Unlocking Radicalization: Correctional Officers, Risk Perception, and Ideological Extremism in Albertan Prisons

by

William James Schultz

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Department of Sociology

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Abstract

A wide range of sources have framed radicalization into violent extremism as a serious risk to prisons in Europe and North America. Some view prisons as a primary recruiting ground for groups like ISIS. I investigated whether this was accurate in Alberta by conducting semi-structured interviews with 43 correctional officers in three Alberta prisons. I asked three questions: 1. Do correctional officers observe what they perceive as radicalization among their inmate populations? 2. How do correctional officers perceive and govern the risks associated with 'radical' inmates? 3. What influence does an insider/outsider role play in shaping prison research? I found nothing to suggest active radical activity within my research sites, suggesting prison radicalization is largely an irrelevant threat in the Albertan Context. However, I also discovered that officers have (in many cases) unconsciously redefined the meaning of "radicalization," and have applied the label onto inmates who are resistant to officer control, rather than members of ideologically violent radical groups. I explore this at length using Ulrich Beck's Risk Society hypothesis. Finally, I discovered my status as a former correctional officer played a strong role in casting me as an "Insider/Outsider" researcher, something which deeply shaped my research experience and impacted the data I was able to gather.

Preface

This thesis is an original work by William Schultz. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name “Unlocking Extremism: Examining Perspectives on Radicalization among Correctional Officers in Alberta”, No. 00062785, on April 1, 2016.

The interviews conducted for this thesis form part of a larger research collaboration entitled The Alberta Prisons Project, led by Professor Sandra Bucerius and Professor Kevin Haggerty. This project is based at the University of Alberta. All portions of the thesis itself are the personal work of William Schultz. However, the consent form for this project was a shared design between William Schultz and Drs. Haggerty and Bucerius. Dr. Haggerty also conducted three of the interviews used in this thesis. They are used with his permission.

Dedication

To all the men and women of FSCC, ERC, and CCC:

You make an impossible job look easy, even when it isn't.

And to my family and friends, for keeping my feet on the ground when I needed it

Acknowledgements

In my experience, a vacuum rarely produces rich and insightful work. Outside opinions, criticism, support and feedback are key in producing a piece with analytical depth. This thesis is no different, and I owe a sincere debt of gratitude to a wide range of people for their assistance.

First and foremost, to all of the officers who gave me time, told me stories, or put up with my irritating questions when you were trying to get your work done: thank you. If nothing else, I hope this piece shows some of the massive pressures which constantly shape life in jail, and how you do your jobs. You gave me a lot, and this will *not* be my last word on Alberta corrections.

Dr. Bucerius: Sandra, I owe you for this one. The advice, feedback, blunt criticism, encouragement, and long discussions while running were what kept me sane and helped me make this. Thanks for taking a chance on me.

Dr. Haggerty: Kevin, thanks for standing up to my opinionated views about how we "should" do this research. You've been more influential than you know in helping to shape my view of the prison, and I deeply appreciate your mentorship and wisdom.

Dr. Mahdavi: Thanks for sitting on my committee; more than one Political Science student has told me they're jealous, and I know why. Your class was a great challenge for me, and deeply shaped my understanding of how radicalization relates to Islam. Thanks also for the feedback at various times—your critiques shaped the way I wrote and thought about radicalization.

My research teammates: Luca, Tyler, Ashley, Justin, Marta—thanks for all the thoughts, arguments, and discussions we have had since starting this project. It's been fun to work with you guys, and I look forward to the next part.

And finally, to my family: Thanks for keeping me level, and encouraging me and my faith when I needed it most.

Contents

Introduction

Incarceration shares a long and dubious history with radicalization. Prisons have played an formative role in every militant movement of the modern era (Neuman, 2010, p. 7). Iraqi prisoner-of-war camps helped form the leadership corps of ISIS (Chulov, 2014); the 2015 Paris gunmen met each other in French jails (Chrisafis, 2015; Faucon, Dalton, Meichtry, & Gauthier-Villars, 2015); and the failed 2009 Christmas Day airplane bomber was radicalized while serving a prison sentence in America (Hamm, 2013, p. ix). Scholars and news organizations have also drawn repeated correlations between prior criminality, prison time and ideological violence (Burke, 2016; Chrisafis, 2015; Faucon et al., 2015; Proussalidis, 2013; Roy, 2017). To date, prison-linked terrorism has been concentrated in Europe; however, violent actions in support of extreme ideologies have been committed in Canada for decades (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009), and many sources finger Canadian prisons as potential sources of terrorism (Harris, 2015; Proussalidis, 2013; Wilner, 2010, p. 4). Other scholars are more skeptical, but suggest further investigation of the subject would be valuable in the Canadian context (Stys, Gobeil, & Michel, 2014, p. 4).

I became interested in studying prison radicalization after observing it first-hand. I worked as a Correctional Peace Officer (CO) at the Fort Saskatchewan Correctional Centre (FSCC) for the best part of five years. A man came into the prison who claimed allegiance to ISIS, sending shockwaves through both the inmate and officer populations. He ended up in segregation, as the other inmates rejected him, and the officers were unsure how to manage him. His case sparked my interest; surely, this man was not the only person in provincial corrections who adhered to radical ideologies. When I left the prison for graduate school at the University of Alberta, I decided to study the topic of prison radicalization in my former workplace context.

Most research on prison radicalization have been case studies and document analyses. There is a notable lack of empirical research (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 562). The studies which do exist centre on inmate perspectives. While this is eminently logical, it ignores a large population within the prison—namely, correctional officers. This is ironic, as—proportionally, over the course of a career—many officers spend more time inside prison than the average inmate (Crawley, 2004, p. xiii). In the worlds of Arnold, Liebling and Tait, "Prison officers remain the 'invisible ghosts' of penality, neglected in research, in policy decision-making and in the public's imagination" (2007, p. 492). This is no isolated description: Liebling uses similar metaphors in other work (Liebling, Price, & Shefer, 2011, p. 1), and several books on correctional officers cite Hawkins's (1976) assessment of officers as a 'grey homogeneity,' invisible—like novelist G.K. Chesterton's postman—simply because of his or her routine, assumed, and therefore overlooked presence (Crawley, 2004, p. 25; Kauffman, 1988, p. 2; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 1; Lombardo, 1989, p. 1).

This neglect is significant, as correctional officers play a vital role in providing services and support within the prison (Crawley, 2004). As a result, they strongly influence the atmosphere of the prison (Kauffman, 1988; Scott, 2015, pp. 53–54), and can dramatically influence the prison experience for individuals or groups of inmates. This does not mean correctional officers are all-powerful; a considerable portion of CO literature mentions officer vulnerability as a defining part of the prison experience (Kauffman, 1988, pp. 123–4; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011), and most works detail how ostensibly total power is limited in actual practice (Crawley, 2004; Kauffman, 1988; Sykes, 1958). The shortcomings and structural flaws in how power and authority are executed within the prison setting (Sykes, 1958) means negotiation and informal arrangements between officers and inmates are the primary method for managing daily

life behind bars, rather than totalitarianism (Ibsen, 2013, p. 343; Kauffman, 1988; Philliber, 1987, p. 27; Sykes, 1958; Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 573). As a result, informal relationships between officers and inmates—which often take the form of demonstrated trust, unofficial privileges for compliant offenders, or merely non-exercise of powers (Liebling, 2011)—play a large role in creating avenues for the exercise of "quiet power", which is often seen as the hallmark and determinative factor of an effective prison (Ibsen, 2013, p. 535; Kauffman, 1988; Liebling, Arnold, & Straub, 2011, p. 3; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 136; Marquart, 1986; Sykes, 1958; Williams, 2015).

Radicalization and perceived radicalization threatens these relationships and reduces the use and applicability of 'quiet power' in the prison setting (Liebling, Arnold, et al., 2011, p. 3). Liebling and Straub (2012) found the presence of accused terrorists on a prison housing unit decreases trust and increases distance between officers and inmates, compared to other housing units (pp. 7, 17; see also Liebling, Arnold, et al., 2011, p. 87). Other authors have noted correctional officers often treat religious conversion—especially to Islam—as an automatic sign of radicalization, despite the demonstrable benefits of religious involvement (Hamm, 2009, p. 669, 2013; Stys et al., 2014, p. 7; Williams, 2015).

My thesis is primarily based on 33 interviews with correctional officers at the Fort Saskatchewan Correctional Centre (FSCC) and the Edmonton Remand Centre (ERC). Drawing on these interviews, I examine how officer perceptions shape actions within the prison, specifically relating to 'radical' inmates. Furthermore, I analyse how officer perceptions of risk shape outlooks and actions toward specific groups, and how officer risk assessments vary depending on inmate race, oppositional behaviour, and mental health. These factors play into a number of important redefinitions; officers commonly assess 'radicalization' as a risk, but

describe groups with little to no ideological messaging as ‘radicals’ within their particular setting. Outside factors also deeply influence individual risk perceptions. Notably, officers suggest military service in Afghanistan may shape perceptions of radicalization, and media portrayals of terrorism and radical violence also play an important role in shaping attitudes.

Chapter I: Radicalization

Although radicalization is a common media theme, it is still poorly understood (Borum, 2011a, p. 3; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). Therefore, determining which definition is most appropriate is a key requirement of any scholarship on the subject (Neumann, 2013, p. 874). I use the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2009) definition:

> [Radicalization is] . . . the process by which individuals . . . are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views. . . . [I]t becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological, or religious extremism (p. 1).

This definition is wide-ranging and relatively straightforward. It has been used as a foundation for radicalization literature in and outside of Canada (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 2; Neumann, 2013, p. 875; Stys et al., 2014, p. 2), and focuses on the support for or engagement with violence as the key differentiator between pro- and anti-social radicalization—an important distinction. Furthermore, it allows concrete boundaries to be placed in a field of considerable relativism and fluidity (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). While this definition will provide the foundation for my research and analysis, I will discuss some of the definitional tensions before going into my data.

Most scholars have acknowledged radicalization is a controversial concept (Neumann, 2013, p. 873). Some frame it as a useful analytical construct, while others frame it as a social control tactic, used to limit controversial forms of individual expression (Borum, 2011a, p. 9; Neumann, 2013, pp. 877–878). The widespread conflation of ‘radicalization’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’ since the September 11, 2001 World Trade Centre Attacks (9/11) has further complicated the discussion, adding a tinge of racism which masks a long history of non-Islamic extremism in Canada, America, and Europe (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 110; Neumann, 2013, p. 873;

Pressman, 2009, pp. 1–2; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 2; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480).[1] Racism also marginalizes moderate Islamic voices, creates tension between Muslims and non-Muslims, and exposes fault lines within Muslim communities (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 122).

The sheer size of the conversation is a large part of the problem. The term "radicalization" has been accused of inherent relativism, describing everything and nothing simultaneously (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). There are both pro- and anti-social radical beliefs (Neumann, 2013, p. 876; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 1), extending from protest groups to active terrorist cells. Creating a useful differentiation between positive and negative forms of radicalization is most easily accomplished if 'radicalization' is viewed as a continuum rather than a pure state (Christmann, 2012, p. 10; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 416; Neumann, 2013, p. 874; Pressman, 2009, p. 4; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 1). Views on the lower end of this spectrum are controversial in their particular social setting, but do not usually embrace active violence. For instance, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was widely viewed as a radical for his direct action campaigns (King Jr, 2003, p. 182), despite his firm commitment to peaceful civil disobedience. Peaceful attacks against social norms are only rarely considered radical, or are not commonly referred to as such.[2] Instead, 'radicalization' has widely been

[1] Canadian examples of ideological violence are surprisingly common. The most notorious terror incident in Canada remains the Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ) crisis, which peaked with kidnappings, murders, and 137 bombings between 1968 – 1970 (Maloney, 2000, p. 73). Sikh extremists planted suitcase bombs on Air India flight 182 in 1985, killing 329 passengers and crew; two airport ground crew members were killed in a separate explosion (Failler, 2009, p. 150). The failed "Toronto 18" plot is well-remembered because of its Islamist motivations, but is dwarfed by other incidents. In 1984, three people were killed and 41 injured in an anti-Catholic bombing in Montreal (*The Associated Press*, 1984); one man died and three U.S. fighter jets were damaged in a 1965 bombing in Edmonton (*The Spokesman-Review*, 1965). This attack was motivated by anti-Vietnam war sentiments, as the bomber ". . . believed the planes might lead to Canada's involvement in a Third World War" (Zdeb, 2015). Finally, Michel Zehaf-Bibeau's attack on Parliament Hill drew international attention (Perreaux, White, & Woo, 2014).

[2] At least, in the North American and European context; authoritarian governments commonly use 'terrorism' or 'radicalization' as an excuse to remove dissenters and violate human rights. Russia has used 'anti-terrorism' as an excuse for its Syrian intervention (Yakovenko, 2016), despite international outcry. The Chinese government has also categorized the Uighur Muslim minority as 'terrorists', and have initiated massive crackdowns in the region (Beech, 2014). Finally, Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently applied the term 'terrorism' in an innovative

applied to beliefs on the extreme end of the continuum, which have been associated with terrorist-style violence since the time of the Roman Empire (Neuman, 2010, p. 12; Neumann, 2013, p. 874; Pitchel, 2011, p. 3; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 2).

Interestingly, violent radicalization often holds similar goals to peaceful radical ideas on the lower end of the continuum. The contrast between Martin Luther King's peaceful civil rights agenda, and the Black Panther Party's "urban terrorism" illustrates this nicely (Hamm, 2013, p. 32). While both movements were generally focused on addressing the disadvantaged status of African American citizens, Dr. King rejected violence, while the Black Panthers embraced terrorism to further their agenda (Hamm, 2013, pp. 38, 77; see also King Jr.'s (2003) thoughts on the Nation of Islam). The main difference between these two groups was their view on violence, and whether it could be justified in promoting their social agenda (King Jr, 2003, p. 182).

The expressed support for the use of violence in support of an ideological agenda is the most useful way to conceptualize anti-social radicalization (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 2; Neuman, 2010, p. 12). In short, it describes the mental and sometimes physical space where individuals reside prior to partaking in terrorist actions, exclusive of whether they ever act on their beliefs (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, p. 151; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 482). This description of radicalization provides the basis for my analysis.

Radicalization and Prison

Radicalization and prison have historically shared a close relationship. Prisons are closed spaces in Canada and America, and inmates face massive societal disapprobation (Kauffman, 1988, p. 264; Simon, 2014, p. 36). Sykes used the metaphor of a fortress when describing New

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fashion: rather than simply use 'radicalization' as a dictatorial tool to crush dissent (Weise, 2016), Mr. Erdogan has employed radicalization and terrorism as an offensive weapon by applying it to anyone who disagrees with him—including foreign governments, notably ostensible NATO ally Germany (Batchelor, 2017).

Jersey State Maximum Security Prison: "A massive wall 20 feet high separates the free community from the prisoners, serving not only as the final barrier to escape, but also as a symbol of society's rejection—for this is a fort to keep the enemy within rather than without" (1958, p. 1). Given the strength of general anti-criminal sentiments, it is unsurprising to discover many scholars explicitly connect prisons with the spread of violent radical ideas (Cilluffo, Cardash, & Whitehead, 2007, p. 114). This assertion has been widely repeated, but is based on next to nothing: supporting evidence is, in essence, an assumption that inmates represent ". . . a captive audience [who] often exhibit many characteristics that render them vulnerable to radicalization, including alienation, anti-social attitudes, cultural disillusionment, social isolation, and violent tendencies" (Cilluffo et al., 2007, p. 114). This generalization is not unfounded: ideologies fostered within the American penal system have been directly implicated in a 1997 race-based torture/murder in Texas (Hamm, 2013, pp. 68–69), the failed 2001 shoe bombing (Wilner, 2010, p. 11), the 2009 Christmas Day "underwear" bombing in Detroit (Hamm, 2013, p. ix), and a thwarted terror attack planned in California's New Folsom Prison (Jones, 2014, p. 77; Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 581). These incidents represent an infinitesimally small percentage of American inmates, and can be safely dismissed as outliers (Jones, 2014, p. 77).[3] However, this has not stopped many authors from extrapolating these examples into a reference frame which labels all prisons as dangers to public safety (Cilluffo et al., 2007, pp. 114, 115; Cuthbertson, 2004; Jones, 2014, p. 75; Reinares, 2010; Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 562; Wilner, 2010, p. 20).

[3] This lack of proven connections between prisons and terrorism has recently become a differentiating feature between American and European penal systems, as France has seen a major spike in terrorist incidents committed by former inmates (Bisserbe, 2016) while Britain has recently created "prisons within prisons" for convicted radicals (BBC, 2016; McCann, 2016).

Canadian scholars have also framed prisons here as a risk for radicalization. Wilner (2010) has suggested Canadian prisons are directly radicalizing inmates (p. 8), and Correctional Services of Canada[4] has dedicated significant resources toward investigating this issue in the Federal system (Axford, Stys, & McEachran, 2015; Michel & Stys, 2014; Stys et al., 2014; Stys & Michel, 2014). Again, these articles do not appear to be based on evidence. For instance, Wilner opens his piece by stating "Canada has a problem with home-grown radicalism" (2010, p. 4), but spends the vast majority of his time discussing foreign radicalization cases as ". . . the figure of 14 Canadians sentenced to prison terms for the facilitation, sponsorship, and/or organization of terrorism is very small" (Wilner, 2010, p. 9). This is a common problem in the academic literature (Jones, 2014, p. 75), as radicalization studies—irrespective of national context—either rely on generalizations about prison's incubating role for extreme ideologies, or extrapolate poorly-understood links between radicalization and prison gangs. Few studies actually speak to inmates (Cilluffo et al., 2007, p. 114; Decker & Pyrooz, 2015, p. 104; Hamm, 2009, p. 674; Neuman, 2010, p. 7). As a result, academic literature does little to establish whether prison radicalization is or is not a threat, as "The radicalization of prisoners is one of the most discussed yet least studied aspects of the domestic terrorism threat" (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 562). Therefore, the few researchers who have entered prisons and interviewed prisoners are important to assess whether alarmist views of prison radicalization are justified (Jones, 2014, p. 75), or whether the threat of prison radicalization is drastically overrated.

[4] In Canada, length of sentence determines federal or provincial placement. Sentences over two years go to a Federal penitentiary; two years less a day go to the province. However, my training officer provided me with a different interpretation, suggesting "The difference between federal and provincial corrections is ten thousand bucks a year."

Literature Review: Prior Studies

Before reviewing the literature on prison radicalization, I must provide a short caveat. Radicalization is *not* solely an Islamic problem, despite media framings which portray a different story (Lindekilde, 2012, pp. 122–123). To emphasize this, I have deliberately chosen to use a continuum model of radicalization, as it allows me to study a wide range of ideologically violent groups, including white supremacists, so-called Sovereign Citizens, and traditional terror organizations like the IRA, LTTE, FLQ, Al-Qaeda, or ISIL. Yet, the vast majority of scholarship on radicalization and terrorism has focused on proving or disproving a link between Islam and radicalization, or at best takes a narrow view of radicalization as a "Muslim" thing (Jackson, 2007, p. 395). The massive increase in radicalization studies which followed 9/11 clearly demonstrates this (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480). This limits my efforts to widely frame radicalization, as the research I cite focuses almost exclusively on radical Islam.

Prison is a difficult place to conduct research (Crawley, 2004, p. 41). Fortunately, several scholars have conducted empirical assessments of prison radicalization in Europe and North America. Hamm (2009, 2013) focused on how Islamic conversion functioned in California's New and Old Folsom prisons. His findings contradict alarmist interpretations about Islam in prison—in fact, he spends considerable time discussing genuine Islamic religious conversion as ". . . a countervailing weight against Islamic extremism" (Hamm, 2009, p. 678). Although Islam provides measurable pro-social benefits in jail, Hamm suggests new evolutions within the prison gang landscape means adherence to radical, violent interpretations of religion are growing (2009, pp. 671-672; 682)—and he does not dismiss this risk:

> For Muslims, this often involves an alternative religious vision expressed in pious forms of 'Prison Islam,' which encompasses gang values and fierce intra-gang loyalties based

> on idiosyncratic interpretations of the Qur'an. For white supremacists, the vision is conveyed in the neo-paganism of Nazi dystopia (Hamm, 2013, p. 37).

Hamm also found the "legitimacy" and permissiveness of the prison setting plays a key role in determining whether prison Islam carried beneficial or radicalizing effects (2009, p. 682). His decision to associate "prison Islam" and white supremacist neo-paganism with prison gangs instead of traditional religion fundamentally alters the focus of prison radicalization. Instead of studying Islam, he suggests the main focus should be on charismatic leadership and group violence (Hamm, 2013, p. 128; Hamm, 2009, p. 682; see also Decker and Pyrooz, 2015, p. 104).

Liebling, Arnold and Straub's (2011; 2012) study of Whitemoor Penitentiary in the UK supports Hamm's dismissal of alarmism about Islamic prison extremism. However, they too add a caveat, as they found "Monotheistic religions based on blind obedience . . . were prone to misuse or misinterpretation and were attractive in the prison setting" (Liebling & Straub, 2012, p. 22). Several of their participants suggested Islam "filled a void" in the lives of vulnerable individuals (Liebling & Straub, 2012, p. 21). However, these individuals relied on practiced Muslims—often, convicted terrorists—for spiritual guidance. As a result, confirmed terrorists and radicals came to occupy powerful positions within the inmate hierarchy (Liebling & Straub, 2012, pp. 22, 17). Liebling and Straub's findings suggested this played a role in defining the atmosphere within the prison, and was a key reason for creating tension between inmates and prison staff (Liebling & Straub, 2012, pp. 17, 18).

Khosrokhavar's (2013) study adopted a micro-analytical framework examining how radicalization functions in prison (p. 305). Like Hamm, Khosrokhavar took a wide view of radicalization, and included Basque, Corsican, and Neo-Nazi radicals in his sample, in addition to Islamist extremists (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 286). Like the previous two studies,

Khosrokhavar identified legitimate religious practice—in this case, Salafism[5]—as a highly effective counterweight to radicalization in prison, going so far as to characterize radicals as "dropouts" from the Salafi movement (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 303). This is a curious finding, as Hamm—among others—points to Salafism, and Salafi Jihadism in particular, as a potential incubator of terrorism (Hamm, 2013, p. 130). Despite this disagreement, Khrosokhavar supports the previous two studies in rejecting alarmism when considering Western prisons as major sources of violent extremism. However, he also acknowledges radicalization is a concern in the French context (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 305). This warning has unfortunately been supported in numerous recent terrorist events across France and Belgium—most notably in the Paris and Brussels attacks (Burke, 2016; Chrisafis, 2015; Faucon et al., 2015).

Useem and Clayton's (2009) study is the final important work on prison radicalization. The authors interviewed over 200 inmates in eleven American prison systems, as well as officers and other prison staff (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 570). Their study involved large-scale triangulation between prison systems, as well as case studies of how individual states have responded to radicalization. Useem and Clayton also refute alarmist messaging around prison radicalization; in fact, they discovered large-scale "inmate solidarity *against* jihadist radicalization" (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 587; emphasis in original). However, they caution against trusting this on its own, and suggest "the offending population itself is worrisome, whatever setting they inhabit", due to violence and mental health issues (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 586). In short, they believe the currently low levels of inmate radicalization ". . . may provide some comfort, but should not lead to complacency" (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 587).

[5] Salafism is a conservative, fundamentalist Islamic sect. Al-Qaeda and ISIS adhere to a radical fringe of this movement, often referred to as Jihadi Salafism. They are not representative of Salafism as a whole.

Justification for my Study

The largest and most authoritative research projects have rejected prison radicalization as an urgent security concern in a number of unique contexts (Hamm, 2009, 2013; Khosrokhavar, 2013; Liebling, Arnold, et al., 2011; Liebling & Straub, 2012). However, this does not tell the whole story. Radicalization into violent extremism has been framed as a major societal risk within our western context (Mythen & Wakelate, 2006, p. 379); in other words, most people believe radicalization is a serious threat regardless of its statistical probability. Similarly, Canadians believe crime rates are a serious concern in this country—due almost entirely to extensive media coverage on the subject, as crime has dropped massively over the last 20 years (Allen, 2016).[6] This has deeply influenced societal perceptions of risk and security, and has changed how individuals govern their own exposure to perceived risks (Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 154). Most importantly, it has pressed citizens to internalize perceived risks; in other words, individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for detecting and reporting crimes which they observe (Ericson & Haggerty, 2002, p. 262).

The internalization of risk is uniquely applicable to radicalization. As Simon points out, people treat nearby 'suspicious' others—especially visible minorities and immigrants (Simon, 2008, pp. 90–91)—as potential terrorists, as a way of coping with risk. As a result, Middle Eastern and Muslim people are widely stereotyped. This is equally applicable to correctional officers—in fact, the internalization of risk is a potent force within the prison, as correctional officers work with 'suspicious' visible minorities on a daily basis. Therefore, as I will demonstrate in my analysis, many officers perceive high levels of radicalization irrespective of whether or not they have concrete evidence to demonstrate that ideological radicalization is

[6] 2016 saw a tiny increase in the reported Canadian crime statistics. This is the first increase since 1992 (Allen, 2016)

actually occurring. Furthermore, my data suggest correctional officers use these perceptions to shape their actions toward inmates. In prison, then, larger societal portrayals of radicalization shape correctional officers' perceptions. These external influences shape officer beliefs, as well as how they treat inmates within the prison—and these actions influence perceptions of legitimacy within the prison, with uncertain results. In short, studying officer perceptions of radicalization allows a brief glimpse into an important force at play within prison.

Chapter II: Methodology

During exploratory research conducted in Fall 2015, I approached the question of prison radicalization through the lens of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This framework allows themes and inferences to emerge from the data as it is collected and analyzed, yet allows for flexibility, which is vital to ensure the findings are "grounded" in the data (Charmaz, 2001, p. 676; Creswell, 2013, p. 83; Gibbs, 2007, p. 87). One of the core assumptions of this framework is a lack of theoretical expectations about the topic, allowing the researcher to avoid canonical interpretations and develop new theory (Charmaz, 1990, p. 1162; 2001, p. 681). As I composed my thesis proposal, I realized I could not conduct a true Grounded Theory project: my class readings had influenced my perspectives on radicalization and gangs, and my experience within the prison setting gave me a strong set of expectations about what I would find. Both of these things placed me out of line with an objectivist Grounded Theory framework (Charmaz, 2001, p. 683; Oktay, 2012, p. 116). Although my research is still informed by aspects of Grounded Theory, I classify my project as participant-driven thematic analysis (Oktay, 2012, p. 129). I also drew on several Ethnographic methods in my research, as I spent considerable time in "direct and sustained contact with [participants], within the context of their daily lives" (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 10; see also Geertz, 1998). Maintaining a flexible methodological stance proved to be an important decision for my work, as it allowed me to fully exploit my insider perspective (O'Reilly, 2009, pp. 9, 10, 132).

In the spirit of Lombardo's (1989), Kauffman's (1988) and Crawley's (2004) research with prison officers, I let my participants speak for themselves. I have marked all pauses or deleted sections with ellipses, and in the rare case where a word was necessary for context, I have added it and marked it with square brackets ([]). These decisions are intentional ones on my

part, as I want my participants' experiences to be the primary driving force behind this research (Kauffman, 1988, p. 5). As my participants often speak in argot or slang, I have defined unusual terms in footnotes. These are complied in Appendix 2**;** I have also included a list of my participants' pseudonyms, along with a brief (albeit vague) description of them in Appendix 1. In order to respect confidentiality and anonymity, all names which I use are randomly-selected pseudonyms, and have no relation to the individuals in question. I have also avoided associating specific pseudonyms with specific prisons or ranks within the prison, when possible.

Outline of Methods

Early in this project, I settled on using semi-structured interviews as my main data-gathering strategy. Later, I added some participant observation to complement my interviews inside the Edmonton Remand Centre (ERC) and the Fort Saskatchewan Correctional Centre (FSCC). I chose interviewing as my primary method for several reasons. First, interviews represent the most straightforward method of gathering deep outlooks and perspectives from research participants (Kvale, 2007, p. 55); as my research questions explicitly centre on perceptions, interviews represented the most logical methodology. Second, existing research has shown semi-structured interviews to be a highly effective method of conducting research within prisons, across a number of national contexts (Ievins & Crewe, 2015; Liebling, Arnold, & Straub, 2011), and with both inmates and officers (Crawley, 2004; Liebling, 2000; Marquart, 1986, among others). These projects included several which directly investigated radicalization and gang membership within prison (Decker, Bynum, & Weisel, 1998, p. 399; Hamm, 2013; Hamm, 2009; Khosrokhavar, 2013; Useem & Clayton, 2009). Most of these studies included elements of ethnography or participant observation in addition to interviewing, which was a key reason for my introduction of a secondary data collection strategy (Crawley, 2004, p. 62;

Liebling, Price, et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2002). Finally, I received training in semi-structured interviewing during a qualitative methods class in 2015, meaning I had some expertise in using this method when I began my research.

I conducted 33 interviews for this thesis. Some of the interviews varied dramatically in length, due to the situational constraints I faced during my research—which I will fully discus in my section on sampling. The shortest interview was a 2 ½ minute conversation, where one officer told me a single dramatic story about a radical inmate, then asked me to turn the recorder off; the longest was a rambling, three-hour conversation which outlined numerous complaints about how 'management' was letting 'the radicals' take over the ERC. The rest of my interviews fell in between, with an average length of approximately 50 minutes. I patterned my interviews with prompts drawn from a generalized interview guide[7] (Charmaz, 2001, p. 679; Kvale, 2007, p. 56); also see Appendix 3), and—with the consent of my participants—used a digital recorder to collect my data.[8] My prompts were primarily drawn from the literature on prison radicalization, although I followed Kauffman's (1981, 1988) example and also used my experience as a correctional officer to shape questions (p. 276; see also Charmaz, 2001, p. 679).

I soon discovered the importance of holding a participant-driven focus, as I quickly discovered flaws in my initial assumptions. When I asked officers the carefully-worded questions in my prompt guide, I received single-word or single-sentence replies which did nothing to improve my understanding of radicalization. However, I noticed my participants were

[7]I have included three 'short' interviews within my sample, measuring 2.5, 9, and 18 minutes respectively. I conducted these interviews at unit control panels within the prisons. The remainder of my interviews are well over 20 minutes in length. I was able to apply limited portions of my prompt guides in these short conversations.
[8]Although each interview varied somewhat, I received verbal consent to record the conversation from each of my participants. I also explained the procedure for withdrawing from the project, explained that the transcript would also be accessible by the Principle Investigator, and left them with a business card with my personal contact information, to be called if they had any questions or concerns. My ethics approval number for this design, granted by the University of Alberta's Research Ethics Office on April 1, 2016, was Pro00062785.

far more willing to talk about issues which—as a former CO—I recognized as common topics of discussion and complaint within the officer subculture (Kauffman, 1981, p. 272). For instance, I collected data on officer corruption, violence, and concerns about management—topics I had not included in my interview guide. After careful consideration and discussion with my supervisor, I realized I would gather richer data if I moved away from a strict reliance on my interview guide, and allowed my respondents' perspectives to play a greater role in leading the conversation. When I did so, these topics rose to the top, as did concerns about drug use and drug entry within the prison. Furthermore, when I questioned my respondents about these topics, I was able to gather a far deeper and broader perspective on prisons generally, which reflected on radicalization and gangs in a way my interview guide could never have encapsulated. As a result, after five interviews, I changed my interview guide to match my findings, rather than attempting to fit my data to the guide (Charmaz, 2001, p. 682) **(**See Appendix 3).

My final methodology varied from the initial proposal in several ways. First, I proposed a sample size of 15-25 semi-structured interviews with correctional officers from the FSCC, the ERC, and the Calgary Remand Centre (CRC). I did not access the CRC, meaning all my participants came from the two Edmonton-area prisons.[9] Despite this, my access was far more productive than I had dared hope. As a result, my final sample size expanded from 25 to 33 interviews, plus one unrecorded transcript. In addition, several of my interviews had more than one officer present during the conversation. Therefore, my sample of 33 interviews represents 43 unique individual perspectives.

I conducted 25 of my interviews at the ERC, and drew the remainder of my sample from the FSCC. I deliberately implemented this imbalance to ensure heterogeneity within my sample

[9] I worked at the FSCC for five years.

(Maxwell, 2013, p. 98). I also used this as a tool to protect validity. Although measures of reliability and validity are difficult to define in qualitative literature, I intentionally designed safeguards to defend the credibility of my research (Maxwell, 2013, p. 122). First, I ensured the majority of my sample were people I had never worked with (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, p. 143). I interviewed a number of former coworkers at the ERC; therefore, I had to expand my sample to accomplish this goal. In the end, I interviewed 15 people I knew—far less than half of my overall total. Second, expanding my sample also helped me address questions about variability between transcripts. As I will discuss, the physical constraints of conducting interviews in a prison meant some interviews suffered in terms of quality. This was especially true for the interviews which I conducted inside the ERC. Including eight additional transcripts allowed for a greater range of perspectives to be represented, thereby reducing variation as well as defending the credibility of my findings (Maxwell, 2013, p. 122).

