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The Effect of Social Categorization and Holocaust Salience on Forgiveness and
Collective Guilt Assignment

By

Michael J. A. Wohl



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Psychology

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, my father, my stepfather, my sister, and the rest of my family. When I smiled you smiled with me. When I laughed, you laughed with me. When I was in need, you were always there. Your support is unwavering. Your belief in me is unquestionable. Your love, true. I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Abstract

I address the different meanings of forgiveness and guilt assignment to harm perpetrators at the interpersonal, intergroup, and human levels of categorization. First, I suggest that willingness to forgive others and judgments of guilt are determined primarily by how the self and the other are categorized. In studies 1 and 2, Jewish Americans were asked about the extent to which they assign collective guilt to contemporary Germans for the Holocaust and the extent to which they forgive contemporary Germans for the horrors of Nazi Germany. In line with self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), when human identity was salient Jews assigned more collective guilt to contemporary Germans and were more willing to forgive contemporary Germans, than when Jews' social identity was salient. In Studies 3 and 4, I tested the hypothesis that reminding a historically victimized group (i.e., Jews) with their victimization (i.e., the Holocaust) would influence willingness to forgiveness and judgments of guilt for actions taken during a contemporary conflict (i.e., Palestinian-Israeli conflict). Data from these studies confirmed the detrimental impact that reminders of historical victimization have on perceptions of contemporary conflicts. Discussion focuses on obstacles that are likely to be encountered on the road to reconciliation between historically victimized and perpetrating social groups.

Preface

Since 1999 I have been conducting studies in the burgeoning area of forgiveness research. What has struck me again and again is the lack of a research investigating the antecedents of forgiveness. Such research may be the key to developing successful methods for conflict resolution. The history of humankind has evidenced the callous manner in which innocent people have been murdered, raped, and tortured simply because they happened to be born into a certain ethnic group. Generally, the perpetrator groups provide shallow excuses for their behavior, while the victims call for justice. Over time, the perpetrator group may begin to recognize that their group committed heinous crimes, while the pain felt by the victimized group may remain quite deep. Unfortunately, intergroup conflict is universal and, hence, victimized people exist in every corner of the globe. No continent, no country, no people have been immune to its destructive power.

In this dissertation, I examine the effect of social categorization on willingness to forgive and collective guilt assignment for historical and current intergroup conflicts. I will draw mostly from the impact the Holocaust has had on Jews and the Jewish identity. This period of mass violence by one group against another has created a strong and lasting imprint on Jews around the world. This imprint on Jewish social identity must be taken into account when discussing forgiveness and guilt for both the Holocaust and the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

In an ideal world, when intergroup conflicts end (e.g., the Holocaust), the negative emotions directed toward the outgroup would cease as well. Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world. Reality has taught us that the negative feelings brought on by intergroup conflict can linger. This seems to be apparent in the former Yugoslavia

where the past continues to torment, because it is not the past. That is, the past and present are continuous. In fact, reporters on the Balkan wars have often commented that when they are told of atrocities they are often uncertain whether these stories occurred yesterday, a decade ago, or hundreds of years ago (Ignateiff, 1997). Pain and anger seem to have traversed generations, blurring the lines between the ancestors that committed the wrong and contemporary members of the perpetrator group. Unfortunately, with lines blurred, negative thoughts and feelings persist. For peace to occur there must be work toward forgiveness. These aspirations may be especially compelling following mass atrocities such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Nazi Germany. I believe it is the job of the social scientist to assist in understanding and hopefully bettering the social world in which we live. One means by which the social scientist could help is by investigating the social factors that promote forgiveness within an intergroup context.

How can one group forgive another following mass violence? Even as time distances the embroiled groups from the horror of these events, questions about the nature of the evils committed, about notions of individual and collective guilt and repentance, and about the possibility of intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation are of the utmost import. Generally speaking, forgiveness has always been relevant within countries plagued by strife. But how can forgiveness be encouraged?

South Africa, for one, is currently engaged in a dialogue between victims and perpetrators of apartheid with the aim of improved intergroup relations. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa has provided a focus for world attention on the righting of the wrongs of the apartheid era. Some may argue that the TRC provides a shield under which perpetrators may hide or protect themselves.

However, the TRC has not prevented some of the apartheid perpetrators from being prosecuted (Minow, 1998). The TRC has provided a path for the victims to address the wrongs that have been committed. As such, the victim can begin to move forward with his or her life. Numerous acts of brutality and harm have been confessed in public hearings, and many have been forgiven by the victims' family, as well as the victims themselves. However, this does not mean that publicly confessing group sins will automatically improve intergroup relations and promote forgiveness. South Africa may be unique in that both the victimized group and the perpetrator group are willing to air their proverbial dirty laundry. The Holocaust may be a different matter altogether, in light of current history.

The vast majority of Jews and Germans alive today were not alive during the time of the Holocaust. Even so, the Holocaust continues to invoke powerful emotions from both Germans and Jews. These powerful emotions continue to negatively effect intergroup relations. With growing interest and effort toward conflict resolution, it is timely to examine the social psychology of forgiveness, and the Holocaust seems an ideal starting point. Such an examination can both inform and invite further scholarly dialogue on the topic of forgiveness and improving intergroup relations.

This dissertation derives from my interest in improving intergroup relations and provides research and my views on the role of social categorization on forgiveness. Although forgiveness is beginning to receive attention in scientific journals and the media, the need for further investigation in the area seems to be outpacing the research being done. I hope that the research presented in this dissertation will provide some

additional energy to this field and help to make up ground, quicken the pace, and fill this need.

Acknowledgment

It seems like only yesterday that I first walked down the halls of the Biological Sciences Building. Yet, Father Time tells me that five years have past since that day back in 1998. I have learned a great deal in that time. As I head off to Carleton University to take up my position as an Assistant Professor, I gratefully acknowledge those who supported my professional development. Specifically, Kim Noels, thank you for always taking the time to listen to my thoughts and ideas (some would say rants) and providing me with helpful feedback. Your warmth and kindness will carry with me forever. The same holds true for Don Kuiken. You have always made time to lend an ear. With your keen insight, many of my research ideas were able to grow and flourish. Mike Evans, I thank you for agreeing to be a part of my supervisory committee. My academic career would not have been so enjoyable had I never met you. Nyla Branscombe, words cannot express my gratitude. You have been like a second supervisor, not only in work but also in life. You inspire me on a daily basis. This dissertation is the product of your support. And, of course, a special acknowledgment goes to my supervisor Mike Enzle. Five years ago you took a chance on a kid from Winnipeg. You took him in and taught him how to be an experimental psychologist. For that, I cannot thank you enough. Mike, I am consistently awed by your knowledge and presence. I can only hope, one day, to provide leadership and guidance to a student as you have done with me. You have taught me so much in the past five years. Most importantly, you have provided me with the tools to go out into the academic world and prosper. Thank you all. It is with great pleasure that I can call each of you a friend.

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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The Holocaust occupies a special place in the history of human brutality. Even though almost a half a century has passed since the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps, the methodical extermination of some six million Jews remains an archetype of the violence that one group can commit against another group (Barkan, 2000; Staub, 1989). The extent to which contemporary Germans should feel guilt for the genocide that was committed by their ancestors is a topic of much debate (see Goldhagen, 1996). The focus of this dissertation is primarily on what determines how much collective guilt contemporary members of the historically victimized group *assign* to the perpetrator group. I consider the role of social categorization processes in altering the victimized group's willingness to forgive the perpetrator group and the extent to which contemporary members of the perpetrator group are assigned guilt based on their national category membership. With North American Jewish participants, I examine the consequences of perceiving Germans and Jews as distinct and separate groups (categorizing at the intergroup level) versus perceiving both groups as members of a single superordinate category (categorizing at the human level). I measure willingness to forgive the perpetrator group and the extent to which collective guilt is assigned to Germans as a function of how the groups are categorized. I will argue that social categorization can have a profound impact on responses to contemporary members of the historical perpetrator group, as well as members of a different group with whom the victimized ingroup is currently in conflict.

Collective Guilt and Forgiveness

Guilt as a Psychological Construct

The guilt experience has been conceptualized as a self-conscious emotional event that occurs when a person's action is perceived as having violated a moral standard (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 1995). Such guilt *acceptance*, resulting from a discrepancy within the individual between what the person ought to have done and what the self actually did, is believed to motivate corrective action (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). Acceptance of *collective* guilt occurs when a moral transgression of one's group is made salient, and the self cannot avoid being categorized according to that group membership. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead (1998) tested this hypothesis by inducing participants from the Netherlands to categorize themselves as members of a group (Dutch) that had historically exploited another group or that had a history of fair treatment toward the other group. Participants also received feedback about whether they personally had or had not displayed prejudice towards members of the other group. Even when participants had nothing to feel guilty about personally, knowing their group's history was exploitive resulted in the induction of feelings of collective guilt. Thus, when people perceive their group as having violated moral standards, collective guilt acceptance can occur even when there is no personal responsibility for the transgression (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002).

Like acceptance, guilt assignment can be either interpersonal or intergroup in nature. Indeed, guilt *assignment* is conceptually the mirror image of collective guilt acceptance. It involves holding another person or another group, as opposed to the self or

the ingroup, responsible and blameworthy for immoral outcomes. We can distinguish the personal and collective bases for assigning guilt by considering the Holocaust. Many Germans, those alive during the Holocaust and those born after, recognize the wrongs committed by the Nazis during World War II. However, only Germans who engaged in behaviors that contributed to or facilitated the Holocaust can be assigned personal guilt (Marshall, 2000). Thus, personal guilt may be assigned to individuals both alive during the Holocaust and to those alive during the time period that preceded the Holocaust. On the other hand, personal guilt clearly cannot be assigned to Germans born after the war because they did not exist when the wrongs were committed. However, they may be assigned collective guilt because of their categorical association with their national ancestors. I thus make a distinction between the assignment of collective guilt to Germans as a whole, and assignment of personal guilt to Germans who played a role in the Holocaust. That is, guilt may be assigned or prescriptively expected by others among those merely associated with the category, even if they were not actual perpetrators.

If people can hold contemporary Germans responsible for events perpetrated by past generations, an interesting question arises. Given that the German nation has accepted collective guilt and paid some reparations to the victims of the Holocaust and their descendents (Barkan, 2000), to what extent *should* subsequent generations continue to bear the burden of the past? “Relativists” in Germany have argued that the Holocaust was just one exceptionally dreadful horror in a long list of human genocides, that many non-Jewish Germans suffered as badly as the Jews, and that, by implication, it is time to accept that the redemptive debt has been paid (Rennsman, in press). However, from the perspective of the victimized group, the assignment of collective guilt to contemporary

members of the perpetrator group is more complex. Pain, anger, and stress caused by the group-based victimization may traverse generations (Yehuda, et al., 2000), making it difficult for victimized group members to accept that the debt has been paid.

Forgiveness as a Psychological Construct

In recent years the topic of forgiveness has garnered increasing attention in the psychological literature. The proliferation of research articles in mainstream psychological journals has firmly entrenched forgiveness as a legitimate area of investigation (e.g., Wohl & Reeder, 2002; Wohl & Pritchard, 2002; McCullough, Pargament, & Thorensen, 2000; Kelln & Ellard, 1999; Enright & North, 1998). At the personal level, forgiveness results in the relinquishing of negative feelings toward the specific transgressor (Boon & Sulsky, 1997; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Sandage, Worthington, Everett, & Hight, 2000). When a transgression occurs, damage is done to the relationship. At the personal level, the act of forgiveness allows the relationship between two people to move forward following the occurrence of a transgression (Minow, 1998). Forgiveness provides the opportunity for reconciliation and the possibility for the relationship to return to its pre-transgression state.

When explaining the act of forgiveness, however, McCullough, et al. (1998) have recently included the notion of a pro-social motivational change on the victim's part. When people forgive, the desire to act in ways that will benefit the transgressor waxes and the motivation to harm their transgressor wanes. Specifically, when people indicate that they have forgiven the transgressor, the motives for avoidance and revenge are no longer stimulated. To test this conceptualization of forgiveness, McCullough et al. (1998) developed a 12-item scale designed to assess the reduction in avoidance and revenge

motivations – the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM) Inventory. Using structural equation modeling, McCullough et al. demonstrated that the TRIM did correlate highly with many of the constructs that they regard as the determinants of forgiveness (i.e., reduction in avoidance and revenge motives). Specifically, they found that empathy is a robust predictor of forgiveness, mediating the link between apology and forgiveness. Thus, forgiving can be conceptualized as a set of motivational pro-social changes, whereby a forgiver experiences the return of a feeling of benevolence toward the transgressor.

It is astonishing, however, that forgiveness ever occurs given the tendency to hold people responsible for their behavior by making internal, dispositional attributions (Ross, 1977; Jones, 1990). Such attributional judgments should have repercussions for willingness to forgive past wrongs. At a theoretical level, Fincham (2000) argued that forgiveness and responsibility attributions share a common feature in that both are concerned with the link between a transgressor and the injury (s)he produces. Wohl and Pritchard (2003) were able to empirically verify this expected relationship between degree of responsibility assigned to another and willingness to forgive. Specifically, the more a target was judged responsible, the less forgiving observers were of that target ($r = -.55$). Similarly, a positive correlation between responsibility and the assignment of guilt has been observed (Baumeister, et al., 1994). Accordingly, it can be hypothesized that the more a person is held responsible for a given act, the less likely that person is to be forgiven, and the more that person will be assigned guilt. Such attributional links have also been observed when actions of a group are to be explained.

Research on intergroup attribution (Hewstone, 1990; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974) has primarily focused on the differential explanations given for behaviors (both positive and negative) by an individual ingroup or outgroup member. In contrast, Sande and colleagues (1989) investigated the differential attributions made for the actions of a group as *a whole*. American participants were asked to read a number of newspaper articles depicting either American, Soviet, or French responses to positive social actions (e.g., a whale-saving mission) or behaviors with an explicit negative connotation (e.g., arms dealing). Differential attributions were made for ingroup compared to outgroup actions. American participants viewed the Soviet behavior as more self-serving than the same behavior performed by the Americans or the French. Canadian participants, in contrast, attributed the behavior of the Americans and of the Soviets to the same motives, suggesting that attributional bias is dependent on the nature of the relationship between the groups in question. Another way to view these results is that reminders of the historical tension between one's ingroup and an outgroup influences attributional judgments concerning contemporary members of that outgroup (see also Bronfenbrenner, 1961).

Tutu (1999) has argued that forgiveness at the intergroup level precludes harboring negative feelings toward the perpetrator category. I argue that forgiveness at the group level might therefore include pardoning contemporary members of the perpetrator category for past wrongs committed against the ingroup. That is, the act of forgiveness at the group level means relinquishing negative feelings toward all members of the perpetrator group – both those who committed the immoral acts and who did not, but are nonetheless associated to the harmdoing based on their group membership. In

order to do so, it might require accepting contemporary members of the former enemy group as no different, or as indistinguishable, from members of the ingroup. This perceptual change could result in contemporary members of the perpetrator group being seen as no more immoral than anyone else. To clarify this position I will now turn to theories of intergroup relations. These theories provide the context for the rest of the dissertation will unfold.

Theories of Intergroup Relations

Social Identity Theory

Tajfel and Turner (1986), among others (e.g., Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), have taken great interest in what happens to an individual's self-perception when becoming a member of a group. Social identity theory (SIT) involves three central ideas: Categorization, identification, and comparison. According to SIT, people tend to separate their social world into discrete categories and then situate themselves in one of these categories (Tajfel & Turner 1986). We categorize objects in order to understand them; in a very similar way we categorize people (including ourselves) in order to understand the social environment. We use social categories like black, white, Canadian, Jew, Muslim, and university student because they are useful. If we can assign people to a category, we gain understanding about those people. For example, when we categorize someone as a university student, we can use this information to guide our impressions and interactions with that person. We can assume that the student is, most likely, a young adult. We know that we can ask them what classes they are attending, if they have student loans, and what they want to do after graduation. Similarly, we find out things about ourselves by

knowing what categories we belong. We define appropriate behavior by reference to the norms of groups we belong to. If you are a Jew, you know that you should go to synagogue on Saturday morning; you know that you do not celebrate Christmas; and you know that you should not eat pork products.¹

The process of categorization also results in the creation of *ingroups* and *outgroups*. The effects of this process of self-categorization into social groups are well-documented. Once a person views him or herself as a member of a group judgments and behavior toward other ingroup members change (Brewer, 1979; Hogg & Turner 1987; Judd, Ryan, & Park 1991; Schaller 1991). Tajfel and Turner (1986) have suggested that these changes are biases in a positive direction and are triggered by self-serving motives. In order to maintain and enhance a positive self-regard, individuals dispose themselves positively toward members of their own group and discriminate against members of other groups.

Specifically, we identify with groups to which we believe we belong. That is, we distinguish ourselves by saying that we are a member of one group and not a member of another. Identification carries two meanings. Part of who we are is made up of our group memberships. Sometimes we think of ourselves as “us” versus “them” or “we” versus “they,” and at other times we think of ourselves as “I” versus “he or she” or “me” versus “him or her.” That is, sometimes we think of ourselves as group members and at other times we think of ourselves as unique individuals. This identity shift varies situationally. Note, however, thinking of the self in terms group membership and thinking of the self in terms of individual uniqueness are both parts of the self-concept. The first is referred to as social identity, the latter is referred to as personal identity.

