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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CHINESE HUMANISM AND WESTERN SOCIOLOGY

by

(C) BINKY TAN

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
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## ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on The Chinese conception of man by examining and interpreting Chinese thought and the way classical and contemporary Chinese conceptions are being synthesized.

One basic theme which emerges from this study is that Chinese thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung is essentially centered on man's self-development to be achieved through a dialectical relationship with nature and society.

This vision is humanistic in the sense that it places the human individual in the position of centrality. The main source of realizing man's potential is his own strength. The human individual is thus viewed as a morally creative agent who constantly struggles with his environment, social and natural. Man is capable of perfecting himself.

At a time when many social scientists are speaking of a crisis in western sociology, it is useful to view Chinese humanism as a source of theoretical inspiration. Moreover, if western sociological theories, as many sociologists have argued, are in large measure based on an egoistic conception of man, a study of the more community-oriented Chinese image of man can suggest some fresh orientation to western social political theory. Furthermore, the Chinese dialectical conception of reality discourages social stagnation and favors change and development.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is to critically analyze the essentials of Chinese humanism and assess their significance for western sociology.

By Chinese "humanism" we do not mean any particular current of Chinese thought but rather that basic orientation that places the "human" individual in the position of centrality -- an orientation that has consistently permeated, though in different forms, the entire philosophy, culture, and way of life of the Chinese people. Being the Chinese Weltanschauung a strictly monistic and inner-world conception of reality, it obviously places the ultimate source of self-realization in man's own strength and not in a supernatural power. Man is seen as a creative and autonomous agent who perfects himself through his relationship to his fellow men and through his experience of oneness with nature. As part of the cosmos he does not experience any subject-object dualism. His interaction with the rest of the world is of dialectical nature; he identifies himself with the perpetual process of production and reproduction, creation and re-creation of forms. Within this context, the cosmic process and the socio-historical process are viewed as a netlike interweaving of events rather than as a series of discrete events

linked in a causal chain.

Humanism, in these essential characteristics, has formed a major dimension of Chinese thought and culture. It began to emerge at the time when the Shang (1751-1112 B.C.) was conquered by the Chou. Chan Wing-tsit is of the opinion that the emergence of humanism was an outgrowth of social change at this time. In other words, as part of the conscious program of the Chou to consolidate the empire, the people were encouraged to develop new trades and skills to develop both the physical environment and the state. In this process, the people became aware of their own ability to develop both the outer world and their inner selves. Or, put differently, men began to realize that even without the help from the supernatural force, they were capable of helping themselves. Thus, as Chan Wing-tsit (1969:3) puts it, "Prayer for rain were gradually replaced by irrigation." Eventually, as the House of Chou established itself, the idea that the destiny of man (and by extension, the future of a dynasty) relies on virtuous deeds and words rather than on some mysterious power also emerged.

It was Confucius (c. 551-479 B.C.) who made humanism a driving force of Chinese thought. Confucius is known for his consistent refusal to speculate about life after death. He did not really care to speak about spiritual beings. On the other hand, he stressed the importance of observing and studying men. His main concern was a rationalized social order through the ethical approach - a good society

based on good government, harmonious human relations, and personal cultivation. He believed that man has the capacity for developing and realizing himself through his own effort. In the Analects, we read;

It is man that can make the Way great,  
and not the Way that can make man great  
(15:28).

Human mind or hsin, is capable of acquiring moral truth without divine guidance.

It is important to note that this humanism believes in the unity of man and 'Heaven' (Nature). This unity is something to be always worked at rather than to be taken for granted. However, man, as part of nature, struggles with nature and not against nature. Man and nature participate together in a perpetual creative endeavor. In order to live and grow, men necessarily organize themselves, and together they make use of the environment and change nature. Thus, in this activity man reshapes the external world, and, in the process of transforming nature, he transforms himself.

Moreover, Chinese humanism explicitly rejects the idea that man can actualize his being by detaching and withdrawing himself from the human world. In fact, this humanism suggests strongly that it is only through making sincere efforts to establish his relationships with others that the human individual can realize his full potential as a human being. In other words, self-realization is achieved in the

context of human relations.

It is in this sense that the individual is part of society and society is manifested in concrete human relations and social practices. The individual and his society, then, are viewed as an interactive relationship. There is no dualism, no sharp line, as most positivistically- and behavioristically-oriented social scientists are inclined to draw, between self and society, and between man and nature.

With regard to their conception of the cosmos, it is important to note that the Chinese, unlike many other peoples, do not have a creation myth. In the Chinese scheme of things, the Tao, the Non-Being, produces Being, and Being produces beings. But the Tao is impersonal, spontaneous, and formless. In other words, the Tao is not some celestial lawgiver. We find this kind of conception among the Taoists, as well as among Confucians and Neo-Confucians. In the writings of Chia I (c. 170 B.C.), for example, we see a conceptualization of the cosmos in terms of "Heaven and Earth" which are described as performing the function of "a smelting furnace," and the yin and yang as "the fuel" (in Needham, 1969:322). The processes of creation and re-creation, activity and non-activity are effortless, natural, and eternal, and never preordered by any superior intelligence. Thus, Chia I maintains that "in the thousand changes and the myriad transformations there is never any final end nor any absolute beginning" (Needham,



1969:322): The Taoist idea of wu-wei,<sup>1</sup> non-action or unforced and natural action, is another instance of the inclination of the Chinese to speak of a spontaneously self-generating life process.

The Chinese conception of the world is that of an organic process in which all the parts belong to a harmonious organic whole, and necessarily interact as participants in one spontaneously self-generating life process. In this sense, the Chinese believe that man is perfectible and that he makes his own history. The Chinese cosmology, then, is quite different from the Christian view of creation, ex nihilo by a Supreme Deity.

The processual view of the world of the Chinese has some important implications for Chinese thought. For instance, methodologically Chinese thought tends to emphasize complementarity of opposites rather than sharp dichotomies. The world is conceived of as a well-coordinated, harmonized organic whole in which every single part is related to every other part. This order is not a static one, however. For example, in the Confucian classic, the I Ching, this order is viewed as a process of transformation. Thus we read: "In this system of change, there is the Great Ultimate (Tai-chi), which generates the Two Modes (yin and yang). The Two Modes generate the Four Forms (major and minor yin and yang). The Four Forms generate the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams determine good and evil fortunes. And good and evil fortunes produce the great

business (of life)" (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:267).

The Taoists, too, have a similar view of the universe. The Tao produces one and eventually all else. And "the myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of the material force they achieve harmony" (Tao-te Ching:42). This includes the idea of the universe as a dynamic totality in continuous evolution from the simple to the complex.

In this same context we also see the basic idea that the yin and the yang are conceived as the agents or forces of change. This idea of yin and yang has affected the Chinese view toward reality as well as provided the common ground for the different schools of thought. In this context, yin is the passive, cold, female force, while yang is the active, hot, and male force. The interaction of the two forces produces the myriad things. Yin and yang are also mutually complementary and balancing rather than in perpetual conflict. The greater yang develops, the sooner it will relinquish to yin, and vice versa. When the moon is full it is also the beginning of its disappearance. Yin and yang not only complement each other to maintain cosmic harmony but also may transform into one another. Day, for example, transforms into night, and summer into winter.

The idea of yin-yang has permeated the methodological emphasis of Chinese thought by looking at the totality. Within the totality, there is a tendency of emphasizing

complementariness of the parts rather than contrairiness and conflict, although the importance of the latter is also recognized. To say that yin complements yang does not mean that yin and yang are non-contradictory or non-conflictive. For instance, perspectives may be viewed as different and yet the differences are seen as constituting a totality; however, this is not to say that there is no contradiction between them or that there is no tension between them and within the totality. When we affirm that A and B are opposed to each other, we do not necessarily conclude that we must therefore subscribe to either A or B. Rather, we may argue further that both A and B are necessary for the whole. To understand the human individual requires an understanding of both the male and the female.

Within this framework, it has been argued that theory and practice, like yin and yang cannot really be separated. Together, theory and practice constitute the whole; separately, each is an isolated instance of partial knowledge about reality. It thus follows that theory and practice are viewed as interrelated and mutually penetrating aspects of the same human activity. It is in this context that we may appreciate the phenomenon that in the human studies, Chinese students at different historical times and with different temperaments, (such as Wang Yang-ming (1474-1528 A.D.), a Ming dynasty (1368-1644) scholar, and Mao Tse-tung (born 1893), a contemporary thinker), can arrive at the same conclusion that there should be a unity of thought and action.

We may summarize by saying that the idea of yin-yang involves the process of the interplay of two fundamental forces which are contrasting as well as in conflict and opposition. Together yin and yang make up the whole. In this connection, Moore (1969:6-7) has described this methodological preference for inclusiveness as a Chinese attitude of thinking in terms of 'both-and,' or 'non-black-and-white,' in contrast with the western tendency to think in terms of 'either-or,' or 'black-and-white.' The 'both-and' attitude, unlike the 'either-or' attitude, implies a more general attitude of tolerance, because within the context of the 'both-and' attitude, there are no sharp line of distinction and exclusiveness.


From this preliminary comments it goes without saying that "humanism" and "dialectic" in the Chinese conception are not two different things. Chinese humanism is essentially dialectical because its emphasis is on the human individual in dialectical relation with his social and natural milieu. Individual, society, and nature are not three entities in opposition to one another but simply three aspects of one and the same dialectical reality. Man is totally "open" to nature and society, and, by participating in the dialectical process of reality, he affirms himself as "human" being.

It is hoped that by expounding this conception of humanism, the basis of western sociological thinking will

be broadened and enriched. It has been said that in the last decade or so Western social scientists have become increasingly more interested in the humanistic-dialectical perspective (see, for example, Friedrichs, 1970, 1971; Glass and Staude, 1971; Gouldner, 1970, 1974; Habermas, 1970a, 1970b, 1973; Matson, 1966; Moore, 1963; Phillips, 1974; Schaff, 1970; Zeitlin, 1973).

In this connection, Glass and Staude have pointed out that this relatively new interest is an indication of a growing dissatisfaction with "value-free, detached, mechanistic, deterministic theories and methodologies." They further argue, that if based on a humanistic conception of the nature of man, sociologists can develop theories and research "that study man and his institutions from a perspective of growth and self-fulfillment rather than from the normative-adjustment, or deviance perspectives prevalent in sociology today" (Glass and Staude, 1971:vi). A humanistic approach in sociology allows sociologists to explore possibilities and to search out alternatives to facilitate human development and growth, to liberate human potentialities, and to improve society. A Chinese humanistic conception of man and society can thus help stimulate the development of what Matson has characterized as a 'humane science' rather than a 'scientific humanism' (Matson, 1966:v).

Moreover, in sociology as well as in other social science fields, there is an observable gap between consensus



theories and conflict theories, between Marxist oriented social scientists and non-Marxist oriented social scientists. With an interest in the dialectical perspective, sociologists might help narrow down the gap. Friedrichs has suggested that the dialectical logic may be viewed as providing a bridge between Marxist and non-Marxist sociology as well as offering a paradigmatic image that might serve the complementary conceptual assumptions of both 'system' and 'conflict' theorists who are currently battling for the mantle of orthodoxy in Western sociology" (Friedrichs, 1972:269).

Furthermore, concerned and sensitive sociologists are finding it increasingly difficult to be satisfied with structural-functionalism, crude empiricism, logico-positivism, and behaviorism. Thus Gouldner has argued that "the old intellectual paradigms are losing their ability to convince, let alone enthuse, and are being challenged increasingly by competitive-paradigm" (Gouldner, 1974:i). In this connection, then, the availability of a Chinese conception of man and society may stimulate sociologists to further reflect on the basic theoretical, methodological, and practical issues, thereby contributing to expand and enrich the conceptual framework of Western social scientists in the scientific study of society.

The present work does not pretend to be a systematic history of Chinese philosophy; rather, it is to give a

presentation of the Chinese conception of man and society by drawing from the major principles of the Chinese intellectual tradition. The principles upon which this work is based are derived from Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism -- the three ways of thought in China<sup>2</sup>. These perspectives emerged during the Golden Age of Chinese thought, an era which covered the Chun-chiu and the Warring States periods (c. 770-222 B.C.) and ended with the establishment of the Chin dynasty (221 B.C.). The ideas and principles of these three perspectives, to a large degree, have influenced all subsequent Chinese schools of thought. Empirically this ancient cultural past is still actively serving contemporary China. In this regard, Mao Tse-tung has urged the Chinese to make the past serve the present<sup>3</sup>. As inheritors of this ancient culture, contemporary Chinese are, observably, both proponents of its values and rebels against it. That is why they are presently actively engaged in a comprehensive re-examination and re-interpretation of Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism. We may say that the importance of China's past as it is related to her present (which necessarily involves her future) is quite obvious.

It is in this sense that we may argue that without an understanding of the importance of the interplay of these three basic perspectives, it will be extremely difficult to come to grips with Chinese thought, ancient or contemporary. In this connection, it is important to appreciate that a very significant dimension of the intellectual tradi-

tion of China has been its ability and tendency to synthesize. This tendency involves a process whereby dissimilar and even opposing elements are combined into a synthetic whole. It is an attitude that is rooted in the Chinese spirit of harmony. Thus the theme of yin-yang; the Confucian idea of chung-yung, or centrality and harmony; and the attitude of 'both-and' are associated with it. This synthetic attitude has affected the development of the three basic ways of thought in China.<sup>4</sup> Thus to speak of a Chinese conception of man and society today necessarily involves an understanding of the dynamic interplay of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung (as a contemporary synthesizer of Chinese thought and the thought of Marx).

Against this background it is worth noting that to synthesize entails interpretation of the different perspectives while interpretation involves taking current problems and conditions of life seriously into account. In other words, the process of interpretation is anchored in the present. That is to say, each generation or era has its own specific set of concrete problems. Therefore, if we are to understand the present nature of Chinese society, and to appreciate a Chinese conception of man and society, it is necessary that we are aware of the twin processes of interpretation and synthesization of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung within a specifically and concretely Chinese sociocultural context.



A Chinese conception of man and society may be articulated by laying out or analyzing a set of ideas and principles, and then reassembling them or synthesizing them into a working whole. For example, the basic theses of Chinese humanism, such as Chinese individualism or respect for the individual and his dignity and capacity for self-cultivation, the creative tension between the inner standard of conscience and the outer criterion of social rules, the interplay of jen and li, the yin-yang dialectic, the conceptualization of social order and social dynamics, must all be analyzed and discussed.

Since these ideas and themes are developed in a socio-cultural situation which is empirically different from that of the western world, the problem of transmitting and discussing these ideas without distortions, and without losing the contextual meaning, is a real one. It is very important to realize that each culture has its own particular ways of classifying its material and spiritual universe, has its own particular world outlook. Therefore, the task of the observer who is not a member of the cultural group which he is trying to understand is to refrain from seeing, interpreting, and evaluating the sociocultural events from his own perspective or world view. Rather, it is necessary for him to get "inside" (verstehen) by grasping the basic orientation people bring in organizing those events in every day life.


This approach to culture is what contemporary ethno-

scientists have labeled as "emic" approach. The "emic" approach is one that attempts to find out and describe the thought-and-action system of a given culture in its own terms, thereby avoiding the serious problem of parochially, ethnocentrically, and unsophisticatedly comparing and evaluating cultures and societies by using some culture-bound yardstick while at the same time insisting that the yardstick is an "objective" and "scientific" one.<sup>5</sup> This approach will be followed in the present study to "understand" the Chinese "thought and action" system.<sup>6</sup>

In conformity with what has been said in this chapter, in this work we shall attempt to identify that basic body of philosophical ideas related to Chinese humanism that, despite the variety of its historical formulations, appear to be common to both classical and contemporary Chinese thought. The analysis will focus on the elaboration of the "human" individual and his self-development, and the dialectical conception of reality. We have chosen these concepts because they form the essential components of Chinese humanism. Accordingly, man will be considered in his dialectical relation with the social milieu and as fulfilling himself as "human" being throughout that dialectical process. Thus, the next two chapters will serve to describe, through a review of the major schools of thought, the core of Chinese philosophy in terms of humanistic and dialectical view of reality. This basic theme will be then elaborated further in three additional chapters devoted to an analysis of the

key ideas of Chinese humanism, "individualism", "self-development", and "dialectic", with some appropriate comparisons with similar aspects of the dominant western perspective.

The final chapter will summarize and integrate the major conclusions of the thesis and point to the significance of the Chinese image of man for a more adequate sociological thinking.



## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>The idea of wu-wei is an important concept not only for the Taoists, but also for Chinese thought in general. In fact, one may argue that it is one of the most important root images of Chinese thought. We will characterize and discuss the concept of 'wu-wei' in Chapter Two.

<sup>2</sup>In his book *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*, Arthur Waley uses the label 'Realism' for 'Legalism.' (see Waley, 1956).

<sup>3</sup>We even see the famous quote "Let the past serve the present" printed on the official brochure of the Chinese exhibition of archeological finds of China held in Toronto in 1974.

<sup>4</sup>The synthetic attitude has also affected the development of Buddhism in China. Imported from India, Buddhism in the course of development in China became Sinified. Chan, or Zen is an example.

<sup>5</sup>See Sturtevant (1964) for a discussion of the 'emic' approach as an important feature of ethnoscience. See also K. L. Pike (1954). For works done in light of this approach see Frake (1961), Goodenough (1951) and Wallace (1962).

<sup>6</sup>As in the case of other types of cultural relativism, the "emic" approach to culture and society has some implications. For example, although it helps us to appreciate human nature in its historically modified concrete forms (which of course is extremely important), it also shows its unwillingness to find room to discuss another important and yet unduly neglected problem of human nature in general.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### CHINA'S HUMANISTIC HERITAGE

Although there is some evidence of relatively advanced civilization in China in very ancient times, recorded history begins with the Shang dynasty (1751-1112 B.C.). The oracle bones or chia-ku wen reveal some rather well-developed forms of an ancient Chinese writing system during Shang times. The Shang also had a clearly divided class society in which the cleavage between ruler and ruled was great. Its economy was based on agriculture, and the making of bronze vessels was both artistically and technologically sophisticated.

The Shang dynasty ended with the invasion of the Chou people who eventually established the Chou dynasty in 1111 B.C. The Chou instituted vassal states as well as a hierarchical system of patriarchal type of government. During the early Chou period, this type of feudal system obviously worked well, for it was a time of peace and security. As time went on, however, some feudal lords became increasingly restless, and eventually they turned against one another, while serfs also began to rebel. By about 770 B.C., the king was killed and in the following year, the new king moved his capital eastward to Loyang, and hence began what is known as the Eastern Chou period.

From this date on the Chou kings could only exercise token power over the feudal lords, because actual political power was constantly shifting hands. In fact, the Chou kings were controlled and manipulated by the coalition, alignment and realignment of the feudal lords. Here was a situation in which intrigue and violence, cheating and trickery, took the place of morality and government. In short, as the feudal order of the Chou dynasty (c. 1111 B.C. - 249 B.C.) was breaking down, there was a serious political and moral confusion."

Nevertheless, it is in this context of severe crisis that many reflective minds began to think about a rational social order. This period thus was at the same time one of intellectual excitement. More specifically, Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism, the three basic ways of Chinese thought emerged in this atmosphere. With this brief historical account of the sociopolitical situation under which the three ways of thought developed, we now turn to the substantive ideas and theses of the three perspectives.

### I. Confucianism

Confucianism as a whole takes a humanistic position, and provides a viewpoint for organizing a rational social order through the pathway of ethics, which is essentially based on self-cultivation. Thus, Confucianism does not separate politics from ethics; in fact, it looks for political harmony by seeking to attain the moral harmony in the



human individual himself. In other words, there is no formal line that separates the political from the moral order. Confucianism may be characterized through a discussion of a set of ideas and themes such as humanism, self-cultivation, li or rules of propriety, and political thought. Confucius (c. 551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) are the two major representatives of this school.

#### A. Humanism

Confucianism is basically a humanistic culture. Confucius himself, for example, repeatedly talks about the idea that the measure of man is man. He shies away from speculating on the world of spirits and on the subject of immortality. Thus the foundations of the Confucian ethical structure are unmistakably secular. In fact, these ethical principles are derived from the earthly discoveries of sages and knowledgeable persons of China's historical past and not from supernatural revelations.

An important dimension of this humanism is the conception of 'jen' or 'human-heartedness.' 'Jen' is admittedly difficult to translate, for it has never been defined by Confucius or by other Confucians. Nevertheless, we may say that it refers to the human individual's capacity for relating himself to other human beings. Therefore, to practice jen is to require one to express one's concern for the well-being of others as well as to acquire an attitude of humane understanding for all conditions of men. In this sense jen

points to the idea of co-humanity; it is "man in society". In everyday life, a man of jen is one who considers other men as active agents rather than as passive "objects." If we extend this conception of jen into the realm of government we find that the ideal government is one which so cares for the basic needs of the people that it will be unnecessary to use force or coercion in order to maintain social order. In view of this, Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.), a major Confucian thinker, anchored his social philosophy on the assumption that human nature is good (Mencius IIa.6). He further argues that all men are equal in goodness of heart and can be like the Emperors Yao and Shun (the Confucian models of ideal virtue).

What is implied in this humanistic view is that all men are capable of reaching the high from the low. In short, man is perfectible. Thus Confucians have put forth a statement that for the human individual to be a man of jen he merely needs to start out by being a good son or a good brother or a good citizen. In the Analects we read "Filial piety and fraternal duty are the root of jen" (1:2). It is obvious that Confucians place strong emphasis on filial duty and brotherly respect when they deal with the problem of self- and collective-development. In short, familism is undoubtedly an important feature of Confucianism.

The humanistic idea of measuring man by man implies a process of self-cultivation, that is, the human individual is required to discover his true self, to develop his poten-

tial. It also involves in subscribing to a kind of "golden rule" which, in the Confucian context, is conceptualized by the idea of 'shu' or 'reciprocity.' When asked to speak of 'shu,' Confucius says "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you." In this context, it is worthy of note that Confucius himself considers the idea of 'chung-shu' as the core of his system of thought (Analects, 4:15). Here 'chung' means faithfulness to oneself and others and 'shu' (reciprocity) implies altruism. In other words, the concept chung refers to the human individual's own self, to the full development of his originally good mind, and shu refers to others or to the extension of the developed mind to others. The word shu is written in Chinese with two symbols: "to be like" and "heart". It suggests "like-heartedness," that is, appreciating how it would feel to be the other human individual. Man is the measure of man.

#### B. Self-Cultivation: The Basis of Social Order

In the context of humanism Confucianism does not view the human individual as existing separately from his society, nor does it consider society a reified thing that is completely prior to and independent of the human individual. It is wrong to retreat from society, and to become a social isolate, but it is equally wrong to follow the crowd unreflectively. The human individual is a social being; a good society depends on sensible social men. This implies a

dialectical interplay between the human individual and his society.

Since a decent society is possible only when it has decent citizens, the cultivation of the personal life by individual citizens becomes necessary. Within this framework, the ordering of a national life may be traced to the regulation of the family life, which in turn may be traced to the cultivation of the personal life. Put a little differently, a nation of reasonable sons and good brothers necessarily make a harmonious nation (see Ta Hsueh or the Great Learning). This is why there is such a strong emphasis by the Confucians on filial piety or 'hsiao'. 'Hsiao' is the Confucian virtue of reverence. It has been argued that within the familial situation one's parents are revered for being the sources of one's life. Concretely hsiao involves giving one's parents physical care as well as bringing them emotional and spiritual richness. It has been further argued that when one has learned to respect one's parents, one is also capable of acquiring the habit of respecting and expressing concern for one's siblings. In other words, when one has acquired the habit of reverence and respect at home it can become easier for one to extend this mental attitude of respect to other people's parents and the authorities of the state.

The practice of hsiao, in Confucian terms, helps the human individual to become a 'chun-tzu', a man of jen or a cultivated decent human being. The chun-tzu (literally means

"son of the ruler") was originally determined by status. It was hereditary. Confucius, however, uses the term to denote a morally superior man, thereby taking the position that any man might be a chun-tzu if his actions are unselfish, just, and kind, and if he is a man of moral principles who loves learning and is at ease in his station of life.<sup>1</sup> This position is rooted again in the idea of the perfectibility of all men. At the same time it involves a philosophy of education that calls for equal access to education for all people. Or in Confucius' words: "In education there should be no class distinction (Analects, 15:38).

In this context, a chun-tzu, as a morally superior man, believes that by setting examples, by his words and deeds, he has a great influence over his society. This idea of the power of example has resulted in a political theory which favors "government by example" and against "government by force." Furthermore, we find in the person of the chun-tzu the link between self-cultivation and collective development, between personality organization and social organization.

In the Chung Yung (The Doctrine of the Mean) we find the famous Confucian argument that when one knows how to cultivate his own character, one necessarily knows how to govern other men, and when one knows how to govern other men, one necessarily knows how to govern the world, to manage its states, and to regulate its families. In short, if we are to achieve the virtuous society, it is necessary

to cultivate the mind of the human individual and to develop his character. The human mind thus is the instrument for creating social order and for effecting social change.

C. Li: The System of Authentic Tradition and Reasonable Conventions of Society

Self-cultivation stresses the development of the human mind, the unfolding of human potential, and hence it points to the inner quality of man. This, however, is only a partial view of the Confucian scheme of things, for the Confucians feel that the mere recognition of these tendencies is not enough to allow man to realize himself or to achieve the perfect society. Therefore, they introduce the concept of 'li' or 'rules of propriety' as man-made tools to help the human individual to cultivate himself and to bring about the ideal society. Li thus points to the outer forms. We have seen that for Confucius and the Confucians, within the familial context, hsiao or filial piety is the most important virtue to be acquired by the human individual in the course of self-cultivation. In the context of the wider community or society, the Confucians specifically emphasize li, rules of propriety, or rites.

Historically, the original meaning of li was "to sacrifice." It was later extended to refer to religious ritual form, and further extended to cover all types of ceremony and the sort of "gracious politeness" that marked the manner of those who constituted the court of a ruler. Eventually it came to mean rules of conduct, customary law,

common morality, or general social form. Confucius was instrumental in the evolution of the concept, for he was among those who had argued the rulers and the ministers to extend and transform religious ritual and court etiquette to other more general social forms. In this regard he had argued that if rulers and ministers could treat one another with courtesy there was no reason why they should not treat the common people also with gracious politeness. He advocated strongly that "When you are away from home, behave to everyone as if you were receiving an important guest; handle the people as respectfully as you would the grand sacrifice" (Analects, 12:2).

Li, then, refers to the whole system of conventional and social usage. On one level it involves a set of rules and ceremonies for the conduct of men, women, and children, and the taking care of old people. On another level it even has transcendental overtones. One reads, for example, the following passage in the Tso Chuan (cited by McNaughton, 1974:3):

Heaven weaves things together with it, Earth measures things against it, and men model their conduct on it.

In its simplest sense, however, li means "respect for social and religious forms." Thus it embodies a plan of a social hierarchy which is manifested in concrete norms that regulate the so-called five relations, or we-lun, namely, relations between ruler and minister, husband and wife, father and son,

elder brother and younger brother, and between friends. In other words, within a hierarchical social order, li involves a set of concrete rules of conduct governing the behavior of each category of people. The concrete rules of conduct spell out the duties, obligations, and privileges according to the various social positions.

The rules also specify the appropriate ways of social interaction among people who occupy the various positions. In this sense li makes distinction among people; it defines the various social relationships. More specifically, through the functioning of li the Confucians make distinction between chun-tzu and mean people, honorableness and humbleness, superior and inferior, seniority and juniority, nearness and remoteness (the degree of intimacy among relatives, and between relatives and non-relatives). In this context, then, li is an institutionalized instrument that legitimizes a hierarchical social system, whereby the more powerful members of the group justify their privileged positions and life situations while making the less powerful members accept their inferior position and life situations.<sup>2</sup>

Another important dimension of li in Confucianism is 'yi' or righteousness within the context of moral relevance. 'Yi' refers to the kind of situation in which an individual does what he has to do because he believes that it is both his duty and morally right to do it. In Confucianism action taken according to yi is to be contrasted with those actions performed for the sake of profit. Thus, to act in accordance



with yi is to detach from the fruits of one's action. That is to say, the outcome does not matter.

As social and religious forms, li is on the one hand a highly generalized concept, and on the other it entails some rather particularized rules involving, in some situations, minute instructions for behavior which spell out, for example, precisely where each finger should be positioned in handling a symbolic object. Thus one finds in the Confucian literature a body of fixed rules, while reading, at the same time, passages that stress the Confucian idea that it is the spirit of li that really counts. Confucius himself has commented:

In rituals or ceremonies, be thrifty rather than extravagant, and in funerals it is better that mourners feel true grief than that they be meticulously correct in every ceremonial detail (Analects 3:4).

This does not mean, however, that Confucius does not genuinely appreciate the effectiveness of ceremonies and conventions in bringing about social harmony. Nevertheless he has said that he would not hesitate to deviate from the conventional practices if he believes that such deviation makes good sense and that his decision is a rational one which is made in good faith and with good taste. We read in the Analects (9:3) "The cap made of very fine linen is prescribed by the rules of ceremony, but nowadays a simpler one of silk is worn. It is economical, and I follow the common practice." In this connection, Creel comments that

the moral man must not be a cipher in society. He goes on to add that "Wherever the conventional practices seem to him (the moral man) immoral or harmful, he not only will refrain from conforming with them but will try to persuade others to change the convention" (Creel, 1953:31). On the other hand, whenever the accepted practices are reasonable, the human individual, as a sensible and social man, will accord with convention. In light of this understanding, li may be said to refer to the whole complex of authentic tradition and reasonable conventions of society.

#### D. Political Thought

The question asked by Confucian political thinkers is a simple and straightforward one: Where does the harmonious social order begin? The answer, in one form or another, dwells upon human psychology: the road to the ideal society must begin with the human individual. Here is the link between the human mind and the problems of government.

Confucius states in the Ta Hsueh (Great Learning) that "From the son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the person as the root of everything else." Self-cultivation in this context involves the development of the human mind or hsin. Hence it follows that hsin (mind) is the instrument or tool man uses to re-create his environment, social and natural. What is implied here is the recognition that man, more or less makes his history. Or put slightly differently, man's most significant

achievement is man's civilization, an achievement that is the result of his own making, unaided by any form of super-human force. Therefore, civilization can be affected, for the better or the worst, only by man, by the human mind.

This emphasis on the inner cultivation of the human individual and then moving toward such larger units as the family and society, involves a view that aims at the moral basis for societal order. This leads to another Confucian idea, namely, that government at its best is government by moral suasion: the ideal ruler leads his people by setting examples. Thus it follows that when a ruler must rely on explicit laws and their forceful enforcement, it is evidence of his moral deficiency. This implies an attitude that is humanistic and anti-legalistic toward government.

It is in this context that Mencius talks about two types of government: one of which is government by virtue or te-chih. It is "the way of a true king," and is labeled as wang-tao or "the kingly way." The other type is government by naked force or pa-tao. Within the context of wang-tao, rulers and governors are expected to rule by virtue, to set good examples, so that the state can bring out the best in man. In the Book of Mencius, we read: "He who uses force in the place of virtue is a pa. He who is virtuous and practices jen or human-heartedness is a wang. When one subdues men by force they do not submit to him in their hearts but only outwardly, because they have insufficient strength to resist. But when one gains followers by virtue,

they are pleased in their hearts and will submit of themselves as did the seventy disciples to Confucius" (Mencius 11a.3).

The whole emphasis on government by virtue is a reflection of the Confucian distrust of laws, especially when they are mechanically enforced. Confucian political thinkers have argued that when men in office guide the people by laws and regulate them by the threat of punishment, there is danger that the government is, in fact, inviting the people to be tricky, to consider ways to make profits for themselves through loopholes in the law, thereby bringing out the worst in them.<sup>3</sup> Thus Confucius asserts:

Govern by laws, keep order by punishments, and the people will avoid wrong-doing but will have no sense of honor and self-respect. Govern by personal virtue and keep order by li, and they will have a sense of honor and respect (Analects 3:2).

Government by virtue in this context is government by example, and this necessarily puts an immediate burden on men in office, for they are not merely managers of a state but are simultaneously moral exemplars. In this connection the Confucians have developed the idea of correspondence of name and actuality, or "rectification of names" to help rulers and governors organize their actions in such a way that they can become correct models in those positions. At the same time, from the vantage point of the people, the principle of "rectification of names" plays an important role in model identification for them. For example, the

name "king" can be given ideally only to one who is morally worthy and politically effective. Therefore when the words and deeds of a king are 'un-kingly,' are morally un-worthy and politically ineffective, to call him 'king' is to perpetuate the discrepancy between "name" and "reality." On the other hand, to remind the 'un-kingly king' of it, is to help him rectify the situation and strive to be king-like.

In this regard, it is important to note that wang-tao or government by virtue, implies a recognition of the importance of the material basis of ethics. Mencius, for example, asserts that hungry men cannot be expected to be good (Mencius Ia.7.20). Confucius, too, has argued that to have enough food for the people is one of the most essential functions of the government (Analects 12:7). In connection with this argument Mencius has advocated diversified farming and conservation of fisheries and of forests. Moreover, he evokes the principle of rectification of names and asserts that if the ruler fails to bring about the welfare of the people, he should no longer be a king; and the people is duty-bound to rebel against him, and even to kill him, because "tyrannicide is not regicide" (Mencius Ib.8). He goes on to say that the mandate of Heaven which gave the ruler his position can be withdrawn if the ruler is unable to take practical measures to assure the welfare of the people and to provide moral examples. Thus he declares: "Heaven hears as the people hear; Heaven sees as the people see" (Mencius Va.5.8).

Confucian political thought, then, is anchored on the assumption that there is no separation between politics and ethics, and that Heaven is the cosmic ethical order.

The emphasis on humanism is the spirit of Confucian thought, which makes man the ultimate measure for government. Man also serves as some kind of standard for Heaven itself, though Heaven is at the same time somehow purposive. The goal of government is to bring about wealth and education to the people and security to the state. The people are to be guided by virtue, regulated by li rather than laws, and ruled by the good examples of the rulers and governors. The goal of education is to know man.

This set of intellectual concerns is rooted in human experience itself. Its approach is an ethical one. Thus, a moral man is one who holds on to the principle of chung-yung or central harmony, that is, to be central in one's moral being and to be harmonious with all. As a programmatic social philosophy, it stresses self-development in concrete situations. But as a philosophical psychology, it tries to ground its humanistic perspective on the assumption of innate goodness of man, especially in the case of Mencius and the idealistic wing of Confucians. In this regard, Mencius has argued that people do good because "man's nature is naturally good, just as water naturally flows downward" (Mencius IVa.2). Mencius' assumption, however, has been challenged by Hsun Tzu (c. 298-238 B.C.) who argues that

man's goodness is the result of his conscious activity rather than inborn. The importance of Hsun Tzu in the development of Chinese thought is reflected in his recognized position as the leader of the realistic wing of Confucianism and also as a pioneer of Legalism.

## II. Legalism

The disintegration of the sociopolitical order in the late Chou dynasty brought with it some far-reaching cultural changes. Territorial expansion through naked military conquest of the larger states had, for example, created a situation in which the old structure of social classes could no longer maintain itself. To wage aggressive wars, the states needed talented people as well as strong, centralized governments. Consequently, the structure and functions of government became increasingly more complex than in the former times. The rulers now needed not idealistic programs for doing good to their people but realistic methods for tackling the new situations. This was the atmosphere under which Legalism as a way of thought emerged in China. Legalism was later officially adopted and put into practice by Chin Shih-Huang, the First Emperor of the Chin dynasty, who unified China. Legalism rejects the Confucian thesis that the people should be governed by li and morality. Instead, it proposes that specific laws be legislated to handle current problems. Laws are to be applicable to all people regardless of statuses and social positions.

Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.) was one of the most important Legalist thinker. Shang Yang (d. 338) was another. Hsun Tzu also played an important part in the development of Legalism.<sup>4</sup>

A. Hsun Tzu: The Link Between Confucianism and Legalism

Mencius was in his seventies when Hsun Tzu was born. As with Mencius, Hsun Tzu's training was Confucian, but as he became intellectually mature, Hsun Tzu's thought became the antithesis of that of Mencius. For example, Hsun Tzu is best known for his disagreement with Mencius in regard to the theory of human nature. As mentioned earlier, Mencius believes that human nature is innately good. Hsun Tzu disagrees with this; instead, he puts forth his thesis that human nature is basically evil. This does not mean, however, that Hsun Tzu is arguing against humanism, though on the surface it might seem that he has a rather low opinion of man. But if we examine his thought more closely we may have to say that the spirit of humanism in Hsun Tzu is in fact very strong.

Hsun Tzu's general thesis is "Human nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity (wei)."<sup>5</sup> (Hsun Tzu, 1963:159). In other words, the good and valuable things are the results of human efforts. Man's culture is the noble thing in the human world; it is also viewed as empirical proof of man's capability to triumph over his nature. Thus Hsun Tzu argues that the place of man in the



universe is as important as those of Heaven and Earth. In this scheme of things, man is an active partner of Tien (Heaven) and Ti (Earth). Together they form a triad. As an active partner, man's task is to appropriate and develop what is offered by Heaven and Earth and thereby create and re-create culture (see Hsun Tzu: A Discussion of Heaven). Hsun Tzu's image of man is that man is an active agent, not a passive non-entity. His thought thus is humanistic.

In spite of the fact that Hsun Tzu and Mencius oppose each other on the matter of human nature, they agree on the perfectibility of man. This agreement, however, does not imply that there is no real difference between the thoughts of the two thinkers. Thus, Mencius argues that man is born with the beginnings of the "constant virtues" of jen (human-heartedness), yi (righteousness), li (propriety), and chi (knowledge and moral wisdom). A man becomes a sage by fully developing these beginnings. Hsun Tzu, on the other hand, points out that man is born with desires for profit and sensual pleasure, but in spite of these beginnings of badness, man is capable of engaging in conscious activity and hence becomes good. In other words, man possesses intelligence which makes it possible for him to become a sage. In this connection Fung Yu-lan has pointed out that "whereas Mencius says that any man can become a Yao or Shun (two traditional cultural heroes and sage-kings), because he is originally good, Hsun Tzu argues that any man can become a Yu (another sage-king) because he is originally intelligent"

(Fung Yu-lan, 1960:145).

Moreover, in the context of humanism, Hsun Tzu has argued that if the human mind itself is the source of moral order, the source of human perfection, attempts to go outside the human realm, as for example, to the realm of the superhuman, are simply pointless. Thus, in his famous essay "A Discussion of Heaven", Hsun Tzu takes a position that is physical-naturalistic, and argues for a rational understanding of Heaven and Earth, or the laws of nature, so that man can "go forward day by day" rather than to wait for the grace of Heaven (Hsun Tzu, 1968:79-88):

Understanding the laws of nature allows man to transform what is offered by nature. And, in order to appropriate and develop nature, men necessarily organize themselves for mutual support. In Hsun Tzu's words, "If people will all live alone and do not serve one another there will be poverty." Thus men need some kind of a social organization in order to live; and a social organization necessarily involves customary rules of living. In this sense, Hsun Tzu's political thought also involves the idea of "rule by li." The emphasis, however, is on li as a tool "to train man's desires and to provide for their satisfaction" (Hsun Tzu, 1963:89). Li is to help men make sure that "desires do not overextend the means for their satisfaction, and material goods do not fall short of what is desired" (Hsun Tzu, 1969:89). As a set of rational rules, li regulates the distribution of society's material goods for satisfying the desires

of its citizens in an equitable fashion. Thus the content of li in Hsun Tzu's conception, in a sense, is 'fa', or law. Empirically Hsun Tzu was the teacher of both Han Fei and Li Ssu, two major figures of the Fa-chia or the Legalist (realist) School. Han Fei was the synthesizer of Legalism while Li Ssu (d. 208 B.C.) was ~~China~~ Shih Huang's prime minister.

B. Han Fei: The Interpreter and Synthesizer of the Legalist School

Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.) is not the originator of Legalism. His concrete contribution to Legalism is his effective synthesization of the ideas and themes of the Legalist thinker and practitioners. Han Fei accepts Hsun Tzu's thesis that human nature is bad, and goes on to modify his teacher's idea that li and fa are two dimensions of the same concept. He rejects the Confucian political theory of "government by li," that is, the virtue theory of governance. Instead, he puts forth a theory of "government by fa", that is to say, the government is of laws, not of men. This position implies that the "virtue" theory of Confucian governance is impractical and unrealistic.

Pointing out that things in nature are continually changing and unceasingly transforming, Han Fei believes that it is necessary for the ruler to understand that nothing is immutable. He therefore suggests that the teachings of earlier rulers, as for example, the policy of "rule by li," must be rejected (Han Fei, 1969:B:79). In other words, the

ruler must be sensitive to the changing conditions of the country. Indeed, men in office should not rule the country of today by methods of government of the kings of yesterday. If they do, Han Fei asserts, they are doomed to fail. He then proposes that specific laws (fa) be legislated to handle current problems. Laws, to repeat, are to be applicable to all people regardless of statuses and social positions. In this way, the doctrine of equality was promoted in ancient China.

As mentioned earlier, Han Fei was the interpreter and synthesizer of the Legalist School. Analytically there had been three lines of thinking among the Legalists. One was represented by Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.) who held that 'fa' or law and regulation was the most essential factor in government. He rejects outright the Confucian virtues of jen, yi, and li, arguing that "li and music are symptoms of idleness, whereas compassion and human-heatedness (jen) are the mother of faults" (Shang Chun Shu: Suo-min Chapter). For Shang Yang, government by virtue will lead to disorder and weakness. Instead, he tells us that "If you govern by punishment, the people will fear. Being fearful, they will not commit villainies; there being no villainies, people will be happy in what they enjoy. If, however, you teach the people by righteousness, they will be lax, and if they are lax, there will be disorder; if there is disorder, the people will suffer from what they dislike" (in Chu Tun-tsu, 1965:263-264).

It is in this context that Shang Yang rejects the Confucian idea of government by suasion, and proposes a program that is based on the ~~thesis that~~ rulers and governors should be concerned more with evils than with virtue. To maintain the legal order, the state should adopt the process that is most certain, the methods that are most direct. It is more important for the government to prevent evil by laws than to encourage good behavior. A good ruler thus "punishes the bad people but does not reward the virtuous ones" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1965:261).

In this connection, Han Fei agrees with Shang Yang that the ruler does not rely on the people doing good themselves, but makes sure that there is no way for them to do wrong. Explaining his position, Han Fei states that "Within a frontier of a state, there are no more than ten people who will do good themselves; nevertheless, if we bring it about the people can do no wrong, the entire state can be kept peaceful. He who rules a country makes use of the majority and neglects the few, and so does not concern himself with virtue but with law" (Fung Yu-lan, 1960:160). Not only that government depends on laws to be effective, rulers and governors must make everyone to follow the laws to the letter. Kuan Chung (d. 645 B.C.), the chief minister of Duke of Chi and a proto-fa-chia, was quoted by Chu Tung-tsu (1965:242) as having argued that government would be successful only when the ruler, the minister, the superior, the inferior, the noble, the humble all followed the law. Indeed, Han Fei himself is very consistent in advocating the

"non-discriminatory" application of the law. He says, "to punish a fault does not exempt the great officials." Furthermore, "There are people who are virtuous and who are unworthy, yet we have no love and hate for them" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1965:242).