In addition to my personal interviews, I used three additional data sources. First, I conducted a series of interviews in late 2015 as exploratory research, under a separate Research Ethics approval. One of my interviews was uniquely relevant; therefore, I re-contacted my participant, who gave me permission to use the transcript in my thesis. Second, I included three interviews which Dr. Kevin Haggerty conducted with ERC staff. As much of my research was conducted with a team of colleagues, I was able to take advantage of different perspectives to view my research questions through a series of unique lenses (for exchanges in insider-outsider research, see Bartunek & Louis, 1996, pp. 7–8). The three interviews Dr. Haggerty conducted allowed me to represent a few of these differences within my sample.

The final source came from my positionality within the prison. My insider status allowed me to conduct detailed participant observation inside both jails—something common in prison

research (Crawley, 2004; Ibsen, 2013; Liebling, Arnold, et al., 2011; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011; Marquart, 1986; Phillips, 2008). I used this to partially compensate for the loss of the CRC in my sample. We conducted two weeks of research at the Calgary Correctional Centre (CCC) in April 2017, and I have included some of the detailed observations which I made there to flesh out the notes I made at the other two jails. Although none of my experience was deep enough to be categorized as true ethnography, 'deep hanging out' (Geertz, 1998; O'Reilly, 2009, pp. 9–10, 227, 245) and daily interactions with the routines of the prison world provided a number of data-rich observations which would have otherwise been unavailable (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 178). This included a large number of interviews and conversation snippets which were unrecorded. I took detailed fieldnotes during these conversations[10]—including verbal notes on my recorder—and recreated the conversations after leaving the prison. I have specifically identified these as field notes within the manuscript. I also observed many inmate/officer interactions—most ordinary, some shocking. I watched the Tactical Team use pepper spray, riot shields, and batons to extract an inmate from his cell on Max Pod (the ERC's segregation unit)—and was also able to see his practiced efforts to counter them, via a TV monitor which showed a live camera feed from inside his cell. I observed officers serving meals and solving problems, sat in on an inmate disciplinary hearing, and at one point found myself operating the main entry doors to the FSCC while interviewing an officer at his station (see Insider/Outsider for a reconstruction). These observations, which measure approximately 30 hours, were an invaluable triangulation to my interviews, especially within the ERC (Fielding & Fielding, 1986; Maxwell, 2013, pp. 102, 128).

[10] I was not able to ask for permission in most of these cases. These situations were usually informal conversations which led to an interesting piece of information. However, several times I had permission refused. This did not typically end the conversation, or indicate reluctance to participate; in the (unrecorded) words of one colleague, "I'm not going on tape for you Schultzie. Just ad-lib it."

Research Questions

I shaped my thesis proposal around three major research questions:

1. Do correctional officers observe what they perceive as radicalization among their inmate populations?
2. Do these individuals alter prison dynamics?
3. How do correctional officers manage individuals who they perceive to be radicalized, and is this different from other inmates?

As I conducted my interviews, I realized these questions were inappropriate for my research setting. My field-notes reflected this at the time:

She—and this is something to watch for—doesn't have any clue about radicalization. She doesn't even know what it means, tying it in with gang stuff. . . is this an indication that there is no perspectives on radicalization . . . ? (Field note, July 2016)

I composed this note after interviewing Jennifer—a conversation where I gathered data on everything except prison radicalization. Outside of individual, limited situations—which were often described in terms which reflected Cohen's folk devils and moral panics (Garland, 2008, p. 10)—my participants had seen almost no-one who fit the stereotypical definition of a 'radicalized' inmate. Therefore, I could not answer my original questions. Instead, when my participants discussed 'radical' inmates, they focused on risk perceptions; in other words, they outlined the comparative risk which they felt a 'radical' inmate would pose in the prison setting compared to a 'normal' inmate. This emphasis on risk was a key theme in my data, and fundamentally altered the direction of my research. Therefore, I changed the focus of my research questions slightly:

1. Do correctional officers observe what they perceive as radicalization among their inmate populations?
2. How do correctional officers perceive and govern the risks associated with 'radical' inmates?
3. What influence does an insider/outsider role play in shaping prison research?

These research questions shape the remainder of my thesis.

Sampling

My sampling design was simplistic, but my recruitment experience uncovered a number of intriguing methodological points. Initially, my proposal focused on recruiting participants via non-probability, theoretical sampling—i.e., "snowball" sampling (Maxwell, 2013, p. 97; Warren, 2001, p. 87). Roughly, this method involves approaching a known member of a group, recruiting him/her, and then asking for references to other members of the group (Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 2001, p. 96). Although this method has been critiqued for its dependence on relationships (Gilchrist & Williams, 1999, pp. 77, 84), its utility for accessing suspicious, hard-to-reach populations has not been surpassed (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, p. 141; Maxwell, 2013, p. 97; Wright et al., 2001, p. 96). Variations have been used in other prison studies and ethnographic work with criminalized or quasi-criminal groups (Bourgois, 2003; Bucerius, 2013; Jefferson, 2015, p. 172; Wright et al., 2001), and it has proven useful for examining tightly-controlled subcultural groups—a highly relevant issue for researchers investigating police and correctional officers (Chan, 1996, p. 110; Crawley, 2004, p. 32; Loftus, 2010, p. 1; Miller & Selva, 2001; Waddington, 1999, p. 287). I used my access points within the ERC and the FSCC to gain my first seven interviews, and these people introduced me to several other officers who I successfully recruited (Sloan & Wright, 2015, p. 140; Wright et al., 2001, p. 96). However, when I entered Edmonton Remand Centre in September 2016, I dramatically expanded my recruitment pool. This allowed me to recruit a wide range of participants whom I had not met (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, p. 143; Gilchrist & Williams, 1999, pp. 84–85; Maxwell, 2013, p. 98).

Entering the ERC was a defining moment for my research. First, it helped create an academic support team. In late 2015, my supervisor—Dr. Sandra Bucerius—and I discussed how we could research prison radicalization in Alberta. She submitted a research proposal, which

Alberta Justice and Solicitor General approved. This evolved into the Alberta Prisons Project, headed by Drs. Bucerius and Kevin Haggerty, which included eight different researchers and research assistants; my thesis was a subset of the larger project. We entered the ERC as a team, rather than as individuals. This provided a strong base for emotional and intellectual support throughout my interview and writing processes.

Entering the ERC also allowed me to move away from a pure focus on chain referral. I was able to address the pre-shift Muster briefings,[11] and gave several presentations there inviting participants to sign up. This attracted limited support and some hostility from the general officer population. Following one presentation, an officer cornered our research team in the lunch room and loudly harangued our group about how we were 'left-wing extremists' due to our university positions, while a second presentation received a lone signup and a round of what I felt to be sarcastic applause. I also had one conversation with a CPO III[12] who roundly condemned me for using the words "right-wing extremists," which he—and others—viewed as an overarching criticism of conservative values. If nothing else, this provided emphatic support for characterizations of correctional officers as highly conservative and cynical toward outsiders (Crawley, 2004, p. 33; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 38). I only collected 15 voluntary sign-ups from Musters, despite having done three presentations to over 300 officers. Furthermore, almost half the people who signed up ended up changing their minds, meaning our Muster presentations only netted 5-6 interviews. In addition to being ineffective, this introduced an element of self-selection bias into my sample. In the end, these presentations primarily served to introduce our

[11] A short meeting for all staff on shift. Managers discuss any critical incidents in the prison since the shift was last on duty, pass along messages or directions for the officer population, and assign roles for the day. Muster also acts as an informal social gathering for the officers, where gossip and personal news is exchanged.

[12] A supervisor within the prison, roughly analogous to a police sergeant. CPO III's—or "Threes", or "Three-bars"—manage emergencies, determine inmate discipline, and assist regular staff. They are the first line of decision-makers within the prison, and the primary conduit for communication between management and front-line staff.

research team to the general officer population. Although we did one Muster presentation at the FSCC, we effectively abandoned it as a recruiting tool after leaving the ERC.

Given our difficulty in securing volunteers, I devised several alternative strategies to reach participants. For instance, I found we, as a group, faced suspicion from COs; yet, I was often able to start conversations with individual officers when I was on my own. These officers usually agreed when I asked to turn on the recorder, even though we were often in public settings. This proved to be highly effective in securing voluntary participation, and dramatically increased my sample size. However, this also meant I sacrificed some elements of the traditional semi-structured interview due to situational constraints. For instance, I conducted many of my interviews in the ERC at work posts—in fact, 19 of my 25 interviews from the ERC took place within the prison, and 15 of these took place while the officers were on active duty on or near an inmate living unit. Over half took place at the officer panel, a place which normally has two, and up to four officers stationed in plain view and hearing distance of the inmates. I conducted four interviews in non-unit locations, like offices or the cafeteria, and began two others on the unit, but completed them in restaurants or coffee shops at a later date. The structural design of the prison assisted this process: there was room and time to talk to officers while they were on duty at the unit panel, and even more so if they were working in Pod Control (a centralized command centre, controlling access to individual units) or an office. Fort Saskatchewan, with a different physical design, did not lend itself so readily to on-the-job interviewing; as a result, I conducted all my interviews from the FSCC at a restaurant or coffee shop, within a private office, or—in one case—at a participant's home.

While I had success in interviewing people at their job posts, this approach also had shortcomings. I found my participants would truncate the interview, or noticeably change their

tone when an inmate or other officers came near. This impacted the quality of my data. Yet, despite repeated personal requests (which strayed dangerously close to nagging) and dozens of business cards, I was unable to successfully establish contact with more than a handful of officers outside of working hours. Only two officers accepted my invitation to continue earlier conversations outside the prison, and in one case (quoted below), it took nearly a month of careful maneuvering on my part to successfully arrange the meeting. This reluctance to talk in a non-work setting appeared to be based on a combination of suspicion about my motives (Crawley, 2004, p. 33) and confusion about what 'being interviewed' really meant. Sitting down with officers on the unit broke down these barriers: they were in 'their' environment, controlled the power dynamics at play in the surroundings (Elwood & Martin, 2000, p. 651), and had little else to do but talk. Furthermore, when they discovered my questions often focused on 'normal,' day-to-day activities as a CO, I was quickly able to develop rapport and collect data. Yet, this did not fully address the issues at play. Matt, one of the smartest officers I met, described it well:

That was my first—honestly, that was my first thought when I came. . . when you asked me to get involved with the study, my first thought was, there's almost no benefit from an officer's standpoint for getting involved with any type of study or . . . there's no benefit in getting involved in a study or a media article, or any kinda thing where it's going to get published. Because even if it sheds good light, it's going to be read, and it's like—alright, cool, passed on, right? From an inmate's standpoint, there's everything to gain and nothing to lose from getting involved in this kinda thing. Alright—we can spin any story we want, and the worse it looks on anything, there's a possibility it could make things better for inmates and criminals, right?

I was not able to break this preconception during my time at the ERC. In fact, our team repeatedly commented on the ease of recruiting inmates, compared to recruiting officers. Yet, I was able to use the situational constraints within the prison to my advantage for recruitment.

The constraints of 'panel'[13] interviews were not uniformly negative. Several locations on the units were relatively private; using these areas strategically allowed me to collect deep interviews. Pod Control[14] was a particularly useful location, as the officers working there were usually experienced, lonely, and bored. Additionally, having inmates and officers 'walk in' on a conversation provided some unusual and valuable information, as the late-comers often became interested in the topic of conversation and added their own perspectives. Two interviews I conducted on the Max Pod[15] yielded a spectacularly diverse range of views (Kvale, 2007, p. 72). These interviews—one with five officers, one with seven—were closer to focus groups than semi-structured interviews. My inexperience as a group moderator meant these 'group' interviews did not necessarily have the depth of 'individual' interviews; yet, they provided me with dramatic insight into morally-questionable and illegal practices within the prison. The officers in these groups demonstrated widespread acceptance for these practices, even though they were on their 'best behaviour' when talking to me (Chan, 1996, p. 109). Ironically, the group setting facilitated these revelations. Kvale (2007) points out "In the case of sensitive taboo topics, the group interaction may facilitate expression of viewpoints usually not accessible" (p. 72), and the presence of multiple officers encouraged some fascinating revelations.

Issues Surrounding Informed Consent

I received Research Ethics Board approval for my project in April 2016. Of course, informed consent is a key part of ethical research (CIHR, NSERC & SSHRC, 2014, pp. 7, 28). I created a consent form for my ethics application (see Appendix 4)—but unlike many research

[13] Officer control station on the unit
[14] A central control point for the pod—picture the central area in Bentham's Panopticon, only updated for the 21st century. The assigned officer controls access to the individual units and the pod generally. No inmates are able to access the pod control space, and other officers rarely visit.
[15] Segregation unit at the ERC

designs, I did not ask my participants to sign it. My work history informed this decision: I experienced the notorious cynicism and collective silence of the CO subculture during my time as an officer (Crawley, 2004, pp. 29, 33), and expected a cool welcome from officers, especially at the ERC. My FSCC participants agreed with me on this:

Ricky: That's another thing—Remand's environment versus the Fort? You're going to have a hard time in Remand.
Will: Talking to CO's, you mean? Or talking to anybody?
Ricky: CO's, or talking to anybody.

I proved officer Ricky incorrect, but most officers at both prisons shared his views. Warren (2001) points out participants do not necessarily view a signed consent form as protecting anonymity, and also suggests consent forms can limit participation (p. 89). Given my experience with the CO subculture, I decided a signed consent form would present a barrier to recruiting officers. As a compromise, I gained verbal, informed consent from each of my participants: I explained why we were conducting interviews, outlined how I would use the information, and guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. I also gave my participants personalized business cards, and told them how to remove their data from the sample should they change their mind about participation. Other research studies have used and defended similar methodologies when researching hard-to-reach populations, as long as participants are capable of understanding the material (CIHR et al., 2014; Joosse, Bucerius, & Thompson, 2015; Warren, 2001, p. 89).

A secondary issue I addressed was the intimate connection between my research and Dr. Bucerius and Dr. Haggerty's Alberta Prisons Project. While the rest of the research team primarily collected data from inmates, I focused on collecting CO interviews. These were part of my thesis of course, but also represented my contribution to the larger study. Therefore, my consent form had Drs. Bucerius and Haggerty's names alongside my own,[16] a design which the

[16] See Appendix 4

University of Alberta Research Ethics Board approved. I explained the shared nature of my data to my participants, and made sure they knew my supervisor(s) would have access to the final, anonymized, transcripts. Although several people refused permission when I asked whether I could turn on my recorder, none withdrew permission subsequent to the interview.

Data Coding

Once I finished the data collection, I transcribed each interview verbatim using Microsoft Word and NCH Software's ExpressScribe program. I stored the interviews and transcripts on a Google Drive folder, which Dr. Bucerius owned. The only people who could access this data were research team members, who had signed a binding confidentiality agreement.

I conducted the data analysis using the Nvivo software suite, using a coding scheme developed in partnership with Ashley Kyle—another member of the research team—to ensure inter-rater reliability.[17] The codes were developed from themes emerging from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Each coder analyzed five transcripts line-by-line. Upon completion, we edited the coding scheme to reflect the data and the differences between the coders. We continued testing and redefinition on three more transcripts, until our coder overlap reached approximately 95%. Drs. Bucerius and Haggerty approved the finalized scheme, after which Ms. Kyle and I coded the data.

The finalized coding scheme consisted of 26 individual codes, ranging from Violence to Gangs to Drugs to Officer Culture. Most codes also contained a series of focused sub-codes, intended to provide a greater level of detail. Two codes were particularly relevant to my thesis:

- **Radicalization**
  - Description/discussion of any "radical" groups/individuals/ideologies/religions, INCLUDING the application of "Radical" to any group/individual—consider whether should be dual-*coded* with **Gangs** and/or **Religion**

[17] The full code scheme, including codebook and instructions to coders, is available upon request.

- Include any mention of TERRORISM, EXTREMISM—i.e., mention of ISIS
  - **Recruitment**
  - **Leaders**
  - **Institutional management of radicals**
    - Institutional/management/officer decisions related to 'controlling' radicals
    - Consider whether to dual-code with **Unit Management**
  - **Religious**
    - Mentions of religiously-motivated radicalization or terrorism. NOT EXCLUSIVE TO ISLAM
    - Any mention of ISIS/ISIL
  - **Non-religious**
    - Examples include Freemen on the Land and White Supremacy
    - consider whether White Supremacy should be double-coded with **Gang**
  - **Mental Health**
    - Dual-code with **Mental Health**
  - **Race/ethnicity**
- NOTE: Do not let perception of personal racism influence coding. Discussions of Muslims are unlikely to be positive (REMEMBER: This is PARTICIPANT-focused coding). If unsure, DO NOT hesitate to place discussions of Religion underneath Radicalization

- **<u>Insider/outsider</u>**
  - Any discussion of Will's identity as a former Correctional Officer/comparisons between Will and other members of research team by RESPONDENTS

I drew the vast majority of my data from the code on radicalization. I also used some information on officer culture and perspectives of officer vulnerability for the next two chapters.

Chapter III: Insider-Outsider Positionality within the Prison

Researcher positionality plays a role in most research studies. However, my status within the prisons—and the project as a whole—proved to be unique enough that Patricia and Peter Adler's (1987) maxim is applicable: "We have become consciously aware that in order to appreciate the value or evaluate the perspective of each other's work we must know where they stood in the picture and the impact it had on them as well as they on it" (p. 86). In many ways, my relationship with Alberta Corrections and the officers and inmates who lived and worked there came to dominate my experience and portions of my team's experience within the prisons. This was largely positive, and allowed us access to areas and information which appear to be unique; yet, as with any research conducted with insiders (McGinn, 2008; O'Reilly, 2009, p. 106), my closeness and involvement with the prison subculture proved a double-edged sword.

I began working as a Correctional Peace Officer I in spring 2010, six months after my twentieth birthday. I needed a summer job to pay for my undergraduate degree, and my father 'knew a guy' in our rural community who proved to be the hiring director at the FSCC. Dad made the initial phone call, and the director and I had what proved to be a fruitful discussion: I got a summer job which lasted for three years and paid for my undergraduate degree, and he obtained a motivated employee who was available to cover off vacations for salaried workers during summer and Christmas 'prime times'. Indeed, the arrangement was successful enough I continued as a full-time Correctional Peace Officer following my university graduation in 2013. However, although the job was beneficial on a wide range of levels, it was not one which I enjoyed. The constant stress of working in an atmosphere of hostility, tension, and violence impacted my psychological health and life outside of the walls, and I found myself retreating from friends and family; in one cringe-worthy episode, my role-performance (Goffman, 1959)

slipped, and I went 'full CO' on an angry soccer mom while referring a youth tournament—in brief, I yelled at her and treated her like I treated angry and recalcitrant inmates on my unit at work. My conduct in this incident was far beyond the boundaries of social propriety, and the violence of my angry response surprised and humiliated me almost as much as it offended the spectators. Although embarrassing, this incident allowed me to examine the personal impact of my job in stark detail, and I began looking for an exit. Following the failure of several other job applications, I applied to university in early 2015; grad school represented my best chance to get out of the jail, and I seized it. When I walked out of the prison for the last time, I told my family, friends and coworkers I was trading a steady paycheck for my mental health.

Literature Review: Field Roles in Sociological Research

Researchers have discussed field roles in reference to sociological research since the work of the Chicago School in the early 20th century (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 14). In the first work on explicitly codified research roles, Gold (1958) and Junker (1960) categorized field-workers as complete observers, observer-as-participants, participant-as-observers, or complete participants (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 13). As Bucerius put it, "Underlying these roles is the degree of belonging a researcher achieves, which is influenced by his or her participation in group activities, commitment to group values and norms, and level of group affiliation" (2013, p. 691). The Chicago school's strongly-held adherence to a "*science* of sociology" (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 132, emphasis in original), an explicitly objectivist perspective which sought ". . . to exert no influence at all on their research subjects" (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 17), underpinned these neatly-organized research roles—and especially, which roles were appropriate and inappropriate for a researcher. Researcher objectivity was thought to defend reliability and validity (Maxwell, 2013, p. 122), and becoming too close to participants or a research site was criticized as 'going

native' (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 107). Beginning in the 1980's, a number of authors critiqued these ideas, notably Adler and Adler (1987) who pointed out the inherent contradiction of pursuing an objectivist viewpoint. In O'Reilly's words, ". . . complete physical and emotional distance is neither possible nor even desirable" in a research setting (2009, p. 107; see also Maxwell, 2013, p. 122). The Adlers instead redefined the spectrum of membership roles for the field researcher, ranging from peripheral group membership to complete group adherence. The most extreme of the roles they outlined was what they called the "Complete membership role", where the researcher was an accepted and respected member of the group or subculture being studied (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 67). In newer literature, this sort of positionality has been referred to as 'Insider/Outsider' research (Bartunek & Louis, 1996, p. 3; O'Reilly, 2009, p. 132).

As Bartunek and Louis (1996) put it, "People who are insiders to a setting being studied often have a view of the setting and any findings about it quite different from that of the outside researches who are conducting the study" (p. 1). Different does not always mean better: inside ethnographies have been criticized for lacking scholarly detachment, focusing on the "primitive within," and failing to provide the "culture shock" which forces researchers to think about the forces at work behind a cross-cultural context (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 134). There are important risks for inside researchers—notably, over-rapport, which can change fieldwork from research to little more than cultural celebration (Maxwell, 2013, p. 91; McGinn, 2008; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, in O'Reilly, 2009, p. 107). Danger also exists in conducting research in a place where exit is not easy, desirable, or even possible (Adler & Adler, 1987, pp. 63, 79; Bartunek & Louis, 1996, p. 3; O'Reilly, 2009, p. 135). Yet, critiques of insider positionality usually come from other researchers, as the groups being studied by insiders usually possess a distinctly jaded view of about research in their communities (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 137). As Contreras (2013) puts it,

> Most inner-city ethnographies have been done by upper-middle-class and elite- educated researchers. For them, fieldwork is often their first sustained contact both with poor people of color and with exciting and unfamiliar social phenomena— the streets, the sounds, the language, the black and brown bodies. They admit their race and class privileges and discuss how these might have influenced their observations. Then they provide wonderful ethnographic insight, mostly for upper- middle- class readers who are just like them but who would never travel to those exotic worlds. (p. 17)

As one of the "black and brown bodies" he describes, Contreras' description is equal parts sarcastic and poignant—yet his point is well-made: broadly criticizing "insider" research overlooks the voyeuristic and historically colonial influence which badly-executed ethnography can have on a research site (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 107). Furthermore, it ignores Adler & Adler's acknowledgement that "[researchers] are the research instrument," (1987, p. 87), something which demands a close and personal involvement with the research field.

Conducting research within "your" group is not a safe or easy method of going about the business of knowledge creation (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 86; O'Reilly, 2009, p. 135). As Bartunek and Louis (1996) put it, ". . . insiders typically see the setting under study as a source of greater and more enduring consequences" than outsiders do (pp. 2-3). Descriptions of how inside research threatens the main characters are easy to find. Contreras extensively outlines how he feared ostracism and exclusion when "the privileged world" discovered his intimacy with violent drug robbers (2013, pp. 18); Humphrey discusses how her ethnographic research of LGBTQ activist groups estranged her from her friends and pushed her into an identity crisis (2007, p. 20); Marquette describes full days spent trying to retain his objectivity and individuality in the face of the brutally violent prison guard subculture in which he worked

(Marquart, 1986, p. 24). These researchers won their existential struggles; others, notably Casteneda in his research with Native American shamans, did not, and were fundamentally changed (described in Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 83). My 'insider' experience was less dramatic. Yet, the subcultural norms of the prison deeply influenced me, and the experience of 'going home' to the jails had a powerful emotional impact. In the end, my identity and personal history played out in four distinct ways: my—and my team's—relationship with the correctional apparatus, my relationship with inmates, how I interacted with correctional officers, and how conducting 'team research' in a high-stakes environment pushed me into a reassessment of my self-identification. Each of these forces shaped the data which I was able to gather.

The Apparatus

My CO status carried a surprising level of influence on how our study interacted with the correctional apparatus as a whole, as did my personal relationships. I had met the government officials who directed the Justice and Solicitor General (Alberta Corrections) ministry during my career, and had directly worked for the Executive Directors of the ERC and Adult Corrections Operations Branch.[18] In fact, the ERC Executive Director was the neighbour who had first hired me in 2010. I also knew the Director[19] of Fort Saskatchewan, and the Director of Programs at the ERC. I took advantage of my relationships with these high-placed decision-makers during our request for access period, and made several phone calls to tell my contacts that I was part of the research study. There is no way to tell whether this had any effect. I believe our team's access was wholly due to factors outside my control and had nothing to do with my status, but some of my participants disagreed:

[18] Equal in status, as Remand housed almost as many inmates as all the other provincial prisons combined. Both positions reported directly to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Solicitor General.
[19] Head of prison. Referred to as 'warden' in Federal system and the inmate argot.

"Do your professors know how lucky they are to have you? The only reason they have this access is because of you. This kinda thing has never happened before. Never." (Field note, December 2016)

The truth of this statement is unclear, and I only present it as a way of demonstrating how my participants perceived my influence within the larger correctional apparatus.

I was able to distinguish the influence of my former status more clearly when Dr. Haggerty and I paid our first visit to the Edmonton Remand Centre. Our contact was a man I had worked for at the FSCC. After we had greeted him and several other former colleagues, he expressed surprise to see me, and asked when I had left the FSCC. This largely set the tone for our interaction with the managerial and administrative staff across the prison—for instance, at our Muster presentations, several different shift managers introduced me as a former CO who had worked at 'The Fort.'

My status primarily helped me build relationships, as I will show. However, my relationship with the apparatus was influential for gaining access to the highest-security area of the prison, Max Pod—four living units housing violent mental health inmates, gang members, inmates serving disciplinary sentences, and high-profile protective custody inmates, all on a 23-hour lockup schedule. In short, Max Pod was the most volatile and interesting research site in the ERC. The caseworker[20] assigned to be our guide in the ERC was a woman I have called Shelagh. I pestered her about access to Max Pod for a week; she quietly pushed back, taking us to less volatile units. I assumed this reluctance was due to the violent unpredictability of inmates on Max Pod, or potentially the damaging observations a researcher might make there; I had not considered the variation in how the institution viewed me compared to my research compatriots. This only became clear when Shelagh gave into my requests. She asked me to stay with her as

[20] An officer who is primarily responsible for case planning. Looks after 'rehabilitation' instead of security.

we delivered the other team members to their respective units; then, once the last person was behind a locked door and out of earshot, she told me we were going to the Max Pod. As we walked through the door, she spelled out the conditions: I was the only team member allowed onto the pod, and I was to strictly follow the orders of the officers and pod CPO III. I reflected on this several days later:

"Another thought on the insider/outsider dynamic: would we even have been given access to Max Pod if it hadn't been for me? I honestly don't know. Shelagh told me, the first day that I went on Max Pod, that I would be the only person from our group allowed onto Max. She didn't say why. But, it wasn't too hard to understand." (Field note, October 2016)

The 'reason'—which I skimmed over in this excerpt—was the standard correctional officer training I underwent in 2014. As a result, the apparatus knew what my capabilities were in a volatile situation, as they had designed my training. Ironically, several of my team members had conducted research projects in volatile, crime-filled settings (Bucerius, 2014; Urbanik, Thompson, & Bucerius, 2015). As a result, they had far more experience in collecting data in high-stress conditions than I did. Yet, my personal relationships, status as a former officer, and the known and calculable value of my Alberta Corrections-administered training proved to be a differentiating factor in allowing the correctional apparatus to judge me as an acceptable risk (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2006, p. 438; Lupton, 2006, p. 12). Given time, I believe the prison administration would have allowed my colleagues onto the Max Pod; however, I am not sure whether it would have been within the window of our three-week access period.

The Inmates

Inmates hold a peripheral status in my research: in essence, they are units of secondary analysis, as my focus is on officer perceptions. Yet, inmates define prisons, and ignoring them for even a moment can create fundamental misunderstandings about how the prison works. The inmate code of solidarity, leading to hostility between inmates and officers, has become a thing

of legend in academic writing (Liebling & Arnold, 2012, p. 414; Marquart, 1986, p. 25 for two examples); in the words of Sykes, ". . . the society of captives is so polarized that anything but unwavering contempt for the guards is defined by the inmates as a sign of abject weakness . . . [the center-man] has destroyed the unity of inmates as they face their rejectors" (1958, p. 90). Our research directly confronted this aspect of the code, as I knew inmates would recognize me as a correctional officer in both the ERC and the FSCC. Our team feared this would create an unbridgeable trust gap between us and the inmates; as Patenaude (2004) puts it, "anyone who has conducted correctional research during the past 20 years will note that inmates and staff possess the ability to either corrupt the research agenda and/or formally or informally terminate the research project" (p. 74). We spent considerable time considering ways to avoid the issue. Some people suggested keeping me away from the inmates, while others suggested excluding me from the prison entirely; we also carefully planned and discussed what we—as a team—would wear, in order to appear professional while distinguishing ourselves from off-duty CO's or undercover police officers. In the end, we decided to chance it. If an inmate confronted me, I would honestly discuss my status, but I would not advertise my job history.

We spent our first day at the ERC introducing ourselves to the inmates. Each unit had several prisoners who I recognized—an uncomfortable sensation, as I expected them to publicly identify me and accuse us of being institutional spies. My colleagues led the introductions, and gave each unit a short speech explaining who we were and what we were doing. On the first few units, I waited outside, or stood at the back of the panel to avoid notice. I also took defensive measures; most notably, I carried a bound clipboard with the University of Alberta's logo conspicuously embossed on the outside. This attempt to visibly disassociate myself with the prison by claiming university allegiance seems vaguely ridiculous in retrospect—after all, if an

inmate knew me or my history, there was little chance a clipboard would reassure them about our intensions. Yet, the clipboard served a purpose. A number of times, I saw familiar inmates peering at my clipboard, then glancing at my face with a confused expression. Other times, I recognized inmates who glanced at me, then stiffly stared in another direction or started talking urgently to their peers. However, the most interesting response came from the individuals I knew intimately: having spent months, even years, working with these inmates, there was no confusion about who I was. This group represented the largest potential threat to our recruitment efforts.

To our collective surprise, my old acquaintances did not reject us, and did nothing to damage our access. Some inmates even seemed happy to see me:

"Jeez Schultz! You take a wrong turn on the way to work today? What are you doing here?" (Field note from the ERC, September 2016)

'Hey, weren't you a guard here? . . . Yeah, sure, I'll talk to you. Come by Laundry later today if you have time." (Field note, the FSCC, December 2016)

Others were more confrontational: one man at the ERC demanded to know why I was at the 'wrong' jail, while another agreed to an interview, but only gave clipped and guarded answers to my questions. Yet these were the exception, and my role as a former CO did not present a major barrier when interviewing inmates, as far as I could tell. I only had three failed inmate interviews out of roughly 50 attempts at the ERC and the FSCC, despite interviewing nine prisoners who knew me or knew I had been a CO. One of these was due to mental health issues on the part of the participant; I will discuss the other two momentarily. My success surprised me, given the subcultural pressures at play, and I asked one of my well-remembered former clients whether my status played a role in his decision to participate. In this excerpt (which discusses medication dispensation) he indicated personal relationships, demeanour, and approach to the job played a far more influential role for his decision than pressure from the inmate subculture:

And you're consistent. You were the same guy every day. I knew if I seen you escorting the nurse around at med-line that you better show up with this amount of water. Don't ask the nurse stupid questions. Like you're the same guy consistently. There's guys that respect that. You're not trying to be somebody's buddy. And I don't have no respect for that kind of stuff.

Despite our fears, my CO status played no role in inmate recruitment. We had far more willing volunteers than we were able to interview at either the FSCC or the ERC, and my presence elicited little observable response. In fact, my status as a former CO became an asset in several cases, as I was able to ask my former clients about officers—including myself—and how they perceived the subcultural pressures surrounding inmates and CO's.

