show that we normally want to minimize costly errors when testing hypotheses, and that we do not merely seek unbiased truth. The vividness of information and its easy availability are relevant, but the important datum is that people tend to search more carefully for confirming than for disconfirming evidence. 'For example, "subjects who tested the hypothesis that a person was angry interpreted that person's facial expression as conveying anger, whereas subjects who tested the hypothesis that the person was happy interpreted the same facial expression as conveying happiness" (Trope, Gervey, and Liberman 1997)' (29). This confirmation bias can obviously produce results that offend epistemologists (by looking irrational, biased, or self-deceptive), but in fact there is no implication of deliberate self-manipulation; these results are merely 'unmotivated manifestation[s] of a purely cognitive habit' (39).

Again and again Mele says that our questions will only be solved by empirical research and not 'by philosophical speculation' (100, e.g.). Nonetheless, he devotes Chapter 3 to an analysis of empirical studies that claim to show subjects who believe *p* and *not-p*. Mele repeatedly performs adept conceptual analysis to show that in each case *intentional* deception (on the interpersonal model) cannot be meant. It seems clear enough to the reader that Mele's questions and his answers are philosophical ones, and that what counts as empirical evidence will not be left to the experimenters to determine.

Chapter 5 contains an interesting discussion of the case of Othello (though without naming him). Mele calls this 'twisted self-deception' because it is Othello's overwhelming desire that Desdemona be faithful to him (rather than a desire that *not-p*) that seems to cause his belief on Iago's flimsy evidence that *not-p*. This goes against the confirmation bias that was so helpful with 'straight' self-deception, but this case, too, Mele analyses into submission.

This is an enthusiastically detailed and accomplished work. It uses plenty of examples, both from the empirical literature and sketched from ordinary life. It may display little of the novelist's or the psychologist's sense of wonder at the intricacies of the human heart or mind, but Mele insists that 'the main source of broader, enduring interest in self-deception is a concern to understand and explain the behavior of real human beings' (4). This book should be studied by anyone who proposes to write more on self-deception.

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Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles, by Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, is in equal parts (i) a negative critique of contemporary neoKantian and utilitarian treatments of the virtues of character and relational goods, such as friendship, and (ii) a positive account of their virtue-based approach to professional roles and their requirements. For many, this will be the chief source of complaint: readers interested in the development of a professional virtue ethics will feel too much time is spent critiquing alternatives, while those preferring the alternatives will doubtless feel too time is spent on a novel solution to problems of whose existence they are not persuaded. In what follows, I shall concentrate on O&C's positive account rather than the negative critique that accompanies it.

Chapter 1 begins by explicating and defending what O&C take to be six central claims any theory must make to be a virtue ethic: An act is right *iff* it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances; goodness is prior to rightness; virtues are irreducibly plural intrinsic goods; virtues are objectively good; some intrinsic goods are agent-relative; and acting rightly does not require that we maximize the good. The first, second, and fifth claims clearly distinguish a virtue ethic from any form of Kantian deontology. The fourth, fifth, and sixth distinguish a virtue ethic from maximizing consequentialisms such as utilitarianism (or any other subjectivist ethical theory — even Hume's). According to O&C, a theory is a virtue ethic *iff* it is either an Aristotelian ethic or a close relative. They themselves favour Aristotelian eudaimonism for which moral virtues are dispositions constitutive of human flourishing, but they acknowledge the existence of certain perfectionist alternatives (e.g., those holding that virtues contribute to perfection of either (i) special human capacities or (ii) capacities humans specially admire.)

One common objection to virtue ethical theories is that their accounts of the virtues and of human flourishing are too vague to tell us what a virtuous agent would do in particular cases, making it useless to imperfectly virtuous agents uncertain about how to act. A second objection is that virtue ethics may beguile well-meaning agents into thinking that any act is right so long as the disposition from which it is performed is virtuous. O&C argue that both objections can be overcome if we think of virtuous agents as operating in accordance with 'regulative ideals' both of human flourishing broadly conceived but also of the more specific goods and practices that constitute flourishing, e.g., the virtues, and relational goods such as friendship, parenthood, etc.

