University of Alberta

Defining the Borders of the Nation
State Culture in Canada and Sweden

by

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ABSTRACT

This project begins with two central questions: what role do state actors and institutions play in defining the values of the nation and how can we determine what these values are? Building on the existing literature on nationalism and citizenship, the concept *state culture* is presented as an alternative mechanism for interrogating the role of states in the construction of national identity. State culture is, quite simply, the values put forward by states, through different state actors and institutions, represented in their policies, practices and literature, which reflect the key values seen as defining the nation. The concept of state culture is tested here in two case studies – Canada and Sweden – through an exploration of historical nation-building, policies, and government literature for new immigrants. The focus, however, is on the politics of immigration as it is through immigration policies, practices and the literature for new immigrants that the boundaries of the nation are most clearly demarcated. This analysis of the case studies reveals an increasing tension between the values of the multicultural welfare state and individual self-reliance in both countries. While both Canada and Sweden are shown to share similar values, the dissertation argues that the two state cultures differ in the emphasis placed in certain values, in particular, those relating to liberty, equality and community. This work concludes that the concept of state culture and the methodology provided for the operationalization of it are effective tools for uncovering and understanding the specific values put forward by state actors and institutions in the construction of national identity.

For Lech and Kate

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As part of this process I lived in Sweden and endeavored to learn Swedish and to understand that country. Many people along the way shared their stories of immigration with me and many others introduced me to the country, its culture and its quirks. Thank you.

A special thank you to my family who continue to support me and believe in me – in particular, Terri and Gerry Ehlert, and Marta Linkiel. In many ways I m here because of my father, Ray Wilton, who passed away while I was engaged in this project. Finally, I could not have done this without the support and help of my partner Lech Linkiel - thanks for always being there.

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CHAPTER ONE

Defining the Borders of the Nation

On June 3, 2006, 17 suspected terrorists, alleged to be inspired by al-Qaeda, were arrested in Ontario, Canada (CBC News). The following week, the CBC nightly news program, *The National*, ran a series on the future of multiculturalism in Canada. In particular, one of the questions that arose through the discussion of Canada's 'home-grown' terrorists was what 'values' the Canadian state was attempting to transmit to newcomers.[1] This project provides a direct response to this question through the development of the concept of *state culture* and a methodology operationalizing state culture and determining the values projected to both newcomers and citizens by state actors and agencies, through their public addresses, documents and literature.

During the Canadian federal election of 2004, the incumbent Prime Minister Paul Martin urged Canadians to 'choose the Canada they want,' by voting for the Liberal Party. His television advertisements pitted the vision of the Liberal Party primarily against that of the new Conservative Party of Canada, suggesting that Canadian values were best represented by the long governing Liberals. The Liberal campaign of Paul Martin raised the idea that electing a Conservative government would fundamentally change Canada and put Canadian values at risk. But, what *are* Canadian values? How would a

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[1] The term 'newcomer' is used here to denote individuals who have recently arrived in a country. While it is difficult to determine when an individual stops being a 'newcomer' and becomes a member of society, this term is specifically aimed at those individuals who are not yet eligible for citizenship in the country. These are the individuals for whom the governments of Canada and Sweden created the literature studied in Chapter Five.

Conservative government redefine them? In this sense, what does it mean to be 'Canadian'?

In Sweden in the summer of 2004, the national newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, made front page news out of the Integration Minister's announcement that Sweden has structural racism. The Minister, Mona Sahlin, suggested that instead of placing the impetus on immigrants to integrate and conform to Swedish standards, the majority needs to question whether their actions are preventing immigrants from fully participating in society. Furthermore, she indicated that Sweden needs to move from discussing 'integration' to embrace a politics aimed at anti-discrimination (Stenberg, 2004). This discursive shift raises a number of questions about the possibility of creating an open and welcoming community for new members, while maintaining or preserving the key values that comprise the society and bind its members. In this manner, the article poses the question of what it means to be Swedish and how that can be preserved in the face of immigration and an increasingly multicultural society.

These examples occur in different places and in very different situations, and many others exist that raise similar questions. The first examples, from Canada, involve the question of values being transmitted to new Canadians and a choice of values during a federal election campaign. The following example, from Sweden, raises questions about the values of a society and how these values are transmitted to new members. These examples, however, share the issue of values – as represented by state actors. They raise similar questions; namely, what role do state actors and institutions play in defining the

values of the nation and how can we determine what these values are? Ultimately, an

ability to answer these questions has the potential to help us better understand the role of

the state in the construction of identity and management of identity politics. These values

shape policy directions and outputs. In doing so, they also influence both internal and

external relations between political actors.

There are a number of different ways of approaching these two key questions. Opinion

polls have been used in the past to measure the key issues or ideas of a specific

population. They have also been used (and continue to be used) to determine what the

'average' citizen considers important or different about being Canadian or Swedish (for

example, the World Values Survey, the Eurobaromoter, or Adams, 2003). Analysts of

political culture have looked to key historical events to determine common aspects of

political and social orientation among a population; for example, the arrival of the British

Loyalists in Canada or the impact of the Depression on Sweden. Others still employ a

neo-institutionalist approach, looking to the constitution or law as a guide to the key

values of a state and its people or to a particular policy or issue that represents the focal

point of a society.[2]

This project builds on these traditions and suggests a new term, approach and method for

both understanding the role of state actors and agencies in defining the values of the

nation and for determining the specific values transmitted. Namely, this project suggests

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[2] Examples of this include Alan Cairns' work on the Canadian constitution (1995), Jill Vickers and Pauline Rankin's work on the National Action Committee on the Status of Women and state feminism (1993; 2001), and much of the work on the welfare state in Sweden; for example Lindbom (2001) and Bryden and Oliver (1994).

an analysis of what I call *state culture* and a method for analyzing it. My central

argument is that an analysis of state policy and literature – particularly that related to

immigration – reveals the values put forward by state actors that are central to the

construction of belonging within a specific political community and, therefore, the

borders of the nation. Immigration policies and the state literature for new immigrants

are especially revelatory of state discourses and state culture because they define who can

belong to the nation, what it means to belong, and what is expected of new members.

This is further illuminated here through the application of state culture to two case

studies: Canada and Sweden. In the end, the case studies reveal an increasing tension

between the values of the multicultural welfare state and individual self-reliance in both

countries. While both Canada and Sweden are shown to share similar values, the two

state cultures differ in the emphasis placed in certain values, in particular, those values

relating to liberty, equality and community.

The State

The following sections explore the literature on the state and culture, both of which are

highly contested concepts within political science. While it is beyond the scope of this

dissertation to do more than outline some of the main issues relating to state and culture,

this section aims to locate the concept of 'state culture' and the subsequent analysis

within the larger theoretical context of work. As the following section demonstrates,

much of the literature on the state deals with questions of political economy,

representation and institutional organization. These are all legitimate and important

issues, but the literature fails to provide an in depth analysis of how this carries over to

the role of the state in the construction of identity and the messages being conveyed via

state actors and documents. Similarly, with a few exceptions (see for example Clarke,

2004), the literature on culture often fails to give sufficient attention to the state and the

roles it plays in the construction of different ideas of culture and specific cultures

themselves. State culture tries to reconcile these two significant concepts within political

science in an effort to illuminate the relationship between the state and the development

of national cultures.

There are a variety of major traditions within the discipline that strive to provide a model

for understanding and analyzing state activity. The pluralist tradition[3] views the state as a

political marketplace within which different groups can compete for power and resources.

Within this approach, the tendency is to focus on groups or governments and their

observable behaviours rather than on the state as a whole (Pierson, 2004: 56). As with

Marxist approaches, pluralists tend to view society as the dominant partner in the state-

society relationship, shaping and even determining the nature of the state itself. This

project takes a different perspective; instead of focusing on how society shapes the state,

I explore how the state strives to shape society.

The Marxist approach to the state is well established within Canadian political science

and has contributed greatly to our understanding of how the Canadian state interacts with

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[3] For example, see Robert A Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (1961); Robert A Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (1976); and Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, *The Policy-Making Process* (1993).

society and economy. While this approach contains many diverse elements or strands, certain shared aspects can be identified. Within Canadian political science, the state is often understood as having relative autonomy from the ruling class and playing a key role in managing class conflict (see Panitch, 1977; Mahon, 1977). The work of Antonio Gramsci set out a distinctive view of the state-society relationship, arguing that "the mode of capitalist rule could not be reduced simply to the actions of a repressive state apparatus acting directly under the control of the capitalist class" (Pierson, 2004: 60). This idea of the relative autonomy of the state was later adopted in various forms by theorists such as Poulantzas (1973), Jessop (1990) and Miliband (1969). Miliband, for example, suggests a definition of the state that is quite useful for this project. He suggests that the state is more than just the central government, it is "a complex of institutions, including government, but also including the bureaucracy ... the military, the judiciary, representative assemblies, and (very importantly for Canada) what Miliband calls the sub-central levels of government" (Panitch, 1977: 6). This project examines only a small portion of the state by Miliband's definition, but, in doing so, does not intend to ignore the scope and diversity of the state. It is beyond the scope of this work to examine the multiple sites of state action, but this does not mean to suggest that there is only one site nor that all sites act in a similar way with similar results. Rather, this represents further work that needs to be done. Jessop's work also contributes to the understanding of the state used in this project. In particular through the argument that "the state is not simply something towards which one must adopt a political strategy but is something (or better, a social relation) which can be fruitfully analyzed as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies" (in Pierson, 2004: 62). These two approaches

can be seen in the following work in that they point to the diversity and potential disunity

of state actions and the importance of studying them. This project focuses on Citizenship

and Immigration Canada and the Migration and Integration Boards (Migrationsverket and

Integrationsverket) in Sweden, and their literature and policies as these are the areas

explicitly engaged in determining what the criteria are for belonging to the political

community and, therefore, who can belong. While the diversity of the state could

potentially lead to a diversity of state cultures, this research suggests that continuities and

similarities do exist in spite of the diversity of actors and sites of action. However, further

research is needed in this area.

The third major set of approaches to the state that deserves our attention are the

institutional approaches. These tend to favour the state as a site of action and study over

society, arguing that the state acts in pursuit of its own interests and can potentially play

an independent role in the shaping of society or even go against the wishes of broader

society (Pierson, 2004: 71). This approach is best developed by the drive to bring the

state back in to political analyses, as exemplified by theorists such as Skocpol (1985) and

Nordlinger (1981). Thus, Nordlinger, for example, suggests that public officials can

occasionally use their "autonomy enhancing capacities and opportunities to bring about a

shift in societal preferences and/or the alignment of societal resources" (in Pierson, 2004:

70). This school of thought also impacts the understanding of the state used here and is

reflected in the idea that the state is not necessarily a neutral actor (or set of actors), but

can play a role in shaping the reproduction of society through the exercise of state power

and influence. Ultimately, the overall importance of the state in the study of both formal

politics and society should not be neglected. In this study, the state as the site of contestations and debate over immigration, citizenship, identity and belonging is of central importance to the overall construction of national identity. This is discussed further in the subsequent chapters.

Finally, the understanding of the state utilized in the development of state culture is strongly influenced by more recent work by feminists and postmodernists that challenge the divide between state and society. These approaches are often translated into a concern with texts and the (de)construction of gender and identity based systems of power, such as the one conducted here. In particular, this approach is integrated through the premise that state and society are not autonomous or distinct categories, but that it still remains useful to look at them in smaller pieces, recognizing that state and societal structures are not a given but are forged through political struggles within and between state and society (Pierson, 2004: 77). This becomes particularly relevant when immigration and globalization are also taken into account. Through globalization, all western states are being forced to address the challenges of an increasingly diverse population. Immigration policy, and the debates surrounding it, thus provides an excellent entry point into understanding how states attempt to convey certain values to a population and in identifying those specific values. As well, the challenges posed to the state by globalization combined with an increasingly diverse population can be seen as destabilizing the hyphen between nation and state and the (often taken for granted) relationship between these political concepts (Clarke, 2004: 82).

The following analysis focuses on the state, more so than on society. This reflects the literature on nationalism, which gives the state a key role in the construction of nations (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1990; Gellner, 1983, 1987) and provides a challenge to the political culture literature (see below) that focuses solely on society at the expense of the role of the state in the construction of identity. The state is also given primacy in the Canadian literature pointing to the role of the Canadian state in nation-building projects (e.g. Brodie, 2002b), as well as in the Swedish literature with its focus on the state's role in building the People's Home and the Swedish welfare society (Gress, 2001; Hollander, 1994). State culture, therefore, focuses on the state as one set of significant political agents involved in the construction of discourses of nationhood. State actors and institutions are able to play a central role in defining the key values of the political community through the policies, public statements, debates and literature that are produced within the public sphere and transmitted to society.

Culture

As mentioned above, culture is also a highly contested concept. In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in the study of culture, leading to an ever growing body of literature on the subject as discussed below This project attempts to utilize the idea of culture in a fairly narrow manner; namely as the result of state efforts to transmit values. The discussion below establishes the definition and understanding of culture for the purposes of this study.

Terry Eagleton (2000) suggests that culture is one of the most complex words in the

English language, often posed in opposition to nature and covering a wide range of

activities from "rural to urban existence, pig-farming to Picasso, tilling the soil to

splitting the atom" (1). Stuart Hall (2001) argues that cultures have often been

understood in terms of a binary opposition – traditional versus modern or particular

versus universal – but that these oppositions are increasingly challenged for reverting to

essentialized, self-contained, static and bounded categories (225-6). As a starting point,

however, this project understands culture as something that is both held collectively and

defined collectively. As such, it is a very broad term that can include art, literature,

popular culture, as well as the values and orientation of individuals to state and society,

and the definition of culture has often been shaped by the academic discipline employing

the concept (Chilcote, 1994: 178). Northrup Frye (1993), for example, suggests that a

> nation's identity is (not is in) its culture, and culture is a structure with several
> distinct levels. On an elementary level there is culture in the sense of custom or
> life-style ... Then there is the middle level of cultural identity, which is the
> product of tradition and history, and consists of the distinctive political, economic,
> religious and other institutions that shape a nation's life and give direction to the
> main currents of its ideology ... Finally, there is an upper level of culture as the
> product of a nation's specialized creative powers. (186)

In political science, culture has often been used in the second way in order to describe

national character. Dissatisfaction with the attempts to do so, however, led to the study

of political culture developed by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. They preferred

political culture as a term because it allowed them to draw on related concepts, such as

culture conflict and socialization (Chilcote, 1994: 178). According to Almond, "every

political system [was] embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action"

that comprised their political culture (quoted in Chilcote, 1994: 179). In this sense,

political culture was related to the general culture of the society, but still maintained a

level of autonomy from the state. As well, it is related to the political system but did not

coincide with it. It forms one part of the equation that comprises national identity – that

is, the opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of the citizens themselves. But, what influences

them? What role to state actors and institutions play in the development of identity? I

argue that national identity results from the intersection between the state culture and

society as a whole. The use of culture, in the case of national cultures, often attempts to

highlight national differences, rather than reduce them (Eagleton, 2000: 9). Thus, it acts

as a marker of difference and, as such, "becomes a strategic resource to be deployed in

struggles around politics and policy" (Clarke, 2004: 33). This is particularly apparent in

the study of immigration policy and the government literature for new immigrants in that

they both struggle to clearly define who belongs to the national community and the

criteria for belonging.

The concept of state culture introduced here attempts to understand culture from the top

down, rather than from the bottom up. As well, while Almond and Verba's approach

looks to polling data to determine the populations' understanding of the political culture,

state culture looks to those aspects of the state specifically concerned with the regulation

of membership and national borders and the role they play in the construction and

production of national values. Instead of examining the orientation of individuals to the

political system, the values and orientations of the state apparatus and their potential

influence on individual orientations is scrutinized. This is not to suggest that dominant

state actors have the final word on what values are important to national identity or that

the values stated by the population will be an accurate reflection of those put forward by the state. Rather, in Hegelian terms, national identity is the end product of a reciprocal or dialectical process involving the values put forward by state actors and the political culture of the population at large. In this manner, the approach used here reflects some of the criticisms of political culture as articulated by Almond and Verba by pointing to the role of the state in political socialization, and the reciprocal relationship between state and society in shaping the values and political system (Chilcote, 1994: 186-7).

This project also draws on the cultural studies tradition, although to a lesser extent. Cultural studies, an interdisciplinary study of cultural phenomenon in industrial countries, looks to the role of ideology in the shaping of power relations (for example, Althusser on Ideological State Apparatuses or Gramsci on hegemony), and in particular, more recently, the relationship between power, race, class, identity and/or gender (e.g. Stuart Hall). As well, the work on cultural identity that examines questions related to universality, difference and equality (e.g. Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and Iris Marion Young) has influenced the formulation of this research and the conceptualization of state culture which draws on similar questions and seeks to understand how the state, in relation to society, shapes power relations based on identity.

One of the more useful discussions of culture comes from John Clarke's book, *Changing welfare, changing states* (2004), in which Clarke applies cultural studies to the study of social policy and welfare states. In doing so, Clarke outlines three understandings of culture: (1) culture as possession; (2) culture as cultural formations; and (3) culture as

practice. The idea of culture as a possession, Clarke argues, is probably the most widespread (2004: 34). In this sense, "Culture locates people: individuals share the culture of the group to which they belong. [It] links, embeds and shapes them" (Clarke, 2004: 34). The problem with this approach is that is treats culture as static and homogenous, and fails to take into account the dynamics of cultural production and formation. The understanding of culture as a formation, on the other hand, sees national culture as composed on different external and internal elements transformed into a single and distinct formation (Clarke, 2004: 36). Thus, it becomes possible to think of cultures as social constructions and as contestable and changing. This understanding is related to several key questions guiding this project: how does the state attempt to define belonging within its policies and documents? How do these definitions vary over time and space? How can practice challenge and change these definitions? Finally, Clarke outlines the idea of culture as practice, or as "actively constructed by social agents" in that "meanings have to be made – and remade" (2004, 39). This approach suggests that the cultural formation is temporary, constructed and needs active participation in order to be sustainable. The concept of state culture adopts the final two understandings of culture: culture as formation and culture as practice. In doing so, I suggest that nation-building is a constructed and contingent process that is always ongoing, incomplete, contestable and contested.

In much of the forthcoming discussion of culture, the term "values" is used to identify aspects of the culture which are projected by state actors and institutions. This is not to suggest that culture can merely be reduced to values, or that these are interchangeable

terms. Rather, the term 'values' is used here to refer to assumed common notions shared by a political unit about how citizens should behave and interact with each other. In this context, values represent the rules or grammar (Mouffe, 1993: 84) put forward by state actors and represented in state literature and policies that outline the normative behaviors of good citizens. These can consist of desirable behaviors, traits, or characteristics exhibited by citizens in their public interactions, as well as the desirable organization of social life. They may include social, political and ethical values that serve as a guiding principle for the state and society and they may shift over time in response to differing ideological and social trends. Through state culture, the values of the nation as portrayed by state actors, institutions, policies and practices, are revealed as striving to define the borders of the nation and shape national identity at one particular place and moment in time. Taking the previous discussion into account, however, this is not to suggest, that the 'state culture' is unified or without internal or external contradictions. Rather, it is part of a process of identity formation and reformation.

State Culture

At the most simple level then, state culture refers to the values projected through different state actors and institutions and represented in their policies, practices and literature. State culture tells us what it means to be part of the political community and what values are central to belonging. As such, the concept of state culture provides the ability to answer many reoccurring questions within the study of politics. Furthermore, the development of a specific methodological framework, based on textual analysis and combining aspects of historical and sociological analysis, provides a concrete mechanism

for identifying the values and characteristics being put forward. For example, a comparative analysis of state culture can offer insight, not only in terms of what it means to belong to a national community and how membership is defined, but also as to why some countries appear to value democracy or individualism more than others. By understanding the different values advanced by different state actors that underpin how they choose to act in certain situations, we can better understand certain policy goals and outcomes and the values embedded in the policies themselves.

The concept of state culture enables the analyst to capture the values of the state at a particular point in time. Patten (1999) argues that the most important conflicts occur around political debates that shape state policies. This is particularly apparent in areas pertaining to language, culture, citizenship and structures of governance. "While many of the policies seem to presuppose a political community that is already defined, they actually serve to (re)define who is Canadian and to (re)construct the social and discursive boundaries of our national political community" (Patten, 1999: 28). The values underpinning the political community, which in turn define the boundaries of the nation, are constantly under debate. An example of this is the changing values regarding security and immigration in the pre- and post-9/11 periods. These values, which govern our political life and sense of community, are inevitably shifting and responding to changes around us in a dialectical relationship between society and the state. However, the fact that the values put forward through state culture are changing, rather than enduring, does not diminish the importance of this concept. The ability to identify the values of state culture at a particular point in time and history, and to link this with other points and trace

patterns and connections, has the potential to contribute significantly to our

understanding of politics, to draw connections between different countries and contexts,

and to challenge the current manifestations of state culture.

The concept of state culture, then, is not intended as a normative model. I do not propose

to define what a state culture should look like, what values are the best for a particular

state, or what values an ideal type would encompass. In fact, the idealized vision of a

particular state culture may stand in direct contrast to other aspects of the state, policies

and actions, as well as the common understanding of the population about the national

culture. Rather, state culture, as presented here, provides analysts with a tool for

understanding the past and the present, and for shaping the future. It is through an

understanding of past and present values and their shifting nature – as represented in state

policies, documents, and practices – that the potential to (re)shape discourses and the

dominant values of state culture becomes possible. State culture, therefore, focuses on

the state as one primary political agent involved in the construction of discourses of

nationhood. State actors and institutions are able to play a central role in defining the key

values of the political community through the policies, public statements, debates, and

literature that are produced within the political sphere and transmitted to society.

The Politics of Identity

The role of the state and of state culture in the construction of national identity becomes

important for the overall understanding of the relationship between identity and politics.

An increased focus on identity within the study of politics is important because political

activity revolves around identity – it is an integral part of the political process. As Jane

Jenson argues, "it is *never* advisable to ignore the ways in which politics *always* involve

contestation about identities" (1999, 39). Identity has become a focal point for the

organization of political demands since the mid 20th Century. It has political

consequences and shapes political discourses, actions and responses. Furthermore,

identities are constructed, situated and intersectional (Hall, 1996; Anthias 1991). They

are based on negotiation between people who potentially belong to a set of communities

(McClure, 2003). "The politics of identity are central to contemporary politics, and only

by appreciating the extent to which identities are at issue in contests for political power,

for resources, for rights, and for recognition, will we understand our past, our present and

our future" (Jenson, 1999: 55).

To ignore the role of the state in the construction and negotiation of identities in

contemporary politics is to exclude a key aspect of identity politics. State actors

determine which voices will be heard and recognized in the arena of formal politics.

State policies and practices reflect the conflict between diverse identities for recognition,

rights, benefits and power. Thus, the role of the state in shaping identity can be seen in

the development of multicultural policies, immigration and integration policies, the

development of the welfare state, and other policies aimed at addressing issues of

inclusion, exclusion, diversity and equality. The exploration and interrogation of the

concept of state culture, therefore, enables us to understand how the processes of

constructing identity and defining values may even operate within state immigration

policy and the literature for new immigrants. This study outlines how the framework for

the conduct of citizens and the limits for recognition, accommodation and tolerance are conveyed to the new members of the political community.

Nations and Citizens

The concepts of nation and citizen both act as identifiers, indicating membership in a collective. Nations consist of groups "conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, [and] having a common past and a common project for the future" (Guibernau, 2003: 116). They are social constructions which aim to provide unity and identity to the members of the political unit – the borders distinguish between 'us' and 'them', defining what it means to belong and differentiating 'us' from the outsider or 'other.' In many western societies today, we continue to see the 'other' as existing outside of our own borders. Through immigration, however, the other is also within the national borders of the state, challenging constructions of nation and community. Citizenship is another example of identity defined from within the state. In legal terms, citizenship determines who belongs and who does not belong to the state, as well as who is entitled to rights and benefits offered by the state. Citizenship can also refer to individual identity as a member of a national community, and to types of activities associated with civic virtue (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). In this sense, citizenship also relates to identity and community, and identifies the values or traits associated with 'good' citizens.

The major challenge today for theorists of both nationalism and citizenship revolves around the potential for building communities and determining what it means to belong

to them, while also accommodating the difference of the 'other'. The literature on

nationalism tends to revolve around nation-building from within. The focus is on how

states (generally) strive to construct a sense of belonging in order to unify the state and

create a sense of 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991). Gellner (1983) and

Hobsbawm (1990), for example, see the state as the key player in nation-building

activities and tie the development of nationalism to modernity and the rise of the

European nation-state. The literature on immigration addresses citizenship in terms of

formal or legal citizenship, but immigration is neglected within the work on citizenship

that explores the formation of political communities.[4] (Abu-Laban, 2000). While both

the literature on nationalism and citizenship address the issue of belonging and the

construction of identity based community, they do not explicitly address the mechanisms

within states for integrating new members or immigrants. Furthermore, this literature

tends to focus on more abstract notions of belonging, while neglecting the concrete

practices of states in delineating the values that define the nation. This literature is

explored in greater detail in Chapter Two and forms the basis for the development of

state culture as an alternative and complementary framework for understanding state-

based constructions of identity. The key issues, questions and critiques are evaluated and

used to construct a method for revealing the values which underpin and define different

state cultures. This method is used in the analysis of state culture in Canada and Sweden,

as transmitted through immigration policy and the literature for new immigrants, in the

subsequent chapters.

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[4] For example, see Yasmeen Abu-Laban (2000) "Reconstructing an Inclusive Citizenship for a New
Millennium: Globalization, Migration and Difference." The broader citizenship literature and its
limitations are discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

The Case Studies

At the beginning of the 21st century, immigration is very diverse within both Canada and

Sweden. While both countries have different histories, the immigration and national

identity challenges they face today are similar. In Canada, immigration has shifted from

Europe to Asia as the primary area of origin for new arrivals. In Sweden, immigration has

shifted from primarily European immigration to large numbers of immigrants from

Middle-Eastern countries and from former Soviet states. As well, both countries are

experiencing the effects of neo-liberalism on the state, and state-individual relations. As

the logic of neo-liberalism permeates the politics of western countries, including Canada

and Sweden, there is an increased emphasis on reducing social spending, decreasing state

economic regulation and the primacy of market forces (Brodie, 1998: 20-21). This also

impacts citizens and state relations, through an emphasis on individual self-sufficiency,

the questioning of social rights associated with the Keynesian welfare state, and the belief

that free markets are efficient distributors of goods and services (Abu-Laban and Gabriel,

2002: 21). This, in turn, also has the potential to influence the state culture of a country.

The case studies consist of two components: an analysis of the politics of identity and

immigration in each country and the embedded discourses and values, and an analysis of

documents distributed by state agencies to new arrivals in the country.

The literature on immigration, unlike the literature on nationalism and citizenship, tends

to focus on processes and policy, as opposed to the broader symbolic importance of

immigration and the interplay between immigration, nation and community. Only rarely

do these two fields intersect to explore the relationship between immigration and the state

construction of national identity (for example, Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002 as opposed to Halli and Driedger 1999). Despite this, it is through immigration policy that state actors determine who can and who cannot enter the state and belong to the political community and share in the rights, privileges and practices of other members. Immigration policies reinforce national borders by providing a selection process and a set of criteria upon which potential new members are evaluated. These policies are designed to choose the applicants who best meet the needs, goals and values of a specific state. Through the literature produced by the state for its new members, the key characteristics and values of the nation are projected. This literature tells new immigrants what they need to know about their new home. It presents an image of the nation, its values, and of the relationship between citizens and the state. In the end, this literature provides the reader with a key to understanding what it means to be 'Canadian' or 'Swedish' and conveys these assumptions to potential members throughout the world.

Immigration has been chosen as the focus of this project in order to facilitate the comparative approach to understanding state culture advanced here. As well, immigration is ideal for understanding identity construction within states because waves of immigrants both shape and challenge understandings of national identity. Rose Baaba Folson and Hijin Park (2004) argue that "every nation-state is believed to be the product of multiple overlapping generations of immigrants" (11). Thus, immigration is seen as an ideal entry point into the comparative study of state culture because immigration is an area of policy that all countries share, whether it occurred hundreds of years ago or is occurring today. While similar work has been done on state discourses surrounding

identity in Canada – for example through the constitution (MacKay, 2002; Cairns, 1995)

or through Speeches from the Throne (Brodie, 2002b) – these are not aspects of the state

that are easily comparable with other countries. In the case of Sweden, identity politics

have not been embedded in constitutional debates as they are in Canada, nor is there a

comparable document to the Canadian Speech from the Throne. Immigration policy and

the discourses surrounding immigration are useful entry points into the study of state

culture for two additional reasons. First, it is through immigration policy and practice

that the boundaries of the nation are defined in terms of who can belong or join the

political community. In this sense, the values put forward by the state apparatus are

reflected in the choices made regarding membership. Second, literature is produced by

the state for new arrivals that act as socialization documents and both explicitly and

implicitly set out the political and social values and norms of the society. These

documents, or texts, contribute greatly to the ability to analyze state culture through

critical discourse analysis.

Immigration policies have historically played two roles. First, they may attempt to

restrict who can enter based on societal values, such as ethnicity or fear of immigrants.

This can be seen historically in Canada with the colonial nationalism of the early

Twentieth century, which aimed to preserve the character of Canada in the face of large

scale immigration (Wilton 2000). Eva Mackay (2002) argues that this attitude represents

a type of 'strategic essentialism' that placed the 'other' outside of Canada and created the

image of a homogenous, united population and a state innocent of policies which serve to

marginalize specific groups (12). This can also be seen in Sweden today where the entry

of large numbers of Muslim immigrants is perceived as a threat to the values central to

Swedish society and identity (Ålund and Schierup, 1991). The perceived threat of the

foreign 'other' is mediated through immigration policies that aim to ensure that those

admitted will be able to adapt, integrate and contribute to the host society. The role of

the other is often central to the construction of what it means to belong to a specific

nation – the characteristics of the nation itself are often defined in relation to the 'other'

or outsider. This relationship of 'othering' often relies on maintaining the historical

construction of ethnic or racial homogeneity within the nation. To this end, if outsiders

are able to join a nation, they are expected to assimilate into the nation, not change it.

Multiculturalism policies in Canada and Sweden, however, have challenged the idea of

assimilation as good for the nation and promoted cultural tolerance and diversity. In

doing so, these policies provide new challenges to the ways in which nations are

imagined and the ability of states to construct national identity and community within

their borders.

As well, immigration policies are designed to reflect the needs and demands (or lack

thereof) of the economy and labour force. As such, immigrants are often viewed as

potential workers who can fulfill workforce needs and thereby contribute to the economic

well-being of the society. One obvious example of this is the recruitment of Chinese

workers to aid in the construction of the national railway in the 1880s. Based on this

labour force demand, Canada's doors were opened slightly to workers from the East.

These workers were, however, merely workers and not viewed as future citizens as

demonstrated by the strict conditions placed on their entry and the resultant and

controversial "head tax" (Fleras and Elliot, 2003: 254-5). An alternative example would be the recruitment of British girls for domestic service at the same time. These young women were seen as future 'mothers of the nation' and therefore their British ancestry was a definite asset. The use of immigration to fill labour needs continues to be reflected in Canada today through the use of the point system for assessing applications for immigration from individuals. The introduction of the 'neutral,' point based system in the late 1960s assessed immigrants on the basis of a number of factors such as proficiency in English or French, age, education, and job skills and aimed to use immigration to fill certain labour force needs. (Abu-Laban, 1998: 74-5) This is also evident in post-World War II immigration of workers to Sweden. Following the war, the Swedish economy was booming, resulting in a need for additional labour (Blanck and Tydén, 1994 and Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997). During this period, up until 1985, the National Labour Board was in charge of immigrant reception and integration programs, as well as overseeing the number of permits to stay in Sweden, reflecting the strong connection between immigration and labour force demand in Sweden (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund 1997, 9). As such, the use of immigration as a mechanism for regulating the workforce is not a new one.

By establishing a set of criteria that defines the ideal characteristics of future members, immigration policies both reflect and reinforce the borders of the nation. The literature for new immigrants produced by state institutions and agencies (in the case of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and in Sweden, Integrationsverket) provides new insights into these issues and our understanding of the relationship between immigration

and the nation. Playing into the role of the state as an agent of socialization, these documents are intended to serve as key statements about the host society and the way immigrants are expected to integrate. They project an image of life in Canada and Sweden to outsiders and set out what new arrivals need to do become a 'good' Canadian or Swedish citizen.

Canada as a relatively young state, formed in 1867, has been plagued by identity problems since its inception. Initially, Canadian national identity was structured around the struggle between British culture and French culture for ascendance, in coordination with efforts to subordinate Canada's Aboriginal Peoples. Contemporary Canada, however, is the creation of immigration trends that have diversified considerably over the past century. According to the 2001 Census, 5,448 million Canadians were born outside of the country (Statistics Canada, 2003). In the 1990s, 1.8 million people immigrated to Canada, compared with 745,560 immigrants in the 1960s and more recent flows reflect a greater diversity of source countries. Since the 1960s, the origin of immigrants to Canada has changed dramatically. In the 1960s, the largest groups of immigrants came from the United Kingdom (160,000), Southern Europe (232,555) and Northern and Western Europe (86,820) (ibid.). In the 1990s, the largest groups of immigrants arrived from Eastern Asia (423, 235), Southern Asia (295,100), Eastern Europe (164,465) and Africa (139,770) (ibid.). The recent waves of immigration have greatly increased the cultural and ethnic diversity of Canada, as well as creating a large "visible minority" population.[5]

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[5] The Government of Canada defines visible minorities as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour" (Government of Canada, 1995). Obviously, not all immigrants or refugees are visible minorities, and not all visible minorities are new immigrants. As well, it

The lack of a strong pan-Canadian identity can be seen in the constitutional debates over the past two decades and the inability of Canadians to achieve consensus on the future of the country and the role of ethnicity, culture and identity in national politics (for example, see Cairns, 1995 or McRoberts, 1997). Canada currently operates under a policy of official bilingualism and multiculturalism. These policies strive to provide Canadians with a pan-Canadian identity through the recognition of cultural diversity as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and something that is encouraged through state programs and protected by law under the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* of 1988 and the 1982 *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. These policies, however, remain controversial, as witnessed in the recent and ongoing debates surrounding immigration, terrorism and national security.

The written history of Sweden, on the other hand, can be traced back over one thousand years with a typical Swedish history beginning with the Vikings and continuing until the present day. Although Sweden has never been a homogenous nation-state, with the presence of immigrant populations from Germany, the Netherlands and Finland over the past few hundred years, it has been much more homogenous than Canada and in possession of a stronger sense of Swedish ethnic identity. In the past century, its historically strong and relatively homogenous national culture evolved into a national culture based on the 'Swedish Model' of accommodation between the public and private sectors, and the presence of one of the strongest welfare-states in the world. Out of the building of the Swedish Model arose a sense of the Swedish people as united by shared

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is important to note that all women in these images are racialized. Rather, it is the racialization of 'white' people (even in the Government of Canada definition) that is 'invisible.'

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beliefs in economic equality and the role of the state in providing for everyone and

ensuring a minimum level of equity (Hannerz, 1996; Lindqvist, 1994). Globalization and

immigration have challenged this model at an economic level, and immigration has also

challenged it at a cultural level as the state attempts to 'fit' new immigrants into the pre-

existing Swedish identity.

Over the past two decades, Sweden has become one of Europe's major destinations for

immigrants and refugees. In 1986, for the first time in Swedish history, more than half of

the immigrants to Sweden were non-European (Blanck and Tyden, 1994: 60). The non-

European background of many applicants was a new challenge for Sweden and one with

which the state is still attempting to come to terms. Sweden currently receives

approximately 50,000 immigrants and refugees per year and is one of the larger receiving

countries in Europe on a per capita basis (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 25-28).

Immigration has radically changed Swedish demographics, creating significant Chilean,

Bosnian, Iranian and Polish communities among others (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2001, 31). This presents a series of new challenges for the state to address. The welfare

state not only shaped the identity of the Swedish people, it was also largely based on the

idea of a relatively homogenous population and culture with similar values, beliefs and

goals (Hannerz, 1996: 158). Because the Swedish state is highly centralized, it was able

to adapt fairly quickly to diversity in the Swedish population at the policy level through

the institutionalization of the idea of 'cultural freedom of choice' (Hannerz, 1996: 158).

However, as discussed in Chapter Four, immigrants remain outside of the prevailing

notions of Swedish culture, and conflicts between immigrant cultures and traditional Swedish culture continue to arise.

Canada and Sweden were chosen for both their similarities and differences. Following the Second World War, both countries are among the very few that have developed multicultural policies as their approach for dealing with issues related to immigration and diversity. While multiculturalism arguably dominates the Canadian political discourse to a much greater extent than in Sweden, the creation of a multicultural policy in Sweden reveals the progressive nature of the Swedish state in addressing these issues, especially in comparison with other European immigrant-receiving countries. In both countries, however, issues related to ethnicity and discrimination tend to remain at the margins of politics. As such, we can see that both Canada and Sweden also developed strong welfare states and have attempted to construct a national identity around the civic values associated with the welfare state instead of ethnicity (e.g. Brodie, 2002; Jenson, 1989; Oakes, 2001; Ålund, 1991). Both countries receive a large number of new members every year and are, in fact, demographically diverse, multicultural societies and both Canada and Sweden have experienced popular dissent in recent years over the issue of immigration and both are trying to construct a national identity that is inclusive of difference and can still unite the country. At the same time, however, Canada (as a relatively 'new' state) has a fragmented national identity, challenged by regional and sub-national identities, such as Quebecois nationalism, Aboriginal nationalism, and western regionalism. Sweden, on the other hand, has a long history of nation-building and, until fairly recently, was a relatively ethnically and culturally homogenous state. For these

reasons, it is useful to compare the values these two states attempt to transmit through immigration politics and literature.

The historical differences of these two countries, combined with the common immigration situation they face today, make them interesting cases for comparative study. The historical differences in national identity provide valuable points for comparison, as does the emphasis on the welfare state as a source of identity in each country and the recent decline of the welfare state in response to global pressures and a shift towards neo-liberal policies. Furthermore, both countries are destinations for large numbers of diverse immigrants, and neither country is seen as a dominant power within the global system. Both countries are struggling to redefine their national identity in a manner that allows for difference and the accommodation of 'immigrant' cultures. In other words, Canada and Sweden provide for an intriguing comparison because they are currently at similar points and face similar challenges, despite having radically different histories. As well, there is a strong history of comparative work on Canada and Sweden, although mostly in the area of social policy.[6]

The study of immigration and the literature for new immigrants in Canada and Sweden provides an excellent entry point into understanding how identity is constructed by state actors and the values that they view as integral to the political community and its growth and continuation. The study of the shifts in policy and identity politics is complemented by a comparative analysis of the state literature for new immigrants. This literature

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[6] See, for example, Bryden and Oliver (1994) or Shaikh (2003) on the welfare state, Raham (2003) on education policy, Mahon (1997) on child care policy, and Baker (1997) on parental leave policy.

reveals the key values being promoted by state actors and institutions. It tells new immigrants what they need to know about their new home, what to expect, how to behave, what their rights and responsibilities are, and what role the state will play in their individual lives. Overall, the literature provides the reader with a key to understanding what it means to be Canadian or Swedish.

Methodology

One of the goals of this project is to look at the construction of national identity and how the borders of the nation are defined through state activities without prioritizing one form of identity over another. Instead, the different ways in which identities intersect within the state culture, as revealed through policy, practice and state literature, are all examined. My approach to this project is feminist and is, in particular, influenced by the feminist work on difference and identity (e.g. Anthias, 1991; Mouffe, 1993 and 2000; and Yuval-Davis, 1997). This approach argues that gender relations, as well as relations of ethnicity and class, affect all aspects of politics and life. People have many overlapping and competing identities, all of which need to be understood in relation to each other. In addition, these relations can be deconstructed in order to achieve greater understanding and change. A neo-institutionalist approach is also employed, focusing on the state, through its institutions and actors, as a site for the construction of identity. Finally, a comparative approach is employed for a variety of reasons. Primarily, utilizing a comparative approach allows for greater understanding of the state culture of one state in relation to another. It allows for certain aspects of one state culture to become more

apparent when compared to another and allows for a more rigorous testing of the concept of state culture as an analytical tool.

A variety of different methodologies are used in the development of the concept and approach of state culture and its application to the Canadian and Swedish case studies. Secondary sources are used to review and examine the various theoretical positions within the existing literature on nationalism and citizenship, in order to construct a basic typology of each area. These are also used in the exploration of the historical development of identity politics and immigration in Canada and Sweden, along with government documents and newspaper articles.

As part of the development of state culture as a research tool, a unique methodological framework for the analysis of specific state cultures and state literature for new immigrants is developed. This methodology uses the questions developed as a result of the literature reviews on nationalism and citizenship as a starting point for analyzing the state culture represented in the texts. These questions are supported by a combination of content and critical discourse analysis, both of which are relatively new research methodologies within political science. Critical discourse analysis is the study of texts, their structures and different linguistic, cultural, social and political implications, in order to determine how language constructs meaning. Content analysis, on the other hand, is a technique for analyzing the content of communications in a manner that allows the research to do more than just form impressions by providing a systematic method for analyzing content (Burnham et. al., 2004: 236). In some ways, these two methodologies

draw on different (perhaps even oppositional) epistemological foundations. Whereas

content analysis has roots in positivism, through efforts to quantify and systematically

analyze large amounts of textual information, critical discourse analysis attempts to

create linkages between discourses, text, language and social context suggesting that

language is not merely a tool for conveying discourse, but a site of struggle in itself. The

combination of these two methods attempts to draw on the strengths of each. Content

analysis does provide a concrete basis upon which to engage in broader discourse

analysis, thus overcoming the tendency among some social scientists to conduct

sweeping analysis, without attention to the differences between discourses and the ways

in which they are constructed and mediated in various contexts. Combining the two

methods also allows for both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the texts, allowing

the researcher to uncover the values comprising the state culture embedded in these

documents and providing ways of replicating the research and findings. Furthermore, the

joining of diverse methodologies is an emergent trend within critical discourse analysis as

evidenced by Norman Fairclough, Phil Graham, Jay Lemke and Ruth Wodak's

introduction to the new journal of *Critical Discourse Studies* (2004), in which they state

that a new methodological approach is developing within critical discourse analysis that

attracts scholars from across the humanities and social sciences developing "new

syntheses between discourse analysis and a variety of theoretical and methodological

perspectives" (3).

In *Racism and the Press* (1991), Tuen van Dijk states that the goal of critical discourse

analysis is to explore *what* is being said and *how* it is said (6). Discourses are important

because they carry social meanings that are politicized by the concepts of power

embedded within them (Henry and Tator, 2002: 25). Wodek, Cillia, Reisigl and

Liebhart, in *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (1999), argue that a

dialectical relationship exists between institutions and discourses. They state that "the

situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse and, in turn,

discourses influence social and political reality" (1999, 8). Critical discourse analysis is

often seen as being more political than other forms of text analysis because it strives to

create a counter-discourse (Henry and Tator, 2002: 73). It does not pretend to be

objective or neutral, but is "committed to an emancipatory, socially critical approach"

(Wodek et. al., 1999: 8). This can be seen in *Discourse and Social Change*, where

Fairclough argues that critical discourse analysis has three dimensions or stages: (1) the

description of the text; (2) interpretation of the interaction processes and the relationship

to text; and (3) an explanation of how the interaction process relates to social action (in

Henry and Tator, 2002: 73). I employ this approach by using the concept of state culture

to provide an entry point into understanding state discourses about the values of the

community, while also providing a way to challenge the state discourse.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been used in many ways by many different

researchers and theorists and there is no specific methodological approach. Carol Lee

Bacchi (1999) uses CDA in her analysis of the construction of gendered policy problems,

calling it the "What's the problem?" approach. She examines how problems are

represented, described, and the implied causes and implications that follow (Bacchi,

1999: 36). Bacchi's work also aims to deconstruct the discourses being used in policy

creation in order to gain leverage against opponents. She analyzes different sources of

discourse, including policy documents, the media, press releases and public statements, in

order to examine the way that subjectivities are constructed in policy, the effects of

discourse change, and different representations of problems. Bacchi's approach informs

this analysis through her efforts to bring together a variety of types of sources and

documents in order to reveal the discursive mechanisms behind policy. Her approach is

utilized here by identifying the key issues and debates surrounding immigration and

integration and deconstructing them in order to provide room for a deeper analysis of

immigration and the role of immigrants in shaping, challenging and revealing state

culture.

In *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (1999), Wodek, Cillia, Reisigl and

Leibhart explore the discursive construction of Austrian national identity through

commemorative speeches, policy addresses, focus groups, and individual interviews. The

research they conduct is qualitative and based in the Vienna School of Discourse

Analysis, which they describe as situated between CDA and philosophical and social

critical theory. They use a discourse-historical approach that attempts to integrate as

much available background information on the historical context, as well as original

historical sources in which discursive events are embedded (Wodek et. al., 1999: 7-8).

This approach also contributes to this study as can be seen in the historical analysis of

identity politics in Canada and Sweden. Understanding the history and context of the

state enables the analyst to better predict states values and to identify shifts and trends

within society and politics.

Media analysis, particularly the approach used by van Dijk (1991; 1995), is used to help

quantify some of the analysis of the literature and to provide key points of analysis. Van

Dijk argues that mass media provide an ideological framework for the interpretation of

ethnic events. In the case of the analysis of literature for immigrants, the literature

provides the ideological framework for how the nation and belonging to the nation are

constructed by the state. The texts provide a 'frame' that helps to form our understanding

of state culture in Canada and Sweden. Van Dijk argues that language is political and

ideologically informed (1995: 260-1). Both the words and their position within the larger

text focus the reader's attention and bring specific issues to the foreground or background

(van Dijk, 1995: 262-3). Van Dijk's analysis of the media evaluates the prominence,

importance and relevance of specific information and messages through the position of

the text and the presence of boxed text (263-6). As well, this model of critical discourse

analysis shows that less abstract or more specific information (e.g. the level of detail)

often raises the importance of the information given (275). Titles, or headlines in the

case of newspapers, express what is felt to be most significant and provide an important

framing function by focusing the reader on specific messages. Similar techniques of

foregrounding will be explored within the analysis of the state literature for new

immigrants.

In the case studies, critical discourse analysis is used to show how language and images

in the texts studied help to construct and define the nation, citizenship and state culture.

The analysis begins by exploring the ordering of the text, followed by an examination of

the images in the texts, and concluding with the content analysis using the framework for

interrogating state culture developed in this project. The analysis of the literature

produced by the state for new arrivals first explores the order of the text and then looks at

the images present in the text and how they reflect the ways in which different state

actors and agencies choose to present themselves and society visually in a specific

context and at a specific point in time. In particular, the focus in on images or symbols of

the nation, on the representation of men and women, and on the representation of visible

minorities. This is followed by an analysis of the content of the text and how that content

is presented to the reader. This includes the ordering of the text and images, what is

included in the text (or not included), what the actual words say about the state cultures

of Canada and Sweden. In the end, state culture is presented as an entry point into

understanding the different discourses about community and identity that are put forward

by state actors in Canada and Sweden.

Chapter Summary

The following chapters outline the concept of state culture and the methodological

approach underpinning it. Chapter Two explores the existing literatures on nationalism

and citizenship. Different questions are raised in relation to these bodies of literature,

including: How are nations and nationalisms constructed? What roles do states play in

this process? What role does the state play in defining the 'ideal citizen'? What values

underpin these processes of inclusion and exclusion and how can we identify them? This

chapter concludes by elaborating on the concept of state culture as an alternative way of

understanding the process of identity construction and outlining a methodology for

determining the values comprising specific state cultures.

The concept of state culture and the methodological framework developed in Chapter

Two are used to explore the test cases of Canada and Sweden in Chapters Three and

Four, respectively. These two chapters examine the historical development of identity

politics in Canada and Sweden, asking how national identity has developed and changed

within the two countries and what role immigration has played in this process. By

focusing on immigration and integration policies, the state discourses surrounding

identity are made clear. This is followed by the identification of the barriers to belonging

that exist within each country and the external challenges faced by governments in the

management of identity politics. Returning to the approach for understanding state

culture outlined in Chapter Two, these chapters conclude with an analysis of the state

culture of Canada and Sweden as advanced in their immigration policies and politics.

Chapter Three argues that diverse immigration in the twentieth century created room for

challenges to Canadian identity and the rise of a discourse of diversity and tolerance.

Chapter Four, on the other hand, argues that the development of the Swedish welfare

state in the twentieth century led to the advancement of equality as the central value of

Swedish state culture. Recent waves of immigration, however, continue to challenge this

vision of equality and the Swedish identity it underpins. These two chapters provide the

historical context from which the literature studied in Chapter Five emerged, giving an

initial understanding of some of the core values underpinning state culture in Canada and

Sweden, and how these values have shifted over time.

Chapter Five turns to the literature produced by the Canadian and Swedish states for new

immigrants in their respective countries. Three texts are analyzed using critical discourse

and content analysis based on the methodological framework outlined at the end of

Chapter Two. This chapter looks at the texts comparatively in order to draw out the

similarities and the differences between the two state cultures and compares these

findings with those of the previous chapters. This analysis shows that the literature for

immigrants in Canada stress tolerance and multiculturalism, underpinned by a strong

emphasis on the individual and his/her responsibility to be self-reliant and to contribute to

Canada. The Swedish literature, in comparison, stresses equality and the role of the state

in promoting equality. However, the message of equality is contradicted by the

inadvertent presentation of Sweden as a country segregated along ethnic and cultural

lines.

Chapter Six returns to the initial questions posed here; namely, what role do states play in

constructing identity and defining the values of the nation and how can we determine the

nature of these values. The main insights of the previous chapters are summarized,

restating the main findings and conclusions of this project. The Chapter then highlights

the consequences and contributions of this research, suggesting areas where the concept

and approach of state culture could be used in the future.

Contribution

Some of the most important and pressing questions facing the world in the 21st Century are related to identity, nationalism, inclusion and immigration. The challenge of attempting to recognize diversity within states and manage increasingly mobile populations within a context of globalization and increased security concerns is one that is not easily solved. This project attempts to understand some of the forces at play within this broad area by bringing together the diverse literatures on nationalism, citizenship and immigration. In doing so, it proposes to bridge the gap between the theoretical literature on nation and community building and the practices of states with regards to immigration and the construction of identity. While the theory informs the practices of states, and my interpretation of them, the analysis of the practices also has the potential to influence and contribute to the theoretical literature.

This project contributes to the theoretical literature within political science in a number of ways. First, the concept of state culture is presented as an alternative and complementary way of understanding community and belonging, as well as the role of the state in constructing identity. Second, the development of a methodology for the operationalization of the concept of state culture provides a framework for other researchers to use and apply in different cases. Third, the analysis of the literature on nationalism and citizenship, combined with a renewed focus on the state as a central actor in identity politics, contributes to the body of literature and theory available within these subject areas. Overall, this constitutes a significant theoretical contribution to the field and our understanding of the politics of identity.