I faced two challenges to my positionality within the jail. The first occurred on the gang unit on Max Pod, and was due to our ambiguity within the prison rather than my work history:

[At this point, an inmate on the top tier started yelling at me:]
Will: No I'm not! (laughing)
Inmate: [Continues yelling at me, indistinguishable except for the word "cop"]. . . you're a . . . officer, right?
Will: No, no! University! U of A! University! (Aside included in Matt's transcript)

[Conversation is interrupted by a call from an inmate through the panel intercom:] "Yo man, who the fuck is this fucking . . ."
Darnell: Who you talking about Larry?!
Inmate: (indistinguishable) . . . fucking government experiment . . .
Darnell: No man, that's not how it works.
Inmate: Well, how's it work?
Darnell: He's just a research project. (Group interview B)

I had gone onto this unit a day earlier, and had spent time talking to officers about whether I could interview inmates (I had also watched with rapt interest as an eight-man Tactical Team 'extracted' inmate Larry from his cell after he threatened to kill unit staff). Due to the strictly-enforced routines of the unit, I was unable to recruit participants—and when I returned, the inmates assumed I was either an undercover police officer or a government scientist with a nefarious agenda. I explained our project to both of these inmates via the intercom system, with

little success. In this case, the peer pressure of the inmate code was a definite force: although Larry later said he wanted to talk to me, he was not willing to be the first participant on the unit.

My second positionality challenge was more intriguing, and placed me at the centre of an inmate-officer power struggle. Dr. Bucerius had conducted several successful interviews on a particular unit, and since I had nothing scheduled one afternoon, I went with her. We found the unit in chaos. Prison management had ordered a search, and had moved the most influential inmates—who were Dr. Bucerius's earlier participants—to the Max Pod. The unit was on lock-up when we arrived, and the officers had lost the inmate signup sheet in the confusion of the search. Dr. Bucerius was able to continue an interview she had begun earlier, but I was at loose ends. The officers eventually asked the unit 'cleaner'[21] to find someone for me to talk to; he produced a volunteer, but the 'interview' quickly became a performance. The inmate dictated every term of engagement: we sat at one of the common area tables, in full view of the rest of the unit, with other inmates within hearing distance. He was more interested in interrogating me than answering my questions, and refused to enter into a 'normal' conversation. After ten minutes of posturing about how awful the institution was, he ended the interview. The officers—who had no difficulty interpreting his actions—watched our exchange with barely-contained rage. I began another interview, which was also a failure;[22] during this, I heard yelling outside the interview room. When I emerged, I found the officers had locked up the first inmate for being rude to me. This was a clear mark of respect, as they had no orders to enforce respectful behavior toward non-officers; however, they failed to recognize the implications of their action. I asked them to

[21] The 'head' inmate on the unit. Acts as a liaison between the officers and inmates. Officially in charge of cleaning, but also organizes meal service and some inmate activities. Usually receives extra privileges due to his status.
[22] This interview was with a man I knew from FSCC. He also had no interest in talking, and provided little more than clipped and guarded responses to my questions. I believe the unit dynamics played a greater role in shaping this interview than our prior relationship did; however, I cannot discount my former CO status, as this man and I engaged in a serious confrontation over his diversion of medication in 2014.

release him, and insisted on it when they demurred; I continued to insist—loudly—until they let him out. When they did, I shook hands with the inmate. His apology was also a performance, but I accepted it loudly enough for the rest of the unit to hear.

This situation was an interesting challenge. My actions were absolutely necessary from an ethical standpoint, as research participation is always voluntary. Furthermore, inmates are considered a vulnerable population (CIHR et al., 2014), and allowing the lockup to stand would have been an abuse of my power as a researcher. More insidiously, it would have placed us on the 'side' of the institution. However, I insulted the officers by 'siding' with the inmate, especially as they had acted out of respect. Recognizing this, I made an effort to explain myself:

Will: . . . sorry about the confusion with that guy today. I asked you to pop him because we have to walk a bit of a line. . . ***I'm not a con-lover by any extent, but if they start saying they have to talk to us or they get locked up, we're screwed****. The University will pull our ethics approval and our research will get thrown out.*
*I have absolutely zero doubt that that guy is a POS [piece of sh*t]; he definitely didn't strike me as a nice character in the least.* ***I had to 'make good' with him in front of the other inmates though, whether I liked him or not****.*
I really appreciated you guys stepping into him by the way . . . it shows that you guys actually care. On Pod 5, [the protective-custody unit,] my supervisor was in the interview room with a con yesterday and another guy walked in and closed the door—and there was absolutely no reaction from the staff. Please, tell your partners that my supervisor and I both appreciated you guys—my prof in particular said you guys were amazing to work with compared to some of the other people she's dealt with. Pass that on to your partner and the float, too
Hope this helps explain what was unquestionably a bit of a confusing situation!. . . .

Officer: Haha yeah today was kind of busy when you came by. Yeah, no worries, I ***kind of figured that was the reasoning, it was against you, so I figured you should have some say if he was locked up or not****. I also wasn't there when it happened, just heard about it. . . .*

(Facebook message from Will to officer, September 2016)

I knew the senior officer on this unit, and reached out to him via Facebook. My torn allegiances are clearly visible in the way I express my sentiments. My word-choice—'that guy is a POS'—flags my CO identity, and my efforts to describe my actions as a performance are a barely-disguised attempt to maintain my identity with the officer corps. Nor was my apology for

'siding' with the inmate necessary, as he had been within his rights to refuse an interview, even though he had been manipulative and rude in doing so. Although I intellectually recognized the necessity of walking between the inmate and officer subcultures, I had not yet created a balance; therefore, I relied on my CO identity as a crutch at the first sign of trouble. However, I suggest my former colleague's response is more interesting. He did not take my actions as an insult, and recognized the validity of my competing alliances. Yet, he allowed me to hold the decisive vote in whether to punish the inmate, and released him at my request. This speaks to a power differential I did not expect. Normally, we were at the mercy of officer decisions in the prison:

". . . when we got on A block, we ran into serious scheduling issues around supper, compounded by near-total officer intransigence. The [officers] working there really couldn't care if we lived or died—or perhaps more accurately, wished we would go die in a fire. We killed time for [hours] in the office . . . It was a very frustrating period, for a number of reasons. Luca[23] *has been on the cutting edge of dealing with difficult staff this week, and I sense a huge level of frustration toward staff in him, bubbling just under the surface. He made several comments about whether 'they were deliberately screwing with us', over the increasingly awkward delay." (Field note, April 2017)*

This incident, from the CCC, was representative of the relationship my team members often had with officers. Yet, in this particular example, my identity as a former CO meant the unit officers gave me a certain level of decision-making power. Although the inmate challenged my positionality, I had to voluntarily—and visibly—surrender my privileged status in order to maintain a position between the two subcultural groups. This, personally, was a challenge.

The Officers

My familiarity with inmates also helped me establish credibility with CO's at the ERC. I interviewed a number of officers who were strangers, and spent a lot of time developing rapport.

[23] One of my team members

As this conversation with officer Asher shows, our conversation often mentioned specific inmates:

Asher: . . . like, in like, in the [news], there was an article on this Phillipe guy from [an unstable African country], I don't know whether you saw it.
Will: Phillipe?!
Asher: Phillipe.
Will: You mean, like crazy Phillipe? . . . We had him out at the Fort!
Asher: He's a piece of . . .
Will: He is.
Asher: He's not a human to me. And I know that sounds awful.

My knowledge of these inmates helped support my insider claims, and also helped me develop relationships. When I was sitting at the unit panel with an unfamiliar officer, I often pointed out inmates I had worked with, which broke the ice and led to lengthy conversations. This also helped ease tensions about my motives, especially when I was able to share an anecdote from my time working with the inmate in question:

Will: The Jerries get nailed occasionally—and poor bugger. It wasn't even his fault—it was just, next guy up in line.
Clint: Exactly. He was just in the wrong place at the wrong time when Ronnie got him. Ronnie.
Will: Oh yeah, he was out at the Fort for a long time. He behaved well when he was at our place—I think we even had him on Unit 10.
Clint: I went through training with Jerry.

As officer Clint's excerpt shows, this was especially influential when my participant shared some element of the story. The quote above outlines the forces at play nicely: I had worked with officer Jerry several years earlier, and had also directly supervised Ronnie, the inmate who had thrown feces on him.[24] Knowing and having experience with inmates—especially inmates who had committed assaults against staff or were notoriously difficult to work with—established a foothold for my credibility. However, my collection of 'war stories' is not a sufficient

[24] Usually referred to as a 'shit-bomb,' fecal bombing involves throwing bags, cups, or bowls of feces and urine onto another inmate or officer. It is commonly used on Max Pod, where the structural constraints of being locked up alone for 23 hours a day prevent confrontation. The liquid of a 'bomb' will travel under doors or through meal slots, allowing inmates to attack those they cannot physically reach.

explanation for why I was largely accepted as a CO 'insider' while conducting my interviews. Although my stories undeniably provided me with significant capital, my CO *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 339, 340) and list of shared acquaintances played a larger role in establishing my credibility, to a point where my participants granted me something which nearly approximated me a 'full participant' status within the jail (Adler & Adler, 1987; Gold, 1958).

In 2012, Lerman and Page conducted a nuanced analysis of correctional officers' perspectives on punishment. Rather than using subcultural literature to explain the differences they found between the Minnesotan and Californian prison systems, they meshed two, ostensibly competing, hypothesis. First, they suggested all CO's are grounded within the occupational role of being a 'correctional officer,' which shapes their beliefs and outlooks on how to run a prison (Lerman & Page, 2012, p. 505). However, they also proposed an "*embedded work role perspective,* which posits that both *within state* and *between state* contexts shape officers' attitudes" (Lerman & Page, 2012, p. 505; ital. in original). The authors used Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus* and fields to mediate the tension between these competing, internal and external, forces:

> A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations 'deposited' within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and action (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 16; see also Chan, 1996, p. 114).

Lerman and Page applied these concepts to propose a unique correctional officer *habitus.* Echoing Bourdieu's description of *habitus* as a "generative and unifying principle" (1994, p. 340), they suggested the experience of being a correctional officer shapes and mediates the

individual officer's experience of corrections, as well as the way in which values, mores, and embedded perspectives are passed along to new staff (Lerman & Page, 2012, p. 510).

In some senses, I washed out of corrections, as I left my career before it had even really started. Yet, my five years working in jail influenced me dramatically. I commonly refer to the FSCC as the place I 'grew up,' and the *habitus* I developed through managing a living unit of 75 recalcitrant inmates is still part of my identity. Strangers often tell me I look like a police officer or correctional officer, a fact encouraged by the way I carry myself. I do not intentionally cultivate this appearance, but my *habitus* shapes the way I walk, talk, and even dress. My *habitus* also shapes my attitudes and outlooks—something which became startling clear when I entered the ERC. When I spoke with officers, I stumbled over my positionality, and often used the term 'we' and 'our' when discussing the CO role, as my conversation with officer Asher shows:

*Will: No, and then they start taking it out on you, so then you're stuck in the middle. I dunno. It's funny—**you talk about us as a buffer between the inmate population and the general public**. It's true, but it's kind of funny how sometimes, **it seems like the prison guards, we're stuck between**. You don't fit in either one, have you noticed that?*
Asher: No, you don't.

My seeming inability to separate myself from the CO subculture was awkward, and left my participants with an opportunity to rebuke me for claiming group allegiance. Yet, to my surprise, this did not happen—in fact, my accidental claims of group membership played an unexpected role in helping create rapport, to a point where several of my participants also began using the term 'we' when discussing the nature of the job:

Will: I remember, unit 10 at the Fort: evening shift, we're there for like five minutes. Wham! Guy gets a full Kimchee bowl[25] *right in the face. I remember like, well, that just quieted things down, cleaning things up . . . it's just dead (laughter). But . . . it's crazy. The fact that they will take it out on each other, especially if the officers are picking on the whole unit.*

[25] Inmates routinely purchase Styrofoam Mr. Noodle bowls with Kimchee flavouring through the prison canteen. They often reuse the empty bowls after eating the noodles—in this case, for a fecal bombing.

Clint: Yeah. That's the beauty of our job. ***We can—sometimes, we'll be the targets****. But there's certain things I've told inmates that make the inmate think that the other inmates are the targets, not us, and therefore, we're spared.*

Asher . . . It's not a bad job—but I find, there's no job satisfaction here, right? I mean, ***what are we doing really****? Nothing . .* ***. I consider us—this is a little off topic. I consider us almost like a buffer between the general public and these inmates, right****? Nothing's really happening here. There's no rehabilitation. We're not really making them pay for anything, other than time. But* ***we deal with them so they don't have to****. That's what I consider the Canadian justice system.*

Not every officer granted me this level of acceptance, of course. Some were still suspicious, and others got rid of me as soon as they could. However, I received near-total acceptance from a surprising portion of my participants:

Will: Would you also mind if I put [this] on a recorder? . . . I just need to transcribe the stuff.
Carrie: Oh yeah. I trust ya. ***And I don't trust ANYBODY. But I trust you.***

In cases like this, my *habitus* and past relationships granted me access across large portions of the jail. Additionally, my *habitus* encouraged officers to ask me questions about our research. COs from the FSCC asked me if things were 'really that bad' at the ERC, while the ERC officers asked about prison radicalization, or how the FSCC officers managed situations.[26] In other words, my participants accepted my expertise and experience, and invited me to contribute it to the group. My experience and *habitus* also played a key role in helping my participants relax and enjoy the interview process, rather fear it:

Matt: ***You've actually got an insight. An inside insight, instead of just like—if you were an academic and had no foot in the door experience, it wouldn't be worth talking to you****, because you would hear half these stories and you would have an uneducated spin on it—wow! You think this guy should actually die?! I'm like yeah! Spend time with the guy, it's like—yes!*
Will: Here, I'll pull the trigger! Its funny, because all these little things that we do—and even now I'm saying we, it's been a year since I'm out.
Matt: I know.

[26] This also happened at the CCC. Many officers questioned me about issues at other prisons, and expressed relief to hear their concerns were not unique to their prison. Furthermore, several officers probed me for information about what we were 'finding' from the inmates, and one officer in particular asked me deep questions on whether the inmates truly hated officers, or were merely posturing.

As officer Matt shows, my ability to relate to the daily challenges of CO life meant my participants were far more willing to open up to me. Yet, as important as my insight and understanding of the setting was, it created challenges. As Contreras (2013) points out, slip-ups and dumb questions are unacceptable in an environment where your participants know your expertise: "*Don't act like you don't know"* (p. 23; ital. in original). Some of my participants used this to escape questions, and others skipped important contextual information because they assumed I understood it:

*Darnell: Yeah, just—**you know how they are, eh**?*
Will: I spent five years out at the Fort. I do know how they are. It's kind of funny.
*Darnell: And that's the thing. **You have your experience, you know. You know how it is**.*
(Group interview B)

This situation was an awkward position for me as a novice researcher, as I needed to ask obvious questions which an insider would know in order to establish a baseline of knowledge (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 14). I was fortunate at the ERC: the sheer size of the officer body meant I was able to disguise some of my knowledge. In addition, I used my experience at the FSCC as an excuse for naiveté. 'We did it different at the Fort—how does it work here,' 'We didn't do real corrections at FSCC,' or 'We heard all these horror stories at the Fort—are they true?'[27] were valuable tools in unlocking my participants' outlook on the jail. This did not work at the FSCC, of course; yet, I was able to use my year-long absence from the field—as well as a constant comparison to 'how they do it at Remand'—to draw information about the CO experience which I already knew.

My inside knowledge also allowed me to challenge my participants on controversial topics. As Braithwaite (1985) puts it, "[I'm] no babe in the woods. I know you do it, but why?"

[27] Fort Saskatchewan is widely known as 'The Resort at the Fort.' Notorious for its easy, relaxed attitude among both inmates and staff, there are far lower levels of violence and malfeasance at the FSCC compared to almost every other prison in the province. There are many reasons for this—far too many for a footnote, but the 'Fort Resort' is widely viewed as the easiest prison to work at in the province, and CO's from other jails do not hesitate to point this out..

(p. 138). My participants did not always appreciate this approach, but I found it produced undeniable results—especially when the topic of conversation surrounded officer malfeasance:

Will: Here's one for you . . . last night, there was a code [fight] on [another unit]. And then I heard some guys discussing—they double-doored him. So that's happening too.
Quinton: Well . . . [that unit], maybe they knew it was going to pop off, maybe they had an idea it was going to pop off, and yeah they could've kept everyone locked up and separated it. Y'know, that could pop up at any time. It's easy for them to say, oh, I didn't know.

"Double-dooring" is a specific reference to something which occasionally occurs on Max Pod. Physical barriers intentionally and deliberately separate inmates there, for their own protection or the protection of others. When an inmate is 'double-doored,' it means the second of the two doors which separate inmates on a tier has opened, allowing them to physically access each other. This usually results in a fight, especially when the two inmates are gang enemies or have a violent history. 'Double-dooring' is usually an accidental human error by the officers, but—as officer Quinton implies—there are allegations of abuse. In this case, my ability to present definite knowledge about a sensitive topic allowed me to gain insight into this particular practice, which I would not have collected otherwise.

My *habitus*—and perhaps more importantly, my participants' acceptance of my *habitus*—was key in providing me with an inside perspective. Yet, there was another force which strongly assisted my claims to group membership, one which I only observed second-hand:

Asher: Yeah. It's . . . once you're here for a while, it's not a big deal, right?
Will: I was out at the Fort for five years, right? it's funny. The first two days I came back here, it was . . . this feels weird—
Asher: You were a CO?!
Will: Oh yeah! I worked with Beefy! I worked with him!
Asher: Why didn't he tell me that!
Will: I don't know!
Asher: Well that changes everything! . . . I can swear! (laughter)

I, naively, had not expected my previous relationships at the ERC to play a significant role in helping me gain more than a few interviews; after all, I had never worked in the prison, and had

not spoken to many acquaintances there in years. Yet, this did not prove to be a barrier; I soon re-discovered coworkers, officers I had trained, and friends with whom I went through recruit training. My contacts at Fort Saskatchewan also helped me network; for instance, officer Beefy was good friends with several of my former coworkers and participants, although I only knew him casually. Ironically, Beefy—now a CPO III—refused to be interviewed, as he disagreed with the way we framed right-wing extremism. Yet despite his skepticism, Beefy introduced me to a very useful participant, and told all 16 officers under his orders to do their best to help me—which they did. He also gave me names of several inmates who he felt would participate.

However, my relationships were useful for more than recruitment and networking:

Will*: You're not working with Shorty, are you?*
Matt: Yeah, Shorty and Mo.
Will: I went through training with Shorty. He's a good cat.
Matt: ***That's what he was saying, yeah****. [several moments later]* ***When I said I was meeting up with you****, Shorty's like—ah man. You should have heard the one that Freaky was saying . . .*

This quotation proves two of my claims. First, my knowledge of CO's within the prison—and a general knowledge of what units they worked—gave me immediate credibility and an avenue for discussion. More importantly, this excerpt shows my participants were actively measuring and critiquing my 'insider' claims when I was not present; in essence, my capital was judged and accepted to be sufficient within the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As with officer Beefy, I did not have an opportunity to interview officer Shorty—in fact, I was only able to briefly speak with him twice. Yet, Shorty confirmed my claims about recruit training and working at the FSCC, and told officer Matt he could trust me when Matt mentioned his upcoming interview.[28]

[28] Shorty also told Matt a story about me, centering on an 'interview' I had conducted. Inmate 'Freaky' specifically requested our conversation be held at the panel in front of the officers, and his 18 minutes of conversation were designed to horrify me—to the total delight of Shorty and his partner, who spent most of the conversation howling with laughter at my discomfiture.

As is often the case with research involving key informants, my network of acquaintances was only capable of helping me to the limit of their influence (Bucerius, 2013, p. 701; Gilchrist & Williams, 1999, pp. 84–85). Furthermore, the majority of ethnographies, especially those dealing with closed subcultures, require significant amounts of time or extraordinary feats of resistance for the researcher to 'prove' trustworthiness (Bucerius, 2013, p. 714). For instance, Marquart did not gain full acceptance from his prison guard colleagues until he had worked for eight months and fought a violent 300-lb inmate (Marquart, 1986, pp. 20, 24). Although I established my trustworthiness and credibility to a point where the majority of officers were friendly, I was not able to fully establish trust in our three weeks of access. For example, I was unable to access the 'boy's club,' which many officers cited as a major power bloc at the ERC:

Clint: They're promoting all the Tac team guys, promoting all their buddies, their drinking buddies, they're promoting the guys they're smoking marijuana with.

Jason: . . . when things weren't right, I fuckin' spoke up. Well. . . you're not going to move very far ahead. So when I came over here, I'm like, oh, I'm going to keep my mouth shut, I'm going to learn. But now I'm like stalemated, 'cause, I'm not on the tac team, so I gotta get on the tac team.
Will: Because from what I hear, you only get hired for overtime if you're on the tac team and buddies with someone.
Jason: That's how it works. So if you can get on the tac team—which, they've come and told me, you'll get on this time. I tried when I first came over here, and no-one knew me. because it's like a boy's club, right? But you have to make—it's like Survivor man. You gotta make all these alliances, and friends, and hang out with people. Fuck! Instead of being like, na, he's good at the job, y'know?

Access to this true insider group was simply not available, and as far as I know, I did not interview any Tac Team members. I did not probe about this, but none of my participants mentioned Tac Team involvement, which—from my observations—usually represented a core part of the CO identity. The influence of this missing population data became clear when we entered the FSCC, several months after finishing at the ERC.

Unlike the ERC, I did not have to spend time establishing my credibility at Fort Saskatchewan. The people there remembered me (Contreras, 2013, p. 22); most of the officers, and all the key stakeholders from the director downward still viewed me as a complete insider. This became crystal-clear on our second day in the prison: as our team entered the jail one day, one of my former partners used the all-page system to announce—to the entire prison—"GOOD MORNING MR. SCHULTZ!!!" After I spent the rest of the day laughing at the joke whilst re-introducing myself to former colleagues, a member of our research team sardonically implied I was "being paid to visit" with my old friends. There was an unquestionable level of truth to this; yet, my status as a 'total insider' meant I was able to access sensitive information immediately:

Officer 1: "I need more—I just need better people! These guys are unbelievable. I've never seen anyone hit a con in cuffs before I came to [this] shift. Never."
Will: "What?! That's unbelievable!"
Officer 1: "Never seen it. But it's happening on this shift."
Officer 2: "Yeah. It's absolute bullshit."
Officer 1: "None of them actually know how to talk to cons. They think that every single con needs a beating, regardless."
Officer 2: "It's gotten so bad that I don't even let [them] in a van with inmates after a sixty-six[29]*. Every sixty-six, they're beating guys. When I'm on the units, I pull Happy and Cheerful off the unit and get them to help me walk the guy down to Seg. And you know those two—they're not exactly the caring types. . . you know me Schultzie. When I'M the sensible one in a situation, you KNOW things are bad." (Field notes, December 2016)*

The two staff members in this conversation were both senior officers of a notoriously mistrustful bent; yet, this conversation happened on our second day at 'The Fort.' My open access here was in stark contrast to the initial suspicion I had to overcome at the ERC. In fact, my comfort level and rapport at the FSCC may have been too deep (Maxwell, 2013, p. 91; McGinn, 2008), as I struggled to maintain a critical outlook and experienced profound role confusion. At one point, I walked in on a conversation between a new officer and a former partner. They were discussing

[29] A fight between two inmates. In the CO culture I worked in, the violence these two men describe would only be acceptable when the inmate in question had assaulted an officer or nurse.

how to do a certain job, which I had done—and explained—dozens of times. I unconsciously reverted to my Field Training Officer[30] role and joined my partner in explaining how to do the job the 'right way.' Again: I was interviewing a former co-worker in the entranceway to the prison, a place which requires significant multitasking. He was unfamiliar with the door controls, and became distracted as he talked to me, received visitors, and let people in and out. I instinctively took control of the panel to help him out, and opened doors for officers and health care staff who were leaving the prison for lunch break—both of us oblivious to the complete incongruity of a university researcher controlling entry to a prison. Like Contreras, it was not until afterward that I realized what had happened: "I was 'one of them' again" (2013, p. 20), and for two glorious weeks I relived the stories and experiences of prison as an insider.

The Team

I discovered the importance of my CO *habitus* long before our research team entered the prison. A version of Sykes' argot roles—the various unique identities, behaviours, and linguistic oddities (including slang) which inmates adopt within the prison society (Sykes, 1958, p. 84)—still exist in Alberta prisons, and I soon recognized the importance of translating these roles for my research colleagues. I created an unofficial argot dictionary for the team, and translated any questions they had about slang or prison rituals. My *habitus* also influenced the specific approaches we took inside the prisons. As Lerman and Page (2012) put it, "Experienced agents in a field intuitively grasp the mores, expectations, and acceptable actions of that field" (p. 510). I soon found myself acting as one of the primary negotiators with officer Shelagh, our ERC handler, about where our access would take us on a given day. My role as primary contact and

[30] A senior officer, who is paired with a junior officer. The senior officer bears a loose responsibility for ensuring the new staff member is learning how to effectively do the job.

interpreter continued long after we left the prison, as I maintained contact with officers we had met, and continued to explain nuances to our team.

Adler and Adler heartily applaud the benefits of team research: "Here, team members adopt different roles in the setting and place themselves with different key informants, thereby achieving a multiperspectival view of the scene" (1987, p. 21). Team membership hugely influenced my research. First, it meant I was able to focus on interviewing correctional officers, rather than continually negotiating both sides of the inmate/officer dichotomy. This occasionally put me on the institutional 'side' of the subcultural positionality battle—but, for better or worse, it allowed me to immediately use my expertise. During the data analysis, my team members told me I had collected information they would not have been able to gather; on the other hand, they collected inmate data which I would not have accessed. Second, our team discussed experiences, ideas, and rough analyses of the situations we encountered within the prison—something which helped us edit our questionnaires, and deeply influenced data interpretations. The wildly different individual points of view on the team meant I was able to draw a far broader and more analytical picture of the prison than I would have been able to do on my own.

Yet, my team membership was also one of the hardest things I dealt with in my research. I had not realized how deeply I identified as a CO until after we entered the prison setting:

"I have identified as a prison guard since I started working at the Fort in 2010, even if I was only part-time. Even after I quit, I have often introduced myself as an ex-prison guard, or discuss prison as my area of interest/expertise in polite conversation." (Field note, October 2016)

Dr. Bucerius and I developed the germ of this project from my work experience. Even though the other team members expanded the project in ways which far exceeded my imagination or abilities, I felt a continued sense of ownership—so much so I have a field note from the ERC referring to myself as a 'caretaker' for my team members. This went too far at times: I positioned

myself as the primary negotiator with officer Shelagh and the other CO's within the centre, suggested 'next steps' about where we would go, and made sure my colleagues were ready for whatever eventualities I could predict, whether they wanted it or not. Yet, as the study wore on, I found myself increasingly torn: I was excited for the success of the project, but could not escape a disconcerting realization that success meant uncovering the dark secrets of my CO compatriots. This led to an identity crisis of sorts after we exited the ERC:

"What this study has done is eliminated my monopoly of knowledge. I can't explain what I know anymore, without being corrected or challenged . . . the time I spent working in prison doesn't matter. I have lost my expertise. And I did not have it taken from me: I gave it away. Is there a benefit for me? I don't know. I have not perceived one over the past three weeks. Instead, I have felt strongly, strongly drawn to the CO's who I've talked to . . . I belong."

"This is a fragile time for me. I am developing a new identity, but that requires the disassembly of my past identification, for the structural bricks of the old shall be repurposed to be the foundation of the new . . . and although the blueprint of the new is far more attractive than the realization of the old, dreams and actuality do not always mesh when leaps are made." (Field note, October 2016)

This crisis largely arose from my *habitus*—or more accurately, from the contrast between the fields of corrections and academe (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bartunek and Louis indicate this is not uncommon in team research, as "the temptation is for outside researchers to become caught up in insiders' understandings and for inside researchers to try to adopt the outsider's analytical approach" (1996, p. 56). Yet, they also reinforce the necessity of intellectual shifts to ensure different perspectives are properly evaluated (Bartunek & Louis, 1996, p. 56).

Intriguingly, my sense of guilt speaks to the CO subculture. Marquart describes how a demonstration of bravery in a fight gained him the trust of his fellow correctional officers (Marquart, 1986, pp. 20, 24). The opposite is also true: cowardice destroys trust between officers (Crawley, 2004; Kauffman, 1988). If a CO backs down in the face of danger—especially if his/her partner is also in danger—they are effectively excommunicated. During my career, I saw

CO's ostracized after failing in violent situations, and we shall discuss other examples. My participants, former coworkers and friends viewed the failure to 'back up' your partner—even in situations of questionable legality—as a betrayal, and I felt the same sense of betrayal for bringing a group of critical outsiders into 'my' environment:

"[By getting] the team into Remand, I have, for all intents and purposes, turned a spotlight onto a dirty floor. There are large clean patches, but there are patches which aren't very pretty to look at. And so I return to betrayal. I staunchly believe that the majority of correctional officers are good people—solid people, who are doing the best they can. Just as firmly, I believe that there are dirty apples who abuse the process, abuse inmates, and mess up the clean officers . . . But, in trying to show the dirt, do I condemn the clean officers to be painted with the same brush? . . . And I am placing my people into a situation where, whether they realize it or not, they are vulnerable." (Field note, October 2016)

My perspectives in this note are not accurate in an objective sense. I wrote them with considerable emotion, and they lack the critical distance necessary for an honest analysis of the subject material. Yet, my sheer emotiveness adds to the insider/outsider discussion on several levels. First, it demonstrates the tension which insider researchers face—especially when the research field in question is a closed subculture, with enforced rules of loyalty and expectations of behaviour. In this case, I found it difficult to navigate this tension. Second, my emotion casts some light on the difficulty of conducting team research in a highly-charged environment. The draw of the prison subculture drove a perceptible wedge between my team members and I in the prisons, even though I recognized the vitality of our symbiotic relationship (Bartunek & Louis, 1996, p. 56). In some cases, this has not been repaired, as I find myself suspended between two fields; as Bourdieu and Waquant might put it, the various forms of capital which underpin the fields of corrections and academe are not necessarily compatible (1992, p. 16), and several colleagues still disagree with my officer-based perspectives. Finally, this fieldnote indicates the importance of distance and field-exit for an inside researcher. As the Adlers put it, "[Complete Membership Researchers] go beyond acting out the peripheral or core behaviours of the group;

they believe in what they are doing" (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. 80). Gaining a sufficient level of distance for appropriate analysis requires time away from the field; it is only now—eight months after leaving the ERC—that I feel capable of deeply analyzing the data which I collected.

My personal insider/outsider dynamic is unique in several ways. First, it reflects on the dichotomy traditionally drawn between the inmate and officer subcultures. With the two exceptions mentioned, I did not face any resistance from inmates. In fact, several of my best interviews were with men and women who I had known as an officer. Second, my former-CO status proved to be far more influential with the bureaucratic side of corrections than any of us expected. Yet, I maintain the most valuable thing my insider reflection provides, sociologically, is how correctional officers relate to those outside of the prison. As officer Beefy put it:

> *"If you walk into a grocery store, you have at least some idea of what a grocery store clerk does. If you walk into a bank, you have at least some idea what a bank clerk does. Unless you have been a prison guard, you have no idea what a prison guard does." (Field note, October 2016)*

My perspective, though not unique, briefly draws back the curtain on this subculture, which—as we shall see—plays a massive role in shaping how the prison runs on a daily basis.

Chapter IV: The Correctional Officers

> *But this imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only:* ***though what are so requisite, must too often be left to the discretion of the gaolers; who are frequently a merciless race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender sensation.***
> Sir William Blackstone, 1769, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*
> (2016, p. 297)

My goal for this chapter is to provide a snapshot of my participants, what they believe, what they do on a daily basis, and how they perceive their duties. I am not making new arguments in this chapter, as a deep assessment of officer subcultural values is beyond my thesis. However, there are aspects of the CO subculture which are important for explaining why officers treat radicalization the way they do; I will outline and analyze these.[31] Understanding how CO's view their job sheds light on how officers relate to inmates—and more importantly, helps explain why officers react the way they do to perceived radicalization in their prisons.

In contrast to the publicity which police and fire departments often receive, academics and members of the public have largely ignored correctional officers—even in comparison to prisoners (Arnold et al., 2007, p. 471; Crawley, 2004, p. 25; Kauffman, 1988, p. 2). Several authors cite Hawkins's (1976) assessment of prison officers as a 'grey homogeneity;' like novelist G.K. Chesterton's postman, officers are invisible to academics due to their routine, assumed, and therefore overlooked presence (Crawley, 2004, p. 25; Kauffman, 1988, p. 2; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 1; Lombardo, 1989, p. 1). Some authors have begun to point out the incongruity in this: "Neither can prison sociology any longer rest content with a depiction of

[31] For a full discussion of prison officer subcultures, see Kauffman (1988), Crawley (2004) and Liebling, Price et al. (2001, 2011).

the guards as merely shadowy figures, peripheral to the main action, who are just *there* as an inertial and conservative influence" (Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996, p. 60; emphasis in original). Although a growing number of accounts emphasize the key role CO's play in shaping daily life in prison (Scott, 2015, pp. 53–54), most stereotypes continue to dismiss officers as corrupt, low-skilled 'turnkeys' (Kauffman, 1988, p. 3; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, pp. 2–3; Lombardo, 1989, p. 2; Toch, 1978, p. 22). It is impossible to draw one archetypal picture of how officers do their job, as prisons differ dramatically between provincial jurisdictions, national contexts, and even municipalities (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 300).[32] But, despite being widely ignored in academic literature, the pragmatic, everyday duties of CO's deeply influence how the prison functions (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 59).

