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GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND UNIVERSITY CHANGE: THE CASE OF UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES

BY

DANIEL SCHUGURENSKY

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduates Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND UNIVERSITY CHANGE: THE CASE OF UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES submitted by DANIEL SCHUGURENSKY in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in INTERNATIONAL/INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION.

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August 17, 1994

ABSTRACT

This study examines the process of university restructuring in the context of the shift in the global economy from fordism to post-fordism. From a theoretical framework that combines political economy and cultural studies, the study identifies three main trends taking place at the international, national and institutional level: the rise of institutional capitalism, the retrenchment of the state and the commodification of knowledge. Although the main features of university restructuring are similar throughout the world, there are peculiarities which are specific to each national formation and to each institution.

After reviewing current transformations of universities worldwide, a shift from the autonomous to the heteronomous university is identified in diverse countries. The heteronomous university results from the combination of a 'commercial' and a 'controlled' environment, that is, a new model amalgamating laissez faire mechanisms and state interventionism. In this model, university autonomy is not eliminated, but is drastically reduced. Although the literature raises some concern about possible negative outcomes of these changes for the academic world and the community at large, the heteronomous agenda is generally welcomed by many university actors. This is partly due to a discourse that is able to reconcile different, and often competing, projects and values.

The study analyzes the situation of Argentina, where the social contract established in the 1918 Córdoba Reform is being challenged by government proposals for university restructuring. Heeding the advice of international agencies, these proposals are oriented towards the heteronomous model, easily imposed in Chile by the military in the early 1980s. In Argentina, the heteronomous agenda is constrained by the rules of parliamentary democracy and a robust tradition of university autonomy. This creates a conflictive situation in which two main sets of actors are identified: 'autonomists' and 'marketventionists'. The study examines the dynamics of this conflict, using the case of the Universidad de Buenos Aires. It is based on information collected from more than sixty in depth interviews with key university and state actors, and from a variety of published and unpublished documents.

The analysis of this case informs that institutional capitalism, the retrenchment of the state and the commodification of knowledge are not abstract entities. They constitute concrete social developments that generate pressure for university restructuring worldwide.

Moreover, as illustrated with the Argentinean case, the three developments are closely interconnected through human agencies. The study also indicates that the Argentinean crisis of the autonomous university modeled after the 1918 Reform is an 'objective' crisis, in the sense that the continuation of its main operational principles is at stake, but is is also subjectively experienced by most actors. In Argentina, the debate on the appropriateness of the autonomous and the heteronomous models for the university is often obscured by a polarized and emotional controversy on funding and efficiency.

The defensive position that the university is forced to asume in this conflict inhibits it from engaging in serious and open self-criticism. The evidence presented in the study suggests that most public universities are becoming 'cultural factories' competing in the marketplace, and at the same time more subjected to state controls and regulations. The study shows that the emphasis that each higher education system places on the 'commercial' or the 'controlled' aspect of the heteronomous university, and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the academic world, are highly contingent upon the national polity, the history of the university system and the internal balance of forces within each individual university.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAUT	Canadian Association of University Teachers
CBC	Ciclo Básico Común, UBA
CEA	Centro de Estudios Avanzados de la UBA
CGI	Confederación General de la Industria
CIN	Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional
CNEA	Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica
CONADU	Coordinadora Nacional de Docentes Universitarios
CONICET	Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología
FICSO	Frente Independiente de Ciencias Sociales
FUBA	Federación Universitaria de Buenos Aires
GFC	General Faculties Council (Consejo Superior Universitario)
IDB	Interamerican Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTA	Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
INTI	Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial
JUP	Juventud Universitaria Peronista
LDCs	Less developed countries
MDCs	More developed countries
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común Sudamericano
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
PRONATASS	Programa Nacional de Asistencia Técnica para la Administración de los Servicios Sociales en la República Argentina
UBACYT	Programa de Ciencia y Técnica de la Universidad de Buenos Aires
UCD	Unión de Centro Democrático
UIA	Unión Industrial Argentina
UNAM	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
UPAU	Unión para la Apertura Universitaria

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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The public university is massive and tuition-free, two slogans that caused its present fall (a 'marketventionist' dean,)

In the model implemented by this government, the university is considered either as an obstacle or as booty (an 'autonomist' dean)

Introduction

There is a general agreement in Argentinean society that the public university is in a state of crisis. However, there is little agreement as to the nature of such a crisis, its causes and its remedies. Whereas the government perceives it as a crisis of performance, the academic community understands it as a crisis of funding. This basic discrepancy is the recurrent theme in the crossfire between the government and university leaders. Usually the debate is framed within the parameters established by the government. Indeed, the conflict between Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) and the state, as reflected in the Argentinean media, shows a polarized debate with a singular focus on efficiency. On the one hand, the government claims that the university has become obsolete, inefficient, insensitive to societal demands, and unwilling to adapt to the new era of fiscal restraint. Challenging this view, UBA leaders contend that the state is abandoning the public university, and that, given the poor working conditions, the scarcity of resources and the high quality of graduates and research products, the university is one of the most efficient social institutions. They also lament that government proposals for university restructuring [1] are short-sighted, and that the long-term consequences of cutbacks on national development may be irreversible [2].

The disagreement is not only related to different interpretations of the university mission, but also to disparate descriptions of the financial reality of the university. For instance, whereas university leaders argue that the university budget is in decline, government authorities contend that it is rising [3]. Beyond the statistical manipulation of the data, the government and the academia understand the university crisis in a different way, and therefore propose different solutions. Indeed, the 'efficiency issue' is just the façade of a larger debate on university restructuring which includes a variety of areas such as admission, finance, governance, relationship with the outside world (industry and state) and the organization of the higher education system. In this debate, two distinct positions can be identified: those that advocate university restructuring, on the one hand, and those that resist it, on the other.

The theoretical assumptions adopted by different authors are generally instrumental in advancing a particular agenda, and are often more related to the strategic position of the authors on the political map than to a dispassionate effort to understand the dynamics of the so-called 'university crisis'. Much of the available literature on the topic tends to align with one or the other side of the conflict, presenting either an institutional-functional account (blaming exclusively universities for a variety of internal 'sins' that led to the current crisis) or a reproductionist account (blaming exclusively external forces for all university problems). I attempt to overcome the limitations of adopting a one-sided approach by looking at the multiple interactions between structure and agency (considering human actors as both products and producers of history) and by examining not only the 'performance' crisis and the 'financial' crisis, but also the crisis in the relationship between university and state and the international crisis of the Fordist model of production and distribution. Although this can be interpreted as a call for a 'neutral' and 'objective' approach to the issue, this is not the case. I do not claim to have achieved such neutrality, nor do I think it is possible. I have made a special effort to carefully listen to the arguments raised by the

contending parties, to find the main areas of conflict, to detect their internal inconsistencies, and to look for an explanatory framework that goes beyond the particular descriptions and allegations of interest groups.

Indeed, this is a study about a conflict in which actors are entrenched in their positions and engage in antagonistic behavior. Confusion, misinformation, finger-pointing and mud slinging are, with a few exceptions, prominent characteristics of the university debate in Argentina and many other Latin American countries. While one set of actors pressures for university restructuring, another set of actors resists such pressure. The latter attempt to preserve the social contract reached in the 1918 Córdoba Reform [4], whereas the former struggle to replace it with a model inspired by the 1981 Chilean restructuring. Throughout Latin America, social forces within and outside the campus exercise intense pressure to reshape the main features of public universities. This conflictive process, a sort of 'Counter-Reformation' of Latin American universities, is a complex myriad of demands, confrontations, alliances and mediations.

In this thesis, I will attempt to describe these factors and to analyze the mediations among them, using the case of the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). I selected UBA because it is one of the few institutions that remain loyal to the main principles of the 1918 Reform and, moreover, because it is at the forefront of the resistance against government policies. It is my contention further that the pressures for restructuring -and the resistances to it- observed at the University of Buenos Aires cannot be fully understood if the analysis is confined to the university setting, or even to the national scene. A better understanding can be achieved by simultaneously examining international, national and institutional factors, and the interaction among them. In other words, this study attempts to remove some of the artificial boundaries which conceptually divorce the analysis of the university from the analysis of the state and the analysis of the world system.

This chapter is organized in two sections. The first section introduces the need for this study, depicts different interpretations of the alleged university crisis, and relates the pressures for university restructuring to a larger process of economic restructuring. The second section presents the research problem, describes the methodological approach of the study, and discusses the main difficulties encountered by the researcher together with some strategies attempted to overcome them. Finally, it presents the general organization of the thesis.

Section 1: Background to the study

1. The need for the study

Universities all over the world are experiencing intense pressure from governments and private organizations to change their goals, functions and organizational structure. In some countries, like England or Chile, important changes already took place during the 1980s. In these countries, the new direction of the public university was evident in performance-based funding, increased links with industry, elimination of tenure, regulations on enrollments, rising tuition fees, changes in the representation of governing bodies and external evaluations, among other measures. In many other countries, similar changes are currently occurring at a rapid pace. Within each country, some institutions fervently endorse the proposed changes, others resign themselves and sooner or later adopt them, and a few present resistance. In the latter case, a conflict between the state and the university, and within the university itself, is inevitable.

This study deals with this type of conflict. In the first three chapters, the main features of the proposed restructuring (and of alternative university models) and the factors leading to the

success of the restructuring agenda are discussed. In the remaining chapters, the mediations between global pressures and institutional dynamics in a concrete setting -the Universidad de Buenos Aires- are examined. The intention was to develop an analytical framework for the study of university change that overcomes the reductionism and mechanicism of structural perspectives, and the limitations of institutional approaches. The underlying assumption is that university change is a product of complex mediations between structural constraints and social actors.

There are at least two main reasons for undertaking this study. The first is the scarcity of relevant literature on university restructuring. Although higher education involves millions of students, thousands of professors and extensive budgets, and despite the fact that present changes in universities are closely related to relevant societal issues such as technological dependency, research and development, critical thought, class domination, social control and the like, the topic of university restructuring has received little scholarly attention. In fact, there is a growing concern that the consequences of structural adjustment policies for higher education, and the potential impact of government funding policies that encourage closer links with the market on the production and distribution of knowledge, have not yet been sufficiently recognized and discussed (Arnove 1967, Clark 1983, Pérez Lindo 1984, Levy 1986, Newson & Buchbinder 1988, Zidelman 1990, Reimers 1991). This situation is particularly evident in Argentina, where the scholarly analysis of higher education is still an incipient field. Despite the fact that Argentinean universities enroll approximately 1 million students, the relevant literature on the topic does not exceed a handful of titles.[5] Moreover, although the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) is the largest university in the country and the leader of those public universities opposing restructuring pressures, none of its 180 research projects are about the university itself. In short, if compared with other educational areas and issues, research on higher education restructuring is meager, particularly in Argentina.

Why this field has not attracted enough attention from researchers can be attributed to the fact that scholars do not have the tradition of seriously analyzing the field of their daily activities (Clark 1983). The negligible academic debate on university restructuring can be explained by three concurrent factors. First, the pressures on universities to implement changes are so compelling that many academics take for granted the new trends and feel that very little can be done to resist them. Second, many academic workers, demoralized by underfunding and decrease in quality, are willing to welcome new sources of funding and the renewed value being placed on their activities by the corporate sector. They believe that no harm will result from this partnership, assuming that the university can serve the interests of business without compromising its traditional functions, that more government control will enhance efficiency, and that restriction of enrollments will improve excellence. In some countries, like Argentina, many professors sympathize with tuition fees on the grounds that in the present situation of cost-free education their low salaries are subsidizing students, and would like to see a reduction in the power exercised by students in governing bodies. The third factor which helps to explain the absence of debate is that the decision making process is restricted to a handful of administrators and full-time managers, such that academics feel excluded from it (Newson and Buchbinder 1988).

The second reason for this study is that most of the existing literature on higher education is descriptive rather than interpretive. Shannon (1990), for instance, complains that novel contributions to the field are minimal. In his view, the discussion has been limited to the constant reappearance of a litany of issues such as access, demographics, elitism, organizational structure and financial support, to the extent that "there truly is little which is new, save the actors" (p.ii). I agree that the issues tend to be the same, but such a charge could be made for most social disciplines. I contend that the main problem is not that the same issues are repeated, but that the literature tends to be extremely polemic and

speculative. The polemic literature is prominent in Latin America, where emerging discussions on university restructuring are perceived to be highly ideological, polarized, and full of emotional symbols (Pérez Lindo 1984, Levy 1986). However, these polemic approaches are also present in the U.S., where the literature on higher education policy, despite its apparent extensiveness, is organized by issues concerning access and equity, on the one hand, and by issues of excellence and quality, on the other hand (Slaughter 1990). The speculative perspective, which still dominates the field, focuses on normative prescriptions and institutional arrangements, draws on organizational analysis, and is based on functionalist approaches which are more concerned with the internal dynamics of a closed system than with historical analyses that consider issues such as power and conflict.

As Omari (1991) noted, with a few exceptions, current studies of universities do not address the issue of the crisis of the state, as if the crisis of higher education were merely a technocratic matter. This speculative perspective tends to understand institutional settings as Platonic entities, and to propose ideal and flawless models of universities together with specific recommendations based on managerial rationality. Since this model interprets university restructuring as a natural institutional adaptation to societal and technological modernization, the question of who benefits and who loses with the new rules of the game is seldom addressed. Critical perspectives based on Marxist or Neo-Marxist perspectives attempt to address those issues, but they tend to overemphasize the reproductionist role of education and to underemphasize the internal analysis of universities and their relationships with industry and the state (Axelrod 1986). These studies tend to focus on the role of the state in modern capitalist societies, and consider both the state and education merely as instruments of the dominant classes. In recent years, a considerable amount of research conducted by critical theorists looks at the state in a different light. Although it tends to represent the interest of the dominant classes, it also acts as a mediator between them and the 'common good', and has some interests of its own. This body of research also attempts to unlock the 'black box' of the educational system. However, the vast majority of these works deal with elementary and secondary education, and few examine universities and colleges.

Drawing on this perspective, it is relevant to understand how universities operate and change, not in isolation, but in real interactions with the outside world, because the public university conflict is intimately related to broader socio-historical developments, both at the national and at the international level. In analyzing these interactions, this study attempts to contribute to the field by providing empirical substance and theoretical significance. For this, I use a framework combining political economy perspectives and cultural studies, where the concept of power, the role of the state and international capital, the analysis of discourse and institutional dynamics are of paramount importance. In this respect, the debate in higher education is part of a broader societal debate which includes, among other issues, state subsidies and user fees, government control and institutional autonomy, societal needs as perceived by different social actors, labor markets, and the contribution of higher education to economic development and social mobility. At the same time, the university is a distinct institution created in the middle ages whose primary function is the production and distribution of knowledge, and has its own peculiarities (Axelrod 1986, Neilson & Gaffield 1986, Levy 1986, Briceño 1988).

In short, in this study I suggest that the changes taking place at UBA are very difficult to explain if these external forces are ignored, and that any analysis of the future of universities must be addressed in the context of worldwide social, economic, and intellectual environments. However, as was already pointed out, the university as a public institution is not a mere reproducer of external structures. Rather, it is a concrete agency in which actors engage in actions that modify not only the direction of the university but also, to a certain degree, some of those external structures that affect them.

2. The contemporary university crisis

The concept of 'crisis' is probably one of the most recurrently referred to in the current literature on universities. Frequent references to the 'university crisis' can be also found in media reports, government papers and university documents throughout the world. Regardless of ideological affinities or positions toward university restructuring, there is a general consensus among actors and observers -inside and outside the university- that higher education is experiencing a serious crisis.

According to their particular disciplinary approach and their ideological premises, analysts conceptualize the university crisis in a different way. References have been made, for instance, to an organizational crisis, a sociocultural crisis, a moral crisis, a confidence crisis, an academic crisis, an efficiency crisis, and a political crisis in the university-state relationship, among other 'crises'. However, there is disagreement over whether the university crisis (however it is defined) is the antecedent or the consequence of university restructuring. For some, university restructuring constitutes the main source of the present university crisis; for others it is the cure. In other words, while some authors perceive the university crisis as the main cause of government initiatives for restructuring, others contend that it was precisely the restructuring promoted by governments that precipitated the university crisis.

Taking into account the origin attributed to the current university crisis, the existing literature can be classified in two major groups: 'internalists' and 'externalists'. The former emphasizes institutional shortcomings and deficiencies, whereas the latter focuses on societal attitudes and government policies. 'Internalists' usually refer to an academic crisis, an adaptability crisis, a sociocultural crisis, and an efficiency (or accountability) crisis. 'Externalists' generally allude to a financial crisis, a confidence crisis, and a moral crisis.

The 'academic' crisis is perceived as the loss of excellence present in the era prior to expansion. Those who speak about an academic crisis tend to compare the current low standards with the vigor, optimism and pride of years ago, and ask for the restoration of the vibrant "good old days". For them, the present university experience is so different and inferior to what it used to be that they wonder whether it can rightly be called a university experience at all. On occasion they even posit a causal link between academic decline and economic decline [6]. Taking into consideration the usual indicators to estimate quality of education in universities -faculty qualifications, permanence of staff, vitality of seminars, number and quality of research projects and publications, teacher/student ratios, well-stocked and up-to-date libraries, availability of journals and laboratory instruments, academic freedom, and high terminal efficiency (low dropout, failure and repetition rates)- this body of literature tends to stress that the crisis is not a mere nostalgic feeling of deterioration of quality resulting from an expanded higher education system, but rather a reality.

As previously advanced, the academic crisis is usually related to educational expansion. Using an ecological approach, in the sense that any disproportion in a given activity degrades the surrounding system, they argued that the lowering of standards of certification during the years of expansion resulted in degradation of the educational product. Likewise, it has been stressed that the pressure to "publish or perish' resulted in a flood of trivial publications, which is equally damaging to academic credibility. In developing countries, it is claimed that the academic crisis is having a concrete impact on the elasticity of mental capacities of students, on the constriction of intellectual diversity and expansion, and on the technologically obsolete practical skills that students get. Moreover, in these countries the decline in the quality of public universities produces a "flight" of better-off students to private institutions, which in turn reduces the political pressure to restore quality, and

deepens the gap between elite and mass education (Levy 1986, Vagianos 1986, Balán 1990, Reimer 1991, Coombe 1991, Salazar 1991, Omari 1991).

The 'adaptability' crisis refers to the isolation of universities in 'ivory towers', which results in an inherent inability to adapt to the modern world. Although some argue that universities have several adaptive mechanisms, first and foremost its the capacity to add and subtract fields of knowledge and related units without disturbing all the others (Clark 1983), those who believe in the existence of an 'adaptability' crisis claim that the university has lost touch with social and economic realities. In this view, the academic and scientific debates do not serve well either the needs of industry or the community, and the governing and organizational structures of universities are obsolete and anachronous.

The 'sociocultural' crisis is expressed as the difficulty of the university to continue being the cultural center of society. Winchester (1986) identifies six features of universities that have persisted over time, since the mediaeval era: a) independence, b) neutrality and impartiality, c) bookishness, d) concern for the advancement of knowledge, e) interest in the passing of knowledge critically, and f) its role as a cultural center [7]. For Winchester, although certain changes have occurred in some of these features, recent changes that have taken place in the latter (its role as a cultural center) are crucial, because they put at risk the very survival of the university. Indeed, the university was, throughout history, the cultural center of society. Depending on the predominant culture of the time, it was successively the center of religion, the center of secularization and the center of science and technology. Historically, universities have provided the necessary knowledge to meet the present and future requirements of particular professions and the general culture. Moreover, the institutional capacity of universities has allowed them not only to survive almost everything -feudalism, capitalism and socialism- and to resist the pressures of the church, the state and the public, but also to shape their immediate environment and even to influence the outside world.

Presently, however, it is perceived that the university is at a serious risk of losing its role as a cultural center. Some even argue that the situation is so dramatic that if the university is unable to overcome this crisis and restore its cultural centrality, it is not likely to survive in the near future (Clark 1983, Winchester 1986). The university's difficulty in continuing to serve as repositories of all knowledge is attributed to different factors. One is the separation of its common culture into the two cultures of sciences and humanities. This process, well described by Snow (1959), has intensified in recent years. A second factor is the inability to cope with the new technologic culture that prevails in today's world. The limitations of existing infrastructure and research equipment is becoming more evident as technology accelerates and financial resources decline. Indeed, the present pace of technological change compels the purchase of expensive equipment that quickly becomes obsolete, making it more and more difficult to keep up with innovation or the frontiers of knowledge. A similar phenomenon occurs with support structures, such as computers or libraries, particularly in public universities. A third factor, closely related to the second, is that the university finds it increasingly hard to compete with other agencies dedicated to the production and distribution of knowledge (Leavis 1979). As more educational resources, research facilities and learning experiences are available outside universities, it becomes more difficult to compete.

The 'efficiency' or 'accountability' crisis is based on the assumption that universities are not cost-effective institutions, and that this is largely due to a generous funding mechanism based on enrolments rather than on performance. In this view, universities are not giving society 'value for dollar'. The argument is that the lack of regulation over university activities and the lack of public control over university spending has led to irrationalities, duplication of efforts and expensive undertakings with little societal relevance. For Brunner (1991), this situation has been expressed in three problems. First, by funding universities through a paternal and benevolent formula based on enrollment figures, the state did not

promote the necessary incentives to improve quality and efficiency, to innovate and to be accountable. Second, the state did not regulate adequately the creation of new universities, which has led to the proliferation of new institutions which lack minimum standards of quality. Thirdly, universities, with or without funding, failed to conduct appropriate evaluation, and therefore performed as self-contained entities, accountable only to themselves. This structure, Brunner contends, has led to a triple crisis: a) crisis of incremental funding (the state is realizing that universities are too expensive and very inefficient); b) crisis of lack of regulation (excessive proliferation of low quality institutions); and c) crisis of lack of evaluation (decline in standards). These three crises combined constitute, in this view, the essence of the 'efficiency' or 'accountability' crisis. Further, those who stress the 'efficiency' crisis blame universities for wasting societal resources by producing an excessive number of graduates who subsequently become 'educated unemployed'. They also contend that tenure has resulted in nothing other than job security and hence an incentive for laziness, that 'isonomy' (equal remuneration for similar categories, regardless of individual productivity or market conditions) has led to mediocrity, and that university products have low societal relevance or little impact on development.

From a different framework, the genesis of the university crisis is identified as being outside the university setting. As was mentioned above, 'externalists' contend that, as a result of external pressures, the university is suffering three major crises: a financial crisis, a confidence crisis (or 'image' crisis) and a moral crisis. Of these three crises, the financial crisis is usually perceived as the most important one.

Those who emphasize the financial crisis focus on the negative impact of budget cutbacks on university activities. In this view, the key element to understand the university crisis is the fiscal crisis of the state, which has resulted in less public spending in the social sector, including education (Gertel 1991, Reimers 1991). Hence, in a chain of rivalry for scarcer resources, education must compete with many other programs, universities must compete with other educational sectors and, within the university, faculties and departments must compete among each other for funding and occassionally for survival. The financial problems of universities are reflected, among other things, in horizontal and vertical cuts (eliminating entire departments or programs), in teachers' salaries, in the deterioration of facilities, etc. This situation is more evident in developing countries, where salaries of university professors have consistently declined in the recent decades. In some African universities, for example, professors may earn one-fifth as much as a bus driver (Omari 1991). In the case of Argentina, the salary of part-time academic staff is so low that some professors find it more sensible to forfeit their salary and donate it to the university, rather than to deal with a troublesome administrative bureaucracy.

In this context, university professors usually take other jobs in order to survive, and in many cases these activities are not related to their disciplines. Some of them abandon academic endeavors and move to other occupations or to foreign countries, resulting in both an internal and an external brain drain [8]. This leads to the erosion of a critical mass in some departments, creating a situation very difficult to reverse in the long term, even if money becomes available. In fact, those who stress the impact of the financial crisis argue that, given the nature of the institution, the problem is more qualitative than quantitative. Since it takes many years to build an academic environment, the destruction of entire research groups may become irreversible. As the financial crisis accelerates, universities are forced to implement certain measures that can undermine quality (hiring less qualified teachers, or canceling library subscriptions), equity (imposing or raising fees), or autonomy (establishing strong links with the business sector). Those who emphasize the financial aspect of the crisis contend that the only way to restore stability and credibility of undermined and underfunded universities is a massive infusion of financial resources.

Partly as a result of financial cuts, and partly as a result of other external influences, a moral crisis [9] has also been identified. In this view, the main crisis of the university is not financial, demographic or organizational, but rather moral in nature. Those who talk about a moral crisis argue that the main impact of budget cutbacks in universities is damage to the morale of both faculty and students. Decline of working and living conditions has impelled professors into cynicism, banality, negligence, absenteeism, irresponsibility and opportunism. Students are also said to be victims of this moral crisis: they have become more apathetic, more self-centered and more interested in pursuing a profitable profession than in seeking knowledge for its own sake. In this regard, it has been shown that in times of recession and uncertainty, students tend to withdraw from arts and general education and to enroll in the more pragmatic disciplines required by the job market (Statistics Canada 1978, Axelrod 1986, Sarik 1991). When this is the case, they lack concern for broader intellectual and social issues beyond the narrow interests related to the pursuit of a career [10].

The moral crisis is reflected in the erosion of academic values. Although members of the academy have been traditionally seen as a conscience for the nation, and academic virtues (such as the search for truth and devotion to public service) have served as a model for society, this is no longer the case. The university, long characterized by a respect for facts, careful analysis, consideration of alternative points of view and problem solutions, and reliance on persuasion, is losing most of these distinctive features. It is falling from its high pedestal, and turning into an institution as mundane and self-seeking as any other (Carnegie Council 1979, Levin 1977, Linnel 1983). Price (1985) adds that the moral crisis is a crisis of meaninglessness in which higher education has little to offer in the clarification of moral choices.

In short, those who believe that there is a moral crisis lament the loss of the grand synthesis of human values that in the past motivated the university movement as a whole. In this view, the increasing specialization of the present scientific age has led to an absence of a common knowledge of values. For instance, Winchester (1986:283) suggests that, since neither science and technology offer any values, "we are in the midst of an obsession that is leading us neither to heaven nor hell but to nowhere in particular" . Hence, according to this diagnosis, the university is dying because it surrendered the spiritual component and forgot the meaning of true learning, replacing these values by marketplace and cybernetic paradigms. Those who perceive a moral crisis also point out that the main challenge for universities is to provide human values to guide the scientific and technological ventures that take place in the present era. However, some of them warn that perhaps it is too late, because the university has become too weak to contest outside forces (namely the intrusions of the marketplace and the state) and most faculty and administrators feel that they are unable to mount a credible defense. In this view, universities are less capable than ever of defining the ways in which they are distinct from other institutions, or of articulating how the principles on which they operate differ from those of business and government, and why they should enjoy special privileges (Oppenheimer 1979, Winchester 1986, Cross 1986, Fulton 1986, Katz 1986, Coombe 1990).

Finally, 'externalists' identify a crisis of confidence in the whole system of higher education and in the intelligentsia in particular. The argument is that a vicious circle of external and internal factors interact to negatively affect the university. Like in the case of the moral crisis, the confidence crisis is usually connected to the financial crisis and to the general economic crisis. On the one hand, the financial crisis limits the university's ability to meet its goals and to maintain standards. On the other hand, the general economic crisis reduces the employability of its graduates. These shortcomings pertaining to quality and cost effectiveness influence the loss of confidence by government authorities as well as by the community at large, which in turn leads to further reductions in funding (Altbach 1979, Katz 1986, Omari 1991). Paul Davenport, University of Alberta President, referred to this

vicious circle in the following way: "We have budgetary problems. We don't deliver the quality of education we'd like to our students. They leave the university realizing that, and they're dissatisfied. They become taxpayers, citizens, voters, and they communicate their dissatisfaction to those who make decisions" (Folio, July 12, 1991:5). In other words, the crisis of public confidence is understood as both cause and effect of budget cutbacks.

The crisis of confidence is expressed in the feeling that the university has a low impact on both national development and individual upward mobility. Many young people have lost confidence in the university as a guarantor of satisfying and well-paid employment, and some are even questioning its contribution to intellectual development. As universities lose public support, it is argued, taxpayers are increasingly reluctant to finance them unless more accountability is established. In this climate, the allocation of public resources to universities, once considered to be a positive investment in human capital or an individual right, begins to be perceived as an expenditure, or as a collection of subsidies for private consumption and personal benefits. The confidence crisis is expressed in the increasing concern of taxpayers and pressure groups who argue that public funds cannot be directed to independent bodies without more thorough accounting of expenditures. The assumption that higher education is the principal determinant of social progress and the necessary step to individual fulfillment, taken for granted for many years, is now being questioned. Likewise, institutional autonomy must be justified as a social advantage rather than a self-evident right. There is increasing insistence that universities receive their mandate less from the autonomy granted by their charters than from the priorities and funding patterns determined by central governments, by the bodies that allocate funds and by consumers. Pressure is growing in some countries to implement systems of contracts, non-academic control of funding and governing bodies, and preferential funding according to 'social relevance' or 'performance' criteria, rather than free grants (Altbach 1983, Linnell 1983, Boys et al. 1988, Brunner 1991, Schwartzman 1991, Van den Bor & Shute 1991).

However, many university authorities tend to perceive the problems of social confidence as a mere crisis of public image, disqualifying and disregarding criticisms about quality and efficiency. These university authorities (among them, as will be seen later, some Argentinean rectors) claim that universities are performing satisfactorily, but that the public does not understand them and, more importantly, that governments and the media have deliberately orchestrated a campaign to undermine their image. For instance, Bruce Johnstone, the chancellor of New York University points out that this lack of public confidence is expressed in books critical of higher education which become best-sellers, or in governments which build a formidable reputation by making blistering attacks on colleges and universities (Johnstone 1992). For him, the hostility against higher education clusters around two criticisms. The first is a suspicion of profligacy and poor management. The second is the perception of a lost ethic, expressed in accusations of bending to political pressure, scientific fraud, hucksterism, and the like. Based on this diagnosis, Johnstone's recommendation basically consists of creating public rapport to rebuild confidence through the implementation of various public relations strategies and techniques. Although many university authorities would not concur that the university is performing as well as strongly as Johnstone claims, they agree with him that a public relations strategy is crucial to overcoming the crisis. They believe that effort spent in creating positive public attitudes towards universities will be rewarded by public pressure for greater support from reluctant governments.

Summarizing, in the literature on higher education there are numerous references to crisis. Everybody seems to agree that universities are experiencing a crisis, but there is no consensus as to its character, its origin and its solution. In general terms, two main diagnoses of the university crises can be identified. On one side are those who focus on internal deficiencies. Claiming that the problem is due to low performance, they prescribe

increasing accountability. On the other side are those who focus on external pressures, contending that it is mainly a financial crisis. Hence, they call for increased budgets and greater societal support. In general terms, the former tend to align with governments promoting university restructuring, whereas the latter are more likely to be closer to those members of the academic community resisting restructuring policies.

To a lesser or greater extent, the above-mentioned crises are present in today's university. However, they are insufficient to explain the contemporary university restructuring. They provide good descriptions of university problems rather than an explanatory framework. In other words, there is no clear causal relation between these crises and the pressures for restructuring. For instance, the most frequently invoked argument to account for university restructuring is the contradictory dynamic of enrollment expansion and budget reduction, which in turn led to academic decline and greater calls for accountability. Nevertheless, this constitutes more a description than an explanation. In the remaining chapters, I will attempt to show, first, that there is little 'contemporary' in the contemporary crises usually discussed in the literature. Many of these crises have been recurrently discussed for centuries in the literature on higher education. Second, I will show how the debate on university restructuring has been confined to the 'efficiency' and 'financial' crises. At first glance, the argument advanced by advocates of restructuring is simple and compelling: premise one, the state has no money; premise two, the university is inefficient; conclusion: a drastic restructuring is needed. Taking into account that a crisis has both an objective and a subjective dimension, I will attempt to show that this definition of the crisis is an effort to build consensus around the restructuring agenda. Third, I will attempt to examine the university crisis in the broader context of the globalization of the economy and the crisis of the fordist model of accumulation.

3. Economic restructuring, university restructuring

In a recent conference organized in Paris by UNESCO, development expert Susan George said that we are presently witnessing the most important socio-economic experiment in history, and it is being implemented in a surprisingly short timespan. In her view, the social and human costs of the present model of structural adjustment is comparable the proletarization of farmers during the Industrial Revolution [11]. The main element of this model is an increasingly integrated global economy largely controlled by a transnational elite comprised of the G-7 countries, international financial institutions and multinational corporations. The fordist model of accumulation based on mass production and a welfare state, which operated during most part of this century, is being replaced by a model of flexible accumulation.

National states are seriously affected by these post-fordist developments. This is particularly evident in developing countries, where the redistributive role of the state is drastically reduced, and society is increasingly ruled by a Hobbesian market where individuals compete among each other. In those countries, governments are pressured by lending agencies to implement austerity programs in order to be eligible for emergency loans. These programs, known as 'structural adjustment programs' or SAPs, recommend liberalization of imports, elimination of subsidies, privatization of public enterprises, user fees in public services and drastic cuts of government expenditures in areas such as health, education, housing, sanitation, transportation and environment. Privatization proposals, generally defended on the grounds that they promote efficiency and decentralization of decision-making, usually result in the disentitlement of large sectors of the population to services that once were considered an inalienable right.

Public universities are not immune to this new climate. Throughout the world, a new alliance of governments and business is pressuring academic institutions to redefine their

priorities and adopt new operational principles. Paraphrasing Axelrod (1986), while during the fordist period universities were perceived as the most vital of public investments, in the post-fordist era they are seen as a major part of the economic problem. The aims of accessibility, social criticism, cultural development and institutional autonomy are being eroded by the three R's of the economic crisis: recession, rationalization and restraint. In the case of Latin America, this is further aggravated by a fourth 'R', the repayment of the external debt.

Hence, university restructuring is occurring within a broader context characterized by the rearrangement of economic, ideological and political forces. Among them are the globalization of the economy, the implementation of neoconservative and neoliberal policies [12], and a redefinition of the role of the state. The impact of these factors on the university is reflected in budget cutbacks, an increased reliance on private sources of revenue (through links with the business sector and user fees), restrictions on enrollments, the growth of private institutions, the deregulation of working conditions, and in general a greater influence of the market and the government over university affairs. Like a chain reaction, these developments impact each other. Changes in the origin of revenues, for instance, may have serious implications for accessibility and autonomy. A reduction in autonomy, in turn, may have an impact on areas like governance, curriculum and research priorities.

Universities are criticized by governments for being highly traditional institutions, relatively impermeable to external forces, and 'out of touch' with societal demands. It is their argument that, in spite of the extensive changes that transformed the world in the last three hundred years, the university still retains many features of medieval times. To some extent, this contention is valid. The university is, together with the church, one of the few institutions whose main structures have remained intact since the middle ages. However, an analysis of restructuring based on an abstract comparison between 'old' and 'new', in which old means 'bad' and new means 'good' is misleading, because it fails to address the social and economic conditions that influence the restructuring, the diversity of reasons leading actors to promote (and resist) it and, more importantly, who benefits the most in each model.

In this environment, conflict is at the forefront. Contrasting values, often compromised during the era of expansion, are beginning to collide. In the clash between two university models, the classical tensions between autonomy and accountability, quality and equality [13], national development and dependency, regulation and laissez faire, arts and sciences, teaching and research, vocational and academic-oriented programs, basic and applied research, etc., become more visible, because universities are increasingly pressured to make difficult choices. These dilemmas recreate basic questions about what the university is all about. Visions that emphasize either individual consumption (certification for professional jobs), public investment in human capital, citizens' right (democratic principle of education for all) [14] or social transformation compete for hegemony among different constituencies. The difficulties faced by university authorities to accommodate a variety of values and visions in times of budget cutbacks, is well illustrated in the frustration expressed by the President of the University of Toronto in an interview with Canadian radio host Peter Gzowski: "You can have my house, Peter, in return for a sensible policy on financing Ontario's universities" (CBC 1991).

Under authoritarian regimes, the need to accommodate conflicting values is underplayed by the government in turn, and any resistance to the restructuring model is easily silenced. It is not by chance that in Chile university restructuring was expeditiously imposed by Pinochet's Junta, while in many other Latin American countries the rules of representative democracy present considerable obstacles to governments eager to follow the Chilean route. In essence, the aforementioned conflicting values seem to boil down to one main conflict,

that of private vs. public interests. However, privatization vs. state control, the central dilemma faced by modern authoritarian regimes in Latin America for some decades now (O'Donnell 1979), is being reformulated under an unprecedented model that increases both private participation and government control. For advocates of privatization, the assimilation of universities into the marketplace and the tightening of accountability mechanisms are going to provide a myriad of benefits to students, professors and society at large. For its opponents, the assumptions behind the replacement of the pursuit of truth and knowledge with a philosophy based on 'staying near the customer', and the replacement of self-governing bodies as key decision-makers with government control of institutional performance based on 'cost-efficiency' criteria, are disputable. In their view, these solutions to university problems are shortsighted and biased (Axelrod 1986, Neilson and Gaffield 1986, Newson and Buchbinder 1988, Neave and van Vught 1991). In spite of these criticisms, university restructuring is taking place at a fast pace in Argentina and elsewhere. The reasons why the forces of restructuring have the upper hand can be found inside and outside the university, and encompass economic, political and ideological variables.

Section 2. Research strategy

1. Statement of the problem and research questions

This study explores the dynamics of contemporary university change, using a case study approach that focuses on the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina). This exploration is guided by two main considerations. The first is that the process of university restructuring is shaped by a combination of international and domestic pressures. Hence, the process of university change is ill-understood if confined to the analysis of a particular institution. What is needed rather is a simultaneous examination of international, national and institutional factors within a historical context. The second consideration is that the pressure is not necessarily an automatic imposition of economic conditions or state policies. University change is molded by a multiplicity of structure-agency mediations. It is not a rigid, top-down process. Rather, it is the result of a complex process of negotiations and disputes between social forces pressuring and resisting it, a process characterized by coercion and persuasion, alliances and divisions, cooperation and hostility.

Because it is exploratory, this study is not aimed at testing a specific set of hypotheses, but rather at providing insights about the different factors involved in the restructuring of the public university in Latin America. Although using a different framework, it builds on Levy's analysis of private universities. In his comparative study on Latin American universities, Levy (1986) argues that the spectacular growth of private universities during the last decades, after more than one century of state hegemony, has reshaped the regional panorama. He also contends that the public sector of higher education "has not been fundamentally reoriented toward private practices" (Levy 1986:333). Although Levy is essentially correct, only a few years after the publication of his book a new trend is emerging in Latin America: the incorporation of private elements into public institutions of higher education, particularly in relation to funding. Marginal to the agenda of the 1980s, this controversial issue is becoming central to the present national debates about public universities. As already mentioned, I suggest that the university conflict in Argentina consists of a clash between forces pushing and resisting a second shift from the 1918 Reform model. The first shift, well described by Levy, took place in the 1960s and 1970s, with the incorporation and proliferation of private universities into the higher education system. Presently, it is possible to observe the development of forces pushing for the second shift, which aims at strengthening the private university system and at promoting radical changes in public universities.

This study examines the context and the potential consequences of these changes. To do so, it adopts a research strategy that considers both the synchronic and diachronic dimension of the problem, that combines political economy approaches with cultural studies, that links a case study with macro-analysis, and that acknowledges the existence of a dialectic relationship between structure and agency. The sets of questions were explored in the study: general questions about university restructuring, and specific questions about university restructuring in Argentina.

A. General questions on university restructuring
a) What are the main features of university restructuring?
b) Why is this process taking place?
c) Does this project encounter opposition?
d) What are the potential implications of this process for the academic community and for society at large, according to the contending forces?
e) Whither the project of university restructuring?
f) How is the conflict between promoters and opponents of university restructuring manifested in a concrete social setting?

B. Specific questions (Argentina)
a) What is the economic, social, political and historical context of university restructuring?
b) Which social forces promote and oppose the restructuring of public universities in Argentina?
c) How is this confrontation of contending visions at the university site related to class formation in Argentine society?
d) How does the conflict between these competing forces materialize in the public debate, in legislation, and in policy?
e) What are the different diagnoses of the current situation of the public university?
f) What are the main policies advocated by proponents and opponents of university restructuring?

2. Methodological issues

a) general description of the methodology

Although current changes in higher education affect a variety of post-secondary institutions, this research focuses on public universities. The analysis of non-university institutions, as well as of private universities, is beyond the scope of the study. In addition to the usual limitations of time and resources, the rationale for this choice is that the most important transformations in higher education are occurring in public universities. While public universities were practically 'untouched' by public policy for many decades, they are presently encountering an unprecedented demand for change. As was pointed out, the first step towards the contemporary restructuring of the Latin American higher education consisted of adding private universities to the system. Meanwhile, no major reform has been implemented in public institutions. By the 1990s, however, the situation reversed: while private universities are essentially free to decide their directions, great pressures are being exercised on the public ones.

The institution selected for examining the complexities of university change is the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Created in 1821, it is the largest and most important Argentinean university. Everhart (1988) summarizes the main features of a case study in four points. First, fieldwork stresses a constructivist perspective: participants in social settings are bearers and creators of knowledge, and this knowledge influences action which is purposive. Second, the process orientation of fieldwork directs researchers to consider social life as it evolves, shaped by contextual factors. Third, phenomena are seen holistically

because dimensions of social life are interactive and no single factor or group can capture the essence of the situation. Fourth, researchers make choices throughout the study in light of the emergent nature of fieldwork.

As Patton (1980) notes, if the case selected is atypical, the representativeness of the results will be undermined. The country case selected (Argentina) is typical in the sense that the restructuring of the state and the reforms under way in higher education, as well and the different resistances to it, are similar to patterns observed in most Latin American countries. The institution selected (UBA) is a typical old, large, traditional Latin American university. Moreover, as a leading national institution, changes taking place in UBA have a great impact on other universities. In short, the issues related to current economic and university restructuring in Argentina are not essentially different from those observed in many other Latin American countries, and the present situation of UBA is typical of public universities defending their right to autonomy.

This study is data-based, in the sense that it involves rigorous and systematic empirical inquiry. Since the primary concern of the study is to contribute to the understanding of university change rather than formulate and test a particular set of hypotheses, the nature of the research problem calls for a qualitative methodology. As Lofland (1971) pointed out, qualitative studies seek to provide an explicit depiction of the structure, order and patterns existing among a set of participants. In this case, the search for a structure, order and patterns has been oriented by the *New Sociology of Education*, an approach that combines ethnographic studies with historical and structural analyses to connect the meanings and constructs developed in educational institutions with the larger context of society. On the one hand, educational ethnography provides rich, descriptive data about the contexts, activities and beliefs of participants in educational settings. On the other, socio-historical analysis examines economic and political structures. In short, the New Sociology attempts to understand and to make explicit the linkages between social and institutional phenomena.

In the present study, this approach has been complemented by a conscious effort to achieve a balance between the uniqueness of specific settings and the application of general laws, and between the positivism of political economy and the hermeneutic-historical orientations of cultural analysis. It attempts to do so by paying special attention to the structure-agency dynamic, and by using a comparative-historical method capable of generating a range of theoretical questions. Indeed, the analysis of UBA's present situation is framed in a historical and comparative context, linking current conflicts to past developments and contrasting them with an examination of contemporary university reform in other countries. Both dimensions, diachronic and synchronic, greatly contribute to understanding the problem in a wider perspective, providing insights about its roots and potential impact.

Although the research is primarily qualitative, since it is based on inductive, generative, constructive and subjective processes, it also incorporates elements of quantitative methodology, which is based on deduction, verification, enumeration and objectivity. As the accumulated research experience shows, the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy is inexact and artificial; in practice they complement each other (Apple 1978, Reichardt and Cook 1979, Goetz and LeCompte 1984, Laxer 1989, Carroll 1990). A frequent shortcoming of research is that it often restricts the methodological approach and the conceptual framework to whatever is current or fashionable in their discipline. When this is the case, other methods, theories and constructs that would enhance the study are ignored. In the same vein, some researchers tend to present only those propositions that support a particular viewpoint. In so doing, they fail to acknowledge the existence of rival explanations. The risk involved is to present a narrow and unnecessarily restricted report of the data, and to select a conceptual framework that is insufficient to understand the phenomena under investigation. Thus, both methodologically and theoretically, this study adopts an eclectic

approach. An eclectic approach is one in which "the researcher is free to choose whatever method best fits the research question" (Burger, Fischer and Thorpe 1988:84). And, since there is no single theoretical perspective capable of encompassing the totality of social reality, an eclectic approach has been taken by selectively drawing elements from a variety of theoretical models, on the basis of their potential for providing a reasonable explanatory framework (appropriate in scope and content) from which to investigate the research questions.

The study began in Canada with a general review of the literature. This revealed an incipient body of literature on contemporary university change, but very little on the current situation of Latin American universities. As was mentioned in the introduction, books about the Argentinean university are scarce. However, a significant number of unpublished articles, internal documents, position papers of interest groups, draft legislation and the like provided relevant information for this study. The field work was carried out in Argentina during the months of October, 1991 to April 1992. Immediately before that, while travelling to Argentina, I had the opportunity to interview university authorities, government officials, student leaders and professors' representatives in Mexico and Nicaragua. What this experience revealed to me is the striking similarities of the proposed reforms and the concerns expressed by university actors.

It was beyond the scope of this study to collect information from a representative sample of the entire university population. Instead, the study relied on quota and network selection. Emphasis was placed on looking for internal differences within the sample, exploring reactions to university restructuring by discipline, constituency, and political affinity. As a matter of fact, qualitative studies depend on conventions of pragmatically and theoretically informed selection rather than probabilistic sampling. Populations are chosen on the basis of their theoretical significance or their relevance to the theory that informs the research question. During the early stages of theory development, as is the case of university change, sampling or selection procedures depend upon creative judgment (Goetz and LeCompte 1984). Quota selection, also called maximum variation sampling (Patton 1980), is restricted to a representative subset of some larger population. In this procedure, the researcher identifies the major, relevant subgroups of some given universe, and then obtains an arbitrary number of participants in each category. Although quota selection does not achieve the precise representation provided by random and systematic sampling, it seeks representativeness by selecting units which correspond to relevant dimensions that characterize the population (Goetz and LeCompte 1984). Network selection (also known as 'snowball sampling') is a strategy by which each successive participant or group is referred by a preceding group or individual. Interviewees are asked to suggest potential respondents who possess particular attributes pointed out by the researcher. In this study, the relevant groups are the different constituencies that have decision-making capacity in terms of university restructuring. Although I had a preliminary list in advance, each interviewee helped me to identify and contact new potential sources of information who, in many cases, belonged to a rival group.

As in most eclectic approaches, this study was multimodal in the sense that it used a variety of research techniques and multiple sources to gather data. The bulk of the information came from published and unpublished documents, newspaper articles published during the period of study, and interviews with key participants and observers of university reform. It is pertinent to recall that, since the available literature on the topic was relatively scarce, this study was forced to rely heavily on newspaper articles, unpublished documents, official statements, public debates and especially interviews. Understandably, when written information is insufficient, oral sources become particularly valuable.

In short, data collection included primary and secondary sources. Documentary information was collected from published and unpublished printed materials elaborated by a variety of individual and collective actors. These include: a) law proposals, legal documents and statutes; b) official policies and regulations; c) public statements of government officials, members of the opposition and university actors; d) pamphlets and brochures of different slates, particularly those used in university electoral campaigns of students, alumni and professors; e) statistical and administrative information; f) papers focusing on diagnosis and policy recommendations, especially those emanating from university experts and agencies such as the World Bank; g) minutes, agendas and proceedings of university, parliamentary and governmental meetings; h) letters, and i) media coverage of university affairs, such as editorials, interviews, columns and reports in newspapers and magazines.

Primary information was collected through regular observation of the General Faculties Council [15] meetings (held every two weeks) and more than seventy semi-structured interviews. These interviews included: a) government bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Economy and the Project 06; b) top-level administrators of the Universidad de Buenos Aires (President, Chancellor and Vice-Presidents); c) the Deans of the 13 faculties; d) GFC representatives for professors, students and alumni, both for the majority and the minority; e) leaders of the academic and student movements; f) recognized experts on the Argentinean university (particularly published authors); g) representatives of industry, and h) students, professors and administrative staff at UBA.

In the interviews, individuals advanced their views about the university. These views, which were shaped by their particular positions as actors in the process of university change, included both the diagnosis of the situation and policy formulation. They also provided factual information about the university, from historical reconstructions of the past to current data on enrollment figures or research contracts. Therefore, two types of questions (focused and open-ended) were asked. A broad open-ended question was generally used at the beginning of each session ("What is your diagnosis of the University of Buenos Aires?"), followed by more specific open-ended questions organized under topics and subtopics. Focused questions were used to gather precise data unavailable (or not accessible) in existing documents and to double-check information provided by other sources. In order to minimize the researcher's control of the direction of the dialogue, at the end of each interview informants were invariably asked if they felt anything important was missing.

The interviews usually lasted one and a half to two hours and were held at the interviewee's offices. Some, however, were conducted at private homes, in classrooms and in cafés. I used a list of questions which differed slightly between the actors, but often the interview topics ranged well beyond this format. In some instances the interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the interviewee. However, a notebook seemed much more effective than a tape recorder because it appeared to lessen apprehension and to encourage them to feel comfortable and express their opinions more freely. I was responsible for the transcription and translation into English of all interviews. Given the sensitivity of the topic, interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of their information, and that their identity would not be disclosed, with the only exception being statements they expressed in public settings such as the GFC or through the local media. Anonymity was especially guaranteed when the private discourse of the interviewees was noticeably different from their public discourse. However, it was agreed that reference to position and institutional ascription was necessary for the account to be meaningful. Informants (persons who were on the scene in the researcher's absence and were contacted by the latter in order to piece together relevant information about a particular event [16]) played an important role in the research by providing valuable insights into certain incidents. Some informants were actual interviewees, and

others were people who I managed to contact in order to gain information which was not easily available.

There was a reciprocal relationship between documents collected during the fieldwork and interviews in the sense that they fed each other. Examination of documents referred to by interviewees complemented the information provided by them in the interviews, and suggested new avenues and unexpected themes to explore in further interviews. In like manner, the analysis of written documents and GFC meetings helped not only to identify the positioning of the different actors and groups, and the formal and informal linkages among them, but also to detect consistencies and discrepancies with the information collected in the interviews.

Data analysis was not an easy task. Bogdan and Biklen (1993), point out that analysis in qualitative research implies working with 'soft' data, organizing it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, and deciding what and how to report on it. Therefore, the first step of the analysis was to organize the data following a typological analysis, breaking it into categories on the basis of themes. The process of organizing the information into units started in the field, when it was classified into different issues and subsequently refined. The second step was to look for patterns which were inferred through the identification of regularities and recurrences. The discovery of patterns allowed me to observe how ideas related to each other and to individual actors, as well as the relationships between individual and collective actors. Although the literature review called for a taxonomy based on three visions, groups or projects [17], the analysis of the data showed a very polarized conflict in which two main groups could be identified: 'autonomists' and 'marketventionists' [18]. The former struggle to protect the principle of autonomy declared in the 1918 Reform, and the latter believe in a combination of market forces and state interventionism. Although both constituted relatively homogeneous groups, among the latter there were internal discrepancies -more formal than essential- in relation to specific issues. These different attitudes toward the intensity of the restructuring process are described as 'hard' and 'soft' marketventionists. Finally, the third step was to move from description to interpretation, searching for the explanatory causes of these patterns, and looking for the meaning, rationale and organization behind them. A conceptual framework that simultaneously contemplated international, national and institutional factors was helpful for this task.

b) methodological problems

A first problem of this research has to do with generalizability. It has been cautioned that qualitative studies pose problems of uniqueness and idiosyncrasy, which in turn leads to the problem of replicability. True, the study of the restructuring at the University of Buenos Aires cannot be replicated in any other university, not only because the event cannot be reproduced, but also because the context is different and so are the multiple factors interacting in the process. However, as Goetz and LeCompte (1984) point out, experimental research involving human behavior cannot be replicated exactly either, because the actors and the social environment will not be the same. Furthermore, generation, refinement, and validation of constructs and postulates may not require replication of situations. In terms of generalizability, following Bogdan and Biklen (1993), this study was less interested in finding commonalties between UBA and other universities than in deriving universal statements of general social processes. It is in this sense that the insights provided by the analysis of this particular case study can be useful in understanding the process of university transformation in other contexts. As mentioned above, this study intended neither to prove or disprove a particular hypothesis nor generalize its results to all public universities in Latin America or even in Argentina. Rather, its aim was to contribute to a better understanding of

the dynamics of change in higher education, and of the relationships between university, society and state.

A second problem, present in any social research, relates to the ways in which the assumptions of the researcher may bias the direction of the research. The predisposition a researcher holds toward the formulation of research questions and toward the theoretical perspectives framing these questions is influenced by a multiplicity of factors. Among them are personal life experiences, cultural ideologies, philosophical values, ethical commitments, and the issues and problems identified by leading scholars in the research community. Since these influences lead to biases and assumptions, they should be recognized and confronted throughout the research process. As a researcher, I was concerned with my own presumptions from the outset, and tried to remain self-conscious and bracket my own biases throughout the study. Though I am not certain how successful I was, I attempted to constantly scrutinize them through self-reflection, dialogue with colleagues, and the identification of theoretical shortcomings or logical contradictions. For instance, my field notes, where I consciously wrote down conflicting perspectives on the issues, reveal changes in my own ideas on the different issues under examination. Most of these changes occurred when my own suppositions were challenged by empirical evidence. It appears that acknowledging my own biases allowed me to examine, as objectively as possible, explanations that differed from mine.

A third problem typical of any examination of a conflictive situation, is the potential impact of one of the contending parties on the researcher. Indeed, the ideological and political affiliations of interviewees, informants and interpreters, as well as their argumentational skills, may influence a researcher's perceptions. Because different sources represent different constituencies, they provide different information and interpretations. Much like the previous problem, a strategy to safeguard a certain perspective and objectivity was to establish a temporary distance from the field, which was more effective when combined with an opportunity to review field notes and to share ideas with experts on the topic (regardless of personal preferences and prejudices) and a diversity of actors outside the research setting (Whyte 1955, Goetz and LeCompte 1984). This was particularly necessary -and helpful- when the frequent interaction with participants almost led me to uncritically take sides and lose perspective. In addition, the triangulation of several sources of data reduced the risk of uncritical acceptance of initial impressions, and enhanced the scope, complexity and focus of constructs developed during the course of the investigation.

A fourth problem, which is the opposite of the previous one, is known as the 'interviewer's effect', meaning that, in the case of an observation, the presence of a researcher can change the behavior of the subjects and, in the case of an interview, the profile of the interviewer can alter the response of the interviewee. Indeed, one methodological problem of the use of oral sources is that interviewees sometimes withhold or distort information, or tell what they assume the researcher wants to hear. In the case of this particular study, the risk was limited by three factors. First, the interviewees belong to the national intellectual leadership, and therefore are supposed to espouse well-thought ideas, not likely to be changed by the presence of an interviewer. Second, most interviewees are political leaders; be they at the government or at the university, they are largely responsible for setting the direction of university policies. They are generally entrenched in their own caucus, and are unlikely to change their view to fit that of even the most obtrusive researcher. Third, given their leadership status, most interviewees recurrently express their opinions about university issues through the media. They are accustomed to journalists and researchers, and generally have a script that addresses the most upsetting questions and leaves little room for surprises. In short, these three factors greatly reduce the possibility of interviewees giving a distorted response to please the researcher or to avoid a potential inconvenience. In spite of the presence of these three factors, I suspect that my profile may have altered the responses of

certain actors, particularly those related in some way or another to the social sciences (be they professors, bureaucrats or students). Among these actors, a cross-check between their private and public statements revealed that their public antagonistic discourse and confrontational attitude were usually softened in the interviews, where they took some distance from the heat of the dispute and attempted to analyze it from an academic perspective. I suggest that this overshadowing of their animated and biased statements as political actors involved in a conflict by a more distant, dispassionate and 'objective' examination of the conflict was partly due to their perception of me as a 'colleague' from a foreign university.

A fifth problem, characteristic of international studies, relates to translation, particularly when the researcher does not speak the language of the subjects. Since interpreters may influence attitudes and perceptions of participants, and consciously or unconsciously distort the meaning of the original statements, it is pertinent to avoid them as much as possible by communicating with interviewees directly in their own language. Fortunately, Spanish being my first language, this problem was easily overcome. Unfortunately, since English is my second language, I may have lost some of the nuances and intentions of the original version in the translation. To reduce this risk, I asked bilingual friends to double-check the accuracy of the English version. As the reader will note in chapters 5 and 6, when a particular expression had no corresponding concept in English, an approximate expression was used, but the original version was also presented.

Finally, a sixth problem encountered during the research (particularly during the data analysis) was the recurrent emergence of contradictory information, expressed in different perspectives on the same issue and irreconcilable accounts of the same event. Being that this is a study about conflict, it was not uncommon to find among the interviewees very distinct -often contradictory- understandings of reality. In the beginning, I desperately tried to find which version was an accurate description of reality, and which one was inaccurate, a situation that on occasion led me to play the role of investigative journalist (particularly in relation to statistical data or denunciations of administrative corruption). However, I later accepted that, as Bogdan and Biklen (1993) point out, the role of the researcher is not to resolve these contradictions by looking at a standardized version, as if the discrepancies were the result of a mistake in data collection. Rather, the researcher should aim at examining how the various interviewees perceive and experience reality, and at explaining their differences taking into account the context in which these social actors interact. In some cases, though, drawing on Rosaldo (1980), I carefully contrasted contradictory information in search of 'truth', revising and refining my own reconstruction of the situation by shifting from one source to another (the aforementioned triangulation of multiple sources of evidence) and continually moving back and forth from broad interpretation to specific details.

3. General organization of the study

This study has been organized into 7 chapters. This first chapter has provided a general overview of the research problem, and succinctly described the strategy utilized to approach it. It also introduced the concept of crisis, probably the most invoked expression in the call for -and, ironically, to resist- university restructuring. Although advocates and detractors of university restructuring may agree on the existence of a university crisis, they tend to differ in their diagnosis of this crisis (selectively emphasizing some aspects of it and minimizing others), of its origins, and therefore of the most appropriate policies to address it.

The second chapter is about the politics of university restructuring. It starts with a review of the literature on university models, and discussion organizes the different perspectives on university problems into major projects or visions, in terms of taxonomies advanced by

various authors. It continues with a review of university restructuring in different parts of the world. Providing evidence from different countries, this comparative description clearly reveals that the process of university restructuring is a worldwide phenomenon, and that the Argentinean situation cannot be fully comprehended if it is analyzed in an isolated fashion. This brief summary also indicates that a new university model, different from the major visions described in the previous section, is becoming the hegemonic agenda. It also raises the question of how does one explain such similarity of directions within such dissimilar contexts.

A subsequent section of chapter 2 describes the main features of the emerging university model, one based on a combination of privatization measures and government control. The privatization package is summarized as the '5 Cs' of the commercial university: cultivation of private universities, customer fees, client-oriented programs, corporate rationality, and contracts with industry. Government control is exercised through the two 'Cs' of conditional funding and coordination. Since this double pressure from the market and the state reduces the university's room for proactive strategies, the institutional change that takes place is understood more as a 'response' than as a 'reform'. As a result of these pressures, the autonomous university is being replaced by a 'heteronomous' university more subject to external impositions. The next section of this chapter re-examines the visions described at the beginning,, and analyzes why the project of university restructuring is gaining support outside and inside the university. It outlines the wide spectrum of hegemony-building strategies used by advocates of restructuring in order to achieve legitimacy, a topic that will be expanded in further chapters. As this study will show, university restructuring goes hand and hand with restructuring of consent. Finally, the last section of chapter 2 examines the debate about the implications of the proposed policies that is being carried on between advocates and detractors of the heteronomous university. The heavier weight given in this section to discussion of the potential consequences of market-oriented policies and increased links with industry (relative to the potential consequences of state control) reflects the greater attention devoted to it in the literature.

Chapter 3 presents the main elements of the conceptual framework which help to illuminate the data collected in the study. As was previously advanced, I argue that a better understanding of the dynamics of university restructuring can be accomplished if a simultaneous examination of international, national and institutional factors is undertaken. Drawing from world system analysis, theories of the state and cultural studies, three major macro-processes affecting university change are identified: institutional capitalism, retrenchment of the welfare state, and commodification of knowledge. In addition to these universal developments, the examination of particular developments at three levels helps to explain the dynamics under investigation. At the international level, the globalization of the economy and the shift from fordism to post-fordism provides a general background to university change. At the level of the national formation, the particular nature of the state, recent changes in the class structure, the pattern of economic development, the importance attributed to knowledge among leaders and the relation between political parties, among other factors, help to explain why the pressures and resistance to university restructuring take a particular form in Argentina. At the institutional level, the pace of restructuring is highly influenced by factors such as the internal structure of the university, historical traditions, inter-faculty rivalry, conflicts over decision-making, or student activism.

Chapter 4 presents the case study and its context. Since social problems are not static, nor do they emerge overnight, this chapter starts with a historical background of university restructuring in Latin America. The second section provides a general overview of the Argentinean university system. The third section describes the University of Buenos Aires, outlining its main structures and problems. The last section of the chapter portrays the conflict, identifies its main actors, and describes existing alliances and disputes. This

chapter assists readers who are unfamiliar with the case study by providing the background needed to analyze and interpret the information included in chapters 5 and 6, where the voices of the actors involved in the conflict over university restructuring are presented.

Indeed, chapter 5 describes the differing diagnoses of the 'university crisis' advanced by different actors (government, students, professors, alumni, deans, university authorities, etc.), and chapter 6 shows how these diagnoses are reflected in conflicting policy directions. For analytical purposes, the debate over policies is organized into seven issues: administrative rationalization, financing, function, governance, admission policies, research and development and the role of the state.

Finally, chapter 7 provides a discussion of the findings and presents the main conclusions derived from the study. First, it includes an application of the conceptual framework advanced in chapter 3 to the particular situation of university restructuring in Argentina. By describing the similarities and differences between the UBA case and the general pattern described in chapter 2, it shows the universal (worldwide) aspects and the specific (national and institutional) aspects of university change. To conclude, it summarizes the conflict between 'autonomists' and 'marketventionists', and puts forward possible scenarios of the future of the university.

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[1] This is the translation of the term used by the Argentinean government in several documents: "proceso de reconversión universitaria".

[2] Opponents of university restructuring argue that economic restructuring is leading towards a knowledge-based society, and that government cuts on universities are shortsighted because they jeopardize the possibilities of competing in a global economy. This argument, which is a reformulation of human capital theory, assumes a 'disfunctionality' between economic restructuring and university restructuring. In this thesis I will argue, instead, that the logic governing university reform is consistent with economic restructuring.

[3] University authorities argue that, between 1987 and 1991, government funding has been drastically reduced. Government officials claim that using 1987 as the year base is inappropriate, because that was the highest budget in recent times. They also contend that, even using 1987 as the year base, the university budget has been slowly increasing. The discrepancies can be attributed to the use of different statistical data, of different methodologies, or to different adjustments of the national currency to the dollar and to the inflation rate. See, for instance, La Nación, September 26, 1991.

[4] A description of the 1918 Reform can be found in chapter 4.

[5] Prominent among them are the works of Pérez Lindo (1985), Cano (1985) and Delich (1988).

[6] Stauffer (1983), for instance, mentions as probable cause of the collapse in productivity rates in the US and the fall in international competitiveness the inadequate attention paid to research activity, the decline in the quality of university education (especially mathematic, science and engineering) and the deterioration of scientific equipment in university laboratories. However, contrary to Stauffer's contention, it has been argued that the recent loss of American economic leadership was not due to a deterioration of universities, measured by a weakness in generating new technology or in conducting scientific research (the US still accounts for roughly half of all new patents issued), but to problems in standardization and massive production at low prices and high quality (Cohen and Zysma 1988, Bok 1990).

[7] For another approach to the differences between present and mediaeval universities, see Altbach, 1979, pp. 20-23.

[8] Although the financial crisis largely accounts for the brain drain, the reasons for this phenomenon are far more complex. Brain drain results from a variety of factors, such as the search for higher economic rewards or a better political environment (particularly where there are authoritarian regimes), opportunities for participation, university autonomy and academic freedom, as well as a favorable academic culture within departments and a positive attitude towards the intelligentsia by state and business sectors. Besides these factors, there is also a more structural problem that explains why many highly qualified specialists emigrate, and it is that socio-economic development in developing countries often relies on scientific and technological skills from abroad and does not encourage the full employment of the domestic scientific and technical manpower (Blat Gimeno 1983:170). This creates a serious problem from the point of view of the use of

human resources and also from that of the endogenous development, contributing to economic and technological dependence.

[9] The "moral" crisis can be approached from different perspectives. Mobiley (1985:10), for example, when analyzing social forces contributing to the current educational crisis, refers to "social ills" such as alcoholism, drug abuse, the decline of the family, single-parent homes, suicidal conflicts, juvenile delinquency, low self-esteem, loose moral codes, high divorce rate, sex revolution, violence and the like. I will rather refer to the "moral" crisis using Winchester's perspective, in the sense of the debasement of the main values of a given educational institution, such as the pursuit of knowledge, commitment to the truth, autonomy, academic freedom and the like.

[10] Some authors suggest that this is not a new trend. The mediaeval universities were largely vocational schools. In that epoch, the student ambition was to master knowledge that could be used to gain lucrative employment in the established professions of the time. After eight centuries, it is more than evident that disciplines and professional fields are inherent in academic life (Cobban 1975, Clark 1983). Moreover, contrary to widespread belief, it is argued that even in the radical 1960s, the prevailing attitude among students was the "grade point average" approach: "their only concern was about individual courses, mainly in terms of marks, and how they added up for purposes of graduation, certification and employment prospects" (Becker et al., 1968).

[11] See Página 12, December 4, 1993. Section "Futuro", page 2.

[12] Two clarifications are needed at this point. First, neo-liberalism is different from neo-conservatism. The former concept is more related to economic arrangements while the latter is more related to values and politics. The main difference is that neo-conservatism pays more attention to traditional values such as patriotism, the family and religion, while neo-liberalism is more concerned with free market individualism. As neo-liberals, neo-conservatives may also call for less government intervention, but their emphasis on preventing social change leads to more control, which in turn requires a strong state in charge of law and order, defence and security. Neo-liberals, instead of populist moralism, advocate pragmatic capitalism. While neo-conservatism may attract the disillusioned worker or small businessman, neo-liberalism appeals more to actors interested in a smaller state and larger incentives to the private sector, such as multinational corporations, high technology and service industries or the professional and managerial class (Langille 1987:45-46). The second clarification is that classical liberalism, which neo-liberalism is based upon, must not be understood as a particular philosophy of a specific political party. Liberalism goes far beyond party politics, and its origins can be traced to the teachings of Hobbes (1558-1679) and Locke (1632-1704) (Marchak 1975; Schugurensky 1990:49-51 and 64-68).

[13] The 'quality vs. equality' dilemma is also known as democracy vs. meritocracy, equity vs. competence, social justice vs. excellence, massive vs. elite education, etc.

[14] In this regard, it has been mentioned that little empirical knowledge of the public's views on the major functions of universities exists. Even the Gallup Poll organization has no information on this (Allen 1988).

[15] In Spanish, Consejo Superior Universitario. From now on, I will refer to the General Faculties Council as GFC.

[16] See Yin 1984.

[17] The typology of university projects proposed by Vasconi and Recca (1977) and subsequently applied by Da Veiga (1982) and Briceño (1988) has three main categories: modernization, democratization and revolution. Newson and Buchbinder (1988) proposed three visions of the relationship between university and society: academic haven, service university and social transformation. In this study the 'revolutionary' or 'social transformation' project was practically insignificant, both in terms of its number of supporters and their political significance. This project, hegemonic in Argentinian universities during the early 1970s, was literally annihilated by the 1976-1983 military dictatorship.

[18] The terms 'autonomist' and 'marketventionist' were chosen as they reflect more accurately than others the essence of each university project. In previous attempts to characterize the situation I used 'reformists vs. counter-reformists', 'reformists vs. neo-reformists', and 'democratizers vs. efficientists', but I discarded them. On the one hand, the term 'reformism' refers to the way autonomists call themselves, but in the current situation they are not proposing major structural changes. Likewise, both parties claim to be reformers, and to promote democracy and efficiency. On the other hand, the concepts of counter-reformism or neo-reformism do not correctly reflect historical reality, because the current university restructuring is neither a call to turn a clock back to the pre-1918 situation, nor a continuation of the 1918 reform. It is an unprecedented push to combine laissez faire and state interventionism. Due to an absence of a concept that describes this situation, in this study I use the neologism 'marketventionists'.

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

autonomy: the quality or state of being independent, free, and self-directed.

heteronomous: subject to external controls and impositions; a subordination to the law or domination of another.

This chapter is about the politics of contemporary university restructuring. It starts with a review of university change in different parts of the world. Providing evidence from different countries, this comparative description clearly reveals that the process of university restructuring is a worldwide phenomenon, and that the Argentinean situation cannot be fully comprehended if it is analyzed in an isolated fashion. This brief summary also indicates that a new university model, different from the major visions described in the previous section, is becoming the hegemonic agenda. It also raises the question of how to explain this similarity in direction in so dissimilar contexts, a problem that will be explored in chapter 3. The following section describes the main features of the emerging university model, one based on a combination of privatization measures and government control. The privatization package is summarized as the '5 Cs' of the commercial university: cultivation of private universities, customer fees, client-oriented programs, corporate rationality, and contracts with industry. Government control is exercised through the two 'Cs' of conditional funding and coordination. Since this double pressure from the market and the state reduces university's room for proactive strategies, the institutional change that takes place is understood more as a 'response' than as a 'reform'. As a result of these pressures, the autonomous university is being replaced by a 'heteronomous' university more subject to external impositions.[1]

The third section describes the main concerns raised by some academics in relation to the heteronomous university. They claim that a drastic reduction of university autonomy expressed in more government control and unregulated linkages with business could lead to the development of priorities alien to the academic world, conflicts of interests, erosion of the academic environment, and a benefit to private groups in the name of the public interest. The fourth section analyzes why the project of university restructuring is gaining support outside and inside the university. It outlines the wide spectrum of hegemony-building strategies used by advocates of restructuring in order to achieve legitimacy, a topic that will be subsequently expanded in further chapters. As this study will show, university restructuring goes hand and hand with restructuring of consent. The main argument advanced in this section is that the heteronomous agenda is succeeding in becoming the hegemonic model largely because it presents an inclusive discourse which encompasses the main tenets and values of competing projects. Finally, the last section examines the current and potential resistances to the heteronomous model.

Section 1. University restructuring: a worldwide phenomenon

This section aims at uncovering, interpreting, and explaining distinctive patterns of university change, dealing simultaneously with both first and third world contexts. The first part provides a description of university restructuring in different parts of the world, and shows the striking similarities in the changes experienced by higher education systems in very dissimilar contexts. In the second part, the main trends are identified, and the pattern of change is analyzed with respect to two areas: the new relationship with the state, and the incorporation of a market logic. Finally, the last part delineates the most frequent explanations for present university restructuring.

1. An overview of contemporary university change: dissimilar contexts, similar direction

A brief description of policy initiatives implemented by governments throughout the world reveals the unprecedented scope of university change currently taking place as well as the striking similarity of tendencies taking place in a wide variety of nations having different social, political, historical, and economic characteristics. Although the pace and the dynamics of this change varies according to the specific historical conditions and social formation of each country, the direction of the change follows an unmistakably similar path. What follows is a general review of these changes in selected countries in different regions of the world.

Europe

Many European nations have developed new legislative frameworks to propel university restructuring. A wave of government plans, acts, regulations and recommendations are hoisting universities into the marketplace. In Belgium, for example, the Saint-Ann plan (1986) drastically reduced subsidies. Universities had to bear a heavier burden than other levels of education, to compete among each other and serve the market. Wielemans and Vanderhoeven (1991) report that universities have lost a great deal of autonomy, and that the pressure of the market has affected significant dimensions of higher education, such as enrollment, study choices, curriculum and budget allocation. In Germany, after four decades of state monopoly, a private sector has been allowed in higher education. Moreover, the revision of the Framework Act (1985) and the Science Council recommendations (1986) pressured public universities to strive more competitively for research funding and for students, and to be more responsive to the demands of the labor market (Teichler 1991). According to Habermas (1989:106) the Science Council is orienting professors and students to the economy and administrative planning through the production of technically usable information and professional qualifications, so "the flow of information between the universities and the economic-military-industrial complex can be coordinated all the more inconspicuously". In Finland, the Higher Education Development Act (1986) required universities to adopt systematic procedures for the evaluation of their operations in order to provide the basis for funding allocation.

Similarly, in France a Comité National d'Evaluation was set up in 1984 to carry out individual evaluations of universities, providing a means for carrying out performance-based financing. In the same year, the Higher Education Guideline Law allowed individual universities to make contracts with the private sector and to assume responsibility for the administration of their own resources. These reforms encourage students to opt for courses deemed 'closer to the national interest', and the traditional disciplinary structure of undergraduate studies is being replaced by a professional approach that focuses on occupational sectors (Neave 1988). In 1992, Jacques Derrida and other prominent intellectuals published an open letter in the French press to protest against "changes imposed from above" which give more power to administrators and external pressure groups and undermine academic autonomy (The Times Higher Education Supplement, June 12, 1992:1). More recently, a reform bill passed in 1993 by the National Assembly proposed radical changes in all aspects of university life, from finances to courses to research agendas. Students and faculty unions opposed the bill, arguing that it constitutes the first step toward the privatizing of French universities. They also contested the proposed competition between universities, arguing that it will lead to inequalities (The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 21, 1993: A34).

In Spain, a sharp rise in fees prompted an outbreak of student militancy which reached its peak in October 27, 1993, when a national one-day strike and demonstrations took place [2]. In Italy, where universities have one of the most prominent roles in scientific research among

developed countries[3], the pressures for diversification and vocationalization of higher education, so far strongly and successfully opposed by the 'academic oligarchy', are starting to be implemented in a process of 'modernization' reinforced from outside (Moscati 1991 and 1993). In 1980, a Presidential Decree encouraged universities to obtain funding from external sources and to set up departmental structures (replacing the old system of chair/institute/faculty). In 1987 the state created a Ministry of University and Scientific Research to maximize efficiency and productivity by linking universities with the market and breaking down the traditional walls of the 'ivory tower'. In Greece, in spite of the fact that the government does not recognize their degrees, private institutions are expanding (Patrinos 1992).

In Holland, there is a shift from the 'Humboldtian' model based on a close relationship between academic training and scientific research, as well as on a strong emphasis on disciplines, towards the American model stressing a market orientation. In that country, the Conditional Funding Strategy (1983) and the policy document, "Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality" (1985), left higher education institutions more accountable to the government and to industry. Many higher education institutions were obliged to merge (314 institutions merged into 51 new institutions), performance indicators were developed and linked to funding, and competition for students and research grants was encouraged. In Norway, a university law passed in 1990 introduced measures to make universities more efficient and accountable to the government by promoting amalgamations of departments, the development of managerial procedures, and the implementation of strategic (result-oriented) planning and conditional funding (Aamodt et al. 1991). Sweden's 1983 policy of higher education reform encouraged decentralization and autonomy and increased external participation in university committees to 25%. A 1987 reform elevated this proportion to 60%. This means that presently people from outside the academia constitute the majority on institutional boards. Simultaneously, several centers for cooperation-operation between academia, industry and local governments have been developed, leading to a new entrepreneurship among academics (Lane 1991).

In England, the 1980s witnessed important changes to higher education. During that period, "a government ideologically committed to the private sector was seeking to transform higher education institutions into private profit-seeking enterprises" (Graves 1988:108). The main policy of the British Conservative government on higher education was simply a cutback on expenditure, together with a strong government support to private universities (Walford 1991:176). Throughout the decade, Thatcher's government reduced education budgets, redirected the educational system further towards the 'needs of industry' and promoted strong government support to private universities. Alternative sources of revenue in British universities (research grants, contracts, fees, etc.) increased from 16% of their total income in 1980 to 26% in 1987. However, only 3% of total income was actually from industry (Walford 1991). In 1981, the government gave freedom to the UGC (University Grants Committee) to distribute funds, but under the condition that resource allocation should be selective, favoring science, technology and engineering at the expense of arts and social science.[4] In 1982, a National Advisory Body was established to act as a planning body for publicly funded universities. In 1985, the government proposed to privatize certain disciplines, ceasing public funding to these activities, and replacing it by fees, endowments and contributions from industry and commerce. In 1986, the government started to implement a funding formula to allocate resources for research according to rankings. Criteria employed to rank the research output were publications and other identifiable results, success in obtaining research grants and studentships, and peer reviews.

The landmark of Thatcher's university policy was the 1988 Education Reform Act, which severely reduced government financial support to higher education, and increased

accountability for the use of public funds. It required higher education institutions to become consumer-responsive and entrepreneurial, providing the highest quality goods at the lowest price, and competing for students and research projects. Since that year, universities must not only compete among themselves, but also with some polytechnics, which have been granted university status by the Privy Council [5].

While pressuring universities to attract funding from other sources, particularly the private sector, the Reform Act incorporated members of industry and commerce into governing bodies. Furthermore, it states that working conditions and salaries of academic staff no longer had to be nationally agreed, and abolished tenure for all new appointments and promotions, replacing it by a policy of 'hire and fire'. These measures, together with the reduction of governmental financial support to higher education, have a significant impact on the quality of the service: salaries have decreased in real terms, promotion chances have declined, support staff has been reduced while teaching and administrative loads have increased. The academic career has difficulties attracting the best graduates, libraries can no longer afford to buy the necessary books and journals, teacher/student ratios are higher than ever, equipment is falling out of date, and the whole infrastructure of universities is crumbling away (Scott 1988, Watson 1988, Walford 1991). In addition, a newly created Information Technology Institute is financed directly by industry, and is run as a business. The Institute's principal acts as a managing director, reporting to a Board of directors; staff are employed on a contract basis and are paid high wages "with the explicit policy of tempting them away from universities and colleges" (Schiller 1989:320).

The drift of universities toward the market economy is taking place also in Eastern Europe. Universities in the former Soviet Union and its area of influence are experiencing growing crises in funding, and increasingly are encouraged by the state to follow Western models of university reform and to move towards tuition fees, a concept that challenges the notion of egalitarianism embodied in four decades of Communist governments. They are also emphasizing market oriented programs such as business administration, computers, banking, marketing, etc. In Romania, 20 private universities have been recently created. Although they lack state recognition, they are able to attract students. In Russia, in 1991-1992 alone, 27 new institutions of higher learning were opened, and all but five were private (Government of Russia, 1992). Plans have also been launched to introduce tuition fees and to solicit US and European universities to establish programs in a variety of former socialist countries, such as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Hungary, a blueprint delivered by the National Rectors' Conference pressures universities and colleges to merge so as to compete with European universities by reducing redundancies. In Poland, private universities have proliferated since the early 1990s. In Czechoslovakia, the Higher Education Law of 1990 requested universities to "take greater initiatives towards the needs of the economy so that additional resources may be generated" (Hendrichová 1991, The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 21, 1993: A-35.).

North America

In the United States, higher education restructuring has a special relevance due to the leadership exercised by this nation in a variety of areas ranging from military research to economic policies. Indeed, educational analysts in different parts of the world write about the "Americanization" of their national university systems. Guy Neave (1991:68), for instance, recounts how in Europe the neo-Keynesian consensus has been replaced by right-wing conservatism, and how new forces are pressuring many European countries to follow the American university model, which involves reduction of the role of the state in higher education and its replacement by the market as the primary instrument for shaping the institution. This includes competition among institutions for funding and students. In Latin

America, a transition to the American model is evident in an increasingly blurred public-private distinction, the implementation of tuition fees in public universities, the public funding of private institutions, the partnerships between universities and business, and the pressures to create community colleges.

A turning point in contemporary university reform in the USA was the *Business-Higher Education Forum*, established in 1978, in which about fifty chief executive officers of large corporations and a similar number of presidents of the most prestigious universities met with the explicit purpose of aligning higher education with the corporate sector. This blueprint, accompanied by a myriad of parallel strategies, was complemented by substantive literature developed by the American 'new right'. In fact, during the early 1980s several influential documents provided academic support for the conservative policies implemented by the Reagan administration. Three examples illustrate this point. *The Carnegie Council Report Three Thousand Futures: The Next Twenty Years for Higher Education*, published in 1980, argued for less state control, more university autonomy, and for a strong reliance on student choice and the free market. In 1983, the compelling document *A Nation at Risk* argued that enrollment expansion during the 1960s and 1970s had deteriorated the quality of higher education, and that the US was thus losing its competitive edge in science and technology. In 1987, Allan Bloom published *The Closing of the American Mind*, an essay full of Platonic reminiscences which immediately became a best-seller. In that book, he complained that American universities had imported from Europe (particularly Germany) the ideas of relativism and egalitarianism, which have replaced reason and natural rights. In his view, rather than combating the selfish individualism of the youth, universities are encouraging it by propagating value relativism, which is expressed in rock music, divorce and feminism. He particularly denounced the pervasive influence of Freud and Weber (p.148).

Consistent with the recommendations contained in these documents and ideologically-related literature, during the 1980s most state universities began to devise more selective admission policies. Simultaneously, state governments gradually reduced financial support for public universities, leaving a vacuum for the private sector to fill. As a result of it, by the beginning of the 1990s far less than half of the budget for leading state universities comes from general state revenues; most revenue comes from tuition and fees, endowment income, alumni contributions, and grants and contracts with corporations and the federal government. This represents an important change from 1986, when the principal source of income for public universities were state governments, while private institutions derived only 2% of their income from that source. As a result, there is a greater blurring of the public/private sector distinctions, with the former seeking more non-governmental support and the latter turning increasingly to public funds for help (Berdahl and Millett 1991:215 and 227, Yudof 1992: A48). In 1986, a governmental task force report expressed an urgent need for permanent assessment of the outcomes of the higher education system, in order to have greater control in the use of public resources. Moreover, universities were forced to compete with industry for government research funds to conduct the same research (Slaughter 1990). At the same time, salary policies have increased the gap between faculty who receive higher salaries (business, engineering, management, etc.) and those who receive lower salaries (nursing, humanities, education, home economics, etc.).

Another development of the 1980s in the USA has been the resurgent militarization of academia. Although the military orientation of major science and technology funding agencies started soon after WWII (in 1959, C. Wright Mills referred to it as the 'the militarization of science'), it intensified during the Star Wars program. As Krinsky (1988:40) reports, university administrators have not been passive agents in this trend. Just as educational administrators eagerly embraced a business mentality early in this century (a process brilliantly described by Callahan in 1962), leading American educators have repeatedly embraced the products and agendas of military research in schools and universities during the

1980s (Noble 1991). As a result, the USA Department of Defense funds 70% of all academic research in computer science and is the most active federal agency in biological science, exceeding the funding provided by the National Institutes of Health (Thomborson 1987:283, Krinsky 1988:42). Military involvement is also substantial in electrical engineering, information sciences, bioengineering, foreign languages and cognitive psychology. An example of a military-funded university laboratory is the University of Illinois, which developed the PLATO system in a protected military environment, intentionally divorced from other interests within the university (Noble 1991).

In Canada, a *Corporate-Higher Education Forum* modeled after the one instituted in the USA five years earlier was launched in 1983 to harmonize the activities of universities with the market. The alliance that developed between selected business and university leaders was so intense that the chairman of the Forum observed that, during the discussions, it was almost impossible to distinguish who was a university president and who was a corporate president (Newson and Buchbinder 1988) [6]. One of the main reform policies emerging from this Forum has been funding cutbacks, which have placed many universities in a position of financial exigency. In fact, in 1991 the Federal government decided to freeze the per capita EFP [7] transfers to post-secondary institutions for five years, which led to a 7.7% drop in cash transfers that same year and, according to the calculations of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT 1992) will produce an estimated decrease of 21% by 1994-95 [8]. For the province of Alberta, the federal cash transfers for health and higher education that took place in 1992 were roughly one half of the original agreement (Davenport 1992). In order to counterbalance this situation, the University of Alberta' General Faculty Council passed a document (entitled 'Degrees of Freedom') which calls for increased tuition fees to the point where they cover 33% of the University's operating budget. This means, according to university's statistics, an increase of 234% in real dollars.

In an effort to streamline, universities and other higher education institutions have undergone downsizing and mergers. A good example of this occurred in 1988, in the province of Saskatchewan, where a large number of community colleges (originally mandated to serve the educational needs of small rural communities) and technical institutes merged into far fewer and larger applied science and technology institutes. Another policy recommendation of the Forum that has shaped university reform across Canada has been its insistence on "greater emphasis on institutional competition, supported by a mechanism to monitor and analyze the performance of universities and community colleges" for the purpose of allocating funds (Cameron 1987:18).[9] This recommendation is combined with an explicit promotion of a model, piloted at the University of Waterloo, in which private corporations provide universities with capital or operating grants in exchange for the right to exercise influence over the direction of research and to acquire exclusive licenses on patentable discoveries made in laboratories (Axelrod 1986, N&B 1988). As part of the same process, not only the budget allocated to the several centers of excellence in research has been severely curtailed, but these centers are increasingly pressured to move from basic to applied research.

In the same vein, new programs are required not only to address specific 'societal needs' but to offer at least the promise of entrepreneurial opportunities before they will be authorized for government funding support (Pendersen 1991, Calvert and Kuehn 1993). Another important development of the 1980s in Canada has been the intensifying trend towards privatization. Between 1970 and the 1990, enrollment in private schools doubled. The Minister of Education and Training of Ontario, David Cooke, suggested that this reinforces the need for the public system to be more responsive to the concerns about expressed by the public [10]. Simultaneously, student participation in university funding, in the form of tuition and fees, has dramatically increased.

Asia

Similar higher education reforms have taken place in several Asian countries during the 1980s. In Australia, for instance, the federal government enforced the merging of smaller institutions, established a National Unified System, and reintroduced tuition fees. In that country, where spending on higher education has fallen faster than the total spending on education, the recommendations of the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (1981) led universities and colleges to amalgamate into fewer but larger institutions, a process that deepened after the publication of the 1988 White Paper. In 1984, a Commission was established to evaluate the nature and quality of the courses, demand for graduates, standards of teaching and research, effectiveness of resource use and the extent of unnecessary duplication. In 1986, the government Council for Economic Planning stressed the need to improve the 'relevant' fields, namely the business and technology-related disciplines.

Fees, which were abolished in 1974, were reintroduced in 1988 under the so-called Higher Education Contribution Scheme. Differential fees were proposed according to the cost of the service, science and technology courses being the most expensive ones. However, since these areas are regarded by government as high priority fields, a standard charge for all courses was finally established (Dawkins 1988). In an effort to promote diversification and specialization, the 1988 Australian White Paper obliged universities to compete with one another (and with colleges) for resources. It also encouraged excellence through rewards granted according to achievement and efficiency. The White Paper granted more institutional control over resources, but funding depended on university performance in areas established by the government. It also stressed the need for a larger private contribution, a statement of national research priorities, and a system of budget allocation on the basis of efficiency. In 1989, one year after the publication of the White Paper, the first private university was established in Australia. At the same time, some universities established courses on entrepreneurship and marketing skills for faculty in science and engineering. In the 1990s, as a result of changes in foreign student's policies, fee-paying foreign students are becoming an important source of income for the national economy. The financial contribution of foreign students (whose proportion increased from 4.3% in 1988 to 7% in 1992) has drawn all 35 public universities into a competition for this new consumer.

In Japan, recent reforms geared towards privatization have been analyzed by Horio (1991) and Kopp (1992). Kopp reports that costs for studies in public universities, in former times much cheaper than those in private ones, are currently equivalent. Hence, students are unwilling to accept the poor conditions of both buildings and equipment typical of public universities. The deterioration of facilities in public universities, and their backwardness relative to the private sector, is a fact publicly accepted by the Japanese government. At the same time, special government subsidies to private universities (as a proportion of total subsidies) rose from 10% in 1982 to 26.2% in 1990. Recent increases in tuition and fees are seriously jeopardizing accessibility, and the intensification of research contracts with industry give additional benefits to departments related to science and technology. Between 1983 and 1990, the number of university researchers in joint research projects grew from 66 to 1,031. Horio expresses great concern about the transformation of Japanese education from a public social enterprise into a purely private one, dependent upon fluctuations in the marketplace rather than upon developments in the world of knowledge and educational science. He claims that, in this transition, Japanese education and the forms of knowledge it makes available, will be transformed into consumer goods, leading to the commodification of learning. He fears that, after this transformation is completed, the principles of learning will be replaced by the principles of competition, and the unique values of education (particularly the nourishing of critical spirit) will cease to exist, to the extent that "nothing which we can properly call education will be left" (369).

In China, Li and Xu (1990) indicate that privatization of higher education is not only possible but necessary. They argue that mobilizing the private financial resources by contracting with business firms, receiving donations, using tuition and establishing private universities are some imperative ways to improve China's higher education system. To be sure, the state has launched in 1992 a wave of market-oriented reforms forcing universities to spend their funds in more efficient ways and to raise money to support themselves, using Shanghai as a pilot site. There, universities are urged to look for alternative sources of revenue, including donations, contracts with industry and tuition fees. Some universities have developed their own industries to generate income, particularly in high-tech areas ranging from micro-electronics to biological engineering. In 1991, the value of goods produced by the 376 companies operated by Shanghai's higher educational institutions exceeded US $65 million (Cao 1993). Since 1987, Shanghai universities started to enroll 'self-sponsored students', an euphemism for tuition fees, and the percentage gets higher every year. In 1992, self-sponsored students represented 22% of total enrollment. This percentage rose to 30% in 1993, and is expected to increase to 70% by 1997. The fees for humanities students is 2500 yuan, for sciences students 2700 yuan, and for fine arts students 3000 yuan (the equivalent of a year's salary for average wage earners). In 1992, the first Chinese private university was opened in Shanghai, enrolling 231 students, to which 300 more students were added in 1993. This university focuses on disciplines such as international business, finance, new technologies and informatics (People's Daily, May 22, June 4 and August 4, 1993) [11]. As a result of recent policy changes, university students outside Shanghai are now also required to pay fees. The only exception are a few fields considered of national interest, such as teaching or geology.

In Nepal, a reform package has been developed for Tribhuvan University (the largest institution in the country) consisting of selective admission policies, managerial administration, curriculum reforms promoting self-employment and cost-recovery mechanisms such as consulting services to external clients, high fee paying courses and an increase of tuition fees from 6% to 20% of operational costs. This project is financed with a $20 million dollar loan from the World Bank [12].

Africa

The aforementioned trends towards university reform have also been prominent in many African countries. In Nigeria, for example, higher education policy has been guided by what is commonly known as the 'three R's' of university reform: reduction, retrenchment, and rationalization. Departments and programs have had to justify their existence to a 'Curriculum Rationalization Committee' (established by the National Universities Commission of Nigeria in 1987) which assesses the relevance of programming to the national economy. Universities have been encouraged to look to the market for alternate sources of funding. In some cases, budget cutbacks have been used to punish dissidence. The Minister of Higher Education of Nigeria, for instance, claimed that the best way to ensure a slow but painful collapse of universities is to provide them with a "starvation diet" (cited in Goma 1989). The 1987 White Paper issued by the government aims at rationalization, phasing out programs which are neither attractive to students nor to the economy, allocating grants tied to specific projects and results, and privatizing many university activities, from bookshops to farms. The impact of austerity measures and structural adjustment has been notable decline in several areas, including university residences, class sizes, subscription to books and journals, scientific equipment and materials, staff development, research and buildings (Hinchliffe 1989).

A key actor in African university reform is the World Bank, whose programs aim to improve the ability of universities to generate their own revenues and to ensure that their activities are

cost-effective. Universities are eligible for World Bank loans only if they meet specified criteria such as staff reductions, course rationalization (i.e. phasing out departments with low enrollment, remedial programs in arts, redundant programs), and increased revenues from private sources (tuition fees, contracts with business, etc.). Furthermore, the World Bank obliges its aid recipients to purchase at least 60% of their equipment from manufacturers "approved" by the World Bank (Nigeria). Other measures include cost-recovery programs through student loans and charging students for meals in university cafeterias (Kenya and Zambia), cost-reduction plans to eliminate student and teacher allowances (Kenya, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal), educational reforms aimed at curtailing repetition at the university (Madagascar), more selective admission policies (Côte d'Ivoire), and examination reforms (Mali). These policy reforms and drastic reductions of state funding have exacerbated student unrest which, in turn, generated a strong government reaction, including the closing of many universities. This has occurred in several countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, Zaire, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Student unrest also took place in South Africa, where, in the summer of 1993, student protests against fees and 'unrepresentative' university councils ended in violence (The Times Higher Education Supplement, September 10, 1993).

Latin America

Higher education in Latin America has undergone similar changes. As in the African case, in this region the role of the World Bank has not been alien to university reform. In an influential paper produced for that organization, Winkler (1990) recommends that Latin American countries should follow the lead of the United States by increasing cost-recovery in public universities (including the implementation of tuition fees) and by expanding and subsidizing private higher education. Other recommendations call for a reduction in the number of graduate programs, the linking of funding to performance and cost-efficiency, an increase in the teacher-student ratio and the implementation of external evaluations. Winkler's paper was followed by another study sponsored by the World Bank and produced by Sam Carlson, in which it is suggested that Latin American universities raise fees to between 25 to 35 percent of unit costs. In order to promote the implementation of these policy proposals, the World Bank is currently giving loans to some Latin American countries to set specialized teams responsible for conducting research and influencing university restructuring. As will be shown in further chapters, one of these countries is Argentina. As a matter of fact, nearly every Latin American country is presently engaged in a neoliberal experiment which consists of a diminishing role of the state and an increased participation of the private sector. In the area of higher education, the magnitude and intensity of privatization has not been experienced by any other continent (Levy 1993). The main features of university restructuring in Latin America are the proliferation of private universities, on the one hand, and the inclusion of private elements and government control in public universities, on the other.

University restructuring is most advanced in Chile, where the 1981 reform [13] imposed by the military rule of Augusto Pinochet can be interpreted as the reverse of the 1918 university reform. Before 1981, the Chilean higher education system was a one-tier public sector system, institutions were legally recognized as self-governing bodies, students did not pay fees and financing of universities was protected through public incremental funding. After 1981, the higher education system experienced an institutional diversification, with the establishment of three vertical tiers (universities, professional institutes and technical training centers). At the same time, the institutional power of the two traditional state universities was reduced: they were forced to give up their regional centers, a process that gave birth to 14 new institutions. Expansion of enrollments in higher education was delegated to private institutions, which proliferated in a context of deregulation and minimal requirements. Civil servant status for

academic staff was abolished, and replaced by a system based on differential salaries. Likewise, public universities were pressured to diversify their sources of revenue through competition for research funds, external contracts and fees. In the late 1980s, public universities received more than 25% of total revenues from tuition and fees, and an increasing percentage of their operating budgets was obtained through contracting with industry. To encourage entrepreneurship, many public agencies fund researchers or research groups directly without passing through the university. As part of the reform, the government established a national system of admissions -based on the best scorers- encompassing both public and private institutions, and a new mixed system in which private and public universities compete for public funding. Managerial procedures and budgetary incentives for cost reductions have been implemented in several Chilean universities. The restructuring of the Chilean university is being carefully observed by other Latin American governments as a model to follow. Although the negative impact on equality has already been recognized (Brunner 1993), the alleged efficiency and rationality of the Chilean system constitute mermaid songs for most Latin American government bureaucrats. At a faster or slower speed, the majority of Latin American higher education systems are moving towards the Chilean path.

In Perú, for instance, a university has recently been founded that is co-administered by a group of private enterprises. In Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, the governments have begun to subsidize students attending private universities through tuition loans and grants. In these nations, a retrenchment of the interventionist state has led to increased reliance of public universities on the market for funding and a proliferation of private universities. In Nicaragua, Mexico and Argentina, Ministers of Education have argued publicly for tuition fees, claiming that the free education guaranteed in their Constitutions does not apply to higher education. In Argentina, where university budgets comprise less than 0.5% of that country's GNP, the Minister of Education presented a legislative proposal to Parliament to introduce tuition fees in public universities. Although it is forbidden by law, some Argentine universities are already charging fees as 'voluntary contributions'. Major universities (such as Buenos Aires and Córdoba) are increasingly selling services to private companies through newly created liaison agencies. A more detailed description of the restructuring of Argentinean universities is provided in chapter 4 and beyond.

Budget cutbacks are a central feature of university reform throughout the region. Per capita expenditures in Latin America decreased by 6.14% between 1980 and 1985 and even more after that. Cutbacks have been so drastic that the President of UNAM, the largest Latin American university, conceded that salaries of academics have become so inadequate that they must seek supplementary jobs outside the university or leave the country (Proceso 709, Mexico, June 4, 1990:16). A similar situation exists in many other Latin American universities, where supposedly full-time professors need to teach in two or three universities in order to survive, and the brain drain is increasing day by day. The declining budget and its negative impact on academic activities is a strong factor in the shift toward the market that many public universities are experiencing.

2. Summary of main trends

The wide variety of changes described in the aforementioned international overview indicates the existence of certain general tendencies. These trends have been summarized elsewhere (Pannu, Plumb and Schugurensky 1994) in ten points:

1) Government financial cutbacks, with emphasis on diversification of revenue sources aiming for cost-recovery, including contracts with the business sector.

2) Conditional funding, with emphasis on accountability. Financing is increasingly dependent upon evaluation according to "criteria of performativity" established by governme[illegible]nd market forces.
3) Self-evaluation processes, which are to be complemented with external evaluations. Universities have autonomy to decide on internal matters and the means to achieve stated goals (process control) while the governments have the power to decide those goals (product control). This system is known as "distance evaluation".
4) Increased private participation in public universities (both in finance and governance) blurring the division between public and private.
5) Increased public financing and control of private institutions, blurring even further the distinction between public and private.
6) Increased presence of a corporate rationality: managerial professionalism in decision making (including administrative structures separated from academe); mergers among departments, faculties, and institutions; departmental structures; emphasis on efficiency rather than on equality of opportunity, etc.
7) Increasing presence of market values and forces: academics, departments, and faculties of public and private universities are increasingly engaged in competitive behavior similar to that prevailing in the marketplace for funding, grants, contracts, students, etc.; entrepreneurship among academics; consumer approach (user fees); elimination of tenure [14], etc.
8) Demand-driven orientation, introducing short cycles and an emphasis on vocationalization.
9) More restrictive admission policies, with an emphasis on "excellence."
10) An integrated system of institutions, under a co-ordinative approach, encouraging differentiation and choice.

These trends have implications for the university's relationships with the state and the market, and for the internal organization of the institution as well. This redefinition affects not only the way the three functions of the university are conceived and carried out, but also a variety of areas like financing, governance, admission policies or curriculum. If one common element summarizes all these changes, it is the decreasing degree of autonomy enjoyed by universities, and the increasing participation of external actors and rationales in determining university's agenda. If autonomy is the quality or state of being independent, free, and self-directed, and heteronomous means a subjection to external controls and impositions, or a subordination to the law or domination of another, what we are witnessing at the end of the 20th. century is a shift from an autonomous to a heteronomous university. This shift is so dramatic that the nature of the university itself is likely to be fundamentally transformed

Section 2. The heteronomous university

A recapitulation of the preceding description suggests that, throughout the planet, university systems are increasingly forced to respond to market demands and state imperatives. Since the push towards privatization of higher education is one of the most visible features, and calls for further privatization can be found in almost every country, it is not surprising that many authors refer to the emerging institutional model as the market university or the service university. However, an exclusive focus on privatization may distract the attention from a supplemental development affecting the contemporary university, namely its gradual financial dependence on state evaluations and regulations. These two developments together are giving birth to the heteronomous or 'conditioned' university.

In the heteronomous model, the university is increasingly conditioned by these two external forces. Interestingly, in this model it is possible to find two apparently contradictory dimensions coexisting: the laissez faire dimension, and the interventionist dimension. Indeed, the heteronomous university consists of a blending of a 'commercial' (also known as 'market', 'entrepreneurial', 'service' or 'business') university, and a 'controlled' (or

'accountable') university. The 'commercial' university consists of a privatization package based on a combination of policy instruments including that include the proliferation and strengthening of private schools, decentralized management and a multiplicity of cost-recovery mechanisms. The 'commercial university' can be summarized in five Cs: a) cultivation of private universities, b) customer fees, c) client-oriented programs, d) corporate rationality, and e) contracts with industry. With the implementation of this package, the traditional research and professional university is being replaced by an institution in which research and teaching are reoriented towards a dynamic relationship with industry and the job market. The 'controlled' university can be summarized by the two Cs of 'conditional funding' and 'coordination'. 'Coordination', in turn, consists of 'collaboration' and 'competition'. The 'commercial' and 'controlled' university has advocates and detractors. What follows is a brief recount of the main debates around these issues, with a particular focus on Latin America.

1. The five Cs of the commercial university

a) cultivation of private universities

As was already mentioned, private universities are proliferating in many regions of the world. In Spanish Latin America, the private shares in total enrollment grew from 7% in 1955 to 38% in 1988, and it continues growing (Levy 1993). Supporters of private universities argue that the state should cultivate them not only by tolerating their existence but by encouraging their operations. They claim that, with decreasing state resources for public higher education, the private sector adds quality and access, which in turn contribute to economic growth and political stability. The argument is that, without a private sector, the state should have to select between two evils: to accommodate more students in the public university, or to restrict access. The first choice would imply larger classrooms and a quality decrease. This could be avoided by shifting funds from other budget areas, but such a decision would create intense conflict with competing social sectors. The second choice would generate the animosity of the excluded sectors, which would undermine the social legitimacy of the government. In short, the proposition is that by attending private universities, students release state resources to be used for either the expansion or the betterment of the public university. Levy argues that the state achieves many of its ends simply by allowing freedom and choice for privileged (private) alternatives rather than by having to "rationalize" the public sector through exclusion and coercion.

In addition to the political and financial arguments, there is an argument based on the ideology of pluralism and choice. The postulate is that students unable to meet the standards of selective public universities or, conversely, discontent with low standards of mediocre ones, should be allowed to attend private universities. Likewise, students should also have the right to attend institutions responding to their religious or ideological preferences. In this regard, it is also argued that private universities do not necessarily seek profit and; moreover, it is claimed that private education is typically non-profit (Levy 1986:325, Psacharopoulos 1989:11).

Detractors of the private university argue against it in terms of finance, governance and function. First, private finance may undermine state responsibilities and equal access. Second, private governance denies democratic principles of community self-rule while fostering control by private enterprise. Finally, private functioning directly serves upper classes, private enterprise and the powerful, at the expense of the more open public sector serving wider interests. This means that private universities are shaped by a market logic in which consumers make private payments for expected private returns. The market logic implies the provision of profitable courses and the absence of expensive ones, as well as the neglect of research (Levy 1986, Patrinos 1990). Hence, critics of the private sector perceive

public funding of private universities as an "investment in the nation's future from which business would profit handsomely" (Axelrod 1982:37).

This criticism of the elite function of private universities is based on the relative affinity between them and private industry. In general terms, there is a general correspondence between the type of institution in which the students graduate (private or public) and the sector of the labor market that will hire them. The private sector tends to employ graduates of private universities, and viceversa. In the US, where the distinction between public and private is less marked than in most countries, graduates of private universities tend to get employment in the private sector, mainly in managerial positions and even high status appointments in public bureaus. State universities, instead, have a strong service orientation, and tend to prepare students for agriculture as well as state and local government (Clark 1983). In developing countries, private universities tend to concentrate on inexpensive fields catering to upper classes (business administration, law, international relations, etc.), while public universities also engage in research, in disciplines that demand expensive facilities and equipment, and in careers with a low rate of private return.

Whereas for their supporters private universities promote freedom of choice and diversity, for their detractors they increase class inequity, privilege and hierarchy. Some detractors go even further, dismissing the choice and diversity nurtured by private universities as restrictive and limited. The argument is that although private universities offer certain fields of study not offered, or not offered in innovative or prestigious ways, in the public sector, the latter covers a full spectrum. In fact, taking into account that private universities only add student choice to the existing careers offered by the public sector, they conclude that in practice the public sector offers more choice, and that the choice exercised by students in a private university is merely a liberal choice for the elite. Promoters of private universities also stress their greater effectiveness vis-a-vis public ones. Their detractors accept that, if effectiveness means success in achieving selected goals, private universities are much more effective than the public ones. However, they argue that it is easy to fulfill limited and carefully selected goals, under a centralized power structure. The public sector, instead, usually has broad and even contradictory goals, and they are carried out in a less cohesive, more democratic, power structure. Although public universities are more effective in some areas like access, research and dissemination of knowledge than private universities, their difficulty in setting clear goals could be considered as a sign of ineffectiveness (Levy 1986).

In Latin America, although the distinction between public and private university is more clear than in the US, this does not mean that the state only serves -and is benefited by- public higher education. In his book on Latin American universities, Levy (1986) advances the thesis that, in terms of finance, governance and function, Latin American public universities are quite public, and private ones are quite private. However, he also raised the interesting proposition that the state is served by both public and private higher education and that, reciprocally, the state serves both public and private higher education. On the one hand, the public university serves the state and the masses. Public universities serve the masses by training professionals in fields usually avoided by the private sector, and by providing extension programs in nonformal education, health, housing, community development, etc. Through satisfying the demands of the middle classes for higher education (perceived as a means for upward mobility) the state obtains in exchange legitimacy and stability. It also benefits by recruiting a trained political and bureaucratic personnel relatively loyal to the public interest. On the other hand, state support to private universities is implemented in a variety of ways. It permits them tax exemptions as non-profit institutions, and sometimes supports them with direct financial assistance. Moreover, by providing mass access, it frees the private sector to concentrate on selected clientele able to afford tuition fees; likewise, by providing training in expensive fields, it allows the private sector to concentrate in inexpensive ones. In a more indirect way, the state benefits private universities when it

forwards expansion, represses dissidents, restricts access or reduces financing in public universities. In a general sense, the state promotes private universities by providing the structural conditions for their growth, promoting a development pattern that favors the classes, groups and institutions linked to that sector. Conversely, private universities benefit the state by providing it with well trained professionals at no cost (Levy 1986).

Challenging the widespread perception that recognizes only the alliances between public universities and the state, on the one hand, and private universities and business, on the other, Levy was able to identify a third element: the mutual relationships between private universities and the state. However, he was unable to foresee an emerging fourth relationship linking the public university with private enterprise. His claim that in Latin America the public sector "has not been fundamentally reoriented toward private practices" (Levy 1986:333)[15], though true for the 1980s, is inaccurate for the 1990s. Presently, the state is abandoning traditional public areas (such as health, pensions, transportation and education) to the private sector, and some public universities are now engaged in profit-making enterprises, such as exploitation of patents, leases and royalties, joint ventures in high-tech business, etc. However, public subsidies to private universities and private enterprises are less tolerated in Latin America than in the US. In this regard, Levy (1986) claims that, whereas in the US the public opinion tends to punish the state for social problems and give the benefit of the doubt to the private sector [16], in Latin America, following the European tradition, the benefits and condemnations are often inverted. In the same vein, Adrian (1983) and Patrinos (1990) contend that in Latin America privatization of higher education is strongly opposed on the grounds that a) it will affect both quality and access, and b) that it runs counter to the tradition of free higher education firmly entrenched in Latin American campuses since the Córdoba Reform.

b) customer fees

Out of the multiple reforms for privatization, the most contentious one is probably the one related to tuition fees. In some countries (for instance, most Latin American countries) public higher education is cost-free. In other countries, fees represent a percentage of the operating budget usually ranging from 10% to 40%. In Canada, for instance, fees range between 12% and 25% of the university income, according to each institution. In the meanwhile, efforts are being channeled to increase student participation in financing. The goal recommended by agencies such as the World Bank, the Ontario's Bovey Commission and the Carnegie Commission is that undergraduate students should pay between 25% and 35% of the direct costs of their education. However, 'cost of education' is a relative concept that varies from region to region. There is a range of $80 to $2,257 per student recurrent expenditure in low income countries and industrialized countries respectively (Heyneman 1990).

A number of arguments have been raised to justify tuition fees in public universities. One of the most recurrent arguments is that educational services take place in a market where students (consumers) exchange money for desired services. The basic assumption is that, if people pay for cars and bread and houses, they should also pay for health care and education. Psacharopoulos (1989:11), for example, argued for fees on the basis that "it is necessary to move beyond the rhetoric and realize that there are not many free things in life". Although this argument may not sound very sophisticated, it has been utilized by partisans of fees in the Argentinean debate. One dean, for instance, contended that "education must be paid for because many other things are paid for". A second argument is based on quality improvement and efficiency, assuming that fees will make up for budget cutbacks and it will make students more responsible in the use of educational resources. A third argument is that fees, as well as quotas, are tools used by the state to reduce both university expansion and state expenditure. In the context of increasing educated unemployed, tuition fees are thought to limit access

beyond market demands, thus lowering the returns to a more realistic level (Psacharopoulos 1989:6, Ferris 1991). Since pricing policies are considered as instruments to influence the demand for higher education, fees can also redirect enrollment from some areas to others. The University of Calgary President, for example, proposed a policy of differential fees for high-demand professional programs [17]. Another argument used in the US is that parents (regardless of SES) accept fees as fair, and do not consider that the government should be the main funder of higher education [18].

However, as was suggested before, the most invoked rationale advanced in favor of introduction of fees is equity, a claim based on studies published in the 1970s and 1980s which questioned the distributive effects of higher education, and showed that private rates of return are higher than social ones (Schieffelbein and McGinn 1975; Psacharopoulos 1985 and 1989). In short, the argument is that students should pay fees because of the direct benefits that they accrue as a result of their post-secondary learning. In addition, pressure groups such as taxpayers who have no children attending universities resist subsidizing the professional training of other people's children. Likewise, some authors (i.e. Ratinoff and Jeria 1978, Cano 1985) support tuition fees on the grounds of equity and distributive impact. They claim that, since universities serve predominantly upper class students, state subsidization transfers funds to the already privileged.

Interestingly enough, the equity argument to justify fees in higher education, currently widely used by the right, has its origins in Marx himself. In the Critique of the Gotha Program (1938:20), he says that 'free' higher education "only means in fact defraying the cost of the education of the upper classes from the general tax receipts". The argument for introducing or raising fees on equity grounds is usually accompanied by proposals to redress socio-economic inequalities with direct aid to students unable to pay them. This aid is usually proposed in the form of students loans and scholarships. On the other hand, those who oppose fees raise questions about access and equity, contending that fees discourage the participation of lower-income groups. For example, the President of one Argentinian public university argues that tuition fees constitute the most unjust of all the systems designed to restrict access, because they are based on economic discrimination (Página 12, March 12, 1990). Those who oppose fees tend to reject the argument that student payments would increase equity, quality or accessibility, contending instead that the only purpose is to cover the government's lack of funding. In their view, it is not the function of the university to redistribute income in society. That is the function of a progressive tax system. They also argue that the private sector benefits from a professional labor force, and thus it should contribute to their training. However, the business sector usually claims that corporations should not participate in the funding of higher education, because they are not philanthropic institutions. For business representatives, finance of public higher education is a government responsibility (Axelrod 1986). The question is how governments can afford such commitment without altering the tax system, which eventually may affect business interests.

c) client-oriented activities and programs

In the 'commercial' university, knowledge becomes a commodity to be purchased by potential clients in an open market. Universities are pressured to be more responsive to the demand, which means to cater programs and services to the needs and interests of prospective consumers. These can be consumers of teaching (students), of graduates (employers), or of research findings (industry). According to the rules of the market, the relevance of a product is measured by success, and success is in turn measured in terms of demand. This thirst for the market is related to a society increasingly shaped by materialistic values and to the supposed efficacy of the private sector, but also by new government

exigencies for 'responsiveness'. These exigencies are usually exercised through state cutbacks:

> As public funding is being choked off, marketing becomes a big thing. A university has to sell itself to generate enough revenue to flourish in hard times. The result is that programs, and even entire departments, are assessed on whether they can meet the test of commercial viability or, minimally, commercial relevance. New programs are established not fundamentally for academic reasons, but because they will enable the university to tap into public or private research money. Existing programs are restructured so that they can attract potential revenue. Or, they are closed down (Calvert and Kuehn 1993:116).

In some countries, for instance, it has been reported that the chances of survival of a university are measured in terms of its capacity to be useful and to serve the labor market. Curriculum is permeated by a market-oriented utilitarianism, the service function ranks highest, and the humanities are challenged to show their usefulness and value (Wielemans and Vanderhoeven 1991). In these countries, universities and scholars are pressured as well to be more entrepreneurial, raising funds from a variety of private sources. In this context, research, teaching and extension activities become legitimate when they are perceived as economically relevant by external actors. Fields of study, in order to be successful, must develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes valued by industry and the service sector. Likewise, researchers must continually prove the utility and relevance of research to the economy and to society through direct technology transfer activities. Furthermore, certain demands and requirements of the labor market are, without critical examination, taken as normative for university research. The legitimacy and the quality of a given field is increasingly assessed by external bodies and forces, which have gradually more power over the university agenda. Extension is forced to become financially self-sufficient, and international education is compelled to shift from 'aid' to 'trade', that is, from the development education model to one based on the premise of a global marketplace (Schugurensky and Higgins 1994). In order to ensure more responsiveness to the 'economy', the model of self-governance based exclusively on academic actors is being replaced by a model that includes an externally recruited board with comprehensive responsibilities. Primary among these responsibilities is to ensure a successful adaptation to external demands, an aim that is skillfully packaged as 'social accountability'.

One of the mechanisms considered by governments to ensure that programs respond to the demand is to shift from institutional funding to individual funding in the form of vouchers. In this system, students can ultimately decide which courses die and which remain alive (Gooding 1990). Even without a voucher system, the existence of a course is increasingly justified on the basis of minimum enrollments. Considering enrollments as the main criteria to preserve or eliminate courses would lead to an emphasis on large introductory courses and the withdrawal from small graduate seminars. Critics of this policy argue that at the end of this process the university will resemble a high school rather than an institution of academic excellence. Defenders of the proposal rebut that all courses can coexist, but students enrolled in small seminars should pay a higher fee than students enrolled in massive classes [19]. Obviously, such a scheme would affect not only accessibility to, but also quality of, graduate programs. Moreover, a client-oriented philosophy may lead to a weakening of science and humanities programs, and a strengthening of professional and vocational ones.

