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RESISTANCE IN HENGELO (O),
THE NETHERLANDS DURING WORLD WAR II.

BY



ANNETTE E. RICHARDSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY.

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1987



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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled RESISTANCE IN..... HENGELO (O) DURING WORLD WAR II.....
.....
submitted by .Annette E. Richardson.....
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts.....

To Alfred Charles, a blank page, not because I do not know what to say, but because I do not know where to begin.

ABSTRACT

The regionalism which has traditionally pervaded the Netherlands is also quite evident in Dutch historiography. The World War II period in Dutch studies is well represented with countless monographs but focusses mainly on the more populous west. The purpose of this study is to indicate that events of national significance also occurred in the eastern Netherlands, especially the Twente region, during the World War II period. It will be argued that the strike that broke out in Hengelo, Overijssel in April 1943 was the turning point of the resistance against the occupying authorities. The protest activities carried out by church leaders, doctors, professors and students before the strike had largely been ineffective. After the strike Netherlanders realized that the aim of the occupying authorities was to subjugate their country to the German war effort politically, socially and economically. The face of the resistance movement changed significantly after the strike from one of protest to one of active, militant resistance. For that reason alone the eastern Netherlands deserves greater historical recognition.



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This study could not have been completed without the help of a number of people and they deserve to be thanked for their contributions. The help I received at all the archives in the Netherlands was outstanding but I wish to point out that without the special attention I received at the State Institute for War Documentation this study could not have been completed. In Hengelo the library staff at Stork was efficient and at all times supportive of my endeavours and they often went out of their way to be helpful. I also wish to thank the people who kindly agreed to be interviewed.

My thanks go to the Snyder family not only for the use of their family archives but also for allowing me to interrupt their family life during my studies, my gratitude knows no bounds. Many thanks also go to Bennie and Bettie Helthuis who have affectionately become my manager and my secretary. Dika Kelder has inspired me and supported me both here and in the Netherlands, her example guides me in many ways. And I wish to thank Hans Kelder, for reasons he well knows.

The University of Alberta was quite instrumental regarding my thesis. The support I received from President Myer Horowitz, the Vice-Presidents and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research cannot be equated. The Executive of the Graduate Students' Association also gave me strong support for which I will always be grateful. Sam Proskin and Len Todd also deserve a thank you for their help with charts. In the History Department I wish to thank Betty Florchyk whose

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kindness was much appreciated. I also wish to thank my committee members, Dr. David Moss, Dr. George Rothrock and Dr. Leslie Green. However, my greatest appreciation goes to Dr. Helen Liebel-Weckowicz, without her excellent supervision and guidance I could not have completed my studies.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Considering the voluminous material written about World War II in English, the paucity of works on the Netherlands war experience is surprising. Few general texts are available on this topic. Monographs devoted to specific topics of war history — for example, resistance, intelligence, sabotage, or the liberation — allot only one or two pages to the Netherlands.¹ Yet the Netherlands wartime experience deserves greater attention because this tiny country suffered uniquely and in more varied ways than any other country in western Europe. It is the aim of this thesis to delineate this experience more clearly for the English language reader.

The Dutch historiography about World War II chiefly considers the western region and the large cities and views the whole country from the perspective of the more populous west. This leads to the perception that the war only occurred in the west which certainly was not the case. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of resistance in smaller, eastern areas. A comprehensive account of the war years in the Netherlands is not within the realm of this or any other thesis. For this reason, Hengelo, an industrial municipality with a population presently of over 77,000 in the eastern province of Overijssel, will be used as a representative example.² Hengelo was

chosen for a number of reasons; such as its proximity to the German border and its railway junction from which trains travelled in all directions. Most significant, however, was its heavy concentration of industry.

Numerous questions immediately arose regarding Hengelo. Was Hengelo among the first towns to be invaded simply because of its geographical location? Or was it targeted because of its heavy industry and the close proximity to Airfield Twente? Was the airfield strategically important? How did Hengelo's citizens react to the occupying forces? When did resistance become a factor? Was sabotage committed and if so at which factories? What actually happened in Hengelo during the occupation? And, finally, what effect did the war have on the municipality.

The author encountered considerable difficulty because of the lack of sources, as general texts in English contain only sketchy surveys that leave many questions unanswered and only three sources about the Netherlands are available in English regarding the thesis topic.³ The May 1946 issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science was devoted exclusively to the history and politics of the wartime Netherlands.⁴ Editor N.W. Posthumus gave the issue the title The Netherlands during German Occupation. While this monograph presents a wealth of factual material, the style of most of the contributing authors seem to lack the objectivity gained from the perspective of time. This is no doubt due to the freshness of the experience and the inability, at that time, to distance oneself from the events. The 1963 study by Werner Wambrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945, was the first comprehensive account available in English.⁵ Wambrunn points out that the Dutch successfully

prevented the implementation and adoption of National Socialism by diverse means of resistance. However it is difficult, on the basis of primary sources, to agree with Wambrunn's interpretation of the various phases which he believed occurred during the occupation. Wambrunn argues that four phases were distinguishable during the war. He considers the period from May 1940 to the Spring of 1941 as a "honeymoon" period. This is a most unfortunate phrase; the majority of Netherlanders would disagree with his use of that term. He might have used words like adaptation or adjustment. "Honeymoon" is totally inappropriate as the Dutch were never enamoured of the Germans nor of Nazi ideology. Moreover, this initial period was not as lengthy as Wambrunn believes. The adjustment to the occupation took only a few months. The Germans began their cruelty and intimidation, especially toward Jews, as early as October 1940, as is discussed more fully hereafter.

The second phase of the war, according to Wambrunn, lasted from the Spring of 1941 to the Spring of 1943. The reasons he gives for this periodization include: 1) the failure of Dutch conciliation with National Socialism; 2) the war becoming a global conflict; 3) stricter rationing measures; 4) the reinternment of professional military officers in 1942; and 5) the February strike in Amsterdam. But Wambrunn is only partially right in adducing these reasons. The February strike, for example, was localized, an Amsterdam affair, and never extended to other areas so the impact of the severe reprisals was felt mainly in Amsterdam, not nation-wide. Many Amsterdam citizens consider the February 1941 strike as the major event of the occupation period, but this is an erroneous perception which will become quite

apparent in Chapter IV.

Moreover, the entry into the conflict of the USA and the Soviet Union did not necessarily guarantee a victory, all that it represented at that time was an increased hope for a quick end to the hostilities. Also, rationing measures were strict to begin with, rations were implemented as early as 20 May 1940, and they remained in force until liberation. Rationing became stricter during the course of the war for economic more so than for political reasons. Only in late 1944 were rations so meager that malnutrition became readily apparent. Wambrunn also states that segregation of the Jews intensified from 1941 on, but he ignores the fact that many Jews lost their livelihood as early as 1940 because of a German decree which stated that Jews could no longer be civil servants. Wambrunn could have made a stronger case for phases of the occupation had he combined the first two phases he delineated and pointed out that German tactics grew increasingly more oppressive from the summer of 1940 to April 1943, thus making that period phase one of the occupation.

Then, Wambrunn argues that a third phase occurred from the Spring of 1943 to September 1944. He is probably right when he attributes this to the German defeats in the Mediterranean and at Stalingrad, as well as to the demand for increased labour from occupied territories. He also accurately points out that the April 1943 strike, which incidentally began in Hengelo, led to the establishment of extensive resistance activities. However, Wambrunn errs somewhat in believing that the final phase of the war occurred from September 1944 to the liberation in 1945. The most expert Dutch authority on the war, Louis de Jong, writes that after the strike a different Netherlands emerged;

the Netherlands became a country unified in its struggle against the oppressor, a country that turned to resistance activity when it had only practised protest before the strike.⁶ The most severe German retaliation and the harsh measures which occurred after the strike worsened because of the increased Dutch resistance to anything connected with German policies. Consequently, it will be argued that two phases existed in the Netherlands during the occupation period: the first phase lasted from the day of the invasion to the end of the April-May 1943 strike, and the second from the immediate aftermath of the strike to the liberation. During the first phase the Netherlanders adapted to their situation but vehemently protested German policies by using whatever means were at their disposal. During the second phase, the people reacted actively and militantly as resistance groups were established spontaneously and aid was supplied to those hiding from the German authorities. More importantly, the strike reiterated a sense of unity among the Dutch; the national identity that the Germans had hoped to subjugate was no longer submerged.

Initially one would scarcely note that a significant difference exists between the words "protest" and "resistance", because one word can often be used to describe the other. The Webster dictionary defines "protest" as follows: "to state positively, affirm solemnly, dissent: to make objection to, to speak strongly against." The Oxford dictionary describes protest as "a formal declaration of dissent from, or consent under certain conditions only to, some action or proceeding, a remonstrance." It is in the context of these definitions that the word protest will be used throughout this thesis. Protest is the only accurate term one can use to describe the actions of the majority of

Netherlanders who publicly indicated their dislike for German policies during the first phase of the occupation.

On the other hand, resistance is a stronger term and describes a variety of actions. The verb "to resist" means to withstand, fend off, stand firm against, to oppose actively, fight, argue or work against, to refuse to cooperate with or submit to. The noun "resistance" means the act of resisting or it can mean an underground movement in a country fighting against a foreign occupying power. The words "resist" and "resistance" will be used interchangeably in this study. However, resistance will be divided into two categories; passive and active. This distinction needs to be made because passive resistance occurred during the first phase of the occupation alongside the protest actions. For the purposes of this thesis passive resistance will be used to define activities like reading illegal newspapers, not handing in radios or bicycles, listening to church sermons, praying for the Royal Family, listening to the BBC broadcasts, and leaving a public place whenever a German entered the facility. Active resistance will mean committing such acts as opposing German policies with a greater conviction than that carried out with passive resistance: becoming a member of an underground group and carrying out various clandestine activities, such as printing and distributing underground newspapers, acting as couriers or hiding those being sought by the Germans. Conducting sabotage, espionage, and military activities will also be included in this category, and those who refused to go to Germany as forced labour also are considered active resisters. Evidently various resistance activities occurred but without these distinctions the story cannot be told accurately.

One cannot really refer to a unified national resistance movement in the Netherlands because such a homogenous entity never existed. Small, inexperienced groups sprang up throughout the war years, but they seldom made contact with other groups. Infiltration and arrests led to the obliteration of many of these small groups which in many cases left little documentation behind. After the April-May strike in 1943 resistance activities became a nationwide phenomenon. However, no one took control, largely because no one was experienced enough to be a national leader because of the severe regional and political differences and because of the many cases of petty jealousies over power and territories. A national resistance network, the Grote Raad der Illegaliteit (Great Council of Illegality), was only established in June of 1944, but this was done at the expense of political parties which had been very active in the underground activities. While this group did good work, political differences were allowed to interfere, and it unfortunately people dedicated to the cause of resisting German affronts to the Netherlands could not be united with each other.⁷ In September 1944 the Netherlands government in exile decreed that an amalgamation of three resistance groups be established; this became the Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten (Fighting Forces of the Interior) so it was only into the last months of the war that some semblance of organized national resistance became a factor.

The initial source for this study was the Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden (General History of the Netherlands) which has a general overview of the war that mentions the strike in Twente.⁸ Then the Louis de Jong series Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Kingdom of the Netherlands in World War II),

was consulted, an excellent series commissioned by the Netherlands government, on which de Jong has been working for over twenty years; eleven volumes range from the 1930s to the loss of the Netherlands Indies and de Jong is presently writing volume twelve.⁹ De Jong is considered the expert on this period of Netherlands history. Another general source was Onderdrukking en Verzet Nederland in Oorlogstijd, a four volume series edited by J. J. Bolhuis.¹⁰ The contributing authors are professors, historians, and experts in numerous fields who wrote articles on many aspects of the war. There are also more topically limited studies of value. Jacob Presser's classic account of the Netherlands Jews, Ondergang, was considered a crucial source for this topic.¹¹ This work was translated into an abridged English version in 1969 entitled The Destruction of the Dutch Jews.¹² The facts are well presented by Presser who, being Jewish himself, sees no reason to excuse subjectivity. No other author in the Netherlands has come close to Presser's expertise, and he is considered the authority on the subject. Other sources were nevertheless consulted and can be found in the bibliography.

The subject of resistance in the vernacular as well as in English was approached next and can also be found in the bibliography though commonly in the English language sources the Netherlands wartime experience only warranted a page or two, but they all basically related the same story.¹³ The topic of intelligence was also researched because subversive activities occurred at various Hengelo factories which were crucial to the Allied war effort. Considerable English language sources are available on the intelligence activities, mainly because the British and Netherlands intelligence groups worked so

closely together during the war.¹⁴ The Netherlands source that stands out is Frank Visser's De Bezetter Bepied (Dutch Counter Espionage) which is a history of wartime intelligence activities in that country.¹⁵

Quite a number of secondary works about Hengelo exist, and primary information can be found in local factory archives, reprinted editions of old books, and the Gemeente Hengelo Archieven (Hengelo municipal archives, hereafter GHA). War material on Hengelo is located in the archives at the Stork factory library, the Ijssel Centrale (power plant), Akzo-Zout Chemie (the salt factory), the post office and the GHA. Unfortunately many of the factories were destroyed during the war so that archival material pertaining to them was unavailable. A number of other factories have since closed for business reasons, which has resulted in further loss of archival material, and the records of the Hengelo branch of the Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Netherlands Railways) were destroyed by the Germans according to information given the author by railway personnel. Provincial archives were also helpful, and the national Department of Defense archives in the Hague supplied military information. The RvO supplied the author with copies of all its original documents pertaining to Overijssel, Twente, and Hengelo, sources invaluable as they confirmed much of the material in the monographic studies of Hengelo, many of which failed to use footnotes.

In addition, interviews were conducted with survivors of World War II. Some of those interviewed had to be coaxed; many of them had not recounted the experience so minutely for many years, and the emotions that surfaced were heart-rending. Yet others who were interviewed had

little difficulty recounting their wartime experiences. Information that could not be verified by at least two other witnesses was reluctantly omitted as the author perceived that some accounts were confused by time and had become romanticized. All the interviews were transcribed and those interviewed read the transcription and signed his or her name to validate the story. In addition, the interviewees had witnesses verify their signatures.

Chapter II, Part 1.

The Development of Hengelo as an Industrial Center.

Hengelo was not mentioned in early historical writing because the region of Twente (Tuvante), was not a part of the Roman Empire. However, Tacitus did mention Twente in his writings. The great population shift of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries resulted in Germanic tribes moving into the area. Pepin II of Heristal gained control over the region with his victory over the Friesian King Radboud in 689. Pepin introduced Christianity and established the See of the bishopric of Utrecht.¹⁶ The advent of Christianity was complemented in the Twente area by the missionary works of the Irishman Plechelmus and his companion Wido and an Anglo-Saxon missionary, Marcellinus, who was responsible for constructing the first church in Ootmarsum.¹⁷ The distinct Twente dialect had also emerged at this time.¹⁸ In the seventh and eighth centuries two social classes existed among the inhabitants of the area, edhilinge or nobility, and frilinge, freemen. The nobility became increasingly more powerful and assumed responsibility for the safety of the small farmers. As in the rest of western Europe, the feudal and manorial systems existed by the end of Charlemagne's time.

Hengelo was first mentioned in thirteenth century historical writings when 'Conradus te Hengelo' witnessed a document in 1252.¹⁹ The bishop of Utrecht had been the suzerain of Hengelo since 1248

although the vassal lords of Hengelo had the right to appoint the clergy. The manor House of Hengelo was built in the thirteenth century and constituted the north side of the village while de Brink and Veldzijde were the southside. Tenants worked at "the House," but the village also had a baker, a tailor, a smith and weavers.²⁰ At this time, Hengelo became a transit station for travellers because of its central location in Twente. Hengelo's geographical location certainly became important in its later development.

The area of the present day Netherlands was under Burgundian rule from 1456-1528. Philip the Good appointed his illegitimate son David to the bishopric of Utrecht, a position he held from 1456 to 1496. David was responsible for the unification of the districts of Salland, Vollenhove, and Twente into the province of Overijssel.²¹ By 1500 Hengelo had forty to fifty houses, a church, and a home for the sick and elderly.²² The strong Twente traditions of humanity, tolerance, and equality were established under the leadership of Frederick van Twickelo, the most revered of the Twente noblemen.²³ Van Twickelo waived dues from his tenants and let them conduct their lives entirely as they wished. The tenants did not need permission to marry, to hunt, to fish, to grow a garden, or to build or design a house. His humane attitude resulted in strong loyalties and an even stronger love for freedom that was to be tested time and time again during the next centuries.²⁴ The heavy influence of van Twickelo has been maintained to this day. The Twente people are well known for their egalitarian, humane attitudes and their spontaneous reactions in times of conflict.

Hengelo's industrial growth began after the Thirty Years' War. Textiles, mainly linen manufacturing, became important in Twente after

this time. The early modern type of capitalist organization, the so-called "putting out" systems, appeared. In the Netherlands the merchant factors were called fabrikeurs. Twente merchants traded in Amsterdam and Amersfoort and the fabrikeurs purchased yarn in the western Netherlands. As capitalist entrepreneurs they financed the purchase of looms and also the cultivation of flax in rural areas. The entrepreneurial factor "put out" to weavers and bleachers. The early modern type of factory production made its appearance by 1650. Yet Twente had a subsistence economy and remained largely agricultural. Rural income was supplemented by linen weaving and spinning and the domestic industry organized by the merchant factors.²⁵ By 1795 a census showed that Hengelo was a self-sufficient village of 1194 people with few craftsmen and yet it had ten buyers and nine fabrikeurs.²⁶

The presence in Hengelo of the numerous domestic weavers led to the present day supremacy as a textile industry. But the weavers produced only a semi-finished linen. The product was improved when the Anabaptist entrepreneur Wolter ten Cate introduced a better yarn to the weavers.²⁷ Ten Cate's firm catered to the upper class tastes and originally produced only bont (vari-colored Frisian cloth). Later, ten Cate learned from Danzig traders how to produce fine linen damask, and successfully expanded to fine linen manufacturing. He was also instrumental in establishing a charity organization in Hengelo.²⁸

The French occupation was welcomed in Hengelo largely due to the principles of the revolution — freedom, liberty and equality. The government of King Louis Bonaparte gave a stimulus to the textile industry. A national industrial fair was held at Utrecht on 19 April 1808. Hengelo linen and cotton manufacturers were well represented by

Hendrik Bruins - linens and table goods, B. ten Cate - linens and cottons, Jan Dijk - linens and cotton, Hendrik Ensink - cotton thread, Abraham ter Horst - linens, topsail, and napkins, Claas Nyhoff - damask, and Jan Pol - multi-colored linen.²⁹ King Louis Bonaparte visited Hengelo on 11 March 1809.³⁰ Three roads were also constructed in Hengelo during the French period.

Some antagonism towards the French regime was quite apparent, despite the earlier welcome and the positive changes. Conscription of men and horses and billeting of soldiers were not easily accepted by the Hengeloers. Yet many Hengelo citizens died fighting for the French.³¹ Some Hengelo citizens who wished to avoid conscription simply disappeared by going underground, they became onderduikers, a term later used in World War II. Many hiding places were built for such men. French rule ended on 10 November 1813, when the first patrol of Kossacks appeared. Then on 30 November 1815, the Prince of Orange returned from his English exile and as sovereign took the title of William I, King of the Netherlands.³²

One French legacy was the establishment of municipalities. On 1 May 1802, Hengelo was declared an autonomous municipality. A municipal council was established which would consist of two Reformed, two Roman Catholic, and two Baptist council members.³³ The first mayor, Jan Dijk, served in that position from 1802 to 1832 and he also served as Secretary.³⁴ Initially he was called dorpsman (village man), but when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established the term changed to burgemeester or mayor. Hengelo by this time also had a letter carrier and six firefighters.³⁵ The municipal system introduced by the French is still in use in the Netherlands today.

Religious tolerance on the part of Hengelo citizens had been exhibited as early as the sixteenth century, but was very clearly illustrated when a Jewish synagogue was built in 1836. Hengelo Gentiles had financially assisted towards the cost of the construction. The opening was attended by Reformed and Baptist church leaders. This first synagogue was made of wood, but it was later replaced with a stone structure. Hengelo already had a Jewish cemetery dating back to the sixteenth century. The Jewish community easily assimilated with Hengelo's citizens and lifestyle. The Netherlands constitution gave Jews equal rights and by 1940 most citizens viewed Jews as their fellow citizens.

The growth of the textile industry in Hengelo surged forward in 1832 when a chance meeting occurred in a Hengelo hotel between an English textile technician, Thomas Ainsworth and Willem de Clerq, the Secretary director of the Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij (the Netherlands Trade Society), hereafter NHM.³⁶ During their discussion of the textile industry Ainsworth advised de Clerq to establish textile trade schools and to adapt to power looms rather than go through the expense of moving a textile firm from Belgium which had been planned originally. On Ainsworth's advice the NHM also built a factory which inspected all the textile goods produced in Twente. Ainsworth also founded a textile training school for young boys. The industry of Hengelo, as well as Twente, owes a great deal to Ainsworth.

An 1853 census indicated that Hengelo had three weaving factories, two thatch makers, one brushmaker, a milliner, a tobacco grower, a corn miller, an oil miller, two corn chandlers, and two beer breweries.³⁷ A municipal building was built at the cost of f8,999.³⁸ A Chamber of

Commeroe, which consisted of seven members, was established in 1852.

Hengelo had a population of 3,780 in 1853 and was becoming an important textile center in the eastern Netherlands.³⁹

The expansion of Hengelo as a textile and later as an industrial center began in 1854 when C. T. Stork of Oldenzaal moved his dye business from Denekamp to Hengelo; today he is considered the founder of modern day Hengelo. He was a kind, genial man who was always concerned about those less fortunate than himself. Charles Theodorus Stork was born on February 9, 1822 at Oldenzaal. He was the second of eight children born to D. W. Stork, a civil servant and his wife Anna Craan.⁴⁰ D. W. was a quiet man but of strong character; he instilled strong benevolent values in his children. At the age of fourteen C. T. was sent to work at a factory. A novel he read while a teenager, likely a translation of a French Utopian treatise in which the interests of factory personnel were of primary importance, strongly influenced him.⁴¹ The moral of the book was that those who worked hardest would gain the most benefit with promotions and profit sharing.

In 1846 C. T. borrowed fl. 2,000 from his father and bought two weaving looms; he produced goods for a large producer in Almelo.⁴² He worked twenty hours a day for many years. C. T. experienced financial difficulty in 1840 when his father died. In 1851 with financial aid from his family C. T. and his brother Juriaan Engelbert formed a dyeing business which was first located in Oldenzaal, then in Denekamp and which then moved to Hengelo.

Once the business was located in Hengelo it expanded enormously. Looms were in use by 1858. Then in 1860 Stork established a textile school. The company earned the right to use the royal predicate

after King William II visited in May 1862. Upon C. T.'s death the company disbanded and was replaced by N.V. Koninklijke Weefgoederen Fabriek C. T. Stork en Co (the Royal Weaving goods Factory C. T. Stork and Company, hereafter called KWF). During World War II the factory buildings were largely destroyed by the extensive bombings. The company amalgamated with Nyverdal ten Cate in 1959.

C. T. Stork was also a partner along with his brother Coenraad Craan and a smith Jan Meyling, in Stork, Meyling en co. (Stork, Meyling and Co.), which repaired all types of machinery. The company was originally established in Borne. Meyling sold out to C. T. Stork in 1865.⁴³ C. T.'s brother Juliaan Engelbert and H. J. Ekker then joined him in Gebroeders Stork en Co (Stork Brothers & Co.), which moved to Hengelo in 1868. The first few years were financially disappointing, but by 1873 considerable orders assured the permanent financial stability of the company.⁴⁴ C. T. became very influential in the eastern Netherlands because of his benevolent attitude towards his workers.⁴⁵ Stork was the first company in the Netherlands to initiate pensions, sick pay and a savings plan for its employees. He became a member of the First Chamber of Overijssel in 1867 and received the Order of the Netherlands Lion for his social leadership. C. T. Stork, who was affectionately known as "Grandfather", died in 1895.

The cotton industry was also represented in Hengelo. The Nederlandse Katoen Spinnery (Netherlands Cotton Spinning), was established in 1865 by R. A. de Manchy and H. Veder. Approximately 225 people were employed by 1866 and 23,000 spools produced the cotton.⁴⁶ The factory burned to the ground in 1872 but was rebuilt within two years. After World War I production nearly ceased but

towards the late 1930s significant production increases occurred. The company celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary in 1940 and the building was decorated with flags and flowers. On 10 May 1940 a German panzer division passed by the factory and the soldiers erroneously thought the decorations were meant to welcome them. The company received the royal predicate in May 1940 and will hereafter be referred to as KNKS. The company buildings, which were located near Stork, were extensively damaged during World War II.

The C. V. Hengelosche Gasfabriek (Hengelo Gasfactory), was founded in 1865. The product was to be consumed mainly by Stork's weaving factory. The gas factory was initially situated on the Beurstraat. The company moved to the Twekkelerweg where it produced gas until 1957 at which time natural gas was introduced.⁴⁷

The establishment of a railway was without a doubt the most important development in Hengelo's history. The Stork brothers and Ekker were quite instrumental in obtaining a railway concession for Hengelo. In Twente a railway line had been established in 1862 from Almelo to Salzbergen. Then in 1865 the Hengelo to Zutphen line was opened. The Hengelo connection expanded to Enschede in 1866 and to Winterswijk in 1886. This made Hengelo the only station in Overijssel which had railway lines running north, west, east, and south.⁴⁸ The industrialists realized the significance of the railway as transportation for their goods and the crossing points made Hengelo an important connection point. None of the industrialists could have possibly imagined that the railway connection in Hengelo would become a detriment 75 years later.

Several fabrikeurs joined together to establish the Maatschappij

tot Waterverschaffing (Sewage and Waterworks Company), in 1896. The idea was to improve the hygiene of the population and to provide fire protection. The municipality became responsible for these services in January 1908. The Roman Catholic Gerardus Majella Hospital was also built in 1896 and various additions have been made to it since then.

Industrialists were also responsible in 1900 for the establishment of the Twents Centraal Station voor Stroomlevering (the Twente Central Station for Electricity). The product was first delivered to Hengelo in 1901. The company moved to its present location in 1902. During the 1920s the cooling towers were built and became a familiar sight on the Hengelo skyline.⁴⁹ In 1949 the company merged with Ijssel Centrale of Zwolle. Two turbines which deliver 54 megawatts each are used to deliver electricity to the surrounding area.⁵⁰

The Stoom-Beyersch-Bierbrouwerij-Meylink en Bartelink, a beer brewery, was founded in 1879, but the name later changed to N.V. Hengelosche Bierbrouwerij. Initially the company only produced ice and beer but in 1955 it expanded to produce soft drinks and lemonade. An extension or growth was never planned and the brewery presently is a part of the Steller-Artoris concern.

G. Dijkers en Co. n.v., which produced attachments for various technical apparatus, was founded by G. J. O. G. Dijkers, who originally came from Almelo. He had spent his youth working at Stork and was educated there. Dijkers eventually became department head of attachments and other general adapter technical apparatus, for example, control and safety apparatus for steam kettles such as taps and manometers. During a discussion with D. W. Stork, son of C. T. and his future brother-in-law, a decision was made to establish a separate

factory for the production of appendages.⁵¹ The factory was built on Stork property. The business flourished to the point where Dijkers soon became autonomous and completely independent with branch plants across the country.

