigenous struggles for life, land, and self-determination. (2016, 9)

### **Non-Indigenous Non-Relations with Ottawa**

White settlers have attempted to evict Indigenous peoples from cities, first through the relocation of Indigenous peoples onto reserves, and now through violent practices like “starlight tours”, a term used in Saskatchewan “to describe the police practice of dropping Indigenous men in an isolated area outside the city” (Razack 2015, 173). Neil Stonechild died when police left him outside of Saskatoon on a freezing cold night. There is a prevailing belief that Indigenous people do not belong in cities, that *real* Indigeneity exists in the past, in the wilderness, or on reserves. But cities are Indigenous (Andersen, 2013).<sup>28</sup> As Nicholas Blomley (2004) writes in *Unsettling the City*, the city is “imagined as a settled site, conceptually uncoupled from a native world” (30). Blomley disrupts the idea that cities are settled by interrogating the “chain of

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<sup>28</sup> Statistics Canada (2017) reports 867, 415 Indigenous people live in cities, though numbers are likely much higher due to undercounting, and urban Indigenous populations continue to grow (Tomiak, 2016: 10). In 2011, Statistics Canada estimated an urban Indigenous population of 30,570 in the Ottawa-Gatineau region (INAC, 2016), though Tomiak (2016) reports that Indigenous community organizations and service providers tend to estimate a much larger Indigenous population in Ottawa than Statistics Canada reports (10). In addition to a large and diverse First Nations population, community organizations and service providers report over 1500 Inuit living in Ottawa, making it the “largest urban Inuit community in Southern Canada” (Tomiak, 2016: 10; see also Tungasuvvingat Inuit, 2016).

colonial ownership” (2004, 30). The doctrine of *terra nullius*, of course, reveals that the “first link” in the chain, or the “issue of initial acquisition is decidedly ‘unsettled’” (Blomley 2004, 30). Western liberal understandings of public and private property reinforce the notion that the city is a settled place, but Blomley notes that public and private property are often difficult to differentiate, raising questions about who has the “right to the city” (Mitchell 2003). Disrupting the notion that exiting a private dwelling entails entering public space, Blomley notes that, “Were we to draw a map of property in the city using the ownership model, the majority of land would appear as privately held” (2004, 16). In his study of public space in capital cities, John R. Parkinson (2012) notes that national capitals can be more or less inclusive, accessible, and democratic, and many are heavily securitized, restricted, and perpetuate exclusions (61). Where public space does exist within cities, municipal governments restrict and regulate its usage. For example, city governments are often hesitant to allow the public to use public space for the purposes of community gardening, making community gardens “neither clearly public nor private” (Blomley 2004, 26). Analyzing occupations of public space during Canada 150, then, necessitates asking: “what is public space?”, a question that critical geographers have struggled to answer definitively.

Space that is communally owned may qualify as public space, but as Blomley notes, citizens – particularly exalted national subjects – often exert proprietary claims on public space by enacting and governing its respectable usage (Blomley 2004, 25; Thobani 2007). Public space is often refigured as “as proprietary space, space that belongs to the public”, according to Samira Kawash (1998, 323). One way this happens is through the expulsion of the homeless body from public city space (Kawash 1998). Without somewhere private to dwell, people who are homeless are “by definition residents of public space”; yet, at the same time, the homeless are

simultaneously cast out of public space by restrictions and regulations on appropriate uses of public space (Kawash 1998, 320). Kawash argues that, as opposed to being defined in contrast to *the private*, *the public* is, in fact, defined in opposition to the “homeless body”. Kawash cites Rosalyn Deutsche’s (1996) example of Jackson Park in New York City. In the late 1980s, a group called “Friends of Jackson Park” argued for padlocking the park’s gate in order to prevent homeless people from sleeping in the park at night (276). These kinds of attempts to regulate and police people without homes, Kawash argues, are a means of “securing a public, establishing the boundaries of inclusion, and producing an abject body against which the proper, public body of the citizen can stand” (1998, 325).

Kawash is “not suggesting that homelessness can be reduced to the phenomenon of the homeless body”. Rather, she defines the homeless body as the “material counterpart” to an imagined “public” (Kawash 1998, 322-5). Nonetheless, given Ottawa’s colonial past and present, it is important to consider the demographic characteristics of those who experience this expulsion from public space in Canada’s national capital city (1998, 322-23). In the spring of 2018, the City of Ottawa conducted its first survey of people experiencing homelessness. Of those surveyed during the 24-hour survey period, 24 per cent identified as Indigenous – a statistic that is disproportionate to their overall percentage of the population.<sup>29</sup> Importantly, definitions of Indigenous homelessness are about more than a lack of housing. Jesse Thistle (2017) notes that Indigenous definitions of homelessness differ from colonial understandings of homelessness in that:

Indigenous homelessness is not defined as lacking a structure of habitation; rather it is more fully described and understood through a composite lens of Indigenous worldviews. These include: individuals, families, and communities isolated from their relationships to

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<sup>29</sup> Queer and trans youth also comprise a disproportionately high percentage of the homeless population in Ottawa, at 21 percent. Finally, approximately 25 percent of those experiencing homelessness are recent immigrants or refugees (Global News, 2018).

land, water, place, family, kin, each other, animals, cultures, languages and identities. Importantly, Indigenous people experiencing these kinds of homelessness cannot culturally, spiritually, emotionally, or physically reconnect with their Indigeneity or lost relationships. (6)

This holistic definition emphasizes that Indigenous homelessness involves an overall loss of connectedness.<sup>30</sup> This Indigenous emphasis on connectedness and relations is important context for my analysis of Canada 150 “urban camping”, which, I argue, is an example of what Rifkin (2013) calls non-Indigenous peoples’ “everyday experiences of *non*-relation” to land, space, and Indigenous peoples (323, emphasis added).

Non-Indigenous non-relations to land and space are enacted through a complex network of settler-colonial governance and securitization in Ottawa, including the federal and provincial governments, the City of Ottawa, and the National Capital Commission (NCC). The National Capital Commission oversees the planning, development, conservation, and stewardship of federal lands in the National Capital Region and has a mandate to “ensur[e] that Canada’s Capital is a dynamic and inspiring source of pride for all Canadians and a legacy for generations to come” (NCC, 2019). This mandate is primarily enacted through beautification and commemoration projects, forming a dense and complex symbolic national landscape, as I discuss in Chapter 3 (Walby and Lippert 2012, 1016). Kevin Walby and Randy Lippert’s (2012) research on the “spatial regulation” of homeless people in Ottawa demonstrates how homeless bodies are conceived as being in tension with the NCC’s mandate of producing city space worthy of national pride. NCC “conservation officers” are tasked with policing and regulating NCC land, “cleaning” such bodies from public space (Walby and Lippert 2012, 1016; Luscombe and Walby

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<sup>30</sup> It is also important to note that while poverty is a central concern given ongoing colonial violence and dispossession, Ottawa is also home to a growing professional Indigenous middle-class (Andersen, 2013: 52). In Ottawa, for example, Statistics Canada reports that Indigenous residents of Ottawa— many of whom are probably employed in the federal government or non-profit organizations – have similar income levels to non-Indigenous residents of other Canadian cities (2016: 10).

2014, 303). Section 38 of the NCC's Traffic and Property Regulations states that: "No person shall camp, picnic, or erect a tent on any property of the Commission not specifically designated by the Commission for that purpose". As Walby and Lippert write, these regulations function to erase the homeless, both materially – through the dispersal or eviction of homeless people to "clean" public space – and discursively through the construction of the "illegal camper". The legal and discursive construction of the "illegal camper", whose "principle 'wrongdoing is sleeping or preparing an area to sleep" is sinister because it "denies the reality of homelessness": "only someone with a permanent private dwelling 'camps' elsewhere" (2012, 1028). As I argue below, by turning downtown parks into campgrounds for Canada 150, the City of Ottawa embraced a form of respectable "urban camping" available to those wishing to celebrate the nation-state.

Luscombe and Walby's (2014) research demonstrates that the state enacts these regulations on people who occupy public space for reasons of resistance as well as people without private homes. In the fall of 2011 when Occupy Ottawa protestors pitched over 100 tents in Confederation Park, NCC Conservation Officers treated participants "as nuisances to be expelled" (Luscombe and Walby 2014, 297). After approximately six weeks, the NCC and the OPS "cleaned" Confederation Park by evicting the demonstrators (Luscombe and Walby 2014, 305).

