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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

AFFECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE THROUGH ART:  
BALANCING SCHOOL EDUCATION

BY

Marcia Jane Johnston

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF EDUCATION

IN

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION  
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA  
FALL, 1987

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
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

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Supervisor

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Date: May 28, 1987

## ABSTRACT

Today's educational system has often been criticized for being limited by the prevailing view that knowledge is acquired through the memorization of inert ideas. In schooling the focus is often upon the students learning about ideas developed by experts, rather than upon using their own experiences to discover, test or explore ideas. This limited perspective abnegates the possibility for the students to come to know the meaning of their emotions through attending to their emotional experiences.

Many theorists now agree that emotions have a cognitive element which involves personal appraisals. For example, R.W. Hepburn (1975) points out that part of being afraid is perceiving a situation as threatening to ourselves. To feel gratitude is to see someone as our benefactor. To feel apprehension is to see something as dangerous to ourselves or to someone for whom we care. That is, we select, interpret and judge the objects as being meaningful to us in some way, either egotistically or as part of our commitment to self-transcendent values.

Frequently, though, we are only subsidiarily or unconsciously aware of both the feeling and appraisal of an emotional experience. When meeting the tasks of daily life, there is little room to consciously discern all the complexities involved in our experience. Or reasons such as fear of facing painful apprehensions may cause us to repress them. For example, we may only be subsidiarily aware of the happiness we feel being in a particular decor because we are attending to a conversation we are having with a friend. We may only vaguely be aware of feeling

angry towards the world and not at all aware that this vague anger reflects an unconscious feeling of jealousy at a friend's success. A child may be unaware that she continually loses her school books because she fears failing. Part of understanding ourselves, then, involves becoming consciously aware of these recondite affective experiences.

However, it is not always so easy for the appraisals and feelings of emotions to come into our consciousness for reasons already mentioned. Therefore, a catalyst and guide to awareness and understanding may be needed to uncover emotions, to elicit their meanings into consciousness and to aid in the comprehension of them. This thesis proposes that the beholding and creating of art can act as this aid to conscious awareness and understanding.

The sheer power of an aesthetic symbol's metaphorical sense imagery to evoke emotional connectedness stimulates us to have a conscious emotional experience upon which we can contemplate. We can attend to our emotional response and our appraisals of the work which evoked the emotion, and in doing so we can come to understand the personal meaning of our emotion.

With this mode of coming to self-knowledge, education in schools, without ever submitting to the pretension of therapy or psychological analysis, can overcome to an important extent, the historic imbalance whereby knowledge and understanding have been restricted to the impersonal, the general and the 'external', leaving the individual to wallow in ignorance and confusion regarding him or herself as unique identities.

15  
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. INTRODUCTION.....  | 1    |
| The Scope of This Thesis .....  | 1    |
| Learning Disconnected Ideas About Emotion.....                            | 1    |
| Education of Emotions.....  | 4    |
| Education Guided By The Special Passion For,<br>Knowledge Itself.....     | 7    |
| Education Through Emotions.....   | 8    |
| II. AFFECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE.....                 | 12   |
| Structure of an Emotional Experience.....                                 | 12   |
| Objectless Emotion.....   | 17   |
| Unconscious and Subsidiary Awareness of<br>Personal Meanings.....         | 20   |
| The Effects of Living Lives Based Upon<br>Partial Self-Understanding..... | 22   |
| The Effects of Living Lives Based Upon<br>One Form of Knowing.....        | 26   |
| Education/Knowing/Quality of Life.....                                    | 27   |
| III. AFFECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE THROUGH ART.....                            | 34   |
| Symbolism.....  | 34   |
| Appropriateness of Symbol.....  | 35   |
| The Power of Art to Focus Attention Upon<br>Affective Experience.....     | 37   |
| A Mode of Truth-Perception and Understanding.....                         | 42   |
| Knowing Through Art Which Symbolizes Affective<br>Experience.....         | 45   |
| IV. EDUCATION AND ART.....  | 49   |
| Knowledge of the Educators.....   | 50   |

CHAPTER

PAGE

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Focusing Students' Minds Using Symbolization..... | 50 |
| Presentation of Lessons.....                      | 56 |
| Student Activities.....                           | 58 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....                                 | 66 |

## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Scope of This Thesis

This is a thesis about education through attention to emotions and their meaning. I am not concerned with the teaching of inert ideas about emotion or with the enhancement of emotions. Nor am I interested in education guided by the special passion for knowledge itself. It is a thesis in which it is argued that emotions can be used to come to know some aspects of ourselves which cannot be adequately known in any other way. Implicit in this argument is a challenge to those who believe that emotions are basically irrational and that we only come to know through intellection and rote memorization. It fills gaps which I believe exist in education about emotions and education of emotions. To begin with, I shall clarify the specific aspect of education which concerns me by contrasting it with other varieties of teaching and learning with which it might be concerned.

#### Learning Disconnected Ideas About Emotion

It is my opinion that learning ideas about emotion which are not tested and explored through the learner's own experience is of limited value in education, although I have observed that this kind of learning is a major part of schooling today.

For example, based upon my experience, high school and university students learn about emotional behavior by attending lectures and memorizing the theories presented. It rarely occurs to them, and their teachers do not encourage them, to confirm the

validity of these ideas by observing themselves, their families, friends and acquaintances. Nor does it occur to them to use the ideas to understand and transform their experiences, if it seems beneficial to do so. There is no time! They have to pass examinations which are usually not concerned with personal observations and growth. The questions usually pertain only to the ideas developed by known and respected researchers. Thus, their learning remains at the level of ideas about emotion, with no reference made to discovery and verification in their own experience.

Speaking generally about education, T. Roszak poignantly describes such an educational experience:

Think how fanatically verbal our education is, our good education that strives for "excellence" by force-feeding children with reading-writing-and-arithmetic from the earliest possible age, and never ceases exercising that narrow range of skills from nursery school to graduate school. Lecture, textbook, recitation, examination, note taking, research, criticism, debate, discussion....from Dick and Jane to the seminar table and learned journal. If there is more to the human anatomy than the reading eye, the logical ear, and the articulating voice box, our schools know nothing of it. God help the painters and dancers, the musicians and contemplatives among our students!

It is the "force-feeding" of any subject matter that is antithetical to the focus of this discussion. Its major premise is that through emotional experience we can come to know the emotion as it is felt and the knowledge and beliefs which contribute to it. Thus, rather than separating ourselves from the emotional experience we want to know, we enter into it more fully,

thereby achieving self-knowledge about what we feel and why we feel the way we do. That is, we attend to what Roszak calls the "resonance of experience" or the "feel of the words" to find the meaning.<sup>2</sup> How to achieve this understanding about ourselves through art is the major focus of this thesis.

This direct knowledge of our emotional experiences as they are felt can be used to confirm the validity of and to develop ideas about emotions. In applying this knowledge to ideas, we connect ideas to experience. Thus, they become meaningful in their connection with, rather than in their abstraction from life. However, the main focus of this thesis is not the exploration of such a connection, but of the process by which we become aware of and understand an emotion's meaning by attending to the emotion.

On the other hand, connecting ideas to this self-knowledge is a means by which to understand our emotions. As well, we can use the ideas to confirm the correctness of our beliefs, perceptions, and the appropriateness of our emotions and to change these if necessary. For example, a man who has an unresolved, unconscious Oedipus complex, may learn about Freud's theory in University, but not recognize himself as having the complex. Consciously knowing the theory, he continues to unconsciously feel sexual desire for his mother and guilt for having the desire. These unconsciously felt emotions inhibit his ability to develop a satisfactory relationship with his wife. He often shows anger towards her and feels dissatisfied with his marriage, but cannot explain his

24

dissatisfaction. Consciously he knows that he has similar interests and philosophy to those of his wife and that he respects and loves her, therefore he should be happy and satisfied. What is wrong? If by some fortuitous experience such as discussion with friends, counselling, artistic endeavours, contemplation, he recognizes his own Oedipus complex and thus that the theory applies to his situation, he can become consciously aware of his desire and guilt, and understand their originating apprehension. He can then seek ways to transform them so that they do not continue to have a negative effect upon his marital relationship. This situation exemplifies transformation of our emotional experience which falls under the category 'education of emotions'.

#### Education of Emotions

Central to the views on the education of emotions is the recognition that emotions have a "cognitive core",<sup>3</sup> to use John White's terminology, and that the education of them involves the transmutation of emotions and their "cognitive core".

R.S. Peters points out that emotions seem to be associated with appraisals, that is, "seeing situations under aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable, beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions".<sup>4</sup> He suggests that the education of emotions involves extending our capacities for making appraisals, changing our appraisals if they are based upon false beliefs, and changing appraisals linked with passive emotional states to those linked with motivation and action. Furthermore, it involves the

development of "self-transcending emotions" such as love and respect instead of "the more primitive self-referential ones" (e.g., jealousy) and the "control and canalization of emotions through speech and symbolic gesture".<sup>5</sup>

However, these educational proposals presuppose that we are already aware of our emotions and their appraisals. This point is important in the light of Peters' view that emotion is something that "comes over us", often immediately and intuitively, which makes it difficult for us to specifically identify the appraisal and/or emotion.<sup>6</sup> Peters does state that psychoanalysis is a means by which we can recognize them, but he also points out that the status of this knowledge has not been determined.

