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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF JUSTICE AND SCARCITY IN  
GLOBAL EDUCATION

BY

STEVEN RICHARD MATHER



A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND  
RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF EDUCATION.

IN

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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
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
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**FOR THE ONE WHO WAS LOST ALONG THE WAY**

**"it is the time you have wasted on your rose  
that makes your rose so important"**

**the little prince**

## **ABSTRACT**

**In this thesis I critically examine the Centre for Global Education's conception of global justice in light of the problem of global scarcity and its implications for systems of justice. My purpose is to determine whether or not global education is or can be philosophically consistent with the aims which it intends to achieve and the principles which it espouses.**

**Global education intends to eliminate instances of human marginalization and environmental degradation, which are the result of human artifice, through the process of educating globally just citizens. Global justice is an amalgam of social justice and environmental justice. The central problem which global justice faces is that the concerns and methods of social justice typically run counter to those of environmental justice and vice versa. This problem is exacerbated in that resources which are intimately linked with life's flourishing and survival are becoming increasingly more scarce. Furthermore, some of these resources must be allocated to the environment if flourishing and survival are to be possible.**

**The problems which social justice and environmental justice face under present conditions of scarcity cause global justice to be philosophically inconsistent with its aims. Accordingly, some principles of global justice must be sacrificed if it is to achieve the aims it deems most significant.**

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NEEDED THROUGH TIME

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BARB SHOKAL FOR ALWAYS HAVING TIME

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DARYL FOR THE COW WITH FREE WILL

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STEPHEN DOWNES FOR HIS COMPASSIONATE WISDOM

BONNIE FOR SO MUCH MORE THAN SHE IMAGINES

## IN MEMORIAM

FRASER BIRSS FOR BELIEVING



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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **A Statement of the Problem and Methodological Considerations**

The crux of the matter is not only whether the human species will survive, but even more whether it can survive without falling into a state of word:less existence.

**The Club of Rome**  
*The Limits to Growth*

#### **The Rationale**

Global educators advance global education as a panacea for the myriad global ills which humanity and the planet presently face. Broadly conceived, these global ills fall under the categories of human marginalization<sup>1</sup> and environmental degradation. Global educators perceive these problems to be the manifestations of the imposition of an inappropriate world-view upon the planet and humanity. Further to this point, global educators perceive these manifestations, insofar as they result in marginalization and degradation, to be unjust, as they are the result of a human-made system. In other words, insofar as incidents of human marginalization and environmental degradation are the results of human action, and not the result of natural planetary conditions, human marginalization and environmental degradation are incidents of injustice.

Global educators assert that the most sound way to resolve these problems is to replace the existing world-view with a more appropriate one. Following the lead of a legion of philosophers throughout history, global educators have chosen education as one of the primary means to bring about this change. Their end is to bring about 'global justice.' So, global education's *raison d'etre* is to educate individuals to

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<sup>1</sup> Human marginalization, in this sense of the term, occurs when people receive less of either, or both, the natural and cultural resources which are deemed to demarcate an acceptable minimum for a predetermined notion of flourishing. What this acceptable minimum is differs according to the system of resource distribution which is being forwarded and according to the amount of resources available for distribution.

bring about and live within a construct of 'global justice' and, therefore, to be 'good' global citizens.

I take it as self-evident that the problems which global education is trying to address are both serious and pressing, especially when they are considered in their totality. But it is not self-evident that global education, as it is presently conceived, can resolve the problems which it is trying to address. This thesis will examine the conception of global justice forwarded by one school of thought, the Centre for Global Education, now of the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education in Toronto, but until recently of York, England. The aim will be to explicate two recent works by the centre, *Earthrights: as if the planet really mattered* and *Greenprints: for changing schools*, to uncover the presuppositions underlying their proposed concept of justice. The intent is to submit this conception of global justice to rigorous philosophical examination so as to determine whether or not global justice is philosophically consistent with its aim of resolving global injustice.

### Why *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*?

The Centre for Global Education represents only one of a number of differing schools of global educational thought and it might justifiably be asked why I have chosen their works for scrutiny. I've chosen to study their work because they are a prominent and influential school in this area, their work is directed at the functionaries of school systems (teachers, principals, trustees, superintendents and so forth) and their work is both contemporary, readily accessible and ongoing. I've chosen to study *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* because they represent the most up to date work on global justice which the centre has produced.

### The Problem

Like those who advocate global education, I am concerned about human marginalization and environmental degradation, particularly when it is the consequence of human artifice. Concurrently, I also

believe that education has the potential to bring about significant positive changes in this regard.

Given the serious nature of these problems and the promise which certain global educators assert global justice holds to mitigate or eliminate these problems, I consider an examination of global education and global justice to be a worthwhile endeavour. If these problems are worth considering then potential remedies are also deserving of consideration. In this regard, global education is a relatively new field and at this time a bit of a "cause celebre." The contemporary nature of the Centre for Global Education's work and its ready accessibility suggest that their ideas are likely to disseminate rather rapidly among neophyte global educators. Given this scenario, it is important to determine whether or not global education can deliver what it is promising. If we are serious about curing the ill then we should first scrutinize the remedy to see if it is capable of doing so. At least, such an endeavour should decrease the chance that we have wasted our resources on snake oil or help to brew a more efficacious concoction. Given that the brewing is ongoing, my work on their work has the potential to contribute to the scholarly discourse in this comparatively new area.

### The Methodology

At issue in this thesis are two questions:

- 1) what conception or hybridized conception of justice does global education promote; and
- 2) is this conception philosophically sound, given the problems which global education is attempting to address and the goals which global education is intending to pursue?

Methodological necessity demands that these questions be dealt with in this order. Simply, the question, "what is global justice?" must be clarified prior to asking the question, "is global justice philosophically consistent the aims of global education?" The first part

of this thesis, therefore, will be dedicated to rooting out what global justice is, according to *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. The second part of this thesis will consider whether or not global justice is philosophically sound given the nature of the problem and its ramifications for various systems of justice.

Answering the first question requires an exegesis of both *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. If the ethical presuppositions, conceptions of rights and obligations, and overall aims of 'global justice' were made explicit in these works their straightforward explication would have provided the requisite information. This, however, is not the case as some of this information is only implicit within the literature or hidden within global education's conceptual structure. To render this implicit information explicit, a rigorous explication of both texts is provided.

The second part of this thesis concerns the question of whether or not global justice is philosophically consistent with the aims of global education. For global justice to be so it must address the issues of human marginalization and environmental degradation in a way which answers the philosophical and practical concerns which can be weighed against it. The most pressing question which global justice must answer is how it will deal with the problem of scarcity.

In the past, those people representing the paradigm of development, which includes development, human rights, and peace educators, have stated that scarcity is not a problem. They have based this assertion on the assumption that there are enough resources to go around and that the problem is one of distribution, not scarcity.<sup>2</sup> To this group scarcity is only a human artifice and it need not exist.

Against this perception, Engel offers that among development and environment circles, "the twin moral principles of social justice and environmental responsibility have remained permanent features

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2 S. Greig, G. Pike, and D. Selby, *Earthrights: education as if the planet really mattered*. (London: World Wide Fund for Nature and Kogan Page, 1987.), p.17.

of international discussion"<sup>3</sup>, but that in the recent past the notion that these two pillars might be built upon irreconcilable foundations has gained notoriety. The reason for this notoriety, according to Goulet, is that "one stream is concerned with protecting nature, the other with promoting economic justice. Almost always the two streams have flowed in opposite directions."<sup>4</sup> Markovic affirms Goulet's perceptions claiming that, "All basic economic constituents of the prevalent paradigm of development presuppose the unlimited exploitation of nature."<sup>5</sup> Present day advocates of the development paradigm, such as Doug Roche, argue that it is possible to produce the required resources within the context of sustainable development.<sup>6</sup>

According to Anne and Paul Erlich, however, those who say this are both the victims and propagators of a "pernicious fallacy" which is particularly seductive, "because in the short term and in a limited sense it is correct."<sup>7</sup> It might be the case that if all of the planet's people

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- 3 J.R. Engel, 'The ethics of sustainable development', in J.R. Engel and J.G. Engel (eds. ), *Ethics of Environment and Development*.(London: Belhaven Press, 1990.), p. 2.
  - 4 D. Goulet, 'Development ethics and ecological wisdom', in J.R. Engel and J.G. Engel (eds. ), *Ethics of Environment and Development*.(London: Belhaven Press, 1990.), p. 36.
  - 5 M. Markovic, 'The development vision of socialist humanism', in J.R. Engel and J.G.Engel (eds. ), *Ethics of Environment and Development*.(London: Belhaven Press, 1990.), p. 130.
  - 6 Doug Roche and I argued this point at a seminar on environment and development considerations which he presented at the University Of Alberta earlier in the year.
  - 7 A. Erlich, and P. Erlich, *The Population Explosion*. (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1990.) pp. 66-7. The point of supplying the empirically-based interpretations of the Erlich's, and their sources, is twofold. First, it suggests that there is a sense of urgency about the questions at hand. Second, it leads into the discussion of scarcity and its relevance to conceptions of justice, which is forthcoming. That other professors of Population Studies who do research in the fields of ecology, human ecology, evolution, and behavior will disagree to some degree with what Paul Erlich suggests in *The Population Explosion* is taken as a

switched to a grain diet, cash crops were abandoned, domestic animals were excluded from grain consumption, and a system of equitable distribution were put in place that the food which we presently produce would bring the current population of humans up to basal nutritional requirements.<sup>8</sup>

Unfortunately, argue the Erlich's, this scenario disregards the reality that our present way of acting upon the planet is unsustainable. In other words, if we continue with the example of agricultural production, we cannot continue to produce the same amount of food which we now do using the methods which we currently use. Our present system of groundwater and soil exploitation, two fundamental components of agricultural production, is not sustainable.<sup>9</sup> We must produce less.

What is true for agriculture is true for most human endeavors. This point is stressed by the Erlich's in their book, *The Population Explosion*:

The key to understanding overpopulation is not population density but the numbers of people in an area relative to its resources and the capacity of the environment to sustain human activities; that is, to the area's *carrying capacity*. When is an area overpopulated? When its population can't be maintained without rapidly depleting nonrenewable resources... and without degrading the capacity of the environment to support the population... By this standard, the entire planet and virtually every nation is already vastly overpopulated.<sup>10</sup>

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given. That professors in the Biological Sciences who do research concerning population, resources, and the environment will disagree, to some degree, with Anne Erlich is also considered a given. I admit that their interpretation is only one of potentially many interpretations. That I have not mentioned other interpretations, does not discount their interpretation; it only puts into question my methodology for not supplying a far more elaborate survey of the research literature available in this area.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 66-109.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 26-30.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 38-9.



To paraphrase, to continue our present way of acting upon the planet, when conjoined with our increasing population, is ultimately a suicidal course for humanity to follow.

Some reject this assertion, placing their faith in technology, and stating that by practising "sustainable development," it is possible to feed far greater numbers of humans than presently exist. Some suggest that the notion of "sustainable development" is oxymoronic, but in fact it is not.<sup>11</sup> "Sustainable development" simply means that whatever type and level of development we strive for should be sustainable. "Sustainable development" is most certainly a step in the right direction, but at present it is an ideal and in practise it is almost non-existent.<sup>12</sup> How far we can go with "sustainable development" is at this

---

11 The perception that "sustainable development" is comprised of contrary terms, like, e.g., "military intelligence" or "business ethics", has led to much debate about the usefulness and appropriateness of the term. Much the same as these other terms, however, that development can be sustainable, that the military can act intelligently, and that ethics can be shown in business indicates that these terms are not so much contraries, but interesting plays on words. This said, the inclusion of this point is merely to recognize that the debate on the term exists.

12 See Erlich's. It is possible to develop areas in a sustainable manner, but the pressures of population force the area in unsustainability because greater short term yields can be realized if unsustainable practises are adopted and population demands are for more. What I mean by the pressures of population are all the forces for action which stem from cultural artifice and biological need. Economic and political forces are two examples of the pressures of population. A contemporary practical example of this phenomenon is the depletion of the cod population off the Grand Banks and in the North Sea due to continuous overfishing for many years. Twenty years ago school children were taught that these areas were being overfished. Today a ban on fishing the Grand Banks is being attempted as the cod are close to being, or may have been, fished out. Pressures from fishermen, business and cod eaters and a total lack of foresight or backbone by political leaders allowed the cod fishery to fall into this state. The cod very well could have been fished sustainably, but the forces of population prevented this from occurring.

time unknown and whether or not we can sustainably feed the number of humans currently inhabiting this planet, let alone a projected doubling in less than a century, is far from a given.<sup>13</sup> Whether or not we should strive to do so is another question.

Realistically speaking, this thesis is not the place to address in detail the scientific elements of the population equation. The scientific elements serve to give a context into which to frame the discussion and are not intended to serve as its focus. While the scientific elements place limits on our actions, ethical elements determine which level of per capita consumption and degradation we ought to choose to serve as the lowest common denominator. In short, science gives us our options, ethics seeks to determine how we will choose between them.

This said, it is not necessary, and in fact it is undesirable, that discussion of this question should take place only if there are too many humans acting upon the planet in an unsustainable fashion. Such a question should be asked prior to the event because the event should clearly be avoided. The sooner we face the reality of our possible futures, the sooner we are able to make the choices which will determine those futures. The sooner we make our choices, the more choices we will have available to us, both ethically and scientifically.

If global justice is to effectively deal with the problems of human marginalization and environmental degradation, artificial or not, it must take into account the problem of scarcity. For this reason, I propose to use two subsidiary questions as tools to answer the question, "is global education philosophically consistent with its aims?":

A) can we develop the standard of living in the developing world within the constraints of our environmental carrying capacity and, if not;

B) what ought we to do about excessive human impact upon the planet?

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<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p.16.

"A" and "B" serve to demand a response to issues whose presuppositions encompass aims fundamental to global education, namely, human marginalization and environmental degradation. Further, they allow a very basic scrutiny of the capacity of global justice to meet those aims.

Both questions imply that there are physical limitations to both the number of humans that the planet can sustain and the level of development at which they can be sustained, the per capita level of sustainable development.<sup>14</sup> They also suggest that humanity should not go beyond the per capita level of sustainable development. "A" does this by framing the question of development within the context of sustainability. "B", on the other hand, implies that the developing world cannot, within itself, further develop, as it presupposes excessive human impact. Increased development in the developing world, if possible, must occur while the planet undergoes a decreased per capita level of sustainable development and, therefore, comes at the expense of the developed world. That the level of development might have to decrease in the developed world in order that the rest of the world might develop further is also implicit in "A".

Ultimately, these questions state that acting upon the planet in an unsustainable manner is an undesirable thing and that, if we can, we ought not to let it occur. If this notion is accepted and, therefore, if the course of continuing or accelerating humanity's present course of action is rejected, then we must consider where humanity, as it presently exists, does have an excessive impact upon the planet.

The answer which most environment and development circles give to this question is somewhat vague and reminiscent of the apparent painlessness of question "A", per capita living standards should conform to planetary limitations. Nonetheless, after only a

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<sup>14</sup> Sustainable development, in this sense, refers to that aim of development being sustainable and not the technique of sustainable development.

Although the practise of sustainable development is not presently manifest the aim of sustainable development must be met to meet the aims of global education, namely survival and flourishing.

quick perusal of the situation as described, three possible courses of action become apparent:

- i) we can reduce the impact of humanity upon the planet by changing how humans act upon the planet. This requires that peoples actions become sustainable.
- ii) we can reduce the impact of humanity upon the planet by reducing the numbers of people upon the planet.
- iii) we can do a combination of the above.

Scarcity, therefore, has profound implications for global justice because it determines whether or not conditions of human marginalization and environmental degradation can be alleviated or, in fact, if one, the other, or both must be precipitated, given whatever ethical aims are considered most significant. That this is so, as it pertains to philosophical consistency, will become clear in Chapter Four where David Hume's notions on the nature of justice and its relation to scarcity will be presented.

To summarize, this thesis is concerned with the questions, "what is global justice?", and, "is global justice philosophically consistent with its aims?" The following chapter will begin the examination of the former question through an explication of two global education texts, *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*.

## CHAPTER TWO

### *Earthrights and Greenprints: The Explication*

'Cheshire-Puss,' she began, rather timidly...' would you tell me,  
please, which way I ought to go from here?'  
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat.  
'I don't much care where...' said Alice.  
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the cat.

Lewis Carroll  
*Alice in Wonderland*

### Introduction

This chapter commences the explication of both *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* so as to derive what global education means by global justice. The works are treated separately so that the conception of global justice contained in each can be individually analyzed and synthesized. This is a means of determining whether there are conceptual differences or practical difficulties between the two. The analysis and synthesis of global justice is further divided into the categories of social justice and environmental justice or human rights and environmental (planetary and non-human) rights. Since the problems which global justice aims to solve are those of human marginalization and environmental degradation, it is important to uncover how it intends to deal with each area in terms of what constitutes justice within and between the two. Following the explication, analysis and synthesis of each work separately, a further synthesis or recombination of the two forms of global justice yields 'global justice' per se.

### Preliminary Thoughts and Brief Overview

*Earthrights* and *Greenprints* are written as seed books for the cultivation of global justice in schools and their surrounding communities. In tandem, whether intentional or not, they provide a brief introduction to the problems of global injustice and reasons why

these problems must be rectified, suggest why these problems exist, describe and prescribe global justice as a solution to these problems, and give teachers, principals, trustees, superintendents, and other potential educational functionaries a methodology for developing a globally just sensibility through a broadly conceived notion of curriculum change.

The reason I refer to using *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* in tandem is because they have differences in intent, content and form. Where they differ in how they present global justice, one tends to complement the other and vice versa. A brief overview of the content of the texts shows this.

One of the aims of *Earthrights* is to trace the evolution of global education and consequently the evolution of 'global justice', which effectively outlines the rights and obligations which it advocates. Following this, *Earthrights* outlines a number of principal concepts arising from global justice and the systemic nature of rights violation or maintenance. These then serve as a source from which to derive educational aims. Worthy of note is that *Earthrights* provides little reference to the presuppositions which underlie the rights and obligations which global justice entails.