There is another line of thinking among the Legalists which was originally represented by Shen Pu-hai (d. 337 B.C.) whose main theme was that 'shu' or, statecraft, that is the method, technique, and art of conducting governmental affairs and handling people, was the most important factor in ruling a country. Thus, the ruler must develop some methods to handle his ministers in all situations. The means by which the ruler controls his ministers, according to Han Fei, are "none other than the 'two handles' or 'er pien': punishment and kindness" (Han Fei, 1969:A:25). Here Han Fei assumes that since ministers are afraid of punishment but look upon rewards as advantages they will fear the power of the ruler, and hence submit themselves to the ruler. Shu, in Han Fei's scheme of things is to be used in such a fashion that it is not obvious. That is to say, in shu secrecy is desired.

There is still a third group which was originally led by Shen Tao (d. 275 B.C.) who lived about the time of Mencius. Shen Tao stressed "shih" or power and authority. For him, in ruling a country, morality and wisdom are, for all practical purposes, simply unimportant. What is important is establishing authority and exercising power with a view to strengthening the position of the ruler, because if

and when both the ruler and his government are weak, there is nothing else the ruler can do (see Yang Yung-kuo, 1973: 352). In this connection Han Fei argues that those who rule the country according to fa, necessarily need authority and power; otherwise, even if they are in a position to rule, they still cannot rule effectively. To maintain political order, then, the ruler must act in accordance with law and must have the authority and power to enforce his orders (Han Fei, 1969:B:74).

These, then, are the three lines of thought within the context of Legalism, but it was Han Fei who "put them together" as a single, coherent perspective. In his synthesis, Han Fei starts from the argument that the ruler must not rely on people doing good themselves. Good behavior can be produced through a system of fa or law, to which rewards and punishments are attached. In short, through a code of law the people are told explicitly what they should and should not do. At the same time, the ruler must always retain shih or power and position, so that he can punish those who violate his laws and reward those who obey them. Indeed, a capable man who does not have power and position cannot effectively help rectify "indecent men" (Han Fei, 1969:A:110).

Even Yao and Shun and other sage-rulers were unable to accomplish much until such time as they occupied the throne. On the other hand, even the intellectually most unstimulating ruler were able to make the people to obey them. Therefore, Han Fei argues that wisdom and virtue are of no signifi-

cant importance as compared with shih in politics and government. Or, put a little differently, what a ruler needs in order to ~~rule~~ are fa and shih (law and power).

This program can become even more effective, however, if it is supplemented by a set of administrative techniques and methods of handling people, or shu. The stress on shu, in a sense, is the recognition by the Legalists that as states become increasingly larger and more complex, administrators necessarily need some rather technical knowledge and skill.

The idea of shu as used by the Legalists is not exactly new, for it may be viewed as an aspect of the older notion of the rectification of names. Han Fei, for example, states that shu involves "appointing officials according to their abilities and demanding actualities correspond to names." That is to say, the ruler is to define by law the functions of each office so that any person who holds an office knows about the duties and privileges that are attached to the office. The ruler is then to reward or punish office holder as the case may be by checking on correspondence between what is expected of the office holder and what the official has in fact accomplished or failed to accomplish. The "two handles" (kindness and punishment) of the ruler are effective because they are derivable from Han Fei's assumption that it is the nature of man to seek profit and to avoid harm (Han Fei, 1969:A:25).

In sum, the Legalists asserts that the most practical



way of government is one that the ruler faithfully follows a system of rigorously defined laws, consciously retains and exercises power and authority, and knowingly applies some method of administration, and techniques of handling men. Thus they argue that it is rather unnecessary that a king be a philosopher at the same time. In fact, any individual who puts the Legalistic theory into practice can govern, and govern well. In this context, the Legalists further argue that with the Legalistic way of government, the ruler does not have to do anything, and yet "there is nothing that is not done." This is the Legalistic way of using the Taoist idea of wu-wei. Thus, they argue that the ruler must not do anything himself; instead, he should simply let others do everything for him.

### III. Taoism

There is another major current of Chinese thought which, in many ways, serves as a severe and yet creative and constructive critique of Confucianism. This is Taoism. As is the case with Confucianism and Legalism, Taoism emerged in response to some historically concrete situations: it arose as the result of the time when rulers and feudal lords were indulging in extravagant ceremonial feasts, displaying deadly weapons, and fighting one another, all at the expense of the welfare of the common people.

In short, Taoism emerged in opposition to existing institutions and mores. In the process it also offers an

alternative way of life. Thus, Taoist sages Lao Tzu (born c. 570 B.C.) and Chuang Tzu (born c. 369 B.C.) mounted a series of attacks on institutional arrangements and social practices of the time. The people starve, Lao Tzu points out in the Tao-te Ching (Ch. 75), because "the ruler eats too much tax-grain." He further argues that the displaying of weapons and the waging of wars by the rulers are indications that there is a decline of man's humanness. Indeed, the imposition of such doctrine as jen, yi, and li on the people are also symptomatic of the decline of man, because a truly virtuous man is one who is virtuous in a natural, spontaneous, and effortless fashion. He cannot be truly virtuous if he is a calculating individual. For the Taoists, the Confucians are calculating individuals.

As an alternative perspective, Taoism offers the philosophy of Tao which serves as the standard for man as well as for the myriad things. The philosophy of Tao is a perspective which emphasizes the cultivation of the human mind with a view to freeing the human individual of selfish desires, so that he can enjoy spiritual tranquility and mental peace.<sup>7</sup> Simplicity, spontaneity, non-artificiality, and non-interference are the keynote. In this connection it is important to note that Taoism as a major current of Chinese thought refers to Lao-Chuang che-hsueh or the philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, not to what Mote (1971:70) characterized as "vulgarized Taoism," or religious Taoism.

A. The Concept of Tao

Taoism is a form of naturalism. It glorifies natural spontaneity, and draws its followers from what it considers the turmoil of the world toward a spiritual union with Nature. An expression of the Taoist view is found in Chinese paintings. Nature is dominant. We see a path, a bridge, trees, the mist on the mountains. If we look close enough, we also see a few people. People are subordinated to the total effect; they are seen as following the paths and enjoying and speculating on the beauties of nature. Abound in paradoxes, Taoist text are difficult to interpret. Tao is characterized by the Taoists as the Way, principle, Nature. It is natural, spontaneous, nameless, and indescribable. The first chapter of the Tao-te Ching begins with a characteristically Taoist way of articulating the idea of 'Tao':

The Tao that can be spoken of  
is not the eternal Tao.  
The name that can be named  
is not the eternal name.

What is implied in the Taoist view of the Tao is that things that can be named are, in most cases, those that lie within shapes and features, but the Tao lies beyond shapes and features, therefore, it is unnamable. Like the Uncarved Block (Tao-te Ching: 32), it is formless, and yet, the myriad things are derived from It. Put differently, the Tao is Non-Being from which came being which generates all things in the world. Non-Being or 'Wu', in the Context of

Taoism, means Wu-ming or having no name (see Fung Yu-lan, 1947:59-80). For Lao Tzu, the Unnamable is "the beginning of Heaven and Earth while the namable is the mother of all things" (Tao-te Ching:1). Or again,

The Tao produces one,  
And the one, two;  
Then the two produces three,  
And three, all else (Tao-te Ching:42).

It is in this context that Chuang Tzu calls the Tao the Supreme One, or Tai-Yi. It was the Tao, the Supreme One that brought oneness into being. In this connection it is worthy of note that the proposition that the Tao is the Supreme One, the beginning of Heaven and Earth, is, strictly, a formal proposition and not a positive one. That is to say, it is a proposition that involves not in making any assertion about matters of fact, but one that implies a formal argument which says that since there are things in the empirical world, there must be something whereby all things came to be. That something is the Tao.

From the formal argument emerges the assertion that the Tao is not in the same category as "all things." As Fung Yu-lan (1947:61) puts it: "For 'all things' means the sum total of things, and if the Tao is the same category as these things, then it is not that whereby the sum total of things comes to be, because then the words 'sum total' would include the Tao itself." In this sense, then, the Tao is not itself a thing. Being not itself a thing it is beyond shapes and feature, it is the Uncarved Block, and it is

invariable or chang. In other words, as contrasted with all things which are changeable and changing, The Tao is eternal, invariable. It is, so to speak, the image of the Law of Nature. Or, in Joseph Needham's conception, it is the Order of Nature (Needham, 1954:36).

A characteristic of any law of nature is that under certain conditions it always operates in a certain way. Thus, for the Taoists, an example of the most basic laws of nature that governs the changes of all things is that when a thing develops and reaches an extreme, it invariably reverts from it. Or in Lao Tzu's words, "The movement of the Tao is reversion" (Tao-te Ching: 40). Indeed, the greatness of the Tao implies its ability to reach out, and yet "far reaching means to revert again" (Tao-te Ching: 25). It is interesting to note that this Taoist notion that "the extreme qualities of a thing invariably reverts to become their opposites" is within the yin-yang dialectical world view. Thus reality is the appearance of the reversing of the Tao as it goes from one extreme and back to the other pole. In a more concrete term, Lao Tzu points out that if men of wealth and exalted social position are arrogant, they have themselves sown the seeds of their eventual downfall (Tao-te Ching: 9), or again, "A whirlwind does not last a whole morning, nor a rainstorm last a whole day" (Tao-te Ching: 29).

These, then, are some examples of the "invariables" or "laws" that govern the changes of things. It thus follows that in order to be free one has to understand the nature of

things (Chuang Tzu: Yang Sheng Chu Chapter). That is to say, in order to be free we must understand the laws of nature. Having knowledge about the "invariable" is all-embracing and everlasting, not to know the "invariable" is to act blindly to result in disaster (Tao-te Ching: 16).

Within the context of this image of the law of nature, the Tao operates impartially and has no favorites. It benefits all without any sign of conscious kindness. While vacuous it gives a supply that never fails; it is never exhausted (Tao-te Ching: 5). The Tao produces the myriad things and supports them in their natural state, but does not take possession of them. Its activity is characterized by taking no artificial action or 'Wu-wei.' Thus, the Tao, as Needham has pointed out, "brought all things into existence and governs their every action not so much by force as by a kind of natural curvature in space and time" (Needham, 1954:36-37). We may then say that a basic assumption in this context is that all matter is part of one cosmic unit. Man, for example, is part of the universe as are all living creatures, mountains, the raindrops, trees, and the myriad things. And the Tao, characterized as a naturally moral and rational principle, resides in nature itself.

#### B. The Thesis of Wu-wei or Acting Without Artificiality and Arbitrariness

In examining how things work in natural setting, Lao Tzu says that the way all things work is the simple way. He observes that the activity of the Tao is characteristically

non-artificial, non-interfering, and non-arbitrary, or wu-wei. "The Tao invariably takes non-action (wu-wei) and yet there is nothing left undone" (Tao-te Ching: 37). The way of wu-wei is the way of spontaneity, to be contrasted with cleverness and superficial morality. In other words, the natural way is to understand the nature of things, thereby allowing them to develop and transform themselves. To understand the nature of things involves a process of learning to know the intrinsic qualities (te) of things. The te of a particular thing is the manifestation of the Tao in that thing. In this context, then, Tao is the ultimate common principle for the myriad things. The human individual, for example, receives his internal principle from Tao. For the Taoists, every single thing contains the essence of Tao. Te, then, refers to something received by the individual from Tao. In the Tao-te Ching we read: that Tao is likened to the uncarved wood and Te, is the same wood turned into a concrete thing. Te in this sense is the defining characteristic of any particular thing.

To understand the nature of things thus allows the human individual to act toward things in a seemingly effortless way, and in harmony with Heaven and Earth and other things. This is the way of wu-wei. Having understood the nature of things, we are able to take only natural and necessary actions in our everyday life. This is the idea of simplicity. The Tao is simplicity itself, the Uncarved Block.

The way of wu-wei implies a recognition that hyper-activity is to be avoided; it also implies a certain taste

for humility and simplicity. Lao Tzu says:

So the sage embrace the One.  
 And becomes the model of the world.  
 He does not display himself,  
 And is therefore luminous.  
 He does not assert himself,  
 And is therefore distinguished.  
 He does not boast of himself,  
 And therefore is given credit.  
 He does not brag,  
 And therefore he is the chief (Tao-te Ching:22).

The idea of wu-wei is concretized in the Taoist refusal to become aggressive and pushy in everyday life. This, however, is not to say that wu-wei is a way of passivity. As Lao Tzu observes, "The sage puts himself in the background but he finds himself to the fore" (Tao-te Ching: 45). And, in the Taoist view, weakness overcomes strength, and gentleness overcomes rigidity. Therefore, "There is nothing weaker than water but none is superior to it in conquering the hard and the strong" (Tao-te Ching: 78).

An important implication of the thesis of wu-wei is that in the realm of knowledge, the Taoists aim at attaining an understanding of wu or non-being. Wu lies beyond shapes, feature, and time. To them this kind of understanding is to attain the so-called 'sage-knowledge' or 'no-knowledge,' which involves a process of cultivating one's sensibilities to the totality rather than to certain parts within the totality. 'Sage-knowledge' is attainable only after one has passed through a prior stage of having rational knowledge. Rational knowledge is obtainable through reason. 'Sage-knowledge', on the other hand, is obtainable, in this context, through extra-rational means. Thus, to obtain rational



knowledge, man is a detached observer-investigator of nature, but to obtain 'sage-knowledge,' he necessarily becomes an active participant in nature. In other words, 'sage-knowledge is attainable only when the human individual is an integral part of the totality. Or, to put the matter a little differently, when man has tried as far as possible to come to grips with the mechanisms of the natural world, and knows how to refrain from taking action that is contrary to nature, we may say that he has come close to attaining sage-knowledge (see Needham, 1969:210).

It is in this light that R. G. H. Siu (1957:76) notes that the true zoologist participates artfully and empathically, so that the observed creature "speaks through his data." Moreover, Siu observes that it is sage-knowledge that stimulates the Taoist artist to paint a forest as it would appear to the trees themselves.

Against this background, then, we may appreciate why the Taoists and the Confucians can agree that the state should be ruled by a sage-king. On the other hand, they do disagree on what the sage-king can do for the people. The Confucian sage-ruler, for example, believes that he has to do many things for the people. The Taoist sage-king, on the other hand, will stick to the principle of simplicity or pu; thus, he will govern a large country "as though he is frying a small fish" (Tao-te Ching: 38). That is to say, the Taoist sage-ruler will avoid over-management. In frying a fish one makes sure that he does not handle it too roughly, for over handling will spoil it. In governing a country,

the ruler takes care not to push the people around unnecessarily; otherwise, there is danger that the people will be forced to revolt. When the sage-ruler sticks to the way of Tao, government will proceed in a natural way. Under this condition, harsh laws are unnecessary. It is in this sense that the Taoists argue that over-management is tantamount to "painting feet on the snake." It is perverting nature; it is artificial.

#### C. A Note on Tao Chiao Or The Taoist Religion

What has been characterized and discussed is a set of basic ideas and themes of the Taoist School of philosophy or Tao Chia, but parallel with the development of philosophical Taoism was another development, namely, that of a magical Taoist cult or Tao Chiao. Because of this, the image of Taoism can be a confusing one. In this connection it is interesting to note that while the ideal of philosophical Taoism is the idea of harmony with nature, the aim of the practitioners of magical Taoism is the search for immortality on earth. Ironically Lao Tzu was made the spiritual founder of the Taoist religion and the Tao-te Ching was turned into its "Bible" for a purpose which, as Chan Wing-tsit (1963:26) has pointed out, is alien to the philosophy of Lao Tzu.

Historically, it was about A.D. 155 that this Taoist cult emerged as a semi-religious movement. The man who was responsible for this movement was a rebel by the name of Chang Ling. As leader of a semi-independent state, Chang

Ling organized his followers, through the practice of magic and faith healing, into a semi-religious group. Some of his followers later became priests and practitioners of the Tao. In the process both the Tao-te Ching and the Book of Chuang Tzu were used--or misused--as "manuals" for the preservation of life and the search for immortality. The development of religious Taoism has corrupted philosophical Taoism. Or, as Mote (1971:69) puts it, it has vulgarized philosophical Taoism.

Philosophical Taoism takes the idea of simplicity seriously, for the Tao is simplicity itself. Simplicity is also the function of the Tao, for its activity is characterized by wu-wei, taking natural, spontaneous, non-interfering, and un-forced action. The activity of the Tao is simple, that is, pure, frugal, "never too much," unassuming, and natural. Lao Tzu tells us that he has three treasures: the first is compassion; next is frugality (never too much); and the third is "never would I once presume that I should be Number One of the whole world" (Tao-te Ching: 67).

The ideal of the Taoists is to reach a state in which one's spirit is pure, and one's mind is free of egoistic selfish desires. True, the Taoist way might seem quietistic and even nihilistic. It is also true that Lao Tzu emphasizes such 'yin' categories as the infant, the female, the valley, the uncarved block, non-being, and water, in the Tao-te Ching. But it is worthy of note that Lao Tzu's image of nature is one that is continually changing because of the

creative interplay of yin and yang, and of non-being and being. In the first chapter of the Tao-te Ching, Lao Tzu states:

Therefore let there always be non-being,  
 so we may see their subtlety.  
 And let there always be being,  
 so we may see their outcome.  
 The two are the same.

For Lao Tzu, being and non-being cannot be separated. Also, Lao Tzu's discussion of the spirit of the valley (Tao-te Ching: 6) stresses not only its feminity and its vacuousness, but also the idea of natural transformation and the principle of continuous production and reproduction. It is in this sense that the seemingly quietistic philosophy of the Tao is dynamic and creative.

At this juncture, when we look back we see that Confucianism, Legalism, and Taoism, the three schools of thought in China, show a wide range of ideas about man, society, and nature. When we look ahead we can anticipate some kind of theoretical integration. In the next section of this chapter, then, we will see the significance of the interplay of the basic principles and ideas of the three schools, and the emergence of a set of common ideas about man and society.

#### IV. Theoretical Integration of the Three Ways of Thought

We have described Confucianism, Legalism and Taoism in the previous section as if they had developed in isolation from one another.

In reality this was not the case. Rather, in the course of development each perspective had affected the others and had been affected by the others. Also, to most Chinese, these three ways of thought have been complementary, not mutually exclusive perspectives. True, Confucianism is more rational and group-minded, Taoism is more naturalistic and individualistic,<sup>8</sup> and Legalism is more "hardheaded," and rigid, but together they are aspects that form one single Chinese world view.

In other words, although there are tensions and contradictions among these three ways of thought, their union as parts of the Chinese view of the world is more important than animosity among them. In this connection, we may point out that as aspects of a whole, each perspective serves as a balance to the other perspectives. For example, Taoism historically has provided ideas which otherwise are weak in either Confucianism or Legalism. Thus, throughout Chinese intellectual history, Taoism has been a fascinating and charming realm of imaginative thought for a good many Chinese. The principle of centralization of power of the Legalists, and the insistence of the Confucians on social conformity place obvious restrictions and limitations on human freedom, whereas Taoism, in this context, allows the human individual to achieve self-expression and encourages his intellect to wander freely, though it could be pushed too far, and hence generate such problems as nihilism. The point we are trying to make, however, is that, in the course of the interaction among them, an integrated Chinese perspec-

tive has emerged.

#### A. Confucianism and Taoism

The individual freedom provided by Taoism and its emphasis on spiritual union of man with nature, historically, are the major intellectual sources that have inspired a vast majority of artists, poets, and revolutionaries. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1973:49) have said that the Chinese individual, and for that matter, the whole Chinese society, could be Confucian and Taoist at the same time, thereby achieving what they consider a "healthier psychological balance" view of life. They also describe a rather common Chinese practice, namely, "the active bureaucrat of the morning became the dreamy poet or nature lover of the evening." In a sense, they have reiterated Lin Yutang's now famous statement that "The Confucianist in us builds and strives, while the Taoist in us watches and smiles" (Lin Yu-tang, 1935:55). In this context, Lin Yutang has argued that "the poetry of Taoism alone has made the rigoristic life on the Confucian pattern endurable, and its romanticism has saved Chinese literature from becoming a mere collection of eulogies on the imperial virtues and a rehash of moral exhortations" (Lin Yutang, 1935:55).

The Chinese, in their everyday life, then, have considered Confucianism and Taoism as two aspects of a single whole, not as two irreconcilable perspectives. Thus, Lin Yutang could say that Taoism is a philosophy which counter-

acts the positivism of Confucius, and serves as a "safety-valve" for the imperfections of a Confucian society. Moreover, since Confucian outlook on life is "positive" whereas the Taoist one is "negative," Lin Yutang argues that "out of the alchemy of these two strange elements emerges the immortal thing we call Chinese character" (Lin Yutang, 1935: 55). In this regard, Creel has observed that Taoism "has in fact collaborated with Confucianism to produce the very considerable amount of social and political democracy that China has known" (Creel, 1953:114), and Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1973:50) have suggested that "Confucianism is the yang of Chinese thought and Taoism the yin."

As the yang of Chinese thought, Confucianism stresses doing good for society and for the individual by the elders through education, moral guidance, and personal influence. Thus, for the Confucians, the human individual is to busily strive for social adjustment while developing himself and perfecting himself. On the other hand, Taoism as the yin of Chinese thought, emphasizes taking unforced action (wu-wei) and leaving the people to transform and to perfect themselves. Thus for the human individual to develop and perfect himself, the Taoists insist that he must achieve peace of mind and tranquility of the spirit. The importance of the interplay of Taoism and Confucianism in the development of Chinese thought and culture is therefore difficult to ignore.

Moreover, since both perspectives were concerned with moral, social, and political reform, it may be worthwhile to

note, at the same time, the similarities between them. On the surface, Lao Tzu attacks the doctrines of jen, yi (righteousness), li, and chih (moral wisdom). He says that it is better to get rid of jen and to discard yi; and to get rid of "sageliness" and to discard wisdom (Tao-te Ching: 43 and 19). But this is not to say that Lao Tzu's attack is against jen, yi, and other virtues as such. On the contrary, Lao Tzu's esteem of jen and yi is uncompromising. For example, he has argued that the man of high virtue (shang te) does not display it as his own; and in this way he really possesses virtue. The man of low virtue, on the other hand, misses no chance to show off his virtue; thus his virtue is not genuine. Therefore, the man of high virtue takes unforced action (wu-wei) and has no ulterior motive to do so, while the man of low virtue takes action and has an ulterior motive to do so (Tao-te Ching: 38). Therefore, it is to the displaying of virtue, the artificiality, that Lao Tzu objects, not virtue itself.

In other words, what is attacked is the hypocritical and what is esteemed is the authentic, the non-calculating, and the natural. In his perceptive book about another Taoist sage--Chuang Tzu--Father Merton points out that "Chuang Tzu was not demanding less than Jen and Yi, but more." Father Merton further commented that Ju (Confucian) philosophy "produced well-behaved and virtuous officials, indeed cultured men. But it nevertheless limited and imprisoned them with fixed external norms and consequently made it impossible for them to act really freely and creatively in response to



the ever new demands of unforeseen situations" (Thomas Merton, 1965:20). Along this line, Blakney (1955:71) also has commented that Lao Tzu's attack on jen and yi is in reality a protest against specific "scholars" and not against goodness, morality, and wisdom as such. In sum, Lao Tzu is concerned not only with Tao and te but also with authentic, natural, un-hypocritical jen, yi, li and chih. Jen, yi, li and chih, we recall, are the four Confucian cardinal virtues.

It is interesting to note in this connection that in spite of its naturalistic orientation, Taoism, like Confucianism, is concerned with the problem of living in this world here and now. For example, in the Tao-te Ching Lao Tzu discusses such problems as survival in the human world, achieving positive goals through taking natural action (wu-wei), and even the tao of governing people. In fact, at least a third of the Tao-te Ching deals with the problem of governing including five chapters (36, 57, 68, 69, and 76) on military operations (see Chan Wing-tsit, 1967:19)! Even Chuang Tzu, one of the most spiritual of the Chinese philosophers, devotes a considerable portion of his "inner chapters" (Nei-pien)<sup>9</sup> to such problems as the mundane world, the ideal teacher, and the ideal ruler.

For Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, and for that matter, for the Taoists in general, the ideal human being is neither a do-gooder nor one who withdraws from the human world. Rather, the sage is person who has attained rational as well as extra-rational knowledge, who has penetrated the mechanisms

of nature as far as possible, and knows how to take unforced action, refrain from taking action that is contrary to Nature, or use "action at a distance."<sup>10</sup> In short, the Taoist ideal human being can be characterized as one of "sageliness within and kingliness without," or "nei sheng wai wang" (Chuang Tzu: Tien Hsia Chapter).

In Confucian terms, the ideal human being is one who, in his inner sageliness, has achieved spiritual cultivation through self-development and, in his kingliness without, can function effectively in society. Basically, both the Confucians and the Taoists believe in man's capability to become sage by his own effort; thus, both are humanistic. In the case of the Taoists, to follow Nature means to understand the mechanisms of the natural world and thereby understanding man's capabilities, for man himself is part of nature (see Needham, 1969). To follow Nature also means simply to be "natural" which obviously does not mean less human (see Chan Wing-tsit, 1967:20).

We may point out in this connection that both Confucianism and Taoism accept the conceptualization of the harmonious interplay of complementary forces (Yin and Yang) as an explanation of observed change in the universe as well as in the human world. Within the context of the development of Chinese thought and culture, the yin-yang analogy of Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig in regard to the roles of Taoism and Confucianism is then appropriate, though we would add that in the development of Chinese intellectual history, Legalism has been another contributing line of

thought. We must thus take a serious look at the process of the interplay of Legalism, Confucianism, and Taoism.

B. Confucianism and Legalism

If we are to understand the totality of Chinese thought, it is necessary that we try to appreciate the mutual influence of Confucianism and Legalism. In many respects, these two perspectives are very different. For example, Mencius, who is generally regarded as second to Confucius in importance in the Confucian tradition, believes that man's original nature is good, whereas the Legalists in general share Hsun Tzu's thesis that man is naturally evil. Thus, Han Fei, a student of Hsun Tzu, accepts the assumption that man's nature is bad, and puts forth a programmatic theory of government which essentially is anchored on the idea of rewards and punishments. It is interesting in this connection however, to note that while Hsun Tzu argues that even though man's nature is evil, he can become a sage because he is originally intelligent and because he is capable of engaging in conscious activity. Han Fei's program does not stress man's capacity for achieving sagehood through conscious activity. Han Fei insists that social order can be maintained only by law (fa) and must be implemented by rewards and punishments.

In a sense the Legalists and the Confucians both subscribe to the idea that the aim of any government is to maintain social order, but the Confucians maintain that the people should be governed by li, not by fa or law. At the

same time, the Confucian program is to be implemented by moral education, not rewards and punishments. It is worthy of note that the Confucian idea of government by li and moral education was originally grounded on a concrete social structure which was essentially feng-chien or "feudalistic." More specifically, it was based on kinship relations and the hierarchical, stratified social order of the early Chou dynasty.

The social structure during that period was relatively simple, as kings, princes, and feudal lords were in fact related to one another either by birth or by marriage (see Fung Yu-lan, 1960:155-157). Thus, when the various principalities and feudatories had to deal with one another socially or diplomatically, they did it in an informal fashion, because they were, after all, kin to each other; and if they had to follow any rules, they stuck to their unwritten code of "gentlemen's agreements" (Fung Yu-lan, 1960:156). Or put another way, their conduct was governed by li. During early Chou, the Chou king was technically the king of the various feudatories; however, he did not have to deal directly with the common people, for he left the matter to the lesser feudal lords. Thus, we may say that the lesser feudal lords were the real governors within their respective fiefs which were usually small both in size and in population, thereby allowing them to rule the people on a rather personal and informal basis. Their style of government, then, was that of government by li and moral persuasion rather than by impersonal law and punishments.

Concretely, in the early Chou society, the li and the hsing (punishments or penalties) were the two basic principles that governed the conduct of the members of the society. The li of course involved a set of rituals, ceremonies, mores, and rules of propriety, and thus formed the unwritten code of honor governing the conduct of the nobility, the chun-tzu, while hsing applied only to the common people, the shu-jen or the hsiao-jen (small men). Obviously this was a society which was organized explicitly on the principle of inequality. And in the Li Chi (Book of Rites), a Confucian classic, we read "The li do not go down to the common people, and the hsing do not go up to the ministers" (Chapter 10).

Against this background we may appreciate Confucius' effort in transforming the concept of chun-tzu from the original meaning which was based on the accidental birth to a new meaning which was based on moral and intellectual achievement. Historically, the breaking down of the old fixity of inherited class structure came about in the later centuries of the Chou dynasty as a result of the political and military conflicts among the various states. As the time wore on, the larger states expanded their political power through aggression and conquest. In the course of this political and territorial expansion, the larger and stronger states needed talents to carry on warfare and to handle some highly centralized administrative machineries. Consequently, the structure of the government began to change, that is, to become more and more centralized, more and more

complicated and bureaucratic. At the same time, the class structure also began to transform, because the common people, by talent or ~~simply~~ by luck, could now emerge as militarily, socially, and politically prominent persons, hence "upsetting" the old class structure.

In this regard, it is significant to note that in Confucian thought, chun-tzu is still different from hsiao jen (small man), though it is no longer based on inherited class differences. In other words, as a category of people in society, the chun-tzu has its duties and obligations which are different from those of the hsiao jen. In Mencius words, "Great men have their proper business, and the little men have their proper business...Some labor with minds, and some labor with the strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1965:226). Great men (chun-tzu) are then governors, and hsiao-jen, governed. In the Confucian scheme of things, everyone of course is a potential chun-tzu, but empirically not everyone is able to become one, because in the course of self-cultivation, some have better teachers than others, some work harder than others, and some live in better environments (both social and physical) than others. Thus, in the Analects, we read, "All men are alike in nature but become different through practice" (17:2). Consequently, grown up men are of unequal merit, though all men at birth are equal in the sense that all men are alike in nature.

Since some men are governors and others are followers, and since mental work is esteemed and physical work is depreciated, social positions and social relationships are viewed in terms of superordination and subordination. Men's statuses and the different forms of social relationships are "defined" by li and implemented by moral education. In this connection the Confucians have asserted that education and moral influence can fortify the minds of the people and thus bring perfect peace and order to society. On the other hand, law and punishments can exert only a temporary effect. It is true, the Confucians argue, that most people will try to avoid punishments but "they have no sense of shame" (Analects 1:10). It has thus been argued by the Confucians that law and punishments can only function negatively but cannot induce men to do good in a positive way. At most punishment is a subsidiary means of moral education. It is in this sense that the Confucians argue that the law is made for man and not men for the law.

The Legalists, on the other hand, reject the principle of sage government or the rule-by-man, and deny that moral influence and education can contribute in a significant way to the maintenance of social order. More than this, they reject all appeals to tradition and refuse to rely on supernatural guidance and sanctions. Instead, they advocate strongly the rule-by-law style of government, and propose that the program be implemented by rewards and punishments. Han Fei is rather consistent in this regard, and has argued that to wait for the sage-rulers to appear to maintain order means that "there would be only one generation of order out

of a thousand generations" (Han Fei, 1969:Lan-shih Chapter). The basic argument of Han Fei here is that since the average man is not as virtuous as Yao and Shun (Legendary models of virtuous emperors) nor as vicious as Chieh and Chuo (Ideal-typical evil emperors) government should not rely on man but must necessarily depend on the objective law and punishments.

At the same time, the Legalists point out that since in any state there are only a few citizens "who will do good for themselves," moral education and personal influence as a style of government is unworkable, and unrealistic. Pressing on the point, Han Fei says "If one brings it about that people can do no wrong, the entire state can be kept peaceful. He who rules a country makes use of the majority and neglects the few, and so does not concern himself with virtue but with law" (in Fung Yu-lan, 1960:160). Laws, to be effective must by necessity be applied uniformly. This, then, is the Legalists' principle of equality under the law for all alike.

The Legalists thus oppose the Confucian idea of 'graded love',<sup>11</sup> or reliance on li which differentiates between the members of society with emphasis on kinship relations and the hierarchical social structure (we shall have to return to this topic in a later chapter). It is thus not surprising that there have been tensions and conflicts between these two perspectives and between their followers. In this connection it is interesting to examine the effects of the tensions and conflicts on the two perspectives within the



context of the development of Chinese thought and culture. Of the three perspectives discussed in this work--Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism--Legalism was adopted officially by the state and put into practice very early in China's history.

The government of Chin Shih Huang, China's first unifier, was based on Legalism. In other words, Legalism provided Chin Shih Huang's first minister Li Ssu some effective means to organize the vast machinery of Chinese government and to unite the country into a coherent and manageable whole. The Chinese government of Chin Shih Huang was a highly centralized government based on the principle of rule-by-law. It thus adopted clear regulations and unconfused and rigorous penalties (fa) to govern the huge country. The functioning of the bureaucratic machinery was regulated through impersonal administrative methods (shu). And in conflictive situations, the government never hesitated to bring force to bear (shih).

Although the Chin dynasty did not last long (221-206 B.C.), the government was able to codify laws, and to standardize script, coinage, weights, and measures (see Levenson and Schurmann, 1969). In fact, the basic Legalistic principles and techniques of practical government introduced during the Chin dynasty have never been completely discarded. Indeed, they have been modified and combined with the principles and ideas of other perspectives. The interplay between Legalism and Confucianism started immediately after Liu Pang established himself as the leader of a new dynasty.

As the first ruler of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), Liu Pang (Han Keo-tsu) felt the need for men of education to help run his government. A good many of these men of education were Confucians and once they were in the government they started to influence the policy and functioning of the Han government. Their influence gained momentum during the reign of Han Wu-ti (141-87 B.C.).

It was during this period that Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B.C.) helped create the institutional basis for making Confucianism the prominent philosophy of the Han dynasty, for he was instrumental in creating the famed Chinese civil examination system, a system that controlled the entry into the ranks of the government official who ruled the country. It is significant in this regard that Tung Chung-shu insisted on the Confucian classics as the ideological basis for the operation of the examination system.

Thus, from Han Wu-ti's time on, considerable portion of the state bureaucracy was manned by official scholars who were definitely Confucian in orientation. In the process, such Confucian ideas and principles as jen and yi and government by moral suasion which were practically discarded during the Chin dynasty were now slowly reintroduced into operational framework of the Han official scholars. Even the field of law, which was codified by the Legalists earlier, was now being transformed. In other words, Confucian precepts of proper rituals, ceremonies, etiquette, that is, li, were also gradually incorporated into law. Chu Tung-tsu (1965) has described this process as the

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Confucianization of law, a process whereby the Confucian concept of li, with emphasis on differences in social status which implies a hierarchical social order, was incorporated into law.<sup>12</sup>

The interplay of Confucianism and Legalism has affected both perspectives. The Confucians since the Han dynasty, have accepted some basic Legalistic ideas and principles. Even Tung Chung-shu, for example, had incorporated the Legalistic notion of law and punishment into his thought system, for in his own conception, the Confucian virtue and moral influence became the yang while law and punishments were the principle of yin. The view that law and punishment supplement moral influence became the generalized viewpoint of the Confucian scholars since the Han period. Again, Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig consider the balance eventually achieved between the Legalist empire and its Confucian administrator during the Han dynasty, "once again illustrates the usefulness of the yin-yang concept of complementary, as opposed to conflicting dualism" (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1973:69-70).

### C. Legalism and Taoism

While the Legalists considered themselves different from the Confucians in terms of orientation and basic beliefs, and hence they had bitterly attacked the Confucian idea of government by virtue and moral examples, they did not attack the Taoists, at least not explicitly. This does not mean, however, that Legalism and Taoism are completely

compatible. We have seen the Legalists' inclination for violence, and for adopting rigid social control measures; we have also seen their commitment to the ideology of the supremacy of the state over the individual.

These basic ideas of the Legalists obviously are very different from the essence of Taoism. Nevertheless, several doctrines of Han Fei, an important Legalist theoretician and synthesizer (see previous section), can be traced to Lao Tzu. For example, Han Fei believes that the one great virtue a ruler should never neglect to cultivate is following the course of wu-wei, that is, refraining from action that is contrary to Nature. The Taoist idea of wu-wei somehow had a strong appeal to the Legalists,<sup>15</sup> for if the law or fa works well all the time as the Legalists thought it should, there should not be necessary for any actual government. The ruler need not do anything himself but simply let his ministers and the law do everything for him. Han Fei says: "Just as the sun and moon shine forth, the four seasons progress, the clouds spread, and the wind blows, so does the ruler not encumber his mind with knowledge, or himself with selfishness. He relies for good government or disorder upon laws and methods (shu); leaves right and wrong to be dealt with through rewards and punishments; and refers lightness and heaviness to the balance of scale" (in Fung Yu-lan, 1960:162).

Or again, in the Book of Han Fei Tzu (in Chan Wing-tsit's Source Book in Chinese Philosophy:254) we read: "Like water flowing and like a boat floating, the ruler

follows the course of Nature and enforces an infinite number of commands. Therefore he is called an enlightened ruler." In short, if the ruler control the tools and mechanisms through which government is conducted, he does not have to do anything himself, and yet "there is nothing that is not done."

Han Fei's position could be traced to his study and interpretation of the Tao-te Ching. In fact he was one of the earlier scholars who had written commentaries on the Tao-te Ching. In this connection Han Fei has maintained that Tao is not an undifferentiated continuum in which all distinctions disappear but rather the very reason why things are specific and determinate. He says: "Tao is that by which all things become what they are; it is that with which all principles are commensurable" (Han Fei's commentary on Tao-te Ching in Chan Wing-tsit, 1963:260-261).

Since the characteristic of Tao is wu-wei, taking only non-artificial action, Han Fei suggests that the ruler therefore should not be over-active, and should not get involved too deeply in arranging every matter himself. For Han Fei, a true ruler is one who is "too great to be measured, and too profound to be surveyed...Hence the saying, 'The ruler must not reveal his wants; for if he reveals his wants, the ministers will polish their manners accordingly. The ruler must not reveal his views; for if he reveals his views, the ministers will display their hues differently. If the likes and dislikes of the ruler be concealed, the true hearts of the ministers will be revealed. If the experience

and wisdom of the ruler be discarded, the ministers will take precedence.' Accordingly the ruler, wise though he may be, should not let everything find its proper place" (Han Fei in Hughes, 1942:261). Moreover, the great ruler is non-interfering and non-assertive, and he does not lose sight on the fundamental, the essential. We see then the Taoist influence in the thought of Han Fei as well as his interpretation and implementation of some basic Taoist concepts.

Furthermore, the Legalists and the Taoists are, to a certain degree, in agreement in the conceptualization of the nature of Heaven (Tien). Or in different words, the Legalists' attitude toward Heaven is rather close to the Taoists' non-anthropomorphic, natural Tao. To both schools, there are simply no supernatural agents anywhere. Lao Tzu, for example, keeps harking back to the idea that Tao is the impersonal order of Nature, not a creator-God. In the Tao-te Ching he points out that Heaven and Earth are impartial, neutral, and clear, and hence "have no favorites" (Tao-te Ching:5). And in the thought of Hsun Tzu, the teacher of Han Fei, Heaven is not to be conceptualized anthropomorphically, for it is merely man's Name for the law of Nature operating within cosmic events. For Hsun Tzu as for Lao Tzu, man can never expect Heaven to respond to prayer. Thus Hsun Tzu says:

Heaven's ways are constant. It does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not cease to prevail because of a tyrant like Chieh. Respond to it with

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good government, and good fortune will result; respond to it with disorder and misfortune will result. If you encourage agriculture and are frugal in expenditures, then Heaven cannot make you poor (Hsun Tzu in Watson, 1963:79).

In his scheme of things, man is an active force of nature, for man forms a triad with Heaven and Earth.

When Heaven and Earth combine, all things are born. When the yin and yang act upon each other, all changes are produced, and when nature and conscious activity join together, the world is well ordered (Hsun Tzu in Watson, 1963:103).

Man, by engaging in conscious activity is an active partner of Heaven and Earth in the development of things in nature. In any event, the naturalistic view of Heaven of the Taoists and Legalists complements the view of the Confucians -- Heaven is regarded by the Confucians, however unspecifically, as purposive.

After all has been said about Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism, we may point out that there is a single overriding concern which is shared by all these perspectives, namely, how to achieve the ideal social order so that man can realize himself to the fullest. What has emerged from the interplay of the three perspectives is a cluster of ideas about man and society. Man, for example, is placed in the position of centrality. All men are potentially equal in the sense that sagehood is open to all. Or phrased a different way, cultivation to the highest level is

possible to everyone. This, then, is the idea of the perfectibility of man. The respect for the human individual's capability to become good, to perfect himself, has led to a theory of government that is essentially based on the assumption that the law is made for man rather than man for the law.

It must be added that the idea of the universal attainability of sagehood is possible through self-cultivation which, however, involves other men, and hence society, for it assumes that man cannot hope to actualize himself by isolating himself physically and spiritually from the human world. The social nature of man is thus emphasized. In other words, a cultivated decent human being is not merely concerned with self-cultivation but also with extending his scope of activity to include others, with the business of the world. This is what is meant by "sageliness within and kingliness without." In this sense the idea of the inseparability of philosophy and life, and of theory and practice, is an important dimension of the Chinese view of the world. There is still another important dimension of Chinese thought and culture, namely, the idea that the interaction of the active (yang) and the passive (yin) principles necessarily accomplishes a synthesis in a harmonious totality.

We have now characterized and discussed the essential elements of Classical Chinese philosophy. We shall in the next chapter, show that these basic principles, though in new forms, still continue in China today, through examining the process by which Mao Tse-tung has adopted and integrated



the Hegelian-Marxian-Leninist tradition into Chinese culture.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Chan Wing-tsit (1969:15) has argued that it was Confucius who was responsible for making Chun-tzu a goal that is attainable by any man rather than a position that was linked with the hereditary classes of nobility. Chan Wing-tsit considers this transformation amounting to a kind of "social revolution," or at least a big leap forward in the context of evolution.

<sup>2</sup>Chu Tung-tsu (1965), for example, has stressed this dimension of li and has argued strongly that since the family and the stratification order were fundamental features, people of different statuses were not treated alike before the law, and hence nobles and officials enjoyed certain privileges whereas the mean people were legally unprivileged.

<sup>3</sup>In this regard, Hansen (1972:174) has commented that for the Confucians, governing by laws, instead of moral examples, will lead to endless litigation since "clever, eloquent, but unscrupulous men will attempt to wriggle through carefully argued loopholes."

<sup>4</sup>It was customary to consider Hsun Tzu a Confucian although not exactly an orthodox one such as Mencius. Fung Yu-lan (1960:143-154), for example, labeled him as the leader of the realistic wing of Confucianism in contrast to Mencius who represents the idealistic wing.

