University of Alberta

Strategic Truth: The *Didache* and the Ritualization of Confession

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Religious Studies

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Fall 2011
Edmonton, Alberta

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Abstract

The *Didache's* imperatives to confess faults are located in an array of ritual practices similar to that of other Greco-Roman associations. Yet, there are distinctive ways in which each group strategically uses confessional practice within these arrays. In this thesis, I will argue that examining confession in the *Didache* as practice, in particular through the lens of Catherine Bell's "ritualization," exposes how certain activities are being privileged with respect to other activities and how these distinctions are ordered together into wholes that allow for their strategic use, manipulation, and adaptation. Specifically, the *Didache* utilizes confession in order to link "teaching," as both oral tradition and written text, with a "way of life." As a part of this argument, it will be necessary to suggest an extension to Bell's understanding of the operation of misrecognition within ritualization in order to show how the *Didache* misrecognizes its own discourse of sacrifice.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful for the support and assistance I have received that has made this thesis possible. The gracious and insightful guidance by my supervisor, Willi Braun, has been indispensible as this project made its way from a vague idea for a research paper in one of his classes to something that is a little more coherent. I am also thankful for the engaging environment of the Religious Studies Program at the University of Alberta. The seminars I participated in, led by Francis Landy, Andrew Gow, and John Kitchen, all helped to spark an interest in theory and to foster lines of inquiry that have, directly or indirectly, been incorporated into this project.

I have also been fortunate to receive generous financial support for this research with scholarships from the University of Alberta and the Government of Alberta, along with a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Master's Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Most of all, I am deeply grateful to Pamela, whose complete support and patient encouragement throughout the research and writing of this thesis has been invaluable.

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List of Abbreviations

AmEth	*American Ethnologist*
AnNYAS	Annals of the New York Academy of the Sciences
B.C.E.	Before the Common Era
BIWK	*Die Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens*
BTB	*Biblical Theological Bulletin*
C.E.	Common Era
CIG	*Corpus inscriptionum graecarum*
CMRDM	*Corpus moumentorum religionis dei Menis*
CR	The Classical Review
CW	*Classical World*
EpAn	*Epigraphica Anatolica*
EJS	*European Journal of Sociology*
ExpTim	Expository Times
H	Hierosolymitanus (Codex)
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
IEph	*Die Inschriften von Ephesos*
JAC	*Jarbuch für Antike und Christentum*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JJS	*Journal for Jewish Studies*
JQR	*Jewish Quarterly Review*
JRA	*Journal of Roman Archaeology*
JRH	*Journal of Religious History*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
LSAM	*Lois Sacrées de l'Asie Mineure*
LSCG	*Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques*
LSS	*Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques, supplément*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LXX	Septuagint
MAMA	*Monumenta asiae minoris antiqua*
Neot	*Neotestamentica*
Newdocs	*New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity*

NGSL	*Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents*
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
P. Oxy	Oxyrhynchus Papyri
SEG	*Supplementum epigraphicum graecum*
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
StudLit	*Studia Liturgica*
StudPat	*Studia Patristica*
SymOs	*Symbolae Osloenses*
Syll	*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*
TAM	*Tituli Asiae Minoris*
VC	*Vigiliae Christianae*
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*

Introduction

Reconsidering Method in Light of the Didache

At the end of the second century C.E., in a short work mainly devoted to conversion, baptism, and community discipline, Tertullian prescribes a confessional practice for those who have committed an egregious fault ("sin") after already being initiated by baptism into the community:

> And thus ἐξομολόγησις is a discipline for man's prostration and humiliation, enjoining a demeanour calculated to move mercy. With regard also to the very dress and food, it commands (the penitent) to lie in sackcloth and ashes, to cover his body in mourning … to feed prayers on fastings, to groan, to weep and make outcries unto the Lord your God; to bow before the feet of the presbyters, and kneel to God's dear ones; to enjoin on all the brethren to be ambassadors to bear his deprecatory supplication (*De paen.* 9.3–5).[1]

This discipline of ἐξομολόγησις is not merely an utterance, a speaking out, of improper behaviour, but a bodily *performance* displaying the proper signs that demonstrate genuine contrition. For Tertullian, and others, the severity of this ritual meant that it should only be performed once as a means to reconcile the initiate with the community. It also requires a particular form of organized and official authority, as it is the bishop who determines the efficacy of the ritual. Yet,

[1] Tertullian, "De paenitentia," in *Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian* (ed. Allan Menzies; trans. Rev. S. Thelwall; Ante-Nicene Fathers; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1885); the word ἐξομολογεῖσθαι and its cognates occur within Greek literature with various cultic nuances from thanking or extolling a deity, to confessing "sins" (ἁμαρτίας), to a priest or cult official, to confessing "sins" to a diety (ἐξομολογεῖσθαι τῷ θεῷ). See Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds., *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (trans. G. W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1964), 199–220. Tertullian, writing in Latin, uses ἐξομολόγησις as a technical term, distinct from *confessio*, to describe a set of acts performed as penance for post-baptismal sin. See Tertullian, *Treatises on Penance* (trans. William P. Le Saint; Ancient Christian Writers; Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1959), 171 n. 51.

Tertullian's ἐξομολόγησις is a paradoxical act. It apparently reconciles through separation, and provides sameness and unity through difference. The marking of particular differences on the body, by eating, dressing, and acting differently than other members of the community, allows for the eventual erasure of all difference and return to the social body.

Along with another short work, *De pudicitia,* some scholars take Tertullian's description of confessional practice in *De paenitentia* as evidence of a momentous change in the disciplinary practice of early Christians. As Robert Mortimer once described it, "[i]t is with Tertullian that we emerge into clear daylight and find a penitential system, severe and elaborate, in full operation."[2] This change is typically asserted as one where "in general the development was from public confession of sinfulness to private confession of specific sins,"[3] marking a putative change of epochs in organizational and disciplinary models of Christianity.[4] In other words, this apparent change in disciplinary practice is claimed to be a movement from some form of egalitarianism, communitarianism, or revolutionary social causes to hierarchy, organization, and social stratification. It

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[2] Robert C. Mortimer, *The Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 5.

[3] Eugene LaVerdiere, "Confession of Sins," in *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* (ed. Everett Ferguson, Michael P. McHugh, and Frederick W. Norris; New York: Garland, 1997), 223.

[4] This periodization is also implicit in the claim that the Roman Catholic Church began around the second century C.E. For example, when Peter Brooks asserts that it was a "movement from a penance of expiation, the performance of expiatory acts in order to demonstrate one's unworthiness and wish for reintegration with the sinless, to the verbal demonstration of one's sin and remorse for sin," and when he characterizes the former as "public" and the latter as "private," he unwittingly finds the production of and transition to the modern sense of the self through a temporality and spaciality that are products of modernity. See *Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law & Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 91; and Thomas N. Tentler, *Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 52.

is used to differentiate between first-century literature linked to the emergence of what, in the second century, became referred to as Christianity,[5] the Pauline letters, the gospels, the sayings gospel Q, and so on, and those texts deemed to be from the second century, the so-called Pastorals, the *Didache*, the Shepherd of Hermas, *Barnabas,* etc. Coordinated with this myth-history, then, the confession of faults, which appears in several first and second century texts, is often imagined by scholars to have been *sui generis* in the social "revolution" of Jesus and his first followers, or to have been "borrowed" from, or at minimum been "influenced" by, the disciplinary practice of various first-century, or earlier, "Jewish" groups.

Such genealogical assumptions infuse much of the scholarly discussion surrounding the *Didache,*[6] a text primarily concerned with the ritual and disciplinary practice of an ἐκκλησία, that is, a Hellenistic association, in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire in the early centuries C.E. The *Didache* begins with the moral teaching of the ὁδοὶ δύο (the Two Ways) in chapters 1–6, and proceeds to give instruction on baptism, fasting, prayers, and a εὐχαριστία ("thanksgiving") meal (chaps. 7–10). This is followed by directions regarding pragmatic community concerns, such as how to deal with travelling prophets or teachers and the appointment of community leaders (chaps. 11–15). It concludes,

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[5] In particular, this view of the formation of early Christianity has been suggested by Daniel Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); idem, "Rethinking Jewish Christianity: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (to which is Appended a Correction of my Border Lines)," *JQR* 99 (2009): 7–36; William E. Arnal, "Doxa, Heresy, and Self-construction: The Pauline Ekklēsiai and the Boundaries of Urban Identities," in *Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity* (ed. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger Zellentin; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 87 n. 106.

[6] We can find such assumptions beginning with one of the earliest commentaries on the *Didache*, Adolf von Harnack's *Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1884); see also his *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1972).

in chapter 16, with warnings regarding ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις (the last days). Often referred to as a "church manual," "liturgy," or "handbook" the *Didache* had been known only in part, until the late 19th century, from citations in early Christian literature and from lists of known works by the compilers of canonical lists.[7] There is also some evidence that it had been in circulation and been used as part of the education of initiates in fourth century Egypt.[8] The only complete manuscript of the *Didache* is the eleventh-century Codex Hierosolymitanus (H), which was found in the Patriarchal library of Jerusalem in Constantinople in 1873.[9] The late date of the H and the small number of other sources,[10] however, raises some serious problems when the *Didache* is approached with standard

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[7] For examples of early Christian literature that use parts of the *Didache*, see the *Ap. Const.* 7:1–32 and *Barn.* 18–20. Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 3:25) describes the *Didache* as known by many ἐκκλησιαστικοί ("assembly members") although it is still ἀντιλεγομένας ("disputed"). That Eusebius is referring to the *Didache*, as we have it, in his canonical list is not completely certain; see Kurt Niederwimmer, *The Didache: A Commentary* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 4.

[8] Two important MSS witnesses for the text of the *Didache*, POxy 1782, are parchment leaves from Oxyrhynchus and are dated to the fourth century. These fragments contain *Did* 1:3c–4a and 2:7b–3:2a. Additionally, Athanasius of Alexandria includes the διδαχή καλουμένη τῶν ἀποστόλων along with the Wisdom of Solomon, Ben Sira, Esther, Tobit, and the Shepherd of Hermas as appropriate literature for teaching catechumens (*Epistula Festalis* XXXIX 24). Although, like the reference in Eusebius, the congruence of this phrase with the *Didache* as we have it is questionable. Some scholars, such as Sandt and Flusser, see the Athanasius remark as being a reference to an independent "Christianized" version of the Two Ways. See *The Didache: Its Jewish Sources and Its Place in Early Judaism and Christianity* (Compendia rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum; Minneapolis: Royal Van Gorcum, 2002), 86–87.

[9] H also contains Ps.-Chrysostom *Synopsis Veteris et Novi Testamenti, Epistle of Barnabas, 1* and *2 Clement,* a list of "books of the Hebrews," the letter of Maria of Cassoboloi to Ignatius of Antioch, twelve letters of Ignatius, and a discussion of the genealogy of Jesus.

[10] The subsequent discoveries of other fragmentary sources, both in Greek (P. Oxy 1782, fourth century C.E.) and Coptic (Br. Mus. Or. 9271, fifth century C.E.), have provided some minor supplements to the text in H. The *Apostolic Constitutions* also expands on and paraphrases much of the text of the *Didache.*

methodologies designed for and tested upon Christian canonical literature, texts which typically have many early MSS witnesses.

Additionally, there has been much scholarly debate surrounding the date and the provenance of the *Didache* due to its many textual redactions and its anonymous, and possibly collective, authorship. This situation, along with a paucity of internal socio-historical information and the presence of several difficult passages, has led some scholars to characterize the *Didache* as an "enigma"[11] or "riddle."[12] Many of the *Didache*'s postulated sources, such as the Two Ways tractate, are given an earlier date in the first century C.E. (70-80), while the redaction and collection by the so-called "Didachist" is situated later in the second century (120 C.E.).[13]

The place of writing (or redaction) is even more uncertain. As Kurt Niederwimmer opines, "[r]egarding the provenance, we are completely in the dark."[14] Some scholars suggest Palestine, Egypt, or Asia Minor with a slight majority favouring Syria.[15]

In light of these uncertainties, it would be pertinent to take note of Jürgen Zangenberg's caution regarding relevance of the standard hermeneutical methodologies, which rely variously on constructions of an "author" (or

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[11] Stanislas Giet, *L'enigme de la Didache* (PFLUS; Paris: Les Editions Orphrys, 1970).

[12] Frederick Ercolo Vokes, *The Riddle of the Didache* (London: SPCK, 1938).

[13] See "Der Didachist und seine Quellen," in *The Didache in Context: Essays on Its Text, History, and Transmission* (ed. Clayton N. Jefford; Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 15–36. Cf. Audet, who makes the case for a late first-century date for the final text; see *La didachè: Instructions des apôtres* (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1958).

[14] Niederwimmer, *The Didache,* 53.

[15] For an overview of the date and origin debates, see Jonathan A. Draper, "The Apostolic Fathers: The *Didache*," *ExpTim* 117 (2006): 177–181.

editor/redactor), "original text," or a specific community behind the text of the *Didache*:

> With respect to such texts, *Didache's* "authorship" is of a very limited nature. Such texts grow out of the need of the communities that use them or meet the demands of a quite anonymous *Sitz im Leben* (teaching, moral adoration)…Having such parenthetical and constitutional writings in mind, one might perhaps go one step further and ask if there ever existed a standard text of *Didache* at all. Texts like *Didache*, as well as similar traditions behind or alongside it, were always open to be edited, transplanted, supplemented, updated, or rewritten into new forms and compositions …We must consider the possibility that the *Didache* text as we have it today only represents a moment in time in a longer development of instructional tradition.[16]

Nevertheless, these uncertainties do not completely undermine the validity of attempting a social and historical analysis of the *Didache.* In fact, quite the opposite is the case. Precisely because of its enigmatic character the *Didache* affords an opportunity to robustly test socio-historical methodologies.

Yet, much of the study of the *Didache* has focused on locating it within the aforementioned genealogies. Aaron Milavec, for example, locates the *Didache* in a tradition extending from "the way of Jesus." Citing the work of John Dominic Crossan and Gerd Theissen, he writes, "[t]he *Didache* represents the first concerted attempt by householders to live the way of Jesus adapted to the exigencies of family, of occupation, of home — the very things that Jesus and his wandering apostles had left behind."[17] On the other hand, Willy Rordorf describes the *Didache's* treatment of confession, and the meal practice within which it is placed, as an important moment of hybridity between an "origin," a "pure" Jewish

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[16] Jürgen K. Zangenberg, "Reconstructing the Social and Religious Milieu of the *Didache*: Observations and Possible Results," in *Matthew, James, and Didache: Three Related Documents in Their Jewish and Christian Settings* (ed. Huub van de Sandt and Jürgen K. Zangenberg; Atlanta: SBL, 2008), 49.

[17] Aaron Milavec, "The Purifying Confession of Failings Required by the *Didache's* Eucharistic Sacrifice," *BTB* 33 (2003): 65.

practice, and a "*telos*," or "end," the later (and also pure) Christian practice; it is a "bridge" or "a transitional link between the Jewish tradition represented in the blessings pronounced at the table and the eucharistic anaphora as preserved in the later formularies for the Christian Mass."[18] This search for a genealogy, however, has led to the dissection of the text where each component is assigned a "Jewish" or "Christian" character. Once one steps back to try to assess the text as a whole, this has resulted in a confusing proliferation of hybrid categorical terms: Jewish-Christian, Judaizing-Christian, Christian-Judaism, and so on, all dubious reifications, none illuminating the text and none explaining the problems of our interest.

Claims of the *Didache's* Jewishness rest largely upon the description of "this way of teaching," (ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διδαχῆς, 6:1) as the "whole yoke of the Lord," (ὅλον τὸν ζυγὸν τοῦ κυρίου) in 6:1–2. Jonathan Draper suggests that this phrase relates to the controversy of Torah observance and issues of commensality with non-Jewish Jesus followers, as mentioned in the book of Acts (15:6–29).[19] According to Draper, it reflects an attempt to integrate Gentiles into the mostly Jewish ἐκκλησία of the *Didache* without requiring "perfect" Torah observance.[20]

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[18] Willy Rordorf, *The Eucharist of the Early Christians* (trans. Matthew O'Connell; New York: Pueblo, 1978), 1.

[19] This by no means is the only interpretive option for this curious phrase. Harnack (*Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel*, 19–21) and others suggest that "the entire yoke" refers to rigouristic asceticism, including the renunciation of marriage. Niederwimmer (*The Didache*, 120), who considers 6:2–3 to be appended to the epilogue of the Two Ways tractate, prefers the interpretation offered by Rordorf and Tuilier. They understand the phrase to refer to "the law of Christ."

[20] Jonathan A. Draper, "The Didache," in *The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers* (ed. Paul Foster; London; New York: T & T Clark, 2007), 16. Nathan Mitchell likewise asserts: "Even the most causal reading of the *Didache* 1-5 reveals a group which has maintained its allegiance to the fundamental tenants of (Hellenistic diaspora?) Judaism. The decalogue remains as the axis of 'canonical authority' within the community and anchors its ethical beliefs. Thus the earliest redactional layer of the *Didache* (chapters 1–5,

Following Draper and Marcello Del Verme,[21] Jürgen Zangenberg similarly asserts that even though the *Didache* is a "Christian text," it remains "within the common practices of Jewish piety" defined as "fasting, prayer, meal practice and almsgiving."[22] Yet, while appearing to extol *behaviour* in a Jewish manner, the "*Didache* also shows a clear intention to separate socially from the pharisaically inspired matrix. It does not suggest that *Didache* intended to leave Judaism as such, or in fact had done so."[23]

Huub van de Sandt also finds that the *Didache* presents close parallels to Jewish liturgy in the Second Temple period.[24] Though he suggests that the *Didache* may have originated in a Jewish community — as evidenced by earlier redactional levels — portions of the text, such as *Did* 10:5 and 9:4, demonstrate feelings of

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a reformulation of the Two Ways material) reveals a community of Christian Jews who are still living within the ambit of the Torah. They are believers whose relationship to Jesus in no way subverts their religious identity as Jews. For them, the 'yoke of the Lord' has not been replaced or relaxed by the 'yoke of Jesus'…The implication, then, is that the perfect observance of the Torah (as interpreted according to Christian *halakoth*) is the supreme goal of every believer's life. In other words, the *Didache* suggest that one can attain salvation only by becoming a fully observant Jew" ("Baptism in the *Didache*," in *The Didache in Context: Essays on Its Text, History, and Transmission* [ed. Clayton N Jefford; vol. 77; Supplements to Novum Testamentum; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995], 232).

[21] Marcello Del Verme, *Didache and Judaism: Jewish roots of an ancient Christian-Jewish work* (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004). Elsewhere, Del Verme argues that the earliest portions of the *Didache* were compiled/written before the final redaction of Matthew and Luke: "If follows, then, that one should not speak about a defining parting of the ways, as if shortly before or after the end of the first century there was a fork in the proverbial road…*Did* 8 does not lead to the supposition that such individuals are Pharisees or Jews. We might perceive in this chapter and elsewhere also some form of social and religious tension within one large group with factions, perhaps to be comprehended as Christian Jews" ("Who are the People Labelled as Hypocrites in *Didache* 8? A Propos of Fasting and Tithing of the Hypocrites," *Henoch* 25 [2003]: 325).

[22] Zangenberg, "Reconstructing," 60.

[23] Zangenberg, "Reconstructing," 60.

[24] Although, it is important to note *contra* Sandt that there is no evidence of a Jewish liturgy in the Second Temple period, see Paul F. Bradshaw, *The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of Early Liturgy* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

"alienation" from or "discontinuity" with Israel.[25] He turns to the ritual practices of chapters 9–10 to identify the group labelled οἱ ὑποκριταί ("the hypocrites") in 8:1–2. In particular, he focuses on the eucharistic prayer which, he claims, is a Christianized version of the Jewish meal prayer, the *Birkat Ha-Mazon*.[26] Sandt concludes that the ὑποκριταί is a reference to Jews in general and, therefore, that the "final" text of *Didache* is marking a clear separation with Judaism.[27]

It is interesting to note, however, what constitutes the *Birkat Ha-Mazon* as "Jewish" for Sandt: "an earthly orientation … a compassionate treatment of Israel, the people according to the flesh, of Jerusalem, Zion, and the temple."[28] On the other hand, the "Christian" aspects of the *Didache* are its focus on "ethical, spiritual, supra-terrestrial, and everlasting goods: the spiritual building of the 'church,' its deliverance from all evil, its perfection in love, and its ultimate integration into an immaterial reign of God."[29] This characterization of Judaism as particular and Christianity as universal rests upon his comparison of the *Didache* to "Hellenistic" Judaism, represented by Philo and the early Christian letters of Hebrews and 1 Peter. Yet, as Jonathan Z. Smith has critically observed, this methodological recourse to Judaism serves to both immunize Christianity, here represented by the *Didache*, from its Hellenistic environment, and simultaneously provides the very thing which must be surpassed in order for Christianity to

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[25] Huub van de Sandt, "Was the *Didache* Community a Group Within Judaism? An Assessment on the Basis of Its Eucharistic Prayers," in *A Holy People: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Religious Communal Identity* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 103.

[26] Sandt, "Was the *Didache* Community a Group Within Judaism," 90.

[27] Sandt, "Was the *Didache* Community a Group Within Judaism," 87.

[28] Sandt, "Was the *Didache* Community a Group Within Judaism," 91.

[29] Sandt, "Was the *Didache* Community a Group Within Judaism," 91–92.

become itself.[30] Even Del Verme, who proposes to "not limit our research to a general (and generic) presence of Jewish elements in the *Didache*"[31] by "reading the *Didache* within a complex and varied historical and literary phenomenon,"[32] still takes an approach that only searches out identity with other Judaism(s) while occluding evidence from Greco-Roman sources.

In one of the more critical treatments of liturgy in early Christianity, Paul Bradshaw brings to our attention the important work of Joseph Heinemann.[33] Heinemann reverses the standard evolutionary model that governed liturgical studies, and to a large extent still does.[34] He argues that there was never an original form, but an original heterogeneity of various liturgical forms that later were homogenized. This then gives new significance to textual variation. Instead of being regarded as evidence of evolutionary stages or deviation, they "might be often indicative of simultaneous, parallel strands, some of which ultimately converged, while others in time disappeared from use."[35] Following Heinemann's

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[30] Jonathan Z Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1994), 83.

[31] Del Verme, "Who are the People," 323.

[32] Del Verme, "Who are the People," 357.

[33] While Gregory Dix (*The Shape of the Liturgy* [London: Dacre Press, 1945], ix) frames his approach as a comparative endeavor, using the most recent insights from history and sociology, he circumscribes it as an effort at "enriching our Christian faith"; so also Anton Baumstark, *Comparative Liturgy. Rev. by Bernard Botte. English Ed. by F. L. Cross* (trans. F. L. Cross; London: A. R. Mowbray, 1958); more recently in this vein, Cheslyn Jones et al., eds., *The Study of Liturgy* (New York: SPCK, 1992).

[34] Along with the movement from simple to complex, Bradshaw (*The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of Early Liturgy* [Oxford University Press, 1992], 3) notes four other problematic assumptions guiding this model: (1) a centralized rabbinic authority, (2) textual variations occur sequentially, (3) variations that fall outside the linear progress must be either heretical or accidental, (4) variations could be dated using an attentive historicism.

[35] Bradshaw, *Origins of Christian Worship*, 5–6.

insights, Bradshaw turns to the meal prayer in the *Didache* and questions whether the Jewish "grace" had a standardized form. He notes significant differences in the opening dialogue, which calls into question a pure, original Jewish version behind eucharistic prayers. Like Heinemann, he argues for the existence of variant forms of such ritual prayers.[36] Yet, while he rightly questions the need to look for "a *Jewish* precedent," Bradshaw curiously goes on to ask, "Why is it not sufficient to accept this as a purely *Christian* development, brought about entirely by the current needs of the worshipping community?"[37]

Besides masking apologetic interests, viewing the *Didache* as a hybridized group on the margins of "Christianity" and "Judaism" does not provide a sufficient explanatory model for the distinct aspects of this text. Instead, such an approach assures the marginalization of the *Didache*, as an aberration, and immunizes a putatively "normative" Christianity and Judaism.