*Greenprints*, on the other hand, has the intent of outlining why the problems which the planet and humanity presently face have occurred. Specifically, *Greenprints* locates the root cause of these problems in a particular world-view. It states the epistemic, ontologic, and ethical presuppositions which underlie this "faulty" world-view. To address these problems *Greenprints* offers a number of the presuppositions which underlie its own world-view. Interestingly, it explicitly states the ethical presuppositions which underlie the rights and obligations which global justice entails without really addressing the systems of rights and obligations which might be derived from them.

Ideally, these two works should complement each other entirely, for the rights and obligations presented in the one clearly derive from the presuppositions presented in the other. Though this occurs to a large extent, it isn't entirely the case that the conceptions of global justice which they forward are entirely congruous. These differences are not condemnably substantial, but they do affect how global justice

is to be interpreted and, therefore, must be addressed. To emphasize the distinction I will designate notions stemming from *Earthrights* as E-justice and notions stemming from *Greenprints* as G-justice, respectively. Whenever I speak of global justice from here on I will be specifically referring to the conception of justice arrived at after the synthesis of the two.

### *Earthrights: Emphasis on Rights, Obligations, and Justice*

The objectives of *Earthrights* are essentially twofold. First, *Earthrights* provides an historical perspective on global education from its roots amongst the ideals of groups concerned with development, human rights, peace, and environmental issues and traces their evolution into educational disciplines up until and including their incorporation into "global education". In tracing global education's development *Earthrights* concurrently traces the development of E-justice. Second, *Earthrights* outlines contemporary global educational objectives, principal concepts, educational aims and explanatory foci. The presuppositions of global justice are implicit within these areas. Accordingly, both the historical overview and the educational areas are excellent sources of information about the nature of E-justice. In the following section they are examined in the order just presented.

### A Brief History of Global Education's Conception and Development

Global education, "as a contemporary educational movement, is now approximately twenty years old."<sup>15</sup> It found its genesis amongst international development, human rights, peace and environment groups who were searching for effective ways to deal with the problems

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<sup>15</sup> W. Kniep, *A Critical Review of the Short History of Global Education: Preparing for New Opportunities*. (New York: Global Perspectives in Education, Inc., 1985.), p.2.

particular to their areas of concern.<sup>16</sup> These 'global problems', are the various degradations in both the planet and varying segments of the human population, such as pollution, starvation, exploitation, and basic deprivation, to name a few. Research into development, human rights, peace, and environmental issues led to the perception that the problems which are faced are both chronic and endemic and, therefore, not so much accidents as systemically determined, i.e., they are symptomatic of the systems in which they occur.<sup>17</sup> Further to this, it was argued that many of these problems are not naturally determined, i.e., they are not the result of some natural deficiency in the environment, but are culturally derived phenomena.<sup>18</sup> As these problems are thought to have a culturally systemic aspect, i.e. they are the manifestation of one of many possible human choices of how to act in given situations, they can potentially be changed. What is required to alleviate or eliminate the problems manifest in these systems, therefore, is that the systems change.

The idea that the systems must change is fueled by the reality that some groups benefit from these systems, whereas others are marginalized. This raises ethical concerns about the justification for this systemic variance. Insofar as marginalization is not a matter of accident and is culturally systemic, demarginalization is considered not a matter of altruism, but a matter of justice.

Given that change requires understanding the systems, understanding why they should be changed, and understanding how such a change can and should occur, education is viewed as the means to realizing this end. In fact, education, as part of the existing social structure, is seen to be part of the problem if it is not part of the solution. In this regard, each group has developed its area of concern into an educational discipline, resulting in the creation of development, human rights, peace, and environmental educational schemes.

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<sup>16</sup> Greig et al, *Earthrights*, p. 23.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 3-28.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 3-28.



Over time, some of the advocates of the four educations recognized a large degree of overlap, or interrelatedness between their disciplines. In particular, what was noted is that both the factors, which they view as the causes of the problems, and the endstates, which they hold as appropriate, are similar. In other words, when they view their disciplines from a broad focus, they find both the problems and proposed solutions to be aspects of a larger or, at least, similar systems. Recognition of this systemic commonality ultimately led to a merger of these educational disciplines under the rubric of global education as they recognized that

their respective principle (sic) concepts - development, environment, human rights, and peace - are complementary, interdependent and mutually illuminating.<sup>19</sup>

Just how, "their respective principle (sic) concepts...are complementary, interdependent and mutually illuminating," and in fact, how they are not, demands an examination of their origins and their objectives.

A Brief Survey of the Development, Human Rights, Peace, and Environment Education and Their Broad Focus Objectives

"Development education", according to Greig, Pike and Selby, "grew out of the mounting concern of charitable organizations, the churches, and the United Nations over 'Third World' countries."<sup>20</sup> Development educators focus on the study of developmental processes and the economic and political systems to which they are tied. Originally the emphasis was on "economically poor nations," but the notion of "Third World" was later expanded to encompass all those "areas and groups" who are in some way marginalized by the workings of economic and political systems (e.g., women, the aged, the homeless,

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<sup>19</sup>    ibid., p. 30.

<sup>20</sup>    ibid., p. 23.

the unemployed, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and poor, remote, or uninfluential parts of wealthy countries ).<sup>21</sup> In this regard

development is essentially about the realization of material and non-material human rights just as undevelopment or distorted development and their effects, malnutrition, hunger, disease - involve rights denials.<sup>22</sup>

According to development educators, "such development implies change for the betterment of the individual, the society in which the individual exists and the world at large."<sup>23</sup> Development education's objectives are said to emphasize:

1. World development/interdependencies.
2. Non-western perspectives given due emphasis.
3. Solutions lie in reforming economic/political arrangements within and between societies.
4. Student involvement: developing skills etc., for participation in decision-making processes (Teaching for development).<sup>24</sup>

Human Rights education originated out of the desire to enact the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drawn up by the United Nations in 1948, in the face of gross violations of its basic tenets worldwide.<sup>25</sup> In following the Declaration, human rights educators promote the notion that for civil and political rights to be meaningful, social and economic rights must also be provided. In other words, the opportunity to exercise human rights is only significant if one has the ability to do so. Consequently, civil, political, economic and social systems violate the rights of individuals if they do not provide individuals with the conditions to exercise their rights, if this is within their means.<sup>26</sup> In this sense, human rights educators advocate what

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<sup>21</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>23</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>24</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>25</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>26</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 27.

they term a "broad focus rights orientation."<sup>27</sup> Human Rights education is also concerned with the development of new rights orientations such as, "the rights implications of environmental abuse." Human Rights education's objectives are said to emphasize:

1. New rights, e.g. environmental rights, also included.
2. Social and economic rights given equal emphasis.
3. Serious exploration of non-Western perspectives.
4. Teaching for rights (i.e. developing skills) and in rights (i.e. democratic open classroom climate).<sup>28</sup>

The focus of peace education is to eliminate or alleviate the conditions which lead to war. In this sense, their "focus has broadened to include not only negative peace (i.e. absence of war) but also positive (ways of creating more just structures in and between societies)."<sup>29</sup> It advocates that:

A society or world characterized by injustice, oppression and exploitation may seem superficially peaceful in the absence of actual physical violence but a masked violence is constantly done to the rights and lives of human beings.<sup>30</sup>

This being so, peace educators perceive social injustice and its perpetuation, in its broad focus, to be the root cause of violence. With regards to the environment peace educators

would want to explore the question of humanity's relationship with the environment and encourage their students to consider whether and in what ways we need to modify our behaviors, expectations and values so as to bring greater harmony (peacefulness) to that relationship.<sup>31</sup>

Peace education's objectives are said to emphasize:

1. Absence of war and injustice.

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28.

2. Disarming/dismantling oppressive structures globally.
3. Extended concept of peace including ecological balance.
4. Participatory skills within democratic classroom (Teaching for and in peace).<sup>32</sup>

Environmental education emphasizes, "...the interdependent nature of all components of the biosphere, including human communities, and thus directly linked the future of the planet's life support systems to human behavior and development decisions."<sup>33</sup> Environmental educators assert that a

new ethic, embracing plants and animals as well as people is required from human societies to live in harmony with the natural world on which they depend for survival and well-being." Accordingly, "the long term task of environmental education is to foster or reinforce attitudes and behavior compatible with this new ethic."<sup>34</sup>

The Tbilisi Recommendations of 1980 suggest that the goals of environmental education are

to foster clear awareness of, and concern about, economic, social, political, and ecological interdependence in urban and rural areas; ...to provide every person with opportunities to acquire knowledge, values, attitudes, commitment and skills needed to protect and improve the environment; ...to create new patterns of behavior of individuals, groups and society as a whole towards the environment.<sup>35</sup>

Greig, Pike and Selby found their conception of environmental education on

a recognition that the local environment is caught up in the global ecosystem; ...an awareness that human and natural systems interact in myriad ways and that there is no part of human activity which does not have a bearing on the environment and vice versa; ...a dawning acknowledgement of how much we can learn from other cultures and, perhaps especially, indigenous peoples, about how to relate to the environment - an emphasis on the development of environmentally friendly values, attitudes and skills (including, very importantly,

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<sup>32</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>33</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 25

<sup>34</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>35</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 26.

those skills appropriate to influencing public opinion and political decision making).<sup>36</sup>

Environmental education's objectives are said to emphasize:

1. Local/national/global environmental interdependencies.
  2. Exploring relationship between human behavior and global ecosystems.
  3. Serious exploration of non-Western perspectives on the environment.
  4. Developing concerned awareness and participatory skills etc.
- (Teaching for the environment).<sup>37</sup>

*Earthrights: A First Phase Analysis and Summary Followed By  
An Epidermal Synthesis*

Examining both the impetus for and objectives of the four educations yields two conceptual themes. First, all four educations intend to bring about some conception of justice and accord with a view that the existing systems are unjust. Development, human rights, and peace educators view the systemic discrepancies which marginalize some while benefitting others as violations of the basic rights they believe that every human deserves. Environment educators view the degradation of non-humans and the planet, whether locally, regionally and globally, as systemically based and ethically wrong. All groups recognize that for human existence, let alone human rights, to be safeguarded the planet must not only survive but be able to sustain human life. In this regard, actions which compromise the Earth's abilities to do so are also considered rights violations.

Second, the way to bring about a more just system is through an education system which stresses open, democratic, participatory educational experiences which aim to develop decision-making skills. That such a system places a great deal of emphasis on individual development and significance within a group structure appears consistent with the desire to develop a just system of interrelation

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<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, p. 29.

which is rights based. This is potentially enhanced by the actual study of 'unjust' interrelations and interrelationship in general.

### **Earthrights: A Potential Inconsistency?**

A predominant theme in the objectives of the four educations which has not as yet been addressed is the emphasis which is supposed to be given to non-Western perspectives concerning the four areas. Even cursory examination of this theme as it relates to the other two indicates that the model is potentially inconsistent. In defining injustice and justice in the terms of contemporary Western philosophical thought it might be argued that the non-Western theme is excluded by fiat. The advocacy of an open democratic participatory classroom which aims to develop rational autonomous decision-making skills may conflict with non-Western cultures which may view an expository or didactic model as more appropriate. In that the very impetus and objectives of the educational system are grounded in Western philosophic perceptions they may inherently exclude non-Western perspectives. At the very least the lack here needs to be addressed, even if eventually it is not in itself a killing point.

### **Earthrights : The Principal Concepts**

From consideration of the educational impetus and objectives of each of the four "genesis" educations a number of broadly focussed principal concepts for global education were developed. *Earthrights'* principal concepts are that:

development decisions for human communities cannot disregard their environmental impact without, in the short or long term, jeopardizing human development;

environmental conservation is not contrary to development but an essential consideration if we are to work to create human lifestyles that are sustainable;

development is essentially about the realization of material and non-material human rights just as undevelopment or distorted development and their effects, malnutrition, hunger, disease - involve rights denials;

making choices between different types of development and different environmental strategies will, almost inevitably, involve a particular interpretation and prioritization of rights;

making wrong or risky choices about the environment will leave a sorry heritage for future generations - e.g. less productive land, less diversity of plant and animal life, less room for manoeuvre, fewer, options - and thus involves rights of profound importance;

global conflict continues to impede massively our ability to meet the development needs of the whole human community; it also has devastating environmental effects.<sup>38</sup>

**Earthrights : A Second Phase Analysis and Summary. The Inclusion of Further Educational Considerations and A Slightly More Developed Synthesis**

Even a cursory examination of the principal concepts yields premises primary to global educational theory: that human development is a right, that human development must occur within an environmental framework which is sustainable over time, and that actions or systems which thwart development or harm the environment are unjust.

Further examination of these points yields clues about what form E-justice might take. "Making choices between different types of development and different environmental strategies will, almost inevitably, involve a particular interpretation and prioritization of rights..."<sup>39</sup> is a statement which certainly alludes to the question of which aspects of E-justice have 'trump' status. The concern about the effect of today's actions upon the future implies some sort of 'rights' status for future generations.

Worthy of note also is what is not said, but is implied in these principal concepts, and here is where an apparent inconsistency lies. The principal concepts appear to disregard the "new ethic, embracing plants and animals as well as people"<sup>40</sup> in their expression. The notion

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38    *ibid.*, p. 30.

39    *ibid.*, p. 30.

40    *ibid.*, p. 25.

that non-humans or the planet have some style of rights is not considered and even a liberal reading of the principal concepts implies that the planet and its non-human inhabitants' relation to humanity appears solely instrumental, i.e., their existence has importance only insofar as it relates to human development and survival.

That said, this inconsistency is more likely the result of an ambiguity caused by what is not said, rather than an actual inconsistency. This point is borne out through examination of two other sources contained in *Earthrights*, the section outlining the authors' interpretation of Roszak's notion of "person/planet" and the educational aims and explanatory foci which are offered.

### *Earthrights: Roszak's Person/Planet*

Roszak's notion of "person/planet" concerns the development of authentic personhood through a continuing process of introspective self-examination mediated by an increasingly broadened focus of external relations. By enlarging the boundaries of one's common experience, one comes to gain a better understanding of oneself. Encounters with different people, cultures, and nature force upon the individual a re-examination of the world-view which she holds. Essentially, what is proposed is a contemplative journey into the nature of one's interrelations with the planet, where the planet is conceived both as a totality and a community of individuals. Through exploration of the external world, of people (culture) and planet (nature), and reflection upon the nature of oneself (a person of a particular culture and nature), a person is said to become able to discover what is common to all. In other words, the purpose of the journey is not to perceive oneself as being separate, because that is the point from which the individual starts the journey, but to perceive oneself as an interrelated, integrated personality. Perceiving oneself in this way is to perceive oneself in a state of "universal particularity."

The notion of "universal particularity" has deep ethical ramifications. Perceiving what is common to all leads to perceiving the value of all. In fact, the notion strongly alludes that the planet has intrinsic value. Roszak states that



suddenly, as we grow more introspectively inquisitive about the deep powers of the personality, our ethical concern becomes more universal than ever before; it strives to embrace the natural beauties and all sentient beings, each in her and his and its native peculiarity. Introspection and universality: center and circumference. Personal awareness burrows deeper into itself; our sense of belonging reaches out further. It all happens at once, the concentration of the mind, the expansion of loyalty.<sup>41</sup>

From this notion Roszak derives the position, "that the needs of the planet are the needs of the person. And, therefore, the rights of the person are the rights of the planet." A simple analysis of this statement is that the planet and people share similar needs and, hence, they should have similar rights. Rights, therefore, are derived from, or are consequent with, needs. That "our ethical concern becomes more universal than ever before," striving "to embrace the natural beauties and all sentient beings," implies that the natural beauties and sentient beings also share similar needs and, therefore, deserve similar concern in the shape of similar rights.

What these rights might entail or how they might manifest themselves is, however, for the most part, an open question. The answer to this question turns on what meaning one interprets from the notion of that which is "common to all." Unfortunately, it is difficult to come to terms with a need from which rights are derived and which all things share, particularly when one realizes that the sum total of things includes things which are not alive. Perhaps the best that can be made of this notion is to assume that "all things" means "all living things." Given this distinction, what all living things share, recognizing that within some communities this is done vicariously, is the need to continually propagate and persist. If this point is accepted, then Roszak's notion is that all things have the right to do so. Unfortunately, this interpretation only points towards the direction which planetary and non-human rights might take and, thus, still leaves open the question of what such rights would entail or how they would manifest themselves.

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, p. 40.

Nonetheless, *Earthrights's* advocacy of non-human and planetary rights in the section on Roszak and the lack of its concurrent advocacy in the principal concepts is an inconsistency in the work. Why this inconsistency is significant will become clear when the notion of non-human and planetary rights is cashed out.

### **Earthrights : Educational Aims and Explanatory Foci**

The most comprehensive statement about the curricular direction of *Earthrights* is outlined in the section upon educational aims and explanatory foci. Essentially, the aims and foci elaborate upon the objectives and principles which preceded them. A review, analysis and synthesis of these will serve to complete the explication of *Earthrights*. Accordingly, the educational aims and explanatory foci are:

#### **SYSTEMS**

*Students should understand the systemic nature of the world.*

Firstly, in the spatial dimension: changes in any one part, at whatever level (personal to global), can affect the whole. Processes and factors that bring about change operate within an interrelated and interdependent system.

Secondly, in the temporal dimension: interpretations of the present grow out of past history but are profoundly shaped too by beliefs about the future.

Thirdly, in an issues dimension: contemporary global problems can only be understood as malfunctions of a system, not as unconnected issues.

*Students should understand the principles of ecology.*

The components of an ecosystem are in dynamic equilibrium with adjustments continually taking place. The vital stability of ecosystems can be threatened through the short-sighted actions of mankind.

*Students should understand the relationship of person to planet.*

An individual is an integral part of the global system. Humankind lives in a complex interrelationship with environmental systems: the well-being of the person and the planet are interdependent. A personal exploration of the wider world can lead to greater self-awareness, just as heightened self-awareness can aid and enlarge understanding of global issues.

Global conditions give rise to, and nurture, many examples of unjust relationships and dependencies. A concern for justice entails achieving a delicate balance between asserting one's rights and recognizing one's responsibilities towards safeguarding the rights of others and of the planet.