There is a long-standing problem in the theory of knowledge about the status of knowledge of persons which is partly connected with the general problem of criteria of knowledge in this field, and partly with the issue about whether there is any kind of priority to be attached to knowledge of one's own case. But whatever is said about these very difficult matters, there is certainly an important distinction to be made between knowing certain facts about oneself and other people and the more imaginative type of entering into one's own and other people's more recondite emotions, for which we use the term 'insight'.<sup>7</sup>

The arguments in this thesis support the view that knowledge of our recondite emotions should be highly regarded and be part of education. Peters, himself acknowledges that:

As, however, one's ability to recognize emotions in oneself is a feature of being educated in this sphere, and as a criterion of being educated emotionally is the tendency for one's appraisals of others to be based on a realistic assessment of their condition, further knowledge about how this imaginative ability is developed is of

crucial importance in the education of emotions. In this sphere, we are particularly prone to see what we fear or wish to be the case; our beliefs are likely to follow the lines of our moods and intuitive appraisals. If we lack the capacity for ascertaining what really is the case, we are very likely to remain in what Spinoza called 'The state of human bondage', at the mercy of our own prejudices and passivity.<sup>8</sup>

It is the intention of this thesis, in part, to explore our imaginative ability to enter into our own emotions through art, and to use this process to recognize them as they are felt and to acquire insights into them. Also, I believe that this is part of the development of safe, legitimate ways to express negative, disruptive emotions, which Peters also argues is part of the education of emotions.

The control and canalization of emotions through speech and symbolic gesture is an extremely important intermediary in the sphere of emotion, which lies between extreme forms of passivity and appropriate action. In the case of many appraisals, such as those connected with hate, fear and lust, we would be in a very sorry plight if there were no intermediary between grieving in the passive state specific to the appraisals in question and launching into the relevant actions of murder, flight and rape.<sup>9</sup>

In his article, "The arts and the education of feeling and emotion", R.W. Hepburn discusses "the educating of emotion through the appreciation of art".<sup>10</sup> He argues that this process of educating involves the refinement of emotional responses and the creation of new emotions through the elucidation of new ways of seeing and using works of art. For he is also an advocate of the notion that emotions have a cognitive element which involves "selective attention, the grouping or interpreting of perceived



features of one's situation, and the making of judgments of value", which he terms "seeing-as".<sup>11</sup>

According to Hepburn, a necessary condition for transforming a stereotypical, undiscriminating emotion is to understand it.

To be free to modify a pattern of feeling, it is essential to have a grasp of its origins, objectives and affiliations".<sup>12</sup>

He further states that, "art can enormously add to our grasp of such patterns,...".<sup>13</sup> However, he does not explain the process by which art aids in our grasp of emotions and their appraisals. He only discusses briefly how our emotional patterns might be transformed through art. Therefore, we are told of a necessary condition for modifying our emotions in describable ways, but we are not told how art could help to establish this condition. This is not meant as a criticism of Hepburn for this was not the intent of his article. Rather, it is a means to point out that the intent of this thesis is to describe this use of art in education.

Education Guided By The Special Passion For Knowledge Itself

Part of education involves the development of emotional attitudes which lead us to knowledge. Love and respect for truth and order, humility of thought, sympathy for other points of view are examples. Fear of facing the truth, arrogance and antipathy towards others block us from knowing.

Peters uses the term "rational passions" to denote emotions which "are internalizations of principles which give structure and point to theoretical inquiries;...they are also involved in practical activities and judgements insofar as these are conducted

in a rational manner".<sup>14</sup>

Although Peters is speaking of the role certain passions play in the development of rational attitudes, I think that the fostering of similar passions is necessary in the knowing of emotional patterns. Even though we do not initially use our reason in the process of becoming aware of the meanings of our emotions (as I explain in this thesis), we do use reason to understand the emotional meaning. Furthermore, we must "care about consistency and clarity", "abhor irrelevance and other forms of arbitrariness", and "value sincerity"<sup>15</sup> to use Peters' examples. Otherwise we can easily deceive ourselves regarding the meaning of our emotions and without them, emotion too often degenerates into sentimentality. Thus, we have to have the courage to face the truth about ourselves and to enter into the emotions that will guide us to this knowledge.

However, the development of emotions which lead us to knowledge is not the focus of this thesis. Nor is using these emotions to give structure and guidance to the focus of an enquiry. When I speak about knowing through emotions, I am speaking about emotions such as joy, sadness, fear, anger, whose appraisals are not about truth, order, clarity. That is, their meanings are not apprehensions connected to a search for knowledge, but are apprehensions connected to ourselves.

#### Education Through Emotions

The focus of this thesis, then, is not education as guided by passion for knowledge. Nor is it education of emotions for the

refinement, expansion and rationalization of emotional experiences. Finally, the focus is not education about ideas regarding emotions, where the ideas are disconnected from immediate experience.

The concern is education through emotions which involves focusing attention on our emotions in order to become aware of our own knowledge and beliefs. Thus, it is mainly concerned with the attainment of knowledge of oneself as an individual rather than truths having general reference. I ~~say~~ mainly because an effect of knowing ourselves can be knowing others, which I will discuss later.

Furthermore, in this thesis, the scope of self-knowledge is limited to awareness of our emotions as directly felt and their appraisals. It includes other aspects of ourselves, such as our talents, culturally defined identities and familial history only insofar as these are part of emotional appraisals. I acknowledge that knowing other dimensions of ourselves is also important. However, it would be impossible to discuss all aspects of self-knowledge within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I have restricted its intent to the elucidation of the attainment of self-knowledge through attention to immediate emotion.

FOOTNOTES

1. T. ROSZAK, "Rhapsodic Intellect," In: Where The Wasteland Ends, Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973), p. 352.
2. T. ROSZAK, op. cit., pp. 350 and 352.
3. J. WHITE, "The Education of the Emotions," In: Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1984), p. 233.
4. R.S. PETERS, "The education of emotions," In: Education and reason, Part 3 of Education and the development of reason, Edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p.77.
5. R.S. PETERS, op. cit., p. 90.
6. R.S. PETERS, op. cit., pp. 80 and 83.
7. R.S. PETERS, op. cit., pp. 88.
8. Ibid.
9. R.S. PETERS, op. cit., pp. 91 and 92.
10. R.W. HEPBURN, "The arts and the education of feeling and emotion," In: Education and reason, Part 3 of Education and the development of reason, Edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 94.
11. R.W. HEPBURN, op. cit., pp. 95.
12. R.W. HEPBURN, op. cit., pp. 98.

13. Ibid.

14. R.S. PETERS, "Reason and passion," In: Reason, Part 2 of Education and the development of reason, Edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 76.

15. Ibid.

AFFECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE

Structure of an Emotional Experience

We can think about an idea such as, "A nuclear war will annihilate all life on earth" as a mere empirical possibility. Another talking to us can be perceived as the other's body position, words and tone of voice. A decision to do something can be determined as a rational action. Understanding a concept can be thought of as clarification of our ideas. A room can be considered an object consisting of four walls, a floor and a ceiling. But when do these thoughts, perceptions, decisions and understandings affect us emotionally?

What occurs when the thought of nuclear war precipitates despair and anguish? What takes place such that we feel disparaged, violated and angry as a person is talking to us? What happens when we feel anxious and betrayed by a decision? What occurs when understanding evokes elation and excitement? What happens such that we feel peaceful and secure in a room? That is, what needs to occur for us to emotionally respond to these objects?

As was pointed out in Chapter 1, some theorists have argued that emotions have a cognitive element. I propose that apprehending the personal meaning of such objects is the cognition that evokes emotional responses. R.W. Hepburn terms the notion of apprehending the significance of an object as "seeing as". He states that:

Today we have been made aware that the concept of emotion is complex; that, for instance, emotions have objects, and have them necessarily. My fear is fear of x, my rage, rage at y, my delight is delight at z. Part of what it is to be afraid is to perceive my situation as threatening; that is, a cognitive element enters necessarily into the having of that emotion.

...  
 These cognitive and evaluative elements can be brought together in the notion of "seeing as". To feel gratitude involves seeing so-and-so as one's benefactor; feeling apprehension, seeing such-and-such as possibly dangerous. There are no theoretical limits of complexity or scope in emotional "seeing-as".<sup>1</sup>

Part of being afraid, then, is perceiving a situation as threatening to ourselves. To feel gratitude is to see someone as our benefactor. To feel apprehension is to see something as dangerous to ourselves or to someone for whom we care. That is, we select, interpret and judge the objects as being meaningful to us in some way, either egotistically or as part of our commitment to self-transcendent values.

For instance, we believe something about physical handicaps when we select either a severely handicapped man's physical or psychological characteristics about which to be concerned. We interpret the characteristics selected as being crippled or wise and kind, and we judge our interpretation as being positive or negative in some sense. Thus, we feel attraction or repulsion, respectively.

We may concern ourselves with the architectural design of a house and interpret it as being similar to the house where a close friend died and where we felt separateness and loss. We judge it as being personally disagreeable; we feel sad and depressed when

in its presence.

Or we may concern ourselves with a child's vulnerability to danger and identify it with the fear we have for our own safety and our inability to cope with the loss of that child. This meaning the child has for us, gives rise to the judgment that there is something to be afraid of and the subjective form of our experience of that child is worry.

I have cited the above examples in order to emphasize that there are many different ways in which objects have personal import, and not to suggest that the process is limited only to the ways indicated in the examples. As Hepburn states, the cognitive and evaluative elements of emotions are complex and without known limit in scope. At another point in time, under different circumstances the personal meaning of the handicapped man, house or child and our emotional response may be completely different depending upon how we ourselves have developed.

A key point is that we, ourselves determine the personal meaning of the object; whether it has literal or metaphorical significance, it is the consequence of our own integration, although the personal import of an object for one person nonetheless may be similar to someone else's, and often is. This is what makes the communication of personal meaning through art possible and the fact that the effect of knowing oneself can be knowing others.

