How Can an Oppressed Social Group Gain the Right to Participate in a Field :

An Investigation of First Nations in the Canadian Gambling Field

by

Chang Lu

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Strategic Management and Organization

School of Business

University of Alberta

ABSTRACT

Prior research on organizational fields has suggested that the arrival of new actors is an important exogenous source of field change, as it can trigger the transformation of field boundaries, governance, and the distribution of power and interests. However, a majority of studies tend to focus on powerful, dominant actors as new entrants, such as corporations, professional associations, and government entities. In this dissertation, I shift the focus to oppressed social groups, and explore how oppressed groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields. Specifically, I draw from the literature on tensions within oppressed groups, regulative institutions, and stigma, (as most, if not all, oppressed groups carry stigma, and stigma often plays the role of a barrier to social inclusion), and investigate how oppressed groups overcome the hurdles of intra-group tension, existing field-level regulative institutions, and stigma when attempting to participate in mature fields. Adopting a qualitative historical design, I investigate how First Nations—an indigenous population whose ancestors are predominately indigenous—gained the right to participate in the Canadian gambling field. My interpretative analysis of documents and interview data, supplemented by understandings of indigenous culture, history, and worldviews, reveals that oppressed groups may engage in three overarching processes to accomplish field participation: forging in-group consensus, regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. This study contributes to the field literature by revealing a "bold" pathway by which actors with low resources and power accomplish purposeful actions in mature fields. It also highlights how adhering to or promoting a stigmatized identity, rather than acculturating to the mainstream, can support this process. In addition, this study shows that the arrival of new actors may result in the expansion of field boundaries but field governance may remain intact. Overall, this study contributes to the stigma literature by demonstrating how social groups can use stigma as a resource, and how stigma that is neither concealable nor revealable

can be managed. Further, this study sheds light on how those at the bottom of society can address social inequality through self-initiated measures.

PREFACE

This dissertation represents an original research project conducted by Chang Lu. It has not been published as a book or in a journal. During the process of writing this dissertation, I received a graduate student scholarship from the Alberta Gambling Research Institute. However, the Institute was not involved in any part of the research. This project received research ethics approval under the title [No. Pro00064279] "Dynamics of Contested Practice Diffusion: An investigation of First Nation casinos in Canada." Except for the interview transcriptions, for which I hired a freelancer transcriber, I conducted all the other activities of the research by myself. I received ongoing feedback from my supervisor, Professor Trish Reay, and my committee members, Professor Michael Lounsbury and Professor Joel Gehman. However, any errors are mine.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I feel deeply grateful for all the help that I received from indigenous peoples during this research process. Without their help, this dissertation would not have been possible. In particular, I thank Dr. Patricia Makokis and her family for introducing me to their community, for being open to an outsider like me who did not know anything about indigenous people, and for connecting me with the indigenous leaders who participated in this study. I would not have been able to complete this dissertation if I had not met Dr. Patricia Makokis and her family.

Second, I would like to thank all the indigenous people that participated in my study. For many indigenous people, talking about the painful past means reliving the pain. I am very grateful that they participated in my study.

I am equally grateful to my supervisor, Professor Trish Reay, for her ongoing support, encouragement and advice. In the past five years, she not only taught me how to do research, but also role-modeled how to live a fulfilling, balanced and happy life, which highlights the meaning of successful education. Her life wisdom has greatly influenced me, and will be an invaluable asset for me in the future.

I also thank my committee members, Professor Michael Lounsbury and Professor Joel Gehman, for their insightful feedback and support.

Certainly, I am grateful to my family for the freedom and quiet love they give to me. Completion of this dissertation was only possible because of their love and support.

Lastly, I want to thank and acknowledge myself. This dissertation was an extremely difficult journey for me. As a non-native English speaker undertaking qualitative research in a completely foreign setting, only I myself know how hard it has been. I have often thought that doing this dissertation has been as difficult for me as researching the oil or mining industry in Tibet would be for a White Canadian person. Not only would this person have to understand the nuances of Chinese culture, history, and politics, but he or she would also need to understand the Tibetan culture, history, and worldviews, and the extremely complicated relationship between the Chinese government and Tibet. In addition, if not more difficult, he or she would need to write down the findings using culturally nuanced, politically correct, and academically accurate Chinese. Looking back at this dissertation journey, there have been days when I felt I was manually moving Mount Everest, and that I would never succeed. However, in spite of those dark moments, I persevered. I continued to push and did not give up. Now that I have almost completed this dissertation and the five-year PhD journey, I feel I have become a much stronger person inside. I am proud of the personal growth I have gained through working on this dissertation, and I believe the inner strength or toughness that I have accumulated during the process will help me chase higher dreams.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Around the world, oppressed social groups such as First Nations (Indigenous peoples in Canada), African Americans, and women in male-dominated societies are currently fighting intensely to participate in specific social-economic arenas; their aim is to gain increased access to material, social, and cultural resources. While it is true that many of their actions have failed as the barriers to upward mobility are becoming stronger (Amis, Munir & Mair, 2017), some oppressed groups have made remarkable progress. For example, women in Saudi Arabia finally gained permission to be part of the taxi industry in June 2018, in the face of extreme sexism and institutional exclusion. In India, the number of workers from the lowest caste has been increasing in the high-tech sector (Raghunath, 2010). In addition, I observed that in the country I come from---China, the descendants of peasants have appeared in the country's most prestigious sector---government services.

Trained in the neo-institutional tradition, I see that the phenomena that I observed above represent the process of oppressed groups successfully gaining the right to participate in mature fields. The concept of *field* is central in the institutional literature (Zietsma et al., 2017; Scott, 2014), which provides a very useful level of analysis and a conceptual framework to understand institutional phenomena; it is often through the lens of "field" that grand institutional phenomena become analyzable and theorized at the middle range (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Kluttz & Fligstein, 2016). The literature has suggested that oppressed or disadvantaged actors are motivated to participate in mature fields as they seek to affirm their values or identity and access field resources to improve their economic and social conditions (Clemens, 1993; Grime, Gehman & Cao, 2018; Wooten, 2015). Importantly, as oppressed groups participate in field activities from which they were previously excluded, it represents a viable pathway toward addressing

grand challenges such as poverty and inequality (Ferraro, Etzion, Gehman, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi & Tihanyi, 2016; Zhao & Wry, 2016).

However, the existing literature cannot adequately explain the process of oppressed groups gaining the right to field participation. First, although the literature on fields has demonstrated that the arrival of new actors can prompt profound changes to the field, it tends to focus on mainstream-dominant actors as new entrants (e.g. the state or corporations) (Ansari, Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2016; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001; Sauder, 2008; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), and studies involving oppressed or disadvantaged challengers do not unpack the mechanisms of gaining field participation *per se* (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Van Wijk et al., 2013). As actors' positions in the social hierarchy can significantly affect the ways they bring about change (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Wright & Zammuto, 2013), it is likely that oppressed groups may come to participate in mature fields in distinctive ways from mainstream-dominant actors.

Second, although studies on social movements and institutional change have examined how oppressed groups (e.g. disfranchised women and minority groups) affect social change broadly (Clemens, 1993; Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsh, 2003; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005), they have yet to focus on the specific processes by which oppressed groups gain the right to participate in established fields. As the scope and type of change can greatly influence change strategies and processes (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Micelotta, Greenwood & Lounsbury, 2017), the specific process of gaining field participation may exhibit characteristics distinct from social change broadly. As such, the extant institutional literature provides an insufficient understanding of how oppressed groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields.

It is important to address this gap for two theoretical reasons. First, it may help understand the diverse pathways by which actors with low resources and power accomplish desired change in mature fields. Although the literature on fields has paid attention to such pathways, it seems to suggest that actors with low resources and power accomplish change through quietly innovating local practices, demonstrating practical value and gradually capturing the interest of powerful incumbents; in other words, through a "quiet" pathway characterized with small wins (Leblebici, et al., 1991; Reay, Golden-Biddle, GermAnn, 2006). This understanding originates in the presumption that the changes that actors with low resources and power seek to accomplish tend to undermine the interests of field incumbents (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012); due to a power disadvantage, it seems only viable for them to quietly and gradually pursue the change. However, according to social movement studies (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1998), when oppressed social groups attempt such change as gaining the right to institutional participation, they often resort to radical, sometimes violent collective actions, pointing to the potential of a bold, confrontation-infused pathway. Thus, by exploring how oppressed groups can gain the right to field participation, we may understand whether and how diverse pathways of change may exist when actors with low resources and power effect change in mature fields, enriching the literature on field change.

Second, when examining how oppressed groups gain the right to field participation, we can better understand the relationship between field boundary and governance in the face of new actors. The field literature has suggested that the entrance of new actors often leads to transformational change in field governance as these actors protect resources and ideological positions, resulting in the convolution of field boundary and governance (Sauder, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). However, social movement studies have revealed that when oppressed

groups such as disfranchised women, LGBT and African Americans gain the right to institutional participation via social movements, powerful incumbents can use a wealth of tactics to alleviate overt conflict, granting the right to participation and yet sustaining the established patterns of governance or domination (Tarrow, 1998; Giugni, 1998; Lounsbury, 2001; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017). As such, despite waves of social movements and the seemingly increased presence of oppressed groups in mainstream institutions, the institutional basis of domination continues to persist (Amis, Munir & Mair, 2017). These insights suggest that when we consider oppressed groups as new actors, we may find that the arrival of new actors does not necessarily trigger convolution of field boundary and governance; instead, field boundary may expand but field governance remains intact. Thus, by exploring how oppressed groups gain the right to field participation, we are offered the opportunity to better understand the relationship between field boundary and governance in the context of new actors' entrance. Given all the considerations above, I formulate the following question: how can an oppressed group gain the right to participate in a mature field?

I draw from the studies on the internal tensions of oppressed groups, regulative institutions, and stigma to address this question. As scholars have suggested, the internal tensions of oppressed groups can be detrimental to their collective actions (Aguirre & Turner, 2004; Denis, 2015; Pyke, 2010). Since obtaining field participation is very likely to be a collective undertaking for the oppressed entrants, the tensions within the oppressed groups may manifest and obstruct the process. Besides, as dominant actors design regulative institutions to protect the social order according to their best interests (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Suchman & Edelman, 1996; Bourdieu, 1994), regulative institutions may preclude or constrain oppressed groups from participating in field activities and accessing field resources. Moreover, stigma, as a discrediting

4

mark that most oppressed groups carry, is widely known to negatively influence the carrier's participation in mainstream activities (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015). Thus, the internal tensions of oppressed groups, regulative institutions, and stigma may be the important hurdles that oppressed groups need to overcome when attempting to obtain field participation.

Empirically, I investigate how First Nations gained the right to participate in the Canadian gambling field. Considering that readers may not be familiar with this research setting, I provide a glossary of terms in Table 1. For hundreds of years, since the first European settlers arrived in Canada, First Nations have been oppressed (Whiteman, 2009). They were denied the right to vote until 1960 and suffer from institutional exclusion in many areas, such as education, healthcare and business. In the late 1980s, upon the legalization of native gambling in the United States, First Nations began their attempt to participate in the Canadian gambling field. At that time, the Canadian gambling field was already established and mature. There are four main actors in the field: provincial governments, casino operators, charities and consumers; and these actors had "frequent, fateful interactions" (Scott, 2014) with each other. Provincial governments were granting licenses to charities for fund-raising through gambling, determining the size and location of casinos for consumers, and hiring private operators to operate the casinos. Such patterned interactions were fateful because the Criminal Code of Canada designated provincial governments as the only regulator and owner of casino gambling. This designation by the Crimination Code also means that there was a sharply defined domination structure where provincial governments dominate all the other actors. In addition, the actors faced an increased amount of information due to the emergence of new gambling practices and manifestation of the

5

social issues caused by gambling. Moreover, the actors were mutually aware of each other as they jointly conduct state-owned gambling businesses day by day.

In the next few decades, First Nations, despite severe oppression, gained the right to participate in the gambling field, creating 19 First Nations casinos. During the process, First Nations experienced intense internal tensions, exclusive field-level regulative institutions, and the negative impact of stigma. However, First Nations were able to overcome all these challenges and successfully took a part in the gambling field. Notably, while First Nations became new field members and the boundary of the gambling field expanded, the governance structure of the gambling field remained stable. The actors that were in the field prior to First Nations' participation continued to be in the field, namely, provincial governments, casino operators, charities and consumers; and their interactions followed the same pattern as before. In particular, the previously established patterns of governance continued: provincial governments continued to be owners and regulators of casinos, granting licenses to charities, determining the size of consumption of consumers and hiring private operators to operate casinos. First Nations began to participate in the interactions, however, only as an additional actor parallel to the charities.

As the admittance of First Nations unfolded in a historical process, I take a historical, qualitative approach in this study. First, I conducted ethnographic observations in indigenous communities to gain an understanding of indigenous worldviews in which the actions of First Nations were embedded. Second, I collected over 8,000 pages of historical documents from both indigenous and non-indigenous sources to understand how First Nations acted. Since this study is by nature historical, these documents serve as the main source of data. Third, as a supplement to this data, I conducted 31 interviews with First Nation leaders, government officials, and experts

(researchers and professionals) who were either directly involved in or knowledgeable about First Nations' actions. I analyzed the data using grounded theory, which in turn allowed me to produce a process model of how oppressed groups gain the right to participate in mature fields.

Through the data analysis, I identified three key, overarching processes that oppressed groups may engage to participate in mature fields: forging in-group consensus, regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. The first process that I identified was forging in-group consensus. When oppressed groups obtain the right to field participation, they may experience tension and conflicts among themselves. In response, they may forge in-group consensus over time in three different ways: redirecting in-group tension toward government, enacting communal decision-making, and antagonizing yet engaging government. Through forging in-group consensus, they can better prepare themselves to take collective actions to enter and become integrated into the field. This finding advances the literature (Bertels, Hoffman & DeJordy, 2014; Denis, 2015; Hardy & Maguire, 2017) by explicating the in-group conflicts among change agents in low-resource positions (e.g. issue sellers, social movement organizations, and grassroots change agents), and reveals how such conflicts can be managed during field entry.

The second process that emerged during my data analysis was regulative maneuvering. Oppressed groups tend to encounter strong regulative barriers that preclude them from participating in mature fields. In response, they can maneuver through obstructive regulations by attempting regulative inclusion, forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks and compromising the power of those frameworks. By regulative maneuvering, they can demonstrate that they were skillful, determined actors capable of seriously threatening existing field boundary, and achieved a balance between competitiveness and legitimacy as new field members. This finding suggests that skillfully maneuvering regulations is important for

7

oppressed groups who attempt change in mature fields, and that the malleability of law (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 2014) could be a source of power for oppressed groups. By extension, it also reveals ways in which regulative institutions can be maneuvered, enriching the relatively underdeveloped literature on the regulative pillar of institutions (Scott, 2014; Suchman & Edelman, 1996).