As Lane (1991:163) notes, "it is more and more a widely shared belief that higher education resources should pay off, either in the sense that it is socially productive or in the sense that higher education training is productive when outputs are related to inputs". Although there is still a strong government belief in human capital theory (investment in education in order to elevate the quality of labor inputs), now such investment must be targeted to the 'relevant' fields, namely business and technology-related disciplines (Taylor 1991:190). Indeed, there

is a strong drive towards 'market-oriented' studies, in the context of a profound 'vocationalization' of higher education (with a focus on industrial training and cognitive instrumental learning), at the expense of non-vocational courses and basic research. In Norway, for instance, there has been an explicit policy to encourage expansion in engineering, information technology (computer science), biotechnology and business administration. This development has led to reallocation of staff, with some fields experiencing cutbacks, particularly the humanities. In Australia, there has been an increase of enrollment in business, administration, economics and engineering, and a decrease in education. In Canada, at Simon Fraser University, Interdisciplinary Studies were discontinued and a Faculty of Applied Engineering created, probably to show government that the university was doing its work in making cutbacks and meeting the needs of industry. Also in Canada, the government of Alberta has proposed that post-secondary institutions give renewed emphasis to programming to respond to the needs of the economy, and that an emphasis should be placed on the employability of graduates and their ability to become entrepreneurs (Teichler 1991, Aamodt et al. 1991, Graves 1988, Miller 1991, Alberta Advanced Education 1994).

In this context, not only the gap between sciences and humanities described by Snow in 1959 is widening, but an internal split is taking place within the humanities. On the one hand, 'hard' and 'useful' subjects like economics, social work, educational administration, certain branches of psychology and sociology (especially those related to social control and 'social technology', like counseling, criminology or demography) are growing. On the other hand, 'softer' and more critical/reflexive fields are apparently less desirable as suppliers of a capable and useful workforce. This trend was also observed in Argentina, where government officials demand that social sciences abandon theoretical undertakings and critical reflection to become tools for economic and social development (see chapter 6). In Belgium, as reported by Wielemans and Vanderhoeven (1991), the implementation of the Saint-Ann plan led to a marginalization of humanities, which suffer enrollment declines and the migration of the best students to fields with better employment prospects. Indeed, in some cases funding is conditional upon the prospective employment of graduates. The reaction of several threatened faculties and departments has been to implement curriculum changes in order to be more 'marketable', or to develop tailored courses to obtain profits, which are used partly to finance deficit courses. Under fierce competition for students, universities want their programs to look attractive, and thus have mounted what have been labeled as "all singing, all dancing" courses. In order to attract the necessary clientele and enhance the appeal of a course, professors are beginning to market their products using advertisement techniques, to the extent that some announcements for graduate courses look like promotions of travel agencies.

d) corporate rationality

A fourth element of the commercial university is the gradual incorporation of a market-oriented logic, which consists of the internalization of market values such as entrepreneurship, utilitarianism, cost-efficiency, competition, and profit-making, and the implementation of market practices like amalgamations, professional managerialism, rational management, privatization, client fees, incentives and flexible contractual relations. In terms of governance, the assumption is that an economic model of administration based on lines of command that end up in senior administrators and chief executive officers makes more sense than endless delays resulting from apparently ineffective committees and councils.

As universities move towards the market, the corporate rationality slowly replaces the logic of academic disciplines. Among the three main models of university identified by Clark (1983), it is becoming increasingly evident that universities are moving towards the American model. The Italian model, coordinated primarily by the academic oligarchy rather than by political bureaucracies or market interactions, is fading out. The Napoleonic or Continental

model, in which universities have a high dependence on the authority of the state, is not disappearing, but as governments are espousing the values and practices of the private sector, they are going to pressure universities to embrace the same corporate rationality that will be asked from other agencies receiving state funds. In the US model, public and private universities often engage in competitive behavior similar to that prevailing in the marketplace: they compete for students, faculty, government funds, research grants and donations; moreover, they work as partners with business in highly competitive economic activities. Universities are considered as being in the service industry, with the students and employers as their customers [20]. The characterization of students as customers justifies the recent decision of the US government to channel aid to individual students rather than directly to institutions. This strategy allows the state to subsidize private universities discretely without creating public controversy (Clark 1983, Scott 1983, Omari 1991). Simultaneously, in 1992 and 1993, tuition in US public universities and colleges increased three times as fast as the rate of inflation [21]. In the US, the incorporation of market values and practices in the educational system can be traced to the end of the 19th century [22], and had been denounced as early as 1902 by John Dewey and in 1918 by Thorstein Veblen, who coined the term "captains of erudition" to label the new entrepreneurial university leaders. During that period, school administrators adopted business values and practices and assumed the posture of the business executive, worshipping the new cult of efficiency (Callahan 1962). Moreover, as Noble (1977) points out, many US universities were set up and promoted by corporate capital from their very inception.

However, although the incorporation of a corporate rationality in US universities has a long past, a renewal of interest and emphasis can be observed (Harvey 1989, Slaughter 1990). Presently, the US model is not only intensified in its home base, but is being adopted by many developed and developing countries. Whereas most explanations tend to stress a causal relationship between budget cutbacks and the adoption of a corporate rationality by universities, evidence from the US and Canada indicates that lack of funding is not the only factor pushing universities toward the private sector. In these countries, during the expansion of the 1970s that took place at more prosperous economic times, corporations and private institutions greatly benefited from the state, and universities avidly served their corporate sponsors (Axelrod 1986, Slaughter 1990).

The attraction towards the US model is particularly noticeable in Canada and Mexico, where the full-scale economic integration, the implementation of neoliberal policies and the decline of state support for indigenous culture furthers the historical trend towards 'Americanization' (Panitch 1981, Clarkson 1988, Carroll 1990, Muñoz Izquierdo 1991, Calvert and Kuehn 1993). Official documents at the national and provincial level suggest that present investments in education are not paying off, and that program design should be closer to the marketplace (Globe & Mail, July 29, 1991:A 18) [23]. Likewise, in a recent economic discussion paper, the government of Alberta demands a more business-oriented education. The paper claims that "educational institutions can help promote entrepreneurship by more effectively incorporating entrepreneurial values and approaches into their course work", and expects business to play a larger role not only in financing higher education, but also in governance [24]. In a recent NAFTA-related meeting held in Vancouver, representatives of business, government and education from Canada, the US and Mexico listened to Canada's emissary of the Prime Minister praising the importance of education for entrepreneurship, and saying that higher education must "adjust" by reaching out more to business and industry [25].

A similar situation is taking place in many other countries, where higher education is being saturated with corporate values based on entrepreneurship and utilitarianism (Schiller 1989: 320). As was mentioned before, in the context of an increased globalization of the economy, standardized recipes to confront the crisis imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, and

domestic pressures derived from the years of expansion, universities in many countries are being pushed towards the US university model and to adopt the logic of corporate management. As will be examined in the next chapter, the adoption of a market rationale in cultural institutions is related to the increasing commodification of knowledge. As knowledge replaces raw materials as the primer of the world economy, the universities are increasingly expected to produce and disseminate knowledge for private consumption and to perform as factories. These 'factories' are supposed to operate with commercial criteria rather than social ones, and governments ensure that this occurs through reward and punishment strategies. As this process takes place, the notions of quality and efficiency replace the principles of equality and accessibility as the core of prevailing ideology in academic life (Aamodt et al. 1991:138; Lane 1991:163). The first notion (quality) is usually invoked by marketventionists [26] as incompatible with equality. Indeed, many governments contend that the years of expansion have produced a decline in standards, and blame universities for being too egalitarian and for not rewarding academic merit. However, the allegation that the concern for quality is an exclusive feature of the heteronomous university model (and absent in the autonomous model) is debatable.

Moreover, marketventionists' ardent defense of quality has not been accompanied by the development of clear indicators to assess it. This suggests that in the restructuring agenda 'quality' has more a political than an academic rationale. The second concept (efficiency) has become a new theology in higher education policy. In terms of research, efficiency in the commercial university refers to productivity, as expressed in publications, patents, technology transfer and the like. In terms of extension, it means the capacity to be self-sufficient or even to make profits. In terms of teaching, it means producing more graduates of a given standard at less cost, which means the reduction of dropout rates and the average length of time required to graduate, and the adoption of new practices such as the enlargement of the teacher-student ratio, the use of instructional technology, the implementation of vertical cuts and the amalgamation of institutional structures into larger units (economies of scale).

Advocates of the commercial university argue that some features of academic institutions (such as tenure, collegial democracy, peer review, etc.) are barriers inhibiting the capacity to respond to change and to compete in the global economy, and should be replaced by values and practices that promote competition, entrepreneurship and creativity. Moreover, other features of universities, such as research priorities, faculty evaluation and retraining, and curriculum planning, should be rapidly adapted to the market model (Fulton 1986, Cochrane 1986, Vagianos 1986). The recommendation is that the university should be interpreted "more as a factory than as a club" and should be treated accordingly, being its task is "to produce outcomes (graduates) at the lowest possible cost" (Ginestar 1990:21-22). Partisans of the commercial university attribute academics a conservative ideology, because they tend to vote for the status quo out of fear of the unknown, and are unable to see the advantages of the market. The assumption is that resistance to new ideas is inborn among academic communities, but that once these individuals gain experience and confidence in managing market processes, they will come to recognize that they prefer such a situation (Peacock 1979:26, Becher 1989).

This means that the adoption of a corporate rationality is part and parcel of the commercial university. As Newson and Buchbinder (1988) pointed out, under this new rationality universities must redefine their objectives on the needs of the economy, on developing a workforce that fulfills the requirements of new high-tech industries, and on conducting research to assist industries in securing a competitive edge in the world market. Hence, in some countries national research councils (granting bodies that allocate government funds to support university research) have altered their funding policies to encourage projects with

practical applications, particularly those related to private-sector development and technological innovation. The borrowing of corporate values by universities has led to a situation of increasing ideological affinity between academics and businesspeople [27].

Although many academics argue against the application of financial and economic principles for evaluating universities, contending that higher education is a nonmarket activity, the language of private investments, rates of return, full cost pricing to users, competitive pricing, competitive marketing for student recruitment, incentives, cost-effectiveness, level of diminishing return, economy of scale and the like is increasingly shaping the literature on higher education. Advocates of applying economic principles to academic contexts argue that the philosophy and purpose of the university is not going to change. In their view, the corporate rationality is a means to help institutions to perform their functions and to achieve their goals in a more effective way.

As was advanced before, the corporate rationality implies the adoption of market values, but also market practices. One of these practices consists of a specialization in a few areas where success is more likely to be achieved. The argument is that, to ensure efficiency and quality, institutional resources must be concentrated in areas of greatest strength, eliminating operations in weaker areas. This strategy, known as vertical cuts, has been implemented in the University of Alberta by President Paul Davenport, portrayed in a national magazine as the 'maverick' of Canadian universities. Another practice imported from the business world is the promotion of competition among providers for students and for funds, assuming that this competition is the key for innovation and efficiency. In the private sector of higher education, competition is sometimes complemented with deregulation, under the assumption that consumers will discriminate among good and bad providers.

In addition to vertical cuts and competition, maximization of efficiency is sought through amalgamations and mergers. The rationale behind these policies seems to be to attain an 'economy of scale' that is more efficient, because larger institutions optimize the use of resources and offer better options to students and staff. In other words, the underlying assumption is that bigger is better. These scale-enlargement operations are particularly encouraged in Holland and Australia, where the state rewards merging institutions and sanctions those which remain below specified sizes (Miller 1991, Taylor 1991). In the latter country, in less than two decades (from 1975 to 1991) the number of institutions was reduced by two thirds, from 99 to 32. Internally, universities are pressured to amalgamate many departments into larger units, with a separate administrative staff who assists the heads in a professional, managerial way. To provide an example close to home, at the time of finishing this dissertation, my own department (Educational Foundations) is being merged with two other departments.

Another important practice that universities are borrowing from the business world is professional managerialism. The rationale behind managerial professionalism is that by achieving more management flexibility, public universities will increase initiative, imagination, motivation and therefore long-term improvements in productivity. Managerial professionalism has important consequences for governance and academic work. In terms of governance, the state is compelling universities to withdraw from the traditional 'political model' of shared governance, and to move into a more 'entrepreneurial management' model based on corporate rationality. This implies, first, the incorporation of external partners (such as industry, commerce and government itself) into university decision-making, in accordance with the argument that there is a need to make universities more sensitive to their milieu. Second, it implies an increase of professorial power vis-a-vis the influence of students and non-academic staff, with the argument of the need to concentrate responsibility into the hands of those 'of proven excellence'. In Latin America, recommendations to limit the power of

students and alumni, who have tremendous participation in university political life, have been periodically reiterated since at least the Atcon Report (1959). Third, there is a pressure for universities to undertake their own strategic management. This means that universities must develop an 'institutional mission' expressed in clear goals and long-term plans based on simulations of future scenarios. These plans are then used by governments to evaluate the efficient use of resources to achieve and to allocate funds accordingly (Neave and Van Vught 1991). The move towards strategic planning and institutional missions as part of government conditions for fund allocation is already occurring in several countries, such as the USA, Holland, Norway, England, Chile and Canada. In the latter, an illustration of strategic planning can be found in the 'Degrees of Freedom' document, which presents 46 recommendations for the University of Alberta over the upcoming 15 years (Strategic Planning Task Force 1992).

A fourth implication on governance of the implementation of corporate practices is the development of 'managerial professionalism', a tendency to place university decision-making in the hands of professional managers who must apply the technical procedures developed in the business world. Consistent with the ideology of 'consumerism', according to which education should be less under the control of professional educators and respond more to the needs of industry and commerce, either some academics become professional managers, or university administration is delegated to professional experts in management (CEOs). In this context, the collegial, democratic, institutional model of management is being replaced by a corporate, efficiency-oriented managerial model. As this process takes place, a gap opens between the administrative-managerial culture, on the one side, and the culture of faculty and students, on the other (Graves 1988, Slaughter 1990, Miller 1991, Benjamin et al. 1993). An illustration of these changes can be found in Australia, where the Ministry of Education developed a strategy for enhancing institutional management based on three recommendations. First, top executives should acquire high level management skills and assume leadership roles; second, the size of governing bodies should be reduced; and third, decision-making processes should be streamlined.

As was mentioned above, the adoption of market practices also has an impact on the organization of academic work. Indeed, the three main areas around which academic work is organized (teaching, research and extension) are being greatly affected by the new organizational policies and practices. For instance, class size influences teaching and evaluation methods. Likewise, granting agencies influence the way research is carried out, ranging from time constraints to public availability of findings. Finally, a customer-oriented approach may lead to a shift in extension priorities, from community development to the supply of courses and services for those individuals and organizations who can afford them. In addition, pressures towards specialization are increasing the divorce of teaching, research and service. Although academics are supposed to engage in the three areas and all three are supposed to have the same weight, this is rarely the case. Some areas carry more prestige than others, and this differential status is expressed in funding, promotion criteria, merit awards, classification of appointments, salary allocation, benefits, sabbatical leaves and the like. Research -measured by publication records- is more rewarded, whereas 'non-productive' faculty members are assigned heavier teaching loads, and the importance of community service ranks at the bottom of university priorities.

Another change in the organization of academic work that takes place in the commercial university is the increased diversification of the academic workforce, which is organized in three main categories: tenure-track (full-time), part-time (only to teach specific courses) and limited-contract (sessionals). Each one has distinct terms and conditions of employment, including salary scales, benefits, career chances, duties, and prerogatives in university governance. As in the rest of the job market, the proportion of the flexible workforce (part-time and sessional workers) is increasing. Before university restructuring, these limited-

contract and part-time positions were stepping-stones to tenure-track positions. Now, they are used to reduce costs and to increase managerial flexibility. As a result, the situation of individuals with a good teaching and research record to be hired and re-hired as sessionals or part-time is becoming less and less unusual. In Germany, for instance, long-term employment security for junior academic staff has been reduced (Teichler 1991). Not only part-time and sessional workers are affected by this trend, but also tenured professors, who are being transferred into the category of 'flexible' workforce. In England, tenure has been abolished, and many other countries are attacking tenure on the grounds that it is not a protection of academic freedom but simply job security for unproductive staff.

The combination of the above changes results in an increasing disparity between academic and administrative (managerial) positions and roles, which is expressed in privileges, salaries and functions. Probably the most important implication of it is the gradual marginalization of faculty in decision-making. In fact, when academic work is more fragmented and specialized, when conditions of appointments become more diversified and unstable, when there is a diminishing role for collegial committees in making decisions about resource allocation, program priorities and the general direction of the university, academics are less able to speak with a unified voice (Newson & Buchbinder 1988, Slaughter 1990).

e) contracts with business

In an environment shaped by the four trends described above, universities are urged by governments to build stronger links with industry and to seek alternative sources of financial support. Yet the idea of closer links between university and industry is not a novel one, and can be traced at least to Comte, who in 1819 published a plan for businessmen, industrialists and technologists-scientists to be represented by three chambers, assuming that such alliance would be in charge of the progressive understanding and exploitation of the natural world, to the benefit of all. Relationships between them had traditionally taken the form of 'co-operative' education programs in which students divided their time between classroom and factory, and the curriculum was shaped to respond to the needs of the latter. This type of collaboration between university and industry has been implemented in socialist and capitalist countries alike. The difference is that in the former the exchange lies completely within the public sector, while in the latter it is primarily within the private enterprise.

While the university-industry relationship has existed to a certain extent throughout this century, particularly in the USA and Canada (Noble 1977, Axelrod 1982), from the 1980s on the trend is much deeper and global. During that decade, technology transfer from universities to industry has proliferated, leading to a commercialization of academic work. In developed and developing nations alike, more and more researchers are transferring results to industrial companies, and new offices of technology transfer are being built on university campuses. Indeed, the strengthening of corporate-university links is leading to the creation of new division units and positions in the university, namely contract management, international development, industrial liaison, technology transfer, etc.

Under specific arrangements, private corporations provide universities with capital or operating grants in exchange for an influence over the direction of research and exclusive licenses on patentable discoveries made in laboratories (Axelrod 1986). The rationale behind these arrangements is that the knowledge system needed to support the diversity of industries affected by university research depends on timely, frequent and informal interactions between practitioners and researchers, as well as more traditional forms of technology transfer such as joint research, journal articles, faculty consultants, patenting and licensing processes and recent graduates, as well. Through these interactions, ideas, relationships and innovative approaches to manufacturing emerge (Lindenstein and Walshok 1990:195). The Universidad de Buenos Aires is not alien to these trends. As will be described in chapter 4, in that

institution the links between this university and the local industry are carried out through an institutional unit called UBATEC. Created in 1991, UBATEC has the explicit mandate of generating a market for university research products, to make business and to make a profit. Consistent with this mandate, in 1993 alone UBATEC generated a profit of US $ 20 million, approximately 10% of that year's budget.[28]

The intensification of university-industry relationships is taking place throughout the world, but is particularly evident in the USA, where dozens of universities are forcefully turning to private corporations, especially pharmaceutical and electronics companies, to obtain revenues from scientific research. While in 1984 industry-sponsored research and development spending at all US universities and colleges accounted for $0.4 billion, in 1991 it had tripled to $1.2 billion (De Palma 1993). Alluding to the benefits of the extended ties with industry, a University of Minnesota dean claimed that "when university and industry researchers work together, they quicken the pace at which laboratory findings can be put into the marketplace" (quoted in Schiller 1989:86). However, Schiller immediately adds that cooperation also quickens the pace at which the marketplace and its rules are moving into the university, and that the bottom line for corporations is to siphon off the findings in the academic laboratories and institutes for their own profit.

The increasing contracts with external customers cannot be separated from the shared belief among government administrators in the superiority of the dynamics of the market vis a vis state interventionism. Hence, universities are pressured to become more entrepreneurial and offer their services and products (research, consultancy, training, etc.) to a wide range of customers, including the government itself. Indeed, in this model, governments are considered just one of many possible customers of the commercial university, searching for the highest quality goods at the lowest price (Walford 1991). The assumption is that by encouraging competition among suppliers, the market will reward the efficient and will punish the inefficient.

Under an ideological context that glorifies the private sector and condemns the public, governments' confidence in the market is leading to a rampant privatization of public agencies. Some governments, such as those of Australia and Argentina, have gone even further, laying proposals to privatize the national research system (Pichel 1991, Woock and Clyne 1993). The rationale behind this initiative is that by leaving the research system in the private sector, university research could become more relevant to the local industry, under the assumption that local industry is interested in funding research efforts. However, available evidence suggest that this interest is low: in both countries the contribution of local industry to R&D is below 0.4% of GNP.

2. <u>The two Cs of the 'controlled university'</u>

It was advanced at the beginning of this section that the heteronomous university is the consequence of two simultaneous institutional processes: the *commercial university* and the *controlled university*. The nature of the commercial university has been summarized in the 5 Cs described above. Although the identification of these five trends are of great importance to understand present university change, the concept of commercial university has a rather limited conceptual potential to illuminate such change, because it focuses on just one aspect of it. Whereas the commercial university accounts very well for the increasing integration of the university into the market, it does not pay enough attention to the increasing role the state has taken in university affairs, shifting from a mere funder to an active evaluator and regulator. These new roles of the state can be condensed in two Cs: conditional funding and coordination. Conditional funding and coordination mean greater governmental intervention in university life.

It can be argued that the only development that really counts is the commercial university, since the controlled university is merely a tool to adapt the university to the market, and not an end in itself. This is partly correct, because the contemporary state does not hide its sympathies towards a market-oriented university. Under the assumption that universities are insufficiently responsive to social goals and public needs, government bureaucrats are inclined to make the university more responsive by encouraging it to interact with the market. However, if the university were surrendered to the market without state mediation, the system would soon become extremely fragmented and chaotic. In order to prevent this from happening, the state has begun to provide the rules of the game. On the one hand, the state is increasing the pressure for accountability through conditional funding, which is contingent upon product evaluation. Through conditional funding, the state can emphasize 'useful' disciplines according to labor market predictions or quantifiable outcomes, or leave that decision to the students themselves through strategies such as a voucher system. On the other hand, the state is developing the basis for the operation of the higher education system by setting up a general division of labor. This coordination consists of a general complex based on collaboration and competition.

Neave and Van Vught (1991) point out that adjustment policies affect universities in two ways: first, in the reduction of their budgets, and second, in the pressure to compete among themselves, thus demonstrating the efficient use of resources. In this context, governments facing financial stringency are demanding that universities optimize their relationship with the labor market, and are managed on a more 'rational' manner. To attain such management rationality governments are implementing new systems of control and planning. In Brunner's terms, the 'benevolent' state characteristic of the years of expansion is turning into an 'evaluative' state during an era of contraction. Until recently, universities were regarded as a public good, so accountability demands focused on access and efficiency. In this regard, Ewell (1991) points out that, as public officials increasingly view higher education as part of the state's infrastructure, the focus of accountability has changed. Now, state officials regard accountability in terms of documenting return of investment and assessment of performance. This pressure for accountability -and its impact on institutional autonomy- has been brilliantly diagnosed by Philip Altbach at an early stage of its development:

> There is little question that public authority -government- is winning the 'struggle' for accountability and that universities throughout the world are adjusting to demands for data, and increasingly for participation in academic affairs...the traditional right of the university to define its own academic goals, to maintain autonomy in terms of internal governance and to expend its funds essentially without scrutiny from the outside have all been called into question, and universities are quickly losing some important elements of their autonomy (Altbach 1979:48).

A similar diagnosis has been advanced years later by Brunner (1990) in reference to the Latin American case [29] and by Neave and van Vught (1991) for developed countries. The latter writers compare the current university-state relationship with the myth of Prometheus, disputing government's claim that the university benefits from policies aimed at releasing it from the direct control of the state and placing it closer to industry. They argue that the change in the relationship between higher education and government should be interpreted not as 'Prometheus unchained' but, on the contrary, as 'Prometheus bound' (1991:xiv)". After reviewing several case studies, they conclude that "higher education systems of the West are chained to a rock, with the eagle of budgetdom and intervention tearing daily at their entrails" (253). It may argued that, since Neave and Vught acknowledged that universities are granted more autonomy, their accusation has no grounds in reality. One may also advance the hypothesis, as Smart (1989) does, that the state is implementing contradictory policies that lead to tensions. The paradox identified by Smart is the state's advocacy of deregulation of economic and academic activity, as well as of institutional autonomy, through a highly centralized, regulated and government controlled system. This paradox has been depicted by

George Watson (1989) as the great contradiction of neo-conservatism: on the one hand, a rhetoric based on laissez faire and competition; on the other hand, a strong interventionist role.

Neave and Van Vught resolve this apparent contradiction by showing that the state selectively propels competition and increases regulation in certain areas. Indeed, their distinction between process control and product control allows us to understand the simultaneous development of a more unified yet diverse system. Process control refers to the regulation of, or the influencing of, the necessary conditions, resources and means to develop the product (i.e. work conditions, admission policies, curriculum, disciplinary profile, duration of studies, distribution between disciplines) while product control refers to qualified output (type and level of student qualifications, publications, projects, patents, etc.). It is their argument that the most important change in the state-university relationship is government's shift from process control to product control. This shift, which results from increasing pressure to show efficiency and societal relevance, may lead to greater university autonomy in the domain of process, but at the same time increases accountability in relation to product control by developing systems of performance evaluation. Moreover, the autonomy of process control seems to be dependent on success in product control. In other words, greater autonomy in the area of process is conditional upon the performance in product according to government criteria. Thus, autonomy is increasingly limited to process control, and even this restricted domain is contingent on meeting goals set by government. Indeed, the autonomy promoted by the government encourages universities to be creative and entrepreneurial; furthermore, such autonomy must be bargained for every year in the light of institutional performance and availability of public resources (Neave and Vught 1991:252).

Under the strategy of product control or 'self-regulation', which replaces the strategy of 'rational planning and control' prevalent during the 1980s, government refrains from control of details, and focuses instead on co-ordination and steering of the higher education sector whereby desired directions are influenced through a system of rewards and punishments. As Van Vught (1988) notes, in this model preventive governance is replaced by repressive governance, and a priori control is replaced by retrospective monitoring. The new strategy increases university self-management and reduces government control and detailed oversight, but develops new initiatives to supervise the higher education system by 'remote control' (Brunner 1990). Such a system is perceived by government as the best formula for increasing creative development and excellence in universities. The main philosophy behind this move is that the university should use its autonomy to respond to the needs of external society.

'Self-regulation' strategies tend to give greater freedom to educational institutions to develop their own policies, while the Ministry of Education limits itself to the broader issues. As the Australian White Paper of 1988 states, the recommendation is that universities have "greater control over their own resources, enhanced by revenue-raising options and decreased intervention by governments in internal funding and management decisions". In England, universities suddenly found themselves with fewer resources and the need to contract and rationalize. They were forced to go to the market for funds, but state control over the direction of the university simultaneously increased. University administrators must continually respond to governmental demands for information, documentation and requests to undertake managerial changes in the context of cost-efficiency analyses (Walford 1991). In Argentina, as it will be described in chapter 7, this turnabout has been promoted by the Ministry of Finance, and resisted by the Ministry of Education, which allegedly considered that the shift from administrator to planner would imply a loss of power. At the same time, the government concedes universities the freedom to choose how to internally distribute their budget, but reserves the right to decide the total amount granted. However, if universities fail in achieving consensus on criteria for publicly validating the quality of academic programs

and for internal distribution of resources, governmental audit staffs may develop their own. In sum, under the strategy of self-regulation, autonomy is constrained by the conditions imposed by the state. State control over the process is reduced, while the evaluation of results becomes emphasized.

As was advanced above, governmental effort to influence higher education may follow two models. On the one hand, the rational planning of control strategy that reduces institutional autonomy; on the other, the self-regulating strategy that allows institutions more autonomy and responsibility in order to enable them to become more responsive to the market and to competition for state resources. In this strategy, which is becoming prevalent in the present, detailed regulations are replaced by rewards and sanctions. Activities performed by individual institutions are increasingly subjected to strict evaluations undertaken by the state. This tends to enforce methods of accounting, auditing and performance evaluation borrowed from the private sector (Aamodt et al. 1991, Lane 1991, Benjamin et al. 1993). Gradually, universities are propelled by governments to develop management capacities, to formulate clear goals -in the framework of objectives set by government- and to show how resources are used to achieve them.

The central dilemma of governments in relation to higher education is how to achieve simultaneously three conflicting policy goals: to severely constrain public expenditure, to increase or at least maintain access, and to increase quality. The strategy followed by many governments to achieve these goals is a division of labor within the higher education system in which different institutions concentrate on different functions. Hence, some universities are in charge of training certain professionals, others concentrate on other careers, others focus on developing excellence in research, and so on. At the same time, by centrally coordinating the system, the government regulates competition and cooperation among units, and forces universities to accommodate student intake to potential demands for employment. Although this 'labor forecasting approach' based on regulating educational enrolments according to future labor market demands has been already criticized for the its difficulty in predicting those demands (due to the inherent dynamism of the economy) [30], and have generally failed (Psacharopoulos 1989), some governments still ground their policies on it.

In highly regulated university systems, government intervention in individual institutions may also take place in order to ensure the efficacy of the whole. In Holland, for instance, government intervention is contingent upon the occurrence of any of the three following situations: a) when a given university develops courses or programs that do not fit in the sectors allocated to such an institution [31]; b) when the macro-efficiency of the higher education system is harmed; and c) when the performance of the institution, in terms of quality, is judged to be inadequate. If one or more of these conditions are present, the government can force the university to interrupt or alter certain activities, using financial sanctions as a threat.

This leads to the notion of conditional funding, which means that funding is based on performance evaluations for both teaching and research. During the era of expansion, the higher education-state relationship was remarkably stable. It rested on an implicit agreement by which universities provided educational services for all qualified applicants, while governments provided the necessary funding. Now, when governments are eager to limit spending and to increase control over the allocation and use of public moneys, that unconditional contracting (or benevolent funding, in the words of Brunner) is being replaced by conditional funding. Under the 'conditional funding' model, each institution receives funding in terms of a lump sum, and has freedom to distribute it internally. However, as already mentioned, institutional goals and resource allocation rationales must be clearly stated. At the end of the year, a report of results must be submitted to the government, which

will target further funding based on performance, rewarding efficiency and sanctioning inefficiency (Taylor 1991).

Conditional funding constitutes one of the most powerful instruments used by the state for shifting the fundamental ethic of higher education, from an institute for service to society into a 'market responsive' agency. Conditional funding has been initially applied to research, which led to reallocation of funds between universities, competitive tendering by individual establishments, and increasing contracts with private agencies (Neave and Van Vught 1991). It was subsequently applied to teaching, which led to new criteria -based on performance measures set by the government- to fund programs. By linking funding to evaluation, governments can steer universities in certain directions. As a result of it, a variety of bureaucratic structures are evolving whereby politicians have more control and more involvement in the affairs of the university than ever before. However, this control is not interpreted by most members of the university community as a necessary accountability for the use of public funds, but as an intrusion on institutional autonomy and a disregard for collegial decision-making. For them, as will be discussed later, such pressure exacerbates the clash of values between academics wanting freedom and external groups wanting control (Stauffer 1983).

In general terms, indicators of performance set by governments incorporate non-academic criteria, and tend to emphasize efficiency rather than quality. In Norway, for instance, research funding has been reorganized through targeted programs according to an applied (or mission oriented) approach, and no longer on a disciplinary basis. Such a funding strategy has changed the research climate and provoked some resistance in the scientific community, which was further aggravated when conditional funding strategies started to be applied to teaching. In this field, the government focused on measures such as retention, graduation rates, and employability of students after graduation. Another example can be found in Alberta, where the key indicators of performance announced by the government are "enrolments, graduation rates, cost per graduate, student satisfaction with programming, and employment outcomes" (Alberta Advanced Education 1994:7). A third example can be taken from Britain, where the Funding Council for England, a bureaucratic state-controlled institution which is in control of the measurement of the quality of teaching, understands quality as having the lowest per-capita cost, and rewards and punishes accordingly. The reward for the winners is more students, and the punishment for the losers is to get less money, pushing the spiral downwards. Since in a context of increased deficits the bottom line of state control is to reduce costs, their evaluation criteria and quality assessments are going to be biased by such need (Benjamin et al. 1993). Using the 'factory' approach advanced by Ginestar, it has been suggested in many countries that funding should be based on 'outputs' (graduates) rather than on enrollments, because this would provide an incentive for good quality teaching [32].

The preceding discussion suggests that conditional funding goes hand in hand with state evaluation, which focuses on quality and accountability. As mentioned above, under the new rules universities have greater autonomy, particularly in budgetary matters, but at the same time, as part of the public sector, they are pressured to implement result-oriented planning and performance evaluation. This arrangement has been summarized by Aamodt et al. (1991) as 'greater freedom, but more public accountability', or 'you get more freedom, but we want to see the results of your efforts on the table'. In this perspective, conditional funding constitutes an indirect mechanism of governance over supposedly autonomous universities. A case in point is Italy. Moscati (1991:103) shows that in this country, under the principle of autonomy, each university has, in theory, the right to govern itself, to organize its own activities, to finance them and to organize its own personnel in both academic and

administrative domains. In practice, however, universities are subordinate to decisions taken by the Ministry of Education, which sets criteria for the distribution of financial resources.

Coming back to the paradox described by Smart, the fact that greater degree of autonomy granted to universities is accompanied by budget cutbacks and performance evaluation may reflect a confusion among policy-makers, who, through a strange hybrid, attempt to combine self-regulation and autonomy with central planning and dirigism (Massen and Van Vught 1988). However, it may also be interpreted as a government's rhetorical exercise in which, behind a façade of autonomy, institutional behavior is highly influenced through the power of the purse (Van Vught 1989, Taylor 1991). By granting academics autonomy to define their 'hows', the state attempts to promote participation in the required changes. This strategy, called 'facilitative policy', encourages institutional autonomy and differentiation, under the claim that this stimulates quality and adaptive power to respond to the changing demands on modern society. In this regard, the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee (1986) stated that by making institutions and their staff the agents of reform, standards can be increased and morale improved, and that this should improve the professional responsibility of academic staff.

However, as Miller (1991) has pointed out, the notion of 'professional responsibility" is ambiguous: it may imply autonomy and independence, but it also may mean managerial control and accountability to the state and/or the market. Those who ascribe to the latter view argue that, in order to create consensus among academics, the state prefers to portray university restructuring as a voluntary measure undertaken by university actors to achieve excellence rather than as a result of external pressures based on coercion. This consensus is attempted through appeals to concepts such as quality, efficiency and entrepreneurship which, as Guy Neave (1988:7) pointed out, are abstract principles that all are in favor of, "just as we are in favor of gastronomy and a thin waist-line".

Summarizing, the commercial university provides closer interactions with the market. and the controlled university ensures an overall rationality of the system according to government criteria. The combination of these events is the development of an institution that can be understood as either 'responsive' or 'reactive' to the external world. Those who use the term 'responsive' emphasize the need to replace the ivory tower model by a service model fulfilling 'societal' (whatever it means) and industrial needs. I rather interpret the emergent pattern as a 'reactive' or heteronomous university. Although I acknowledge that the current autonomous model has problems and should be improved, I concur with Newson and Buchbinder (1988) that an irreflexive move into the heteronomous model carries the risk of developing an institution that expresses less of a vision and more of a mere reaction to external pressures, an institution unable to set its own goals, for it is unable to develop a vision that could provide a framework for these goals. This is the topic of the next section.

Section 3. The debate over the heteronomous university: main critiques

The two aspects of the emerging heteronomous university discussed in the previous section have raised deep concerns about its potential consequences among many academics. However, a difference of emphasis can be noted among academics from North America and Latin America. While in North America the main concern deals with one of the aspects (closer links with the market), in Latin America, there is a great apprehension about the other aspect (state interventionism). This is probably due to the historical developments of each region. In developed countries there is already an accumulated experience in the area of university-industry relations that can be used as reference to potential dangers in the case of an expansion and intensification of these relations. In Latin America, recurrent military coups have generated a vast experience about the negative consequences of state interventionism in university affairs. This, together with the autonomist tradition originated in the 1918 Reform

and the relatively weak liaisons with industry, explains why in Latin America the main concerns about the heteronomous university focus on control rather than on commercialism.

Among the early critics of the heteronomous university were Thorstein Veblen, Upton Sinclair, Ernest Hollis, Irving Horowitz, David Smith and Robert Hutchins in the US, and W.H. Alexander and Carlton Stanley in Canada, later joined by the voices of Bowles and Gintis, Martin Carnoy, Michael Apple, M. Gibbons, Paul Axelrod, Michael Katz and Castles and Wüstenberg. More recent objections were raised by N&B (1988 and 1990) Slaughter (1990), Slaughter and Rhoades (1990), Ziman (1991), Wood (1992) and De Palma (1993), among others. In Latin America, the original contributions of the 1918 Reformists have been complemented by the works of Vasconi and Recca (1977), Briceño (1988) and Torres (1993), among many others. Concerns about the heteronomous university relate to educational, financial, institutional and ethical issues. The worry is that a university shaped by business and the state will tie its creative energies to the needs of industry and to the agenda of the government in turn, sacrificing its most cherished academic and societal values such as the search for truth, the free flow of information, accessibility and community service. The broad range of warnings about the potential consequences of the heteronomous university can be summarized in four major concerns: development of priorities alien to the academic world, conflict of interests, erosion of the academic environment, and a benefit to private groups in the name of the public interest.

1. Development of priorities alien to the academic world

In the light of closer accommodation of universities to commercial interests, a visionary Galbraith (1967) cautioned that education would be adapted to industrial need, to the extent that the conventional morality of the community will be constrained to the disciplines required by the industrial systems, and other goals will be made to seem costly, unimportant or antisocial. In the same vein, Becher (1989:167) argues that government and the military-industrial complex are trying to harness academic activity to suit their sectional interests. As a matter of fact, in the face of limited public funding, collaboration between university-appointed and private-sector researchers is already increasing. Under such circumstances, the interests of academic scientists in basic research may be skewed in the direction of the marketable interests of private laboratories, and universities run the risk of becoming the private sector's captive (Axelrod 1986:46, Newson & Buchbinder 1988:73 and 1990:374).

Critics of the heteronomous university are concerned that the general direction of external funders is in disharmony with the general priorities and direction of the university, and claim that the continuation of current trends will increasingly limit academics' range of choice over priorities and methods of work, diminishing available options in higher education. For instance, the work process of university environments, characterized by self-paced work, discretion over organization and management of research, freedom of communication and publication and the like, could be increasingly replaced by the logic of business, which emphasizes profit and commercialization, deadlines, secrecy, proprietary rights, a competitive edge in the marketplace and so on, and the logic of government, which emphasizes cost-effectiveness and budget reduction. As a result of the new pressures, universities will be forced to establish priorities: applied research at the expense of basic research, professional training at the expense of liberal arts, science at the expense of arts and humanities, and graduate programs at expense of undergraduate education.

To begin with, an excessive openness to business needs may increase applied research at the expense of basic research and teaching. The apprehension expressed by many critics of the heteronomous university is that industries are more likely to sponsor applied research than basic research, and this will be detrimental to university pursuits. The affinity between private enterprise and applied research is even admitted by sympathizers of privatization such

as Winkler (1990: 86). Hence, as private sources of revenue replace public funding, the university will be increasingly pressured to promote applied research at the expense of basic research. Industries find it cheaper to conduct such research at universities rather than their own laboratories because universities, in order to attract funding, frequently underprice their work. Since research projects sponsored by industry are typically routine projects related to production, professors and graduate students would orient their research according to what they perceive is required by profit-oriented organizations. An excessive emphasis on applied research is likely to impose secrecy, undermine objectivity, inhibit scientists to pursue ideas apart from priorities stated in the contract and divert the creativity of the researcher to private financial or commercial gain. Moreover, as science becomes a commodity, it will be manipulated for their own ends by those who allocate resources for research, and that given the economic and military potential of contemporary scientific knowledge, such manipulation cannot be regarded with equanimity (Bok 1982, Stauffer 1983, Gibbons 1985, Walford 1991, Moscati 1991). This, as will be seen later, may lead to conflicts of interest and restrictions in the flow of information.

Detractors of the heteronomous university are also concerned about industry's disdain for basic research, arguing that any respectable research is useful at least in the sense that it contributes to the ongoing scientific enterprise. They claim that industry, in its shortsighted perspective, fails to recognize that basic and applied research are both part of a spectrum that curves back on itself, since sometimes the most esoteric information becomes the most practical. For instance, a study of advances in clinical medicine between 1940 and 1975 found that 60% of them were linked to discoveries of basic research. A more recent example of the unexpected applications of basic research can be found in biotechnology, which is the result of basic research in molecular biology that took place between the 1950s and 1970s under the auspices of government funded research councils (Washington and McArthur 1983, Owen 1988).

Advocates of the heteronomous university usually respond to these concerns with two arguments, which can be called the 'spillover' argument and the 'committed state' argument. The spillover argument contends that knowledge of the applied problems itself stimulates more basic inquiry, so a policy directed to the expansion of applied research will bring in its wake an increasing amount of pure research. This argument is advanced, among others, by Kornberg (1986), who illustrates his claim using the case of Salford University, an institution which obtains a large proportion of its income from industry, and created for this purpose an independent incorporated company [33]. Such organization is legally and managerially independent of the university, yet its directors are also appointed in the university. Although it is profit-oriented, proceeds go to the university. This company also encourages senior staff to work part-time in industry and part-time in the university. For its proponents, this type of partnership not only provides a link between university and industry in terms of immediate responses to specific problems, but also create awareness among industrialists about the long-term advantages of basic research. In this view, university rigidities can be eliminated by creating better understanding among the partners, by a leadership firmly committed to the partnership, and by removing some institutional barriers (Maxwell and Currie 1984, Kornberg (1986). However, the spillover effect has been questioned by a number of academics. Ironically, among them is Asworth (1985), a former Vice Chancellor of Salford University itself, who pointed out that the direct involvement of industry in universities put academic freedom to teach, research and publish at risk.

Those who advance the 'committed state' argument accept the fact that industry is not very keen on investing in R&D [34]. They predict that even if industry only sponsors applied research, basic research will be funded by the state. However, in the context of financial constraints, government commitment to basic research is doubtful. In Finish universities, for

instance, funding allocated to basic research has been drastically reduced, whereas applied research has rapidly increased. According to the Academy of Finland, these extensive investments in applied research, if not accompanied by a considerable promotion of basic research, in the long run will undermine the fulfillment of national science policy (Kivinen and Rinne 1991). In Canada, Newson and Buchbinder (1988) contend that new budget proposals would decrease resources available to granting councils, transferring them instead to the private sector. Since the private sector does not perceive great contributions of basic research to the short-term needs of industry, it may be expected that investment in basic research will be curtailed. This concern is shared by researchers at the University of Manitoba. In a recent meeting held in that university, a team of NSERC (National Science and Engineering Research Council) presented a new strategy called the 'Collaborative Grant Program' to approximately 170 researchers. At the end of that meeting, researchers expressed an overwhelming opposition to the program: only 4 were in favor, while 160 were against. Moreover, the majority of researchers present at that meeting expressed a mistrust of NSERC support to basic research: 6 believed that NSERC was committed to the funding of basic research, while 158 did not (Atlantic Journal, Nov.-Dec-Jan 1993-94). In the US, in the name of a balanced budget, the superconducting supercollider, a particle physics experiment carried out for four years, was canceled in October 1993. While the argument used by those who canceled the project was that is was an 'unaffordable luxury', European scientists described this measure as a blow to high energy particle physics research [35]. Moreover, the cutbacks in pure research that are taking place in the US are driving young physicists from the campus to Wall Street [36].

In Australia, the White Paper addressed the general concern that basic research could be subordinated by pointing out that government's funds to basic research will be available in 'strategic areas', meaning those areas which have potential for future developments. However, Australian academics were not satisfied by such commitment, and noted the absence of a clear method to distinguish in advance which basic research will become strategic and which will not. Unexpectedly, the education minister from Western Australia, and member of the ruling party, expressed concerns in this regard by saying that under the new plan academic freedom could be curtailed and that, through the power of the purse, the Commonwealth was planning "a more explicit, centralist, pro-active and unduly intrusive role in higher education" (Taylor 1991:201).

In the USA, the scientific community is aware that an excessive participation of the market in university research has an impact in the definition of the research agenda. A study conducted at University of California found that the large majority of department chairs and researchers identifies outside funding as the principal determinant of what research gets done. They acknowledged that they must gear research to the funding source, "going where the money is" (Meyerhoff 1986). This leads to a change of rationale and attitudes among researchers. In this regard, Stanford immunologist L. Wofsy points out that, in a normal academic environment, the main concern of a scholar is to make an outstanding contribution from an intellectual and scientific point of view in order to gain the respect of the academic community, but in a university pervaded by the forces of the marketplace, the same scholar will be interested in something exploitable or productive with commercial potential (cited in Axelrod 1986). Other university authorities are inclined to accept industry funds, but are skeptical about its academic benefits. The director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, for instance, noted that "now, just to keep research programs afloat, you end up making a deal with the devil". Likewise, the U. of Miami's vice president for research, stated that "as money becomes less and less available, more people are going to be compromising their principles and their time. We can get to the point where we're not research universities any longer but fee-for-service corporations -hired guns" (DePalma 1993).

Critics of the market university also express the concern that the logic of capital may only favor certain areas, creating haves and have-nots within the same university. They argue that the more narrowly functional the intellectual climate becomes, the greater the danger that the less seemingly applicable sciences (such as zoology, plant physiology or entomology) could shrunk, with restricted possibilities of attracting gifted young scientists, and a similar pattern will be observed in disciplines outside science (Zinberg 1985, Kogan 1987, Becher 1989). Likewise, in the social sciences, disciplines focusing on social control, such as criminology, demography, social work, law, counseling or educational administration may enjoy a better status than areas like anthropology, critical theory, cultural studies or educational foundations. The experience of the US supports this thesis. In this country, Linnell 1982:32) reports that the average total additional earnings by faculty members beyond their university salaries in 1980-81 ranged from $2,940 in the humanities to $9,246 in business. He subsequently argued (1983) that on many campuses the outside business and/or professional activities of some faculty have become divisive to faculty and therefore to the central academic commitments to teaching, scholarship and public service. He also describes the disenchantment of some faculty strongly committed to university over a system that permits their "have" colleagues to enrich themselves at the expense of academic integrity. Schiller (1991) concurs, affirming that, in practice, every public university has become in reality two universities, one reasonably financed and the other starving for funds. Moreover, those who analyzed the experience of the US Forum (i.e. Stauffer 1983) argue that industry tends to concentrate on elite schools conducting major research, thus reinforcing the gap between 'first-class' and 'second-class' universities.

The probable emphasis on vocational education in order to meet the demands of the job market also generates a concern. Indeed, corporations tend to fund institutions like themselves, having little tolerance for those who do not share their ideals. Since an overwhelming majority of business executives tend to think that academics are too critical of business, and complain of a liberal bias in social science programs, it is possible to expect that arts and humanities will not receive as much support as science and technology. Thus, Walford (1991:179) predicts that, since industry will wish to see direct benefits from their investments, it will promote specific vocational training, science and engineering at the expense of arts, humanities and social science, and hence higher education is likely to become more closely linked to specific skills training and the short-term needs of future employers. Confirming Waldorf's prediction, the Albertan business community warned that enrollments are dropping in the areas of engineering and computer science, and that such a trend will undermine the capacity to remain internationally competitive. For this reason, the business community developed a plan to encourage sciences and technology-related fields in universities as well as in high schools [37]. Likewise, the business representatives at the US Business-Higher Education Forum were not eager to fund general programs, except when they had specific objectives or campuses in mind (Watkins 1982, Baron 1983, Stauffer 1983).

As was mentioned before, the main objection to adapt university programs to industry need is the inadequacy of labor force planning, on the grounds that job market forecasts are often unreliable. Two additional concerns are that predictions on labor market evolution can reduce academic control and academic autonomy, and that they respond to the needs of employers rather than those of workers (Skolnik 1983, N&B 1988). Furthermore, it is argued that the most sophisticated employers do not relate their own labor needs with the content of university programs. In Britain, for example, two thirds of graduates, including most of the industrial, business and civil service elites, find employment in areas well away from the subjects in which they graduated (Boys et al 1988, Pearson 1985), a pattern also reported in Japan by Ushiogi (1977).

A related concern is that the heteronomous university will privilege profit-oriented fields, such as professional careers and applied sciences, at the expense of arts and humanities. The present split between humanities and science, which results in two different cultures within the university, can be traced to the middle ages, when disciplines were organized into the Trivium and the Quadrivium. It has been noted that the particular nature of a university at a given time is largely determined by which one of these is dominant during that period (Snow 1959, Winchester 1986). At the beginning of this century, Max Weber warned that an increasing gap between the 'generalist' and the 'specialist' was going to generate a crush of problems in education, and by the early 1980s it became evident that the specialist is winning the contest (Clark 1983). To the objection that the business sector may privilege profit oriented fields, in detriment of arts and humanities, a President of a Canadian university maintained that private funding is not always tied to a particular interest group or a particular business aspect, and claimed that the business sector can support a Chair in Philosophy as well as a lab in science.

Although university presidents still glorify the arts as the core of the university, public funding restraints and research priorities of the private sector contradict this rhetoric (Axelrod 1986). Furthermore, approximately 70% of WB lending to university concentrates on high level science, engineering and agricultural personnel, and research capacity (Ziderman 1990). In addition to its external support, applied sciences can also benefit from internal university policy. In fact, partisans of the commercial university suggested that among the conditions for promotion should be the professor's ability to generate funds. Although social scientists may feel handicapped with respect to their colleagues in hard sciences, it has been said that intellectual creativity can meet the challenge. However, it is assumed that the proportion of academics in social sciences and humanities supporting corporate-university ties is much smaller than among academics working in the natural sciences. Whereas advocates of the commercial university assume that this interaction is the only way to allow universities continue with their commitment to teaching and basic research, it can be counterargued that the marketplace does not have a similar commitment to either teaching or basic research.

Another concern raised in some universities is that the shift towards marketable research may create harm in undergraduate programs. For example, the President of the University of Waterloo said that "we may have to withdraw regular faculty from undergraduate teaching so they can concentrate on graduates and research. It would be...very alien to Canadian experience but I think we're on the threshold of it" [38]. In many countries, the pressure is towards channeling undergraduate programs to community colleges or their equivalents.

In short, the main point in relation to this concern is that both relations with business and increased government control do have a price. In relation to the former, non-marketable fields and activities become a lower priority in allocation of human and financial resources, and institutional objectives become skewed toward saleable applications. It is paradoxical that, while university administrators expect that links with business will expand their range of choice, the situation is exactly the opposite. In the words of Newson & Buchbinder (1988:74), "the more 'useful' the university becomes, the more limited its options". In relation to the latter, the subordination of process control to product control provides governments with the power to impose external needs over those arising from the intrinsic development of the disciplines or from the individual needs for personal development or unrestricted inquiry, all of which are better determined internally within the institution by those who create and those who consume knowledge. By using product control as the main indicator of quality, governments will tend to evaluate higher education in terms of number of graduates, patents and publications, and academe "will be gradually reduced to the status of a 'knowledge factory', impotent to resist the short-term and political opportunism of objectives which governments have set" (Neave and van Vught 1991:253). The overall concern is that

the subordination of internal priorities to external priorities has serious implications for higher education. If appropriate guidelines are not in place, universities can lose not only their more fundamental values and practices, but also the capacity to decide their own agenda.

2. Conflicts of interest

A second concern about the heteronomous university relates to a possible conflict of interests between academia and business. The arguments is that if research goes where the money is, researchers may have a double loyalty. On the one hand, science, academia, scholarship and truth. On the other, profit and the general interests of the private sector. It is also claimed, in the case of applied research sponsored by corporations, the community is aware of potential conflict of interests and that would create of problem of public image. In other words, even if the research is accurate and the researcher is honest, the results will be under suspicion, damaging academic and institutional credibility, and undermining society's trust in academia and science (Linnell 1983, Axelrod 1986).

Taking into account current trends in R&D, scientists working in a variety of fields are increasingly pressured to make complex ethical choices. In agriculture, for instance, choices are being made between ever-increasing reliance on toxic chemicals and alternative means of pest control; in energy, between nuclear power or coal and the "soft" energy path; in medicine, between new wonder drugs, and sophisticated equipment, on the one hand, and preventive medicine and basic health care, on the other; in industry, between capital-intensive and labor-intensive means of production. As Meyerhoff (1986) warns, in a context in which some medicines become poisons, sugar substitutes cause cancer, nuclear power plants threaten to melt down and new forms of life are genetically produced, technology cannot be isolated from ethics.

In analyzing what she perceives to be a relatively unacknowledged policy problem facing higher education, Slaughter (1990) argues that when universities and business are engaged in common tasks, university leaders will choose the business, and will pressure faculty to do the same. Likewise, a report entitled "Guidelines are needed", published by a Canadian newspaper cautions that an "inherent conflict between the openness of the university and the secrecy of the industrial workplace" may exist (Globe and Mail, May 7, 1984). Confirming these fears, a multiplicity of cases for concern have emerged in different countries as a result of increasing links between universities and the private sector, ranging from accusations of the use of university facilities and federal research money for private commercial purposes to censorship on publications about new discoveries, and flagrant conflict of interests.

In 1982, for instance, in the University of California alone, 340 cases of scientists having some financial interest in business entities were identified. More recently, in a case that went to court, the President of Boston University, John Silber, was accused of profiting when the university sold a division of a research company to a Japanese firm (De Palma 1993). Another conflict of interest arose in McGill University in Montreal in 1984, when two professors working on a secret invention eventually resigned (N&B 1988:73). Likewise, in a broadly publicized case of apparent conflict of interest occurred in 1980, when the National Academy of Science of the US issued a report ("Toward healthful diets") stating that there was no need for the average person to cut down on the amount of cholesterol in the diet. Such report was immediately discredited in the editorial pages of*The New York Times* and *Science* magazine, on the grounds that several members of the committee preparing the report, including the chairman, had financial ties with industry. In another celebrated case, a university conducted a testing program for a large and prestigious multinational corporation. When the researchers discovered that the substance submitted for testing was linked to sterility among company workers who handled the chemical during its production, they

submitted the findings directly to the company in confidential reports, evading public disclosure.

As a result of this case, the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Congress of the US discussed the ethical and legal responsibilities of researchers to publish research findings expeditiously when evidence indicates potential harm to public health (Linnell 1983, Washington and McArthur 1983). In the early 1990s, a new process for rapidly duplicating strands of DNA in vitro was kept in secret, provoking serious conflicts of interests between scientific exchange and profit maximization, on the one hand, and between societal benefits and shareholders' interests, on the other (Buchbinder and Newson 1990:373). At the University of Pittsburgh, one of the top medical research universities in the US in terms of the money it receives from public and private grants ($109-million in fiscal year 1993), cases of scientific misconduct resulting from conflict of interests (including major fabrications of data) have been so pervasive that a scientific-integrity office was opened in 1991 to examine such cases [39].

But perhaps the most fascinating personal case in terms of conflict of interests is the academic life of Charles Hine, a faculty entrepreneur at the University of California. He hid information on toxic chemicals linked to male sterility, birth defects and cancer, he claimed that a non-smoker cannot contract diseases from secondhand smoke, and argued against the imposition of more strict lead standards in the workplace. Although he always portrayed himself as an academic committed to university pursuits, he was discovered to have worked for Shell in the first incident, for a variety of tobacco companies in the second, and for the major lead producer in the US in the third one (Meyerhoff 1986). Coming back to the suggestive title of the Globe & Mail article, it is stated that existing guidelines regulating university-business relations are often vague and ambiguous, and do not prevent research from being carried out even when potential conflict of interests are likely to arise. The conflict of interests involved in the Hine case raises the issue of values in academic research, and a heteronomous university may increase existing concerns about ethics of funding. It may be argued that these cases are just exceptions to an otherwise well regulated system. However, as Linnell (1983) reports, only those blatant cases of conflict of interest that come to public attention are dealt with. He states that a large number of universities lack the most obvious of needed policies on links with industry and possible conflict of interest and that the monitoring and reinforcement of the inadequate policies that do exist is so benign as to be almost nonexistent.

Another point made by critics of the market university is that as universities find themselves strapped for funds, they will be more likely to accept funding without asking questions about the potential use of research results. A point in case is military research. In the US, as it was pointed out in section 1, the military complex funds 70% of all academic research in computer science and is extremely active in many other areas. At the university of Alberta, the Department of Defense funding for contracted research tripled from $180,000 to $625,000 between 1987-88 and 1989-90. Due to confidentiality requirements, in this institution the published record documenting university research no longer identifies the departments which benefit from such funding (Chown, Williamson et al., 1991). Critics of the heteronomous university argue that the double loyalty of the researcher (to the sponsor and to the academia) results in secrecy, which in turn contributes to undermine the academic environment.

3. Erosion of academic environment

A third concern, strong among faculty, is that the heteronomous university may undermine their most cherished values, which in turn may erode the academic environment. Apparently,

the worry that commercialism perverts academic activities is as old as the university itself. For example, as early as 1241, in a work entitled Morale Scolarium, John of Garland resentfully made the point that

> "if you are a real scholar you are thrust out in the cold. Unless you are a money maker, I say, you will be considered a fool, a pauper. The lucrative arts, such as law and medicine, are now in vogue, and only those things are pursued which have cash value" (cited in Wake 1991).

However, what we are witnessing today is not only an intensification of this historical pattern, but also a dramatic change in the relationship between university, state and market. Medicine and law are still disciplines favored by enrollments, funding, professional colleges and social status, yet the move of public higher education from the autonomous to the heteronomous model has no precedents in the long history of universities. Now, in addition to the exacerbation of the traditional gap between 'professional' and 'academic' fields, faculty members are concerned about the negative impact of entrepreneurial activities. The main argument is that the search for knowledge and the search for profits are not compatible, and that the replacement of the former by the latter will be detrimental to the academic world. They contend that scholars should compete in the marketplace of the world of ideas, and not in the economic marketplace of commercial products (Boly 1982, Linnell 1983). In the words of Baron (1983:160)

> A business is unlikely to manufacture a product because it is good for society at large. The demand must be there. Conversely, higher education gives students not just what they want but what it, from centuries of critically evaluated experience, believes the society needs: liberally educated men and women able to think, reason to a logical conclusion, and contribute to the general welfare of society.

The central concerns are that academic entrepreneuralism is undermining collegiality, that the need for secrecy is eroding academic freedom, as well as the honest interchange of ideas and findings, that external pressure will reduce institutional autonomy, and that the elimination of tenure would erode academic freedom. Indeed, the first of these apprehensions is that the heteronomous university is leading to the breaking down of collectivity. Unionization, that was born to confront lower incomes, layoffs and administrators at the university and at the government level, is being replaced by academic entrepreneurialism. The private exchange between technology and money is materialized in terms of business contracts, spin-off firms, joint research centers, etc., implemented through contractual arrangements in which the academic staff will be affected individually, debilitating collective self-defense. If rewards are channeled primarily to academics working in commercially relevant fields, existing divisions within the professorate are likely to be exacerbated. Moreover, it is claimed that the hierarchical business-like structure is not appropriate to encourage high quality academic work, which requires certain freedom to pursue individual interests which cannot be pre-defined (Chafin 1988, Walford 1991, Wood 1992).

As a matter of fact, the corporate rationality described in the previous section has been criticized as an inadequate approach to solve university problems. Although it may help to ascertain less productive or less effective areas, its emphasis on visible and measurable variables -economic and financial- as exclusive criteria for success has raised two concerns. The first refers to its tendency to centralize power and to establish authoritarian decision-making methods antithetical to the collegial process. After an exhaustive revision of the corporate model of university management, Benjamin et al. (1993:6) conclude that this 'top down' management model, besides being seriously re-evaluated by the business community itself, offers no solution to the problems of university government. For them, the implementation of such a model would exacerbate existing problems within the university community and provoke profound impairments in the institutional structure. The assumption

is that a competitive environment in which individuals look for marketable niches would increase intramural conflict and decrease collegiality. The second concern is related to the inadequacy of applying financial criteria to measure institutional success. Since business and academic environments have different rationales, they cannot be evaluated on the same grounds. As Hardly (1990) suggests, a university can have black ink in the balance sheet but its inability to recruit good students and staff would result in a loss of excellence.

Currently in the United States, many research contracts with industry include conditions that undermine collegial decision-making, and collegial practices in general. In fact, industry is taking increasing initiative to influence the direction of the university. For instance, George Pake, from Xerox Corporation's, describes four types of activity in the links between university and industry, with the first being participation by business and industrial leaders in the university governance (Pake 1981) [40]. At the same time, new contracts prohibit scientists funded by one company from collaborating with investigators funded by another, impose stricter limits on the disclosure of proprietary information, and veto faculty members from speaking about their research at academic meetings without first submitting their notes to their sponsors. The last restriction is, according to some authors, particularly crucial for the future of academic work. Baron (1983), for instance, contends that the main problem that universities are confronting in their links with industry is how to reconcile free flow of information with secrecy requirements of profit-making corporations.

As universities increase links with industry, the open process of communication, sharing of ideas and dissemination of the truth that characterized academic scholarship will be replaced by the industrialists' pressure for secrecy. Indeed, restrictions on the free flow of information may create conflicts between university and industry. University administrators will be "sandwiched" between academics advocating freedom to access information, and corporate rationale stressing ownership of knowledge (Linnell 1983, Meyerhoff 1986, N&B 1988, Bok 1990, Slaughter 1990). As a former President of Harvard University warned, "investigators may not merely withhold ideas from publication; they become closemouthed and refrain from the free, informal discussions with colleagues that are essential to the process of discovery" (Bok 1982:150). A case in point is the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California. This institute, whose strengths lay in immunology and cardiovascular disease, entered a long term agreement with the Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation, based in Switzerland. According to the contract, which is being investigating by the Congress, Sandoz has the first rights to any and all discoveries made at Scripps. Since Scripps receives $70 million yearly from the National Institute of Health, the US government is in the uncomfortable position of subsidizing a foreign corporation. Indeed, members of the US Congress have claimed that some universities have been selling the results of federally financed research to foreign companies before domestic companies gain access to the same results (Wheeler 1989, DePalma 1993).

As Baron (1983:162) indicated, the concern is not about researchers moving toward areas of interest for industry, or even that the university community is used for profit by the private sector, but about the final destiny of the research results: will others be able to learn from them and add to them, or will they be the private property of the sponsors, to be ignored if they are potentially damaging to their interests? He also cautions that if censorship, secrecy and self-interest replace open debate, the university may temporarily overcome the fiscal cutbacks, and it will probably survive for yet another day; however, its crucial raison d'être will have been extinguished. For him, the function of university as a center for the clash and conflict of ideas must be preserved. In the same vein, Linnel (1983) contends that higher education flourishes in an environment of free intellectual exchange, where young people are challenged by new ideas and can challenge accepted thought, and this is only possible in an atmosphere of freedom of thought and expression.

The concern that a close relation with the market can erode the academic environment has been also raised by Robert Murphy, who argued that before allowing fiscal necessity to dictate the mission and erode the independence of the university, several questions must be addressed: Would universities cut some programs and expand the more profitable ones? Would liberal arts and humanities suffer at the expense of applied education? Is society prepared to allow market realities to influence its evaluation of various educational pursuits? He also contended that a corporate contributions program would also damage the potential for independent research by creating a punishment regime enforced by vested interests, ultimately restricting dissent [41].

In essence, the academic value that is most at risk in the heteronomous university is autonomy. In this regard, it is claimed that the push to become more entrepreneurial will reduce both the autonomy of scholars to freely decide about their research activities, and government power to promote areas where scholars are less likely to draw external funds (Teichler 1991:43). For Kivinen and Rinne (1991) the only real solution for the university is to cut off pure vocational training and strictly market-oriented services. Otherwise, they claim, the best aspects of the traditional university system will be lost in the 21st century. In the same vein, Camp (1983) suggests that, since the business sector has a very narrow view of the value of higher education and that, if the model of heteronomous university prevails, the universities "will be producing in greater numbers than they do now, the inarticulate, the functionally illiterate, the ethically sterile, the politically passive and the morally inert". An equally tragic scenario was raised by Wielemans and Vanderhoeven (1991), who claim that when academics have to look for money to undertake scientific research and the production of knowledge is dependent on the market, "universities become obedient, submissive, humiliated and reduced, if not to serfdom at least to beggary" (p.19) For them, by going too far in the direction of external demands, universities are succumbing to the temptations of the labor market uncritically and unconditionally. It has also been reported that in those countries where government criteria had replaced academic rationales, the available evidence indicates that quality suffers (Benjamin et al. 1993). Another implication of a diminishing university autonomy is that programs will be shaped by the short-term interests of industry, emphasizing a vocational orientation that may undermine cherished academic objectives such as the search for truth and the development of intellectual curiosity (Skolnik 1983, Baron 1983, Pannu 1991).

In relation to preservation of autonomy, there are two instruments that are especially important in safeguarding the university from the intrusion of the marketplace: academic freedom and tenure. These features prevent the transformation of academics into free wage laborers, becoming commodities whose value is only determined by market prices, provide an alternative to the logic of supply and demand, protecting academics from each other and from the market, preclude administration from the tendency to fire faculty members with critical ideas, and allows internal self-criticism (Katz 1986). In short, this third concern cautions that the heteronomous university may result in an excessive academic entrepreneurship which, in spite of everyone's good intentions, may pervade the university working environment and threaten the central values of academic research. In this context, the disinterested search for knowledge that has characterized university scholarship will vanished, because the nature and direction of research will be dictated by commercial priorities. Robert Rosenzwaig, who resigned in 1993 after 10 years as president of the Association of American Universities (which represents the US largest research universities) complained that in that country the research enterprise has gone too far, and warned that

> institutions have to decide now, as they haven't had to at previous times, what kind of institutions they are: universities with teaching and research or something else just to generate funds, which, in its most pejorative form, would be an industry job shop [42].

In short, critics of the heteronomous university claim that reliance on private funds and government conditions undermines the main missions of public universities: to transmit cultural traditions across generations, to prepare future professionals, and to foster inquiry and learning for their own sake (Bok 1982, Axelrod 1986, Meyerhoff 1986, Yudof 1992).

4. Benefit to private groups in the name of the public interest

A fourth concern about the heteronomous university is that its activities and products will primarily benefit powerful economic, social and political groups. In spite of its appeal to the common good, the heteronomous university may serve in the first place the sectorial interests of industry, the political agenda of the state and the social aspirations of the upper classes. Indeed, heteronomous universities are portrayed as development centers interacting with local demands and looking after new needs for training and research, for the benefit of society at large. As previously noted, one of the terms used to refer to the emerging university model is 'service university'. This term suggests that the university would serve the needs of society at large rather than the specific needs of business, and implies that the main goal of university restructuring is to serve community needs. For instance, the Science Council of Canada refers to the service university as one having a dynamic, integral relationship with society (Enros and Farley 1986:16). However, this claim can be misleading, because it equates service to society with service to industry. The community is not one undifferentiated mass: it consists of various sectors with different -often competing- interests.. Since no invisible hand coordinates these conflictive interests in a harmonious manner, it is more likely that elite groups shape policy toward their own ends. In short, it is possible that in a less autonomous university, the aggregated interests of the most powerful groups define societal interest. In this case, the term 'service' becomes an euphemism that really means a narrow focus on satisfying the economic needs of the business sector and the government need for political control rather than the diverse needs of academic research and society as a whole (Enros and Farley 1986, Axelrod 1986, N&B 1988 and 1990, Woods 1992).

Indeed, critics of the heteronomous university argue that it proclaims a service to the community when the real agenda is to energize universities in the direction of being better servants to corporate research needs. In their view, the real interests of the business sector are the legitimization of its research efforts, free access to leading scholars in the field, admittance to educational technical facilities built up over decades and the hiring of top college graduates (Baron 1983). The concern is that, as universities lose autonomy, the conditions established by the funders (both business and the state) will shape the university agenda. The academic sector believes that corporations have little interest in expanding scientific knowledge and are only interested in the commercial exploitation of scientific discoveries. They also feel that industry does not support research for the benefit of society in general. Hence, as funding from the private sector increases, university will tend to direct its services to the wealthier segments of the community. Projects involving workers layoffs, health problems derived from smoking, or environmental degradation, for instance, will not be a priority. 'Science' or 'knowledge' are not abstract and neutral terms: they transmit cultural values, and their applications change people's way of life, social structures and even a country's culture ((Blat Gimeno 1983, Axelrod 1986, Cochrane 1986). Likewise, as government conditions funding upon performance and outcomes, certain areas will be more emphasized than others. As will be shown in the chapters 5 and 6, Argentinean government authorities expect that universities refrain from their criticisms, and collaborate with the government to improve the efficacy of its programs.

Critics of the heteronomous university also argue that industries have penetrated the state apparatus, leading decisions to their benefit. In this respect, delegation of state power to private hands has been described, in the case of the US, as "an alienation of public domain, a gift of sovereignty to private satrapies" (Lowi 1979:296). Moreover, critics of the private

sector contend that corporations bear a significant portion of the blame for the social and educational crisis, and denounce the tendency for corporate economies, when they are in crisis, to transfer the blame from the economy to the state. They also find paradoxical that, while private interests claim that the root of the economic problem is government interference, corporate leaders request government intervention (in passing legislation, allowing tax exemptions, etc.) to solve those problems. Moreover, skeptics of neoliberal policies claim that, in spite of Adam Smith's promises, profit maximization by large, economically powerful, private corporations has not maximized the public good. On the contrary, they claim, it has greatly contributed to generate unemployment, discrimination, declining real wages, pollution, criminality, as well as poor transportation, educational and health systems. They argue that this situation takes place because these negative consequences are not considered when the corporate sector makes decisions, since these costs are usually borne by the public (Apple 1982 and 1986, Carnoy et al. 1983).

Good examples of incisive analyses of the gap between rhetoric and real intentions of the heteronomous agenda can be found N&B (1988 and 1990), Slaughter (1990) and Morales-Gómez (1990), who examined respectively the Canadian Corporate-Higher Education Forum, the US Business-Higher Education Forum and World Bank reports. They contend that these documents are often strong pieces of rhetoric which obscures the substantive examination of the fundamental problems that the documents supposedly address. They use the rhetoric of the common good to promote an ideology that serves the interest of the business groups. They emphasize cooperation among industry, education and governments, so long as business concerns are recognized as paramount. Moreover, the lack of attention to the role of the community, civil society, NGO's, etc., is in open contradiction with the claims of a more egalitarian and participatory vision of education. Sometimes, these supposedly impartial organizations are not worried about public relations exercises, and take a side. The US Business-Higher Education Forum, for instance, contends that "government's responsibility is not to direct the activities of the private sector, but to streamline its own processes and create an environment in which the individual and collective talents of the private sector can be focused to meet the competitive challenge" (cited in Slaughter 1990:221). For advocates of the heteronomous university, the role of the state is not to be an impartial arbiter of groups' conflict, but a promoter of the interests of the private sector.

In Latin America, most of the concerns in relation to who benefits from the heteronomous university focus on the Cs of cultivation of private universities and customer fees. The claim is that such a policy perverts public interest, serves the upper classes and private enterprises, promotes conservatism and is based on US models (Levy 1986). Moreover, there is a generalized fear among university actors that the pressure for universities to look for alternative sources of income may provide a justification for governments to withdraw from their social responsibilities. The concern, shared also by academics outside Latin America, is that as universities succeed in their fund-raising effort, the government will cut funding in the same proportion [43]. It is interesting to note that, although in the short term the heteronomous university will assist business and the private sector, in the long term it is not clear who benefits: "students, academics, employers, shareholders and even taxpayers all appear to lose in the end" (Walford 1991:181). In general terms, industry is not able to protect its long-term interests, and such shortsightedness undermines not only industry, but scientific, technological and sociocultural development as well.

First, the probable focus on specific vocational and skills training will not serve industry in the long run because current change is so rapid that is impossible to predict future demands for labor. Moreover, it has been extensively argued that in the upcoming decades, the skills more needed by industry will involve not technical skills but the ability to think, analyze, adapt, problem solve and communicate, as well as extensive knowledge of political,

economic and cultural institutions. Since these skills are usually not considered in programs teaching specific occupations, it is claimed that universities in the post-industrial era must favor critical judgment and evaluative reasoning and creative assertiveness. Hence, industry's long-term interests might be better served by a higher education system which aims to produce educated, adaptable and flexible graduates able to organize and systematize knowledge, and that this can only occur in a university which is autonomous in relation to the political and economic forces shaping the social order.

Second, few industries are likely to fund research which does not appear to have direct relevance to their own profit activities, because that might be interpreted as being against the shareholders' interests. However, even though industry may make short-term gains through collaborative projects with higher education, in the long run researchers will be unable to keep up to the forefront of their fields, and this will have irreversible consequences on industrial development. As was discussed before, in countries moving towards the heteronomous model, both industry and the state can lose perspective and disregard the need for long-term, basic research which is not directly focused in product development.

Third, a democratic society requires responsible and critical citizens, able to make judgments and to contribute to a better cultural and social environment. Since a commercial and controlled university is unlikely to give first priority to the development of these features, there is a concern that university's contribution to ideological pluralism and democracy can be hindered. In short, the concern is that in the long term the heteronomous university will have detrimental consequences for national development and, ironically, for industry itself (Levin and Rumberger 1983, N&B 1990, Walford 1991).

The four concerns discussed throughout this section express a warning about the possible dangers of implementing the restructuring agenda without an open academic debate and without establishing appropriate guidelines. If the heteronomous model is finally imposed, how will the university of the future look? Taking into account the trends already reported in this chapter, it is possible to expect that more co-operative programs with industry will take place, entrance requirements will be higher, substantial quotas will be imposed on programs with limited employment opportunities, students will pay higher fees, more faculty will be seconded to government and business, and research activity will be more linked to industrial application, with an increase in joint ventures between industry and university. Public universities will accrue more revenue from private sources; private institutions will receive more funds from government, and will expand in size and number. In terms of hiring policies, it is possible to expect fewer career academics with full-time contracts and more part-time and sessionals hired only to teach specific courses. A decline in faculty salaries will discourage professors from remaining in the university.

Changes in curriculum will take place, with the introduction of new subjects to be taught, and the marginalization of courses related to social critique. Low rank universities in which restrictions on enrollment are not applied will be characterized by overcrowded classrooms and labs, though this will be compensated by distance education and the intensive use of media. Collegial decision-making will be reduced to a minimum, and replaced by managerial processes based on a corporate rationality. Changes in the organization of academic work will continue to reformulate the balance between teaching, research and extension, with a reward structure placing more emphasis on research and publications. Finally, and more important, the university agenda will be increasingly shaped by market dynamics and state control. (Long 1985, Cochrane 1986, Cross 1986).

From the evidence provided in the worldwide description presented in the first section, it is clear that the heteronomous model has the upper hand, and hence this is not an unlikely scenario. The reasons that help to explain why the heteronomous model is becoming the

hegemonic one will be examined in the next section. However, it is important to note that nothing in history is a final script. The depth and pace of the restructuring is contingent upon the political economy and the historical traditions of each nation-state. As will be shown in chapters 4 to 6, in Argentina the agenda of the heteronomous university is being confronted by concrete social actors who oppose and resist it and eventually may advance alternative projects.

Section 4. University restructuring and the manufacturing of consent

In spite of the aforementioned concerns raised by academics, and in spite of the existence of competing projects for the university, the heteronomous model based on the combined developments of the commercial and the controlled university is becoming the hegemonic vision among a variety of social actors in different parts of the world. This section examines some of the factors explaining why advocates of the heteronomous model are being successful in building consensus around it. In the ideological battle for the university, two main sets of tools are used by advocates of restructuring: persuasion and coercion. Through persuasion, actors who favor alternative models are convinced of the rightness of the heteronomous model. Through coercion, those actors are pressured to 'understand' that the heteronomous model is the only viable model under the present circumstances.

1. Competing university projects

An adequate analysis of university change must concern itself with the existence of groups of intellectuals -within and outside the university- who represent different social interests and participate in the elaboration and dissemination of competing ideologies for the university. These ideologies, also referred to in the literature as 'models' (Cano 1985), 'projects' (Vasconi and Recca 1977) or 'visions' (N&B 1988) frequently correspond to broader worldviews, each of which may carry distinct -often mutually exclusive- prescriptions for policy, not only in the educational area but for society at large. Although these visions attempt to present a worldview that presumably transcends the interests of a particular social group, they are shaped by concrete political and economic forces and hence embody social interests.

As Newson and Buchbinder (1988) noted, people endorsing a particular vision are not necessarily self-consciously pursuing it. Even though their actions point in a particular direction, they may be based on pragmatic reasons (practical responses that 'work' within the prevailing political and economic context) rather than on deliberate design. In any case, the totality of responses adds up to a guiding vision, which has the potential for mobilizing and bringing into play the human agents and the necessary political and economic resources to influence reality. Visions of the university provide justifications for priorities in resource allocation, and are often promoted by organizational structures, be they government offices, international agencies, political parties, student unions or academic committees.

In the analysis of university change, different taxonomies have been used to identify alternative visions or projects. For the Latin American case, Vasconi and Recca (1977), and later Briceño (1988) distinguished three competing university projects (democratization, modernization, and social transformation), which were understood as expressions of competing class projects for society as a whole. The 'democratizing' project is mobilized around issues of participation and autonomy, the 'modernizing' one is in tune with the needs and requirements of dependent development, and the transformative or 'radical' vision seeks a drastic restructuring of society. In their interpretation, the democratizing view stresses the role of the university in social equality and in the political life of the society, the modernizing view centers on issues of internal and external efficiency and the radical view is not as

concerned with institutional reforms as it is with the use of the university as another front to struggle for social change. Cano (1985), in particular reference to the Argentine university, distinguished three main perspectives: the populist, the technocratic-conservative and the redistributionist. The supporters of the populist model favor a democratization of the social composition of students and professors (equity policies), free and open access to a mass education, and closer links with the community in the context of transformative actions. The second is opposed to demand-driven expansion and advocates entrance examinations and quotas, tuition fees, optimum use of available resources, efficiency and excellence. The supporters of this model aspire to restore the selective, small university of the past, in which the future roles and social status of the graduates were clearly defined. They also demand more resources for higher education. The third perspective calls for a redistribution of the educational budget, reducing the portion allocated to universities. Partisans of this view argue that universities absorb large portions of the public revenue, while basic problems at the level of elementary education (like illiteracy and student drop outs) do not receive enough financial attention. This vision, the one that Cano supports, advocates the establishment of tuition fees on equity and distributive arguments based on rates of return.

Instead of using a three-party analytical model, some authors have proposed dual models. Coleman (1984), for instance, distinguishes between the 'academic' and the 'development' university, arguing that the latter is more adequate for developing countries, where the university should relate research and teaching to the indigenous culture and the practical problems of development. Another dual model has been advanced by Carnoy and Levin (1985), yet based on different categories. From a political economy perspective, and underlying the polarity between status quo and change, they argue that, in the context of capitalist and democratic states, educational change should be understood as an interplay between forces of reproduction and forces of democratization. Patrinos (1990) distinguished between partisans of privatization and defenders of the free, open public university. Advocates of the privatization package argue for cost-recovery mechanisms (including tuition fees), the spread of private universities to meet social demand and decentralized management. Advocates of the public university perceive higher education both as an individual right and as a social need, and expect governments to provide as much education as is required by society. Newson and Buchbinder (1988) identify four visions: academic haven for scholars, tool for economic growth, social transformer, and service university.

Drawing on the above taxonomies, and particularly on Newson & Buchbinder's descriptions, three main models can be identified that have traditionally competed for university hegemony: scholastic excellence, human capital and social transformation. According to the 'scholastic excellence' perspective, the academic and moral integrity of the university has been eroded by politicization (through direct involvement in societal conflicts), democratization (expressed in massive enrollments) and utilitarianism. A prototypic advocate of the academic haven model was Cardinal Newman. When asked about the end of university, he stated that "any kind of knowledge, if it really be such, is its own reward...knowledge is not merely a means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of certain arts which it naturally resolves, but an end sufficient to pursue for its own sake (Newman 1915:93). More recently, the instrumentalist character of today's university and the decline in standards has been addressed by Polin (1983:48), who contended that a multitude of pressure groups seek "to subvert academic ideals and corrupt the univers[illegible] and their methods include propaganda, dogma, indoctrination, and cultural, even physical, terrorism" and by Allan Bloom in the aforementioned *The Closing of the American Mind*, in which he links the decline in standards of excellence and educational orthodoxy with equity policies (Bloom 1987:347).

Adherents of this vision regret both the use of the university to satisfy the needs of the economy and to transform society, because these have led respectively to an extreme

vocationalization and to the displacement of cognitive objectives by political ones. They also criticize equalizing mechanisms such as affirmative action, because this has resulted in the lowering of academic standards in student and faculty selections. In their view, the decline in public support for universities is the result (rather than the cause) of the university's own weaknesses, which in turn were the product of an excessive expansion. The argument is that the attempt to please new constituencies and to respond to the pressure of 'human capital' and 'social transformation' promoters has led to grade inflation, minimal competition in the hiring process, adoption of 'practical' courses and programs, faculty unionization, massive enrollments, utilitarianism and politicization. These consequences have resulted in quality decline, which in turn led to a decline in public confidence and to calls for outside intervention.

This vision tends to reject the idea that universities should be a means to achieve social equality and emancipation, arguing that such a pursuit not only may distract them from their primary purpose, but would limit academic freedom [44] and undermine intellectual integrity. Hence, the agenda of advocates of 'scholarly excellence' is to restore universities to their glorious past, before they were corrupted by external influences during the expansionist period (Chapman 1983). Universities must withdraw from their excessive involvement in the surrounding community, resist external pressures alien to intellectual discipline and loyalty to truth, and return to their primary commitment to cognitive rationality. This can only be achieved by raising standards, limiting the number of tenured positions, eliminating vocational programs, reasserting authority, rebuilding deteriorated research facilities and reinstating previous teaching-student ratios. Since this reconstruction of the academic environment requires resources, promoters of this vision tend to criticize budget cuts [45]. While this vision contends that, in order to produce scholarly excellence, the university must be an unpolluted bubble or an academic haven, its critics refer to it derogatorily as an 'ivory tower' founded in elitism and socially irrelevant pursuits.

The 'human capital' project, as its name suggests, argues that university is the key to social development and economic growth. In this perspective, highly influenced by Schultz' human capital theory, universities constitute strategic tools for the creation of wealth, particularly the training of a qualified labor force. From this perspective, "unless countries can develop their own intellectual infrastructure and a scientific technical capability, they cannot escape dependency and poverty" (CHESS 1990:32) or, in other words, "no country can prosper without quality university education and training" (Omari 1991). The claim made by Kerr 30 years ago that "the basic reality for the university is the widespread recognition that new knowledge is the most important factor in economic and social growth" (Kerr 1963:v) is flourishing again. Indeed, in Europe and North America alike there is a strong revival of the traditional human capital approach that perceives the development of human resources as the main factor for international economic competitiveness. This perception is believed to be so widespread that almost every management guru around the world is linking human capital development to economic growth (Neave 1991, Simpson 1991). However, although the new versions of human capital theory still advocate the importance of an educated labor force, they place greater emphasis than the earlier formulations on the contribution of research products.

The argument advanced by advocates of this vision can be summarized in four points. First, as a result of fiscal pressures, the state is less willing and able to support academic activities than during the period of expansion, when it provided most of the necessary funding to support them. Second, retrenchment in funding is resulting in declining quality, deterioration of facilities, and cuts in essential services. Third, since universities have been securely funded by the state, scholars have emhasized academic freedom and autonomy, and industries had little interest in research, neither universities nor corporations were highly

interested in forging more interaction. Fourth, economic pressures derived from harsh international competition are forcing the development of knowledge-based, high-tech production. In short, the combination of industry's need for technological know-how and university's budget cutbacks creates an environment conducive to closer links between the academic and business communities, which has positive implications for both teaching and research (Maxwell and Currie 1984, Newson & Buchbinder 1988). In this view, the solution to restore quality and relevance is to use corporate funds in exchange for universities' contribution to corporate needs. For doing so, more dialogue between the business and academic communities should be encouraged, "bringing together the country's leading entrepreneurial forces and its primary intellectual resources" (Maxwell and Currie 1984:101). Since the main strategy to escape the current university crisis is increased funding from the business sector for programs and research which may benefit them, the formula for facilitating economic recovery and the transition into the emerging 'high-tech' society is to tailor research and curricula to the needs of the marketplace.

In terms of enrolments, the human capital project is internally divided into two factions. One of them, after examining the criticism that expansion not only did not generate economic growth but also accelerated the mismatch between education and labor market, argues that it is not appropriate to continue investing in graduating educated unemployed and escalating the diploma disease. The other faction, more loyal to the original formulation of human capital theory, contends that there are more advantages than disadvantages to keeping enrollments high. First, in the context of the loss of credibility of full employment policies and central planning, they argue that competition is good for the health of the economy. Second, they believe that high demand for jobs helps to keep salaries down. Third, given the limitations of labor forecasts, they point out the importance of preparing people for unexpected economic booms, avoiding shortages in certain areas. Fourth, they claim that, if faced with unemployment in the formal market, many of the graduates will enter into the informal economy, promoting economic growth anyway. Finally, the burden for taxpayers and for the state will be reduced through client payments (tuition and fees).

The third perspective corresponds to the 'social transformation' project in Vasconi and Recca (1977), the 'populist' perspective in Cano (1985), the 'forces of democratization' in Carnoy and Levin (1985), the 'radical tendency' in Briceño (1988) and the 'social transformer' vision in Newson and Buchbinder (1988). For those who adhere to this vision, the main task of university is to contribute to social transformation, that is, a radical alteration of economic and political relationships, in order to achieve a more just and equitable society. This, in turn, requires changes in both subjective and objective conditions. The former can be pursued through consciousness awareness, and the second through formal and informal links between progressive movements on campus and outside it, such as unions, political parties and social organizations. This was the spirit of the 1918 Córdoba Reform and its reappearance half a century later in Paris and elsewhere. One of the aims of this vision is to eliminate the gulf between mental and manual work and thereby the stratified social relations that derive from the division of labor, and to integrate theoretical and practical knowledge. Another objective is to promote critical analysis of social reality and to make students subjects, rather than objects, of the learning process (Newson & Buchbinder 1988).

In terms of university policy, 'social transformers' tend to advocate free, massive education, and attribute greater importance to extension, to democratic decision-making and to equity issues. While during the 1960s and 1970s the 'social transformer' model was able to compete head-to-head with the other two models, and in certain historical conjunctures even enjoyed a relative hegemony (such as in Argentina and Chile during the early 1970s), in the present context of fiscal deficits and exaltation of technological innovation and economic competition, it has been increasingly marginalized. At the societal level, as part and parcel of the general crisis of the left after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 'social transformation' model

seems unable to congregate and mobilize a critical mass of supporters. At the university level, social transformers are accused of populism and demagogy, of being more concerned with accessibility than with quality, and of proposing obsolete formulas which are inadequate for the 1990s.

2. Competing values

In the present reaccommodation of enemies and allies of particular university projects, the debate is permeated by appeals to abstract values. Values are used as key elements of persuasion about the social or economic relevance of alternative options for the university. However, although values and beliefs are crucial to understand the creation of consent and hegemony, very little is known about them. In this regard, it has been claimed that among the different types of bonds that help to cohere organizations (the physical, the habitual, the expedient, the moral and the emotional), the emotional are the strongest, molded by attraction to common symbols and ideas. Despite its importance, the symbolic side is one of the least-understood parts of modern organization (Kaufman 1971, Clark 1983). Weber (1947) suggested that beliefs act like switchmen, helping to determine the tracks along which action will be propelled by interests and external pressures [46]. Shared accounts and common beliefs help people to build cohesion around projects. Within the university, but also outside it, different actors interpret the meaning of societal trends and decide what responses are appropriate for the university to take, in the framework of their particular beliefs, be they about access, efficiency, financing, quality or governance [47]. In this regard, it is important to mention that values related to higher education are not confined to university settings; rather, they are constantly present in society at large. Debates about the university are carried on in parliamentary sessions, in newspaper editorials, on radio programs, and in many other contexts. This is not unusual, since almost every group inside and outside university (students, professors, church officials, union leaders, political parties, business representatives, etc.) has a vision of what university must be, and this vision is expressed through constantly appealing to values to be preserved or changed. Some groups will call for the defense of certain values considered as universal and immanent, that is, valid for any circumstance, while others may denigrate the values of opposing groups for being utopian or out of date.

Clark (1983) identifies four basic values in higher education: social justice, competence, liberty, and loyalty [48]. Similarly, Levy (1986) analyzes the public-private debate also taking into account four basic values: freedom, choice, equity and effectiveness. Neave (1991) contends that higher education has become one of the main arenas of confrontation between the opposite ideologies of state vs. market, or dirigism vs. liberalism, or control vs. competition. Likewise, existing values can be organized into three conflicting pairs: quality-equity, competition-regulation, and autonomy-accountability. It is pertinent to note that there is no direct correlation between a particular project and a particular set of values. Aiming for inclusiveness, most university projects tend to support all the above values, although they usually develop a hierarchy of priorities. Nevertheless, they avoid a total rejection of a given value, for it could mean a loss of potential constituencies. Moreover, because universities are pluralist institutions, they provide a favorable environment for the peaceful coexistence of a variety of values. Hence, the structure of higher education is full of contradictions, inconsistencies and compromises, allowing a constant tension and accommodation between opposite values.

a) The first pair of contending values: quality vs. equity

One of the eternal tensions of every higher education system is the conflict between accessibility and academic excellence, also known as the 'quality vs. equality' dilemma, or

'equity vs. scholarship', or 'democracy vs. excellence'. 'Equity' is related to the idea of social justice, and includes a variety of factors associated with structural discrimination such as class, gender, ethnicity, geographic location, religion, age, disability, etc. 'Quality' is related to the notions of excellence, competition, merit, academic elitism and selection and excellence. Equity traditionally means that the various socio-economic groups in the community are represented in universities and across fields of study, that higher education is equally accessible to all groups, and that the views of all involved groups should count in decision-making (Government of Victoria 1987). Equity concerns are usually expressed in terms of financing and opportunity. In the financial arena, it is expected that education receives a fair share of the public budget, that higher education receives a fair share of the education budget, that all faculties and departments receive a fair share of the university budget, that academic staff are remunerated on fair basis, and that public and private contributions are adequately distributed. In terms of equality of opportunity, it usually means equality of access, equality of treatment while in the system, and equality of outcome or success upon leaving. Based on the traditions of the Enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions, advocates of equity believe that education is a universal right, and that no single social group should be discriminated against, be it on the basis of class, ethnicity, gender or region [49].

In contrast to the values of equity and social justice is the belief in quality. Promoters of excellence seek to legitimate their claims for a more selective system by pointing to the wide social consensus about the need to maintain or improve the quality of education. In many countries, representatives from the business community, professional associations, government agencies and even from the academia itself, paint dramatic pictures about the declining quality of higher education, and attribute this situation to enrolment expansion [50]. Whether or not there is an actual decline, and whether or not this alleged causal relationship can be demonstrated or not with empirical evidence, it clearly it influences public policy. In England, the Education Secretary argues that universities should shun remedial courses and reject students who do not meet academic requirements. In Argentina, a former Vice-Minister of Higher Education contends that the massive university has sacrificed quality in favor of quantity. Arguing that open access policies have only produced a large number of mediocre graduates, he called for the implementation of quotas [51]. In short, those who champion the value of quality complain that an emphasis on equity carries two negative consequences. First, available resources are spread across multiple institutions and programs, while modern science requires concentration. Second, accepting underqualified students is detrimental to the academic enterprise, which is inherently elitist.

The quality vs. equity dilemma is permanently present in debates about university policies, and the challenge of every higher education institution is how to achieve an adequate balance between them. For social, economic and academic reasons, it seems clear that both are necessary values to be simultaneously pursued. The British Minister of Higher Education, for instance, claimed that the central challenge of higher education "is how to continue expansion of opportunity for new students while sustaining and enhancing quality" [52]. Likewise, Neave (1991:70) points out that

> Without quality, policies based solely on equality serve simply to remove temporarily large numbers of young people from the labor market. And without equality, the resultant stream of excellence is not likely to be sufficient to supply all the foreseeable needs of a changing economy. For reasons as much pragmatic as ideological, quality and equality are, if not one, then certainly indivisible.

However, analysts tend to agree that quality and equality are related in an inverse function. Generally, when one rises, the other falls, although there are some exceptions to this rule. As Balán (1991) points out, reduction of quantity alone does not necessarily improve quality; on

the contrary, if this measure is implemented under a repressive regime, it may make things even worse. Similarly, he contends that a low quality mass education constitutes a subtle mechanism to increase existing inequities in the universities. This is precisely the argument advanced by several authors such as Clark (1983), Chitnis (1985) and Ziderman (1990), who argue that past gains in the provision of access to higher education have led to a serious deterioration in quality. In their view, higher education policies and practices have been so carefully geared to avoid elitism that excellence is bulldozed into low quality uniformity. Moreover, they argue, inequities persist, because the upper classes are able to retain their privileges by attending private schools at home or abroad. This perspective criticizes the widespread perception that equates excellence with elitism, because it has inhibited the creation of centers of excellence within public higher education. Systemwide equity, they argue, undermines competence and liberty. In this view, systemwide equal access, treatment and outcome is self-defeating. It only produces inflation of degrees, which become worthless in the market and leads to a homogenization to the lowest common denominator.

Quality advocates are often perceived to be against equalization of educational opportunities, and for good reasons. Since the only solutions to restore quality are to economize (which may compromise academic work), to obtain additional funding (which is politically unfeasible) and/or to restrict enrollment, they tend to promote this last option. Once that choice is made, excellence becomes a higher priority than accessibility. University administrators are very aware of this situation. In a recent radio show, the University of Calgary President explained that his institution is restricting access in the name of competence [53]. In his own words, this measure intends "to protect quality in the face of government reductions of funding". Commenting on such an initiative, the President of Mount St. Vincent University in Halifax acknowledged that these enrollment caps mean to turn down qualified students and to deny accessibility to under-represented groups (CBC 1991).

To express it in a different way, primary values of equality and excellence often contradict one another, as inevitable tradeoffs. Extreme accent on the quality pole sometimes means emphasis on grades, credentials, competitiveness and individualism that lead students and professors alike to suffer stress and mental breakdown. It also implies the risk of leaving aside ethical questions, pursuing excellence independently of the possible effects of research on human beings or the environment. It also means elitism in the distribution of knowledge and a certain degree of authoritarianism in decision making, affecting democratic processes. On the other hand, excessive emphasis on equality may lead to wastage of financial resources, inefficiency, demoralization of academic workers and lack of competitiveness in the international arena (Clark 1983). A typical case of the tension between quality and equality in educational policies is the Chinese Cultural Revolution and its subsequent backlash after Mao's death in 1976. These policies fluctuated between 'redness' (preference to earlier excluded sectors, such as workers and peasants) and 'expertise' (admission based on performance and merit). While emphasis on academic criteria reinforced social inequalities, a focus on social criteria often resulted in a deterioration in the quality of graduates. As this and other cases illustrate, the cost of pursuing only one set of values seems to be very high, and sooner or later a counter-reform may take place to restore the place of the forgotten principles. As will be shown later, the architects of the heteronomous university seem to have learned this lesson.

b) The second pair of conflicting values: competition vs. integration

The debate between competition and integration (also known as 'diversity vs. regulation' or 'differentiation vs. homogenization') refers to two conceptions of higher education: demand-driven and supply-driven. These conceptions are based, in turn, on two distinct theoretical models: the natural selection (or laissez faire) model, and the model of rational planning and

control. The natural selection model emphasizes free market mechanisms such as competition, specialization, differentiation, self-regulation and entrepreneurship. Under this model, universities are encouraged to further their links with the 'real world', and hence to sell their expertise in the marketplace and to compete for public and private funds. It also calls for specialization in order to cater to specific clienteles, which leads to a deepening of the tracks within higher education, differentiating even further between academic-oriented institutions and those offering short cycles and vocationalization. This model is based on the idea that universities are not supposed to be equalized. They should be encouraged to compete, and that the market and society will reward the best.

On the other hand, the model of planning and control promotes the integration of universities within a rational system that responds in a comprehensive way to national and regional needs. Advocates of integration argue that a laissez faire approach with almost no governmental intervention may create a myriad of problems, particularly in relation to quality, efficacy and equality. They argue that the lack of regulations and external evaluations will encourage universities to grant degrees without much concern for quality, which will result in a general decline in standards. Hence, they assert the need for a centralized control to provide equivalent conditions for all students across the country, and to guarantee general validity to the degrees granted by different universities. Likewise, they contend that the absence of planning leads to duplication of programs and waste of social resources. They agree that universities are not equal, but the role of the state is not to reinforce those inequalities but to promote a higher degree of homogeneity. Moreover, they argue that the market tends to reward certain characteristics (i.e. enterpreneurship) more than others (i.e. excellence) and that could be detrimental to academic activities. Thus, they note that the role of the state is to balance this natural tendency of the market, not to reinforce it, and complain that presently governments are doing the latter. In France, for instance, Neave (1991) reports that universities which are more able to respond to the demands of industry in terms of training of personnel or in establishing research and service contracts receive more positive rewards from the state.

Advocates of the laissez faire model believe in autonomy, which is considered a precondition for the institution to develop new forms of adaptive and flexible behavior. Conversely, they consider that the more restrictions to 'free enterprise', the less an organization will be able to find a successful adaptation to the environment. Thus, this model does not concede government any role in co-ordinating the system or in trying to optimize its performance through policies and regulations. On the other hand, partisans of the planning approach tend to distrust social benefits of the free market and a competition regulated by the 'invisible hand'. Hence, they seek to reduce differences -and avoid differentiation- between universities which are already uneven for many reasons, oppose vocationalization and short cycles (arguing that it will lead to second class programs which penalize those who attend them) and believe that public services can be improved without privatization (Berdhal and Millet 1991, Van Vught 1991, Moscati 1991).

For its advocates, the natural selection model enables universities a) to assess their own performances, and to make their own decisions; b) to establish direct relationships with their societal environments; and c) to find their evolutionary niches, in a system co-ordinated by the choices of consumers and producers of higher education (supply and demand) and not by governmental wishes and opinions (Van Vught 1991). Their critics argue that this strategy may promote efficiency in the short-term, yet it may lead to long-term inequalities and irrationalities. They may also identify the Durkheimian reminiscences of Van Vught's approach, with a focus on adaptation to the modern environment via differentiation and specialization, with no reference to economic interests or political conflicts. Although they would accept that the state has limitations in developing a working, rational system, they emphasize the limitations of the market and academics in protecting the public interest. They

predict that even if academics have wisdom and good intentions, the logic of the market will eventually shape the relation between the university and its environment. Since the market is seldom a neutral mechanism regulated exclusively by supply and demand, and does not always hold the benefit of consumers as a top priority, there is no reason to assume that the pressures of the market are less dangerous than government influence. In short, although some advocates of regulation may admit that the government is not always the wisest actor to influence or regulate higher education policies, they contend that neither academics nor the market are natural defenders of the public interest.

c) The third pair of contending values: autonomy vs. accountability

The value of autonomy refers to independence from external forces such as the state or industry. It is usually associated with academic freedom, which refers to the freedom to choose what to teach, what to learn, what to research and what to publish. Accountability is associated with social responsibility or 'responsiveness', which are often used as euphemisms to refer to the loyalty that universities owe to their main funder, be it the state or private sources. In general terms, private universities are accountable the Church and private enterprise, whereas the autonomy of public universities is limited by State pressure.

However, autonomy has been traditionally more restricted in private universities than in public ones. Because of an unmistakable identification between the private university and its sponsors, its accountability to them is greater and the limits of autonomy are less likely to be tested. Not only conflicts of interests with external forces are more unlikely to happen than in public ones, but if a conflict arises, private universities are less able to assert their independence. Conversely, academic freedom is larger -and more energetically exercised- in the public university. If a conflict arises, and institutional autonomy is under attack, the public university is often more prepared than its private counterpart to challenge its sponsor. In private universities, instead, the relative socio-economic and ideological homogeneity in the selection of students and professors makes them less inclined to claim freedoms to speak and act.

Autonomy is one of the most sacred university values. It is considered a requirement for academic freedom, initiative, criticism, innovation, diversity, adaptability, pluralism, self-determination, expression, creativeness and quality, and hence a condition *sine qua non* for any authentic academic institution. The assumption is that, in order to progress or even survive, modern democratic societies need centers of independent thought. Without autonomy, universities would lose their role as independent centers of knowledge and criticism, and hence become unable to adequately fulfill their social function (Hutchins 1964, Tunnerman 1990). In Latin America, autonomy is so highly valued that the word 'autonomous' is included in the official name of many public universities. Based on the traditions of the 1918 Córdoba reform, student movements argue that institutional autonomy should promote freedom of expression, ideological diversity, engagement in social criticism and political action, and should be used with social responsibility, contributing to the welfare of the community.

Those who emphasize the value of accountability contend that autonomy has been abused by the university, and this has led to an ivory tower insensitive to its surrounding community, to irrelevant curricula and to unproductive tenured professors. They also claim that it has led to an excessive politicization of students, which in turn has resulted in longer times for completion of studies and lower quality education, undermining their professional careers and employment prospects. Accountability, on the other hand, would enforce strict evaluations of institutional performance and the linking of the system to forward national integration.

Government calls for accountability are producing a tension within universities. On the one hand, academics tend to argue that if accountability is defined unilaterally by the funders, it will imply the limiting of criticism and the subordination of the academic logic to the particular agendas of political bureaucracies and business enterprises. On the other hand, leaders of the university administration tend to defend accountability on the grounds that it will promote a more positive societal attitude towards the university. An illustration of this is the following statement by Paul Davenport, U. of A. President:

> Those funding us are going to try to make us more accountable. And indeed we will have an interest, in terms of public support, in being seen as fully accountable. It's an issue we should embrace rather than resist (Folio, July 12, 1991:5).

Hence, in the 'Degrees of Freedom' document [54], which became official policy of the University of Alberta in 1993, accountability was listed as one of the 9 guiding principles for the institution. Interestingly, autonomy was not included among them. Although historically public universities' autonomy is associated with state control, in the emerging heteronomous university accountability to "those funding us" means both state and business [55]. For instance, the cited document also states that curricula should be more responsive to employers and to the changing dynamics of the job market: "If the recipients of University of Alberta degrees are to be sought by employers, we must ensure that our educational programs are adequately preparing students to meet the needs of the present and future employers of university graduates" (p. 25).

The tension inherent in the competing models and pairs of values described above is constantly present in university life. Most university reforms tend to proclaim adherence to one model and one set of values, and to negate the others. As was mentioned before, sooner than later these reforms are going to suffer a backlash undertaken by the excluded groups. Hence, the strength and duration of a restructuring strongly lies in the ability of its ideologues to convince their opponents that certain models and values are obsolete and infeasible for the present circumstance, and to formulate an inclusive discourse that also appeals to those who are going to lose with its implementation. This is precisely the strategy followed by the architects of the present university restructuring, and explains much of its success in the ideological battle for the university.

3. Hegemony-building strategies

The rise of the heteronomous university agenda has been assisted by a favorable ideological and financial context. The favorable ideological environment is evident in the growth of Social Darwinist thinking in education and society in general (Apple 1993). Moreover, there is a widespread consensus that past gains in equality and expansion of fields of study have undermined quality and hence the ability to compete in the international marketplace, and that disciplines should be judged on the marketability of their graduates and in their response to industrial needs. The harsh financial environment of universities also influences the creation of consensus. Indeed, the fiscal crisis of the state compels people to think that budget cutbacks are inevitable and that the only solutions to university problems are the ones included in the heteronomous agenda, thus constraining alternative options. As noted in the previous chapter, since the shift towards fiscal restraint and contraction in the 1970s, the university has been perceived by governments and the public as being in a state of crisis, ill equipped to manage the new challenges, paralyzed in the face of fiscal problems, and lacking a sense of purpose in a rapidly changing society. It was also deemed unable to reappraise its broad goals and mandates, to strategize planning, and to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In the current period of state retrenchment, the principles of broad accessibility, diversity, and interdisciplinary scholarship that guided university growth and received broadly based public consensus is fading out as a guide for university development.

At the same time that government and public support for the university is declining, the lack of funds is forcing policy-makers and academics to think about the role of university in other terms (Watson 1985, Neilson and Gaffield 1986, Axelrod 1986, N&B 1988, AAU 1991).

For instance, a commission set by the Canadian university presidents points out that in university campuses there is a resistance to change and an unwillingness to keep up with society's educational demands. It was argued that the natural inertia of universities may not allow them the restructuring needed to accommodate to the current developments characterized by the expansion of new scientific and technical knowledge, and that such a failure may result in other institutions assuming university's responsibilities. Indeed, it was asserted that if universities do not fulfill corporate research needs more successfully, companies may substitute universities with their own version of higher education institutions and research centers (The Globe & Mail, November 26, 1986 and June 4, 1991, A1). Moreover, it has been already claimed that, at least in the US, corporations are now self-sufficient in meeting their employee training and development needs (Deustch 1983, Cochrane 1986).

Advocates of the heteronomous university stress that external support provides at least three tangible benefits: a) increases the quality of research and education in some fields; b) universities become more related to the demands of the market and the wider community; and c) universities will set institutional priorities instead of unrealistically attempting to be world class in every discipline (Yudof 1992). They also suggest that the market has some positive aspects: it promotes flexibility, breaks rigid and traditional structures, makes them more sensitive to external incentives, unveils self-protecting complacency and intensifies interaction among sub-systems. When calling for more university-industry research contracts, they usually appeal to the need of developing new technologies and products in order to be competitive in world markets, especially in countries which rely on technology import. Their main claim is that universities are failing in producing the type of graduate that industry needs, and that they must be more effective contributors to the national economy. Moreover, they contend that universities have a problem of knowledge utilization, that academics are alienated from the use of knowledge, and that mechanisms for enhancing the linkage between research and utilization should be created. It is also claimed that, in order to make the maximum use of available resources, more communication skills and marketing of ideas are necessary, as well as a need to look at consumers' preferences in terms of science and technology, adaptations, etc. (Fulton 1986, Omari 1991b).

The linkage between the university and the practical world of industry, commerce and government is promoted on different grounds. First, advocates contend that the cultural differences between academia and business are an artificial exaggeration of peculiarities that lead to adversarial postures, and that there is a need for accommodation and collaboration (Northeast-Midwest Institute 1988:147). Second, they claim that the need for a partnership between government, universities and industry to develop a new kind of higher education system is so crucial that national prosperity, vitality and international standing depend on it (Boys et al 1988). Third, it is argued that applied research can be more rapidly transferred into products and processes useful to society. From the industry's perspective, university provides intellectual talent in the form of readily available, independent and focused expertise. Moreover, government is also in need of nonpartisan, credible and high quality advice. At the same time, by increasing links with industry and government, both faculty members and their university gain prestige and credibility (Linnell 1983, Baron 1983). Fourth, it is argued that the best people would leave university if they are denied the professional experience and the income associated with consulting, fee-for service and external business. These activities are perceived to be an excellent method for keeping up with the latest developments in the field, for allowing them to work with up-to-date

technology [56] and for implementing two-way technology transfers. Fifth, the partnership would not only help to fund university's research activities, but it would provide scholarships and employment opportunities for students.

The above arguments are based on the assumption that university-corporation interaction is in the public and national interest. In this view, corporate-academic collaboration turns the research effort and the university curriculum more closely to the needs of the marketplace, and hence helps to optimize national resources applied to research and education. In fact, it is argued that the heteronomous university will give more legitimacy, relevance and utility to academic activities and services, because they will be related to the local communities, to the needs of employers, and to national economic goals. In essence, the nature and scope of the collaboration between universities and the outside world will be determined by the needs of the corporations and by the areas of expertise that the university can offer. This marriage, which is originated in pressures from financial exigency and scientific-technical revolution, is generally perceived as a partnership for growth in which everybody wins and nobody loses (Maxwell and Currie 1984, Shore 1986, Enros and Farley 1986).

Favored by this context, the heteronomous vision of the university is gaining consensus in different arenas, from editorial columns to scholarly conferences, from parliamentary debates to casual conversations in university hallways. The success of the heteronomous agenda in building ideological support is also based on its appealing to a wide variety of constituencies. Partly due to the existence of competing paradigms within the marketventionist movement (those who focus on market dynamics, and those who focus on state interventionism), and partly due to careful strategizing, the discourse of the heteronomous university selectively conciliates the conflictive projects and values described throughout this section.

Any project attempting to achieve hegemony will publicly support, to a lesser or greater extent, all projects and values. A total rejection of a given project or value may alienate potential constituencies. For that reason, it is not surprising to observe opposite policies being justified in the name of the same value [57]. Although the competing projects have priorities in their commitment to values, largely depending on the interests they represent, they attempt to portray themselves as expressing the interests of society at large, and to encompass, at least rhetorically, as many values as possible. Thus, in order to gain public consensus within and outside campus, advocates of the heteronomous university usually identify themselves as the representatives of the entire community. They also try to incorporate in their proposals for university change those values treasured by challenging visions. Sometimes, support for one or another value is influenced not only by ideological preferences or rhetorical exercises, but by the need to respond to real social and financial pressures. For example, governments' rationale for either controlling or expanding enrolment is influenced not only by the particular ideologies of policy-makers and by the necessity of attracting public support, but also by financial and demographic pressures. Whereas the government is pressured by declining budgets to control enrollment, it has difficulty resisting the demand for higher education because politicians know that imposing quotas implies a social cost.

The heteronomous university model integrates, at least rhetorically, the three aforementioned projects by portraying itself as an agent of modernization that pursues university and socio-economic change through democratic procedures. Indeed, ideologues of the heteronomous model criticize the perceived weaknesses and adopt the perceived strengths of each model. For instance, they attack the arrogance, irrelevance and elitism of the 'scholarly excellence' model, but vindicate academic freedom, excellence and selectivity. They dispute blind faith in education as the key to development inherent in the 'human capital' project, and hence the adequacy of massive enrollments and incremental funding. However, they base their

arguments on international competitiveness and market-oriented rationales. Finally, they dismiss the 'social transformer' vision as being obsolete and discredited by empirical evidence in the former socialist countries, but they constantly appeal to the notions of common good, social justice, equity, responsiveness, rationality of the system, societal interests and the like. Hence, by incorporating the main tenets of the three alternative models into one project, the heteronomous university receives the support of different constituencies. First, it attracts a considerable support from the academia because it appeals to its core value, excellence, advocating the restoration of the quality lost during the years of expansion through state control of standards. It also receives the support of proponents of the human capital model because it promotes competitiveness, efficiency, entrepreneurship and other values regarded as essential to capital accumulation. Third, in order to include the basic concerns of the 'social transformer' vision, the heteronomous university explicitly addresses the issues of equity and responsiveness (societal accountability).

However, among the three projects, 'scholarly excellence' and 'human capital' have more prominence in the new model than 'social transformation'. Not only the 'social transformation' project is in a serious crisis of redefinition after the fall of the Berlin wall, but the type of changes proposed by the other two projects are more compatible with external political and economic pressures, as well as with the patterns of change already under implementation in terms of institutional organization and academic work process.

The heteronomous university also appeals to a broad audience by virtue of its capacity to encompass the three pairs of conflicting values within one discourse. As in the case of university projects, both the existence of different constituencies within the heteronomous movement, and the ability of its ideologues to combine alternative values, reduce internal and external confrontations. First, a redefinition of the meaning of equity allows it to coexist with efficiency, quality and selectivity. Second, the intense calls for accountability never impugn the legitimacy of institutional autonomy. Moreover, it is assumed that by shifting funding from public to private sources, universities will gain autonomy. Third, competition and regulation are simultaneously promoted by the heteronomous model. Competition, which is promoted in the name of efficiency, is balanced with reassurance of state control in order to guarantee standards and avoid consumer fraud.

An examination of the first pair of opposing values (equity and quality) shows that, traditionally, the former has been perceived as a political, ideological value, while the latter has been portrayed as a neutral, technical, value. Equity is perceived as a democratic principle based on social justice, while quality is related to academic standards. However, since educators value educational processes and products differently, quality cannot be treated as a single index around which policies may be judged. Because under every policy some groups win more than others, quality -as well as equity- is also a political concept (Omari 1981, Adams 1990).

An interesting illustration of how values are politically loaded can be found in the recent appropriation of the concept of equity, historically a flagship of the social transformation project, by the heteronomous model. For many years, the traditional concept of equity (understood as free and open education) has been opposed on efficiency and quality grounds, and its advocates accused of demagogy and populism. Those who put quality before equality claimed that the university is an academic institution, which should be based on merit and excellence. Likewise, they contended that admitting students with lower qualifications to redress social injustices may result in higher repetition and attrition rates, which in turn indicates both inefficiency in the use of resources and higher costs in producing a graduate. On the other hand, partisans of equity argued that inefficiency is less related to massive enrollments than to factors such as expensive duplications of programs with very few students, corruption in the use of university resources, massive administrative staff resulting

in a large bureaucracy, wastage of food in cafeterias, perpetuation of an antagonistic relation with the education ministry, and a general lack of concern for cost effectiveness and efficiency (Musangi 1980, Kauseni 1990, Coombe 1991, World Bank 1990, Omari 1991). In short, for many years, the two contenders of this ideological struggle were perceived as antagonistic. On one side were those concerned with fairness and justice, but indifferent towards quality. On the other were those preoccupied with quality and excellence, but insensitive to social inequalities.

Presently, however, ideologues of university restructuring adopted the concept of equity in its full meaning of favoring the lower income groups, dispelling their image of social insensitivity and leaving the left with no exclusive platform in this regard. For instance, when promoting higher tuition fees, quotas, private universities, institutional diversification, or budget cuts, the principle of equity is always invoked either to show that these policies will not affect it, or that it will be enhanced. A brief description of these five cases illustrates the inclusiveness of the heteronomous discourse. To begin with, advocates of the heteronomous university argue that tuition fees promote equity because they reduce excessive state subsidies based on coercive payments by all, poor and rich alike, for services used only by the latter. They also base equity arguments for fees on the high private rates of return enjoyed by university graduates as compared to graduates from lower educational levels, who contribute instead with a higher social rate of return (Levy 1986, Cano 1986, Psacharopoulos 1990, World Bank 1990, Winkler 1990, Carlson 1992). Tagliavini (1991) goes one step further and, using an intriguing argument, proposes to privatize the entire education system in the name of equity [58]. They also contend that shifting more of the costs of higher education on to the student does not restrict accessibility, because it does not change the composition of the student population. The argument is that a free-cost university does not increase equity because the process of class differentiation occurs at earlier educational levels. Moreover, although existing evidence suggests otherwise [59], they claim that any negative effect on equity resulting from fees would be neutralized by student loans.