Hazemeyer n.v. was established in 1907 by Floris Hazemeyer. This company produced linking (gear shift) and safety materials for high and low electrical tensions. This production was continually adapted to the changing technology. In 1915, fifty-six people worked at Hazemeyer; in 1962 personnel numbered approximately 2100.⁵² Branches were established in several other cities, as well as retail stores.

At that time Hazemeyer commenced producing electrical apparatus. In 1900 the business moved to Hengelo and received contracts to build and maintain power stations in Twente and throughout the country. The company also exported electrical installations in factories and the building of light and power nets for electricity.

The name HEEMAF appeared in 1908 when the firm was restructured and became N.V. Hengelosche Electricische En Mechanische Apparaten Fabriek (the Hengelo Electrical and Mechanical Apparatus Factory), hereafter HEEMAF. After World War I production was expanded to include electrical motors and dynamos. The discovery of the SKA motor, a rotary current motor, was beneficial to Heemaf because the motor was sold around the world. Also of significance to the company was the electrification of the railways by Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Netherlands Railways). Another very lucrative development for HEEMAF occurred with the establishment of the PTT, the post office and telephone company which placed orders with HEEMAF. The company quite obviously stimulated the Hengelo industry.⁵³

Hollandse Signaalapparaten N.V., was founded in 1922 as the N.V. Hazemeyer's Fabriek van Signaalapparaten (Hazemeyer's Factory for Signalling Apparatus), hereafter Signaal. Hazemeyer worked in conjunction with the huge Berlin company of Siemens and Halske. The reason for the joint venture with the Germans was simple. The Netherlands navy required weaponry for two cruisers, the Sumatra and the Java, which were under construction at that time. The Netherlands government preferred the navy to employ the superior German systems expertise which far surpassed the slower, older English system. However, the Germans were prevented, by a stipulation of the Treaty of Versailles, from constructing any type of weaponry. Through the Signaal connection, which was the official patent holder, the Siemens and Halske patents were accepted and approved by IPATH, the patent agency in the Hague. Signaal began production in an old empty building in Hengelo. The first orders were worth f2,160,000 and established a new industry in Hengelo.⁵⁴ With the Siemens and Halske contacts, the Hengelo company filled orders for the navies of Spain, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Romania, Argentina, Finland, and Denmark. Orders for the fiscal years of 1924-5 totalled fl. 810,000 but business increased significantly by 1927 when orders totalled fl. 3,300,000 including fl. 500,000 from the Netherlands navy.⁵⁵ The Depression, however, had a deleterious effect on Signaal; orders for 1933 plummeted and only totalled fl. 100,000⁵⁶ Soon after, specification changes in all the Netherlands naval apparatus saved the company from insolvency because new ships artillery and equipment were required for the navy.

One of the most important influences at Signaal during the formative years was the director J. J. A. Schagen van Leeuwen.⁵⁷ He had the foresight in the 1930s to realize what the complications were which could emerge from the German connection. He had made extensive efforts to keep Netherlands naval affairs secret from the Germans, and he made sure that plans were in place to destroy the factory in case of a German invasion. These plans ultimately failed but Schagen van Leeuwen did manage to reach England after a harrowing escape through the Netherlands with the top secret plans. He worked in liaison with the British intelligence units in London during the war.⁵⁸ Signaal was immediately subjugated to the German administration on the day of the invasion and remained in German hands until the liberation.

Another important industry developed from natural resources. The discovery of salt in Twente occurred in 1886 when the owner of castle Twickel wished to connect waterpipes from his castle to Delden. Salt, rather than water, appeared at the drilling site. The Netherlands government declared that drilling for salt could only be conducted by the state, through the Dienst voor Rijksopsporing van Delfstoffen (the Service for State Prospecting of Minerals). In 1918 the N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Zoutindustrie (Royal Netherlands Salt Industry Company), was established and a factory was built just outside Hengelo at Boekelo. In 1930 it appeared that the Twente canal could be built to connect the eastern Netherlands with the major waterways. In the vicinity of the canal digging, a drill was attempted with the result that a great salt deposit was found at Hengelo. A concession for this area was requested and granted. When the Twente canal opened in 1937 the new salt factory was ready for operation and the canal

facilitated easier and less costly transportation. The company is now known as Akzo Zout Chemie (Akzo Salt Chemical hereafter AKZO), and is a principal employer in the Hengelo area.⁵⁹

The expansion of industry also affected the religious life of the Hengelo citizen. After the arrival of the French, a new Roman Catholic church was built but it was destroyed by fire in 1888 and replaced with the St. Lambertus church which presently stands on the site and has become a Hengelo landmark. Presently there are ten Roman Catholic parishes in Hengelo. The Netherlands Reformed community in Hengelo had 180 members in 1684. Church gatherings were held in the chapel at Huis te Hengelo (house of Hengelo), until 1839 when a church was built on the Deldenerstraat. Three Netherlands Reformed parishes are established in Hengelo today. Anabaptists have resided in Hengelo since 1628. Initially they held their services in a member's home until 1789 when their first church was built. Similarly the Reformed congregation held their meetings in a house until 1892 when they built their own church. Three Reformed parishes exist in Hengelo today. Baptists first appeared in 1869. They built their own church in 1894 but the building was completely destroyed by bombs during World War II.⁶⁰ Thus it is quite evident that the religious community in Hengelo expanded simultaneously with industry and that religious tolerance was an accepted fact of life.

With the heavy concentration of industrialization, the need for housing greatly increased. Housing in Hengelo had always presented a problem and the demand has always outstripped the supply. The Stork-owned KNKS however, realized that the housing scarcity could easily be rectified. To this end the Hengelosche Bouwvereniging (Hengelo Building Association), hereafter HB, was established on 13 November

1867. The HB was a private company with the Stork brothers as shareholders. The idea was to build houses in a neighborhood with gardens and recreational facilities. To carry out this plan the Amsterdam architect Karel Muller and landscape architect Waltez were appointed. They had a unique design for Tuindorp t'Lansink (garden village t'Lansink), the monotony of row housing was rejected so considerable variation in the styles of houses was a prime consideration.⁶¹ As a result a laborer could have an engineer, a department head, or a union leader as a neighbor. In 1911, some 300 houses were built. The neighborhood was constructed on fifteen hectares of land and a pond was constructed, to serve as a recreational waterpark. In 1919 the HB became a foundation governed among the Stork companies, Dijkers and KNKS.

Vocational education was also controlled by the industrialists. In 1866 a school was built beside the KNKS factory. Stork had commenced with education five years earlier because he employed one hundred and thirty children from ages nine to fourteen. Groups of ten to fifteen children would take lessons in shifts according to their age and grade level. A Kindergarten was also established for children of industrial workers. Around 1880 a draughting school was established which developed into a specific Stork company school where many youngsters learned the trade.⁶² Another social element was the establishment of the Beurs, which can be equated to an English pub, where people could meet and have a few drinks. Many Hengelo citizens and travellers spent time there. Readings were held, religious and political discussions and business matters were frequently discussed at the Beurs. Concerts, dances, and traditional folk events were often organized at the Beurs

so that it became a place of relaxation where a laborer could take his wife and family for a pleasant evening. Folksfeasts and weddings were also held at the Beurs. It no longer exists; largely because people prefer to spend leisure time at home.⁶³

The cultural associations were also supported by the numerous industrialists. The director of the KNKS provided a practice location for the Hengelosche Gymnastiek Vereeniging (Hengelo Gymnastic Club). The industrialists established the Concert Association and the Hengelo Men's Choir also emerged. As well, these associations took care of the elderly. Obviously the industrialists catered to their workers; all their needs were met.

The World War I period had a deleterious effect on production in Hengelo. The paucity of raw materials caused a significant decrease in production which resulted in lower sales. Consequently, the factories shortened working hours or ceased production for short time periods. After the war Hengelo was overrun with returning Belgian POWs which did little to alleviate the unemployment problem. The textile firms solved their problems with a decrease in wages. When this was implemented in November 1915, work ceased at these factories. The problem was solved by D. W. Stork, commissioner of the Twente Bontweverij who managed to convince the workers to return to work. A consequence of this episode was the establishment of a union, De Toekomst (The Future), for those not already affiliated with a union. By 1919, the influence of the unions had grown significantly. Strikes were not uncommon during the 1920s. A wild strike at De Jong and Van Dam, a lace and hose factory,

began in December 1923, and lasted four months. Another strike, at Hazemeyer, also in 1923, resulted in a pay increase. Stork was the only company to avoid a strike in its entire existence.⁶⁴ By 1925, the Hengelo unions had obviously become a very important aspect of industrial life in Hengelo.

The 1930s were crisis years in Hengelo in the same fashion that they were throughout most parts of the world. During the Depression Hengelo faced similar problems and applied similar remedies to alleviate the situation. More difficult to handle than the Depression was the stiff competition from Japanese firms. This forced three Twente firms to cease doing business permanently. To counter this trend a diversification from textiles occurred. For example, the N.V. Hengelosche Veerenfabriek (Hengelo Feather Factory), was established. An improvement in the economy only became noticeable in 1936 but that was largely because the gold standard was dropped.

Changes also occurred in the education system during the 1930s. Previously industrialists had been largely responsible for educating their workers. A public school had been established as early as 1917 but courses at this school were complemented by trade courses taught by Dijkers professionals. The strong educational influence of the industrialist ended in the 1930s because of the cost cutting measures they implemented to counter the Depression. In 1931 education became the responsibility of the Hengelo council which received a subsidy from the national government. However, the Stork family remained financially instrumental in the area of education. D. W. Stork and his wife were financially responsible for the construction of the C. T. Stork School which was a public institution. The couple also provided

a reading room for the public. W. Stork was responsible for the construction of an agricultural school. Thus the change from industrial education to public education was largely accomplished by the end of the 1930s. However, the older Hengelo citizens still consider industrial education far superior to a public education.⁶⁵

By 1940 Hengelo was a thriving industrial town of 42,502 people which was centrally located and vitally important to the rest of the Netherlands.⁶⁶ The railway connection and the concentration of industry were of great interest to the Germans. During the latter stages of the war, Hengelo was also of equally great interest to the Allies. For those reasons Hengelo was one of the first towns to be invaded in 1940 and one of the last to be liberated in 1945.

Chapter II, Part 2

Invasion and Adjustment

On Friday morning 10 May 1940, the Germans invaded the Netherlands. The 22nd Infantry Division supported by the 7th Airborne Division of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), led the attack from the east.⁶⁷ Mayor J. A. H. J. Van der Dussen of Hengelo received a telephone call from the stationmaster at Oldenzaal to inform him that large numbers of troops had just crossed the border into Overijssel.⁶⁸ The 328th Infantry Regiment passed through Hengelo by way of Bentheim, Germany. The regiment consisted of 3300 men who together with the 227th Infantry Division were to clear a path through Twente to the Ijssel River.⁶⁹ To counter this long-awaited, frequently postponed invasion, the municipal governments had plans to destroy factories, railways and airfields which could be useful to the Germans. Nearby Twente airfield was bombed by the Dutch before the Germans could secure access to it, and the explosions could be heard in Hengelo. The census registry was buried at the Algemene Begraafplaats (the local cemetery), for safekeeping.⁷⁰ However, other contingency plans failed to materialize because the village of Hengelo was not prepared to act quickly enough; railway viaducts were not mined, nor were obstacles placed on the roads for obstruction purposes. Hengelo, like the rest of the country, had hoped that Germany would honour the Netherlands position of neutrality.

In addition to troops arriving by train, hundreds of German troops

marched through Hengelo; it took a full two hours for them to pass any one point. Countless airplanes from the German 22nd air landing division flew so low over Hengelo that the German insignia could be seen clearly by those on the street. When a Hengelo citizen questioned a German soldier about their presence in the village the soldier replied, "Hallo guten Morgen, wir kommen hier Pfingsten feiern."⁷¹

Since Hengelo was the major industrial area in the eastern Netherlands it was not surprising that the invasion had an immediate effect on its industry. Mayor Van der Dussen was visited by J. A. Schagen van Leeuwen, of Signaal.⁷² The Germans, in fact, used the activities at Signaal as an excuse to invade because they were aware that in the Netherlands sabotage had been pledged, in case of war, wherever armaments were produced. The Netherlands police and army troops tried to defend Signaal against the Germans; plans had been made to destroy the factory in case of invasion but the telephone lines had been cut so communication with the army was impossible and effectively ended any defense plans in Hengelo and the rest of the Twente area.⁷³ However, the Director retrieved all the top secret plans and went directly to the mayor's office. During the discussion between the two men the Director asked the mayor to accompany him to England, but the mayor declined, saying that it was his duty to remain in Hengelo.

That same day the mayor was also visited by a German officer who informed him that this part of the Netherlands was occupied by German authorities. Hengelo would henceforth be the headquarters of the regional commander. During the next four days of mass confusion, Netherlanders realized that national and local defense plans had gone awry.⁷⁴ In retaliation for the fierce resistance of the Netherlands

troops the Germans bombed Rotterdam and warned that if capitulation did not follow, the Hague, an open city and the seat of the Netherlands government, would suffer the same fate and be destroyed.⁷⁵

Some 2100 Netherlands troops died and 2700 were wounded, and ten Hengelo soldiers died in the struggle against the Germans.⁷⁶ The Netherlands army capitulated on 14 May 1940. In an interview, a Hengelo corporal related that he had severely mixed emotions when he simply laid down his weapon and went home; the unit had been engaged in fighting the Germans near Eck en Wiel.⁷⁷ The day before, H. M. Queen Wilhelmina had addressed her subjects and fled to England, along with her family and cabinet, much to Hitler's chagrin. The Netherlands populace was certainly demoralized and in shock; everything happened so quickly. However, this sentiment did not prevail for long, and the process of adaptation to events quickly followed.

The first major provincial announcement regarding acceptance of German authority came from Mr. A. E. van Voorst tot Voorst, the Commissioner of Overijssel to Queen Wilhelmina. He informed the people of Overijssel on 12 May 1940 that he expected orderly, peaceful, and worthy conduct. In addition he promised that plans were in process to re-engage the normal economic activities and that channels of food supply would scarcely be affected for long.⁷⁸

On 15 May 1940 the first German occupational authority arrived in Hengelo. Dr. Reuss established his headquarters at Hotel Eulderink, just across from the railway station. He announced that he had been appointed by Hitler to act as the commander for the region of Twente.⁷⁹ He added that his task was to ensure peace, order, and general contentment. Dr. Reuss warned that those who countered his

task would be dealt with by him personally. He then proceeded to hold Van der Dussen, in his capacity as chairman of the Twente mayors, responsible for peace and order in Twente.⁸⁰

A number of problems had to be solved in the immediate aftermath of the occupation. For example, there was a yeast shortage in Hengelo so that bread became scarce. A food distribution plan was put in place in which each citizen was allotted 750 grams of bread for every three days. Other distribution plans were enforced on a provincial level; shoes purchase was by coupons, meat had to be inspected by the Wehrmacht, and heating fuel was restricted.⁸¹

Another problem in Hengelo was the shortage of cash to meet the payroll needs of the factory personnel. The Nederlandsche Bank (Netherlands Bank), in Hengelo had little cash on hand so that a contingency plan was devised. Van der Dussen and a councilman devised a scheme where they had paper cards printed, with their signature on them, which were valued at one guilder and two and one half guilders. However this completely illegal currency was never distributed.⁸² Those who wished to cash their cheques had to travel to Almelo.

Apart from the presence of troops, life went on normally in Hengelo. The stores were open, children went to school, civil servants performed their regular duties and the municipal government adjusted to each event with relative ease. The western Netherlands, especially Rotterdam, was not that fortunate.⁸³ To help the needy in the west, the Nationaal Hulpoomite (National Help Committee) was established and the Hengelo chapter was called the Hengelosche Oorlogsrampen (Hengelo War Disaster Office).⁸⁴ Hengelo citizens regularly collected bedding, clothing, mattresses and diverse household goods to aid

victims of the bombings. Through the Red Cross Rotterdam children were offered vacations in Hengelo throughout the war years.

Once the initial shock of the invasion wore off, the naive illusion that the occupation would be bearable quickly evaporated. The German occupying authorities soon established their own regulations. For example, blackout ordinances were to stay in effect and all available vehicles had to be registered. The orders from the Netherlands government in exile were to be ignored. Singing of the national anthem was prohibited. Weather reports could no longer be publicized. Writs were issued in the name of the Reich rather than the Queen.⁸⁵ These regulations were not difficult to adjust to and can be viewed as normal in time of war. The major changes, the regulations that the Netherlands would first passively and later actively resist, were implemented by Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a minister without portfolio in Hitler's cabinet.

Arthur Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reichskommissar (State Commissioner), for the occupied Netherlands by Hitler and given the objective of converting the Netherlands populace into accepting the tenets of National Socialism. He would be entirely in control of all aspects of the Netherlands administration and become the driving force in subjugating the Netherlands economy to the German war effort. It was Seyss-Inquart who would ultimately be responsible for the deportation and death of the majority of the Jews who lived in the Netherlands. He was also responsible for laborers from the Netherlands being forced to work in Germany. And it was Seyss-Inquart who at war's end was responsible for approximately 25,000 deaths due to malnutrition during the Hunger Winter of 1944-1945. He was not responsible to any

officials within the German military force; he was appointed by Hitler and accountable directly to him. In fact, he only had personal contact with Hitler a total of eleven times during the five year war period, and eight of these contacts were before the end of 1942.⁸⁶

Arthur Seyss-Inquart was born while his parents were on vacation, on 22 July 1882, in Stannem, Moravia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. His father, Emil, was Catholic and his mother, Auguste, was Lutheran. Arthur was the youngest of six children (three daughters and three sons) but one son died in infancy. The boys were reared as Catholics while the daughters were reared as Lutherans. Emil taught classical languages at Iglau (in present day Czechoslovakia), became a rector at Olmutz, and retired to Baden in 1910. After his graduation from the German gymnasium, Arthur studied law at the University of Vienna. He was admitted to the bar in 1916.⁸⁷ Arthur Seyss-Inquart was one of the most intelligent Nazis under Hitler's command. Hitler described him as "extraordinarily clever, as supple as an eel."⁸⁸ This was confirmed after the war by the intelligence tests administered to the Nuremberg war criminals. The Wechsler-Bellevue Adult Intelligence tests given by Dr. G.M. Gilbert, the prison psychologist at the Nuremberg war trials, indicated that Seyss-Inquart scored 141; genius was considered to be 140. The only other war criminal to score above him was Hjalmar Schacht.⁸⁹

In July 1914, Arthur volunteered with the Tiroler Kaiserjager, a military unit, and fought mainly on the Italian front. He was commended for bravery and soon reached the rank of Oberleutnant.⁹⁰ In December 1916 he married Gertrud Mascha, an Austrian general's daughter. Their's would be a happy marriage; unlike other Nuremberg

war criminals, he remained faithful to his wife. The couple had one son and two daughters who were raised as Catholics.⁹¹ Arthur's religion and cold demeanor were held against him by his fellow Nazis. General Christiansen called him an eiskalter Jesuit, and Hans Rauter believed he was, ein Mann der kein Herz gekannt hat.⁹² Dr. Gilbert viewed him as a person who believed he could do no wrong, a man who fumbled his own defense, a man stoic in his adversity at the Nuremberg trial.⁹³

In 1919, Arthur became a member of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft (German Secret Community), which was anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic. He migrated from Moravia to Austria in 1930 and at that time entered the political arena. He worked with, but did not formally join, the Nazi party from 1934 to 1938, pious Catholics being debarred from party membership. Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior and Security by Prime Minister Schussnig in 1938. Seyss-Inquart's role in the German Anschluss (overtaking), of Austria has been documented widely and need not be minutely detailed here. It is sufficient to mention that he can be viewed as an Austrian Quisling.⁹⁴ Once Schussnig resigned, Seyss-Inquart became Chancellor of Austria, which had been renamed Ostmark. During his term in office, Seyss-Inquart helped Jews personally known to him to escape by means of emigration.⁹⁵ On 1 May 1939, he became Reichsminister (State Minister), without portfolio which politically was a step up the ladder. His formal basic salary was 4000Rm per month but he was also paid an additional 100,000 Rm per month from secret funds.⁹⁶ His benefits included a villa, an office in Berlin, a service automobile, and a small staff.

Seyss-Inquart was transferred to Poland on 15 September 1939, where in October he became deputy to Hans Frank, the new head of the General Government in Poland. He was certainly aware of the atrocities inflicted on the Poles but he viewed them as a necessary evil which the Poles had to endure on their road to becoming part of the Reich. However, he was unhappy in Poland. He felt that he had too little responsibility in administering the regime he had helped to build.⁹⁷ Moreover, he was not trusted, and he trusted no one; he had great difficulty working alongside his old enemies and requested a transfer on 10 May 1940. He was given the new post in the Netherlands on 18 May 1940.

On 29 May 1940 Seyss-Inquart was formally installed as Reichskommissar für die niederländische Gebiete (State Commissioner for the Netherlands territory), but excluding the Netherlands Indies. In his inaugural speech he claimed that Germany had no imperial designs in mind for the Netherlands. He stated:

We will neither oppress this land and its people imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political convictions. We will bring this about in no other way- only through our deportment and example.⁹⁸

Seyss-Inquart was only vaguely familiar with the history of the Netherlands and had never learned nor wanted to speak its language. Moreover, he completely failed to grasp the traditions and mentality of the Netherlanders. Perhaps this was a blessing in disguise; had he known the resistance he eventually met he might have been even more oppressive and cruel. Towards the end of the war Seyss-Inquart realized his mistake and in an uncharacteristically open moment said, "Wenn man hier frisch aus Deutschland kommt, glaubt man dieses Volk zu verstehen. Je länger man hier ist, je mehr sieht man wie anders es ist

als man denkt."⁹⁹

Seyss-Inquart's mandate gave him responsibility for all the powers of the Crown, the supervision of the Netherlands civil administration, all the Netherlands agencies then in existence, as well as governing through his Generalkommissars (General Commissioners).¹⁰⁰ These were often Austrian like himself. Two of the most important were the Justice Commissioner, Friedrich Wimmer and the Finance Commissioner Dr. Hans Fischbock. The three men had been friends for a long time and often listened to classical music together.

Wimmer owed his political career to Seyss-Inquart's influence and was his most loyal supporter. He was born in Salzburg in 1897 into a family of eight siblings. Academically bright, he was educated at the gymnasium and had fought in the Austrian army for three years. Wimmer followed that stint by studying art history in Vienna and in Goteborg, Sweden. In 1922 he earned a doctorate and in 1930 a second doctorate in law at the University of Vienna; he specialized in constitutional law.¹⁰¹ His friendship with Seyss-Inquart began in 1936 when they met in a Catholic Bible study group. During the Anschluss, Wimmer personally advised Seyss-Inquart about Austrian constitutional law. Personally Wimmer was lazy; all the work in his department was accomplished by his subordinates despite Wimmer's apparent disinterest. He repeatedly requested transfers to Germany which Seyss-Inquart denied. Wimmer thus remained in the Netherlands for the duration of the war.¹⁰²

The Generalkommissar fur Finanz und Wirtschaft (Finance and Economy), was Dr. Hans Fischbock. He was born in 1895 at Geras, north of Vienna. In the 1920s he was a member, as was Seyss-Inquart, of the

Deutsche Klub (the German Club). He was an extremely intelligent man who, in the 1930s, was repeatedly promoted in his career and became director general and president of one of Austria's largest banks.¹⁰³ During the Anschluss Fischbock was quite active in the business of plundering Jews. He quickly accepted the Reichskommissar's job offer. His quick mind served him well and he was overly anxious about subverting the Netherlands economy towards Germany's war requirements. Fischbock was the responsible party for eradicating the currency differential between Germany and the Netherlands early in the occupation.¹⁰⁴ Although he stayed at his post for the entire war period he was frequently absent. The ambitious Fischbock really wanted to be posted to Berlin, where he believed all the action took place. In January 1942, he gained the additional position of Reichskommissar fur die Preisbildung (State Commissioner for Inflation).

The head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, was responsible for Hitler's appointment of Hanns Albin Rauter to the position of Reichskommissar fur das Sicherheitswesen (Higher SS and Police Leader). Himmler, not Seyss-Inquart was Rauter's direct superior; everything that occurred in the Netherlands, even the most trivial detail, was duly reported by him to Himmler. Seyss-Inquart legally had no authority over Rauter, who was his superior in SS ranks, but they had equal power in the Netherlands.¹⁰⁵

Hanns Rauter was born in 1892 in Klagenfurt, Austria, and his father was a wealthy Austrian with extreme German national leanings. The second son in a family of seven children Hanns began to study architectural engineering at Graz, but his studies were interrupted by World War I. He served three years in the Austro-Hungarian army and

served on both the Italian and Balkan fronts. After the war, he soon became involved with militant student groups. During the 1920s Rauter was the ringleader in many overt actions, conspiracies and loved the fights against the Slovaks who lived near the frontier. He became a National Socialist and was involved in underground activities for the Nazis in Austria. In 1931 Rauter was arrested for his role in a coup d'etat which had been planned in conjunction with the Austrian NSDAP. Rauter quickly rose to become a member of Himmler's personal staff; in 1933 Himmler appointed him as chief administrator of the SS-Oberabsschnitt which was headquartered in Breslau. He was also assigned the annexed part of Poland. As a reward for his excellent service he was awarded the post of Hohere SS und Polizeiführer in the Netherlands on 22 May 1940.¹⁰⁶

Rauter was perfectly suited for the position. His personality was geared to aggressiveness and he was cold-blooded. He had been a street fighter since 1914, and loved the male aspect of his semi-military lifestyle. He married in 1937 but never showed much affection for his wife; he thought she failed him by only giving birth to three daughters and one son. He concerned himself with the most trivial administrative details; he wanted no errors to emanate from his office. Rauter tended to view things strictly as black or white; subtleties and nuances escaped him. Moreover, he was too impulsive to calmly analyze complicated situations.

During the war Rauter became the symbol in the Netherlands of the National Socialist party. His name appeared on each Verordnung (ordinance), and on all other regulations. Rauter paid particular attention to any resistance activities. Sabotage attempts infuriated him because it indicated his failure to control all policing aspects in

the Netherlands. He nevertheless had considerable respect for the Netherlands resistance movement. Rauter once exclaimed to Seyss-Inquart that he believed it was "Schade dass sie nicht an unsrer Seite stehen."¹⁰⁷ He was severely injured on 5 March 1945, when his car was attacked by a Netherlands resistance group near Apeldoorn. The British captured him in Germany in May 1945, but he was released to the Netherlands government. Rauter was brought to trial in 1948 and received a death sentence which he appealed but lost. Hanns Rauter was executed in February 1949.¹⁰⁸

Political propaganda used to encourage the Dutch towards accepting National Socialism was in the hands of Fritz Schmidt. He was born in Eisbergen, Westphalia, in 1903. In 1922 he volunteered in the Reichswehr the small regular army of the Weimar Republic, where he served three years with the military engineers. Following this stint he became a street photographer. Then in 1929 he joined the NSDAP. He was an eloquent orator and organizer and his impressive performance led to his appointment in 1934 to Gaupropagandaleiter (regional propaganda leader), Westphalia. He rose in rank quickly; in September 1938 he went to Munich and became the contact person with Konrad Heinlein of the Sudeten Deutsche Partei (the Sudeten German Party). The following year Schmidt was transferred to Berlin where he became a department head under Goebbels with the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (State Ministry for Information and Propaganda).