Chu Tung-tsu (1965:269) has pointed out that Hsun Tzu "did not underestimate the value of law and punishment as did the earlier Confucianists." In fact, in Hsun Tzu's conceptions, many legal principles has a place, and "it was no accident that the great Legalists, Han Fei and Li Ssu were his disciples." Yet, Chu Tung-tsu is of the opinion that Hsun Tzu "must still be considered a Confucian, since for him li, and moral influence were fundamental." Recently, however, in the course of re-examining and re-interpreting China's intellectual history in China, Hsun Tzu is considered a Legalist (see, for example, Yang Yung-kuo, (1973), Yan Ping (1974, and Ching Yin-ko (1974:51-63)).

<sup>5</sup>Watson (1963) translates "wei" as "conscious activity." Chan Wing-tsit's (1969:128) translation is similar to that of Watson - "activity" or "man's activity" - and has commented that "wei" means "what is created by man and not a result of natural conditions." Legge (1971:79) uses the term "factitious."

<sup>6</sup>Tao-te Ching is a 5,000-word classic (the number of its words varies from 5227 to 5722 with the different available texts). About 350 commentaries are available in Chinese. And, according to Chan Wing-tsit (1969:137), there are more English translations of it than of any other Chinese book - already over forty. Many Sinologists have expressed their views on the question of authorship of the Tao-te Ching, but after many years of argument and counter-argument, the question remains controversial and inconclusive. Meanwhile, Lao Tzu still is associated with Tao-te Ching and considered its author by many.

<sup>7</sup>In his Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy (Chung-kuo Che-hsueh-shih ta-kang), Hu Shih (1891-1962), a student of John Dewey, labels Lao Tzu a rebel (Hu Shih, 1938:50). In this regard, Chan Wing-tsit (1963:3-34) has pointed out that throughout Chinese history Taoism has always been the philosophy of the suppressed and that in their revolt against oppressive rulers, the rebels have often raised the manner of Taoism. In another occasion, Chan Wing-tsit (1969:137) takes pain to explain that "one should not be misled by its ideals (Tao-te Ching) of weakness and emptiness into thinking that Taoism is a philosophy of negativism or one of absolute quietism. The book advocates not only "non-action," but also practical tactics for action. It teaches submission, but strongly opposes oppressive government. The philosophy of the Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching) is not for the hermit, but for the sage-ruler, who does not desert the world but rules it with non-interference....Man is to follow Nature, but in doing so he is not eliminated; instead, his nature is fulfilled."

<sup>8</sup>Individualism in the context of Taoism refers to personal autonomy and its belief in the relativity of all values. It does not mean egotism. It does not refer to selfishness.

<sup>9</sup>The nei-pien or inner chapters of the Book of Chuang Tzu are considered to be the authentic chapters by Chuang Tzu himself.

<sup>10</sup>"Action at a distance" is one of Needham's terms to characterize the non-interventionist conception of human activity (wu-wei) of the Taoists.

<sup>11</sup>The idea of 'graded love' is the Confucian answer to Mo Tzu's doctrine of 'universal love.' Confucius insists that it is simply false that there is a natural tendency to all men equally. They insist that love must have an order, which implies relativity of importance. Thus, Mei yi-pao (1967:159) states that "to say that one loves or should love the man on the street as much as one's parents "violates every sense of rationality."

<sup>12</sup>We shall return to Chu Tung-tsu's notion of Confucianization of law later when we discuss the different dimensions of the concept of li and its implications for self-development.

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### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE CHINESE TRADITION AND MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT

We are aware that the ancient civilization of China is being transformed today. Does this, however, mean that the transformation involves a total break from the past? Or is it merely the continuation of Chinese dynastic history in the sense that contemporary China is the latest turn of the dynastic cycle?

To understand this transformation requires a careful examination of the ways in which the basic principles of classical Chinese philosophy and the fundamental ideas of the Marxist-Leninist tradition have been blended within the sociocultural context of China. Thus, to view the contemporary Chinese government as though it is the latest "dynasty" is to apply mechanically the idea of continuity, hence ignoring China's response to a set of specific new problems in a new age. And yet, to view the situation in contemporary China as a complete break from the past and hence a wholesale mechanistic imposition of a cultural pattern that is entirely and totally Marxist-Leninist - is to ignore the historical forces and cultural roots of the contemporary Chinese world view. Thus, a study of the interplay of old and new, of the traditional Chinese and Marxist ideas and practices, could help us understand the way the Chinese conceptualize reality.



## I. Marxism In The Chinese Setting

On January 17, 1975, a new Constitution of China was adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress. The Constitution explicitly states that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation" (1975 Constitution: Article 2). It is thus clear that Marxism-Leninism plays a significant part in China's sociocultural change.

We must not, however, overlook in this context another very important factor, namely, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, because it is through it (the thought of Mao Tse-tung) that Marxist-Leninist theory (li-lun) is both interpreted and translated into action in the Chinese setting, and then assimilated into the transforming Chinese culture. To say that Marxism-Leninism affects Chinese culture does not necessarily mean that there has been some kind of unimaginative transplantation of a cultural pattern that is totally Marxist or Russian in China. Rather, it involves an interpretive synthesization of Marxism-Leninism and the traditional Chinese philosophical principles.

Mao Tse-tung in fact has repeatedly urged Chinese intellectuals not to allow themselves to become dogmatists. He has emphasized the need to adapt Marxism to the particular necessities of China's sociocultural setting. Marxism is to be refined into "a theory which is our own and of a specific nature" (in Compton, 1952:12-13). In this context, the aim is to integrate Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Thus in his work On New

Democracy (in de Bary, 1964:227), Mao Tse-tung stresses the point that if Marxism is to be useful it must first be integrated with characteristics of the nation and given a definite national form; therefore, "Formula-Marxists are only fooling with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no place of them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution." Perhaps it can be argued that it is only by demystifying a conceptual scheme that it (the demystified conceptual scheme) can become a useful theoretical basis to guide man's thinking. Thus,

When we say Marxism is correct, it is certainly not because Marx was a "prophet" but because this theory has been proved correct in our practice and in our struggle ..... In our acceptance of his theory no such formalities or mystified notion as that of "prophecy" ever enters our minds (Mao Tse-tung, 1971:42).

It is in this sense that Mao Tse-tung's approach to Marxism has at times been criticized by Marxist - determinists or what Hsiung Chieh<sup>1</sup> (1970) has called orthodox Marxists, a point to which we shall return. In any case, to interpret Marxism in the Chinese setting and to assimilate it into Chinese culture involves simultaneously the process of re-interpretation of China's own traditional culture. More specifically, if we are to understand the present nature of Chinese society, it is necessary that we examine more closely the process of interpretive synthesization of Marxism and China's own traditional culture. In other words, to say that China's culture is in the process of

transformation does not necessarily mean that China's traditional cultural ideals and ideas are being abandoned. We may argue that what is involved, in terms of China's culture change is, among other things, a careful process of discrimination and selection so that aspects of the traditional culture may be either developed further or abandoned in a new context and in a new era.

## II. China's Cultural Legacy and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung

If we are to understand the present state of China, we may have to address ourselves to a basic question, namely, to what extent do old and new cultural elements, traditional culture and Marxist li-lun (theory), complement or contradict each other. For example, we find the traditional humanistic conception of man, the belief that the source of realizing man's full potential is his own strength, hence the faith in the perfectibility of man, continuously to inform the Chinese. True, we find new expressions of this basic idea, but the essence of humanism, of the belief that the human mind (human will) is capable of creating man's civilization, is still very much a part of the mode of Chinese thought. Hsiung Chieh (1970:5), for instance, sees "the parallel between the traditional concept of hsin (mind, or human will power) and the Communist emphasis on szu-hsiang (thought as the prime mover of human action)." Other notable examples where elements of traditional culture and contemporary ideas are found to be mutually reinforcing will be the yin-yang dialectical thinking and Mao Tse-tung's theory of contradictions.

At any rate, szu-hsiang or thought, is an important dimension within the framework of Chinese 'ideology' which, according to Hsiung Chieh's analysis, offers contemporary Chinese society "an apocalyptic vision, a spiritual force, a philosophy of life, a goal structure, a value system, a body of concepts and vocabulary for communication, and a methodology" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:7). In a more specific fashion, 'ideology' has taken the function of the Confucian li which prevailed in both state and society in classical China. In other words, social conscience, principles of right and wrong in human conduct, ethics, rules of propriety, and faith that were "covered" by the all-pervasive Confucian li is now replaced by 'ideology.'

Following Hsiung Chieh, we may view analytically the structure of Chinese 'ideology'<sup>2</sup> as composed of three inter-related "parts." At the most abstract level Chinese ideology involves a conceptual system, or kuan-nien hsing-tai. It implies a way of abstracting, organizing, and conceptualizing the world that is physically outside the individual human being. Or phrased a different way, it involves a body of conceptual "tools," for helping man to obtain knowledge. Thus, it also implies a way of viewing the universe, or an "yu'-chou kuan," a way of life, and an ethos. In this regard, Mao Tse-tung has discussed the importance of the development of conceptual order in man's search for knowledge (Mao Tse-tung, 1968). He argues that in the course of meeting everyday life men through their senses perceive the phenomenal aspects of things in the outer world and so acquire a sense

of external relations of things. This is a process whereby perceptual knowledge is acquired; this helps men to carry out their everyday activities. In the course of meeting everyday life social practice necessarily appears. As social practice continues, concepts that deal with more than just external relations emerge. These concepts allow people to "capture" the essence, the "internal relations of things," and to draw logical conclusions by means of judgement and inference; (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:1 - 22). This, in other words, is the process by which rational knowledge or logical knowledge emerges.

Or, to phrase the matter differently, rational knowledge emerges from the interplay of concepts, judgment, and logical inference. It must be noted that rational knowledge is analytically different from perceptual knowledge: the latter pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena, and the external relations of things, whereas rational knowledge, to repeat, takes a leap forward to reach the totality, the essence, and the internal relations of things, and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:6). Rational knowledge, then, entails a synthesis of the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them. In other words, this is a process whereby a conceptual order emerges. The emergence of a conceptual system, or kuan-nien hsing-tai, in turn, affects the way people perceive and act toward the surrounding world, social and natural. It is in this sense that the conceptual order of a people is said to be manifested in their culture.

In this connection, Hsiung Chieh has suggested that in Tse-tung's view, the Chinese conceptual order is basically dialectical one which involves, among other things, the principles of the whole and of contradictions, and dialectical concept of transformation and change (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:127). This, we may point out, is not entirely dissimilar to the traditional Chinese yin-yang dialectical world view, nor is it very different from the classical way of viewing the cosmic and sociohistorical processes more as a like interweaving of events than as a series of clear-cut discrete events linked neatly in a causal chain. In any event, Hsiung Chieh (1970:128) argues that Marxism-Leninism is the "outgrowth" of the dialectical materialist conceptual system. Within the framework of Chinese ideology, then, Marxism-Leninism plays the part of 'theory,' or li-lun, which is analytically different from the conceptual order, and hence is another dimension of Chinese ideology. 'Theory' or li-lun, is both action and organization oriented, rather than involving merely academic interpretation of philosophical principles or writing commentaries on the ideas of some earlier thinkers. 'Theory' must offer, at the same time, a program for going beyond, for transforming the existing order by conscious activity. 'Theory' is thus meaningful when it is applied to practice.

The problem of whether theory corresponds to the objective reality is not, and cannot be completely solved in the movement from the perceptual to the rational (knowledge) . . . . . The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see

whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:14-15).

More concretely, the Chinese practice of revolutionary struggle is the actual application of Marxist-Leninist theory. That is to say, the Chinese revolutionary struggle is in fact the practice that put Marxist-Leninist theory into action.

Thus, in the context of Chinese ideology, li-lun is active theory and is inseparable from shih-chien or practice. There is a link, however, between theory and practice, and that is, szu-hsiang or thought. Put a little differently, szu-hsiang mediates between theory and practice. Therefore, szu-hsiang is the third dimension of Chinese ideology. We may now say that (1) kuan-nien hsing-tai or conceptual order is the epistemological part of Chinese ideology, which is basically dialectical, while (2) li-lun or theory is that part of Chinese ideology which offers an action program with organizational ideas to guide social development, and (3) szu-hsiang or thought is the process whereby a theory is conceptualized, interpreted, and applied "non-mechanically" in changing circumstances and ongoing situations. In sum, the structure of Chinese ideology involves analytically three basic dimensions: kuan-nien hsing-tai or conceptual order, li-lun or theory, and szu-hsiang or thought, mind, or human will.

In light of this understanding, Hsiung Chieh (1970: 132) has argued in some rather specific terms, that Marxism supplies a "new world view" as well as "a critique of social

values and institutions," while Leninism offers the strategy and organization for revolution. Together they "provide a broad framework, a world view from which to comprehend and measure all things, a standpoint from which to approach a situation or problem, a direction to follow, a body of effective organizational skills." Nevertheless, Hsiung Chieh goes on to point out that according to "the Maoists," it is the thought (szu-hsiang) of Mao Tse-tung that "can rally the masses to the Party's effort to rebuild man and society in China." In this connection it is important to note that within the sphere of Chinese ideology, szu-hsiang plays the significant part in mediating between Marxist historical materialism and Leninist organizational skills and techniques on the one hand, and Chinese revolutionary practice on the other hand. More specifically, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, as Hsiung Chieh (1970:132) observes, "breathes relevance into the actual practice of Marxism-Leninism, maintains situational flexibility within rigid operational principles and schemes, translates doctrines into reality, and can sustain the people's faith in the darkest hours." Thus, the 1945 Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party recognized the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the Party's guiding principle for action, and described it as "the thought that unifies the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of Chinese revolution" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:133).

When thought is viewed as the guiding principle for action, it implies a recognition that human will, or hsin is



a driving force that can affect human activity. It also implies that thought, consciousness, or will, can affect the infrastructure, economic base, or mode of production of a society. It must be pointed out, however, that this is definitely not to say that the forces of production and the relations of production of a given society do not profoundly affect the consciousness of individuals who live in it. This simply means that in Chinese thought, classical as well as contemporary, there is a recognition of the importance of the interplay between man's will, mind, or hsin and his social being. Thus, the importance of szu-hsiang within the sphere of Chinese ideology cannot be overstressed.

In light of this understanding, it may be necessary to examine closer the nature of szu-hsiang and to discuss the implications for contemporary Chinese thought and culture. If szu-hsiang gives direction to man's action, and if it provides guidelines for formulating and interpreting theories as well as for applying theories creatively rather than mechanically in changing situations, it is necessary that we realize that within the sphere of Chinese ideology, the function of szu-hsiang is to mediate creatively between theory and practice. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, within the framework of Chinese ideology, the interplay of man's will and society's material base has been stressed; therefore, szu-hsiang cannot be viewed merely and simply as a product of the economic base of society, even though the prevailing substructure of that society can in fact influence the forms of thinking of the men who live in that society. In

other words, man's consciousness, man's mentality can also influence his being. Thus, as Hsiung Chieh (1970:137) has pointed out, "A formerly rich man who has been converted to Marxism may be considered an irreproachable proletarian." Conversely, a worker or poor peasant who acquires a "false consciousness" who, as Hsiung Chieh (1970:137) puts it, "clings to old customs falls into the bourgeois or even feudal category." Class consciousness, then, is not solely determined by the material base of society. It can also be affected by purposive motivation of members of society. More specifically, within the context of Chinese revolution, Mao-Tse-tung speaks of the possible emergence of a new class of "labor aristocracy" from the working people (see Peking Review, 1968:May 10). He also refers to the possible influence of pre-revolution "bourgeois ideology and undesirable traditions within each individual, regardless of his social background" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:101). In this sense, we might say that Mao Tse-tung's notion of szu-hsiang could be viewed as an "independent variable," and ideology could not, strictly speaking, simply be a "dependent variable." within this context.

The thesis that the human individual's mentality is not solely determined by his relation to the actual production process shows again the importance of szu-hsiang within the framework of Chinese ideology. It also points to the idea that voluntarism is another significant dimension of szu-hsiang. In this connection it may be noted that Mao Tse-tung, like Hsun Tzu some two thousand years ago, has consistently

emphasized man's capability to transform nature. Thus Mao Tse-tung declares that the human mind is capable of devising and improving methods of developing and transforming man's environment.

Many living examples show that there is only unproductive thought (szu-hsiang), there are no unproductive regions. There are only poor methods for cultivating the land; there is no such thing as poor land. Provided only that people manifest in full measure their subjective capacities for action, it is possible to modify natural conditions (Mao Tse-tung, cited by Schram, 1967:295).

Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on man's mind or will power to transform the outer world has led Hsiung Chieh to question the wisdom of what he considers to be "overreliance on the power of such subjective capacities," because it has had economic repercussions arising from "the overtaxing of human resources." Moreover, according to Hsiung Chieh, it also "raises theoretical questions about Mao's Marxist credentials" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:138). At the same time, Schram has described Mao Tse-tung's faith in the power of the human will to transform the social and natural world as "romantic" (Schram, 1967:294).

As with the case of hsin in traditional Chinese thought, szu-hsiang in contemporary Chinese ideology is viewed as man's tool to integrate man and nature. The matter of the unity of man and nature, it is recalled, has always been a major concern for the Chinese. Hsun Tzu, we recall, spoke of the triad, of man as the active partner of Heaven and Earth. As for the Taoists, man is simply a part of nature.

But more specifically, Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.), a Sung dynasty (960-1276 A.D.) thinker, conceptualized the universe in terms of the interpenetration of the realm of principal (li<sup>4</sup>) and the material world of energy or force (chi). Li or principle pertains to "what is above shapes" and is the source of things while chi or material force pertains to "what is within shapes" and is the means by which things are produced (see Fung Yu-lan, 1960:294-306). Li constitute a pure, and vast world, and hence it does not actually move, and ~~with~~ with the pure and empty world of li there exists the ~~of movement~~ or yang and the li of quiescence of yin. As soon as the chi, the material force, receives the li of movement and quiescence, the chi begin to move or rest. Thus, li or principle is itself invisible and it becomes manifest to us when there are the movement of the yang and the quiescence of the yin.

Principle (li) and material force (chi) are never separate. In Chu Hsi's scheme of things, everything is composed of li and chi, principle and material force. The human being, for example, is viewed as a combination of li and chi in the sense that li accounts for the defining characteristic of man as a member of the species while chi is the particular individual's characteristics. The human individual receives his li from the li of the universe, which is pure, and is, so to speak, the mind of the universe or tao-hsin. Thus, the human mind is the link between man and nature.

Nevertheless, for a particular human individual to have

concrete existence, he necessarily has to receive chi. Here Chu Hsi believed that li for every man is the same, and it is the chi that makes people different. Therefore, some men are morally and otherwise strong, others are weak. Yet, through 'the investigation of things,' or 'ko-wu', man can derive knowledge of li (principle) which is inherent in him, and by self-cultivation he can correct his conduct so as to follow the spirit of li. In this way, the weak can rectify himself.

In other words, particular human minds (jen-hsin) are not always pure and good, but they can be purified through the process of 'investigation of things' and thus acquire an intimate recognition and understanding of the spirit of li (principle). In short, man is perfectible. More specifically, Chu Hsi proposed to investigate other things, man's relations with his fellow men, and social and political problems. He further argued that through the practice of jen or human-heartedness, which involves, we recall, sociality, mutuality, reciprocity, and human-relatedness (see Chapters 2, and 4) man can cultivate himself, get rid of egotism and selfishness, and establish unity between himself and the mind of the universe.

In his work, Chu Hsi apparently adopted the traditional yin-yang dialectical mode of thinking, and continued the thesis that man, through his hsin, will, or mind is capable of self-cultivation, and hence perfect himself. It is thus interesting to note that the thought of Mao Tse-tung, especially in his philosophical works such as his theories of

contradictions and knowledge and practice (1968) also reflects this cultural heritage. For example, Mao Tse-tung's idea of contradictions is not based merely on antagonistic conflicts but also on non-antagonistic ones (a form of complementary interplay of yin-yang forces).

Furthermore, societal contradictions, as mentioned earlier, are viewed by Mao Tse-tung as rooted in ideological conflicts more than in struggles between actual members of the different classes. Thus conflict resolution is basically through the process of ideological rectification. This shows again the importance that Mao Tse-tung attaches to szu-hsiang. It also reflects his faith in the perfectibility of man. Within the framework of Chinese ideology, man's szu-hsiang, similar to Chu Hsi's idea of jen-hsin, or human mind, can get off the right path, and when it does, it is to be rectified. In this regard, Hsiung Chieh has intriguingly argued that in China today, the thought of Mao Tse-tung "resembles the 'new jen' through which the individual can purify his own thought, shed his selfish bourgeois mentality, and steep himself in the collective proletarian ethics" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:140-141). Perhaps it is in this sense that the function of the thought of Mao Tse-tung is to provide the theoretical basis to guide the nation.

In Chu Hsi's conception both the reality of the mind and the reality of things external to the mind are recognized. There is the distinction between hsin (mind) and li (principle). In the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528 A.D.), however, hsin and li become one. In other words,

Wang Yang-ming's conception is based upon the principle that there are neither principles (li) nor things outside the mind. A significant implication of Wang Yang-ming's position is that the myriad things exist only in hsin. That is why he rejects Chu Hsi's thesis that man is capable of overcoming his weakness through the process of investigation of things (ko-wu). This is not to say that he rejects the idea that man is capable of overcoming his weakness through self-examination or through the process of rectification of his hsin (mind), however. What Wang rejected is simply the conception that things can exist outside man's mind and that through the investigation of "things out there" man can derive correct knowledge about the principles inherent in them so that he can rectify his own mind (hsin).

Put differently, Wang Yang-ming argues that the universal moral law is not to be sought externally because every human individual possesses the intuitive knowledge through which he can immediately know what is right and what is wrong. This intuitive knowledge (liang chih), according to him, is the manifestation of man's original mind. It is in this sense that he maintains that everyone, in his original mind, is a sage. Here again is another expression of egalitarianism and the faith in the perfectibility of all men (that sagehood is open to all) in Chinese culture, which has found still another expression in the thought of Mao Tse-tung in our time.<sup>6</sup>

Wang Yang-ming's account of hsin, though overlaps a little with Chu Hsi's thesis and also with the contemporary

idea of szu-hsiang, is extremely subjectivistic and idealistic. Nevertheless, there is still another aspect of Wang Yang-ming's conception which overlaps with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, namely, the emphasis on the inseparability of theory and practice. This thesis, we may recall, is in fact within the framework of traditional Chinese thought and culture. Confucius, for example, has spoken of the dynamic interplay of knowledge and action. In the Analects, we read "He who learns but does not think is lost; he who thinks but does not learn is in danger" (2:15). Knowing is not merely and purely a cognitive function; it is not only a disinterested mental exercise of apprehending some objects "out there." In other words, the process of knowing involves not only that which is to be known but also the whole existence of the human individual who is the knowing subject. What is known thus is manifested in the course of everyday life. For Wang Yang-ming, knowledge "is the beginning of action" (Wang Yang-ming in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:656). And as action involves the broad context of the self, it is not to be viewed as merely a mechanistic way to perform. In short, action begins when thought becomes an intention. Therefore, Wang Yang-ming maintains that "Action is the completion of knowledge" (Wan Yang-ming in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:656). Knowledge and action, then, are moments in a dialectical processual unity rather than two static units. For Wang Yang-ming, knowledge for its own sake is "idle speculation." The seeker of knowledge is not to neglect the demand for wordly action.



Against this background, we may recall Mao Tse-tung's account of the interplay of perceptual knowledge, conceptual knowledge, and social activity (practice), and point out that Mao Tse-tung has called his theory of the unity of knowing and doing the theory of "chih-hsing tung-i." We may also note that Wang Yang-ming's thesis of the unity of knowing and doing is labeled the doctrine of "chih-hsing ho-i." In either case, the basic idea is the unity of knowledge and action. More specifically, for Mao Tse-tung, rational or conceptual knowledge entails a synthesization of the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them. This is also how a 'theory' is formulated. The importance of theory is to guide action but it is crucial to note that conceptual or rational knowledge (theory) cannot be independent of perceptual knowledge.

In the history of philosophy, there is the 'rationlist' school that admits the reality only of reason and not of experience believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside down (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:12).

Thus, it is worthy of note that theoretical knowledge emerges from social practice, and yet, what is also very important is the leap from theoretical knowledge to the practice of changing the external world, to the practice of scientific experiment. This is what Mao Tse-tung has described as "the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition" (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:14). This implies the notion that man is a

force of nature engaged in a struggle with nature. Or within the framework of traditional thought, especially the conception of Hsun Tzu, man is conceptualized as an active partner of Heaven and Earth whose task is to appropriate and develop what is offered by nature. In sum, what is involved is a process of transformation of the outer world.

The movement of back and forth between perceptual knowledge and rational or conceptual knowledge via social activity (practice) implies a spiral movement toward truth that rise ever higher, though it would never reach absolute reality. Thus, the form of "practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge" repeats itself "in endless cycle and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to higher level" (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:20).

The basic idea, within the framework of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, is to avoid the tendency of seeing things as isolated, static, and one-sided. In his theoretical essay "On Contradiction," Mao Tse-tung emphasizes the importance of the principle of the "unity of opposites." He thus argues that the dialectical world view allows man not only to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in the myriad things, but also, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for solving contradictions (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:29).

Mao Tse-tung's thesis of contradictions, both within a thing and between two or more things, reminds us of the traditional Chinese sense of yin-yang complementarity and contradictions. His idea of the unity of opposites, and

that of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions could be traced to both the Hegelian-Marxian-Leninist tradition and the older Chinese yin-yang thinking, especially in regard to the category of the dynamics of non-antagonistic contradictions. It is recalled that a very consistent theme of Lao Tzu is that everything has its opposite, and that opposites can be synthesized into a totality. Chapter Two of the Tao-te Ching reads:

When the people of the world point up  
 beauty as such,  
 There arises the recognition of ugliness.  
 When they know the good as good,  
 There arises the recognition of evil.  
 Therefore:  
 Being and non-being produce each other;  
 Difficult and easy are complementary;  
 Long and short are relative;  
 High and low are comparative;  
 Pitch and sound make harmony;  
 Before and after are a sequence.

In our time, Mao Tse-tung speaks of the existence of things and their counterparts:

Without life, death is nonexistent;  
 without death, life is nonexistent.  
 When there is no top, there is no bottom;  
 where there is no bottom, there is no top  
 .....(cited in Hsiung Chieh, 1970:102).

We thus see some similarities between the conception of Lao Tzu and that of Mao Tse-tung in regard to the thesis of the unity of opposites. Nevertheless, we may point out that it is still possible to argue that, the early thinkers, on the whole, stressed the harmonious or complementary aspect more than they did the conflictive or struggling aspect of opposites. Or, to phrase the matter differently,

the early thinkers did not consistently express their appreciation of the scientific value of struggle between opposites. Instead, they stressed the tendency toward a compromise between the contradictory forces. Thus, some Confucian virtues are seen by some contemporary Chinese scholars (see Monroe, 1970:97-107) as tools to compromise and harmonize contradictions between the different categories of people.

More specifically, such concepts as jen, chung (Loyalty), and shu (altruism), in the context of Confucianism, are viewed by some contemporary Chinese scholars as having the function of harmonizing relations between rich and poor, powerful and powerless, ruler and minister. In short, overemphasis on "combination of two into one" is seen by some contemporary Chinese thinkers either as an attempt to justify compromises between contradictory categories or as an indication of the inability to appreciate genuinely the value of struggle between opposites in the development of things in nature. In this regard it has been suggested that a shift of emphasis from "combination of two into one" to "dividing one into two," allows men to understand and appreciate the nature of struggle between opposites.

In Hsiung Chieh's terms, "one divides into two" is "probably the most sophisticated" analytical and practical method provided by "Maoist ideology" for dialectical analysis (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:124). At any rate, the principle of "one divides into two" (yi fen wei erh) implies a recognition that a person, a thing, or a piece of work, must

necessarily be viewed from two sides: a good side which must be no cause for self-satisfaction and complacency, and the side of deficiencies which must be rectified through unrelenting struggle (see Hsiung Chieh, 1970:125).

The emphasis on struggle reflects the shift from the older traditional thinking of stressing harmony and mutual adjustment among the different categories of people and things.<sup>7</sup> Within the present conceptual framework, socio-political struggle involves ideological struggles which is anchored on the idea of 'class' in a rather subtle fashion. Thus, before 1960 class struggle was essentially an ideological struggle between peasants and workers on one side, and the bourgeoisie on the other side.

But, as Hsiung Chieh (1970:121-122) has pointed out, since 1960 class struggle has been viewed in a more general way in the sense that it is the struggle within the individual regardless of his actual class background. As mentioned earlier, within this context a person may be a worker or poor peasant and yet he can be viewed as an individual who represents the interests of another class, if he had acquired, for example, a bourgeois world outlook; conversely, it is possible for a middle class person to acquire a proletarian szu-hsiang (thought). In this sense "class struggle" is the struggle between proletarian thinking and remnant (pre-revolution) bourgeois thinking. Hsiung Chieh has characterized this conception as "contrived class struggle" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:122).

In summary, we may say that traditional Chinese humanistic and dialectical world view have continued to influence the thinking of the Chinese. True, some traditional concepts and ideas have found new expressions, but this is not to say that the traditional conceptions have been negated. Rather, the older forms have been reformulated and synthesized with new elements in the present conceptualization.

For example, Mao Tso-tung's conception of 'ideology,' like the traditional concept of li, exerts influence in society as well as in state. In other words, as with li in traditional China, ideology in contemporary China has a wide range of application: it attempts to establish, through collective means, a philosophy of life, and offers Chinese society a spiritual force and morality, a set of concepts and methodology, and a system of values. As was the case with the dynastic government of traditional China, the present government serves as a "guardian" of public and private morality, as society's judge and legislator, and as Hsiung Chieh (1970:107) puts it, its authority is not to be challenged, "as long as its performance lives up to the expectations created by the official ideology. If that performance appears to fall short, as in 1957 and 1966-68, forces within the Party or the society may question the mandate of the regime."

Moreover, just as the mind (hsin) was traditionally viewed as the source of human action, szu-hsiang (thought) is now conceptualized as having a comparable function. In

the thought of Mao Tse-tung there is a dialectical sense of the active interplay between subjective ideals and objective reality. There is an explicit recognition that while the material element profoundly affects the spiritual element, revolutionary will, nevertheless, can help man transform the material world. In other words, Mao Tse-tung in continuity with the tradition, does recognize the creative tension between internal purpose (will, mind or hsin) and external determination.

An important implication of the emphasis upon hsin (mind) or revolutionary will in Chinese thought and culture is that in the Chinese scheme of things the human individual occupies the central position. This idea will be further analyzed in the next chapter which will deal with the concept of individualism within the context of Chinese humanism.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Hsiung Chieh is also known as James Chieh Hsiun.

<sup>2</sup>'Ideology' in Hsiung Chieh's work is similar to the anthropological concept of 'culture.' Hsiung Chieh (1970:7) says, "In Mao's usage, the word 'ideology' is coterminous with 'culture' as the latter is understood by most Chinese, and has anthropological connotations." He goes on to quote Yehudi A. Cohen's definition of 'culture': "(Culture is) made of the energy systems, the objective and specific artifacts, the organizations of social relations, the modes of thought, the ideologies, and the total range of customary behavior that are transmitted from one generation to another by a social group and that enables it to maintain life in a particular habitat." Hsiung Chieh then concludes that "In Communist China today, ideology has a comparable wide range of application, in the sense that it seeks to establish a new culture, a new way of life, through purposeful, collective means. It is all inclusive."

<sup>3</sup>Hsiung Chieh maintains that "the important thing about szu-hsiang is its independent status," and argues that it must be understood "outside the existing theory-practice framework" (Hsiung Chieh, 1970:136).

<sup>4</sup>It is extremely important to understand that li (理) or principle is NOT li (礼) or rules of propriety. Both are important concepts within the context of Neo-Confucianism.

<sup>5</sup>See Chan Wing-tsit's Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:654-691).

<sup>6</sup>Wang Yang-ming's conception is, at the same time, labeled by contemporary Chinese Scholars as an "extreme kind of subjective idealism and egoism" (see, for example, Shen Ning, 1974; Yang Yung-kuo, 1973; and Yen Ping, 1974).

<sup>7</sup>The older emphasis on complementarity and harmony is not ignored or negated, however. Rather, it is contained within the current conceptualization. Non-antagonistic contradiction is one of the examples of the older forms of contradiction which is contained within the present conceptual scheme.





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## CHAPTER FOUR

### INDIVIDUALISM IN CHINESE THOUGHT

The idea that the destiny of man depends, in his conscious struggle with external nature as well as with internal selfishness, on self-cultivation within a social context rather than on some supernatural power, is a major theme in Chinese thought. This theme, we may point out, is grounded in the Chinese conceptualization of the cosmos. We may recall that the Chinese do not have a creation myth that expresses the notion of creation ex nihilo by a Supreme Being; instead, their account of the emergence of the universe is that of the organic process. In the Chinese conceptualization all parts of the cosmos necessarily interact as participants in one unforced, spontaneous, self-generating life process. The parts of the entire cosmos thus belong to a single organic whole. Or, as Needham puts it, the Chinese conception of the universe is that it is "an ordered harmony of wills without an ordainer" (Needham, 1956:II:287).

In this view, then, man as a part of the cosmos is a participant in the creation and re-creation of the universe. Therefore, man more or less creates and re-creates his own history. As a part of the cosmos, however, he is at the same time affected, in many ways, by the actions of all other

elements of the cosmos. This organismic view of the cosmos is manifested in the humanistic Chinese thought, which in turn is the basis of the Chinese conception that man is a morally creative agent who is capable of perfecting himself. It is from this standpoint that Chinese thinkers maintain that man's destiny is subject to subjective human intervention. Writing about the Chinese humanistic mind, Moore points out that

There is the universally recognized doctrine--and attitude--of humanism, which is unquestionably more pervasive and more significant in China than in any other philosophical tradition. People come first in China (Moore, 1967:5).

Within the framework of Chinese humanistic thought, the end of knowledge is to serve human happiness. Confucius, for example, in the Analects, argues that knowledge "was to know man" (12:22), and wisdom "was to attend to the welfare of the people" (13:9). Moreover, human happiness, knowledge, and wisdom are attainable through man's own effort, rather than depending upon some ultrahuman forces. In this regard, Hsun Tzu maintained that the Way (Tao) "is not the Way of Heaven, nor the way of Earth, but the way followed by man" (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1967c:37). Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, on their part, argued that sagehood can be attained through the cultivation of the human mind by man's own effort. Within this perspective, then, man is not viewed as the product of some ultrahuman craftsman, nor is he considered simply a passive organism to be conditioned, manipulated, or "modified" by other men. Man is a force of Nature.

The thesis that man occupies the central position in the scheme of things in Chinese thought has been expressed in many ways at different times in Chinese history, and it still plays an important part in contemporary Chinese culture. Writing in 1949, Mao Tse-tung noted that "Of all things in the world, people are the most precious" (Mao Tse-tung, 1969 (1949) :454). He then argued that as long as there are people, every kind of "miracle" can be performed. This thesis that man is an active being rather than a passive organism is further developed in the idea of the revolutionary will of mass man. In this connection it is important to note that there can be no self-realization for man in isolation from his fellow men. For any concrete human being to think of himself as an individual abstracted from mankind as a whole is a contradiction of terms in this context. In other words, man is central and yet he is emphatically not an isolated, free-floating, ego-centric, profit-motivated, commercialized organism. Rather, he is a social person who develops himself by integrating his own inner freedom and his social responsibilities. In the following sections we shall illustrate the importance of the human individual in Chinese thought, as well as in various aspects of Chinese life.

## I. The Individual in Chinese Social Thought and Practice

In the context of Chinese humanism, the human individual forms one body with Heaven and Earth. Man's nature or humanity is conceptualized as being identical with life itself. If, we recall, the defining characteristic of Tao is its capability for creation and production, man, too, is viewed as creative in his fundamental characteristic. Thus, a Ming dynasty (1368-1643) scholar, Chen Hsien-chang (1428-1500), could speak of the idea that man's physical self and his ethical mind are at the center of the creative process. Chen Hsien-chang expressed this idea rather eloquently:

Standing between Heaven and Earth,  
What dignity this body of mine possesses.

Who says an individual is trivial?  
He can shake Heaven and Earth (cited in  
Jen Yu-wen, 1970:83).

He went on to say that though the body of man is small, it is nevertheless bound up with ethical principles. The vision of man standing at the center of creation is shared by all sorts of Chinese thinkers, past and present. To be a sage, a decent human being, or an enlightened revolutionary man, is to be "the master of creation."

It is interesting to note that in spite of the humanistic conception of the importance of man in Chinese thought, the question of whether or not the concept of 'individualism' has been "adequately" developed in Chinese social philosophy still comes up at times. It is true that the Chinese term for 'individualism,' ko-jen chu-i, is a term of recent period,

but it must be pointed out that the problem of the "individual"--his relation to the collectivity, his role in society, what is due him as a human being, his rights in occupying such and such social positions, his duties, and obligations as a member of society--has been the subject of as much thought and deliberation in China as in other civilizations (see de Bary, 1970:145-146).

During the first part of the present century, when China was reflecting on the impact of imperialism and contemplating a reasonable way to respond to it through a series of self-examinations, 'individualism,'--the lack of it or the excess of it--was considered one of the major problems. Thus, de Bary (1970:145) recalls that reformers in the early decades of the twentieth century China advocated "individualism" in opposition to traditional authority in both thought and social life, indicating that there was a lack of 'individualism' in Chinese thought and practice. On the other hand, others have argued that the excess of 'individualism' was one of China's major problems (see Chan Wing-tsit, 1967a:25-26). Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), one of the most important leaders of the Chinese revolution of 1911<sup>1</sup>, while organizing the Chinese people, complained that the inability of the Chinese to achieve solidarity was mainly because of an excess of "individualism." The Chinese people, Sun Yat-sen complained, were like "a heap of loose sand."

In this regard it is worth noting that in Chinese thought and social practice, while the human individual

occupies a central place, his importance is not measured by his ability to place his private wants ahead of the needs of his fellow men or society. The importance of man is not expressed in terms of man against society, but rather in terms of man in society. Thus, society is conceptualized as more than a set of voluntarily entered exchange relations among isolated and self-seeking individuals. As Chang Wing-tsit has pointed out, "While the individual is fully considered as important, his importance is not to overshadow that of society" (Chan Wing-tsit, 1967a:26). Or, expressed otherwise, within the yin-yang perspective, a balance between the human individual and his society has to be maintained. The Chinese emphasis on the interplay of the individual and society is anchored in a specific image of man.

#### A. The Nature of Man

As in the case with other cultural perspectives, the Chinese outlook on the relation of the individual human being to society is based on a conception of the nature of man. In this connection, the Chinese are not uniformly optimistic about human nature. At the same time, any such concept as that of "original sin" is conspicuously absent in Chinese thought, although some schools are tinged with pessimism. Human nature is on the whole seen as both "good" and "bad": man is born with a set of desires, passions, capacities, and potentials which are to be developed in some directions, and in other respects are to be checked



and reoriented by means of social, organizational and cultural processes. In all events, man is viewed as capable of continually developing and improving himself--indeed, of perfecting himself.

The question of whether man's nature is good or bad has been "one of the most controversial problems in Chinese philosophy" (see Fung Yu-lan, 1970:60). As mentioned earlier (see Chapter Two), Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) holds that human nature is innately good, whereas Hsun Tzu (born c. 298 B.C.) and the Legalists believe that man's nature is inclined toward waywardness and evil. It is important to note, however, that both Mencius and Hsun Tzu agree on the final perfectibility of man. For Mencius, the goodness of man is evident in man's possession of the faculties of sympathy and empathy, which allow man to develop such 'virtues' as jen or 'human-heartedness,' yi or 'righteousness' within the context of moral relevance, li or rules of 'propriety,' and chih or knowledge and moral wisdom. It is against this background that Mencius argues that men always and everywhere possess the beginnings of all the "basic virtues" (Book of Mencius, 2a,2c).

On the other hand, Hsun Tzu believes that man comes into the world without a set of ready-made virtues or ethical standards. He holds, in fact, that man is born with a complement of passions and desires, such as love, hate, envy and anger. If these passions and desires are given full play, chaos, confusion and violence are likely to be the result. In these sense, Hsun Tzu argues that man's natural inclinations are "bad." This, however, does not

mean that man is therefore destined to live an evil life in a sick society, for in spite of his dangerous propensities he is capable of engaging in what Hsun Tzu has characterized as 'conscious activity' (wei), and hence can rectify his course of action and develop the positive aspects of his nature. It is in this context that Hsun Tzu made his famous statement that "human nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity" (Hsun Tzu, 1969:157).

Thus, although it is "man's emotional nature to love profit and desire gain," he is, nevertheless, capable of gathering together his thoughts and ideas, and experimenting with various forms of conscious activity; in this way he can produce a set of rational rules and conventions (li) which can direct his energies and powerful emotions toward constructive purposes. "Conscious activity" is a simple, universal human faculty which allows man to become "good" in the sense of becoming an active moral agent. No external validation of man's moral potential is therefore needed. Jen and li, and the rest of Mencius' "basic virtues," are viewed as the end result of man's conscious activity. In this sense, then, the human individual is seen in Chinese philosophy as a morally creative and autonomous being.

The struggle between the idealism of Mencius and the realism of Hsun Tzu is a conflict between what are essentially two complementary views. On the one hand, Mencius' position is that the development of man's humanity is mainly a process of inner self-cultivation, because by this means man can gain access to a realm of innate knowledge.

On the other hand, the position of Hsun Tzu and the Legalists is that, although man's nature is originally bad, he is capable of perfecting himself by consciously exercising his intellectual faculty to transform himself and the world. In the course of engaging in conscious activity, man rectifies himself, develops himself, and actualizes himself (see Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:323-346). Thus, it has been argued that self-development involves a dialectical interplay of the inner standard of conscience and the outer criterion of social rules.

It must be pointed out at this point that the Chinese image of man is linked to the historically significant though controversial concept of jen or human-heartedness. Jen is a typically Chinese conceptualization of man's nature in reference to the linkages between man and man, between man and society, and between man and nature.

The idea that man is essentially capable of extending himself and reaching out toward others has been accepted by various Chinese schools of thought, which have argued that the capability to sympathize and to empathize was developed in promordial man. This of course refers to man's capacity for entering into the perspective of an other<sup>2</sup>. A dimension of jen, then, is man's capacity to act as though he can assume the perspective of an other, and then reflect on his own action accordingly. In light of this understanding, it is worth noting that jen seems to stress the subjective feelings and attitudes of the human individual, yet it can be understood only in the context of man-and-man, of

intersubjective, interpersonal feelings and attitudes. Thus jen is "man in society." This phrase refers not merely to the observable situation that man lives in groups (society), but to the notion that man cannot hope to actualize himself by isolating himself by isolating himself physically and spiritually from the human world.

The Chinese character for jen consists of the characters for "man" and for "two." Thus, as Tu Wei-ming (1973: 188) has pointed out, it signifies the primordial form of "human-relatedness." Man is linked to other men because human relations necessarily arise from and are maintained by the principle of mutuality, or shu. It is through practice of this principle of mutuality and reciprocity that the individual human being's egotism and selfishness are generally reduced; hence it becomes easier for him to identify with the universe as a whole. Thus, "as the man of jen desires to establish his own character, he seeks at the same time to establish the character of others" (Analects, 6:28). And as Fung Yu-lan puts it:

While perfecting oneself, one must also see that others are likewise perfected. One cannot perfect oneself while disregarding the perfection of others. The reason is that one can develop one's nature to the utmost only through human relationships, that is, within the sphere of society (Fung Yu-lan, 1960:176-177).