The second example refers to quotas. In the past, those advocating selective admissions used to make their case by arguing that, since the university is an institution of excellence, only those who possess academic merit deserve to participate in it. After the democratic attacks of the 1960s and 1970s, this argument lost much of its public appeal, because it was perceived as discriminatory against lower income groups. Hence, the original defense of quotas based on academic elitism has shifted to one based on social benefits and fairness. The new argument is that massive access results in a wastage of public resources, and is detrimental to both the community and the individual who is admitted but lacks academic merit. This argument is built on two assumptions. First, that in a selective system the selected ones are those who are supposed to succeed and, conversely, that the rejected ones were going to fail sooner or later anyway. Second, that expansion leads not only to quality decline, but also to educated unemployed and frustration. Based on these assumptions, they argue that a mediocre education constitutes a fraud to both the students who receive the service and the community who supports it, and that producing graduates who cannot find jobs or end up as incompetent professionals is not only unfair to the individual but to society at large. Robert Prichard, University of Toronto President, for instance, noted that the quality vs. equality dilemma is a catch 22, but admitted that, if he must choose, he will go for quality because massive access to a poor quality education is against students' own interests. In his words, "there is a growing number of qualified students who will be turned away, but the cost of admitting those students, if given current levels of support, is to create something that in due course will be a fraud on the concept of accessibility to universities. That is accessibility in abstract, which I don't think for our students is a meaningful idea. It must be access to a quality education. To simply take more students given the inadequacy of the resources even

for the current number of students is simply to make a bad situation worse" (CBC 1991). In short, the shift from an open door policy to a more selective admission policy is not anymore justified exclusively on academic merit, but also on the institutional capacity to offer an educational service, on labor market dynamics and on 'national priorities'.

The third example refers to the cultivation of private universities, one of the main issues in the restructuring agenda. Traditionally, it has been asserted that inequities are natural for quality institutions in highly stratified societies, and sometimes the only way to promote quality and maintain high standards. However, more recently private university's contribution to equity has been defended on the ground that, since public universities are not able to grow indefinitely, the private sector increases overall accessibility to the higher education system as a whole [60]. Furthermore, it is argued that, in the case of developing countries, private institutions attract many elite students that otherwise would study abroad, deepening dependency. Moreover, it is stated that, since lower income groups are generally underrepresented in higher education, the public system is also vulnerable to the accusation of inequity. Although the fact that the private sector brings an additional inequality to this situation is usually admitted, it is contended that it is counterbalanced by having its students pay for their privileges, thus bringing larger resources to education and allowing the state to provide more services to less-privileged groups. In other words, the argument is that the creation of private universities releases governments from financial burdens, and enables them to channel resources to improve the public system (Clark 1983, Levy 1986).

The fourth example regards institutional diversification of the public system. Traditionally, it has been argued that diversification and hierarchy in the public system are valid means to nurture quality and excellence without serious damage to equity only if they do not operate across the system, but in segments of the whole (within each institution, faculty or department). In this view, a diversified and hierarchical system has the function of cooling out the excess of demand by sending the low profile aspirants to non-prestigious public institutions. Killing two birds with one stone, the government saves a costly slot in the academic track and rejected candidates do not feel excluded (Pincus 1974). However, ideologues of university restructuring contend that institutional diversification promotes equity because a system with permeable boundaries allows chances of transferring across sectors, institutions and programs. In such a system, students can move with limited restrictions, and find the place that best fits their needs and interests. A President of a Canadian university, for example, declared that "we have to show some people that access to university may not be their first choice in the first instance. It may be very well to be another kind of institution" (CBC 1991). The argument is that any attempt to equalize the inequalities developed during previous stages of the formal education system is condemned to fail, because it ignores the fact that those with higher SES, connections and family environment take more advantage of the system. From this perspective, there is no causal relation between differentiation and inequality, because systems characterized by differentiation are not more inequitable than homogeneous ones. On the contrary, it is argued, a homogeneous system, under a façade of egalitarianism, hides inequalities, because it does not protect its sectors of excellence, does not reward merit, and maintains implicit hierarchies among universities, faculties and careers (Balán 1991). Likewise, the Alberta Minister of Advanced Education, in response to the claim that university education in Alberta is becoming elitist, argued that this position "assumes that the only type of post-secondary education of value today is university", and stated that "students should be prepared to investigate a number of different programs and institutions, including technical institutions and colleges" (The Edmonton Journal, July 18, 1991).

Last but not least, cuts to university budgets are also justified on equity grounds. University actors identified with the 'social transformer' and the scholarly excellence' models tend to

perceive an unfairness in the distribution of public resources that gravitate against the university. Such perception has resulted in certain countries, particularly in Latin America, witnessing massive public demonstrations headed by university authorities and followed by professors and students calling for a larger proportion of the budget for higher education. These protests may end up dramatically, as in the recent Venezuelan case, where police used water cannons and tear gas to repress the crowd, killing a university employee and wounding a number of demonstrators, who in turn threw bottles and rocks [61]. However, advocates of university restructuring claim that higher education funding is being reduced in order to promote equity in the overall system. In their view, the share of the budget enjoyed by higher education is disproportionate to the population, and this discriminates against elementary and secondary education, where per student expenditures are ten times lower than in higher education and the social rate of return is much higher [62]. Hence, the argument goes, financial resources should be a transferred from the latter to the former in order to reverse a blatant social inequity.

In relation to the second pair of conflicting values, the heteronomous university is also succeeding in encompassing accountability and autonomy within the same discourse. First, since autonomy is a highly sacred value, advocates of the heteronomous agenda are very careful in not challenging it as an abstract principle. What they argue is that this good universal value has been perverted in practice, becoming a safeguard for incompetence and inefficiency. Although a few may claim that the university is not the place for the diffusion of 'eternal truths', or for the promotion of general intellectual capacities, but for specialized research that leads to discovery of the new, the majority contends that autonomy has often led to arbitrariness of professors in relation to students, to curricula which are irrelevant to future occupations, and to a high degree of heterogeneity in higher education that has created difficulties for student mobility between institutions and has undermined the credibility of credentials (Sykes 1988, Kimball 1990, Teichler 1991) [63].

In other words, calls for accountability are usually justified not on the inadequacy of autonomy as a value, but on the abuses perpetrated in the day-to-day practice that had led universities to lose sight of their moral responsibility [64]. However, academics tend to resist accountability criteria developed by the government on the grounds that they are alien to the university logic. In order to reduce this conflict, advocates of the heteronomous university launch a second argument which states that, as universities diversify their sources of revenue, they will enjoy less state interference and greater liberty for action. In an apparently logical proposition, this expected financial autonomy is promoted as a precondition for institutional autonomy. Although this argument has been criticized because it fails to recognize that business will demand return on its investment, and hence autonomy will not be necessarily greater [65], it has captivated the spirits of university leaders and academics. Indeed, at least in the US, most university authorities believe that the relative advantage of contracts with industry vis-a-vis government funds is the loosening of regulations and a gain in autonomy (Mallot 1978) [66].

In regard to the third pair of values, the discourse of university restructuring is also inclusive, in the sense that it appeals simultaneously to sympathizers of competition and regulation. Partisans of regulation argue that an unregulated system based on a diversity of revenue sources may promote competition, differentiation and even autonomy, but at the cost of a proliferation of low quality programs, an emergence of irrationalities in the system and a development of new institutional priorities that, borrowing Axerlod's terminology, put dollars over scholars. Partisans of competition argue that total dependency on government funding leads to a highly regulated system that ensures broad accessibility, but to homogeneous institutions, unresponsive to changing external environments. Hence, governments advance a discourse that simultaneously promises efficiency (through

competition in the market) and academic quality (through control mechanisms, and incentives such as performance budgeting).

Indeed, governments promoting a heteronomous university advance a non-interventionist discourse, highlighting the advantages of the market in determining social dynamics, but at the same time control institutional behavior through the imposition of mission budgets, performance assessments, sectors of specialization and the like. This double discourse is helpful in building support for the heteronomous project, but can lead to potential contradictions. In Finland, for instance, new universities are supported only in those fields where they reach an advanced, competitive scientific level, which implies a sophisticated division of labor among universities and collaboration in the use of equipment. However, it is unclear how this spirit of collaboration would coexist with a policy that encourages fierce competition (Kivinen and Rinne 1991:58-60). In Holland, contradictions are particularly evident in the evaluation system. While the government encourages universities to conduct self-evaluation and peer-review processes, on the grounds that reallocation of funding will consist of an open competition based on these assessments, it is up to the government to determine the criteria by which a given institutional performance should be rewarded or punished (Van Vught 1991). In Italy, the contradictions are evident in a 'mixed model' in which universities are open to the external world, compete among each other and pursue their own goals, but the government intervenes to ensure that universities operate in a common framework designed to promote top-quality education at both central and peripheral institutions (Moscati 1991). In Alberta, the Draft White Paper encourages post-secondary institutions to compete for public funds, and in the subsequent paragraph calls for collaboration and cooperation among providers for the same funds (Alberta Advanced Education 1994:20).

Another area in which the 'laissez faire' model based on competition and the 'rational planning' model based on regulation may collide relates to national and regional development. The dilemma faced by a government in this regard can be expressed in the following question: is it better to encourage competition or to distribute functions, allocating specific disciplines according to local or regional needs? Should universities compete among each other, or pursue distinctive missions? That is to say, is it more appropriate to have two faculties of Engineering and two faculties of Medicine in the same province, or to have one faculty of Engineering in one city and a faculty of Medicine in the other? [67] According to the competition argument, the first option is more reasonable, because it elevates standards and increases geographical accessibility. According to the regulation argument, that option would result in a duplication of services, whereas the second option would increase efficiency in the use of resources. Nevertheless, in spite of these potential conflicts and contradictions, the simultaneous appeal to contending values contributes to build consensus around the heteronomous university. By capturing the best of both worlds, ideologues of university restructuring claim that the market will make universities more autonomous, efficient and responsive, and state regulations will correct the imperfections of the supply-demand model.

In summary, the ideological foundations of university restructuring attempt to simultaneously seduce a broad variety of actors in the political spectrum, on and off campus. However, when they are translated into concrete policy formulations, the original unconditional support begins to fracture, counter-arguments start to emerge and a network of alliances are mobilized to resist them. This is the theme of the next section.

4. Emerging resistance to the heteronomous university

The previous section examined how, favored by an advantageous political and economic context, and amalgamating competing projects and values into one vision that is presented as

the remedy for all existing problems, the heteronomous agenda is winning the battle for the university. However, hegemony is never total. Both inside and outside the university, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces coexist in a constant arm-wrestling that in certain contexts (as shown in chapter 4 and those following) results in high level conflicts.

For Weber (1947), an essential element in the definition of a conflict is that the parties are aware that they are in contention. Based on the Weberian perspective, Dahrendorf (1959) and Kriesberg (1973) contend that a social conflict exists when the parties believe they have incompatible objectives. Aubert (1963) identifies two main types of social conflicts: consensual and disensual. In consensual conflicts, the parties agree about what they want, but one side perceives that the other obtains more than what is fair at the expense of the other. Disensual conflicts exist when the parties differ in norms, values or beliefs, and one side wants the other to accept its values, beliefs or way of life. Hence, the conflicts between higher and basic education, between academic institutions and between faculties and departments competing for the same funding can be understood as consensual conflict. On the other hand, the conflicts between partisans of massive education and partisans of elite education, advocating accessibility and excellence, respectively, can be interpreted as disensual conflicts. Likewise, the conflict between the autonomous and the heteronomous university can be interpreted more as disensual than as consensual.

In a conflict, three main tools are used by adversaries in their attempt to gain their objectives: persuasion, coercion and reward. Persuasion refers to convincing the adversary that an agreement would be in its own interest or in harmony with its own values; it also implies modification of the other's perception of the issue on contention through an argumentation that appeals to the worldview of the contender. An illustration of persuasion is government's call for fees with basis on equity, or university's call for budget increases in the name of economic development and technological competition. Coercion involves the attempt to make the contender comply through fear or actual harm. The threat used by the coercer tries to make the adversary believe that the potential pains of not complying will be greater than those of capitulating (Etzioni 1961, Baldwin 1971, Wrong 1979, Kriesberg 1982). For instance, governments threaten universities with financial punishments, while university actors threaten governments with strikes and social unrest. Finally, rewards refer to positive sanctions, to promises that offer the adversary something it prizes in exchange for a concession. As an inducement for compliance, rewards are conditional upon the action of the other side. In the state-university conflict, the government promises financial rewards to those institutions which follow the right path, and university actors expect that restraint in public criticism will be rewarded accordingly.

In a concrete dispute, as the Argentinean case shows, the three types of inducements are usually combined. In a conflict between relatively equal parties, the rules of the game will be based on mutual persuasion (Kriesberg 1982). As Gottlieb (1991) pointed out, rhetoric is not just an abstraction, but a fundamental tool in political struggle that functions to persuade, to define the problem and to focus attention towards certain solutions while discrediting others. In a dispute involving unequal parties, if persuasion fails, the dominant party is likely to resort to coercion and rewards in order to pursuit its aims. In a democratic context, the possibilities of imposing the heteronomous university agenda are highly conditioned by the capacity of building an hegemonic bloc within the university to support it. This, in turn, is contingent upon national politics, the historical traditions of individual universities, and the structural and ideological position of the main university actors: administrators, faculty members, and students. In some cases the non-academic staff may also play an important role in shaping university policy. The greater or lesser success in the implementation of a heteronomous model depends on the opposition or complaisance expressed by these actors. As suggested above, the degree of resistance or acceptance is contingent upon the

effectiveness of persuasion mechanisms, but also upon the effectiveness of punishments and compensations.

In the analysis of the reaction to the heteronomous university, it is important to recognize that, in general terms, faculty have a different ideology than the institutional class that heads universities and research institutes [68]. While the latter have an ideology that promotes managerial prerogatives, maintenance of hierarchies and places economic prosperity first, faculty has developed a professional consciousness that values expertise, professional autonomy, specialization and collegiality. In general terms, faculty adhere to the ideology of expertise, which sustains a view of knowledge that is scientific, neutral and value-free, rejecting the ideological. Its primary values are academic freedom, specialization, professional autonomy and scholarship. The main division within those who adhere to the ideology of expertise is among those who have a preeminent concern for the general welfare and those who defend a self-interest (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979, Slaughter 1990).

University administrators, constrained by cutbacks and motivated by possible gains in autonomy, will be inclined to align themselves with the dominant agenda. But in order to impose the new university model, a willing management is not enough. It is also necessary to capture the consensus of a compliant academic staff receptive to the requirements of the corporate-state agenda, and a submissive student movement. However, this scenario is not always attainable (Katz 1986, N&B, 1988). In general terms, the most likely groups to confront the heteronomous university are faculty and students. Among academic staff, probably the most important opposition will arise from advocates of the 'scholarly excellence' project, who will emphasize arguments based on quality, academic values, collegial decision-making and institutional autonomy.

They would argue that when university takes on roles inappropriate to its fundamental nature, it exposes itself to adverse opinion without any compensatory justification (Vagianos 1986). They would contend that the rapid integration with the market and the state is associated with a growing moral degeneration and a growing abdication of moral leadership by university faculty and administrators. In this view, such a trend threatens the community of learning, the essential feature that distinguishes university from other public institutions. As mentioned in section 2, they would also express concern that increasing industry involvement in research and government regulations will inevitably lead to direct influence in university governance. They would perceive this outside influence in university governance as harmful, since only scholars can hire, discipline, judge and govern scholars, and because universities operate under a logic incompatible with business and state rationales (Wolff 1969, Walker 1983). Academics and scientists require international cooperation and freedom to criticize state policies, whereas politicians are more concerned with national development and political stability [69]. At the same time, academics believe in free flow of information, freedom to research and collegial governance, whereas business representatives emphasize the need for secrecy and moratorium in publications, managerial decision-making, and the immediate solution of practical problems (Kornberg 1986).

Faculty rejecting the heteronomous model would claim sooner or later that unless the current trend is reversed, the university will be impotent to realize those noble objectives for which it was established. As was pointed out above, one of their concerns is that, as research becomes sponsored by private corporations and steered within government parameters, new institutional forms may transcend the boundaries of the university, incorporating external criteria, standards and considerations. For them, if university loses autonomy, either surrendering to the state or to the business sector, academic freedom becomes limited. They would foresee that, because of their great dependence on private donors or legislative good will, university presidents tend to demand that professors not offend trustees or influential

sectors of the public. Moreover, they will fear that, when responding to marketplace trends, universities become professional schools offering specialized training, losing its sense of purpose. Based on Newman (1959), and Hutchins (1968), they also argue that specific professional training and specialized applied research are inappropriate, because they are not intellectual in a general sense, and they dismember the previously integrated academic community. They will contend that universities must become again places for conserving and teaching universal knowledge, and not for discovery or utility. In short, supporters of the 'scholarly excellence' project will defend institutional autonomy, self-government and academic freedom on the grounds that these are preconditions for creating and disseminating knowledge, and for universities to be the major source of moral and social criticism in modern life. Without academic freedom, integrity (this is, intellectual honesty and moral courage) may easily succumb to outside forces, and universities will become "little more than supermarkets with raw power for sale" (Katz 1986:24).

Academics who believe in the 'social transformation' project are also potential adversaries of the heteronomous model, who will claim that the term 'community' invoked by advocates of greater accountability is usually an euphemism for 'sponsor', and that arguments for client fees and privatization based on equity grounds are problematic. They will claim that only a free, public education can provide low costs and equal opportunity, hence promoting progressive social change, while private alternatives reinforce class differentiation. They will dispute the validity of rates of return studies on political and technical grounds, arguing that reallocations from higher to lower educational levels are not only detrimental for R&D but also not supported by evidence provided in those studies (see Morales Gómez 1990, Leslie 1991). They will probably agree with tuition fees partisans' claim that those who benefit the most from higher education are upper classes, or at least middle classes, and that some redistributive strategies should be implemented to achieve a more equitable situation. However, they will claim that such redistribution, if executed at the university level by charging tuition fees, will increase the difficulties of access for the lower classes. As an alternative view, they will argue that redistributive policies must be rather instituted in the tax system [70], promoting progressive schemes such as the Australian [71].

In addition to the resistance arising from ideological disagreements with the reactive university model, some developments inherent in the model itself would affect the university life in such a way that unexpected obstacles to its scheme may inhibit its rapid execution. As new conflicts emerge, the affected faculty members may articulate some serious opposition. First, faculty will channel their professional expertise into promoting corporate projects, the benefits of which will not reach evenly the population at large. This may bring into question the ideology of common good espoused by the heteronomous university. Second, an unrestrained competition for private funds will encourage faculty to contend against each other and against private firms, leading to a cut-throat competition and excessive laissez-faire. Likewise, the state's conditional funding and reward-punishment strategies may create intratribal wars among faculties and individuals, risking institutional stability. This would eventually end up in new regulations over entrepreneurial activities of faculty, which in turn may create new problems. Third, the more faculty channel their energies into external activities, the more university research (and profits derived from it) will be affected, and the more conflicts for revenues between faculty and university administrators will arise. This will lead to more control of institutional managers over professional labor, creating new problematic situations.

At the same time, however, the participation of academics in a counter-hegemonic bloc may be inhibited by at least two factors. First, their relative weakness with respect to the university administration and powerful external interest groups. Currently, faculty are starting to face an unaccustomed situation. Their old ideology of expertise is becoming

unable to mask political agendas, and the ideological dimensions of technical solutions are becoming evident. Hence, the main dilemma they must deal with is whether or not to align with the new model. The option is to subscribe to an entrepreneurial ideology of expertise, which will help to reproduce the status quo, or to advocate an ideology of expertise, in which knowledge is at the service of the interests of subordinate classes (Slaughter 1990, N&B 1990). Although faculty have their own power base and resources, they often must comply with managerial authority and external funders, be they state or corporations, especially in terms of developing alternative policies. Professors tend to oppose changes only when they perceive that such changes may weaken the prestige of the professorate or adversely affect working conditions, and are able to sabotage those reforms by refusing to fully implement them (Altbach 1979). However, in the case of alterations resulting from the heteronomous university, they may be in an unfavorable situation to struggle against them (fear of administration punishment) and, more importantly, they may even be unaware of the way these changes are going to affect them.

This leads directly to the second factor, which is the faculty's lack of global vision. Despite the growing corporate-university links, academics are generally not very aware of these developments, because they are more and more immersed in their own work, probably as a result of such developments. In fact, academics (including department chairs) have no problems in explaining the rationale and purpose of their own activities, but can hardly express the meaning and purpose of the institution as a whole. Academics are heavily individualistic, and their most treasured tenets (freedom of research, teaching, learning and publishing) are based on autonomy of reason and free inquiry, and in the assumption that each person is able to judge and choose. Hence, they may embrace the assumption that individualism and competition are going to enhance the overall quality of the work carried out in the institution (Bellah 1973, Becher and Kogan 1980, Clark 1983, N&B 1988).

With respect to the student body, the other potential actor in an eventual counter-hegemonic bloc confronting the service university agenda, it has been suggested that its role is very limited. Clark (1983), for example, when discussing students' political culture in the US, argues that there is a myth that students are also scholars, searching and highly motivated, because they are uncertain of where they are going and what the university is all about. From another perspective, Altbach (1979) mentions that, despite their vocal activism on political matters and their relative influence in some decision-making, they seldom play a key role in university reform. While Altbach's claim may be true for the US, it does not describe very accurately the situation of Latin America where the student movement has played an important role in the definition of the university agenda at least since the 1918 Córdoba reform. However, Levy (1991) contends that such historical activism is currently declining, and explains such decline in terms of two contexts: macropolitical and higher educational. The macropolitical context subsumes three causal factors. First, the legacy of the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the complex and mixed impacts of redemocratization and the economic crisis, which leads many to regard activism as a luxury or an irrelevance. Third, the general decline of the left both internationally and domestically. On the higher education context, Levy identifies as inhibitors of student activism the fragmentation of the student body resulting from institutional proliferation, the isolation of top social scientists in research centers apart from universities and, most importantly, privatization. Three comments can be made in relation to Levy's analysis. First, since he does not provide evidence of the decline, his initial assumption is disputable. Indeed, recent massive student demonstrations in Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela can be interpreted as contradictory to his main claim. Second, by focusing on student apathy, he misses a recent phenomenon of student politics, namely the emergence of the activist of the right, on occasion fomented (as the case study will show) by right wing political parties or government authorities. Thirdly, increasing financial constraints will probably ignite more

student activism, particularly if access becomes limited or if the quality of public university's graduates is perceived by employers as lower than that of private ones.

In summary, external pressure for changes has the support of some university actors, but at the same time, faces the active resistance of some university groups. Indeed, the existence of the trends described throughout this chapter does not mean that they are easily imposed on universities. Many of the state's policies are resisted by the academic community, and many societal perceptions are challenged by university actors. Voices have been raised against the university model proposed by governments on all continents. In some institutions the policies of self-regulation strategy, strategic planning and conditional funding have met with considerable resistance.

Although university-industry ties are becoming stronger everyday, and the state is rapidly implementing control mechanisms, the full implementation of a heteronomous university will not be an easy task. Whereas there are many points of convergence between the heteronomous model and the alternative projects and values, there are also some points of friction. The model can be resisted by the academia when it erodes some traditional academic values such as institutional autonomy (undermined by accountability to the state and the market), tenure (seen as an erosion of academic freedom) [72], and the risk of weakening basic research, social sciences and humanities. Many of them fear that these changes will increase administrative work, that research freedom will be endangered, and that fights between departments and faculties for budget funds will proliferate, with overall negative outcomes for the university as an academic institutions. Likewise, the model can be resisted by those from the traditional human capital model who believe in expansion, not a contraction of enrollments. Finally, although sympathizers of the social transformation model also endorse the idea of more interactions between the university and society, they believe that such interaction should be geared towards the solution of community problems rather than serve industry and government. The model is also going to be challenged by students when they believe that accessibility and quality are at risk. As will be described in subsequent chapters, university authorities, professors and students who do not endorse the main tenets of the heteronomous model on occasion can present considerable resistance.

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[1] The term heteronomous has been borrowed from Weber (1947:148): "Autonomy means that the order governing the group has been established by its own members on their own authority. In the case of heteronomy, it has been imposed by an outside agency".

[2] The Times Higher Education, October 29, 1993:11.

[3] In Italy, approximately 20% of the total amount of R&D funding goes to universities, a high figure in comparison with other developed countries (13.4% in the USA, 16.8% in Germany, 15.8% in France and 14% in the UK). In Italy, the "academic oligarchy" has traditionally exercised more influence over university policy than the market and the state (Clark 1983, Moscati 1991).

[4] Boys et al. (1988) analyzed nine British universities to explore if higher education prepares its graduates for work and, if so, how do they make their impact. They also wanted to know if there is a shift from the induction of undergraduates into knowledge for its own sake towards the acquisition of knowledge and skills instrumental to economic and social objectives. They found out that official and employer statements did not make reference to the needs of public sector (a huge employer which uses a large proportion of national resources), and that all the language was that of business, commerce or industry.

[5] A good description of university change in Western Europe can be found in Neave and Van Vught (1991)

[6] From now on they will be referred as N&B.

[7] Under the Established Programs Financing (EFP) Act, cash and tax transfers are provided to provinces and territories as a block contribution in support of health and post-secondary education.

[8] Federal spending on post-secondary education and research. Canadian Association of University Teachers. October 1992.

[9] Even before the creation of the Forum, in British Columbia the provincial government established an Academic Council which was assigned unprecedented authority over colleges and universities (Axelrod 1986).

[10] Globe & Mail, Aug. 5, 1993, C6.

[11] Translation provided by Wang Zifeng, Department of Educational Foundations, U. of A.

[12] Kedar Bhata Mathema, Vice-Chancellor, Tribhuvan University. Personal interview, Edmonton, November 3, 1993.

[13] The legislative package was adopted in December 1980, and its implementation begun in early 1981.

[14] It is argued that tenure, though necessary to creativity in research and scholarship, has developed into collectively bargained job security. (Cameron 1987)

[15] Although this is still true, the question is: for how long? An examination of current trends toward privatization taking place in USA and Canada, of major changes in the Latin American public sector, and emerging policies in the Latin America's higher education system suggests that this distinctive dual sector system may be altered in the near future.

[16] This statement, however, differs from Clark (1983:268), who states that in the US conventional wisdom continues to view monopolies in the public sector as good.

[17] Folio, October 22, 1993:4.

[18] Steelman and Powell (1991) report that the view that the government should be the main source of financial support is not held even by parents with few resources, and conclude that if this is the general impression it may be difficult to persuade the government to help fund postsecondary education (p. 1528).

[19] The idea consists of developing a system of separate fees for each course, according to the cost of production of such service. In this system, higher fees would be paid for higher cost services, such as small seminars, courses involving lab work and courses offered at much demanded times (Attiyeh 1974).

[20] Cannon (1988) notes that in the US model there is a close working relationship between corporations and alumni, on the one hand, and universities, on the other. Industry tends to have joint projects with the university and has a strong influence in university affairs, to the extent that there is 'no sense of distance' between the firm and the university. Alumni are also interested in the quality of education of their alma mater, because they believe that a deterioration in standards may reduce the marketability of their diplomas.

[21] The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 14, 1993:A 37.

[22] In the US, the relationship between higher education and business had been traditionally vibrant until the 1940s, when acute expansion in federal spending took place. At that time, university and industrial research split, and professors encouraged students to pursue their research careers within the university. In the 1980s, however, with the decline of generous government support, the situation changed. Faced with massive state cutbacks and with inflation-weary taxpayers, and witnessing the deterioration of facilities and research equipment, US universities were pressured to turn to the arms of business and industry (Baron 1983, Stauffer 1983).

[23] See also the documents "Prosperity through competitiveness" and "Learning well...living well", prepared by the federal government in the early 1990s.

[24] "Towards 2000 together". Government of Alberta, 1991. See also The Edmonton Journal, September 3, 1991:A10).

[25] The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 22, 1993: A 39.

[26] For an explanation of this neologism, see chapter 1, footnote 18.

[27] When Lloyd Barber, chairman of the Canadian Corporate-Higher Education Forum to promote co-operation between Canadian universities and the business community was asked some by Gzowzki about the risks of continuing to link academia and business, he replied: "If you sat around the table and listened to the discussion and didn't know, you'd be hard-pressed to know who was a university president and who was a corporate president" (cited in Newson and Buchbinder 1988:7).

[28] See Clarín, November 28, 1993. Educational Supplement, pp. 1 and 3.

[29] A detailed analysis of Brunner's argument can be found in chapter 5.

[30] In Canada, for instance, in the 'good old days', when the oil industry was booming, it was proposed to double the output of petroleum engineers to meet the needs to the National Energy Policy (Goodings 1980).

[31] In Holland, there are nine sectors: education, agriculture, science, engineering, health, economics, law, behavior and society, language and culture. Each university must focus in one or more sectors, and has freedom to innovate within those sectors.

[32] See the article "More teaching, less research". The Gateway, Vol. 83, No.12, October 21, 1993:1.

[33] Salford University also operates a university-industry partnership under which professors spend half of the time at the university and the other half at the company. Each pays a portion of the salary.

[34] In Britain, for instance, it is less than 1% of GDP. In Argentina it is less than 0.4%.

[35] The Times Higher Education, October 29, 1993:4.

[36] See the article by Gary Taubes "Shrinking Job Market: young physicists hear Wall Street calling". Science, Vol. 264, April 1994, p. 22.

[37] Folio, March 8 1991:4.

[38] Quoted in N&B: p.74.

[39] For a description of these cases, see The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 15, 1994:A24-27.

[40] The other three are direct industrial support for universities, university services provided to or for industry, and professional development.

[41] Murphy, Robert. "The market should not influence a university's educational pursuits. Financing alternatives must coincide with our notion of the role of university in society". Globe & Mail, March 21, 1991:A7). This article was a response to a previous article written by Jeffrey Simpson entitled "Suppose corporations paid the universities for each graduate they hired" (Globe & Mail, March 5, 1991, A16),

[42] The New York Times, March 17, 1993, B8.

[43] For concerns raised in Argentina, see chapters 6 and 7. For Canada, see Folio, University of Alberta, June 28, 1991.

[44] Academic freedom can be defined as "a set of vocational liberties: to teach, to investigate, to do research, and to publish on any subject as a matter of professional interest, without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanctions" (Alstyne 1972:146).

[45] When advocating the relevance of university pursuits to counteract budget cuts, partisans of the 'scholarly excellence' vision usually end up contradicting themselves. In order to defend the university with an argument that appeals to government, they fall into their own trap. Indeed, they try to convince government and society that university should be supported on the basis of its contribution to economic growth and technical innovation, and by saying that they renege on their anti-utilitarian tenets and endorse the vision of the university as a tool for economic growth (Lobkowicz 1983).

[46] Weber pointed out that modern societies are replete with irreconcilable values, and that these values are expressed in a power struggle. Indeed, it is power that finally determines whose values attain priority and who pays the cost.

[47] In Clark's words, "to grasp the relation of external events to internal organizations involves comprehending the way that beliefs intervene to give the external a particular form and relevance" (Clark 1983:100).

[48] He also distinguishes four basic types of academic belief: discipline, enterprise, profession-at-large, and national system (Clark 1983). Although academics have a sentiment towards all of them, there are certainly degrees and priorities in their commitment. In fact, faculty is oriented primarily by one of four different commitments: research, scholarly teaching, professional training and outside professional work.

[49] While most of the arguments for equality of access are based on class discrimination, Moscati (1991:106) contends that, for the Italian case, regional factors seem to be more important than class factors. Because of the decline of peripheral universities, in that country students living in less developed regions are penalized more than students from lower social classes.

[50] In the USA, for instance, the president of Chrysler claims that his company uses some of the most sophisticated technology and competes against the best in the world, and since the quality of graduates that he hires is sinking, so is his ability to compete (Iacocca 1988). Likewise, Clark (1983) alerts that some university students still read at the eighth-grade level. In Argentina, a medical doctor and former Dean of Medicine of the University of Buenos Aires said on TV that he was happy that many physicians are driving taxis, because they are less dangerous to society that way. All these arguments are used to justify more restrictive admission policies.

[51] Enrique Bullit Goñi. Carta a Raúl Alfonsín. April 29, 1991, unpublished.

[52] Quoted in the editorial article entitled "Expansion and quality: killing the golden goose", in Higher Education Review Vol. 24, No.1, Autumn 1991, p.3.

[53] As of 1991, for the first time in twenty years, the U. of C. is not taking students for winter sessions for three years.

[54] Degrees of Freedom. Report of the Strategic Planning Task Force. September 1993. University of Alberta.

[55] It is interesting to note that, when dealing with the issue of accountability, Clark (1983) referred exclusively to domination by the state. He argued that loyalty to the state means restraint of open criticism of state actions and social realities. He also asserted that subservience to the will of the state are primary values in universities all around the world, and in the particular case of developing nations, universities are so dominated by the state that it is "difficult to dissociate the tasks of the university from the tasks of the state"

(Clark 1983:250). The possibility of loyalty to non-state sectors was not considered as a relevant issue by Clark in 1893, probably because he was referring to public institutions. At that time, loyalty to non-state actors, such as the Church and private enterprise, was exclusive to private universities. However, as showed throughout this thesis, public universities have increasing loyalties to the business sector (see N&B 1988 and 1990, Slaughter 1990).

[56] It has been found that scientific equipment in US college labs is twice as old as that found in industry (Stauffer 1982).

[57] Equity, for instance, is simultaneously invoked by advocates and opponents of tuition fees.

[58] In a recent newspaper article, under the provocative title of "Social Injustices: Public Education" (La Prensa, March 8, 1991, p. 7), Alejandro Tagliavini begins by saying that education is an enterprise like any other, such as selling cars, manufacturing cookies or providing telephone services, because it operates under the same rules and laws of the market. His second point is that public education is necessarily inefficient, because the state is economically inefficient by definition, since economic efficiency implies profit and the state does not look for profit. After stating these two premises, his conclusion is that the best way to make education better and accessible for as many people as possible, is to make it efficient through total privatization. Moreover, he argues that the cure does not consist only in privatizing education; the state must avoid distorting the market with its unsound intervention. "Unsound -explains Tagliavini- because the state is a political entity, and education should not be political". He ends his prescription by saying that the state must not impose programs, provide subsidies or provoke any other interference in the market. After proclaiming his recipe for success, he exposes the outcomes of public education in Argentina: miserable salaries for teachers, poor facilities and low quality of instruction. The final paragraph is a good rhetoric exercise, and deserves quotation at length:

> *"Who has not heard over and over the repetitors of pre-manufactured slogans to assert that education must be compulsory, and therefore, free (to be consistent they should start by making eating compulsory). Can anybody be so naive to believe that something can be free? Private education is paid for by those who use it, and public (inefficient) education is paid even by those who do not use it, via taxes that, inevitably, strike harder those with lower incomes. Juan, 14, is a tree-feller in El Chaco* [an underdeveloped province in northern Argentina]. *He works all day because his father's wage is not enough to feed the family. Obviously, at the end of the day he has no time or energy to study seriously. But, because his wages are taxed taxes, he contributes to the budget of the University of Buenos Aires, which is spent on urban students who are older and wealthier than he. Years later, some of these students will make fortunes and others will go abroad, and Juan will continue cutting trees to support the new university students, the children of those already mentioned. But Juan, certainly, will receive the help of his son".*

[59] In England, for instance, where a loan scheme has been established to offset fees, loans have discriminated against students from poorer backgrounds (Waldorf 1991:181).

[60] However, supporters of the public university contend that a dual public-private system reinforces existing inequalities, creating an elitist education for the rich and a second-rate education for the poor. They claim that there is enough evidence that the clientele of private universities, especially in developing countries, belongs to the highest SES groups, and that middle and lower classes are usually excluded from them.

[61] This episode took place in Caracas, on September 23, 1993. Although the demonstration was legally authorized and headed by university rectors, the Defense Minister gave orders to detain around fifty university buses from the interior of the country to prevent them from joining the demonstration.

[62] According to the World Bank, in many developing countries there is evidence that the average dollar invested in primary education returns twice as much as the one invested in higher education (World Bank 1986:1). However, rates of return analyses have been challenged on several grounds. For instance, they do not consider research (see Leslie 1991).

[63] The idea that universities are unresponsive to social needs (whatever it means) goes usually hand-at-hand with the portrayal of the university as a mediocre ivory tower and of academics as esoteric or rebellious. Recent examples of this outlook can be found in the works of Sykes (1988) and Kimball (1990). These books charge the university for multiple failures, and criticisms include charges ranging from granting tenure to radicals "who are subverting educational institutions from within" (Kimball, pp. 167). From this perspective, social sciences are perceived as irrelevant pseudo-sciences, and humanities are the site of ideologically motivated assaults on the intellectual and moral substance of our culture (Kimball pp. xv and xviii). Sykes goes even further, arguing that professors are "polluting the intellectual inheritance of society"

(p.5). He also contends that they have obtained "job security and the freedom to do whatever they like... or to do nothing at all" (p.39), and that their rises in salaries are in inverse proportion to their teaching loads. Furthermore, he presents a list of "crimes against higher education": being overpaid and underworked, abandoning teaching responsibilities, pursuing personal goals while neglecting students, transferring teaching loads and responsibilities to an ill-trained, ill-paid and bitter academic underclass, distorting curricula to coincide with self-interests, mortgaging the nation's scientific future and economic competitiveness, etc.

[64] Richards (1988), for instance, portrays the university as an 'ivory tower' engaged in pursuing knowledge for its own sake, which is inefficient, inward-looking and self-satisfied, and proposes instead a model of an extended university, useful and responsive to society, and particularly to the economy.

[65] See, for example, Neave and Van Vught 1991.

[66] In the US, a 1977 survey of administrators, trustees and senior professors at 150 institutions of higher education found that 72% preferred increased financial dependence on corporations rather than on government, presumably aiming at both more funding and less regulations (Mallot 1978).

[67] Presently, government and business tend to favor the latter option. John Balheim, the president-elect of the Alberta Chamber of Commerce, for instance, asked if it is really necessary to have two faculties of law and two faculties of medicine in Alberta, and suggested institutions may have to forego some programs (Folio, October 22, 1993:4).

[68] See also the distinction established by Gouldner (1979:52) between intellectuals and technical intelligentsia.

[69] Academics themselves have also a double loyalty, that is, they have a commitment to their field (as a subject of research and teaching) and to their professional activity outside university. This is known as the "discipline" vs. "enterprise" conflict (see Clark 1983:29).

[70] In Canada, for example, the New Democratic Party demands the elimination of tuition fees, and contends that, since the conservative government was elected in 1984, taxes for the working class have increased by 369.7%, while those of the upper classes have decreased between 34% and 29%. Moreover, the NDP claims that in 1988, the first year of the federal fiscal reform, 60,000 profitable enterprises did not pay any taxes, and the proportion of individuals with income higher than $250,000 who did not pay taxes increased 40%.

[71] In Australia, students have two choices: a direct payment at the time of enrollment (with a 15% discount) or through the income tax system, when the person's income reaches a minimum related to average earning in the labor force (Taylor 1991). This model is being carefully examined by governments and university communities in several countries.

[72] Tenure is understood by academics as a scheme to encourage the activity of criticism in the positive sense, so that anyone can criticize a policy or theory (or virtually anything else) without fear of arbitrary sanction or dismissal on political premises. For them, without this protection, the concept of a university fails (Patchett 1991).

CHAPTER III: TOWARD A THEORY OF CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSITY CHANGE

This chapter is organized in two sections. The first section briefly describes the most frequent explanations for university restructuring presented in the literature. Drawing on some of these explanations, the second section provides an alternative framework that combines political economy with cultural studies. This framework identifies three key developments in contemporary university change: the rise of institutional capitalism, the retrenchment of the state, and the commodification of knowledge. According to the perspective advanced in this section, a comprehensive examination of university restructuring in the post-fordist era must consider simultaneously the international, national and institutional dimensions of such restructuring. This conceptual framework will be revisited in the concluding chapter, to illuminate the main factors that interact in the university restructuring process that is underway in Argentina.

Section 1: The reasons behind university restructuring

1. Main explanations advanced in the literature

The fact that similar university changes are taking place on a massive scale throughout the world raises the intellectual challenge of understanding why this is occurring. One explanation, advanced by some university authorities, contends that the reform package is the result of an institutional initiative exclusively formulated by autonomous university governing bodies. This perspective denies any external intervention in the direction of university restructuring, and argues instead that it is an effort undertaken by the academic community, in a situation of total autonomy, to overcome the main challenges and problems faced by the institution [1]. However, this explanation does not account satisfactorily for the parallelism of changes described in the previous chapter. It would be too great a coincidence that the self-governing bodies of many universities in different continents simultaneously decide to take similar directions. Although this perspective recognizes the effect of budget cutbacks on the redefinition of university priorities, it tends to understand and/or portray the restructuring process as having internal origins.

A second perspective interprets the changes as a result of a decision exclusively undertaken by a particular government which considers universities to be irrelevant or to be political enemies. In each country, those who advance this explanation tend to identify a specific government as the main agent of university restructuring. Either because of a fiscal deficit, a determination to make universities more responsive, or a purposeful decision to undermine public education, university restructuring is perceived as originating solely in the government house or the ministry of education of a given country. Those in this perspective who agree with the direction of the changes argue that the state is assisting the university because the university itself is incapable of carrying out reform on its own. In this view, the university is not only inefficient and irrelevant, but also a conservative, self-complaisant institution reluctant to change. Conversely, those who disagree with the changes tend to blame the anti-intellectualism or the elitism of the government. Whether the latter is perceived in a positive or a negative light, the common theme of this second explanation is that university restructuring is a local phenomenon that results from the educational and social policies of provincial or national political authorities.

A third explanation focuses on an alleged societal dissatisfaction with university performance. In this view, the university has lost its former status of a 'sacred cow' among taxpayers, who claim that the quality of undergraduate education has suffered at the expense of research and graduate studies. Moreover, due to demographic trends and to the ideology of the free-market, taxpayers with no direct relation with university are demanding that only

those with a direct stake should pay, and are withdrawing their support of public higher education (Yudof 1992). This dissatisfaction exerts public pressure on the government to implement cutbacks and privatization measures.

A fourth explanation is that university restructuring is the inevitable result of enrollment expansion. The hypothesis is that pressures for university restructuring and contraction are a consequence of problems that originated in previous growth. This explanation can be illuminated by a situation that took place in Europe more than a century ago. In his study of Padua University after the fall of Bonaparte, Laven (1992) shows that the difficulties in finding a secure and well-paid job by a large army of university graduates led first to disenchantment and later to an increase in student militancy. Laven explains how the government of that time was aware of the potential problems of an excess of educated unemployed and seriously contemplated the introduction of *numerus clausus* (quotas), higher fees and tougher entrance examinations. Taking into account this historical example, one may be tempted to formulate the hypothesis that history repeats itself, and that what we are witnessing today is just a variation of an old theme which can be formulated as a simple principle: any period of expansion is likely to be followed by a period of contraction.

At first glance, the expansion-contraction dynamic provides an appealing explanation for present university restructuring, particularly in a period of fiscal restraint. Yet a deeper examination shows its limits. First, expansion can be considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for university restructuring; otherwise, after a period of expansion, all contractions would be alike. Second, an exclusive reliance on the demographic-financial explanation implies that the only required changes are increased funding and/or enrolment reduction. However, the discussion on the heteronomous university presented in the preceding chapter showed that contemporary university restructuring is much more complex. Finally, this explanation, as well as the previous ones, helps to illuminate some of the factors leading to university restructuring, but has limited power to account for the simultaneity and similarity of changes throughout the world. True, it can be argued that during recent decades enrolments expanded and government funding declined in most countries. But this constitutes more of a description than an explanation. The problem is how to explain the factors underlying this phenomenon.

2. An overview of the discussion on university change

Several analyses have been advanced to understand the contradictory dynamic of growing enrolments and declining budgets that took place in the late 1970s and accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s. Before that, particularly during the 1960s, universities had experienced a period of rapid expansion. This expansion has been attributed to a combination of economic and ideological factors. Among the former were the increased supply of secondary graduates (due to both demographic growth and internal efficiency of the formal system), increasing formal academic requirements for jobs, continued shortages of trained personnel in certain fields, and highly subsidized higher education. Of them, the most important elements that led to a rapid growth in public enrollments were the prevalence of ideologies of social justice (equal opportunity) and doctrines of development that predict high rates of return for expansion (human capital theory). The first ideology is based in the common belief among liberals that a rise in enrollments would increase equality of opportunity, while the second is based in the widespread hope that investments in 'human capital' will increase economic growth (Levy 1986, Ziderman 1990, Brunner 1991).

Some authors, like Cross (1986), emphasize the 'social justice' factor. She claims that, during the 1960s, higher education shifted from a privilege to a right, and from exclusiveness to inclusiveness. In a rapid movement towards a less discriminatory access policy, one barrier after another was abolished. First, she says, was the removal of financial

impediments, and later, the equality of opportunity measures adopted to increase access to university of previously underrepresented groups including the poor, ethnic minorities, women, older people, workers, rural residents, etc. Other authors believe that 'equality of opportunity' principles were not the determining factor. Clark (1983) for example, points out that society never thought about the possibility of decreasing quality as a result of expansion. He suggests that if the prevailing belief were that mass education is incompatible with a decent education, expansion would have not taken place. From a different perspective, Axelrod (1986) recognizes the importance of democratization pressures, but argues that expansion occurred mainly because of economic demands, noting that in good and bad times, universities are judged primarily on their ability to contribute to economic growth. Porter (1979) as well as N&B (1988) are also of the opinion that equity arguments certainly had an influence on expansion, but were not the central issue. In any case, the distinction between demands for equality and for growth was not very relevant at the time of expansion. As Axelrod points out, in a period when all investment in higher education was viewed as profitable, there was no need to distinguish between the democratic argument and the economic argument. In short, the contention is that the rapid expansion of higher education during the 1960s was the combined result of buoyant economic conditions, free spending politicians and widespread public support. At that time, policy-makers, businesspeople and the public at large, encouraged by the promises of human capital theory, strongly believed in the economic benefits of educational investment in post-secondary education, including non-vocational fields.[2] Archer (1982) offers a different explanation, arguing that educational expansion was not wanted by anybody, and does not embody logic. For her, it was the irrational and unintended consequence of a parallelogram of forces (the polity, the profession, external interest groups and parents) impelled by different interests and values.

Intended or not, after several years of expansion, certain developments led corporations to withdraw from public university financing and decision-making. First, massive state funding undermined the leverage of business on university finances. Second, politicization of university life and society in general encouraged the appointment of non-corporate directors, including student, faculty, labor and ethnic representatives to governing bodies. Third, in some countries, particularly in Latin America, private universities were allowed to exist, and the business sector naturally shifted its resources toward them. After several decades of unprecedented growth, universities experienced stabilization of enrolments and public funding, and in the late 1970s, a period of contraction started, particularly in developed countries [3]. The transition from the 'steady state' to the 'lean state' implied not only structural changes but also ideological ones. Indeed, during this period, growing public deficits and declining economic growth provided fertile soil for the cultivation of conservative ideology. Fostered mainly by the business community, this ideology attributes economic problems to excessive state expenditure and to an oversized state bureaucracy, and thus calls for drastic cutbacks in university funding. Current reforms have emerged, therefore, with the collapse of a progressive, optimistic view which links investment in education with economic growth and democratization of society. This has been replaced by a much tougher view based on Friedman's monetarist theory. The main assumption is that the private sector creates wealth while public expenditure based on high taxation fuels inflation and disencourages entrepreneurs (Offe 1990, Milier 1991). In this context higher education has been pressured to take its share of cuts in public spending, particularly where it does not directly serve the needs of industry.

Hence, like most public institutions (schools, hospitals, mental-health facilities or prisons) the university has begun to suffer the effect of a deep unrelenting recession. But its situation has been aggravated by a generalized distrust of its contribution to economic development, by the growth of educated unemployed and underemployment, by the widespread belief that universities have too long been luxurious 'ivory towers' disconnected from the real world,

by complaints about waste and mismanagement, by suspicions about the productivity of tenured academics, and by the problems caused by student unrest (Axelrod 1986, Ornstein 1988, N&B 1988, Yudof 1992). Burton Clark (1983) finds a causal relationship between expansion and the attack on autonomy. He states that the greater the number of students, the more government shoulders the burden of rising costs, and the more it expects guarantees that it will get a good return on its investment - a form of reassurance to taxpayers that it will not longer tolerate the 'ivory tower' model. For Clark, this is why higher education has moved from the periphery of society to the center, a shift leading to greater pressure for accountability. In addition, advocates of human capital theory modified their earlier model, arguing that, at the university level, the private rate of return is higher than the social rate of return. On these grounds, they effectively impugned public subsidies to higher education, recommending instead client fees and alternative sources of revenue.

Another important element in elucidating the pressure for change is the relationship between expansion and quality decline. Although, as mentioned above, the possibility of quality decline did not act as a deterrent to expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, expansion is often used by restructuring advocates as an *ex post facto* explanation for quality decline and hence as justification for contraction. Although many governments are careful in proclaiming a causal relationship between broadened access and quality decline, they recurrently argue that access without quality means a denial of educational services to students (Berdahl and Millett 1991). However, the present university restructuring is not merely a contraction. Moreover, it is shaped by a new constellation of factors which were not present in previous university reforms. For instance, there is a need to respond to changes in the labor process required by the scientific-technical revolution and post-fordism. This means the intensification of a dual higher education system oriented towards skill training, on the one hand, and elite education, on the other. It also means the creation of a new kind of student, one who is able to meet the technological challenges of the labor market, mainly in the areas of bio-technology, micro-technology and computer-related developments (Skolnik 1983, Stephenson 1983).

Although not all these analyses of expansion and contraction approach the problem from the same perspective, there is a general consensus that university change is usually externally induced. Be they pressures originated in budget cuts, the demands of a high-tech society, the decline of the human capital approach, demographics, national education policies, shifts in job markets or societal dissatisfaction, it is widely agreed that current restructuring is largely the result of external forces. This understanding is consistent with the 'Big Bang' theory of university reform developed by Kitamura and Cummings (1972), according to whom university reforms usually are stimulated by a major crisis and are carried out by forces outside normal academic decision-making systems. It is precisely the argument of this thesis that a clearer understanding of the changing nature of the university worldwide can be gained if it is related to broader political, economic and cultural transformations that are occurring at the international, national and institutional level.

However, although university transformations are largely propelled by external forces, they are mediated by university actors who support and resist them. In some contexts, the very nature of the changes underway make universities less autonomous and therefore less resistant and more receptive to further changes in the same direction, and unable to formulate an alternative policy. Because sliding into a new reality is different from planning for it, what is occurring in many universities can be interpreted more as a 'response' than as a 'reform' [4] (Cerych and Sabatier 1986, N&B 1988, Yudof 1992). But not all universities are adapting quietly to the heteronomous model. The University of Buenos Aires, for example, is presenting considerable resistance to this model, as will be shown in the next chapter. In sum, what is needed is a conceptual framework that simultaneously considers the international, national and institutional dimensions of university change in a dynamic fashion,

taking into account the links between these factors and the mediations between structural constraints and human agencies.

Section 2. A theoretical interpretation of university change

1. Elements for a conceptual framework

José Joaquín Brunner (1988a) distinguishes two main theoretical approaches for studying higher education: the organizational analysis approach and the socio-historic approach. He summarizes the main differences between the two approaches as follows:

Table 1: Two Perspectives in the Study of Higher Education (Source: Brunner 1988a:17).

ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS	SOCIAL-HISTORIC ANALYSIS
Emphasis on internal factors	Emphasis on external factors
Emphasis on knowledge	Emphasis on actors
Mainly synchronic	Mainly diachronic
Focus on micro-processes	Focus on macro-processes
Differentiation (Durkheim)	Stages (Weber)
Accent on work	Accent on power
System of limits (closed system model)	System of relations (open system model)

Brunner (1988a and b) states that the first type of analysis is mainly used in developed countries, while in developing countries, at least in Latin America, the second type of analysis prevails. He argues that the organizational approach is more pertinent to the analysis of higher education in developed countries, where production of knowledge plays a decisive role in society, especially in the economy. In developing countries, instead, most changes in higher education have political origins. He contends that changes in Latin American universities are more the result of a chaotic and largely historic aggregation of reforms and initiatives, political/social movements that occur within the universities, or reactions and adaptations to politics originating 'outside' and 'above', than the product of design or global planning. Three comments can be made about Brunner's perspective. First, in developed countries 'outside' and 'above' influences also play an important role in shaping changes in the higher education system, and thus the organizational analysis alone may be insufficient to understand the latter comprehensively. Second, in developing countries university changes are also influenced by global planning, formulated not only by the state but also by international agencies. If changes were just the result of a chaotic aggregation of initiatives, it would be difficult to explain why current reform initiatives follow a similar pattern in many Latin American countries. Thirdly, it has been observed that, in general terms, both approaches are inadequate to understand change in higher education systems.

Both approaches have weaknesses. Organizational analysis tends to ignore the existence of forces external to the system, whereas the socio-historical perspective tends to focus on determinants external to the system, reducing human agents to mere puppets (Apple 1986, Aronowitz and Giroux 1988, Carroll 1990). Probably acknowledging these limits, Brunner calls for the building of a theory of transformation for higher education systems. It has been already noted that most explanations of university change (including Brunner's) are based on the contradictory developments of enrolment expansion and budget decline. However, *strictu sensu*, this constitutes more a description than an explanation. Even granting it the status of explanation, it refers only to the proximate determinants of change, and hence calls for a

more comprehensive interpretation of the situation. In the construction of such a theory, elements of organizational and socio-historical analysis can be combined in a fruitful way. This means that, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the forces shaping university change, such change should not be examined either solely as the result of autonomous adaptations generated by self-regulated mechanisms of the system, or as a mere imposition of external conditions, be they superstructural apparatus or economic structures. Rather, change can be better understood as the influence of a plurality of factors that operate at different levels and are propelled by different forces, inside and outside the university. Hence, in order to formulate a theory of university change it is important to analyze the dynamic linkages between the system and its context, and the dialectical contradiction between forces promoting and resisting change. In short, what is needed is a conceptual framework to study the transformation of contemporary universities. Such a framework should consider simultaneously economic, political, social and cultural developments at three levels: international, national and institutional. Although the three levels are affected by a variety of developments, in each one it is possible to identify a macro development that overrides the rest.

At the international level, it is relevant to analyze the structure and conditions of economic relations and international trade in the context of North-South economic ties. The interaction of states at a global level, that is, at the level of the "world capitalist economic system" (Wallerstein 1979), is crucial to an understanding of relations of domination among countries, and hence the model of university in dependent (or, as Cardoso states, conditioned) capitalism. For instance, as long as peripheral countries are producers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods and technology, the role of their universities in R&D will be limited. The key macro-process at this level is the emergence of institutional capitalism. At the national level, the central concept is the state. From a theoretical point of view, in this study the state is not understood merely as a political instrument of the bourgeoisie, but also as an arena of confrontation among different social groups. Drawing on the contributions of original marxism and functionalist marxism (Althusser), the conceptualization of the state is also complemented by the insights of neo-marxists such as Poulantzas, Offe and Mishra. In the conceptual framework of analysis developed in this study, the state plays an important role as a mediator between international and institutional pressures for change. The key development at this level is the retrenchment of the welfare state [5].

At the institutional level, the analysis incorporates elements of organizational and crisis theories, as well as cultural studies, focusing on three major areas: functions, actors, and the relationship with the outside world. In regard to the first one, pressures for change encompass the three main functions of university (research, teaching and extension). In terms of the first mission of the university, the production of knowledge, the main issue is the relationship between research, societal problems and industrial needs. In terms of the second function, the transmission of knowledge (or production of professionals), an important factor explaining university change is the massification of public universities and the 'functionality' of their graduates to the development model. With respect to the third function (extension), change can be examined through the types of services provided by the university and the characteristics of its clientele. The second area (actors), refers to the interaction between the different agents of the institution, such as students, professors, administrators, alumni, etc., and their influence on governance. Finally, the relationship with the external world will focus on links with the market and the state. The key development at this level is the commodification of culture.

By combining an examination of the global political economy with state analysis and a study of culture, an appropriate framework to explain university restructuring can be constructed.

In short, the transformation of the university, in the current phase of global restructuring, can be illuminated by an examination of three concurrent macroprocesses: a) the emergence of institutional capitalism; b) the decline of the subsidiary state; and c) the commodification of culture (Pannu, Plumb and Schugurensky 1994). Further, these global, structural developments are mediated by specific organizational cultures and power relations unique to each university.

Table 2: Conceptual Framework for Analyzing University Change

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	THEORETICAL APPROACH	KEY DEVELOPMENTS
International	World system theories	Institutional capitalism
National	State theories	Retrenchment of the state
Institutional	Cultural studies	Commodification of knowledge

It is important to acknowledge that, in the social world, the boundaries between international, national and institutional levels are difficult to identify, and that the distinction is only for analytical purposes. Indeed, the dialectic between general models and the uniqueness of nation-states poses an intriguing problem for the interpretation of social change. As was seen in chapter 1, the current 'crisis' of the public university is universal or generic in nature, and so is the relation of the university with the state and the private sector. Although the interconnections of different countries through the world capitalist economic system are increasing daily, the history of nation-states is characterized by a great deal of cultural and institutional specificity. Indeed, historical legacies such as the relative power of labor and capital, the nature of political parties and the role of the state account for the uniqueness of the responses to global crises in national settings. In short, transnational forces are mediated by the national economy, polity and culture, and therefore the university crisis takes on a specific form in different nation-states (Mishra 1990, Ginsburg 1991). In turn, as the Argentinean case shows, in each country the resolution of the university conflict takes on a specific form in different institutional settings, according to the traditions and the particular balance of forces in a given university. Hence, it is pertinent to avoid either an approach based on global determinism or one that is grounded in an insular perspective that only focuses on national or institutional dynamics. Moreover, it is important to recognize the mediations among international, national and institutional factors in order to examine both structural constraints and available options for action.

2. The international dimension. Economic restructuring in a post-fordist world

As several works have shown (i.e. Mazrui 1975, Altbach 1977 and 1981, Arnove 1980; Fuenzalida 1982, Weiler 1984, Levy 1986, Briceño 1988, Samoff 1990), any examination of higher education in developing countries must consider the influence of international forces. The analysis of these international forces from a world system perspective is grounded in the works of Wallerstein (1974) and Amin (1974), who claim that, after WW II capitalism entered a new phase of increasing transnationalization in which it became a global, techno-industrial and oligopolistic system, characterized by a growing power of multinational corporations. The main contention of this body of research is that the transnational system of power and knowledge conditions the development of universities in developing countries. Mazrui (1975) and Altbach (1981) contend that industrialized nations and multinational institutions have a deliberate policy with respect to Third World universities that reinforces neocolonialism and dependency structures. Mazrui (p. 193) claims that the university is a cultural corporation with political and economic consequences, and the multinational company is an economic corporation with political and cultural consequences, and that the former produces 'westernized' human resources and redefines markets for the latter. In the case of Latin America, Fuenzalida (1982) argues that, after WW II, universities were

mobilized to serve, reproduce and legitimize the transnational institutional order and to incorporate Latin American nations into the new regional hegemony that had the US at the center of the system. This re-orientation was organized through a process of 'subsidiarization', by which a dependency relationship between Latin American universities and US institutions was nurtured. In summary, the analysis of current university change in a given developing country cannot ignore the emerging new international economic order of the 1990s. In this new order, two key developments are crucial to understanding the context of university change: global economic restructuring and the emergence of institutional capitalism (Wallerstein 1986, Useem 1986, Harvey 1990).

a) Economic restructuring and the trend toward globalization

The global economic restructuring which emerged in the late seventies, went hand in hand with the implementation of neoliberal policies. At that time, capitalist management was caught in a profit squeeze, with labor fighting to keep wages high, and foreign competitors pressing to keep prices down. As the economy slowed, state revenues failed to keep pace with social expenditures, and taxpayers began to express resentment towards those who benefited the most from state revenues (the state bureaucracy, welfare recipients, institutions receiving state subsidies, etc.). This led to a breakdown of consensus and to a rearrangement of the social relations of production: the state refrained from its role as arbiter between labor and capital, and allied with capital thus pushing labor into a defensive position. Economic restructuring is characterized by at least the following aspects:

. globalization of the economy, in the context of a new international division of labor and economic integration of national economies (common markets, trade agreements, etc);

. emergence of new relations and arrangements among nations, and among classes and social sectors within each country; development of geographical areas, especially in developed countries, where information and service industries are becoming more important than manufacturing;

. increasing internationalization of trade, reflected in the increasing capacity to connect markets on an immediate basis (moving information and capital around at accelerated speed), and a growing concentration of capital. Currently, 600 major multinational corporations (MNCs) control 25% of the world economy and 80% of world trade;

. flexibilization of labor legislation (which decreases the power of unions) and replacement of the hourly wage by piece work remuneration;

. decline in the position of labor vis-a-vis capital, mainly due to such factors as an increase in the number of surplus workers (unemployed or underemployed), regressive revisions of the tax system, the intensification of competition, the decrease of profit margins, less protective labor contracts and the institutionalization of 'team concept' strategies;

. a shift from the rigid production model to a model of flexible accumulation, based on an increased flexibility in the use of the labor force, stocks, processes and markets;

. the rise of new forces of production, with industry shifting from an industrial-mechanical model to one governed by the micro-chip, robotics and automatic, self-regulating machines, which in turn, leads to the emergence of a high tech information society based on the computer;

. capital-intensive production, which results in the deskilling or redundancy of large sections of the workforce, and leads to a polarized labor market composed of a small, highly skilled and well-paid sector, on the one hand, and a large low skilled and low-paid sector, on the other;

. an increase in the proportion of part-time and female workers;

. an accelerated increase in the size of the service sector, at the expense of the primary and secondary ones;

. an ever-increasing financial and technological gap between more developed and less developed countries, with the exception of the 'new industrialized countries' (NICs).

This process of economic restructuring has been also interpreted as the transition from fordism to post-fordism. Fordism is associated with the following features: a) the mass production of homogeneous products and a homogenization of consumption patterns; b) the use of inflexible technologies such as the assembly line; c) the adoption of standardized work routines (Taylorism); d) economies of scale based on mass consumption; e) deskilling and homogenization of labor; f) workers' associations (unionism) and uniform wages; and g) a centralized welfare state, guided by Keynesian macroeconomic policies, which oversees collective bargaining through a capital-labor social pact and ensures the reproduction of the labor force through universal education and health care. Post-fordism, conversely, is associated with the flexible accumulation paradigm, which is characterized by the following: a) a decline of interest in mass production, and a growing interest in specialized products; b) smaller, more flexible and more productive systems, based on new technologies; c) increasing differentiation, autonomy and responsibility of workers, who are equipped with better training and more diverse skills; d) replacement of centralized and bureaucratized institutions, such as unions, political parties, and welfare, by more flexible ones that better respond to the needs of a more differentiated labor force and a more diverse population; e) reduction of labor power and collective action, with a corresponding increase in individualism and entrepreneurialism; f) increased relative autonomy of the international financial system vis-a-vis manufacturing industries and national states; and f) more differentiated lifestyles and consumption patterns (Harvey 1989, Clarke 1990, Pelaez and Holloway 1990, Ritzer 1992, McCaughan 1993).

At the level of the state-economy nexus, economic restructuring also implies a deep fiscal crisis and budget reductions affecting the public sector, creating pressures on the state to withdraw from its economic development and social welfare roles, which results in an increased privatization of social services, health, housing and education, and decreased protection of workers through labor legislation. This evolves into a restructuring of the state-workers relationship, in such a way that the social wage (public expenditure distributed in the form of social benefits) diminishes at the expense of individual salaries. As a result of this, society is being segmented into two sectors: one that is composed of those who are protected and included by the model, and one that is made up of those who are unprotected and excluded (Offe 1988, Newson and Buchbinder 1988, Gilly 1990, Harvey 1989, Mishra 1990, Cameron 1993, Lipsey 1993).

Economic restructuring is concomitant with the trend toward globalization. Globalization of the economy is producing the unification of capital on a world scale, while workers and other subordinate groups are becoming more fragmented and divided. In fact, economic restructuring is operating through the impersonal dynamic of intercapitalist competition in progressively deregulated markets, enhancing the local impact of the global trend. National states become internationalized, in the sense that their agencies and policies become adjusted to the rhythms of the new world order. In other words, in an order where ruling class strategies are increasingly global, the prospects of state sponsored attempts for significant social transformation on a national basis become increasingly dim (Cohen and Rogers 1983, Cox 1987, Carroll 1990).

Among the several developments that characterize the process of economic restructuring, perhaps one of the most salient ones is the growing power of multinational corporations over national states. Indeed, the deepening of the international division of labor and the economic integration of national economies through common markets and free trade agreements is

pushing to a borderless world, a phenomenon that cannot be separated from the growing concentration of power in supranational organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Back in 1972, Alvin Toffler noticed that the state was shrinking in power, pointed out the incapacity of national governments to deal with transnational economic forces, and predicted that "politicians of individual nations will continually deny to the public that they are surrendering sovereignty, but they will be compelled to do just that by the force of the new economics" (Toffler 1972:74-75).

Toffler's early prophecy has been confirmed by a multiplicity of economic and political analyses. Langille (1987), for instance, shows how mobility of capital gives capitalists leverage over the state. Likewise, Held (1991) claims that "the internationalization of production, finance and other economic resources is unquestionably eroding the capacity of an individual state to control its own economic future...multinational corporations may have a clear national base, but their interest is above all in global profitability, country of origin is of little consequence for corporate strategy". In short, there is mounting evidence that this process of globalization is leading to rapid decline in the capacity of national governments to set national economic goals, let alone control their economies (Rohwer 1993) [6]. Multinational corporations are becoming so powerful that they are creating their own education systems, which include post-secondary institutions [7].

In Latin America, one of the most indebted regions of the world, creditors have openly influenced the direction of economic and social policy. The severity of the structural adjustment programs experienced during the 1980s has resulted in what has been called 'Latin America's lost decade' (Ficher and Husain 1990, Reimers 1991). However, in spite of draconian cuts to public services, the problem remains unsolved. In the 1990s, in an attempt to solve the debt problem by reaching balance of payments equilibrium and closing the fiscal gap, the cuts to public services are being complemented by privatization of public companies, many of which are purchased by multinational corporations. The capacity of corporations and multinational agencies to influence state policies is based on two main tools: coercion and persuasion. Coercion is exercised through financial mechanisms, and is particularly efficient in highly indebted nations. Persuasion is exercised through "moral and intellectual leadership", which consists of infusing policy-makers with a new set of values and setting limits on the state's range of options. As it is suggested in this thesis, this constitutes a more effective strategy for changing policy priorities than the threat of punitive sanctions. The new set of values (in reality a modernized version of old themes) promotes less state intervention in favor of greater reliance on the free market, and appeals to individual self-interest rather than collective rights. This leads to the notion of institutional capitalism.

b) Institutional capitalism: the Fora and the World Bank

As was described in chapter 2, university restructuring is taking a similar path in a variety of countries having different social, political and economic regimes. Why is it so? It may be extremely naive to view such striking similarities as being coincidental. In general terms, the adaptation of similar ideologies and policies in different parts of the world can be explained as either a process of diffusionism, or a process of institutional capitalism. Those who favor the diffusionist explanation argue that the simultaneous development of similar university policies in a variety of countries reflects a common response to common problems that stem from similar imperatives, namely, the 'international economic imperative' to remain competitive in the global market. In this view, reform strategies flow from developed to developing countries in a process of cultural diffusion through networks of experts who borrow sensible alternatives, ideologies and policies from the First World. This process is usually piecemeal, and works through 'demonstration effects', literature and the travel of individuals, including participation in academic activities abroad. Through diffusion, lessons

learned in one country through long and painful experiences are rapidly learned by others (Coombs 1985, Inkeles and Sirowi 1984, Guthrie 1990).

Alternatively, university reform can be analyzed in relation to dynamics within the world economic system between core and peripheral countries. The role of corporate foundations, institutional fora and supranational institutions such as the World Bank in fostering particular reforms is central to this type of analysis (Klees and Wells 1983, Altbach 1988, Berman 1983, Kolko 1988, Wallerstein 1984, González 1982, Carnoy 1986, Weiler 1988, N&B 1988, Ginsburg et al. 1991, Torres 1993). According to this view, university reform can be understood as being largely a conscious effort on the part of specific interest groups to adapt the university to the new era of flexible accumulation. This effort is organized through institutional arrangements that put together business and government representatives, a process described by Useem (1984) as 'institutional capitalism'. Instead of attributing state retrenchment to a rather nebulous upsurge of mass disaffection with that arrangement, Useem argues that it was largely the deliberate product of an organizational network linking together most large corporations. The emergence of this institutional entity constitutes a new stage of capitalist development.

Useem identifies three stages in the evolution of capitalism, distinguishing 'institutional capitalism' from earlier eras of 'family' and 'managerial' capitalism [8]. The transition from managerial to institutional capitalism was the result of the formation of an intercorporate management network of ownership and directorships, which in turn was related to evolving markets and bureaucratic conditions. Drawing on Useem, four main features characterize institutional capitalism. The first is that, with the emergence of institutional capitalism, there is a weakening of the alliance between class and culture and the consolidation of an alliance between business and culture. This trend is evident in the increasing participation of members of the classwide network of corporate executives in governing boards of cultural institutions such as universities and museums. The second feature is the emergence of a relatively cohesive and organized corporate community that represents the interests of a select circle of companies. This leads to the third feature, namely the increasing political intervention of business and the intensification of the alliance between large companies and the state. In fact, one of the most important criteria for promotion of top managers is their acceptance by the inner circle of both the corporate community and its state counterpart. Moreover, private companies are openly encouraging their top executives to be involved in the governmental and opinion-forming areas, making regular contacts with members of the official party and shadowing politicians of the opposition. The political mobilization of capital is perceived by business leaders as crucial to restoring company profits and to reducing government spending (precisely because, as we said in the foregoing discussion of the welfare state, excessive regulation of business activities and its failure to control organized labor was identified as the main obstacle to capitalist accumulation) [9]. Nowadays, more than ever, business is better organized to influence the political agenda.

The fourth and final feature of institutional capitalism is that it is shaped by a classwide principle of organization which is "the product of inclusive and diffusely structured networks of intercorporate ownership and directorship linking ever concentrating units of economic activity. These networks define a segment of the business community whose strategic location and internal organization propel it into a political leadership role on behalf of the corporate community" (Useem 1984:194). In Useem's approach, the strategic location of these specialized elements of the business community is primarily determined by position in a set of networks encompassing most large corporations. Unlike in previous periods, upper-class origins and corporate credentials are subordinated to a distinct logic of classwide organization. This leads to the formation of worldwide networks constituted in each country

by an inner circle of the business community that rises above the competitive dynamic of local corporations.

Slaughter (1990) claims that classwide principles extend beyond the corporate sector to the public sector, including academia. For her, "classwide principles of organization depend not exclusively on ownership of the means of production, nor on wealth, but on a relationship to central institutions in the public and private sectors" (Slaughter 1990:219). The spread of classwide principles at the international level has been influenced by improvements in air travel, communications systems, and international media. In sum, the emergence of institutional capitalism and the resulting proliferation of far reaching, highly coherent networks of representatives from business and the state has provided a new means for dominant interests to assert their influence. The ability of this network to develop the public policies most needed for capitalist growth and to communicate them in electoral campaigns, government lobbying, etc., has been one of the factors impelling not only state retrenchment, but also university restructuring.

In the USA, for instance, the "Business-Higher Education Forum" was established in 1978 to link the efforts of corporations and universities in science and technology activities with the explicit purpose of aligning higher education with the business and corporate sector and of regaining the US competitive edge (Slaughter 1990). From the outset, the Forum was interested in influencing policy formation and creating ideological hegemony, and received the full support of President Reagan (Bok 1982, Baron 1983). The ideology of the Forum reflects the two main concerns of the US dominant class in the context of economic restructuring: increasing unemployment and displacement of workers due to automation systems, and international competition. Forum leaders expect the private sector to have a powerful voice in directing institutions created by the state. Likewise, the Forum is concerned with creating a consensus that brings the entire nation to subscribe to the importance of the private sector in the national economy. The Forum tries to maintain class dominance through policy proposals, and permanently refers to higher education as part of the private sector. By doing so, the Forum is aligning higher education with the business and corporate sector. The corporate leaders represented in the Forum explicitly state that it is their intention to influence the higher education sector, which in turn is of immense importance in the formulation of the political arrangements that govern the relationship between business and the rest of society. Indeed, they argue that the ideas fostered in universities are a major determinant of the social attitude towards business and corporations, and hence of the climate in which business operates.

The Forum justifies expertise on the basis of its contribution to commercial success. Faculty supporting this ideology of expertise and engaging in economic activities outside the university will tend to legitimate it by claiming that it contributes to economic growth and prosperity. Under the promise of prosperity and economic development, the Forum exalts the entrepreneurial culture. The private sector is presented as reflecting excellence, quality, innovation, independence, creativity, diversity, vision and responsiveness to demands, which are portrayed as crucial elements for economic recovery. However, according to Slaughter (p.194), beyond the rhetoric of excellence, quality, diversification, etc., the real aims of the Forum are profit and control. Appealing to public support for general welfare, the private sector and the entrepreneurial ideology are presented as essential to the salvation of society by rebuilding a strong economy and raising the standards of living. Under the US model, there is a strong effort to recast the university's public function as economic development, which includes a wide range of profit options for higher education. In such a model, the warning raised by Winchester that universities may decline as cultural centers becomes clear: universities must compete with industry for the same government research funds to conduct the same research. Furthermore, the government itself has created a legion

of specialized research institutes which operate independently of universities (Business-Higher Education Forum 1983, Fulton 1986, Johnston and Edwards 1987, Slaughter 1990).

It is interesting to notice that the Forum strategy has a clear focus on faculty and administrators as the main allied groups. Although the US and Canada Fora broadly publicize their benefits for the general public, they direct most of their ideological efforts toward the professional-managerial class, paying little attention to the participation of labor and other groups in the university-business partnership. Interestingly, the Forum does not create consent in the Gramscian way, that is, by identifying diverse interest groups and then engaging them in an educational and political process in order to articulate a hegemonic principle incorporating elements from the worldviews and interests of allied groups. Instead, they appeal to hegemonic despotism, emphasizing fear over incorporation. Indeed, in order to ensure the alliance of PMC with the institutional class (administrators), the Forum frightens the former with the possibility of losing their standard of living and way of life if global competitiveness is not maintained (Giroux 1981, Slaughter 1990).

Institutional capitalism has different expressions in core and peripheral countries. In the former, a forceful and mature capitalist class and a relatively autonomous state attempt to influence university change through a bevy of joint research groups, conferences and fora. In the latter, where a weak capitalist class and a dependent, indebted state are unable to formulate a university policy compatible with the new economic paradigm, the role of these Fora is fulfilled by what Samoff (1992:67) calls 'the intellectual/financial complex of foreign aid', a network of international agencies led by the World Bank. While in the 1970s the dominant donors of multilateral official development assistance were United Nations organizations, in the 1980s the World Bank's combined disbursements have been almost double those of the UN and its organizations. Patterns of financing for technical co-operation have also changed dramatically over the same period, and the WB has become the most important single source of multilateral technical co-operation and the lead agency in setting the education and development agenda. Moreover, the WB has emerged as an important delivery agency for the United Nations Development Programme (Cassen 1986, Samoff 1992, Hennes and Schumm 1992). The WB approach to education in the late 1980s "can only be understood in the light of the rapidly deteriorating prospects for growth and sustained development seen in many borrower countries" (Jones 1992:162).

Indeed, the power of the WB to influence national governments is largely related to the structural adjustment programs, austerity measures and conditionalities imposed by the IMF, its historical partner [10]. Developing countries' access to credit is generally subject to the approval of these two institutions [11], which demand that certain requirements are met. Prominent among these requirements are deficit control, economic liberalization, the privatization of the public sector, financial stability, the reduction of government expenditures and a diminishing role of state interventionism in the economy. In the WB-IMF lending system, countries which fulfill these conditions and are net exporters of capital are more likely to receive a better allocation of resources, while countries aiming at establishing their own policies are less likely to be eligible for assistance.

Although the tremendous power of the WB in educational policy-making can be largely attributed to its capacity to mobilize funds and to impose conditions, the quality of its human and material resources should not be underestimated. In relation to human resources, the impressive expertise, analytical skills and experience of its professional staff provide the WB with the possibility of asserting the initiative in policy formulation. In regard to material resources, its capacity to collect data throughout the world, its considerable library and its proficiency at distributing documents to key educational and political leaders in developing countries makes the WB a center of reference for educational policy makers. From 1972-

1982, the WB supported 272 studies of education, a number that increased to 436 for the period 1982-1989. The WB expenditures on educational research in this period was $98.5 million, which probably exceeds the funding for educational research by all Latin American universities combined. The potential of the WB in the shaping of educational policies in developing countries is complemented by the limited power of developing countries when it comes to development assistance. The principles of cooperation, participation and partnership, when applied to the relationship between donors and governments, usually result in staged consultation or a direct subordination to the donors' agenda (Morales Gómez 1990). In sum, the capacity of the WB to set educational priorities at an international scale derives from the amalgamation of funding, research and policy formulation in one single agency, a phenomenon called by Samoff (1992:67) 'the intellectual/financial complex of foreign aid'. For Samoff, this amalgamation provides the WB with the possibility of constraining the education and development discourse, legitimizing weak propositions, entrenching flawed understandings by according them official status, seeding and fertilizing theoretical and analytical fads, and treating education primarily as technique and administration.

Indeed, in the WB discourse, education is reduced to an input-output mechanism regulated by external parameters, where the virtues of planning, standardized objectives and measurement of achievement are the primary considerations in educational change. This cult of efficiency and technocracy advances a skewed notion of investment and modernization. In terms of investments, the WB recommends a reallocation of resources from higher to basic education. Since this can be detrimental to technological and scientific development, it has serious implications for self-reliance. Modernization is seen as a technical process, and underdevelopment is portrayed as an outcome of the inefficiency of third world governments in the management of resources. In a language of educational reform that presents a conflict-free scenario and disregards structural causes of underdevelopment and the effects of structural inequalities on education, the educational problems of developing countries are depicted as the result of inadequate investments, poor planning, institutional inefficiency and misallocation of resources (Morales-Gómez 1990, Samoff 1992).

Although world system explanations are necessary to account for the similarity of university reforms in dissimilar nation-states, they are not sufficient in themselves to understand the particular processes of give and take, struggles and alliances that take place at the national and institutional level. As will be seen in the next sections, university reforms involve an interaction between structure and agency in which human actors engage in situations of conflict and cooperation (Giddens 1979, Ginsburg and Cooper 1991). This means that university restructuring can be analyzed through the rhetoric and action of social groups operating at the international, national and institutional levels.

3. The national dimension. Differential retrenchment

a) State and class conflict

At the level of the national formations, the key developments are the retrenchment of the state, the privatization of the public sector and the struggle for hegemony, which are analyzed from the perspective of state theories and class analysis. As Carnoy (1982) has pointed out, any attempt to understand educational change must include the role of the state. Within structural-functionalism, the state is considered a consensual collective expression of individual views, like an empty vessel that only reflects the general will and the common good. Classic marxism, in contrast, portrays the state as a "mere committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels 1848:61), that is, an instrument of the dominant classes. Neo-marxists have attempted to overcome the reductionism of original marxism, conceding to the state different margins of relative autonomy which vary

according to specific social formations. Moreover, some versions of neo-marxism perceive the state as an arena of confrontation in which class struggle takes place. In this view, the state is fragmented by special interests, and its complex bureaucracies generate an intricate mix of diversified micro-policies, many of which are mutually contradictory. Hence, the state can be considered both an arena of confrontation among a variety of interests (Cardoso and Falleto 1978, Poulantzas 1978, Carnoy and Levin 1986) and an actor in its own right possessing interests of its own (Cardoso 1979, Offe and Ronge 1982, Evans 1988, Carnoy and Samoff 1990) [12].

Poulantzas does not conceive the state as an entity with an intrinsic instrumental essence, but as a relation -more precisely the condensation of a class relation- or in his words, the "condensation of a balance of forces" (1975:98). For Poulantzas, the state is marked by contradictions resulting from class conflict. In this view, the state must appear neutral and autonomous while at the same time representing the interests of the dominant classes. In this situation, class struggle expands from the economic to the political arena, and the state itself - including the educational system- becomes an arena of class conflict. Relative autonomy is seen as the necessary condition for the capitalist state in the political organization of hegemony. Even accepting the idea that the state as a whole is an instrument of the dominant class, it is evident that this is not the case for every public institution. Although to some extent universities reflect the interests of the dominant class, there are many variations in terms of degrees and type of arrangements. Without neglecting the existence of a strong dependence upon a powerful state, universities still enjoy a great deal of autonomy, accommodating a great variety of social sectors, ideologies and interests. Until recent times, with the exception of military interventions, the state has often lacked the necessary consensus, coherence, ability and even inclination to impose clear governance and functional structures through its financing of public universities.

Indeed, public universities are not simply a superstructural 'ideological state apparatus' that can be manipulated at will, but also a site of struggle related to broader societal conflicts. Hence, it is important to consider the role of the state as an arbiter of these conflicts. Since the state is an expression of social relations, and these relations imply domination of one group by another, the state must mediate between the efforts of labor to resist this domination and the demands of corporations for favorable treatment (Carnoy 1984). For these reasons, some authors claim that the state has its own agenda for higher education, which not always may coincide with the agenda of the dominant class [13]. The interpretation of the relationship between the economy and the polity from a reproductionist perspective (in which the latter is a sort of mirror of the former), once useful for analytical purposes, offers a limited understanding of the complexity of a social reality in which correspondences and conflicts between economic and social goals are simultaneously present. For instance, while the market economy seeks to maximize profit through competition, rewarding the efficient and punishing the inefficient, the political order pursues matters of national concern, such as democratic representation, environmental safety, job legislation (including minimum wage and sometimes the provisions for full employment), the provision of basic services (health, education, transportation, etc.) and the like to compensate for the inequality and amorality which derive from the logic of the market. For this reason, the state is not merely an instrument of the dominant class, but a regulator between production and reproduction.

Indeed, the state has the role of harmonizing economic and social goals. On the one hand, it must provide the conditions for capital accumulation. On the other hand, it must also provide the conditions for social reproduction, mainly through policies of legitimation and distribution fostering social harmony and consensus. The conflict between these two contradictory functions often results in one of the dilemmas of modern democracies, namely the clash between property and equality. Under the equality rationale, the state proclaims an

egalitarian access to educational services, as well as equal opportunity to succeed in them. However, differential access to property usually means the opposite, that is, unequal opportunities for access, performance and success. As discussed in the preceding chapter, expansion and contraction trends in higher education are occasional manifestations of this conflict.

At the national level, university restructuring, like any other process of social change, is shaped by complex and dynamic patterns of conflict and alliance among classes or fractions of classes. To some extent, the drive for, and the possibility of success of university restructuring in a given country is related to its particular pattern of capital accumulation. In many societies, the current pattern of accumulation is changing the nature of conflicts and alliances. The recently adopted neoliberal capital accumulation (or 'flexible accumulation') strategy by most developed and developing capitalist states is both a consequence of shifts in the relative power of social classes and conflicts between them as expressed in the state itself and a cause actively shaping the emergent class relations and conflicts. The growing gap between have and have-nots and the general weakening of the middle class, both in terms of quantitative contraction and political power, have had important ramifications for the university, an institution crucially linked to the production of the new middle class in Latin America and elsewhere [14]. Indeed, the leverage exercised by post-secondary students on influencing educational policy is partly related to the relative weight of the middle class in a given society.

In Latin America, whereas the 1918 Córdoba movement was closely linked to the ascendance of the middle class, the present university restructuring takes place in a context of decline. Moreover, as employers increasingly favor graduates of private universities, students of public universities tend to oppose lesser resistance to restructuring attempts. Obviously, the military variable makes a key difference in prompting a restructuring process without institutional resistance. The ease with which the Pinochet regime implemented university reform in Chile during the early 1980s compared to the difficulties currently faced by the democratic regimes of Argentina, Mexico or Nicaragua in their efforts to institute similar transformations are clear examples of this situation.

As was advanced above, at the national level, the main macro-transformation affecting the destiny of universities is the retrenchment of the state, a process accompanied by an increased presence of market principles in public institutions. The deep fiscal crisis affecting the public sector is addressed through adjustment programs consisting of a reduction of public expenditure, the sale of government-owned companies, deregulation, and the decline of state provision of social services in areas such as social services, health, housing, pensions, transportation and education, and their subsequent takeover by private enterprises. In short, the retrenchment of the state -understood as a reduction in the level of state provision at the expense of private provision- is inextricably linked to privatization. Under the ideology of privatization, which glorifies free-market capitalism and has faith in the natural efficiency of competition, the state is perceived as wasteful, inefficient and unproductive, whereas the private sector is seen as efficient, effective and responsive to the rapid changes occurring in the modern world (Walford 1991). The combined result of an economic restructuring that polarizes the occupational and wage structure, a social policy directed toward tax reductions for the upper classes and for industry, and the deterioration of underfunded public services, results in an intensification of a two-tiered education system (Therborn 1986, Levin and Rumberger 1990, Mishra 1990).

It is important to note that retrenchment does not mean elimination. As Offe (1990) points out, the embarrassing secret of the welfare state is that, while its impact upon capital accumulation may become negative, its abolition would be highly disruptive of the overall

social and political conditions necessary for continued capital accumulation. Negative impact on accumulation results from disincentives to investment (excessive taxation and regulation of capital) and to work (extensive social security provisions and labor protection legislation makes it easier to avoid undesirable jobs, obstruct the reserve army mechanism, and allows unions to obtain wage increases beyond productivity increases). However, the working of modern industrial society would be not possible in the absence of a welfare state; without it, the system would be in a state of exploding conflict and anarchy. The paradox is that, while capitalism cannot afford it, neither can it exist without the welfare state. Offe observes that this contradiction is systematically ignored by conservative critics, and notes that the flaw in *laissez faire* arguments is the emphasis that is placed on the first side of the equation and the neglect of the second one. Indeed, advocates of laissez-faire capitalism cannot conceal an inconsistency between their general ideological outlook and their unwillingness to resign from those special transfers, subsidies and social security schemes from which they personally derive benefits. Thus, although the discourse of many governments consists of a call to shift financial burdens and decision-making powers from the central state level to the sphere of the immediate participants, the relative economic strength of these participants determines how the respective burdens and benefits will eventually be distributed. This suggests that the preferred strategy is not of total but rather differential retrenchment.

Although state interventionism is declining, its withdrawal is not uniform. The greater the inequalities arising from the free market, the more necessary state intervention becomes in certain areas. In order to secure social discipline, neo-conservative governments rely on coercion; in order to remain in power through democratic elections, they rely on consent (Gramsci 1972, Miller 1980, Harvey 1989, Mishra 1990). In relation to discipline and coercion, it can be observed that in certain areas, such as labor control, state intervention did not diminish, but rather increased. At the same time, in order to build hegemony and create consensus, particularly under democratic regimes, neo-conservative ideologies have developed a strong element of populism. In fact, although *laissez faire* ideologies represent the interests of a particular group or class, they are skillfully articulated as representing the national interest. At the same time, since the constraints of electoral democracies constitute a limit to the extent and type of retrenchment, conservative regimes were often compelled to restrain a direct assault on social expenditures and services in light of adverse electoral consequences [15].

To gain a better understanding of differential retrenchment, it is useful to establish a distinction between universal (or 'indiscriminate') and selective (or 'targeted') services. Williamson (1990), in analyzing public expenditure priorities in Latin America, points out that Washington (particularly the World Bank) advises governments to eliminate indiscriminate subsidies in order to reduce deficits, but to replace them with 'targeted' subsidies. Williamson contends that Washington attributes more relevance to public expenditures which are regarded more as investments than as expenditures, and to those expected to protect vulnerable groups. Therefore, he concludes, investment on infrastructure, expenditures on health and education and subsidies benefiting the poor are less likely to be cut. However, it may be claimed that health care or education are universal services rather than 'targeted' ones, since they benefit almost the entire population. This is precisely the approach of Korpi (1983), followed by LeGrand and Winter (1987) and Mishra (1990). Although having internal differences, these three authors basically agree on the proposition that electoral concerns lead regimes to implement a differential retrenchment rather than a universal one. The rationale behind differential retrenchment is that programs which have a cross-class constituency are more likely to be maintained, given electoral considerations, than programs which serve only a specific constituency. Selective programs tend to divide the electorate, because some sectors perceive themselves as paying for another sector without enjoying the benefits. Universal services, in contrast, are perceived to benefit the large

majority of the population, and hence tend to unite. Thus, universal services which benefit a wide spectrum of the population (such as health care or basic education) are less vulnerable to retrenchment than programs which serve a particular constituency.

Whether education is considered a selective or a universal subsidy, one limitation of both approaches is that they do not discriminate among different educational levels. In other words, the debate on the character of education (universal or selective) is pointless if a distinction between basic and higher education is not made. Since the electoral significance of the clients of basic education (practically all parents of school-age children) is larger than the clients of higher education, a strategy of differential retrenchment is more likely to target services directed to middle and upper classes, such as the university than universal services like basic education. Moreover, mass education regulates the participation and non-participation of individuals in the labor market (particularly when purely repressive measures like punishment for begging and theft are not enough) justifies inequalities through meritocracy, reduces demographic growth, provides a more standardized labor force for international capital and increases consumption aspirations in a period of scarce markets.

This rationale is very clear in the aforementioned World Bank's recommendation to shift resources from higher to basic education, a program endorsed by 155 governments and an equal number of non-governmental organizations in a world conference held in Jomtien, Thailand, in March 1990 [16]. However, attempts to build consensus do not target the popular sectors only: as will be seen later, they also look for the support of intellectuals and opinion leaders. As Mishra noted, neo-conservative ideologies provide sophisticated economic and social justification for the upward transfer of income. In terms of university policies, arguments that justify tuition fees by appealing to the notion of equity are a good example of this. The notion of differential retrenchment challenges understandings of welfare state retrenchment which are not sensitive to the dynamics of change, taking into account distributional conflict and class struggle. In fact, differential retrenchment helps the state to avoid a unified and homogeneous protest against its policies. For that reason, differential retrenchment is understood as a 'divide and rule' strategy based on exploiting existing differences among groups.

Mishra (1990:97) stated that the dualization of the economy created by neo-conservative policies in the USA and in England "has not cost these regimes electorally", and wrongly foresaw that they would remain politically viable. He argued that the widespread electoral support garnered by these regimes was due to their great achievements in terms of economic growth, price stability and -to some extent- economic modernization. A similar argument has been recurrently used to explain the popularity of Menem in Argentina. However, as suggested in footnote 15, Mishra's analysis holds true for the short and medium term, but not necessarily for the long term. In other welfare states (i.e. Sweden, Austria, Canada) where the social costs of capitalist economic development have not been allowed to fall on those least able to shoulder them, and inequality has not dramatically increased, the political regimes are still in power. In those countries, the state has not been willing to risk electoral unpopularity by embarking on a neo-conservative social agenda even though pressure from business to move in that direction has been strong. In Argentina, the decision of the Minister of Education to dismiss a top functionary renowned for his confrontational attitude towards the university [17], shows that even when the university is considered a target, diplomacy and tact are respected for the sake of political legitimacy.

b) 'Welfare state' and 'welfare society': from right to disentitlement

Some analysts (i.e. Rein and Rainwater 1986, Rose 1986) reject approaches which equate social welfare with state welfare, and advance instead the notion of a 'welfare society'. By

using this alternative concept, they claim to present a holistic approach to welfare, which examines all forms of social protection regardless of the sector in which they take place. This perspective assumes the existence of a sort of 'welfare pluralism', in which the sum of goods and services which satisfy basic needs and guarantee social protection derives from a variety of sources, including the public sector (namely the state) and the private sector (business, non-profit organizations, charity, kinship networks, households, etc.). Under the logic of 'welfare pluralism', if one sector diminishes its provision of welfare, another sector will increase its share. While a redistribution of the roles played by suppliers may take place, the final result (the general level of welfare enjoyed by society) will remain the same. In other words, these authors contend that if the state withdraws from its role as a supplier of welfare, the private sector will increase its effort to compensate for the loss. In the shift from the public to the private sphere and the new redistribution of functions, welfare pluralists do not foresee any negative implications for equality. For instance, they would argue that the state's withdrawal from pre-schooling or seniors' care does not create inequalities, because it affects everybody alike. Those who can pay a private service, will pay and those who cannot will receive the indulgence of relatives or charitable organizations.

However, as Mishra (1990) has illustrated, shifting the care of children, disabled or elderly from the public sector to the household is likely to have implications for gender inequality. He points out that the main shortcoming of welfare pluralists is their inability to make an analytical distinction between privatization and disentitlement. It is one thing to privatize, that is, withdraw public services and public commitment to maintaining standards, without undermining entitlement or while ensuring that equity considerations are met. It is quite another thing to decentralize the service in such a way that entitlement is unaffected. For Mishra, if the withdrawal of the state leaves the provision of welfare up to the market and civil society to make up for the decline, the service becomes either a commodity (through client fees) or uncertain (because it is voluntary and not compulsory). From a juridical perspective, in this new situation people do not have any right or entitlement to assistance from private sources, be it from their employers, their older siblings or a philanthropic group.

In the case of higher education, a similar situation occurs with the WB proposal to offset the negative impact of fees with student aid programs. If a shift from institutional subsidies to individual subsidies takes place, students who cannot afford tuition become automatically disentitled. Opponents of privatization argue that in this case students will not have any right or entitlement to free education, and they should be grateful for whatever help they receive, be it from the state or from private sources. Likewise, the state and private sources may devise as many conditionalities and bureaucracies as desired in order to provide an aid package or a loan, deterring low income students from accessing universities. Even if access to free education continues to be a right, with growth of privatization the state will be less able to procure taxes and hence less able to provide good quality educational services to those who cannot afford a private education. Indeed, the agenda of the private education lobby is to convince their users of the unfairness of paying twice for their education, and subsequently to persuade parents, politicians and the media about the adequacy of vouchers. This agenda to divert tax money to private education, and the creation of a deeper gap between public and private schools is no secret plot, but rather an explicit goal publicly stated by its advocates [18].

4. Institutional dimension

An analysis of the university as a specific institution poses several problems. First, the university's unique institutional features (which reflect traditions and practices related to autonomy) makes inappropriate those theoretical and methodological approaches used to analyze other social institutions such as business firms, unions or state bureaucracies.

Likewise, works originated in the tradition of sociology of education tend to concentrate on the dominant ideology (and, more recently, on resistance to it) but rarely analyze competing ideologies within the middle class, the main constituency of public universities. Another problem is the absence of a distinctive formulation concerning the role of this institution in modern society. For different reasons, there is much less consensus about the role of university than about many other institutions. Not only the public is unclear about what universities do and should do, but also the universities themselves have trouble in defining their purpose. According to its three tradiuonal functions (teaching, research and extension), the role of university is to provide high quality professional training, generate information through research, and create and disseminate culture. However, the state's expectations include a) the production of ideologically neutral 'human capital', professionally trained and equipped with practical knowledge; b) the training of an intellectual elite to occupy the upper echelons of the public and private productive system; c) the training of a small nucleus of scientists for research development and innovation; d) the constitution of hegemonic groups and the training of the ruling classes for their tasks of leadership, and e) the cultural and practical training of the masses and the workers; and f) providing the armed forces with the academic and technical training needed for their new leadership functions in society (Kaplan 1976, Latapi 1980).

Universities are also expected to impart cognitive and technical skills to students and communities, to provide advisory services to society and government, to sharpen lifestyles and leadership qualities, to produce the necessary intelligentsia for a technological civilization, and to contain youth unemployment (Dore 1976, Chitnis 1985, Winchester 1986, Katz 1986, Cochrane 1986, Sarukhán 1990, Omari 1991). A brief examination of these and other expectations indicates that universities are supposed simultaneously to pursue truth, the growth and dissemination of knowledge, academic quality, student upbringing, national development, rational links with industry, social justice, high technology, community service among other goals. As was noted above, the university can be analyzed from an organizational or from a socio-historical perspective. The organizational approach assumes that universities constitute closed systems which have their own dynamics and a low responsiveness to external forces. Hence, it rejects general theorizing across major societal sectors, and proposes instead micro-analysis of particular realms which focus on three basic elements: work (the way tasks are conceived and arranged), belief (the primary norms and values of the main actors of the system) and authority (the distribution of legitimate power throughout the system).

The possibilities and limits of university change are generally explained by the internal structures of work, belief and authority. The issue of power is recognized, but emphasis is usually placed on power relations within the system, omitting larger societal structures of power. In socio-historical approaches, particularly those grounded in political economy perspectives, the university is considered as an agency in which different social groups attempt to achieve hegemony [19], that is, to control the institution in order to impose throughout society a certain world-view consistent with their objective interests. From this perspective, it is important to analyze the interactions of public universities with the state, private institutions, societal actors and social classes, and examine changes within the system in the light of those interactions. Da Veiga (1981), for instance, identifies three types of linkages: a) with the productive system (through the training of highly specialized personnel and through the development of science and technology); b) with the structures of domination and authority (through the training of elites and the legitimation of social roles), and c) with structures of social control (through the legitimation of particular theories of social reality as well as the dissemination of knowledge, values and attitudes which enhance -or challenge- domination).

The university-state relationship is extremely complicated, particularly in periods of economic crisis. On the one hand, universities depend on state financing, and this implies a large degree of compliance to state authority. On the other hand, as a result of the specific functions performed by universities, they are allowed to enjoy a larger degree of autonomy than many other public institutions. This relation is further complicated in countries where university actors tend to engage in political struggle. In these cases, as clashes between the academic (both students and professors) and political elite intensify, universities are often disregarded by the government, which has the easy weapon of financial punishment. In some occasions, as it happened in many Latin American and African universities, this situation leads to censorship, academic repression, closure of universities, detention and deportation of staff and students, etc. Under strong authoritarian regimes, state repression results in demoralization and extensive brain drain. While gaining political control, the state pays a high price through a lowering of competence in scholarship, science and professional preparation (Clark 1983).

In the analysis of the state-university conflict, neither consensus nor conflict paradigms by themselves are useful to understand the complexity of this social reality. These approaches tend to stress that society is either entirely conflictual or entirely harmonious, overlooking the fact that it is an arena of both conflict and cooperation. While the consensus approach ignores social conflict (particularly class conflict), the conflict approach leaves out the functional and institutional mechanisms which hold together common interests and values (Mishra 1990) [20]. Likewise, both traditional functionalist and social reproduction theories fail to fully capture the conflictual character of the educational system, the economy and the state. As was advanced above, *correspondence* theory is insufficient to understand conflict and resistance in educational agencies, because, by stressing a causal relation between social relations and educational practices, it tends to perceive both the state and the educational system as one monolithic structure (Anyon 1981, Aronowitz & Giroux 1985). If such an approach has proved insufficient to analyze the school (where state control is particularly forceful), it is even more inappropriate to examine universities, sites characterized by a high degree of institutional autonomy.

However, as reported in the previous chapter, this autonomy is increasingly constrained by the logic of economic restructuring, state interventionism and drastic alterations in university life itself. In summary, the university is neither a mere state apparatus nor an entirely autonomous institution; rather it is both at the same time. On the one hand, the fact that universities are undertaking similar transformations in so many countries indicates that they are closely interconnected with the state and the economy. On the other hand, the variations in pace, scope and depth of the undergoing changes for each particular institution indicate a relative degree of autonomy. Indeed, the conflict over university restructuring results from the role that this institution plays as an arena of contestation among powerful social groups in the larger society. Moreover, as the Argentinean case shows, the intramural struggle goes beyond academic disputes, to include broader political and ideological confrontations in the larger society.

As advanced above, the third macro-process that is shaping the context in which university reforms are taking place is the increased transformation of culture and technology into commodities. The process of commodification of knowledge has been described by Jhally (1989) as the real subsumption of culture into the capitalist mode of production. Drawing on the earlier work of Adorno and Horkheimer, Jhally distinguishes between *formal* and *real* subsumption. The formal subsumption of culture occurs when cultural institutions "become vital for the functioning of the economic system without taking on the structures of the economic system" (p. 72). Indeed, although capitalism invests in educational institutions, so far they have been conceived as institutions of cultural reproduction rather than as economic

institutions. As Weiler (1984:21) states, "the production of knowledge is one of several interlocking elements for the consolidation and legitimation of the existing institutional order at the international and transnational level". In other words, Jhally argues that under formal subsumption the purpose of the investment in cultural institutions is not to make money directly but to foster an ideological environment in which money can be made. On the other hand, the real subsumption of culture occurs when cultural elements (meanings) begin to be produced as commodities and when cultural institutions are viewed, not just as a means of reproducing inequitable social relations of production, but as economic enterprises in their own right.

An interesting paradox of post-fordist capitalism is its increasing organization through geographical dispersion, which leads to the simultaneous need for centralization and for flexible responses in labor markets, labor processes and consumer markets. This has resulted in the complete reorganization of the global financial system, with the simultaneous formation of conglomerates of extraordinary global power and the decentralization of financial activities, and in extensive institutional and technological innovation. At the same time, knowledge itself has become a key commodity, to be produced and sold in a competitive environment. This element, which has been the result of the importance of immediate access to information for successful and profitable decision-making (from government policies to market trends to scientific and technical know-how) in a quick-changing world, has great implications for university restructuring (Harvey 1990).

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the commodification of cultural elements. The escalating erosion of traditional cultural institutions, the increasing importance of information in industry and services, and the proliferation of communication technologies, have combined to enable new markets for cultural commodities to open up at a staggering pace. It is important to note that this process is not only affecting higher education, but other educational levels as well. Indeed, if current trends continue, the whole public education system may shift from being a right to just one more commercial product in a diverse market. In this unprecedented scenario, parents are going to fight among themselves to get the best use for their vouchers instead of raising tax-support for public schools, and the ideas of excellence and equity for all will be replaced by rivalry, social fragmentation and utilitarian individualism (Kozol 1993). In this context, many activities related to entertainment, education, training, health, child rearing, senior's programs, counselling, religion, etc,. which were all once produced as *use values* are now produced in assorted culture and service factories for exchange on the market (Pannu et al. 1994). At the post-secondary level, the commodification of knowledge is particularly evident in the intensified wave of partnerships between universities (producers of knowledge) and private corporations (purchasers of knowledge) that are systematically encouraged by the state. Newson (1992:18) notes that

> These new partnerships are accomplished through various types of contracts and collaborative arrangements which are oriented toward the production and distribution of intellectual 'property' and are based, directly or indirectly, on the exchange of financial support for specified quantities or types of knowledge, in other words, of commodified knowledge.

As knowledge becomes private property, the pattern of the production, distribution and consumption of information and cultural goods becomes drastically altered, an issue that causes apprehension among a variety of individuals and agencies. For instance, in 1985 the US Council of Library Resources raised the concern that

> Uncritical adherence to the concept of information as a commodity will distort the agendas of institutions and disciplines alike...Public interest in the principle of open access must appropriately influence the structure of the information system and its components. It is certain that the information needs of society cannot be defined by the marketplace alone. [21]

This conflict between societal needs and private interests has been also addressed by Harvey (1990:160), who refers to the "uncomfortable transitions of many universities in the advanced capitalist world from guardianship of knowledge and wisdom to ancillary production of knowledge for corporate capital". Indeed, the entry of the university into the realm of commodity production has entailed a dramatic restructuring in the way it conducts its activities. With the commodification of culture, the university becomes a cultural factory where individual entitlements are replaced by private investment, use values by exchange values, and knowledge is prioritized according to its market value rather than its academic value. Knowledge discovery and knowledge dissemination processes are designed to ensure that specified and pre-determined demands of customers (purchasers) are satisfied. To facilitate this, knowledge is constructed into discrete, measurable bundles of information that can be bought and sold for specified amounts of money. In this new context, the links between knowledge and power, and between the generation and the application of knowledge, become more evident than ever (Washington and McArthur 1983).

The commodification of knowledge brings important consequences to many facets of university life. This applies not only to research (through the aforementioned flourishing partnerships with industry) but also in teaching and extension, activities in which information is increasingly restricted to those who can afford it. As the commercialization of university activities deepens, major changes are going to occur in the creation and distribution of knowledge, in organizational practices, and in ethical options in research and development. Access to information will be more controlled by private companies which own data banks, and access to them will become more expensive. Likewise, the intellectual products of the university, once easily open to debate and dissemination, will be hidden from colleagues (who become competitors) and from the public. Preliminary results will be subjected to secrecy until they hit the market. This implies the replacement of co-operative learning and collegiality by individualism and competition (which delay the discovery process), and the growth of conflicts of interest such as the ones mentioned in chapter 2.

Furthermore, copyright laws governing the photocopying of classroom reading materials are increasingly restricting free access to knowledge, and expensive property rights may inhibit the printing of published materials for student use [22]. As a result of this, some departments are developing their own textbooks, written by their own staff, with the risk of parochialism and insularism. Since these textbooks allow departments to make profits in a period of cuts, department councils can impose their compulsory use, even when some professors complain that such a policy harms academic freedom [23]. At the same time, tenure is going to be challenged by performance-based contracts, and academic staff will concentrate their efforts on well-paid research activities rather than in teaching. Moreover, as some universities focus on capital-intensive research and others engage mainly in teaching, a potential divorce between these interconnected activities is likely to occur. Undergraduate courses may emphasize selective job skills developed in accordance with specific demands of employers and customers, and graduate students may be sponsored by companies in exchange for specific research outcomes. In short, the commodification of knowledge is challenging universities to reshape most of their established values, and to develop a new entrepreneurial ethos which is not always compatible with the nature of academic production (Dickson 1988, Buchbinder and Newson 1990, Wood 1992).

According to the framework presented in this chapter, any comprehensive analysis of university change should examine simultaneously its international, national and institutional dimensions, taking into account economic, political, social and cultural developments. In the final chapter, which discusses the implications of the empirical findings presented in the thesis, an attempt is made to apply such framework to Latin American higher education, with particular references to the Argentinean case. As will be shown in the following chapters, the

international, national and institutional dimensions of university restructuring are not isolated compartments. Rather, they are interconnected by a variety of institutional and non-institutional channels.

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[1] This argument was advanced by Kedar Mathema, Vice Chancellor of Tributhan University, Nepal. He contends that the reform package adopted by that university, based on privatization, tuition fees and selective admission policies was developed solely by democratic governing bodies of the university, with no influence at all by external agencies such as the World Bank. In spite of the parallelism between WB recommendations for higher education and the reform package developed in that university, he claims that the university needed to convince the WB about the necessity of these reforms in order to obtain a $20 million loan from that institution (personal interview, Edmonton, October 3, 1993).

[2] For example, while art professors may not intentionally have been preparing their students for careers in business and science, the subjects they taught were perceived as essential by the business sector (Axelrod 1986).

[3] Although in Argentina university change has been affected by global economic and ideological factors, expansion and contraction of enrollments have been greatly affected by local political conditions. There, expansion and contraction of enrollments have usually operated independently of expansion and contraction of budgets. Indeed, the pace and periods in which enrollment contracted and expanded were highly dependent upon the restrictive and permissive admission policies implemented by military and democratic governments, respectively.

[4] For this reason, Cerych and Sabatier (1986) distinguish between 'reform' and 'response'. For them, 'reform' is something someone wants to do in relation to a set of values, while 'response' is something someone must do in reaction to a situation. Although both involve change, in the first case change is active and by choice, whereas in the second change is reactive and of necessity.

[5] In developing countries, the equivalent of the retrenchment of the welfare state is the retrenchment of the subsidiary or interventionist state. It is important to note that state interventionism is lessening in the economy but not necessarily in education. While less regulation and more market dynamics are encouraged in labor relations, there is an increase of state interventionism in educational agencies. However, for the sake of synthesis, from now on I will refer to this phenomenon, in either developed or developing countries, as state retrenchment.

[6] With the European market, the commercial divides among 12 of the world's richest countries, with 350 million people and 30% of the GDP, has vanished. Likewise, the North American Free Trade Agreement is linking 3 countries with 370 million people and 31% of the world's wealth, and eventually is going to extend to the rest the continent. In this context, goods and services will be ever more inclined to flow to places where they earn the best returns, not necessarily where governments would like them to go. The $1 trillion a day that is now traded round the clock has tripled from the figure of 1986. The value of world trade in 1993 is about $8 trillion, a figure 20 times greater in real terms than it was in 1950, and equal to one third of gross world product. Foreign direct investment, amounting to some $2 trillion worldwide, is courted by countries throughout the world. The regular flow of companies, technologies, products and parts between countries undermines the ability of national governments to control their economies or even to define national economic goals. In the new global economy, the "nationality" of products and firms is difficult to assess. For instance, the new jet that US-based Boeing Co. is launching in 1993 has components from suppliers in a dozen foreign countries (Rohwer 1993).

[7] Burger King has opened 'Academies' in 14 US cities, and IBM and Apple are contemplating the idea of opening schools for profit. Whittle Communications (a corporation largely owned by Time Warner and the British Associated Newspapers) provides satellite dish and TV sets to schools in exchange for 12 minutes of daily broadcasting (10 minutes of news and two of advertisement) to more than 10,000 schools, with an audience of 5.4 million students (one third of the total US secondary school population). In addition to this enterprise, known as Channel One, Whittle Communications is also planning to open 1,000 profit-making schools serving two million children within the next ten years. Moreover, US corporations are spending upwards of $40 billion each year, approaching the total annual expenditures of all America's four-year and graduate colleges and universities, to train and educate their employees. In the mid-eighties, Bell and Howell had 30,000 students in its post-secondary network, and ITT had 25 postsecondary proprietary institutions. It has also been reported that AT&T performs more education and training functions than any university in the world; moreover, "corporate learning centers are more modern, sleek, and up-to-date than

traditional colleges with classrooms... they surpass many universities in their sophistication both in offerings and in the delivery systems as well" (Levy 1986, Schiller 1989:88, Kozol 1993, Apple 1993).

[8] Family capitalism was based on the great family enterprises which emerged during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Kinship, ownership, and control were synonymous, and dynastic marriage was a means of corporate merger. Near the turn of the century, the power of family capitalism declined in favor of corporate rule, giving way to the emergence of managerial capitalism. Upper-class dominance was displaced by corporate interests, while the firm as an extension of the founding family transformed into a new entity with its own internal logic. This transformation permitted the growth of very large firms, the creation of new forms of multidivisional structures and administrative coordination, the formation of a professional management and career hierarchy within the firm, and the shift of decision-making power from the family to trained managers (Useem 1984).

[9] Given this diagnosis, the influence of top corporations on public policies has concentrated on three areas: a) government reductions in social spending; b) dismantling agencies that regulate business; c) scaling back programs beneficial to labor (Useem 1984:195).

[10] For a good examination of the IMF-World Bank historical partnership since the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 to the present day see The Economist, October 12th, 1991. Under the title "Sisters in the Wood", The Economist devoted that entire issue to this topic. Most of the adjustment programs imposed by international agencies through their conditionality clauses in loan or aid agreements have a short-term emphasis, expecting that the debt problem can be solved by reaching balance of payments equilibrium and closing the fiscal gap (Ficher and Husain 1990, Reimers 1991). With the implementation of neoliberal policies, the state withdraws its responsibility for administering public resources to promote social justice, replacing it with a blind faith in the market and the hope that the charity of its growth will generate a spillover to help the poor. Skeptical observers of state reduction argue that the main issue is not the size of the state but the type of its interventions and decisions, promoting welfare and equality in a context of efficacy and efficiency.

[11] The subordination of sovereign nation-states to these two institutions has been labeled by Meller (1991) as the 'double conditionality'.

[12] In the words of Offe and Ronge (1982:250), "the state does not defend the interests of one class, but the *common* interests of all members of a *capitalist class society* "

[13] Clark (1983), for example, argues that the state wants from the higher education system at least three types of benefits: socio-economic (i.e.: professional training), cultural (i.e.: national identity), and political (i.e.: good citizenship and conformity).

[14] For a discussion of the linkage between university and the middle class in Canada, see Axelrod (1989 and 1990).

[15] While in the short and medium term these policies captivated the popular vote (as the re-elections of Reagan, Bush and Thatcher indicate), they were unable to secure long term support. The erosion of public services, as well as the drastic decline of efforts to prevent poverty and promote employment eventually put both Bush and Thatcher out of office.

[16] See "Meeting basic learning needs: a vision for the 1990s". World Conference on Education for All. Jomtien, Thailand, 1990.

[17] This official said to the Minister that he had not time and energy to respect forms and diplomacy: "I put on my war uniform, and went to the battle field, because that's the only way to change the Argentine obsolete university. However, it seems that the Minister understood the situation in a different light" (personal interview).

[18] See the statements of Chris Whittle and John Chubb in Kozol (1993:8 and 9).

[19] In Gramsci, hegemony refers to the capability of a group to exercise control over the society through its moral and intellectual leadership, and to establish its particular worldview as all-inclusive and universal.

[20] For Mishra, cooperation is usually present on issues related to efficiency, production, quality and the like, that is, in the performance of functions which are necessary to maintain the system alive and competitive. Conflict appears when some groups, classes or institutions perceive an unfairness in the distribution of work in a given system, or in the access to resources, goods or services. In short, Mishra argues that productive issues tend to unite, while distributive and normative issues tend to divide, a distinction that is present in Durkheim's view of society as an interplay of competition for rewards and group co-operation for collective ends.

[21] "Scholarship, Research and Access to Information", a statement by the Council on Library Resources, Washington, DC, Jan. 1985. Cited in Schiller (1989).

[22] This is already happening in many universities. Under current rules, if a university wants to print previously published materials, the institution must pay copyright fees to the publisher. This applies even in the case where the author is employed by the university, in which instance the work was produced in university facilities, using university resources, and enjoying university salaries. The implication is that the university is paying twice for the same product; the ensuing cost is likely to be transferred to the student. As a matter of fact, this circumstance occurred in the preparation of a textbook for Educational Foundation students, at the University of Alberta.

[23] This 'hypothetical' situation already took place in the Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, in 1993.

CHAPTER IV. HIGHER EDUCATION IN ARGENTINA. CONFLICT AND CONTEXT

This chapter presents the context of the conflict over university restructuring that will be analyzed in detail in the next two chapters, and is organized in four sections. The first section presents a brief historical review of university change in Latin America, and the main challenges faced by Latin American universities today. The second section provides a general overview of the Argentinean higher education system. The third section describes the institutional features of the case study, the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). Finally, the fourth section succinctly depicts the conflict and the characteristics of participating actors.

Section 1. The Latin American university. Background and present situation

The Latin American university is an offspring of the Napoleonic model and the 1918 Reform. Indeed, among the four modes of authority described by Clark (1983) -the Continental, the British, the American (or US) and the Japanese-, Latin American universities are closer to the first one, that is, the European university based on the Napoleonic model. This model was adopted by most Latin American countries at the beginning of the 19th century, when they became independent nation-states. Whereas it conserved some features of the colonial university, the Napoleonic model reigned practically unaltered for a century, until the 1918 Reform that originated in Córdoba (Argentina) ignited university change throughout Latin America. The Napoleonic-Reform model, in turn, prevailed during most of the 20th century, even though it allowed for an increasing participation of private universities in the higher education system. According to Levy (1986), private universities arrived in three successive waves: religious institutions, elite universities and non-elite universities.

By the 1980s, in terms of public-private organization of higher education, two extremes could be observed. On the left was Cuba, the only country still loyal to the traditional Napoleonic model, holding state monopoly over free, public, mass education [1]. On the other extreme was Chile, characterized by a private-public homogeneity similar to the US model. In between stood most Latin American countries, characterized by a public-private distinctiveness. During the 1990s, these 'in between' countries are undergoing a deep process of university restructuring, moving in the direction of the Chilean model. In these countries, the view of higher education as a public good, a social right and an exclusive responsibility of the state prevalent since independence is being replaced by a view of higher education as a marketplace, in which private units can compete among themselves and with public institutions over the provision of services. Simultaneously, the principle of autonomy is being challenged by increasing pressure for state control.