Contributions are also made to the study of policy within political science in a number of ways. This project contributes to the comparative work on Canada and Sweden, by expanding the literature to include immigration policy, as compared with the historical focus on social policy and the welfare state. A new way of understanding and approaching policy is also encouraged through the concept of state culture, which implies that policy is not just a framework for action within a state but also a reflection of the values of the political community. The introduction of the concept of state culture and the analysis of state culture in Canada and Sweden also provides a position from which to critique current immigration and integration practices, and to challenge the discourses surrounding identity and belonging within different states.

While many doctoral research projects focus on a narrow area of study and explore it in great depth, this project attempts to bring together many different bodies of literature within political science in order to contribute to our understanding of how these different areas of study, research and policy can be linked together through the development of a *new* concept and analytical tool – *state culture*. In this sense, one of the challenges faced here was to present an adequate overview of the different areas – for example, the state, culture, nationalism, citizenship, feminism, and different areas of policy including diverse social and cultural policies in Canada and Sweden – that enable the development of our understanding and the drawing of connections and conclusions within the space constraints of a single piece of work. The literature reviews and the bibliography, however, do provide direction for readers interested in exploring any one of the areas in

greater detail than is done here. As such, the goal of this dissertation is to integrate different bodies of literature and provide a framework for further work and analysis on state culture within the discipline. The development of the concept and methodology for understanding state culture has, I believe, great potential to facilitate research on the construction of national identity and the transference of values to new members in the future, but will require further testing and research.

Conclusion

The subsequent chapters develop the framework for exploring state culture, followed by the application of the framework to the case studies of Canada and Sweden. The aim of this project is to explore the role of states in the construction of identity and to develop a mechanism for determining the actual values put forward. In other words, what role do states, represented by state actors and institutions, play in constructing identity and what is the nature of the identity they project? I argue that one way of answering these questions is through state culture. State culture is defined as the values put forward by state actors which are seen by them as defining the borders of the nation. Thus, states play a continual role in the construction of identity through their policies, practices and literature. By using these state 'outputs' as an entry point into understanding state culture, the values that comprise state cultures become evident.

CHAPTER TWO

Constructing Ways of Belonging: Nations, Citizens and State Culture

Introduction

This chapter explores the existing literature on nations, nationalism, and citizenship. Various approaches to the construction of identity and community have been developed within what might be labeled the mainstream literature on nationalism and citizenship, and by the critics of this literature. Following this literature review, the chapter argues that the concept of state culture provides an alternative and complementary mechanism for understanding the construction of identity and community within developed, Western states and develops a methodological framework for the interrogation of specific state cultures. Ultimately, the concept of state culture links the theoretical literature on nationalism and citizenship to the practices of states regarding immigrants. In doing so, it reveals the boundaries of the nation and the characteristics of the 'good' citizen.

This chapter begins by defining nations and nationalism and the questions and issues raised by the literature and its critics. In particular, questions related to the role of states in the construction of national identity and mechanisms for identifying the values transmitted by states are explored. This is followed by an exploration of the literature on citizenship and its critics, which explores issues surrounding the universality of models of good citizens and feminist challenges to citizenship theory regarding issues of inclusivity. The final section of the chapter returns to the concept of state culture and, based on the issues raised within the nationalism and citizenship literatures, outlines a framework for

determining the state culture of a specific country. This is subsequently applied to the

Canadian and Swedish case studies in the following chapters.

Nations and Nationalisms

Montserrat Guibernau draws the following distinctions between nations, nation-states and

nationalisms. Nations refer to a group "conscious of forming a community, sharing a

common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a

common project for the future, and claiming the right to rule itself" (2003: 116). In this

sense, it is also important to emphasize that nations are self-defined groups. Nation-

states, then, are states that hold the monopoly of legitimate use of force within a territory

and that seek to "unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural

homogenization" (Guibernau, 2003: 116). In other words, nation-states are built upon

and united around the idea of the territory containing one people or nation. Nationalisms,

finally, are the "sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a

set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life and have the will decide upon their common

political destiny" (ibid.). Nationalisms, however, are generally associated with

movements, which strive to maintain or increase their political power and autonomy.

Thus, I would draw a distinction between nationalist movements and national identity,

where the former is mobilized on behalf of specific goals and the latter is the

identification of individuals with a specific nation or nation-state.

National identity can be distinguished from state culture in two important ways. First,

state culture represents the values, characteristics and behaviors that are seen as defining

the nation as put forward by state actors and agencies. Although state culture may be influenced by what the 'people' think and how they behave, this is a state-driven project, not an issue of individual identification. In fact, different parts of the state may advance contradictory values or values that do not resonate with the population as a whole. Second, the method for determining the state culture of a country must, therefore, differ from the method for determining national identity. National identity refers to an identity held by a specific population, in which individuals self identify with a particular nation. It is often tied to political culture and determined through opinion polling and surveys, which ask individuals questions about their identities and values. An understanding of state culture, on the other hand, must be based on an analysis of state outputs – policy, practices and literature. Thus, national identity and state culture both have differing sources and potentially different outputs. Put together, however, they have the potential to form a national *culture* that is the product of their overlap and intersection; one that is both held by the population and espoused by the state.

Many problems confront the expression of nationalism and nationalist movements. These include the difficulty of drawing clear boundaries around the group and differentiating between 'us' and 'them'; the frequent violence erupting out of nationalist politics; and the problem of reconciling the mythical nation-state with the reality of the multi-ethnic state of today. In addition, the rise of globalization and the increasing numbers of international agreements and partnerships all appear to diminish the role of the traditional state in today's economic and political world. However, while the role and power of the nation in the twenty-first century faced distinct political and economical

challenges, the emotional power of the nation remains. Perhaps increasingly levels of globalization actually increase the importance of the nation for some people who want to know who they are and where they belong. As Ulf Hannerz points out, although Europe and North America are seeing the weakening of the nation-state as they develop more supra-national connections, there is of yet no transnational culture to replace national culture (Hannerz, 1996: 89-90).

Marshall and Horsman argue that, along with a trend towards globalization, we are also seeing a trend towards increasing divisions along the lines of ethnic and national communities (Marshall and Horsman, 1994). In spite of the trend towards globalization, or perhaps because of it, the need to belong and identify with a national and/or ethnic group remains very strong. Groups, in an effort to protect and promote their identity and values, attempt to create symbolic and political bodies to differentiate themselves from 'others'. For these groups, national identity and nationalism remain an important force in today's world for uniting and mobilizing groups.

While nationalism remains problematic in practice, the idea behind nationalism – that of providing a common identity for citizens that connects them to a larger community sharing their values, history and future – remains important. At the same time, minority ethnic and cultural groups in Europe and North America and their respective demands can no longer be ignored. In fact, many of these minority groups, such as the Quebecois and Indigenous peoples, are using the rhetoric of nationalism to improve their position within the state. Others, such as immigrants, are more likely to work within the state to

improve their position and to gain recognition, for example, through the movement for

multiculturalism in Canada. As Europe and North America become ever more diverse,

the ability to create a common identity that includes everyone becomes increasingly

difficult. The first part of this chapter explores the responses within the literature on

nationalism to these issues by raising two questions: How do states participate in the

construction of national identity? And, what mechanisms exist for identifying which

values the state attempts to transmit?

This section seeks to verify whether these questions can be answered by any of the

existing theories on nationalism. In doing so, the theories about nationalism are broken

into major schools of thought and evaluated in the context of the political situation in

Canada and Sweden. The above questions will be explored by way of the main theories

and critiques of nationalism today, combined with how well they explain the construction

of national identity in multi-ethnic states such as Canada and Sweden. Following the

discussion of the nationalism literature, the chapter proceeds to use these questions to

explore the literature on citizenship.

Dividing up the Landscape

Many different typologies have been developed for the study of nationalism. The most

common (albeit contested) method for distinguishing between types of nationalism is to

divide them into civic and ethnic nationalisms. Michael Ignatieff, in his exploration of

current nationalisms *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (1993),

uses the concept of civic and ethnic nationalisms to distinguish between the different

contemporary nationalist movements. He defines civic nationalisms as those which

embrace all peoples who subscribe to the nation's political creed stating, "this nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a set of shared political practices and values" (Ignatieff, 1993: 6). Ethnic nationalisms, on the other hand, are defined as based on the individual's inherited attachment and belonging to an ethnic community (Ignatieff, 1993: 6-7). To put it more simply, ethnic nationalisms are based on perceived shared ethnicity, whereas civic nationalisms are based on shared political and civic values, such as citizenship, democracy and territory, which are seen as overriding ethnicity. In civic nationalisms, the state binds the nation, whereas in ethnic nationalisms the nation is viewed as preceding the state (Seymour et. al., 1996: 2-3). As discussed in greater detail below, however, both of these are social constructs, with civic nationalism set in opposition to 'negative' ethnic nationalism. The two are not, in fact, separate or distinct, but rather are overlapping, interrelated and interdependent.

Ignatieff, in line with most other contemporary writers on nationalism who utilize this dichotomy, gives civic nationalism a normatively higher value than ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is implicitly equated with rationality and civilized behaviour, and explicitly equated with democracy and human rights. Ethnic nationalism is viewed as a force that undermines democracy and most often leads to violence. The civic/ethnic dichotomy provides a 'neat' tool for an initial look at nationalisms, which can be categorized into the two types. This simple dichotomy, however, is filled with pitfalls that limit, rather than expand, our understanding of nationalisms and national identity. For example, civic nationalisms and the political values of the states that espouse civic

nationalisms are often based on traditions and values with ethnic origins. As Ignatieff himself points out, in the case of Germany in 1993 nationalism masqueraded as being based on civic values, but in reality was a form of ethnic nationalism defined through immigration and citizenship policy at the time (Ignatieff, 1993: 15).

There are many existing critiques of this model for understanding and categorizing nationalisms. One of the best in recent years is found in the introduction to a special edition of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* entitled "Rethinking Nationalism" by Michel Seymour, Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielson (1996). Suggesting that nationalism today exceeds the boundaries of existing theory, they charge students of nationalism to develop new ways of understanding and theorizing nationalism. They argue that the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism "trace[s] a truncated picture, and yield[s] in important ways a distorted understanding, of the complex phenomena that nationalism has become" (Seymour et. al., 1996: 1-2). In a similar vein, Michelene de Sève and Jill Vickers argue that the civic/ethnic dichotomy often obscures relationships within nationalisms and create a false dichotomy of good versus bad nationalism. They point out that "some civic (state-created) nationalisms are violent, undemocratic and oppressive for women, whereas, some ethnic (cultural) nationalisms are peaceful, democratic and women-friendly" (de Sève and Vickers, 2000: 12).

Tracing the ideas of civic and ethnic nationalism back to their roots in the work of Ernest Renan and German Romanticism, Seymour, Couture, and Nielson (1996) raise a number of serious charges against this method of theorizing nationalism. First, they argue that

the civic/ethnic dichotomy is too conceptually weak to account for the diversity that

exists within each type of nationalism. Second, this conceptualization makes is difficult

to explain the plural and multicultural nature of contemporary western societies. Third,

both civic and ethnic nationalisms are essentially exclusive (Seymour et. al., 1996: 4-5).

Civic nationalisms become hegemonic and exclude those who do not belong to the

majority group, whereas ethnic nationalisms exclude those who do not share the same

heritage or ethnic ancestry. Finally, they argue that both models of nationalism promote

the nation-state model as the primary means of organizing political space; this becomes

more problematic as the world becomes increasingly globalized and the role of the

nation-state changes (Seymour et. al., 1996: 8). These are all valid criticisms. However,

I would suggest that they underestimate the continuing role of the state in the

construction and maintenance of identities within national borders; for example through

immigration or social policy. Although global and local factors cannot be ignored, the

state remains an important actor in both international and national politics.

Anna Yeatman (1994) distinguishes between customary and conventionalist national

communities. Starting from the assumption that private interests are not sufficient to

unite communities, she looks at the concepts used to hold national communities together.

Similar to Ignatieff, she argues that while customary national communities are bound by

the axis of descent, kinship and brotherhood, conventionalist national communities are

held together by a legal-conventionalist view that looks at the historically specific

traditions and conventions of a particular national democracy and the legally sanctioned

social and political values that members of the community share (Yeatman, 1994: 95).

Whereas customary communities recognize a pre-existing community and are bound by their exclusivity, conventionalist communities are inclusive, participatory and guided by an acceptance of the cultural complexity of the society (Yeatman, 1994: 97-105). Conventionalist national communities invite the exploration of multiple and flexible identities supported by state infrastructure. This type of community requires a more democratic and participatory form of governance. Although this represents another dichotomous typology of nationalisms, Yeatman's conceptualization of national communities does offer a new interpretation of how communities can integrate and embrace differences, while still imagining themselves as a coherent unit. As well, her focus on the state as the site of community building through democratic processes reinforces the continuing importance of the state in this global era.

Tim Nieguth and Nira Yuval-Davis both offer critiques and alternatives to the civic/ethnic dichotomy. In "Beyond dichotomy: concepts of the nation and the distribution of citizenship" (1999), Neiguth argues that the migration and increased interdependence characterized by globalization that challenge the traditional idea of the nation-state contrasts with the return of ethnicity and the revival of nationalism (Nieguth, 1999: 155). He argues that these factors make it increasingly difficult to achieve broad consensus within states and that in order to survive, states "need to instill a sense of belonging and solidarity in their citizens" (Nieguth, 1999: 156). Nieguth proposes the three dimensions of ancestry, culture and territory as an alternative to the civic/ethnic dichotomy. He argues that territorial conceptions of nation-states, which examine the construction of boundaries around the group, are the most flexible and offer the most

potential for affirming cultural diversity through the politics of recognition (Nieguth, 1999: 170).

Yuval-Davis, on the other hand, suggests that both civic and ethnic nationalisms are based on imagined communities (1997: 10) In an effort to move away from this dichotomy she uses the idea of *volknation, kulturnation and staatnation* to discuss nationalism. A volknation is based on the origin of the people and biological explanation for the nation and is the most exclusive. Kulturnation addresses the symbolic and cultural heritage of the group. Staatnation is the most inclusive concept and looks at the civic dimensions of citizenship, state sovereignty and territory. Her categories are similar to Neiguth's, but the staatnation is more broadly defined.

These typologies have potential; however, they remain closely linked to the concept of civic and ethnic nationalisms and merely add an additional category. While they respond to some of the criticisms raised by Seymour, Couture and Neilson, they retain what are essentially exclusive categories that are unable to address the diversity of manifestations of nationalisms and national identities globally and within states. As well, Yeatman, Neiguth and Yuval-Davis all privilege one type of nationalism over another. While this hierarchy may be justified, it continues to enable us to make judgments about specific nationalist movements, without revealing the specific political and social values underpinning that particular nationalism or the context within which it emerges and develops.

Based on the discussion of theories of nationalism thus far, it seems that the idea of

separating groups in an 'us' versus a 'them' is connected with the use of binary

opposition to describe and differentiate types of nationalisms. This weakness within

nationalism is also a weakness within the theorizing about nations and nationalism.

Ultimately, more attention needs to be paid to context in order to understand the ways in

which nations and nationalisms have been constructed. In order to begin the process of

disentangling nationalisms (as much as they can be) from discussions of civic versus

ethnic, the next section reviews the main theories of nationalism according to the type of

nationalism they attempt to explain. In order to distinguish between the existing theories

of nationalism this section begins with primordial explanations. It then divides up the

modernists based on where the nationalisms occur into European nationalisms, colonial

nationalisms and post-colonial nationalisms in order to provide more of a context for

understanding nationalism. While this typology does not remove itself completely from

the problems of the civic/ethnic dichotomy, by looking at the context within which the

nationalism is constructed I hope to further illustrate the problems in much of the existing

theory, as well as to identify some of the strengths.

Primordial and Perennial Explanations of Nations

For the primordialists, ethnicity is the core of the nation (Seymour et. al, 1996: 16-17).

Yuval-Davis writes that they naturalize the nation and the power structures within it,

viewing them as an extension of the family structures that are seen as part of the 'natural'

order of things (1997: 15). As I stated earlier, this approach argues that nations are built

on ethnicity; ethnicity is not merely a construct of elites striving to bind together nations.

Rather, nationalism uses perceived pre-existing ethnic and cultural characteristics to build

nations. Geertz, for example, argues that societies are bound together by the primoridial

ties, such as language, race, religion and custom (Smith, 1998: 151). Nations, according

to primordialist explanations, are organisms of a "fixed and indeliable character which

was stamped on its members at birth and from which they can never be free" (Smith,

1998: 146). Perennialism, on the other hand, refers to the historical antiquity of the type

of social and political organization known as the 'nation' (Smith, 1998: 159). This

approach views nations as updated ethnic communities while recognizing that they are

also the result of historical and social phenomena. Thus, according to Walker Conner, a

nation "is a group of people who *feel* that they are ancestrally related" (quoted in Smith,

1998: 161, emphasis added). This 'feeling', while not necessarily based on fact,

continues to provide nationalist leaders with a rallying point for their movements.

Anthony Smith, while distinguishing himself from primordial and perennial explanations

of the nation, argues that there is some measure of national continuity (Smith, 1998: 190).

In his various works, Smith argues that while nations are a modern creation they are

founded on pre-existing ethnies. Ethnies had many of the cultural characteristics of

nations but lacked their unified education, economic and/or legal systems (for example:

the Normans, the Persians, the Jewish people) (Smith, 1996: 111-17). He argues that

these ethnies, united by common myths, symbols, memories and values helped "to create

and preserve the networks of solidarity that underpin and characterize nations" (Smith,

1996: 112). In this sense, ethnicity has been the social-cultural model for human

organization for approximately 5000 years, with community ties often based on shared

language and culture (Smith, 1997: 30). According to Smith, to remove ethnicity completely from our understanding of nations and nationalism is to ignore the roots at the basis of these types of bonding communities.

While this may be true, ways of exploring the ethnic roots (even within supposedly civic nations) need to be addressed. The ethnic and racial overtones of Geertz' and Smith's approaches are problematic for many theorists and nationalisms. Identities based on ethnicity are often seen as detrimental and of a lower form than those built upon civic values. This is particularly true in many parts of Europe where nationalism, and in particular ethnic nationalism, is seen by many as reminiscent of Nazism and as something to be stamped out and avoided, with supporters of nationalism often occupying the extreme right of the political spectrum; for example the Front National in France, the National Party of Germany, or the New Democracy Party in Sweden. The work of authors such as Smith, however, has value and helps us to understand that at the roots of nations and nationalisms (even civic ones) often lie cultural and ethnic ties. Even the values which are seen as civic (the legal system, democracy, human rights) are almost always connected to a cultural tradition. Ignoring the ethnic roots of our civic values does not help to make national identity and nationalisms more inclusive, but rather obscures the ways in which people and groups from other cultural traditions are excluded and find it difficult to become part of the larger community. This, however, does not suggest that ethnicity is a natural fact. Rather, this project suggest that notions of ethnicity are also constructed and may in fact result from aspects of state culture that attempt to naturalize certain characteristics or values among the population.

Europe versus the Colonies

European explanations of nationalism have achieved a hegemonic status in recent decades as they attempt to explain all nationalisms according to one model regardless of context. Generally, these models are based on the average, male, majoritarian citizen and tend to ignore the role(s) of women, homosexuals, and other competing ethnic and nationalist groups within the state. Overall, they focus primarily on the European experience and suggest that nationalism and the nation-state are a product of modernity and specific European developments. As the section on post-colonial and anti-colonial nationalism explains, these are no longer uncontested assumptions. Overall, this modernist view of nationalism is more popular than the primordial view, particularly since the idea of nations as social constructions as opposed to organic identities has taken hold (Eley and Suny, 1996: 4-7). Whereas primordial nations are seen as oppressive and irrational; modern nations are seen as rational, unifying and beneficial constructions. Gellner, for example, argues that nationalism is not a natural process, but a "theory of political legitimacy" (Gellner, 1983: 1).

Hobsbawm argues definitively that "nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way around" (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10). According to him, nationalism is a product of modernity, Europe and the Industrial Revolution. Nationalisms are based on 'invented traditions' that outline the boundaries of the nation. These include common ethnicity, language, culture and a belief in a common past and an interdependent future. Nations are a byproduct of modernity and cannot exist without a minimum level of technological

development, a common language, and a national education system (Hobsbawm, 1990:

10).

Nations and nationalism are also, according to Hobsbawm, a thing of the past. He

suggests that they are not a good alternative for state building in the 21st century, and

attributes the remaining nationalist conflicts in Europe, for example in the Balkans, to a

resurgence of early twentieth century conflicts suppressed by the Cold War (Hobsbawm,

1997: 74-79). Globalization has changed the role of nations and eroded their power,

rendering them irrelevant in the new global economy. He argues that "nations and

nationalism are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone analyse, the political

entities described as such" (Hobsbawm, 1997: 79).

In some respects, Hobsbawm is convincing. The idea of nationalism, as conceived by

him and other modernists, does not always apply very well to the world we are seeing

today. At the same time, however, states remain important actors within the global

system and the nation-state system does not seem on the verge of collapsing. Again, we

encounter the problem of distinguishing between what academics wish to label as proper

nationalism and the popular use of the terminology and ideology of nationalism, which

continues to give political legitimacy to political movements for independence and /or

increased power and autonomy for ethnic groups. Simply stating that this is an idea that

no longer applies to our contemporary political and economic environment does not

necessarily dispel the idea of nationalism or its perceived political usefulness among

many groups around the world. The object of analysis should be on how the idea of

nationalism is used and how states are constructing nationalism today, not the beginning

and end of nationalism as if it were only a historical fact and not also a concept or

ideology.

Ernest Gellner highlights the role of the state in constructing nations. He observes that:

> the state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have
> certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. It is more debatable
> whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense, did not presuppose
> the prior existence of the state. (Gellner, 1997: 56)

For Gellner, the national school system is central to the development of nations and

nationalism, as it is responsible for ensuring the existence of an educated mobile

workforce that can communicate easily with one other. He argues that schools are now

the transmitters, not only of the skills that are the main currency of the modern industrial

world, but also of culture (Gellner, 1997: 66-67). Only the state is large enough to

provide the education function necessary and the state is the actor strong enough to

control what is being transmitted by the education system. The function of nationalism is

to organize groups of people into large, culturally homogenous units (or 'nations') and

this is what states, through central education systems, are doing. Similarly, immigration

policies, practices and documents are also important but under-recognized ways of

socializing the population and encouraging certain political and social values among

citizens.

Benedict Anderson's concept of nations as 'imagined communities' represents one of the

most influential ideas within the study of nationalism and nation building. In *Imagined*

Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1991), Anderson

argues that nationalisms and nations are neither inherent nor eternal, but rather

communities based on imagined commonalities. Imagined communities move beyond

kin relations and offer an alternative to religion, while giving people a sense of belonging

to something larger than themselves and their immediate circle of family and friends

(Anderson, 1991: 83-87). He links the development of nationalism to the creation of the

printing press, which gave elites the ability to reach the masses through a common

medium and language and thereby create imaginary communities of people.

Interestingly, although the construction of imagined communities was dependent on

European technology and advances, Anderson argues that it first occurred in the colonies

and was used by the Creoles in the Americas to develop national identity and unity in the

new colonial states (Anderson, 1991: 47-65). The community is imagined because

members have no real, concrete connection or ties to one another – the community is

united through imagined practices and myths of a shared history and a shared future.

These modernist theories reflect the experience of nationalism and nation building in

Sweden, as a European nation-state, better than they reflect the experience of Canada,

which began as a colony and a country made up of diverse peoples. In Sweden, the

nation was constructed based on efforts to promote a common language, culture and

ethnicity, a common (if shifting) territorial base, and a common history of fighting the

Danes and Norwegians. It was united under a king and developed into a modern nation-

state, gradually becoming a democracy and one of the strongest welfare states in the

Western world. Today, however, globalization challenges the strength of the welfare

state and recent influxes of immigration have challenged the cultural and ethnic character

of the nation. The concept of nationalism, as presented by the above theorists, is

insufficient for understanding how the Swedish state today attempts to construct national

identity and incorporate these changes. Thus, a new model is needed.

Colonial Nationalisms

Much less work has been done on colonial nationalisms than on European and post-

colonial nationalisms. This type of nationalism is included here, however, because of the

its relevance for Canada as a former colony of both Britain and France. Richard Jebb

first developed the concept of colonial nationalism in his book *Studies in Colonial*

Nationalism (1905) where he argues that the white, majoritarian settler populations of the

British colonies were not seeking to create a separate state, but to imprint their unique

new national identity on the existing state. The British colonial nationalisms of the settler

states of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa reflected a combination of

their strong ties to Imperial England as well as a strong connection to their new

environment and the forces of immigration and existing aboriginal peoples within the

new state.

In *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism* (1988), John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder define

colonial nationalism as "not only the assertiveness of local autonomy and interest, the

sense of cultural identity and of environment, but also to the desire for self-rule and self-

respect within a changing set of connections to the Empire" (1988: 7). Colonial

nationalisms are "a love of one's own" where one's own "began in the colony as a new

society, and drew in a sense of identity with empire as a world state" (Eddy and

Schreuder, 1988: 7). The two identities – as a member of the new state and as a member of the empire – were virtually inseparable for the dominant members of the colony. Often the new identity was based on the settlers' belief in the moral and cultural superiority of the British race and their duty and desire to tame and civilize the other races within their borders. They strove to give the others the benefit of the best of the British Empire by importing its institutions, morals, values, language, political culture and social norms (Eddy and Schreuder, 1988; Wilton, 2000).

This type of nationalism accurately describes the nation building process in Canada at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century as British-Canadians strove to make Canada as British as possible and erode the influence of the French and other ethnic groups outside of Quebec. The last half of the twentieth century, however, shows a significant shift in the politics of nationalism within Canada. One major shift occurs in the 1960s with the appearance of state policy aimed at distancing Canada from the British Empire and British control culminating in a revised constitution in 1982, as well as the construction of new national symbols, such as the new Canadian flag, a national policy of multiculturalism, and a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Another major shift in Canadian nationalistic politics occurred through the resurgence of both Aboriginal and Quebecois nationalisms that challenge the hegemony and power of the federal state and its vision of national identity. These shifts present a serious challenge to attempts to construct a homogenous national culture based on one ethnic group within a context of competing identities and increasing diversity.

Beyond Colonialism

Post-colonial and anti-colonial nationalisms developed in response to the oppression of

colonialism and imperialism. Articulations of these nationalisms arose in response to the

colonial tendency of hegemonic European theories of nationalism. Partha Chatterjee

captures this sentiment perfectly when he states that nationalism in colonial and/or post-

colonial states is often seen as imitative of European nationalisms. He states that if

colonial states cannot even imagine themselves as new nations distinct from the European

experience, they will be forever colonized (Chatterjee, 1993: 4-5). In general, these

theories of nationalism are a rejection of European colonizing power and models of

nationhood and an attempt to frame new expressions of nationalism around the colonial

experience. For example, Indigenous nationalism in Canada is not only an attempt to

gain a voice and increased power within Canadian politics, but also to cleanse Aboriginal

politics of the influence of western, colonial culture. Anderson, however, is skeptical of

the 'newness' of such theories pointing out that they often want to maintain the territorial

borders imposed by colonialism (and often with serious effects) and that the nationalism

is generally put forward by a western-educated intelligentsia that is separate and

marginalized from both the colonizers and the colonized (Anderson, 1991: 113-14).

Chatterjee, in *The Nation and Its Fragments* (1993), argues that anti-colonial

nationalisms take a distinct form that incorporates both the material and the spiritual

spheres of the social world. The material domain is equated with the influences and

activities of the Western world and includes state institutions, economy, science and

technology. The spiritual domain, on the other hand, is where the national culture

resides. The spiritual domain stands in contrast to the institutions of the state, which is where most European theorists would argue the nation is constructed. It is within the spiritual domain that post-colonial nationalists can launch "the most powerful, creative and historically important project: to fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation is an imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being" (Chatterjee, 1993: 6). This approach offers an interesting alternative to Western theorizing on the nation in its attempts to reclaim aspects of the nation for colonized peoples. It remains problematic, however, in that it both assumes the existence of a true and natural national core and ascribes this to women, thereby gendering the nation.

Gerald (Taiaiake) Alfred, in his study of Mohawk nationalism in Canada, *Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors* (1995), criticizes the eurocentricity of theories of nationalism that assume that the idea of nations and nationalism originated in Europe out of European experiences and developments. He argues that theorists have "created a model of nationalism based on a narrow view of one aspect of European history and applied it as the global standard" (Alfred, 1995: 9). European conceptualizations of nationalism are unable to incorporate the experiences of communities or nations that are reacting to political and cultural hegemony, as opposed to trying to enforce it. According to Alfred, assertions of Aboriginal groups in Canada for self-government or Aboriginal rights are, in actuality, assertions of nationhood (Alfred, 1995: 10). Furthermore, the nations upon which they are based go much further back in history than the arrival of Europeans and colonialism.

These postcolonial understandings of the nation attempt to bridge the civic/ethnic divide

as constructed by Western theorists and create a new nation that amalgamates includes

aspects of both civic and ethnic identities. While such an approach can be applied to sub-

state nationalisms in Canada and Sweden (for example, Aboriginal nationalism in

Canada, and perhaps even to the Iranian and Finnish minorities in Sweden) it does not

help us to understand the ways in which the Canadian and Swedish states are attempting

to reconstruct the 'nation' and national identity, although it may be helpful for

understanding the claims of colonized indigenous groups within these societies. In the

end, however, postcolonial nationalisms are not necessarily more inclusive than the

colonial nationalisms they critique and struggle against, as evidenced by the struggle of

many women within postcolonial nationalist movements.

Feminist Re-Imaginings of the Nation

Feminist work has provided some of the most challenging critiques of mainstream

theories of nationalism and nation-building. The work of feminists on nationalism and,

in particular, the exclusion or obfuscation of women and gender relations from existing

work on nationalism reveals the exclusionary nature of these theories. While nationalism

has always been about power for a specific group of people – getting more power,

maintaining power, or reducing the power of other groups – the question of power within

the nationalist group is one that has been raised primarily by feminists. Feminist scholars

have studied the ways in which power relations, particularly those between men and

women, have been constructed in nationalist theories. They have made a number of

important points, arguing that theories of nationalism are concerned with the public

sphere and the activities of men, but nationalisms go far beyond these spheres, and that

women play a number of important roles in nationalisms, including symbolic and active

roles. In general, they reveal the ways in which nationalisms work to include and

exclude people and groups, even within the privileged group.

As well, feminist theory and feminist work on the identity of women within the women's

movement and the category 'woman,' in particular, is useful for addressing the question

of the homogeneity of an identity and inclusive ways to use identity. As de Sève and

Vickers point out in their introduction to the special issue of the *Journal of Canadian

Studies* on women and nationalism in Canada (2000), even women writing about

nationalism and participating in nationalist projects are a very diverse group (de Sève and

Vickers, 2000: 8). In this particular case, they encompass English, French, Aboriginal

and immigrant women, heterosexual and gay women, white women and women of

colour, and women approaching the issues from a variety of different political

standpoints and ideological perspectives. The diversity represented in this one small

volume reveals the diversity within feminist work at large and it is this very diversity that

has "compelled feminists to take the politics of difference seriously" (Peterson, 1999:

38). This recognition of the importance of difference and diversity led feminists to

pioneer and dominate research and theorizing on issues of identity, identification

processes and their relationship to power both within the traditional disciplines and across

them. For this reason, as well as because of the important critique of nationalism that

they provide, feminist theory is extremely relevant to this project and the study of

nationalism in general. As well, it is important to note that discussions of nation, race and difference have also challenged and informed feminist theorizing with regards to diversity and the category 'women' (e.g. Dhruvarajan and Vickers, 2002).

Anne McClintock writes that "nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender differences ... [Yet] male theorists have seldom felt moved to explore how nationalism is implicated in gender power" (McClintock, 1997: 89). This becomes apparent in a review of the mainstream literature. Gellner's last book, *Nationalism* (1997), begins with the statement "men have always been endowed with culture" (Gellner, 1997: 1). This raises the following questions: Only men? Which men? And, what exactly does he define as 'culture'? This is representative of a characteristic division between men and women, in which men are equated with culture and women are equated with nature. Another example is the *Oxford Reader on Nationalism*, edited by Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson (1994), in which gender is relegated to a section at the end entitled "Beyond Nationalism." On the contrary; the work by feminists on nationalism shows that gender is very much an integral part of nationalism, neither outside nor beyond it.

Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, in the introduction to *Woman-Nation-State* (1989), provide one of the earliest frameworks for looking at how women participate in ethnic and national collectivities. In contrast to the mainstream literature on nationalism that focuses on men, they argue that women are important participants in many aspects of nationalism and nation-building. In particular, they suggest that women participate as:

1. Biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
2. Reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;
3. Participants in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;
4. Signifiers of ethnic/national differences – as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories;
5. Participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989: 7)

This framework provides a useful entry point into understanding the gendered nature of nationalisms and the significant roles women play in all aspects of nation-building and national processes. The framework reflects the diversity of women's participation that is overlooked by many other theorists, both male and female.

Within feminist work there is a division between those who tend to paint women as victims of nationalist processes (Enloe, 1989; Pettman, 1996), and others who see nationalisms as potentially empowering and liberating for women (Chatterjee, 1993; West, 1997; Moghadam, 1994). Cynthia Enloe, for example, in *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (1989), argues that "nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope" (Enloe, 1989: 44). Similarly, Jan Pettman, in *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (1996), argues that nationalism is a masculinist process that results in the oppression and objectification of women as the symbols and reproducers of the nation (48-63). Both suggest that nationalisms do not advance women's interests within the national group or the state; rather, while women may play an important symbolic role within nationalisms, they are also most often the victims of nationalisms, used and abused in the struggle for national dominance. This becomes

most obvious in the use of rape as a "weapon in nationalist struggles," where "rape constitutes the ultimate transgression of national boundaries" (Day and Thompson, 2004: 125). Thus, women's bodies are often used as sites for nationalist struggles. While this may be extremely negative, as in the case of rape, the relationship between women's bodies, reproduction and national identity is not always so simple. In many cases, women gain power and status through their ability to be not only biological reproducers of the members of the nation, but also through their responsibilities for the cultural reproduction of the nation among its young.

Chatterjee, on the other hand, shows how central women are to the nation-building project in India where they represent the traditional culture of the nation and are often a meeting point for the cultural conflict between the east and the west (Chatterjee, 1993). Moghadam suggests that we look at the nationalism itself and how the vision of the nation determines the ways in which women are able to participate in the nation-building project (Moghadam, 1994: 4-5). Her edited volume *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies* (1994) presents many different experiences of women's participation in nationalist projects. These range from women making sacrifices in the belief that under the new nation conditions would be better than under colonialism, to women actively participating in military projects.

In general, the role women play in nation building and nationalistic activities reflects their position in society. For example, in my earlier work on women and colonial nationalism in Canada, I argued that British women played a very different role than

women from other immigrant groups and/or aboriginal women (Wilton, 1998 and 2000).

Also, Lois West (1997) and Michelene de Sève (2000) both point to the positive

relationship between feminists and Quebeçois nationalism where the liberation of

Quebeçois women is seen as irrevocably connected to the liberation of the Quebec nation.

The importance of examining context in the exploration of women and nationalism and

the way gender relations are constructed in nation building projects is recognized by

many writers who employ a located approach (e.g. Gilliam, 1991; McClintock, 1993 and

1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997). The located approach recognizes the interconnectedness of

race, gender, ethnicity, economics and politics within nationalist projects and avoids

separating a specific nationalism from its history.

The majority of the work on women and nationalism looks at women outside of Europe

and primarily at colonial and post-/anti-colonial settings. Women primarily located in the

Western world, however, have carried out this research. Within these settings, it is very

important to remember that the role women play is determined to a large extent by their

place and position within the colonial hierarchies. Ann Stoler (1997), Jill Vickers (2000)

and Wilton (2000), for example show that majoritarian women in colonial nation-

building were disadvantaged within their own culture but were advantaged and held

power over colonized men and women. The work on colonial women (Moghadam, 1994;

Enloe, 1989) shows that colonized women held a very different position and held

considerably less power. By examining women in relation to other women and men

within the nationalist movement a clearer picture of the structure of power and the nature

of the specific nationalism becomes apparent.

More recently, critics have charged both mainstream and feminist nationalist theory with heterosexism (Peterson, 1999; Rankin, 2000). Looking at heterosexism and the reinforcement of heterosexual gender roles in theories of nationalism reveals another way in which these theories tend to reinforce power hierarchies. Peterson argues that "heterosexism as practice involves gendered divisions of activity and entitlement, naturalized by reference to binary sex and its corollary production of masculine and feminine identities and appropriate roles" (Peterson, 1999: 55). She argues that nationalisms practice heterosexism by, for example, viewing non-reproductive sex as a threat, not recognizing homosexual family units, and using women as symbols in overtly heterosexual ways. Similarly, Rankin (2000) argues that in Canada the project of defining national identities has always been strongly connected to the regulation of sexual preferences and practices. 'Queers' do not have access to the same human and citizenship rights as other members of the community and tend to be excluded within their own national communities. The idea of a 'Queer Nation' makes reference to Jenson's argument (1993) that by claiming the name of a nation a group or social movement is able to effect goals and affect political discourses. The idea of a Queer Nation offers a unique perspective on how national communities can be defined and reveals that political power and legitimacy accrued to demands made on behalf of a nation.

By opening up the study of nationalism to include women and examine gender and sexual relations, these authors provide a serious challenge to studies of nationalism that focus

solely on military and/or state projects and on the dominant male experience. While some feminists are skeptical of the ability of nationalism to liberate women, many female members of ethnically marginalized groups point to the interconnectivity between ethnic and gender oppression. Studying nationalisms as autonomous movements separate from other power relations both within societies and globally obscures other forces shaping nationalisms. Ultimately, understanding the context within which nationalisms occur is essential to understanding the nationalism.

One of the major contributions of feminist theorizing on the intersections of identities is the revelation that studying one identity in isolation often leads to the misunderstanding of identity based political action. This project focuses on state-based initiatives for the construction of national identity, while recognizing the importance of examining these state-based activities within a wider social, political, economic and historical context. In doing so, the aim is not to look at state actions at the expense of other spheres of activity or by ignoring other forms of oppression. Rather, it seeks to look at how Canada and Sweden are attempting to construct national identity within a specific context and how the construction of state culture reinforces or challenges divisions, power structures and roles in the society at large. This literature points to the importance of addressing all types of diversity within states and the intersections between different types of identity, as well as the tendency towards exclusion within the mainstream literature. Therefore, it is not only important to explore the ethnic roots of contemporary state constructions of identity, but also how states incorporate gender issues, and ideas of equality and diversity within the more traditional components of nationalism.

Michelene de Sève and Jill Vickers (2000) suggest four conceptual shifts within theorizing on nationalism that can potentially help to avoid many of the pitfalls within that body of literature. First, they suggest a shift away from a focus on Western Europe as a center of theorizing about nationalism to one that incorporates the many diverse experiences of nationalism in many different places. Second, they suggest that the United States should not be looked at as the norm or definitive experience of nation building outside of Europe. Again, the diversity of experiences must be addressed. Third, they recommend the decentering of male experiences and a shift away from "an undifferentiated, universalist perspective focused on (heterosexual) men's experiences, to exploring nationalisms from diverse perspectives" (de Sève and Vickers, 2000: 23). Finally, they suggest that the focus of theorizing on nationalism needs to be on the interaction between nationalisms, race, gender and other systems of oppression and not merely on the dominant group. These are important considerations that inform the approach advocated here – that of exploring state cultures. The use of Canada and Sweden as case studies represents a move away from Western Europe and the United States as a focus for studying nationalism. As well, state culture speaks to the intersectional nature of identity and strives to understand how identities can be both inclusive and exclusive in different ways and for different groups. As such, state culture addresses some of the problems within nationalism and nation-building raised here. It also draws on the strengths of the literature on nationalism; namely, the emphasis on the continuing importance of communities of belonging and the central role of the state in defining identities and regulating identity politics.

As discussed in the previous section, existing theories of nationalism are insufficient for

obtaining a clear understanding of the ways in which multiethnic, industrialized Western

states are working to construct and define national identity. First, nationalism is very

connected to political movements and holds many negative connotations. Second, while

feminists continue to challenge the exclusive nature of mainstream theorizing on

nationalism, it remains a project aimed at promoting the interests of one group over

another and does not address how different nations and groups can co-exist within one

state. Third, the focus on typologies, such as the civic/ethnic divide, within mainstream

theory obscures the differences between nationalisms and their context. These problems

further limit our ability to understand the current manifestations of state-centered nation-

building in countries such as Canada and Sweden. In turning to theories of citizenship,

an alternative means of looking at membership in a 'national' community and the

identity/identities associated with that community becomes possible. The next section

explores theories of citizenship and their contribution to our understanding of identity and

community.

Citizenship: An Introduction

Chantal Mouffe states that "the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind

of society and political community we want" (Mouffe, 1993: 60). As with the theorizing

on nationalism, the literature on citizenship provides new ways of understanding and

envisioning political communities (in particular, ways of devising more inclusive

communities), but does not provide adequate mechanisms for identifying the current

values that underpin these identities and communities. This section examines both mainstream and alternative theories of citizenship and, in particular, explores what these theories say about the relationship between individuals and the state, the construction of the ideal citizen, and how identity politics intersects with democracy. The problems associated with theories of citizenship are also explored. Some of these problems are similar to those raised in the discussion on theories of nationalism; namely, the problems of exclusivity and the construction of citizenship around the model of the universal (white, middle class, able-bodied, heterosexual) male. This section asks how community is constructed within citizenship theory and what the literature says about the values of the political community. This examination, combined with the above analysis of the literature on nationalism, lays the foundation for the concept of state culture and the methodology for interrogating the values of states that are introduced in the final section of this chapter.

Liberal Citizenship Theory

"The modern pre-occupation with citizenship is an expression of a desire to create, and the capability to imagine, comprehensive membership frameworks that are capable of replacing the weakened communities of traditional society" (Shafir, 1998: 23). Citizenship performs a number of functions in modern society and provides the legal and social framework for democracy and individual autonomy (Shafir, 1998: 2). Citizenship is often associated with liberty, equality and solidarity. Liberty generally refers to individual freedoms, both from interference from others and from the state. Equality can be viewed as encompassing legal, political and social rights (e.g. Marshall, 1950).

Solidarity (or fraternity) implies membership in a political community and a feeling of belonging to that community. At the individual level, citizenship can refer to the legal status of an individual, to the identity of the individual as a member of a political community, and to types of activity characterized by their civic virtue – for example, utilizing political rights, the obligation to participate in the political sphere, and the level of participation required for the 'good' citizen (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). At the group level, citizenship is a force of social cohesion by providing stability, unity, a core set of values, and a definition of the good citizen. (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 30-31). It is the function of social cohesion that is most important to this project. The individual functions, however, are also important as they help define who is a citizen (or who is included and excluded from the group), the meaning of this identity, how it relates to other identities, and the ways in which citizens can and do participate in the state and political culture. The literature on citizenship raises two questions: (1) What role does the state play in defining the community and the ideal citizen? (2) How can we determine how the community and the ideal citizen are defined and what values underpin these definitions?

Liberal citizenship theory has its roots in ancient Greece. Shafir argues that the ancient Greek polis used citizenship to emancipate humanity from tribal loyalties and to create a voluntary and civic community to replace those loyalties (Shafir, 1998: 3). Citizenship was the legal foundation of the new community and the social glue that held it together. Through the development of citizenship over the ages, and in particular its development in the western world, citizenship became associated with certain rights and freedoms held

by citizens. Ultimately, liberal citizenship theory views humans as equal before the law, atomistic, rational agents who exist prior to society. It argues that society should ensure the freedom of all its members to realize their own potential and that individual citizens are the bearers of formal rights. Finally, it sees the individual as a free competitor, and thereby responsible for his/her own performance in life (Dietz, 1987).

Liberals value citizenship because of the "rights it bestows giving space to individuals to pursue their interests free from interference" (Faulks, 2000: 1). Citizenship also makes demands on citizens, which appeals to conservatives and communitarians (Faulks, 2000: 1-2). In other words, according to Faulks, citizenship "recognizes the dignity of the individual but at the same time reaffirms the social context in which the individual acts" (Faulks, 2000: 5). These two premises of liberal citizenship – individualism and community – provide the basis for the different debates within citizenship in recent years as theorists argue for the primacy of one over the other.

Rawls, for example, revisits liberalism and citizenship with the intention of replacing self-interest with a focus on public morality, justice and fairness. He argues that mutual benefit can be achieved from cooperation, enabling a shift in the focus of liberalism from private to public life, rather than on the maximization of individual 'happiness' (Shafir, 1998: 6-7). Communitarians, however, continue to criticize liberal conceptions of citizenship, arguing for a form of civic republicanism to take its place. They suggest that the lack of solidarity and the limited involvement in political life have been lost in the transition to the modern world (Shafir, 1998: 10). The debate centers on two normative

visions of the citizen. First, liberals support the idea of the individual as a sovereign and autonomous actor pursuing his/her private rational advantage and conception of good (Shafir, 1998: 10). Second, communitarians argue that individuals are members of the larger political community, which provides citizens with their identity through public participation and identification with the values of the larger community (Oldfield, 1998). According to this perspective, the pursuit of the common good is the core of the communal citizen's civic virtue. This approach advocates a larger conception of good, which encompasses a society, whereas the liberal or Rawlsian approach argues that good is privately determined. Ruth Lister distinguishes between the two concepts of citizenship as follows: liberalism casts citizenship as a status that is primarily concerned with issues of right accorded to individuals, whereas civic republicanism casts citizenship as a practice that incorporates the idea of responsibilities to the wider society (Lister, 2006: 3). This project does not adopt one approach or the other, but rather seeks to explore how state literature and actions advance specific ideas of the 'good' citizen and where they fall within these two distinct traditions.

T. H. Marshall, in "Citizenship and Social Class" (1950), provides a framework for understanding citizenship from a welfare state perspective that influences much of the discussion about citizenship in the post-World War Two period. He outlines the three elements of citizenship – civil rights, political rights, and social rights – that are based not on the ancients but on the modern industrial experience of Britain. Civil rights are the legal rights and freedoms accorded to the individual by the state. Political rights give the right to participate in the exercising of power, by voting in elections for example. Social

rights are guaranteed by the state through the provision of basic services that help to equalize the population, generally under the guise of the welfare state. As the most recent achievement, these rights also remain the most vulnerable to contestation. However, they are necessary as they enable citizens to be able to use their civil and political rights effectively and fully participate in society. Marshall argues that it is only when individuals hold all three types of rights that full citizenship is attained. He also points out that citizenship is different from nationalism in that it is not based on the past but on a shared loyalty to a civilization that is a common possession (Marshall, 1950: 24).

The inclusion of social rights within Marshall's approach addresses some of the problems of exclusion within liberal and civic republican approaches to citizenship, while still providing a foundation for a common identity. Marshall is criticized, however, for presenting social citizenship as a linear and irreversible process and presenting the British model as the only model (Sharif, 1998: 15). Also, this view of citizenship encounters new challenges with the rollback of the welfare state that occurred in western countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, Gordon (1990) points out that Marshall's theory on the development of citizenship rights ignores the exclusion of women and really only describes the male experience (18). This is attributable to the fact that modern citizenship arose along with the public/private distinction that ideologically separated women from public life. As Lister notes, "the public-private dichotomy, and the male-female qualities associated with it, stands at the heart of the gendered citizenship relationship" (Lister, 2006: 2). This relegated women to the private sphere of reproduction, effectively depriving them of the rights associated with citizenship

(Gordon, 1990: 20). The challenges posed by feminists to this dichotomy, discussed below, provide some of the most interesting recent work on citizenship.

Mothers Versus Brothers: The Feminist Critique

Mainstream conceptions of citizenship, such as those discussed above, remain subject to criticism from many quarters. Critiques of citizenship emerging from immigrant and multicultural perspectives focus on the problem of conceptualizing the citizenry where citizens and members of the nation tend to overlap, constructing the idea of a culturally homogenous citizenry that does not allow for diversity. Others, such as Kymlicka, point to the need for more than just liberal tolerance of pluralism, suggesting ideas of differentiated citizenship containing both individual and group rights (Kymlicka, 1998). One of the most significant sources of critique for mainstream citizenship theory and for the re-thinking of citizenship, however, can be found in feminist scholarship. Feminist critiques of citizenship theory range from liberal feminists who seek to extend liberal rights to include women, to maternal feminists seeking to create a new model of citizenship based on values associated with mothering, to those who attempt to outline a concept of gender-pluralist citizenship.

Liberal feminists make the important assertion that while liberalism assures everyone formal equality and presumes individuals to be free and equal competitors, women are disadvantaged within the existing system (for example, see Tong, 1998: 10-44). Liberal feminists are often criticized, however, for using the male standard without challenging it. Their critics argue that liberalism reifies certain characteristics generally associated

with masculinity, such as independence, self-restraint, competitiveness, rationality, impartiality, loyalty and courage. Defining citizenship according to the ideals of liberalism, therefore, imposes a male standard on citizens.

One group of critics, the maternal feminists, propose using the 'private sphere' and characteristics often associated with women, such as nurturing, self-sacrifice, and caring, as an alternative. Ruddick (1980), for example, argues that maternal values and practices provide a basis or an alternative model of citizenship. She suggests that the skills and values of mothering, such as a commitment to others, self-sacrifice, sharing, and connectedness, can potentially replace the masculinist values of the public sphere with an ethic of caring. Di Quinzio (1991), similarly, argues that the process of raising children shares many similarities with the process of raising citizens and that their respective practices can potentially inform and benefit each other.

While these theorists raise important criticisms of the masculine bias within citizenship theory, their reification of women and the private sphere is highly problematic. Such an analysis reverts to a stark dichotomy between masculine and feminine, and public and private, presenting a very black and white vision of society and failing to consider possible historical and cultural variations. Mary Dietz (1987) criticizes them for presenting a white, middle-class vision of mothering and family that is more myth than reality. She argues that the answer does not lie in merely replacing one model with another, but in developing new ones. Ideally then, a new model would take the best out of each system and concept of citizenship and address questions of gender, ethnicity,

class, and sexuality, as well as looking at how citizenship can become more inclusive and aimed at developing discussion. Furthermore, such a model would be flexible and able to adapt to changes in society and its constituent parts.