For example, it is possible that we, who live in a democratic society, may never live under a dictatorship and therefore never



suffer because of a ruthless dictator's actions. We may never experience the fear or pain of our children becoming political prisoners. However, we do fear the loss of our children through personal conflict or death, and the pain of the loss if it does occur. Through this consciously acknowledged emotion and its personal meaning, we can empathetically connect with those people of another culture, or other kind of group in which we are not actual participants.

We can become aware that there are crucial similarities between ourselves and others when we transcend a disconnected conceptual awareness and understanding to an emotional, though still rational, level of understanding. Then we become aware that their pain is like our pain, their joy like our joy, their fear like our fear, even though our situations are different. Our horror of a neighbor battering a child is similar to another's horror of a guard torturing his prisoner. Our despair at not finding employment resembles another's despair at not finding food to eat. Our joy of freeing ourselves from a dogmatic ideology we chose to follow, resembles another's joy of overthrowing a ruthless dictator.

Furthermore, we recognize similarities in our basic beliefs about situations which evoke similar emotions. Horror of physical abuse, in whatever situation, originates in part from beliefs about respect and love for others and ourselves. Despair at not being able to satisfy our needs originates, in part, from beliefs about failure and death. Joy at freeing ourselves from another's

control, originates at least partially, from our beliefs about independence and responsibility.

When we recognize our emotional connection to people suffering under dictatorships we no longer see them as disconnected factual data, but as human beings who have some crucially similar beliefs and feelings. Thus, we become aware that we cannot rationalize away another's problem as not being similar to ours because their situation is different from ours. We come to recognize our potentiality for experiencing the suffering, joy, love and beauty that another has felt and therefore we cannot ignore another's experiences as personally idiosyncratic or irrelevant. In fact, recognition of the similarities allows us to identify with the other to the point where his situation symbolically expresses our own. The truth of art includes this. When we recognize both the commonality of experience and the fact that for us our own character of subjectivity is a partial but crucial contributor to many of our most serious problems, we also see that a mere reorganization of external factors cannot adequately bring significant and lasting benefit to our lives.

We cannot be intelligent by merely substituting one government for another, one party or class for another, one exploiter for another. Bloody revolution can never solve our problems. Only a profound inward revolution which alters all our values can create a different environment, an intelligent social structure, and such a revolution can be brought about only by you and me. No new order will arise until we individually break down our own psychological barriers and are free.

...

Those of us who are serious must regenerate ourselves; but there can be regeneration only when we break away from those values which we have created through our self-protective and aggressive desires. Self-knowledge is the beginning of freedom, and it is only when we know ourselves that we can bring about order and peace.<sup>2</sup>

And one vital aspect of the self-knowledge of which Krishnamurti speaks, is self-knowledge of our emotions. This, by virtue of our common humanity, results in our appreciating the experiences of others as well. Achieving self-knowledge is education pursued in its most significant region, according to Krishnamurti:

Thus education, in the true sense, is the understanding of oneself, for it is within each one of us that the whole of existence is gathered.<sup>3</sup>

Though "it is within each one of us that the whole of existence is gathered" is a highly complex idea, it at least refers to the important fact that the right kind of understanding of those aspects of experience representing "common humanity" connects us empathetically to anyone and everyone.

#### Objectless Emotion

I have been speaking about personal meanings of objects evoking emotions, but philosophers have noted that some emotions such as melancholy and euphoria are not directed towards objects. Before I can accept this as being plausible, I must clarify what aspect of the emotion is its 'object'. Is it an emotion's appraisal or does it refer to what an emotional appraisal is about?

It cannot be the appraisal, if an emotion can be objectless, because implicit in the definition of emotion is the notion of appraisal. Therefore, the object must be what the appraisal is directed towards. From this point of view, we can understand Hepburn's premise that:

Even if not all emotions have objects, at least on all instances of their occurrence, there remain ways in which these emotions can be expressed discriminatingly, without reference to any specific object. They can be expressed through describing how the world looks, how things seem to the subject. In the absence of a determinate object, we are not thrown back, that is, on the impossible task of describing wholly inner, private sensations.<sup>4</sup>

The emotions, then, are expressed by symbolizing their appraisals such as 'how the world looks, how things seem to the subject' without referring to any particular object.

However, there is an added problem in that some emotions and their appraisals are difficult to determine because through self-deception, repression, distraction we may not clearly discern them. That is, we may only be subsidiarily or unconsciously aware of them, and therefore at a conscious level it appears there is no precise affective appraisal. We are only conscious of vague feelings of disquiet, sadness, etc. For instance, unconsciously felt jealousy at a friend's success may be experienced consciously as a vague anger at "the world" or "things in general". Part of understanding our emotions, then, involves becoming consciously aware of these recondite affective meanings by focusing upon the general vague feeling. Dunlop states this notion as follows:

In the same way desires for something specific

are sometimes preceded by obscure impulses to do something we can't quite identify, such impulses often taking the form of feelings of disquiet, discontent or restlessness. In such cases, the right way to discover what it is that we are 'blindly' seeking or being 'unconsciously' affected by, is often to let the desire or affection 'come to the surface' of consciousness, as it were, of its own accord, or to pass by itself from obscurity to clarity (as the name we can't remember will most likely come to mind if we let it alone). Otherwise we may wrongly identify the object of desire, and lay ourselves open to suggestions from advertisers or the arbiters of fashion.

However, as seems to be implied here, it is not always so easy for the appraisals of emotions to come into consciousness. Reasons such as fear of facing painful events block an emotional event coming into consciousness. Therefore, a catalyst and guide to awareness and understanding may be needed to uncover emotions, to elicit their meanings into consciousness and to aid in the comprehension of them. In this thesis I argue that the creation and beholding of works of art can act as this aid to conscious awareness and understanding.

In light of this view of the components of an emotion, it is knowing affective appraisals, whether they have determinant objects or not, that I believe is a necessary part of education, if education, as I will argue, is responsible for enhancing the quality of life. That is, it is the self-contribution in terms of exposure of unique beliefs, desires, aims, etc., that is necessary for the enhancement of the quality of life. Therefore, any emotion, whether its appraisal has a determinant object or not, should be open, even with difficulty, to exploration, so as to

reveal crucial aspects of the unique self in terms of affective meaning.

There is the concern, though, that the notion of personal meanings evoking emotions betrays emotion as sometimes "purely subjective". If that were so, any self-knowledge in this area would not be generalizable, but merely idiosyncratic. In a sense, this affective self-knowledge is meant to be idiosyncratic, i.e., what is wanted is knowledge of something unique to the individual. However, this idiosyncrasy does not imply the arbitrariness of what is absolutely private and separate - simply that common elements of the world (as previously discussed) are uniquely organized by an individual, and emotions betray this uniqueness or 'idiosyncrasy'. Further examples of these common elements will be presented in the discussion about education and the quality of life.

Finally, since this thesis is about the cognitive element of emotions, it is not concerned with feeling states which do not entail appraisals such as physical pain, drug-induced euphoria and general tiredness.

#### Unconscious and Subsidiary Awareness of Personal Meanings

When meeting the tasks of daily life, there is little room to consciously discern all the complexities involved in our experience. We are often only subsidiarily or unconsciously aware of personal meanings and their emotional responses in the midst of external demands. For example, a person may be sitting in a room consciously attending to the conversation he is having with a

friend, while being subsidiarily aware of the peaceful, blue-color scheme of the room, the welcoming, crackling fire, and the friendly, relaxed attitude of the people present. His focus of attention is on the conversation, while his perceptions of his environment are on the fringe of his conscious awareness. Furthermore, he may be subsidiarily aware that this environment is among situations that he believes to be non-threatening, secure and aesthetically pleasing, and thus feels happy and content. Although his assessment of his situation is only on the fringe of his conscious awareness, it affects him with happiness and contentment. Although he is not fully conscious of his emotions, such an affective state enables him to focus fully upon the conversation.

Reasons such as fear of facing painful events may cause us to repress an emotional event. In Leo Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, Karenin's unconscious intuition that he was a cuckold exemplifies such unawareness.

Karenin thought and said that he had never had so much official work to do as this year; but what he was not aware of was that it was he himself who kept thinking up things to do that year, that this was one of the ways he had of not opening up the box containing his feelings toward his wife and family and his thoughts about them, which were becoming more and more dreadful the longer they lay there. If anyone had had the right to ask Karenin what he thought about his wife's behavior, Karenin, mild and peaceable, would not have replied but would have flown into a rage at the man who asked him. Because of this too there was something haughty and stern in Karenin's expression when he was asked about his wife's health. Karenin did not want to think about his wife's behavior and feelings, and as a matter of fact he never did.

...  
 He did not allow himself to think about it and he did not; but at the same time, in the depths of his heart, without ever expressing it to himself and without having not only any proofs but even suspicions, he knew without a doubt that he was a cuckold, and because of this he knew he was deeply unhappy.<sup>6</sup>

As well as keeping the meaning of his emotions hidden from conscious recognition, Karenin did not allow himself to consciously feel his unhappiness. Solomon notes that we "can have an emotion without feeling anything".

Moreover it is clear that one can have an emotion without feeling anything. One can be angry without feeling angry: one can be angry for three days or five years and not feeling anything identifiable as a feeling of anger continuously through the prolonged period.

However, unconscious emotions do affect our conscious thoughts, feelings and actions. Although repressed into unconscious, Karenin's tacit recognition of his situation and its subjective form influenced his work activity and response regarding his wife to others. Solomon notes that it is psychoanalysis that has given us insight into unconscious awareness and its effect.