The introduction of private universities into the higher education system can be considered the first move away from the traditional Napoleonic (state-monopoly) model to the American model, and current trends indicate a second step in that direction. As will be described in this section, this phenomenon can be conceived as a 'fourth wave' in the privatization of higher education. Whereas the debate over the first step was about whether or not to allow the existence of a private sector in higher education, today's debate is over whether or not to allow private elements within the public sector itself. This section also suggests that international elements play a vital role in these major shifts. The changes occurring in the 1960s in Latin America were partly influenced by the Atcon Report, a document written in the context of the Alliance for Progress. In the 1990s, in the context of structural adjustment policies, Latin American university policy is largely influenced by the recommendations emanating from the World Bank and related agencies.

1. From church monopoly to state monopoly. The Napoleonic model.

The origins of the Napoleonic model in Latin America can be traced to the period of independence from Spain and Portugal, at the beginning of the 19th. century. During the colonial period, most Latin American universities were controlled by the church. At the time of independence, the church lost control to the state. Two main reasons appear to account for this. The first relates to the separation of powers between the church and the state that took place in Europe. Indeed, the church-state conflict that arose in Spain and France during the second half of the eighteen century had also implications in Latin America. Carlos III in Spain and Napoleon in France increased state control over the selection of administrators, curricula, etc., and moved toward a new centralization and bureaucratization of higher education, wresting it from the hands of the church. The second reason for state appropriation was the emergence of new ideologies associated with the French and the American revolutions. Liberalism in the United States and the Enlightenment in France, in combination with other ideologies like the Masonry, advocated principles and ideals -such as positivism, rationalism and scientific progress- which were perceived incompatible with faith and religion.

In the early 1800s, after independence, Latin American countries built higher education systems that emulated the Continental model set up by Napoleon to gain the monopoly over national education previously enjoyed by the church. One reason the Latin American state imitated the Napoleonic model rather than the US model is that, in those years, France was regarded as the world's cultural centre, and its national university system seemed more relevant for the few universities existing in Latin America at that time than the diverse US system. Indeed, the great concern for national unification made a centralized system controlled by the state suitable [2]. When the system started to grow, unlike in the US, institutional proliferation represented more "replication of standardized form" than "pluralist diversity" (Levy 1986). Another reason is that Latin America's public sector traditionally adopted European models, while the private sector adopted US models. In the traditional Napoleonic model, university and its faculties have a low degree of autonomy in terms of policy making, which is highly influenced by the state bureaucracy.

The Napoleonic and the US model are based on different funding arrangements, a situation that has consequences in the areas of governance and function (Levy 1986) [3]. While in the Napoleonic model public institutions are funded almost exclusively by the state, usually by the national government, in the US model state financing is supplemented by business, endowment, and individual (both alumni and client) contributions. Moreover, the US model allows for state subsidization of private universities, a feature that is almost nonexistent in the Napoleonic model. Likewise, in the Napoleonic model, a great proportion of graduates find employment in the state bureaucracy (Levy 1986). Since in the Napoleonic model the state is the main source of funding, it is not surprising to find in this model a strong influence of government bureaucracies on university governance. However, since the 1918 Reform, the power of the state to impose decisions at will is limited by a high degree of institutional autonomy. On matters of policy, the state has, thus, found it necessary to negotiate with the academic community.

2. The 1918 Córdoba Reform

The tremendous impact of the 1918 Córdoba Reform on Latin American universities -and subsequently even on the 1960s student movements in Europe and the USA- has been extensively analyzed in the literature (i.e. Mariátegui 1928, Del Mazo 1957, Lipset 1966, Walter 1968, Liebman et al. 1972, Cúneo 1974, Smith 1973, Ribeiro 1976, Portantiero 1978, Maier and Weatherhead 1979, Cano 1985, Levy 1986, Delich 1988, Pérez Lindo 1989, Tunnermann 1990, Brunner 1990, Vior 1990, Mollis 1990). The objectives of the Córdoba

Reform were promptly adopted by student organizations in most Latin American nations and eventually enacted into law in many universities. In the same year the reform statutes enacted into law at Córdoba were extended to the University of Buenos Aires and later to other Argentinean universities. Its principles were included first in the 1920 manifesto of FUA (the national organization representing students enrolled in all Argentinean universities) [4], and subsequently endorsed by the International Student Congress on University Reform held in Mexico City in 1921, with the participation of delegates from Latin America, United States, Europe, and Asia. European and US student leaders of the 1960s movement also used the ideas that emanated from the Córdoba Reform to build their university and social projects.

The 1918 Reform, the result of an original student movement for university and societal democratization, has been characterized as an historic legend, and as a grand emancipatory epic that opened a heroic cycle in the development of the Latin American university (Mariátegui 1928, Brunner 1990). Student leaders of the 1918 Reform asserted that the solution of educational problems should be related to the solution of the entire national problem, which implies a profound economic and political reform of society and the state. They were explicit about the ideal relationship between the university, the state and the national society, and allied themselves with workers' organizations. As a matter of fact, the Córdoba movement was endorsed by labor unions, leftist political parties, liberal groups and important newspapers, while opposition was based on the church and conservative institutions (Del Mazo 1957, Liebman et al. 1972).

The prevailing ideology of the 1918 Reform was leftism and progressivism, with a strong anti-private, anti-military and anti-imperialist tendency. For instance, the 1920 FUA manifesto was the first public condemnation of imperialism issued by an organized group in Latin America. At that time, the student movement was advocating the secularization and democratization of universities, which up to that point formed a very elitist, traditional system highly influenced by the Church. Indeed, student leaders criticized the previous university model as oligarchic, anachronistic and as a school of castes, and proposed instead to organize an autonomous, self-governing university, able to establish solid linkage with the community in order to contribute to the solution of its main problems. Reformists expressed a passionate commitment for democracy, both within and outside of the university, and presented themselves as the moral conscience of society (Ribeiro 1971, Liebman et al. 1972, Cúneo 1974, Levy 1986, Delich 1988, Pérez Lindo 1990, Brunner 1990, Tunnermann 1990). The most important features of the Reform, as expressed by these authors, can be summarized as follows:

a) institutionalization of student participation in university councils, in a three-party system including professors and alumni (co-governance).
b) a linkage between student politics and national politics, to mobilize the university toward the solution of economic, social and political problems [5].
c) a concern for university extension, particularly to courses for workers leading to the development of fraternal bonds with the proletariat.
d) tuition-free education, conceived as an instrument to achieve democratization of access, expanding enrollments to include all academically qualified applicants and replacing the elitist, oligarchic and archaic 19th century university by a mass university.
e) a defense of institutional autonomy with respect to the state [6].
f) institutionalization of mechanisms to protect academic freedom, including the implementation of "free teaching" (docencia libre) to ensure academic pluralism and to break the monopoly of teaching enjoyed by senior professors (catedráticos).
g) promotion of new ideas, innovative methods of teaching, changes in exam systems, optional classroom attendance, original research, and a rejection of dogmatism, all leading to the replacement of theology by positivist disciplines.
h) selection of faculty through open, competitive examinations in order to counteract nepotism and patronage, and promotion of professors on the basis of merit and achievement rather than seniority.

i) the enlargement and diversification of professional training through the establishment of new professional schools.
j) an understanding of university life as a truly communitarian experience, therefore encouraging the development of a population of full-time professors and full time students.

By securing cost-free and open access to the universities, the 1918 Reform constituted an unequivocal pledge for university democratization, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In the five year period after the reform, enrollment grew approximately 80% relative to the previous quinquennium. During the same period, graduation rates increased 244% (Mollis 1990). The success of the reform was not fortuitous. It was the result of a variety of social, political and economic forces operating at the international, national and institutional levels. At the international level, three major events -World War I, the Mexican Revolution and the Soviet Revolution- had important repercussions on the political and cultural attitudes of Argentine students. The war created disillusionment with Europe and shifted students' focus towards their own region [7]. The Mexican and Bolshevik Revolutions represented a new age of equality and social justice, a triumph of workers and young intellectuals over a decadent oligarchy. As a result, reformist students attempted to shape the university in tune with the new social forces, rebuilding it as a democratic and modern institution which would lead the way to national progress (Liebman et al. 1972).

At the national level, the 1918 Reform represented the political aspirations of an emergent middle class, anxious to access positions up to then exclusively enjoyed by the high bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. Hence, the Reform was inextricably linked to the rise of Modernism and the Welfare State, a period of optimism and progress for the burgeoning middle class. Indeed, the turn of the century witnessed a rapid expansion of the middle class [8], and this growth was reflected in government reform in a variety of areas such as universal franchise, a progressive income tax, shorter working hours, liberalized retirement benefits, the abolition of child labor and the formal separation of church and state. As a matter of fact, the Radical government [9], headed by President Irigoyen, provided vital support to the student movement, even when this support resulted in confrontations between the executive power on the one hand, and some politicians and university authorities, on the other [10].

At the institutional level, reformists early recognized the feeling of alienation among university students, and were very skillful in articulating demands for scholastic relevance and social activism (Brunner 1990). The reform was the result of a mismatch between an obsolete, archaic and authoritarian post-colonial university, and the aspirations for a more democratic and positivist model, better in tune with the requirements of industrialization. It was spearheaded by a student body that perceived itself as the vanguard of a libertarian, urban, scientific and rationalistic modernity.

3. The cessation of state monopoly

During most of this century higher education in Latin America has been a state monopoly. In recent years, however, this situation has changed rapidly. Whereas at the beginning of the century only two countries (Colombia and Chile) out of twenty allowed private universities, by the mid-seventies the proportion reversed, with only two countries (Cuba and Uruguay) maintaining an exclusively public system of higher education. When, in the mid-eighties, the first private university was opened in Uruguay, Cuba was left as the only country in the region with no private universities.

The first Latin American private universities (most of them Catholic) emerged between 1930 and 1950. They were the result of the renewed power of the Church, after almost two centuries of continuous decline. But the trend towards privatization -in a direction toward the American model- was particularly vigorous between 1955 and 1976 (year in which Costa Rica

finally broke its public monopoly), with the creation of a multitude of private universities that were mostly secular. By the 1980s, in the 18 countries that permitted private universities, the private share accounted for about one of every three enrollments.

Different explanations have been advanced for the astonishing growth of private universities in the second part of this century. While some tend to focus on international pressures, others emphasize domestic factors. Levy (1982 and 1986), for instance, acknowledges the existence of international pressures, but his analysis of the emergence of private universities concentrates on domestic dynamics. More precisely, it emphasizes what he calls the "public sector failure", an argument that has been also applied by Burton Clark (1983:167) and Margaret Archer (1982:15). Levy contends that the main explanation for the growth of private universities (elite and secular) [11] lies within the public sector. He argues that the 'flight' of many students from public to private universities was the result of disenchantment resulting from the failure of the former to provide the type of service that these students demanded. In his account, the more significant failures that account for the exodus were social, political and economic in nature [12].

The 'social failure' of the public sector is linked to the perceived inability of public universities -as a result of expansion- to maintain the degree of class differentiation that upper classes demand. Since a transition from 'elite' to 'mass' university means lower average SES, as soon as the ascendant sectors of the middle class consolidate their position in society, they withdraw their support for the principle of universal admission and begin to stress the doctrine of individual choice, enrolling their children in private universities. Large expansion also means declining academic standards, and this, combined with declining SES, produces a crisis of credentialism which leads to devalued job opportunities. Hence, when public universities failed to preserve the social-class distinctions and privileges that the elite had previously enjoyed, a new private sector emerged to maintain this separateness and social status [13]. 'Political failure' lies in the inability of public universities to prevent intense politicization, a common trait among state universities since the 1918 Córdoba reform. In reaction to student activists' claim that the prime role of university is not to provide professional training but to change society, middle and upper class students sought private institutions, which not by chance portrayed de-politicization as one of their virtues. Finally, 'economic failure' has to do with decreased capacity for technical training and student preparation for the job market. Public universities are therefore accused of being irrational from an economic point of view, giving inadequate attention to job-relevant fields. Levy argued that the growth of private universities in Latin America was particularly influenced by industry requirements for qualified cadres in the context of technological modernization. Moreover, as Tunnermann (1977) indicated, even in nations with a primitive industrial apparatus, such as Nicaragua, graduates from public universities were perceived by the private sector as "technically mediocre and decidedly deficient". Business played an important role not only in founding and funding private universities, but also in offering job opportunities to their graduates, which in turn attracted more people to private universities.

In summary, the 'public sector failure' argument advanced by Levy maintains that, as a result of educational expansion, students from elite origins participating in public universities perceived their interests threatened by a) social interaction and sharing the institution with lower classes; b) increased politicization, shifting the university away from the status quo and disrupting learning and socialization; and c) challenges to job security, as other classes received the same credentials previously reserved for them. In addition to these student perceptions, there was the need of business and industry for highly qualified, disciplined students. The perception of public sector failure was stressed not only by pro-private partisans, but also by many who are ideologically neutral in terms of sectorial preference, and even by some who ideologically supported the public sector (Levy 1986:306).

Ironically, if this public failure promoted a 'flight' from public to private institutions, public attempts to restore the old order also encouraged the growth of private universities. Once Catholic universities accommodated the demand for religious-oriented instruction, and elite private universities recruited students who were dissatisfied with public institutions, a third type of private institution (nonelite university) took advantage of the public sector's attempt to correct its failures. In fact, the 'flight' towards nonelite private universities took place when the state tried to "protect" the public university by restricting growth and imposing admission requirements. Since elite universities were not willing to accommodate excess demand (because this would threaten their elitist status), nonelite private universities emerged to serve the needs unmet by both the state and the existing (religious and elite) private sector. Nonelite private universities also appealed to those parents unhappy about the high degree of politicization of public universities, and to workers unable to adapt their schedules to the rigid timetable of these institutions. Although private universities may have benefited from some of the shortcomings of public universities, they were unable to replace them due to their incapacity to provide accessible, low-cost, good quality secular education (Brodersohn 1978, Clark 1983, Levy 1986).

The three-step process described by Levy resulted in the development of three different types of private universities. In light of their temporal succession, he refers to them as three waves. The first wave occurred when the Church regained influence, leading to the emergence of Catholic universities. Later, the "public failure" to deal with expansion (social, political and economic failure) led to the second wave, that is, the emergence of elite private universities. Finally, when public universities temporarily restricted enrollments by raising entrance requirements, a surge of nonelite private universities appeared on the scene. Once these three waves were consolidated by the end of the 1960s, a dual sector higher education system was clearly in place. This not only pleased the private sector (which was training its own professionals in controlled settings), but also the state. Relieved from social and financial pressures, at the same time that it avoided the need to respond to an ever increasing demand, the state was able to recruit qualified cadres without paying for their training.

As a matter of fact, the emergence of private universities was not only due to failure and restrictions of public universities, but also to state interests. Although at a first glance it may seem that, by allowing the establishment of private universities, the state committed political suicide, or at least betrayed its principles, a closer look shows that the state obtains at least four benefits from this arrangement. First, by absorbing excess demand, the existence of private universities minimizes pressures for accessibility, which in turn relieves the state from addressing social discontent that may end in political disorder and repression. Second, because they obtain their revenue mainly from tuition and donations, private universities alleviate government's financial burdens [14]. Third, it provides a relatively well-trained pool of graduates who can be recruited by the state to fill technical, managerial and even political positions. Fourth, in a general sense, private universities serve the private interests with which the capitalist state is allied. Moreover, the state is likely to support depoliticized options, because they alleviate social conflict and institutional disruptions. In sum, while private universities are blamed for their low quality and their profit motives, they are tolerated for saving public funds and lowering the pressure on the job market. (Levy 1986, Brunner 1990).

The state's role in the proliferation of private universities was played through its decreasing funding for public ones. As a World Bank discussion paper reports (Winkler 1990:iii), the disparity between rapid enrollment growth and declining government spending between 1960 and 1985 led to lower quality instruction in public universities, and this led in turn to growth in private higher education. An additional factor that affected the emergence of private universities was the international influence.

4. The international element in Latin American university reform. The Atcon Report

The proliferation of private universities in Latin America is also related to a broader modernization reform carried out during the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America. This was part and parcel of the US policy for the region, known as Alliance for Progress. Many of the reforms sponsored by US agencies attempted a total reorganization of the state and the economy, including public services such as education, health and transportation, and activities such as industry and agriculture. In relation to higher education, the program of the Alliance for Progress was based upon the Atcon Report, submitted by Rudolph Atcon in 1961. This report, published in Spanish as La Universidad Latinoamericana, was widely distributed throughout Latin America and became the bible for US-based university reformers dealing with Latin America (Vasconi and Recca 1977, González 1981, Briceño 1988). The Atcon Report not only proposed the establishment of private universities, but also the 'modernization' of public universities.

For Atcon, the Latin American university needed to undertake a rapid process of modernization to transform its feudal structure into one more consonant with emerging economic and social changes. These 'controlled mutations', as Atcon called such a process, should aim at eliminating those values and attitudes that inhibited Latin American development, such as personalism, regionalism, individualism, lack of rational thought (i.e. emotionalism), ascriptive behavior and lack of creativity (Atcon 1966:10). This approach, consistent with Rostow's *stages of economic development* model, assumed a world of totally autonomous and equal nations, dismissing the possibility of unequal exchanges among them. It therefore laid blame exclusively on Latin American societies for their backwardness. Since the main barriers to progress were perceived to be the 'backwardness' of society, prescriptions took the form of cultural and technological modernization. According to Atcon, university modernization was inhibited by structural impediments, including the institutional organization by faculties, the emphasis on professions, the irrelevance of course content, the participation of students in governance, the politicized nature of the university, and its reliance on public funds.

Congruent with this diagnosis, the main recommendations of the Atcon Report were: a) to establish a centralized administration; b) to limit academic freedom; c) to pressure professors to conduct research by making it a condition for hiring and promotion; d) to exclude students from governing bodies; e) to remove universities from their close ties with political parties; f) to reduce dependence upon state financing, encouraging self-financing (including tuition fees); and g) to gradually reduce the 'public' character of the university, as well as promote the creation of private universities. In sum, the Atcon Plan sought to change the traditional character of the administrative and organizational aspects of Latin American universities in order to achieve a level of efficiency characteristic of the private enterprise. It also proposed the development of a planning system to coordinate and rationalize university activities. Moreover, the Atcon Plan suggested the convenience of turning public universities into independent private institutions, free from state interference, and politically neutral.

Premised on the modernization paradigm, one of the main arguments used by international experts like Atcon to support their defense of private universities is that Napoleonic systems of higher education are less conducive to scientific progress than decentralized and competitive systems [15]. They claim that a serious weakness in the operation of such a system is monopoly of power, which in turn restrains academic freedom, leads to a highly prescriptive order and excessive formal integration, inertia and repression, and inhibits flexibility, which is considered as indispensable to progress. They also contend that the push for consistency and uniformity in institutional arrangements required by these systems generates rigidity and

reduces adaptive capacities, thus creating the conditions for revolutionary transformations, as opposed to evolutionary changes (Ben-David and Zloczower 1962, Clark 1983).

For the critics of the modernization model of development, the *dependentists*, the attempt to modernize the Latin American universities during the 1950s and 1960s was externally induced and financed, in order to increasingly adjust them to the new conditions of dependent capitalist development. They claim these reforms are largely alien to the national interests of Latin American countries, corresponding instead to the interests "of small but powerful economic groups based in the United States and supported by the political weight of the state" (González 1981:229). These theorists also contend that, by accepting the Alliance For Progress, the nations of Latin America opened their doors to increased university research, consultants and development missions from the United States, as well as to lenders and donors who commonly mandate the specific use of the money (Vasconi and Recca 1977, González 1981, Briceño 1988).

While the reform package recommended by the Atcon Report encouraged the development and growth of private universities, its impact on Latin American public universities was minimal. Two main factors account for this. The first is the relationship between the public university and political parties, which is shaped by *clientelismo* (Boss Tweed system). This situation leads to party allegiances, favors, compromises, behind-the-scenes agreements and even to blatant corruption. In some cases, academic positions are arranged on the basis of political and personal ties, and decision making processes are influenced by student vote. This patronage system, deeply rooted in Latin American public institutions, constitutes an obstacle to the creation of a 'rational bureaucracy' and undermines most efforts towards the modernization of the administrative apparatus. The second factor can be found in the democratic movements of the 1960s, which included a militant teacher and student body. Although professors and students did not oppose the reform as such, they expressed reservations about some of its potential implications, and manifested their resistance through strikes and demonstrations. These rebellions reached their peak in the 1968 student revolts [16] which pushed for a transformative university, where research and teaching were not tied to foreign interests or to the needs of the national oligarchy, but rather to national development. Professors and students who opposed the Atcon proposal also claimed that it would inhibit democratization, which constituted a key limitation in a context of increasing demand for participation (Vasconi and Recca 1977, González 1981, Briceño 1988).

Regardless of the theoretical approach adopted, the literature indisputably reveals the existence of external pressures. As Levy points out, "whether one calls it dependency or modernization, foreign interests have clearly supported those trying to mold Latin America's universities towards US models" (Levy 1986:53). In his account, the main foreign interests pressing for privatization were identified as being the US government [17] and private foundations, transnational corporations and international agencies such as AID, UNESCO, IDB, etc. In the same vein, Altbach (1979:29-32) observes that, since the end of the WW II, US higher education has been the paradigm for Latin American countries. He points out that the US is "a powerful nation which has provided considerable educational assistance to the Third World, and through this aid its educational models have been publicized and stressed" (p. 29). Likewise, Latapí (1980) identifies the common interests of international capital, local capital and the state, and shows how their ideological, economic and political needs have been reflected in the increasing number of private universities (which can more easily be used to serve their interests), and in the efforts to 'deideologize' and depoliticize public institutions. Among those who most strongly impugned the creation of private universities were students. It has been suggested that, in some cases, while the students' rhetoric appealed to the principles of free and public education, their opposition was based on a concrete fear of competition and additional deterioration of their already weak job prospects (Scott 1969).

With the emergence of private universities, a new trend emerged in Latin America. The shift from public monopoly to dual private and public sector has radically changed Latin American higher education. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the private sector is currently present in all Latin American countries except Cuba. It constitutes one third of total enrollments in the region and continues to expand at an accelerated rate.

5. The present situation of Latin American universities

Latin American universities today face a variety of challenges. The traditional problems related to institutional features rooted in historical patterns have been worsened by external factors, particularly the economic restrictions and authoritarian governments experienced by many countries in the 1980s and 1970s. To begin with, during the financial crisis of the 1980s, known in Latin America as the 'lost decade', educational expenditures declined in most Latin American countries, in terms of actual and per capita expenditures in real terms and relative to total government expenditures as well. The adjustment process led to declines in financial allocations that reversed the limited increases in education funding that occurred in the 1970s, producing negative consequences in equity, accessibility and quality. Focusing on the cases of Venezuela and Costa Rica, Reimer (1991:341) shows the impact of recent reductions in educational expenditures in these three areas. First, the cuts prevented the educational system from addressing the equity disparities that existed even in times of fiscal abundance. Second, it led to declines in the rate of growth of the educational system, so that increasing demand now exceeds the supply of educational services. Third, it resulted in significant reductions in the quality of instruction.

The deterioration of the quality of teaching and research is becoming more evident. A distinguished Mexican researcher who is the holder of the main national science award, Ruy Pérez Tamayo, said that in most Mexican universities "the quality of teaching ranges in between bad and disastrous. Their research is either null or insignificant, sporadic, irrelevant for educational purposes and isolated from the local environment" [18]. In relation to the work conditions of faculty, the President of the Mexican UNAM, the largest Latin American university, pointed out that salaries of academics are very inadequate, and this forces them either to find supplementary jobs outside the university or to leave the country [19]. In Argentina, as will be described later, similar statements were advanced, and there is a general consensus among academics that the university is under a severe financial crisis that affects all its activities. Because of budget cutbacks, in many Latin American universities most of the available financial resources are channeled to salaries, which results in the deterioration of building and research facilities. Financial constraint has led many Latin American students, professors and non-faculty staff taking to the streets to demand more government support for public education and increased funding [20]. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the academic community has been recurrently calling for more resources, improvement of working conditions, better facilities and equipment, less bureaucratism and more diffusion of research. So far, their efforts have met with little success.

In addition to the economic crisis, the surge of military regimes during the 1970s and 1980s in most Latin American countries and the recurrent government interventions deteriorated the climate of ideological and intellectual discussion, forcing thousands of academics to seek exile with the consequent impoverishment of teaching and research. In those countries, universities were reduced to an instrumental function, catering to the needs of an authoritarian state typical of a dependent and backward capitalist economy which demanded a repressive, arbitrary and techno-bureaucratic authority (Latapi 1980). In many cases, universities lost their autonomous status, and a significant number of professors and students were incarcerated and assassinated. The wounds created by that situation, early described by Rama (1974) as the

most terrible attack on Latin American culture in the past one hundred years, may still take several decades to heal.

As was advanced above, the political and economic pressures have exacerbated a variety of internal problems which Latin American universities have been bearing for decades now. One of the problems most recurrently cited in the literature is the excessive professionalism, which is reflected in an academic structure based on a federation of semi-autonomous faculties or professional schools, in rigid career-oriented curricula which severely impede transfers from one program to another and in unnecessary duplication of resources. It is also reflected in an atomization of academic efforts: each university is divided into many independent faculties, and each one of these in a great number of institutes with little interaction among them. Moreover, the excessive focus on professional training as the essence of academic activities leads to a compartmentalization of interests in disciplinary feuds and to intra-corporatist competition. It also results in an excess of part-time jobs, creating an environment in which academic staff are more interested in the exercise of their profession than in university activities.

The excessive professionalism of Latin American universities is closely related to another problem constantly reiterated in the literature, namely the low attention paid to research activities. The scarce production of new knowledge is evident in the limited tenure track systems and full-time positions, in a negligent attitude toward libraries, laboratories and scientific information, and in a general disregard for scientific research. Moreover, since most universities lack the necessary infrastructure to conduct research, professors tend to teach whatever is produced in developed countries. Since most professors do not investigate but teach what others have discovered in the past, the academic community is closer to a school than to a university, emphasizing the production of diplomas rather than the production of knowledge (Levy 1986, Bunge 1987, Brunner 1990, Pérez Lindo 1990, Tunnermann 1990, Winkler 1990 and Balán 1990). Other internal problems of Latin American universities recognized in most of the literature on higher education are an inefficient administrative organization, with a tendency towards bureaucratization and the cathedra as the main academic unit, and low levels of pedagogical innovation. Although some universities have undertaken a variety of changes that include incipient departmentalization, promotion of liberal education, curriculum development, managerial administration and institutional planning, in general terms teaching methods still rely on lectures, there is little concern for pedagogical problems, there is an overemphasis on theory due to limitations in labs and equipment, and educational technology in curriculum development, program delivery and student evaluation is scarcely utilized.

While there is a general consensus in the literature about the aforementioned problems, other problematic areas are more contentious and are expressed in serious disagreements. Since the particular way in which a problem is identified and analyzed frames the conditions for its solution, most of these disagreements are related to different projects for the university. For instance, Latin American universities are accused of social elitism (Pérez Lindo 1989:131, Tunermann 1990:160). Although an underrepresentation of students from lower income groups is still observable in most Latin American universities, this situation has greatly diminished by the large expansion that took place during the last decades. From 1960 to 1985, student enrollment grew from 550,000 to 6 million, while the number of teachers increased from 75,000 to more than 500,000. Ironically, some of those who criticize this expansion and open door policies in general for being demagogic and populist, use the argument of social elitism to call for the privatization of the public university system. Prominent among those advocating this proposal is the World Bank (1993:xxxviii).

Another contentious area relates to governance. Different social actors tend to complain about the politicization of university life, meaning by it different things. In Mexico, for instance,

student organizations argue that the present governing system is antidemocratic and based on political criteria rather than on academic ones. In the National University of Mexico (UNAM), the local student movement complains that the most important decisions are made by a Board of only 15 members, that appointments are not based on academic merit, and that decision making is highly influenced by external pressure groups, especially the State and industry [21]. This perception is shared by UNAM's Dean of Law, who publicly acknowledged that some important decisions are taken not for academic reasons but rather for political ones [22]. In other countries, like Argentina, it is the government who mostly condemns the politicization of university life, meaning by it an 'excessive' participation of alumni and students in decision-making, and the existence of political activism on campus. In this case, the charges about an excessive proportion of students and alumni in university governance is interpreted by the latter as a call for the authoritarian model typical of the pre-1918 era. Moreover, the politicization of university life cannot be separated from the extreme politicization of educational decision-making in Latin America (Pérez Lindo 1985). As will be seen later for the case of UBA, the same government that criticizes the university for its linkages to political parties is itself establishing political alliances with key university actors in order to shape the direction of the institution.

Another problem pointed out by some authors is the absence of a tradition of private participation in higher education (Tunnermann 1990:160). However, this contention can be disputed by the impressive growth of private universities [23]. Moreover, it is not quite clear why this should be considered a problem. As the experiences of several countries suggest, it is possible to have a high-quality, efficient and accessible higher education system that is entirely public.

The trend of university environments to isolation, as expressed in the weak links with the external world, is also a matter of concern for many people. However, although there is a general agreement that the divisions between science and social reality, theory and practice, and research and teaching should be reduced, there is a discrepancy among marketventionists and autonomists [24] in relation to the type of relations that are missing. From a marketventionist's perspective, the university is accused of being dysfunctional to society, as well as in having little interest in addressing the needs of the economy, in securing an employment for its graduates, in establishing partnerships with industry, and in being accountable to the state. From an autonomist perspective (particularly the branch grounded in the 'social transformation' project), the university is blamed for being more "a ministry of welfare for the middle class" than a development agent, and for its low preoccupation for national problems and for its negligible solidarity with the historical struggles of disadvantaged groups.

The rationale for the heteronomous university is based on the contention that Latin American higher education systems are currently affected by several problems that can only be solved through a deep restructuring. The main problems are inefficiency, government's over investment in higher education, excessive subsidization, absence of accountability, politicization, poor quality, mismatch between supply of graduates and labor market demands, and low R&D effort, particularly in relation to applied research (Balán 1990, Winkler 1990, Brunner 1991, World Bank 1993).

In examining the efficiency issue, marketventionists tend to diagnose that instruction unit-costs are either too low (due to accelerated expansion) or too high (due to an inefficient use of available resources. They also detect poor planning and coordination of investment, which results in many small institutions being unable to be academically or financially efficient and in programs with low enrollments and demand in the market while others are overcrowded. In addition, they report excessive staff (both academic and administrative), a subsidization of student services nonessential for educational purposes, and high drop out and repetition rates,

which are usually attributed to inadequate selection mechanisms. All these factors lead them to the conclusion that productivity is much lower in Latin American universities than in developed countries (Winkler 1990). However, considering that the cost per student/year is lower in Latin America than in developed countries ($1,000 and $6,000 respectively), and that output is directly related to input, it can be claimed that internal efficiency is the same in both groups of universities (Schieffelbein 1991).

Another important diagnosis of marketventionists is that Latin American governments overinvest in higher education relative to primary education, and thus public resources should be shifted from the former to the latter. In this view, subsidies to higher education have a regressive impact (because they tend to benefit students from higher income families) and should be replaced with a system of client payments and student loans. This diagnosis is not shared by autonomists, who dispute the adequacy of promoting a confrontation between higher and elementary education. In this view, resources for primary education should come from areas where the social rate of return is lower than that of higher education. Likewise, autonomists contend that, if the intention of fees is to promote equity, there are more equitable avenues to explore, ranging from charging fees to students coming from private high schools with a tuition equivalent to that paid in their former high school [25] to progressive changes in the tax system.

In relation to R&D, marketventionists condemn Latin American universities for conducting mostly basic research, while in industrialized countries basic research represent 10 to 20% of all research activities (Winkler 1990:86) [26]. Given that research activities in Latin America are relatively scarce (expenditures in Latin America are only 0.5% of the GNP, one-fifth of the proportion allocated in developed countries), because research and development on a large scale is conducted mainly in core countries (Repo 1970, Tedesco 1983), the criticism about the emphasis on basic research and the recommendation to move towards applied research has not generated much debate yet.

In essence, all diagnoses of Latin American universities advanced by marketventionists tend to emphasize two issues. First, universities are inefficient institutions because they reward their staff based on 'isonomy' and 'homogeneity', that is, equal remunerations for similar categories, regardless of individual performance or market conditions (opportunity cost). In this view, as long as public universities do not diversify their sources of revenue, they will be unable to perform according to market rules. Second, most of the problems faced by Latin American universities are very difficult to solve as long as universities remain autonomous, and are not accountable to state controls. Indeed, according to the World Bank (1993:89), universities represent a difficult problem for the government because they are legally autonomous, and thus the Ministry of Education is unable to control the destination of expenditures. These are precisely the two main features of the heteronomous university.

6. Emerging trends: Towards the fourth wave?

As can be inferred from the previous discussion, the Latin American higher education system of the 1990s inherited a very difficult situation. In addition to firmly entrenched historical-structural problems, universities have been experiencing very acute financial constraints: while total enrollment in Latin American universities has increased tenfold since 1960, public financing for higher education has declined during the 1980s. This situation, in the context of increasing state deficits, extensive selling out of state enterprises, pragmatic structural adjustment programs, institutional pressures and market-oriented ideological climate, creates a propitious environment for a drastic restructuring towards the heteronomous university (O'Connor 1991).

By incorporating private values and practices into the public university, this restructuring can be understood as a fourth wave of privatization into the system. Whereas the aforementioned three waves dealt with the emergence of different kinds of private universities, this fourth wave consists of integrating private elements in the public university. In the 1960s, Atcon (1966) claimed that universities in Latin America were subsidized wholly or almost exclusively by the state, that universities lacked clear financial policies and that private financing was insignificant. Twenty years later, Levy (1986: 297) acknowledged that Atcon's view remained "fundamentally right for the public sector", but contended (correctly, in my view) that Atcon ignored the existence of private universities, which were in place even before the 1960s. By showing that public universities in Latin America were truly public, and private universities were essentially private, Levy demonstrated that the traditional Napoleonic model of state monopoly described by Atcon was being replaced by a dual private-public sector model.

However, this dual model still retains some features that makes it different from the US model. In the US public and private universities compete with private firms for the same public research grants, and both public and private universities receive funding from public and private sources. In the US model, private elements are present in public universities in three areas: finance, governance and function. In the first instance, private sources account for roughly 20% of the public sector's income. In terms of governance, decision making in public universities is highly influenced by private groups, including donors from industry and business, alumni and other bodies. With respect to function, public universities are not only allowed, but also encouraged, to serve private interests (Levy 1986). In Latin America, instead, until the present time, little publicness (state subsidization) could be found in most private universities, and even much less privateness (non-state funding) could be detected in public universities. So far, the Latin American public university has been truly public, and the private university has been even more truly private (Fulton 1986, Levy 1986). Nevertheless, the current restructuring project aims at replacing this dual system by a new one that includes the private financing of public institutions, and eventually the public financing of private institutions. In this sense, this fourth wave of university privatization represents a second shift from the traditional Napoleonic model to the US model.

In Latin America, private financing of public universities relates to the capacity of these institutions to get access to sources of revenue other than the state. Among others, five are the main possible sources: a) tuition fees, either direct or "hidden" [27]; b) ad hoc programs and applied research for business and industry; c) assessment of fees for services provided to the community (i.e. Dentistry, Law, Agriculture); d) donations (alumni, corporations, community at large); and e) international subsidies and funding for specific projects. As was discussed in chapter 2, non-state sources of financing may have important implications for governance and function.

The available evidence suggests that in the 1990s, in the context of the fiscal crisis of the state, most Latin American governments are eager to make the next step in the shift toward the US model, a process inaugurated by Chile in 1981. Currently, the discourses of Ministries of Education throughout Latin America have marked similarities. Showing striking affinities with World Bank diagnosis and recommendations, they perceive Latin American public universities as expensive and ineffective, compare their rates of return to basic education, propose fees on equity grounds, and encourage contracts with industry [28]. Even the presidents of traditionally combative universities, such as Universidad de Córdoba in Argentina or the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), openly advocate tuition fees and private resources to complement state subsidies [29]. In the University of Córdoba, the mother of the 1918 Reform and a historical enemy of tuition fees, voluntary fees have been successfully applied since 1990. In UNAM, which has historically prided itself on its dedication to the

ideal of an accessible education for all, an attempt to increase tuition fees in 1988 led to student riots and strikes. In the early 1990s, the government is determined to raise annual tuition from the current 6 cents (a level at which it has been frozen for 44 years) to about $670. On this occasion, student resistance was very scarce [30].

Furthermore, promoters of the restructuring are attempting to move the debate from the pertinence of applying tuition fees, to a discussion on how much -and to whom- is going to be charged once differential fees are imposed. The UNAM President, for example, declared that a differential fee by career should be established according to the service received. In terms of resources utilized, he argues, the study of Literature or History is not comparable, cost wise, to the study of Chemistry or Dentistry. Using a different rationale, the Argentine Minister of Education proposed differential fees according to national needs. Both call for restrictions on enrollment growth based on the main objective of 'academization' of university (Rodríguez Castañeda 1990). At the same time that Latin American universities are pressured to move into the market, they are increasingly subjected to state control mechanisms.

In Latin America, hence, as in many other parts of the world, the pressures for university restructuring are of considerable magnitude. Public administrators, influenced by international advisors, are vindicating the advantages of market models, and developing performance indicators to use as criteria for conditional funding. In short, the agenda is to substitute the principles of 1918 Reform with the arrangements of the 1981 model. However, this will not be an easy task. Among the obstacles that this project is going to face are the difficulties in applying market principles to a decision-making process based on a combination of collegiality and corporatist arrangements, and the strong pro-public tradition of most Latin American countries. At the same time, the fact that most Latin American governments are now democratically elected) rules out the Chilean way, and calls for the implementation of careful strategies -based on persuasion and negotiation- to foster the heteronomous model while preserving political legitimacy. These efforts can also face considerable resistance in some universities, particularly in those where the prevailing traditions and shared values are still loyal to the 1918 Reform. This is the case of the Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Section 2. The Argentinean higher education system

1. General description

The Argentinean higher education system comprises 3% of the buildings, 8% of the students and 10% of the teachers of the overall educational system. The national university system includes 29 national universities, 33 private universities (both secular and Catholic, which enrol roughly 10% of all post-secondary students), 2 provincial universities (La Rioja and Santa Cruz) and 5 military institutes [31]. One of the national universities is in reality a large technical school with many branches throughout the country.

The higher education system is completed by non-university institutions, a residual, heterogeneous sector that can be grouped in two categories: teacher training colleges, on the one hand, and technical and semi-professional schools (social work, paramedics, arts, etc.), on the other. The non-university institutions have had an impressive growth, from only 3 in 1910 to 91 in 1960, and 581 in 1980. Between 1983 and 1986, the expansion of non-university institutions more than doubled that of universities: while the latter increased by 14%, the former increased by 39.4%. By 1987, total enrollment in higher education was 958,542 students (twice as much as in 1980), and 78.8% of them were enrolled in universities (Martínez 1991). Both the total enrollment in higher education and the proportion of university students in that total remained nearly the same in 1992 as it had been in 1987 [32].

An important caveat is necessary at this point. In Argentina, since enrolments are linked to funding, they tend to be inflated, and therefore 'real' enrollment figures are difficult to obtain. Moreover, there is no distinction between students who attend part-time or full-time, and between students who attend regularly and those who attend irregularly or do not attend at all. Indeed, a substantial gap between registered students and 'active' students (however defined) exists in many universities. According to one expert, if active students were defined using as a criterion the approval of one course every two years, the number of students enrolled could be reduced by up to 50% [33]. The statistical chaos can be illustrated by the experience of a group of researchers from the Universidad del Sur who attempted to know the enrollment of that university. From four different sources they obtained four different figures, ranging from 2,712 to 10,550 [34].

Discrepancies are also observable in terms of financing. According to official sources, in 1986 government expenditure on education represented 4.23% of GNP (1.50% from the national treasury and 3.05% from provincial treasuries). That year, the government allocated the equivalent of 1.1% of the GDP to national public education, 0.22% to private education and 0.02% to provincial programs.[35] According to other sources, educational expenditure in Argentina (using 1987 as reference) was only 1.9% of the GNP, a low investment if compared with countries with similar level of economic development (see table 1).

Table 1: % of GNP allocated to education in selected developing countries (GNP per capita from US 2,000 to 3,000) in 1987.

	GNP per capita (US)	% of GNP allocated to education
Algeria	2,779	9.8%
Brazil	1,980	4.5%
Peru	2,150	3.3%
South Korea	2,796	4.2%
Syria	2,532	4.7%
Venezuela	2,098	5.4%
Yugoslavia	2,580	3.8%
Argentina	**2,467**	**1.9%**

Source: Pichel 1991:15 .[36]

By educational levels, government spending on education for 1986 was distributed as follows: 56% to elementary education, 26.8% to secondary education, 11.6% to higher education and 5.5% to other areas.[37] Within the higher education system, public universities are allocated 90% of the budget, while the remaining 10% is used to finance the non-university institutions. Government subsidies to private education represent 7% of the spending on public education. At the higher education level, government funds for public and private institutions represented 0.51% and 0.02% of the GNP, respectively (Pronatass 1988:15).

The main features of the Napoleonic-Reform model of Latin American universities described in the preceding section are present in Argentinean universities. For instance, Argentinean universities are constituted by distinct faculties or schools, often with a professional orientation (i.e. medicine, economics, law, architecture, pharmacy, psychology, etc.). Among the schools with no clear professional boundaries are the faculties of arts and humanities (filosofía y letras) and natural sciences (ciencias exactas y naturales). Enrolment is largely concentrated in the former faculties, to the extent that almost two thirds of enrolments are in medicine, law and economics. Moreover, during the first 40 years of this century, when its

higher education system was considered the best of Latin America, Argentina graduated more students in law than in all other fields combined (Levy 1986). Likewise, there is low support for research, the improvement of teaching is seldom encouraged, professional development courses are scarce, and merit systems for promotion of faculty are almost nonexistent. Table 2 summarizes the main figures of the Argentinean public university system in absolute and relative numbers.

Table 2: Students, graduates and budget of Argentinean public universities (1991)

University	Active students		Graduates		Budget (state sources) [38]	
Buenos Aires	203,648 [39]	34.5%	13,351	40.3%	130,538	20.4%
Catamarca	4,334	0.7%	64	0.2%	7,890	1.2%
Centro	5,162	0.9%	249	0.7%	9,607	1.5%
Comahue	9,239	1.6%	1,152	3.5%	18,169	2.8%
Córdoba	77,068	13.1%	4,136	12.5%	57,329	9.0%
Cuyo	16,356	2.8%	1,266	3.8%	37,903	5.9%
Entre Ríos	6,306	1.1%	224	0.7%	7,338	1.1%
Formosa	n.d.	n.d	n.d.	n.d	4,011	0.6%
Jujuy	5,217	0.9%	49	0.1%	4,932	0.8%
La Pampa	2,809	0.5%	219	0.6%	7,336	1.1%
La Plata	65,203	11.0%	3,373	10.2%	39,920	6.2%
Litoral	12,644	2.1%	1,122	3.4%	18,438	2.9%
L. de Zamora	24,414	4.1%	982	3.0%	6,824	1.1%
Luján	5,988	1.0%	136	0.4%	6,452	1.0%
Mar del Plata	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	13,625	2.1%
Misiones	6,306	1.1%	160	0.5%	12,879	2.0%
Nordeste	n.d.	n.d.	1,220	3.7%	22,879	3.6%
Patagonia	n.d.	n.d.	89	0.3%	13,671	2.1%
Quilmes	802	0.1%	----	---	906	0.1%
Río Cuarto	7,036	1.2%	446	1.3%	10,026	1.6%
Rosario	49,173	8.3%	1,487	4.5%	39,698	6.2%
Salta	14,549	2.5%	190	0.6%	10,887	1.7%
San Juan	7,830	1.3%	265	0.8%	31,485	4.9%
San Luis	3,827	0.6%	277	0.8%	16,577	2.6%
S. del Estero	2,428	0.4%	48	0.1%	6,544	1.0%
Sur	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	16,388	2,6%
Tecnológica	59,616	10.1%	1,484	4.5%	43,462	6.8%
Tucumán	n.d.	n.d.	1,160	3.5%	45,238	7.1%

Source: Universidad de Buenos Aires 1991:8.

The relationship between the state and each autonomous public university is regulated through a special department within the national ministry of education (department of university affairs), whose function it is to supervise the fulfillment of current legislation by each institution, and to negotiate the yearly budget, which is supposedly prepared by each university. In practice, however, the budget is developed by the federal government, with universities having little to say about it. There is also a National University Council (CIN), made up of all university presidents and a representative from the national government, whose main function is to coordinate university policies and programs. The role of the University

Senates or General Faculties Council (Consejos Universitarios) in decision-making is shaped by the contradictory dynamic of the Napoleonic and Reformist legacies.

In the light of the Reformist tradition, universities enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and many decisions are made by self-governing bodies. At the same time, due to the Napoleonic tradition, the power of these bodies is constrained by the state. Since the state provides the budget, and can always raise the specter of intervention, it claims the right to make important decisions, sometimes after negotiating with university authorities. Also consistent with its Napoleonic foundations, the structure, governance and aims of the Argentinean university largely depends upon the political orientation of the government in power. In short, Argentine universities are legally autonomous, yet are highly influenced by the state. This often results in zig-zag policies affecting university life. During military regimes, enrolment is greatly restricted. When democratic governments take power, access is opened not only to the annual demand, but also to the demand accumulated during the military years. These shifts create dramatic cyclical decline and growth in enrollment.

In spite of Philip Altbach's contention that "the Latin American academic profession is undergoing major changes as it shifts from a part-time occupation to a full-time profession with increased emphasis on research and publication" (Altbach's 1979:43), teaching in Argentinean universities is still largely carried out by part-time staff, including the highest and most prestigious faculty: they comprise about 90% of the academic staff [40]. Moreover, full-time positions are often symbolic, and salaries tend to be complemented by other incomes. Part-time academic staff is particularly abundant in professional faculties and in private universities, where teaching is combined with the practice of another profession, usually better remunerated. Students also tend to be part-time: between 40% to 70% of them also work, which forces them to graduate two or three years later than the expected time (Pérez Lindo 1985).

After the reinstatement of democracy in the early 1980s, student unions have been legalized again in all public universities. All students are formally members of student unions, and voting participation is very high. Unions have an active political life, with different factions linked to major national parties. Unlike the pattern of previous decades, when student party preference was out of tune with national public opinion, in the 1980s student voting patterns reflect the voting patterns of population at large (Balán 1990). In the 1990s, however, the student vote overwhelmingly supports the Radical Party, where civil society tends to favor the Peronist Party.

The Argentinean higher education system has gradually expanded since 1920, a process that intensified during the 1970s. Three main factors can be adduced for this process: a) a general growth of national economy; b) the expansion of secondary education, without creating employment or training alternatives; and c) a larger female participation in social life. As these conditions have changed, enrolment in Argentinean universities during the early 1990s has not been growing. Economic stagnation, stabilization of high school enrolment and an increased proportion of female students in universities (reaching presently 50% of the total student population) have reduced demands (Balán 1991). Moreover, the thousands of applicants rejected by the restrictive admission policies imposed by the last military regime (1976-1983) had already entered university during Alfonsín's period (1983-88), when a policy of open access to all was re-established. Indeed, the number of incoming students increased from 73,830 in 1983 to 139,250 in 1984, 230,125 in 1985 and 279,300 in 1986. Consequently, total enrolment rose from 416,571 in 1983 to 707,016 in 1986 [41]. As can be observed in Table 3, the expansion of higher education in the period 1970-1986 surpassed by far expansion in other levels of the educational system:

Table 3: Evolution of enrolments in elementary, secondary and university education 1970-1986

Year	Elementary	Secondary	University
1970	100.0	100.0	100.0
1975	104.2	127.2	200.3
1980	112.7	135.3	157.0
1985	131.9	171.7	262.1
1986	138.4	184.6	279.0

Source: Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina 1983-1986, INDEC (base year = 1970)

As a result of this expansion, in 1985 Argentina had one of the highest university enrollment rates (measured against the total population age group): 36.4%, a very high figure if compared with Venezuela (26.4%), Mexico (16%), Chile (15.8%), Colombia (13%) or Brazil (11.3%). As of 1986, the distribution of professors and students in higher education and universities was as follows:

Table 4: Students and professors in higher education and universities, 1986

	H.Educ.	%males	Universities	%males	Private only	%males
students	902,882	47	707,016	54	71,824	10 [42]
professors	69,985	53	41,804	67	13,023	34

Source: Pérez Lindo (1989:92). The category 'professors' does not include teaching assistants.

In Argentina, university graduates represent 4.1% of the total population. The participation of Argentine youth in higher education is particularly high if it is considered that its GNP per capita is substantially lower than countries with similar participation rates (see Table 4). Retention rate in higher education is estimated at 67.3%, which means that approximately one third of students drop out before graduation [43] (Pronatass 1988:68, Winkler 1990: 50).

Table 5: Students in higher education and GNP per capita in selected countries

Country	% Students in H.E. (20-24 years old)	GNP per capita (US $)
United States	58	14,200
Sweden	37	12,500
Canada	37	12,500
Argentina	35	2,100
Israel	30	5,500
Germany	28	11,500
Italy	27	6,500
France	26	10,500
Australia	26	11,500
Spain	23	4,800
USSR	21	---
Great Britain	19	9,400
Cuba	19	---
Switzerland	19	16,500

Source: Etcheverry, Jaim. Nuestra Universidad ¿tiene futuro? Los puntos de partida, p. iv.

Three major developments that took place during the period of expansion redefined the general configuration of the higher education system. First, the aforementioned feminization of enrolments, from 15% in 1980 to 50% in 1992. The second development consisted of institutional regionalization. During the 1970s, as a result of the *Plan Taquini*, universities and higher education institutions were created in almost all provinces. Between 1970 and 1973, fourteen national universities, one provincial university and eleven private universities were established, raising the total number of universities to 46. The justification for this regionalized expansion was mainly organizational: to link universities with local development (in the context of human capital theories) and to decentralize enrolments, previously concentrated in a few large universities. However, the political rationale -seldom explicitly stated- was not absent in the push for decentralization. As a result of the 'Cordobazo' revolt in 1968 and the growth of revolutionary movements, decentralization was also conceived as a means to divide the student movement [44].

In spite of that decentralization, enrolment is still concentrated in a handful of large universities. While 19% of universities enrol more than 40,000 students each, 60% of universities (the newer ones) enrol fewer than 10,000 students. Overall, 70% of the total university population is enrolled in large, old institutions. Moreover, 55.7% of total enrollments and 63.2% of private institutions' enrollments are in Buenos Aires and surrounding area (Cano 1985, Martínez 1991). This proliferation of institutions during the 1970s and 1980s led to a number of irrationalities in the Argentinean university system. For instance, the career of agricultural engineering is offered by 24 universities, and 19 of them are located within a distance of less than 200 km. from each other; the cities of Córdoba and Rosario have three faculties of engineering each, staffed by the same professors; in between Buenos Aires and La Plata, which are only 60 km. apart, there are five faculties of law [45].

2. The dual public-private sector in Argentine higher education

As in most Latin American countries, in Argentina the distinction between public and private university system is marked. Public universities are overwhelmingly public: they receive 99.75% of their revenue from the state and an insignificant 0.25% from other sources. Unlike developed countries, Argentina has no tradition of philanthropic or alumni donations to public universities, even to the most prestigious and traditional ones. Private universities are overwhelmingly private, in terms of financing, governance and function (Levy 1986). While the proportion of students enrolled in private universities has been relatively constant over time (about 10% of total enrollments), the institutional growth has been astonishing. In the early 1980s, private institutions shared only 15.5% of Argentinean higher education, yet in the early 1990s there are more private than public universities (33 and 29, respectively). A new phenomenon that took place in the early 1990s, with the liberalization of the educational market, was the proliferation of private universities. During the first two years of Menem's government, 10 new private universities were authorized, raising the total from 23 to 33 [46]. A new phenomenon in this recent wave was the emergence of elite private universities, with annual fees ranging from US $ 6,000 to $10,000. These elite institutions, which are a minority among private universities, generate cadres for the private sector, but mainly in management-related areas, and very seldom in areas related to production, such as engineering. In these areas, the elite cadres tend to get their education overseas, and generally do not return.

Most of private universities offer a restricted curriculum. With a few exceptions, there is a clear over-representation in the social sciences and humanities, a severe under-representation in basic sciences and technology, and almost no programs in the medical science [47]. Until 1984, only two private universities (UCA and Salvador) were comprehensive in nature, offering more than ten fields. By 1992, only two other private universities could be added to

the list (Belgrano and Católica de Córdoba) [48]. Indeed, private universities tend to concentrate in the most inexpensive and profitable disciplines, such as law, economics and humanities. Levy reports that the tendency of the private sector does not seem to be even toward business fields (such as administration) but toward low-cost fields (Levy 1986:261). Moreover, Universidad de Belgrano, one of the most prestigious private universities, considered an elite university by Levy (p.285), does not conduct research (except specific research contracts) [49], has very few full-time professors (carefully selected famous scientists, mostly for image purposes) and pays low salaries, even lower than in the deteriorated public sector.

In Argentina there is a tendency to perceive each sector as opposing the other, in such a way that to point out the decrease in quality of one should imply the increase in quality of the other. As a matter of fact, Levy suggests that the private gain of recent years is more related to public deterioration than private improvement, although private improvement may arise precisely as a consequence of public decline, attracting high quality professors and students from public universities (Levy 1986). The last intense public debate in relation to higher education was in the late 1950s, which ended in 1958 with the legal framework for the creation of private universities. Argentines are divided over which sector is superior, partly because the private-public issue still ignites zeal from the past. Complementing Levy's proposition of public sector failure, Cano (1985) points out that private universities emerged looking for lacunas in the market for diplomas, taking advantage of the relative rigidity of public universities to offer short careers or to adapt to new demands of the job market. Private universities are extremely loyal to the interest groups that sponsor them, be they religious, ideological or economic. This does not mean that private universities lack solid links with the state apparatus [50]. Indeed, although they are not allowed by law to receive any subsidy from the state, they receive tax exemptions and some hidden subsidies. Moreover, in certain occasions they may not only control the state departments that supposedly should control them, but they also strongly influence decision-making in relation to public universities (Cano 1985, Pérez Lindo 1985, Levy 1986).

Levy estimates that Argentinean public universities held an edge over the private sector in terms of quality and prestige until the late 1970s, and that by the 1980s both sectors enjoyed a similar status. Public universities still retain the most prestigious professors, and have an overall quality edge in disciplines such as medicine, law, architecture, engineering, economics and exact sciences, whereas the quality of private universities is usually confined to specific fields (e.g. business administration) in specific institutions. In public universities, prestige derives from the tradition of the *good old days*, while in private universities prestige is related to social exclusiveness in the latter (Graciarena 1972, Levy 1986). Today, the deterioration of the public university provides an advantage to the private sector. However, slowly but surely, the distinction between public and private is being blurred. While private universities have access to public resources and public policy, public universities are increasingly forced to foster links with the market and to incorporate non-governmental sources of revenue, such as tuition fees and contracts with industry. This trend is particularly noticeable in the universities of Córdoba, La Plata, San Juan and Nordeste.

3. The deterioration of the public university

The turning point in the decay of the Argentine public university can be traced to the 'night of the long sticks', on July 29, 1966, when the military regime of Onganía authorized the use of police violence against the university community in the Faculty of Sciences. While the immediate outcome of that event was the physical wounds inflicted on hundreds of students and professors, the most important consequences were massive resignations and a brain drain [51]. Since then, the financial erosion of public universities has been uninterrupted. Whereas between 1970 and 1985 the Brazilian budget for public higher education increased by half, the

Venezuelan three times and the Mexican eight times, the Argentinean budget decreased by half. During the same period, the Argentinean budget per student diminished 83% (see table 5) and between 1980 and 1985 faculty pay declined by two thirds (Winkler 1990: 6, 23 and 128).

Table 6: Public higher education spending per student in selected Latin American countries

(1970 = 100)

Country	1970	1980	1985
Argentina	**100**	**32**	**17**
Brazil	100	170	87
Chile	100	86	34
Mexico	100	244	171
Venezuela	100	144	82

Source: Filmus 1990:92 [52]

Although Levy (1986:412) predicted that "the 1983 return of democracy could substantially rescue the public sector" in Argentina, available evidence suggests that, after a decade of democratic rule, the situation has worsened. The crisis reached its peak in 1990, when in some faculties telephone and electricity services were cut for lack of payment, disrupting classes and ruining laboratory materials kept in freezers. The situation became so acute that some Presidents and Deans of public universities (i.e. La Plata, Comahue, Córdoba, Luján, del Sur, Tecnológica Nacional, Lomas de Zamora, del Centro) declared that their institutions were facing the virtual paralysis of teaching, research, and extension activities (Clarín, February 28 and March 19, 1990; Página 12, March 12, 1990).

In 1990, the total budget for all public universities was $745 million dollars, which represented half of the state contribution to a typical medium size American or European university, half of the monthly state subsidies to balance the deficit of public enterprises, and less that the tax evasion of just one business group (Página 12, March 9, 1990). At the time of the field study (1991-1992), university authorities declared a crisis in higher education. In a call of despair, most Rectors contended that if financial scarcities continued, the university would die in the near future, a concern captured by the local media under dramatic titles. In that context, the Rector of UBA estimated that the overall national budget for universities in 1991 was half of that allocated in the 1960s (although the number of public universities has doubled) and represented 25% of the 1987 budget (Schuberoff 1991:15).

Table 7: Argentinean university budget 1986-1992 [53]

1986	$ 746,933,112
1987	$ 1,016,719,016
1988	$ 977,792,391
1989	$ 722,048,203
1990	$ 745,621,234
1991	$ 728,457,500
1992	$ 808,258,000.

Source: Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional (CIN). Proyecto de ley del Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional de modificación de la ley de presupuesto 24,061: p. 2. April 1992. Figures are in US $ dollars.

Of the total 1992 budget (US $808,258,000), the Ministry of Education retained $84,365,000 (10.44%) to be allocated to science and technology on a discretionary basis. For that reason, the percentage allocated to universities decreased relative to previous years.

Table 8: Distribution of the total university budget (percentages) among national universities 1981-1992

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
B. Aires	21.67	21.49	19.99	22.06	22.16	23.17	25.02	24.18	24.04	21.95	20.78	17.49
Catamarca	.96	.92	0.80	0.85	1.10	1.00	1.16	1.10	1.11	1.11	1.19	1.12
Centro	.98	1.27	1.28	1.20	1.34	1.38	1.43	1.16	1.15	1.41	1.45	1.41
Comahue	1.87	1.99	1.98	1.86	2.42	2.41	2.18	2.30	2.14	2.29	2.76	2.22
Córdoba	10.76	10.72	11.08	10.43	9.91	8.94	8.46	9.24	9.23	8.65	9.71	8.17
Cuyo	5.19	4.86	4.79	4.96	5.03	4.84	4.42	4.95	4.88	5.23	5.76	5.41
Entre Ríos	0.75	0.70	0.72	0.71	0.92	1.00	1.12	1.11	1.01	1.18	1.11	0.97
Formosa									0.26	0.51	0.61	0.59
Jujuy	0.74	0.78	0.86	0.82	0.83	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.80	0.80	0.75	0.74
La Pampa	1.22	1.14	1.03	0.96	1.28	1.29	1.11	1.08	0.99	1.12	1.11	1.06
La Patagonia	1.54	1.57	2.20	1.68	1.63	1.83	1.73	1.92	1.79	2.20	2.07	1.88
La Plata	7.94	8.68	8.41	8.15	7.17	6.92	6.74	6.41	6.17	6.01	6.29	5.25
Litoral	3.30	3.34	3.05	3.20	3.10	3.10	3.09	2.68	2.73	2.79	2.80	2.40
L. de Zamora	0.65	0.89	1.22	0.92	1.22	1.33	1.31	1.14	1.09	1.06	1.03	0.99
Luján				0.44	0.87	0.95	0.98	0.96	1.01	1.00	0.98	0.94
M. del Plata	2.22	2.16	2.30	2.29	2.12	2.28	1.97	1.91	1.97	2.03	2.06	2.01
Misiones	1.36	1.33	1.41	1.40	1.51	1.45	1.76	1.80	1.78	2.10	1.95	1.75
Nordeste	3.92	4.26	4.31	4.13	4.06	3.77	3.67	3.93	3.78	3.29	3.59	3.08
Río Cuarto	2.14	2.02	1.87	1.88	1.73	1.64	1.71	1.60	1.49	1.62	1.53	1.46
Rosario	7.96	7.45	8.02	7.37	7.34	6.76	5.98	6.90	6.03	6.34	6.11	5.72
Salta	1.72	1.76	1.98	1.87	1.89	1.93	1.73	1.96	1.71	1.82	1.66	1.49
San Juan	3.82	3.86	3.83	3.96	4.01	3.96	4.19	3.73	4.70	4.74	4.91	4.81
San Luis	2.52	2.60	2.41	2.35	2.40	2.50	3.25	2.48	2.29	2.48	2.52	2.41
S. del Estero	0.78	0.79	0.75	0.82	0.84	0.92	1.45	1.19	1.27	0.87	1.00	0.81
Sur	2.91	2.66	2.64	2.82	2.64	2.68	2.66	2.47	2.75	2.29	2.50	2.28
UTN	6.03	6.16	6.12	6.50	6.53	7.00	6.58	6.39	6.32	6.80	6.72	6.09
Tucumán	7.05	6.60	6.95	6.37	5.95	6.08	5.43	6.53	7.51	8.31	6.91	6.86
Quilmes											0.14	0.17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: From 1981 to 1991: Universidad de Buenos Aires 1991:10.
For 1992: Orden del Día No. 1969 de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación. December 2, 1991.

The historical percentages enjoyed by each institution did not experience substantial alterations in the last decade (see table 8); thus, all universities suffered comparable cutbacks. Since most universities suffered the mismatch between expansion of enrollments and a decrease in funding, they are confronting similar problems, ranging from quality decline to infrastructural deterioration. For instance, in 1991 spending in libraries amounted to one percent of the annual budget, and in some universities represented as little as 0.3% of the budget, a very low proportion considering that UNESCO recommends 5%. This general decline is also evident in research and development, which started in 1966 and has been on a decline since. In 1983, the national universities in Argentina received only 6.1% of all government funds spent on science and technology, a reduction from 22.8% in 1974 (Gertel 1986).

Analysts of Argentinean scientific development reproach the political and economic leadership for its lack of vision and its disregard of knowledge, arguing that the reliance on 'cows and wheat', and the indolent attitude about the weakening of scientific and educational structures is severely limiting the prospects for national development (Pérez Lindo 1989:5, Pichel (1991:19). The little commitment Argentina has shown for research and development in the early 1990s is quite marked compared with that of developed countries (table 9). While the latter allocate on average more than 2% of the GNP (2.23 according to Winkler) to Science and Technology, and Asian countries 1.08%, Argentina devotes only about 0.4%. Likewise, Argentina has one of the lowest funding levels for scientists at $17,400 per scientist, not only compared with the US, Canada, Germany or France, where it usually exceeds $100,000 per

scientist, but also in relation to other Latin American countries such as Mexico ($56,700) or Brazil ($52,500).

Table 9: % of GNP allocated to non-military R&D in Argentina and selected MDCs (1986)

Japan	2.8%
Germany	2.6%
England	1.8%
USA	1.8%
France	1.8%
Argentina	0.4%

Source: Pichel 1991:25

This decreasing support for R&D has become increasingly evident over time. In 1973, Argentina was the leader of Latin American countries in scientific papers published, with 30.8% of the total, but in 1984, Brazil became the leader, increasing its share from 22.9% to 31.7%, while Argentina fell to 25.7%. Moreover, during the period 1973-80 Latin America as a whole increased its participation in international journals, relative to the rest of the world, in biology, chemistry, physics, geology, space, engineering and technology, mathematics and psychology, Argentina's participation declined by 88.9% in mathematics, 25.3% in biology, 31.9% in chemistry, 57% in physics, 48% in geology and space and 69% in engineering and technology. Curiously, it increased 128% in psychology (Mosto 1989, Pichel 1991:35 and 39). Another indicator of this decline is that, while in the 1970s Argentina was one of the major exporters of books in Latin America, today it imports books on a massive scale [54].

Another symptom of the deterioration is the brain drain, a process that has continued uninterrupted since the 1966 military coup. Indeed, after a long tradition of research that led to three Nobel Prizes in Science [55], the coup prompted many top scientists to emigrate. By the early 1970s the largest number of foreign researchers in the French *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* were Argentines (Pichel 1991:19). Over time, the situation has deteriorated. During the period 1960-1985, approximately 100,000 university graduates emigrated abroad [56]. Now, more than 80% of doctoral graduates from Exact Sciences find work in foreign countries, with very low prospects of them coming back [57].

In 1993, an explosive document entitled *Argentinean scientific and technological research policy* was publicly released. This report, produced by a team of 15 researchers coordinated by Enrique Oteiza, was kept for three years in the file cabinets of the same Secretary of Science and Technology who had originally requested it [58]. The reason for this seems to be political timing. The study was submitted to the Secretary at the end of 1989, when the Peronists took power after defeating the Radicals in the general elections. That report stated that two out of three Argentine researchers work abroad. In fact, while there are only 15,000 scientists working in R&D in Argentina, there are another 50,000 in foreign countries. Moreover, of the one million Argentines living overseas, 10% are university graduates, and half of them work in science and technology. The report claims that, even assuming there were only 30,000 scientists rather than 50,000, the country has lost a minimum of $600 million dollars (US) that was invested in their education.

However, the figure of 600 million dollars can be disputed, since it was reached using the lowest figures estimated by developed countries as the social costs involved in producing a researcher (roughly US $20,000), without considering the real investment of Argentinean society in those graduates. In any case, regardless of the magnitude of the wastage, the fact that two thirds of Argentine scientists have emigrated is alarming enough. Moreover, the report points out that, of those academics and scientists who returned to Argentina during the

1980s after the last military dictatorship, 80% have emigrated again. According to the study, the exodus is explained by the low salaries, the lack of conditions basic to conducting research, and the low importance assigned by the state to research and technology. The net result of this dynamic is an export of 'raw intelligence' (experts) and an import of 'manufactured intelligence' (technology). In fact, Argentinean industry pays annually $600 million in royalties and patents to foreign companies, which is equivalent to the combined budget of all Argentine universities, or to 7% of total exports, and three times its total investment in R&D (Bunge 1987:76, Perez Lindo 1989:113).

As a matter of fact, for Pichel (1991), the main reason for this decay is not the decline in the prices of natural resources for export (wheat, soya, sorghum, meat, etc.), but rather the breakdown of the intelligence cycle (a combination of education, basic and applied research in order to transform nature and produce wealth). Three successive catastrophes have weakened this cycle, resulting in internal and external brain drain [59]. The first two were the military coups of 1966 and 1976 [60], which provoked unjustified ideological persecution, and the third was the combined result of the breakdown of the scientific system and an extreme pauperization of researchers and professors. He concludes that "after us (the generation of scientists and intellectuals graduated in the mid-century), the increasingly abandoned new generations will suffer the phenomenal weight of the atrocities perpetrated against science and education" (Pichel 1991:52). In the same vein, Pérez Lindo (1989) contends that Argentina has not yet addressed the main dilemma regarding universities: either to change them into an agent of development, or to continue being reproducers of underdevelopment.

In a later book (1991:124) he argues that the main problem is that the current pattern of development blocks the possibilities of benefiting from existing human and material resources, pointing out five main bottlenecks: a) widespread speculative mechanisms; b) industrial expansion not based on permanent technological innovation; c) no relation between agricultural development and scientific development; d) lack of efficacy criteria in state functioning; and e) little appreciation of the value of knowledge by the political class. The last point is reiterated by Favaloro (1991), who claims that the university crisis is a consequence of the tendency of the political class to give priority to conjunctural factors, without paying sufficient attention to the deeper causes of decay. This argument is usually advanced by university authorities, who complain that budget cutbacks are the product of the ignorance of the political and economic leaders.

From a different perspective, advocates of privatization tend to relate the deterioration process to the gross inefficiency of the public sector, which in the case of the university, is allegedly related to an extreme politicization of governance, massiveness, bureaucracy, weakness of internal structures of authority, excessive power of academic and non-academic unions, etc. The marketventionist's call for university restructuring is well received by many Argentinean academics, partly because of financial pressures, but also because there is a general agreement among university leaders that the Argentinean university system is in need of a profound change. On the one hand, the challenges arising from the contradictory dynamic between enrollment expansion and funding contraction are pressuring many academics to accept that, in order to survive, an urgent flow of resources is needed. For them, at this point in time, it is inconsequential if funds have a public or a private origin. Indeed, there is a consensus that decreasing resources have resulted in a general deterioration of all university activities, which is particularly noticeable in the constant decline in quality and working conditions of academic and non-academic staff. Since practically the entire budget is directed to salaries, with almost no additional resources to cover operational costs, equipment, scholarships or infrastructure, most of the debate on higher education policies is generally confined to salary-related conflicts.

On the other hand, many university leaders share the view that Argentinean universities still endure several historical problems inherited from the Napoleonic model. Prominent among these problems is the emphasis on the professional mission of the university at the expense of its scientific mission, which is expressed in lengthy undergraduate programs, low professionalization of teaching and research careers, weak graduate programs, the marginal role of scientific research, high drop out rates and the absence of indicators to measure the quality of incoming students, graduates, academic production and research (Balán 1991, World Bank 1993). In spite of the general agreement that the Argentinean university sooner or later must undertake a transformation, the pace and direction of this transformation is under dispute. Indeed, the heteronomous model is not favored by those universities which are strongly attached to the principles of the 1918 Reform. Probably due to its size and its history, UBA plays a leadership role among public universities in the resistance to government's pressure for university restructuring. The relation between universities and the government is greatly shaped by the relation between the government and UBA, to the extent that it can be suggested that once reforms are implemented in UBA, they can be easily imposed on other universities.

Section 3. The University of Buenos Aires. Description of a mega-university

1. General Overview

The University of Buenos Aires (UBA) is a massive public university founded in 1821 under the notion of *Université Imperiale*. Indeed, it shares with other large Latin American universities its Napoleonic roots and its extensive scope. As Winkler described them

> Large, comprehensive public universities often had their origin as the traditional institution for preparation of the country's political and technical elite. When social demand for higher education expanded, many of these institutions were allowed to grow, resulting in massive enrollments... The comprehensive public university is often the flagship institution of the country offering a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate fields of study. Its special status puts it in a category separate from all other universities when budget allocations are determined (Winkler 1990:7).

However, UBA authorities reject Winkler's last statement, arguing that UBA is overlooked at the time of budget allocation. Their complaint is not groundless: while in 1991 UBA enrolled 34.5% of students attending all public universities, generated 40% of all graduates and produced 44.3% of all refereed scientific publications, it received only 20.4% of the total universities budget. In 1992, UBA's budget was US $141,371,000, a decrease in its share of the total university budget to 17.49%.

UBA includes 13 faculties, a one-year introductory course called CBC (Ciclo Básico Común), a center for graduate studies and research, 2 secondary schools, a distance education program (UBA XXI), 8 museums, 5 health units, one health clinic for students, one cultural center and one sport complex. It offers 105 different undergraduate degrees (34 of which take 4 years or less, and 71 with a duration of 5 and 6 years), 11 master programs, 11 doctoral programs, 114 after degree specializations (diplomas) [61], and 2 high school degrees. It also has 18 libraries which hold 2,160,800 volumes, 881,900 periodicals (journals and magazines) and provide an average of 2,580,000 services per year.

Due to its considerable enrolment, UBA has been classified by some authors (such as Delich 1990) as a mega-university. Indeed, UBA is the major Argentine university and the second largest Latin American university, after the Mexican UNAM (which caters to 300,000 students). In 1983, UBA enrolled 160,000 students. With the fall of the military regime, changes in admission policies allowed the entrance of delayed demand, and by 1986 total enrollment increased to 250,000 students. Once this demand was satisfied, enrollments

stabilized to approximately 200,000 students. By 1991, total enrollment amounted to 215,100 students [62]: 126,600 of them were registered in undergraduate programs, 77,100 in the Ciclo Básico Común, 7,200 in graduate programs and 4,200 in the two secondary schools. These students attend classes taught by 36,896 professors, of which approximately 8,000 are ad-honorem, that is, work on voluntary basis and do not receive any payment. Most professors and students are part-time employees. The proportion of full-time professors varies depending on the source. According to government officials, only 3% of UBA professors are full-time, but according to UBA (see table 11) the figure is 20%. Although the proportion of full-time students is not reported in university statistics, indirect data suggest that it is very high. According to the 1988 university census 67% of students work, and in some faculties, such as humanities the figure rises to 82%; it may be inferred that many of these students are unlikely to attend university full-time. The non-academic body is made up of 9,712 members, of whom 5,720 are administrative, technical and janitorial support staff, and 4,400 are assistants, particularly in the university health clinics and hospitals.

UBA's health services are provided in 5 units, which have 1,200 beds, receive 448,000 outpatients per year, perform 103,300 surgeries and provide 2,667,194 laboratory, physiotherapy and other services. These health centers provide training for 5,400 undergraduate students and 1,500 graduate students. UBA also has a veterinary school-hospital. UBA also offers a summer camp which provides services to 1,500 children per season, and has 30 agreements with public and private universities in Argentina, and 114 international agreements. Extension programs are directed towards the community at large and to the university community, and include a broad range of cultural, social, educational and sport activities, ranging from health prevention to professional development for UBA's staff. UBA also has a student aid program that benefits 340 students.

By 1991, research was conducted in 75 centers integrating 558 research units, involving 3,764 researchers and 610 research assistants working in 891 financed research projects. The number of researchers is usually estimated taking into account all full-time faculty who, by definition, are researchers, plus all professors and graduate students who are engaged in research projects. In 1992, the Secretary of Science and Technology provided specific funding for 435 research projects, which were selected from 735 applications.

Table 10: Research projects approved by the Secretary of Science and Technology of the University of Buenos Aires for 1992 (partial assessment as of March, 1992)

	Presented	Approved
Agriculture	76	27
Architecture	26	12
CBC	4	--
Center of Advanced Studies	7	2
Social Sciences	31	20
Law	12	2
Economics	12	3
Exact Sciences	198	134
Pharmacy	106	65
Philosophy	64	49
Engineering	34	23
Medicine	93	55
Dentistry	21	12
Biology	33	15
Animal Sciences	35	16
TOTAL	752	435

Source: Secretary of Science and Technology, UBA.

Curiously, none of these 435 research projects deals with the university itself. Technology transfer is promoted through 180 contracts with public and private enterprises. All services provided to local government and to industry are organized under a company called UBATEC S.A., created in 1990 in association with three other partners: Municipalidad of Buenos Aires, Unión Industrial Argentina (large industry) and the Confederación General de la Industria (small and medium enterprise). The university authorizes its academic staff to work a maximum of 450 hours per year in projects generated via UBATEC, with remuneration varying for each particular case. Three percent of all UBATEC's revenues is reinvested in research activities, and six percent of all revenues is distributed among all full-time professors. In 1991, UBA granted fellowships to a total of 530 research projects: 30% went to senior undergraduate students, and the remaining 70% to alumni, most of them pursuing graduate studies. The internal distribution of the latter category is as follows: 40% correspond to junior fellowships (becas de iniciación) and 30% to advanced fellowships (becas de perfeccionamiento). Most of these researchers are linked to a research group. The importance attributed to this research is manifested by the fact that it consumes 25% of all resources not allocated to salaries (which in turn represent 10% of the budget) [63]. A significant feature of research at UBA is that it is concentrated in physical sciences, as evidenced by the fact that half of the doctoral graduates are from the faculty of Exact Sciences.

In terms of decision-making, UBA has a co-governance system involving three parties: professors, students and alumni. In each one of the 13 faculties there is a council comprised of 8 professors, 4 students, 4 alumni, and the dean. These 104 professors, 52 alumni and 52 students elect, in turn, 5 representatives each to the General Faculties Council (GFC) [64]. Among the different slates participating in these elections, the one capturing the most votes is considered the majority and those obtaining fewer votes are called the minority. In the three constituencies (professors, alumni and students) the slates linked to the Radical Party regularly attain a majority, whereas the minority is usually filled by right and left movements and parties. These 15 majority and minority delegates ('consejeros'), plus the 13 Deans, constitute the 28 members of the GFC, which is chaired by the university rector. Beyond these governing bodies, the relationship between the faculties (often oriented around a profession) and the central university institution, and between themselves, is very limited. Institutional decentralization is further reinforced by geographical dispersion of faculties throughout the city. In the Napoleonic tradition, UBA can be characterized more accurately as a confederation of faculties than as an integrated university.

2. Deterioration process and current situation

As already mentioned, the process of institutional and academic deterioration can be traced to the military intervention of 1966. The military leaders themselves have acknowledged their university policies as a mistake, because the authoritarianism and brutality of their intervention and the proscription of intellectual debate had the contrary effect of prompting the university community to participate in social and political conflicts [65]. Most analysts agree that the 1976-1983 military period brought about a repression and a decline in academic and research activities that was unprecedented in the history of Argentinean universities (Cano 1985:18, Pérez Lindo 1985:177, Graciarena 1986:xxiv) [66]. By 1977, Argentina had more writers imprisoned than any other country in the world. And by February 1978, Taquini had pointed out that the massive exodus of scientists would not continue because, by that time, there was no scientific community left [67]. Of the 30,000 persons who 'disappeared' during the military regime, it is estimated that almost 40% were engaged in intellectual activities. During that period, UBA imposed quotas, tuition fees, entrance examinations and even a certificate of 'good behavior' issued by the police. Professors and students were expelled for ideological reasons, and new appointments were not necessarily based on academic merit.

Hence, in 1983 the new UBA authorities inherited an institution deprived of its best elements, where democratic and peer review practices were absent and research activities were ill-performed. In 1983 UBA not only had more non-academic than academic staff, but the former (particularly administrative staff) also enjoyed higher salaries and working conditions than the latter. Moreover, UBA authorities were confronted with the social expectation that they accept all applicants who had been denied admission during the military period. Whereas in 1974 the number of incoming students was 40,825, in 1982 (the last year of the military regime) only 12,719 were accepted. In the same period, the number of students decreased from 154,661 to 102,941. In order to deal with the social pressure for open admissions, UBA created in 1985 an introductory program (CBC, or Ciclo Básico Común) consisting of 6 courses to be taken during the first year. This program was conceived as a buffer to reconcile two conflicting elements: the democratic expectations for open access and the virtual impossibility of individual faculties to multiply their enrollments overnight. Due to financial constraints, the CBC was created without a library, thus being probably one of the few academic units in the world without such a vital resource. In its first year, 80,000 students were registered in the CBC. It maintained its enrolments in the 1990s, providing services to an average of 70,000 students. At the time of the study (1991), the general situation of UBA had not improved much, especially in the financial aspect. According to UBA authorities, the 1991 budget represented (in constant values) only one-half of the 1987 budget, and investments represented only 11.7% (UBA 1991:22).

During the same period, the proportion of the budget allocated to salaries increased from 68% to 87%, and the salaries of support staff suffered a deeper decline than the rest of the public sector. This increase in the budgetary allocations to salaries led to a corresponding decrease in the amount allocated to equipment and capital expenditures. Whereas in 1987 UBA assigned 4% of its budget to equipment and related expenditures (e.g. computers, laboratory equipment, books and journals, museum pieces) in 1991 it allocated only 1% of the budget. In the same vein, UBA has been suffering a constant decline in the funding for R&D. According to the Vice-President of Science and Technology, between 1988 and 1991 the number of research fellows decreased from 1,000 to 750. Likewise, the 1991 university budget for R&D represented a real decline of 50% relative to the previous year. Furthermore, funds for R&D, which were only 2% in 1990, were reduced to 1% in 1991 [68]. Budget cutbacks also affect equality of opportunity. For instance, the 340 student aid packages currently assigned represent only one-half the number assigned in 1960, and a great decline compared to the 1,730 granted annually between 1984 and 1989.

Table 11: Budget evolution (base 1987=100) Source: UBA 1991:23

Concept	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Personnel	100	93.0	74.9	77.8	67.7
Goods and services	100	78.7	102.7	81.9	37.4
Other expenditures	100	108.3	63.9	40.0	40.5
Total expenditures	100	92.0	77.3	77.0	63.7
Capital goods (books, etc.)	100	56.5	18.3	19.7	11.7
Construction	100	71.0	18.2	8.9	11.7
Pre-existing goods	100	63.1	73.6	21.1	47.0
Total capital expenditures	100	67.1	20.3	12.1	13.0
Total	100	86.9	65.1	63.1	52.9

Currently, UBA faces a variety of problematic situations. One of them, which will be analyzed in the next section, relates to its conflictive relationship with government. While the government accuses UBA of inefficiency and declining quality, UBA claims that there is no evidence for these claims [69]. Moreover, UBA blames the state for its attack against university autonomy (expressed in decrees 1111/90 and 160/91) and for the lack of significant input that universities have in the formulation of scientific and technological policies. Another problem is its weak relationship with industry and society at large. Although UBA blames industry and society for not recognizing either the importance of universities to the generation and dissemination of knowledge, or the necessity of having a high level scientific system in the country, it is also true that the university has made little effort to bridge the gap. Indeed, UBA itself has recognized the limited success of extension services to address specific social problems (UBA 1990, 1991).

In addition to these relational problems, there are several bottlenecks that are rooted in UBA's own organizational structure. Prominent among them is the long-term emphasis placed on professional training, which has furthered the fragmentation of university life into individual faculties, and has had a negative influence on teaching, research, extension and the transfer of technology. Other organizational problems include an excessive centralization of decision-making within a large bureaucratic administration, limited relationship among faculties [70], absence of general mechanisms for planning, implementation and evaluation, excessive concentration of students in some facilities and underutilization of others, scarce supply of graduate programs, vocational programs and intermediate degrees, little relationship between extension, teaching and research, scarcity of teaching aid materials and inadequate organization of libraries, insufficient books [71], and the absence of reliable information.

Last, but not least, are the financial difficulties, expressed in drastic reductions in budget and investments: 40% and 70% respectively between 1987 and 1990. Over that period, reduction of the university budget from 0.7% of the GNP to 0.3% has been aggravated by the diminution of the GNP itself. The financial crisis not only affects the basic infrastructure (labs, libraries, etc.) but also creates frustration among professors, who increasingly disengage themselves from the university either by moving to other professions [72] or emigrating to other countries. For UBA, the financial crisis is so grave that "there is a real possibility of losing the critical mass of qualified human resources that still today make possible the existence of the Argentinean university" (UBA 1990:8).

3. Alternative sources of revenue

As a result of budget cutbacks, UBA has implemented a strategy to obtain complementary sources of revenue. In 1990, UBA's own revenues amounted to 8 million dollars US. Half of these revenues came from contracts with the private sector, and the other half from services provided by university hospitals [73]. In 1991, according to its own estimations, UBA obtained additional resources that represented 33% of all revenues generated within the national university system (UBA 1991:22). In some faculties, external sources can amount to as much as 20% of the total state funding.

The main avenues pursued to attain this goal are contracts with government and industry through the aforementioned UBATEC or through direct agreements, and the imposition of fees for graduate courses and for the provision of specific services. Linkages with industry and government started in mid 1990 (though in some faculties they started as early as 1988) and are developed in three areas: a) contracts for research and development, b) technical assistance (consultancies, advisories, etc.), and c) performance of specific services (quality control, analyses, etc.). Academic staff who participate in any of these three areas usually receive extra money, and some are able to double their incomes. Although from an academic

point of view the most important area is the first one, due to external demand most activities are undertaken in the other two. Indeed, R&D activities generate only about 10% of all revenues from contracts with industry and government. Hence, self-defined research still represents a great proportion of research projects conducted in UBA. The most successful faculties in generating additional revenue are Medicine, Economics, Engineering, Pharmacy, Animal Sciences and Humanities. The unexpected achievement of the latter faculty in attracting external funding can be attributed to the particular ability of its Dean. A geographer, he has been able to market the services of the Geography Institute to government and industry alike. At the time of the study, the faculty was developing projects in the areas of urban planning, transportation, non conventional sources of energy, river pollution, treatment of industrial and household water, and demography, for a clientele as diverse as industry, unions, the legislature and government agencies. The faculty of humanities also obtains revenues from its language lab, extension programs, publications [74] and graduate courses. In general terms, a great part of the revenue (from 60% to 80%) is channeled into strengthening the department or area that developed the contract, while the rest is reinvested in the general fund of the faculty [75]. The faculty of Economics collects most of its revenue from consulting jobs and graduate course fees [76]. In undergraduate programs, although fees are constitutionally forbidden, informal fees are already in place in some faculties to cover part of the costs of materials used in practical activities, particularly in areas such as medicine, engineering, meteorology, physics, dentistry, chemistry, computers or biology.

In some faculties, such as architecture, medicine or exact sciences, the relation with industry is channeled through foundations. In the latter faculty, the foundation provides different types of services, from the development of computer programs to the analysis of nuclear magnetic resonance, which in the past were sent abroad to be analyzed.

Besides the efforts of individual faculties, additional sources of revenues are also procured by almost every university area. For instance, in 1990 university hospitals collected more revenues (13% higher) than the operational budget allocated by the government (UBA 1991:12). In Extension, between 40 to 50% of the operating budget is self-financed, which represents 5% of its total budget. Most university authorities do not question the shift towards the private sector for revenues, and accept it as a *fait d'accompli*.. In their perspective, there is no doubt that the era of the subsidizing state is over, and the university can expect decreasing contributions from it. Moreover, they predict that, in the future, their achievements as deans will be evaluated not only in relation to educational activities, but also to economic accomplishments.

4. The efficiency issue

One of the main controversies surrounding UBA relates to its efficiency. According to Delich (1988:46), former UBA Rector and current Rector of the University of Córdoba, UBA is the archetype of inefficiency:

> "When inertia is part and parcel of daily life; when a student must wait for a year after graduation to obtain the diploma because of bureaucracy; when nobody is able to control purchases at the University Hospital, and there is always a shortage of basic elements, whatever the amount of money spent; when hundreds of people are paid but do not work; when you never know if classes or exams are going to be held; when it is possible to realize the disappearance of...an elevator! (as it happened in San Martín Hospital), without any explanation or solution, it means that the organization is no longer an organization, that the system is no longer a system and that the University is no longer a University. All has become a tremendous state of confusion which survives only because in that situation thousands of particular interests find a means to obtain some individual advantage, even if it is a small one".

He also condemns UBA's excessive size and the fragmentation of the university into individual faculties, which in turn are subjected to the power of professional corporations. UBA's inefficiency is also addressed by Winkler (1990:20), who compares its low graduation rate (10%) with graduation rates of about 60% in large American public universities and 80% in elite American universities. Winkler attributes UBA's low graduation rates to the decline in admission standards, especially as a result of open admission policies, and to the decline in the quality of educational services which, in turn, is related to reductions in expenditures per pupil and resource misallocation. Government officials also contend that UBA is inefficient and wasteful, but complain that it is very difficult to demonstrate this because university's accounts are not public. The most recurrent examples of inefficiency provided by government officials refer to duplications, bureaucracy, academic-support staff ratios, and professors' absenteeism. The typical illustration of duplication is the existence of 8 departments of mathematics, and the argument on bureaucracy usually alluded to the presence of seven vice-presidents, an excessive number according to government sources.

The government also contends that at UBA the ratio between academic and non-academic staff is 1:1, which they claim is unacceptable. They further charge that most of the budget for non-academic staff goes to administrative positions in the central administration (Rectorado). In relation to professors' absenteeism, government officials were unable to provide figures, but the existence of the problem was widely accepted by the university community. The most cited situation in this regard was that many lectures are not taught by full-time professors who are supposedly in charge, but by teaching assistants.

University authorities rebut that UBA is one of the most efficient universities in the country, and probably in Latin America. To support their claim, they provide several examples. First, as was already pointed out, with only 20% of the total university budget UBA enrols 34.5% of students and produces 40% of graduates. Second, UBA has only 26% of all scientific researchers in the country, but they generate 44% of all scientific production. Third, while in the rest of the national research system only 13% of researchers publish, in UBA the proportion of those who publish is 23%. Fourth, the annual per student cost in 1991 (US $640) was lower than the average cost in private universities (US $2,000) and in the majority of national universities (i.e. US $744 in Universidad de Córdoba, $748 in Salta, $1,458 in Litoral, $1,967 in Comahue and $2,317 in Cuyo). The difference becomes more obvious if compared with the University of Sao Paulo, where the annual per student cost was $7,000 (UBA 1991:7-8). In 1992, the per student cost at UBA increased to US $963, which was still lower than the Argentinean average and faraway from prestigious universities in the United States (table 12).

Table 12: Budget allocation in selected universities (1992)

University	Budget per student	Student/teacher ratio	Full time professors (%)
Yale	18,826	5	95
Princeton	10,856	9	99
Harvard	23,358	17	91
California	28,274	7	100
Duke	16,628	5	96
Stanford	13,819	9	97
San Pablo	4,009	6	69
Argentina (mean)	1,634	14	15
UBA	963	14	20

Source: UBA, Secretary of Science and Technology (published in Clarín, Feb. 7, 1993:43).

Fifth, in 1991 the budget per graduate (in millions of australes) was $97,78, relatively low in comparison with Córdoba ($138,61), Comahue ($138,61), La Plata ($118,35), Litoral ($164,33), Cuyo ($299,39) or Salta ($573,03). Sixth, in 1986 the ratio of students to teachers in all Argentinean institutions was 22, whereas in UBA was 38 [77] (Gertel 1986, Borón 1991, UBA 1991: 8, 30, Finoli 1992). Seventh, with only 4% of the health budget of the City of Buenos Aires, UBA maintains more than 15% of all available beds in the city and registers 11% of discharges, providing high complexity treatments. Finally, UBA contends that the academic/non-academic staff ratio is 7:1, more than twice the guidelines established by the government, which is 3:1. UBA stresses that even if the non-academic staff who work in university hospitals are included, the ration is 3.8:1, which is still higher than the government's standard. The discrepancy between university's and government's estimates (3.8:1 and 1:1, respectively) can be due to the fact that the former refer to persons and the latter to budget distribution. In other words, while 50% of the budget may be allocated to support staff, this does not necessarily mean that they represent 50% of the workforce. The discrepancy between the two sources can be further illuminated by the fact that more than 25% of professors work ad-honorem, and the rest are mostly part-time, underpaid staff. The controversy around the efficiency issue will be revisited in chapter 5.

Section 4. The conflict and the actors

This section presents a general description of the actors involved in the university conflict, and outlines some highlights of the conflict. Its main purpose is to provide a context for the reader to situate chapters 5 and 6 (diagnosis and policies, respectively) in a historical and political framework. It is pertinent to note that the conflict cannot be reduced to a simple dispute between government and university authorities. Although they are the two main contenders, the inclusion of a variety of actors in the conflict, partly due to the democratic system of university governance, and partly to the intense politicization of the Argentinean society, has resulted a complex network of alliances and animosities.

1. Autonomists and marketventionists. An overview

One of the key elements to consider in the analysis of the present university conflict in Argentina is its relation to social dynamics, ideological consensus and state policies. Indeed, the fluctuations of the Argentinean university system throughout this century cannot be isolated from broader ideological and social developments. When conservative ideologies dominated the political agenda, education was perceived as a means to consolidate the national state and to preserve an aristocratic social order, and the university followed an elitist model. In the first decades of this century, with increasing middle class involvement in political and economic life, the university followed a democratic-liberal model that favored expansion, particularly after the 1918 Reform. Such expansion was further promoted in the 1950s and 1960s when, under the winds of developmentalism, education was perceived as human capital, the key variable for economic development.

Although the 1966-1973 military intervention restricted university autonomy, enrolments continued to expand and new institutions were created. Later, with the 'national liberation' movement of the early 1970s, the university adopted a social transformation model in line with government populist policies. After the 1976 military coup, it was forced into an authoritarian and restrictive model which shifted with the democratic transition of 1983 into an 'inertial model' primarily based on response to demand (Tedesco 1987, Marquis 1990, Martínez Porta 1991). With the advent of the Menemist government, the university system has been pressured to evolve into a 'modernization' model based on cost-effectiveness built on the two pillars of privatization and accountability.

In the early nineties, two main contending parties can be observed: autonomists (or reformists) and marketventionists. The former are grounded in the principles of the 1918 Reform, which emphasize internal democratization and eventually a progressive democratization of the entire society. Presently, their major concern is to preserve the situation of autonomy, understood as a basic prerequisite for a progressive academic institution. The latter contend that autonomy has led to internal and external inefficiency, and therefore call for increasing market participation and state control, and advocate technocracy, accountability, rationalization and depoliticization. In general terms, the autonomist movement has an overwhelming hegemony at the University of Buenos Aires, whereas marketventionists control the state apparatus. However, autonomists have allies outside UBA, and marketventionists have supporters in some universities, and even among UBA members.

The marketventionist bloc is headed by President Menem himself [78], and is entrenched in and consolidated through government agencies (particularly the Ministries of Economy and Education), the project 06 (funded by the World Bank), some media like the newspaper La Prensa, large industry associations (particularly the Unión Industrial Argentina) and some alumni societies linked to external institutions such as the *Club de Harvard.* Within UBA, it has its base in the faculty of Medicine, and enjoys the backing of alumni, professors and students of the neoliberal minority, as well as the hesitant support of some deans. The autonomist bloc is led by UBA authorities and the majority representatives of students, professors and alumni, particularly the student group named Franja Morada (FM), the youth branch of the Radical Party, which prevails in all Argentinean universities since the restoration of democracy in 1983. In the 1991 elections, FM obtained 49.17% of total votes and won the majority in 8 of the 13 faculties: Law, Architecture, Psychology, Economics, Pharmacy, Dentistry, Animal Sciences and Social Sciences. In the five remaining faculties the student associations are controlled by the following groups: Humanities and Exact Sciences by the left wing Compañeros de Base, Agronomy by an independent slate), Engineering by the right wing UPAU, and Medicine by FUNAP, a recently created pro-government branch of the Peronist student movement [79]. Consequently, FM obtained three of the five seats allocated to students in the GFC, and the remaining two seats are occupied by Compañeros de Base and UPAU.

In 1992, FM increased its popularity, winning in 10 faculties. FM leaders argued that these electoral results implied a plebiscite against the government's university policy, which is "an attack against free education, co-governance and autonomy". They claim that the university model of the government is individualistic and restrictive, contrary to the model of the 1918 Reform. They proclaimed that the electoral results were a call of attention to the government "who must dialogue, and not combat, the university community [80]. Whereas the minority representatives of the left (students, professors and alumni) tend to make alliances with autonomists, the minority representatives of the right tend to support the marketventionist proposals for university restructuring. Outside UBA, autonomists have strong allies in the Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional (CIN), which is comprised of the rectors of all public universities, as well as in the Radical Party. As the conflict become more polarized, those who still remain neutral are increasingly pressured to take sides, and the chosen side depends on the inclination to resist or to adapt to the marketventionist agenda.

Present university leaders and government officials have a clear disadvantage with respect to their predecessors. While the 1918 Reform was supported -and encouraged- by the state, and therefore was based on an alliance between university intellectuals and the Radical government, the current counter-reform finds the university and the government in opposite trenches. As was suggested in chapter 1, the 1918 Reform was part of the modernization process of the Argentine society that took place between 1885 and 1930, in which the middle classes replaced the traditional oligarchy in the control of the state apparatus. The strategy of

the newly arrived Yrigoyen's government to increase its political hegemony included the control of universities [81], and the flow of the middle classes to the university during the previous decades assisted the achievement of that purpose. Today, autonomists no longer have an ally in the government, but rather an adversary. Conversely, the Menemist government needs to boost supporters within a hostile university in order to build consensus for its agenda. Indeed, the marketventionist coalition headed by the government not only has recruited followers among minority representatives, but has also built a beach head in the faculty of Medicine.

The relative weight of each contender is determined by its public support and its capacity to control public resources and influence public policy. Whereas Autonomists seem to hold the sympathies of the university community (particularly students) and large sectors of the middle class, marketventionists have the power of the purse and the control of the state apparatuses. As Neave (1991:78) points out, the free market model does not have a popular appeal but the political influence of its proponents is inversely related to their number. Additionally, whereas in 1918 the international context favored the Reformist agenda, in the early 1990s it bolsters the marketventionist coalition [82].

The conflict between autonomists and marketventionists is permeated by mutual distrust and threats. Marketventionists recurrently claim that the university administration is engaged in administrative corruption and disguises political activities as academic activities, but they are unable to prove their points because the university conceals information. On the other hand, autonomists do not trust the promises of the government, particularly in relation to evaluation and finances. Although institutional stability, autonomy and open competitions for academic positions promote the utilization of more consensually shared evaluation mechanisms than in the military period, autonomists fear that state evaluation of quality can be used -as it has been used in the past- for ideological and political discrimination. In regard to finances, although government officials constantly promise that tuition fees and other potential sources of revenue would be 'complementary' and not 'alternative' (and hence the state would maintain its commitment to higher education) autonomists do not believe them.

Indeed, there is a concern on part of university actors that if the university increases its own sources of revenue, this income would replace (instead of complement) state funding. Their suspicions about government's reassurance that private sources of revenue will complement - and not replace- public funding have some basis in international experience. Interestingly, while Argentinean government officials point out that such fears are unfounded, two WB papers admit that there is some reason for concern. Eisemon and Salmi (1992:13), for instance, call attention to the serious constraint that any savings or income derived simply reduces government obligations to the universities, and warn that government support should not fall by a dollar for each dollar of revenue generated. Douglas and Ziderman (1993) confirm this warning, showing that, in 1990, Chilean institutions received only about 60% of the resources forecasted in the initial plan. Moreover, UBA itself experienced this situation. Rector Schuberoff (1991:15) claimed that the upcoming national budget contemplated a reduction from the total budget in the amount equivalent to the revenues generated by the university.

Autonomists also indicate that they carried out certain reforms against their own will, due to the threats expressed by some government officials. These threats could be summarized as follows: "if you don't do the changes right now, we will do them for you later, and it will be much worse". In an interview with a national magazine, one professor confessed that Enrique Bullit Goñi, a Ministry of Education top official, told university rectors that at the end the 1980s that adjustment policies could not be postponed any longer, and that is was preferable that they (the Rectors) do the adjustment themselves and not the Ministry of Economy [83]. It is

interesting to note that the 'grinch' pointed out by Bullit Goñi was not his own Ministry but the Ministry of Economy which, according to many interviewees, was the site where university restructuring was being designed. The battle between autonomists and marketventionists is being fought in four main fronts: legislative, institutional, ideological, and financial.

2. The four fronts of the conflict

a) The legislative front: An indecent proposal?

The strained relation between marketventionists and autonomists can be traced to the higher education policies of the Menemist government which assumed power in 1989. That very year, the then Minister of Education Antonio Salonia called for the "end of the educational island, the pure science in the isolation of the laboratory, and the culture of stratosphere, faraway from the people and the concrete problems". He also claimed that resource allocation traditionally benefited university at the expense of basic education, which is not only inadequate but also unjust. In an implicit reference to autonomous governance, he stated that "the current university is not the one of 1918. There are new social, technological and cultural demands. Therefore, university affairs are of interest to society as a whole, and new institutional mechanisms to include social and governmental representatives in the university should be developed". Furthermore, he contended that "university planning must constitute a technical-political instrument, coherent with national socio-economic and educational planning" (Salonia 1989).

Following these directions, a legislative proposal was prepared by the Secretary of Educational Coordination, Enrique Bulit Goñi (who was the head of the Argentine delegation to the World Conference on Education for All held in Thailand in 1990, co-sponsored by the World Bank, in which an emphasis on basic education was proclaimed) to modify Law 23,569 which regulates university funding. That project attempted to eliminate the prohibition to charge fees, and to promote alternative sources of funding. Article 6 of the proposal stated that universities could not allocate payments of more than 20% of the amount allocated to salaries of academic staff to non-academic staff. Additionally, article 11 compelled universities to submit to the Ministry of Education information about academic, administrative and financial affairs at the times and under conditions required by the Ministry. Minister Salonia denied the existence of such a proposal, stating that "there is no official project oriented to move the state away from its financial duty to universities" and attributed the misunderstanding to a rumor initiated by a newspaper. However, the newspaper alluded to by the Minister reaffirmed the existence of the project (Clarín, April 3, 1991:39). One month later, in an interview with another newspaper, Salonia acknowledged that the project indeed existed, and that it was designed "to define new, non-conventional sources of funding which could include fees, consultories and research results" (La Nación, May 9, 1991:10).

Some months later, Clarín (Sept. 21:2 and 3) disclosed more specifics of the government's project. The main proposal was that state funding would no longer be the major source of resources. Moreover, the state would 'reward' universities which comply with its educational policy, obtain their own financial resources, increase the proportion of graduates and reduce the proportion of the budget allocated to support staff and administrative activities. In fact, article 4 made it clear that the state would reward universities that charge fees as well as show greater efficiency and educational quality and that, for funding purposes, the state would take into account the correspondence of academic activities of universities with the overall government educational policy. Other administrative reforms contemplated annual external audits and a selective salary policy for academic and support staff based on performance. Universities would be granted the freedom to hire personnel and make investments. Student fees would be implemented together with fee waivers, scholarships and a graduate tax.

These administrative and financial reforms proposed by Bullit Goñi were accompanied by a plan for academic reform, prepared by the then Sub secretary of University Affairs, Luis de Imaz. Among the changes proposed was the elimination of co-governance: only full professors would form part of university government, whereas students, assistant professors and support staff would no longer be able to elect their representatives to university councils, although they could present specific problems related to their areas. Another intended reform was the creation of boards (with representatives of both the university and the community at large) to manage the use of non-state resources, and to pursue donations and subsidies. University products, both in terms of teaching and research, were to be subject to quality control, implemented through evaluations performed by internal and external juries. These evaluations would lead to the development of rankings by discipline. In the same plan it was proposed that the granting of professional licenses be removed from the university and allocated instead to a commission formed by representatives of the university, the state and professional corporations. In terms of hiring and salary policies, the plan stated that professors would be hired through open competition (as it is currently the case) but also through direct contracts, and that salaries could vary by universities.

The response from the university community was ardent. The National University Council (CIN) vehemently opposed to the majority of the 16 articles of the administrative-financial project, especially to article 4. Rectors argued that, although budget distribution was supposed to consider educational quality and administrative efficiency, in reality resource allocation would punish those universities that do not follow the government's program. They also opposed tuition fees and use of the indicators for quality and efficiency proposed by the government, such as enrollment, proportion of graduates, expenditure in academic and support staff, and the procurement of additional resources. Rectors also pointed out that state control and evaluation of university activities would reduce university autonomy, and lamented that the Ministry of Education perceived education as an expenditure rather than as an investment. In this regard, CIN rejected the proposal that henceforth the university budget would be allocated by the Ministry of Education and not by the Parliament. Some Rectors alleged that the proposed reforms follow the requirements of the IMF in terms of rationalization of the public budget. The Rector of UBA, Schuberoff, took a strong stand against budgetary cuts, and pointed out that the proposed reform, if implemented, would limit access to the university to an elite and would mean an end to knowledge creation. He also expressed a concern about the Minister of Education's announcement that universities would not have no choice but to impose fees because of the state's unwillingness to continue taking charge of budgetary necessities that exceed the current allocation of resources (La Nación, May 10, 1991:9).

In a meeting held in Jujuy in March 1991, the Rectors of the five North West universities (Jujuy, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca and Salta) opposed the project of university privatization which, according to them, originated in the Ministry of Economy. The Rectors denounced the proposal, saying that its implementation would transform universities into non-state public institutions which would receive state support similar to that received by private institutions. The rectors argued that the state should not abandon its responsibility for public education, and that revenues from business or from students would be insufficient to cover operational costs of universities (Clarín, March 28, 1991). Although the controversial proposal was not passed as legislation, it created fertile ground for a national discussion on topics that only a few years ago were taboo in Argentina. Moreover, it pressured university authorities to recognize the shortcomings and inefficiencies of the university system, and to show a willingness to seek solutions for the problems identified by the government. For instance, the aforementioned five rectors, after criticizing the government's initiative, expressed a committment to reduce spending and to avoid duplication of programs.

But the legislative battle was not over. By 1992, several drafts of a new education law intended to replace the Law 1,420 (sanctioned more than hundred years ago, and considered the pillar of the Argentinean educational system) were ready to be discussed in the Parliament. In terms of higher education, the most contentious issue revolved around tuition fees. The character of the competing proposals and the significance of the social forces backing them made it clear to the government that it would not be an easy task to convince legislators about the benefits of privatization . When the government realized the difficulties involved in imposing direct fees, it attempted to introduce them indirectly through the tax system. Indeed, in July, 1992, the government proposed a new law according to which wealthy parents with children attending public universities would pay an extra tax of US $1,000 per annum [84]. Coincidentally, a study sponsored by the World Bank published in 1990 suggested that income tax surcharges might be more politically acceptable than a violation of the principle of zero tuition [85]. However, although the government proposal theoretically excluded people with low income or capital from this tax, autonomists rejected it. They argued that education (like health), being a public good, cannot be divided in users and non-users in terms of tax collection, and rapidly organized a massive demonstration "for the defense of public education". On July 5, 1992, 100,000 people congregated in front of the Parliament, shouting the slogan "students yes, customers not". These demonstrators demanded free public education at all levels, participation of the education community in policy formulation and decision making, and respect for the principles of autonomy and co-governance. President Menem claimed that he totally agreed with these demands, because his government was never against public education. Moreover, as an attempt to gain public support, during the days before the demonstration, his government published full-page advertisements in the major national newspapers asserting its commitment to public education, free education, adequate financing and to community participation (La Prensa, July 1, 1992:3, La Nación, July 6, 1992:2, and Clarín, July 31, 1992:33).

Finally, another area in which legal concerns were raised relates to the newly created public universities. These universities are governed by their own legislative acts that do not provide for the establishment of GFCs and co-governance. Instead, government is given a leverage in the selection of university authorities. Autonomists denounced this situation saying it violates the law 23,068 (Normalización Universitaria), undermines the principles of autonomy and democracy, and constitutes one more instrument of government control over universities [86].

b) The institutional front: the enemy within

Within UBA, the marketventionist agenda was advanced by the representatives of the minority in the GFC, particularly by members of the Faculty of Medicine. As a matter of fact, Medicine was the pilot site used by the government to introduce market-oriented reforms and to confront the central administration. Three concurrent elements seem to have interacted in this choice. First, the government needed to have a forceful ally within the university which would play a strategic role in shifting the university-state conflict into an intramural dispute. Second, the prestige and tradition of the Faculty of Medicine makes its case more appealing to the community at large than those of other faculties. As one student member of the minority pointed out, "in this country, the image of the university, in terms of the public opinion, is focused on Medicine". Thirdly, the historical opposition of the faculty of Medicine to UBA's central administration, based on demands for autonomy and the ideological affinity of the Dean to the government agenda, made this faculty a 'natural' site to initiate the offensive against autonomists.

Since students are a key factor in university decision-making, it was important for marketventionists to control the Medicine Students Association. In highly controversial elections, the pro-government slate, FUNAP, won the majority of votes. Franja Morada

formally issued an accusation of electoral fraud, arguing, among other charges, that CBC students were not allowed to vote. The Faculty of Medicine, invoking a recent decree issued by the government (known as Decree 1111, or *Recurso de Alzada*), bypassed the authority of the GFC and appealed to the Ministry of Education, which settled the dispute in favor of FUNAP. This decision was denounced by university authorities and student leaders as one more government assault on institutional autonomy. The connections between this slate and government officials were openly acknowledged by one of its leaders, who proudly recounted that, after their electoral victory, he was personally congratulated by President Menem in the official residence. Likewise, he complained that, since university authorities were unwilling to release financial information, he gathered data on administrative inefficiencies and corruption from the Ministries of Economy and Interior [87]. Furthermore, this student leader advocated a reallocation of funding from higher to basic education, using a justification that was, in essence, a simplified version of World Bank's argumentation.

The neverending confrontations between the Dean of Medicine, Luis Ferreira, and the Reformist bloc, particularly Rectorado and FM, continued in GFC meetings and in media statements. Ferreira and Schuberoff not only disagreed over university policies, but even over statistical information. For instance, Ferreira argued that in the 1992 budget his faculty was discriminated against because it received only 7.8% of the budget, while Rectorado allocated 19% to itself and 12.3% to the CBC. Schuberoff contended that the budget allocated to the Faculty of Medicine was close to 23%, whereas the CBC, which provides services to 35% of UBA students, only receives 9% [88]. During 1991 and 1992, it was very rare that in GFC meetings (which take place twice a month) a conflictive issue related to the Faculty of Medicine was not addressed. During the six-month period that I attended GFC meetings, in almost all occasions Dean Ferreira was accused by other member of violating one or more university laws and/or resolutions. For instance, in the last meeting I attended (March 25, 1992), Ferreira was indicted with two charges that, according to the accusers, justified taking him to academic court. A professors' representative (majority) expressed his frustration with this situation, and one Dean interpreted it as a larger problem related to the weakening of university autonomy:

> Professor: *I'm tired of spending all our time on the faculty of Medicine. The Dean of Sciences was just telling me that he will not be able to pay salaries to his academic staff after September, and the same situation is taking place in other faculties. I think that we have grave problems in this university besides Medicine.that demand our attention as GFC representatives.*
>
> Dean: *It is not a problem of Medicine. It is an institutional problem of the university. The problem is who rules in UBA. The central issue is not Medicine, but the state-university relationship in the context of autonomy. There is a steadily increasing hegemony of the Executive Power in institutions such as the judicial system and the university.*

In the same meeting, Rector Schuberoff also linked the Faculty of Medicine issue with an attack against university autonomy orchestrated by the government:

> *Only the Minister of Education knows what the next aggression will be, and what he wants from the university. The university functioning itself is being threatened, because autonomy is being violated, and there is no university without autonomy.*

In constant declarations to newspapers, Ferreira accused the university authorities of administrative corruption, particularly in the CBC and Rectorado, but also other areas such as Extension, Culture, and Sports. Some newspapers linked these allegations to the Peronist-Radical confrontation at the national level, pointing out that Ferreira's main target was an internal group within the Radical Party known as 'Coordinadora', in which UBA's Rector is an important protagonist. Dean Ferreira, during the annual dinner of physicians of 1991, in

the presence of President Menem, issued an alert about a supposed Marxist infiltration in the CBC (he referred to the inclusion of Althusser's work in the course on state and society), an accusation echoed by Domingo Cavallo, the Minister of Economy. One year later, on December 9, 1992, during the same celebration, and again in the presence of President Menem, the Dean of Medicine criticized the links between the University of Buenos Aires and the Radical Party, as well as the use of university autonomy to promote an island which is divorced from the community [89].

In certain claims, particularly the replacement of the CBC by an admission system controlled by each faculty, the Dean of Medicine has received the support of four other Deans [90]. While critics of CBC argue that it is merely a waiting room that makes students waste a full year, and that it has no usefulness at all [91], autonomists contend that the elimination of the CBC would allow Ferreira to control access to Medicine, imposing quotas and entrance examinations. The Rectorado also accuses Ferreira of being the founder and former director of a private health care system from which many doctors have full-time appointments at the university, and even accuses Ferreira himself of the same offense (Página 12, April 3, 1992).

In mid-1993, the government submitted draft legislation to Parliament imposing tuition fees in public universities. At that time, a World Bank document circulated among government officials contending that Argentinean students should be charged "a modest tuition of US$100 per term plus US$ 20 per month", and proposing that fees and tuitions be combined with loans and scholarships for low-income and meritorious students (WB 1993:91). Coincidently, the Vice-Minister of University Policy, Juan C. del Bello, stated that fees would be complementary to the state budget, that part of the revenue generated would be channeled to student aid programs, and that no portion of it would be allocated to salaries. He added that the proposal "induces universities to rationalize their spending". Government's argument for fees was based on the results of a survey carried out by the Faculty of Medicine under the auspices of Dean Ferreira, involving 1,800 incoming students. Based on the SES of these students, Ferreira estimated that the majority of them were able to pay a monthly fee of US $100. The national leaders of students and professors (FUA and CONADU, respectively), rejected the draft arguing that only a minority is able to pay a fee, that the faculty of Medicine of Buenos Aires is not a representative sample of Argentinean universities, and that Ferreira's estimations did not consider total family expenditure per student (La Nación, July 19, 1993:3).

Interestingly, the eagerness on the part of the Faculty of Medicine to introduce fees and quotas is not restricted to UBA. In 1991, the faculty of Medicine at the Universidad de Tucumán imposed both fees (for a value of US $ 7.5 per month, the equivalent of 25 bus fares) and entrance examinations. According to the Dean, Carlos Fernández, entrance examinations helped reduce the number of incoming students from 1,800 to 1,500, which still far exceeds his ideal figure of 300 incoming students per year. At UBA, although the Faculty of Medicine was the most visible opposer to Rectorado, it had the support of other faculties on specific issues such as admission policies [92].

c) The ideological front: Manufacturing consent

In addition to the legislative and institutional combat, a third contest took place in the realm of ideas. The aim was to persuade the contending party -and public opinion- about the adequacy and the social benefits of each agenda. The battlefield included papers presented in academic fora, articles and inserts in newspapers and magazines, press conferences, media interviews, institutional documents and the like. On most occasions the strategy was not to present the appropriateness of one's own case, but to attack the opposition on various grounds, ranging from inefficiency to corruption. For this reason, most university analysts complained that

there was an absence of serious debate, and that much of the debate taking place was rather fruitless.

Ideologically speaking, the headquarters of the marketventionist bloc was in the Ministry of Economy, where a professional team was developing the government's agenda for the social arena. The coordinator of the overall project, which was funded by a loan from the World Bank, made it clear that the project aimed at pushing the university closer to the market and the state:

> *University people have plenty of biases against businesspeople and politicians. They don't feel that they are part of national reality. Now, with Cavallo [the Minister of Economy] they are finally waking up. Radicals are stagnated in the 1918 Reform principles. They defend an autonomy that makes no sense. They must understand that they depend on the government, be it the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Economy. In other words, if they don't behave as required, that is, with social responsibility, we'll cut the funding.*

The specific project for university restructuring, known as Project 06, aims at improving efficiency and quality through the development of administrative and academic criteria. Administrative criteria would provide the foundations for an organizational rationalization, focusing on cost reductions. Academic criteria would provide objective elements for evaluating quality in universities. In both cases, the project relies on comparative analyses across different institutions. Tuition fees, restrictive admission policies, non-governmental sources of revenue, managerial procedures, performance-based incentives and reduction of students' participation in governance are among the broad array of policy issues addressed by Project 06 members. Although the loan provided by the World Bank for the Project 06 is not tied to any specific agenda, the similarities between World Bank recommendations and Project 06 proposals are inescapable. In its efforts to create institutional and ideological support conducive to its agenda for university restructuring, the state and its social policy development agencies and functionaries find a reliable and resourceful ally among World Bank personnel who are responsible for promoting the Bank's own educational agenda.