Schmidt was intelligent and ambitious and soon became an accomplished manipulator. His knowledge about the Netherlands was minute but he firmly believed that he had a firmer grasp on the Dutch mentality than Seyss-Inquart.¹⁰⁹ Schmidt was somewhat unbalanced and

tended to play one Generalkommissar against the other with the result that few people trusted him. He committed suicide by jumping off a train in 1943.¹¹⁰

Hitler, at Goering's suggestion, also appointed a military commander for the Wehrmachtsbefehl (air command), on 20 May 1940. Friedrich Christian Christiansen was appointed to co-ordinate the three Wehrmacht branches. This military counterpart to Seyss-Inquart was his staunch supporter but technically much less influential. Friedrich Christiansen was born in 1897 at Fohr, Schleswig into a seafaring family. After elementary school he became a sailor, then an airman. He was made an officer mostly because of his bravery in World War I. Friedrich joined the Nazi party in 1933 and idolized Hitler. Goering appointed Christiansen as commander of all the Luftwaffe schools in 1935. Then in 1937 he became leader of the Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps (the National Socialist Flying Corps). Christiansen knew little about the Netherlands' military affairs and politics confused him. His weak personality earned him little respect from his subordinates, essentially because he was ill qualified for his position. His orders to shoot hostages in August 1942 and to destroy the village of Putten in October 1944 were his gravest errors. He was tried for these crimes and received a twelve year prison sentence.¹¹¹

The brutality that these major German figures would inflict on the Netherlands could not be imagined in this early stage of the occupation. The damage they caused could not be accurately gauged until after the liberation.¹¹² Certainly in the first stage of the occupation, 1940 to mid-1943, the German policy was to appease Netherlanders as much as possible since they hoped these Aryan people

would ultimately accept National Socialism. Seyss-Inquart had cautioned his troops to act above reproach in their dealings with Netherlanders. A prime example of trying to win them over occurred when Hitler released the Netherlands POWs in June 1940. The 22,000 military personnel who had been captured after the capitulation were confused, frustrated, and demoralized.¹¹³ The first batch of POWs returned the second week of June and were welcomed at the Overijssel border stations by the jubilant Netherlanders. The POWs reported that they had been treated adequately but not fed properly. The spontaneous element of the Twente people was quite evident that day; everywhere in Twente, Hengelo included, the citizens opened their homes to the returning POWs. Each man was fed, he bathed, and was given fresh clothing, before commencing his journey home.¹¹⁴ Hitler had released the POWs with the proviso that they could be called back at any time. When he did call them back, in April 1943, the reaction was again entirely spontaneous but it served as the turning point of the resistance movement in the Netherlands.

Chapter III

RESISTANCE AND PROTEST 1940-1943.

Diverse resistance groups emerged almost simultaneously with the capitulation. However, none of the members of these rapidly established groups had any experience in resistance tactics because there had been no need for these groups in the modern Netherlands. In addition, no outstanding leadership was exhibited in the small resistance groups because no one had the necessary qualifications. Consequently, resistance in the first half of the war was extremely amateurish by nature, unorganized, largely incidental and nearly always reactionary.

Perhaps the best example of the lack of professionalism was the first resistance group of the occupation which was called De Geuzen (The Beggars), a name purposely chosen as a parallel from the struggle with Spain for Netherlands independence during the seventeenth century.¹¹⁵ Bernard Ijzendraat, a tapestry maker, founded a clandestine newspaper as early as 15 May 1940. He gained hundreds of followers very rapidly, but the group actually accomplished very little. They were betrayed when a member inadvertently spoke too freely about the group's activities. Ijzendraat and fourteen of his followers were executed on 24 February 1941, the day before a protest strike in Amsterdam.¹¹⁶

Several other resistance groups emerged shortly after the German invasion, and some of these managed to remain in existence throughout

the war. The Communist Partei Nederland (Netherlands Communist Party, hereafter CPN), played the most active role during the early years of the war and was instrumental in the outbreak of the Amsterdam general strike in February 1941. When the Germans appointed the Netherlands NSB party leader, Rost van Tonningen, as Commissioner of the CPN on 20 July 1940, an underground CPN group was immediately established because many of the CPN members could not abide National Socialism. This group consisted of small cells with a few members who had quite minimal contact with other cells. By 1941 this clandestine CPN group had several thousand members. Infiltration in 1942 led to massive arrests and executions in 1943, and the CPN was dormant for a time. However, the remaining members joined another resistance group in mid-1943 and remained active throughout the war.

Another underground group which emerged in the immediate aftermath of the capitulation was the Orde Dienst (Order Service, hereafter OD).¹¹⁷ A group of politically right wing disillusioned Netherlands military officers established this military style resistance group. The objective of the OD was to take legal control of the Netherlands after the expected German withdrawal but before the return of the Dutch government in exile. A secondary objective was to expedite the collapse of the German occupying forces by employing sabotage and espionage. The OD did not remain inactive during the war period; it engaged in military espionage throughout the war. Politically the OD was the most conservative of the underground organizations. However the OD was unpopular among the other clandestine organizations which sprang up early in the war because of its inflexible military structure and its claim to leadership of the Netherlands resistance. In

addition, the government in exile believed the OD to be infiltrated by German agents; consequently little credence was given to OD communications from the Netherlands during the early war years. There were several arrests in 1941, and the OD became a stronger organization after restructuring in 1942. An OD branch was not established in Hengelo until late 1944 when the OD merged with two other resistance groups to form a national resistance group led by H.R.H. Prince Bernhard.¹¹⁸

Protest against German policies started within a few weeks of the capitulation throughout Hengelo and the Netherlands. A prime example of protest was the response of Hengelo citizens towards the blatantly confrontational actions of members of the Nationaal Socialist Beweging (National Socialist Movement, hereafter NSB). The Hengelo branch had between two and three hundred hard-core members during the occupation period.¹¹⁹

Organized resistance action against the NSB never existed in Hengelo, but considerable spontaneous action against NSB tactics occurred in various ways. On a municipal level Van der Dussen was continuously requested to give special treatment to the NSB party by Dr. Piekaar, an NSB member. Because the mayor rejected these frequent demands, Piekaar appealed directly to Dr. Reuss. Much to Piekaar's chagrin Dr. Reuss agreed with Van der Dussen's decisions. As a result, Piekaar, who later became leader of the NSB Folks Service, grew to dislike Hengelo's mayor strongly.

Again on a municipal level, the power struggle between the NSB and the Hengelo police force escalated quickly in the early stages of the occupation. Tensions between the two groups rose on the evening of 30

July 1940 when the NSB headquarters in Utrecht failed to give official sanction to a meeting the NSB wished to conduct in Hengelo. Approximately forty members refused to accept this information and illegally marched through Hengelo. The Hengelo police disbanded the marchers but after regrouping they commenced to march again, this time with support of the Wehrmacht. Once again the Hengelo police ordered the marchers to disband, but the leading Wehrmacht officer told the police not to interfere. Nevertheless the police escorted them to their destination. In a later consultation with Oberstleutnant Knapp, who had replaced Dr. Reuss, the mayor was informed that neither the Wehrmacht nor the NSB had any jurisdiction whatsoever in Hengelo.¹²⁰

Protest against the aggressive behaviour of NSB members was not restricted to official municipal levels. Confrontations between Hengelo's citizens and NSB members were commonplace in the first stage of the war. The Hengelo citizens had little choice but to retaliate and they did so with a vengeance. Hengelo's police force received complaints almost weekly from NSB members who objected to the treatment they received from unyielding Hengelo citizens. For example, a barrel of tar was thrown through Piekaar's living room window, and the log huts of the NSB youth group were repeatedly destroyed. The German stationmaster had great difficulty dealing with the taunts of youths who called him "Mof", a derogatory term Netherlanders use for German nationals, much like calling an Italian a "wop" or a Chinese person a "chink".¹²¹ The citizens' actions against the NSB became so severe that Van der Dussen declared on 29 June 1940 that he expected good behaviour from all Hengelo citizens.¹²² However some citizens ignored this decree, for on 5 July 1940 the home of the German

appointed director of Signaal was deliberately set on fire. The perpetrators were never found.¹²³

Protest against National Socialism and NSB party members also extended to factory life in Hengelo. Management, personnel and laborers all strongly disliked the idea of the German occupation and the atmosphere in the Hengelo factories throughout the war was definitely anti-German. The behaviour of NSB members in Hengelo in one case resulted in the loss of employment for several NSB members at the KNKS. On 20 December 1940 an NSB member celebrated his twenty fifth anniversary of employment with KNKS, and as was the custom, the worker's work area was decorated with crepe paper, some of which was orange, the color associated with the royal family. The celebrant saw this and immediately asked for personal time which he was granted. He soon returned with the Hengelo NSDAP leader who asked for an immediate meeting with the KNKS Director D. W. de Monchy. The leader informed de Monchy that the decorations were a grave insult to the worker who claimed to be terrorized by the actions of his colleagues. At the conclusion of the meeting the leader indicated that he would complain to the SS. With this announcement de Monchy lost his temper and showed the two NSB members the door; he promptly notified the Hengelo police of the incident and that same day the four other NSB members left KNKS employ.¹²⁴

On a national level protests against NSB attempts to nazify the Netherlands populace gained some form of unity and extended to all areas of the country. The Nederlandse Unie (Netherlands Union, hereafter NU), was established on 24 July 1940 by L. Enthoven, Professor J. E. de Quay and J. Linthorst Homan. The objective of the

patriotic NU was to act as a counterbalance to the NSB propaganda and actions. However the existence of this organization quickly led to more confrontations between the two opposing ideologies. Both the NSB and the NU had newspapers, Volk en Vaderland and De Unie respectively. One newspaper tried to outperform the other. Tactics, on national as well as local levels, became riotous at times. The NSB intentionally created unrest and intimidated NU members, and in July 1941 regulations were enforced which prohibited propaganda for the NU.

Printing continued despite this regulation, which had an opposite effect on the Dutch; subscriptions increased dramatically. The NU was fined fl. 60,000 because of its anti-German bias.¹²⁵ The fine was paid within a few days. However, by the end of 1941 the NU membership dwindled because the only thing it achieved was the confirmation of Dutch patriotism. Those who remained members went underground and strengthened the illegal press which mushroomed during the war.¹²⁶ Although the NU failed to reach its lofty objectives it gave a strong impulse to the eventual outcome of World War II in the Netherlands.

Protest against the German occupying authorities also emerged when Seyss-Inquart decided to reorganize the trade unions. At the time of the invasion, the Nederlandse Verbond van Vakvereniging (Netherlands Association of Trade Unions, hereafter NVV), consisted of 319,000 members and was considered the umbrella union organization of the Netherlands. The Rooms Katholiek Werkliedenbond (Roman Catholic Workmen's Association, hereafter RKWV), which was affiliated with the Rooms Katholieke Staatspartei (Roman Catholic Party), had 186,000 members. The Protestant Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (Christian National Trade Union, hereafter CNV), had a membership of 119,000. Due

to the high unemployment prevalent in 1940, one quarter of the members were unemployed.¹²⁷

Trade unions held a special place in the lives of their members. Collective bargaining was not the major concern of union leaders. Unions were practically responsible for a member from cradle to grave. Unions also administered auxiliary institutions such as sports clubs, social clubs, rest homes, and travel organizations. Newspapers and periodicals were also published by the unions, social insurance was under union, not governmental, control. Thus, retaining their own union officials and management was a crucial concern for the majority of the membership.

Seyss-Inquart's objective, as early as June 1940, was to reorganize the Netherlands trade unions into a Netherlands Labor Front much like the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front).¹²⁸ An additional objective was to create a branch, in November 1940, to be called Vreugde en Arbeid (Joy and Labor), which was a replica of Germany's Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy), program.¹²⁹ Dr. Werner Hellwig was made responsible in May 1940 for restructuring the Unions in all the occupied territories. Hellwig had had ties with Nazism since its infancy and was an administrator in a German employment association. By 1940 he was head of the Arbeits Rechtsberatung der Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Advisory Board).¹³⁰

Hellwig's first step was to remove the popular and respected Dutch leaders of the NVV and replace them with NSB member Hendrik Jan (Henk) Woudenberg. Henk was born in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam in 1891 into a very poor family which eventually had fourteen

children. He was born with a deformed left arm and thus never learned a trade. After six years of elementary school he became an errand boy and studied accounting, French, and German. He was employed as an accountant to a Jewish fish merchant in IJmuiden and by 1937 owned his own company. He had a superficial personality and was a follower, not a leader. Woudenberg became a Nazi party member in 1933 and was elected to the Netherlands Second Chamber in 1937.¹³¹

Woudenberg's appointment as a German puppet was accepted as a normal course of events in most of the Netherlands. Many union leaders realized they were better off to remain at their posts; preserving their careers and the rights of workers took precedence over their dislike for the Germans and Woudenberg. However, this was not the case in Twente. The forced removal of the national union leaders caused great animosity with the workers in Twente. The leaders of the three constituent NVV unions were agreed that they disliked the removal of the NVV leaders and expressed this sentiment when they met with Woudenberg in 1940. Kees van Es of the Enschede Textiel Arbeidersbond (the Enschede Textile Workers Association), Gerrit Visser of the Hengelo branch of the Algemene Metaalwerkersbond (the General Metalworkers Association), and Kees Tabak of the Almelo branch of the Algemene Nederlandse Textielarbeidersbond (the General Netherlands Textile Workers Association), refused to cooperate with Woudenberg and protested against all his actions. Their refusal resulted in threats and intimidation by Woudenberg, but these tactics failed. These vehement disagreements continued and eventually led to resignations of the labor leaders.¹³²

The protest against Woudenberg was so strong in Hengelo that he was

forced to appoint people arbitrarily to posts they did not want. When these people showed reluctance they were handled deftly. J. B. Vlam, for example, was appointed as leader of a union which had office, retail store, and merchant workers as constituents. Vlam however remained true to his principles and was taken hostage in May 1942 and sent to Camp Beekvliet at St. Michelsgestel. Then Gerrit Visser was appointed as district leader of the NWV. He also wavered and was quickly arrested by the secret police in Eschede. Visser died six months later at age forty-eight at the concentration camp Niederhagen, near Paderborn. The union leaders who had resigned, van Es and Tabak, were also arrested. Tabak died in a concentration camp and van Es returned after the liberation although his health was broken and he died shortly afterwards.¹³³

Protest against Woudenberg's changes reached a national level in 1941. He was named commissioner of the RKWV in July and the immediate result was the resignation of the union's management and complete membership. Consequently, the RKWV ceased to exist and the union was dissolved. The CNV followed the same pattern and was also liquidated. To replace the dissolved unions the Germans established the Nederlandse Arbeids Front (Netherlands Labor Front), hereafter NAF, with the objective of bringing all workers, except Jews, together into one union. Woudenberg was appointed leader of the NAF. This new organization never gained the loyalty of the Dutch workers. Only a few registered and the union had very little influence.

While all these events were occurring during this period of adjustment and protest, Hitler occupied Belgium and forced France to surrender; the armistice was signed on 22 June 1940. His next

objective was the invasion of Great Britain, and he commenced the Battle of Britain on 10 July 1940. With Britain, Hitler's strategy was to eliminate British air superiority first, then to force the populace into submission by destroying morale with massive air bombardments. Inexplicably, the Germans changed their assault tactics. Rather than concentrating on the south, they began bombing London on 7 September 1940. However, RAF fighter superiority retained the upper hand and German losses were substantially higher than British: 1733 German aircraft were lost compared to 915 British.¹³⁴ Hitler postponed the invasion of Britain on 17 September 1940, and abandoned it on 2 October 1940, for the duration of the winter. Italy joined Hitler's camp and plans were made to invade the Soviet Union. In 1940 and 1941 German military strength seemed incontestable.

In addition to the rules and regulations imposed immediately after the invasion, the Germans introduced an identity document called the Ausweis. As of 17 October 1940 every citizen over age fifteen was compelled to carry this card which included a photograph. German authorities had the right to inspect these at any time. In 1941 the thumb print of the cardholder was included. Jews had a large J printed on their cards.

At the beginning of June 1940 the factory sirens were silenced except for use as air raid warnings. A curfew, from midnight to 4:00 A.M., was imposed on theatres, restaurants, cinemas and other social establishments to facilitate the midnight curfew. Markets were restricted on Saturday evenings due to blackout regulations. The Hengelo Municipal Council accommodated the Hengelo citizens by changing market hours to Saturday mornings.¹³⁵ The Council also had sidewalk

borders whitewashed so that people could see them in the dark.

Protests were not limited to union and political affiliations.

During the first phase of the war, extreme patriotism and allegiance to the royal House of Orange publicly manifested itself on the occasion of Prince Bernhard's birthday. The German-born but much loved husband of Crown Princess Juliana always wore a carnation in his lapel; it had become his trademark. So on his first wartime birthday the Netherlanders celebrated with wild abandon. The activities of this day, now known as Anjerdag (Carnation Day), took the Germans completely by surprise. Carnations were placed at all national monuments. Baskets and huge bouquets of flowers were placed at the entrances of the various royal residences.¹³⁶ Flags with orange streamers were displayed from thousands of homes. Factory smokestacks were adorned with Bs and Ws painted in orange. These same symbols were painted on buildings and streets and the national anthem was sung repeatedly throughout the day.

Hitler was furious at this astonishing display of loyalty and anti-German sentiment. All the other occupied territories were relatively peaceful and "die verdammten Hollander" lessened his glory from the French capitulation of only a week earlier.¹³⁷ Seyss-Inquart and Rauter were called to Berlin and given strict instructions to make sure there would be no encores. Thus, for the August 1940 birthdays of Princess Irene and Queen Wilhelmina, regulations were enforced to prevent public displays of allegiance to the royal family. But the Netherlanders were not to be deterred. On the specific birthdays school children wore orange ribbons in their hair. Teachers carried carrots on the backs of their bicycles. The

national anthem was sung in schools and government organizations. Orange flowers were prominently displayed in business establishments and private dwellings. Increasingly the Dutch listened secretly to the BBC, especially so when the Queen gave an address.

German attempts to eradicate allegiance to the royal family escalated with more anti-royal decrees. Singing the national anthem was outlawed. All streets named after living royalty had to be changed. In Hengelo the Juliamalaan (Juliana Avenue), officially became the Juliana van Stolberglaan, but the original name stayed in use.¹³⁸ In addition, pictures of living royal family members could not be publicly displayed. Netherlanders responded by hanging pictures of deceased Netherlands royalty and whitening out the living members. This was a tiny defiant gesture, but the Germans had not decreed against it. Throughout the war the Queen's broadcasts on the BBC were the mainstay of the Netherlands people. The bond between the royal house and the people was much too strong for Hitler to destroy.¹³⁹ He was most annoyed by this and had a strong dislike for Wilhelmina, mostly because she managed to escape his clutches before the capitulation.

The general antipathy towards German authority and National Socialism was also clearly demonstrated by the wholesale rejection of the German charity, Winterhulp (Winter Help). Seyss-Inquart established this organization on 22 October 1940, and used the German Winterhilfe (Winter Help), as a model. Financial contributions were expected in Hengelo and Van der Dussen signed up by contributing ten cents.¹⁴⁰ NSB members canvassed in Hengelo to raise funds but few non-party members supplied financial support. This National Socialist

endeavor was rejected by the Netherlanders and they protested in their own manner with their low contributions. German authorities contributed significantly but Winter Help was never as successful as Seyss-Inquart had hoped it would be.

Resentment against the imposition of German policy increased in 1940 and 1941 but never reached the stage of organized national resistance. However, protest increased significantly against German authorities once the tolerant Netherlanders realized the severity of the discrimination against the Jews within the societal structure.¹⁴¹ The reactions ranged from annoyance to outright anger and, after the wholesale Jewish deportations, Netherlanders reacted with shame because they believed they had not done enough to protect their fellow citizens. The major protest against German authorities occurred in Amsterdam in February 1941 when the populace, enraged at the treatment meted out to Jews, went on strike for several days in protest. This solidarity with the Jews totally surprised the Germans who so ruthlessly suppressed the strikers that Amsterdam never again offered any resistance during the war.¹⁴² This episode, and its link to the general resistance, becomes comprehensible only through a summary of the gradual elimination of Jews from Dutch society.

The German discriminatory measures against Jews began in October 1940.¹⁴³ Most importantly, Jews were excluded from working in the civil service. These actions were in flagrant conflict of the Netherlands constitution which did not discriminate against religion, and this caused considerable resentment from non-Jews. The majority of the Netherlands church leaders provided an example to the populace by sending a collective protest letter to Seyss-Inquart, but he never

bothered to reply. Jews also had to obtain a permit if they changed their place of residence. Jewish professors were dismissed from their posts at universities, and this caused students to protest. Also, in October 1940 businesses financed in any manner by Jews, whether by ownership, shares or loans, had to be registered. In December 1940

Seyss-Inquart declared that effective 1 February 1941 non-Jews were prohibited from working for Jews.¹⁴⁴ Jewish doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and midwives were no longer allowed Gentile customers.¹⁴⁵ An ancestral document had to be signed in January 1941, indicating heredity. One was considered a full Jew based on the following criteria: if three or more grandparents were full Jews, if one had two full Jewish grandparents who were attached to the Jewish religious community as of 9 May 1940 or married to a Jew before that date or if a grandparent once practiced Judaism.¹⁴⁵ All these harsh measures only strengthened the prevailing anti-German sentiment in the Netherlands. However, Amsterdam, where sixty per cent of the Netherlands Jewish population resided, experienced the greatest difficulty with German strong arm tactics.¹⁴⁶

In addition to these measures, the Germans imposed a Jewish Council on the Amsterdam Jews on 12 February 1941, the same day the Jewish quarter was sealed off. This Council had two co-presidents, Abraham Ascher and Professor David Cohen.¹⁴⁷ The presidents met with the eighteen member Council and all agreed that the Council's mandate as to be a:

... predominantly executive and mediatory task, but could bear no responsibility for the orders it had to transmit, nor could it accept orders that were dishonourable to the Jews.¹⁴⁸

The duties of the Council were basically administrative. It served as a registry of Jewish organizations, verified individual Jewish registrations and administered funds in frozen Jewish bank accounts. Moreover, the Council had to work in conjunction with the Zentralstelle für die jüdische Auswanderung (Central Office for Jewish Emigration), the organization responsible for deportation of Jews to Westerbork, a transit concentration camp. Thus, the Council was forced to work at the liquidation of its constituents.¹⁴⁹

The spark that set off the Amsterdam General Strike occurred on 19 February 1941. Blatantly provocative German tactics resulted in a skirmish at the Koco ice cream parlor owned by two German Jews, A. Kohn and E. Cahn. The SS stormtroopers instigated a physical fight.¹⁵⁰ In self defense Kohn threw a cylinder of ammonia in the face of the German group's leader Klaus Barbie, later known as The Butcher of Lyons.¹⁵¹ Barbie was not seriously injured and the Germans retreated when the Jews, aided by Dutch non-Jews, fought back with totally unexpected force. In retaliation Rauter, in consultation with Seyss-Inquart and Himmler, sealed off the Jewish quarter even though the Koco incident had occurred in southern Amsterdam.¹⁵² On 22 and 23 February, Barbie supervised more German retaliatory measures. Extremely brutal methods were employed by the Germans at raids which netted them over 425 young Jewish boys for deportation.¹⁵³ The boys were first sent to Buchenwald and then transferred to Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria.

Mauthausen held great fear for Jews and other Netherlanders. Shortly after the Anschluss Himmler had Mauthausen built around a stone quarry. Atrocities were the norm at Mauthausen. For example, fifty

Jews from Amsterdam, after a shower, were purposely thrown against the electrically wired fence around the quarry.¹⁵⁴ Others were worked to death in the quarry. The granite pit was over two hundred feet deep, with a staircase which had steps unequal in size ranging from one to two feet in height. Some of the young Amsterdam Jews were subjected to unusually inhumane treatment and in an act of defiance ten of them "linked arms and voluntarily plunged to death in the pit rather than submit any longer to the tortures of their Austrian SS guards."¹⁵⁵

The humiliation and cruelty inflicted on the Jews aroused great sympathy in the hearts and minds of Amsterdam's citizen once this news reached them. The Communist party strongly agitated for a public strike.¹⁵⁶ The Amsterdam populace responded on 25 February 1941, when streetcar operators, metal workers, shipyard workers, white collar workers and manual laborers failed to report for work. This was the first anti-pogrom strike ever held in Western Europe. The Germans were caught off guard at this reaction and swiftly declared a state of siege. Then they proceeded to use extremely harsh measures to suppress the strikers.¹⁵⁷

Anti-Jewish measures increased in frequency and severity after the strike. Barbie claimed he was responsible for the execution of Cahn and his friends and afterwards he said that he "really felt quite ill seeing their brains squirting all over the place."¹⁵⁸ Radios were confiscated, travel was restricted, club membership was forbidden, transportation was denied and sports activities were prohibited for Jews.¹⁵⁹ Barbie's roundups in late July resulted in over 6000 Jews being deported to Westerbork; in September between 500 and 600 Jews were arrested on an almost daily basis.¹⁶⁰

Barbie was not adverse to using the Jewish Council presidents' concern for their constituents to his advantage. On one occasion, to gain addresses of young Jewish boys Barbie very politely approached Asscher and Cohen and explained to them that 300 Jewish apprentices had left a training camp and now were allowed to return. He expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of a roundup so he asked the co-presidents for the youngsters' addresses so that they could be apprised of their good fortune. The list was given to Barbie who promptly had his subordinates pick up and detain the boys. Unbeknown to the co-presidents, the boys had never been in a camp and it had been a ruse by Barbie to obtain information from the Council co-presidents. The youngsters were deported to Mauthausen; before the end of 1941 they were all dead.¹⁶¹

The 27 August 1941 census revealed that 140,552 full-blooded Jews lived in the Netherlands: in addition, 14,549 half-Jews registered, and 5119 of were registered as one quarter Jewish.¹⁶² Of these, some 410 listed Hengelo as their place of residence.¹⁶³ The Hengelo Jews faced the same persecution as their brethren in other parts of the Netherlands. Forty year old Max Cohen, who had fought the Germans tenaciously at the time of the invasion, was arrested along with ten other Jews on 14 September 1941.¹⁶⁴ The entire group was sent to Mauthausen and their death certificates arrived in Hengelo within the within the month.¹⁶⁵

The Hengelo business community protested against the decree forbidding Jews entry into their establishments. Cafeteria owners continually tore down the notice decreeing Jews be forbidden from using cafeterias. Hengelo business establishment owners refused to post these

decrees and continued doing business with their fellow citizens.¹⁶⁶ However, the WA stormtrooper branch of the NSB daily patrolled the streets and they ensured that the posters were in place.

Van der Dussen also supported the Jewish meat and poultry butchers in Hengelo when in June 1941, three NSB members asked him to remove the Jewish butchers from their profession. The mayor insisted that he would not voluntarily dismiss the butchers, he would only act if such a thing was legally constituted by the occupying authorities. Van der Dussen wrote the new provincial commissioner, Egon L. M. Th. J. von Bonninghausen. The Commissioner informed the mayor that all butchers should be Aryan, but Van der Dussen disagreed and cited the laws on the slaughtering quotas.¹⁶⁷ The mayor never received a reply but in September 1941 a national decree established that Jews could no longer enter slaughterhouses and Van der Dussen had little choice but to comply.

As was the case throughout the Netherlands, countless Jewish homes, businesses and buildings were destroyed with great glee by NSB members. In Hengelo, the synagogue which had been in use since 1838 was wantonly destroyed and all the holy artifacts inside were smashed.¹⁶⁸ Jewish families had first appeared in Hengelo in 1740 and had long since been assimilated. Of the 410 Jews in Hengelo registered in the 1940 census, only 100 survived the war.¹⁶⁹ This is slightly higher than the national average. A heavy financial burden faced these few people who wished to rebuild their synagogue, but with extensive financial help and moral support from Hengelo citizens the synagogue was completely rebuilt by 1951.