The third process that I identified was resourcing stigma. To obtain the right to field participation, oppressed groups may engage in resourcing stigma by transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy, smoothing resource acquisition with stigma, and differentially leveraging stigma suffering and stigma. In doing so, they can elicit the moral obligations of field incumbents, while became motivated to concede to field incumbents during the negotiation of field membership arrangements. After initially obtaining the right to participation, resourcing stigma may help oppressed groups accrued legitimacy and competitiveness as new field members. This findings of how to resource stigma suggest that although stigma is traditionally conceptualized as the reason for oppression and exclusion (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015), it can be resourced for oppressed groups to achieve inclusion or break down oppression.

The processes of regulative maneuvering and resourcing stigma together constitute a bold, confrontational pathway by which oppressed groups obtain field participation. Rather than quietly operating under the radar, oppressed groups can construct regulative threats through regulative maneuvering, defy the enactment of mainstream legitimacy framework and challenge the moral legitimacy of field incumbents through resourcing stigma. Combining these two processes in a bold, confrontational pathway, oppressed groups may be granted the right to field participation while suffering minimum punitive responses from powerful incumbents.

As oppressed groups engaged in all three processes, the interactions with field incumbents can unfold and the stability of field governance may emerge therein. As demonstrated by First Nations' experience, forging in-group consensus may be demanded by field incumbents, and engaging in such process may reinforce the power structure in the field. While regulative maneuvering can demonstrate the threats of oppressed groups, pressuring field incumbents into negotiations with oppressed groups, it may also result in punitive reactions from field incumbents, stimulating the incumbents to preserve the existing patterns of domination. As such, the negotiations tend to take place in a reinforced dominative relationship where the incumbents dominate the oppressed. In the meantime, resourcing stigma may motivate the oppressed to concede to the incumbents. Although it helps the oppressed acquire resources, the resources can gradually become material and relational investments that motivate concessions. As field incumbents preserve the status quo and oppressed groups concede when negotiating with the incumbents, they are likely to settle on membership conditions where the oppressed can only participate in the field if the existing field governance structure remains intact. The stability of field governance thereby emerges while field boundary is expanded.

I contribute to the field literature (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sauder, 2008; Scott, 2014; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) by rectifying the understanding that actors with low resources and power only accomplish change in mature fields through a quiet, gradual pathway and demonstrating the manifestation of a bold, confrontational pathway. Also, I rectify the understanding that the entrance of new actors necessitates the convolution of field boundary and governance and illuminate how field governance can remain stable while field boundary is expanded. Besides, I draw attention to the variety of field entrants, explicating how oppressed groups can also be field entrants and revealing the distinctive nature of field entry by oppressed

groups. Moreover, I contribute to the stream of literature on social movements and institutional change (Lounsbury, 2001; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017; Van Wijk, 2013; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008) by showing that oppressed groups can accomplish change in highly institutional settings through adhering to or promoting their stigmatized identity, rather than acculturating to the mainstream-dominant actors. Furthermore, I contribute to the stigma literature (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Link & Phelan, 2001; Hudson, 2008; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Hampel & Tracey, 2017) by showing how social groups can use stigma as a resource and how stigma that is neither concealable nor revealable can be managed. In addition, I draw attention to the tension within oppressed groups during collective actions and show how such tensions can be managed, thus enriching the existing studies that have touched upon such tensions (Bertels, et al., 2013; Dennis, 2015). Finally, the three processes uncovered in this study have practical implications for oppressed groups with regard to addressing poverty and economic inequality by themselves.

In the following chapters, I lay out the theoretical background (Chapter 2), detail the methodological approaches and procedures (Chapter 3), explain my empirical findings (Chapter 4), discuss the theoretical meanings of the findings (Chapter 5), and end the dissertation with my overarching reflections on the dissertation process (Chapter 6).

Table 1 A Glossary of the Terms Related to the Research Setting

Terms	Meaning
Indigenous Peoples	• A noun for the collective of First Nations people, Metis, Inuit and non-status Indians who are descendants of the population that resided in the territory now called Canada before the arrival of Western settlers. • Sometimes interchangeably used with aboriginal peoples, however, "indigenous" is becoming more popular than "aboriginal" in the current political discourse.
Native	• "A general term that refers to a person or thing that has originated from a particular place. The term "native" does not denote a specific Aboriginal ethnicity (such as First Nation, Métis, or Inuit). In the United States, the term "Native American" is in common usage to describe Aboriginal peoples. In Canada, the term "Aboriginal" or "Indigenous" is generally preferred to "Native." Some may feel that "native" has a negative connotation and is outdated. This term can also be problematic in certain contexts, as some non-Aboriginal peoples born in a settler state may argue that they, too, are "native."" (Terminology, n.d. para 14)
First Nations	• An indigenous population whose ancestors are predominately indigenous. • Normally residing in the south of the arctic circle. • Often combined with the name of a specific indigenous community, referring to a distinctive political indigenous entity.
Metis	• An indigenous population whose ancestors are both indigenous and Western settlers. In other words, a person whose ethnicity is mixed between indigenous and White; frequently a Metis has an indigenous female ancestor and a White male ancestor. • Often combined with the name of a specific Metis community, called as xxx Metis Settlement, so as to define a distinctive political entity.
Non-status Indian	• Indigenous individuals self-identified as indigenous, but not registered in the government or an indigenous community that has a treaty with the Crown.
Treaties with Indigenous people in Canada	• "Indigenous treaties in Canada are constitutionally recognized agreements between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. Most of these agreements describe exchanges where Indigenous nations agree to share some of their interests in their ancestral lands in return for various payments and promises. On a deeper level, treaties are sometimes understood, particularly by Indigenous people, as sacred covenants between nations that establish a relationship between those for whom Canada is an ancient homeland and those whose family roots lie in other countries. Treaties therefore form the constitutional and moral basis of an alliance between Indigenous peoples and Canada". (Hall, 2011. para 1) • Currently 11 treaty areas in Canada. The treaty areas do not correspond to provincial territories.

Assembly of First Nations	• "The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) is a political organization representing approximately 900,000 First Nations citizens in Canada. The AFN advocates on behalf of First Nations on issues such as treaties, Indigenous rights, and land and resources". (Marshall, Posluns & Hall, 2006. para 1)
Chief	• The political leader of an indigenous community.
Band	• A term often used interchangeably with "First Nations", referring to a First Nation community.
Reserve	• A term often used interchangeably with "First Nation" or "Band", since every politically recognized First Nation community has its own reserved land.
Grand Chief	• The political leader of a treaty area.
Band Council	• The governing body in each First Nation.
Province	• "In modern Canadian constitutional theory, the provinces are considered to be sovereign within certain areas based on the divisions of responsibility between the provincial and federal government within the Constitution Act 1867, and each province thus has its own representative of the Canadian "Crown", the lieutenant governor". (Provinces and territories of Canada. n.d. para 4)

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Field is probably one of the most important concepts in institutional theory. "Fields are presumed to be the dominant source of pressures for institutional conformity and the site of institutional embeddedness, which is the core idea of institutional theory" (Zietsma, et al. forthcoming. p. 5). A field is "a recognized area of institutional life constituted by key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983. p. 148). Field not only represents a social arena in which individual and organizational actors co-constitute each other's institutional life, but also a level of analysis that brings attention to the interactions between actors and their institutional environment (Scott, 2014; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Research on fields has proliferated in the past few decades, intertwining with important topics, including embedded agency, practice diffusion, and institutional stability and change.

Central to fields and field processes is the concept of field boundary, which refers to a distinction that demarcates a community of actors from those who do not share a common meaning system and interact less frequently with (Grodal, forthcoming; Scott, 2014; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Field boundary, regardless of formally defined or informally agreed upon by actors within the field, functions as the basis on which actors envision and legitimize field practices, and therefore serves the structuration of field-level interactions (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Scott, 2014). As scholars have suggested (Swidler, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), field boundary provides stability, ensuring the reproduction of field order by shielding the influence of societal-level transformations on field practice, and yet the breach of field boundary can lead to radical changes in fields. Recently, scholars have paid increased attention to institutional work targeted at field boundary, showing that actors actively maintain, expand and

contract field boundary as a way to claim symbolic and material resources, power and autonomy (Gieryn, 1983; Grodal, forthcoming; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).

Within a bounded field, the interactions among actors are vertically arranged through a field governance system. According to Scott (2014), field governance is the 'arrangement which supports the regularized control---whether by regimes created by mutual agreement, by legitimate hierarchical authority or by non-legitimate coercive means---of the actions of one set of actors by another" (p. 231). Governance is critical for organizational fields, not only because it sustains the reproduction of field practices in the face of actors vying for advantages over cognitive templates, value propositions, and material interests (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hinings, Logue & Zietsma, 2017), but because it supports the maintenance of field boundary when actors are so vertically interweaved that positions for outsiders may not be spared (Sauder, 2008; Grodal, forthcoming; Scott, 2014). Together with boundary, field governance determines the distribution of resources and brings structure to field-level interactions.

The Entrance of New Actors into Mature Fields

Recently, scholars have begun to pay attention to the outside actors joining mature fields. For example, Lounsbury et al. (2003) described how participants in the recycling movement became part of the waste management field, and Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) showed that advocates for environmentalism took membership in the forestry field. These studies have suggested that field entry is an important process, because as outside actors enter fields, they may bring ideas and practices from other fields, trigger practice change (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), and alter the structure of the field network, as well as the nature of the relations among field incumbents (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). The entrants may also pressure for a new distribution of interests and power, and profoundly change field governance (Sauder, 2008;

Holm, 1995). Broadly, the partaking of new actors embodies social mobility; it is through such process that societal-level boundaries often become permeated and redrawn (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Studies have shown that the entrance of new actors into mature fields may originate in social movements or technological shifts. The entry of recycling advocates into the waste management field originated from the broad social movement of recycling (Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury et al., 2003), while the entry of TiVo into the field of television took place as recording technology advanced into new areas (Ansari et al., 2016). More specifically, social movements and technological shifts sensitize actors to pursue new material interests and/or ideological undertakings, and hence motivate them to seek membership in a field. For example, the environmental movement prompted the ideology of environmentalism, which in turn propelled environmentalists to seek entry into the Dutch outbound travel field (Van Wijk et al., 2013), and the development of nanotechnology gave rise to funding opportunities, which in turn motivated small research institutions into the nanotechnology field (Grodal, forthcoming). By obtaining membership in a field, these actors perceive that they have enacted their value and identity in honorable ways (Clemens, 1993; Ferraro et al., 2015; Gehman & Grimes, 2017; Van Wijk et al., 2013).

As scholars often embed the entrance of new actors in the broad investigation of field change, existing studies portray that such entrance necessitates the convolution of field boundary and governance (Ansari et. al, 2016, Holm, 1995; Sander, 2008; Swidler, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). While new actors seek to join a field and break field boundary, they may create pragmatic linkages with field incumbents by exchanging resources and developing resource-dependence with the incumbents, which can accumulate into the bases of power and

status for the entrants and results in the rearrangement of field governance (Sauder, 2008). For example, Sauder (2008) showed that as news companies developed the dependency of field incumbents such as students and universities on their ranking of law school, they not only breached the boundary of the legal education field, but also altered field governance by becoming a powerful intermediary. Or, new actors may bring in practices that are guided by ideologies that prescribe a different distribution of power and authority; as those practices become institutionalized, field boundary is breached while field governance is required to adapt (Holm, 1995; Swidler, 2001). As shown by Zietsma and Lawrence (2010), environmental organizations introduced new harvesting practices into the forestry field that embody the environmentalism ideology, and the institutionalization of the practices breached the boundary of the field while resulted in a new governance structure where environmental organizations must be regularly consulted.

Given the significant impact of new actors' entry on field boundary and governance, the literature has suggested that it can be difficult to enter mature fields because the entrants may encounter strong resistance from field incumbents. When fields are mature, they tend to have a "highly elaborated institutional infrastructure, with thick, overlapping and self-reinforcing sets of institutions" (Zietsma et al., p. 28), characterized by the strong pressure of conformity, stable and commonly understood field boundaries, settled distribution of interests and power, and recognizable governance units (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014; Zietsma et al., 2017). As outside actors enter mature fields, field incumbents may strongly resist because they perceive the entrance to be a violation of field membership rules and because the entrance may potentially reduce resource allocation for some or even all incumbents (Ansari et al., 2016; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence; 2010). For example, Zietsma and Lawrence (2010)

described that incumbent forestry companies strongly resisted the entry of First Nations and environmental organizations, because they believed the entrants violated the established rules of membership that only those who hold government licenses could be part of the field. Similarly, Ansari et al. (2016) documented that the incumbent television networks resisted TiVo's entrance because they perceived that the entry would disrupt the existing value propositions based on the traditional broadcasting model.

In the face of resistance, studies have shown that new entrants must engage in the following processes, as displayed in the center of Figure 1. First, they must break down regulative barriers that prevent their entry (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Russo, 2001) through legal battles or mobilizing policymakers. For example, Gurses and Ozcan (2015) described that entrants to the pay-TV field filed multiple lawsuits against the existing field membership regulations in the Supreme Court before they accomplished entry. Russo (2001) showed that the entrants into the American utility field, facing monopoly-oriented utility regulations, mobilized Congress and the president to enact new legislation allowing their entry. To mobilize regulative barriers, entrants need to develop sophisticated understandings of the regulative environment, activate political ties in their relational network, or even participate in social movements (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Sine & Lee, 2009).

Second, entrants must carefully frame their entry as aligned with the entangled interests of multiple incumbents when the incumbents perceive that the entry will reduce the field resources allocated to them (Ansari et al., 2016; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Grodal; forthcoming). As the incumbents often have conflicting interests, and framing the entry as aligned with some incumbents may trigger resistance from other incumbents, the entrants must frame entry in a way that aligns with the interests of the most important incumbents at a given

time and then adapt the framing as the entry proceeds (Ansari et al., 2016). During this process, the entrants must draw from their understandings of the entangled interests of field incumbents and in-depth knowledge of the linkages between field practice and incumbents' interests; in other words, which practices bring what benefits to which incumbents (Ansari et al., 2016; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001).