Both the WB and the Project 06 staff attribute the university-state conflict to the resistance to change of a conservative institution rather than to incompatible perspectives on the role and functions of university in society. Both agree that, since the university is unable to change by itself, the restructuring process should be imposed from outside, and both are aware that this imposition will lead to strife. Indeed, one member of Project 06 foresees that many conflicts are going to arise "because the university community has a resistance to change". Anticipating these situations, WB documents warn government officials about the potential difficulties of implementing university change in a hostile environment and, as will be seen in chapter 7, offer advice on how to deal with specific dilemmas.

World Bank documents also tend to lament the politicization of university life in Latin America. As Winkler (1990:16) states, "the political nature of some administrative positions leads to their being filled by individuals with strong political skills rather than individuals with expertise and experience in university administration". Coincidentally, one of the most recurrent criticisms of UBA authorities by Project 06 staff, and marketventionists in general, is that the political activism of Rector Schuberoff is incompatible with the stature of his position. Curiously, this reproach has been very seldom used to target university authorities connected to the Peronist Party, or even to those who, though devoted to the Radical Party, are sympathetic to the marketventionist agenda, such as the Universidad de Córdoba Rector, Francisco Delich. In other words, the concern of marketventionists does not seem to lie in the fact that Schuberoff is involved in party politics, but rather in his opposition to government's plans. For instance, one member of project 06 admonished that

Universities should not assume a confrontational attitude with the state. They have many sins and inefficiencies that they need to deal with internally before confronting the government. Schuberoff's strategy is to confront the government, probably more for political reasons, because he is concerned about his future in the Radical Party, than for academic ones. A possible outcome of that strategy is that the government let the public university die.

By and large, autonomists firmly oppose the World Bank's social and educational policies. They identify it as a new version of the modernization project attempted by the Atcon Plan, and point out some internal contradictions in the discourse.

Today, the second wave of external influence is led by the World Bank, whose staff are mainly economists and technocrats. This inhibits Latin America to carry out its own reform. It's a cut throat environment. The university of the 1918 Reform is more democratic than any alternative model proposed by the WB or the government (professor).

The WB, in the economic area, uses the spillover theory, but in the social area is the other way around. It says: "those who can pay, must pay", and this applies to all social areas, such as education, health, housing, etc. (Vice-President).

The ideological battle is also expressed through the media. During 1991 and 1992, almost no week went by in which the mutual accusations between autonomists and marketventionists were not displayed by local media, particularly newspapers. Some newspapers, such as La Prensa [93], recurrently criticize the UBA administration, publishing alleged administrative irregularities in the Rectorado, sometimes on the front page [94]. Other newspapers, like Página 12, tend to give more coverage to the Reformist viewpoint which emphasizes university achievements in spite of government's cutbacks. Between them, La Nación attempts to provide a more balanced view, yet in its editorials it tends to show more sympathy for government's position, arguing that "nobody ignores the reality that the state's ability to pay for everything is disappearing, and that public resources are increasingly insufficient" [95]. Sometimes, government officials anonymously release information to the media about internal and external inefficiencies of universities, in order to justify the need for university restructuring [96].

Another social actor actively using the newspapers is the Club de Harvard (formed by Harvard Alumni), which regularly conducts studies, releases reports and organizes press conferences to divulge its findings and to propose university reforms [97]. The main targets of the Club de Harvard are the CBC (which is accused of inefficiency), the Rectorado (which supposedly manages resources which should be managed by the faculties), open admission policies and tuition-free education (which allegedly leads to irrational planning and wastage) [98]. The arguments advanced by the Club de Harvard are similar to those advanced by government officials, by Deans of professional faculties (particularly Engineering and Medicine) and by project 06. Coincidentally, the Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo, is a Harvard graduate. Some university authorities complain that the government has implemented a media campaign to devalue the university, while other autonomists disagree, arguing that such a strategy is unnecessary. For instance, a Reformist student leader said that

I don't think that there is a campaign against the university orchestrated by the dominant sectors, as Alicia Camilloni [Academic Vice-President] says [99], because the university is not as important for the public opinion, partly due to its own shortcomings. If the university is unable to implement a campaign to promote itself, because it lacks the necessary resources to do it, I don't see why the government will need to erode its image. Having said that, we cannot ignore that there are systematic mechanisms implemented by the state to destroy the public university.

Beyond the accuracy of this analysis, both parties know that access to the media plays an important role in developing public image. Hence, although the government may not be interested in negative campaigning, it can erode the university's prestige by reducing its exposure to the public. Indeed, as part of the ideological battle, the government increasingly restricted UBA's access to the media. While until the early 1990s UBA had programs on the official TV station and two public radio stations, the government gradually removed it from all of them [100]. Most of the programs broadcasted consisted of distance education.

d) The financial front: the color of money

Whereas in the legislative, institutional and ideological battlefronts both contenders have a relative balance of power, on the financial front the control is almost exclusively in the hands of marketventionists. Autonomists claim that the budget is miserable, and that it discourages teaching and research, while marketventionists argue that the public university is obsolete and inefficient, and that it is not accountable for the funding it receives.

Autonomists recurrently complain that the state punishes the university through the power of the purse, and that the budgets of the 1990s have been even lower than those of the military regimes. However, there is no agreement between the two contending parties on this particular issue. Whereas UBA's Rector Schuberoff claims that, between 1987 and 1991, the university budget had declined by one-half (see table 10), the Minister of Higher Education, Palacios Hidalgo, argued that the budget has increased. Each one accused the other of falsifying information and manipulating data. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to assess the evolution of the university budget, because high inflation rates and changes in the dollar-peso parity complicate the analysis.

Nevertheless, government officials acknowledged that, at least for the period 1990-1991, although the total sum was the same for both years, there was a budget reduction in real terms of 20% due to inflation. Moreover, in 1991 the direct subsidies for university research assigned in the budget (known as item 08) were eliminated and allocated instead to the Ministry of Education, which distributed the resources according to its own criteria. After an intense political campaign and lobbying, the universities pressured the government to distribute research funds according to historical patterns. For most autonomists, the financial front is, in comparison to the other three, the one most effectively used by the government to influence university policy. In their view, budget cutbacks have more power to sway the direction of the university than legislative means, institutional alliances, ideological persuasion or even direct intervention in university affairs:

> *I have no doubt in my mind that many state bureaucrats are thinking of suppressing universities, but they plan to do it by strangling them through budget cutbacks. For that reason, when representatives of Franja Morada at the GFC talk about a possible intervention, I tell them that this government is smart enough to avoid an intervention, because they are aware of the political cost that such a policy may imply. Instead, they know that it is much more effective to financially strangle the university until it practically vanishes (Dean).*

The most common tool used by the autonomists to protest funding cuts was the call to strikes, usually in conjunction with other sectors of the education system. Between January 1, 1985 and June 26, 1992, teachers and professors engaged in 1,062 strikes, one fifth of all the 5,034 labor strikes undertaken in Argentina in that period [101].

3. The conflict as perceived by the actors and the media

Marketventionists and autonomists undertand the university-state conflict from a different perspective. For marketventionists, particularly government officials, this conflict is rooted

mainly in the university's own shortcomings. Interestingly, marketventionists recognize the existence of an educational crisis, but they have a different interpretation for basic and for higher education. In their view, the crisis in basic education results from the low allocation of resources and the chronic deterioration of teachers' salaries (Ministerio de Cultura y Educación 1991), whereas the university crisis is usually interpreted as the result of internal deficiencies of higher education institutions.

In their view, university actors have committed a variety of sins. First, they have not understood yet that Argentina is a poor country, and that the state has a deficit problem. Second, university actors are blamed not only for their low contribution to national development, but for their lack of intention to contribute to it, which was perceived as a symptom of low social solidarity and arrogance. Third, government officials accuse university authorities of mixing university affairs with the politics of the Radical Party, and of having an excess of personnel who allegedly are cadres of the Radical Party. Fourth, they claim that full-time professors do not work the number of hours that they are supposed to, that a significant proportion of support staff only show up for the payment day *(ñoquis)*, and that enrollments are inflated for funding purposes. Fifth, they claim that research products are scarce and of dubious quality and that, as a result of overexpansion, the quality of graduates has been steadily declining.

For autonomists, the conflict originated in the government's poor understanding of the relationship between higher education and development, which leads it to consider universities as an expenditure rather than as an investment. For instance, in a document entitled "The university and the future of the nation" [102], ten Rectors of public and private universities (including UBA) attributed the crisis to the failure of the state to express a clear commitment to support universities, and to the lack of understanding among politicians and civil society about the importance of higher education for national development. Therefore, claim the Rectors, both the state and society must give a higher priority to higher education. Although the ten Rectors claim that the universities are undertaking a responsible, severe and profound self-criticism, such effort is not noticeable in the document. The only problem of the universities seems to be related to their public image, that is, their inability to find an adequate strategy to obtain the confidence of the country, particularly the state and industry, to invest in them. In another paragraph it is stated that universities should strengthen their links with social and economic realities, and should be prepared to modernize their structures.

The rest of the document is a passionate defense of the university and a condemnation of state policies and social apathy. In fact, the university is portrayed as performing miracles in order to overcome the deficiencies of the secondary school and the financial constrains. Moreover, the document strongly denounces state policies because they "put at risk the existence of the higher education system itself". Among the policies criticized by the Rectors are budget cutbacks, the reinforcement of social inequalities, the proliferation of new universities with obvious deacreses in quality, the absence of a clear system of certification (similar diplomas are granted by dissimilar institutions). According to this document, which is representative of many other documents released by university actors, the mistaken policies undertaken by the government may lead to the destruction of the higher education system.

Most observers of the conflict (e.g. the media, and university actors who are neither autonomists nor marketventionists) perceive it as a confrontation between two groups unwilling to compromise, or as a stalemate in which none of the parties are even inclined to negotiate with the other. One student from JUP summarized this generalized perception in the following way:

> *Neither of the two main actors in this conflict, namely the Ministry of Education and the university, are willing to make any conciliatory movement. The university requests more money,*

and the government says no. Reformists are still defending a status quo that is not functional to anybody, and clashes against the logic of structural adjustment, which aims at reducing both the budget and autonomy of the university. University authorities cannot endorse the policies proposed by the Ministry of Education, like tuition fees, because its power is based on the support of Franja Morada in particular and the Radical Party in general. The situation is stagnant.

However, there was a also a consensus among observers and actors that Marketventionists have both the initiative and the upper hand. One member of the project 06 was very clear in this respect:

This is a critical moment. The university must make an effort to improve, and, from that position, start to negotiate with the state. Otherwise, by confronting a very strong state, it is going to lose the battle, and that will mean the destruction of the public university.

Although the situation can be defined as a temporary stalemate, even autonomists acknowledged that the government and its allies have a proactive agenda, and that this limits their capacity to resist. One of them portrayed the situation as "a conflict between an offensive state and a defensive university", and the majority complained that this 'reactive' university (see chapter 2) expends too much energy at the barricades, reacting to government's attacks at the expense of developing its own plan. Three quotes from Reformist actors (two Deans and one university authority) illustrate this point:

There are two possible strategies for UBA. One is linked to the current state policies, with the private sector as an alternative source for financing, fees, quotas and so on. The other option is still unclear, because the alternative to that model does not constitute yet a homogeneous discourse. The university has not had time yet to generate this alternative policy, because it allocates all its time, energies and resources to respond to the adjustment policies (Dean).

On one hand, the university is suffering a painful financial situation because of the state withdrawal from public expenditure, but on the other hand the university has not yet internalized the need for reform. Although many of the principles of the 1918 reform are still valid, it is necessary to update them to the current historical context. However, that debate is not taking place yet, because the attack by the state is so strong that the university is adopting a defensive attitude, which only aggravates the crisis (Dean).

The confrontation with the government has polarized the debate, and there is a lack of space to think and dialogue about the big issues of the university. Unfortunately, not even in the GFC there is debate about the big topics (Vice-president).

According to a national leader of university professors, the university sector is in a defensive position because it lacks the necessary initiative to develop a university policy and a coherent planning. In his view, the National University Council (CIN) has not yet produced a unified and serious strategic plan, or any important contribution to improve the university or to develop new policies, because of internal struggles over resources and ideological differences. He notes reproachfully that its only creation was the Protocol, which in his view "leads universities to administrative rationalization and adjustment", and does not constitute an original formulation, but merely a compromise. For this leader, three reasons can explain why academics have been unable to articulate an alternative proposal to the current state policy.

Firstly, and mainly, because of the long years of [military] intervention. As a result of it, there is no history of participation in the creation of policy. Secondly, budgetary decisions, which are translated as cuts, are beyond the power of the university, and it is very difficult to develop a policy without resources. Thirdly, the university has been unable to establish links with its productive and social milieu.

Most observers also agree that the conflict between autonomists and marketventionists is influenced to a lesser or greater extent by the larger dispute between Radicalism and Peronism. For marketventionists, it is indeed a problem that university authorities and students have a political affinity with the Radical Party. In recurrent statements, marketventionists claim that Radicals confuse the university with a *comité* (in direct reference to the internal structure of the party) and that they administer UBA as if it were one more province under their control. To quote a marketventionist dean

> *The university-state relation is bad, because the university has developed a political line. The current university responds to one political party, and that is inappropriate. There is no doubt that UBA is extremely politicized, and that's a big problem. The rector has recently been a candidate running for a political party, and even the council representatives respond to political parties. Likewise, student representatives respond more to the Radical Party than to students' needs. That's a disaster. If [GFC] council representatives persist in taking a partisan attitude, the university will be over.*

Most autonomists tend to assert that their resistance to government's policies is related to an ethical commitment to public education rather than to party politics. A dean expressed this view in the following way:

> *If the model implemented by this government model continues and wins, the future is black. In such model, the university is considered either as an obstacle or as booty. This model is supported on very weak bases. It is based on a restructuring process, leaving aside crucial areas which are duties of the state. The fiscal deficit is currently covered with the selling of our patrimony, but there are no genuine foreign investment in productive areas. Our opposition to this government has nothing to do with the Radical Party, but with our academic and critical perspective.*

While other autonomists admit that the university is politicized, and regard it as a positive trait, they attempt to distance this politicization from party politics. As one Reformist student leader has stated

> *The fact that its actors have clear political commitments, gives it support from several sectors of the population and prevents it from falling apart. This is what keeps the university alive. The fact that university is politicized does not mean that university leaders act according to their political parties. No, we are primarily human subjects, and our explicit ideology and action is, from a corporatist perspective, in the good sense of the word, the irrevocable defense of the university. Although opposition to government policies can be observed in many areas, as it happens in most democratic societies, there is no other public institution besides the university engaged in clear and organized opposition. We never say that the university is against the government, except when the latter attacks its fundamental principles like autonomy, or cuts its budget. In those occasions the university responds as such, and not as a political party within the university. Since the opposition is an organized one, the government cannot stand it, because of its own perverse logic that makes them feel as the owners of the state.*

Standing somewhat at a crossroads between autonomists and marketventionists, some university actors blame both the Rectorado and the government for mixing party politics with academic affairs. For those who feel this way, like one Dean, the conflictive university-state relation "has become very political, in the negative sense of the word, that is, the relationship is shaped by the active participation of political parties". This Dean, who represents a minority of actors who are interested in a reform but do not agree with government policies, simultaneously condemns university authorities and government officials, the former for engaging the university in the internal political struggle of the Radical Party, and the latter for ignoring or punishing the university due to political reasons [103]. In this view, the Peronist-Radical antagonism puts the university in a dangerous situation.

The links between party politics and institutional policy have been addressed by both contenders in a confrontational way. For instance, Schuberoff accused the Minister of Higher Education, Ignacio Palacios Hidalgo, of authoritarianism and submission to the frivolity of politics, and Palacios Hidalgo accused Schuberoff precisely of the same sin. Nevertheless, according to higher government officials, the university-state dispute has been exaggerated by the media and the public opinion. One of them, for instance, contends that this relation

> *is not as conflictive as many people think. There is a heated debate due to different perspectives. There is a controversial relation, but not a conflictive one. Under this government there are no interventions or any other type of authoritarianism.*

This government official is correct in the sense that this government, unlike previous military regimes, does not resort to the big stick in order to influence university policy. As a matter of fact, the conflict between autonomists and marketventionists has very seldom escalated to the level of violence, and when it has (like in the case of Reformist leader Daniel Petrillo, President of the Student Association of the Faculty of Architecture, who was beaten and received death threats), it immediately attracted the concern of media and politicians, including President Menem [104].

Indeed, it is pertinent to note that even when the UBA-state conflict was characterized by hostility, distrust and mutual accusations, contenders never allowed the dispute to escalate beyond a degree that would break down the dialogue. For instance, at one peak of the confrontation UBA's central administration almost took over in the faculty of Medicine (on the grounds that it did not comply to a GFCs resolution) but eventually refrained because that would have led, in turn, to a government takeover of the university. On another occasion, when an open clash seemed inevitable, the government temporarily withdrew the issues of tuition fees and performance-based salaries from the negotiation table. In exchange university rectors (including UBA's rector Schuberoff) accepted external evaluations and a new governing system that gives the majority to professors. These agreements have avoided a high political cost to the government, and at the same time have prevented a fracture within the National University Council [105].

4. Internal conflicts

As was mentioned above, neither the university nor government constitutes a homogeneous bloc. In an intricate network of sectorial and corporate disputes, both contenders suffer a multiplicity of internal conflicts, to the extent that some individual or collective actors occasionally switch constituencies. Although the government bloc is relatively more homogeneous than the university one, the internal disputes between the Ministries of Economy and Education were not only mentioned in the interviews, but also in the media. Most descriptions agree that in this battle Economy has enjoyed a clear superiority over the Education portfolio. University actors are aware of these intra-state disputes, and alluded to them on different occasions. What follows are three examples of these references:

> *The traditional scenario of the Argentine university life is changing rapidly. The state as a master of higher educational policy through its educational Ministry is now absent, and the leverage of the Ministry of Economy is increasing day by day (dean).*

> *The government lacks an educational policy, partly because of lack of technical competence, and partly because of lack of political will. The Ministry of Education follows the orders of the Ministry of Economy, and the latter is only concerned about reduction of public expenditure. Hence, the main thing that they demand from the university is that it spends less resources; however, it is very little what universities can really save, and therefore the government is not very keen in promoting a big political confrontation (university authority).*

For the time being, the only university policy of this government is adjustment, which means basically budget cutbacks. The Ministry of Education is a devaluated Ministry; it has not taken any important decision in regards to education. The most important issue is the fiscal policy of the Minister of Economy. This Ministry thinks that no substantive problem of the economic area is related to the university. This implies that science and technology are not considered a priority (student leader).

In the Ministry of Economy itself, the sympathies towards their Education colleagues are not very high. The following quotation illustrates such dismissive and derisive postures:

The Ministry of Education spends the money on candies, and they request more money again and again. Until now, budgets were done in a very haphazard manner, and at the end of the year they executed (implemented?) the budget in a rush, regardless of the relevance of the activity. As of this year budgets are going to be elaborated by program. Likewise, there will be no more double appointments and 'floquis'. The Ministry of education has a great deal of irrationality; a profound rationalization is needed (high official at the Ministry of Economy).

In addition to this, high government officials are concerned about the presence in the state apparatus of bureaucrats who were not completely loyal to the Marketventionist agenda. One of them openly stressed that

Those public functionaries who are in disagreement with the state's current policies should resign. If they agree, they should thoroughly support them. There is no space for sitting on the fence [106].

Within the Ministry of Economy itself, there are also conflicts between staff and management of project 06. The former, composed of educational experts, complain that the political rationality of the project coordinators has sometimes undermined technical rationality. In the same vein, they object to the criteria used for resource allocation, arguing that project funds were used to reward personnel at the Ministry of Economy who were not directly involved in the project, but were performing political duties for the government. Finally, another internal conflict within the government has been the dispute between the legislative and the executive wings. For instance, at the end of 1993 President Menem vetoed a Congress resolution to increase the 1994 university budget by US $120 million [107]. Since that resolution had been approved by both Radicals and Peronist legislators, as a consequence of an agreement signed two weeks before between university Rectors and the Secretary of University Affairs, the veto created confusion among leaders of the governing party and further exacerbated the contradictions between the Ministries of Education and Economy.

The university has not been immune to internal discord either. A number of intramural conflicts, some of them originating long time ago, are being exacerbated by the current confrontation with the government. A first conflict, manifesting through institutional and formal channels, relates to the internal disagreements in the GFC between minority and majority representatives. A second conflict corresponds to the confrontations between some traditional professional faculties and the Rectorado over issues such as fees, admission policies and budget distribution. For instance, the Faculty of Architecture imposed in 1991 a "voluntary" tuition fee like the one implemented by Delich in Cordoba. Likewise, in 1992 the faculty councils of the faculties of Engineering and Medicine denounced 'administrative irregularities' (an euphemism for corruption) in the central administration, and demanded the elimination of the CBC and its replacement by an admission system controlled by each faculty. The most noticeable aspect of this conflict, as expressed in the local media, was the battle between the central administration and the Dean of Medicine described above.

A third conflict has been the internal disagreement among autonomists as to what is the most adequate response to the pressures for university restructuring. Within the university, autonomists have to combat not only marketventionist forces allied with the government, but

even some well recognized Reformist leaders and militants of the Radical party such as Francisco Delich, the Rector of the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. The mutual accusations between Delich, on the one hand, and Schuberoff and Borón (President and Vice-President of UBA, respectively), on the other, were displayed in the local media, and almost ended up in Court [108]. This duel was the public expression of an increasing division of autonomist forces throughout the country into two parties: those loyal to the 1918 Reform, and those calling for its partial or total acclimatization. Both groups are aware of this fracture within the autonomist movement, and refer to it using different terminology. Those loyal to the 1918 Reform consider themselves 'principistas' (or consistent with the 1918 principles), and accuse the other party of having an acquiescent position. On the other hand, those calling for the adaptation of the reform see themselves as 'modernizing reformists', and others as 'populist reformists'. It can be observed in the taxonomies advanced by the two contenders a deliberate intent to express a positive connotation for themselves and a negative connotation for their intellectual adversaries. Likewise, terms like 'principismo' (consistency), 'pragmatism', 'state interventionism' or 'market logic' are used as positive or negative, according to the ideological perspective and the intention of the interviewee .

A fourth conflict, very important for the influence of its actors in university decision-making, has taken place in the arena of student politics. Pérez Lindo (1989) argues that, in the context of the deep economic crisis and the many problems that universities are facing, the students constitute the only university group that is seriously addressing this dilemma. Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, it can't be ignored that the student movement in Argentina is very active. Cano (1985) identified four main visions or models for the university, each one supported by competing forces within the student movement: democratic-reformist, national-popular, sanitary and revolutionary island. The democratic-reformist model, based in the principles of the 1918 reform, emphasizes the function of university as an agent of social change responsive to the demands of popular sectors. It advocates institutional autonomy, democratic governance with students' participation, pluralism, quality of teaching and a linkage of research and teaching topics with national reality. The main groups supporting this model are Franja Morada (the students' organization of the Radical Party) and some moderate socialist and marxist groups.

The national-popular model criticizes the historic divorce between the university culture (elitist and foreign-oriented) and the 'popular culture', and proposes to integrate the university with the people. In terms of university policy, it agrees with many of the postulates of the previous model, although it emphasizes academic freedom and the inclusion of non-academic staff in governance, and rejects the concept of institutional autonomy. This model is sponsored by the Juventud Universitaria Peronista (JUP), linked to a progressive branch of the Peronist Party. The 'sanitary' university model rejects the idea that universities are a site appropriate to engage in disputes over broader national political conflicts. In this view, the university must confine itself to a scientific analysis of the national problems, offering objective, academic and dispassionate solutions. This model, which also opposes politicization, is usually supported by the independent slates. Finally, the fourth model is the revolutionary island. It perceives university autonomy as a means to create a space of power to confront the state, which is perceived as a mere instrument of the dominant classes. Groups supporting this model, usually at the left of the political spectrum, favor the exacerbation of the contradictions between the university and the state.

Although Cano's description accurately represents the situation of the 1970s and early 1980s, during the mid 1980s a student group called UPAU emerged in the university scene. UPAU is the university branch of the UCD, a right wing political party which endorses the privatization policies of the Menemist government. As a matter of fact, during the first years of the Menem's administration UPAU leaders received instructions on policy and strategy from high

government officials at the Ministry of Education [109], who subsequently selected FUNAP as the key ally within the student movement. Although Franja Morada was recurrently attacked from the right by UPAU and FUNAP, and sporadically from the left by a variety of groups, during the early 1990s its leadership among students was practically uncontested.

In addition to these four political areas of dispute, the university was afflicted by other conflicts which, although not necessarily political, were influenced by (and in turn influenced) the political battles. Among these conflicts, three were particularly noticeable: inter-faculty rivalry, generational clashes, and competition between academic and administrative staff. The competition and distrust among faculties could be observed in the resistance to efforts geared towards departmentalization and even cooperation. For instance, in relation to a probable creation of one department of mathematics for the entire university, one Dean argued that the specificity of mathematics in each discipline (i.e. Engineering, Exact Sciences, Architecture), should be preserved through the control of each faculty. Similar views were present in the area of health, where neighbor faculties were unwilling to share professors or labs, or in the social sciences, where each faculty (i.e. Economics, Law, Social Sciences) offer similar courses, each one believing that the others are doing a poorer job. Additionally, disciplinary training also affected the attitude of university actors towards the conflict. The 'two cultures' examined by Snow (1959) come to mind in the following opinion advanced by one Dean:

> *As a scientist, I am more pragmatic and less tied to principles ("menos principista") than other colleagues of mine, particularly Deans from the humanities. I do not question if shifting from a protectionist state to a free-market state is positive or negative. For me, that is a fact.*

The generational conflict is more evident in the professional faculties, where senior and junior professors are guided by a different logic, mainly due to their class origin. One professor summarized this situation in the following terms:

> *Some decades ago, the university, and particularly the faculty of Medicine, used to be the place in which the upper classes did charity or gained prestige, but that time is over. Today, the rich seclude themselves in the private practice. Nowadays this is the university of the middle classes, and the middle classes cannot afford charity. There is an encounter of two generations: the rich professors who earn their living from their professions and oppose the concept of full-time, and the middle class professors who earn their living from the university. Those who have simple dedication are here either for prestige [in the professional faculties], or to avoid being totally unemployed and have some income. As a remnant of old traditions, university teaching is still perceived by many as an honor, and that perception does not correspond to the present situation. The university is still functioning with criteria from the beginning of the century, such as glory, honor and the like, and not as a daily workplace which deserves a remuneration. However, the academic work should be considered a work as any other.*

This description suggests that, although the shift from the oligarchy to the middle class in the control of university policies that took place in 1918 was a relatively expeditious process, a complete change in attitudes and behaviors has not occurred. Remnants of the old persist to this day. As members of the upper classes have retained academic positions, the emerging middle class has been unable to radically change the conception of the university (held both inside and outside campus) from that of being a sacred place dedicated to intellectual energy to that of being a workplace. This may explain the fact that almost one out of four UBA professors is ad-honorem. This also explains why younger professors are more likely to engage in an organized union. As a matter of fact, UBA's senior professors seldom participate in the Coordinadora Nacional de Docentes Universitarios (CONADU), which has a militant stance and recurrently accuses the government of "the destruction of the public university system" [110]. CONADU leaders and student leaders tend to express similar viewpoints, and this affinity results in joint demonstrations and press releases.

Finally, the conflict between academic and non-academic staff has been escalating in direct proportion to resource reductions [111]. Academic staff feel at a disadvantage with respect to the unionization of support staff and the privileges enjoyed by the administrative staff. In addition to the seven aforementioned conflicts, university actors engage in disputes originating in factors such as political ideologies, party affiliations or disciplinary orientations. As was also mentioned in chapter 3, the combination of all these variables creates an intricate and fluid network of enmities and friendships, antagonisms and alliances.

The absence of internal homogeneity is not exclusive to the government and university. Within the national industry as well, an internal division can be observed. As will be further analyzed in chapter 6, the distinct interests of large and small industry are reflected in different attitudes towards the public university. Large industry, allied with MNCs and the rural oligarchy, calls for a lean state, and is not very keen on supporting the public university. For UIA (Unión Industrial Argentina, the organization that represents the interests of large industry), the main problems of the public university are the bureaucratism and centralization typical of state agencies, and its open admission policies. In relation to the former, UIA contends that increasing state interventionism has resulted in an undesirable control and the restriction of choice, and therefore call for the urgent deregulation and decentralization of Argentinean education, for the supervision and control of public education by parents, community members and students, for the total or partial privatization of public universities, and for the separation of the academic diploma and the professional license through a system which excludes state participation.

In relation to admission policies, UIA points out that open admission has resulted not only in low quality graduates, but also "in an excess of graduates for a country whose capacity to offer a job according to the years of studies grows at a very low pace", a situation that leads to the conclusion that "the community is badly allocating an enormous amount of resources" (UIA 1988:2).[112] Given this diagnosis, the UIA recommends elimination of open admission policies in public universities and its replacement by a rigorous entrance system based on intellectual and academic merit, which should be complemented by tuition fees. According to local sources, one leader of UIA has declared that it is cheaper to import technology than to invest in R&D, and another has stated that universities should undertake only applied research.

These statements, which confirm the fears expressed by scientists described in chapter 2, have been criticized by the scientific community, who argues that they reveal a complete ignorance about the dynamic relationship between basic and applied research (Pichel 1991). The small and middle industry representatives (organized in the Confederación General de la Industria, or CGI), instead, seem to realize their own vulnerability in the absence of an expanding internal market and an alliance with a protectionist state. They express a concern about the deterioration of the public university, and the limited relationship between university outcomes (graduates and research products) and industrial needs. Their support to the public university is not based on benevolence, but on perceptions of their own interests. They wish a betterment of the university, but such improvement should be accompanied by an increasing adaptation to the demands of small and middle enterprise.

5. The expressions of the conflict

The core of the conflict lies in the efforts undertaken by marketventionists (government and allied forces) to implement a thorough university restructuring more in line with the heteronomous model, and the eagerness of autonomists (the majority of university actors in decision-making capacities) to remain loyal to the autonomist model. The pressures to abandon the autonomist model is apparent in a variety of aspects, such as tuition fees,

admission policies, student participation in governance, responsiveness to the market and state control.

The most controversial among them is the issue of tuition fees, which has become the flagship of the battle between autonomists and marketventionists. It is an emotional issue that creates intense debate in political life within and outside universities. Indeed, tuition fees constitute a symbol of an old ideological struggle over accessibility, usually expressed as the quality vs. equality debate described in chapter 2. In UBA, tuition fees were imposed in the period 1980-83 under the last military regime, with the explicit purpose of increasing revenues. Nonetheless, their impact was much lower than what their supporters expected because they represented only 3.8% of the total university revenue. To avoid criticisms of social selectivity, it was decided to use a large part of the fees to help students from lower strata. However, the loans and scholarships thus dispensed benefited only 1.3% of the university population (Cano 1985:91, Perez Lindo 1985:184).

As a result of this experience, Cano predicted that tuition fees were "very unlikely to be applied in Argentina under a democratic government, because it is emotionally associated with the militaries". Hence, he forecasted that the only alternative to face the growing demand for access was a drastic increase in the budget allocated to university. The events of recent years have shown how inaccurate his prediction was. Although fees have remained a political impossibility (and in this sense Cano was right), a simultaneous combination of increase in enrollments and decrease in funding has taken place. The implementation of a massive introductory course (CBC) served as a temporary buffer, postponing the use of unpopular measures such as fees or quotas.

However, in the early 1990s, under a new political and ideological climate, the issue of fees, formerly a taboo, became a topic of open discussion. Advocates of tuition fees in Argentina invoke the widely appealing redistributionist argument, which, as was seen in chapter 2, has been advanced by sources as disparate as Marx and the World Bank. This argument contends that tuition fees should be understood as a basic redistributionist policy to eliminate the "subsidy to the upper classes" implied in the free public university. In an unexpected rupture with autonomists, the leader of university professors, Aníbal Velázquez, concurred with this redistributive view, agreeing with the government's claim that low income groups are underrepresented in higher education [113]. He declared that public universities are moving toward privatization and, although he recognizes that tuition fees are just a palliative measure for the situation of universities, he supports them in the name of equity. For him, the problem that a child of a worker cannot afford to study is not only a university problem, but also a broader problem that requires a political solution through state intervention. As was mentioned before, voluntary fees were implemented in two bastions of Reformism, such as the Universidad de Córdoba and the Faculty of Architecture in UBA. Simultaneously, certain services like diplomas, certificates, transcripts, etc., have begun to be charged for in several universities.

The debate over tuition fees has even reached the stage of electoral campaigns. A candidate to governorship of the Province of Buenos Aires for the October 1991 elections, Santiago de Estrada, considered "positive" the concern of the Ministry of Education to generate genuine resources for higher education. He labeled as 'unjust socialism' the fact that funding of public university relies on 32 million Argentines, of which a third part live below the poverty line, and contended that most university students can afford the partial or even total cost of the educational service they receive" [114].

University presidents demand state support for higher education in an indirect way, using a technical language that recalls the importance of education for society. In a document entitled

The university and the future of the nation, ten rectors of public and private Argentinean universities pointed out that "university is the natural place for creation, renovation and dissemination of strategic knowledge". Therefore, they contend that "education, and higher education in particular, is the most strategic investment a nation can make in today's world", and reinforce their case by claiming that "the creation of new scientific and technological knowledge presents the highest aggregated value of the history, and a nation without such capacity cannot face with autonomy the challenges of today's world" [115]. In his answer to the rectors, the Minister of Education acknowledged the "basic responsibility of the state in scientific and technologic research, which is mainly based in universities" but explained that, in the context of the crisis, "the exercise of such responsibility requires to access all available means and resources, without restrictions", and openly referred to tuition fees as a possible funding source. Although the Minister made it clear that the implementation of tuition fees would be left to the 29 university rectors, some months later President Menem stated that "in the future university students must pay for their education", a statement criticized by autonomists as an infringement in institutional autonomy [116]. During that period students' demonstrations against tuition fees begun to take place, sometimes resulting in violent incidents [117]. These demonstrations continued into 1992 and 1993.

Among the 29 rectors, it was difficult to identify who were in favor of fees because, with a few exceptions, they prefer to maintain a low profile. Those who oppose them are generally more vocal, standing out among them Oscar Schuberoff (UBA), Ricardo Biazzi (Misiones), Martín Campero (Tucumán) and Fortunato Daher (Jujuy), who publicly claimed that such a policy was a form of discrimination against poor students, and that "it constitutes an affront in the context of the socio-economic situation of many families because, in addition to already existing difficulties in attaining an adequate standard of living, there are now additional difficulties to access education" [118] . Likewise, the rectors of the universities of Catamarca and La Pampa made public declarations against imposing tuition fees in their institutions, arguing that they reinforce existing inequalities [119]. Although in 1990 and 1991 politicians of the ruling party were reluctant to publicly promote tuition fees for electoral reasons, in 1992 and 1993 they became more outspoken.

The Argentinean government rapidly transformed the discussion on the pertinence of tuition fees into a debate over who was going to pay, and how much. In other words, if tuition fees were to be universal or differential and, if the latter were the case, which criteria would be used to determine who pays less and who pays more? Antonio Salonia, the same Minister of Education who said that tuition fees would be left to the will of universities, declared that "tuition fees will vary according to careers that are, or are not, of nation's interest" [120]. Some rectors, like Daher (Jujuy), oppose to this formula on two grounds: first, the difficulty to define what is the national interest; and second, that such a plan would be a deterrent for careers that are not of the interest of the national state. At the same time, the possibility of differential fees by careers ignited existing interfaculty struggles. On the one hand, following the rationale of the Rector of UNAM (Mexico), arts and humanities' students maintained that they should pay less than science and engineering students, because those programs use expensive equipment and facilities (infrastructure, labs, chemicals, instrumental, etc.). On the other hand, science and engineering students argue that they shouldn't pay at all, because their work was socially and economically relevant for national development, and contended that arts and humanities students should pay, because those were luxury activities, good for individual growth but socially irrelevant.

The other contentious issue in the marketventionist agenda relates to admission policies. For marketventionists, the public university has experienced a quality decline, and such decline has been caused by enrollment expansion. Hence, they claim, a more restrictive admission policy is imprescindible to restore quality. Whereas supporters of free and open access

enjoyed ideological supremacy for several decades, in the 1990s they are increasingly challenged by marketventionists, who accuse them of being populists, demagogues and romantics. In an unprecedented movement, two directive councils at UBA (Medicine and Engineering) claimed for the elimination of the CBC and its replacement by an admission policy controlled by them, and the implementation of a quota system. The Dean of Medicine, Luis Ferreira, even had a target number of 700 per year. In the Faculty of Medicine of La Plata University, entrance examinations were already approved in 1991 and since implemented [121] .

Marketventionists argue that, although access to university is a legitimate aspiration of everybody, free access generates some unpredicted and undesired effects, such as the aforementioned quality decline, the devaluation of diplomas, the lack of articulation between large contingent of graduates and job opportunities, and state's difficulties to channel resources to other cultural and scientific areas or to other levels of education. They also contend that expansion resulted in low terminal efficiency (high drop out rates, extremely long careers, etc.) and brain drain. Autonomists, on the other hand, contend that there is not enough evidence to link expansion with quality decline. For them, the quality of graduates has more to do with educational practices than with enrolments. This was precisely the argument raised by Rector Schuberoff in response to Dean Ferreira. Based on a study conducted by an ad hoc committee, he stated that the number of students enrolled in certain courses offered by the faculty of Medicine was the same as it had been twenty years before, during the golden age, when students received three times the lectures with one fifth the number of professors [122]. Autonomists and marketventionists also disagree about the origins of the brain drain. Whereas marketventionists contend that the excessive number of university graduates emigrating abroad or underemployed is due to an overproduction of graduates relative to the capacity of the market to absorb them, autonomists suggest that the alleged surplus of graduates has not been created by the university, but by an obsolete economic structure, the low level of indigenous research and development, and the rigid social structures typical of conditioned capitalism.

Curiously, the third area of proposed restructuring raised by marketventionists, the increasing links with industry, has not become a contentious issue. The new wave of contracts with the private sector in the early 1990s, the clear support to them expressed by the university administration, and the almost complete absence of critical voices about their potential negative effects [123] shows that the 'service university' is under full implementation. In spite of the poor public image of business [124], autonomists not only do not oppose partnerships with the private sector, but publicly express their strong support for them. Reformist faith in the positive effects of the 'service university' can be partially explained by the historical insulation of Argentinean universities from the national economy. Balán (1990:19), for instance, has pointed out that the Argentinean public university had grown out of tune from societal demands for human resources and knowledge and warned that, if the situation was not corrected, the lack of tune would only increase in the future. The scarce historical experience in university-industry partnerships explains why in Argentina, unlike in developed countries, there is no debate about this issue in the conflict.

In summary, although marketventionists control the state apparatus, and autonomists steer university decision-making, both have allies outside their institutions. The debate is full of condemnations, accusations, threats and distrust. The conflict takes place in four main fronts (legal, institutional, ideological and financial) and the influence of the Peronist-Radical dispute in national politics is inescapable. This context may contribute to understanding who are the main actors of the university restructuring, and what are their agendas. As was advanced before, marketventionists and autonomists disagree in their diagnosis of the university problems, and thus in the pertinent intervention strategies to solve them. These are the themes of the following two chapters.

[1] Winkler (1990:10) inaccurately contends that Uruguay is another extreme case of public dominance because in this country there are no private institutions. However, since a private university was created in Uruguay in the mid-1980s, Cuba is since then the only country with total public dominance.

[2] When Latin America started its new independent life, universities had the mission of educating the new leaders and of creating a new middle class. This is probably why these countries have given such tremendous importance to education (Londoño 1975).

[3] From a financial point of view, Levy claims that the distinction between public and private institutions is very clear: "an institution is private to the extent that it receives its income from sources other than the state and public to the extent that it relies on the state" (Levy 1986:16). Governance refers to general policies and orientations, and particular aspects such as resource distribution, hiring and firing of staff, curriculum, etc. It is also related to the relative power of different actors (students, professors, administrators, private firms and the state) in decision making. In public institutions power is widely distributed among a variety of groups with conflicting interests (administrators, professors, students, the state) while private universities centralize power in the hands of a small and efficient group of administrators and representatives of financiers (mainly business and religious groups). Function refers to the real outcomes, to what is done and what interests and values are served, including aspects such as class composition of the clientele, profile of the human resources produced, values and ideologies promoted, academic quality, etc. Religious groups are predominantly served by Catholic universities. Private universities tend to serve private enterprise -as it may be observed in fields of study, employment patterns, etc.- and conservative parties. Finally, public universities tend to prepare students for state employment, although some overlaps may exist (i.e. state hiring graduates of private institutions, or public university graduates working in the private sector).

[4] Federación Universitaria Argentina, a national organization representing students enrolled in all Argentinian universities.

[5] Research conducted by Inglese (1967) in Argentina reports the high degree of political activism in universities, and points out two features of student leaders, as compared with nonleaders: they are usually more radical and leftist in their ideology, and they they have a less professionalist orientation.

[6] For Pérez Lindo (1990:59), one of the shortcomings of the 1918 Reform was its emphasis on declarations of principles rather than in the rational and scientific management of the university.

[7] In this regard, Walter (1958:27) pointed out that for many Argentine intellectuals and students "the war represented the culminating failure of 19th century ideas and institutions. Looking to their own country, young Argentines sought to eliminate European influences"

[8] At the beginning of the century, two thirds of the members of the Argentinian middle class emanated from the working class)

[9] In Argentina, the Radical Party is at the centre of the political spectrum, and historically represents the interests of the middle class.

[10] For example, the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires province, Dr. Camilo Crotto, the Rector of Universidad de Córdoba and some prominent professors of University of La Plata. Correspondence between the conflicting parties is presented in Mollis (1990:90-96).

[11] The emergence of Catholic private universities took place before the proliferation of secular private universities. This universities were incapable of absorbing the "flight" from public universities. Since they had little differences with public universities (which they copied to obtain political and academic legitimacy), they offered a limited choice to the potential clientele (Levy 1986).

[12] He also mentions, as a minor reason for the exodus, the existence of a 'spiritual failure', which prompted some students to switch to religious institutions.

[13] Private universities usually enjoy higher prestige and status than public ones. Among developed nations, the only exception is Japan, where there is a large sector of private universities which is less elite than the public sector (Levy 1986).

[14] In India, the promotion of private universities is advocated precisely on the grounds that the state cannot provide the necessary funds and resources to guarantee excellence and equity (remedial programs) in public universities (Chitnis 1985).

[15] For Clark, concentration of power should be replaced by linkage, in which all parts of the system are compelled to check and balance one another. In this model, the university is somehow applying the federal system that operates at the national level: "semi-autonomous departments and professional schools, chairs and faculties act like small sovereign states as they pursue distinctive self-interests and stand over against the authority of the whole" (Clark 1983:267).

[16] In Argentina, the 1968 revolt, in which students and workers demonstrated together, is known as "Cordobazo". In Mexico, it is known as the "killing of Tlateloco".

[17] The history of US intervention in Latin American affairs has been widely documented. This interventionism has been openly recognized in several occasions by US government officials. For instance, in a recent interview, the US Ambassador in Mexico himself admitted the possibility of US "orientation" in Mexican foreign policy (Proceso 130, July 1991).

[18] (Mira 69, Mexico, June 14, 1991, p.45). A similar picture has been recurrently portrayed by researchers interviewed at the University of Buenos Aires (see chapter 6).

[19] (Proceso 709, Mexico, June 4, 1990:16).

[20] The Mexican student movement attempted to submit to the Parliament a modification to the Constitution in order to guarantee, as minimum, 2.5% of the GNP to higher education (Mira 2, February 21, 1990).

[21] Imanol Ordorika, one of the leaders of the Mexican student movement points out, as an example, that the powerful private group ICA influences the dean of the faculty of Engineering (Proceso 707, Mexico, May 21, 1990:21).

[22] Proceso 709, Mexico, June 4, 1990:16.

[23] Private institutions grew from 15% in 1960 to 34% in 1980 and to approximately 50% in 1985. Although in 1985 private universities represented almost half of all Latin American universities (193 of 422), they only enrolled 24.2% of all university students. Yet in other post-secondary institutions, private enrollments represent 60% of the population (Levy 1986 and 1993, Brunner 1990:107).

[24] For an explanation about the selection of these terms, please see chapter 1, footnote 18.

[25] This policy was advanced by Dr. César Jerez, the extint Rector of the jesuit Universidad Centroamericana in Managua (personal interview, Managua, October 1991), and several UBA authorities. See also Schieffelbein 1991.

[26] Winkler (p.96) identifies four causes to explain the low research productivity in Latin America: a) lack of strong empirical research tradition; b) youth and immaturity of most research-oriented graduate programs; c) lack of critical mass in terms of trained and experienced researchers; and d) lack of incentives, especially financial, for conducting research. Similarly, in a meeting held in Chile in 1984, the Latin American Academies of Science pointed out several factors adversely affecting science. Among them were: a) emphasis on professional rather that research-oriented degrees; b) limited research experience of instructors of graduate courses; c) isolation and lack of exchange between Latin American scientists; d) brain drain; e) lack of participation of scientists in decision regarding research projects; f) separation of scientific communities from economically productive sectors; g) insufficient community and government undertanding of the role of science and development (Segal 1987).

[27] "Hidden" or indirect tuition fees are starting to be imposed in the form of levies, which are mandatory contributions from students toward certain programs or services threatened by the financial constraints that universities are under. An example is the $2.50 per student per semester charge at the University of Alberta for the upkeep of its athletic teams.

[28] The influence of international bodies such as the International Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Development Agency in Latin America's social and educational policymaking is not new. Their attempts to encourage a search for alternative sources of financing can be traced at least to the Atcon Report, and have been also reported by Latapí (1980). More current World Bank positions on university change in Latin America can be found in Winkler 1990, Ziderman 1990, Carlson 1992, and World Bank 1986, 1990 and 1991 (see chapter 4).

[29] For Córdoba, see Delich (1990). For UNAM, see Rodríguez Castañeda: Interview with Dr. José Sarukhán, Proceso No.706, Mexico, May 14, 1990, pp. 20-25).

[30] The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 24, 1992:A32.

[31] Data provided by Palacios Hidalgo, Secretary of Higher Education, March 1992 (personal interview).

[32] Indeed, La Nación (January 29, 1992) reported one million students in higher education, and 750,000 of them in universities.

[33] The example used by this source was the Faculty of Law, in the Universidad de Mar del Plata, and allegedly constitutes a representative sample of the situation taking place in most national universities.

[34] The Secretary of Students and Studies provided a figure of 10,550 students. University authorities, based on past census and newcomers, assessed an enrollment of 5,592. According to the Office of Statistics, the student body was 3,790. Finally, taking into account those students who were elegible to vote, who were those who pass at least one course per year, the number was reduced to 2,712 students. La Nación, October 21, 1991:10.

[35] See Pronatass 1988:15. In 1983, the Armed Forces received 7.3% of the total education budget, an equivalent of 0.08% of the GDP.
[36] Pichel's figures are borrowed from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 110th, Edition, 1990, US Department of Commerce.
[37] In 1992, according to data published by La Nación (January 29, 1992:1) the distribution changed in favor of higher education. Of the US $3,000 million spent in public education, $1,200 million are allocated to elementary education (which serves 6,800,000 students), $900 million to secondary education (2,800,000 students) and $900 million to higher education (1 million students).
[38] In thousands on US dollars.
[39] Includes 77,087 students enrolled in the CBC (Ciclo Básico Común).
[40] Until 1957 there was only one full-time professor at the University of Buenos Aires (Perez Lindo 1985:136).
[41] Data extracted from Pérez Lindo (1991:92).
[42] This percentage is probably inaccurate. A more likely figure would be around 50%. Cano, for instance, reported that, in 1980, the percentage of female students in private universites was 46% (Cano 1985:144).
[43] Pronatass cites an unplublished work of E. Sánchez Martínez, which in turn is based in census figures for individuals older than 24 years old . However, the use of census figures to capture drop out rates is debatable, because they do not use cohort analysis.
[44] Two interviewees who were associated with the government at that time recollected that the proliferation of higher education institutions was promoted by the militaries with the main purpose of dividing the student movement, which was supposed to be the center of the subversion. Both interviewees remembered that such assumption was wrong, and afterward the militaries realized that the origin of the subversive movement was outside the university. Both interviewess agreed that although the political objective was not successfully achieved, the decentralization policy promoted regional development and diminished rural-urban migration.
[45] La Nación, 21-X-91.
[46] In 1990 the government approved the creation of the universities of San Andrés, Maimónides, Adventista del Plata, Blas Pascal and Austral. In 1991 were created the universities of Palermo, FASTA, Di Tella, Ciencias Empresariales y Sociales, and Champagnat (in Mendoza).
[47] Medicine, a field traditionally neglected by private universities, is currently taught in at least three private universities: El Salvador, Maimónides and Católica de Córdoba.
[48] The 1984 data was taken from Levy (1986:273). The data for 1992 was taken from Noticias, March 22, 1992: 86.
[49] Whereas public universities conduct 60% of the total scientific activity of the country, the private university only contributes with 1.5% (Borón 1991:14).
[50] As an illustration, Avelino Porto, founder and president of Universidad de Belgrano, and considered a pioneer of private universities, was first part of Menem's cabinet.
[51] See the article by Manuel Sadosky in Clarín, July 29, 1993:9.
[52] La crisis de la educación universitaria latinoamericana: breves comentarios sobre el debate actual. Flacso, 1990.
[53] These figures differ from those provided by Borón (1991:11), who reports that for 1987 the budget for all national universities was US $ 470 million; which in 1988 declined to US $439 million and in 1989 to US $270 million. The discrepancy probably lies in the different criteria used to assess past budgets in a period of constant devaluations and hyperinflation. While Borón seems to refer to the equivalent value in US dollars at the time of each government contribution, CIN corrects all figures to average values of 1991.
[54] In the 1970s, Argentina used to export 34 million books per year, whereas in the 1990s it imports approximately 10 to 12 million books.
[55] Bernardo Houssay, Alfredo Leloir and César Milstein, although the last one obtained the Nobel Prize while working in England.
[56] See Perez Lindo 1985.
[57] Data provided by Dr. Héctor Torres, former Dean of Exact Sciences, and corroborated by Dr. Eduardo Recondo, current Dean of the same Faculty.
[58] In order to accomplish the publication of the report, the director of the study approached the Commission of Science and Technology of the Senate, which declared it of "public interest". In public declarations the Director of the Secretary of Science and Technology, Raúl Matera, acknowleged the existence of the report ("I have a copy in my house") and declared to ignore the reasons of the delay in the publication. Even more, he

was surpised to see the published edition of the report, and requested a copy from the journalist who was interviewing him (see Clarín, International Edition, December 29, 1992-January 4, 1993).

[59] By internal brain drain I refer to the shift of human resources from the academic or professional world to the 'outside world', either through occupational change or underemployment, within the same country. Scientists working in real estate, medical doctors as taxi drivers or architects doing home decoration are examples of internal brain drain. External brain drain refers to the emigration of professionals and scientists to other countries. In both cases the social investment in human resources is wasted.

[60] Although the 1966 and 1976 regimes were the ones that more fiercely persecuted ideological disent, censorship and book burnings also occurred before (i.e. during the Peronist government of 1946-55 and during the military regime that took over in 1955, Pichel 1991, Pérez Lindo 1991).

[61] Graduate programs have been traditionally neglected in Argentinian universities, and its expansion constitutes a relatively new phenomenon. As a matter of fact, of the aforementioned 136 graduate programs offered by UBA, 63% were created in between 1986 and 1991. Moreover, only 22 of these 136 programs are masters or doctoral programs.

[62] Official statistics often overestimate university enrollment, since they include inactive students. A census carried out at the University of Buenos Aires in 1988 counted approximately fifty thousand students less than the official enrollment figure, for a loss of about 25%. This means that many students register but they are not actual students. University authorities are reluctant to exclude these students from the registers because they receive funds according to enrollment numbers (Balán 1990).

[63] Data extracted from a variety of documents, particularly *Universidad de Buenos Aires*, an official report prepared by UBA authorities in 1991, and the April and November 1991 issues of Techno, a publication of the Secretary of Science and Technique of UBA.

[64] In Spanish, Consejo Superior Universitario.

[65] This self-criticism was displayed by Generals Onganía and Lanusse in the testimony written by the latter (see Lanusse, Alejandro, Mi Testimonio, Lasserre: Buenos Aires, 1977: 129).

[66] The cessation of university autonomy had already took place in 1974. In his speech of September 10, 1974, the then Ministry of Education Oscar Ivanissevich quoted the then US President Nixon, who said that the university misses its objectives when it uses its funds for research, because research should be conducted by industry, who will recruit the assistance of selected members of the academic community (cited in Pérez Lindo 1986:174).

[67] La Voz del Interior, February 8, 1978.

[68] La Nación, November 13, 1991:8.

[69] Although UBA does not accept the accusation of declining quality as a result of expansion (because of a lack of empirical evidence and the ambiguity in the definition of what is the adequate number of students), it recognizes that a great challenge faced by the institution is how to overcome the dilemma between a high quality, elitist education and the homogenization to the lowest common denominator, and suggests that this could be achieved through the implementation of alternative educational methods (UBA 1991).

[70] For instance, if graduates from one faculty want to pursue a second degree in a different faculty, they must start all over again, from the CBC. This includes CBC instructors.

[71] UBA authorities contend that the 2,160,800 books held in its libraries are inadequate for 175,000 students and 26,000 professors. They point out that Harvard, with a smaller population, has 11 million books.

[72] As a result of salary deterioration, most professionals faculties are losing academic staff at the expense of the private sector. However, an interesting phenomenon takes place in this migration. Although there is a brain drain of young academics from university to industry, especially when they are raising a family and need money, they generally return to the university after retirement, offsetting ebbing energy with accumulated experience.

[73] Clarín, May 5, 1991:13.

[74] Since 1990, the faculty of humanities obtains US $3,000 to $4,000 per year from sale of publications.

[75] For instance, in humanities is 60%, and in exact sciences is 80%.

[76] A typical 9 month course costs US $5,000. For 1992 there were more than 100 applicants, mainly from corporations.

[77] These estimations on student/teacher ratios do not distinguish between part-time and full-time faculty or students, and hence they are not calculated on the basis of full-time-equivalent. Moreover, they do not discriminate between 'active' (real) students and enrolled students.

[78] For instance, in a press conference held in Santa Fe, President Menem stated the need to transform the Argentinian university. He claimed that government economic policies "do not accept a university like the

current one", and argued for closer links between the university and the business sector, and for tuition fees (La Nación, October 18, 1991:2). At the same time that Menem pressured public universities to engage in the restructuring process recommended by the government, he publicly expressed his support to private universities. When Reformists denounced in the local media that the government benefited the private Universidad de Belgrano with a tax exemption (decree 80/90 of the Ministry of Economy) for the importation of elevators installed in the new building of that institution, Menem presided the opening ceremony of that building. The Rector and owner of Universidad de Belgrano, Avelino Porto, was a Minister in Menem's Cabinet. At that time, the Secretary of Education, Scientific and Cultural Co-ordination (the most powerful position in the Minister of Education after the Minister) was José Aromando, who was the Dean of Economics in the Universidad de Belgrano. Moreover, the meetings hold in the presidential residency by Menem and Dean Ferreira to plan the marketventionist strategy were constantly denounced in GFC meetings by Reformist actors, and referred to in newspapers (see Página 12 (February 25 and March 24, 1992), La Nación (March 22, 1992) and Clarín (July 15, 1992:18). In a personal interview, Patricio Downes, the educational columnist of Clarín, ratified to me the existance of these encounters.

[79] Another student movement called Juventud Universitaria Peronista (JUP), which represents the left branch of Peronism, maintains a more critical position to the government than FUNAP. Although JUP was the hegemonic student movement during the early 1970s, in the early 1990s it does not hold the majority in any of the 13 faculties.

[80] La Nación, Nov. 2 and Nov. 9, 1992:3).

[81] However, since the state is not a monolithic structure, this process was not absent of internal conflict. The polemic between the Minister of Interior and the Premier of the Province of Buenos Aires about the intentions of the student movement described by Mollis (1990:92-93) is a good example of contradictions within the state apparatus during the 1918 Reform.

[82] The most evoked symbol of this shift is the rise and fall of the Bolshevik Revolution.

[83] Gente, October 16, 1990: 51.

[84] The definition of 'wealthy' was not very clear, and varied depending on the government spokeperson. According to one of the versions, parents with properties over US $100,000 were to contribute with that special tax. According to another version, that sum referred only to liquid assets (see Clarín, July 29, 1992:1, 2 and 3).

[85] See Winkler 1990:84.

[86] See La Nación, July 12, 1993:3.

[87] Personal interview, March 17, 1992.

[88] Clarín, March 19, 1992.

[89] See Página 12, January 7, 1992:12, and La Prensa, December 10, 1992:1 and 6.

[90] In addition to Ferreira, four other Deans are openly against CBC: Dentistry, Exact and Natural Sciences, Animal Sciences and Agriculture. The last two Deans are actively linked to a dissident branch of Peronism.

[91] See La Prensa, November 12, 1992:7).

[92] The most visible ally was the Faculty of Engineering. See La Nación, April 2, 1992, and Página 12, April 3, 1992.

[93] La Prensa is an old, conservative newspaper which represents the interests of the rural oligarchy. In its editorial columns ocassionally write militaries condemned by human rights violations (i.e. Gral. Ramón Camps). Although it was severely censored during the first and second Peronist regimes, it presently supports Menem's policies.

[94] See, for instance, La Prensa, December 10, 1992: 1.

[95] See La Nación, February 8, 1991.

[96] La Nación, January 29, 1992: 1 and 6.

[97] Most of these reports are coordinated by Horacio Piffano, a Harvard graduate.

[98] The wastage argument is that many students enrol, but they are not regular students. Due to this situation, the university spends an extra 15% to prepare a supply (allocation of faculty, distribution of classrooms, course planning, organization of actitivities, equipment purchase, etc.) which will never be used. See La Nación, October 5, 1992:3.

[99] The student probably refers to an interview published in *Espacios* No. 10 (Nov-Dec 1991:53-58) in which Alicia Camilloni, UBA's Academic Vice-President, denounced a media campaign against the university in which the university was accused of quality decline. Camilloni reproaches that, ironically, those accusations are raised by the very same people who restrict the university budget.

[100] See Página 12, March 26, 1992.

[101] As a matter of fact, the educational sector is the one that more frequently has engaged in strikes during that period. They were followed by state employees (911 strikes), railway workers (248), metalurgic workers (227), and bank employees (206). See La Nación, June 28, 1992.

[102] Reprinted in the "Boletín de la Academica Nacional de Educación", Buenos Aires, September 1991:7 and 8.

[103] Several university actors mentioned that the only government officials who could be interested in supporting the university because they understand its importance for national development were those working in the team of Domingo Cavallo (the Minister of Economy, a Harvard graduate), who was recognized basically as an intellectual. In an attempt to explain Cavallo's indifference towards the university, one Dean suggested that "he and his people are more concerned about their political future than about the university". This comment can be interpreted as an allusion to Cavallo's alleged aspiration to run in the the 1995 Presidencial elections, a rumor that circulated among political circles during the period of interviews.

[104] See La Nación, July 12, 1993:3.

[105] See Página 12, December 16, 1993:8.

[106] This statement ("those who disagree with the government's policies should resign") led that official to an interesting contradiction with a previous statement expresssed during the same interview, in which it was claimed that university people, as part of the state, should abandon theoretical discussions and engage in the transformation of the public sector: "Don't they want to transform reality? So they should integrate themselves into public policy, and transform the system from within" - said the functionnarie. It is unclear how is it possible to transform a system while thoroughly supporting it.

[107] See Página 12, December 28, 1993 and Clarín, December 29, 1993.

[108] The crossfire between Delich and UBA authorities was also displayed not only newspapers and magazines, but also in radio and TV, including the popular TV program "Tiempo Nuevo" conducted by Bernardo Neudtadt, one of the most effective opinion leaders in Argentina and personal friend of President Menem. Delich argue that UBA's problems are not due to financial resources but to mismanagement, whereas UBA authorities proclaim the efficiency of their administration. For more information on this debate, see Página 12 (July 3, 12 and 26, 1992) and Clarín (July 29, July 30, 1992, and August 4, 1992). Delich also had a public dispute with the Rector of Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Juan C. Millet, about the political implications of tuition fees (see La Nación, March 23, 1992:5 and with Inés Izaguirre, a professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, who accused Delich of anti-democratic procedures and tacit complicity with the militaries during his administration as Rector of UBA in 1984 (Página 12, July 31, 1992). Delich and Schuberoff belong to two competing branches of the Radical party contending for its control.

[109] The links between government officials and UPAU was confirmed in interviews by an UPAU leader and by a former top functionnary. The latter complained that in the early 1990s, when UPAU leaders went overseas to pursuit graduate studies, they were replaced by an incompetent leadership. In his own words, "with the previous leaders, I gave them the tune, and they were able to compose the song. With the current leaders, I needed to provide the tune, the lyrics, everything. The level of icompetence of the present UPAU leadership is pathetic, especially if compared with their predecessors.

[110] See, for example, the statements of Rosa Lludgar, CONADU press secretary, in La Nación, February 8, 1991.

[111] This phenomenon is not exclusive to UBA. Indeed, the intratribal struggle between academic and support staff for smaller pieces of the pie is a typical development of any university suffering cutbacks. In the University of Alberta, for instance, in the last GFC meeting of 1993, sociology professor Derek Sayer argued that non-academic units should be eliminated before academic units, and singled out three units which in his view should be targeted for eradication. Representatives of these units energically opposed to Sayer's proposal.

[112] Consistent with what was mentioned in chapters 2 and 3 in relation to consensus-building strategies, in the discourse of UIA employers are subsumed under the broad category of 'the country'. In other words, one side of the equation is mentioned ('the university produces too many graduates') and the other is silenced ('large industry does not create enough jobs'). Hence, the only responsible for the problem is the university.

[113] See La Prensa, June 12, 1991. Velásquez argues that 35% of the "rich" and "very rich" benefit from public universities, in comparison to only 7% of lower-middle class. According to the statistics referred to by Franja Morada, however, lower and middle income groups are the one that benefit the most from higher education. As pointed out above, the indicators used to define these categories are not necessarily the same.

[114] See La Prensa, June 11, 1991, p.7. Estrada was the candidate of the Frente Independiente, and lost.

[115] See La Prensa, May 10:1991:6.

[116] For the Minister's statements, see La Prensa, May 29,1991:4 and 6. For Menem's statement and the reactions to it from the university community, see La Nación, October 18, 1991.
[117] La Prensa, June 7 1991:4.
[118] La Prensa, May 11, 1991:5.
[119] La Prensa, May 12, 1991:3
[120] La Prensa, May 29, 1991:4 and 6.
[121] La Prensa, June 10, 1991:5.
[122] See Página 12, February 15, 1991:6.
[123] One of few voices of disagreement was observed among some groups in the faculty of Humanities (Filosofía y letras). In a document published in 1992, they complained that "la crisis por la que atraviesa la universidad argentina, resultado de una política nada favorable al desarrollo sostenido de las instituciones del estado en desmedro de la furia privatista, la hieren de muerte. A menos que salga a vender servicios y objetos varios para solventar desde sus gastos menores hasta los gastos mayores, la autonomía, la autarquía, el prestigio y la calidad académica de poco han de servir" (Boletín del Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Educación; Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UBA, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1992:1). Curiously, the objection is not about the potential negative implications of the involvement with industry, but about the inappropriateness of demanding an academic institution to look for its own sources of funding. Even more curious is the fact that the faculty of humanities receives one of the highest revenues from contracts.
[124] A poll on the image of the Argentinian big-business people carried out in Buenos Aires showed the following results:

Bad	63.2%
Regular	21.3%
Good	13.7%
Very good	0.9%
No answer	0.9%

Source: Noticias, February 10, 1991

CHAPTER V: ACTORS' VIEWS ON THE UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES

This chapter, organized into three sections, presents actors' perceptions of the situation of the university. The diagnosis advanced by autonomists and marketventionists has resulted in different (often conflicting) descriptions, understandings and explanations of what they referred to as "the university crisis". In the first section a general overview of the various manifestations of the crisis and its impact on human and material resources is provided. The second section presents the ways in which different social actors interpret the crisis. Though there was consensus in the description of the manifestations, discrepancies were evident at the level of interpretation: autonomists tended to emphasize the external origins of the crisis, whereas marketventionists (both government officials and minority representatives within the university) stressed internal factors. Between them, it was also possible to identify the existence of a smaller group of people ('soft' marketventionists) who took some distance, pointing out relational factors. Finally, the third section summarizes the previous perceptions and situates them in the light of the university-state conflict.

Section 1. The university crisis: a recurrent theme

A centerpiece in the discussion about the University of Buenos Aires, the notion of *crisis* has been recurrently addressed by all interviewees, be they university actors, government officials, business representatives or experts on the topic. As was pointed out in chapter 1, the first part of the interviews consisted of an open question requesting a diagnosis of the Argentinean university, particularly regarding the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Interestingly enough, an overwhelmingly majority of interviewees began their observations with similar statements, alluding to the existence of a university crisis. Indeed, they started their elocution by pointing out that it was a crucial moment for the university. The presence of a crisis was implied through analogous expressions, such as "extremely grave situation", "critical situation", "turning point" and the like. At the time of the study, these constant references to a "university crisis" were paralleled by similar descriptions in the local media (newspapers, magazines, radio and TV), and even in academic papers. Most descriptions of the crisis consisted of a long litany of problems, hardships, malaise, complaints and accusations. The common element of these characterizations is a reference to a situation of increasing deterioration, which affects both personnel and facilities alike.

1. Impact on personnel

For university authorities, the most obvious symptom of the crisis was reflected in salaries. Indeed, with very few exceptions, references to professors' salaries were incessant. Deans complained that salaries were miserable. The large majority of UBA professors work on *dedicación simple* (12 hours per week), with a monthly income ranging from $40 to $60 [1]. Full-time professors at the beginning their careers are making $400 per month. As one dean observed, "it is obvious that with these salaries they cannot pursue an academic career if they need to support a family". To give an idea of the purchasing power of those salaries, at the time of the study an international survey identified Buenos Aires as one of the most expensive cities in the world, even above New York, Paris, Rome and Madrid [2], and the Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo, publicly declared that he needed a monthly income of $10,000 [3]. In order to depict the discrepancy between incomes and market prices, some deans used their own examples : "I have the highest salary that a professor can get, because I am at the top of the academic hierarchy. I have a full-time position, publications and 30 years of seniority, and my monthly salary is $1,100 [4]. However, the current fees in the secondary school where I send one of my children is around $300. I have 5 children". Indeed, deans complained that at the time of the interview, salaries were

much lower than they were in 1987, a striking datum if one considers that in 1987 there were many strikes to demand salary improvements.

The deterioration of salaries was also illustrated by the comparisons which interviewees made with other professionals of the public sector. While in previous years a Camaral judge and a full professor earned the same salary, at the time of the study the salary of the judge was more than ten times higher [5]. The gap between university salaries and market rewards, especially in the case of liberal professions, was clearly pointed out by one university authority, who said: "I can't ask professors who in their professional practice earn $70 per hour to come to university to work full-time for $250 a month." Moreover, one interviewee complained that a few years ago, when he was dean and had a full-time position, the custodian of his apartment building had a higher salary than his. Another way used to depict the low salaries was the comparison with colleagues working in similar countries. The most recurrent example was Brazil, where a full professor earned approximately two and three times more than in Argentina.

For university authorities, the deterioration of salaries has three major consequences: the exodus of staff, the decline of performance and the demoralization of personnel. One of the most direct consequences of the low salaries is the massive exodus of academic staff. As one dean stated, "full-time faculty members are quitting everyday because of the impossibility to survive with the present salaries; the best people leave and the worst stay". This comment, which was reiterated by most deans and Vice-Presidents, captures the deep concern about the inability of the university to retain the best professors. Indeed, they claim that the low salaries and the lack of incentives move people to the private sector, where they find jobs in industry and business. The comparative disadvantage with the rewards of the outside world was expressed by a professor in the following way: "Presently, there is a crisis to recruit and retain people in the university, because the young people are realizing that they can gain access to money and eventually to power without attending university". Interestingly, according to some interviewees, the difficulty in attracting the best appears to include the deans as well. In this regard, one university authority lamented that

> *the calibre of deans decreases with each new administration. Some time ago, deans used to have academic trajectory and an impressive curriculum vitae. Today, the least thing that those 'big shots' are willing to do is to work as deans. This job implies lots of problems and conflicts, and very little satisfaction.*

Difficulties in attracting and retaining people do not pertain exclusively to the domain of academic staff, but also to that of support staff, whose salaries range from $160 to $200. One Vice-president pointed out the existence of a permanent exodus of support staff, including nurses, clerks, secretaries and administrative staff. A dean referred specifically to the growing loss of relatively well-skilled technicians: "they go to the private sector, where they receive offers that are two or three times their current salaries. For instance, today the person who is in charge of heating in this building announced his resignation to me". Furthermore, this situation is not only affecting personnel, but also students.[6] For some deans, the deficits in the area of qualified human resources (be they academic staff, support staff or students) are much more important that in other areas because, unlike economic, financial, or material resources, human resources are not readily renewable. Another problem resulting from the low salaries is decline in performance and morale of personnel. Low salaries pressure staff, including those who are supposedly hired on full-time basis, to take other jobs, while the lack of recognition makes them feel discouraged. The decline in the quality of performance was recurrently addressed by government officials, who argued that the quality of the "product" of the university (its graduates) was increasingly deteriorating. This assessment was shared by some deans, particularly from professional faculties. One of them, for instance, declared that "most of our graduates are of low quality and cannot find jobs. Our final product is neither good nor useful".

The deterioration of working conditions has affected even the academic traditions of some faculties. In Law, for instance, the dean complained that in that faculty the tradition of the great "tratadistas" (law makers) has been interrupted, which in his view has resulted in a shortage of outstanding legal experts willing to take up appointments. An additional complaint was that faculty lack information on the current contributions in their fields. In this regard, one GFC member (representing professors) argued that the salary of part-time professors *(dedicación simple)* is insufficient for them even to buy books to keep current in their subject matter, and this has deteriorated the quality of teaching. Deans complained that the decline in performance is rooted primarily in work conditions. To quote three of them:

> *It is impossible to request academic and non-academic staff to fulfill the actual requirements of their duties. They come when they can.*
>
> *Under current regulations, full-time professors are caught in a system that obliges them to fulfill their duties or to resign. With these salaries, such a system forces them to lie. Some people suggested making the system more flexible, by allowing professors to fulfill their academic tasks in a less rigid way. I was against such a proposal, because it implies the end of the university. This situation can only change when the government understands the importance of university for national development."*
>
> *As a result of the constant financial deterioration, those who still do not leave the university are working increasingly less time and at a lower quality. There is a very low productivity rate.*

One university authority summarized this 'general decay' of performance in a very eloquent way:

> *I am a symptom of the deterioration of UBA. I have just graduated, I am only 26 years old, and I am directing the extension program of this faculty. I do not consider myself inept, but I am sure that there are better, more qualified people than I for this position. However, those people with more qualifications and experience are not willing to take this responsibility, to go against the tide to get every little thing, and all that for a salary that is barely enough for subsistence.*

In relation to the second manifestation of the low salaries (demoralization), a few professors argued that the problem of motivation affects predominantly the performance of support staff, and has less of an impact on faculty. The argument behind this statement is that the latter have an intrinsic interest in their work, and therefore have a greater motivation. In this view, faculty consider their university work more as a 'hobby' than as a job, and therefore low salaries will not greatly affect their productivity as is does with support staff. However, the majority contended that the demoralization is general, affecting academic and non-academic staff alike.

Although autonomists do not usually address the issue of low morale in the public discourse, there were several references to this problem in the interviews. For instance, after providing a detailed description of an atmosphere of decay, a university authority acknowledged that "the university is full of apathy and mediocrity". Another university authority declared that as a result of the budget cutbacks by the state, many people adopt a selfish approach, "using the university for their own benefit, without caring much about the future of the institution as such" and a third one noted that the crisis is not only financial, but also moral, and cautioned about a weakening of the university ethos.

2. Impact on facilities

In addition to the problems affecting human resources (exodus, decline in performance and low morale), another consequence of the financial constraints noted by the university community is the deterioration of the infrastructure. This is reflected in deficits in the

maintenance and repair of buildings, as well as in inadequate facilities, such as outdated libraries and obsolete laboratories and equipment. The latter problem -particularly evident in the "scientific" and "technological" faculties- results from the fact that the last significant investment in this regard was made in the 1960s. Excerpts from three deans' interviews illustrate this situation:

> *In our faculty, for this year, we are going to have only 1 million dollars for all research and operational expenditures. This is a huge faculty, and to give an example of the costs we have to cover, in the last year we had explosions in three water pumps, out of five pumps. And water is essential for experiments and everything else.*

> *Every academic unit lacks resources for the minimum services, such as libraries, labs, telephones, cleaning and so on. There are also problems with buildings, which are greatly deteriorated, and there is no budget to repair them. It is also impossible to modernize facilities and labs, and the overall result is a great technological backwardness.*

> *Our technical equipment is obsolete, to the point that I feel ashamed to show our facilities to my foreign colleagues when they visit us. Libraries and periodical collections are in ruins. We are unable to conduct research because we lack the necessary resources, from the basic infrastructure, such as equipment, labs and libraries, to qualified human resources. The results of UBACYT are very poor. I just had a look at the 1991 description of projects. The low quality made me sad. The backwardness of Argentina in science and technology is practically irreversible.*

Understandably, the 'humanities' and some faculties oriented toward theoretical research do not seem to feel greatly affected by this problem:

> *In the humanities, I think that in certain areas the level is better than during the mythical 1960s. In humanities, research is less conditioned by infrastructural resources, and therefore people have remained updated. Our professors are constantly invited to teach in foreign universities, including Europe and the United States (dean).*

> *Our full-time faculty are internationally recognized, they have a good calibre, and they publish regularly in refereed journals. This is possible because they develop more theoretical than applied research (dean).*

In summary, there seems to be a consensus about the existence of a crisis, which is expressed, or reflected, in low salaries, exodus of staff, decline in performance, demoralization, poor facilities and the like. The combination of these factors seems to be leading to a general deterioration. Some people interpreted this situation in terms of a general decay of status, in an implicit comparison with a better past time, and linked physical deterioration to wage decline:

> *the university has become massive and proletarianized. There is no prestige. Many professors earn a ridiculously salary, everything has been degraded. Some time ago, to be a university professor involved certain prestige, but today it is not the case. Everything is degraded, in the Rectorado, in the GFC and in the whole university (professor).*

> *In many cases the lack of upkeep of buildings and facilities is the result of apathy and disinterest. Because of low salaries, everything deteriorates (Vice-President).*

The majority of the deans agreed with this diagnosis, using terms like 'decay', 'calamitous situation', 'extremely grave circumstance', 'profound deterioration' and the like. An examination of the interviews, public declarations and written documents shows that very few people would dispute these manifestations of the crisis. Although the symptoms seem to be evident to everyone, the diagnosis of the situation varies according to the relative position of the actor. In fact, as we will see in the next section, actors tend to understand the crisis, and to explain its origins, from three different perspectives.

Section 2. Actors' interpretation of the crisis

Although there was a general agreement about the extent and gravity of the crisis, the reasons given to account for this situation were very different. Diagnosis of the causes was greatly shaped by institutional, political and academic affiliation. As a general tendency, autonomists focused on external factors, hard marketventionists were more inclined to emphasize internal factors, and a third, smaller group formed primarily -but not exclusively- of soft marketventionists advanced explanations that could be classified under 'relational factors'.[7]

Given the polarization of the conflict, actors tended to identify the main causes of the crisis as a fault of their adversary. Autonomists, particularly university authorities, emphasized the financial crisis to the extent that, for them, the survival of the university itself is at stake. In their perspective, the university crisis is a financial crisis, and has clear external origins [8]. On the other side, marketventionists (particularly government officials) tended to reject the notion of "crisis of underfunding", arguing that the university crisis has its roots in its own inefficient structure, which has little to do with financial resources. University authorities publicly responded that, given the available resources and the quality of outcomes, they are extremely efficient. Those few government officials who accepted that the university was indeed suffering a financial crisis claimed that the whole country was suffering from the effects of adjustment policies, and not only the university.

This public debate, vented almost daily in the local media, was replete with personal aggressions, including reciprocal accusations of corruption, distortion of the truth and ignorance that in some cases even led to mutual threats of legal prosecution. In the private discourse, however, although the basic elements of the public debate were still present, the actors (particularly academics) seemed to be more tolerant of their adversary's point of view and more open to self-criticism. As will be seen later, there was also a small group of people who attempted to remain 'objective' and did not clearly align themselves with either contenders, identifying the root of the crisis as being in the strained relationship between the university and the state. Some of them went even further, interpreting the university crisis as being the result of the disconnection, miscommunication and mutual distrust of four social actors: the university, the state, industry, and the larger community.

1. External causes

For autonomists, the crux of the crisis is financial constraint. Although they identify other crises as well [9], the financial crisis is perceived to be the most important. They argued that the financial crisis is manifest in the drastic reductions of budget and investments (40% and 70% in between 1987 and 1990, respectively). Moreover, they add, the university budget decrease from 0.7% of the GNP to 0.3% in that period has been aggravated by the diminution of the GNP itself. For UBA authorities, the financial crisis not only affects the basic infrastructure necessary for academic endeavors (labs, libraries, etc.), but also creates frustration among support staff and professors who are increasingly disengaged from the university, either emigrating to other professions or to other countries. UBA contends that the financial crisis is so grave that "there is a real possibility of losing the critical mass of qualified human resources that today still make the existence of the Argentinean university possible" (UBA 1991: 8).

In this context, it was not surprising that the majority of the academic community interpreted the crisis by focusing on factors external to the university. One of these factors was the alleged state indifference towards scholarship, which was seen as part of a larger anti-intellectual attitude embodied in the Argentinean society. A second argument perceived cutbacks mainly as an intentional assault on the university carried out by the government for

political or economic reasons. This argument was rejected by government officials and university representatives of the minority for being 'conspiratory', and advanced a counter-argument based on the idea that university financial problems are part and parcel of the general financial crisis affecting the entire public sector. Furthermore, they argued that among the different areas of the public sector undermined by this situation, the university is not the most affected one.

A fourth reason external to the university advanced to account for the university crisis is that such a crisis is the natural outcome of the low quality of the previous levels of education. In this perspective, the university crisis is consistent with the crisis prevailing throughout the educational system. Finally, another factor that university authorities considered to be out of their control is the inheritance, in 1983, of an institution in very adverse circumstances. They claim that the military's intervention in university affairs propelled the exodus of the best professors, undermined scientific research and devastated academic life. The democratic government was expected to rebuild the university environment, and simultaneously deal with the accumulated number of applicants who were rejected entrance to the university for the previous seven years.

a) lack of societal recognition

One of the external factors advanced by autonomists to explain the university crisis was the indifference of the state, industry and the community towards the university. This idea, reiterated by many interviewees, was formulated by Pérez Lindo in a newspaper article[10] in which he points out that increasing anti-intellectualist tendencies of the political and economic leadership are rooted in a historical "rejection of knowledge" (RK) embodied in the Argentinean society. In that article, as well as in his most recent book (Pérez Lindo 1991), he contends that the RK factor is strongly rooted in the authoritarian and dogmatic practices of the church and the state. Regardless of the validity of this claim about the historical origins of this trend, many academics shared his concern about the societal indifference towards science in general and towards the university in particular. For instance, UBA (1991) complains about the lack of societal recognition of the importance of universities in the generation and dissemination of knowledge.

This explanation, consistent with the 'confidence crisis' mentioned in chapter 1, suggests that civil society no longer grants legitimacy to public universities. In this regard, a leader of professors complained that "nobody in society is interested in the university". Three main reasons were mentioned by autonomists for the societal indifference towards the university. First, some referred to societal ignorance of the role of university and science in national development. A second group resented society's lack of gratitude for the services that the university provides them. Finally, some academics raised self-criticisms about their inability to convey their message or to respond to societal needs. These three categories are exemplified through the following statements:

> *The debate about the university in particular, and about knowledge and R&D in general, is not established in the public opinion. The Argentinean society is not interested in this debate, because people do not know what the usefulness of the university or of knowledge is. The university is not perceived to be something important for national development, but only as a means of upward social mobility (expert).*

> *Society uses the university but does not acknowledge its social impact, and that is reflected in the low political and economic interest manifested to UBA, an institution that provides service to 10 million people and provides direct teaching to 200,000 students (professor).*

> *In our struggle to defend the public university we do not feel supported by society, either because we were not able to get our message across, or because there are more important priorities (dean).*

Other autonomists linked this crisis of confidence, not to a negative attitude of society as a whole, but rather to a particular segment of it, namely decision-makers. In a document published in 1991, UBA authorities referred to the lack of conviction among the political and economic leadership about the possibility (and perhaps necessity) of having a high level scientific system or good universities in Argentina, and to the lack of importance attributed to universities in the formulation of scientific and technological policies by the government (UBA 1991). This perception, shared by many interviewees, is reflected in the following examples:

> *In Argentina knowledge is not valued; the interest in knowledge as something valuable has been lost, starting with the anti-intellectual attitude of the President of this country. The young talents are leaving the country everyday (professor).*
>
> *The promotion policy of universities is the worst of the entire public sector. This is so because the Argentine political leadership (of any color) has no conscience about the importance of education in society, and they don't know that to form a good teacher and researcher takes years. It is easier and faster to destroy something than to build it (dean).*
>
> *The state is undergoing a moment of great indecisiveness; it doesn't know what it wants universities for. It is not clear whether it should support the public or the private universities (dean).*
>
> *The government does not recognize the present situation nor the importance of education (professor).*
>
> *This government is not interested in the problems of university research in particular and public education in general; the state conceives education not as a service to provide or as an investment, but as an expenditure (student).*

The RK hypothesis was also implicit in many statements about the way resources are invested in Argentina. Besides the generalized comments about the low percentage of the GNP invested in R&D, there were some explicit references about a perceived inversion of priorities in Argentine society. For instance, one professor said that the university cannot afford to buy additional laser beam equipment, which is necessary for research and would cost $2,000, while this very equipment abounds in discotheques.

In the same vein, Pichel (1991:20) contends that developed countries investments in research and technology are increasing, whereas Argentines "prefer to buy week-end cottages, houses in Punta del Este (a beach resort in Uruguay) or imported cars". Some pages later, he complains about the mistaken idea of industrialists that research should be only applied (p.38). In this regard, a professor mentioned that a former Vice-President of UIA (Argentine Industry Association), said in 1990 to a representative of CONADU (Argentine University Professors Association), on the occasion of the University Congress: "Why should we invest in research and knowledge creation, when it is cheaper and easier to import technology?".

b) attack on the university

One of the most recurrent explanations of the crisis advanced by university actors was the alleged negative attitude of the state towards the university, which was repeatedly referred to as an 'attack'. For instance, in the UBA document previously cited (UBA 1991:4), the University of Buenos Aires alluded to the "evident governmental attack against university autonomy expressed in recent decrees"[11] . In a GFC meeting, Rector Schuberoff also presented the case of an attack against academia. After citing the disregard for the university present in the rhetoric of state officials [12], he finished with the dramatic statement that "what is at stake here is the existence of the university." In public declarations (Schuberoff

1991:15), he also complained that "the state does not listen to our claims, and leads us in a sordid way to an elitist university and hence to an elitist country". He accused the government of "strangling scientific development" and "leaving the education of Argentines unprotected", and suggested that the state's lack of commitment towards the university was a result of a premeditated neglect.

References to the alleged "attack" were also present in the publications of the student movement, where the government was blamed for its "interventionist practices" (in apparent reference to the Decree 1111/90), for the "65% budget cutbacks", for the suspension of student aid, and for the destruction of the scientific-technological system (García 1991). Many other university authorities, professors and students also used the concept of 'government attack' as the main explanation for the university crisis. While some autonomists interpreted such an attack using an economic rationale, others proposed political reasons. Those who emphasized economic factors mentioned the structural adjustment policies implemented by the government as the main determinant:

> *The university is pressured today to play a new role: to apply the monetary policies of fiscal adjustment. This is taking university out of its specific role, which is the academic one. It is contradictory to request universities to improve if they must implement an adjustment. The university is not a business, even less a private business. It cannot function based on cost-benefit criteria. It is inappropriate to pressure the university to fight with the other sectors of the educational system or with other areas of the public sector for scarce funding (dean).*

Adjustment policies are perceived by university actors as part of a larger scheme to impose a new model in which the public sector is undermined and the private sector is promoted:

> *The situation of public university is a reflection of the national situation. We are quickly moving from a protectionist system to a free market system. Since the national university has been accustomed to a system of open admission and no tuition, there is a natural clash (dean)*

> *In this model, the state is increasingly abandoning the public education system. It's an attack to the public sphere in order to glorify the private sphere. This explains why the government disregards the duties of the state towards society. This is a grave problem for the future of education and for the future of society in general. The attack on the public sector is also evident in health. For instance, while we are talking in this office out there is an epidemic of cholera, something that we Argentines have overcome many years ago* (student leader, majority).

> *In this process of transformation, the social expenditure has been reduced and education, together with other public services, has deteriorated* (Vice-President).

> *In the model implemented by this government, the university is considered either as an obstacle or as booty. Such a model is supported on very weak foundations. It is based on a restructuring process, leaving aside crucial areas which are duties of the state (i.e. hydro resources, flooding, health, etc.). The fiscal deficit is currently being adressed with the selling of our patrimony, but there is no genuine foreign investment in productive areas* (dean).

> *Until today, the free and public university has been a key feature of a state that is now collapsing and is disowned by everybody. In this context, many things are being burned, among them the public university. In the meanwhile, our available resources are faraway from the model we proclaim for the university* (dean).

> *The university is not only perceived as an expenditure by this government, but also as an obstacle for the implementation of the new economic model* (Vice-President).

Some university actors went even further, contending that such a model is imposed on the state by foreign powers, and that in the new international alignment the Argentinean public university is forced to play a new role:

There is clear alignment with the policy that the US defined for Latin America in educational affairs. For the USA to be a country with students of the year 2,000, the peripheral countries must make larger interest payments on the external debt, and must have less capacity to generate their own resources. Societies with no theoretical formation are easier to control and dominate. There is a new alignment in the public-private conflict, where a new logic seems to indicate that the private sector is efficient and profitable, while the public sector is inefficient, bureaucratic, etc. To me, this is a fallacy, but the important thing is that there are ideological and political lines supporting this logic, new alignments are developed, and the Argentine state is clearly allied with one of the poles of this supposed contradiction. I do not attempt to elaborate a 1960s speech; this is the logical conclusion after a careful observation of objective data (student leader, majority).

An illustration of what is happening in the university is the case of the Condor missile project. Much effort and resources were invested in that project, a high tech scientific program to put satellites in orbit. The Argentine society made the investment, but the USA pressured the Argentine government under the argument that it was going to be used for war purposes. The Condor was a project that would enable Argentina to generate its own technology and revenues, but it would eventually compete with the USA, and the USA does not want competitors in the Southern Cone. For that reason the project was attributed a destructive intention, and its cancellation means the dismantlement of a highly sophisticated scientific and technological project and the waste of years of accumulated experience. In our university the isolation of the HIV was recently achieved, an accomplishment that only three other countries have attained. If Argentina develops an AIDS vaccine, a similar thing that happened with the Condor project will take place. The USA has invested in technology, and wants to profit from that investment; hence, they are not going to give us the minimum space to commercialize our scientific discoveries. In terms of scientific research, we have achieved a quantitative and qualitative leap forward in UBA. When we came to UBA in 1984, there was not even the 10% of the scientific projects currently undertaken, both in terms of infrastructure and results. Most of our research has possibilities of application, and this creates a problem for this government, because of the new international alignment of Argentina. For this reason our scientists are the worst paid in the world, for this reason research equipment is not acquired, and for this reason our activities deteriorate everyday. With the USA I want at least to make good business. I can't waste in a second an investment that the Argentina society has made for many years (Vice-President).

Other university actors interpreted the government attack on political grounds, arguing that the financial strangling suffered by the university represents a punishment for its opposition to the government's attacks on the public sector or simply because a public, massive university was dysfunctional to the new economic order. The first explanation, advanced mainly by university authorities, recurrently referred to the university as "the last space of resistance" to the conservative policies implemented by the government. The latter view, expressed primarily by students, was based on the idea that dominant groups, in order to control, require an uneducated populace. In any case, the common theme is that universities are progressive institutions which challenge the status quo [13]:

The State is under a deep restructuring, and is redefining its role. For this purpose, it is necessary to discipline society, and the university is the only sector that has not accepted such discipline (vice-president).

The perception, from the perspective of the dominant sectors, is that if the popular sectors enter into the university life, they will acquire the necessary knowledge and tools to challenge the conservative model, and that means an increase of social conflict (student).

The government is trying to impose an elitist university, so the educational level of the population decreases. They want us to become more and more mediocre, and less able to criticize the economic and social model that they are imposing upon us. They want docile people who accept everything (student leader, majority).

The political dimension of the attack was sometimes related to the fact that UBA has an affinity with the Radical Party. Many professors, deans, alumni and students equated the

attack on the university with an attack on Radicalism. Most autonomists contended that the Peronist government is wrong in conflating university policies with national politics on the grounds that their opposition to the government has nothing to do with their sympathies for the Radical Party, but has everything to do with their academic and critical perspective. On the other hand, marketventionists argued that, given the obvious subservience of academic goals to party politics, government attack is justified. Nevertheless, regardless of ideological positions, the overwhelming majority of interviewees pointed out that the university-state conflict is shaped by the Peronist-Radical confrontation in national politics.

c) financial crisis of the state

Although reluctantly, marketventionists acknowledged that the university is suffering financial problems. They agreed with the academic community that this financial crisis has an external component, but they rejected both the 'indifference' and the 'attack' hypotheses. For instance, government officials deny that they ignore the importance of higher education for national development, or that they are mounting an attack in order to impose an economic or a political agenda. Instead, they argued that the state is suffering a general financial crisis, and the university is just one sector affected among many others. To quote some of them

> *There is no attack on the University. What is happening is part of a general adjustment. The entire social expenditure has been reduced. University is the political project of the middle class, and middle classes are more vocal* (government official).

> *We are all suffering from the adjustments, especially the social sector, and the university remains in its ivory tower. The university community has no right to enjoy the luxuries that are alien to other public agencies* (government official).

> *It is terrible that it was necessary that the Ministry of education had to apply pressure in order to ensure university rationalization. Now, the paranoids of the university think that this is a project of the government specifically designed to attack public universities, without realizing that there is a general crisis of the Welfare State that is equally affecting all areas of the public sector* (government official).

> *Neither through exports nor through taxes the State can obtain the same resources that it used to have. We are in a situation of pre-bankruptcy* (former government official).

Some functionaries went even further, arguing that, within the educational system, higher education is more favored by the government than the other sectors.

> *We must realize that 50% of the educational spending goes to the non-university sector, which provides service to 5 million students, while the other half goes to the only 500,000 university students. If the poor people get to know these figures, they will burn both the university and the ministry of education* (government official).

The perspective that the external causes of the financial crisis of the university are exclusively related to the fiscal crisis of the state was rejected by the majority of autonomists, and some of them even challenged the existence of such financial crisis:

> *The state says that there is no money, but they avoid talking about tax policy. Moreover, in order to maintain the exchange rate with the dollar, the Central Bank buys some days 200 million dollars, which represents one fourth of the annual budgets of all Argentine universities (Vice-President).*

As noted earlier, not everyone at UBA rejects the government position. On the contrary, within the university, the marketventionist bloc has adherents among representatives of the minority who sit as 'official opposition' on the GFC. This coalition includes professors, alumni and students:

We are a developing country, with a recent past of hyperinflation. The public finances should be taken good care of in order to match the genuine revenues with public expenditures. UBA cannot escape the general situation of the country, and must adapt to an insufficient budget (professor).

The context is economic adjustment; hence, we are suffering a financial adjustment in the university. The economic crisis of the university is a reflex of the overall national crisis (alumni).

The deficit of the state, basically in bankruptcy, makes it impossible to secure an exclusive public funding which guarantees an acceptable academic quality (student, minority).

As will be seen in the next chapter, this last statement expresses one of the rationales behind linking the financial crisis of the state with the imposition of tuition fees.

d) quality of previous educational levels

Another external reason advanced to explain the university crisis is the low quality of incoming students, a problem that can be traced to elementary school. According to UBA authorities, students with low qualifications are allowed by teachers to move to the next level, until the crisis blows up when they enter university. Problems faced by the university as a result of the promotion of unqualified students from one level to the next were even accepted by the Minister of Education in public declarations. One professor summarized the situation as follows:

The poor quality of incoming students is due to the low standards of elementary and secondary schools. Our students have problems in almost all subjects; even worse, they don't know how to write. There is only one reason for encouragement, namely the high quality training of our professors, which is much higher than the average level of other developing countries. The most distinguished professors of Argentina are in UBA.

It is interesting that, to compensate for the low quality of one of the inputs of the learning process (students), this professor felt the need to balance the statement by praising another input (professors). Those who consider the poor quality of secondary schools as a factor affecting the financial crisis of the university contend that UBA is pressured to devote immense resources to correct it. Indeed, in order to improve the quality of fresh students and to upgrade them to the university standards, UBA has created a huge structure to which it allocates important amounts of financial and human resources. While 126,600 students are enrolled in the different faculties, and only 7,200 are taking graduate programs, there are 77,100 students taking the one year introductory program called CBC (Common Basic Cycle). The rationale behind the argument of those who blame the previous levels of education is that if elementary and secondary schools did a proper job, the university would be free from devoting so much effort to offset the inadequacies of the previous levels and thus would be able to transfer those resources to more substantive areas.

e) the legacies of the past

Finally, another external factor advanced by university authorities to explain the crisis is the difficult situation that they faced when they took charge of the administration in 1983, after seven years of military dictatorship. Comments in this regard centered on two major issues. First, the terrible shape of the institution in terms of academic work, and second, the pressures to expand enrollment to accommodate the demand that was 'contained' during the military period. In relation to the former, references were made to the discontinuity of academic staff (mainly due to the 1966 and 1976 military interventions and the firings of 1974), the low quality of teachers that resulted from the lack of open competition for making appointments (concursos), and the virtual elimination of research activities due to their transfer to another institution (Conicet). In relation to the latter, university authorities

acknowledged that, as a result of the massive explosion of enrollments brought about by democracy, they were pressured by the circumstances to hire many ill-prepared professors.

Given that, at the time of the interviews, almost ten years have passed since the army withdrew from government, frequent references to the enormous challenges left to the present administration by the previous one may sound surprising to observers, but not to the two major actors of the conflict. University authorities point out that the situation inherited by them was so calamitous that it excessively delayed the transition period between dictatorship and democracy. They also contend that, when performance finally started to improve, the Menemist government elected in 1989 began its attack. In contrast, the government suggests that autonomists' references to the university of the pre-democracy to explain the current crisis are nothing more than a justification to cover up internal deficiencies with supposed external constraints.

2. Internal factors

Government authorities agreed with the university community that UBA is experiencing rapid deterioration. They also concurred with the university community that salaries are low, and acknowledged some of the consequences of this situation, such as the exodus of personnel, the decline in quality of performance, the demoralization, and the deterioration of infrastructure. However, although they sometimes recognize the existence of financial problems, they disagreed with the diagnosis that the core of the problem is the financial crisis. Instead, they claim that public funding is adequate, but that funds are used in an inefficient way. In other words, the government rejects the diagnosis that the university crisis is the result of external factors, arguing instead that the main reasons for the crisis lie in the internal shortcomings of the university. In other words, while university actors construct their notion of crisis as a crisis of underfunding, the government refers to a crisis of efficiency and purpose.

Although in the public discourse autonomists tended to dismiss the government's diagnosis and to spotlight the great achievements of UBA, in the interviews most autonomists were frank and willing to point out internal problems. Indeed, of all university actors, only two deans and one alumni (majority) reiterated the triumphalistic vision of the university advanced in public, emphasizing UBA's accomplishments in terms of democratization (via massive admission policies and open competition for appointments) and promotion of research, using terms such as 'good academic quality' or 'center of excellence in post-secondary education'. When requested to elaborate this evaluation, arguments were based on comparisons with poorer quality of the pre-1983 university or with current private universities.

Aside from these three, in the interviews the university actors partially concurred with the government's claim that the university crisis can also be explained by internal factors. Although some members of the academic community expressed stronger self-criticism than others, overall they were not as critical as government officials in addressing internal factors. The discussion on the alleged 'defects' of the university can be organized in five categories: a) isolation; b) obsolescence and conservatism (unwillingness to change); c) inadequate structure; d) inefficiency, and e) poor academic environment.

a) isolation

To begin with, many argued that one of the factors of the current crisis is the isolation of the university. In the discourse of those who sustain this view, the university was continuously portrayed as an "island", an "ivory tower", with recurrent references to its unaccountability, elitism, abstraction and social irrelevance.

Autonomy, for instance, is very important, but it has led UBA to become an island, isolated from its surrounding community. This is the main defect of UBA: it is alienated from the community that supports it. In fact, a public and free university should be at the service of the community that sponsors it (dean).

The university, in the context of the structural change undertaken by the nation, must be, and it is, willing to show to society that it is not an ivory tower. Society is asking the university serious definitions about its mission (student).

The university is isolated from production. Its high level of abstraction is far away from the market needs. The university continues its own way in its ivory tower (government authority).

The university has a big problem: lack of communication with the external world. There is no approach to community problems, from the academic specificity (professor).

The university must assume the social reality in which it is immersed. It cannot feign distraction (university authority).

The portrayal of the university as an "ivory tower" was usually illustrated with reference to the irrelevance of research topics or course content. To quote one of them

Universities claim that they have little money for research. First we must see what research do they really do, and after that we may decide if they have little money or not. My opinion is that much of the research conducted in universities is irrelevant for the current Argentine context (government authority).

Those government officials who criticized the university for being irrelevant, when pushed to provide examples, selectively focused on examples from the social sciences and humanities (particularly sociology, psychology and law). Interestingly enough, these government officials were themselves trained in social sciences and some of them still teach one or two courses at the university.

They are still engaged in theoretical debates, discussing abstract issues which are totally disconnected from reality. In Sociology, for example, they are still discussing Gramsci, and they don't learn anything about the public social system, such as health, social security, pensions, housing and the like (government authority).

Psychologists are still debating Freud and Lacan, but they don't do anything in relation to selection of personnel, or motivation strategies for employees in the business sector. They do not have any idea about how the real world works. In education is the same: they are still reading Paulo Freire. They need to wake up soon (government authority).

Some university authorities conceded that some isolation may exist in terms of curriculum, but argued that this situation can be explained by the lack of institutional continuity:

Because of the absence of institutional continuity, the university has been unable to assimilate the changes that have been taking place in the work-place in other parts of the world. Here we overemphasize one aspect of psychology, the clinical one, and within that, we only deal with one school, namely Freud and Lacan. We need to update ourselves and to generate new specialties in other areas of work. We pay very little attention to what is happening in other parts of the world (dean).

The university has closed within itself for many years; it is part of its tradition, which is linked to the institutional history of Argentina. The university isolated itself to protect itself from the rapid and drastic institutional changes that have taken place recurrently, like military coups, repression, anti-intellectualism and the like. Since 1966, the university has preferred to isolate, and to make deals with the government in turn. This isolation has diminished the prestige and the perceived usefulness of the university before those mainly concerned with economic growth and the system of production in general (Vice-President).

b) obsolescence and conservatism

The previous comments about the isolation from the 'real world' can be linked with those which explain the university crisis in terms of its inability to change. Though using different perspectives and presenting different arguments, the majority of the interviewees agreed on two issues: first, the obsolescence of the present university model vis-a-vis the demands of the external world, and second, its inability to undertake a genuine reform. In terms of obsolescence, it was perceived that the university has not been able to respond on time to the new world order, to the new technological paradigms or to the new class structure of the Argentinean society. It is their argument that the professional, massive university was not a viable model anymore:

This university crisis is related to the decline of a development model based on internal markets, which started to fall apart in the late 1960s. Such a development model required many professionals, but today the global trend is toward concentration of economic resources and towards concentration of knowledge in spaces of excellence, which leads to an extreme specialization. This is replacing the classic Napoleonic university education which trains for the exercise of a particular profession. Since the 'professional' university model has persisted without taking into account the macro socio-economic changes, it is now unable to guarantee employment opportunities for the professionals who graduate every year. Of course, this is not just a university problem, but also a problem of the market logic. This situation creates two problems. On the one hand, the state, in the context of its modernization project and its exclusive restructuring, attempts to restrict universities, to create a few centers of excellence, and to favor the private sector. It is astonishing to see the amount of advertisements of newly created private universities in newspapers and magazines. On the other hand, large business and industrial organizations, with a few exceptions in certain areas, do not need public universities for professional training anymore. Indeed, private groups have been able to develop their own institutions and strategies for professional training (student leader, minority, left).

The public university is experiencing a profound crisis, and not only in financial terms. The financial crisis camouflages the other crises, and therefore it distracts the attention from many of the structural deficiencies of the university. The public university did not notice yet the change in the productive paradigm that took place during the last decade, both in terms of production and in the formation of highly specialized human resources. Technological changes imply a high scientific component in production. The university has not seriously transformed its program offerings in terms of careers, curricula, consolidation of solid scientific groups, and it is still engaged in old discussions, such as the gratuity of higher education. With the structural adjustment, the university feels offended and confused [in Spanish: 'ofendida y confundida']. Offended, because it feels that its values and contributions are not recognized. For instance, it is a fact that this university produced human resources for a particular productive paradigm (import substitutions), that it was an efficient mechanism for democratization and that, at least until the 1960s, has had a high scientific standard. Confused, because, being a progressive sector, it finds itself in the ironic situation of defending the flags of the past, while the conservative sectors criticize its incapacity for transformation. The public university preaches for the left and works for the right (Vice-President).

The present Argentinean university was the result of a project of the middle classes, which in turn were a product of immigration since 1890. Their children managed to enter university, and they broke the elitism that prevailed there. At that time, the university shifted from the oligarchy to the middle class. In the Argentine society of that period, the oligarchy and the middle class were the majority of the population. To the middle class, the modernist project promised progress and justice. With the present postmodernism, the door slammed shut, and all those who are outside will remain outside. Moreover, nobody promises them anything, as it was before. New university strategies and policies are increasingly being shaped by this new model, in which the market rules and the disadvantaged are unprotected. We are witnessing the emergence of closed models. For instance, USA and Europe are creating their own markets, and do not accept more immigrants. Confronted by these developments, the university is perplexed, and doesn't know what to do. As the university project of the middle class was buoyant and expanding, the resources to fuel the growing demand have become more scarce. In the whole world the Welfare State is being abandoned; everything is privatized, and whatever is not efficient is shut down. There are no alternatives to that model, and therefore, it is impossible today to swim against the current. The fate of the public university depends on the fate of

the middle class, which made it in its image with the discourse that it was open to everybody. The oligarchy is going to get through, as it always did, developing new centers of excellence, such as (the recently created) San Andrews University, but the middle class has lost upward mobility and its social project (dean).

The university has been immersed in a national situation where the democratic government constituted the only common good; however, that represents a very restricted view of democracy. Hence, university limited itself to continue demanding resources from the state for the same activities that has been performed historically, but without taking into account the new context (dean).

The university was unable to respond to the new social demands (Vice-President).

In order to overcome its present crisis, the public university must come to terms wih the twenty first century, both in academic and in academic terms (government authority).

This is a very old model; the Radicals are still defending a status quo that is not functional to anybody, and clashes against the logic of structural adjustment, which aims at reducing both the budget and autonomy of the university (student leader; Peronist).

Many people want to go back to the "golden age" of the 1960s, that is, the UBA of Risieri Frondizi. These people do not realize that the UBA of the 1960s was adequate for that historical period, but presently that model is inadequate to respond to the current challenges (dean).

Some went even further, arguing that the university is lagging behind not by one decade, but by three decades or more. In this view, the university is still being managed with out-of-date criteria:

UBA is still thinking like in the 1960s, before the big expansion. They still think that they have few students (expert).

As a remnant of old traditions, the university is still perceived by many as an honor, and that perception does not correspond to the present situation, because academic work should be considered as work like any other. The university is still functioning with criteria from the beginning of the century, such as glory, honor and the like, and not as a daily work which deserves a remuneration (dean).

Some interviewees, both outside of and within the university, contend that the problem of obsolescence consists of an ideological and institutional stagnation in the principles and structures adopted in the 1918 Reform:

The university people didn't realize that things have changed since the 1918 Reform (government authority).

The main problem of UBA is its tie to old slogans. Although many of the principles of the 1918 reform are still valid, it is necessary to update them to the current historical context (dean).

UBA's deep crisis resulted from being managed by a statute which is 25 years old and a reform which is 75 years old. In their moment both of them had great value, because they were necessary, but today it is impossible to manage a university according to those principles (dean).

The key issue is not how appropriate is the 1918 Reform today, but how absent is the reform of the end of the century. The 1918 Reform must be seen as a turn point to continue forward, and not as something static (dean).

The university is stuck in 1918. Many years have passed, and we need to be able to reformulate the role of university in today's world putting aside dogmatism and "principism".[14] *For example, is it still appropriate the co-governance structure? Does it make sense to oppose tuition fees? (university authority).*

This stagnation was related to the inertia of UBA to undertake reforms. In this regard, it was pointed out that UBA is in a state of shock and paralysis, unable to provide a structural response to the new challenges. While some people attributed this situation to the necessity to attend to urgent demands or to the lack of internal consensus, others argued that UBA is a conservative institution which refuses debate and resists change.

What are we doing to solve this situation? Nothing! We are waiting for somebody else to solve it (dean)

We know that changes must be implemented, but we have not agreed yet on what and how things must be changed. The problem is the lack of a clear and shared framework. There is a high uncertainty in relation to decision-making for the medium and long term (university authority).

Sometimes there is a collision between the need for a deep transformation of the system and the need to provide an immediate answer to a specific -and massive- demand (dean).

The university is not an easy location to inject innovations, particularly innovations related to market principles (dean).

The university reproduces the status quo, a paradox taking into account that they call themselves 'Reformists' (expert).

The main issue is the absence of truly academic debate about the university. A university that is not permanently willing to discuss and to question its role, enters into a stage of 'pigheadedness' (dean).

Currently, UBA lacks a global analysis of structural problems. We lack a debate about the mission and role of the university in the present (dean).

University people are not willing to leave aside the principles of 1918, because in order to create something different it is necessary to transit a road full of uncertainties, and people prefer to stick to the known rather than face the unknown. In short, the typical resistance to change. There is no self-criticism. The confrontation with the government has polarized the debate, and there is a lack of space to think and dialogue about the big issues of the university. Unfortunately, not even in the Superior Council there is debate about the big topics (university authority).

The university has a crisis of ideas, an inability to formulate an alternative model of university to face the dominant conservative model carried out by the state. The Argentinean society, which is suffering the impact of this conservative model, lacks a university able to generate new knowledge as a tool for power (student leader, FICSO).

The university responds to the middle class, which looks for euphemisms, because it is afraid of calling things by their real names, and lacks a clear identity. Because of this, in the university there are too many declamations and masks, and too little pragmatism and action. Besides, changes in the university take more time than changes in the economy, in part because academics do not seem to be in a rush for changing things. The university uses a strategy that consists of changing a multipicity of irrelevant things in order to avoid real change (student leader, UPAU). [15]

Before confronting the government, universities must engage in a serious exercise of self-examination and self-criticism (government authority).

Many conflicts will arise [as a result of government's attempt to impose new policies] because the university community has a resistance to change (government authority).

Some of those who acknowledged that the university is not doing much in relation to the crisis pointed out the necessity of assuming a pro-active rather than a reactive attitude towards the exigencies for change:

Right now, we are still on time to implement a rationalization at almost zero cost, that is, without firing staff. This is our opportunity to adjust the university in accordance to the demands of the moment. We must take rationalization seriously, without firing anybody, redistributing resources, generating new resources and negotiating with the external world (university authority).

c) inadequate academic organization

A third 'internal' problem advanced to account for the university crisis is related to its emphasis on traditional careers, its size and its long degrees. To begin with, the inadequacy of the "professional" university to face the challenges of the contemporary world seems to be the only "internal" problem publicly recognized by the university. Indeed, the obsolescence and limitations of the traditional Napoleonic university has been pointed out by government and by university actors alike. There was a general agreement that the old institutional patterns, the emphasis on long professional careers, the excessive weight given to individual faculties and the low importance attributed to research and graduate studies were detrimental to the essence of the university. For instance, one Vice-President recognized that one debt that the university has with society is its institutional modernization, because "many internal structures have been crystallized for decades". A former government authority referred to the low priority attributed to research and the high importance enjoyed by professional faculties by confronting two university models:

The Argentinean university has never had an interest in research. In the 1960s, the Professional University had the support of 95% of professors, whereas the Scientific University had the support of Conicet, with all its resources and infrastructure, and of the minority of full-time professors, particularly those who conduct research, go to Conferences and have more prestige. Today that lack of interest is also evident; otherwise, they would have closed the CBC and transferred those resources to research. Here the university is conceived as an institution whose mission is to award undergraduate degree with a professional orientation, while research is left to graduate programs. That's the idea of CEA, and it is a tremendous mistake: training in research methods must start in the bachelor's degree. After that, it's too late.

In a public document, the university authorities themselves acknowledge that the emphasis placed on professional training has negatively influenced teaching, research, extension and technology transfer (UBA 1991). In reference to this issue, some minority representatives of the academic community claimed that the amount and quality of research conducted at UBA is insignificant, and representatives of the majority recognized that "most of the professors are professional practitioners who are not academics at all" [16].

In our universities very little research is done. There is no critical mass, no full-time faculty, and no linkage with industry. There is no knowledge creation even in the faculties which are close to industry, such as Engineering. Engineering should be the university outlet to industry, but here at this university (UBA) *nothing happens (expert).*

One professor attributed this situation to the large influence of professional corporations on setting university priorities. In this regard, a related problem shared by the university community and the government is that enrollments are heavily concentrated in professional faculties. Indeed, out of a total of 1,697 degrees, roughly two thirds are conferred in law, medicine and economy. In these faculties, according to some people, the weak relationship between the university and society is magnified.

In these faculties the lack of relations with society is evident. For instance, during the first years of democracy the fundamental problems perceived by the public opinion were the economic crisis and justice, particularly in relation to human rights. However, these problems are not researched by the faculties of law and economy, which limit themselves to training professionals (dean).

In professional faculties, such as Medicine, people do not have a comprehensive view of the university. Some time ago the faculty implemented primary health care, we visited living people in their communities, but now our professors and students only see the dead. Instead of seeing real people, they go to the morgue to study corpses (former dean).

The other problems pointed out in relation to the inadequate structure of the university were its emphasis on long degrees and its massive enrollments. In relation to the former, a government authority stated that

there is a lack of intermediate diplomas and a scarcity of short cycles. There is a clear orientation toward illustration, with no technical specialization, or laboratories.

In relation to the latter, both university actors and government officials agreed that a student body of more than 200,000 students creates difficulties in both management and in the provision of quality services. In this regard, the government states that the main problem of the university is the mismatch between its financial resources and its "theoretically universal goals" of free education for everybody (Pronatass 1988:91 and 93). However, since no studies were conducted in this respect, there is no clear evidence to indicate to what extent massive enrollments affect quality of learning. Although university authorities acknowledge the possibility of a negative correlation between these two variables, they argue that other inputs, such as the quality of professors and research activities, may have a greater impact on learning. Otherwise, they claim, graduates of small public and private universities should have a much higher caliber than UBA graduates, and that it is not the case. A second problem related to student body is to determine which is the ideal size of a university. Different figures were advanced in this regard, but without much empirical evidence to substantiate the claim.

d) inefficiency

Among the internal factors mentioned to account for the university crisis, probably 'inefficiency' was the most contentious one. As advanced in the preceding chapter, government officials shared the view that universities have serious problems of inefficiency, and that these inefficiencies are particularly damaging when resources are shrinking:

Universities are inefficient. We must understand that we are in a context of crisis, and that the only immediate solution is to rationalize spending (government authority).

For the government, given the situation prevailing in the public sector, the unwillingness of the university to become more efficient and to adapt, like other sectors of the public sector, to structural adjustment policies, is not only technically unacceptable but also immoral. Though most autonomists respond to the accusations with empirical evidence of efficiency, such as the proportion of national research carried out by UBA or the success of UBA's graduates in foreign universities, a few of them acknowledged the existence of inefficiencies.

What is missing in this university is rationalization, efficiency, creativity and talent. I regret to agree with the government, because I share neither its policies nor its intentions. There is a lack of management, and nobody controls professors. Nobody knows who conduct research, what research they do, what they publish, and the like. Presently, if there is no other competitor, professors can renew their cathedrae for another seven years without going through competition, and that is a setback from an academic point of view (university authority).

In general, those university authorities who acknowledged the existence of inefficiencies where less severe than the one quoted above. They usually referred to "pockets of irrationality in spending" in the professionalized academic units, such as Engineering, Law,

Economics and Medicine, including the university hospital. Marketventionists instead concentrated their attacks on the basic organization of the university. The evidence of university inefficiency provided by them cn be organized around seven indicators: academic/non academic ratio, excessive and unproductive bureaucracy, teacher/student ratio, per student cost, graduation rates (proportion of students who complete their degrees on time), duplication of activities and administrative irregularities.

Regarding the weight of support staff relative to academic staff, the government claims that the excess of non-academic staff has reached an unacceptable dimension. One government authority stated that in some universities, like UBA and UNC, the academic-non academic staff ratio is 1:1, and another one said that more than 50% of the university personnel are support staff. UBA authorities reply that the real ratio is 3:1, or even 4:1 if ad-honorem (non-paid) professors are considered. Looking at the figures, the discrepancy seems to be rooted in the fact that they are talking about different things. If one considers the number of staff assigned to academic and non-academic tasks, the university is correct. However, if one looks at the budget distribution, it may be observed that 50% of the budget allocated to salaries is directed to non-academic staff, and in this sense the government is right. The university acknowledges this situation, and finds it understandable:

> *Yes, it is true that in UBA 50% of the budget allocated to salaries is used to pay support staff. It is also very logical, because many professors come to teach once a week for a symbolic pay, or even ad honorem. If professors' salaries were raised to a normal figure, that proportion would change. In reality, this university is financed by professors* (dean).