We have learned from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens, we say of the idea that it is in a state of being "unconscious" and we can produce good evidence to show that even when it is unconscious it can produce effects, even including some which finally reach consciousness. Everything that is repressed must remain unconscious; but let us state at the very outset that the repressed does not cover everything that is unconscious. The unconscious has the wider compass: the repressed



is part of the unconscious.<sup>8</sup>

### The Effects of Living Lives Based Upon Partial Self-Understanding

The fact that we may not be completely or at all conscious of the particulars participating in an experience suggests that we can consciously think, feel and act in a context of meaning reflecting only part of the truth. That is, we might construct a satisfying meaning only on that which we are fully conscious of, and in so doing we may not live in a way that is most beneficial to ourselves.

Although Karenin consciously attended to thoughts and activities which did not relate to his family situation, they were infected, albeit tacitly, with the knowledge concerning his wife's unfaithfulness. He was not able to attend to his thoughts and interests for their own sake - his attention was warped by his pain. He incorrectly thought that he had so much official work to do. That is, no one had ordered him to do the work and no situation demanded that he do it; he, himself, had chosen to do it as a means of avoiding the conscious impact of his pain. It was only when Anna admitted her "crime" that he was forced to consciously recognize that he was a cuckold and that he felt a dreadful pain at being one.

His wife's words, which had confirmed his worst suspicions, had given him bitter pain. This pain was heightened still further by the strange feeling of physical pity which had been evoked by her tears. But when he was left alone in the carriage, to his own surprise and joy, he felt utterly liberated both from his pity and from the doubts and jealous anguish that had been tormenting him lately.

He felt like someone who has just had a tooth extracted after a long-drawn-out toothache. After dreadful pain, and a sensation of something vast, larger than his head, being pulled out of his jaw, the sufferer suddenly, still not believing in his own good fortune, feels that the thing that had been poisoning his life for so long and preoccupying his whole attention, no longer exists, and that once again he can live, think and be interested in something besides his tooth alone. This was Karenin's feeling. The pain had been strange and terrible, but now it was past; he felt that once again he could live and think about something besides his wife.

No honor, no heart, no religion — a depraved woman! I've always known and always seen it, though in my pity for her I tried to deceive myself, he thought. And it really did seem to him that he had always seen it; he recalled details of their past life together that had never seemed to him wrong in any way before — now these details were a plain proof that she had always been depraved. I made a mistake in linking my life to hers, but there was nothing wrong in my mistake, so I can't be unhappy. It's not I who am to blame — he said to himself — but she. She is no longer any concern of mine. For me she doesn't exist...

Consciously, recognizing and understanding his experience of being a cuckold, freed Karenin from the emotional entrapment of being one. He was able to accept his situation through attending to, rather than avoiding his pain, and thus begin to live a life in accordance with his situation, rather than in avoidance of it.

Fusing unconscious knowledge or beliefs about ourselves with percepts of an object, that is, projecting on to the object our unconscious "complex", is another way in which we live lives based upon partial understanding. That is, we can unconsciously identify ourselves with an object because it does have some qualities similar to those of our own character. In such a

situation, we may consciously recognize specific qualities in the object, but are unaware of our participation in how we perceive the objects. That is, we are somewhat falsely aware of what we perceive and unaware that the emotions, knowledge and beliefs which we fused to, the percept unconsciously express truths about ourselves. Thus, in the determination of our conscious scheme of meaning and consequent life patterns, we ignore the contribution of influential elements of ourselves.

For example, a mother attending to her child's safety may overprotect her child to the extent that he becomes vulnerable and weak. As well, her worry for her child's safety distracts her from recognizing her own vulnerability and weakness, from understanding why she feels this way, and from finding ways to overcome them. Or, unconsciously knowing that we do not listen to ourselves may cause us to wrongly believe that another does not listen to us. As a result, we become angry with the person, and withdraw from him as an expression of our anger. Consequently we lose a friend and do not learn the meaning of our anger. 'Listening' to ourselves can be the solution to the problem.

Implicit within this argument that living lives based upon the most complete understanding involves consciously knowing our tacit affective selves, is the premise that such living is beneficial to us. However, one might argue that it is more beneficial to live lives based upon ignorance or repression of knowledge too painful to bear. In some cases and at certain times in our lives, I would have to agree that to become conscious of

painful, discordant meanings may be more harmful than helpful. But, as I have tried to argue, in other circumstances, remaining ignorant of our tacit understandings can be detrimental to ourselves and others, rather than advantageous. Therefore, it would be unfortunate to deny ourselves the benefits that could be reaped from the most complete understandings as are possible because there are times when we are not ready to face recognizing aspects of ourselves. In my opinion, it would be more to the point to accept that at times it is beneficial to repress discordant appraisals, but at other times it is more advantageous to become aware of and understand them. Furthermore, it must be remembered that, although repressed, unconscious appraisals still influence our lives.

#### The Effects of Living Lives Based Upon One Form of Knowing

Bringing into our conscious awareness our tacit personal meanings is often inhibited by our limited view of how we come to awareness and understanding. Believing that valuable knowledge can be achieved through mere memorization, may cause us through lack of critical understanding, to miss the opportunity to acquire knowledge which transforms our experiences. Believing that our emotions are irrational and should be suppressed so that they do not interfere with our thinking abnegates the possibility of knowing through our emotions and limits us to such knowing as is possible through intellection alone. Consequently, we may live in ignorance or dependent upon partial understandings which, in turn, may have detrimental effects upon our lives.

For example, understanding such ideas as implying adherence to particular rules, following them dogmatically and accepting them on authority, prevents an individual from understanding his own experience, no matter how true the ideas are. Thus, there is the potential for the individual to faithfully follow a philosophy which claims to provide solutions to world strife, yet at the same time be depressed and in conflict with other members of the philosophical group and those outside of it. However, there is no recognition by the person that there is anything wrong because he is carefully adhering to the rules. In this case, the theory is an actual hindrance to intelligence. On the other hand, understanding the meaning of his depression to be denial of himself through dogmatic obedience of rules and isolation through condemnation of those people who do not follow his chosen path, provides the knowledge he needs to be able to change his relationship to the philosophy and others to more beneficially suit himself and others.

#### Education/Knowing/Quality of Life

I have been arguing that apprehending personal meanings evokes emotions. I have also pointed out that we may be unconsciously or only subsidiarily aware of such personal appraisals and their emotional responses. Furthermore, to live lives based upon beneficial thoughts, feelings and actions, it is often necessary to be consciously aware of and understand these personal meanings and emotions; that is, to acquire self-knowledge which is as complete as possible. Moreover, learning through

memorization and intellection does not enable us to achieve such knowledge of ourselves. Therefore, an educational system which does not guide its students in achievement of affective self-knowledge may inhibit their ability to live higher quality lives.

The quality of life to which I refer is conditioned to an important extent by the degree to which we base our lives upon knowledge. It is on the basis of awareness and understanding that we free ourselves from the bonds of ignorance and confusion and provide ourselves with the knowledge upon which we can beneficially think, feel and act. Knowing ourselves enables us to base our lives upon facts about ourselves which, in turn, enhances our quality of life in the ways that I have exemplified earlier in this chapter.

However, there are many who would argue that the quality of life is dependent upon happiness, pleasure or contentment and that the achievement of these mental states is not dependent upon knowledge. I disagree with this perspective. Given that a positive mental state is highly contingent upon achieving what we desire and value, where these have been rationally formed, self-ignorance of our emotions will tend to detract from happiness by leaving us ignorant of what we desire and value and insulating these from rational scrutiny.

For example, if someone makes a decision about her life based upon her conscious thoughts only, and not upon her emotions and their meanings, then the person may suffer from the outcome of such a decision. A young woman may decide to take a job because

the salary and the status of the position meet her financial needs and need for recognition, respectively. Her decision has a logical rationale to it in that the job will satisfy some of her needs, yet she feels anxious about the decision. However, she ignores her anxiety, and thus ignores that to which her anxiety is a response. It is only when her anxiety gets to the stage where she cannot carry out her daily activities without a struggle that she is forced to acknowledge it. Through whatever means, (discussion with friends, counselling, artistic endeavours, contemplation), she learns that the decision evoked anxiety because she saw herself, unconsciously, as incompetent for the position. Her anxiety, then, originated from the ignored belief that she was inappropriate for the job.

If she had made her decision with greater sensitivity to the sources of her anxiety, she might have decided not to take the job, or to take the job and to arrange some means of acquiring the expertise that she believed she lacked. Her final decision then would have been based upon awareness and rational scrutiny of all her needs relative to the job and thus would have met satisfactorily her most pressing needs. It would not have been in conflict with herself but, rather, in harmony with herself; thus, she would not have experienced anxiety and she could have chosen a path that would more likely bring her pleasure and contentment.

Moreover, although it is sometimes more beneficial to our well-being to suppress knowledge, it is questionable whether a stable positive mental state can be achieved by habitual

suppression of knowledge about discordant and painful experiences. As was argued earlier, even though knowledge is suppressed, it still can affect our conscious thoughts, feelings and actions. In failing to recognize negative emotions such as fear, anger and jealousy which detract from our happiness, we cannot consciously address the problems which provoke these emotions with a view to moving towards a pleasurable mental state. Thus, if the young woman had not been forced to come to understand what evoked her anxiety and thus alter her plans accordingly, she would have stayed in a state of anxiety, albeit at a level that she could still function at, while working at the job.