To reiterate, in social identity theory, group membership is not something foreign that is tacked onto the person; it is a real, true and vital part of the person. Again, it is crucial to remember ingroups are groups with which people identify, and outgroups are ones with which people don't identify. For example, I am a psychologist. More importantly, I identify myself as being a psychologist. That is, I see myself as belonging to the professional group called psychologist. When someone asks me what I do, I proudly tell him or her that I have chosen psychology as my career path. If another person tells me that he or she is a proud psychologist as well then I know that we both identify with the same professional group (psychologist). Further, I know (s)he is a member of my ingroup. If, however, this person tells me that he or she is a medical doctor, then, instantaneously, there is recognition we do not identify with the same group. I know this person is part of another professional group to which I am not a member. That is, (s)he is a member of an outgroup.

Another implication of social identity is that we are, in some sense, the same, or similar to other people in our ingroup. This should not be misinterpreted. When we say that we are the same, we mean that for some purposes we treat members of our groups as being similar to ourselves in some relevant way. So, when I meet a fellow psychologist, I know instantaneously that we share some basic similarities. I know that, like myself, this person has probably gone to graduate school and he or she is interested in the science of behavior and the mind. On the other hand, when I meet a medical doctor, I know that, unlike myself, this person has extensive knowledge about human physiology and medications. Thus, I know instantaneously that basic differences exist between the groups to which we belong.

In a violent conflict such as a war, all members of the outgroup may be treated equally. People may not draw a distinction between those group members who committed war crimes and the group as a whole. Thus, when the ingroup responds to outgroup aggression, all members of the outgroup may be seen as deserving of reprisal. That is, members of the outgroup may be perceived as a homogeneous set. As a result, all outgroup members might be seen as deserving a common fate (defeat and death). This behavior and these beliefs are not the products of a bizarre personality disorder, but under these circumstances violent behavior becomes rational, accepted and even expected behavior.

Social identity theory also emphasizes social comparison (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Whether people think of themselves in terms of their personal identities or categorize themselves in terms of their group membership (in contrast with other groups), they generally look to others to evaluate their social standing. Categorizing at the personal level of identity occurs when there is no salient contrasting outgroup. As a result, people will compare themselves to other ingroup members. That is, personal identity is based on a comparative process that makes salient the differences between oneself and other ingroup members on relevant dimensions of comparison (Reynolds & Oakes, 2000). The basic idea here is that a positive self-concept is a part of normal psychological functioning. In fact, there is ample evidence that, to deal effectively with the world and stay healthy, people create positive illusions about the self (e.g., Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). One method people use to view the self positively is to compare the self with similar others that possess less skill and or ability (Festinger, 1954). Similarly,

in order to view the ingroup positively (have a positive social identity), we compare the ingroup to relevant outgroups.

Like the self, people want to see the ingroup as a whole in a positive light. But how do group members come to view their group positively? Tajfel and Turner answer that social identity refers to self-descriptions that emerge from comparisons between the ingroup and salient outgroups. These group relations are biased in that group members compare their group with others on dimensions that will permit a positive social identity. That is, people choose to compare their groups with other groups in ways that reflect positively on the ingroup. Two ideas follow from this desire for a positive social identity. One is positive distinctiveness: people are motivated to see their own group as better than other similar (but inferior or less powerful) groups. The other is negative distinctiveness: groups tend to minimize the differences between similar (but superior or more powerful) groups, so that our own group is seen favorably.

The operation of these processes is subsumed within the concept of social creativity. Groups choose dimensions to maximize the positivity of their own group. For example, groups that perceive themselves to be of high status on particular dimensions will choose those dimensions as the basis of comparison. Groups of low status will minimize differences on those dimensions or choose new dimensions. For example, people from some Middle Eastern Islamic countries might regard their country as inferior to the West in terms of economic and technological advancement but regard their way of life as morally superior.

The group is also a tool for personal survival (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) because it enhances the likelihood of reaching desired goals for the individual members (Baumeister

& Leary, 1995). Thus, anyone who threatens the survival efficacy of the group also threatens each individual member (Caporael, 2001; Caporael & Brewer, 1991; Darby & Schlenker, 1989). It follows that when outgroup members threaten the survival efficacy of the ingroup, those outgroup members should be judged in a relatively harsh manner. According to this logic, judgments about an aggressive outgroup should be necessarily negative. Moreover, perceivers should be relatively unwilling to forgive an aggressive outgroup, especially if that outgroup aggressed against the ingroup.

Within the context of my dissertation, it is useful to discuss aggression in terms of intergroup conflict. Based on SIT, I predict that the assignment of guilt and willingness to forgiveness should be harsh for aggression committed by an outgroup (relative to aggression committed by the ingroup). When an outgroup aggresses against the ingroup, that outgroup is in essence attacking the ingroup's social identity by threatening the survival efficacy of the ingroup. An extreme case of outgroup aggression is the treatment of Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II. In the case of the Holocaust, outgroup aggression on the part of Nazi Germany threatened the very existence of the Jewish people. What effect might such aggression have on Jews' perception of Germans today? I argue that people who are even tangentially associated with that group (today's Germans) could be judged harshly. That is, although most of the Germans that currently reside in Germany were not alive during the time of the Holocaust, the negative perceptions of that outgroup's attempts to annihilate the ingroup traverse generations. Thus, I predict that Jews, even today, still hold Germans responsible for the Holocaust.

Present day conflicts and SIT. What about present-day intergroup conflicts? Are ingroup members biased in their perceptions of ingroup versus outgroup aggression? SIT

would answer yes. Why? Outgroup aggression may place the ingroup at a disadvantage (i.e., economically, politically, psychologically), which should be particularly threatening. During intergroup conflict, both sides aggress to weaken the other side. This aggression is committed with the aim of eventually forcing the other group to concede. Consider the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict as an example (an example of intergroup conflict that I will address in more depth later in this dissertation). The Palestinians aggress (e.g., suicide bombers) with the aim of forcing Israel to allow the existence of a Palestinian homeland (Palestine). The Israelis aggress (e.g., enforcing curfews and restricted travel on Palestinians) in an attempt to control the Palestinian populace from aggressing. (This explanation for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is, of course, a gross understatement of the complex issues that fuel this conflict, but is nonetheless useful to demonstrate my point). However, the main objective of both groups is to eliminate the threat the other group poses.

Self-Categorization Theory

A later reformulation of SIT stresses the importance of self-categorization for group formation. The Self-Categorization Hypothesis (SCT; Turner, 1985; 1987; 1999) posits that in addition to categorizing others, people are consciously and actively involved in categorizing themselves. By categorizing the self as a member of a certain group, they perceive themselves as more similar to ingroup members, and in parallel, more different from outgroup members. Turner views the self-categorization process as the core of social identity.

Although Turner, like Tajfel, stressed the cognitive aspects of social identity, he and his followers explicitly rest their theory on sociological grounds. The following

assumptions are explicitly made in their writings: (1) that society is divided into social categories across many domains with relative power and status relationships between the various categories, (2) that a social category becomes important only when juxtaposed against other categories, (3) that these categories are frequently in conflict with each other, (4) that the nature of society is determined by its category structure, (5) that this structure exists prior to the individuals who constitute the group, and (6) that the social structure is fluid and changing and not static. New categories emerge, others transform, and others fade out.

According to SCT, the most fundamental process underlying human judgment is that of categorization (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). The relative salience of different possible social categorizations will depend on the context. When category salience shifts, perceptions of the self in relation to others will be altered (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). When a given categorization is salient, an individual may be perceived as an ingroup member (sharing the same category membership as the self), but when another categorization is salient that same individual may be perceived as an outgroup member (not sharing the same category membership as the self). Affective responses to the same target can, as a consequence of such shifts in categorization, dramatically differ (Schmitt, Silvia, & Branscombe, 2000).

Because categorization is inherently variable and is tied to changes in context (Bruner, 1957; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), context changes can alter which others are categorized as like or different from the self. At the lowest level of inclusiveness—the personal identity level—the self is differentiated from other ingroup members. At the intermediate or social level, the self is seen as different from outgroup

members but like other ingroup members. Social identity is defined by this level of inclusiveness. The most inclusive superordinate level reflects the perception of the self as like other human beings, and potentially different from non-humans. The higher the level of inclusiveness, the more socially shared similarities between the self and others should be expected.

According to this model, as the level of inclusiveness increases, people will view themselves as interchangeable parts of the increasingly greater whole (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1998; Turner & Onorato, 1999). This process is referred to as depersonalization, and it tends to result in uniform intragroup behavior and intergroup discrimination toward outgroup category members at the lower inclusiveness level (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). Accordingly, when a specific social identity is made salient, self-perceptions and conduct should be stereotypic of ingroup norms. For an ingroup that perceives itself to have been harmed by an outgroup, strategies that maintain negative views of the outgroup should be expected.

One approach to reducing such group-based perceptions and the resulting conflict involves encouraging members of both groups to shift their level of categorization from the social level to a more inclusive superordinate level (Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999). This concept is not new or foreign to philosophers. For example, Socrates understood the power of recategorization as can be evidenced by his proclamation that “I am a citizen, not of Athens or Greece, but of the world.” He understood that superordinate categorization, thinking of oneself as a citizen of the world, tore down walls erected by social-group oriented categorization. According to SCT, by including former outgroup members in the same category as the self, perception and interaction,

regardless of group membership at the lower level, should become more intragroup in nature. Theoretically, then, by making a superordinate group membership salient, intergroup boundaries that would operate at a lower or less inclusive level of categorization should be reduced.

Common Ingroup Identity Model

Like self-categorization theory, the common ingroup identity model (CIIM; Gaertner, et al., 1993) proposes that recategorization from distinct groups into one group—increasing the level of inclusiveness—will decrease negativity of responses to former outgroup members. That is, the CIIM proposes that influencing the ways in which group members conceive of group boundaries can reduce intergroup bias and conflict, but through recategorization rather than decategorization. Thus, by categorizing people as ingroup members at the superordinate level, rather than as outgroup members, evaluations of those former outgroup members will become more positive (see also Messick & Mackie, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the former group-based biases in perception and attribution will be reduced (Brown & Abrams, 1986; Hewstone, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1985). Four decades prior to the CIIM, Allport (1958, pp. 41-43) advocated precisely the same mechanism. Drawing concentric circles with family in the center and humankind at the periphery, he argued that “concentric loyalties need not clash” and that negative judgments are minimized by inclusive group membership. Thus, social categorization is a potentially critical process for understanding when forgiveness can be expected and when collective guilt assignment will be reduced.

Overview of Studies 1 and 2

Based on self-categorization theory, I hypothesized that making a higher level of inclusiveness salient (human identity) among members of a victimized group, should decrease the degree of collective guilt assigned to contemporary members of the perpetrator group. Conversely, by categorizing contemporary perpetrator and victimized group members as separate and distinct, assignment of collective guilt to contemporary Germans should be high. I also expected that willingness to forgive Germans for the past actions of their national group should depend on level of categorization. Categorization at the more inclusive human identity level should result in participants being more willing to forgive than when categorization is at the group level.

In the first two studies of this dissertation I assessed forgiveness and collective guilt assignment within the context of the Holocaust. The Holocaust was framed as either a German-Jewish intergroup event, or as an event reflecting something more general about human behavior. I considered the consequences of shifting levels of inclusiveness—from the social to the human level—for both forgiveness of contemporary members of the perpetrator group and collective guilt assignment to them among members of the historically victimized group. Accordingly, among Jewish Americans I manipulated how the Holocaust was categorized—as reflecting what humans have done to other humans or as what Germans did to Jews. I expected that Jews would be more willing to forgive Germans for the past when they were conceptualizing the Holocaust at the human identity level and that the guilt assigned to contemporary Germans would be lower in the human identity condition compared to the social identity condition. An

inverse relationship was hypothesized between willingness to forgive and assignment of collective guilt, with both expected to differ by categorization condition.

I also considered different possible routes by which shifts in level of categorization among victimized group members might affect the assignment of collective guilt and willingness to forgive perpetrator group members. One possibility is that at the human level of categorization, people are less likely to perceive genocide as unique to Germans; that is, genocide will come to be seen as a more pervasive phenomenon in human societies. As a result of seeing genocide as not uniquely something done by Germans against Jews, the specific category of Germans will be seen as more deserving of forgiveness and less deserving of assigned Collective guilt compared to when it is an outcome only Germans have brought about. This would be consistent with the recategorization studies of Gaertner and colleagues, where shifts in social categorization from the intergroup level to a more inclusive or superordinate level makes former outgroup members (Germans) come to be seen as ingroup members (humans).

CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1

Method

Participants

Jewish participants were contacted via the Internet through the Hillel (i.e., Jewish Students Association) e-mail list at the University of Kansas. Hillel members were asked to access a website to fill out a short questionnaire concerning Jews' perceptions of the Holocaust. Forty-seven participants (26 males and 21 females) responded to my request by accessing the website and completing the questionnaire.

Procedure and Design

A link to an on-line questionnaire was provided to potential Jewish participants on an e-mail sent to the Hillel listserv. This link directed the participants to an on-line consent form. Hillel members who responded to the e-mail participated in a two-condition (social vs. human identity salience), between participant design. Participants were told that they could proceed to the on-line questionnaire by clicking the "next" button that was located at the bottom of the consent form. The consent form page was designed to randomly send participants to one of two webpages once the "next" button was clicked. These web pages corresponded to the two levels of inclusiveness: social or human. In all conditions, participants were first asked to reflect on their views concerning the Holocaust. If participants accessed the social identity condition webpage, the Holocaust was described as an event in which Germans had behaved aggressively towards Jews. In contrast, if participants accessed the human identity condition webpage, the Holocaust was described as an event where humans had behaved aggressively toward other humans.

Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with a series of Likert-type statements by clicking on their selected response option using a (1) definitely disagree to (8) definitely agree scale. Four items assessed willingness to forgive contemporary Germans for the Holocaust. These items were: “Germans today should be forgiven for what their group did to Jews during World War II,” “Jews should move past their negative feelings toward today’s Germans for the harm their group inflicted during World War II,” “Today’s Germans should be forgiven for what their ancestors did to Jews during World War II,” “It is possible for me to forgive today’s Germans for the Holocaust.” Four item assessed the degree to which Jews assign collective guilt to contemporary Germans for the Holocaust: These items were: “Germans of today should feel guilty about the bad things that happened to Jews during World War II,” “Today’s Germans should feel guilty about the awful things their ancestors did to Jews in World War II,” “Germans today should feel regret for what their group did to Jews during World War II,” and “All Germans should feel guilty about the harm done to Jews during World War II.” In addition, three items assessed perceived pervasiveness of genocide: “Harmful actions such as those during the Holocaust have happened throughout human history,” “There have been many similar instances of mass killing throughout human history,” and “The Germans targeting Jews in World War II is similar to many other examples of mass killing of people that have happened throughout human history”.

Results

Experimental Effects

Manipulation check. In order to test my hypotheses, I randomly assigned American Jewish participants to either a human or a social identity salience condition.

The success of the inclusiveness manipulation was assessed in terms of perceived similarity between Jews and Germans. In the social identity condition relatively few similarities between the two groups should be perceived, and in the superordinate or human identity condition, Jewish participants should be more likely to perceive similarities between their ingroup and Germans. That is, when Germans are seen as part of a shared ingroup in the human condition, there should be more perceived similarities between Germans and Jews than in the social identity condition.

Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which “Germans and Jews share basic similarities” anchored at (1) *strongly disagree* and (8) *strongly agree*. In the intergroup categorization condition, participants perceived Germans and Jews as somewhat dissimilar groups ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 2.20$), while they perceived the two groups as relatively similar in the human categorization case ($M = 6.36$, $SD = 1.85$), $F(1, 45) = 22.05$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.36$. Thus, I was rather successful in varying the perceived similarity between the groups as a function of the categorization manipulation.

Pervasiveness of genocide. An overall pervasiveness of genocide score was calculated by averaging the three items assessing this perception ($\alpha = .95$). One-way ANOVA yielded a significant effect of condition, $F(1, 45) = 35.59$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.71$. In the social identity condition pervasiveness of genocide was seen as relatively unique to Germans ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.84$), whereas in the human identity case it was seen as pervasive and not unique to Germans ($M = 6.33$, $SD = 1.36$).

Willingness to forgive. An overall willingness to forgive contemporary Germans score was created by averaging the four forgiveness items ($\alpha = .76$). Participants were more willing to forgive Germans when the human level of identity was made salient ($M =$

5.84, $SD = 0.92$) than when categorization was at the social identity level ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.25$), $F(1, 45) = 16.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.20$.

Collective guilt assignment. The mean for the four collective guilt items was calculated to create an overall collective guilt assignment score ($\alpha = .95$). Jewish participants assigned significantly less collective guilt to Germans when the more inclusive human level categorization was employed ($M = 5.47$, $SD = 2.06$) than when the social level of identity was employed ($M = 6.75$, $SD = 0.74$), $F(1, 45) = 7.62$, $p < .009$, $d = .83$.

Path Analysis

To test the effect of my independent variable on the measured variables, I performed path analyses using LISREL, Version 8.5 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2001). Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a very general, chiefly linear, chiefly cross-sectional statistical modeling technique. (Factor analysis, path analysis and regression all represent special cases of SEM.) SEM is a largely confirmatory, rather than exploratory, technique. That is, a researcher is more likely to use SEM to determine whether a certain model is valid, rather than using SEM to “find” a suitable model – although SEM analyses often involve a certain exploratory element. In SEM, interest usually focuses on latent constructs – abstract psychological variables like “intelligence” or, in the case of this dissertation “forgiveness” – rather than on the manifest variables used to measure these constructs. By explicitly modeling measurement error, researchers seek to derive unbiased estimates for the relations between latent constructs. To this end, SEM allows multiple measures to be associated with a single latent construct. A structural equation model implies a structure of the covariance matrix of the measures. Once the model’s

parameters have been estimated, the resulting model-implied covariance matrix can then be compared to an empirical or data-based covariance matrix. If the two matrices are consistent with one another, then the structural equation model can be considered a plausible explanation for relations between the measures. In this dissertation, I used SEMing to test the structural relations between my variables. Several possible models of the effect of level of categorization on the pervasiveness of genocide, willingness to forgive Germans, and assignment of collective guilt to Germans were tested. Analysis was based on the correlation matrix shown in Table 1-1.