In light of these issues, what I will suggest in this thesis is that by examining confession in the *Didache* as practice, in particular through the lens of Catherine Bell's "ritualization," the type of questions asked can be adjusted so that confession, and the *Didache* by extension, can be placed in a broader scope of social behaviour. Analyzing confession as practice,

> can allow us to imagine historically some of the possibilities of inflecting particular local or occasional performances and performance traditions to be meaningfully distinct within wider 'Christian' ritual discourse and even wider Mediterranean language.[38]

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[36] Bradshaw, *Origins of Christian Worship*, 141–142. Earlier in the book, he rightly cautions us that "[w]hile it is true — as Christian scholars have constantly asserted — that the *berakah* was a first-century Jewish prayer-form, it was not the only form that prayer could then take in the Jewish tradition, nor was there only one standard form of *berakah* in current use" (15).

[37] Bradshaw, *Origins of Christian Worship*, 149.

[38] Ian H. Henderson, "Early Christianity, Textual Representation and Ritual Extension," in *Texte als Medium und Reflexion von Religion im römischen Reich* (ed.

The perspective of ritualization examines confession in relation to other ritual practices within the *Didache* in order to focus on how certain activities are being privileged with respect to other activities. It exposes how these distinctions are ordered together into series and wholes that allows for their strategic use, manipulation, and adaptation. "Ritualization is," as Bell describes, "a matter of various culturally specific strategies for setting some activities off from others, for creating and privileging a qualitative distinction between the 'sacred' and the 'profane,' and for ascribing such distinctions to realities thought to transcend the powers of human actors."[39] This approach also takes seriously the *Didache* itself as a set of textual practices located in a wider context than the narrow and by no means persuasive context of early Jewish and Christian differentiation contests. Following Edward Said, Bell suggests that the "worldliness" or continuity of practice demands a focus on how texts are used, rather than the interpretation of texts. In other words, ritualization views texts as "cultural entities that act in the world."[40] Such an approach attempts to understand the *Didache* as a strategic intervention in a wider network of cultural groups, including Greco-Roman associations. It is this network, for the most part neglected in studies of the *Didache*, that will provide the basis of comparison in this thesis. Moreover, by drawing out the production of differentiation, ritualization will help to delineate how confessional practice is used within ritual environments to contribute to the generation of relationships, social structures, and ritualized bodies.

Dorothee Elm von der Osten, Jörg Rüpke, and Katharina Waldner; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), 95.

[39] Catherine M. Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 74.

[40] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 81.

Chapter one will provide a general examination of some of the theoretical issues surrounding confession. I will argue that Bell's work on ritualization provides a change of perspective that allows the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding confession to be seen as integral to its effectiveness.

Confession is also a strategy of differentiation and systemization. This will be argued in chapter two by utilizing Bell's dimensions of ritualization. Such a perspective will allow a constructive re-appropriation of the concept "liturgy." Liturgy will highlight the way that ritual texts order activities, traditions, time and space, and social structures into "arrays," that is, ritual environments. In order to demonstrate the ordering that takes place in ritual texts, I will analyze a selection of inscriptions from various Greco-Roman associations, and in particular the regulations of the household cult of Dionysius from Philadelphia.

In chapter three I will show how disciplinary practices are used to produce truth and to invest the body with particular modes of power. I will show that confession, tests of authenticity, self-examination, and physiognomy are examples of technologies employed in judicial, medical, and socio-religious contexts that produce indices of bodily knowledge. Such knowledge is then used to generate, maintain, and negotiate identity. The κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, the "Lord's Dinner," of the Corinthian Christ association, will be presented as an example of how sacrifice and the festive meals of Greco-Roman associations provide a context of practice where self-examination, meals, and mythmaking are interconnected and produce the distinctions necessary to constitute the social space of the ἐκκλησία.

Lastly, in chapter four, I will analyse how the imperatives to confess faults in the *Didache* also participate in the systemization of activities, bodies, and a ritual environment. In distinction to the οἶκος inscription of Dionysius, which uses

disciplinary strategies to ensure the homology between the body of a sacrificial animal and patrilineal kinship, and Paul's κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, which employs testing to generate a homology between the divided self and the martyr myth of Christ, the *Didache* utilizes confession in order to link διδαχή, that is "teaching" as both oral tradition and written text, with a ὁδὸς ζωῆς, a "way of life." As a part of this argument, it will be necessary to suggest an extension to Bell's understanding of the operation of misrecognition within ritualization in order to show how the *Didache* misrecognizes its own discourse of sacrifice.

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The Police and the Penitent: Theorizing Confession

Tiger Woods and the Ambiguities of Confession

One week after a late night car accident and several claims of marital infidelity appearing on various media, professional golfer Tiger Woods issued a press-release on his website in which he apologized for "letting his family down" and regretted "those transgressions."[41] In his statement there is something more interesting than the all-to-common revelations of celebrities', frankly ordinary, behaviour. What is interesting is that he perceived an imperative to reveal the lurid details of these transgressions in his own words despite the already mounting public evidence of them. "Personal sins," Woods stated on his personal website, "should not require press releases and problems within a family shouldn't have to mean public confessions."[42] Here he invokes the particularly modern value of "privacy" and its corresponding opposition between the private and the public in order to justify *not* articulating the names of what he did. Yet, only three months later, in front of "small group of friends, colleagues and close associates" at the TPC Sawgrass Clubhouse in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, Woods reverses and names his deeds on that most public form of modern media: television. Sombre and looking directly

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[41] Tiger Woods, "Tiger comments on current events," *TigerWoods.com*, December 9, 2009, http://web.tigerwoods.com/news/article/200912027740572/news/.

[42] Woods, "Tiger comments on current events."

into the camera, he confesses, "I was unfaithful. I had affairs. I cheated. What I did is not acceptable. And I am the only person to blame."[43]

Why the change? Why confess now? One rationale, besides as an attempt to mitigate the incessant media attention on his family, is that he had come to view public confession as a way "begin the process of making amends."[44] Peter Brooks, in his book *Troubling Confessions,* notes not only how pervasive this cathartic view of confession is in the modern American context, but he also captures the tensions present when confession is viewed as a means toward reconciliation:

> Strange and yet familiar, in that the imperative to 'fess up, to take verbal responsibility for one's acts, is deeply ingrained in our culture, in our pedagogy, even in our law … Confession of wrongdoing is considered fundamental to morality because it constitutes a verbal act of self-recognition as wrongdoer and hence provides the basis of rehabilitation. It is the precondition of the end to ostracism, re-entry into one's desired place in the human community. To refuse confession is to be obdurate, hard of heart, resistant to amendment. Refusal of confession can be taken as a defiance of one's judges … whereas confession allows those judges to pass their sentences in security, knowing that the guilty party not only deserves and accepts but perhaps in some sense wants punishment, as the penance that follows confession.[45]

The perception that confession is an "act of therapy," as Peter Brown described Augustine of Hippo's *Confessions*,[46] often coincides with the use of religious imagery or discourse. In Woods' statement, theologically loaded terms are used to characterize his behaviour, both past ("transgressions") and future ("atone"), and he appeals to a return to Buddhist practice as evidence of the sincerity of his

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[43] ASAP Sports, "Transcript: Tiger's public statement," *TigerWoods.com*, February 19, 2010, http://web.tigerwoods.com/news/article/201002198096934/news/.

[44] "Tiger to give remarks Friday," *TigerWoods.com*, February 17, 2010, http://web.tigerwoods.com/news/article/201002178086282/news/.

[45] Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, 1–2.

[46] Peter Robert Lamont Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (University of California Press, 2000), 158.

apology.[47] This religious discourse combined with the highly formalized setting in which Woods delivered his statement creates the potent image of Woods as a penitent confessor performing a social ritual before his priestly judges (family, friends, the public), who are able to grant reconciliation or mete out punishment.

Yet, as Brooks observes, this religiously oriented perception of confession is often paired simultaneously with an equally powerful legal image: the criminal who confesses under intense police interrogation. This particular image is especially prevalent on Woods' choice of television as the primary media through which to publicize his statement. While popular television shows, such as *Law and Order* and *CSI,* tend to grossly over-determine the effectiveness of interrogation in eliciting confession, there is, nevertheless, a confidence in the ability of relentless interrogators to produce a confession. Here, the value of spontaneity gives way to a truth that *must* be produced. As Brooks describes it, "The process of rehabilitation and reintegration — if by way of punishment and expiation — can only begin when the suspect says those words 'I did it.'"[48] While this image is not as explicit in Woods' statement, his concern over the heightened and relentless media attention on his family, as well as the increasing number of women publically claiming to have had affairs with him, could easily be interpreted as the primary factors motivating the change from repudiating to performing confession.

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[47] "I have a lot of work to do, and I intend to dedicate myself to doing it. Part of following this path for me is Buddhism, which my mother taught me at a young age. People probably don't realize it, but I was raised a Buddhist, and I actively practiced my faith from childhood until I drifted away from it in recent years. Buddhism teaches that a craving for things outside ourselves causes an unhappy and pointless search for security. It teaches me to stop following every impulse and to learn restraint. Obviously, I lost track of what I was taught" (ASAP Sports, "Transcript: Tiger's public statement").

[48] Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, 3.

In any case, both images of the confessor, as penitent or criminal, are fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. The truth of the utterance and the intentions of the confessor are under constant scrutiny and there are plenty of abuses that make the use of confession suspect:

> We want confessions, yet we are suspicious of them. The law has seen the necessity of attempting to regulate and police confessions: it has tried to establish conditions of the confessional act that guarantee that it has been "voluntarily" made, all the while authorizing kinds of pressure to confess that run counter to voluntariness.[49]

The images of confession, along with these conflicting anxieties and concerns which are often framed in oppositions, such as public/private and voluntary/coerced, have been employed by scholars as explanatory models for confessional practice, both modern and ancient.

As a brief example, the early 19th-century History of Religions scholar Raffaele Pettazzoni, relying primarily on ethnographical evidence taken from tribal peoples, provided a model in which confession was a ritual of expulsion.[50] This expulsion operated therapeutically as the "sin" was a type of evil, harmful substance that must be expelled from the confessor using the power of words. "They are," Pettazzoni wrote, "regularly associated with gestures or symbolic actions which express in the clearest way possible the performance of a separation or an expulsion."[51] The ritual of confession was predicated on the magic of words, a theory Pettazzoni closely connects to James Frazer, who posited an explanation

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[49] Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, 3.

[50] Raffaele Pettazzoni, "Confession of Sins: An Attempted General Interpretation," in *Essays on the History of the Religions* (trans. H. J. Rose; supplements to Numen; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 43–54.

[51] Pettazzoni, "Confession of Sins: An Attempted General Interpretation," 48.

of religion that emphasized the individual and characterized confession as "magical."[52] Confession operated retroactively, analogously to interrogation, in that "when declaring a sin one calls it back, so to say, from the past occasion when it was committed, tears it away in a manner from the person who committed it, brings it out from within that person, in short expresses it."[53]

One can quite easily recognize, however, the inadequacies of such a model. This view of magic vis-à-vis religion explicitly legitimates modernized forms of religiosity, especially Christianity, as evolutionarily superior. Additionally, the concept of magic serves to obscure the operation of confession rather than provides a sufficient explanation. Magic turns confession into a therapeutic slight-of-hand, an all-to-easy and fantastic production of a white rabbit, which diverts our eyes from human relationships and human bodies.

The notion that confession makes exterior something interior and hidden is, however, still rather common in much more recent treatments of confessional phenomena. In his thorough and detailed article on the importance of confessional inscriptions found in Anatolia for understanding the confessional practice in early Christianity, Fritz Graf argues that it was the relentless intervention of the gods, by way of misfortune, calamity and death, that transformed "this secrecy [of the transgression] into public knowledge. And it is public common knowledge only that brings healing."[54]

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[52] Pettazzoni, "Confession of Sins: An Attempted General Interpretation," 46; for his discussion of Frazer's theory, see p. 52.

[53] Pettazzoni, "Confession of Sins: An Attempted General Interpretation," 49.

[54] Fritz Graf, "Confession, Secrecy, and Ancient Societies," in *Religion im kulturellen Diskurs: Festschrift fur Hans G. Kippenberg zu Seinem 65* (ed. Brigitte Luchesi and Kocku von Stuckrad; Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 266.

Towards Ritualization: Durkheim and Foucault

In both the examples of Tiger Woods and in Brooks' observation of the two images of confession it is precisely the importance of social relationships that are highlighted in relation to confession. Groups, such as the family and the public, are invoked by Woods in both his initial repudiation of confession and then later in his televised statement. Likewise, social interaction and social formation are integral aspects to understanding confession in early Christianity.[55] What this suggests, then, is that our approach needs to be one that takes seriously the social aspects of confession. But we are not interested only in confessional acts, but in the combination of confession with religious discourse and behaviour. Catherine Bell's work on ritual, in *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, promises to provide such a framework with which to approach confession. She argues that certain social actions can be analyzed fruitfully through the lens of "ritualization," which stresses the interconnectedness of social behaviour with the social body and its environment.[56] Before we examine ritualization, it would be pertinent to trace two important theoretical trajectories on which her approach is built.

Émile Durkheim, in *Elementary Forms,* attempted to chart a course which would provide a general explanation of religion, beginning from what he considered to be its origin: totemism. Relying on the work of scholars, such as William Robertson Smith, Durkheim argued that the origins of religion are to be found not in belief in spirits, in animism, or other states of mind, but, rather, in the

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[55] Burton L. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1991); Burton L. Mack, *The Christian Myth: Origins, Logic, and Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2001).

[56] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*.

social act, in the rite or ceremony that symbolically binds the individual to his kinship community. What makes these acts religious was the fact that they were predicated on an absolute division of all things, real and ideal, into the categories of the sacred and the profane.[57] This dichotomy was not ontological in the sense of being an innate attribute of objects or humans. Rather, it "result[ed] from causes wholly foreign to the nature of the object upon which they fix themselves. What constitutes them are the impressions of comfort and dependence which the action of the society provokes in the mind."[58]

While Durkheim argued that society appears to its members as a "quasi-divine entity"[59] with the power to "dominate and direct all conduct"[60] through moral forces active in the individual, society was simultaneously constituted in the ritual actions of those individuals. "The cult," Durkheim wrote, "is not simply a system of signs by which the faith is outwardly translated; it is a collection of the means by which this is created and recreated periodically. Whether it consists in material acts or mental operations, it is always this which is efficacious."[61] Moreover, he suggested that the function of ritual in relationship between the

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[57] Durkheim argues for the social origin of the categories of human perception. Yet, there are several difficulties with some of his assumptions regarding categories. One of which, as Roy Rappaport points out, is that Durkheim "does not ... make explicit, much less detail, how the concept of time, or any of the other categories, are actually formed in religious thought or practice" (*Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 175); see also Rappaport's discussion on pp. 171-175.

[58] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (trans. Joseph W. Swain; 2nd ed.; London: George Allan & Unwin, 1976), 323.

[59] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 189.

[60] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 349.

[61] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 417.

individual and society is advantageous for both; it gives strength to the individual and stability to society.[62]

In addition to the sacred and profane, the duality that constituted religion as such, Durkheim also divided religion itself into beliefs and rites. Ritual practices were differentiated from other practices based upon "the special nature of their object" which is only expressed through beliefs.[63] "Between these two classes of facts," he wrote, "there is all the difference which separates thought from action."[64] Confession, for Durkheim, amounted to a ritual action. Like for Pettazzoni, confession is a rite of expiation, one in which "the end sought is always the turning aside of an evil or the expiation of a fault by means of an extraordinary ritual prestation."[65] As a piacular rite, it was identical to the more common mourning rites of the Australian aboriginals. As such, it provided the same function as other positive rites (e.g., sacrifice, initiation, representation), that is, the production of a collective state of "effervescence." The only difference between the types of positive rites was "the sentiment aroused."[66] Yet in a bold, although somewhat overstated move, Durkheim rejects any hint that this sentiment is a product of the individual:

> One initial fact is constant: mourning is not the spontaneous expression of individual emotions … Of course, it may be that in certain particular cases,

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[62] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 226.

[63] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 36.

[64] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 36.

[65] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 405. Durkheim, however, disagrees with Pettazzoni and Frazer with regard to the evolutionary priority of magic over religion. For Durkheim, this priority was reversed and magic was an asocial aberration derived from religion. See p. 361.

[66] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 399.

> the chagrin expressed is really felt. But it is more generally the case that there is no connection between the sentiments felt and the gestures made by the actors in the rite … Mourning is not a natural movement of private feelings wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty imposed by the group. One weeps, not simply because he is sad, but because he is forced to weep. It is a ritual attitude which he is forced to adopt out of respect for custom, but which is, in large measure, independent of his affective state.[67]

If the above statement is equally applicable to confession for Durkheim, which seems to be reasonable, then what we have here is a model of confession as a *performative* force for society. Furthermore, this role for ritual creates an interesting juxtaposition with his defining dichotomy for religion, in which beliefs are given priority over ritual. Here, ritual becomes, as Bell describes it, "the means by which the collective beliefs and ideals are simultaneously generated, experienced, and affirmed as real by the community."[68]

As we can see, the Durkheimian model is not as simple as it may first appear. There are ambiguities and also several problematic aspects. For example, it is unclear whether the collective representations that make up society are external to individuals as singularities or to all individuals that make up a group (i.e., more than the sum of its inter-related parts).[69] Another problematic aspect is that

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[67] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 397.

[68] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 20.

[69] Take for instance the following statement by Durkheim: "Collective representations are the result of an immense co-operation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infinitely richer and complexer than that of the individual" (*Elementary Forms*, 16). If in fact Durkheim makes the latter claim it would seem to contradict his earlier statement that "[s]ociety is a reality sui generis" (Elementary Forms, 16). Theodore Schatzki also perceives this problem and argues:"It is misleading, consequently, to speak of the sui generis nature of social facts. Facts about inter-related individuals are distinct from sums of facts about individuals, but facts about group, or complex, A are also distinct from those about group, or complex, B. It is hard to know whether facts about inter-related individuals are more or less distinct from facts about individuals than is one collection of facts about inter-related individuals from another such

Durkheim predicates his view of religion on a structure of dichotomies grounded in the principle duality of thought and action. Most notably, he employs an opposition between belief (thought) and ritual (action) in order to isolate both as objects of inquiry. While the division between the sacred and the profane constitutes religious belief, ritual *depends* on belief for its definition: "The rites can be defined … only by the special nature of their object … Now it is in the beliefs that the special nature of this object is expressed. It is possible to define the rite only after we have defined the belief."[70]

The division of religious phenomena by Durkheim also mirrors what he considered to be the universal and foundational division of the human subject:

> man is double. There are two beings in him: an individual being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation—I mean society. This duality of our nature has as its consequence in the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral ideal to a utilitarian motive, and in the order of thought, the irreducibility of reason to individual experience. Insofar as he belongs to society, the individual transcends himself, both when he thinks and when he acts."[71]

This anthropology is not unique to Durkheim as it has deep roots in Western modes of thinking. The division of the subject between the universal and particular with a corresponding division between body and intellect has been espoused — although, of course, with significant, and possibly irreducible, differences — by Paul of Tarsus, Augustine, and Martin Luther, and more recently, Michel

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collection. Once the individual-social opposition becomes one between sums and groups of individuals, that is to say, between individuals aggregated and inter-related, the distinction loses its clear categorical character" (*The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change* [University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002], 137).

[70] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 36.

[71] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 16.

Foucault, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek not to mention the formalization of this in the assumption of Cartesian dualism in Western metaphysics.[72]

The logic intrinsic to Durkheim's divided subject simultaneously affirms the validity of both belief and ritual as conceptual categories and their hierarchical arrangement (belief/thought over ritual/action), as Catherine Bell rightly points out. This has two serious implications: (1) it is the systematic extension of such oppositions on various levels, what Bell terms "homologization," that provides a sense of coherence and totality, and (2) included in this is the implicit hierarchical opposition between the observer and observed.[73] Bell argues, however, that the homologization and hierarchization present in the theorist's models of ritual is, in fact, characteristic of ritual itself. "This ritual logic is," she writes, "a minimalist logic that generates a 'sense' of logical systematicity while simultaneously facilitating subtle shifts in the ability of some symbols to dominate others."[74] Yet, the totality generated is, she suggests, merely apparent and only perceived.

Bell then turns to Foucault, primarily for his work on power, in order to argue that the effectiveness of the sense of coherence generated by ritualization lies in its strategic ability to arrange particular social relationships.[75] Foucault's "analytics of power" has important implications for ritual with respect to social control, resistance, and the body. Bell cogently summarizes:

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[72] See especially Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute: Or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (New York: Verso Press, 2008); idem, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

[73] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 21.

[74] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 104.

[75] See especially Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 199–204.

> Foucault goes as far as to locate the very generation of individuality, the subject, and subjectivity within this network of strategic power relations…The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation…[it is] that very microcluster of relations that constitutes power itself."[76]

For Foucault, there was a particular practice, one that Bell does not discuss, that effectively illustrated the constitution of the modern subject: confession. First signalling this interest in a transcribed lecture appended to *The Archaeology of Knowledge,*[77] he proceeded to explore confession, with special attention given to early Christian practices, in both books and several lecture series. Despite the fact that Foucault's view of confession takes several turns, what is important to note is his emphasis on the *act* of confession, rooted in the body, as a technology that (re)produces — and may also provide a mode of resistance to — the conditions of power, via the production of a truth, of a particular discourse.

In *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1,* Foucault employs a differentiation between *ars erotica* and *scientia sexualis* in order to uncover the operation of a knowledge power system behind discourse on sex in the West, particularly from the nineteenth century until the present.[78] The proliferation of speaking about sex, primarily in the form of confession (especially Christian modes of confession), gradually and systematically replaced the erotic mode, in which the truth of sex is in relation to itself; that is, "it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its

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[76] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 203.

[77] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1st ed.; New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 232.

[78] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1* (1st ed.; New York: Vintage Books, 1980).

intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and soul."[79] On the other hand, confession, as the primary mechanism of *scientia sexualis*, is a production of truth that is "thoroughly imbued with relations of power."[80] This production of truth operates in a discursive mode, as Foucault distinctly describes:

> The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile … and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation.[81]

It is through the act of confession that a particular form of knowledge regarding sex (e.g., homosexuality) is discursively constituted *as the origin* of a system of power through the claim to explain the meaning or cause of sexual acts. This knowledge is then put in service of the particular interests of a particular group. The knowledge that drives this system is, according to Foucault, the knowledge of sexual subjectivities which when coupled with confession "compels individuals to articulate their sexual particularity — no matter how extreme."[82]

There are two other aspects of Foucault's analysis of confession that are worth discussing here: the notion of excess and the division of the subject. Foucault argues that by being compelled to confess sex, that is, by admitting the place of certain sexual acts in a system that evaluates them (for example, by *agreeing* that

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[79] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 57.

[80] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 60.

[81] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 61–62.

[82] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 61.

having sex with a particular individual *is adultery*), is not the *repression* of sex, but rather it is the creation of an *excess,* or redoubling, of discourse.[83] The dissemination of this excess of sex-talk is the simultaneous proliferation of particular sexualities intertwined in particular relations of power. Or, as Foucault articulately states, confession is

> not a movement bent on pushing rude sex back into some obscure and inaccessible region, but on the contrary, a process that spreads it over the surface of things and bodies, arouses it, draws it out and bids it to speak, implants it in reality and enjoins it to tell the truth: an entire glittering sexual array, reflected in a myriad of discourses, the obstination of powers, and the interplay of knowledge and pleasure.[84]

One could thus say that, for Foucault, confession is a politics of sex. These sexualities, as mentioned before, are the truth of sex, the knowledge of a subject. It is "a knowledge not so much of his form, but of that which divides him, determines him perhaps, but above all causes him to be ignorant of himself."[85]

While he invokes the divided subject here, a subject divided between act and knowledge, it is a subjectivity *imposed* through confession, whereas for Durkheim this division is prior to all subjectivity.[86] It seemed, however, at least at

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[83] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 65.