Furthermore, happiness is contingent upon appraisals of our physical and social environment. For example, the pleasure evoked when we perceive the grace of a running deer is lost when we kill the deer. The peacefulness of listening to a babbling brook is lost when the brook is sucked dry by our excessive use of water. Feeling delight when walking through a forest changes to dejection when we perceive the remains of it after it has been levelled by bulldozers and saws. Our joy in beholding the beauty of a mountain lake changes to despondency when we smell the decay of polluted material and see the dead animals around it. Thus, when we harm nature we do not merely threaten our physical survival, we harm our emotional well-being which, since we are part of the natural scheme, is hardly surprising.

Not being aware of our emotional life as affiliated with



personal meaning of nature hampers our ability to choose and to preserve the right conditions under which the environment can bring us peace and joy. It is commonly assumed that a prosperous life depends upon exploitation of nature: that we prosper when our food, clothing, and shelter, that is, our physical needs, are adequately or luxuriously met. The importance of our emotional well-being and its reliance upon an undefiled natural environment is naively and dangerously ignored. This notion extends to our man-made environment as well. Our lack of understanding about its participation in affecting our well-being enables us to assume that we can live and work happily and effectively in virtually any surroundings which provide us with warmth and shelter. Yet, although we keep warm and dry, we do experience a marked variation of emotion when in different environments which we appraise. Without attention to this fact, we cannot preserve or create an environment for the express purpose of nurturing our emotional needs. One aspect of ourselves is taken care of, while the other is neglected; thus we are fragmented.

The painful effect Anna Karenina's behavior had upon her husband, exemplifies how our personal relationships and identity in society can influence our affective state. How we see our situation in relation to others has a determining effect upon whether we feel happiness or pain.

Finally, even if happiness is very valuable, it does not follow that it is the only thing that matters. Scholars want to make discoveries, not just experience the joys of discovery, which

may be impossible anyhow without achieving the former. Philosophers want to become wise through comprehension of life's painful and joyful aspects, and not just to feel the pleasure and contentment of being wise. Moreover, many if not most people, want happiness, pleasure (etc.) which is not based upon deception or other corruptions of the truth.

Thus, knowing does enhance the quality of life, whether it is dependent upon happiness, pleasure or contentment. Furthermore, the achievement of living according to that which is most beneficial to us, is contingent upon the most complete understanding we can achieve. Therefore, education which is concerned with knowledge and understanding, in turn, influences the quality of life of its students. To improve their lives most effectively, it must not limit itself to a narrow view point of knowing such as, 'the only way to know is via intellection'. I have already stated that I believe that it should also be concerned with helping students to know their personal meanings through attending to their emotions by creating and beholding art.

FOOTNOTES

1. R.W. HEPBURN, "The arts and the education of feeling and emotion," In: Education and reason, Part 3 of Education and the development of reason, Edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 94 and 95.
2. J. KRISHNAMURTI, Education and the Significance of Life (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 52.
3. J. KRISHNAMURTI, op. cit., p 17.
4. R.W. HEPBURN, op. cit., p. 101.
5. F. DUNLOP, "The education of the emotions," In: Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1984), p. 250.
6. L. TOLSTOY, Anna Karenina, Translated by Joel Carmichael (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1960), p. 213.
7. Robert C. SOLOMON, "Emotions and Choice," In: Explaining Emotions, Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1980), p. 254.
8. Cheshire CALHOUN and Robert C. SOLOMON, What Is An Emotion? Classical Readings In Philosophical Psychology (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 186.
9. L. TOLSTOY, op. cit., pp. 297 and 298.

### Chapter III

#### AFFECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE THROUGH ART

##### Symbolism

In Chapter II, I argued that personal meanings and their subjective forms can be repressed into our unconscious or intuited subsidiarily, and that, although they are tacit they still influence our thoughts, feelings and actions. Also, I expressed the importance of consciously acknowledged emotion as a basis on which we can more beneficially live. In this chapter, I propose that creating and beholding art that is partially symbolic of our emotional experience, can call forth tacit affective knowledge into consciousness, giving critical awareness of an important influence on our lives. In this way, it aids us in our comprehension of emotional experience.

We aid our minds to focus on our apprehensions by creating symbols which represent important aspects of them. Symbolic representations, such as theories for intellectual cognition and works of art for immediate feelings, enable our minds to cope with the otherwise confusing excess of particulars in these cognitions and intuitions. This coping strategy is described by Jerome Bruner as follows:

There is, perhaps, one universal truth about all forms of human cognition: the ability to deal with knowledge is hugely exceeded by the potential knowledge contained in man's environment. To cope with this diversity, man's perception, his memory, and his thought processes early become governed by strategies for protecting his limited capacities from the confusion of over-loading. We tend to perceive things schematically, for example, rather than in

detail, or we represent a class of diverse things by some sort of averaged "typical instance". The corresponding principle of economy in art produces the compact image or symbol that, by genius, travels great distances to connect ostensible disparities.<sup>1</sup>

Creating a symbol which enables us to connect many diverse elements in an experience leads us to clarity and expansion of understanding of that experience. Speaking specifically about art, Elliot Eisner describes this notion as follows:

I do recognize the fact that conceptions are both clarified and altered through the process of representation. The act of representation is more of a dialogue than a monologue, more of a conversation than a lecture. The material suggests to the maker possibilities that were not conceived of at the outset of the activity. What finally results is often a negotiated product possessing features that are something of a surprise to the maker. In that point, at least, I concur with Collingwood that "art properly so called" is not the product of the routine application of highly refined skill but the result of new modes of thinking which conceptions are significantly modified in the process of expression.<sup>2</sup>

#### Appropriateness of Symbol

In order to achieve awareness and understanding of emotion through symbolization, the symbol must be appropriate because different types of cognition require different types of symbols. For example, there are varieties of understanding which may be appropriately realized through the literal symbolization of a definition and others which may require the emotive power of poetic language. The following poem by Christina Rossetti is designed to excite the wonder of that which we cannot see, but which we know exists, and to excite it as if it were being

immediately experienced.

Who has seen the wind?  
 Neither you nor I:  
 But when the leaves hang trembling,  
 The wind is passing through.

Who has seen the wind?  
 Neither you nor I:  
 But when the trees bow down their heads,  
 The wind is passing by.

On the other hand, the Webster Dictionary definition of wind - "a natural movement of air of any velocity" - gives us an idea about what wind is without its personal significance and its affective tone. That is, I apprehend the personal significance of the living context, X, portrayed in the poem's images, rhythm and sounds. Imaginatively, I am there and being there stimulates the experience of the mystery of the reality of the unseen, Y. This involves a contribution from myself - my feeling of awe at the existence of what is unseen (the wind), rather than a recognition of the wind as an event in itself, independent of me. This poem, then, is a figurative-emotional form of symbolization, a form which catalyzes a creation or remembrance of personal affective meaning inexpressible in a literal, abstract mode. The cognition which is expressible in the rational, verbal definition of wind as "movement of air" is cognition of an idea, not of an event immediately felt - even as thinking about the wind is not feeling it on one's face.

Thus, I am making the claim that the appropriateness of the form of symbolization depends upon the cognition. The cognition of an intellectual symbol is of an abstraction divested of

personal involvement with the actual entity or event. The symbol helps us to understand a facet of an experience through the application of familiar concepts. The cognition of a figurative-emotional symbol such as a work of art, is a totality in which the meaning and ourselves are inseparable. It can help us to understand something of ourselves through attention to the emotional form of personal meaning.

Although the focus of my thesis differs from Bell's in that I am mainly concerned with emotions evoked by works of art other than the aesthetic emotion of which he speaks, his statement about the subjectivity of works of art supports my premise regarding the appropriateness of using art to symbolize our subjective experiences.

I have no right to consider anything a work of art to which I cannot react emotionally; and I have no right to look for the essential quality in anything I have not felt to be a work of art. The critic can affect my aesthetic theories only by affecting my aesthetic experience. All systems of aesthetics must be based upon personal experience - that is to say, they must be subjective.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Power of Art to Focus Attention Upon Affective Experience

Works of art have the power to evoke emotions because they are composed of the sense imagery which, by the very nature of the organic unity of sense and emotion as aspects of the body, evoke an emotional response. Whitehead states that,

...we feel with our body. There may be some further specialization into a particular organ of sensation; but in any case the 'withness' of the body is an ever-present, though elusive, element in our perceptions of presentational immediacy.<sup>5</sup>

Whitehead defines "presentational immediacy" as "our perception of the contemporary world by means of our senses".<sup>6</sup>

In art, sense imagery is suggested by description in literature and given directly in color, line, rhythm, sound, movement, with the purpose of depicting personal meaning. This sense imagery is what gives works of art the special power to evoke emotions whereas statements of logic, bare facts, cause and effect, classifications, and numeration, for example, rarely have such power. Whitehead explains this notion as follows:

We enjoy the green foliage of the spring greenly: we enjoy the sunset with an emotional pattern including among its elements the colours and the contrasts of the vision. It is this that makes Art possible: it is this that procures the glory of perceived nature. For if the subjective form of reception be not conformal to the objective sensa, then the values of the percept would be at the mercy of the chance make-up of the other components in that experience. For example, in the intuition of a multiplicity of three or four objects, the mere number imposes no subjective form. It is merely a condition regulating some pattern of effective components. In abstraction from those components, mere triplicity can dictate no subjective form for its prehension. But green can. And there lies the difference between the sensa and the abstract mathematical forms.