Importantly, regulations on urban camping extend beyond NCC land into areas regulated by the municipal government and policed by the Ottawa Police Service. Section 7.1 (i) of the City of Ottawa's Parks and Facilities By-law, for example, states: "No person shall, in a park and without a permit issued by the Director [...] camp in any park, or construct any tent or other structure" (Ottawa, 2019). The City of Ottawa also prevents citizens from "conven[ing],



conduct[ing] or hold[ing] a public meeting or deliver[ing] a speech as a member of or to members of any group or to members of the general public” without a permit. Walby and Lippert (2012) argue that such regulations infringe upon peoples’ rights to the city. Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the “right to the city” refers to the right not only to inhabit city space, but to exercise autonomy over urban space in the sense of having decision-making power, the freedom to form collectivities, and freedom to live, move, and play (Mitchell 2003).

As Eugene McCann (1999) notes, however, Lefebvre’s (1991) work denaturalizing urban space does not account for the ways colonialism and racism structure public space. Cities are no more or no less Indigenous than reserves, but as this chapter demonstrates, the settler-colonial project of moving Indigenous peoples out of cities and onto reserves structures settler common sense about cities, particularly in Canada’s national capital. I turn next to Ottawa’s “urban camping” initiative, examining how the city, the NCC, and the Government of Canada encouraged settler occupations of public space during Canada 150.

### **Performing Settler-Colonial Citizenship in Parks and Parking Lots**

To manage unusually high numbers of tourists expected to visit Ottawa during Canada 150 celebrations in late June and early July 2017, the City of Ottawa coordinated with the federal government and the NCC to allow visitors to camp in city parks and parking lots. The City permitted tourists to park their RVs in select parking lots, and to pitch tents in downtown parks (Ottawa 2017). Campers had the option to select between a five-night “Voyageur” package (ranging from \$339 for a tent to \$1130 for a long RV) or a three-night “Portage” package (\$220.50 for a tent to \$712 for a long RV) (Ottawa 2017). The City of Ottawa described this “unique short-term Urban Camping experience” as a “family-friendly option” for those hoping to “enjoy the Canada Day festivities” (Ottawa 2017). Given that on an ordinary day “no person

shall camp” in public space, what does it mean that visitors are invited to dwell in public space during a national celebration? Urban camping, for certain desirable campers, becomes a respectable and family-friendly way to celebrate the nation, bringing colonial ideas about wilderness camping as a form of outdoor recreation for respectable white city folks into city space.

Camping as a recreational activity involves escaping from the private domain, or, rather taking normally private, indoor practices such as sleeping, cooking, and eating, into the public, outdoor domain. Officially, it is “the practice of living in a temporary shelter” (Young 2017, 9). Camping is generally understood as a recreational outdoor activity, which typically takes place in the wilderness. Thus, the City of Ottawa and the NCC used the modifier “urban” to describe their camping initiative, as camping for recreational purposes usually does not take place inside city space.

The practice of camping in the wilderness originates in the late-nineteenth century. In *Heading Out: A History of American Camping*, Terence Young (2017) describes the emergence of camping as an elite spiritual and recreational practice in late-nineteenth century America as a response to industrialization and urbanization. In this context, artists, writers, and philosophers argued for the benefits of escaping the city and immersing oneself in nature (Young 2017, 10). As William Cronon (1995) notes, this shift in the view of nature is connected to ideas about race and colonialism, as perceptions of nature shifted from wilderness as a “savage” space to a protected national space (15). American elites viewed the wilderness as the “antidote to our human selves”, an “escape from our own too-muchness” and thus sought to protect the wilderness from humanity – a philosophical standpoint that propelled national parks development in Canada as well (Cronon 1995, 7; Kopas 2007). Late-nineteenth century

campers, Young (2017) argues, sought more than recreation – they sought a spiritual experience of connectedness to land and nature. Campers sought to “return home transformed” – closer to nature, and even more American (Young 2017, 12). Indeed, Young connects camping to performing national identity: early American campers, he writes, sought a “sense of belonging, especially of being an American. Many returning campers felt closer to the nation for the experience” (2017, 12).

While wilderness has been imagined as an escape from humanity, wilderness is very much a human construction, as Cronon demonstrates: “Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation” (1995, 7). Wilderness space and national parks have been founded on racial and colonial exclusions; as such, recreational camping of the sort one sees depicted in a Mountain Equipment Co-Op advertisement has developed as a white activity (Scott 2018). In Canada, for example, the creation of national parks aligned with Macdonald’s First National Policy to expand Confederation westward, providing tourist attractions for wealthy Canadian Pacific Railway travellers (Binnema and Niemei 2006, 728; Kopas 2007, 8; see also Youdelis 2016 on Jasper National Park). Banff’s nationalization required the eviction of the Nakoda (Stoney) people, who were eventually invited back into the park to perform their “Indianness” for white spectators at “Banff Indian Days” (Clapperton 2013). Francis (2011) argues that national parks, with their combination of wilderness space and kitschy images of Indigeneity function as a space for white folks to experience the “frontier” (96). Meanwhile, during the First and Second World Wars, internment camps operated inside national parks like Banff, confining “dangerous internal foreigners” including Ukrainians and Japanese citizens who built park infrastructure like highways and hotels (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009; Kopas 2007). A form of “green colonialism” (Jago

2017), national parks have created recreational opportunities for white settlers, meanwhile excluding racialized citizens. In the United States, research documents formal and informal practices of excluding African Americans (Young 2009), manifesting in racialized patterns of outdoor recreation with Black Americans less likely to visit American national parks today (Krymkowski et al. 2015). Jacqueline Scott's (2018) doctoral research suggests similar patterns of anti-Black exclusion in outdoor recreation in Canada.

All of this is to say that while camping might be perceived as an escape from social structures – every individual camper living outdoors, in nature, dependent on the basics for survival – camping, whether wilderness or urban, exists within broader racialized, gendered, and colonial power structures. The costs of camping alone are prohibitive for many, with camping gear ranging from hundreds of dollars for tents and sleeping bags to hundreds of thousands for a deluxe RV. As Cronon writes:

Ever since the nineteenth century, celebrating wilderness has been an activity mainly for well-to-do city folks... elite urban tourists and wealthy sportsmen projected their leisure-time frontier fantasies onto the American landscape. (1995, 20)

The very idea that humans are disconnected from nature is an ethnocentric one grounded in white, wealthy urban experiences – not all cultures are structured by “a boundary between nature and society” (O'Brien and Njambi 2012, 22). Algonquin culture, as Lawrence (2012) writes, has traditionally been connected to land, animals, water, and nature. As such, returning to dwell in nature is the activity of a particular type of person who is already disconnected from the environment – a settler activity. In their 1984 essay “The American Family Goes Camping,” Margaret Cerullo and Phyllis Ewen write that camping for many families represents a yearning for a connection to the “frontier” (41). Observing families setting up their campsites, they write, is like observing a family establishing a homestead on their “little plot of ground” (41). As an

escape from city life, setting up camp in the wilderness offers the possibility of becoming “closer to the nation” – a true settler (Young 2017, 12).

Ottawa’s “urban camping”, I argue, also offers settlers an opportunity to become closer to the nation, performing settler citizenship and belonging – only in urban space. The City initially planned to open eleven urban campgrounds, eventually operating only four given lower than anticipated demand. Urban campgrounds in Ottawa’s core, including Tom Brown Arena, proved popular among visitors, however (CTV Ottawa 2017; Scotti 2017). It is not necessarily the popularity or the prevalence of urban camping during Canada 150 in which I am interested. Rather, I am curious about the meanings this program communicates about who is permitted to occupy urban public space during a national celebration and under what conditions, particularly when contrasted with the state’s violent response to the Algonquin reoccupation of Parliament Hill, as I discuss below.

By designating spaces where dwelling in public is acceptable if campers paid, the City made public space semi-private (Blomley 2004), or, perhaps more accurately, turned public space into national space. Following the City of Ottawa’s announcement that it would turn some city parks and recreation centres into urban campgrounds, critics noted the high costs, ranging from \$75 to \$230 per night, when the average campsite at an Ontario Provincial Park costs \$51 per night), excluding the poor or working class from participating (CBC 2016; CBC 2017). No news media reports mentioned the irony that people who are homeless or protestors face restrictions on camping in public space on a daily basis, however.