Third, new entrants must promulgate new understandings of field boundaries and convince incumbents that their entry makes sense, particularly when the incumbents' established understandings of the field's boundaries are disrupted by the entry (Anard & Peterson, 2000; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Van Vijk et al., 2013). To do so, the entrants must engage in a variety of practices, such as idealizing the new field boundary and connecting it with emerging categories, to cognitively legitimize the entry (Suchman, 1995; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey. 2008; Van Vijk et al., 2013). For example, Weber et al. (2008) showed that some cattle farmers framed grass feeding as authentic and sustainable, appealing to the social ideal of authenticity and sustainability, as a way of giving sense to a new boundary by which they could be considered as insiders. Similarly, Lounsbury et al. (2003) demonstrated that recycling advocates promoted the frame of resource recovery so that their entry into waste management could be understood and accepted by the incumbents that prioritized economic efficiency.

Fourth, the entrants need to negotiate new field membership arrangements with the incumbents, especially in terms of the distribution of resources and the entrants' positions in the field-level relational network and governance system (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Scott, 2014; Grodal, forthcoming). To maximize their material and ideational benefits in those arrangements, the entrants must apply acute social skills, accurately gauging the moves of the incumbents, and exercise power through coercive or relational tactics (Fligstein &

McAdam, 2012). As scholars have suggested (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), those new arrangements may take the form of formal or informal agreements between the entrants and incumbents. Since the entry process may exhibit the contentious political characteristics of social movements, and social movement studies have suggested that the accomplishment of the challengers can only be institutionalized insofar as the accomplishments are crystallized in settlements (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005), the membership agreements between field entrants and the incumbents may be of critical importance. They may serve to restore the stability of a field that has been disrupted by the entrants, and thereby facilitate the institutionalization of the entrants' field positions (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005).

Oppressed Groups Gaining the Right to Field Participation

Oppressed groups are "systematically devalued, exploited and deprived of privileges by groups that have more power" (Barker, 2003, p. 307) and placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy. They lagged behind or were even exploited in the historical process of resource aggregation (Bourdieu, 1994), and tend to suffer from institutionalized poverty and inequality. Since mature fields carry the resources that serve the interests of the dominant class in society (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Grodal, forthcoming), oppressed groups can achieve upward mobility and alleviate their suffering from poverty and inequality by gaining the right to participate in mature fields and accessing the resources associated with the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Mair, Martí & Ventresca, 2012). This process represents oppressed groups' voluntary participation in the robust actions that address poverty and inequality (Ferraro et al., 2015), and signifies a powerful mechanism to address grand challenges such as poverty and

inequality (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi & Tihanyi, 2016; Mair, Martí & Ventresca, 2012; Amis, Munir & Mair, 2017).

Two streams of literature have provided insights into how oppressed groups may gain the right to participate in mature fields. The first stream is the studies that investigate the process of field change involving actors with low resources and power (Ansari & Philips, 2011; Leblebici, et al., 1991; Reay, et al., 2006). These studies demonstrated that actors with low resources and power can bring about field-level change through a quiet, gradual pathway. Specifically, these actors may spontaneously experiment new practices and diffuse the practices through informal social networks to the point where powerful incumbents recognize their pragmatic value and widely adopt the practices (Ansari & Philips, 2011; Leblebici et al., 1991). For example, Leblebici et al. (1991) showed that small radio stations experimented with and spread new radio programs, which then helped powerful incumbents to recognize the market potential of those programs and fundamentally changed radio programming. Alternatively, actors with low resources and power may purposefully use their embeddedness in the field, capturing opportunities at the right time and relating to proper individuals, to gradually institute new roles, practices and relational systems (Reay, et al., 2006). Overall, these studies suggested that a central element of this quiet, gradual pathway is to embed actors into a new network of practices that are proven materially valuable to powerful incumbents.

Another stream of literature is the studies on social movements, which focus on how oppressed or disfranchised oppressed tackle social injustice and obtain rights broadly. Recognizing that oppressive social structures tend to perpetuate (Bourdieu, 1994; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978), scholars pointed to collective actions that involve various identity groups as a major way to overturn exclusive institutions. Such actions often take on the characteristics of

contentious politics, where the oppressed act as challengers, openly challenging the power, interests and cultural organizations of the dominant groups (Clemens, 1993; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017; Snow & Soule, 2010). Combining framing tactics, participant recruitment, resource mobilization and violence-inducing activities such as demonstration and protest, oppressed groups may assemble intensive attacks on the systematic and episodic power of the dominant (Snow & Soule, 2010; Tarrow, 1998). Depending on the intermediate outcomes of contention, the oppressed may enter into cycles of contention, which may span over centuries until oppressive social structures begin to dissimilate (Tarrow, 1998).

Among all the movement strategies, studies have consistently pointed out that acculturating to institutional incumbents is particularly effective; in other words, the oppressed must appear to be similar to the incumbents in order to realize change. For example, Clemens (1993) showed that women acquired the right to political participation by organizing themselves by the once-male model of organization—clubs—therefore demonstrating women could be organized as men. Similarly, Lounsbury et al. (2003) demonstrated that the recycling advocates were able to diffuse recycling only by framing it as a practice that saves resources, thereby showing that they were as economic-minded as policymakers and corporations.

Despite that social movements are promising mechanisms for oppressed groups to gain rights, scholars have also extensively demonstrated the ways by which social movements fail to produce substantial results and oppressed groups continue to be governed by the dominant class. At the macro level, patterns of domination are highly entrenched in the reproduction of material and cultural practices, such that the rights gained through social movements lack institutional backings and often become symbolic (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Tarrow, 1998). At the meso level, the dominant groups tend to form close-knit relational networks where their interests

become entangled and resources are shared, and the oppressed may not have sufficient social capital to substantialize their rights (Bourdiue & Wacquant, 1992). At the micro level, the dominant can use a variety of tactics, including dismantling status-unity, decoupling, co-optation, to halt the process of rights implementation (Jenkins, 1983; Kellogg, 2011). As a result, although equal-rights movements have long existed, oppressed social groups are suffering from increased inequality. Although they seem to be participating in mainstream activities, the essence of domination structure remains in place (Amis, Munir & Mair, 2017; Tarrow, 1998).

Although the field and social movement literature provided useful insights into the strategies, pathways and outcomes of oppressed groups gaining the right to field participation, I suggest that more nuanced understandings are warranted. First, as researchers have demonstrated, the scope or level of change can fundamentally affect the nature of change processes and the strategies that change agents adopt (Micelotta, et al., 2017; Patvardhan, Gioia & Hamilton, 2015; Reay, Goodrick, Waldorff & Casebeer, 2017). For instance, Micelotta et al. (2017) directly dichotomized developmental (part) and transformational (wholesale) change, claiming that institutional change aiming at parts of institutions is by nature different from change aiming at the entirety. As such, it is unclear whether acculturating to the incumbents, despite proven to be effective for oppressed groups to effect social change, may apply to changes aiming at the field level and limited in their scope such as field participation. Second, although social movement studies have illuminated that oppressed groups may take a bold, confrontational pathway to effect social change, the studies on field change by actors with low power suggested a quiet, gradual pathway. Thus, it is unclear what pathways that oppressed groups may go through when attempting field participation. Third, since institutional scholars have suggested that the entrance of new actors leads to the convolution of field boundary and governance while social movement

studies depicted that the attainment of rights is often associated with the persistence of domination structure (Sauder, 2008; Swilder, 2001; Tarrow, 1998), it is unclear how field boundary and governance may be affected in the face of oppressed entrants.

Challenges for Oppressed Groups

The literature suggests that gaining the right to field participation can be a very challenging endeavor for oppressed groups, because institutional infrastructure may not be in place to facilitate the process, or there may exist the institutionalized belief that oppressed groups cannot succeed (Amis, Munir & Mair, 2017; Mair, Martí & Ventresca, 2012). To explore how oppressed groups can accomplish this challenging process, I synthesized the insights into oppressed groups and uncovered three specific challenges that may obstruct them from participating in mature fields, including intra-group tensions (Denis, 2015), existing field-level regulative institutions (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Edelman, Smyth & Rahim, 2016), and stigma (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001). In the following sections, I explain how each of these challenges may work against oppressed groups and how our knowledge of how they can overcome these challenges is inadequate.

Challenge 1: Intra-group Tensions

As scholars have demonstrated, intra-group tensions commonly exist in oppressed groups (Denis, 2015; Rao & Dutta, 2012). Members of the oppressed group may develop different levels of identification with the group and subtly differentiate among or even discriminate against each other based on their affiliations with the privileged, as a result of subtyping (i.e. creating subtypes within the oppressed group) by the mainstream (Aguirre & Turner, 2004; Denis, 2015; Pyke, 2010), a phenomenon some scholars call "internalized oppression" (Pyke, 2010). For example, Denis (2015) demonstrated that indigenous people in a small community differentiated

among themselves based on their racial proximity to White Canadians, as the outcome of the subtyping process where White Canadians categorized indigenous people as "typical natives" and "non-typical natives". Besides, members within oppressed groups may be embedded in different ideological frames of the mainstream, and thus embrace different modes of relating to the mainstream. For example, Rao and Dutta (2012) described that the colonized Indian soldiers embraced or antagonized British colonialism to differing degrees. In addition, as oppressed groups often face resource scarcity, competition over resources sometimes can become intense within the group (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Dong, 1995).

The literature suggests that intra-group tensions within oppressed groups can create significant challenges when they gain the right to field participation. First, they can obstruct the development of a new understanding of field boundaries by which the oppressed attempt to become insiders. As stated earlier, when outside actors enter mature fields, they must develop a new understanding of field boundaries for field incumbents (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Van Vijk et al., 2013). Scholars have suggested that developing new understandings at the field level often relies on the coherence of the supporting arguments; more specifically, only when the supporting arguments are coherent, can the new understandings become "realities of their own" and diffuse quickly in a field (David, Sine & Haveman, 2013). For example, Weber et al. (2008) described that the new understanding of the meat and dairy field's boundary successfully developed and diffused as the farmers and activists juxtaposed "authenticity" and "sustainability" into coherent arguments. However, research has also shown that when actors have resilient, conflicting values and beliefs during collective actions, they may disagree on what elements should be included in the supportive arguments, and therefore find it difficult to form coherent arguments (Bertels, Hoffman & DeJordy, 2014). For instance, Bertels et al. (2014) demonstrated

24

that different environmental organizations hold different values and beliefs and thus disagree on what environmentalism should entail. Relating to oppressed groups gaining the right to field participation, this means that intra-group tensions in oppressed groups, especially in the realm of values and beliefs, may prompt different group members to put forward divergent supporting arguments during the development of new understandings of field boundaries for the incumbents. As such, they may obstruct the oppressed groups from infusing the new understandings of field boundaries.

Second, intra-group tensions can delay the formation of membership arrangements among oppressed groups and field incumbents. As scholars have suggested, forging membership arrangements is necessary during the entrance to a field, which involves the entrants negotiating with the incumbents about how to distribute power and interests (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). However, when the entrants hold different values, beliefs and interests, research has suggested that negotiation with the incumbents can be delayed as the entrants focus their attention on settling within themselves with respect to negotiation strategies and tactics (Bertels et al., 2014; Lu & Reay, 2016). In the case of oppressed entrants, tensions among themselves may not only divert their attention away from negotiating with the incumbents, but also obstruct them from presenting themselves as a united, stronger force to negotiate new membership arrangements. This may lead to a significant delay in the formation of new membership arrangements, and hence obstruct oppressed groups from participating in the field.

Third, tensions within oppressed groups may make it more difficult for the oppressed to break regulative barriers. As the literature has suggested, breaking regulative barriers takes strong collective actions (Russo, 2001; Scott, 2014; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). However, when members of oppressed groups hold different degrees of identification with the group and

competing interests over scarce resources, the tensions can reduce the possibility of collective actions, and hence obstruct oppressed groups from breaking regulative barriers to field participation.

Even though the literature has suggested the intra-group tensions in oppressed groups may be a significant challenge, there are only limited insights into how oppressed groups can overcome the challenge. Although Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) mentioned that First Nations and environmentalists signed "concords" to fight the incumbent forestry companies, they did not clarify if "signing concords" was a way to manage the different interests of First Nations and the environmentalists, and neither did they explain how the two parties reached the decision to sign the concords. Bertels et al. (2014) suggested that challenger environmental organizations may coordinate themselves by "portals" and "satellites" as a way to manage heterogeneous working approaches, but did not specify the ways in which this coordination was realized, and neither did they focus on the fact that some of the environmental organizations were quite powerful and not oppressed. Taken together, we know very little about how oppressed actors can overcome or manage intra-group tensions when gaining the right to participate in mature fields.

Challenge 2: Existing Field-level Regulative Institutions

Regulative institutions, as one of the three pillars of institutions (Scott, 2014), can be understood as a system that is comprised of formal rules, regulations, the law, and the actors that mediate their enactments, such as courts and legal professionals. Together with normative and cognitive institutions, regulative institutions make up the broad environment that constrains and constitutes actors and their actions (Scott, 2014; Edelman & Suchman, 1997). As scholars have suggested (Scott, 2014; Suchman & Edelman, 1996), the effect of regulative institutions not only manifests through coercive mechanisms—that is, providing mechanisms of incentives or

punishment—but also through normative and cognitive mechanisms as they promote value and morality, and define basic categories of actors. Since regulative institutions prescribe what actors must do, compliance to these institutions gives rise to pragmatic and moral legitimacy (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). Nevertheless, similar to the normative pillar of institutions, regulative institutions are "the products of human design and the outcomes of purposive action by instrumentally oriented individuals, and thus the opportunity for deviance and contestation can be expected" (Hoffman, 1999; p. 365)

In organizational fields, regulative institutions can bring order and structure, especially when the normative and cognitive pillars of institutions are not developed or clarified enough (Hoffman, 1999). Specifically, regulative institutions often play the role of drawing boundaries between insiders and outsiders, imposing organizational forms and practices, and sanctioning illegitimate actors and practices. For example, Sine and Lee (2009) showed that the passage of the Energy Policy Act expanded the boundary of the energy field to include exempt wholesale generators. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described that the Affirmation Act led schools to adopt an organization form that necessitated special education teachers. As a result, field-level regulative institutions drive coercive isomorphism and give rise to homogeneity among actors and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014).

The literature suggests that the regulative institutions that preexist can obstruct oppressed groups from participating in mature fields. First, the existing regulative institutions may preclude oppressed groups through the formal rules that give exclusive field membership to those dominating society. Scholars have suggested that despite regulative institutions being commonly considered exogenous, they are seldom created independently from the very actors whom they are aimed at governing (Suchman & Edelman, 1996). Instead, actors can actively shape the

27

making of regulations/law using tactics such as cooptation, political coalition and contestation, or sometimes even prompt new regulations/law as a way to control their environment and protect their access to resources (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). The literature has shown that dominant actors such as powerful corporations are most capable of doing so by molding formal rules in the forms of regulations and law, whereas oppressed social groups have only limited presence in the rule-making process, and their decision-making power is constrained (Lukes; 1974; Bourdieu, 1994; Suchman & Edelman, 1996; Edelman & Suchman, 1997). At the field level, actors that dominate society can create regulations or law that allow them to exclusively access field resources through explicit designations of other actors as illegitimate field members or by making the entry barriers so high (in terms of possession of resources) that oppressed groups are unable to overcome them (Wooten, 2015). For example, Wooten (2015) described how dominant groups in the United States previously created laws that gave only White people access to resources in the education field, and later adapted the law that made the access to education by Black people seemingly easier but actually unattainable.