CO Duties: Care, Custody and Control

Although academics have recognized the important role which CO's play in prison, my participants were more cynical on this point:

Calvin: "I don't consider us law enforcement anyway. More like fuckin' baby sitters" (Field note, March 2017)

Many officers echoed officer Calvin's point, in spirit if not in words. My participants largely downplayed the impact of their role; in fact, many considered their duties tedious and boring. They also dismissed their own influence within the prison, and frankly admitted their only reason for remaining in corrections was the steady paycheck and overtime prospects. Overall, they characterized their duties within the prison as "Care, Custody and Control:"

[32] Much of the qualitative prison research conducted over the last 25 years has been UK-based, heightening the difficulty of creating a portrayal of officer duties which accurately reflects the Canadian perspective. Crawley (2004), Liebling, Price, & Shefer, (2011), Liebling, Arnold, & Straub (2011), Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay (1996), Arnold, Liebling, & Tait (2007) and a number of others (including several important theoretical pieces by Liebling) all came out of the British Prison Service. Kauffman (1988), Lombardo (1989) and Marquart (1986) appear to be the only notable North American researchers who have conducted deep qualitative work involving officers in the United States, and their studies were all conducted in dysfunctional, failed or failing prisons.

Darnell: I'm not here to change lives. I'm here to do three things: Care, Custody and Control, is like my three biggest things. (Group Interview B)

Most authors agree with these general themes. Sykes identifies custody as the first and greatest duty of correctional officers: regardless of ". . . whether retribution, deterrence, or reform is taken as the only proper aim of imprisonment", CO's are responsible for enforcing the social warrant of incarceration, and must ensure inmates remain imprisoned until their release date (Sykes, 1958, pp. 14, 18). On a day-to-day basis, the enforcement of custody is relatively simple. Liebling, Price et al. describe it as "checking locks, bolts and bars" (2011, p. 46), while my participants often mentioned the importance of and techniques for conducting 'security checks' twice daily. Interestingly, my participants often referred to 'security checks' as a control rather than custodial issue. This speaks to an important issue: although custody is the raison d'être for corrections, it is so deeply engrained it is often assumed (Coyle, 2007, p. 49). My participants largely relied on the technologies of prison to ensure custody; although they described their duties as 'Care, Custody and Control,' their actions emphasized control far beyond anything else:

Tim: . . . maybe some of the lighter stuff, like . . . say the number of coveralls, or . . . say, papers in the window, right? On a normal unit, all that's wiped out. Like, two coveralls . . . you pick your battles. OK—maybe you have an extra pair of coveralls, maybe you . . . y'know, you're going to move the papers in your windows, I'm gonna see the window, OK. But once it's clear you can put it back up. But I've done my security check—I know the window's not breached. But it's giving them a little more leeway. So they get away with a little bit more.

Carrie: We'll let them do it today. So all those little rules—like making your bed, not covering your windows. All of Max Pod is newspapered windows! You can't see out of one of them! Those are the worst offenders! They got shit tied in every single room, sheets covering things, they do what they fuckin' want. Or they gonna code out [fight an officer].

These comments demonstrate how officers negotiate control and authority. During our research, institutional regulations restricted inmates to two sets of coveralls, and forbade them from covering their windows or lights with papers. The intent of these rules was to prevent inmates

from disguising escape attempts. Yet, officers chose to negotiate the rules around these minor offences for simple pragmatic reasons: inmate violence was a far more immediate concern than any threat of escape, as officers faced a realistic danger of assault every day. As a result, my participants only mentioned the duty of custody when an actual breach had occurred:

Clint: Because all the glass they built and put into the centre was breaking. Guys were taking Melmac cups and just smashing the glass with them, and the glass would shatter. And it caused a lot of safety issues and concerns for us.

Matt: . . . one inmate was like, 'I jammed cards into the lock. You've gotta do it a certain way, and it works one out of ten times. You kick the door, you kick the door, and all of a sudden it pops open.' It shows locked, but it pops open. And . . . so that's what he said happened. And then, he—some guy got stabbed.

As officer Matt casually points out, the main focus for my participants was security and control of their units. Maintaining custody was an aspect of this rather than the controlling rationale. The scholarly literature has mostly recognized this, as many empirical sources focus on the dynamic exercise of control and power within the prison (Foucault, 1995; Mathiesen, 1965; Sparks et al., 1996) rather than theoretical discussions about custody. Custody breaches—especially large-scale ones like riots and escapes—are the only forces strong enough to fundamentally alter policies and practices surrounding how prisons operate[33] (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 7). As a result, custody is a massively consequential issue for all prisons. However, within my settings, officers viewed the technologies of custody as next to impenetrable. As a result, custody—although a real and realistic concern—acted primarily as a framing device for 'control,' rather than a stand-alone concern for my participants.

Labelling the duty of 'Control' with a single word does not fully convey the complexity of maintaining order among a volatile, recalcitrant and hostile community (Clemmer, 1958).

[33] There is not enough time to fully outline this here, but my participants provided several examples. Most notably, security breaches—specifically the shattering security glass Quinton mentions—led directly to the 2013 wildcat strike which paralyzed correctional centres, courthouses, and police departments across the province.

Sykes hints at this in his assessment of the defects of total power: "the custodians are bound to their captives in a relationship of conflict rather than compelled acquiescence, despite the custodians' theoretical supremacy" (Sykes, 1958, p. 46). Although an assessment of power relationships in the prison is beyond this chapter, how officers' implement control plays an important role in establishing the legitimacy of their exercise of power (Tyler, 2003, p. 287).

Popular discussions of control within total institutions often assume the exercise of dictatorial power on the part of the custodians (Hemmens & Stohr, 2000, p. 327). My participants firmly disagreed with this characterization:

Jason: Biggest thing in this job—there's only one thing: the ability to talk to inmates is the most important thing. And presence. If you're a tiny little guy, you'd better have a really amazing way to talk to some of these guys.

Matt: . . . we could run around every day all day . . . Like, we could literally spend every minute on our feet running around, chasing people down. And in turn, heating people up. Like, you take something away, you take a brew away from a guy—well, we don't take them away [anyway], um. . . if you wanted to charge a guy over a ripped shirt, then all of a sudden he's angry and you gotta deal with an angry guy, and you've neglected something else, right?
Will: And then he's going to go and tell all his friends, and they're going to hate your guts too.
Matt: Yeah. But on the flip side, too, when something goes wrong—it's frustrating from our side of things, is because if something goes wrong, the easiest thing for the centre to do is just, why weren't the officers following the job? We tell them to but they don't do it. And it's like—well, when you have fifty of the biggest shit-disturbers . . .

Connor: Every situation has to be treated [differently]. . . and, no I'm not saying I can choose the rules you follow. . . but you have to be sure you can work with them to make things run smoother. And that doesn't mean breaking rules, that means—eh. Some things are a little less, a little more lenient than others. . . . (several moments later) It's like raising a kid. You have to pick your battles. You can't pick every battle, or you're going to be yelling all the time and your kid will hate you. Some with these guys. If you have to fight every battle with these guys, it'll just drive you crazy.

These quotations describe control within the prison as a negotiation, rather than an imposition. Most scholars agree;[34] in fact, Kauffman's description of Walpole Penitentiary suggests the negotiation of power is a necessity rather than a choice:

> "The officers took isolation of the inmates from the community outside very seriously, and they performed the task exceptionally well. . . . As for internal order, it is a task they had pared to the bone: the prevention of large-scale riots and of injury to officers. The blood- and excrement-stained walls of Walpole attested to their inability to prevent much else (1988, p. 46).

Kauffman's research took place in what she and others have identified as an exceptional prison; in the 1980's, Walpole Penitentiary experienced horrifying violence and an almost total lack of institutional control, to an extent unrecorded in any other research (Kauffman, 1988; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 159). However, the importance of negotiated control between inmates and officers has been observed in a wide range of successful *and* dysfunctional prisons; for instance, accounts suggest Nazi SS guards were unable to force compliance in some concentration camps at the end of WWII, and "dared enter the camp [at night] only under heavy arms" (Kogon, 1960, p. 280; in Kauffman, 1988, p. 78). Returning to Kauffman's example, attempts to exercise control without negotiation were the sign of a failed and dysfunctional prison (Kauffman, 1988, pp. 27–28), rather than an accurate reflection of how CO's exercise control. In fact, Liebling, Price et al. have described the most successful forms of prison work as "quiet" (2011, p. 153), while Sparks et al. describe correctional best practices as exceptionally monotonous: "Prisons, on

[34] Sparks et al. and Hamm (2013, p. 199) point to the U.S. federal penitentiaries at Marion, Illinois and Terre Haute, Indiana, as real-world total institutions, but also point out these are maybe the only true examples of totalized institutions anywhere in the world. Evidence suggests prisons in developing countries also experience significant negotiation of power (Jones, 2014, pp. 85, 89, 91). Foucault leans heavily on the totality of power in his theoretical assessment of prison, but the majority of empirical sources do not follow him. In fact, Sparks et al. (following the example of Garland and Giddens) state "Big Brother is ignoring you" (1996, p. 63), thereby suggesting Foucault overreached himself in outlining the correctional apparatus's desire to totalize inmates (1996, p. 63).

the whole, certainly are boring even if the boredom may be sought in part by both staff *and prisoners*" (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 82; emphasis in original). In short, the effective exercise of control within a prison relies on unspectacular, boring, interpersonal relationships, rather than any form of compulsion.

Since control is a negotiated settlement (Crawley, 2004, p. 24), creating and reinforcing constructive relationships assumes the utmost importance, something my participants and the academic literature unequivocally support. Liebling et al. state "Despite the apparently simple daily tasks of a prison officer . . . it is the relationships an officer establishes with prisoners that hold the key to being a successful prison officer" (Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 44; see also Liebling, 2011). Sparks et al. agree, identifying officer/inmate relations as "being at the very heart of issues of security and control" (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 144). As constructive relationships hold such an important role in reducing violence and other forms of dissent (Crawley, 2004, p. 28), the strategies which CO's use to encourage these relationships on a daily basis take on a far greater significance. Sparks et al. identify humour, "fairness, consistency, and discretion" as vital daily activities in negotiating control (1996, pp. 146, 145). Liebling et al.'s assessment of what makes a 'good' prison officer supports this, identifying professional orientation and the ability to communicate as the key duties of 'role model' officers (Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, pp. 51–52). My participants agreed with both these assessments, and added several other factors they used to establish voluntary compliance on the unit:

Quintin: They know me, they know my partner, they know if we have anything, it'll already be out there. and that's how it works.
Will: So for you, it's a matter of building a reciprocal relationship with the guys on the unit, and also just being consistent.
Quinton: Yeah. It's . . . I always say, you're in jail already. This is your punishment for your actions. I'm not here to punish you, I'm here to—like, police you. I'm your janitor, I'm your milkman, I'm all the services you don't get on the outside, and it's so much easier if we have a relationship—

Will: A working relationship.
Quintin: A working relationship.

Connor (Discussing officer strategies on the Boot Camp unit): There's different ways of telling someone they've done something wrong, and telling them that they can fix it and they're good at it. We call it the sandwich effect. You tell them good things about what they're doing, you tell them all the bad shit they did, and you bring them back up with more good stuff.

Stewart: You've got to find that right balance to work successfully, where you're not giving them everything, because then they'll just walk all over you. But where you follow those rules that are important, and then you give certain things. You just act a little more reasonable. You give them, sometimes, the benefit of the doubt instead of yelling, screaming all the time. Even telling them a joke makes a difference so they're not gonna, at least, come after you on the street.

These examples mention negotiation, consistency, reciprocal respect, trust, and confidence (Crawley, 2004, pp. 111–116; Lombardo, 1989, p. 65; Marquart, 1986, pp. 21–22). None of my participants suggested the most effective control methods involved violent compulsion (Kauffman, 1988, p. 53). However, the 'soft' approach outlined above was enforced with an unspoken but acknowledged willingness to use force if necessary (Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 52). Officer Ethan, an expert in delivering both carrot and stick, put it this way:

Ethan: . . . I'll have a little bit of conversation with them right?
Will: But you kinda gotta be willing to have that crazy edge and go on two seconds notice, don't you?[35]
Ethan: Hell yeah. And what like about these guys, they underestimate me because I'm small. And they just don't know. I've got my own little experience too. So I don't care. I don't have a problem with getting my hands dirty.

"[Selim] praised me for a forgotten incident, where I moved 30 yards to back him up during a confrontation with an inmate. [Simultaneously, he] condemned another officer, who had not displayed the same level of instant aggression I had brought to the table." (Field note, discussing my time at the FSCC. May 2016)

One of Sparks et al.'s inmate participants described the effects of such an environment: ". . . the emphasis is more on seducing people into conformity, as opposed to brutalizing them into

[35] Some of my questions were badly-worded—in fact, there are several excerpts which contain leading questions, and this is one of them. However, I defend the inclusion of these quotations. For instance, this excerpt discusses officer perspectives on use-of-force which I did not understand, expect, or prompt, and shines light on how officers understand violence. Therefore, I stand behind the validity of these quotations, despite my problematic habits.

conformity. The objective is ultimately the same: they want you to conform but there are various ways of doing it" (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 173). Officer Ethan's quote suggests 'seduction' is too soft a word for my research context, as the officers I spoke to were willing—and sometimes eager—to use force when called upon. However, it was not their first, or even their second choice, and many officers proudly described situations where they were able to negotiate their way out of volatile situations without resorting to force. Although my participants acknowledged their exercise of control was not always as 'boring' as Sparks et al. suggests (1996, p. 82), they described various 'seductions' as the most effective ways of maintaining control.

The final duty which my participants discussed was the provision of care: "In addition to their primarily custodial tasks . . . the modern prison officer is also expected to change prisoners' behaviours and outlooks and to provide him or her with care" (Crawley, 2004, p. 95). The literature suggests variations within correctional philosophies—i.e., whether it is focused on retributive punishment, or rehabilitation (Sykes, 1958, p. 14)—means the definition of 'care' can vary significantly between settings. This may explain why my participants were at significant odds with the academic literature on this point. Many authors suggest correctional officers have specific duties when it comes to inmate rehabilitation (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 15), but my participants widely rejected this. Although most officers accepted and internalized the duties of control and custody, they viewed the duty of care with near-total skepticism:

Darnell: I'm not here to change lives. I'm here to do three things: Care, Custody and Control, is like my three biggest things. It's a shitty way to think about it, but at the end of the day—do you think my conversation every day with Larry and Hoser are gonna . . . [make a difference] . . . Probably not. They'll [try] for the first hour, and then I go home for eight hours to my family and whatever. And I come back, and they'll be like, fuck you. . . . When I started in Corrections, the first thing my training officer told me was, you're not here to change people's lives. This is not the centre to do that. Because people are remanded, they're in and out all the time . . . (Group interview B)

Chris: There's no correcting anything. These people don't care. (Group interview B)

Jason: I dunno. My give-a-fuck factor is pretty low now . . . I don't give a fuck what you do. (referring to drug smoking inside the ERC)

Scholars have characterized CO's as cynical, and these quotations do little to dismiss the stereotype (Crawley, 2004, p. 33; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 38). However, my participants outlined massive structural pressures at work within the prison, which influenced the development of cynical and jaded outlooks on corrections. In fact, most officers expressed a feeling of vulnerability within the prison, from inmates, other officers, and even managers:

Jason: But we deal with people, we deal with PTSD every day. Every. Single. Day. You're never having a good day . . .you go to Max Pod, and it's fucking—every day someone's . . . angry at you, pissed off.

Ryan: But if we hit them, we're up for charges, and then we get fired. They get a slap on the wrist.
Tyler: Like I was telling you earlier. It's OK to hit a guard here and get released the same day? How is that OK?!
Will: That happens?
Tyler: It's happened before!
Ryan: All the time.
Will: Bail on the same day. . .
Tyler: Struck a pregnant three, I think. One female hit a pregnant three, and . . .same night, she got released. Think about that.
Will: I'm . . . thinking. I don't know if I like what I'm thinking. I dunno . . .
Ryan: They don't get nothing for assault on us. (Group interview A)

Carrie: . . . and so if you think about it, a female [officer] walks in, and you sit back and put up your feet and you don't really give a shit, and the guy says something dirty to the female and you still don't say anything, how fast that goes down.
Will: So that's what's happening.
Carrie: Now it's become a target. Right? I'm looking at these girls, going, like—I'm actually concerned that you're probably going to get raped and pillaged in this place. I'm like—I don't even want to see what happens.

Trent: Even when it comes to injuries. Some of the guys don't do the [Worker's Compensation Board] thing because it's like . . . I don't want to miss time. Because [managers] pin it on you too. Not so much WCB, but even if you took a General Illness day, or anything like that. They pin it on you when it comes to promotions.

Etienne: And we have some pretty big guards, and there's some pretty big guys on Pod 2 [the gang unit]—if they're ten times as strong as they should be if they're on this crap [drugs], right? So. . . y'know, it puts a lot of people in danger, where we're going to get really badly hurt. But

this is like—just an ongoing thing we deal with here, right? It's like a new generation, like, staff don't really care, they're just here for the paychecks and this and that. . .

These represent a small taste of my quotations, yet these excerpts outline assault, officer incompetence, drugs, mental health, management/staff relations, and maladaptive workplace culture as serious and pressing safety concerns. In short, my participants suggested their workplace environment, particularly within the ERC, was exceptionally difficult to navigate. In the face of these challenges, my participants were forced to choose priorities—and like Kauffman's study, officers typically focused on custody and control (1988, p. 46). Quite simply, they were too busy protecting themselves and their partners to provide care for inmates:

Clint: My strategy is just to ensure that my partner and I go home safe at the end of our shift. My partner is my lifeline—and obviously, I'm there to make sure the inmates are safe too, but with the influx of drugs and the amount of drugs that are in our centre, is quite . . . it's quite alarming.

These quotations suggest my participants viewed the duty of care in extremely simple terms: they felt they had provided sufficient care if there had not been any deaths or major assaults during their shift. This perspective is highly inappropriate, given the vulnerability of the inmate population. Yet, as with so many things within the prison, structural pressures seem to have shaped and exacerbated the dominant officer perspective. Vulnerability was a uniquely powerful force in this; as officer Clint suggests, the constant awareness of numerical inferiority to a violent, unpredictable, and drug-addicted population deeply shaped officer attitudes toward their duties, most notably the duty of care. This does not excuse their attitudes or subsequent behaviours of course, as the lack of care was noticeable even to us, an outside research team.

Prison Work: Economic Necessity, with a Dash of Mental Health

Most research portrays corrections as a job which you 'end up' in rather than aspire to. Kauffman suggests economic necessity pushed her participants into corrections (1988, p. 171), while Crawley (2004) discusses how her prison officers had "'fallen into' the job" (p. 66) due to

circumstances. As one of the officers in her sample put it, “This job is not one you plan to do when you’re a kid . . . this job’s something you do when something goes wrong” (Crawley, 2004, p. 66). My participants expressed similar sentiments. In short, corrections either represented a ‘back-up’ plan for officers (Lombardo, 1989, p. 29) or a stepping stone for other careers, usually policing (Kauffman, 1988, p. 175). Tyler was just one of five officers I spoke to who had or was planning on submitting a policing application:

Tyler: Well, so, I wanted to be a police officer, and I was Ontario. And there’s no jobs there, and I passed all this testing to be a police officer, and they told me I was too young, needed life experience. So I applied here, got the job, I was really excited to come. So that’s what brought me here to corrections. So I came here, and now I don’t know. I’m kinda stuck—staying here or being a cop. I like this job. (Group interview A)

Overall, my participants primarily fit under the economic mould: most had never expected or wanted to be corrections officers, and had ended up working in the prison after the failure of other career options. Officer Matt put it to me this way:

Matt: I mean, I didn’t get into corrections because I wanted to, either. I landed in it, because I came out to Alberta, and I was framing . . . [it] dried up. We lost a couple contracts, and they wanted to go somewhere down south. And I was like, I’m not moving for a framing job. So I moved into the concrete stuff, same thing. It was like, there was no work, had to go find something else. And I ended up—a buddy of mine was like, y’know what, corrections—once you get in, the worse the economy gets, the better your job gets (laughter). There’s ample overtime if you need it, you just put your name in the book and you have an extra $400, so. . .

Officer Matt mentions career security as a prime motivation for remaining in corrections. This is a common theme (Kauffman, 1988, p. 172; Lombardo, 1989, p. 27); in fact, Lombardo goes so far as to say, “psychologically and financially, many guards at Auburn [penitentiary] are imprisoned, dependent on the prison for their new, secure lifestyle” (1989, p. 28).

Both Kauffman and Crawley mention the strong connection between prior military service and correctional work. In fact, corrections has long been seen as a logical ‘next step’ for ex-soldiers due to its highly structured, para-military nature (Crawley, 2004, p. 14; Kauffman,

1988, p. 223). Out of the 43 unique individuals who I spoke to across my 33 interviews, at least 8—18 percent—were ex-military. This created a strong military ethos in both the FSCC and the ERC, and influenced the creation of 'boot camp' units at both prisons. It also shaped the way officers viewed radicalization, as we shall see.

Lombardo and Kauffman did their research in the eighties, and Crawley's research is nearly 15 years old. There is almost no recent literature on correctional officers, and I found important differences between my research setting and the existing literature. Most of my participants suggested officers were willing—even eager—to leave the correctional environment:

Will: . . . the rumor at the Fort, we always heard horror stories, 'oh, ERC's losing this many people!' It'd be quiet, then it'd flair up—'oh, they lost 35 people this month!' or something. Is the staff turnover still that high?
Ryan: Yes.
Paul: Yeah. I heard they can't replace—right now, they're at a point of not being able to replace faster than they're losing.
Will: They're still at that point.
Ryan: In the past 30 days, this shift alone has had eight guys quit.
Will: What?!
Ryan: Just this shift—I obviously can't count for other shifts, but I'm sure it's around there
Will: Eight. . . guys . . . this . . . shift?!
Ryan: In thirty days. My buddy's leaving—his last set this week. He's number eight. (Group interview A)

As officers Paul and Ryan outline, staff retention was a human resources catastrophe at the ERC. The majority of prison staff had less than two years on the job; 'senior' officers had five years' experience, in a career where pension eligibility is 35 years. I gathered some evidence to suggest staff turnover was redefining the CO subculture—my participants especially commented on their inability to trust their coworkers. This, in turn, negatively impacted the way officers did their jobs. The reasons behind the mass exodus were legion, but perceptions of vulnerability appeared to be significantly impacting individual officers' mental health:

Asher: I find that . . . I'm different since I started this job. I have—I've always been naturally untrusting of people, but even more so now. I always feel like people are trying to rip me off . . .

when I go to the malls, I'm scanning. I'm just looking for threats. Even though the odds are nothing, even if they saw me, what's going to happen? Probably nothing. . . Go to restaurants, sit with your back to the wall, you're with a date or a friend, and . . . they don't have your attention because you're doing that, right?

Uncomfortably, officer Asher's perspective was not an isolated one:

Chan: . . . the mental health [of] the officers spills over into how they work. Not only that, it's how they treat each other, right?

"It's like a workplace injury. You get injured working here, psychologically." (Field Note, April 2017)

Crawley and Kauffman both suggest many officers stay in corrections despite major damage to their personal identification, emotional well-being, and physical health (Crawley, 2004, p. 65; Kauffman, 1988, p. 212). Overall, the officers I interviewed were unhappy, and dissatisfied with their jobs. As one of my former coworkers—a CO with over 30 years of experience—put it,

"Corrections is the participation ribbon of law enforcement." (Field note, August 2016)

In fact, many officers, especially the ones I knew, congratulated me on leaving the jail:

"I wish I was brave enough to do what you're doing and go back to school" (Field note, April 2017).

"Yeah. good for you for leaving. I was happy for you when you said you were going back to school." (Field note, December 2016)

Asher: No man, there's more to life than this. It's not a bad job—but I find, there's no job satisfaction here, right? I mean, what are we doing really? Nothing.

Interestingly, officer Asher had no plans to leave corrections—and like him, there was a large group of officers at both the ERC and the FSCC who took pride in their work and did it well, despite significant personal costs. These costs were less at the FSCC, but were still present. For these officers, the instability within their workforce simply became another structural factor which influenced their outlook on inmates, and changed the way they viewed each other.

Aspects of the Officer Subculture

Q: How many correctional officers does it take to push an inmate down a set of stairs?

A: None. He slipped. (Joke I heard—and told—as a CO)

Prison officers are notorious for solidarity and suspicion toward outsiders, something often referred to as 'The Thin Blue Line' when discussed in policing literature (Crawley, 2004, p. 35; Kauffman, 1988, p. 85; Klofas & Toch, 1982, p. 247; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 153). This is at least partially due to negative officer stereotypes: "some officers noted the public's perception that there must be 'something wrong with' people who want to be prison officers" (Crawley, 2004, pp. 244, 241; see also Kauffman, 1988, pp. 237–238). This has influenced the development of a distinct officer culture. In the words of Arnold et al., "We know there is, or often has been, a widely shared prison officer culture, or 'working personality', characterized roughly by insularity, group solidarity among officers, pragmatism, suspiciousness, cynicism, conservatism, machismo and distance from senior management" (Arnold et al., 2007, p. 484). Kauffman (1988) outlined nine detailed values of this working personality: (1) Always help an officer in distress, (2) Don't lug drugs, (3) Don't rat, (4) Never make another CO look bad in front of inmates, (5) Always support a CO in a disagreement with an inmate, (6) Always support officer sanctions against inmates, (7) Don't be a 'white hat,'[36] (8) Solidarity against all outsiders, (9) Show positive concern for fellow officers (Kauffman, 1988, pp. 85–117).

Arnold et al. (2007), Liebling, Price et al. (2011) and Crawley (2004) dispute the universality of these norms, but at least some of them were at play at the ERC and the FSCC:

Ricky: What do you tell your instructors about corrections? . . . Do they know what goes on in that place?
Will: Nobody knows. Nobody has any clue.
Ricky: What do they think goes on there? . . . People—your professors and shit, they think it's Alcatraz, throwing people in a hole. They think it's the States—where if you do something to a guard, they'll put you in Seg for four, five years.

[36] Someone who is more concerned with inmates and their feelings and rights than about officers

Officer Ricky's comments demonstrate several of these norms. First, they display my continued inclusion within the CO code of solidarity. My research partners faced scrutiny and suspicion from officers, but my 'insider' status meant I did not—or, at least, faced a different type of scrutiny and questioning. Kauffman and Marquart, both former COs, outline similar findings; officers viewed them as sympathetic figures, and they were able to access a wide range of information which was normally inaccessible due to CO solidarity norms (Kauffman, 1988, p. 278; Marquart, 1986, p. 29). Officer Ricky's comments also demonstrate sensitivity about outside perceptions of corrections, as he suggests 'outsiders' automatically compare Canadian prisons to American 'worst case' scenarios.

Kauffman's norms about mutual support also came up in my sample. For instance, officer Ethan described the importance of helping other officers in distress:

Ethan: And you get some of these new staff that doesn't want to fight—are you fucking kidding me? That's why they teach control tactics, that's why defensive fuckin— . . . You're going to get into a fight. It's like saying, you want to be a cop but you don't want to use a pistol? What? What's wrong with you?

Many officers shared officer Ethan's uncompromising views on this subject, leading to a framework where officers felt forced into action. This went to shocking extents, both within my sample and in academic literature. New officers in Kauffman's sample who violated or refused to adopt the subcultural norms were informally expelled from the 'society' of prison; one of her participants describes being ostracized and fearing for his physical safety—all for the perceived sin of vocally supporting inmate rights (Kauffman, 1988, pp. 206–207). I saw people 'run out' of the FSCC during my career, and officer Quinton described a similar situation at the ERC:

Quinton: One example—guy went to a code. Skinny kid, all that—dropped his keys. You're not supposed to have your keys with you—what are you doing stopping and picking up your keys during a [Code] 44?[37] *Like, your partner's getting—like, so that . . . immediately.*

[37] An institutional code for "Officer Requires Assistance". Officers call a "44" when an inmate attacks them, or they have to use force to control a potentially-violent situation. Our data is rife with accusations of abuse.

Will: Really? So as simple as, he had his keys at the wrong time.
Quinton: Had his keys at the wrong time, dropped his keys, did the wrong thing about it, and did not jump into the code. He did not go in to go help. Stood on the outside—not knowing what to do. . . . but because that happened, he's no longer part of the group. And until something happens where he can prove himself . . .

This excerpt draws a harsh picture of the importance placed on subcultural compliance within the prison setting. It also shows the importance which small actions hold, which in another context would be meaningless. In this case, a rookie officer's hesitation in using force proved to be a differentiating factor between being 'in' and 'out' of the group—and by extension, potentially 'in' or 'out' of a job. Yet, officer Quinton also outlines a 're-entry' clause in the officer subculture—namely, 'proving' yourself in a fight:

Quinton: I wasn't immediately liked when I started . . . I was an EMT firefighter. I was used to helping people and all that. I wasn't used to officer stuff . . . so they didn't know what to do with me. Couple fights in, all of a sudden, I became part of the guys. The big turning point for me was, I was walking by the tank we kept all the PCs in. and there was a fight breaking out in there . . . for whatever reason, I turned around, casually said 'Code 66,' [fight between two inmates,] opened the door—and . . . the one guy was facing away from me and throwing punches. I grabbed him by the back, and I just ripped him out. And because I did that, and just because of the way he was balanced and everything, he went flying . . . The other guy's standing in front of me, and I pointed at him—'Don't fuckin' move.' And I shut the door, right? That was bad-ass enough, it was strong enough, and it happened in a matter of seconds. And everyone's just kinda looking. . . alright! That works! And then all of a sudden you're in.

Officer Quinton's story couplet emphasizes the importance of being willing to use force—and more importantly, being *seen* to be willing to use force—within the prison. This was an important factor in shaping membership within the officer subculture, particularly at the ERC. Other officers corroborated Quinton's tales of driving out hesitant staff members, and also discussed the redemption option. Crawley hints at the extent of these subcultural enforcement actions, which demonstrates the importance which officers place on compliance: "Individually, prison officers are the salt of the earth. But as a group . . . They can be evil. I certainly wouldn't

want to cross them. . . . staff that did had their tyres slashed and paint stripper put on their cars" (2004, p. 90).[38]

Despite these forces, many people I spoke to expressed concerns about officer attitudes toward violence. In fact, several participants saw the subcultural norms of the officer cadre as a direct threat to their personal and career security. Officer Matt put it this way:

Matt: That's the thing that's almost terrifying. You go into a code [fight], where you're like—there's certain guys that I work with, I'm like—alright, well, if he decides to go and fight an inmate, I have to have a game-plan in mind: if he's going to do that, I've gotta be, alright. Well, there's a potential lawsuit—yes, I could lose my job, but that's not the worst thing. I could be dragged down and potentially charged, right? . . .
Will: So what do you do in that situation? Because I know there was one or two times at the Fort, where it's like—I saw something building, and I said, 'I gotta go help the nurses,' and disappeared.
Matt: I'm not gonna. . . if he's going to go in and fight a guy, I don't want to leave him there.
Will: You can't.
Matt: No, you can't. He's going to go in and fight a guy, what's going to happen? He's going to fight him and end up losing, and I'm not there to back him up? But my go-to is, if there's a fight, I'm like, I'll restrain the legs. Once he gets on the ground, I just grab his legs and stand there, kinda backed out, holding his legs and looking at the camera, I'm like. . .

Despite officer Matt's concerns about potential criminal liability, he continued to abide with the subcultural norms surrounding use of force. Matt's reaction to my story also speaks to the officer code: I left a volatile scene, which could realistically have escalated into violence between my partner and an inmate, because I—personally—thought my partner's attitude was inappropriate and potentially illegal. I also felt that, if I left, my partner would hesitate before trying to fight the inmate. Although this was wise from a personal liability standpoint, my decision violated several CO norms, and Matt recognized this. Rather than commend my decision or accept it as a future template, officer Matt dismissed it; in fact, his wording—'I'm not gonna'—suggests

[38] I believe this story, because a similar incident took place when I worked at FSCC. One of my coworkers had his tires slashed by another officer, who believed he had 'ratted' him/her out during a departmental investigation. Although I knew the tale, I heard about it again on my second day at the ERC when I recognized the victim—and later, the perpetrator, who still had a job with Corrections.

active disagreement with my actions.[39] The structural pressures at play instead caused him to comply with the subcultural norms, even when he feared the consequences. Yet, his negotiation of risk suggested he complied to the minimum extent possible, to prevent damage to his career.