Instead, news coverage of urban campsites tells stories of families who have traveled across the country for the chance to participate in Canada 150 celebrations in Ottawa. Photographs depict families dressed in red and white, Canada flags draped across tents. By

creating urban campgrounds for Canada 150 celebrants, the City produced a respectable urban tent city.

Canada 150 urban campgrounds were discursively constructed as safe places to temporarily live in public. City of Ottawa Mayor Jim Watson, for example, declared that “urban camping” is good as long as it is safe and secure:

if we can offer camping opportunities for people throughout the city and they can bring their RV or camping equipment and it’s a safe and secure spot, then I think that’s a great idea. (Postmedia News 2016)

As the City opened up urban space to campers looking to celebrate Confederation, it also warned people against sleeping in the wrong places. According to CTV, for example:

Squatting in abandoned buildings or in public parks is a major no-no. If you’re planning to bring your vehicle, camper van, or RV into the city, by-law enforcement officers will be out making sure they aren’t parked or set up in illegal or unsafe areas. (Global News 2017)

In contrast, as discussed above, the state treats urban campsites or “tent cities” formed as spaces of survival or resistance as public safety threats, evicting Occupy Ottawa from Confederation Park in 2011 (Luscombe and Walby 2014). Governments and security forces have attempted to shut down other tent cities across the country, including the Black Lives Matter Toronto tent city, and tent cities in Vancouver, Victoria, Edmonton and Winnipeg established in the spirit of survival and resistance to the high costs of housing (Stueck 2019). In the summer of 2019, the City of Winnipeg sought proposals from private companies to “clean up several homeless camps on city spaces” (Tkach 2019). Urban camping for Canada 150, on the other hand, constructed a sanitized, respectable “urban camping” zone as a space of national celebration (CTV Winnipeg 2019; Draaisma 2019).

Aside from discursively constructing Canada 150 campgrounds as safe spaces for settlers, the municipal government rendered these sites respectable by providing bathrooms and

showers in return for payment: “Campers will enjoy the use of bathrooms and showers at city recreation centres” (Ottawa 2017). The provision of bathroom and shower facilities for Canada 150 campers is significant, since the lack of such facilities is one way that people who dwell in public space out of necessity are rendered abject (Kawash 1998). That is, the state produces respectable public space in contrast to the abject “homeless body” in part, Kawash (1998) writes, by:

enacting and selectively enforcing laws that prohibit particular activities or behaviour such as lying down or sitting in particular places, urinating, squeegeeing, [and] panhandling. (326-27)

Public toilets are a rarity in many cities and urban spaces (Kawash 1998, 332). Since “eliminating public toilets does not eliminate the homeless who would use them,” homeless people have no choice but to “violate social norms of bodily control that are interpreted as signs of the proper public subject” (Kawash 1998, 332).

Unlike people without a private residence, Canada 150 campers are also allowed the luxury of relaxing and resting in urban public space. CBC’s profile of Canada 150 campers includes campers’ own reflections on relaxing in the city. Alanna Single of Winnipeg, who set up a hammock between two trees in the Tom Brown Arena Parking Lot said of her urban camping experience that it was:

“[a] little different, but I mean, I have my hammock set up here. It’s pretty similar in that sense. If I close my eyes and don’t hear the traffic, I can pretend I’m in Cape Breton.” (quoted in Kupfer 2017)

Images of campers dressed in red and white, relaxing in folding chairs with the city scape in the background accompany CBC’s profile of Canada 150 urban campers (Kupfer 2017). In contrast, relaxing in one place is not typically permitted by those without a private residence. As Steven VanderStaay writes:

By day, most cities and municipalities tolerate homeless people who live on their streets only as long as they are in motion... Homeless people with nowhere to go are often forced to spend their day getting there. (quoted in Kawash 1998, 327).

Urban campgrounds enabled visitors who might not otherwise be able to find a hotel room the possibility to participate in Canada Day celebrations, bringing them “closer to the nation” as they demonstrated their national pride and respectability while temporarily settling in urban space (Young 2017, 12). With all of the provisions to establish a “home away from home”, Canada 150 urban campers occupied urban Indigenous land in celebration of the settler-colonial nation-state.

Whereas the Canadian state’s urban camping initiative reflects and reproduces settler common sense in its invitation for non-Indigenous folks celebrating the settler-colonial nation-state to occupy public space, for Indigenous land defenders and water protectors, camps in urban space can serve as a form of resistance to the settler-colonial nation-state in the spirit of reoccupying and protecting traditional and unceded territories. From February until September 2018, the Justice for Our Stolen Children camp stood in Wascana Park across from the Saskatchewan Legislature, its presence representing demands that the state end the removal of Indigenous children from their homes and stop enabling premature Indigenous death (Danyluk and MacDonald, 2018a). Built in the wake of the acquittal of Gerald Stanley, campers held ceremony until the Regina Police Service, Wascana Centre, and the Provincial Capital Commission served them with eviction notices. In December 2012, as the Idle No More movement gained momentum, Attiwapiskat First Nation Chief Theresa Spence held ceremony in a tipi on Victoria Island – a sacred Anishinaabe gathering place in the symbolic center of the settler-colonial nation-state (Tomiak 2016, 15). Chief Spence launched a hunger strike to compel Prime Minister Stephen Harper to engage in a conversation about the housing and suicide crises in her community, and colonial dispossession in Canada broadly, “bringing



Indigenous resistance and land-based ceremony into the heart of Ottawa” (Tomiak 2016, 16). Spence, who “declared her own body a space for the pronouncement of need, of sovereignty” and faced sexist and racist backlash from Canadians in response, subsequently inspiring Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Grand Chief Verna Polson. Polson held ceremony and a hunger strike in a wigwam outside of 100 Wellington Street, the former U.S. Embassy, which stands directly across from Parliament Hill’s Peace Tower, in July 2019 (Simpson 2016, 6). Chief Polson demanded that the Algonquin Nation be consulted about plans to convert the building into an Indigenous Peoples Space. Unlike settler forms of protest, urban Indigenous encampments like the Justice for Our Stolen Children camp, or Theresa Spence’s tipi on Victoria Island, are spaces of Indigenous ceremony, medicine, learning, healing, cultural expression, and decolonial world-making (Danyluk and MacDonald, 2018b). I now turn to the reoccupation of Parliament Hill in 2017 as an example of urban Indigenous place-based ceremony and resistance.

### **Resistance and Urban-Place Based Reoccupation: An “Aboriginal Situation on the Hill”**

In advance of 2017’s Canada 150 celebrations and in honour of the late Arthur Manuel, Idle No More issued a call “to make July 1 a National Day of Action” to:

educate Canadians about how their constitutional framework, first established 150 years ago in the British North America Act (1867), illegally confiscated our lands, territories, and resources, [which] spawned the post-Confederation *Indian Act* and attempted to write Indigenous jurisdiction – and Indigenous Peoples – out of existence. (Unsettling150.ca 2017)

Responding to Idle No More’s call to unsettle Canada 150, a group of Anishinaabe and non-Indigenous Carleton University students collaborated with the Bawating Water Protectors of Sault Ste. Marie to organize a reoccupation of the unceded Algonquin territory of Parliament Hill in an effort to unsettle the highest profile Canada 150 event in the country. The organizers of Reoccupation called on “all Nations across Turtle Island [...] to reoccupy the traditional lands of

the Algonquin people by setting up tipis, wigwams, longhouses, or other lodges” on Parliament Hill (Facebook 2017). According to its organizers, reoccupation represented an “assertion of Indigenous self-determination and sovereignties over our lives, lands, languages and cultures” (Facebook 2017).

In this section, I argue that the reoccupation of Parliament Hill succeeded in unsettling Canada 150 celebrations on Parliament Hill, creating a decolonized space despite the settler state’s treatment of the reoccupation as a threat to public safety and national security. In addition to my own observations of the site, I base this assertion on analysis of Government of Canada documents acquired through Access to Information (ATI) requests. During the reoccupation, the Canadian state treated the Bawating Water Protectors as dangerous internal foreigners (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009) or dangerous Indigenous subjects, despite the fact that the water protectors were unarmed, and asserted consistently that their ceremony was peaceful.<sup>31</sup> When contrasted with the City of Ottawa’s urban camping initiative, which invited white and racialized settlers to set up tents in public space during Canada 150, the state’s violent response to the reoccupation demonstrates that occupying public space is only acceptable if it is in celebration of the nation-state.