Second, when oppressed groups deploy legal measures such as lawsuits as a means to enter mature fields, the actors that mediate the process, such as legal professionals who are part of regulative institutions, may interpret or filter regulations/law in a way that favors the powerful incumbents. Although early literature focuses on the constraining effect of regulative institutions, scholars have suggested that actors can use regulative institutions to protect their interests (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). Thus, facing entry barriers, oppressed entrants may resort to litigation and arbitration as a way to advance their interests. When regulative/legal battles with field incumbents occur, research suggests that the regulative agencies or professions that mediate such process are likely to favor the incumbents (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Edelman, Smyth &

Rahim, 2016). As regulations and the law are often ambiguous and contain self-contractionary elements, those who mediate the enactment of regulation/law can moderate or amplify certain aspects. As these actors are constrained by the broad power structure, and their own interests can be at stake, they tend to filter regulations/law in a way that benefits the incumbents rather than the oppressed, despite the systematic effort to reduce such biases (Edelman et al., 1993; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Heimer, 1996; Suchman & Edelman, 1996).

The literature has suggested that actors may manage regulative barriers by two processes: symbolic compliance or altering regulative institutions (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014); however, these processes may not be feasible for oppressed groups who wish to participate in mature fields. First, although actors can adopt symbolic compliance when facing adversarial regulations or law, symbolic compliance requires actors to make the enforcement agencies resource-dependent in order to minimize inspections (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As oppressed groups generally lack resources, they are unlikely to develop the resource-dependency of inspection agencies and thus may not be able to adopt symbolic compliance. Indeed, scholars have documented that inspection agencies actually tend to inspect the oppressed more closely (Goffman, 2014). In the context of gaining the right to field participation, this means that when the oppressed adopt measures of symbolic compliance, such as not formally continuing field entry but actually engaging in key field practices under the radar, they may easily be discovered and prohibited by inspection agencies. Second, although actors can sometimes alter regulative institutions, it takes strong political power or large-scale social change (Hall & Taylor, 1996), which might be unrealistic for oppressed entrants, who tend to lack political power and aim to participate in specific fields.

To sum up, regulative institutions can be a major challenge for oppressed actors attempting to participate in mature fields. Existing regulations or law may preclude them from the field by giving exclusive field membership to the dominant actors in the society. In other words, their entry would appear as illegitimate according to the existing regulations or law. Furthermore, when they adopt legal procedures such as litigation to fight the exclusive regulations or law, the oppressed may be easily defeated because the actors who mediate the enactment of the regulations/law may filter the regulations/law in favor of the incumbents. Although the literature has suggested that actors may manage regulative challenges by symbolic compliance or altering regulative institutions, these processes may not be feasible for gaining the right to participate in mature fields. As such, we know little about how oppressed groups can overcome the obstructive regulative institutions when attempting field participation. Indeed, the understanding of regulative institutions is generally limited in the institutional literature (Scott, 2014).

Challenge 3: Stigma

As scholars have suggested, stigma is a common feature shared by most, if not all, oppressed social groups (Holley, Stromwall & Bashor, 2012). It refers to a sign "cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor – a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places" (Goffman, 1963. p. 1). In other words, stigma can be a tool for the dominant class to mark and oppress those at the bottom of society. Besides, stigma can reinforce oppression. The dominant may use stigma as a cognitive shortcut to discriminate against the oppressed in micro-level interactions and macro-level institutional processes, which blocks the oppressed from accessing resources and reinforces oppression (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001; Ridgeway, 1982). Over time, the oppressed

may internalize stigma, develop inferior personal and social identities, and even self-produce and reproduce oppression (Link & Phelan, 2001; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015).

When social groups carry stigma, group members tend to have a sense of "we-ness" and "us versus them," which is typically activated during interactions with privileged groups. For example, Liu (2017) showed that stigmatized Chinese professionals felt more strongly connected to their Chinese identity when they interacted with White colleagues, and Armstrong (2005) demonstrated that LGBT members displayed strong identification with each other when trying to mobilize powerful organizations during the LGBT movement. Nevertheless, members of stigmatized groups are by no means homogenous. As Denis (2015) described, some members of stigmatized groups identify with the group more than others. In addition, although there tends to be a sharp division between "the normal" and the stigmatized, some individuals in the "normal" group may be seen as acceptable by the stigmatized, as they do not hold prejudicial attitudes or can somehow relate themselves to the stigmatized. Goffman (1963) called such individuals "the wise."

The literature suggests that there are different types of stigma, including cultural and ethnical background, physical deformity, and morally condemned behaviors or preferences (Goffman, 1963). The different types of stigma differ in concealability in social interactions. Some are concealable, such as a history of substance abuse, while some others are non-concealable, such as racial features and physical deformity. The literature has shown that the concealability of stigma can significantly influence the difficulty of social interactions, as well as bring about vastly different interaction tactics by the carrier (Goffman, 1963; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015). Specifically, those carrying non-concealable stigma, such as physical deformity, may find social interactions unpleasant in many more settings and therefore tend to behave as if

the stigma is unimportant, while those carrying concealable stigma, such as a history of substance abuse, may situationally cover up the stigma in order to pass as normal (Goffman, 1963; Joachim & Acorn, 2000; Link & Phelan, 2001). While organizational researchers have paid extensive attention to concealable stigma and studied when and how actors will conceal or reveal the stigma (Ragins, 2008; Devers, Dewett, Mishina & Belsito, 2009), we know relatively little about how actors manage non-concealable stigma such as discredited race.

The literature suggests that stigma can be a significant challenge for oppressed groups to participate in mature fields, for the following reasons. First, it may discredit or even render the entry arguments of the oppressed entrants easily ignored. Research has extensively shown that stigma can discredit the discursive efforts of its carriers. For example, Sutton and Callahan (1987) described that the stigma of bankruptcy discredited the carrying firms' arguments to borrow money from the bank; and Petty, Fleming and White (1999) showed that persuasive messages from Blacks and homosexuals are more likely to be scrutinized by non-stigmatized actors. As Goffman (1963) has suggested, stigma, as social information, can be processed together with any argument made by its carriers, and often leads the audience to disbelieve the arguments. Further, Goffman (1963) pointed out that stigma may even cause its carrier to be perceived as "non-human" and thus significantly discredits anything that its carrier tries to argue. For oppressed entrants, it means that when they frame their entry as aligned with the interests of the incumbents by arguing its benefits, the incumbents may distrust their arguments that they are capable of materializing the envisioned benefits. Besides, when they try to instill new understandings of field boundaries, the incumbents may not be easily convinced that a new field boundary would make sense.

Second, stigma may hinder the negotiation of new membership arrangements between oppressed entrants and field incumbents. As actors carrying stigma are often perceived to be low status or morally devious (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001), the "normal" tend to avoid social interactions with the stigmatized. Indeed, as Goffman (1963) noted, those who appear to have a close relationship with stigmatized individuals may begin to carry "courtesy stigma", which demotivates the "normal" to interact with the stigmatized. For oppressed entrants, it means that their stigma may lead the incumbents to avoid contact altogether for the fear of status degradation, moral contamination, or courtesy stigma. As such, when the oppressed entrants need to negotiate field membership arrangements with incumbents, they may experience delay or neglect from the incumbents.

The literature has suggested three general strategies for managing stigma: concealment, de-stigmatization and leveraging. As explained below, however, these strategies may be either unsuitable for oppressed groups to enter mature fields or require further elaboration and theorization. The first strategy is concealment; that is, actors hide their stigma situationally for "temporary passing" (Goffman, 1963; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015). Although concealment has been extensively studied at the individual level and seems to explain stigma management strategies by individuals, oppressed entrants may not be able to conceal their stigma at the collective level on which field entry takes place, since the collectiveness of their entry (the scale of actions) will likely expose their stigma to field incumbents. Besides, although the literature has suggested that actors may be able to de-stigmatize themselves by demonstrating pragmatic value to society or renegotiating the meaning of their social identity (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Lyons, Pek & Wessel, 2017), de-stigmatizing an entire social group, unlike de-stigmatizing an

individual or organization, may require grand social transformation that is far beyond the scope of entering a specific field.

Although the literature has recently depicted the third strategy, leveraging (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz, Fischer, Liu & Levesque, 2018), we have yet to systematically understand how it can be applied. So far, we only know that one important tactic of leveraging stigma is embracing stigma, that is, publicizing the stigmatized organizational practice, which may attract endorsement from a small niche audience that resonate with the stigmatized organizational practice (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al, 2018). For example, Helms and Patterson (2014) eluded to the idea of embracing stigma by showing that Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) organizations promoted bloody, violent fighting scenes to audiences that find violence exciting, which helped garner support from that niche group of audience. Similarly, Tracey and Philips (2016) described that an immigration organization chose to stick to their identity in the face of stigmatization, resulting in the endorsement from pro-immigration actors. However, since stigma is a social difference that embodies complicated inter-group categorization and politics (Link & Phelan, 2001), leveraging stigma may be more socially and politically complex than the literature has portrayed. There may exist other tactics of leveraging stigma and other mechanisms by which leveraging stigma results in positive outcomes.

Apart from the lack of systematic theorization, existing studies on leveraging stigma also suffer from the mere focus on core-stigmatized organizations, neglecting stigmatized social groups. This is unfortunate because the concept of stigma is originally attached to social groups and stigma-based processes can be largely distinctive for social groups than organizations or professions (Goffman, 1963; Devers, Dewett, Mishina & Belsito, 2009; Paetzold, Dipboye &

Elsbach, 2008). While the stigma of organizations or professions is theorized as the institutionalization of negative social evaluations (Dewett, Mishina & Belsito, 2009; Hampel & Tracey, 2017), the stigma of social groups is more conceptualized as tools for oppression and connotes the exploitation of stigmatized group, closely associated with power and human suffering (Goffman, 1963; Foucault, 1988). As such, the leveraging of group stigma may be infused with power and emotional dynamics (Jarvis, Goodrick & Hudson, forthcoming), which we may not be able to explore in-depth by focusing on core-stigmatized organizations. In other words, without the attention to stigmatized social groups, our understanding of leveraging stigma will remain incomplete.

Moreover, existing studies mostly discuss leveraging stigma in the context of how stigmatized organizations persist despite stigma, treating the purpose of leveraging stigma as organizational survival, and did not explore how leveraging stigma may take place for the purpose of field participation (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al, 2018). For example, Helm and Patterson (2014) alluded to leveraging stigma when investigating how MMA organizations survive in the face of extremely negative social evaluations, and Tracey and Philips (2016) did so when studying how an immigration organization responded to identity threats and resource constraints. However, as Hampel, Lawrence and Tracey (2017) suggested, actions of the same type, but for different institutional purposes, may exhibit very different nature. Thus, despite drawing from the notion of leveraging stigma, it is warranted to explore how leveraging stigma may unfold for the purpose of gaining field participation.

In sum, drawing from the stigma literature, I suggest that stigma may be one of the critical factors that hinder oppressed groups from field participation. Despite that the literature has suggested three strategies to manage stigma, concealing and de-stigmatization may not be

feasible for oppressed groups that seek to participate in mature fields, due to the collective nature of the process and the limited scope of their actions. Although oppressed groups might resort to the third strategy---leveraging stigma, the literature has not provided adequate understandings of how leveraging stigma may occur in the context of gaining field participation.

Summary

I summarize the structure of the arguments in the above section in Figure 1. As indicated in the center of Figure 1, the literature has suggested that entering mature fields entails four important processes: (1) breaking down regulative entry barriers; (2) framing the entry as aligned with incumbents' material interests; (3) instilling new understandings of field boundaries; and (4) negotiating new field membership arrangements. However, for oppressed social groups, the literature suggests three challenges they must overcome, as they make it difficult for the oppressed to engage in the aforementioned processes (as indicated on the left and right of Figure 1). Importantly, the literature has yet to provide sufficient insights into how oppressed groups can overcome those challenges and successfully gain the right to participate in mature fields.

Specifically, the challenge of "intra-group tensions" typically obstructs the oppressed from engaging in the process of "instilling new understandings of field boundary" and "negotiating new field membership arrangements," (the first, third, and fourth processes that entering mature fields entails, as indicated in Figure 1). The commonly existing intra-group tensions in oppressed groups may obstruct new understandings of field boundary by reducing the coherence of supporting arguments or frameworks; they may also delay the negotiation of new membership arrangements by diverting attention away to settling among themselves and limiting their ability to pressure the incumbents into negotiation. Although the literature has begun to

give attention to the tensions within oppressed groups, we know little about how the oppressed

can manage the intra-group tensions, especially in the context of entering mature fields.

Figure 1 A Summary of the Argument Structure in the Section of Theoretical Background

The Challenges for Oppressed

The Challenges for Oppressed

Entering Mature Fields

Entail

Challenge 2: Existing field-level regulative institutions

Obstruct

Process 1: Breaking down regulative entry barriers

Process 2: Framing the entry as aligned with incumbents' material interests

Obstruct

Obstruct

Challenge 1: The tensions within the oppressed entrants

Obstruct

Process 3: Instilling new understandings of field boundary

Challenge 3: Stigma

Obstruct

Obstruct

Process 4: Negotiating new field membership arrangements

Obstruct

The second challenge is that "existing field-level regulative institutions" typically obstruct the oppressed from engaging in the process of "breaking down regulative barriers" (the first process that entering mature fields entails, as indicated in Figure 1). Existing regulative institutions may make it difficult for the oppressed to break down barriers, because of formal rules infused with coercive power that preclude the oppressed from participating in the field. Besides, the actors who enact the regulative institutions tend to favor the incumbents, due to their embeddedness in the broad power structure, when the oppressed and the incumbents become involved in legal battles. Although the literature has suggested that actors may overcome regulative barriers through symbolic compliance, or changing regulations or law, those processes may not be suitable for oppressed groups entering mature fields, due to tougher inspection and the relatively small scale of actions for field entry. As such, we have yet to understand how oppressed entrants may successfully break down regulative entry barriers.