Perception is the strongest link between Kauffman's norms, as most of her rules centre on how officers perceive a specific act or viewpoint. For instance, the importance of Norm 7—don't be a white hat, or as my participants put it, a 'con lover'—has nothing to do with inmates; rather, its significance lies in the all-encompassing importance of officer solidarity. In Kauffman's words, "Walpole officers perceived that their situation would have been intolerable had it not been for this unquestioning solidarity. So important were expectations of support that even defending an inmate in a *private* conversation with fellow officers was frowned upon" (1988, p. 102). As a result, officers shaped their actions toward inmates on the basis of their coworkers' perceptions (Crawley, 2004, pp. 91–92; Kauffman, 1988, p. 102; Marquart, 1986, p. 21). Officer Matt—who spoke at length about how subcultural norms influenced his work—described the pressures at the ERC:

Will: The real problem is—and again, this is one of the things that got to me, the guys who are out to kill somebody, who are out to beat somebody, especially the officers—[40]
Matt: Yeah, and they take pride in being like—ah, yeah yeah—
Will: Yeah! I effed up an inmate today! . . .
Matt: ***What makes you better than another inmate, then? . . . If you don't take part in the—if you run to a [fight], and you don't throw one little punch, it's like—hey! Why didn't you throw a punch man?! Well, I didn't want to****.*

The important force at play here is not the concrete act of kindness or hostility toward the inmate—rather, it is the perception of the act to those around it. We have already seen the way

[39] The situation I imply was not an actively violent scenario; instead, I left a situation where I suspected (correctly, as it turned out) that several of my coworkers were about to assault an inmate who had reported to the prison angrily and obnoxiously drunk, although not violently so. The main perpetrator of this assault later told me I made a 'good call' by going somewhere else.
[40] This is another example of my interviewing inexperience. Although I improved throughout my data gathering process, there are some interviews where my questions are leading.

perceptions around use of force can shape membership within the subculture. Likewise, CO's perceive norms about supporting fellow officers as their only armour against vulnerability within the institution, regardless of whether they personally agree or disagree with the actions (Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, pp. 165–166). As my data show, perception plays a strong role in shaping individual officer actions toward inmates within the prison (Kauffman, 1981, p. 292). This, in turn, played a role in shaping views on radicalization within my setting.

Chapter V: Officer Perspectives on Radicalization

In my chapter on radicalization, I spent a significant amount of time discussing the analytical utility of the RCMP's radicalization definition. To revisit this quickly:

> [Radicalization is] . . . the process by which individuals . . . are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views. . . . [I]t becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological, or religious extremism (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 1).

The length and nuance of this definition is a reminder of the complexity surrounding radicalization. My data remain true to form. I discovered a bewilderingly diverse range of opinions, stories, folk-tales and myths about radicalization in both the ERC and the FSCC. Yet, several themes were strongly evident. Officers did not observe stereotypical radicalization within their settings, and expressed confusion about how to define the term. Even though my participants were unsure about the 'proper' definition, they perceived radicalization as a significant threat, and applied the term in three distinctive to three distinctive groups: gangs, Muslim inmates, and Freemen on the Land/Sovereign Citizens. Each of these applications speak to how my participants understand radicalization within the correctional setting, and how their understanding and perceptions govern their actions toward inmates. I will outline each of these three applications in detail—but, a single, key theme tied all these points together. My participants inability to find the forms of radicalization they were unconsciously looking for meant they redefined 'radicalization' to fit and explain the features of prison life they *did* observe. Many of my participants based this on inmate actions: officers rarely hesitated to label difficult prisoners as 'radicals,' particularly if they were Black or Middle Eastern, or claimed Islamic beliefs. However, this was merely a symptom of a larger theme: officer perceptions of

risk. The societal risk paradigms which accompany radicalization and terrorism deeply shaped officer outlooks. When these societal pressures blended with the heady, violent, and stratified subculture of the prison, officer risk perceptions led to real-world—even violent—outcomes for people across the prison.

Fearing the Unknown: Absence and Confusion about Prison Radicalization

My major finding simply restates the introduction to this section. Few of my participants knew what I was talking about when I asked about radicalization:

Will: Do you think that radicalized . . . do you know what I mean when I'm talking about radicalization?
Esther: I'm not exactly sure what you are talking about.

Establishing what radicalization 'meant' was a challenge. The majority of my participants struggled to provide me with a definition. Several officers had no idea what the term meant, while others had some idea—usually influenced by media portrayals—but expressed confusion about the topic as a whole. Their implicit definitions often became clear in the context of the interview (as we shall see), but some people requested, and even demanded, a definition before they were willing to speak on the subject:

Jennifer: So. . . radicalization as in like gangs and stuff? What's the definition of radicalization?
Will: Radicalization is more um . . . moving toward the terrorist side of things. Extreme ideologies. Extreme ideas. And gangs come into it a little bit. I think white supremacists are probably the best example.
Jennifer: Or like, Native Pride or these . . . what's the native gangs . . .
Will: There's the Redd Alerts,[41] *the [Alberta Warriors]*[42] *. . .*
Jennifer: Yeah Redd Alert.

Will: I guess the first one—probably the best one to start . . . do you see any radicalized guys coming in?
Ricky: Define radicalization
Will: Define radicalization . . . What do you think? I'm going to put that back on you.
Ricky: Depends what you're talking about. Whether it's gangs, or Islam.

[41] A well-established prison/street gang, likely one of the largest in the province. Also known as the RA's.
[42] A defunct prison/street gang, one of the original Aboriginal gangs in the province.

Will: So, the one question I haven't really asked yet—radicalization. We've asked some questions around it—have you ever seen anything going around like that, do you think it's a load of crock, or what do you think? . . .
Matt: I dunno. Like, radicalization as in ISIS and what-not?

Tim: OK. Well. . . when you say radicalization, like. . . I know the term like, institutionalization, where people become—they learn the code, the rules, the behaviour and follow it to survive in jail type a thing. So radicalization—to me that might apply more to, Islamic gangs that are coming in?

I draw two key factors from these quotations. First, my participants expressed confusion about the 'proper' definition of radicalization—something indicative in and of itself, as it suggests Albertan CO's are not observing or dealing with radicalization into violence of any type in their prisons. This is a direct challenge to alarmist prison radicalization literature (Cilluffo et al., 2007; Wilner, 2010), and suggests prison radicalization literature has been overwrought. As we shall see, the lack of a 'proper' definition meant my participants redefined what it meant to be a 'radical' within the prison context. Second, these quotations demonstrate a subtle hesitation around discussing radicalization. Initially, I believed officers prevaricated because they did not understand what 'radicalization' meant. However, my analysis suggests my participants had an opinion, but were unwilling to share it until they had established *my* views on the subject. Many observers have critiqued the implicit racism of media coverage and research on radicalization and terrorism, as terrorism has been repeatedly associated with Islam (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, p. 152). Although the majority of my participants—particularly the ones from the ERC—described a troubled relationship between CO's and Muslim inmates, most were cautious about doing so. In other words, they recognized the danger and potential racism of labelling Muslims as 'radical'; yet simultaneously, many of them perceived what, to them, appeared to be a realistic risk of Islamist radicalization within the jails.

Despite my participants' confusion about radicalization, I found nothing to suggest ideological radicalization into violence was a major problem at the ERC or the FSCC. Quite simply, my participants reported a near-total absence of stereotypical 'radical' groups within either prison:

Jennifer: Honestly, in our centre, I can't really see it being that much of an issue. Because it's not that bad there, honestly.

Dr. Haggerty: Right. So—you mentioned gangs. Are there other extremist kinda groups that you've encountered, or seen?
Francis: Well, I haven't seen any.

Will: But you guys are saying, you haven't seen any of that? Because if it's happening, this would seem like a decent spot to spot it.
Tyler: Too many native gangs and stuff here.
Ryan: They only come in singles, right? Only one or two kicking around.
Tyler: It's not often here.
Alfie: They don't really recruit here, but. . . you see a lot of people switching to Muslim here too. People reading Korans. But it could just be a front to get on a diet. (Group interview A)

Although many officers shared apocryphal stories about 'radical' inmates—which were usually folk-tales about "that time we had a terrorist on Max Pod"—only a few had actually worked with individuals who were members of radical groups. Those who had worked with 'terrorists' spoke contemptuously of their mental health and intelligence, characterizing them as "crazy", "stupid", and "non-factors" within the inmate subculture. This represents a notable contrast to existing research from other contexts. Studies in the UK and France have described prison officers in those settings as informed and concerned about radicalization, particularly Islamist radicalization (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 295; Liebling, Arnold, et al., 2011; Liebling & Straub, 2012). In my setting, ideological radicalization was uncommon, and as a result, it was not a pressing, day-to-day concern for my participants.

I expected my participants to be skeptical about my research because of this:

Will: Long story short. . . we're trying to talk to people about how they join radical groups in prison. That doesn't mean it actually happens.
Jason: It doesn't. Not here . . . [several moments later] Fuck your research on radicals man . . . What you're looking for does not exist
Will: You don't think so.
Jason: Fuck no. I mean, maybe some of the Muslim guys, they might want to be. They say they are. But legit fucking ties? Fuck that. There's no—if you did your whole research, I bet you're coming back with under three percent. And I would say even under one percent. That would be my guess.

Our team's inmate interviews largely support officer Jason's assessment of how common ideological radicalization was in both the FSCC and the ERC. I have no reason to suggest there was significant ideological radicalization of any kind in either prison. Surprisingly though, Jason's comments were one of the few criticisms I encountered. In an odd juxtaposition, the majority of my participants expressed deep interest in my research topic:

Will: So, I mean. . . do you think radicalization in prison is actually something we should be worrying about, or should we be focusing on stuff like gangs and stuff?
Lukas: Oh, I think radicalization is something we should be concerned about.

Will: . . . what do you think about radicalization in Alberta prisons? . . .
Anna: I can see it being . . . so easy. It's a small town, with its own culture, its own moral standards, its own rules that is separate from the rest of society. I can see it being so reasonable. SO reasonable.

Tony: I think with the greater number of Muslims in custody, I think it's just inevitable that there's radicalization among our inmate population.

These comments are highly representative of my sample. Although few of the officers I spoke to had actually seen radical inmates on their units, the majority saw it as a realistic—even pressing—risk. Officer Matt explained the juxtaposition in excellent detail:

Matt: Yeah. Realistically, I don't think any of that's happening. From my perspective, I can't see anything happening at the moment within the Remand Centre.
Will: But you think the conditions are there maybe?[43]
Matt: . . . At the moment no. But I could see it. If somebody who was, who had those intentions, got access. . . I think it wouldn't be too hard. Because the population's right, right? Like, you have the Remand Centre, where you have a thousand seven hundred . . . inmates who already have a tendency toward violence. Not all of them, some of them, right? A good majority of them

[43] Another example of my inexperience as an interviewer, creating weak question design.

are in there for violent crimes and what not, right? And if they've already got a tendency toward that and now they're looking for an excuse to . . . kinda. . . approach violence . . . If they can go out and kill 20 people under the name of Allah, that's way better than them just going out and doing their thing, right?

This contradiction speaks to the perceived nature of radicalization. Officer Matt's comments specifically frame terrorism as a distinct risk, greater than ordinary criminality. He, and many of my other participants, also explicitly connected terrorism and radicalization with Islam, something which drove a deep wedge between officers and Muslim inmates, as we shall see. Finally, his comments also speak to how officers in my research settings view the inmates on their units—something which officer Tyler also spoke on:

Will: . . . Basically in Europe, of the terrorist attacks that've happened in the last year and a half . . . half to three quarters of the guys who've done it have either been long-term crooks, or have joined ISIS while in jail.
Tyler: Because they're easy people to target! It's no different than any other gang. You target the weak, people who need support and family. And they think they're getting it from the gangs, but they're not.

My participants recognized the massive social pressures at play in the inmate population, and outlined the disadvantages which influence criminality. As officer Tyler points out, many CO's were sympathetic to the structural constraints which inmates, particularly youth from Aboriginal reserves, faced on a daily basis. Yet, my participants did not extend this sympathy to actions within the prison—on the contrary: my participants viewed the inmate population as a corruptible blank slate, highly susceptible to any sort of malevolent guidance and manipulation. They blamed structural disadvantage for creating this population, but also recognized the serious hazards it presented (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 586). Officer Matt emphasized how "the population was right" for radicalization, and other participants repeatedly outlined their perceptions of vulnerability within the prison setting. In this environment, my participants over-emphasized the risks that they perceived—which meant they nervously expected threats which they had not yet seen. Most CO's discussed radicalization as something that *can* and *will* develop

in Albertan prisons, rather than something which *has,* or *may or may* not develop. This speaks to the notable risk profile that my participants attached to radicalization. However, this did not apply equally to all forms of radicalization, leading (as we shall see) to active redefinition and labelling of inmate religious beliefs.

Relocating Radicalization

My participants viewed prison radicalization as an impending reality. Several told me about European and Middle Eastern prison radicalization; using this as evidence, they framed radicalization as a threat to order within their prisons, and began watching for clues of ideological extremism among the inmates on their units. However, few officers believed radical beliefs were originating in prison, suggesting the 'true' cause was outside the centre walls:

John: I would say any . . . without any certainty, they were radicalized or had the beliefs prior to being incarcerated. We're not seeing a lot of guys becoming radicalized in here, and I think—with the exception of some of the mental health guys who always kind of pop up—we're not even fitting them into . . . really, doing a lot of the work on identifying them. . . [did] he already having radical beliefs before coming in? Yes, for sure. Most of these guys are.

Because my participants did not see radicalization occurring in either prison, they largely relocated the cause, and subsequent blame, to other settings:

Will: Do you think it's [radicalization] . . . do you think this sort of thing is happening? . . .
Tony: Well, I'll tell you what. I wouldn't be surprised if it was happening. I can't cite any recent examples, but I know that . . . an example, from a friend of mine. His wife teaches at [Neighbourhood] Junior High school here in the city. And they have a Muslim program there . . . She went to the photocopy machine, she was just standing and waiting for some other stuff to be processed that another teacher had put through the machine. She grabbed one of the copies off the machine, and started to read it. And it said, part and part, the depths of hell are reserved for murderers and Christians.

Lukas: . . . I think leaders, people who are like religious leaders that work in institutions, would be good to talk to.
Will: Imams and stuff.
Lukas: I think so. Do I think it's a problem? Absolutely. I think the distorted of anything is—people should be educated. Let's face it. Do you know what happens in a mosque? Could you and I walk into a mosque on a regular worship night, and understand what's being taught?

"There are no radicals here. I've only seen one who claimed legitimate allegiance, and he was a total outcast. There is none here. You're looking in the wrong place. If you want to find radicals, go look in mosques." (Field note, CCC, April 2017)

Given the intimate connection between Islam and terrorism in research, media coverage, and pop culture, it is unsurprising to see mosques cited as a source of radicalization. More surprisingly, mosques were not the most commonly cited sources of radicalization. My participants, especially the more experienced officers (including three officers who specialized in investigating gangs and radicalized prisoners), cited the Federal penitentiary system as the place where I would find violent ideological radicalization:

Ricky: . . . if you're looking to get a group of guys, you want to convert a bunch of guys to Islam or whatever, I'd be the Feds, if I was a prick.

Will: . . . We discussed a little bit about the radicalization thing last year, I think. . .
Lukas: Yeah . . . which is really prevalent in the Federal system.
Will: In the Feds? More than in the province, you think?
Lukas: Yeah, I think . . . you asked me this in the messaging, and I asked myself, I wonder if he knows some of the Paris terrorists, for example. They've confirmed they were radicalized while they were incarcerated.

Esther: I think the provincial system's the wrong system for you to look at. Just because time is short. I don't think people join, because they're in for a shorter period of time. I think the Federal system is where you get all this. Especially when you look at joining the Freemen, or gangs, and ISIS. I think that's more likely to happen in the Federal system because they have a longer term.

My participants did not doubt the reality of prison radicalization; they simply disagreed about where I might find it. They differentiated between the provincial and federal correctional systems for one simple reason: none of them believed inmates served enough time in the provincial prison system to allow for in-depth recruiting. Only one (unrecorded) participant suggested the provincial system was a greater risk:

"When I asked him why, he suggested the increased volatility of the provincial system, the increased movements in and out of the jails, makes the province more susceptible to radicalization. He used the example of sexual exploitation to explain his reasoning. 'Same reason that pimps pick young girls. They don't pick older women. Pimps pick young girls because they're young, they're still trying to figure out who they are, they're susceptible to

manipulation, they're looking for meaning, they're looking for identity. By the time you get to the Federal system, you're already radicalized. You're not searching for anything, you're not . . . looking for something, you're already there.'" (Field note, July 2016)

This officer had worked in the Federal system. Although he made an interesting argument, he was the only one to do so: every other officer who spoke about this (including at least one more who had worked in the Federal system) pointed to the Federal system as a greater risk. This was a consistent finding between the ERC and the FSCC—something I found surprising, as the FSCC has a higher percentage of long-term sentenced offenders compared to the ERC. Yet, staff at both centres insisted the time-frame within the province was not sufficient for radicalization:

Esther: We have a revolving door compared to the federal. Even [compared] to the Remand.

Francis: . . . a Remand Centre is a little bit more short-term, that might be some of the reasons we're not seeing a lot of recruitment attempts, because, y'know, recruiting someone into become a follower of ISIS or the Freemen on the Land—it's probably a pretty exhaustive process. It takes a lot of time. I don't think you can just come up to someone and be like, hey, wanna be. . . a radical terrorist? I think you've got to work at it for a while.

Quinton: . . . it's a Remand centre. The average stay in there isn't a couple years, it's a couple days . . . Weeks or days. It's not in the months or years. They come in, and . . . seventy percent of them come in, and they're out within a couple weeks, a month.

Although my participants widely dismissed ideological radicalization within their own settings, they actively relocated it to other settings. This speaks to the risk which they perceived from radicalization; in essence, many officers relocated radicalization to explain why something which—logically, to them—*should* have appeared, *has not yet* appeared in the forms they expect.

As we shall see, a large proportion of my participants conflated radicalization and gang membership. Yet, there were notable differences in how they discussed the two groups, which sheds interesting light on how perceptions of risk function within the prison. To put it nicely, officers held deep skepticism about prison gangs:

Quinton: [ASAP[44] *is] small potatoes—but in the jail, they're recruiting like it's going out of style. But it's kind of like being recruited into a book club. If you don't show up, who cares? . . . It's like, oh, you want to be in my gang? You're 18? Yeah, sure! You're getting out in a week? OK! Go back to Cold Lake, don't worry about it. Right? [a moment later] . . . native gangs, they fall apart like crackers.*

In short, my participants believed anyone could join a gang, especially in the ERC. Although they acknowledged this was an issue—especially from a security standpoint—they also believed gangs were only a threat in an extremely limited frame of reference:

*John: We'll just use the Redd Alert. Their recruitment standards are basically . . .you do a crime, you continue to do what we tell you, you bring in drugs, you assault who we tell you, y'know. . . you complete so many missions, and then you're one of us. Or you might not be one of us, you might do stupid shit for us for the rest of your life until you figure out that you just keep doing stupid shit. So . . .**That recruitment is very different than what we see with radicals, and radicals for the most part . . . they're changing their beliefs**, not doing missions to become something, right?*

Officer John outlines the contrast nicely, by dismissing the risk of native gangs and emphasizing the risk of radicalization. Many officers believed radical group membership was more stable and required a significant amount of effort to successfully achieve—an effort which, they believed, was not possible due to time constraints in the provincial prison system. The academic literature does not support this theory, as individuals can become radicalized in timeframes ranging from decades to days (Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, & Libretti, 2016, p. 68). In addition, terror networks are far less organized than popularly believed (Sageman, 2008; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, p. 158). Furthermore, Khosrokhavar found higher levels of frustration—particularly religious frustration—in the short-term and remand prisons he investigated, and suggests ". . . radical Islamists take advantage of these religious frustrations to accuse authorities of Islamophobia and also to sensitize fellow Muslims to their radical interpretation of Islam" (2013,

[44] Always Strive, Always Prosper. An up-and-coming prison/street gang in Alberta and Western Canada.

p. 292). This suggests my participants' efforts to relocate prison radicalization may, in fact, represent a false understanding of what radicalization is.

Risky Business

Overall, I would classify my participants' outlook on radicalization as 'absence, yet sincere concern.' It is an odd juxtaposition, and one which speaks to the different forces at play within the prison. Most importantly, this juxtaposition speaks to the vital importance of risk and officer risk perception within the prison.

Risk has become a topic of considerable sociological importance (Lupton, 2006, p. 12). Ulrich Beck's (1992, 1999, 2002) original concept of the "risk society" created an entirely new sociological paradigm, while scholars such as Simon, O'Malley, and Rose have applied Foucault's concepts of governmentality to explain individual and group reactions to 'risks' within daily life. These ideas have dramatically impacted sociological outlooks on the criminal justice system as a whole, and have provided strong explanations for the punitive shift in America (O'Malley, 1996, p. 197). The rise of terrorism in the public consciousness since 9/11 has had a similar impact: the unpredictable and violent nature of terrorism—and by extension, radicalization—has come to represent the ultimate threat to our 'risk society' (Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 10; Beck, 2002; Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 141). These societal-level explanations of moral panics and social movements do not necessarily explain the individual-level pragmatics of daily prison life; yet, by explaining how governance acts on individuals and causes them to internalize responsibility for terrorist threats, risk theory helps explain how and why CO's stereotype Muslim inmates and categorize them as "threats." It also speaks to why my participants were so eager to classify those who oppose control structures as "radical."

Conversations about the "Risk Society" often begin with Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992, 1999, 2002). His assessment of society as defined and wholly characterized by the "de-bounding of uncontrollable risks" (Beck, 2002, p. 41) has become hugely influential (Lupton, 2006, p. 12). A complete exposition of Beck's thesis is beyond the scope of this chapter, but in brief, Beck suggests post-World War II western society reconceptualised the idea of risk. Pre-WWII society was largely industrial, with strong nationalist tendencies; risks were seen as concrete, observable, and controllable, and were addressed, accounted for, and fixed by regular daily activity (Lupton, 2006, p. 12). Furthermore, citizens believed governments and international organizations were fully capable of addressing risks (Beck & Grande, 2010, p. 410). This trust slowly evaporated after WWII, as our society evolved toward a post-industrial, globalized focus, and Beck suggested our perception of risk changed along with it. Unlike the pre-war period, risk is now imbued with human responsibility, regardless of whether or not it is actually connected with any human action (Beck, 1992, 1999, Giddens, 1990, 1991; Lupton, 2006, p. 12). "[C]alculation and control evaporate" (Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 137), and as a result, uncontrollable, unbounded risks—such as SARS, nuclear waste, or (increasingly) terrorism—become globalized concerns which terrify individual citizens and affect whole societies.

In Beck's formulation, the increase in risk—and perhaps more importantly, fear of risk (Beck, 1992; Ericson & Haggerty, 2002, p. 269)—leads to the creation of a 'Risk Society,' which demands the complete eliminations of all threats to personal safety. Any risk which cannot be controlled represents a direct challenge to the credibility of governing structures—to a point where governing a country becomes defined by the tasks of risk assessment and management, rather than visionary leadership (Ericson & Doyle, 2004; Lupton, 2006). As Lupton puts it, "The prevention and minimization of 'bads' have therefore become a central problem for

contemporary societies. Both individual personal lives and the political area are dominated by concerns and debates about risk." (2006, p. 12). This has created increasingly hysterical messaging around any risk of any kind—which ironically, creates more damage and leads to greater harm than the 'risk' itself ever could have. As Ericson and Haggerty (2002), paraphrasing Beck, put it, "Fear ends up proving itself" (p. 269).

Crime is an excellent example of a 'risk' which must be 'controlled' in the Risk Society. Unsurprisingly then, the societal fear which characterizes the Risk Society has dramatically influenced the evolution of the criminal justice system. Ericson and Haggerty (1997, 2002) eloquently describe how this has influenced the evolution of policing agencies. Police are no longer expected to merely apprehend the 'bad guy' who has actually committed a crime; rather, officers and agencies are directly responsible for data collection and community education about risk, with the observable goal of reducing the 'threat' of crime (Ericson & Haggerty, 2002, p. 246). This logic has also impacted correctional agencies. Traditionally, decisions about sentencing and release were largely based on individual-level factors, often related to retributive factors or rehabilitative potential (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 451-452). Yet, with the increasingly punitive shift in sentencing, individual considerations no longer hold the same influence, as the correctional decision-making apparatus becomes ". . . concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness" (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 452). As this managerial focus steadily evolves, individuals become little more than fuel for the risk assessment machine; 'protecting' society from the possibility of victimization becomes paramount, and overpowers concerns like rehabilitation, racism and discrimination, and even guilt and innocence (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 452; Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2006, p. 445; Mythen & Wakelate, 2006, p. 389; Simon, 2008, pp. 90–91).

Although risk has been a key driver in the formation and evolution of penality and law enforcement, it has become even more pronounced around terrorism and radicalization. The World Trade Centre attacks represented a watershed moment for the Americano-centric world, in everything from language to foreign policy (Beck, 2002, p. 39; Simon, 2008, p. 93). Post-9/11, discussions of terrorism—as well as the fall-out from the 'war on terror' (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Simon, 2008)—have become near-synonymous with the Risk Society (Beck, 2002, p. 39). As Ericson (2008) puts it,

> Terrorism is a politics of uncertainty. For example, Jihadist terrorism targets the values, science, technology, and law of Western risk societies, seeking to transform them into uncertain societies. Terrorists are in the business of uncertainty, playing on randomness to keep whole populations in fear, anticipation, and disestablishment (p. 58).

Terrorism, then—and by extension radicalization—represents a key crucible for examining how the risk society attempts to insure and manage against something which "strikes at the foundation of risk society" (Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 141; see also Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 9; Ericson, 2008, p. 59)

Individual duties and responsibilities have always been part of corporate citizenship, but in the Risk Society, these duties dramatically increase. Most risk scholars describe how risk responsibility is transferred from the corporate citizenry to the individual citizen, especially in terms of insuring themselves against harm or taking preventative action to lower the chance of victimization (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Baker & Simon, 2010, p. 6; Ericson, 2008, p. 76; Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 165; O'Malley, 1996). In the words of Lupton (2006),

> As discourses on risk proliferate, more and more risk-avoiding practices are required of the 'good citizen'. Risk avoidance has become a moral enterprise relating to issues of

> self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement. It is deemed people's own responsibility to take note of risk warnings and act on them accordingly. Those people who fail to engage in such behaviours may thus often find themselves stigmatized and subject to moral judgements (p. 140).

As this implies, risk management is no longer a matter of government responsibility in the post-9/11 Risk Society. Rather, individual citizens are 'activated', as neo-liberal governmentality transfers responsibility for dealing with risk from the collective to the individual (Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 12; Mythen & Wakelate, 2006, p. 385; O'Malley, 1996, p. 197). "Responsibilized" individuals look after their own security by managing their own risk. This is often enforced by governmental institutions—for instance, many insurance agencies have made private security arrangements a legal requirement for companies, thereby reducing their own risk (Ericson & Doyle, 2004, p. 139; see also p. 262). This 'risk spreading' (Baker & Simon, 2010) has become so common O'Malley defines it as prudentialism: a "technology of governance that removes the key conception of regulating individuals by collectivist risk management, and throws back upon the individual the responsibility for managing risk" (O'Malley, 1996, p. 190).

This self-regulated, risk-based governmentality plays a key role in influencing banal, every-day decision making for the neoliberal subject (O'Malley, 1996, p. 196). Logically, people make more, and more important, risk-management decisions when they see and perceive the greatest level of risk—and as Ericson points out, the greatest perception of risk in our society is attached to terrorism, and by extension, radicalization: "the citizen must be ready for the malicious demon of terrorism in all places at all times" (Ericson, 2007, in Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 12). The continuing evolution toward actuarial and prudential viewpoints on risk (O'Malley, 1996, p. 190) means individual subjects have, in many cases, been entrusted with the

responsibility for observing, reporting, and avoiding both criminal activity/victimization and terrorist/radicalized activities (Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 12; O'Malley, 1996, p. 197).

Through this discussion, we can begin to see glimmers of how risk is relevant to my analysis; in brief, the risk society conditions officers to be conscious and aware of radicalization within their specific context. However, before we re-enter the analysis, there is one more step: the 'war on terror' has increasingly come to resemble and reproduce 'war on crime;' as a result, the individual, prudential viewpoint on risk governance has come into play for those on the 'front lines' (Simon, 2008). Individuals are responsible for preventing terrorism, as well as preventing crime. More specifically, as the boundaries between the 'war on crime' and 'war on terror' have begun to mesh—especially through the extensive reliance on local police agencies, prison and incarceration in both situations (Simon, 2008, p. 94)—correctional officers perceive they are 'responsible' to govern against the 'risk' of radicalization. My participants, especially those who investigated security threats, were unquestionably aware of this:

Will: But you guys are really actively managing it as well.
John: Well, yes. The other side of it is . . . unless we have staff who are providing us with details and information, right? We don't see what's going on. That becomes the biggest issue. I don't really want to comment on that side of stuff (laughter). . . . We keep an eye on these guys. If we have information that a guy might be radical and all of a sudden he's trying to preach to people on the unit, then we're immediately putting a stop to it. . . So, we're really targeting that—but it all boils back down to the staff. Are they fucking going to put something on ORCA that we can actually investigate? (laughter)

Yet, unlike the deliberate use of private security companies as an apparatus against terror attacks (Ericson, 2008, pp. 72–73), this appears (in the Albertan context) to have been by chance rather than design, leading to risk governance through uncertainty within the prison setting:

Will: So, I'm curious. . . have you guys been seeing any radical groups or anything coming through this place?
Jocelyn: Probably. I don't pay attention though. That's not in my job description.

This individual uncertainty is also indicative of how the risk society is shaped by terrorism: as Amoore and de Goede put it, "Risk in this sense is categorically not about reducing risk, achieving control, or even about ensuring safety or security – what matters instead is that the *appearance* of sociability and manageability is sustained" (2008, p. 9; ital. in original). As the subsequent analysis shows, my participants spent significant effort attempting to control the "appearance of sociability and manageability" (Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 9) within their particular setting; in fact, they went beyond it. My participants often acted on the basis of their perceptions, taking direct, if unofficial, action to control and govern what they interpreted as 'risky' or 'radical' behaviour on their units.

Theme I: Gangs and Redefining Radicalization within the Prison

The absence of ideologically-motivated radicalization within the two prisons I entered does not mean the concept of 'radicalization' was meaningless. On the contrary, my participants applied the term across a broad range of contexts, fitting—roughly—under the themes of gang membership, Islamic inmates, and mental health. The comparison between gang membership and radicalization was one of the most common themes:[45]

Will: Let's start with the radicalization question though. . . Have you seen anything, any incidents that you would consider radicalization while you're working?
Quinton: Break it down a little more for me. What kind of radicalization? . . . if you want to learn about that kind of stuff, the best sort of association I can make it to is gang recruitment.

Tony: But sure, I think any of these—whether they're Muslim inmates or Freemens or anything—aboriginal gang members. In their own way, they're radicalizing others as well, right?
Will: That's a really good point, actually. The gangs are probably doing it more for financial needs or financial reasons, wouldn't you say?
Tony: Yeah. But there's also the Aboriginal element, eh?—Red Power, and that kind of angle.

We have already discussed the variations in how officers perceived risk from gangs, compared to 'radicals.' A number of scholars have also discussed the similarities between radical group

[45] For more examples review the definitions of radicalization on p. 79-80.

membership and criminal gang involvement. Sullivan (2006) draws an alarmist picture. He suggests 'third-generation gangs'—groups like MS-13 which ". . . have evolved political aims and are the most complex gangs (J. P. Sullivan, 2006, p. 490)—could potentially apply their organizational structure toward terrorist, rather than criminally-motivated ends: "the [Paris] riots increasingly and alarmingly suggest that Islamist radicals see criminality as an opportunity for recruitment, while the criminals see Islam as a legitimizer" (J. P. Sullivan, 2006, p. 500). His predicted relationship between criminality and violent Islamism has proven disturbingly prescient in ISIS' European recruiting strategy (Burke, 2016; Chrisafis, 2015; Densley, 2014; Faucon et al., 2015). However, most scholars disagree with Sullivan's extrapolation of this relationship to gangs, insisting that shared anti-establishmentarianism is not sufficient to account for the nuanced differences between gangs and radical groups (Klein, 2007; Useem & Clayton, 2009, pp. 562, 577–578). Decker and Pyrooz point out organizational similarities between radical groups and gangs (2011, p. 154) and suggest gang research methodologies should be applied to radical groups (2015, p. 104). However, they continue to insist the variances between gangs and radical groups should not be minimized, pointing to differences such as financial versus ideological motivation, motivations for violence, and explicit political outlooks (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, p. 157, 2015, pp. 104–105, 109). They (and others) also point out the term 'gang' suggests a false uniformity, which disguises a myriad of complex variations between groups (Decker et al., 1998, p. 396; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, p. 154, 2015, p. 106). In short, while scholars recognize the similarities between gangs and radical groups, most believe they are insufficient to bridge the significant differences, justifying a continued academic separation.