Importantly, while the reoccupation was a form of resistance to the Canadian nation-state, by all accounts, it was a ceremony, not a protest. The four-day ceremony in which water protectors fasted together reflected the Anishinaabe principles outlined by Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2014) in “Fish Broth & Fasting”:

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<sup>31</sup> The state, Dhamoon and Abu-Laban argue, constructs foreignness as a flexible “floating signifier” in relation to the notion of a bounded national community. Foreignness is not dependent on the issue of where one comes from, otherwise all settlers would be foreigners. Rather, they argue that “constructions of foreignness are deployed and legitimized through state-driven appeals to security”, nation-building, and racialization (2009, 166). By this logic, Mohawk warriors were defined as dangerous internal foreigners during the Oka Crisis, for example.

We support. We pray. We offer semaa. We take care of the sacred fire. We sing each night at dusk. We take care of all the other things that need to be taken care of, and we live up to our responsibilities in light of the faster. We protect the faster.<sup>32</sup>

The TRC *Final Report* explains that such “ceremonies and peacemaking practices” are foundational to Indigenous legal and political traditions (2015, 16). The authors of the final report emphasize the importance of ceremonial practices like stories and songs, but also of “sacred objects, such as wampum belts, peace pipes, eagle down, cedar boughs, drums, and regalia”, which are “used to establish relationships, repair conflicts, restore harmony, and make peace” (2015, 16). Understanding tipis as sacred spiritual structures helps illustrate that the reoccupation was ceremonial. Water protectors like Summer-Harmony Twenish consistently made this distinction when journalists asked: “Tell me about your protest” (City News Toronto, 2017).

The ceremony began on 28 June at around 6:00 pm when protectors, students, elders, and supporters gathered at the Canadian Tribute to Human Rights (CTHR) monument. Inscribed upon its red granite arch is the first line of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights: “All Human Beings are Born Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights” (Davidson 2012, 217). Through the red granite archway stands the “House of Canada”, where the words “equality”, “justice”, and “dignity” are inscribed in 73 Indigenous languages (Davison 2012, 221-22). The CTHR, Tonya Davidson (2012) argues, symbolizes the myth of Canadian liberal multicultural tolerance (218). It was here that water protectors declared their reasons for reoccupying Parliament Hill during Canada 150. Among other grave human rights violations, the Bawating Water Protectors identified the Canadian genocide of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, Girls, and Two-Spirit people (MMIWG2S), environmental degradation and resource extraction without consent,

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<sup>32</sup> Semaa means tobacco.

and suicide crises in remote Northern Indigenous communities as reasons for reoccupying Parliament Hill. Meanwhile, the Ottawa Police watched and waited. With the CTHR as the backdrop, the water protectors exposed the fragility of the Canadian myth of white settler innocence as they discussed the impact genocide has on their families and communities. The Ottawa Police's presence reinforced each word the water protectors spoke about structural violence.

From the CTHR, water protectors and non-Indigenous supporters carried the tipi poles to Parliament Hill. In his analysis of the relationship between democracy and global capital cities, Parkinson (2012) argues that Ottawa rates positively as an open, accessible, and democratic city. In particular, he points to “efforts made to permit protests in the grounds” and opening up Parliament Hill to citizens to participate in Canada Day celebrations (217).<sup>33</sup> He issues the following caveat, however: “Access is getting tighter, behavioural restrictions are severe, the galleries are out of sight, and there is little public performance of citizenship” (Parkinson 2012, 217). A tight security network including the sergeant-at-arms, Parliamentary Protective Services (PPS) under the command of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Senate and House of Commons security services restricts public access to both the exterior and the interior year-round. As Anne Dance (2014) points out, managing public access versus the perceived need for increasing securitization on the Hill is a delicate balance, and in recent years, the scales have tipped towards the latter.

The Ottawa Police drove alongside, their red and blue lights flashing as if they were on

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<sup>33</sup> In an interview with Anne Dance (2014) former sergeant-at-arms Kevin Vickers describes the process of organizing a protest on Parliament Hill grounds as follows: “If someone wants to demonstrate on the Hill they simply have to fill out the form and see how it goes [...] Each one of us has a look at it and we sign off ... it’s a collective management of the grounds” (178). Vickers describes a process wherein the committee and the sergeant at arms aims to “balance security with the protestors’ goals” (178-9).



Figure 3 Photo: Water protectors carry tipi poles through Elgin Street entrance to Parliament Hill. By author.

their way to a crime scene. In fact, Indigenous ceremony was criminalized that evening. As Brendon Nahwegezhic of Batchewana First Nation said in a press conference the following day, 29 June, “We marched with those poles up the road from the Human Rights Monument, and yet we had to fight for our right to practice our own traditions” (APTN News 2017).

Canada’s history of criminalizing Indigenous ceremony is well established. From 1884 until 1951 the Canadian state criminalized Indigenous ceremonies including the Blackfoot sun dance and the west coast potlatch (Napoleon 2001, 117; TRC Final Report 2015, 4). As the RCMP and PPS treated the water protectors as criminals, they cited Article 12 of the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, quoted here in part:

Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop, and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs, and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; [and] the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects.

When the water protectors and their supports arrived at the East entrance to Parliament Hill and crossed the threshold, they were soon met with violence from the RCMP, who were ready and on the defensive. In a panel discussion at Algoma University following the reoccupation, Anishinaabe water protector Elsa Hoover (2017) explains the RCMP's fear of the tipi:

When the RCMP and their private security and the Ottawa police were trying to prevent us from coming in it wasn't the *people* they were trying to prevent from coming in – it wasn't exactly *people* that they were afraid of [...] What they were afraid of were the lodge poles – they were really, really threatened by seeing this structure coming in, and that's why they were physically holding these poles down.

Emails from the "Crisis Management Cell" (CMC) to the Privy Council Office (PCO) with updates between 10:15 pm on 28 June and 29 June 03:35 document the night's events from the perspective of those working in government:

10:15: Initial Notification from PPS: "Be advised: There is a small demonstration at Elgin gate, near the East block. At this time, no action is required on your part. Here are the available details:

Nature of the situation: Small demonstration

Location: Elgin gate

Available details: PPS members are holding the demonstrators at Elgin gate. Site commander [REDACTED] from division 4.

10:24 Update: Multiple RCMP cruisers parked along Wellington Street; protest is peaceful so far.

10:28 Update: Ambulance also parked on Wellington Street. It looks like it might only be for precaution as the protestors are still peaceful.

10:43 Update: Based off signs, protestors are a group of indigenous people; it is not clear what they are protesting.

11:43 Update:

- Based on further signage, the protest is against the Canada 150 celebrations.

- The group consists of approximately 30-40 individuals.
- They are all lined up holding some kind of long thin object, light brown in colour.
- There are seven RCMP cruisers parked along Wellington Street.
- RCMP are on site, protest remains peaceful.

12:32 Update:

- RCMP now positioned to the north and south of the group, blocking them from going further up onto the hill as well as lining themselves along Wellington Street.
- RCMP cruisers are still parked along Wellington Street. Ambulance has been replaced by a paramedic vehicle.
- Some type of ceremonial event is taking place involving three indigenous women holding up feathers; a fourth individual is recording the proceedings on a video camera. (Privy Council Office, 2017, A-2017-00269)

What these records fail to document is the aggression demonstrated by the RCMP towards the water protectors. For three hours, between around 9 pm and 1 am, RCMP and PPS officers tried to push the poles to the ground (see image, above), while Indigenous, white settler, and racialized men held the heavy wooden poles on their shoulders. The RCMP arrested nine people without charge; in fact, the RCMP could not level a charge since the water protectors had not broken a law by bringing tipi poles to Parliament Hill. The PPS identified the leaders of the reoccupation with remarkable precision. Eight of those arrested were Anishinaabe water protectors whereas only one white accomplice faced arrest. RCMP officers perpetuated racist myths and stereotypes in their treatment of Indigenous water protectors. With no journalists on the scene, reoccupation organizers asked those observing to document the RCMP's behaviour and post photos and videos to social media. I filmed as an RCMP officer asked a young Algonquin man holding tipi poles: "So, you pay taxes?" before he put him in a chokehold and



*Figure 4, Photo: PPS try to prevent tipi poles from entering Parliament Hill. By author*

arrested him without charge.<sup>34</sup> The PPS, under the direction of the RCMP, criminalized Indigenous ceremony and intensified the securitization of Parliament Hill. As Hoover (2017) says, “Parliament Hill is a public space [...] and it was public through the whole time they were setting up [for the Canada Day celebrations]. It wasn’t barricaded off until we got there.”