[84] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 72.

[85] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 70.

[86] J.Z. Smith is right to point out the danger of naturalizing such dualities. He asserts, however, that Durkheim "explicitly denied" this "through the turn to religion" in *Elementary Forms* (*To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992], 39). While I concede that Durkheim posits that the dualism which is at the heart of religion, the sacred and the profane, is a product of social behaviour, in *Elementary Forms* he also states that the human subject is *innately* split between flesh (individual, body) and spirit (society, mind) — to use the Pauline terms (39, quoted above). Religion, for Durkheim, is a class which is completely subsumed on the "spirit" side of this opposition, hence, his continual assertions that religion is not a product of the individual (and by implication the body). Instead, religion is produced in the "effervescence" of a collection of minds (16). This is not a denial, *pace* Smith. It is merely a homologization.

the end of *History of Sexuality*, that resistance to this sexual subjectivization was futile. In fact, his whole argument is that the very practices (psychoanalysis) which promise to liberate us from the repression of sex (through the free expression of sexuality) are in fact their opposite, a panoptic confessional machine — to invoke the image of his previous work — imprisoning us in the power relations of sexuality, leading him to end the book on the melancholic note: "the irony of this deployment [the confession of psychoanalysis] is having us believe our 'liberation' is in the balance."[87]

Foucault would later modify his view on confession, by delineating different modes of confession that contributed to the production of the modern self, in part as a search for a way out of the aporia of the sexual subject that he traced out in *History of Sexuality*.[88] He divided confessional practice between techniques of domination, represented by Christian confession, and techniques of the self, exemplified by ancient Greek philosophers.[89] These technologies are not strictly opposed to one another, but rather overlap such that "[t]he contact point, where the individuals are driven (and known) by others [i.e. techniques of domination], is tied to the way they conduct themselves (and know themselves) [i.e.

[87] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 159.

[88] Judith Butler goes as far as characterizing this shift as a reversal: "In the last years of his life, Foucault returned to the question of confession, reversing his earlier critique in the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, where he indicts confession as a forcible extraction of sexual truth, a practice in the service of regulatory power" (*Giving an Account of Oneself* [New York: Fordham University Press, 2005], 112).

[89] Chloë Taylor attempts to extend Foucault's search for practices that offer alternative subjectivities to those that, Foucault claimed, contributed to the formation of the modern subject. See *The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy of the 'Confessing Animal'* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

techniques of the self]. It is what we can call, I think, government."[90] Here, Foucault is not merely linking the relation of techniques to power, as something existing outside these practices, but instead is arguing that the very point at which these techniques meet, either in complementarity or conflict, is power.[91] This division is also the means by which Foucault will attempt to situate the "care of the self," based on techniques of the self found in ancient Greek philosophers, which are "an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself."[92]

The confession and self-examination practices of the ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers produced, what Foucault called, the "gnomic self."[93] This subjectivity was marked by a process of self-mastery whereby the aim of philosophical education "was to equip the individual with a number of precepts which permit him to conduct himself in all circumstances of life without losing mastery of himself or without losing tranquillity of spirit, purity of body and soul."[94] This was to be accomplished through the master-disciple relationship in which the practices of confession and self-examination helped the disciple to remember what ought to have been done according to a "universal code" taught

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[90] Michel Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," in *The Politics of Truth* (ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth; Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series; New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 181.

[91] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 182.

[92] Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–82* (ed. Frédéric Gros; trans. Graham Burchell; New York: Picador, 2005), 252.

[93] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 196.

[94] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 184.

by the master. The goal of the autonomy of the subject meant, then, that the role of the master was necessarily provisional and served to facilitate the transference of authority from an external source to an internal one, thus producing a master out of a disciple.[95]

The practices of self-examination by the Stoic philosopher Seneca and the "confession" of the young Serenus to Seneca are, Foucault suggests, examples of such techniques of the self. In *De Ira,* Seneca argues that anger is the most harmful emotion, one that needs to be not merely controlled but eradicated by Stoic disciplines.[96] To this end, he recommended a practice of self-examination:

> I avail myself of this privilege, and every day I plead my cause before the bar of self. When the light has been removed from sight, and my wife, long aware of my habit, has become silent, I scan the whole of my day and retrace all my deeds and words. I conceal nothing from myself, I omit nothing. For why should I shrink from any of my mistakes, when I may commune thus with myself.[97]

Foucault regards Seneca's practice here as one of recollection, which serves as a measure against self-imposed rules of conduct.[98] The truth produced, he argues, is "not at all to discover the truth hidden in the subject, it is rather to recall the truth forgotten by the subject …what the subject forgets is not himself, nor his nature, nor his origin, nor a supernatural affinity."[99]

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[95] As Foucault states, "one places oneself under the direction of a master for a certain period of one's life so as to be able one day to behave autonomously and no longer have need of advice. Ancient direction tends toward the autonomy of the directed" (Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 185).

[96] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, "On Anger," in *Moral Essays* (trans. J.W. Basore; vol. 1; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 2.12–13.

[97] Seneca, "On Anger," 3.36.3.

[98] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 190.

[99] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 189.

Disclosing one's faults to another, or confession, was not a common practice for the Stoics. Rather, Foucault observes, it was more frequently associated with Epicureans and those who followed medical philosophy (e.g., Galen and Plutarch).[100] Nevertheless, he finds that Serenus' revelation of his desires to Seneca, in *De Tranquillitate Animi*,[101] also amounts to the production of a truth which is grounded in a discourse and, like Seneca's self-examination, does not aim at something hidden, but instead "it is something which is in front of the individual as a point of attraction, a kind of magnetic force which attracts him towards a goal."[102] This goal is, of course, the constitution of the self-mastered subject, the "gnomic self."

Christian confession, on the other hand, while being composed by similar elements, such as "the necessity of telling the truth about oneself, the role of the master, and the master's discourse, the long way that finally leads to the emergence of the self,"[103] is a hermeneutics of the self rather than a technology of the self. This type of practice is primarily interpretive in that it aims "to discover what is hidden inside the self; the self is like a text or like a book that we have to decipher."[104] In fact, the hermeneutics of the self characterized, for Foucault, Christianity as such.

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[100] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 191.

[101] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, "On Tranquillity of Mind," in *Moral Essays* (trans. J.W. Basore; vol. 2; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 202–85.

[102] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 195.

[103] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 197.

[104] Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," 198.

"Christianity," wrote Foucault, "is a confession."[105] He asserts that Christianity is a "very special type of religion" which is defined by its programmatic obligation to the truth circumscribed within a set of beliefs, canon, or authority.[106] It is important to note, that what Foucault is emphasizing is that the truths produced in Christianity are *external* to the individual, whereas the confessional practice of the Greek philosophers were designed to facilitate the production of truth *internally.* He is suggesting, then, that it is precisely this form of external truth, or knowledge, which makes possible the exercise of modern power through the human sciences.

Corresponding with his treatment of the Stoics, Foucault splits early Christian confessional practice into *exomologesis* (confession) and *exagoreusis* (self-examination). He does not, however, merely repeat his critique of Christian confessional practice from *History of Sexuality* with this comparison. To confession's complicity with domination, he adds a violent force focused on the annihilation of the self. The dramatic and public display of *exomologesis*, which was an expression of the remorse of the guilty party to the community and in particular the bishop,[107] sought "to superimpose by an act of violent rupture the truth about oneself and the renunciation of oneself. In the ostentatious gesture of maceration, self-revelation in *exomologesis* is, at the same time, self-destruction."[108] On the other hand, the self-examination practice of the monks, *exagoreusis,* was

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[105] Michel Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," in *The Politics of Truth* (ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth; Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series; New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 201.

[106] Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," 201.

[107] For a description of *exomologesis,* see the quotation from Tertullian at the beginning of the Introduction.

[108] Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," 211.

the *excessive* production and analysis of a discourse of faults, which, instead of eventual self-mastery, created a theo-political subjectivity, "a relation of complete obedience to the will of the spiritual father."[109] It was the necessity of the continuous verbalization of an inner state of "sinfulness" with the promise of eventual freedom that masked, and simultaneously legitimized, the domination inherent in regulatory power. In other words, disciplinary practices not only produce the object through which domination exerts its force (sinfulness, sexuality, etc.) but also through this domination produce the subject itself (the Christian, the homosexual, etc.). For Foucault, these relations produce the conditions for "self-sacrifice," although they are conditions of which the individual is necessarily ignorant.[110]

In the end, however, Foucault's solution here is unsatisfactory. Not only is it, as Slavoj Žižek describes it, a "myth of a state 'before the Fall' in which discipline was self-fashioned, not a procedure imposed by the culpabilizing universal moral order,"[111] but also a phantasmic reading of the Greek philosophers, especially Seneca. Foucault claims that the "technologies of the self" apparent in the philosophers are not intended to seek out a hidden truth within the individual, but produce some autonomous self-mastery. However, Seneca asserts that the procedures of self-examination, which are aimed at the annihilation of the passions, would only be beneficial to those *men* who have "great character." This is a *natural* characteristic of *some men* distinguished from those who have an "evil

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[109] Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," 226.

[110] Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," 225.

[111] Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London; New York: Verso, 2008), 297.

nature." Evil *men* may mask their *true* nature through certain behaviours, speeches, acts of charity, etc., but "greatness they will never have."[112]

Practice and Catherine Bell's 'Ritualization'

In *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, Catherine Bell provides a formulation of practice theory specifically designed to address problems in ritual theory and to provide a new lens with which to view ritual behaviour. As we saw above in her critique of Durkheim, ritual theory has become, for Bell, encumbered with a problematic dichotomization of thought and action. In this perspective, ritual acts out thought in the form of beliefs, myths or other cultural meanings. While participants in rituals were popularly characterized as engaging in thoughtless activity, specialist observers were thought to possess the ability to discern religious and cultural meanings or rationales structuring ritual behaviour. Simultaneously, ritual theorists described ritual as the means by which social conflict, predicated on contradictions derived from a thought-action opposition, was negotiated and resolved. The resolution of this opposition functions precisely to render the poles necessary, for both the practitioner and theorist.[113] Hence, for Bell ritual as a site of resolution is "a type of myth legitimating the whole apparatus of ritual studies."[114]

In an attempt to address these issues, Bell proposes a conceptual orientation to "ritualization" which draws upon practice theory, especially the work of Pierre

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[112] Seneca, "On Anger," 1.20.7–8.

[113] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 32.

[114] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 37.

Bourdieu[115] and Foucault's understanding of power. This move situates her work alongside a variety of theorists that form a more or less unified approach for understanding the complexity of social behaviour.[116] In general, this approach views practices "as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding."[117] Social actors, or agents, are seen to be in a dialectical relationship with social structure (e.g., Bourdieu's *habitus*). "Practice," states Sherry Ortner, "emerges from structure, it reproduces structure, and it has the capacity to transform structure."[118] This places a relationship between practices and between individuals and structure as a central feature of social analysis. Although practice is, as Theodore Schaztki terms it, "supraindividual," it does not possess some ontological existence outside of

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[115] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[116] The following is a brief and selective bibiliography of practice theorists: Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*; Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (trans. Alan Sheridan; 2nd ed.; New York: Vintage Books, 1995); Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Paula Jarzabkowski, Julia Balogun and David Seidl, "Strategizing: The Challenges of a Practice Perspective," *Human Relations* 60 (2007): 5–27; Sherry B. Ortner, *High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Sherry B. Ortner, *Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Marshall D. Sahlins, *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981); Marshall D. Sahlins, *Culture in Practice: Selected Essays* (New York: Zone Books, 2000); Theodore R. Schatzki, *Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Theodore R. Schatzki and Wolfgang Natter, eds., *The Social and Political Body* (New York: Guilford Press, 1996); Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, eds., *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (London; New York: Routledge, 2001).

[117] Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny, *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, 2.

[118] Ortner, *High Religion*, 12.

individuals, as is suggested with a macro-phenomena like "society." In this way, practice is always open to individual contribution and intervention.[119]

The emphasis on the interconnectedness of social behaviour undergirds Bell's notion of ritualization. Ritualized actions are seen as strategies within these "activity arrays." This places a focus on differentiation, not in order merely to observe difference as such (i.e., particularism), but rather to understand the means and ends to which differentiation is employed. "When analyzed as ritualization," writes Bell, "acting ritually emerges as a particular cultural strategy of differentiation linked to particular social effects and rooted in a distinctive interplay of a socialized body and the environment it structures."[120] In this way, Bell purposefully avoids the pitfalls of a universalized conception of ritual, that is, attempting to measure particular actions against a "thing-in-itself" called ritual. Rather, she suggests, echoing J. Z. Smith, we concentrate on "how ritual activities, in their doing, generate distinctions between what is or is not acceptable ritual."[121]

Hence, the primary distinction ritualization generates follows from Durkheim's opposition of the sacred and profane. Bell, however, demotes the Durkheimian dichotomy and its implicit prioritization of belief over action to a particular modality of differentiation rather than the limit that determines all other oppositions:

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[119] Theodore R. Schatzki, "Practice Theory," in *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (ed. Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny; London; New York: Routledge, 2001), 2.

[120] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 7–8; for J. Z. Smith on the importance of difference to the comparative enterprise, see *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1982); idem, *To Take Place*; and idem, *Drudgery Divine*.

[121] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 80.

> Ritualization is a way of acting that is designed and orchestrated to distinguish and privilege what is being done in comparison to other, usually more quotidian, activities. As such, ritualization is a matter of various culturally specific strategies for setting some activities off from others, for creating and privileging a qualitative distinction between the 'sacred' and the 'profane,' and for ascribing such distinctions to realities thought to transcend the powers of human actors.[122]

Furthermore, ritualization is the continual production and organization of such modalities (sacred/profane, life/death, good/evil, pure/impure, and so on) into hierarchical and homologous relationships. The systematized arrays that are generated, however, are not in and of themselves a complete whole. Instead, the dual function of ritualization, the production and organization of difference, in effect, requires the system's totalization to be continually deferred. It is the combination of the strategy of differentiation and the deferral of completion which produces, paradoxically, "a 'sense' of logical systematicity."[123]

What Bell is emphasizing by placing sense in inverted commas is the gap between the perception of the ritual participant and their ritual environment. Ritual agents "misrecognize" operations by which their ritual behaviour not only constitutes the ritual as ritual, but also has generative effects on their own bodies. This is, of course, where Bell begins to draw on Foucault such that we can substitute "ritual" for "sex" as that "which divides him [the subject], determines him perhaps, but above all causes him to be ignorant of himself."[124] As we saw above, she also emphasizes with Foucault how it is the very physicality of the body that participates in the generation, organization and naturalization:

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[122] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 74.

[123] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 104.

[124] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, 70.

> By virtue of this circularity, space and time are redefined through the physical movements of bodies projecting organizing schemes on the space-time environment on the one hand while reabsorbing these schemes as the nature of reality on the other. In this process such schemes become socially instinctive automatisms of the body and implicit strategies for shifting the power relationships among symbols."[125]

Although, we can see here how in a subtle way she moves beyond Foucault as she makes integral to the operation of ritualization the ritual subject's own influence on the ritual environment, which is something rather ambiguous in Foucault's work.[126]

Conclusion

Focusing on confession as a social practice, as ritualization, implies that we must pay attention to the way that the *Didache* uses confession as a strategy of differentiation and systemization to aid in the production of a ritualized body in two overlapping and interrelated ritual environments: text and meal. This can be illustrated, albeit in a somewhat limited fashion, by returning to Tiger Wood's confession at the beginning of this chapter. There we highlighted the role of telecommunication in his confession, television and the Internet. Ritualization would attempt to discern the relationship between these media and confession and how the use of confession constructs, reciprocally, the figure of Tiger Woods and "the media," (i.e., the telecommunication apparatus including, but not limited to, journalists, reporters, editors, bloggers, camera operators and so on). This also suggests that the perspective of ritualization does not resolve the ambiguity of the

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[125] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 99.

[126] It is interesting to note that Bell makes this move by way of Derrida; see Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 104–106.

two confessional images, the police and the penitent. Rather, ritualization maintains this ambiguity as apart of confession's effectiveness and continual deployment as a social strategy.

2

Liturgy Reconsidered: The Ordering of Greco-Roman Ritual

Liturgical Ordering

In the introduction we noted that the *Didache* has been described in several ways, including but not limited to "church order," "church manual," "rule," "liturgy," "a handbook of church morals, ritual, and discipline."[127] There is, however, scholarly recognition that the *Didache* is not a homogenous text but a collection of literary genres (the Two Ways, ritual instruction, prayers, apocalypse, etc.) that have been compiled over time.[128] Moreover, much of the text, with variations, has been incorporated in to the later *Apostolic Church Order* and *Apostolic Constitutions.* There is also a version of the Two Ways in the *Epistle of Barnabas.* Hence, the characterization that the *Didache* is "evolved literature."[129] But the complex source and tradition history of the *Didache* has led some scholars to disregard the significance of the "the basic document."[130] While it is an

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[127] For other descriptions, see Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 2.

[128] Niederwimmer succinctly outlines the sources of the *Didache* in "Der Didachist und seine Quellen"; see also Robert Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache* (Bundoora: La Trobe University, 1989).

[129] Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache,* 1; see also Sandt and Flusser, *The Didache*, 28–31.

[130] This is Niederwimmer's term which seems preferable to the "final" text. This latter term, along with "original" text, becomes very problematic in light of the fluidity of the *Didache* in terms of its source and tradition history. For the term, see Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 3.

overstatement to describe the text as a "coherent, systematic unity,"[131] there are still some significant systematizing or unifying aspects. For instance, Henderson points to the importance of διδαχή and διδάσκαλος creating an oral texture for the entire text, one that not only reflects that it was "orally written," reflecting a dissonance with its own production as a text, but also that "it is *about* orality."[132]

Henderson's observation is important for it allows us to return to considering what sort of text the *Didache* is. The oral aspects of the *Didache* suggest a close relationship, with respect to both its composition and use, to ritual.[133] While this seems to be a banal observation, given that much of the *Didache* is about ritual (baptism, fasting, a *eucharistia* meal, and so on) the infusion of orality throughout the text is an indication that the text itself is participating in a ritual *making* process, which is to say, the *Didache* is ritualizing. Such an emphasis is not only a normalizing of the tensions between oral and written traditions,[134] but that such tension "between scripted and improvised language" — for instance, between the composed meal prayers (chapter 8–10) and ritual "improvisation" by prophets (προφήτην λαλοῦντα ἐν πνεύματι, *Did* 11:7) — is, as Henderson suggests in a later article, "a programme of textual self-

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[131] Sandt and Flusser, *The Didache*, 31.

[132] Ian H. Henderson, "*Didache* and Orality in Synoptic Comparison," *JBL* 111 (1992): 305.

[133] In fact, the majority of early Jesus and early Christian texts have a connection to ritual both in use and production, see Harry Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), esp. chap. 5.

[134] Henderson, "*Didache* and Orality," 306.

representation and in processes of ritual innovation, self-definition and adaptation."[135]

Looking at the text this way would allow us a return to a productive, analytical use of the term "liturgy" or "liturgical order." In a sense, it would be to rehabilitate some of the ancient Greek connotations in the word λειτουργία, such as ritual as social activity, and not merely the formal sequence of activities. Liturgy as practice would thus focus on the activity of "ordering" of ritual. Roy Rappaport has aptly described the ordering strategy of liturgy:

> [Liturgies] constitute orders in the sense of such phrases as "the moral order" or "the economic order" or the "natural order"—more or less coherent domains within which generally commensurable processes are governed by common principles and rules. As such they represent and maintain enduring relations among the elements they include, keeping them "in order," and thus establishing or constituting order as opposed to disorder or chaos.[136]

Seen in this light, we could describe liturgy as an attempt, among others, to organize social existence.

Yet, we need to be cautious of Rappaport's use of the term "order," which implies some type of autonomous and enduring "domain." Instead, the liturgy, as a particular kind of order, is an *effect* of a process of ordering which is never complete or final. It is a recognition that "[o]rganizations and orders are in reality precarious, unstable, and transitory beings."[137] In other words, liturgies are not simply products of structuring practices, but are also the means by which these structuring practices change and reproduce themselves. For the purpose of

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[135] Henderson, "Early Christianity, Textual Representation," 95.

[136] Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity*, 169.

[137] Schatzki, *The Site of the Social*, 6.

understanding the ordering which takes place in ritual texts, Rappaport suggests several heuristic dimensions: a synchronic array of symbolic meaning, a hierarchical structuration, and the sequential ordering of ritual focusing on both space and time.[138] While the last two dimensions seem to fit our approach, the focus on symbol in the first may prove to be a distraction for us. This is not to suggest that rituals are meaningless, as Fritz Staal has argued.[139] The role of symbols in ritual theory, as a coherent, stable, meaning-making systems of beliefs, has often been overemphasized. It is being increasing recognized by scholars that not only are symbols ambiguous and unstable, but that ritual does not effectively use shared understandings of symbols to create solidarity. Rather, as Bell points out, "ritualized practices afford a great diversity of interpretation in exchange for little more than consent to the form of the activities."[140] Bell also gives three dimensions to ritualization: a historical dimension with a focus on the construction of tradition, a temporal/spatial dimension including divisions of territory and time (i.e. calendars, cycles), and an organizational dimension which provides for ritual experts, standardization of activities, codification of texts and a ritual discourse.[141]

These dimensions, however, are not meant to suggest an overly rigid view of ordering. Rather, they are meant to highlight the differentiations being made between activities, for instance, those that are structured and those that are improvised. Even such a division between improvised action and formal action,

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[138] Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity*, 170.

[139] Frits Staal, "The Meaninglessness of Ritual," *Numen* 26 (1979): 2–22.

[140] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 186.

[141] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 118; for an elaboration of these dimensions see pp. 118–168.

though, is not inherent to ritual itself as "improvisation" can be incorporated as part of liturgy.[142] For example, in Justin Martyr's description of a *eucharistia* meal (*1 Apol.* 1:65–67), he says that the president (προεστὼς) is to make thanksgiving (εὐχαριστίαν) for a long time (ἐπὶ πολὺ) and, in a later passage, according to his ability (ὅση δύναμις αὐτῷ). In the *Didache*, running water (ὕδατι ζῶντι, lit. "living water"), implying a river or stream, is the preferred mode of baptism, but if one does not have running water, then baptize in some other water (ἄλλο ὕδωρ); if you are not able to baptize in cold (ψυχρῷ), then do so in warm (θερμῷ); if you have neither, then pour water on the head three times" (*Did* 7:2–3).[143] The dimensions of ritualization not only draws our attention to the ways certain behaviours may be prioritized (e.g., structured/improvised) in a localized set of actions (ritual), but also to what these distinctions accomplish in a wider array of social actions and behaviours.

Greco-Roman Associations and the Ordering of Ritual

While the *Didache* is probably the earliest example of a liturgy from a group that specifically honoured Jesus, it is by no means the only one.[144] Interestingly, all but

[142] Spontaneity can even be an expressed goal of discipline or formal action. For example, Muslim women in Egypt who discipline themselves to react with specific, "spontaneous" emotions in prayer; see Saba Mahmood, "Rehersed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of ṣalāt," *AmEth* 28 (2001): 827–853.

[143] Ascough ("An Analysis of the Baptismal Ritual of the *Didache*," *StudLit* 24 (1994): 208–209) suggests that the water here is "being held up as a sacred symbol for viewing." There is, however, no attempt in the *Didache* to interpret water or baptism theologically, Pauline or otherwise, as even Ascough points out. The accommodation of the *Didache* to various conditions of water, in fact, suggest that water is something other than a symbol or communication or "meaning." For a critique of the emphasis on symbol in ritual theory, see Maurice Bloch, "Symbols, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?" *EJS* 15 (1974): 208–209).