The third challenge is that stigma may obstruct the oppressed from engaging in the process of "framing the entry as aligned with incumbents' interests," "instilling new understandings of field boundary," and "negotiating new field membership arrangements" (the second, third, and fourth processes that entering mature fields entails, as indicated in Figure 1). As the literature suggested, stigma may obstruct "framing the entry as aligned with incumbents interests" and "instilling new understandings of field boundary" by undermining both the credibility of the arguments by the oppressed that their entry can benefit the incumbents, as well as the persuasiveness of the arguments that a new field boundary makes sense. In addition, stigma may delay the negotiation of new field membership arrangements, as the incumbents can avoid interactions with the oppressed for the fear of status degradation, moral contamination, or courtesy stigma. Although the literature has suggested three strategies to manage stigma—

concealment, de-stigmatization and leveraging—the first two strategies may not work for oppressed entrants, and the third strategy needs elaboration. Therefore, we do not have a sufficient understanding of how oppressed entrants can overcome the challenge of stigma during field entry.

Overall, it can be particularly challenging for oppressed groups to gain the right to participate in mature fields. As the literature suggests, oppressed entrants face three critical challenges: intra-group tensions, existing field-level regulative institutions, and stigma. These challenges make it difficult for oppressed entrants to engage in the necessary processes of field entry. To understand how oppressed entrants can still gain the right to field participation despite the challenges, I formulate the following question to guide my empirical inquiry: ***how can an oppressed social group gain the right to participate in a (mature) field?***

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

In this dissertation, I wanted to understand how oppressed social groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields. Similar to many other field-level studies that address the "how" question (Ziestma & Lawrence, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Reay et al., 2017), I study a single "revelatory case" (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) in which the processes of interest are "transparently observable" (Plowman, 2007; p. 521), while in-depth examination is also possible. Ideally, I needed an empirical setting in which the following criteria were met: an oppressed group of entrants can be clearly identified; the field they attempted to enter was mature; and the oppressed group had successfully accomplished field participation. As such, I chose to investigate how First Nations gained the right to participate in the Canadian gambling field. First, First Nations have been significantly oppressed in Canada for approximately three hundred years. They are subject to institutional racism and their indigeneity has become a deep-seated stigma (United Nations, 2007). Thus, First Nations qualify as oppressed social groups. Second, the Canadian gambling field was mature when First Nations attempted field participation. It had strict field boundaries created by the Criminal Code of Canada, which granted provincial governments the sole right to regulate and own gambling businesses, a clearly defined governance structure where provincial governments dominated the field, and a shared field practice---state-owned and regulated gambling business. All of these characteristics qualify the Canadian gambling field as a mature field. Third, despite the significant oppression of First Nations and the maturity of the Canadian gambling field, First Nations successfully gained the right to participate in the gambling field and became prominent field members. Between 1985 and 2016, they created 19 native casinos in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, and generated millions of dollars for community development (Belanger, 2011).

Besides, as shown in Figure 2, the presence of "First Nation casinos" as keywords in the media has significantly decreased in recent years. According to Green, Li and Nohria (2009), this signals that the casinos are becoming taken for granted. The deep oppression of First Nations, the maturity of the gambling field, and the great success First Nations achieved consitute a "revelatory case" where an oppressed group gained the right to participate in a mature field (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

Research Setting

In this section, I describe the research setting in more detail. I explain the characteristics of the oppressed group—First Nations and their relationships with the mainstream Canadian society; the critical features of the gambling field; and their accomplished positions in the field. Additionally, I explicate how the emergence of the native gaming industry in the United States may have influenced First Nations' actions.

Important Characteristics of First Nations It is important to understand the main characteristics of First Nations and their relationships with mainstream Canada, because they are the meaningful context in which First Nations' actions happened. First Nations refer to indigenous communities that are comprised of the "descendants of the original inhabitants of Canada who lived here for many thousands of years before explorers arrived from Europe" (First Nations of People of Canada, n.d., para. 1). In Canada, there are currently 617 First Nations across the provinces and territories (see Figure 3 for a map of all First Nations in Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2012). First Nations are often distinguished from (a) Metis, the mixed descendants of First Nations people and colonial-era European settlers, (b) non-status Indians, people who identify themselves as indigenous but are not given an official status, and (c) Inuit people, who reside mainly north of the Arctic circle

(Aodla, 2015). Among First Nations, despite similarities in culture, history, and patterns of social organization, there exist sub-populations, such as Cree, Blackfoot, Stoney, and Mi'kmaq. These sub-populations sometimes have distinctive languages, cultural traditions, and a history of conflict with each other (Dempsey, 2016). The differences and conflicts among different sub-populations played out during First Nations' entry into the gambling field, as I will explain in the Findings section.

Upon the arrival of European settlers in the sixteenth century, many First Nations signed treaties with the settlers, exchanging land for basic goods. Nowadays, individual First Nations have designated areas of land ownership, which are often called "reserves" or "bands." (Gadacz, 2015). According to the Constitution of Canada, First Nations are entitled to conduct activities as independent political entities on the reserve (Dyck & Sadik, 2016). While many reserves are located far from population centers, some are close to major cities, such as the Enoch Cree First Nation close to Edmonton, the Musqueam First Nation near Vancouver, and the Tssu Tina First Nations near Calgary. The location of the reserve can greatly impact whether it is more conducive to the idea of a First Nation casino, as those located near to population centers are more likely to profit (Belanger, 2006).

Since First Nations entered the gambling field as collectives, it is useful to describe the political structure within and among First Nations. Individual First Nations are organized by two (sometimes conflicting) governance structures: the traditional authority structure centered around the elders (i.e., seniors who are commonly considered as knowledge keepers by the community) and the Western political structure centered around a Chief and a Tribal Council (i.e., a structure imposed by Western colonizers for the sake of colonial governance) (Taylor, 2016). Although the elder-authority structure is still prevalent in the social and cultural lives on reserves, the Chief

and Council structure dominates the political realm and functions as the political representation of First Nations when First Nations interact with Canada's federal and provincial governments (Taylor, 2016). During First Nations' attempt to participate in the gambling field, the Chiefs and Band Councils played the role of decision-makers, often overriding the opinions of the elders. At the provincial level, since multiple First Nations exist in each province, each province has an Assembly of First Nations; for example, the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Chiefs of Ontario, and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. In each provincial government, there is also a Ministry responsible for native affairs. While the Assembly of First Nations represents First Nations, the Ministry represents the government, even though many employees of the Ministry are indigenous peoples. At the treaty territory level (above the provincial but below the federal), the Assembly of First Nations represents all First Nations citizens in Canada, which sometimes coordinates with provincial assemblies to advocate for indigenous rights, land, and resources. All levels of these political organizations were involved in First Nations' actions to participate in the gambling field.

The Relationship between First Nations and Canada The relationship between First Nations and Canada is an important context of First Nations' effort to participate in the gambling field, because the government was the most important field incumbent. The relationship has been highly contentious for centuries. In the early colonization period (16th–18th centuries), thousands of First Nations peoples were killed by the colonizers. After the confederation of Canada in 1867, the Canadian government passed the Indian Act in 1876 to dominate First Nations' economic, social, and political lives (Henderson, 2017). For a long period, First Nations peoples were considered as uncivilized and inferior to the white Canadians (Driedger, 2015). As part of the assimilation plan, the government partnered with the church in the 1920s and created

the residential school system for First Nations children. Between the 1920s and the 1970s, an estimated 150,000 indigenous children were forced to attend residential schools, where many were tortured, sexually abused, or killed (Miller, 2018). Since the 1980s, First Nations have battled for the recognition of their suffering in residential schools on many different grounds. Despite initial inaction, the government officially apologized in for the history of residential schools, which signaled the government's intention to repair the relationship with First Nations (Miller, 2018).

While First Nations' resistance to colonization and the government had been ongoing for centuries, it has become stronger and more overt in recent decades. In 1971, a group of individuals in the Kahnawake Warrior Society created the Mohawk Warrior Society to openly resist the government and claim indigenous sovereignty (Abler, 2018). The Society was linked to the Mafia society in the United States, which provided heavy weapons (*First Nations Drum*, Jan 14, 2017). In 1990, the Society became the catalyst of the Oka crisis, where a few Mohawk First Nations engaged in violent resistance against the government on land issues, a crisis that historians considered a milestone in centuries of indigenous resistance (Alfred, 1995). Since then, indigenous resistance has continued to rise. First Nations have fought fiercely against oil and pipeline expansion, organized the "Idle no more" movement, and pushed forward the Truth and Reconciliation initiative (Moran, 2017; Marshall, 2015).

Currently, although the government has admitted and apologized for the history of residential schools, taken many actions to improve relations with First Nations, and sought to address the poverty and social issues many First Nations experience, there still exists intense animosity between First Nations and the government. First Nations often complain that, due to the abuse that their ancestors experienced in residential schools, many indigenous families suffer

45

from inter-generational trauma, addiction, and violence; many First Nations in remote areas live in "third-world conditions" drastically different from mainstream Canada; in addition, they experience institutional racism in education, healthcare, and the justice system. Recently, First Nations have called for "indigenizing"; that is, infusing indigenous culture and identity back into every indigenous person, freeing them from government control so that First Nations can truly become sovereign nations with their own law and decision-making power (Moran, 2017; Marshall, 2015; Dyck & Sadik, 2016).

The Canadian Gambling Field Having described pertinent contextual information about First Nations and their overall relationship with the government, I detail the history of gambling in Canada before explaining why there existed a mature gambling field. Gambling became legal in Canada in 1969 when the parliament designated the federal or provincial government as the regulator and owner of all types of gambling businesses. Before then, gambling businesses were illegal in Canada as the dominant Christian beliefs considered gambling to be a vice (Belanger, 2006; 2012). After the de-criminalization of gambling, federal and provincial governments began to use gambling for revenue generation. For example, the federal government held a lottery in 1974 to raise funds for the Montreal Olympics. In 1975, the Alberta government licensed casino-style gambling activities, "recognizing casinos as an alternative fundraising activity by eligible community organizations" (Belanger, 2006. p. 53). In 1985, a new practice—mechanical gambling became legal, when the federal legislature included a clause in the Criminal Code that any forms of mechanical gambling not conducted by provincial governments and their licensed charities are illegal. From then, provincial governments began to have *de facto* exclusive access to the business of casino gambling.

In the early 1990s, there already existed seven government and community casinos, and provincial governments continued to plan for more casinos. The government casinos were managed as follows: centrally governed by provincial gaming commissions or ministries, operated by private operators that were vendors to the government, and regulated by provincial gaming regulators (see Figure 4). The governments garner casino revenue as part of government fiscal income. By 2018, there were 53 government-owned or licensed community casinos in 10 (out of 13 provinces and territories) Canadian provinces (Alberta Gambling Research Institute, 2018).

As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stated, "fields only exist to the extent that they are institutionally defined" (P. 148). To determine the existence of a field, researchers must empirically assess whether there is "an increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined inter-organizational structures of domination; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise". Next, I explain the reasons how I determined the Canadian gambling field existed based on these criteria suggested by DiMaggio and Powell.

First, the Canadian gambling field existed because actors involved in the gambling business, including provincial governments, private operators, charities and consumers, had frequent and fateful interactions after gambling became legal in Canada. Provincial governments regularly entered partnerships with private operators who operated government casinos and charged operational fees (Belanger, 2006). Provincial governments also regularly licensed charities to run charity-based gambling activities (Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, 2005). These interactions were inevitable because of the Criminal Code designation that provincial

47

governments are the only legal regulators and owners of gambling. Second, there existed a

sharply defined domination structure among all the organizations. Provincial governments were

the only legal regulator of the gambling industry, which means they possessed the ultimate

power over all the others. Private operators, consumers and charities are all governed by the

industry rules created and enforced by provincial governments, such as the number of gambling

machines allowed in a casino, the amount of gambling stake, and the win-loss ratio (Smith &

Rubenstein, 2011). Third, the load of information that actors had to contend with continued to

increase. The rise of gambling addictions, online gambling, and the diversification of gambling

types (e.g. Slot, VLT and sports betting) added a great number of new uncertainties that all the

actors must cope with (Smith & Wynne, 2004). Fourth, mutual awareness continued to develop

among the actors in the gambling business. As a government official reflected: "*If a charity or

community wants to host gambling events or open a casino, they call us first and apply for a

license. We have all the information on our website. Most business people know us [as a

gambling regulatory agency] and know how to reach out*". (Interview with a government official)

Now that I have explained why a gambling field existed, I elaborate on why I

characterize the gambling field as mature. According to Zietsma et al (2017), a mature field

tends to have elaborated institutional infrastructure and settled arrangement of institutional logics.

When First Nations attempted to participate in the gambling field, the field had highly elaborated

institutional infrastructure, as evident in the layers of government policies aimed to regulate

gambling and distribute gambling revenues. Specifically, the federal government delegated the

authority to own and regulate casino gambling to provincial governments, and provincial

governments had mandates, guidelines and policy manuals for provincial gambling regulators,

e.g. (Ontario Lottery and Gaming Commission, Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission,

Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority). Along the highly institutionalized actors and formal guidelines, the field had a clear governance structure where provincial governments took the dominance. Besides, the field was also characterized by settled institutional logics. The state logic dominated the field and the business logic subdued, as all the gambling businesses had to be centrally planned and coordinated by the state and organized around the social enterprise model.

First Nations Gaining the Right to Participate in the Gambling Field   In the late 1980s and early 1990s, First Nations in Canada began to seek participation in the gambling field. They were motivated by two factors. First, when native gambling became legal in the United States, First Nations in Canada "felt that they should be entitled to the same gambling opportunities as many American Indian Bands" (Kelley, 2001; p. 2). Second, since many First Nation individuals had gambled at government-owned or licensed casinos, some First Nation leaders considered casinos as a way to retain money in their communities. As many First Nations suffered from poverty at the time, some members had gambled in government casinos to make quick money, which made some First Nation leaders consider that if some native people were to gamble anyway, they should open their own casinos so that the gambling money could stay inside First Nation communities.

When First Nations tried to open casinos, however, provincial governments were resistant. The participation of First Nations shook up the understanding of provincial governments regarding field boundaries; that is, the understanding that only provincial governments could own casinos. Also, provincial governments were concerned with First Nations' capability as casino owners, suspecting that First Nations may not be able to operate such a complex business as casino gambling, and that gambling might intensify the crimes in

native communities (Belanger, 2006). These concerns reflect the longstanding negative stereotypes of First Nations: lazy, uneducated, drunk, etc. In addition, as the gambling industry has a relatively stable pool of customers (Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, 2005), the entry of First Nations would take customers away from government casinos and reduce the revenue of provincial governments. Provincial governments would resist because "*the money from gambling goes towards health care, education, justice programs and other government programs.*" (*Spectator*, Feb. 27, 1997).