## **ACTIONS**

*Students should recognize the implications of present choices and actions.*

Choices made and actions taken have repercussions throughout the global system. Present choices and actions, both individual and collective, can have implications for the future well-being of humankind and the environment. Failure to choose and act carries implications that can be as significant as conscious choice and action.

*Students should develop the action skills necessary for constructive participation in global society.*

Decision-making, choice and judgement - all important components of constructive participation at all levels of democratic society - require the practise and refinement of social and political skills.<sup>42</sup>

The assertion that, "A concern for justice entails achieving a delicate balance between asserting one's rights and recognizing one's responsibilities towards safeguarding the rights of others and of the planet.", can only be taken as meaning the planet has rights.<sup>43</sup> That the "systems" component states that the "well-being of the person and planet are interdependent", and the "actions" component addresses the issue of the effect of actions or non-actions upon humanity's and the planet's well-being can justifiably be taken to imply, within the context of these aims, that responsibilities or duties are owed to humanity and the planet. This is because some rights are partial correlates of duties. For example, if Sophia has a right to something, then someone or something may have a duty toward Sophia to see that her right is realized. This point will be dealt with in further detail later in the chapter.

That E-justice considers the planet and at least some non-humans to have some sort of rights or value status, therefore, is quite

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<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-8.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, p. 47.

*Students should recognize the extent of their potential.*

Human potential can only be fully realized when the physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual dimensions are recognized as individual and complementary. Students should be encouraged, through heightening their level of self-awareness and self-esteem, to awaken their full potential and, hence, achieve higher levels of personal autonomy and empowerment.

## **PERSPECTIVES**

*Students should recognize that their world view is not universally shared.*

Everyone interprets the world from within a particular framework of perception and thought. Personal perspectives are shaped by such factors as age, class, creed culture, ethnicity, gender, geographical context, ideology, language, nationality and race. There are difficulties and dangers inherent in using one's own perspective as a yardstick to judge the values and behaviors of others.

*Students should be receptive to other perspectives.*

An ability to empathize with other people, to see the world through their eyes can be profoundly liberating. It can help to challenge unexamined assumptions, feed imagination and promote creative thought and action: it can lead to a radical assessment of both problems and solutions.

*Students should appreciate what other cultures have to offer.*

An awareness and appreciation of diverse cultural viewpoints and experiences can be life-enriching and can deepen understanding of the global system. Complementary to this is an appreciation of what humankind holds in common.

## **CONDITIONS**

*Students should understand global conditions, trends and developments.*

Knowledge about major global conditions is necessary for understanding the global system. These would include: sources and distribution of power and wealth; processes and types of development; the impact of human activity, including science and technology, on the environment; the dynamics of conflict and co-operation; setbacks and success stories in the safeguarding of human rights. Informed understanding develops from familiarity with a range of arguments—often conflicting—surrounding those conditions, trends and developments and a capacity to reflect upon the long-term consequences of a range of options.

*Students should have a concern for justice, rights, and responsibilities.*

evident; the question is just what basis and form do these rights have and how do they relate to the rights of humanity?

### **Earthrights : Explicatory Summary**

The central points about E-justice which should be taken into consideration are that human development is a right, that human development must occur within an environmental framework which is sustainable over time (accordingly this development must take into account the rights of future generations), that actions or systems which subvert these outcomes are unjust, that the planet and non-humans have rights which humans have duties to uphold, and that these rights and duties may be subject to trade-offs and compromises insofar as they relate to human development occurring within a just environmental framework which is sustainable over time. The questions of "what are the rights of the planet and non-humans and how are they and human rights subject to trade-off and compromise?" are left begging in *Earthrights*. As this information remains hidden an examination of *Greenprints* is demanded before an elaborated conception of planetary or non-human rights can be given. This said, it is now time to turn to the explication of *Greenprints*.

### **Greenprints: Emphasis on World-views and Presuppositions**

The objectives of *Greenprints* are threefold: first, to outline the presuppositions which underlie the world-view or paradigm upon which the problems of human marginalization and environmental degradation are predicated and propagated; second, to unveil the presuppositions which underlie an alternative world-view which is said to be responsive to the aforementioned problems; and third, to present a model of change which can effectively bring about a change in world-views which is based upon the world-view which it promotes.

Foundational to *Greenprints*'s critique of the faulty paradigm and its advocacy of the alternative paradigm and the model for change

are the presuppositions which underlie *Greenprints* conceptual structure. As these presuppositions are central to G-justice this section begins with an examination of them. Following this, an examination of the problems of the faulty paradigm and the benefits of the new paradigm are given so as to further elaborate upon the structure of G-justice.

### *Greenprints* : Global Education's Conceptual Structure

For *Greenprints*, global education's concern is with development, human rights, peace, and environment issues and this concern is rooted in a particular ethical *weltanschauung* or world-view. What I mean by this is that underlying global education's conceptions of what constitutes a 'problem area', and what constitutes 'justice' are particular ethical and epistemic presuppositions which are part and parcel of a particular paradigm of apprehension.<sup>44</sup> Three presuppositions of fundamental significance underlie global education's paradigm.

The first presupposition is that all things are in a state of interrelation and subsequently that understanding "the-thing-in-itself" demands understanding the thing's interrelations.<sup>45</sup> For example, to understand the nature of a tree one must not only examine the tree and its parts, but all of those things which surround the tree, which the tree is dependent upon and which are dependent upon the tree.<sup>46</sup>

The second presupposition underlying global educational theory is that life is valuable in itself and recognition of this places duties upon humans to consider this value.<sup>47</sup> Accordingly, a fundamental premise of global educational theory is that our actions should not jeopardize life-as-we-know-it on this planet.

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<sup>44</sup> S. Greig, G. Pike, and D. Selby, *Greenprints: for changing schools*. (Helsington, York: World Wide Fund for Nature, 1989.) pp. 6-9.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 5-60.

<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

The third presupposition is that all beings have value in themselves and recognition of this also places duties upon humans in their deliberations.<sup>48</sup> The point to be taken here is that the value of non-humans is not only 'to humans', but also 'to themselves'. In other words, non-human value, like human value, is not solely instrumental.

These three presuppositions, in part or as a whole, form the foundation of global educational theory. They run like an implicate thread through *Greenprints's* perception of nature, humanity's place within nature, the meaning of justice and the curricular objectives which stem therefrom.

### *Greenprints* : Global Education's Perception of the Problem

Global educators of the *Greenprints* persuasion attribute many of the problems which humanity and the planet are presently facing to the *weltanschauung* which is pervasive today. It is said to be "materialist, rationalist, utilitarian, and reductionist".<sup>49</sup> In particular this view is "fragmentationalist" - the result being that, "During the last three hundred years the Western world has by and large, disregarded the connectedness of things."<sup>50</sup> It has led humanity to conceive itself as outside of nature and limited our ability to recognize value in humanity or nature.<sup>51</sup> The result, according to Fritjof Capra, is that:

The natural environment is treated as if it consisted of separate parts to be exploited by different interest groups. The fragmented view is further extended to society which is split into different nations, races, religious and political groups. The belief that all these fragments - in ourselves, in the environment and our society - are really separate can be seen as the essential reason for the present series of social, ecological and cultural crises. It has alienated us from nature and from our fellow human beings. It has brought a grossly unjust distribution of natural resources creating economic and political disorder; an ever rising wave

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<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

of violence, both spontaneous and institutionalized, and an ugly, polluted environment in which life has often become physically and mentally unhealthy.<sup>52</sup>

To oversimplify, our present systems of interpretation and, therefore, acting upon the world are unquestionably flawed because people and the planet are being harmed in the practise. Most notably, fragmentationalist philosophy displaced humanity's notion of value, first removing it from nature, and then from humanity itself. It did so by applying the mechanistic metaphor to our understanding of the functioning of nature. The application, being reductionist, was based on the presupposition that we could understand how nature functions by examining the workings of her parts, which of necessity involves disregarding the functioning of the whole, wherein the value of the whole lies.<sup>53</sup> When combined with Cartesian rationalism, which placed value solely in mind, and not in matter, the result was that:

The environment, relegated to an inferior place in the Cartesian division of mind and matter became a vast pool of organic and inorganic materials appropriate for exploitation. As Gregory Bateson puts it: 'As you arrogate all mind to yourself, you will see the world around you as mindless and therefore not entitled to consideration. The environment will seem yours to exploit.'<sup>54</sup>

That this is unhealthy and destructive is taken as a given by both *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* as they perceive, "that the development of full and authentic personhood is intimately bound up with the health of the planet."<sup>55</sup> In this regard, "Real health is... our awareness of the 'interconnectedness of body, mind, and spirit and of the 'interconnectedness' between ourselves, the rest of humankind and our environment."<sup>56</sup> Further to this point, and following the lead of Neil Evernden, they suggest that, "The defense of the environment... is

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52    *ibid.*, p. 7.

53    *ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

54    *ibid.*, p. 8.

55    *ibid.*, p. 11.

56    *ibid.*, p. 12.



ultimately a defense of meaning. Divorce ourselves from the environment and we lose something essential to our identity."<sup>57</sup>

According to *Greenprints*, global education's response is to call for a paradigm shift from the dominant social paradigm to a 'biocentric' paradigm.<sup>58</sup> It is suggested that:

A shift is needed from such anthropocentric (person-centered) philosophy with its built-in 'biospheric inequality', to a biocentric (life-centered) philosophy which humbly recognizes that we are within the environment; that reverence rather than ruthlessness is due to the natural world, we are but one creature in an incredibly complex and seamless web of life.<sup>59</sup>

Central to this biocentric paradigm is the notion that all beings have intrinsic value, i.e., that all beings have "value extrinsic to human needs."<sup>60</sup> That all beings have intrinsic value is said to place a burden of responsibility upon humanity to recognize this when contemplating actions which might affect the well-being of any being, including other humans.

*Greenprints* carries a strongly holistic interpretation of planetary interrelation. In this regard:

An holistic world-view asks that we... recognize that everything on this planet has a value extrinsic to human needs. It calls on us to embrace ecology in all its biocentric, holistic fullness, seeing humankind as just one strand in the seamless web of creation, not above or outside creation but miraculously incorporate with it.<sup>61</sup>

Accordingly,

The holistic curriculum would help students acquire what Charlene Spretnak calls 'biocentric wisdom': an understanding that we are part

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, p.9.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, p. 15.

of, not above nature; that there is an essential unity between all life-forms.<sup>62</sup>

Given that all beings are said to be interconnected, this means that the effects of all actions affect all beings in some way, shape or form. A tangential but related point is that the value inherent in each human being places a responsibility upon all other human beings to consider the effects upon human well-being when contemplating any actions. A few clues as to how these points will manifest themselves in G-justice are elaborated in *Greenprints's* curricular objectives

### *Greenprints : G-Justice and the Objectives of Global Educational Curricula*

Global education intends to foster a cultural environment which strives to develop 'just' interrelationships among the Earth's inhabitants. Implicit in this development is that it is to occur within a framework of what is environmentally possible. Education is to be one of the primary means to this end by facilitating both the social and personal transformation which is thought necessary for a state of 'global justice' to be fostered. This point is borne out by Grieg, Pike and Selby who state:

Underpinning the curriculum would be a concern to develop personal, social, and environmental responsibility, a respect for diversity within an acceptance of commonality; a concern for justice, equality, and peace; an expression of solidarity with people across the globe; and a recognition that 'acting morally is acting in a way that future generations would ask us to act if they were here to act.'<sup>63</sup>

To accomplish this aim, global educators promote a system of education which asserts not only the fundamental dignity of each individual human life, but the intrinsic value of planetary life as a whole. If G-justice is underpinned by this notion of human and non-

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<sup>62</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>63</sup>    *ibid.*, p. 20.

human value it is supposed that the cultural conditions for global injustice will be eliminated.

Given that humans have value and rights simply by virtue of their existence *Greenprints* advocates a system of radically egalitarian democracy as it is claimed to be the political, social and educational system which takes individual worth most seriously.<sup>64</sup> The notion that all people have value is systemically manifested in this type of educational system as they are able to assert their value when questions which affect their perceived well-being are under consideration.

The educational system which global educators propose as a means to developing their notion of "global justice" strongly advocates non-hierarchical, democratically-oriented schools.<sup>65</sup> Students are to have a significant say in how their learning is to take place, although it is not clear how much say they have in choosing the content of their instruction.<sup>66</sup> The teacher is to be more of a facilitator than an authority.<sup>67</sup> Students are to be active participants in their education in order that they may learn to be active participants in their society concurrent with their level of ability to do so.<sup>68</sup> Through the systemic affirmation of each students' worth, all students are said to learn the worth of others.<sup>69</sup>

### *Earthrights and Greenprints : A Synthesis*

To summarize, *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* share a number of common themes in their interpretation and promotion of global justice. First, human life is valuable; it should not be artificially marginalized, and systems of justice should aim to optimize human flourishing, insofar as this is desirable, *ceteris paribus*, and possible. Second, life in itself is valuable; human actions should not

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<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 45-60.

compromise the life of the planet, they should not degrade life on the planet, and humans have responsibilities to prevent this from happening. Third, all life forms have value and this realization imposes responsibilities upon humans to respect this value. Fourth, rights interpretation and prioritization is required when questioning what responsibilities humans have towards each other, the planet, and non-humans, which is a recognition that rights can compete against each other under scarcity.

How these themes are likely to manifest themselves in actual systems of justice is the subject of the next two chapters. Consistency, logistics, and empirical reality demand that they be divided into human rights justice and environmental justice, respectively. Why this is so will become clear in the chapters below, but before I deal with this I need first to do a recombination of both forms of justice.

### The Recombination: Human Rights

Global education's conception of human rights is founded upon a prescription of human rights which finds its roots in both non-consequentialist and consequentialist ethics. Human rights are grounded by a general principle of what is right, which is something close to the Kantian categorical imperative, i.e., "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold as good as a principle of universal legislation."<sup>70</sup> From this imperative the notion that people should be treated as ends in themselves and not means is derived.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> I. Kant, 'The Critique of Practical Reason', in M. Adler (ed.), *Great Books of the Western World*: 42: Kant. (Toronto: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1971.),p. 302

<sup>71</sup> R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.), pp. 13, 32. I suggest that the categorical imperative is the most likely foundation for this grounding. It is unlikely that a theological foundation is purported as no reference to such a foundation is given in either *Earthrights* or *Greenprints*. An alternative possibility is that offered by life-centered or biocentric metaphysical positions which found themselves on the inherent value of life itself and the

To Kantians, "Persons have rights because of their unconditional worth as rational beings."<sup>72</sup> *Earthrights* strongly implies that humans have intrinsic value. That any human artifice or action which inhibits human flourishing is taken to be an example of injustice appears to be an example of invoking the categorical imperative as the artifice or action would of necessity be placing the worth of some humans above other humans which goes against the imperative. *Greenprints*, on the other hand, states that all humans have intrinsic value, although it does not say that they have this value by virtue of their unconditional worth as rational beings. In this respect *Greenprints's* presuppositions that life and all beings have value in themselves goes against the criterion of the imperative. Nonetheless, the spirit of the imperative is carried through in affording humans intrinsic worth.

What these human rights should be in particular is consequentialistically grounded in an hypothetical imperative. This hypothetical imperative takes as its end a generalized, descriptive, non-controversial conception of human flourishing which posits certain things as being human goods, specifically those things which lead to optimal growth and development.<sup>73</sup> This conception is generalized and descriptive in that it outlines specific human characteristics and capacities and then ties them to needs and wants which all humans, or at least the vast majority, share. This conception is non-controversial in that the characteristics, capacities, needs, and wants are so generally descriptive of humanity as to be incontrovertible. For example, we live and die, we feel pain and pleasure, we need various types of stimulation from our environments, whether consumptive or interactive, to grow and develop. All things being equal, it is better to have one's nutritional requirements met than to be malnourished, and so on.

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existence of life-telos. This will be covered in the section on environmental integrity.

<sup>72</sup> D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce, 'General Introduction', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), p.11.

<sup>73</sup> Vincent, pp. 32, 112, 125.

*Earthrights's* assertion that development is a right and that marginalization is a rights violation is a restatement of the hypothetical imperative, albeit somewhat particularized. The contents of the rights define not only what constitutes human flourishing, but what does not. In this regard, *Earthrights* promotes a maximalist conception of human rights. Maximalist conceptions of human rights hold that social and economic rights must be conjoined with civil and political rights for human flourishing to take place, i.e., both the malnourished homeless with civil and political freedom and well-fed slaves fall into the category of the marginalized.<sup>74</sup> In this conception, "...the content of human rights specifies not merely what is required to keep everyone above some basic level, but all the requirements of practical reasonableness making possible the basic goods of flourishing."<sup>75</sup>

In this sense, rights are things which are held against others and they correspond with duties which potentially responsible others have towards the right holder.<sup>76</sup> These duties can be said to take at least one of three forms or a combination of the three. That is to say, in the maximalist conception, "...all human rights are said to have three correlative duties: duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation, and duties to aid the deprived."<sup>77</sup> As human rights are tied to human duties, the idea that an individual's rights could or should be marginalized even if it would result in "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is anathema.

The point to be taken here is not only that each human life is thought to be valuable in itself, but that each human life is so valuable that it is wrong for the basic conditions of human flourishing to be denied to any human, if it is possible for these conditions to be met. If the basic conditions for human flourishing can be provided to every human, every human has a "right" to these conditions. In other words, if some humans are flourishing at the expense of other

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<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 11, 112.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, 112.

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, p. 11.

humans, given artificial systemic marginalization, those humans who are flourishing have a duty to those who are marginalized only to take their fair share and forsake any extra. Given the principle of fair and equitable distribution, and to invoke the dramatic device of foreshadowing, it follows that if the basic conditions which could be provided are at levels below that of optimal flourishing then whatever level could be shared by all is the level to be aimed for.

### The Recombination: Environmental Rights

Two specific themes concerning environmental integrity occur to some degree in both *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. The first is that the planet, humans, and to some extent, non-human living beings have intrinsic value and rights in accordance with this value. What this value entails and how it manifests itself with regard to planetary and non-human living beings' rights is, for the most part, an open question.