First, I estimated a model in which the categorization manipulation directly affects all of my measured variables. Thus, I included paths from level of categorization to each of the measured variables: perceived pervasiveness of genocide, assignment of collective guilt, and willingness to forgive (see Figure 2-1). The fit of the model was assessed with the chi-square test for goodness of fit and the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). A non-significant chi-square statistic indicates that the hypothesized model does not differ from the observed data. The CFI compares the fit of the hypothesized model to the null model that assumes that none of the variables are related. Generally, a CFI value of .90 or greater is considered an acceptable fit for a model (CFI values range from 0 to 1). The resulting model did not fit the data, $\chi^2 (3) = 17.27, p < .001, CFI = .79$. Therefore, this model significantly differed from the data and was rejected.

Table 2-1

Correlations for Measured Variables in Study 1

	1	2	3	4
1. Categorization	--			
2. Pervasiveness of Genocide	.67**	--		
3. Forgiveness	.52**	.60**	--	
4. Collective Guilt Assignment	-.38**	-.47**	-.50**	--
Means	1.52	5.03	5.21	5.94
Standard Deviations	0.50	2.12	1.28	1.70

NOTE: Categorization was coded 1 = social identity condition and 2 = human identity condition. All measured variables ranged from 1 to 8.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

I then estimated my hypothesized model. This model assessed whether categorizing the Holocaust in terms of the human level of categorization affects the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. Further, I assessed in this model whether changes in perceived pervasiveness of genocide influences willingness to forgive Germans and willingness to assign Germans collective guilt. I treated willingness to forgive and assignment of collective guilt as correlated outcomes. The initial LISREL estimates met the standards for a good fitting model, $\chi^2(1) = 6.95$, *ns*, CFI = .94. Figure 2-2 presents the predicted paths, including standardized regression weights. All paths in the model are statistically significant and show that level of categorization predicted willingness to forgive and assignment of collective guilt by affecting the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. That is, as genocide is perceived to be more pervasive, there is a greater willingness to forgive and less collective guilt assignment.

To assess whether this full mediational model adequately represented the data, or whether the inclusion of the direct paths would improve model fit, I compared my hypothesized model to one including the direct path between categorization condition and the two outcome measures. Although the model with the two direct effect paths fit less well than the model without them, the fit was adequate, $\chi^2(1) = 3.46$, $p > .06$, CFI = .96. Perhaps most importantly, the model including the direct effects was not a significant improvement in model fit compared to the full mediational model, $\Delta\chi^2 = 3.49$, $df = 2$, *ns*. Because this model was not a significant improvement in model fit, I can claim with some confidence that pervasiveness of genocide mediates the effect of categorization on both collective guilt assignment and willingness to forgive.

Figure 2-1. Structural analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on assignment of collective guilt, forgiveness of Germans, and perceived pervasiveness of genocide: Study 1.





Figure 2-2. Structural analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on assignment of collective guilt and forgiveness of Germans, with perceived pervasiveness of genocide as mediator: Study 1.




Alternative Model. This model considered whether the categorization manipulation directly affects both assignment of collective guilt and willingness to forgive, and whether those in turn affect perceived pervasiveness of genocide (see Figure 2-3). Therefore, this model tests the reverse causal order of our hypothesized model. This model differed significantly from the data, $\chi^2(2) = 19.28, p < .001, CFI = .79$, and was thus rejected.

Discussion

I examined the assignment of group-based guilt and willingness to forgive Germans as a function of whether the social or human level of inclusiveness was made salient to Jews. As predicted, there was a negative correlation between assigned guilt and willingness to forgive. As Jews became less willing to assign guilt to Germans they also became more willing to forgive. This negative correlation was echoed in the effect of categorization on both collective guilt assignment and willingness to forgive. When the Holocaust was presented as a human problem, Jews were more forgiving of Germans than when it was presented as an intergroup event. Conversely, Jews assigned less collective guilt to Germans at the human level of inclusiveness than at the social level of inclusiveness. Lastly, level of categorization also had a significant effect on the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. As level of categorization increased from the social to human level of inclusiveness so too did Jews' perceived pervasiveness of genocide. To clarify the processes involved in these effects, I tested a series of structural equation models. The model that best fit the data indicated that level of inclusiveness directly influenced perceived pervasiveness of genocide. Jews were more willing to view the Holocaust as

Figure 2-3. Structural analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on perceived pervasiveness of genocide, with both assignment of collective guilt and forgiveness of Germans as mediators: Study 1.



but one example of mass violence in human history when the Holocaust was presented as an event in which humans behaved aggressively towards fellow humans than when it was presented as an event in which Germans behaved aggressively towards Jews. Perceived pervasiveness of genocide then directly influenced both assigned group-based guilt and willingness to forgive Germans. That is, when participants perceived genocide to be pervasive through human history, our Jewish participants were more willing to forgive and less likely to assign group-based guilt to Germans. Thus, the best-fit model indicated that perceived pervasiveness of genocide mediated the effect of categorization on assigned collective guilt and willingness to forgive Germans for the Holocaust.

In the current Study, I focused on the influence of level of inclusiveness on assigning group-based guilt and willingness to forgive a perpetrating group by the victimized group. I demonstrated that, when the human level of identity is made salient, Jews are less inclined to assign collective guilt and are more willing to forgive Germans for the Holocaust. Such results have far-reaching implications for conflict resolution and pro-social intergroup behavior. Shifts in categorization may be an integral part of the process needed for reconciliation between groups in conflict. Specifically, when two groups are at an impasse regarding a solution to an intergroup conflict, it may be useful to begin mediation by making salient their human level of identity. As the results from Study 1 suggest, making salient a human identity, as opposed to a social identity, will increase the perceived similarity between members of the ingroup and members of the outgroup. The consequence of this increase in perceived similarity is an increase in willingness to forgive the outgroup and a decrease in collective guilt assigned to the outgroup. I suggest that when group members let go of the negative feelings and

cognitions (i.e., forgive) directed toward the outgroup reconciliation becomes possible. That is, ingroup members may be more willing to forgive outgroup members, and subsequently reconcile, if those outgroup members – by way of shifts in categorization – become members of a common ingroup (the human ingroup).

A Caveat for Study 1

While these results support my general hypothesis, my manipulation is open to an alternative interpretation. In Experiment 1, I manipulated level of categorization by framing the Holocaust as either a human tragedy or an event in which Germans behaved aggressively toward Jews. My manipulation, however, may not have been ideal. That is, there exists the possibility that I did not manipulate the variable (categorization) that I intended. Instead, I may have inadvertently cued the Jewish participants in the social identity condition to assign significant amounts of guilt and be unforgiving of Germans for the Holocaust. Linguistically, by stating that the Holocaust was an event in which *Germans* behaved aggressively toward *Jews* may imply greater blame to Germans in the social identity condition. That is, the social identity conditions manipulation may have been inadvertently leading Jewish participants to blame all Germans for the events of the Holocaust. Recall, in the human identity condition, Jewish participants read that the Holocaust was an example of how *humans* behaved aggressively toward fellow *humans*. The key distinction here is that in the human identity condition no reference was made to the specific perpetrator group and specific victimized group. The differences found between conditions may be attributable to the linguistic differences between conditions and not the intended categorization manipulation. Therefore, in Experiment 2, I test the

same hypotheses, but used a manipulation for level of categorization this linguistic explanation is absent.

CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2

Method

Participants

Jewish participants were contacted via the Internet through the Hillel (i.e., Jewish Students Association) e-mail list at the University of Alberta. As in the first study, Hillel members were asked to access a website to fill out a short questionnaire concerning Jews' perceptions of the Holocaust. Thirty-seven participants (19 males and 18 females) responded to my request by accessing the website and completing the questionnaire.

Design and Procedure

As in Study 1, Study 2 was a two-condition (social vs. human identity salience) between-participant design. Participants were recruited via the Hillel listserv. An e-mail was sent to each member of Hillel at the University of Alberta with a request to complete an on-line questionnaire about Jews' perceptions of the Holocaust. A link to the on-line questionnaire was provided in the e-mail message. This link directed the participants to an on-line consent form. The consent form was designed to randomly send participants to one of two websites (corresponding to either the social or human identity condition) when the "next" button was clicked. The human identity condition was identical to the human condition participants experienced in Study 1. In this condition, the Holocaust was described as an event that demonstrated how humans had behaved aggressively toward other humans. In the revised social identity condition, I explicitly requested participants to indicate whether they were Jewish or non-Jewish, and whether they were German or non-German in origin. Thus, the main difference between Study 1 and Study 2 was that that the social identity condition was altered to avoid linguistically suggesting blame to one group.

Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a series of Likert-type statements by clicking on their selected response option using a (1) *definitely disagree* to (8) *definitely agree* scale. The dependent measures for Study 2 were identical to those used in Study 1. Items assessed the degree to which Jews assigned collective guilt to Germans for the Holocaust, willingness to forgive Germans for the Holocaust, and the perceived pervasiveness of genocide.

Once again, following completion of the on-line questionnaire, participants were automatically taken to a website that contained a written debriefing. The debriefing informed the participant about the nature and purpose of the study. In addition, should the participant have questions or concerns regarding the study, contact information was provided.

Results

Experiential Effects

Manipulation check. As was the case for Experiment 1, the success of the categorization manipulation was assessed in terms of the perceived similarity between Jews and Germans. That is, I measured the extent to which Germans were seen as sharing basic similarities with Jews. As was the case in Experiment 1, in the human categorization condition Jewish participants perceived Germans and Jews as sharing more similarities ($M = 5.84$, $SD = 1.17$) than in the social identity condition ($M = 4.84$, $SD = 1.97$), $F(1, 45) = 4.94$, $p < .03$, $d = .62$. Thus, the categorization manipulation employed in the current experiment was as successful as the manipulation version employed in Experiment 1.

Perceived pervasiveness of genocide. I predicted that people would be more willing to see the Holocaust as one of many instances of mass violence throughout human history when their human identity was salient compared to when their social identity was salient. As was the case for Experiment 1, an overall mean rating was calculated for the three pervasiveness of genocide items ($\alpha = .91$). Using the overall mean pervasiveness score, one-way ANOVA was performed using level of categorization as the independent variable with perceived pervasiveness of genocide as the dependent variable. This analysis resulted in a significant main effect on categorization, $F(1, 35) = 12.22, p < .002, d = 1.14$. As expected, when the human identity categorization was made salient, Jews perceived genocide to be more pervasive ($M = 5.63, SD = 1.82$) than when the social identity categorization was salient ($M = 3.67, SD = 1.58$).

Willingness to forgive. An overall forgiveness score was calculated by taking the mean of the four forgiveness items ($\alpha = .89$). This overall forgiveness score was used to assess Jews' willingness to forgive contemporary the Holocaust. As predicted, when the human level of categorization was employed, Jews were more willing to forgive contemporary Germans ($M = 5.67, SD = 1.45$) than when the social level of categorization was salient ($M = 4.60, SD = 1.53$), $F(1, 35) = 4.57, p < .04, d = .72$.

Collective guilt assignment. It was also expected that Jews would assign more collective guilt to Germans in the intergroup categorization condition compared to when the human level categorization was salient. To assess this hypothesis an overall assignment of collective guilt score was calculated by averaging the four assignment of collective guilt items ($\alpha = .93$). As expected, when the intergroup level of categorization was made salient, Jews assigned more collective guilt to Germans ($M = 4.97, SD = 1.56$)

than when the human level was salient ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.83$), $F(1, 35) = 5.19$, $p < .03$, $d = .75$.

Path Analysis

To assess the consequence of my independent variable for the measured variables, I performed path analyses using LISREL, Version 8.5 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2001). Analysis was based on the correlation matrix shown in Table 3-1. The same models assessed in Experiment 1 were assessed in this experiment. These models assessed the effects of level of categorization on the pervasiveness of genocide, willingness to forgive Germans, and assignment of collective guilt to Germans.

First, I considered whether my categorization manipulation directly affected all of my dependent measures. Thus, I included paths from level of categorization to perceived pervasiveness of genocide, assignment of collective guilt, and willingness to forgive (see Figure 3-1). Once again, the fit of the model was assessed with the chi-square test for goodness of fit and the CFI. The resulting model did not fit the data, $\chi^2(3) = 25.19$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .67$. Therefore, this model significantly differed from the data and was rejected.

Recall, my hypothesized model predicted that categorizing the Holocaust at the human level will affect the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. Perceived pervasiveness of genocide, in turn, should influence willingness to forgive Germans and willingness to assign Germans collective guilt. The initial LISREL estimates met the standards for a good fitting model, $\chi^2(3) = 3.96$, $p > .26$. Further, the CFI value indicated a near-perfect fit of the data to the model, .97. Figure 3-2 presents the predicted paths and their

Table 3-1

Correlations for Measured Variables in Study 2

	1	2	3	4
1. Categorization	--			
2. Pervasiveness of Genocide	.51**	--		
3. Forgiveness	.34*	.63**	--	
4. Collective Guilt	-.36*	-.52**	-.53**	--
Means	1.51	4.68	5.15	4.32
Standard Deviations	0.51	1.96	1.56	1.80

NOTE: Categorization was coded 1 = social identity condition and 2 = human identity condition. All measured variables ranged from 1 to 8.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Figure 3-1. Structural analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on assignment of collective guilt, forgiveness of Germans, and perceived pervasiveness of genocide: Study 2.






Figure 3-2. Mediation analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on assignment of collective guilt and forgiveness of Germans, with perceived pervasiveness of genocide as mediator: Study 2.



standardized regression weights. All paths in the model are statistically significant. Level of categorization predicted willingness to forgive and collective guilt assignment via shifts in the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. That is, categorization significantly influenced perceived pervasiveness of genocide. Jewish participants in the human identity condition, as compared to participants in the social identity condition, were likely to perceive genocide to be pervasive. Further, the path linking pervasiveness of genocide and willingness to forgive Germans for the Holocaust was also significant and positive. The corresponding path for pervasiveness of genocide and willingness to assign collective guilt to Germans was statistically significant as well, but it was in the negative direction. As in Study 1, to assess whether this full mediational model adequately represented the data, or whether the inclusion of the direct paths would improve model fit, I compared my hypothesized model to one including the direct path between categorization condition and the two outcome measures. Although the resulting model fit acceptably, $\chi^2(1) = 3.73$, $p > .05$, CFI = .94, it was not a significant improvement from our hypothesized model, $\Delta\chi^2 = 0.23$, $df = 2$, *ns*. Thus, again, I can claim that pervasiveness of genocide mediates the effect of categorization on both collective guilt assignment and willingness to forgive.

Alternative Model. This model considered whether my categorization manipulation directly affected both assignment of collective guilt and willingness to forgive, and whether these, in turn, affected perceived pervasiveness of genocide (see Figure 3-3). This model differed significantly from the data, $\chi^2(2) = 12.84$, $p < .002$, CFI = .70, and was thus rejected.

Figure 3-3. Structural analysis examining the effects of level of categorization on perceived pervasiveness of genocide, with both assignment of collective guilt and forgiveness of Germans as mediators: Study 2.



Discussion

Results from Study 2, in conjunction with results from Study 1, suggest that when categorization included all humans, victimized group members became more willing to forgive and became less willing to assign collective guilt to contemporary members of the perpetrator group, than when categorizing included only members of the social group. Specifically, encouraging Jews to categorize in human terms (i.e., we are all members of the same group, humans) promoted forgiveness of Germans and lowered the guilt assigned uniquely to them. Note, however, these first two studies also suggest that the effects of categorization level on willingness to forgive and collective guilt assignment depend on shifts in the pervasiveness of genocide.

Undeniably, the last century is “a catalog of our capacity to wreak considerable harm on one another and our gross inhumanity to our fellow humans” (Tutu, 1999, p. 124). However, this “catalog” only becomes salient when shifts to a more inclusive level of categorization occur. The shift toward a superordinate categorization altered the perceived pervasiveness of genocide, which in turn affected willingness to forgive contemporary members of the perpetrator group for past harms committed against the ingroup. That is, when the Holocaust was seen as but one example of the harm humans have perpetrated against their fellow humans, forgiveness became more likely and assignment of collective guilt became less likely, than when the Holocaust was seen as a unique event. Indeed, it might even be argued that when a group becomes aware of such genocidal pervasiveness, situational accounts are more apt than are group-based dispositional accounts. Thus, placing the harm committed in the past in a broader

historical context can lead the harmed group to be more willing to forgive the perpetrator group's actions and less likely to assign that group collective guilt.

These results also provide good evidence that forgiveness and the assignment of collective guilt vary as a function of social categorization processes. Further, willingness to forgive and the assignment of collective guilt are dependent on the level of inclusiveness. Social versus human identity salience had a significant impact on forgiveness and the assignment of collective guilt. However, with the use of structural equation modeling, I was able to demonstrate that the effect of categorization on willingness to forgive and collective guilt assignment was mediated by the perceived pervasiveness of genocide. That is, the effect of movement towards a more inclusive view of Germans on willingness to forgive and collective guilt assignment depended on whether Jews perceive genocide to something specific to Germans. More specifically, when Jews thought that the Holocaust was due to German nature versus human nature, they were less likely to forgive today's Germans and prescriptively desired today's Germans to feel collective guilt.