The resistance of governments also manifested in concrete actions. A few provincial governments threatened to or actually raided the casinos unilaterally opened by some First Nations; government leaders openly rejected the possibility of First Nations being in the gambling field in media outlets and sometimes halted the negotiations with First Nations without notifying them. In addition, First Nations lacked financial resources, knowledge of the gambling industry, and business experience. However, despite all these difficulties, First Nations successfully reached agreements with provincial governments in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which allowed them to enter the gambling field by opening First Nation casinos. Since 1994, First Nations have opened 19 casinos on reserves in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario (see Figure 5 for a map of all First Nations casinos in Canada). All of these casinos carry indigenous cultural elements either in the names or architectural design. Nevertheless, the amenities, gambling machines, and types of games are similar to those in non-indigenous casinos.

I identified that First Nations in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario formed agreements with provincial governments in the late 1990s and early 2000, which put First Nations casinos under government control. These agreements mark that First Nations

completed the phase of "seeking participation" and entered the phase of "securing field membership." Securing field membership is important for First Nations because First Nations, as an oppressed group, had a clear power disadvantage vis-à-vis the government. As the tension with the government has continued for centuries, First Nations faced a great risk of being kicked out of the field. Indeed, the documents show that when some provincial governments and First Nations continued to dispute revenue sharing and casino governance, the governments threatened to shut down First Nations' businesses. As reported in the media: "*The province threatens to cut off VLT gambling at the four SIGA run casinos unless Lerat steps down*" (*Star-Phoenix*, Nov 16, 2002)

Currently, all First Nation casinos are operated as social enterprises, and are licensed and governed by provincial governments. By the agreements, the revenue must be strictly used to improve education, social services, and healthcare in First Nation communities. Besides, First Nations must share casino revenue with provincial governments, despite the percentage being different in different provinces. In addition, as the casinos are located in specific First Nations, the host nation has the obligation to share revenue with other First Nations in the same province that do not have casinos on the reserve. Across the provinces, the Ministries of Indigenous Relations manages the process of revenue sharing.

As First Nation casinos continued to develop and First Nations became economically stronger and more experienced with casinos, First Nations are seeking to change some of the initial arrangements. For example, the Enoch First Nation ended the contract with private operators from the US to operate their casino independently. First Nations in Saskatchewan are also mobilizing to reduce the government's share of revenue. In addition, there are ongoing

discussions at the national level to create a federal native gaming commission that centrally manages all First Nation casinos independently of the federal and provincial governments.

The Influence of the US Native Gaming Industry Throughout the course of my study, I have seen that the US native gaming industry has the following influence on the creation of First Nation casinos. First, as noted in the previous section, the legalization of native gaming in the United States upon the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 (Belanger, 2006), enabled First Nations to see the possibility of native casinos. Second, as I will show in the "Resourcing Stigma" section of the Findings, successful casino-owning native tribes in the US provided start-up loans, business advice, and workforce training for several First Nations, helping First Nations become more ready for the gambling business. Also, I will show in the Findings chapter that the successful native casinos hosted First Nations and provincial governments' business tours, showcasing the potential benefits that native casinos can bring to communities and society. However, despite these important influence and support of the US native gaming industry, First Nations must fight their own battles against the federal and provincial governments in Canada.

Methods

I adopt the ontological stance of interpretivism in this study. The interpretivism ontology assumes that reality is the product of social construction (Creswell, 2007; Meyers, 2009). Besides, it prompts researchers to focus on the intersubjective realities that social actors perceive and construct through language, artifacts and gestures, and places meanings at the center of scholarly inquiry (Meyers, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Since field-level phenomena are essentially processes of social construction, and such constructions take place as actors interpret their resource dispositions and social positions, as well as gauge other actors' responses

(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), an interpretivism stance can help researchers immerse themselves in and better understand the meanings and intersubjective realities that constitute field-level phenomena. Indeed, scholars have commonly adopted an interpretivism stance in field-level studies (see Reay & Hinings, 2005; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Wright & Zammuto, 2013, for a few examples).

Specifically, the interpretivism ontology that I adopt distinguishes from radical interpretivism and takes on the essence of "subtle realism" (Altheide & Johnson, 2011; Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995). While radical interpretivism assumes multiple realities and "qualitative inquiry is a moral, political and therapeutic project (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), I align my ontological stance with Altheide and Johnson (2011), admitting the existence of a real world and yet recognizing that the world is socially constructed and the goal of scientific inquiry is to understand the construction process. As Althetide and Johnson (2011) explained, the subtle interpretivism does not assume multiple realities, so it helps to generate trustworthy and relatable theories; but in the meantime, it prompts researchers to explore the meanings that actors give to their experiences, the actions based on those meanings and the consequent interactions with other actors. My study aligns with subtle interpretivism as I recognize the importance of meaning, interaction and social construction and yet embrace the pursuit of abstract theories, with the particular aim to explore field-level processes which are by nature processes of social constructions and at the same time enrich existing, abstract theories of fields.

As subtle interpretivism prompts that the quality of social inquiry is a social consensus between the researcher and his or her audiences, I follow the existing studies on field-level dynamics for research design, data collection, analysis and presentation. As Althetide and Johnson (2011) suggested, since interpretative work focuses on meanings and social construction

53

and recognizes that all interpretations (including researchers' and research readers' interpretations) are colored by the interpreter's values and identity, data should be collected, analyzed and presented in such a way that its concerned groups of audience consider it as trustworthy, authentic and transparent. In other words, how data should be collected, organized and presented must be agreed between the researcher and his or her most concerned audience. Besides, since social inquiry can only approximate but never fully access the reality constructed by multiple actors, data analysis and presentation is effective to the extent that it serves the purpose at hand (Althetide & Johnson, 2011). When the goal of the research is to build a theory that is meaningful for a particular group of audience, researchers should analyze and present data in such a way that those audiences appreciate the value of the theory that emerges. Given that the most important audience of this study are scholars who have published work on fields, following the extant field-level studies promises a consensus that this study is effectively executed.

Here, I describe the commonly adopted pattern of data collection, analysis and presentation in extant field-level studies by referencing three award-winning or highly cited articles: Greenwood and Suddaby (2005), Reay and Hinings (2009); Zietsma and Lawrence (2010). These three articles are not only well-recognized by organizational researchers, but also focus on historical processes that span across a long period of time, closely resembling the nature of this study. The methodological patterns across these articles therefore represent a methodological template that my most important audience have used, aligning with the ontological stance outlined above.

First, when it comes to data collection, these studies commonly collected interviews and documents, and the authors had first-hand experience in the field. In particular, they rely heavily on historical documents, such as newspapers, professional association archives, and government

publications. As Reay and Hinings (2009) suggested, documents contain comprehensive, institutional information about key events and actions, and therefore are particularly useful for field-level studies. Second, regarding data analysis, these studies commonly mapped out the key timeline of events as the first step, and then explore the key actions, rationales and outcomes by triangulating different types of data. This resonates with the "weak" version of interpretivism by somewhat admitting a historical reality awaits for revelation. For instance, Greenwood and Suddaby (2005) used the annual reports from accounting firms to identify the critical actions of these firms and the circumstances of the actions; Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) analyzed various archives to trace how environmental organizations, First Nations and the government responded to each other's actions. After mapping out what happened, i.e. who did what, when and how, these studies commonly aggregated first-order descriptions into higher conceptual dimensions. Notably, throughout this process, the authors always maintained their analysis at the field level, focusing on actions that are critical for the unfoldment of field dynamics. They never retreated to individual or group level of analysis, counting the frequency of observed actions to decide whether certain actions are important or not. Third, with respect to data presentation, the authors commonly used tables or figures where higher level conceptual dimensions are displayed together with supporting first order quotes. The authors also give concrete examples in the main body of the Findings to show their data analysis is trustworthy.

As the authors of these studies are my most important audiences, these methodological practices serve as living guidelines for this study. In the following sections (e.g. data collection and analysis), I demonstrate how this research adheres to the methodology provided by exemplary field studies.

An Interpretative Historical Qualitative Approach I take the interpretative historical approach as the guiding approach in this study. A qualitative approach is suited for this study for three reasons. First, the qualitative approach is especially helpful for building theory (Langley, 1999; Suddaby, 2006; Gehman et al., 2017). It is widely used by scholars to build new theory, often addressing exploratory questions and significant theoretical gaps in the literature. As the goal of this study is to theorize on how oppressed groups could enter mature fields, which, as elaborated earlier, cannot be adequately addressed by existing theory, a qualitative approach can serve the purpose of theorizing. Second, a qualitative approach can help researchers understand phenomena that involve hard-to-measure concepts such as identity and institutional logics (Langley, 1999; Gehman et al., 2018). In this study, stigma is one of the key concepts, which is grounded in actors' subjective experience of their social identity (Goffman, 1963) and difficult to capture through quantitative measures. Third, the qualitative approach is well suited to study phenomena that often involve multiple actors, simultaneous actions, and parallel processes that cannot be reduced to a few variables (Suddaby, 2006). Since this study focuses on field-level dynamics among multiple field actors, adopting a qualitative approach can capture such complex dynamics.

This study is by nature historical, because the empirical inquiry is based on the history of First Nations' entry into the gambling field. As field-level dynamics often span across a long period of time and involve a variety of individuals and organizations, it is not feasible for researchers to observe such dynamics in person; and thus a historical approach has been common in field-level research (e.g. Leblebici, et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1999; David, Wesley & Haveman, 2013). Consistent with the overarching interpretivism ontology of this study, I chose the "interpretative history" tradition in historical studies (i.e. from historical realism, interpretative

56

history, and poststructuralism). Different from historical realism, which focuses on resurfacing the "true" history and detecting the flow of events (Vaara & Lamberg, 2016), the interpretative tradition places the utmost importance on the subjective meaning of historical events, actions, and processes. The researcher interprets the past in its historical context and focuses attention on the historical significance of particular events, actions, and processes. The interpretations of events, actions, and processes are subjective yet reliable, because the researcher interprets historical processes based on his or her grounded knowledge of the subjects in the study. As such, this interpretive stance can serve the purpose of understanding First Nations' entry from *First Nations'* positions, which is important not only because their worldviews are largely different from the mainstream, but also because this study rests on the assumption that First Nations are knowledgeable agents of their situation, and all of their actions are based on their own perceptions of reality.

Grounded Theory I adopted a "grounded theory method" (Glaser & Strausss, 1967) as the overarching method in this study. Grounded theory aligns with the nature of this study in several ways. First, it resonates with my focus on the concept of field. As scholars have suggested (Suddaby, 2006; Meyers, 2009), grounded theory has roots in symbolic interactionism and is commonly used to understand social interactions. Because the central concept in this study—field—inherently denotes social interactions among multiple actors, there is a natural connection between the conceptual focus of this study and grounded theory. Second, a grounded theory approach is grounded in an ontological view that multiple realities can exist in actors' subjective constructions of meaning, and researchers should focus on understanding "the actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings" (Gephart, 2004. p. 457; Locke, 2003; Suddaby, 2006). This ontological stance aligns with the interpretative nature

of this study. In addition, as this study aims to explore under-theorized phenomena—oppressed groups entering mature fields—the openness toward new concepts inscribed in a grounded theory approach can enable novel use of concepts to fully understand the phenomena.

Given that grounded theory is the overarching approach in this study, I structure the procedures of my empirical inquiry around its key principles. I began my data collection with the intention of fully understanding my empirical setting, collecting as many documents and interviews as possible and conducting ethnographic observations in order to fully immerse myself into the culture in which my empirical setting is embedded. This was to align with the principle of grounded theory stating that researchers should first understand their empirical setting without pre-determined theoretical frameworks or selected locus of inquiry (Meyer, 2009; Locke, 2001). During the data collection, I engaged in ongoing data analysis, continuously comparing the emerging conceptual categories and newly analyzed data, which was to align with the principle of "constant comparison," by which grounded theory researchers should minimize the separation between data and theory, and simultaneously collect and analyze empirical data (Suddaby, 2006). Finally, when conceptual categories became increasingly abstract, and the theoretical question became clearer, I began to focus on analyzing the data in a way that answers the theoretical question. This was to align with the principle of "theoretical sampling," by which researchers anchor the next step of data analysis in the previously emerged conceptual categories (Suddaby, 2006; Meyer, 2009). In the following sections, I elaborate on how I applied the principles of grounded theory in more detail.

Data Collection Table 2 provides an overview of the data that I collected. Following the exemplary studies on fields as mentioned earlier (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), I collected three types of data: ethnographic observations,

documents and interviews. The first part of the data collection was to conduct observations in First Nation communities. Because First Nations' actions to enter the gambling field were embedded in their distinctive history, cultures, and worldviews, it was important to understand them, for which first-hand observations can be very helpful. However, due to the historical animosity and distrust between First Nations and mainstream Canada, First Nations are generally not inclined to host outside researchers. As a result, it was very challenging for me to gain access to First Nations communities.

Nevertheless, I obtained access in an emergent manner. At the beginning of this research, I frequently attended networking events where First Nations people were present. At one of the business events, I became acquainted with a prominent indigenous scholar, through whom I gained initial knowledge of indigenous ceremonies. As we developed a stronger relationship, I obtained her permission to attend sacred ceremonies, including five sweat ceremonies in different locations, several pipe ceremonies, three round dances, and two years of powwow dance. These ceremonies vividly elaborated indigenous worldviews and became perfect occasions to talk with indigenous people. During the ceremonies, I experienced indigenous spirituality in its original form and obtained the understanding of the symbols, artifacts, and rituals that construe the indigenous identity. Importantly, attending the ceremonies also helped me to build rapport with First Nations so that we could have in-depth conversations about sensitive issues such as racial discrimination.

Aside from the ceremonies, I also attended a number of indigenous events, including political gatherings, economic conferences, and teaching circles. At these events, I learned about the history of how First Nations were oppressed, the legacy of residential schools, inter-generational trauma, institutional racism, and the call for indigenous sovereignty. These events

helped me understand indigenous politics and economics more broadly. For instance, I learned about the complicated political structure of First Nations and how it might affect economic development decisions and, more specifically, the entry into gambling; the long-lasting struggle of First Nations for empowerment and resistance, as well as the extremely complicated interweaving between material interests and ideological pursuits in indigenous issues. Due to the historical animosity and distrust between indigenous people and outside society, taking notes in front of indigenous people might trigger suspicion, so I usually wrote critical reflections on what I observed after returning home.

Furthermore, I had numerous informal conversations with indigenous leaders, elders, community workers, and youth, through which I gained a more nuanced understanding of indigenous life. In these conversations, I frequently heard that First Nations peoples differentiate themselves from mainstream Canada by emphasizing that while indigenous people are very spiritual, the mainstream Canadians are more industrial. Besides, I heard many stories of oppression at both individual and collective levels. For example, many people told me that they are suspected of stealing from supermarkets, followed by police, and ignored by care providers. Many also said that the government always wanted to "finish" indigenous people once and for all. During one of the conversations, I directly experienced racism toward indigenous people. When an indigenous scholar and I were having a conversation in a chain restaurant, the restaurant manager prevented us from feeding a homeless indigenous person who was looking for food in the restaurant. Such intimate experiences of racism help me understand the reality that First Nations have to face every day.