Ruth Lister attempts to sidestep the traditional 'equality versus difference' dilemma within feminist theorizing on citizenship through the advancement of a pluralist conception of citizenship capable of incorporating diverse social cleavages simultaneously (2006: 1). Thus, she suggests that the re-gendering of citizenship can be described according to three distinct approaches: the gender-neutral or liberal feminist reconstructions; gender differentiation as put forward by maternal feminists as well as among those advancing an ethic of care (e.g. Bubeck 1995); and, finally, a gender-pluralist vision as represented by the work of Chantal Mouffe (1992). Lister argues that while we cannot reject either of the first two models, what is really needed is "a synthesis of the two, within the framework of gender pluralism" that requires changes in both the "public and private spheres and in men's as well as women's relationship to citizenship" (2006: 9). This last approach is discussed in greater detail in the section on "Intersecting Identities and the Inclusion of Others" later in the chapter.

Organizing Citizens for the State

Citizenship policy and discourse appears to be shifting in a variety of different directions, many of which incorporate the work of feminist scholars on citizenship, social rights and the welfare state.. The first of these trends is towards a more liberal, individualistic and consumer oriented model, which is contrasted with discussions of identity politics that

are increasingly becoming a part of the debates on citizenship and democratic theory. The second, which is discussed at the end of this section and is a response to globalization, takes citizenship beyond national borders and explores global citizenship and transnational or postnational citizens.

Citizenship within states is generally seen as a framework that provides several functions, including: outlining the rights and responsibilities of citizens, outlining the state's responsibility towards the citizens, and providing an identity that unifies the citizenry. In the Western, industrialized world, this has generally been accomplished through constitutions, human rights acts, citizenship and cultural policy, and/or the welfare state. In Western states, such as Canada and Sweden, the welfare state peaked in the post-World War II period and began to decline with oil crisis of the 1970s, followed by the recession and rise of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in the 1980s. This shift in ideology, policy and economics has resulted in a changing 'citizenship regime' that is in the process of redefining the relationship between the citizen(s) and the state (Jenson and Phillips, 1996). Jane Jenson, for example, argues that citizenship is a representation of society and that "any definition of citizenship establishes the boundaries of social inclusion and exclusion" (Jenson, 1991: 197). Therefore, as with Marshall (1950), a certain minimum level of equality is necessary for full citizenship and participation. With the rise of neo-liberal ideology, the debate shifted to the definition of equality (versus equity) and how it should be achieved – through equality of opportunity or equality of condition or equality of outcome (Jenson, 1991: 201-2). Furthermore, since 9/11, the focus is increasingly on issues related to personal freedoms – for example, as

related to the Canada's anti-terrorism legislation, the use of security certificates to retain

suspects for lengthy periods of time without full disclosure, and the surveillance methods

used to fight terrorism at 'home' – while concerns surrounding equality appear to be

falling to the side.

Recently, the methods for achieving equality, the importance of social and economic

equality, and the role of the state in achieving these goals have come under question.

Ronald Beiner (1995) points out that there is a conflict between the liberal capitalist

values of Western industrialized societies and the notion of collective citizenship.

Similar to the ideas behind nationalisms and nation-states, the concept of citizenship is

also being challenged by globalizing and localizing pressures, and by the presence of

multiple overlapping identities. These pressures are changing the relationship between

citizens and the state and the societal and state definitions of citizenship and the 'good'

citizen.

Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips, in their study of citizenship in Canada, argue that a shift

in citizenship regimes has occurred since the 1980s. The Canadian system shifted away

from the post-World War II model that aimed to provide social services, a minimum level

of equality across the country, and a sense of pan-Canadian identity, to a model focusing

on the individual. This model diminishes both the role and the legitimacy of

organizations and groups as spokespersons for the people (Jenson and Phillips, 1996).

They argue that:

> [A]s Canada restructures its economy as well as the basic relationships between
> the state and the market, between the national and the international, and among

> parts of the state, it is also restructuring citizenship. ... who qualifies and is recognized as a model citizen is under challenge. The legitimacy of group action and the desire for social justice are losing ground to the notion that citizens and interests can compete equally in the political marketplace of ideas. (Jenson and Phillips, 1996: 112)

This shift can also be seen in Sweden where neo-liberal politics and discourses of global competitiveness are eroding the welfare state, which was the focus of Swedish national identity in the post-war period. These changes challenge the Swedish identity and have a negative impact on the Swedish model of politics, which is based on a politics of accommodation between the public and private spheres.

The regime shift Jenson and Phillips describe can be viewed as a shift from the New Left to New Right approaches to citizenship. The New Left vision of citizenship looks more towards rights and the substantive programs aimed at improving equality and quality of life. They argue that imposing obligations is useless if opportunity is absent. Therefore, the state must ensure equality of opportunity. The New Right conception of citizenship is more individualistic and based on the idea of the responsible citizen who depends on him/herself as opposed to depending on the state (Kymlicka, 1992: 8-10). These shifts not only challenge the construction of an identity based on common and universal notions of citizenship, but also make it more difficult for immigrants and marginalized groups to enter the system and participate in the democratic process. The lack of effective, well funded and accessible programs to assist with integration, language training and education as discussed in the chapters on Canada and Sweden, hinder the ability of newcomers to functionally integrate into the society and effectively obtain full citizenship.

Chantal Mouffe (2000) makes a similar argument about shifts in modern liberal democracies towards rights and liberties, and away from equality. She argues that the 'Third Way' proposed by the New Left is not really a new alternative but the capitulation of social democrats to neo-liberal hegemony. In doing so, she accuses the Left of giving up the fight for equality (Mouffe, 2000: 5-8). Nikolas Rose attributes this shift away from a focus on the social to the challenge of globalization and the decreasing autonomy of national governments and economies. He argues that society and citizens are no longer seen as holding mutual obligations mediated through the state; rather, individuals are solely responsible for themselves and their local communities (Rose, 1996: 330-337). Similarly, Janine Brodie (1996) states that the new citizenship is no longer based on national standards and the welfare state; rather, the new 'good citizen' embraces the obligation to provide for him or herself without making any demands on the state.

Arguably, the trends that are suggested by these authors have serious consequences for new immigrants and are particularly problematic in multi-ethnic states. One cannot assume equality between all individuals and groups within the state or, as state resources are withdrawn, between marginalized groups and individuals. It is generally more difficult for immigrants to access their rights and state services and to make their opinions, needs and demands known. Thus, the shift from mutual obligation and responsibilities between individuals and the state, towards individual self-responsibility makes it even more difficult for immigrants and other marginalized groups, who face more barriers to equality, to be 'good citizens.' As well, the focus appears to be on

liberty and equality, while the third pillar of citizenship – solidarity or community – is missing. Furthermore, if the goal is to create a national identity that is inclusive and allows for diversity, our image of the citizenry and the 'good citizen' must also reflect this diversity and reinforce the image of the community.

The Changing Nature of the 'Good Citizen'

How then does the literature define the good or ideal citizen? Iris Marion Young argues that universal citizenship implies that citizenship transcends difference (Young, 1990: 114). It focuses on similarities, as opposed to differences, and suggests that laws and policies should be applied to everyone in the same way. In other words, naming individuals as citizens is seen as somehow removing the differences between them by placing them all on equal ground as citizens who hold the same rights, obligations and, arguably, identity. Young refers to Benjamin Barber's argument that "citizenship by no means exhausts people's social identities, but it takes moral priority over all other social activities in a strong democracy" (cited in Young, 1990: 119). This argument, however, not only ignores the differences between individual citizens – for example, their experiences, class, education, position – but also ignores the situation of residents of the state who are not citizens and do not share these rights, obligations or identity, but still have a vested interest in policy creation and the future of the state.

Susan James argues that under liberal citizenship "good" citizens are physically, economically, and emotionally independent. She argues that this conceptualiztion of the good citizen seeks to exclude women who are, simply put, often less physically,

economically and emotionally independent than men (James, 1992: 50-55). Furthermore,

James posits that the very idea of emotional independence suggests that a good citizen is

an impartial citizen who does not bring his or her own experiences, identities or other

social bonds with them into the public sphere. This type of 'good citizen' does not speak

in his or her 'own' voice. These issues are being challenged by feminists, such as James

and Trimble. James, for example, argues that

> it is a mistake to see the oppositions around which liberal theory is organized as
> lined up like two rows of dominoes, each male term facing its inferior female
> counterpart with implacable hostility. The relations within and between pairs are
> ... much more diverse. (James, 1992: 49).

Linda Trimble (1998) challenges both the assumptions that politics cannot withstand the

challenge of identity and the view that diversity is essentially disruptive and

destabilizing. She argues that the assumption that citizens can put their own particular

interests aside is "unrealistic, exclusionary, repressive, and perhaps even undemocratic"

(Trimble, 1998: 207). If democracy is supposed to be the framework in which people's

views are discussed and democratic government the forum within which the people are

represented, then there should be as many people and as many voices as possible be

represented. In this sense, the inclusion of diversity and different voices has the potential

to improve the workings of democracy, rather than destroy them.

In *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (2000), Kymlicka and Norman review recent literature

on the inclusion of difference in politics, policy-making and state institutions. They

claim that "while difference-blind institutions purport to be neutral amongst different

ethno-cultural groups, they are in fact implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests and

identities of the majority group" (2000: 4). They conclude by stating that the failure of

state institutions in the task of recognizing identity and identity groups as legitimate actors and perspectives and recognizing and respecting people's culture and identity will have serious and negative consequences. Not only would such a failure bring the legitimacy of the system into question, it would also have a negative impact on people's self-respect and sense of agency within the political system (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 5). If we can no longer ignore difference (or do so to the detriment of both individuals and society at large), the issue becomes how diverse identities can be incorporated into both the concept and reality of citizenship in order to build inclusive communities. In doing so, they address one of the key issues raised in this project – the conflict between inclusion versus defining the borders of the nation – but still fail to provide concrete solutions or methods for determining which values are promoted by state actors and institutions. As well, this approach conflicts with neo-liberalism, which advocates a smaller state that is more removed from individual lives. A smaller state is , arguably, both less able and less interested in addressing the challenges posed by increasing diversity and the politics of identity, preferring to leave these issues to the self-regulation of individuals and markets. In the end, however, these challenges cannot be ignored and such an approach could potentially lead to both increased inequality and societal discord.

Intersecting Identities and the Inclusion of Others

Over the past two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the work on identity and the intersections between different identities by feminists and other scholars studying class, immigration and ethnicity. Among feminists, this work developed out of work on

the 'woman question.' Within the feminist movement conflicts arose surrounding the

identities of members. Many felt that it was necessary for members to see themselves

first of all as women, and to address the oppression of women before they addressed

other types of oppression women experienced. They felt that fighting against more than

one form of oppression would be divisive and diminish the legitimacy of the women's

movement. Many feminists, however, argued that this in itself was oppressive as it

ignored the other identities of women based on ethnicity, class and sexuality, which were

also sources of oppression and could not be ignored.[7] (e.g. Young, 1990: 300-1). "The

notion of essential feminist interests failed to place women's interests concretely in

historical social relation, assumed an essential opposition of interests between men and

women and hegemonized the concerns of white often middle-class women" (Anthias,

1991: 34). In the end, essentializing women's interests and identity proved to be more

dangerous than addressing the diversity of women and their experiences.

A similar issue arose within the study of citizenship, discussing whether an individual's

identity as a citizen should take precedence over all other identities and whether all other

identities should be left behind when one engages in public discourse. Is the inclusion of

other identities within public discourse a threat to citizenship? Kymlicka and Norman

point out that it is unrealistic to suggest that citizenship always take precedence over

other affiliations and forms of identity. People often leave their country of citizenship for

many different reasons, such as political or religious persecution, or for reasons of jobs

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[7] A great deal has been written on this debate. For example, see Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter* (1993); Marilyn Fry, "The Necessity of Differences: Constructing a Positive Category of Women," in *Signs* (1996); Diana Fuss, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference.* (1990); Elizabeth V. Spelman, *Inessential Woman* .(1998); Iris Marion Young, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory* (1990).

and love. As well, an increasing number of people worldwide are stateless and many

others hold dual or multiple citizenships. If we agree that it is unrealistic for citizen

identification to always have priority, the question becomes whether it should have

priority within public discourse, or is there a better way of defining citizenship? A way

of understanding how identities based on citizenship intersect with other identities is

needed. Such an approach would also recognize the value of incorporating diverse

identities and perspectives into public discourse in order to build a national community of

citizens.

Chantal Mouffe provides an interesting and useful alternative definition of citizenship.

She defines it as:

> A common political identity of persons who might be engaged in many different
> purposive enterprises and with differing conceptions of good, but who accept
> submissions to the rules prescribed. [...] What bonds them together is their
> common recognition of a set of ethico-political values. In this case, citizenship is
> not just one identity, as in liberalism, or the dominant identity that overrides all
> others, as in civic republicanism. It is an articulating principle that affects the
> different subject positions of the social agent. (Mouffe, 1993: 69-70)

Mouffe argues in favour of establishing a common political identity, namely that of

radical democratic citizens. In this vision, the unitary subject is the actor, but citizenship

becomes the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions. The crucial point is to view

all social and political aspects as consisting of socially constructed discourses, not as

absolutes. In this case, the construction of a common political identity as radical

democratic citizens can be seen as based on a radical interpretation of democracy. Such

an interpretation implies that all citizens embrace the principles of both liberty and

equality and embrace the tension inherent between these two principles and within

modern liberal democracies (Mouffe, 2000). In other words, what is needed is a political community that does not assert the common good, or strongly defines the characteristics of its citizenry, but is still able to act as a bond or framework within which people, as citizens, can discuss and debate the common concerns that bring them together. The key to the construction of this political community is the act of submission to the prescribed rules, or common set of ethico-political values, which coincide with the principles of modern democracy and can be understood as the underlying principles of the political regime that provide the 'grammar' for citizens' conduct and which govern the debate (Mouffe, 1993: 84). The question of what these values are and how the rules are determined (and by whom) remains unanswered. Also, if a significant role for the state can be assumed, then how can the values and rules promoted by the state be uncovered?

This reconstruction of citizenship opens up new possibilities for understanding the interaction between different identities, as well as proposing options for making citizenship identity more inclusive within a state. The potential problem arises, however, when new members of a society, such as immigrants, do not share or are viewed as not sharing the same set of values, or when alternative values systems arise within the state. In certain instances, this problem becomes apparent in the conflict between western democracies based on liberty and equality (to varying degrees), the values of some indigenous or colonized peoples, and/or certain interpretations of Islam that are less individualistic, less focused on liberty, and hold a different basis for the rule of law. In this case, how can the differing value systems be reconciled and, until they are reconciled, how does discussion and community building take place?

James Tully, in *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity* (1995), uses an aboriginal statue, "the spirit of Haida Gwaii" to suggest a new framework for understanding the role of identity in politics. The statue shows a number of different subjects in a canoe. They are intertwined, interdependent and overlapping. The members of the canoe are equals engaged in dialogue and speaking from their own experiences and perspectives, while also learning and listening to each other. The keys to the statue and this model for politics are self-respect and respect for other participants. Tully argues that we can no longer view cultures, or identities, as distinct and clearly defined; rather, we need to find ways of discovering how they are overlapping, interdependent and intertwined (Tully, 1995: 10). In doing so, he poses a significant challenge to the idea that disunity makes us weak and vulnerable, arguing that we can build strength by weaving together the diverse threads, rather than by trying to impose uniformity (Tully, 1995: 197).

Charles Taylor offers another variation on this theme. In his study of identity in Canada, he calls for an appreciation of Canada's 'deep diversity,' which entails an appreciation of diversity in politics, as opposed to the suppression of it. With reference to Canada, he argues that a united federation must be built upon a foundation of 'deep diversity' in which pluralities of ways of belonging are accepted (Taylor, 1993: 183). Once again, however, the belief in a diverse society is present, but is missing a framework that explains how we can make this happen. Also, Taylor points out that while identity politics threaten the Canadian federation at present, Canadians have never been closer in

the sharing of values (Taylor, 1993: 156). This raises the following question: if identity poses a problem even when the basic values are shared, how can we go about bridging differences in value systems and creating common ground?

Jeremy Waldron (2000) addresses this problem, stating that "in society we can't choose to only associate or come to terms with people who are similar to us" (173). He argues that identity, in diverse societies, cannot be the only argument for adopting or changing policies or the values of the society; instead, arguments must be presented that go beyond claims of identity. In this case, identity is presented as a factor that does not allow for compromise because accommodation implies a loss of respect for the individual or group's identity. What is needed, Waldron argues, is a rationalization of identity based claims. As noted, identity can be a powerful tool for advancing claims to the state. The danger, however, is the potential inability to compromise and discuss. By using the 'identity card' as a last resort in a rational discussion, some of these problems might be avoided. In any case, it appears that diversity can work or works best if there is a basic set of common values setting the framework so that discussions can take place across differences.

This literature points to the importance of inclusive and diverse political communities. In doing so, it challenges the more exclusive ideas of nation and the importance of organizing society around one central identity. However, even the models of citizenship that allow for greater diversity return to a set of shared values as the basis for political community assuming that it is possible to achieve a common set of values. This

literature, however, is quite abstract and does not provide a methodology for determining

the dominant value system nor does it provide strategies for changing that value system

in order to become more inclusive.

The Borders of Citizenship

As mentioned, another emerging area of study within citizenship moves away from

national citizenship to explore the idea of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism.

Globalization, global migration and transnationalism challenge traditional understandings

of citizenship as new actors and factors enter the discussion, diversity increases, and geo-

political units become larger and more complex. Kymlicka and Norman question

whether a common identity based on citizenship actually exists now or ever has existed

within nation-states (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 37). If such an identity does exist,

global forces currently provide a serious challenge to that identity. The existence of

citizenship-based identity in Western countries is most likely to be based on the

acceptance of a set of shared social and political values based on the Western liberal

tradition. The increasing diversity among migrants to Western states challenges the

existing consensus (to the extent that it ever existed), as do global capitalist forces and

supra-national bodies and agreements. Here, the focus is on the movement of an

increasingly large number of people, particularly from third world to first world countries

and the challenges they pose to the idea of a boundary on citizenship affiliations and the

consensus of western values within these states. These problems are compounded when

the different types of residence permits and rights are accorded to people living within a

state and the new challenge of international political communities. Two examples of this

are found in the European Union (EU). On the one had, the EU is now issuing European

passports, but on the other hand has the Schengen agreement, which attempts to further

control entry into Europe, creating what some people call 'Fortress Europe,' vis á vis the

global south. The importance of the relationship between citizenship and migration

becomes apparent when we understand that "citizenship in a nation-state is an exclusive

status that confers on the individual rights and privileges within national boundaries"

(Soysal, 1994: 120). Therefore, when we look at citizenship, we also need to look at the

ability of residents to enter and leave states if they do not hold citizenship.

Castles and Miller (1993) argue that 'migration can change demographic, economic and

social structures, and bring a new diversity, which often brings into question national

identity" (3). They show that in the period following the Second World War and in the

1980s immigration increased considerably and began to affect more countries around the

world. The two main political issues evolving from these trends are regulation of

immigration and the increasing level of ethnic diversity within states. As well, they point

out that the ways in which states attempt to regulate migration and their willingness to

grant citizenship to migrants are often indicators of how that country views diversity and

how well equipped it is to handle it (Castles and Miller, 1993: 13-15). This suggests that

examining immigration and citizenship policy can give significant insights into the state

culture of a country with regards to ethnicity and diversity.

Yasmeen Abu-Laban, however, points out that new work on citizenship only gives

limited attention to migration, focusing on substantive equality rather than on the uneven

manner in which citizenship is granted to migrants (Abu-Laban, 2000). In the post-war

period, both Europe and Canada became major destinations for migrants and immigration

was increasingly seen as a problem that needed to be controlled. While efforts to control

immigration also reflected concerns over nationalism, ethnicity, labour flows, and the

extension of rights, the idea of immigration as a 'problem' is useful particularly when it is

connected to issues of citizenship and identity. Abu-Laban, for example, argues that the

issue of migration is of central importance to work on citizenship as it is here that

citizenship is ultimately real and relevant (Abu-Laban, 2000). The ability to claim legal,

political and social rights associated with full citizenship is not guaranteed to all

migrants. Hence, we need to discuss citizenship not only in terms of rights and

participation, but also in terms of inequality: who does hold rights and who is not able to

participate? What barriers exist to participation? How are limitations on the extension of

citizenship rights justified?

These questions, in turn, raise further important questions about who is excluded from

discussions in citizenship theory when citizenship is related to identity, as a unifying

force for states, and posited as the primary framework within which rights, obligations

and participation are structured. Where are the (new) immigrants in these discussions?

They most often do not hold citizenship, have limited (if any) voting powers, hold

differentiated rights and obligations, and only have access to certain state benefits and

services. The primary issue in this research project revolves around how states define

who belongs and who does not, how its policies construct national identity, and how

these values are conveyed to new members. Migration and the state's treatment of

migrants is central to this discussion. As Abu-Laban suggests, "valuing difference in

liberal democracies is actually *dependent* on discourses valuing immigration" (Abu-

Laban, 2000: 519).

Some theorists are attempting to theorize a form of citizenship that stretches beyond

national borders in order to make it more inclusive and friendly towards migrants. They

suggest that confining citizenship to national borders continues the process of including

and excluding and maintains the power of privileged groups and states. Ruth Lister

(1997), for example, argues that the exploration of the idea of global citizenship and

global governance is prompted by internal pressures calling for increased diversity and

external pressures, such as globalization and international agreements, challenging the

ability of nation-states to clearly define their members. According to Lister, a global

governance structure that can reinforce the rights and responsibilities of the global citizen

is necessary. In order for this to succeed, however, states must bind together to regulate

capital and force their institutions to be accountable for rights infringements (Lister,

1997).

Nira Yuval-Davis (1999) offers a critique of citizenship that is similar to her critique of

nationalism. She argues that citizenship based on the nation-state is gendered,

heterosexist, raced and classed. She suggests defining citizenship in a manner that is not

limited to the nation-state in order to better understand the relationship between women,

people, politics and society (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 120). In this sense citizenship needs to

be understood as a "multi-layered construct, in which one's citizenship in collectivities in

the different layers – local, ethnic, national, state, cross- or trans-state, and supra-state, is

affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each

layer in a specific historical context" (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 122). Yuval-Davis' approach

is useful in that it is historically specific and tries to expand the boundaries of citizenship,

as well as by connecting the very local identities of individuals with the larger context

within which they operate. At the same time, however, her definition of citizenship is so

broad that it becomes difficult to reconcile the multi-layered nature of contemporary

citizenship with the concrete realities of migrants, in which citizenship remains a legal

status attributed to individuals by states. Regardless of the diverse loyalties and identities

held by individuals, they still carry a specific passport, reside in a particular location and

are bound by their rules.

Authors such as Lister and Yuval-Davis represent a shift in the theorizing of citizenship

from one based on nationality to one based on personhood regardless of nationality.

Arguably, the concept of non-state based citizenship is still in the early stages of

theorizing and is still very ambiguous and utopian (Abu-Laban, 2000: 517). However, as

Soysal argues

> It is essential to recognize that national citizenship is no longer an adequate
> concept upon which to base a perceptive narrative of membership in the post-war
> era. Post-national formulations of membership challenge us to refurbish our
> definitions and theoretical vistas of and about citizenship and the nation-state.
> (Soysal, 1994: 167).

Thus, we need to continue to look at this issue and conceptualize how citizenship and

rights can take on a de-territorialized form, while ensuring that this is done at a level

which furthers the debates and concerns about citizenship at the national level as well. At

the same time, we need to recognize that even international documents, such as the UN

Declaration of Human Rights, remain focused on individuals as citizens of states and, in

many ways, reinforce the importance of state borders and sovereignty within a global

context.

Without a global structure of governance, such as the one suggested by Lister (1997), to

play the role of the state or at least its function of protecting its citizens from rights

abuses, moving citizenship beyond national borders at a theoretical level does not solve

the real problems within citizenship theory. As well, these theories assume prematurely

that the nation-state is dead and no longer a relevant unit of study. Even within the

European Union, the best example of something approaching a transnational state that

exists today, members continue to carry passports that state their nationality and country

of citizenship, although these passports are European in design and appearance. As well,

the current process of creating and ratifying a European constitution reflects the

continuing importance of national concerns. Globally, the nation-state is under new

pressures and is no longer as autonomous an actor as it was once. This is demonstrated

by an enduring need for immigrant labour and how the role of such non-citizen workers

and their relationship with their 'homes' impact our understanding of contemporary

forms of citizenship and national identity. Despite the challenges faced by the nation-

state, however, it remains an important site of study as it continues to hold the majority of

control over issues of immigration and citizenship, and controls the ways in which the

identity of the members of the state are constructed and the manner and extent to which

immigrants play a significant and integrated role in society. The goal of this project,

therefore, is to address these issues by investigating how the values underpinning both the physical and imagined borders of the nation are defined by the state actors and institutions themselves.

State Culture: An Alternative Framework

The discussion in this chapter on the debates, trends and issues within the literature on nationalism and citizenship reveals significant challenges. The previous sections raise a number of problems that need to be addressed in order to create an approach to exploring national identity and culture within stable developed Western states. These points and issues help conceptualize the concept of state culture and the framework for understanding it. It is now possible to outline the main issues at stake and how the concept of state culture can contribute to and complement these bodies of literature. This section of this chapter relates the literature above to the concept of state culture and develops a series of questions that inform the exposition of state culture in Canada and Sweden in the subsequent chapters.

The bodies of literature on nationalism and citizenship contain both strengths and weaknesses that inform concept of state culture and the methodological framework for operationalizing it. The discussion of nationalism above raises three problems within the literature that makes using the concept of nationalism to explore contemporary constructions of national identity in Western states difficult. First, the idea of nationalism is connected to political mass movements and the idea of nationalism holds negative connotations, particularly in Western Europe. Second, the construction of national

identity remains tied to the idea of ethnicity. This, although challenged by feminist

scholars, has a tendency towards exclusive as opposed to inclusive policy. Finally, the

literature on nationalism tends to focus on placing nationalisms within predefined

categories, obscuring the differences between nationalisms and their contexts. The

literature, however, also has a number of strengths. Namely, it reinforces the enduring

importance of building communities based on identity and emphasizes the central role of

the state in the construction and maintenance of identity.

The literature on citizenship is vast and varied and encompasses many different themes.

The main issues explored in this literature review dealt with the problems of the universal

citizen, the relationship between citizens and the state, the characteristics of the good

citizen, the intersections of identities, and the possibility of postnational or transnational

citizenship. Within these issues a number of recurring problems and trends were

identified that are significant for this project. First, within mainstream citizenship theory

there is an assumption that 'good citizens' hold characteristics that can be viewed as

masculine and that other identities, bonds, or emotional attachments do not belong in the

public sphere, despite the fact that these identities and issues are fundamental to the

modern construction of citizenship. Second, there appears to be a shift occurring within

the politics of citizenship towards a more individualistic and liberal model within which

citizens are responsible for caring for themselves and are less dependent on the state.

This reduces the importance of solidarity and community within citizenship. Third,

although citizenship is discussed as a factor that builds identity and acts as a unifier, there

is little discussion of how this is accomplished. Finally, mainstream citizenship theory

tends to overlook the position of migrants who do not have the same rights as citizens and for whom citizenship (or the lack of it) has very real consequences in their daily life and ability to participate in the public sphere. In this sense, citizenship and citizenship theory tend, like nationalism, to be exclusive projects in which only those who belong hold rights and benefits. One of the main strengths of this literature, however, is the presence of community and solidarity as central tenets of citizenship. This component has recently been overshadowed, however, by the emphasis on rights and liberty at the expense of substantive equality and community. One of the challenges emerging from this literature, then, is the need to bring these aspects back into the discussion.

The major contribution from these literatures is found in the work by feminist scholars, particularly that which emphasizes intersectionality and context. These challenges to the mainstream literature recognize the importance of flexibility and accommodating difference, and contest the historically essentialized categories of nation and citizen. Thus, the feminist work on citizenship and nationalism points to the importance of understanding and appreciating difference when constructing the boundaries of communities of identity. A more complex and subtle mechanism for addressing the issue of how identity is constructed and revealing the values underlying different identities is required. An examination of how gender differences are treated within state policies, literature and discourses, therefore, can be viewed as an indicator of the willingness and openness of that community to tolerate or even embrace difference and diversity as a component of identity. The concept of state culture aims to bring these debates to a more concrete level in order to explore how these issues are played out in specific states.

Finally, neither the literature on nationalism or on citizenship satisfactorily addresses the issue of immigration and inclusion of new members in the community. Through state culture, we can explore these issues through the role of the state in constructing identity vis a vis immigration and the literature distributed to new members.

As stated in Chapter One, this project seeks to develop the concept of state culture and a methodology for investigating it. While this approach builds on the previous work of neo-institutionalists and feminist theory, it represents an original contribution. State culture is defined as the values put forward by states, through different state actors and institutions, as represented in their policies, practices and literature. As such, via these products and practices, state culture conveys the values and characteristics that help define the nation and the 'good' citizen. State culture provides an alternative and complementary approach to interrogating the construction of identity at the state level. While complementing and building upon the nationalism and citizenship literatures, it also provides an alternative approach for obtaining a clear understanding of how the borders of the nation are defined by the state through the values that state actors and institutions project to new immigrants and what these say abut the community and the characteristics of the good citizen.

The concept of state culture aims to overcome some of the shortcomings of theorizing on nationalism and citizenship with regards to investigating the values underpinning the nation and citizenship at a particular point in time. The central role of the state, as conveyed by the literature on nationalism, as well as the connection between citizens and

the state, as conveyed by the literature on citizenship, are brought together. The focus on context, brought forward by feminist scholars, becomes central to understanding the different values and ideologies that permeate specific state cultures. In doing so, this alternative concept avoids some of the potential pitfalls of nationalism and citizenship by avoiding their typologies and normative assumptions. The contexts within which the contemporary state cultures of Canada and Sweden developed are explored in the next two chapters.

The significance of addressing diversity and intersectionality, as raised by feminist critiques of nationalism and citizenship, also plays a central role in understanding and evaluating the emergent forms of state culture. These concerns are addressed in the methodological framework for exploring state culture outlined below. Finally, the application of state culture to the Canadian and Swedish case studies addresses the omission of immigrants and immigration from theorizing on nationalism and citizenship by focusing explicitly on immigration policies and the state literature for new arrivals. As argued in the previous chapter, immigration provides the common ground for the comparative study of state culture.

The issues and questions arising from the reviews of literature on nationalism and citizenship inform a list of questions that provide a framework or starting point for a comparative analysis of state culture in different contexts. Through the literature on nationalism, three entry points into the exploration of identity at a state level become apparent. First, the historical, social, economic and political context within which the

identity has developed and currently exists must be taken into consideration. Second, the

role of ethnicity must be carefully examined, including civic traits related to culture.

Third, the ways in which membership in the state is defined and demarcated need to be

clearly outlined. These are reflected in questions regarding the historical and economic

context and the processes of immigration and integration. The literature on citizenship

and its focus on the relationships between individuals, state and society, is also

incorporated into the questions, as are issues related to individual rights and

responsibilities, and the interplay between the three pillars of citizenship – liberty,

equality and solidarity. The framework also addresses concerns raised by feminist

scholars regarding the traditional conceptualizations of nationalism and citizenship, and

by drawing attention to the portrayal of gender roles and relationships as indicative of a

willingness to embrace difference. Concerns over context are attended to through the

analysis of historical and economic context. Intersectionality is incorporated by

examining economic relationships, ethnicity and gender roles. Thus the framework,

expressed in the questions below, emerges from the literature discussed in this chapter

and strives to address some of its problems.

The methodological framework for analyzing state culture, therefore, can be

conceptualized as follows:

- How is the historical and economic context of nation-building presented?
- How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?
- How is the democratic process represented?
- How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?
- How are individual rights and responsibilities represented?
- How are males, females and children represented?
- How is the society of the country represented?
- Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?

Applying these questions to the state policies on immigration and identity, as well as to

the literature produced for new immigrants and citizens by the state, allows for the

elucidation of the state culture of different countries. This, in turn, provides an accurate

depiction of the values conveyed to new members of the political community. This

framework, used in combination with aspects of critical discourse analysis as discussed in

Chapter One, provides an alternative and complementary mechanism for understanding

the construction of identity and community in Western, developed states and reveals the

values that shape the borders of the nation. The following chapters begin the process of

applying the framework and concept of state culture to Canada and Sweden; first by

examining the historical and contemporary context of each country and then by

examining state literature for new immigrants.

CHAPTER THREE

Canada: Unity and Diversity

Introduction

Although Canada as a state has a much shorter history than does Sweden, it is marked by

ethnic and linguistic conflict and the search for identity. Whereas Sweden devoted much

of its history to establishing and protecting its territorial borders and the creation of the

Swedish nation-state, conflicts in Canada have emerged through efforts to establish and

maintain cultural boundaries, both within the country and with regards to external

influences. The Canadian conflicts about identity revolved around state efforts to

assimilate or accommodate the French-speaking and Aboriginal populations, depending

on one's perspective and the historical time period. The influx of diverse groups of

immigrants throughout the twentieth century added a new level to the discourse

surrounding identity and identity construction in Canada. In some ways, the prior

identity conflicts created space for immigrants to challenge the dominant identities and

notions of dualism.

This chapter begins by exploring the contested nature of identity in Canada and the

Canadian state's efforts to regulate identity-related conflicts and project certain values

and characteristics to the population via state culture. The importance of providing the

context within which state culture lives becomes apparent. In doing so, this chapter

briefly touches on many aspects of Canadian history, all of which are worthy of further

study. The constraints of this project, however, necessitate a summary overview in order

to cover a wide variety of factors that influence the context for current state culture in

Canada. Thus, tracing the shifting nature of discourses in Canada regarding identity, nation-building and immigration reveals the context from which current state culture emerges and the historical 'baggage' it carries. The current state culture of Canada does not exist separate from its past, but reflects both the past and changing social and political values.

The second section of this chapter looks specifically at federal immigration and integration policy. Although immigration is technically a shared area of federal/provincial jurisdiction, this study focuses on the federal policies as the aim is to show how they reflect attempts to convey national values. Through immigration policy, the boundaries and goals of state policy become clear. It is here that we can see the efforts of state agencies and actors to control who may belong to the Canadian political community and what values are viewed as central to belonging to that community. The chapter concludes by drawing out the values central to contemporary state culture in Canada using the methodological framework established in Chapter Two. These findings provide an initial understanding of the state culture of Canada and the context for the literature analysis in Chapter Five.

The Canadian state has always played an important role in shaping Canadian identity and regulating identity-based conflicts. For example, Richard Gwyn calls Canada a 'state-nation' reflecting the dominant role of the state in nation-building, while Janine Brodie states that "the process of state-directed identity construction has intensified over time" (Brodie, 2002a: 163). Further, an analysis of immigration and immigration policy gives

insights into the values of the Canadian state and the attempts of the state to create a

sense of a Canadian 'us' in relation to the 'them' outside our borders. Over the past

century, the official Canadian state culture has shifted from one based largely on

ethnicity, to one based on ideas of tolerance and multiculturalism as reflected in changing

immigration and cultural policies. This new state culture of Canada, however, is in

conflict with the dominance of neo-liberal ideology in recent decades, which has focused

on the costs of immigration – rather than the contribution of immigrants – and has

reduced funding for governmental programs aimed at promoting cultural understanding,

reducing racism, and assisting immigrants. In Canada, unlike in Sweden, immigration

has always been central to nation-building (e.g. Li, 2003). In both countries, however,

the discourse surrounding immigration is a key to understanding the state culture of each

country. The discourses around immigration reveal the openness (or lack of openness) of

a country to 'outsiders', the characteristics that are viewed as desirable among potential

new members, and reflect state culture through key values that state agencies and actors

define as central to being 'Canadian.' This chapter argues that, recently, the state culture

promoted by the Canadian government, as seen in its policy documents and literature on

immigration, is strongly influenced by neo-liberalism and external pressures. These

forces have led to the creation of a conflicted state culture in Canada. Canada appears to

be torn between the neo-liberal ideas of fiscal responsibility, smaller government and

individual self-reliance, and the idea of a 'caring, sharing and tolerant' multicultural

Canada that requires a strong welfare state and greater levels of state involvement in all

areas of life.

The 'Problem' with being Canadian

Identity has been described as a Canadian national obsession. At times, Canadians appear to give far more thought to what it means to 'be Canadian' than people in other countries. Part of this stems from Canada's proximity to the United States of America and the strong similarities between American and English-Canadian culture. Another aspect of the difficulties in defining what it means to be Canadian stems from the composition and history of Canada. As discussed below, the historical presence of two 'founding' nations – the English and French – combined with Aboriginal nations and other immigrant groups was a serious challenge to state efforts to unify the country around one identity. Not only does Canada not have a relatively ethnically homogenous population or a common language, among the different groups there also exist different understandings of the country's history and future.

Hartz and Horowitz use fragment theory to explain Canadian political culture. They argue that the character of new nations, such as Canada and the United States, was determined largely by the values of the immigrants who first settled there. This accounts for both the similarities and differences between the two countries, with Canada having a more Conservative element due to the French colonial fragment, as well as being influenced by the socialism of early 20th Century British immigrants (Bell, 1992: 16-20). Their theory tells one part of the story, but ignores the contribution of Aboriginal peoples and more recent immigrants to the development of Canadian political culture. Brodie, alternatively, suggests that Canada consists of three co-dependent nations with three distinct narratives – English-Canadian, French-Canadian, and Aboriginal (Brodie, 2002a:

163). Canadian politics has historically been shaped by these three different understandings of the country, its past, its future, and the relationship between the various others within its borders. Since Confederation, rising levels of increasingly diverse immigration – in particular non-European immigration – added a new set of 'others' to the Canadian equation. More recent immigrants are removed from the history of French-English conflicts and the colonization of Aboriginal peoples and understand Canada in yet another way. At the same time, immigrants played, and continue to play, an important role in shaping the values underpinning state culture of Canada. Initially, Canadian state culture was shaped by a desire to exclude certain groups, based on racial characteristics, in order to maintain a British or Northern European ethnic identity. Later, Canada shifted towards a more multicultural identity that has been used to differentiate Canadians from Americans. Today, the "myth of tolerance" plays an important role (e.g. Mackey, 2000), although shifts since September 11 and rising anti-immigrant attitudes throughout the 1990s seriously challenged the myth of Canada as tolerant.

The myth of Canada as a 'tolerant' nation is a myth that speaks from one perspective within Canada, but not all perspectives. Aboriginal peoples, arguably, did not find the process of land acquisition and colonization kind or tolerant. French-Canadians, subjected to repeated attempts by the Canadian government to assimilate them, would probably also challenge this myth, as would many early non-French and non-English immigrants. As Eva Mackey (2002) notes, the reiteration of the myth of tolerance has permeated Canadian nation building over the past 100 years. 'Others,' however, see the history of Canada not as one of tolerance but rather one of confrontation (23-24). As

well, the idea of 'tolerance' itself is problematic as it suggests that one group has the

power to tolerate the differences of others who are outside of the group and display

different norms of behaviour. Thus, tolerance often implies 'acceptance' of difference

without addressing the power relations between different groups and the presence of

racism and discrimination within Canadian society and politics.

Since the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, Canada has witnessed a renewed debate

over its perceived tolerance, particularly in relation to the United States. Edward

Greenspan, in the *Globe and Mail*, takes up the issue of Canadian tolerance arguing that

while Canadians have changed since the Trudeau years, they have embraced the 'greatest

legacy of that era: a tolerant, multicultural Canada" (2001a). He writes:

> We feel attached to Canada because we like the smell of it. It is an affair of
> the heart. The process is ephemeral, not mechanical, but no less real ...
> Today's nationalism is one of inclusion, not exclusion – a self-confident
> nationalism that allows us to pursue our own interests, without feeling the
> need to define ourselves against others. (Greenspan, 2001a)

In an article a few weeks later, he pursues this argument further in response to claims that

Canada is becoming more intolerant put forward by the Canadian Arab Foundation, the

Canadian Islamic Congress and New Democrat Party leader Alexa McDonough. He

points to an opinion poll that showed that more than 80% of Canadians feared a backlash

against Arab and Muslim Canadians after 9/11 and another poll in which Canadians

rejected the idea of a moratorium on Arab and Muslim immigration (Greenspan, 2002b).

He concludes by stating that "multiculturalism is not just a reality in Canada but a

cornerstone of our national identity. Canadians understand that our skill at

accommodating diversity represents both an advancement of which we can be proud and

a competitive edge in a global economy" (Greenspan, 2002b). Former Prime Minister

Chrétien would probably agree. In an interview with journalist John Lloyd in late 2002,

Chrétien was asked "If a country puts all cultures within it on the same level, what is this

country's identity?" Mr. Chrétien's response: "Multicultural! Its identity is

multicultural." (Lloyd, 2003).

The myth of a multicultural and tolerant Canada dominates state and media discourses,

but the relevance of this myth for the 'average' Canadian is up for debate. Greenspan

cites polls throughout the 1990s that showed Canadians by a wide margin described

tolerance and multiculturalism as the country's greatest attributes (2002a). His

conclusion: "tolerance has become as much a part of our national identity as the maple

leaf itself." A 2002 poll conducted for the *National Post* and Global TV, however,

showed very different results. When asked an open question on what they thought made

Canada different, the highest percentage of respondents stated health care (19%), love of

hockey (13%) and geography (12.6%). The idea of Canada as equated with tolerance and

multiculturalism did not even make the list (*National Post*, September 9, 2002). Also, the

continuing threat of terrorism has led some to ask if Canada is too tolerant, or if

tolerance, in itself, is a positive characteristic.

This project, however, does not seek to answer the question of what is means to be

Canadian nor does it seek to develop a list of concrete characteristics and attributes that

are (or should be) distinctly Canadian. Instead, it seeks to identify the key values

identified by state actors and institutions as being central to Canadian identity, the

ideological assumptions underpinning these values, and how they are revealed and

reflected within Canadian immigration policy and the literature for new immigrants. This

chapter explores the evolution of Canadian state culture over the past century showing

that a state culture has developed in Canada that enshrines the myths mentioned above –

the idea of a caring, sharing, tolerant and multicultural Canada. This culture, however,

currently operates within the ideological and economic confines of neo-liberalism, which

suggests a contradiction between the different values being put forward by state actors.

Building a 'Better, British-Canada'

In Canada, it has generally been accepted that it was the role of the state to foster national

identity (Mackey, 2002: 9). This is traced back the first national policy aimed at

developing the country economically. Mackey argues that Canadian studies of

nationalism often sought to define characteristics of Canada and Canadians so that they

could be protected and defended (2002: 11-12). This represents a type of 'strategic

essentialism' that places the 'other' outside of Canada and creates an image of a

homogenous, united population and a state innocent of marginalisation (Mackay, 2002:

12). The presence of diverse populations in Canada from the outset (Aboriginals, French,

English, and other immigrant groups) made it extremely difficult for the Canadian state to

construct a myth of a homogenous nation-state in the true sense of the term. Instead, over

time the state developed a pluralist national identity as a flexible strategy for the

management of a diverse population. This required an interventionist state that

constantly enacted policies to intervene in the production of identity and culture within

the territorial borders of the state (Mackey, 2002: 13).

Outside of Quebec, the perceived threat to a Canadian identity has traditionally been

viewed as Quebec. For British settlers, the presence of the French colony was a continual

threat to the dominance of British values and institutions in Canada. For the French,

however, the presence of the English was also seen as a threat, which was exacerbated as

the English and anglicized immigrant population in Canada grew and achieved political

dominance. One of the first attempts by the British to forcibly assimilate the French

settlers and thereby eliminate the French threat was the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*,

which aimed to abolish the legal status and privileges of the Catholic Church, eliminate

the seigniorial system, and replace civil law with common law. However, "the first

colonial Governor quickly concluded that this assimilationist strategy could not succeed,

and the Proclamation was never enforced" (McRoberts, 1997: 4). Twelve years later, the

official policy took a dramatic shift and the *Quebec Act* revoked the principles of the

Royal Proclamation by recognizing the seigniorial system, civil law, and the freedom to

practice Catholicism. As such, it became the basis for arguments on dualism that

continue to play an important role in contemporary Canadian politics (McRoberts, 1997:

4). The *Constitution Act of 1791* reinforced dualism by dividing the British territory into

Upper and Lower Canada and providing Quebec with its territorial boundaries.

In 1837, a series of rebellions led to Britain appointing Lord Durham, Governor-General

of all British-America, to determine the cause of the "insurrections" and prescribe

solutions to ensure that it would not happen again. In his Report (1839), Durham

determined that French-English dualism was at the heart of the conflict and

recommended that Upper and Lower Canada be united under a single government with a limited franchise and "responsible" government (McRoberts, 1997: 5-6). Durham believed that the numbers of British would grow through immigration giving them a majority which could be used as part of a general policy to assimilate French-Canadians and obliterate their culture. Ironically, French Canadians used their initial majority to further protect their language and institutions, deepening the divide between British and French Canada (McRoberts, 1997: 5-9).

The French-English conflict that continues to play an important role in Canadian politics developed roots over a 200 year period. The strength of the French or Quebeçois identity and its resistance to assimilation has outlived colonialism and the political legitimacy of assimilationist politics. While the debate continues on similar lines, today it occurs within a changed political context – one of pluralism, multiculturalism, and linguistic and cultural rights. Today, the issue is the integration of immigrants (non-British, non-French, and non-Aboriginal) into the dominant French and English cultures, as well as the accommodation of French Canadians and Aboriginals within Canada as a whole.

Canada's ethnic differences were integrated through a federal settlement in the *British North America (BNA) Act of 1867*, at which time Canada was divided in terms of governmental bodies and ethnicity and language (Karmis and Gagnon 2001, 145). Under the BNA Act (now called the *Constitution Act of 1867*) Canada was created as a modern federal government in order to accommodate distinct national differences (Burgess, 2001: 257). However, as McRoberts (1997) points out, "federalism was the price of

Confederation" demanded by the French in order to ensure their protection and gain their

support (10). The character and collective identity of Canada under the BNA Act

remained unclear (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 147). The *BNA Act*, similar to many of

Canada's defining policies, was based on compromise and therefore failed to define

Canada culturally. Instead, it attempted to regulate ethnic conflict. This is significant,

because Canada continues to adopt policies that aim at regulating identity and identity

based conflicts in an effort to shape Canadian identity.

Another challenge to the construction of a pan-Canadian identity has been the continuing

presence of a significant Aboriginal population. Before the Europeans arrived, Aboriginal

peoples inhabited the territory today called Canada. Canada is a 'settler society,' distinct

from colonies of exploitation (Stasiulus and Yuval-Davis, 1995). It was colonized by

settlers who became dominant politically, economically, and in terms of population. The

intention in Canada was to build an overseas extension or replica of British society

(Stasiulus and Jhappan, 1995: 97). In such a context, 'nations' in settler societies must

necessarily be seen by the population as constructed – they cannot be viewed as an

essentialized phenomenon (Stasiulus and Yuval-Davis, 1995: 19). As a settler society,

the role and presence of Aboriginal peoples has often been relegated to the margins of

Canadian history, politics and nation-building. Canadian historical accounts often give

Aboriginals a peripheral role; focusing instead on European exploration, European

settlement, and European nation-building in Canada. The exclusion of Aboriginal

peoples from Canadian nation-building projects, narratives and mythology remains

contentious and controversial. While the earliest constitutional documents, such as the

Royal Proclamation of 1763, treat Aboriginal groups as equal nations, in general the British and Canadian governments have treated them in a subordinate manner. Throughout Canadian history, the evidence points towards a policy of forced integration or assimilation. Policy, in general, has been based on the assumption that the Aboriginal factor would eventually disappear. This policy direction culminated in Prime Minister Trudeau's *White Paper on Indians in 1969*, which aimed to eliminate the Indian Act and all privileges for status Indians. The proposal was eventually withdrawn in the face of the mobilization of the Aboriginal community. Their response to the *White Paper* can be seen as marking the beginning of a more unified and vocal Aboriginal voice in Canadian politics.

The combined mobilization of Aboriginal and Quebec nationalisms since the late 1960s has provided a serious challenge to the way in which the Canadian state attempted to create unity and a state culture. As Stasiulus and Jhappan noted in 1995, "the current politics surrounding racial and ethnic diversity in contemporary Canada is a lesson in how settler societies and the legitimacy around racial/ethnic hierarchies eventually come undone" (1995: 119-120). In addition to the movements of Aboriginals and Quebecois for increased rights and recognition, the mobilization of the non-French, non-English and non-Aboriginal community – the 'immigrant' community – constituted a third force that challenged a British notion of what it meant to be Canadian. With all of these voices vying to be heard and recognized, post-war Canadian governments were faced with the challenging task of creating a state culture that could accommodate difference and still unify the country.

Envisioning a New Canada

During the twentieth century, the character of the Canadian state began to change as it became increasingly independent of Britain and developed its own institutions, structures, and symbols, as well as a welfare state based on Keynesian principles. The issue of conscription during the First and Second World Wars reinforced the English/French divide in Canadian politics. The arrival of more immigrants from diverse backgrounds following the Second World War and the presence of the American cultural threat led to a period of nation-building in Canada during which political and academic elites sought to create a strong Canadian identity (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 148). This process began, in some ways, with the *Statute of Westminster in 1931*, which confirmed Canada's political independence from Britain. It is also evident in the creation of a *Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947*, with the Supreme Court of Canada becoming the final court of appeal in 1949 (instead of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain), and the appointment of the first Canadian governor-general in 1952. During this time period Ottawa began to develop a system of social programs based on the idea that all Canadians as citizens are entitled to certain minimum benefits regardless of where they live. The adoption of the current Canadian flag in 1965 with the red maple leaf instead of the Red Ensign is very symbolic of this transformation. As discussed below, the debate and conflict during the 1960s surrounding the adoption of these national symbols reflected the conflict surrounding the construction of a Canadian identity distinct from that of Britain.

The building of the Canadian welfare state in the post-war years provides further evidence of the re-imagining of the Canadian community. This process was based on the earlier foundations dating back to Confederation, but represented some significant shifts in how Canadians thought about social policy. Initially, as demonstrated by the BNA Act, social policy was viewed as a local and largely private concern, in which social assistance should be targeted to groups, conditional, for example, upon the applicant engaging in certain civic activities (Rice and Prince, 2000: 34-6). At the beginning of the 20th Century, however, there was a growing concern with social justice. This concern, combined with an increasingly urban population, led to increased provincial involvement and, between 1914 and 1939, the provincial governments made significant advances in the areas of Workers Compensation, mothers' allowances for poor women, and minimum wage laws (Rice and Prince, 2000: 40-1). Although the actual programs varied across the country, together they represent a shift from social policy aimed at poor relief to ideas of public responsibility for the well-being of all citizens. At the same time, the federal government, somewhat restricted by the division of powers set out in the constitution, engaged in social policy making largely related to veterans, immigrants and Indians – areas that fell firmly within their jurisdiction (Rice and Prince, 2000: 42-7). The creation of a system of Old Age pensions, however, represented a shift in roles and a new phase of federal-provincial cooperation that came to characterize the building of the welfare state in the post-war period.