The second theme is that the planet and, therefore, humanity must survive and human actions should not jeopardize this. Both works stress that humans do not exist apart from nature and that human health and planetary health are inextricably linked.

These themes are less strongly stated in *Earthrights* which for the most part posits an instrumental relationship between humanity and the environment. *Earthrights* does suggest that the planet and non-humans have rights and, through Roszak, that they deserve similar concern, but does not explicitly state this in its objectives, principles, aims, or explanatory foci. Nonetheless, it states that humans have to make responsible choices when considering development and environmental strategies. This commits humans to certain environmental obligations, even if these are only taken in relation to human survival. What is implied, however, is that they should be taken with relation to the planet's and non-human survival as well.

*Greenprints*, on the other hand, strongly asserts the intrinsic value of all living things and life itself through its assertion of the biocentric paradigm. A burden of responsibility is placed upon

humans to recognize this value when contemplating actions which might affect the well-being of any being, noting that "reverence rather than ruthlessness is due to the natural world." This strongly implies that some rights of non-humans and the planet can override some rights of humans, especially if the rights of humans place the life of the planet in jeopardy, given the mandate that life itself must survive.

What form non-human and planetary rights might take is not terribly difficult to conceive, although some might feel uncomfortable with the notion of these entities having rights if they believe that rights are necessarily correlative with duties. Their point would be that because the planet and non-humans are incapable of bearing duties, which is arguably not entirely the case as concerns some of the more rational non-humans, that they cannot bear rights. Rights, however, are not necessarily correlative with duties and one only need consider the examples of infants, children, and mentally disabled humans to flesh this out. This point will be dealt with in more detail later in the thesis.

The form which planetary and non-human rights would take is much the same as the form which humans rights take. Humans, accordingly, might have duties to avoid depriving, protect the deprived, and to aid the deprived in a manner appropriate to any particular situation.

How these rights cash out is a question of what force non-human and planetary rights are given in relation to human rights under the biocentric paradigm. Before a continuation of a synthesis of global justice can occur, there needs to be an examination of biocentric ethics and environmental justice. A brief examination of ethics and justice in themselves will help to contextualize the mandates of the aforementioned forms.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **The Commonalities of Ethical Systems and the Nature of Justice**

To stress a point, a necessary but not sufficient condition of formulating an adequate ethical theory (and hence an adequate environmental ethic) is determining the most defensible criterion of moral standing.

Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce  
*People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*

#### **Introduction**

The last chapter left two significant questions about the nature of global justice unanswered. The first question concerns what rights non-humans and the planet can be said to hold. The second question concerns how these rights cash out in terms of the encumbrances humans, non-humans and the planet will have to bear under global justice.

As the answers to these questions are not explicitly found in either *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* an examination of other sources of information on environmental justice is required. Accordingly, this exercise is one of the primary components of this chapter. Following this examination other types of justice are evaluated according to how they fit with the aspects of environmental and social justice which global justice promotes.

Interestingly, any meaningful examination of environmental justice and, therefore, environmental ethics first requires an examination of justice and ethics itself. Given that the intent of global justice is to be compatible with human, non-human and planetary concerns the notion that the nature and structure of ethics and justice must be examined should seem less strange. If it is not now, it will be at the end of this chapter.

Before examining how environmental justice and environmental ethics fit within justice and ethics it is necessary to first examine the nature of the latter. This exercise comprises the first part of this chapter. The second part introduces three potential candidates for the environmental component of global justice. The third part

suggests which candidate or combination of candidates is best suited for this role, given the signposts laid out in *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. This effectively results in a determination of what global justice is. The fourth part concerns the implications of cashing out human, non-human and planetary rights under global justice.

### The Nature of Ethics and Justice

Ethics is "the inquiry into the nature of morality or moral acts" and relates to, "the search for the morally good life."<sup>78</sup> Ethics aims at determining what is 'good' about life, and as life is all that we do, with apologies to those who posit metaphysical considerations, ethics determines what is 'good.' Accordingly, ethics distinguishes between what is "good/bad, right/wrong, or correct/incorrect."<sup>79</sup>

The ethical status of justice is that of a regulatory mechanism. The importance of justice to ethics is that it serves to create and maintain the conditions under which the 'good' can be achieved. In other words, justice is a means towards a specific end, that being the 'good.' In this sense, justice is like a thermostat which governs the mean temperature of ethical structures. In determining the ethical ambience of the structure, it is driven by the virtues, i.e., the ideals, values, and principles, which make the structure habitable. In fact, the virtues set the limit control switches which determine the range of tolerance the principles of fairness and equity will apply to the structure.

This said, each ethical structure houses its own conception of the 'good', and there are many ethical structures. The point to be taken here is that justice is the functional component of ethical theories. Justice, in itself, therefore, has very little to say about ethics, but ideally systems of justice say all that needs to be said about the ethical theories they represent. What I mean is that the functional outcomes of a

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<sup>78</sup> P. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1981.), p. 82.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 178-9.

system of justice, if it is consistent with its aims, will represent the ethical end which it strives toward.

Justice governs through the use of specific instruments, such as rights, freedoms, obligations, and duties, to name a few. Where ethical theories differ the temper of these instruments differ, and how these theories differ is in the presuppositions which underlie them. To understand why a system of justice functions the way it does, therefore, demands that the presuppositions which underlie its ethical theory be uncovered.

Pierce and VanDeVeer suggest that a most useful distinction to make when scrutinizing the presuppositions underlying differing ethical theories is, "the distinction between (a) duties to something and (b) duties regarding something."<sup>80</sup> An easy way to clarify the meaning of this distinction is to think of these categories as (a) those things which have moral standing, and (b) those things which do not have moral standing.<sup>81</sup> An important qualification is that only things which can be said to have a 'good' can be candidates for moral standing. This is because the 'good', as it relates to justice, is some conception of wellbeing attributed to specific things.

This last point may appear a little curious, but its truth can be shown through a few examples. If Sophia were immortal it would be absurd to suggest that anyone had a duty not to take her life or to prevent others, including Sophia, from trying to do so. If there were hard, irreducible particles of matter it would be absurd to suggest that anyone had a duty not to reduce them or stop others from trying to do so. The point to be taken here is that duties correspond with some concept of wellbeing that a thing can be said to have. That Sophia is not immortal might impose a duty on others or herself not to take her life, providing she or others consider her life to have such a value as to deserve a corresponding duty. The same applies to Democritus's atoms should it be the case that they are found not to be hard and irreducible. If being in the form where they appear to be hard and irreducible is

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<sup>80</sup> VanDeVeer, p. 5.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*, p. 4.

considered in their wellbeing, and if reducing them constitutes harm, a duty not to reduce them might be appropriate.

This is not to say that Sophia's immortality precludes duties towards her. For example, for Sophia's wellbeing to be optimized she might need the use of all of her bodily capacities. Chopping off her arm would certainly limit her potential activities throughout her immortality, thus constituting harm towards her, and perhaps constituting a duty not to chop off her arm. To summarize, things that can be said to have a wellbeing, and, therefore, can be harmed, are all potential candidates for having duties towards or in regards to them.<sup>82</sup>

What separates things into these two categories is whether or not they are intrinsically valued.<sup>83</sup> To state that a thing has intrinsic value is to unequivocally universalize the value of the thing to all potential moral agents. It is to say that the thing has value just by virtue of its own existence. Accordingly, things which have intrinsic value have moral standing. Things without intrinsic value, although not accorded moral standing, can still come to have a form of moral standing.

Things which are intrinsically valued have duties towards them. Things which are not can have duties regarding them. The key to whether or not a thing, "a", which is not intrinsically valued has a duty regarding it is whether or not a thing which is intrinsically valued, "b", values "a". That "b", which is intrinsically valued, values "a" imposes duties upon any "b", not to harm "a." Consequently, if an "a" is not valued by any "b", there are no duties towards or in regards to it.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> A similar argument relating pleasure, pain, and well-being to tele is presented in L. Johnson, *A Morally Deep World*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.)

<sup>83</sup> VanDeVeer, p. 5.

<sup>84</sup> Perhaps it is useful to point out the possibility for a reductio ad absurdum here. A thing 'b' without moral standing which was valued by a thing 'a' with moral standing could have its well-being tied to a thing 'c' which was not valued by 'a'. This being the case a secondary value placement could occur, that is, 'a' might be forced to value 'c' with respect to 'b'. This could lead to a tertiary value placement and so on.

To clarify this point let me use the example of a biker, Mercury, and his Harley, Alice. If Mercury were intrinsically valued, let's say as a member of the human species or a club member, it would be considered wrong to harm him. If Mercury's wellbeing is tied to the wellbeing of Alice, then harming Alice harms him, and, therefore, it would be wrong to harm Alice. Mercury's relationship with Alice gives Alice value. Mercury's club or humanity respectively have duties to Mercury and duties regarding Alice.

This case can be reversed. It is also possible that a group, the Aesthetic Mechanophiles, could value Alice intrinsically, e.g., as an example of mechanically harmonic perfection, yet perceive Mercury as without standing. That Mercury was capable of keeping Alice in running order, however, as the mechanophiles were aesthetically inclined, but mechanically incompetent, would tie Mercury to the wellbeing of Alice. To harm Mercury would be to harm Alice. The Aesthetic Mechanophiles, therefore, would have duties to Alice and duties regarding Mercury.

This said, a "b" can value an "a" in one or two ways. A "b" can either intrinsically value an "a", instrumentally value an "a", or value an "a" in both ways.<sup>85</sup> Insofar as a "b" intrinsically values an "a", in this sense, it is a private matter, and not a matter of public consensus. Some examples of this might include Dadaist art, original buildings in Old Strathcona, and Carmanagh, which some may claim to have value in themselves, whereas others may only perceive them to have instrumental value or no value at all.

Instrumental value can also be shown to have a public/ private distinction. That certain "b"s could perceive an "a" to be useful, whereas others could see no use for it is not controversial. One need only consider examples such as astrological charts, canned laughter on

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<sup>85</sup> Perhaps I am guilty of conflating extrinsic value with instrumental value.

In this case, however, I think it acceptable to assert that, that which is desired for its beneficial consequences (extrinsic) is very much the same as that which is perceived as a means to an end (instrumental). My argument is simply that a means is quite similar to a tool

sit-coms, specialized types of tools, and formal logic to bring this point to bear.

"A"s, and for that matter, "b"s, can also be valued in both ways. A building in Old Strathcona can be valued as an aesthetic period piece while at the same time valued as a commercial boon to the area insofar as it helps to create an ambience which attracts consumers to the area. A piece of Dadaist art could be valued because of its aesthetic statement as well as in that it covers up a bare wall, is a good capital investment, and tends to impress sexually desirable others. Carmanagh could be valued in that it deserves to exist simply because it does and that no other places like it remain as well as be valued as a tourist attraction, an effective issue to attack the government on, or a symbol of our ability to control our rapacity. Brian Mulroney could be valued by virtue of his humanness, as well as valued for his abilities to lead the country, assure almost tax-free status for banks in Canada, shut down mines, and pay a large bar tab at the end of the evening. Terms like "human resources" and "human capital" lend further strength to this notion.

The public/private distinction as it concerns intrinsic value has significant implications for the notion of moral standing. It suggests that individuals and groups can argue about what has intrinsic value and what doesn't. It posits that arguably different characteristics can be said to constitute the essence of intrinsic value. That people have differing conceptions of intrinsic value is evidence of the obvious case that who or what functionally holds moral standing is a matter of consensus, insofar as public conceptions of justice apply, even if what is consensually determined is not ethically justifiable.

The point to be taken here is that to some extent the notion of who or what has intrinsic value, and, therefore, who has moral standing, is relative. In other words, which quality or qualities an object or experience has which are taken to be inherently valuable is not universally self-evident. Relativity, however, does not imply arbitrariness. Relativity only implies that differing substantive criteria for determining moral standing can be applied. History bears witness

to this point.<sup>86</sup> Apparently, the category or categories of things which are valued can be broadened or narrowed, depending upon which criterion values are selected.

Returning to Mercury, Alice, and their wellbeing, the assertion that Alice the Harley has a wellbeing appears rather strange, although it is not strange to think of Mercury as having a wellbeing. This is particularly the case because wellbeing has been tied to the capacity to have certain actions be in one's interests. Alice is not consciously self-aware and she doesn't feel pleasure or pain so it's strange that she could be said to have interests. Mercury, admittedly, is sometimes close to catatonic after a serious week-end of partying, and, therefore, not consciously self-aware, but he does meet these criteria at least some of the time. Even if he's nearly comatose, he is at least alive and that's one thing which Alice certainly is not. Mercury can be harmed, even if it is self-induced. Alice is a particular configuration of non-conscious, non-feeling, non-living matter. How can she have a wellbeing if she can not be harmed? The answer, according to an infrequently held but nonetheless significant few is that Alice can be harmed because she has a telos which can be disrupted. This apparently bizarre viewpoint has interesting implications for ethics and justice and so is fleshed out in the following paragraphs.

To say that some thing has a telos is to say that it has an end, aim, goal or purpose.<sup>87</sup> Its wellbeing, or good, corresponds to this end. This point is asserted by Aristotle who states:

Every art or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every action and choice, seem to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been defined as that thing at which all things aim.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> See R. Nash *The Rights of Nature*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.)

<sup>87</sup> Angeles, p. 291.

<sup>88</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company Inc., 1908.)

Both Mercury and Alice have a telos. Mercury exists to be a biker. (For sake of argument let's forget about what induced him to be so.) Alice exists to be a motorcycle. In being a biker, Mercury functions as a biker should both within and outside of biker culture. Alice functions as she was designed to do as a member of the class of motorcycles. Garrotting Mercury, converting him to Christianity, or kidnapping him and placing him in the midst of an Amazonian hunter-gatherer society are all things which could be said to harm him insofar as his purpose is to be a biker. Blowing up Alice, banning the production of hydro-carbons, or stopping the production of Harley parts could be said to harm Alice insofar as they prevent her from fulfilling her purpose as a motorcycle.

One might be tempted to say, and it would be appropriate to do so given what has been said so far, that the harm is not really occurring to Alice, but to anyone who can consciously value Alice, such as Mercury or the Aesthetic Mechanophiles. If no one valued Alice, then no one was harmed. This is to engage in, what might be termed, "the fallacy of misplaced wellbeing." The fallacy of misplaced wellbeing occurs when one attributes an action upon a thing with a telos which does not have moral standing, "x", to not harm "x", yet harm a thing which values "x", that being "y". This disregards that "y"'s concern is about the harm occurring to "x". In other words, "y" perceives that "x" is being harmed, in that, "y" perceives that "x" has a telos which is being disrupted. "Y" may be concerned that the harm which is occurring to "x" will make "x" useless to "y" and, therefore, harm "y", but this does not change the reality that "x" is being harmed. This does not mean that "y" is not harmed by the action upon "x", only that what harms "y" is the harm to "x". "Y"'s concern is that "x" is being harmed.

One might accuse proponents of ~~this~~ view of using loaded language, in that Alice is being transformed, but not harmed, if Alice is not considered to have a wellbeing. This is to say that Alice does not have a telos other than that which the valuer perceives. The onus, therefore, is upon Mercury, the Aesthetic mechanophiles or myself to prove that Alice's wellbeing is not one of our tele anthropomorphically projected upon her. This view, accordingly,



locates all value, all wellbeing, and all tele, outside of so-called inanimate objects, such as Cleopatra's library at Alexandria or the Mona Lisa, and places it in the perception of a perceiver with moral standing.

The objection taken is correct. The primary difference between the two, and the one which I suggest is the relevant distinction, is that the telos of Mercury is self-determined, whereas, the telos of Alice is other-determined, or projected upon her. The wellbeing of Alice is wellbeing with regards to her motorcycleness, her aesthetic mechanicalness, or her dollar value as scrap metalness. She was created by someone with a specific telos in mind. In the past, her constituent parts could have many differing other-determined tele and in the future, after her role as a Harley has passed, she may fulfill many more roles. As an inanimate object Alice's telos is not her own and changes in her form which an interested observer construes as harm to her are tele projections of that interested observer on her.

Mercury, on the other hand, can be seen to have been the object of other-determined tele through time, for example those who induced him to become a biker, but he still is self-determined to some extent. Whether or not other tele are projected on him, he still has a telos which is directed by him.

This point is important and deserves elaboration, in particular because self-determination is given by some as a knock-down argument for moral standing, although it can reasonably be asserted that it is not.<sup>89</sup> Before carrying the latter point through, however, it is useful to trace the former to its founder, Immanuel Kant and his Categorical Imperative.

The Kantian Categorical Imperative states, "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold as good as a principle of universal legislation."<sup>90</sup> Under the imperative, persons are

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<sup>89</sup> The point behind the exercise of exorcizing the notions of 'telos' and 'well-being' in the last few pages is to stress the need for philosophical clarity in their definition as these notions are fundamentally important to the notion of global justice I present in this thesis.

<sup>90</sup> Kant, p. 302

to be perceived as ends in themselves and as such are never to be treated as mere means to an end. Persons, in the Kantian sense, are synonymous with human beings as humans have the potential to be rational, autonomous beings.<sup>91</sup>

Kant divides the world into two categories, persons and things. Persons are those with moral standing and things are those without moral standing. Persons have moral standing because they

are rational, autonomous beings who are capable of formulating and pursuing different conceptions of the good. That is persons have ends of their own.<sup>92</sup>

In this regard:

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<sup>91</sup> This statement raises obvious difficulties for those who do not have the capacity for rational, autonomous judgment. I make this assertion following the interpretation of Kant's meaning given by Hilary Putnam in his book, *The Many Faces of Realism* and extrapolating upon Putnam's interpretation. Putnam argues that Kant's aim is to show that all humans are equal in having to think for themselves (we shouldn't be heteronomous) in a world where the moral end of humanity is not discoverable. Happiness, for example, does not work as an end because happiness can mean many things, some of them contraries. The point to be taken is that all humans, regardless of talents and abilities are in the same boat. We are equal in that we all have to answer the question of "how should I live?", in a world where the answer is thickly veiled. As no one human or group of humans can profess to have the truth for all, beyond question, we should all live with this humility and respect for our mutual condition in mind, when we take actions which can affect others. I think it likely that this Kantian notion of equality is intended to extend to humanity in general, regardless of talent or ability. Those with brain injuries, therefore, are merely humans with lesser capacities for rational, autonomous judgment and not excludable from the category of humanity.