[144] Here I follow Joseph Mueller, "The Ancient Church Order Literature: Genre or Tradition?" *JECS* 15 (Fall 2007): 337–380. He suggests that these documents are

one of these texts were discovered after the 19th century, the *Apostolic Constitutions* being first published in 1563. Scholars have mapped a general family relationship between them.[145] It is more important to note, however, that this type of textual ritualization was a strategy employed by a wide variety of ancient Greco-Roman social groups and not merely groups that identified in some way with the figure of Jesus or those that identified themselves as Judean.[146]

Across the Mediterranean in the first centuries C.E., there were many types of social groups, often called "associations," which participated in various ways in the cultic honouring of gods and goddesses.[147] These "religious" activities, of course, were not the only — nor perhaps primary — activities of these urban

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difficult to class as a "genre," specifically as *Kirchenordnungen*, or "Church Order," a category particular to the Reformation. Instead, Mueller suggests that we consider these texts as part of a tradition of "ancient ecclesiological exegesis." While this nuance is helpful, as a primary classification it may place a little too much emphasis on the interpretive mode at the expense of the social aspects of the texts.

[145] See the table in Bradshaw, *Origins of Christian Worship*, 84.

[146] For examples of Judean "community rules," see the Dead Sea Scrolls CD, 1QS and 1QSa. In particular, Matthias Klinghardt has an excellent study examining the Qumran community with respect to the activities and organization of Hellenistic associations. See "The Manual of Discipline in the Light of Statutes of Hellenistic Associations," *AnNYAS* 722 (1994): 251–267; see also "The Influence of Symposia Literature on the Literary Form of the Pesah Haggadah," *JJS* 8 (1957): 13–44; for a direct comparison of the Didache and the Qumran community, see André Tuilier, "La liturgie dans la Didaché et l'essénisme," *StudPat* 26 (1993): 200–210.

[147] For more recent studies of such groups, see Richard S. Ascough, "Translocal Relationships Among Voluntary Associations and Early Christianity," *JECS* 5 (1997): 223–241; Richard S. Ascough, *Paul's Macedonian Associations: The Social Context of Philippians and 1 Thessalonians* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Richard S. Ascough, "Forms of Commensality in Greco-Roman Associations," *CW* 102 (2008): 33–45; Philip Harland, *Associations, Synagogues, and Congregations: Claiming a Place in Ancient Mediterranean Society* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); Philip Harland, *Dynamics of Identity in the World of the Early Christians: Associations, Judeans, and Cultural Minorities* (New York: T & T Clark, 2009); John S. Kloppenborg and Stephen G. Wilson, *Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World* (London; New York: Routledge, 1996); M. Weinfeld, *The Organizational Pattern and the Penal Code of the Qumran Sect: A Comparison with Guilds and Religious Associations of the Hellenistic-Roman Period* (Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus 2; Fribourg; Göttingen: Éditions Universitaires, 1986).

groups, but such activity did form an important texture to their social behaviour.[148] In his epigraphical study of these groups in Roman Asia, Philip Harland has suggested a typology of these groups based on different social connections: household, ethnic or geographic, neighbourhood, occupational, and cult or temple. These are not rigid divisions but more like a "web of connections," such that a single group, and even a single individual, would have many such connections that overlap.[149] Moreover, this diverse web provided the flux within which issues of identity were complexly expressed and formed.[150] Yet, while there is a level of heterogeneity to all the types of associations, he notes that these groups often shared aspects of the organization and discourse of the *oikos*, the household.[151]

The religious life of the associations included a variety of ritual practices. Foremost among these were festive meals, or "banquets," which often featured alimentary sacrifice (θυσία), offerings of other food, and libations of wine in honour of the particular deities associated with the group.[152] A group of physicians from Ephesus, in an honorary inscription for T(itus) Statilius Kriton, their *archiatros* and procurator, identify themselves as "those who sacrifice ([οἱ] θύοντες) to ancestor Asklepios (τῷ προπάτορι Ἀσκληπιῷ) and to the "revered

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[148] On the urban context of the formation of early Christianity, see Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

[149] Harland, *Associations*, 29.

[150] Harland, *Associations*, 29; see also Arnal, "Doxa, Heresy, and Self-construction," 70–71.

[151] Harland, *Associations*, 31.

[152] The topic of sacrifice and meals of association will be dealt with more extensively in the next chapter. Briefly, see Harland, *Associations*, 70–84; Stanley K. Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice and Those Who Do Not: Toward an Anthropology of Greek Religion," in *Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 293–333.

ones" (τοῖς Σεβαστοῖς)," that is, the emperor and the imperial family.[153] Associations often gathered in buildings that were designed with banquet halls, shrines, and monuments as central features so as to facilitate and give prominence to sacrificial rites honouring the gods.[154] Other practices recorded in epigraphical evidence include: the reading of narratives, enacting narrative in drama, hymn singing, prayers, playing musical instruments, and dancing.[155]

Some associations inscribed various regulations for group activities and organization, including sacrificial and feast calendars, purity regulations, the duties of particular group roles, and financial obligations of the association members.[156] Although these do comprise a minority of the evidence from such groups — in comparison to epitaphs and honorary inscriptions — there is still a substantial amount that has been collected by Franciszek Sokolowski, in three volumes, and more recently by Eran Lupu.[157] The following Greek calendar, which lists festive

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[153] *IEph* 714, circa 110 C.E.

[154] Harland, *Associations*, 63–68. See especially the building for the guild of merchants, shippers, and traders on Delos, 67; on the importance of architecture for evoking and constructing Hellenistic *paideia*, in both Christian and Greco-Roman authors in the second century, see Laura Salah Nasrallah, *Christian Responses to Roman Art and Architecture: The Second-Century Church Amid the Spaces of Empire* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[155] For examples, see Harland, *Associations*, 71–74.

[156] The Qumran community also had a sacrificial calendar, 4QMMT (4Q394-399), see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Origins* (Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature; Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2000), chap. 11.

[157] Franciszek Sokolowski, *Lois Sacrées De l'Asie Mineure* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1955); Franciszek Sokolowski, *Lois Sacrées Des Cités Grecques; Supplément* (E. de Boccard, 1962); Franciszek Sokolowski, *Lois Sacrées Des Cités Grecques* (E. de Boccard, 1969); Eran Lupu, *Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents (NGSL)* (Religions in the Graeco-Roman World; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005).

occasions, is commonly taken to belong to an association dedicated to the cult of a goddess:

> [- - - -]
> Μηνὸς Δείου δ, ἡ ἀνάβασις τῆς θεοῦ τῇ ζ´
> ἡ ὑδροποσία μηνὸς Ἰουλαίου νουμηνίᾳ
> ἡ πομπὴ ἐκ πρυτανείου ι´
> τὰ νεώματα μηνὸς Ἀπολλωνίου ιε´
> 5 ἡ δύσις τῆς θεοῦ μηνὸς Ἡφαιστίου δ´
> ἡ κατάκλησις μηνός Ποσιδείου ιε´
> κατά κέλευσιν τῆς θεοῦ Ἀρίστιππος Ἀριστίππου
> ἐπέγραψα
>
> [- -] on the fourth of the month of Deios, the ascent of the goddess on the seventh; the *hydroposia* on the new moon of the month of Ioulaisos [sic]; the procession from the *prytaneion* on the tenth; the *neomata* (breaking of fallow land) on the fifteenth of the month of Apollonios; the descent of the goddess on the fifteenth of the month of Hephaistios; the banquet on the of the month of Posideios. I, Aristippos son of Aristippos, inscribed (this) at the command of the goddess.[158]

As one can see, such calendars seem to be designed towards the efficient use of information deemed necessary for the performance of the ritual. Even though such regulations tend to be very brief, all three dimensions of ritualization are apparent. This particular text emphasizes the temporal aspects delineating when specific activities are to take place, for instance, the ὑδροποσία on the new moon of the month of Ioulaios (2). There is also an implicit sequence that serves to both naturalize the order of the rituals and the order of time (by month and day). Such temporalization produces the possibility of a coherent sense of time, which, in turn, through the sense of regularity and repetition, allows for the constitution and legitimation of a history. A tradition of particular activities at particular places and times is imposed "at the command of the goddess." The invocation of the goddess, simultaneously, authorizes this tradition as well as the authority of the inscription

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[158] *LSCG*, no. 128 (Roman Imperial Period); translation from *NGSL*, 69.

and scribe. Thus, through the construction of a calendrical discourse circumscribing a ritual tradition, the production and use of such calendars is an element in an *autopoietic* process. That is to say, it is a self-maintaining process in which the various elements interact to regenerate themselves by the same processes, which produced them in the first place.

As a counterpart, there are also inscriptions that publicized "confessions" of transgressions against such cultic regulations.[159] The largest collection of these has been published in Georg Petzl's volume *Die Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens* (BIWK) in 1994.[160] The inscriptions, written on stone stelæ and set up near temples and sanctuaries, report the confessions of various ritual offences, petty crimes, and misdemeanours.[161] Many of the offences relayed by the inscriptions, however, occur within a matrix of ritual practice: showing proper respect for the gods and

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[159] There is some disagreement whether the inscriptions are "confessions," "propitiations," or "reconcilations." Arguments for the other designations can be found in Aslak Rostad, "Confession or Reconciliation? The Narrative Structure of the Lydian and Phrygian 'Confession Inscriptions'," *SymOs* 77 (2002): 145–164; and Clinton E. Arnold, "'I Am Astonished That You Are So Quickly Turning Away!' (Gal 1.6): Paul and Anatolian Folk Belief," *NTS* 51 (2005): 433.

[160] Georg Petzl, *Die Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens* (Epigraphica Anatolica; Bonn: Habelt, 1994); additional inscriptions have been published by Georg Petzl, "Neue Inschriften aus Lydien(II): Addenda und Corrigenda zu den Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens," *EpAn* 28 (1997): 69–79; Marijana Ricl, "CIG 4142–A Forgotten Confession Inscription From North-West Phrygia," *EpAn* 29 (1997): 35–43; G. H. R. Horsley, *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1978* (vol. 3; North Ryde, N.S.W.: The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 1981), 26–30; the first extensive survey of the "confession" inscriptions was Franz Seraph Steinleitner, *Die Beicht im Zusammenhange mit der sakralen Rechtspflege in der Antike* (Munich: Kommissionsverlag der Dieterich'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, Theodor Weicher, 1913); for an extended bibliography of research on the inscriptions, see Angelos Chaniotis, "Under the Watchful Eyes of the Gods: Divine Justice in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor," in *The Greco-Roman East: Politics, Culture, Society* (ed. Stephen Colvin; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4n10 and n12.

[161] For a general physical description and some plates, see Richard Gordon, "Raising a Sceptre: Confession-narratives from Lydia and Phrygia," *JAR* 17 (2004): 181–82.

temple property, not keeping service oaths, and concern over ritual purity — especially with respect to sexual intercourse.[162]

One such stele from Mysia, which Petzl dates to the first or second century C.E., describes the consequences of a ritual infraction:

> Μείδων Μενάνδρου κρατῆρα
> ἐπόει ἐπὶ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Τρωσου
> καὶ οἱ διάκονοι ἄθυτα ἐφάγοσαν,
> καὶ ἀπεμάκκωσεν αὐτὸν
> ἐπὶ μῆνας τρεῖς καὶ παρεσ-
> 5 τάθη αὐτῷ εἰς τοὺς ὕπνους,
> ἵνα στήλην στήσας ἐπιγράψῃ
> ἃ πέποσχεν, καί ἤρξατο τότε
> λαλεῖν.[163]

> Meidon, son of Menander, had a drinking party in the sanctuary of Zeus Trosu, and (his) servants ate meat that had not been sacrificed. And he (Zeus) made him silent for three months and then came to him in his sleep. So, he erected a stele and wrote what had happened, and only then did he begin to speak again.

While many confession texts also include non-cult related transgressions, for example slander, adultery, and theft,[164] very serious crimes, such as murder and tax

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[162] As also noted by Chaniotis, "Under the Watchful Eyes," 4; for an example of the last type of transgression, see *BIWK*, 5.

[163] *BIWK*, 1. For another example in regard to unsacrificed meat, see BIWK, no. 123 ; on the interpretation of dreams, see Artemidorus, *Oneirocritica* (trans. Robert J. White; Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press, 1975), 1, esp. 5.66 and 5.71.

[164] For example, BIWK 60: Μηνὶ Ἀξιοττηνῷ. ἐπὶ |Ἑρμογένης Γλύκωνος |καὶ Νιτωνις Φιλοξένου |ἐλοιδόρησαν Ἀρτεμίδωρον περὶ οἴνου, Ἀρτε|μίδωρος πιττάκιον ἔ|δωκεν· ὁ θεὸς ἐκολά|σετο τὸν Ἑρμογένην|καὶ εἱλάσετο τὸν θε|ὸν καὶ ἀπὸ νῦν εὐδο|ξεῖ. "To Men Axiottenos: Since Hermogenes, son of Glykon, and Nitonis, son of Philoxenos, have slandered Artemidoros concerning wine, Artemidoros has given a petition. The god has punished Hermogenes and he has propitiated the god and from now on will extol (him)." The last word, εὐδοξεῖ, has caused some difficulty. It can also be read as a future of εὐδοξέω, "he will be acceptable." For commentary see Richard Gordon, "Social Control in the Lydian and Phrygian 'Confession' Texts," in *Actas Del XXVII Congreso Internacional Girea-Arys IX: 'Jerarquias Religiosas y Control Social en el mundo antiguo': Valladolid, 7–9 de Noviembre, 2002* (ed. L. H. Guerra and J. A. Ezquerra; Centro Buendia; Valladolid, Spain: Universidad Valladolid, 2004), 199–200; H. S. Versnel, "Writing Mortals and Reading Gods: Appeal to the Gods as a Dual Strategy in Social Control," in *Demokratie, Recht und soziale Kontrolle im klassischen Athen* (ed. David J. Cohen and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner; Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2002), 64; Chaniotis, "Under the Watchful Eyes," 20.

evasion, are not present. Richard Gordon argues that the omission of these serious crimes means that they "were the exclusive province of the Roman and local civic justice, and that confession-texts represent one element in a sometimes extended process of arbitration that complements those jurisdictions rather than competing with them."[165] This insight aligns with Harland's observation that associations cooperated with the authorities and institutions of the *polis,* often through connections with powerful officials or functionaries.[166] Thus, such complementarity indeed shows how "personal piety was very much a public matter."[167] In other words, it was a way to demonstrate, maintain, and re-establish one's status as a proper member of the community. This also suggests that the link between the political authority of the *polis* and the piety of the associations is perhaps something stronger than complementarity. The regulation of piety shows that the associations had a distinct interest in maintaining the authority structures of the *polis*. That is to say, it was used as a way to increase the social capital of association members, in particular those of highest social standing in the group, in the economy of power in the *polis*.

The Touchstone of Dionysius

The *oikos* of Zeus Eumenes and Hestia (among other "saviour" gods), from Lydia (Philadelphia) in the first century C.E. is illustrative of household cult

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[165] Gordon, "Raising a Sceptre," 187.

[166] Harland, *Associations*, 107.

[167] Aslak Rostad, "The Religious Context of the Lydian Propitiation Inscriptions," *SymOs* 81 (2006): 100.

associations.[168] Dionysius, who was the head of the family, inscribed a set of ritual instructions given to him in a dream by Zeus on a marble stele. This inscription has attracted attention from scholars of early Christianity because of its so-called "moral" instructions— primarily prohibitions regarding sexual behaviour, lying, malevolent spells, and abortions — and the requirement to regularly prove adherence to the regulations by touching the stele.[169] I suggest that it will be fruitful to analyze this inscription as a "liturgy" in the sense we described above, an ordering of ritual, by means of a process of ritualization. This perspective will allow us a more useful basis for comparison rather than the usual appeals to a purported universal morality or egalitarianism.[170]

The inscription begins by providing a simple narrative that serves to establish the legitimacy and the authority of the *oikos* and its founder, Dionysius who received instructions in a dream from Zeus for the establishment of the *oikos* cult (4–12). While this cult is apparently new, the two main elements of this myth of origins, dreams and particular deities, place the Dionysian *oikos* within the

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[168] *LSAM*, 20. The text with translation is also found in S. C. Barton and G. H. R. Horsley, "A Hellenistic Cult Group and the New Testament Churches," *JAC* 24 (1981): 7–41.

[169] Otto Weinreich, *Stiftung und Kultsatzungen eines Privatheiligtums in Philadelpheia in Lydien* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1919); Arthur Darby Nock, "The Christian Sacramentum in Pliny and a Pagan Counterpart," *CR* 38 (1926): 58–59; Barton and Horsley, "A Hellenistic Cult Group"; Stanley K. Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia: Oikos Religion or Cultic Association," in *The Early Church in Its Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson* (ed. Abraham J. Malherbe, Frederick W. Norris, and James Thompson; Supplements to Novum Testamentum; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1998), 287–301; Harland, *Associations*, 30–31; L. Michael White, *Building God's House in the Roman World: Architectural Adaptation Among Pagans, Jews, and Christians* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

[170] Representative of this view are Barton and Horsley, who describe it as "a cult cosmopolitan in character and universal in appeal. The focus for all the members of this religious association was not to be upon their disparate origins and status outside the group. It was to be upon their corporate worship of the gods, for which a strict morality was required from each member" ("A Hellenistic Cult Group," 17).

conventions of established Greco-Roman temples and household cults, or "in accordance with ancestral custom" (14). As we saw in the case of Meidon above, who came to recognize the inappropriateness of his drinking party by means of a dream in which Zeus appeared,[171] dreams figure prominently in the authorization and legitimization of the ritual activities of associations.[172]

The gods, in particular Zeus and Hestia, referenced in the stele also place the *oikos* in a continuum with similar *polis* cults. As Stanley Stowers has noted in his article on the stele, "nothing is more typical of the religion of the Greek *oikos* in general than Zeus and Hestia."[173] The other saviour gods in lines 9 and 10 "form a list of blessings that a very pious and insecure *kurios* would want to seek for his household."[174] Zeus clearly occupies, though, the place of prominence in this cult. It is Zeus who bestows the ordinances (11–12); it is Zeus who desires obedience (44–45), and it is Zeus as Ζωτή[ρ] ("saviour") who is able to accept the touch of Dionysius and provide health, peace and safety to his family (60–64).

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[171] See *BIWK*, no. 1 above.

[172] Inscriptions are not the only place where we find the virtues of dreams being extolled. The dream interpretations of Artemidorus also extol the virtues of dreams with respect to honouring the gods: "A man dreamt that someone said to him, 'Sacrifice to Asclepius.' On the following day, he was involved in a terrible accident. For he was thrown out of a carriage that had overturned and his right hand was crushed. The dream was telling him, then, that he should be on his guard and sacrifice to the gods things that would avert evil" (*Oneirocritica*, 5.66; see also 2.33–44; 5.71; and 5.75). Moreover, the interpretation of dreams, for Artemidorus, reveals that there is commensurability between the social position of the dreamer and the particular gods that are honoured. A proper and natural fit between profession and god leads to health, safety from misfortune, and success (Harland, *Associations*, 62–63, see Artemidorus, Oneirocritica, 1.9 and 4.74).

[173] Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 288.

[174] Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 291.

This is, however, not a simplistic reproduction of a generalized Greek religiosity in Asia Minor. It is a delicate negotiation, a *bricolage*, of the "old" with the "new" as the invocation of Agdistis near the end of the text attests. While some have seen this as evidence to the contrary, i.e., that the Dionysian *oikos* was orientalised and un-Greek,[175] Stowers has pointed out that not only was there a temple to the Great Mother — of which Agdistis was a form — in Athens, but also that there were numerous cult and votive sites dedicated to her across the Greek world in the classical period. He argues rather that it was a creative integration of the cults:

> Dionysius reveals [Agdistis] as a redundancy, but that is not surprising in light of his long list of saviour gods. He is a person who wants the largest possible insurance policy…One plausible explanation for this representation of the gods would involve imagining Dionysius, a Greek, acquiring his property from someone who was ethnically Lydian, Anatolian, or Phrygian and for whom Agdistis was the chief god of the place and the household.[176]

This suggests, then, that here we have two significant moments of tradition-making occurring simultaneously through the ordering of ritual. First there is the Dionysius liturgy that attempts to facilitate a "sense of legitimized continuity with the past and to experience tradition as fixed,"[177] to borrow Bell's wording. Not only does the inscription merely assume Zeus's ability to affect material circumstances and material bodies, it also assumes the authority of "ancestral custom." Moreover, Dionysius explicitly legitimates the place of Zeus in the *oikos* cult by claiming that the commands that Zeus gave him in a dream *accord* with

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[175] For example, Robert Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 325.

[176] Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 292; similarly Weinreich, who asserts that this was a "concession" made by Dionysios to "local" religion (*Stiftung*, 31).

[177] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 120.

this custom (12–14). With the incorporation of Agdistis into the cult, we have a second moment in the construction of tradition. Even though she continues with a role as guardian, this is precisely a secondary role meant to accept, support, and legitimize the honouring of Zeus and the other gods of the cult. Thus, while this liturgy is attempting to unify, it is a strategy that also *necessarily* produces difference through stratification and hierarchization. One such difference is the distinction between the present group, of which Dionysius is κύριος and Zeus the primary deity, and the group of the past that was centred on Agdistis. Hence, Dionysius uses his deity bricolage in order to constitute the place of the *oikos* as distinct from other groups.

Along with this creative construction of tradition is the invocation of a particular *paradoxical* opposition that helps to homologize the other elements into a schematic whole. This opposition, liberation through subjection, is one that H.S. Versnel argues is not only characteristic of Greco-Roman religion in the Roman Imperial period, but also endemic to Imperial political ideology.[178] At the end of our inscription Zeus is referred to as Ζωτή[ρ] ("saviour"), the one who is able to provide "health, salvation, peace, [and] safety on land and sea" (60–62). Here, Stowers is right to point out that the type of σωτηρίαν ("salvation") imagined here is not some otherworldly salvation.[179] Rather, as our inscription details, it is liberation from the effects of "evil curses" (κακάς ἀρὰς, 45) and "great punishments" (μεγάλας τιμωρίας, 50). What constitutes the evidence of these actions is death, disease, and misfortune — that is to say, the unwanted results of

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[178] H. S. Versnel, *Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion I: Ter Unus* (vol. 1, 2nd ed.; Studies in Greek and Roman Religion; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), 94.

[179] Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 291.

mere existence — as often revealed by the "confession" inscriptions. For example, one inscription claims that Eumenes κατέθηκεν ἰσοθάνατον, "was lying down death-like" (a coma?), for letting cattle graze in the sacred grove.[180] In another, Antonia, daughter of Antonios, erected a "praise" (εὐλογίαν) to Apollon Bozenos for her recovery from the punishment she received for entering the sacred area in dirty clothes.[181] Yet, in order to gain this freedom, this release, from the "tyranny" of the everyday, one must subject oneself to the god(s). The Dionysian inscription makes this plain:

> [… ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ] ταῦτα οὔτε Βούλεται γίνεσθαι μηθ[αμῶς, οὔτε θέλει, ἀλ]λὰ κατακολουθεῖν
>
> For the god does not desire these things to happen at all, nor does he wish it, but he wants obedience (45–46).

A whole series of practices, with their corresponding oppositions, are invoked in order to maintain, or produce, a sense of coherence for this contradictory opposition. Purifications (purity/impurity), mysteries (revealed/unrevealed), sacred space (in/out), and ordinances (proper actions/ improper actions), among others, organize the members of Dionysius' *oikos* into a relatively ordered social environment, especially in terms of space, time, and hierarchical relationships.

Inscriptions, such as Dionysius', were often used as a boundary marker at the entrance of a sacred place, warning those who wished to enter. A set of Andania regulations, LSCG 65, is very explicit in this respect (line 37):

> ἀναγραψάντω δὲ καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν δεῖ καθαρίζειν καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ ἔχοντας εἰσπορεύεσθαι.
>
> They shall write and post things which require purification and whatever one ought not to have when entering the sanctuary.

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[180] *BIWK*, no. 7.

[181] *BIWK*, no. 50.