The *Report of Social Security in Canada*, often called the Marsh Report, was tabled in 1943 and "urged the [federal] government to intervene in the economy by creating

programs to help people deal with the problems created by modern industrial society"

(Rice and Prince, 2000: 15). It clearly saw the welfare state as a means to pool social

risks across the country and recommended the creation of comprehensive and universal

and insurance-based programs for Canadians (Armstrong, 1997: 54; Rice and Prince,

2000: 80). The Marsh Report was followed by the Dominion-Provincial Conference of

1945, during which the federal government clearly stated that seeking collective

responsibility through the welfare state could contribute to national enthusiasm and unity.

Thus, although the majority of policy areas remained under provincial jurisdiction (e.g.

education, health care and social assistance), transfer payments provided for a continuing

role for the federal government in these areas (Armstrong, 1997; 63). Federal influence

over social programs and spending led to these initiatives being viewed as central to

Canadian identity because there were federally driven and shared by all Canadians

equally. As Pat Armstrong argues, "Universal programs gave everyone a stake and

shared the risk. They promoted a notion of collective citizenship and of Canadian

distinctiveness" (Armstrong, 1997: 67). Today, however, we see that "universal rights

are increasingly becoming welfare claims and in the process the very meaning of

Canadian citizenship is being redefined" (Armstrong, 1997: 67).

Following the Second World War, a number of federal and provincial programs that

eventually formed the social safety net in Canada were created.[8] The *Family Allowances*

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[8] A huge body of literature exists on the Canadian welfare state; however, it is beyond the capacity of this chapter to do more that recognize the significance of this area and outline some of the major policy advances. In doing so, some of the diversity of programs and approaches across Canada are not discussed here, nor is the often delicate relationship between the federal and provincial governments discussed in detail. For a more detailed discussion of the development of the Canadian welfare state, see Boase, 1998; Rice and Prince, 2000; Armstrong 1997; and Guest 1997.

Act (1944) ensured an allowance to all mothers of school age children. In 1951, a

constitutional amendment brought pensions under shared jurisdiction and led to the

approval of the *Old Age Security Act*. The Canadian and Quebec Pension Plans were

enacted over a decade later in 1964 after negotiations between the federal and provincial

governments. The federal government came to play an increasing role in health care in

Canada through the *National Health Grants Program* of 1948, which provided matching

funds to provinces for hospital construction, and through the *Hospital Insurance and*

Diagnostic Services Act of 1957, in which the federal government agreed to pay

approximately 50% of per capita health care costs and set out the principles of

comprehensive, universal, portable and public health care that later came to underpin the

Canada Health Act. The federal government also initiated funding for post-secondary

institutions in the 1950s – initially through cash grants and later through transfers to

provincial governments. By the end of the 1960s, "despite political resistance and

constitutional restraints" (Boase, 1998: 203), the Canadian welfare state was in place.[9]

Since then, the welfare was come to play an important role in the Canadian psyche. As

Brodie argues:

> The welfare state infused new content, again largely state generated, into
> the meaning of nation and nationalism, and engendered widespread public
> expectations that the Canadian state – the collective – was responsible for
> meeting the needs of the individual citizen. In other words, the welfare
> state gave tangibility to the idea of Canada as a shared community of fate.
> (2002a: 167)

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[9] This dissertation is most interested in the role of the federal government in the building of the welfare
state, but this is not intended to undermine or ignore the importance of the provinces in the construction of
social policy, nor in the sharing of state power (e.g. Panitch, 1977: 10) However, it is the federal
government that has tended to use the welfare state and social policy generally to advance ideas of
Canadian community and national identity.

This change is reflected in Canadian opinion polls, in which the vast majority of

Canadians see universal health care as a significant symbol of Canadian identity (Brodie,

2002a: 178). Since the 1980s, however, Canadian governments have shifted away from

the Keynesian idea of the welfare state to a model that is more limited, costs less and is

based on necessity – not shared responsibility. As in Sweden, the dismantling of the

welfare state in Canada has consequences for Canadian identity and reflects a shifting

state culture, in which the values promoted by state actors and agencies reflect the

principles of neo-liberalism at the expense of community building initiatives such as

multiculturalism and the welfare state. Olsen (2002), for example, notes that the global

and political environment has encouraged a more 'austere' approach to social policy in

both Canada and Sweden, with both countries introducing cost-cutting measures and

arguably less generous policy provisions (3). At the same time, however, great variations

still do exist between the welfare states of the two countries, and within the Canadian

provinces themselves.

`Brodie (2002a) asks how a Canadian national identity built on a welfare state can be

sustained under a rubric of neo-liberal globalism and the neo-liberal state (170). This

question is relevant for both Canada and Sweden and suggests a threat or a challenge to

the construction of national identity and contradictions within the state culture of both

countries. In Canada, Brodie argues, the dominant role of neo-liberalism shifted the

symbolic order away from the idea of a caring, sharing Canada (Brodie 2002a, 172).

Thus, while the myth of a caring, sharing Canada remains, the political and financial

commitments to the programs that underpin it are waning. This becomes more

problematic when faced with the challenges of other identities in Canada during the

second half of the 20th century.

As Canada was in the process of developing a distinct 'Canadian' nation with its own

symbols, institutions and identity, Quebec was also working towards the modernization

of its culture and reshaping its identity, moving away from the traditional hold of the

Catholic Church and challenging both the old and the new orders as it became more

modern, self-aware and nationalistic.[10] The Quiet Revolution in Quebec sought to

combine liberalism and nationalism in order to take control of the fate of Francophones in

Quebec. In doing so, the provincial government succeeded in revamping the education

system, the electoral system and labour relations. (McRoberts, 1997: 32-33) Some argue

that the liberalizing, modernizing and embracing of liberal capitalism in Quebec removed

much of their distinct character and made it indistinguishable from other North American

societies in spite of their linguistic differences. However, as Carens points out, the

Quebecois still see their society as distinct (2000: 132). This perception is very

important. In the end, the fact that they consider themselves to be distinct is really more

important than any measurement of how distinct they are, as this perception is the force

that drives Quebec politics provincially and within federal politics. At the same time,

Aboriginal groups began to mobilize and demand more rights and recognition from the

state as well. These conflicts drove politics over the next few decades and led to major

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[10] Others would argue that the changes during this period occurred in what was already a 'modern' society. Rather than a project of modernization, these changes were a realignment of political and social forces that already existed (Couture and Kermoal, 2003).

shifts in the way Canadians understood Canada and the way the Canadian state

constructed state culture.[11]

In the late 1960s, Pierre Trudeau captured the imagination of English-Canada

with his vision of a united, bilingual, multicultural Canadian identity. Trudeau's

embodied a philosophy of "reason over passion" that was strongly opposed to the ethnic

nationalism of Quebec, which was viewed as emotional and irrational (Trudeau 1968).

He believed that a strong federal system based on the provinces as building blocks

focused around a core of individual, personal rights could accommodate Quebec.

Trudeau's vision of Canadian federalism was one in which "individual Canadians,

possessed of inalienable rights, including linguistic rights, make up a national community

in which the people are ultimately sovereign" (Axworthy and Trudeau, 1990: 204). By

entrenching a *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Trudeau hoped to set the groundwork for

such a system. In doing so, he "left an indelible mark on the institutions and political

culture of the country" (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 151).

Trudeau's philosophical outlook strongly influenced his policy decisions, all of which

were aimed at created a new Canada with a new pan-Canadian identity. His philosophy

of the 'just society' based on individual rights, not collective rights, can be seen in the

White Paper of 1969 which proposed to eliminate 'Indian Status' on the grounds that it

was discriminatory. In Trudeau's mind they should all be 'Canadian' (Karmis and

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[11] Arguably, the Quebec government could also be viewed as promoting a 'state culture' distinct from that of the Canadian government. In fact, Quebec is an excellent example of how state apparatuses can be used to further a particular agenda or vision of the nation. For the purposes of this project, and in order to facilitate the comparison with Sweden, the focus is on the Canadian government and state and the efforts at promoting a state culture that encompasses the various nations within Canada's borders.

Gagnon, 2001: 153). The *White Paper* implied the end of protection of land reserves and

a rejection of territorial claims and was withdrawn in 1971 due to growing opposition and

mobilization from Aboriginal peoples. In many ways, the *White Paper* was responsible

for mobilizing native groups to protect their rights and launching the Native nationalist

movement (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 153). This example shows that although

Trudeau's philosophy was very compelling, it did not address the realities of Canada's

cultures or the claims and concerns of marginalized groups. The idea of the just society,

however, also sought to protect the weak and those in need through the welfare state.

Many welfare state policy developments in the post-war period sought to address the

concerns and needs of minority groups and women (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 171-

2). While these groups obtained representation in government (for example, through the

Secretaries of State for Women and Multiculturalism), the programs also aimed at

increasing individual equality across Canada, so as to remove the need for group

representation.

Although the debates over language and culture began before Trudeau came into power,

they were not formalized in policy until the Trudeau years. The *Royal Commission on*

Bilingualism and Biculturalism (or the B&B Commission) was established in 1963 by

Prime Minister Pearson in order to address this basic divide within Canadian politics. Its

mandate was to:

> recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian
> Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two
> founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic
> groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should
> be taken to safeguard that enrichment. (quoted in Karmis and Gagnon,
> 2001: 149).

It was co-chaired by a Francophone and an Anglophone, André Laurendeau and A.

Davidson Dunton, symbolizing a return to dualism within Canadian politics (McRoberts,

1997: 40). Significant opposition arose in response to this dualist definition of Canada

from non-English/French Canadians who argued that Canada had never been solely

bicultural and that a new definition of Canada that did not exclude non-English, non-

French groups was required. According to Trudeau, however, the nationalist demands of

Quebec were not to be indulged in any way and his policies on bilingualism and

multiculturalism did not strictly adhere to the findings or recommendations of the B&B

Commission. Instead of building policy on the basis of the idea of two founding nations

– according to the original mandate of the Commission – or pursuing a policy of

multiculturalism within a context of multilingualism – according to some of the

recommendations – Trudeau opted to maintain the primacy of the English and French

languages and individual bilingualism under the *Official Languages Act* and combine this

with a policy of multiculturalism that shifted Canadian identity away from ethnicity

towards civic identification (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 106-9). While Trudeau

recognized the linguistic importance of French in Canada, he was unwilling to recognize

the distinctiveness of French-Canadian culture over other cultures.

The *Official Languages Act* (1969) outlined the principles of bilingualism in Canada.

Although not very well received outside of the two official language minorities (the

Anglophone population in Quebec and the Francophone population outside of Quebec), it

had two major effects. First, it decreased understanding between Quebec and other

Canadians by undermining the legitimacy of Quebec language policy. Second, because

the provinces were not consulted, the positive aspects and potential of bilingualism were

not focused on (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 155-6). English-speaking Canadians outside

of Quebec had difficulty accepting the promotion of French outside of Quebec, whereas

French-speakers in Quebec opposed the principle that they were only one of many French

communities in Canada (Dyck, 2004: 100). The primary aim of the policy was directed

at ensuring the equality of both official languages in the federal government and the

provision of government services in both French and English. A secondary aim,

however, was the promotion of both languages within Canadian society. Burgess (2001),

however, notes that in spite of this, Canada has not become bilingual other than at the

most superficial level (260). Since the 1960s, bilingualism has increased less than five

percent in Canada as a whole to 17.7% of Canadians in the 2001 Census and over half of

all bilingual Canadians reside in Quebec (Brooks, 2004: 360-1).

In 1971, a national policy of multiculturalism was adopted by Trudeau in an attempt to

address the grievances of non-British/French/Aboriginal Canadians who had grown from

just over 10% of the population in 1900 to one-quarter of the population in 1961.

Trudeau outlined the policy as having a number of aims, including: providing financial

assistance for cultural groups; assisting members of cultural groups to overcome barriers

in society; promoting exchanges between members of different groups to promote

national unity; and assisting immigrants to acquire one of the official languages in order

to participate in society (McRoberts, 1997: 125). Initially the policy appeared to be

individualist and to promote cultural preservation. In the 1980s, however, the aim shifted

to focus more on racism and social issues (McRoberts, 1997: 127).

Abu-Laban notes that Canada's multicultural policy is seen as a model for other countries

seeking to manage ethnic diversity (Abu-Laban, 1998a: 86). However, it is not without

its critics. Neil Bissoondath is one of the most vocal opponents of multicultural policy

arguing that it has often been understood as facilitating an excess of cultural relativism

and that it discourages immigrants from identifying with Canada and identifying

themselves as Canadians (Bissoondath, 1994). Himani Bannerji (1996) also provides a

compelling critique of the idea of multiculturalism. She argues that "the importance of

the discourse of multiculturalism to that of nation-building becomes clearer if we

remember that 'nation' needs an ideology of unification and legitimation" (Bannerji,

1996: 109-110). However, the problem is that the ideology of multiculturalism places

'others' is a strange position where they are both central to this construction of Canada

and at the same time required to maintain their difference and otherness in order to

maintain the construction (Bannerji, 1996: 109). She places multiculturalism in

perspective when she writes that "English/Europeaness, that is, whiteness, emerges as the

hegemonic Canadian identity ... It provides the context of Canadian culture, the point of

departure for 'multiculture'" (Bannerji, 1996: 118). At the same time, however, Salojee

(2003) reinforces the importance of multiculturalism for full citizenship in Canada. He

argues that in Canada full citizenship cannot be understood simply in terms of class

inclusion, but must be broader and address other types of difference and discrimination

(Saloojee, 2003: 20-21). "For citizenship to matter it must be inclusive and for inclusion

to matter it must successfully deal with social inclusion in a society that is fractured along

numerous fault lines" (Salojee, 2003: 20). Regardless of whether Canada is achieving the

ideal of multiculturalism, it is certainly being promoted by the Canadian state as an

integral part of Canada's state culture. Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002) argue that today

the areas of immigration and multiculturalism are guided by the principles of business

with an emphasis on markets, efficiency, competitiveness and individualism. This has

resulted in the Canadian government "selling diversity" in order to enhance Canada's

competitiveness in global markets (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 12). These changes

are discussed in greater detail in the section on immigration below.

Identity and Constitutional Politics

Underpinning the vision of Canada as a multicultural country of citizens holding

individual rights is the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. The constitutional debates that

occurred in the 1980s and 1990s brought issues of identity to the forefront of Canadian

politics. The Charter was Trudeau's legacy in many ways and it changed the way

Canadians viewed identity and the actors involved in the political process. The

participation of civil society groups, in particular women and minority organizations, in

the years spent negotiating the Charter ensured the guarantee of their rights within the

Charter and their future representation (to varying degrees). While some people view this

as a further disintegration of a unified Canadian identity and as representing the transfer

of power from governments to the courts and special interest groups (e.g. Morton and

Knopff, 2000), others see it as representative of the increasing democracy within the

Canadian state (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995). Either way, discussing identity in Canada can no

longer return to a discussion of dualism that ignores the presence of multiple identities and affiliations in Canada. The post-Charter years showed how much had shifted within identity politics in Canada during the second half of the Twentieth Century. In particular, the debates during the *Meech Lake* and *Charlottetown Accords* regarding the inclusion of a Quebec Clause in Meech and the Canada Clause in Charlottetown demonstrated not only the lack of a clear of idea of Canada, but the presence of many conflicting and irreconcilable understandings of the country and what it represents.

For Trudeau, the Charter was the key to unifying the country around a set of civic values as opposed to ethnic nationalism. As discussed below, it guaranteed Canadians a number of rights and freedoms, including the freedom of religion, assembly and communication and democratic, mobility, equality and language rights. It aimed to change the way Canadians thought about themselves and identified themselves in relation to each other. In some ways, it succeeded. However, while English-Canadians embraced the vision of Canada put forward in the Charter, the province of Quebec did not sign on to the Charter and felt betrayed by English-Canada's approval of it without the agreement of Quebec. The failure to include Quebec has led many academics to argue that Trudeau did not achieve the goal of unity and the just society, but rather added to discontent and fragmentation (e.g. Cairns, 1995; McRoberts, 1997; and Karmis and Gagnon, 2001). Karmis and Gagnon argue that Trudeau's Charter neglected to address major effects of socio-historical variations on perceptions and identities and that by regarding the individual as the only unit of analysis, he made language and culture into purely individual matters (Karmis and Gagnon, 2001: 171). They suggest that similar to

Trudeau's vision, individualist liberal theory is generally underpinned by a creed of the

moral superiority of unity; for example, federal unity and pan-Canadian allegiance

provide the primary good of democracy, while identity politics create disunity (Karmis

and Gagnon, 2001: 171). In this sense, one can argue that Canada's policies are

exclusive in their focus on the individual. The primacy of the individual and the state

over other identities and affiliations ignores the importance of group identity in the

creation of any policy that truly aims to be inclusive. The past two decades show that this

is a growing trend and that since the entrenchment of the Charter this individualism,

despite the inclusion of some collective rights, has not proven to be enough to unite

Canadians from all backgrounds and situations. The suggestion that all the current

divisions within Canadian politics sprung from Trudeau's policies, however, is also

problematic as it ignores the wider historical context within which they occurred.[12]

Contemporary patterns of identity politics did not arise out of thin air or solely out of the

entrenchment of the Charter. Rather, they reflect global trends stressing the importance

of human rights, the increased mobilization of social movements, a changing perception

of the relationship between citizens and the state, and the long-standing history of

identity-based claims in Canadian politics. The threat of Quebec separation continues to

lead many Canadian political scientists to advocate a return to the politics of

accommodation. Perhaps the best example of this mode of thought appears in the writings

and ideas of Alan Cairns. While Cairns (1995) recognized the practices of exclusion

which have led to the creation of identity politics he is troubled by the problems

they have caused (Cairns, 1995: 114). He argues that the Charter has made it more

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[12] For example, see the discussion on Cairns and McRoberts that follows.

difficult to accommodate Quebec and Aboriginal peoples in that it would violate the

norms of equal citizenship emerging from the Charter (Cairns, 1995: 219). He sees the

opposition to the Meech Lake Accord from "Charter Groups" seeking a Canada

comprised of equals as evidence for this view in which the individual rights guaranteed

by the Charter could not be compromised by the goals of provinces, Aboriginal groups,

or Quebec (Cairns, 1995: 274). At the same time, however, "the political articulation of

various social, ethnic and gender diversities of modern society ... challenge the norms of

a common universal citizenship" (Cairns, 1995: 175) creating a problem for the

sustainability of a concept like universal citizenship within a context of the recognition of

diversity. Cairns states that Canadians must find a way to accommodate the demands of

Quebec and Aboriginal peoples, most likely within a system of asymmetrical federalism,

and that the Rest of Canada needs to develop a political identity in order to unite itself

and bargain effectively with an independent Quebec. In his view, the equality of citizens

and equality of the provinces must make room for the increased rights of Quebec in order

to keep it in Canada (Cairns, 1995).

McRoberts makes a similar argument for a return to a system of dualism. In

Misconceiving Canada (1997), he argues that Trudeau single-mindedly worked to change

the way that Canadians thought of themselves and to submerge what he saw as the low,

ethnic politics of Quebec nationalism under a new regime of national rights and reason.

He suggests that the Trudeau vision of Canada has failed to unite the country, instead

opening the doors for the politics of identity and exacerbating the conflict over Canadian

identity by making English-Canada more reluctant to consider the demands and special

needs of Quebec. While Trudeau did deliberately attempt to construct a new Canada, the

Charter also reflected the demands of the women's movement and immigrants to have a

piece of the "new" Canada. McRoberts concludes that despite its success in English

Canada, the Trudeau vision as a national unity strategy has failed and we need to create

new solutions.

Both Cairns and McRoberts suggest that the "Rest of Canada" needs to clearly

define its own identity in order to be able to deal effectively with a more independent

Quebec within Canada. This suggestion also implies, however, that it is not possible for

Canada to create one unified, homogenous Canadian identity. McRoberts argues that "the

ultimate obstacle to a 'multinational Canada' is, of course, that English Canada refuses to

think of itself as a distinct nationality ... the notion of an 'English Canadian' nation is

totally beyond comprehension" (McRoberts, 1997: 267). Unless English Canada reverts

back to the Anglo-conformist, colonizing British nation of the period prior to the Second

World War (which is not likely to be politically feasible), it is difficult to imagine this

nation. English Canada, in defining itself as Canadian, has attempted to move away from

the trappings of ethnically defined identity to an identity based on common civic values

and rights. However, at the roots of this identity is still, in many cases, a British identity

and values, symbols and institutions. Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (1999) argues that it is

possible to conceive of an ethnic Canadian identity encompassing English-speaking, non-

Aboriginal Canadians that is based on territory, language, European ancestry, Christian

religious heritage and a broader Canadian culture. However, she argues that this

'English-Canadian nation' is being undermined by illiberal multiculturalist policies.

While Howard-Hassmann's argument is exclusionary towards non-European, non-Christian Canadians, Abu-Laban and Stasiulus (2000) also suggest that it appears to be an assimilationist and anachronistic approach that excludes the Quebec and Aboriginal collectivities that are central to the ongoing negotiation of Canadian identity (477). Further, they suggest that attempts to promote 'English-Canadian ethnic identity" will come into conflict with the diverse identifications of the Canadian population (Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, 2000: 482). Ultimately, as demonstrated below, the presence of large immigrant groups defies the possibility of creating an essentialist concept of Canadian or English-Canadian identity. The solution may not be to create one Canadian or English-Canadian identity, but to create space for multiple identities and allegiances within Canadian politics.

The Politics of Immigration in Canada

While there is much debate over the fragmented and multiple nature of Canadian identity, there is also evidence that the Canadian state (through its actors and agencies) continues to try to promote what it perceives as being key 'Canadian' values to the Canadian people through its policies and practices. These values underpin the concept of state culture presented here – they outline the key values and characteristics of Canadians for Canadians. Immigration is an entry point into the analysis of the values promoted through state activities and to a deeper understanding of state culture. Immigration policy helps us to understand who is viewed as a desirable immigrant and why, as well as what is expected of new members in terms of integration and adopting Canadian values and behaviors. It also elaborates on the relationship between new arrivals and full members

of the Canadian political community. As Haque (2004) argues, "Canada's identity as a

settler nation can be traced in the development of immigration policies since its

inception" (61).

It is important to note that in Canada immigration is a shared area of federal and

provincial jurisdiction as defined by the *Constitution Act of 1867*. While the Canadian

state oversees immigration policy and applications, provinces can play a role. However,

since the 1990s most provinces have not established agreements with the Government of

Canada that allows them to play a more direct role is selecting immigrants who wish to

settle in their province. The Government of Quebec has greater autonomy in the area of

immigration than the other provinces, however, with Quebec holding sole responsibility

for selecting the immigrants who will settle within the province and the federal

government responsible for admission (*Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de

l'Immigration*). The focus here is on federal policies and literature for new immigrants,

as the purpose of this project is to identify the values being promoted as 'Canadian' by

federal actors and institutions that can therefore be understood as comprising *Canadian

state culture* – in other words, the efforts of the federal government of Canada to identify

and promote uniquely Canadian values and traits in order to promote national unity,

national identity, and a sense of belonging to Canada among the population.[13]

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[13] As part of this effort to construct a Canadian identity via the promotion of Canadian state culture, the role of minority nations within Canada and diversity in general is addressed. So, for example, in order to promote a 'Canadian' identity and Canadian unity, the role of Quebec and Francophone culture within this construction of Canada is something that needs to be interrogated.

Canada, since Confederation, has experienced three distinct phases of immigration and

integration policies (Abu-Laban, 1998c).

> **Phase One: 1867-1966** – Characterized by discriminatory immigration
> policies and an emphasis on Anglo-conformity. Immigrants arrived
> primarily from European countries, beginning with the United Kingdom
> and gradually expanding.

> **Phase Two: 1967-1990s** – Characterized by the development of the point
> system, emphasizing professional and technical skills in immigrant
> selection, and the development of an official multicultural policy.
> Immigration shifted from Europe to the rest of the world, resulting in the
> increasing diversity of the population.

> **Phase Three: 1990s-Present** – Characterized by the tightening of criteria
> for immigrants and refugees, an emphasis on self-sufficiency and the
> decline of multiculturalism as a discourse. Immigration shifts towards more
> independent, highly skilled immigrants.

Overall, these three phases represent a shift from overtly racist and assimilationist

policies, to attempts to open Canada's doors to more ethno-culturally diverse immigrants

(with proper job skills) and the creation of the idea of Canada as a multicultural state

where one ethnicity is not privileged over another. The final phases, beginning in early

1990s with the election of the first government of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien

and continuing today, reflects a retrenchment of the values put forward in policy during

Phase Two in its gradual closing of Canada's doors. These phases of immigration and

integration policy can be roughly correlated to the waves of immigrants entering Canada

since Confederation and are discussed in greater detail below.

Early Immigration

Canada is a state comprised of different nations. In spite of the presence of Aboriginal

population prior to European contact, contemporary Canada has been populated and

constructed primarily by immigrants. This makes the idea and project of distinguishing between immigrants more difficult. The initial immigrants to Canada were largely of British or French origin, and it is these two fragments of Europe that have had the most influence in shaping the Canadian state and culture – most often in efforts to protect one group from the other. In the subsequent sections, references to immigrants refer to non-British and non-French immigrants; in other words the immigrants who came after. These immigrants were subjected to the efforts of the French and particularly the British communities to assimilate. They were required to learn English and/or French, to adopt these cultures and cultural norms, beliefs and institutions. The rapid diversification and growth of non-British and non-French immigrant communities over the twentieth century led to the growth of this third force of Canadians in size and influence. This third force in Canadian politics is much less homogenous than the Aboriginal people or French Canadians, challenging the identity of Canada in different ways. As a result, they have challenged the historical dualism of Canada, leading to the creation of a state culture that purports to respect, and even embrace, difference.

In the early twentieth century Canada experienced a massive influx of immigration as part of a national policy to populate the western provinces. Between 1896 and 1914 around 2.5 million people immigrated to Canada, of which close to one million were British, three-quarters of a millions were from the USA, and half a million were from continental European countries other than France (Hawkins, 1991: 3-4). The majority of immigrants were English speaking, but large numbers also came from Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Russia, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland

(Hawkins, 1991: 4). This new wave of immigration rapidly diversified Canada's

population.

These new immigrants arrived in a country already divided along ethnic and linguistic

lines. British-Canadians, threatened by French-Canada, embarked on a policy aimed at

assimilating the new immigrants into their culture in order to offset the French threat

(Wilton, 2000). This was a period of colonial nationalism, during which the British

aimed to ensure that new arrivals adopted British values and beliefs as part of the effort to

build a better British Canada (ibid.). Howard Palmer describes this period as one of

Anglo-Conformism as immigrants were required to renounce their ancestral cultures and

traditions and adopt the values and behaviours of British-Canadians (Palmer, 1990: 192-

3). It is important to note, however, that this was a project or ideal of assimilation, but it

was not completely implemented in practice. Many different cultures and groups

maintained aspects of their ancestral language and practices, while selectively adopting

aspects of Anglo-Canadian culture as well.

The immigration policy of the time reflected the policy of Anglo-Conformism and

attempted to ensure the new immigrants were likely to be easily assimilated and not a

threat to the British character of Canada. In many ways, Canada's early immigration

policies were overtly racist. The most desirable immigrants were seen as being British or

northern European, as they were alleged to possess the proper characteristics (for

example, being hardy and hard working) necessary to easily adapt and integrate into life

in Canada (see Wilton, 2000). For example, British girls were the most desirable for

domestic service as they would eventually marry and become mothers of both future

citizens and the nation, ensuring the perpetuity of certain values and characteristics

(Wilton, 2000). "The concern for racial purity that was the cornerstone of much of

English-Canadian nation-building and immigration policy meant that it was not desirable

that women from the so-called 'lower races' to reproduce" (Abu-Laban and Gabriel,

2002: 38). Immigration policy was guided by the demands of the labour market, the

desire to populate the western territories, and the desire to preserve the ethnic character of

the new country. Although immigration did diversify significantly during this period,

and more immigrants from eastern and southern Europe came to Canada, the desire to

protect Canada's British nature was apparent in the policies and practices of the day.

The direction of Canadian immigration policy in the early twentieth century is made

apparent in a speech made by Prime Minister Mackenzie-King in 1947. He stated:

> The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of
> Canada by the encouragement of immigration...
> ... With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about
> discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within
> her right in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future
> citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter
> Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy.
> ... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the
> people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a
> fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large scale
> immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of
> the Canadian population. Any considerable oriental immigration would,
> moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a
> character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international
> relations. (quoted in Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 40)

The above quotation shows the racial bias inherent in Canadian immigration policy, as well as the acceptance of such forms of discrimination among the political elite of the country. The emphasis on non-oriental immigration (implying non-European immigration) illustrates that Canada sought to avoid cultures and racial groups seen as different or incompatible with Canada's European heritage and can also be read as discriminatory towards the existing Asian population in Canada. This preference for European immigrants suggests that Canadian identity at the time was seen as having ethnic roots and that large-scale immigration from outside of Europe would potentially threaten the construction of a Euro-Canadian identity. This outlook continued to influence Canadian immigration policy into the 1960s, at which time the procedure for immigration was revamped and a new dialogue on Canada's character and culture emerged. The arrival of diverse immigrants played a large part in the re-shaping of the Canadian discourse on identity.

At the same time, Canada was disengaging itself from Britain and the process of constructing a unique Canadian identity was also beginning. In 1947, Canada was the first of the British Commonwealth countries to enact citizenship legislation – immigrants would become Canadian citizens as opposed to citizens of the British Empire (Frith, 2003: 72). The legislation gave Canadian citizens automatic right of entry to Canada, set out residency requirements, gave married women full authority over their nationality, and defined loss of citizenship. The new *Citizenship Act* also set out a provision for instruction in citizenship and the structure of citizenship ceremonies including the Oath of Citizenship (Frith, 2003: 72). Thus, the Canadian state engaged in enacting legislation

to define membership in the Canadian community, as opposed to the larger British

Imperial community. It is, perhaps, not surprising that with a conscious effort towards

Canadian nation-building, the Canadian state also engaged in ensuring that the members

of the new Canadian civic community would not, as Mackenzie-King said, "make a

fundamental alteration in the character of our population."

Historically, Canada encouraged white immigrants to come and settle. As I argued

above, early Canadian immigration policy was driven by the "desire to populate Canada

with white, British people and the drive to meet the shifting demands of the labour

market" (Abele and Stasiulus, 1989: 241). However, Abele and Stasiulus (1989) point

out that the construct of Canada as a white, settler society also ignored the presence of

Aboriginals and other minority groups and the policies of assimilation aimed at them, as

well as the economic forces informing these policies. Despite these shortcomings,

concept of Canada as a white settler society remains a useful tool for understanding how

this idea shaped immigration policy and provided a basis for the racial, ethnic and class

structure of Canada. As well, it shows us how the elites of the time envisioned and

attempted to define the state culture of Canada. This idea underpinned the policy of

Anglo-conformism dominant at the time; as time went on, however, and the population

became much more diverse, this approach to diversity in Canada became far less

politically tenable.

In the years following the Second World War, a second immigration boom occurred as

the Canadian state sought to fill labour gaps through immigration. At the same time,

however, the idea of Canada as a white, settler society was still in place. The

Immigration Act of 1952, for example, outlines the following reasons for limiting entry to

immigrants:

> (1) nationality, citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or
>   geographical area of origin;
> (2) peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding
>   property;
> (3) unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social,
>   industrial, education, labour, health or other requirements existing
>   temporarily or otherwise;
> (4) probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the
>   duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a
>   reasonable time after admission (quoted in Abu-Laban, 1998b: 73).

With these guidelines, it became possible for Canada to refuse entry to almost anyone on

the basis of almost anything; for example, if he/she was a suspected communist, socialist,

non-Christian, or non-Northern person. The racism, classism and inherent bias of

immigration policy at the time is made obvious by these limitations which gave

incredible power to the immigration officer deciding an applicant's fate. As, Yasmeen

Abu-Laban argues the primary purpose of Canadian immigration policy has always been

to "deny citizenship to the majority of the world's inhabitants" (1998b: 70). As with

other countries, immigration policy in Canada has always been about excluding people,

or keeping out the 'undesirables' while finding ways to address labour demands through

immigration. In this sense, the underlying purpose of immigration policies themselves

has been to restrict entry, although as elaborated upon below, the criteria for doing so

have changed over time. As such, the relationship between immigration policy and

existing inequalities in Canada based on race, gender and class cannot be ignored.

Post-World War Two Immigration

It is important to understand the political environment in the decades following the

Second World War. Karmis and Gagnon (2001) describe Canada's political situation in

the 1960s in the following way:

> [T]he English-Canadian majority was divided between its overseas roots, its
> identification with the new Canadian symbols, and a plurality of regional identities;
> in redefining their identity through an emerging quasi-citizenship in Quebec, the
> Franco-Quebecois distanced themselves not only from English-Canadians, but also
> from French-Canadians outside Quebec; as for the aboriginal peoples, they were
> struggling between the extremes of genealogical identification and outright
> identification; finally, despite the objective of assimilation of the Canadian
> immigration policy, New-Canadians began to make claims for an institutional
> recognition of their differences. (150)

During the 1960s, the composition of Canada's identity or identities began to change

dramatically. It was during this period, and during the decades that followed, that current

Canadian identity politics and state culture took their contemporary shape. Immigration

and immigrant groups played an important role in challenging the previous understanding

of Canada as a dualist, white, settler society. As well, the changes to immigration policy

over the next couple of decades represents a response to the emerging idea of Canada as a

multicultural country in which citizenship was based on participation, as opposed to

racial or ethnic background.

In 1966, Prime Minister Pearson's *White Paper on Immigration* stated that Canada

should encourage immigration and that it should not be based on race but on skills (Abu-

Laban, 1998b: 74). A point based system for assessing immigrants and their potential

ability to contribute to Canada was created and put into place with an Order in Council in

1967. Immigration advocates embraced the policy and its overhaul of the system,

"including a final purge of every last hint of racial or ethnic discrimination" (Troper, 2000: 17). The more controversial aspects of the *White* Paper, however, were the plans for tightening the criteria for family unification in favour of more skilled and independent immigrants, and the recommendations for capping immigration numbers (Troper, 2000: 17). This was incorporated into the new Immigration Act in 1976 along with the guarantee that applicants should not be discriminated against based on race, nationality, ethnicity, colour, religion or sex (Abu-Laban, 1998b: 75). The new system led to more diverse immigration, however the emphasis on certain skills continued to favour male applicants. The new point system eventually led to new classes of immigrants: family class (consisting of the sponsorship of certain relatives to Canada), independent immigrants (including assisted relatives, retirees, entrepreneurs and self-employed persons), and refugees (those who have a well-founded fear of persecution according the UN definitions) (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 44). Since this time, independents have been the largest and most 'desirable' group of immigrants in Canada, privileged over family class immigrants and refugees. This has led to criticisms that the point system, used for independents, favours certain educated, professional applicants to the disadvantage of potential applicants from the developing world; however, overall, the rampant racism of the previous system has been curtailed following these changes (Troper, 2000: 19).

This signified a major shift in immigration and immigration policy as the previous method for selecting immigrants was replaced with a new, and allegedly 'neutral', point-based system. The new point system assessed immigrants based on a number of factors

such as proficiency in English or French, education, and job skills. Initially, potential

immigrants required at least fifty points, out of a possible one hundred points, to be

eligible to immigrate. In the 1990s, the points were tied more closely to the demands of

the labour market and the minimum level was raised to seventy out of one hundred points

(Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 43). In 2002, with the passing of the new immigration

law, the cut off point was further raised to seventy-five out of one hundred points. The

following year, in 2003, the number of required points was reduced to 67 based on

demand for skilled labour and the perception that the criteria were too high. This

continual raising of the barrier to immigration (with the one recent exception) reflects the

increasing importance of economic contribution as a criterion for immigration. It also

reflects the increasing exclusivity of Canadian immigration, which focuses more on

independent immigrants who will be able to contribute economically to the country.

Although the new system was much less explicitly discriminatory than the previous

system, the point system continues to present a barrier to many potential immigrants as

well as define the contribution of immigrants solely in terms of their market and labour

force contribution. In particular, this system contains a gender bias, privileging the male

breadwinner model, and a class bias, privileging those with high levels of education and

the economic resources to immigrate.

The changes to Canada's immigration policy did lead to changes in the origin countries

of Canada's new immigrants. As discussed in Chapter One, the most notable change in

recent decades is the shift from Europe as the dominant continent of origin, to Asia. The

number of immigrants from Central and Southern America, the Caribbean and Bermuda,

and Africa has also increased over the past five decades, whereas immigration from the United States and Western Europe has decreased (Statistics Canada, 2003). These statistics reveal the changes in the origins of immigrants during the post-1945 period and the resulting effect on the ethno-demographics of the Canadian population.

In 1977, the Canadian government enacted a new citizenship law, updating the law of thirty years earlier. The new law further simplified the naturalization process and provided clearer and more equitable criteria. Knowles (2000) argues that both the 1947 and 1977 Acts embodied two clear principles related to accommodating diversity and advancing equality: open citizenship and equal citizenship. Under these Acts, citizenship is formally open and accessible to people from diverse origins and backgrounds, and all citizens have equal rights and responsibilities (Knowles, 2000: 65). This has resulted in a citizenship regime in Canada that is much more progressive than what existed prior to the Second World War. The 1977 Act goes further than the 1947 Act in that it removes certain aspects of preferential treatment for British subjects and places all candidates for citizenship on a more equal footing (Garcea, 2003: 59). This complements the changes to immigration policy ten years earlier, which also attempted to remove bias and discrimination from the process.

Recent Trends in Immigration

In the 1990s, under Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, immigration policy and attitudes towards immigration shifted from a more open, expansionist perspective, to a more closed, restrictive approach that emphasized tighter controls and enforcement, as

well as the social and economic costs of immigration (Anderson and Black, 1998).

Anderson and Black attribute this change to a variety of factors, including the challenge

posed by the anti-immigration platform of the Reform Party, harsher public attitudes, and

efforts at cost control and deficit reduction (Anderson and Black, 1998: 193). The

restrictionist policies of the Liberal government included the introduction of a

controversial right of landing fee for immigrants and refugees. This was seen by critics

as a type of 'head tax' that would make immigration by refugees, family status

applicants, and applicants from the third world much more difficult but was defended as a

necessary fiscal measure by the government (Anderson and Black, 1998: 202). The

government document *Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future*

Immigration (released in January 1998), argued for a complete overhaul of the

immigration and refugee system, a radical rewriting of the Immigration Act, and

fundamental changes in both administrative practices and policy substance (Anderson

and Black, 1998: 207). Overall, the report emphasized outcomes over processes, and the

selection of self-sufficient immigrants, which was in tune with neo-liberal policy and also

the policy of the Reform Party (Anderson and Black, 1998: 210).[14]

In the shadow of September 11, 2001, Canada's federal government quickly and quietly

passed new immigration legislation aimed at increasing security and addressing concerns

about abuse of the system. The new law, the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*

(IRPA), became effective July 29, 2002. In the words of the government, the Act aims to

"respond quickly to a rapidly evolving environment and to emerging challenges and

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[14] Further discussion of the Reform Party can be found in the section entitled 'Immigrants in Canada' on page 153.

opportunities. New legislation is essential to ensure that Canada can preserve

immigration as a source of diversity, richness and openness to the world" (CIC, 2003a).

While the government description of the legislation speaks about the importance of the

humanitarian tradition in Canada with regard to refugees and the importance of

immigration to Canada, the primary direction of the majority of the changes is aimed at

increasing security and decreasing abuse.

The section on refugees for example, states that "Bill C-18 reinforces provisions that

relate to the integrity of the refugee determination system to ensure that protection is

offered only to people in genuine need" (CIC, 2003a). The assumption behind this

statement appears to be that people are abusing the system and trying to enter Canada

under false pretenses. Similarly, a section stressing the importance of Canada's

humanitarian tradition with regards to refugees is followed by a paragraph discussing the

threat to Canada from transnational criminal organizations. Further changes strengthen

the ability of the government to deem refugees inadmissible on "grounds of security,

violating human rights or organized criminality" (CIC, 2003a). At the same time,

however, greater emphasis is to be placed on need and less on the refugee claimant's

ability to resettle successfully in Canada. The contradiction between the perceived role

of Canada as a humanitarian state, the myth of a tolerant and multicultural Canada, and

the backlash against refugees and immigrants emerging from the New Right is apparent.

These contradictions, in turn, have consequences for the concept of state culture and its

manifestation in the Canadian context. State culture is constantly undulating and shifting

in response to changes within Canadian society, politics and the global context, but certain values are sustained all the same.

The focus of the new immigration act continues to be on self-sufficient immigrants, especially immigrants with transferable skill sets (as opposed to specific job skills), who are given priority in the points system. This emphasis is seen as a better way to ensure that Canada selects workers with the skills "required to succeed in a fast changing, knowledge-based economy" (CIC, 2003a). Abu-Laban and Gabriel point out that the focus on transferable skills is also a reflection of the changing perceptions in Canada about the role of the state. From 1945 to the late 1970s, it was assumed that the state should play a significant role in the management of the labour market. One way for the state to perform this function was through immigrant selection (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 79-80). In an age of neo-liberalism, the market is to manage itself, hence the idea of state management of the labour market and economy is no longer palatable. Some programs, however, continue to address temporary labour needs for short-term labour in response to extraordinary labour market conditions (for example, connected with the booming economy in Alberta or certain aspects of agricultural production in Ontario and BC). Ultimately, however, the "proposed changes to immigration selection speak to a broader trend of implicit and explicit withdrawal of the state from labour market regulation in the last decade" (ibid. 80). Further, Folson and Park (2004) argue that the IRPA is consistent with the trend in Western states to restrict future immigration, weaken the rights of landed immigrants and liberalize the grounds for detention, effectively "constructing all immigrants and refugees as potential criminals" (15).

Citizenship and Immigration Canada's plan for 2001 and 2002, *Planning Now for Canada's Future* (2001c), states that "immigration has been and will continue to be an essential tool for social, cultural and economic nation-building ... We all benefit enormously from immigration." This document establishes the goal for immigration for 2001 and 2002 at 1% of the total population and strives to promote the idea of a strong Canada built on diversity while meeting international commitments to refugees. It also notes the changing nature of international migration due to an increased number of people on the move and shifts in source countries. In recent years, the top five countries from which new immigrants are coming to Canada are China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Korea. The report states that economic, independent immigrants are by far the majority of immigrants admitted to Canada, followed by family class migrants, and then refugees. The immigration plans continue with these trends. There is a contradiction, however, between the goals of increased immigration to Canada, the promotion of diversity, and the increasing restrictions on immigration to Canada combined with the high threshold that potential immigrants must meet.

Shifts in immigration policy in the past decade are also expressed within citizenship policy. In 1999, the Liberal government announced plans to modernize the *Citizenship Act* in order to protect the integrity of Canadian citizenship and emphasize the values of Canadian society. Since 1999, three attempts have been made to update the legislation. The first two attempts, Bills C-63 and C-16, died on the Order paper. The most recent attempt, Bill C-18, was introduced in the fall of 2002 and again failed to be passed within

the legislative session. The push behind the efforts to modernize the Act aim to ensure

Charter compliance, to reduce inconsistencies in rulings and to allow the Minister to take

quick and effective action against persons who have fraudulently obtained citizenship

(Frith, 2003: 72).

In *Strengthening the Value of Canadian Citizenship: the Government of Canada's Plan*

for Modernizing the Citizenship Act, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) states

that the new citizenship act reflects what Canadians believe citizenship means, promotes

loyalty to Canada and respect for our rights and freedoms, and celebrates what it means

to be a citizen of Canada (CIC, 2001b). According to Citizenship and Immigration

Canada, in "What does it mean to be a Canadian Citizen?" (2001d) the value of Canadian

Citizenship can be defined as follows:

> Canadians have long valued their traditions of democracy, freedom and tolerance.
> The rights and values so important to all Canadians are enshrined in the Canadian
> Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Bill of Rights, and provincial human rights
> codes. Along with these rights come certain responsibilities.

> Canadians are also proud of Canada's multicultural heritage, created as generations
> of immigrants joined the Aboriginal peoples who have lived in Canada for
> thousands of years. New Canadians are expected to learn one of Canada's official
> languages, English and French. (CIC, 2002d)

Although this definition is vague at best, it does reflect the changing context of Canadian

politics and signifies a shift from the idea of Canada as a white, settler society to the idea

of Canada as a tolerant society filled with Aboriginal, English and French speaking,

rights bearing citizens. This reinforces the idea that the Canadian state is promoting a

state culture that emphasizes diversity and 'tolerance', as well as the importance of

immigrants and immigration to Canada. The government constantly reiterates the ideas

of moral responsibility, multiculturalism and Canada as a country of immigrants. Again, when compared to the actual shifts in policy, this rhetoric reveals the contradictions within government policy on immigration.

The proposed revisions to the Citizenship Act differed from the 1977 legislation in that they proposed: a stricter definition of residency, an ability to sponsor same-sex and common-law partners, objective criteria for the decision-making process for granting citizenship, and a new Oath of Citizenship under which allegiance is sworn to both the Queen of England and Canada (Frith, 2003). A number of changes also reflected the concern over denial and even revocation of citizenship. Revocation would have been a fully judicialized process with allowances for expedited removal where war crimes, organized crime or terrorism is involved (a post-September 11th addition). Also, the Minister would have had the power to annul citizenship in clear-cut cases, upon notification of the grounds alleged against the person, and the Governor in Council could have refused citizenship when a person demonstrated a "flagrant and serious disregard for the principles and values underlying a free and democratic society" (Frith, 2003: 73). Such changes would have created a second class of Canadian citizens – unlike those who were born with Canadian citizenship, the status of new citizens would have been less secure. As with the *IRPA*, these changes reflected an increased concern with security and the abuse of the rights and privileges associated with Canadian citizenship. Unlike the IRPA, however, the legislation was tabled and was not reintroduced in subsequent sessions.

Immigrants in Canada – Rising Racism and Barriers to Belonging

During the first Mulroney government (1984-88), the issue of immigration became highly politicized, with the claims of many refugees being seen as 'false' (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 46). By 1988, national opinion polls indicated that 30% of Canadians felt that there were too many immigrants in the country. This figure rose to 45% in 1993 and was over 50% by 1994 (ibid. 47). This shift in public opinion and public policy is well represented by the New Right, embodied previously by the Reform Party of Canada and the Alliance Party, and now by the Conservative Party of Canada. As the Reform Party has metamorphosed into the new Conservative Party, some of their positions on immigration and multiculturalism have softened in order to appeal to a broader spectrum of voters. They continue, however, to take a more restrictionist stance on immigration and a more assimilationist stance on integration (Conservative Party of Canada, 2006). Ultimately, the vision of the new right, as represented by these parties, is significant because of the influence it has had on public policy and public opinion over the past decade. Anderson and Black (1998), for example, argue that the Reform Party's closed-door attitude towards immigration helped shift public opinion and ultimately shifted the governing Liberal Party towards more restrictionist policies.

The vision of the partisan Right incorporates market liberalism and social conservatism (Patten, 1999: 29) and is one in which all Canadians and provinces are treated equally, by which they mean that they are treated the same. All citizens would share a common national identity and ethnic and identity politics become part of private life separate from the functioning of the federal government.

> The Reformers want a nation at once united and decentralized, a country
> without public debt where all people are declared equal but no individual
> receives special help. They believe that women should make their way
> without affirmative action or any federal program to lift them up. ... There
> would be no official multiculturalism, sharply limited bilingualism, and no
> funding for any private group to preserve its identity (Sharpe and Braid,
> 1992: 10).

This approach assumes that there is a public sphere national identity (or that one can be

created) which is based on universal values transcending the private identities

of ethnicity, gender and class. As Patten suggests, the Reform vision of Canada was

based on an exclusionary discourse that strove to limit the ability of minorities to define

the political community in a way that provided space for their collective identities (1999:

28). While the Reform Party no longer exists, their ideas continue to shape the politics of

the partisan Right in Canada and are carried forward (albeit perhaps in a more moderate

form) by the Alliance and now the Conservative Party. The 2006 Conservative Party

Platform, for example, combined potentially progressive measures (such as reducing the

landing fee and improving the assessment of foreign credentials), with a more hard-line

approach aimed at more rapidly processing and enforcing deportation orders

(Conservative Party of Canada, 2006). In reality, the roots of the national identity put

forward by these parties are based on Christianity and liberalism. They "[assume] that

any political community is, at bottom, an aggregation of individuals who share an

essential sameness that is more fundamental than any apparent differences (Patten, 1999:

29). This, in turn, makes it difficult for them to understand the reluctance of ethnic

groups to embrace their vision.

This vision of Canada influences the stand of the partisan Right on many issues related to identity within federal politics. They argue that the role of the federal government should be to "provide the common background onto which those pieces must be affixed, and the glue which must hold them together" (Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 131). Ottawa should not act as the protector of special interests and identities but should provide equality of opportunity to all individual Canadian citizens and promote a shared national culture. In this sense, immigration policy should reflect the economic needs of Canada, the federal government should stop protecting Aboriginal Peoples and financing multiculturalism and the women's movement, and Quebec must accept its status as one of ten equal provinces, rather than as a distinct society. How the government can ensure equality of opportunity without rectifying the real, structural problems of difference and discrimination is not addressed by the New Right, yet, as the following section demonstrates, racism continues to be a serious problem within Canada.

Since the Second World War, Canada has become a multi-ethnic and multiracial society. Yet while programs embodied by the Multiculturalism Act exist to encourage and embrace this diversity, racism continues within Canada. The Canadian Federal and Provincial governments have conducted a number of research projects aimed at uncovering and addressing racism. In 1992, Stephen Lewis in the *Report on Race Relations in Ontario* argued that Blacks in Canada face obstacles that other non-white groups do not. He said:

> What we are dealing with ... is anti-Black racism. While it is obviously
> true that every visible minority community experiences the indignities and
> wounds of systemic discrimination ... it is the Black community which is
> the focus. It is Blacks who are being shot, it is Black youth who are

unemployed in excessive numbers, it is Black students who are being inappropriately streamed in schools, it is Black kids who are disproportionately dropping out ... it is Black employees, professional and non-professional, on whom the doors of upward equity slam shut. (Quoted in Kymlicka, 1998: 80)

This report speaks to the prevalence of racism and its consequences for visible minority individuals in Canada.