An example of the use of sense imagery in art is Vincent Van Gogh's painting, Wheatfield with reaper. It is a visual image of 'death' as friend, which has the power to evoke emotions peculiar to experiencing death as a friend, not a foe. In a letter to his brother, Van Gogh describes his painting of the reaper, whom he saw from the window of his room in St. Rémy mental hospital, as follows:



(Letter 604, September 4th or 5th, 1889). Work is going pretty well - I am struggling with a canvas begun some days before my indisposition, a Reaper; the study is all yellow, terribly thickly painted, but the subject was fine and simple. For I see in this reaper - a vague figure fighting like a devil in the midst of the heat to get to the end of his task - I see in him the image of death, in the sense that humanity might be the wheat he is reaping. So it is - if you like - the opposite of that sower I tried to do before. But there's nothing sad in this death, it goes its way in broad daylight with a sun flooding everything with a light of pure gold. (...) There! The Reaper is finished, I think it will be one of those you keep at home - it is an image of death as the great book of nature speaks of it - but what I have sought is the almost smiling. It is all yellow, except a line of violet hills, a pale fair yellow. I find it queer that I saw it like this from between the iron bars of a cell.

For Van Gogh, the visual imagery of the worker reaping the lush, fully-matured wheat in the golden-yellow sunlight, expresses happiness, the meaning of which was his seeing it as death and death as a friend. To symbolize this experience as he understood it, Van Gogh painted the visual imagery that he perceived, understood metaphorically and emotionally experienced:

Furthermore, works of art are composed of dissimilar sense imagery that are united as a metaphorical representation of an emotional pattern. Bruner, speaking about the metaphorical nature of art, says that:

Metaphor joins dissimilar experiences by finding the image or the symbol that unites them at some deeper emotional level of meaning. Its effect depends upon its capacity for getting past the literal mode of connecting, and the unsuccessful metaphor is one that either fails in finding the image or gets caught in the meshes of literalness. We may say of a woman that "she is a peach" - peach by now connoting little more

than "very nice" - and the effect is prosaic. But say now of a woman that "she is a garden" and the metaphoric process is renewed, with a skein of unpredictable though not altogether pleasing affective connections.<sup>9</sup>

Rainer Marie Rilke's poem "From Childhood", in its symbolization of betrayal is exemplary of such metaphorical sense imagery:

The darkness in the room was like enormous riches;  
 there the child was sitting, wonderfully alone.  
 And when the mother entered, as if in a dream,  
 a glass quaked in the silent china closet.  
 She felt it, how the room was betraying her,  
 and kissed her child, saying, "Are you here?"  
 Then both looked toward the piano in fear,  
 for often at evening they would have a song  
 in which the child found himself strangely caught.

He sat stone still. His great gaze hung  
 upon her hand, which, totally bowed down by the  
 ring,  
 walked over the white keys  
 as if plowing through deep drifts of snow.<sup>10</sup>

The contrasts between the child being wonderfully alone in a room with the child in company with his mother in the same room, has the potential of heightening the richness and freedom of the alone child in contrast with the rigidity and entrapment of the child with his mother. Even the former then comes to reflect the betrayal of the child in his preference to be alone rather than with his mother. Juxtaposing betrayal with the image of "mother and child", that is, with the relationship idealized as being unflinchingly trustworthy, reveals the falseness and thus betrayal in believing the ideal is the actual. Forming such contrasts of

different beliefs or events into a synthesis of betrayal has the power to enhance their individual effects as well as the emotional quality arising from their unity in awareness.

Metaphorical sense, imagery in which each part contributes to the expression of an emotional form has nothing which inhibits the 'pointing to' the meaning it represents. That is, there is nothing in the work discordant with its meaning for the subject, or with any other aspect of the subject. The particulars and affects of the beheld work of art, the pointing to, and the total event of experience itself are in harmony. Thus, there are no blocks in our attention moving from the beholding it as a whole, to its meaning and to the final effect of its meaning on the totality of the occasion of experiencing. Nor is there any irrelevant material in or suggested by the work which distracts our attention or causes confusion as to the meaning. It is the meaning of effective symbolization to which we readily respond. "Yes, that is how it really is".

For example, in the poem "From Childhood", it seems that there is nothing which distracts our attention from the emotional pattern, betrayal. There is no reference to the child's clothes, or what the time is. Rather, the images seem to rivet our attentions to this feeling. When mother and child are together, everything seems to become infused with the known, but unspoken betrayal: the quaking glass in the silent china closet, the room, the piano, the evening song. The images of fear, entrapment, rigidity, heaviness, seem to be in harmony with the actual affects

of consciously disguising betrayal. Thus, each of these images seem to point us to betrayal and what characterizes it, and, in my opinion, there is none which prevent us from doing so. Thus, we are easily drawn into the feeling of betrayal through the images of the poem.

An aesthetic symbol's effectiveness, then, lies in the sheer power of its metaphorical sense imagery to evoke emotional connectedness and in its perfection of economy - that is the elimination of unnecessary, and therefore potentially confusing and distractive, elements. Many symbols might do, and each imperfectly formed might well be deciphered. But the artistry enters in the perfection of choice of symbol, and the aesthetic perfection of its detailed representation. As Bruner says:

For, indeed, there is more to metaphor of art than mere emotional connectedness. There is also the canon of economy that must operate, a canon that distinguishes the artfully metaphoric from that which is only floridly arty or simply 'offbeat'.

#### A Mode of Truth - Perception and Understanding

The evocation of emotion and focus of attention by art enables us to feel an emotion while also becoming consciously aware of its meaning. Thus we can come to an awareness and understanding of the emotion as it is felt. For to be effectively aware of emotional tones of subjective apprehensions and the latter as emotional meanings, we must consciously feel the emotions. If we have never felt the pain of an unpleasant event, we do not know that pain and its meaning. We can hypothesize that we would feel it under certain circumstances, but in hypothesizing

we do not come to know the feeling we call pain and the appraisal which evoked it. Similarly, we cannot know that the graceful movement of a deer is pleasurable for us by logically deducing from its physical features that it runs gracefully, and that it should therefore evoke pleasure when observed. We have to feel the pleasure to be aware of what it is like for us and to know its significance to us. We cannot know horror by being told that physically beating and verbally abusing someone fills us with horror. We have to feel horror to know its essential character and impact upon us. We cannot know the peacefulness of the babble of a brook by reading the scientific research findings on this effect. We have to feel the peace to know it as peace for ourselves.

Thinking and verbalizing about an emotion may afford nothing more than an abstract understanding which is confined to concepts instead of an actual acquaintance with the reality of that emotion. That is, with thinking the emotional experience becomes a separate entity about which we can hypothesize, conceptualize, etc., rather than with something we are immediately familiar. Thus, thinking alone is not the appropriate mode for knowing the elements of our emotions themselves, as immediately constitutive of that experience. Feeling and direct apprehension are necessary. Furthermore thinking about emotional experiences presupposes conscious awareness of the latter, if the aim of coming to know is affective self-knowledge.

Conscious awareness of our emotions and contemplation on

their derivation brings into our consciousness the personal meanings which contribute to them. If I want to know what evoked my feeling of sadness, I can clear my mind of all ideas and emotion other than the sadness, and focus on that immediate feeling. As I do so, I may see an image of a close friend who has recently died, I see her stilled form in a framed picture which I can only look at now, rather than touch, talk to or do things with, and I see the dark, empty background of the picture. This kind of truth-perception is described by Krishnamurti as follows:

Truth comes into being when there is a complete cessation of thought; and thought ceases only when the self is absent, when the mind has ceased to create, that is, when it is no longer caught in its own pursuits.<sup>12</sup>

Cessation of thought and focus on emotional feeling is a means to conscious awareness of our tacit knowledge. We attend from that of which we are consciously aware in order to attend to that of which we are tacitly aware. Thus, when I cease thinking about why I am feeling sad, what I should be doing, where I should be going or about any ideas or other feelings that I might have, my mind is open to receiving into consciousness the meaning of my sadness. It is free to create a symbolic image of the particulars which actually contribute to the emotion, without forcing myself to determine speculatively what might affect me with sadness. Once the image has been created, then I can use my intellect to analyze its symbolized meaning.

Analyzing the image I have created, I may realize that it symbolizes my apprehension of the separateness that is between my

friend and myself, and my belief that I have lost something of myself by losing my friend. It is the separateness and loss in experiencing the death of a friend that evokes my sadness.

Knowing Through Art Which Symbolizes Affective Experience

Similarly, if we clear our minds of all thoughts, desires, expectations and associated feelings when first attending to a work of art, we open our minds to receiving that which the work has to offer. This is an interpretation of what has been termed by modern theorists, "disinterestedness".

To perceive disinterestedly is to make oneself a pure, unflawed mirror, prepared to receive without distortion all the impressions, which the objects that are before us can produce.<sup>13</sup>

From this point of attention, we can put aside "disinterestedness" and apprehend the actual personal significance of what the work symbolizes through attending to the emotion it evokes.

While listening to Martha and George, in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf, torment each other with wounding comments and expose their painful deceit to a younger couple, emotional pain can be evoked. Contemplation on the pain, sensory perceptions and apprehensions of events in the lives of the characters as depicted in the actors' and actresses' facial and verbal expressions, and bodily movements, can lead to an awareness of 'fear of facing ourselves'. Through subsequent analysis, we can understand the significance of our emotional pain as our avoidance of coming to terms with ourselves - the price of self-deception.

Thus, knowing through a work of art, as just exemplified, involves intuiting the emotional impact and its personal meaning

as a whole, attending to our emotional response in order to consciously recognize the appraisals contributing to the emotional experience, and finally, at some stage, analyzing the appraisals in order to comprehend their significance to the whole.

Michael Polanyi describes coming to know a comprehensive entity and its particulars as follows:

We can see then two complementary efforts aiming at the elucidation of a comprehensive entity. One proceeds from a recognition of a whole towards an identification of its particulars; the other, from the recognition of a group of presumed particulars towards the grasping of their relation in the whole.