On the national level, the records of the State Institute for War

Documentation indicate that 102,893 Jews were deported.¹⁷⁰ The numbers for the early deportations are not accounted for, but the figures are well over a thousand. Although the Jews only constituted two percent of the Netherlands population, more than seventy-five percent of the Netherlands Jews perished in the Holocaust.¹⁷¹ This is the highest percentage of all the Western European countries.

Protest as a form of resistance continued unabated in 1941. The Germans had established a Culture Chamber on 22 November 1941, with the intent of it becoming the parent body, with National Socialist overtones, of all the Netherlands cultural unions.¹⁷² Early in 1942 D. W. De Monchy and H. J. F. ten Cate of the Hengelo Concert Union advised all the members to resign and the unions to disband because of the German tactics to take over the unions. Before the occupation 800 stage members, 550 orchestra members and 200 soloists were registered; they all promptly resigned, although music did not stop completely in Hengelo. During the remainder of the war over 120 clandestine concerts were given in homes throughout Hengelo after the unions disbanded.¹⁷³

The Hengelo factory workers also indicated their strong displeasure with the frequency of the National Socialist propaganda assemblies held at their workplace. A good example is the failure of an NSB assembly at Stork on 8 April 1942, the day labor leader Wouderberg was scheduled to speak to the workers at Stork about the glorious ideals of Nazism; when he arrived he failed to gain entry because an electronically operated gate was closed by order of the Stork director. Wouderberg furiously accused the porter of sabotage and a heated exchange took place. The Stork Secretary opened a side gate and while Wouderberg was trying to enter three thousand workers fled through the

gates to avoid attendance.¹⁷⁴ After nearly all the workers dispersed the meeting took place but with very small attendance. The refusal to listen to the propaganda was not restricted to Stork workers. At the German-directed Hazemeyer the workers were compelled to listen but many protested in their own way when they all turned their backs to the speaker.¹⁷⁵

Protest as a form of resistance also occurred within the medical profession on national as well as local levels. German attempts to Nazify the national governing medical body during the first half of the occupation met with severe repercussions for the Germans. In 1941 the occupying authorities attempted to gain control of the governing national medical council, the Nederlandse Maatschappij tot Bevordering van Geneeskunst (Netherlands Society for the Advancement of Medicine). The decisions of the Society's Board of Directors, which worked with the pro-German Dr. C. A. Croin of the NSB sponsored Medical Front, were rejected by the membership which collectively resigned as a form of protest. This subsequently led to the resignation of the Board of Directors on 27 September 1941.¹⁷⁶

The Netherlands physicians responded by establishing their own clandestine organization, the Medisch Contact (Medical Contact, hereafter MC). This new organization quickly gained the allegiance of former members of the Society. The MC had 6500 members and employed an excellent organizational structure and communication system which ensured that those in the medical profession were kept informed about issues concerning their professional occupation. The Germans countered the MC by establishing a Chamber of Medicine which was headed by Dr. Croin. This Chamber would automatically include every practicing

Netherlands physician. Only collaborationist physicians joined the Chamber. However, Seyss-Inquart received a protest letter from 4500 Netherlands physicians objecting to the automatic inclusion of their names into the Chamber of Medicine. The signees objected on the grounds that the Chamber was politically rather than professionally oriented.

The next collective medical profession protest action occurred when the Chamber ordered every Netherlands physician to fill in applications for registration purposes. This would serve to distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish physicians. Only 1500 doctors, including 250 collaborationists and 600 Jewish doctors complied with this order. Another protest action occurred on 24 March 1943, when 6000 doctors signed a protest letter to Dr. Croin indicating renunciation of their titles; this would mean automatic expulsion from the Chamber. Then, Seyss-Inquart decreed that those who had taken an oath of office could not resign unless granted permission to do so by German authorities. The Germans considered resignations a political move, and peace was only ensured once clarification of the MC stand was understood by the Germans.

The next confrontation occurred when the NSB attempted to interfere with the national health insurance plan. Some 3500 physicians protested and threatened to cease work if the NSB gained any control whatsoever over the financial aspect of affairs of medicine. However, the Germans backed down because they realized the Netherlands could ill afford to function without doctors. Then 4300 physicians signed a protest letter of indignation when it became known that Netherlands workers were to be sent to Germany as forced labor. As a result of this labour call all of the doctors who were called up went underground. Three hundred and

thirty-six Netherlands physicians nevertheless were sent to concentration camps, but most of them were released within six weeks. The protest actions of the Netherlands medical profession proved successful; after the arrests the Chamber passed into oblivion.¹⁷⁷

Protest on a local level regarding medical affairs also occurred in Hengelo in 1942. The Commissioner of Non-Commercial Unions and Institutes imposed two NSB party members on the Hengelo Green Cross at its annual general meeting. This action was vigorously opposed by Dr. H. Hartstra who had been inspired by the principles of the MC.¹⁷⁸ Hartstra wrote the Commissioner that the two NSB party members did not enjoy the trust of the membership. In addition, he wrote that the occupying authorities should refrain from meddling in the affairs of the Green Cross. Consequently Hartstra was arrested and sent as a hostage to camp Beekvliet in St. Michelsgestel.¹⁷⁹ In turn, the Hengelo Green Cross membership protested by resigning en masse. Members found work with the local White-Yellow, cross but Nazification was soon attempted with this group as well. Members then resigned from this organization. Both the Hengelo Green Cross and the White-Yellow Cross were liquidated by the end of 1942.¹⁸⁰

The protest actions also extended to the Netherlands churches.

The divergent ideologies of Christianity and National Socialism could never have worked agreeably in the Netherlands, and clashes occurred repeatedly. The Catholic Church, the Dutch Reformed Church and the Reformed Church had nearly eighty percent of the Netherlands population as followers.¹⁸¹ Therefore, it should not be surprising that Netherlands looked to their church leaders for guidance during the occupation.

The churches at first protested individually, but after the joint sessions of the Inter Church Discussion Group the varying denominations protested collectively as one unit.¹⁸² This union greatly exasperated the Germans, who tried to create ill feeling among the groups but without much success.¹⁸³ Church protest began as early as 1940 when the churches unanimously rejected German demands to control the funds raised from collection plates. Instead, the funds went to aid underground activities. During one special collection more money was raised on one Sunday than the whole German Winter Help charity collected during the entire occupation.¹⁸⁴ However, during the first phase of the war protest constituted the extent of church resistance and, letters of protest were the only means the churches employed to indicate their displeasure towards German policies. Thus letters were sent to Seyss-Inquart regarding anti-Jewish measures in 1940 and 1941, and more letters were sent in 1942 about such things as compulsory labor, the dissolution of the Bible Society and the sentencing of prisoners to death during the Christmas season.

The protest letters became more frequent in 1943. The church leaders protested in February about the deportation of the thousands of Jews, and in April they protested about German interference in hospitals. Several protest letters were sent in May 1943, one regarding sending students as forced labor to Germany and another protesting sterilization of Jews. Then in September 1943 the church leaders protested again about the deportation of Jews because the number of deportations had increased so significantly. Protest letters were also sent in November 1943 concerning the compulsory Nazi salute.¹⁸⁵ Unfortunately, the letters were largely ignored by Seyss-Inquart.

Nevertheless he must have realized the discontent in the Netherlands because he did read the letters, recognized that the church leaders represented the opinions of the Netherlands, and subsequently used a certain amount of caution. The main goals of the church leaders, namely to alert Seyss-Inquart that they objected to German policies, were achieved with this letter writing form of protest.

The educational sector of Netherlands society also used protest as a means of resistance. Outright protest was practiced by university faculty members and even more so by students. There were four public universities in the Netherlands in September 1940: Leiden, Utrecht, Groningen and the Municipal University of Amsterdam. The first academic protest occurred in September 1940 as a response to German attempts to differentiate between Jews and other Netherlands. Professors Scholten and Telders of Leiden sent a petition signed by 229 people to Seyss-Inquart.¹⁸⁶ The Scholten Petition explained that no distinction had ever been made regarding religious persuasions and that consequently there had never been a Jewish problem in the Netherlands. Then thousands of students signed a petition when anti-Jewish measures adversely affected the teaching positions of Jewish professors. Several students clandestinely published a newspaper, De Geus Onder Studenten (The Beggars Among Students), which was quite widely read during the occupation.

One of the most memorable protest actions occurred in November 1940 when the very highly respected, widely reknowned European scholar Professor Meyer of Leiden University was dismissed from his post because he was a Jew. Students were drawn like magnets to what was to be his last lecture; the room was soon so dangerously overcrowded that the

lecture had to be moved to the great hall where Hugo Grotius once taught. For security reasons Professor Meyer did not appear. In his stead the Dean of Law, Professor P. O. Cleveringa, appeared, and he gave one of the most electrifying speeches of recent Netherlands history. In his speech he denounced the inhumanity forced on the Jews and recounted the traditional tolerance Netherlanders had for religious and political equality.¹⁸⁷ Copies of the speech were quickly typed and mimeographed and sent clandestinely to all areas of the Netherlands. The following day both Cleveringa and Telders were arrested and Leiden University was temporarily closed. All student organizations were disbanded. Then, when the Germans replaced the Leiden University President with an NSB party member, the entire Board of Governors resigned in protest.¹⁸⁸

The conflict between academics and the occupying authorities reached a climax in May 1942. Nearly eighty percent of the Netherlands university professors resigned as a method of protest because one of their colleagues, Professor Kranenberg of Leiden University lost his position to an NSB party member.¹⁸⁹ The professors were arrested as hostages and Leiden University ceased to function as an academic institution for the duration of the war. Delft University suffered a different fate. In April 1942, two Delft professors and seventy students were sentenced to death after being found guilty of sabotage in connection with OD activities; they were executed the following month.¹⁹⁰ After the executions Delft protest subsided because morale had sunk so very low.

Students also suffered under the occupation policies. In 1943 the Germans entered the classrooms at Utrecht, Delft, Amsterdam and at Wageningen Institute and forcibly took students from their desks. A

total of six hundred students from that roundup were sent as forced labor to Germany.¹⁹¹ This harsh German action led to considerable protest from many sectors of Netherlands society. The Germans viewed a loyalty pledge to the Fuhrer as a solution. Those students who signed the loyalty pledge could continue studying while those who refused to sign immediately lost their student status and consequently could be sentenced to forced labour. Only fifteen percent of the student population signed the loyalty pledge.¹⁹² Then in May 1943 Seyss-Inquart decreed that those who had failed to sign the loyalty pledge had to report for deportation to Germany. The Netherlands at this time was under a police state of siege and a number of students were intimidated by this order so some did report.

The students in the German work camps endured extremely horrendous conditions. In May 1943, Professor J. Oranje of the Free University of Amsterdam made clandestine inspections of the camps. He facilitated an escape route which effectively helped many students to return to their homes.¹⁹³ Upon their return to the Netherlands many students were forced to go underground and became members of the resistance which by this time was becoming somewhat organized.¹⁹⁴

Obviously a significant amount of protest occurred during the first phase of the war. The German attempt to inflict National Socialism upon the Netherlands failed, largely because of protest actions by various professional and working men's groups. Protest actions against the NSB propaganda was manifested nationally, and converting the Netherlands to National Socialist ideology never reached even a semblance of success. The Nazification of the unions had also failed and contributed significantly to the German labor shortage because many of the union

workers were forced to go underground. The German treatment of the Netherlands Jews, moreso than anything else, indicated to Netherlanders that German intentions were diabolical. The church leaders realized this early in the occupation and with their example set the mood for their parishioners. The medical profession also objected to the racial and political policies of the Germans and indicated displeasure by officially withdrawing services. Academics as well as students also vehemently objected to the German measures and effectively prevented Nazification of the post secondary educational system. These groups collectively protested to the Germans with as much force as they could without endangering any lives and without breaking laws. The fact that the Germans largely ignored these protests was in the long term detrimental to their own objectives; had they understood the traditions and mentality of the Netherlanders they might have developed a different strategy.

Chapter IV.

The April-May 1943 Strike.

The third year of the war proved to be a turning point for the resistance movement, not only in Hengelo but in the rest of the Netherlands as well. The sporadic protests of the early war years increasingly changed to more active, organized resistance in 1942. This occurred for a number of reasons. First, the war was no longer a strictly European conflict. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States of America entered the war winning significant battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway in May and June of 1942. Secondly, people began to realize that German strength was not invincible: in October 1942 the British Eighth Army was victorious at the Battle of El Alamein in North Africa, and the German offensive against Russia which had begun in June 1941, failed, with heavy losses. The staggering figures were reported as follows:

...in the East for the period of June 22, 1941, to February 20 1942, [there] were 199,448 dead (including 7879 officers), 798,351 wounded (including 20,992 officers), 44,342 missing including 701 officers)- a total of 952,141 (including 29,572 officers).¹⁹⁵

These unanticipated heavy losses created a strong need for replacement labour, a need the male German population could not accommodate at that time.¹⁹⁶ The subsequent foreign labour drives by the Germans would prove to be the catalyst that changed the face of resistance in the Netherlands. However, this change can only be understood in the context of the German program to increase labour which was initiated in early 1942.

During the first two years of the war, the still weak Netherlands

economy could easily supply Germany with an abundant labour force.¹⁹⁷ Germany, whose labor shortage had manifested itself in the late 1930s, capitalized on this favorable Netherlands labour situation; many who were unable to find work at home volunteered to go to Germany for employment, though, the term "volunteer" may be a misnomer. One World War II worker postulated that Netherlands labourers had little choice but to go to Germany to find work since none was available at home but that did not mean they willingly volunteered.¹⁹⁸ By the spring of 1941 some 90,000 Netherlands workers worked in Germany.¹⁹⁹ This figure increased only slightly throughout the year; in October 1941 some 92,995 Netherlands had gained employment in the Reich.²⁰⁰ Those who lived near the frontier regions appreciated the chance of gainful employment because they could commute daily.

Significant changes occurred in the German economic system after Hitler appointed Albert Speer to the position of Armaments Minister after the death of Reich Minister of Munitions Franz Todt on 8 February 1942. Speer was born into an upper middle class family in 1905. He was an architectural student when he first became acquainted with Hitler. Speer joined the Nazi Party in 1931 and eventually became a close friend to Hitler, who revered Speer's architectural skills.²⁰¹ Although it had appeared to foreign powers that Germany was ready for war, Hitler's generals did not think that Germany could win a long drawn out war and told him so.²⁰² As late as February 1942 Speer was firmly convinced that Germany was totally unprepared for war. In 1940 German war production had stood at fifteen percent of the Gross National Product, and it increased by only four percent in 1941.²⁰³ Speer's immediate objective was to significantly increase German war

production.²⁰⁴ With his excellent administrative skills, German war production underwent a complete managerial revolution which was often tempered with ad hoc measures and ingenious innovations.

To assist Speer in achieving maximum production with full mobilization of the available manpower, Hitler appointed Fritz Sauckel as Plenipotentiary for Labour Mobilization. Sauckel, who was born in 1894, had only an elementary school education. He served as a merchant seaman from 1909 to 1914 and was a prisoner of war in France during World War I. Thereafter he worked in a factory. Sauckel rose along with the Nazi party: he became a member in 1923, Nazi party business manager in 1925, and Gauleiter (regional leader), in 1927. In 1932 he became Governor and gained a seat in the Reichstag (parliament). He was a fanatical Nazi and to his death blindly obedient to Hitler. He was also a very close friend of Martin Bormann, Hitler's right hand man, who recommended Sauckel to Hitler for the position of Labor Plenipotentiary. Sauckel also impressed Goebbels who believed that his "strong National Socialist hand will achieve miracles."²⁰⁵ The psychiatrist and psychologist at the Nuremberg trial considered Sauckel extremely dull with a low intelligence; they were frankly surprised at his wartime accomplishments.²⁰⁶ While the working relationship between Speer and Sauckel was not always smooth, they nevertheless managed to keep Germany in the war a further two years. Together they achieved an almost unprecedented labour mobilization program.²⁰⁷ With ruthless methods and shrewd planning, Sauckel managed to obtain approximately five million workers to fill German wartime labour requirements.

To enforce the new labour requirements in the Netherlands

Seyss-Inquart altered Verordnung 32-42, (ordinance 32-42), which had restricted labour only to the Netherlands. Now it was to have the phrase "within the occupied Netherlands area" deleted.²⁰⁸ This meant that Netherlands labourers were compelled to go wherever the Germans wished to send them. The Netherlands labour leaders did not take these changes lightly. Thirty-seven regional labour offices administered labour affairs throughout the Netherlands which in turn had one hundred and forty three branches, and the immediate reaction of many of the labour leaders was to resign.²⁰⁹ In fact, the labor director of Hengelo handed in his resignation in protest the day after the labour conscription was announced.²¹⁰ His protest was to no avail for the compulsory requirement was continued and the first of four Sauckel actions was carried out in April of 1942. The first compulsory Sauckel action, or labour round-up, lasted from April to September of 1942 and netted Germany 1,639,794 foreign workers.²¹¹ The largest percentage of these workers were from eastern occupied territories, but 25,395 Dutch workers were sent to Germany in the three month period from May to July.²¹²

The labour draft also affected Hengelo. Over 500 Hengelo metal workers were sent to Germany in one month during the first Sauckel action; on 13 June 1942, these skilled workers, mostly obtained from Stork and Dijkers, were forced onto a train bound for Germany.²¹³ However, not all the workers reached their destination. The Hengelo labour office staff managed to retrieve one hundred of the labourers at Bentheim.²¹⁴ A number of other workers simply took the initiative to escape from the train, and upon their return to Hengelo they either went underground or worked under false identification.²¹⁵ The

Hengelo labour office also played a preventative role when requests were made for labour. Quite often when a notice of a labour draft was received, workers were secretly notified in advance so that arrangements could be made for them to go underground.²¹⁶

The second Sauckel action, from August to December of 1942, netted Germany another one million workers.²¹⁷ Nearly 100,000 of these were from the Netherlands; 38,000 workers were sent in August, 35,000 in November, and 25,000 in December.²¹⁸ Hitler was highly pleased with Sauckel's successes. In September 1942 he granted Sauckel enormous discretionary powers over German and foreign workers making all recruiting agents subordinate to him.²¹⁹ Sauckel sent out instructions that a "ruthless commitment of all resources" should be employed.²²⁰ Among other things, he was granted permission by Hitler to utilize the POWs as labour. With these additional powers, Sauckel was able to add another one million foreign workers to the German war machine. The British Economist reported that "eight or nine millions out of a total 28.1 million are foreign workers - roughly one third."²²¹

The third Sauckel action, in 1943, proved to be exceptionally problematical. Sauckel began the year without a definite quota in mind, but for the first quarter of the year he had projected recruiting 100,000 workers from France, and 50,000 from Belgium and the Netherlands.²²³ Then, in February 1943, Zentrale Planung (Central Planning) requested 400,000 workers before the end of the first quarter: 30,000 were to come from the Netherlands.²²³ On 15 April 1943 Sauckel reported to Hitler that he set a quota of one million foreign workers for the remainder of 1943 with 450,000 to be derived

from western occupied territories.²²⁴ To enforce the recruitment regulations, Sauckel granted the SD the authority to recruit labour. Sauckel was well on his way to achieving this quota, for by the end of May he had recruited 846,511 workers.²²⁵

Foreign labour recruitment slowed considerably in the western occupied territories after May 1943 because of strong local resistance to compulsory recruitment.²²⁶ Speer decided that Sauckel should employ labour in native lands, thus avoiding transportation and negative reactions. In the Netherlands, the slowdown in labour recruitment can be directly attributed to spontaneous reactions, first in Hengelo, then nation-wide.

In late 1942 and early 1943 passive resistance turned into active opposition in the Netherlands because of the more ruthless and harsher methods, rules and regulations of the German occupying authorities. At this stage of the occupation Seyss-Inquart had succeeded in exploiting the Netherlands economy for the sake of the German war machine. Consequently resentment increased when the Netherlands populace had to suffer economically because of ruthless German policies. The mood of the Netherlands people turned against anything connected with Germany and National Socialism and intensified each time a new measure was introduced. The catalyst that plunged the Netherlands into the first national protest action was completely due to the third Sauckel action and his authority over recruiting POWs as forced labor.

On 29 April 1943 General Christiansen, under orders from Himmler, decreed that the demobilized Dutch army, which had been released in June 1940, had to report for deportation to Germany as forced labor. The idea was to send 200,000 former military men to Germany to work in

the war industry and to place another 100,000 in the Netherlands factories which were under German control.²²⁷ This radical step would thus affect 300,000 men and almost every Netherlands household, as most people had a soldier within their family or circle of friends.²²⁸ Had the occupying authorities any idea of the effect this labour call would have, they might have found other ways to recruit labor.

News of the labour call first appeared in Hengelo when publisher Smit, who printed the local newspaper, posted the notice on the public notice board of his printing business. In Hengelo the reaction to this news was swift. As the factory workers returned to work after the lunch break many passed by Smit's establishment which was centrally located and near various Hengelo factories. The workers, once at their place of employment, did not pursue their work; instead, deliberations ensued. At Stork, which had the greatest number of employees, there was never a question of returning to work. The Stork employees had reason to be angry. Extreme tension had existed at Stork for several days preceding the reinterment notice. On 26 April 1943 a German committee had visited Stork to see firsthand the type and quality of products Stork could provide the Krupp company after it had been severely bombed in Essen.²²⁹ This committee's proposal angered the workers and put them in an ugly mood. It is not surprising then, that this additional labour demand caused such a reaction. By 2:15 p.m. the former military personnel had disappeared and by 2:30 p.m. a strike was in effect. Only the Stork security service, the air raid warning service, and some administrative staff stayed behind.²³⁰

News of the Stork strike quickly spread throughout Twente. The

Hengelo commuters announced the news upon reaching their destinations in such villages as Rijssen, Vriezenveen, Wierden, and Losser. Word was also communicated by the Hengelo switchboard operators. The regional switchboard operators, who were based in Hengelo, telephoned the news to other local factories and also to the major businesses in Almelo, Oldenzaal, Nijverdal, and Enschede.²³¹ Calls were purposely not placed to Stork. The immediate effect of the Stork strike in Hengelo was that it became a clarion call for collective but spontaneous action, for no one had organized the walkouts. As the factory workers at Dijkers, KNKS, and the KWF saw the Stork workers leave many took it upon themselves to join the walkout. That afternoon the Stork workers set an example that was followed by 700 workers from Dijkers, 800 from Hazemeyer, 300 from de Jong en Van Dam, 400 from KNKS, 550 from C. T. Stork and 500 from AKZO.²³² The strike did not extend to the German directed Signaal. The 1179 strong work force there included 129 Germans and 59 NSB members.²³³ After about twenty workers had left Signaal, a guard was placed at the gate. Those who were forced to remain inside the building nevertheless staged a sitdown strike.²³⁴ The smaller establishments such as stores, dairy producers and schools as well as the municipal staff and distribution services also joined in the strike. Of the forty-one factories in Twente, which employed a total of 25,591 people, twenty-eight factories with a total of 20,947 workers were on strike in the late afternoon of 29 April 1943.²³⁵

News of the strike also spread to non-urban areas in Twente. On the evening of 29 April 1943 some farmers and milk delivery men agreed not to supply the dairies with the daily milk quotas for the next day.

Consequently, only eight of the twenty-four Twente dairies received milk on 30 April and only seventeen point three per cent (17.3%) of the quota was delivered.²³⁶ The total milk production dropped from 132,016 Kg. on Thursday to 22,862 Kg. on Friday.²³⁷ Eleven dairy producers joined the strike movement that day, while the other thirteen were forced to stop work due to lack of milk deliveries. Farmers and milk delivery men sold their product directly to the sympathetic Twente public.

The German reaction to the strike was one of incredulity. They simply could not believe that the strike had been an entirely spontaneous, unplanned reaction. Towards late afternoon on April 29 Rauter received word that a strike had broken out in Hengelo. He was not aware of its strength nor of the fact that it extended to areas outside Hengelo. Since Seyss-Inquart was in Berchtesgaden, Rauter immediately imposed a police state of siege for Hengelo only. He also ordered a 200 strong unit of the First Battalion of the SS Polizeiregiment Todt (SS Police Regiment Todt), which was stationed at Arnhem, to restore order in Hengelo.²³⁸ Rauter instructed the commander to shoot on sight, wanting the Hengelo citizens to pay a heavy price for their actions. The SS arrived in Hengelo around 7:30 p.m. on 29 April and orders were immediately issued that the Hengelo citizens had to be indoors by 8:00 p.m. .²³⁹

The next day, 30 April 1943, the strike expanded locally, provincially, and nationally so that by the end of the day the strike reached its peak. Nearly the entire Netherlands was united in protest against the reinterment of the POWs. In Hengelo the thirteen factories and other businesses which had not gone on strike the

previous day joined the strike movement, including Signaal whose non-NSB workers failed to report.²⁴⁰ The border commuters also failed to report. Virtually the entire province of Overijssel was on strike.

Nationally, news of the Hengelo strike spread quickly. In Drente, the large towns of Meppel, Assen, Hoogeveen and Emmen joined the strikers. The provinces of Friesland and Groningen were also completely in accordance with the strike. In Gelderland, Arnhem joined as did the southern area of the Betuwe bordering the IJssel River. The Apeldoorn canal workers also refused to work. Some workers joined the strike in isolated Zeeland, and in North Brabant and militant Limburg the strike movement was nearly as intense as in Overijssel. In Utrecht, numerous industrial businesses joined the movement, and in North Holland the numbers of strikers quickly grew. In Amsterdam only three percent of the workers went on strike; the memories of the brutal suppression of the February 1941 strike were still too fresh in the minds of Amsterdam's citizens. But in South Holland workers from factories in Dordrecht, Delft, Katwijk, and the western region joined in the protest. The strike was not big in Rotterdam, but in the Hague, the official seat of the occupying authorities, the municipal workers left their jobs. It was thus abundantly clear by noon of 30 April 1943 that nearly all of the Netherlands was at last united in a protest against a highly unpopular measure.²⁴¹

The occupying authorities by this time realized that the situation was more serious than they originally thought. Rauter was in telephone contact with Himmler as well as Hitler, who feared the strike would spread to Belgium and France. Hitler also believed that if these

countries were all to strike at once the Allies could easily improvise an invasion. Hitler, enraged at the audacity of the Netherlanders, ordered Rauter to use as much force as required to quell the strike. On 1 May 1943 the police state of siege was extended to all areas of the Netherlands because the movement had gained such momentum.

Attempts by the Germans to crush the strike began late in the afternoon of 30 April. The Twente mayors and factory directors were called to Hengelo's municipal building and placed under extreme pressure to recall the strikers.²⁴² Work was to resume as normal at 7:30 p.m. the next day. The Hengelo factory directors would be held personally responsible for the actions of their workers.²⁴³ The German authorities promised to withhold patrols until 10:00 a.m. Saturday so that all the workers had a chance to reach their destination; workers who were found outside their place of employment would otherwise be shot on sight. However, the Germans failed to keep their promise. Approximately thirty minutes before the stipulated time German patrols shot Hengelo citizens randomly and terrorized the populace.²⁴⁴ Eight people were immediately executed, among them was Mr. Frederick M. Loep, an engineer and department head at Stork who the Germans believed was largely responsible for the strike agitation.²⁴⁵ F. G. Stork, who had been called to the municipal building, had seen Loep near an open window. Stork advised Loep to escape but Loep replied that he had done nothing wrong thus had nothing to fear.²⁴⁶ Loep was declared guilty shortly after his arrest and executed in the woods just outside Hengelo.²⁴⁷ Because of these terrorist tactics, large numbers of workers throughout Twente returned to work on the Saturday. Those who failed to report to work considered the

consequences and the majority of the strikers were back on the job on Monday, 3 May, the day German reprisal tactics were most severe. In Twente, a number of those arrested for deportation as punishment for striking managed to escape while being transported to Enschede. However, seven of the strikers were shot "while escaping." One of the escapees went underground while another simply went home; the latter was found, arrested, and immediately executed.²⁴⁸ Some areas in the Netherlands remained on strike several days longer, but German reprisals were so harsh that by 8 May the country was almost back to normal - as much as it could be under the circumstances.