<sup>92</sup> VanDeVeer, p. 11.

Persons have rights because of their unconditional worth as rational beings, whereas the relative worth of things is relative to the ends of persons.<sup>93</sup>

The worth of things is relative to persons because a thing

is incapable of autonomy in the Kantian sense which entails self-rule, that is, formulating and following rational principles. Hence, inanimate objects do not have rights in Kant's view.<sup>94</sup>

Although things do not have rights under the Kantian scheme, Kant still believed we could have duties regarding them, i.e., insofar as they are tied to our duties towards other humans or ourselves. Kant also asserted that we should be virtuous in regard to animals.<sup>95</sup> To treat animals cruelly would be to disregard a duty to ourselves, insofar as we know causing others needless pain is wrong.

To summarize, Kant asserts that because humans are conscious, self-aware agents who can posit their own ends, they have unconditional value and, therefore, they have moral standing. This places duties upon humans towards other humans. Non-humans, on the other hand, insofar as they are not capable of meeting these criteria, and he believed they were not, have no moral standing unless it is in regard to humans.

But do non-humans have self-determined tele? Unlike Alice, who is an inanimate object whose telos is projected upon her, non-humans can most certainly be said to have a telos. They may not be conscious, self-aware agents who posit their own ends, but it is incontrovertible that non-humans act so as to achieve certain ends. To see how this is so requires a look into biocentric ethics. Before doing so I will quickly summarize what has been said in this chapter so far.

Ethics determines what is good and justice is the mechanism through which the good is realized. The good pertains to the wellbeing of things with moral standing. For things to have a good they must

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<sup>93</sup>    ibid., p. 11.

<sup>94</sup>    ibid., p. 11.

<sup>95</sup>    ibid., p. 11-2.

have a wellbeing that can be benefitted or harmed and in this sense they must have an end to which they are directed. Harm constitutes the thing's progress towards its end being thwarted whereas benefit constitutes its progress being aided or unimpeded. A thing's end is its telos. A telos can be either be self-directed, imposed, or both. If a telos is self-directed the thing has an end it itself. If a telos is imposed its end is other directed. A minimal condition for a thing to have a good, therefore, is for it to have a telos.

The questions which need to be answered at this point, as the purpose of this examination is to unveil non-human and planetary rights, is "do non-humans and the planet have telos?", and if so "is this telos intrinsically valuable?" Further to this point, "given that this telos is intrinsically valuable how does this telos cash out in terms of rights?" These questions are the subjects of the next two sections.

### **Biocentric Ethics and Environmental Justice**

Earlier in the chapter, it was noted that the Kantian categorical imperative denied moral standing to non-humans. This does not mean, however, that the imperative is ecologically useless. If it were the case that human virtue were environmentally oriented the categorical imperative could lead to environmentally sound practise. If it is considered imperative for the wellbeing of humanity that wild areas be preserved in their integrity and that human life-practises be environmentally sound, then the categorical imperative could achieve similar aims to those of the biocentric systems. Nonetheless, as the biocentric paradigm expresses that all beings have intrinsic value, Kant's categorical imperative cannot be said to serve its purposes.

Even though the Kantian system, in its pure form, is unsuitable for a biocentric ethic, some quasi-Kantian ethical systems hold promise in this regard. These structures are also hierarchically structured in that they divide the world into classes of those who are persons and those which are things. The distinction is not always clearly demarcated, however, and to some extent personhood is weighted by degrees of possessing certain types of characteristics deemed requisite for moral consideration. In other words, these ethical systems differ on

the issue of which "esse" a thing has that constitutes its intrinsic value and how much. Pierce and VanDeVeer outline seven categories which have been claimed to be value inhering: personhood, potential personhood, rationality, linguistic capacity, sentience, being alive, and being an integral part of the ecosystem.<sup>96</sup> Alone or in combination, all of these have been said to be grounds for perceiving something as having intrinsic value. Those systems which ascribe to the biocentric paradigm of necessity must share in at least one of the last two characteristics.

The biocentric paradigm has two distinct ethical modes of advocacy. The first mode, biocentric moral extensionism, focuses on the rights which individual non-humans or species could be said to hold against humans. The second mode, which I shall term "biocentric holism" focuses on the notion of community oriented value. The third mode, "transpersonal ecology" rejects the need for environmental justice insofar as the development of an environmental consciousness would mitigate or eliminate the need. I shall treat each mode individually.

### Biocentric Moral Extensionism

Biocentric moral extensionism asserts that all living things have a telos, and therefore, a wellbeing, which accords with giving them certain rights. VanDeVeer states:

I shall simply assume that generally when it is in some creatures (sic) interest not to suffer it is also not in its interest to die (and hence be killed.)<sup>97</sup>

The notion that non-humans have interests is directly tied to the notion that non-humans have a wellbeing or telos. Biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela refer to this telos as autopoiesis, and accordingly it leads to the notion of autopoietic ethics.

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<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5-9.

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, p. 52.

Essentially, autopoiesis describes the tendency of organisms to strive to continually reproduce and persist. Organisms, "continuously strive to produce and sustain their organizational activity and structure" and the primary product of the operation is themselves, not something external to themselves" as is the case with machines.<sup>98</sup> In this sense, organisms are, "not merely self-organizing systems, they are self-generating or self-renewing systems."<sup>99</sup> In this regard, Lawrence Johnson states, "Living beings have an intercoherent organic wholeness that is self-defining and defines their particular wellbeing requirements within a broad range."<sup>100</sup> In other words, organisms are self-directed even if the 'self' is not human personhood.

The biological notion of self-direction of necessity ties in with a biological notion of "knowing." To Maturana and Varela, "knowing is effective action, that is, operating effectively in the domain of existence of living beings."<sup>101</sup> In this regard, they

characterize cognition as an effective action, an action that will enable a living being to continue its existence in a definite environment as it brings forth its existence.<sup>102</sup>

Lawrence Johnson suggests that this view is similar to Spinoza's notion of a conatus, that is, "the endeavor wherewith a thing endeavors to persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of the thing."<sup>103</sup> It also resembles the Aristotelean notion of a telos as "the inherent nature of a being that defines what it is and what its effective functioning is."<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> W. Fox, *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology*. (Boston: Shambhala Publications Inc., 1990.), p. 169.

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>100</sup> Johnson, p. 146.

<sup>101</sup> H. Maturana, and F. Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding*. (Boston: Shambhala Publications Inc., 1987.), p. 29.

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>103</sup> Johnson, p. 146.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*, p. 146.

One might be tempted to state that functioning effectively and knowing are two quite different things in that effective functioning may have nothing to do with the thought process, except, insofar as it relates to stimulus-response. Indeed, stimulus/response actions or non-conscious, non-self-aware actions would be categorized as effective functioning, or knowing, if, in fact, it led to continuous reproduction and persistence, but this is not necessarily a killing point. If one takes the place of an observer who is unaware of the mental states of the things that one is observing, one could easily describe the actions of humans in much the same way, albeit more complex and even, sometimes, confusing or contradictory. That is, we identify action by looking for the intention of the action. For those involved in evolutionary epistemology, our knowing is simply a more complex variation of effective functioning.

In that organisms can be said to be self-directed towards achieving an end they can be said to be candidates for moral standing along a quasi-Kantian line. Fox states that:

This argument can be expressed in a more formal way. The fact that autopoietic processes are primarily and continuously engaged in the recursive (or circular) process of regenerating (renewing) themselves means that they are not merely means to ends that are external to themselves but rather that they are ends in themselves. This amounts to a classical formulation of intrinsic value: by definition, any entity or process that is merely a means to an end has only an instrumental value whereas any entity or process that is an end in itself has an intrinsic value, and, therefore, is deserving of moral consideration.<sup>105</sup>

The peculiarity of the notion that non-humans have interests stems from the questionable idea that a being can only have interests or a wellbeing if it can conceptualize its desires, i.e., it is consciously aware of what it desires and why. Beings who cannot conceptualize their desires do not have interests and therefore do not have a wellbeing. The relevant distinction in this case is the difference between self-rule and self-regulation. Kantian moral agents are self-ruling whereas self-directed organisms are merely self-directed and self-regulating.

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105 Fox, p. 172.

Kantian moral agents have interests because they are consciously, self-aware of their interests. They are also able to discern, to some extent, the interests of other moral agents. Kant states that moral agents can also discern what is in the best interests of those things which are not moral agents although he posits no moral consideration towards them. But surely this is to beg the question in favor of conceptual reflection if only because having interests precludes conceptualizing them in oneself and others. Perhaps it is better to state that self-rule is a quality of a moral agent, but self-direction is a quality of a thing with interests.

The question which remains, then, is whether or not one needs to have both qualities, self-rule and self-direction, to qualify for moral standing? This most certainly does not seem to be the case when the notion of self-rule is cashed out. Infants are incapable of self-rule and the capacity for self-rule in children is at best a matter of degree, dependent upon their level of development and their environmental influences. Does this mean that infants do not have moral standing and children only have degrees of moral standing?<sup>106</sup> How does this affect the moral standing of adults whose environmental influences have left them as somewhat less than capable self-rulers?<sup>107</sup> In fact, because primates, such as chimpanzees and gorillas, exhibit qualities which are indicative of lower level self-rule and rational reflection, does this mean that they should be given a degree of moral standing?

The idea that things could have differing degrees of worth by virtue of their level of rationality as well as differing degrees of moral worth by virtue of their rational morality is endemic to Aristotle's ethical structure. In this sense, in terms of worth, most humans are above most primates which are above most fish which are above most plants, and so on. Note that rationality is also the fundamental criterion for moral standing in the Aristotelean system.

Counter-arguments which suggest the potential for self-rule as the relevant consideration fail in the face of humans with cognitive disabilities or those who have reached developmental plateaus and are less than capable of self-rule. This, of course, presumes that one is

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106 *ibid.*, p. 184., VanDeVeer, p. 13.

107 *ibid.*, p. 184., *ibid.*, p. 13.



unwilling to abandon the position that all humans have intrinsic value. Hierarchies of moral standing within humanity are the end product of this exercise with more consciously, self-aware humans having greater amounts of moral standing than those who are less consciously self-aware. I doubt that this is what Kant meant to happen. The point to be taken here is that any criterion for moral standing which is taken to its logical extremes finds itself on a slippery slope.

One can also defend the position that only humans have moral standing by abandoning rationality as a criterion as well as rational reflection as a means of determining moral standing. This is simply to say that only humans have moral standing by virtue of somewhat undefinable, yet somehow understood criteria and accept this view as a self-evident truth. This is not in every way an unacceptable move in that all ethics, at bottom, are forced to make this move, i.e., to commit the naturalistic fallacy.<sup>108</sup> Even so, the question then is, how shall we choose to do this?

As it applies to non-humans, the point which is raised is that it is to commit the naturalistic fallacy to assume as a logical derivation that that which things tend toward is their good. Fox responds that:

We are not trying to derive a value from a fact here. Rather, we simply regard it as axiomatic that any entity that has a "good of its own" is morally considerable. Every formal system of reasoning adopts certain axioms at the outset. These axioms are propositions that are assumed to be so obvious as not to stand in need of proof; moreover, these propositions cannot themselves be proved or disproved within the system to which they attach. No formal system of reasoning can get started without adopting at least some fundamental logical assumptions. Thus, to deny that an entity is morally considerable if it has a "good of its own" is to deny the possibility of ethics. That is, rational ethical discussion ceases if someone accepts that an entity has a "good of its own" but simultaneously claims that it is not morally considerable. You can't prove that an entity is morally considerable if

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108 Contemporary interpretations of the naturalistic fallacy suggest that any derivation of value from facts or prescription from description involves committing the fallacy. 'Boo-hurrah' ethics are exemplary of this position, the relevant criterion for goodness being an individual's or group's approval for a thing. Under 'boo-hurrah' ethics "good" does not exist as a simple, undefinable quality. 'Good', per se, does not exist.

it has a "good of its own." One either accepts this as obvious - or, at the very least, as a reasonable starting point for ethics - or one doesn't.<sup>109</sup>

He further states:

Moreover, to suggest these theorists commit Hume's "is-ought" fallacy in assuming that any entity that has "a good of its own" is morally considerable is to miss the point that this is an assumption (and a necessary one if ethics is to be possible), not a logical inference.<sup>110</sup>

That self-rule, in combination with self-direction, is the relevant criterion for having moral standing, therefore, is taken as inappropriate insofar as one is either not willing to abandon the position that all humans have moral standing or abandon rationality as a criterion for having moral standing. If one is not willing to do either of these then one is committed to accepting that at least one criterion for determining moral standing is self-direction. Simply, a minimum criterion for a thing to hold moral standing is for that thing to be self-directed whether or not the thing is self-ruling.

Whether or not this means the same thing for each life-form or species is dependent upon which biocentric ethic is adopted as some ethical systems are more hierarchical than others. I shall categorize the systems which can be seen as biocentric using the distinctions outlined by Donald VanDeVeer. All of these views suffer biocentric inadequacies. I will outline these inadequacies after the examination is completed.

### Interest Sensitive Speciesism (ISE)

Interest sensitive speciesism is the first of the three solely "interest-based" systems in this group. This system affords non-humans a small degree of protection against competing human interests. Interest sensitive speciesism gives humans 'trump' consideration over non-humans whenever basic needs conflict, but

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<sup>109</sup> Fox, p.194.

<sup>110</sup> Fox, p. 194.

gives non-human basic needs 'trump' status over peripheral human needs. VanDeVeer states that:

When there is a conflict of interests between an animal and a human being, it is morally permissible, *ceteris paribus*, so to act that an interest of the animal is subordinated for the sake of promoting a like interest of a human being (or a more basic one) but one may not subordinate a basic interest of an animal for the sake of promoting a peripheral human interest.<sup>111</sup>

An example of a basic interest is survival at some step above a lowest common denominator level of flourishing. A peripheral interest is something which merely promotes a frivolous enjoyment. To sacrifice an animal for dinner is to have a human basic interest override the basic interest of the animal. To sacrifice an animal to appease the gods, depending upon how sincere one's belief in the gods is and presuming it is sincere, is also a basic overriding a basic. To sacrifice an animal because it likes to defecate on one's lawn is probably to have a peripheral interest override a basic interest and therefore is not acceptable under ISE.

### Species Egalitarianism (SE)

Species egalitarianism is the logical outcome of a truly biocentric rights based ethical system. All beings are given equal consideration in terms of their basic and peripheral needs. Trump status is always given to the species with the more basic need regardless of the consequences. Accordingly, under such a system the need to survive overrides the need to flourish. VanDeVeer states:

When there is a conflict between an animal and a human being it is morally permissible, *ceteris paribus*, to subordinate the more peripheral to the more basic interest and not otherwise; facts not

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111 D. VanDeVeer, 'Interspecific Justice', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), p. 55.

relevant to how basic the interests are, are not relevant to resolving this conflict.<sup>112</sup>

Under SE sacrificing an animal for dinner is acceptable only if consuming the animal is necessary for healthy survival. Sacrificing an animal for hors d'ouvres is frivolous and not acceptable. Animal testing is a question mark, especially if the animal must be killed. This follows if one accepts that the basic interest of the animal to survive outweighs the interests of humans to find cures for diseases which are not immediately endangering. What I mean here is that temporal proximity and directness of basic need are relevant considerations when determining need status.

### Two Factor Egalitarianism (TFE)

Two factor egalitarianism conjoins basic and peripheral needs to the species psychological capacities. Thus the criteria of rationality, linguistic capacity, and sentience become part of the means for assessing intrinsic value. VanDeVeer states:

When there is an interspecies conflict of interests between two beings, A and B, it is morally permissible, *ceteris paribus*:

1. to sacrifice the interest of A to promote a like interest of B if A lacks significant psychological properties possessed by B,
2. to sacrifice a basic interest of A to promote a serious interest of B if A substantially lacks significant psychological capacities possessed by B,
3. to sacrifice the peripheral interest to promote the more basic interest if the beings are similar with respect to psychological capacity.<sup>113</sup>

VanDeVeer offers the principle of utility as the means by which to determine which party's interest to choose when one party's interest must be sacrificed.<sup>114</sup> TFE gives humanity trump status over other beings. It also gives primates trump status over mammals, mammals

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112 *ibid.*, p. 57.

113 *ibid.*, p. 56-7.

114 *ibid.*, p. 58-61.

trump status over birds, fish, and amphibians, and so on. Intrinsic value, therefore, is a function of just how much like humanity a species is.

### The Difficulties

All of these views inherently present a number of functional difficulties. First, apart from life's termination, just how does one determine what distinguishes basic from peripheral needs, basic from more basic needs, peripheral from more peripheral needs, when considering the possible needs of a whole variety of different species upon which extraordinarily little common ground exists for comparison? Does the young tree's right to live outweigh the ungulate's right to feed? What if birds were nesting in the tree? Does my right to read outweigh the trees right to live? Is it right for the bear to consume the honey of the bees?

Two, all of these views have an inherent bias towards sentience, as evidenced by the referral to animal rights in ISE and SE and the psychological criterion of TFE. One has to wonder about the status of plant and insect interests in the former, whereas their status is fairly much outlined in the latter. If non-human status were fully realized in SE none of us could take the life of another. Considering all three, is a tree's right to life greater than my right to build a stable? This does not even take into account the rights of a baboon with angina to receive the heart of a brain-dead human.

Third, and most damaging, just what relevance do these criteria have to the functioning of nature, if humans are excluded from the process? Does a bear have any more value than a bacterium or a turtle than a tree?

This said, why not place humanity in nature? A human seeking to build shelter has more value than a tree, but does his need to build a large house have more value than the lives of a species of trees?

By now the point should be coming clear that the rights-based system doesn't seem to function very well when natural systems are considered. At the same time, this is not entirely damning, because the difficulty of practical realization does not constitute a refutation. This

is quite simply the problem one faces when trying to impose cultural modes of morality upon nature. Our cultural modes of morality have a strong emphasis on the rights of the individual and tend to disregard the wellbeing of the group.