Dionysius' inscription also reveals such a concern with differentiating between the inside and outside of the *oikos*. While the regulations were given to permit access to men and women, free people and slaves (5), the boundary is clearly marked. Those who want to enter must swear that they have not participated in deceit, poison, or spells before πορευόμενοι εἰς τὸν οἶκον, "crossing over into the house" (15).[182] Additionally, those who have confidence (πιστεύουσιν) must touch the inscription itself at the annual and monthly sacrifices, a performance intended to expose those who have not obeyed the ritual laws (55). Like LSCG 65 above, purity discourse also facilitates this very physical boundary making, delineating where particular bodies may or may not go. This is especially highlighted with respect to the prohibitions against certain kinds of sexual activity, as "whoever does any of these things written above, let him not enter this *oikos*" (31).

As we saw above in the Greek sacrificial calendar, the organization of events and people into a homologous temporality is also an important dimension of liturgical ordering. This element is less prominent in this case, but there is still an attempt to create continuity with a "past," both recent (the integration of Agdistis) and distant (τὰ πάτρια, "ancestral custom," 14). The present is cyclically ordered by means of "monthly and annual" sacrifices (55), which places practices in a line of succession facilitating a sense of temporal coherence.[183]

These spatial and temporal dimensions are designed to facilitate the hierarchical arrangement of individuals in Dionysius' *oikos*. Through the marking out of space and time, both physically and discursively, this inscription participates

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[182] C.f. *BIWK*, no. 6, a stele that reports of Polion who was punished for stepping over the boundary without permission.

[183] On calendars and social structure, see Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 96–109.

in the generation of Dionysius' position of authority with respect to other individuals in his *oikos.* It is not, as Barton and Horsley suggest, an association's radical egalitarian social experiment;[184] rather, the inscription is a means by which Dionysius wants to legitimate and maintain his position of authority.[185] While restricting the entry of certain groups, in particular women and the uninitiated, into a sacred place is a common enough feature of the cultic regulations,[186] there are also many associations that allowed the entry of women, slaves, and others (prostitutes, actors, musicians, etc).[187] Nevertheless, as Stowers points out, the stele participates in the construction of the social hierarchy the *oikos*:

> the *kurios* was *kurios* because the cult belong to him and had been inherited from this father and because he served as "priest." Slaves served as slaves during sacrifices. In Aristophanes' *Peace*…[t]his participation includes the dirty work of butchering the animal, but also carrying the sacrificial basket and the purification vessel around the altar and saying a prayer after his master's own.[188]

Moreover, in different essay, Stowers clearly demonstrates that Greek cultic practice specifically linked men's activity in sacrifice with women's procreation as the very construction of the Greek "man" *and* "woman."[189] This hierarchical scheme is not only implicit in the performance of such rituals as the Dionysian

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[184] Barton and Horsley, "A Hellenistic Cult Group," 15.

[185] So Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 294–296.

[186] For examples of restricted and forbidden entry, see *LSCG*, 82, 109; *LSS*, 75.

[187] For slaves entering, see *LSS*, 68; the 'confession' inscription provideσ several examples of women entering, albeit improperly, see *BIWK*, 50 (above) and 19: ἔτους σπγ′, μη(νὸς) Ξαν|δικοῦ· Μαρκία Ἀρίου | ἐπὶ {ἐπεὶ} λειπούσης ἡμέ|ας εἰσῆλθα {εἰσῆλθον} ἐπεζή|τησαν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἐσ|τηλλογράφησα | καὶ εὐχαριστῶ (In the year 283, in the month of Xandikos. Because I, Markia daughter of Arios (or -es) went in when one day remained, the gods demanded (it), and I wrote down (the events) on a stele and convey my thanks) .

[188] Stowers, "A Cult from Philadelphia," 294.

[189] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 299–312.

annual sacrifices, but is homologized to both temporality, in terms of past and present where the group of the goddess becomes the group of the god, and space, where, to quote J. Z. Smith, "human beings are not placed, they bring place, into being."[190] Hence, we have an alternate way of seeing the "sexual ethics" that comprise a large part of the inscription. No longer is this "morality" disconnected from the honouring of particular gods or the performance of the *oikos*' annual and monthly sacrifices. Rather, the sexual prohibitions, in concert with surveillance of others and oneself, are a technology of the body aimed at constituting and maintaining the distinctions present within the dimensions of the order of the *oikos*. In this way, the "touchstone" of Dionysius' *oikos* attempts to produce the bodily experience of the coherence of an order that circumscribes time, space, material objects, physical bodies and invisible deities. Such "logical systematicity,"[191] however, is always provisional and incomplete, continually needing to provide space — as the case is here, in the form of contradiction and ambiguity — so that it can adjust and adapt to new situations as they arise. As Bell describes the sense of totality that such ritual order affords, it is

> not a perfect and holistic order imposed on minds and bodies but a delicate and continual renegotiation of provisional distinctions and integrations so as to avoid encountering in practice the discrepancies and conflicts that would become so apparent if the 'whole' was obvious.[192]

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[190] It is in relation to one of Kant's papers on geography that Smith argues: "Kant argues that orientation [in space] is always in relation to our bodies…It is the relationship to the human body, and our experience of it, that orients us in space, that confers meaning to place. Human beings are not placed, they bring place into being," (*To Take Place*, 28).

[191] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 104.

[192] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 125.

Conclusion

By returning to the concept of liturgy the sense of ordering as a social activity, we are provided with a new lens that allows us to see the textual orchestration of time, space, hierarchy, bodies, and ritual activities into an apparent whole. It is a textual modality of differentiation that relies on the interplay of the construction of tradition, temporalization and spatialization, and the organization of bodies into social relationships. Schemes of oppositions, tensions and contradictions slide between the dimensions in order to create structurally similar relationships and thus facilitate a sense of an interconnected whole. Yet, seeing these texts as liturgy, as textual ritualization, reveals that such relationships are not innocuous and without consequence. Rather, as we saw in the example of the inscription from Philadelphia, such organization and orchestration plays a role in the constitution of power. Furthermore, the ways in which the body is drawn into such ritualization suggests that power is not something that is merely external to bodies. Rather, as I will show in the next chapter, it is constituted as a site of power by technologies or strategies that operate in ritual environments.

3

The Truth Hurts: Sacrifice, Symposia and Practices of Truth

Establishing the Truth: Quaestio

> Again, when Quintus Gallius, a praetor, held some folded tablets under his robe as he was paying his respects, Augustus, suspecting that he had a sword concealed there, did not dare to make a search on the spot for fear it should turn out to be something else; but a little later he had Gallius hustled from the tribunal by some centurions, tortured him as if he were a slave, and though he made no confession, ordered his execution, first tearing out the man's eyes with his own hand. (Suet. xxvii. 4)[193]

As an instrument designed to elicit the truth by means of the application of pain, torture was a judicial technology employed by the regulatory and political powers of the ancient Greek and Roman empires. The Roman jurist, Ulpian, discussed his view on the definition of torture, or *quaestio per tormenta,* in his *Treatise on the Duties of a Proconsul*:

> By 'torture' [*quaestio*] we should understand torment, corporeal suffering and pain employed to extract the truth. Therefore, a mere interrogation of a moderate degree of fear does not justify the application of this edict. In the term 'torment' are included all those things which relate to the application of torture. Hence, when force and torment are resorted to, this is understood to be torture. (*Digest* 47.10.15.41)[194]

[193] Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, *Suetonius* (trans. J.C. Rolfe; vol. 1; Loeb Classical Library; London: William Heinemann, 1913) Suetonius notes after this short narrative that Augustus offered his own version of the events: "[Augustus] writes, however, that Gallius made a treacherous attack on him after asking for an audience, and was haled to prison; and that after he was dismissed under sentence of banishment, he either lost his life by shipwreck or was waylaid by brigands," 165.

[194] As quoted and translated in Edward Peters, *Torture* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 28.

While modern liberal nation states often have a duplicitous relation to the use of torture, on the one hand officially denying and prohibiting its use and, on the other, either directly using it or facilitating its use by others, the Greek and Roman authorities were under no pressure to maintain such duplicity. On the contrary, as the short narrative from Suetonius above illustrates, torture was a justifiable instrument of investigation.

Suetonius' story is in some respects distinctive, as torture was primarily reserved for slaves and, in some cases, foreigners. As Edward Peters explains,

> The idea of majesty that had once resided collectively in the Roman people now came to reside in the person of the emperor. The emperor could not only make law, but he could make exceptions to the law which did not necessarily recognize the old Republican privileges of the freeman, particularly when the imperial safety was (or was imagined to be) in danger.[195]

Peters is pointing out that torture was previously employed to materially and bodily produce the distinctions within earlier Greek and Roman polities, the difference between citizen and slave. In Suetonius' narrative, these distinctions become blurred as Augustus employs torture in order to produce, on the body of Gallius, "the Emperor" as distinct from all others (citizens, slaves, foreigners, and so on). The production of the emperor as an extralegal figure coincides with the production of the figure of the "traitor." The logic by which Augustus used torture to produce truth was not to ascertain whether or not Gallius was a traitor and posed a threat; rather, torture was employed to provide the proof of the already decided truth that Gallius was indeed a traitor. When Gallius refuses to confess it is not evidence of his innocence; instead, his refusal reveals a void, a gap, or a lack between the body and the subject.

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[195] Peters, *Torture*, 22.

For Aristotle, torture was a type of "enthymematic" reasoning (i.e., deductive reasoning) which helped to determine the truth or falsity of events that took place in the past. It was an unskilful proof [ἀτέχνων πίστεων] that belonged to forensic oratory (*Rh.* 1.15.1). Torture, though, was not an unproblematic production of this evidence. For, as Aristotle reasoned,

> [t]orture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it…we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true kind of evidence…those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. (*Rh.* 1.15.26)[196]

Under the Roman Empire, jurists (and others) continued to caution against the reliability of the evidence elicited by torture.[197] Ulpian, for instance, in the midst of a discussion on torture filled with cautions regarding torture in judicial inquiries, suspicion, the need for other evidence, and the questions asked during such procedures, relayed that Augustus did not want investigations to commence with torture and that "confidence should not be unreservedly placed in torture" (*Digest* 48.18). The *Digest* also reports other reservations regarding the reliability of what torture produces:

> It was declared by Imperial Constitutions that while confidence should not always be reposed in torture, it ought not to be rejected as absolutely unworthy of it, as the evidence obtained is weak and dangerous, and inimical to the truth; for most persons, either through their power of endurance, or through the severity of the torment, so despise suffering that the truth can in no way be extorted from them. Others are so little able to suffer that they prefer to lie rather than to endure the question, and hence it

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[196] Aristotle, *Aristotle in 23 Volumes* (trans. J. H. Freese; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926).

[197] Peters provides several examples from the orators and emperors who also question torture's efficacy in producing truth, see *Torture*, 33–34.

> happens that they make confessions of different kinds, and they not only implicate themselves, but others as well. (48.18.1.23)[198]

These cautions regarding torture, however, did not produce a decrease in its application and use; rather, it produced the opposite:

> Although they had some misgivings about the legitimacy of torture, the Romans also had few misgivings about its effect upon human beings. Between the second and the fifth centuries, they expanded and developed a method of investigation about whose reliability they had few illusions. Instead of questioning the method, they surrounded it with a jurisprudence that was designed to give greater assurance to its reliability, a jurisprudence that is admirable in its scepticism and unsettling in its logic.[199]

The continual expansion and experimentation of this jurisprudence demonstrated that the Roman authorities misrecognized the operation by which the application of pain to the human body proved to be effective. In other words, while the Romans sought veracity in the utterances procured, the effectiveness of torture was the (forced) bodily performance, which often was a public display, of a particular subjectivity. As Michel Foucault argued about the medieval and early modern production of the "criminal," torture is a "ritual" in which the power of the sovereign is constituted. The aim of such a strategy is "not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength."[200]

Others subject to the Roman imperial judicial system, however, sought to take discursive advantage of bodily performance, both in the construction of sovereign authority and politically resistant subjectivities. For example, Fourth

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[198] As quoted and translated in Peters, *Torture*, 34.

[199] Peters, *Torture*, 35.

[200] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 49.

Maccabees, a late first-century Stoicized[201] recounting of the Maccabean resistance (168–164 B.C.E), used narratives of extreme forms of punishment to place the body as the "epicentre" in the contest over identity and power.[202] By being able to control the body, in particular pain and the passions, through the use of *logos* figures such as Eleazar, the seven young men and their mother are invested with a division between the body and self. But more than that, it is an argument that the true self, characterized by the (élite male) values of παιδεία (civility), εὐσέβεια (piety), and ἀρετή (virtue), is demonstrated by internal rather than external power. "The victim of torture," Brent Shaw notes,

> then acquires the greatest value attributed to persons of high social status in this world: they are ennobled, imbued with an aura of aristocratic demeanour — the type of inherent excellence reserved by nature for the ruling élite, but one which could be acquired by a victorious athlete through the exercise of his body.[203]

The bodily performance of the division between body and self, for the author of Fourth Maccabees, reversed the intended outcome of torture, confession and assent (in the form of the performance of certain rituals) onto the oppressor. What we have here is a "contest" (ἀγών) between the bodies of the tortured and those of the torturers and spectators wherein the control of their own bodies under the application of extreme forms of pain-inducing techniques draws out the inability of the torturers and the spectators to control their own bodies.[204]

All of this is to say that the application of pain to the body was a fairly

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[201] For a brief overview of Stoicism and other traditions in the context of moral philosophy, see Wayne A. Meeks, *The Moral World of the First Christians* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 40–64.

[202] Brent D. Shaw, "Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs," *JECS* 4 (1996): 276.

[203] Shaw, "Body/Power/Identity," 277.

[204] Shaw, "Body/Power/Identity," 271–2.

explicit example of a strategy aimed at producing truth. As we saw in the concerns of the jurists and orators, though, it was not a simple procedure nor did it produce unambiguous results. Nevertheless, the truth produced was regarding the sovereign (and masculine) power over the bodies of others. There were, of course, alternative ways of viewing sovereign power as we saw in Fourth Maccabees, which argues that the truth that is revealed is about the power — that is, of course, masculine power — one has over one's self. In this way, sovereign power moves from an external force exerted over the bodies of others to an internal force in which one demonstrates the control of one's own body.

The Strategic Truth

The strategies of truth-making were not limited to political or juridical contexts under the Roman Empire. Maud Gleason describes the ancient Mediterranean village culture as a "competitive atmosphere of mutual distrust" and a "forest of eyes—a world in which the scrutiny of one's fellow man was not an idle pastime but an essential survival skill,"[205] especially in regard to assessing a body's relative masculinity. While Gleason most assuredly overstates this generalization—in order to construct a Foucauldian comparison to modern masculine hegemony—she does note the way in which the handbooks of physiognomists prescribed the reading of particular physical features of a body as a strategy to identify the truth of one's masculinity.[206] Most telling is the way the physiognomists use this type of

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[205] Maud W. Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the Second Century C.E," in *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (ed. David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 389.

[206] Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender," 390.

investigation to distinguish a true self that can be hidden by the bodily appearances. An anonymous physiognomist remarks:

> The true character of a human being may be obscured by the assiduous effort and [deceptive], so that it frequently happens that a single individual may exhibit a complex disposition [compounded of various animal signs], whereas animals are simple, naked, take no precautions, and show their [true] nature out in the open. (Anon. Lat. 132, 2.144F)[207]

The presumption of the deceptiveness of deviant genders means that the bodily features became signs (e.g., hairiness) for a signified gender (e.g., manliness). The relation between signifiers and signified, however, was tenuous and an overabundance of signs could be construed as an attempt at concealment. Hence, Gleason notes the example of another physiognomist who attempts to examine a very hairy man, only to identify him as a *cinaedus* by a sneeze as he walks away.[208]

Stanley Stowers has also drawn our attention to how Greek sacrificial practices were imbued with complex truth practices. Sacrificial practice (θυσία) pervaded the Greco-Roman world as an element of many significant social events:

> Sacrifice stood at the centre of a complex set of cultural, social, and political institutions. With the "official" cults of the particular city and the imperial cult at centre, worship of the gods under the empire occupied many groupings of people in many different contexts from the mystery cults, much overemphasized by modern scholarship, to societies of freedmen, household sacrifices, kinship groups, and artisans' clubs.[209]

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[207] Quoted in Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender," 407.

[208] Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender," 407. The ancient *cinaedus*, or effeminate one, was defined by the physiognomists' techniques and other such bodily practices, "not in terms of the gender choice of his sex partners, but by his own gender deviance, his departure from the norms of 'correct' masculine deportment. The *cinaedus* was a 'life-form' all to himself, and his condition was written all over him in signs that could be decoded by those practiced in the art. What made him different from normal folk, however, was not simply the fact that his sexual partners included people of the same sex as himself (that, after all, was nothing out of the ordinary), nor was it any kind of psychosexual orientation — a 'sexuality' in the nineteenth-century sense—but rather an inversion or reversal of his gender identity: his abandonment of a 'masculine' role in favor of a 'feminine' one" ("The Semiotics of Gender," 411–412).

[209] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 295. Stowers follows the above statement with: "These cults were not different religions like Judaism and Christianity but modulated

To be clear, the Greeks did make a distinction between animal sacrifice with an accompanying feast (θυσία) and sacrifice without a feast (σφάγιον).[210] It is, though, the complex of θυσία, feasting, and socializing that has a ubiquitous significance in the Greco-Roman world, which is highlighted by an often-cited passage from Dio Chrysostom's *Orations*, "What sacrifice [θυσία] is acceptable to the gods without the participants in the feast [τῶν συνευωχουμένων]" (3.97). As Stowers notes, certainly not all Greco-Roman meals included meat, but meat that was incorporated into a meal usually had been sacrificed.[211] While the evidence Stowers amasses is from the classical period, he argues that the commonalities and constancies demonstrate that Greek sacrifice neither fundamentally changed nor lost cultural and social significance between the classical age and the early empire.[212] There is evidence from the Anatolian inscriptions we examined in the

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articulations of one somewhat riotous religious system" (295). While Stowers is certainly correct to emphasize that these groups participated in a loose conglomeration of practices that involved non-human agents, marking out "Judaism" and "Christianity" as seemingly homogenous "religions" as distinct from the heterogeneous "riotous religious system" of the Greco-Roman associations, house cults and other male banqueting groups actually hinders the comparative enterprise that he is attempting to establish, especially in the early part of this chapter: "The historian must be fully open to the possibility of both differences and commonalities in the ritual meaning and practice that cross boundaries we represent as "paganism," "Judaism," and "Christianity" (293, citing J. Z. Smith's *Drudgery Divine*). My point here is by no means a critique of Stowers' method; it is merely a point of clarification. It may be more beneficial, as Phil Harland does and Stowers would surely agree, to see Judean groups and early Jesus or Christ followers as participating, experimenting, and challenging the heterogeneous "riotous religious system" alongside these other Greco-Roman groups; see especially Harland, *Associations*, 55–87.

[210] Dennis E. Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 68.

[211] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 294; cf. Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Harvard University Press, 1985), 55–59; Marcel Detienne, *The Cuisine of Sacrifice Among the Greeks* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 25.

[212] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 294.

previous chapter that testify to this continuity, at least in regard to the significance of meat being properly cooked—that is, sacrificed—before consumption.[213]

Stowers argues that sacrifices were effective truth-strategies which were a part of "distinctive ritualized environments in which modes of power and ways of organizing and interpreting the world were negotiated and reproduced."[214] During the sacrificial activities, the animal was not only examined so that it produced the proper signs of acceptability,[215] but parts of the animal — in particular the σπλᾶνγχνα, the "guts": heart, lungs, liver, bladder, spleen, kidneys — were used to establish the truth, usually in concert with an oath, about participants of the group. These practices reached back into classical Greece where, as Stowers notes, "the future citizens or elites of the Greek cities … sacrificed with testings [δοκιμασίαι] as they feasted and took oaths upon graduation from the ephebic training that made them adult citizens."[216] Furthermore, the truth established through sacrificial testing was an important proof for establishing *legal* and *political* identity, such as citizenship, lineage and status as heir. In cases that concerned the establishment of an individual's identity, others who were also present at events that featured sacrifice and oath-taking, such as initiations into

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[213] See BIWK 1 on page 51 above and BIWK 123, which prohibits the eating of ἄθυτον αἰγοτόμιον, non-sacrificed goat-meat, by temple officials. Although αἰγοτόμιον is a *hapax legomenon* and the meaning uncertain, Petzl's suggestion that the word is a compound of αἴγεος (goat) and τομιον (portion of meat) is reasonable.

[214] Stanley K. Stowers, "Truth, Identity and Sacrifice in Classical Athens" (unpublished paper presented at the Seminar of the Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, June 14, 1996), 1; idem, "On Construing Meals, Myths and Power in the World of Paul" (unpublished paper presented at the Ancient Myths and Modern Theories of Christian Origins Section at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, New Orleans, 1996).

[215] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 5.

[216] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 7.

various associations, festivals, and funerals, were called upon to verify the individual's ritual performance.[217] Stowers provides an example from Isaeus' *Kiron*, which emphasizes the efficacy of touching the sacrifice with respect to identity:

> We also have other proofs that we are sons from the daughter of Kiron. For as is natural since we were male children of his own daughter, he never performed any sacrifice [θυσία] without us, but whether the sacrifices were great or small, we were always present and sacrificed with him [συνεθύομεν] … and we went to all the festivals with him. But when he sacrificed to Zeus Ktesios he was especially serious about the sacrificial rite [θυσία], and he did not admit any slaves or free men who were not relatives [ὀθνείους], but he performed all of the sacrificial rites himself. We shared in this sacrifice and we together with him handled the sacred meat [τὰ ἱερὰ συνεχειρουργοῦμεν] and we put offerings on the altar with him and performed the other parts of the sacrifice with him. (8.15–16)[218]

As we can see, such sacrificial testing practices were strategies that attempted to produce the physical continuity, that is, the naturalization, of patrilineal kinship. In fact, though, one could argue that such practices ironically reveal the impossibility of kinship being purely natural and physiological.[219] Nevertheless, as a strategy, the testing of ritual participants established a particular index of knowledge that produced, legitimated and maintained the male hegemony of the οἶκος through the transfer of property and status from father to son.

The κοινωνία ("togetherness") of performing sacrifice and eating together in a demarcated space was an environment that attempted to homologize the body of an animal with the bodies of group members.[220] "In this way," Stowers points

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[217] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 4.

[218] Cf. Stowers, "Truth, Identity and Sacrifice," 3; Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 5.

[219] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 313.

[220] Stowers, "Truth, Identity and Sacrifice," 4.

out, "the truths about the contiguity of fathers and sons seemed natural and divinely approved in the very acts by which men socially constructed descent."[221] But Stowers also argues that the array of activities in which sacrifice was an effective practice had shifted, although still subservient to male hegemony. It was a shift from an array that emphasized a connection to land and food distribution to one that asserted an idealized (male) urban cosmopolitanism.[222]

The Practice of Hellenistic Dining

Within the context of this "cosmopolitan urban culture," sacrifice was not only apart of the οἶκος and official temple cults, but also was integrated in other gatherings of the πολίς, guilds, trade associations, *collegia*, ethnic groups and so on, as an integral element of the groups' social activities, especially "dining." In *Quaestiones Convivales,* Plutarch makes a distinction between everyday meals at home and those enjoyed with peers:

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[221] Stowers, "Truth, Identity and Sacrifice," 12.

[222] Stowers, "Greeks Who Sacrifice," 331. Extending the work of Nancy Jay (*Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]), Stowers shows how maternity as well as paternity is constituted in the practice of sacrifice. He deftly argues that sacrifice is often associated with procreation and thus demonstrating the dual and simultaneous constitution of male and female roles in Greek sacrificial practice. In particular, he finds that "[a]ttention to [the Greek] medical texts, and to certain patterns of Greek thought that they reflect, suggests qualifications to Jay's theory of sacrifice as a means of effecting paternity. Jay writes as if paternity were an artificial construct stolen from the mother through sacrificial practices, and that while paternity is socially constructed, maternity is a natural fact. Thus, Jay fails to notice the widely varied conceptions and meaning given to procreation for both genders in different societies and the inherent polyvalence of sacrifice. The evidence from the medical texts and elsewhere strongly suggests that Greek sacrificial practices were concerned with constituting and interpreting both paternity and maternity, with defining male and female roles in procreation and, more broadly, with gender itself, since the Greeks took the procreative roles as central to the meaning of male and female" ("Greeks Who Sacrifice," 300).