Statistics indicated that the death toll was relatively minor despite the extremely brutal tactics the Germans used. In total, some ninety-five people were executed, fifty-nine were randomly shot to death and approximately four hundred were seriously wounded.²⁴⁹ In addition, nine hundred people were arrested and sent to camp Vught. Although most of them were released within six weeks, several hundred were detained for at least a year.²⁵⁰ Of the anticipated 300,000 men to be reinterned only 8,000 reported and were sent to Germany.²⁵¹

The initial impression of the strike was that it had been an unsuccessful protest against an unpopular labour call and that it achieved very little except to aggravate German brutality. However, the April-May strike reinforced the spiritual resistance of the Netherlands. The strike came to mean much more than a spontaneous reaction; it brought cohesive national unity against the occupying authorities and emphasized to the Netherlands that they were all in the war together. For the remainder of 1943 Speer devised a plan whereby labor could be utilized within the occupied areas instead of being deported to Germany. Sauckel was thus forced to recruit on a

significantly smaller scale in the Western occupied areas from May to December 1943. The recruiting agents who had been receiving considerable resistance before May were thus able to relax somewhat. The final result of the third Sauckel action was that only one million, not the projected 1.6 million, workers were deported as labor to Germany.²⁵² Of the foreign workers in Germany in 1943, some 264,677 were from the Netherlands.²⁵³

The fourth Sauckel action emerged after a conference at Bomann's instigation. Hitler, Speer, Sauckel, Keitel, Backe, Milch, and Himmler were present at the meeting held on 4 January 1944.²⁵⁴ A quota of 4,000,000 workers was established for 1944.²⁵⁵ Sauckel hoped to obtain 250,000 workers from the Netherlands.²⁵⁶ However, by March Sauckel clearly realized that his hopes would not be fulfilled. In a report to Hitler dated 7 July 1944, Sauckel indicated that only 537,400 foreigners were included in the total of 1,482,000 new workers; 94,000 POWs and 848,000 Germans made up the rest of the total figure.²⁵⁷ Several weeks later Sauckel authorized his recruiting agents to use the armed forces and police members to seize labourers off the streets. This occurred everywhere in the Netherlands; on 3 November 1944 Hengelo was sealed off and all males were picked up off the streets. The municipal servants who had been exempted with their special Ausweiss also had to report because the Germans had invalidated their cards.²⁵⁸ By the spring of 1945 the labour shortage in Germany was so severe that every male between the ages of seventeen and forty was forced to register. In addition, German patrols searched each house in Hengelo. When the Germans knocked at the door of a young mother, she replied that she did indeed have a male in the house and

brought them her eighteen month old baby.²⁵⁹ The Germans left, not realizing that a number of males were hiding in other parts of the house. But even these tactics proved disappointing for Sauckel. In the latter half of 1944 only 400,000 foreign workers were recruited.²⁶⁰ Despite the fact that recruitment numbers decreased during the second year of the labour recruitment program, Sauckel nevertheless managed to obtain a total of 5,379,567 new workers during his two year labour program.²⁶¹

The modern world had never before experienced the transfer of over five million people from occupied territories as compulsory labour in wartime. The administrative detail, the logistics, the expense and the final result were, however, carried out largely on an ad hoc basis, as a reaction rather than by organized planning. The Sauckel actions were extremely unpopular largely because the "policy of transferring people to productive work has been brutally carried out, without regard to humanitarian considerations."²⁶² For the militant industrial workers in Hengelo, the strike of April-May 1943 was the response of the culmination of grievances but at the same time it was the declaration of a call to reason. The very idea of removing men from their families, from their homes and from everything dear to them repelled Netherlanders. This concept seemed entirely out of place in time of war, a time when family members most needed support from each other. It is not surprising then, that in the Netherlands as well as other occupied countries:

...the conscription of labor, however much combined with inducements and propaganda, led to resistance. To their best ability, and often at the cost of their lives, the conscripts and their families resisted participation in German war work. But for their efforts, the wartime labor policy of the Third Reich might have had far other results and, indeed, the war itself taken a different course.²⁶³

Chapter V

Effects of the April-May 1943 Strike

The April-May 1943 strike had both immediate and long-term effects in Hengelo and throughout the Netherlands. The most important from a national perspective was that the Netherlands people finally realized that German promises were worthless, entirely selfish and dishonorable. The suppression of the strike indicated to Netherlanders that the Germans had taken "the iron fist right out of its velvet glove and began to use terror as a principal means of government."²⁶⁴ One immediate effect locally was the change in the German attitude toward Hengelo and Stork. On 19 May 1943 Seyss-Inquart paid a visit to Stork, ostensibly to put things in order. To ensure an audience he brought with him hundreds of uniformed storm troopers.²⁶⁵ In the great hall where the earlier NSB assemblies had failed he presented an arrogant speech about the failure of the strike. He lauded the excellent performance of the German police in suppressing the strike and discussed at length the generous, magnanimous attitude of the Fuhrer and defended his regime's actions regarding the strike. His true intention, to subjugate the Netherlands to National Socialism, was revealed in his speech at Stork on 19 May 1943 when he said:

Several times it has been held against me that I have let national socialism come to the fore in all phases in public life. As far as I am concerned that is no reproach, it is a historical mission, which I have to fulfill here.²⁶⁶

The German occupation authorities believed that the Stork Co. official had instigated the strike, so Stork was to be punished for

two reasons; for initiating the strike and for extremely low productivity. Consequently Stork received a German-appointed overseer, Verwalter E. Stengel, but he had little effect on production, which had progressively decreased and it became even lower.²⁶⁷

These were not the only actions implemented because of the strike. Another immediate but national effect occurred on 13 May when all radios were confiscated.²⁶⁸ On 20 May 1943 the Germans conducted extensive raids in various Jewish quarters throughout the Netherlands.²⁶⁹ Two days earlier all males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five had to register for work in the labour draft. In Hengelo the resistance group intervened. Arson was committed at the labour registry office for the purpose of destroying the card system which contained names of those people to be called up for labour. On 15 June the labour office building was set on fire and the files were destroyed.²⁷⁰ The occupying authorities reacted swiftly. The Green Police, sealed all routes out of Hengelo. All males over eighteen were picked up off the streets and detained at the Anthonius Institute on the Thiemsbrug (Thiems Bridge) but they were released for the night with the understanding that they would report again the following day.²⁷¹ On 17 June those who reported were informed that they would be sent as forced labour to Germany. Originally this order was to have been implemented on 1 July 1943, but the strike and the incidents of arson quickened the German desire to expedite the process.²⁷² A system of classifying workers according to date of birth and so scheduling their departure was instituted;

thus, those born in 1924, would leave on 18 June, those born in 1925 would be sent on 19 June and those born in 1921/22 would leave on 21 June.²⁷³ In addition, a permanent police guard was posted at the labour-office. The labour-office keys henceforth were ceremoniously taken to the police station at the end of the working day.

Initially, the strike can be viewed as a failed attempt to protest yet another unpopular German directive. However one has to look beyond the obvious German reaction. The strike had an extremely patriotic effect on the Netherlanders. The populace was definitely united in its dislike for the Nazi invader, but more importantly it realized that few Netherlanders had accepted Nazi propaganda. Werner Wambrunn, believes that "the most significant outcome of the strike was its spiritual impact on the Dutch people themselves."²⁷⁴ He supports this statement by a quotation from an underground newspaper publication, Het Parool (The Word) which stated that the strike was:

...the greatest event since the capitulation...For a few moments the fear psychosis was broken and we did not feel like subjects of a terror regime, but like courageous and liberated people suddenly pushed on by an invisible bond.²⁷⁵

Many Netherlands historians readily agree with Wambrunn's statement.²⁷⁶ However, the unity that emerged with the strike was nowhere more apparent than in the rapid acceleration of the fledgling resistance movement.

As mentioned earlier, a few resistance groups were established immediately after the German invasion but by late 1942 and early 1943 several of these organizations were in ruins, largely because of infiltration and arrests. The largest resistance group formed in the Netherlands had been established in the late autumn of 1943, the Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers (National

Organization for Assistance to Underdivers, hereafter IO), a nation-wide organization that looked after the physical, spiritual, and social needs for those forced to go underground. These onderduikers, who had been forced to go into hiding to evade German authorities and policies were literally "ducking under". The idea of forming the IO arose during a meeting in Winterswijk in the autumn of 1942 between Mrs. Helena Theodora Kuipers-Rietberg and Dr. Fredrik Slomp.²⁷⁷ She had been born in 1893 in Winterswijk, Gelderland where she had spent her entire life. Mrs. Kuipers-Rietberg was a housewife who had reared five children. Extremely religious, she headed the Bond of the Reformed Women's Union and was highly respected for her organizational skills and her humanity to others.²⁷⁸ She viewed Hitler as an anti-Christ and firmly believed that it was the duty of every Netherlander to fight what she viewed as Nazi enslavement.

Dr. Slomp, on the other hand, was a professional and well educated. He had been born in Ruinerwold, Drente, in 1898 and had studied theology at Kampen. Since 1930 he had been pastor in Hardenberg, Overijssel, a town situated very close to the German border.²⁷⁹ He had many German parishioners and a considerable number of German friends. During the 1930s Slomp realized the inherent dangers of National Socialism and had urged all those he met to resist as much as humanly possible, and he often spoke at meetings of the Anti-Revolutionary Party in 1940 and 1941.²⁸⁰ In consequence, his name appeared on the 13 July 1942 Gestapo hostage list but he was warned and eluded capture by hiding in the tower of his church.²⁸¹ Slomp went underground, first in Ruurlo and then in Winterswijk. After reading and speaking in small circles, he was told that Mrs.

Kuipers-Rietberg had been impressed by his speeches. She urged him to help organize the IO, and when he hesitated because he feared for his life, she then asked him if his life was worth more than that of thousands of others. Slomp could not find the words to reply, and it was this exchange which initiated the IO.²⁸²

A chapter of the IO had been established in the Twente area in December 1942 after Dr. Slomp had visited Hengelo and had spoken at a meeting held in the Reformed Church. Approximately a dozen men attended this recruitment meeting.²⁸³ Only two of the men, whom Slomp intuitively trusted, remained interested. With four men from the other Overijssel chapters, the two Hengeloers visited Mrs. Kuipers-Rietberg who instructed them on how to work within the resistance network and how to best use the IO system. The Twente group made contacts in Borne and Almelo, where the IO weekly meetings were held after the strike.²⁸⁴ Two IO districts were also formed after the strike, in Hengelo and Enschede. The Enschede group consisted of Denekamp, Oldenzaal, Haaksbergen, Glanerbrug, Eibergen and Gronau, Germany.²⁸⁵ The Hengelo group covered the areas of Borne, Almelo, Vrieserveen, Daarle, Nijverdal Rijssen, Wierden, Goor, Markelo and Diepenheim.²⁸⁶

The IO groups were responsible for a number of resistance elements. Printing false labor cards was a crucial part of hiding onderduikers. A member of the IO who worked in a rubber stamp shop found the stamp of the Hengelo Arbeidsbureau (the Hengelo Labor Office), on a table; he copied it and was able to use it to aid the IO.²⁸⁷ Falsifying documents was the responsibility of the Enschede branch because facilities were unavailable in Hengelo.²⁸⁸ However,

the Hengelo IO branch did manage to produce and distribute 500-600 coupon cards weekly, with any extras going to the Beurs, an exchange.²⁸⁸ The Zurückstellungskarten (identification cards) were introduced by the Germans not only to make forging more difficult, but to control labor registration more effectively; however, these cards were also reproduced. Blank forms were clandestinely obtained from the Chamber of Commerce and printed by the Enschede IO branch.²⁸⁹

Financial aid for the IO's Hengelo branch was not a problem. Hengelo was such a highly industrialized area that an abundance of work opportunities existed, and the factories could easily absorb the clandestine workers. There were also many places to hide overnight at Stork, Dijkers, and Heemaf. One onderduiker slept in a coal bin at the power plant, and sometimes he even went home.²⁹⁰ In a number of instances people purposely became NSB members but did so strictly as a cover to facilitate hiding places for onderduikers.²⁹¹ However in January 1944 the IO Twente was contacted by the Nationaal Steun Fonds (National Assistance Fund, hereafter NSF), which due to massive increases in the number of onderduikers throughout the country took financial responsibility. The government in exile guaranteed the finances.²⁹² When Twente resistance members were arrested the NSF supplied fl. 30,000 to pay the fines.²⁹³ The Hengelo branch received fl. 500 a month in the last war years. Throughout the war the two Twente IO groups were able to provide aid to approximately 2500 to 3000 onderduikers.²⁹⁴

Yet another important element of the resistance in the Hengelo area was the pilot escape line which was organized to help downed allied airmen. The main objective was to keep these people out of

German reach. The escape lines were never nationally organized and remained concentrated around an individual who took this particular initiative. The Hengelo escape line began in May 1942 when the RAF bombings of the Ruhr valley were implemented.

Several escape routes originated from Twente, one quite by accident. Early in 1942 several French POWs appeared at a farm near Oldenzaal. The farmer, unable to speak French, contacted the Olde Iochuis family which had two members who were teachers fluent in French. These family members personally brought the POWs to the Belgian border.²⁹⁵ From then on fugitives appeared regularly at the Olde Iochuis farm. The family never organized an established routine; their actions were always entirely spontaneous but during the later stages of the war the family worked with resistance groups. A route via Tilburg to Goirle in North Brabant was established where the fugitives were handed over to the Belgian White Brigade group.²⁹⁶ The line ended in Nancy, France where the maquis took control. The Olde Iochuis family helped over 200 POWs during the war.²⁹⁷

The most famous and extensive pilot escape route in Twente revolved around Jules Hæck, a Frenchman who lived in Hengelo. He had had contact early in the war with French POWs and he personally secured Belgian currency and civilian clothing for them.²⁹⁸ In June 1943 Hæck received moral and physical support help from Fonz Gerard, who arranged for the distribution booklets and coupon cards required by the allied crew members. The IO in Hengelo supplied Gerard and Hæck with these vital necessities.²⁹⁹

The routine for retrieving a downed air crew was quite simple. The farmer who initially hid the downed airmen notified resistance workers.

Then the resistance workers would go as a group of four on bicycles to the farm. The front biker, who rode one-hundred meters ahead, had two lights to warn the others of any danger. The next biker, armed, rode with the crew members, and fifty to one-hundred meters behind them the two other bikers, who were also armed, guarded those in front of them.³⁰⁰ Haeck personally took his escapees to the border by train. Tickets were bought separately to avoid detection. Enroute the downed crew member pretended to be deaf and mute so that he could avoid having to speak Dutch. Once the Germans caught on to the ruse, the method was changed, and the two rode separately. Haeck's escape line was established via Zutphen, Nijmegen, and Roermond to Echt. He also established lines via Beek and Gronsveld.³⁰¹ Haeck's contact person in Limburg, M. A. M. Bouman, was shot during the strike.³⁰² The resistance groups which emerged in the Hengelo area after the strike also sent downed airmen to Haeck, who later in the war became a courier between two resistance groups. The Twente IO also brought twenty-five to thirty people to Haeck.³⁰³ In total, Haeck's group aided between 250 to 300 downed airmen throughout the war.³⁰⁴ Only three allied airmen were arrested, in Belgium, while the escape line was operational.

The IO was the largest aid group, but a large number of people in the Twente area worked in other clandestine organizations after the strike. A Catholic group founded by clergyman P. Van de Brink was concerned with helping children. Early in the war Van de Brink had sought out farmers and clergy throughout Twente, and in this respect he laid the groundwork for the future underground system for onderduikers. He had access to false coupon cards and personal

identity cards as well as illegal newspapers. After the April-May 1943 strike Van de Brink utilized the Catholic youth group as couriers who delivered the onderduikers to Catholic families. However, Van de Brink was adverse to helping non-Catholics. Another Catholic group which was organized to fight the NSB with military tactics was betrayed before it could become active, and seven members of this group were executed by the Germans in October 1944.³⁰⁵

The early history of another aid group is just as unfortunate. The group Overduin was established in October 1941 by clergyman Ieen Overduin after the first Jewish roundup in Enschede and sent to Mauthausen. The Enschede Jewish Council realized that non-Jews had to get involved, so Group Overduin was contacted and agreed to assist. However, when the Jewish Council members attempted to go underground during the April-May strike through Dutch collaboration with the SD one of the Council members was arrested and others were sent to concentration camps which they did not survive.³⁰⁶

The Overduin group was not the only underground organization that helped Jews before the strike. The initiative to aid Jews in Enschede occurred late in 1940 when a baker and his daughter became appalled at German Jewish policies.³⁰⁷ After the Jewish roundups in 1941 the father and daughter worked with a group connected to Overduin: his two sisters and four others as well as numerous other acquaintances also assisted. Financing was supplied by local businessmen who obtained it through Netherlands government sources in Amsterdam.

The approximately one thousand Enschede Jews who went underground were not only placed in Twente but throughout the Netherlands as well. Group Overduin retained two carpenters who built hiding places for

onderduikers. One five year old Jewish boy spent the entire war period in one of these hiding places during the daytime, much like Anne Frank in Amsterdam.³⁰⁸ Overduin was also able to place onderduikers in NSB homes because many patriotic Netherlanders became NSB members only to facilitate the hiding of onderduikers; the Germans never thought to look in the homes of these converts to National Socialism.³⁰⁹ On 3 September 1943 Overduin himself was arrested but he was released nine months later, and his arrest did little to harm the smooth functioning of the organization. Throughout the war this group was able to hide approximately 1000 Jews.³¹⁰

Some students who had declined to sign the mandatory declaration of loyalty to the Fuhrer had returned to their native Twente. After the strike Jan Buijer and a colleague, both of whom had studied in Amsterdam, founded an organization to aid those who went underground and to distribute illegal newspapers.³¹¹ This organization became Group Blok, which developed contacts with the distribution office, with other underground organizations, with the labour office and with businessmen who gave financial aid. Group leader Buijer was arrested on 17 June 1944, but his brother Harm came from the northern province of Friesland and took over his duties until an SD raid led to his permanent withdrawal from the resistance. The second in command led the group thereafter.³¹² From December 1944 to April 1945 Group Blok worked closely with the Strike Forces of the Interior, a national resistance organization that had been established by the Netherlands government in exile.³¹³

The April-May strike also had a significant effect on increased resistance on a national level. The IO, for example had several

thousand volunteers, and by the summer of 1944 between twelve and fourteen thousand persons had volunteered. By then the IO was operational in 100 different districts and had at least one thousand couriers.³¹⁴ But this rapidly accelerating organization saw the need, immediately after the strike, to form armed resistance groups which could sabotage vital German offices such as labor and census registries. These small groups would form the politically left of center Calvinist, Landelijke Knokploeg (Strike Force, hereafter LKP), which would become a large national organization responsible for active, militant resistance acts.³¹⁵ The LKP had dual objectives: to destroy distribution offices, coupon card distribution, census registries and labor offices for the purpose of sabotaging the German labor draft program. Railway lines were destroyed, telephone lines were cut and power plants were sabotaged. In Twente the LKP was quite active. On the night of 5-6 May 1943 a German supply train was derailed.³¹⁶ On 28 July 1943 a distribution transport was attacked with a net result of 128 coupon cards.³¹⁷ Countless similar acts followed these initial successes. January 1944 proved to be the most active month; nine assaults were conducted, although only five were successful.³¹⁸

On 20 February 1944 two LKP members sought to free a twenty-one year-old man from a concentration camp near Amersfoort. To facilitate a successful operation, a guard had been bribed with two bottles of gin and fl. 5,000. The guard was to lead the prisoner out of the camp. Unfortunately the plan backfired. The two LKP men stood one hundred meters apart when a car with SS men suddenly approached. One of the LKP men was forced to enter the SS car, and they all travelled towards

the second KP man who promptly shot the Germans. The IKP men managed to escape but without the prisoner who died of exhaustion four days later.³¹⁹

One of the most daring exploits of the IKP was the rescue of Dr. Slomp and Hengelo resistance leader Henk Kruithof from a German prison. Dr. Slomp, who had given the Germans a false name, had been arrested ten days earlier at Ruurlo; the IKP knew it was imperative that he be released before the Germans learned his true identity. Kruithof had been arrested on 14 April 1944.³²⁰ IKP members from Apeldoorn and Twente were responsible for the escape in a daring daylight operation conducted on 11 May 1944. Several IKP men, dressed in military police uniform supplied by the Arnhem IO group, walked into the prison and obtained keys from the guards who along with the prison personnel were then locked up in two cells. Dr. Slomp and Kruithof were found, and the IKP men made good their escape.³²¹ Both Dr. Slomp and Kruithof became onderduikers again after the escape. The IKP could have helped a total of 130 prisoners to escape, but only fifty-four took advantage of the offer, and these men, once free, were provided with coupon cards and a financial start of fl. 10.00.³²²

The IKP also sabotaged the official automobiles of the German authorities at Apeldoorn. On 5 September 1944 the IKP members destroyed the motor of Seyss-Inquart's Mercedes Benz limousine. Queen Wilhelmina's Cadillac, also being used by the Germans, in the same location, was similarly incapacitated. The perpetrator walked by very nonchalantly several hours later and saw the cars being towed away. The Germans then placed a guard to patrol the empty garage.³²³

The Twente IKP was also responsible for one of the largest bank

robberies in the history of the Netherlands. On 7 November 1944 a source from the Hague notified the IO resistance groups in Overijssel that a shipment of between thirty and one hundred million guilders was to be transported to Almelo under Seyss-Inquart's instructions.³²⁴ Within a week the IKP had completed plans to rob the bank. During the robbery the bank personnel was ordered to place the currency in crates and was then locked up while the crates full of currency were loaded onto a waiting truck. A column of Green Police marched past the bank while all this occurred, but the group nevertheless managed to flee with the money which totalled fl. 46,000,000.³²⁵ The furious Germans printed posters throughout the Netherlands offering a reward of one million guilders for information leading to an arrest but no one came forward. Then, on 29 November 1944, during a routine inspection, a citizen was found to have a large number of blank identification certificates with him; after he told the Germans where he got them, he was arrested and forced to lead the Germans to the bank robbers, who by this time had become onderduikers. Because the IKP members had correct identification papers the Germans were ready to release them, but an acquaintance recognized one of the IKP men; the bank manager was called in, and he identified the IKP member as one of the robbers.³²⁶ The rest of the group was arrested and the Germans promised them their lives in exchange for the crucial information regarding the hidden location of the currency. Realizing that human life was more important than money, the group collectively decided to give the Germans the information, but despite their promises the authorities sent the men to Germany where they all died.³²⁷ Another organization that appeared shortly after the strike was the politically left wing Raad

van Verzet (Council of Resistance, hereafter RW). This group was established nationally on 4 July 1943 by Jan Thijssen, a former member of the OD who had grown increasingly disillusioned by the group's ineffectiveness. The initial objective of the RW was to coordinate the national resistance groups that emerged in 1943, but this lofty ideal failed to materialize, mostly because no group wanted to recognize another as superior. The RW nevertheless managed to evolve into an active resistance organization. The RW was governed nationally by a small central committee, but locally it functioned as a military unit of local brigades which usually consisted of three to four people. Approximately 2000 people joined this organization.³²⁸ The RW was primarily concerned with sabotage of German establishments, but also concerned itself with espionage and intelligence. This extremely active organization also operated transmitters which became an excellent source of information for the Netherlands government in exile during 1943 and up to September 1944.³²⁹ In some instances the RW worked closely with the IKP.

In Overijssel the RW group leader, Infantry Captain A. F. Lancker, had excellent organizational skills and because of his profession was trained to be a leader. He was widely respected and soon attracted a group of people to work with him.³³⁰ However, the relationship between the IKP and the RW in Overijssel was at best disfunctional. The first contact between the two groups was made in August 1944, when Jules Haeck, the Hengelo pilot help organizer, acted as both contact and courier for the IKP and the RW. Unfortunately the leaders, Lancker of the RW and Johannes ter Horst of the IKP, had a personality clash and the relationship soon turned into a power

struggle. Moreover the RWV which had a significant number of Communists in its ranks, was looked down upon by the IKP as an upstart organization. The gulf between the two groups widened when a Jedburgh team which consisted of a Netherlands major, an American major and an Irish sergeant major was secretly parachuted into the Twente area.³³¹ Both resistance groups vied for their favour because working with this elite team increased prestige. The team initially favoured the RWV, but the IKP group convinced the Jedburgh team that they were the largest, most active and most experienced resistance group, so the team switched to working with the IKP.³³²

The rivalry between the two groups had commenced before the arrival of the Jedburgh team, and the relationship worsened when Johannes ter Horst was arrested on 22 September 1944.³³³ The SD in Enschede interrogated him and he gave them information regarding Lancker and the IO Enschede group.³³⁴ The SD could not find Lancker, but they did find Ria Hermans, a courier and Lancker's fiancée whom they arrested. The Germans threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate.³³⁵ Hermans was forced to show them villa Liduina where the IKP was headquartered. Everyone had left the villa in anticipation of a German attack, since a resistance member had witnessed ter Horst's arrest and had given the IKP warning.³³⁶ However, when some resistance members returned the next day to eliminate all traces of illegal activity the Germans simultaneously destroyed the villa; in the ensuing action three IKP members lost their lives, two escaped and two female couriers were freed.³³⁷ Johannes ter Horst had been executed by the Germans on 24 September 1944.³³⁸ With these deaths the organization temporarily lost its nerve-centre, and although a new

location was found at a farm in Saasveld two weeks would pass before the organization was restructured.

The RW was also inoperative after Hermans' arrest. Lancker was nowhere to be found, and other members lost their contacts and worked without direction. After some time three members made contact with each other and a new RW camp was built near Beerzeveld. Hermans continued to be interrogated and she naively mentioned the name of J. Prins and spoke about a Frenchman who helped allied airmen escape.³³⁹ Prins was arrested on 30 September; the Germans plundered his house and set it on fire. After a confrontation between Prins and Hermans, he was forced to give the Germans Haeck's name. On October 4 the Germans arrested Haeck who admitted signing a note Ter Horst had had in his possession upon his arrest which instructed Ter Horst to spy at Airfield Twente.³⁴⁰ Despite repeated interrogation Haeck gave no further information to the Germans. He was executed, along with a Catholic resistance worker, on 7 October 1944 at Airfield Twente; Prins had been executed three days earlier.³⁴¹ Only Ria Hermans was spared, but she remained a German POW until she was freed by resistance groups in January 1945.³⁴²

Despite the ever widening gulf there was still a semblance of contact between the two groups. Attempts to mediate in the conflict were made by both Brinkgeve, the Jedburgh team commander, and by members of the respective groups but to no avail. One disgruntled LKP member wrote that , "Working with the RW was impossible and I must advise against it. I no longer see them as co-strugglers but as political opponents."³⁴³ The idea of working together for a common cause was thus overshadowed by personality conflicts and petty

politics.