While conducting observations in indigenous communities, I also assembled a rich database of archival documents. Since this study is by nature historical, these archival documents

serve as the main sources of data. The majority of the archival data are newspaper articles. As

First Nations issues tend to capture media attention and the casino business is controversial ,

these news articles contain rich, detailed information about First Nations' entry. I searched

multiple newspaper databases and collected 6,037 news articles from the mainstream Canadian

media. Since First Nations have their own newspapers, I also systematically searched special

indigenous newspaper databases with the assistance of librarians and collected 469 articles from

First Nations media.[1] My search strategy can be characterized as comprehensive, as I broadly

searched keywords such as "First Nation casinos" "native gambling" "native casinos" and "First

Nation gambling." This was to ensure that I exhausted all available newspaper articles and

collected as much data as possible. In addition to the newspapers, I collected other types of

documents, including books, recorded and transcribed legislature debates, government policies

and reports, and research articles. Together, the documents amount to more than 8,000 pages.

Apart from the observations and documents, I conducted 31 in-depth, semi-structured

interviews with First Nations leaders (20 interviews) and government officials (11 interviews)

who have been extensively involved in the gambling field. These interviews were designed to

complement the document data by capturing the most critical processes in the course of First

Nations' actions. Since the interviewees had to be knowledgeable about First Nations' actions, I

mainly used purposeful sampling supplemented by snowball sampling (Patton, 2001). The first

round of interviews started with purposeful sampling, in which I conducted six interviews with

government leaders by directly contacting provincial gambling management organizations, and

eight interviews with First Nation leaders who I identified from the documents and became

---

[1] As First Nations have long experienced poverty and do not typically have sufficient funding for activities such as news reporting, First Nations newspapers generally publish only once a week, and each volume contains fewer than 10 articles. Thus, there are fewer articles from First Nations media than from mainstream Canadian media.

acquainted with through the network I developed in indigenous communities. During the interviews, I used the snowball sampling technique, acquiring six successful referrals to government and First Nation leaders (three on each side). In total, the first round of interviews amounts to 20 (9 with government leaders and 11 with First Nation leaders). The purpose of these interviews was to understand what has happened with First Nation casinos since the late 1980s, focusing on who did what, when, why, and how. I followed a semi-structured format, starting by asking the interviewee to describe how she or he became involved with First Nation casinos and clarify the timeframe, and then asking questions specifically tailored to the interviewee's role and provincial location, and ending with questions that invite an overarching reflection of how First Nations succeeded.

After the initial data analysis, I conducted the second-round interview, aiming to discuss the preliminary findings. This procedure is common in qualitative studies, as researchers use it to refine their interpretation of the data (Patton, 2001). With the clear purpose of discussing my initial findings, I adopted purposeful sampling for the interviews. I contacted all the First Nation leaders and government officials I had interviewed in the first round; five First Nation leaders and six government officials responded and agreed to participate. As such, I conducted a total of 11 interviews in this round. I started the interviews by explaining my initial findings, and then asked the interviewees to comment on those findings. All the interviews from the first and second round were recorded and transcribed.

Data Analysis After I finished the first round of interviews, I began to analyze the collected observations, documents, and interviews. The first step was to summarize my observations of indigenous history, culture, and worldview. I organized my observation notes into memos in Nvivo 10.0 and highlighted repeated features of indigeneity, which include

62

spirituality, bonding with the land, the symbolic and material function of spiritual ceremonies, elders as indigenous knowledge keepers, decolonization and self-governance, "us" (indigenous) versus "them" (mainstream Canadian populations), and a consistent, significant perception of racial discrimination and oppression. This step laid the foundations for me to interpret the documents.

The next step was to analyze the documents and interview transcriptions. I first organized the documents in Nvivo 10.0 in chronological order by the year they were produced and then by source (First Nation versus the mainstream), read them line by line and paraphrased any sentences or paragraphs that might have been related to my study. A typical open code begins with the year of the texts, followed by the key actor and its actions; for example, "1994 Whitebear First Nation in Saskatchewan opened a casino without notifying the government." After I openly coded all the documents, I organized the open codes into different folders in Nvivo by actors, including First Nations, provincial governments, local communities, and private operators. This step not only enabled me to see the commonalities of each actor's actions, but also allowed me to focus on First Nations and provincial governments, as I saw the open codes for other actors were significantly fewer.

Based on the open coding, I then wrote a detailed description of how First Nations entered the gambling field, depicting who did what, when, and why. This step helped me to obtain an overall understanding of key events and processes, from which I then created a timeline of key events (see Table 3). Subsequently, I followed Langley (1999) to temporally bracket different stages of First Nations' course of actions. I decided 2001 was a critical year, because First Nations in major Canadian provinces had all reached gaming agreements with provincial governments, and First Nations changed their focus to sustaining field membership.

63

This temporal bracketing produced two stages during First Nations' entry: seeking participation (1990–2001) and strengthening field positions (2001–2016). However, as Langley (1999) suggested, historical processes are often messy. Temporal bracketing is to help conceptualization, but reality may not be as clear-cut. During First Nations' entry, some First Nations began to strengthen field positions earlier than 2001, because they obtained membership earlier (e.g. First Nations in Saskatchewan).

Next, I conducted thematic coding, following Gioa, Corley, and Hamilton (2013), and Patvardhan, Gioia, and Hamilton (2015). I separately coded for First Nations and provincial governments while paying attention to the roles occasionally played by local communities and private operators. Within each temporal bracket, I sought commonalities among the open codes and organized similar open codes into higher-order codes. Much of this work involves trial and error, because the second-order codes were continuously adapted to encompass the open codes that were initially left out. During this step, I noticed that many of the open codes spoke to issues such as discrimination, injustice, and suffering, which sensitized me to engage with the stigma literature. Similarly, I noticed internal conflict was a recursive theme, so I began to engage with the literature on the dynamics within oppressed groups. In addition, legal institutions, laws, and regulations seemed to be major hurdles that First Nations overcame, so I began reading the literature on regulative institutions. Following Strauss and Cobin (1998) and Langley (1999), I went back and forth between the literature and the first-order codes, and frequently adjusted the grouping of the first-order codes. Because this study is historical, I also took special care to ensure that the time frame of second-order themes was aligned with first-order codes. Finally, I grouped the second-order themes into higher theoretical dimensions. This step involves searching for the conceptual connections between second-order themes and articulating

theoretical dimensions that highlight the concepts in the literature. I conducted the theoretical grouping mainly for First Nations, as their actions are the focus of this study. Figure 6 depicts the process by which first- and second-order codes were aggregated into theoretical dimensions, and Tables 4, 5, and 6 show some of the most illustrative data. Finally, I connected the theoretical dimensions in a temporal manner and produced a process diagram of how oppressed groups enter mature fields (see Figure 7). Throughout the coding process, I paid commensurate attention to data from First Nation and mainstream sources, with slightly more focus on First Nation sources. Among all the 139 document passages I quoted in this dissertation, 70 percent (98 out of 139 passages) are from First Nation media (41 passages), or directly quote First Nation leaders (57 passages). Overall, the data analysis was conducted in a similar way to existing field studies (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), focusing on the field-level meaning of actions and processes and being cautious about not regressing to lower level of analysis.

Research Ethics

As the research that involves First Nations often touches upon sensitive issues such as racism, trauma, sovereignty, and the animosity between the indigenous communities and mainstream society, I took special care to ensure that my research activities were aligned with the ethics principal for research that involves indigenous populations. I obtained the research ethics approval from the research ethics office at the University of Alberta under project number Pro00064279. To obtain the approval, I not only took the general Tri-council research ethics training courses, but also self-studied the TCP 2 Chapter 9 that explains how to conduct responsible, ethical research in indigenous communities. Additionally, since "consent" is especially important for indigenous research participants, I acquired the formal consent of my

interview participants using the consent letters attached in the Appendix. In addition, I

anonymized the names and titles of my interview participants, and obtained a confidentiality

agreement from my interview transcriber as a way to ensure confidentiality for my interview

participants.

Table 2   Data Overview

Data Type		Description	Amount
Fieldwork		Indigenous ceremonies, collective documentary watching, reserve visit, and informal and formal gatherings, conferences	Regularly for two years
Documents	Book	Historical monograph, research book	652 pages
	Newspaper	Global Mail, CBC News, National Post; Edmonton Journal, Calgary Herald, Vancouver Sun, Toronto Sun, Winnipeg Free Press, Saskatchewan News Hub	about 6000 pages
		(First Nation): Packet and Times, Raven's Eye, Saskatchewan Sage, Windspeaker, First Nations Drum	about 1300 pages
	Government publications	Policy procedures, annual reports and policy reviews from gambling commissions; Legislative debates across provinces	about 600 pages
	Research articles	Research articles on First Nation gaming in Canada	65 pages
Interviews		31 Interviews (20 with First Nation leaders and 11 with government officials)	823 page of transcriptions

Table 3   The Timeline of Key Events during First Nations' Entry

Time	Event
1985	The responsibility to regulate and own commercial gaming is delegated to the provincial government by the Criminal Code of Canada.
1988	Native gaming became legal in the U.S.
1989	The Warriors in Akwesasne First Nation attempted native gaming house.
1990	Canadian and U.S. troops closed the Warriors' gaming house after two men shot dead Oka Crisis erupted in July.
1992	Pioneering First Nations across Canada began the attempt to create native casinos.
1994	Ontario government promised to open one Las Vegas-style native casino; the Saskatchewan government allowed native casinos.
1995	Ontario government imposed 20 percent revenue sharing; the Saskatchewan government signed a collective agreement with natives for casino operation.
1996	Casino Rama opened in Ontario; Four native casinos opened in Saskatchewan.
1996	Metis and Non-status Indians in Ontario sued the government and First Nations for exclusion from revenue sharing.
1996	Alberta government decided to allow native casinos.
1997	British Columbia decided to allow native casinos.
1997	Metis and non-status Indians in Ontario lost their lawsuit in the Supreme Court.
1999	Cranbrook was selected as the only native casino in British Columbia, as the only native casino in British Columbia. Built on an abandoned residential school site.
2000	Manitoba government decided to allow native casino; The CEO of Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority—Dutch Lerat was found to misspend casino proceeds.
2001	Alberta government published First Nation Gaming Policy.
2002	Manitoba government finalized native casino policy and the casino PAS opened.
2005	Four native casinos applications were approved in Alberta.
2010	A new agreement in Ontario formed. Natives as a whole began to take 1.7 percent from Ontario total gambling revenue.

Figure 2   The Number of Media Articles Related to First Nation Casinos from 1985 to 2016

Figure 3   A Map of First Nations in Canada

Note: The green circle represents First Nations
Source: Government of Canada.

Figure 4   The Canadian Gambling Field Before and After First Nations' Participation

Before

The Federal Government of Canada

Provincial Governments (Regulator and Owner)

First Nations (About to break in)

Provincial Gambling Regulatory Agencies

Private Operators (Operation Vendors)

Municipality Governments, Charity Organizations (Owner)

70

After

The Federal Government of Canada

Provincial Governments (Regulator and Owner)

Provincial Gambling Regulatory Agencies

Municipality Governments, Charity Organizations (Owner)

Private Operators (Operation Vendors)

First Nations

Figure 5   A Map of First Nations Casinos in Canada

Figure 6   Coding Categories and Mechanisms

Overarching Process 1: Forging in-group consensus

- Leaders for conflict resolution stating that casino gaming is not First Nations' heritage and it is brought by the settlers, which then caused the conflict

- Voicing that the conflict wouldn't happen if there was no oppression, poverty and the need for quick money

Attributing the internal conflicts to provincial and federal governments

- Conflicting parties highlighting the tension over gambling doesn't affect that they are all natives
- Conflicting parties calling for fighting against the government instead of fighting within the native community

- Conflicting parties co-organizing self-government conferences and peace talks as part of the conflict resolution process

Highlighting the shared political fight for self-governance

Redirecting ingroup tension towards the governments

- Openly debating about the economic, social and cultural benefits and risks of entering the gambling field
- Encouraging the expression of opposite views by rounds of opinion survey and public hearing

- Commonly using community referendum as a final decision-making device to decide whether to enter the

- First Nations in the same province organize consortium and conferences to discuss entry approaches

- First Nations in different provinces creating gambling alliances, as places for information exchange
- Some First Nations organizing trade shows where they share with each other the understandings of the gambling

Implementing formalized bottom-up decision-making procedures

Creating open discussion and negotiation space

Enacting Communal Decision-making

- Metis and non-status Indians suing the Ontario government and Chief of First Nations to share gaming revenue

- Rama First Nation sued the Ontario government, together with the Chiefs of Ontario when the Chiefs tried to reduce Rama's share of revenue

- Chiefs in Ontario inviting former prestigious politicians to mediate the conflict between Rama and the Chiefs

- Alberta First Nations engaging the government to address the conflict in Stoney First Nation over building new casinos
- Manitoba chiefs engaging the government to mediate

Adding incumbents to the defendant list of the lawsuit against ingroup members

Seeking help from incumbents to resolve ingroup conflicts

Antagonizing yet engaging the governments

Overarching Process 2: Regulative Maneuvering

- A few First Nations suing the government for not allowing them to open casinos in the beginning and hoping that favorable court decisions will include First Nations in the gambling field

- Some First Nations attempting to mobilize in the federal legislation and change the Criminal Code through open demonstration

- Promoting a national native gaming commission like in the U.S
- Organizing federal level native gambling alliances

- Attempting to create a separate piece of gambling legislation for First Nations at the federal level

Attempting to include First Nations as new field members by changing the Criminal Code

Attempting to create separate gambling regulative system for First Nations

Attempting institutional inclusion

- First Nations asserted that they do not fall under provincial governments' jurisdiction according to the Treaties and Constitution

- Some First Nations asserted that gambling was a cultural tradition, appealing to the legal understanding that First Nations can freely practice their culture, taking advice from the American natives

- Some First Nations threatening to sue provincial governments on the basis of sovereignty claims, or unilaterally open casinos again after provincial

- First Nations in different provinces opening casinos without noticing provincial governments

- Some First Nations unilaterally signing management contracts and purchasing gambling machines

Discursively asserting the competing legal-political frameworks that favor First Nations