John Rodman, Paul Taylor, and J. Baird Callicott share this perception of the problems which moral extensionism faces when a biocentric ethic is considered. Being atomistic, it can't appropriately accommodate the needs of a system because the system's needs are subverted somewhat by the individual's prerogative. Rodman's statement that moral extensionism results in "only a slightly modified version of the conventional hierarchy of moral worth"<sup>115</sup> also appears to hold true in the face of our present examination.

This is not to say that individually oriented rights based systems do not have relevance in environmental ethics; however, it is only saying that their application is limited. Such systems can be valuable in determining what duties humanity should have towards nature or an ecosystem treated as a single entity. Giving rights to Carmanagh, the Furbish louse-wort, or the Grand Banks, e.g., in the form of national parks, would be an example of such relevance. This system can also be effective in determining which rights should be offered domesticated non-humans. The bias towards perceived sentience seems more sensible here as duties towards a field of wheat seem absurd, whereas duties not to cause domestic animals undue pain seem rather obvious. Perceiving natural systems as recipients of moral standing, instead of individuals, takes us beyond the perimeter of individually based rights systems and into the area of biocentric holism.

### Biocentric Holism

Aldo Leopold's "Land Ethic" is probably the best known example of an ethic based on biocentric holism. This view is supported by VanDeVeer who states:

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115 *ibid.*, p. 152.

Leopold's views take us beyond anthropocentrism and individualism. In doing so, his views are often referred to as holistic. Roughly speaking, holism is the view that the entire biosphere as an interconnected system has moral standing.<sup>116</sup>

For this reason, it is important to spend some time examining Leopold's ethical system.

Leopold believed that the extension of ethics to the land is merely another step in the evolution of ethics to encompass more of the biotic community.<sup>117</sup> That the slave girls of Odysseus had no moral standing which allowed for their hanging when he returned from Troy, Leopold takes as partial evidence of this evolution.<sup>118</sup>

Leopold perceives ethics as determinate of how individuals should act within the community and ecology as determinate of how individuals do act within the community. From these two notions, Leopold asserts that:

The extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses.<sup>119</sup>

He further states:

An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that the path of social expediency is not discernable to the average individual. Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual meeting in such situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making.<sup>120</sup>

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116 *ibid.*, p. 71.

117 A. Leopold, 'The Land Ethic', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), p. 73.

118 *ibid.*, p. 73.

119 *ibid.*, p. 73.

120 *ibid.*, p. 74.

Also,

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for).<sup>121</sup>

From these premises Leopold develops the "land ethic." It states:

A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.<sup>122</sup>

The "land ethic" takes into account that humanity is only one species among many who are striving to persist and flourish. The "land ethic" demands that humanity recognize its ecological community embeddedness by taking into account that it is a member of such a community in its act deliberations. The reality of trophic pyramids and energy exchange places the responsibility upon humanity to behave in an ecologically sound manner because not to do so destroys the community upon which humanity's survival is predicated.<sup>123</sup>

That said, Leopold is under no illusions about the difficulty of developing a "land ethic" among humanity. He notes the trend to urbanization and recognizes that humanity's illusory unattachedness with the land would detract from the recognition that we are part of an ecological community. Leopold states:

Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of the land.<sup>124</sup>

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121 *ibid.*, p. 82.

122 *ibid.*, p. 82.

123 *ibid.*, pp. 78-80.

124 *ibid.*, p. 82.



Losing this connectedness is a serious concern for Leopold because he recognizes that the foundations for ethics are not merely a group of abstract principles, but the actual physical, intellectual, and emotional connection with the beings upon which these principles are founded. According to Leopold:

Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to the land... No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without a internal change in intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions.<sup>125</sup>

Leopold's view is taken further by Christopher Stone who reflects on the need for people to gain perspectives which reveal the commonalities between themselves and the land so as to appreciate the land's value.<sup>126</sup> John Rodman also talks of the need to develop an "ecological sensibility" which focuses partially on non-rational ways in which to develop an ethical attachment to nature.<sup>127</sup> The gist of the matter is then that if people are not well aware of their connection to the land they will not be able to develop the compassion towards the land which results in the adoption of duties towards the land. Duties towards the land, however, are necessary if humanity is not to subvert not only the lands survival, but that of humanity itself. Humanity, in order to survive, must stay within the parameters of what is ecologically possible and necessary, and the most sound way to do this, in Leopold's mind, is to develop an ethic which truly takes into account how it is that we are in the world. To disregard this is to undermine our health and the health of the planet. He states:

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125 *ibid.*, p. 76.

126 C. Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), pp. 83-93.

127 J. Rodman, 'Ecological Sensibility', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986), pp. 165-83.

A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity.<sup>128</sup>

That said, the adoption of the "land ethic" does not prevent humanity from "using" the land. It is much more like a call to responsible stewardship.<sup>129</sup> To be responsible stewards, however, of necessity demands a firm understanding of how it is that the land "lives" and how it is that our wellbeing is mutual. In this sense, responsible stewardship could be said to beget even more responsible stewardship because the more we become aware of our interrelatedness the more we are likely to incorporate this "holistic" knowledge into our deliberations.<sup>130</sup> This is particularly necessary when non-glamorous land comes into question.<sup>131</sup> Marshes, bogs, swamps, and estuaries all have their place in the ecological order of things and non-appreciation of their roles can be catastrophic.

The "land ethic" does not presume individual rights for non-humans, but asks that the individual be considered with respect to its place in the systemic whole. The ecological reality of existence is, after all, that beings need to consume in order to survive and some of what they consume is other beings. J. Baird Callicott states:

The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal worth to each and every member of the biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, n.b., human individuals) is relative, to be assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold called "land."<sup>132</sup>

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128 Leopold, pp. 80-1.

129 *ibid.*, pp. 73-82.

130 *ibid.*, pp. 80-2.

131 *ibid.*, pp. 80-2.

132 J.B. Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), p. 192.

Note that the moral value of humanity is placed on the same footing as all other species insofar as humanity's moral worth is also, "to be assessed in accordance with the the particular relation of each [species] to the collective entity."<sup>133</sup>

Following the "land ethic" the consumption of other beings is wrong only if it harms the "integrity, stability and beauty" of the ecosystem. This is not to say that humans should not act if they cannot act without harming the biotic community because plainly humans cannot. It is only to say that because humans have this effect they must make sure to mitigate it wherever possible. Before considering what implications the "land ethic" has for global justice, two other biocentric holistic views, those of John Rodman, Paul Taylor and J. Baird Callicott will be briefly considered.

John Rodman advocates the development of an ethical "ecological sensibility" which posits nature as having intrinsic value. He believes that such a development would eliminate the need for rights and duties towards nature "under normal conditions" because appropriate actions towards nature would be commonplace. He suggests that an "ecological sensibility" has three components,

a theory of value that recognizes intrinsic value in nature without (hopefully) engaging in mere extensionism... a metaphysics that takes account of the reality and importance of relationships and systems as well of individuals; and an ethics that includes such duties as noninterference with natural processes, resistance to human acts and policies that violate the noninterference principle, limited intervention to repair environmental damage in extreme circumstances, and a style of cohabitation that involves knowledgeable, respectful, and restrained use of nature.<sup>134</sup>

Rodman finds intrinsic value in the notion of an internally "self-directed" or "self-regulated" telos which applies to both individuals and ecosystems.<sup>135</sup> He also offers a number of value-giving characteristics which are to enter into act deliberation concerning

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133 *ibid.*, p. 192.

134 Rodman, pp.165-6.

135 *ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

individuals and ecosystems, these being, "diversity, complexity, integrity, harmony, stability, scarcity, etc."<sup>136</sup> According to Rodman,

this cluster of value-giving qualities provides criteria for evaluating alternative courses of permissible action in terms of optimizing the production of good effects, the better action being the one that optimizes the qualities taken as an interdependent, mutually constraining cluster.<sup>137</sup>

An interesting result of Rodman's ethical system is that human social reality is to also be perceived within the system's structures. This is to say that human "diversity, complexity, integrity, harmony, stability, scarcity, etc." are relevant considerations when deliberating about our own social interrelations.<sup>138</sup>

Paul Taylor also adopts the notion of a teleological intrinsic value inherent in all of the planet's biotic community, sentient or not. He describes his ethic as an "ultimate moral attitude toward nature" which he terms "respect for nature."<sup>139</sup> His system is rationally based on a quasi-Kantian categorical imperative which holds that the attitude of respect for nature is rationally justifiable by all moral agents.<sup>140</sup> Taylor says that the principle is moral,

because it is understood to be a disinterested matter of principle. It is this feature that distinguishes the attitude from the set of feelings and dispositions that comprise the love of nature.<sup>141</sup>

J. Baird Callicott forwards the position that the worth of all beings, including humans is a function of their particular relation to and within an ecological community with the summum bonnum of

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136 *ibid.*, p. 167.

137 *ibid.*, pp. 165-6.

138 *ibid.*, pp. 167-8.

139 P.W. Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature', in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Inc., 1986.), pp. 172-5.

140 *ibid.*, pp. 169-83.

141 *ibid.*, p. 172.

the community being the imperative.<sup>142</sup> His conception of the community, which can also be taken to be that of Leopold and Rodman, is that ecosystems function like a utilitarian entity which posits worth in all of its constituents, which is why it comes into existence, and regulates its worth in accordance with its own best interests.<sup>143</sup>

### Transpersonal Ecology

The central theme of transpersonal ecology is that an environmental ethic is unnecessary if people develop an attitude of care and concern for the environment, which spawns from a recognition that, quite literally, they are what surrounds them. The notion of beings as field-like, as opposed to atomistically particle-like, which is forwarded in the theories of Heidegger, Von Uexhull, and Merleau-Ponty are echoed here<sup>144</sup>. Ties also exist with the notions of evolutionary epistemology as they pertain to the evolutionary interactions between beings and their ecosystem, i.e., they come into their being together. In this sense, the ethic of transpersonal ecology, "follows from how we experience the world."<sup>145</sup>

Explaining what is meant by beings as field-like is the topic of many lifetime's work and so can't be explicated in any great detail here. Nonetheless, the notion deserves at least some elaboration because it has been raised. Essentially, three fundamental elements are involved in the "process of being": a being's genetic structure, the being's sensory

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142 Callicott, p. 190.

143 To say that nature functions like an utilitarian entity is to say that the good of an ecosystem is the desired endstate toward which actions concerning individuals are directed. There are no individual rights in nature, per se, and it is presumed that nature functions in her own best interest. As a matter of utilitarian calculation, therefore, individual wellbeing can and is sacrificed to benefit the ecosystem.

144 N. Evernden, *The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.), pp. 35-144.

145 Fox, p. 219.

field or field of awareness, and the other beings or objects that interact with this field or the environment. A simple way to describe the process of being using the example of a being "q" is as follows. "Q's" process of being involves the growth and development of "q" over time. How "q" grows and develops over time is a product of the interaction between "q's" genetic structure and the cues which "q" receives from the environment as mediated through "q's" sensory field.<sup>146</sup> In this simplified manner the process of being represents the continuous unfolding of a being's life [characteristics] through time.

A more complex way to describe the process of being and a way which is truer to the meaning of the term involves the forces which govern growth and development to a much greater extent. What this description suggests is that the interactions which occur between beings involve actual incorporations of the participants or at least some selected aspects of them into each other. This is intended to be taken at the subatomic level as well as the level of consciousness. This results in two effects. First, at the subatomic level the actual incorporations of beings or aspects of beings into each other results in an expanded realm of self. In this way the one becomes the other and vice versa and the realm of self and its accompanying ego considerations is expanded. The realm of self, in this sense is the field of self. Second, at the level of consciousness the notion of abstraction as it relates to templates becomes the notion of abstracted. What this means is that the templates for shape, colour, taste and other sensations are developed through actual physical and conscious contact and that the esse of these templates is physically manifested with us. One outcome of this view is, given that everything is ultimately in contact with at least one other thing, that all things are ultimately in contact with everything, and therefore, all things affect the becoming of all things.

That said, these notions are exceedingly difficult to communicate, which is why philosophers and lovers of other wisdoms involved in this type of study tend to create new terminology or appear

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146 In this example "q's" sensory field is separated from "q's" genetic structure, but this separation is merely made for the purpose of explanation and not meant to be taken literally.

intentionally obfuscatory. I hope that this attempted explanation, which is far too brief, and perhaps not fair to those it is trying to represent, has not served to do the same.

To the transpersonal ecologist, inclinations to act are more fundamentally moral than rules or commands which one might obey against one's inclinations. The transpersonal ecologist would argue that, "Cultivating ethical consciousness precedes and pre-empts the search for an "environmental ethic.""<sup>147</sup> Some, notably John Livingstone, argue that ethics should not even enter into our relationship with the environment. He states:

Ethics and morals were, I believe, invented by one species to meet the particular needs of that species. They have nothing to do with the rest of nature<sup>148</sup>

Those who hold the transpersonal ecology perspective argue that coming to understand who we are is the "first task of ethics."<sup>149</sup> They assert that the "search for who and how I should be" is what leads one to know what to do.<sup>150</sup> Instead of an ethic which is grounded in the similarity of self-direction, where what is the same is noted, but not necessarily felt, the understanding of commonality, which is said to be experientially binding, is what grounds inclinations towards others. Incorporating this notion with reference to the notion of beings as field-like, it is stated that,

the experience of commonality with another entity, even if this similarity is not of any obvious physical, emotional, or mental kind; it may involve "nothing more" than the deep-seated realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality.<sup>151</sup>

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147 Fox, p. 225.

148 Fox, p. 228.

149 Fox, p. 226.

150 Fox, pp. 226-8.

151 Fox, p. 231.

It might be argued, at this point, that the development of a transpersonal ecology is very little different than the development of Leopold's notion of environmental consciousness. I believe such an objection to be justified. "The experience of commonality with another entity" and "the deep-seated realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality" is not far from the notion that an ecosystem is a community of which humans and non-humans share membership. They hold membership in common. That Leopold stresses connection with the land to be a requisite for the development of a land ethic supports, rather than debates, Livingstone's notion that "cultivating ethical consciousness precedes and pre-emptes the search for an 'environmental ethic.'" It also supports the conception of humanity being field-like and individuals being very much determined by, and therefore, connected with, what they interact with.

Perhaps what it is best to say here is that transpersonal ecology more fully deals with the problem of how to cultivate an environmental consciousness, whereas the land ethic calls for the need to do so. Environmental justice is the enforcement of that need insofar as people have not developed an environmental conscience.

This is very much the same as the problem of developing a humane consciousness which inclines people to act in specially sensitive ways towards each other, whereas ethics is a call for the need to do so. Justice is the enforcement of that need insofar as people have not developed a humane consciousness.

Transpersonal ecology, therefore, does not represent an alternative view to biocentric holism as forwarded by the land ethic. What it does do is describe what is needed for meaningful, environmentally sensible interrelation to occur.

### Global Justice and Environmental Integrity

Biocentric holism is the most likely candidate for global justice as it is most consistent with the starting points of *Greenprints* while allowing for, if environmentally sound, the development position of *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. As to the former, first, it is biocentrically



based which satisfies one criterion. Second, it has a holistic orientation, which satisfies the other criterion. Transpersonal ecology accomplishes the same thing, but rejects the notion of environmental justice, which excludes it from candidacy. Biocentric moral extension, on the other hand, has an atomistic orientation which eliminates it presuppositionally. Referring back to *Greenprints* recall that:

An holistic worldview asks that we... recognize that everything on this planet has a value extrinsic to human needs. It calls on us to embrace 'ecology in all its biocentric, holistic fullness, seeing humankind as just one strand in the seamless web of creation, not above or outside creation but miraculously incorporate with it.<sup>152</sup>

And:

The holistic curriculum would help students acquire what Charlene Spretnak calls 'biocentric wisdom': an understanding that we are part of, not above nature; that there is an essential unity between all life-forms.<sup>153</sup>

This view appears to be paraphrasing the center piece of biocentric ethics, Leopold's land ethic and his definition of biotic health. Reiterating, the land ethic states:

A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.<sup>154</sup>

And:

A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity.<sup>155</sup>

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152 Greig: 1989, p. 15.

153 *ibid.*, p. 20.

154 Leopold, p. 82.

155 *ibid.*, pp. 80-1.

Leopold's 'land ethic', as interpreted in this thesis, appears to be ideally suited to the worldview which global education posits because it accommodates the notions that human health is dependent upon planetary and ecosystem health and that all life forms and life, in general, are valuable in themselves, while still allowing for actions which promote human wellbeing, which of necessity have a somewhat harmful effect upon the land. The land ethic implicitly accepts that life is predicated on life as well as death and, therefore, any workable environmental ethic must allow for the taking of life. At the same time, the land ethic does not accept the taking of life to be a frivolous or inconsequentially perceived matter, as "reverence rather than ruthlessness is due the natural world." This is where the notion of sustainable development ties in, recognizing that development which is sustainable is healthy development whereas development which is not sustainable is not healthy. It is important to note that the healthiest ecosystems are those which are not developed and that one cannot say that developed land is truly healthy. One can only say whether or not the type of development which occurs is of a healthy type.

Human action which endangers large or ecologically significant ecosystems would be curtailed or prohibited under the land ethic, as it would jeopardize the beauty, stability, and integrity of those systems. Where humans interact with ecosystems to derive sustenance or the goods of comfort, actions would be directed so as to derive optimal benefit with minimum harm. Adherence would also provide for aid or non-interference to areas which have been injured and require human intervention or human non-intervention to heal.

As Leopold's land ethic is the view far and away the most consistent with the aims and presuppositions of global education I tentatively accept it as the valid form of the environmental justice component of global justice. It is treated as such in the following chapters.

This said, quasi-biocentric moral extensionism also has a role to play in the design of a workable system of global justice, specifically as domesticated species, such as cattle, grains, and white rats are concerned. Sentience, in this regard, is the relevant consideration.

Before elaborating upon this point, however, it must be stated that the forthcoming listing is not even close to being definitive, nor is it intended to be. It is merely intended to demonstrate where biocentric moral extensionism is applicable to global justice.