At this stage of the war, in September 1944, the government in exile ordered the armed resistance to combine forces as the Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten (Striking Forces of the Interior, hereafter NBS), headed by Prince Bernhard, was a combination of the OD, the RW and the IKP, so the Netherlands finally had a national resistance organization. In Overijssel one parent organization was to oversee all armed resistance activities. Lancker was initially offered the post of commander, but he declined and Major Brinkgeve consequently gave regional command to the leader of the OD for Overijssel. The KP agreed to this solution, but at first the RW refused because Lancker originally had left the OD and could not abide the thought of serving under an OD commander, though later the RW members agreed to the compromise and the RW was officially inducted as part of the NBS in November 1944.

At the end of October 1944 Colonel Hotz officially became commander of the NSB in Overijssel and Cor Hillbrink, whose father had died at villa Liduina, was appointed as provincial NBS sabotage commander and liaison officer between Twente and the NBS staff.³⁴⁴ Major Brinkgeve did not survive the war. Brinkgeve and a number of other NSB members were attending a staff meeting at a farm near Losser late in 1944 when two German soldiers approached the maid for some eggs; she panicked and ran to the NBS group whereupon the suspicious German soldiers opened fire and Brinkgeve was killed.³⁴⁵ Lancker did not survive the war either; on 11 February 1945 he was shot during a fight with the SD.³⁴⁶ The NBS, nevertheless, continued working as the major militant resistance group, until the liberation. The history

of the relationship of the two major military groups in Overijssel is not an honourable story. Petty arguments, childish jealousies and personal insecurities and power struggles seriously harmed the resistance cause.

On the other hand, the NBS was quite active in Hengelo, especially during the month before liberation. The Hengelo NBS section consisted of a 200 man force which was led by H. A. Gerard.³⁴⁷ The group was supplied with Sten guns and a Piat anti-tank cannon. The Hengelo section was divided into four territories, each of which had its own meeting place. The Hengelo NBS section was instrumental in helping the allies during Hengelo's liberation. Realizing the allies would liberate Hengelo any day, the NBS cut all the Hengelo telephone lines on 29 March 1945. The group also repeatedly threw nails, glass, and clay shards on the streets to incapacitate German vehicles. On 29 May the Hengelo NBS, after a fight with a German military transport group, obtained a truck which contained munitions, automatic weapons, hand grenades and incendiary bombs.³⁴⁸ Then on 31 March twelve NBS members occupied the Hengelo police headquarters in the municipal building and they also arrested deputy major Groneman.³⁴⁹

The Hengelo NBS was also responsible for the prevention of the destruction of the power plant. On 1 April the Troelstrastraat NBS section was ordered to occupy the power plant because Stork Verwalter Stengel was on his way to destroy the facility. Twenty-five NBS members occupied the power plant and prevented Stengel's actions. However, Stengel escaped and warned the Green Police who, upon reaching the power plant, immediately opened fire. Two NBS members died and one was immediately executed against a wall just inside the building.³⁵⁰

A plaque at the power plant commemorates this event.

Another effect of the April-May 1943 strike was the establishment within the IO of the Persoonbewijzenactie (Personal Identification Action, hereafter PBS), which was an organization that specialized in falsifying documents. This group soon became a national organization which produced documents such as railway tickets, coupon cards, Ausweiss cards, and all the other identification required by onderduikers. The work of the groups was so authentic that an IKP group in Overijssel received its own cards to falsify.³⁵¹ The PBS often worked with another falsification group, the Persoonbewijzencentrale (Personal Identification Centre, hereafter PBC) which was based in Amsterdam, but had an extensive network of local groups. The PBC was primarily concerned with the painstaking work of removing the large J from Jewish identity cards.³⁵² The PBC, which began with approximately twenty volunteers, had expanded by February 1944 to approximately 150 men.³⁵³ The collective falsification groups were responsible for a low estimate of 200,000 falsifications during the last two years of the war.³⁵⁴ Fortunately, neither religious nor political affiliations interfered with the functioning of the falsifications groups. The PBS had direct and indirect contact with nearly all the resistance groups in the Netherlands during the occupation.³⁵⁵

Yet another national resistance organization that emerged after the strike was the Nationaal Comité van Verzet (the National Committee of Resistance, hereafter the NC). This group was organized in December 1942 at Eindhoven but was not active until the spring of 1943. The NC's mandate was to stimulate resistance activities and prepare for

strikes. However, this group was not prepared when the April-May strike occurred; consequently Hengelo did not receive any help from this organization regarding the strike. But the NC nevertheless became quite active after the April-May strike, successfully persuading civil servants to join resistance activities. The NC also was responsible for stimulating patriotic Netherlanders to resist through the distribution of pamphlets, which resulted in countless small cells of resistance groups throughout the Netherlands.

Contacts and a working relationship were established with the OD, the NSF and the PBS.³⁵⁶ By 1944 the NC had its own falsification organization. The provinces of Groningen and Friesland had the most NC cells while very limited contact was made in Zeeland. Despite its relative success on a national scale, the NC had extremely limited contacts with the IO/IKP and none whatsoever with intelligence groups. The NC never had more than several hundred volunteers and only became another link in the resistance movement.³⁵⁷

In similar fashion the Grote Raad der Illegaliteit (Great Council of Illegality), was established in June 1944, with a mandate to coordinate the almost countless resistance groups that had emerged after the strike. Representatives of nearly all the resistance groups and underground newspapers attended the first meeting. In July 1944 this huge committee decided to delegate authority to a five member Grote Adviescommissie der Illegaliteit (Great Advice Commission of the Illegality, hereafter GAC), but the GAC was established too late; as with many of the other resistance groups, politics and superiority interfered and these issues were not resolved until April 1945, shortly before the German capitulation.³⁵⁸

The most crucial of all the resistance groups was the Nationaal Steunfonds (National Assistance Fund, hereafter NSF), which was the financial arm of the resistance movement. This group began under the auspices of the Zeemanspot (Seaman's Pot), a group that financially aided sailor's wives.³⁵⁹ Contributions from this fund came from small groups located in various cities. A brilliant processing scheme was developed so that all transactions, which were coded, could be recorded.³⁶⁰ By the third year of the war the need for greater financial assistance increased significantly, and in 1943 a fund was established by the Netherlands government in exile to deal with the extra funding required; this became the NSF. At this time, L. J. A. Trip, the pre-occupation Director of the Netherlands Bank, gave assurance to everyone connected with resistance activities that governmental reimbursements would be granted after the war ended.³⁶¹ With this guarantee businesses and banks made generous loans to the NSF. A minimum contribution of fl. 25,000 was established.³⁶² In August 1944 the government in exile authorized aid to all resistance or underground organizations. The total amount of funding supplied by the NSF is quite impressive. A final figure for expenditures by the NSF totalled 83.8 million guilders for the entire war period.³⁶³

Intelligence activities also played an enormously important role within the resistance movement. Significant growth occurred in this area after the April-May strike. The Geheime Dienst Nederland (Secret Service Netherlands, hereafter GDN), was established early in 1943 at Eindhoven. This national organization was initially financed by the large Philips conglomerate, but later it was funded through the NSF.³⁶⁴ The GDN evolved from earlier small intelligence cells which

had been disbanded in 1942. The mandate of the GDN was to gather mainly military intelligence, most importantly to procure drawings of the V1 rockets for the government in exile. The GDN also took part in a number of prison escapes. By the autumn of 1943 the GDN consisted of sixty to seventy agents, and by the end of the war at least 1200 people were involved with the organization; the GDN lost twelve agents through arrests, but none of those interrogated betrayed the organization.³⁶⁵ The group which consisted largely of reserve officers and students did not have any political ties.

Although espionage has little relation to the April-May strike these activities do need to be considered to obtain a clear picture of the overall resistance movement. The largest Netherlands espionage group during World War II was the Centrale Inlichtingen Dienst (the Central Intelligence Service, hereafter CID), which was based in London.³⁶⁶ Several months after capitulation, in July 1940, the government in exile established this service for the purpose of sending agents into the Netherlands who could train willing volunteers for intelligence purposes. As with most of the resistance groups previously mentioned, the CID was largely ineffective before mid-1943 for a number of reasons. Personality conflicts and policy differences within the departments and agencies of the government in exile and the CID played a most deleterious role, and section leaders were changed repeatedly which resulted in very little stability in the organization.³⁶⁷ In addition, the strong dependence on the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was also detrimental. The Dutch SOE section did not always receive transmitted messages if the SIS did not perceive them to be important, and this lack of communication severely

hindered the operation.³⁶⁸ Better planning, better communication and less rivalry between the CID and the government in exile might have prevented most of these problems. Few of these problems existed on the regional and municipal levels. The CID became active in Hengelo in 1945 and was led by people who worked in harmony; a network of contact persons was quickly established with two headquarters in the Twente area, one in Hengelo and the other in Eschede.³⁶⁹ Telephone equipment was given to the CID by the local telephone company and the group was able to listen to German telephone conversations and thus warn targeted people about upcoming raids.

But the ineffectiveness of intelligence was largely due to the Englandspiel (England Game) which was the most tragic element of the CID's experience during World War II. The Netherlands intelligence agency was irreparably damaged by a disastrous German counter espionage program headed by F. H. J. Giskes, whose mandate was to find out as much as possible about British communications and intelligence, and to intercept invasion plans.³⁷⁰ Churchillian strategy was to defeat the Germans by aiming at peripheral areas rather than an all out attack which was the American viewpoint.³⁷¹ With this concept in mind the British established the Special Operations Executive, (hereafter SOE), for the purpose of stimulating resistance not only in the Netherlands but throughout all the occupied areas.³⁷² The SOE would prove to be successful in nearly every area except the Netherlands.

The disastrous Englandspiel originated in March 1942, when a Dutch SOE agent who had been dropped in the Netherlands was captured by the Germans. The British were not aware that the transmitter was in German hands but they should definitely have had an inkling of problems when

the agent failed to include his security code. The SOE chose to ignore this warning and failed to pay close attention to repeated warnings.³⁷³ The Germans forced the agent to instruct SOE and CID to drop additional agents and transmitters, which was done. As a result Giskes and the German central intelligence had perfect access to SOE directives. In total, fifty-six agents were dropped in the Netherlands; forty-three were captured and thirty-six of these were later executed.³⁷⁴ Several captured agents managed to escape and returned to England via the Switzerland escape route, but upon arrival in England, they were not believed by the SOE and as they were thought to be German agents they were held in Brixton jail. Not until April 1944 did the Germans cease the Englandspiel activities. An inquiry held by the Joint Intelligence Committee late in 1943 concluded that extreme disregard for security rules and errors of judgement had occurred but treachery by the SOE was never established.³⁷⁵

The entire tragedy could easily have been avoided. Lack of good communications between the SOE and CID was the most detrimental element of the Englandspiel. Trust in each other's abilities was crucial, but the petty quarrels over superiority and methods eroded what could have been a mutually beneficial working relationship. Moreover, the quarreling within the CID itself to a large extent prevented good relations with the SOE. Because of the animosity engendered by the Englandspiel, the relationship between the Netherlands government in exile and the British government was tenuous at times. However, the role played by the Dutch tendency for infighting should be considered as a major contributing factor and by some is perceived as the real tragedy of the Englandspiel; this aspect has not been fully examined.

Another espionage group that emerged in Twente after the strike was called Groep Albrecht (Group Albrecht, hereafter GA). In June 1944 the GA became active in Twente because the Germans had placed V1 launching pads in the eastern Netherlands. Four launch sites were constructed near Lauen, Gelderland. The other launch sites were established in Twente at Schoonheter, Nijverdal, Koningsbelt and Lettele with the command post in Nieuw Heeten in the municipality of Raalte. Another launch site was situated near Wierden and three others were constructed at Rijssen. Three other launch pads were built at Bolshoek, Nijreesbos and Platenkamp with their command post at Borne, near Hengelo.³⁷⁶ Launchpad Nijreesbos was last used by the Germans on 30 March 1945.

The GA was primarily responsible for obtaining intelligence regarding German V1 activities. The expansion of the GA was made by contact with the RW as well as the OD and the IKP. The group also reported on German troop movements, equipment positions, and locations of the upper echelon of the occupying authorities. One report, for example, noted that on the night of 18-19 September 1944 a train full of soldiers left Hengelo every fifteen minutes, that local bridges were guarded, that all cars in Twente were inspected, that Seyss-Inquart was staying at a hotel halfway between Goor and Markelo and that V1 activities occurred near Markelo.³⁷⁷ Another report dated 20 October 1944 indicated the exact locations and house numbers of the destroyed houses after a severe bomb attack and that approximately 350 Germans had died during the bombing.³⁷⁸ All this information was subsequently reported to the Allies who managed to down some 638 V1s though a large number of V1s reached London.³⁷⁹

The more powerful V2 caused greater damage than the V1s. Hitler's objective in November 1944 was to destroy Antwerp because this crucial port had been liberated by Montgomery's Eleventh Tank Division. Hitler hoped that by bombing Antwerp he could delay Allied advances, and V2s were launched from Twente, in the woods near Hellendoorn; in total, some 126 V2s were shot from the Hellendoorn site but fifteen of them exploded en route causing considerable damage.³⁸⁰

Undoubtedly the April-May 1943 strike gave the Netherlands resistance movement a strong impetus at the exact time such a force was needed. The number of resistance groups more than doubled after the spontaneous events in Hengelo became a nation-wide movement. The ultimate effect of the strike was a call to reason, a call for patriotism and a call to work to the best of one's ability to obstruct German objectives. The figures are most noticeable regarding onderduikers. The total locations available to onderduikers increased tenfold.³⁸¹ By war's end, over 300,000 Netherlands had become onderduikers.³⁸² In addition, a total of 1500 pilots and 3000 POWs were helped by the resistance.³⁸³

Quite obviously the resistance movement during the second phase of the occupation was not a progressive nor unified body. The distinct political and ideological differences were too apparent for the implementation of a cohesive working relationship among resistance groups, and each organization jealously guarded its own independence and authority. This lack of cohesion prevented the development of a single strong and effective resistance movement. So while the basic effect of the April-May strike was a numerical increase in resistance groups in addition to patriotic stirrings, the petty squabbling and rivalries negated resistance activities to some degree. Nonetheless,

the ultimate effect of the Netherlands resistance was to thwart German encroachment — economically, socially and politically. The resistance movement was not successful in preventing economic plundering of the Netherlands, but socially and politically the Germans had worthy opponents; they failed to achieve their objectives in these areas. At the Nuremberg trial in 1946 Seyss-Inquart, almost in tribute said that:

...people did not put themselves at our disposal any longer. That was the greatest success of the Dutch resistance movement that politically it resisted us so completely. That was Holland's significance in this war.

Chapter VI

Hengelo-1943 to Liberation

The second phase of the occupation in Hengelo differed quite significantly from the first as changes occurred in nearly all aspects of daily life, politically, socially and economically. At the municipal level, Van der Dussen no longer held the position of mayor. By early 1942 he had been interrogated repeatedly by the occupying authorities in the Hague and the Germans finally arrested him as a political hostage and sent him to camp Beekvliet in St. Michelsgestel.³⁸⁵ An official notice from Generalkommissar Wimmer arrived in Hengelo on 12 September 1942 which formally announced Van der Dussen's arrest and removal from his post.³⁸⁶ Between 1000 to 1500 political hostages were held in St. Michelsgestel; among them other Hengeloers such as D. W. Stork and Dr. H. Hartstra.³⁸⁷

The Germans appointed M. Sichterman as deputy mayor, but he resigned 24 April 1943 because he found it too difficult to work in the intense anti-NSB atmosphere. Then, pro-German J. Best was appointed as deputy mayor by the Germans, he was very active in administering a guard service to protect strategically important German occupied buildings from resistance activities. Best only held the position until 8 September 1943 when J. Th. L. Groneman replaced him. An NSB party member, Groneman, much like Seyss-Inquart, promised not to let

his political affiliations interfere with his administrative duties. As mayor he was faced with an extreme housing shortage. Hengelo, had already suffered from a shortage of accommodations before the war, and since 1940 it was repeatedly being bombed while some 1540 people had moved into the municipality during the war.³⁸⁸ Thus housing became his major concern. However, Groneman had extreme difficulty working with the Hengelo council members and extensive conflict, mainly ideological differences with municipal servants and Hengelo council members, occurred throughout his tenure as deputy mayor.

Meanwhile, Van der Dussen had been released in December 1943 because of a German administrative error. For propaganda purposes, Hitler liked to release political hostages on his birthday and at Christmas as a goodwill gesture. The warden at St. Michelsgestel had been instructed not to release Van der Dussen under any circumstances, but a lottery with names of hostages erroneously included Van der Dussen's name. He was one of two people released that Christmas. By the time the Germans realized their error Van der Dussen was already an onderduiker in the Hague where he worked for the Red Cross. In July 1944 he went underground in Twente where he continued his work with the Red Cross mainly to send onderduiker addresses to the Red Cross headquarters. Van der Dussen also worked with the various resistance groups and returned to his position as mayor on 3 April 1945.³⁸⁹

Living standards also fell significantly during the second phase of the occupation, not only in Hengelo but nationally as well. The total cost of living had risen by fifty percent from August 1939 to October 1944 and by sixty-two-and one half percent in food alone.³⁹⁰ Wages, on the other hand, had only risen by seventeen percent in 1942,

so a considerable drop in living standards occurred.³⁹¹ The general lifestyle of the Hengelo citizens also changed during the second phase of the occupation. Because of the scarcity of raw materials, dietary adjustments had to be made. Surrogate coffee and sugar were consumed and items such as soap, bicycles, tobacco, coal, oil, milk and milkpowder were unavailable to consumers. Prices rose outrageously. In Rotterdam, for example, a hectolitre of potatoes cost fl. 300. or 40 cents a piece. One loaf of bread was priced at fl. 30.³⁹² Many farmers sold sugarbeets at fl. 3.50. per hectolitre.³⁹³ Since currency was no longer of much use, the bartering system prevailed between consumers and local farmers. A Hengelo wartime bride, for instance, traded her china dinner service, a wedding gift, for some bacon.³⁹⁴ Coupons had been introduced almost immediately after the invasion but fewer and fewer items could be obtained because of shortages. One coupon, for example, allowed for only three kilos of potatoes every fourteen days.³⁹⁵ Generally very little food was available, but one Hengelo citizen remembers going to bed hungry only towards the last winter of the war, but she emphatically stated that she never suffered the malnutrition experienced by many other Netherlanders.³⁹⁶

The government in exile, called for a railway strike in September 1944 to impede German military transports.³⁹⁷ The Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Netherlands railways) complied, and most of the personnel was forced to go underground.³⁹⁸ The strike had serious and unexpected repercussions for the Netherlands. As a retaliatory measure, Seyss-Inquart initiated a food transportation embargo to the west. As a result, nearly 24,000 Netherlanders died from starvation.³⁹⁹

At his trial a year later, Seyss-Inquart denied responsibility and claimed that "...the Dutch people themselves were responsible for this state of emergency."⁴⁰⁰ The Hengelo factories were able to alleviate the food situation in the west to some extent. Stork, for example, sent personnel to Groningen for the purpose of purchasing truckloads of food. A Stork draftsman, Reinder Snyder, was sent to Groningen with papers dated 17 January 1945 and signed by Stork officials which stated:

Hierdurch erklaren wir, das unser Angestellter R. Snyder, geboren 18.5.1915 und wohnhaft in Hengelo (O), Kennkartennummer H61/024382 von uns beurlaubt worden ist um von 18. Januar bis zum 29. Januar eine Reise nach Groningen und zuruck zu machen. Wir bitten ihm den Gebrauch von jedem Verkehrsmittel zu gestatten und ihm unter keinen Umstanden fur andere Arbeits-zwecke einzusetzen.⁴⁰¹

This letter was a cover; in reality Snyder would not be working but was to find sources of food and arrange for considerable amounts of it to be sent to Hengelo. Other Stork personnel carried out the same tasks in Friesland and Drente. The Gemeentelijke Hulpdienst Hengelo (Municipal Help Service Hengelo, hereafter GH), was established in January 1945 and operated without any political affiliations. This organization helped Stork and other Hengelo factories such as Dikkers in receiving, sorting and distributing food supplies.⁴⁰²

The utility companies also were affected by the shortage of raw materials. The power plant could no longer deliver electricity to private dwellings due to the coal shortages and intermittently, electricity was supplied via Zwolle⁴⁰³. Some people used petroleum lamps, but many could ill afford the kerosene so most people did without lighting. Gas for cooking purposes was restricted to two and a

half hours a day of consumption. No heat was available, so people wore layers upon layers of clothing. Consequently the general health of Hengelo citizens, as well as the overall Netherlands population, declined and a large number of people suffered from scarlet fever, diphtheria, and scurvy.⁴⁰⁴

During the second phase of the occupation Hengelo was frequently the target of air attacks. The town, because of its industry, its railway and the nearby Airfield Twente was becoming increasingly crucial to both the Allies and the Germans. Army reports indicated that the main purpose for the bombings was to diminish labour effectiveness, and a War Industries report stated that "every alert results in a loss of labour amounting to 2,000 guilders."⁴⁰⁵ Thus the RAF would drop a few bombs almost daily on the way to their Ruhr objectives. Another report indicated that Signaal was far more important from a military objective than either Stork or Dijkers and that Hengelo was worth a "visit" if only for sabotage purposes.⁴⁰⁶

The strength of the bomb attacks increased significantly after the April-May 1943 strike. Hengelo had only been targeted seventeen times during the first half of the occupation and the resulting damage was not very extensive although some people were forced to evacuate their homes. Before the strike approximately thirty people died as a direct result of the bombings although hundreds of others had been injured and hospitalized.⁴⁰⁷

However, during the second phase of the occupation Hengelo was seriously bombed twenty three times. On 18 March 1944 a formation of Mosquitoes from England bombed Hazemeyer's factory, which burned to the ground.⁴⁰⁸ In addition, a munitions train, sitting at a siding, was

hit. The explosion caused severe damage to the railway station, to KNKS and especially to Stork. Two Hengelo citizens as well as several German soldiers died as a result.⁴⁰⁹ Airfield Twente was targeted countless times, and a number of British airplanes were shot down near there by the Germans. Allied industrial sabotage was successful on 1 May 1943 when Stork was targeted and six recently completed motors were destroyed. However, the most extensive bomb damage occurred on 6-7 October 1944 when a formation of thirty-seven B17s dropped 1500 bombs and totally destroyed the inner center of Hengelo. The Wolter ten Catestraat, the Enschedesestraat, the Weemenstraat, the Abelensstraat, the Grundel market, schools, churches, the railway station and hundreds of houses were totally demolished.⁴¹⁰ In addition, KNKS, KWF and Hazemeyer were nearly totally destroyed. The Stork offices also suffered extensive damage.

The reason for the near destruction of Hengelo was simple. After the dismal Allied failure at the Battle of Arnhem, Hengelo was now situated near the front and had become the most important railway center in the Netherlands from a German perspective.⁴¹¹ Thus, destroying this vital area was an important objective for the Allies. Some one hundred and ten Hengelo citizens died from this bomb attack and one hundred and thirty three were admitted to hospital with various injuries.⁴¹² One wartime Hengelo citizen recalled that he would never forget the look of horror on his neighbor's face as the neighbor found his wife's body underneath the rubble that had once been their home.⁴¹³ The Germans also had considerable casualties. It was rumored that nearly 500 Germans had died during the attack but Group Albrecht reported that only 350 Germans lost their lives in the

attack.⁴¹⁴ Since water was not available, the numerous fires simply had to burn themselves out, making the damage even more extensive. The scene was devastating, and the volunteers had no idea where to begin searching for bodies and clearing the rubble to create passageways to first aid areas.

The bomb attacks did not cease with the destruction of the inner center of Hengelo. On 28 October 1944 a train near the power plant was bombed which resulted in four deaths. Then on 29 November 1944 a fuel tank which had fallen from an airplane landed on several Hengelo houses and killed a young boy. And on 21 February 1945 the Berfloweg was bombed and twenty four houses were destroyed; this attack resulted in twenty four deaths.⁴¹⁵ In total, the bomb attacks claimed 186 lives and some 500 houses were completely destroyed while over 3,000 homes were damaged.⁴¹⁶ One of the returning POWs was devastated when he saw the destruction of most of Hengelo upon his return from Auschwitz. From the viewpoint of his wheelchair he took pictures for posterity.⁴¹⁷ The bomb damage to Hengelo was so severe that the inner center of Hengelo was the second hardest hit area in the Netherlands; Rotterdam rated first. Proportionately, however, Hengelo suffered the greatest bomb damage in the Netherlands during the war.

After all the misery and destruction the Hengelo citizens eagerly looked forward to their liberation, which had been expected on 31 March 1945. However, the Germans had blown up the sluice at the nearby Waarbeek as well as the two bridges across the Twente canal which facilitated access to Hengelo.⁴¹⁸ This delay caused other areas to be liberated first. On 1 April 1945 the Allies broke through the Wezel river and liberated Haaksbergen and Beckum and the next day

Winterswijk, Groenlo, Neede, Ruurlo and Eibergen were occupied by the Allies. Airfield Twente and the towns of Ootmarsum, Oldenzaal, and Almelo were also liberated before the Allies marched to Hengelo. On 2 April 1945 the British 7th Hampshire Regiment and the 5th Dorsetshire Regiment were ordered to liberate the area in and around Hengelo via Enschede. Meanwhile the Germans, who had neglected to publicize civilian restrictions, shot everyone they encountered on the streets of Hengelo. The occupying authorities anticipated a battle and had gathered most of their fighting troops at Woolde, just outside Hengelo. Then on 3 April 1945 the war diary stated that the:

move started at midnight and our route was only a track which became almost impassable owing to heavy rain. However by 09.00 hrs 7 Hamps followed by 5 Dorset started the assault on the town. This went very well and Hengelo was captured midst a tumultuous welcome from the population.⁴¹⁹

Further reports in the war diaries stated that:

The Battalion was taken across country over a poor track in heavy rain during the night of 2nd April and was then directed to capture the northern part of Hengelo while the 5th Dorsets captured the southern half. The Battalion advanced in transport through woods, covered by a screen of carriers. When they came out of the woods, opposition was encountered from enemy posts covering the main road into town. 'B' and 'D' Companies advanced into the town itself, but there was no further opposition. In fact the movement of the Battalion was seriously hampered by the jubilant crowds of civilians who poured exulting out of their houses.⁴²⁰

On the day Hengelo was liberated, citizens were drawn like magnets to the municipal building. Troops, support groups, the police force, Red Cross workers and various other groups marched past Hengelo's municipal building in a victory parade. A party atmosphere was evident throughout Hengelo. The national anthem was sung, flags flew everywhere and the jubilant citizens cheered the

British soldiers until they were hoarse. The Jewish onderduikers also came out of hiding, many of them physically supported by those who had hidden them.⁴²¹ Chocolates and cigars were handed out to the crowds, and these were immediately used as barter for other items. The next day Borne, where Van der Dussen was an onderduiker, was liberated, and he promptly returned to Hengelo where a huge task awaited him. The liberation of the Netherlands would not be complete until the Germans capitulated on 5 May 1945 when General Blaskowitz surrendered his troops at Wageningen.⁴²² The Victory for Europe day followed on 8 May 1945 and in Europe World War II was officially over.