Thus far I have shown in both Study 1 and Study 2 that how a historical victimization event is categorized has important consequences for the victimized group's responses to contemporary members of the perpetrator group. Specifically, when social identity is salient, victimized group members respond in a harsh manner to contemporary members of perpetrator group. Thus, group-based victimization not only results in harsh judgments of those who perpetrated the harm, but those judgments can traverse generations to influence how contemporary members of the victimized group judge contemporary members of the perpetrator group.

In the following two studies, I extend Studies 1 and 2 by considering how memories of past group-based victimization not only traverse generations to influence

judgments, but can also traverse intergroup conflicts. That is, I consider whether remembering a historical victimization event can influence responses to *other* social groups with whom the ingroup is currently in conflict. To address this issue, I conducted a set of studies to examine the influence of a historical reminder of group-based victimization for willingness to forgive and the assignment of collective guilt to a new enemy with which the ingroup is presently in conflict. I hypothesized that reminding a historically victimized group (i.e., Jews) of their prior victimization (i.e., by Germans) would induce social identity level categorization. By doing so, it should reduce willingness to forgive and increase assignment of collective guilt to another social group (i.e., Palestinians).

CHAPTER 4: PERSECUTION REMEMBERED

Introduction

Social groups have histories, and many groups have rituals that involve remembering their history in some way or another. Material objects or symbols are often used to remind group members of their collective past (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). Indeed, some groups are quite ambitious in their efforts to actively maintain a sense of their collective past. Groups that treasure their collective history develop annual celebrations to mark past triumphs. As my first and second studies suggest, such collective memories can have powerful effects on intergroup perception and behavior. Indeed, responses to more recent intergroup conflicts are likely to be affected by referencing a collective past (Marques, Paez, & Serra, 1997; Paez, Basabe, & Gonzalez, 1997).

Jews are a group that may be especially prone to define themselves by their past, which is one that has seen victimization like few others (see Barkan, 2000). Indeed, the most important Jewish traditions highlight overcoming group-based persecution. For example, Passover commemorates the release from bondage in ancient Egypt, Purim recounts the circumstances that led to the end of Persian oppression of the Jews, and Chanukah is the celebration of the Jewish army's success against their Greek oppressors in Jerusalem. Thus, Jews frequently define their group in terms of its history of persecution. Today, Jews are especially likely to employ the Holocaust as a defining aspect of their group identity (Barkan, 2000; see also Nadler, in press). The Holocaust has left an indelible print on the Jewish social identity. Thus, I predict that the Holocaust may set the stage for experiences involving guilt, recrimination, and forgiveness (Nadler,

in press) for past injustices (as seen in my first two studies) and for transgressions within current conflicts as well.

Holocaust Victimization Reminders and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is of great import to Jews around the world. Indeed, the future of the Jewish homeland, Israel, whose existence has its roots in the Holocaust experience, is intrinsically tied to the outcome of the Palestinian conflict. Following the end of World War II, there was an outcry for a Jewish homeland. Jews argued that they needed a land to call their own. Having a Jewish homeland would help ensure that the Holocaust would not be repeated. That is, a Jewish homeland would provide a place of refuge should another group attempt to annihilate the Jewish people again. In fact, today, many Jews continue to assert that the Holocaust demonstrates the need for a Jewish homeland. Others have argued that, Jews around the world have used the Holocaust as a justification for Israel's "right to exist" (Finkelstein, 2000). Proclaiming these sentiments, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, unequivocally asserted that the Jewish State of Israel was the heir of the six million Jews who perished at the hands of Nazi Germany (see Teveth, 1996).

As a result, Jews who are reminded of the Holocaust may see Israel's treatment of the Palestinians as justified, for the Palestinians represent a threat to the very existence of a Jewish homeland. Thus, the current conflict can be perceived in terms of how Jews without a state might suffer from a repeat of history. Palestinians may also make use of Holocaust history as a means of gaining sympathy for their own desire for a homeland. Indeed, Palestinians claim that although the Germans oppressed Jews during World War II, Jews themselves are now the oppressors of the Palestinians.

The psychological implications of remembering a historical victimization event such as the Holocaust for perceptions of another group conflict have not been explored. For Jews in particular, I consider whether remembering the Holocaust influences willingness to forgive and the assignment of collective guilt to Palestinians for the current conflict. Remembering the Holocaust—in effect, a reminder of the ingroup’s historical victimization—should have the effect of reducing sympathy toward an outgroup which currently represents a threat to the ingroup. If Jews conceive of themselves as historical victims, it is then likely that the memory of the Holocaust will threaten their survival efficacy. As stated earlier, when outgroup members (in this case the Palestinians) threaten the survival efficacy of the ingroup, those outgroup members will be judged harshly.

Since the end of World War II, Jews have worked diligently at remembering the Holocaust (Zuckerman, 1993) in order to encourage both fellow Jews and non-Jews to support the need for a Jewish homeland. Thus, the Holocaust and the formation of the State of Israel are intrinsically linked. Remembering the Holocaust may, therefore, strengthen Jews’ claims to the land of Israel, and be used as justification for actions taken to defend their territory. If this were the case, reminding Jews of the Holocaust should reduce willingness to forgive the Palestinians and increase the collective guilt assigned to Palestinians for the harm perpetrated against Jews.

Group Processes and Perceived Rationale For Aggression

It is useful to clarify what SIT might predict about willingness to forgive aggressive acts committed by the ingroup and aggressive acts committed by the outgroup. According to SIT, assignment of guilt and willingness to forgiveness should be more negative for outgroup aggression relative to ingroup aggression. With respect to the

current conflict in Israel and the occupied territories, Jewish North Americans should respond to aggression by Palestinians during the present Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a relatively harsh manner. The North American Jewish social identity has become intrinsically tied to the State of Israel and its vitality. This connection between Jews and Israel has sustained and invigorated Jewish life for half a century (Ariel & Graham, 2001). This bond has also allowed many Jewish organizations (e.g., Jewish National Fund and Bnai Brith), which have the aim of seeing a healthy and vibrant Jewish Homeland grow and prosper. When Palestinian suicide bombers enter the State of Israel with the sole purpose of killing innocent Israelis, destroying Israeli buildings, and crippling Israeli infrastructure, Jews around the world sit up and take notice. According to SIT, Jews should see these actions of the Palestinians as a threat to the future of the Jewish homeland, and, de facto, a threat to Jewish social identity. If this were the case, Israeli aggression should be viewed as reactive. That is, those acts committed by the Israeli defense force should be seen as merely responses to the aggressive acts committed by Palestinians. As such, Jews should be more than willing to forgive their ingroup's aggressive acts.

According to realistic conflict theory (RCT) (Sherif, 1956), groups become prejudiced toward one another when they are in direct conflict. Furthermore, in the face of conflict, groups undergo specific changes. First, their relations to their competitors become hostile. They begin to act toward that outgroup in ways that their own morality would otherwise forbid. A second change involves relations between the individuals and their ingroup. Conflict not only produces hostility to the outgroup, but also intensifies loyalty to the ingroup.

Muzafer Sherif and his collaborators (1954/1961) carried out a classic study designed to show that if you randomly assign people to groups and then place those groups in direct competition with each other, judgments of ingroup aggression and outgroup aggression differ. Not only that, but, as previously stated, affective responses to the *same* target can, as a consequence of being categorized as either an ingroup or outgroup member, dramatically differ (cf., Schmitt, Silvia, & Branscombe, 2000). For example, Sherif (1956) describes how, during one particular summer camp, a boy who was previously regarded as a bully (prior to the separation of the boys into two distinct groups) became a hero to his fellow ingroup members. Aggressive acts once thought unforgivable were now being lauded. In particular, Sherif predicted that conflict would: produce loyalty to the members of the ingroup and hostility to the outgroup; cause the ingroup to judge outgroup members harshly; and lead people to overvalue the actions (even negative actions like bullying) of the ingroup relative to that of the outgroup. Within RCT, outgroup derogation occurs naturally and automatically as a function of group distinctions. According to the theory, such behavior is an attempt to heighten the position of the ingroup relative to the outgroup.

Although RCT might predict that aggression directed toward the outgroup would necessarily be lauded, others have suggested that not all aggressive acts are created equal (Mummendey & Otten, 1993; Otten, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 1995). When an individual aggresses due to provocation, such aggression is seen as being the result of situational forces. Such harmful acts resulting from provocation represent hostile aggression (Bushman & Anderson, 2001), or what I call *reactive aggression*. This type of aggressive act is defensive in nature and is the consequence of perceived threat. When

situational forces are seen a contributing factor in aggression, the aggressive behavior may not be seen as particularly immoral (Carpenter & Darley, 1978; Harvey & Rule, 1978). That is, the aggressor(s) might be seen as having a good reason for committing the aggressive behavior (e.g., one group retaliating for harm previously inflicted by another group). Thus, the aggressive behavior might be forgiven and relatively little guilt might be assigned for the acts.

In contrast, harmful acts not resulting from provocation represent *instrumental aggression* (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). This type of aggressive act is offensive in nature and is committed simply to gain something from another (e.g., to gain power over another group). This type of aggression is generally viewed as emanating from the individual or group as opposed to the situation. I argue that instrumental aggression directed toward an outgroup may be viewed in a particularly harsh manner. For example, deprecating speech represents “old-fashioned” racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998) that goes against the current cultural values of fairness, justice, and racial equality. In fact, when Whites are asked to evaluate an explicitly hostile statement uttered by an ingroup member, they may try to protect or restore their positive social identity through dissociation from the threatening behavior, also known as the black sheep effect (Marques & Paez, 1994). This effect represents a self-enhancing bias that distances deviant ingroup members who negatively contribute to the group’s social identity.

According to research on the black sheep effect, misbehaving ingroup members can be considered a serious threat to the vitality of the group (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). The group strives to see itself as moral and just. Deviant members of the ingroup, whose

behavior crosses clear moral boundaries, could threaten the group's identity. Findings from this research suggest that social perceivers sometimes judge misbehaving ingroup members more extremely than they do equally misbehaving outgroup members. Because aggression is ordinarily considered deviant, this perspective suggests that perceivers might react more negatively to aggressors from the ingroup, as opposed to aggressors from the outgroup. Moreover, given that instrumental aggression tends to be perceived more negatively than other forms of aggression (Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, in press), instrumental aggression by ingroup members might lead to particularly harsh judgments about the aggressors.

I predict that discriminatory judgments about an outgroup aggressor may depend on the perceived reason for a conflict. Judgments about the outgroup should be more negative (compared to the ingroup) if the aggression is perceived to be instrumental (i.e., aggression committed in order to gain at the expense of another) than if the aggression is perceived to be reactive (i.e., retaliatory aggression). This should occur because an outgroup member's instrumental aggression puts the ingroup at a competitive disadvantage, which should be particularly threatening, whereas reactive aggression presupposes that the ingroup was at least partially responsible for the outgroup's aggression.

Given the argument above, Jews' willingness to forgive and assigned collective guilt may vary with their perceptions of the cause of the conflict. That is, the feelings and cognitions that Jews may hold toward Palestinians may lie in the *type* of aggression they perceive the Israelis and Palestinians to be committing. Jews should be unwilling to forgive and assign collective guilt to Palestinians if they perceive their aggression to be

instrumental (e.g., to rid remove Jews from the Middle East and, more specifically, from land they consider to be Palestine – their Homeland). Further, if Palestinian aggression is understood to be motivated by instrumental goals, Jews should be willing to forgive Israelis and unwilling to assign them collective guilt for their aggressive behavior during the conflict.

Conversely, Jews may be somewhat understanding of Palestinian aggression if they perceive the aggression as a reactive answer to Israeli oppression and resistance to a Palestinian Homeland. That is, if Israeli oppression is seen as the reason for the aggressive actions perpetrated by Palestinians against the people of Israel, Palestinians might be seen as deserving of forgiveness and may not assign them much guilt. Further, Israelis (who are by and large Jews) may be regarded as misbehaving ingroup members. If this were the case, Jews should be relatively unwilling to forgive Israelis and assign them a great deal of guilt.

Overview of Studies 3 and 4

The rationale for Study 3 and Study 4 were two-fold. First, I wanted to determine the effect of remembering group-based persecution on responses to a current intergroup conflict. More specifically, I wanted to determine the effect, if any, the memory of the Holocaust has on Jews reactions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As such, I manipulated Holocaust salience within a Jewish sample. I expected that when reminded of the Holocaust, Jews would respond by assigning group-based guilt to Palestinians for their role in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and be relatively unwilling to forgive their aggressive actions. Conversely, Jews should be more willing to forgive their ingroup's

aggressive actions when reminded of the Holocaust compared to when no such reminder is given.

I also wanted to determine if variations in perceived causes of aggressive action results in differential willingness to forgive the ingroup and the outgroup (cf., Wohl & Reeder, 2002). More specifically, perceiving the conflict as being the result of Palestinian terrorism would result in an increased willingness to forgive Israeli actions during the conflict and decrease willingness to forgive Palestinians. On the other hand, if Jews perceived the conflict to be due to Israeli oppression they would respond by judging Israelis relatively harshly, while simultaneously judging Palestinians less harshly. That is, the more Jews perceived the conflict to be the result of Israeli negative behavior willingness to forgive Israelis would decrease and willingness to forgive Palestinians would increase.

To assess the effects of remembered suffering at the hands of an outgroup for responses to a current intergroup conflict, I asked Jewish Canadians to complete a questionnaire about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Half of the participants were first asked to reflect on and remember the events of the Holocaust prior to completing the questionnaire. The other half of the participants were not reminded of the Holocaust prior to completing the questionnaire. Thus, in one condition Jews were asked to remember the victimization their group experienced during World War II, while in the other condition no such victimization history was made salient. All participants then made judgments of Palestinians, Israelis, and the cause of the conflict.

CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3

Method

Participants

Jewish participants were contacted via the Internet through the Hillel (i.e., Jewish Students Association) e-mail list at the University of Calgary. Hillel members were asked to access a website to fill out a short questionnaire concerning Jews' perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Fifty-four participants responded to my request by accessing the website and completing the questionnaire.

Design and Procedure

Study 3 was a two-condition (Holocaust prime vs. control) between-participant design. Participants were recruited via the Hillel listserv. An e-mail was sent to each member of Hillel at the University of Calgary with a request to complete an on-line questionnaire about Jews' perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Once again, a link to the on-line questionnaire was provided on this e-mail that sent participants to an on-line consent form. If participants agreed to participate they were asked to click the "next" button on the bottom of the page. When this "next" button was clicked, the participant was randomly sent to one of two websites (corresponding to either the Holocaust prime or control condition). In the Holocaust prime condition, Jewish participants were asked to reflect on the Holocaust and its impact on Jews around the world. Specifically, participants were told to think of the hardships Jews faced during the Holocaust and its continuing impact on Jews today. Then they read a short description of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Within this description, participants read how the Israeli army treats the Palestinians (e.g., restricting their movement and minimizing their power to self-govern). In the control (or no prime) condition, participants were only exposed to

the description of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That is, Jewish participants were not asked to remember the events of the Holocaust or its impact on Jewish life. Thus, the sole difference between the two conditions was the presence or absence of a Holocaust reminder.

Following completion of the on-line questionnaire, participants were automatically taken to a website that contained a written debriefing form. The debriefing form informed the participant about the nature and purpose of the study. In addition, should the participant have questions or concerns regarding the study, contact information was provided.

Dependent Measures

Similarity. This item assessed the perceived similarity between Palestinians and Israelis (“Palestinians and Israelis share basic similarities”). As was the case for the previous studies, participants in both conditions indicated their agreement with these statements using Likert-type scale by clicking on their selected response option using a 1 (*definitely disagree*) to 8 (*definitely agree*) scale.

Collective guilt assignment. Two items tapped the amount of guilt North American Jews assigned to the main combatants in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. The first item asked participants to indicate Palestinian guilt (“Palestinians should feel guilty about their behavior towards Israelis”). The second item asked participants to indicate the amount of guilt Israelis should be experiencing (“Israelis should feel guilty for their behavior toward the Palestinians”). Participants in both conditions indicated their agreement with these statements using Likert-type scale by clicking on their selected response option using a 1 (*definitely disagree*) to 8 (*definitely agree*) scale.

Willingness to forgive. Two separate items were used to examine North American Jews' willingness to forgive either the Palestinians (the purported outgroup) or Israelis (the purported ingroup) for their particular role in the conflict. The first item asked participants their willingness to forgive Palestinian aggression during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict ("Palestinians should be forgiven for the aggressive acts committed during the uprising"). The second item asked participants to indicate their willingness to forgive Israeli aggression toward Palestinians (Israelis should be forgiven for the aggressive acts committed during the Palestinian uprising). Participants in both conditions indicated their agreement with these statements using Likert-type scale by clicking on their selected response option using a 1 (*definitely disagree*) to 8 (*definitely agree*) scale.

Perceived cause for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Two items were included in the questionnaire to assess Jews' perceptions for the reason behind the aggressive actions taken by both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One item asked participants to indicate whether they believed that Israeli action was a reactive response to Palestinian aggression ("I believe that the current actions of the Israelis are in response to Palestinian terrorism"). The second item asked participants to indicate if they perceived Palestinian aggression to be a reactive response to Israeli oppression ("I believe that the current actions of the Palestinians are in response to Israeli oppression"). Once again, participants in both conditions indicated their agreement with these statements using Likert-type scale by clicking on their selected response option using a 1 (*definitely disagree*) to 8 (*definitely agree*) scale.