Racism is also evident in terms of the socio-economic success of new immigrants and visible minorities. Overall, studies show that Canadians of Chinese, African and Caribbean origins remain poorly integrated into the culture and economic structure of Canada and educational achievements fail to protect them from poverty or income disadvantage (Canadian Heritage, 1998a). For example, studies of the participation of Blacks in the workforce show that despite the fact that Black workers had almost comparable levels of education as non-Blacks, they tended to have higher levels of unemployment and earn approximately 15% less that the Canadian average (Canadian Heritage, 1998a). Statistics Canada data from 2001 shows that both Canadian-born and foreign-born Blacks in Canada continue to earn significantly less than the average Canadian and have a higher incidence of unemployment (Milan and Tran, 2004: 6-7). As well, Black Canadians are reportedly far more likely to feel that they have been discriminated against than other visible minorities in Canada (Milan and Tran, 2004: 7). This structural racism is also gendered. As Vickers and de Sève note, visible minority women in Canada are doubly disadvantaged and tend to earn less than both visible minority men and other non-minority women (2000: 152). As well, recent reports show that Canada has not effectively addressed the isolation of many immigrants, partially due

to cutbacks in settlement programs and language services, and the difficulties associated

with finding work and getting their credentials recognized (Jimenez, 2006).

While measuring racism in any society is problematic, some statistics based on racially

related incidents have begun to be collected in Canada. According to a Heritage Canada

report, at the end of the 1990s an estimated 60,000 hate crimes occurred each year in

Canada's nine major urban centers (Canadian Heritage, 1998c). Approximately 61% of

there were against racial minorities (especially Black Canadians) and 23% were against

religious minorities. While many incidents may not be recorded as 'hate crimes' or

counted in this manner, these numbers do portray a different image of being an belonging

to a minority group in Canada and challenge the myth of Canadian diversity. The report

also noted that these numbers appeared to be increasing over the 1990s.

These problems continue within the Canadian Justice System, in which visible minorities

are discriminated against at the hands of police and within the court system. Overall,

visible minorities are more likely to be detained, charged, to go to jail and to receive

harsher sentences. Government studies such as the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry in

Manitoba 1991, the Marshall Inquiry in Nova Scotia in 1990 and the Commission of

Systemic Racism in the Ontario Justice System in 1998 all argued that systemic racism

and discrimination does exist within the justice system. As well, studies by the *Toronto*

Star (2002) and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (2004) found that Blacks were

the most likely group to be stopped by police in Toronto and subject to harsher treatment.

Finally, a recent report by Corrections Canada's Ombudsman stated that there is systemic

discrimination against Aboriginals in Canada's prisons. The report found that

Aboriginals were routinely classified as higher security risks, were released later, and

were more likely to have their conditional release revoked for technical reasons than non-

Aboriginal offenders (Correctional Investigator Canada, 2006). All of these studies

indicate the presence of systemic and ongoing discrimination within Canada's justice

system.

These problems are perpetuated by the virtual absence of visible minorities among the

political elite of Canada. Jerome Black's statistical analysis of ethno-racial minorities in

the House of Commons shows that although the numbers are increasing, they remain

underrepresented (2002). The majority of Members of Parliament continue to come from

an English or French background. Visible minority MPs are especially underrepresented.

Following the 2000 election, for example, visible minorities won 17 out of 301 seats

(5.6%) in the House of Commons, but made up 11.2% of the general population of

Canada (Black, 2002: 25). As well, this was a decrease from 6.3% in the previous

election (Black, 2002: 25). Thus, despite official multiculturalism, visible minorities in

Canada remain underrepresented at the most powerful levels of Canadian society and

political life. This suggests that John Porter's vertical mosaic (1965), in which very few

non-British and non-French individuals comprised the economic and political elite of

Canada, remains within Canadian politics.

Canada and Canadians, therefore, continues to experience racism and barriers to

belonging. This contributes to the challenge to define the values of Canada and to ensure

that state actors and institutions accurately reflect these values that is facing the Canadian government. The shift towards a neo-liberal state form in Canada provides new barriers to community building efforts. The ability to confront these challenges, however, is also affected by events and trends from outside of Canada's borders.

Challenges from 'Outside'

In addition to the numerous local challenges facing the Canadian state and the construction of Canadian identity, Canada also faces a number of external pressures. Globalization has compromised Canada's ability to act independently within its borders on certain matters. For example, the *North American Free Trade Agreement*, among other international trade agreements, has placed restrictions on the ability of the Canadian government to control the economy. Since September 11, the openness of the Canadian-US border has become an increasingly important issue, and policies such as the *30 Point Smart Border Action Plan* (signed in December 2001), may lead to increased border and immigration policy integration with the United States, lessening Canada's control over its borders. Around the world, the global movement of money, information, culture, and people has led to a changing perception of the role of states. In fact, some argue that the erosion of state powers has led to the proliferation of identities and identity politics as people search for belonging and community at a more local level (e.g. Barber, 2002; Rosenau, 2000).

Canada's identity has often been structured around a negative identification: we are not Americans. Instead, English-Canadians self-identify as a peaceful and orderly society,

characterized as a cultural mosaic that values accommodation, diversity and collectivity (Brodie, 2002a: 162), as opposed to the more aggressive and individualist culture south of the border. Canadians have often distinguished themselves from Americans through the Canadian welfare state, which has been used as a symbol of Canada's commitment to universality, equality, tolerance, and generosity. Similar to Sweden, the welfare state, and the system of universal health care in particular, have been used as a lynchpin of Canadian identity. As discussed above, the past few decades have witnessed the erosion of government provided social services and the increased targeting of the services that remain. The challenge to the welfare state and the decentralization of services and powers from the federal to provincial governments undermine the solidaristic construction of Canadian identity.

From the beginning of Canada, federal economic initiatives (such as the building of a national railway from coast to coast) attempted to unite the people economically and socially and create a pan-Canadian identity. If the ability of the state to do this is increasingly diminished by the forces of globalization and neo-liberalism, what does exist of a Canadian identity is further threatened. Furthermore, these changes pose a challenge to the idea of social citizenship as advanced by T. H. Marshall (1950), which served as a cornerstone for Western countries in the post-war period. The rolling back of the welfare state in Canada and Sweden leads to increased inequality between citizens and subsequently diminishes the ability of some citizens to use their rights effectively and fully participate in the state and society.

Another obstacle to the construction of Canadian identity in a global age is the presence

of American culture conveying American values into Canadian society. Kresl (1996)

argues that globalization and the dominance of the American cultural industry in Canada

threatens the ability of Canada to effectively convey and promote Canadian culture (226).

The efforts of the Canada Council and the Canadian Broadcasting Company to promote

Canadian cultural industries have proven insufficient in the face of the overwhelming

amount of American cultural products and media to which Canadians are exposed every

day. While this is a valid concern, as many would argue against the development of a

Canadian identity that is merely a branch of American culture and identity, the question

of what kind of a Canadian identity the state or the Canadian media would put forward

remains unanswered. As well, the increasing American concern over the security of the

Canadian border (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2003) combined with the continuing

integration of the Canadian and American economies, border control facilities, and

security may prove to be another threat to Canadian sovereignty, including in the area of

immigration.

While Canada facing serious external challenges, it also faces challenges from within its

borders. Through the presence of Quebec nationalism, the Canadian case study has a

wider applicability for understanding national identity. Carens (2000), for example,

argues that the immigration and integration policies of Quebec are similar to most

Western European states with a strong sense of identity and wish to preserve it. As well,

in spite of the problems in Canada discussed above, many regard Canada as an ideal

example. Holsti (2000), for example, writes that Canada is a model civic state where a

state policy of "unity through diversity" provides a strong contrast to states that attempt

to repress ethnic diversity (Holsti, 2000: 164). Finally, the role of Canada as an

international model for multiculturalism shows the importance of critically examining

Canada's multicultural policies. With these factors in mind, it is important to recognize

the value of Canada's identity politics.

It is also important to understand the Canadian case in terms of the larger context of

global politics. As Burgess (2001) argues, the political struggle between Canada and

Quebec is symptomatic of a more general challenge to the nation-state in the 21st century

(2001: 258). Globally, we have shifted towards neo-liberalism, increasing and /or

changing patterns of immigration (or at least the feeling that this is occurring), and the

challenge to the idea of the welfare state and the conflict over how to support it. The

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have increased the polarization between the east

and the west, or between the Christian and Muslim worlds, within western discourse.

This will potentially have an effect on immigration policy with regard to Muslim

migrants within Western states and has led to increased racism and concerns over ethnic

profiling in Canada and other countries.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that Canada is a country that has been shaped by its diverse ethnic

roots and that the conflict over how to manage and incorporate this diversity continues.

In many ways, Canada continues to struggle to define itself. Perhaps the lack of a strong

historically based and homogenous ethnic identity makes the task of defining the national

character or identity more difficult; however, it also provides Canadians with an

opportunity to challenge the traditional ethnic identity of the nation-state and construct

new models for national identity. While Richard Gwyn (1995) views Canada as a

"nation-less" state perpetually doomed to reinventing itself and incapable of imagining a

national community (254), the ability and need to reconstruct identity evident in Canada

can also be seen as a positive aspect.

Canada has moved away from a state culture that promoted the idea of a British-Canada

and encouraged both the strict assimilation and exclusion of immigrants. In the post-war

period, Canada developed its own identity and the idea of a tolerant, caring and

multicultural identity emerged in the discourse of the Canadian state. The 1990s

represented a shift away from these values. Certain key trends in recent immigrant and

immigration policies can be identified. First, there is increasingly a focus on security

(especially after September 11, 2001) and on the need to quickly deport immigrants and

refugees who are seen as a threat to national and international security. Second, the new

legislation reflects concerns about the abuse of the system by refugees and immigrants

and the problems of 'false' claims. Third, economic independence is increasingly

important as the government tries to reduce spending and comply with the tenets of neo-

liberalism. Thus, policy attempts to ensure that immigrants are self-supporting and not

dependent of the state or consuming state resources. Finally, these trends combine with

the frequent assertions of the benefits of immigrants and immigration to Canada's culture

and economy. The ideas of moral responsibility, multiculturalism and tolerance as

central to Canadian values are continually reiterated by the Government of Canada.

Again, this reflects a contradiction with the state culture of Canada and the image being

put forward by the government in comparison with the constraints of neo-liberalism.

Chapter Two listed a series of questions that can be used to focus the analysis of state

culture. These questions were:

- How is the historical and economic context of nation-building presented?
- How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?
- How is the democratic process represented?
- How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?
- How are individual rights and responsibilities represented?
- How are males, females and children represented?
- How is the society of the country represented?
- Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?

When these questions are applied to the literature discussed in this chapter, the following

aspects of Canadian state culture become apparent. In regards to the first question on the

historical and economic context, we can see the importance of Canada's history as a

settler society comprised largely of immigrants. The importance of a resource based

economy for westward expansion and settlement and the creation of the welfare state all

contribute to the current context for state culture in Canada. In addition, the neo-liberal

shift within Canadian politics and governance creates new conditions for state culture in

Canada today. Question two relates to immigration processes revealing a neo-liberal

shift within immigration, integration and citizenship policies in Canada. Over time, these

policies became more inclusive of different nationalities and ethno-cultural groups. The

shift towards neo-liberal governance, however, has arguably led to the retrenchment of

those values that promoted inclusion and increased social equality. These policies reflect

changing visions of the nation within Canada and reveal the increasing importance of

economics within Canadian politics. The issue of democracy, addressed in question

three, further demonstrates the difference between the idea of Canada as inclusive and the reality, exemplified by the under representation of minorities among political elites.

The next three questions address the relationship between individuals and the state, individual rights and responsibilities, and the role of gender. The building of the welfare state creates a new relationship between citizens and the state, but the rolling back of the welfare state in recent years potentially redefines this relationship. The entrenchment of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* has come to define individual rights and responsibilities in Canada, but does so by focusing on the individual as opposed to group rights or responsibilities towards groups in Canada. While significant advances on gender equality have been achieved since the 1960s through social programs and the inclusion of gender equality in the Charter, gender inequality continues to permeate processes and policies related to immigration and integration. Finally, Canadian society is presented as diverse, multicultural, but also individualistic. Consequently, the focus of Canadian state culture as represented in contemporary policies appears to be on a peculiar understanding of liberty (with a strong emphasis on security that potentially threatens individual liberties), at the expense of equality and solidarity.

Two competing discourses emerge from this overview of Canadian policy and practice. The first discourse emphasizes multiculturalism, tolerance and the caring society, as evidenced by the multiculturalism and bilingualism policies and the social policies of the welfare state. The other discourse is one of neo-liberal individualism. This discourse has become dominant and can be found in the new immigration and citizenship policies, the

rolling back of the welfare state, and decreased funding for cultural and identity building programs. Through its policies and actions, Canadian state actors and agencies appear to be advancing both of these discourses simultaneously – these, in turn, reflect the core values advanced by Canadian state culture at this point in time: multiculturalism, tolerance, the caring society, and neo-liberal individualism.

The following chapter explores the history of nation-building in Sweden and examines the Swedish state culture emerging from its integration and immigration policies. This is followed, in Chapter Five, by a comparative analysis of the state produced literature for newcomers in Canada in Sweden. In this chapter, the analysis of state culture in the literature will be compared with the findings of Chapters Three and Four, in order to determine if the values promoted in the literature distributed by the state match the values that are found within state policy. These values together can then be understood as comprising the state culture in Canada and Sweden at this time.

CHAPTER FOUR

Equalizing Differences? The Swedish Case

In the 20th century, following almost 1000 years of nation-building, the welfare state

society was developed in Sweden. Today, Sweden is known internationally for

promoting a high level of equality and standard of living among its citizens.

Underpinning this model is a *belief* in the essential equality and sameness of the people.

Since the development of the Swedish welfare state played such a central role in the

construction of Swedish identity following the Second World War, the state has also

played a tremendous role in projecting values and characteristics to the population. In the

latter part of the 20th century, however, increasing levels of diverse immigration,

combined with global political and economic trends, have challenged this vision of

equality and the Swedish identity it created. This context makes Sweden an excellent

case study for the examination of the values which comprise its state culture.

This chapter begins by outlining the long history of nation-building in Sweden,

highlighting the development of a culture of equality. The transformation of Sweden and

the development of the Swedish welfare model are then explored. This process provides

the foundation for the development of Swedish identity in the 20th century. The chapter

then turns to immigration and integration policy in order to explore the changing nature

of Swedish society, the increasing diversity of the Swedish population, and the values

projected through state policies on immigration and integration. Following this, the

continuing barriers faced by immigrants and the debates surrounding immigration are

explored. Finally, challenges from outside Sweden regarding immigration and identity

construction are addressed. The chapter concludes by applying the model of state culture to the Swedish case study. By focusing on immigrants and the state policies aimed at them, the state culture of Sweden and the values being promoted by state actors and agencies become apparent. These conclusions are then used as a starting point for the analysis of the state literature for immigrants in the following chapter.

Examining the policies and literature of the state of Sweden in regard to immigrants, immigration, integration and culture enables us to begin to determine the values promoted by Swedish state actors and institutions that define the state culture of Sweden. This chapter argues that, Swedish state culture is focused on the idea of equality, primarily presented as promoting sameness. This equality as sameness emphasis provides an interesting contrast to the focus on diversity in the Canadian case. As with Canada, however, Sweden also presents conflicting messages in its policy; namely, the conflict between neo-liberal individualism and Sweden's desire to fulfill its humanitarian obligations and maintain a strong welfare society.

The Importance of Being Swedish

Compared with Swedes, Canadians seem to be obsessed by identity politics. In Sweden, national identity is something rarely discussed or written about in the popular media or within academic circles. In fact, in Sweden nationalism is something associated with right-wing politics, neo-Nazis and fascism. Displays of patriotism are simply considered bad manners, in spite of the fact that Swedes have been shown to have a strong sense of national identity (Oakes, 2001). Sweden's lack of concern over its national identity is

largely attributable to its history. For a thousand years, Sweden has been relatively

isolated and homogenous. As discussed in this chapter, the multicultural reality of

contemporary Sweden is something of a shock to its citizenry and a serious challenge to

state actors and institutions. The Swedish state, however, has made an effort to bring

policy in line with its rapidly diversified population. It offers a high level of rights,

benefits and programs to immigrants and refugees. Unfortunately, as the Report of the

Integration Board (2001b) recently announced, Swedish integration policy in the 1990s

was a failure and recent immigrants remain very much on the margins of Swedish

society.

The lack of discussion about Swedish identity is at the root of the marginalization of

immigrants. The lack of awareness of what it means to be 'Swedish' and how the

institutions and policies are culturally specific makes it more difficult for governments to

address the concerns and problems of immigrants and make the state structure, policies

and practices (as opposed to just the population) multicultural. By accepting their

identity as a given, it becomes more difficult for immigrants and other marginalized

groups to find space to articulate their concerns and experiences. In many ways, the idea

that everyone in Sweden is equal and treated equally by the state perpetuates inequality

by refusing to recognize differences. This provides a strong contrast to Canada, with its

historical French, English and Aboriginal nations, and more recently immigrant groups,

contesting the meaning of Canadian history and identity. This opened up space for new

immigrants and other identity groups to participate in the political process of constructing

identity and share their own experiences of what it means to be Canadian. The

mobilization of identity groups around the constitutional negotiations for the *Charter of*

Rights and Freedoms, The Meech Lake Accord and *the Charlottetown Accord* and their

participation in the processes bear witness to this phenomenon.

The Swedish welfare state is the defining feature of Swedish identity in the twentieth

century. Leigh Oakes argues: "If it is possible at all to discuss the core of national

Swedish identity, that core would be this notion of modernity, of being part of modern

Sweden, part of an advanced, highly developed, rationally organized country whose

leading principles are justice and social welfare" (Oakes, 2001: 70). Both the Swedish

state's discourses and its citizens are characterised by a strong belief in compromise,

equality and the avoidance of conflict. They are neutral, reserved, and pragmatic. They

are "organized, regulated and disciplined" (Ålund, 1991a: 82). These characteristics are

both the source of the rise of the welfare state in Sweden, with its accompanying strong

tradition of corporatism, and the product of the huge role of the welfare state in the

average Swede's life. In other words, while the welfare state arose out of Swedish

traditions, its influence over daily life in Sweden has also helped to shape the nature of its

citizens.

Some of the cultural traits and attributes of Sweden, and the other Scandinavian countries

of Norway and Denmark, can be described as adherence to the "law of Jante." The Jante

Law takes the form of ten commandments and is derived from the novel *En flygtning*

krysser sitt spor (A Refugee Crosses His Tracks), written by the Norwegian/Danish

author Aksel Sandemose in 1933. The book takes place in an imaginary Danish town

called Jante and is about the ugliness of Scandinavian small town mentality. The term

"Jante law" has come to mean the unspoken rules of Scandinavian communities in

general and is significant because it reinforces the idea that not only is everybody equal,

but that no one person is any better than any other person. This idea can be seen in the

construction of the Swedish welfare state – the idea of equality is very much based on the

idea of sameness. Further, as this chapter will show, the idea of equality as sameness

presents difficulties when attempting to address the issues of diversity and difference

created by immigration within the state culture.

Lagom, a Swedish word that has no direct translation to English, is also at the core of

Swedish identity. For something to be 'lagom' is the highest praise in Swedish society.

Lagom is neither too much, nor too little – it is just about enough and just about right (a

bit like Goldilocks and the Three Bears). Don Belt (1993) describes the idea of lagom as

an all-purpose definition of what is acceptable and is not acceptable. " 'Lagom is best,'

the Swedes say, meaning reasonable, in moderation, with no extremes. 'To be average is

good in Sweden… To be different is bad'" (Belt, 1993: 22). The middle way of lagom

can be seen throughout Swedish society, from education policy to foreign policy, in the

Swedish neutrality, and in their compromises between capitalism and social welfare,

equality and liberty.

Whereas in Canada the conflict between ethnic groups begins pre-Confederation and is

centered on contested political, territorial and social space between English-Canada,

Quebec and Aboriginal groups, in Sweden conflicts arising from ethnic diversity are a

much more recent phenomenon. Their roots only go back to the 1970s when Sweden

began to receive large numbers of refugees from South America (primarily Chile), the

Balkans, Africa and the Middle East. The conflict in Sweden is often portrayed as a

cultural clash, rather than a conflict over territory, language and rights. It is a conflict

between the perceived homogenous Swedish state and society and the diverse cultures of

the immigrant groups. The arrival of large numbers of Muslim refugees intensified the

popular idea that integration problems in Sweden are based on a conflict between a

perceived progressive Swedish culture and a perceived 'backward' immigrant culture, or

between Islam and the Western, Christian tradition. This 'clash of civilizations'

perception results not only in the essentializing of immigrant culture, but also of Swedish

culture which is portrayed as the homogenous norm against which immigrant culture is

measured.

Building a Swedish Nation

The Swedish State dates back approximately 1000 years to when the Svea and Göta

kingdoms were united under the first Christian king, Olof Skötkonung (Lindqvist, 1994:

9). The Swedish State grew quickly and by the Middle Ages acquired all of the territory

known today as Finland. In 1397, the Kalmar Union united the three kingdoms of

Denmark, Norway and Sweden under Queen Margaret of Denmark and Norway, with the

Danes dominating the union much to the displeasure of the Swedes. The Union was

initiated to oppose the economic and political power of the Hanseatic League (Arter,

1999: 14). The Swedes, however, were unhappy with the union from the beginning.

This led to a century of social unrest involving peasant revolts and wars of succession

(Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 1). The Battle of Brunkeberg in 1471 was fought

between the Swedish Earl and Governor Sten Sture the Elder and Christian the First of

Denmark. Lindqvist argues that this battle marked the beginning of a nationalist Swedish

State and has been described as the first nationalist Swedish victory (Lindqvist, 1994:

28). Under the rule of Sten Sture the Elder, the national Regent became an equal rival to

opposing powers in Sweden and the Kalmar Union. (Lönnroth, 1935: 1056). The Kalmar

Union finally collapsed in 1520 with the Stockholm bloodbath in which Christian II of

Denmark, and later Sweden, executed 94 of his opponents (supporters of Sten Sture the

Younger). The execution was conducted under the premise of heresy, but in reality was

about the Danish retention of control over the Swedish territory and Kingdom – and led

to blood literally running in the streets as the bodies were piled in the main square

(Henrikson, 1985: 185).

With the support of the Lubeck Hansa, Gustav Vasa rose against Christian II as the leader

of the Sture faction and established Sweden as an independent country, assuming

leadership of it. He was later elected king of Sweden on June 6, 1523, which has since

become Sweden's National Day. Under Vasa, Sweden broke with Rome and created the

Lutheran Church of Sweden, primarily in order to gain control over the Church's

properties and treasury (Lindqvist, 1994: 36). Vasa also commissioned mass printings of

the bible in Swedish, providing the first common language and vocabulary (Lindqvist,

1994: 36). Oakes describes this as the beginning of language cultivation within Sweden

(Oakes, 2001: 65). As well, the development of the Swedish common language can be

viewed as one of the major steps towards the building of a coherent and united Swedish

nation. These changes also point to the emerging role of state and political elites in the

nation-building project in Sweden.

By the 1600s, the Swedish bureaucracy was in place, and there was massive urbanization

and tremendous efforts at building an Empire under King Gustav II Adolph. Sweden

entered a period of empire-building and emerged as a great power in Europe (1611-1718)

with territories in Russia, Germany, Finland, and the Baltic States, as well as establishing

colonies in Delaware and Cabo Corso in Africa (Arter, 1999: 15-17; Oakes, 2001: 65). In

1658 the Peace of Roskilde was established between Denmark and Sweden granting six

provinces to Sweden, the most important of which were Skåne (southwest Sweden) and

Bohus (the West Coast). This peace treaty ended the struggle in Sweden for control of

the West Coast and established the western borders that Sweden holds today. The

foreign territories were all lost under King Charles XII who ruled from 1697 until 1718

when he was killed in a battle against Norway. The only foreign territory that remained

was Finland, which was lost to Russia in the early 1800s. Peace was only established in

many of the conflicts started by Charles XII following his death, but his regime was

coterminous with the demise of the Swedish Empire (Henrikson, 1985: 253). Through

his policy of continuous warfare, Charles XII was responsible for the deaths of a large

portion of the male population in Sweden. His war efforts also drove the country into

debt and the peace negotiations following his death proved to be very expensive

(Henrikson, 1985: 254). With no heir to follow Charles XII on the Swedish throne, the

head of state continued to be drawn from Swedish royalty, but political power was

effectively transferred from the kings to the Riksdag, or Swedish Parliament, beginning the tradition of democracy in Sweden (Lindqvist, 1994: 52-54).

Under King Gustav III, Swedish society underwent a period of peaceful transformation. On August 19, 1772, in reaction to events on the European continent including the French Revolution, Gustav took power and privileges away from the ruling nobility in a peaceful revolution and distributed them more equally among the Swedish people. He also destroyed the Rose Chamber and other torture prisons, effectively abolishing torture in Sweden (Henrikson, 1985: 268). He allowed freedom of religion for foreigners in 1781, which led to increased diversity in Sweden, including the growth of a Jewish population (Henrikson, 1985: 270). "In time [Gustav's] reforms would lead to an almost total transformation of the community, because it was now that the political and social advance of the lower classes actually began" (Lindqvist, 1994: 61). Unfortunately, not everyone appreciated his efforts at democratizing Sweden and he was shot while attending the opera in 1792 and bled to death.

The Swedish-Norwegian Union of 1814, which lasted until 1905 when Norway gained independence, signaled the beginning of a new period of peace and nation-building in Sweden. An official government policy of 'peace, vaccine and potatoes' led to an increase in the population. The infrastructure and communication network of Sweden was also developed at this time and government acts were passed to improve the lives of the common people. The *Elementary Education Act* was passed in 1842 requiring every parish to have a 'people's school' (folkskola) for the children of the parish (Lindqvist,

1994: 68). In the 1840s, women's rights were also improved as daughters were granted equal inheritance rights and women were allowed to run their own businesses. Universal suffrage was granted to all citizens in 1919 and women voted in a national election for the first time in 1921. These early policies provided the roots of equality, and specifically equality of state provision, a democratic value that formed the basis of the Swedish welfare state in the twentieth century.

A Time of Transformation

The 1930s was a time of transformation in Sweden in which nation-building shifted towards the promotion of social and economic equality through social democracy and the welfare state. By the 1930s, Sweden was an industrialized and urban country compared to the poor, agrarian society of the previous century. It was during this decade that Sweden began the process of building the *folkhem* (People's Home) and the Swedish welfare state. At the same time, through the work of the Institute of Racial Biology in Uppsala, racism gained scientific credibility in Sweden and more restrictionist immigration policies were introduced by the government.

The idea of the 'People's Home' (*folkhem*) began in the 1930s under a government initiative to ensure that families could receive assistance in getting their own homes. The term originated in 1928 from Per Albin Hansson, the Social Democratic Party leader, to describe the social and economic goals of the labour movement. He described the society of the People's Home as one where "everyone cared for one another without the barriers that divided 'citizens into privileged and disadvantaged, exploited and exploiters'"

(Gress, 2001: 259). It was based on the two guiding principles of Swedish society, emerging from this history discussed in the previous section: egalitarianism and solidarity. It set down the principle that all people living in Sweden are to be treated equally and that one should not distinguish between the various subgroups. This principle is central to Swedish society and is largely responsible for the high level of economic equality between the citizens. However, the principle of equal treatment has also had a negative impact on minority groups in society; for example, it was used to justify not recognizing Sami demands on various occasions to be recognized as an indigenous people with their own cultural and political rights (Boyd and Huss, 2001: 7). The Sami, also known as the Lapps, are an indigenous people inhabiting Northern Sweden, Norway and Finland. Approximately 15,000 Sami live in Sweden and have historically been subjected to a strong assimilationist policy. Today, the Sami hold the same rights as all other Swedish citizens. It is only recently, through European Union membership and EU legislation on issues such as minority language rights, that the Sami have gained any specific group rights in Sweden. As discussed below in the section on current immigration and integration policy, this emphasis on equal treatment has a negative impact now that Sweden has become a more multi-ethnic society.

The People's Home project combined with the Saltsjöbaden Agreement laid the foundation for the Swedish Welfare State and the corporatist political culture that characterised twentieth century politics in Sweden. The Saltsjöbaden Agreement was signed in 1938 and its signatories included the trade union wing of the Social Democratic Labour Movement, the Trade Union Confederation (LO), the national association of big

and small businesses and the Employers Confederation (Hort, 1993: 75). They agreed on a system of wage negotiations, peaceful settlement of industrial disputes and paved the way for central labour negotiations for decades to come (Hort, 1993: 75). It also allowed for the rationalisation of industry and state management of the economy and industrial sectors (Arter, 1999: 175). This agreement became the basis for the post-war strength of the labour movement and the Social Democratic Party and created a framework for modern social policy. It also provided the foundation for the corporatist framework of negotiations on all social and economic political issues, including immigration and relations between immigrants, immigrant organizations and the state (e.g. Soysal, 1994 and Hammar, 1991).

Despite this framework of progressive social policy, Swedish attitudes towards foreigners and immigrants were not that different from those in the rest of Europe. The Institute of Racial Biology, established in 1921 in Uppsala, was a leader in the field of racial biology and helped influence similar projects in the United States, Canada and Germany by providing an academic basis for similar research (Arter, 1999: 192). This little researched and less talked about Institute carried out a number of supposedly 'scientific' projects. The 'degeneration danger' became one of the most potent images of social threat in Sweden and the Sami, Jews and Gypsies were seen as inferior (Arter, 1999: 192-93). In 1932, laws were passed in the Riksdag for the enforced sterilisation of all "detrimental types and characteristics" (Arter, 1999: 192). The policies of the Institute of Racial Biology are arguably a reflection of the common eugenist views of most Westerners of this time. The danger of the Institute, however, was that it gave these views

academic legitimacy and influenced Swedish policy makers. Between 1934 and 1976, sixty thousand Swedes were sterilized based on these beliefs; 90% of them were women (Arter, 1999: 192). The Institute was not abolished until 1973.

The racist views promoted by the Institute for Racial Biology are also apparent in the restrictive Swedish immigration and refugee policy in the inter-war years, as discussed in the section on immigration. The slogan, "Sweden for Swedes," popular during the inter-war period, highlights the desire among many Swedes to preserve the ethnic homogeneity of Sweden (Oakes, 2001: 112). Sweden's neutrality during the Second World War is still a controversial subject. During the War, Sweden had sympathizers for both sides, as did most of the Scandinavian countries. The invasion of all of Sweden's neighbors without action from Sweden (and perhaps even with prior knowledge), and the transportation of German troops and supplies over Swedish soil remain most controversial. In spite of its neutrality, many Swedes participated in resistance movements and as troops on both sides of the conflict (most notably in Finland). Sweden's neutrality was an ideological as well a pragmatic decision. Sweden did not have the defenses to resist Nazi Germany and possessed resources, namely steel, which the Nazi Regime needed. Although Swedes suffered shortages during the war, they maintained a much better standard of living that most of Europe. It emerged from the war unscathed and was able to use their in tact industries and infrastructure to build the welfare state and quickly became one of the most prosperous countries in Europe.

Building the Swedish Model

Unlike in Canada, where identity became extremely politicized during the constitutional

debates of the 1980s and 1990s, identity is not a constitutional issue in Sweden. Rather,

Swedish state actors and agencies had a formative role in shaping Swedish national

identity through the building of the welfare state and Swedish model. Since the 1930s,

the Swedish model and the social policy of the state have defined the way Swedes view

themselves and are viewed by the world. In 1936 Marquis Child, in his book *Sweden:*

The Middle Way, displayed his admiration for the Swedish people and the actions of the

Swedish state. He described the Swedes as "a people who cultivated their garden, their

rocky, remote, lonely garden, with patience, with courage, and with an extraordinary

degree of intelligence" (quoted in Gress, 2001: 266). In many ways, the perceived

strength of Swedish society is premised on the Swedish welfare model, which is the

backbone of the 'strong society' Sweden aimed to build. Tage Erlander, the post-war

Social Democratic Prime Minister, first used the term 'strong society' in parliamentary

debate arguing that the social democratic policies of redistribution and collective

provisions of education, health care, and pensions made society strong and able to take up

new challenges. The idea of the strong society underpins the Swedish model (Gress,

2001: 268). Finally, the most common and unique element in all definitions of the

Swedish model is "the ability of opposing political actors to meet and discuss their

differences. Swedish historians conclude that dialogue and mutual respect rather than

conflict and mistrust became the method for interaction among social classes in Sweden"

(Micheletti, 1991: 148).

Sweden began to build the modern welfare society in the post-war period based on earlier

traditions of equality, the idea of *lagom*, the 1930s project of the People's Home and the

Saltsjöbaden Agreement. However, the Swedish welfare state was not merely a response

to the economic crisis of the 1930s – the seeds that made it possible already existed in

Swedish society (Hollander, 1994: 138). Furthermore, the build-up of the welfare state

during the post-war years occurred in a time of great prosperity and is based on the

assumption of continuing growth and prosperity, not recession. This assumption of

prosperity is part of the cause of the so-called 'crisis' of the welfare state in the 1980s and

1990s, and the challenge to Swedish identity that arose out of it.

Jan-Erik Lane (1991) argues that the Swedish model consists of three primary elements:

compromise politics, social consensus (expressed in corporatist interest articulation and

interest mediation), and comprehensive social engineering by means of public policy

making (Lane, 1991: 1). Historically, "the emergence of the Swedish model was a

conflict resolution device controlling the interaction between the major social groups in

industrial society; it replaced class conflict with class co-operation both within and

outside Parliament" (Lane, 1991: 5). Arter (1999) outlines six characteristic features of

what he calls the 'ideal type of Nordic government':

1. Social rights based on citizenship;
2. The public sector is the key player in the provision of basic services;
3. Comprehensive 'cradle to grave' and 'womb to tomb' social policy provision;
4. A public monopoly of social policy provision financed by taxation;
5. A strong element of income redistribution; and
6. Equality as an explicit policy objective. (177-181)

These values that characterize Nordic government underpin the creation of the Swedish

model. They continue to be promoted by the state, through social democratic

governments, state actors and institutions, despite cutbacks and the influence of neo-

liberalism. At the same time, however, important changes are also occurring that

potentially challenge this understanding of the Swedish government and society.

Bryden and Oliver (1994) draw the following comparison between the Canadian and

Swedish welfare states:

> The Canadian social welfare system never reproduced that of Sweden,
> either in terms of program content or overall philosophy, though many of its
> goals were similar. The 'Swedish model', in fact, became synonymous
> with the apotheosis of social welfare planning. Its emphasis on
> compromise politics, social consensus and social engineering resulted in an
> unparalleled commitment to social justice and decades of labour harmony,
> rising living standards, and economic growth. (175)

This quotation points to the fact that in Sweden the project of building the welfare state

was more than a project aiming to provide basic services – it was an attempt to build a

certain type of society. The fact that it plays such a central role and that it is referred to

throughout the world as the primary and best example of a social welfare society has, in

many ways, shaped the identity of Swedes. It is also an important part of the pride they

feel for their country. Whereas, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Canadian

welfare state is an important part of Canadian identity and often used to distinguish

Canadians from Americans, for Swedes the welfare state is central to their identity and its

all-encompassing role in their lives distinguishes them from everyone else. In many

ways, the Swedish model is the end result of over one hundred years of nation-building

activities and the understanding of equality built into it continues to set the boundaries for

mainstream political discussion in the country. This is evidenced by party politics within

Sweden, namely the fact that the Social Democrats have governed for all but 9 years

since 1932 and that even the mainstream conservative party, the Moderates, does not

challenge the importance of the welfare state in its platforms, but rather the institutional

structure and implementation of its policies.

The Swedish *Social Security Act of 1954* made Sweden into one of the most advanced

welfare states in the world. The Act included coverage for sickness, retirement, early

retirement, unemployment insurance, disability, work related injuries and maternity leave

(Hollander 1994, 139-40). Reforms to the system since 1954 include the addition of

supplementary pensions, child benefits, and national pensions. It is a nationally uniform

system in which everyone, including non-citizen residents or denizens, are entitled to the

same benefits.

Gender plays an important role in the Swedish welfare state as the equality of women,

often measured by equal participation in the workforce and equal wages, is a goal of the

Swedish society. For many, the Swedish system is a model for attaining gender equality

(Eduayds, 1991: 166). Paid work is considered to be a basic condition of citizenship.

Therefore, the government promotes full female employment by offering subsidized day-

care and thirteen months parental leave with 80% of their salary to be shared between

both parents (Gress, 2001: 290). Although Swedish women enjoy more benefits than

most other women in the world, the policies of the Swedish state have not been entirely

successful. Women still earn less than men for the same work and day-care spaces are

difficult to find. Also, although men are entitled to share parental leave, very few fathers take advantage of this opportunity with over 85% of parental leave taken by mothers (Economist, 2004). In many ways, gender equality in Sweden has been measured by women's participation in the workforce without really challenging the divide between the public and private spheres or the idea of the male norm of valued work within the society. Sweden was also one of the first countries to allow, recognize and extend benefits to gay couples as well as one of the first to allow civil unions. The Swedish Lutheran Church employs homosexual ministers, and, as of 2002, homosexual couples are legally allowed to adopt children. Common-law couples, including same-sex couples, have the same rights and benefits as married couples (even for purposes of immigration) and, due to declining rates of marriage, the concept of illegitimacy for children no longer exists.

The highpoint for the Swedish welfare system occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the welfare state has faced new challenges. The political consensus between political parties has broken down on social issues and policies, including immigration. Hollander writes that "the Welfare State is increasingly blamed for economic problems and its political legitimacy has deteriorated somewhat" (Hollander, 1994: 143). The early 1990s were a difficult time in Sweden with a serious recession, high public debt, currency speculation, and high interest rates. The Social Democratic government responded to the economic crisis by devaluing the currency to maintain competitiveness, introducing tighter fiscal and monetary policies to lower the deficit and reduce inflation, and a more aggressive industrial strategy (Bryden and Oliver, 1994: 176). As Gress puts it, the Swedish state has begun to adapt to market conditions (Gress, 2001: 281). The state has

partially privatized healthcare, privatized the telephone system (ironically selling shares in it so that the 'people' can own the company), and reformed the pension system. The reform of the pension system allows individual Swedes to use part of their pensions to invest in stock market funds and thereby increase (or diminish) their state pensions.

These changes signify an important shift in Swedish culture in response to the global dominance of neo-liberal policy and the international pressure on Sweden to conform. Perhaps the economic problems of the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a diminished faith in the system for Swedes, who now want to explore new options. Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme argued that the goal of the Swedish state was "realizing freedom not against the collective, but through and within the collective" (quoted in Gress, 2001: 231), thereby placing more emphasis on equity and equality than on liberty. Arguably, his murder on the streets of Stockholm in February 1986, while walking home from a movie, changed the way the average Swede viewed his or her country. In some ways, the death of Olof Palme can be viewed as the death of the Swedish dream, for it is after his death that Swedish society and its normative assumptions also began to change. The extent to which they are changing and trading social democratic values for a neo-liberal state and whether or not this is a crisis of the welfare state is still up for debate.

Many political scientists argue that the Swedish model is at a crossroads, or in crisis (e.g. Lane, 1991; Hollander, 1994; Gress, 2001). Lane, for example, argued in the early 1990s that "Sweden is now searching for an alternative practical model in order to adapt to the

constraints of a new environment: government overload, private and public sector

intermeshing and the internationalisation of the economy" (Lane, 1991: 1). In 1991, the

new conservative government of Sweden declared the Swedish model dead and promised

a freedom of choice revolution (Hort, 1993: 71). In many ways, "[t]he early 1990s found

Sweden questioning itself as never before." (Hort, 1993: 72) Most authors are in

consensus that domestic and international changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s

brought about a period of questioning and change in Sweden. This period signifies a shift

away from solidarity and the social democratic model and a shift towards more neo-

liberal and individualistic policies that led to a combination of both private and public

coverage and a rise in inequality (Hollander, 1994: 143). Hollander summarises this

change well, stating that:

> The shift towards market-oriented social security in Sweden includes an
> effort to increase the productivity and competitiveness of the economy.
> This is followed by stronger pressure on the individual worker and more
> restrictive rules for claiming benefits. The idea of welfare according to a
> conception of social rights has at least partly been replaced by incentive-
> oriented policies. (Hollander 1994, 143)

Anders Lindbom (2001) argues that despite cutbacks and reforms in the 1990s, the

Swedish welfare state has not been dismantled. In comparison with other countries, its

major attributes of generosity, universality and level of services are almost as prominent

as before, although slightly more liberal. In fact, he suggests that the welfare state in

Sweden is, in some ways, proving resilient to globalisation due the unpopularity of

welfare cuts among the public (Lindbom, 2001: 171-193). Similarly, Hort suggests that

Sweden is less prone to major cutbacks and changes in the welfare state because such a

wide sector of the population benefit in some way or another from the welfare system,

suggesting that these institutions are self-reinforcing (Hort, 1993: 86). They may accept privatization of some aspects of service provision, but most desire that the state still provides some services and maintains a major role in their regulation and financing; for example, in the context of the partial privatization of the health care system, which included the established of private clinics and user fees (Hort, 1993: 86). Mahon argues that the Swedish model of social democratic governance continues to provide a viable alternative to neo-liberalism, despite global pressures and the rolling back of the welfare state witnessed in the 1990s (Mahon, 2000: 27-9). Bryden and Oliver conclude that "despite the obvious rise of international conservatism and the expensive nature of an activist state, neither Canada nor Sweden have yet moved far from their origins as social welfare societies and, therefore, seem to have successfully maintained the integrity of their systems" (Bryden and Oliver, 1994: 182). Thus, while the Swedish welfare state obviously underwent modification (including some downsizing and privatization) since the high point of the 1960s, it still remains one of the most comprehensive and generous social policy regimes in the world. While significant change has occurred and diminished the importance of solidarity as a value in Sweden, the principle of solidarity is much more significant than in Canada.

The question of the future of the Swedish welfare state and the ability to maintain levels of service provision and pursue the Swedish model is not yet resolved. Although the Social Democratic Party retained power with their re-election in 2002, the rhetoric and aims of the government have changed since the days of Prime Ministers Erlander and Palme. However, this issue is very important to the study of Swedish identity. The

challenge to the Swedish model is also a challenge to the Swedish identity based on this

model. What happens to Swedish identity if the Swedish model, and its underlying

principles of equality, co-operation and solidarity, is challenged or disintegrating? As

stated earlier, most Swedes are very proud of their welfare state and its international

reputation. The threat to this lynchpin of Swedish identity contributes to the other

challenges facing Swedish society, such as the high levels of diverse immigration that

challenge homogenous Swedish culture.

The Politics of Immigration in Sweden

Through the building of the welfare state, the Swedish model and the People's Home, the

Swedish state came to play a central role in the lives of its citizens and in defining key

Swedish values for the Swedish people. Through their policies and practices the values

seen as central to being a 'modern Swede' continue to be projected to the population by

state actors and institutions. These values underpin the state culture of Sweden.

Immigration provides an entry point into the analysis of the values promoted through

state activities and to a deeper understanding of state culture as it helps us to understand

how the state regulates the borders of the nation. These policies define who is a desirable

immigrant and what is expected of new members in terms of integration and adopting

Swedish values and behaviors.

While Sweden has always experienced some immigration, it is only in recent decades that

immigrant numbers reached a level where they began to challenge the organization of the

Swedish society, the state and the assumptions underpinning it. Unlike Canada, with a

history of large scale immigration, addressing immigration and the challenge it poses to

national identity is relatively new in Sweden. As such, immigration is an excellent

mechanism for assessing how the Swedish state faces identity challenges and the values

promoted in its policy responses.

The phases of immigration and integration policy are outlined below:

> **Phase One:** *Prior to 1945* – Early immigration and emigration was
> relatively unrestricted. During the war years (1914-1945), Sweden began to
> implement immigration and refugee legislation and created authorities for
> managing the movement of people.

> **Phase Two:** *1945 to the late 1980s* – Following the war, immigrants were
> recruited to fill labour needs and assimilation was considered to be an
> automatic process. In the late 1960s and 1970s, there was a shift towards
> multiculturalism in Sweden, while at the same time immigration controls
> became more restrictive as there was a change from recruiting labour based
> immigrants to receiving refugees.

> **Phase Three:** *Late 1980s to the Present* – Stricter control of immigration
> continues. There is a renewed emphasis on integration of immigrants into
> Swedish culture and language, as opposed to multiculturalism. With EU
> membership, an increase in EU and professional immigration occurs.
>   (adapted from Hammar, 1999: 172-3)

As is the Canadian case, immigration was increasingly restricted in the later part of the

20th century. As well, both Canada and Sweden experienced a move towards cultural

pluralism through multicultural policies in the 1970s. Unlike Canada, however, Sweden

retreated from these policy goals in the late 1980s and 1990s and began to emphasize

Swedish culture and language over cultural pluralism. Another important difference to

note between the two cases is that Canada, in the second half of the 20th century,

consistently emphasized work force immigration, while in Sweden refugees became the

largest group of newcomers. This leads to different challenges and costs for Sweden, as

states tend to have more control over the types of immigrants they choose to receive,

whereas this is less the with refugees case due to UN conventions. Thus, refugees

generally require more state funds and programs to integrate and achieve independence.

As these phases are described in more detail below, the role of immigration in helping to

define state culture and the borders of the nation becomes clear.

Early Immigration and Emigration

Sweden has always experienced some immigration. Stockholm and Gothenburg, the two

largest cities in Sweden, have always been multi-ethnic. Both cities have Finnish and

German communities and churches dating back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

and the Jewish community was established in the late 1700s. The two most prominent

early groups of immigrants were the Germans and the Dutch; however, there were also a

significant number of Finns resulting from the colonization of Finland by Sweden. These

early immigrants, however, constituted a very small portion of the population (for

example, 2% in the 1700s) and were easily integrated into the society, thus contributing

to the myth of Swedish ethnic homogeniety (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 58). As well,

these immigrants generally arrived to fill a need in the Swedish economy, whereas

arrivals in recent decades are primarily refugees.

The Germans were very influential from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries due to trade

and the Hanseatic League, whose trade routes included some Swedish ports most notably

the Port of Visby on the isle of Gotland (Åkerman and Springfeldt, 1994: 73). In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, economic power in Europe shifted from Germany to

the Netherlands and the Dutch became much more influential in Sweden. As well,

Dutch workers were brought to Sweden in the 1600s to help build the fortified city of

Gothenburg. The first city council of Gothenburg had more Dutch and German

representatives than Swedish ones, signaling the importance of these two groups in

Swedish society and politics. (Wigerfelt, 1995: 63-4)

During the seventeenth century, the rise of the Swedish Empire led to Sweden becoming

increasingly multi-ethnic. As Sweden became a centre of power in Europe, cultural

figures began to flock to Sweden (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 58). Throughout the 1600s

the common people of Sweden were largely ethnically homogenous; however, the

cultural, economic and social elites were much more cosmopolitan and reflected the

scope of the Empire and Sweden's power within Europe (Wigerfelt, 1995: 64). As stated

earlier, Sweden lost most of its foreign provinces by the early 1700s. As a result of this,

many foreigners left Sweden and the workforce and elite became more ethnically

homogenous (Wigerfelt, 1995: 64).

By the mid-1800s, Sweden was one of the poorest countries in Europe, which led to the

emigration of huge proportion of the population. Between 1851 and 1930, 1.4 million

Swedes (approximately one-fifth of the population) emigrated due to poverty (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2001: 13-14). The majority of them left for the United States, although

others went to Canada and other parts of Europe. "For many poor Swedes, America

represented a dreamland with good access to land, real work opportunities, high wages,

and political and religious freedom" (Wigerfelt, 1995: 70). The reality, however, appears

to have been somewhat different as, over time, approximately one-fourth of those who
emigrated returned to Sweden (Wigerfelt, 1995: 70).

The early 1900s saw minor migrations to Sweden from other troubled areas of Europe.
Notably, a number of Polish people came seeking work at the turn of the century, which
led to one of the first discussions on the need for controls and restrictions to deter foreign
workers from coming to Sweden. Also, a number of Russians fled to Sweden following
the attempt at a Revolution there in 1905. Finally, a number of Finnish people fled to
Sweden in protest of Russian rule in Finland. These numbers, however, were relatively
small and, despite fears over foreign workers, immigrants were easily incorporated into
Swedish life and society, as were the immigrants in the earlier centuries. Sweden's
relative isolation and distance from the rest of Europe protected it from many of the
political disturbances and problems on the continent, as well as from floods of migrants.
This isolation resulted in a relatively homogenous population in Sweden over the
centuries, despite minor waves of immigration, and left it unprepared for the upheavals,
refugees and resulting ethno-cultural diversity of its population in the twentieth century.

Despite some popular resistance towards immigration, Sweden shifted from being a
country of emigration to one of immigration during the World Wars. Hitler's ascent to
power in Germany led to the refugee situation in Europe becoming acute. The Swedish
Foreigner Law was reworked in 1937 against the background of the increasing refugee
stream in Europe at the time. The law was meant to address those at risk of being put in
concentration camps for political reasons, but not those detained because of their race

(i.e. the Jewish people) (Wigerfelt, 1995: 74-75). Those resisting the arrival of more

refugees in Sweden used arguments based on race, biology and economics, whereas those

in favour of admitting refugees argued that it was their responsibility as human beings to

help those in need (Wigerfelt, 1995: 75). These two arguments continue to dominate the

debates over immigration today. Those who were admitted to Sweden in the 1930s

received no economic help from the state or communities and therefore were both

expected and allowed to work to support themselves (Wigerfelt, 1995: 75). Although the

arguments for and against immigration and refugees did not change very much after the

war, a system designed to help refugees establish themselves and integrate was later

established by the state.

Sweden's borders were opened in 1942/43 to Danish and Norwegian refugees, many of

whom were Jewish, and Sweden became an important haven for refugees as the war

ended (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 59). During the later years of the war, Sweden accepted

over 200,000 refugees from neighbouring Norway, Denmark, Finland and from the Baltic

states (Wigerfelt, 1995: 76-77). Most of these refugees returned home after the war

ended; however, those from Baltic States – other than those deemed 'collaborators –

largely remained (Wigerfelt, 1995: 77). Another 34 000 refugees arrived through rescue

missions from concentration camps in continental Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2001: 14). During this period, immigration came to be regulated by the Swedish state in

order to control the flow of people into Sweden. While this initial phase of immigration

was motivated by humanitarian concerns, immigration quickly became an economic issue

in the period immediately following the war.

Post-World War Two Immigration

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, immigration in Sweden was driven by the need for workers. Sweden's industries and economy were booming as a result of Sweden's intact infrastructure after the war and the demand for goods in the rest of Europe. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of intense growth and economic boom in Sweden. Although Sweden never employed a guest worker system, as in other European countries, it did recruit a great deal of labour from other European countries during this period. However, because it was assumed that the workers recruited would remain and work in Sweden, it was important to assimilate them into the work environment and society as quickly as possible (Ohlsson, 1995: 89). During the 1950s, the majority of workers came from the Nordic states, Germany and Italy, and were recruited for skilled industrial work (Ohlsson, 1995: 93). In the 1960s, another wave of workers arrived in Sweden, primarily from Yugoslavia and Southern Europe, and recruited primarily for unskilled labour in Swedish industries (Ohlsson, 1995: 94). During these periods, 90% of the immigrants came from other European countries and 60% of them were from Nordic countries (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 60).