However, within the university, the non-academic staff issue is a very divisive and sensitive one, especially when it relates to administrative staff. While almost no one complained about funds allocated to support staff, some deans and many professors showed a certain degree of animosity towards the Rectorado's bureaucracy. In this regard, it was claimed that this bureaucracy is too large, that it enjoys special benefits and that it is very inefficient, cumbersome and slow.

> *Our academic staff is poorly paid, in great part because most of the budget is absorbed by the administrative bureaucracy (dean).*
>
> *Rectorado has an excessive bureaucracy. Most of the budget for non-academic staff goes to administrative positions (professor).*
>
> *Parking spots, offices, secretaries and the like are for administrative staff, not for academic staff. Administrative employees, specifically those appointed through political affiliation, earn higher salaries than professors, even full professors with years of experience (professor).*

The excessive amount of regulations and time required to achieve administrative goals can be illustrated by two examples:

> *We have in total about 2000 professors, and only 400 have tenure (secure position for seven years). The problem to have more tenures is that the process to select a professor through open competition (concurso) may take up to two years, because of excessive bureaucracy and regulation. At the faculty level, the procedure to select a professor works relatively well, but as soon as the university administration enters the arena, bureaucracy delays the whole process (dean).*
>
> *There is a high level of administrative irrationality. For example, to move from one faculty to another, or from UBA to another university, may take one year (professor).*

In terms of mismanagement, marketventionists claimed that the lack of accurate and up to date information about basic issues (i.e. exact number of regular students), the poor planning, the irrational policies and regulations, the inadequate hiring practices and the

waste carried out by the central administration is making the university dissipate up to 50% of its budget. Autonomists respond that, since 90% of the budget is tied to salaries, the university can freely operate on the remaining 10%, and therefore the charges of mismanagement are unfounded. However, this 10% should not be underestimated, since it represents more than 10 million dollars. Indeed, some autonomists acknowledged that the university's awkward purchasing policies ("from chalk to chemicals, we buy late and bad") create waste, and if changes were implemented the university would be able to save 25% to 50% of those 10 million dollars.

A third indicator of inefficiency, according to the government and minority representatives, is the teacher/student ratio. Some concerns related to supposed irrationalities in the distribution of teachers. To quote a minority representative

> *There are cathedrae with three professors (a full professor, and associate and an assistant) for only seven students, whereas other cathedrae must teach a thousand students.*

Government authorities claim that, on average, Argentinean universities have one professor for 7 students, whereas in the United States the ratio is 1:17. Although the Argentine data were correct, the comparison is not valid because the large majority of university professors in Argentina are not full-time. On average, only 15% of professors are full time, and in the professional faculties the figure ranges between 1% and 3%. Although some professors are part-time (20 hours per week), the bulk of the academic staff have 'simple dedication' (approximately 12 hours per week). In this regard, UBA argues that if all academic positions were converted into full time positions, the real teacher/student ratio in this institution would be 1:30, that is, ten points higher than the average ratio of developed countries.

Even if the latter figure were real [17], concern over the low proportion of full-time professors is still valid. This constitutes another case in which the discrepancy between public and private discourse can be observed. In private, university authorities argue for the implementation of a tenure track system (carrera docente), under the assumption that it is easier to request academic performance to 6,000 full-timers than to 26,000 part-timers and sessionals. Indeed, while university authorities acknowledged the advantages, in terms of efficiency and productivity, of having a majority of full-time professors, they avoid public declarations on this topic to avoid conflicts with the large mass of 'adjunct professors' and with the professional faculties.

> *Rectors know that it is better to manage a few full-time professors than a huge army of adjunct professors who in many occasions do not show up in their classes or come ill-prepared. However, Rectors are not willing to make changes because they are afraid of political costs (professor).*

In the professional faculties, however, neither deans nor professors seem to consider this situation as problematic. Furthermore, some even argued that part-time positions are the most efficient means to articulate the university and industry, because those faculty members filter information from one side to the other.

As another evidence of the internal inefficiency of the university, government constantly refers to the exorbitant per student cost, relative to the low per student cost of primary education. Curiously enough, this argument has been raised almost simultaneously by authorities of the Ministries of Education in many Latin American countries, and disseminated through the national press [18]. In the case of Argentina, the government claims that the annual cost per university student was US $950 which, extremely high in comparison to the US $176 invested in elementary students, demonstrates once again the inefficiency of higher education. University authorities claim that comparison is made only for political purposes, to antagonize the subsystems and to predispose the public opinion

against the university. Indeed, the university community argues that such comparison is invalid because elementary and higher education have different functions, perform different tasks, undertake different activities and use different inputs to generate different outcomes. Thus, to compare one with another in terms of cost does not make much sense, because it is not the same to produce a graduate from elementary school as a medical doctor or an engineer. For university authorities, it makes much more sense to compare similar institutions, and if this is the case UBA is not an expensive university. In fact, UBA claims that the per student cost in 1991 was US $640 (a different figure that the US $950 estimated by the government), much lower that the US $10,000 of American and European universities, and still below the US $7,000 of the Universidad de Sao Paulo, Brazil.

The government would contend that international comparisons are not valid, for the same reasons advanced by the university to reject the comparison with primary education. Indeed, the government may claim that if a Harvard or Cambridge graduate is more expensive than a UBA graduate does not necessarily mean that UBA is more efficient, because they are not of the same quality. Even if the UBA authorities accept this argument, they can still make their case on national basis. As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, UBA provides service to 34.5% of all students enrolled in public universities, produces 40.3% of total graduates, and uses only 20% of the budget [19]. Moreover, UBA points out that if one considers that 20% of the university budget is allocated to hospitals, its efficiency relative to other public universities is still higher.

Another indicator of inefficiency pointed out by the government is the low graduation rate. On the front page of one of the most traditional Argentine newspapers, under the provocative title of "National University: the figures that almost nobody knows", a top functionary of the Ministry of Education who preferred to remain anonymous revealed that out of 100 students who begin grade 1, only five enter the university and only two complete their degrees. In addition to the high drop out rate, it was claimed that the average time used to complete a bachelor's degree during the 1970s was 9 years, while in the 1980s it has reached 14 years (La Nación, January 29, 1992:1). However, these figures can be disputed on the grounds that it is impossible to assess both drop out rates and the average duration of university studies in present times because cohort studies are not being conducted. As one expert recalled in relation to this case, the last cohort study of Argentinean universities was conducted in the 1960s by Devaubois, for OECD.

A fifth often used indicator of inefficiency was the duplication of infrastructure and services, which is largely related to the organization into independent faculties. One of the most clear examples of duplication is the case of Agriculture and Animal Science. In spite of the fact that they still share the same campus, they are divided into two separate faculties since 1973. As one of those deans stated

> *There was no glory among the actors of that period. There is a traditional tribal war between Agriculture and Animal Science. We have everything duplicated. Each one has its own auto body repair shop, library, etc.*

A similar situation occurs with Medicine, Pharmacy and Dentistry, which are only blocks apart but do not share their facilities. The problem of duplication was also mentioned by a government authority, who claimed that the excessive duplication of activities (using mathematics as an example) and the massive bureaucracy means a waste of resources that "is immoral in a country where 10 million people are hungry".

Some faculties (e.g. engineering, exact sciences, architecture) argue that the lack of centralization of mathematics under one department is not a problem, claiming that mathematics is not the same for all disciplines. In their view, there is no duplication, but specialization by professional fields. Last, but not least, another factor to account for the

inefficiency recurrently mentioned was the excess of administrative irregularities. One former government official referred to this situation in the following terms:

Money is not the key issue. There are enough resources, but they are not spent in a rational way. There is a lot of inefficiency, mismanagement and administrative anarchy, including squandering funds in many areas, such as long distance telephone calls, electricity, and the like. Many professors receive very low salaries, or nothing at all, yet lots of money is wasted in patronage, such as travels, as well as in "ñoquis" (ghost professors), non-academic staff, etc. There is zero administrative control.

In some cases, administrative irregularities seem to be the inevitable outcome of a structural situation. For instance, the average monthly salary of support staff is U$150. Since salaries are determined by the state, and not by the university, the latter is obliged to engage in administrative irregularities, making double contracts in order to provide adequate salaries [20]. For instance, when I was waiting to interview a dean, the secretary admitted having a full-time contract, and an additional contract for 4 hours. Another case in which the organizational structure leads to administrative irregularities is teachers' absenteeism. To quote one dean

Many professors, including full professors, do not come to teach; they are 'ñoquis" ('ghost professors'). Because of their political career or professional practice, they have no time to come to teach, and we have to replace them with second rate professors. Even if we punish them by discounting the unattended classes from their monthly payment, the salary is so low that such a punishment is meaningless to them. However, I think it is improper to pay people for work that was not done, and therefore we do not pay the days in which they are absent. I believe we are the only faculty, together with Humanities, in which professors who do not teach are not paid . All the other deans prefer to pretend that they ignore the problem in order to avoid conflicts (dean).

In this regard, government authorities claimed that another factor to explain the partial fulfillment of research and teaching duties can be found in the considerable 'amiguismo' (mutual protection and favoritism based on friendship), patronage and 'reciprocities' present in many public institutions. In some universities the deficit in the fulfillment of duties is so generalized that their GFC's, in order to allow professors to earn an extra income outside and avoid a massive firing or resignation of personnel, have agreed on reducing the amount of hours per week required for full-time and part-time jobs. National newspapers and magazines, often citing anonymous sources [21], regularly print articles which denounce administrative irregularities, such as staff that are paid without working, existence of special funds to support the political activities of student leaders who are loyal to university authorities, and the use of a double filing system.

In the particular case of UBA, government officials complained that research projects do not present results on time, and that 'amiguismo' allows dereliction of research and teaching duties, and even many 'ñoquis'. Even more, the problem of administrative irregularities has been often linked to accusations of corruption. From the Minister of Advanced Education to student leaders of the minority, most government authorities and representatives of minority groups within the university community made references to dishonesty in the management of funds:

It is true that universities have historically been punished in terms of budget. We are willing to increase the university budget, but first they need to have their accounts in order. For instance, the Rectorado alone has telephone bills for $600,000, and the CBC for $170,000. The Rector went to Japan with a group of 14 people. That's unacceptable (Secretary of Advanced Education).

The Rector claims that university funding is insufficient, while the Ministry of Education says that resources are misused. An explanation about the use of resources is needed. 30% of the budget is consumed by Rectorado and CBC. This suggests that these two areas are centers of corruption. The

remaining 70% goes to the faculties. To begin any discussion about the university, we first want to know what is done with the money, that is, how much money is spent, and for what purposes. All the money that UBA receives for selling services, rental of infrastructure, UBATEC, etc., must be accounted for as well. Accounts must become clear. In relation to the university fund, it is not clear yet what should be done with it. The university has many sources of revenue, and until all numbers become clear we won't know if the present level of funding is truly insufficient or not. An answer is needed (Student leader, FUNAP)).

Schuberoff has a construction company, doing jobs for the university (former government authority).

These are just three examples of the multiple accusations of administrative dishonesty attributed to the UBA administration. Curiously enough, the person who took the most prominent role in the media in spreading these accusations in public was Francisco Delich, former UBA interventor, current Rector of the University of Córdoba, and member of the Radical party [22]. UBA authorities, in turn, rejected these incriminations one by one, and in turn discredited government functionaries with charges of corruption, such as briberies related to the authorization of privates universities. Whether all, some or none of these mutual accusations are true goes beyond the purpose of this study. I leave such examination to lawyers or detectives. However, it constitutes a clear indication that, at the time of this study, the level and quality of the dialogue between the university and the government was not a very fruitful one.

e) poor academic environment

Finally, a sixth internal reason advanced to explain the university crisis was the extensive presence of factors undermining a good academic climate, such as political activities, ideological confrontations, clientelistic structures and internal conflicts. The traditional connection between Latin American universities and political parties denounced by the Atcon Report [23] is evident in the case of UBA. The link between Rector Oscar Schuberoff and the Radical Party is open and explicit, but the same can be said about many other rectors who are closely connected with the two main political parties, namely Peronist and Radical. A similar circumstance takes place within the student movement, where student slates are directly related to political parties of the center, left and right. Although the majority of students recurrently vote for *Franja Morada* [24], a student movement which may be situated at the center of the political spectrum, a former government official stated that UBA is undermined by "students' political discourse of confrontation with business, and with capitalist society in general". While university authorities, with very few exceptions[25], do not seem to perceive any serious consequence as a result of their links with a given political party, government authorities and members of the university community who have links with parties other than the Radical Party established a clear the relationship between party politics and academic crisis. To quote one of them

The university has become too politicized, and I'm not talking about university politics, but party politics. The main problem is that the debate is political, not academic. Everything has been degraded. People do not want to participate anymore (alumni, minority).

In general, marketventionists argued that Schuberoff's affiliation to the Radical Party creates a hostile environment in the university-state relationship:

The Rector is confronting the state from a political barricade, not from an academic one, but it is not solely his fault. All of us who participate in the GFC are guilty of what's going on, because we were not able to change this situation. However, the low academic profile of the Rector does not contribute to improving the situation (dean).

The state is not going to give money to Schuberoff, even if it has the money, because he is a militant of the Radical Party (student, minority).

Schuberoff's strategy is to confront the government, probably more for political reasons -he is concerned about his future in the Radical Party- than for academic ones. The outcome of that strategy could be that the government lets UBA die (government authority).

It was also stated that the clientelistic structure of university power inhibits a decision-making process based on administrative or academic rationales (note in the second statement the reference to the clientielistic relationship between university authorities and university leaders:

University authorities cannot endorse the policies proposed by the Ministry of Education, like tuition fees, because its power lies in the support of Franja Morada (student, minority).

University leaders respond to their electorate, that is, the students, and therefore are often involved in demagogy (government official).

Another reference to the negative influence of politics in academic life was that scholarly activities become perverted by political priorities:

The project of this Rector was full of great ideas, but they've become perverted in the practice. The scientific policy, for instance, was good in principle, with subsidies, scholarships and the like. Hence, we supported that policy in the beginning. Unfortunately, later on subsidies and scholarships were granted under political criteria, such as payments for political favors, without any control of results (dean).

In many Argentine universities, rectors and deans sometimes hire administrative personnel and advisors who in many cases are political activists as academic staff, using "puntos docentes" (teaching positions) for non-teaching activities. University authorities enjoy a great deal of impunity, because state and society lack adequate control mechanisms (dean).

Although the large majority praised the current democratic environment, and comments about ideological persecution referred mainly to situations of the past or to current problems exclusively confined to CONICET, a minority of academics raised their concerns in this regard. To quote one of them

We have the problems of the totalitarianism present in some democracies; for instance, in this university there is a sort of apartheid against certain sectors for ideological reasons; we should be able to ensure ideological pluralism (dean).

Internal conflicts, division and competition were also raised as problems affecting academic performance and institutional belonging:

The university is a structure in atomized into multiple small token groups in which the unit is the individual person. People do not feel any attachment to any particular structure (dean).

UBA is an institution becoming increasingly weaker and experiencing increasingly intense internal power struggles. It is like an immense house, with a pretty facade but inside it is half empty, in ruins, and its occupants are ruled by the law of the jungle. There is a lot of 'cannibalism' (expert).

Our university people are very individualistic (dean).

3. Relational factors

While for some actors the university crisis is rooted in external pressures and for others it is due to internal deficiencies, a third perspective attributed the crisis to a breakdown in the

relationship between the university and the outside world. In this view, the main problem is perceived as a deficit in the communication with the state, with industry and with society at large. The first aspect of this 'relational' crisis was the tense relationship existing at the time of the study between Antonio Salonia, the Minister of the Education, and Oscar Schuberoff, the Rector of UBA, who acted, in the words of the latter, as "uncompromising enemies" [26]. The low willingness of these adversaries to make concessions was addressed in the following way:

> *Neither of the two main actors in this conflict, namely the Ministry of Education and the university, are willing to make any conciliatory move. The university requests more money, and the government says no. Hence, the situation is stagnant* (student leader, Peronist).

It is interesting to note in this statement a detachment from a partisan position, an attempt to assume an objective position from which the actor observes the situation as an outsider. Indeed, this was the prevalent attitude among those who stressed the strained relationship between university and state as the main element of the crisis. These interviewees, who constituted a small proportion of the sample, tended to blame equally both the university and the state for the current crisis. This capacity to take a 'distance' from the conflict, avoiding to take a clear stand for one of the rivals is probably due to the fact that those who expressed these views were mainly academics (deans, students and even some university authorities) with no affiliation to Radicalism or to Menemism (a branch of Peronism which supports Menem's policies). The following excerpt provides an example of this position:

> *This is the most critical moment for public universities, because the need for expansion and quality improvement coincides with the state budget cutbacks. On the one hand, the university is suffering a painful financial situation because of the state withdrawal from public expenditure, but on the other hand the university has not yet internalized the need for reform. However, the debate on such reform is not taking place yet, because the attack by the state is so strong that the university is adopting a defensive attitude, which only aggravates the crisis* (dean).

This defensive attitude is clear in the public declarations of university actors (particularly authorities and professors), who tend to overemphasize their achievements, and to stress that these have been made despite very adverse conditions. The most frequently invoked pieces of evidence to support these assertions are usually the high proportion of students accepted for graduate studies in reputable universities (i.e. MIT, Stanford, Oxford, Harvard), relative to other universities in the world, the cost-effectiveness among public universities (UBA produces 40% of all university graduates with only 20% of the budget), the international recognition of faculty members (via publications in refereed journals, invitations to teach overseas, etc.), and the superiority of the public university vis-a-vis the private university, especially regarding research. Regardless of the extent to which this information is accurate, it is evident that the university is more willing to talk about its strengths than about its weaknesses, because the latter would shift societal support to the side of the state. This "public relations" strategy was opposed by a professor (and also former dean) in the following way:

> *University authorities only concentrate their efforts in conveying to society the message that they do wonders with limited resources. That is not true. All they do is rubbish, and nobody wants to admit it. It is true that a few academics undertake projects of exceilence, and that some graduates are admitted in very prestigious foreign universities, but these are exceptions, and not the rule. In the university nobody acknowledges the disaster. The internal actors of the university do not say the truth. The slogan that "we do wonders with little resources" is advanced to counteract the image of inefficiency spread by the government. But this may backfire, because the government is going to say: So, what do you want more money for? There is too much hypocrisy and lying.*

A second aspect of the 'relational crisis' is the mutual distrust between the university and industry, a problem raised by many university actors. A representative of industry, a chemical engineer himself, summarized this situation in the following way:

During the last 30 years I have been participating in committees aiming at improving the university-industry relationship, with the purpose that new technologies developed by the university were used by industry. From the point of view of the university, industrialists are criticized because they do not take risks, do not trust academic values, do not invest in the university and do not think in the long term. On the other hand, industrialists perceive the university as a space where each person does research in whatever he or she likes, where there is lots of redundancy and repetition, and where people produce more in terms of papers and CVs than in function of outcomes to be used by the productive apparatus. After 30 years, both sides are still saying the same things.

Finally, the third aspect of the "relational crisis" is the loss of legitimacy of the university in the larger society, which was related to perceptions about university performance. University actors interpreted these perceptions according to their political or institutional affiliation. For minority representatives of the right, these perceptions are an accurate image of university reality, while university authorities understood them as misperceptions fed by the government through the media. The minorities of the left, since they are not aligned either with the university or with the government, combined both interpretations.

The public opinion distrusts the university, with good reasons. If serious regulations are not implemented, people are not going to trust the university again (student, minority, right).

Now, the public opinion wrongly perceives university people as being lazy, squandering, and devoting all their time to politics. The external concern seems to be that the university should produce graduates with a certain degree of excellence, and they believe that we are not doing it (dean).

This university, as it is today, does not work. This is a reality, and the state takes advantage of this reality. The rhetoric of the government is accepted by many people because they see that many things do not work in this university. The government uses this situation to equalize efficiency with privatization, and we know that this is false, because efficiency is not a monopoly of the private sector; it is possible to have efficiency in the public sector too. However, in order to achieve efficiency, the first step must be to redesign the basic structures of this oversized university (student, minortiy, left).

Other actors interpreted the legitimacy crisis as a result of weak communication or an inadequate implementation of the autonomy principle:

There is a crisis in the relation with society, which is expressed in a weak communication between these two sectors. The university lacks social consensus, because it is suffering a crisis of representation. The social contract of the university is unclear (student leader, Radical).

Apparently, the contradiction between autonomy and relation with society has not been satisfactory solved. Autonomy implies to be able to formulate our own policies but taking into account that the university operates in a society and is funded by the state. Autonomy, although important, has led to a gap between university and society (university authority).

The three aspects of the 'relational crisis' were summarized by several actors as a broader problem of disconnection among social actors:

Argentina is a country of projects. Indeed, we have too many ambitious projects and too low capacity of action, and this constitutes a perverse equation, because everybody loses and nobody wins. The main problem is that the articulation of social actors is dysfunctional (expert)

In Argentina all the necessary factors for growth are present. We have an abundant nature, qualified human resources, etc. The problem is the inefficient articulation of the factors. Even within the university knowledge is unconnected (university authority).

There is a demand for university services, but it is disassociated, and the same occurs with the supply (university authority).

Indeed, those who emphasized the relational problems pointed out that some relations between the university and outside agents do exist, but they are based on individual initiatives rather than on organizational or systemic structures.

4. The main patterns in the diagnosis and intepretation of the crisis

In this brief concluding part, the main patterns observed throughout the chapter are summarized in seven general conclusions.

a) In general terms, the debate about the university crisis was highly polarized.
In the context of a high level of hostility between the university and the state, most of the actors approached the analysis of the university crisis from a political rationale, aligning themselves either with the university administration or with government officials. As it was possible to observe in the previous pages, contrasting appraisals were present in almost all aspects of the diagnosis, from the identification of the crisis, to its description, to the interpretation of its origins. Moreover, discrepant views were held across a broad spectrum of issues. Not only the description of the situation and the reasons advanced to account for the situation, but also the basic data: from enrollment to budget, figures provided by autonomists and marketventionists were seldom consistent. This can be partly attributable to the deficient system of statistical information [27], but also to the manipulation of data for political purposes.

b) there was no agreement in relation to the real extent of the financial crisis.
First, while the university claims that the budget has suffered a drastic decline in recent years, government officials contend that it is not the case. The discrepancy seems to lie in the year of reference used as the base to compare the current budget. Second, the university administration claims that funding is insufficient, whereas the government claims that the problem is not the amount of resources, but its inefficient use. University responds to this accusation arguing that 90% of the budget is directed to salaries which are determined by the state, and that gives no space for misuse of resources. The government counters that inefficiency in resource allocation does also include staff policies. Finally, the university claims that the Argentine society and the state have sufficient financial resources to increase the university budget, but that these resources are allocated to non-priority areas or not collected due to tax evasion, loopholes and corruption. In contrast, the government contends that it is indeed suffering a real financial crisis, and that priorities in resource allocation are clear, sensible and sensitive to social problems.

c) in relation to the origins of the university crisis, there was a tendency to assume a 'blame the other' attitude. The antagonistic nature of the debate is manifested in the trend to locate the roots of the problem almost exclusively in external or internal causes. In general terms, actors tended to behave according to their relative position in the system. Therefore, the academic community was more likely to identify external causes (state attack, expansion of demand, societal indifference, quality of previous educational levels, etc.), whereas government actors were more likely to identify the roots of the crisis in the internal deficiencies of the university (inefficiency, mismanagement, politics, etc.). Only a minority of academics took distance from this polarization and understood the crisis as 'relational' [28].

d) The state presented a more cohesive discourse than the university. Indeed, although in general terms university and state actors tended to blame each other for the crisis, the government presented a much more monolithic bloc, whereas the university was more fragmented. In fact, while governmental actors advanced a unified discourse, among

university actors a number of conflicts and contradictions were present, with some actors defending the government position. One marketventionist dean, with regular exposure to the media, was the most clear and public example in this regard, but similarities with government diagnosis were also found among students, professors and alumni who represent minority slates. This suggests the existence of political alliances between the state and some university actors. Although these contacts were usually "underground" (in order to avoid criticisms regarding state violation of university autonomy), the advice that state officials were providing to these internal actors (and, in turn, the advice that state officials received from international agencies such as the World Bank) was acknowledged in interviews by both state officials and minority representatives, and sometimes it was even reflected in the press. For some observers, the state rationale behind this strategy was to promote an internal opposition to the university administration, and to shift the public image of the university-state confrontation to a conflict within the university.

e) The state presented a more consistent discourse (public-private) than the university community. Indeed, the state had not only managed to give a more monolithic structure to its position on university restructuring, but it also had a greater consistency in terms of public and private speech. While government officials usually advanced the same diagnosis in public and in private, university actors were less reluctant to engage in exercises of self-criticism in the interviews. Without considering the minority of university actors who criticized the university in public, there was a good number of university leaders who had a confrontational public discourse against the state, but a more temperate attitude in private. The self-criticisms expressed by university authorities in the interviews are practically absent in their public discourse.

The greater discrepancy between public and private discourse within the university community can be explained on various grounds. First, the nature of the conflict puts the university in such a defensive position that it feels constrained to permanently publicize its achievements in terms of quality and efficiency. In this context, the university community feels that, if it publicly acknowledges inefficiencies, this may be used as a justification for further cuts and would lead public opinion to transfer its sympathies to the government. Second, the confidential nature of the interviews allowed actors to express their genuine ideas without fear of political consequences. In fact, given the distinct institutional character of the state on the one hand and the university on the other, discussion, debate and internal disagreement are more likely to be present in the academia than in the state. While government officials are more inclined to appeal to instrumental rationality [29], the nature of academic work is more likely to promote critical thinking. Therefore, university people were more willing to criticize their shortcomings than state officials.

Furthermore, it is also possible that by identifying me as a 'colleague' coming from a similar institution, they felt more inclined to speak as academics than as political representatives of a particular interest group in society, and therefore were more inclined to present a critical, 'objective' diagnosis of the crisis than a passionate political apologia. This view, in which external and internal factors are seen as "objective" elements has a greater purchase among academics generally, and it is well illustrated in the interviews by one dean who interpreted the crisis as the result of the simultaneous and contradictory developments of expansion and cutbacks, on the one hand, and inappropriate managerial procedures in the administration of the university, on the other.

f) In order to garner and consolidate public support, the two main actors of the conflict are attempting to build a different concept of crisis. As was pointed out in chapter 2, subjective factors constitute an important element of a crisis. In this sense, "crises" are partially constructed by social actors who aspire to draw societal attention to particular problems which may or may not exist. From the examination of public statements as expressed to the media, and to some extent private statements made in the interviews, it may be suggested

that autonomists are attempting to build the notion of 'financial crisis', whereas marketventionists are attempting to create consent around the idea of an 'institutional crisis'. While the university emphasizes the miraculous achievements accomplished in totally unfavorable conditions, the government stresses the inefficiency, obsolescence and social irrelevance of the university. The university debate therefore consists in a struggle for consent over the meaning of crisis. For autonomists and marketventionists, the university crisis must be interpreted as a crisis of underfunding or as a crisis of efficiency, respectively, as if they were exclusive categories. Both sets of actors of the conflict seem to be more concerned about convincing the public opinion of the accuracy of their perception of the crisis than in engaging in a genuine debate on the values, purposes and functions of the university.

g) The debate on diagnosis is being increasingly framed within the 'service university' vision. Considering the three visions of the university proposed by Newson and Buchbinder (1988), that is, social transformation, academic haven, and service university, the description provided in this chapter suggests that in Argentina the debate was framed within the third vision. While very few actors diagnosed the university using as a criterion for assessment of its success its contribution to social change or its need to protect its academic environment from external interference, the majority confined the discussion within the parameters of the service model advanced by the government. In this new discussion, principles and ideas that have remained unchallenged for decades are being questioned. For instance, the once sacred principle of autonomy has moved into a discussion of accountability, in which the state accuses and the university defends itself. Likewise, academic institutions have traditionally contended that they cannot be measured with indicators that may apply to other type of institutions, such as the bureaucracy or business. However, in their diagnosis university actors seem to be compelled to accept that the university can be considered as a factory, in which input-output models and economic indicators of efficiency can be applied, and attempt to justify their social function on those grounds.

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[1] As previously mentioned, all figures are in US dollars.

[2] The survey, which included 97 cities throughout the world, was conducted by Corporate Resources Group. The results of the study were made available in Geneva, and were reported by the Argentine newspaper La Nación (December 14, 1992:6).

[3] Although his official salary was US $1,800 per month, he received the remaining $8,200 from a private foundation (Fundación Mediterránea). When this situation was spread through the media, the Minister was accused of being socially insensitive, and some MPs were investigating whether or not it constituted an infringement of the law.

[4] According to Enrique Oteiza, an expert on scientific policy, 95% of full professors have an income below US $1,200, a figure considered by official agencies as the minimum to ensure a decent standard of living (Clarín Internacional, December 29, 1992- January 3, 1993). One dean illustrated salary deterioration by contrasting the earnings of a full professor with 20 years of seniority in the 1960s (US$ 1,500 to 2000), with 1991 salary (US$1,000), which means a real decline of 75%. For this dean, this fall explains why most UBA's professors work outside in order to meet their basic needs.

[5] Créase o no, así se enseña. La situación de nuestra universidad. Gente, October 1990.

[6] In fact, some Deans mentioned their worries about the difficulties in attracting and retaining (with adequate scholarships and other mechanisms) the best graduate students, and the impact of this situation on academic standards. Others pointed out that in many faculties enrollments are falling, because students must work in order to survive.

[7] Although most of these persons could be labeled as soft marketventionists in terms of their policy formulation, in their public life they may have an autonomist or a marketventionist position. They may belong to the university or to the government, and they may be professors, alumni, students or bureaucrats. Their common trait is that in the analysis of the university provided in the interviews they took some distance from the conflict, and examined it from a systemic approach, using more an academic than a political rationale.

[8] Very few university authorities were willing to publicly recognize the internal aspect of the crisis, and when they did it, it was underemphasized and subject to a prior resolution of the funding problem. Atilio Borón, UBA Vice-President, for instance, dedicates roughly 95% of a newspaper article to describe the financial crisis, devoting only one sentence to mention the need of public universities to rationalize their administrative and academic structures or to discuss new funding strategies. However, having said that, he indicates that all reform efforts carried out by the university will be condemned to failure if they are not preceded by a vigorous expansion of the public budget (Página 12, July 22, 1992:11).

[9] In a public document (University of Buenos Aires 1991), UBA authorities referred to four concurrent crises: the relationship with the state, the relationship with society, the emphasis on professional training and the financial crisis. In that document, the latter crisis is considered to be the crucial one.

[10] Página 12, Saturday, July 6, 1991:2-3.

[11] The UBA document refers to decrees 1111/90 and 160/91, which limit the the powers of the GFC as the highest authority of the university, granting more powers to individual faculties and to the state.

[12] To begin with, Schuberoff quoted President Menem, who said that those who want to teach philosophy must pay the consequences. Immediately, he quoted a functionaire of the Ministry of Education who said that it doesn't matter if researchers abandon the university, because in ten more years, when money will be available, they will come back. Finally, he mentioned that the Ministry of Economy told the universities to solve their problems by themselves, because the state cannot support them anymore (personal notes, GFC, March 11, 1992).

[13] While university actors, mainly authorities and leaders of Franja Morada and left movements, perceive the university as a progressive institution, governmental actors perceive it as a very conservative institution. The difference in perception seems to lie in the criterion used to make the assessment: the university takes into account its role as a social critique, whereas the government focuses in its difficulties to embark in institutional changes.

[14] The word "principismo", with no clear translation into English, refers to the tendency to take principles to an extreme, excluding a priori any possibility of dialogue and negotiation.

[15] In Spanish, "cambiar todo para que nada cambie", a strategy known as 'gatopardismo'.

[16] Most interviewees agreed that the problem of excessive professionalism and scarce research activities is more acute in small public universities and in private universities.

[17] Indeed, the reliability of this figure is doubtful. While in the document entitled "Universidad de Buenos Aires 1991", the teacher/student ratio is 1:30 (see p.11), in a table released by the university and published by the newspaper Clarín (February 7, 1993:43) the figure is 1:14. The reason for this discrepancy between two figures released by the same source is unclear. One hypothesis is that the latter specifically refers to graduate programs, although nothing is stated in that regard. Another hypothesis is that data are manipulated according to the purpose of the message: while in the first document the intention is to demonstrate efficiency, in the the second the obvious aim is to convey an image of academic excellence.

[18] In a full-page article, Humberto Belli, the Minister of Education of Nicaragua, complained about the expensiveness of university spending, and argued that the cost of one university student is equivalent to the cost of twenty elementary students (La Prensa, October 26, 1991). In the same vein, a top functionaire of the Argentinian Ministry of Education pointed out that the per student cost of university is 5 times higher than that of primary education (La Nación, January 29, 1992). Similar comments were raised by education authorities in Mexico (see report No. 8930-ME of the World Bank).

[19] See chapter 4, table 2.

[20] In the last decade, salaries of non-academic staff have decreased as part of the general decline of public servants' salaries, but they experienced a more profound decline, decreasing from +25% to -61% in average, relative to the salaries of public servants.

[21] See, for example, La Prensa, December 9, 1992:6. Ironically, one of the most public attackers of UBA with respect to administrative irregularities, who publishes ferocious articles in newspapers and magazines is a person who is not a government official, and not even a Peronist. His name is Francisco Delich, who is Rector of the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba and, like Rector Schuberoff, belongs to the Radical Party. This has been interpreted by some observers as an internal conflict within the Radical Party that has been translated into university politics.

[22] In different documents made available to the media, Delich asked to inspect Schuberoff's resolutions, accused him of committing legal irregularities, and even threatened with taking him to court. Schuberoff responded that the accusations were irrational, and that the Rector of the University of Cordoba had no authority to inspect the University of Buenos Aires. Although both Rectors are members of the Radical Party, they belong to different internal groups. See, for instance, Clarín, August 4, 1992:41.

[23] For information on the Atcon Report, see chapter 4..

[24] Franja Morad' 'literally: "Purple Stripe") is the university movement of the Radical Party (a mainstream political party rep. enting the interests of the middle class, founded in the late 19th century).

[25] One university authority who belongs to the Radical Party pointed out the negative impact of the political affiliation of Schuberoff for his academic reputation: *"This Rector is deprecated by the academic community. As Cavallo (the Minister of Economy) said, he manages the university as a Committee of the Radical Party. Unfortunately, this is true, and it's very harmful".*

[26] Rector Schuberoff contended that the enmity was provoked by the reluctance of the Minister to promote a debate about the university (La Prensa, 31-XII-92:7).

[27] Indeed, public access to an efficient system of statistical information does not ensure consistency. In the province of Alberta, for instance, where statistical data are public information, universities compete to demonstrate that they have the lowest cost per student (see Folio, January 21, 1994:1.).

[28] This was probably due to the fact that these actors perceived me not only as an outsider to the conflict, but also as an academic from a foreign university. Therefore, it may be suggested that, since they did not feel any threat to their opinions, they built an examination "for export" rather than a discourse for internal use; hence, they attempted to advance a rational ('objective') analysis rather than a political ('subjective') one.

[29] In the sense of the term used by Habermas. However, there was one government representative (also an academic) who advanced a self-criticism, though making it clear that the main problem still lies within the university: "It is true that the state has underestimated the importance of the university and scientific research", he said. "However -he added- "the universities should not asume a confrontational attitude with the state. They have many sins and inefficiencies that they need to deal with internally before confronting the government".

CHAPTER VI: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. THE DEBATE ON POLICIES

The different perceptions of the university crisis described in the previous chapter led to a variety of proposals about the preferred direction of the university. Whereas marketventionists have an agenda for university restructuring similar to the one undertaken by other Latin American governments, autonomists (also known as 'reformists') are keen on defending the status quo adopted in 1918. To highlight the main areas of dispute and agreement, this chapter has been organized in seven sections: 1) administrative rationalization; 2) financing; 3) function; 4) governance; 5) admission policies; 6) research and development; and 7) the role of the state. The first section, administrative rationalization, set as an introduction to the chapter, presents the actors' views on the need for university reform, and their proposals on changes related to its organizational structure, including the possibilities of departmentalization. The second section deals with financing, the most controversial issue of the university-state conflict. The debate on financing included the topics of subsidies, resource allocation, and complementary-alternative sources of revenue, such as sale of services to the private sector and tuition fees. The third issue of debate was the function of the public university in the context of the higher education system. The discussion encompassed the role of the public university vis-a-vis the private one, and the three main functions of a university (teaching, research, extension), including topics such as the type of human resources to be developed and the clientele to be served.

The fourth section deals with the debate on university governance. Salient topics in this regard were the distribution of power in decision making, the role of different constituencies in the GFC, the appropriateness of the three-party system, and the intramural struggle between the central administration and certain faculties for decision-making. A fifth axis of debate, related to admission policies, is presented in the next section. The main disagreements here were in relation to the adequacy of quotas in terms of accessibility and market demands, the impact of massive enrollment on educational quality, and the pertinence of the introductory course known as CBC. Section six picks up the debate on research and development, and includes issues such as the role of science and technology in a developing country, the appropriateness of the Napoleonic university, partnerships with industry, the national research system and the mission of graduate programs. Finally, the last section describes the different viewpoints on the role of the state in the higher education system. Controversies arose in relation to the conflict between autonomy and accountability, evaluation of performance, differential funding policies and creation of new universities.

Section 1: Administrative rationalization and organizational reform

1. The origin and possibilities of university restructuring

A brief examination of the perceptions described in the previous chapter reveals that very few actors are satisfied with the current state of the university. While in the public debate university authorities and student leaders assume a defensive position, proclaiming efficiency and quality, in the private discourse most of them acknowledged the need for reform. However, it is interesting to note that even those who were at the frontline of the defense of the public university recognized in private that these transformations are more the product of external pressures than of an internal willingness to change. While marketventionists were more definite in their statements, and autonomists tended to formulate the situation more in terms of speculative hypotheses, all tended to agree on the external origin of the push for change:

> *It is possible to think that the rationalization and the improvement of university management that we are implementing in UBA was induced from outside, through an intentional governmental*

policy, and that without such external pressure would have taken many years to do it by ourselves (alumni, majority).

Without this 'coercion' from outside, as Rector Schuberoff calls it, the university would never have been able to rationalize on its own (alumni, minority).

For the government, this reluctance to change is understandable, since universities, together with the army, are the most conservative institutions[1]. Autonomists, on the other hand, complain about the external pressures towards restructuring, maintaining that a genuine reform must come from the university community and not from the state. They claim that rationalization should not be synonymous with adjustment. For them, to adjust means a reduction of financial resources, whereas a rationalization means systematization of information, training of academic staff, increased salaries, improved libraries, links between teaching and research, etc., which in turn imply financial resources. Whether it is called adjustment or rationalization, it is evident that the university has not been very keen on undertaking a restructuring process. One explanation for this incapacity of the university to design its own reform was advanced by student leaders, who admitted the absence of an alternative model:

There is a crisis of ideas, an inability to formulate an alternative model of university to face the dominant conservative model carried out by the state. The Argentine society, who is suffering the impact of this conservative model, lacks a university able to generate new knowledge as a tool for power (student leader, Franja Morada)

On one side is the state policy, and on the other are all of us who defend the public university, but we still lack an alternative policy (student leader, FICSO).

For marketventionist deans, however, the main reasons for the absence of an internal reform are the lack of accountability of the university and the unwillingness of public institutions to carry out a rationalization on a voluntary basis. To quote two of them:

Until this crisis, the university was not accountable. Only now we are thinking about establishing priorities, in knowing what we do, and how much it costs.

Our rationalization is imposed by the state, because of adjustment policies, and that is logic: ¿do you now of any government agency able to rationalize by itself?

In any case, only one interviewee, a dean, rejected the hypothesis that university restructuring has an external origin, claiming instead that the changes undertaken by the university are the result of an internal conviction for quality and efficiency. Although university authorities and student leaders of the majority agreed that the university must implement a serious administrative rationalization and redesign its basic structures, they did not agree about the preconditions for this undertaking. While half of them argued that an administrative modernization is an expensive task, and therefore requires funding [2], the other half contended that administrative restructuring is not a matter of money, but of political will and leadership.

In the government's view, an increase in budgets does not necessarily guarantee an increase in quality, because academic staff is not elastic. Thus, even those university actors who claimed that additional funds are necessary to implement a reform, acknowledged that the government -whether it is because it lacks the financial resources, because it does not want to give money to an inefficient structure, or because it has a policy of 'financial asphyxiation' towards the university- is unwilling to provide them. Therefore, with only two exceptions, everyone agreed that, with or without financial resources, the university must undergo a profound reform, or at least start to move in that direction.

2. The direction of university change

Although university authorities argued that the Ministry of Education lacks a serious university policy, government officials have a relatively clear idea about the goals, priorities and direction of university change. The two goals of the reform are to promote efficiency (rationalizing expenditure) and to improve quality. The three priority areas [3] shaping university reform are the MERCOSUR [4], the University Law, and the Negotiating Commission (Comisión de Concertación). In relation to MERCOSUR, the Ministry of Education was collecting information about existing university agreements among the partner countries, and requesting priorities from the social, economic and political Commissions of MERCOSUR. The Ministry hoped that this would enable universities to develop appropriate contributions to the needs of the new common market. In relation to the second area, the government was attempting to develop a University Law, which was to be framed into the new Federal Law of Education, which at that time was under discussion in the Parliament. The third priority area was to generate "consensuated university policies" between the government and the universities through the Comisión de Concertación. In this regard, the government had already presented a proposal for administrative reform which was being discussed by university representatives. It was probably the emphasis placed by the government on these administrative reforms (developed by the Minister of Economy), which focused on rationalization of expenditures, that led university authorities to suggest the lack of a serious university policy.

The administrative reforms proposed by the government consisted of the following policies: a) the state is not going to increase university budgets; b) there will be a freezing of existing academic positions (puntos docentes); c) any improvement of academic and non-academic staff (salaries, professional development, etc.) will depend upon the universities' own resources; d) the central administration (Rectorado) is not supposed to conduct teaching or research activities, hence it must not have non-administrative positions among its staff; e) non-academic staff cannot be hired using the budget allocated to academic staff; f) universities should be authorized to sell services in the market and to charge tuition fees, which would be complemented with a system of student aid; g) universities should improve their teacher/student ratio and freshmen/graduating student ratio, and to reallocate resources according to enrollment, including the possibility of vertical cuts in low demanded careers, and the creation of short-term, professionally oriented cycles; h) the functions of all Secretaries and Offices in one university should be the same as in other universities; i) a system of rewards and incentives will be developed [5].

Simultaneous with the development of criteria for cost reduction, the government started to develop criteria for evaluating quality. However, it was evident that the administrative project was much more advanced than the academic project. According to the Secretary of Higher Education, the rationale behind the emphasis on administrative rationalization was that the spending resulting from it could be allocated to academic activities. Autonomists had a less detailed vision of university reform. Although they accept the need for it, they seem to concentrate more on making justifications on behalf of the university or demanding budget increases than in formulating an alternative plan for reform. Although some university authorities agreed with the government about some of the proposed reforms, they seemed reluctant to openly express this because they would appear to be endorsing the government's position. The fear of appearing weak in the eyes of the government has made reform a taboo topic within UBA. This apprehension has probably resulted in a lack of deep thought in this regard; in other words, since there is no need to talk about a reform, there is no need to think about it.

However, half of the deans, especially those from professional faculties, with the proviso that salaries and state funding should be substantially increased, advanced some ideas about

an internal restructuring. Among the reforms proposed by these deans were changes in the university statute, in the economic-financial regime and in the organizational structure. First, a new university statute would allow a more managerial system of administration. Changes in the economic-financial regime may contribute to overcoming excessive regulations and bureaucratization. Finally, changes in the organizational structure related to the relative weight of the central administration (Rectorado, CBC, CEA, Extension, etc.), the redistribution of academic positions, the creation of short-term careers, the strengthening of graduate programs and the like.

In general terms, university actors agreed with the government that the 3 R's of rationalization, reduction and restraint should be pursued. In this regard, one university authority pointed out that to think that the crisis is mainly financial is to steer away from the real problems, "which would not disappear even if the budget is tripled". First at all, in terms of rationalization, university actors asserted almost unanimously that a profound administrative reform was necessary in order to achieve a more efficient use of available resources, and that the first step in that direction was the establishment of priorities:

> *I would not give financial resources to this university, but I would give them to a university willing to reestablish its goals and functioning structures (Dean).*

> *We should stop delivering flowery speeches and start to develop real projects. We must stop saying that we do what we don't do. In reality, we do everything, and we do everything poorly. We have no priorities (Dean).*

Although not all university actors were as severe as these two deans in their statements, the great majority (including reformist student leaders) referred to the need for priorities in order to make better use of declining resources. The key issue is to generate a consensus as to what the priorities are or, more importantly, what the priorities are not. In other words, who is going to decide what are the possible targets for reduction or elimination, and how is this going to be decided. For some deans of professional faculties, the target was the central administration and its sphere of influence: the Rectorado, CBC, CEA, and Extension. Arguments to downgrade -or even dismantle- these areas were based on their excessive bureaucracy, their inefficiency, or their lack of relevance in terms of what was claimed were the university primary functions (teaching and research). Two other targets raised by deans of professional faculties were the student body and the academic staff, which were both perceived to be excessively large. Although the proposal for reduction of enrollments was not shared by most of the university administration, some deans and student leaders [6], the great majority of interviewees did agree on the need to reduce academic staff at least by half, making all those selected to stay full-time professors, and therefore doubling their salary. As one dean proposed

> *Rationalization should start by dismissing professors, because we have too many, and poorly paid.*

The idea of having a smaller, well paid academic body is consistent with the diagnosis described in the preceding chapter. However, the technical and political implications of such policy (namely the hurdles of setting appointments committees at a massive scale, and the negative reaction of the rejected ones), seem to inhibit the formulation of this proposal in a more serious and open way. The reduction of support staff was also a recurrent demand of marketventionists. For instance, UPAU leaders (Trombetta 1991) recommend that in order to avoid the proliferation of support staff, "an extended practice in Argentinean universities", universities should not allocate to support staff more than 20% of the funding allocated to academic staff.

Whereas university actors agreed that many actions could be undertaken in terms of rationalization and reduction, very few proposed restraint policies, an area in which most university actors believed they reached the limit. For many deans, neither salaries, operational costs or expenditures in research equipment and materials could be trimmed any further. Finally, other reforms proposed by university actors are related to the implementation of clear rules of the game in both the academic and the administrative areas. In the academic area, interviewees proposed more quality control over the products of teaching and research. With a smaller, better paid academic staff, these control mechanisms could be easier to enforce. In the administrative area, many actors contended that a reform should ensure a more efficient management, and called for the incorporation of professional managerialism in all faculties. To quote one of them:

> *To solve this crisis, there should be a general manager in each UBA faculty to be in charge of the administration of these monstrosities into which the they have turned (Dean).*

There were also recurrent demands for a more open and honest administration, enforcing more respect for existing rules and regulations, and implementing double-check mechanisms to avoid favoritism, patronage and "secret networks" among friends, especially in cases related to fund allocation (scholarships, grants, 'special contracts', etc.). The government's idea of rewarding the performance of institutions and faculty members with incentives was not well received by university authorities and leaders of professors. The former pointed out that rewards and punishments to individual universities can be easily influenced by political factors, whereas the latter argued that salary incentives to individual professors promote divisions within the faculty body [7].

3. Organizational structure: the debate on departmentalization

Another way in which university actors approached reduction and rationalization was with the elimination or merging of areas which have similar functions. Although in abstract terms all actors (autonomists and marketventionists alike) expressed concern about the existence of duplicated structures, courses, services and research [8], and that the overwhelming majority was in favor of departmentalization, very few foresaw any real possibility of achieving it. The generalized skepticism has its roots in the identification of three related inhibitors: the ancient and entrenched Napoleonic model, the lack of a university campus and the opposition of few, but powerful, agents who are not willing to compromise their sovereignty.

The Napoleonic model has developed a rigid structure by faculties, a teaching arrangement based on the chatedrae, a distaste for research and a large proportion of part-time professors whose main occupational identity is provided by their professional associations rather than by belonging to the university. In this regard, UBA can be analyzed more as a confederation of autonomous republics than as an integrated system. This factor is aggravated by the fact that individual faculties are scattered throughout the city. Indeed, the absence of a campus community was perceived by promoters of departmentalization as a serious obstacle to departmentalization. Although nobody suggested the creation of a campus, there were several proposals for geographic restructuring.

With opposite intentions in mind, university authorities and their adversaries were both proposing geographical reforms. Some public adversaries of university authorities proposed the decentralization of UBA into smaller, more manageable units. For instance, Taquini (1985) and Delich (1988) proposed dividing UBA, according to geographical criteria, into four and six units with autonomous governance and management. In addition to the stated goals of administrative improvement, it is possible to infer a hidden, political objective aimed at limiting the power of the central administration. UBA authorities approach

geographical decentralization from a different perspective. They reject the transformation of existing units into autonomous entities, but accept the emergence of new ones. As expressed in a document (UBA 1991:17-19), decentralization means for them the creation of two new units (one in the north, one in the south) which would eventually become autonomous universities that may relieve demand for enrolment in UBA. Within UBA, the decentralization policy conceived by the Rectorado is the development of a new structure defined by disciplines, with combined programs involving two or more faculties[9]. Besides its academic purposes, this policy is also intended, as one reformist student pointed out, "to undermine the corporate and feudal power of each faculty", especially "in faculties like Medicine or Law, where professors are mainly professionals who come to the university once a week to improve their CVs." In other words, while for autonomists a decentralization policy should lead towards an increasing integration of university structures, for marketventionists it should lead towards its atomization.

Although the institutional and the geographic factors were frequently mentioned, there was a consensus that the most influential factor was the third one: the reluctance of the deans of some professional faculties to share their resources or to merge some of their services in departments which would provide services to the entire university. This was perceived to be the major obstacle to a cordial relationship among the different faculties which would be involved in the management of those potential departments. Those who support departmentalization but are pessimistic about its possibilities of implementation, accused professional faculties of protecting their particular interests of their units at the expense of the common interests of the university community:

> *I see very low possibilities of implementing departmentalization, because faculties are managed like fiefs. Each faculty wants to have total control over its cathedrae, even when they have no capacity to provide a high quality teaching. As an example, the faculty of Economics has a very bad course on Economic Law, and we could do it ten times better, but they want to keep the control, and besides, they think that they are doing a good job (Dean).*
>
> *A departmental model, is primarily attacked by the professional faculties, because it challenges their feudal domains and their academic dogmatism. This explains why they attack the CBC, which is basically interdisciplinary (student, majority).*
>
> *I am in favor of departmentalization, but we are still very immature. Deans have their own fiefs, and don't want to give up an inch (student, minority).*
>
> *The main problem is that in our model deans want power over their feuds. It is our individualistic spirit that makes us unable to make concessions, and therefore deans try to defend their quotas of power (alumni, minority).*

Interestingly enough, departmentalization was one of the few issues about which government officials and university authorities expressed a strong agreement. One example of each sector may serve to illustrate this point:

> *Departmentalization allows a rationalization of university administration. A professor should belong to a department, not to a subject. A professor should be a professor of humanities, not a professor of Logic I (government official).*
>
> *The present structure by faculties is obviously obsolete; it is incompatible with the current dynamic of knowledge production. A university organized by faculties is unable to circulate knowledge in an efficient way. Departmentalization allows a more efficient use of available resources (university authority).*

Although several cross-tabulations to examine forces in favor and against departmentalization are possible, the analysis of the data shows that those who oppose it

consistently belong to professional faculties, particularly those linked to strong professional corporations. Those who favor departmentalization claim that it contributes to economize resources, it favors the circulation of knowledge in a more efficient way, and it integrates the university community. Those who oppose it based their arguments on the specificity of their disciplines:

> *In this rationalization I don't support departmentalization, because it doesn't work very well. For instance, mathematics is not the same for all disciplines (Dean).*
>
> *It is very difficult to implement it, because the demands of each career are very different. In this faculty, we tried to implement departmental structures, but it didn't work. We returned to the cathedra system, using only our own resources (Dean).*
>
> *Most of the representatives to the GFC are in favor, but it will not produce the expected results. Departmentalization will not work, because each faculty has its own problems. For instance, if professors from the Faculty of Economics come to the Faculty of Law, or viceversa, to teach Economic Law (Derecho Económico), they will go in depth on issues that are not of interest to the students and for which the students are ill prepared. It's like sending a university professor to a secondary school. It's nonsense. Stick to what you know (Professor).*

As is possible to note in the last quotation, interviewees often equated departmentalization with the mobilization of professors (instead of students) from one faculty to another. This makes deans believe that they would be pressured to serve other faculties at the expense of their own. As one of them stated

> *We deans fear scarcity of resources, and therefore there will be lots of resistance to that [departmentalization] However, with money everything can be solved. We may teach in Medicine, but if we are paid for it. In fact, there are certain areas in which we have levels of excellence, and we may teach those disciplines in the Faculty of Medicine. However, if I request that of my professors, they will kill me. They don't want to teach in Medicine, because that Faculty has too many students. However, as I said before, everything can be solved with money. If the Faculty of Medicine pays for the drugs, reagents, extra-time of professors, etc., there should be no problem. If UBA is departmentalized, our fear is that we may have less resources to develop our program* (Dean).

This fear can be interpreted in the context of continuous budget cutbacks and the incipient inter-faculty struggle for the appropriation of scarce resources. As the university is being pressured to re-examine its resource allocation criteria, and the GFC attempts to standardize criteria, individual faculties are seeking to influence the process of development of indicators in their favor. In general, those who reject a departmentalized model are not concerned about the present geographical dispersion of academic units. On the contrary, they argued that a campus may lead to an ivory tower, further isolating the university from its surrounding community. Indeed, several deans of professional faculties equated a departmental structure with full-time professors and a campus life, two conditions that -in their view- could be detrimental to both the university and to society. In relation to the former, they contend that if professors become full-time, they would lose their 'practical' skills, especially because the university would be unable to match the opportunity cost. In the words of one dean, "it is much better that they continue practicing their profession, without any cost for us, and that they transfer such experience to the university on regular basis". In relation to the latter, the idea of a centralized campus, as opposed to the current structure in which faculties are scattered throughout the city, was rejected on the basis that this dispersion improves the relationship with the community, whereas the campus would promote isolation tendencies. As one dean of a professional faculty put it

> *The campus may lead to Olympus, isolating the university from the surrounding community and transforming it into an ivory tower. In this regard, Paris has not been worse than Oxford.*

Interestingly, this perspective seems to imply that the relationship with the community is more a matter of geography (where the university is) than a matter of function (what the university does).

In sum, while in the public debate the university demands funds and the government insists on deep university restructuring, in the private discourse university actors tended to accept the need for a reform. While the government seems to have a clear idea about the direction of this reform (rationalization, reduction and restraint), university actors have quite different ideas about it. Although there was some general agreement within the university community (i.e. in terms of academic staff) there were some discrepancies in terms of targets for the hatchet. University authorities did not have a specific area in mind to cut, whereas some deans of professional faculties and representatives of the minority focused on the central administration (Rectorado) and its areas of control (i.e. CBC, CEA, Extension) as key locations to begin the downsizing.

Unlike other contentious issues related to organizational restructuring, the dispute over departmentalization must not be seen as associated with the university-government confrontation, but to an internal conflict between professional faculties and the rest of the university community. In general, professional faculties tend to oppose to a departmentalized model. Although a few leaders of professional faculties expressed a sympathy towards departmentalization, they blamed other professional faculties -and not their own- for impeding it.

Section 2. Financing

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the financial issue was the most sensitive one, and the majority of the comments and discussions referred to it directly or indirectly. This section summarizes the main aspects of this debate. First, it relates the policies suggested by autonomists and marketventionists to the respective diagnosis advanced by each group. Second, it describes the different perspectives on the role of the state in university financing, including the proposed shift from budget to subsidy. The remaining pages of this section are devoted to the dispute on private sources of finance, considered by the World Bank to be one of the most important elements of public higher education reform in Latin America [10].

1. The actors' perspectives on university finances

The debate on financial policies was greatly related to the varying diagnoses of the situation. In general terms, autonomists complained that levels of funding are clearly insufficient. Although they acknowledged (sometimes reluctantly, especially in relation to fees) the need for complementary sources of revenue, they constantly asserted the state's responsibility as the main funder. Marketventionists, conversely, focused on the issues of waste and mismanagement, as well as on the social inequities derived from free education. Although they agreed (in most cases hesitantly) that levels of funding are insufficient, they recurrently referred to efficacious administration, differential rewards and tuition fees as the main schemes to be implemented in order to improve university finances. However, neither autonomists nor marketventionists constitute homogeneous groups of actors. Within the government, although decision-making on universities theoretically is the province of the Ministry of Education, it was evident that the Ministry of Economy also had a say -in many cases the final decision- on the matter. This conflict over jurisdiction, and the relative power of Economy, was reflected in the statements of the interviewees from this Ministry who threw their darts simultaneously at both the Ministry of Education and the universities.

> *On the one hand, the Ministry of Education spends their budget in candies, and they request from us more money again and again. The Ministry of Education has a great deal of irrationality; a*

profound rationalization is needed. On the other hand, university financing is a catastrophe. The Ministry of Economy, in conjunction with CEPAL [11], is developing a project to establish criteria to distribute the university budget. These criteria will be implemented by the Ministry of Education (government authority, Ministry of Economy).

The subordinated role of the Ministry of Education vis-a-vis the Ministry of Economy in terms of university reform is clear in this statement: the latter develops the criteria, the former implements them. This official also complained that the Ministry of Education has a poor vision of the educational system, concentrating on irrelevant administrative duties and neglecting planning and evaluation. For instance, the official pointed out that the Ministry of Education does not evaluate curricula, neither from public nor from private universities. When referring to the university, the Ministry of Economy took a more confrontational approach than the Ministry of Education. Indeed, after pointing out the irrelevance present both in teaching and in research, and denouncing the existence of administrative irregularities (i.e. double appointments and 'ñoquis'), a top official at the Ministry of Economy summarized the message sent to universities in the following way: *"If you don't behave, I'll cut your allowance"*. Later in the interview, this coercive and threatening attitude was reverberated in a related statement: *"The university should find alternative sources of revenue, or it should be prepared to die"*.

Although in the public arena the unceasing debates between top functionaries of the Ministry of Education and the university, as reflected in the local media, suggest a highly confrontational style, in private the Ministry of Education had a more conciliatory approach toward university funding than did the Ministry of Economy. For instance, as it was pointed out in the previous chapter, a senior official of the Ministry of Education acknowledged that universities have historically been punished in terms of budget, and even expressed a willingness to increase it. However, in the final analysis government officials tended to agree that fund allocation should be conditional to university performance. University actors, in turn, were also split in their evaluation of the financial situation and therefore on future financial policies. However, in general terms they tended to explain shortcomings in performance as the result of budget insufficiency. The following quotes are representative samples of the perception held by the university community as a whole:

Ninety per cent of our budget goes to miserable salaries. In order to recover the 1987 levels, they should be doubled (Vice-President).

UBA cannot be financed with 166 million dollars, because it is a huge institution. The support staff is leaving the university everyday. If we want to pay them competitive salaries, we must increase the current budget two and a half times (Dean).

State financing is extremely low. In reality, the university is being financed by professors, support staff and the community, who contribute with something in order to pretend that we have a university (Dean).

However, some deans who are opposed to Rectorado (particularly those from professional faculties), as well as representatives from the minority, did not take it for granted that the budget was insufficient. To quote one of them

This year UBA received $170 millions. Is that too much or too little? I have no idea. According to our President, it is a misery, and much below historic levels. According to the Minister of Economy, it is more than enough, even above historic levels (Dean).

In short, in terms of future directions regarding funding, two different perceptions of priorities can be observed. While autonomists emphasized a substantial budget increase as the central need to be addressed, marketventionists highlighted the urgent need for

rationalization of expenditures. This represents a sort of a 'chicken-egg dilemma' in which actors do not agree on which one of the two factors (budget increase or efficient performance) is the precondition for the other.

2. The role of the state in university financing

Although all autonomists stressed the central role of the state in university funding and the need for a vigorous public education system, not all examined the financial issue from the same perspective. The main differences lay in their response to budgetary pressures. While a minority of autonomists expressed a tolerant attitude towards cutbacks, understanding them as part and parcel of a general financial crisis of the state, the majority of them assumed a more confrontational position, arguing that the financial resources needed to fund universities were available, but they were channeled to other priorities. From vice-presidents to student leaders, autonomists cited a variety of examples to demonstrate that the state has the necessary funds but not the will to invest them in the university. Some of these examples referred to financial resources channeled with clear political purposes, like sponsoring pro-state unions or promoting votes in provinces on the eve of elections. Other arguments were based on calculations of the daily purchase of dollars to maintain the exchange rate, of the revenues derived from privatization of public enterprises, of the generous subsidies to the business sector (agribusiness, industrialists and financial institutions alike) and of priorities of budget allocation [12].

It was precisely the assumption that the state has enough resources that led CIN (Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional) in April 1992 to propose a law to increase university funding from 0.5% to 2% of the GDP. Among those who argued that the state has the financial resources, but is reluctant to provide them to the universities, two main explanations were advanced to explain the reasons for this reluctance: the 'ignorant state' hypothesis and the 'deliberate state' hypothesis. According to the 'ignorant state' hypothesis, the state considers higher education to be an expenditure rather than an investment. It is argued that the government shows its ignorance when proclaiming its willingness to enter into the 'first world' [13] while at the same time neglects the importance of education, science and technology in order to successfully compete in the modern world. The following quotations, extracted from two deans, represent this view:

> *Education is not an expenditure, but an investment. The Ministry of Education perceives it as an expenditure* (Dean).

> *The university budget must be discussed with the Ministry of Economy [14]. Those government officials must realize the importance of university, and that the state should be responsible to fund it* (Dean).

The 'ignorant state' hypothesis is usually accompanied by an 'ignorant society' hypothesis, according to which government's attitude towards the university is the natural result of societal lack of understanding about the importance of higher education.

> *People tend to complain that the university spends too much money. They say: "why do you have so many professors, or why do you have so many students, if many of them are going to become taxi drivers?" Those arguments are fallacious. For instance, it is true that we have many professors, but only a few of them are full-time* (Dean).

In this view, the main strategy to counteract declining budgets is to convince both the community at large and government officials of the relevant functions of the higher education system. This 'public relations' approach (see chapter 2) usually suggests building task forces by which students and faculty promote awareness about university's

contribution to society.[15] The 'deliberate state' hypothesis perceives declining budgets as part of an intentional strategy carried out by the state to 're-functionalize' the university in order to make it compatible with the rules of the new socio-economic order. In this view, financial cutbacks have a political or economic rationale (cfr. chapter 5, section 2, 'attack of the state'), and therefore the strategy to increase government funding lies not in persuasion and 'public relations' but in confronting the neo-conservative model. From this perspective, 'public relations' are not viable because the university is considered an enemy by the government, and the government is not trustworthy when it comes to financial affairs. Indeed, autonomists' distrust of government authorities was expressed on many occasions, sometimes backing this attitude with concrete examples such as the following:

> *In June 1990 a Protocolo de Concertatión [compromise] between the President and university rectors was signed. President Menem addressed a speech, in which he committed himself to support public universities. In that meeting he verbally promised Rectors to channel part of the funds originated in privatizations to improve professors' salaries, but that promise never materialized* (university authority).

Nevertheless, regardless of their adherence to either hypothesis, most university actors tended to accept the new rules of the game as irreversible. At the same time, however, they manifested a concern about an excessive retrenchment of the state. To quote two deans

> *The problem with the adjustment is that university must solve the crisis alone; the state is not going to help.*

> *We need to accommodate to the new situation, although nobody likes it. We cannot fully depend on the state anymore, but it is not possible to replace the role of the government.*

Marketventionists, on the other hand, claim that the university should look for new sources of revenue on the grounds that academic autonomy should go together with financial autonomy (autarquía). This argument did not convince autonomists, who expressed their suspicion as to the government's intentions behind granting financial autonomy:

> *University is interested in financial autonomy, at least we, university students, are interested in it. But if it is a type of autonomy in which the autonomous chicken can be eaten by the autonomous wolf, we are not interested* (student leader, majority).

Interestingly, the meaning of this metaphor, used also by Rector Schuberoff, is very similar to the one of Prometheus unchained crafted by Neave and van Vught (1991:253), referred to in chapter 2.

3. Budget or subsidy?

As was pointed out in chapter 4, at the time of the study an attempt was made to transform the university budget into a subsidy. This would mean a qualitative change in the state-university relationship, because it implies that universities can look for their own sources of revenue, and state contribution becomes one among several sources. According to government officials, a subsidy is better than a budget because it allows them to provide incentives to reward efficiency. However, they anticipate that many conflicts are going to arise as a result of its implementation because *"the university community has a resistance to change"*. The new financial policy intended to allocate a global sum to the university system, asking universities to distribute that total among themselves. This situation was recounted by an observer close to government circles in the following way:

> *The Ministry of Education is concerned about the fact that the total subsidy does not exceed 800 million dollars, and it is not interested about the way in which that money is distributed. So, the*

state said, is up to the universities to decide it. The universities opposed to that policy, because it would have created many internal conflicts, and requested the Parliament to distribute the resources, using historical allocations (based on enrollments, functions performed, and also political pressure). This was accepted by the government, because the Ministry of Economy is only concerned about the total, and does not care about internal distribution. At that moment, each university started to lobby deputies. Contrary to common belief, Peronists universities did not obtain more benefits than Radical ones. Indeed, those universities with better contacts and personal relations with deputies obtained more advantages, regardless of their Presidents' political affiliation. Those universities that lost in the distribution received a plus from the government, which used for that purpose the $300 million that the Ministry of Education reserved for itself before the distribution.

University authorities perceived such policy in a different light. For them, it was a policy intended to create internal conflicts:

The plan of the Ministry of Education is to divide and conquer. They attempted to submit the budget as a global sum to all national universities, to provoke an internal fight for resources. Fortunately, we managed to pressure for the budget to continue to be allocated according with historical patterns. Now, they are doing the same thing with research funds. The Ministry gave the funds to CIN [16], and the 29 universities are fighting for its distribution (university authority).

In order to avoid the irregularities derived from these 'historical patterns' in allocating funding (namely political pressures and inflated enrollments), a group of researchers proposed to distribute it according to 'productivity rates', taking into account the proportion of graduates in relation to students. Since the apparent low terminal efficiency of many universities can be explained by the inflation of enrolments (see chapter 4, section 1), the argument goes, the new criterion would pressure universities to declare their real number of students more accurately [17]. This proposal was rejected by the majority of university authorities, claiming that universities cannot be treated as a homogeneous entity because they provide different services (e.g. careers) with different quality. Moreover, they claimed, the implementation of this policy would pressure universities to graduate students at a faster pace, with negative consequences for standards. Other characteristics of the new budgetary policy were the freedom granted to individual universities to allocate internal resources and the implementation of a base-zero budget [18]. Government officials explained the new situation as a step towards rationalization:

Until now, budgets were done in a very haphazard manner, and at the end of the year they implemented the budget in a rush, regardless of the relevance of the activity. As of this year budgets are going to be elaborated by program (government official, Economy).

The administrative rationalization will free resources which can be allocated to academic activities. We want universities to be able to use their funds at their will. As a matter of fact, as of this year the rule that constrains universities to allocate resources by categories will be eliminated, so they will enjoy freedom to dispose of such resources (government official, Education).

Interestingly enough, although these new policies generated an intratribal conflict within each university to establish common criteria to distribute the budget [19], most university authorities agreed with these policies. This is probably due to the various irregularities that they were pressured to incur as a result of budget regulations. For instance, one dean pointed out that, because of rigid prescriptions he has been unable to hire support staff for the last 6 years, and that therefore, he has been pressured to hire support staff disguised as academic staff. Indeed, most deans showed delight with the introduction of a zero-based budget and a better distribution of existing resources. In this regard, deans' references to inequities and inefficiencies in resource allocation usually blamed the central administration. For instance, one dean complained that, in terms of temporary staff, the central

administration had 38% of the budget whereas his Faculty, with 5 buildings, had only 1.4%. This suggests that, in a context of rationalization, the intratribal struggle for resources among the 13 faculties may shift to a struggle between some faculties and the central administration (Rectorado).

4. Private sources of revenues

Another aspect of the new financial policies proposed by the government consisted of encouraging universities to collect external sources of revenue. As the Ministry of Higher Education stated, with the new policy *"universities will be free to sell services in the market. The idea is to liberate universities from any legislation or regulation that inhibit them from enjoying administrative autonomy"*. In reality, at the time of this study UBA was already accruing complementary sources of revenue (see chapter 4), but the intention of the government was to intensify it and to eliminate regulations which may restrict it. For government officials, universities must resort to a broad range of private funding, including donations, fees, contracts and the like [20]. They also advocated a system of rewards and punishments in order to promote efficiency, using precisely the capacity to generate new sources of revenue as one indicator of efficiency.

Autonomists, by and large, agreed with the idea of obtaining additional income from sources other than the state, especially from research and services provided to industry. Although reaffirming the state's primary responsibility for financing public education, they admitted that the university must make an effort to obtain 'genuine resources', and that such a search for additional income should be a permanent policy of the university. One dean summarized the situation as an irreversible trend:

> *What we are seeing now is a new arrangement of responsibilities. The Ministry claims that public monies are insufficient to continue funding universities at the same rate as before, and therefore universities must request contributions from business, alumni and students. As a scientist, I am more pragmatic and less tied to principles than other colleagues of mine, particularly deans from the humanities. This year in this faculty alone we got a revenue larger than US $250,000, and hence I believe in the future. I do not question if shifting from a protectionist state to a free-market state is positive or negative. For me, that is a fact.*

However, contrary to what this dean suggested, deans from the humanities were not at all opposed to the idea of selling research and services to the business sector. Moreover, they were not only very much in favor of that, but they were already selling services and research for substantial amounts of money. Furthermore, as it will be seen later, those who cautioned about the potential risks of overengaging in those activities belong to scientific and technological disciplines. The overwhelming support for the 'commercial university', evident in the interviews and in documents, can be interpreted as a reaction to counteract the perception of the university as an 'academic haven'.

Although autonomists agreed in principle with the idea of increasing revenues, some of them pointed out the difficulties and constraints limiting its implementation. They expressed a willingness to pursue new sources of revenue, yet they identified three main inhibitors that may limit the success of such an enterprise. First, it was pointed out that academics lack the necessary experience in technology transfer or sale of services, and in some cases they do not have anything to offer. In this regard, one dean admitted that "the reasons we don't sell research are not ideological; it is just lack of capacity". A second reason was the financial crisis of the potential funding sources:

> *Students' contributions will be minimal, because they are not in conditions of paying high fees; the Argentine industry is bankrupt, and international agencies have less resources than before. In sum, there are no clear perspectives of getting external resources* (Dean).

Indeed, most deans pointed out the difficulties in obtaining revenues from the private sector, which invested less than 1% in R&D. At least for the short term, no one foresaw the possibility of attaining more than 15% of the total budget from private sources. However, although they believe that the university will never become self-sufficient in terms of funding via technology transfer and other sources of revenue, they expect that in the long term they may substantially increase:

> *Since the private sources for R&D are not going to increase much, we expect that governmental agencies continue funding these activities. The possibilities of obtaining our own revenues by selling services, graduate courses, etc., are still faraway from the total budget. For the time being, the state must assume its responsibility* [underline is mine].

A third constraint was the resistance among certain groups to external sources of revenue, with the exception of funds oriented to research controlled by the university. Indeed, at least half of the deans (mainly from scientific and technologic areas), noted the risks of perverting university functions as a result of external pressures. Comments in this regard related to the lack of neutrality of donations and contributions, the shift in priorities, the potential conflicts of interests, the pressure of industrial or professional corporations, and the withdrawal of state support. In relation to the first issue, one dean argued that

> *Donations and contributions are not neutral. Private groups orient their donations (taxes) according to their ideologies and interests. In reality, a donation is a camouflaged state subsidy, because industries, instead of giving the money to the state as taxes, give the money directly to the university, in many cases selecting the institution, program or activity they want to promote. This is in the nature of the enterprise. For example, I organized an International Conference, and asked the Bank of Germany to sponsor the travel expenses of German visiting professors. They answered that if those professors were from Kiel University, they had no problem in paying the expenses, but if they were from Berlin University, they wanted to see first their publications. That's ideological control.*

The link between private funding and tax was also mentioned by other deans. One of them, for instance, argued that "the main issue in relation to private funding is just that business and industry sectors pay their taxes". These comments were not surprising in a country where, until recently, tax evasion was equal to the state deficit. The possible shift in priorities as a result of an overemphasis on profitable activities was also a matter of concern among university authorities. Some deans referred to this situation in the following way:

> *We have a very low capacity to generate our own sources of revenue, and that is understandable, because this is a faculty, and not a business or an enterprise. It is inappropriate to be concerned about making money out of this. I have recently been in Berkeley, and there they are not paying enough attention to teaching, because university authorities encourage only those activities that bring money, therefore promoting research at the expense of teaching. I think that a good service to the community is to produce qualified human resources.*
>
> *In order to achieve funds some spurious mechanisms are promoted, and that distorts the mission of a university. For instance, we are going to start an educational farm that will be open to the general public. People will pay an entry fee, and we probably are going to make lots of money, but that's not the function of a university. I personally dislike this trend, because very soon professors will be selling hamburgers to generate some income for the university. However, like it or not we need to do these things because otherwise the university dies.*
>
> *I also want to stress that I am an academic, not a businessman (concesionario). I direct an academic institution, not a franchise").*
>
> *If we engage in these linkages, the university must avoid that research becomes governed by the market. The second risk is that university is used as cheap laboratories by the private sector or by*

the state. Academically speaking, two issues are important: to ensure continuity, and the priority of research over sale of services.

Unlike the situation in the developed world, where the issue of conflict of interests is at the forefront of the debate on the commercial university, this did not seem to be a concern for UBA authorities. Only one dean mentioned the possible emergence of conflicts of interest, arguing that *"the international experience indicates that, in a situation of conflict of interest, business wins, because researchers will keep their loyalties to those who pay more"*. The low attention paid to this issue by the rest of the university community can be explained by the lack of experience in the matter.

Another opposition to the sale of service came from the industrial and professional corporations, which complained that the university tendency to charge less for a similar service constitutes unfair competition. This situation seemed to affect several professions, although two professional colleges (engineers and architects) have been the most vocal ones in raising their protests. The contrasting views of professional associations and university authorities can be illustrated by excerpts from interviews with an alumni representative to the GFC and the dean of a professional faculty, respectively:

Through UBATEC, the university is taking jobs away from the professionals who have graduated from the university. It constitutes an unfair competition. The university should only engage in areas in which it does not compete with the professional that the university itself launched to the market. Likewise, UBATEC should only engage in areas where the private market does not operate or cannot offer services, mainly areas with a high level of research that require laboratories and the like (alumni).

Now, the professional association of [....] complains that we are engaged in unfair competition. In Argentina all receipts are made for two or even three times the real value because of corruption and briberies, and because we present budgets for half the price than professional associations, there are some powerful interests that have declared a war against us. Professional associations complain that we make an unfair competition, because our function is to educate students and not to compete with them in the market. But we are also professionals, and we play the idiot role educating them and their children for free (Dean).

However, although deans strongly reacted to the accusations of "unfair competition", they were unwilling to confront the power of industrial corporations or professional associations. Hence, most of them agreed with the alumni's proposal that, in order to avoid conflicts with industrial and professional corporations, the university should engage in areas where there is no competition with the private sector. Finally, university authorities fear that as faculties increase their revenues from selling services to the market, the state will decrease subsidies in the same proportion. Indeed, while the government claims that revenues obtained by the university will be 'complementary', that is, additional to state subsidies, university actors fear that in the future they will take the character of an 'alternative' by replacing state contributions. In this regard, university authorities urged a need for generating complementary sources of revenue from sale of services and technology transfer to donations, research contracts and even tuition fees, with the proviso that they are complementary and not an alternative. To support their concern, university authorities pointed out some precedents in which the governments reduced funds with the excuse that the university was able to raise them.

In spite of these concerns about possible negative implications of private funding expressed in the interviews by some university authorities, in public declarations they advanced an entrepreneurial discourse to show that the university is useful, efficient and relevant to industry and business. In UBA documents, references to UBATEC's achievements and to the 180 contracts with private and public organizations were constant. This emphasis on

accomplishments and "good will" can be understood as a conscious strategy to counteract both the traditional mutual distrust between university and business and the "ivory tower" image propagated by governmental sources.

5. The 'black projects'

It was pointed out that UBA already obtains additional sources of revenue from contracts with external sources. However, some of these contracts remain clandestine in the sense that they are not submitted to the appropriate institutional units within the university, be they a given department or faculty, or the central administration. This means that the total amount received for the provision of those services remains in the hands of those who provide them. In this context, the term 'black projects' refers to products and services sold by faculty members to the private sector independent of the university administration. In a hierarchy of deceit, sometimes it is a Faculty that hides the existence of a project from the Rectorado, sometimes it is a Department from its housing Faculty, and sometimes a research team or an individual from the Department. Although this 'informality' does exist, there is no agreement about its dimension and function. In terms of the former, the university administration complained that this cheating is widespread and represents a substantial income:

> *if we were able to charge at least 10% and not 20%, which would be the normal figure, of overhead for the "services in black" that some university people provide to the private sector using university resources and infrastructure, the issue of tuition fees wouldn't even bother us* (Vice-president).

Assuming the lowest fees discussed by university actors (5 dollars per month), and an enrollment of 200,000 students, which is consistent with the idea that fees may account for 10% of the total budget, it means that, according to this functionary, the lost revenue amounts to approximately 10 million dollars per year. This implies, in turn, that projects and services are being sold every year for at least $100 million dollars without the consent or knowledge of the university bureaucracy. However, other university authorities find this estimation an exaggeration, arguing that the amount of these projects has been often miscalculated. Interestingly, in this view such overestimation is not perceived as an indicator of a favorable situation, but as an adversity:

> *'Black projects' are mainly in the area of services. I hope there are as many black projects as people say, because that indicates that the university is satisfying a demand, but the supply has not yet been channeled through the appropriate institutional lines. However, I think that there is an exaggeration about the number of black projects. Unfortunately, there are fewer such projects than those that people talk about* (Vice-President).

In terms of the function of these projects, there was a general consensus that the intention of those researchers who carry them out without involving their Departments was not to become rich, but to reproduce the basic working conditions:

> *In some critical economic moments we, as authorities, had to turn a blind eye to irregularities, because people were not able to make enough to survive (University authority).*

> *When I was dean I chose to turn a blind eye, and I understand that the present dean is doing the same thing. If the poor guy earns $500 dollars per month, and has a concrete demand from the market, and he decides to remain in our university, I close my eyes and hope that he does not leave the faculty. Besides, these researchers are not thieves. The money that they receive is usually reinvested in the lab -they buy the chemicals and equipment that are necessary for the experiments- or they use it to feedtheir families (former dean).*

Yes, there are some researchers doing "black' projects in this Faculty, but I do not persecute them, because they use that money to continue doing research (Dean).

In any case, regardless of the extent and intention, it was stated by most interviewees that with emerging regulations, foundations and institutional arrangements, the current informal links between the university and the private sector will be formalized and regularized through institutional lanes. This means that, although professors do not have legal obligations to attract customers, incentives (e.g. extra payments) will be provided to those working on external contracts. Although, as was seen before, a few academics raised some possible risks in going too far in the 'service' to industry, not one interviewee opposed these new arrangements.

6. Tuition and fees

Within the debate on private sources of revenue, the issue of fees deserves a special section because it was at the center of the public debate on the university. For autonomists, the extraordinary importance attributed to fees in such debate can be explained more by its metaphoric value than by its objective (financial) value. For them, fees seemed to be the symbolic crossroads of all university conflicts. In the social imagery, university authorities and government officials are playing the future of university in an arm-wrestling match on the small table of tuition fees. Reformist student leaders reflected on this situation in the following terms:

We are against fees not because we have a dogmatic position on this issue. Obviously, even if each student contributes with one dollar, some money would be collected, and something could be done with that money. In this context, our opposition to fees seem irrational. What is taking place today is basically a political struggle in which fees constitute a flag, a symbol of confrontation against the model propagated by the government. We are convinced that if we lower this flag and accept the state's pressure knowing in advance that this will not solve the financial problems of the university, the government will trim from the budget the sum that we were able to collect, regardless if it is a mandatory or a voluntary fee. In this context, fees will not be a complement, as the government claims, but an absurd substitute (student leader, majority)

The issue of fees plays the role of "ideological battle" in a broader project carried out by the government to restructure financing, governance and research and development. The government knows very well that even with fees, the university cannot survive without state funding. In occasions they present fees as a sine qua non condition to ensure the survival of the university, but we know that the issue of fees is advanced to achieve an ideological consensus; it is a symbol that hides what is behind it: the broad university restructuring project (student leader, minority, left).

In the same vein, one Vice-President suggested that the opposition of university authorities to fees is not as much a product of technical or ideological reasons, as it is a function of both its symbolic value in the struggle with the government and the political power of the student movement. This may explain why most university authorities, while agreeing with fees -or at least accepting them as inevitable- in the private discourse, fiercely opposed them in the public scene. For instance, contrary to all expectations, the majority of deans (9 out of 13) and even some members of the top administration, were in favor of fees. The discrepancy between their private and their public discourse was explained by one university authority who supported fees but felt inhibited from speaking openly about it:

It is better for the university to have multiple sources of revenue than to have only one. The free university has regressive effects. I agree with fees, because a free university is a subsidy from poor to rich. However, fees must be the result of an agreement with the government; otherwise, if they are imposed without such an agreement, it will be perceived as a sign of weakness and, with this government, to show weakness implies certain death, because the government will run over us without mercy.

An additional reason to explain the unwillingness of university authorities (both deans and administrators) to publicly support fees is the clientelistic structure of university governance. Indeed, although many of them complain that the university is being financed by the low salaries of academic and non-academic staff, and that students do not share that burden with them, they are reluctant to say that on record. They fear that as soon as they do, they will immediately confront the wrath of tens of thousands of students, for whom gratuity is not only a transcendent historical principle but a pecuniary issue as well.

Nevertheless, government officials maintain that students support tuition fees. They argue that, as soon as the current legislation that prohibits tuition fees is revoked, the main pressure to impose them will come from students. However, government's perception that students are in favor of fees is contradictory to the student vote: slates advocating tuition fees, such as UPAU, receive a scarce support from the student body. When I informed them of their contradiction, they attempted to attribute it either to the weakness of the leadership of the 'right' or to the strength of the leadership of the 'left':

> *Students do not vote UPAU because UPAU lacks a coherent and comprehensive platform that articulates the issues of fees and admissions with a general university policy. I was advising them for a while, but the new leadership has many limitations* (former government official). [21]

> *Students do not vote UPAU because student vote is articulated in terms of national politics, not only university politics (student leader, minority).*

> *In the University of Mar del Plata, a donation was requested from first year students, with the idea of channeling those funds to scholarships: 50% of students accepted. Thus, the university wanted to request that donation from the rest of students. At that time, student leaders started an intense political campaign, and only 5% accepted to contribute. This confirms the existence of a 'cleavage' or 'gap' between leaders and students* (government official).

Reformist student leaders, on the other hand, dismiss the 'gap' hypothesis and argued that the majority of students do reject fees. The three most commonly cited pieces of evidence to support such a statement were: a) that when a voluntary contribution is set up, only one percent of students do contribute; b) that students still overwhelmingly vote for Franja Morada; and c) the success of student leaders (described in chapter 4, section 3) in mobilizing tens of thousands of students to the Legislature with the purpose of defending 'the public and free university'.

a) reasons for imposing fees

Reasons advanced by marketventionists to impose fees were mainly based on equity. Their central argument is that university financing is regressive, because it favors the upper classes. In other words, being the private rate of return higher than the social rate of return, it is seen as unfair that society at large subsidies university students who will use their diploma mainly for personal benefit. In this regard, marketventionists perceive higher education as a commodity among others:

> *It is ridiculous that if the university provides a service, such a service is not paid for. The state charges for water and gas, the bakeries charge for their bread, and so on. Therefore, why not to charge for university services to those who can pay a teaching that is going to provide a personal, private benefit to those who consume them?* (Dean).

In this framework, the rationale of the Ministry of Education for imposing fees is that funding could be reallocated from universities to primary schools. An additional argument - refuted by some university authorities and most student leaders- is that the great majority of students are able to pay (see footnote 25). A third reason is that 'hidden' fees are already in

place, favoring better off students. In this regard, a government official pointed out that in some faculties upper class students pay for private classes from university professors in order to compensate for the low quality of instruction. However, it is unclear in this argument how "open" tuition fees are going to compensate social inequalities, because privileged student can continue paying 'hidden' fees to professors or external tutors. A fourth argument to impose fees was the improvement of university performance. With fees, it was maintained, students will be more careful with facilities, more efficient in completing their degrees on time, and more demanding both in terms of quality of the service and accountability in the use of the financial resources. Moreover, the university would be able to do a more rational planning. In this regard, it was pointed out that the current practice of linking enrollments to funding leads many universities and faculties to lie, "inflating" their numbers of students. Fees may discontinue such tendency, 'clearing' enrollments.

At the same time, students are expected to become more responsible, taking the exams and the courses in which they register: the discrepancy between registration and actual participation is sometimes 6:1. This makes planning virtually impossible and creates lots of waste in terms of unused staff [22]. In the same line of improving planning and efficiency, government officials suggested that fees could be used as rewards and punishments to promote or penalize according to state policies and local needs. For them, higher fees should be imposed in careers which are not a national priority, while those which constitute a priority should receive state subsidies and charge low or zero fees.

A fifth reason to impose fees, put forward even by some autonomists deans and professors, is that students are having a "free ride" in the crisis, at the expense of academic and support staff, who are the ones who are financing the university through their low salaries. This resentment against students for not sharing the pain with the rest of the university community, expressed only in private, constitutes a potential divisive issue, and may provide an additional explanation to account for the divergence between the public and private discourse. A sixth reason invoked, as was already pointed out, was that the majority of UBA's student body was in favor of fees, though no evidence was presented to support such a claim [23]. Finally, a seventh reason, advanced not only by marketventionists, but also by some autonomists (one third of deans and a university authority), is that fees may represent a symbolic gesture of peace-making efforts with the government, either to reduce the friction with it (i.e.*"the university must give the state a signal of good will"*), or to gain public support (*"we need to make an effort, and to show society that we are making the necessary effort"*). Two interesting assumptions are implied in the latter statement, expressed by a vice-president: first, that other sectors of society were already making an effort in terms of rationalization, reduction and restraint, whereas the university was not; second, that the public opinion was in favor of tuition fees.

b) reasons for rejecting fees

As was advanced above, only a minority of the interviewees (composed by less than one third of the deans [24], half of university administrators, and student representatives of the majority and of the left) declared themselves against tuition fees. Opposition to fees was based on political and technical grounds. In the political arena, the core of the arguments was accessibility, rejecting the arguments of 'equity' and 'affordability' advanced by fees supporters. The equity argument was challenged with a "tax reform" argument. In this perspective, the university should not reinforce existing inequalities by inhibiting the access of lower income groups. Hence, the role of university is regarded to be the correction of economic distortions, ensuring that access to knowledge is not conditioned by economic level. For those autonomists who disqualify the 'equity' argument, the solution to the problem of equity must lie in the reform of a regressive tax system:

One of the tricky arguments of the government is that it is looking for a distributive justice in which those who have more should pay more. If they are truly looking for that, they should reform the Argentine tax system, which is absolutely archaic and reactionary. Both income taxes and property taxes are blatantly regressive in Argentina (student leader, majority)

In relation to the official argument that is not fair that the poor finance the rich, I agree with that, but the university should not become a state revenue system in charge of collecting taxes and redistributing income. A tax system already exists in this country, and this system should ensure the alleviation of injustices present in society. However, the Argentine tax system is regressive and perverse. If we want to talk seriously about capitalism, the owners of the large economic groups should pay taxes, like the capitalist class contributes in central capitalism. In the USA and Japan, the proportion of revenue generated by direct taxes to capital is about 50% to 55%, while in Argentina it represents 3%. I agree that those who have more should pay more, but they should do it in the appropriate site. The function of the university is to produce knowledge, not to redistribute income like a tax system. If the latter were its function, this mechanism should be replicated in all public institutions, like hospitals. It is absurd (student leader, minority, left).

Interestingly, most marketventionists (and also a few autonomists who favored fees) agreed with these students that tax reform would be more appropriate for achieving equity than implementing fees. However, all of them argued -in a unanimous concert- that tax reform was not viable in the short-term:

Tax reform is out of the question in today's Argentina. It is an ideal for a long term future. For the time being, the government is going to focus in obtaining revenues wherever it is easier to collect them: consumer's taxes, import taxes, etc. Fees must be seen as a social solidarity mechanism (government official).

A tax reform would be ideal, but many years will pass to achieve it. One of the major Achilles heels of our successive governments is the difficulty to collect taxes, and that will take a long time to improve (university authority).

The ideal situation would be a tax reform to accomplish greater equity, but that may take a long time, and we need to do something now (Dean).

Indeed, all government officials (and those university authorities who support fees) agreed that a tax reform would be more appropriate than fees as a means to increase equity. Therefore, objections to tax reform (which may include a graduate tax to alumni) were not formulated around its inappropriateness, but rather on the technical and political impediments to its implementation. This does not mean that they do not forecast technical or political difficulties in implementing fees, but that they are perceived to be easier to overcome. Hence, the rationale for favoring fees over tax reform is based on a practical reason, namely its possibilities of implementation. The Minister of Higher Education, for instance, after agreeing that an overall tax reform would be more appropriate, pointed out that such a reform would be extremely slow, and disregarded detractors of tuition fees for being stagnated in attitudes based on principle ('actitudes principistas'). This division of the world between the 'pragmatists' who want to alleviate the university's financial situation as soon as possible and the 'principalists' who are paralyzed in obsolete slogans was present throughout the discourse of marketventionists, particularly government officials.

The second argument raised by fee supporters (affordability) was rejected by student leaders and a minority of university authorities: while the former argued that the majority of students can pay, the latter stated exactly the opposite. Interestingly, each of these two incompatible statements is supported by several surveys on socio-economic status of students: some demonstrate that the majority of students can pay, others demonstrate that they cannot. The divergence might not be necessarily a result of unethical manipulation of data, but of using different criteria to define SES [25]. Another 'proof of evidence' advanced to demonstrate that

UBA students can afford a fee is that approximately half of the students come from private secondary schools. However, this indicator was also very problematic: government officials argue that the majority of these schools charge expensive fees, whereas university authorities, student leaders and even former President Alfonsín [26] argue that the majority of them are parochial schools which charge symbolic fees or do not charge fees at all. Since the last university census (1988) asked about 'school of origin' as an open-ended question where only 'public' or 'private' could be provided as an answer, there is no evidence to back either claim. In general, the 'unaffordability' argument was challenged by those who favor fees on two grounds. The first one, based on surveys on SES, on informal observations ("look at the expensive cars in the parking lot", "look at their clothes", etc.) or on a simple speculative hypothesis, is that the overwhelming majority of students are able to pay fees. The second one is that those who could be excluded from the university were already excluded in high school, and therefore fees were not going to make a difference.

A third argument for rejecting fees and to defend accessibility was based on economic and cultural grounds, looking at education both as a right and as an investment. In this view, the demands of the contemporary world (i.e. international competition, technological changes, etc.) require a raise in the level of education of Argentines. As one dean contended, "I am against fees because Argentina needs a substantial improvement of the educational level of its population. Therefore, the state should totally finance the university". However, this argument is usually contested on two accounts: first, as it was already pointed out in chapter 4, Argentina has one of the most massive higher education systems of the world, with 29.3% (or 35%, according to the source) of the age group enrolled in the university [27]; second, the existence of educated unemployed, and the probable incapacity of the job market to absorb university graduates in the near future.

In addition to the political arguments of accessibility ('tax reform', 'affordability' and 'massiveness'), partisans of free education raised a technical argument: its financial irrelevance. Indeed, many student leaders and university authorities speculated about how much fees would be, and those who opposed fees implied that: a) they must be low, otherwise students would not be able to afford them, and b) since they are going to be low, the revenue collected would be insignificant:

> *Fees would be meaningless to build a serious university policy. For instance, salaries would be increased only $30 (Vice-President).*
>
> *Fees themselves do not mean anything, they represent a mechanism of diversion to keep people busy. Fees do not solve the financial problem of the university. To do so, it would be necessary to charge $3,000 fees, but that is impossible because we would have a university without students. The state presents us the issue of fees as the main problem to be solved, whereas the research budget is reduced, and the Parliament attempts to cut university funds (student leader).*
>
> *We cannot talk about fees without talking about salaries. In our faculty, if we impose fees, in the best case scenario we may be able to collect one million dollars, but in order to duplicate salaries (the minimum we can do to stop the exodus) we need at least ten million dollars. It is absurd that the Ministries of Education and Economy talk about imposing fees when they know that such a policy does not solve anything. Either they do not understand what is going on, or they are worried about other things (Dean).*
>
> *To debate about fees without debating about the overall financing of university is misleading, because fees do not solve the problem of low salaries (Dean).*

However, those who favor tuition fees do not agree with these assessments, arguing that fees may help to cover functioning costs or even to raise salaries. These people

provided different figures for fees, ranging in between 5 and 50 dollars per month, and advanced endless hypothetical calculations. Just to quote the lowest and highest estimates

> *Since UBA needs 15 million dollars annually to function, without considering academic staff salaries), with a $5 monthly fee, 200,000 students can solve our functioning expenditures (Dean).*

> *If a $50 monthly fee is charged, and the university lays off 20% of its personnel, salaries may be increased by about 25% (Vice-President).*

c) intra-institutional destination of fees

The above statements reflect the two main ends to channel fees proposed by fee advocates: salaries and operational costs. Although salaries were a concern for some deans (*"What else is UBA going to do, in order to survive? We need to pay salaries"*) the majority (including government officials) preferred to use fees to cover the latter. Out of them, some even explicitly rejected the possibility of using fees to pay salaries. The discussion on the destiny of fees did also contemplate the type of operations fees should be used for. In this regard, the majority of those who believe fees should be used to cover operational expenses stated that they should be used to provide direct services to students, such as equipment and facilities (labs, libraries, computers, etc.), as is the case with the voluntary contributions in the University of Córdoba, of which none of the revenue is directed to salaries. Some deans, especially those from professional faculties, would like to restrict the use of fees to their faculties:

> *In this Faculty Council I am sure that the three sectors would approve it, but with the proviso that all financial resources are operated within the faculty, especially in relation to practices (labs). The bottom line is that they (people in this faculty) distrust the bureaucracy: they don't want the money collected here to go to the central administration, because of distrust and fear of bureaucracy.*

This statement reflects, once again, the conflict between professional faculties and the university administration. Another proposal for the use of fees, advanced by the Minister of Higher Education and the dean of Medicine, was to provide financial aid for low income students, either as scholarships (becas) or loans.

d) The character of fees

Although one government official declared that the government grants universities with financial autonomy (autarchy), and therefore, each university has the right to formulate its own policy on fees, deciding the amount and the way in which they will be implemented, they have a clear agreement about the main characteristics of fees. Indeed, all of them (including the aforementioned), in individual interviews, stated that fees must be voluntary, complementary, and low, and these features were shared by those university actors in favor of fees. The voluntary character of fees was also shared by some deans, but they suggested that voluntary contributions should be 'compulsorily consensuated' as in elementary education. Opposers of fees interpreted the voluntary character proposed by the government as a political strategy to increase their acceptability. Once established, they claim, fees would easily become compulsory.

The 'complementary' character was recurrently raised by government officials as a reaction to university's concerns about its 'alternative' character previously discussed. However, although government officials clearly stated that fees would not affect state subsidies, and therefore would be complementary, they constantly stated that universities should find "alternative" sources of revenue. It was not clear if these permanent references to that word were Freudian slips or a reflection of linguistic or conceptual misunderstandings. Thirdly, all government and university actors who support fees agreed that they should be low; as

was already pointed out, proposals ranged from 5 to 50 US dollars per month. A top government official justified this decision by stating that *"we don't want universities with a high business success and low academic standards"*.

However, some autonomists argued that charging extremely low fees would constitute a mistake: in such a case, the administrative costs of collecting fees would be higher than the potential revenues[28]. As a fourth consideration, a minority of interviewees (three deans and two vice-presidents) argued for differential fees. While two of them proposed differential fees by socio-economic level (e.g. some pay, some do not pay, some receive), the other three argued that fees should be established according to the cost of service. The rationale of the latter can be illustrated with the following quote:

> *Fees must be differential, according to the cost of the service. To transfer resources from rich to poor sectors in a more serious and uniform way there are other social mechanisms, such as the tax system, and that function does not belong to the university (Vice-President).*

In any case, it is interesting to note that, among those who referred to differential fees, no one agreed with the idea, once advanced by the Minister of Education (and later forgotten), that fees should be linked with 'national priorities'. The argument against this proposal was that the concept of "national priority" was too vague and abstract, and that therefore the criteria for operationalization would be extremely subjective.

e) The reluctant acceptance to impose fees

As was pointed out, university authorities who favored fees advanced a variety of equity-related reasons. While some endorsed the arguments about distribution of the educational budget stressed by the government, and others referred to the unequal burden carried out by students (in relation to academic and administrative staff) in university funding, the common denominator was the issue of fairness. However, it is important to point out that a minority of university authorities accepted fees, not for ideological reasons, but for pragmatic reasons. In their view, fees are going to be implemented anyway because there is no other choice to remain alive:

> *Fees are still a political taboo, but I have no doubts that very soon are going to be implemented (Dean).*

> *All Rectors know that sooner or later they will have to impose fees, but they claim: "I don't want to be written down in the history of this university as the Rector of tuition fees" (University authority).*

Even some university authorities who opposed to fees resigned themselves to the idea that, as a result of financial hardships, the university will soon be in the necessity of imposing fees. For instance, one Vice-President predicted that, if the legislation that prohibits fees is revoked, and universities are authorized to impose fees, at least half of the 29 universities would impose them the following day. Moreover, another university authority contended that, if universities were allowed to impose fees, all of them are going to comply sooner or later. The reasons given for such compliance is that the universities which "do not do their homework" according to the parameters established by the Ministry will be financially punished.

In the same vein, another university authority, after developing a long argument against fees, ended with a capitulation: "If fees are going to be imposed anyway, they should be complemented with a system of scholarships". Since this clause is openly shared by the government, it seems that, if fees are going to be implemented, there is not much to negotiate. Even Rector Schuberoff, a traditional enemy of fees and probably the national

leader of free education, publicly acknowledged his favorable position towards the implementation of a system of voluntary contributions, a gesture well received in governmental circles. In that statement, which surprised many of his followers, Schuberoff clarified that voluntary contributions should be understood not as a concession to the government's pressure, but as a solidarity mechanism to avoid the death of the public university [29]. In any case, that was the first time that UBA's Rector openly accepted the implementation of fees. In the meanwhile, all student representatives (with the exception of UPAU, a minority group) and professors' associations (mainly CONADU) continued to express their rejection of fees.

In summary, there was an overall consensus among university actors and government officials that the state must contribute with secure funding, and that additional revenue should be complementary, and not alternative, to such funding. The main disagreement related to tuition fees, which seemed to be the symbolic focus of the university-state conflict. Although in the public sphere the university showed a relatively homogeneous block against fees (only UPAU leaders and two deans openly manifested their support of them), in the private discourse the only ones who were consistent with that position were a minority of deans, half of university authorities, and student leaders of the Franja Morada and the left. With two exceptions which may be explained by personal rather than institutional factors, deans from professional faculties were particularly keen on imposing fees. University authorities who favor fees also argue that the majority of students are enrolled in professional faculties, and that as university graduates, they are going to work in liberal professions, making a substantial profit. However, it was interesting that this reasoning, advanced by several university bureaucrats, was never followed by a proposal for differential fees based on rates of return of graduates.

Section 3. Function

Using Levy's notion of 'function' and Newson and Buchbinder's concept of 'vision' described in chapter 2, this section describes actors' views in regards to what the university should do, and what interests and principles it should serve. Although the majority of interviewees gave priority to issues such as funding, number and type of academic staff, governance and enrollment there was a minority who considered the issue of function as the crucial one. For these actors, the first thing to be discussed is what UBA must produce, and for whom, and only in accordance to this decision can the requirements of funding, academic staff, number of students, and the like be considered. The debate on the functions to be performed by UBA was prompted by two simultaneous developments. On the one hand, the changes occurring at the level of the Argentinean higher education system. On the other, the declining funding and the consequent pressure for selective cuts, which generated a discussion about the essential and secondary functions of the university. This implied an examination of the services provided by the University of Buenos Aires, the function of the public university vis-a-vis the private university, the appropriateness of the 'commercial university' model and the identification of areas which should be trimmed or subjected to deep restructuring.

1. The debate on function. A marginal topic?

As was previously pointed out, the debate on function was very limited at the time of the study. For autonomists, the government is responsible for the lack of debate because it pressures them to constantly respond to the financial crisis, leaving little time left to seriously discuss the mission of the university. Moreover, they claim that the government relegates the debate to specific trees, discrediting any attempt to analyze the forest. To quote one of them

The government has confined the debate to two or three minor issues, such as fees, quotas, and the like, but nobody talks about the role of public university for national development, that is, what type of development we want to pursue, and what type of university is necessary for that purpose. To those of us who pose this debate, the government criticizes us by saying that we are frozen in the 1960s. (Vice-President).

For marketventionists, instead, it is the university, with its conservative attitude expressed in its ties to old slogans and its resistance to change, that is the one who is refusing to enter a debate on function. Indeed, it is government's perception that the university is unable to realize the mismatch between the challenges of the modern world and its obsolete structures. Therefore, government officials claim, only an external pressure can make the university re-examine its functions and become more accountable to the community. Moreover, marketventionists within the university claim that this lack of accountability has transformed a public university which was once at the service of the nation, into a corporate university which is at the service of the particular interests of students, professors, support staff, or the Radical Party.

For marketventionists, it is precisely this corporatist arrangement between university leaders and several interest groups which is the main reason to explain autonomists' resistance to change. Autonomists perceive the situation in a different light. They contend that this accountability means nothing other than accommodating the university, like the rest of the public sector, to the structural adjustment policies carried out by the government. For instance, a dean close to the university administration contended that, in the new context, the university will move away from the academic function to an entrepreneurial one:

The university is pressured today to play a new role: to apply the monetary policies of fiscal adjustment. This is taking university out of its specific role, which is the academic one. It is contradictory to request universities to improve if they must implement an adjustment. The university is not a business, even less a private business. It cannot function based on cost-benefit criteria. It is inappropriate to pressure the university to fight with the other sectors of the educational system or with other areas of the public sector for scarce funding.

Two concerns can be identified in this statement. The first one refers to the detrimental impact of adjustment policies for university activities, a preoccupation shared by all autonomists and even some marketventionists. The second concern (the shift from the 'scholarly excellence' model to the "commercial university' model), however, was not shared by as many. Indeed, as it was already pointed out in the previous section (cfr. 2.d), only a minority of university actors spoke out against the 'commercial university'. In terms of function, those opposed to the commercial model expressed the preoccupation that the university will waste a great amount of time and energy in minor enterprises, diverting these resources from its essential functions [30]. In this regard, although there was a consensus that the three functions of the university (teaching, research and extension) must be protected, there was no agreement in the priorities to be established in each case. The dissensions related to the mission of the University of Buenos Aires in the context of changes in the higher education system (particularly in relation to private universities), and to the identification of primary and secondary functions to be undertaken by the university

2. <u>The function of UBA in the context of the higher education system</u>

The Argentinean higher education system has experienced the proliferation of public universities during the 1970s, plus the proliferation of private universities in the early 1990s, accompanied by a new wave of public universities. What is the function of these newly created institutions, and how does it affect the function of UBA? Autonomists contend that the new public universities, due to the of scarcity of financial resources and the absence of an academic tradition, have low possibilities of improvement. They suggest that

the creation of these universities, both in the 1970s and in the 1990s, responded more to ideological and political motivations than to an overali educational project. They argue that in these institutions, (particularly the small ones), as well as in the non-elite private universities, most professors are professionals with no academic background. Therefore, a significant number of the academic pool of these universities is composed of professors from large public universities (mainly UBA) who develop these activities as a complementary job.

Because of the low level of research, the newly created institutions -both public and private- were conceptualize more as schools than as universities by autonomists. They claim that, due to the lack of quality control, the only function they perform -teaching- is highly unsatisfactory. Therefore, they contend that, despite exodus and scarcities, old public universities such as UBA still have an average degree of excellence higher than new universities. Moreover, autonomists perceive UBA as the mother of most universities, providing research results and highly qualified professors. Marketventionists agree that in the newly created public universities research is absent and teaching is deficient, but perceive it as a momentary problem to be corrected with time. In relation to private universities, three major functions are identified by marketventionists: to alleviate the state budget, to promote ideological pluralism and to encourage competitiveness in the public sector.

> *Private education fulfills a complementary role, because it supplies services that the state is not able to provide. On the one hand, our public universities are overcrowded. On the other, private universities guarantee the principle of freedom of teaching, under the condition of meeting basic academic standards (government official)*

> *I hope that many high quality private universities are created in the future, because the consequent competitiveness will force us to raise our standards (dean).*

However, deans and professors (be they autonomists or not) are skeptical about the capacity of private universities to pressure the public ones to improve quality in either research or teaching. First, since private universities do not conduct research, there is no competition in that respect. Second, teaching is only provided in a limited number of areas (i.e. business, arts and humanities, etc.) which demand low capital investment. Third, they fall short of essential facilities such as laboratories and libraries. Fourth, as was already pointed out, private universities often lack their own academic staff, and therefore are constrained to rely on professors from the public university [31]. In order to attract them, they often appoint them at a higher category. These quotes illustrate the opinion of deans and university authorities about private universities:

> *Too many private universities were open in the recent past, many of them too small to perform academic activities, which is wasteful. Private universities do not constitute yet a challenge to public ones: they still have low enrollments and low quality teaching. They do not undertake research, and they hire low rank UBA professors with higher positions: UBA' associate professors are usually hired as full professors (Dean).*

> *There is no research in private universities; therefore, they are not truly universities. Until today, there is no significant brain drain from public to private universities (Dean).*

> *Private universities in Argentina are private enterprises which sell knowledge. A professor does not earn there a better salary than in the public university. There are no academic incentives; even worse, there is no academic spirit (Dean).*

> *I really doubt about the idea of using private universities as a model to follow. Furthermore, I wonder about the contribution of private universities to national development (Vice-President).*

Even the marketventionist dean who advocates the creation of more private universities quoted above cautioned about the proliferation of small businesses with more interest in profit than in education, and derogatorily referred to them as 'kiosk like' universities. Likewise, a former government official pointed out that public universities should make an effort to improve quality, but acknowledged that, as of today, private universities are not necessarily better. In his own words

> *They do not have libraries and do not conduct research at all. They are just schools, and their professors are poorly paid. Now, nonelite private universities are scared because of the emergence of elite private universities, because the latter are going to take many clients from them.*

Nevertheless, while most marketventionists stated that private universities should have a proper infrastructure in terms of facilities, academic staff and research, the fulfillment of this requirement by newly created nonelite private universities is highly disputable. In this regard, it has been pointed out that sometimes the authorization of new private universities is related to political or economic pressures, and that this has prompted at least one resignation in the Ministry of Education [32]. Autonomist students and alumni were more straightforward than deans and professors, implying that the multiplication of private universities is part of an orchestrated governmental plan to erode accessibility. Moreover, they question the argument of pluralism advanced by state officials, suggesting that private universities often have ideological links with financial or religious groups. To quote one of each group:

> *The state, in the context of its modernization project and its excluding restructuring, attempts to restrict public universities, to create a few centers of excellence, and to favor the private sector. It is astonishing to see the amount of advertisements of newly created private universities in newspapers and magazines (student).*

> *This government is at the service of private universities. Indeed, the deterioration of the public university benefits the private university. As the deterioration continues, those able to pay fees will shift into private universities. This is regressive, because the public university fulfills a democratization function, both in terms of teaching and research, and such function is neglected by the private sector. The private university promotes ghettos. Private universities do not encourage pluralism, whereas the public one promotes freedom of thought (alumni).*

These autonomists also contend that, under the new restructuring of higher education, state control over public universities is going to increase, with the net result that private universities are the only ones enjoying autonomy. They also expressed concerns about the role of the newly created elite private universities [33]. However, since these universities were a recent phenomenon at the moment of the field work for this study, prognosis about their potential functions were still dubious.

Indeed, there was no consensus among autonomists about the function of elite private universities in the higher education system. While the majority of them mentioned that these universities do not pose a challenge to public universities, and will not do so for a substantial period of time, a minority of them cautioned that they may lead to a two-class university system, the public and the private, with different resources and quality. Although in terms of research there was an agreement that elite private universities are not going to develop a significant role, and that this will continue to be a function to be performed primarily by public universities (particularly basic research), there were serious concerns about a potential segmentation of the higher education clientele, and therefore a new redistribution of functions among the public and the private universities in the formation of the national leadership.

In this regard, marketventionists contended that UBA is serving exclusively the middle classes, and therefore is poorly performing its function as a public institution. As was

mentioned in the previous section, this has been the main argument in favor of tuition fees. Nevertheless, according to a study carried out by the student movement (Orquín and Eliosoff 1991:3) three quarters of UBA students belong to low income groups, while only 20 to 25% belong to middle and upper classes. Curiously enough, in the same magazine where the Orquín and Eliosoff's article was published, Gustavo López, UBA's General Secretary, asserted that only 2% of the Argentinean population reaches the university.

Nevertheless, regardless of the proportion of middle and low income students served by the public universities, the implicit apprehension of autonomists related to a shift in the professional training of the cadres of the dominant groups, particularly in relation to finances and policy-making. In fact, autonomists expressed a concern that elite universities may attract a good number of students and professors from public universities. At the moment of the study the elite private universities, which are a minority among private universities, was training cadres for the private sector, especially in areas related to management, and very seldom in areas related to production, such as engineering. In these areas, the elite students get their education overseas, and generally do not come back. However, they were increasingly developing programs in the area of public policy. Although this fact created preoccupation among some autonomists, the majority of them argued that elite universities cater to such an inconsequential clientele that its social relevance is irrelevant. It was their argument that if elite universities are in fact going to nurture a new leadership, it will be alienated from the reality of underdevelopment. To quote one dean

> *These elite universities are creating an elite of astronauts with international level, with little place in our third world reality, and the likely outcome of that is the emigration of their graduates. For a long time, the national leadership is going to continue to graduate from UBA. There are a few elite universities, but that is a "galactic" elite, with no training to face the problems of this country, but the problems of the developed world. The "terrenal" (down-to-earth) elite, prepared for this country, the one that is going to constitute the future leadership, will continue to graduate from the public university.*

Obviously, it is still too early to assess the accuracy of this prediction, which is going to be seen in the near future. In any case, it was clear for autonomists and marketventionists alike that the functions to be performed by UBA are to a greater or lesser extent related to the functions performed by other universities, be they private or public, or by other tertiary institutions. For instance, if the proposal to create community colleges which was under incipient discussion at the time of the study is approved, UBA's current capacity to attract a considerable clientele from outside Buenos Aires City would be seriously undermined.

3. Indispensable and dispensable functions. The pressure to trim services

In addition to the changes in the higher education system, pressure to redefine functions also originated in the more active role of the state and in the intra-university conflict. Indeed, the state's increasing influence on directions and its restrictions on funding, on the one hand, and the struggle between marketventionists and the university administration, on the other, fueled an agitated debate about the preeminent functions to be performed by the university.

For marketventionists, UBA spends too many resources on non-essential functions. In this regard, the most frequently mentioned areas to be trimmed or even abandoned were the two secondary schools, the CBC, the four university hospitals, extension and, to a lesser degree, the CEA. In relation to the two secondary schools and the CBC (whose rationale is to compensate for the low quality of secondary schools), marketventionists argued that those two areas do not belong to the university, but rather to the Secretary of Secondary Education. In regard to the university hospitals, they contended that they do not constitute a fundamental function of the university, but rather of the health sector.

Criticisms about the appropriateness of having university hospitals were usually supported by references to their cost. Indeed, Medicine takes 25% of the university budget: 19% goes to the four university hospitals, and 6% to the faculty itself. Moreover, one dean who asked for the abandoning of the university hospitals pointed out that at the University of Fluminense (Brazil), a significant portion of the university budget comes from the university hospital, whereas in UBA it is the other way around. However, the general demand was not to eliminate all university hospitals, but to reduce their number to only one.

Autonomists vindicated the presence of university hospitals as indispensable teaching facilities, and reproached the government for the fact that UBA does not receive any funding from the Secretary of Health, even when the hospital university system provides for more than 15% of the available beds in Buenos Aires. Consequently, UBA has been forced to reallocate educational funds for operational functions. Furthermore, at the time of the study the university hospitals started to pursue a cost-recovery strategy, but the revenue collected was still very low in relation to expenditures. In relation to the withdrawal from extension activities, the main argument was that, in the light of financial constraints, UBA should limit itself to the main functions of a university, namely teaching and research.

The context of financial cutbacks helps to explain the shift in the function of Extension, from a 'community-oriented' paradigm towards a 'commercial university' one. According to university authorities, Extension is probably the area undertaking deeper changes within the university. Although the tendency to 'go to the people' still remains in some sectors, the fundamental focus is rapidly changing to the sale of services. For university authorities, the new function of extension is the transfer of knowledge and technology from the academic specificity. They rejected the assistencialist-demagogic model of the 1970s, which consisted of sending students to a 'poverty shower' once a week, and argued that the university must provide advice and technical-professional services to society. However, although they personally believe in that function, and that a few programs in that line (i.e. AIDS campaigns through posters, advisory on drug addiction, etc.) are still being implemented, they manifested the concern that Extension is increasingly following "the American model" (SIC), based on an excessive emphasis on courses and services provided on cost-recovery basis. To quote one of them

> *The debate of the next years will be how much of the resources is the university going to devote to the relationship with industry and how much to "extension" in the strict sense, that is, community development. The necessary ideological debate has been replaced by an excessive pragmatism. If we lose the debate, it will be regrettable. I don't think that this model that the state wants to impose will be totally successful (Vice-President).*

Interestingly enough, the move of extension activities towards the market is also present in traditional 'anti-business' environments like the Faculty of Social Sciences, where Extension has practically abandoned community-oriented work for lack of funding, and has started to sell services and products to the market.[34] Finally, in relation to CEA, those marketventionists who asked for its dismantling did not imply that graduate programs are not an important function of the university, but that CEA was not fulfilling its mission in an effective way, and that graduate programs should be managed by each faculty [35]. Indeed, the majority of university actors stressed the necessity to improve and expand graduate programs to respond to an ever growing demand. Indeed, the increasing unemployment and the decreasing value of the bachelors' degree in the labor market is exacerbating the diploma disease and therefore the pressure for graduate studies [36]. However, the function of graduate studies is not perceived in similar terms by autonomists and marketventionists. While the former relate graduate studies to interdisciplinary studies and research, the latter would like to emphasize professional development.