Regulative ideals are internalized standards of excellence that we try to realize in our dispositions, relations, and conduct, whose 'regulative' force

operates counterfactually: although we do not act for the sake of ideals (in the normal case we simply act from them) we are prepared to revise our characters, relations or conduct should any of these fall short of our ideals. Thus imperfectly virtuous agents can tell how to act by appeal to appropriate standards of excellence. Similarly, imperfectly virtuous agents can discover that acts they are motivated to perform by virtuous dispositions are nevertheless not what a virtuous agent would do when these fall short of the overall regulative ideal of flourishing (i.e., the act is benevolent to one but unjust to others.) *Phronesis* is essential of course, and *phronesis* takes the form of judicious appeal to the regulative ideals of flourishing and/or narrower, domain-specific ideals governing particular practices.

Chapter 2 is actually a red herring for readers interested in O&C's own virtue ethical approach to professional ethics. The chapter is based on an article, 'Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation', and is, as that title suggests, primarily a critique of consequentialist (and, in this version, neoKantian) accounts of such agent-relative goods such as friendship. It is a red herring for their own approach to professional ethics, for they reject the idea that professional-client relationships are a species of friendship, arguing that as they have specific 'entrance' and exit' criteria, they cannot properly be considered friendships.

Chapter 3 returns to the project of constructing a virtue-based account of professional roles. O&C propose that professions be distinguished from occupations not merely by sociological criteria, but also by the relation of the goals of these practices to the overall ideal of flourishing. They write: 'Good professional roles must be part of a good profession, and a good profession, on our virtue ethics approach, is one which involves a commitment to a key human good, a good which plays a crucial role in enabling us to live a humanly flourishing life' (74). This approach, they claim, not only distinguishes professions morally from occupations, but also from one another. It also helps to resolve two long-standing questions: (1) are professionals justified in privileging clients over third parties when their interests conflict? and (2) are there ethical grounds for refusing clients' requests?

First, as professions realize goods crucial to human flourishing (e.g., health, justice, etc.), these roles and their requirements often can and do outweigh the other values with which they may conflict. Whether and to what extent this is true in a given case may be settled by appeal to the ideal of human flourishing. Second, since good professionals are those acting from the ideal goal of their profession, they cannot in good *professional* (as opposed to *personal*) conscience act against it. So if the ideal of medicine is health (e.g., normal functioning), and a client requests treatment inimical to it (e.g., assisted suicide,) or enhancements beyond species norms (e.g., fertility for women over 60), a professional may ethically refuse such a request.

Chapter 4 offers a more detailed examination of O&C's virtue ethical account of professional-client relationships in medicine. Chapter 5 switches the focus to trial lawyers, allowing O&C to better develop certain complexities in professional roles and their ideals. While the GP's ideal of health may

occasionally force her to choose between serving her client's private health interests and the general (public) ideal of health, trial lawyers, who serve both as advocates in adversarial disputes and as officers of the court regulated by a more general ideal of procedural justice, regularly face such dilemmas. Focussing on lawyers' roles heightens our awareness of the potential for similar conflicts in others. Reporting requirements, medical and financial, promote *public* health and financial stability as opposed to the health or financial stability of the clients whose confidentiality (or welfare) is sacrificed. But while O&C raise the issue, they never address it theoretically. So although we get an interesting analysis of the specific form it takes among lawyers, we do not get a general account of how such public/private splits in our regulative ideals should be handled. (One might try resolving them by appeal to more encompassing ideal of human flourishing. But as it seems the same conflict could occur at any level, this strategy will not do. A further account is needed.)

Although O&C never resolve this issue, their concluding Chapter 6 complements the foregoing discussion of the nature of professional-client relationships among GPs and lawyers with an enlightening discussion of the nature and value of professional detachment in healthcare, law, and other fields. Curiously, one of these is prostitution. And this raises another question about which much more might have been said. Just what kinds of goods constituent of human flourishing are such as to constitute regulative ideals distinctive of professions? Pleasure is surely an intrinsic good — one prostitutes help clients achieve. Does this mean that prostitution could or should be a profession with a monopoly of the provision of this service? Are architects really professionals? Buildings are instrumentally valuable in various ways, but are they or their qualities constitutive of flourishing? And if so, how is this contribution to be distinguished from those of the mere trades men and women who construct the buildings that architects 'professionally' design?

These sorts of issues are neglected because O&C devote so much space to critiquing principle-based rivals, to the dismay of readers chiefly interested in a virtue-based approach. However, as there have been relatively few theoretical contributions of this caliber to the interdisciplinary literature on virtues and the professions, this book will be a welcome addition to the field.

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