Redefining radicalization: the importance of actions

My participants' application of 'radicalization' to gang membership was straightforward. In the absence of ideologically-motivated groups or individuals within the prison—in other words, groups which fit the stereotypical image of a 'radical'—the officers I interviewed applied the label of 'radicalization' onto the most visible groups they dealt with in the prison:

Asher: Well, in regards to prisons, so far in Alberta we haven't seen a lot of Muslim radicalization, but we've seen a lot of native gangs. Some of the older gang members will recruit the younger ones, and they'll slowly make them start carrying drugs for them, make them hold liquor for them, stuff like that. So I guess that's a form of radicalization.

Unwittingly, officer Ricky explained why officers so quickly resorted to this explanation, pointing out the longstanding structural issues at play:

Ricky: We don't see great organization. ***Our greatest fear is organization. It's always been—corrections is always scared. It used to be, if offenders were organizing in any way, we'd come down like the left hand of God****. I mean, like, literally—because you can't have it. What's gonna happen—you get these Muslims come in, they get the prayer mats, then the—'oh, that's cool, I want to be a Muslim, I'm a Muslim now too.'*

This crude 'organized group membership equals radicalization' theme was present across my transcripts—often alongside negative assessments of Islam, as we shall see. However, as I analyzed this more deeply, I realized officer Ricky (along with many other officers) had unconsciously oversimplified the issue. In presenting gangs as radicals within the prison, my participants had mistakenly confused a symptom as the root cause. The majority of officers used examples of active, oppositional behaviour from inmates (the sort gang members specialize in) when discussing radicalization within the prison, rather than discussing ideological outlooks. As a result, my participants began to define 'radicalization' on the basis of actions which they observed and experienced within the prison on a daily basis. This has some precedent in academic literature. For instance, Neumann (2013) and Borum (2011a, 2011b) outline actions-based, behaviourally-defined versions of radicalization as alternatives to the cognitive,

ideologically-based continuum model which I have used (Neumann, 2013, p. 875). Within the prison, this action-based model meant CO's applied radicalization to a wide range of individuals and groups, irrespective of whether they professed an ideological outlook; in fact, they labelled almost anyone who challenged the status quo of legitimate control as a 'radical:'

Quinton: You don't see a lot of radical movements from Remand. You'll see, specific incidents of it. So, if there is a [fight], and something pops off—let's say a guy gets in a fight with an officer, officer puts him on the ground in the cell or something like that, when that guy's getting walked out, everyone else's locked up. And everyone else will start banging on their glass, their window—they're either saying, yeah, get this head off here, or they're saying—they're upset because they don't think it's fair or something. And that's the closest thing you'll get to it. But by the next day, nobody cares. Very rarely will they carry on from there.

Officer Quinton's decision to label this as 'radical' behaviour initially seems whimsical, as the situation he describes is more closely related to mass disobedience, or a riot, than movement along an ideological continuum. However, this contradiction becomes clear if we apply an actions-based definition of radicalization—in fact, the inmates' mass disobedience becomes key in explaining *why* Quinton defined this situation as 'radical' activity. Active, oppositional behaviour—especially mass action—represents a direct challenge to the state's right to incarcerate lawbreakers. By extension, these actions signify a direct threat against COs, the most visible and accessible symbols of the state's power in the prison. Yet, this excerpt also emphasizes the 'temporary' nature of these actions; therefore, this conceptualization of radicalization only applies to individuals who are actively resisting control structures in the prison. In other words, officers tended to characterize inmates as 'radical' when they directly challenged official control of the prison. As officer Quinton specifically describes mass protests like this as temporary, this action-based definition of radicalization bears no relationship to long-term ideological radicalization or group membership. For most officers, the only important point in this scenario was the challenge levied against the prison's governance structures.

Quinton was the only officer to explain this redefinition in depth, which is why I have used his comments to outline the definition. However, this is not a minor theme; once I identified and isolated how this worked, I found examples of 'radicalization' being redefined by officers across my sample, in many different contexts—as we shall see. In fact, some of the more outlandish redefinitions added significant support to Quinton's explanation:

Stewart: Again, you talk about radicalization, it's really not just inmates, the officers too can be very radicalized in that us-versus-them mentality, where some of us look at them as . . . completely negatively, zero positive, like. . . if you had a choice, you'd take care of them and stuff like that, some guys. . . certain individuals start to develop these really radical beliefs, as they're sort of. . . not only screwed over by management, but also by our own . . . also by inmates as well, which then leads them to be more bitter at the system, so then they become more. . . to put it, for lack of a better word, more assholes, always yelling at inmates, locking them up for really no reason. Just having these beliefs that oh, they should all be liquidated and stuff like that. . . . [several minutes later] . . . It creates an 'us against them' mentality when there doesn't need to be one.

Officer Stewart's comments are idiosyncratic and—unsurprisingly—isolated. Yet, viewed through the lens of an actions-based model, they provide extensive support for my redefinition outlined above. Like officers Quinton, Asher, and Matt (among others), Stewart initially applied the label of 'radical' to a wide range of difficult inmates, specifically gang members who consistently challenged and disrupted order within the prison. His innovation lies in extending the definition of 'radical' to include the officer corps. This presents an apparent contradiction, as officers—by virtue of their official position—are on the 'right' side of the law, and therefore are in the 'right' when it comes to the control debate officer Quinton outlined. However, this is misleading. Like Quinton, Stewart's comments also centre on individuals who challenge legitimate control structures—officers who break centre policies and social mores by causing problems for inmates and/or officers, and actively express a desire to "take care of" or "liquidate" the inmates under their control. Stewart merely shifts the unit of analysis: officers are equally capable of committing inappropriate, deviant, and even corrupt actions which violate

control structures, social mores, and legal codes of conduct within the prison. As a result, Stewart's comments are not as idiosyncratic as they appear; rather, they add a strong layer of support for an action-based definition of radicalization, regardless of whether inmates or officers are responsible for the widespread anti-social actions which often define the prison.

Officer Stewart was alone in defining a portion of the officer cadre as 'radicalized' (although I did not explicitly probe on this). I nearly dismissed Stewart's perspective as an outlier, until I realized how many other officers expressed deep concerns with the CO subculture. My interviews provided me with a large body of data on subcultural forces within the prison, some of it surprisingly critical. Officers Etienne, Esther and Quinton drew direct comparisons between officers and gang membership, while Jason, Tony, and Matt (to name a few) repeatedly characterized officers—especially violent officers—as being 'no different' than inmates:

Esther: The officer code is exactly the same as the inmate code. It's just a different shade of blue.[46]

Jason: OK, so what makes us so different than inmates? . . . If you were to get 12 CO guys together, and get them pissed up and drunk, and you get twelve inmates pissed up and drunk, are the behaviours similar? Wow, right? THEY ARE!

Quinton: Being a CO, you're essentially part of the biggest gang in the jail. They teach you that when you first start. It kinda makes sense: it doesn't matter what's going on with the inmate or the officer, who's side do you take?
Will: Officer.
Quinton: Always take the officer's side. Even if you disagree, you take the officer's side. If that's not gang mentality . . . What is? There are numerous times that guys have seen greasy beat-downs, or. . .right? Kept their mouth shut . . . they all write it up the same way. It's not the right thing to do, but it is a gang mentality. Right? They all have each other's back, even if they don't like each other. Everything's dealt with in-house.

Comparing an officer to an inmate was a hugely pejorative assessment in both the ERC and the FSCC. As officer Quinton's comments show, the dominant subcultures placed a strong emphasis on an 'us vs. them' and 'good vs. bad' dichotomy, even in the face of behaviour approximating

[46] Refers to the light blue inmate coveralls, and the darker, navy-blue officer uniforms.

corruption. Yet, when my participants spoke to me about the officer subculture on their own, a significant portion abandoned this façade and used the inmate subculture to explain their own group membership. This went to surprising lengths. In fact, one participant implied support for violence against officers who violate the subcultural 'rules:'

Etienne: That's stuff we have to deal with, right? To trust your partner, sometimes, it's like . . .
Will: . . . I mean, that's a terrifying thing when you can't trust your partner
Etienne: Of course it is! You talk to the inmates—what do you do if you're in a gang and one of your bros, you can't trust him?
Will: The gang's going to fall apart.
Etienne: Guess what's going to happen to him? He's going to get beat up, they're going to get rid of him. Get rid of the garbage.

In drawing a direct link between the CO and inmate subcultures, my participants erased the dichotomy between the two groups. This is no small thing—in fact, it implicitly supports an actions-based definition of radicalization. About half of the officers I spoke to redefined radicalization as active opposition toward control structures, in one way or another. Therefore, by acknowledging and discussing the prevalence of semi-legal officer behaviour in the prison—which the main officer subculture occasionally encouraged—my participants implicitly support officer Stewart's assessment of 'radicalization' as the direct and continued subversion of legitimate control structures within the prison. Both officers and inmates were fully capable of crossing the figurative line set down by rules and social mores, and my participants recognized this. The actions-based model was not the only definition of radicalization at play in my setting, but it is a reasonable explanation for why my participants conflated gang membership with radicalization, rather than differentiating between the two on the basis of ideological motivation.

The absence, redefinition and relocation of radicalization described in these two sections are interesting on several levels. As we shall see, my participants' redefinitions seem to be interacting with stereotypical definitions of Islamist radicalization, suggesting there are multiple

discourses influencing their perceptions. The reasons for this are difficult to conclusively determine. Again, it speaks to the relative absence of ideologically-motivated groups within the prison contexts I studied; the relocation of prison radicalization to other contexts also suggest my participants were actively looking for 'radicals' who meet a media-driven definition:

Archie: . . . is he isolating himself, is he becoming more—y'know, very religious, or all of a sudden is glued to his prayer times, that sort of thing . . . These guys aren't at the top of the tier, screaming out stuff.

As they were unable to find these, they either redefined radicalization to fit their experiences, or redefined the inmates they met to fit a stereotypical definition, as I will discuss. Alternatively, the redefinition of 'radicalization' may represent an attempt by my participants to please me by discussing something they have not experienced (Charmaz, 2001, p. 681; May, 1991, p. 197). However, the officers I spoke to used the term in reference to a wide range of inmates and inmate behaviours. This suggests the word 'radical' carries a significant amount of caché in both prisons—and also speaks to the power implicit in labelling something as 'radical.' By doing so, my participants actively reframed difficult inmates of all stripes from irritations, to active threats to officer safety and social order. As a result, they increased the risk profile of these individuals, thereby justifying control strategies which would not have applied to a 'normal' inmate.

Theme II, part I: Officers and Islam

Ricky: There's an increase in the Muslim crap. Like, when I started, we never had a Qur'an. No. Are you kidding me?

The relationship between officers and Muslim inmates in the two prisons I entered was troubled. On the one hand, a significant portion of the CO's I spoke to recognized the value of religion as a tool for rehabilitation; many discussed the importance of protecting religious freedom, and several officers, both Muslim and Christian, discussed the deep impact religion had in their personal lives. Others expressed sincere concerns about racism they observed both in and

outside of prison, especially as it applied to discussions of radicalization. On the other hand, a significant portion of my sample identified Muslim inmates as a challenging group to deal with inside the prisons, and expressed sincere concern over the possibility—although not necessarily the incidence—of Islamist radicalization. Unsurprisingly, some of my participants viewed all Muslim inmates as 'radicals.' While it would be easy to dismiss such sentiments as simple racism, my data speak to a far more potent mix of active resistance, redefinition, prior military service, racial stereotyping, and cultural tropes which intermingle to create a potent risk paradigm, altering and shaping individual perceptions.

Islam is by far the fastest-growing prison religion in America. I was unable to find comparable Canadian prison data, but Islam is commonly cited as the fastest-growing religion in the country (Press, 2013). Hamm states 80% of all American religious conversions in prison are to Islam (2009, p. 670), and my participants (as Officer Ricky points out in the introduction to this section) also commented on the growth of Islam in their prisons. Despite popular stereotypes, it is grossly erroneous to conflate Islamic religious practice with radicalization (Hamm, 2009, 2013)—something which some, but not all, of my participants recognized. A number of officers commented on the rehabilitative potential of religion in prison, while others outlined the value of individual religious freedom:

Matt: I think it's good, because if an inmate can find faith, whatever it is, I don't care what it is, it's generally going to lead to good things. So, it's just because it's new within the prison system that all these guys are finding the, finding some faith in Muhammed or Allah or whoever it is. . . . [a moment later] *when someone says, all Muslims are bad, I'm like—no. One billion of them aren't.*

Etienne: I know there's certain people—like, all of a sudden they'll say they're Buddhist or Muslim, and they're white guys, and it's like . . . (laughter) since when? I'm not sure.
Will: Oh, you're getting extra food at Ramadan. Now this makes sense.
Etienne: And that's what I think too, right? But who am I to judge someone if they want to change? What is it, just a change of diet? To me it doesn't matter. A human being—if he wants to change his religion, that's up to him.

Tim: Now I'm seeing the Imam more. They've added an Islamic prayer day, every Friday. They now call it Islamic prayer day. They just started that . . .
Will: What do you think of that?
Tim: It's fine. It's religious freedom. I'm OK with that . . . I don't think that in itself is an issue—it's fine if they get it.
Will: It's whether they use that to cause problems.
Tim: Right. Or it's a way for them to all meet.

The only hint of complication in these quotes is the restraint in officers Etienne and Tim's comments—restraint which a suspicious mind might identify as cynicism. To be fair, another observer might identify this as cynicism about the possibility of reform in the inmate population, generally. Yet, by and large, my participants respected the validity of any kind of religious involvement, even when they were unconvinced of some inmates' religious sincerity. This was evident in the effort they made to differentiate between what they saw as 'true' and 'false' versions of Islam, which almost inevitably became the focus of our religious discussions:

Chan: Depending—well, it was really bad when it started up. We'll take the Muslim activists. Not the Muslims.
Will: The Muslim activists, that's a good way of putting it.
Chan: Not the real Muslims. There's a difference between—just like the Christians, and . . . [another Christian].

Ricky: So if you have these groups, it starts off—probably well-intentioned Muslims who just want to pray and stuff like that. Then you put in [someone from] the Fed system, next thing, and you're going to get people in there, their intentions aren't so nice.

Calvin: . . . in the last couple years, with this huge. . . terrorism bullshit, where . . . I'm seeing a lot of people being painted with the same brush. . . . my friend, Selvin, now is being painted as, y'know, Muslim. He says he notices that. And he's a peace-loving Muslim man.

Each my participants qualified their statement in some manner, despite their effort to distinguish between "good" and "bad" forms of Islam—a sign of trouble in the relationship between Muslim inmates and officers. The contradiction speaks to the tension at play: officer Chan differentiates "Muslim activists" from "Muslims," while officer Ricky suggests legitimate Islamic religious

expression could disguise dangerous ulterior motives. Officer Calvin's comment is a self-explanatory cry against casual racism, but still connects Islam and terrorism.

As I continued my interviews, this theme became more apparent. I soon realized Muslim inmates, as a group, were highly visible to officers within both ERC and FSCC:

Adam: When I look out on the unit and see ten Muslims, or wanna-be Muslims, because only three of them are Muslims, then they've recruited other Muslims. Natives that are—black people, whatever. No previous history, but they want to be Muslims, because they've read X amount in the Qur'an, and they figure—hey, that's pretty good.
Dr. Haggerty: So you're getting native guys who are being converted to Islam?
Adam: yeah! Trying to! In the beginning, right? But it takes a lot.

This appears to have been due to a number of factors, including assumptions about race, ethnicity, religious conversion, and visible religious practice. Officer Adam's comments about 'black people' betrays an assumption that all Muslims are from the Middle East. Again, officer Calvin discusses the fasting month of Ramadan. During this month, Muslims only eat before sunrise and after sunset; therefore, in the prison, officers give Muslim inmates their meals at a different time from the rest of the unit. As a result, officers are—in essence—required to police Muslim religious practice on their unit:[47]

Calvin: Now. . . radical Islam, definitely I've seen an increase. Like, guys with the Qur'an in the cells. I generally don't try to notice . . . but again, it's hard during Ramadan, because this guy's on a Ramadan diet, so therefore he's trying to practice Muslim.

Chan: Why are they always coming to me and saying—all these brown guys, "Can I go into the cell with this other guy?" Who's this other guy? So now they're in cell one, all of a sudden, two other brown guys ask to move into cell 2. And more brown guys ask for cell three. . . [several moments later] . . . That's what all these brown guys are putting together, and then you've got a couple who are screaming radicals. Muslim, Muslim this, Muslim that, and now we're a group.

[47] Calvin's comments mesh with my experience at the FSCC. As an officer, I was responsible for observing meal service on my unit. I was also in charge of enforcing the rules around Ramadan diets, and made sure inmates receiving a special meal tray were not eating during the daylight hours. In fact, I once charged and had two inmates taken off Ramadan diets after they left the unit and went to meal line with all the other inmates. Both strenuously protested, claiming they wanted ice cream, which came with the meal line but not the Ramadan trays. One inmate got his tray back after appealing to the chaplain, while the other did not. This incident merely emphasizes the point: Ramadan means Muslims are highly visible to officers on the unit.

"[Selvin] expressed serious concerns about conversions within prison—not because he views them as ineffective. . . . His concern was primarily with who would be doing the converting, specifically in the Muslim case. He asked me who I thought the Muslims in jail were. I made a couple of wild guesses about Somali youth; he smiled and suggested there are people deliberately entering the prisons in order to convert people." (Field note, May 2016)

Officer Selvin's comments are especially interesting, as he was the only devout Muslim officer—and one of the few visible minority officers—who I was able to speak to. I was unfortunately not able to record this conversation. Selvin expressed frustration about the complete lack of religious knowledge among staff and administrative personnel, even musing about a potential training course to help officers understand and relate to Muslim inmates. His comments clearly spoke to a need, which officers Calvin and Chan unintentionally emphasized though their association between legitimate Islamic religious practice—for instance, possessing a Qur'an—and radicalization. Selvin also outlined personal concerns with violent interpretations of the Qur'an; he suggested these interpretations would be popular and easily spread within the prison, as there was no oversight for religious exchanges between prisoners. Despite his dual identity as a Muslim and a CO, Selvin—like the other officers here—was hyper-aware of Muslim inmates. Furthermore, he shared his coworkers' views on Islam as a risk.

Officer Chan's points lack the subtlety and context of Selvin's. To be blunt, his comments suggest officers use racial profiling as a way to manage inmates. However, Chan's points are not without analytical interest, as he describes a self-selected grouping process by inmates on the basis of shared race and religious identity within the prison. Officers repeatedly mentioned this as a concern. In other words, my participants routinely noticed and observed visible minority 'gangs' on their units:

Tim: "Yeah. definitely a lot of black African, middle-eastern guys, right?"

These quotes suggest my participants widely conflated visible-minority ethnic groups—especially those linked by religious practice—with radicalization. Even more interestingly, some officers in the ERC compared this to the behaviour of other staff members:

Paul: [In] just over seventeen years, I've seen a way bigger population of black guys in here, and I see a way, way bigger population of brown guys.
Will: So they were saying about the Ramadan diets and the mass conversions to Islam before Ramadan—have you seen a legitimate increase in people, like, religious observance so to speak, in the jail over seventeen years?
Paul: . . . No. I actually see a lot of. . . not a lot. . . I've seen the influx of staff, even.
Ryan: Yeah.
Chad: Yeah!
Paul: Muslim staff members. And I . . . like, it's not a problem, but it becomes a problem when it interferes with their work. (Group interview A)

The negotiation and reserve which was evident in my first excerpts about religious freedom are again visible here. Although Islam is 'not a problem,' officers Paul, Ryan, and Chad believed differently, especially when religious practice interferes with the operations of the prison. Specifically, Paul went on to tell me a story about an officer who left an inmate alone and unsupervised in Administration and Discharge (traditionally the most volatile area in a remand centre) while he went away to do his Islamic prayers. Paul suggested this this particular staff member was unskilled, inept, unintelligent, and "*a bad officer"*; however, by framing this officer's poor decision as something connected to his religion, Paul cements the heightened visibility of Islam within the prison. In fact, his comments suggest Muslim officers are not free from critique, even though they are part of the CO subculture.

Islam and 'actions-based' radicalization

Although race and observable religious practice were both strong themes, they were not the most important factors my participants discussed. The strongest theme in this topic focused on the behaviour of Muslim inmates on the unit—a point of clear intersection between stereotypical radicalization and the actions-based definition of radicalization I outlined earlier. In

fact, the actions-based definition appears to have *interacted* with stereotypical viewpoints surrounding Muslims to create the stormy relationship I have described. Many officers identified Muslim inmates as a self-contained group on their unit, often acting as troublemakers, and providing high levels of opposition to officers and control structures within the jail. Yet, the key factor in defining these individuals as 'radicals' was behaviour, rather than ethnicity or race:

Stewart: Well, not at all to be racist, but I find sort of like the Muslim and Islamic inmates cause the most issues, 'cause they think that anything you say is sort of racism. So, um, ***they're just trying to grind always, because it's their religion—they can do this, they can do this. And then if you say no, then all of a sudden they blow up.*** *And they sort of group together, and . . . causes a lot problems.*

Carrie: And now ***these Muslims, that we've been having a lot of issues with—with the Muslims. Um. Because they're just so defiant and so argumentative, and so aggressive****. Even when I was doing escorts, I go to pick up a guy on [the Segregation unit]—and everybody's using it, everybody's Muslim, I want that extra meal, shit like that. And oh, your pants, pull [up] your pants, I gotta escort you. "No, this is a part of my religion." You know what I mean? Shit like that, like, where they're just using it. Using it.*

Almost all of my participants who discussed 'Muslim inmates' made statements like this—more so than any other group in the prison, excluding gangs. In short, officers saw Muslim inmates as difficult to deal with, especially as they quickly resorted to accusations of racism. In fact, the way most officers complained about Muslim inmates was unique, even compared to gangs:

Chan: In a gang, you're a piss-ant. You have to earn your way up. Jumped in, you're jumped in—roll of the dice. Whatever you roll, that's how many minutes you get. . . But when you join Islam, there's no minutes. It's a welcoming ceremony . . . We'll pick you up from jail. When my mom won't pick me up. No other gang members come to the jail—they think it's a trap. Islam, they're more organized, they're more savvy—they're way more political and businesslike.

Most officers identified gang activity as a common threat to officer and inmate safety within the prison. But, gang members were unable to use their status to openly challenge the institutional rules. In fact, admitting to gang membership would have simultaneously invited sanctions from officers, prison administration, and the justice system as a whole. Religious beliefs do not face this drawback. As a result, religious freedom acted as one of the most powerful tools for inmates

to challenge officers and institutional practice. My participants suggested inmates were applying this inverse power differential to a point that—in their mind—was far beyond the bounds of propriety. This did not solely apply to Muslim inmates, although they were overrepresented:

Chan: When Islam first started in the jails, the Feds were so uneducated . . . what is Ramadan? Kay, so I get to eat after sundown. What do I get to eat? [It was] a feast. Every night. Fresh vegetables . . . Especially grapes and figs . . . But you would get full heads of broccoli, full heads of cauliflower, you would get melons—big cafeteria trays full, saran-wrapped, would go to each inmate. Because Ramadan's a celebration.
Will: Yes, but at the end—at [Eid al-Fitr], at the end.
Chan: Did they bother to find this out? No! Every day, they're getting all this—all the other inmates saw it. 'Oh, I'm Ramadan, I'm Muslim!' [several moments later] . . . ***I can go do this or act like this here, because if you do come after me I'm going to scream religious freedom****. Because I know—and this goes back to the lack of communication that we have—I know that I can tell this guard it's religious freedom. Write it up, scare the hell out of management by saying 'I'm getting a lawyer. . .'*[48]

Carrie: Religion is a war starter. It is, it's known to be. And it's not appropriate. It is not appropriate. Plain and simple. . . . so now you've got them coding them out on the units, and management's now coming down, like one of the guys said yesterday . . . accusing [officers] of it being a racist thing! The guy's fucking given me every reason to knock him out in the book! Does it piss me off more that he's a Muslim douchebag doing it? Fucking rights! (laughter)

Will: Why'd he get checked off?
Basil: ***Because he was shutting down the TV/programs room for the bible study.***
Will: (disbelieving laughter). He'd kick everybody out of the TV room? How'd that go over?
Basil: He got checked off within four days.

The use of religion as a tool against institutional control structures is a classic example of inmate resistance (Mathiesen, 1965), and also speaks to the key reason Islam has become a force within American and Canadian prisons. Hamm suggests the religion's status as an 'outsider' faith within the North American context made it attractive to 'outsider' groups—historically, black Americans—who face racism, poverty, criminalization and other structural constraints within the general social milieu (Hamm, 2013, p. 47). This was key in the Nation of Islam's rise in the

[48] Chan's comments are part of a larger description of a situation he witnessed in a Federal prison; allegedly, over half the inmates were claiming Islamic adherence in order to receive special privileges. This collapsed when a new Imam entered the prison, and told prison management the privileges were not required for religious observance.

1960's and 1970's; for instance, the Nation's most famous adherent once said, "Cassius Clay is a slave name. I didn't choose it and I don't want it. I am Muhammad Ali, a free name—it means beloved of God, and I insist people use it when people speak to me" (Coleman, 2016). Echoes of this rebellion against the status quo continue to echo within American prisons, in both the 350,000-plus prison conversions to Islam since 2001 and alarmist conflations of Islam and radicalization (Hamm, 2009, 2013, pp. 66, 70).

Despite the long history of Islam in North America, my participants still viewed it as an "outsider" religion, which only appealed to inmates because it was outside the societal norm:

Ricky: They want to be part of something. They want to be . . . outside the societal norms. So if all the news is ISIS and shit like that, they're like—'well, I'm with ISIS. They're bad-ass!' right?

Matt: . . . ***that culture is more popular than Christianity is . . . it's just because it's new within the prison system*** *that all these guys are finding the, finding some faith in Muhammed or Allah or whoever it is.*

One of the reasons Islam became popular in American prisons was because of mass inequality. Islam presented an alternative to an unfair social hierarchy which imposed significant structural disadvantages (Hamm, 2013, p. 47). Although my participants recognized the impact of structural disadvantage, they only referred to it in terms of the systematic marginalization of Canadian First Nations people. Many officers were sympathetic to the massive social issues faced by young Aboriginal people, but did not extend their view to a broader perspective on discrimination of other groups which would have lent sympathy to inmate acceptance of Islam.

Inmate subcultural opposition to radicalization

In fact, the counter-cultural aspect of Islam, alongside perceptions of radicalization, accomplished an extremely difficult feat: it created an alliance between officers and 'normal' inmates within the prison:

Will: Did he have any swing on the unit? Were guys listening?

Andrew: Oh no, they hated him! They were drawing pictures of Allah getting fucked by a pig and sliding it under his door (laughter).

Paul: . . . we had the one guy, I forget his name, but I remember the nickname because it was funny. His nickname was 'Kaboom' (laughter). Which isn't funny, but . . . he's part of a group, they identified him, he was being extradited to the States because he had bombed some American military base in Iraq or something, and then he got shipped out. But yeah. the inmates nicknamed him Kaboom.

John: . . . and you'll still get those inmates that will say, I'm not housing with this guy because he's crazy. In the case of some of these Islamic guys, when we go back into incidents in Canada or across the world where these guys all of a sudden are saying, "Yeah, good for, way to go ISIS, or ISIL" or whatever you want to call them, it actually disrupts the inmates' mentality.
Will: [Kaz] ended up in Seg, for exactly that.
John: Right, so . . . you will see that change in the unit themselves, and people, and inmates start to react negatively to these individuals. We kind of really . . . don't see the recruiting because of that. There's going to be people who say, whoa, this guy shouldn't be here, we don't like him, we might assault him because he's overly preaching to people [laughter]. He's making comments that, you know what . . .it almost changes how you think of the inmates, where it's that us-versus them mentality, cause they're actually saying—"This guy, you've got to get rid of him, cause he is a bad person." It's interesting.

These excerpts clearly echo Durkheim's (2014) work on solidarity within populations (Hart, 1967, p. 5). My participants framed the adoption of radical Islam as a risky decision within the prison context; although it provided a sense of meaning and group membership, it also represented a violation of the social boundaries of the inmate society. On some (though not all) occasions, it was punished as such (Gans, 1992, p. 12; Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Sykes, 1958):

"It'd be pretty hard—pretty lonely to be an ISIS type in this prison, because these [inmates] are not exactly the most caring types. Even if you're a Muslim—a softer Muslim-type guy. We had a Muslim guy who had to check off A range, because all the other offenders on the block were calling him a terrorist. Doesn't even matter whether you're actually associated with them or not—if you're a lighter Muslim guy, you'll get bullied for it." (Field note, April 2017)

Officers Andrew, John and Paul all suggest inmates ferociously rejected 'radical' recruitment on their units. Useem and Clayton (2009) outline a similar finding, as inmates in their sample routinely used patriotic, nationalist identification as an important rationale for their rejection of radicalization (2009, p. 566). My data actually expand on Useem and Clayton's findings, as my

participants suggest the mere presence of an ideological or religious radical on the unit upset the 'normal' atmosphere and created tension between inmates. This, in turn, pushed 'regular' inmates into alliance with officers on the unit, bridging the subcultural dichotomy—as officer John's statement about radicals being 'bad people' shows. Counterintuitively, inmate solidarity against radicalization—or even, as my field note suggests, being Muslim—influenced hostility from officers. Officers typically assumed the worst-case scenario when dealing with inmates:

Stewart: . . . certain individuals on the range they get these negative influences where, no, I'm not locking up, you have to make me lock up. Throwing the finger our way, kicking the door to try and pick fights with us, just really anything to cause issues with us. And of course, they're also trying to bait us into doing stupid things so they can sue us and make them look innocent, and us look like bad guy.

My participants largely assumed hostile resentment between officers and inmates was an immutable and unchanging fact; as a result, they noted any instance of widespread cooperation. Officer John's comments—specifically, the part where he discusses how inmates describe radicals as 'bad people—particularly emphasize this. Inmate resistance and countermeasures against 'radical' prisoners acted as a confirmation for some officer biases—regardless of whether this was proof of a true or false consensus. As a result, adopting Islam—and thereby, ostensibly rejecting mainstream cultural values—pushed tensions between officers and Muslim inmates towards a tipping point.

The Pod 5 incident

Muslim inmates and officers in the prisons I studied expressed significant resentment against each other, especially at the ERC. Given the litany of issues at play, I was unsurprised to witness an active breakdown in the relationship:

[Paul walks onto the unit, and speaking to Group Interview A, says] *I guess that [code] 44*[49] *was a terrorist on Five.*

[49] To refresh: a Code 44 refers to a fight between an officer and an inmate.

The inmate/officer fight in question occurred on Pod 5 (the Protective Custody pod at the ERC) which—during our access—was home to a group of Muslim inmates who were well-known to the officer population:

Harry: Pod Five—I've only worked Pod Five a couple of times, like I haven't been there regularly, so I can't really say for sure, but the impression I get out of there—the guys there think they run it. They kinda have an operation going on there, they just have their thing going on. Sense of entitlement—it's hard to describe. It's it's own world, is what I'm trying to say.

This group was notorious for challenging officer authority on the unit, often using religious freedom as a tool. Our research team had a number of conversations with CO's who deeply resented this group, and labelled the de facto leader a "terrorist." Our interviews, with both inmates and officers, did not support this allegation; although many of the inmates on this unit were evangelical, active, even ascetic Muslims, we discovered no evidence of overt ideological radicalization. We did discover deep-set hostility and accusations on both the inmate and officer sides of the debate. I was not on Pod 5 when this fight occurred, but several days later, I had an opportunity to interview the inmate involved. He was a practicing Muslim, who proudly described evangelizing and converting other inmates, but vigorously denied radical ideation. He accused the officers involved in the fight of racism in terms bordering on the hysterical, but downplayed his own actions. I was unable to interview the officers, but the inmate allowed me to read his institutional charges, which contained their perspectives. They detailed an series of threats and inflammatory comments which the inmate had allegedly made against the officers involved in the confrontation. I made a rather scattered field note at the time:

"[The CPO III's description was as follows. 'The inmate] said he was a terrorist, and had done a bunch of stuff in Pakistan, and he was bragging and making stories about how this is easy time, Pakistani prisons are way worse, so I committed a terrorist offence over there and now I'm getting easy time over here' . . . [the CPO III's comments also said the inmate] was laughing at the guards about it, [and it] turned into a [fight]. The inmate claimed he came on the unit, the officers were insulting him, calling him a terrorist. He wasn't answering to that name because he

was not a terrorist—that's not his name, he wasn't going to answer to it. He got a little messed up." (Field note, September 2016)

According to the charges, the inmate had bragged about his past history as a radical, violent jihadi in Pakistan, and used this to disrespect the officers on his unit. However, as this field note shows, the inmate emphatically denied the veracity of these accounts.