The Hengelo citizens, despite their relief at being liberated, were appalled at the toll the war had taken on the population. Concentration camp deaths accounted for only 150 of the Hengelo Jews while thirty one non Jews perished in the camps. The Germans had shot twelve Hengelo citizens on the streets and they had executed fourteen people for various crimes against occupying policies. While labouring in Germany, thirteen Hengelo citizens died because of illness, and eight deaths were listed as being due to bombings. At least six Hengeloers died while they were passenger in trains which encountered bomb attacks. Approximately twenty five refugees died in the Hengelo area during the war. Four NSB members lost their lives while fighting the Allies just before Hengelo's liberation.⁴²³ Hengelo lost approximately one percent of its citizens as a direct result of the war, a very low percentage in comparison to national figures. The total number of war victims for the Netherlands was estimated at about 240,000 which was three percent of the national population.⁴²⁴

During the immediate aftermath of the liberation Netherlanders

wanted an accounting for the collaborationist behavior of some of its citizens and Hengelo was no exception. Some of the girls and women who had fraternized with the Germans publicly had their hair shorn. The Hengelo NSB members were dragged from their homes. Those accused of collaboration were gathered in front of "Camp" Stork but at least 200 of the accused 500 were released due to lack of evidence.⁴²⁵ The remaining 300 had to face a local commission which held an inquest regarding collaborators, and one Hengelo policeman received a three year prison sentence for his collaborationist activities.⁴²⁶

The British troops did not stay in the Hengelo area very long. The Dorsetshire Regiment left for Germany on 3 April and the Hampshire Regiment left on 9 April. These troops were replaced by the Canadian occupational forces.⁴²⁷ Hengelo had also become the Red Cross receiving centre for those returning from Germany. The Canadian troops caused considerable damage to Hengelo as the tanks took chunks out of sidewalks, damaged lamp posts, and knocked chips off buildings. At Signaal the Canadians perpetrated the most serious damage. All the files were torn up, filing cabinets were smashed, typewriters were thrown against walls, and instruments and machinery were destroyed outright.⁴²⁸ The Canadian realized the importance of Signaal to the Germans and destroyed what they erroneously believed was German property. This type of behaviour, while totally unprofessional and inexcusable, can be attributed to war stress and is not all that unusual after a victory over a longtime enemy.⁴²⁹ After Schagen van Leeuwen returned to Signaal the affairs of the company more or less returned to normal, but it took many years before the effects of the

war receded. The damage inflicted by the Canadians was paid by the municipality and amounted to fl. 109,000.⁴³⁰ The national Commission of War Damage, which was established through the Ministry of Finance, reimbursed the municipality of Hengelo.

The most daunting task that faced Van der Dussen upon his return was the Reconstruction of Hengelo and he established an Advisory Council for the reconstruction of Hengelo almost immediately after the liberation. Some 190,000 tons of rubble were removed from the city center; it took from April to October 1945 for 1000 people to accomplish this task.⁴³¹ On 22 December 1945 Van der Dussen spoke to the Hengelo citizens and presented the motto "Hengelo zal herrijzen" (Hengelo shall rise).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Hengelo was among the first towns of the Netherlands to be invaded for a number of reasons. One was the geographical location; the close proximity to the German border naturally made Hengelo an easy target. Another was the heavy concentration of industry, the armaments production and the readily available textile industry. Also, the proximity to Airfield Twente made Hengelo an important target for a German invasion. However, by far the most important reason for the early invasion of Hengelo was the junction at the hub of a network of major railways. This made Hengelo vitally important from a strategic standpoint, not only for the Germans but later for the Allies as well.

Numerous events that occurred in Hengelo during this period contribute to the historical understanding of World War II. Hengelo was a characteristic microcosm of the Netherlands in some respects, yet not at all in others. For example, in 1940 the plans that were made in Hengelo to thwart the German invasion were entirely inadequate and quickly went awry. The national plans, as discussed earlier, were no different. As in the rest of the Netherlands, the Hengelo citizens were happy to welcome the Dutch POWs back from Germany. Nationally, rationing was implemented for economic reasons and the Hengelo citizens had to adjust in the same manner as their fellow citizens. The

loyalty to the House of Orange was as pervasive in Hengelo as it was on a national level, and as with the majority of the Netherlanders, the Hengelo citizens fiercely disliked the German discriminatory measures against the Jews not only on religious grounds but on humanitarian grounds as well. Moreover, the Hengelo citizens were not afraid to let their displeasure be shown to the occupying authorities; the aggressive behavior of the NSB members was as much opposed in Hengelo as it was in the rest of the country. The resistance movement in Hengelo did not actually commence until December 1942, and even then very little was accomplished until May 1943, which fits the national pattern. During that six month period, methods were established and leaders and volunteers were sought, but the resistance movement was never organized nationally until it was almost too late - in fact, when the war was nearly over. Even then political and religious differences as well as the power struggles often took precedence over the actual resistance activities.

Where Hengelo differed from the national perspective was in regards to labour and in this the Hengelo citizens strongly supported each other and reacted spontaneously and honestly, as was their custom. In the labor area Hengelo stands out and in that sense no longer remains a representative example. In addition, Hengelo was one of the most severely bombed towns in the Netherlands, a sad and unfortunate distinction. Hengelo clearly deserves greater recognition for its contribution to the resistance movement in the Netherlands during World War II. The question then becomes what made Hengelo react so differently from other major industrial areas in the Netherlands. One important factor was that Hengelo was fortunate to have a mayor

with humane, just and egalitarian qualities at just the time when such a person was most needed. These qualities, which had been instilled in the Hengelo citizens through the lordship of Frederick van Twickelo hundreds of years earlier, had been handed down by oral traditions and reinforced with a solid religious background and would surface repeatedly during the war period. Also, the concept of samenleving (collective living experience) created a feeling that everyone had to help each other during the difficult times, and this certainly occurred in Hengelo. Mayor Van der Dussen, Jules Haeck and the factory directors are but some examples of the samenleving concept. Moreover, the ideals of justice and honesty in dealing with others remained of paramount importance despite the fact that Hengelo was occupied by Germans. The spontaneous reaction of the blue collar workers to the German labour call regarding former military personnel, considering Hengelo's history, should not have been all that surprising; the combination of Hengelo striking and the Stork involvement was too strong to ignore on national levels.

As indicated throughout this thesis, two distinct phases in the resistance movement can be ascertained. The first phase, from the German invasion to the April-May 1943 strike, was a slow reaction to and recognition of the policies implemented by the Germans. The grandiose nazification plans were never suspected by Netherlanders because each new policy or ordinance was viewed strictly on its own and not as a master plan. Few people realized the significance of each new German measure until it was too late to effect any countermeasures, and experience and leadership, two necessary factors in any resistance movement, were sadly lacking. For those reasons a cogent national

resistance movement in the first phase of the war was out of the question. Also, since there had been no reason for a resistance movement for well over a century, it took considerable time before any type of resistance plans could be formulated. Only when the Netherlanders realized the full implications of German policies was the idea of an active and militant resistance approached with any seriousness. The protest actions of the first phase of the resistance movement accomplished very little but the face of the resistance movement changed significantly after the April-May 1943 strike because the workers viewed the German labor call as unjust as well as an insult to national pride. The majority of Netherlanders agreed with this reasoning and spontaneously joined the first major national resistance act. Hengelo, of course, received the brunt of the punishment, but as with most incidents where they felt justified, the citizens responded with a clear conscience and few complaints.

Undoubtedly the April-May 1943 strike changed the resistance movement from one mainly of protest to one of militant and active resistance. In the final analysis, the resistance acts which were carried out from mid-1943 to the liberation were in most cases not as successful as the sacrifices warranted, on national as well as local levels. The resistance movement in the Netherlands during World War II suffered more defeats than it did victories and was of little importance from a military point of view. However, those affiliated with the resistance groups were more than willing to sacrifice their property and their very lives; Hengelo was at the forefront. As indicated, Hengelo certainly deserves greater recognition for its World War II efforts not only in Dutch historiography concerning the era but in international sources as well.

Footnotes

1 Refer to the bibliography.

2 Hengelo lies in the center of the region known as Twente in the easterly province of Overijssel. See Appendices A and B.

3 See Gerald Newton, The Netherlands: an historical and cultural survey 1795-1977 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1978). See also Max Schuchart, The Netherlands (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1972). Refer also to Frank E. Huggett, The Modern Netherlands (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

4 N. W. Posthumus, "The Netherlands during German Occupation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1946), vol. 245.

5 Werner Wambirunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

6 Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (s' Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 11 volumes, 6-2: 861.

7 See H. M. Van Randwijk, "De Coördinatie van het Verzet," J. J. Bolhuis, et al, editors, Onderdrukking en Verzet Nederland in Oorlogstijd (Amhem: Van Loon Slaterus, 1955), 4 volumes, IV: 121-153.

8 J. A. Hutte et al, editors, Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden (Zeist: Uitgeversmaatschappij W. De Haan, 1953), 12 volumes.

9 See De Jong, passim.

10 See Bolhuis, Onderdrukking en Verzet.

11 Jacob Presser, Ondergang De Vervolging en Verdrijving van het Nederlandse Jodendom 1940-1945 (s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1945), 2 volumes.

12 _____ . The Destruction of the Dutch Jews (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1969).

13 See two volumes by Henri Michel, The Shadow War Resistance in Europe 1939-1945 translated by Richard Barry (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1972); and The Second World War translated by Douglas Parnes (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975). Also refer to the bibliography.

14 The Netherlands wartime intelligence developments are a fascinating story. Countless studies have been done in English on this topic. Refer to the bibliography.

15 Frank Visser, De Bezetter Bepied De Nederlandse Geheime Inlichtingendienst in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Zutphen: Thieme, 1983).

16 See Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden , I, for the delineations of territories of the various Sees. See also A. W. Byvanck, Nederland in den Romeinschen Tijd, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1944).

17 L. A. Stroink, Stad en Land van Twente, (Enschede: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam b.v., 1962), sixth edition, 1980), p. 78.

18 See Appendix C, The Twente Dialect.

19 G. J. I. Kokhuis, historie van Hengelo (Hengelo: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam bv., 1982), p. 39.

20 Ibid.

21 See Walter Prevernier and Wim Blockmans, The Burgundian Netherlands (Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also B. H. Slicher van Bath, Geschiedenis van Overijssel (Zwolle: Waanders, 1979).

22 Oald Hengel, 1980,3, p. 7.

23 Frederick van Twickelo, 1480-1545, was nicknamed the Rich. He was the son of Johan van Twickelo and Adriana van der Rutenberg who had been bequeathed Huis te Hengelo by her father. During the French period, van Twickelo's gravestone was turned over to prevent vandalism. He was originally buried in a chapel but after it was torn down in 1830 he was reburied in a church in Delden.

24 Hengelo, under the lordship of Adolf van Twicklo who was the son of the previously mentioned Frederick van Twickelo, chose the Spanish side of the political dispute the United Provinces were fighting against the hated Inquisitioners from Spain, but only until the 1620s. The repeated Spanish invasions and defeats in Twente warrant their own historian. See Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606-1661 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, first edition 1982).

25 See J. K. W. Quarles van Ufford, "Een Kijkje in Twente", De Economist (1871), I: 247-268.

26 Hengelo van Gehucht tot..., (Hengelo: Bureau Voorlichting, 1978 p. 23.

27 Wolter ten Cate, 1701-1796, was born into a Anabaptist family. His father was a baker and linen manufacturer. At age 19 Wolter took control of the linen production of his father's business concerns. In 1725 he married Tjilke Jans Dijk who brought with her a dowry of 6,000 fl. In 1730 he went into partnership with his brother Jan; twenty years later their nephew joined the weaving firm. Ten Cate then left that particular type of manufacturing and joined in a business with the grandson of his brother, they manufactured fine linen and table linens. Ten Cate was childless. He laid the groundwork for charity in Hengelo and helped initiate the postal connection as well as being financially responsible for building a church. He was affectionately known as Wolter Oom.

28 E. ter Marsch, Het beuksken van Hengel (Hengelo: Boekhandel Broekhuis, 1976), p. 7.

29 Oald Hengel, 1980, 3, p. 11.

30 Gedenkboek Hengelo (Hengelo: E. Broekhuis & Zonen, 1913; reprint ed., Boekhandel Broekhuis en VV Hengelo 1979), p. 86.

31 Ibid, p. 87.

32 See Reina van Ditzhuyzen, Het Huis van Oranje (Haarlem: De Haan, 1979). See also Han van Bree, Het aanzien van het Huis van Oranje van Vader des Vaderlands tot jongste telg (Utrecht: Het Spectrum B.V., 1984). Gene Gurrey, Kingdoms of Europe (New York: Crown Publishers, 1982) has an excellent account of the history of the Netherlands royal family.

33 Hengelo van gehucht, p. 23.

34 See Appendix D, Mayors of Hengelo.

35 Oald Hengel, 1980, 2, p. 27.

36 Thomas Ainsworth was the son of a wealthy Manchester textile manufacturer. He remained in Twente after meeting de Clerq and is buried there. A street in Hengelo is named in his honour.

37 Oald Hengel, 1976, 2, p. 13.

38 Kokhuis, p. 90.

39 Hengelo van gehucht tot, p. 25.

40 C. F. Stork, C. T. Stork In Zijn Leven en Werken Geschetst 1822-1895 (Hengelo Koninklijke Machinefabriek Gebroeders Stork & Co. N.V. Historische Collectie 1918), pp. 6-7.

41 Stork had forgotten the exact name of the novel but believed it was entitled "Capital and Labor". See Ctm Bergsma, "Ontwikkeling van de Hengelose Industriële Structuur," Unpublished thesis (Free University Amsterdam, 1980).

42 80 Jaar Stork, (Hengelo: Machinefabriek Gebr. Stork & Co. N.V. 1948) p. 19.

43 Ibid, p. 23.

44 H. P. M. Weggener, "De Groei van een Machinefabriek 1859-1940" (Hengelo Stork archives), p. 13. The company made no profit whatsoever until 1864. The figures from 1864 to 1868 respectively are as follows: fl. 6335.80, fl. 7204.80, fl. 7725.29, fl. 18256.75, and fl. 18256.75

45 Considerable attention has been given in Dutch academia to Stork's innovative social policies. See P. A. Th. Dickmann, "Social Beleid van een Machinefabriek," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (K. U. Nymegen, 1981). See also R. Roesink, "De Kern by Stork 1883-1955" (Hengelo: Stork archives, 1969) The provincial archives in Zwolle contains most of the Stork material. C. T. awaits his historian. A newspaper for employees De Hengelosche Fabrieksboede which has been printed throughout Stork's existence, also contains a wealth of information about the social aspects of the company.

46 Hengelo van gehucht, p. 30.

47 Ibid, p. 31.

48 See Appendix E, Railway Connections. The author amalgamated this information from the sources previously noted. The Netherlands archival materials was destroyed during the latter stages of World War II.

49 See E. J. Fischer, Stroom Opwaarts De elektriciteitsvoorziening in Overijssel en Zuid-Drenthe tussen circa 1895 en 1986 (Zwolle: N.V. Elektriciteits-Maatschappij, 1986). This well researched book is simultaneously a good source for the development of industry in Hengelo. Considerable access was given the author to the YSS archives. More discussion about the role of YSS during the war will appear in Chapters V and VI.

50 One megawatt equals 1,000,000. watts.

51 See Appendix F, The Hengelo Industrial Families.

52 Hengelo van gehucht, p. 32.

53 Ibid.

54 J. C. Telders, et al, editors, Doorgaan... Beknopte geschiedenis van Hollandse Signaalapparaten B.V.-Hengelo 1922-1974 (Hengelo: Boekbindersbedrijf Elbeka B.V., 1974), p. 13.

55 Ibid, p. 17.

56 Ibid.

57 Schagen van Leeuwen was an artillery officer in the Netherlands navy. He was extremely proficient at mathematics and technical innovations. He served in the Netherlands Indies from 1926 to 1931 when he obtained a position in the Bureau Materieel Marine Artillerie, (Materials Office of the Navy Artillery). He became Director of Signaal shortly before the war. The Germans realized the strength of his influence and purposely kept him ignorant of developments at Signaal but he found out what was being planned by speaking to the lower placed personnel. He encountered considerable difficulties during his escape to England. After the war he returned as Director to Signaal but not without considerable problems with the Allies for control of Signaal.

58 Schagen van Leeuwen worked at the Admiralty in London during the war. See Department van Defensie, (Department of Defense), hereafter DvD, archives letter dated May 7, 1942.

59 See 60 Jaar "Zout" in Twente (Hengelo: Akzo Zout Chemie Nederland bv, Department of Public Relations, 1978). The company has branches throughout the Netherlands and Europe as well as in Japan, South Africa, and Brazil.

60 Hengelo van gehucht, pp. 37-39.

61 See C. Beets, Het tuindorp 't Lansink, 2nd ed. 1918 rpt. (Hengelo Stork archives, 1981). This design won an international award.

62 See Dickmann and Wenneger.

63 See A. L. Van Schelven, Hengeler Wind (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., 1965).

64 Kokhuis, p. 150.

65 Van Schelven, p. 96.

66 GHA, Statistisch Jaarboek 1960-1964, p. 3.

67 E. Bauer, editor, The History of World War II (Toronto: Royce Publications, 1966), p. 69.

68 GHA. Van der Dussen was born on 23 June 1900 in Kampen. He received a law degree from the University of Utrecht (MA) in 1924. He worked as a journalist for a short period before starting his law practice in Kampen. He joined the Vrijheidsbond party and in 1929 was chosen to represent this political party in the Kampen municipal council, serving until 1931 when he withdrew from politics. He reappeared on the council in 1932 and remained in that position until 1937 when he was appointed mayor of Hengelo. He was installed as mayor on 20 July 1937. On 16 January 1951, he was appointed mayor of Dordrecht, a position he held until his retirement on 29 June 1965. He presently lives in Soest.

69 C. B. Cornelissen and J. Slettenhaar, in de schaduw van de adelaar (Enschede: Twents Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam b.v., 1982), p. 35.

70 RvO, IO, BC-1. See also Henry L. Mason "War Comes to the Netherlands," Political Science Quarterly (1963), 78:548-580, for an excellent account regarding the reasons behind the twenty-nine invasion postponements. One can readily agree with his assessment that the Dutch erred with their defense plans. Some of the responsibility, he claims, was simply because of internal personality clashes, not for ideological or political differences. This phenomenon would occur throughout the war period in the Netherlands.

71 Jan Pieter van Vree, editor, Hengelo in Oorlogstijd (Hengelo: Drukkerij Insulinde, 1985), p. 19.

72 Telder, pp. 41-49.

73 Ibid. The Netherlands Department of Defense archives has a report dated 10 May 1940 which lists the actions carried out by the Dutch, but only the German invasion of the power station is mentioned. Once this occurred communications were cut off so nothing further could be reported.

74 See Netherlands Department of War publication, De Strijd op Nederlands Grond gebied tijdens de Wereldoorlog II Hoofddeel III, Deel 2, Onderdeel E," De Krijgsverrichtingen ten Oosten van de Ijssel en in de Ijsselinie Mei 1940" ('s-Gravenhage, Staatsdrukkery in en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1952). Also refer to Mason, note 70.

75 See Aad Wagenaar, rotterdam mei '40 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeidspers, 1970). See also John Killen, A History of the Luftwaffe (New York: Bantam Books, 1986).

76 Van Vree, p. 22. The names of the Hengelo citizens who died are as follows: L. J. G. Badout, G. Bosker, B. Bruggink, A. H. Groothuis, W. Jansma van der Ploeg, F. Lohuis, J. F. Schultes, E. Spit, G. Hulshoff and J. A. van der Vliet.

77 Personal interview with Cpl. Derk Gerritsen of the 11de Regiment Luchtdeel Artillerie. Most of the corporal's colleagues in the unit carried out the same actions.

78 GHA.

79 GHA. Biographical information regarding Dr. Reuss is unavailable.

80 Van Vree, p. 22.

81 Van Vree, p. 27. By the end of 1940 medicine, gas, paint, soap, paper, asphalt and tar were all placed on coupons.

82 Kokhuis, p. 167.

83 See Wagenaar.

84 Van Vree, p. 29.

85 Ibid, p. 31.

86 De Jong, 4-1: 62.

87 H. J. Neumann, Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Graz: Universitats-Buchdruckereier Styria, 1970), p. 7.

88 Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, translators, Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944 His Private Conversations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953), p. 344.

89 Dr. G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1947), p. 31.

90 Hellmuth Rossler and Gunther Franz, Biographische Wörterbuch zur Deutsche Geschichte, (Munich: Francke Verlag, 1973), 3: 2634-2636.

91 Neumann, pp. 117-118. Seyss-Inquart lapsed as a Catholic but continued to support the Church by paying tithes for his daughter. He became a practicing Catholic again after his arrest.

92 De Jong, 4-1: 59. Translations: "an ice-cold Jesuit" and "a man who has not known a heart."

93 See Gilbert.

94 See Neumann for Seyss-Inquart's role in the Anschluss.

95 De Jong, 4-1: 55.

96 Ibid, p. 56.

97 Seyss-Inquart felt that his skills were not used to full capacity and he wanted more responsibility. See de Jong, 4-1: 56-57.

98 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 10 Volumes, (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), II: 989, hereafter NCA

99 De Jong, 4-1: 65. De Jong derived this quote from G. A. S. Snyder, Gesprekken met Seyss-Inquart p. 10. Translation: "When one first arrives here from Germany one believes one understands these people. The longer one is here, the more one sees how it differs from how one thinks." This book is out of print and could not be obtained by the author.

100 See Appendix G, Occupational Government Administrative Structure. See also Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," The American Journal of Sociology (1940), 4: 517-541.

101 De Jong, 4-1: 100.

102 Ibid, 4-1: 101-103.

103 See Wambrun, pp. 30-31 regarding Rauter's position in the occupational government.

104 See L. J. A. Trip, De Duitse Bezetting van Nederland en de Financiële Ontwikkeling van Het Land gedurende de Jaren der Bezetting ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1946). See also G. Brouwers; "Price Policies", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May, 1946), 245: 39-48.

105 Refer to Appendix G.

106 De Jong, 4-1: 71-82.

107 Ibid, 4-1; 81. Translation: "It is a shame that they are not on our side."

108 For further information see Het Proces Rauter Bronnenpublicaties Nr. 5, (s' Gravenhage, 1952).

109 De Jong, 4-1: 95.

110 Some historical controversy exists regarding Schmidt's death but it has been widely accepted that he committed suicide.

111 See Het Process Christiansen, Bronnenpublicaties Processen Nr. 4, ('s-Gravenhage, 1950).

112 See Chapter VI of this thesis.

113 Cornelissen en Slettenhaar, pp. 77-79.

114 Van Vree, p. 32.

115 See Harry Paape, De Geuzen (Nijmegen: Koninklijke Drukkerij G. J. Thieme N V), p. 1965. This group has become almost legendary and in many instances has become romanticized. Bernard Ijzendraat would probably have disliked this type of adulation. He was forty eight years old when he began his resistance work and saw it strictly as a duty.

116 Ibid.

117 De Jong, 5-2, 835-846.

118 The OD, the RWV, and the IKP, were amalgamated into the only national militant resistance group in September, 1944. See D. A. van Hilten, Van Capitulatie tot Capitulatie (Leiden, 1949).

119 GHA. After the liberation over five hundred NSB members were arrested and questioned regarding their pro-Nazi activities during the war. A list of those arrested is available in the GHA.

120 GHA.

121 Van Vree. p. 42.

122 GHA.

123 Van Vree, p. 38.

124 GHA. This episode is also discussed in all the secondary sources which were consulted regarding Hengelo.

125 See de Jong, 4-2: 824-837.

126 The underground press played a considerable role regarding resistance activities. See L. E. Winkel, De Ondergrondse Pers 1940-1945, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). See also H. H. Van Namen, "De Illegale Pers," Onderdrukking en Verzet, 3: 644-688.

127 Jaarcijfers Voor Nederland ('s-Gravenhage, 1942).

128 See Taylor Cole, "The Evolution of the German Labor Front," The Political Science Quarterly (1937), 52: 532-558.

129 See E. Rupers, "Labor and Employer Organizations," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May, 1946) 245: 62-69. See also J. J. van Bolhuis, "Opbouwdienst en Arbeidsdienst," Onderdrukking en Verzet III: 462-471.

130 De Jong, 4-1: 456-461.

131 De Jong, 4-1: 453-455.

132 Kokhuis, p. 170.

133 Ibid.

134 Alan Isaacs, editor, A Dictionary of British History (London: Pan Books Ltd., p. 48.

135 GFA.

136 Cornelissen en Sletterhaar, p. 97.

137 Ibid. Translation: Those damned Dutchmen.

138 GFA. Juliana van Stolberg was the mother of William of Orange.

139 See Gurrey. See also H.R.H. Wilhelmina, Princess of the Netherlands, Lonely But Not Alone (London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1960).

140 Van Vree, p. 50.

141 See Presser.

142 See B. A. Sijes, "The Position of the Jews during the German Occupation of the Netherlands: Some Observations," Acta Historiae Neerlandicae (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976). X: 170-192.

143 See J. F. Krop, "The Jews Under the Nazi Regime", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May, 1946): 245: 28-32.

144 See Appendix I, Discriminatory measures against Jews.

145 Ibid.

146 Lucy Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), pp. 366-369.

147 More information on these two men can be found in both de Jong and Presser.

148 Presser, The Destruction of the Jews, p. 48.

149 See Joseph Michman, "The Controversial Stand on the Joodse Raad in the Netherlands," Yad Vashem Studies (1974), X: 9-68.

150 See Robert Koehl, "The Character of the Nazi SS", Journal of Modern History 1962) 34: 275-283. The events leading up to the strike are discussed in nearly all the sources already mentioned.

151 Tom Bower, Klaus Barbie Butcher of Lyons (London; Transworld Publishers Ltd., 1985), pp. 30-31.

152 See Appendix H, Jewish Quarters in Amsterdam.

153 See de Jong, 4-2: 892 or Presser, p. 52. Both historians discuss this incident quite thoroughly in their works. Also see Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945, (New York: The Beechhurst Press, 1953).

154 De Jong, 4-2: 894.

155 Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Soldier of Orange (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1981), p. 214. Dutch Jews were also sent to Sobibor, an elimination camp but some managed to escape. See Richard Rashke, Escape from Sobibor (New York: Avon Books, 1983). See also Louis de Jong, "Sobibor," Encounter (December, 1978): 51: 20-28.

156 See Abel J. Herzberg, editor, Onderdrukking en Verzet, vol. 3: 5-256.

157 Presser, p. 83.

158 Bower, p. 32.

159 Warmbrunn, p. 167. See Appendix I.

160 Ibid.

161 This story is discussed in all the sources consulted.

162 Davidowicz, pp. 366-368.

163 GHA.

164 Van Vree, 71.

165 GHA.

166 Van Vree, p. 65.

167 GHA.

168 Van Vree, p. 65.

169 GHA

170 Jacob Presser, editor, Documents of the persecution of the Dutch Jewry 1940-1945 (Amsterdam: Athenæum-Polak & Van Gemep, 1979), pp. 115-120. See also Appendix J, Jewish Victims.

171 Davidowicz, pp. 366-368.

172 See W. C. L. Van Der Ginten, "Nieuwe Organen," Onderdrukking en Verzet," I: 466-472.

173 Van Vree, p. 72.

174 80 Jaar Stork, p. 75.

175 G. H. I. Kokhuis, De Geschiedenis van Twente van prehistorie tot heden (Hengelo: Twente Publicaties bv, 1982), p. 221.

176 The information presented herewith is derived from an article by W. F. Noordhoek Hegt, "The Resistance of the Medical Profession," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1946), 265: 162-169.

177 See also Ph. de Vries, MC 1941-1945, geschiedenis van het verzet der artsen in Nederland (1949).

178 GHA.

179 Personal interview with Dr. Hartstra, 29 April 1985.

180 Van Vree, p. 66.

181 Wamburn, p. 156.

182 Ibid.

183 See H. C. Touw, "The Resistance of the Netherlands Churches," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May, 1946), 265: 149-161.