Hours went by before the RCMP released eight people without charge – after all, they had not committed a crime.<sup>35</sup> The RCMP did, however, issue them trespassing notices, an ironic twist, given that Parliament Hill is situated on unceded Algonquin territory, currently subject to a land claim. Under the guidance of grandmothers, the water protectors finally raised the tipi in

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<sup>34</sup> I gave copies of the video to the person who was arrested, and per his instructions, also shared it on Facebook and Twitter.

<sup>35</sup> The ninth person – a white settler – was not released until days later.



ceremony at around two o'clock in the morning. The CMC documents the rest of the night's events for the PCO:

01:00 Update:

- The object being held by protestors appears to be multiple long thin pieces of wood, strapped together in a bundle.
- The bundle of wood has been placed on the ground and the ropes binding them together has been cut off.
- Individuals have started to play tribal drums next to the pieces of wood.
- It appears at this point that this is some kind of ceremony taking place.

01:09 Update:

- Individuals have begun using the pieces of wood to create a teepee inside the perimeter of the hill next to the Elgin street entrance.
- There is now only three RCMP cruisers parked along Wellington Street; many have been shifted to the inside perimeter of the hill.
- RCMP have maintained their position to the north of the protestors, but are no longer positioned along Wellington Street to the south.

01:42 Update:

- The protestors are having difficulty placing the covering over the teepee.
- The teepee is being taken down.

01:47 Update:

- The teepee has been taken down.
- The protestors are now beginning to put it back up, but are making it smaller.

02:08 Update:

- Teepee has been completed.
- Individual wielding video camera seems to be from a news crew. (Privy Council Office, 2017, A-2017-00269)

Of the RCMP, Hoover explains:

They conceded again and again because we kept making them give us more space, asserting that we didn't need a permit – we didn't need *their* permit to be there.” (2017)

Hoover describes the feeling of creating a community of belonging as everyone congregated around the tipi, which rested tenuously on the sloped landscape of the east entrance:

It really was – it was that sense of community – that's how I knew that we were doing that in ceremony, that we were doing it the proper way – that people could already feel that it was a home, that they were safe. And we slept in it that night. These guys got

some rest, even though, you know, we were in this precarious place – we were just clinging to the side of that hill. (2017)

In describing the tipi as “a home”, and the feeling of community that shared experience generated, Hoover demonstrates that the reoccupation not only disrupted the perception of settled urban space, but created a decolonial space grounded in ceremony and community, where the leaders asserted Algonquin laws.

The next day, Thursday, 29 June, Candace Day Neveau led negotiations to move the tipi from the east entrance to Parliament Hill to its rightful place on the lawn of Parliament Hill. Day Neveau (2017) describes trying to mediate between the grandmothers’ wishes that the tipi occupy a prominent space in front of the Canada 150 sign and to the left of the main stage on the west lawn of Parliament Hill with the RCMP liaison’s wishes that the tipi be relegated to the corner. After intense back and forth, they agreed to “meet in the middle”, and the RCMP liaison placed a red tobacco pouch on the spot where the tipi would sit for the next three days. Email exchanges between Canadian Heritage staff at around the same time a decision was reached between the water protectors and negotiators indicate that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) sanctioned the tipi’s new location. At 7:29 pm, an email from Marc Pagé: “Call me. A decision has been made by PMO. We need to talk” (AI-2017-00330, 17). One hour later, water protectors and their supporters were carrying the tipi from the east entrance to Parliament Hill down Wellington Street to the west lawn where it was raised again, now standing in front of the Canada 150 sign.

Information from ATI requests reveals that relevant government departments including the Department of Canadian Heritage and Public Safety Canada saw the reoccupation primarily as a security issue, and secondarily a public relations issue. For example, on Wednesday 28 June, after most arrests had been made, at 9:36 pm, Canadian Heritage staff exchanged emails: “There

is a protest at Elgin St. entrance onto Hill. PPS seem to have situation under control – [REDACTED]” (AI-2017-00330). It is worth noting here that Canadian Heritage’s mandate, described in the *Department of Canadian Heritage Act* is to foster and promote “Canadian identity and values, cultural development, and heritage” (Canadian Heritage 2019). Heritage Canada’s approach to the reoccupation as a safety and security issue raises the question of whether policing Indigenous peoples is part of Canadian identity and heritage. Notably, while the state viewed urban campgrounds for Canada Day celebrants as safe spaces to dwell in public, it portrayed this Anishinaabe ceremony as a safety risk.

Not surprisingly given its mandate, Public Safety Canada (PSP) primarily focused on the reoccupation as a safety issue. What might be surprising to readers is that PSP communications positioned the reoccupation and ISIS as comparable in the risk they posed to public safety during Canada 150 celebrations. A 315-page document obtained through an ATI request (A-2017-00155) reveals that on 28-29 June, Public Safety Canada (PSP) were concerned with two safety risks: the reoccupation ceremony and reports of ISIS threats naming Canada. Indeed, Public Safety briefings identify the reoccupation ceremony as a matter of “national security”, along with ISIS. Further, of the government documents I obtained through ATI requests, many contained redactions per section 15(1) on the grounds of national security. Combing through redactions reveals that, often, what is redacted is person’s name or email address. But, some documents, including an email to then Clerk of the Privy Council Michael Wernick and Caroline Xavier, who then served as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence, contains heavy redactions labeled 15(1) and 21(1)(a). An investigation by VICE News also confirms that the RCMP surveilled the water protectors in the name of national defence (Beaumont 2017). These findings are consistent with Crosby and Monaghan’s (2018) argument in *Policing Indigenous*

*Movements* that the Canadian security state not only criminalizes Indigenous dissent, but treats Indigenous activists as threats to national security.

The day after the arrests, the government's attention turned to managing public perceptions of the "Aboriginal situation on the Hill" (AI-2017-00330: 5). Heritage Canada staff tried to determine how to respond to a situation they described as "gaining in [social media] and becoming pan-Canadian" (AI-2017-00330, 8). Their official talking points focused on reconciliation, including the government's commitment to "renewing the relationship with Indigenous peoples – one based on the recognition of rights, respect, cooperation, and partnership" (AI-2017-00330, 8). Daily briefings from the PSP Media Centre on Canada 150 Security focused on public perceptions and media narratives. The 29 June brief, notes "a significant spike in [social media] activity at approximately 23:00 ET on June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2017 with 809 posts" (A-2017-00155, 8). Public Safety Canada attributes this spike to "the beginning of the protest on Parliament Hill, initial confrontations between protestors and police, and efforts to erect a teepee on the grounds" (A-2017-00155, 8). Notably, Public Safety Canada discursively positions "protestors and police" as equal partners in "initial confrontations". In order to manage public perceptions of their violent response to the water protectors, the RCMP and Parliamentary Protective Services constructed a media/public relations spin that positions the water protectors as a threat to "the collective rights of public safety" (A-2017-00155, 275). That is, PPS media lines state their respect for "the Charter right to peaceful protests" but emphasize the need to "ensure that individual rights are balanced with the collective rights of public safety" (A-2017-00155, 275).

The state's emphasis on balancing the ceremony as an issue of public safety versus "the Charter right to peaceful protest" not only mischaracterizes a peaceful ceremony as a security

issue, but also misrepresents the event as one about individuals exercising rights as opposed to a collective expression of Indigenous sovereignty and law. While media lines from PPS, for example, claim to respect “the rights of Indigenous people on Algonquin territory”, PPS also “acknowledges that the group has not acquired a permit for the protest” (A-2017-00155, 242). This suggests that: first, the Canadian state does not understand the political and legal character of Indigenous ceremony; and second, that acknowledging Indigenous rights on Algonquin land means that Algonquins do not need a permit.

For his part, Prime Minister Trudeau’s response to news of the arrests on the first night of the reoccupation resorted to diversity talk. In a live press conference, a CBC News reporter asked Trudeau if the arrests were warranted, to which he responded:

I haven’t seen the full details of what went on but we’re certainly looking to make sure that Canada 150 reflects the entire diversity of Canada. I said many times diversity is a strength. It doesn’t just mean diversity of backgrounds. It also means diversity of views and I think it is important that even as Canada – as Canadians celebrate Canada, we reflect upon the experiences and the importance of folding in and hearing the stories of the experiences of Indigenous Canadians. (reproduced from transcription in A-2017-00155, 276).