Results

Perceived Similarity

As in the studies reported earlier, perceived similarity between the groups varied as a function of condition. Jews who were reminded of the Holocaust perceived Palestinians to be less similar to Israelis ($M = 1.92$, $SD = 1.34$) than those who were not reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 2.71$, $SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 52) = 5.25$, $p < .03$, $d = .63$. Thus, reminding a historically victimized group of their past of victimization may create a sense of differentiation from other groups, especially groups with which they are currently in conflict with. More specific to this study, reminding Jews of the Holocaust made the differences between Palestinians and Israelis more salient. Note, however, that regardless of condition, Jews perceived Palestinians and Israelis to be different (both means are well under the midpoint of the scale). However, the Holocaust reminder manipulation exacerbated the perceived differences.

Judgments of Collective Guilt and Willingness to Forgive

Figure 5-1 depicts collective guilt acceptance by Jews and willingness to forgive the ingroup (Israelis) and Figure 5-2 depicts the assignment of collective guilt and willingness to forgive Palestinians.

Collective guilt assignment. Each participant made judgments of both Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, a two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder and no reminder) as a between-participant variable and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant variable was conducted on the collective guilt assignment measure. As expected, there were significant main effects for target, $F(1, 52) = 44.82$, $p < .001$, $d =$

Figure 5-1. Mean collective guilt acceptance and willingness to forgive Israelis by reminder of the Holocaust or no reminder conditions: Study 3.





Figure 5-2. Mean collective guilt assigned to Palestinians and willingness to forgive by reminder of the Holocaust or no reminder conditions: Study 3.



1.27. Jewish participants assigned more guilt to Palestinians ($M = 6.07, SD = 1.88$) than Israelis ($M = 3.56, SD = 2.06$). No significant effect of condition was observed, $F < 1$. However, a significant target by condition interaction qualified these results, $F(1, 52) = 9.92, p < .004$. This interaction was produced by a polarizing effect the Holocaust reminder had on the amount of collective guilt assigned to both Israelis and Palestinians. That is, Jewish participants assigned more guilt to Palestinians following a reminder of group-based victimization ($M = 6.69, SD = 1.57$) than when no reminder was given ($M = 5.50, SD = 2.03$), $F(1, 52) = 5.91, p < .02, d = .66$. Conversely, Jewish participant assigned less guilt to their ingroup (Israelis) after they were reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 2.92, SD = 1.67$) than when no such reminder was given ($M = 4.14, SD = 2.24$), $F(1, 52) = 5.08, p < .03, d = .62$.

Willingness to forgive. As with the collective guilt measures, each participant made judgments of both Palestinians and Israelis. As a result, the most prudent method for analyzing willingness to forgive was to use a mixed model ANOVA. As a results, a two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder and no reminder) as a between-participant variable and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant variable was conducted on the willingness to forgive measure. As expected, there was a significant main effect for target, $F(1, 52) = 19.36, p < .001, d = .84$. Jewish participants were more willing to forgive Israelis ($M = 5.31, SD = 2.02$) than Palestinians ($M = 3.46, SD = 2.37$). No significant effect of condition was observed, $F < 1$. However, a significant target by condition interaction qualified these results, $F(1, 52) = 9.47, p < .004$. This interaction was produced by a polarizing effect the Holocaust reminder had on willingness to forgive both Israelis and Palestinians. That is, Jewish participants were

more forgiving of Israelis following a reminder of group-based victimization ($M = 5.89$, $SD = 1.80$) than when no reminder was given ($M = 4.79$, $SD = 2.10$), $F(1, 52) = 4.25$, $p < .05$, $d = .56$. Conversely, Jewish participants were less forgiving of Palestinians after they were reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 2.12$) than when no such reminder was given ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 2.38$), $F(1, 52) = 6.45$, $p < .02$, $d = .69$.

Perceived Cause For the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

In intergroup and international relations research, it is well-known that perceptions of conflict are often subject to bias. Typically, what happened will be construed differently, such that negative behaviors of the other side are the prime focus or are exaggerated (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954), and actions of the ingroup are evaluated more positively than are similar actions by an outgroup (e.g., Bettencourt, 1990; Burn & Oskamp, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979). Therefore, I predicted that the Jews would perceive the cause of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be more the result of Palestinian terrorism than Israeli oppression. Thus, I examined whether there was a significant difference in whether Jews perceive the conflict as being due to Israeli or Palestinian negative actions. Recall, I asked Jews to report whether they thought that the conflict was the result of Israel oppressing Palestinians and if they perceived Israeli action to be the result of Palestinian terrorism. A two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder and no reminder) as a between-participant variable and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant variable was conducted perceived cause of the conflict. A significant main effect of target was found such that Jewish participants' perceived that the cause of the conflict was due more to Palestinian terrorism ($M = 6.96$, $SD = 2.46$) than Israeli oppression ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 1.11$), $F(1, 52) = 71.67$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.77$. However, a

significant target by condition interaction qualified these results, $F(1, 52) = 36.58, p < .007$. This interaction was produced by a polarizing effect the Holocaust reminder had on Jewish participants' perceived cause for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That is, Jewish participants perceived the conflict to be due to Palestinian terrorism more following a reminder of group-based victimization ($M = 7.31, SD = .74$) than when no reminder was given ($M = 6.64, SD = 1.31$), $F(1, 52) = 5.17, p < .03, d = .63$. Conversely, Jewish participants were less willing to perceive the conflict as due to Israeli oppression after they were reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.85$) than when no such reminder was given ($M = 4.36, SD = 2.70$), $F(1, 52) = 6.89, p < .02, d = .72$.

Perceived Cause as a Predictor of Willingness to Forgive

The last step of my analysis was to determine if perceived cause of the conflict would predict variation in Jews' willingness to forgive their outgroup (Palestinians) and their ingroup (Israelis). As a result a series of regression equations was performed, such that perceived Palestinian terrorism (PPT) or perceived Israeli oppression (PIO) was examined as predictor of forgiveness of ingroup and outgroup negative action. Note, because there was a significant effect of the independent variable (Holocaust reminder) on both perceived Israeli oppression and Palestinian terrorism it was inappropriate to collapse ratings across the Holocaust manipulation. Thus, separate regression equations were performed on the two levels of Holocaust reminder (prime and no prime).

Perceived Palestinian terrorism. Separate regression revealed that PPT was predictive of willingness to forgive Palestinians in the no prime condition, $\beta = -0.44, t(26) = -2.48, p < .03$, but not in the prime condition, $\beta = 1.23, t(24) = 0.61, p > .55$. A similar result was found when PPT was examined as a predictor of willingness to forgive

Israelis. In the no prime condition, PPT significantly predicted willingness to forgive Israelis, $\beta = .47$, $t(26) = 2.71$, $p < .02$, but not when Jewish participants were primed with the Holocaust, $\beta = 0.06$, $t(24) = 0.29$, $p > .77$.

Perceived Israeli oppression. As was the case for the examination of PPT, separate regression analyses revealed that PIO was predictive of willingness to forgive Palestinians in the no prime condition, $\beta = 0.48$, $t(26) = 2.82$, $p < .01$, but not in the prime condition, $\beta = -1.00$, $t(24) = -0.49$, $p > .62$. A similar result was found when PPT was examined as a predictor of willingness to forgive Israelis. In the no prime condition, PPT significantly predicted willingness to forgive Israelis, $\beta = -.38$, $t(26) = 2.05$, $p = .05$, but not when Jewish participants were primed with the Holocaust, $\beta = -0.30$, $t(24) = -1.54$, $p > .13$.

Discussion

Perhaps the most important finding of Study 3 involved the reminder of the ingroup victimization manipulation. When groups were reminded of their history of victimization outgroup members with whom they are currently in conflict were judged harshly. More specifically, reminding Jews of the Holocaust reduced their willingness to forgive Palestinians for their role in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Results from the current study also demonstrated that reminding Jews of the Holocaust reduced perceived similarity between Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, as Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, perceived similarity has a substantial effect on willingness to forgive an outgroup. More to the point, reminding Jews of their own victimization strengthened the social boundaries between ingroup members (Israelis) and the target outgroup members (Palestinians). Thus, memories of past victimization may harden the distinctiveness

between ingroup and outgroup, subsequently increasing ingroup bias. Other researchers have drawn similar conclusions about the effect of intergroup conflict and victimization on social identity (Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian, & Hewstone, 2001; Jackson, 2002; Zerubavel, 2002). For example, Jackson (2002) argued that the Jews' history of hardship and victimization (i.e., the Holocaust) has a strong impact on the formation of the Jewish identity. It should follow, then, that reminding Jews of the Holocaust would make salient Jews' social identity and buttress ingroup versus outgroup distinctions.

Study 3 also tested the possible impact that perceived cause of the conflict would have on willingness to forgive both the ingroup and the outgroup for their negative actions. Distinct differences were found between the Jews who were reminded of the Holocaust and those who were not reminded of the Holocaust. Overall, the results tended to support previous research on reactive aggression when Jews were not reminded of the Holocaust. In the no reminder condition, perceiving the conflict to be due to Palestinian terrorism predicted willingness to forgive both Palestinians and Israelis. The more Jews perceived the conflict to be the results of terrorism at the hand of Palestinians, the more willing they were to forgive Israelis for their actions and the less likely they were to forgive Palestinians. Presumably, if the conflict were due to Palestinian terrorism, then Jews saw Israeli action as being motivated by provocation. Previous research by Wohl and Reeder (2002) has shown that people who perceive aggressive behavior to be the results of direct provocation are more willing to forgive that aggressive behavior regardless of group membership. Not surprisingly, as Jews perceived Palestinian negative action to be due to Israeli oppression, willingness to forgive Palestinians increased, while

willingness to forgive Israelis decreased. Overall then, these results tend to support the black sheep effect.

The black sheep effect implies that misbehaving ingroup members will be judged relatively harshly. When ingroup members behave poorly, the group's positive social identity is threatened. Thus, group members vilify deviant members of the ingroup as a means of psychologically (if not physically) distancing themselves from the negative behavior. This may be the case for Jewish participants who were not reminded of the Holocaust and perceived the conflict to be due to Israeli oppression of the Palestinians. In this case, Jews may have psychologically distanced themselves from Israelis, thereby allowing derogation of their ingroup members' behavior and approval of outgroup members' behavior.

This black sheep effect, however, was not observed in the Holocaust prime condition. When Jews were primed with the Holocaust, perceived Palestinian terrorism and perceived Israeli oppression had no impact on willingness to forgive Israel's aggressive behavior. Likewise, when reminded of the Holocaust, neither perceived Palestinian terrorism nor perceived Israeli oppression predicted Jews' willingness to forgive aggressive behavior by Palestinians. When primed with the Holocaust, they evaluated Israelis positively and Palestinians negatively regardless of perceived cause of the conflict. This effect may be due to the fortifying effects of group victimization on social identity. When a group is reminded of their past victimization, strong distinctions are made between ingroup and outgroup members. The results of Study 3 suggested that this heightened perception of "us" versus "them" created by memories of past hardship eliminated negative judgments of the misbehaving ingroup members by Jews. That is,

when Jews were reminded of the Holocaust, perceiving the conflict to be the result of Israeli oppression had no impact on willingness to forgive the ingroup or the outgroup for their negative actions.

One possible explanation for these results is that reminding Jews of the Holocaust may have awakened anxiety about the group's survival efficacy. When group-based survival efficacy is threatened, via Holocaust reminders, Jews may perceive a need to bolster the group's claim to the land of Israel. That is, reminding Jews of the Holocaust might make salient that the group was once the victim of outgroup aggression, and that such aggression can occur again. If so, the actions of the Palestinians would be more threatening in the Holocaust reminder condition than in the no history reminder condition. Therefore, when reminded of the Holocaust, Jewish participants may use their history as justification for Israel's existence and its political actions toward the Palestinians. The wrongs committed by the Palestinians would therefore be seen as unjustified, where as the wrongs committed by the Israelis would be seen as justified as a means of self-preservation.

CHAPTER 6: STUDY 4

Introduction

Although the findings of Study 3 are compelling, I am hesitant to draw strong conclusions without further investigation. For one, I am unsure whether the results from Study 3 are due to Jews' remembering a past in which their own group was victimized or whether this effect could result from priming any mass victimization. That is, was the effect the result of a social comparison between the horrors experienced by the world Jewry during the Holocaust and that currently being experienced by Palestinians? When reminded of the Holocaust did Jews say, "What we went through is nothing like what they are going through." Perhaps, Jews were merely reacting to the experimenter drawing symmetry between Jewish victimization during the Holocaust and the events of the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Such a reaction could have drawn the ire of the Jewish participants resulting in increased ingroup bias. Another possible explanation is that any type of mass atrocity, such as those in Rwanda or Cambodia, could have created a similar contrast between that experienced by Palestinians and that experienced by peoples victimized in other holocausts. When reminded of the Holocaust, Jewish participants might have thought, "Many peoples have endured worse; in comparison, Palestinians aren't bad off?"

Put in terms of a succinct research question: Is a reminder of any group-based victimization history sufficient, or does it need to be specific to the ingroup? To accomplish this end, a third condition was added to assess if reminders of group-based victimization must be group-specific. In this new condition, Jewish participants were reminded of past group-based victimization not relevant to the ingroup's history of

victimization. More specifically, participants were reminded of the Cambodian holocaust.²

Study 4 also provide the opportunity to more directly test the hypothesis that reminding Jews of the Holocaust resulted in Jews perceiving a stronger tie and claim over the land of Israel (the Jewish Homeland). Recall, I hypothesized that reminding Jews of their victimization might threaten their group's survival efficacy. In order to relieve this anxiety about the group's future viability, Jews may perceive a need to bolster their claim over the land of Israel (which is seen as a safe haven for the world Jewry against threats from outgroups). As a result, an item was included in the questionnaire that assessed perceived claim over the land of Israel. A second item was added to the questionnaire to assess whether the effects observed in Study 3 were due to social comparison processes. More specifically, this item was included to determine whether the manipulation created a distinction between the hardships faces by Jews during the Holocaust and the hardships faced by Palestinians during the currently Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. When reminded of the Holocaust, perhaps Jewish participants perceived the experimenter was attempting to draw symmetry between the events of the Holocaust and the events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Such perceptions could have drawn the ire of the Jewish participants resulting in increased ingroup bias. If Jewish participants perceived the experimenter was attempting to draw such symmetry, they might have reacted by comparing the harm done to Palestinians during the conflict and the harm done to Jews during the Holocaust. This comparison may have had the effect of minimizing the perceived harm done to Palestinians. By reminding Jews of the Holocaust, they might become less willing to forgive Palestinian's aggressive action and assign them more collective guilt, than if no

reminder of the Holocaust was given. Thus, Study 4 was designed to both replicate the results of Study 3 and address some lingering issues.

Method

Participants

To assess the effects of remembering a prior history of victimization on responses to a current intergroup conflict, Jewish participants were contacted via the internet through the Hillel (i.e., Jewish Students Association) e-mail list at York University. Hillel members were asked to access a website to fill out a short questionnaire concerning Jews' perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Sixty participants responded to my request by accessing the website and completing an on-line questionnaire.

Procedure and Design

A link to the on-line questionnaire was provided on an e-mail to Hillel members. This link allowed participants access to an on-line consent form. If participants agreed to participate they were asked to click the "next" button on the bottom of the page with their mouse. When this "next" button was clicked, the participant was randomly sent to one of four internet websites. As such, Study 4 was a four-condition between-participant design.

Each of the four websites contained the same questionnaire. This questionnaire assessed participants' agreement with a series of statements about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The only difference between these four websites was what the participants were presented prior to completing the questionnaire. As in Study 3, Jewish participants in the Holocaust prime condition were asked to reflect on the Holocaust and its impact on Jews around the world. Participants were asked to contemplate the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust and how the Holocaust continues to affect Jews today. Then participants read a

short description of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This description was left unchanged from Study 3. Participants read that the Israeli army has been restricting Palestinian movement and minimizing their power to self-govern. In order to assess the impact of other holocausts on perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, some Jewish participants were given a short description of the horrors of the Cambodian holocaust. I tried to maximize the symmetry between the Holocaust Prime and the Cambodian prime conditions. As such, participants were asked to take a moment and reflect on the horrors of the Cambodia holocaust. They were told the Cambodian holocaust occupies a special place in history because of the Communist Khmer Rouge's quest for power and the systematic killing of the Cambodian people. Jewish participants were told that the Khmer Rouge forced millions of people from their homes and created labour camps. They were also told that millions of people perished as a result. In the control condition participants, as in Study 3, were only exposed to the description of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Participants were then asked to complete a brief questionnaire. This questionnaire asked participants to indicate their agreement with a series of Likert-type statements by clicking on their selected response option using a (1) definitely disagree to (8) definitely agree scale. Upon completion of the dependent measures, all participants were fully debriefed.

Dependent Measures

The dependent measures were the same as those in Study 3 with two exceptions. An item was added to assess the extent to which Jewish participants believed that Jews have the strongest claim over the land of Israel (including the occupied territories). This item was: "The Jewish people have the strongest claim over the land which is now Israel

(including the occupied territories)” anchored at (1) *strongly disagree* and (10) *strongly agree*. I also wanted to test the hypothesis that reminders of the Holocaust cause Jewish participants to engage in social comparison processes. Thus, a second item was added to the questionnaire to assess the perceived symmetry between the harm done to the Palestinian people during the conflict and the harm done to the Jewish people during the Holocaust. This item was: “The harm the Palestinians have experienced during the Palestinian Israeli conflict is similar to the harm experienced by Jews during the Holocaust” anchored at (1) *strongly disagree* and (10) *strongly agree*.