In the 1960s, labour immigration rose sharply sparking debates on immigration and calls for restrictions, primarily from the Trade Unions and from women, both of whom were concerned about the risk of flooding the labour market (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 59). The National Board of Labour was in charge of immigrant reception and integration programs, as well as for issuing permits to stay in Sweden. Because immigration was seen as filling a demand for labour, the Swedish government felt that the Unions and the

Labour Board should control it (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 9). The National

Immigration Board did not assume responsibility for immigration and integration until

1985 due to the large increases in immigration and the shift from labour-based

immigration to refugees (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 9). While post-war

immigration was initially dominated by labour immigration, smaller numbers of refugees

also arrived in Sweden during this phase in response to the political situation in

neighboring countries. For example, refugees arrived from Hungary in 1954, from

Greece in 1967, and from Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1968 (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 2001: 17-8).

Up until the late 1960s and 1970s, immigration was not the contentious political issue in

Sweden that it has become today, largely because of the primarily European origins of

immigrants, the lower numbers of immigrants (and refugees in particular) arriving, and

the relative ease with which they were assimilated. Immigration in the post-war period

was comprised mainly of workers from Southern Europe recruited for industrial jobs.

These immigrants were quickly and easily assimilated into Swedish society and culture,

as compared with many immigrants today. In fact, assimilation was considered to be an

automatic social process and immigrants were expected to adapt without a specific policy

or assistance (Hammar, 1999: 172). This approach appeared to work as immigrants were

forcibly assimilated – they had no choice if they wanted to keep their employment and

stay in Sweden. At the end of the 1960s, however, the Swedish economy began to

weaken and issues surrounding immigration and integration arose. The Swedish

Authorities began to react to immigration and committees and commissions were

established to address the issue of immigrant integration and to provide information on

legal issues related to permits, visas, and citizenship. This led to the introduction of

measures for controlling immigration in 1967 requiring immigrants to Sweden to have

employment, a work permit and housing before entering the country (Minister of Foreign

Affairs, 2001: 16).[15] As well, the National Immigration Board was established in 1969

(Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund 1997, 5). By 1970, labour immigration ceased altogether

as industry labour demands were met. The growing participation of women in the

workforce led to an overall increase in the size of the workforce by twelve percent by

1970 and contributed to the decline of labour immigration (Minister of Foreign Affairs,

2001: 16). Women's organizaions, in fact, supported decreased labour immigration as

they feared that too much immigration would lead to their unemployment.

In 1968, the Invandrarutredningskomissionen (Immigrant Investigation Commission) was

established. The Commission set out goals and guidelines for a special immigrant policy

wherein immigrants would hold the same rights and obligations as Swedish citizens. The

Commission also stressed the importance of the immigrant's own culture (Södergran

2000, 3). The conclusions of the commission signaled a clear deviation from the

previous assimilationist stance in Sweden and led to the development of Sweden's

multicultural policy in response to the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of newcomers

to Sweden.

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[15] These new regulations did not include people from other Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland
and Iceland) who retained their right to move freely between the countries.

Between 1972 and 1989, immigration to Sweden was characterized by flows of refugees

and family reunification of both new and previous immigrants as well as by an increasing

concern over the costs and effects of immigration for the Swedish state and society. As

well, the types of immigrants and refugees changed during this period from primarily

those with European origins to those from the Middle East, Latin America and Third

World countries generally, as Sweden welcomed waves of refugees from Latin America

(primarily Chile), Lebanon, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001:

17-18). In 1986, for the first time in Sweden's history, more than half of the immigrants

to Sweden were non-Europeans (Blanck and Tydén 1994, 60). Again, immigrant flows

were largely connected to political events, but were more likely to have occurred outside

of Europe. This led to the creation of sizable ethnic communities in Sweden that were

neither Swedish nor Nordic and led to new demands on the Swedish state for recognition.

In 1974, the Swedish Constitution was amended to include a section stating that "the

possibilities for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to maintain and develop their

own cultural and religious life shall be supported" (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 63). While

this support could be more detailed and strongly stated (for example, by defining what

constitutes maintenance and development of cultural and religious life, as well as the

nature or level of acceptable support), this change signaled a shift in policy and law in

Sweden. In 1975, Sweden introduced a multicultural policy, which was built around the

framework of three concepts: equality, freedom of choice, and partnership (jämlikhet,

valfrihet, och samverkan). Tomas Hammar summarizes the original intent of these three

overarching principles (which are a bold paraphrase of the French Revolution's liberté,

egalité et fraternité), in the following way:

> The goal of *equality* implies the continued efforts to give immigrants the
> same living standard as the rest of the population. The goal of *freedom of*
> *choice* implies that public initiatives are to be taken to assure members of
> ethnic and linguistic minorities domiciled in Sweden a genuine choice
> between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a
> Swedish cultural identity. The goal of *partnership* implies that the different
> immigrant and minority groups on the one hand and the native population
> of the other both benefit from working together. (Quoted in Ålund and
> Schierup, 1991: 2)

At the time, these goals implied that not only would foreigners enjoy the same legal

privileges as Swedish citizen, but also that the general public would accept these

multicultural aims (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 3). The emphasis on sameness and

similar treatment is problematic, however, as it assumes that equality is achieved by

treating everyone the same as opposed to recognizing that difference may require

different treatment and policies in order to achieve substantive equality. Also, the idea

that immigrants have the freedom to choose whether to be 'Swedish' or maintain their

cultural distinctiveness is somewhat naive. As most immigrants in Sweden and their

children are aware, it is not possible to 'become' Swedish without the right last name or

skin colour. In this way, one is born a Swede, one cannot just choose to become one.

The multiculturalism policy also included clauses on language rights and the principle of

ethnic maintenance (Blanck and Tydén, 1994: 63). As well, in 1975, foreign residents

who had resided in Sweden for at least three years gained the right to vote and run in

local elections (Hammar, 1991: 187), thus limited political rights were granted to non-

citizens. The Home Language Reform Program followed the Multiculturalism policy and

aimed to ensure that children of immigrants could maintain their home language

(Hammar, 1991: 188; Boyd and Huss, 2001: 4). These policies made Sweden one of

three western countries, along with Canada and Australia, in the world to have officially

adopted multiculturalism as the approach for dealing with issues related to immigration

and diversity. Their enactment shows the progressive nature of the Swedish state in

addressing these issues, especially in comparison with other European immigrant-

receiving countries.

Recent Trends in Immigration

Since the Second World War, immigration to Sweden has remained tied to international

political events. Approximately 2.1 million people have immigrated to Sweden and 1.2

million have emigrated from Sweden in the post-war period, either to return home or to

live elsewhere in the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 19). Sweden is viewed as

a desirable place to seek refuge because of the high standard of living, the attractive

welfare state benefits, high wages, low unemployment, good housing and the high quality

of the education system (Ohlsson, 1995: 86). Immigration has increased dramatically

since the Second World War and the nature of immigration has changed from imported

workers to refugees and immigration based on family reunification. This contrasts with

Canada, where the majority of immigrants in the post-War period were independents

allowed entry based on their skills and potential contribution. The number of permits to

stay and work in Sweden doubled in the 1980s and more immigrants are remaining in

Sweden than ever before (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 19). As a result,

immigration is literally changing the face of Sweden.

Today, one in five residents of Sweden has some non-Swedish background (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2001: 30). In 1910, only 0.4 % of the people living in Sweden were not

Swedish citizens and 60% of these were Danish, Norwegian or Finnish (Ohlsson 1995,

83). By the early 1990s, 6% of the population or 499 000 people in Sweden were

foreigners. If naturalized citizens are included, this increases to almost 10% of the

population. If individuals who were either born outside of Sweden or whose parents

were born in another country are included, the number increases to 16% or almost 1.5

million people out of a total population of approximately 9 million (Ohlsson, 1995: 83-4).

This increase represents a significant change in Swedish demographics. As Oakes (2001)

points out: "Unlike the immigrants of the past, who on the whole were not substantially

culturally distant from the Swedes, the Yugoslavs, Turks, Greeks and others who arrived

in the post-war years constituted a major challenge to Swedish identity" (Oakes, 2001:

112). Not only did many of the new arrivals look differently than the average Swede,

they struggled to maintain their distinctive cultural practices and were of significant

enough numbers that they began to raise the idea of what it meant to be Swedish in a

multicultural Sweden.

By 1985, however, the political climate on issues of immigration shifted again from

promoting multiculturalism to cultural protectionism. This was the culmination of a

variety of factors coming together, including the increased diversity, segregation and

poverty of recent immigrants, economic shifts, the rise of right-wing extremists, and a

number of policy changes. The multicultural policy was modified to state that: "freedom

of choice must not be interpreted in such a way that it results in a repudiation of the

Swedish language or the larger Swedish community of interest" (Blanck and Tydén,

1994: 64). At the same time, the minister responsible for immigration asserted that the

term 'minority' was not to be applied to Swedish immigrants (Blanck and Tydén, 1994:

64-5). In this sense, immigrant groups could not make claims on the state on the basis of

minority status. This directive reinforces the individualistic emphasis of Swedish

multicultural policy – individual immigrants have rights and choices, but maintenance of

their culture remains an individual choice and within the private sphere of life – not

dissimilar to the approach embraced by the Reform Party in Canada. Thus, one might

argue that Swedish multicultural policy is about addressing the presence of immigrants in

Sweden and providing them with rights, without really trying to change Swedish culture

itself. The idea of a coherent and homogenous Swedish culture as a norm against which

immigrant culture can be measured is still strongly present.

The Refugee Resettlement Plan (*Hela Sverige Strategin*, 1985) was developed at this

time to help integrate immigrants into Swedish society. The primary issue became

integrating immigrants into society and the workforce, as opposed to promoting any type

of a multicultural vision for Sweden. In other words, policy did not aim at changing

Swedish culture into a multicultural culture, but rather at ensuring that immigrants were

able to fit into the existing model. The Refugee Resettlement Plan was a response to the

rising numbers of immigrants and aimed to blend Sweden's population and distribute

refugees throughout the country. As Södergran (2000) notes, its purpose was positive

(12-13); reception of immigrants was to be managed by social services and funded

through social subsidies. Municipalities best suited for integration – those with a strong labour market, housing facilities, language services and cultural competence – were asked to participate in the integration program. The program aimed at placing refugees into a municipality as soon as possible so that they would start a regular life, learn about Sweden, meet neighbours and work mates, and become part of the society. Special refugee camps (which were previously used) might be necessary for short periods, but through this program, longer stays would be avoided (Hammar 1991, 194). Södergran criticizes the program, however, for reinforcing the public's idea that refugees are a burden on society and the system, and for creating a care taking approach to integration that left many refugees on social assistance and unable to integrate (2000, 13).

The arrival of a great number of refugees swamped Sweden's programs, which were designed to handle approximately 5000 visa applications per year. Instead, between 1990 and 1999, 245 000 asylum seekers arrived in Sweden, 159 500 of whom were granted residence permits. An additional 209 700 applicants were granted residence permits based on family ties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000: 25). However, in the 1990s the rate of rejected applications for asylum increased, along with the number of asylum seekers going underground. Currently, approximately 90% of applications for asylum are rejected, compared with 10-15% in the mid-1980s (Hammar 1999, 196-97). The non-European background of many of the applicants was a new challenge for Sweden and one with which the Swedish bureaucracy is still attempting to come to terms (e.g. Kamali, 1997). The cultural and religious differences of the new immigrants, particularly the Muslim arrivals, changed the debate about immigration in Sweden and led to the idea of a

'culture clash' becoming common within the discourse on immigrants and immigration. As well, towards the end of this period the consensus on immigration within the political arena and society at large broke down and anti-immigration voices began to grow louder.

In the early 1990s, immigration was characterized by increased family reunification and asylum seekers from southeastern Europe, and the freedom of movement of professionals within the European Union. As well, the economic recession of the early-1990s was severe in Sweden and put intense pressure on the welfare state and the Swedish model in general, resulting in very high levels of unemployment among immigrants. For example, in 1993, 24% of foreigners were unemployed, one-third of foreigners between the ages of 20-35 were unemployed, and 50% of Iranian men were unemployed (Ohlsson, 1995: 97). This led to a vertical mosaic in Swedish society where class based divisions reflected ethnic divisions.

Sweden currently receives approximately 50 000 immigrants and refugees per year and is one of the larger receiving countries in Europe on a per capita basis (Blanck and Tydén 1994, 61; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000: 25-28). The majority of immigrants live in the major urban centres of Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm. Stockholm has the largest proportion of foreign born people in Sweden at 17% of the city population (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 31). While the Nordic countries remain among the ten largest foreign communities in Sweden, they are joined today by people from the former Yugoslavia, Iran, Poland, Africa and South America (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 32).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001) argues that Sweden's immigration policy has the

following goals:

(1) to ensure that migration to and from Sweden occurs in an orderly
    fashion;
(2) to safeguard the right to asylum;
(3) to maintain regulated immigration; and
(4) to ensure that the policy measures are characterized by the rule of law,
    humanity and respect for the human rights of the individual (Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs, 2001: 34).

It is interesting to note that orderly migration receives primacy in these goals, whereas

respect for human rights, while still prioritized, comes last. These goals are all

understandable. However, there is a potential conflict between maintaining control and

order, and respect for human rights and the needs of refugees for asylum. According to

Hammar, however, control is currently more frequently emphasized, potentially leading

to more severe judgements and actions from the controlling agencies (1999: 199-200).

Also, the goals outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not appear to reflect the

perceptions of the general public on immigration, as shown by the increased support for

political parties such as the New Democracy Party (Ny Demokrati) and the Liberal Party

(Folkpartiet).

Over a period of less than a century, Sweden changed from a relatively homogenous

society into a multicultural country – at least in terms of population, if not in terms of its

institutions, culture or identity. As the following section shows, however, immigrants

continue to face serious barriers in Sweden. In typical Swedish fashion, its policies and

programs are formally very progressive, founded strongly on the idea of equality and

'sameness' for all, and aimed at protecting the rights of the newcomers to Sweden.

However, they fail to address the realities brought on by increasing diversity. This

diversity has proven to be a challenge to Swedish policy, institutions and identity.

Immigrants in Sweden: Rising Racism and Barriers to Belonging

As mentioned above, the changing national and international context with regard to

immigration shaped Swedish immigration and integration policy over the past half-

century. This section outlines the position of immigrants in Swedish society and the

current debates surrounding immigration and integration in order to contribute to the

context for the literature analysis in the next chapter. By examining the reality of

immigrants and their situation, along with the current issues and debates, we obtain

further insights into the state culture of Sweden and its contested nature.

In Sweden, immigration appears to be more politicized than in Canada, with high levels

of public discussion and debate over the nature and role of immigration in Sweden. This

is evident upon an examination of the recent national elections in the two countries. In

Canada, during the federal election of 2004, immigration was a non-issue. During the

national election in Sweden in 2002, however, the debate surrounding immigration

appeared and played a significant role as political parties and candidates came forward

with 'solutions' to the immigrant 'problem.' These so-called solutions were primarily

aimed at integrating immigrants, forcing them to learn the language and, at the extreme,

proposals to expel immigrants who cannot find work and support themselves. The Liberal

Party's (Folkpartiet, literally the People's Party) Leader Lars Leijonborg managed to

dramatically increase his party's standing in the 2002 federal elections. This increase is

at least partially attributable to his stand on the integration of immigrants. The story

broke in the daily national newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, on August 4, 2002, when

Leijonborg announced that his party wants to see a shift towards work-based

immigration, with immigration focused on those who can contribute to the Swedish

economy (Wiklund, 2002). Immigrants would be required to prove that they have a job

waiting for them to enter the country and would be required to leave Sweden if

unemployed for more than three months. Further, any immigrants bringing family

members to Sweden would have complete responsibility for that person for the first three

years of their residence. Finally, the party leader stated that there should be a mandatory

language test in Swedish to ensure language competency and knowledge of Sweden

before immigrants could obtain citizenship. This would represent a shift from a right to

citizenship for all 'denizens' (or long-term, permanent residents) after three years

residence (Larsson, 2002). Interestingly, this proposed shift in policy would have made

Sweden's immigration policies more comparable with Canada's policy, which has similar

requirements.

Leijonborg's comments led to an uproar in the debate on immigration and a war of words

within the major Swedish newspapers, with both *Dagens Nyheter* and *Göteborg Posten*

publishing a minimum of two articles each per day over the next week. A comparison

was made in the Letter to the Editor section saying that there were no differences

between the Swedish Liberals and the Danish Liberal Party, which was responsible for

the drastic shifts in Danish immigration policy in 2002 (Berggren, 2002). The Danish

Liberal Party has also been highly criticized by the Swedish state and media for its

actions. While the majority of the responses in the media were critical or skeptical of

Leijonborg's plan, there was still a sense of agreement that the current system of

integration of immigrants is not working. For example, a representative of the Christian

Democrats stated that 'this is not the best way to ensure that immigrants learn Swedish'

and a representative of the Green Party stated that Leijonborg's plan could be 'more

divisive' (Qviström, 2002).

A number of interesting issues came out of this debate within the media. First, the

emphasis on language training suggests that a lack of proficiency in Swedish is the

primary barrier that immigrants face. Second, the debate challenged the historically

entrenched idea in Sweden of equal access to social benefits and rights for all residents,

not just citizens. Finally, Leijonborg basically proposed a guest worker program that had

the potential to divide Swedish society further, creating an underclass of non-Swedish

workers. He appeared to assume that immigrants do not want to work, as opposed to

recognizing the proven fact that immigrants face structural barriers to finding work in

Swedish society, as discussed in more detail below. This represents a shift within the

discourse on immigration in Sweden towards blaming the individual immigrant for his or

her failure to integrate, which – despite traditionally representing a right-wing party

position – is also reflected in the recent policy shifts brought forward by the Swedish

Social Democratic government.

Both the policy and debates reflect a shift towards neo-liberalism within Swedish policy. This is represented in the movement away from the state as the actor responsible for ensuring multiculturalism, to the individual as responsible for being a 'good citizen' that can take care of him/herself without the assistance of the state. An example of this shift can be found in the focus on unemployment among immigrants, which is addressed through job-oriented Swedish language training and individual job training, as opposed to addressing the racism within Swedish hiring practices and the difficulty in getting non-European education and skills recognized in Sweden. This emphasis on individual solutions to societal issues and placing responsibility for integration solely on the individual immigrant is common when immigrants and refugees begin to be seen as social problems. "Caught in between structurally grounded discriminatory practices embedded in the formal political system, on the one hand, and imprisoned in the culturalist tower of Babel of state sponsored ethnic organizations on the other, immigrants (and especially immigrants of Third World origin) tend to end up in a political backwater" (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 19).

Indeed, the majority of Swedish immigrants do tend to end up on the margins of Swedish society. The literal expression of this phenomenon can be seen in the major Swedish cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, where immigrants are segregated into the suburban outskirts of the cities, living in neighborhoods such as Rinkeby, Rosengård, and Bergsjön. These neighborhoods have developed into Swedish 'ghettos' where the

average Swede would not choose to live. As Schierup notes, discrimination is common

in the housing market with "immigrants concentrated into newly built large concrete

suburbs with poor services" (Schierup, 1991b: 128). The 2001 report from the

Integration Board reinforces this, stating that housing is highly segregated in the large

cities with people with a foreign background concentrated in low-income areas. They

attribute the level of segregation partially to the difficulty in securing housing in other

areas and the high cost of housing; however, they also state that many foreign-born

residents choose to live together in these areas (Integrationsverket, 2001c: 14).

A recent study by the Integration Board also notes the difficulties immigrants face when

seeking employment in Sweden (Integrationsverket, 2001c). Not only do they face the

standard barriers of acquiring language skills and getting foreign qualifications

recognized, they also face a large degree of racism in hiring practices. A newspaper

article in the Gothenburg Post on the 17th of June 2002 began with the headline "Tough

for Job-seeking Immigrants" (Fransson, 2002) and stated that only 10% of immigrants

who arrived in Sweden in 1999 have a job today. The article continued to summarize

changes in the reception of refugees, stating that more communities are shifting this

responsibility from social workers to the Ministry of Industry and that the new focus will

be on the individual and getting him/her a job. An increase in ethnic discrimination in

hiring practices of 364% over the past 5 years was also noted.

Immigrants also play a marginal role in Swedish political life. Non-Swedish residents are

allowed to vote and run in local elections after three years and have the right to become

Swedish citizens after five years of residency, thereby obtaining full political rights.

However, the voter turnout among the immigrant population and the number of

immigrants running for election remains significantly lower than among the population as

a whole. In 1976, the first year in which permanent residents were able to vote in local

elections, only 60% voted compared with 90% voter turnout in the general population

(Sahlberg, 2001: 11). In the 1998 elections, the level of voter turnout among immigrants

had dropped to approximately 35% (Sahlberg, 2001: 11).

Sahlberg (2001) notes there is an over representation of individuals with characteristics

that generally accompany low voter participation among the immigrant population.

These include low levels of activity in clubs and associations, single people, people with

lower levels of education, and higher levels of unemployment (12-13). As well, lower

levels of political participation among immigrants may be connected to difficulties with

the Swedish language, and a lack of understanding of Swedish politics. Alienation from

the political system is another possible reason for low voter turnout, as immigrants feel

that their votes do not really count. Until recently, immigrant issues did not rank highly

on the political agenda and there were few differences between political parties in the

area of immigration, leading some researchers, such as Sahlberg, to conclude that this

consensus contributes to their alienation from the process (Sahlberg, 2001: 13-15). When

differences do appear between the parties, it is often in response to an emerging anti-

immigrant stance on the part of one or more parties as shown with the Folkparti above.

In the 2002 national election, the number of representatives with a non-Swedish

background elected to parliament doubled to twenty out of 349 seats, and the number of

representatives with an African background increased from one to four (Immigrant-

institutet, 2005).

Westin and Dingu-Kryklund note that opinion polls show a strong opposition to

continued refugee immigration and a belief that immigration policy is too lenient (1997,

66). As well, they point to an increase the number of reported racist hate crimes. They

note that, "besides unemployment and housing segregation, the most significant obstacle

to integration is the increasing negative opinion to the national immigration policies"

(Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 67). Racist attitudes lead to immigrants feeling

rejected, alienated and of not belonging to society. Despite the fact that these attitudes do

not necessarily reflect the opinion of the majority of Swedes, they "probably represent

some of the most significant obstacles to integration" (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund,

1997: 68). Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund's analysis points to the inadequacy of the current

policies and strategies of the government and the Immigration and Integration Boards.

The problem is not necessarily with the levels or type of immigration or with the existing

policies and laws, but with the reluctance of segments of Swedish society to truly

embrace multiculturalism and immigration. As long as immigrants feel that they are not

welcome, they will not make the same level of effort to learn the language and participate

in Swedish society.

Part of the problem may be related to the creation of a discourse of 'culture clash'

emerging within the media and political parties and the fact that a growing number of

Swedish migrants come from Islamic countries. This idea of a cultural clash between the

Christian and Muslim worlds is neither new nor unique to Sweden (e.g. Huntington,

1996; Barber, 1992), but has been strengthened since the terrorist attacks in the United

States and through the rhetoric of American President George W. Bush. This approach

creates a dichotomy between allegedly 'progressive' and 'modern' western culture and

the perceived 'traditional' or 'backward' Muslim culture. In Sweden, this results in a

perceived divide between 'modern' Swedes and 'backward' immigrants, further dividing

Swedish society into an 'us' versus 'them' mentality. Such perceptions also make it

more difficult for the contributions of immigrants to be recognized; rather they are more

likely to be considered a burden on Swedish society, if not a threat to its core values.

Aleksandra Ålund (1995) argues that "immigrants have continuously been conceived of

as 'traditionalists' inevitably in conflict with a supposedly homogenous and modern

Swedish culture" (9). Despite the idea perpetuated by the state that Sweden is a

multicultural country, the popular debate surrounding immigrants since the 1980s has

been one of a culture clash based on the defense of Swedish culture against the 'wife

batterers,' 'turbans' and 'hijabs' that are seen as representing backward immigrant culture

(Ålund, 1991a: 83). This portrayal of immigrant cultures works against efforts to

integrate immigrants and create a Swedish state culture that is diverse and multicultural,

as opposed to homogenous, assimilationist and essentializing.

The idea of a culture clash between Swedes and immigrants gained momentum in the 1980s and by the end of the 1980s the social taboo on making xenophobic comments evaporated and people began criticizing the national immigration and integration programs (Hammar, 1999: 179). The national consensus on immigration had officially broken down. This is attributable to the levels of growth in immigration in Sweden and Europe, the shift in immigration from European countries to Third World countries, and problems within the Swedish economy in the early 1990s (Hammar, 1999: 176-77). One example of this shift in popular opinion is the referendum in the community of Sjöbo in 1987 on whether or not to participate in the Resettlement Program. Fully 65% of the voters chose not to participate because they did not want 'foreigners' in their community. Another example is the rise of the New Democracy Party in 1991, which based its platform on a strong anti-immigration stance. The success of Folkpartiet and the debate emerging from their proposed solutions to the immigration problem discussed above also support this trend.

In 2001, the Integration Board released the *Swedish National Action Plan Against Racism, Xenophobia, Homophobia and Discrimination* (Integrationsverket, 2001b), which was adopted by the national government later that year. The plan's goal is to create dialogue between key actors and focus educational efforts on elites – the people in 'key positions' in society – as opposed to broad based campaigns aimed at the general populace. It does not address the findings of Swedish studies showing a strong tendency for immigrants to be concentrated in the lower labour market, having low levels of contact with the general Swedish population, and having lower political participation in

the political institutions. As well, it does not address the problem of everyday racism or the fact that "increasing xenophobia and discrimination have also been reported by immigrants themselves as being strong obstacles to a more complex and qualitative (i.e. non-ethnically segregated) incorporation into the labour market" (Diaz, 1993: 2). Studies showing these problems have been available in Sweden, but the *National Action Plan* does little to address them. Instead, the *National Action Plan* talks about "investigating the possibility" of establishing a broad new anti-discrimination law. However, without proper education about the law for the Swedish population and groups most affected by discrimination, it is likely to be as little used as the current law. Also, without making such a law known, effective, and accessible in terms of procedures, costs and reparations, it is likely to have little effect.

The other major area to be identified within the *National Action Plan* is the building of a national knowledge base; for example, by using the experience and knowledge of NGOs, compiling existing research and information into databases, and consulting the major actors on the existing problems and solutions. However, this information already exists and has been compiled elsewhere; for example, by the Immigrant Institute (www.immi.se). The nature of the problem is known; what is missing are concrete policies and initiatives to address it. Finally, while the *National Action Plan* mentions the importance of schools in the promotion of democracy and human rights values, it does not proceed to offer any suggestions or plans for how to do this. What is remarkable about the plan is the distance it creates between the everyday acts of racism and discrimination that occur in Swedish society, the people who suffer from it, and the actors

and strategies involved in planning for the process of eliminating it. This is exacerbated by the focus on educating elites, as opposed to the average person, and to compiling more knowledge on the issue, as opposed to developing concrete policies and plans that can be quickly brought into practice. While this strategy shows that the Swedish state is aware of these problems, the lack of a pro-active strategy is indicative of their unwillingness to tackle issues of racism head-on. Arguably, more action is needed, as opposed to more research.[16] This unwillingness can also be seen is the emphasis on integration as opposed to the creation of a multicultural society in Sweden or the reduction of racism.

Sweden's integration policy receives much more attention from politicians, the media, and within the public discourse than its multicultural policy, shich suggests a powerful level of resistance to immigrant cultures and changing the homogenous nature of Swedish culture. The primary goal of Swedish integration is 'functional integration' as opposed to assimilation. In other words, the adaptation of immigrants to the institutions, norms, and culture of the majority of society to such a degree that they can function in society while at the same time keeping intact their own ethnic identity. Ålund and Schierup argue that when such adaptation proves difficult the immigrants in question are generally defined as 'deviant' and the roots of the problem traced back to their 'deviant culture' (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 14). This approach was obvious during the 2002 election, as discussed above, where the debate in the newspapers over the integration of immigrants focused on the individual and his/her inability to, for example, learn Swedish or get a job, as opposed to structural barriers to integration.

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[16] Interestingly, when research is done that calls for significant changes in practice, such as a recent report by Prof. Masoud Kamali arguing for the dismantling of the Integration Department, the government tends to dismiss them. (Bodin, 2006)

Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund argue that the goals of the multicultural policy were to

> reinforce respect for the individual's identity and integrity. [The goals] aim,
> furthermore, to enable immigrant minorities to maintain and develop their cultural
> heritage within the framework of the basic norms that apply to in Sweden. These
> basic norms may be put down as human co-existence, mutual toleration and
> solidarity between people of different origins. Benevolent ethnic relations are to
> characterize Swedish society. Expressions of ethnic intolerance are unacceptable.
> (1997, 36)

According to them, the aim of Swedish integration policy is to smooth the road (or even

the playing field) for immigrants in Swedish society (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997:

59). Furthermore, the treatment and rights accorded to immigrants can be seen as a

product of Swedish belief in the welfare society and that everyone should be 'pretty much

the same' or no better than anyone else. The role of the Swedish state is to ensure that

immigrants have access to the services they need to integrate and be part of Swedish

society, whether this is through housing, work, language classes or social services.

However, immigrants are having an increasingly difficult time fitting into Swedish

society. They experience higher health problems, unemployment and social exclusion

(Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 60) and not all of this can be attributed to their

'immigrant' status and 'native' culture, but rather must be accounted for by considering

the characteristics of the 'host' society.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which immigrant or minority culture can

challenge the monoculture of Sweden without coming under attack. However, it seems

that the challenge of incorporating difference into Swedish society is one that has not

been taken up by the Swedish state. By and large, immigrants remain on the margins of

Swedish society. This is becoming a more serious problem as time goes on and must be addressed.

In 2001, the Swedish Integration Board released a report on their work of the past 10 years. The report acknowledged that Swedish integration policy is not succeeding in meeting its goals and that the situation and segregation of immigrants in Swedish society is a problem that needs to be addressed. The report noted that Sweden has become a multicultural country and that immigrants are not a homogenous group. It pointed to the qualities of immigrants that have the potential to contribute to Swedish society; for example, at the end of the 1990s, immigrants ran 70,000 businesses in Sweden, employing a quarter of a million people, thereby contributing to the Swedish economy (Integrationsverket, 2001c: 9). In keeping with the Swedish tradition of using immigration to fill labour gaps, the report also noted the increasing shortage of labour and skills in Sweden as the post-war generation retires. However, the report acknowledged that integration poses a substantial challenge and that a great divide exists in Sweden between Swedes and foreign-born residents. The Integration Board's report states that foreign born residents in Sweden are far more likely that Swedes to be unemployed and that many are stuck in long-term dependence on social assistance, remaining at the margins of Swedish society (Intergrationsverket, 2001c: 9). Others have difficulty in finding work corresponding to their education, skills and knowledge. As well, immigrant children generally receive worse results in school, perpetuating these patterns of marginalization (ibid.).

As part of its efforts to create positive conditions for integration, the Integration Board's report outlines a new strategy for working together with different actors, including state authorities, communities, companies, labour organizations, NGOs, schools, colleges and universities. This report gathered statistics from the past 10 years and outlined the problems facing integration as well as outlining a new strategy for addressing these problems and achieving integration. With the goal of creating the same rights, obligations and possibilities for all people in Sweden, the new strategy attempts to individualize the process and framework of integration by bringing the 'individual into focus' (Integrationsverket 2001c, 10). It states a need to develop a common and long-term vision and plan for integration and diversity based on cooperation with all sectors of society and the creation of coordinated policies (Integrationsverket, 2001c: 17). The primary goal of the strategy is to create the conditions for immigrants to be 'self-sufficient' and 'self-reliant' (Integrationsverket, 2001c: 17). This will be done by placing the 'individual in focus' with language training aimed at obtaining specific jobs and the rapid placement of individuals in the workforce.

While this approach may represent a positive shift from the previous method under which all immigrants received the same introduction to Swedish society, the language used and the individualistic approach strongly suggest a shift towards a neo-liberal agenda. The emergence of neo-liberal language and ideology within integration policy in Sweden is similar to what has occurred in Canada. In Canada, along with an increasing emphasis on

criminality and security with regard to recent immigration policy, policy shifts have

focused on the importance of immigrants to contributing economically to Canadian

society, and on transferring the costs of immigration and integration to individuals and

families. These last two trends in particular reflect the presence of neo-liberalism in

Canadian politics and policy making and the communication of these values to new

members through policy initiatives.

The influence of neo-liberalism in Sweden is reinforced by the emphasis on labour force

participation for immigrants (as though employment will solve the integration problems)

and the recurring use of words such as self-sufficient and self-reliant. The emphasis is on

the individual to find a job, thereby contributing to and being a part of Swedish society.

Also, while the report notes that immigrants face barriers to employment, there are few

concrete suggestions for how these barriers can be overcome (Integrationsverket, 2001c:

18). The report states that the two primary goals of the integration policy are related to

entry into the workforce: (1) to enable immigrants to quickly find employment, and (2)

for them to then have the possibility of advancing within the workplace

(Integrationsverket, 2001c: 18-19). The report proceeds to argue that a lack of success in

finding employment that matches an individual immigrant's skills and qualifications

should not be seen as a failure, because a person has to enter the workforce to advance

and entry at any level is a measure of success. Effectively, immigrants are being told that

they should take any job that they can find, regardless of their education, qualifications or

skills. Furthermore, it suggests to immigrants that they should not have very high

expectations about their employment possibilities in Sweden. The ongoing and pervasive

racism within Swedish society and hiring practices remains unaddressed. The emphasis

is not on changing the structures of society, but on molding immigrants to accommodate

the exclusionary social structures and 'fit in' where they can, despite the active

structuring of immigrants as outsiders.

In short, while the report acknowledges the failure of the previous integration strategies,

the proposed plan of action promises to do little to eradicate the real barriers to the

meaningful participation and inclusion of immigrants in Swedish society. Also, the focus

on employment as the primary site of integration reflects a neo-liberal bias that the only

(or best) way to participate and contribute to society is by working hard and paying taxes.

This emphasis is further reinforced by the movement of the Integration Board from under

the responsibility of the Department of Culture to the Department of Industry. Thus,

while the goals of Swedish integration policy are to achieve equality for all residents of

Sweden, it appears that equality is measured in a very limited way – through workforce

participation. This can also be seen in terms of gender equality, where equality of

women has been promoted and measured through their ability to participate in the formal

workforce. While workforce participation is one way to measure gender equality, it does

not take into account other factors such as cultural reasons for women working in the

home, the distribution of family chores and child care responsibilities, education, social

status, or the level of contentment or job satisfaction achieved.

Recently in Sweden, the integration department underwent a number of shifts in its

approach and began to speak about the pervasive and systemic nature of racism in

Sweden. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Mona Sahlin, the minister

responsible for Integration from 2000-2004, publicly decried racism in Sweden and

argued for a shift in policy and practice throughout the country (Stenberg, 2004). A

report submitted to government placed part of the blame for racism in Sweden on the

state's integration policies. As one author of the report, Professor Masoud Kamali, wrote

"In practice there is a paradox, where Swedishness becomes a goal which is never

reached ... The whole policy is based on the idea of 'us and them.' (*The Local,* 2005).

This represented a new and important discursive shift – if the report is taken seriously,

the emphasis on the individual in previous policy documents could be replaced by an

emphasis on society and societal responsibility for racism. In 2004, however, Sahlin was

replaced by Jens Orback who dismissed the findings of the final report by Prof. Kamali

(presented in 2006), including the recommendation that the Integration Department be

dismantled on grounds that it was dividing Swedish society into an 'us' and 'them'

(Bodin, 2006). Kamali's *Blackbook on Integration* (*Integrationens svarta bok)* outlines

27 recommended changes that aim at reducing structural racism and improving the

situation for newcomers to Sweden. Orback stated that he was unsatisfied with the

scholarly quality of the research and would be sending it out for an external review by

other interested stakeholders before addressing its contents in more detail (Bodin, 2006).

Kamali stated any changes depend upon political will, but argued that at least now the

government cannot say that the information is not there (Bodin, 2006).

Challenges from 'Outside'

Immigration politics in both Canada and Sweden, and the values entrenched in the policies, are challenged from within each country. However, both countries are also influenced by factors outside their borders. Globalization and the impact of neo-liberal ideology on both states have also been documented here and can be seen through their impact on the welfare state, as well as through discursive changes surrounding policies and political goals. While Canada remains tied to, and heavily influenced by, the United States of America, Sweden's integration into the European Union provides further challenges from outside.

Through the European Union, Sweden has voluntarily given up some of its national sovereignty to this larger governing body. At the same time, however, as Heywood, Jones and Rhodes (2002) note, the nation-state continues to represent a potent force in West European politics (2). While the EU is infringing on areas of national jurisdiction, states remain key players and continue to wield a great deal of decision making power (Heywood et. al., 2002: 5). The concern in Sweden over diminished sovereignty was evident in the referendum on the adoption of the Euro held in September 2003 and the debate leading up to it, in which the left and the right of the political spectrum joined together to oppose the Euro with arguments about decreased economic control and loss of sovereignty (Nilsson, 2003a). Opponents of the Euro were successful with 56.1% of Swedes voting against the adoption of the Euro, compared with 41.8% in favour (Nilsson, 2003b). This process reflects the ambivalence of Swedes towards the EU and its further empowerment.

Many of the challenges confronting Sweden find their origins outside both the country and the EU; namely, from changes in the world economy and world events. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA arguably had serious security implications for Europe, in part pointing to the diminished importance of territory in relation to security (Heywood et. al., 2002). As well, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005 increased the impetus to develop integrated European counter-terrorism measures aimed at sharing intelligence, coordinating law enforcement efforts and the alignment of criminal law related to terrorism in all 25 member states (Council of the European Union, 2005). In Sweden, however, while the terrorist attacks and the ensuing war on terror have shaped popular discourses, there have been no significant changes to immigration policy since 9/11. Perhaps because Sweden is somewhat off the American radar, it has experienced very little pressure to adopt US measures. In Canada, due largely to the shared Canadian-American border, the movement of peoples following 9/11 became subject to increased scrutiny and regulation (Abu-Laban, 2004: 17). Canada's close relationship with the United States, in terms of trade and cross-border activity, differs greatly from that of Sweden. The immigration pressures in Sweden, in actuality, stem more from changes within Europe. In fact, Swedish immigration policy has not experienced any substantive changes in the post-9/11 period, other than through EU agreements (Mayda and Patel, 2004).

While overall Sweden continues to have one of the most generous and welcoming policies in Europe for immigrants and refugees, there is a trend towards tightening the

borders. In some ways, this trend is due to changing public opinion and the changing

nature of immigration to Sweden – for example, the rising number of refugee claimants

as opposed to a fear of terrorism – as well as Sweden's participation in the European

Union and international agreements, such as Schengen, which aim to tighten control over

European borders. EU integration combined with shifts in immigration towards the third

world as the major source of newcomers resulted in a shift in attitudes towards

immigrants that are less open and a closer reflection of the idea of Fortress Europe. As

Andrew Geddes (2000) notes, within the EU freedom of movement for some implies and

leads to tighter control over movement for others (29). Further the idea of the 'fortress',

tells us something about the social inclusion of settled immigrants and the lack of

welcome for new immigrants (Geddes, 2000: 30).

The recent implementation of a 'safe third country agreement' within the EU, similar to

the one between Canada and the USA, will also have effects on the reception of refugees

in Sweden and limit their mobility and their ability to choose the EU country in which

they wish to settle. Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund argue that:

> the restrictive immigration policies that are now being enforced in Sweden
> and other parts of Western Europe are primarily directed at Third World
> immigration. The concept of Fortress Europe is currently in vogue with
> analysts of international migration. One outcome of Maastricht is the
> opening up of Western Europe for internal migration but at the same time
> the closing of its gates to immigration from Eastern Europe and non-
> European countries. (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1995: 7).

This trend has continued in recent years with the expansion of the European Union to

twenty-five members on May 1, 2004. Concerns over immigration prior to the expansion

revolved around concerns over new members utilizing EU mobility rights to swamp the

Swedish welfare system. In this sense, the expansion of 'Fortress Europe' to include the

poorer East European countries also affected attitudes towards European immigration in

Sweden. Thus, changes within attitudes towards immigration are driven not as much by

terrorism as the fear of large scale migration from Europe's border areas. As the EU

continues to develop policies regarding border control and immigration, these changes

will be reflected in Sweden. The nation-state, however, retains control over the

integration of immigrants within its border and the messages it passes on to them about

belonging to the national and political community. In this sense, despite the challenges

from outside, state culture and the values that comprise it remain an important area of

study. State governments will continue to try to influence national identity in a manner

that will impact the way in which issues related to European identity, integration and

immigration are addressed in the future and the popular response they receive.

Conclusion

Sweden has a history of being concerned with issues of economic, political and social

equality. The influence of traditions, such as the Jante law and the idea of *lagom*, created

a culture in which equality is very similar to the idea of sameness. Sweden has some of

the most progressive laws related to immigration in Europe and accepts a large number of

refugees and family status immigrants per year. Citizenship is a right associated with

birth and residence; as of yet there are no tests or criteria associated with obtaining

citizenship other than residency in Sweden for a set period of time. The process for

immigration reflects the importance of openness and equality in Swedish culture, yet

recent reports on integration show a shift towards placing responsibility on the individual,

and a rejection of societal responsibility for the problems association with immigration

and integration.

If we return to the questions posed at the end of Chapter Two and apply these to the

issues covered in this chapter, and to the issues of immigration and integration in

particular, they begin to illuminate the values that comprise the state culture of Sweden.

These questions were:

- How is the historical and economic context of nation-building presented?
- How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?
- How is the democratic process represented?
- How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?
- How are individual rights and responsibilities represented?
- How are males, females and children represented?
- How is the society of the country represented?
- Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?

To begin with the first question, the long history of nation-building in Sweden is a story

of establishing territorial boundaries, increasing democracy, the expansion of rights and,

finally, the development of the welfare society. The state, until fairly recently, was

relatively ethnically and culturally homogenous and there remains a strong sense of

'Swedishness' based on this history and the principles underpinning the welfare state that

continue to play a role in the shaping of policy. These principles are challenged today

not only by the arrival of increasingly diverse groups of immigrants, but also by external

factors, such as globalization, European integration, and neo-liberalism. These

challenges are again reflected in shifts in immigration policy, which aim to control or

manage flows of people into Sweden in order to maintain the values underpinning the

society. These are part of the state culture of Sweden, as witnessed in the promotion of

equality, the welfare state and humanitarian obligations by state actors and institutions as essential components of what Sweden represents.

As mentioned, rights are an important part of this equation and are addressed through question three on democracy, in the form of political rights, and question five, relating to individual rights. Unlike many other countries, permanent residents of Sweden have some limited political rights and therefore can influence politics at the local level before becoming citizens. Despite the fact that encouraging the political participation of immigrants is an excellent way to ensure that their interests are represented and encouraging integration into mainstream Swedish life, very little work is being done in this area. The process of integration is becoming more focused on the individual, and the state is playing a smaller role as actors from the private sector are encouraged to work towards integration through public-private partnerships.

The role of the Swedish state in the lives of citizens and residents, and the relationship between them, shifted during the post-war period. Historically, the state has played a very large role in the life of the average Swede through the extensive jurisdiction of the welfare state. The state has traditionally been viewed as caring and responsible for ensuring the well-being and equality of its members. This can be seen in the importance given to gender equality in Sweden, and the success of such policies. In the past fifteen to twenty years, however, the role of the state changed. While Sweden still has one of the most advanced welfare states in the world, and the state continues to play a significant role in daily life, the impact of neo-liberalism and concerns about deficits and social

spending diminished the role of the state. The recent literature from the Integration

Board supports this shift as new residents are encouraged to be more self-reliant as

opposed to depending on the state for ensuring their success in Swedish society. As well,

the failure of the state to take a pro-active role in addressing issues of racism and

discrimination reveals that although the state emphasizes equality of life and opportunity,

it is not able (or committed perhaps) to ensuring this.

Citizens are represented as rights bearing, responsible and, above all, equal. Swedish

society is presented as white and relatively homogenous. Although a level of tolerance

for diversity can be detected (for example through the multiculturalism policy, women's

rights, and rights for same sex couples), overall the society appears to be one with a large

level of consensus and 'sameness'. The fear that the diversity represented by immigrant

culture is a threat to Swedish culture, suggests that an idea of a homogenous Swedish

culture exists.

In conclusion, the state culture of Sweden can be described as one that emphasizes

equality, in the sense of sameness. It is very difficult to incorporate 'difference' into a

state culture built upon the idea of promoting 'sameness'. The most significant trend

within Swedish state culture is the slight shift towards neo-liberalism, with an increased

focus on the individual, and individual responsibility, and a diminished role for the state.

This trend towards a neo-liberal state culture threatens the relative equality of Swedes,

and the welfare state that has been a model for the Western world. Thus, as in the

Canadian case, two major and potentially conflicting discourses emerge from this

analysis of state policy; namely, the welfare society comprised of a community of equal

and similar citizens, and a new emphasis of the individual stemming from neo-liberalism.

These are the two main 'messages' that the state is projecting to its members and, in

particular, its new members. These discourses are comparable to those in the Canadian

case, although the emphasis is somewhat different. In Sweden, the values of the welfare

state as the foundation for community dominate, and neo-liberalism is less entrenched

and more contested than in Canada.

The next chapter continues the exploration of state culture in Canada and Sweden

through an examination of the literature distributed to new immigrants by the respective

states. These texts are key socialization tools for transmitting the values of the society, as

determined by state actors, to newcomers and, as such, are an excellent mechanism for

uncovering the values that comprise the state culture of each country.

CHAPTER FIVE

State Literature for Immigrants

Introduction

The previous chapters provided the first part of the analysis of state culture in Canada and Sweden by examining the historical context of immigration and integration policies and the development of national identity within each country. This historical context then provides the framework within which the literature for new immigrants is produced and, through the analysis of immigration, indicates the values that constitute state culture in Canada and Sweden. State culture, as defined earlier, is comprised of the values put forward by states, through the state actors, institutions, policies and practices that define the boundaries of the nation. In this sense, the values indicated in the previous two chapters should be reflected in the literature produced for new immigrants in the respective countries. Specifically, the Canadian literature today can be expected to promote the ideas of Canada as a multicultural and tolerant society, while also emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of the individual within society. The Swedish literature today then can be expected to project the idea of a community based on equality and the welfare state, as well as the idea of equality as 'sameness.'

Using the methodological approach outlined in Chapter Two to analyze the literature created for new arrivals by the Canadian and Swedish states, the values that each state wishes to transmit to newcomers become apparent. In this way, the analysis of the ordering of the text, the images present and the specific content, provides an additional entry point into understanding the values that comprise the state culture being

transmitted. This chapter employs a comparative approach, bringing the Swedish and

Canadian case studies together, in order to draw out the similarities and differences

between the two texts. In this way, a direct comparison between the different aspects of

the texts also clarifies the individual state culture projected through them.

As discussed in Chapter One, the methodology for this chapter incorporates aspects of

critical discourse and content analysis. Content analysis is a technique for analyzing the

content of communications and can be both qualitative and quantitative (Burnham et. al.,

2004: 236). Critical discourse analysis examines the importance of language as a

transmitter of the assumptions about the nature of the social and political world

(Burnham et. al., 2004: 242). Both of these are relatively new methodologies to be used

in political science. The analysis here draws on the previous work of van Dijk on the

media (1991; 1995), Bacchi's work on gender and public policy (1999), and the work of

Wodek et. al. on the construction of Austrian national identity (1999). The approach of

this chapter combines aspects of the approaches used by these authors and the methods of

content and critical discourse analysis to determine the state culture of Canada and

Sweden as presented in the state literature for new immigrants. The first part of the

analysis explores the ordering of the texts, the symbolic representations of the nation, and

representations of the population, using both quantitative and qualitative measures. The

second part examines the specific content of the texts. The content here is analyzed using

the approach and questions outlined at the conclusion of Chapter Two. It is explored in

response to the individual questions and presented in a comparative manner. Through the

combination of these two different methods, the discourses revealed within the documents relating to state culture are made apparent.

Through the analysis, the following points become clear. The Canadian texts emphasize the diversity of Canada and the importance of tolerance and respect for the rights of others. At the same time, however, the focus within the texts is on individuals and their responsibilities. In the Swedish case, equality is the primary value put forward in the state literature for new immigrants, supported by the importance of the welfare state and the creation of a political community that takes care of its members. This chapter argues that while the Canadian literature presents a picture of a more ethno-culturally inclusive society, it fails to provide a framework for building equality in society. The Swedish literature, on the other hand, reflects the importance of equality, while also reaffirming the idea of equality based on sameness. As with the policy analysis in the previous two chapters, the literature for new immigrants also reflects the conflicting discourses within the respective state cultures.

The Texts

In order to explore how the state attempts to transmit its values to the new members of the community and the values it attempts to transmit, three texts will be analyzed. These texts are created by the Canadian and Swedish states respectively. *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* is published by Citizenship and Immigration Canada for new immigrants. *A Look at Canada* is also published by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, but for permanent residents preparing to take the citizenship examination.

Sweden: A pocket guide is published by the Swedish Integration Board

(Integrationsverket) for all new arrivals. These are the primary texts created with the

purpose of introducing immigrants to their new home in each respective country.

Both *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* and *A Look at Canada* are booklets available

in English or French from immigration offices or over the internet on the Citizenship and

Immigration Canada website (www.cic.gc.ca). *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* is

thirty-eight pages in length and targets individuals and families who are preparing to

move to Canada or who have recently arrived. *A Look at Canada* is thirty-nine pages in

length. It provides the information necessary for permanent residents to pass the

citizenship examination. The publication of the two books in only the two official

languages can been seen as reflecting the expectation that new independent immigrants

and family class immigrants will have a working knowledge of one of the two official

languages. As well, by the time residents prepare to write the citizenship exam, the

assumption is that they will be fluent in one of the two languages, English or French.