The concept of jen is thus further characterized by evoking the idea of 'sociality,' or, to put it differently, 'sociality' is viewed as an integral part of man's self-

realization. In this context, it is crucial to note that the spirit of co-humanity or mutuality in human relations is expressed through a set of concrete social relationships which are articulated in specific forms by the traditional rules of conduct and conventional rites, or li. In other words, jen is manifested in li. It is in this sense that li is a "tool" of man which regulates the satisfaction of man's desires by taking into account the needs and desires of others; hence, li is the fulfillment of impulse as well as its rational expression.

It is in this light that the social implications and consequences of myth-making come into view. Since li is that body of mores, rules and conventions that harmonizes the actions of the members of society, it is conceivable that it could be used intentionally (or perhaps un-intentionally) by the ruling classes to justify their privileged position, and to make those less powerful accept their inferior position, and life changes, thereby preserving a non-disruptive and non-reflective social equilibrium--the status quo. Thus, Lao Tzu speaks of what happens when jen is used to mystify or confuse the people, resulting in the emergence of hypocrisy:

On the decline of the great Tao,  
 the doctrines of jen and yi arose.  
 When knowledge and cleverness appeared,  
 there emerged great hypocrisy.<sup>3</sup>  
 When the six family relationships<sup>3</sup>  
 were not in harmony,  
 there was the advocacy of filial piety and  
 deep love for children.  
 When a country fell into chaos and misrule,  
 there was praise of "loyal official" (Tao-te Ching: 18).

Just as Hsun Tzu and the Legalists had reacted to the Confucian idea of innate goodness of man, so the Taoists had responded to what they considered a danger of making such Confucian virtues as jen and yi superficial morality and instruments of manipulative control.

We may thus say that in Chinese social thought man is considered potentially an active being who is capable of engaging in conscious activity and hence capable of continually developing and improving himself as well as of extending himself and reaching out toward other human beings, but there is also a recognition that man's creativity, sensitivity and reflectivity can be held back because of some reified social forces. In other words, in spite of man's capacity to achieve what Chuang Tzu described as 'sageliness within and kingliness without' (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969: 208-219), some types of economic and social arrangement can become serious obstacles to his progress. It is important to understand, however, that it is the struggle--the contradiction, the dialectic, the creative interplay between the obstacles and the active efforts of the human individual to change unnecessarily repressive social institutions and practices--that could make man transform himself (a point to which we will return later in this chapter.)

In this context, we may argue that the emergence of the Chinese brand of "individualism" could be linked to the assumption that there exists a kind of creative tension between the human individual and the collectivity, a kind of delicate balance of freedom and responsibility, a kind of

imaginative interplay between private and public spheres. The human individual struggles with, not against society. We now turn to the Chinese conception of the organic unity of self and society.

B. Chinese Humanism and the Individual: The Dialectic of Man and Society

We may point out that, in a fundamental sense, the men-centered Chinese thought can be traced back to social thought and practice before the "Hundred Schools" period, that is, before the times of Lao Tzu, Confucius and Hsun Tzu. An early Chinese expression of the status of the human individual can be found in the legend of the Three Sovereign Groups.<sup>4</sup> In this legend, man is so important that he joins Heaven and Earth to form a cosmic triad. This theme was later developed by Hsun Tzu (see Chapter Two) into a physical-naturalistic conceptual scheme. Hsun Tzu, we recall, argued for a rational understanding of Heaven and Earth (Nature) so that man becomes an active partner of the triad. Man thus emerged very early in Chinese thought as of supreme importance. In this connection, Mei Yi-pao (Y.P. Mei) has pointed out that "it is doubtful whether any other major world-civilization has laid emphasis to a comparable degree on the cosmic importance of man" (Mei Yi-pao, 1967:324).

It was against this background that social thinkers of the Hundred Schools period developed their philosophies of man. Confucius himself was one of the important thinkers of this period. In his thought, Confucius was concerned with

the problem of the human individual. We recall, for example, that one of the major ideas of Confucianism is jen, and since jen is to love and respect all men (Analects, 12:22), the importance of man is thus emphasized. For Confucius and his followers, "jen is man" (Book of Mencius, 7b.16). Or, to put it more accurately, at birth every human being has the "beginning of jen," a "seed of humanity."

...when man suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child's parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends... from such a case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man...the feeling of commiseration is the beginning of jen (Book of Mencius, 2a.6).

Beginning with the assumption that jen is the characteristic shared by all men, the Confucians move on to say that men are naturally equal. Furthermore, the Confucians maintain that every human being has in him the capacity to become a sage. The native dignity and integrity of the human individual is thus recognized. It must be pointed out, however, that to say that sagehood is open to all does not necessarily mean that every man is a sage. What is implied is that human beings, without innate defects, are perfectible through education and self-cultivation. In other words, while the seed of jen is inborn in all human beings, its blossoming depends on proper cultivation. Likewise, while each and every human individual is born with the capacity to become a sage, its actualization depends upon proper self-cultivation.<sup>5</sup> The idea of perfectibility is



then related to the process of self-cultivation, which, in turn, depends upon proper social, economic and educational environments. Self-cultivation depends as well on the human individual's awareness of and sensitivity to the development of other human individuals.

It is in this sense that it has been argued that man cannot view himself as an island apart. At the same time, society cannot be viewed as an aggregate formed by disparate atomistic units. Instead, man and society are viewed as mutually dependent. As Mei Yi-pao (1967:326) puts it, the relation of the individual and society is in terms of "a continuing permeation of the quality of the character of the individual throughout the ever-broadening circles of society." We read in the Ta Hsueh (The Great Learning):

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world could first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things.

From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation. There is never a case when the root is in disorder and yet the branches are in order (the Ta Hsueh in Chang Wing-tsit, 1969: 86-87).

Thus the human individual is obligated to develop and perfect himself for the well-being of society. The well-being of society in turn is a positive condition for self-cultivation. It must be mentioned in this context that an important dimension of Chinese social thought is the emphasis on responsibilities and obligations rather than rights and prerogatives of the individual in relation to the collectivity. In a fundamental sense Chinese social thought accepts the idea that man is essentially capable of extending himself and reaching out toward others; therefore, social responsibilities and social obligations are manifestations of the spirit of co-humanity. We see, in this context, both the conviction of the inviolable worth of the human individual and the basic belief that it is in the fulfillment of social responsibilities and obligations that the human individual realizes his potentialities. Mencius, Hsun Tzu and Chuang Tzu, we recall, were in agreement that man is capable of achieving "sageliness within and kingliness without."

Since this conception of man and society explicitly recognizes the basic worth and dignity of man and emphasizes self-cultivation as a means of self-realization, it tends to encourage the human individual to develop an inner frame of reference, which could give him an inner sense of confidence and serenity. According to the Confucians, the importance of having an inner reference is to encourage the human individual to stand firm and not to be easily affected by the fortunes of the day. Thus, to achieve a sense of confidence and serenity is a positive indication of self-development.

In the words of Confucius:

The wise are free from perplexities;  
the virtuous from anxiety; and the courageous from fear (Analects, 9:28).

Or, again in the Analects we read that "although the commander of the armed forces (san chun or three armies) can be captured, the will of a common man cannot be destroyed" (9:25). It must be pointed out, however, that the Confucians have argued that it is through active participation in the social process, through human relationships that the human individual develops his inner frame of reference. Thus, in social practice, the individual is considered as a member of the collectivity rather than as an isolated, unattached, atomized individual. More specifically, in traditional China, the individual was known as a member of a family; he was a father, a husband, a wife, a mother, a sister. And, as mentioned earlier, the cultivated person is prepared to regulate the family, to govern the state, and to help bring order to the world. He is not merely "to do his own thing."

In the context of Chinese social thought, then, a sage cannot be a selfish or egotistic individual. The basis of self-cultivation is reciprocity or shu. A decent human being (chun-tzu), we recall, is concerned with his responsibilities to others, with his duties to the collectivity and humanity. He is by no means a "rugged individualist," so that the Chinese conception of individualism is dissimilar to the formulation of some other cultural group. De Bary (1970:147) puts it rather neatly:

Here we face the paradox that, in order to establish and secure its own claim, such an individualism must be "social."..... (the individual) was to make sacrifices more to the group than he got in return, and there is a real question whether this kind of "individualism" could ever be equated with the types of individualism known in the West (Italics added).<sup>6</sup>

At any rate, in the context of Chinese social thought and practice, a self-seeking person who is over-concerned with his own personal comfort and becoming rich, rather than concerned with the well-being of the collectivity, society, and the world (tien-hsin) is a person who has failed to achieve sageliness within and kingliness without. Or, phrased a different way, a self-seeking person is a stranger to his fellow men; he is a man who has lost the spirit of co-humanity, of human-heartedness.

We can say now that in Chinese social thought and practice, man lives in a subtle balance with his surroundings. To be a good man means that one has to harmonize desire and reason, emotion and intelligence. It also requires to integrate one's freedom with one's social obligations, and one's integrity and that of others. The maintenance of this balance is a delicate task. We have already mentioned the tendency of Chuang Tzu and some other Taoists to take a subjectively idealistic position and to concentrate on the issues of freeing the human individual from the fetters and burdens of life (see Chapter Two). The Legalists, on the other hand, were more inclined to subscribe to the idea of supremacy of the state over the individual. The Confucians, in turn, liked to think that their position is midway between

the two, but this claim has been challenged. De Bary, for example, has pointed out that some critics "have complained that "Confucianism made a bad bargain for the individual" (De Bary, 1970:147).

It is, however, the interplay of these three tendencies, rather than any of these in isolation, that the dynamics of the Chinese perspective can be appreciated. Thus, in the Chinese formulation, there is always some tension between the individual and the group, between self and society, and between inner freedom and social responsibilities. In this connection, Chan Wing-tsit (1967a:26) has maintained that achieving a delicate balance of self and society is, in essence, "the goal of moral discipline," and is also the expression of the spirit of jen. It is in this sense that the Chinese insist that a good man must also be a good member of society. At the same time, the Chinese maintain that in stressing the importance of achieving a balance of the individual and the group, both the interests of the individual and those of the group are recognized.

In social practice, the traditional Chinese family, as an institution, was to mediate the individual and the larger group. Chan Wing-tsit has suggested that it is in the family that the individual is trained in becoming sensitive to his fellow men, and in "the adjustments he will have to make throughout life as between himself and other man" (Chan Wing-tsit, 1967a:26). Along the same line, Mei Yi-pao points out that the family situation provides "the first and most favorable opportunity" for the exercise and

development of human-heartedness (jen). The family situation is thus "a sort of nursery for nurturing the seed of jen" (Mei-Yi-pao, 1967:331). Thus, to achieve balance between self and society, to maintain the human individual's freedom and inner integrity while fulfilling his social obligations and responsibilities, entails a conscious struggle, a kind of creative interplay both inside the individual and between him and the group.

Historically, Chinese social thinkers as well as men in the streets in China have shown, from time to time, their sensitivity and awareness of a possible conflict of the demands of society on the individual to discharge his familial and societal obligations on the one hand, and to achieve and maintain individual freedom and intellectual integrity on the other. The development of Taoism and Legalism, and, at a later stage, Neo-Confucianism are cases in point.

In this connection, it may be interesting to discuss the case of Li Chih (1527-1602) a Ming dynasty (1368-1643) social thinker. Li Chih was sensitive to a fundamental conflict between his own individuality and what he was required to do in order to fulfill his social responsibilities and to succeed in a rigid social world. In the process he became suspicious of the scholar-officials of his time so that he was involved in a series of struggles against the Ming establishment, against the scholar-bureaucrats who, according to Li Chih, were hypocrites, because they were corrupted by wealth and rank while preaching the Confucian

virtues of jen and yi.

In China's history, Li Chih has been acclaimed by some as the most outstanding iconoclast, and condemned by others as the greatest heretic. In any case, Li Chih is, as de Bary has pointed out, "one of the most brilliant and complex figures in Chinese thought and literature" (de Bary, 1970: 188). In the first place, Li Chih rejects the Neo-Confucian position that "We must preserve Heaven's li (principle) and eliminate man's desires" (chun Tien-li; chi jen-yu). To eliminate man's desires is to make him passive and insignificant. This is something Li Chih could not accept. Li Chih also takes Chu Hsi (1130-1200) et al<sup>7</sup> to task for evoking the Confucian idea of the three bonds" (san kang) and "five invariables" (wu chang) to characterize the essence of li (principle).

The idea of kang-chang was first introduced by a Han dynasty Confucian, Tung Chung-shu (c. 179-104 B.C.), to account for the hierarchical social order of his time. The term kang literally means a major cord in a net to which all the other strings of the net are attached. In Tung Chung-shu's formulation, the three bonds are the relationships between sovereign and subject, father and son, and husband and wife. These three human relationships are formulated in terms of superordination and subordination so that, for example, the sovereign is the kang of his subject.

In other words, in Tung Chung-shu's formulation, the sovereign is the master of his subject, the husband is the master of his wife, and the father is the master of his son.

Aside from the three kang, according to the Confucians, there exist also the five constant virtues (wu chang), namely, jen, yi, li (rules of proper conduct), chih (wisdom), and hsin (good faith). The three kang are the ethics of society while the five chang are the virtues of the individual human being (See Fung Yu-lan, 1960:191-203).

It is from this standpoint that Chu Hsi develops his thesis that the "three kang and five chang" are the "li of Heaven." Also, Chu Hsi is explicit in asserting the prior existence of the li of kang-chang. More specifically, he argues that "before there exist any sovereign and subject, there is the li of the relationship between sovereign and subject. Before there exist any father and son, there is the li of the relationship between father and son" (cited in Fung Yu-lan, 1960:199). This formulation is unacceptable to Li Chih. For Li Chih, social ethics and morality are not based on the Heavenly principle of "bonds and invariables" as Chu Hsi and the School of Principle would like us to believe. Rather, social ethics and morality must be grounded on the everyday life of the people (pai-hsing jih-yung)<sup>8</sup>. Or, in Li Chih's own words, the human relations entails such matters as "to eat food and to wear clothing" (in Yan Ping, 1974:137). Furthermore, Li Chih attacks the moralistic pretensions of those scholar-bureaucrats who never stop preaching the Confucian Way but are determined to attain high office and to become rich. To Li Chih, outwardly these scholar-officials are sages but inwardly they are as selfish as merchants.



Li Chih, however, pushes himself into a position that he finally asserts that "man is essentially a selfish being," and that "without selfishness there is no mind (hsin)" (Jo wu ssu, chih wu hsin) (in Yan Ping, 1974:137). And so, as Yang Jung-kuo (1973:278) points out, selfishness now becomes the generalized nature of man.

Li Chih began by criticizing the tendency of Confucian scholar-officials to subscribe to the mystified principle of Heaven, thereby doing damage to the human individual's freedom as well as his inner dignity and integrity; in the process, he seemed to have made man a profit-motivated, egotistic, self-seeking organism. Thus to those contemporary Chinese scholars who are generally sympathetic to Li Chih, his protest against the oppressive social institutions and social practices of the time is considered a positive contribution to the historical development of an anti-feudal (fan feng-chien) awareness, but Li Chih's thesis that "Man is necessarily selfish" is unacceptable to them (See, for example, Shen Ning, 1974:109-110; Yan Ping, 1974:137-142; Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:275-281; Yin Ming et al, 1975:205-214).

The reaction of the contemporary Chinese scholars to Li Chih's position is consistent with the ideal-typical Chinese social thought which consistently argues that the dignity of man must be recognized and maintained, but it can be maintained only when man is unselfish. A decent human being (chun-tzu) cannot refuse to reconcile his own self-respect with respect for other human beings. Or, expressed otherwise, a person cannot "rationally" exploit

and oppress other human beings and then rationalizes his action by evoking the notion of "rugged individualism." In traditional Chinese formulation, men are expected to be public-minded, not selfish egocentrists. Emperors who were not ready to sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of the people were not considered true emperors. It is in this ideal sense that Emperor Yao (a legendary sage-emperor) named Shun his successor and not his own son.

The idea of integrating private and public interests still is an important aspect in contemporary Chinese conceptualization. Mao Tse-tung, for example has argued that since not all natural human desires coincide with the aims of society, the dialectical relations between the human individual and his society are therefore crucial. Mao Tse-tung's position reminds us of Hsun Tzu's argument that though man's nature is originally bad, he is capable of perfecting himself by consciously exercising his intellectual faculty to transform himself and the world (See Chapter Two). Mao Tse-tung, in turn, maintains that it is in the struggle between man and society, between man and the external world, that man realizes himself to the full. For Mao Tse-tung, revolutionary activity is a kind of conscious activity which not only liberates but in fact promotes the development of man's forces of production:

The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country. (Mao Tse-tung, in Chen, 1970:126).

Again,

Revolution is the emancipation of productive force; it promotes the development of productive force (cited in Chen, 1970:143)

We have already seen that man occupies a central position in Chinese thought, but within the context of orthodox Confucianism, the system that Li Chih so bitterly fought, self-cultivation entailed an over-emphasis on taming, domesticating, and bringing man into accord with the environment. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, is more sympathetic to Hsun Tzu's position that man is capable of forming a "triad" with Heaven and Earth, and hence an active partner of Nature. In other words, man is capable of "reshaping the objective world." Mao Tse-tung, too, is obviously sympathetic to Li Chih's attack on the Ming scholar-official class, for he speaks of:

Wherever there is repression of the individual, wherever there are acts contrary to the nature of the individual, there can be no greater crime. That is why our country's three bonds (san kang) must go..... (in Schram, 1974:27).

Thus, the importance of the individual is stressed, and the three bonds must go. The integrity of the individual is maintained, however, by respecting the integrity of other individuals, and by developing an awareness of man's capability to participate actively in the creative process of Nature. Therefore, to combat selfishness was a conscious effort in the proletarian Cultural Revolution. Indeed, it is argued that when the capability of the single individual is over-

stressed--especially when the self is taken out of the context of human collectivity--there is danger that the vast potentialities of the masses will be dissipated or simply disregarded. To stand alone is to stand apart. In this context, then, 'individualism' or the preservation of personal integrity and freedom cannot be grounded in a kind of selfishness which puts personal interests foremost and the interests of the masses in the second place (see Mao Tse-tung, 1954:74-76).

Moreover, in Mao Tse-tung's formulation, man and nature are inseparable. Similar to Hsun Tzu's conceptualization, Mao Tse-tung maintains that the relation between man and nature is a dialectical one:

Although we are determined by nature, we are also a part of nature. Hence, if nature has the power to determine us, we also have the power to determine nature; although our power is slight, one could not say that it is without influence on nature (Mao Tse-tung in Schram, 1974:26).

In his concluding speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, Mao Tse-tung told of an ancient Chinese fable about Yu Kung (Mr. Foolish) who dared to challenge nature by trying to remove two mountains because they obstructed the views from his doorway. With great determination, Yu Kung and his sons launched a long term project of digging away at the slopes of the mountains. Yu Kung argues that "When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity." Thus, Yu Kung and

his sons went on digging everyday, unshaken in conviction. God was so moved that he sent two angels to move the mountains for Yu Kung. Urging the Chinese people to dig up two modern mountains--imperialism and feudalism--Mao Tse-tung states:

We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together...why can't these two mountains be cleared away? (Mao Tse-tung, 1971 (1945): 321).

Thus seen, man is an active force of nature. As an active partner of Heaven and Earth, man moves through history by taking struggle for granted. In the course of struggle, man unites nature and merges with society. It is in this sense that Mao Tse-tung maintains that in the struggle to reshape the outer world, the proletarian and revolutionary people at the same time reshape their own subjective world (Mao Tse-tung in Chen, 1970:151). In this conceptualization, the importance of the interplay of man and nature and of man and the collectivity is recognized. As an active partner of Heaven and Earth, man has the capacity to understand the external world, and he might also be able to change it. Thus self-cultivation is not a process of taming and domesticating one's own self in order to adjust to the environment, social and physical. Instead, it is a process whereby man unfetters his nature-given capacities and thereby transforms the external world. Or, expressed otherwise, it is a process by which man becomes the master of creation.

To summarize, man in Chinese social thought is the center of things. He stands between Heaven and Earth: his physical self and his ethical mind are at the center of the creative process. This, however, does not mean that man is an aggressively self-seeking, profit-motivated, commercialized individual. Rather, a decent human being is one who takes the well-being of other human beings into account and respects the integrity and dignity of other individuals.

It might be mentioned that in politics and legal philosophy as well as in religion and ethics, the human individual is more important than the abstract rule in Chinese thought. In the following sections we shall discuss the position of the human individual in the realms of ethics and politics.

## II. The Individual in Chinese Religion and Ethics

Since there has been a persistent emphasis upon the cosmic importance of man in Chinese thought, it may be interesting to examine closer the status of the human individual in Chinese religion and ethics. If we are to characterize and discuss 'religion' in China, even if only briefly, it is crucial that we recall that the Chinese do not regard the cosmos and man as the products of a Creator external to them. Having restated this, we may add that Confucius had argued rather forcefully that it might be wise for men to learn more about life than to speculate about death (Analects, 11:2). Furthermore, Confucius once advised his pupils to honor spiritual beings (kuei and shen)

but at the same time "keep them at a distance" (Analects, 11:20). It is against this general background that we may appreciate "religious" matters in Chinese thought and practice.

Following Chan Wing-tsit (1967b:286-306), we may say that the goal of Chinese religious beliefs and practices involves the idea of the survival of the individual and the actualization of his nature. The so-called "ancestor cult," for example, is an indication of a belief in the survival of the spirits of ancestors. Records found in the oracle bones dating back to the Shang dynasty (1751-1112 B.C.) contain references to sacrifices to ancestors with offerings of food and other items such as daily utensils. These records have been interpreted as indications of a belief in survival after death (See Chan Wing-tsit, 1967b:287).

This idea of the survival of the individual is essentially the classical problem of "immortality." Thus, the Taoist magicians wanted immortality on earth so that they practiced alchemy and delved into breathing, meditation and concentration, and even sex techniques. The Buddhists<sup>9</sup>, especially members of the Pure Land school (Cheng-tu Chung), on the other hand, believed in eternal life in paradise. And we have already mentioned the belief of the ancestor cultists in the survival of the spirits of ancestors. Nevertheless, if one may speak of Chinese religious thought and not of the beliefs of the particular religious groups in China, one may suggest that immortality or the survival of the individual refers mainly to 'social immortality,' or

'immortality of influence.'<sup>10</sup> We may mention here that the early Chinese attitude (c. 549 B.C.) toward this form of immortality was recorded in the Tso Chuan (Tso's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals) in the context of explaining what the ancient saying "Dead but suffered no decay" meant:

I have heard that the highest meaning of it is when there is established an example of virtue. The second, when there is established an example of successful service. And the third, when there is established an example of wise speech. When these examples are not forgotten with length of time, this is what is meant by the saying "They do not decay" (The Twenty-fourth Year of Duke of Hsiang).

Immortality, then, is achieved in virtue, in public service, and in teaching. It is in this sense that Hu Shih (1891-1962) spoke of "Worth, work, and word" as the "Three-W theory of immortality" in Chinese thought (Hu Shih, 1945-1946:40-41). Another way of expressing this Chinese attitude toward immortality is their hope of "leaving a long-lasting fragrance" (liu fang chien ku) when they die. It is in this context that men like Lao Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Confucius are still considered to be "living," for they are recognized as living forces.

Thus viewed, immortality is not by means of a disembodied soul, nor is it in terms of everlasting life on earth physically. Instead, it involves the idea of full realization of one's nature. Or, expressed otherwise, immortality refers to the perfection of the capacities of human nature.



In the Book of Mencius, we read "He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind and to nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven" (7a.1). Preserving one's nature, "leaving a long-lasting fragrance," so as to "suffer no decay" is the sacred duty of man, "the way to serve Heaven." And it is a difficult task, for "only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature" (The Doctrine of the Mean, XXII).

Thus, the realization of one's moral life depends on making one's will sincere. When one's nature is developed, one can also assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth. Therefore, in the formulation of Chu Hsi and the Cheng brothers--Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Chang I (1033-1107)--to fulfill one's destiny, to investigate the principle (li), and to develop one's nature are inter-related. And, in the twentieth century, Hsiung Shih-li (b. 1885) has expressed this trend of thought rather well:

One's self-nature is true and real. There is no need to search for heavenly Lord outside oneself. One can develop one's own nature to the fullest extent. One need not desire nirvana (cited in Chan Wing-tsit, 1967b:292).

At this point, we may point out that there has never been a central religious authority in China to dictate to conscience, to control and regulate the beliefs, and to manipulate the believers. The Taoist "priests" (or the Buddhist monk), as Chan Wing-tsit has pointed out, "was in no sense an agent of the worshipper before the gods or

a link between them" (Chan Wing-tsit, 1967b:287). The individual's approach to the gods (shen) are direct and personal.

At any rate, self-perfection involves, among other things, turning inward to oneself so that one may cultivate and develop one's potential or nature. Within the context of Chinese ethics, the human individual is responsible to himself for taking care of his own will, that is, for making his will sincere (See The great Learning, VI). He is also obligated to himself for carrying out self-inspection or self-examination (tsu sheng). Self-inspection, as Hsieh Yu-wei (1967:315) has remarked, is the inspections of actions that one has done, while making one's will sincere is inspection before action, for it is concerned with one's intention rather than one's conduct.

The thesis of self-inspection as a duty to oneself finds its modern expression in the contemporary Chinese emphasis on self-criticism. Mao Tse-tung, for example, maintains that self-criticism is a basic method by which the human individual cultivates, develops, and transforms himself as well as the collectivity. Self-criticism is not only an effective instrument of self-education (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:90) but also the method by which contradiction within the Party is resolved (Mao Tse-tung, 1968:38). Moreover, it is through criticism and self-criticism that the old unity yields to a new unity.

If self-criticism is an effective technique by which the human individual develops himself, he should have no

fear of meeting other individuals and accepting their criticisms and suggestions. Reporting to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, Mao Tse-tung spoke of the importance of criticism and self-criticism:

Conscientious practice of self-criticism is still another hallmark distinguishing our Party from all other political parties .....To check regularly our work, to fear neither criticism nor self-criticism, and to apply such good popular Chinese maxim as "Say all you know and say it without reserve," "Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words" and "Correct mistakes if you have committed them and guard against them if you have not"--this is the only effective way to prevent all kinds of political dust and germs from contaminating the minds of our comrades and the body of our Party (Mao Tse-tung (1945) 1967:266-267).

Thus, through criticism and self-criticism man may transform himself, and by undertaking the task of struggle-criticism-transformation sociocultural change can be seriously carried out. But the task of carrying out sociocultural change is proceeded from the interests of the masses and not from the interests of a few individuals. To divorce oneself from the people, to shy away from one's responsibility to the masses, and to become a self-seeking egotist is being selfish. Pointing out that "countless revolutionary martyrs have laid down their lives in the interests of the people," Mao Tse-tung (1967:267) asks: "Can there be any personal interest, then, that we would not sacrifice or any error that we would not discard?"

This brings us to another point, namely, the status of

the human individual in regard to other individuals in Chinese ethics. We may recall that in Chinese ethics, the individual's duties to himself center on self-inspection and making his will sincere. On the other hand, the individual's moral duties to others is based on the idea of self-respect of man as man (see Hsieh Yu-wei, 1967:315-316). Put differently, Chinese ethics require the human individual to pay respect to other human individuals. This of course implies the idea of jen, the spirit of co-humanity. We may now say that if one desires to be respected by others, one is required, ethically, to respect others. In this connection we may recall that Confucian ethics prescribe "loyalty" (chung) and "reciprocity" (shu) as basic principles for the relations between man and man. 'Loyalty' or chung in this context, implies faithfulness to oneself and others (see Chapter Two) while 'reciprocity' or shu involves in treating others in the same fashion one treats oneself.

As mentioned earlier, man in Chinese social thought is viewed as having the capacity for extending himself and reaching out to others. His ability to extend himself and to fulfill social responsibilities, however, depends on the development of his own person. Thus in Chinese thought, man is duty-bound to develop himself as well as to regulate the family, to order the state, and to contribute to the development and maintenance of a peaceful world. In Chinese ethics, then, the human individual is a participating member of a group, who accepts social responsibilities and obligations

as a matter of duty, while the group is the context within which the individual may realize his potential. In this sense, the wider society is conceptualized as a community of neighbors and not as a congregation of strangers.

The idea that the individual is a social being has been made even more explicit and put to practice even more seriously in contemporary China. One basic aim of the Cultural Revolution, for example, was to combat selfishness and to encourage a kind of collective immersion. It may be worth mentioning a significant event in 1939 involving Norman Bethune,<sup>11</sup> a Canadian physician. Recognizing Bethune's unselfishness, the Chinese considered him one of the models to be emulated. In the words of Mao Tse-tung:

Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his boundless sense of responsibility in his work and his boundless warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people (Mao Tse-tung (1939) 1971:180).

The deeds and spirit of Bethune are viewed as manifestations of man's inner dignity, moral integrity, and non-artificiality.

We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people (Mao Tse-tung, 1971: 180-181).

But if man is to become unselfish, to extend himself, it is necessary that he first make his will sincere. For Mao Tse-tung, it is "fundamentally impossible to accomplish anything in this world without sincere attitude" (in Compton, 1952:24). When the individual has made his will sincere, he can reach outward in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. To reach outward, that is, to serve the masses well, one must never detach from the masses, because, to say the obvious, it is only by keeping in touch with them that one may know them, understand them. More specifically, Mao Tse-tung argues that all work done for the masses must start from the needs of the masses and not from the desire of any individual, no matter how good his intentions could be. In this regard he speaks of two principles:

One is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making their minds for them (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a:68).

The cultivation of one's personal life is viewed as a continuous process of reaching out toward others, society and humanity. In this way, transformation of self and transformation of the external world are mutually dependent. In this way, too, what the individual can do for his group is important not only to the group but also important to himself. To help create a decent world is to help everyone in the world, including the individual himself, to cultivate

his personal life and to realize his potential. For the single individual, the continuous process of self-development may be interrupted by death, but physiological death does not always mean that the individual ceases to contribute to the betterment of the masses. In other words, one can be "forever thought of and suffered no decay" (yung chui pu hsiu)<sup>12</sup> if one's words and deeds continue to inspire the living. Or, as Mao Tse-tung puts it, "all men must die, but death can vary in its significance" (Mao Tse-tung, 1971:310).

In Chinese religion and ethics, then, the human individual is required to develop his own person by his own effort so that he may realize his nature and continue to be a living force after death. Self-realization, however, is possible only when the human individual is not separated from other human beings or from nature. There is no sharp line to be drawn between the good of the individual and the good of society. With this we turn to the matter of the status of the individual in Chinese political thought and practice as well as legal philosophy.

### III. The Individual in the Political and Legal Tradition of China

Ethics and politics in Chinese thought and practice tend to blend into one so that the moral order and the legal order in China are difficult to separate. This tendency emerged before the Han period (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) and is still an important dimension of contemporary Chinese legal and political philosophy.

Political authority in the Chinese context is a trust conferred by the people, in the name of Heaven<sup>13</sup>, upon the government for the welfare of the people. In the Shu Ching<sup>14</sup> one of the oldest Chinese classics, the following song is recorded:

It was the lesson of our great ancestor:  
The people should be cherished;  
They should not be downtrodden;  
The people are the root of the country;  
And, if the root is firm, the country will  
be tranquil (Songs of the Five Sons).

The famous pronouncement of Mencius that "The people are of supreme importance...then comes the ruler" (Book of Mencius) is another variation on the same theme. We may point out that the thesis of the importance of the common people may be a familiar one, but within this perspective, there are some rather significant implications, so that a good government, for example, is one that rules by 'virtue' and moral examples (the 'kingly way' or wang-tao) and not by punishment or force (the coercive way or 'pa-tao'). Mencius argues that a ruler "who practices human-heartedness (jen) with virtue is a true king (wang)," and a ruler "who uses force to make a pretense at human-heartedness is a despot (pa)" (Book of Mencius 2a.3).

In the context of wang-tao, to govern is to rectify. Confucius thus maintains that if the ruler leads the people by being rectified himself, no one will dare not to be rectified (Analects, 12:17). To phrase the matter a little differently, unless the ruler possesses rectitude, he can



hardly hope to rectify the people. The wang government is, in this context, maintained through moral instruction and education by providing moral examples to help the people cultivate their character and develop fully the human potential. If and when punishment is used, it is used as a subsidiary measure of education. We may recall that as a result of the influence of the Legalists, punishment and morality have been identified with the yin and yang dimensions of the unified process of government (see Chapter Two). In this connection, it may be worth mentioning that Wu Ching-hsiung has pointed out that within the context of Chinese philosophy of penal justice, "The ultimate end of punishment is to bring about the cessation of all punishment" (Wu Ching-hsiung, 1967b:349).

The thesis that the creation of the government is for the well-being of the people implies also that the ruler is expected to be the steward of the common good. He must not represent any specific interest group. Rather, he is morally obligated to ignore his private interest. Lao Tzu has articulated this thesis in the Tao-te Ching:

Only he who is willing to give his body for the sake of the world is fit to be entrusted with the world. Only he who is able to do it with love is worthy to be the steward of the world (Tao-te Ching: XIII).

Confucius, in turn, maintains that to be a prince is difficult. It may be a privilege to be a prince, but it is also a grave responsibility. The difficulty of being princes,

governors, or ministers may be further appreciated if we take into account the historical development of the spirit of Chinese penal justice. For example, the Chinese penal philosophy is grounded in the humanistic thesis that the law is made for man and not man for the law. This implies that a mechanistic application of the law is viewed as unenlightened. In the Shu Ching, for instance, we read an interesting dialogue between Emperor Shun and Minister Kao Yao which, as Wu Ching-hsiung (1967b:349) has said, could be viewed as the early statement of the fundamental principle of criminal justice of China:

The sovereign said, "Kao Yao, owing to your being minister of Crime, hardly one of my ministers or people is found to offend against the government. You are intelligent in the use of...punishment...your aim is the perfection of my government, that through punishment may come to no punishments..."

Kao Yao replied, "...You condescend to your ministers with kind ease; you preside over the multitudes with a generous forbearance...You pardon inadvertent faults, however great, and punish purposed crimes, however small. In case of doubtful crimes, you deal with them lightly; in case of doubtful merit, you prefer the high estimate. Rather than put an innocent person to death, you will run the risk of irregularity and error. This life-loving virtue has penetrated the minds of the people and this is why they do not render themselves liable to punishment by your officers" (The Council of the Great Yu).

We see here that from the earliest classics, the emphasis was placed on the presence of purpose or intention as the essential dimension of a crime, as well as on the idea that it is better to miss the guilty than to kill an innocent person. At any rate, the influence of the earlier

conceptualization of the status of the individual in the Chinese legal system has been significant. The interplay of Legalism and Confucianism in the development of the penal system in China may be better appreciated against this background. We shall return to this subject in later chapters. Here we will only mention that the development of the penal codes in China, to a large extent, involves the twin processes of legalization of morality and of Confucianization of the law. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, there is no sharp line to be drawn between the moral order and the legal order.

In light of this perspective, we may say that to be a model judge in the Chinese context, one has to have what Wu Ching-hsiung (1967b:350) has called "a touch of humanity." Drawing upon the History of the Later Han Dynasty, Wu Ching-hsiung tells a story of a magistrate who, instead of punishing a thief, humored him and eventually "profoundly moved" him so that he became a reformed man. In the story, Chen Shih, the magistrate, discovered a thief had entered his house one evening and hid himself on the top beam. Chen Shih pretended not to notice the thief. In the meantime, Chen Shih began to preach a moral lesson to the members of his family, saying: "Each of you must diligently attend to your duties. You should know that robbers and thieves are not bad by nature. They become such only through the habit of laziness. For example, the gentleman on the top beam<sup>15</sup> is a case in point." On hearing that, the burglar fell down to the ground. While the burglar was still trembling, Chen

Shih spoke to him gently: "judging by your appearance, you are not a bad man. Probably your wrong-doing is due to your poverty; I here give you two pieces of silk to help you start anew." The burglar was so "profoundly moved" that he later became a reformed man (See Wu Ching-hsiung, 1967b:250-251).

An important implication of the above is that men in office have an extremely serious obligation to work for the kind of psychological, economic, political and social situation in which self-cultivation, self-rectification, and self-development can take place. This again is wang-tao (the kingly way) or rule by virtue. This does not mean, however, that wang-tao, as a style of government is without problems. In fact, Chuang Tzu, the Taoist sage, has complained that it can be mystified and hence becomes a powerful tool that the rulers and governors can use to define reality for the people, and therefore to exploit them. As Chuang Tzu observes, the people may think they are loved and are made rich by the king, but "soon they will have to accept something they do not like..." Moreover, Chuang Tzu maintains that,

When justice and benevolence are in the air, a few people are really concerned with the good of others, but the majority are aware that this is a good thing, ripe for exploitation...For them, benevolence and justice are traps to catch birds. Thus benevolence and justice rapidly come to be associated with fraud and hypocrisy (Chuang Tzu in Thomas Merton, 1965:147).

Chuang Tzu's reaction to the way the common people can be manipulated by the sophisticated but hypocritical rulers and governors finds an echo in contemporary Chinese criticism on the mythified "virtue" theory of Confucian governance. Thus, the Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities (1974) argued, in a critical article on Confucius, that when the ruling class in the name of benevolent government, urges the citizen to restrain himself and to return to the rites<sup>16</sup>, the legitimate channels to protest against some unreasonable and oppressive social arrangements are blocked. In other words, a reified wang government becomes a justification of status quo.

Nevertheless, wang-tao in its non-mystified form has been the model of government in China since the Han dynasty, although each particular ruler interpreted and practiced it a little differently. Thus, particular rulers and their administrations were measured in reference to how close they have approximated the ideal wang-tao, or how far they had deviated from it. In our time, Mao Tse-tung has said that the kingly way or wang-tao involves basically taking care of the material needs of the people. The essence of wang-tao thus is "really nothing more than (providing) food and clothing to prevent starvation and exposure" (Mao Tse-tung in Wakeman, 1973:163). To attend to the material needs of the masses of the people is to fulfill the government's responsibility so that the people can cultivate and develop themselves, and the government can claim its legitimacy. The government ultimately needs the mandate from the masses

of the people. Mao Tse-tung's remarks about power are rather significant in this connection:

Our power--who gives it to us? The working class gives it to us and the masses of the laboring people who comprise over ninety percent of the population give it to us. We represent the proletariat and the masses, and have overthrown the enemies of the people. The people therefore support us" (In Chen, 1970:156).

In this context Mao Tse-tung argues that if the ruling party genuinely represents the masses of the people, there should be no barrier between the party and the people, and if there should be any observable barrier between them, it should be taken as a sign that the party is in error, hence, as Wakeman has remarked, "bereft of legitimacy" (Wakeman, 1973:304). Mao Tse-tung maintains that an effective way to prevent political stagnation is to expose party members to mass criticism. He also believes that by removing barriers that separate cadres and masses, collective social enthusiasm will emerge.

In light of this we may now discuss the well-known "mass line" thesis. This is a fundamental principle of contemporary Chinese government. For Mao Tse-tung, the policy process is basically a dialectical one, for he conceptualizes the policy-making as a dynamic interplay or reciprocating communication pattern between leaders and followers. In this formulation, the masses are to play a continuous role in presenting their ideas to the party as well as in implementing policies formulated by the party.

In 1943, Mao Tse-tung wrote the now classic statement of the mass line:

In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses." This means: take the ideas from the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are preserved in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time (Mao Tse-tung, (1943) 1971:290).

The mass line, as Townsend (1974:76) points out, is an expression of "identification with and commitment to the people." Townsend further observes that "the Chinese Communists spent most of the years before coming into power in intimate association with the peasantry". Thus mass exhortations "to eat, live, work, and consult with the masses" are ongoing reminders "not to lose touch with the popular needs that are said to legitimize the revolution" (Townsend, 1974:76).

We may recall that for Mao Tse-tung, wang-tao involves essentially looking after the material needs of the people so that the mass line is a recognition that leadership could not be effective or achieve meaningful results without mass support. We may point out that a dimension of the Cultural Revolution was that some technocratic elite of the

government and the party were seen by Mao Tse-tung as having lost touch with the masses whose interests they were supposed to represent and serve (see Starr, 1973:20-52). Like Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, and Li Chih before him, Mao Tse-tung is highly sensitive to the Chinese scholar-officials, so that the mass line may be viewed as a response to the stereotypical bureaucratic-intellectual elite. Thus by requiring cadres and officials to interact with the masses, Mao Tse-tung hoped that the structure of bureaucracy can be transformed and be more responsive to the opinions and needs of the masses of the people.

Furthermore, the mass line is also relevant to understanding the legal system of contemporary China. In this regard, Victor Li (1971:221-255) has characterized the legal system of China as influenced by an "external model" and an "internal model." The external model requires a formal, codified, and institutionalized system. Thus as would be expected, the external model draws upon available legalistic-rationalistic-formalistic models, Chinese, Roman, Soviet, and others. On the other hand, the internal model, according to Townsend (1974:317), "*derives much more directly from the Confucian tradition amplified by the CCP's<sup>17</sup> mass line*" (italics added).

Essentially, the internal model stresses enculturation, familiarization of societal norms, education, and societal resolution of conflict as the means of rule-enforcement and adjudication (see Li, 1971:221-225; Townsend, 1974:315-325). In short, the legal system of China may be appreciated if we



take into account the dialectic of the external and the internal models. Interestingly, this may remind us of the interplay of Legalism and Confucianism in the earlier period. In any case, there was in the mid-1950's a rather strong external model at work. Townsend, for example, speaks of the appearance of the 1954 Constitution and its supporting documents as well as specific regulations concerning courts and legal procedures as signs of the vitality of the external model during the mid-1950's (Townsend, 1973:317-318). After the Cultural Revolution, however, popular participation in rule-enforcement rather than formal court action has been encouraged. This shows the pre-eminence of the internal model.

We may mention that as a means of involving the masses in rule-enforcement and adjudication, there are mediation committees on the local level. These committees are charged with helping the local population to know about their social responsibilities, and to be prepared for possible conflict as well as to mediate actual disputes. It is worthy of note that members of the mediation committees are not full-time cadres but are local activists. These committees are thus nonbureaucratic and decentralized in character. And, according to Townsend's analysis, members of the committees, in their mission of mediation, "display the Chinese preference for informal, persuasive, and voluntary modes of settlement over formal litigation and adjudication" (Townsend, 1974:324). We may recall that the Chinese penal philosophy stresses the humanistic theme which involves the idea that

the law is made for man and not man for the law.