> Χαρίεντος ἀνδρός, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, καὶ φιλανθρώπου λόγον ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι διὰ στόματος, ὅστις ἦν ὁ εἰπών, ἐπεὶ μόνος ἐδείπνησεν, 'βεβρωκέναι, μὴ δεδειπνηκέναι σήμερον', ὡς τοῦ δείπνου κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλοφροσύνην ἐφηδύνουσαν ἀεὶ ποθοῦντος.
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> The Romans, Sossius Senecio, are fond of quoting a witty and sociable person who said, after a solitary meal, 'I have eaten, but not dined to-day,' implying that a 'dinner' always requires friendly sociability for seasoning. (697C)

Such dining was associated with the evening meal, known as the *deipnon*.[223]

The research on meals in the ancient Mediterranean by both Dennis Smith and Matthias Klinghardt has provided much needed insight into various commonalities.[224] These meal elements can be roughly outlined as follows:

- The reclining of (more or less) all participants while eating and drinking together for several hours in the evening.
- The order of a supper (*deipnon*) of eating followed by an extended time (*symposion*) of drinking, conversation, and performance.[225]
- Marking the transition from *deipnon* to *symposion* with a ceremonial libation, almost always wine
- Leadership by a "president" (*symposiarch*) of the meal—a person not always the same, and sometimes a role that was contingent or disputed

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[223] For a brief description of other meals throughout the day, see John Fotopoulos, *Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth* (Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 159–160; and Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*, 20–21.

[224] Matthias Klinghardt, *Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft: Soziologie und Liturgie frühchristlicher Mahlfeiern* (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 1996); Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*.

[225] Although, note Harland's caution that "[t]hough there is truth in the observation that eating and drinking were important parts of group life, and sometimes this might be interpreted as disorderly behavior in the eyes of some (cf. Paul's comments on Christian assemblies in 1 Cor 11:17–34), we should not reduce the purposes of associations to mere conviviality or exaggerate the uncontrolled nature of the meetings. First of all, there was a set of socioreligious expectations and values concerning behaviour, sometimes set in stone as statutes, which helped to maintain order during the meetings and banquets of associations" (Harland, *Associations*, 75); for a discussion of other accusations of the banquets of associations were socially transgressive, e.g., cannibalistic or occasions of human sacrifice, see Philip Harland, "'These People are...Man eaters': Banquets of the Anti-associations and the Perceptions of Minority Cultural Groups," in *Identity and Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean: Jews, Christians, and Others* (ed. Zeba Crook and Philip Harland; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), 75.

- A variety of marginal personages, often including servants, uninvited guests, "entertainers," and dogs.[226]

More pertinent to our purposes here, however, is Hal Taussig's *In the Beginning was the Meal.* Taussig takes the work of Smith and Klinghardt and sifts it through the insights of a pantheon of social and ritual theorists, such as Burton Mack, J. Z. Smith, Judith Lieu, Catherine Bell, Pierre Bourdieu, Victor Turner, and Mary Douglas. His project is to attend to the ways early Christian identity is constructed on the "social stage" of meal practice,[227] especially with respect to the political dynamics of the Roman Empire. Similarly to our approach in this thesis, he contrasts his method to those that are primarily descriptive, especially with respect to belief, or those that seek to find in the emergence of Christianity some kind of social redemptive quality (e.g., egalitarianism, resistance to oppressive political regimes, gender equality). The concepts he employs from the theorists mentioned above are put to the task of understanding the emergence and formation of Christian groups as human behaviour, with a focus on how such behaviours contribute to the production of identity.

Following the meal typology of Smith and Klinghardt, Taussig first argues that the social environment of festive group meals, or banquets, of the Mediterranean in the early centuries C.E. was rich in the elements needed for social experimentation and formation. Such events were

> highly stylized occasions that carried significant social coding, identity formation, and meaning making. Participating in a meal entailed entering

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[226] As summarized by Hal Taussig in *In the Beginning Was the Meal: Social Experimentation & Early Christian Identity* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 26.

[227] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 19.

> into a social dynamic that confirmed, challenged, and negotiated both who the group as a whole was and who the individuals within in it were.[228]

Particularly important to these social experiments were the ways in which banquets brought together "social dynamics"[229] which were open to manipulation in a relatively safe and open space.

For instance, Taussig highlights how the practice of reclining at the meal invoked social hierarchy and ranking according to a Greco-Roman normativity, but in way that allowed open modification of norms, with even the possibility of the creation of a new social order. Eating at a "dinner party" often involved lying down on one's left side on a stone couch covered in cushions and eating with the right hand.[230] Not everyone who participated in these events, however, was permitted to assume this position. Reclining demarcated free male citizens from those — women, slaves, foreigners, and children — who produced, served, and entertained at banquets. Yet, there were some notable exceptions, for instance, there is some evidence that upper-class Roman women reclined at banquets.[231] For Taussig, such exceptions demonstrate that dining was a somewhat flexible and dynamic environment of social experimentation, albeit within certain constraints. For example,

> the general taboo against women and slaves reclining seems to have been quite regularly violated in a kind of social experimentation. But even the

[228] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 22.

[229] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 32.

[230] For examples of Greco-Roman dinning rooms, see Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*, 12–13.

[231] Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*, 43.

> idea that a woman or slave may have reclined was based on reclining as a position of social leisure and privilege.[232]

He is careful to assert that this does not imply a move towards egalitarianism.[233] It was, instead, an active exploration and negotiation of social values, among people from increasingly diverse cultural backgrounds, and not merely an exhibition of a uniform set of values.[234]

While such meal customs were in place since the archaic periods, banquets acquired a greater share of significance in the first and second century, according to Taussig, as a result of the Roman state's program of Hellenization and the spread of elite meal practices to non-elites, which is evidenced by the Hellenistic associations.[235] To account for the rise in popularity of the Hellenistic associations, he suggests that the social environment of the meal substituted for the tribe- and kinship-based social organization of the previous periods, which had been disrupted by the Roman Empire.[236] This point is significant because it provides the foundation on which he establishes his later claims that the meals provide the

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[232] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 31; Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*, 10–12.

[233] This point is highlighted by D. Smith. Smith takes special note of the discourse of equality at Greco-Roman meals and argues, convincingly, that such rhetoric should be "understood as giving everyone their due on an equal basis according to their relative status" (Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist*, 11, citing Gregory Nagy); see also John S. Kloppenborg, "Egalitarianism in the Myth and Rhetoric of Pauline Churches," in *Reimagining Christian Origins: A Colloquium Honoring Burton L. Mack* (ed. Elizabeth A. Castelli and Hal Taussig; Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1996), 75–88; Bruce Lincoln, *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 75–88.

[234] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 31.

[235] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 33.

[236] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 34–35.

possibility of resistance to the dominance of the Roman Empire.[237] He claims that the Roman Empire, following a series of oppressive imperial powers, destroyed the way people and nations had previously organized based on kinship, clans, and tribes, "blood" and "geography." Part of this change resulted from the Roman project of constructing new urban centres, designed upon the romanticization of classical Greece. While the "forced" imperial forms of social organization had "limited success," the Hellenistic associations provided an alternative avenue for belonging and identity.[238]

While Taussig is surely right to point out that changes in social organization occurred as a result of Roman rule, his characterization of this change is problematic. Social organization before Roman rule is deemed to be one of "stability," "cohesion," and "identity," whereas the imperial governance brings "social chaos" and social dynamism:

> The combination of the destruction of traditional groups and the resistance to imperially imposed institutions resulted in a lack of social cohesion and identity among the populace throughout the Roman Empire. In the wake of these combined forces of social chaos, a new kind of social association emerged. This was the voluntary association, in which an individual chose to belong to a group in contrast to being forced by the empire to be a part of some grouping or being able to claim a decimated family, tribal, or national grouping.[239]

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[237] To support this point, he quotes at length from a previous work co-authored with Catherine Nerney, *Re-imagining Life Together in America: A New Gospel of Community* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

[238] cf. Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 35; Nerney and Taussig, *Re-imagining Life Together in America*, 11–12.

[239] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 35; Nerney and Taussig, *Re-imagining Life Together in America*, 12; contrast to the description Robert Wilken gives: "The early years of the Roman Empire were times of great growth, sustained peace, and relative prosperity. The burgeoning industry and the demand for artisans, craftsman, merchants, and similar skills and occupations became a ready avenue of economic and social betterment for slaves, freedmen, and freeborn persons throughout the Mediterranean world. Most of these men and women — bridlemakers, stonecutters, purple dealers, woolcombers, fruit dealers, et al. — were cut off from the social and cultural life of the senatorial and equestrian class. Devoting themselves to their crafts and

Although Taussig backs away from some of the individualist connotations of "voluntary" in a footnote,[240] this assessment of social change can only be, "the myth of a state 'before the Fall,'" to borrow Žižek's phrase again. Not only does it mask the power relations present in so-called kinship groups — patriarchy and hierarchy, for example — it also implies that cohesion and identity are generated —more cohesively, at any rate — by kinship or geography, as if these products of human ingenuity are more "natural" than the "imposed," and, by implication, "fabricated," social arrangements of the Romans.[241]

Moreover, this characterization is what undergirds his assertion that meal practices of the Hellenistic associations "provided a stable and protected setting in which participants could "perfect" (J. Z. Smith) the structures and relationships under more contingent construction in the Hellenistic society itself."[242] This distinction between the group and society, however, serves to set up the meal as a place of mediation for the problems of "society." This, in turn, implies that the

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small businesses, these people discovered the benefits of gathering together on holidays. The chief purpose of these gatherings was not to organize as "labor unions," though theses associations were often formed along occupational lines, but for recreation, social intercourse, and religious worship. Eventually such gatherings grew into clubs or associations or societies. Initially they may have organized to provide for burial expenses of the members, but very quickly the social and religious aspects of the associations took on an equal, if not greater, importance" ("Collegia, Philosophical Schools, and Theology," in *The Catacombs and the Colosseum: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* [ed. Stephen Benko and John J O'Rourke; Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1971], 280); see also the thorough critique of the decline model in James Rives, "Graeco-Roman Religion in the Roman Empire: Old Assumptions and New Approaches," *CBR* 8 (2010): 280.

[240] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 207 n. 37.

[241] See also Harland's evidence against the erosion of social and political structures and authority in "The Declining Polis? Religious Rivalries in Ancient Civic Context," in *Religious Rivalries in the Early Roman Empire and the Rise of Christianity* (ed. Richard S. Ascough; Studies in Christianity and Judaism; Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 21–49.

[242] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 67.

meal is primarily a vehicle for social integration and cohesion via identity. Turning to Victor Turner's notion of *communitas*, Taussig marks Roman society as the place for inequality and the meal, as ritual, as the place of — at least, attempted or experimented — equality: "A *communitas* was formed over against the larger societal norms, making the meal into a social experiment relative to economic inequality. The 'ritual' of reclining together posited a togetherness that was in the moment both ephemeral and actual,"[243] and a little later, "[t]he power of the 'ritual' of reclining lay in its ability to have people who often were not equal outside of the banquet room reclining as equals within the meal."[244] Hence, even though Taussig recognizes that there was a continuing role of "social boundaries and stratification in the ways of the hierarchy of reclining according to honourable societal status,"[245] the moment banquets come into contact with Pauline ideology, Taussig turns them into a liberal, egalitarian, and ultimately, Christian fantasy where "[t]he values of Rome and early Christianity were diametrically opposed."[246]

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[243] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 69.

[244] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 69.

[245] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 68.

[246] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 117–119. He attempts to build this case by appealing to Warren Carter and Wendy Cotter in distinction to Philip Harland's work on associations in Asia Minor. Taussig follows Carter, who opposes—very problematically—Pauline groups, which for him are communities of mutual support, love, not haughty, and generous with food, to Rome, which is dependent on patron client relations, hierarchy and domination, the execution of military retaliation. Cotter extends this power dichotomy by documenting official imperial hostility to the gatherings of voluntary associations, although she notes there were exceptions in the second century. She also argues that there was consistent tolerance towards Jewish gatherings around the Empire. Harland, on the other hand, does not find such tensions in the association of Asia Minor. For Taussig, Harland's work "does not directly dispute the general tension between associations and Rome found by Cotter…but he finds additional indications of cooperation and acceptance of Roman power in and around the associations" (121). Yet, in order to construct the dominance/resistance opposition, Taussig both dismisses the

Taussig's argument also seems to rely on a slight misreading of J. Z. Smith. In "The Bare Facts of Ritual," Smith makes the point that ritual is a performance of the rationalization of the discrepancies experienced in ordinary behaviour.[247] He illustrates this through the example of the bear hunting rituals of the paleo-Siberians in which the descriptions of the hunt by the hunters are incongruous with their hunting behaviour. The bear hunting ritual is an attempt at controlling the variables, which Smith terms "perfecting," that in the actual hunt are very difficult, if not impossible, to control.[248] Taussig maps inequality, in the form of hierarchy and dominance, for ordinary behaviour and egalitarianism — as its "perfection" — for ritual behaviour. This does not work, however, which is attested by the continuing presence of hierarchy and power relations in the practice of reclining, something that Taussig has difficulty dealing with.[249] Instead, if we

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generalizability of Harland's findings and charges that Harland ignores official Roman imperial antagonism against associations. While we cannot address generalizability of Harland's work here, Taussig too quickly dismisses the reasons Harland gives for somewhat de-emphasizing Roman edicts. Harland does not, in fact, ignore Roman imperial antagonism, but spends an entire chapter arguing that the evidence from Roman officials is over-emphasized because such conflicts were irregular and occasional. This reveals an important incongruity between the official power of the state and the happenstances of everyday life. See Warren Carter, *The Roman Empire and the New Testament: An Essential Guide* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006); Wendy Cotter, "The Collegia and Roman Law: State Restrictions on Voluntary Associations, 64BCE–200CE," in *Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World* (ed. John S. Kloppenborg and Stephen G. Wilson; London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 74–89; Harland, *Associations*, 161–173.

[247] Jonathan Z Smith, "The Bare Facts of Ritual," in *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 63.

[248] Smith, "The Bare Facts of Ritual," 64.

[249] Taussig runs into difficulties especially in the case of slaves and women. Clarence Lee, for instance, in his brief survey of social unrest in the Roman Empire, finds that in the case of slaves "there was nothing resembling a general 'mood' of social discontent among this group which Christianity was able to exploit. The exact opposite would appear to have been more nearly the case" ("Social Unrest and Primitive Christianity," in *The Catacombs and the Colosseum: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* [ed. Stephen Benko and John J O'Rourke; Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1971], 131); on male hegemony and early Christianity, see Todd C. Penner and

follow Smith, the obverse is true, that is, the fantasy of the controlled ritual environment of the meal would be *hierarchy*. The "perfection" would not be a movement from hierarchy to egalitarianism, but from the experience of the *ordinary* accidents of social life, which can border on social chaos, *to a performance of a more effective form of hierarchy*. Humans orchestrate and rationalize systems of dominance and power that cannot control reality completely. Meal practice attempts to harness this incongruity. In other words, the Hellenistic banquet, to quote J. Z. Smith, "provides an occasion for reflection and rationalization of the fact that what ought to have been done was not done, what ought to have taken place did not occur."[250]

While we cannot agree with some of the ways Taussig frames power relations, his overall project of attempting to socially explain the meal and to situate early Jesus and early Christian groups offers important insights. First, his characterization of the meal, following Mack, as an environment for social experimentation places a much-needed emphasis on human behaviour as creative, responsive, and adaptive within an array of other practices, in space and time. Second, Taussig links two of the most significant practices of early Jesus and early Christian groups: text and meal. The *symposion* of the meal provided a "school-like" environment in which the texts were read and composed:

Caroline Vander Stichele, eds., *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses* (Brill, 2007); Willi Braun, "Fugitives from Femininity: Greco-Roman Gender Ideology and the Limits of Early Christian Women's Emancipation," in *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 317–32.

[250] Smith, "The Bare Facts of Ritual," 63.

> The combination of structured learning exercises of the *Progymnasmata*[251] and the lively repartee of the symposial atmosphere certainly allowed both a framework for composition and improvisational and elaborative creativity, as the *chreiae*[252] were reworked into longer units. When applied to the gospel material, it becomes quite clear that the meals provided the conventional location for the communal and school-like composition of subgospel units.[253]

The importance of this context is not limited to gospel narratives, but extends to the majority of texts written by early Jesus groups and early Christians, including Q, Paul's letters and, as we shall see in the final chapter, the *Didache*.[254]

This allows us, then, to return to the question of the strategies of differentiation within the meal and how, as Willi Braun suggests, "at least some Christian meal practices cut against the grain of the more general Roman meal/food practices as a way of signifying and enforcing non-egalitarian social regimes."[255] It is here then that Stowers' work again suggests an avenue to proceed:

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[251] These were "preliminary exercises" used for instructing students in the use and analysis of arguments in speech and composition. Progymnasmata were collected into textbooks, such as those written by Aelius Theon and Hermogenes.

[252] A chreia is a short saying, or possibly an action, attributed to someone of note. For a description, see Vernon K. Robbins, *Exploring the Texture of Texts: A Guide to Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation* (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1996), 41–50. The analysis of chreia, and how they have been incorporated into narratives, typically but not exclusively by expansion, has been mostly conducted with respect to the gospels. See Burton L. Mack and Vernon K. Robbins, *Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1989).

[253] Taussig, *In the Beginning Was the Meal*, 39.

[254] Willi Braun, "The Schooling of a Galilean Jesus Association (the Sayings Gospel Q)," in *Redescribing Christian Origins* (ed. Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller; Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2004), 43–65; E. A. Judge, "The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," *JRH* 1 (1960): 4–15; Kloppenborg and Wilson, *Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World*; Lee, "Social Unrest and Primitive Christianity."

[255] Willi Braun, "'Our Religion Compels Us to Make a Distinction': Prolegomena on Meals and Social Formation," in *Identity and Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean: Jews, Christians, and Others* (ed. Zeba Crook and Philip Harland; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), 50.

the use of sacrificial truth practices as a comparative measure in order to understand the meal practice of the Christ association in Corinth.

The Kuriakon Deipnon of the Corinthian Ekklēsia

In Paul's correspondence with the ἐκκλησία of God in Corinth (1 Cor 1:2), he attempts to persuade the members of this group to adhere to his version of the κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, the Lord's Dinner, a meal of some significance within the group.[256] According to the sporadic information given in 1 Corinthians, this meal roughly corresponds with the dimensions of Hellenistic meals delineated by Smith and Klinghardt. As we already noted, Paul specifically refers to this meal as a *deipnon*. He also mentions, in 11:23–26, the eating of bread (ἄρτον) and a libation (ποτήριον), which may mark—although this is far from certain—the transition to the *symposion*-like activities mentioned in 14:26: ψαλμὸν (hymn), διδαχὴν (teaching), ἀποκάλυψιν (revelation), γλῶσσαν (trance-speaking), and ἑρμηνεία (interpretation). There was also, according to Paul, some disagreement over leaders in the community that caused "divisions" (σχίσματα, 1:10–17). These "divisions" are particularly worrisome for Paul with respect to the community's meal (11:18–22). Finally, Paul suggests that uninvited guests might,

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[256] This, of course, assumes that Paul was primarily in the business of modifying existing groups, and not inventing and forming them ex nihilo, as recent scholarship on Paul's letters to Corinthians and Thessalonians has suggested. See Jonathan Z. Smith, "Re: Corinthians," in *Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 340–362; Richard S. Ascough, "The Thessalonian Christian Community as a Professional Voluntary Association," *JBL* 119 (2000): 311–328; Arnal also points out something similar, but much more ambiguous, in the case of Romans, that is, Paul does not claim to have founded the group, if in fact it was a singular group at all (Arnal, "Doxa, Heresy, and Self-construction," 70 n. 60).

at the least, observe the activities of the group, particularly after dinner activities (14:16).

This similarity to other Hellenistic meals, however, merely reminds us that the Lord's Dinner of the Corinthian ἐκκλήσια was not unique, but is a product of, to use Bourdieu's concept, the *habitus* that also produced Greco-Roman meals—*meals being, of course, not merely a product, but also a means through which this habitus perpetuates itself.*[257] In some very important ways, Paul wants to differentiate the Lord's Dinner within this commensal field which operates on an economy of commensal interests. We must turn, then, to the way the ritualization of the κυριακὸν δεῖπνον produces "difference-making differences."[258]

Stowers draws our attention to an important aspect of Hellenistic meals, an aspect which helps to produce the sense that participating in such a meal is the appropriate or reasonable thing to do: "festive meals provide a context in which participants make themselves liable to divine judgment and signs reveal truths

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[257] Bourdieu defines *habitus* "as a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems, and thanks to the unceasing corrections of the results obtained, dialectically produced by those results" (*Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 82). Taussig, however, collapses practice (meals) and *habitus*, an important distinction that Bourdieu maintains. For Bourdieu, the *habitus* is a relation between relations, or that which "structures structures," and, as such, is what generates practice and, in turn, tends to be reproduced by practice. As a "generative principle," it would produce, then, the regularities in Greco-Roman meals that Smith and Klinghardt have identified, and would not be the accumulation of the commonalities themselves. It is also that which provides a sense that doing something like reclining at a meal or giving an honorary libation to a god is a sensible and reasonable thing to do (cf. Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72–95). For Bourdieu, this is, as Catherine Bell rightly identifies, the "socially informed body, with its tastes and distastes, its compulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its senses" (124, cf. Bell, Ritual Theory Ritual Practice, 80–81).

[258] Braun, "'Our Religion Compels Us to Make a Distinction': Prolegomena on Meals and Social Formation," 55.

about one's identity."[259] We have already seen this above in relation to the meals that involved sacrifice. In the Corinthian case, Paul's κυριακὸν δεῖπνον is also an event that can determine, by eating or drinking inappropriately (ἀναξίως, 11:27), whether or not one belongs to a "faction" (αἵρεσις) or is among those exposed as "genuine" (οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ, 11:19). Additionally, like the inscriptions we examined in the previous chapter, Paul explicitly outlines the consequences of the failure of such self-examination:

> δοκιμαζέτω δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου ἐσθιέτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ποτηρίου πινέτω· ὁ γὰρ ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων κρίμα ἑαυτῷ ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα.[260] διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ὑμῖν πολλοὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἄρρωστοι καὶ κοιμῶνται ἱκανοί.
>
> A person should examine himself, and in this manner eat from the bread and drink from the cup. For the one who eats and drinks without evaluating the body eats and drinks judgement on himself. For this reason, many of you are weak and ill, and quite a few are dead. (1 Cor 11:29–30)

In this way, Paul similarly employs a matrix of self-examination, eating practices and other bodily signs in order to determine truths regarding individuals.

Yet, as Stowers points out, Paul's κυριακὸν δεῖπνον is not only a familiar memorial meal for the dead, announcing the death of the κύριος (τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλετε, 11:26), but is one that is missing a significant element, θυσία. This absence creates not a little space for what we could call commensal confusion. That is, without sacrificed meat the meal becomes difficult to distinguish from everyday meals. Hence, Paul must insist that this meal is unlike

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[259] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 7.