184 Touw, p. 150.

185 Ibid., pp. 158-159. Touw wrote a classic Dutch work on the resistance of the Netherlands churches, Het Verzet der Hervormde Kerk: Geschiedenis van het Kerkelijk Verzet, 2 volumes ('s-Gravenhage, 1946).

186 R. D. Kollwyn, "The Dutch Universities Under Nazi Domination, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1946), 245: 191.

187 Ibid, p. 121.

188 J. J. van Bolhuis et al, Onderdrukking en Verzet, II: 310.

189 Wambrunn, p. 149.

190 Bolhuis, p. 126. See also Wambrunn, p. 149.

191 Process Rauter, p. 94.

192 Wambrunn, p. 152.

193 Kollwyn, p. 126.

194 See Bornebroek for an account of students who founded resistance organizations in the Twente area.

195 Louis Lochner, editor, The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1948), p. 112. See also John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 2 volumes, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).

196 See Dudley Kirk, "Population Trends in Postwar Europe," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 336: 45-46.

197 See Appendix K, Unemployment Statistics.

198 Interview with Derk Gerritsen , a wartime Hengelo citizen.
4 June 1986.

199 John H. E. Fried, The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1945), p. 60.

200 Edward J. Hanze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 57.

201 See Joachim Fest, Hitler (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc., 1974), for an excellent account of the relationship between Hitler and Speer.

202 See Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler In The Twilight War (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1968).

203 De Jong, 5-2: 665. See also Raymond Goldsmith, "The Power of Victory," Military Affairs, (1946), X: 69-80, for a comparative study of war production. For general overviews see Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), and Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (London: The Athlone Press, 1965). See also Nicholas Kaldor, "The German War Economy," The Review of Economic Studies (1945-1946), 13: 33-52.

204 See Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Collier Books, 1979) for an account of the reforms instituted during his ministry. The authors mentioned in footnote seven indicate where ad-hoc measures were implemented.

205 Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunals (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), 39: 400-401. Hereafter abbreviated as IMT.

206 See Gilbert, and D. M. Kelly, 22 Cells in Nuremberg (New York: Greenberg Publishers, 1947), were the psychiatrist and psychologist in charge of the mental state of the Nuremberg war criminals.

207 Fried devotes several pages to the labor mobilization program experienced in Belgium during World War I in The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany.

208 De Jong, 5-2: 671. VO 26-42 and VO 32-42 are otherwise identical.

209 Ibid, 5-2: 670. De Jong presents an excellent account of the organizational structure of the labor administration in the Netherlands.

210 Ibid, 5-2: 672.

211 Horze, p. 137.

212 IMT, 27: 116-117.

213 Kokhuis, historie, p. 171.

214 Van Vree, p. 82.

215 Kokhuis, p. 171.

216 Van Vree, p. 82. A large number of workers also returned to their rightful jobs. At Stork, for example, 155 workers were simply reassigned to their original their workplace and everyone pretended there had been no irregularities. This occurred throughout the Netherlands.

217 Hanze, p. 143.

218 De Jong, 6-2: 779-782.

219 Hanze, p. 141.

220 IMT, 25: 73

221 Economist (London), July 10, 1943, p. 61.

222 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 15 (Washington, D.C.): 15 volumes, 2: 968, (hereafter abbreviated as Minor War Criminals).

223 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 8: 180-181.

224 NCA, 3: 391.

225 IMT, 26: 13.

226 Hanze, p. 147.

227 Cornelissen, p. 235.

228 After demobilization in 1940 the former military personnel went to work wherever jobs were available in the Netherlands, many men received their old jobs back.

229 DVD, TBO-Rapport Bakker.

230 Cornelissen and Slettenhaar, p. 236.

231 De Jong, 6-2: 801. The standard Dutch work on this episode is P. J. Bouman, De april-mei stakingen van 1943, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950).

232 Van Vree, p. 114.

233 G. J. I. Kokhuis, twente 1940-1945 (Enschede: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam B.V., 1980). 1: 77.

234 Kokhuis, historie, p. 173.

235 A. H. Bornebroek, De Illegaliteit in Twente (Hengelo: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam, 1985), p. 17.

236 Cornelissen and Slettenhaar, p. 236.

237 B. A. Sijes, "De april-mei stakingen in Twente," in Bouman, p. 356. This is the standard work on the Twente area concerning the strike.

238 See de Jong 6-2: 806-810, regarding the methods that led to the police state of siege. See also Wambrunn, pp. 99-120.

239 GHA

240 Kokhuis, twente, I: 78.

241 See Appendix L, Strike Areas.

242 Van Vree, p. 116.

243 Ibid.

244 Personal interview with G. Huitink, 16 June 1985. He was repeatedly caned and still has the scars that were inflicted upon him.

245 80 Jaar Stork, p. 76.

246 Van Vree, p. 118

247 Ibid.

248 De Jong, 6-2: 841-842.

249 Ibid, p. 843.

250 Wambrunn presents an excellent comparison and contrast of the two strikes. See also Jorgen Hastrup, European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945, A Complete History (London: Meckler Publishing, 1981).

251 P. R. A. van Iddelkinge et al, De Gekleurde Werkelijkheid (Ede: Zomer & Keuning Boeken B.V., 1985), p. 136.

252 Hanze, p. 147.

253 Ibid, p. 148.

254 Speer, pp. 320-321..

255 NCA, 3: 867-868.

256 Minor Trials, 2: 481.

257 Hanze, p.150

258 Van Vree, pp. 158-159.

259 Interview with Anna de Jong, 14 April, 1985.

260 Hanze, p. 151.

261 Ibid, p. 152.

262 Franz Neumann, Behemoth The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London: Victor Gollancz), p. 279.

263 Fried, p. 13.

264 Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War, (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1981), p. 266.

265 80 Jaar Stork, p. 76.

266 NCA, 2: 989.

267 Rijks Archief Overijssel - Archief Stork. Archival materials indicate that although purchase orders increased production decreased significantly.

268 Stroink, p. 703.

269 See Presser, Ondergang, pp. 369, 373-374, 483, and 495, for a detailed description of these raids.

270 Kokhuis, twente, 1: 82.

271 Van Vree, p.122.

272 G.H.A. Letter dated March 23, 1943.

273 Ibid.

274 Wambrunn, p. 117.

275 Het Parool (May 28, 1943), 4: 3, cited by Wambrunn, p. 118.

276 Presser, de Jong, Winkelman and Cornelissen as well as local historians all agree that after the strike a different Netherlands emerged, a country no longer as ready to cooperate with German policies.

277 De Jong, 6-1: 126.

278 Ibid. Mrs. Kuipers-Rietberg's story is well documented in the RvO archives and is recounted in nearly all the Netherlands academic as well as non-academic work regarding the IO.

279 Jan Hof, Frits de Zwerver Twaalf Jaar strijd tegen de Nazi-terreur (Den Haag; Omniboek, 1976), pp. 2-5. This is the only biography available on Slomp in Dutch and it is based on officially recognized documentation and interviews with Slomp before his death in 1977.

280 De Jong, 6-1: 126. The Anti-Revolutionary Party (AR) was the largest Protestant political party which believed in a forceful colonial party. As with most Netherlands political parties it was closely tied to religious affiliations in this case the Reformed Churches.

281 Hof, p. 105. See also RvO, IO-BC, Ontslag Twente.

282 This story is well known to the Dutch because Slomp mentioned it in a documentary produced by de Jong entitled De Bezetting. See Dr. L. de Jong, De Bezetting (Amsterdam: Em. Querido's Uitgeverij, 1985), p. 586. The information is also noted in several archives the RIOD.

283 RvO, IO, BC-1. See also Verslag Hengelo.

284 Ibid.

285 RvO, IO, AD-4.

286 RvO, IO- BC-1. See also Verslag Hengelo.

287 Ibid.

288 Ibid.

289 RvO, IO, AD-4, Ontslag Hengelo.

290 Personal interview with H. Ehreburg, 2 May 1986. His story is confirmed by original documentation in RvO archives.

291 Bornebroek, p. 39.

292 This will be discussed more fully under the section on finance later in this chapter.

293 RvO, IO, BC-1. See also *Ontstaan IO Twente*.

294 Ibid.

295 RvO, IO/LKP, BS-1.

296 Ibid.

297 *Bornebroek*, p. 43.

298 RvO, IO/LKP, AD-3. See also *Verslag Pilotenwerk*.

299 RvO, IO, AD-4, *Verslag F. Gerard*.

300 RvO, IO/LKP, AD-4 *Vlieger transport*.

301 See Appendix M, *Pilot Escape Line Jules Haeck*. This information is derived from RvO IO/LKP, AD-4, *Vlieger transport*.

302 *De Jong*, 7-2: 943.

303 RvO, IO, AD-4. See also *Henk Kruihof*.

304 RvO, IO, BC-1. See also *Ontstlag Twente*.

305 *Ministerie van Justitie, Dossier Schober*, map 2. (Hereafter abbreviated as M of J)

306 Ibid., *Dossier Schober*, map 2

307 *Bornebroek*, p. 38.

308 This story was told in an interview with Anna de Jong, a wartime Hengelo citizen, 3 April 1985. This information was confirmed by three other reliable sources. The person who was in hiding declined to be interviewed because he did not wish to bring up the memories of his wartime experiences. See Almar Tjepkema and Jaap Walvis, Ondergedoken (Weesp: De Haan, 1985) for an account of the life of onderduikers during the war.

309 Bornebroek, p. 34.

310 RvO, IO/LKP, AD-4, Onstaan IO Twente.

311 Bornebroek, p. 40.

312 RvO, IO BC-1, IO Geschiedenis Twente in data. See also Cornelissen and Slettenhaar, pp. 324-332. De Jong and Bornebroek also discuss the activities of this group. They obtained their information from an unpublished thesis by T. J. M. van der Schilden and A. P. A. de Jong, Het verzet 1940-45. "De ontwikkeling en het functioneren van de groep 'Blok'" (Breda, 1966.)

313 The Strike Forces of the Interior were a national resistance organization which relied significantly on local resistance groups. These Forces were invaluable to the Allies in a number of aspects.

314 De Jong, 7-2: 759.

315 Ibid.

316 RvO, IO/LKP, DD-1, Hillbrink.

317 Ibid.

318 Bornebroek, p. 47.

319 RvO, IO, LKP, DD-2. See also H. W. Poorteman, Van Bezetting naar bevrijding (Enschede, 1978).

320 RvO, IO, BC-1, Onstaan IO Twente.

321 RvO, IO, AD-4, Henk Kruihof.

322 Ibid.

323 RvO, IO, BG-3.

324 RvO, IO/LKP. Ad-2.

325 Ibid.

326 Ibid.

327 Ibid.

328 J. Kok and J. Meulenbelt, "Lijst van Organisaties", Onderdrukking en Verzet, 4: 212

329 See Appendix N, Resistance Activities in Overijssel.

330 Cornelissen and Slettenhaar, pp. 270-271.

331 RvO, RWV, 3-i. A Jedburgh team was the name designated for operational teams which would provide support for Operation Overlord in conjunction with the American OSS. This team consisted of the Netherlands Major Henk Brinkgeve, Irish Sergeant Major John Austin, and American Major John Olmsted.

332 RvO, IO/LKP, DD-1.

333 RvO, IO/LKP, EC-3, Bijzonderheden betreffende de arrestatie van Johannes.

334 M v J, Dossier Schober, 1-3.

335 M v J, Dossier Hermans.

336 Bornebroek, p. 63.

337 RvO, IO, EC-1. L.O. Geschiedenis Twente in data. See also Verslag Almelo.

338 M v J, Dossier Schober, I-5.

339 M v J, Dossier Schober, I-6.

340 M v J, Dossier Schober, I-5, and II.

341 Ibid.

342 A historical controversy exists about Ria Hemman's role in this episode. Cornelissen believes she was a collaborator while a resistance member believes she acted out of spite because her fiancée's rivals might have been outwitted due to her actions. Bornebroek is unconvinced about her innocence because she repeatedly changed her testimony after the liberation. But he does give her the benefit of the doubt and states that she was probably in over her head and panicked. Ria Hermans presently lives in Switzerland.

343 RvO, IO/IKP, EC-4.

344 RvO, IO-IKP, DD1.

345 Stroink, p. 721.

346 Cornelissen and Slettenhaar, p. 244.

347 GHA.

348 Van Vree, P. 173.

349 Ibid.

350 Ijssel Centrale Archives, Hengelo.

351 See C. J. Rubsaam en H. C. De Lange-Wibaut, "Vervalsingen", Onderdrukking en Verzet, 3: 754.

352 De Jong, 7-2: 716.

353 J. Kok and J. Meulenbelt, "Lijst van Organizaties", Onderdrukking en Verzet, 4: 211-212.

354 De Jong, 7-2: 711

355 See Appendix O, Contact Among Resistance Groups.

356 Ibid.

357 Kok and Meulenbelt, 4: 208-209.

358 See Van Randwijk, passim.

359 De Jong, 7-2: 808.

360 De Jong, 7-2: 808-823.

361 See Trip.

362 Wambrunn, p. 200.

363 P. Sanders, Het Nationaal Steunfonds. Monografieen 9 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 180.

364 Kok and Meulenbelt, Onderdrukking en Verzet, 4: 205.

365 Ibid.

366 A significant amount of historical research has been allocated to this aspect of Netherlands intelligence history so the sources are extensive. Foot, Michel, Deakin, Lemkin, Wambrunn, and countless Netherlands historians have discussed this issue and have reached varying opinions about the Englandspiel culprits.

367 See Hazelhoff-Roelfzema, Soldier of Orange, passim.

368 Ibid.

369 RvO, Doc. II - 1190-1. See also RvO, IO/IKP ES-6.

370 J. G. Beevor, SOE Recollections and Reflections 1940-1945 (London: The Bodley Head, 1981.), pp. 174-181. For a general overview of the intelligence operations see F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 volumes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

371 See Hanson Baldwin, "Churchill was Right, " The Atlantic Monthly (1954), 194: 23-32.

372 Beevor, p. 180. He argues that the failure to take note of the omission of security checks was entirely due to carelessness and that no deception was ever proven.

373 M. R. D. Foot, SOE An outline history of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984), p. 134.

374 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945 (Toronto: University of Ontario Press, 1980), p. 94.

375 Public Records Office, CAB/69/6XP 326., a paper by Lord Selbourne to the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet, January 11, 1944.

376 Kokhuis, twente, I: 128.

377 RvO, Coll. GA 7a-119a.

378 Ibid.

379 David Mondey, general editor, The International Encyclopedia of Aviation (London: Octopus Books Limited, 1977), p. 194.

380 Kokhuis, twente, I: 137.

381 Kok and Meulenbelt, IV: 205.

382 Louis De Jong, "The Dutch Resistance Movement and the Allies (1940-1945)," pp. 340-365. European Resistance Movements 1939-45, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan 26-29 March 1961, p. 35.

383 Ibid.

384 IMT, 16: 31.

385 GHA.

386 Van Vree, p. 90.

387 GHA.

388 Statistisch Jaarboek, 1960-1964, (GHA).

389 GHA.

390 W. F. Gaay Fortman. "Living Standards," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1946), 245:85.

391 Ibid.

392 Van Vree, p. 165.

393 Ibid.

394 Personal interview with Anna de Jong, 3 April 1985.

395 GHA.

396 Personal interview with Dika Kelder, a wartime Hengelo citizen, 1 May 1985.

397 See Warbrunn, pp. 138-146.

398 See de Jong.

399 See Appendix P, Netherlands Casualties During World War II. See also Henri van der Zee, The Hunger Winter, (London: J. Norman & Hobhouse, 1982).

400 IMT, 16: 15.

401 Snyder Family Archives. Translation: We herewith inform you that our employee R. Snyder, born 18 May 1915 and residing in Hengelo, identification card number H61/024382 has been granted our permission to travel to and from Groningen from 18 to 29 January. We ask that you allow him to use your transportation and at the same time do not let any other matters interfere with our assignment for him.

402 GHA. This information is also available at the Hengelo Stork Archives.

403 Ijssel Centrale Archives

404 See C. Banning, "Food Shortage and Public Health, First Half of 1945," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1946), 245: 93-110.

405 DvD, TBO, MID 24 May 43 War Industries.

406 DvD, TBO Top Secret Rapport 24-3-43, 48.

407 See Appendix Q, Bombardments on Hengelo to April 1943.

408 DvD, TBO Kees 50.

409 DvD TBO, Kap. Muller Rapport 116.

410 Kokhuis, geschiedenis, p. 180.

411 See Appendix R, The Frontline.

412 Van Vree, p. 151.

413 Personal interview with H. Ehreburg, son of the Ijssel Centrale Director, 3 May 1986.

414 RvO, Coll. Groep Allbrecht, 7a-119a.

415 Kokhuis, historie, p. 180.

416 De Hengelosche Fabrieksode, (23 August, 1958), 64:#4.

417 Personal Interview with G. Mateboer, a Hengelo citizen who was interviewed at the Oald Hengel Institute 16 July 1985.

418 Van Vree, p. 173.

419 As quoted from the War Diary 45 of the 21st English Army Group in Van Vree, p. 177.

420 Ibid.

421 Van Vree, p. 179.

422 An old schoolhouse was the location for the signing of the capitulation of the Third Reich in the Netherlands.

423 GHA.

424 See Appendix P.

425 GHA, Lijst van Arrestanten. (List of those arrested).

426 GHA. The collaborationist element is an intriguing story and has been extensively discussed in Dutch sources. See Koos Groen, Landverraad (Weesp: Uniboek, b.v., 1984).

427 The Canadian Forces consisted of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division which included the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade: 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General's Footguards, 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards), 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment), Lake Superior Regiment (Motor Battalion), the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade: Lincoln and Welland Regiment, Algonquin Regiment, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, and the New Brunswick Rangers (10th Canadian Independent MG Company. The Royal Canadian Artillery consisted of the 15th Canadian Field Regiment, the 23rd Canadian Field Regiment (SP), the 8th Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, and the 5th Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment. The 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment) and the 19th Canadian Army Field Regiment (SP) RCA, and the 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (XII-Manitoba Dragoons) supplied support services to the Brigades.

428 Telders, p. 61.

429 Personal interview with H. J. S. Pearson, 23 September 1987. Pearson indicated that by the time his unit liberated Groningen they had seen extensive loss of officers and men. They were war weary and never had any idea what to expect whether they were confronting friendly natives, angry resistance group members, or stray German soldiers. This hardening is not uncommon in times of war. It is quite likely that the Canadian troops in Hengelo felt the same emotions.

430 Van Vree, p. 217.

431 GA.

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APPENDIX A

THE NETHERLANDS



APPENDIX B THE REGION OF TWENTE



Appendix C

TWENTE DIALECT

The verb "to be" will be used as an example of the Twente dialect.

Dutch	German	French	English	Twents
zijn	sein	e(s)tre	to be	sin
ik ben	ich bin	je suis	I am	ik sin
jij bent	du bist	tu es	you are	dou sins
hij is	er ist	il est	he is	hee sin
wij zein	wir sind	nous sommes	we are	wi-j sind
gij zijt	ihr seit	vous etes	you are	i-j sind
zij zijn	sie sind	ils sont	they are	see sind

Source: Stroink.

Appendix D


Mayors of Hengelo.

Jan Dijk	(Also served as Secretary)	1802-1832.
B. W. A. E. Sloet tot Olthuis		1832-1838.
Jacob Thomkins		1838-1840.
B. Visser		1840-1846.
G. D. Raedt		1846-1884.
A. D. van Assendelft de Coningh		1884-1887.
J. Hora Adema		1887-1891.
C. M. Kooy		1891-1893.
J. J. Veurman		1893-1900.
N. A. Tonkens		1900-1926.
G. Jansen		1926-1937.
J. A. E. H. J. van der Dussen		* 1937-1951.
R. J. J. Lambooy		1951-1961.
L. M. E. von Fiserne		1961-1973.
C. P. M. Bevers		1973-

* Van der Dussen was replaced by German appointed temporary mayors during the last three war years.

Source: Kokhuis.


APPENDIX E
RAILWAY CONNECTIONS




LEGEND	
—————	1865
-----	1866
- - - - -	1875
- . - . -	1884
-	1888
-	1890
	1903
=====	1906
=====	1908
=====	1910

HENGELO INDUSTRIAL FAMILIES


APPENDIX P



APPENDIX G
OCCUPATIONAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE



Appendix H
JEWISH QUARTERS IN AMSTERDAM



LEGEND

- SEALED AREA BOUNDARIES
- ↑ GERMAN RAIDS

SOURCE: DE JONG.

Appendix I

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS

Jews are not allowed to possess wirelesses and must hand these in. 1 May 1941.

Jews are not allowed either to travel or to move their place of residence without a permit. 1 May 1941.

Membership of non-Jewish organizations is forbidden. Bridge clubs, dancing clubs, tennis clubs are forbidden to Jews. 7 November 1941.

Jews are not allowed to enter non-Jewish hotels, theatres, swimming pools, etc. 21 November 1941.

Jews are not allowed to have non-Jewish servants. 21 November 1941.

Jews are not allowed to enter council schools. 1 January 1942.

Jews are not allowed to drive cars. Jewish identity cards must bear the letter J. 9 January 1942.

Jews are not allowed to marry non-Jews. 23 January 1942.

Extra-marital sexual intercourse with non-Jews will be severely punished. 25 March 1942.

It is forbidden to take furniture out of Jewish homes. 25 March 1942.

A large number of Jewish butcher shops are closed. 26 March 1942.

Jews are not allowed to fish. 24 April 1942.

Complete travel ban for Jews. 29 May 1942.

Jews are not allowed to buy vegetables in non-Jewish shops. 5 June 1942.

Jews must hand in bicycles and other vehicles. All sports are forbidden to Jews. 12 June 1942.

After 8 p.m. Jews are not allowed outside. They may not ride a bicycle. 12 June 1942.

Jews are not allowed to use the telephone. 30 June 1942.

They are not allowed to visit non-Jews. 6 July 1942.

In The Hague a large number of streets are closed to Jews. 6 July 1942.

They may only do shopping between 3 and 5 p.m. 17 July 1942.

Jews are not allowed to go to the hairdresser. 17 July 1942.



In the Hague Jews are not allowed to sit on public benches. 31 July 1942.

Jewish students are forbidden to attend the university. 8 September 1942.

Jews are not allowed to send letters or requests directly to German authorities, they may only do so via the Jewish Council. 15 September 1942 to 5 February 1943.

Source: A combination of sources noted in the bibliography.

APPENDIX J
JEWISH VICTIMS



APPENDIX K

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES IN THE 1930s

Year	Netherlands	Enschede	Almelo	Hengelo
1931	138,000	3,486	769	1,205
1932	271,000	6,912	2,084	1,806
1933	322,000	5,989	1,870	1,765
1934	332,000	6,088	1,881	1,686
1935	384,000	6,138	1,990	1,906
1936	414,000	5,165	1,706	1,685
1937	368,000	5,027	1,899	1,480
1938	<u>300,000</u>	<u>4,737</u>	<u>2,089</u>	<u>1,343</u>
	2,582,000	43,452	14,288	12,876

APPENDIX L
STRIKE AREAS



APPENDIX H

PILOT ESCAPE LINE JULES HAECK



THIS PILOT ESCAPE LINE BENEFITED
SERVICEMEN FROM ENGLAND, CANADA,
AMERICA, NEW ZEALAND, FRANCE,
AND THE U.S.S.R.

APPENDIX N
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN OVERIJSEL



LEGEND

- ⊙ REGIONAL COMMAND
- ⊙ COURIER CENTER
- DISTRICT COMMAND
- CELL COMMAND
- LOCAL COMMAND
- ≡ COURIER LINES (line thickness indicates relative amount of traffic)
- ▽ SECRET RADIO TRANSMITTERS
- x RESISTANCE ATTACKS (supply depots, bank robberies and prison breaks)

APPENDIX O

CONNECTIONS AMONG RESISTANCE GROUPS

	ALBRECHT	BAKKER	CID	GDN	LKP	LO	NC	NSF	OD	PBC	RVV
ALBRECHT					X	X					
BAKKER					X	X	X	X			X
CID					X				X		X
GDN								X	X		X
LKP											
LO	X	X	X					X		X	
NC											
NSF*								X		X	
OD											
PBC											X
RVV									X		

* The NSF only had indirect contact with the resistance groups.

Appendix P

NETHERLANDS CASUALTIES DURING WORLD WAR II

Military victims	4,570
Mercantile marine	1,492
Victims of bombardments, etc.	20,400
Victims of declining public health (approximately)	65,000
Executions and summary justice	2,000
Jewish victims	104,000
Forced labour	10,000
Concentration camps and prisons in the Netherlands	1,500
Concentration camps and prisons in Germany	10,000
Hunger-winter 1944/45	20,000
Prisoners of war	258
Missing	500
Total about	240,000

Source: Presser.


Appendix Q

Chronology of bombardments on Hengelo.

- 20-6-1940 Beursstraat-Enschedesestraat, four deaths, homes (several) and hotel destroyed.
- 23-8-1940 Oelerbrug & Agathastraat, six deaths, many homes destroyed, extensive damage.
- 11-11-1940 Enschede-Hengelo railway, twenty firebombs and three explosives fell on the tracks, some homes surrounding it slightly damaged.
- 20-9-1941 A Vickers Wellington from 103 Squadron RAF from Elsham Wolds airbase in England was shot down by Germans. The pilot died and was buried at Delden. Other crew members were captured.
- 28-3-1942 The power plant was hit but did not sustain serious damage.
- 21-6-1942 The Oldenzaalsestraat hospital was severely damaged. The airplanes came from the direction of the Twente airfield. Two large and twelve small bombs damaged seventy houses.
- 14-7-1942 The De Jong en van Dam lace factory was damaged as well as 150 houses in the vicinity. One person was slightly wounded.
- 6-10-1942 The power plant was struck and damaged although power was continued.
- 15-10-1942 Four Mosquitos from 105 Squadron RAF dropped bombs on the Langelemaatweg. Several homes were destroyed. Three people died.
- 21-10-1942 Bombs directed at Stork, slight damage. Two deaths.
- 23-10-1942 Three Mosquitos from 105 Squadron RAF bomb Hengelo. Stork hit badly and the repair shop was totally destroyed. The Dijkers factory was badly damaged.
- 20-1-1943 Four Mosquitos from 105 Squadron RAF bombed the factories and offices of Stork, Dijkers and Hazemeyer. Houses were destroyed in the Kerkstraat, Beckumerstraat, Industriestraat, and the Langelemaatweg. Five deaths, several people were badly wounded. Also, several German fighter planes were destroyed at airfield Twente.

- 28-2-1943 Four Mosquitos from 105 Squadron RAF destroyed houses at the C. T. Storkstraat and the Esrein which resulted in ten deaths. On the Esrein a family sought shelter in a cellar, the cellar was hit, seven members of this family died.
- 27-3-1943 Six Mosquitos from 139 Squadron RAF caused extensive damage to the Stork Kettle Making area. One death. On the Adamsweg four houses were destroyed, on the Berfloweg twelve houses, and on the Langelenmaatweg four houses were destroyed.
- 11-4-1943 Two Mosquitos from 105 Squadron struck Stork and again extensively damaged the rebuilt repair shop. England was notified that no war materials were built at Stork.

APPENDIX R
THE FRONTLINE





SI SUIT AD VITAM
SI QUAEQUOMUE VERA
SI SUIT AD VITAM

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