Underlying our discussion is a fundamental Chinese view which emphasizes the organic unity of man and society, of citizen and government. In this perspective, the government is obligated to look after the needs of the people at large, so that the people can develop themselves. At the same time, the people are morally responsible for their self-development, as well as to help develop their society and bring order and peace to the world. This view involves a desire to integrate state and society. Thus, political society is viewed ideally as an instrument of individual realization. The goal is to achieve an organic unity of rulers and people so as to generate a sense of common purpose. This perspective is grounded in a cosmology which stresses the unity of man and nature. As active partner of nature (Heaven and Earth), man transforms nature and himself simultaneously. This view involves a recognition of the native integrity and dignity of man, as well as a belief in man's perfectibility through self-cultivation. The significance of self-cultivation in Chinese social thought and practice will become clearer as we turn now to a more detailed examination of the process of self-development.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Chung-san), the Revolution of 1911 led to the overthrow of the Ching dynasty (1644-1912) and the establishment of the Republic of China.

<sup>2</sup>It is significant that it is only in the twentieth century that this intuition appeared in western literature by the merit of George Herbert Mead.

<sup>3</sup>Father, son, elder brother, younger brother, husband and wife.

<sup>4</sup>According to the legend of the Three Sovereign Groups, the earliest rulers of China are said to have made up of the Celestial Sovereign Group of twelve brothers, each reigning 18,000 years. The Terrestrial Sovereign Group then succeeded the Celestial Sovereign Group as rulers of China and was, in turn, succeeded by the Human Sovereign Group (See Mei Yi-pao, 1967:323-324).

<sup>5</sup>In this connection, we may say that in the context of Confucianism, men are equal at birth because each and everyone is capable of perfecting himself, but as adults they are of unequal merit so that, as Monroe has pointed out, "unequal treatment is...justified" (Monroe, 1969:vii).

<sup>6</sup>It might be interesting to read de Bary's statement here while reflecting on the famous pleading of an American President, John F. Kennedy, "Ask what you can do for your country and not what your country can do for you."

<sup>7</sup>When we say Chu Hsi, we are in fact referring to Chu Hsi's elaboration of the basic formulation and characterization of li (principle) by the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng I). The Cheng brothers and Chu Hsi are the major figures of the School of Principle (also known as the Cheng-Chu School).

<sup>8</sup>Li Chih's concern about the everyday needs of the people is a restatement of Wang Ken's (1483-1540) thesis that the Way (Tao) should be made to solve the everyday needs of the people (Pai-hsing jih yung chi Tao).

<sup>9</sup>The development of Buddhism in China is a fascinating area of study, but is outside the scope of the present work. The influence of Sinified Buddhism in the development of Chinese thought is acknowledged and considered as an important dimension of Neo-Confucianism in the present work.

<sup>10</sup>See for example, Mei Yi-pao, 1967:323-339; and Chan Wing-tsit, 1967:286-306).

<sup>11</sup>Norman Bethune was a Canadian surgeon who went to China in the spring of 1938. At that time the Chinese were fighting a war of resistance against the invading Japanese. Bethune worked with the Red Route Army as a surgeon. While operating on wounded soldiers, he contracted blood poisoning and died in Tanghsian, Hopei on November 12, 1939. On December 21, 1939, Mao Tse-tung said he was deeply grieved over Bethune's death, and pointed out that "No one who returned from the front failed to express admiration for Bethune whenever his name was mentioned, and none remained unmoved by his spirit...No soldier or civilian was unmoved who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had seen how he worked" (Mao Tse-tung, 1971:180).

<sup>12</sup>The headline of a news story about the memorial ceremony held in Peking for Kan Sheng (Vice-chairman of the central committee of the Communist Party of China) which appears in China Reconstructs (1976:3) reads: Comrade Kang Sheng: The Great Proletarian Revolutionary of the Chinese People and a Glorious Fighter Against Revisionism: Yung Chui Pu Hsiu (Forever Thought Of and Suffered No Decay).

<sup>13</sup>We will characterize and discuss the concept of "Heaven" in a later chapter.

<sup>14</sup>The Shu Ching (Book of History) is generally considered the oldest complete Chinese classic. It covers a period of 1700 years, from 2357 B.C. to 613 B.C., dealing largely with the dynasties of Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.), Shang (1751-1112 B.C.) and Chou (1111 B.C. - 249 B.C.).

<sup>15</sup>The Chinese have a euphemism for thief "The gentlemen on the top beam" (liang shang chun-tzu).

<sup>16</sup>This statement refers to one made by Confucius in his response to Yen Yuan who asked about jen (Analects, 12:1).

<sup>17</sup>CCP stands for Chinese Communist Party.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### SELF-DEVELOPMENT

In Chinese thought there is a unified vision of the universe, an image of the whole. The humane man thus forms one body with Heaven and Earth and the myriad things (Tien-wan-wu i-ti chih jen). With the feeling of kinship between man and the universe, Chinese thought is very much grounded in man and his life. It is the duty of man to cultivate, develop, and actualize himself, but self-development cannot be divorced from the development of society and the development of the myriad things. This holistic view of man, society, and nature emerged in pre-Chin China (Chin Dynasty: 221-206 B.C.) and has since been continually reformulated and developed by later Chinese thinkers.

Basic to this view is the conception that the fundamental characteristic of both nature and man is production and reproduction, creation and re-creation (sheng-sheng). In the I Ching (Book of Changes), a Confucian classic, it is said "The great characteristic of Heaven and Earth is to produce," and that "Change means production and reproduction" (Chan Wing-tsit, 1975:139). Lao Tzu, in his own way, also spoke of creation and re-creation as the nature of Tao, so that Chapter Six of the Tao-te Ching says that Tao, symbolized by the spirit of the valley, is "called the subtle and profound

female," and "the gate of the profound female is the root of Heaven and Earth." Moreover, "It is continuous and seems to be always existing. Use it and you will never wear it out."

The early Confucian and Taoist idea that Nature naturally produces, has been further developed and re-conceptualized by later thinkers. The Cheng-Chu school of Neo-Confucianism of the Sung period (960-1276), for example, regarded their universal principle (li) as the source of creation. Cheng I (1033-1107), one of the major figures of the school, says that "It is the Principle of Nature (Tien-li) that there are production and reproduction succeeding each other continuously without end" (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1975:139). Furthermore, by interpreting jen to mean "seeds" or the source of life (by Chen I) and as something gentle and weak (by Chu Hsi)<sup>1</sup>, the Cheng-Chu school combined principle (li) with jen and productivity.<sup>2</sup> Thus, for Cheng I and Cheng Hao, everything has the spirit of spring, and "there is nothing more worth seeing than the spirit of life in things" (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1975:139).

In this formulation, the characteristic of Nature is its production and reproduction, and man, too, is seen as having the spirit of life. Thus, while the earlier Confucians and Taoists believed in the unity of Heaven, Earth, and man, the Sung thinkers were more explicit in their formulation so that man's nature (hsing), like Nature itself, is seen as creative. In other words, Nature, man, and the myriad things are identical in their essential nature.

This view was further developed and expanded by the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) thinkers who were rather concerned with concrete manifestations of man's capabilities to participate in the creative process of Heaven and Earth. In Ming thought, man stands at the center of creation. Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528), an important Ming scholar, thus argued that ontologically man is in an organismic unity with Heaven and Earth, and the myriad things. The point at which this unity is manifested "in its most refined and excellent form is the clear intelligence of the human mind" (Wang Yang-ming, 1955:Vol. 1:51). The human mind, in Wang Yang-ming's formulation, is identical with heavenly principle (tien-li), and the heavenly principle is the original substance of the mind (See Tu Wei-ming, 1973:187-205).

More concretely, in Wang Yang-ming's scheme of things, the heavenly principle is identified as "innate knowledge" (liang-chih) inherent in the mind. In the thought of Wang Yang-ming, a dimension of "liang-chih" is "clear illumination," that is, the penetrative insight by which man grasps reality by intuition. Another dimension of liang-chih involves a kind of spiritual awareness" or sensitivity to "capture" the universe as a whole by what Tu Wei-ming (1973:202) has called a sort of "anthropocosmic feeling." Thus viewed, liang-chih is not something that can be learned, nor is it a value imposed from without and then internalized by man. Instead, liang-chih is seen as the inner most reality of man. It must be pointed out, however, that human beings are not the only possessors of liang-chih, for in Wang Yang-

ming's formulation, liang-chih is the ultimate reality of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. We read in Wang Yang-ming's Chuan-hsi lu:

The liang-chih of man is the same as that of plants and trees.....Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the liang-chih that is inherent in man. For at bottom Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man for one body (Wang Yang-ming, 1955:89-90).

Thus in the thought of Wang Yang-ming, human nature is characterized in terms of a series of empathetic communions between the human individual and the myriad things in the universe. In this sense, man's nature, as Tu Wei-ming puts it, is such that his spiritual sensibility links him "in an organismic unity with the cosmos as a whole" (Tu Wei-ming, 1973:203). Man, then, is capable of extending his liang-chih to embrace the whole universe. For Wang Yang-ming, to extend innate knowledge (chih liang-chih) is to affirm man's humanity, to actualize the sage that is in him. Or, phrased a little differently, Man's humanity is manifested in his experience of the inseparability of his own being from other human beings and the myriad things. Existentially, however, some men have manifested their humanity to a greater extent than others. As Tu Wei-ming has pointed out:

...the distinction between the great man who manifested his humanity to a great extent and the belittled man who manifests his humanity only to a limited extent lies not in man's being but in what he existentially has become (Tu Wei-ming, 1973:202).

More specifically, "the belittled man ~~has~~ become small not because the limitation of the sage that is in him, but because the sage has been 'burried' in selfish desire."

Or, to articulate this point in a different way, if man is to realize his potential, to actualize the sage that is in him, it is necessary that he extends his liang-chih (chih liang-chih), that is, to free himself from selfish desires. Thus, to develop himself, and eventually to realize himself, man is obligated to identify with others, to establish concrete relationships with others, to carry out social responsibilities, and to form one body with all things. Self development and "social control" are inseparable, that is, the development of the human individual cannot be divorced from the development of others and the development of society. Wang Yang-ming argues:

The mind of a sage regards Heaven, Earth, and all things as one body. He looks upon all people of the world, whether inside or outside his family, or whether far or near, but all with blood and breath, as his brothers and children. He wants to secure, preserve, educate, and nourish all of them so as to fulfill his desires of forming one body with all things (Wang Yang-ming, 1963: 118)..

The Tao of the sage, however, can be obstructed when man is in pursuit of personal interests. In other words, in Wang Yang-ming's formulation, man's humanity can be neutralized when "the poison of the doctrine of success and profit has infected the innermost recesses of man's mind and has become his second nature" (Wang Yang-ming, 1963:122-123).

In Wang Yang-ming's conceptualization, then, man's mind is the link between man and Heaven-and-Earth, and it is man's nature to extend himself so as to embody the whole universe, but existentially, man's self-care may become frozen and turned into egocentrism, so that he may become a manifestation of inhumanity. In Wang Yang-ming's thought, then, self-cultivation involves, among other things, a struggle with one's own self and with others, an interplay of social control and self control. Thus viewed, self-cultivation implies man's conscious effort to overcome egotism so that he may join other members of society to form a united body, and eventually to form one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things.

In these terms, Wang Yang-ming's formulation is not dissimilar to some basic features of contemporary Chinese conception of man and society. His thesis that selfish interests are socially harmful while egotism is an expression of man's inhumanity, for example, is compatible to the theory and practice of contemporary Chinese society. This, however, does not mean that Wang Yang-ming's philosophy in its totality is congruous with contemporary Chinese thought and practice. In fact, Wang Yang-ming has been severely criticized by contemporary Chinese scholars because his position is considered too subjectivistic and over idealistic.

Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is anchored in his thesis that man's mind (hsin) is Principle (li); therefore, "outside the realm of hsin there can be no li nor can be 'things'

(hsin wai wu li; hsin wai wu wu). In this regard, Yang Jung-kuo (1973:250-260) is of the opinion that Wang Yang-ming is essentially arguing that to know about the nature of things man does not need perceptual knowledge, nor does he need conceptual knowledge or practice; instead, he merely extends his subjective idea inherent in one's mind (hsin). Yang Jung-kuo thus argues that as a result of Wang Yang-ming's denial of the existence of the material world outside of man's mind, he (Wang Yang-ming) failed to explain such institutional practices as chung (loyalty to the ruler) and hsiao (filial piety) in the context of a concrete feudal social structure; instead, he explained those social practices in terms of man's innate "virtues," that is, "virtues" inherent in man's mind.

In other words, Yang Jung-kuo and, for that matter, other contemporary thinkers in China, including Mao Tse-tung, are more inclined to take the philosophical position of materialism or dialectical materialism. In the specific context of the conception of man, of the human essence, for example, Mao Tse-tung has stated that before classes are eliminated all over the world, there is only human nature in the concrete but there is no human nature in the abstract. (Mao Tse-tung, (1942) 1971:276). This position reminds us not only of Marx's materialism,<sup>3</sup> but also brings to mind the materialist conception of man and history of Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692), an early Ching dynasty (1644-1911) thinker.

From the standpoint of materialism, Wang Fu-chih was critical of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism (See Yang Jung-kuo,

1973:306-323; Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:692-702; and Yin Ming et al, 1974:215-231). More specifically, Wang Fu-chih rejected their thesis of the priority of principle (li) over material force (chi) and put forth his own proposition that li is within chi (li chai chi chung). For Wang Fu-chih, "The world consists only of concrete things (chi)".<sup>4</sup> In this conceptualization, a "concrete thing" or a definite object possesses an order or pattern and exhibits discernible principles. Principle thus occupies a secondary position in Wang Fu-chih's conceptual scheme. Furthermore, he rejects another thesis of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism, namely, the opposition of Heavenly Principle (tien-li) to human desires (jen-yu) or, to use Wang Yang-ming's terms, "to preserve Heavenly Principle and to eliminate human desires."<sup>5</sup> Instead, Wang Fu-chih suggests that human desires are natural phenomena and they are concrete things, hence, they cannot be eliminated by the mystified Heavenly Principle.

In this context, then, self-development involves not suppression of human desires, not withdrawal from the senses or from contact with the outer world (social or natural), but constant interaction of three elements, namely, man's senses, man's ability to think reflectively (hsin szu), and concrete things in the outer world. In his work Chang Tzu cheng-meng chu, Wang Fu-chih spoke of the process by which man develops knowledge about himself, others and things, as a process which involves the emergence of "the unity of man's senses, reflective thought, and concrete things" (Hsing shen wu san siang-yu). His emphasis here is clearly



on the interplay and unity of man's sense organs, thinking and material things. This is a kind of materialist view of knowledge which emerged from his criticism and opposition to the idealism of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming.

It is also a materialist view of knowledge that anticipates Mao Tse-tung's thesis of the unity of knowing and doing or chih hsing tung-i (See Chapter Three), about which we shall have more to say in later chapters. Wang Fu-chih's views have been interpreted, developed and absorbed by contemporary Chinese thinkers who have drawn upon the thought of Karl Marx, too. Contemporary thinkers in China are, in general, more inclined to speak of man by bringing in the idea of social man in the context of class struggle, and to talk about practice in terms of social practice of the masses.

In Chinese thought, then, man realizes his potential not by withdrawing from the senses, or from contact with others and with the environment, but through establishing social relationships with others, fulfilling obligations towards others, and becoming sensitive to things. Self-actualization, in the Chinese context, is pursued through the observance of a body of conventional usages or what the Confucians refer to as li. In other words, li serves as "training tools" for self-development. In the following sections, we will characterize the concept of li a step further, and discuss the implications of li for self-development in Chinese social thought and practice.

## I. The Concept of Li

Li, we recall, is one of the basic "virtues" in Confucianism (See Chapter Two). And, when it is viewed in broader terms, that is, when li is conceptualized in terms of social conscience, or as principles of right and wrong in human conduct, as a set of rules of propriety, as a system of social ethics, and as an expression of faith, it is comparable to the role which szu-hsiang (thought) plays in contemporary China (See Chapter Three). Li is significant in the development of Chinese culture in still another way: historically, one of the important issues in the course of struggle between Confucianism and Legalism (Ju-Fa tou-cheng) is the issue of whether li or fa should be the basis of social-political thought and organization.

### A. Li and Confucianism

An important dimension of the Confucian li may be characterized as "the rule of behavior varying in accordance with one's status defined in the various forms of social relationships" (See Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:230-231). In the Book of Rites (Li Chi), a Confucian classic, li is described as:

The rules of propriety that furnish the means of determining the (observance towards) relatives, as near or remote; of settling points which may cause suspicion or doubt; of distinguishing where there should be agreement, and where difference; and of making clear what is right and what is wrong.

The decreasing measures in the love of relatives and the steps in the honor paid to

the worthy, are produced by (the principle of) propriety (li) (Cited in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:232).

In this connection, Hsun Tzu (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:233), points out that "the ancient kings invented the rules of conduct (li) and justice (yi) for man in order to divide them; causing them to have the classes of noble and base, the disparity between the aged and the young, and the distinction between the wise and the stupid, the able and the powerless; and to cause men to assume their duties and each one to get his proper position." In this sense li is for the purpose of distinguishing the "superior" from the "inferior", of distinguishing between "the noble" and "the humble" and of arranging the grades of the remote and the near, so that in the Tso-Chuan (Tso's Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals), we read, "Li arrange the people in their ranks" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:233). Furthermore, Hsun Tzu states that "Li signifies to respect the noble, to be filial to the old, to be submissively fraternal to the elders, to be kind to the young, and to be gracious to the humble" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:233-234).

In these terms, then, li were formulated to regulate the behavior of individuals in the context of the positions they occupy in their society, so that there were li for the elder, li for the younger, li for close relatives, li for remote relatives, li for the "superior," li for the "inferior." Moreover, within this framework, each person must observe those li that are proper to his social position

and status. Thus, according to li, a king was expected to use a kind of decorated bow, while a feudal lord was allowed to use only a red bow, and a high official a black one (See Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:235). Violation of any specific li was to be negatively sanctioned. Confucius, we read in the Analects (3:1), was rather critical of the head of the Chi family who used eight rows of eight singers and dancers each at the celebration in honor of the Chi family, because he considered that as usurpation of royal rites.

We recall that familism was an important feature of Confucianism (See Chapter Two); in fact, it has often been said that in Confucianism, the family was a microcosm of society so that li also operated in the family to regulate the behavior of the members of the family, and again they were based on the statuses of the members of the family. Thus, while in the wider society the king was expected to be benevolent and the minister respectful, in the family, the father must be kind, and the son filial; at the same time, the husband was required to be righteous and the wife submissive, and it was the duty of the elder brother to be gentle and the younger brother obedient. Chu Tung-tsu (1961:237) cited the work of Yen Ying, a fifth century B.C. scholar, to illustrate how general expectations of the individuals in the different social positions were "translated" into concrete behavior patterns through specific li.

That the ruler order and the subject obey,  
 the father be kind and the son dutiful, the  
 elder brother loving and the younger respect-  
 ful, the husband be harmonious and the wife

gentle, the mother-in-law be kind and the daughter-in-law obedient - these are things in propriety (li). That the ruler in ordering order nothing against the right, and the subject obey without any duplicity; that the father be kind and at the same time reverent, and the son by dutiful and at the same time able to remonstrate; that the elder brother, while loving, be friendly, and the younger docile, while respectful; that the husband be righteous, while harmonious, and the wife correct, while gentle, that the mother-in-law be condescending, while kind, and the daughter-in-law be winning, while obedient; --these are excellent things in propriety (●).

It is in this context that ideal social order in Confucian terms is said to be based on the principle of human relationship. In other words, the Confucians believed that, when the basic human relationships are operated "properly", social order will be maintained. There are five fundamental human relationships (wu-lun) within the framework of Confucianism, namely, those between sovereign and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and friend and friend. We may recall that the first three relationships have been called the "three bonds" (san kang) by Confucian scholars. These human relationships, as Chu Tung-tsu (1961:236) has pointed out, are grounded in "the most general categories of "noble and humble," "superior and inferior," "elder and younger," and "near and remote."

In any case, the importance of li in the maintenance of social order within the Confucian context can hardly be overstated: it is, for example, through observance of specific li that disputes can be eliminated, and differences in both social statuses and degrees of relationship within the kin

group can be distinguished. Moreover, the Li Chi (Book of Rites) says that "Li regulate the mind of the people" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:238); they enable men to regulate human desires (jen yu). Thus, when Confucius was asked by Duke Ching of Chi (Chi Ching Kung) about the matter of good government, his reply was: "Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son" (Analects, 12:11). That is to say, when the basic human relationships are in accordance to the specific li, the ideal government will emerge. At the same time, Confucius was recorded in the Li Chi for having said that li "form a great instrument in the hands of a ruler," and that "for giving security to superiors and good government of the people, there is nothing more excellent than li!" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:239).

As mentioned earlier (See Chapter Four), within the framework of Confucianism, men are considered equal at birth because all men are capable of perfecting themselves, but as adults they are of unequal merit because men do not cultivate or develop themselves equally well, so that unequal treatment is justified. A Confucian society is a stratified one. As li is for defining the duties, obligations, and privileges of different classes of people within a hierarchical society, it is indeed "a great instrument" in the hands of the ruling classes. Unlike music (yueh) in the Confucian scheme of things, which aims at harmonizing the community, li, in this particular context, aims at drawing its social distinction (See Lin Yutang, 1938:16). The

Confucian idea of the social order, then, was based on a relatively clearly defined stratification system. And, an important feature of li involved in establishing and maintaining that particular image of social order.

We may now argue that li is the foundation of Confucian social and political thought. What we have discussed here, however, is essentially the intended meaning and functions of li as formulated by early Confucian thinkers. We may point out that in spite of the fact that Confucianism has been very influential in Chinese thought and practice, it has been challenged periodically by other schools. More concretely, the Confucian idea of "governing by li," has been challenged from time to time by Chinese thinkers of other schools. Among the earliest challengers were the Legalists. In fact, the Legalists were the activists who helped Chin Shih Huang to unify China and to establish the Chin dynasty, as well as to help manage the country. In the course of organizing the government and governing the country, the Legalists put their thought into practice.

B. Li vs. Law: The Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism (Ju-Fa Tou-cheng)

As was the case with the Confucians, the Legalists were interested in maintaining social order. Unlike the Confucians, however, the Legalists did not believe that the governing of a state can be facilitated by the consideration of matters such as the statuses of the noble and the humble, the superior and the inferior, the elder and the

younger, and the near and the remote. On the contrary, they argue that to rule a country, the ruler and his ministers should rely heavily on rewards and punishments, which in turn, should be determined by what men usually considered "objective," and "absolute" standards. The importance of those standards, we may recall (See Chapter Two), was to have a uniform law and a consistent reward and punishment system, so that discrimination on the basis of personal differences would be avoided and justice could be maintained.

The Legalists were of the opinion that although some people are observably "virtuous" and others are "unworthy," the ruler and his ministers should not let this observation influence over the law. As mentioned earlier (Chapter Two), Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.), the great synthesizer of the Legalist School declared that the Legalists "have no love and hate" for those who are virtuous and those who are unworthy. And Kuan Chung, a seventh century B.C. proto-Legalist, considered relatives and nobles as threats to government, and insisted that government must neglect the difference between "the close, the remote, the far, the near, the noble, the humble, the beautiful, the ugly" (cited in Chü Tung-tsu, 1961:242). The Legalists thus maintained that before the law all must be equal. In this connection, Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.), an early Legalist, was explicit in explaining his position regarding punishment.

What I mean by the unification of punishment (yi-hsing) is that punishment should know no degree or gradation, but that from ministers of state and generals down to great



officers and ordinary folk, whosoever does not obey the king's commands, violates the interdicts of the state, or rebels against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty of death and should not be pardoned (Shang Yang, 1974:60).

Moreover, the Legalists insisted that relatives can be punished but the law can never be put aside. The position of the Legalists here is in opposition to that of the Confucians. It is interesting to note that there is a story in the Confucian Analects in which a father stole a sheep and the son bore witness against him. Commenting on the case, Confucius said:

The upright men in my part of the country are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this (Analects, 13:18).

There is a similar story about a man of Chu who reported to an official about his father's stealing a goat; as the result of his action, he was killed by the official who considered that while the man was loyal to his ruler, he was disloyal to his father. The Legalists were critical of the official because, as Han Fei put it, as the result of the minister's executing the son, the crimes against the state of Chu were not reported to the ruler (cited in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:246, 247). We see here the conflicting views regarding what counts as proper and improper social behavior as held by the Confucians and Legalists. Differences between the Confucians and Legalists were not limited to the conflicting views regarding good and bad social

behavior though. For example, the Confucians strongly believed that both man and society can become good by moral and educational influences. The Legalists disagreed. Instead, they argued that men can become good only when they are afraid of being punished if they should violate the law.

The Confucians insisted that li can prevent what is going to happen, while law and punishments attempt to prevent what has already happened. Moreover, they argued that through education, the meaning of li can be understood by the people, so that society can prevent evils before they occur. In this way, "the people are made to approach the good and keep away from the evil day after day, while they themselves are not conscious of it" (See Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:249). They further argued that by one continuous effort, education can bring long-lasting peace to society, and this is something, they insisted, that the law cannot achieve, because, according to them, the law can exert only temporary effect. In this regard, Kung Fu, a third century scholar, was reported to have said in the Kung Tsung Tzu, that "the influence of Yao and Shun did not perish for a hundred generations; this is because the wind of benevolence and righteousness reaches far. Kuan Chung employed law but the law became inoperative as soon as he died; this is because he was severe and lacking in kindness" (cited in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:251). Kuan Chung (d. 645 B.C.), we may recall, was an important pre-Chin Legalist thinker and prime minister of the state of Chi. He was considered by the Confucians as an able and intelligent government official,

and, in this particular context, viewed by the Confucians as a case to support their thesis that the maintenance of order for a long period of time cannot be assured only by law and punishment but must be through education and moral influence.

Thus, the Confucians maintained that it is the moral responsibility of the ruler and his ministers to educate, provide examples, and persuade the common people to become good. Within this framework, they tended to believe that only men of jen ought to be in high stations. Moreover, when the people failed to become good, some officials would consider it to be their own failure to influence the people and took the blame themselves. We read in Hou Han Shu or History of the Later Han (cited in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:254) that:

Lu Kung was a magistrate who depended entirely upon moral influence. Once a chief canton borrowed an ox and refused to return it, the owner sued. Lu Kung urged the man to return the ox, but he could not be persuaded to do so. Lu Kung sighed and said, "This is because education has not been in operation." He intended to resign, his subordinates wept and asked him to stay. The borrower was ashamed of himself and returned the ox.

Another interesting case was recorded:

There were two brothers who accused each other because of property. Hsu Ching, the governor of the province, sighed and said, "The failure of education is the fault of the governor." He then ordered his subordinates to present a memorial and asked to be sent to the Ministry of Justice for punishment. The two brothers were sorry and apologized.

We see here the Confucian idea of government by moral influence and persuasion. This position, as noted earlier, was opposed by the Legalists, who maintained that benevolent government would encourage the people to violate the prohibitions. As Kuan Chung put it, "If pardon is given, the people will not show respect; if kindness is practised, crimes will accumulate day by day. When kindness and pardon are applied to the people, even if prisons are full and executions numerous, it will be impossible to overcome evil" (in Chu Tung-tsu, 1961:265).

The struggle between Confucianism and Legalism is a continuous one, and has taken many forms, so that in addition to the early thinkers such as Confucius and Mencius on the one hand and Hsun Tzu and Han Fei on the other, we find also other important figures such as Tung Chung-shu (Han dynasty), Chu Hsi (Sung dynasty), and Wang Yang-ming (Ming dynasty) arguing from the Confucian position, and Sang Hung-yang (152-80 B.C.), Chao Chao (b. c. 154 A.D.), Tze-ke Liang (181-234), Liu Tsung-yuan (773-819), and Wang An-shih (1012-1086) taking the position of Legalism. Moreover, a significant dimension of the recent campaign in China to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius could be viewed as a continuation of the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism. Thus, the publisher of a book printed by Foreign Languages Press in Peking entitled Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius notes that Lin Piao "revered Confucius and opposed the Legalist School" (Yang Jung-kuo et al, 1974).

At any rate, it is important to note that in the course of struggle, Confucianism transforms with a transforming Legalism. The long struggle between Confucianism and Legalism has affected both perspectives, so that Chu Tung-tsu (1961) speaks of the "Confucianization of the law." To which we may add that the other side of the coin may simply be the "Legalization of Confucianism." We may recall that the Legalists helped Chin Shih Huang, the First Emperor, to govern a huge unified China. We may recall, too, that during the Han dynasty, the period that followed immediately the Chin dynasty, Confucianism emerged as the state philosophy in China. In this connection we may point out Tung Chung-shu (c. 179-104 B.C.), an influential Confucian scholar-official, in his effort to promote Confucianism admitted that in his scheme of things, law had a definite place and, in fact, could not be replaced by virtue.

It is true, however, that Tung Chung-shu insisted that the Confucian virtue was fundamental while law and punishment should only be secondary. Moreover, in 81 B.C. Han Chao Ti (Emperor Chao) ordered a court debate between the resident scholars at the capital city (scholars of Virtue and Literature or Hsian-liang wen hsueh) and the Grand Secretary Sang Hung-yang (152-80 B.C.). The scholars of Virtue and Literature took the Confucian position which stress the importance of li and virtue, while Sang Hung-yang subscribed to the Legalist thesis of law and punishment. As was the case with Tung Chung-shu, these Confucian scholars considered law and punishment as instruments for implementing

moral influence and education. In this sense they did not reject the law, even though they maintained that when moral influence is sufficient and the education is completed, punishment will not be used (See Chu-Tung-tsu, 1961:273-274).

Furthermore, since the Han dynasty, judicial judgments were mostly made by official-scholars who were basically Confucians, and who, from time to time had tried to introduce the principle of li into the codes, that is, to write explanatory notes to the law. According to the study of Chu Tung-tsu (1961), "After Han times, the formulation and revision of the law fell into the hands of Confucian scholar-officials who seized the opportunity to incorporate as many as possible of the essentials of Confucianism into the codes." In the process, what was originally approved by li was also considered legal and approved by law, and what was originally considered wrong by li was later prohibited and punished by law. Thus, the early Confucian way of placing the people in status levels according to sex, kinship, and social function was later not only socially sanctioned but also enforced by legal sanction. In other words, the Confucian idea that men were superior to women, elders to juniors, and the literate few to the illiterate mass later were enforced both by social and legal sanctions.

In this context, we may say that the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools is a continuous one with Confucianism becoming increasingly dominant, so that,

as Lo Szu-ting has observed, "the contention between the two schools more and more took the form of a struggle between Legalism that was not open but cloaked itself under Confucianism and the orthodox Confucian school" (Lo Szu-ting, 1974:208). Thus, during the reign of Sung Shen Tsung (1068-1085) prime minister Wang An-shih (1021-1086), although inclined toward Legalism, was afraid to admit openly that he was a Legalist. Lo Szu-ting mentions, too, that after Wang An-shih's time "many thinkers who came out with refutations of the Cheng-Chu School of Principle were in fact critical of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. But they generally used Confucius as a protective shield, insistently presenting themselves as his genuine disciple" (Lo Szu-ting, 1974:209).

The struggle with Confucianism in the twentieth century, however, has become increasingly more explicit. Even before the Revolution of 1949, the problem of "the Confucian Shop" (Kung Chia tien) was already an aspect of the May Fourth Movement in 1919.<sup>6</sup> Thus, in a recent article, Fung Yu-lan points out that "Ever since the May Fourth Movement the question of whether to knock down or to protect the 'Confucian shop' has been an important part of struggle between the two classes of the two lines in the field of ideology in China" (Fung Yu-lan, 1974:88).

Moreover, the Confucian-Legalist conflict has been intensified recently so that in the anti-Confucius campaign, the Legalist School is considered the school that has shown respect for materialism. The Legalist School is also consi-

dered as the school that has given impetus to the development of science and technology, and stressed on production and economic development. On the other hand, Confucianism is viewed as the school that has placed emphasis on elitism, on maintaining a hierarchical social order, and on promoting bureaucratism. In this context, the anti-Confucian movement is a campaign against elitism, bureaucratism, scorn of physical labor, and the inferior position of women (See Goldman, 1975:435-462).

In this connection, we may mention that in contrast to the Confucian view, Mao Tse-tung's vision of human society is an egalitarian one, so that even when he recognizes the inevitability of some division of labor and the necessity of maintaining political authority, he is in opposition to the Confucian elaboration and reinforcement of social hierarchy. In a discussion about Mao Tse-tung's view of social structure, Townsend has this to say:

It seeks to minimize material and psychological inequalities generally and to eradicate what it regards as irrational subordination, such as that of younger generations and women (Townsend, 1974:183).

Mao Tse-tung's concern for youth and women is well-known. At a meeting with Chinese students and trainees in Moscow in 1957, Mao Tse-tung told them that the world belongs to the younger generation, and that China's future belongs to them:

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine



in the morning. Our hope is placed on you  
(Mao Tse-tung, (1957) 1967:165).

Meanwhile, women are pictured by Mao Tse-tung as "holding up half of heaven." Earlier, in 1945, in his report<sup>o</sup> to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Mao Tse-tung spoke of a specific program in which the interests of the youth, women and children would be protected. In other words, he suggested that the youth, women, and children can participate on equal footing and in all areas of activity. Furthermore, the program should also provide young people and children a useful education (See Mao Tse-tung (1945) 1967:238).

In light of this discussion, we may suggest that a dimension of the anti-Confucius campaign involves an attempt to promote egalitarianism, to revolutionize and humanize bureaucracy, and to fight against elitism. That is to say, among other things, the anti-Confucius campaign is a movement that tries to prevent party officials and state bureaucrats from becoming a ruling elite similar to that which ruled China for centuries through the bureaucracy of the Confucian state. We may point out, too, that the campaign may be viewed as a continuation of the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism. In this connection, it is worthy of note that li and law as instruments of social control can affect societal values and, at the same time, reflect the structure of a society. In the next section we will discuss the implications of the Chinese conception of li and law for self-development.

## II. Self-Development

In Chinese thought, the human individual is responsible for trying continuously to improve himself. If the human individual, as mentioned in the previous chapters, is capable of engaging in conscious activity, the process of self-improvement is to turn this capability into practice. When the Confucians speak of cultivation of the self (hsiu-shen) or cultivation of the human individual's nature (yang-hsing) they are referring to the capability of the human individual to develop his mind through his own effort. This idea of self-development, we may recall, is grounded in the belief that man is capable of achieving "sageliness within and kingliness without," a belief which is shared by other Chinese thinkers of other schools.

In Chinese thought, man is perfectible. Self-development, nevertheless, entails hard work, so that the human individual initially must exert discipline and follow customary codes or li, and consciously observe and emulate the behavior of sage-like persons. The goal of self-development, however, is to cultivate man's evaluating mind so as to allow him eventually to dispense with reference to li, free himself from relying on emulating sage-like models, and do without deliberate self-control. In other words, for Confucius, Lao Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and other Chinese thinkers, to be a decent human being, to achieve "sageliness within and kingliness without" is to be able to exercise one's evaluating mind effortlessly and spontaneously, thereby virtually apprehending the right action without relying on rigid

regulations. Hansen, in this connection, has argued that within the framework of Confucianism, the goal of self-cultivation is to be able to apprehend immediately what is right. Thus,

Becoming moral means cultivating the faculty of evaluation so it can immediately and naturally apprehend the right action without mediating or subjecting its judgment to the discipline of a set of rules or formulas (Hansen, 1972:175).

In this regard, one is reminded of the following statement in the Confucian Analects:

At fifteen my mind was set on learning. At thirty my character had been formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the Mandate of Heaven. At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At seventy I could follow my heart's desires without transgressing the rules (Analects, 2:4).

To be able to follow the desire of one's heart without transgressing the rules is to be able to apprehend what is right naturally and effortlessly. And in The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung), another Confucian classic, we read: "He who is sincere is one who hit upon what is right without effort and apprehend without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage" (Chung Yung, XX). In this context, we may recall that both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu treasure spontaneity and unforced action. It is important to note at this point, however, that to speak of grasping the essence or spirit of the li rather than to follow mechanically the specific rules, does

not necessarily mean that the li are unimportant in the process of self-development. On the contrary, as Hansen has pointed out, the li, "as practical matters, are typically treated as enormously important tools" (Hansen, 1972:177). They are important especially at the beginning stages of the process of self-cultivation.

In this chapter, we have characterized li, up to this point, mainly as the principle of order in society. We have mentioned that in the context of virtue theory of governance, li serve as the basic instrument for legitimizing social distinctions between different categories of people so that in the Li Chi we read that li "serve to rectify the relations between ruler and minister, to maintain the generous feeling between father and son.....to adjust the relations between high and low, to give proper places to husband and wife" (The Li Chi, cited in Gimello, 1972:205). In short, it is by the li that society is ordered. In the following pages, however, we will discuss another dimension of the concept of li, namely, li as a personal discipline in furtherance of spiritual, intellectual, moral and ethical self-cultivation of the human individual. In this context, li becomes a method in the process of self-development. It is worthy of note that in Confucian terms, man is born into society with what Fingarette has described as "the raw stuff of humanity" which must be developed and elaborated into a mature person. Li plays an important part in this process of development and elaboration. As Fingarette puts it:

The basic conception of man in the Analects is that he is a being born into the world - more especially into society - with the potentiality to be shaped into a truly human form. There is, to begin with, the raw stuff, the raw material. This must be elaborated by learning and culture, shaped and controlled by li (Fingarette, 1972:21).

In the Analects, the process of developing the raw impulses and potential by li is described by Tzu-kung as the process of "cutting, filing, carving, and polishing" (Analects, 1:15).

We recall that Hsun Tzu, while agreeing with Mencius in regard to man's nature, ~~argues that~~ through conscious activity men are capable of producing ritual principles (li) to help cultivate themselves. In his famous chapter on "Man's Nature is Evil," Hsun Tzu states that "In ancient times the sage kings realized that man.....inclines toward evil and violence.....Accordingly they created ritual principles and laid down certain regulations in order to reform man's emotional nature and make it upright, in order to train and transform it and guide it in the proper channels" (Hsun Tzu, 1968:158). Furthermore, Hsun Tzu has specifically spoken of the implications of li or ritual principles for self-cultivation when they function as a set of techniques of training the mind, as a resting place for emotions, and as a set of devices of integrating desires and reflective intelligence. In his "Discussion of Rites" (Li Lun), Hsun Tzu addresses himself on the question of the origin of li:

What is the origin of ritual? I reply: man is born with desires. If his desires are not satisfied for him, he cannot but seek some means to satisfy them himself. If there are no limits and degrees to his seeking, then he will inevitably fall to wrangling with other men. From wrangling comes disorder and from disorder comes exhaustion. The ancient kings hated such disorder, and therefore, they establish ritual principles in order to curb it, to train man's desires and to provide for their satisfaction. They saw to it that desires did not overextend the means for their satisfaction, and material goods did not fall short of what was desired. Thus both desires and goods were looked after and satisfied. This is the origin of rites (Hsun Tzu, 1963: 89).

In Hsun Tzu's thought, then, li "disciplines" the desires of human beings but not to the last extremity of suppressing them. Or, put a little differently, Li, as "the entire body of authentic tradition and reasonable conventions of society" (See Fingarette, 1972: 6) operates to restrain and stabilize men's desires by satisfying them rather than by trying to extinguish them. In this context, then, we may say that when desires are unattended they can create social disorder, but when they are satisfied within the limits of human reason and moderation according to inter-subjective standards, they can become a creative force. There exists, then, a kind of creative tension between desires (yu) and regulative principles (li). Or, as Gimello has pointed out:

Desires, restrained and yet satisfied by li, serve as the very "raw material" out of which man fashions his distinctively human creations - his music, art, cultural forms, moral values. In these tasks, the li are men's tools (Gimello, 1972: 207).

It is important to remind ourselves, from time to time, that, as with other tools of man, li or regulative principles are created by man's conscious activity. In the words of Hsun Tzu,

The sage gathers together his thoughts and ideas, experiments with various forms of conscious activity, and so produces ritual principles and sets forth laws and regulations (Hsun Tzu, 1963:160).

In light of this conceptualization, li or regulative principles may be viewed as an objectification or externalization of man's conception of the world and of humanity in historically specifiable situation. Tu Wei-ming, for example, sees li as externalized jen in concrete situations (Tu Wei-ming, 1972:187-201). The concept of jen, it must be recalled, implies, among other things, the spirit of co-humanity, so that when one speaks of the process of self-realization, it becomes necessary that one recognizes the importance of human relations. Moreover, Tu Wei-ming (1968:34) speaks of jen as "basically linked with the self-reviving, self-perfecting and self-fulfilling process of an individual." He further argues that "it is in jen's inner demand for self-actualization that the meaning of li as a principle of particularism really lies" (Tu Wei-ming, 1972:187). In other words, he sees li or regulative principles as concrete manifestations of human-relatedness.

More specifically, particular rules of conduct are viewed as manifestations of the principle of reciprocity and the spirit of co-humanity. Thus, as is the case of jen,

li points to the existence of others, so that Tu Wei-ming declares that li "necessarily involves a relationship or a process by which a relationship comes into being" (Tu Wei-ming, 1972:190). Thus viewed, the li of a specific human group at a specific point in time may be seen as the group's way of expressing its idea of humanity. In this way, the li help the members of the group to relate to one another in an intersubjectively meaningful way. Thus, in the context of self-cultivation the li serve as basic training instruments, and we may repeat, li serve as methods of moral, spiritual, and intellectual self-discipline. In Tu Wei-ming's view, the human individual achieves jen through li.

In this connection, it is important to note that as methods of self-development, regulative principles (li) are not to be followed mechanistically, but are to be handled creatively. Mencius, for example, contrasts hsiang-yuan ("honest villagers"), a category of "non-deviant" people who unimaginatively follow to the letter the convention and acquire a pedestrian life style of appearing "virtuous", with the "ideal decent human being" (chun-tzu) who is capable of conducting himself by following his cultivated evaluating mind without particular reference to specific rules. For Confucius, the hsiang-yuan are "the thieves of virtue" (Analects, 17:13), because, as Mencius explained:

If you want to censure them, you cannot find anything; if you want to find fault with them, you cannot find anything either. They share with others the practices of the day...They appear to be conscientious and faithful...They are liked by the multitude



and are self-righteous--yet, it is impossible to speak to them the Way of Yao and Shun, and so Confucius called them "thieves of virtue" (Mencius, 7b.37).

What is implied here is that as methods of moral, spiritual, and intellectual self-discipline, li can help man harmonize emotion and reason, impulse and intelligence, man and man, self and society, but when approached mechanistically, li can make man non-reflective, uncreative, and passive. Following this line of thinking, Tu Wei-ming argues that "the road to sagehood is a 'narrow ridge' between spiritual individualism and ethical socialism" (Tu Wei-ming, 1972:191). Self-development thus involves a process of self-awareness and moral inquiry. In other words, self-cultivation implies avoidance of ethical tropism, of being a hsiang-yuan. Speaking of the tension between rules (li) and morality, Danto (1972:219-220) points out:

A man who followed the rule book for kindness, namely, giving lumps of sugar because this is "kind" (and helping old ladies cross streets, etc.) would not through this fact be a kind man, however outwardly his mechanical behavior would resemble that of the spontaneously kind man. A man who adhered strictly to the rules of propriety designated as li would equally not qualify, as especially moral if moral at all. Rather, it is the spirit in which li is followed which is crucial (Danto's emphasis).