[260] Some MSS (ℵ^{c} C^{3} D G K P most minuscules it syr$^{p, h, pal}$ goth arm) add ἀναξίως after πινέτω and τοῦ κυρίου after σῶμα as glosses. It seems clear, however, that the examination is of one's own body and not the absent body of Christ, either literally or metaphorically as the social body of the group.

the meals eaten at home (11:22).[261] The reason for the switch of emphasis in the meal from the meat to the bread is, as Stowers rightly suggests, Paul's ritualization of a division between the body and the self, rooted in the martyr myth of Christ, a division which contrasted the (apparent) unity of body and self implied in sacrifice:

> Paul's Christ myth and ritual … work around a disjunction between the truest self and the body. Instead of the community being constituted and tested by eating meat, it exists by eating bread that is a symbol of an absent body that points both to the significance of giving up that body and to the loyalty of the social body toward that symbol. In the martyr myth, the martyr's obedience, will and benevolent intention triumph over the body. The body symbolizes both what is expendable and the obedient resolve that triumphed. Because of this triumph of will and obedience to God, Christ lives on a new level of existence transcending the old existence of the body.[262]

From the selection of animals, to the butchering, to the cooking, and finally to the distribution and eating of meat, the signs of the truth of patrilineal kinship were on display with the deity as the guarantor of the commensurability between the body of the animal and the bodies of participants in sacrifice and its accompanying meal. With an absent κύριος and an absent sacrificial animal, however, Paul attempts to reorganize the remaining meal elements and activities into an array that still includes a differentiation between the Corinthians' festive meal as a distinguishing mark of the community — without, of course, the usual mode of distinction, θυσία — and everyday meals. Yet, the strategies that were employed in maintaining these divisions in sacrificial practice — testing, examination, and so on — are appropriated by Paul in the service of producing a different body, one divided between σάρξ (flesh) and πνεῦμα (spirit). Without the body of a sacrificial animal present, these strategies are focused on the bodies of the

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[261] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 11.

[262] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 11–12.

members of the community in order to provide the evidence — that is, the truth — of the internal "true" self, the self that facilitates "the priority of the social body over the desires of one's body."[263] This self is designed by Paul to address the issues of diversity in a social body that can no longer be easily homologized with ideology and practices of patrilineal kinship.

We might, however, slightly disagree with Stowers that this represents a "new order of power," as he states elsewhere.[264] While Paul has certainly reorganized some significant aspects within the array of practices we have just analyzed, the result is simply another modality of (male) sovereign power.[265] For Paul, the division of the individual between the body and the self not only has the capacity to erase all division in the social body (1 Cor 1:10), but also is what allows one to become one πνεῦμα with the κύριος(6:17). Moreover, Paul's Christ is a vehicle through which the sovereign power typically constituted in the male hegemony of the οἶκος, πολίς, and state is transferred to those who are relatively marginal: "not many of you were wise according to the flesh, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth" (1:26).[266] This transfer of power is accomplished through its

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[263] Stowers, "On Construing Meals," 12.

[264] Stanley K. Stowers, "Elusive Coherence: Ritual and Rhetoric in 1 Corinthians 10–11," in *Reimagining Christian Origins: A Colloquium Honoring Burton L. Mack* (ed. Elizabeth A. Castelli and Hal Taussig; Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), 79.

[265] While this is, in fact, close to what Stowers suggests, I (politely) differ in describing this mode as "new." He puts it this way: "Now alongside ancient lineages of aristocrats, whose power had always been based in the land, sheep, and cattle that they owned and sacrificed, would stand commoners and freedmen who wielded power derived from the patronage of cities and emperors rather than from the ownership of animals and land" (Stowers, "Elusive Coherence," 79).

[266] I say "relatively marginal" because even though Paul asserts that the Corinthians do not occupy the social positions usually associated with power, and even though there is some evidence that women and slaves are members of the group, there are indications that the members of the *ekklēsia* have some social "capital," such as literacy, a

internalization in the form of bodily "signs" revealed through self-examination, primarily in terms of what and how one eats (8:1–13; 11:27–34) and with whom one has sexual intercourse with (5:1–13; 6:9–7:7; 7:25–39). These "morals," however, must continually distinguish between bodies that are "spiritual" and those that are not (2:14–15). What this means, then, is that Paul's project, the κυριακὸν δεῖπνον with its corresponding truth practices, is the production of a ritualized body that perpetually generates the very difference that it is trying to and must erase.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, certain practices can be utilized for the purpose of investing the body with particular modes of power through the production of truth. Confession, testing, and self-examination are strategies that appropriate the ritualized environments of torture, sacrifice, and the κυριακὸν δεῖπνον in the Greco-Roman world. These are strategies that place bodies at the centre-stage in relations of power. In this way, bodies are used to generate the distinctions necessary in order to constitute a social place: state, *oikos*, *and ekklēsia*. "It is," as Michel de Certeau describes, "an effort to delimit one's own place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other."[267]

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basic level of education, the time for leisure, household ownership, the financial resources to hold communal festive occasions, being invited to dinner parties, and so on.

[267] Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 36.

4

Making Meaningful Differences: Confessional Practice in the *Didache*

Οδοὶ δύο εἰσί,
μία τῆς ζωῆς καὶ μία τοῦ θανάτου,
διαφορὰ δὲ πολλὴ μεταξὺ τῶν δύο ὁδῶν.

There is two ways,
one of life and one of death,
there is a great difference between the two ways (*Did* 1:1).

The *Didache* opens with an adaptation of a very common topos in ancient Greek moral philosophy, the Hebrew Bible, early Judaism, and early Christianity.[268] In *Memorabilia*, for instance, Xenophon has Socrates quote Hesiod's fable of Prodicus in which Heracles is faced with a crossroad in the transition from childhood to adolescence:

> φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὡρμᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν δι᾽ ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέψονται ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται (2.1.21)
>
> When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth's estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place, and sat pondering which road to take.[269]

For Xenophon's Socrates, Heracles' predicament, which becomes personified by two women (2.1.22–34), illustrates the necessity of training or education (παίδευσιν) in order to produce in oneself a particular way of life (βίος)

[268] Examples of the varied use of the two way topos abound from the ways of virtue/vice (Philo *Spec. leg*. 4.108), to the righteous/impious ways of Ps 1:1–6, to the extremely popular ways of light and darkness (Prov 2:13; 4:18–19; 2 Enoch 30:15, 1QS 3:18–4:26; *Barn* 18:1; *Doctr* 1:1). See Niederwimmer's extensive list, *The Didache*, 59–63.

[269] Xenophon, *Xenophon: Xenophon in Seven Volumes* (trans. E. C. Marchant; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923).

characterized by practicing self-control (ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν) in matters of food, sexual intercourse, and sleep (2.1.1). The goal of the production of virtue is not merely for virtue's sake; it is, for Xenophon, a bodily technology of power, for the one who has been trained and practices this βίος will be capable of ruling (ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, 2.1.1). Similarly, the *Didache* not only delineates the opposition between life and death as a fundamental part of its pedagogy, its way of teaching (τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διδαχῆς, 6:1) for initiates into its ἐκκλησία (*Did* 7:1), but also attempts to inscribe it on the body through the prescription of an ongoing ritual practice for its members—that is to say, a ritual pedagogy. The *Didache,* however, makes explicit that which is often only assumed in many of the variations of this topos: the production and organization of *difference.*

While the *Didache* orders an array of activities similar to some of the Greco-Roman groups analyzed previously, there are distinctive ways in which each group utilizes cultural strategies within these arrays. In chapter two, I organized these strategies into three dimensions, the construction of tradition, the division of time and space, and social organization, and showed from the inscriptions of associations and *oikos* cults how these "liturgies" structure a ritual environment with particular social effects. I added to this web, in chapter three, a specific type of technology employed within these ritual environments that aids in the generation of power through the bodily production of an index of knowledge. This knowledge becomes truth when self-examination, surveillance by others, tests of authenticity, and confession of faults are used to establish, maintain, and regulate social and political identities in judicial, medical, and social contexts. In this final chapter, I will assess how the imperatives to confess one's faults in the *Didache* participate in the constitution of an embodied sense of virtuosity and

compare it to the οἶκος inscription of Dionysius and Paul's κυριακὸν δεῖπνον. In order to facilitate a comparison based on analogy and not homology, I will suggest that the *Didache*'s strategic misrecognition regarding the discourse of pure sacrifice illustrates the need to adjust Bell's understanding of misrecognition within ritualization.

Two Left Feet: Confession in Didache

The *Didache* prescribes the confession of faults, first, at the end of the "way of life" in the Two Ways section (*Did* 4:14), and then repeats a similar imperative at the beginning of a passage on the εὐχαριστίας, the "thanksgiving" meal in *Did* 14:1–3. As we can see below, the latter text expands in some ways on the former:

Did 4:14	*Did* 14:1–2
ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ[270] in [the] assembly	κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου συναχθέντες κλάστε ἄρτον And according to the lordliest[271] [day/rule] of the Lord, having gathered, break bread
ἐξομολογήσῃ τὰ παραπτώματα σου· confess your failings	καὶ εὐχαριστήσατε προεξομολογησάμενοι[272] τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν ὅπως καθαρὰ ἡ θυσία ὑμῶν ᾖ

[270] ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ only appears in H, see discussion below.

[271] See below for a discussion regarding the translation of the phrase κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου.

[272] H reads πρὸςἐξομολογησάμενοι followed by Rordorf and Milavec. Niederwimmer (*The Didache*, 196n13), however, argues for this emendation following Harnack and Audet.

	and eucharistize, having already confessed your failings, so that your sacrifice may be pure
καὶ ὁυ προσελεύσῃ ἐπὶ προσευχήν σου ἐν συνειδήσει πονηρᾷ and do not go to your prayer with a bad conscience	πᾶς δὲ ἔχων τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν μετὰ τοῦ ἑταίρου αὐτοῦ μὴ συνελθέτω ὑμῖν, ἕως οὗ διαλλαγῶσιν, ἵνα μὴ κοινωθῇ ἡ θυσία ὑμῶν. but each one having a dispute with his companion, do not let him come together with you, in order that your sacrifice may not be defiled.

In both cases, the infractions one is to confess are termed παραπτώματα, "missteps," continuing the imagery of the ὁδοὶ δύο and confession is to take place in front of the community (ἐν ἐκκλησία, συναχθέντες).[273] This is not to say that both passages refer to or reflect an autonomous ritual(s); rather, confession is a strategy used within a ritual environment in order to homologize eating, textual, and other practices with a ritualized body. While *Did* 7 explicitly links the Two Ways as pedagogy before initiation, ταῦτα πάντα προειπόντες, βαπτίσατε, it does not directly connect baptism and confession (cf. Matt 3:6; Mark 1:5) but implies an ongoing disciplinary expectation for initiated members (c.f. James 5:16; 1 *Clem* 51:3).

The reason given, in *Did* 4:14, for practicing confession is so that one does not pray with a συνειδήσει πονηρᾷ, a "bad conscience." One should be careful not to imagine this confessional practice as an introspective examination of a sinful conscience (importing the Protestant theology of grace through faith), but rather it

[273] *Psalms of Solomon* (10.6) also recommends a confession in the assembly.

is concerned with upholding the moral instruction of the Two Ways.[274] This is indicated by the use of παραπτώματα instead of ἁμαρτία, which is the term used more frequently for failings or errors (cf. the "confession" inscriptions in Chapter Two; Josephus *Antiq.* 8.129; *Asenath* 12.4; *Dan* 9:20 (LXX); Matt 3:6/Mark 1:5; James 5:6). In fact, two of the Greek sacrificial calendars also refer to having a "clean" or "pure" mind before entering the οἶκος temple area.[275] What is implied in these inscriptions is an interest in the concealment of past, or the intention of future, purity infractions.[276] The "bad conscience" and the vice lists of the *Didache* are, in an analogous way, an affront to the integrity of the community and not to the κύριος *per se*.[277]

Although, it should be noted that only Codex Hierosolymitanus (H) has the phrase ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ. Jonathan Draper argues that because both the *Apostolic Constitutions*, which is dependent on the *Didache*'s version of the Two Ways, and *Barnabas* and *Epitome*, which are dependent on a different recension of the Two Ways,[278] omit ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, its appearance in H should be regarded as a gloss from

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[274] Rordorf considers συνειδήσει πονηρᾷ, " a bad conscience," to particularly refer to the disputes of 14:2. This interpretation is unlikely given that the context of 4:14 is in the midst of the instructions on the Two Ways, which would then imply that what causes a "bad conscience" is related to the entire moral code of the community. See Rordorf, *The Eucharist of the Early Christians*, 16.

[275] *LSS*, 108; *LSCG*, 139.

[276] The inscription for the Dionysios οἶκος (LSAM 20) is more explicit in this regard: "[Those who enter] are not to refrain in any respect from being well-intentioned [εὐνοεῖν] towards this οἶκος. If anyone performs or plots any of these things, they are neither to put up with it or keep silent, but expose it and defend themselves" (23–25).

[277] Contra Rordorf who states, "C'est-à-dire qu'ils confessent à Dieu leurs péchés et qu'ils soient en parfaite entente entre eux" ("La rémission des péchés selon la Didachè," *Irénikon* 46 [1973]: 283).

[278] For an illustration of the relationships between the texts containing the Two Ways, see John S. Kloppenborg, "*Didache* 1.1–6.1, James, and the Torah," in *Trajectories*

the eleventh century copyist. This argument is directed at the more widely held position that ἐν ἐκκλησία is an addition made sometime in the second century by the compiler of the *Didache*.[279] Draper finds Niederwimmer's suggestion that the phrase's absence in the *Apostolic Constitutions* is an attempt to reconcile with a later situation, when public confession is no longer practiced,[280] is untenable because "later practice moves precisely towards such a 'general confession.'"[281] He also appeals to a grammatical difference between the two passages (4:14 uses singular verbs, whereas 14:1 uses plural) as an indication that this confession is individual.[282] Even though the omission in the *Apostolic Constitutions* does raise serious concerns, Draper's dismissal of Niederwimmer rests on the problematic premise of a straight and even evolutionary development of confession with apparently no room for deviation. Moreover, his point regarding the sources of the Two Ways assumes a single original document for all the traditions. Although this view is widely held,[283] there are at least two versions of the "Jewish" Two Ways recognized by these scholars: the version in 1QS, which has some affinities to the

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Through the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers (ed. Andrew F. Gregory and C. M. Tuckett; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 196.

[279] Harnack, *Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel*, 17; Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 113; Aaron Milavec, *The Didache: Faith, Hope, & Life of the Earliest Christian Communities, 50-70 C.E.* (Mahwah, N.J.: Newman Press, 2003), 167–8; Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache*, 155.

[280] See Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 113 n. 14.

[281] Jonathan A. Draper, "Pure Sacrifice in *Didache* 14 as Jewish Christian Exegesis," *Neot* 42 (2008): 232.

[282] Draper, "Pure Sacrifice," 232.

[283] For example, see Sandt and Flusser, *The Didache*; Niederwimmer, *The Didache*; Kloppenborg, "*Didache* 1.1–6.1, James, and the Torah"; idem, "The Transformation of Moral Exhortation in Did 1–5," in *The Didache in Context: Essays on Its Text, History, and Transmission* (ed. Clayton N Jefford; Supplements to Novum Testamentum; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 89–109.

"Christian" versions of the Two Ways but is not directly connected to them, and the version that the "Christian" Two Ways have adapted. This begs the question: if there are two, why not more? While these problems with Draper's argument do not erase the possibility that ἐν ἐκκλησία is a much later addition, I will proceed here with the majority view.

The insertion of ἐν ἐκκλησία into the *Didache* is used as evidence of the type of confession that is often expressed in terms of public/communal or private/individual. While such an addition certainly helps to highlight the social aspect of confession, it is, in fact, not necessary as confession is an intrinsically social behaviour whether performed in front of a community or by oneself to an invisible deity. This is because, as the *Didache* makes clear, the moral code against which one "sins" is something generated outside of the individual in the array of practice of others. Confession is involved in a dialectical operation whereby this normativity is inculcated and regulated in the body and, in turn, the body generates and maintains this normativity in practice.

Additionally, the *Didache* also does not imagine a communal confession, that is, a confession *as a group* for the failings of the group, but rather a confession of an individual in front of the community. This is also implied by *Did* 4:3: "Do not cause dissention, and reconcile those who quarrel; judge justly, do not show partially when reproving failings." It is true that a major scholar of the *Didache*, Willy Rordorf asserts that confession in the *Didache* is a type of communal prayer. He claims that this common prayer is a liturgical confession of the general "sinfulness" of the community without specifying particular failings, similar to the prayer found in *1 Clement* 60:1-2.[284] Yet, as Milavec demonstrates, everything

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[284] Rordorf, *The Eucharist of the Early Christians*, 16.

regarding Rordorf's communal prayer is problematic from his curious reading of *1 Clement*[285] to the suggestion that the confession is in the form of a "prayer."[286] Nevertheless, my concern here is not to argue what specific kind of ritual the *Didache* is prescribing. Rather, by pointing out that confession is inherently social, I am suggesting that *Didache* needs to be analyzed for what it is doing with confession. This leads to examining the way confession contributes to the ordering of the *Didache*'s ritual array of tradition, time and space, and social organization.

Tradition and Epic Imagination

One way in which the *Didache* attempts to forge continuity with the past is through its "epic imagination," as Jonathan Reed has put it. For Reed, epic is "the way in which the community imagines a set of stories or symbols with respect to the past, as well as the community's imagination of how these stories and symbols relate to the community's present."[287] Viewing the construction of tradition in this way is an alternative to seeing the *Didache* as representative of a hybridized "sect" determining itself in relation to a putatively "normative" Judaism or Christianity. Epic imaginations are, instead, constructed from various cultural materials

[285] Rordorf ("La rémission des péchés selon la Didachè") claims that 1 *Clem.* 60.1–2 provides an example of the type of prayer that the *Didache* community might have used for confession. Milavec (*The Didache*, 542) rightly points out, however, that 1 *Clem.* does not place this prayer in the context of either a confession of faults or a festive meal.

[286] Milavec, *The Didache*; this confessional practice should also not be considered as an individual "prayer," thus following Niederwimmer, who states, "it is highly improbable that προσευχήν refers to private prayers" (*The Didache*, 113 n. 15).

[287] Jonathan Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," in *The Didache in Context: Essays on Its Text, History, and Transmission* (ed. Clayton N Jefford; Supplements to Novum Testamentum; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 214.

available, including Hebrew literature and historiography, popular folklore, and past social institutions.

Using this approach, Reed sifts through the major sections of the *Didache* in order to discern how "all previous symbols, texts, and traditions are combined into a coherent whole."[288] A major contributor to this epic are the Hebrew Scriptures. He finds in the Two Ways a clear attempt at providing continuity with the Decalogue, particularly evident in a style and "theology" similar to Deuteronomy. Moreover, this continuity is extended to the sayings of Jesus, which are assimilated into the Two Ways as a "natural" extension of the Decalogue.[289] The ritual instructions of *Didache* 7–10 are framed so as to permit the "resumption of the true Israel." For instance, in regard to the eucharistic prayers of chapters 9–10, Reed explains,

> the *Didache* proclaims, in essence, that what was once scattered as Israel will be gathered together form the corners of the earth as the church. And the spatial focus, or the centre of the universe, is the community itself—not Zion, not Jerusalem, not Israel as a place. References to Hebrew scriptures which focus upon the land, or Jerusalem as a holy city, or the temple as a place for worship are absent in the *Didache*.[290]

The community rules of *Did* 11–15, which focus on social roles, continue the transfer from Israel to the ἐκκλησία. Ancient prophets are the ἐκκλησία's apostles and prophets (11:11), high priests are associated with prophets and teachers (chap 13), and sacrifice is ἐκκλησία's "thanksgiving" meal (14:1).[291]

Reed concludes from this analysis that

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[288] Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," 215.

[289] Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," 219.

[290] Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," 220.

[291] Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," 221.

> [t]he *Didache* represents, in my estimation, a community that has long since determined its place within its epic imagination. The community of the *Didache* found an important source for its epic imagination within the stories, themes, and passages of the Hebrew Scriptures, and in fact has transferred important items within the tradition to its own epic: past temple sacrifices are now communal meals; officiating priests are now prophets, teachers and apostles; and the temple is now the church. The community views itself as the true Israel, has grafted itself into the Davidic lineage, and has gathered itself from within the diaspora.[292]

Such a conclusion, however, is slightly at odds with some implications of "epic" imagination. The stability that Reed wants to assign to the *Didache* is claimed to be the result of a coagulation of cultural material into a cohesive and coherent whole; rather, I would argue from the perspective of ritualization that the apparent unity of the *Didache* is merely an effect of the textualization and mythmaking processes. The "epic" imagination of the *Didache* is caught in an always fluid and dynamic social process. This is especially evident in the way that different parts of the text, for instance the Two Ways, are selected and adapted for use in other "liturgies."

Furthermore, while Reed points to the modification of the selected cultural material, this is primarily for the purposes of re-interpretation. This suggests that identity markers such as the "true" Israel, the Davidic lineage, and diaspora are part of an implicit, already-out-there "Jewishness" which the *Didache* is reinterpreting to fit with a new situation consisting of no temple, geographical distance from Jerusalem, and Jesus adherence. This neglects, however, the way the *Didache*, by the very selection and modification of the content for its epic imagination, constructs and participates in the normalization of the "Jewishness" of this material.

The so-called "Christianization" of the "Jewish" material of the *Didache* is well recognized. The insertion of the Jesus tradition *Did* 1.3b–2.1, although

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[292] Reed, "The Hebrew Epic and the Didache," 224.

unattributed, into the Two Ways is often cited as evidence of this hybridization.[293] Kloppenborg, however, has pointed out a curious and simultaneous process occurring within the text. Along with "Christianization," a term Kloppenborg likewise seems uncomfortable with, there is evidence of the "Torahizing" of the Two Ways. He argues that "Torahizing" is first demonstrated by the use of a particular syntactical structure characteristic of the LXX version of the Decalogue.[294] Secondly, the *Didache* adds three terms — πορνεῖναι, κλοπαί, and ψευδομαρτυρίαι — found in the Decalogue but absent in *Barnabas*.[295] Even though he considers the "Torahizing" to have occurred mostly in an earlier recension,[296] this is mostly inconsequential for our purposes here. What is important is that the *Didache* appropriates this material in a way that maintains its underlying appeal to the self-evident authority of the Decalogue. "The fact that the framer of the document can do this," Kloppenborg argues,

> implies that the text is edited and employed in an environment in which the authority of the Torah can be taken for granted. This is different, for example, from the environment of those persons who are represented by the Sayings Gospel Q, where at least in its early stages the Torah is never

[293] For example, the *Barnabas* version of the Two Ways contains very few "Christian" features.

[294] This syntactical structure is "the use of οὐ with the second person singular future indicative, and the asyndetic structure of the string of prohibitions" (Kloppenborg, "The Transformation of Moral Exhortation," 100).

[295] Kloppenborg, "The Transformation of Moral Exhortation," 100.

[296] Kloppenborg ("The Transformation of Moral Exhortation in *Did.* 1–5," 99–100) explains, "Where *Barn* mentions only adultery and covetousness (19.4, 6), the *Did/Doctrina* (and *Canons*) list murder, adultery, theft (omitted in the *Doct*), covetousness, and false witness…The agreement between the *Didache*, the *Doctrina*, and the *Canons* in their introduction of other prohibitions from the decalogue indicates that the "Torahizing" of this section of the Christian Two Ways document was not the innovation of the Didachist, but already belonged to an earlier recension."

> the source of the argument. Nor has the Torah been problematized, as it was in Pauline circles.[297]

The "Torahizing" of the *Didache*'s Two Way nicely illustrates that the addition of Jesus material to the *Didache* is not a syncretistic corruption of a purely Jewish document. Rather, it shows that the Two Ways, like the rest of the *Didache*, is caught up into a textual process of appropriating—and reconstituting—a past in service of the present.

Seeing the construction of tradition in such a way as "epic" imagination allows a point of comparison with the οἶκος examined in chapter two. There I pointed out how Dionysius' creative integration of the cults of Zeus and Agdistis simultaneously provided a means of unification under the sovereign authority of Zeus (and by extension Dionysius) and produced difference not only through the distinction between the role of the gods, but also by social hierarchization. The *Didache,* in an analogous way, combines and orders Hebrew and Jesus traditions. Within the *Didache*, the two traditions are integrated in with much more ambiguity, for instance the unattributed Jesus material in the Two Ways (1.3b–2:1) and several references to κύριοςwhich could be taken as either Jesus or YHWH.[298] This ambiguity, however, effectively contributes to the sense that the two traditions are but one. In terms of making difference, it is this ambiguous conglomerate that helps to distinguish the *Didache* from other groups interested either in Jesus, such as the Q and Pauline communities which displayed much

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[297] Kloppenborg, "The Transformation of Moral Exhortation," 102.