Results and Discussion³

No significant differences were found between the Cambodia prime and the control condition on any of the dependant measures, $ps > .30$. Thus, for ease of presentation, I will provide means for the different conditions in text, but will not make reference to post-hoc t-test between these two conditions.

Perceived Similarity

As predicted, there was a significant effect of condition on perceived similarity between Israelis and Palestinians, $F(1, 42) = 10.63, p < .001$. Jews that were reminded of the Holocaust perceived Palestinians to be less similar to Israelis ($M = 1.33, SD = .89$) than Jews who were reminded of the Cambodian holocaust ($M = 2.73, SD = .96$) or received no group-based victimization reminder ($M = 2.80, SD = 1.32$), $ps < .001, ds > 1.83$. Thus, only when a group is reminded of their own history of victimization do differences between ingroup and outgroup become exaggerated. Note, once again, Jews perceived Palestinians and Israelis to be vastly different (both means are well under the midpoint of the scale) regardless of condition. That is, Jews seem to have a general

tendency to view themselves as different from Palestinians. This, of course, does not bode well for a peaceful resolution to the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Claim of the Land of Israel

To assess the impact of my manipulation on Jews' perceived claim over the land of Israel, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. A significant effect was found on the perceived claim over Israeli item, $F(2, 42) = 7.52, p < .003$. When reminded of their ingroup-based history of victimization (i.e., the Holocaust) Jews perceived themselves to have a larger claim over the land of Israel ($M = 7.47, SD = .64$) than when they were either reminded of outgroup-based history of victimization ($M = 6.27, SD = 1.22$) or given no group-based victimization history ($M = 6.40, SD = .83$), $ps < .009, ds > 1.23$. Thus, reminding Jews of their history of victimization fortified their perceived claim over the land of Israel. This is not entirely surprising. The State of Israel has roots in the Holocaust. That is, following the Second World War there was an outcry from Jews around the world that Jewish people need a homeland in order to protect themselves from future victimization. They believed that if the world Jewry had a homeland it would act as a sanctuary for the Jewish populous should horrors the likes of the Holocaust occur once again. Thus, reminding Jewish people of the Holocaust may have buttressed the perceived need for a Jewish homeland and strengthened the desire to protect the land of Israel. One means of protecting the Jewish homeland is to quell any intimation that Jews are not the rightful owners of the land.

Similarity in Victimization Histories

Branscombe and Miron (in press) argued that information about another national group's similar negative history might engage social identity protection processes. That

is, if people see that another group has also committed wrongs to a specific outgroup then ingroup members may appraise the harm done as minimal. The commonality here is that the ingroup and another group have perpetrated harm on a third group. The minimizing of the harm committed protects ingroup social identity and results in a reduction of collective guilt acceptance. In contrast, I examined a historically victimized group that is currently involved in an intergroup conflict. Specifically, I assessed whether Jews perceived symmetry between the negative histories of both Jews and Palestinians. I hypothesized that if Jews perceived symmetry between their history of victimization and the present experience of Palestinians, then there should be an increase in collective guilt acceptance and willingness to forgive Palestinians, with a corresponding decrease in collective guilt assignment and willingness to forgive the ingroup. Results showed that Jewish participants in the control condition perceived no such symmetry ($M = 2.47$, $SD = 1.36$). In fact, reported symmetry of negative histories was significantly below the midpoint of the scale, $t(14) = 7.05$, $p < .001$. Similarly, there was no such symmetry in either of the reminder conditions (Cambodia condition, $M = 3.00$, $SD = .93$; Holocaust condition, $M = 2.73$, $SD = .96$). Both experimental conditions differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale, $ps < .001$. Further, there was no condition effect, $F < 1$. As a result, no further analysis was conducted on this measure.

Judgments of Collective Guilt and Willingness to Forgive

Figure 6-1 depicts collective guilt acceptance by Jews and willingness to forgive the ingroup (Israelis) and Figure 6-2 depicts the assignment of collective guilt and willingness to forgive Palestinians.

Figure 6-1. Mean collective guilt acceptance and willingness to forgive Israelis by reminder of the Nazi Holocaust, reminder of the Cambodian Holocaust, or no reminder conditions: Study 4.





Figure 6-2. Mean collective guilt assigned to Palestinians and willingness to forgive by reminder of the Nazi Holocaust, reminder of the Cambodian Holocaust, or no reminder conditions: Study 4.



Collective guilt. A two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder, Cambodia reminder, and no group-based victimization reminder) as a between-participant variable and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant variable was conducted on the collective guilt measures. As expected, there was a significant main effect for target, $F(1, 42) = 227.15, p < .001, d = 2.54$. Jewish participants prescriptively desired the Palestinians to feel more collective guilt ($M = 6.33, SD = 1.54$) than Israelis ($M = 2.47, SD = 1.53$). Once again, no significant effect of condition was observed, $F < 1$. However, a significant target by condition interaction was observed, $F(2, 42) = 9.92, p < .004$. This interaction was produced by a polarizing effect the Holocaust reminder had on the amount of collective guilt assigned to both Israelis and Palestinians. That is, Jewish participants assigned more collective guilt to Palestinians following a reminder of ingroup-based victimization ($M = 7.53, SD = .74$), than when remembering outgroup-based victimization ($M = 5.87, SD = 1.06$), or when no group-based victimization reminder was given ($M = 5.60, SD = 1.84$), $ps < .02, ds > 1.82$. Conversely, Jewish participant assigned less collective guilt to their ingroup (Israelis) after they were reminded of ingroup-based victimization ($M = 1.27, SD = .46$), than when reminded of outgroup-based victimization ($M = 3.00, SD = 2.04$), or no group-based victimization history was given ($M = 3.13, SD = .83$), $ps < .01, ds > 1.16$.

Willingness to forgive. As in Study 3, each Jewish participant made judgments of both Palestinians and Israelis. As a result, willingness to forgive was analyzed using a mixed model ANOVA. A two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder, Cambodia holocaust reminder, and No reminder) as a between-participant factor and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant factor was conducted on

willingness to forgive. As was the case for collective guilt, there was a significant main effect for target, $F(1, 42) = 19.36, p < .001, d = 2.14$. Jewish participants were more willing to forgive Israelis ($M = 6.29, SD = 1.56$) than Palestinians ($M = 2.76, SD = 1.73$). No significant effect of condition was observed, $F < 1$. There was, however, a significant target by condition interaction, $F(2, 42) = 12.45, p < .001$. As was the case in Study 3, the interaction was produced by a polarizing effect the Holocaust reminder had on willingness to forgive both Israelis and Palestinians. That is, Jewish participants were more forgiving of Israelis following a reminder of ingroup-based victimization ($M = 7.40, SD = .83$) than when reminded of the Cambodian holocaust ($M = 5.73, SD = 1.49$) or when no reminder was given ($M = 5.73, SD = 1.67$), $ps < .01, ds > 1.27$. Conversely, participants were less forgiving of Palestinians after they were reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 1.53, SD = .83$) than when reminded of the holocaust in Cambodia ($M = 3.33, SD = 1.95$) or when no group-based victimization history reminder was given ($M = 3.40, SD = 1.60$), $ps < .01, ds > 1.20$.

Perceived Cause for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Once again, a two-way ANOVA with condition (Holocaust reminder and no reminder) as a between-participant variable and target (Israeli and Palestinian) as a within-participant variable was conducted perceived cause of the conflict. A significant main effect of target was found such that Jewish participants' perceived that the cause of the conflict was due more to Palestinian terrorism ($M = 7.16, SD = .98$) than Israeli oppression ($M = 3.00, SD = 1.94$), $F(1, 42) = 157.11, p < .001, d = 2.71$. However, a significant target by condition interaction qualified these results, $F(2, 42) = 9.52, p < .001$. Jewish participants were more perceived the conflict to be due to Palestinian

terrorism more following a reminder of group-based victimization ($M = 7.87, SD = .35$) than when reminded of the Cambodian holocaust ($M = 6.80, SD = 1.08$) or when no reminder was given ($M = 6.80, SD = .94$), $ps < .005, ds > 1.33$. Conversely, Jewish participant were less willing to perceive the conflict as due to Israeli oppression after they were reminded of group-based victimization ($M = 1.67, SD = .72$) than when reminded of the holocaust in Cambodia ($M = 3.60, SD = 2.17$) or when no group-based victimization history reminder was given ($M = 3.73, SD = 1.94$), $ps < .02, ds > 1.19$.

Perceived Cause as a Predictor of Willingness to Forgive

As in Study 3, perceived cause of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was assessed as a predictor of Jews' willingness to forgive the outgroup (Palestinians) and their ingroup (Israelis). A series of regressions equations were performed, such that perceived Palestinian terrorism (PPT) or perceived Israeli oppression (PIO) was examined as predictor of forgiveness of ingroup and outgroup negative actions. Once again, because there was a significant effect of Holocaust reminder on both perceived Israeli oppression and Palestinian terrorism it was inappropriate to collapse across all three conditions to perform the regression equations. Thus, separate regression equations were performed on the Holocaust reminder condition and a combination of the Cambodia reminder and no reminder condition (recall the latter two conditions did not differ from one another).

Perceived Palestinian terrorism. Separate regression revealed that PPT was predictive of willingness to forgive Palestinians in the no prime condition, $\beta = -0.44$, $t(26) = -2.48, p < .03$, but not in the prime condition, $\beta = 1.23, t(24) = 0.61, p > .55$. A similar result was found when PPT was examined as a predictor of willingness to forgive Israelis. In the no prime condition, PPT significantly predicted willingness to forgive

Israelis, $\beta = .47$, $t(26) = 2.71$, $p < .02$, but not when Jewish participants were primed with the Holocaust, $\beta = 0.06$, $t(24) = 0.29$, $p > .77$. For Jewish participants that were not reminded of the Holocaust, the more they perceived the cause of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be due to Palestinian terrorism the more they were unwilling to forgive Palestinians for their negative actions. When, however, Jews were primed with the Holocaust, no such relationship was found. The lack of a significant effect with the Holocaust reminder participants could be due to the overriding influence of remembering ingroup victimization. Reminding the ingroup of their victimization could have initiated group protection processes whereby Jews perceive Palestinians to be in the wrong regardless of perceived cause. This argument is strengthened when we examine perceived Israeli oppression.

Perceived Israeli oppression. As was the case for the examination of PPT, separate regression revealed that PIO was predictive of willingness to forgive Palestinians in the no prime condition, $\beta = 0.48$, $t(26) = 2.82$, $p < .01$, but not in the prime condition, $\beta = -1.00$, $t(24) = -0.49$, $p > .62$. A similar result was found when PIO was examined as a predictor of willingness to forgive Israelis. In the no prime condition, PIO significantly predicted willingness to forgive Israelis, $\beta = -.38$, $t(26) = 2.05$, $p = .05$, but not when Jewish participants were primed with the Holocaust, $\beta = -0.30$, $t(24) = -1.54$, $p > .13$. Thus, for Jewish participants that were not reminded of the Holocaust, the more they perceived the cause of the conflict to be due to Israeli oppression the less they were willing to forgive Israelis for their negative actions. Jewish participants in the Holocaust reminder condition, however, showed no such trend. That is, there was no relationship between perceived Israeli oppression and willingness to forgive Israelis in the Holocaust

reminder condition. I suggest that when reminded of the Holocaust, Jewish participants protected the ingroup by letting go of the negative feelings that might be associated with harming another group. That is, Jews in the Holocaust reminder condition may have minimized the harm done to Palestinians as a social identity protection strategy, thus enabling them to forgive the ingroup. Future research should be aimed at understanding such identity protection strategies in real world ingroup conflicts.

CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION

Summary of Results

I considered how categorization affected forgiveness and collective guilt assignment to members of social categories who have harmed the ingroup. I found that increasingly inclusive categorization is a critical determinant of increased forgiveness and reductions in assignment of collective guilt to the transgressor outgroup. I believe these studies illustrate the fundamental role that categorization plays in controlling whether forgiveness and reductions in the assignment of collective guilt occur. When Jews categorized themselves in social group terms, they were less willing to forgive contemporary Germans for their ancestors' harmful actions and assigned them more collective guilt, compared to when the ingroup and outgroup were categorized as all members of a single more inclusive group—that of human beings. At higher levels of inclusiveness, more socially shared similarities between the ingroup and outgroup were perceived. This is consistent with Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) who found that taking the perspective of an outgroup increases the overlap of the image of the self and the outgroup. When perceivers categorize the perpetrator group as human, like themselves, more situational attributions for the perpetrator's behavior are made, which presumably facilitates forgiveness and reductions in guilt assignment.

Clearly, categorization effects have important implications for conflict resolution processes. When discussing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu describes his perspective in highly inclusive terms, and argues against thinking about the atrocities that were brought to light in racial group terms. Specifically, Tutu (1999) recalled that while he listened to the horrors related during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings he found himself thinking

repeatedly how “some of God’s children are suffering at the hands of God’s other children” (p. 124). Reflecting on his desire to create a new South Africa where all races are equally included, Tutu (1999) commented that “none is an outsider, all are insiders, all belong; all belong in the one family, God’s family, the human family” (p. 265). Such language shows that Tutu perceived the atrocities of the past at the human level of categorization (humans behaving aggressively towards other humans) and not in intergroup terms. My research findings are consistent with Tutu’s own seemingly high level of forgiveness: that is, to the extent that a shift is made from an intergroup to a superordinate level of inclusiveness, it may permit the healing and reconciliation process to begin. Such superordinate categorization in terms of perceiving each member of society (regardless of subgroup membership) as part of a “human family,” may well have been crucial to the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Increasing category inclusiveness among historically victimized group members may be of considerable importance for promoting intergroup reconciliation.

I also demonstrated that history is important for understanding psychological responses to current intergroup conflicts. Specifically, I examined how a Holocaust reminder influenced Jews’ perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. When reminded of the Holocaust, Jewish participants assigned greater collective guilt and were less willing to forgive the Palestinians for their role in the conflict. When not reminded of the Holocaust, participants assigned relatively less collective guilt and were more willing to forgive the Palestinians. I suggest that being reminded of the Holocaust, and their group’s suffering at the hands of an outgroup, encouraged intergroup categorization. Here, the idea that one should “never forget the past” may psychologically involve never forgetting

that “we are different from other groups.” More specifically, reminding Jews of the Holocaust may encourage them to think in terms of their social identity, with this resulting in stronger distinctions being drawn between members of the ingroup (Israelis) and members of the outgroup (Palestinians). As I showed, such intergroup categorization results in less willingness to forgive and greater assignment of perpetrator guilt. Indeed, this effect on responses to Palestinians occurred only in the social categorization condition where the ingroup was specifically distinguished from a perpetrator outgroup, and did not occur when an ingroup-irrelevant (Cambodian) victimization history was made salient.

Aggression and Intergroup Relations

A classic study by Hastorf and Cantril (1954) demonstrated bias relevant to the perception of aggression by ingroup and outgroup members. The researchers studied reactions to a particularly contentious football game between the universities of Dartmouth and Princeton. After the game, the researchers asked students from both schools to view films of the action on the field in an effort to identify rule infractions. The students’ reports demonstrated an ingroup serving bias: Princeton students saw twice as many infractions by Dartmouth players as the Dartmouth students did. That is, both sides’ perception of the aggressive behavior which took place during the game differed. Subsequent research suggests that bias in favor of the ingroup can take many forms (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). My dissertation contributes to and extends this literature.

My dissertation contributed to this literature by demonstrating that, first, reactions to an aggressor can be quite varied. In my first two studies, categorizing the aggressor

group as members of a common ingroup (humans), as opposed to categorizing the aggressor group as distinct from the ingroup, significantly increased willingness to forgive and decreased collective guilt assignment. In my final two studies, group members who were reminded about their history of victimization judged members of an outgroup that the ingroup is currently in conflict with more harshly than when no such reminders were given. Reminding group members of their history of victimization significantly influenced judgments about a current intergroup conflict. Willingness to forgive and the assignment of collective guilt can shift both with changes in social categorization and reminders of ingroup history.

My dissertation extends the current literature by demonstrating that inferences about the perceived pervasiveness of genocide (Study 1 and Study 2) and perceived cause on an intergroup conflict (Study 3 and Study 4) play a crucial role in reactions to aggressive intergroup behavior. I was able to show that historically victimized group members who perceived the harmful actions committed against them as historically pervasive (and not unique to one particular perpetrator group) assigned contemporary perpetrator group members less guilt and were more willing to forgive for the harm done than those who perceived the aggressive behavior as specific to that group. I was also able to demonstrate the importance of perceived cause of intergroup conflict on judgments of both ingroup and outgroup members. In Study 3 and Study 4, I showed that perceiving the ingroup's aggressive behavior as a reaction to outgroup terrorism led to an increase in willingness to forgive the ingroup for the aggressive acts it has committed. Conversely, when outgroup aggressive behavior is viewed as a reaction to ingroup aggression there was a decrease in willingness to forgive these "deviant" ingroup

members. Seeing the ingroup as instrumentally aggressing against another group (viewing the Israelis as oppressing the Palestinians) may initiate black sheep effect processes. That is, believing that members of the ingroup are committing immoral acts may cause psychological distance between misbehaving ingroup members and the rest of the ingroup. With reference to my dissertation, North American Jews became less forgiving of Israelis as their perceptions that Israeli oppression as the cause of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict increased. Note this pattern of results is not isolated to the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

As I write this dissertation, anti-war protests abound as George W. Bush prepares to send American troops into Iraq. These anti-war protesters point to the instrumental aggressive nature of such American involvement (Reeder & Wohl, 2003). That is, many suggest that the cause of a war in Iraq would be America's lust for oil (ingroup reward). Iraq has one of the largest oil reserves in the world (second only to Saudi Arabia); America is the world's largest consumer of oil. This situation (Iraq having oil and America needing oil) provides impetus for the anti-war slogan "no blood for oil." Anti-war protesters in the United States, I suggest, would be very unwilling to forgive the leader of their ingroup (the President of the United States) should war come to fruition.