Sweden: A pocket guide offers a comprehensive guide to Swedish culture and life in

Sweden. The book is 280 pages in length and is in colour. Although the English edition

of the book was used for this analysis, it is available in numerous languages – including

Arabic, English French, Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, Swedish and 'easy' Swedish –

reflecting the primary linguistic groups of new arrivals in Sweden. The book is intended

for all new arrivals, including family class immigrants, individuals on work permits and

refugees, and reflects the understanding that many new arrivals will not have a working

knowledge of Swedish. The book does, however, stress the importance of acquiring the

Swedish language for new immigrants and the relationship between the Swedish

language and Swedish culture is emphasized. This is particularly apparent with the

inclusion of key Swedish words and terms in bold in the text and the presence of the

Swedish term with a definition in the margins of the text. The emphasis on the Swedish

language can be seen as reflecting the goals of the Swedish Integration Board and the

Swedish state of encouraging new arrivals to adopt the language as quickly as possible.

Another noteworthy component of this text is the inclusion of four segments, entitled

"Your new neighbours," written by immigrants to Sweden and relating their experiences

in adapting to life in Sweden. This reflects an awareness on the part of the state of the

common challenges that new immigrants face upon taking up their new lives in Sweden

and learning both the written and unwritten rules of Swedish society.

The texts are produced under the direction of the national bodies responsible for the

integration of new immigrants. These bodies do have some significant differences. First,

Canada is a federal state, whereas Sweden is a unitary state. In Canada, immigration is a

shared area of jurisdiction and programs for new immigrants may be offered by both the

federal and the provincial governments. As well, as discussed in Chapter Three, the

welfare state is technically a provincial responsibility, however it is an area in which the

federal government provides funding and guidance for which it takes both responsibility

and credit. In Sweden, the national government is the only sovereign body, but many

responsibilities regarding immigration, integration and service provision have been

delegated to the municipalities and communes. Thus, while the programs remain under

the control of the national state, they are implemented at a more local level. Finally, it is important to note that the Swedish Integration Board has a direct mandate to facilitate and monitor the integration of immigrants into Swedish society, while Citizenship and Immigration Canada does not have the same level of responsibility for this process. These factors may influence the content of the literature distributed to new arrivals in Canada and Sweden as analyzed below.

The Ordering of the Text

When analyzing a text, the order in which information appears can be seen as reflecting the relative importance of different information in relation to each other, as certain items are given primacy within the text or section (van Dijk, 1995). This applies both to the text as a whole and within the different segments or chapters of specific texts. In this sense, what comes at the beginning of a text is more likely to be paid attention to than what is buried in the middle. Either the first paragraph of a chapter or the conclusions are also more likely to be read and remembered than the middle of the chapter. So, an analysis of the order in which information appears in each of the texts reveals the priority placed upon specific information by the respective states. At the same time, it is also useful to note how much space is devoted to a specific topic – the more space given to an issue the more important it is perceived to be by the author; in this case, the Canadian and Swedish states. This section explores the ordering of specific topics within each of the three texts analyzed. The table of contents for each text can be found in the appendix.

The primary focus of *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* is on helping immigrants prepare to move to Canada and settle once they have arrived. The first five chapters of the text deal with related issues, reflecting the focus of this text on those preparing to immigrate or who have just arrived. These chapters reflect a chronological approach to immigration, beginning with preparing to move, the first day in Canada and what to expect from officials, contact information and services provided by immigrant serving organizations, the first few days in Canada, and how to find a job and build a future. This type of information comprises over half of the booklet (twenty-two out of thirty-eight pages) and suggests that the impetus is on the individual to be prepared and responsible for adjusting once he or she arrives.

Information on Canada is provided in the final three chapters of the booklet entitled: "General Information on Canada," "The Canadian Way of Life," and "Your Rights and Obligations." Chapter Six starts with geography, including maps, and reinforces the idea of the importance of territory to nation-building and national identity. The section also discusses the various regions, suggesting that regionalism is an important factor in Canada. The people who make up Canada are described in terms of linguistics and distribution, but not in terms of ethnicity or culture. This is followed by a section on the history of Canada, beginning with Aboriginal peoples, and a discussion of the major Canadian national symbols (such as the maple leaf and the beaver – see below). The different levels of government in the federal system and their jurisdictional responsibilities are also presented. The order of the text within the chapter suggests the importance of territory and regionalism, followed by bilingualism and diversity as key

Canadian values. Also, while the responsibilities of different governments are discussed, there is no mention of the responsibility of the state towards citizens, or the relationship between the two; for example, by outlining the social contract in the form of the welfare state.

Chapter Seven, "The Canadian Way of Life," begins by with the following paragraph:

> Many people in Canada find that it takes two incomes to raise a family, even though parents are having fewer children. Most mothers have a job outside the home, and in many families, both parents share the work of shopping, cooking, cleaning the house and looking after the children. Because divorce has become more common, there are many one-parent families in Canada. Most single parents who raise their children on a full-time basis are women. There are also same-sex couples with children. (CIC, 2002: 31)

The presence of this quotation at the beginning of the chapter on the Canadian way of life, reflects the reality of the social order in Canada. In doing so, it also suggests that working, gender equality and tolerance for same-sex relationships and families are the norm in Canadian life and society. However, in terms of the order of familial relationships, it appears that traditional families are given priority followed by single-parent and same-sex families, perhaps reflecting the relative distribution of family forms in Canada.

The following parts of Chapter Seven address laws surrounding marriage and divorce, family planning, and the differing processes of integration for children of immigrants. This is followed by a section on "Standards and Expectations" that outlines common social practices that govern behaviour in Canada. These include: lining up or queuing,

not smoking in private homes, punctuality, respect for the environment, not bargaining

for a better price on goods, and competition between stores and brands (CIC, 2002: 32-

33). The final section of the chapter outlines important laws and how to interact with

officials. Overall, the order of this chapter suggests that families are an important

Canadian value and that it is important for new arrivals to adapt to Canadian standards of

behaviour, tolerance and interactions.

The final chapter of *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* outlines the rights and

obligations of members of the Canadian community. The chapter begins by stating that

"Having the right to participate in Canadian society also means that you have a

responsibility to respect the rights and freedoms of others and to obey Canada's laws"

(CIC, 2002: 35). This is followed by sections outlining the rights and freedoms of

Canadians under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the specific rights of children,

women and senior citizens. The section on senior citizens includes one of the few

references to the welfare state in the form of Old Age Security and the Canada Pension

Plan. The booklet ends with information on becoming a Canadian citizen and the

additional rights entitled to citizens as opposed to residents. The chapter and book

conclude by stating that "For many Canadians, being a good citizen means getting

involved in their community. Regardless of your interests, contributing to your society is

rewarding and is appreciated by others who, like you, are proud to make Canada their

home" (37).

In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, the most importance is placed on being prepared for and adjusting to life in Canada, including the importance of getting a job and contributing to Canadian society. The fact that the section on rights and responsibilities comes last in the book suggests that this is not the most important information for new arrivals. In terms of the ordering of the text, the information needed to make the transition in concrete and material terms is considered more important than the values associated with Canada, such as equality, multiculturalism, and rights and freedoms.

As mentioned above, *A Look at Canada* is provided to permanent residents who wish to become Canadian citizens. In this sense, it is the sequel to *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* and the focus is somewhat different. This book targets individuals who wish to become full and permanent members of the Canadian community and its attempts to transmit Canadian state culture and values are much more apparent. The book begins with a message to the readers on the requirements for becoming a Canadian citizen and the values of Canadian citizenship. The 'good' citizen is defined as one who knows of Canadian values, participates in all aspects of life in Canada, and accepts responsibility for Canada's future. The primary characteristics of Canada are described as peaceful, respectful of difference and equality, and based upon the principles of negotiation and compromise. (CIC, 2001: 1) The inclusion of these values on the first page of the booklet suggests that these are the primary values that the state is trying to convey. Or, in other words, these values can be seen as central to the state culture of Canada. These values are restated on page four under the heading, "What does Canadian citizenship mean?"

The terms 'equality,' 'tolerance,' 'peace' and 'law and order' are also printed in bold typeface, reinforcing their importance within the text.

The order of the text for the remainder of the booklet reinforces the importance of diversity and tolerance, as well as the historical development of Canada. The reader is introduced to Canada (with an emphasis on multiculturalism and bilingualism), the country's history, and the Aboriginal people of Canada. This is followed by a number of sections on each of the different regions of Canada and their respective geographies, histories, populations, and economies. Overall, these sections comprise nineteen out of the thirty-nine pages (3-22) in the booklet, again reinforcing the significance of Canada's regions, the diversity of the population and the importance of the economy as Canadian values. The role of territory is also emphasized with the presence of a large map (12-13) and the described relationship between the land and the different regions.

The description of the way government works, the electoral system and the justice system follows the regional and historical descriptions of Canada. The final section focuses, again, on rights and responsibilities. Overall, the ordering of the text in *A Look at Canada* suggests that the most important values to be conveyed by the state in the construction of state culture are those mentioned at the beginning: equality, tolerance, peace, and law and order. The actual functioning of the system is portrayed as secondary to ensuring that new citizens recognize and adopt these key values. Awareness of individual rights and responsibilities is presented last in the book suggesting that, of the three key issues presented, this is the least relevant for new citizens. This focus is also

reflected in the appendix to the book, which provides sample questions to help individuals study for the citizenship examination that reflect the different issues presented in the text. As well, a specific section of questions is devoted to promoting knowledge about the region in which the individual lives.

The first line of the Swedish guide for new residents reads: "Welcome to Sweden. In our society, everyone is entitled to equal rights and opportunities. That includes you too." (Integrationsverket, 2001: 3) By beginning the book with a statement on the equality of individuals in Sweden, the importance of equality in Swedish culture is emphasized. The first line of the first chapter, "The New Country," continues the commentary on equality in Sweden. "Until just a decade ago, Sweden was a society that assumed all its residents were the same ... It is possible that the similarities seemed greater than they really were" (7). In this manner, the book emphasizes the importance of equality but attempts to differentiate this from previous ideas of sameness and assimilation. By placing this information at the beginning of the book, it conveys an key message to new arrivals about the type of society that Sweden is trying to build. "A society based on ethnic and cultural diversity is actually a revolutionary commitment for a country like Sweden ... which more or less explicitly based their community of welfare on ideas of historical and cultural affinity" (9). Again, the chapter attempts to qualify this 'revolutionary' commitment by stating that a democracy, however, requires that it "must seek to unite culturally distinct values with culturally blind societal institutions, to bridge cultural differences with cross-cultural justice" (10). By the time the first ten pages have been read, the reader may already be thoroughly confused. Arguably, this confusion reflects

the current ambivalence and debate in Swedish society over the level of integration

necessary for immigrants. Perhaps it could be said to present a 'lagom' approach to

difference – some recognition of difference is necessary, but not too much. The

placement of this section, with its internal contradictions, at the beginning of the book

points to the centrality of these issues for the Swedish state and its struggle over the

values it wishes to convey.

The second and third chapters focus on three primary aspects of traditional nation-

building activities on the part of states: the land, the people and their history. The second

chapter includes a discussion of geography, the role of democracy, and the Swedish

population and minorities. The third chapter outlines the process of nation-building in

Sweden, from the "Ice Age to the Cyber Age." Within this chapter, an emphasis is

placed on the construction of the Swedish welfare state in the twentieth century. The

following two chapters explore the role of a resident in Sweden in political life, outlining

the institutions of government and political parties, and in everyday life with a discussion

of traditions and popular customs in modern Sweden. Chapter Six details the role of

municipalities in providing services in the community, followed by six pages of maps.

Overall, the first six chapters attempt to convey the state culture of Sweden, focussing on

the country's history, ties to the land and values, as well as the relationship between the

state and members of the community. This initial section comprises almost one quarter

of the text and reflects the importance placed on conveying the Swedish culture and

values to new arrivals.

Unlike in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, it is only after this initial introduction to Sweden that the concrete information on adapting to life in Sweden is introduced (e.g. finding a home and a job, money, familial relationships, children, education, health care, religion, the legal system). Also, it is significant to note that within these sections the role of the state as the provider of services and rights held by the individual in relation to the state and others is emphasized (see the section on content analysis for further detail). Finally, the most specific details, such as getting a driver's license, the regulations regarding residence permits and citizenship, and immigrant organizations appear at the end of the book, in the last fifty pages. Within the book, the ordering of the text makes it apparent which information the Swedish state considers most important to convey to new residents –the values and history of the country are more important than getting a job, which in turn is more important than information on regulations regarding driver's licenses and residence permits.

When the ordering of the texts within the Canadian and Swedish books are compared, a number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. First, for new arrivals, the emphasis in the Canadian book (*A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*) is on getting settled, whereas the emphasis in the Swedish guide is on introducing the person to Sweden and Swedish culture. This is perhaps a reflection of the level of assistance provided for new arrivals and the level of independence expected of them in each country, as discussed with regards to immigration policy in the previous chapters. Canada expects a greater amount of independence with assistance more likely to come from family and the community, whereas Sweden provides a high level of state assistance. The fact that most new arrivals

in Canada are independent immigrants, whereas most new arrivals in Sweden are refugees also contributes to this understanding of the role of individuals and the state. The Swedish text also places a greater emphasis on equality and rights, raising these issues early in the text in comparison with Canada where they are addressed at the end of each book. Again, this suggests that it is more important for the Swedish state to convey these values than for the Canadian state.

Images of a Nation

The next section of the analysis explores the picture of state culture that the various images in the text convey to the reader. Images are important because they help the reader to interpret the text. They also provide an overall image of the country for new arrivals. In order to conduct the analysis of images, a brief description of the all the images present in the three texts was compiled (see Appendix). In some cases, the descriptions are more detailed based on the information given in the captions alongside them, which help the reader to understand and interpret what they are looking at. For example, in the Swedish text, the captions sometimes stated that it was a picture of immigrants when this would otherwise not be obvious to the reader. These descriptions were then analyzed based on a number of characteristics. In particular, the analysis examines the presence of national symbols in the texts, the proportion of 'visible' or 'racialized' minorities to 'white' subjects, and the roles in which they are portrayed, and the portrayal of female subjects in comparison with male subjects. It is important to note that while not all immigrants or refugees are visible minorities, this category was used to assess the presence of the 'other' in the eyes of the state. Also, some images are placed

in more than one category; for example, a visible minority boy waving a Swedish flag

would count as representation of a national symbol (the flag), a visible minority, and a

male subject.

Symbols of a Nation

Symbolic representations of the nation are present is all of the three texts and are

summarized in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1

In the Canadian texts, the images in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* (NIC)

contained a total of five symbols within thirty-eight images. In other words, 13% of the

images contain symbolic representations of the Canadian state. These include visual

representations of the Canadian flag, the national anthem, the Parliament Buildings and

two maps. The occurrence of symbols in images is much greater in *A Look at Canada*

(LAC), where fifteen of the forty-seven images (32%) contain symbols, including

governmental buildings, the image of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, four images

of the Canadian flag, another of a maple leaf, and images of animals seen as Canadian

symbols - such as the loon and the beaver. The Swedish text (SWE) contains twenty

symbolic images out of a total of one hundred and seventeen images (17%). These

include the cover in the Swedish colours of yellow and blue, the symbols of political

parties, government buildings, the three crowns, and two images of the Swedish flag.

The inclusion of important symbolic images for the respective countries is indicative of

what Michael Billig calls 'banal nationalism' (1995). These images are of items that

members of the political community encounter daily and are often (although not always

by minority nations) seen as benign representations of the state. However, these political

symbols "flag the nation" for its inhabitants, reminding them of their nationhood and that

they belong to a national community (Billig, 1995: 6-8). While they are often almost

invisible or unnoticed in our daily encounters with them, they serve the purpose of

binding the nation. The more extensive use of symbols in *A Look at Canada* suggests

that banal nationalism is very present in Canada and that the Canadian state does use

these symbols to foster national feeling. The images of the Parliament buildings in the

Canadian and Swedish texts remind newcomers of the role of government. The three

crowns in the Swedish flag are a reminder of Sweden's past as part of the Kalmar Union

of the kingdoms of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The presence of symbols in all of the

texts, however, reflects the common practice of using symbolic representations of the

nation to remind members of the community of the nation's role and history.

Representing the People

The presence of visible minority individuals in the images representing the nation, such as those used to introduce newcomers to the country, is noteworthy. The presence of individuals who are identifiably 'other' (i.e. non-white in the Canadian and Swedish cases) reflects the role of such individuals within the country. An image of Canada or Sweden that is presented through faces that are not all white conveys the impression that immigrants can and do integrate and play a role in the national community. If these are supposed to be images of the Canadian and Swedish people, then what they look like and who is included in that definition is important. As well, the visual representation of different ethnic groups in positions of power suggests that there is not an ethnic hierarchy or vertical mosaic within the state (or at least that the state aims to remove such hierarchies). While the association of visible or racialized minorities[17] with immigrants is problematic (not all immigrants are visible minorities, and not all visible minorities are immigrants), visible minority immigrants are the ones who are most likely to encounter racism and face greater difficulties integrating. Therefore, exploring the representation of "visible" or "racialized" minorities in the texts reveals whether the state sees immigrants as comprising the face of the nation and how it presents images of immigrants to the newcomer. The table below outlines the presence of racialized minorities in the texts as a proportion of the total number of images.

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[17] A discussion of the term, "visible minority" can be found in Chapter One, on page 25.

Table 5. 2

Images of Racialized Minorities

Non-white individuals appear in over half of the images in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* (twenty out of thirty-eight). As well, people of colour are represented in positions associated with prestige and power, including health care workers, teachers and business people. Among these images of visible minorities, women are also presented as obtaining positions of power in Canadian society; for example, the image of a black female doctor (CIC, 2002: Cover) and the image of a black female teacher (8). Images of individuals associated with the law and the state, however, are all of white individuals; for example, a white female customs and immigration officer (9), white police officers (34), and a white woman presiding over the taking of the oath at a citizenship ceremony (37).

In *A Look at Canada*, there is only one image that contains only visible minority people – the image of two women of colour examining their new citizenship papers (CIC 2001, 30). There are, however, three images of groups of mixed ethnicity and four images of Aboriginals, three of which present Aboriginals in traditional dress. This compares with

five images that only contain white individuals. In other images containing people, the

ethnicity or skin colour of the individuals is not clear. Thus, in over half of the images of

individuals, people of colour are present. The majority of pictures of people in *A Look at*

Canada are of people engaged in cultural activities that can be seen to reflect the cultural

diversity of Canada; for example, Ukrainian dancers (20), Aboriginals in traditional dress

(11, 19, and 22), a cowboy on a horse (20), and a young woman playing the bagpipes

(14).

In both Canadian texts, the images display a conscious effort on the part of the state to

represent Canada as diverse and welcoming of immigrants. Overall, immigrants are seen

as blending into the images of the nation. This reflects the Canadian state's emphasis on

multiculturalism, diversity and tolerance within the texts. However, it also raises the

question of whether or not whiteness can still be seen as the defining racial identity of

Canadians. This analysis may appear to support such a position, however, it is based on

the fact that white people have comprised the majority of Canada's population

historically and, while this is changing, it continues to be the norm. Evidence of this can

be found in the discussion of racism in Chapter Three, which demonstrates that visible

minority or 'non-white' Canadians are subject to discrimination. Ultimately, the

inclusion of diverse peoples in the Canadian texts provides an interesting contrast to the

representation of visible minority people in the Swedish text.

The Swedish text, *Sweden: A pocket guide*, is much longer and contains many more

images. Also, as mentioned above, some of the pictures are accompanied by captions

that state that the picture is of immigrants, even though they are not visible minorities.

Out of a total of 117 images in the Swedish text, three were of immigrants (as defined by

the caption), and seventeen contained visible minority individuals. Of the pictures

containing visible minorities, ten of the pictures only contained visible minorities and

seven contained both visible minority and white people. An additional twelve images

contained people who could not be identified as white nor as visible minorities. This

compares with sixty-four images that only contained white people, or fifty-five percent of

all the images. If this number is combined with the images that contained both

categories, then white people were present in seventy-one out of the ninety-six images of

people, or seventy-four percent; whereas visible minorities and immigrants were present

in only twenty-one percent of the images containing people and seventeen percent of all

the images contained in the text. These figures convey the image of Sweden as a very

white country, despite the fact that many immigrants to Sweden in recent years are

visible minorities.

The Swedish text contains more images of people in their everyday lives and at particular

events associated with Swedish culture. In the pictures of couples and families, for

example at church (Integrationsverket, 2001: 199) or together at home (pages 85, 120,

134, 126), the individuals portrayed are overwhelmingly white and heterosexual

suggesting that this is the normal family unit. As well, there are numerous images of

white people engaged in Swedish cultural activities – for example, dancing around the

maypole (50), dressed as St. Lucia (53) or preparing Semlor, a traditional, seasonal

dessert (60).   These images suggest that there is a distinct Swedish culture and that this culture is that held by white, ethnic Swedes.

This impression is reinforced by an analysis of the ways in which white individuals are portrayed in the images as compared to visible minority individuals. Visible minorities are generally portrayed as workers (Integrationsverket, 2001: 79), as students (146, 148, 150), or at home (221, 223). On the other hand, white people tend to be portrayed in jobs that are associated with greater prestige and power; for example, as civil servants (34), or as teachers, nurses and doctors (177, 179, 182, 186). Also, most of the individuals in the pictures associated with the state are white. This includes not only historical figures, but also more recent politicians (25, 29), police officers (213), immigration officials (231, 232), and even people engaged in political activity such as voting or protesting (39, 67). By comparison, there is only one image of a visible minority engaging in political activity – the image of women in hajib protesting outside the Iranian embassy (194). These images convey to the reader the impression that Sweden has a vertical mosaic, where the top of the social and economic pyramid is occupied primarily by white individuals. There is a potential conflict between the message that these images are sending and the message that the state is diverse and multicultural. At the same time the racial division present in these images does reflect the reality of Swedish society in which political, economic and social elites tend to be of Swedish ethnicity. This is a direct challenge to the idea of equality that I argued (in Chapter Four) underpins Swedish identity and raises the question of why this model of equality does not apply to immigrants. While an effort to include a greater number of images of immigrants and

visible minorities that challenge the current structure of Swedish society would suggest a

desire on the part of the Swedish state to change perceptions and practices, there also

appears to be a reluctance to account for diversity and difference within the Swedish

literature that has the potential to continue to discriminate against immigrants at the

individual, societal and discursive levels.

Content Analysis

This section explores what is written in the texts and, in some cases, what is omitted. By

applying a series of questions developed as a model for understanding how the state

portrays its own culture, the state culture of Canada and Sweden become apparent. The

questions, originally presented in Chapter Two, are:

- How is the historical and economic context of nation-building presented?
- How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?
- How is the democratic process represented?
- How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?
- How are individual rights and responsibilities represented?
- How are males, females and children represented?
- How is the society of the country represented?
- Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?

These questions are intended to expose the main tenets of state culture in each country.

Each question will be answered in relation to each of the three texts in order to allow for

comparison. As well, the analysis draws on the information provided in the above

sections on the ordering of the text and images in order to deepen the analysis and

provide a greater empirical basis for the answers to the questions. In certain cases,

information provided in Chapters Four and Five, the case studies of Canada and Sweden,

may also be included. The goal is to use the texts in their entirety to draw out an

understanding of the values being conveyed within them; this also includes the political context within which the texts were created, as discussed in the previous two chapters.

How is the historical and economic context presented?

History has traditionally been seen as one way of binding the idealized nation together. Members of the nation are believed to share a common past and this shared past becomes a basis for a shared future and shared identity that forms the basis of their imagined community. History also tells the story of how the nation-state has been built up to this time. It tells the story of a people, their struggles and their successes. As demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, economics historically played an important role in determining immigration policies and the categories of desirable new members, in both Canada and Sweden. All three of the texts discuss the history of the respective countries, although in slightly different ways and with different emphases.

In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, the history and society of Canada is outlined fairly briefly on pages twenty-six and twenty-seven, comprising five percent of the total text. The subject appears over halfway through the text, after the discussion of arriving and settling in for new immigrants, suggesting that this issue and information is not the focus of the text. After a brief discussion of the francophone population of Canada and bilingualism, the section begins by stating, "Canada is a land of many cultures and many peoples," (CIC, 2002: 26) reinforcing the importance of cultural and ethnic diversity in Canada. In goes on to state that other than the Aboriginal people, everyone is an immigrant to Canada. "We have all come from somewhere else ... Canada is a 'nation of

immigrants'" (CIC, 2002: 26). The section continues to discuss the waves of

immigration to Canada and the importance of immigrants to the development of Canada

and, in particular, the Canadian economy (CIC, 2002: 26-27).

A Look at Canada contains a much greater focus on the history of Canada. The historical

section begins on page eight in section five and is interspersed over the next seven

sections, comprising a large portion of the text. The discussion of Canadian history

begins with Confederation and the process of bringing together the provinces that today

comprise Canada. It then proceeds to list the Canadian national symbols, such as the

beaver, the flag, the Parliament buildings, and the national anthem (CIC, 2001: 8-9). It is

interesting to note that the section on the history of Canada begins by outlining the

acquisition of the territory that constitutes the state and the development of symbols

representing the state – both very nationalistic activities. Following this, the history and

role of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is presented – almost as a sidebar to "Canadian"

history. The history of Canada continues at the beginning of the sections for each region

of Canada, thus reinforcing the importance of region and regional identity in Canada and

reflecting the regional development and westward expansion of the Canadian state.

In terms of the ordering of the text, history plays a very important role in *Sweden: A*

pocket guide appearing in the third chapter. The historical chapter, entitled "A brief

overview from the Ice Age to the Cyber Age," condenses the long history of Sweden into

12 pages, comprising slightly more than four percent of the total book. The chapter

outlines the process of nation-building in Sweden and major historical events and eras.

Swedish words and translations are provided, for example, for terms such as the Viking

Era (Vikingatiden), the Stockholm Bloodbath (Stockholms blodbad) and the Era of Great

Power (Stormaktstiden) when Sweden was a super-power in Europe (Integrationsverket,

2001: 19-23). The section also points to the historical economic and social inequality

that existed in Sweden and the importance of the development of the welfare state in the

twentieth century as part of the process of nation-building. The importance of the

Swedish welfare society is reinforced in the selection of bolded and translated text in the

final section of the chapter, where the key terms presented are the labour movement

(arbetarrörelsen), the People's Home (folkhem), and social welfare (välfärd). The

chapter on history concludes with a discussion of globalization and the need for the

Swedish economy to remain competitive in an era where the state has less control.

How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?

The presentation of the processes of immigration and integration play an important role

in defining state culture because this is the area in which the state defines the ways in

which an individual can become a member of the national community. The presentation

of images of visible minorities discussed above is also important to note here because

they represent the ability of immigrants and refugees to integrate, to become present in

the images of the nation.

In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* the focus is much more on the process of

immigration and integration than in either of the other two texts. *A Newcomer's*

Introduction to Canada begins by addressing the process of moving to Canada and

settling in. The placement and space allocated to this issue gives the process priority over the transmission of culture and values. Getting a job is emphasized, appearing in both the first chapter and again in a chapter of its own. The process of immigrating is presented in clear terms and the requirements and obligations for new immigrants are clearly expressed. The process for becoming a contributing member of Canadian society is also clearly articulated in the sections on finding a job, dressing for the climate, locating a home, getting a social insurance card and paying tax. In this sense, the integration of new arrivals is largely portrayed in economic terms and through their ability to integrate into the Canadian economy.

In *A Look at Canada*, the process of becoming a Canadian citizen is clearly presented on the first main page of text (3). In terms of the order of the text, the process is given a place of importance. In terms of the overall content, however, the process of becoming a citizen is secondary to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of Canada, which comprises the vast majority of the book. The formal process appears again at the end of the book (CIC, 2001: 32, prior to the practice questions) where advice on learning about Canada and passing the citizenship exam is conveyed to the reader.

In the Swedish text, actual information on the formal processes of immigration and citizenship, including information on permits and visas, appears at the end of the book after the sections presenting information on Sweden and adjusting to life in Sweden. This suggests that conveying this information is of low importance for the Swedish state. The processes are clearly laid out, however, and presented as neutral and fair.

Integration, or adjusting to life in Sweden, is addressed in the middle of the book and

comprises the majority of the text. It appears after the discussion of history, politics and

culture of Sweden, suggesting that this is the primary knowledge needed for newcomers.

The chapter, "Your initial period in Sweden," begins the discussion of integration by

informing the reader about language courses provided by the state and municipalities, as

well as introductory courses offered in some municipalities to refugees and their families

(64). Starting the chapter with a discussion of language courses reflects the importance

placed by the state on learning the Swedish language. This is viewed as central to the

integration of immigrants and refugees. This section also demonstrates the greater

involvement of the state in the process of integration in Sweden, via language and

introductory courses, than appears in the Canadian texts and context. Finding paid

employment also receives considerable attention in the Swedish text, including

information on unions, paying taxes and benefits for the sick and unemployed (92-106).

The entire section emphasizes the importance of state programs and assistance are given

a high profile and introduced in relation to all topics; for example, through discussions of

child benefits, day care, senior benefits and pensions, and free education. Overall, the

state has a higher profile in the Swedish text than in the Canadian texts, attesting to the

dominance and interventionism of the Swedish state relative to the Canadian state, as

presented by the states, themselves.

How is the democratic process represented?

The democratic process represents the direct relationship between individuals and the

state. It shows how individuals are able to influence policy and government. The

presentation of the democratic process informs newcomers about the roles that they can

play in shaping their new home. Also, it is through the discussion of democratic rights

that the texts begin outlining the responsibilities of individuals towards the state, and the

responsibilities of the state towards them.

The democratic process is not represented in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*.

This can be explained by the fact that new residents of Canada do not have the right to

vote. The only aspect of government that is addressed in *A Newcomer's Introduction to*

Canada is federalism and the division of powers between the different levels of

government in Canada, again reinforcing the impression of Canada as divided and

regionalized (CIC, 2002: 28). More attention is paid to the democratic process in *A Look*

at Canada. Government and elections are covered over six pages, comprising fifteen

percent of the book. The issue of government and elections can be seen as given more

importance in the second book because, with the attainment of citizenship, new citizens

are granted political rights in Canada. In *A Look at Canada*, the section at the beginning

of the book, "What does Canadian citizenship mean," states that "Canadians have

developed a kind of genius for compromise and coexistence ... We value that we live in a

democracy where every citizen is encouraged to do his or her share" (CIC 2001, 4). This

quotation implies a strong role for citizens in the democratic process. However, the text

does not provide much detail on how to get involved, other than by voting. The process

of federalism is described again, as well as the process of making laws and issues of

representation, in particular how Members of Parliament are chosen from the federal

constituencies (23-28). Three of the six pages are devoted specifically to federal

elections, explaining the electoral system, the role of the MP, and the role of political

parties. The process of voting comprises the majority of this section, however, beginning

with the statement, "One of the privileges and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship is

the right to vote" (CIC, 2001: 27). This reinforces the message that citizenship, and the

rights that go with it, is a privilege that, once earned, comes with responsibilities, thus

encouraging new full members of the political community to be active and "good"

citizens.

In *Sweden: A pocket guide*, the democratic process is given greater priority in terms of

the ordering of the text than in the Canadian books. The fourth chapter, "Debate, vote,

influence," looks at how Sweden is governed. The chapter begins by stating that:

> Sweden is a democracy, meaning that it is governed by the people. To call a
> country a democracy is to say that all its adult citizens have the right to vote on an
> equal footing. [...] there are political parties that represent different opinions.
> The people choose their political representatives in general elections, and the
> party or parties that receive the most votes are allowed to govern.
> (Integrationsverket, 2001: 29-30)

The fact that the Swedish text defines democracy for the readers and how the idea of

democracy is applied in Sweden suggests that the value of democracy is important to

Swedish political culture and the state. The idea of democracy is put forward much more

strongly in the Swedish text than in the Canadian texts where the importance of

democracy is not mentioned. This could suggest either that the Canadian state does not

take democracy as seriously as the Swedish state or that the Canadian state sees this value

as self-evident. It could also reflect the limited role that Canadian newcomers can play in

the democratic process because they have no political rights.

The chapter on governance in the Swedish text also explains how the Parliament

(Riksdag) works and the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the state, which is

not mentioned in the Canadian texts. Interestingly, the Swedish guide also informs the

reader about how to appeal the administrative decisions of the state, which suggests a

different relationship between the individual and the state than in the Canadian texts,

where the state arguably appears to be more distant. The major parties, their symbols and

place on the political spectrum are explained. Also included in this section is information

on interest groups, social movements, the media and the public ombudsmen. Thus, while

greater emphasis and amounts of information may be given on the democratic process in

the Swedish text because permanent residents have limited political rights, the book also

informs the reader on alternative ways of influencing politics in Sweden and ensuring

his/her individual rights in relation to the state. Again, this reinforces the idea of a

different relationship between individuals and the state in Sweden than in Canada. In

Sweden, the text presents the state as having closer ties to the population and its various

interests, reflecting the corporatist approach to interest integration. It also suggests a

stronger emphasis or value placed on popular sovereignty through the discussion of

Sweden as a democracy and the different methods individuals have of appealing state

decisions and influence government and decision making.

How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?

As mentioned above, the sections related to the democratic process portray a different

relationship between individuals and the state in Canada and in Sweden. Other than

through the democratic process, the primary way in which the relationship between

individuals and the state is represented is through the welfare state. The welfare state

outlines the relationship of responsibility between individuals and states and the role that

the state plays in the lives of individual residents. The welfare state also represents the

state's responsibility to care for its members, as well as the commitment of individuals to

ensure that others are cared for by the state if necessary.

In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* limited space is given to the welfare state. A

total of 1.5 pages of the text is devoted to health care coverage, stating early in the text

that the federal government is responsible for setting national standards (CIC, 2002: 2)

and later providing information on which services are covered and how to apply for

health care coverage (15). Information is also given on federally funded government

programs for newcomers, including LINC, which provides language instruction to

eligible adult newcomers to Canada, and the Host Program, which matches new arrivals

with a Canadian family or individual to help them adjust (11-12). Towards the middle of

the book, employment laws are briefly covered in one paragraph, followed by a

paragraph on discrimination which states that it is illegal but does not give information on

what to do if one is experiences such treatment (21). This is followed by a section on

taxation and the importance of paying income tax as "this money helps pay the cost of

government services" (21). Finally, brief mention is given to the Canadian Pension Plan

and Employment Insurance (21).

Overall, the emphasis in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada* is on the individual.

This is apparent in the discussion of the importance of sustainable development (which is

presented as a key Canadian issue), where the responsibility of the individual to reduce

use and recycle is stressed, as opposed to focusing on the role of the government in

providing a framework for improving the environment (29-30). In the sections on

interacting with the state and people in positions of authority, these people are presented

as holding positions based on merit and acting in a neutral and rule bound manner (34).

Police officers are presented as being part of the community and accountable to the

public, and not corrupt (34). The majority of this section discusses what to do if you are

arrested or questioned, focusing on the individual's rights and responsibilities. Overall,

the idea of a strong relationship and high level of interaction between the state, its

representatives and the people is not present in the text. The only example of interaction

is through the justice system and a very limited discussion of social programs, suggesting

that interaction occurs primarily when the individual does not uphold his or her

responsibilities.

A Look at Canada presents the primary relationship between individuals and the state

through the democratic process, in particular through voting. This can partially be

explained through the purpose of the text, which is to prepare permanent residents for

becoming citizens and acquiring the right to vote. At the same time, as mentioned in the

previous section, this is a limited way of presenting the relationship between individuals

and the state. While the text suggests that individuals know who their elected

representatives are, the book does not encourage contacting them or engaging in any

other type of political activity. A large portion of the text (pages 23-35) is devoted to a

discussion of government, but throughout this section elections and the procedure of

voting are presented as the primary form of interaction between the state and citizens.

There is no mention of the welfare state or state provided services that could establish a

relationship between the provider and receiver. The concept of social rights and mutual

obligations is not introduced. Although equality is mentioned as a key value of Canadian

society (CIC, 2001: 4), there is no introduction of issues of social, economic or regional

equality ensured by the state. This is despite the fact that permanent residents have

access to the same social programs as citizens, other than social assistance (the sponsor

retains the obligation for the economic well-being of the permanent residents until they

gain citizenship). The shifting of economic responsibility for sponsored immigrants to

the sponsors, combined with the reduction of free integration services, such as language

classes, reflects a privatization of support for immigrants and the downloading of

responsibility to family members. This also enhances the potential for exploitation of

sponsored immigrants, as they are increasingly dependent on the goodwill and assistance

of their sponsors.

As discussed in the previous section on the democratic process, the Swedish text gives

the impression of closer, stronger ties between the state and individuals in its discussion

of democracy and explicitly states that this is an important component of Swedish state

culture. The state is accountable to the people and all permanent residents and citizens

have an equal right to participate in the political process (although non-citizens cannot

vote in national elections other than at the municipal level). Whereas the Canadian texts

give little attention to the welfare state as a link between the state and its people, the

welfare state plays a prominent role in the Swedish text. As mentioned above, the

historical section of the Swedish text represents the 20th Century history of Sweden as focusing on the building of the welfare state and the People's Home (Integrationsverket, 2001: 25). The text states that the social democrats "wanted to help those who were worst off. They spoke of creating a society that would be a home for the People, folkhem, without great social and economic differences" (Integrationsverket, 2001: 25). This quotation suggests a number of things. First, it reinforces the importance of equality in Sweden, in both economic and social terms. Second, it suggests that this is a project driven by the state for the people and "funded by all residents of Sweden through taxes and fees" (25-6) reinforcing the relationship between individuals and the state. While the lack of attention given to the welfare state in the Canadian texts could be attributable to the fact that this is a provincial area of jurisdiction, it does not account for the other brief forays into areas of provincial responsibility in the text (e.g. mentions of health care and education) nor does it address the fact that the federal government often portrays itself as a key player within the welfare state system in Canada.

The welfare state plays an important role in the Swedish text and appears in virtually every chapter, drawing linkages between the people and the state. The text also draws attention to the fact that other levels of government are responsible for many aspects of service provision related to the welfare state, despite the fact that this is a national project. For example, the chapter on municipalities discusses the municipal role in providing income support (welfare) and home care, as well as providing for leisure and cultural activities. The text states that two rules govern the administration of municipal government: "a municipality may not charge more for its services than they cost to

provide. [...] everyone within a municipality must be treated equally" (64). This reinforces the important role of municipalities in the everyday lives of residents of Sweden. Also, since permanent residents have the right to vote in municipal elections, this gives them an important voice in government and in how these services are provided.

The text also outlines the various supports provided by the state for new arrivals, including home furnishing loans for refugees, language instruction for all new arrivals, an introductory course for new arrivals, interpreters and income support (Integrationsverket, 2001: 77-80). The state is also represented as playing a more involved role in the labour market through job training, laws against discrimination, laws protecting workers, and unemployment benefits (93-102). Personal finances are also addressed by the text and many of the state subsidies and income support measures are raised, including housing allowances, child allowances, sick benefits and old age pensions (115-121). Three chapters are devoted to the education system and one chapter discusses the health care system. The chapter on health care begins by stating that "Sweden's 'social safety net' has gradually taken shape throughout the course of the twentieth century. It constitutes society's response to protecting those who are sick, functionally disabled or unemployed, or who are having other problems, and whose families cannot solve the problems on their own" (172). The large component of the text devoted to matters related to the welfare state and the social safety net paints a different picture of the relationship between individuals and the state than that which appears in the Canadian texts. The Swedish state is portrayed as being very involved in the everyday lives of its people; whereas, the

Canadian state remains distant and individuals are expected to be responsible for themselves.

This can be traced to the historical development of the welfare state and the historical role of the state in Canadian politics, as well as reflective of cultural predispositions towards state intervention in the lives of individuals. Olsen, for example, discusses the differences between the social democratic welfare state of Sweden and the 'social liberal' welfare state that developed in Canada and identifies socio-economic, socio-cultural, socio-political and institutional factors and how they interrelate to provide the context for the development of individual welfare states (2002: 2-3). Also, a fear of immigrants taking advantage of the welfare state exists in both Canada and Sweden (whether real or imagined), the importance of equal treatment in Sweden perhaps explains why they do not explicitly exclude immigrants and refugees from receiving any social benefits from the community as a whole.

How are citizen rights and responsibilities represented?

Individual rights and responsibilities play an important role in the attainment of full citizenship and membership in the political community. They protect individuals from interference by the state or other members of society and outline the responsibility of the individual to the larger community and society. Evaluating the ways in which rights and responsibilities are presented in the different texts enables us to further develop an image of how the state views the role of individuals and their relationship to each other and the political and social communities.

In terms of placement and the ordering of the text, rights and responsibilities are not given high priority in the two Canadian texts. In both texts, the sections on rights and freedoms appear in the last section of the state literature. The emphasis in these sections is on individual rights as seen through the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Both texts emphasize the rights and freedoms contained within the *Charter* and in *A Look at Canada* a reproduction of the *Charter* is included. In particular, the texts stress the notion of equality and rule of law (CIC, 2002: 36; CIC, 2001: 29). They also emphasize the importance of the responsibilities that come with rights, an issue that is not as evident in the Swedish literature. For example, in *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, the text stresses responsibility "to respect the rights and freedoms of others and to obey Canada's laws" (CIC, 2002: 35). *A Look at Canada* states that "All Canadians have certain rights and responsibilities that are based on Canadian laws, traditions and shared values" (CIC, 2001: 30). The two texts give further information on specific rights held by portions of society. In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada,* further detail is given on the rights of women, children and seniors (36). *A Look at Canada* provides further information on the rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship; specifically, the right to vote and the right to enter and leave Canada freely (31). The text also lists additional citizenship responsibilities, including: helping others, caring for and protecting our heritage and environment, obeying Canada's laws, respecting the rights and freedoms of others, and working to eliminate discrimination and injustice (31). The emphasis is on community involvement in terms of the responsibilities of citizens to the larger society; however, rights are presented in a largely individualistic manner. There is no mention of any type

of social or economic rights either between individuals, groups or regions. The literature

also does not provide information on what to do if an individual experiences a violation

of his or her rights and freedoms. This provides an interesting point of comparison with

the Swedish text, which does raise these points.

The issue of rights and responsibilities is dealt with primarily in Chapters Four and

Twenty-two of *Sweden: A pocket guide*, which deal with democracy and the justice

system respectively. A discussion of rights also appears in other chapters, such as the

chapter on family and social life and the chapter on work, in which specific rights and

laws related to these areas are discussed. Unlike the Canadian texts, in the Swedish text

the issue of rights is raised quite early in the book. Chapter Four outlines political rights

and voting practices. It also emphasizes the constitutional rights of freedom of speech,

the press, assembly, association and religion as basic individual rights central to the

functioning of a democratic state (39-40). This chapter also emphasizes the role of the

public ombudsmen to ensure that an individual is neither discriminated against nor has

his/her freedoms infringed upon. In particular, the text refers to the Parliamentary

Ombudsman who is responsible for addressing problems with the state; the Equal

Opportunity Ombudsman who ensures equal treatment of men and women by employers;

the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination; and the Ombudsmen responsible for the

protection of children, the functionally disabled and for ensuring one is not discriminated

against on the basis of sexual orientation (41). The emphasis in this initial discussion of

rights is focused on equality and the elimination of discrimination. It is interesting that

while the Canadian literature stresses equality under the law through the *Charter*, the

Swedish literature provides concrete information on what to do and where to go in the case of discrimination.

While the basic rights and freedoms are presented early in the text, the details of the process come later, suggesting that these are of lesser importance. Chapter Twenty-two, "Law and Order: Sweden's Efforts to Promote Justice," addresses the question of rights in more detail and with specific reference to the Swedish Justice System. Individual rights and protection are divided into constitutional law, statute law and common rights, such as the right of common access to land throughout Sweden (Allemansrätten) (Integrationsverket, 2001: 206-7). Legal rights and processes are outlined for civil and criminal cases, and the Swedish court system is presented (211-12). The chapter also examines legal aid and compensation for victims of crime, focussing on spousal abuse and the protection of women (212-14), and informs readers of the right to an interpreter in any dealings with police, courts and/or lawyers (214). Overall, the Swedish text provides more information, particularly in the areas regarding an individual's options if his/her rights are infringed upon. Without any knowledge of what to do if someone infringes upon your rights, the rights themselves become rather meaningless. Many recent immigrants are often particularly vulnerable to exploitation in society due to a combination of factors that may include their uncertain status, the need to retain the goodwill of their employers or sponsors, and the threat of deportation. As well, they are more likely than full citizens to be less familiar with their rights and language may be a significant barrier to their ability to access information. Therefore, knowing their rights and the available resources should they experience an infringement of those rights is

necessary both to empower them and to ensure that their rights not only exist on paper, but can be acted upon.

How are males, females and children represented?

Both the Canadian and the Swedish literature emphasize the rights of women and children. This may be a response to an impression that these rights are not respected in certain immigrant cultures.[18] In both case studies, women are fairly equally represented within the various images and are represented in positions of power and authority. As well, specific attention reinforcing their legal equality is raised in the written text. As we shall see below, however, the Canadian texts do a better job of presenting women as equal in all their diversity.

A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada, presents the various laws related to gender and age discrimination (CIC, 2002: 21). As well, in the section on the Canadian way of life, gender equality is raised through the sharing of responsibility for housework and the caring for children between men and women (31-32). The text points out that most single-parent families in Canada are headed by women; but it does not address the issue of the feminization of poverty related to this. This section does not discuss the rights of children, instead raising the issue of youth crime (32). Children's rights are brought forward in Chapter Eight, "Your Rights and Obligations," which states that "In Canada,

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[18] Susan Moller Okin (1999), for example, argues that there is a growing tension between feminism and the multiculturalist concern for protecting cultural diversity. She suggests that many minority cultures claiming group rights are more patriarchal than mainstream cultures and that the advancement of these types of rights may exacerbate the oppression of women (Okin, 1999: 17-22).

you are required by law to properly care for your children" (36). The text outlines

different types of abuse and neglect, informing readers that their children can be taken

away in cases of abuse. This section also reaffirms the equality of men and women in all

areas of Canadian life and states that "violence against women is against the law" (36).

In *A Look at Canada,* on the other hand, the rights of women and children are not

specifically addressed other than as part of the general principles of equality in society

and under the law.

Sweden: A pocket guide (Integrationsverket, 2001) places additional emphasis on the

rights of women and children in addition to the discussion of the general principles of

equality in Swedish society and law, restating these principles at different points in the

text. As discussed in the section on images, men and women are presented relatively

equally in the text and shown participating in different types of activities (e.g.

professional and political activity as well as household and childcare activities). The

chapter on families, "Our Nearest and Dearest," reinforces the images present in the

book, discussing the diversity of familial structures and relationships and the equal

opportunity of men and women to participate in family responsibilities and in activities

outside the home (126-29). The text states that gender equality is "considered such an

important issue in Sweden that it is covered by special legislation" (128). The text also

outlines provisions for the care of children in society and the fact that the Swedish state

"has established a close-meshed safety net for them" (129). Further, the text restates that

one cannot be discriminated against because of sexual orientation (132).

The sections related to gender equality and the rights of children reinforce the importance

of equality in Swedish state culture and society, which has become a priority for the

Swedish state since the mid-twentieth century. As well, the Swedish text's discussion of

men, women and children reinforces the role of the state in promoting and securing a

level of equality for its members. Whereas the Canadian text focuses on legal rights to

equality, there is little mention of programs aimed at ensuring equality or the role of the

welfare state in the promotion of equality. Gender equality thus appears stronger in the

Swedish text, largely because it receives more attention and discusses programs aimed at

promoting the equality of women. The Swedish efforts at presenting an image of an

equal society are marred, however, by the whiteness of the images presented in the book.

While men and women are portrayed in a relatively equitable manner, there is little

representation of visible minorities in a familial context.

How is the society of the country represented?

This question touches on many of the issues discussed in the previous sections.

However, whereas those sections attempted to discern the texts' representation of specific

aspects of how the state views society and national culture, this section attempts to look

at the representation of society as a whole as it is presented in the texts.

In the case of Canada, the texts give an impression of Canada as divided, but without any

of the problems associated with the lack of a strong national identity. First, Canada is

presented in a regionally fragmented manner. Both texts pay particular attention to

Canada's different regions (CIC, 2002: 23; CIC, 2001: 14-22). In *A Look at Canada,* the

history, development, population and economy are all presented in regionalized terms.

Canada is represented as divided along geographic lines and the geography of the

different regions is portrayed as influencing other types of growth and development.

Both texts also refer to federalism and the division of powers between the federal and

provincial governments (CIC, 2002: 28; CIC, 2001: 23). Regionalism and the divided

identity and culture within Canada are reinforced; a peculiar approach given that one of

the goals of the federal government is to promote Canadian unity, helped through the

construction of a strong Canadian identity. Thus, the emphasis on regionalism and other

identity based cleavages in Canadian politics seems counterproductive to the project of

instilling a strong sense of 'Canada' among newcomers.

Additionally, both texts refer to Canada's linguistic divide. *A Newcomer's Introduction to*

Canada discusses Canada's Francophone population, stating that although Francophones

are concentrated in Quebec almost one million French speakers live in other parts of the

country (CIC, 2002: 26). The text goes on to provide web sites that offer additional

information on Francophone communities outside of Quebec (26). This is interesting

because it creates a distance between Quebec nationalism and their ownership of French

language and culture in Canada, reflecting Trudeau's strategy of displacing Quebec's

claims to represent the French people in Canada. Also, it conveys the impression that

Canada is both a bilingual and linguistically diverse country. The text later refers to

official bilingualism and the *Official Languages Act*; in particular, the availability of

federal services in either official language in emphasized (29). Canada is represented as

bilingual and diverse, while the politics of identity, Quebec nationalism, and the politics

of language are ignored. Bilingualism and multiculturalism are presented as key

Canadian values, but little information on the policies and programs themselves is given

to the reader, thereby creating the impression that these are superficial values. The

debates surrounding these policy areas, including issues around their creation, their

funding, and their contribution to Canadian identity and unity, are not mentioned in the

two texts. There is no mention of the historical conflicts surrounding issues of identity in

Canada. State endorsed diversity is presented as a positive attribute, embraced by all

Canadians.

Bilingualism is introduced early in *A Look at Canada*: "English- and French-speaking

people have lived together in Canada for more than 300 years" (CIC, 2001: 5). The

sentence, the first in the section on Canada's official languages, presents the

French/English relationship in Canada in a manner that does not reflect the history of

conflict between the two dominant linguistic groups. Further, the text states that

"linguistic duality in an important aspect of our Canadian identity – over 98% of

Canadians speak either English or French or both" (5). This quotation gives the

impression that Canadians are bilingual and proud of it, despite the fact that the national

levels of bilingualism are low, only increasing slightly, and that the policy itself remains

contentious in parts of Canada (see Chapter Three). This section reflects the position of

the federal government as a promoter of bilingualism in Canada and suggests that the

federal state does see this as an important component of state culture. However, this

presentation of bilingualism in Canada is misleading to Francophone immigrants who

settle outside of Quebec, New Brunswick and other French-speaking 'pockets' where

English is the predominant language and speaking French is not necessarily viewed as an asset.