...they contribute jointly to the same final achievement, yet it is also true that each counteracts the other to some extent at every consecutive step. Every time we concentrate our attention on the particulars of a comprehensive entity, our sense of its coherent existence is temporarily weakened; and every time we move in the opposite direction towards a fuller awareness of the whole, the particulars tend to become submerged in the whole. The concerted advantage of the two processes arises from the fact that normally every dismemberment of a whole adds more to its understanding than is lost through the concurrent weakening of its comprehensive features, and again each new integration of the particulars adds more to our understanding of them than it damages our understanding by somewhat effacing their identity. Thus an alternation of analysis and integration leads progressively to an even deeper understanding of a comprehensive entity.<sup>14</sup>

With respect to this thesis, the deeper understanding involves deepening what we are consciously aware of by calling forth our tacit knowledge, beliefs, perceptions and emotions into focal consciousness. Subsequently, our partial conscious awareness and understanding of an emotional experience deepens to a more complete understanding of the meaning of the emotion as it is immediately felt.



FOOTNOTES

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12. J. KRISHNAMURTI, In: Education and the Significance of Life (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 15.
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## Chapter IV

### EDUCATION AND ART

In this thesis I have taken the view that a quite essential and undoubtedly central part of education is that it is a process by which students come to know and understand. I have also argued that there is an important and largely tacit body of knowledge concerning our emotions and their personal significance. I have proposed that an important means by which we can become consciously aware of and understand this tacit knowledge is by contemplating an emotion while feeling it, and its meaning. I suggested that this process of coming to know could be readily facilitated by the creation and contemplation of images guided by our emotions using various forms of art. It is this means of coming to know through attention to our emotions, when creating or beholding art, that I believe should be part of the process of knowing and understanding in education, if education is responsible for enabling students to significantly improve the quality of their lives. For, as I have argued, the quality of life is seriously limited when understanding is confined to purely abstract consideration of subjectivity or to "external" matters of fact, to the exclusion of "internal" matters of fact. Such an educational system, then, does not demand an imbalance towards the impersonal, general and external on the part of its students, but demands, as well, the use of emotions in the acquisition of affective self-knowledge.

### The Knowledge of the Educators

In order to achieve this task, educators must recognize the existence of personal affective knowledge and value it for itself and as a legitimate part of the subject matter of an educational institution. They have to accept that our personal meanings and their subjective forms make up a body of fact which is worthy of study. They have to have some understanding of this body of fact and they have to feel comfortable dealing with initial ambiguities, vague suggestiveness, emotions, fringe associations and unconscious awareness of such a body of fact. If the educators themselves do not have this awareness, understanding and acceptance of personal knowledge, they cannot facilitate educational success in these areas. Thus, such educators themselves need to be creators and appreciators of art to some significant extent.

### Focusing Students' Minds Using Symbolization

If, in education, students are to raise the tacit knowledge of their experiences to explicit awareness, by attending from their emotions to the related tacit intuitions, then the symbolization they use to aid them in this process must be that which speaks to their emotions and tacit awareness. It should not be that which predominantly stimulates intellectual concern with abstract generalities.

Speaking about the difference between the natures of art and science, Jerome Bruner says:

The intent of the scientist is to create rational structures and general laws that, in

the mathematical sense, predict the observations one would be forced to make if one were without the general laws. To the degree that the rational structures of science are governed by principles of strict logical implication, to that degree prediction becomes more and more complete, leading eventually to the derivation of possible observations that one might not have made but for the existence of the general theory. Surely, then, science increases the unity of our experience of nature. This is the hallmark of the way of knowing called science. Art as a form of knowing does not and cannot strive for such a form of unification. In its most refined form, the myth of Sisyphus is not the concept of the mathematical asymptote. The elegant rationality of science and the metaphoric nonrationality of art operate with deeply different grammars; perhaps they even represent a profound complementarity. For in the experience of art, we connect by a grammar of metaphor,<sup>7</sup> one that defies the rational methods of the linguist and the psychologist.<sup>1</sup>

As I have already argued, much art symbolizes our experiences as they present themselves affectively; whereas science focuses on the literal and explicitly logical expression of what is predictable and possible in relation to the sensory component of experience. Because of these differences, scientifically and artistically designed symbolic objects engage our minds in different ways.

For example, symbolic objects displayed in a science museum ask that we focus our attentions on predictable relationships between the characteristics of an external object and between one such object and another. In a geological museum we may observe a topographical map from which we can learn about the configuration of a mountain including its relief and the position of its rock formations. In an entomological museum we may look at insects

mounted on pins and classified according to their similarities. The way in which these objects are displayed stimulate our minds to analyze the logical, rational relationships between their features, rather than elicit apprehensions of subjective meaning of the objects which evoke emotions.

On the other hand, there is an almost irresistible urge to apprehend personally the images of human experiences as symbolized in paintings which are hung in art galleries, in a performance of a play or in a novel. We are drawn to behold some works of art because of their power to elicit personal meanings and to evoke emotional responses, rather than for intellectual stimulation. When we are disappointed in a work of art, it is often because we ourselves did not find it personally significant and thus are not affected by it.

Simone de Beauvoir, in talking about her novel, She Came to Stay, describes the personal significance of the denouement of the story and the emotions evoked:

Rereading the final pages, today so contrived and dead, I can hardly believe that when I wrote them my throat was as tight as though I had the burden of a real murder on my shoulders. Yet so it was; and sitting there, pen in hand, I felt a weird sort of terror as I set down Françoise's experience of mental isolation. Xaviere's murder may look like the abrupt and clumsy conclusion of a drama I had no idea how to finish; but in fact it was the motive force and *raison d'être* behind the entire novel.<sup>2</sup>

The reason for the novel was to purge herself of the relationship that she had with a woman who had become intimately part of her life. She succeeded in doing the latter by describing the act she

believed would accomplish the goal, rather than by committing it. As well, she created characters based upon the appraisals which had contributed to the personal experience of love that lead her to the need to do away with something in herself.

Yet insofar as literature is a living activity, it was essential that I should end with this denouement, which possessed a cathartic quality for me personally. In the first place, by killing Olga on paper I purged every twinge of irritation and resentment I had previously felt towards her, and cleansed our friendship of all the unpleasant memories that lurked among those of a happier nature. But above all, by releasing Françoise, through the agency of a crime, from the dependent position in which her love for Pierre kept her, I regained my own personal autonomy. The paradoxical thing is that to do so did not require any unpardonable action on my part, but merely the description of such an action in a book. However attentive the encouragement and advice one receives, writing remains an act for which the responsibility cannot be shared with any other person. In this novel I exposed myself so dangerously that at times the gap between my emotions and the words to express them seemed insurmountable. But such an abstract victory, projected on to an imaginary situation, would not, by itself, have carried sufficient weight of reality. If I was to overcome on my own account that solitary wilderness into which I had flung Françoise, I must work my fantasy through to the bitter end, and not water my version of it down in any way. And in any event, the process of self-identification came off.<sup>3</sup>

Through Françoise's contemplation, the visual images of her actions and the place that they occurred, readers can be drawn into the struggle for self-identification, whether it be their own or that of Simone de Beauvoir. The need to annihilate that which prevents us from knowing ourselves can be recognized and accepted, and the aloneness of carrying out such an action can be felt.

She stood staring at Xaviere's door: alone; unaided; relying now entirely on herself. She waited for some time. Then she walked into the kitchen and put her hand on the lever of the gas meter. Her hand tightened - it seemed impossible. Face to face with her aloneness, beyond space, beyond time, stood this alien presence that had for so long overwhelmed her by its blind shadow: Xaviere was there, existing only for herself, entirely self-centred, reducing to nothingness everything for which she had no use; she encompassed the whole world within her own triumphant aloneness, boundlessly extending her influence, infinite and unique, everything that she was, she drew from within herself, she barred all dominance over her, she was absolute separateness. And yet it was only necessary to pull down this lever to annihilate her. 'Annihilate a conscience! How can I?' Francoise thought. But how was a conscience not her own capable of existing? If it were so, then it was she who was not existing. She repeated 'She or I'. She pulled down the lever.

She went back to her room, gathered up the letters strewn on the floor and then threw them into the fireplace. She struck a match and watched the letters burn. Xaviere's door was locked on the inside. They would think it was an accident or suicide. 'In any case, there will be no proof', she thought.

She undressed and put on her pyjamas. 'Tomorrow morning she will be dead'. She sat down, facing the darkened passage. Xaviere was sleeping. With each minute her sleep was deepening. On the bed there still remained a living form, but it was already no one. There was no longer anyone. Francoise was alone.

Alone. She had acted alone: as alone as in death. One day Pierre would know. But even his cognizance of this deed would be merely external. No one could condemn or absolve her. Her act was her very own. 'It is I who will it'. It was her own will which was being accomplished, now nothing at all separated her from herself. She had at last made a choice. She had chosen herself.<sup>4</sup>

Imagining Xavier, alone, engulfed in her self-centeredness



behind her self-locked door, and Francoise's tightened hand waiting, then pulling down the gas lever in an act of final acceptance and letting go of that which was destroying her, students can experience vicariously and symbolically the act of understanding, accepting and dealing with these 'shadows' which prevent them from becoming themselves.

On the other hand, the following statement about self-identification as an independent person and social being by Dr. Jack Birnbaum, a psychiatrist, does not give students visual images through which they can imaginatively live through an act by which they achieve self-identification.