On the other hand, those in favor of war with Iraq suggest that American action would be either retaliatory or preemptive (Reeder & Wohl, 2003). On 11 September 2001, terrorists flew hijacked commercial airliners into the Pentagon and both towers of the World Trade Center. In a perfect world, the impact of these attacks would fall only where it belongs—on the perpetrators. Unfortunately, in times of conflict and stress there is a tendency toward simplified information processing (Wallace, Suedfeld, & Thachuk,

1993), which may result in prejudice and discrimination. Today, war advocates suggest that the Western way of life is under siege. What is known is that the September 11 terrorists were Arabic in origin. There is also an assumption that Saddam Hussein may have been involved (Reeder & Wohl, 2003). Thus, war would be a reaction against a leader who supported the September 11 attacks. War advocates also justify their position by referencing Hussein's potential use of weapons of mass destruction. They point to his previous use of these weapons, both in the Iran-Iraq war and against his own people (the Kurds), as rational for regime change. Thus, war is a preemptive response to rid the world of the threat he poses. Whether starting a preemptive war is justified in a particular instance is beyond the scope of my dissertation, however, what is of import is that pro-war individuals perceive an attack on Iraq as reactive aggression – either for September 11 or non-compliance to UN resolution 1441 requiring Iraq destroy its weapons of mass destructions. As a result, any aggressive action taken by the ingroup (those with western ideological values) is not only tolerated, it would be forgiven.

I have, of course, simplified the rationale for both sides. That is, war advocates and protesters would be able to generate many more reason for their particular side. My point is that the rationales generated by war protesters focus on the instrumental nature of American aggression, whereas war advocate focus in the reactive nature of American aggression. These variations for perceived cause of the impending war with Iraq should have direct consequences on willingness to forgive.

The Meaning of Forgiveness

An issue that should be taken into consideration when reading the results of this dissertation concerns the meaning of forgiveness (cf., McCullough, Hoyt, & Rachel,

2000). Most forgiveness researchers (McCullough, 2001; Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992) agree that forgiveness is conceptually distinct from pardoning (which is a legal term), excusing (which implies that the wrongdoer had good reason to commit the offense), or forgetting (which implies a memory loss). In general, available definitions emphasize the covert outcomes of overt acts of forgiveness, suggesting that forgiveness is an activity that induces a shift from negative to more positive feelings toward the transgressor. However, despite progress in the area of forgiveness, as yet there is no clear consensus as to what forgiveness really is.

As McCullough (2000) noted, a large volume of research to date has focused on forgiveness within the context of a specific offense. That is, researchers have assessed the extent to which a person has forgiven a specific wrongdoer for a single interpersonal offence. This assessment is either done using single-item self-report measures (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982), multi-item measures (e.g., my dissertation), or scales (e.g., McCullough, et al., 1997). For example, Darby and Schlenker (1982) conducted a study in which they asked 110 children to rate how severely another child should be punished for having caused harm by behaving inattentively. The authors manipulated the target's responsibility for the harm (high, low), the severity of the consequence (high, low), and the target's behavior subsequent to the incident (the presence or absence of an apology). In the first condition he disappeared without saying anything, in the second condition he apologized, in the third condition he apologized extensively, and in the fourth condition he additionally offered his help. To assess willingness to forgive the target, Darby and Schlenker asked the children if they thought that the target "should be forgiven for what happened, and if so, how much do you think [the target] should be forgiven?" Results

indicated that forgiveness was more likely when the transgressor apologized for the wrongful act than when the transgressor did not apologize. However, what definition of forgiveness are we to use to understand what the children meant when they responded to this single item. Generally such single-item self-report measures use the word forgiveness. Thus, single-item measures of forgiveness are face-valid. However, with single-items measures, the participant must decide what the word “forgiveness” means. As noted earlier, definitional issues remain amongst forgiveness researchers. If participants are allowed to generate their own idiosyncratic definition, as opposed to constructing items geared to tap aspects deemed relevant to the underlying essence of the construct, then different forgiveness researchers may interpret results from these single-item measures differently.

As with many new research topics, construct clarity is currently a problem for the field of forgiveness research (Brown, in press). Therefore, when discussing results from forgiveness studies, people must take into account the researcher’s idiosyncratic definition of the construct. The researcher’s definition of forgiveness is important because it generally influences the measure used to assess the construct. For example, McCullough and colleagues (1997; 1998) define forgiveness as a pro-social motivational change on the victim’s part. When people forgive the motives for avoidance and revenge are no longer stimulated. To assess forgiveness, therefore, McCullough et al. (1997) developed a 12-item scale, the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM) Inventory, designed to assess the reduction in avoidance and revenge motivations. If there is a reduction in both motives, McCullough asserts that forgiveness has taken place. On the other hand, Enright and colleagues conceptualize forgiveness as a reduction in

resentment and the offering of compassion, mercy, and love for the offender (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998; Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1991). As a result, they constructed the 60-item Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI) that assesses six aspects of forgiving another person: presence of positive affect, cognition, and behavior, and the absence of negative affect, cognition, and behavior. If the victim's attitude toward the offender is more positive and less negative Enright would argue that forgiveness is said to have taken place. Note, love is not a component of the TRIM and no specific reference is made to avoidance or revenge motives in the EFI. The TRIM and the EFI both report that higher scores on their scales reflects an increase in forgiveness, however, the construct being tested is somewhat different. Both may be investigating aspects of the larger construct of forgiveness, but I argue, that situational variables may influence one of these aspects more than others. For example, a daughter may still have love in her heart for an abusive father, but wish to avoid contact with him for safety reasons. If this daughter completed both the EFI and the TRIM, results would drastically differ. Results from the TRIM would suggest that forgiveness had not taken place, yet results from the EFI would suggest otherwise. Thus, when examining research results regarding forgiveness, the idiosyncratic definition of the research should be taken into account.

In my studies, I allowed the participant to use his or her own idiosyncratic definition of forgiveness. That is, I used the word "forgiveness" in all my measures. Further, I did not explain to the participant what I meant by the word. I permitted participants to use their own idiosyncratic definition of the construct because my definition of forgiveness is quite broad. In generally, I conceive of forgiveness as a letting

go of negative feelings and cognitions toward the offending person or group. This broad definition subsumes both Enright's and McCullough's definition. Specifically, I used multi-item self-report measures of participants' willingness to forgive. As a result, a second issue regarding forgiveness research should be addressed.

Willingness to forgive is distinct from actual forgiveness. The former suggests a readiness to forgive, whereas the latter is the "real deal." Although willingness to forgive may be highly correlated with the act of forgiveness, willingness to forgive does not necessarily mean that forgiveness will follow. People may be willing to forgive during a certain time and place, but later find that they are not ready to make the full commitment to forgiveness. For example, a girlfriend may believe she is ready to forgive her boyfriend for cheating, but after further deliberation realize that she is not capable of making such a commitment. Thus, with reference to my dissertation, Jews reported an elevated willingness to forgive Germans in Study 1 and Study 2 when their human identity was made salient; this does not mean that forgiveness actually occurred.

Future Directions

Although not the effect that I observed, it might be possible for a Holocaust reminder, with its victimized and victimizer intergroup categorical distinction, to promote feelings of sympathy for the Palestinians. In fact, there has been considerable internal dissent concerning the cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians within the Jewish population (Gorenberg, 2002). Soldiers under Yitzhak Rabin's command in the 1948 war, refused to "cleanse" Arab villagers from areas that would become part of the new Israeli state. During the Israeli bombing of Beirut in the 1980s, some Israeli soldiers refused to serve in Lebanon. Furthermore, during the first Palestinian uprising, other

Israeli soldiers perceived symmetry between the acts of Nazi Germany against Jews and the acts of the Israeli Defense Force against Palestinians. For these Jewish people, a transposition had taken place in Jewish life: in denying the rights of Palestinians, Jews could be perceived as acting like those who had denied Jewish rights across the millennia. Thus, it is possible that remembering how one's own ingroup was previously victimized could be a catalyst for the formation of sympathetic attitudes toward the outgroup. To the extent that such an effect of remembering the Holocaust rests on increasing perceived similarity between the groups, future research might profitably vary this directly. Indeed, an explicit comparison focusing on the similarities between Jewish history and the current situation faced by the Palestinians, might well lead to greater forgiveness and a decrease in the amount collective guilt assigned to the Palestinians. In contrast, my manipulation of a reminder of the Holocaust seems to have created a focus on differences between Jews and other (antagonistic) outgroups. In my study, although perceived similarity between Palestinians and Israelis was less when reminded of the Holocaust than when not, both means were well under the midpoint of the scale. If I had manipulated perceived similarity such that participants focused on actual similarities between Israelis and Palestinians (e.g., Semitic peoples, or Middle-Easterners), which in effect implies a recategorization at a higher level of inclusiveness, I may have been able to increase sympathetic reactions toward the Palestinians with a Holocaust reminder. Future research is needed to address this possibility, as well as whether North American participants might be differentially affected by the level of categorization and Holocaust reminder manipulations compared to Israeli Jews. Such national differences might be

expected especially for responses to the Palestinians, a group with whom North Americans have had relatively little direct contact.

The Rocky Road to Reconciliation

Although I was able to alter the perceived distinctiveness of Palestinians and Israelis, as well as Germans and Jews, I cannot know how durable such categorization manipulations might be. It might well take considerable repeated practice for people to employ more inclusive categorization levels with consistency. In fact, blurring the boundaries between social groups, which in effect occurs with recategorization, has been shown to be a threatening experience for highly identified group members (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999 for a review). For this reason, I expect that highly identified Jewish participants would be potentially reluctant to employ the more inclusive human level categorization over an extended duration of time.⁴ Indeed, for a whole host of political reasons, ingroup members might well object to “human” level categorization. In particular, doing so might be perceived as inconsistent with maximizing the ingroup’s interests. For example, given that use of a more inclusive categorization leads to greater forgiveness of the transgressor category, it could make requests by the victimized for reparations considerably harder to seek and obtain. As Tutu (1999) has discussed, for groups to engage in reconciliation, they may have to forego seeking retribution (and perhaps reparations) and settle for restorative justice which ultimately requires a re-integration of former perpetrators so that they come to be seen as deserving of the same treatment as victims. Such an agenda may be especially hard to promote during periods of ongoing open conflict. Indeed, groups are likely to have

powerful punishments for ingroup members who suggest that perpetrators and victims share anything at all—especially the same social category.

As can be seen by the four studies reported here, however, perceiving a shared common ingroup identity (e.g., human identity) with a former, or current, outgroup perpetrator can have a powerful affect on emotional responses to those outgroup. Specifically, the more group members perceive similarity between the ingroup and a perpetrator group, the more likely forgiveness (and possibly reconciliation) is to occur. Thus, long-term resolution of intergroup conflicts might be achieved through negotiation at a superordinate level of identification. For example, Kelman (1997a) suggested that superordinate categorization is a powerful part of the Middle East equation. For many involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, simply acknowledging the other's identity becomes tantamount to jeopardizing the identity of one's own group. The concept of negotiating at the level of superordinate identity provides hope for change. Because social identities are to a large extent constructed, they can be redefined.

One means by which identity may be redefined is through education. For example, Kelman (1997b) notes that small group workshops improve communication between Palestinians and Israelis. These groups typically involve high profile people from each side (from media, academic, policy, and political institutions) who are led by neutral professionals to try to build pre-negotiation coalitions that will make official intergroup negotiations possible. One-shot workshops meant to educate both groups about the others position, however, are not very helpful. Education and, subsequent improved communication between groups takes time. Thus, only with a sequence of workshops, with the same people attending over many months, can progress be made.

Within these multiple workshops an integrative and cumulative process of coalition building is encouraged.

Another means through which superordinate categorization might be encouraged is by reminding all humans of the harm we have inflicted on each other. As suggested by the results of Study 1 and Study 2, reminders of the pervasiveness of genocide encourage victimized group members to forgive their perpetrator group. Perhaps, an international day of remembrance of the gross inhumanity that humans have inflicted on our fellow humans would encourage a dialogue between groups in conflict. By discussing the pervasiveness of genocide, people might realize that the ingroup is a potential target of genocide, which can be quite a sobering thought. No group wants to be the target of genocide. Moreover, by discussing the pervasiveness of genocide, people might come to realize that every group (including the one's ingroup) is capable of inflicting great harm on another group. To protect our ingroup from harm, we must understand that all groups are vulnerable. When people realize that we share a potential common fate, movement toward forgiveness (as demonstrated in Study 1 and Study 2) can occur. Such a dialogue could promote Mohandas Gandhi's overarching goal of *sarvodaya*, which translates to "the welfare of all" (Bose, 1987, p. 23). However, as Kelman's (1997b) research suggests, one-shot attempts like a single international day of remembrance is not enough. To promote forgiveness and reconciliation, the pervasiveness of human genocide might have to be made salient on a continuing basis.

The past century has witnessed the establishment of the first international organization aimed at the maintenance of world peace, the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). The latter has endured many trials, outlasted predictions of its

demise, and now appears to be a permanent fixture on the global stage. To facilitate forgiveness, perhaps it will be necessary for the UN to be proactive in disseminating information about genocide, bringing the catalogue of human injustice to the fore, placing education of the world populous about genocide on the agenda, and speaking to the world as the voice of the human race as opposed to the sum of the countries it now represents.

What is called for now, is the creative genius of psychology to generate new approaches to propel the transformation from separate social groups to one human group. This creative genius can also be brought to bare on new and innovative means of reminding our fellow humans of the injustices in the world and the need for forgiveness of past wrongs.

Concluding Thoughts

The Nazi Holocaust could be conceptualized as the powerful event that serves to link Germans and Jews in a crucial intergroup categorization. Some might say that the Holocaust is a defining aspect of both groups' ethnic identity. For this reason, it would be very interesting to examine the consequences of superordinate versus intergroup categorization among Germans. I suggest that such recategorization among Germans is likely to reduce collective guilt *acceptance* and increase *ingroup* forgiveness for the past. Whether one's social identity is based on a category that is either the historical perpetrator or victim may well have opposite effects. I am confident that my main results with Jewish participants concerning the importance of social categorization can be generalized to other historically victimized groups. My main findings have been replicated with Native Canadians, illustrating the power of superordinate categorization to evoke forgiveness and reductions in the collective guilt assigned to White Canadians

for their past history of harm to Native peoples (Wohl & Branscombe, 2003). How people and their history are categorized can have powerful consequences for the perception and treatment of outgroup members. Making salient past group-based mistreatment can fuel ethnic conflict by decreasing forgiveness and increasing collective guilt assignment, although it is also likely to encourage collective protest for that too is fundamentally based on perceiving the self in group-based terms (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Which option, forgiveness or collective action against an oppressor, is deemed desirable, is likely to depend on the perceiver's own group membership and how the groups are categorized.

Footnotes

¹ Although social categorization can be useful for providing understanding, the information may be invalid. At the very root of stereotypes is social categorization. People routinely use salient markers such as age, sex, and race to identify and categorize people (e.g., Allport, 1954). Because the perceiver has limited cognitive resources to handle the often complex information one encounters in everyday social life, categorization can provide the quickest and most efficient way of processing information (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Once perceivers categorize a group, they do not have to waste valuable cognitive resources in searching for further information about each member of the group to have an opinion of that group. Such cognitive processing can furnish the perceiver with over-generalized and invalid information about members of a social category.

² In Cambodia on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge armies defeated the Lon Nol regime and took the capital, Phnom Penh, immediately dispersing almost all of its more than 2 million inhabitants to a life of hard agricultural labor in the countryside (Shawcross, 1984). Other cities and towns were also evacuated. The Khmer Rouge renamed the country Democratic Kâmpuchéa (DK), and for the next four years the regime, headed by Pol Pot as prime minister and other members of the Standing Committee of the CPK Central Committee, terrorized the population. Almost 1.7 million Cambodians were killed, including members of minority and religious groups, people suspected of disagreeing with the party, intellectuals, merchants, and bureaucrats. Millions of other Cambodians were forcibly relocated, deprived of food, tortured, or sent into forced labor. Of about 425,000 Chinese Cambodians, only about half survived the Khmer Rouge

regime. While most of about 450,000 Vietnamese Cambodians had been expelled by the Lon Nol regime, more were driven out by the Khmer Rouge; the rest were tracked down and murdered. Of about 250,000 Muslim Chams (an ethnic group inhabiting the rural areas of Cambodia) in 1975, 90,000 were massacred, and the survivors were dispersed. The most horrific slaughter took place during the second half of 1978 when at least 250,000 people were killed in the worst single massacre of the Khmer Rouge period (cf., Kiernan, 1996).

³ Although not reported in this dissertation, the procedure used in this study was replicated with a non-Jewish sample. Although, the procedure of Study 4 was replicated the results were not. That is, the non-Jewish sample did not elicit the same emotional response to reminders of the Holocaust. Specifically, there was no difference between the Holocaust reminder condition and the no Holocaust reminder condition for the non-Jewish Sample. The non-significant difference between these two condition with a non-Jewish sample further substantiated my claim that group-based victimization history reminders must be ingroup relevant. That is, if reminders of group-based victimization are not relevant to the group to which the person identifies, then such reminders will not produce the affects demonstrated in this dissertation.