As seen from this perspective, then, li are treated ideally as important tools of self-cultivation; nevertheless, one must be aware that as methods of self-development, li can slip out of man's control and acquire existence of their

own and come back to force man to submit to their arbitration and control so that man becomes a hsiang-yuan. This is the problem of reification of li, of mythification of li, which, in recent years has become one of the central issues of the campaign to re-evaluate the past in contemporary China. In an article on the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism which appeared in People's Daily (Renmin Jih-pao) in 1974, Hsieh Cho spoke of li as instruments of the ruling classes to consolidate their political power (cheng-chuan), the power to control the clan organizations (chung-chuan), and the authority to handle ritualistic rules (shen-chuan), and so by "manipulating the systems of li, slave-owners were able to reinforce their dictatorial rule." Furthermore, Hsieh Cho argued that to speak as the Confucians have spoken, of returning to the li of another era, is to turn back the wheel of history and to make the masses abide by the "will of Heaven" and "fate," rather than to encourage them to innovate, to make rules that are relevant to the present (Hsieh Cho, 1974).<sup>a</sup>

It is crucial to note that an important aspect of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the wheel of history from turning backward. Thus, there was a campaign against the "four olds," namely, old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old ruling class customs. In other words, when li, as regulative principles, are not taken seriously as man-made tools to help man cultivate and develop himself, but are used by the ruling class as instruments to control and manipulate the behavior of the masses, and to justify the

privileged position of the ruling class, a serious re-examination and re-evaluation is necessary. Burchett and Alley (1976:283) thus observe:

In urging an attack against the 'four olds,' Mao was laying down a challenge to any automatic obedience to authority based on age, classical learning and custom, a legacy of Confucianism which had permeated the educational system and dominated some approaches to scientific research (emphasis added).

In this regard, we may point out that Mao Tse-tung's idea of permanent revolution implies a thesis that the human individual must not mechanistically submit himself to a rigid social hierarchy but must develop into a self-conscious man among an active mass whose regulative force is transformation, change, not status quo. The primacy of the masses over authority or bureaucratic rules, then, was a major theme in the Cultural Revolution. In August, 1966, Mao Tse-tung wrote a ta-tzu pao (big-character poster) urging the people to "bombard" the party Headquarters. Mao Tse-tung's concern here is with the contradiction, which if unresolved, can develop into a serious basic split between the masses and those in position of authority, that is, between the masses on the one hand, and Party and State cadres, administrators, and those in charge of educational and cultural institutions, on the other.

Thus, in Mao Tse-tung's conceptualization, unless bureaucratic authority is demythified, there is a danger of the emergence of a privileged bureaucratic and technocratic

class with interests of its own, and hence, a serious opposition and antagonism between rulers and ruled. In light of this discussion, we may suggest that an important objective of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the emergence of a life style and a style of work of those in leadership positions that are too far remote from those of the masses (See Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970:101-103).

Mao Tse-tung's determination to demythify bureaucracy is well-known. In 1967, for example, he came up with twenty negative characteristics of bureaucracy (Cited in Wakeman, 1973:336). Among the traits of a bureaucratic organization that are considered by Mao Tse-tung as antithetical to the development of the human individual and the development of society are "egoistic overlordism," selfishness, divorced from reality and the masses, sectarianism, factionalism, conceit and complacency, routinism, and red-tape formalism.<sup>7</sup> Mao Tse-tung considered the ideal-typical bureaucrat "rotten sensualists.....they are inconstant and they are ignorant" (Cited in Wakeman, 1973:336). In his estimation, bureaucratic organization tends to become insensitive to the purpose for which it is set up and to foster instead the private, egoistic goals of the bureaucrats; hence, it tends to become unresponsive to those whom it is supposed to serve. Moreover, it tends to become hierarchical, rigidified, routinized, and hence resists efforts at change.

There have been several campaigns against bureaucraticism (fan kuan-liao-chu-i) in China. In the 1950's, for example, there was the "Three-anti Campaign" (san fan), a campaign

against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism. Again, an aspect of the Cultural Revolution was a campaign against bureaucratism. Also Mao Tse-tung's call to youth to question dogmatic authority was another example of his concern about bureaucratic organization. It is interesting to note that in his campaign to demystify bureaucratic authority, to resist excessive bureaucratic control, to avoid elitism, and to maintain China's revolutionary spirit, Mao Tse-tung, at times, would push himself into taking a rather extreme position, so that he would declare that "To rebel (tsao-fan) is justified" (Mao Tse-tung, 1969:427-428), and to describe himself as "a graduate of the University of the Greenwoods" (Mao Tse-tung, 1961 1974:213) - Greenwoods being the hideout for heroic outlaws in revolt against an unjust society.

It is worthy of note that the call to revolt issued to youth in the Cultural Revolution was an example of Mao Tse-tung's seriousness against some specific aspects of li within traditional Confucianism. Thus, instead of occupying an insignificant junior position in the hierarchy of a Confucian social system, youth in the Cultural Revolution became "the most active and vital force in society." Moreover, tsao-fan (to rebel) used to be synonymous with treason, but when Renmin Jih-pao (People's Daily) printed, on August 24, 1966, an earlier speech of Mao Tse-tung which declared: "The immense complexity of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: It is justifiable to tsao-fan," its seditious connotation was erased (See Wakeman, 1973:15).

We may mention here that Mao Tse-tung frequently evokes ancient Chinese stories and traditional expressions to help put his ideas across. Thus, in putting forth his idea of "rebellious spirit," he evokes the symbol of Sun Wu-kung, the Monkey King, a superhero in the classical novel Hsi-yu Chi. In the novel, Sun Wu-kung is courageous and rebellious, wise and tactically astute, and wields a cudgel which can be changed by him at will into different sizes. Sun Wu-kung even dares to go to Heaven where he creates havoc and challenges the authority of the Emperor of Jade. Mao Tse-tung once composed a poem in response to his old colleague Kuo Mo-jo. This poem has since become one of the most popular of all his poems. Two of the lines read:

The golden monkey wrathfully swung his  
massive cudgel  
And the jade-like firmament was clear of  
dust (Mao Tse-tung (1961) 1973:42).

Self-development and social development, then, involve going beyond merely adapting, adjusting, and maintaining the existing forms of the institutions. In this context, it is relevant to mention an event which involved Chou En-lai and a young American ping-pong player (See Burchett and Alley, 1976:300-301). On April 14, 1971, nineteen-year-old Glenn Cowan, long-haired and in a floral shirt, met Chou En-lai at the Great Hall of the People in Peking. Cowan told Chou En-lai that he was curious "to know what Premier Chou thinks about the hippie movement which excites the youth of the U.S.A. today."

Chou En-lai:

First, I'm not very clear about it...I can only say something rather superficial: Perhaps youth in the world today are dissatisfied with the present situation and want to seek the truth. Through this there come changes in ideology which are likely to assume various forms. Such forms cannot be said to be final because in their search for truth youth must go through various processes. It should be permitted for young people to try out different kinds of activity. When we were young we did the same...They are very curious about things. One can see this same aspect in the young people of other countries who come here. They are not dressed like you but they have something in common - long hair for instance.

Cowan:

What is going on in their minds is deeper than what is seen from outside. I believe it is a new way of thinking.

Chou En-lai:

Through the development of mankind..... universal truth is bound to be found in the end.....We agree that young people should want to try out various ways of getting at the truth. But one thing is that you should always try to find something in common with the great majority of mankind, and in this way the majority can make progress and achieve happiness. But if through one's own practice it is clear that what one is doing is not correct, then one should change.

Cowan:

Men's ideas change through a change of spiritual growth.

Chou En-lai:

But the spiritual must be transformed into material force before one can change the world. And one must have the agreement of the majority of the people...As we are speaking of philosophy, I would like to quote from Chairman Mao: "From the masses to the masses." This is the guide line to transform theory into practice.

As is the case of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai here is speaking with a cosmic sense of the power of the masses as an elementary force. At the same time, as Burchette and

Alley (1976:301-302) put it, Chou En-lai "was not just giving some avuncular advice to foreign visitors, but confirming a policy of official encouragement to youth boldly to seek new ways, as evidenced during the Cultural Revolution when tens of millions of young people went on the move from their homes and schools all over China.....discovering their country for themselves, encouraged to take an active part in the Cultural Revolution and to identify themselves with its objectives." We may mention here that a very important aspect of the Cultural Revolution was Mao Tse-tung's explicit encouragement of youth to assert themselves, thereby preparing them for the succession in leadership.

There is in Chinese thought a basic conception that man forms one body with nature and the myriad things. With nature, man is seen as creative in his very essence. And, as an active force of nature, he realizes himself through social relationships and obligations toward others. Man thus transforms himself by following a middle way between self-control and social control, between spiritual individualism and ethical socialism. There is always a creative tension between man and society. In the next chapter, we will discuss the philosophical base of this essentially dialectical world view through an examination of the Chinese view of the interplay of the yin-yang forces. In the course of our examination, we will discuss the implications of the Chinese dialectical world view for social change.



## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>For an account of the development, reformulation, and reinterpretation of the concept "jen", see Chan Wing-tsit (1955:285-319). Jen, according to Chan Wing-tsit, started out to mean a particular "virtue," namely, benevolence, and it was Confucius who turned it into a general virtue, out of which all particular virtues such as "yi", "li" (propriety), and "chih" have emerged. Mencius, in his turn, had reinterpreted it to mean "man's mind" (hsin) (Book of Mencius, 6a.11) and "the distinguishing characteristic of man (jen cheh jen ye)" (Book of Mencius, 7b.16). Han Yu (768-824), a Tang dynasty (618-907) scholar, developed it further to mean "universal love (po-ai) (to be distinguished from Moh Tzu's (c. 478-392 B.C.) thesis of chien-ai). Thus, the interpretations of the Cheng brothers and those of Chu Hsi are a continuation of the ongoing reinterpretation of the concept jen.

<sup>2</sup>Chu Hsi had combined the Confucian idea of jen with Lao Tzu's concept of Tao. We may recall that for Lao Tzu, Tao is the source of life. Moreover, Lao Tzu generally associated the tender and the weak with life, and the stiff and the hard with death. Chu Hsi is here saying that jen is a principle of creation and life because of its gentleness, of its "weakness."

<sup>3</sup>Marx, for example, argued that since Feuerbach was unserious about grounding his (Feuerbach's) discussion of man in history, he had to speak of the human essence merely as inherent in the individual but failed to consider the human essence as being manifested in society. In Marx's words: "...the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations" (Marx, 1969:14).

<sup>4</sup>It must be pointed out that this word chi (氣) is not to be confused with the chi (力) that signifies material force. Both (氣)--material force--and (力)--concrete things--are key terms in Chinese thought.

<sup>5</sup>We may recall that both Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming considered Heavenly Principle (Tien-li) the first principle. Both of them also believed that human desires are to be controlled.

<sup>6</sup>The May Fourth Movement of 1919 was launched by China's intellectuals. The Movement marked the beginning of China's struggle against both foreign imperialism and Chinese feudalism. Calling for transformation from a traditional decadent society to a viable, respectable, responsible, and humane new society, the May Fourth Movement is regarded today by some as the direct predecessor of the Cultural Revolution. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Hu Shih, an Ivy Leaguer (Cornell and Columbia) and Nationalist China's war time ambassador to the United States, was a key figure in the Movement. He was involved in a campaign "to overthrow Confucius and Sons." Donald Monroe (1969:165) believes that Hu Shih (d. 1962 in Taiwan) was generally regarded as the first to make a clean break with the Confucian past.

<sup>7</sup>In this connection, we may mention that Starr has made an interesting observation as he points out that "Mao shares Weber's ambivalence. However, where Weber devoted his efforts to elucidating the nature of bureaucratic organization and express his distress at it only parenthetically, as it were." Mao reversed these priorities. He devoted his time to finding a solution for the problems of bureaucracy and analyzes the phenomenon only in passing" (Starr, 1973:150).

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## CHAPTER SIX

### THE DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF REALITY

The yin-yang image of reality has permeated practically all aspects of Chinese thought and affected almost all features of the Chinese way of life. Essentially it is a view that all things may be considered as partaking the yin (negative) principle or the yang (positive) principle. Yin and yang are forces which oppose each other, and yet they also complement each other, so that in their unity cosmic harmony is maintained. They might even transform into each other. Furthermore, one may be contained in the other. In this view, all manifestations of nature are generated by the interactive tensions of the polar forces of yin and yang.

This image has played an important part in the development of the Chinese world view which stresses the idea that things are interrelated and that reality is a process of continuous transformation. All things are seen as involved in a cosmic process of continuous flow and change.

It is the purpose of the present chapter to illustrate how this dialectic conception of reality has dominated the entire Chinese tradition and how it still persists, though in a different form, in the thought of Mao Tse-tung. In the course of the analysis we shall also compare this conception with western dialectics, particularly the Marxist-

Leninist, and shall see what are the theoretical implications with regard to the concept of social change.

### I. The Concept of Dialectic in the Traditional Chinese Thought

In their early analysis of the cosmos the Chinese came up with certain postulations such as: "positive (yang) force" involves the "negative (yin) force", what men see as "life" must entail "death", "activity" presupposes "stillness", the notion of "time" embraces its complementary notion of "eternity", and the idea of "space" implicates the idea of "infinite". This was the context in which the processual, organic and non-mechanical quality of Chinese thought emerged.

An important implication of the above is that there is a recognizable tendency toward dialectical, or what Chang Tung-sun (b. 1886) calls correlative logic that stresses the relational significance of phenomena (Chang Tung-sun, 1970(1939):121-140). Chinese thought, Needham argues:

Always concerned with relation:....Where Western minds asked 'what essentially is it?' Chinese minds asked 'how is it related in its beginnings, functions, and ending with everything else, and how ought we to react to it?' (Needham, 1956:199-200).

Chinese thought emphasizes the relational quality between above and below, good and evil, something and nothing. All these relations are supposed to be interdependent.

Correlative logic encourages a search for interconnection among phenomena. Chang Tung-sun cites Lao Tzu's work

as typical of the Chinese tendency to correlative or dialectical logic:

Being and non-being produce each other;  
 Difficult and easy are complementary;  
 Long and short are relative;  
 High and low are comparative;  
 Pitch and sound and harmony;  
 Before and after are a sequence  
 (Tao-te Ching:II).

In this regard, Needham has reminded us that there were scholars of other schools who also tended to use correlative logic. He mentions specifically the work of the Mohists (Mo Chia) and the Ming Chia (see Chapter Two). Needham thinks that perhaps the most significant things about them is that "they show an unmistakable tendency towards dialectical rather than Aristotelian logic, expressing it in paradox and antinomy, conscious of entailed contradiction and kinetic reality" (Needham, 1956:199). Furthermore, Needham cites the work of Wang Fu (second century A.D.) as an example of correlative logic after Lao Tzu:

Poverty is born from riches,  
 weakness comes from strength,  
 Order engenders disorder,  
 and security insecurity (Wang Fu in  
 Needham, 1956:199)

"Here," says Needham, "one begins to sense the implication of a dialectical account of social change."

In any event, we find dialectical thought in the I Ching, a Confucian classic, as well as in the Tao-te Ching, a major work within the framework of Taoism. The I Ching sees the world as a continuous process of transformation. When the



myriad things and events reach a certain stage, they tend to change into their opposites: as the sun goes down, the moon rises; cold and warm weather transform into each other. Chang Tung-sun (1970:131) points out that a dominant theme of the I Ching is expressed in the statement that "One yin and one yang; that is the Tao!" (I yin i yang chih wei Tao!) That is to say, there are the two forces or operations (yin and yang) in the universe, "now one dominating, now another, in the wave-like succession" (see Needham, 1956:274). Thus, the movements of things and events are viewed in terms of the dynamic interplay of yin and yang forces.

The Taoists, too, have shown the dialectical quality in their thought, so that we find the idea of using opposition as a means of expression in Lao Tzu's Tao-te Ching. For example, many and few, outgoing and incoming, emotive and phlegmatic, assertive and resigned, lucky and unlucky, strong and weak....Lao Tzu tends to argue that there are two opposite sides in the myriad things and events. Without life, for example, there is no death. In the Tao-te Ching we read:

"Prosperity tilts over misfortune,  
and good fortune comes out of bad."  
Who can understand this extreme turning-point?  
For it recognizes no such thing as normality.  
Normality changes into the diabolical.  
Too long has mankind been bewildered by these  
changes....(Tao-te Ching:58)

We can see here Lao Tzu's appreciation of the relational significance of opposites. We may point out that Lao Tzu was also sensitive to what might be called cyclical change

of observable cosmic and biological phenomena. Thus the Tao-te Ching says that reversion is the characteristic movement of the Tao (ch. 40).

In this regard, Chuang Tzu, another Taoist, also considers transformation and change as essential features of nature, as eternal. "In the transformation and growth of all things," Chuang Tzu says, "every bud and feature has its proper form." And he adds, "In this we have their gradual maturing and decay, the constant flow of transformation and change." (ch. 13: Tien-tao). Furthermore, as is the case with Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu talks about the relationship of opposites:

The "this" is also "that". The "that" is also "this." The "that" has a system of right and wrong. The "this" has also a system of right and wrong.....That the "that" and the "this" cease to be opposites is the very essence of Tao. Only this essence, an axis as it were, is the center of the circle responding to the endless changes (ch. 2: Chi Wu Lun).

In Chuang Tzu's conceptualization, the "that" and the "this", in their mutual opposition, are like an "endless revolving circle" (see Fung Yu-lan, 1960:112).

Several centuries after Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, when the neo-Confucians developed their cosmological philosophy, their work was still within the context of the yin-yang image of reality. For example, Chou Tun-yi (1017-1073), a neo-Confucian was influenced by the yin-yang dialectic while assimilating the concept of the Ultimate Non-Being or Wu-chi into his own thought.<sup>2</sup> Chou Tun-yi's work was primarily a study and

development of the Confucian classics, especially the I Ching, but in the course of his research he was influenced by the Taoists. In his major work, Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (Tao-chi Tu Shuo), he speaks of "The Ultimateless! And yet the Supreme Ultimate!" (Wu-chi erh Tai-chi). Chou Tun-yi states that the Supreme Ultimate through activity generates yang, and upon reaching its limit activity becomes tranquil. Through tranquility the Supreme Ultimate generates yin, and when tranquility reaches its limit, activity begins again. Thus the "one" produces the "other" as its opposite.

The interaction between yin and yang produces the myriad things. More specifically, in Chou Tun-yi's scheme of things, the five material elements, metal, wood, water, fire, and soil are derivable from the dynamic interplay of the two forces (yin and yang), which are in turn united in the Tao-chi (the Supreme Ultimate). The Tai-chi is identified with li (principle). It is also identified with the Non-Ultimate or Ultimateless (Wu-chi).

Chou Tun-yi's work provides the basic outline for the cosmology of other Sung Neo-Confucians, especially that of Chu-Hsi (1130-1200). We may recall that Chu Hsi was a major thinker of the Cheng-Chu school of Neo-Confucianism. In his commentaries to Chou Tun-yi's work, he affirms the identity of the Tai-chi and the Wu-chi, saying that "the Wu-chi is not something outside the Tai-chi (cited in Needham, 1956:464). Thus:

The Supreme Ultimate is simply what is highest of all, beyond which nothing can be. It is the most high, most mystical, and most abstruse, surpassing everything. Lest anyone should imagine that the Supreme Ultimate has bodily form, Lien-hsi (i.e., Chou Tun-yi) has said of it: "The Ultimateless, and yet also the Supreme Ultimate." That is, it is in the realm of no things that there is to be found the highest Li (quoted in Fung Yu-lan, 1960:297).

The idea of the Wu-chi in this particular context has aroused considerable criticism. In contemporary China, for example, the idea that the Tai-chi is to be found in the realm of "no things" (wu), has been re-examined and criticized. Yang Jung-kuo argues that as Chu Hsi considers the Tai-chi not as material thing but rather as spiritual li (principle), he has taken a position that is idealistic and not materialistic. In other words, in Chu Hsi's conceptualization, as well as in that of Chou Tun-yi, li is the first principle while matter takes a secondary position; hence, it is "objective idealism" (Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:188-189). At the same time, Yin Ming et al (1975:178-191) maintain that Chou Tun-yi's statement "Ultimateless! And yet the Supreme Ultimate!" amounts to saying that the Supreme Ultimate (Tai-chi) is without material base and is without form. Thus they contend that it is a system that is not based on materialism.

Meanwhile, it is important at this point to introduce Chang Tsai (1020-1077), a contemporary of Chou Tun-yi. As was the case with Chou Tun-yi, Chang Tsai was inspired and influenced by the I Ching (Book of Change). There is an

important difference, however. While Chou Tun-yi assumes that evolutions proceeds from the Ultimateless (Wu-chi) and the Great Ultimate (Tai-chi) through the yin-yang forces, and the Five Elements, Chang Tsai identifies material force with the Great Ultimate itself. In other words, Chang Tsai's cosmology is basically materialist (see Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:201). Thus in his famous work Correcting Youthful Ignorance (Cheng Meng) (trans. Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:500-514), Chang Tsai states that:

The Great Vacuity (Tai-hsu) has no physical form. It is the original substance of material force. Its integration and disintegration are but objectification caused by Change.

In Chuang Tsai's formulation, then, the substance of the universe is material force (chi), which is characteristically able to integrate as well as disintegrate. When it integrates or condense, its visibility becomes effective and the shapes and physical forms of individual things appear; when it disintegrates or disperses, its visibility is no longer effective and there are no more shapes, no more physical forms. In other words, chi (material force) is conceived as an airy, delicate, and non-perceptible form of matter which is present throughout space and can condense and integrate into solid material objects. Chi integrates and disintegrates in a rhythmic manner, bringing forth the myriad things while eventually dissolve into the Great Vacuity (Tai-hsu).

In this connection it is interesting to note that Chan

Tsai thinks that "the integration and disintegration of material force is to the Great Vacuity as the freezing and melting of ice is to water" (Trans. Chan Wing-tsit, 1969: 503). An important implication here is that in observable terms we may say that when ice melts it transforms into water, and when water evaporates it becomes vapor, but in any event, what is to be understood is the principle of the indestructibility of matter. Furthermore, Chang Tsai speaks rather seriously of the dynamic quality of chi (material force):

Material force moves and flows in all direction and in all manners. Its two elements unite and give rise to the concrete. Thus the multiplicity of things and human beings is produced. In their ceaseless successions the two elements of yin and yang constitute the great principles of the universe (Chang Tsai in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969: 505).

It is worthy of note that while speaking of the integration and disintegration of chi (material force) through the two elements of yin and yang, Chang Tsai makes it clear that "in the final analysis", integration and disintegration, motion and rest, reality and unreality, the Great Ultimate (Tai-chi) and the two forces of yin and yang, are all one and not a duality. As Yang Jung-kuo (1973:204) puts it, in Chang Tsai's scheme of things, chi, as a dynamic whole contains two opposite elements, so that within "one" there are "two". The interplay of the two elements accounts for the continuous development and change of nature as well as concrete entities of nature. We see here some aspects of

Chang Tsai's dialectical thought. More specifically, Chang Tsai maintains that without opposites there can be no unified whole; and without the whole the opposites can hardly exist. In his own words,

If yin and yang do not exist, the One (the Great Ultimate) cannot be revealed. If the One cannot be revealed, then the function of the two forces will cease (cited in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:505).

Within the context of contemporary Chinese thought, the two forces of yin and yang refer to the opposing sides of any thing or any event, or both, while the One points to the unity of opposites. Thus Yang Jung-kuo (1973:204) thinks that Chang Tsai affirms the existence of contradictions in the material world. Indeed, Chang Tsai seems to have come to grips with the thesis that nothing exists in isolation, for he argues that "Unless there are similarity and difference, contraction and expansion, and beginning and end among things to make it stand out, it is not really a thing although it seems to be" (cited in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:515). In Chang Tsai's formulation, individuality of a thing cannot be achieved unless there is mutual influence between similarity and difference and between being and non-being. Nothing exists in isolation; nothing stands still. The continual process of change and development of the universe and the myriad things can be understood by recognizing the inner contradictions in everything and in every phenomenon. Therefore, it is said, "Contraction and expansion act on each other and thus advantages are produced" (Chang Tsai

in Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:515).

Nevertheless, Chang Tsai's dialectical method has been criticized by contemporary Chinese thinkers for "lack of thoroughness" (pu cheh-ti). Yang Jung-kuo, for example, thinks that although Chang Tsai understands that the forces of development are the inner contradictions, the opposite conflicting tendencies in all things, are, nevertheless, "afraid of struggle" (Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:205). In a chapter of his work entitled "The Great Harmony", Chang Tsai states that "As there are forms, there are opposites. These opposites necessarily stand in opposition to what they do. Opposition leads to conflict, which will necessarily be reconciled and resolved" (trans. Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:506). Referring to the "Great Harmony", Yang Jung-kuo says that opposition leads to conflict which in turn leads to the struggle of the opposites, while Chang Tsai believes that the result of the struggle is necessarily reconciliation and resolution. Yang Jung-kuo thus argues that Chang Tsai has inadequately considered the struggle of opposite tendencies as a process of continual transformation and development, but has subscribed, instead, to the idea of reconciliation as a method to resolve contradictions. There is a danger, then, that in practice it can lead to compromise rather than to genuine qualitative change, to qualitatively new substance and forms. More specifically, although in his own time Chang Tsai understood the contradictions between peasants and land-owners, "his so-called 'reconciliation and resolution' (ho erh chieh), in effect, was a policy of



pacifying the peasants in order to quash any peasant uprising" (Yang Jung-kuo, 1973:205).

Contemporary Chinese thinkers are more inclined to view the concept of the unity and struggle of opposites as one of the most important dimensions of the dialectical method. Within this framework, the thesis that everything in the world is a unity of opposite tendencies involves the conception that under certain conditions opposite tendencies or properties are inseparably interconnected and are in conflict and struggle with each other. They are thus in a state of continual movement and transformation, or renewal and development. This image of a dynamic unification through conflict and struggle of opposites can be seen also in Mao Tse-tung's work:

Marxist philosophy holds that the law of unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change (Mao Tse-tung, 1971 (1957): 442-443).

We will further discuss this aspect of Mao Tse-tung's work in a later section. In the meantime, we find it necessary to survey, for comparative purpose, even if only briefly, some of the dialectical perspectives that have developed in western civilization.

## II. A Note on Western Dialectic

Although the dialectical perspective is not the mainstream of western thought, nevertheless, since the ancient Greece, dialectical thinking was developed from time to time by a number of western scholars. Here we limit ourselves to mention only the conceptions of Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx. Heraclitus' conception is the closest one to the classic Chinese conception. For example, the concept of change in I Ching reminds us of the famous Heraclitian aphorism "everything flows". Since both the author of the I Ching and Heraclitus lived around the 500 B.C., H. Wilhelm correctly remarks:

...we have here one of those remarkable instances of parallelism when phases in the development of East and the West simultaneously find expression in similar ways (Wilhelm, 1973:13).

Quite similar to the image of nature of some ancient Chinese thinkers, Heraclitus interprets nature as a system of cyclic change, by and large according to the order of the seasons. He selects "fire" as the prototype of the ever changing reality, as a symbol of the continual transformation of all things. "Fire" signifies the restless course of nature. "Everything", according to Heraclitus' conceptualization, "flows", and "into the river we step and we do not step; we are and we are not." Again,

This universe, the same for all, no one either god or man, has made; but it always was, and is, and ever shall be an ever-living fire, fixed measures kindling and fixed measures dying out (Heraclitus in Bakewell, 1907:30).

The very existence of things is "becoming". Nothing, in Heraclitus' scheme of things, merely is this or that; rather, everything is constantly on the move, passing from one form to another. In this sense water is never hot or cold but is always warming up or cooling off. A particular thing can be understood only when it is viewed in connection with the opposite tendency from which it springs and toward which it moves. In this context, then, a quality is usually destined to beget its opposite; moreover, no qualitative state endures permanently.

Further, the opposite forces that struggle for supremacy are viewed as manifestations of the single all-pervading flux, which is guided by logos, a thought that is "the indwelling spirit of the world" (see Stallknecht and Brumaugh, 1950:7). However, it is this conception of the logos that makes the difference with the ancient Chinese thought. As Wilhelm puts it:

Heraclitus, who held that life was movement and that it developed through the conflict of opposites, also conceived a harmonious world order, the Logos, that shapes this chaos. But to the Chinese... the two principles, movement and the unchanging law governing it, are one; they know neither kernel nor husk-heart and mind function together undivided (Wilhelm, 1973: 13).

In Hegel's philosophical idealism dialectic involves "the passing over of thoughts or concepts into their opposites and the achievement of a higher unity" (Hall, 1967: 3688). It is assumed that the universe is the objectification of the Absolute Idea or Spirit in process of continuous

development. Thus the entire reality is nothing but the process of the Absolute Spirit towards its self-consciousness that is achieved through its objectification in innumerable forms.

In this conception, an important category is that of "totality" which for Hegel is a universal timeless entity encompassing all specific forms of 'reality' and all particular stages of development. It is in relation to this universal timeless entity that each individual event derives its significance. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel states:

We must have a general idea of the nature and the aim of the whole in order to know what to look for. The high value of the detail lies in its relation to the whole (as cited in Markovic, 1974:39).

It is important to note that what makes a 'totality' intelligible is 'mediation' or the recognition that anything is what it is because of its relation to something else. Any entity is meaningless without relating to another thing that is its opposite. Mediation thus refers to the process of unification of opposites.

The most valuable element in Hegel is precisely the dynamic and evolutionary character of the universe and human society, and the emphasis on the interrelatedness of things. Hegel saw the whole of existence as a great complex dialectical movement, meaning that contradictions, identified as thesis and antithesis, continually work themselves out and merge in a higher stage identified as the synthesis. Under

this aspect the Hegelian dialectic is similar to the Chinese dialectic. But it greatly differs from it because it attributes this dialectical movement to a Supreme Mind.

In contrast to Hegel's position, Marx considers the world as the product of man rather than the objectification of an Absolute Reason. For Marx, the human individual is the actor, the one who constructs new social worlds, and, in the process, realizes ever new realm of his potential. In this sense the world is an "historical being", the product of the human individual acting on antecedent surroundings. Thus 'totality' in the Marxian dialectic is not spiritual; it is human history within which there are such particular wholes as the historical situation in a definite epoch, a particular mode of production, an observable ensemble of social relations in an historical moment. Marx himself says that his dialectical method "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite." Further, in the afterword to the second German edition of Capital, he states that:

To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which under the name of "the Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought (Marx, 1873 (1954):29).

Marx's dialectic has a practical-critical orientation. In Hegel, critique is spiritual, that is, it takes place in pure thought. ~~Within the~~ Marxian framework, instead, man is conceptualized as a being of praxis, who is capable of changing the world. In this connection Markovic has pointed out that an important difference between Hegelian and Marxian approaches to 'mediation' is that while for Hegel 'mediation' always entails a moment of 'reflection,' of 'return-to-itself', of identification with an ever present Absolute, for Marx it is a dynamic inter-relation which leads to some genuine historical novelty (Markovic, 1974:33).

Marxian dialectic implies a process of the interplay of man and nature. What is involved here is the basic Marxian idea of the dialectical praxis, or a process of human production. Within this framework, man is relative to his preceding history and existing social conditions; he is also, at least potentially, able to understand that within the existing form there is an assemblage of possible futures. To say that man is able to anticipate possible futures is to say that man is able to take a critical distance toward the present, thereby making it possible for him to have a vision of a desirable future. The dialectical praxis thus involves more than the recognition that the later stages of the development of human history are "determined" by the preceding stages; it implies also an awareness of man's capacity for anticipating and making choices among the possible futures. "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please" (Marx, 1969:398). The Marxian

historical analysis thus involves giving an account of what gave rise to the present as well as discovering the rudimentary forms that contain the seeds of a possible new reality.

Although both, Marx and Hegel, subscribe to the idea that contradictions are the moving principle of the world, nevertheless in Hegel contradiction is a negative relation of one thought toward another (it is purely logical), while for Marx contradiction is a real phenomenon, an observable historical conflict. Marx thus speaks of class struggle and of incompatibility of some specific institutions and trends of development. Moreover, as contradictions are the moving principles of the world, Marx argues that any historical form is potentially able to have its essential inner limit abolished and its rational features preserved, thereby tending to a higher stage of development. The key to this Marxian revolutionary transcendence is human praxis. Again, for Marx it is men who make history.

We may point out that although Engel's (1820-1895) in Anti-Duhring as well as in Dialectic of Nature spoke of three basic "laws" of dialectic, namely, the law of transformation of quantity into quality, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, and the law of the negation of negation, Marx himself had not made explicit the principles of his dialectic method. As Markovic (1974:26) puts it, for Marx dialectics is concerned about "how things may be produced, superseded, and further developed by man". It is a method of critical thinking and history-making.

In the following section we shall compare the Marxist dialectical perspective with that of the Chinese philosophy through an examination of Mao Tse-tung ideas.

### III. Mao Tse-tung's Materialist Dialectic

In his report to a cadres' meeting in Yen-an in 1941, Mao Tse-tung observed that during the first twenty years of the Communist Party in China, Marxism-Leninism had become more and more integrated with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, he believed that "we still have shortcomings," and unless the party members correct these shortcomings they will be unable to take another step forward in their work and in their cause of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. One of the serious shortcomings, according to him, was that party members did not have adequate knowledge about and knowledge of Chinese history. He pointed out that for several decades many students who returned from abroad "can only parrot things foreign," but they had forgotten "their duty to understand and create new things." This "malady", he continued, has also infected the Party.

There are many (Chinese) Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing ancient Greece; but as for their own ancestors---sorry, they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history (Mao Tse-tung, 1967b (1941):19).

In his own writing, Mao Tse-tung has shown that one of the major sources of his ideas is unmistakably Chinese. We



mentioned in Chapter Three that Mao Tse-tung urged the Chinese to develop a brand of Marxism that takes into account Chinese history and culture.

Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a (1940):381).

In this connection, we may mention that Holubnychy (1964:3-37), in his content analysis of Mao Tse-tung's work, has shown that Mao Tse-tung's Chinese sources include not merely Confucianism, Taoism, and other classical schools but also folk legends and belle lettres. An important implication of this fact is that the dialectical world outlook has permeated most areas of Chinese life. Or, as Holubnychy says, "the importance of this lies in the fact that Mao is able to find a source for his dialectics even in the comparatively simple and popular products of the Chinese thought and culture, so much are they really dialectical". (Holubnychy, 1969:15).

Mao Tse-tung himself seems to be quite certain that the folk literature and other explicitly "non-philosophical" writings in China are significant sources of dialectic. He believes (1975(1937):325) that "there are many examples of materialist dialectics in Shui Hu Chuan", a popular novel attributed to a fourteenth century writer Shih Nai-an.<sup>4</sup> And when he discusses the importance of understanding the characteristics of both sides or aspects of a contradiction in order

to resolve the contradiction, he again draws upon the "non-philosophical" literature. Thus the idea of Wei Cheng (580-643) (a Tang dynasty prime minister and historian) that "Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened, heed only one side and you will be benighted" (chien ting cheh ming, pien hsin cheh ahn), as well as the thesis of Sun Tzu (Sun Wu Tzu) (a famous military scientist in the fifth century B.C.) that "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat" (chih pi chih chi, pai chan pu tai) are good instances of dialectical thought. For Mao Tse-tung, the above-mentioned ideas and theses are concrete examples of Lenin's conception of dialectics:

in order really to know an object we must embrace study, all its sides, all connections and "mediations". We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity (Lenin cited in Mao Tse-tung, 1975:324).

Mao Tse-tung's philosophical position is clearly materialist. This is why Mao Tse-tung tends to assign more weight to social practice than to abstract theory, although he never fails to point out that theory and practice are inseparable. Mao Tse-tung's thesis of the unity of knowledge and practice, of knowing and doing (chih hsing tung-yi), is anchored on a materialist basis. This principle of the unity of knowledge and practice, as proposed by Mao Tse-tung, is rather different from Wang Yang-ming's subjectivistically idealistic position of the thesis of chih hsing ho-yi,

which also stresses the inseparability of knowing and doing (see Chapter Three), for Wang Yang-ming's position is essentially based on the postulation of man's innate knowledge. In Wang Yang-ming's view, as soon as man intends to do something he has already taken action. Knowledge is the beginning of action. In his Instructions for Practical Living or Chuan-hsi lu (in Chan Wing-tsit, 1963:667-691) Wang Yang-ming argues that "seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge while loving beautiful colors appertains to action." Thus knowing and doing in Wang Yang-ming's theory of knowledge, as Yang Jung-kuo (1973:357) characterizes it, are merged in the activity of man's inner mind (nei hsin). In other words, Wang Yang-ming's thesis of the inseparability of knowing and doing tends to emphasize the extension of the inner light of man's mind, the direct, intuitive, subjectivistic grasp of the "nature" of things, rather than the identification of sensitive and rational knowledge with human activity.

While Wang Yang-ming believes that action begins when a thought becomes an intention, and that action is the completion of knowledge, Mao Tse-tung argues that "knowledge begins with experience" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:303), and that the whole of dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge (the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing) involves the process of understanding that "knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must return to practice" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:304). Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on practice in

acquiring knowledge is clear:

The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but - and this is more important - it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production...in the practice of scientific experiment (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:304).

This, in the view of Mao Tse-tung, is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. Within this context, then, Mao Tse-tung speaks of the necessity to practise theories and to use concepts in the process of knowing the external world. In other words, theories are tools created by man in order to help him come to grips with the world; hence, they must be practised. As theory, Marxism also is a tool which can be utilized by man to help understand and change the world. Thus Marxism is good only when it is practised:

Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying of these laws actively to change the world (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:304).

Again,

Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:304).

It must be pointed out that Mao Tse-tung does not view Marxism as a cook-book which provides step-by-step guides to action. On the contrary, as Holubnychy observes, Mao Tse-tung believes that Marxism "teaches only how to find methods of acting on your own" (Holubnychy, 1964:22). For Mao Tse-tung, Marxism-Leninism "has in no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to knowledge of truth /in the course of practice" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975:307-308). There are different roads to truth, and there are different methods to solve different contradictions.

In his dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, Mao Tse-tung speaks of the movement back and forth between perceptual knowledge and conceptual or rational knowledge via social activity or practice. This entails a spiral movement toward truth that rise ever higher, though it would never reach absolute reality. The form of "practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge" repeats itself "in endless cycle and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975(1937):308). Mao Tse-tung's dialectical view of truth, then, is non-absolute, always new and dynamic. In other words, he does not believe in truth a priori; hence, practice is a necessity. Moreover, if one wants to obtain knowledge one must participate in "the practice of changing reality", and if one wants to know the structure and properties of atoms one must "make experiments in physics and chemistry to change the state of atoms" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):300)<sup>5</sup>. Echoing Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach,<sup>6</sup>

Mao Tse-tung argues that it is not adequate "to understand the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it", for the more important task is "to apply the knowledge of those laws actively to change the world (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):304). In this context then, if one wants to know the theory and methods of revolution, one must take part in revolution. There can be no end to man's learning, nor can there be an end to man's search for truth through practice and experiment.

As man's practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programs, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man's cognition of truth through practice (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):307).

In Mao Tse-tung's view, practice and experiment reveal not only correct knowledge about the laws of the external world but also the erroneous ideas about objective reality. In the latter instance, man draws his lessons, rectifies his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success. It is in this context that Mao Tse-tung speaks of "failure is the mother of success", and "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit" (Mao Tse-tung 1975 (1937):297). We may point out here that the Chinese political process of self-criticism and transformation, as mentioned in the earlier chapters, is consistent with Mao Tse-tung's view of knowledge, practice, experiment, and truth.

It is crucial to note, however, that Mao Tse-tung's theory of knowledge is strongly influenced by his idea of the universality of contradiction. In this formulation, contradiction is contained in everything. In other words, ontologically "there is not a single thing in the world without dual nature" (Mao Tse-tung, 1969 (1958):98). Thus dialectic as a way to view the world can help man understand the process of the development of contradictions, as well as an epistemological method of study and solution of contradictions. In this regard, Mao Tse-tung considers the principle of the unity of opposites the most important principle of dialectic.<sup>7</sup>

It must be pointed out that in Mao Tse-tung's materialist dialectical conception, the structure of contradiction is highly complicated. The complexity involves his postulate of the inequality of contradictions and of the uneven and unbalanced state of the opposites within contradictions. Thus Mao Tse-tung argues that if we are to understand the importance of the universality of contradiction, it is necessary to conceive the universal contradiction as existing in a particular contradiction. The two kinds of contradictions cannot be separated.

The particular and the general are, in fact, mutually connected and inseparable. If we separate them, we part with objective truth, for objective truth manifests itself always as a unity of the general and the particular. Without the particular the general does not exist; without the general one also cannot have the particular (Mao Tse-tung, quoted by Holubnychy, 1964:21).

It is in this sense that Mao Tse-tung speaks of the necessity of uniting the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete. In this context, he points out that the universality of contradiction has a twofold meaning: one is "that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things", and the other is that "in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):316). Pointing out that Engels had stated that "Motion itself is a contradiction," Mao Tse-tung argues that contradictory aspects not only exist in everything, but that they are, in fact, also inter-connected. Moreover, the struggle between contradictory aspects affects the life of all things. "Without contradiction," he maintains, "nothing would exist" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):316). The development of contradiction and its resolution move on continuously.

The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites, whereupon a new process emerges to replace the old. The old process ends and the new one begins. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):318).

The universality of contradiction is unconditional. This general character of contradiction, however, is contained in every individual character. In this connection, Mao Tse-tung states that it is the particularity of contradiction that constitutes the particular essence of things, that distinguishes one thing from another. This, in other words,



is the basis for the large variety of things and phenomena. It is also the basis of man's knowledge about individual things and phenomena. The sciences, for example, are differentiated on the basis of the particular contradictions in their respective objects of study. More specifically, the contradiction peculiar to a particular field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a concrete branch of science. For example:

positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics...dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, classes and class struggles, in social science...idealism and materialism, the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in philosophy (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):320).

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung argues that unless we study the particularity of contradiction and understand the particular essence of individual things we cannot adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things. In addition to the differentiation between the universality of contradiction and its particularity, Mao Tse-tung also speaks of the importance of understanding the difference between one principal and many secondary contradictions in any given thing or phenomenon.

For in the process of development of any complex thing, there are many contradictions. Qualitatively these contradictions are neither identical nor equal. On the contrary, one of them "is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence

and development of the other contradictions" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):331). For example, in China, during the Sino-Japanese war, the contradiction between China and Japan became the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes and interest groups, including the feudal system and the masses of the people, were relegated to a secondary position. Mao Tse-tung thus maintains that at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading and decisive role. Therefore, if we are to study a complex process, it is necessary that we find its principal contradiction, and, "once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):332).

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung also states that inside any given contradiction we must distinguish between the principal aspect of contradiction and the secondary aspect. In short, in any contradiction the development of the two contradictory aspects is uneven. For instance, in the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, the former are the principal aspect, the latter, secondary.