Domesticated species, for the most part, no longer have an ecological niche, in that the niche they have is artificially created. In this sense, domesticated species have been bred for human purposes and, as such, their fates are determined by human communities. Being domesticated does not preclude them from having interests per se; it does, however, preclude them from having interests as part of an integral ecosystem.

Nonetheless, even the most basic interests of domesticated species are generally subjugated to human interests. Interest sensitive speciesism is likely to be the rule which applies to domesticated species, in that these species have a human designed role. Reiterating, "Interest sensitive speciesism gives humans 'trump' consideration over non-humans whenever basic needs conflict, but gives non-human basic needs 'trump' status over peripheral human needs." What this means is that cattle and grains will be slaughtered for consumption. Insofar as species are sentient, a biocentric ethic demands the compassion of a somewhat natural life, as opposed to imprisonment in small cages where natural light never enters and drugs for weight increase are the order of the day. It also demands that death be as painless as possible.

Insofar as animal testing is concerned, testing which relates to specific natural human health concerns, although this itself is difficult to categorize, could be seen as a basic interest of humans. Testing for artificial concerns such as an allergy reactions to cosmetic products would likely be categorized as peripheral to human needs. To those who would say that the animals involved in testing are bred specifically for testing and, therefore, would not exist otherwise, which implies that they are harmed if existence is denied them, I suggest that, qualitatively, it is better not to exist than to exist for the express purpose of being harmed. The mere parallel of preventing humans from being bred specifically to be tested upon and tortured, which effectively denies a certain category of humans from existing which would not

otherwise should bring home the point. The point specifically is that quality of life is a relevant consideration to those who judge the value of existence.

Breeding animals or plants for clothing, such as sheep or cotton, would be acceptable, but the breeding of mink for luxury clothing would not. Breeding rabbits or cattle for meat and fur, however, does not seem unacceptable. An argument for the breeding of mink for meat would seem to be stretching a point.

What variables humans are likely to choose in consideration of these and other questions is still an open question, but the contextual parameters of these choices are not. The mandate of the land ethic defines the parameters upon which humanity is to act. These parameters clearly state that humans must of necessity take into account the effects of their actions upon the health of ecosystems and the biogeosphere. The land ethic tacitly states that human moral standing is an open question insofar as human actions within an ecosystem or the biogeosphere<sup>156</sup> relate to the health of the whole. This parameter implicitly states that humans had better act in a healthy manner because not to do so puts their moral worth into question. This said, the implications of the biocentric paradigm and the land ethic for global justice, in combination with the notion of human rights previously forwarded, is the topic of the following chapter.

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156 The term biogeosphere is used because it incorporates the significance of the non-living to living in the dynamic of life. The notion of the "land ethic" also conveys this message.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **David Hume, Scarcity, Community, Society, and the Impetus for Justice**

Friends, Romans, Countrymen! Lend me your ears. I come not to praise Caesar,  
but to bury him.

William Shakespeare  
Marc Anthony from *Julius Caesar*, Act I

#### **Introduction**

At the close of the last chapter it was stated that in adopting the land ethic humans must of necessity take into account the effects of their actions upon the health of ecosystems and the biogeosphere. It was also stated that human moral standing is an open question insofar as human actions within an ecosystem and the biogeosphere relate to the health of the whole and that humans had better act in a healthy manner so as to avoid jeopardizing their own moral standing.

The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon the latter point as it relates to systems of justice, the constraints of scarcity and the relations between communities and societies. In particular this chapter examines how systems of justice arise and function and what differences exist between justice-in-actuality and global justice. Parochialism along community lines is the manner of the day. This goes against the universalism presupposed by global justice and most contemporary forms of justice. Accordingly, the ethical and educational implications of communitarian parochialism are significant nodes of discussion in this chapter.

#### **Scarcity, Rights Realization, and Resources**

How justice relates to scarcity is strongly implicit in the notion that justice pertains to the fair and equitable distribution of natural and cultural resources over time. Given that what is fair and equitable is the concern of, and determined by, the system of ethics which is adopted, the function of justice is to facilitate the distribution of said resources. These resources which are essentially the goods of human

flourishing are close correlates to rights, insofar as rights determine people's access to resources. Under conditions of scarcity there are less resources to distribute and therefore, less rights. Depending upon how great the scarcity is, the body of ethics itself can fall victim as resources are the stuff which fleshes out the body.

Given this description of justice it is axiomatic that **rights realization costs resources**. The scope of the problems which global justice faces enlarges upon recognition that giving rights to non-humans and the planet effectively removes the former from the status of things or resources. As rights realization costs resources it follows that giving non-humans, ecosystems, and the planet rights removes resources from the pot of rights which are available for distribution. Subsequently, less resources are available for rights distribution to humans.<sup>157</sup> It might be blithely stated that this being the case we shouldn't give non-humans rights, but this is merely to fall back to the position that scarcity does not exist which is the reason for allotting non-humans rights in the first place. It is also to disregard that relative scarcity is a precondition of the creation of societies and the systems of justice which govern them. This relation is the topic of the following section.

#### David Hume and Social Contract Theory: Community, Scarcity, Society, and Justice

The axiom that **rights realization costs resources** is derived from the resource-based description of justice which generally holds true for all modern political philosophy. This description finds its roots in the moral and political philosophy of David Hume.

David Hume argued that conditions of scarcity are a precondition for the creation of a system of justice. Hume believed that people are fundamentally interested and concerned about the wellbeing of their families and friends, which, for the sake of clarity, I

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157 This holds true in the case of both the generalized right of a being to optimal flourishing and the particularized rights which follow from the generalized right.

will refer to as the person's community. Under conditions of relative scarcity, however, the wellbeing of one's community is not secure, in that one individual or group seeking to benefit another community, might see fit to harm another individual or group. For example, if one had a reason to fear an attack from another community one might engage in a preemptive attack so as to weaken or frighten that community. If another community had some desirable goods, one might attack that community directly, or sneak under cover of night, to acquire those goods. Essentially, scarcity can and does lead to a community-based, quasi-Hobbesian "war of all against all", the consequences of which are that

every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.<sup>158</sup>

According to Hume, that scarcity exists demands that humans create an artifice by which to regulate their intercourse so that a certain degree of security of condition can be achieved and maintained.<sup>159</sup> Societies, therefore, are created with the idea of protecting the wellbeing of one's family and friends and their means of sustaining themselves.<sup>160</sup> In other words, the protection of community, as

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158 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1982.), p. 186.

159 D. Hume, 'An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals', in H. Aiken (ed.), *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy*. (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1972.)p. 181-206.

160 Hobbes, 183-188, 251-261., J. Locke, 'An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and Lend of Civil Government', in E. Barker (ed.), *Social Contract*. (Oxford: Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd., 1966.), pp. 23-64., J.J.

distinct from society, and property, are the reasons behind the creation of a system of justice. This notion fits comfortably with other social contract theories such as that of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. For the sake of driving home this point I'll invoke the words of Hume himself, who declares:

Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society; hence justice derives its usefulness to the public; and hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation.<sup>161</sup>

To continue along these lines, Hume further argued that a system of justice has no need to arise in conditions of abundance because, having abundance, no one has any reason to deprive another. In a round about way, this view finds agreement in Marx's political thought. According to Will Kymlicka, "Marx was emphatic about the need for abundance, for he thought that scarcity made conflicts inevitable."<sup>162</sup> Marx presupposes abundance in his political entity, thus mitigating the need for justice.<sup>163</sup>

Interestingly, and as alluded to by Marx, Hume recognized the dual nature of scarcity. Scarcity is both a precondition for the creation and the dissolution of justice. Conditions of scarcity demand that one seek security of condition, through a system of justice, to protect the wellbeing of one's community.<sup>164</sup> If one cannot find that security of condition, meaning that the wellbeing of one's family and friends is not being attended to within a system of justice, one no longer has a reason to stay within that system, insofar as one can escape its ties.<sup>165</sup> Hume states:

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Rousseau, 'The Social Contract' , in E. Barker (ed.), *Social Contract*. (Oxford: Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd., 1966.), pp. 253-258.

<sup>161</sup> Hume, p. 189.

<sup>162</sup> W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.), p. 166.

<sup>163</sup> Kymlicka, pp. 165-6.

<sup>164</sup> Hume, p. 181-206.

<sup>165</sup> Hume, p. 181-206.



Thus the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men; produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity; implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice - by rendering justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its very essence and suspend its obligation upon mankind.<sup>166</sup>

The point to be taken here is that people try to enter into, or exit, just societal relations, in order to improve their security of condition. Whether expressly stated or not, this theme has variations in Hobbes<sup>167</sup>, Locke<sup>168</sup>, Rousseau<sup>169</sup>, Rawls<sup>170</sup> and Dworkin.<sup>171</sup> In fact, scarcity, necessarily, has implications for any mode of justice concerned with the distribution of natural and cultural resources.

Importantly, security of condition applies to both property and bodily protection. This leads to trade-offs which are inevitable simply because those who enter into systems of justice have to sacrifice some goods to achieve others. For example, some sacrifice some property so as to secure other property from those who would otherwise seek to acquire that property through bodily force, whereas, others withhold their recourse to bodily force so as to acquire the property that is offered. Whether or not that property was acquired justly is another matter, as is whether or not it should be redistributed in some way now, regardless of how it was acquired.

The implications of Hume's conception of justice for global justice, and, therefore, global education, are significant. Primarily, it

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166 Hume, pp. 188-9.

167 G. Kavka, *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.), pp. 237-240, 443-446.

168 Locke, pp. 3-43, in particular 23-43 where Locke presupposes relative abundance or moderate scarcity.

169 Rousseau, pp. 240-268, 363-365, 380-383.

170 Kavka, pp. 237-240.

171 Kymlicka, p. 76-90, 164-6, 185.

suggests that people will not operate within the constraints of global justice, unless the interests of their communities are served.<sup>172</sup> This point is reinforced in reality when one realizes that, for most of us, our worlds are divided into a myriad of nested communities, some of which we have closer ties to than others. For the most part, these closer ties mean a greater sense of obligation toward the community and the members with which we are joined; which is precisely the point upon which Hume posits his notion of justice. In fact, if we consider the Humean model of justice, the world can be said to be comprised of many nested communities, each of which has its own conception of well-being. These communities, whether familial, micro-social, local, regional, national or global are linked together through a series of just and unjust relations, the relevant conception of justice being the notion of wellbeing held by the individuals within the relation. The point to take here is that unjust relations exist precisely because one community values its wellbeing more than it values the mutual wellbeing of other communities with which it is in relation, and that the marginalized community cannot escape that interrelation, at least without worsening their situation.<sup>173</sup> An extrapolatory example should serve to clarify this point.

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172 It is important to reiterate that interests can be served in one of two ways: first, if lowest common denominator acceptable wellbeing is achieved, second, if lowest common denominator wellbeing is not achieved but leaving the system is even worse, so a partial serving of interests is accepted. In other words, people leave a system only if extrication from the system is better than staying within the system and if the system can be left. As to the latter point Rousseau said, "So long as a people is constrained to obey, and does, in fact obey, it does well. So soon as it can shake off its yoke, and succeeds in doing so, it does better."

173 For those who are feeling cognitive dissonance at this point I will try to relieve the effect by revealing its cause. The notion of justice forwarded in this chapter appears wholly different than the notion of justice espoused in chapter three. Here a distinction must be made between community justice and societal justice. Community justice is the form represented in chapter three. Societal justice is the form represented in chapter four. Community justice arises from a conception of the good that the community shares. Societal justice differs in that it is a

Within Edmonton one can find wealthy communities, in terms of resource capital, such as those who live in the wealthy society, or enlarged community, of Glenora. One can also find impoverished communities in terms of resource capital, such as the communities which live within the impoverished society, or enlarged community, of Boyle Street. Within, and between, each of these communities a series of just and unjust relations may exist. Within the smallest community designation, e.g., a family, or what Rousseau might call the mini-patrie, it might be the case that loving, caring, and sharing relations exist between the members, or they could be strained by the overindulgence of a substance abuser in each group who drains the family of its resources and abuses its members in other ways as well. Regardless of which type of family relations occur, it can also be the case that they will extend into the next larger community designation. One family may rob, cheat or abuse another family in a number of ways so as to gain benefits for its own family. Families may also treat each other altruistically, or at least, one family may be altruistic to another without the relation being reciprocal. That unjust relations in favour of the community of Glenora over the community of Boyle Street exist in the society, or the larger community of Edmonton, in terms of resource capital distribution, which is dependent upon which variables one chooses to determine fairness and equitability, is also likely, given the large discrepancies between the two groups. It is also conceivable that members of both communities act in altruistic ways towards each other.

Boyle Street and Glenora, as members as the community of Edmonton, can also work together to try to achieve somewhat mutual

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compromise between competing conceptions of community good or between competing communities in different positions of wealth or power with similar conceptions of the good. Typically, societal justice is marred by community parochialism which conforms to Hume's notion. Marx would agree with this conception and argue that systems of justice exist to justify the exploitation of the proletariat. Nonetheless, societal justice can also have beneficial effects for those who are marginalized within communities. An example of this would be legislation which prohibits wife burning or child abuse.

benefits, which cost the community of Calgary, such as a willingness to offer tax concessions to lure a business presently located in Calgary to Edmonton. On the other hand, the wealthy communities of Edmonton and Calgary can conjoin to lobby the larger society of Alberta, i.e., the provincial government, for tax concessions for the wealthy, at the cost of the impoverished communities of both cities. The impoverished communities can also attempt the same.

This model easily extends outwards to encompass global relations. First world countries may strive to outdo each other or join together to oppress developing nations. A first world nation may enter into a relationship which benefits a developing nation at the cost of harming a first world nation with which it formerly had such a relation. (This doesn't imply an equal relation, but perhaps, a more equal relation.) Ruling families in the first world and the developing nations may conjoin to oppress non-ruling families world-wide insofar as it benefits them all to some degree.

Indeed, it is a tangled web we weave, with all sorts of different just and unjust relationships on a myriad of levels in a constant state of interplay. This reality has serious implications for global education insofar as its aim is to eliminate artificial systemic human marginalization. Global education, if it is to succeed, must find a way to counter destructive community affiliation when it comes to teaching global justice.

This first point has further implications for global justice. It suggests that people will not allocate resources to the environment unless they perceive it as necessary to their community. It also suggests that those who do perceive the environment as part of their community will perceive those who harm the environment as harming the wellbeing of their community. Logically extending these points, the outcome is a war between communities over the environment.<sup>174</sup>

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174 A dialogue between communities over the environment is also a possibility if this is perceived as necessary for community survival and war is taken to be a less palliative than mutual well-being decrease.

Global justice, and therefore, global education have the daunting task of introducing a universalized conception of global justice to people who, quite naturally, tend to value their closer community relations over those of the global human totality. This demands asking those who presently benefit the most from unjust relations to sacrifice their excesses to lower the level of marginalization of those who have not benefitted.

A further implication of Hume's work is that the key to ethical behavior is community membership. If other humans or non-humans are seen as members of one's community, then ethical concern follows. The question global education must answer is how do we educate people to perceive themselves as part of a global community of humans and non-humans?

Interestingly, some philosophers, namely communitarian ethicists, suggest that the basis for ameliorating this problem lies within the problem itself. Communitarians suggest that notions of loyalty to a group ground morality. Loyalties are said to be neither based upon self-interest nor on an impersonal morality. Rather they exhibit some or all of the characteristics of an impersonal morality within a particularized group or groups with which an individual feels a shared ownership.<sup>175</sup> Communitarians also posit the nesting of communities and assert that the more loyalty one feels towards a group the more likely that one will adopt a fuller moral obligation towards them. According to Andrew Oldenquist:

Our wide and narrow loyalties define moral communities or domains within which we are willing to universalize moral judgments, treat equals equally, protect the common good, and in other ways adopt the familiar machinery of impersonal morality... A loyalty defines a moral community in terms of a conception of the common good and a special commitment to the members of the group that share this good.<sup>176</sup>

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175 A. Oldenquist, 'Loyalties', in *The Journal of Philosophy*. (Lancaster, Penn.: The Journal of Philosophy Inc., Vol. 79, Number 4, April 1982.), pp. 174-6.

176 Oldenquist, p. 177.

Communitarians, such as Oldenquist, suggest that moral grounding in one's communities provides individuals and communities with a basis for moral consideration towards individuals and communities with whom loyalties are not shared.<sup>177</sup> In this sense, one acquires ethical consciousness and learns ethical conduct within one's close communities, and then the acquisition and learning thereof can be potentially outwards to non-associated communities.

Significantly, communitarians also suggest that inasmuch as a person can develop a loyalty towards a group, she can also be alienated from that group. Oldenquist views alienation as a manifestation of something gone wrong with the "causal machinery" of society.<sup>178</sup> In other words, loyalty is learned, and when an individual does not feel herself as sharing ownership in a society it means that the individual has not been made to feel an integral, important part of the society. She has not learned that she is valued. Moral education, therefore, of necessity must not only teach why certain acts are just or unjust, but also serve to integrate the person within the community itself. The point to be taken here is that if she does not feel valued within a community, then there is a good possibility that she will also not perceive the community as being hers, and consequently, not value the community.

A further element deserving of discussion is that people can be taught within their communities not to have loyalty towards members of certain other communities. This communitarian perspective can best be explained by reference to the example of a head-hunting society. Within the head-hunting society each community member shares equal rights and duties towards other members.<sup>179</sup> For example, if a head-hunter were to kill another head-hunter he would have to pay retribution of some sort within the society. For manslaughter he might have to make some sort of service-type remuneration to the society or be excluded from some of the privileges he would typically enjoy. For first degree murder he might pay with his life.

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177 Oldenquist, p. 178.

178 Oldenquist, p. 187-190.

179 Oldenquist, pp. 175-9

These rights may be partially or fully extended to other larger communities which the headhunters are associated with such as the federation of head-hunting societies.<sup>180</sup> In this sense, communitarian ethics posit a nesting of communities each involving rights and duties but with the most emphasis placed upon the community which forms the nucleus.<sup>181</sup> Those who are not members of the head-hunting community, unless special arrangements have been made otherwise, do not share in the community's allocation of rights. Their heads are all potential trophies.