It is impossible to determine who was telling the truth in this situation. In fact, dwelling on the question would be irresponsible, as I have no doubt both sides framed the opposing party in the worst possible light for their own advantage. Furthermore, attempting to read into this would mask important analytical points. First, the hostility between officers and Muslims within the ERC was not simply an academic matter; rather, it appears to have been an active force, negotiated on a daily basis by both inmates and officers. Second, the hostility between these two groups appears to have informed their actions, as both sides expressed and acted upon mistrust and hatred toward the other group. Interestingly, this appears to have been a centre-specific issue. My participants from the FSCC did not report anything remotely similar to this incident; as a group, they were more in line with officer Calvin's thoughts on the matter: ". . . *guys with the Qur'an in the cells. I generally don't try to notice."* If anything, they claimed the ERC staff caused their own problems. Third, officer perceptions of risk seem to have influenced the way they view Islamic practice; for instance, in this case, the officers specifically noted the inmate's religion in an effort to secure institutional punishment against him. This plays into my fourth point: officer perceptions of Muslims as 'radicals' or 'terrorists' influenced their actions toward inmates. I will examine the rationale for this more closely, but for the moment, it seems clear that Muslim inmates were viewed as a greater risk than other inmates; therefore, officers felt justified in taking steps against 'radicals' which they did not take against other identifiable threat groups.

CO military service and views on radicalization

One important fact deserves repeated mention at this point: many of the officers who I talked to pushed back against direct connections between Islam and terrorism. Some made strong arguments against assuming specific groups caused more trouble simply due to their identification; others made strong efforts to stand up for treating inmates "right," irrespective of race, religion, or creed. As this excerpt from Group Interview A shows, this even caused tension between friends and partners who worked on the same unit:

Tyler: Some of the Muslim, people misinterpret that Muslim people are all terrorists [**Ryan, a six-year soldier and Afghan veteran nods enthusiastically, leading to laughter from all parties**]. *But, I've met a couple guys—my opinions not based on someone's religion, eh? I base it on people who I interact and talk with. Some of the guys are polite. Extremely polite people. And they're some of the better inmates I've ever dealt with. But in the end, I'm not going to hate someone for this or that. I go off how they decide to treat me. You give me respect I'll give it back.*

Officer Tyler's attitude is laudable, and he—and the other officers like him—seem to play an important role in mediating tension between officers and inmates of all stripes at both the ERC and the FSCC. However, there is another key point in this quotation which demands analysis—namely, the throw-away joke which officer Ryan makes in the middle of Tyler's point.

Of the 43 officers in my sample, at least eight—roughly eighteen percent—had served in a military. Many of these had completed tours in Afghanistan, fighting against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Several of these officers did not discuss inmate radicalization with me, speaking instead about boot camp or officer culture. However, those who discussed radicalization were far more likely to resort to stereotypical and racist arguments when discussing Muslim inmates:

Ryan: Do you think it'll increase? Be more and more radical groups? . . . I don't see why we wouldn't [have more] in the future. We're a pretty vulnerable country. . . What precautions do we take, besides screening guys and hoping they don't do nothing because they said they wouldn't? We bring them in ourselves. Because I did six years in the military, one tour in Afghanistan. We bring back our translators with us, and guess who ends up in some of these jails—in this jail, was my translator! (Group Interview A)

Officer Ryan's eagerness to question me about the threat of radicalization show how he had framed the issue as a risk[50]—but more importantly, his deliberate use of "we" and "they/them" framed immigrants and Muslims as an enemy. This even applied to an individual who fought alongside him in Afghanistan, *against* other Afghans and Muslims.

Ryan's thoughts begin to sketch a picture which officer Carrie paints in colour. She began her story by describing a scene which occurred at the ERC. Prison management had invited a Muslim Imam to speak to the officers at the pre-shift officer Muster. The Imam gave a short speech about one of the Muslim holidays, then asked everyone in the room to stand up. He then began to publicly pray over the assembled group, without warning or requesting permission from anyone in the room. Although this was likely well-intentioned, it set off a firestorm among the CO population. The Imam's actions angered most of the officers in the room, as they felt his actions were presumptuous, out-of-place, and badly timed. However, the CO's who were also military veterans were particularly irate. Officer Carrie described the scene well:

*. . . like I stood up, and I'm like—what the fuck's going on here? And then I'm like—HE'S STARTING TO PRAY! So I sit down, a couple guys walked out. Like, it was a big deal. I was furious, and none of the military stood up. . . .You have no respect for these ex-soldiers. I don't care—it has nothing to do with the fact that you're Muslim. It has nothing to do with what you're wearing or whatever. This day and age—**this is the war going on right now**. You have no respect to come in and disrespect these ex-soldiers—**because that's who they fought!***

The use of war imagery in this quotation is disconcerting. It implicitly justifies and supports violence against Muslim inmates. Officer Carrie's comments also imply a standing demand for more respect from prison management due to the military's unique social status—an understandable request given the historical veneration of military service, but one with

[50] This passage could also be used in support of my insider/outsider status; in a number of cases, officers began questioning me about our research, and about whether or not they 'should' be worried about radicalization in the prison. To the best of my knowledge, none of our other team members faced questioning from officers.

dramatically problematic ends given the logical extreme of the war imagery she uses. It also confirms what officer Ryan said: despite officer Carrie's effort to soften the blow, this excerpt suggests some ex-military officers within the ERC view Muslims as 'the enemy,' even though they are no longer in Afghanistan.

My sample likely underrepresents military experience in the prisons—something I can only support with circumstantial evidence, like the boot camp units and numerous conversations with officers about colleagues with Afghan-related PTSD. Either way, officer Carrie suggested military service played a direct role in creating tension between officers and Muslim inmates:

Carrie: it's not the overall Muslims. It's Muslim extremists. The ones that are utilizing it for their own games, whatever their games might be. Just to be a fucking ignorant asshole. Right? ***So you've got ex-soldiers on a unit, coding out Muslim guys for the forth time this week, because fuckin . . . that tension's already there.*** *And management's not respecting—religion should not enter a jail. It should not enter into any large facility like that. Religion is a war starter. It is, it's known to be. And it's not appropriate. It is not appropriate. Plain and simple.*

Carrie was something of an outlier in the officer population, and her interview is not wholly representative. In fact, I doubt many of my participants (military or otherwise) would agree with her hardened, uncompromising views on Islam. However, as one of the few officers who discussed how military service impacted her work in prison, Carrie's comments deserve some analysis. I cannot prove military service is an active stressor on the inmate/officer relationship, but Carrie and officer Ryan's comments certainly frame it as such. If true, this is a serious concern, given the high percentage of ex-soldiers in the officer population. A note of caution though: this limited discussion is based on an extremely small portion of my data, and I would be hesitant to make any claims beyond what I have written here.

Theme II, part II: Muslims and Risk Governance within the Prison

By this point, it is tempting to dismiss my entire sample as xenophobic and violent bigots, tainted beyond redemption by the exercise of total power within a racist and corrupt

institution. This critique could logically extend to my analysis, as I have largely allowed my participants to speak without dispute. Although this has occasionally bordered on the offensive, I firmly believe giving officers an active voice is important; as we have seen and will continue to see, racism and stereotypical preconceptions play a role in shaping my participants' perspectives and actions within the prison. However, racism is not the only causal explanation for what I have outlined so far. Rather, I suggest micro-level racism is a symptom of at least two larger structural forces at play, instead of the sole driving factor behind the issues I have outlined. The first structural force is the widespread inequity and procedural brutality which the Canadian criminal justice system engenders. Officers are, in essence, small cogs in a large and soulless machine, and resort to actively dehumanizing inmates as a way to cope with the pain and brutality they observe. We observed this in my chapter on officers, and will see flashes of it throughout this section. The second—and more important—cause in question, which I outlined earlier, is a larger social understanding of terrorism and radicalization, which influences and creates a potent risk paradigm within the prison. I will now discuss exactly what it looks like when perception, responsibilitization, stereotype, and risk governance meet in a prison.

To return to an earlier point, many of my participants expressed confusion around the concept of radicalization. As a result, they either redefined what radicalization meant, or relied on media stereotypes of what radicalization 'should' be. This inevitably meant many of my participants emphasized the perceived risk of Islam within the prison setting:

Nigel: . . . when you start seeing . . . I don't wanna be racist or anything, but seeing people that are not Muslim, that don't have Muslim backgrounds, Muslim families, that are converting . . .
Will: That's different.
Nigel: It's weird. It's like, you're seeing like. . . uh, Aboriginal people, First Nations. . . just normal white people, probably wouldn't be doing this if they were on the streets, but now . . .
Will: Probably won't be doing it back on the streets . . .
Nigel: But now that you're in jail, now you want to join . . . [a minute later] . . . You start seeing other areas in the centre . . . it starts to become the way it does, I dunno. Now faith is starting to

take over, this that, the other . . . [several minutes later] . . . The radical thing, it's taking over more and more. Y'know, I don't know if it's an easy . . . I don't know why. . . what's the difference between any other religion? Why does it have to be the Muslim faith?

This excerpt is useful for outlining the importance of risk on a number of levels. For instance, officer Nigel confirms the visibility of Islamic practice within the prison—and despite his avowed hesitance about racism, he also suggests Islam's increasing prominence represents a security threat. In fact, he—and those who agreed with him—echoes several earlier quotations framing Islam as a 'greater' risk than other forms of misconduct within the prison. However, to emphasize an important point, the blunt and direct line which Nigel draws between Islam and risk was not wholly representative. Many officers—notably Matt and Tyler—specifically disconnected Islam from radicalization, and emphasized the potential benefits of religion. However, although many officers disconnected Muslims from terrorism, most of them still agreed with Nigel's assessment of Islam as a risk either implicitly or explicitly.

As we have discussed, the actions-based definition of radicalization plays an important role for my participants, especially in how they assess inmates as 'risks.' Redefining oppositional behaviour—especially from Muslim inmates—as radicalization invokes the 'risk' of terrorism; this, in turn, justifies harsh counter-measures to deter the threat of radicalization. When paired with societal messages of risk responsibilitization, this gives officers justification to take action against 'radicals' to prevent the "malicious demon of terrorism" (Ericson, 2007, in Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 12), regardless of whether or not the ends justify the means. Officer Nigel's excerpt—especially the portion where he suggests 'faith is taking over more and more'—is representative of this process, as he outlines the 'threat' in clear detail. Interestingly, Nigel worked on Pod 5 with the intransigent Muslim group, and primarily relied on an actions-based definition, rather than leaning on evidence of ideological radicalization.

In the end, using risk to reinterpret opposition as radicalization creates situations like the Pod 5 fight I outlined earlier, where accusations of jihadism, racism, corruption, and terrorism fly. It also directly led to unofficial forms of racial profiling as a method of risk governance:

Will: Have you seen any radical Islamist gangs or anything?
Tim: Oh yeah, there's a big new one out, called the UB, United Brotherhood. That's brand-new. And that's fuckin' taking over everything—that's lining up the black guys. They're having big battles with the RA's[51] *right now. We had a 20-person gang fight on the one yard. Oh yeah. they're heavy shit right now (laughter).*
W: So they're fighting against the native gangs?
Tim: Yeah.
Will: And is that more of an ethnic thing, or is it a religious thing do you think?
Tim: Mmm. . . well. . . both. . . . . Definitely a lot of black African, middle-eastern guys, right? . . . And I mean. . . it's sorta like, maybe they're a little tighter. And maybe it's due to their religion or things like that, but they tend to stick together a little more and back each other up a little more.

Many officers were careful about how they portrayed the 'problem' of radicalization, and delicately negotiated potentially-racist dialogues. Officer Nigel's excerpt is an excellent example of this. However, as officer Tim demonstrates, the specter of widespread, ideological gang membership—especially when paired with a minority ethnic or racial group—seems to have overcome this delicacy for a smaller portion of my sample. The United Brotherhood, which he describes, was—during our access—a small but rapidly growing prison gang with a primarily Black membership. Like the Pod 5 Muslim group, it did not have observable connections to radical ideologies; however, some of my participants observed the primarily black, Muslim, and immigrant/second-generation-immigrant membership, and classified it as 'radical' rather than 'criminal.'

This speaks to an important element of the larger risk paradigm surrounding radicalization: its direct connection to race. Radicalization scholars generally agree media coverage on the topic often frames terrorism and radical group membership as a "Muslim"

[51] Redd Alert gang

problem (Jackson, 2007). Sedgewick suggests ". . . the adoption of the term 'radicalization' made possible an analysis of Islamist terrorism that build on pre-existing experience and knowledge. . ." (2010, p. 480), and there is some discussion about whether radicalization's emergence was simply an attempt to sanitize more controversial terms like 'home-grown terrorism' (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 110; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480). The majority of my participants recognized the influence of these demagogic pressures, especially when it came to identifying 'radicalization' versus other oppositional behaviour within the prison:

Will: So you would say, if I'm talking about radicals, would you consider [White Supremacists] a form or radical?
Jason: I don't, no. I consider radicals like, fucking . . . I dunno, maybe ISIS and shit like that. That's what I consider radical. Maybe cause we've just been—white supremacy, y'know, all that shit's been so—
Will: It's normal?
Jason: Kinda! We accept that as normal, don't we though? We kinda do. It's not like I'm far off here—it's like, if there was like, white supremacist beat up somebody, we'd be—OK. We'd get it. But if we say ISIS came in and bombed here, people would be like, what the FUCK!!!! Radicals! Bahhh! They're two separate media things, right?

Officer Jason's excerpt provides one of the most unambiguous and representative pictures of how the majority of my participants viewed radicalization. In essence, they explicitly linked it to race and religion, tempered by behaviour; ideology had little—even nothing—to do with it. This quotation is also interesting because Jason identifies large media tropes as the primary driving influence behind this; yet, he, and officers like him, continued to use racial identification and religious adherence as the primary method of determining radicalization within the prison. In other words, most officers relied on a bigoted risk paradigm to identify 'real' radicals within the prison. Many of my participants attached explicit racial and religious expectations to radicalization: if an inmate did not meet these expectations, CO's often dismissed them as 'crazy,' regardless of ideological beliefs. In the face this, it is difficult to ignore the importance of risk perception within the prison setting. Social pressures, particularly media portrayals,

deeply shape and frame perspectives of radicalization, painting a concrete picture of specific individuals who are distinct and pressing risks to social order:

Matt: That's your extreme radicalization, and what the media loves to hear about right? If you're talking about radicalization in a sense, like—full-blown gang culture. . . that happens all the time. ISIS-style—I dunno.

As a result, many officers, who, through the workings of the risk society, feel responsible for controlling radical behaviour within their prisons, treat specific and identifiable groups as risks regardless of whether or not they have any connection with ideological radicalization. One final example emphasizes this nicely:

Calvin: The normal, stereotypical con, right? Generally has a dull, kinda 'uuuh' [makes dumb, vacant face to show his opinion of the average inmate's intelligence level]. *These guys are a little bit . . . a little bit more aware of their surroundings, and a little more attentive to what is going on around them. And how things are functioning. Now . . .again, that's just in the scope of guys that I know . . . . who are more open and outward about their confirmation to Islam, right? Why that is, I don't know. But I'm noticing that—like I said, they're a bit more intense in regards to the way they are on the unit. Like, they don't disrespect, they don't . . .*

The ugly connection between Islam and radicalization rears its head yet again in this excerpt. Officer Calvin's comments frame all Muslims as a risk by suggesting they are 'more intense,' 'more aware,' and 'more attentive' than the average inmate on the unit. By doing so, he again redefines radicalization on the basis of behaviour—even though in this case, the behaviour in question is not problematic or oppositional. Calvin, informed by his perception of Islam as a 'risk' within the prison, simply assumes 'radical' inmates are smarter than others, and avoid detection—and are therefore a greater danger. Calvin was alone in doing this, but his actions are another example of how risk perceptions shape officer attitudes and actions within prison.

Mental health and risk governance

In an extraordinary contrast, the participants I met who *had* met and worked with proven, ideologically-driven, confirmed radicals, largely dismissed the risk they presented:

Will: Have you seen any of these guys, radical groups—do they have any swing in here? You're saying maybe not [inmate Sticky Fingers] but . . .
Tyler: Every time I see them, they seem so fucked up. These people are so bizarre. Last time I saw this [inmate Wingnut] guy I was talking about, he was in his cell, he had like an apple core glued to the wall, talking about how we're all going to, we're the white devils, and we're going to burn in hell.

John: [Wingnut] had made some comments, kinda around the time of the Ottawa shooting, and [I haven't] seen anything out of him since. So . . . is that because he's a mental health, and he's a Muslim, and he just spouted off? I dunno.

W: But [inmate Kaz] was a bug . . .
Lukas: Yeah. . .there's a case to be made that Kaz had some mental health issues as well.

Mental health is perhaps the most consistent theme within my data. I have deliberately avoided mentioning it until now, as it is the only point where my participants' perceptions of risk are directly comparable to actual incidents of ideological radicalization within their prison settings. Almost every single officer who had direct dealings with members of violent ideological groups categorized them as 'crazy,' rather than dangerous.

My data suggest mental health is perhaps the most common theme accompanying discussions of radicalization within both the ERC and the FSCC: if my participants understood what I meant when I said the word 'radicalization,' they almost inevitably replied with something like this:

Will: have you ever seen that sort of radical group behaviour?
Harry: We had one guy who was . . . he wasn't ISIS, but he was an ISIS supporter/sympathizer. He's . . . he's a total idiot.

Archie: It's almost as if they have a screw loose to begin with.
Will: There's a little bit of mental health there
Archie: Yeah. They're going to be looking for some other screw-loose sort of guys as well.

However, this did not apply equally to all types of radical groups. Instead, perceptions of mental health interacted with racialized stereotypes to create a volatile situation—as officer Andrew's treatment of 'ISIS' demonstrates:

Andrew: I had a guy . . . we used to call him ISIS. But he tried to recruit other people or whatever by giving them individually-wrapped Lifesavers. Like, he took them all out of the package, and tried to—so my partner and I . . . We're like, what are you doing man? And he's like, [assumes stereotypical Arab accent]*, 'Oh, I'm trying to make all of them my friends and come with me [to Syria] by giving them candy!'. And we're like, 'When are you giving them candy? He's like, 'Tomorrow.'* ***So [my partner] and I went to every cell and were like, 'Don't eat the candy!' And they were like, 'What?' And we're just like, 'Nothing,' and just kept walking. And the next day, they were like, 'Oh my FUCK, he tried to give us candy!!!!'*** *(laughter) . . . He's probably dead. Which is fine by me.*

Officer Andrew's efforts to turn the other inmates on the unit against this individual strongly reflect a 'responsibilitization' of risk among officers; in other words, he felt some level of responsibility to sabotage this inmate's recruitment attempts, and acted on them—despite the clear mental health issues at play. Earlier in our interview, he gave a hint as to why:

Andrew: How about that fucking guy that told me he was going to Syria to fight with ISIS when he got out of jail, and I told psychology, and they did nothing about it!

Officer Andrew clearly believed the institution had abdicated responsibility for managing the risk presented by 'ISIS,' and as a result, unofficially took matters into his own hands. Neither he, nor his partner, viewed the inmate's clear mental health issues as balancing out the risk which his ideological beliefs presented to the ERC's security, or to societal security as a whole. As a result, he directly engaged in unofficial risk governance strategies. Nor was this an isolated incident:

Asher: There was one fellow on One-Charlie . . . he was difficult, and he was trying to recruit other people.
Will: He was?
Asher: He was. But the thing was, he didn't really look Muslim. To me he looked Native. But you can't really—that stereotype—
Will: Brown, brown brown (laughter).
Asher: Yeah, exactly. Am I going to generalize all of them look the same? Of course not, right?
Will: Interesting. But he was trying to recruit people.
Asher: He was. Absolutely. Just to join his gang. And again, ***they're very secretive with the way they do things. They don't want us involved at all****. He was popular on the unit—****I ended up getting rid of him, because I knew he was a cancer for that unit, right****?*

These two incidents are uniquely comparable. Like officer Andrew, officer Asher took steps to prevent 'radicalized' recruitment on his unit, and had the 'risky' inmate moved; like Andrew,

Asher also relied on some form of ethnic/racialized stereotype to identify the Muslim inmate in question as a 'risk,' then acted on the basis of his perception. Furthermore, both officers believed it was their duty to address the risk, as the institution had abdicated responsibility:

Chan: So the managers can say, 'Yeah, we haven't had any reports from the guards, haven't found any literature, signs, they're not watching specific shows, dressing a certain way.' But nobody considers how the prison works! What guard truly writes reports every day about what they find? You'd have no time. Look at how the system's set up.

Officer Chan's comments reflect frustration with the institution; like the two previous officers, Chan sincerely believed prison management was ignoring concerns about radical activity. This frustration strongly hints at individual risk responsibilitization. However, there is one, key difference: officer Andrew's discussion and treatment of "ISIS" was demonstrably contemptuous, and placed the inmate's safety at risk. His flippant disdain is in stark contrast to the way other officers—specifically, those who had not dealt with true ideological radicals—discussed the pressing risks they perceive. In short, officers who had dealt with 'radical' inmates disparaged them, while officers who had not, emphasized the risk they presented.

The difference in demonstrated perceptions between the 'crazy' ISIS supporters I have mentioned and other 'radicals' is telling. The perception of risk that shaped my participants' outlook on radicalization meant they dismissed the 'crazy' individuals who legitimately expressed allegiance to ideological groups, and treated them contemptuously. Simultaneously, officers projected 'radicalization' onto oppositional, intelligent, difficult-to-work-with Muslims, who more closely fit media stereotypes of terrorists. Officer Harry outlined this brilliantly:

Will: He's a bug, he's not. . . when we think of radical groups, we kinda think of these malevolent people, who—oh, man, terrorists! He. . . doesn't strike with that whole media stereotypes, y'know?
Harry: ***No, he's not one of those stone-cold faced killers that, like terrorists or whatever, he's just . . . he's just an idiot****. Scatterbrained. It's almost like—do you actually follow that, or do you just follow it because you don't know any better? I dunno—it's really unique dealing with him, because* ***in the media you see these like, stone-cold-faced, y'know, death-to-America kinda types, and you actually meet one of them, and you're like—this guy's not going to do shit.***

Will: (laughter). This guy can't spell his name!!!
Harry: Yeah. this guy can't remember where his glasses are. It's happened quite a few times.

Officer Harry's assessment of the inmate in question—who, despite his mental health challenges, actively supported ISIS's vision to recreate the Muslim caliphate—shows the importance of an idealized 'terrorist' type to the majority of my participants. In other words, my participants were looking for the idealized 'Death to America types' which Harry describes. They were not looking for individuals with mental health challenges—an oversight, as news coverage suggests radicalization can and perhaps should be associated with mental health and drug issues (Freeze & Perreaux, 2014; Friesen & Freeze, 2014; Perreaux, White, & Woo, 2014, Dodd, 2016; Gore, 2016; Heer, 2014; Hong, 2016).[52] Yet, their search for intelligent, group-oriented, oppositional 'terrorists' appears to have simultaneously shifted officer attention to the Pod 5 group, while blinding them to the existence of other groups or individuals within the prison who fit the definition of radicalization.

Theme III: Non-Religious Radicalization within the Prison

Asher: "So do you want to talk about—when you say radicalization, do you mean just Muslim radicalization, or any types?

I specifically chose to use a widespread, continuum-based definition of radicalization for this project, in the hopes of avoiding a focus on Islamist radicalization. I fully outlined my reasoning in the introduction, but in brief, my communication with law enforcement suggested 'other' radicals outnumber Islamist radicals in Alberta. These groups are largely unresearched, and given my participants' unique position relative to the criminal underworld, I expected them to have some insight on this topic. I was partially correct: although most officers had insights on non-religious radical groups, they did not usually view them as radical. When I asked questions

[52] There does not appear to be notable scholarship on this as of yet.

about radicalization, I only gathered data on Islam; breaking this preconception required specific, probing questions. This proved to be worthwhile, as I collected significant data on the Sovereign Citizens. More importantly, I was able to gauge my participants' views and perceptions of non-religious radicals in comparison to Islamist groups. In essence, I was able to compare my participants' risk perceptions about inmates they dealt with regularly, compared to groups which they expected, but had not yet regularly encountered.

Will: Would you think they [the Freemen on the Land] were kind of a radical group?
Calvin: Yes. Definitely, I would classify that as radical.

John: The other side of this whole radical stuff is groups like the Freeman on the Land. And those are homegrown radicals, and those are kind of the ones that . . . we've actually seen more of, than Islamic radicals.

Will: I was asking them earlier about radical groups or radical guys coming through. Have you seen any guys, anything like that?
Paul: Aah. . . we get those Freemen on the Land lots, every once in a while. Very rarely—because I used to work in Admissions and Discharge. You get some guys claiming every once in a while, but not big groups of people sort of claiming to be part of one group or another. (Group interview A)

The Freemen on the Land, or Sovereign Citizen movement, was the only non-Islamic, non-gang group my participants identified as an active 'radical' presence within either prison. All of my participants knew who they were, and most had dealt with one or more Freemen; therefore, by all logic and existent sources, these individuals should have presented a quantitatively greater threat than Islamist radicalization in my research settings.

The Freemen: A Short History

In essence, Sovereign Citizens believe in two forms of government: the original, 'good,' form, and the existing form, which is a corrupted and therefore illegitimate version of the original. The American Anti-Defamation League (2012), which has written two extensive special reports on the sovereign citizens, puts it this way:

> They claim allegiance to the original government and disdain the 'illegitimate' one. To them the original government was a utopian minimalist government which never interfered with the citizenry; in their fantasy history of the United States, they believe that people followed 'God's laws' rather than 'man's laws.' (p. 3)

In other words, Sovereign Citizens believed 'original' government allowed people to do as they wished. Therefore, Freemen believe current governance structures have no authority, as strictures on individual freedom are 'corrupt'; they do not abide by the law, and routinely ignore the directions of courts or law enforcement (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 4). Their quasi-anarchistic beliefs also extend to things like property ownership and driver's licenses. Sovereign Citizens are routinely arrested for driving without licenses or insurance, often with home-made license plates (F. Sullivan, 1999, p. 785), and news stories about Freemen illegally seizing ownership of homes are common, even in Alberta (CBC News, 2013; Lazzarino, 2013).

To justify these beliefs, Freeman gurus have created an entire counter-legal system, largely based on archaic statutes like the Magna Carta or obscure maritime legal ordinances (Kent, 2015, pp. 1, 9). They use this to 'prove' modern-day courts are operating illegitimately. Moreover, the Freemen have developed labyrinthine methods of intimidating officials and stalling the judicial process, often by placing property liens against officials who oppose them and flooding courts with excessive amounts of documentation.[53] This has been widely referred to as 'paper terrorism' (Kent, 2015, p. 6), and courts now recognize it as a form of intimidation—in fact, an Albertan Freeman-on-the-land was recently charged with intimidation of a peace officer after conducting ". . .a campaign of 'paper terrorism' against the justice system and the peace officer who issued the ticket" (Lamoureux & Snowdon, 2016). In some, extreme, cases,

[53] For a detailed account of dozens of incidents of paper terrorism, fraudulent liens, fake banks, and fictitious law enforcement agencies (among other things), see the Anti-Defamation League publication, pp. 16-25.

Sovereign Citizen gurus have developed their own unique syntaxes, which they claim enables them to ". . . master the judicial system" (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 7).

Given their policy of continued, direct legal disobedience, it is unsurprising to discover Sovereign Citizens have received significant law enforcement attention across North America. Their actions extend beyond intimidation, as there have been numerous accounts of anti-law enforcement violence perpetrated by Freemen (Kent, 2015). The Anti Defamation League lists several dozen incidents across the United States, all within a year of publication (2012, pp. 32-35); closer to home, the 2015 shooting death of Edmonton Police Service Cst. Daniel Woodall was blamed on an individual with Sovereign Citizen leanings (Pruden, 2015). This is also relevant to the correctional setting: The Anti-Defamation League suggests prison is one of the most productive recruiting sites for Freemen, and describes,

> a wave of prison-based sovereign citizen activity [which] has swept the country, much of it generated by "traditional" criminals such as drug dealers or thieves, some of whom have actually become sovereign citizens themselves, with others simply trying some sovereign citizen tactics because they have been told they would work (2012, pp 12-13)

News coverage suggests Sovereign Citizens dramatically outnumber Islamist radicals in Canada, with estimates of 30,000 adherents across the country (Lamoureux & Snowdon, 2016).

Sovereign Citizens: Officer Perceptions and Management Strategies

An intriguing aspect of the Sovereign Citizen movement, which differentiates it from Islamist radicals (or, at least, the stereotypes of Islamist radicals), is the lack of a single, unifying body or idea. In other words, ". . . the default structure of the sovereign citizen movement is that of a large mass of individuals or loosely aligned and informal/ad hoc groups. . ." (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 6). This lack of definition tends to define the Freemen. Gangs often

institute a required membership ritual, while radical group membership demands at least partial adherence to a shared political or ideological belief system (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015, p. 104). While Sovereign Citizens ascribe to specific ideologies, they tend to do so alone, as lone actors, who draw support and inspiration from the internet rather than other group members (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 8; Kent, 2015, p. 11). As a result, individual Freemen believe different things yet claim the same title. This seems to have influenced my participants' perception of Sovereign Citizens, as identifying who was, or who was not, a Freeman was challenging—especially as the inmate would often deny it:

Trent: Yeah. He's claiming that he's not a Freemen on the Land, but the police are deeming him that, right? So we have a lot of guys that come through and say, this doesn't apply to me, or the charter, or whatever. They try to pull all that out. But I think there are a few. But not as many as people think.

Because of the difficulty of communicating with Sovereign Citizens, conclusively establishing an inmate was following the Freeman ideology was difficult. Many officers dismissed inmates who met Freemen criteria as mentally deficient, rather than ideologically motivated. This provides a clear level of contrast with 'radical' Muslim inmates: it was not difficult for my participants to establish who the Muslim inmates on their unit were—in fact, Muslims were highly visible, as we have seen, and religion is by definition an ideological belief system. As a result, it was far easier for my participants to identify 'radical' Muslims, than 'radical' Freemen.

Regardless of motivation or concrete identification, my participants unequivocally labelled Freemen as difficult to deal with in the prison setting:

Anna: Oh, they were horrible. "You have no right to hold me, I don't believe in this legislative . . . I am a free man, you have no authority to keep me here."

Tony: . . . The Freemen are certainly an issue. We've had a couple of them in custody—I know there's one guy that I had to speak to a couple years ago. He didn't want to sign his federal fifteen-day waver. Told the Parole officer, so I went down to talk to the guy, "no, I'm not signing anything." Y'know, these guys are just opposed to any kind of paper trail, y'know?

Ricky: Oh, yeah! My favourite. I love those guys. They're really hard to deal with. Kanada . . . . It's not Canada, it's their own . . . member of the independent state of Kanada . . . They drive you nuts, right? And they're all paperwork oriented. You want to get paperwork, go piss one of them off. They'll fire [makes motion with hand, indicating a stack of papers inches thick.] *They're crazy, right? They're nuts. And they're . . . they're actually violent. They're their own, they're radicalizing themselves.*

I heard numerous stories of 'paper terrorism' in both the ERC and the FSCC, something which aligns with the Anti-Defamation League's observations about active Sovereign Citizen recruitment within American prisons (2012, p. 12). Officers Ricky and Anna both labelled Freemen as violent, but only in relation to life outside of jail. Within both prisons I visited, my participants largely dismissed Freemen as an irritation—although, as officer Archie describes, minor details often became major nuisances when dealing with them:

Archie: I remember, there was a guy on Unit 5 . . . I'm calling, all-paging him and stuff, no-one's coming. I finally went down to his cell, and he's like—"No, that is not my legal, binding, name." And at that time, I didn't realize he was a Freeman . . . . he's [like]—"Well, why are you asking me this, why do you need to know this, I'm not answering that, you guys just sit there and watch me" . . . very anti-authority, anti-government. . . it was to the point where I had to be like—"I don't really care what your belief system is outside of these walls . . . I need a couple signatures, so we can go about this a couple ways, the easy way or you can just be locked up," and so he's . . . "well, I would like [you and your partner] to be aware that I am signing this under duress."