In this context, then, the development of any given thing entails a series of struggles between the two aspects of the contradiction. In the course of the struggle, the principal and the secondary aspects may transform themselves into each other, thereby changing the character of the thing. Thus when capitalism has changed its position from being a

secondary aspect in the old feudal era to being the principal aspect, the nature of society has changed accordingly from feudal to capitalist. This is the process of "the new superseding the old" (hsin chen tai hsieh) which, according to Mao Tse-tung (1975-1937 :333), is a "general, eternal and invariable law of the universe."

Mao Tse-tung states that in any given thing or phenomenon there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects. This gives rise to a series of struggles, the new aspects may change from being secondary aspect to being principal aspect; when it does, it will rise to predominance, and the old aspect will change from principal to secondary aspect and will gradually die out. The moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old aspect, the old thing or phenomenon transforms qualitatively into a new thing. This movement of opposites involves a process of "one divided into two". First, the unity of a thing is divided, and then there is a struggle, transformation, and eventually a new unity is reached, which again will be divided into two and again a new unity will be reached. Putting the matter in another way, the state of unity of opposing contradictions not only is temporary, but also begets new struggles.

Mao Tse-tung points out that as a materialist he recognizes that in the contradiction between the infrastructure and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect, and in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect. Yet, under certain conditions, such aspects as the superstructure and theory may

eventually play the principal role. For example, when the superstructure obstructs the development of the infrastructure, when politics and culture obstruct the development of the economic base, the political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. He goes on to make an important point:

While we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also--and indeed must--recognize the reaction of mental on material things, or consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):336).

This, he insists, does not go against materialism. Rather, it avoids "mechanical materialism" and firmly upholds "dialectical materialism".

Furthermore, Mao Tse-tung argues that if we are to appreciate the dynamics of contradiction in the process of the development of any given thing, it is necessary to understand that the two opposite aspects can coexist in a single entity. In other words, contradictory things can hardly exist in isolation. With Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, Mao Tse-tung maintains that without life there would be no death and without death there would be no life. Without "above" there would be no "below"; without "below" there would be no "above". Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies; without colonies there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. Therefore, in 1958, Mao Tse-tung maintained that the relation between

politics and professional activities, between redness and expertness, is that of the unity of two opposites." "We must appose empty-headed politicians," he said. And, "we must oppose pragmatists who lose their sense of direction." There is not the slightest doubt about the unity of politics and economics, the unity of politics and technology (cited in Schram, 1971:228). This, then, is what is meant by "both red & expert" in the Chinese context. Contradictory aspects thus are at the same time complementary. Mao Tse-tung thus states:

We Chinese often say, "Things that oppose each other also complement each other"... This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that in given conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):343).

Struggle, however, can be analyzed into two major forms according to the nature of the contradiction. Some contradictions, for example, are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. Thus one form of the struggle of opposites is antagonistic while the other form is non-antagonistic. To be able to distinguish the nature of contradictions and the forms of struggle allows one to take appropriate actions to resolve the contradictions. As Mao Tse-tung (1975(1937): 334) points out, contradiction and struggle are universal, but the methods of resolving contradictions "differ according

to the nature of the contradictions." Generally speaking, antagonistic contradictions can be solved only by antagonistic struggles; while non-antagonistic contradictions must be resolved by non-antagonistic struggles.

More specifically, contradictions among the people must be resolved by the method of discussion, or persuasion and education, of criticism and self-criticism, and not by the method of coercion or repression (Mao Tse-tung, 1971 (1957):438-439). Nevertheless, contradictions which are antagonistic may develop into non-antagonistic ones and vice versa. In this regard, Mao Tse-tung seems to be saying that, in certain types of social organization, antagonistic struggle will disappear, while non-antagonistic contradiction, will remain. This, we may suggest, is in tune with the earlier Chinese view that all manifestations of nature are generated by the struggle of the polar forces of yin and yang and that reality is a continuous process of transformation. It is probably in the earlier Chinese view, too, that Mao Tse-tung's conception of continuous revolution is anchored (a point to be dealt with shortly).

Meanwhile, we may point out that there are some interesting implications of Mao Tse-tung's thesis of the inequality of contradictions and of the uneven and unbalanced state of the opposite elements inside contradictions for the understanding of dialectics. It is the inequality of contradictions and the imbalance of their internal components that trigger the myriad things and phenomena into motion along what Holubnychy (1964:30) calls "a one-way spiral route."

In Mao Tse-tung's conceptualization, there are two stages of motion "in all things", namely, the state of 'relative rest', and that of 'conspicuous change'. Either state, however, is caused by the struggle of two contradictory elements in a thing. The state of 'relative rest' is one in which a given thing is undergoing some kind of quantitative change. This is the first state of motion. But then, the quantitative change of the first state reaches a culminating point, we can expect the dissolution of the things as an entity, and thereupon, a qualitative change will occur. This qualitative leap gives the appearance of a "conspicuous change" (see Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):311-347).

For Mao Tse-tung, then, things and phenomena are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion. Further, while the struggle of opposites exists in both states, the contradiction is resolved through the second state. This is the state when the principal aspect transforms into its opposite, that is, when it loses its dominant position. In this connection, Mao Tse-tung maintains that "the unity of opposition is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute" (Mao Tse-tung, 1973 (1937):342).

In this context, it has been suggested that Mao Tse-tung's conceptualization makes the dialectical principle of transformation of quantity into quality "simpler and clearer" (see, for example, Holubnychy, 1964; and Fan Liang-huei, 1977). More specifically, Holubnychy argues that

Mao Tse-tung's interpretation of the cause of motion and its spiral direction is "a large step forward" compared to Engel's "simple postulate that motion is itself a contradiction," and that spiral route of development is "merely" an axiom (Holubnychy, 1964:30). Moreover, Holubnychy maintains that since Mao Tse-tung's view of the temporary and conditional character of the unity of opposites is derived from his thesis of the inequality of contradictions and the unevenness of their internal components, it is "a more sophisticated postulate than Lenin's simple axiom about the 'struggle of the opposites', which Mao politely quotes from time and again" (Holubnychy, 1964:30).

It has been said, too, that Mao Tse-tung's dialectics suggests that he is influenced by traditional Chinese dialectical thought though it also differs from it in some ways. His thesis of the universality of contradiction (the unity of opposites) somewhat resembles Lao Tzu's idea that:

The ten thousand things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of the material force (chi) they achieve harmony (Tao-te Ching:42).

Moreover, Lao Tzu's idea that "Being and non-being produce each other" (Tao-te Ching:2) unmistakably anticipates Mao Tse-tung's notion that contradictory elements depend on each other for their existence. Further, in speaking of the principle of mutual transformation of the contradictory aspects, Mao Tse-tung acknowledges the influence of Lao Tzu:



We must learn to look at problems all-sidedly, seeing the reverse as well as the obverse side of things. In given conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago, Lao Tzu said: "Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good (Mao Tse-tung, 1971 1967:473)".

We may recall that the idea of creative tension between two polar forces can be traced to the I Ching (Book of Changes). The first two hexagrams in the I Ching are the paired concepts of Chien and Kun, the creative and receptive. We read about the paired concepts in the Great Commentary of Ta Chuan:

The Creative and the Receptive are the real secret of the Changes. Inasmuch as the Creative and the Receptive present themselves as complete, the changes between them are also posited. If the Creative and the Receptive were destroyed, there would be nothing by which the changes could be perceived. If there were no more changes to be seen, the effects of the Creative and the Receptive would also gradually cease (tr. by R. Wilhelm, 1967:322-323).

We may point out that the changes here are viewed as natural processes. They are conceptualized as practically identical with life. Furthermore, life itself depends on the polarity between activity and receptivity. Chien and Kun are the hexagrams representing the polarity of yang and yin, respectively. They are continually being generated by the changes inherent in life. It is interesting to note that a contemporary writer has interpreted Chien as the principal aspect of the two contradictory aspects which plays the dominant role, and Kun as the secondary aspect (Fan Liang-huei, 1977).

Furthermore, while it is true that some ancient Chinese schools tended to view the activities of the yin and yang as taking the form of cycles, in the I Ching the interaction also takes a "progressive direction leading to the development of society, morality and civilization (Chan Wing-tsit, 1969:263).

In any event, an important implication of the above discussion is that it points to a major origin of Mao Tse-tung's concept of contradiction and his dialectical view of the world. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung is more explicit than the earlier Chinese schools in speaking of "transformation not as one that repeats itself within a circle but as a transformation of one quality into another as a result of change in the quantitative relationship between the dominant and the subordinate aspects of the contradiction along a one-way spiral route" (Holubnychy, 1964:31). We may add that he also takes a more active part in articulating the basic idea as expressed in the I Ching and in the Tao-te Ching that the universe is a realm of perpetual activity and constant change. Thus in paragraph 21 of the Sixty Articles on Work Methods (cited in Schram, 1971:229), Mao Tse-tung speaks of the constancy of disequilibrium:

Disequilibrium is the universal objective law. Things forever proceeds from disequilibrium to equilibrium, and from equilibrium to disequilibrium, in endless cycles. It will be forever like this, but each cycle reaches a higher level (emphasis added).

This is Mao Tse-tung's restatement and reformulation of the Chinese view that all developments in the universe, including human situations, are a continuous flow and change. Against this background we now turn to Mao Tse-tung's idea of continuous revolution (pu-tuan ko-ming) and its implications for social change.

#### IV. Social Change in the Context of Chinese Dialectic

When Mao Tse-tung was a student at the Normal School in Changsha in the 1910's he already had a tendency to state his position within the framework of what might be characterized as yin-yang dialectic. According to his semi-official biographer Li Jui (see Schram, 1969:26), Mao Tse-tung had this to say in 1918:

I say, the concept is reality, the finite is the infinite, the temporal is the intemporal, imagination is thought, I am the universe, life is death, death is life, the present is the past and the future, the past and the future are the present, the small is the great, the yin is the yang, the high is the low, the impure is the pure, the thick is the thin, the substance is the words, that which is multiple is one, that which is changing is eternal.

We may note that this was the period during which Marx's thought was not yet an important source of inspiration in China. Therefore, as Schram has pointed out, ~~the~~ dialectical component in Mao Tse-tung's thought came from "the heterodox currents" in Chinese thought rather than from Marx (Schram, 1969:26). We may further note that the seeds of the theory and practice of continuous revolution were

already contained in traditional Chinese dialectical world view and that Mao Tse-tung's idea "that which is changing is eternal" signifies the beginning of a series of his restatements, reinterpretations, reformulations and applications of the Chinese processual view of the universe.

Historically, this dialectical world outlook had been manifested in the Chinese conception of nature, man and society. It had, as well, been expressed in a continuous struggle between the masses of the people and the ruling classes. We may point out here that although the scholar-officials' account of Chinese history showed that historically China was a changeless, peaceful, gracious country, a well-balanced, harmonious society that followed some kind of dynastic rhythm until she was shattered by Western imperialistic aggression, there was, nevertheless a long list of not quite harmonious and not necessarily peaceful peasant revolts.

In fact, a survey of the Chronology of Historical Events in China (Chung-kuo li-shih chi-nien piao) published in 1975 by Jen-min chu-pan-she (Shanghai) should allow one to appreciate the fact that throughout the long history of China there was no single dynasty that had not been challenged by peasant revolts. Even in Chin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), there was the historically "famous" revolt led by Chen Sheng and Wu Kuang. Yang Jung-kuo (1973:76) describes this revolt as "the first major peasant uprising in the history of China". This uprising was a reaction of the peasants against the exploitative tax measures adopted by the Chin ruling classes.

Since the Chen Sheng - Wu Kuang uprising, peasant revolts had become a regular feature in China's long history, so that Chesneau (1973:7) can say that "No country has had a richer and more continuous tradition of peasant rebellion than China." Indeed, bitter struggle between the peasantry and the ruling classes was not exactly the exception in China's history.

As Mao Tse-tung puts it, peasants and the handicraft workers were the basic classes which created the wealth and culture of China's feudal society. Yet, they lived like slaves and in poverty and suffering. On the other hand, "the emperor reigned supreme in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed forces, the law courts, the treasury and the state granaries in all parts of the country and relying on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal state" (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:308). He goes on to say that it was under such feudal economic exploitation and political oppression that the peasant were forced into launching a series of uprisings against the ruling classes. "There were hundreds of uprisings," Mao Tse-tung points out, "great and small, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars ---

from the uprisings of Chen Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang in the Chin Dynasty, those of Hsinshih, Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses and the Yellow Turbans in the Han Dynasty, Those of Li Mi and Tou Chien-teh in the Sui Dynasty, that of Wang Hsien-chih and Huang Chao in the Tang Dynasty, those of Sung Chiang and Fang La in the Sung Dynasty, and that of Li Tzu-cheng in the Ming Dynasty, down to the uprising known as the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the Ching Dynasty (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a:308).

These are some major peasant uprisings and peasant wars in China's history. Mao Tse-tung, too, thinks that the scale of peasant revolts in Chinese history "has no parallel anywhere else," and he believes that "the class struggles of the peasants" and the peasant revolts constituted "the real motive force of historical development in Chinese feudal society," because each of the major peasant revolts "dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time, and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social productive forces" (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a:308).

Until recently, official historians tended to play down the importance of peasant uprisings and peasant wars. China's scholar-officials were more concerned with writing about how history conforms to the will of Heaven than with giving accurate accounts of peasant revolts. As Balazs points out, Chinese history "was written by officials for officials" (Balazs, 1964:135). It is true that these scholar-officials occasionally sided with the peasantry. It is also true that if the uprising led to dynastic upheaval, some of these official-bureaucrats might even participate in establishing the new administrative structure, but in the process they also sought to bring the popular forces "under control, canalized them, tamed them and rendered them harmless" (Balazs, 1964:159).

In Chinese history we see the traditional dilemma of violent peasant revolt versus bureaucratic domination, peasant egalitarianism versus bureaucratic hierarchy, change versus stifling order. Conflict and struggle were viewed

and experienced as ongoing processes. In this context, then, individuals are part of a process of struggle, conflict and revolutionary transformation. What is to note is that peasant revolts were revolts from below, and they were movements that involved mass participation. In other words, Peasant revolts were intense struggles between the underclass and the ruling classes.

In the long history of their struggle, however, the Chinese peasants were unable to redirect, in a decisive way, the course of Chinese history so that their positions and life chances could be changed. The Chinese peasants were handicapped by inexperience, by their unsophistication in political affairs. Their vision of a good society was a simple communal one in which every member has enough food to eat and clothes to wear, a plot of land to cultivate and a house to live in. Yet "small holdings and primitive techniques offered no way to prevent the old process of differentiation, which had originally produced landlord and tenant from producing them over again" (Peck, 1973:90).

As the peasant uprisings failed to bring about structural changes, to introduce new forces of production, and to create new class forces, the peasantry, as Mao Tse-tung points out, "was invariably used by the landlords and the nobility, either during or after the revolution, as a lever for bringing about dynastic change" (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a:309).

It is against this historical background that one can understand why the Chinese people conceive of revolution as a rather 'normal' event, in contrast with the westerners who

usually look at revolutions as sudden and abnormal happenings or as exceptional and disruptive events.

For the Chinese, as Peck has pointed out, successful revolution "could not be a temporary mass upheaval, a cataclysmic outbreak". Rather, the Chinese have learned that revolution is a long process, and since the 1949 revolution, they have been trying to say that they consider revolution "not just an act of seizing power but a century-long process fueled by rich and varied traditions of learning to understand intense struggle and consciously moulding them in a way to produce a better society"(Peck, 1973:91). The Chinese thus conceptualize revolution as a continuous process by which man consciously directs the movement of history. Or, differently put, revolution is a continuous process whereby a good society is created and re-created. In this context, then, we can discuss Mao Tse-tung's idea of the "dialectics of revolution," of the thesis or "continuous revolution" (pu tuan ko-ming).<sup>9</sup>

Mao Tse-tung's thesis of "continuous revolution" is anchored in his Chinese dialectical vision of the world. It is derived from his image of man, society and nature, a conception which expresses a dynamic and processual view of the universe. A very important implication of this Chinese world outlook is that it has affected the ways they organize their society and the way they view the social as well as physical environments. As Schram observes, Mao Tse-tung's conception of man, society and the universe in ceaseless and unending flux, "has no real parallel in Soviet thought"



(Schram, 1971:224). Moreover, Schram argues that "at the heart of both the Great Leap Forward of 1958, and of the Cultural Revolution" lies the same conception of the universe. From this dynamic image of the universe, Mao Tse-tung has put forth his view that communist society does not necessarily represent the ultimate destiny of humanity, that as with everything else, Communism will be transformed, will undergo qualitative change.

Mao Tse-tung has been criticized by those Marxists who do not share his dialectical vision of the future of communist society. Nevertheless, he is rather consistent in this view of the universe. We may recall that in 1919, he was already writing "that which is changing is eternal." We may add here that in the late 1950's, he again spoke of the principle of continuous transformation of things and phenomena. In his Selected Writings (Mao chu-hsi wen-hsuan), we read:

The finite is transformed into the infinite, the infinite is transformed into the finite. The dialectics of the ancient world were transformed into the metaphysics of the middle ages, and the metaphysics of the middle ages was transformed into the dialectics of the modern period. The universe is also in the process of transformation; it is not immutable. Capitalism leads to socialism, socialism leads to communism, and communism too will be transformed, it will also have a beginning and an end, it will certainly be divided into stages, or there will be still another name, it cannot be established once and for all, having only quantitative changes and no qualitative changes, that would go against dialectics. There is nothing in this world that does not appear, develop and decay (quoted by Schram, 1971:240) (Emphasis added).

As the universe is not immutable but is in constant process of transformation, so a good society cannot be created once and for all. What must be avoided after revolution are routinization, bureaucratization, enbourgeoisement, and cultural and ideological rigidification. Revolution, we repeat, is a continuous process. Speaking before the Supreme State Conference on January 28, 1958, Mao Tse-tung put forth his thesis of continuous revolution:

In making revolution, one must strike while the iron is hot, one revolution following another, the revolution must advance without interruption. The Hunanese have a saying: "There is no pattern for straw sandals; they take shape as you weave them.".....For example, liberation in 1949 was followed by land reform, and as soon as land reform was completed, we set up mutual aid teams, followed by lower-stage co-operatives, and then by higher stage cooperatives. Within seven years, co-operativization was carried out, and the productive relations were changed. Following this, we carried out rectification, and then, striking while the iron is hot, we proceeded, after rectification, to launch the technical revolution (in Schram, 1971:226).

In addition to Mao Tse-tung's dialectical vision of the world, the emphasis on continuous revolution is also the expression of the fear that after 1949, a new elite might emerge as a new privileged class similar to the earlier ruling classes of scholar-bureaucrats. Moreover, the launching of the "technical revolution" was an attempt to coordinate scientific and technological development and the task of nation-building. Thus, an important dimension of China's continuous revolution, at this particular point in time, is what some political scientists call "modernization."

We may point out here that while the Chinese appreciate the liberating role of science and technology, they are conscious about the possibility of spilling the 'technocratic ethos' over other realms of human activity. Science and technology are human products; they are tools produced by human beings. They can help man conquer and transform the environment, but they are not to be viewed as if they are something "out there" to dictate to man. Speaking about the different fronts of the revolution in 1958, Mao Tse-tung urged the cadres to shift the emphasis from the political front to the technical one, for he maintained that since China has to strengthen her economic, material foundation, she has to develop further science and technology.

In the past, we were capable of fighting and of carrying out land reform. Now it is not enough to possess these skills alone..... We must really understand science and technology (Mao Tse-tung in Schram, 1971:227):

The development of science and technology in China is what Mao Tse-tung calls the "technical revolution", a phase of China's continuous revolution. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung is quite consistent in taking every caution against the danger of reifying science and technology. In his Sixty Articles on Work Methods (cited in Schram, 1971:228), Mao Tse-tung points out that "once attention is shifted to the technical side, there is also the possibility of neglecting politics." Therefore, he urges the cadres and the masses "to pay attention to integrating technology with politics."

The relation between politics and technology thus is that of the unity of two opposites. This is, again, what is meant by "both red and expert," rather than "either red or expert." 'Politics,' or 'red', in this context, may be characterized as the social theory which is aimed at universal knowledge and the transformation of the world; thus, it gives direction and empowers praxis. In more abstract terms, 'politics', or 'red' is to be understood as 'theory'--a 'theory' in the sense of a vision or an image of man, society and nature, which dialectically transcends the given objects of the natural and social world. Thus Mao Tse-tung argues:

The term "politics" will continue to exist in the future, but its content will change. Those who pay no attention to ideology and politics, and are busy with their work all day long will become economists or technicians who have lost their sense of direction, and this is very dangerous (Mao Tse-tung cited in Schram, 1971: 228).

On the other hand,

Politicians must understand something of specialized work (yeh-wu).....Those who do not understand reality are pseudo-red; they are empty-headed politicians (Mao Tse-tung, cited in Schram, 1971:229).

The struggle in the course of strengthening China's economy and its material foundation is the struggle of the unity of the development of science and technology on the one side and of a vision of the good society on the other. The Chinese thus consider 'modernization' or the development of economy and technology as a conscious project. It is in this context that they have launched a campaign in quest of non-bureaucratic means to achieve economic development. There

is also a conscious effort to promote equality and collectivity rather than depending upon self-interest and competition to stimulate economy and to achieve scientific development.

It is interesting to note that when the Chinese speak of 'modernization', they do not conform to the American academic tendency, "to mean something approximating Max Weber's conception of the process of rationalization in all those fields of social action--economic, political, legal, and educational---which lend themselves to the application of 'Zwecksrationalitat'" (Schwartz, cited in Peck, 1973:77).

In Weberian sense, rationalization is linked to the scientific specialization and technical differentiation. It presupposes the separation of the different realms of human activity--religion, law, art, science, politics and economics. As these realms separate, and as every activity develops its own conceptual basis, each becomes the province of professionally trained experts and bureaucratic administrators. Zweckrational or rational action in relation to a goal (instrumentally rational action) involves a process whereby the actor chooses his goal and takes account of competing means and possible consequences which may either thwart the actor's intention or make his action lead to an undesired result.

It is important to note that the process of rationalization, in Weber's conceptualization, implies bureaucratic coordination. In other words, bureaucracies are organized according to rational principles, so that offices are ranked

in a hierarchical order and operated by impersonal rules. Office-holders are ruled by methodical allocation of areas of jurisdiction and delimited spheres of duty and obligation. Appointments are made ideal-typically according to specialized training and qualifications. Thus specialized knowledge becomes not only the basis of the division of labor but also an effective means for legitimizing domination of the technocrats and bureaucrats over the masses of the people.

In a formally rational social organization there is a differentiation between work and life so that, in Weber's analysis, the worker is separated from the means of production, as well as from the control of the means of political administration, means of military strategy and scientific research. This situation, in Weber's words, (quoted by Mitsman, 1970:184), "is the decisive foundation common to the capitalist private enterprise and to the cultural, political, and military activities of the modern power state." A rather important implication of Weber's category of instrumentally rational action, as Peck has argued, is that "it implies a society without collective effort, without community, a society where individuals see each other largely as means" (Peck, 1973:80). In his analysis of the process of rationalization, Weber maintains that rational activity builds on calculation, the use of statistics, prediction through accounting of profitability. He then points out that "capital accounting in its formally most rational shape... presupposes the battle of man with man" (Weber, 1968:93).

Instrumentally rational action or, more concretely, the ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy tends to encourage acquisitive individualism and to discourage collective work relations. Thus Peck observes:

An intensely egoistic, competitive notion of modern human nature feeds a certain conception of bureaucratic organization, rationality and power--and vice versa (Peck, 1973:80).

Pointing out that Weber himself often stated that the development of modern economic power was marked by its "specific hostility to the idea of brotherhood," Peck (1973: 82) maintains that democratic participation by the workers within a bureaucratic structure is not possible, for the technical superiority of "bureaucratic administration and its panoply of trained, privileged experts" was too great for the workers to overcome. There is thus a split between the bureaucratic and technocratic elite on the one hand, and the masses on the other, and there is also a kind of technological and bureaucratic differentiation between work and life. Furthermore, the pursuit of self-interest and private economic gain have, on the one hand, reinforced a rugged, atomistic individualism, and discouraged traditional forms of community on the other.

This, then, is the context in which theorists speak of the process of "modernization." Interestingly, modernization theorists do not seriously consider the negative aspects and consequences of the bureaucratized society, of over-emphasis on instrumental rationality. Instead, they

passionately accept individual competition rooted in egoistic self-interest and rationalization as inseparable aspects of an industrial society. Modernization theorists tend not to discuss seriously what Weber calls value-oriented action (rational action in relation to a value).

In Weber's conceptual scheme, examples of value-rational orientations "would be the actions of persons who regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it consists" (Weber, 1968:25). In any case, modernization theorists, as well as Weber himself, do not analyze instrumentally rational action within the larger framework of the interests and broader goals of society. They tend not to discuss the consequences of spreading modern technique and its application into other areas of social life, and are not inclined to address themselves to the question that formal rationality can be incorporated into an ideology with the view to legitimizing existing social and economic conditions (see Peck, 1973:57-217).<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, the Chinese tend to argue that the task of nation-building can be meaningful only when it is carried out simultaneously within the realms of economy and philosophy. In other words, nation-building involves among other things, the appropriation of technology so that it can be used to improve the economy of the nation. That is to say, technology must be utilized for the benefit of the



people and not as new instruments for their oppression. Thus the Chinese speak of combining economic development and self-cultivation. As Peck (1973:94) sees it:

It is this double, intertwined speeded advance toward what they regard as a higher stage in the revolution of mankind that underlines the Maoist view of uninterrupted revolution.

The Chinese conception of education illustrates such an approach. Education in the Chinese view is not merely the acquisition of some technical skill in order to land a job, to make a living. For the Chinese, education is not limited to exercising instrumental rationality. Rather, education includes explicitly and emphatically moral behavior, that is, a conscious effort to cultivate and develop moral attitudes toward other human beings, society and nature. In the process of education, the human individual develops the sensitivities to integrate morality and technical know-how, the personal and the social, the cultural and the political. Thus for Mao Tse-tung, education has its formal aspects,

but it is fundamentally a lifelong process to which all organizations and work can be made to contribute. After all people acquire most of their knowledge outside of schools as a by-product of other activities. The community must be organized to encourage learning in all facets of one's work and life, to promote creativity, an inquisitiveness. But such learning comes faster when people are involved in a cooperative effort for a meaningful objective. A self-contained intellectual world breeding values of egoism and private ownership of one's skill can only intimidate the masses while isolating the intellectuals (Peck, 1973: 150).

We may note here Mao Tse-tung's dialectical view of the unity of living and working, of learning and living, of working and learning. There is also Mao Tse-tung's conception of the Chinese people as a single and united political and cultural entity with collective (rather than egoistic) social aspirations and high revolutionary potential. Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1919 that "We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses.....Our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance" (trs. Schram, 1963:163). As the Chinese at the turn of the century were fond of saying that China was essentially an agricultural country, as Mao Tse-tung's own revolutionary activity in the country was a successful experience, and as the peasants in fact constitute the great majority of the Chinese population and have engaged in a long and hard struggle with corrupt scholar-officials, it is no wonder that Mao Tse-tung's faith in the masses is basically a faith in the peasant masses.

In 1927, Mao Tse-tung points out the significance of the upsurge of the peasant movement of the 1920's. As man is an active force of nature, so the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants would "rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so shift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back" (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1927):23). Furthermore, as a spontaneous revolutionary force, the peasants "will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into

their graves". Thus he argued in the 1927 Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan that it is not the party that is to evaluate the revolutionary capability of the peasantry. Instead:

Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they (the peasants) decide (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1927):24).

Mao Tse-tung never fails to show his appreciation for the revolutionary traditions of the Chinese peasantry. At the same time, he has little to say about the revolutionary capacities of the urban proletariat. In this regard, it has been pointed out that while the rural basis of the Chinese revolution led to a glorification of the peasantry as the revolutionary people, Chinese cities were "the official and symbolic strongholds of the traditional Confucian order, of the Western imperialism...and of the Koumintang" (Murphy, 1967:325-326). For Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese peasants are more able than the urban people to appreciate collective values; therefore, they are more capable of carrying on the revolution.

It is significant to note that Mao Tse-tung's tendency to look to the countryside and the peasantry for the sources of revolutionary creativity does not fit well into the formal Marxist-Leninist position. It is also interesting to note that a dimension of the Cultural Revolution was Mao Tse-tung's negative attitude toward China's urban elites. The Cultural Revolution "was directed primarily against

newly-emergent urban elites--cultural and technological intelligentsia and especially urban-based Party bureaucrats" (Meisner, 1971:22). We must point out, however, that to speak of Mao Tse-tung's faith in the masses and his idea that ultimate revolutionary hopes rest in the relative purity of the countryside and with the potential socialist transformation of the Chinese peasants does not necessarily mean that he ignores the role of the party to provide leadership and direction for the spontaneous revolutionary impulses of the masses. In fact, he was the principal architect and leader of the party. Nevertheless, as Meisner has observed, "Mao's confidence in the Party and its organizations has never been as absolute as was Lenin's, and Mao has always expressed a faith in the spontaneity and wisdom of the masses that Lenin neither possessed nor expressed" (Meisner, 1971:26).

While Mao Tse-tung has called for Marxist intellectuals and party cadres to bring socialist consciousness to the masses, he has insisted also that all revolutionary intellectuals and cadres must merge into the masses:

...the intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants. In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and non-revolutionaries or counter-revolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants and actually do so. Ultimately it is this alone, and not professions of faith in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism, that distinguishes one from the other (Mao Tse-tung, 1967a (1939):238).

More than this, Mao Tse-tung has continuously argued that genuine revolutionary knowledge ultimately comes from the masses themselves, and that party leaders and cadres must learn from the people. In his Preface and Postscript to Rural Survey which was published in 1941, we read:

It is my wish to go on being a pupil, learning from the masses, together with all other Party comrades (Mao Tse-tung, 1967b (1941):13).

According to Mao Tse-tung, then, it is necessary for revolutionary intellectuals and cadres to learn from and merge with the masses as well as to teach and lead them. The relationship between the organized consciousness of the party and the spontaneous consciousness of the masses is one of creative tension. In his analysis of what he calls "Maoism," Meisner maintains that it was mainly because of the countryside and Mao Tse-tung's faith in the spontaneous revolutionary creativity of the peasant masses that the 1949 revolution was a successful one. Moreover, he argues that Mao Tse-tung's hostility to bureaucratic elitism and his distrust of formal institutions are some crucial factors in preventing the bureaucratic degeneration of the Chinese revolution (Meisner, 1971:35-36). Meisner goes on to comment that:

If this has not led to anything resembling a Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat (as Maoists would have it), it has so far prevented a dictatorship of bureaucrats, as many foreign observers would seem to like to have it (Meisner, 1971:36).

The Chinese have never made the claim that they have already created a genuinely socialist society in China, but certainly they have created a situation of permanent revolutionary ferment which keeps open the possibility of attaining (or, at least, pursuing) Marxian socialist goals.

The analysis pursued in this chapter has clearly shown how correlative thinking and the dialectical conception of reality have been always dominant features of Chinese culture. From the early conception of the I Ching and the Tao-te Ching until Mao Tse-tung this pattern has been consistent throughout.

On the surface, Mao's position might be considered as a discontinuous element in the Chinese tradition for, under the influence of Marx, he has formulated for the first time a formal theory of revolution in a traditionally highly stratified society. A more careful consideration, however, leads us to a different conclusion. As has emerged clearly from our analysis, the practice of revolution was a fact taken-for-granted in Chinese tradition. The merit of Mao Tse-tung has been to develop a formal theory out of that traditional practice. And this, more than discontinuity, is in essence a further application of the traditional yin-yang dialectic, an enrichment of it. Moreover, as we have seen, although Mao borrowed from Marx, he clearly has gone beyond him, and he could do so because he drew heavily upon his

indigenous tradition which is deeply permeated by dialectical thinking. In essence, Marx provided to Mao a stimulus to build a formal theory of revolution, but Mao built it using elements indigenous to his Chinese origins. Clearly, by becoming a Marxist Mao Tse-tung did not relinquish the Chinese philosophical heritage; rather, he made it more consistent with century-old Chinese tradition

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Chang Tung-sun ~~concludes~~ that the structure of the Chinese language is more favorable to dialectical reasoning than to Aristotelian logic (Chang Tung-sun, 1930:121-140). In this connection, note should be taken of Needham's remark that "There is some ground for believing that the structure of the Chinese language is essentially favorable to the type of thinking now being explored in modern combinatory logic" (Needham, 1956:199).

<sup>2</sup>The concept of the Ultimate Non-Being or Wu-chi was developed by Lao Tzu (see, for example, Chapter 28 of the Tao-teh Ching). Chan Wing-tsit (1963:149) states that Chou Tun-yi borrowed the concept Wu-chi from the Tao-teh Ching while Needham (1956:464) considers Chou Tun-yi's statement "Wu-chi erh tai-chi" is essentially "that of a synthetic philosophy uniting in itself the treams of Taoist and Confucian thought."

<sup>3</sup>Volume Five of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works was published posthumously in April 1977 by Jen Min Chu-pan-she in Peking.

<sup>4</sup>There are several English translations of Shui Hu Chuan. Pearl Buck preferred to call it All Men Are Brothers. There is still another English title, namely, Water Margin. At any rate, Shui Hu Chuan is a popular 14th century novel which describes a peasant war towards the end of the Northern Sung dynasty.

<sup>5</sup>In this regard Holubnychy (1964:26) noted that "it ought to be easy for the Chinese dialectical materialism to accept the 'indeterminacy principle' of modern nuclear physics and chemistry, since it recognizes the change in the state of matter resulting from an experiment."

<sup>6</sup>"The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it."

<sup>7</sup>Holubnychy (1964:29) considers Mao Tse-tung's main contribution to the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectics "is his particularly apt formulation of the Universal law of the unity of Opposites." Moreover, Holubnychy points out that "prior to Mao such a law was discussed only by Hegel." but as formulated by Mao Tse-tung, "the law is clearly anti-Hegelian in its materialist objectivation of reality and of contradictions outside of man's mind."



8 Mao Tse-tung himself traced the saying "Things that oppose each other also complement each other" to Pan Ku, a historian in the first century A.D. (Mao Tse-tung, 1975 (1937):347).

9 The idea of continuous revolution has also been translated as "permanent revolution," "uninterrupted revolution," and many more. All these terms, however, are derived from the term "pu-tuan ko-ming."

10 In another context, the problem of technology and science as ideology has been discussed by the Frankfurt School. See, for example, the works of Marcuse (1964, 1968) and Habermas (1970, 1971).

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

The analysis we have conducted in the previous chapters has shown how Chinese philosophy from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung is essentially centered on man's self-development to be achieved through a dialectical relationship with nature and society.

In this vision, the individual occupies a central position. Consequently, Chinese scholars have never developed a formal macro-theory of society such as we find in the writings of many western scholars. Society is never considered as a complex structured reality standing as an object in opposition to the individual. Man and society, instead, are two aspects of the same dialectical process. (Significantly, the Chinese character for jen consists of two parts, one meaning "man" and the other meaning "many", that is, "society"). Indeed, in the Chinese tradition, society is simply man in his social relations, i.e., man is the process of becoming fully "human" through his interaction with others.

Thus, for the Confucians society was simply the "family" written large; the Emperor was the "Son of Heaven," the local

magistrate the "parent-official," and all others were considered as "brothers". The social norms were nothing but an extension of the family relations.

In Taoism, we find a consistent tendency to ignore any matters related to formal social organization. The Taoist conception of society was very much that of a small village community, quiet, simple, self-contained, and stable.

The Legalists, though more concerned with the problems of social organization, also failed to develop a general theory of society. In their emphasis on a strong role of the law they stressed techniques of social control but they did not develop any formal theory of society. Indeed, the emphasis on man and his social obligations in the classical Chinese schools prevented any vision of society that could transcend the individual.

It is only with Mao Tse-tung that society is seen for the first time as a gigantic battlefield in which "enemy classes" clash among themselves. From this struggle a new society emerges, a society seen as a "community" organized on the principle of egalitarianism. This vision represents a drastic departure from the classic Chinese tradition which had assumed the hierarchical model of the family relations at the basis of all social relations, and had emphasized harmony and compromise. Nevertheless for Mao Tse-tung as well the human development of the individual still remains the ultimate focus of attention. Struggle is not an end in itself; it is simply a means to develop a more "human" indi-

vidual in a more just society.

In any case, whether we look at the traditional or at the modern Chinese social thought, there is no doubt that the underlying conception of society in Chinese culture implicitly assumes a genuine interactionist perspective of man in society. The kind of humanism that we have identified in the course of this thesis as the basic denominator common to the various Chinese schools is one that emphasizes man as "subject" of self-determination and geared toward self-realization, and that society is expected to reflect this ideal of man in its structures and functions.

Although these ideas are wrapped up in the framework of ethical or ideological conceptions, nevertheless it is relevant to sociological theorizing. After all, as Thomas Khun (1962) correctly notes, scientific theory and research do have a pre-scientific frame of reference.

In the following pages, therefore, we shall probe the theoretical validity of the Chinese conception with regard to the two major topics we have studied in this thesis, the relationship of man and society, and the idea of dialectical change. We shall examine its theoretical validity by way of critical comparisons and contrasts with corresponding western theories.

## I. MAN AND SOCIETY

In the West, the prevailing dichotomous tendency of separation of subject and object has led to a series of unsatisfactory theories of the relationship between the individual and society in the field of social sciences. Typically, these theories have put primary emphasis on the subjective factors or on the objective factors. The psychoanalytic theory, for example, has emphasized subjective factors.

According to this theory, all behavior, mental processes, symptoms, and adjustment mechanisms are largely determined by unconscious psychological factors such as instintual drives, repressed wishes, complexes and the like. These unconscious factors form the basic psychological dynamics of human behavior. Responses to unconscious drives are necessitated by the strength of the motivating conditions, without any freedom or self-determination. The three principles, the "unconscious," the "psychological dynamics," and the "psychological determinism," are complemented by the conception of "psychosexual development" which supposes different stages of sexuality beginning in infancy and progressing through childhood and adolescence and dominated throughout by the factors of pleasure. If this development is normal and if sexual urge - libido - is allowed adequate gratification, the person will remain free of emotional conflict and personality disturbances.



In contrast, when restrictive measures originating in the environment or society inhibit pleasant gratification, a distortion of personality and normal behavior will be the result. Following these ideas, Freud and his disciples admitted an intrinsic antagonistic contradiction and conflict between the individual and his cultural environment. "Every individual is virtually an enemy of culture . . ." (Freud, 1929:4).

The reaction to these principles of the classic psychoanalytic theory of the Freudian school is well known. Many criticisms have pointed out the weak points of that doctrine. For instance, it has been noted that many gross generalizations derived from it are based on restricted clinical experiences, and that the unrestrained emphasis on sex and its role in the development of personality disorders is unwarranted. The emphasis on pleasure as the dominant motivating force is unrealistic, and the conception of psychological structure is purely conceptual and difficult to apply consistently.

Moreover, there is little attention given to social determinants of personality and its disturbances, while the theory of psychological determinism is fatalistic and does not explain properly the influence of ethical and religious values in the achievement of adjustment and mental health. (See, for example, Allport, 1955, 1960; Fromm, 1947, 1955.) Psychoanalytical propositions that have been subject to empirical tests have generally not been corroborated.

(Olansky,1949; Sewell,1953).

The Freudian view of motivation, which reduces every striving to a moment in its source, may indeed, as Allport has pointed out, furnish an acceptable model for neurotic behavior which is by definition "determined", for it is patterned or stereotyped, marked by repetition, fixation and rigidity, but not for the ordinary or normal behavior which is to be assumed intrinsically free and responsible (Allport,1960:29).

On account of these shortcomings, therefore, it is not surprising that today the Freudian theory has been partially abandoned or radically altered by many scholars such as Adler (1927), Jung (1960), Horney (1939,1950), Fromm (1941, 1947,1955), Allport (1955,1960), and many others who have called for a more integral synthesis.

On the other extreme, the behavioristic school has overemphasized the deterministic impact of objective factors in the explanation of human behavior. First formulated by Watson in 1913 the behavioristic approach limited its investigation to objective, observable phenomena and to the methods of natural science. Watson equated science with the mechanistic, the materialistic, and the physical, labeling as "unscientific" or "elusive" any concept that could not be anchored to observable facts, such as mental process, emotion, and volition.

Accordingly, he proposed to make psychology scientific by utilizing only objective, naturalistic methods, including adaptations of Pavlov's conditioning techniques, investigations of animal behavior, and especially laboratory procedures in which experiments could be repeated with different subjects and statistically significant results could be obtained. All complex forms of behavior, including reasoning, habit, and emotional reactions, are basically composed only of simple stimulus-response events which can be controlled, measured, and therefore predicted. Most of our learning is the result of simple conditioning. Even the processes of thinking and reasoning were explained, for Watson, in terms of conditioning and physiology. All forms of thought are described as "implicit speech", and are reduced to muscular movements acquired through conditioning.

As Watson believed that the fundamental relationships between organisms and the environment are much the same for men and animals, he advocated an expansion of animal psychology as a means of discovering principles that would apply to human behavior (Watson, 1958).

The behavioristic approach has exerted a strong influence on American psychology. It has stimulated the development of carefully designed, highly objective, and rigidly controlled experimental investigation. It has led to the wider use of statistical procedures in basic research and applied psychology. And, in general, it has helped to achieve a better understanding and interpretation of the role of

environmental factors in the development of personality, and to have a deeper grasp of the importance of learning in the process of socialization.

However, there are many dissatisfactions with certain excessive conclusions that some of his strong supporters tend to draw. One dissatisfaction is the exclusion of the mental world from the field of science. In his overemphasis on conditioning and the control of behavior and development, Watson conceived the human being as an automaton instead of a creature of will and purpose. Those behaviorists who exclude the whole idea of consciousness coherently would risk to take the absurd position that human beings (behaviorists included) are completely unaware of what they are doing.

One of the most influential contemporary behaviorists is B. F. Skinner who has gone further to contemplate an applied science aimed at the manipulation and control of human conduct. More plainly even than Watson's his writings reveal the urge not only to observe man behaving but also to make them behave (Skinner, 1938, 1948, 1953, 1974).

In Skinner's view, Pavlov and Watson not gone far enough in the conception of behaviorism. Although both had gone beyond the sterile tradition of "mentalistic" psychology, yet they still relied heavily upon the internal (subjective) processes of the nervous system. What instead is needed is a more "radical" and "complete" behaviorism: one that would limit itself strictly to what an organism is doing -- or more accurately what it is observed by another organism to be doing.

From behaviorism as an approach to understand behavior one can logically derive a method of controlling behavior. If human responses are governed by the kind of degree of reinforcement they lead to, anyone who can control the pattern of reinforcement can control also the probability of response -- that is, how people will behave. "To the extent that relevant conditions can be altered, or otherwise controlled, the future can be controlled . . . What a man does is the result of specifiable conditions and . . . once these conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some extent determine his actions"(1953:6).