This statement is a feel-good, euphemistic gesture towards inclusion that “works to obscure and reproduce deep and historically entrenched inequalities” (Brodie 2018, 22). That Trudeau sees the reoccupation as an opportunity to include “Indigenous Canadians” avoids the reoccupation’s fundamental message – that Canada is on Indigenous land.

### *“Fire pit at the teepee”*

Up against a state that refused to acknowledge their sovereignty, the water protectors nonetheless succeeded in creating decolonial sovereign space on the lawn of Parliament Hill – the heart of the settler-colonial imagination. The night before Canada Day celebrations would begin, for example, the water protectors solidified Indigenous jurisdiction over the space,

subverted colonial law, and unsettled Parliament Hill when they lit a sacred fire on Parliament Hill. Despite the police's reluctant agreement to move the tipi from the East entrance of Parliament Hill to the west lawn, the RCMP's constant presence around the tipi created a securitized zone. Day and night, armed RCMP officers, including undercover officers, surrounded the tipi. They aimed to restrict the development of a decolonial zone by subjecting water protectors and their belongings to thorough searches, and confiscating a tent and a tarp intended to help provide shelter for supporters and keep supplies dry given the heavy rain that started on Thursday morning and continued through the Saturday celebrations.

During negotiations between water protectors and the RCMP regarding the sacred fire, the RCMP liaison told water protector Candace Day Neveau it would be a "threat to national security". Recalling this conversation during a panel at Algoma University, Neveau (2017) laughs: "We were just a bunch of friends ruffling some feathers". Thus, the water protectors asserted their Indigenous jurisdiction over unceded, Algonquin land by smuggling firewood and a fire pit into the securitized zone of Parliament Hill. On the Canada 150 stage where bands rehearsed their performances for the next day, Walk Off the Earth played "Fire in my Soul".<sup>36</sup> In an act of resistance and solidarity, water protectors, elders, and non-Indigenous supporters including white settlers and racialized folks, formed a human chain around the tipi and started a round dance. Neveau describes the affective energy generated in that moment: "That was a really powerful moment [...] you felt the difference there after the sacred fire was lit".

Meanwhile, the manager of Logistic Services for Major Events, Commemoration and Capital

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<sup>36</sup> It is worth noting here that over three days, not one performer stopped their rehearsal to acknowledge the Bawating water protectors or their elders. It was not until the televised Canada Day show that some musicians acknowledged Algonquin territory.

Experience emailed Canadian Heritage staff with the subject line: “fire pit at teepee”. “There’s a fire pit that has been lit. PPS is managing the situation” (AI-2017-00330, 24).

Everyone at the decolonial space of the tipi protected the sacred fire from the heavy rain that started on Thursday morning and continued until Saturday night. It rained so much that massive puddles accumulated on the Parliament Hill lawn on Canada Day. It was as if Mother Nature cooperated with the ceremony, doing her part to unsettle Canada 150. In Johnny Wabigwan’s words:

It seemed like it was raining for like four days. Every day, you’d wake up, it’d rain. Go to bed, it’d rain, but I feel like that was like a cleansing, you know. It was really cleansing. Like it was needed.

### *Strange Encounters of the (De)Colonial Kind*

Draped in red and white rain ponchos with maple leaf patterns, red hats, and carrying Canada flags, 150 celebrants began arriving at the Hill in the early morning of 1 July, sitting in the rain to secure their positions by the stage. For decades Canada Day partygoers could move freely from adjacent Elgin and Wellington Streets on and off of the Hill to take in the afternoon and evening musical performances that have been a staple of Canada Day since the 1960s (Hayday 2010, 297). In 2017, on the other hand, Canada Day participants encountered RCMP patrolling downtown Ottawa with AK-47s and hours-long line-ups with airport-style security screening to enter the Hill. Canada 150 partygoers complained about poorly planned and intense security in Letters to the Editor of the *Ottawa Citizen*:

We got up early in the rain to line up for what we thought might be two hours to get onto Parliament Hill. We waited five-and-a-half hours. When we reached Kent Street, it was barricaded. We finally pushed our way through. It was terrible. (A-2017-00155).

As partygoers arrived, two distinct spaces formed: the decolonial reoccupation and the celebration. The tipi occupied its own space, separate from the crowd, as if an invisible border

encircled the tipi. One group was there to invest happy feelings in Canada, the other, to assert a sacred claim to land and sovereignty. One group was drawn together by the celebration of the nation-state, and one formed around contesting its foundations. I attribute this demarcation between the reoccupation and the Canada Day celebration to what Ahmed (2000) calls the “spatial function” of “strangers”, who “establish and define the boundaries of who ‘we’ are” (3). In this case, those reoccupying Parliament Hill were strangers, those who are immediately “*recognized as not belonging*, as being out of place” (Ahmed 2000, 21).

Ahmed is interested in how encounters – defined as meetings involving surprise and conflict – with strangers “surprise” and “shift the boundaries of the familiar, of what we assume that we know” (2000, 7). I argue that the establishment of a decolonial zone on Parliament Hill succeeded in challenging “the boundaries of the familiar” by disrupting the spatial and colonial dynamics of the celebratory space. Ahmed emphasizes the racist and colonial nature of strange encounters, informed by discourses of exclusion, including “stranger danger,” and inclusion, in the form of “stranger fetishism” – defined as “the turn to the stranger as a figure who should be welcomed” (Ahmed 2000, 6). While the state response to the reoccupation of Parliament Hill as a matter of public safety and security invoked a discourse of “stranger danger”, some national subjects responded to the reoccupation with “stranger fetishism”.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to the tipi on Friday, 30 June illustrates the ways inclusive discourses fetishize strangers. Clad in a denim jacket embroidered with the words “Canada: 150 Years Young” in red, Trudeau and Sophie-Grégoire Trudeau dropped by the tipi unannounced and uninvited. Some water protectors and land defenders noted that it was a breach of Anishinaabe law and protocol to visit the tipi without making an offer of tobacco. Nonetheless, Trudeau declared to news media waiting outside the tipi that his visit was one of



“respect and reconciliation”. Recounting this visit at Algoma U, Neveau (2017) had the following to say about Trudeau’s reconciliatory message:

When we were in the tipi with Justin Trudeau, what he said to us was like, ‘Oh, well, we did include you [...] in the 150 celebration. You know, so, they said that they had the dancers and, and the throat singers – that part. But it’s, it’s the whole point of, like, that wasn’t from *our* voices. That wasn’t from the grassroots people. Those decisions were made by Perry Belgarde from the AFN, and really not grassroots voices at all.

While Neveau implies that perhaps there is a way in which Indigenous youth engaged in decolonial struggles might be successfully included in Canada 150, if, for example, they had been consulted about the celebrations, what her movement fundamentally aims to do is to unsettle Canada, and inclusion and cultural recognition – no matter who is consulted – does not accomplish that aim. Neveau is refusing representations of Indigeneity that incorporate Indigenous peoples into the Canadian story without truly affirming their political sovereignty (Simpson 2014). When she says, “that wasn’t from *our* voices”, she means that representations of Indigenous peoples in Canada 150 are depoliticized and carefully crafted by elite politicians. Neveau highlights the perils of inclusion and stranger fetishism for Indigenous peoples struggling for decolonization. The Canadian national narrative has consistently incorporated these kinds of respectable cultural, depoliticized images of Indigeneity. In Banff “Indian Days”, for example, settler newcomers asked Stoney and other First Nations to perform like “real Indians” (Clapperton 2013, 350). “Dominion Day” celebrations have featured these kinds of fetishizing representations of Indigeneity since at least the 1950s (Hayday 2010).