Chan: Freemen become administrative burdens. Outside of the prison I think they're extremely dangerous. Inside, they kinda calm down a bit, and they become more of an administrative burden. I believe . . . I wouldn't call them intelligent, but educated enough . . . they become administrative burdens when they start firing paperwork.

Officer Chan's comments about violence are relevant, and I will return to them momentarily. Despite commenting on how irritating Freemen were, the majority of my participants did not view them as a threat. Freemen were described as a nuisance, but—unlike the 'Muslim radicals'—officers did not view them as a risk which demanded an immediate response. Furthermore, my participants only mentioned single Freemen, meaning they did not see a risk of group formation. Oddly, some of my participants were even sympathetic:

Chan: Freemens—just pissed-off guys who are down on their luck, and they're grabbing for something.

Lukas: But what they have to say, it's appealing! Who wants to pay taxes? Who doesn't want to have their own land, where they don't have to pay anybody anything? Like, some of their ideologies, belief systems are really appealing. So, that attracts some people. And it attracts people who don't have all their scruples together.

These comments are surprising when compared to my participants' antipathetic views surrounding Islamist radicalization. Again, this speaks to the risk profile attached to radicalization. The Freemen, as a relatively common radical group who cause significant work for officers and administrators in the prison, should logically have attracted more, rather than less, disapprobation from CO's. However, in clear contrast to Muslim inmates, the diffuse nature of the Sovereign Citizen movement meant my participants viewed Freemen as individuals, rather than representatives of a greater cause. They are also, typically (at least in the ERC and FSCC), white or Metis men, and as a result face far less racial profiling than Muslim inmates. Furthermore, media coverage has never linked Sovereign Citizens to watershed terrorist attacks like 9/11.[54] This means Freemen do not have the same societal risk profile as 'Islamic terrorists,' which—in turn—means the individual risk responsibilitization which deeply shaped officer reactions to 'Muslim extremists' does not apply.

Despite the above, my participants firmly rejected any Freeman effort to subvert order in the prisons. Officers dismissed 'paper terrorism' as a joke, and several people told me about the 'fun' of 'spinning up' Sovereign Citizens to hear them rant about government illegitimacy. This is unique; news and academic portrayals of Freemen/law enforcement interactions are painted in a harsh light, as Sovereign Citizen gun violence against law enforcement is a tragically-proven

[54] Interestingly, officer John—who extensively studied Freemen, and expressed deep levels of concern about them—suggested this may have been incorrect. He classified people like Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and Waco commune leader David Koresh as aligned with Sovereign Citizen ideologies. However, these events do not have the same societal cache as 9/11, and therefore do not influence social views on risk.

fact (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 1; Kent, 2015, p. 6; Pruden, 2015). However, my participants' attitudes suggest the highly-regulated prison environment removed the threat of Freeman violence against law enforcement, leaving only the administrative burden—which some officers were able to dramatically reduce, albeit unofficially:

We get them sporadically . . . But they're a threat. It's very hard to deal with someone who won't even acknowledge your existence. . . [indicates recorder] *that thing's recording but. . . one time down in A&D, "I'm a sovereign citizen," blah blah blah blah. "I don't acknowledge, I don't acknowledge". . . wack!* [Makes slapping motion. Laughter from both parties.] *I'm like,* ***"You're not protected by the Charter, or anything . . . You're your own institution . . . So this is how it's going to be, right? You have no rights . . . you don't have my protection, you don't have the protection of the union, so I can do whatever I want to you. And I'm a hell of a lot bigger than you."*** *He clued in and started following directions after that. (Officer transcript, 2016)*

If the alleged malfeasance outlined here occurred as described, it is a clear example of inappropriate use-of-force. Importantly though, these actions demonstrate a rejection of Freemen as a credible threat to officer safety. I had numerous discussions with my participants about use of force. When officer-on-inmate violence occurred, fellow officers and subcultural pressures managed it to some extent; my participants would not have treated a gang leader, or 'solid con' like this, as it was a clear incident of 'disrespect' which would have attracted revenge. Actions like this reinforce the perception of Freemen as nothing but loudmouthed nuisances in the jail setting—something officer Francis confirmed:

Dr. Haggerty: Is there any sense that these people present a particular risk to COs? I have heard that.
Francis: From a lot of guys I've talked to, they're not worried about, y'know, some Freeman on the Land guy stabbing them. They're more worried about some guy on Max Pod or Mental Health having a break with reality and attacking them. That's way more concerning. And as far as I know, Freemen haven't attacked anyone in the Remand Centre.

My participants did not view Sovereign Citizens as a risk at either the FSCC or the ERC. However, this may have blinded them to active recruitment within their settings. The Anti-Defamation League publication on Freemen suggests recruitment is a pressing issue within American prisons (2012, pp. 12-13). I also interviewed at least one inmate at the ERC who had

begun following Sovereign Citizen ideologies while incarcerated, suggesting the movement has some attraction. However, when I asked my participants, they claimed Freeman recruitment would have been either impossible or unlikely within their prisons:

Will: And they don't have any swing in here, either.
Trent: No. Not those guys. There's not . . . There's not enough of them right? And when they do come in, most of those guys that are saying this type of stuff, they're not mentally all there, and they end up in mental health. They don't have the communication with the GP [General Population] guys.

John: [U]sually what we're looking at is, OK, we get somebody who is a Freeman. And we start watching him . . . So we're not seeing a lot of guys recruiting or trying to bring people on board . . . there's a very small number of those types we're ever seeing in corrections. [a few moments later] . . . really, I mean—most inmates . . . they're criminals, but they're going to look at these people the same as most of us do . . . "That guy's crazy," right? And they even talk to the staff, and they're like . . . "The inmates are getting tired of this guy, because he's fucking weird." So, I don't think there's a lot of recruiting happening.

Earlier, we discussed mental health as a major theme in shaping officer perceptions of 'radical' Islamists within the prison. This was also prevalent in discussions about Sovereign Citizens. The Freeman ideology is complicated, archaic, and driven by large-scale conspiracy theories (Anti-Defamation League, 2012, p. 3); one lawyer even described Sovereign Citizens as "living in an alternate universe" (Lamoureux & Snowdon, 2016). As officer Lukas put it, "*It's almost as if they have a screw loose to begin with*." My participants did not differentiate between mental health and genuine belief when it came to Freemen—likely, because the two were synonymous in their view. As officer John states, this caused issues when the institution was trying to manage evangelical Sovereign Citizens:

John: The only time I could see these guys finding followers is in a mental health setting, right? We decide this guy is mental health, because traditionally these radical, these Freeman-type ideology people have gone to the Mental Health unit 'cause we just traditionally thought they were crazy. Now it gives them an opportunity to prey on some of the other people who are in fact actually mentally ill, and then they might get a few followers. [several moments later] . . . We're trying to go away from classifying somebody with—like the Freeman—as a mental health issue, because . . . they're really not mental health issues, it's a belief system. Whether we think it's right or wrong, it doesn't mean that they're actually mentally ill. We've actually changed from

moving them into a mental health setting to moving them out into a General Pop[55] *area where . . . that's a more appropriate area for them.*

Although Sovereign Citizens were often mentally deficient, John recognized significant dangers in lumping all the 'weird' inmates together, thereby placing evangelizing ideologs in the same setting as impressionable mental health patients.

Intriguingly, my participants' insistence on dismissing Sovereign Citizens as 'crazy' means they committed exactly the same perception errors that they did around Muslim inmates, only in reverse. In the case of 'Islamic radicals,' my participants associated visible Islamic religious practice or ethnic grouping as a form of radicalization, regardless of proof. Societal risk profiles influenced this, and helped create individual responsibilitization; as officers Andrew and Archer showed, these profiles were strong enough that CO's acted on them regardless of whether they perceived an 'Islamic radical' had mental health concerns. On the flip side, my participants immediately associated overt Sovereign Citizen behaviour with mental health. As a result, they dismissed the Freemen as an irritation, and rejected Sovereign Citizen recruitment as only a concern in mental health wards. They did this *despite* identifying the inmate population as 'right' for radicalization; in short, they under-emphasized the risk of Freeman radicalization almost as much as they over-emphasized the risk of Islamic radicalization within the prison. Race also played a role, as my participants largely characterized Freemen as 'crazy white guys;' this made them less visible than groups like the Muslims on Pod 5, and allowed them to avoid the stereotyping which played a role in discussions of 'Islamic' radicalization. To emphasize a point which I have repeatedly made: the risk profile attached to radicalization meant Muslim and visible minority groups within the prison attracted far more attention from officers than they deserved, and also blinded officers to other forms of radicalization and criminality within the jail.

[55] "General Population" or "GP". A regular living unit, with the fewest strictures of any housing unit in the prison.

Conclusion

Correctional officer perceptions of radicalization are merely a microcosm of what is, in many ways, a perfect storm. Societal views and pressures deeply shape radicalization, regardless of whether these pressures reflect a fact-based reality. Massive terror attacks—most notably 9/11, and recently, the rise of so-called ISIS—have made radicalization and terrorism a unique space for neoliberal prudentialism (O'Malley, 1996) and the subsequent implementation of responsibility onto individuals (Ericson, 2008; O'Malley, 1996). This means individuals who see radicalization are 'responsibilitized' to deal with it in some form (Erickson, 2007). These pressures influence correctional officers, who find themselves in a unique position: faced with recalcitrant, hostile Muslim inmates, they feel responsible for 'dealing' with 'radicalization'—which, as they largely do not have specialized training, they define through individual actions and media portrayals. They perceive the larger correctional apparatus as ignoring their concerns and abdicating responsibility; therefore, they take personal action. Yet, their methods of 'dealing' with radicalization are often unofficial, or—as the Pod 5 fight demonstrate—use tactics which the inmates perceive as 'dirty tricks'. As a result, officers find themselves in confrontation with Muslim inmates, with several consequences. First, they ignore other potential forms of criminality and radicalization within the prison. Second, their actions create more problems than they stop; inmates widely interpret officer reactions to 'radicalization' as racism and discrimination. Although this plays a role, risk perception is the driving force behind these actions; yet, inmates fail to understand this, and view all officers as bigots. Like virtue, legitimacy within the prison setting is easy to lose, but far more difficult to regain.

My participants are not sympathetic characters. They are tough and hard-edged; some have killed people in military combat, others routinely engage in illegal violence. They

dehumanize their clients—even if they do so to protect their own mental health, rather than from inherent malevolence. They are on the right side of the law by virtue of their position, rather than their actions—which they shape through stereotype, race, and subcultural pressure with uncomfortable regularity. They often pass over legality, right, and wrong, unless it concerns personal liability. In short, my participants are correctional officers, skilled practitioners of a near-impossible balance between the law, management policy, imminent violence, uncertainty, and massive structural pressure on all sides.

To conclude, I return to my discussion of vulnerability. My research and work experience suggests vulnerability is the key, defining factor for everyone within the prison, both inmates and officers. I cannot overemphasize the influence this has on officer perceptions; it directly shapes everything they do, both consciously and unconsciously. It becomes an all-encompassing structural pressure; it shapes subcultural membership, and responses to threats. My participants even justified their illegitimate use-of-force decisions through vulnerability; they believed they had to 'send a message' to the inmate population, in order to maintain control and prevent future victimization. This structural weight, along with the stupendous pressure exerted by the risk society hypothesis, deeply shaped their views on prison radicalization, in a way which may not have happened in a different province or country. In a way, my participants' concern about radicalization is laudable—they actively watched for and tried to interrupt malevolent group membership. Unfortunately, they did not realize their efforts to protect themselves and their partners created new problems, rather than solving old ones. There is, perhaps, little hope for my participants given the massive structural issues at play. Yet, by recognizing the vital importance which individual actions play in shaping legitimacy within the prison, there is a chance of taking steps back along the road toward a safer and friendlier prison environment.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: The Participants

- **Adam** has been doing the job for a while, and feels strongly about how to do the job "right". He is unimpressed with the young losers he has to work with. Interview conducted by Dr. Haggerty.
- I went through training with **Anna**. She spent many years working with a police organization, and is passionately involved in the peer support organization at her prison.
- **Archie** is intelligent, hard-working and quick-tempered, and has placed himself on the promotional fast-track.
- The first thing which you notice about **Asher** is the tension in his eyes and voice. Although he has only been doing the job for a few years, the stress and vulnerability of 'doing corrections' in a harsh environment has left him on the edge of breakdown.
- **Basil** didn't want to talk to me. He gave me one story, then told me to turn off the recorder. We chatted afterward, but little came of it.
- **Jason's** muscle-bound and foul-mouthed exterior hides a surprisingly subtle and nuanced view of how corrections should be done—namely, massive increases in programming for at-risk youth.
    - **Sheldon**, who was working as a 'float' on Jason's pod, dropped by during the interview. He told me he felt safer in the Afghan combat than he does at the ERC.
- **Calvin** is well-liked by his coworkers, but has an unfortunate reputation for combining dumb decisions with bad luck, both in and outside of the jail.
- **Carrie** has a few mental health issues; she is also tough, strong, hard-working, and has an unquestioned edge which intimidates inmates, coworkers, and supervisors alike.
- **Chan** worked for federal corrections before the poisoned staff relations in his prison caused him to quit. He is bitter and self-identifies as jaded.
- **Clint** was a Warrant Officer in Afghanistan, and is proud to tell you why he was a damn good one. He is far less proud of his current career, seeing the entire correctional apparatus as corrupt.
- **Connor** gave me a nuanced and well-thought-out assessment of Boot Camp and its problems.
- **Dan's** experience of dealing with officers everyday for 20-plus years has left him cynical about the quality of both his employees and his bosses.
- **Esther** recently took advantage of a regulatory loophole to retire and 'cash out' 30 years of pension in one lump sum. Her quick tongue and inflexible opinions were legendary.
- **Ethan** is ex-military, and is a driving force behind the Boot Camp program. Although cocksure, his abilities back up his boasts—and the inmates like and respect him for it.
- **Etienne** is a large, tattooed, and taciturn officer who handles the roughest unit in his prison. He unapologetically describes his clients as the 'stupidest' in the jail.

- **Francis** recently started in the job; he is undoubtedly intelligent, but isn't smart enough to avoid saying controversial things which make him unpopular with older staff. Interview conducted by Dr. Haggerty.
- **Harry** is a slight, unassuming young man, and does not fit the hyper-masculine CO stereotype in any form. Yet, his penetrating analytical mind allows him to notice small details which other people overlook.
- Known and liked by people for her kindness, **Jennifer** also possesses an iron streak which she uses to rebuff any attempt at manipulation. Few people know about the life experience which she draws on to privately educate female inmates about drug abuse.
- **John** has spent most of his career investigating security threats within the jail. He complains that the budgetary constraints of his position mean he will never be fully able to detect or prevent the increasing threat of inmates smuggling drugs into prison
- **Laura's** fiancée died in the Afghan combat. She admits that 'screwed her up', and it is why she left the army for corrections. It is difficult to tell how much of her hard-boiled exterior is protective, and how much truly reflects her personality.
- **Lukas** retired recently after about ten years in corrections. He has little good to say about prison, despite having occupied a coveted job position for almost half his career.
- **Matt** is one of the few people in the prison who seems 'normal' despite his experiences. A former athletic star, he successfully employs non-verbal and relational techniques to control some of the most volatile inmates in the prison without violence.
- **Nigel** is a CPO III on a protective custody unit. He suspects deeper, malevolent motivations behind recent malfeasance on his unit, but cannot prove his suspicions—yet.
- **Quinton** is young, tough, and very good at his job. He doesn't hold any illusions about the nature of corrections work. Despite his demonstrable skill, he is looking for an exit.
- **Ricky**, a veteran CO, is nearly invisible if you aren't paying attention—surprising for a man so large. He is a silent power-brokers in the officer cadre; he knows everyone and everything, and inmates respect him almost as much as they fear and avoid his displeasure. Nobody questions his toughness or ability.
- **Rob** is among the few people in the prison who genuinely and whole-heartedly cares about the well-being and rehabilitation of his charges. He struggles with the attitudes of many of his coworkers.
- **Selvin** served 20 years in an African military before moving his family to Canada. He is a pious Muslim, and is well-respected and well-liked by his colleagues
- **Siddiqi** wasn't interested in discussing deep issues around corrections, mostly because he was at the panel of an unhappy unit which had been searched earlier in the day.
- **Stewart** has an unique perspective on the correctional officer subculture—but his methods of conveying it make him controversial among his peers. Interview conducted by Dr. Haggerty.
- An ex-football player, **Tim** is strongly-built, strong-minded, and strongly opinionated. Like Ethan, his claims do not exceed his abilities. He enjoys working on the most volatile units in the prison, seeing it as an entertaining challenge.

- **Trent** admits to being at a breaking point in his six-year career: if promotion doesn't come soon he will look for another career. He admits he is only doing it for the money.
    - **Andrew**, who was working as a float on Trent's unit, was present for the first few moments of the conversation, and added some salty detail to the transcript.
- **Group Interview A**
    - A group conversation between **Tyler, Paul, Chad, Alfie** and **Ryan.**
- **Group Interview B**
    - A group conversation between **Darnell, Mohammed, Chris, Ron**, and some assorted others.
- **Other officers mentioned:**
    - **Beefy**
        - Legendary across both ERC and FSCC, Beefy is tough, hard, loved by his coworkers, and feared by the inmates. His friends joke that he lives on the Max Pod.
    - **Shelagh**
        - Our officer contact at the ERC.
    - **Jerry**
        - An acquaintance who was assaulted several years before this study.
    - **Shorty**
        - A friend I worked with before retiring.
- **Inmates:**
    - I have chosen to provide no descriptors of these individuals, in order to fully protect them. Their pseudonyms were randomly chosen and do not reflect individual characteristics of the inmates in question. However, they do reflect the officers' ways of describing them—i.e., 'this guy is a freak' became "Freaky"

Appendix 2: Definition of Terms

- Caseworker/CSW
  - A Correctional Service Worker. These individuals are also officers. In some centres, they work on the unit and provide a security role alongside the Correctional Officers; in others, they have separate offices and only visit the units. However, their main responsibility is case planning; they are responsible for getting inmates into programming, creating release plans, and the like. They are widely seen as the 'soft' touch in prison, whereas CO's are seen as providing discipline and security.
- Cleaner/Tier Rep
  - A liaison between the officers and inmates. Officially in charge of cleaning the unit, but also organizes meal service and some inmate activities. Usually receives extra privileges due to his status.
- Correctional Officer/CO
  - The basic, front-line correctional staff worker in Albertan prisons, responsible for the care, custody and control of inmates on the units. Officially, the title is "Correctional Peace Officer." The addition of "peace officer" is important legally, as it gives CO's legal standing underneath section 25 of the Canadian Criminal Code. CO is regular short-hand, although inmates often use the term 'Boss'.
- Code 44
  - An emergency code, meaning "officer requires assistance." Usually refers to a fight between an officer and an inmate.
- Code 66
  - A fight between two inmates.
- CPO III/'Three bar'/Three
  - A supervisor within the prison, roughly analogous to a sergeant or NCO in the military or police. CPO III's—or "Threes", or "Three-bars"—are in charge of managing emergencies, determining discipline, and helping staff. They are the first line of decision-makers within the prison, and the primary conduit for communication between management—typically the DDO—and front-line staff.
- Director
  - Head of prison. Referred to as 'warden' in both the inmate argot and the Federal correctional system.
- DDO
  - Deputy Director of Operations. The 'shift manager' who is responsible for the mundane, every-day operations of the prison. Attached to a specific shift schedule.
- Edmonton Remand Centre/Remand/ERC
  - The largest and most technologically-advanced prison in Canada, housing up to 1800 inmates on seven different pods/specialized units. Opened in 2013, and suffered a wildcat strike by officers within a month of opening. Over 500 staff

work there, and on an average day, there will be over 2000 people in the building. Dominates any conversation about corrections in the province.

- Fecal bomb/Shit bomb
    - Usually referred to in the prison argot as a 'shit-bomb,' fecal bombing involves throwing bags, cups, or bowls of feces and urine onto another inmate or officer. It is commonly used on Max Pod, where the structural constraints of being locked up alone for 23 hours a day prevent confrontation. The liquid of a 'bomb' will travel under doors or through meal slots, allowing inmates to attack those they cannot physically reach.
- Field Training Officer
    - A senior officer, who is paired with a junior officer. The senior officer bears a loose responsibility for ensuring the new staff member is learning how to effectively do the job.
- Fort Saskatchewan Correctional Centre/FSCC/'The Fort'
    - Opened in 1988, 'The Resort at the Fort' is both loved and reviled for being one of the most relaxed prisons in the province—if not the country. Houses up to 550 inmates, half of which are overflow remand inmates from the ERC. The prison is contained by a large wall, meaning inmates get to walk outside regularly—something which helps prevent the violence and tension which the ERC experiences. Both ERC and FSCC staff comment on the differences between officer attitudes at the two prisons.
- Gangs
    - ASAP: Always Strive, Always Prosper.
        - An up-and-coming Aboriginal street/prison gang, primarily drawing support from reserves in Northern Alberta.
    - Alberta Warriors
        - One of the original street gangs in the province, now defunct. Many of its members 'patched over' to ASAP following the AW's dissolution
    - Redd Alert
        - A well-established Aboriginal street/prison gang, primarily drawing support from urban centers in Northern Alberta and BC. ASAP and the RA were friendly during this research.
    - United Brothers
        - A new prison gang within the major Albertan centres. Primarily draws support from black and other visible minority inmates in the prisons. The UB's were fighting with both the RA's and ASAP during our research.
- General Population
    - The 'regular' inmate units. Inmates are allowed out for the majority of the day, unless they are being disciplined. Prisoners usually start their prison career in 'General Pop' or 'GP', and are moved for discipline/protection if needed. Each 'GP' pod has its own character; for instance, Pod 1 and Pod 2 at the ERC are both 'GP,' but Pod 1 holds the quietest, best-behaved inmates in the prison, while Pod 2 is the maximum-security gang unit.

- Max Pod
    - The Segregation unit at the ERC. Inmates are housed individually, or with one roommate. Unit operates on a 23-hour lockup system; each inmate is allowed out for one hour per day, and is not allowed direct contact with anyone else on the unit.
- Muster
    - A pre-shift briefing for all the officers on a given day. Major incidents from the prior 24 hours are outlined, and duties and responsibilities are assigned. Also serves as the main place for transfer of information between managers and regular staff.
- Pod
    - A large, square building, attached to the remainder of the prison by hallways referred to as 'links.' Each pod contains four Units, and the pods, collectively, make up the ERC. Each pod is largely self-sufficient, and can be remotely closed off from the rest of the prison.
- Pod Control
    - A station on the second floor of the pod, overlooking all four units. The officer working there controls the entry and exit for the individual units and pod as a whole.
- Protective Custody/PC
    - A unit specifically dedicated to hold inmates who would not be safe in 'GP'. In the past, was synonymous with sex offenders, as they were not allowed to live on GP units. The unit operates on normal principles, and is not segregated; as a result, the inmates are not protected from each other, they are simply protected from inmates on other units. At the ERC, Pod 5 holds nothing but PC inmates.
- Unit
    - One-quarter of a Pod. Contains up to 72 inmates, in 36 cells. Each unit has three 'tiers,' or levels, with 12 cells on each tier. Inmates are double-bunked. There are typically two full-time staff on each unit, with a 'float' who helps on two different units.
    - At the FSCC, units stand alone; they are not contained within a pod. They are linked with other buildings by sidewalks; inmates often walk on their own, unescorted.
- Officer station/unit control station/'panel'
    - Each Pod is a rough square, and so are the units. The officers sit in the central corner of the units, with their backs to 'pod control,' facing outward so they can see the entire unit. The place where they sit is the officer station; it contains the controls to the unit. Depending on the unit, it can be raised above floor level to provide a barrier and give better angles, or it can be set directly on the floor.
- Panel
    - Officer slang for the unit control station. Also refers to the buttons, monitors, computers, switches, and/or CCTV units which officers use to control the unit, open doors—in other words, the technology of prison management.

Appendix 3: Original and Edited Prompt Guides for Correctional Officers

Original Prompts

I. **Tell us a little bit about your job responsibilities and work history in the correctional system.**

II. **Tell us a little bit about the different groups that you have encountered in this prison and the challenges/risks they pose.**

(prompt into group differences – especially with respect to gangs and other extremist groups – are there differences?/prompt into whether they see any as particularly challenging to the routine and security of the prison? Are risks directed at other inmates or staff?/would you identify any of these groups as extremist groups or as radicalizing people (probe into definition of staff member)

III. **Tell us about who becomes part extremists groups?**
(who is attracted and why (certain "types" of inmates?)?/is there active recruitment?/ how do people come to join? are some people not allowed to join)

IV. **How do radicalized inmates change the routine of the prison?** (prompt into formal and informal ways of engaging these inmates). Is prison different for radicalized inmates versus others (other routines/access to resources etc.)

V. **How do staff members identify radicalized inmates?** (prompt into behavioural cues, signs/tattoos/formal vs informal identification process).

VI. Is there a formal response to radicalized inmates? Is there formal training?

VII. What are best practises?

VIII. Final thoughts- anything we did not ask?

Revised Prompts, used at FSCC:

I. How'd you get into corrections?

How long in corrections? Prior job experiences (try and probe if Military, ask if they did any tours—be aware this may shape perspectives on inmates)? Where do they work in the prison (what's special about it)? Comparisons of corrections with other jobs?

Perceptions of the job (DO NOT LEAD WITH THIS IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY BUILT RAPPORT): do they like working in jail? Do they hate it? (corrections as "the participation ribbon of law enforcement") Why/why not? What do they think about their coworkers? (expect griping. Get to 'why' of griping—i.e., what's wrong with the prison culture)

Female officers: perceptions of sexual harassment within the workplace from officers and inmates (AGAIN: handle with caution). Also: how does being female

and working on a male unit differ from working on a female unit? (women have a reputation of having an easier time on male units. Why?)

II. How do you identify and deal with security threat groups/gangs?

Differences between groups: gangs, "other" groups (ask about radicals; ask about gang beefs; ask about FREEMEN, etc. . . look for comparisons between radical = mental health problems)

Who joins the gangs? Why? How? How do you try and stop it? How do you identify it? Who leads them? Does it matter?

Religious conversion in jail?

III. **Negotiating the job**

How do officers view use of force? Is it necessary? How much (caution here)? Perspectives of how necessary use of force is (absolutely necessary/needed vs. used as a last resort)

How do you maintain control of a living unit? What tactics do you use? What are effective? Are there inmates you 'work with?' Why/where/when/how? How do you work with an inmate without having them labelled as a "rat"?

How do you choose your tier rep (cleaner)? (heavies/polite/etc.) What makes a good rep?

How do you deal with the dynamics of having mixed genders in this prison/do you ever work the weekend unit? (dig into perceptions of weekender unit, and prepare to laugh at explosions of rage)

How do you punish inmates? (lockups/internal charges; look for descriptions of unofficial sanctions, and probe into 'why'—are unofficial sanctions more effective, more useful, don't get you in trouble with the boss, etc.; see if they bring up use of force, if not, probe GENTLY) What is your perception of the inmate disciplinary process? (and prepare for lots of complaints)

IV. **Negotiating the coworkers**

Is there an officer subculture? What is it like? How do you work with it? Bad/Good/indifferent? Thin blue line? Or everyone for themselves?

How do you judge/deal with/train new staff? What makes a good officer?

How do you deal with "bad" officers (probe into what bad means—could mean corrupt, could mean incompetent, could mean indifferent. . .)? how do 'other'

officers deal with ‘bad’ staff?

How do you perceive management? Are they good/bad/indifferent? Do you hate/like/respect them? What makes a good prison manager?

What do you think of Boot Camp?

V. What do you think of Remand Centre?

Dig for perceptions on differences between Remand/FSCC; Why does Remand have so many codes; what’s the difference; have you ever worked there?

Are the inmates more relaxed here than they are at Remand? Why? Articeture, outside, privileges, sentenced/remand? Do you see differences between REMAND inmates and SENTENCED inmates? Why?

VI. If you were in charge of this research study, what would you ask about?

What’s the interesting stuff we’re not asking about?

Appendix 4: Information Letter and Consent Form

Study Title: Places of identity within prisons

Research Investigator:

Sandra Bucerius
6-20 Tory Building, HM
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H4
Bucerius@ualberta.ca
1-780-492-3561

Kevin Haggerty
6-26 Tory Building
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H4
kevin.haggerty@ualberta.ca
1-780-492-3297

William Schultz
4-08 Tory Building
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H4
wschultz@ualberta.ca
1-780-878-8108

Background and purpose

First of all, I want to thank you for allowing me to speak with you today. I would like to invite you to participate in this research project exploring the experiences of prison staff with respect to radicalization in correctional facilities. One key focus of our proposed study is to investigate how radical groups or individuals might pose challenges to correctional facilities. This research is being conducted by Professors Sandra Bucerius and Kevin Haggerty (University of Alberta).

This knowledge is key to determining 'best practices' with respect to questions of radicalization. In other words: we are interested in hearing your opinion on which strategies 'work best' when engaging with radicalized inmates and the challenges of working with such populations.

Study Procedures

The interview may last up to one hour and will give you an opportunity to share your insights on a variety of different topics related to radicalization and radical groups with Alberta corrections and the challenges they pose to the prison system. Please do not feel rushed or pressured to talk about a topic that is on your mind within a specific time frame. I have lots of time and I will listen to what you have to say for as long as you are willing to talk to me.

Benefits

- You may find it rewarding or cathartic to discuss your experiences and share your knowledge with an objective researcher.
- Although we do not work for or report to the Ministry, we hope that Alberta Corrections will benefit from the results of this research, including 'best practices' with respect to radicalization

Voluntary Participation

Your participation in this interview today is **completely voluntary**. You don't have to be interviewed if you do not want to and you can stop the interview at any time without penalty. You can also refuse to talk about topics that you don't want to talk about. You can stop the interview at any time to ask me questions about the study, to take a washroom or drink break, or for any other reason.

After the interview has been completed you also have the option of calling the primary investigators to indicate your decision to withdraw from the study. The latest point of withdrawal from the study is 14 days from today.

Confidentiality & Anonymity

The information that you give me will be kept **completely confidential**.

- This research will be used for research articles, conference presentations, and for teaching purposes.
- Your job title within corrections will be collected, but only for the purpose of making general distinctions and statements about the opinions of different professionals, should differences exist. If you have a distinctive job title we will use a euphemism to ensure you cannot be identified
- Your name will not be put on any of the data that I collect. Instead, I will use a code name so that I can link you to your data without ever using your real name. This way, nobody from outside of the study will ever be able to tell who you are.
- Your name will never appear on any of the research reports that result from this project.
- The information that you provide is completely confidential with us. It will not be given to other people—like your employer, your colleagues, community, family members, welfare office, the police, or the courts.
- I will be asking you if I can tape-record your interview. If you agree, the information that is collected on tape will be written down after the interview is over. The purpose of tape recording the interview is to make the process go a bit faster because I won't have to physically write down your answers. It will also help me record exactly what you said. To protect your privacy, I will ask you not to say your name while you are being taped. Even if you don't want to be tape-recorded, I still want to interview you.
- All study documents (for example, consent forms) will be kept in the Principal Investigator's office, in locked filing cabinets. The transcriptions and audio-files of the interviews will be encrypted and kept on a study computer.
- If you are interested in receiving a copy of the research reports please contact either of the primary investigators.
- We may use the data we get from this study in future research, but if we do this it will have to be approved by a Research Ethics Board.

Further Information

If you have any further questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact:

Sandra Bucerius
Department of Sociology
University of Alberta
Bucerius@ualberta.ca
1-780-492-3561

Kevin Haggerty
Department of Sociology
University of Alberta
kevin.haggerty@ualberta.ca
1-780-492-3297

William Schultz
Department of Sociology
University of Alberta
wschultz@ualberta.ca
1-780-878-8108

The plan for this study has been reviewed for its adherence to ethical guidelines by a Research Ethics Board at the University of Alberta. For questions regarding participant rights and ethical conduct of research, contact the Research Ethics Office at (780) 492-2615.

Do you have any questions about what I've said?

Consent Statement

Now I'd like to keep a record that we talked about the research process and that you agree to participate in it. I will circle 'yes' or 'no' for the following two questions and then sign my own name on this document. I won't write down your name or ask you to sign anything.

1	Do you agree to participate in the interview today?	Yes	No
2	May I tape-record the interview with you?	Yes	No

I, _____(Name of research team member), have read the participant this form, offered him/her the opportunity to ask questions, and have answered any questions he/she has asked. The participant will be provided with a copy of this form after I sign it.

Date:_____Place:_____Signed:_____