⁴ Note, the vast majority of my participants were highly identified Jews. Indeed, only Jewish people who identify strongly with their Jewish heritage tend to join Hillel. In the four studies reported in this dissertation, participants reported being highly identified with their Jewish heritage (a mean of over 7.00 on an 8-point Likert-scale). As a result, it may not be prudent to generalize the results reported in this dissertation to the larger Jewish populace. Low identified Jews may not experience the same emotional response to the

Holocaust has high identifiers, because low identifiers are more inclined to distance themselves from the group than are high identifiers. In fact, low-identified group members more readily acknowledge the negative aspects of their own group's history and feel more guilt compared with high identifiers when both negative and positive aspects of their nation's history are made salient (Doosje, et al., 1998). Thus, my Holocaust reminder manipulation may not be as robust should low identified Jews be used as the target population. However, low identified Jews, compared to highly identified Jews, may be more willing to categorize themselves at the human level of inclusiveness, as they do not have as much invested in their Jewish social identity.

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Appendix A: Studies 1-2 E-mail Letter to Hillel Members

Dear Hillel Members,

My name is Michael Wohl, I'm a graduate student in psychology at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. I wish to answer some questions regarding Jews' perceptions of the Holocaust. As a result, I would like to invite all of you to access and complete a questionnaire we have on-line. This questionnaire consists of statements about the Holocaust to which I will ask if you agree or disagree. This will only take a couple of minutes of your time. By participating in this study you are greatly assisting us obtain basic knowledge about Jews' perceptions of Holocaust.

You may contact me by phone or e-mail at any time concerning the procedure and purpose of this study. Data collection will terminate in a couple of weeks, after which I will provide the results, and some discussion of these results, in a forthcoming e-mail.

<http://www.psych.ualberta.ca/consent.html>

Thank you in advance,

Michael Wohl

Principal Investigator:

Michael J. A. Wohl
Department of Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
(780) 492-1355
E-mail: mwohl@ualberta.ca

Appendix B: Studies 1-2 Informed Consent

INFORMED CONSENT

The Department of Psychology at the University of Alberta supports the practice of protection for human participants in research. The following information is provided so you may decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

I am interested in your perceptions about the Holocaust. Therefore, I will provide a short paragraph describing the Holocaust followed by statements about this event to which I will ask if you agree or disagree. All your responses will be anonymous, although the findings obtained from the entire sample may well receive wide scientific attention. By participating in this study you are greatly assisting me obtain basic knowledge about social phenomena. Completion of this study should not take more than five minutes of your time.

In addition to helping me answer my research questions, you will be provided with information about the aims of my study at the conclusion of this session. I can anticipate no psychological or physical discomfort to you as a result of your participation in this study. Your participation is solicited but is completely voluntary, as you may withdraw from the study at any time.

You may contact me by phone or e-mail at any time concerning the procedure, purpose, and results of this study.

Principal Investigator:

Michael J. A. Wohl
Department of Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
mwohl@ualberta.ca

By clicking the "next" button we are assuming that you have read the above form and have granted consent.

Appendix C: Study 1 Categorization Manipulation

Human Identity Condition Protocol:

We would ask that you to take a few moments to reflect on the Holocaust. This 20th Century event reflects how humans behaved aggressively toward other humans during the Second World War. Because it remains an important question today as to how this kind of behavior on the part of humans toward other humans ever was possible, we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Social Identity Condition Protocol:

We would ask that you to take a few moments to reflect on the Holocaust. This 20th Century event reflects how Germans behaved aggressively toward Jews during the Second World War. Because it remains an important question today as to how this kind of behavior on the part of Germans toward Jews ever was possible, we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Appendix D: Study 2 Categorization Manipulation

Human Identity Condition Protocol:

We would ask that you to take a few moments to reflect on the Holocaust. This 20th Century event reflects how humans behaved aggressively toward other humans during the Second World War. Because it remains an important question today as to how this kind of behavior on the part of humans toward other humans ever was possible, we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Social Identity Condition Protocol:

We would ask that you to take a few moments to reflect on the Holocaust. This 20th Century event reflects how humans behaved aggressively toward other humans during the Second World War. Because it remains an important question today as to how this kind of behavior on the part of humans toward other humans ever was possible, we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Please indicate your ethnic group (you may check more than one box)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jewish | <input type="checkbox"/> German |
| <input type="checkbox"/> non-Jewish | <input type="checkbox"/> non-German |

Appendix E: Studies 1-2 Holocaust Questionnaire

In the following statements, please indicate your agreement by clicking the circle beside the statement that best reflects your opinion.

- 1 = Definitely Disagree
- 2 = Mostly Disagree
- 3 = Somewhat Disagree
- 4 = Slightly Disagree
- 5 = Slightly Agree
- 6 = Somewhat Agree
- 7 = Mostly Agree
- 8 = Definitely Agree

1. Germans and Jews share basic similarities.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

2. Today's Germans should feel guilty about the awful things their ancestors did to Jews in World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

3. Such harmful actions as those during the Holocaust in World War II have happened throughout human history.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

4. There have been many similar instances of mass killing throughout human history.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

5. The Germans targeting Jews in World War II is similar to many other examples of mass killing of people that have happened throughout human history.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

6. Germans of today should feel guilty about the bad things that happened to Jews during World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

7. Germans today should feel regret for what their group did to Jews during World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

8. Today's Germans should feel guilty about the awful things their ancestors did to Jews in World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9. All Germans should feel guilty about the harm done to Jews during World War II." In addition

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

10. Germans today should be forgiven for what their group did to Jews during World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

11. Jews should move past their negative feelings toward today's Germans for the harm their group inflicted during World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

12. Today's Germans should be forgiven for what their ancestors did to Jews during World War II.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

13. It is possible for me to forgive today's Germans for the Holocaust.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Please indicate your gender?

Male Female

Please indicate your age?

Please indicate your ethnic background?

Appendix F: Studies 1-2 Debriefing

Post Experimental Debriefing

Part of the scientific process involves building on previous research in order to attempt to clarify issues and lead to new discoveries. The findings in the present work will lead to modifications of theory and other testable hypotheses which, in turn, should lead to other hypotheses, and so on. This is how science builds on previous work and is known as the functional approach to theory development. We often identify issues raised in journals, point out problems, extend issues, or modify theories in order to advance our understanding. As you can see, it is very important to have research participants so that scientific endeavors can continue. Your participation not only helps to advance science, but is also meant to help you understand how we conduct research when we address important psychological issues.

We did not tell you ahead of time what our hypotheses are. If we had done so, you might have felt pressure or some demand to respond or react a particular way, based on what you thought we wanted rather than on your typical or normal response. When people respond based on what they believe the researcher is looking for, this is called the demand awareness effect. This can be a problem in research because our results would not accurately reflect your responses. If this did occur, scientific progress would be affected because inappropriate avenues of research might be followed. Therefore, we inform you about the nature of a particular study AFTER you have participated in it. It is for this same reason why I need to ask you not to tell other people what I am studying until the end of this year. If other people were to learn the purpose of the research before participating, their reaction to my scenarios would vary likely be different than if they had responded normally, with no prior knowledge. As well, please do not access this sight to submit new data. That is, feel free to access this site and view the questions again but do not press the submit button, as this will contaminate the data set.

As for the purpose of the current study, we wanted to empirically examine collective guilt assignment and forgiveness of contemporary Germans for the Holocaust among North American Jewish people as a function of how groups are categorized. We consider the consequences of Jews perceiving Germans and Jews as distinct and separate groups, versus perceiving both groups as part of a single more inclusive superordinate category—that of humans. We expected that when the groups are categorized in terms of their intergroup relationship, greater collective guilt would be assigned to members of the perpetrator category compared to when the groups are thought about as a single inclusive category membership. In all conditions, people were first asked to reflect on their views concerning the Holocaust. If you accessed the social identity condition website, the Holocaust was described as an event in which Germans behaved aggressively towards Jews. In contrast, if you accessed the human identity condition website, the Holocaust was described as an event where humans behaved aggressively toward other humans. Thus, the way that the Holocaust was framed was our independent variable.

Psychologists manipulate independent variables to assess how these variables cause changes in other variables called dependent variables. So independent variables are the theoretical causes, and dependent variables, the variables that we measure, are the effects or outcomes of our independent variables. In this particular study the questionnaire you responded to would be our dependent variable. Random assignment means that each participant has an equal probability of receiving any of the levels of an independent variable. Because of this, we know that different groups of people who receive the various levels of an independent variable are about the same before our manipulations. The only systematic difference between the groups is the level of the independent variable; thus, the independent variable is the most likely cause of any change in our dependent variable. Thus, the currently research has potential to modify theories of forgiveness and perhaps shed light on the variables that are implicated in people's willingness to forgive.

If you have any questions about a particular questionnaire or just general questions related to the issues addressed here, you can contact Michael Wohl at
by e-mail :

Thank you for your participation in this study

Appendix G: Studies 3-4 E-mail Letter to Hillel Members

Dear Hillel Members,

My name is Michael Wohl, I'm a graduate student in psychology at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. I wish to answer some questions regarding Jews' perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, I would like to invite all of you to access and complete a questionnaire I have on-line. This questionnaire consists of statements about this conflict to which I will ask if you agree or disagree. This will only take a couple of minutes of your time. By participating in this study you are greatly assisting me obtain basic knowledge about this situation. I would greatly appreciate your participation.

You may contact me by phone or e-mail at any time concerning the procedure and purpose of this study. Data collection will terminate in a couple of weeks, after which I will provide the results, and some discussion of these results, in a forthcoming e-mail.

<http://www.psych.ualberta.ca/consentform.html>

Thank you in advance,

Michael Wohl

Principal Investigator:

Michael J. A. Wohl
Department of Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA

Appendix H: Informed consent: Studies 3-4

INFORMED CONSENT

The Department of Psychology at the University of Alberta supports the practice of protection for human participants in research. The following information is provided so you may decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

I am interested in your perceptions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I will ask you your opinion on statements about this conflict to which I will ask if you agree or disagree. All your responses will be anonymous, although the findings obtained from the entire sample may well receive wide scientific attention. By participating in this study you are greatly assisting me obtain basic knowledge about social phenomena. Completion of this study should not take more than a couple minutes of your time.

In addition to helping me answer my research questions, you will be provided with information about the aims of my study at the conclusion of this session. I can anticipate no psychological or physical discomfort to you as a result of your participation in this study. Your participation is solicited but is completely voluntary, as you may withdraw from the study at any time.

You may contact me by phone or e-mail at any time concerning the procedure, purpose, and results of this study.

Principal Investigator:

Michael J. A. Wohl
Department of Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA

Appendix I: Study 3 Reminder Manipulation

No Reminder Condition Protocol:

Today, Jews are again the focus of international attention. It has been widely reported that the state of Israel has been oppressing the Palestinians in their attempts to achieve a homeland. Many point to the Israeli government's sporadic sealing of all exit and entry points into the West Bank and Gaza as examples of Israeli oppression. Because this issue remains a very important one for both of the groups involved we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Holocaust Reminder Condition Protocol:

We would like you to take a moment to reflect on the Holocaust and the devastating impact it had, and still has, on Jews. The Holocaust occupies a special place in history because of Germany's systematic attempt to exterminate Jews. During this time, Jews were forced out of their homes into ghettos or worse, and eventual death in the concentration camps. During the Holocaust, 6 million Jews were methodically killed.

Today, Jews are again the focus of international attention. It has been widely reported that the state of Israel has been oppressing the Palestinians in their attempts to achieve a homeland. Many point to the Israeli government's sporadic sealing of all exit and entry points into the West Bank and Gaza as examples of Israeli oppression. Because this issue remains a very important one for both of the groups involved we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Appendix J: Study 4 Reminder Manipulation

No Reminder Condition Protocol:

Today, Jews are again the focus of international attention. It has been widely reported that the state of Israel has been oppressing the Palestinians in their attempts to achieve a homeland. Many point to the Israeli government's sporadic sealing of all exit and entry points into the West Bank and Gaza as examples of Israeli oppression. Because this issue remains a very important one for both of the groups involved we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Holocaust Reminder Condition Protocol:

We would like you to take a moment to reflect on the Holocaust and the devastating impact it had, and still has, on Jews. The Holocaust occupies a special place in history because of Germany's systematic attempt to exterminate Jews. During this time, Jews were forced out of their homes into ghettos or worse, and eventual death in the concentration camps. During the Holocaust, 6 million Jews were methodically killed.

Today, Jews are again the focus of international attention. It has been widely reported that the state of Israel has been oppressing the Palestinians in their attempts to achieve a homeland. Many point to the Israeli government's sporadic sealing of all exit and entry points into the West Bank and Gaza as examples of Israeli oppression. Because this issue remains a very important one for both of the groups involved we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Cambodia Holocaust Reminder Condition Protocol:

We would like you to take a moment to reflect on the holocaust in Cambodia. The Cambodian holocaust occupies a special place in history because of Communist Khmer Rouge's quest for power and the systematic killing of the Cambodian people. During this time, Cambodians were oppressed and forced out of their homes into the countryside and to labor camps. During the Khmer Rouge's rule, it is estimated that 2 million Cambodians (30% of the population of Cambodia at the time) died of starvation, torture or execution.

Today, Jews are the focus of international attention. It has been widely reported that the state of Israel has been oppressing the Palestinians in their attempts to achieve a homeland. Many point to the Israeli government's sporadic sealing of all exit and entry points into the West Bank and Gaza as examples of Israeli oppression. Because this issue remains a very important one for both of the groups involved we would like to ask you to answer the following questions.

Appendix K: Studies 3-4 Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Questionnaire

In the following statements, please indicate your agreement by clicking the circle beside the statement that best reflects your opinion.

- 1 = Definitely Disagree
- 2 = Mostly Disagree
- 3 = Somewhat Disagree
- 4 = Slightly Disagree
- 5 = Slightly Agree
- 6 = Somewhat Agree
- 7 = Mostly Agree
- 8 = Definitely Agree

1. I believe that the western media has been Pro-Israel in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

2. Palestinians should be forgiven for the aggressive acts committed during the uprising.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

3. Israelis should be forgiven for the aggressive acts committed during the Palestinian uprising.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

4. Israelis should feel guilty for their behavior toward the Palestinians.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

5. Palestinians should feel guilty about their behavior towards Israelis.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

6. I believe that the current actions of the Israelis are in response to Palestinian terrorism.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

7. I believe that the current actions of the Palestinians are in response to Israeli oppression.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Please indicate your gender?

Male Female

Please indicate your age?

Please indicate your ethnic background?

Appendix L: Studies 3-4 Debriefing

Post Experimental Debriefing

Part of the scientific process involves building on previous research in order to attempt to clarify issues and lead to new discoveries. The findings in the present work will lead to modifications of theory and other testable hypotheses which, in turn, should lead to other hypotheses, and so on. This is how science builds on previous work and is known as the functional approach to theory development. We often identify issues raised in journals, point out problems, extend issues, or modify theories in order to advance our understanding. As you can see, it is very important to have research participants so that scientific endeavors can continue. Your participation not only helps to advance science, but is also meant to help you understand how we conduct research when we address important psychological issues.

We did not tell you ahead of time what our hypotheses are. If we had done so, you might have felt pressure or some demand to respond or react a particular way, based on what you thought we wanted rather than on your typical or normal response. When people respond based on what they believe the researcher is looking for, this is called the demand awareness effect. This can be a problem in research because our results would not accurately reflect your responses. If this did occur, scientific progress would be affected because inappropriate avenues of research might be followed. Therefore, we inform you about the nature of a particular study AFTER you have participated in it. It is for this same reason why I need to ask you not to tell other people what I am studying until the end of this year. If other people were to learn the purpose of the research before participating, their reaction to my scenarios would vary likely be different than if they had responded normally, with no prior knowledge. As well, please do not access this sight to submit new data. That is, feel free to access this site and view the questions again but do not press the submit button, as this will contaminate the data set.

As for the purpose of the current study, we wanted to explore how reminders of the ingroup's victimization history can alter collective guilt assignment and willingness to forgive members of another group with whom the ingroup is currently in conflict. We argue that reminders of past suffering based on group membership encourages categorization in intergroup terms, which then promotes ingroup-favoring and conflict-maintaining responses in the present (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Put in other words, we wanted to see how reminding Jews of the Holocaust influenced their perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As such, some people were asked to reflect on the Holocaust prior to filling out the questionnaire about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, others were not given such instructions. Thus, Holocaust reminder was our independent variable.

Psychologists manipulate independent variables to assess how these variables cause changes in other variables called dependent variables. So independent variables are the theoretical causes, and dependent variables, the variables that we measure, are the effects or outcomes of our independent variables. In this particular study they questionnaire you responded to would be our dependent variable. Random assignment means that each participant has an equal probability of receiving any of the levels of an independent variable. Because of this, we know that different groups of people who receive the

various levels of an independent variable are about the same before our manipulations. The only systematic difference between the groups is the level of the independent variable; thus, the independent variable is the most likely cause of any change in our dependent variable. Thus, the currently research has potential to modify theories of forgiveness and perhaps shed light on the variables that are implicated in people's willingness to forgive.

If you have any questions about a particular questionnaire or just general questions related to the issues addressed here, you can contact Michael Wohl at (780) 492-1355 or by e-mail at mwohl@ualberta.ca.

Thank you for your participation in this study