I propose a permanent updating of diplomas, which must promote a continuing reeducation of professionals... Overall, graduate programs must emphasize professional development and retraining, not research. Graduate programs should aim at improving professional performance (government official).

Another government official even suggested that such retraining should be mandatory for all professionals after a certain number of practicing years. The rationale behind this proposal is that rapid technological and scientific transformations are increasingly going to lead to the obsolescence of professionals' knowledge. Interestingly enough, according to government officials, the main resistance to this policy would not come from university authorities but from professional associations, probably assuming that the latter are not interested in losing control over the continuing education of its members. Together with graduate studies, the function of the bachelor's degree was also debated. While hard marketventionists call for the abolition of the long undergraduate degrees, autonomists contend that they are an essential ingredient of an academically oriented education. Standing between them, soft marketventionists propose that the long degrees should be allowed to continue, but the university should begin to grant diplomas for intermediate degrees. Autonomists, particularly university authorities, tend to reject the idea of intermediate degrees, arguing that they would distract the university from its most important functions, and that such a task belongs to technological institutes and other educational agencies:

We should not engage ourselves in short careers or technical diplomas. For that purpose, there are already the technical secondary schools. We should function as a university, with long programs and an academic profile. I don't want to create anything new. It is better to do well what we do now, without inventing anything new.

Although marketventionists and several deans of professional faculties pointed out various functions to be trimmed, the ones most frequently mentioned were those managed by the central administration. The attack on these 'non-essential' functions (requesting to transfer them to non-university agencies or to individual faculties, or even to eliminate them altogether), was based on two main arguments. First, that the Rectorado has become a top-heavy, large ('macrocefalic') bureaucratic apparatus which has undertaken too many functions. Second, that some of these functions, particularly the CBC, are expensive and beyond the university mandate.

The implicit background in all these comments was that, in a period of financial crisis, the university is not able to perform as many functions as in the period of expansion, and therefore must begin its contraction as soon as possible. The axis of the discussion was to determine the essential ones from those considered superfluous or out of the competence of the university. The visions of the university that shaped the debate were the ones of 'academic haven', raised by autonomists, and 'commercial university', advanced by marketventionists. In the struggles and negotiations for a compromise between these two visions, the third vision identified in the literature (Newson and Buchbinder 1988, Briceño 1988), the 'transformer university' that promotes the upbringing of critical consciousness and linkages with progressive social movements, was usually excluded. This vision was only present in the discourse of some student leaders, who recurrently felt the necessity to clarify that they were not stagnant in the 1960s. One university authority who had suffered the persecution during the last military dictatorship explained the low support for the 'transformer university' as a momentary set back:

The transformer university is still in the spirits of many people, but we have suffered very hard times. The university is still recovering from the experience of many dead people, disappeared, repression, break of autonomy and interventions. The transformer university project is linked to the fall of ideals and utopias, and it is attempting to reacommodate until new utopias emerge. This is a moment of transition.

In summation, the three main functions of the university are being seriously examined by university and governmental actors alike. In regard to teaching, the traditional function of training professionals for the market is in crisis. While in the past, graduation from UBA led almost automatically to a well paid job and was a guarantee of social and/or economic status, the situation has drastically changed in the present. The expansion of enrolments, on the one hand, and the general decline of the national economy (which implies less job opportunities for professionals), on the other, have greatly contributed to the twin problems of educated unemployed and overqualification. Curiously, the government's intent to link supply to national development is not totally consistent with its drastic neo-liberal agenda based on the free exchange of supply and demand only regulated by free market forces, which is manifested in the proliferation of private universities and the pressure for tuition fees in public universities. Moreover, as a result of the emergence of private elite universities, there was an increasing re-examination of the function of the public university in providing highly qualified cadres and national leaders in a variety of areas. There was also an increasing concern about the overemphasis on undergraduate studies, which resulted in a growing debate about the function of graduate studies: while autonomists were more inclined to link them to research and to interdisciplinary studies, marketventionists tended to advocate the function of professional development (retraining of former undergraduates), under the control of individual faculties.

In regards to research, it has been publicly stated in GFC meetings that UBA does not assign enough importance to this function, overemphasizing teaching. However, the move from a 'professional' to a 'scientific' university, shifting the emphasis from training to research, was still a marginal topic of discussion initiated by actors involved in the non-professional disciplines. For the time being, the debate focused on the transition from an academic-driven research agenda to one which is market-driven. Given the meager experience at UBA on this issue, this discussion was confined to a handful of interviewees. From an utilitarian perspective, marketventionists argued that research presently undertaken by UBA is superfluous and inapplicable, and thus called for more 'relevant' research. Conversely, those few autonomists who have considerable research experience expressed cautions about an overemphasis on applied research for the market that were similar to those analyzed in chapter 2. As will be described later in section 6, these researchers are conscious of the potential risks of commodifying knowledge. In any case, there was a general consensus among all interviewees that, due to the low consideration of private universities to this matter, research (particularly basic) will continue to be a function of the public university.

As was the case in relation to the other two functions, extension was also under pressure to be more in tune with the marketplace. While the 1918 Reformists considered extension to the community as a sacred principle and as part of a broader alliance between the university and progressive social forces, today's Reformists resigned themselves to the financial pressure to shift priorities from the community to the market. Moreover, since extension is a sphere directly controlled by the Rectorado, it was under attack from marketventionists, together with other areas considered by them to be dispensable or inefficient, such as the CBC and CEA.

Section 4. Governance

The debate on governance reflects the conflict for power in order to influence university policies, a process formally exercised through the General Faculties Council. In the analysis of this conflict, a double alignment of forces can be observed: the political and the institutional. The political alignment corresponds to the struggle between autonomists and marketventionists. This struggle was not confined to the boundaries of the university, since both groups have alliances with external groups, including the state apparatus and political

parties. The institutional alignment corresponds to the internal competition among the different constituencies to increase their respective capacities to effect the decision-making process. In turn, this institutional contest is shaped by two main confrontations. On the one hand, the dispute among the three main constituencies (professors, students and alumni) and the pressure of two currently excluded groups to participate. On the other, the dispute between the university administration and the deans of some professional faculties. In an intricate network of relationships, all these conflicts are interconnected. For instance, a particular dean may have a position in the general political debate as autonomist or as marketventionist, another position -as a professor- in the debate about the adequacy of the current three-party system, and a third position as a head of a faculty in the debate about the amount of power enjoyed by each faculty vis-a-vis the central administration.

In spite of the quarrels related to membership to different interest groups, most interviewees supported the three-party governance [37] established by the 1918 Reform, many of them pointing out that the autonomous governance of universities constitutes a step forward with respect to the military interventions of previous years. However, two possible reforms were under discussion: the inclusion -or exclusion- of particular groups in university councils, and the relative weight enjoyed by the different groups (proportionality of representation). The former relates to the demand of non-academic staff and assistant professors for being included in university councils [38], as well as to the demand expressed by certain groups to limit alumni's participation. The latter is related to the demand expressed by professors and student groups to increase their share of power.

1. Inclusion and limitation of certain groups in university councils

A battle for representation in university councils has been launched by a variety of actors who feel underrepresented under the current conditions. On the one extreme of the spectrum, a minority of actors (a surprising combination of university authorities, government officials, deans and minority representatives) claim that university should be ruled exclusively by full professors, therefore excluding the other two groups. On the other extreme, another minority advocates the inclusion of two more sectors, thus expanding the present arrangement into a penta-party system. In between, the vast majority favors a 4-party system in which the incoming sector (support staff) can participate, certain conditions provided. Indeed, the inclusion of support staff in university councils was probably the proposal that received the broadest support. This demand was endorsed by the majority of deans, and by student leaders, alumni and professors representing the majority. Out of the 13 deans, 10 agreed with this initiative, two of them did not have a clear position in that regard, and only one clearly opposed to it. Likewise, Frenja Morada and left student groups overwhelmingly favored it [39].

However, with very few exceptions, all those who endorsed the inclusion of support staff and therefore the expansion of the 3-party system to a 4-party system made a proviso that such participation of support staff should be limited. Indeed, two main conditions were expressed in order to accept support staff in university councils: first, its participation should be limited to non-academic issues, and second, that this group should be allowed a voice, but not a vote. As a matter of fact, some deans already allow non-academic staff to intervene (on those two conditions) in the meetings of the Directive Council of their Faculties. Even the very few interviewees who endorsed the idea of full participation of non-academic staff in university boards stressed that such participation should be helpful only if they make an effort to understand the university from a global perspective, and not from their specific interests. Those who disagree with the incorporation of non-academic staff (representatives of UPAU, and of professors and alumni of the minority, in addition to the two deans mentioned above) contended that the university governing body must be exclusively academic, and that support staff, as employees, can express their concerns by

sending their representatives to university authorities. Unlike the previous proposal, the demand expressed by assistant professors to be included in university governance was not very well received by university actors. Although CONADU claims that assistant professors constitute two thirds of the academic body and therefore it is unfair to exclude them from electing representatives for University Council, very few university actors (only some student groups of the left) proposed the idea of a 5-party system.[40]

The third dispute on governance originated in the proposal raised in the Imaz' report to exclude alumni who were not university professors. This proposal was endorsed by four deans and, curiously enough, representatives from both the left and the right. Although some argued for their exclusion from university governance, most of them demanded that alumni's participation was to be in accordance with the above mentioned criterion. Two main arguments were raised to restrict alumni's role. The first contends that the original idea of bringing to the university the concerns of professional colleges and associations has evolved into a new situation in which alumni also represent -in some faculties to a large extent- the needs and interests of assistant professors. The second group perceives alumni from an opposite perspective, arguing that they have lost contact with university problems, and this lack of familiarity makes them unable to contribute in a positive way. These two contradictory perceptions clearly show that the role of alumni in university governance is not very clear. Ironically, while some people claimed that alumni must also be professors, so they can understand the university problems, others claim that they must not be professors if they are to effectively represent professional associations, which was the original intention of their incorporation to the GFC. Further, the second group argue that, since professors are already represented, to have professors disguised as alumni increases their relative representation of professors, and in the last instance it is not clear which sector they really would represent.

2. Relative weight of each group in university councils

The second dispute for change was over the demand expressed by professors and certain student groups to increase their power in university councils. On the one hand, students from the left (JUP and FICSO) call for not only a 5-party system, but also for equal representation for all parties, claiming that students should have as many representatives as professors [41]. On the other hand, both professors and deans not only reject such a request, but moreover seek to increase the role of professors vis-a-vis the other two constituencies, either in quantitative or qualitative terms. Either by excluding alumni, reducing the role of students or enlarging professors' share of power, the majority of deans (8 out of 13), government authorities and minority representatives want to see a more prominent role played by professors, on the grounds that university governance is largely controlled by the other two sectors. Some of them pointed out that the governance system in universities has been perverted because student interests prevail, even when they only represent one fourth of the council.

Three explanations were advanced to account for this situation. The first one is that students are much better organized than professors, and, more importantly, they have a project. In this view, professors have neither a presence nor a political project, partly because a very low proportion are real university actors who work full-time [42], and partly because of the demoralization that results from their working conditions. In this context, it is argued, students have taken advantage of this void left by professors and have gained a leading role. The second explanation is related to the relationship of political clientelism between professors (including the deans themselves) and students, by which professors attempt to satisfy the demands of the majority of students. The third one is the network of alliances built by the student movement with assistant professors and alumni. For these reasons, the majority of deans, some government authorities and minority representatives claim that the

responsibility of ruling the university should be in the hands of full professors, and hence that they should have the majority of votes (or even all the votes) in university councils [43].

The responsibility corresponds to full professors. They should constitute at least 51% of the total. Students should be represented, but not according to the current arrangement. My proposal is that 51% should be full professors, and the rest should be students, professors and support staff representatives (Dean).

University governance corresponds exclusively to professors (government authority).

If students and alumni are eliminated from decision making process, this model of university falls apart. Professors, students and alumni act in a way of a partisan coalition. It is our proposal to give more power to full professors, and to reduce the power of students and alumni to the minimum possible (student, minority).

On the other hand, university authorities and all those groups which support them (particularly Franja Morada) do not perceive any need to alter the current state of affairs in terms of representation.

3. Performance of University Councils

In addition to (or perhaps as a result of) the problem of representation, roughly half of the deans, minority representatives and government authorities pointed out a serious problem of performance in relation to university councils, particularly the GFC. The first problem of performance was linked to the political confrontations between supporters and detractors of the university administration. Those who believe that UBA is more a confederation of faculties than a university [44] perceive the GFC as a battlefield for inter-corporate struggle in which the rector has either little political and administrative power to govern effectively or a broad network of alliances to protect the status quo. The clearest expressions of the struggle were the recurrent disputes between the dean of Medicine and the university administration described in chapter 4, section 3. In regard to this situation, the majority of deans bemoaned either in public (in the GFC meetings themselves) [45] or in private that more than half of the time in GFC's meetings were devoted to discussing problems related to the Faculty of Medicine, while debates on more fundamental issues, such as the role of science in Argentina, the relation between teaching and research, the professional development of academic staff, the evaluation of quality and the like, have been practically absent from the GFC's agenda. To quote a dean from a professional faculty

The problem we are suffering now is that one dean is setting the overall university policy, and that's quite inappropriate.

Other deans regretted that this conflict is expressed in a very confrontational way, with no space for a real debate on the issues that are behind it. On the one hand, the dean of Medicine used the media to accuse the university administration of administrative irregularities, and attempted to impose "his own rules of the game" in the Faculty of Medicine [46], even in opposition to the decisions of the GFC. On the other hand, university authorities, deans and alumni aligned with them, and particularly the student movement, accused the dean of Medicine of fraud, of rebelling against the GFC's resolutions, and of promoting government interventionism. In relation to this conflict, a minority representative claimed that "the Rectorado cries crocodile tears because the state limits its autonomy, but later on the Rectorado limits the space of faculties". The minority of deans who do not adhere to either pole of the conflict expressed frustration about the mud slinging. Although they criticize the university authorities and their support groups of students and alumni for refusing an open debate on issues considered "taboo", they also criticize the dean of

Medicine for carrying out his own agenda. For this group, the main problem of GFC is that academic discussion has been replaced by a political and ideological cross-fire.

In addition to the problems of representation and extreme politicization, a minority of actors complained about the difficulties for decision-making in university councils. A typical GFC meeting (which meets every two weeks) is never shorter than 6 hours, and usually takes a whole workday. For some deans, this is a small price to pay for democracy. In this view, a democratic system is slow but it is always better than an authoritarian system because it provides for checks and balances. For other deans, however, the problem is not democratic decision-making but bureaucracy. In this perspective, the GFC has too many functions (executive, legislative and judicial) which are often mixed up. As it is possible to observe in the following statement, government officials are also critical of university governance:

> *Today, universities are impossible to govern. Rectors are generally impotent before the Superior Council. Moreover, since it is a clientelist system, there is a great deal of demagogy to please the students. The governance system must be reformed. Universities do not improve by themselves because they are impossible to govern. Everything is carried out through the Superior Council, which generates bureaucracy and makes decision-making processes slower. For instance, one Foundation donated $300,000 to computerize university libraries, but in three years nothing was implemented due to bureaucratic hurdles.*

This observation is particularly interesting because it summarizes in one sentence the three problems mentioned above by a variety of actors: low power of academics, politicization and anexcess of functions. An additional set of problems pointed out by some deans and government officials who are close to university affairs relate to the mismatch between GFC meetings and the 'real' issues:

> *The debates in the Superior Council are like Alice in Wonderland. Nothing that happens there has any remote relation with the reality of university life, because the reality of university life runs along other avenues: underground partisan arrangements and negotiations, secret interviews with state functionaries where a give and take bargaining process takes place, etc. (Dean).*

> *The university has a double speech. Some things are said in private, while in public forums such as the Superior Council very different things are said (Government official).*

Indeed, these quotations, which represent the perceptions of many interviewees, indicate three problems of the GFC that most representatives would like to overcome. The first one is the low relation between the maximum university authority and the real process of decision-making. The second is the excessive time and energy devoted to discussing and achieving consensus on minor issues, at the expense of more relevant issues. Thirdly, as a result of political clientelism, there is the fear of many representatives (particularly deans and professors) to openly express their opinions, which leads once again to a situation of double discourse. For instance, those deans and university authorities who in private agreed with the government's view that university governance should lie exclusively or majoritarily in the hands of full-time professors refrained from expressing such an opinion in the GFC.

Section 5. Admission policies

Together with fees, the disagreement over admission policies constituted the two most contentious debates in relation to university restructuring. As pointed out in the beginning of this section, admission policies and fees are pre-eminent symbols of the intense political conflict that is ongoing between the university and the government.[47] On the one hand, both the central administration and all university actors that endorse in one way or another the 1918 Reform, defend the present policy of open access, mediated by an introductory

course called Common Basic Cycle, or Ciclo Básico Común (CBC). Vociferously opposed to this are marketventionists (mainly government authorities, but also alumni, professors and students from the minority) who call for quotas and entrance examinations.

The discussion centered on accessibility involves two levels of debate, one at the theoretical and abstract level, the other at the practical and concrete level. At the abstract level, the debate focuses on the adequacy of open door policies and quotas, as contradictory admission strategies. At a more concrete level, the discussion focuses on the adequacy of the current mechanism used by UBA to incorporate new students, namely the CBC. Although actors usually combined these two levels of discussion into one, for analytical purposes they will be treated separately.

1. The theoretical debate: open door policies vs. entrance requirements

The theoretical debate concerned the question of what is the best admission policy: open access or entrance requirements. Those who oppose open door policies (mainly government authorities, but also minority representatives of students, alumni and professors) argue for quotas and selective admission policies. Three main arguments (on academic, social, and economic grounds) were raised against the principle of open access to higher education which currently guides UBA admission policies. The academic argument stresses that the university is, by definition, an elitist institution based on excellence; hence, wide access, particularly in a time of financial scarcity, results in quality decline. As one marketventionist expressed it

> *The idea that the university should be at the service of the working class and open to everybody is obsolete and will never come back again. To achieve such aim there should be a level of economic development and tax collection that does not exist here yet and it is not going to exist for a long time (student, minority).*

Moreover, those opposed to the open door policy claim that the majority of students admitted who are not academically or emotionally prepared to undertake university education will drop out sooner or later. Therefore, an entrance examination will save both university resources and students' time. In the particular case of UBA, those who endorse this view implicitly or explicitly advanced three assumptions: a) UBA is experiencing a process of decline in quality, especially with respect to teaching; b) the reason of this decline is the massive enrollment resulting from open admission policies; and c) entrance examinations have predictive power about academic performance.

It is important to note that government authorities do not advocate quotas as a universal principle, but rather only for universities where the demand is greater than the capacity of to provide a good service. For them, UBA falls into this category. Particularly outspoken in the call for quotas was the dean of Medicine, who made recurrent public comments in this regard. For him, in Argentina everybody wants to be a doctor, but the university lacks the infrastructure and capacity to prepare all of them. In his view, the result is disaster: a large dropout rate (85%) and a low quality of training for those who graduate, which constitutes a betrayal of taxpayers and a risk to patients.

The social argument contends that open access does not work as a democratization tool because the process of social selection already has taken place in elementary and secondary education. The assumption here is that all students who aspire to enter university are a homogeneous well-off group, and that success or failure on an entrance examination is unrelated to SES. Finally, the economic argument states that the oversized university is producing educated unemployed on a massive scale, which results in both excessive competition among graduates, and an internal and external brain drain [48]. The underlying

assumption in this regard is that the university is producing more graduates than the capacity of the market to absorb them. In addition to government authorities and minority representatives (alumni, professors and students alike), some professional associations endorse the implementation of quotas to avoid an excess of professionals in the market.[49], especially in areas where graduate unemployment rates are high (i.e. Medicine, Dentistry, Architecture).

On the other hand, autonomists (mainly UBA authorities and majority representatives) advocate open door policies (ingreso directo). In response to the academic argument, UBA argues that capacity to provide quality service does not depend on enrollments, but rather on resources to respond to them. They reject the existence of a 'crisis of massive enrollments' that the government argues exists. In different documents and also in the interviews, university authorities and student leaders maintain that the argument that massive enrollment has affected quality lacks empirical evidence. Furthermore, they contend that there is ambiguity in the definition of what constitutes an adequate number of students (UBA 1991, Franja Morada 1991). In this regard, while government authorities use international examples to argue that universities must have selective admission policies ("the university is not for everybody"), university authorities also use international examples to demonstrate that UBA's enrollment is no larger than some European and American universities. UBA's Vice-President (Borón 1991:12), for instance, states that UBA is smaller than the Mexican UNAM, and has enrolments similar to those of the main European public universities (such as Paris, Rome, or Complutense of Madrid) and to the public university systems of California, Texas, New York and North Carolina.

In his view, the problem is not the number of students, but rather the low budget and the low expenditure per student, which are much lower than those of universities in developed countries and even in some Latin American countries [50]. In short, Boron's argument, shared by student leaders and university authorities in the interviews, is that quality decline stems not from massive enrolments, but rather from underfunding. Moreover, they dispute the alleged academic benefits of entrance examinations, arguing that there is no predictive test that guarantees academic success. In a concrete response to dean Ferreira, Franja Morada (1991) argues that the number of students currently graduating from the faculty of Medicine is below the mean of the last 40 years (1,180 graduates per year), lower than that during the years of the golden university and even much lower than the number of graduates during the years of the military dictatorship. Franja Morada also challenges Ferreira's argument about the low quality of graduates, contending that, in the exams for internships in hospitals, the performance of public university students was much higher than those of students attending private universities (a 67% and 36% success rate, respectively).

Although Franja Morada makes a case, it still does not destroy Ferreira's argument that large enrollments have a negative impact on the quality of graduates because it does not address the same issue. First, Franja Morada's contention that the number of graduates is not higher than in the past may indicate high drop out rates, but it does not contradict Ferreira. Ferreira's argument relates to the quality of service to students enrolled in the program, which is loosely related to the number of graduates. Second, the higher success rate on exams shows that, in the case of Medicine, public universities provide better training than private universities. But this may indicate the poor quality of teaching in private universities and not necessarily the high quality of public universities.

In response to the social argument, as was pointed out in relation to tuition fees in section two of this chapter, autonomists advocate the right of every high school graduate to access university studies, and claim that the majority of UBA students come from low and middle income groups. As was previously noted (see section 2, financing, footnote 10), this claim

is disputed by marketventionists, who argue, using different data or a different interpretation of the same data, that the majority of students belong to middle and upper income groups. Autonomists also contend that an entrance examination would discriminate against those who attended lower quality secondary schools and/or cannot afford private courses to prepare for the exam. Moreover, they defend the access to higher education as a right, in the sense that anybody who wants to study should be allowed to do so. This principle was raised not only by student leaders, but also by the majority of deans. Indeed, autonomists argue that entrance examinations are not designed to evaluate how much students know about the subjects, but rather to limit admission.

In this view, the necessary knowledge for the examination comes partly from personal merit, but also from the availability of financial resources to study in good secondary schools and to prepare for the exam, via tutors, institutes, etc. Since there is a differential access to knowledge depending upon economic factors, the exam eliminates the opportunity of disadvantaged groups, and contradicts one of the missions of university, which is to promote a just distribution of knowledge. Government authorities reject this argument, claiming that open admission policies do not improve accessibility. For them, while open access is supposed to promote democratization, it fails to do so, because the university is still overepresented by the middle and upper classes. Hence, the government claims that, in spite of the autonomists' claim that the university is a democratic institution, it is still very elitist. Yet, although government officials state that open access has failed as a democratization policy, they have no alternative policy to promote accessibility. For them, given that entrance examinations and open access have the same result in terms of accessibility, and that open access leads to high expenditures whereas entrance examinations enhance excellence and predict academic success, the clear option is to move towards entrance examinations.

In regard to the third argument, university authorities and student leaders argue that it is necessary to raise the average level of schooling, using as evidence that the proportion of the Argentine population with university degrees (2%) is lower than the proportion in developed countries and some Latin American countries such as Panama and Puerto Rico [51]. Although some autonomists accepted the government's premise that the university was graduating more people than the capacity of the market to absorb them, they claim that the root of the problem does not lie in the production of graduates, but in the incapacity of the national industry to create jobs. Unlike marketventionists, they do not prescribe quotas as a solution for this mismatch. On the contrary, they contend that the university should continue admitting as many students as possible, not only because education is a right, but also on social and economic grounds. The social rationale consists of keeping youth out of the streets, and the economic rationale consists of developing human resources for a possible economic recovery. These two rationales can be illustrated by the following quotations:

> *It is true that there are many people in this university who are going to drop out or, if they get to graduate, are going to be unemployed or underemployed. However, I still think that a massive university, even using the parking lot metaphor, is in part positive, because otherwise those youngster would be in the streets as robbers or drug abusers. We should not be derogatory about the parking lot role of university, because it is a social investment (Dean).*

> *The university must not be organized in order to adapt to a period of crisis... If a government adjusts the university in order to make it functional for a country suffering negative rates of investment and low rates of employment, it is narrow minded thinking. In a period of recession, there are two possible errors, alpha and beta. Error alpha is to develop an educational system congruent with a country in decay. The risk is that, if the country overcomes the crisis and the economy grows, it will lack the necessary human resources to undertake the new challenges. Error beta is to continue educating as always, ignoring the recession. The risk is that, if the economy remains stagnated, there will be an excess of qualified human resources with respects to the needs*

of the economy. If a choice between these two probable mistakes is required, it is preferable to take the risks of error beta than the risks of error alpha (professor).

This relationship between graduates and labor market was also addressed by several autonomists in regard to quotas, transforming an academic argument into an economic one. In fact, while for the government and the dean of Medicine quotas should be imposed when the demand is higher than the institutional capacity to provide a good service, it is the view of some deans and professors' representatives that quotas should be imposed only in the framework of a rational, central planning of human resources (i.e. proportion of physicians per inhabitants, distribution of professionals by region, etc.). In that context, they argue, quotas could be used to provide incentives and disincentives to certain professions, activities and careers.

These deans and professors do not share the dean of Medicine's premise that the smaller the enrolment the higher the quality, because this causal correlation underestimates the characteristics of the institution and the profile of the teachers. Moreover, autonomists claim that the press for quotas is not based on a surplus of graduates vis-a-vis national needs, but instead on the corporate interests of professional associations. In Medicine, for instance, using historical and international data, Franja Morada contends that a *numerus clausus* of 700 students (the number of incoming students demanded by Dean Ferreira) is arbitrary and irrational, both in terms of quality and physician/population ratio [52].

2. The institutional debate: the adequacy of CBC as an entrance mechanism

Once favored by an overwhelming support, at the time of the study the CBC was the target of growing disenchantment. Indeed, while in the abstract debate the majority of university actors were against both quotas and entrance examinations and presented a homogeneous common front against the government, the minority representatives and the only dean who advocates them, the appropriateness of CBC was highly questioned at the institutional level by autonomists and marketventionists alike. For instance, out of the 13 deans, only one defends the CBC as it is, three would like to see some improvements and the rest proposed drastic changes in terms of duration and jurisdiction. Overall, the only actors who unconditionally supported the CBC were the university authorities, and even at this level some Vice-Presidents expressed concern.

Criticisms leveled at the CBC can be organized in four categories: institutional, political, ideological and social. At the institutional level, the most widely shared concerns about the CBC are related to its size, duration and cost. To put it simply, the majority of interviewees pointed out that CBC is too large, too expensive, too long, and extremely inefficient, four capital sins in a period of financial constraint. They claim that, with its 60,000 students, it consumes considerable human and material resources which could be utilized in a different way. For them, the university cannot afford the luxury of having one third of its enrolment in an introductory course. They also contend that a one-year introductory course is too lengthy, and that it should be either shortened to a summer course or replaced by an examination. Issues of efficiency relate to its high drop out rate (around 50%), the long time used by students to complete it (sometimes up to six years), the low quality of the large teaching force, and the lack of basic facilities. In this regard, it was pointed out that the CBC is probably one of the few academic units in the world with no library.

At the political level, criticisms against CBC can be framed in the struggle that marketventionists were carrying against the central administration (Rectorado). Although deans who would like to see the control of admission policies transferred to individual faculties (roughly half of them) abstained from expressing political considerations in

relation to the CBC, alumni and student representatives of the minority were less diplomatic in this regard. Particularly outspoken was one alumni's representative for the minority:

> *Our organization was born with the specific purpose of killing the CBC, which is a monster invented by the Rectorado to concentrate more power... CBC limited the autonomy of the faculties. In the university statute it was pointed out that each academic unit will decide its own admission policy, but in 1985 that clause was eliminated, and therefore the autonomy of faculties was eliminated, with the purpose of granting more power to the Rectorado, which was able to distribute more positions to its friends... In the San Pedro meeting an attempt was made to transform the CBC into a faculty, but fortunately this idea did not succeed. The idea behind it was political, that is, to have more representation in the Superior Council, as they did before with the Faculty of Social Sciences... CBC produces conflicts everywhere, like recently in the Faculty of Medicine. However, in order to have the CBC disappear, Schuberoff must disappear first.*

In this view, the CBC is one more device to realize the political ambitions of the Rectorado through further expanding the power of the university bureaucracy and reducing the control of individual faculties over their own curricula. In this regard, critics of CBC argue that the main losers of the CBC have been the faculties, because the CBC took a year from all programs. They contend that, since it was decided that the CBC was equivalent to the first year of courses, all programs were obliged to compress and shrink their programs. None of the deans who would like to shift admission to faculties (roughly half of them) used the confrontational approach of minority representatives. Indeed, their arguments were not based on political grounds (the power accumulated by the central administration through the CBC), but on the pertinence of faculty's say in the profile of incoming students and in the content of first year courses.

Thirdly, ideological factors were also pointed out in the critique against CBC by a few minority representatives and the dean of Medicine, who made several public statements in this regard [53]. They complained specifically about one of the two compulsory courses (State and Society) [54] which was perceived as 'dogmatic indoctrination'. Finally, there is the social argument. Consistent with their position in the abstract discussion on open access vs. quotas, marketventionists claim that an introductory course like the CBC doesn't work as a democratization tool. For marketventionists, since exclusion mechanisms took place in earlier stages of the educational system, neither fees nor entrance examinations pose barriers to access. Furthermore, the argument that CBC does not help to equalize opportunities is supported by the existence of a multiplicity of private courses and tutors whose main activity is to help CBC students who can afford them to pass the exams.

On the other hand, autonomists (university authorities, most of the deans, and student representatives of the majority and the left) defend the concept underlying the CBC. However, as we will see later, most strongly stressed the urgent need for improvement. Arguments in favor of CBC revolved around four themes: upgrading for high school deficiencies, career reorientation, unification of individual faculties under a common institutional structure and democratic filter.

The most frequently-mentioned argument in support of the CBC is the lack of connection between the secondary school and the university, which calls for the need to upgrade the poor academic skills of secondary school students. Interestingly enough, when the pertinence of this function was beginning to be scrutinized by university actors, the Secretary of Higher Education -unlike other government representatives- defended it. Indeed, while some UBA authorities started to question whether it was the role of the university to compensate for the deficiencies of secondary schools, thus opening a debate on the subject, the high government official asserted that the university cannot elude that responsibility. However, he predicted that, as secondary education improves, the CBC will cease to exist.

The second argument in favor of preserving the CBC is that, given the traditional structure by faculties, students do not have the possibility of changing careers. Through the CBC, incoming students have the opportunity to undertake that change during the first year of university life. As a result of this enrollment redistribution some faculties (e.g. Engineering, Agriculture) lose students. Conversely, the faculty that gains the most students from career change during the CBC is Arts and Humanities [55].

In relation to the third issue, the CBC is perceived by autonomists, particularly by Rector Schuberoff and university authorities, as a common university space over the fragmentation represented by individual faculties. While marketventionists view this situation as an increasing centralization of power by Rectorado, autonomists contend that the CBC constitutes an instrument for unifying individual faculties, a tool for encouraging them to share their limited resources. In this regard they claim that, together with CEA, the CBC represents the first step towards departmentalization.

Finally, the fourth argument in favor of CBC is that it constitutes an effective and democratic mechanism for enhancing access to university, balancing the right of all citizens to higher education with the institutional capacity to provide quality service. Indeed, autonomists claim that the CBC represents a felicitous compromise between those advocating for quotas and entrance examinations, on the one hand, and those defending a direct entrance to university for all high school graduates, on the other. In this regard, they praise the CBC for its capacity to work as a buffer for the pressure of tens of thousands of incoming students without sacrificing the principle of open access.

Although this 'buffer' function is not openly acknowledged by autonomists, a number of them (two deans and one university authority) referred to it in the interviews. They admitted that the CBC is, like it or not, a selection mechanism. Even if it is the most democratic mechanism available of all the possible options, as they contend, in the end it is still a selection mechanism, and its virtues and defects should be analyzed in that light. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, while for marketventionists the high drop out rate is an evidence of the inefficiency of the system, and reformist students complain about it for its discriminatory implications, those deans and university authorities argue that, given the real objectives of CBC (to provide the most democratic filter possible), the fact that only 50% actually complete it can be seen as an indicator of efficiency.

In spite of their ardent advocacy for the CBC, most of those who defend it recognize that important changes are essential. In fact, although autonomists advanced at least one of these four arguments to defend the philosophy of the CBC, there was a consensus about the gap between the merit of the original idea and the shortcoming of its implementation. Even Franja Morada, a strong advocate of CBC, publicly recognized that "CBC is going through an extreme difficult situation. The chronic administrative disorder and the absence of an academic policy produce a situation that undermines the postulates that gave origin to it" [56]. Although Franja Morada is critical of the CBC, its leaders made it clear that they would never substitute it for entrance examinations. Whether or not Franja Morada represents students' views on the CBC is a matter of contention. While the government contends that, according to opinion polls, students are against the CBC, Franja Morada rebuts that, according to their surveys, 60% of the CBC students are in favor of CBC.

According to polls conducted, first-year students are generally against the CBC and in favor of entrance examinations. This evidence is used by the government to legitimate its calls for eliminating the CBC. Although student leaders reluctantly accept the government's argument, they contend that the sample is slanted, having only solicited opinions of first-year students. While government officials argue that these students are the most qualified to judge the CBC because they have already experienced it, student leaders and university

authorities contend that their judgment is biased by their vested interest. The fact that CBC students demand an open university but, upon graduation, demand a closed university, is explained by autonomists by the 'full bus theory'. This is basically a metaphor used to illustrate students' attitudinal change by comparing the university to a bus. The idea is that once students are inside the institution, they ask the driver to shut the door.

In any case, it was evident in the interviews that the large support the CBC received during the 1980s is vanishing during the 1990s. In 1983, in a context of democratic effervescence, the idea of a common introductory course was perceived by the university community (Peronists and Radicals alike) as a perfect solution to the accessibility dilemma. After 8 years of quotas imposed by the militaries, the only apparent choices were either to continue with the practice of entrance examinations, or to admit all who seek entrance without any type of restriction. However, a novel third option -the CBC- allowed UBA to matriculate the massive delayed demand without undermining the capacity of individual faculties to respond to it. "At that time" - recounted a professor's representative- "we developed what we thought was the best possible system". Although introductory courses had existed before, the difference between the CBC and previous introductory courses was that, under the new modality, once students enroll in the CBC they become automatically part of the university (prior to that they were not considered UBA's students until they passed the course).

Nevertheless, although for several years the CBC worked as an effective entrance mechanism, over time a multiplicity of problems have arisen out of its inability to meet the needs of myriad students with very low quality secondary education. Even some autonomists admitted that the original intention was perverted when the system became too massive, because it precipitated the need to open new facilities and to hire an army of low paid, low quality professors. In the words of one dean who used to support it, "the CBC is a good filter, but it's too expensive".

As a consequence of the internal problems of the CBC and increasing financial constraints, a more viable arrangement between the impossibility of direct access and the unpopularity of entrance examinations was beginning to be discussed. Among the possible options available, the majority favored a shorter course (i.e. summer course), with more power delegated to individual faculties in management and program delivery. While only two deans favor entrance examinations, the majority of them would like to have more control over the CBC. Indeed, although most deans and student representatives strongly disagreed with the procedures used by the dean of Medicine to transfer the control of the CBC to its Faculty, approximately half of them support the idea of a shorter course -and sometimes even an entrance examination- managed by each Faculty. Although the majority agreed with the original purpose of the CBC, they pointed out that it became too expensive, massive and chaotic. Excerpts from four deans provide a sample of their views:

> *The CBC constitutes a noble idea, and its outcome is not bad but neither is it very good. However, if the survival of the university is at risk, one starts to look around in order to chose the next victim (Dean).*
>
> *We should be able to develop a cheaper selection mechanism. The CBC equalizes student admission, but at the price of general mediocrity, and that's not the mission of the university. The function of the university is excellence, and excellence has disparity (Dean).*
>
> *I support the idea of a short course, managed by each faculty, and a rigorous selection process based on the performance during the course and an examination. There should be no quotas. If it were necessary, the university can accommodate its teachers to provide service to more students (Dean).*

We must be able to undertake this selection task in a shorter period of time and at a lower cost. The CBC should not be allowed to teach the courses of the first year of the career. Instead, the CBC should be shortened, while the career oriented courses should be left to each faculty (Dean).

In summary, hard core autonomists defend the open admission policies and the CBC, while hard marketventionists believe in entrance examinations and quotas. In between them, soft marketventionists perceive the CBC as extremely long and expensive, but do not endorse proposals for entrance examinations. As a compromise, they suggest a shorter course (e.g. three months, during the summer period) which, according to many of them, would not have any significant negative impact on accessibility. At the same time, these soft marketventionists agree with the hard marketventionists' contention that the CBC is using resources that could be allocated to the faculties. This is particularly clear in the case of most deans, who would like to have more control over admission.

Although soft marketventionists may agree with some of the academic, political and ideological criticisms of the CBC raised by hard marketventionists, and may admit that the social benefits of the CBC are at least disputable, they contend that it is a good buffer to cool down the pressure. In the end, they claim, the CBC and the exam produce the same result, because only 50% of aspirants access the 'real' first year of university. Additional advantages of the CBC are the promotion of a certain degree of equalization, keeping youth off the streets and fostering departmental structures. Simultaneously, the fact that UBA has 60,000 additional students gives it a supplementary bargaining power in the political and financial conflict with the government. The questions are how much is the university community willing to pay for this alternative, and what are the strategies carried out by the government to reduce the number of aspirants to UBA. The answers to these questions lie in the availability of financial resources and in the creation of new universities in the area of influence of UBA, and in both cases the government has the upper hand.

Section 6. Research & Development

This is another area in which conflicts are expressed and different social projects are reflected. Various issues were discussed in relation to the purpose of research in a developing country such as Argentina. The first has to do with the role of the state and of the national industry in R&D. The second is the relation between university and state in terms of research, which in this particular case refers to the relation between UBACYT and CONICET. A third issue pertains to the relation between university and industry. Although research is not yet the essential component of this relation, it is becoming increasingly important, and becoming a matter of hopes and concerns. Finally, a fourth issue is the organizational aspect of research, which includes aspects related to graduate studies and UBATEC.

1. Research and national development: the role of the state and industry

The great majority of the interviewees agreed that research is a key factor in economic development. In this regard, one dean claimed that the fundamental answers to Argentina's problems are related to research, and not to machines or seeds. However, the question is who is going to fund such research, and why. Within the university, autonomists claim that, since Argentinean industry has been unable or unwilling to make its contribution, research must be funded primarily by the state. In contrast, marketventionists and all those who would define themselves as 'pragmatists' (regardless of their ideological affinity) argue that it is time to realize that the subsidiary state is over, and therefore that the university can only expect very limited contributions from it.

According to autonomists, representatives of the large industry and the land oligarchy are either indifferent to R&D or against the state funding of those activities. As pointed out in section 2, large industry representatives believe that technology import is more advantageous than knowledge creation and propose the partial or total privatization of public universities [57], a recommendation that has been also advanced by the World Bank (1993:91). Furthermore, heeding another advice of the World Bank (1993:xxi), the government attempted to privatize the national research system (CONICET), but the vigorous reaction of the academic international community scuttled the initiative. Particularly important in this opposition was a letter submitted by Frank Press, the President of the US Academy of Sciences, to President Menem (with a copy to the American Ambassador in Argentina). Published in Argentinean newspapers [58], this letter cautions him about the negative consequences of such a decision for the future development of Argentinean society.

The small and medium enterprise, unlike the large industry, is not interested in university privatization. On the contrary, they demand strong state support for universities, which in turn should assist local industry with technology and training. In the words of a representative from the small and medium enterprise:

> *The free interplay of demand and supply, without establishing priorities and systems, cannot generate international competitiveness. Local businesspeople alone cannot compete at the international level. It is the society at large that must develop strength in certain areas of comparative advantages, and the university must support those efforts. The key issue is productivity, but not at the expense of low salaries, but because of incorporation of talent. The small and medium enterprises play an important role in this process, but they need support in the form of technology, training and financial resources, and the first two depend in great deal from the university.*

Hence, this representative rejected a laissez faire approach, and ardently defended state interventionism in certain areas:

> *I don't believe in conspiracies, but I do think that there are some interests that push toward particular directions, setting trends. All these new theories about privatization, deregulation, deburocratization, eradication of corruption, elimination of white elephants, etc. that are inspiring current policies have been developed abroad. Some of them are indeed necessary, but the risk is to excessively limit the role of the state in the formulation and implementation of national policies promoting growth and equity, as well as in encouraging local business and the scientific-technological role of the university.*

In this statement, the interests of small-scale industry appear to be different from those of large industry and financial capital. Indeed, this representative admitted that the destiny of the small and medium enterprises largely depends on the national destiny, and therefore a national project of development is a key element in their survival. Obviously, the wounds of the late 1970s, when a military government opened the economy and massive imports practically dismantled local industry, are still fresh. Unlike MNCs and to some extent large industry, the small-scale enterprise is against a small and weak state: it needs the state (i.e. protectionist policies, subsidies, support to applied research, etc.) to survive; likewise, its interest in equity seems to be related to its reliance on internal markets.

In any case, neither small nor large scale industries are known for their support of local R&D activities. On this point, a student leader suggested that "in the dependent capitalist model, knowledge and education are secondary variables, or even worse, they are perceived as superfluous resources". For this leader, knowledge is important in central capitalism, where technology plays a central role. The low demand for research in Argentina can be illustrated by the case of one factory which, after 100 years of producing

beer, has opened a new plant in which all the technology is imported. With the exception of a few niches for some small and medium industries in certain areas, and some research projects sponsored by MNCs (who in general conduct research in their mother countries) there is little industrial demand for research. One dean of a technological faculty attributed this situation to the attitude of businesspeople:

> *In Argentina industry is totally dependent; development of national technology is nonexistent. The national industry prefers to import technology; in order to produce national technology, they need to invest and take risks, and they are not willing to do so.*

Although unwillingness to take risks may be a factor, it is also true that this reliance on technology import is also due to structural constraints that favor 'stock, lock and barrel' type of industries. Overall, Argentinean industry has very low aggregated value because it is still based on commodities such as gas, oil and the like. This means low employment, low national technology, etc., and implies that these industries do not demand much research. In spite of the low industrial demand, university authorities sustained the importance of research. However, they qualified their support by stating that all research should be part of a research policy, and this can only be formulated in the framework of a development model that takes into account comparative advantages rather than merely as part of an adjustment model in which there are neither direction nor priorities. For them, Argentina should look at the type of scientific and technological development occurring in the rest of the world as well as its application to the productive sector, and then act accordingly.

At the time of the study, former large industries such as metal-mechanic and electronic were experiencing an unceasing decline, high tech industries had not been created, and Argentina was once again becoming the agro-export country that it was during the last century. However, this did not discourage university authorities. Even in the worst case scenario of long-term stagnation, recession and technological regression to primary production, they proclaimed that scientific research is still necessary to improve productivity and to develop certain transformation processes in order to compete internationally. The small industry representative agreed that a national development project is of the essence in order to concentrate R&D efforts and resources in those areas in which the country has dynamic advantages, but he did not think it is necessary to wait until the government defines such a project. In the meanwhile, he suggested, university and business can germinate a strategy of mutual support. Sooner or later, he argues, the different sectors (i.e. university, business, state, finance) must begin to formulate their own proposals and to articulate them in a dynamic way:

> *The financial sector is afraid of lending money, the university distrusts business and viceversa, the state does not formulate clear rules of the game, etc. Each one alone is incapable of doing anything. Their association in a systemic context must be encouraged. Efforts should not be conducted to help isolated individuals (as it is the case of UBATEC) or just to show off five exemplary projects of university-business linkage, but to establish systemic relationships for the long run.*

This argument reinforces Pérez Lindo's hypothesis that one of the main inhibitors of development in Argentina is the insufficient interaction among social actors. The other argument raised by Pérez Lindo (the RK factor, or the generalized rejection of knowledge by the economic and political leadership) has been recurrently mentioned by university actors, as a criticism of the lack of long-term vision of the Argentinean elites. Conversely, industry and government representatives claim that the scientific system, and especially the university, has very little to offer. In order to analyze this issue, it will be useful to describe actors' views regarding the relationship between the university and the state, on the one hand, and the university and industry, on the other, in relation to R&D.

2. The state-university relation in relation to research

In terms of R&D, the state-university relationship is one of mutual distrust. On the one hand, the government argues that most of the research conducted in universities is inefficient and irrelevant for the current Argentine context. Indeed, marketventionists contend that university people are elitists, dissociated from the productive apparatus, without making any attempt to approach it, and that many research projects do not deliver results on schedule. The plan of the government, according to their own functionaries, is to have a stronger say in university research ('specializing' universities according to regional demands) and to promote the generation of alternative sources of revenue. Conversely, autonomists accuse the government of being short-sighted, claiming that the university research agenda should be developed mainly by the scientific community, out of a fear that government intervention will have negative repercussions for university autonomy. They argue that politicians, who are mainly professionals such as lawyers and economists, ignore the importance of research -particularly basic research- for national development.

One expression of the state-university conflict in terms of science and technology is the tense relationship between CONICET and UBACYT, which are the government and UBA agencies in charge of research, respectively. The former has been autonomous from the university since the Onganía regime (which took power in 1966 through a military coup). According to autonomists, this separation resulted from military's distrust of university activities. Whatever the reason, the 1966 intervention impelled researchers to leave the university for research centers and institutes funded by CONICET or foundations, leading to a separation between researchers and the university.

Since 1966, events have shown that the quality of communication between the government and the university scientific apparatuses is a function of the quality of communication between the government and the university. For instance, after the 1976 military coup the proportion of the public budget allocated to research decreased from 28% to 8%, whereas the Conycet budget increased from 20% to 40%. Although some approaches between CONICET and UBA have taken place since then, political antagonism continued during both Radical and Peronist regimes. Even during the Radical government, practically all research policy was in the hands of CONICET. For university authorities, the scientific community did not oppose the strengthening of CONICET at the expense of the university because that institution has generated a hierarchical structure that gave power to the scientific corporation, without the problems of working within the university environment.

Since the creation of UBACYT in the late 1980s, the university has recovered part of its previous influence in determining its own research policy, but the problem has been the development of a dual research system (the CONICET system and the university system). While the current lack of a coherent national research system is partly an inheritance of that past, university authorities reproach the government (particularly the Secretary of Science) for this absence. For them, the problem originated in the fact that this Secretary has minimal links with universities and shows favoritism towards CONICET. They explain the government's preferential treatment to CONICET on the grounds that the Menemist regime, like previous military rulers, distrusts university activities.

They also complain that CONICET manages its affairs autonomously, without establishing communications with the university, and that the lack of information and common policies create a chaotic dual system. As an illustration of the perversions derived from the lack of common policies, university authorities recalled situations in which a researcher who belongs to two institutions asked both institutions for a computer, and obtained two computers. Although university authorities admit that CONICET provides resources to some people in universities, they contend that it never considered the university as an

institution. They contend that CONICET never set a research policy, and that university research groups must compete for resources in a confused context of "laissez-faire". The criticism is that CONICET has been unable to go beyond peer judgment to allocate resources. One Vice-President said in this regard that CONICET

> *still works like the developed countries in the 1950s, when project approvals were contingent only upon peer reviews, without incorporating strategic research in function of socio-economic goals. UBA, instead, undertook diagnosis by sectors. The university must develop its own research priorities, alone or together with specific state agencies.*

Autonomists also accuse CONICET (not only in private, but also in the local media) of being managed by right wing elements linked to the most conservative sectors of the church and even to the militaries. They argue that government's low support for research is not coincidental, but rather a pre-established agenda to deepen technological dependency. As one of them stated, "the government, aligned with the USA, has no interest in knowledge creation, but in its import". Although autonomists in general are very open to establish research contracts with industry, they strongly stress the indeclinable role of the state in basic research. They also contend that universities must contribute to national development producing technology, research on products with higher aggregate value, and strategies for engaging in the international market from a less disadvantaged position. As a reformist student leader summarized this position, "if research is not directed to create an autonomous model of development, we are wasting our time".

3. The university- industry relationship in relation to research

As was previously advanced, the university-industry relationship is characterized by minimal interaction, partly due to mutual distrust, but also due to the low demand for research on the part of industry and the limited offer (or the incapacity to publicize its offer) on the part of the university. The partnership is still based on advisories, training, graduate courses and technical services (quality control, specialized analyses, etc.), with very few R&D contracts. Most university actors, particularly those from the scientific areas, expressed that, from an academic perspective, this situation is far from ideal. University authorities shared this concern and, since the creation of UBATEC, have started to implement research projects linked to production and technology transfer.

Autonomists tend to criticize industrialists for their lack of understanding of the benefits that research can provide them, for importing obsolete technology (instead of joining efforts with the university to create it) and for their suspicion of university activities. Autonomists claim that they have already overcome their distrust of the private sector (using as evidence that subsidies from the private sector, repudiated during the seventies, are currently endorsed by the academic community), but the private sector has yet to overcome its distrust of universities. Marketventionists, particularly government officials, disagree, contending that the university community is the one that suspects business. However, a small group of actors on both sides recognized that disbelieves and stereotypes are mutual. As one dean put it, "university people are perceived as guerrilla fighters, whereas business people are perceived as being intrinsically perverse".

These actors recognized that such distrust is quickly vanishing, particularly since the creation of UBATEC and the implementation of clear rules of the game between the academic and the business world. In this regard, university authorities identified a change of attitude among some industrialists who are increasingly approaching the university. The representative of small industry also recognized the attitudinal change on the part of the university community, but he still has concerns about rules of the game, particularly in relation to the confidentiality of research results:

The university distrusts businesspeople. There is a stereotypical image of businesspeople. It is not well looked upon if research is done for someone, because such research will benefit somebody in particular, while it is claimed that research findings should be open to everybody. That perception is changing, and new rules are emerging in order to increase mutual trust and to acknowledge the importance of the other, although this has seldom been translated into practice. I can only think of very few concrete cases. There is the problem of secrecy. As an industrialist, I want that the research I sponsor to be secret, and only I should have access to it; however, I don't trust that the university is not going to provide the same information to other people. In this matter existing agreements and contracts are very ambiguous.

From both a critical and uncritical perspective, most interviewees agree that university research must serve industry. Marketventionists were often uncritical of these links. For instance, a marketventionist dean stated that

In [this faculty] *we started the relationship with private enterprises in 1989, with extraordinary results. That's the only way to conduct research.*

Although autonomists were usually more critical, all of them -even the more orthodox ones- were convinced that in the near future the relationship with the private sector is going to increase. However, although all autonomists agreed that the trend is inevitable, they were divided about its desirability. Indeed, three positions about this issue were found among autonomists. First, a small minority argued that this relationship fulfills a university mandate, and therefore should be pursued. This position can be illustrated by the pronouncement of one Vice-President, who proclaimed that "the university must work with industry because it is one of its functions [59], as it is a function to collaborate with the community."

Another small minority is strongly opposed to these links, arguing that this initiative should be read in the context of government's scheme to dismantle the public university. For this group, the emergence of private sources of revenue will result in state withdrawal from financing research, and in aligning the university with business needs. In the words of a student leader, "the strategy of the government is to finance universities through direct contracts with corporations, using as a mask a technocratic and participatory rhetoric which revolves around linking education with production and opening universities to the community". The third group, which constitutes the prevailing view among autonomists, had some reservations about the relationship with the private sector but accepted it as a 'necessary evil'. While they do not perceive this trend as the most desirable route to follow, they believe that it is inevitable. As one Vice-President stated, "the linkage with industry must be implemented regardless of our willingness to engage in such relationship. We have no alternative".

Contrary to the apprehensions of government officials, most student leaders shared this attitude. Indeed, while a top government official claimed that "students still insist on the rebellious discourse, and it is not possible to invite businesspeople to invest money in the university, while at the same time insulting them", the discourse of most autonomist student leaders suggests that this skepticism is unfounded. These students argued that, in the context of falling revenues, contracts with industries are an inescapable route to follow. One of them, for instance, admitted that "as far as we live in a capitalist system, we need to accept the market logic" and that "the relationship with the private sector is a general trend that we cannot escape". Other student leader perceives the link with industry as the only way to solve a temporary crisis. In his words, "research cannot be interrupted; if the only way to continue doing research is through the private enterprise, we welcome them, but at some point we will need to talk about the necessary conditions to ensure that the university community and society at large benefit from research activities".

Since the accumulated experience of the University of Buenos Aires with industry-funded research is still scarce, reservations like the ones expressed by this student or potential problems like the ones described in chapter 2, were not a matter of concern for most university actors. Indeed, very little discussion took place in relation to the best mechanisms to avoid the occurrence of those problems in the first place, or to achieve a solution once they arise. However, there were some actors who advanced some concerns and suggestions in this regard.

The first concern relates to a potential conflict between the public and the private interest. In this regard, a student leader argued that extension programs and links with the public sector (i.e. health, education) should have a priority over links with the private sector. He stated that the link with the private sector is important, but the link with society is more important:

> *In order to defend itself, the university needs to generate public support, and this implies that the university must open itself to the community, must inform about its usefulness and relevance, and must inform how knowledge production can result in a social benefit. This is important, because the government, for political purposes, portrays an image of an 'ivory tower' university, as a luxurious space funded by taxpayers who do not get any benefit in return.*

It is not clear in this statement how the 'social benefit' of research is going to be compromised with the need for confidentiality demanded by industrialists. In the same vein, a Vice-President argued that "the university must help industries to increase their profits, but at the same time it must protect the community from the pollution generated by that industry". Although at an abstract level the university should be able to protect both the private and the private interest, it is not clear what is it going to occur in the concrete case of a collision between them. As was discussed in chapter 2, the literature shows that such situations put researchers in an uncomfortable position. This circumstance was recognized by one dean:

> *I acknowledge that conflicts of interests may arise. In fact, the international experience indicates that, in a situation of conflict of interest, business wins, because researchers will keep their loyalties to those who pay more.*

A second concern -expressed by some university authorities, but mainly by student leaders- is that the private sector is going to profit from the research capabilities of the university without giving much in exchange. According to this view, if strict guidelines are not developed industry is going to take advantage of university's research capacities.

> *I am concerned that in the context of the present drive towards the private sector, which is just a fashion, the university concedes too many spaces and does not put forward its own conditions to the private sector, allowing the latter to take advantage of a public institution and a huge amount of human and technological resources that were accumulated throughout decades, obtaining very little in exchange. It is necessary to develop a more strict policy, increasing the control over research projects and other agreements with the private sector* (student leader, minority).

> *I am not against linking the university with the private sector, but there are different models for linking the public and the private sectors. One example of the consequences of the lack of strict policies is the use of our faculty of Medicine's facilities by the Universidad del Salvador* [a private university] (student leader, majority).

> *I see a risk in the link with industry, because knowledge is an indispensable tool for power in modern society, and the question is who is the owner of the research outcomes. In our model, research products will be owned by the university, while industry will have certain rights for commercialization* (student leader, majority)

We have a positive attitude, but we are conscious that there is a risk of becoming subordinated to private interests (Vice-President).

Likewise, one dean expressed concerned about the risk that the university will be used as a source of cheap manpower by the private sector or even by the state. Several actors suggested that, to avoid this situation, a control mechanism for all agreements between the university and external actors implemented outside UBATEC (be it industry or the state) should be developed. A recurrent proposal in this regard was that a specific university agency, such as the Secretary of Science and Technology, ensure that the norms and regulations established for each particular case (in terms of overhead, equipment purchasing, copyrights, etc.) are respected by both parties.

A third concern related to the difficulties that may emerge as a result of university-industry competition. One dean suggested that, to avoid discord, technology transfer should be developed only in areas where the private sector is not actively involved; otherwise, this dean cautions, industrial corporations may create serious problems for the university. According to this hypothesis, since universities tend to charge much less than the market for its research activities, the private sector would probably complain about unfair competition.

A fourth preoccupation was that, in the rush for cash, the university would concentrate on research, diminishing the efforts devoted to teaching. One dean expressed this worry by pointing out a case in which this situation has already materialized:

I have recently been in Berkeley, and there they are not paying enough attention to teaching, because university authorities encourage only those activities that bring money, therefore promoting research at the expense of teaching. It is inappropriate to be concerned about making money out of this, because this is a faculty, and not a business or an enterprise. I think that a good service to the community is to produce qualified human resources.

A fifth concern was that the increasing reliance on private funds for research purposes is benefiting certain disciplines and research topics, which in the long run has the potential of creating first-class and second-class faculties. The main complaints in this regard were formulated by representatives from the social sciences, who argue that the new model has no place for critical analysis:

In the hegemonic project, research is confined to those areas with the highest profitability in the present economic restructuring model, such as telecommunications, petrochemicals, pharmaceutics or biotechnology. The strongest incentives to research from the private sector are related to these areas. In regards to social sciences, only few things are of their interest, and they are related to the idea of transforming the social sciences into a marketing mechanism for political or economic purposes, with an emphasis on quantitative analysis and empiricism. The game theories, so well developed in the USA are precisely one of these new forms and mechanisms of social control; they are a strategy to quantify, with disputable methods, social behaviors and trends (student leader).

If we analyze contracts between the university and the private sector by faculties, we'll find out that two or three faculties (Pharmacy, Economics and Medicine) concentrate 75% of the contracts, whereas other faculties such as Humanities or Social Sciences have almost no possibilities (student leader).

It is assumed that us, in the social sciences, the only thing we do is to criticize, hence they don't support us. The critical spirit is not promoted by industry. Although society has resources, investment in the university has been stagnant for many decades (professor).

To some extent, the critical spirit is not promoted by the government either. Indeed, as was described in chapter 5, several government officials condemned the social sciences for their low capacity to contribute to social and economic development. The concern that industry

tends to favor some faculties was also present in the scientific disciplines. For instance, sometimes the interest of the private source is not mainly in research results but rather in promotion:

> *We do not undertake much applied research and technology transfer, because the private laboratories prefer to give contract to the Faculty of Medicine, mainly for image purposes. In fact, in terms of advertisement and public image, it is more fruitful for a private lab to invest in Medicine than in Dentistry (Dean).*

A sixth concern about industry-sponsored research is that the university and industry operate under a different logic. In addition to the contradiction between the logic of secrecy and the logic of free flow of information already mentioned by both university and industry representatives, a similr contradiction exists between the logic of academic prestige and that of practicality. In this regard, one vice-president agreed with the representative of industry (see chapter 5) that the logic and interests of researchers and industry are not always the same:

> *The scientist is oriented to the international scientific research, and not to solving problems of industry, because the latter does not provides much benefits in terms of academic and scientific prestige. Unfortunately, the demands of local industry are still very limited, and in general do not encourage great scientific challenges. At the most they may request some adaptations, or process control, or product quality control.*

However, most university actors noticed that, due to the current crisis, there is a profound change of attitude among researchers: many are willing to do 'practical' research with the condition that they can still undertake scientific projects. Another vice-president also pointed out that the logic of business sometimes contradicts the logic of education, citing as an example that the faculty of Medicine was going to rent expensive equipment for diagnostic analysis, but the private company who owns the equipment established as a condition that it should not be used by students.

Finally, an additional apprehension relates tc the autonomy of academics to develop their own research agenda. Many actors from the scientific disciplines fear the subordination of academic and scientific research priorities to the needs of the private sector, and they stress that the producer of knowledge, that is, the researcher, should have the ultimate power to determine the research agenda. Although almost everybody stated that research contracts with industry should be encouraged, some autonomists cautioned that "if we engage in those linkages, the university must avoid its research agenda being determined by the market". Most of the interviewees who referred to this potential situation expressed the need to maintain a balance between basic and applied research. One dean summarized this situation in the following way:

> *In Europe there is currently a boom in the industry-university relation, because the industrial and business communities finally realized that universities can offer high quality services to them. If Argentina recovers from its actual crisis and enjoys an industrial reactivation, we may provide a great variety of services. The risk is that the research team devotes more time and energy to these contracts than to its own research projects. My idea is that researchers should devote no more than 25% of their time to research contracts with industry. Otherwise there is a danger of downgrading, or even abandoning, basic research. People in the industrial and business community should realize the importance of basic research. Nobody knows when basic research is going to move to applied research. However, it is my impression that our business and industrial sectors are not mature enough to realize it. Therefore, the university must approach them.*

For this dean, an overemphasis on applied research is as detrimental as conducting applied research on topics lacking scientific relevance, such as health problems related to poverty:

We don't think it's good for this faculty to have low quality researchers conducting mostly applied research, even if that generates lots of money. Likewise, we don't think that makes much sense, from a scientific perspective, to conduct research on cholera or chagas, because everybody knows that those diseases can be prevented in the social area. There is nothing to research there.

The risk of condemning basic research to obliteration was mentioned by several actors, mainly those from the scientific disciplines and the humanities. The main argument is that the Argentinean industry is shortsighted, unable to see the link between basic and applied research. The most recurrent example of the applications of basic sciences was biotechnology, which, as many actors pointed out, "started from basic sciences and now the large enterprises are making great profits". Ironically, while this example was used to demand more societal interest in basic research, in the case of biotechnology the dynamic originated in the supply, not in the demand. In the beginning, the move from basic to applied research started with academics who wanted to try their luck as entrepreneurs, and formed university companies. With a few exceptions, most university actors agreed that research projects should respond to social and economic demands, but the university should not abdicate basic research. The consensus was that as long as industry is interested in short-term results, basic research must be supported by the state.

A related concern in this regard was that, as the university increases its revenues from industry-oriented research, the government will decrease its research funding in the same proportion. In practice, this would mean an abandonment of basic research at the expense of applied research. Some actors suggested that the ideal situation would be the division of labor implemented in Japan, where the university develops only basic research while R&D is conducted by industry. However, since the local industry is still unable to carry out research, there is a consensus that, in Argentina, both should be undertaken by university groups. However, according to these actors, applied research should be developed in close relation with industry, while basic research must be developed in the inner circles of university.

In order to avoid some of the above-mentioned risks, it was suggested that all demands from external actors, be they industry, government, community groups, etc., should be mediated by the scientific community who should be responsible for finding a middle ground between principles and needs. It was also recommended that professors should not spend all their time in applied research; although technology transfer activities were regarded as very relevant, it was stated that professors should have enough time to conduct their own work. Since this requires financial resources, some actors proposed that a portion of the revenues obtained through contracts with business should be directed to a common fund for basic research, either ignoring the reality that this mechanism is already in place, or assuming that significant research is contracted outside UBATEC [60].

4. Institutional structure for research

There were three main problems discussed in terms of the institutional context of research activities: the low number of full-time professors, the low quality of research, and the lack of relationship between research and teaching, particularly in graduate studies.

In relation to the first problem, UBA still remains a Napoleonic university, with 75% of enrollments in three professional careers (Medicine, Law and Economics), an emphasis on undergraduate studies and a huge army of part-time academic staff who spend most of their time in their professional activities and go to the university only to teach their class. The low number of full-time professors (approximately 2,000, which represents less than 10% of the total academic staff, and indicates the lack of a scientific tradition in the university as

a whole) was a shared concern among university authorities, and even a matter of discussion at the GFC. In one of these meetings, one vice-president pointed out that, since 80% of alumni are professionals who have not been trained to constantly update their knowledge, they do not understand the relevance of research.

The second problem (low quality of research) was not shared by as many people as the previous one, but very few were willing to claim in the interviews that research conducted at UBA was of very high quality. In general, marketventionists (Government officials and university actors alike) tended to criticize the low quality of research:

> *It is said that we conduct research, but that is not true. Those who conduct real research, already left the university and probably left the country too. There is too much bureaucracy to request resources for research. There are too many lies and too little control* (student leader, minority).

While in the public discourse autonomists (mainly university authorities) proudly exhibit the large amount of research conducted in UBA and proclaim the high quality of such research, in private they were more cautious about stating a definite opinion in this regard. One of the concerns expressed by many actors is precisely that quantity does not necessarily imply quality. As the industry representative said

> *In Argentina, we can't give few resources to everybody, and at the same time demand excellence. Given the very small budget allocated to research, we need to be selective. In this context we need to concentrate efforts and resources in some areas; otherwise we would be reducing excellence everywhere. Some people say that we need to invest in everything, and that from the mass some genius will emerge. I think that is not enough. We need to concentrate efforts in strategic areas.*

This approach seems to be increasingly accepted by university authorities. As was mentioned in chapter 4, UBA receives approximately 800 applications for research funding every year, and finances an average of 500 projects. In addition to this, there are also research projects funded by other sources such as CONICET. In private, some university authorities agreed with the opinion of the industrialist quoted above that the university promotes a huge amount of small projects and that this eventually undermines their impact. In fact, the Vice-President of Science and Technology recognized that the average funding for operational costs per project ($2000 per year) was a symbolic amount, and that the new policy to be adopted as of 1992 was to fund fewer but more ambitious projects, raising the average funding to $10,000 per year. In the new system, the criteria to select these fewer projects were going to be based on a wider framework of five socio-economic goals and 11 thematic areas [61]. As one university authority said, "we are now undertaking a change: we are setting priorities, developing research programs according to each priority, and emphasizing technology transfer".

Finally, the third organizational problem was that these projects, and research in general, are not linked to graduate programs. The lack of relationship between research and teaching was a matter of concern for many actors, especially autonomists. Among marketventionists, there were three main criticisms of graduate studies. The first one condemns UBA for its lack of interest in research. In this view, if UBA were really serious about research, they would have closed the CBC a long time ago and transferred tho· resources to research. The second criticism, which to some extent contradicts the first one, is that graduate studies have an exaggerated emphasis on research, with little attention paid to updating alumni in their professional fields:

> *I propose a permanent updating of diplomas, which must promote a continuing reeducation of professionals. Overall, graduate programs must emphasize professional development and retraining, not research. Graduate programs should aim at improving professional performance (government authority).*

The third criticism contends that the Center for Advanced Studies is just a means of Rectorado to increase its power:

> *CEA [62] is just an ivory tower used by the central administration (Rectorado) to give jobs to friends. It constitutes a perverse system, because it does not link research conducted there with the activities undertaken by the different faculties (Dean).*

This attack against CEA represents another manifestation (in addition to CBC and UBATEC) of the internal struggle between faculties and the central administration. Indeed, UBATEC has also been criticized by marketventionists for being another instrument of the central administration for reducing the power of individual faculties:

> *UBATEC is full of obstacles, and only contributes with 5% to the university budget through selling services to the private sector. The proportion from this source should be increased to 45%, which is the average of European universities. The problem is that the private sector distrusts the university. The sale of services should be reformulated. UBATEC has a state-oriented and bureaucratic profile. It is controlled by the Rectorado, and not by the Faculties. The sale of services, and technology transfer, should be implemented via faculties* (student leader, minority).

Similar to the case of the CBC, UBATEC was also accused of administrative corruption by marketventionists. But when they were asked to provide any evidence in this regard, they complained that UBATEC is not accountable to the GFC, particularly in reference to finances, and therefore it is impossible for the university community to scrutinize its operations. Moreover, as was pointed out in chapter 4, marketventionists linked to professional associations (i.e. alumni) contend that UBATEC is taking jobs away from the professionals who have graduated from the university, which in their view constitutes unfair competition. These marketventionists demand that UBATEC engages only in areas where the private market does not operate or cannot offer services, particularly in high level research activities that require laboratories.

This type of demands were probably in the mind of the above mentioned dean who suggested that the university should abstain from competing with the private sector in order to avoid potential conflicts. Autonomists, in turn, accuse marketventionists of hypocrisy. They contend that, because of the government cutbacks, the university is making a great effort to rationalize, adjust, and look for alternative sources, three policies strongly advocated by marketventionists. However, autonomists claim that these same marketventionists, paradoxically, don't want the university to compete with the private sector in the market. In general terms, autonomists were strong advocates of UBATEC; however, actors from the scientific disciplines expressed a concern about the emphasis placed on applied research.

In conclusion, research constitutes another area in which the conflicts pointed out in previous sections are readily observable. On the one hand, autonomists complain about the state's lack of understanding of research activities, which for them is evident in the lack of a research system and in the incompetence of CONICET, also accused of ideological conservatism. The traditional reformist rejection of the private sector is weakening, and a new era of university-industry collaboration is beginning to take place. However, this partnership is still focused on activities other than research. On the other hand, marketventionists contend that the research undertaken by UBA is irrelevant and of low quality. They tend to believe that relevant research is equivalent to applied research, and that graduate studies should emphasize professional development rather than teaching. Some criticize the minimal relationship between research and teaching, a charge that is accepted by most autonomists. For university-based marketventionists, research constitutes another front to attack the central administration. The main targets in this regard were CEA and UBATEC, which are perceived as political tools of the Rectorado.

Section 7. The role of the state

As was discussed in the first section, the pressure for university change largely originated in the state apparatus and thus only to a limited extent in internal forces within the university. The type of changes promoted by the state relate not only to specific university policies on a variety of issues (i.e. financing, admission, personnel, etc.), but also -and perhaps fundamentally- to the new role of the state in higher education decision-making and thus to the redefinition of the state-university relationship. This section deals precisely with these two areas. The first part describes the discussion on the higher education macro-policies promoted by the government and the alleged rationales behind them. The second part recounts the different opinions that exist on a key higher education issue: the implementation of new rules of the game in the relationship between university and state. This has prompted a passionate debate in which government's pressure for accountability and evaluation of institutional performance is countered by autonomists' efforts to preserve institutional autonomy. The relevance of this matter for the future direction of the university cannot be underestimated. Indeed, resolution of this dispute, which depends on social and political forces inside and outside the university, will strongly influence the course of action of most of the conflictive issues described in the previous sections of this chapter.

1. The state and the higher education system

Higher education policies developed by the state and resisted by a large portion of university actors consist of a package of proposals that contradict some of the basic tenets of the 1918 Reform. In this context, autonomists contend that the mislabeled 'university modernization' attempted by the government is in reality an 'adjustment' or, even more, a financial attack. Four main hypotheses (not necessarily exclusive) about the reasons behind this 'modernization' or 'adjustment' have been advanced by autonomists: political, ideological, cultural and economic. According to the political explanation, the government's attack against the public university is motivated by the need to undermine the only organized opposition to the official plan. Although most autonomists argue that the Radical-Peronist antinomy is irrelevant to explaining the government's offense to the university, some of them accept that the overwhelming presence of Radicals in university decision-making bodies is an important factor in this regard.

Those who favor the ideological explanation argued that the government tries to undermine the public sphere in order to glorify the private sector. According to autonomists, this is correlated, in terms of higher education policy, with a particular bias towards private universities. The most cited examples of this alleged favoritism are the Universidad de Belgrano, whose founder and President acted simultaneously as a Minister of the Menemist government, and the Universidad del Salvador, which offers a degree in Medicine but lacks the necessary facilities. Reformists allege that the former institution was favored by government hidden subsidies and tax exemptions, and that the latter used regularly the Faculty of Medicine's facilities at UBA without charge [63] and received undeserved research grants. In relation to this issue, one professor expressed that

> *The private universities receive research grants, but they do not present projects. Recently, Matera (Director of Conicet) granted a research subsidy to Universidad del Salvador, because he was one of the founders of that university. In a public meeting he justified his favoritism towards private universities on the grounds that they are "deep in his heart".*

According to the cultural explanation advanced by most autonomists, the new economic and social model implemented by the government requires an ignorant, complying and obedient population. Hence, the argument goes, a massive cultural institution like the public university is dysfunctional to such a requirement. As one Vice-President stated

The economic model carried out by the state has problems with this university. It has problems with the fact that so many people have access to higher education, to knowledge, to critical thinking .

Finally, those who preferred the economic explanation contend that the government has no specific agenda for the university, as it has no agenda for the social sector, because it is concerned exclusively with deficit reduction and debt payment. According to this explanation, the only rationale of government is to adapt the university to the same model of adjustment applied to other areas of the social sector -such as health, housing or transportation- based on downsizing and privatization. Since the main aim of this model is to reduce spending, autonomists argued that a smaller, almost self-financed university is more appropriate than a large, expensive one. As one Vice-President declared

The state has no strategic plan for public universities. For the time being, it tells us: "you can do whatever you want as long as you don't spend more than what is available".

From this perspective, given the fiscal crisis of the state, the only government policy is to abandon the funding of sectors which can operate on cost-recovery basis, including the university. In this regard, autonomists argue that the government's attempt to measure all university activities in terms of money is a big mistake. Indeed, with very few exceptions, autonomists contend that the government has a clear economic policy, but lacks a social policy, not to speak of a university policy or a research policy. Resembling the 'RK hypothesis' described in chapter 5, autonomists complained that the state has underestimated the importance of the university and of scientific research. For them, government's obliteration of the public university contradicts its own development aims because it is unable to link the improvement of international competitiveness with the promotion of scientific research. As another Vice-President stated

The state does not understand university affairs. Even more, it does not understand that in order to access the first world, as the President wishes, it must train highly qualified human resources. And this is the great contradiction of this government. Now, this government is only concerned with reduction of spending, and in this context the university is a second, or third priority, which makes even more difficult university change (Vice-President).

Although the four explanations advanced by autonomists suggest the existence of an attack on the public university, and the four imply that the government distrusts or ignores the contributions of the university to national development, there is a major difference between the first three and the last one. While the political, cultural and ideological explanations identify an intentional government agenda to undermine the public university, the economic explanation contends that the government has no project to reform the university because its main concern is not political, cultural or ideological but financial.

On the other hand, marketventionists in general and government actors in particular reject the existence of a government project specifically designed to attack public universities. Concurrently with the fourth explanation, they contend that the pressures for university restructuring are the result of a general crisis of the Welfare State that is affecting all areas of the public sector. However, unlike autonomists, they maintain (especially at the level of the Ministry of Economy) that in fact there is a project to modernize the university. Such a restructuring project is allegedly based on three main elements: rationalization, efficiency and equity.

Officials at the Ministry of Economy admitted that, at the time of the study, the Ministry of Education had yet to formulate a clear university policy, and suggested that the most important policies on university restructuring were designed by them. For instance, they disclosed that the Ministry of Economy, in conjunction with international institutions, was developing a project to establish criteria to distribute the university budget, and expressed

that the role of the Ministry of Education is the implementation of those criteria. However, functionaries from the Ministry of Economy pointed out that the mission of the Education Ministry was going to change as soon as all secondary schools are transferred to the provinces. Indeed, the Ministry of Economy has pressured a profound transformation of the Education Ministry, which would abandon its administrative responsibilities to concentrate on planning. The Ministry of Economy believes that a Ministry without schools will be able to devote all its energy to policy formulation, human resource training and the like. In the Ministry of Education this proposal was initially resisted on the grounds that, losing the control of schools, its power would substantially decline. In the end, the persuasion and coercion of the Ministry of Economy resulted in the proposal being accepted [64].

In spite of the criticisms raised by autonomists, functionaries affiliated with the Ministry of Economy, and even some marketventionists university actors [65], officials at the Ministry of Education have some concrete ideas about the direction they want the higher education system to move toward. One of them, based on the assumption that universities are secluded from the productive world, is to specialize them according to regional demands. A central instrument in this plan is the implementation of quotas [66]. Indeed, the marketventionist project contemplates quotas for two main reasons. First, as one marketventionist dean said, "the right of a youngster to choose a career should be related to national needs". Second, as a top government official expressed it, "the amount of students and teachers should depend upon the available facilities for a particular discipline". Another plan of the government consists of linking higher education policies to economic policy, particularly in relation to MERCOSUR (South American Free Trade Agreement), which is expected to be complemented by a regional agreement on cultural affairs.

The Ministry of Education was also considering the development of new careers, the reform of some of the existing ones, and authorizing the creation of new universities, both private and public. In relation to the former, at the time of the field study the Ministry of Education was considering more than 60 applications for private universities. In order to authorize a private university, the Ministry has set five criteria: a) it must have a patrimony (own building, adequate facilities, etc.); b) it must be a non-profit organization (revenues must be re-invested in salaries and infrastructure); c) it must have qualified academic staff; d) it must develop programs of study and course outlines; and e) even if they are managed by religious groups, they must be open to accept students who do not belong to that religion. It is pertinent to note that the proliferation of private universities is a recent phenomenon. Indeed, during the six years of Radical government not a single private university was approved.

According to a former government official, two concurrent factors may explain that reality. First, public universities were able to exercise their ideological opposition to private universities due to their close political links with the government. Second, the political and economic pressure exercised by existing private universities, in order to avoid competition. With the Menemist regime, that policy drastically changed on the condition that private universities complement state effort and ensure freedom of teaching. Hence, as was pointed out in section 3, private universities are propagating throughout the entire country. Autonomists complain that this policy has very negative consequences because private universities, with very few exceptions, are just schools implemented as a business. The argument to support this statement is that private universities invest only in a limited number of disciplines, use the facilities of public universities, hire on part-time basis the academic staff of public universities, do not undertake research, increase social inequalities and in general have very low educational standards.

Autonomists were even thinking of proposing a law by which new private universities should be approved only if they develop new areas, using as a rationale that they should complement public universities, not compete with them. Autonomist student leaders suggest that such a policy should avoid duplication, overlapping and competition among higher education institutions. The government, on the other hand, argues that it is precisely the competition with the private sector which will make public universities improve their academic standards and efficiency [67]. 'Soft' marketventionists agree with 'hard' marketventionists that a competition between public and private universities is beneficial for the entire system, but they share autonomist concerns that the state would favor the private sector by action or omission. As one dean commented,

> *We shouldn't be afraid of this; on the contrary, it constitutes a powerful motivation to raise the quality of our service. However, if the state intervenes, the competition becomes unfair. This is what is happening now, because the state is destroying the public university with the power of the purse.*

In regard to the creation of new public universities, a top government official stated that the rationale behind this policy is to respond to regional needs. In implicit allusions to UBA, that official stated that in the Ministry of Education "we prefer small universities to mega-universities", and that "large universities should be restructured in terms of space". The reference to UBA was more explicit when the official mentioned the existence of a project to decentralize UBA by setting up branches in San Isidro and Avellaneda, two Buenos Aires suburbs. Autonomists, and UBA authorities in particular, interpret the creation of small public universities as a mistaken policy. To quote one Vice-President

> *Today, each small town is starting to have its own university, but they don't have even the minimum human resources to undertake academic activities. Hence, they bring professors from the big cities like Buenos Aires, Rosario or Córdoba once or twice per month to teach.*

For UBA authorities, there are two reasons behind the government's enthusiasm for the creation of new public universities. The first one is that it is a means to 'reward' local politicians for services to the government. The second reason is that it is part of the government's strategy to diminish the power of large universities, particularly UBA. In one GFC meeting, Rector Schuberoff complained that, contrary to original agreements, these newly created universities are taking resources from the general university budget. He informed that the original agreement was that these universities were going to be funded by their surrounding communities, but once those universities began their activities the government changed the rules of the game and included them in the university budget.

The role of the state in university expansion has been discussed by many interviewees. There was a general consensus that university expansion -and contraction- should be linked to development priorities. However, autonomists fear that giving the state the monopoly to establish those priorities and the correspondent university policies may lead to misuse or abuse, thus undermining university autonomy. 'Hard' marketventionists, in concert with World Bank proposals, believe that the direction of the university should be market-driven. Between them, 'soft' marketventionists do not believe in university autonomy or in the market as the basis for university pursuits, but rather in state planning. An example of this position is provided by one dean:

> *The supply may be transformed according to development priorities. Today we are witnessing a transition period, product of the obsolescence of the old model and the re-accomodation to a new model that is not very well defined yet. The old model did not solve our structural problems. Argentina has nationalized more companies than many socialist countries, but at the same time the state was feeding the private sector. The failure of central planning in socialist countries does not mean that the state must eliminate its planning function. In United States, for instance, the state*

develops priorities and allocates resources. In Argentina, the university is not related to state planning; it functions with instruments from 20 years ago, and responds mainly to the requirements and principles of the demand side.

A case in point was the plan developed during the first democratic period (1983-88) to produce 60 million tons of grains, with no linkage to any university policy. Although the share of blame varies according to the institutional and political position of the actors, the majority agree that the absence of links between the university and the larger socio-economic reality is due to faults on the part of the university, industry and the state alike.

As was outlined throughout this chapter, marketventionists and autonomists disagree on a number of higher education policies (i.e. creation of new universities, susbsidies to private universities, fees, quotas, autonomy, evaluation, rewards for performance, etc.). Nevertheless, there is at least one area in which the government's plan is agreed upon by autonomists: the necessity of redistributing enrolment patterns. As was said in chapter 4, while there are almost 1,400 authorized careers in Argentina, enrolments are concentrated in three of them, the typically professional ones (Medicine, Law, Economics). According to the government, in spite of the fact that economic rewards are often higher in less traditional disciplines, students are not yet attracted to them.

Interestingly enough, marketventionists accuse autonomists of the same fault that autonomists accuse them of: the lack of a coherent plan for university reform. University authorities accept the criticism, but justify the situation by saying that the time and energy spent in resisting government attacks leave little room for developing alternative proposals. An additional explanation is that, while the government presents a relatively solid front, and on top of that has allies within the university, the university community is fragmented by political, ideological and disciplinary boundaries. One dean commented on this situation in the following terms:

There is a conflict among opposing forces, and these two tendencies are in unstable equilibrium. University authorities know that changes must be implemented, but they still do not reach an agreement on what must be changed, and how. The problem is the lack of a clear and shared framework. There is a high uncertainty in relation to decision-making for the medium and long term.

Indeed, the lack of a clear and shared framework is expressed in the competing projects for a university law, a juridical instrument inexplicably absent in the Argentinean educational legislation. Perhaps one of the most contentious issues in the definition of this legislation, and therefore in the future direction of university policy-making, is the autonomy-accountability debate.

2. The autonomy-accountability debate

a) the concept of autonomy

Marketventionists argue that the concept of autonomy advanced by the 1918 Reform has been perverted, leading to a gap between university and society. In an official document (Ministerio de Educación 1991:80), the government stresses the need to link the university with the community, "in order to avoid the existence of an 'unreal' world and a 'marginalized' world". Concurrently with an argument increasingly popular in governmental spheres throughout the world (see chapter 1), they claim that the university is a public institution, and therefore it is part and parcel of the state. They argue that autonomy has been misapplied, and turned into "sovereignty". When referring to the university, the marketventionist discourse recurrently uses expressions such as the above mentioned "unreal world", "ivory tower", "island", "luxury", "unaccountable public

institution", "political corporation" or "academic feud". Quotations from marketventionist actors belonging to four different constituencies illustrate this perception of the university:

> *Radicals are stagnated in the 1918 Reform principles. They defend an autonomy that makes no sense. For the university people, autonomy means that they are superior entities and therefore they can do whatever they want. We are all suffering the adjustments, especially the social sector, and the university remains in its ivory tower. The university people has no right to enjoy the luxuries that are alien to other public agencies* (government official)

> *In 1918 the idea of autonomy was excellent, but the original idea has been distorted. The idea was to avoid the intervention of the political power in university affairs. Now, the political power does not want to leave the university. The university constitutes a country within another country* (student, minority).

> *Autonomy is a relative concept, because we are not an island, and we shouldn't be one* (alumni).

> *Autonomy is very important, but it has taken UBA to become an island, isolated from its surrounding community. This is the main defect of UBA: it is alienated from the community that supports it. In fact, a public and free university should be at the service of the community that sponsors it* (Dean).

In other words, three main reasons are raised by marketventionists in order to limit the university autonomy enjoyed by UBA. First, they claim that UBA's links to the Radical Party have already distorted the concept of autonomy because it refers not only to the state, but to any external political influence. Second, they contend that autonomy has led UBA to isolation, and now "society [sic] [68] is asking the university serious definitions about its mission". Third, they perceive the university as one more governmental institution. Since the university "financially depends from the government" (sic) [69], the implication is that it must also depend on the government in terms of decision-making. In this regard, some government officials suggested that the university's right to autonomy should be positively correlated with their ability to obtain alternative sources of revenue. The implicit argument is that, if universities want autonomy, they should have autonomy in all areas, academic as well as administrative. The government's project to release universities from any legislation or regulation inhibiting them from enjoying administrative autonomy is in principle accepted by autonomists, but they have some reservations about its intentions:

> *This is a very clever political move, but it may lead to the death of the university; since this government has no limits, it doesn't give a damn. University is interested in financial autonomy, at least we, university students, are interested in it. We want financial autonomy to allow the university to invest, to produce, to sell its services and production, to generate more revenues, etc. But we also want the state, which is a property of society as a whole [70], to assume its responsibility as the main funder of public education. These are two different things. In other words, to grant universities with financial autonomy in order to allow them to increase revenues, to establish research contracts with the private sector, is fine. But if this means that the state abandons the university, it is fallacious* (student leader).

However, according to what was expressed by government officials, autonomists should not be concerned over state abandonment of the university, but over by the opposite trend, that is, too much involvement:

> *University people don't feel that they are part of national reality. Now, with Cavallo* [Minister of Economy] *they are finally waking up. It is important to link the university with the state. We want to put the university closer to the government* (government official).

This double process of abandonment and involvement, brilliantly analyzed by Neave and Van Vught (see chapter 2) implies a redefinition of the very notion of autonomy [71]. This

redefinition process is creating apprehension about the state-university relationship. On the one hand, autonomists argue that the government constantly violates university autonomy, overthrowing the powers of the GFC [72]. They also claim that the rejection of government intrusion in university affairs is not exclusive to Radicals. They contend that Peronist rectors also understand that government intervention undermines the academic, social and scientific functions of the university, and therefore ardently defend the principle of autonomy [73]. Autonomists perceive a trend towards an increasing loss of autonomy and a deeper subordination to the state, and some of them constantly warn about a possible intervention of the university [74], a scenario emphatically denied by government authorities. Autonomists also point out that autonomy is already limited by the Constitution and several laws. However, they contend that absence of a university law creates a vacuum in the regulation of the state-university relationship, and that the government interprets the existing legislation according to its own interests.

On the other hand, 'hard' marketventionists argue that the university has transformed autonomy into isolation. They contend that autonomy must be limited because the university does not belong only to the university community. They assert that, given the lack of clear legislation on autonomy, "the university continues doing whatever it wants" and that, therefore, the state must urgently formulate those policies. Between them, 'soft' marketventionists endorse the claim that autonomy has prompted a gap between university and society, but they call for a middle ground between "state interventionism" and "university sovereignty". They argue that a clear definition of autonomy, with a distinct package of rights and duties, should be agreed upon, and not imposed unilaterally by the state. For instance, they propose that the controversial decree 1111 (Recurso de Alzada) [75] must be carefully analyzed using academic and not political criteria, to see if it undermines university autonomy. Indeed, at the heart of the debate is the type and amount of state intervention in university affairs that is acceptable to both parties. Hence, as was pointed out in chapter 2, the discussion on autonomy inevitably leads to its complementary concept: accountability.

b) the concept of accountability

Marketventionists claim that the main flaw of university autonomy is the lack of accountability that it has engendered. They assert that the university, as with every institution receiving public funding, must be accountable. They criticize university leaders for being accountable only to their electorate (students), which often leads to demagogy. They particularly condemn the large degree of discretion enjoyed by the central administration (Rectorado) in the use of funding.

> *The university is still an adolescent. It tells the state: "I want to do whatever I like, and you just give me money to do it". But that time is over now (Dean).*

> *People talk about university and state as if they were two different entities. The concept of autonomy makes some people think that the state provides funding, and the university need not be accountable for what it does, or how it does it. The university is of the state. The university does not account for what it does with the budget (student, minority).*

'Hard' marketventionists also lament that university's great inefficiency and waste is very difficult to demonstrate because of the secrecy in the administration of resources [76], and therefore call for a larger accountability in this regard. 'Soft' marketventionists within the university accept that the State has been unable to formulate higher education policies, but contend that this does not justify an absolute freedom on the part of the university. Some of them caution about an excessive intervention of the state on university affairs, but recognize that UBA's allocation of financial resources has been hermetic to outsiders [77].

Others raise a *mea culpa*, linking the lack of accountability to the low preoccupation for expenditures:

> *We don't allow anybody to snoop around here, and that's inappropriate, because we use public funds, and we should be accountable to society for those monies* (Dean).

> *Until this crisis, the university was not accountable. Only now we are thinking about establishing priorities, in knowing what we do, and how much it costs* (Dean).

Marketventionist students proposed that, in order to promote accountability, "universities submit to the Ministry of Education all information regarding budgetary, administrative and academic management, within the terms and conditions required by the Ministry" [78]. Until today, the university is accountable to the Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación, to which it submits financial statements every three months. According to marketventionist students, the Ministry of Education will be able to exercise better control than the Tribunal de Cuentas. Autonomists agree that the university should be more accountable to the state and to society, but, as the following quotations show, they contend that such accountability is merely political control, and suspect that the state may abuse its powers to undermine institutional autonomy and academic freedom:

> *The State is under a deep restructuring, and is redefining its role. For this purpose, it is necessary to discipline society, and the university is the only sector that has not accepted such discipline (Vice-President).*

> *... So many years of burning witches and McCarthyism [oscurantismo] have developed a great deal of distrust. The university must accept state control, but with the condition that the state becomes truly democratic (Dean).*

Autonomists are also willing to accept financial audits and administrative controls, but in exchange for two conditions: first, a budget increase, and second, the delivery of the funding at the beginning of the year, instead of partial submissions for which the time and the amount of each one are left to the discretion of the government. Indeed, for them, at the heart of the autonomy-accountability debate is the financial issue, because the absence of an adequate budget makes autonomy very precarious. They concede the right of government to check university expenditures, and are disposed to looking for complementary funding as well, but with the proviso that the state does not withdraw from its responsibility as primary funder of higher education. While marketventionists perceive the ideal relationship between state and university as one of subjection (under the assumption that the university is part of the state's infrastructure), autonomists would like to see a collaborative and horizontal relationship. The following quote illustrates the latter perspective:

> *Universities, in the limited time which the state allows them to think, attempt to implement actions in order to improve. The state should contribute to this task (e.g. providing data), but it doesn't. The current situation of autonomy has a serious limitation: the absence of systematic exchange mechanisms. There are some areas in which the university must be free to make decisions (e.g. changes in academic policies, innovations, etc.) and other areas in which a relation with the state should exist, such as the type, quantity and quality of human resources necessary for national development (Dean).*

'Soft' marketventionists also call for more cooperation between the two major actors of the conflict. Given their detachment from the Menemist project or the Radical Party, they emphatically claim that the university-state relationship should be more academic and less political. This position is different from university authorities and government officials, who minimize the political variables of the conflict.

c) evaluation of university performance

The debate on autonomy and the pressures for accountability compound in a tug-of-war over evaluation. On the one hand, marketventionists advocate external evaluations carried out by the state and eventually other actors, and linked to funding. On the other, autonomists defend the idea of self-evaluations undertaken by the academic community. Halfway between them, marketventionists propose that evaluations should be conducted by both internal and external actors. All three groups agree on the need for evaluation, but disagree over who should implement it and for which purposes. For marketventionists, any human activity is subject to evaluation, and higher education is not an exception. Moreover, evaluation is conceived as the best way to promote efficiency. Hence (and coincidentally with WB recommendations [79]), it should be tied to funding through an incentives scheme. Indeed, marketventionists argued that a system of rewards and punishments is essential to avoid a homogenization toward mediocrity, and underlined the importance of stimulating the best. They clearly stress that efficient universities should be rewarded by the state and propose that one of the measures of efficiency must be the capacity to generate alternative sources of revenue.

The link between evaluation of performance, funding, and the ability to obtain additional resources alternative is not only stressed by marketventionists in the interviews, but also in public documents. UPAU, for instance, proposed that, in allocating resources to different universities, the Ministry of Education evaluate the use of resources taking into account the correspondence between academic activities with general educational policy and indicators such as amount of revenues obtained, incoming-outcoming students ratio, spending in non-academic staff, etc. [80]

Since the university community may resist external evaluations, the government is devising a two-stage process. During the first stage evaluation will be "imposed as a method", starting with self-evaluations in order to train institutions in the evaluation of their own administrative and academic activities, and to help universities "to generate their own antibodies against mediocrity". Although in this phase evaluation will not be linked to funding, the distribution of funding for scientific and technological activities will depend upon external evaluations. In the second stage, evaluation will be conducted by external actors. For this purpose, the Ministry of Education will be willing to provide expertise in evaluation to those universities who request it. Interestingly, marketventionists within the university contend that an internal evaluation is not viable, and demand a bypass to the second stage:

> *The state has the function of evaluating the university. I don't see any conflict between the university and the state, because the university is part of the state. The university must not be an island. My children are not autonomous, because I support them economically. However, I grant them with freedom of choice in certain areas of their lives. It is inappropriate to have a university that depends totally on the state, but it is as inappropriate to have a university with its own interests, not to speak about a university linked to party interests (Dean).*
>
> *Presently, a self-evaluation is not feasible for two reasons. First, the absence of criteria to orient the evaluation, and second, university authorities are afraid of the possible outcomes of such evaluation. We should have an external one, carried out by a Commission formed with the participation of Ministries, private institutions (mainly professional associations), and community representatives* (Dean).

These quotations nicely summarize the position of university marketventionists in relation to internal and external evaluations. They not only distrust university authorities, but the academic community in general. Indeed, in the call for external evaluators, the inclination for the state, professional associations and 'community representatives' (usually an

euphemism for business representatives or social groups allied to the government) and the exclusion of members of the academic community show the political and professional affinities of this group. Most marketventionists within the university used a language that equates evaluation with controls and rewards. For instance, they advocate a subsidy (instead of a budget), because it allows the state to provide incentives in order to reward efficiency. Likewise, they propose that the difference in quality among universities should be reflected in tuition and certifications. A former government official, and currently professor, said in this regard that

> *Fees should vary according to the quality of the university. As there are first class and second class students, and first and second class professors, there are first and second class universities. In this regard, it is an immorality that everybody have the same diploma.*

However, government officials are more tactful in their comments, probably to cool down the antagonistic atmosphere, For example, the above proposal suggesting the development of a hierarchy in the university system was discarded by public officials, who specified that "it is not the purpose of the government to develop a ranking of universities, because this is not a boxing championship" and remarked that the only intention of external evaluations was to improve the system.

Autonomists do not only distrust the intentions of the government, but also discredit its professional capacity to undertake evaluations. Indeed, they claim that university evaluation is an academic endeavor, and therefore should be performed exclusively by academics. While some autonomists attribute the responsibility of self-evaluation to the entire university community, others want to keep it at the level of individual faculties, and a third group admit the possibility of external evaluators (such as academics from other universities or employers) all of them explicitly rejected the state's involvement in evaluation. Arguments not only revolved about the low proficiency of public officials, but also about the probable use of 'business-oriented' criteria and the political innuendoes of the scrutiny:

> *I accept an academic evaluation, but nobody in the Ministry of Education has the technical competence to do it (Vice-President)*

> *I don't agree with the idea of external evaluations. There should be self-evaluation carried out by each faculty. Nobody can judge the university performance better than its own actors, that is, professors and students (Dean)*

> *University is not an enterprise like any other. It must go beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis. It is not the same a cheap career than an expensive one, an old and established discipline than a new one, etc. The only ones who can evaluate the quality of university are the consumers of the product (employers) and the university community (Vice-President)*

> *In accordance with the principles of university autonomy, evaluation must be conducted by the university itself. As plain as that. There is no other possibility. We accept that the state develops some control mechanisms in relation to administrative affairs, in order to supervise the proper use of public funds. However, the lack of democratic traditions in Argentine institutions, the scarcity of technical positions in the Ministries -most are political appointments-, and the lack of experts on university issues in the government, may turn the technical evaluations into political ones* (student).

Indeed, autonomists express strong reservations about an evaluation carried out by the Ministry of Education, under the assumption that it responds to a particular political party. Interestingly, this is precisely the same criticism that the government makes to the university: that it is controlled by a political party. Therefore, autonomists' claim that even if that Ministry responds to the Radical party and not to the Peronist one, it would still be

wrong, is met with skepticism by public officials. In any case, for autonomists evaluation should be undertaken either by the university itself, or by a selected group from the Argentine intelligentsia totally detached from political parties and from the state. Autonomists suggest that the only purpose of the state in evaluating higher education is to exercise a larger control on the university in order to apply the fiscal monetary policies of adjustment and privatization. In this regard, some of them detect an inconsistency between the government's rhetoric of decentralization and privatization and its attempts for greater leverage. To quote one dean,

> *In this frenetic race towards the free market and deregulation headed by the state, there is a basic contradiction: on the one hand, the university is left to the free play of supply and demand, but on the other, the state wants to evaluate, and to determine the evaluation criteria. If the state wants to deregulate: what does it want to evaluate for?*

The answer to this question can be illuminated by Neave and Van Vught's distinction between process control and product control discussed in chapter 2. Autonomists tend to differentiate between performance evaluation (based on efficiency) and academic evaluation, arguing that the criteria for the former should be arranged concurrently by the government and the university, while in the latter the government should not intervene. Those few autonomists who reluctantly accept the participation of the state in academic evaluation stipulate that it should just be one more actor in a board including representatives from professors and students (and eventually representatives of the community at large, from unions to business) and stress that the process should be entirely academic.

In sum, be it academic or administrative, autonomists express three concerns about evaluation: who is going to evaluate, the criteria to be used, and the impact of such evaluation. First, they tend to advocate internal evaluation, and only reluctantly are willing to accept external evaluations, especially when the government is involved. Second, when external evaluators are accepted, they stress that evaluation criteria should not be alien to the academic world, in an implicit rejection of evaluations implemented under business or bureaucratic rationales.

> *I reject external evaluations with evaluation criteria alien to the academic enterprise. For example, if I need to evaluate the army, but I don't know the rules of the game of that system, I can develop certain criteria (i.e. how many tanks per division), but those criteria will be irrelevant because I ignore the logic of the system (Dean).*

For this reason, autonomists warn that evaluation criteria should be clear and based on consensus, and implementation mechanisms must be transparent. Finally, there is autonomists' apprehension that evaluation results are used by the state to punish or reward academic units (financially or otherwise), following political motivations. The distinction between process control and product control can be also usefully applied to analyze an additional issue related to evaluation that was incipiently being discussed: the separation between the professional diploma, granted by the university, and professional certification (license to perform certain professions granted by professional associations or by the state). This proposal, advanced by the World Bank (see Winkler 1990), aims at raising the standards of graduates.

Given the recent proliferation of public and private universities of dubious standards, both marketventionists and autonomists have been partisans of developing some quality controls, and suggest that such separation may be an important instrument in that regard. However, autonomists caution that strict control mechanisms should be put in place to avoid the potential abuse of power by professional corporations. Again, they express that the evaluation criteria should be the result of a consensus between university and external actors, and based solely on academic benchmarks.

Section 8: The main patterns in the debate on the direction of the university

This final section provides a general summary of the trends described throughout this chapter. As expected, the proposals advanced by the different actors are generally consistent with their diagnoses of university problems presented in chapter 5. Marketventionists' proposals focus on adapting the university to the needs of the economy, establishing more government control over university activities, reducing expenditures, and increasing efficiency. These goals are expected to be achieved through the implementation of stricter admission policies, tuition fees, accountability mechanisms and conditional funding. In order to remove political obstacles for the implementation of this agenda, marketventionists propose reforms that would diminish the power of students and Rectorado, and eventually lessen institutional autonomy. Confronted by this battery of proposals, distressed by cutbacks, and conscious that the university requires some urgent changes, autonomists are generally on the defensive, and unable to outline a coherent alternative. Autonomists justify their incapacity to formulate a coherent project because they are too busy responding to government pressure. In their view, a genuine reform should not be a mere response to external pressures, but rather the result of an internal, democratic, collegial process in which different alternatives are discussed in an open debate. For marketventionists external pressure is indispensable to provoke changes, given the conservative nature of the university.

Taking into account the patterns of proposals, it is possible to infer an informal alliance between the government, the conservative slates among professors, alumni and students, and the deans of some professional faculties against the Rectorado and the partisans of the 1918 Reform who are the majority. Although autonomists have been able to resist many of the proposals thus far, they are conscious that they are in a disadvantaged position, and that the government has leverage to influence the direction of the university through the power of the purse. It is also clear in the interviews that the key government agency in determining this direction is not the Ministry of Education but the Ministry of Economy, and that the proposals emanating from this Ministry and the recommendations formulated by the WB are astonishingly similar.

Institutional structure

In relation to changes to UBA's internal institutional structure, marketventionists propose a variety of alternatives aiming at the reduction of Rectorado power. These alternatives range from the elimination of particular units controled by the central administration (i.e. CEA, CBC), to a fragmentation of UBA into smaller, semi-autonomous units like in the Californian system. Autonomists, instead, seek administrative reforms that promote more interaction among individual faculties and reduce duplication, with the probable collateral effect of limiting the power of professional faculties. The issue of departmentalization is still a marginal topic in the debate, and not well understood by many actors. As was pointed out above, departmentalization is sometimes perceived as the mobilization of professors (and not students) from one faculty to another. This misconception leads some deans to fear that their faculty may lose in the arrangement. Deans of professional faculties were also blamed for their resistance to departmentalization, and they, in turn, blame each other for not engaging in collaborative efforts. Finally, another aspect of institutional reform stressed by marketventionists is the need to promote efficiency by including rewards for better performance.

Financing

Proposals related to financing were the ones that received more attention in the debate. Autonomists recurrently blame government cutbacks for the university crisis, whereas

marketventionists argue that the problems to be corrected are waste, inefficiency and mismanagement, as well as the inequities of free education. Thus, marketventionists' proposals focus on conditional funding (contingent upon outcomes and the fulfillment of certain performance indicators), and private sources of revenue, particularly through contracts with industry and tuition fees. Autonomists express concerns about the academic pertinence of performance indicators developed unilaterally by the government. They also fear that the high degree of discretionary power enjoyed by the government could lead to situations in which universities are financially rewarded or punished for non-academic reasons.

A related concern is that the new sources of revenue become alternative, and not complementary, of state subsidies, resulting in a de-facto privatization. Increasing contracts with business, however, do not represent a contentious issue for most autonomists. With a few exceptions, autonomists do not perceive potential risks of linking research activities to industry. While in developed countries this topic produces a heated debate and receives a substantial attention in the literature, in Argentina, probably due to the lack of experience in this regard, almost everyone anticipates that closer links with industry will bring only benefits to the university. Nonetheless, the establishment of tuition and fees constitutes the most controversial proposal. It is the one that probably occupies most of the energy in the university debate, and a variety of academic, economic and social arguments have been developed to justify and to reject fees. The dispute on fees is so emotional and intense that it seems that both contenders are taking it as the battle that can decide the outcome of the war.

Function

Partly because of the great amount of energy spent on the discussion on fees, the debate on function is almost negligible. In relation to the higher education system, UBA's autonomists criticize the recent proliferation of public universities as a waste of resources because these universities -contrary to government's claim- have no possibilities of becoming serious academic enterprises. They also contend that UBA is not challenged by private universities because of their shortcomings in terms of accessibility, their lack of research, their low quality teaching, and their failure to offer programs in a broad variety of areas, and not only the profitable ones. Although autonomists admit that the newly created elite private universities offer high quality programs, they claim that these universities are far removed from national reality, and provide cadres for management and not for production.

Marketventionists, on the other hand, argue that private universities save public funds and that through an open competition elevates the standards of the public universities. At the institutional level, marketventionists contend that UBA should abandon dispensable units such as the CBC, CEA, extension, hospitals and secondary schools. Not surprisingly, most of these areas are under the jurisdiction of Rectorado. Marketventionists also claim that research should be more 'relevant' or applied, and that the university should be more responsive to the market and to the national economy, particularly in the context of the South American common market (MERCOSUR). Although not all these recommendations are shared by autonomists, extension is already moving towards cost-recovery services, and the commercial university is taking place in the form of research and consultations for industry even in traditionally anti-business faculties like Arts and Humanities, and Social Sciences. The transformer university model, once the hegemonic project in these two faculties and even in the whole university, has been practically absent in the debate on function; only a few representatives from the left slates (mainly students) advanced the vision that the university should be an active agent of radical social transformation.

Governance

In terms of governance, the discussion focused on the ideal representation of the university community in decision-making bodies. The issues at stake are the internal balance of power among the three parties currently represented (professors, students and alumni), and the appropriateness of including two new constituencies (assistant professors and non-academic staff). Marketventionists tend to complain about the excessive politicization of the GFC, and perceive students as one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the heteronomous agenda. In this particular situation marketventionists have clear allies among a broad range of autonomist deans and professors who would like to see a reduction of alumni and student power, and an increase of academic power.

Admission policies

Admission policies were, after fees, the second most contentious issue in relation to future policies. At an abstract level, autonomists and marketventionists advance academic, social and economic arguments for open admission policies and for selective admission policies. At a more concrete level, the original consensus on the CBC is dissipating, and even a significant number of autonomists are accepting that the CBC has serious administrative problems. Two professional faculties (Medicine and Engineering) are at the forefront in the battle against the CBC, claiming that it should be replaced by an admission system controlled by each individual faculty, which should have the prerogative to set quotas. The main criticisms to the CBC are justified on administrative, academic, political and ideological bases. Indeed, marketventionists claim that the CBC is an inefficient and expensive mechanism to select students, that its academic standards are deplorable, that it delays student entrance into their faculties for one year, that it promotes marxist indoctrination, and that it is a political tool of Rectorado to accumulate power. From an opposite perspective, autonomists contend that the CBC facilitates a transition between high school and the university that allows for career changes at an early stage, that bridges the vacuum among separate faculties and last, but not least, that promotes greater accessibility. Beyond the validity of each specific argument, the debate on the CBC cannot be isolated from the battle between Rectorado and certain professional faculties, and the overriding conflict between autonomists and marketventionists.

Research and Development

In the marketventionist agenda, R&D activities should be more responsive to the market, and eventually undertaken privately. Moreover, in tune with WB recommendations, the government attempted once - in that case unsuccessfully- to privatize the national research system (CONICET). The WB has also recommended a progressive privatization of CNEA (Atomic Energy Commission). In the context of gradual reduction of state subsidies to national research centers such as INTI, INTA and CONICET [81], researchers are increasingly looking at the market for research opportunities. In relation to industry's position on R&D, it is interesting to note a difference between the interests of large enterprises, on the one hand, and the small and medium enterprises, on the other. While the leaders of large enterprises, closely linked with MNCs, express little concern for research at the national level and are strong advocates of privatizing the system, leaders small and medium enterprises clearly understand the importance of the active role of the state and the university in scientific-technological development for their own survival.

In spite of the traditional mutual distrust between university and industry, the links between them are increasing yearly through UBATEC. As mentioned above, very few interviewees expressed the type of concerns described in chapter 2 about the potential risks of these links. This indicates that, whereas one of the elements of the heteronomous university

(government control) is highly resisted, the second element (the commercial university) is being implemented with the acquiescence of most autonomists.

The role of the state

The final policy issue analyzed in this chapter was the role of the state in university affairs. Although some autonomists contend that the government has no project for the university but an exclusive interest on saving expenditures, it can be inferred from the interviews and related documents that marketventionists have a clear agenda in mind, and the possibilities of imposing such agenda is contingent upon a redefinition of the state-university relation.

In this regard, marketventionists advocate conditional funding, accountability mechanisms, regular evaluation of public universities, and subsidies to private universities. In relation to the latter proposal, in 1992 the government begun to provide financial aid for private universities. That year, public universities received transfers for US$ 724 million, and private universities received US$ 30 million [82]. Since accountability arguments are usually justified on the need of the university to open its ivory tower to public scrutiny and to be more social responsive, autonomists have a difficult time in presenting an appealing case that goes beyond the fears of a possible utilization of inappropriate indicators or a misuse of evaluation results to punish universities which are considered 'unfriendly' by the government.

In sum, in the increasing interest of the government for the direction of the university, three elements can be observed. First, the key factor of the marketventionist agenda in the proposed state-university relationship is the reduction of university autonomy. Second, the main government actor in the redefinition of the new relationship between the university and the state is the Ministry of Economy. Finally, it was possible to note the striking simmilarities between the proposals emanating from this Ministry, the recommendations postulated be the WB, and the preferred directions expressed by marketventionists within the university. As in the case of the diagnosis presented in the previous chapter, marketventionists presented a more solid bloc in terms of university policies than autonomists.

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[1] In a meeting held October 1, 1991, between government representatives (Ministry of Economy) and CIN representatives, a government representative stated that "universities and armed forces are the most conservative institutions in society, and therefore the most reluctant to undertake changes and to modernize" (CIN report, internal document, n/d). In the same vein, one government official interviewed lamented that "it is terrible that it was necessary for the Ministry of education to resort to pressure in order to ensure university rationalization".

[2] One Dean, for instance, to support his argument, recalled that in Spain the university underwent a rationalization process, but the government quintupled the funding.

[3] As recounted by the Secretary of Higher Education (personal interview).

[4] Mercado Común Sudamericano, or South American Common Market.

[5] These proposals were communicated by government to CIN representatives in a meeting that took place October 1st., 1991. The highlights of the meetings were recounted by Prof. Leonidas Cholasky Sobari, and transcribed in a 21-point document by CIN. In turn, I summarized the 21 points in 9 proposals.

[6] As will be seen later, the fear of student reaction inhibited deans who favor quotas and dismissal of students who do not attend on regular basis. Indeed, only one dean spoke out on these two issues, and was intensely attacked by the university administration and students.

[7] See, for instance, the declarations of Hugo Kaufman (CONADU) to Clarín, March 21, 1993, p.4.

[8] Among other examples, interiewees pointed out the existence of 8 departments of mathematics, 5 printing services, as well as multiple facilities (such as laboratories, libraries, auto body repairs, etc) performing similar functions. In many cases a single course is offered by two or three faculties.

[9] For instance, one of the suggested areas was Health, which should include Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, Biochemistry and Psychology. Similar proposals were being developed for the Humanities and Social Sciences.

[10] Cfr. the Report No. 18 of the WB, prepared by Sam Carlson (1992).

[11] Comisión Económica para América Latina, known in English as ECLA.

[12] See, for instance, the article of Gustavo López, General Secretary of UBA, in Primera Impresión, Vol.1, No. 2, in which he describes state subsidies and transfers to business. In relation to budget priorities, one example provided by Massarino and Rosemberg (La Maga, March 1993:3) was that in some cases the budget allocated to advertisement was higher than the one channeled to culture. For instance, it is argued that the government of the Province of Buenos Aires spends more than 18 million dollars per year on advertising, a figure representing the average annual salary of 2,672 researchers from CONICET. At the same time, the budget for culture during 1992 in that province was US $12,000,000, and the provincial funding to the University of Lomas de Zamora, with an enrollment of 24,414 students, was $15,327,765

[13] Argentina's incorporation into the 'first world' has been one of the most widespread slogans of the Menem's administration.

[14] It is interesting to note that this Dean identifies the Ministry of Economy -and not Education- as the key interlocutor of the university. This perception about the increasing role of Economy in university affairs, shared by several university actors, was related to the intra-state conflict advanced above.

[15] In the University of Alberta, for instance, the Students' Union organized a special task force called PEST (pre-election strategy team) to raise the profile of post-secondary issues during the provincial and federal election campaigns (see FOLIO, February 26, 1993:1).

[16] Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional. The research budget represents 3% of the total budget.

[17] "Cómo distribuir los fondos universitarios". La Nación, October 21, 1991.

[18] This means that universities will receive a total sum at the beginning of the year, and should plan the use of that total during the academic year. Deans will be inhibited from implementing the budget in advance using administrative maneuvers. Additional grants and special arrangements with state companies to condone or postpone payment of public services (gas, power, etc.) will be eliminated.

[19] As one university authority perceived it, with this policy "the government moved the budget struggle within each university, creating internal battles among faculties". Some Deans immediately pointed out that their faculties should receive more money than others, using as arguments their enrollments, their functions and their costs.

[20] For government officials, private sources are unlimited, and depend on the imagination of universities to attract them. The only exception mentioned in terms of fundraising was gambling. As one of them stated, "casinos should not be allowed". This animosity towards gambling highly contrasts with North American patterns of fundraising. For instance, the Premier of the Province of Alberta, Ralph Klein, suggested that universities and hospitals should resort more on bingos to outweigh state's difficulties for funding.

[21] This confession illustrates the existence of links between government authorities and marketventionist actors within the university.

[22] For instance, the difference between the number of students registered for oral and written exams and the number of students who actually show up at the exam day is usually considerable. As a result of this, facilities and professors allocated for this purpose are typically in excess.

[23] In this regard, Zidelman (1993:7) points out that most information about students' willingness to pay fees is anechdotical.

[24] Out of the four deans who oppose fees, two belong to "non-professional" faculties (humanities and sciences"), and two to "professional" ones (psychology and economics). Given that, as a pattern, Deans of professional faculties tended to favor fees, the "dysfunctionality" of the latter two Deans can be explained by their ideological positions on public education, and does not mean necessarily that they represent the feelings of their academic communities in that regard.

[25] For example, in some surveys the main indicator is father's and mother's occupation and education, while in others it is students' occupation (dichotomizing "workers" and "not-workers"). Even more, the categories asigned to determine if a given occupation or educational level belonged to lower, middle or upper class widely varied. Since there were not universal categories to classify occupations and educational levels, and nobody knows the possible amount of fees, it is very difficult to provide any serious opinion on affordability. This suggests that most of the surveys were highly shaped by ideology or, conversely, that surveys were conducted only to back up an ideological claim, with low concern for methodological rigor. According to FUBA (using data from the 1988 census), students' SES analyzed through father's occupation

shows that 63.9% belong to low income groups, 26.3% to mid-income groups, and only 7.6% to high income groups. Moreover, FUBA claims that 67% of students work and 90% of them have low incomes (Orquin and Eliosoff 1991:3). However, Anfbal Velásquez, national leader of academic staff, declared to a local newspaper that 35% of the "rich" and "very rich" benefit from subsidies channeled to public universities, whereas only 7% of lower-middle class has access to universities (La Prensa, June 12, 1991). Moreover, according to a study conducted by Toer (1990:23), the majority of the students belong to middle and upper groups: he claims that half of UBA students (50%) belong to upper socio-economic levels (A, B and C1: 14% in level A and B, and 36% in C1; 36% are in C2 and 15% in D). Using this survey as evidence, UPAU considers that fees do not represent an excessive burden for the family budget of A, B and C levels, and therefore at least 80% of students are able to pay. UPAU uses this evidence (see Trombetta 1991) to claim that the majority of students belong to the mid and upper socio-economic levels, and therefore should pay fees. Trombetta also argues that, since the majority of the students (67%) live with their parents, this indicates that they have their basic needs met, at least in terms of food and housing. Conversely, claims UPAU, only 5.85% live by themselves, and must pay all their expenses. Interestingly, Trombetta uses as source the 1988 census (table 10), but he omits to mention, from the same table, the 15% living with their spouse, the 6.75% who have families to support and and the 3.45% who live with friends. Although more than 60% of the students work (census 1988, table 11), UPAU considers that, because they live with their parents, such work is to finance personal expenses, and not for subsistance. An additional argument raised by UPAU is that 23% of the students are 27 years old or older (census 1988, table 4). For UPAU, these people are either already in the labor market, or have no need to work, and therefore study mainly as a hobbie. In both cases, the university does not imply, necessarily, expectations of improving work conditions. For UPAU, since investment in education increases future income, and therefore is a personal investment, it is clear that this investment rationale is not present in the mind of mature students.