In such a theoretical system, so rigidly restricted to observables, obviously, there is no place for concepts dealing with psychic events or inner states, and Skinner banishes as irrelevant such "archaic" terms as "meaning," "intent," "understanding," or "freedom"(Skinner,1974).

Everything in the behaving system must be reducible to physical terms, without any lapses into "subjective anthropomorphism" in order to "avoid the labor of analyzing a physical situation by guessing what it 'means' to an organism or by distinguishing between the physical world and psychological world of 'experience'"(Skinner,1953:35-36). For Skinner, ". . . the issue of personal freedom must not be allowed to interfere with a scientific analysis of human behavior . . ."(Ibid.:322). This is because the ultimate criterion of behavioral science is simply that of "survival" of the "culture," not of the individual. Whatever has

survival value for the social culture is "good," and whatever does not contribute to its survival is "bad" (Ibid.: 430ff).

Reflecting these ideas is Skinner's scientific utopia of the world of Walden II, a manipulative culture designed and engineered on the rationality of behavioral science (Skinner, 1948). The famous science-fiction novel is, as one of his critics adequately put it ". . . an altogether explicit disavowal of the freedom and responsibility, as well as the moral and political primacy, of the human person; and it is, correspondingly, an avowal of the superior value and importance of 'society'" (Matson, 1964:80). "It is not too high a compliment indeed to say that Skinner's program of applied behavioral science possesses much the same moral urgency, the same inexorable logic and persuasive power -- and the same totally authoritarian personality -- as Hobbes's Leviathan" (Ibid.:80-81).

The behavioral approach applied to the field of sociology has emphasized the conditioning of sociological factors upon the individual's behavior, thus generating what Dennis Wrong calls "the oversocialized conception of man" (Wrong, 1961).

A basic assumption profoundly influencing the main stream of sociology is the idea of the "plasticity" of human nature. Accordingly, role theory has to explain how an individual becomes "socialized" through the "internalization" of

the system of norms, values and roles provided by society and culture. Internalization is implicitly been equated with "learning", or even with "habit-formation" in the simplest sense. Thus, when a norm is said to have been "internalized" by an individual, what is frequently meant is that he habitually both affirms it and conforms to it in his conduct, while the entire dynamic aspect of the individual as an actor is overlooked (Wrong, ibid:187).

In this perspective, the human individual is seldom considered as having a self. Generally, it is assumed to be merely an organism, with some kind of organization, responding to social forces which play upon him. These forces are called "social system," "social structure," "culture," "status position," "social role," "social norm," and the like. The assumption is that the behavior of people is an expression of the play on them, of these kinds of factors or forces. The individuals, as members of society, are treated as the media through which such factors operate, and their social action is regarded as an expression of such factors (Blumer, 1969:83).

Thus, man is seen as a "role-playing actor," responding to the expectations of other "role-players" in the multiple group settings in which he finds himself. He appears devoid of self, that is, of personal meaning, understanding and responsibility, and such items as organic drives, motives, attitudes, feelings, internalized social factors, or psychological components are not good surrogates for the

"self", for "they are regarded as factors which play on the individual to produce his action." (Ibid.)

Similarly, societies or human groups are often considered as "social systems" and their collective actions are regarded as expression of a system in a state of balance or seeking to achieve balance. Group action is conceived as an expression of "the functions" of a society or as the outward expression of cultural demands, societal purposes, social values, or institutional stresses. "The individuals . . . or the groups become "carriers", or media for the expression of such forces; and the interpretative behavior by means of which people form their actions is merely a coerced link in the play of such forces." (Ibid.:84).

Such an approach creates the abstract, artificial creature of homo sociologicus, "the bearer of socially predetermined roles" (Dahrendorf, 1973). To a sociologist the human individual is his social roles, and his action is defined by the function of a social system. Although this view may be of some interest, particularly in grasping the complexity of highly differentiated social structure of modern society, nevertheless its horizon is too limited, and it creates the crucial split between "scientific" sociology and "human" society.

Criticism of the structural-functional school has been increasing steadily (Lynd, 1939; Mills, 1959; Stein and Vidich, 1963; Gouldner, 1970; Friedrichs, 1970). At the same time, a growing number of scholars are concerned with developing a



methodology for sociology that is more appropriate for the study of human behavior than the positivistic methods which were borrowed from the natural sciences (Cicourel, 1964, Bruyn, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Filstead, 1970; Glass and Staude, 1972).

Under various names -- existential or phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, participant observation -- a number of sociologists are taking as their point of departure the world as the individual or group sees it and constructs it, rather than how the researchers themselves predefine or categorize it. They recognize that man is a thinking, feeling, experiencing, intentional being, and that he should not be studied as an object, a thing, or as a subject detached from his human context.

A similar revolution is occurring also in the field of psychology where humanistic thought has recently had a great impact as a kind of "third force" transcending the limitations of the two main schools, behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Humanistic psychology, as represented by Allport, Fromm, Horney, Maslow, Rogers, Matson, Bugental, and many others, shows a central concern with the dignity and worth of man and the development of his potentialities.

All of these variations of the humanistic approach in social sciences are to be regarded as subsequent developments of the scholarly legacy of C. H. Cooley, W. E. Thomas, W. James, J. Dewey, and G. H. Mead, who first emphasized man as a subject capable of autonomy, choice, and self-

determination, and therefore, able to engage in symbolic interactional processes.

The term "symbolic interactions" properly refers to the process by which individuals relate to their own minds or others' minds; the process, that is, in which individuals take account of their own or their fellows' motives, needs, desires, means and ends, knowledge, and the like (Swanson, 1967). This process was first labeled "symbolic interaction" by Herbert Blumer (1937) who has also most clearly and forcefully stated its position.

The interactionist perspective is not so much a body of specific testable theory as it is a general orientation or an image of man that originates from a simple reflection on the most common experience of everyday life. Blumer has attempted to summarize the basic position of symbolic interactionism in the form of three basic principles (1969: 2).

The first is that "human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them." This assumes that man is endowed with "self", that is, with the ability to consciously affirm himself as an object of his own actions, and therefore to meaningfully make indication to himself of things in his surroundings and to guide his actions by what he notes. Indeed, the conscious life of man is a continuous flow of self-indications -- meaningful notations of things with which he deals and which he takes into account.

This elementary datum of experience is ignored or played down by those social scientists committed to the behavioristic and functionalist views. Meaning in human action either is neglected or it is regarded as a mere neutral link between the factors assumed to be responsible for human behavior and the behavior itself. In contrast, the symbolic interactionist perspective recognizes that the process of self-indication, by means of which human action is formed, cannot be accounted for by factors which precede the act. "The process of self-indication exists in its own right and must be accepted and studied as such. It is through this process that the human being constructs his conscious action" (Blumer, 1969:82).

The second principle is that the meaning of things "is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows." This assumes, contrary to other views entrenched in the social and psychological sciences, that the meaning does not emanate from the intrinsic makeup of the things themselves, nor it does arise through an accretion of psychological elements brought to the things by the subject. Meanings are seen to arise from the process of interaction between people. They are social products that are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact among themselves with a certain purpose in their minds.

Thus, instead of the individual being surrounded by an environment of pre-existing "things" which act as external

stimuli upon him and call forth his behavior, the interactionists suggest a more realistic picture in which the individual constructs his "objects" on the basis of his ongoing interaction with other subjects and with the things themselves (Ibid.:2,69,80).

The third principle of symbolic interactionism affirms that the meanings "are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process, used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters." This maintains that people build up their social behavior through an interpretation of objects, situations, or the actions of others. Accordingly, this interpretation should not be regarded as a mere automatic application of established meanings but as a formative process in which meanings are used and revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of action. "The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroupes, and transforms the meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action" (Ibid.:5).

Group life consists of acting units developing acts to meet the situations in which they are placed, and not as a release or expression of an established social structure. The essence of human society lies primarily in an ongoing process of interaction brought about by responsible actors interpreting or taking into account each others' actions.

The picture is not that of a society conceived "as a system, whether in the form of a static, moving, or whatever kind of equilibrium, but as a vast number of occurring joint

actions, many closely linked, many not linked at all, many prefigured and repetitious, others being carved out in new directions, and all being pursued to serve the purposes of the participants and not the requirements of a system" (Ibid.:75).

The sociological implications that can be derived from the interactionist perspective are of great significance. For example, socialization ceases to be an effective "internalization" of societal norms and values geared to producing a "self" or a kind of "superego" that works perfectly to control behavior. According to the interactionist perspective, socialization is regarded as a "cultivated capacity to take the roles of others effectively" (Ibid.:77). That is, the self is not primarily seen as a vehicle of social control, but as a process of behavior.

At first responsive only to controls over their behavior actually exerted by others, individuals come to apply controls over their own conduct as they develop a "generalized other", abstracting the common perspectives of the group out of a series of particular experiences with it. By taking the attitude of the generalized other, individuals construct their acts to meet social expectations. The self, interpreted in such a way, becomes representative of the group, and once acquired, it exercises its controls. Thus, in this view, social control becomes fundamentally and necessarily a matter of self-control" (Ibid.:77).

Consistently with this dynamic perspective, the interactionist conceives of social change as "a continuous indigenous process in human group life instead of an episodic result of extraneous facts playing on established structure" (Ibid.). Human group life is seen as a perpetual flow of interactional processes always incomplete in each stage and in a state of development instead of an ensemble of discontinuous jumps from one completed state to another.

Social disorganization is seen not as a deplorable breakdown of existing social structures, but as a temporary inability to mobilize action effectively in the face of a given situation. Failures of role-making and role-taking, along with perceptions of whole situations as disorderly, have more than merely negative or disruptive effects. Indeed, problematic situations and occurrences are met creatively by people's efforts to restore social interaction to a smooth course and to sustain a sense of social order. Such creative responses themselves make as important a contribution to order as does the maintenance of routine social interaction.

By shifting the focus from the social structure to the individuals, the interactionist perspective creates a dynamic view of social action as a dialectical process having a historical dimension.

The Chinese humanistic perspective is certainly in line with the basic theoretical framework of symbolic interactionism and, as we shall show below, it is consistent with the fundamental tenets of contemporary humanistic psychology. As we have already shown in this thesis, particularly in chapters IV and V, the Chinese conception of man can be adequately resumed in the following three principles:

1. man is essentially active and self-actualizing;
2. his self-actualization is obtained through a dialectical relationship with others in society;
3. the rules and institutions of society must contribute primarily to the self-actualization of the individual.

Let us illustrate these three principles and comment on their theoretical significance in the context of an interactional perspective and, what is strictly connected with it, the humanistic psychological approach.

#### 1. Man is essentially active and self-actualizing

In the Chinese monistic perspective, man is identified with the spontaneous self-generating life process and prominently participating in the creative dynamics of the universe. Man is not seen as the product of a supernatural being nor in any way as a dependent "passive" entity conditioned, manipulated, or modified by a god or by other men. By his nature, man is active and independent, placed at the very core of the creative process in the universe.

Hence, one can understand why "people come first in China" (Moore, 1967:5), and why Chinese civilization is permeated by a strong sense of confidence in man. The assumption that man is essentially an active, independent being is also at the very root of the revolutionary will of the masses in China; Mao Tse-tung strongly believed that as long as there are people, any kind of "miracle" can be operated.

Despite the conflicting conceptions about the nature of man between Confucians and Legalists in the history of Chinese thought, what is substantially affirmed throughout the Chinese tradition is that man is motivated by one basic drive, that of self-realization.

This picture of man in China, as it has emerged in the course of our analysis in this thesis, is essentially consistent with the picture of man provided by the interactionist perspective and the humanistic psychology. The two images of man reveal similar basic assumptions. They refer to the genuine man of everyday life, not to an artificial construction of it. In contrast with the behavioristic model, man is not viewed as an organism responding to external stimulations with the regular predictability of a machine. Man is grasped as a free, creative being, controlled not by outside or unconscious forces but by his own values and choices. Human being is a "subject" endowed with "intentionality" which implies meaning, self-consciousness, motivation, and striving for an end goal in life.



The "self" does not appear as a static structure of personality, but rather as an organizing principle of a person's experience. Man is essentially "open" to the world. The situation or the world where man lives is more than an external milieu; it is an element strictly related to man's self-development. The terms "ego-world" are not like two separate entities standing face to face, but they are two mutually correlative and integrative realities forming a dialectical unity. This dialectical "ego-world" relation is the very source of the self-realizing drive in man.

Among humanistic psychologists, the most widely spread theory is that "self-realization" is the end goal of life (Horney, 1950; Fromm, 1941). Some authors call it "self-actualization" (Goldstein, 1939; Maslow, 1954). Others prefer to emphasize specific characteristics of this process of development. Rogers (1951) speaks of it as a growth process in which potentialities are brought to realization. Buhler (1962) emphasizes, as does Von Bertalanffy (1966), that essential to the self-realization process is the experience of bringing values to materialization. Frankl (1969) asserts that human existence is self-transcending and that the human goal lies in the fulfillment of a personal meaning projected into something for which he lives. For Hampden-Turner (1970:121-122), the self-actualized individual is the person who is capable of making the highest form of moral judgement -- that judgement based on principle and conscience.

The common denominator of these concepts is that all humanistic psychologists see the goal of life as that of using it to accomplish something in which one believes. From this they expect a fulfillment toward which people direct themselves (Buhler and Allen, 1972:45).

The idea of self-cultivation traditionally inculcated in Chinese culture to achieve the ideal of moral maturity, "sageliness within and kingliness without," is a conspicuous affirmation of man as a self-realizing being. Similarly, in today's China the ideal of complete devotion to others, as we shall see below, can be considered as a strong affirmation of a self-realizing being.

## 2. Self-realization and Others

Although the humanistic psychologists recognize self-realization as the basic drive of human being, they do not cease to advise that this does not mean isolation and self-centeredness. Since "self" and "others" are dialectically correlated, there cannot be true human development of an individual without contributing at the same time to the human development of others (Fromm, 1947; Maslow, 1962; Bugental, 1971; Buhler and Allen, 1972).

The conditio sine qua non for the self-realization of an individual is man's "openness to society". This openness is the channel by which man "gives" and "receives" part of himself in his emotional exchange with others. The

"overture" to others is the basic law of self-realization. Man develops better, the less he concentrates on himself and the more he opens to others (Ibid.)

Conversely, anxiety and abnormal traits emerge in a personality when behavioral and affective contacts with others are broken. In contrast with the Freudian notion that love for others and love for oneself are mutually exclusive, the humanistic psychologists prove that they are basically "conjunctive" and mutually "complementary" (Fromm, 1941:119-141).

Thus, "the ideal for relationship between people is one of mutuality between persons each of whom is the subject of his own life and each of whom values and recognizes the subjecthood of the other" (Bugental, 1971:20). This is Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relationship (1958). The individual truly realizes himself with others, through others, and not at the expense of others (Caldarola, 1968).

This conception of self-realization, as it is expounded by modern scholars, largely confirms the traditional conception of self-realization in Chinese culture. The individual in China is not primarily considered as an end in himself but as a member of a community. As we have seen in other chapters, the idea of jen essentially implies "man in society," not only in the obvious sense of being materially in society, but also, and primarily, in the sense that the individual is engaged in a relation of mutuality and reciprocity with others.


An important dimension of jen is man's practice of empathy. The individual grows as human being by being empathic. Thus, the basis for self-cultivation is "reciprocity" or shu, not egoistic interest. This means that an individual can realize himself as human being only to the extent that he is sensitive to the human development of others. Confucius taught this idea in his famous saying: "In order to establish oneself, one should try to establish others; in order to enlarge oneself, one should try to enlarge others."

This practice of ~~it~~ obviously implies a dialectical tension between self and society, between individual freedom and social responsibility. Chinese culture has always been concerned with this dialectical tension and with creating a suitable balance between individual and collective interests, although it has expressed it in two different ways, traditional and modern. The traditional way stressed the ideal of the Confucian "superior man," that is the man who is true to himself and who exercises benevolence towards others, the one who considers what is "right" in opposition to the ordinary man who considers what is useful.

The aim of Chinese education has always been the morally "good" life, in which the supreme value is the full realization of "human being" through the respect of others. All men are fundamentally equal in innate goodness, in inherent dignity, and in personal rights. Society exists for the full development of this innate goodness of man.

Translated into practice, however, this Confucian ideal produced an elitist society with the literati in power. Since the ways of the superior man, though open to all, are practiced only by a few, it followed that a small elite, outstanding in virtue, had the right to rule over the masses. Eventually, the elitist society degenerated into a rigidly stratified class society. Ambitious youngsters would seek fame and fortune and would look down on those who work with their hands. Since the traditional society had taken administrative and scholarly work as superior, education gradually became an excuse of mediocre people to escape from physical work into the more privileged realm of the educated elite. Thus, class struggle in the educational field, and particularly the reforms since the Cultural Revolution, are directed against such values.

In this sense, the Communist revolution, by abolishing the traditionally elitist type of society, has created a sharp break with the past; it marks a discontinuity in the tradition of China. However, as we have argued in another chapter, Mao Tse-tung's philosophy and revolution are a vigorous affirmation of the most genuine Chinese humanism, a revised version of it. By realizing a Communist society in China, Mao Tse-tung did not create a break in the humanistic tradition as such. He, instead, developed a new aspect of it, and made it more consistent with practice and more relevant to the exigencies of a modern society. Surely, for Mao Tse-tung, as for Confucius, the basic ideal remains the self-



realization of man through society, the happiness of the individual with others, and not at the expense of others.

Mao Tse-tung was interested in the practical fulfillment of man as a "human" being in modern society. The appeal to the equality of human nature and freedom is not just an academic, philosophical point, but a basic social question strictly related to class struggle and to the issue of social justice. The affirmation of the ideal alone is illusory and deceptive as it disguises class oppression and it beclouds the real issues of power and struggle. The theory alone cannot develop man to fulfill himself as a true human being. Personal development has to be sought in the context of a community where workers and peasants have equal dignity with scholars and intellectuals, where there is no gap between the theory and the practice of human values.

In the Maoist ethic there is a strong recognition that the division of society into struggling classes prevents an expression of true humanity. Indeed, true humanity can be achieved only when the inhumanity of class oppression has been overcome. The central concern of Mao Tse-tung was to create social conditions which might lead to true self-development and a true human society. Mao's thought does not reject love and humanity for the sake of hatred. The enemy has to be hated and destroyed, but this has to be done only for the sake of destroying their power to exploit and enslave. When the power of the enemies has been broken, they can be dealt with "on the basis of equality and mutual

benefit" and transformed into useful citizens. When the oppressors have been overthrown, then the situation of class antagonism, which prevented genuine humanity, is changed. True love and humanity are possible only after the victory of the revolutionary struggle against those who created the original situation of oppression (Whitehead, 1977:28-46).

Mao Tse-tung has repeated, though with different applications, the essence of the Chinese tradition: self-cultivation as human person involves the struggle of the individual against selfishness. In the Chinese conceptualization man's moral potential is great, but this potential can be actualized only through the community. "Self" can be meaningfully defined in relation to others. It was in this context that the followers of Mao Tse-tung spoke of the Cultural Revolution as a movement of history aimed at crushing selfishness and promoting a sense of obligation to the collectivity.

The Cultural Revolution was, among other things, a moral and ideological struggle between self-interest (ssu) and the consciousness of the common good (kung). Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution the Maoists considered ssu as the moral foundation of capitalism and revisionism, and kung, the moral foundation of socialism (Kung Chung-wu, 1973:306). Ssu was further characterized as consciousness of private-ownership which is a reflection of the property system of the feudal China as well as of modern capitalist societies. We read in the People's Daily (December 1, 1966) that when one subscribes to the idea of ssu, one tends to "care only

for oneself." Also, one becomes "eager for reputation, gain, power, position, and fame." At the same time, one tends to "forget about the millions of Chinese people and the tens of hundred million people around the world."

In this regard, it is interesting to note that as early as 1938, Mao Tse-tung was already very explicit in urging the members of the Party to combat selfishness:

At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight . . . are most contemptible, while selflessness . . . wholehearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command respect (Mao Tse-tung, 1967, vol. 2:198).

And later, in the People's Daily (October 6, 1967) we read:

Strive not for reputation or gain, fear no hardship, have no fear for death; do nothing for self-interest, but always work for others; have total devotion to revolution and the people; wholeheartedly serve the Chinese people and the people of the world (Kung Chung-wu, 1973:308).

Therefore, self-sacrifice and devotion to the people are central values in the traditional Chinese culture, as well as in Mao's ethical thought. Self-development is strictly related to the devotion that the individual gives to the development of the collectivity. What is to be noted, however, is that while the Confucians had stressed self-development by taming the individual in order to harmonize with the



larger society, contemporary Chinese, instead, stress self-cultivation by developing a deep sense of devotion to reshaping the structures of society in order to make them more conducive to human development.

In any case, the Chinese conception of self-development, in whatever form is proposed -- traditional or modern -- affirms that the individual will realize himself as human being only to the extent that he contributes to the development of others. Although the individual is central in Chinese culture, it is never regarded as "individualistic", that is as a profit motivated person who places the satisfaction of his private interests above the interests of the collectivity. For the Chinese, the individual is primarily a social person who best fulfills his individuality only when he has fulfilled his social responsibilities.

### 3. Self-development and Social Norms

In the course of this thesis we have shown how the human development of the individual is the central concern of Chinese tradition and the ideal to be followed in creating proper social institutions. Accordingly, the rules of propriety (li) were considered as the most perfect embodiment of the spirit of jen, the ideal of human development to which any individual naturally aspires. The achievement of jen by the individual was to be operated through an intelligent and creative "role-taking" as proposed by li.

Confucians and Legalists disagreed only with regard to the importance of rewards and punishments. But the two perspectives eventually softened, resulting in a synthesis of Confucianism and Legalism.

Interestingly, not until today did China develop a formal legal system in the Western sense. In the practice of justice, emphasis has always been placed on the propriety of behavior of the individual to be evaluated according to the particular circumstances, and not on the material observance of abstract formal codes of law and prescribed sanctions. In any period of Chinese history the law has been regarded as "made for man", and not viceversa. Nor there has been any sharp line drawn between legal and moral order in Chinese tradition.

Similarly, as we have seen in previous chapters, politics in China has been traditionally regarded as an instrument for the practice of jen, geared towards the human development of the people. The leaders, being the stewards of the common good, are to look after the needs of the people, so as to create for them the proper conditions for human development. And, in turn, the members of the community are responsible to one another and to the leaders to promote an organic unity where individual interest and common interest may reach an adequate balance. Revolutions have periodically erupted in China any time the masses felt that the social order was not conducive to proper human development.

Reacting to an elitist class which had made of li an instrument to justify and perpetuate the position of a few privileged people, Mao Tse-tung has revitalized the humanistic tradition of China with the application of Marxist principles. Mao's teachings consistently emphasize an active conception of society where individuals are responsible for self-determination, and not just cogs in a machine.

Thus, a rigid bureaucracy, entrenched in the hierarchical structure of status-positions and routinized functions, is rejected as a dehumanizing system. In its place, Mao Tse-tung sees a participatory popular democracy in which bureaucrats (state officials and party cadres) are required to mingle with the people and be responsive to their ideas. In a thoroughly dialectical relationship between leaders and followers, the masses present their needs and their suggestions to the leaders who in turn translate them into social policies.

In this conception of politics, social order is not predefined and imposed on the people by the elite but it is a negotiated order, the result of bargaining, negotiation, deliberation, agreements, temporary arrangements, deliberate suspensions of the rules, and a variety of other procedures jointly undertaken by the leaders and followers at the local level in order to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of adequate balance between self interest and public interest. This conception which relies more on the interaction of the people rather than on formally prescribed social structures,

discourages stagnation, and favours change and development.

The Chinese idea according to which human self-development is regarded as the ultimate standard for developing an adequate normative system in society is quite consistent with the conception of those western scholars who currently take a humanistic approach in the field of social sciences.

As Maslow points out, ". . . a society or a culture can be either growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. The sources of growth and of humanness are essentially within the human person and are not created or invented by society which can only help or hinder the development of humanness, just as a gardener can help or hinder the growth of a rosebush, but cannot determine that it shall be an oak tree . . . This makes theoretically possible a comparative sociology transcending and including cultural relativity. The "better" culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. The "poorer" cultures do not. The same is true for education. To the extent that it fosters growth toward self-actualization, it is "good" education." (Maslow, 1962:197).

In other words, any social order or any social institution that fosters self-realization is "good" to man, or "human"; otherwise it is "inhuman". Hence, we have a normative humanism according to which the criterion of normality or abnormality does not consist in a perfect or imperfect adjustment to a given social order (as the functionalist approach would suggest) but in the satisfactory answer

to the problem of human realization. In this way, we will be able to understand in which direction we should move in order to create the most favorable social setting in which education, economics, environment, culture, discipline and precept may positively favour an integrative personality development and the realization of a healthy human society (Fromm, 1955; Caldarola, 1968).

The recent emphasis on participatory democracy by a growing number of social scientists is precisely the recognition of the principle of self-realization as the basic criterion in the creation of an "authentic" society (Etzioni, 1968; Breed, 1971; Pranger, 1968; Ferkiss, 1974).

The above principles are the direct theoretical implications of Chinese humanism with regard to the relationship of man and society. As we have seen, they appear to be quite consistent with the tenets and the implications of the interactionist perspective and humanistic psychology.

The proposed position offers the possibility of shifting the emphasis in sociology and other social sciences from a so-called "value-free" position to a value-committed position, oriented toward exploring new alternatives to improve society and facilitate human growth.

Building on a humanistic image of man, sociologists can develop theories and methodologies that study man and his institutions from the more comprehensive perspective of human

growth and self-fulfillment rather than from the normality-adjustment, or deviance perspectives still prevailing in the field today. The growing dissatisfaction with the scientific rhetoric of value neutrality and the mechanistic and deterministic theories and methodologies is persuading a number of scholars to direct their efforts towards making sociology and other social sciences a more humanistic enterprise (Glass and Staude, 1972).

## II. DIALECTICAL CHANGE

In conformity with its cultural heritage, the western mind is definitely inclined toward the "either-or" dichotomous way of thinking which makes the grasp of dialectics laborious and complex. This is why the reality of change has always been one of the most crucial issues to explain in western tradition. Despite certain remarkable efforts done by several authors to produce dialectical views of reality, a correlative logic capable of expressing the intrinsic ontological ambivalence of reality has never become popular in the West.

Sociology began with evolutionary theory, and much of contemporary sociology still bears the imprint of the nineteenth century evolutionary theorists. Evolutionary theory drew heavily upon the biological sciences. Thus, society was seen as a highly complex organism composed of inter-related parts, all of which function in important ways for

the maintenance of the whole. The function of each part can be assessed in terms of its overall contribution to the survival of society.

In this conception, society is an organism that changes only in so far as its exigencies of survival demand. As existing social structures become inadequate to their assigned tasks under the increasing pressure of environmental forces, they are forced to change. This change occurs through a process of increasing complexity and differentiation of structures and functions (Spencer, 1958).

Critically considered, this explanation provided by the evolutionary theory may serve better as a post hoc description of social change than as a theoretical analysis of the process of change itself. And even as a post hoc description, early evolutionary theory has been found lacking in crucial respects, for it did not adequately fit the anthropological data that first became available in the early twentieth century. The stages of evolution specified by writers such as Comte (1893) and Morgan (1877) simply failed to square with the facts.

Moreover, and more seriously, the central postulate that characterizes all evolutionary theory of change, that societies develop in the direction of increasing adaptability through a process of structural-functional complexity and differentiation, has been called into question by empirical research. As Wibert Moore, among others, notes, "the easy assumption that societies evolved from 'simple' to

'complex' forms, and that a scale based, say, on the predominant productive technology would order all significant aspects of social organization, turned out to be unwarranted" (Moore, 1963:114).

Equilibrium theory is in many respects the twentieth century legacy of early evolutionary theory. The difference between the two approaches is largely one of emphasis. Like evolutionary theorists, equilibrium theorists see societies as basically stable, smooth-running organisms, highly differentiated and therefore highly complex.

However, whereas evolutionary theory combined an organismic analogy with the sociological equivalent of Darwin's theory of the evolution of species, equilibrium theorists have emphasized primarily the study of the social organism in its environment. They tend to see societies as homeostatic systems, possessing "mechanisms" designed to restore equilibrium in the face of disturbances. The equilibrium is conceived as a condition of a system whereby "the state of the elements that enter the system and of the mutual relationships between them is such that any small change in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to reduce the amount of that change" (Homans, 1950:303-304).

According to the structural functionalists who sponsor this approach, social systems change, but only with great difficulty; forces productive of change will tend to be met by compensating forces that offset change. The essential



reality of a social system is believed to be its inner coherence. Values and beliefs, and the institutions in which they are embodied, are extremely durable and tend to prevent incipient changing tendencies from affecting more general structures or the nature of the society itself.

Boundary exchanges between system and environment tend to be equilibrating, not destabilizing. The forces of change in a social system arise from external pressures that have somehow overwhelmed or penetrated the system's defences. Unlike the evolutionary theory which regards change as essentially smooth, continuous, and incremental, the equilibrium theorists regard change as abrupt, discontinuous, and total.

Despite these differences, the evolutionary and the equilibrium models are quite compatible. As Appelbaum(1970: 127) notes, they can be said to be "two sides of the same coin," for "the difference is more analytical than real." This is why some sociologists have been classified both as evolutionary and equilibrium theorists, according to the emphasis of a particular work; Parsons, for example, has written essays with an equilibrium focus(Parsons,1960:ch.4; Parsons and Smelser,1965), as well as works with an evolutionary focus (1960:ch.3; 1966;1977).

The two models have eventually converged in developing a modernization theory with emphasis on the unidirectionality of change. By emphasizing a high degree of structural interdependence and functional integration, a social system is

viewed as highly determinate, given a major structural component.

Thus, it has been maintained that certain societal patterns (similar to those of the West) are inevitable for any society that accepts western technology. In identifying the "necessary correlates" of industrialization, it has been maintained that all societies are held to undergo a parallel series of transformations during the process of industrialization that results in a highly homogeneous final product, that is, a modern, industrial society with an obvious western appearance. The theme of recapitulation is rather common in the literature, with most writers arguing that in all important aspects of industrialization, a recapitulation of the western model, but with greater central planning, is essential (see, for example, Holton, 1960; Apter, 1960; Kerr, 1960; Parsons, 1960:Part 2; Levy, 1965).

Obviously, this position could not explain the crude and stubborn facts of variability in modernization cases. The experience shows that modernization does not demand the obliteration of tradition, nor does it impose a particular social structure upon a people. For example, Goode (1963) finds a considerable variety of family forms congenial with industrialization; there is no necessary destruction of traditional family patterns.

Moreover, it has been shown that some of the factors we often associate with modernization on the basis of western experience may show a negative correlation with sustained

growth in some developing nations. At certain levels of development, such factors as degree of literacy, growth of the mass media, formal education and urbanization may correlate negatively with sustained growth (Eisenstadt, 1970: 23).

These observations have induced a number of sociologists to reformulate the evolutionary-functional model to explain more adequately the variability of the patterns of modernization in the world (see, for example, Moore, 1965; Black, 1966).

On the other hand, systems theory, as developed by Parsons (1951; 1960; 1964; 1971), focuses on the equilibrium in boundary exchanges between social subsystems. Although this perspective agrees with the evolutionary approach that the underlying process of change is one of differentiation, specialization, and reintegration, yet its primary concern is the boundary relations between subsystems rather than the ramifications of the evolutionary process itself.

Accordingly, a society consists of specialized systems and subsystems, each engaged in a series of boundary exchanges with the other and with the "environments" external to the social system itself. Social systems and their subsystems are conceived as existing in a cybernetic hierarchy, subject to "conditions" and "controls". Conditions provide the "givens" within which change occurs; they relate ultimately to physical-organic environment. Controls govern change itself. They refer to "ultimate reality" concepts, and are directly related to cultural systems.

The cultural system is highest in controls and lowest in conditions. Thus, changes in cultural patterns occur with great difficulty and over long periods of time; the more generalized the value the higher it lies on the hierarchy of controls, and, therefore, the less likely it is to change. Social structures may change. The lower they are on the hierarchy of controls, the more readily they will adjust to changing conditions in their environments, but these changes tend to decrease as they spread upward through the entire system. Looking from this perspective, Parsons (1951:486) coherently concludes that "the theory of change in the structure ~~of~~ social systems must, therefore, be a theory of particular subprocesses of change within such systems, not of the overall processes of change of the systems as systems.

This position, obviously, can neither explain the occurrence of radical changes in society nor account for the phenomena accompanying them. As Guessous(1967:34) correctly notes in this regard, ". . . it says next to nothing about what happens when a social system is in disequilibrium, and only tells us what that system will be like if and when it has reached a new position of rest . . . It is tied to the image of a society whose historical developments holds no surprises. Nothing new and unique, no important transformations ever happen in the normal world of equilibrium theory."

In contrast with this dominant approach in sociology, conflict theory assumes that conflict and change, rather than persistence and stability, are ubiquitous, all social organization is inherently unstable, and any unity is due largely to coercion and constraint (Dahrendorf, 1959:161-162; 237).

In the conflict perspective social phenomena are viewed to possess contradictory qualities in that they always pose a clash of opposite variables which are integral to them and which only resolve their incompatibility through structural changes. The dialectical method assumes that nothing is determinate, durable, and that, in consequence, everything is emerging, developing and being transformed or displaced in the process. Social change is the working out of conflict.

The most outstanding effort in the West to produce a dialectical conception of change is that of Marx. By emphasizing the importance of economic relations, instability is seen to inhere in social structure due to the tension between the forces and the relations of production. The process of change is dialectical in that social classes stand in the relation of Hegel's thesis and antithesis, in the sense that one is characterized by the affirmation of those features of which the other is the complete negation. Furthermore, the historical sequence of change is itself dialectical in that in any given epoch, the dominant class carries within itself the seeds of its own future destruction in the form of a class which it creates to provide the productive forces necessary for its own existence.

In his reformulation of Marx's theory of class, Dahrendorf(1959:27-32) attempts to purify it from unsound philosophical elements, and produces "a theory of structural change by revolutions based on conflicts between antagonistic interest groups"(Ibid:26). Properly speaking, Dahrendorf's reformulation gives us not a theory of societal change but a theory of antagonistic groups in conflict. This seems to be the maximum theoretical reach in the western dialectical theory of social change. So far, there has been no effort to go beyond the conception of antagonistic contradictions in social reality.

However, the dialectical conception of Mao Tse-tung, as we have seen in chapter six, has focussed attention also on the nonantagonistic contradictions. His conception is a specific application of the Chinese dialectical conception of reality to the particular case of class struggle in society. Mao Tse-tung's idea of the duality of contradiction -- both within a thing and among things -- recalls the fundamental principle of yin-yang philosophy according to which contradiction is found not only between two antagonistic entities but also within a given entity.

Mao Tse-tung insists that without contradiction each aspect loses the condition of its own existence. This is in conformity with the traditional yin-yang dialectics for which, by contrast with the Hegelian counterpart, the yin is not the antithesis of yang but its natural complement and alternate.

In the traditional conception of Chinese dialectics the elements of reality are mutually interacting and complementing through a perpetual process of development stimulated and fulfilled by intrinsic tension and contradiction. Thus, if Mao drew from western Marxism the idea of antagonistic contradictions in society, his theory of nonantagonistic contradictions owes much to the yin-yang heritage of Chinese thought. As these contradictions do not occur between truly antithetical polarities, they still may continue to exist after the passage from capitalism to socialism.

In his dialectical conception, Mao Tse-tung does not see any final resolution of all contradictions. For him the contradiction is merely transferred to a qualitatively different and higher unity. Therefore, contradictions continue to exist under socialism; they merely exist at a higher stage. In his essay On Practice, in discussing the importance of understanding the link between practical activity and consciousness, between material and mental, Mao Tse-tung affirmed: "Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level"(Mao Tse-tung, 1975:308).

Since contradiction is the real force of change and transformation, there follows, on the basis of the principle of the unity of theory and practice, the necessity of a "perpetual revolution," thus arresting the tendencies toward cultural and ideological rigidity or toward complacency and

social stagnation. Following this principle, Mao Tse-tung could formulate a model of modernization which primarily requires the dialectics of collective efforts rather than the initiative of an established bureaucratic elite separated from the masses.

These conceptions of revolution and modernization are different from those prevailing among western theorists. Revolution in the West has always been conceived as a momentary, violent upheaval similar to an earthquake, that is, long in germination but sudden and short in duration. Revolution is quickly over as society returns to more normal ways of operating which are based on the rational imperatives of administrative routine and technical specialization.

In this context, the idea of uninterrupted revolution would suggest a perpetuation of the abnormal, the exceptional, the emotional. Revolutionary values stand opposed to the steady, ordered measures needed for building a new society. Thus, the Chinese revolution is dismissed by certain China watchers as a kind of transition crisis to a certain stage of society's development (Schwartz, 1966).

Western scientists usually suggest controlled development through bureaucratic elites rather than by mass participation. Collective work is in contrast with acquisitive individualism and competitive self-interest which are assumed to be at the very root of any advanced form of division of labour in society.

The picture of modern man drawn by western theorists is one of an egoistic, self-interested, competitive man, motivated



by the pursuit of material good, status, and power. Rationality, with its emphasis on the abstract impersonal reason, is an essential criterion of modernity. It demands a break with the emotional relationship, with the sacred, with the human. It implicates a society without community, a society where individuals see each other largely as means to an end. Bureaucracy, with its precision, discipline, rigor and dependability, is considered to be the best rational means of control of atomized individuals.

This picture draws on a long tradition in the history of western sociology led by such names as Toennies, Durkheim, Weber. But whereas these scholars felt themselves uncomfortable with the new "rational" way of human relations and looked for alternatives, modern theorists, instead, seem to accept for granted the picture of modern man. Thus, an intensely egoistic, competitive notion of human nature feeds a certain notion of bureaucracy, and vice versa. In this mutually reinforcing set of assumptions lies the essence of modernization theory (Peck, 1973:80).

However, Mao's theory has to be understood and evaluated on its own merits, apart from the assumptions of western culture. Permanent revolution is regarded by Mao Tse-tung as a continuous process unfolding in a "wave-like form of progress." Accordingly, this does not mean that tension is maintained at the same extreme pitch at all times. Rather, it implies alternate phases of "hard fighting" and "rest and consolidation," "haste" and "deliberation," "toil" and

"dreams" (Quoted in Schram, 1974:106-107).

The ultimate objective of the revolution is economic prosperity to be achieved along humane, non-exploitative social relations. Revolution must affect simultaneously both the economic infrastructure and the ideological superstructure of society. The process of development has to be regarded in terms of the unity of opposites, "politics" and "economics," "redness" and "expertise," "theory" and "practice". Industrialization alone does not make a "good" society. The latter is the result of people who at the same time are both technologically skilled and virtuous, that is, committed to collective values; and who directly and actively participate in determining the course of politics (Pfeffer, 1971).

~~This conception is quite consistent with the traditional~~ idea of education in Chinese culture. As we have seen elsewhere in this thesis, education for the Chinese is not just the process of acquisition of knowledge in order to make a living. It includes also the learning of a sound moral behavior, attitudes towards others, and public responsibility. It includes the struggle within each individual between selfish and social demands, between egoistic gains and collective gains; and this in any field -- economic, social, political, cultural.

In other words, education assumes the identity of theory and practice. Abstraction alone never shows the way to truth. No true knowledge precedes experience, and no real competence

is possible before practical doing. To isolate oneself from a situation and dwell only with abstract concepts leads to false pretense, to privilege, superiority of intellectual knowledge over manual skill. In this division of knowledge and practice lies the power of the bureaucratic elite.

By vigorously affirming the unity of theory and practice, Mao Tse-tung rejected the bureaucratic class as a privileged class of experts separated from the masses. For him the true source of change consists primarily in the mass initiative, not in the blueprints prepared by the bureaucrats. History is not created by the planners but by the masses.

Mass initiative and creativity are to be properly guided and promoted by the leaders who have not segregated themselves from the masses. For Mao, revolutionary leadership suggests one must go to the masses, learn from them and translate their human experiences into better articulated principles and methods; then call upon the masses to put the principles and the methods into practice so as to resolve their problems and help them to achieve liberation and happiness. Through this collective work, it is possible to make change both uninterrupted and shaped, continuous and guided (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:vol.3:158).

Obviously, this dynamic approach to social change assumes the integration of the personal and the social, that is, the identification of individual concerns with community concerns. This high degree of participation in society is possible only with an adequate socialization whereby indivi-

duals learn how to translate social goals into individual and moral goals through a process of self-examination, self-criticism, and transformation.

In other words, the traditional Chinese emphasis on human development through collective participation, rather than through individualistic expression, is at the very basis of the Maoist thesis of dialectical change. Indeed, we may say that Mao's humanism is a revitalization of the basic principles of the traditional Chinese humanism extrapolated from the old structures and repropose to the Chinese people in Marxist terms.

The policy of the post-Maoist government in China in the past two years is essentially a development of Mao Tse-tung's program. As we have noted, Mao Tse-tung conceived of revolution as a continuous wave-like pattern. He spoke of such "waves" as land reform, mutual aid team movement, co-operativization, rectification campaign, cultural revolution, and many others. He also conceived of "scientific and technological revolution" as another "wave" that was to come in the context of China's permanent revolution (Schram, 1974:106-107).

Since the death of Mao, and especially after the overthrow of the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao wing of the Party, the new leaders of China have made decisive moves to promote the "scientific and technological revolution" as an important cycle of the country's continuous revolution. Moreover, there are sound indications that the new leaders intend to

promote this economic program along the same Maoist line of the dialectic of "readness" and "expertise". Their goal is still the Maoist goal: to find a proper balance between economic growth and revolutionary practice (Tsou Tang, 1977; Wu Chiang, 1978; Fang Yi, 1978).

The ultimate goal is to build a modern nation that is different from the models of modernization followed by the West and the Soviet Union. The Chinese model emphasizes a more humane society as it aims at creating flexible institutions that are responsive to the people's needs, encourage direct mass participation, and are capable of controlling development on the basis of values meaningfully determined by the people.

Only time will tell what the Chinese have been able to achieve in facing this challenge and what those achievements may mean in the concrete, for China and the world (Pfeffer, 1971:296).

The above considerations have shown how the basic ideas of Chinese humanism are consistent with those of the interactionist/humanistic perspective in sociology. They also have reposed once again the crucial debate between the "system" and the "conflict" approaches in the theoretical interpretation of social reality.

The analysis has demonstrated that the system paradigm, which claims identity with the epistemology of natural science,

is grossly misleading when applied to represent the human social experience. This paradigm needs to be balanced by the humanistic paradigm which assumes at its core a self-determining and self-responsible human individual, capable of transcending the yoke of compulsive order.

At a time of acute crisis in western sociology characterized by conceptual vacuum and theoretical dis-orientation, it is refreshing to turn to the wisdom of Chinese humanism as a healthy source of theoretical inspiration. In the course of our analysis the basic principles of Chinese humanism have been found theoretically valid and able to lead to the creation of a more humane society.

Theoretical thinking in sociology would greatly profit from meaningful comparisons with orientations of different cultures. Comparative efforts provide a unique opportunity for a profitable dialogue leading to self-reflection and criticism. The present work is a modest effort in this direction.

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