Many people keep an intensely dependent relationship going, not so much because of its joys or rewards as through fear of the dangers of assuming independence. After all, growth involves new problems connected with sexual identity, sexual involvement, interdependence with others, and taking responsibility for yourself. Occasionally, I see people maintain this kind of helpless, clinging dependency because they will not face the rage they feel in the relationship. But once the anger is faced, they can free themselves and start to grow into a position of independence. Sometimes I wonder why people want to be independent. The answer is, of course, that there is a fine sense of fulfilment in producing for yourself; the value of the "I" goes up, and there are many good feelings of satisfaction and pleasure.<sup>5</sup>

This statement is a generalization about the 'struggle for independence'. It states the cause and effects of failing to achieve or of achieving self-independence. It does not provide images through which students can feel the fear, anger, satisfaction, pleasure of such experiences. It gives them ideas to think about, rather than images of sensory data which, when

imagined, evoke into conscious awareness the subjective forms of such experiences. Thus, they learn about the causes and effects of such a struggle, rather than becoming aware of the struggle as it is experienced by them and from which they can develop such a generalization. In other words, they are given ideas which they can apply theoretically to experience, so obtaining a general explanation which does not have power to transform experience. The alternative is to work with images through which they can consciously, in imagination, live through their experiences as the start of a process of spontaneous changes arising from changed personal understanding.

If students are to know the personal significance of their experiences, they must live through the experience in full consciousness, as was argued in Chapter III. The creation and contemplation of aesthetic symbolism gives them this opportunity and thus can be used by educators to help their students achieve some affective self-knowledge.

#### Presentation of Lessons

However, the presentation of the lessons determines whether the students do affectively experience the personal significance of the work of art and whether they think about its possible meanings. The objective in using the artistic mode of symbolization to achieve affective self-knowledge, is to use the subjective and evocative nature of art to evoke emotions within the students. Then they can be guided to attend from their emotions to their meanings, that is, to the personal significance

of the work of art. For example, in Steiner's Practical Advice to Teachers, he describes what is most importantly aroused in children when they are told legends and fairy tales.

You should sense that you are gripping the whole child and that it is from the feelings and excitement you arouse that an understanding comes to the child of what you are telling. You may therefore consider it ideal, when you are telling the child legends or fairy tales or while you draw or paint with him, that you do not explain anything or work with concepts but seek to move the child's whole being so that when he then leaves you he only later out of himself reaches an understanding of what you have told.

...

Try not to tell stories in a way that causes them to be reflected in the head and understanding; tell them in a way that evokes a kind of silent thrilled awe — within limits — and also pleasures and sorrows which echo on when the child has left you and only after a while are transformed into understanding and interest.

To achieve such focusing of their students' minds, teachers must present their lessons by using gestures, images, metaphors, archetypes, that is, artistic modes of expression, rather than factual, literal forms. The presentation of works of art must not, in the context of the educational purpose I have outlined, be reduced to the philological interpretations of literature, possible interpretations of the stage props used in a performance of a play or speculation of the intent an artist had in painting a picture. In other words, the meaning of art must not be a reduction to the abstract, attractive to the intellect alone. For this will prevent the students from emotional engagement of themselves with the meanings suggested by a work of art. In their

teaching, then, educators need to become, in this way as well, artists.

However, this intellectual exploration must be put aside only temporarily. According to developmental psychologists, children begin to comprehend abstractions and hypothetical situations using their intellects during adolescence.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, developing intellectual extensions of their insights at the right time can deepen their understandings and therefore should be encouraged.

### Student Activities

As well, the students must become 'artists' in their expression of their understandings. For example, the students must use the emotional impacts works of art have upon them as guides to their expressions of their understandings of them, rather than answering teacher or curriculum-directed questions.

Similarly, the students must not let their thoughts predominantly control their expressions of personal meanings not connected to works of art. They must let their feelings be the guide - somewhat in the manner described in relation to Helen Frankenthaler.

More than ever, it appears, Frankenthaler refuses to acknowledge that rules exist. The only rule is that there are no rules. Anything is possible — metallic paint or something ugly or pouring a huge quantity of paint on the paper. The picture unfolds, leads, unravels as I push ahead. More and more I feel led into the manifestation of how it must look. Despite the fact that it exists because I am the insistent developer of how it will look, it must appear as it does. As always, from the 1950s on, I must be ready to work with what is insisting on emerging and use it and take it from there.

What can insist on emerging and must be encouraged, is an expression of the personal significance of the emotion in the art object.

Thus, rather than the students controlling the creation of their symbol using their intellects, they use what comes into their consciousness through attention to their emotions. For example, they do not predominantly think about the cause and effect relationship between the personal meaning and its emotion while creating. Rather, they feel the subjective forms of the images being symbolized and feel the 'correctness of them', as did Simone de Beauvoir when she wrote the denouement of her story. She felt the burden of murder and the terror of mental isolation as she wrote it. Attending to her emotions she exposed that which was their meaning and resolution in a fantasy that was not intellectualized by such thoughts as the possible clumsiness, abruptness and immorality of such an ending. It just had to be according to the affective side of her relationship with the other woman. This process of emotionally guiding the creation of images, presupposes that the students know the skills of effectively shaping metaphorical, sensory images. Thus, they need to learn a variety of techniques for symbolizing using color, form, sound, movement, descriptive metaphor, etc.

Jerome Bruner explains this process of symbolizing through the guidance of emotions and metaphorical imagery rather than thought as follows:

Let us be more specific about how impulses are converted into the experience of art. Two types

of cognitive activity are set in train when a need is aroused. One is at the center of awareness as desire: it is directed toward achieving an end and is specialized to the task of finding means. The other is at the fringes of awareness, a flow of rich and surprising fantasy, a tangled reticle of associations that gives fleeting glimpses of past occasions, of disappointments and triumphs, of pleasure and unpleasures. It is the stuff of which James' stream of consciousness was made, and we honor such a writer as Joyce for his insight into the technical problem of communicating this scarcely expressible fringe. To the degree that the direct expression of impulse can be kept in abeyance, to that degree it is possible for the fringes of association to elaborate themselves. And to this degree too there can be a merging of the streams fed by different impulses, a joining of the scraps and images. For at this level, thinking is more symphonic than logical, one theme suggesting the next by a rule of letting parts stand for wholes. Where art achieves its genius is in providing an image or a symbol whereby the fusion can be comprehended and bound.

In short, the conversion of impulse into the experience of art comes from the creation of a stream of metaphoric activity and the restraining of any direct striving for ends. In essence, the connecting of experience is given its first impetus by the simultaneous presence of several such streams of fringe association.<sup>9</sup>

However, it is not only the fringe associations that artists strive to express in works of art, but also unconscious intuitions.

The great fantasies, myths, and tales are indeed like dreams; they speak from the unconscious to the unconscious, in the language of the unconscious -- symbol and archetype. Though they use words, they work the way music does; they short-circuit verbal reasoning, and go straight to the thoughts that lie too deep to utter. They cannot be translated fully into the language of reason, but only a Logical Positivist, who also finds Beethoven's Ninth Symphony meaningless, would claim that they are

therefore meaningless. They are profoundly meaningful, and useable -- practical terms of ethics; of insight; of growth.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, students need to learn to attend to of which they are subsidiarily or unconsciously aware and to create images of them guided by their feelings, without first making intellectual judgments about them. However, adolescent students can be encouraged to intellectually clarify their images after they have been created. Such clarification is not recommended for younger students who understand through direct engagement in an experience, rather than through analysis of an experience.

The creating of images involves restraint, control and selection. Jerome Bruner writes:

But creating new unities is not all the work. There is also control and conversion of the impulses that are aroused in the experiences of art, the exercise of restraint that permits the reader to maintain a distance from the hero of a novel and the play-goer to remain on his side of the proscenium arch.<sup>11</sup>

The "exercise of restraint" enables the students to determine only the particulars which contribute to the emotional experience or to find the meaning of their emotions using the symbolism in the work, rather than just to respond to a situation or the symbolism in a blind rash of emotion. Thus, they are able to control without repression what they symbolize in or understand from a work of art.

For it is not simply a matter of drawing, painting or writing whatever comes into their consciousness as they attend to an emotion. Since they can easily be distracted from their task by

many situations, such as other pressing concerns or avoidance of recognizing unpleasant appraisals. Thus, images or thoughts connected with other aspects of their lives may come into their consciousness during the contemplation of a particular emotion. Therefore, it is a matter of selecting what is relevant. To do so, students can feel an emotion and apply the feeling to an image to see if they belong together.

In letting their emotion determine which particulars contribute to its meaning, students can attempt to create a work of art in which there are no distracting elements, as did Simone de Beauvoir in the denouement of her story. The aloneness of being isolated was expressed in all the contrasting images: Xavier locked in her room and in her self-centredness, Francoise all alone in her act; the darkened empty passage, the implied suicide, a person dying on a bed, yet not existing. All these particulars are connected together through their expression of the aloneness in the annihilation of that which prevents us from the integrity of self-identification — self-ignorance.

Furthermore, by this process students add to what they are already conscious of, what they are tacitly aware of regarding an experience, thus understanding the experience in its wholeness. As well, they become aware of the emotional form of all the particulars contributing to an experience. Out of this awareness and understanding they can strive to artistry of symbolization in the manner of Virginia Woolf.



all the traces of the mind's passage through the world; achieve in the end, some kind of whole made of shivering fragments; to me this seems the natural process; the flight of the mind.<sup>12</sup>

The development and use of this mode of achieving self-knowledge need not be restricted to organized art lessons. It can be utilized whenever teachers or students need to understand an affective experience. In this mode of procedure, education in schools, without ever submitting to the pretension of therapy or psychological analysis, can overcome to an important extent the historic imbalance whereby knowledge and understanding have been restricted to the impersonal, the general and the 'external', leaving the individual to wallow in ignorance and confusion regarding him or herself as unique identities.

FOOTNOTES

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