Given the federal government’s attempts to incorporate Indigenous resistance to Canada 150 celebrations, reframing Indigenous resistance as “diversity”, it is significant that the jingle dancers who performed as the Prime Minister and the Governor General entered the Canada Day crowd joined the water protectors at the tipi as soon as they had finished their performance. Along with the water protectors and their supporters, the dancers knelt in a demonstration of

resistance as “O Canada!” played, an act of refusal to condone the very celebration that had sought to depoliticize and fetishize their presence. This was similar to the performers at Banff Indian Days, who frequently used the event to subvert and resist settlers’ expectations (Clapperton 2013). Before leaving, the jingle dancers thanked the water protectors and their allies for their show of resistance to the Canadian nation-state. The dancers refused to have their culture offered up for consumption without also expressing their political sovereignty (Simpson 2014, 11). In fact, the dancers themselves probably would not read these two actions to be mutually exclusive, since their dancing is an expression of sovereignty in the first place. Billy Ray Belcourt’s call to embrace paradox is helpful here. Paradox, Belcourt writes, “is a modality [...] with which to upend the hold that narrow ways of thinking have on our ethico-philosophical possibilities” (237). Paradox, he writes, “weakens the epistemic power of normative theories that seek to once and for all determine how best to be in the world” (2018, 237). The failure to embrace paradox, Belcourt writes, often means that “Indigenous peoples are squeezed into flattened forms of subjectivity” (2018, 237).

Despite the acts of refusal at the reoccupation site, when settler partygoers did approach the tipi, they often did so with a sense of “stranger fetishism” (Ahmed 2000). For example, some partygoers wearing red and white took pictures in front of the tipi, treating it as a tourist attraction. A settler there to take in the celebration told me she objected to the representations of Indigeneity and acts of resistance, such as die-ins, that she saw around the tipi – acts she accurately recognized as hostility to the settler-colonial nation-state. Gesturing to the Indigenous dancers performing on stage she said: “*This*, I’m okay with”, highlighting Canadian settler tolerance for depoliticized representations of Indigeneity. Whereas Rifkin (2013) argues that these kinds of “tropes of Indianness” enable “Native presence to ‘figure’ in settler

phenomonologies without ‘completely disrupting’ them” (332). Indeed, settlers often appropriate tipis as symbols of Canadian multiculturalism and diversity as opposed to sacred spaces of teaching, learning, healing, and resisting (Danyluk and MacDonald (2018).

## **Conclusion**

As Canada 150 celebrations wound to a close at the end of 2017, the Department of Canadian Heritage sanctioned an illuminated tipi on Parliament Hill, “lit every night at 5:30 p.m. of the closing celebrations” (Passport2017, 2017). These kinds of state-sanctioned representations of “Native presence” fail to disrupt settler certainty about land and resources, and therefore evidence settler common sense (Rifkin 2013, 332). Likewise, in 2018 Canada Day celebrations on Parliament Hill commenced with an Algonquin ceremony, for the first time ever. I return to the way I began, with reminder of reasons to be skeptical about land acknowledgements. While a land acknowledgement has the potential to be unsettling, it is also worth considering the ways such a gesture incorporates Algonquin sovereignty without changing relations. By reasserting Algonquin sovereignty and law on Parliament Hill and engendering decolonial encounters between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, reoccupation disrupted the perception of settled urban space in the centre of the settler-colonial national imagination. In a panel discussion at Algoma University following the reoccupation, Freddy Stonepoint (2017) describes the goal of disrupting notions of settled urban space:

What we wanted to do was challenge the notion of settled space by reasserting a new form of Indigenous jurisdiction, and what that means is reconceptualizing urban space and urban place because, you know, urban spaces, they were originally Indigenous land.

The reoccupation generated tangible “settler anxiety” (Mackey 2016, 35; Tuck and Yang 2012). In response, the settler-colonial nation-state attempted to “fold in” Indigenous resistance to Canada 150 as representative of “diversity”, and depicted water protectors and land defenders

reoccupying Parliament Hill as threats to public safety and national security. Settler Canada 150 celebrants had strange encounters with the tipi, fetishizing it as a symbol of Canadian multiculturalism (Ahmed 2000). At the same time, through a logic of settler-common sense emphasizing “non-relations” to land, the state invited non-Indigenous peoples to occupy public space in celebration of the nation-state (Rifkin 2013, 323).

As I discuss in the introduction to this dissertation, I do not understand my own presence there to be somehow outside of settler-colonial power relations. In *Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times*, Alexis Shotwell (2016) argues for doing away with attempts to live a pure political and ethical life, in which one constantly strives to separate herself from power relations. No one can live their life outside of “complex webs of suffering”; thus, to strive for a pure ethical and political stance in which one does no harm to other living things elides the important step of acknowledging one’s complicity (Shotwell 2016, 5). Shotwell’s point is not that we are all impure, and therefore social justice and anti-colonial politics are lost causes. Rather, acting from a position of acknowledging our “constitutive impurity” is a starting point from which we can grapple with the messiness of the present (Shotwell 2016, 1). Accepting one’s impurity, I think, also counteracts the pull settlers feel towards innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012). If settlers were to embrace their impurity, and act anyway, this might be a better starting point towards what Mackey (2016) and (Regan 2010) term “settler decolonization”, a term to which I return in the concluding chapter.

## CHAPTER SIX: CANCEL CANADA DAY

In its focus on narratives, myth, symbols, and rituals, this dissertation has strayed from Canadian Political Science's traditional focus on politics as the stuff that happens in political parties, elections, legislatures, courts, and bureaucracies. Studies of national celebrations and commemorations do not tend to come from within the field of Political Science. But why not? On their surface, national celebrations and commemorations are cultural and social events, so one could be forgiven for imagining that parties on the lawn of Parliament are irrelevant to decisions made inside the building. Studying the ways culture, myth, heritage, tradition, and kinship are political, relating to policy, law, and democracy, avoids a conception of politics as always rational, evidence-based, orderly, and institutional (Stevens 1999). Stories, myths, symbols, and traditions shape the ways subjects come to understand their relationship to the nation-state, and their political values, needs, wants, and desires. As Christie (2011) writes, stories "are the carriers of meaning itself", defining "who we are and how we think of the world", shaping "what can be thought" and what can be done (338).

Indeed, a premise of my argument is that national celebrations are political – both in the sense of creating stories that shape people's relations to one another and political in the sense of relating to core Political Science concepts: sovereignty, legitimacy, nations, and land. If a state is an institution with a legitimate claim to authority over a bounded territory, then territory is something Canadian Political Scientists seem to forget when they take Canadian sovereignty for granted. Indigenous resistance continues to expose Canada's tenuous grasp on legitimate authority over Indigenous land. If the RCMP must exert force, as it did on Wet'suwet'en land, for example, so that extractive industries can build "critical infrastructure", how strong is Canada's claim to sovereignty *a mari usque ad mare*? Simpson argues that non-Indigenous Political Scientists have yet to deal in a robust way with the fact that Canada is not settled: it is

not “‘done,’ finished,’ ‘complete’” (2014, 11). I have argued in this dissertation that national celebrations are one means through which Canada tries to settle its legitimacy, which is very much on shaky ground.

Landmark celebrations produce happy narratives of diversity, inclusion, and cooperation which nurture settlers’ attachments to the nation-state. Whereas Canadians have come to associate refrains about the strength of Canadian diversity with Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the deployment of the progressive language of diversity, I demonstrate, is not uniquely Conservative or Liberal. For example, in Chapter Three I challenge the conventional understanding of former Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s nationalist vision of Canada as a white, British “Warrior Nation”, demonstrating that the Harper Conservatives also mobilized the language of diversity, arguing in the commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812 that the war represents the origins of Canadian diversity (Government of Canada 2015). The 1812 monument, *Triumph Through Diversity*, functions to diversify Ottawa’s white national symbolic landscape while, at the same time, obscuring settler-colonialism as foundational and ongoing. In Chapter Four, I show that reconciliation and diversity discourses slide together, such that encounters with and consumption of diversity is imagined as doing reconciliation. Whereas Canada C3 as a project of storying Canadian sovereignty through reconciliation presents Inuit as diverse, Inuit participants presented alternate stories that challenge singular conceptions of sovereignty as statehood. These alternate stories, Christie (2011) argues, are a form of resistance to a potential new stage of colonization in the North.. That the Canada C3 project was so easily transformed from its original focus on Canadian sovereignty under Harper to a “voyage of reconciliation” demonstrates the ease with which white settler-colonial national narratives converge with liberal progressive narratives of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation. At the

same time these stories affirm settler states of feeling, they also curtail the range of possibilities for the alternative futures (Christie 2011). That is, if Canada is the collaborative endeavor of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, then Indigenous resistance to the very foundations of the Canadian nation-state and ongoing settler-colonial power structures seem illegitimate. Or, as Darryl Leroux (2010) writes of the presentation of Samuel de Champlain in the 2008 Québec 400 celebrations: “How could present-day Indigenous movements against colonialism be legitimate if the ‘encounter’ was so peaceful and amicable?” (19). If Canada is not the result of colonial encounter, then Canada cannot be *decolonized*. If Canada is serious about establishing a nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous peoples – which implies a respect for Indigenous sovereignty and survival – then Canada should discontinue the practice of landmark celebrations, which are fundamentally incompatible with respect for Indigenous sovereignty and survival.