The natural extrapolation of these points, as it applies to environmental justice, is that people must learn to see themselves as integral parts of their eco-communities if they are to develop an environmental consciousness to ground their ethics. Conversely, if people are alienated from their eco-communities they are not likely to act ethically towards them, even if they know which actions count as ethical. People can also learn to view the environment as solely a resource, i.e., to view the environment as a trophy.

The point to take from this is that ethical consciousness, as the foundation for ethical actions, is learned within one's communities. Depending upon which type of ethical consciousness is desired, and provided the teaching approach is successful, a foundation for potential ethical universalism or parochialism can be developed.

### **Summary**

If global justice is to be realizable it must effectively deal with the problem of scarcity. Rights realization costs resources and allocating rights is very much equivalent to rightly allocating resources. Science determines what potential resources exist. Ethics determines who has moral standing and what are resources. Systems of justice determine how resources and rights are cashed out in the details of everyday life.

Systems of justice and societies are the products of community attempts to secure wellbeing of person and property in the face of

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180 *ibid.*, pp. 175-9.

181 *ibid.*, pp. 175-9.

**relative scarcity. A community will stay within a system of justice insofar as their perception of lowest common denominator wellbeing is being met, but will leave if it is not, and if it is able to leave.**

**The extension of community perceptions to society is necessary if ethical universalization is to occur. For non-humans, the ecosystem and the planet to become ethically significant they must be seen as part of the community of those by whom they are judged. Parochialism can also be taught.**

**For global justice to arise and manifest itself, it must be able to answer to these concerns. How global justice fares in doing so and what types of things are likely to happen are the subject of the last chapter.**



## CHAPTER FIVE

### Global Justice and Global Education: Implications and Concerns

A man is rich in proportion to the number of things which he can afford to let alone.

Henry David Thoreau

#### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this last chapter is to cash out the implications of scarcity and community parochialism insofar as they relate to the realization of global justice. The intent is to indicate where problems of significance lie, which need to be answered by global educators if global education is to be true to its purpose, namely the survival and flourishing of the planet, humanity and non-humans. These problems, though mutually rooted, relate to the actual realizability of global justice and to pedagogical concerns.

The fundamental problem that this thesis faces is what sense can be made of global justice as it is found in *Earthrights* and *Greenprints*. The problem which global justice faces is that both social justice and environmental justice need to be realizable if it is to be true to its aims. If only one or the other is realizable than global justice cannot be true to its aims.

The primary tool for analyzing global justice's philosophical soundness is the axiom **rights realization costs resources**. The fundamental problem this thesis addresses is that resources are scarce and that our present modes of consumption are making the scarcity deadly. The essential point here is that if one accepts that the purpose of justice is to secure the wellbeing of individuals, communities, and societies and that systems of justice regulate the fair and equitable distribution of scarce natural and cultural resources, one can equate resource distribution with rights distribution. Under the system outlined, rights distribution is functionally determined by moral standing and insofar as things are not considered to have moral standing, they are considered to be resources.

Throughout this thesis the components concerning human rights and environmental rights are segregated. This is because the wellbeing and accompanying rights of one are generally considered to run counter to the wellbeing and accompanying rights of the other. This occurs because all things are potential resources, all things need to consume resources to survive, resources are scarce, and removing a thing from the realm of resources creates even greater scarcity.

So, for global justice to accomplish its aim which, to oversimplify, is to promote the wellbeing of those it holds to have intrinsic value and, therefore, moral standing, of necessity it is constrained to operate within biogeospherical limitations. Global justice, in this regard, at the least minimally adopts duties towards the biogeosphere as a necessary condition of assuring the wellbeing of those with moral standing which includes the biogeosphere. It is significant that the survival of the planet under the biocentric paradigm and the land ethic ultimately gives life itself trump status over the lives of individuals. On the other hand, the grounding of maximalist rights for humans in the categorical imperative gives humans trump status over ecosystems and their non-human inhabitants insofar as doing so does not threaten the health of the greater ecosystem.

The implication is simply that some unknown, yet to be chosen, demarcation points will determine when human rights of significance will be overridden by ecosystem rights of significance, and vice versa. At bottom then, global justice will be forced to adopt a biocentric utilitarian, that is consequentialist, position in that what we judge at each viewpoint to be in favor of systemic health will outweigh the health concerns of certain individual humans. If global justice is to be consistent with its adoption of the biocentric paradigm this must be.

The point of becoming a utilitarian entity deserves repeating.<sup>182</sup> It means that when the life of the greater ecosystem is threatened, then whatever measures are necessary to ensure its survival are sanctioned.

This said, what types of things are likely to happen under global justice can now be examined.

### Global Justice Cashed Out

Global justice is not particularly difficult to conceptualize in terms of its implications for humanity. Things become difficult when the conceptions are fitted to their practical considerations. This can be shown by examining the structures which global justice advocates insofar as they tie in to its aims.

A globally just society would be democratically-oriented and serve to distribute natural and cultural resources following a basic presupposition of equality which manifests itself in terms of maximally conceived rights. To achieve this state, some sort of quasi-Rawlsian, Dworkinian, and/or Neo-Marxist distributive mechanism for redistribution, is presumed. Of necessity, the resources which are shared must be shared sustainably, given consideration for future generations since "renewable" as an aspect of "health" implies this.

The problems which this model presents are manifold simply because the evolution of such a system presupposes itself to a large extent. If global justice is to arise in a way which is consistent with the means and ends of global justice the adoption and maintenance of global justice must come about through democratic choice. Ideally this demands that those who presently benefit from the unjust distribution of resources agree to such a redistribution of their own accord, i.e., they must have a non-coercive motivation to renegotiate their position, insofar as coercion is a human phenomenon.<sup>183</sup>

What this amounts to, bizarrely enough, is the existence of a social contract situation. This is bizarre because social contract theorists only conceive of this event hypothetically. Then again, it is not necessarily that bizarre because if one considers the world's leaders as ex officio representatives of their people, then this is precisely what

happens at events such as the 1992 world environmental summit at Rio de Janeiro. Admittedly, however, this assertion stretches the point as the world's leaders are not democratically chosen representatives of peoples who have had the benefits of a globally just education system, and present day negotiations are fraught with parochial forms of human coercion. Given the Humean notion of justice this is hardly surprising. In fact, given the Humean notion of justice, and contemporary demographic theory regarding population growth and resource availability, it is not surprising that the developing world requested monetary aid, particularly when one acknowledges that money is a surrogate for resources.

The point to take here, metaphorically, is that if the developing world is not to consume the world's seed grain, e.g., as in the Amazon rain forests' oxygen production, the developed world must sacrifice some of its feed grain. When a people eat their seed grain they effectively leave themselves open to starvation as they have nothing to plant future crops with. Oxygen is a staple dietic component of many species of which ours is no exception. If the rain forest is consumed a major source of oxygen that is effectively self-planting and easily harvested from is lost. It being lost, it cannot replant itself. That said, what was also noted at this conference was that overpopulation is a key issue when it comes to environmental concerns and as such feed grain, as there are limits to its production, should not be used to create even more mouths to feed. To act otherwise is to exacerbate the problem much the same as putting a bandage on a gangrenous wound. In such cases, to save the body one might need to amputate the limb.

This allusion serves to re-introduce the options for actions should it be the case that human impact upon the planet is too great to fall within the parameters of the biocentric paradigm, namely:

- i) We can reduce the impact of humanity upon the planet by changing how humans act upon the planet. This requires that peoples actions become sustainable.

iii) We can do a combination of the above.

If rights realization costs resources, than resource scarcity costs rights. Rights, insofar as they are the mechanisms of human flourishing, are the goods of wellbeing. Given that human impact upon the planet is excessive and that it must decrease, human rights, as a sum total, must correspondingly decrease. Given global justice, and the possibility that resource redistribution is sustainably possible without going below a lowest common denominator level of flourishing(not as yet decided), and allowing for an environmental safety factor cashed out in environmental rights(also undecided), then rights cutting measures will be invoked. If this cannot be met, given the biocentric imperative, then human life cutting measures, in combination with rights cutting measures, must be invoked.

The point to be taken here is that the measures which will have to be introduced to bring about global justice and life flourishing are monumental, to say the least. Of necessity, first world rights, in accordance with the Erlich's notion of carrying capacity and in comparison to their present state, will require a dramatic decrease. Some of the rights decrease will feed the coffers of the environment whereas others will go to the rights treasury of the developing world. Given some redistribution to the developing world, some developing world rights will probably increase, such as those which pertain to improving the basic conditions of subsistence, whereas others, will of necessity decrease. The extent to which first world rights must decrease and third world rights must decrease will be determined by what rights values the environment receives and what safety factor for biogeosphere survival is built-in.

It may be useful to engage in a thought experiment at this time. The intent will be to tease out a few of the implications of rights reduction. The idea is to seek out things which are taken for granted in daily life which could become targets for drastic change, in favour of more significant rights options.

of global injustice, is the right to produce children, insofar as overpopulation is a key factor in both human marginalization and environmental degradation. The problem of overpopulation is a significant variable in the equation of future human, non-human, and planetary flourishing. The basic tenets of global justice point to a significant reduction in human population as a desirable event. This point is strengthened by the fact that artificial systemic scarcity, where artificial means human-made is by definition an example of global injustice. The most profound example of such artificial scarcity is the environmental impact of the burgeoning human population which endangers the life of the planet and its citizens as we know them. This point is important so it must be stressed in order that it become vitally clear. Human overpopulation, and therefore, human impact on the biogeosphere, is the result of human actions and human actions are marginalizing the planet's ability to sustain life through unsustainable resource consumption and environmental degradation. In doing so, human systems are also endangering future humans which global justice posits that present day humanity has obligations toward. Insofar as human overpopulation causes these undesirable effects it is unjust and global justice has no recourse but to call for a reduction in human impact upon the planet.

Whether this occurs under present world injustice and, therefore, both in the first world and the developing world, or in a globally just society, the point is that it must happen, if the ultimate aim of flourishing is not considered controversial. That the most significant rights cost to promote future and present flourishing would be the sterilization of a significantly large percentage of the world's female population, or some equivalent measure, is not controvertible, unless actual life culling were to take place.<sup>184</sup> One assumes that should such action be considered necessary then an accompanying change in

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184 This might seem to reek of sexism, but the fact is that one fertile male can impregnate many females, whereas many fertile males can little affect a single female. Sterilizing a far higher percentage of males rather than

how the world's population would view child-bearing and having children would be required so as to assuage, if only minutely, the loss of parenthood. The notion that all children are, to some extent, the children of everyone, will have to play the role of surrogate.

I raise this example to show the magnitude of the change implicit in global justice by virtue of its adoption of the biocentric paradigm and the land ethic. It must be further stated that the adoption of this paradigm is only a minimally acceptable position if the planet, humanity, and non-humans are to survive and flourish.

To continue with the thought experiment, I now shift my focus to the first world and, in particular, the spectre of consumerist society. A redesign to sustainability demands an orientation away from consumerism. Imagine newspapers, radio and television without ads and consequently advertising revenue. Imagine what such services would cost. Imagine what the cost is to the environment of supplying these services. Fifty-percent of a newspaper's running space is advertisements printed on dead forests. The electricity which powers the radios and televisions, let alone myriad electrical appliances and implements in the Edmonton area is supplied from a coal fired generator. The production of the appliances and implements also has resource costs. Are they justifiable? Which resource costs are the most justifiable?

Workable democracy itself might not be possible if the distribution schemes of global justice are enforced. If one considers that the foundations of a worthwhile democracy are a well educated populace with open access to myriad possibilities of action and the freedom to choose without human coercion the problem starts to come clear. Educating a population costs resources. Information networks cost resources. Systems which allow people to choose cost resources.

The upshot of all this, and it is just the tip of a very large iceberg, is that the changes which are required are fundamental and all-encompassing. A radical change in the way the first world lives, as well as how the ruling classes in the developing world live, is required

if global justice is to be implemented.<sup>185</sup> The task of developing a consciousness which is amenable to such change and sacrifice is that of education.

### Global Justice's Educational Implications

Global education's aim is or ought to be the development of a global biocentric ethical conscience within humanity. To accomplish this global educators must overcome a number of substantial difficulties, which predictably are encountered in the areas of social justice and environmental justice.

To recall the fourth chapter, global educators will need to overcome the parochial communitarian sensibilities which people tend to adhere to. This is especially the case as people in all groups will be asked to sacrifice much that is tied to their current view of the conditions of their wellbeing, as suggested in the preceding section. Conditions of scarcity, following Hume, are likely to cause animosity between societies and, given this, communitarian outcomes appear likely. When people are concerned about their community's wellbeing it will be difficult to persuade them to sacrifice for those who they are not immediately identified with. This could even be the case if people who hold the environment to be a member of their community perceive the others as a threat to the environment.

Developing an environmental consciousness, as outlined in chapter three, also faces difficulties, albeit of a different kind. Following Leopold, the development of a land ethic, much the same as a community ethic, requires interaction with the land. Besides the obvious logistical difficulties and resource cost of enabling people to have frequent and direct experience of the land, the cost of the disruption of the land from human interaction is prohibitively high as well. Educators will need to find suitable surrogates for the environment if they are to successfully develop a land ethic within

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<sup>185</sup> The personal wealth of Mobutu Sese Seko who rules Zaire, for example, is



their students, recognizing that these surrogates must have the force to direct students actions. This said, the notion of a curriculum which directs its course content towards biological relations and interrelations, which is not suggested in either *Earthrights* or *Greenprints* might be effective.<sup>186</sup>

### Concluding Remarks

The goal of global education is the development of globally just citizens. Globally just citizens will act so as to reduce and eliminate instances of human marginalization and environmental degradation insofar as these are the result of human systems. Following the tenets of the biocentric paradigm, and the land ethic, human systems which violate these tenets will be dismantled or redesigned so as to promote sustainability. Insofar as sustainability is possible, the fruits of human production will be shared globally in line with the conception of flourishing implicit in the maximalist notion of rights advocated under global justice.

The implementation of global justice is unlikely given Hume's interpretation of justice's emergence. Given communitarian considerations, the recognition that the problem can to some extent be reduced to overpopulation puts humans at odds with each other, as the conditions for human wellbeing are what places humanity, and, therefore, communities at risk. Options which demand less sacrifice in and of community while being environmentally healthy, are likely to be chosen by those with the power to implement them. Given the present sense of community breakdown in Canada and the United States this is especially so. This said, the environmental component of global justice has a greater chance of being realized than the social justice component, given the perception that the sacrifices that need to be made to the environmental community are necessary for survival. The sacrifices that need to be made to bring about social justice, on the

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186 Here it is assumed that schooling will have to overcome its universal tendency

other hand, are likely to be perceived as too extravagant in terms of the loss of the wellbeing of the human community.

Interestingly, they are extravagant, but they are also imperative, simply because the developing world is not defenseless. It still controls the fate of its ecosystems and, therefore, to some extent, the biogeosphere, and nations such as China and India have nuclear weaponry. They can hold the first world hostage. At the same time, however, ruling classes are communities of their own and this can work against the developing world's masses. In fact, evidence exists that the community affiliation of the ruling classes is undermining the developed world's masses. Specifically I am speaking of Biosphere II, the eco-lifeboat of the wealthy. Its existence should be taken as confirmation that they are well aware of the scope of the environmental problems which are presently faced, and are not currently prepared to change their fundamental attitudes.

That the implementation of global justice is unlikely, however, does not refute its claim of necessity or successful functionality. It only means that its claim is likely to go untested. Global justice, in this regard is no different than other forms of social contract justice or Marxism in that they all fail under conditions of scarcity which compromise community wellbeing.

Perhaps the most telling thing against advocacy of global justice, which, nevertheless, does not refute its advocacy, is that it of necessity must assert that humanity has been immoral, that acting in the way we have in the past and are presently doing is immoral and that these acts must stop. Globally, it seems likely that people will wish to deny their immorality and to some extent they will be right in doing so. Nonetheless, their participation in the global totality which is humanity makes them guilty from the day of their birth. That, as Thomas Nagel would say, is simply a matter of moral luck.

That rights realization costs resources, and global justice posits maximalist notions of rights, both for humans as well as the planet and non-humans, works against its realization insofar as conditions of scarcity are a determining factor in any justice equation. In this sense,

the notion of equality, are in actuality subject to utilitarian considerations. If, on the other hand, global educators find themselves abandoning the biocentric paradigm upon recognition of the human moral cost, they fail to secure the survival of humanity, as well as life as we know it on the planet.

Global justice is also potentially consistent with its aims. If, a lowest common denominator notion of rights is possible within a framework of acceptable planetary health then global justice is realizable and, therefore, consistent. That its implementation is unlikely, given Humean constraints, does not refute its claims to validity. Rather, it means that these claims will in all probability not be tested.

It seems reasonably clear that the progenitors of global education and global justice as conceived in *Earthrights* and *Greenprints* are insufficiently aware of both the magnitude of the problem which they are trying to address and the implications that their theory has in practice. Specifically, they have not addressed the problem that scarcity presents for justice, and this is manifested in the lack of consideration given to the axiom **rights realization costs resources**. This axiom must be pervasive in global education's structure if it is to be consistent with its aims.

The aims of global education and global justice are noble in intent. The forms of social justice and environmental justice which they represent, even if unknowingly, constitute what I consider to be objectives worthy of humanity at its best. Humanity, however, has not been and is not now at its best. It is unlikely that humanity will or can be at its best in the future given the situation which is presently faced, and given the historical tendency to resist rapid, fundamental change in consciousness.

Global justice, in this regard, is pleasant, inspiring and comforting in theory, but its blueprint does not conform to reality. Global education cannot be consistent in its aims. Global educators, therefore, must do one of two things. They must either go back to the drawing board and produce a blueprint which takes proper account of

**the greatest possible clarity the costs in consequences which will likely be incurred. Whichever route is chosen, the aims of social justice and environmental justice are in crucial respects diametrically opposed. As things now stand, this problem, when seen in combination with the practical problem of planetary limitations, confines global justice within the bounds of exercises in imaginative intellectual speculation.**

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