[26] In interviews and public documents, university authorities and university leaders consistently claim that the majority of these students come from low income groups. However, as the university authority who was in charge of the UBA Census acknowleged in an interview with me, this claim can not be supported by empirical evidence. The lack of statistics on this regard did not inhibit former President (and current leader of the Radical Party) Raúl Alfonsín to assert in an article published in a widely distributed weekly magazine that 90% of these students come from subsidied religious schools which charge only symbolic fees (Alfonsín 1991). This statement, which was allegedly based (at least that's Alfonsín's claim) on the 1988 census, reveals once more the low reliability of figures used in the debate on the university by many actors.

[27] The former figure (29.3% of the age group) can be found in Martínez Porta (1991:50). The latter can be found in Etcheverry (1991:IV).

[28] This can be interpreted as a pragmatic argument raised by some autonomists to advocate free education. Since high fees are socially undesirable and financially unfeasible, and low fees are administratively disadvantageous, the best solution to the fee issue is to continue the status quo of free education.

[29] Página 12, February 19, 1992: 10.

[30] A case in point was the reaction of one dean to the imminent opening of an educational farm in his faculty. While he agreed that such enterprise would eventually provide some financial resources, but he complained that it would be at the expense of dissipating academic staff from their specific functions.

[31] In most cases, the nonelite universities hire a few prestigious academic "pour la gallerie", but the day to day teaching workload is carried out by low rank, part-time professors from public universities.

[32] The existence of economic rewards has been suggested by UBA's authorities. The incident related to the resignation of a top official in the Ministry of Education originated with the pressures he received to authorize the creation of two private universities which lacked the minimum academic condition, and was described to me by Dr. Emilio Mignone (personal interview, Edmonton, May 1993).

[33] For a description of the newly created elite universities, see chapter five.

[34] Among them were the production of institutional videos for private companies, and opinion polls and surveys (personal interview with the Secretary of Extension of the Faculty of Social Sciences).

[35] Those few university actors who criticized CEA were mainly Deans and professors from professional faculties. This criticism seems to be partly related to real shortcomings of CEA, but also to the struggle between some faculties and the central administration for the control of graduate programs.

[36] This relates to another implicit function of the university pointed out in the literature but only mentioned by two interviewees (a student leader and a Dean), namely the "parking lot" function.

[37] As was described in chapter 5, three main constitutencies (full professors, students and alumni) are represented in faculty councils and in the General Faculty Council. Non-academic staff and assistant professors (*adjuntos*) are not included.

[38] Some support staff representatives went even further, demanding participation in the process of professors' selection (concursos). Deans overwhelmingly opposed such demands.

[39] For the position of the student movement (particularly Franja Morada) in favor of the 4-party system, see Itinerario, Vol.1, No.2, August 1992: 5.

[40] The "penta-party system", as it was called by those assistant professors who demand their inclusion in university governance (in addition to the inclusion of academic staff, was not supported be any Dean.

[41] This demand has been endorsed by professors of leftist groups. In one particular faculty (Social Sciences), students and professors already have the same amount of representatives.

[42] In one faculty, for instance, out of a total 110 professors, only 11 are full-time, and only two of them have been working there for more than five continuing years. In general, UBA professors spend in the university only the necessary time to teach their class, and therefore are not very likely to provide leadership in policy formulation. On the other hand, full professors tend to avoid participation in unions (such as CONADU). Most of the participation is done by assistant professors, who are young and do not participate in university councils.

[43] As was pointed out in chapter 5, under the current system half of the votes of Faculty Councils correspond to professors, and the other half to students and alumni.

[44] See chapter 6 and section 1 of the present chapter.

[45] A case in point was the GFC session held on Nov. 27, 1991.

[46] For instance, he attempted to change admission policies, implementing quotas and entrance examinations. He was also accused of promoting a student movement to support his position, and to help it to win students elections through fraud. When the GFC did not recognize the results of the election and requested a second vote, the Dean of Medicine obtained the legal recognition of the elections from the government, in a very controversial decision. This incident created endless discussions about an alleged violation of university autonomy. A more detailed description of this situation has been provided in chapter 5, section 3.

[47] As a matter of fact, with only a few exceptions, a high correlation was found between those who advocate for fees, quotas, and entrance examinations, on the one hand, and those who advocate for no fees and open access, on the other.

[48] External brain drain refers to those graduates who work abroad. Internal brain drain refers to those graduates who work in areas unrelated to their education or are overqualified.

[49] See, for instance, the article by Arch. Francisco García Vázquez published in Summa, June 1986, where he complains about an excess of architects in Argentina.

[50] Argentina spends in education only 2.3% of the GDP, half of the 5% recommended by UNESCO, a low figure if compared with the cases of USA (5.3%), France (5.9%), Sweden (7.6%) and even Latin American countries such as Chile and Venezuela (5.2% and 6.6%, respectively). Likewise, UBA's expenditure per student in 1985 was US $605, inferior to Canada ($6,000), but also to Venezuela ($2,875), Nicaragua ($1,869), Mexico ($1,130), Honduras ($1,007), Costa Rica ($998), Brazil ($952), Panama ($858) or Cuba ($793) (Borón 1991:13 and 17; Brunner 1990:131).

[51] The figure of 2% is probably provided by autonomists is probably accurate, because the total percentage of graduates from higher education is, according to government sources, 4.1% . However, Argentinean enrollment rates in higher education (35%) are comparable to those of developed countries (see chapter 5)

[52] See Cupo, Calidad y Salud, unpublished document by Adrian Gindin, majority representative (students, Franja Morada) to the General Faculty Council.

[53] In a public speech addressed to medical doctors, Dean Ferreira cautioned about a supposed marxist infiltration in CBC. In an interview with Página 12 (January 7, 1992, p.12), he complained about the bibliography used in the course "State and Society", particularly about the inclusion of Althusser, who he qualified as an extremist and compared with Hitler.

[54] The other is Introduction to Scientific Knowledge.

[55] According to one UBA Vice-President, these transference from some faculties to others are not related to market demands, but to youth culture. In this perspective, youngsters are more concerned with expressing creativity than with the job market. This may explain the rapid growht of careers such as communications and design-related careers (graphic design, custom design, industrial design, etc.).

56 Primer Plenario de Franja Morada 1991. In Itinerario de la Universidad y la Sociedad, Vol. 1, No.2, 1991:6.

57 The lack of interest of large industry in investing in R&D was expressed by a senior representative of this sector, who argued, in a meeting with CONADU (as it was recounted by A. Velázquez, national leader of CONADU), that it is easier and cheaper to import technology. The proposal to privatize public universities was formulated in a document on university policy (UIA-Gallup 1988:7).

58 See La Nación, Sunday 14, 1991.

59 It is interesting to note in this statement that the relation with industry is not perceived by this authority only as a means to obtain revenue, but as one of the functions of the university . As a matter of fact, he stated that "the relation with industry is going to give the university good money, but that is a secondary issue, because to make money is not the important thing in that link". See also section 3 of this chapter.

60 As was already pointed out, UBATEC remits 3% of its total revenue to the university, to be used in basic research. However, as was mentioned in chapter 6, some projects are still directly arranged between university-based research groups and industry, with or without the consent of faculty authorities. In any case, the point is that -at the time of the field work- the concern was that some research projects were not implemented through UBATEC.

61 The five socio-economic goals are: a) health and quality of life; b) energy and petrochemistry, c) agriculture and food; d) social development and e) technological development. The thematic areas are: 1) biotechnology; 2) sciences of materials; 3) informatics and computer sciences; 4) chemistry; 5) food and nutrition. 6) environment and ecotoxicology; 7) regional integration; 8) employment and labor market; 9) state and public administration; 10) applied ethics; and 12) clinical research.

62 Centro de Estudios Avanzados (Centre for Advanced Studies).

63 Although the University of Buenos Aires did not receive anything in exchange as a result of this arrangement, the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine defended it in a GFC meeting. As was described in chapter 4, the Dean of this faculty openly criticized UBA's authorities and the Reformist project, explicitly manifested his agreement with government policies toward the university, and received the public support of government authorities, including President Menem.

64 The tension between the Ministries of Economy and Education started in 1991, when the Minister of Economy claimed that the only way to control the irrational spending of Education was to appoint there somebody loyal to his plan. At that time, there were even rumors of a virtual intervention of Education by Economy, in terms of a direct control of expenditures. The pressure to instal an official loyal to the Ministry of Economy in the Ministry of Education came to an end in 1993, when Juan C. del Bello, a top functionary of the Ministry of Economy and World Bank consultant was finally appointed at the Secretary of Higher Education, in the Ministry of Education. See La Nación, March 22, 1993:3.

65 A student representative from UPAU, for instance, criticized the political class for the low priority assigned to develop a university policy, because they have other priorities, and expressed a self-criticism when he recognized the "we have no specialized people in the topic of university from a neoliberal perspective". Likewise, a professor stated that the Ministry of Education did not pay much attention to university, focusing instead on elementary and secondary education, and that the Secretary of University Affairs had a symbolic function, because he doesn't operate budgets. Although this Secretary was supposedly in charge of academic issues, university autonomy inhibits this function, leving as the exclusive role to authorize the creation of new universities.

66 See section 5 of this chapter, "Admission Policies".

67 Both actors are missing the important point, sagaciously described by Levy (1986), that the creation of private universities does not result exclusively from academic criteria.

68 In several occassions Neo-Reformists (in this quote represented by a student leader) implied that university modernization is a result of government's response to a societal demand. However, there is little evidence to support such a claim, as there is no evidence either to suggest that society at large defends the university as it is.

69 Indeed, most government officials equated state with government. In the case of this particular interviewee, a government official who holds a Masters in political science granted by a prestigious institution, the confusion is difficult to be explained by ignorance or lack of command of the terminology.

70 Unlike marketventionists, autonomists were very explicit in the distinction between government and state. Since this student is enrolled in a discipline (Psychology) alien to these concepts, the conflation between them as expressed by the government official (see previous footnote) is even more difficult to be understood as a mistake.

[71] The new autonomy is limited by the conditions imposed by the state, which encourages self-regulation in certain areas and external leverage in others. State control over the process is reduced, while the evaluation of results is increased.

[72] The most mentioned case in point was the election of student representatives at the Faculty of Medicine, in which autonomists accused marketventionists of electoral fraud. The Faculty of Medicine and the government, using as a juridical instrument a recent decree (1111), dismissed the decision of the GFC calling for new elections and conferred the victory to a marketventionist student group (FUNAP), at the expense of Franja Morada. Another controversy related to state intervention in university life at the time of the field study was the allocation of research funding to the University of Río Cuarto. According to autonomists, this reward was not granted because of any tradition or reputation in research, but because of the close links between this university and Peronism, the party in power.

[73] In terms of political affiliations, CIN is composed by 26 Rectors (16 Radicals, 7 Peronists and 3 of other filiations) plus the representative of the Ministry of Education. Although it is true that no Rector is in favor of state intervention, it is also true that some Peronist rectors (and even some Radical ones, such as Francisco Delich) criticized UBA for a misuse of the principle of autonomy.

[74] The most passionate calls to the GFC to be prepared against a potential intervention of the university came from Adrián Gindín, one of the student representatives for the majority. While university authorities were more prudent in the public discourse, in the interviews they also manifested concern about a possible intervention.

[75] See chapter 4.

[76] Interestingly, when I requested their source of information to some 'hard' marketventionists who commented on UBA's corruption or mismanagement, they mentioned the Ministries of Education, Economy and even Internal Affairs (Interior).

[77] As a matter of fact, when I asked for information about the different expenditures of the central administration (i.e. Ciclo Básico, Centro de Estudios Avanzados, Rectorado, etc.) the person who I was referred to, told me that such information was confidential. However, when I finally convinced that bureaucrat that I was going to use the information for an academic work abroad, the information was finally released.

[78] Trombetta, Augusto. Documento de Trabajo No. 2: Nuevas consideraciones sobre el arancelamiento universitario. UPAU, June 1991.

[79] cfr. Winkler 1991.

[80] "Cómo distribuir los fondos universitarios" (La Nación, October 21, 1991), and Trombetta, Augusto (personal interview).

[81] In the period 1990-1993, the budgets of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI), the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) and CONICET were reduced in approximately 15%, 82% and 10%, respectively (World Bank 1993:303).

[82] World Bank 1993:280.

CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has shown that, in what constitutes a startling phenomenon in the history of universities, most higher education systems of the world are rapidly moving toward the heteronomous university. A construct of the 'commercial university' and the 'controlled university', the heteronomous model combines laissez faire mechanisms with state interventionism. Among other things, public universities are increasingly pressured to compete among themselves and with private universities to generate their own revenues, and to respond to both market demands and to government regulations. The similarity of the changes occurring in different continents calls for an explanation that considers global forces.

However, this is not a uniform process. The specificity of changes implemented in each higher education system, and the pace at which they are implemented, are contingent upon local conditions. The polity, the economy and the culture of each national formation informs the nature of changes occurring in the universities of a given country. Moreover, the reaction to proposed restructuring policies varies in each individual university, according to its historical traditions, institutional features and the character of its leadership.

In Argentina, the pressure exercised by the government and the discourse used to justify the heteronomous university resembles the situation in other countries. Nonetheless, the modus operandi of the university restructuring process takes on peculiar characteristics. Likewise, the reaction of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, as described in chapters 4 to 6, reveals patterns that are common to the general trend but also unique elements that are propelling this institution to become one of the most vocal opponents of the heteronomous agenda.

This final chapter illustrates the analytical framework presented in chapter 3 with examples that describe the participation of international agencies in shaping the direction of the university at the local level, as well as the role of national and institutional factors in university change. It continues with a summary of the conflict between autonomists and marketventionists, and culminates with a brief depiction of the most likely scenario for the university of the future. This university will be partly autonomous, partly linked to the market, and partly controlled by the state. Although in general terms the degree of institutional autonomy will probably decrease, the degree of heteronomy of each individual university will be contingent upon local circumstances.

Section 1 The macro-processes in action

The framework presented in chapter 3 suggests that any comprehensive analysis of the current spate of university changes should examine simultaneously economic, political, social and cultural dimensions at the international, national and institutional level. In this section an attempt is made to apply such a framework to the restructuring of Latin American higher education, with spcific references to the Argentinean case.

1. International level

a) Institutional capitalism in motion

As noted in chapter 3, in the current phase of transnational capitalism, strategically located and extensively networked elements of the corporate community can have tremendous influence in defining the parameters of university policy. It was also suggested that this process, known as 'institutional capitalism', assumes different forms in developed and developing countries. The role played by state-sponsored Higher Education Fora and White

Papers in developed countries is performed in developing countries by international agencies such as the World Bank, whose representatives have enjoyed a vast increase in their ability to influence decision-making of national governments. Although the World Bank and many US-based agencies have been present on the Latin American scene since the end of World War II, their influence over national states has increased greatly in recent times. Such power derives largely from the globalization of the economy and the relative position of weakness of indebted national states.

The World Bank has clear recommendations for university reform in Latin America, as expressed in several articles and discussion papers. In essence, they advocate a decrease of government involvement in education, an increase in the private sector's role, greater application of market principles to educational systems, and a phased divestiture of the public university system (Winkler 1990, Carlson 1992, Berman 1992, World Bank 1993). The alleged rationale behind the proposed policies is to decentralize decision making in public institutions, to increase accountability of institutions receiving public funds, to promote more open competition for resources and to increase access of low income groups to higher education. The WB explicitly states in many documents that Latin American countries should follow the Chilean university model, a product of the restructuring imposed by Pinochet in the early 1980s, based on a combination of market exchanges and state interventionism. The WB argues that its reform program, which includes recommendations in areas such as financing, governance and the role of the state, would bring not only financial savings but also important benefits to society in the form of increased diversity, cost-effectiveness and equity within the higher education system.

In terms of university financing, WB recommendations for Latin America include the following: a) greater cost-recovery through levies of tuition and other fees; b) broader diversification of revenue sources, particularly through selling services to industry; c) expansion of private higher education; and d) introduction of performance criteria and external evaluations in resource allocation to universities (conditional funding). In the WB scheme, fees should be complemented by a scholarship program for those students experiencing severe economic hardships and loan programs for others (Winkler 1990, Carlson 1992) [1]. As a WB document clearly states, the overall objective of these recommendations is a program of phased divestiture of the university system, and its transfer to the private sector (WB 1993:xxxviii and 91).

In relation to graduate programs and research, the WB recommends reduction of the number of graduate programs offered in Latin American universities, and to determine their elimination, expansion or contraction according to performance criteria (Winkler 1990: 98). According to the World Bank, research resources should be reallocated from non-productive faculty to productive faculty, and from non-productive programs or institutions to productive ones [2]. Moreover, strategic research institutes such as the Argentinean CNEA (Atomic Energy Commission) -and even the entire national research system- should be restructured into business and research units for privatization (WB 1993:xxi).

In terms of governance, the WB identifies university autonomy as the key structural obstacle hindering restructuring efforts. Hence, it recommends that governments establish more control over decision-making, and that universities abandon their 'popular' and 'politicized' electoral processes (which include teachers, students and sometimes alumni and administrative staff), replacing them with a new system that gives more weight to the most productive members of the academic community, and to community representatives and government.

To improve efficiency, the WB recommends the introduction of modern management systems and the replacement of tenure by a scheme whereby each university would be free to hire, pay and utilize staff according to its own criteria, and to implement a variety of reward and punishment mechanisms. Additional recommendations for improving efficiency include larger class sizes, higher student-faculty ratios, and more selective admission screening procedures. To increase accessibility to higher education, the Bank recommends the introduction of low-cost public community colleges ((Winkler 1990:47, WB 1993:90-92). These recommendations are justified using academic and social arguments which appeal to the values and principles espoused by a wide array of constituencies, including partisans of the 1918 Reform model.

The main arguments of the World Bank

According to the World Bank, university restructuring would result in several institutional and societal benefits, generally expressed in terms of goals. Notable among them are the promotion of equity, efficiency, accountability and autonomy. The relation between suggested restructuring strategies and the achievement of these goals is developed in four major arguments, which can be summarized as follows:

Argument 1: To promote equity

Two major policy proposals (university divestiture and tuition fees) are supposed to bring greater equity into the system. The argument is that tuition fees would allow a reduction in higher education expenditures, which in turn would allow the transfer of public funds from higher education to elementary education. Two reasons are usually given for this argument. The first is that, currently, the benefits of higher education primarily accrue to students from higher income backgrounds. Arguing that the selection process actually took place in basic education, the WB claims that fees are not a primary barrier to access. The second argument is that the social rate of return to higher education is considerably lower than the social return to investments in primary education.

In other words, the WB claims that subsidies to public universities are regressive because most graduates come from upper-income family backgrounds and once they graduate they earn above-average salaries. Thus, if private financing of higher education were to increase, governments could reallocate some of public resources to the primary level (Psacharopoulos 1991, Eisemon and Salmi 1992, WB 1993). The WB admits that fees may have a potentially regressive impact, but contends that this could be offset by raising subventions to low income students through financial aid packages. Since the WB contends that low income students tend to enrol in private universities, for equity reasons these aid packages should apply to students enrolled in both public and private institutions.

Argument 2: to promote efficiency

The efficiency argument is mainly used to defend the implementation of performance-based funding and the gradual replacement of state provision by alternative sources of revenues. The inefficiency of public higher education is attributed to its bureaucratic practices, to 'isonomy' and to the lack of discipline inherent in market competition. Hence, the WB recommends that governments use fund allocation to create incentives for the most efficient universities and staff members, linking funding to performance evaluation (Winkler 1990, Brunner 1990, Carlson 1992, Ziderman 1993).

Criteria for rewarding efficiency should be based on the capacity to reduce research and teaching costs without affecting quality (i.e. increasing the student/teacher ratio). Indeed, the WB indicates that if cost is not used as a criterion for resource allocation, governments

may be rewarding inefficient behavior. In the spirit of competition, government funds should be allocated among both public and private institutions, providing fiscal incentives to those institutions which provide a given quality of instruction at lower cost. Competition among these institutions could also be enhanced by providing vouchers or 'portable subsidies' to individual students (WB 1993:92). The argument of efficiency is usually linked to cost reduction, and is used to support a variety of measures, ranging from larger classrooms to entrance examinations to the expansion of private universities. In regards to the latter, the WB contends that direct or indirect government subsidies to expand or improve private institutions would allow an increase in student enrolments and instructional quality at lower public cost.

Argument 3: to promote accountability

The accountability argument is advanced to justify state evaluations and diversification of revenue sources. For the WB, institutional autonomy takes the form of government finance of higher education with little accountability by universities regarding how funds are used. Hence, a tighter control on expenditures would link university priorities to government objectives. At the same time, receipt of funds from other sources (business contracts or contributions, donations by the wealthy, even government research contracts) will make universities more responsive to the 'community', which is sometimes equated with the market. In one of the WB documents that has influenced much of the thought of WB Latin American state bureaucrats, it is stated that

> *The public university, unlike the private one, lacks strong incentives to respond to market signals regarding university graduates. University autonomy often means universities receive their funding in terms of block grants not tied to any particular program or activity* (Winkler 1990:46).

From this perspective, a demand-driven university is perceived to provide more societal relevance than direct government intervention. Hence, the replacement of current funding mechanisms (based on the size of previous year's budget, student enrollment, and ad hoc politics) by performance and market criteria would increase accountability (Winkler 1990:73 and 81, Ziderman 1993:17).

Argument 4: to promote autonomy

This rationale is used to justify the proposed package of policies aimed at diversification of sources of revenue. These proposals include the sale of technology and research results, joint ventures with industry, and cost recovery mechanisms. The argument to support this proposal is that the more universities rely on private sources of revenue, the more autonomous they become. For the WB an increase in autonomy is the result of a decrease in dependency from public funding. The reasons for this claim is that excessive dependence on government finance creates two problems. First, political regimes unfriendly to the university can do great harm to the institution simply by withholding government funding. Second, the financial hardships of the government have immediate repercussions on the university, which is left with no other option than to wait for a recovery in state revenues (Winkler 1990:73).

Discussion

As discussed in the preceding chapters, three main problems can be identified in the arguments advanced by the World Bank. First, an underestimation of the impact of proposed policies on equity and accessibility. Second, a glorification of the private university. Third, a biased understanding of the principles of autonomy and accountability.

In relation to the first problem, the WB argues that free public higher education is inequitable because it provides services to high income students, whereas private universities serve low income groups.

Indeed, Winkler (1990:iii) contends that low income students lack the academic preparation to either gain entrance to or successfully compete in the public university, and therefore they do not enrol in universities at all or they attend private institutions. As a result, "low income students are often more likely to pay for their education, and government-financed higher education subsidies are heavily skewed in favor of higher income families" (iii). This argument is reiterated on page 64 ("in terms of equity effects, there is no reason why financial aid should be limited to low income students attending public institutions") and on page 76, where he claims that "in some Latin American countries private institutions provide greater access for low income students than do public institutions". Moreover, he contends that fees are not a primary barrier to access (p. 5).

Unfortunately, Winkler is unable to provide enough evidence to support these arguments. First, although some exceptions may exist, in general terms private institutions have much higher representation of high income and a much lower representation of low income students than do public institutions (Levy 1986:54). Second, even the WB acknowledged that the introduction of fees has resulted in equity problems, due to government's inability to maintain funding (Albrecht and Ziderman 1992, Brunner 1993).

The second problem with the WB argument is its glorification of private higher education as a model to follow. Winkler argues that declines in spending led to declines in the quality of public institutions, and this, in turn, to the growth of private institutions (iii, 69 and 77). This double causal relationship can be analyzed on two levels. First, by explaining the growth of private universities via low funding to public ones, Winkler acknowledges that budget cuts affect quality. However, he argues that an increase in funding is not necessarily linked to a rise in quality because there is no assurance that additional spending would be used efficiently. This 'inefficiency' argument, widely used by state officials to justify zero increases to public universities, contradicts his explanation of quality decline in public universities. It also contradicts his caveat that differential costs may be attributed to inefficiency, but they also may reflect differences in institutional missions, objectives and quality. Second, the explanation of the growth of private universities as a result of public decline in quality contradicts his assertion that private universities have lower entrance standards (iii).

In addition, he recommends that governments provide equal funding to public and private institutions, arguing that they generate similar social benefits (xii and xv). However, since most private universities concentrate almost exclusively on inexpensive disciplines (i.e. humanities, business, law) and do not engage in research (Levy 1986, Brunner 1990), the assertion that social returns are similar is disputable. Furthermore, he contends that the fact that university rectors in public universities are frequently elected by the academic community means they are often more responsive to internal pressures than they are to external pressures or to objectives of academic quality (p. 15). The causal connection between institutional autonomy and low interest in academic quality is unclear at best and a logical fallacy at worst, particularly taking into account that there is no evidence that private universities have more quality than public universities [3].

The advantages of private education have been also addressed by Guy Sorman (the French philosopher author of "The new wealth of nations") who, in a special reference to Argentina, said that the main problem of this country is the perpetuation of a hierarchical system. For him, the solution to this problem lies basically in "breaking the monopoly of

public education, privatizing and diversifying pedagogical experiences" [4]. In a country where the contribution of the private sector to research and development is practically insignificant [5], and where the great expansion of higher education during the last two decades led to the creation of many unregulated private institutions which are criticized by most academics as being profit-seeking ventures with low standards, poor quality of instruction, scarce research and a lack of commitment for improving education, Sorman's recommendation is questionable.

In summary, the ideological preference of neoliberal and WB experts for the private sector leads them to accept several contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies in their proposed agenda for reform. The comparisons between 'efficient and responsive' private universities and 'inefficient and unaccountable' public institutions fail to recognize that the Latin American higher education system (both public and private) is fragmented into a diversity of segments with dissimilar qualities and missions. Winkler's inability or unwillingness to distinguish elite from nonelite private universities allows him to use them selectively throughout his document in order to support his arguments.

Finally, a third problem consists of a biased assessment of the implications of revenue diversification, highlighting its benefits and disregarding possible negative consequences. Indeed, Winkler claims that a diversification of revenue sources invests the university more institutional autonomy because it is no longer entirely subjected to the arbitrariness and animosities of volatile political regimes. However, he also contends that new sources of revenue imply accountability and loss of autonomy (Winkler 1990:73).

The apparent contradiction between the two statements can be explained by the existance of a policy that grants universities with autonomy from government control but only to increase its accountability to the market. As Neave and van Vught reported for the case of Europe (see chapter 2), the replacement of government by market sources does not necessarily promote more autonomy, but a rather a new type of dependency. Secondly, the WB provides little attempt to discuss the potential problems derived from private funding expressed by the academic community, which were examined in the last section of chapter 2. The WB also omits any mention of how to prevent the use of the proposed performance evaluations for political purposes.

b) Institutional capitalism in action: strategizing change

In its proposals to achieve the success of the university restructuring, the WB recognizes possible obstacles and considers a variety of strategies to overcome them. For the WB, the three main constraints to changes in Latin American higher education policy are values, institutional practices and political practices. In relation to the first obstacle, it is claimed that the political and administrative feasibility of university change depends on a change in prevailing values regarding university autonomy and the role of private higher education (Winkler 1990:30, WB 1992, WB 1993:90).[6]

In regard to institutional practices, the WB attributes the slow pace of change to the conservatism of Latin American universities, to the power of tenured professors, to the participation of students in university governance and to the fact that universities are legally autonomous (Winkler 1990:46, WB 1993:89). A third, and frequently-mentioned factor in WB analyses, is the highly politicized nature of the Latin American university (Winkler 1990:2, WB 1993:83). Given these obstacles, the scheme advanced by the WB to impose the agenda of university restructuring includes several strategies that combine persuasion, coercion and reward. Among them are the following:

- intermingling of functions

As was already pointed out in chapter 3, the leverage enjoyed by the WB in shaping the direction of university restructuring is enhanced by an institutional strategy consisting of blending together activities previously undertaken by different agencies. Indeed, one of the key strategies used by the WB to effectively advance its agenda is the amalgamation of funding, research and policy formulation under one single roof (Morales-Gómez 1990, Samoff 1992). First, by tying loans to the adoption and implementation of policy recommendations, the WB exercises considerable influence over national governments.

Although the process of conditionality is often subtle and complex, its existence is beyond doubt [7]. Brock-Utne (1993), using the Tanzanian case, reports that WB assistance is almost exclusively for the development of private schools. In Argentina, Fossedal's suggestion that World Bank loans are conditional on certain policies (see footnote 7) was confirmed by a WB representative who clearly stated that among its recommended policies are the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of labor regulations [8]. At the same time, by justifying those policy recommendations using its own research findings, the WB is able to persuade many academics about the necessity and desirability of a particular type of university restructuring and to frame the university debate within its own logic, exluding alternative approaches based on different premises.

- leadership for political consensus

In its documents, the WB estimates that a favorable environment for university restructuring in a given country occurs when government officials announce their intention of introducing fees in public universities, when media discuss public university's costs, and when it becomes clear for all interested parties that the extent of the crisis makes it impossible to improve quality under the current system. To create this environment, the WB advises governments to build consensus among intellectuals, politicians and media in favor of the proposed reforms, and to mobilize the "most progressive and farsighted citizens" behind it (WB 1991). Likewise, consensus should be built among congressmen, retired university senior administrators and politicians respected by the academic community. Interestingly, the WB explicitly recommends that a key location for external agencies to be involved in Latin American countries is the Ministry of Finance, "as this is where funding decisions can be heavily influenced" (Carlson 1992:98). This situation is evident in Argentina, where the government unit in charge of developing research and policies on university restructuring (Project 06) is funded through a WB loan and operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

- peremptory discourse

The use of a peremptory discourse allows the WB to dismiss the arguments of the opposition. The authoritarianism of the WB discourse on university restructuring manifests itself in at least three different ways. First, in the use of excessive generalizations and the presentation of preliminary and fragile findings as indisputable research evidence (Samoff 1992:62-63). Second, in belittling adversaries (namely universities who oppose market logic) as conservative institutions engrossed in preserving the status quo, implying that any change, regardless of its direction, is progressive by definition and that any resistance to such change is by definition an emotional attachment to a dysfunctional past. At the same time, university leaders who do not espouse the restructuring agenda are portrayed as weak (WB 1993:90). A third expression of the peremptory discourse is the use of a language that limits options and depicts alternatives to the heteronomous university as infeasible. For instance, once it is assumed that government spending is not going to increase, and that demand for higher education is not going to decline, the logical conclusion of these two

premises is the "impossibility of improving quality under the current system" (WB 1991: vi) and the subsequent imperative for privatization.

The use of a restrictive language is also observable in the presentation of policy recommendations as predictions, and possible scenarios as unavoidable fate, reifying social forces. Winkler (1990: xiv and 41) forecasts that in the near future, the private share of university financing in Argentina will continue to grow, due to either growth of the private sector or cost-recovery in the public sector. Likewise, Brunner (1992) predicts that "the deterioration of public universities will deepen, and this process will be parallel to the substitutive role of the private sector which is increasingly taking in its hands the education of the elites and the most qualified professionals" [9]. This *inevitability argument* assumes grotesque proportions in the case of Psacharopoulos (1992), who prognosticated that a combination of tuition fees and student loans will be the dominant method of higher education financing in Europe, if not the world, not only in the near future, but... in the next millennium!

- technical-economic rationale

The WB presents itself as a technical agency promoting rational reforms, while it portrays its opponents as conservative defenders of the status quo. The WB presents itself as a rational, scientific actor, while adversaries are depicted as political actors. In this context, the utilitarian, no-nonsense, quantitative dimensions of reform based on cost-effectiveness are highlighted, while its political and social agenda is generally obscured. The 'technicality' stance of the WB can be observed in Winkler (1990:105), who argues that "Latin American higher education provides a textbook example where problems are evident and desirable public policy (from the economic perspective at least) is quite easily determined, but the design of strategies to successfully implement those policies is sometimes extremely difficult", and attributes these difficulties to political and institutional constraints. Statements like this enable the WB to successfully hide a political agenda behind a technical discourse (Walker 1984, Briceño 1988:41, Morales-Gómez 1990, Omari 1991) [10].

- avoidance of conflicting issues

The WB forewarns governments attempting university restructuring that the high politicization of university environments calls for cautious strategies based on piecemeal reforms, particularly in relation to sensitive issues. It also notes that the degree of political support for existing governing systems makes major changes in university governance unlikely, and hence the challenge to policy-makers is to develop reform strategies within the existing governance structure Winkler 1990:14, WB 1992). A senior economist of the WB summarized this situation as follows:

> *No doubt in pressing for reform and rationalization, the Bank will have inevitably incurred the resentment, if not the odium, of diverse constituencies. Higher education is an especially difficult sector in which to engage reform. Faculty, as well as students, may represent articulate and potentially politically volatile groups. Governments must be sensitive to their possible reaction to initially unpopular reforms. Clearly, enacting too many reforms, too quickly can outstrip the system's implementation capacity, have unexpected negative effects and create strong opposition to reform* (Ziderman 1990:28).

Hence, a pivotal strategy to increase the feasibility of the reform is to diminish resistance to it by avoiding, at least in the beginning, matters more likely to prompt emotional issues. Since autonomy, free education and open admissions are almost sacred values in Latin

American universities, the WB recommends to governments a number of tactics to delay or at least reduce conflict. For instance, Winkler (1990:85) advises that, due to the high regard for university autonomy, the challenge is how best to improve budgeting practices while having the smallest impact on autonomy. In the same vein, Eisemon and Salmi (1993) advise governments to shift from direct participation in university governance to broader, more indirect forms of control (distance control) that may be less irritable.

A similar view is evident in relation to fees. Winkler clearly states that "politically, both within and outside the university, there are high costs to advocating tuition increases and few short-run benefits" (p. 77). He suggests that the tradition of free higher education, its operationalization as a constitutional principle, the widespread perception that very low tuition fees assure equality of educational opportunity, and the role of students in university governance are all factors that militate against introduction of fees.

To reduce the opposition of professors and administrators, Carlson (1992) advises governments to treat them as colleagues rather than adversaries, avoiding top-down approaches to the university. This includes giving administrators certain autonomy to manage university finances, which would increase their willingness to implement reforms. Another recommendation to appease administrators is to stress that fees are not going to replace state funding, but rather provide additional resources. To reduce student opposition, Carlson's recommendation is to never present fee increases without including a proposal for loan programs, emphasizing the positive impact of these two policies on quality and equity, respectively.

Carlson also recommends the 'salami tactic', in which finance reforms are enacted incrementally with each incoming class. Since reforms are 'grandfathered', enrolled students retain their benefits and therefore are unlikely to protest. Likewise, by introducing changes on a small scale, resistance is lower. However, if opposition is too high, another strategy is recommended, namely to avoid charging direct fees, requiring instead that students pay an array of indirect fees. In order to avoid discord, Carlson advises that these charges not be called tuition fees but rather service fees (e.g. library, computers, laboratories). An additional strategy is to gain the support of low income students participating in nonelite private institutions (technological and training schools), and to mobilize them to demonstrate their approval of the financial reforms.

- non-democratic decision-making process

From the WB perspective, the possibilities of guiding the restructuring of the public university in the desired direction increase when the most important decisions are made by a select group of authorities and intellectuals. A democratic process, in which all relevant documentation is available for public scrutiny, and all discussions are open to all interested parties, could be rather inefficient and subject to long delays. Indeed, the WB reports that one of the main problems of higher education in Argentina is its high politicization, meaning by this institutional autonomy, student participation in electing university authorities and political confrontations.

However, a façade of participation must be maintained to confer some legitimacy on the process. In Nigeria, the university restructuring agenda is controlled by a committee formed by the representatives of the military government, World Bank staff, and prominent bureaucrats from the national university commission. Documentation related to proposed university changes is kept from public scrutiny, and only circulated to the inner circle of 'reformers'. The university community is encouraged to participate in the debates on institutional restructuring, but it has no access to the documents on reform. Hence, the democratic process becomes in essence a pseudo-democratic process in which one of the

players lacks essential information [11]. In other countries, this pseudo-participation has been implemented through encouraging written responses to draft documents, or through educational roundtables in which participation is restricted by government invitation. In Argentina, as already mentioned, the strategy and direction of university restructuring is developed mainly in the headquarters of the Ministry of Economy, where Project 06 - financed by the WB- plays a significant role. The participation of university actors in this process is very low. It is not rare that university actors learn about government proposals through draft documents leaked to the media, on occasions as an intentional strategy to test public reaction. As was seen in chapter 4, the Argentinean Minister of Education has been put in the embarrassing situation of first denying and eventually admitting the existence of certain proposals released by the local press.

- wooing of talented intellectuals

The WB is able to influence the direction of university reform not only through a formidable mobilization of financial resources, but of intellectual resources as well. The competitive salaries offered by the Bank allow it to hire top quality expertise in many developing countries. It has been reported that the WB hires personnel to rewrite policy papers in order to appeal to the donor community, and that experts in developing countries who disagree with WB educational policies silence their criticisms to avoid jeopardizing attractive stipends (Brock-Utne 1993) [12]. In Latin America, the recent phenomenon of intellectuals working for international agencies has been analyzed by Petras (1991), who refers to them as 'institutional intellectual entrepreneurs' [13].

As a result of a skillful use of the aforementioned strategies, the WB has acquired a strong capacity to influence the university debate worldwide. In many Latin American countries, the discourses of government bureaucrats of different countries resemble one another, and their main justifications for university restructuring are inescapably similar to WB arguments [14]. On occasions, government officials who initially disagree with certain WB policies eventually accept them. In Argentina, for instance, the impact of WB analyses on staff working under WB funding was recognized by a top official at the Ministry of Economy who was related to Project 06:

> *Before starting to work here, I was against user fees, but now I discovered that the poor are financing the rich through taxes.*

Within each country, these rationales filter down to the different government allies in advancing the heteronomous agenda. In Argentina, as was shown in the preceding chapters, similar arguments were simultaneously advanced by government officials, Project 06 experts, and those university authorities, professors, alumni and student leaders who could be classified as 'marketventionists'. For example, many of these actors advanced the argument for fees based on differential rates of return in higher and primary education articulated by the WB. When these actors raised the argument based on equity to justify fees, I usually asked if a progressive tax system would not be a fairer method of achieving social equity. Curiously enough, none of the interviewees showed any surprise over the question and, without hesitation, all answered with the same argument: "a tax reform is not feasible in this country at least until the year 2,000, and we need responses right now". Furthermore, the very same argument has been advanced by government officials in other Latin American countries.

In the same vein, most Argentine marketventionists concur with the need to reduce the proportion of non-academic staff relative to academic staff, to provide incentives to outstanding personnel in order to reward good performance, to channel tuition fees to

provide loans and scholarships to poor students, and to increase government's control over university activities and finances, all policies recommended by the WB. These commonalties are difficult to explain without considering the concept of institutional capitalism as described in chapter 3, and thus acknowledging the role of organizations such as the WB in articulating and promoting with considerable deliberation the package of university reform agenda.

2. National level

At the national level, the key macro-process is the retrenchment of the state. As was indicated in chapter 3, state retrenchment is not uniform, but selective. In addition to this almost universal process, university restructuring is affected by three specific elements which are peculiar of every national formation: the historical pattern of development, party politics, and class dynamics.

a) state retrenchment

In Latin America, the retrenchment of the state from the public sphere is closely related to the payment of the debt. The IMF and the WB maintain that there is a direct causal relationship between the fiscal deficit of Latin American states and the accumulation of external debt. However, this diagnosis has been challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds by those who argue that the process has been exactly the opposite, that is, that an account deficit originating in causes other than fiscal deficits resulted in external borrowing, which in turn led to debt-service payments and a fiscal deficit (Thorp and Whitehead 1987, Taylor 1988, Anglade and Fortín 1990). Regardless of the succession of events, Latin American governments are under intense international pressure to use state revenues for payment of international debt. As of December 31, 1992, Argentina's overall debt (internal and external) stood at US 70 bn., with annual interest liabilities equivalent to 2% of GDP [15]. Most of Argentina's agreements with foreign banks for loans are 'co-ordinated' with the IMF and are linked with Argentina's loan agreements with the WB and the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). For 1993-1994, Argentina obtained loans from the WB totalling US $1,960 million, which puts her as the third most indebted client of the WB, after only China and India.

In this context, the state is transferring to the private sector, both national and foreign, strategic -and in many cases financially healthy- enterprises such as communications, energy, banking, transportation and heavy industry. Such privatization of public enterprises and assets is often accompanied by 'deregulation' of labor legislation, replacing it by less protective and more 'competitive' rules, reducing restrictions on private enterprises. Profitable enterprises are sold to private groups, while those which are non profitable must be rapidly converted into a cost-recovery pattern, reduced or eventually eliminated. In Argentina, privatization has already occurred in traditional public-owned sectors such as petrochemical companies, oil fields and steel factories. Likewise, privatization includes a wide range of services traditionally provided by the government, such as telephones, airlines, water supply, electricity, gas, postal and telegraphic services, highways, railways and subways. The selling off of public assets is also taking place in military and maritime enterprises, and state-owned resorts.

The main argument made to support these policies is that the public sector is inefficient, while the private sector is more competitive [16]. Hence, the benefits of privatization are twofold: it alleviates the public budget, and improves the provision of the services as well. The depth and scope of privatization strategies have been personally ensured by President Menem, who stated that his policies of state reform, market economy, and liberalization of

exchange controls are so successful that "Chile, Brazil and Russia are following the Argentine example in the area of privatization" [17]. He also announced that "all those things that can be done by private agents will not be done by the state" (Ministerio de Educación 1991: 72). Unlike his mentor Perón, who struggled against the corporations that attempted to control the state apparatus, the current President Menem declared: "He who wishes to go against corporations, can do it if he likes, but I do not give a dime for his salary" (quoted in Martínez 1991) [18].

The erosion of public services is provoking a flight toward private institutions. Since 1960 to 1990, the number of private schools in Argentina has quadrupled, and currently there are 2,700 private schools which enrol more than 2 million students. In the Province of Buenos Aires, in only five years (1986-1991) and despite the economic crisis, private education increased by 45% (Página 12, March 1, 1992). A top-level functionary acknowledged that the flight towards private schools has been greatly hastened by the recent deterioration of public education, including strikes, discipline problems, etc. In his interpretation, many families are sending their children to private schools because "they prefer more stability, less teachers' absenteeism, more control over students and more personalized attention" (La Prensa, June 10, 1991:6).

As was mentioned in the preceding chapters, the winds of privatization led to proposals for privatizing Conicet, the national research system. These proposals, prompted by WB advice, generated deep concern and strong criticisms not only in Argentina but also abroad. Indeed, the US National Academy of Sciences sent a letter to President Menem expressing its concern about the implications of drastic cutbacks for science and technology, and privatization of research institutes and universities. The letter indicated to the President that "in the US, Europe and Japan, these private institutions have often short term goals: industry, for example, is product-oriented. Only the state has the capacity to orient basic science, which generates discoveries that, in turn, lead to concrete advances in health, environment, agriculture, defense, biotechnology and industrial competitiveness" (La Nación, April 7, 1991).

Paradoxically, while in the US -the promulgator of the free market economy- R&D activities are funded mainly by the state [19], in Argentina "the pupils of the US model" (as the government calls itself [20]) attempted to leave the scientific apparatus in the hands of the private sector. As Pichel (1991) shows, such a measure would mean the end of technology transfer and the elimination of qualified personnel that industry requires (Pichel 1991). Even the WB, an enthusiastic advocate of privatization, points out that governments need to play an important role in financing basic research, including research-related graduate education (Winkler 1990:66). In addition to the sale of state companies, governments' efforts to quickly collect revenues in order to finance the deficit (mainly to pay the external debt), and to reduce consumption (and therefore inflation), include an emphasis on export and indirect taxes, and an increase in the prices charged for (or reduction in the quality of) public services.

In a detailed analysis of the impact of IMF policies on economic stabilization, using Argentina as a case study, Manzetti (1991) concludes that stabilization policies had a negative impact on income distribution. He argues that, although this strategy was successful in achieving those goals set by the IMF, it also created larger social inequalities. As a matter of fact, direct taxes in Argentina are extremely low (6.2% of total public revenues), not only in comparison with developed countries like Italy (37.7%) or the U.K. (45.1%), but also in relation to similar Latin American countries such as Brazil (20.8%) or Venezuela (43%) (World Bank 1989:186). Moreover, Argentina has one of the most regressive tax systems in the world. Consumption taxes increased from 25% in 1972 to

42.6% in 1985, while income and capital taxes decreased from 15.% to 3.1%. This means that during the last 20 years the income and capital tax has decreased 75.2%, while consumption tax has increased 70.4% in real values (García 1991:12). When justifying the low capacity of the state to collect income and property tax, to avoid tax evasion [21] or to make the tax burden better distributed across social classes, government officials usually blame the high bureaucratization, inefficiency and corruption of the tax administration, and the difficulties of generating and implementing a new revenue system.

Manzetti's proposition that wage earners' income share of the GDP and purchasing power declined with IMF-supported adjustment programs is consistent with the findings of related research, such as that of Pastor (1987), Frenkel and Fanelli (1987), Anglade and Fortín (1990) and Meller (1991). One of the interviewees analyzed the logic of this situation in the following way:

> *In the Argentinean model, as in the Thatcher and Reagan models, capital accumulation is achieved through the transfer of resources from the poor sectors in society to the rich ones. There are two key mechanisms in this transfer, in order to reduce the budget deficit and promote capital: first, a regressive tax system (punishing consumption and rewarding industrialists); second, diminishing social expenditure. In summary, it is not simply that industry grew while public services and workers' living conditions deteriorated. Industry grew precisely because public services and workers' living conditions deteriorated.*

Interestingly, despite privatization efforts carried out by the government, Argentina's foreign debt increased US $ 7 billion (11%) by 1993, since Menem took office in 1990. In this context, the legitimacy and the popularity of Menem's regime can be explained by its success in preserving economic stability (control of inflation, exchange rates) and even in promoting some growth. Indeed, the international experience shows that immediately after stabilization policies are adopted, a government can count on a "grace period" in which interest groups hold back from confrontational behavior and grant the authorities a 'blank check'. However, once stability is achieved, the blank check expires, and so does the justification for sacrifices and self-restraint, since social groups (particularly the victims of the stabilization period) will return to claim the restoration of their losses. In other words, if privatization results in increasing inequalities, and redistributive policies are not implemented, the popularity presently enjoyed by the Argentinean government may be just a temporary honeymoon. As Talbot pointed out in an article published in *Time Magazine*

> *To sustain a stable democracy, a country needs more than elections; it needs a strong state. When the people see themselves as victims rather than beneficiaries of the system, they have little use for the ballot box and little regard for constitutional procedure"... Latin American governments "are embarked on free-market reforms that entail massive hardships in the short and middle run. And they are doing all this without the benefit of a strong state.* [22]

- differential retrenchment

Once governments decide to decrease their spending in order to cover the deficit and to pay the external debt, the next question is what to cut and how much. This generates in the public sector of many countries an intensified struggle for increasingly scarce resources. In many Latin American countries, as in other developing and developed areas [23], it has been widely documented that one of the most affected sectors in terms of budget allocation has been education. In this regard, it has been suggested that in times of economic crisis education suffers more than other social sectors (i.e. health, housing, welfare) because education does not rank high in the political agenda.

As a Latin American bureaucrat said: "politicians don't win elections campaigning for education" (quoted in Reimers 1991:349). In this region, there is a direct relationship between servicing the public debt and declines in educational expenditure, which in turn leads to declines in quality. Likewise, and linked to the aforementioned pattern of income distribution, inequities in Latin American educational systems are not only not reduced but reinforced, and hence access and permanency in school become more and more difficult (Dieguez 1986, Prawda 1989, Psacharopoulos and Steir 1987, Slaughter 1990, Reimers 1990 and 1991).

In Latin America, per capita expenditures on education increased by 4.29% per year between 1975 and 1980, while they decreased by 6.14% between 1980 and 1985. Reimers (1991:322) summarizes this shift by stating that "the progress in educational finance made in the seventies was undone in the eighties". He claims that this structural adjustment program impacts educational provision in two ways. First, via its effects on state expenditures on education, and second, through a deterioration of living conditions of most students.

Within the educational system, the relative share of each level or sub-system in the adjustment program is unclear. According to Omari, in times of budgetary cuts, higher education is more vulnerable than the other educational levels, and this relative weakness stems from a variety of factors. First, many government officials contend that higher education is elitist, extravagant, wasteful, arrogant, and that it benefits the upper segments of society rather than the masses. Second, they perceive that graduate unemployment leads to social disharmony, which eventually may threaten the stability of the government. Third, based on WB analyses, they consider that higher education generates lower social returns than other educational levels. Fourth, government officials tend to accuse both academics and students as being too critical with respect to the status quo. The latter perception plays a key role in deciding budgetary cuts under authoritarian regimes (Omari 1991, see also Psacharopoulos 1990).

Omari's statement may hold true for some developing countries, but not necessarily for Latin America, where, according to Reimers (1991:328, 342 and 349), adjustment programs implemented in the 1980s had a disproportionate impact on primary education. In fact, Reimers argues that higher education in Latin America usually receives a higher share of the total educational expenditure than the other subsystems, and in times of crisis, lower levels of education suffer more than higher levels. For him, this is due to the important role of students in national politics and the bargaining power of university bureaucrats. In order to avoid political turmoil, in some cases the government is not willing to reallocate educational resources in such a way that could affect universities. To illustrate this point, Reimers quotes a senior member of the Venezuelan Ministry of Education, who following the opposite strategy of his Nigerian counterpart quoted in chapter 2 (see p. 30) summarized this issue in the following way: "There is really nothing we can do about the universities; the best we can do is give them what they want and leave them alone" (Reimers 1991:350).

In support of Reimers' argument, Levy (1986) contends that in recent years expenditures have soared faster in higher education than in primary or secondary education. On average, higher education receives 25% of the educational budget, with some cases reaching even 40%. Beyond the relative share of universities with respect to other levels of the educational system, it is clear that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, state financial support to universities is declining [24]. In Argentina, while the public statements of government officials present higher education as a government priority, the federal budget directed to education in 1990 represented only 28% of the one assigned in 1987 [25]

Moreover, it is clear that the government is willing to follow the WB recommendation of reallocating resources from higher to basic education. As a prominent former official at the Ministry of Education put it in one of the interviews, "in this country 50% of the educational spending goes to the non-university sector, which provides service to 5 million students, while the other half goes to merely 500,000 university students. If the poor people find these figures out, they will set fire to both the university and the ministry of education". The university community rejects this approach, accusing the WB and the government of using a 'divide and rule' strategy which ignites confrontation among educational actors. In reference to this issue, one of the interviewees complained that "the WB is creating a false antagonism between the educational subsystems."

It is important to note that state retrenchment from university funding does not necessarily result in a greater degree of institutional autonomy. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, retrenchment is financial, but not political, and hence it simultaneously implies less funding and more control. As a senior official stated "it is important to link the university with the state. We want to put the university closer to the government".

b) the political economy of Argentina: development model, party politics and class dynamics

The previous section illustrates how the macro-process of state retrenchment that takes place in most countries is also affecting Argentina. However, at the level of national formations, there are at least three other elements that have an influence on the destiny of the university: the historical pattern of development, party politics, and class dynamics. The Argentinean historical pattern of development shows an interesting paradox. Contrary to the assertions of human capital theory and modernization theories, during the 20th century Argentina became culturally richer and economically poorer. At the same time that the university expanded, the economy started to fall (Delich 1990). The economic decay of Argentina is not only considerable, but also difficult to explain.

While at the beginning of the century Argentina enjoyed a degree of political stability and economic development almost without precedence in Latin America, during the second part of the century the trend was exactly the opposite: economic stagnation and political turmoil. From being ranked among those countries with the highest income per head, Argentina is placed today much lower in the world income leagues. In terms of exports, Argentine world's position descended from the 12th place in 1930 to the 39th place in 1987 [26]. In terms of gross national product, from being one of the ten richest countries in the world, Argentina has descended to the 84th position [27]. A few decades after its glorious past, Argentina has become a synonym for decay, economic mismanagement, hyperinflation, strangulation, political instability, increasing dependency, praetorianism [28], authoritarianism, chaos and violence.

The economic structure has changed considerably during the last 40 years. Agriculture has decreased from 20% of GNP in 1946 to 11% in 1983. Conversely, industry increased from 20% in 1946 to its highest share, about 37% in 1974, the year in which services reached more than 50% of the GNP. Since then, a consistent process of de-industrialization, both in terms of product and employment, has been taking place. The country has suffered significantly in terms of the misallocation of resources, a slow rate of growth, recurrent political and financial crises, a decrease in wages, big fiscal deficits, a skyrocketing foreign indebtedness and increasing inflation. (Di Tella and Dornbusch 1989).

Although during the late 1950s and the 1960s large investments resulted in important industrial growth, during the 1970s the situation drastically changed. At that time,

especially since the seizure of power by the last military regime (1976-83), Argentina was not only lagging behind the rest of the world (as it did during the previous decades) but it started to pursue a different direction. Its industrial product stopped growing, capital investment had a negative growth, and from a slow growth it moved to a net decline of the accumulated wealth. In a world characterized by an increased technological competition and industrial modernization, the then Minister of Finance Martínez de Hoz threw opened the economy exorbitantly and favored speculative practices, which resulted in continuous recession, decapitalization, uncertainty and social suffering.

Despite the contracting of a considerable external debt, during the military regime real wages went down to their lowest level in many years [29]. Indeed, since the late 1960s, wages have gone down more than 15%, while per capita income has been stagnant and social services deteriorated: while in the 1960s there were 12,000 beds available in public hospitals, in the 1990s that figure has fallen to 4,500. Since the 1970s, living standards and incomes have fallen steeply and continuously, and inflation had become part of everyday life: with the only exception of two years, from 1975 on it has exceeded 140 per cent every year, and when Menem took power, annual inflation was 12,000%.

The vicious Argentine economy can be illustrated by the fact that, during most of 1989, it was possible to obtain a monthly interest rate of 700% in local currency and a yearly interest rate of 40% in US dollars. Those rates only contributed to a rapid growth of the already large state deficit and the accounts of astute speculators. For this reason, when President Menem took power, he argued that Argentine capitalism "is a joke; it is just a simulation game characterized by minimum risk and maximum speculation, and an isolation from the political and commercial world" (Clarín, International Edition, 3-9 Sept 1990).

In 1988 the GNP decreased 2% and in 1989 more than 5%. In 1989, industrial production was 18% lower than that of 1980, and in 1990 it decreased about 50% relative to 1989. During 1990, when the gross industrial product was 25% lower than that of fifteen years before, production fell 4.5% (the third consecutive annual negative growth since 1987), global consumption dropped 8% and gross internal investment decreased by at least 25%, and industries used only 50% of their potential (Ortúzar 1990, La Prensa, April 1, 1990, Página 12, January 16, 1991:8). For the 12-month period ending in March, 1990, the cost of living reached 20,666 per cent. In 1990, according to figures of the Ministry of Labor, more than 30% of the economically active population (4,300,000 out of 12,000,000 people) was unemployed or underemployed.

Economic recession and lack of an internal market resulted in more capital out-flow, while foreign investment was declining. This had clear effects in the standard of living of the population. Between 1980 and 1990, the purchasing power of salaries fell more than 50% (Ortúzar 1990; Clarín, International Edition, Sept. 3, 1990:9; La Prensa, March 7, 1991:8; The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1991). While in 1980, each student bought 2.7 books, in 1990 he/she was able to buy only 0.3 books, which means one book for every three students. In that year, it was also estimated that 70% of the children who went to a hospital for attention evidenced a certain degree of malnutrition, and among them, more than half were extremely malnourished. In the peripheries of the capital city, half of a population of 3,200,000 persons live in extreme poverty. According to some sources (Ortúzar 1990; La Prensa, March 7, 1991:8), in 1990 one third of Argentina's population still lacked potable water and two thirds lacked access to sewage systems. In terms of access to basic services, Argentina was considered by those sources as the worst of all Latin American countries, the only exceptions being Nicaragua and Haiti.

In summary, over the last decades, Argentina has become an outstanding example of failed development. The astonishing pattern of growth of the second half of last century and the first quarter of this century led the Argentine governing elites and many foreign observers to anticipate, based on the experience of precedent cases, that growth would continue and that, within a reasonable period of time, Argentina would join the ranks of the world's rich and powerful nations. Perhaps among the most notable of these foreign observers are Zbigniew Brzenzinsky, who predicted that "given its natural and human resources, Argentina should be a rich country" (see Baron 1989) and Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson who, on the occasion of his presidential address to the International Economic Association in Mexico City in 1980, pointed out how Argentina betrayed the predictions of the great majority of developmental economists and economic historians:

> *If someone in 1945 had asked: 'What part of the world do you expect to experience the most dramatic take-off in the next three decades?', probably I would have given an answer something like the following: 'Argentina is the wave of the future. It has a temperate climate. Its density of population provides a favorable natural resource endowment per employee. By historical accident its present population is the fairly homogeneous progeny of Western European nations. And Argentina is in 1945 at that intermediate stage of development from which rapid growth is most easily expected'. How wrong I would have been. Is it farfetched...to fear that many of our mixed economies will begin to suffer their own version of the Argentine sickness?*

Indeed, Argentina's curvilinear development has troubled scholars for several decades now because it challenges explanations advanced by structural functionalism, classical Marxism, dependency theory, modernization theory, 'new country' theories and human capital theory. This enigma has been dubbed the 'Argentine question' (Prebisch 1950, Waisman 1987). Indeed, it has been said that the failure of Argentina is "one of the mysteries of our time" (Naipaul 1972), that it presents one of the most paradoxical cases in contemporary economic experience (Ferrer 1967), and that it is one of the two countries (the other being Japan) whose evolution could not be understood by economic theory (Kuznetz, cited in Waisman 1987) [30].

Argentina has been also characterized as "strikingly backward in relation to its relative riches", "a land of endless promise and never-ending frustration", "one of the most extravagant enigmas of this century", "a frustrated destiny", "an inexplicable and perverse downhill" and "a cruel joke of fate". Even W.W. Rostow believed that Argentina had already "taken off", and thus that sustained growth was assured and irreversible. Moreover, it has been classified as a 'deviant case' in relation to other lands of recent settlement such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US. It has also been claimed that, since Argentina's natural and human resources provide the potential and the feasibility of independent development, poverty in such a country is unacceptable, and underdevelopment is a mistery (Goldwert 1972, Lewis 1978, Snow, 1984, Ferrer 1985, Walter 1988, Halperin Donghi 1988, Martínez 1990, Korol and Sábato 1990). Ironically, whereas virtually all economists agree that Argentina has all the ingredients of a sound and stable economy, the nation has accumulated one of the largest per capita external debts in the world.

The reasons for the failure of Argentina to become a developed country are various, complex and sometimes contradictory, and have been analyzed elsewhere [31]. In short, a combination of foreign and domestic factors, including class dynamics, the role of the state, militarism, cultural values, international trade and geopolitics interacted in a particular way, propelling Argentinean development in a certain direction.

In the 1990s, the Argentinean model of development is based on adjustment rather than growth. As was pointed out above, under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank,

the Argentinean political leadership is implementing, often through an abuse of democratic procedures [32], an economic program not very different from those applied in other Latin American countries. In essence, it is a program against inflation based on the adjustment of public finance (reducing the deficit), and on the reduction of inflation through a freeze on prices and salaries and recessionary policies [33]. Under this strategy it is possible to decrease the so called 'inertial inflation'. Once this is achieved, the next step is to allow selective increases in prices and salaries, according to the sectors of the economy selected for reactivation. At this stage of the process a vehement struggle for the benefits of the selected reactivation between capital and labor, and between sectors of the economy, will probably take place. In a praetorian system like the Argentine one, the possible consequences of a situation like this is an aggravation of social conflict, a conflict not only confronting capital and labor, but also internal sectors of capital. For instance, the development project of large industries allied to multinational corporations differs from the national project of small and medium enterprises. As will be seen in the following section, these dissimilar national projects are reflected in different projects for the university.

In the national context of Argentina, a second factor that affects university life is party politics. Some economists and political analysts (e.g. Wynia 1986, Moyano Llerena 1987, Llach 1987, Manzetti 1991) have argued that Argentine governments have traditionally been perceived as partisan agents that reward their followers and punish or ignore their opponents. The lack of consensus on government policies derived from this situation usually results in a legitimacy crisis, in which conflict is exacerbated rather than diminished.

This problem is particularly acute in the case of the public universities, where most rectors, administrators and leaders of interest groups (alumni, professors and students) have an ideological affinity (and often times a political affiliation too) with the Radical party. So, the usual conflict between the state and the university, which might be observable in many other countries as well, is aggravated in Argentina by the political confrontation between a Peronist government and a Radical university. Although top government officials and university leaders tend to disregard the influence of party politics in the hostile university-state relationship, most interviewees indicated that they latter play a great role, especially in the University of Buenos Aires, whose Rector is an active militant of the Radical Party. As one interviewee noted, "the low institutional stability and the scarcity of democratic life makes both university and governmental actors to be more loyal to the restricted interests of political parties than the broader educational and development goals of the nation".

The third factor to be considered at the national level is the decline of the middle class, the main actor in the 1918 reform. In addition to the general process of economic decay, in recent years the distribution of wealth also has suffered dramatic modifications, disfavoring the working and middle classes. While in 1950 the share of the national wealth enjoyed by salary and wage workers was about 50%, in 1989 it fell to 23%. In the mid-seventies about half of the Argentine population consisted of the middle class. In the early 1990s, only one third can be included in that category, while 60% belong to low income groups and the rest to high income groups. While in 1974 the middle classes shared more than 40% of the national income, in 1988 they obtained one third; in the same period, the high income group increased its share to about 25% (Marshall 1990, Morales Solá 1990). In 1991, an official survey conducted in Buenos Aires and surrounding area revealed that the poorest 10% of the population receive 1.8% of wealth, while the top 10% retain 32.8%. Furthermore, the poorest 20% receive 4.5%, whereas the top 20% absorb 50% of the national wealth. According to this survey, 30% of the families receive a monthly income below $260. Moreover, the majority of state revenues still derive from taxation of consumers and employees, while efforts to tax capital are not noticeable [34].

This trend has created a brand-new class: *the new poor,* formed by the millions who previously constituted the middle class. The increased gap between wealthy and poor leads to a polarized society in which a public, massive and free university is losing much of its support base. In addition to the misfortunes of the general economic crisis, which it shares with low income groups, the middle class must endure alone the crisis of the public university. As one interviewed noted

> *The public university crisis has different consequences for different social sectors. First, high income groups are unaffected by the crisis of public university, because those groups are able to manage anyway, as they always did and they always will do. Secondly, the low income groups do not have much access to university, and they have no interest in its fate or perceive it as an elitist place. Finally, we have the middle class, including poorly paid professors and unemployed graduates, which is the one that suffers the most the consequences of the university crisis.*

In other words, the deterioration of the public university is particularly affecting the middle class, whose diminishing social and economic presence makes it less able to articulate a strategy of defense of the public university.

3. Institutional level

At the institutional level, the key macro-process reshaping university life is the commodification of knowledge, a phenomenon that is rapidly transforming the practices and values of university actors. In addition tc this, it is pertinent to consider the organizational dynamic of the university, and the variety of intramural struggles.

a) commodification of knowledge

The commodification of knowledge is part and parcel of the 'commercial university' model described in chapter 2. As has been shown throughout this thesis, the pressure for knowledge commodification can be identified in the recommendations for cost recovery and privatization advanced by governments, university-business fora and international agencies. The adoption of these recommendations is becoming increasingly evident in the new practices, attitudes and mentalities of university actors throughout the world. This approach tends to conceive knowledge as a commodity, and university actors (mainly professors and students) as utilitarian beings dedicated to maximizing returns for their educational investments.

It can be argued that 'knowledge' has been deemed an important commodity by industrial and financial capital for a long time. What is qualitatively different today seems to be the fact that publically produced knowledge is being appropriated by private interests. As was discussed in chapter 2, a variety of knowledge products that before were considered to be a public good are now being treated as private goods. Universities, as producers of knowledge, are under new pressures for restructuring as a result.

In Argentina, this shift has been detected, among others, by the current Rector of Universidad de Córdoba, who observed that in present times abstract knowledge is made concrete, and ideas become materialized and subsequently made into business. He also noted that science and technology are bought and sold in the market, and that "what once was freely transmitted to an anxious and diffuse public in the universities has become a state secret, and has generated situations of espionage and business conflicts" (Delich 1988:23).

The conception of knowledge as a commodity can be also observed in the justifications against free education based on the fact that most things in this world are not free, an

argument advanced by Psacharopoulos (1989:11) and extensively repeated by Argentinean marketventionists in the government and in the university. Professors are also seen as essentially profit-seeking individuals, and consequently Latin American university administrators are instructed to consider opportunity costs, introducing a different salary scale for areas where labor costs are higher (computer science, electrical engineering, etc.) to successfully attract high quality faculty. In the same vein, it has been recommended that faculty salaries should be kept at their current low levels, with the expectation that, for that pay, faculty will effectively work part-time and that work will consist of teaching only (Winkler 1990:48). This WB recommendation has been already considered by the Argentinean government, which forwarded a decree proposal in which university teaching would be paid by the hour [35].

Likewise, students are conceived as rational investors in human capital, and student demand is assumed to reflect relative earnings and shortages in the job market. Hence, universities are encouraged to attract students by providing competitive programs in terms of price, quality and marketability of skills involved. To help students to make better career choices, universities should provide them with updated information on earnings, employment rates and employment opportunities (Winkler 1990:48, Ziderman 1993:17). Two objections can be raised to this perspective. First, it assumes that a purely instrumentalist logic (based on private returns) is at work in career choices, neglecting the fact that students may have also other considerations in mind while selecting a field of study. Second, as labor markets change rapidly and unpredictably, information provided to first-year students may become obsolete at graduation time.

The increasing presence of commodified knowledge in academic environments leads to the emergence of an entrepreneurial university. If government intervention does not correct market pressures, such an institution can give birth to a community of haves and have-nots in which the probable losers would be those in basic research and the humanities. The weakening of basic research under the new model is recognized by Winkler (1990), who recommends that productive researchers should be given reduced teaching loads and extra remuneration tied to research project funding. However, he admits that "private benefits are likely to be highest for instruction and applied research and development, and smallest for basic research (p. 66), and acknowledges that "this policy would clearly work to the disadvantage of faculty who do research but in areas for which funding is not readily available" (p. 105).

An illustration of the differential status of disciplines in the new model can be observed in Winkler's recommendations to Venezuela (p.43). In this country, a university diploma in education yields a private return of only 8% (less than half of the private return to engineering, which is 20.3%), and graduates from humanities and education have lower earnings than graduates from economic and social sciences. Winkler advises that, in order to raise the overall return to government investment in higher education, government resources allocated to science and economics should increase, whereas resources allocated to humanities and education should be reduced.

As knowledge becomes increasingly privatized and multinational corporations are able to produce or purchase the most important innovations, the research role of universities in dependent societies becomes proportionally restricted. As one expert linked to the government pointed out

> *The current expansion of MNCs limits the demand for university graduates, because the 'know how' is imported from abroad. In an extreme scenario where the market was controlled by MNCs, local scientific research would be practically nonexistent. In peripheral capitalism, the employment of university graduates will be concentrated in small and mid-size enterprises.*

As a matter of fact, according to the same source, 65% of university graduates in Argentina currently work as employees, and only the minority are liberal professionals (self-employed). In sum, entry of the university into the realm of commodity production of knowledge goods is leading to a market-oriented rationale in which teaching and research activities are based on demand, and demand on purchasing power. Individual entitlements are replaced by private investment, and use values by exchange values. At the Universidad de Buenos Aires, these changes in the material conditions of educational production are generating a change of mentality among those who are traditionally opposed to this logic.

For instance, in 1964, UBA rejected an important fund for research on the retina because the source of funding was the US Air Force, and because Chagas (a poverty disease) was considered a higher priority. Today, most university authorities regard those times as an exaggeration of the application of principles to daily life or as demagogic, anti-scientific populism. Hence, they point out that persisting with the same attitude today would constitute an anachronism. Two main factors were identified by the interviewees to explain the general change of mentality among authorities, faculty and students alike: on the one hand, economic hardships; on the other, the ability of the state to skillfully introduce previously tabooed issues in the university debate.

Indeed, as reported in chapters 4 to 6, the commodification of knowledge is increasingly shaping UBA's life. First, the pressure for establishing fees is presently more intense than ever: in some faculties voluntary fees have been implemented already, and students enrolled in graduate courses have been paying fees for years. Second, the sale of research and services to business and industry through UBATEC and bilateral contracts is expanding yearly. Third, activities carried out by the Secretary of Extension are becoming less community-oriented and more cost-recovery driven.

b) Organizational dynamics

As was noted in chapter 3, the three universal macro-processes do not affect all universities alike. These processes are mediated (reinforced and resisted) by concrete actors in each specific university. Institutional practices at UBA are clearly impacted by the rise of institutional capitalism, the retrenchment of the state and the commodification of knowledge. But they are also a product of internal dynamics. There was a criticism raised by marketventionists, and shared as a concern by several UBA leaders, be they administrators, professors or student leaders, that UBA's academic life is loaded with individualism and cannibalism, and that the institution consists of a structure atomized into thirteen separate faculties and multiple small token groups in which the unit is the individual person. It was also noted by many interviewees that professors do not feel any attachment to any particular structure, with the exception of their own *cátedra* [36].

The problem of individualism, which can be partially linked to the absence of a campus life, the scarcity of full-time faculty and low collegial communication, is aggravated by the existence of other intra-institutional problems. One of them is the low status of academics, who, as a result of a three-fold process, feel devalued and resented by the government, society, students and administrators. First, professors' earnings are not only substantially lower in comparison to the past, but are also lower than those of many white-collar and blue-collar occupations. They attribute this reality to the fact that neither the government nor society value the importance of knowledge sufficiently, and resent the low level of support for academic activities. Second, many professors feel frustrated because of political clientelism, and feel subordinated to students, who are more proactive and organized in advancing their own agenda.

Moreover, because they perceive that most students can afford to pay, professors feel that they are subsidizing the university via their low salaries. Third, professors are discontent with their poor working conditions and resent their inferior status in relation to administrative staff. Many professors also complained that facilities and resources for academic staff are almost nil, whereas administrative staff enjoy most offices, secretaries, parking spots and the like. Furthermore, some academics express with bitterness that a good number of administrative employees, especially those appointed through political affiliation, earn higher salaries than professors, even full professors with years of experience.

The silent confrontation of academics with students and administrators is further complicated by the existence of internal conflicts among academics themselves. In this case, a combination of variables including political ideologies, party affiliations, theoretical and methodological preferences, job status, professional fields and generational values and practices generate a complex array of confrontations and alliances. These multiple intramural struggles, together with the low proportion of full-time academic staff, may explain why professors are unable to form a solid bloc to promote their common needs and interests, and why most of the resistance to the heteronomous university is expressed by students and university authorities.

Section 2: The battle for the university

1. Autonomists and marketventionists

This study analyzed a conflict between two university models, a conflict that is part of a larger conflict between two societal models. Although this conflict is taking place in all regions of the world, and the two models have universal, generic characteristics, both the intensity of the conflict and the specific features of the models under dispute vary according to the social structure of each national formation and the historical development of its higher education system.

In Argentina, no one denies that the university must undertake important transformations. Government officials and university actors alike perceive the depth of the current university crisis, and the need for change. However, since there is no consensus as to the nature of the crisis, there is no consensus about the direction and pace of change either. Although technical elements are -and should be- present in this definition, the preceding chapters have shown that the process of university restructuring is essentially political. Indeed, issues like who makes the decisions, what are the criteria for making these decisions, and who are going to benefit from these decisions are not just technical matters.

The worldwide conflict between the autonomous and heteronomous university described in the first two chapters also takes place in Argentina but, due to specific historical conditions, it assumes particular expressions. As in other countries, the autonomous model is characterized by expansion, that is, availability of public funding and high accessibility, while the heteronomous model is characterized by contraction, which means declining public funding and low accessibility.

The autonomous model is characterized by a high degree of publicness and homogeneity, whereas the heteronomous model is shaped by increasing government control and a market rationale that encourages privatization, cost-recovery programs, user fees, partnerships with business, competition among units and economies of scale. In Argentina, the conflict between these two models assumes distinct features which derive from the particular developments analyzed in chapter four. In this country, the model based on the Napoleonic tradition and inaugurated by the 1918 Córdoba Reform is being challenged by an alternative

based on the US system and institutionalized in Chile since 1981. The difference between 1918 and 1981 is more than a numerical alteration; it represents two distinct approaches to university in particular and to society in general. For lack of better names, the two sets of contending social actors have been identified as autonomists and marketventionists. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the competing models.

Table 1: The university as perceived by autonomists and marketventionists

	Autonomists	Marketventionists
Diagnosis	crisis of funding	crisis of efficiency
HES organization		
institutional diversification	homogeneity (equality)	heterogeneity (choice)
institutional interaction	self-regulation	competition and regulation
public-private interaction	public-private distinctiveness	public-private mix
Finance		
public sources	'historical' funding	conditional funding
private sources	almost nonexistent	cost-recovery, entrepreneurship
Functions		
research	focus on basic research	focus on applied research
teaching	public, free	comnodified knowledge
extension	community service	cost-recovery activities
Governance		
main principle	autonomy	accountability
representation	only university actors	inclusion of external actors
decision-making process	co-governance	professional managerialism
Internal organization	faculty and chatedra	departmentalization and amalgamation
Admission policies		
main rationale	entitlement rights, public investm.	privilege, individual investment
entrance requirements	open access	restricted access
employment conditions		
academic staff	tenure	'hire and fire'
non-academic staff	unionization	flexibility
remuneration policy	isonomy	individual performance
Relation with outside world		
state	financial accountability	performance evaluation
industry	research and service contracts	research and service contracts
Declared values	equity, excellence, accessibility	equity, excellence, efficiency

Diagnosis

First, although defenders of both models identify a university crisis, they have a different interpretation as to the causes of the crisis. For marketventionists, it is the natural result of the university's own shortcomings: inefficiency, social irrelevance, excessive expansion,

politicization, and inappropriate use of institutional autonomy. For autonomists, the crisis has a clear external origin, particularly government cuts in funding. The two positions, extensively described in chapter 5, can be expressed in recent public statements made by Juan Carlos del Bello, the current Secretary of Higher Education of Argentina, and Oscar Schuberoff, the Rector of Universidad de Buenos Aires. The former contends that the profound crisis experienced by UBA is the result of inadequate allocation of internal resources and "important pockets of inefficiency", whereas the latter maintains that the problems affecting UBA are "clearly budgetary" [37].

Expectedly, the disagreement in the diagnosis leads to a disagreement on the solution. While autonomists aver that the essential elements of the 1918 model should be preserved, marketventionists call for a drastic restructuring inspired by the 1981 Chilean model. As could be inferred from the debate on policies described in chapter 6, this study found a high degree of correspondence between the conceptions held by each group, their diagnosis of the situation and the strategies adopted for political and institutional action. Indeed, Table 1 shows that differences between the two contending models can be observed in a variety of areas.

Higher education system organization

First, the general organization of the higher education system is different in each model. The three main differences pertain to institutional diversification, institutional interaction and public-private interaction. The autonomous model emphasizes a homogeneous structure, meaning that the services offered by the different institutions should be relatively equivalent. Partly due to the premises underlying the Napoleonic model to produce professional cadres as needed by the state, and partly due to the 1918 Reform aspirations for equality, this model has been resistant to the institutional heterogeneity intrinsic to the heteronomous model.

While autonomists emphasize accessibility to educational opportunities of equal quality to all high school graduates in the name of democracy, marketventionists promote the supply of differentiated services in the name of choice. An illustration of this disagreement was the marketventionist campaign for community colleges, an initiative rejected by reformists on the grounds that it would create a two-track system of higher education. In terms of institutional interaction, the autonomist model believes that each institution should be self-regulated by its governing body, and respond to demand according to available resources and academic priorities. It also believes in a self-regulated system, in which CIN (Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional) continues to be the body where all public universities meet on a regular basis to coordinate efforts.

Marketventionists, instead, believe that public and private institutions should compete for government funding, and that programs undertaken by individual institutions should be regulated by the state in order to avoid duplications. An example of this discrepancy can be found in the way advocates of each model propose to address the existence of similar programs in nearby institutions. Autonomists would preserve these programs to protect accessibility, while marketventionists -after a rigorous competition- would select one institution to carry out that particular program, distributing functions within the system. Finally, in the autonomist model the public system coexists with a limited private system, and each system is distinct in terms of financing, governance and function. In the heteronomous model, the private-public distinction is increasingly blurred, to the point that it eventually becomes difficult to distinguish a public from a private institution. In Chile, following the US pattern, the terms private and public have been abandoned in higher education since 1981.

Financing

In terms of financing, in the traditional autonomist model the funding of public universities is based on the previous year's budget, adjusted by enrolments, and private sources of revenue are traditionally excluded [38]. Although contracts with business have been recently incorporated (in some institutions they are tolerated, in many others encouraged), introduction of tuition fees is still firmly rejected. In the heteronomous model, financing provides a clear example of the combination of the 'commercial' and the 'controlled' university.

The commercial university is reflected in the pressure for public universities to diversify their sources of revenue, which implies the generation of private funds and the imposition of the highly controversial tuition fees. The controlled university is manifested in the implementation of conditional funding, which means that, in addition to aforementioned competition between public and private universities for state subsidies, state funding would not be based on historical patterns but rather conditional upon performance evaluations. As a matter of fact, since 1981, public funding in Chile goes to either public or private institutions in three forms: direct institutional support, financial aid to students, and performance incentives to outstanding students. At the same time, in Chilean public universities tuition and fees account for 25% of total revenues.

Function

The three main university functions are also conceived differently by the two contending models. First, the research function is not highly valued in the traditional autonomist model, a situation largely due to the influence of the Napoleonic tradition. The little research that is conducted is mainly basic. The heteronomous model, in contrast, tends to emphasize applied research since it is considered more socially relevant. As was described in the preceding chapters, this argument is widely shared by most autonomists, who are self-critical of their disconnection from the world of industry. The scarce concern expressed by autonomists about possible negative impacts of increasing links with industry can be related to the lack of accumulated experience, to the belief that in the future this will be the only realistic mechanism to sponsor research, and to the emphasis placed on the negative consequences of state interventionism.

In relation to the second function (teaching), in the autonomist model knowledge is considered a public good to be offered at no cost to the learner. In the marketventionist model, instead, knowledge is considered to be a commodity, and learners are considered clients or customers who should pay for the services provided. Courses and programs which are not 'marketable' or considered relevant for the economy run the risk of being canceled, and professional colleges would have more control over curricula. Finally, the third classical function of universities (extension) is highly cherished in the autonomist model. Since the early 1918 manifestos calling for closer links with the working class, Extension has become an important function in most Latin American universities, and clearly oriented towards community services. In the marketventionist plan, however, Extension should be a self-sufficient unit, providing services to industry and business, and courses to the public on cost-recovery basis. As was already mentioned, in UBA this is the direction that extension is taking.

Governance

As its name suggests, the principle of institutional autonomy is a sacred value in the autonomist model. As in other parts of the world, in Argentina this value is being

challenged on the grounds that it has led to an ivory tower, isolated from societal needs. For marketventionists, the public university, as any other public institution, must be accountable to society, and this accountability can be secured through government involvement in university decision-making. Such involvement can be direct, via participation in governance bodies, or via the definition of criteria and priorities to follow. Marketventionists also advocate the participation of community leaders (usually an euphemism for business and industry representatives) in university governance

As strong believers in the democratic tradition of the 1918 Reform, autonomists seek the continuation of the three party-system of university governance, and some of them would even extend it to a penta-party system, allowing the participation of assistant professors and non-academic staff. Marketventionists, in contrast, believe that students enjoy too much power in university governance, and that their participation should be eliminated, or at least drastically reduced. Indeed, most marketventionists believe that governance should rely mainly or exclusively on faculty members, thus excluding students and alumni. As was shown in chapter 6, a good proportion of autonomist deans and professors share this approach, yet without expressing it publicly. This convergence between marketventionists and professors (regardless of their ideological preferences) indicates the existence of a fertile soil in which to sow an alliance between government and academics to reduce student power in university affairs. A minority of marketventionists would like to go even further, replacing the co-governance system by a class of professional managers who would run the university with a corporate rationality.

Internal organization

As a result of its Napoleonic origins, the Argentinean university is organized into semi-autonomous faculties that are in charge of producing professionals for a variety of fields. In each faculty, the unit is the *cátedra*, a pyramidal structure chaired by a full professor. Autonomous leaders linked to Rectorado have recently started to advocate the need for departmentalization and interdisciplinarianism, and argue that the CBC and the CEA are attempts in that direction. The majority of autonomists, however, do not express a great deal of concern in this regard.

Being an alliance of heterogeneous constituencies, the marketventionist bloc lacks a unified position in this regard. Marketventionists who are located in the state apparatus contend that the professional model of separate faculties is obsolete and wasteful and, inspired by the US model, propose a restructuring based on two strategies: departmentalization, and amalgamation of related units. The first strategy would reduce existing duplications among faculties, while the second is supposed to reduce costs through an economy of scale. Marketventionists who are entrenched in professional faculties are not such good allies of the government on this issue as they are in relation to other issues. These actors, particularly those belonging to the most powerful faculties (in term of enrolments and social prestige), are not keen in on pursuing any change that could limit their present privileges.

Admission policies

The disagreement between autonomists and marketventionists also includes admission policies. The former group, inspired by the 1918 Reform, conceives higher education both as a right and as a public investment in human capital. The latter, endorsing the argument that the private rates of return are higher than the public rates of return, tend to consider university education primarily as an individual investment. Marketventionists also contend that university expansion has resulted in quality decline, overqualification, educated unemployed and brain drain.

Autonomists do not link these problems to relaxed admission policies but rather to declining funding and to the incapacity of the private sector to provide an accessible, good quality education. Consequently, autonomists advocate open access to higher education institutions for all high school graduates, whereas marketventionists contend that either the costs of enrolment expansion should be shared by the users of the system or more strict admission policies should be implemented. Marketventionists also call for the elimination of the CBC and its replacement by an admission system controlled by each individual faculty, which should be free to set quotas. UBA administrators and a few autonomists leaders still defend the continuation of the CBC on the grounds that it is the best available option to ensure accessibility, to ease the transition from secondary school to university, to equalize opportunities, to allow career changes at an early stage and to release individual faculties from large enrollments in the first year. However, there is an increasing number of autonomists who are withdrawing their original support from the CBC. In their opinion, although the CBC was an excellent idea, it has been a casualty of its own oversized structures, generating an aggregate of administrative and academic deficiencies that have become irreparable.

Employment conditions

A good number of autonomist leaders view tenure and unionization as guarantees of academic freedom and workers' rights, whereas for marketventionists these are mere mechanisms of job protection that should be replaced by a flexible 'hire and fire' policy. In the autonomist model, remuneration is based on isonomy, which means equal remuneration for similar categories, regardless of individual productivity or market conditions (opportunity cost). Marketventionists view these arrangements as inherently inefficient and thus propose that salaries and promotions be based on merit, performance and opportunity cost. For this perspective, universities should pay star performers star salaries and average performers average salaries, like in the corporate world.

Relation with the outside world

Universities' relation with the state and with industry is also a contentious issue. Since the 1918 Reform the state's attitude towards the Argentinean university has alternated between extreme indifference and authoritarian interventionism. While in 1918 the relation between the university and the state was characterized by an alliance, presently the state and the university are on opposing sides. Marketventionists contend that university autonomy has led to an unacceptable situation of sovereignty, in which the university considers itself to be a 'special' public agency immune to external controls. To remedy this situation, marketventionists propose that the state should ensure accountability through performance evaluations and conditional funding.

Autonomists accept marketventionists' claim that the university should be accountable to the state for the use of public monies, but reject the charge that universities are not accountable. They argue that accountability in relation to the control of expenditures is presently ensured because universities submit their financial reports on a yearly basis to the appropriate government agency (Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación). For autonomists, accountability to the state should be limited to control of expenditures, and should not include funding or academic matters. For autonomists, decisions on university funding should continue being made by Parliament, and academic evaluations should be conducted internally, or by colleagues from other national or foreign universities (peer review), but not exclusively by government bureaucrats.

In regard to the university-industry relationship, there is a shared agreement among most interviewees that, after a long history of mutual indifference and distrust, increasing links

between these two partners would be beneficial for both. Historically, the Argentinean universities, shaped by the Napoleonic and Reformist traditions, have not promoted relationships with industry. The long-term emphasis on preparing professionals for self-employment or public administration, and the anti-business stance of the 1918 Reform were not propitious for these types of links. Presently, as a result of budget cutbacks and the rise of marketventionist criticisms to university's societal irrelevance, autonomists have undertaken considerable efforts to establish research, service contracts, and joint ventures with industry.

As already pointed out, most autonomists are unaware of the concerns raised in the developed world about the potential risks of developing a close relationship with industry without the existence of appropriate protections and guidelines. Probably due to the lack of experience in this regard, most autonomists have faith that this partnership will result in mutual benefits. However, a small circle of autonomists, especially those who conduct applied research or are familiar with the international literature on the topic, expressed some reticence about the advantages of the 'commercial university'.

Proclaimed values

Paradoxically, the values proclaimed by autonomists and marketventionists are essentially the same. Although the respective diagnoses of university's problems are mutually contradictory, as are the proposed remedies to cure them, both contenders appeal to the values of equity and excellence. A slight difference can be found in the fact that autonomists emphasize accessibility whereas marketventionists stress efficiency. Indeed, autonomists stress the democratic benefits of a mass university whereas marketventionists proclaim the benefits of cost-reduction strategies and the adoption of a corporate rationality.

However, although autonomists do not believe that the main problems of the university are due to inefficiency, they did not rule out efficiency as a desirable objective. In their perspective, it is the university itself, and not the government, that can develop efficiency criteria without undermining the academic rationale. Likewise, although marketventionists argue that excessive expansion results in quality decline, inflation of diplomas, brain drain and unemployment, they did not exclude accessibility as a value to pursue. In their view, accessibility could be achieved through the diversification of the higher education system, offering a broad range of non-university options.

The operational definitions of equity, excellence, efficiency and accessibility may differ in each discourse, and therefore the means to achieve and evaluate them, but they are used in the abstract sense by autonomists and marketventionists alike in order to garner public support. Although at the abstract level and in the public debate both contenders share the same values, in private discourse marketventionists accuse autonomists of being mired in dogmatic attitudes and of remaining attached to old principles, irrelevant to the demands of contemporary society. On the other hand, autonomists contend that marketventionists confuse pragmatism with mere opportunism and fail to understand that, in political conduct, principles provide important guidance for action.

2. University restructuring in Argentina. Towards a new social contract?

Although the conflict over university restructuring revolves around government pressure and university resistance, it cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between these two monolithic actors. As the developments described in the preceding section indicate, the analysis of the conflict is further complicated by the presence of international agencies, of internal conflicts among different government agencies, and of internal conflicts among different university constituencies. In examining the conflict over university restructuring,

this analysis has taken into account the theoretical debate on the dialectics between structural constraints and human agencies, looking at educational systems both as reproductory and transformative. By relating political economy analysis of structural patterns with the cultural analysis of hegemony and value construction, it showed how the interaction between global pressures and institutional resistance -mediated by the state- takes the form of a conflict expressed in four battlefronts: legislative, institutional, ideological, and financial.

This study also argued that, in order to understand the complexity of forces affecting the conflict over university restructuring, three levels of analysis must be simultaneously addressed: international, national and institutional. In the international arena, the description of changes occurring in different regions provided in chapter 2 showed that universities throughout the world are moving towards the same direction. It was claimed that the striking resemblance of proposed and actual university restructuring in many countries cannot be explained simply as a coincidence. Probably the most frequently advanced argument in the literature on university restructuring is the imbalance of growing enrolments and decreasing funding. However, it was contended that this constitutes more a description than an explanation. Rather, it was suggested that the simultaneity and similarity of changes underway can be better interpreted by the demands of post-fordism and the emergence of institutional capitalism, a phenomenon characterized by Useem as an ulterior development from family and managerial capitalism.

This study suggested that the process of institutional capitalism has a different expression in developed and developing countries. In developed countries, the direction and pace of university restructuring has been gradually removed from the university realm, and increasingly shaped by a solid partnership of business, state and university leaders. This partnership is effectively formulating university policy through a variety of institutional mechanisms, such as boards of governors or the corporate-university fora that emerged in the USA and Canada in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In developing countries, where neither the state not the capitalist class is capable of formulating an agenda for the university, the direction and pace of university change is highly influenced by what Samoff calls 'the intellectual/financial complex of foreign aid', a network of international agencies led by the World Bank.

Indeed, this thesis has referred to and drawn from a number of World Bank-sponsored documents that recommend Latin American universities follow the path of the Chilean model. It was also shown that these recommendations do not fall into a 'vacuum'. In Argentina (as in other Latin American countries) the restructuring agenda, as expressed by government officials and allied university actors, shows multiple parallelisms with World Bank recommendations for university restructuring. Moreover, formal nexus between international agencies and marketventionists are evident in Project 06, carried out by the government with a loan provided by the World Bank, and in the Club de Harvard, an association of Harvard graduates which includes the Minister of Economy and a select and vocal group of economists who advocate market-oriented policies in higher education, comprising demand-driven subsidies and vouchers [39].

At the national level, a key development linked to university restructuring is the retrenchment of the state from the public sphere, expressed in policies such as the reduction of the social budget, the sale of public companies and the increased privatization of public services. In addition to this worldwide phenomenon, a combination of national-specific factors explain some discrepancies between the process of university restructuring in Argentina and other countries. In terms of historical development, a reliance on agricultural exports, a technologically dependent industrial sector and recurrent military interventions in

academic affairs have had a noticeable negative impact on university life, and explain the low emphasis on research and the strong defense of institutional autonomy.

Unlike the situation of most countries, the conflict over university restructuring in Argentina is extremely complicated by party politics, to the extent that it is difficult for the observer to distinguish where the university-state conflict ends and the Radical-Peronist confrontation begins. It was also suggested in the study that the degree of authority that the state is able to exercise over civil society is also an important factor in explaining the breadth and speed of university restructuring. For instance, while in Chile the heteronomous university model was easily imposed by the military regime of Augusto Pinochet in the early 1980s, in most Latin American countries the logic of parliamentary democracy subjects the local versions of the Chilean reform to unexpected turnabouts and delays. This is particularly evident in the case of Argentina, where the university conflict, after half a decade of government pressure, is still characterized by a stalemate. Moreover, the nature of the alliances between the state and university actors can also hasten or retard the process of change. As was shown in the preceding chapters, while the 1918 Reform was favored by an alliance between the student movement and government's plans for expansion, the current efforts undertaken by the government to impose a contraction are resisted by the majority of the academic community.

At the institutional level, the key development affecting university life is the commodification of knowledge, that is, its transformation from a public good to a product for private consumption. As was examined in chapter 3, this reconceptualization of knowledge has important implications for the future of the university, which will no longer be considered a cultural center but rather an industry producing two main outcomes: graduates and research results. In the new model, the student is treated as a consumer rather than as a learner, research focuses on technology-transfer efforts for the industrial sector, and extension is understood as a service to business or to anybody willing and able to pay for it.

In promoting this agenda, the Argentinean government finds friends and foes within the university. Indeed, it was advanced in the theoretical chapter that the university should not be understood as a homogeneous entity rejecting government policies or as a state agency reproducing the interests of dominant classes. The university -a unique institution characterized by a relatively high degree of autonomy and yet a strong dependence on state funding- is instead a site of confrontation in which concrete agents engage in disputes and alliances among themselves and with external actors. This situation is evident at UBA, where the different slates and groups constantly realign themselves according to the particular topic in contention.

Indeed, although in the University of Buenos Aires groups favoring and resisting proposed changes are relatively easy to identify, the complexity of university life makes alliances and oppositions unstable, temporary, and difficult to understand by an external observer because they vary according to the issue at stake. The multiplicity of internal disputes, such as the ones between some faculties and the central administration, between faculties, between constituencies (students, professors, alumni), between political parties or between disciplinary preferences complicates the problem even further. Moreover, as in any academic environment, most actors are aware of the weaknesses and faults of the university but the intensity of the political conflict often restrains them from expressing their self-criticisms openly. This explains the occasional discrepancy between the public and private discourse of some university leaders.

In summary, the conflict between autonomists and marketventionists has been expressed in a variety of proposed reforms, the most controversial ones relating to tuition fees,

admission policies and state aid (direct or indirect) to private higher education. In this conflict, a complex network of alliances favoring each project has been built within and outside the university. Indeed, a variety of government units, international agencies, unions and political parties has also taken part in the conflict.

Generally speaking, marketventionists are led by the government, whereas autonomists are led by UBA leaders. The government bloc is highly monolithic, with almost no inconsistencies among its representatives. The university community, instead, is fragmented in two main segments. On the one hand, a small but outspoken group of university actors, encompassing representatives of a variety of constituencies (students, professors, deans and alumni), sympathize with government's position. On the other hand, a strong coalition of all groups defends the principles of the 1918 reform and the position of the university administration.

However, a growing number of autonomist sympathizers (from the central administration to faculty to student) who does not agree with most of the government's proposals, but at the same time is highly critical of the current state of university affairs, was also identified during the fieldwork. Among these actors, a discrepancy between their public and private discourse was particularly noticeable. Opposed to the overall government restructuring agenda -but in agreement with some specific proposals- and aligned with the university administration -but dissatisfied with the current state of university affairs- these actors were frustrated with the polarization of the debate.

This means that the state has three types of allies within UBA. For most policies, it has the support of open marketventionists, such as the dean of Medicine and the representatives of some minority slates of professors, alumni and students. And for certain policies, it also has the support of the interest groups of some professionals faculties that are against the university administration, and even some dissident Reformists who believe that autonomy should be reduced or that the close links between the central administration and the Radical Party have perverted academic life. The appeal of the government agenda to these different groups is not surprising, considering that, as was shown in chapter 2, one of the main strengths of the heteronomous model lies in its inclusiveness. In fact, advocates of the scholarly excellence model support government pressure to emphasize quality over equality, and therefore sympathize with more restrictive admission policies (quotas and entrance examinations) and in some cases even with fees. Advocates of the 'social transformation' model concur with the government's claim that university activities should be more relevant to the community, and therefore endorse government's argument that the university has become an ivory tower isolated from societal needs. Proponents of the 'human capital' model agree with governments plans to reduce enrolments and reformulate programs to adapt the university to the labor market and the needs of the economy. Moreover, there are also some autonomists who ideologically reject the government agenda, but contend that, in practical terms, resistance would prove ineffective in the long term. For these 'pragmatic' autonomists, it would be more fruitful to negotiate with the government and to adapt to the heteronomous university model on the best possible terms than to antagonize the government.

The outcome of the conflict is still uncertain, yet it can be predicted that the current stalemate is not going to last for a long time. On the one hand, it is increasingly evident that the anguished cries from universities for more funds will not obtain a positive response from the government. On the other, the heteronomous agenda is politically infeasible without modifications. Both parties are aware of the necessity to build a new contract, and that the first step in that direction is to restore trust between academic and state representatives. Autonomists realize that, in the negotiation of the new contract, government officials do not hold anything as sacred nor take anything for granted.

Hence, the academic community is slowly starting an internal debate in which everything is on the table, including topics which not long ago were considered taboo. As part of the new contract, the government will probably demand that universities establish realistic institutional priorities, eliminate weak programs, increase private sources of revenue and reduce waste and duplication. The state would also enforce the accomplishment of these goals by linking resource allocation to performance (conditional funding). In return, the university will request the government to support the core functions of the academy, because those functions will never receive adequate support from private sources.

In terms of research, the state is expected to ensure the continuity of pure research and the development of a research agenda that is not totally geared towards market needs. In terms of teaching, the state is expected to provide enough funding to ensure that non-marketable disciplines are maintained, and that equality of opportunity is defined more by academic merit than by social class. In terms of extension, one of the main principles of the 1918 reform, autonomists seem to be less demanding, willing to undertake more cost-recovery programs and less community service activities.

One of the experts interviewed in this study argued that the key social actors involved in the construction of the new accord lack the necessary vision to transcend their narrow self-interests. Drawing a parallel with Burton Clark's triangle, one of them suggested in an interview that the Argentinean triangle represents a dependent industry, a draconian state and a corporate university. In his view, which is largely confirmed by the evidence presented in the previous chapters, local industry is more interested in technology-import than in research and development, the state has an almost exclusive focus on cost reduction strategies and a disregard for their potential negative implications, and the university is too closely associated with the Radical Party and, therefore, more interested in developing an anti-statist discourse than in building a constructive relation with the government. In his own words

> *The struggle for knowledge is in reality a struggle for power, but in this case we are only talking about political power, and a very limited one. Knowledge is irrelevant in Argentina, because there are no projects linked to knowledge, and because knowledge is not linked to industry. Neither the government nor the university have a project. On the one hand, the university has a reproductionist perspective; it reproduces the status quo, a paradox taking into account that they call themselves 'Reformists'. The Rectorado is more concerned with using the university as a strategic platform for the next elections than as an academic project. On the other hand, the state has a Malthusian perspective, which is only concerned about less spending, cutbacks, reductions of personnel and so forth.*

Although the perspective of this interviewee towards the university is probably biased by his Peronist background, the connections between UBA's leaders and the Radical Party are open and public. In this context, and squeezed by its different pressure groups (professional associations, students, alumni, professors) the university administration feels more inclined toward clientelistic arrangements and party politics than toward formulating a consensual long-term vision, with rationalizing their internal structures in order to reduce inefficiency and waste, or with educating the public and the politicians as why it is so important to create, accumulate and transmit knowledge.

Furthermore, while his portrayal of the state as 'Malthusian' may be dismissed for its failure to identify government policies aimed at improving efficiency and equity, it cannot be ignored that the bottom line of those policies is cost reduction. It is also interesting to note in the above quote the reference to an apparent contradiction between the advocacy for change implied in the term 'reformism' and the resistance to government-proposed restructuring. As a matter of fact, the portrayal of reformists as a conservative force

interested only in protecting the status quo, and of marketventionists as a progressive force looking for change was recurrently advanced by government officials and their university allies.

Although this polarization of 'conservatives' and 'progressives' could persuade some sectors of the public opinion that the university is irrationally stuck in the past or only interested in protecting its self-interests, the fallacy of the argument is self-evident. Change is depicted as a progressive concept per se, regardless of the direction of such change. Hence, those who advocate free and public education are labeled 'conservatives' simply because they oppose change, and those who advocate privatization are labeled 'progressives' simply because they want to see a change. In this context, the concepts lose meaning and evolve into a simple ideological tool used to dismiss adversaries in the battle for popular support.

In the negotiation of a new contract, it is important to reiterate that in Argentina there is an absence of debate about the increasing links between the university and business. Whereas in other countries academic and political actors are passionately discussing whether exclusive patent licenses should be provided to corporate sponsors of research where public funds and resources are used, whether 'faculty entrepreneurs' should be allowed to engage in business ventures and to enjoy the benefits of intellectual property created at public expense, whether scientists should be disqualified from participating in research where they have a direct financial interest in its private sponsor, or whether public disclosure of all research that may benefit business firms using societal resources should be required [40], their Argentinean colleagues are promoting university-industry partnerships with the eagerness of a pauper and the naiveté of a novice.

Feeling abandoned by a state which is withdrawing funding, and without a vast experience in technology transfer, autonomists and marketventionists alike believe that the new partnerships will increase university response to societal needs, and that the new sources of revenue will promote autonomy. The possibility that the university research agenda is shaped by business needs, the possible rise of conflicts of interest or the split of the university into haves and haves-not, all concerns recurrently addressed in the international literature on university restructuring, were not yet issues in the Argentinean debate. With a few exceptions, neither in public statements [41] nor in personal interviews conducted for this study did UBA authorities contemplate the emergence of problems such as the ones examined in chapter 2.

Hence, there was no perceived need among reformists to develop a legal framework and institutional guidelines to regulate the partnerships and to protect the public interest. In the current autonomist discourse, university's protection of the public interest lies mainly in ensuring accessibility and in providing a service equivalent or better in quality than the one provided by private institutions. However, by channeling most of their energies to fight against budget cuts and tuition fees, with almost no attention paid to the potential implications of university-industry partnerships, reformists may be missing an important aspect of the conflict between private interests and the common good.

4. The future of the university: Prometheus bound or Persephone?

As was mentioned in chapter 2, Neave and van Vught (1991) compare the relation between university, state and business with the myth of Prometheus. In their analogy, the new situation of the university should not be interpreted as 'Prometheus unchained' (as the government claims) but as 'Prometheus bound'. The metaphor suggests that universities are being released from state control only to fall under the control of a new, powerful

master, namely industry. However, they also claim that state control is not declining but assuming a different form, shifting from process control to product control. This continuation of state control is not captured by the metaphor, which may be understood simply as the replacement of one dependency by another. Furthermore, the analogy fails to illustrate the extent of relative autonomy that the university still enjoys. Without ignoring the validity of the 'Prometheus bound' metaphor, I would like to complement it with another allegory that may illustrate better Neave and van Vught's interpretation of the new relationship between university, state and industry: the myth of Persephone [42].

Persephone was the daughter of Zeus, supreme even over the sun, and Demeter, the goddess of corn. Considered a savior and guardian of humanity as well as an administrator of justice, Zeus could represent an equitable state. Old and wise, Demeter represents the transition from hunting and gathering to cultivation, and could be equated with productive knowledge and the common good. One day, Persephone is attracted by the portentous bloom of a flower, which was nothing more than a trap set by Hades (or Pluto), the god of wealth, lord of the underworld and brother of Zeus. Hades carried Persephone to his kingdom, married her and made her queen of the lower world.

Though she was the wife of one of the most powerful immortals, Persephone was never again the naive creature who used to play in the gardens without a thought of risk or danger. Upset by the disappearance of her daughter, Demeter interrupted her protection of seeding and harvesting. That year was the most dreadful and cruel of all history on earth. Nothing grew, and famine was about to kill the entire humanity. At that point, Zeus realized that the situation called for his intervention. In order to protect the common good, he ordered his brother to return Persephone to her mother. Hades had no other choice but to comply with Zeus, though before releasing his wife he asked her to eat a pomegranate. As a result of this scheme, Persephone was forced to remain at Hades' side for one third of the year. According to one version of the myth, during the rest of the year she divided her time in two: four months with her mother, and the other four months by herself.

However simplistic the story may be, it illustrates a situation in which the university is not entirely autonomous, but neither is it totally dependent upon the state apparatus or business interests. Although the university is increasingly pressured to be more 'reactive' than 'proactive', there is still an important space for autonomy that can be used to pursue the goals of the 'academic haven' and the 'social transformation', namely the pursue of truth and disinterested knowledge, on the one hand, and justice and welfare on the other. The myth of Persephone also suggests that state and industry have a strong alliance, but in situations of crisis the state may temporarily break such alliance in order to ensure the survival of the system.

The question is not whether universities should be autonomous or accountable, but rather what type of autonomy and what type of accountability should they have. In a context characterized by an increasing supremacy of the market over democratic control, and increasing state control over university products, three major issues are going to be faced by the university: what is it going to do with its parcel of autonomy, to whom should it be accountable, and which will be the criteria to be considered in the accountability test? In other words, autonomy for what, and accountability to whom?

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[1] Two studies sponsored by the WB (Winkler 1990 and Carlson (1992), for instance, argue that in Latin American higher education institutions are excessively dependent on single sources of revenue (public institutions depend almost solely on government subsidies, while private institutions depend on tuition) and that economic criteria of efficiency and equity call for diversification. They also contend that the weak ties between the university and government and business, an inheritance of the 1918 Córdoba movement, has

resulted in an undesirable degree of autonomy. In fact, they argue that the development of private institutions of higher education has been stimulated by the lack of relevance of the public university's curriculum to the private employer. In line with this diagnosis, their main recommendation is to increase the private share of university. This can be achieved by encouraging the development of private institutions and by increasing cost-recovery strategies in public institutions. The development of private institutions can be encouraged if the state provides selective subvention to private universities (for instance, subsidizing the expansion of physical plant). In the case of Argentina, Winkler predicts that "further expansion of the higher education system should probably be financed privately, either via expansion of private universities or self-financed (i.e. tuition and fees) expansion of public universities. In order to reduce expenses and increase external efficacy, he suggests the adoption of lower-cost alternatives (i.e. two-year community colleges, distance learning) and the creation of a national-level entity to establish budgetary incentives for changes in the fields offered by the university (Winkler 1990:41 and 102).

2 One of the mechanisms to implement this recommendation consists of increasing the teaching load for those faculty not doing research, reducing faculty numbers, and using the resulting savings for research purposes. In doing so, financial research support could be directed to the development of research capacity as well as to specific projects, and stricter performance criteria could be attached to funding.

3 Most information about quality in Latin American universities is still anecdotal or based on dubious indicators. As Winkler (1990:19) admits, the absence of quality measures makes it impossible to assess the quality of instruction in Latin American universities. One of the few reliable comparisons consists of comparative results in common examinations. In Argentina, in the exams for hospital residences, the rate of success of Medicine graduates from public universities was 67%, whereas among graduates from private universities was only 36%, a proportion that has remained constant for several years now. In Argentina, private universities impose quotas and fees, and some of them use, for Medicine courses, the laboratories and facilities of public universities.

4 (La Nación, January 25, 1992:10).

5 This is not a universal case. For instance, the private sector funds and carries out 45% of research in Canada, 60% in OECD countries, and 75% in Japan (Bélanger and Lacroix 1992:67). In general, private investment in R&D is very small throughout Latin America: the private sector contributes only 3.5% of total R&D investment, compared to 60-70% in developed market economies (Winkler 1990:90).

6 Although those two factors are important in explaining the feasibility of reforms, it can be argued that they are not the most important ones. If they were, it is difficult to explain why Canada, a countercase, has engaged strongly in these reforms. In Canada autonomy is a strong value and private universities are almost nonexistant, but reforms are underway. A key factor overlooked by Winkler is the relative hegemony of the capitalist class and the extent of class conflict. In Canada, as in other developed countries, capitalism is well consolidated and able to impose its ideology on university elites. Thus, there is a place for a business-university forum which foster an alliance between these two actors. As was stated in the previous chapter, in developing countries capitalist development is less organized and institutionalized, and therefore the role of institutional capitalism must be played by the WB. In relation to class conflict, in advanced capitalism it is mediated by the welfare state, while in LDCs it is mediated by the corporative state.

7 An independent analysis conducted by the Institute Alexis de Tocqueville, which includes among its board members prominent representatives of both democratic and republican parties, was entitled precisely "IFM Conditionality, 1980-1991. A White Paper researched and prepared by the staff of the IMF assessment Project". The director of the project, Gregory Fossedal, was asked by a journalist about the government's officials claim that each country develops its own economic programs to meet its commitment. The answer was very suggestive: "When you go to a restaurant, you get a menu. You may request another meal, but the risk is that the food is not good. The IMF provides formal suggestions which are not mandatory, but everybody knows that if a government wants to obtain a standby, the temptation to follow the suggestions is very high." Página 12, March 22, 1992, Economic Suplement, p. 2.

8 Interview with Myrna Alexander, World Bank representative. La Prensa, December 9, 1992, Section 2, p.1

9 Interview published in Noticias, March 22, 1992, p. 86.

10 Walker (1984) shows how the term 'privatization', when applied to welfare services, is an euphemism for budget cuts. Briceño (1988:41) claims that 'modernization' means in reality subordination to transnational capitalism. Morales-Gómez (1990) contends that the WB reduces everything to technical solutions and managerial reorganization, and that this technocratic approach masquerade political intentions. For this reason, Omari (1991:9) argues that the role of the WB in the educational debate must be analyzed

in "the context of its capitalistic cultural, ideological, and financial hegemonic interests associated with the current lure of neoconservatism, an ideology capitalizing on the theme of the disengagement of the state from its traditional social and welfare roles". Thus, he argues that it corresponds to the local universities leaders and policy makers in appropriate government units to make the decisions and choices rather than donor agencies, which are known to be "frequently changing, unaccountable and ideologically motivated".

11 Godonoo, Prosper. The role of the World Bank in setting the intellectual agenda for Nigerian universities. Draft of the Doctoral Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1994.

12 In the case recounted, just the per diem for the day spent on the plane was higher than twice the monthly salary earned by that person as university professor (p.5).

13 Petras contrasts these institutional intellectuals of the 1990s with the 'organic intellectuals' of the 1960s, who were unwilling to accept financing from externally funded institutions. In Argentina, former leftist organic intellectuals currently working for these organizations are known as 'intellectuals light' or 'intellectuals diet'.

14 In Nicaragua, for instance, the proposal for privatization advanced by the former Minister of Education Humberto Belli constitutes an unsophisticated version of WB recommendations. He compares the public university with a shoe factory, and builds an argument base on the inefficiency of public monopolies and the inherent efficiency of a competitive private sector. He also suggests that a voucher system in which public funding goes directly to the student, and not to the institutions, would promote equity (La Prensa, July 6, 1993:4).

15 Latin American Regional Reports, London, February 4, 1993:4.

16 Nevertheless, it has been claimed that in Argentina a great deal of the deficits of state enterprises is not due to the inherent inefficiency of the public firms, but to private appropriations and corrupt subcontrating (Petras and Morley 1991).

17 La Prensa (Argentinian daily newspaper), May 31, 1991:4 and June 2, 1991:1.

18 For the sake of public image, some functionaires close to the President are trying to balance his extreme market oriented remarks. For example, in an indirect response to the quoted statement, a top level bureaucrat pointed out that "in the 1960s there was a deification of the state: people thought that it could bring all solutions. Now, there is a deification of the market, and many leaders think that the market solves magically all problems. The solution is to harmoniously interrelate state and market" (La Prensa, June 3, 1991:4).

19 In the US, 60% of R&D funding comes from the Federal Government, 26% from universities, 7% from non profit organizations and the remaining 7% from industry (National Science Foundation 1990, Data Book 1990, Washington DC). Interestingy, a similar proposal to privatize the national research system was raised at the same time in Australia (Woock and Clyne 1993).

20 The language of 'pupils' (the Argentinian government) and 'teachers' (the USA and the European community) is recurrently used by President Menem to refer to market-oriented policies. See, for instance, La Nación, September 27, 1993:1).

21 Tax evasion is a serious problem in Argentina. The President of the Universidad del Litoral, Dr. Hidalgo, estimated that "with the tax evasion of only one of the economic corporations the problem of functioning of all Argentine universities could be solved" (Página 12, March 9, 1990). The inefficiency of the revenue system is shared with other Latin American countries. In Mexico, for example, 75% of the 800,000 enterprises are accused of fiscal evasion (La Jornada, January 11, 1990).

22 "Why the people cheer the bad guys in a cup". Strobe Talbot, Time, May 4, 1992:61.

23 In Africa, state priorities in resource allocation favor defence, at the expense of education (Omari 1991). In Alberta, between 1987 and 1988 the provincial funds to universities decreased by more than 22% in real terms.

24 In Canada, for example, official documents state that by the year 2,000, the federal government expects to double the number of post-secondary graduates. However, the government is cutting funding of post-secondary education by $3.8 billion between 1990 and 1995. Moreover, the contribution of the federal government to provincial higher education is going to disappear in the year 2,004 (The Edmonton Journal, July 29, 1991:A8, NDP document on education, 1991).

25 La Prensa, July 16, 1991, page 3..

26 The decreasing tendency was as follows: In 1930 Argentina occupied the 12th position, in 1940 position 16th, in 1950 position 12th again, in 1960 position 22nd, in 1970 position 25th, in 1980 position 31st, and in 1987 position 39th (La Prensa, Nov. 3, 1990, Section 2, Economy).

[27] This figure was mentioned by President Menem in a recent meeting with the Pope (Clarín, Oct. 15-21, 1990:6).

[28] Praetorianism occurs when the levels of political participation and mobilization markedly exceed the level of political institutionalization in a society. In a praetorian society there is an absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating group political action. Therefore, in a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly, because no corps of political leaders are recognized as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate social conflict. Moreover, no agreement exists among the groups as to the methods for resolving conflicts. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities: the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, and the military coup (Huntington, 1969; O'Donnell, 1973).

[29] Martínez de Hoz has been probably the most unpopular Argentine Minister of Finance of this century. Criticisms of his policies were tough, and did not lack humor. For example, among low income groups he was known as "Hood Robin", because he robbed the poor to give to the rich.

[30] The idea was expressed by Kuznetz in the early seventies. In recent years, a third case of development pattern not easily explained by conventional economic theory emerged. Such a phenomenon is constituted by the East Asian NIC's (New Industrialized Countries). A good analysis of NIC's and their implications for Latin America can be found in Evans, 1987. See also A.G. Frank 1981:157-187.

[31] The Argentine Question Revisited. A discussion from the "new comparative political economy approach". Daniel Schugurensky, University of Alberta, 1991 (unpublished paper).

[32] The 1853 Argentinean Constitution allows the use of presidential decrees to avoid parliamentary delays in cases of 'urgency' and 'necessity'. In only three years Menem has issued 260 such decrees, over 90% of those announced in Argentinean history. Most have brought privatization and tax and tariff cuts.

[33] Between 1991 and 1992, the average salary diminished approximately 6.5%. Página 12, March 22, 1992.

[34] Página 12, November 10, 1991 and March 22, 1992.

[35] "Universitarios, a cobrar por hora". Página 12, February 20, 1992. The faculty association (CONADU) strongly criticized such a proposal.

[36] As Winkler (1990:15) notes, in Argentina, unlike other Latin American countries, the catedrático system has not been replaced or merged with the departmental system (15)

[37] Both statements were published in Noticias, November 28, 1993:70.

[38] In Latin America, public institutions receive only 6.4% of funds from non-governmental sources, while private universities receive 28% of their revenues from the government (Winkler 1990:71).

[39] See Página 12, December 4, 1993, and the documents written by Horacio Piffano listed in the reference section.

[40] See Newson and Buchbinder 1988.

[41] See, for example, the suplement published by Clarín on November 28, 1993 entitled Universidades S.A. (Universities Inc.).

[42] In latin Proserpine.

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