### **The Case for Cancelling Canada Day**

Decolonization, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012) argue is not about bringing about a state of feeling among settlers; rather, it requires the “repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (1). In “The State is a Man”, Simpson (2016) writes that reconciliation – which is different from decolonization, is not possible:

unless all people stand fully before the sorts of stories I have just assembled, the stories that circulate in our communities, the loss, the gains, the names, and think then about what peace means. The settler state is asking to forgive and to forget, with no land back, no justice, and no peace.

Cancelling Canada Day, which aims to construct happy narratives out of the stories Simpson tells, is just one step towards producing the conditions for Canada to “stand before” the stories of survivors of Canada’s settler-colonial regime. This argument for cancelling Canada Day is not my own. On 1 July 2020, as governments cancelled Canada Day across the country to limit the

spread of COVID-19, the Idle No More movement called to permanently “Cancel Canada Day” and the hashtag #CancelCanadaDay went viral (Daflos 2020). Far from a radical proposition, the notion of cancelling the annual celebration of Confederation is very much in step with widespread calls to take down statues to Canada’s “Founding Father” Sir John A Macdonald. Called “Dominion Day” until 1982, Canada Day as Canadians now know it is relatively new, so it is not a natural and inevitable part of the Canadian fact, nor is Canada the only settler-colony facing calls to stop celebrating dispossession. In settler-colonies worldwide, Indigenous peoples resist celebrations of national founding. For example, 6 February, when New Zealanders celebrate the Treaty of Waitangi, is a day of protest for Maori. On 26 January, when Australians mark the arrival of the First Fleet of British ships, Indigenous peoples remind them that it is “Invasion Day” – a “day of mourning” (Coleman 2018). Calls to “Abolish Australia Day” are louder year-by-year. Whereas Israelis mark the Israel Declaration of Independence, Palestinians recognize the day as *al Nakba* – the catastrophe. Cancelling Canada Day is necessary because, as I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, celebrations focused on diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation do not suffice to engender new relationships. To the contrary, they reaffirm present relationships between the state, settlers, and Indigenous peoples. My analysis of the 1812 commemoration shows, for example, that attempts at more “diverse” and “inclusive” commemorations may nonetheless perpetuate settler-colonial logics, and end up only “diversifying whiteness” (Smith 2018a). On this point, future research should investigate how the RCMP as a settler-colonial, white supremacist institution incorporates the language of diversity, inclusion, and reconciliation in the celebration of its sesquicentennial in 2023. Amidst a growing movement to defund or abolish the police, led by Black Lives Matter, I suspect the RCMP will turn to the language of diversity and reconciliation.



I do not want to imply that different kinds of stories do not matter. Narratives of diversity, reconciliation, and inclusion can have symbolic and political importance when paired with critiques of white supremacy and ongoing colonialism and projects of decolonization and anti-racism. For example, Malinda S. Smith (2018) challenges the erasure of Black women from Canadian national narratives, which, she argues, both reflects and reproduces Canadian anti-Black racism. National narratives that employ diversity as way of describing Canada, Smith demonstrates, do not suffice to capture the complex lives of Black, Indigenous, and racialized people, their relationships to Canada, or to challenge gender and race power relations. By “excavating and foregrounding” stories of Black women’s resistance to racism and sexism, Smith demonstrates that anti-Black racism has been foundational to Canada, but so has Black women’s resistance. When stories of Black women’s resistance remain untold, or when a single story dominates, the “social imaginary” is left to “default to hegemonic narratives” (Smith 2018b).

Indeed, finding alternative narratives is crucial. Michael Asch (2014) argues that a national narrative that positions treaty-making as Canada’s foundation has the potential to change settler-Indigenous relations:

the place to begin is to retell the story of Canada in such a way that the treaties by which the Crown secured the legitimate right of those it represented to settle on these lands are understood as its founding moment. (7-8)

If treaties were a starting point for understanding Canada, Asch argues, then settlers would conceive of their own presence as conditional upon respecting treaties, which advanced a nation-to-nation relationship (Asch 2014, 6). Yet, re-narrating Canada in this way would require Canada to develop relations with Indigenous peoples with whom it has entered into treaties based on living up to the terms and conditions of those treaties. Using treaties as the starting point for Canada’s national narrative could be revolutionary, because the state would have to seriously

acknowledge the fact that it has not signed treaties with Indigenous peoples on the west coast, for example, and therefore does not have legitimacy. However, in the New Zealand context, celebrating the Treaty of Waitangi annually on the 6 February does not make Indigenous peoples feel any less dispossessed. Therefore, future research might study the potential for Canada to position treaties as founding documents by studying the case of New Zealand. Like Maori, Indigenous peoples on the Canadian plains tend to view treaty making as a form of dispossession in itself, because the Crown's interpretation of the agreements is profoundly at odds with Indigenous oral histories (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996, Venne 1997). Therefore, any attempt to position treaties as founding documents must reflect Indigenous critiques of treaties.

As opposed to searching for a new national narrative that the Canadian state can use to legitimize its sovereignty, I contend that the kind of “fundamental shift in settler common-sense frameworks” required for decolonization will come from the bottom up, through the hard work of collective resistance at the grassroots level (Mackey 2016, 11). For example, Mackey (2016) argues that alliances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists around land rights, invite non-Indigenous people to “experience ‘being in Indigenous sovereignty’ [...] preparing the ground for new decolonizing relations” (16, quoting Nicoll 2004). Epistemological shifts take place through “political activism and collective work” that refuse to Other (Ahmed 2000, 17). Writing about the potential for transnational feminist alliances, for example, Ahmed writes: “we need to find ways of re-encountering these encounters so that they no longer hold other others in place” (2000, 17). In Chapter 5, for example, I argued that the reoccupation of Parliament Hill by Algonquin water protectors not only unsettled Parliament Hill, but engaged in a form of decolonial world making in alliance with Black, racialized, and white settlers. “Collectivities,”

Ahmed writes, “are formed through the very work that has to be done in order to get closer to other others” (2000, 17).

It is possible to will something different. In *Willful Subjects* (2014b), Ahmed explains that willful subjects are the ones who reject the “withness” of willing towards the thing that is supposed to provide happiness: the family, the community, or the nation (Ahmed 2014b, 51). Willful subjects, who will towards something different, become separate or difficult. They are the killjoys at national birthday parties – kneeling during Oh! Canada. Willing towards something different is difficult: “It might be,” Ahmed writes, “the difficulty of ‘not willing’ that is how we come to be willing with others: willing together as a way of avoiding difficulty” (Ahmed 2010, 51). Decolonization requires settlers to embrace difficulty, discomfort, and uncertainty (Mackey 2016, 38). Rejecting settler common sense may engender “alternative frameworks, and seed possibilities for creative and engaged relationships and collective projects” (Mackey 2016, 38).

Yet, Tuck and Yang (2012) write that settlers prefer reconciliation over decolonization, because reconciliation holds out hope for happiness, enabling settlers to come to terms with our “guilt and complicity” without threatening “settler futurity” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 3). While it seems unlikely that settlers will embrace alternatives to their own futurity, my experience teaching millennials and Gen Z, who reflect “super diversity” and “hyper diversity”, suggests otherwise (Smith 2018a). These generations face “multiple and overlapping crises” of climate change, income inequality, migration, in addition to the crisis posed by ongoing colonialism (Brodie 2012, 117). Unable to buy homes, secure full-time jobs with benefits, and faced with the uncertainty of a rapidly changing climate, millennials and Gen Z demand new ways of thinking about the world. They understand that their future is not secure, and many of them see land theft

and resource extraction as a threat to their future as opposed to the backbone of a strong economy, which has yet to provide for them anyway. Millennials and Gen Z understand that the future, as it is, is untenable, and they are engaged in movements for racial justice, climate justice, social justice, and decolonization. The stories that come out of these resistance movements are stories worth telling.

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