[298] Besides κυρίος in the title, which may be a very late addition (Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 56-57; Zangenberg, "Reconstructing," 46), see *Did* 4:13; 6:2; 9:5; 10:5; 11:2; 11:8; 14:1,3.

more tension between the traditions, as pointed out by Kloppenborg above, or in the Hebrew traditions.

The *Didache* also employs a long string of oppositions that help to produce and maintain a sense of coherence for this mythmaking project. Some of the more significant oppositions include: life/death (1:1), spiritual (10:3)/fleshly (1:4), self-control/desire (1:4), true/false (12:1), peace/division (4:2–3), imperishable/perishable (4:8), taught/not taught (4:9), gathered/separated (4:2, 14; 9:4), ἐκκλησία/hypocrites (8:1–2); heaven/earth (8:2); ignorance/knowledge (10:2); true/false prophets (11:3–12); pure/defiled (14:2). These are coordinated with practices such as baptism, fasting, a festive meal, and a programme of pedagogy in order to produce a particular social formation which seeks to produce the continuity of a "way of life," a ὁδὸς ζωῆς, a τρόπος, through its textualization and ritualization. This necessitates the practice of "teaching" (διδάσκω, 4:9; 6:1; 11:1, 10), which, in turn, provides the legitimization for "teachers" (διδάσκαλος, 13:2; 15:1), that is, specialized male experts with authorized knowledge of the "way." Thus, as patrilineal kinship was generated through the distribution and consumption of the bodies of sacrificial animals, the *Didache's* ὁδὸς ζωῆς — which is also a type of idealized (male) urban cosmopolitanism — is generated through the distribution and consumption of texts. This also suggests that, although there are festive meals and the use of disciplinary strategies both in groups that sacrifice and those that do not, these practices play different strategic roles in the liturgical ordering of each group.

An explicit corollary to the pedagogical aspects of the text is the concern to distinguish this teaching from other teaching, as in 11:2: "If the teacher [ὁ διδάσκων], having gone astray, teaches [διδάσκῃ] another teaching [ἄλλην διδαχὴν][299] in order to abolish it, do not listen to him." This concern is expressed in terms of truth and genuineness, and is diffused throughout the *Didache.* The second commandment of the διδαχή of the Two Ways contains prohibitions against perjury (ἐπιορκήσεις, 2:3), false testimony (ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, 2:3), double-mindedness (διγνώμων, 2:4), speaking false and worthless words (οὐκ ἔσται ὁ λόγος σου ψευδής, ψευδής, οὐ κενός, 2:5; see also 3:5), and hypocrisy (ὑποκριτὴς, 2:6; see also 4:12). The way of death, mainly composed as a list of vices that repeats many of these infractions, is characterized as the way of those who hate truth and love a lie (μισοῦντες ἀλήθειαν, ἀγαπῶντες ψεῦδος, 5:2).[300]

It is not surprising, then, that in the section on the treatment of outsiders, those who come in the name of the κύριοςare to be both welcomed *and* subjected to an examination (δοκιμάσαντες), a complex greeting that apparently provides the means to distinguish the truth (δεξιὰν καὶ ἀριστεράν, lit. "right" and "left," 12:1). Such examinations are also a means of verifying individuals for social roles inside the community: διδάσκαλος ἀληθινός, "true teachers," (13:1), prophets examined to be true (προφήτης δεδοκιμασμένος ἀληθινὸς, 11:10), and the ἐπισκόπους and διακόνους, *men* who are humble, not greedy, true and approved

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[299] The Coptic MSS (5th cent.) reads αλλας διδαχας.

[300] On the male hegemony of such lists, see Fredrik Ivarsson, "Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity: The Rhetorical Function of 1 Corinthians 5:10–11 and 6:9–10," in *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses* (ed. Todd C Penner and Caroline Vander Stichele; Brill, 2007), 161–184.

(ἄνδρας πραεῖς καὶ ἀφιλαργύρους καὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ δεδοκιμασμένους, 15:1). It is also important to note that evidence of being of the truth is not *belief*, but rather a prophet's τρόπων, his "ways" or, probably better, "lifestyle" (11:3–12).[301]

The final chapter of the *Didache* raises the stakes by turning the surveillance of behaviour onto oneself (Γρηγορεῖτε ὑπὲρ τῆς ζωῆς ὑμῶν, "Watch over your life," 16:1) and elevating the realm of consequence from a merely temporal utopian fantasy in the here and now to a cosmic fantasy in which history comes to an end (ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις, 16:3) and all humanity is put to the fiery test (τὴν πύρωσιν τῆς δοκιμασίας, 16:5). The few who have endured in their fidelity will be saved (οἱ δὲ ὑπομείναντες ἐν τῇ πίστει αὐτῶν, 16:5),[302] which seems to mean some type of everlasting life (ζωὴν αἰώνιον, 10:3). Along with examination, "truth" strategies such as mutual correction (ἐλέγχετε, 15:3; 4:3), shunning (14:2; 15:3), and confession (ἐξομολογήσῃ, 4:14; 14:1) are intended to regulate the spontaneous bodily performance of the ὁδὸς ζωῆς.

[301] In *Allegory*, Philo interprets Gen 29:35 and 49:15 as symbols of the man (Judah) who practices confession. He also asserts in connection to this confession that the feeling of gratitude—which, in order to be "genuine," is often considered, in modern times, to require some level of spontaneity—needs to be taught: "Why then as he had called the sapphire the green stone, did he not also speak of the red stone? Because Judah, as the type of a disposition inclined to confession (ὁ ἐξομολογητικὸς τρόπος), is a being immaterial and incorporeal. For the very name of confession (ἐξομολογήσεως) shows that it is a thing external to himself. For when the mind is beside itself, and bears itself upward to God, as the laughter of Isaac did, then it makes a confession to him who alone has a real being. But as long as it considers itself as the cause of something, it is a long way from yielding to God, and confession to him. For this very act of confessing ought to be considered as being the work not of the soul, but of God who teaches it this feeling of gratitude. Accordingly Judah, who practices confession, is an immaterial being" (1:82).

[302] Niederwimmer (*The Didache*, 221) and others translate πίστις here as "belief," which cannot be correct considering the *Didache's* stress on remaining "perfect" to the ὁδὸς ζωῆς. Milavec's (*The Didache*, 44-45) translation is rather ambigious: "the ones having remained firm in their faith," although it mostly retains the stress on faith as belief. Instead, fidelity is a more fitting choice. This is not without analogy to the debates over πίστις Χριστοῦ in Pauline letters. For an example of that discussion, see Hung-sik Choi, "Pistis in Galatians 5:5–6: Neglected Evidence for the Faithfulness of Christ," *JBL* 124 (2005): 467–490.

The Spectre of Sacrifice

Like the associations analyzed in the previous chapters, the *Didache* emphasizes a festive meal as a significant part of the group activities of the ἐκκλησία. This particular meal is designated as a εὐχαριστίας, a "thanksgiving" meal (9:1). It has a libation (9:2) and a distribution of bread (9:3), each with an associated thanksgiving prayer, and only those who have been initiated may participate (9:5).[303] This meal also concludes with a final giving of thanks to the πάτερ ἅγιε, the sacred father (10:1). The *Didache's* εὐχαριστίας does not feature θυσία in consideration of the earlier prohibition to "strictly avoid 'idol' meat" (ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ εἰδωλοθύτου λίαν πρόσεχε, 6:3).

This meal also was to occur on a specific day, which many scholars consider to be a weekly occurrence on Sunday, possibly providing a distinction to Sabbath observance.[304] The assertion that the εὐχαριστίας meal, and the required confession beforehand (14:1), occurred weekly, however, is predicated on the very difficult phrase κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου. Most commentators follow Niederwimmer in that this is a pleonastic way of referring to the 'Lord's Day' and

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[303] Much has been made regarding the differences between the *Didache*'s meal and, especially, Paul's description of the κυριακὸν δεῖπνον in 1 Corinthians. Often noted are the reverse order of the cup and the bread, the Davidic discourse, the absence of the so-called words of institution, and the absence of any connection to the martyr myth of Christ. The concern over these differences, however, results from presumption of a shared origin of the two practices. Once this assumption is left aside such aspects are simply an indication of two different types of meals that were used to honour Jesus in some way. The length limitations of this thesis prevent me from following up on an interesting implication. From a practice perspective, such characteristics would not be the result of divergent *beliefs* regarding Jesus but are an effect of a difference in practice.

[304] Niederwimmer, *The Didache*; Milavec, *The Didache*; Willy Rordorf and André Tuilier, *La doctrine des douze apôtres* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978); Audet, *La didachè*.

assert that the implied noun of the adjective κυριακὴν ("lordly") should be ἡμεραν ("day"). This is not the only possibility, though. Samuele Bacchiocchi suggests that the implied noun should be 'rule' (τὴν ἐντοήν) and not 'day' because: (1) the implied antecedent occurs at the end of the previous sentence, δόξῃ δὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐντολήν (13:5), and (2) κατὰ is never used in the *Didache* in reference to time but rather commonly in relation to acting according to the given rule (1:5; 4:13).[305] While plausible, it is more likely a reference to an annual festival, as Tidwell and Draper have suggested. After noting the problems with Lord's Day and Sunday interpretations, Tidwell has convincingly argued that κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου resembles the structure of Hebrew superlatives in which a noun in the singular is joined to its own plural in the genitive, and in the case of the tetragrammaton, YHWH, the Greek translation of the LXX uses the anarthrous κύριος.[306] As a superlative, he suggests that it would denote, "the greatest of the Lord's days," akin to "Sabbath of Sabbaths."[307] Tidwell argues that this would then be a reference to Yom Kippur.[308] Draper also argues for an annual festival but places the passage in a baptismal context and sees κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου as a reference to an annual Easter/*Pesach* festival.[309] While both possibilities are plausible, they are far from certain.

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[305] Samuele Bacchiocchi, *From Sabbath to Sunday: A Historical Investigation of the Rise of Sunday Observance in Early Christianity* (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University Press, 1977), 114.

[306] Neville L. A. Tidwell, "*Didache* XIV:1 (ΚΑΤΑ ΚΥΡΙΑΚΗΝ ΔΕ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ) Revisited," *VC* 53 (1999): 200.

[307] Tidwell, "*Didache* XIV," 202.

[308] Tidwell, "*Didache* XIV," 203–206.

[309] Draper, "Pure Sacrifice," 229.

Nevertheless, the identification of the specific festival is not of central importance. Rather, it is by designating this particular occasion the κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ κυρίου — if indeed it is a specific day — that the *Didache* places the εὐχαριστίας meal in an order of time belonging to the κύριος, the absent sovereign of the ἐκκλησία. This order of time includes fasting on different days (Wednesday and Friday) than the hypocrites (Monday and Thursday) (8:1), a past time of the ἀρχαῖοι προφῆται, the "ancient prophets" (11:11), and a future that will end with chaos and the fiery test (τὴν πύρωσιν τῆς δοκιμασίας, 16:5) of the last days (ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις, 16:3). The final chapter is particularly interesting because it both directly links the order of time to the "way of life" through maintaining "perfection" (16:2; cf. 1:4; 6:2) and it also places the entire pedagogical project and the *raison d'être* of the group, the gathering of the ἑκκλησία, in a state of emergency of the ἒσχατος καίρος, a perpetual crisis of time, "for you do not know the time in which our lord comes" (οὐ γὰρ οἴδατε τὴν ὥραν, ἐν ᾗ ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἔρχεται, 16:1).

The εὐχαριστίας meal is located within this crisis chronology, which is coordinated with the delineation of a particular space and a discourse of sacrifice. In distinction to the οἶκος cults, the space that the *Didache* marks out is not a physical space. It is, instead, the space of the ἐκκλησία, a space marked not by stone inscriptions and sacrificial altars, but by the gathering of a people (see 9:4; 16:2) distinguished by their ὁδὸς ζωῆς and their liturgy written on parchment or scroll. As such, the space of the ἐκκλησία is portable, facilitated by activities that are not tied to any particular building.[310] The disciplinary practices — testing,

[310] This is not to say that in reality groups that styled themselves ἐκκλησίαι were more universal or translocal than οἶκος groups. Rather, these are conceptual categories that groups used to distinguish their activities from one another. Ascough ("Translocal

confession, and vice lists — that ensured the integrity of the link between sacrifice and οἶκος and provided a means of identity production are deployed in the *Didache* in order to homologize the ὁδὸς ζωῆς with the ἐκκλησία and to generate, regulate, and maintain their coherent coincidence in a ritualized body.

The *Didache* also invokes "pure" sacrifice, θυσίαν καθαράν, as a rhetorical device to justify both confession (14:1) and shunning of members (v. 2) engaged in some type of conflict. This sacrificial discourse is legitimated through an authoritative "citation" of Hebrew tradition (Mal 1:11, 14).[311] There has been, of course, much effort spent on trying to identify the referent of "pure" sacrifice, with suggestions ranging from the particular elements of the meal (Harnack),[312] to the whole ritual event of the meal (Rordorf, Milavec, Draper),[313] to the prayers offered during the meal (Niederwimmer, Kraft, Vööbus).[314] There have also been attempts at explaining "pure" sacrifice in terms of the so-called "spiritualization" of sacrifice, where the *Didache* is placed near the end of a developmental trajectory

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Relationships Among Voluntary Associations and Early Christianity") has demonstrated the complexity and variability of associations' relationships to particular locations and spaces.

[311] Many later Christian writers also appropriated this text from the LXX version of Malachi, for a list see Niederwimmer, *The Didache*, 199. Niederwimmer rightly points out, however, that the later authors were specifically drawing a distinction between "Christian" and "Jewish" practice, which is a connotation not explicitly emphasized here in the Didache.

[312] Harnack, *Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel*.

[313] Rordorf and Tuilier, *La doctrine des douze apôtres*; Milavec, *The Didache*; Draper, "Pure Sacrifice."

[314] Niederwimmer, *The Didache*; Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache*; Arthur Vööbus, *Liturgical traditions in the Didache.* (Stockholm: ETSE, 1968).

from sacrificial practice at the Jerusalem temple to sacrifice's idealized form, often associated with "prayer."[315]

What I would like to draw attention to, however, is that in the *Didache* "pure" sacrifice is an absence, a void. "Pure" sacrifice is a θυσία without θυσία, as 6:3 makes clear. In order for "pure" sacrifice to be itself, it transcends and erases its own referent, actual sacrifice. This is the operation that creates the sense of ambiguity in the text that allows for the multiplication of the various interpretations by scholars. These interpretations tend to be a distraction, aiding the analytical neglect of the *Didache*'s strategic use of this discourse. It is reasonably straightforward to point out that the *Didache* uses "pure" sacrifice metaphorically for the stability and unity of the ἐκκλησία, hence, for the associated concern regarding division and quarrels among members. Yet by invoking past tradition, the *Didache* is explicitly asserting a homology between the practice of θυσία and the εὐχαριστίας in terms of identity production and community formation.

This logic, however, directly contrasts the argument I made above that confession, and other disciplinary practices, are strategically employed to produce truths of the ὁδὸς ζωῆς in the ritualized bodies of the ἐκκλησία. The reason for this difference is that the homology the *Didache* creates with the discourse of pure sacrifice is a strategic *misrecognition* of what it is in fact doing. Misrecognition plays an important part in the circular operation in which ritualized bodies and ritual environments dialectically produce one another. It helps to provide and maintain a sense of coherence for the circularity of ritual practice. That is to say,

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[315] Milavec, *The Didache*; Draper, "Pure Sacrifice."

by "not see[ing] itself do what it actually does,"[316] the *Didache* contributes to the overall effectiveness of its own ritualization.

This does not mean that misrecognition is a type of ideological "false consciousness." Rather, as Bell argues, following Bourdieu,

> this act of misrecognition is essentially a strategic engagement in a struggle over symbols, a struggle in which contending factions seek 'to impose the definition of the social world most in conformity with their interests.' Misrecognition is, therefore, not a matter of being duped, but a strategy for appropriating symbols, despite how structured and structuring the symbols may prove to be in practice.[317]

Seen in this way, pure sacrifice is not merely a production of difference, a distinction that prioritizes one particular eating practice, εὐχαριστίας, over another, θυσία, through their homologization, but is the very legitimization of εὐχαριστίας as a practice. In this way, the *Didache* creates the presumption of participation, which involves, as Bell puts it, "the necessity of encouraging or inducing consent, usually be stressing the personal advantages to be had or cost be incurred by not consenting."[318]

Yet, the *Didache's* discourse of pure sacrifice also illustrates the need for an adjustment to Bell's formulation of ritualization. As I have shown, a main component to Bell's ritualization is the way ritual practice generates a symbolic and semantic systematicity through the coordination and hierarchization of oppositions. It is, as she describes, "a closed and endlessly self-deferring circular system."[319] The ordering of a space-time ritual environment in accordance with

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[316] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 87.

[317] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 190–191.

[318] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 211.

[319] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 101.

this system provides the means in which the schemes of oppositions become "socially instinctive automatisms of the body."[320] She does acknowledge the ultimate incompleteness and imperfection of this semantic order — for instance, she refers to it being an "apparent" whole[321] — which is important to allow for changes to bodies, social environments and discursive systems over time.
Yet, Bell has given too much prominence to the ability of semantic systems to impress themselves on the body. This is due, in part, to her reliance on Foucault's ontology of power.

As I argued in chapter one, however, Foucault overemphasizes the extent to which power is able to produce a subject that it can completely control. Bell carries this problem into ritualization, which can be seen in her illustration of how ritualization has the capacity for "resistance":

> A participant pressured to attend a political ritual in a totalitarian state might assert that her physical presence is consenting to what is going on, but her mind is resisting. Such participation creates the relations and the very hold of power within her person in terms of a consenting physical body experienced as distinct from a resisting mind.[322]

The resisting "mind," and the corresponding division between body and mind, of the participant is generated by the totalitarian state as a means of its own legitimation. I agree, however, with Žižek, who asserts that

> [t]here is nothing more misguided than to argue that Foucault, in Volume 1 of his History of Sexuality, opens up the way for individuals to rearticulate-resignify-displace the power mechanisms they are caught in: the whole point and strength of his forceful argumentation lies in his claim

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[320] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 99.

[321] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 125.

[322] Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 208.

> that resistances to power are generated by the very matrix they seem to oppose.[323]

Bell does not, fortunately, follow Foucault down the path of his later writings in which he finds the fantasy of pure resistance in the confessional practices of ancient Greek philosophers. In relying too heavily on Foucault's account of power, her formulation of ritualization is trapped within the circularity of power producing resistance and resistance producing power. In other words, Foucauldian resistance is ultimately futile. Bell tries to adjust for this problem by extending to the ritualized body the ability to partially determine its ritual environment. She does not, however, question the coincidence of the ritualized body with itself. What I mean by this is that at the level of the body, the process of ritualization is always incomplete and there are aspects of the body and practice that continually resist this process.

Moreover, by prioritizing the linguistic determination of the body in ritualization, Bell reifies the very thought-action dichotomy that she critiques in the first part of her book. In this way, she falls into the problems of what Stowers has called "discourse ontologies."[324] He argues that such approaches "treat the body as a text written upon by discourse" and focus primarily on the linguistic aspects of

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[323] Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 299.

[324] Stowers includes in this category those approaches, including Foucault, Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe, and Judith Butler, which "involve theories that make discursivity ontologically central and essentially a linguistic affair, even if discourse is thought to involve relations with other sorts of non-linguistic entities. Abstract and virtual linguistic-semiotic systems of difference supposedly determine or bring about social phenomena by shaping and constraining human activity. What something is is the meaning endowed upon it by a system of differences" (Stanley K. Stowers, "The Ontology of Religion," in *Introducing Religion: Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith* [ed. Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon; London; Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2008], 436).

human activity.[325] Instead, he proposes, with an assist from Schatzki's theorization of practice, that things like systems of discourse and schemes of oppositions are merely one set of behaviours among many that constitutes practice. This implies that "meaning does not derive from differences, but that meaningful differences derive from socially organized human activities, practices. Practices involve linguistic aspects, but language is dependent on the practical understanding and normativity implicit in practices."[326]

The *Didache* illustrates this difference between Bell's and Stowers's approaches to this aspect of practice. Following Bell, one would argue that the oppositions intrinsic to the discourse of pure sacrifice are embodied through participation in the εὐχαριστίας. Schemes such as sacrificed/not-sacrificed, false deities/true deities, purity/impurity, and so on, structure the ritual environment of the εὐχαριστίας through the various practices associated with the meal (eating particular kinds of food, prayer, confession and reconciliation, etc). The ritual participants would misrecognize the fact that the difference asserted in pure sacrifice is generated in their bodies as they participate in the meal. Not only would this approach reify the perspective of the *Didache*, which constitutes the difference between θυσία and εὐχαριστίας by homologizing them, but it would also assumes a direct correlation between the discourse of sacrifice and the understanding and perception of the meal by the participants. In other words, while this way of seeing the *Didache* would give credence to the view that this is an example of an early Christian eucharist meal interpreted *as* sacrifice, there is no evidence to suggest that

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[325] Stowers, "The Ontology of Religion," 436–437.

[326] Stowers, "The Ontology of Religion," 437.

this interpretation goes beyond the *Didache* to any community which may have utilized the text.

On the other hand, Stowers' approach presumes that the meal difference declared by the *Didache* is a result of practice. The practical understanding needed in order for such an assertion to make sense as the appropriate thing to do is not derived from eating, ritual or otherwise. Rather, it is constituted in *pedagogical* practice, the very practice that not only structures the *Didache*, but also, in fact, *produced* the *Didache* itself as a ritualized pedagogical text, as liturgy. When compared to the operation of θυσία, what provides the best *analogy* is not another meal practice, εὐχαριστίας, but διδαχή as both text and practice. For, it is in the use, dissection, and distribution of texts as a means of "teaching" that the very possibility of the *Didache* and the normativity of the ὁδὸς ζωῆς are generated. This is not only shown in the way the *Didache* puts particular texts to use by selection, appropriation, and dissemination, but also in the fact that the *Didache* is itself subjected to the sacrificial procedure of pedagogical practice by being variously incorporated into other liturgical texts. The confession of faults is a strategy within "teaching" practice that aims at producing the truth of the ὁδὸς ζωῆς in the bodies of the members of the ἐκκλησία. Yet, the very need for such a disciplinary strategy and its corresponding proliferation of virtues and vices in the Two Ways is evidence that the ritualization of the ὁδὸς ζωῆς is always incomplete, never final, and that bodies do, in fact, resist.

Logoi Eschatoi

There is much more that could be said, of course. I have endeavoured to show, in a very limited scope, that practice theory affords a useful and beneficial line of inquiry for socio-historical purposes. Because of the limitations of this thesis, it has only begun to scratch the surface. Just within the *Didache* itself there are many more interconnections that practice theory elucidates and which would provide additional insights and useful bases for comparison.

For instance, I merely pointed to the place of "teachers" within the pedagogical practice of the *Didache.* Yet, the approach of ritualization suggests that those who occupied such a role had a significant impact on the emergence of Christian groups in the early centuries C.E. While there has already been some suggestive work done that can provided a basis for comparison between the *Didache* and other early Jesus groups, such as Q,[327] there is much more that can be undertaken with respect to the activities of "teachers" in other Greco-Roman associations, particularly the philosophical schools.

The data from Greco-Roman associations, including early Jesus and Judean groups, also provides ample opportunity to test and refine practice theory. I have suggested that ritualization, as an approach built on practice theory, is a robust enough analytical tool for the complexity of social phenomena in the first centuries C.E. This data, though, indicates a need to re-adjust Bell's formulation of ritualization with respect to how it prioritizes the linguistic aspects of behaviour and how it frames relations of power. Finally, more theoretical work needs to be done to justify the use of ritualization instead of simply socialization. While Bell is

[327] Braun, "The Schooling of a Galilean Jesus Association"; Judge, "The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community."

careful to avoid discussing the ontology of ritual, ritualization assumes the generalizablity of the category of ritual across social phenomena. She also minimally distinguishes between ritualization and socialization based on two primarily linguistic variables, the sacred/profane dichotomy and invisible agents, the prioritization of which may not prove analytically useful.

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