Not surprisingly, Canada is also presented in the state literature as ethnically and culturally diverse. Tolerance and multiculturalism are presented as important Canadian values. In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, ethnic diversity appears in the discussion of Canada's history, which begins by stating that "Canada is a land of many cultures and many peoples" (CIC, 2002: 26) and proceeds to describe the history of Canada's peoples in terms of waves of immigration (26). Formal multiculturalism receives brief attention in one paragraph at the end of Chapter Six. The text states that "Through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, the government encourages Canadians to take pride in their language, religion and heritage, and to keep their customs and traditions, as long as they don't break Canadian laws" (29). This sentence is significant because it provides definite limits on the policy of multiculturalism in Canada, contradicting the claims of its opponents and fears that multiculturalism may spread indefinitely dividing Canada into numerous ethno-cultural ghettos (e.g. Kymlicka, 1998: 22-24).

A Look at Canada, aimed at residents wishing to become Canadian citizens, goes much further in its efforts to define what it means to be Canadian and, in particular, a Canadian citizen. The second paragraph of the text states "Canadians work hard to nourish a peaceful society in which respect for cultural differences, equality, liberty and freedom of expression is a fundamental value. Canada was created through discussion, negotiation

and compromise. These characteristics are as important today as in the past" (CIC, 2001: 1). This ties Canada's current values (as defined by the state) to our history, pointing to the roots of Canadian culture. This is restated a few pages later under the heading, "What does Canadian Citizenship Mean?" (4). The following quotation appears in bold text at the top of the page, reinforcing its importance: "Canadian history and traditions have created a country where our values include tolerance and respect for cultural differences, and a commitment to social justice" (4). This section then proceeds to identify four key Canadian values (also in bolded text): equality, tolerance, peace, and law and order. The next section, entitled "Introducing Canada" again reinforces the theme of tolerance and diversity. Two key terms appear in boxed text aimed at pointing the reader to the important information. These two terms are official languages and multiculturalism. The section begins with the following bolded text: "Through Canada's history, millions of immigrants have helped to build this country. Today, Canada, a country with two official languages, welcomes people from more than 150 countries each year" (5). Again, for the fourth time in almost as many pages, the state presents its message: Canada is diverse and multicultural and based on "the idea of equality" and "the importance of working together and helping one another" (5). The message of Canada's multiculturalism is reinforced by the images in both texts (discussed above) that portray Canada as comprised of culturally diverse peoples engaged in a wide variety of activities.

One interesting issue that appears in both Canadian texts is sustainable development. While this is perhaps not one of the first characteristics of Canadian society that would typically come to mind for most Canadians, the texts both present this as an important

characteristic defining the relationship between Canadians and the land and reinforcing

the connection between the land, culture and economy. This may partially be a result of

environmental policies, such as the Kyoto Accord, and the commitment of the Liberal

government to environmental protection. Most importantly, however, it shows the

government trying to adapt state culture in Canada to fit the government's political

agenda. By instilling new values, such as sustainable development, in newcomers we

witness how the state attempts to define 'being Canadian' through the immigrant

literature. This demonstrates a conscious effort of the part of state actors and institutions

to shape Canadian identity and the values associated with 'being Canadian' in the future.

It is also interesting to note that the environment has become a key political issue in the

years since this document was written.

In *A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada*, the primary discussion of sustainable

development follows the sections on bilingualism and multiculturalism, suggesting that

this is an important aspect of Canadian culture and politics. The section states that

"Canadians are very concerned about environmental issues" and that "Canadians know

that economic growth is crucial for the prosperity of Canada" (CIC, 2002: 29). The text

points to the key role of the federal government in promoting sustainable development, as

well as the obligation of everyone living in Canada to "act in a responsible way" (29).

The section on sustainable development in *A Look at Canada* appears early in the text,

bringing the issue quickly to the readers' attention and reinforcing its importance in the

eyes of the state. While the message is similar to that in *A Newcomer's Introduction to*

Canada, the second text also provides information of how individuals can help the environment. Interestingly, this section also refers to "environmental citizenship," which will lead to "responsible environmental action" (CIC, 2001: 7). The relatively large emphasis on sustainable development in both texts (receiving more attention and space than either bilingualism or multiculturalism), suggests that this is an important issue for the state. By bringing this issue forward in the literature for new arrivals and citizens, the government can be seen as trying to promote these values within Canadian state culture. Apparently, according to the federal government, a "good" citizen is one who recycles.

Overall, the society of Canada is presented as diverse, heterogeneous and, perhaps unintentionally, relatively disunited. While the texts do present certain key "Canadian traits" – such as official bilingualism, tolerance, multiculturalism, and sustainable development – the way in which the information on the country is presented gives the impression of disunity. Furthermore, the lack of unity or a homogenous national culture in Canada is presented as a positive trait. The omission of the conflict and politics of identity, language and region in Canada is noteworthy. Not only does this represent a form of rewriting Canadian history, thus painting a somewhat false image of Canada, it also suggests that these are not key issues for the current administration. The representation of Canadian society in the two texts provides an interesting contrast to the Swedish literature, which while recognizing the diversity of Sweden at the beginning of the book and addressing some of the challenges of integrating in the comments from other immigrants, does overall present Sweden as a relatively homogenous state, passing over the historical consequences of Swedish nation-building for non-Swedes.

As in the Canadian case, the previous sections also contribute to the analysis of how the Swedish text represents Swedish society; for example, the emphasis on equality and democracy in Sweden, the importance of the welfare state in ensuring equality, and the corresponding large role of the state in the lives of residents of Sweden. While the beginning of the text stresses the current diversity of Swedish society, it also reflects the problems and ambivalence with which the Swedish state and society faces this growing diversity. This is particularly apparent in Chapter Five, appropriately entitled "How we usually do things ... traditions and popular customs in modern Sweden." The title of this chapter is in itself revealing, suggesting that there is a 'we' and a usual way of doing things. The first paragraph of the chapter addresses this issue, however, stating that "you can also read something about what is specifically Swedish – if there is such a thing" (Integrationsverket, 2001: 43). The chapter continues by arguing that "'Swedish' is a diffuse concept" (44) and will be understood differently by different people with different ancestry.

The chapter proceeds to discuss the importance of language, the Swedish love of nature, and traditional Swedish foods (Integrationsverket, 2001: 44-5). The majority of the chapter is devoted to outlining the various Swedish traditions, holidays and festivals that occur throughout the year, many of which are Christian in origin (Easter, Lent, Christmas), historical and political (the National Day, Labour Day), and pagan (Midsummer and Walpurgis night - which welcomes spring) (46-56). Following the calendar of events is a section entitled "Traditions Change" which contains an image

depicting a woman (the only person of colour shown in this section) jitterbugging with a white man at the annual jitterbug training camp in Roslagen (57). This section briefly discusses non-Swedish traditions that are increasing in importance in Sweden (in two sentences), specifically the "Iranian New Year" and Ramadan (57).

Following this chapter is one of the "Your new neighbours" segments written by an immigrant woman and describing her frustration while learning the Swedish social code. She writes, "Now, after 25 years, I feel I have a fairly good understanding of things Swedish. I know the unspoken rules well enough to break them. Because now I know what they are: never just tell it like it is; never contradict anyone, even in a debate; never try to show that you are better than anyone else" (Integrationsverket, 2001: 62). This quotation gives the impression that there is a Swedish 'way of doing things' and strongly reflects the ideas behind the Law of Jante described in Chapter Four. The idea of equality appears to be strongly related to the idea of sameness and not standing out. As mentioned before, this is easier for some immigrants than for others. The fact that such a statement appears in the literature is amazing in its honesty as it challenges the Swedish identity itself and recognizes the problems that do exist.

The images in the text, as well as the written text, convey the idea that there is something uniquely "Swedish" about Swedish society. Much of the written text discusses diversity and the importance of equality, tying Swedish identity to the history of nation-building, the development of the welfare state and the Swedish model of doing things. In doing so, the text attempts to remove Swedish identity from a concept of ethnicity or blood

belonging, creating room for new members. The images in the text, however, contradict this message as they are overwhelmingly white and portray Sweden as a very white society, with ethnic Swedes dominating the political and economic elite, as well as the cultural life of the society.

While the Canadian texts portray Canadian society as diverse and heterogeneous (to the extent that the impression is one of fragmentation), it appears to be more welcoming of diversity than the Swedish text's presentation of Swedish society. In some ways, this is attributable to a perceived lack of distinctly 'Canadian' traditions, customs and behaviours, even though they may in fact exist in social norms and institutional practices, many of which the texts themselves are attempting to convey. While the Swedish text recognizes the changing nature of Swedish culture and society, and the barriers that new arrivals face, the very presentation of centuries old traditions and customs reveals the relatively unchanging nature of Swedish society. The entrenchment of the Swedish model and 'way of doing things' is so strong, that this becomes an additional barrier to becoming part of a modern and diverse Swedish society.

Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?
This question attempts to bring together the diverse issues discussed throughout this chapter and relate them to the vision of citizenship put forward in the respective texts. These three aspects of citizenship – liberty, equality and solidarity – and the relationship between them reveals the primary traits in each society as presented by the state, through its literature. Liberty generally refers to individual freedoms, both from interference from

others and from the state. Equality can be viewed as encompassing legal, political and social rights (e.g. Marshall, 1950). Solidarity (or fraternity) implies membership in a political community and a feeling of belonging to that community.

Both Sweden and Canada refer, in their literature, to the liberties or freedoms enjoyed by members of the society and protecting by law. In the Canadian literature, these are discussed primarily through the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. In the Swedish text, they are presented primarily in the chapters on the democratic process and the judicial system and discussed in broader terms. In both cases, rights are primarily held by individuals and protected through the constitution and state legislation. The Swedish text also provides more information on what can be done if these rights are infringed upon. This can be seen as related to the more interventionist role the Swedish state plays in ensuring equality.

Equality is emphasized in both the Canadian and Swedish literature produced for new arrivals; however, the idea of equality is presented in different ways. *A Look at Canada* presents equality as one of the key characteristics of Canadian citizenship, stating "We respect everyone's rights, including the right to speak out and express ideas that others might disagree with" (CIC, 2001: 4). This quotation ties the Canadian idea of equality to individuals holding the same liberties or basic individual rights and freedoms. This idea of equality also resonates in two of the other defining characteristics of Canadian citizenship presented in this text: tolerance, which is presented as being a positive attribute in that one culture is not better than another, but that can also be interpreted as

'putting up with' other cultures; and the rule of law, which insists on the equality of all

individuals under law and in dealings with state authorities (4). While equality is

emphasized in the Canadian literature, it is a formal type of equality held primarily by the

individual. It is the equality of individuals in law, protected by the *Charter*; elements of

social, economic, or group equality are not mentioned. This, in turn, reflects an emphasis

in the Canadian literature on liberty above substantive equality and on the individual, as

opposed to the community.

The Swedish text emphasizes equality from the first paragraph: "In our society, everyone

is entitled to equal rights and benefits" (Integrationsverket, 2001: 1). While the Swedish

text also presents equality in terms of rights and legislation (e.g. 39; 205-7), this

quotation suggests equality is also defined in terms of benefits or via the welfare state. In

other words, although there is an emphasis on gender equality and on promoting ethnic

diversity, the emphasis on social rights is much greater than in the Canadian texts. Entire

chapters of *Sweden: A pocket guide* are devoted to the health care system, the education

system and social programs for new arrivals, children and the elderly and infirm. In the

Canadian texts, by contrast, these issues receive scant attention. The pinnacle of Swedish

history is presented as the development of the welfare state and People's Home, which

aimed to create a society "without great social and economic differences" (25). Virtually

every section of the Swedish text refers to the social safety net, if the entire chapter is not

devoted to it. Not only does the Swedish text presents a different and deeper

understanding of equality than the Canadian texts, the social rights associated with

community membership also place more weight on the ideal of solidarity and community versus the individual.

While the Canadian texts emphasize the individual and the responsibility to take care of oneself and one's dependents, the Swedish text presents a more equitable balance between individual rights and responsibilities and the caring, sharing welfare society. In some ways, this reflects the immigration patterns of each country and the different target audiences of the respective texts. In Canada, the majority of new arrivals are independent immigrants (58.7%), followed by family class immigrants (26.6%), who are required by law to take care of themselves and not depend on the state for assistance (CIC, 2001c). In Sweden, on the other hand, the majority of new arrivals are family class (52.4%) or refugees (13.8%) and who are entitled to all state benefits when granted residency (Migrationsverket, 2004). If one of the principles of citizenship, or membership in a community in the case of denizens, is a feeling of loyalty and common possession of the society and a sense of sharing it with others (Marshall, 1950), then a sense of solidarity may build greater feelings of responsibility to the community and other members than rampant individualism. In this study, the feelings of solidarity appear greater in the Swedish texts where more emphasis is placed on the community through the People's Home and the welfare state, than in the Canadian texts where new arrivals are told from the beginning that they must fend for themselves and that equality is something written into law, but where individuals themselves are responsible for pursuing claims against rights infringements, even though they may not have access to the social rights necessary to do so.

Overall, the Canadian texts place more emphasis on liberty than on substantive equality

or solidarity. The focus on liberty complements Canadian immigration policy, as

discussed in Chapter Four, which is also focused on the individual and expects

individuals to be self-reliant. In the Swedish literature, the emphasis is definitely on

equality and the removal of social barriers and hierarchies, contributing to the expression

of a greater sense of solidarity as the Swedish state works for a better society for all

members.

Conclusion

The boundaries of the nation become more apparent at the borders of the state. The

above discussion of the literature for immigrants created by the state reveals some of the

values that these policies and documents contain. This analysis reveals the values that

the state is attempting to promote among newcomers. These values can be said to

comprise the basis of Canadian and Swedish state culture and are summarized in the table

below. The table ranks the different criteria analyzed as strong, medium, or weak based

on the emphasis given to a particular topic in the texts and the ability of the text to

present that aspect in a positive and inclusive manner.

Table 5.3

Summary of the Literature Analysis		
Point of Analysis	**Canadian Literature for Newcomers**	**Swedish Literature for Newcomers**
1. Promotion of National Symbols	• **Strong** - particularly in the guide for potential new citizens	• **Strong** – symbols of the nation are visible throughout the text
2. Importance of Territory	• **Strong** due to the presence of maps and the territorially based discussion of history, the economy, and the people	• **Medium** – included maps and the historical importance of territory
3. Visual presentation of diversity	• **Strong** – images reflected ethno-cultural diversity • Immigrants and visible minorities were shown as integrated into Canada	• **Weak** – Sweden is presented as white and as having a strong ethnically based culture
4. Historical and economic context	• **Medium** – information on building Canada is present, but regionalized	• **Strong** – the importance of history and the economy to nation-building is clearly presented early in the text
5. Processes of immigration and integration	• **Medium** – information on process is clearly presented • The impetus is on the individual	• **Strong** – the information is clearly presented • Access to state resources and assistance is provided
6. The democratic process	• **Weak** – little information is given • Process is presented as limited to voting	• **Strong** – a great deal of information is given • Residents are encouraged to participate is a variety of ways
7. The role of the state	• **Weak** – the state appears to be distant from the people • Little mention of the welfare state	• **Strong** – state clearly plays an important role in the lives of individuals through the welfare state
8. Rights and responsibilities	• **Medium** – presented in formal, legal terms through the Charter • Little information on recourse in case of infringements	• **Strong** – presented in both legal and economic/social terms • Information given on ombudsmen
9. Gender equality	• **Medium** – women are presented as equal, but little information is given on promoting/ensuring equality	• **Strong** – women's equality is frequently mentioned, as well as the role of the state in promoting/ensuring equality
10. Presentation of society	• **Medium** – society is presented as diverse, but divided	• **Medium** – society is presented as united, but exclusive
11. Liberty, equality or solidarity	• Focus on liberty	• Focus on equality and solidarity

Overall, the Swedish literature does a better job of conveying to the reader what it means to be Swedish. Despite the emphasis in the Swedish literature on equality and the role of the state in promoting equality, the state culture appears to be exclusive with regards to ethno-cultural diversity. In the Canadian case, the overall rating is medium suggesting that the Canadian state is not succeeding as well as Sweden is conveying to the reader the key values associated with being Canadian and the role of the state in ensuring equality among citizens. At the same time, however, the Canadian literature – perhaps because the values of the state are less clear – does appear to be more inclusive of diversity than in the Swedish case. This could be viewed as positive; however, the lack of attention given to the issue of structural supports for diversity and equality compromises this strength in the Canadian literature. Similarly, the weakening support for such programs among recent governments in Canada undermines the practice of Canada as an inclusive society. The challenge, ultimately, is to reconcile the construction of identity with the recognition and celebration of diversity. How can a state promote certain values as central to identity and belonging while recognizing difference? How important is it to have a clear and strong sense of national identity in an increasingly multicultural and postnational world? This analysis of state literature helps facilitate how we approach and understand these important questions and their ramifications.

In conclusion, the analysis of the state literature for immigrants reflects the values within the immigration and integration policies discussed in the previous two chapters. In Canada, Canadian state culture in both the policies and the literature stresses tolerance and multiculturalism, underpinned by a strong emphasis on the individual and his/her

responsibility to be self-reliant and to contribute to Canada. These findings suggest that

Canada is more interested in "selling diversity" than in ensuring equality in diversity. In

the Swedish case, the primary values are equality and the role of the state and welfare

society in ensuring this equality. However, the message of equality is contradicted within

the immigration policies, which are becoming more restrictive and individualistic, and

within the literature, which still presents an image of Sweden as segregated along ethnic

and cultural lines.

The analysis of Canadian state culture in Chapter Three, "Canada: Unity and Diversity,"

looked at the historical development of identity politics, focusing on immigration. This

analysis revealed that Canadian state culture is comprised of two competing and

potentially conflicting discourses: the idea of Canada as a diverse and tolerant society,

and a focus on individual responsibility emerging from neo-liberalism. Sweden's state

culture was explored in Chapter Four, "Equalizing Differences? The Swedish Case,"

which explored the history of Swedish nation-building. Here, the state culture was

determined to consist of the values of equality (often interpreted as sameness) and the

welfare state society. The values comprising state culture in Canada and Sweden in the

previous chapters are reflected and projected to new immigrants in the state literature

analyzed in this chapter. The Canadian texts reveal the tension between the portrayal of

Canada as a multicultural, tolerant and equal society with the individualism that currently

undermines Canadian efforts at community building. The Swedish text also reflects the

values determined to underpin its state culture in Chapter Four; namely equality and a

community based on the principles of the welfare society. At the same time, the text also

reflected the problems within Swedish state culture, specifically the inability to adequately address diversity.

This chapter aimed to apply the methodological framework proposed within the concept of state culture to the literature created for new immigrants in Canada and Sweden. In doing so, the analysis was able to uncover the central values promoted by the respective states to the new members of the political community and relate these back to the previous chapters on the development of state culture in Canada and Sweden. This approach allows for a new understanding of how states are working to construct the boundaries of the nation and reinforce key principles within society. It also provides a new departure point for efforts to change the state culture and to redefine what it means to be Canadian or Swedish.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion:

State Culture – An Alternative Approach

What roles do state actors and institutions play in defining the values of the nation and, as such, in constructing identity? How can we determine what these values are? This project argued that one way in which to answer these questions is through the concept of state culture. State culture, as I have defined it here, consists of the values put forward by states, through different state actors and institutions, as represented in their policies, practices and literature. These values reflect the borders of the nation and define what it means to belong to the nation. The concept of state culture and the methodological framework developed here may uniquely allow researchers to capture the values of the state at a particular point in time and explore the role of those values in establishing the dominant discourses. This research developed the concept of state culture and the framework for interrogating it, and then applied it to the Canadian and Swedish case studies. The focus of the exploration in these cases was through identity politics, immigration policies, and the literature created for new immigrants.

The concept of state culture is grounded in the literatures on nationalism and citizenship, as discussed in Chapter Two. Nationalism and national identity have traditionally been used both to build communities within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state and to exclude those who do not belong to the national community. In other words, the idea of the nation has historically been used (and continues to be used) to distinguish between an 'us' and a 'them'. Citizenship has also been used to build community and to provide ties

that bind the members of the community together. Both bodies of literature provide partial answers to questions relating to the role of state actors in defining the values and boundaries of the nation, but neither provides a complete one. The literature on nationalism is useful because of its focus on the role of the state. However, because of the tendency of nationalist movements to create exclusive and essentialized groups, this approach to community building can become problematic when immigrants and newcomers are taken into consideration. The literature on citizenship is useful because of the developments that focus on the intersectionality of identities. One function of citizenship is to build a community of citizens. Recently, however, there has been a shift away from ideas of solidarity towards more individualist notions of citizenship. This potentially creates problems for those interested in nurturing communities. Thus, while states continue to play a role in building national identity and community, this role is diminished within the literature on citizenship. Based on the concept of state culture, an alternative methodological approach to understanding the role of state actors in the construction of identity and the nature of the identity they put forward was advanced. This approach links the citizenship and nationalism literatures. Drawing on their relative strengths, a series of questions was developed, providing an entry point into the analysis of state culture. These questions were:

- How is the historical and economic context presented?
- How are the processes of immigration and integration presented?
- How is the democratic process represented?
- How is the relationship between individuals and the state represented?
- How are individual rights and responsibilities represented?
- How are males, females and children represented?
- How is the society of the country represented?
- Which aspect of citizenship is emphasized – liberty, equality or solidarity?

Thus, the concept of state culture has the potential to bridge these two schools of thought. Further, the methodology accompanying it provides an alternative and concrete mechanism for exploring the role of the state in defining values and illuminating the values promoted through its activities. As well, by linking the literature on citizenship and nationalism to the issue of immigration, state culture reveals the boundaries of the nation and the characteristics of the 'good' citizen, as defined by state outputs.

Both secondary and primary sources were used in the development and application of state culture in this project. The combination of secondary and primary sources in the case studies allowed for the establishment of the context within which state culture currently operates, as well as the analysis of the values and discourses contained within specific policy documents. The employment of a variety of methodologies and sources allowed for a broader analysis and understanding of the role of the state in contemporary identity politics. The analysis of the texts given by state agencies to new immigrants combined critical discourse with content analysis, framed around the questions established in Chapter Two, in order to uncover the values advanced within the documents. These relatively new methodologies within political science have a great deal of potential for understanding state rhetoric and the discursive construction of power relations within state documents. State documents are concrete manifestations of the goals and values of particular political actors who represent the state. They carry social meaning and are embedded with concepts of power, citizenship, rights and equality, among others. In order to determine the actual messages being transmitted by state actors via these documents, methodologies such as critical discourse and content analysis are

invaluable. They offer the opportunity to systematically analyze the content of the

documents, both qualitatively and quantitatively, while drawing out the broader

discourses and consequences for society as a whole. This project, through the

methodology utilized in the analysis of the state literature for new immigrants,

contributes a clear method for revealing the discourses and values embedded within

policy documents and state literature.

The methodological framework of state culture developed in Chapter Two was used to

explore the test cases, Canada and Sweden, in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Both

countries experience significant numbers of immigrants per year and have attempted to

address the changing demographics of their respective populations through integration

policies, such as multiculturalism. The two countries, however, have very different

historical experiences of immigration and nation-building. This allows for a relevant

comparison, particularly with regards to their current responses to wide ethnic, cultural

and socio-economic diversity among new arrivals.

Immigration was chosen as the focus for this project because it is a common denominator

between most countries. Global migration continues to be a pressing issue in the 21st

Century as large numbers of people continue to move around the globe in response to

globalization, economic determinants, and social and political upheaval. As part of this

recent and ongoing wave of migration, we are witnessing dramatic shifts in destinations,

restrictions on residency, and protectionist immigration policies. As Folson and Park

note, affluent nation-states are "growing more concerned with policing their borders and

devising increasingly more complex mechanisms for controlling people within and keeping people out" (2004: 12). Most countries address the movement of people across their borders, either through immigration, emigration or refugees. Control over national borders, and controlling the movement of people across those borders, continues to be viewed as central to state sovereignty. As well, in countries that receive large numbers of immigrants annually, the reasons for admitting or refusing applications to enter reveal the priorities of the state with regard to its population. As western states become increasingly ethnically and culturally diverse, this places increased pressure on them to develop policies that address diversity and serve to integrate newcomers. The needs of new immigrants and their integration into the society and economy thus become important concerns. Moreover, as sizable immigrant communities establish themselves, these communities also develop the potential to challenge state policies and the construction of identity. This was seen in Canada in the 1960s, through the mobilization of immigrant groups around the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission. The mobilization of immigrant groups, diasporas and indigenous peoples continues to have an impact in Canada, as well as in other communities. The migration of individuals from former European colonies to Europe is another area that must be addressed. Ultimately, the presence of a large Turkish community in Germany, the Indian communities in the United Kingdom, African communities in France, as well as Muslim communities in most Western countries will continue to challenge the state construction of identity, values and community for many years to come.

The Canadian case study began with an examination of the history of identity politics in

Canada, with a particular emphasis on immigration. Canada is a settler society, built

through immigration. It has always been a culturally, ethnically and linguistically

heterogeneous state. The history of competing group claims for recognition have

competed with strong efforts to impose a homogenous identity within Canada, ultimately

creating space within Canadian discourses for discussions regarding identity, inclusion

and exclusion. The examination of policies and politics carried out in this chapter,

however, points to a shift in Canadian identity politics. The influence of neo-liberalism,

combined with the fear of terrorist attacks following September 11, 2001, led to increased

security concerns around immigration and the perpetuation of a trend of Canada closing

its doors to more and more immigrants. Those who are allowed into Canada today are

expected to be self-sufficient and to not depend on the state for assistance. As well,

immigrants are increasingly assessed based on their potential contribution to Canada's

economic prosperity. This chapter argued that these shifts have led to the state culture

currently promoted by the Canadian government today, as seen in its policy documents

and literature on immigration, incorporating two concurrent discourses; namely, one

based on the idea of Canada as a caring, sharing, multicultural society and another based

on the principles of security and individual responsibility and self-reliance. These

discourses are not necessarily compatible. The shift towards neo-liberal policy goals has

the potential to undermine the idea of Canada as a caring society. As well, the diversity

of the Canadian population requires some level of state involvement to promote equality

among citizens and create community across differences. This is evident in the focus on

self-sufficient independent immigrants, where their contribution is evaluated in terms of

their participation in the workforce. It also places an additional burden on refugees and

family class immigrants who often require more state assistance to participate in social,

political and economic life. In the end, the influence of neo-liberalism may dramatically

change the way in which the Canadian community imagines itself.

Similarly, the Swedish case study began by examining the history of nation-building in

Sweden, with particular emphasis on recent immigration and the challenge it poses to the

Swedish state and society. Sweden's history stretches back over 1000 years and follows

a more traditional, modernist trajectory for the building of the nation-state. Historically,

Sweden was a relatively ethnically homogenous state with a strong sense of Swedish

national identity. The challenges posed by increasingly diverse waves of immigrants in

the post-war period have proven to be more difficult to accommodate in Sweden, as it is a

country that is not as accustomed to re-imagining itself to the same extent as Canada, but

which, as with Canada, is currently engaged in a process of re-examining the foundations

and functioning of its identity. Since the Second World War, Sweden has shifted from an

identity revolving around ethnicity to one that revolves around the welfare state, the

building of the People's Home, and the struggle for the equality of all residents. In

response to the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of Sweden, a multicultural policy

combined with integration policies were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. Recently,

however, neo-liberalism has also made inroads in Sweden, supported by fears regarding

the sustainability of the social safety net and the 'outsiders' who are perceived as an

additional burden on it. This chapter determined that the primary value that forms the

basis of Swedish state culture is equality. Equality is reflected in the central importance

of the Swedish welfare model, but can also result in the inability to recognize and address

difference within the society. The Swedish state is also impacted by neo-liberalism,

which places responsibility for integration on the immigrants themselves, ignoring

societal structures. Placing the responsibility for integration on individual immigrants

has the potential to create greater inequality in Sweden through the creation of a second

class of citizens. Recent studies in Sweden, pointing to the presence of structural racism,

may lead to changes in policy that place more responsibility on mainstream society to

accommodate the diversity of immigrants. Successful accommodation, however, requires

that the Swedish understanding of equality evolve to address the diverse conditions and

needs of the people.

The analysis of identity politics and immigration in Sweden and Canada shows that they

have similar state cultures. In both cases, the welfare state plays a central role in the

definition of societal values by state actors. In Canada, this is often used in comparison

with the United States; for example, with regard to universal health care or education. In

Sweden, the development and export of the Swedish model is regarded as the definitive

characteristic of the society and shapes relations between citizens and the state. Both

countries, however, exist within a larger context and experience external pressures. This

is evident in the development of multiculturalism in both Canada and Sweden in the

1970s as a way to address the concerns of more recent immigrants. It is important to

note, however, that the forms that multiculturalism has taken in each country does not

really meet the ideal of multiculturalism, but rather can be seen as more of a governing

strategy. In this sense, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, multiculturalism has

become a way to 'sell diversity' or lessen the potential challenges of minority groups to

the dominant identity without necessarily adequately recognizing those groups or

improving their position in society. The influence of the global trend towards neo-liberal

governance is also evident in the growing emphasis on individuals and individual

responsibility within state policies and documents on immigration and immigrants. The

increasing emphasis on the individual within both countries diminishes the importance of

community and society. As well, it ignores the structural barriers to integration and

participation and the fact that the larger society also has a role to play in the process of

integration and accommodation. In fact, a neo-liberal approach to immigration may place

an unreasonable burden on the new arrivals themselves as they struggle to find housing

and employment, to integrate, and to learn the language and norms of their new home

with diminished services and assistance available to them. As was demonstrated in both

the Canadian and Swedish cases, newcomers are facing difficulties in integrating and the

blame for this failure in increasingly placed on the immigrants themselves, rather than

being viewed as a failure of the state to assist them.

The analysis of state policy and the historical development of identity politics in Canada

and Sweden provided the context and initial point of comparison for the analysis of the

state literature for new immigrants conducted in Chapter Five. In this chapter, the texts

distributed by the state to new immigrants in Canada and Sweden were analyzed

comparatively in order to determine what values were identified as being most important

for new members of the Canadian or Swedish political community to learn. The analysis

explored the ordering of the texts and the images of the nation and its people, followed by

a content analysis based on the questions developed in Chapter Two. The analysis determined that the values put forward in the literature for new immigrants reflected the values found in the analysis of immigration policy. The Canadian texts present Canada as a diverse society that shows tolerance and respect for others. At the same time, new arrivals are given the message that they must be self-reliant. There is little sense of a common identity or national community presented in these texts. The Swedish text emphasizes the importance of equality and the role of the state in promoting equality and building the welfare society. This is done at the expense of diversity, however, as the Swedish model assumes a certain level of 'sameness' among its members in order to promote these goals. Swedish culture and values remain the norm against which immigrants are measured. Thus, equality is the central value conveyed to the reader, supported by the importance of the welfare state and the idea of Sweden as a society built upon equality. The political community in Sweden exists through the welfare state and the idea that citizens take care of each other.

When these texts are compared with the discourses emerging from immigration policy, a tension between the values of the welfare state in each society and the efforts to control immigration and reduce immigration costs is apparent. This is evident in the Canadian case through increasing immigration fees, reduced services for new arrivals and the message in the texts that immigrants should not expect the state to provide for them. There is a contradiction between these messages and the idea of Canada as a caring and tolerant society. In the Swedish case, the problem emerges through the idea of equality – presented very much as sameness – and the reports from the Integration Board that place

responsibility for the failure to integrate on the immigrants themselves. While these trends are not completely incompatible, they do present different messages to newcomers about their role in the respective societies. How well are differences tolerated? What role does the state play in individual immigrant's lives? Where is the line between a caring society and excessive dependence on the state? How do immigrants, with their unique circumstances, incorporate themselves and their needs and identity into the larger nation? According to the state cultures of Canada and Sweden, and the values implicit in them, this is not entirely clear. This tension has consequences for both immigrants and for multiculturalism as an ideal. For immigrants, the burden for integration into the host society is placed on the individual, irrespective of structural barriers to integration and accommodation that may exist. For multiculturalism, the literature reveals the shortcomings of multicultural policy in that the rhetoric or ideal of multiculturalism is not matched by the reality of the immigrant experience. While both societies are formally multicultural, racism continues to be a significant problem and there is little within the actual policies and practice of multiculturalism that aims to overcome this.

The concept of state culture was proposed to provide an alternative concept for understanding the role of states in defining the borders of the nation and transmitting the values of the nation and a methodology was advanced to facilitate the investigation and articulation of particular state cultures. Through the case studies explored here, Canada and Sweden, the evaluation of state culture through an examination of the policies, practices and literature produced by the state was successful in revealing the values that are put forward and the ways in which it is accomplished by state actors and institutions.

Both of these test cases reflect the fact that certain key values are advanced by states to the population. It is important to note, however, that the role of the state in defining the borders of the nation is only one part (albeit an important part) of the equation. State culture, as mentioned at the beginning, exists within a dialectical relationship with social actors. State actors play an important role in determining who is heard within the arena of formal politics and what identities are represented within governmental policies, reflecting the conflicts surrounding demands for recognition, rights, benefits and power among different groups. However, in many cases they may be responding to demands emerging from society or from outside the borders of the state. As well, in order for the state culture to have legitimacy, it must be accepted by society and reflected back to the state itself.

The questions surrounding immigration, integration, and the constitution of inclusive identities are some of the most important ones facing political scientists in the 21st Century as we struggle to deal with globalization, global flows of people, increasing diversity within countries, and the threat of terrorism. State culture is proposed here as one way of attempting to understand how identities are constructed at the state level and the values that are being projected by state actors and institutions to new members of political communities. As such, the framework used here can also potentially be applied to other social actors and other locales. This is, however, a beginning point and further work is needed to develop the concept of state culture and to apply to different cases.

One area in which further work is desirable is through an examination of how well the values put forward via state culture, through policies and practices, are recognized by individuals in society as defining the borders of the nation. It would be important, for example, to compare the state culture at a particular point in time with public opinion polls. This would be one way of evaluating the relationship between public opinion and state culture, enabling an analysis of how the nation is defined both from above and from below. Another way of addressing this issue in future research is to trace the historical development of state culture through policies; for example, in the literature produced for new immigrants over a period of time. A historical analysis would reveal how state culture changes over time. This could also be expanded to incorporate major events or crises within a specific polity – such as ideological shifts, significant conflicts, changes within the governing parties, the rise of the welfare state and/or its decline – exploring how these shifts within society and governance are reflected in the state outputs; thus suggesting changes within the state culture itself. This would be particularly appropriate to explore in a settler society such as Canada, which has a long history of producing literature aimed at recruiting and socializing new immigrants.

The analysis of contemporary state cultures should also be expanded to further test the concept of state culture and the methodology for operationalizing it. The inclusion of additional cases, for example in other settler societies or European countries, would be an initial step towards broadening the analysis of state culture as presented here. Both the Netherlands, with the recent release of a video and test for potential immigrants aimed at ensuring that they accept certain 'liberal' Dutch values, or Belgium, as another example

of a multinational, federal state. The model of state culture can also be utilized in non-Western countries. For example, an analysis of Japan's or Saudi Arabia's state cultures through their migration and citizenship policies would likely provide an interesting contrast to the cases explored here. As not all countries define themselves as immigrant or multicultural countries, they may not have literature for new immigrants. In this case, other documents could be analyzed. In Japan, for example, there is a series of videos about Japanese life and culture produced by the Overseas Public Relations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could be studied. As mentioned above, in the Canadian and Swedish cases the state culture that emerges shares many commonalities. A more diverse group of countries could potentially broaden our understanding of state culture and its applicability.

The analysis of state culture within a larger number of countries could also lead to the development of a system of classification for state cultures. As mentioned in the discussion of nationalisms in Chapter Two, the creation of typologies relating to a concept can become problematic as it often results in trying to fit specific cases into predetermined categories. However, a system of classifications could be created that allows for distinguishable categories that can also overlap. This could potentially lead to the development of continua assessing the placement of a particular state culture with regards to specific values; for example, inclusion versus exclusion, communitarian versus individualistic values, the promotion of diversity versus homogeneity or equality versus inequality. Two continua could also be presented in a scatterplot graph that would create four quadrants (e.g. evaluating the promotion of inclusive/exclusive discourse in

combination with communitarian/individualistic values). This would not only allow for

the classification of state cultures and present their relative positions, but would also offer

insight into how different values and discourses relate to each other. State culture, as

presented here, is an empirical concept. The potential does exist, however, to expand this

conceptualization of state culture to include normative evaluations based, for example, on

the promotion of equality and community within the state culture or the inclusive nature

of the state culture.

Another question that arises from this research is whether the concept of state culture is

limited to the analysis of the nation-state or if it can be utilized beyond the nation-state.

As well, as local cultures become more important in response to the pressures of

globalization, in response to the more porous and potentially less significant borders of

the nation-state, state culture can potentially also be used to evaluate the construction of

identity from governing bodies in a more local setting (e.g. city cultures such as Danzig

or Brussels) and in a more global way (e.g. regional cultures such as the EU or North

America). For example, one pertinent comparison would be between the settler societies

of North America and European states relating to their views of immigration. Such an

analysis could challenge the conception of the nation itself.

The model of state culture also has applicability across and between different levels of

governance, between different government departments, and different policies. In the

Canadian case, the state cultures of the provinces could be compared with the state

culture promoted by the federal government. This could potentially offer insights into

some of the conflicts in Canadian politics as well as into federal and intergovernmental relations. It is even possible that such research could determine either that there is little difference between different governments or determine where the conflict lies. The proposed European constitution, should the process be restarted, would also offer many interesting possibilities with regards to state culture. Constitutions generally fulfill a symbolic function, as well as dividing powers, structuring government and outlining the rights and responsibilities of members. What then does the European constitution say about what it means to be European? This analysis combined with an analysis of the debates surrounding the constitution in different EU countries would not only provide insight into the attempted construction of a European identity, but also into the values that underpin the state cultures of different European states. In their responses to the European constitution, the values that they hold most important and are trying to project also become evident.

The concept of state culture, therefore, is in its initial phases of development. The aim of this project was to develop and test a concept that has the potential to grow and shape our understanding of different identities and how they are constructed. In doing so, my aim was to contribute to the study of identity politics in a number of ways. By bringing together the diverse literatures on nationalism, citizenship and immigration, I aimed to bridge the gap between the theoretical literature on nation and community building and the practices of states with regards to immigration and the construction of identity. In doing so, the work here contributes not only to our understanding of the practices of the Canadian and Swedish state, but also has the potential to contribute to the theoretical

literature on nation-building and identity. The presentation of state culture as an alternative and complementary way for understanding the role of the state in constructing identity potentially provides other researchers with a tool for interrogating identity building in many different contexts.

This project also contributes to the comparative work on Canada and Sweden by expanding the comparisons to include immigration policy, as compared with the historical focus on social policy and the welfare state. Through state culture, a new way of understanding and approaching policy is also encouraged that implies that policy is not just a framework for action within a state but also a reflection of the values of the political community and elites. The introduction of the concept of state culture and the analysis of state culture in Canada and Sweden also provides a position from which to critique current immigration and integration practices, and to challenge the discourses surrounding identity and belonging within different states. As such, this dissertation integrates different bodies of literature and provides a framework for further work and analysis within the discipline.

In conclusion, this project has brought together a variety of perspectives, literatures and methodologies in order to develop the concept of state culture and the methodological framework for investigating it. State culture is the product of the combined values of state actors, institutions, policies and practices. This concept provides researchers with an alternative concept and complementary methodological mechanism for understanding the role of the state in the construction of identity and for exploring the values promoted

by the state in its activities. A sensitivity to state culture also has practical implications.

An awareness of the values embedded in state policy and literature creates the possibility

of groups challenging these values and the state culture they comprise. This, in turn, may

potentially allow citizens to exert greater influence on the values emerging from the state

in order to build a community that better reflects the values of society as a whole and is

better able to accommodate difference.

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Appendix One

A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada (CIC, 2002)

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Appendix Two

A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada (CIC, 2002)

Images

1. The Canadian Flag is blowing in the wind. The text of the first part of the Canadian national anthem is on top of the flag. On the side are four pictures of people: (1) a white man and his son; (2) a black, female doctor with a patient; (3) one white and one black man in hard hats; (4) an Asian woman and man in an office, the man is wearing a tie. (Cover)

2. A picture of documents above the heading "Essential Documents." (p.1)

3. A picture of health care service providers. There are three men and two women, all of different ethnic backgrounds. (p. 2)

4. A picture of a ship coming into dock. (p. 3)

5. A woman of colour in a suit, with a couple (backs facing camera). (p. 4)

6. A man of colour sitting in front of a computer above the heading "Getting Ready if you are a business immigrant." (p. 5)

7. A city skyline (p. 6).

8. A white woman and child building a snowman (p. 7).

9. A white female teacher talking to a young white male student (p. 7).

10. A black female teacher working with a female student (p. 8).

11. A white, female customs and immigration officer (p. 9).

12. A group of seven males from different ethnic backgrounds and one woman of colour, below the heading "Immigrant-serving organizations" (p. 11)

13. A white, female teacher instructing a classroom of adult students from different ethnic backgrounds, above the heading LINC (Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada) (p. 11).

14. One white woman and one woman of colour working together in front of a computer (p. 12).

15. A man of colour sitting across a desk from a woman of colour and another person (back to camera) (p. 12).

16. A black family (mother, father, daughter, son) sitting in their living room (p. 13).

17. An Asian couple (male and female) talking to a black woman in a suit (p. 14).

18. A white man with his arm resting on the shoulder of a black man. Both are dressed in 'workers' clothes (p. 17).

19. Six men from different ethnic backgrounds and two women from different ethnic backgrounds representing the different regulated professions and trades in Canada (p. 19).

20. Two women of colour looking at a computer screen, looking for a job (p. 19).

21. A white woman in a suit instructing two women of colour. She is standing over them while they sit at a table (p. 20).

22. White fingers using a calculator (p. 21).

23. A map of Canada (p. 23).

24. A larger map of Canada (p. 24-25).

25. A painting of aboriginals in canoes (p. 26).

26. A painting of immigrants arriving in Canada in the 19th Century (p. 26).

27. A photograph of immigrants arriving in Canada after the Second World War. A woman is carrying a baby. A priest stands beside her. There is the symbol for the Red Cross on the wall behind them. (p. 27)

28. Two white men in front of a computer (p. 27).

29. The Parliament buildings in Ottawa (p. 28).

30. The trunk of a very large tree (p. 29).

31. A man of colour preparing food for his daughter (p. 31).

32. A white father talking to his son (p. 32).

33. A white woman driving a car with a small white boy in the backseat (p. 33).

34. A white male and white female police officer (p. 34).

35. A white woman in a field picking berries with her daughter (p. 35).

36. A young Asian girl with a doll (p. 35).

37. A white man and woman are in the foreground. A woman wearing hijab is in the background (p. 36).

38. A group of people with their backs to the camera stands in front of a white, female justice at a swearing in ceremony for new citizens (p. 37).

Appendix Three

A Look at Canada (CIC, 2001)

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20. Citizenship Test: Questions
           Questions about Canada
           Questions about your region

Appendix Four

A Look at Canada (CIC, 2001)

Images

1. The Canadian Flag is blowing in the wind. The text of the first part of the Canadian national anthem is on top of the flag. (Cover)

2. A partial image of the Canadian Flag, again blowing in the wind (p. 1).

3. A group of Canadians of all ages, from various ethnic groups, including males and females. Appears below the section on what Canadian citizenship means. (p. 4)

4. A painting of a group of multicultural Canadians standing in front of a Canadian Flag that is blowing in the wind (p. 5).

5. Two men in front of a computer, designing a car (p. 6).

6. A common loon in water (p. 7).

7. A picture of a nickel, showing the side with the beaver. The text under the image reads, "The beaver is one of the symbols of Canada. It appears on a five-cent coin." (p. 8)

8. A maple leaf (p. 8).

9. The Canadian Flag (p. 8).

10. The Peace Tower in the Parliament Buildings (p. 8).

11. Queen Elizabeth II (p. 9).

12. Text outlining the Origin of the name Canada (p. 9).

13. The English text for the Canadian national anthem (p. 9).

14. A totem pole (p. 10).

15. A soapstone carving appears with the text on Aboriginal Peoples on top of it (p. 10-11).

16. An aboriginal youth in a parka (p. 11).

17. An aboriginal girl in traditional dress (p. 11).

18. A map of Canada (p. 12-13).

19. A lighthouse in Peggy's Cove (p. 14).

20. A young, white woman playing the bagpipes (p. 14).

21. A ship (p. 14).

22. An older white couple (male and female) in front of their farmhouse. Their family is behind them (p. 15).

23. A white man in old-fashioned military dress (p. 15).

24. An older, white man and a young, white man fishing (p. 15).

25. A ship in the St. Lawrence Seaway (p. 16).

26. A multicultural group of people (men, women and children) in winter clothes in front of a snowman at the Winter Carnival in Quebec City (p. 17).

27. Many people walking down a busy street (p. 17).

28. Two people sitting on a large rock in a lake. There is a canoe beside them (p. 18).

29. A multicultural group of people in front of Toronto's City Hall (p. 18).

30. A young, aboriginal youth in traditional dress (p. 19).

31. An airplane above a lake (p. 19).

32. A crop being harvested (p. 19).

33. The Legislative Building in Regina (p. 19).

34. Wagon racing at the Morris Stampede (p. 20).

35. A man on a horse in a field of cattle (p. 20).

36. A man dancing with two women, all in traditional Ukrainian costumes (p. 20).

37. A totem pole (p. 21).

38. A group of people rowing in Vancouver's harbour (p. 21).

39. An Inuit man and woman in traditional dress, holding hands (p. 22).

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42. A fill-in sheet on government representatives and government (p. 25).

43. The inside of the House of Commons (p. 26).

44. A chart outlining the process for voting procedures in Canada (p. 28).

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47. The Oath of Citizenship (p. 31).

Appendix Five

A Look at Canada (CIC, 2001)

Key Words

1. Official Languages
2. Multiculturalism
3. Confederation
4. *British North America Act*
5. First Prime Minister
6. Constitution
7. *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*
8. Head of State
9. Inuit
10. First Nations
11. Aboriginal

Appendix Six

Sweden: A Pocket Guide. Facts, Figures and Advice for New Residents
(Integrationsverket, 2001)

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Appendix Seven

Sweden: A Pocket Guide. Facts, Figures and Advice for New Residents
(Integrationsverket, 2001)

Images

1. The cover shows the Swedish colours of yellow and blue. The image on the cover is of a yellow field, a blue sky and clouds. (Cover)

2. A family from Kosovo (mother, father, two children) arriving at the Karlskrona airport "in hopes of a new, more peaceful life in Sweden." (p. 7)

3. Five young boys of different ethnicities on a school visit to a museum. (p. 9)

4. The silhouettes of people eating in a cafe. The caption reads, "Over the years the face of Sweden has changed. People on the streets, in shops and restaurants often have traits which suggest that they come from other parts of the world." (p. 10)

5. Three refugee boys from Iraq playing hockey outside. (p. 11)

6. A white, male backpacker hiking across a river. (p. 12)

7. A group of people on a street. (p. 14)

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9. A reproduction of a painting of a Viking ship arriving to make trade. (p. 19)

10. A reproduction of a painting of Duke Magnus attending the Opera. (p. 20)

11. A reproduction of a painting of King Gustav Vasa. (p. 22)

12. A reproduction of a photograph of Prime Minister Olof Palme speaking to a large crowd in Gothenburg's amusement park. (p. 25)

13. A photograph of paper pulp being loaded onto a ship. (p. 26)

14. Swedish Cabinet Minister Mona Sahlin campaigning for votes for the Social Democratic party. She is a white woman speaking to an all-white crowd. (p. 29)

15. King Carl Gustav XVI, Queen Sylvia and Crown Princess Victoria. (p. 31)

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17. A picture of a woman representing the public service. (p. 34)

18. Symbols of the different political parties accompanied by a description of the party. (pp. 36-37)

19. A picture of students demonstrating. They are all white women. The caption reads: "The right to demonstrate is guaranteed by law in Sweden." (p. 39)

20. A group of white women being led in exercise in a park by a white woman. (p. 43)

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22. Three white girls dressed up as Easter witches for Maundy Thursday. (p. 47)

23. A white, heterosexual couple in wedding attire accompanied by two young, white girls. (p. 49)

24. A group of white people dancing around a Maypole on Midsummer. (p. 50)

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27. An image of escalators during the busy Christmas shopping season next to a picture of a full church for the Christmas service. (p. 54)

28. A woman of colour and a white man jitterbugging on the grass. (p. 57)

29. An immigrant man selecting fruit at a grocery store. The caption reads: "There are now specialty shops in most cities carrying foods from around the world. Dishes that once seemed exotic are now everyday fare." (p. 59)

30. A white woman carrying a tray of semlor (a traditional pastry for the end of Lent). (p. 60)

31. A picture of an immigrant woman above her article for the "Your new neighbours..." section of the book. (p. 61)

32. An image of the territory of Sweden. (p. 63)

33. A white woman at her kitchen table doing her taxes. (p. 65)

34. A white woman approaches a polling station to vote. The path is lined with volunteers from the different political parties (five white men, one white woman) who are handing out ballots for their respective parties. (p. 67)

35. A white nurse in a hospital treating a white man in a hospital bed. (p. 69)

36. Maps of the Swedish municipalities. (pp. 70-74)

37. A white woman and the back of a man moving furniture into a new flat. (p. 75)

38. A picture of the three crowns (the national symbol) on top of Stockholm city hall. (p. 76)

39. A picture of "recent immigrants" renovating a house. The caption reads: "New arrivals should be able to support themselves. This is one of the most important objectives of the introductory period." (p. 79)

40. A white, heterosexual couple in a window of their new home. (p. 81)

41. An older, white man walking down the street. (p. 82)

42. A white woman helping her daughter with her homework at the kitchen table, while her white husband prepares food. (p. 85)

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60. A white man and woman eating breakfast together. (p. 126)

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64. A white man and woman who appear to be arguing. They are lying on their stomachs on the bed facing away from each other. (p. 134)

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67. Two white children smiling and touching noses. The caption reads: "All children are entitled to care when their parents are working and studying." (p. 140)

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72. A visible minority girl in eating lunch in the school cafeteria. There are other children in the background. (p. 150)

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85. Two white, male doctors and one white, female doctor are talking to an older, white male. (p. 177)

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93. A white father and two sons. The caption reads: "Daily life in Sweden. New arrivals in Eriksberg. For this family the move is a first step in a new life." (p. 193)

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108. A group of four women (three of them wearing head coverings) exercising in a kitchen. (p. 223)

109. A young black girl, a young white man, and a young black man are using computers in the public library. There are two white men looking at books in the background. (p. 224)

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111. A white man playing guitar and singing on a stage at a rock festival. There is a crowd of people in front of the stage. (p. 229)

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