Taking actions to substantialize the competing legal-political frameworks

Forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ • Initially refusing to disclose financial       │
│   information to the government but decided to    │
│   give in under the pressure of the government   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                                        ┌──────────────────────┐
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │ Claiming competing   │
│ • Initially claiming sovereignty but later       │──► │ frameworks but       │
│   respected the different levels of governments  │    │ eventually giving in │
│   for not supporting casino                      │    └──────────────────────┘
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                                                                    ┌───────────────────┐
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐                                │ Compromising      │
│ • Some First Nations passed bylaw to allow       │                                │ the power of      │
│   smoking but then banned smoking                │                                │ competing legal-  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    ┌──────────────────┐        │ political         │
                                                        │ Reversing the    │        │ frameworks        │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │ enactment of     │        └───────────────────┘
│ • Some First Nations passed bylaw to allow       │──► │ competing        │
│   smoking in the casinos but then created        │    │ frameworks       │
│   non-smoking areas upon the pressure of the     │    └──────────────────┘
│   public and a lawsuit by entertainment          │
│   business owners                                │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Overarching Process 3: Resourcing Stigma

- Highlighting the severe poverty and political oppression in First Nation communities
- Framing casino as a much needed way to alleviate economic and political suffering

- Describing the gambling field only with the mainstream Canadians as racially discriminatory

- Pressing on the fair treatment by comparing with the comparing with the natives in the United States and later mover First Nations comparing with the early movers

- Framing gambling as a spiritual practice in indigenous culture
- Demonstrating the long history that First Nations have

- Asserting that First Nations were entrepreneurial and familiar with business because of indigeneity

Invoking stigma suffering

Embracing stigma

Transforming and Stigma Suffering and Stigma into Sources of Legitimacy

• Acquiring financing, business knowledge and experience from American natives who have successfully opened native casinos • Sending individuals to train in American native casinos	→	**Acquiring resources from similarly stigmatized actors**	↘
• Sharing information, knowledge and experience among First Nations gatherings, ceremonies, conferences, workshops and indigenous gaming alliances and commissions • Hiring First Nations members with professional experience other sectors such as law and banking	↗		**Smoothing Resource Acquisition with Stigma**
• Seeking support from business experts who have worked with First Nations in the past and friendly to First Nations	↘	**Acquiring resources from "the wise"**	↗
• Mobilizing endorsement from lawyers and politicians who have relatives in the First Nations communities	↗		

```
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ • Actively using casino proceeds to support indigenous   │
│   social and cultural development                        │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                              ┌──────────────────────┐
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐│ Maximizing the       │
│ • Highlighting higher employment, income,   ││ alleviation of stigma│
│   pride and confidence that casinos have    ││ suffering            │
│   brought to First Nations                  │└──────────────────────┘
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘                          ┌──────────────┐
                                                                         │ Deferentially│
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐                          │ Leveraging   │
│ • Removing the Tipi from the casino as a    │                          │ Stigma       │
│   way to reduce its negative impact on      │                          │ Suffering    │
│   migrant birds                             │                          │ and Stigma   │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘                          └──────────────┘
                                              ┌──────────────────────┐
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐│ Compromising the     │
│ • Claiming smoking has distinctive spiritual││ embrace of stigma    │
│   meaning in First Nation communities       │└──────────────────────┘
│ • Dividing the casino into smoking and      │
│   non-smoking areas or banning smoking      │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

In this study, I wanted to understand how oppressed social groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields, especially in the face of three major challenges: internal conflicts, existing field-level regulations or laws, and stigma. Through an inductive, qualitative analysis of archival documents and interviews with key informants, I examined how individuals and groups took action as part of First Nations' efforts to participate in the Canadian gambling field. I identified three key processes— forging in-group consensus, regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma—as ways of overcoming each of those three challenges. My analysis of the documents and interviews suggest that the three processes took place in parallel with each other across two stages: seeking participation and strengthening field positions. In this chapter, I explain the results of my analyses, showing how First Nations took specific actions toward achieving their goal of being a prominent member of the gambling field. I describe the three key processes, and provide a graphic representation of the overall process in Figure 6. While explaining each process, I provide a rich description of how the entrants---First Nations---and the most important field incumbents---provincial governments---interacted. I also give particular attention to the interim arrangements and outcomes of the interactions that eventually accumulated and resulted in the establishment of First Nations' positions in the gambling field.

I show the overall process of how First Nations gained the right to the gambling field in Figure 6. I display the three key processes in parallel bars: forging in-group consensus, regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. As indicated by the parallel bars, these processes occurred in parallel. For each process, I explicate their three subprocesses numbered 1, 2, and 3. To indicate that the subprocesses occurred through two stages, I used a dashed line to separate those subprocesses in the first stage from those in the second stage. In the next section of this chapter, I

provide an overview of how First Nations gained the right to the gambling field by referring to Figure 6.

At the bottom of Figure 6 is the first process---forging in-group consensus. By forging in-group consensus, I mean a process of crafting agreements within First Nations as a way of managing internal conflicts. During First Nations' entrance into the gambling field, intense internal conflicts occurred about whether and how to carry out the process, as well as how to distribute gambling revenue among First Nations. The documents and interviews show that First Nations had to manage the conflicts, because the conflicts made it difficult for First Nations to carry out collective actions that would not only help obtain government approval but also strengthen First Nations' positions as new field members. In attempting to manage the internal conflicts, First Nations engaged in what I call "forging in-group consensus" by (1) redirecting in-group tension toward the governments and (2) enacting communal decision-making, and (3) antagonizing yet engaging the government. The first subprocess means that First Nations attributed the tension among themselves to the governments and sensitized group members to fight together against the governments. During the second process, First Nations adopted community-based decision-making procedures and created open discussion spaces as ways of forging agreements for disputed issues. The third subprocess means that First Nations on the one hand brought legal actions against the governments in the midst of suing each other, and on the other hand sought mediation from the government to manage internal conflicts.

The second process I identified is regulative maneuvering, as indicated by the bar on top of the first process in Figure 6. By "regulative maneuvering" I mean deploying available resources to maneuver through the regulative environment as a response to the challenge of "existing field-level regulations or laws". My analysis of the documents showed that First

Nations faced a very challenging regulative environment during the entry process. According to the Criminal Code of Canada, they could not legally own a casino, because only provincial governments could be designated as legal owners and regulators of casino gaming. After First Nations obtained government approval to participate in the field, they also faced the regulative challenge of their business practices having to be scrutinized and approved by provincial governments, rather than develop on their own terms to gain a competitive advantage and strengthen field positions. Responding to the regulative challenges , First Nations engaged in "regulative maneuvering", which unfolded through three subprocesses: (1) attempting regulative inclusion; (2) forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks; and (3) compromising the power of the competing frameworks. During the first subprocess, First Nations attempted to change existing regulations regarding field membership (i.e. the Criminal Code designation) to include themselves as new field members; and during the second subprocess, forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks means that First Nations drew on societal-level legal-political frameworks that countered the existing regulations and supported First Nations' entry. In the third subprocess, First Nations compromised the power of the competing frameworks they had previously forced.

The third process that I identified is resourcing stigma, as indicated by the bar above the second process in Figure 6. Resourcing stigma, as a response to the challenge of stigma, means that First Nations acted upon the very hurdle of stigma and used it to support their arguments for being allowed to open a casino, thus drawing on stigma as a resource. Documents and interviews show that during First Nations' entry process, the stigma they carried, namely indigeneity, was a key challenge that they needed to overcome. Because of the stigma, provincial governments and the mainstream resource providers (e.g. commercial banks) doubted whether First Nations were

competent enough to run casinos in professional and responsible ways. Also, it attracted public criticism of casino expansion, as well as native-specific business practices. Facing the challenge of stigma, First Nations engaged in "resourcing stigma" in three ways over time: (1) transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy; (2) smoothing resource acquisition with stigma; and (3) differentially leveraging stigma suffering and stigma. The first subprocess means that First Nations invoked stigma suffering and embraced their stigma (i.e. indigeneity), highlighting that their entry fulfilled the moral obligations of provincial governments to alleviate stigma suffering and to respect cultural differences. During the second subprocess, First Nations acquired resources from similarly stigmatized actors (i.e. native Americans in the United States) and "the wise" (i.e. sympathetic, non-native actors). The third subprocess means First Nations maximized the alleviation of stigma suffering while compromised on the embrace of stigma.

In the next sections I explain each of the three overarching processes in further detail.

1: Forging In-group Consensus

In this section, I describe and explain the first key process, forging in-group consensus, which represents a way of overcoming the challenge of "internal conflicts". By drawing on my analysis of the archival documents that detailed how the conflicting parties acted and reacted, and the key interviews that highlighted the rationale and outcomes, I first describe the nature of the internal conflicts that First Nations experienced and how the conflicts obstructed First Nations during the two stages of First Nations' actions. Following this explanation of the conflicts, I then explain each of the three subprocesses based on my analyses of document and interview data. As part of these explanations, I present excerpts from interviewees about why First Nations were motivated to manage the conflicts, and from newspaper account statements

about how First Nations overcame the challenge of "internal conflicts" by engaging in the three subprocesses of "forging in-group consensus", redirecting in-group tension toward the governments, enacting communal decision-making, and antagonizing yet engaging the governments.

First Nations experienced strong internal conflicts during the entry into the gambling field. The documents portray one layer of the internal conflicts as originated in the different opinions regarding whether or not to participate in the gambling field. While some members of First Nations believed that entering the gambling field would help retain money in their communities and bring in much-needed economic benefits, others worried that having casino gambling in their community would increase gambling addiction and other social issues such as organized crime, worsening the social conditions of First Nations. The following quotes illustrate the pro-gambling views.

> "Casinos are seen by First Nations as a method of raising substantial funds for self-government and community projects. The main interest of aboriginal people . . . is to bring gaming revenues back into our communities. To allow our communities to be able to take control of their destinies", said Sharon Bowcott, a representative of the First Nations Summit now negotiating with the government over native gambling. (*Vancouver Sun*, Oct 5, 1994).

> In contrast, anti-gambling views were also publicly stated, as follows:

> "People don't want a casino. People have told me they're worried about spending all their money and not having anything left to feed their kids.", said Steve Williams, Chief Councillor from the Six Nation. (*The Hamilton Spectator*, Nov 16, 1992).

The excerpts illustrate different views on gambling and point to serious and widespread contentions within some First Nations. Below are two examples extensively reported in the documents. First, when the pro-gambling members of the Akwesasne First Nation in Ontario insisted on opening gambling houses in 1988, the anti-gambling forces (also members of the same First Nation) responded by blocking the road to the site and cutting off the water supply. In

retaliation, the pro-gambling side burned down the houses of the anti-gambling individuals and

threatened to end their lives. As Doug George, a spokesman for a committee formed to oppose

gambling on the reserve, described:

> He (a pro-gambling person) was carrying a 303-caliber British rifle…he put his
> gun to his shoulder, and I knew he was going to kill me. So I ducked. The bullet
> missed my brother Dennis by about a foot, put a hole through the rear window of
> a vehicle and came out the front (*Whig-Standard*, Jan 19, 1988).

In a second example, when the pro-gambling members in the Stoney First Nation in

Alberta decided to open a casino, the anti-gambling side protested for about three months,

striking down construction vehicles and claiming that the casinos would destroy their spiritual

land. As the media reported:

> Monday's standoff began when bullet about two dozen people joined three sisters
> [anti-gambling leaders] from the reserve to block construction vehicles from the
> site. The vehicles had arrived earlier and knocked down a temporary barbed wire
> fence before the protesters showed up. But the sisters and their supporters blocked
> the access route with their own vehicles and refused to allow land surveyors to
> begin their work. (*Canadian Press Newswire*, Oct 25, 2005).

The internal conflicts within First Nations also stemmed from different views on whether

to confront provincial governments. Some First Nations advocated forceful confrontation with

provincial governments, as shown by the following quote:

> "They [some First Nations in Alberta] will go ahead and set up their own casinos
> with or without governmental approval," said Alain Dubuc, who is handling
> casino development deals for both the Louis Bull and Enoch First Nations.
> "They'll just do it in defiance of the law." (*Edmonton Journal*, Aug 30, 1995,).

In contrast, others strongly believed that a collaborative approach would be more

effective. As shown in the following quote:

> "We want to work with the Alberta Gaming Commission; we shouldn't fight with
> them," said Arcand, Alexander First Nations' economic development officer]."
> (*Edmonton Journal*, Dec 27, 1993).

Apart from the disagreements on whether or not to participate in the gambling field and

how to interact with provincial governments, the documents show that the internal conflicts also

occurred with respect to revenue sharing and the location of new casinos in several provinces

(e.g. Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), which manifested strongly after First

Nations obtained government approval to participate in the field. As shown by the quotes below,

individual First Nations contested the percentage of shared revenue (mainly in Ontario, Manitoba,

and Alberta); Métis and non-status Indians also wanted a share of the revenue in Ontario and

Saskatchewan; and some First Nations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan were unsatisfied with the

location of the new casinos chosen by their leadership at the provincial level (i.e. Provincial

Assembly of First Nations).

> Ontario established the First Nations Fund to distribute profits from the casino in
> an attempt to help impoverished First Nations and as a compromise to prevent
> bands from opening their own illegal gaming houses. But Metis and non-status
> Indians weren't included in negotiations. (*Star – Phoenix*, Jul 23, 1996)

> The announcement of a new gaming facility within the RM of Elton has prompted
> the leader of Sioux Valley Dakota First Nation to threaten legal action, and finally
> end its membership in the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. "We'll be looking to
> take whatever action is necessary to protect our interest in this project," Sioux
> Valley Chief Donna Elk told the Sun yesterday.(*The Brandon Sun*, Nov 1, 2008)

My analysis shows that the conflicts within First Nations, as illustrated above, hindered

their entry into the gambling field, and First Nations had to manage those conflicts. As the

following quotes from the documents and interviews powerfully illustrate, the strong

disagreements within First Nations prevented them from gaining government support.

Interviewees explained that it was important for First Nations to address internal conflicts as part

of their effort to persuade provincial governments to allow them to open a casino. In Alberta, for

example:

> They [the provincial government] wanted the signature of all the chiefs in Alberta,
> before we can move forward with our proposal. We had no choice. So, my Chief
> and I went to the Chief meetings, talked with all the chiefs, and got the signatures.

Some didn't want to sign, so we had to explain to them what we want to do with the province. (Interview, First Nation leader).

Similarly, newspaper accounts identified that internal conflicts prevented First Nations' entry plans from moving forward in Ontario.

But that Native community faces stiff competition from other bids, including a huge casino complex proposed for the Six Nations Reserve south of Hamilton by a largely non-Native investor group. That plan is running into resistance from some members of the Six Nations band council (*The Spectator*, Mar 26, 1994.).

Also, as members of First Nations in Saskatchewan argued amongst themselves, their entry was delayed because they were unable to develop a collective frame to negotiate with the provincial government, as demonstrated by the following interview excerpt:

"[One government official speaking] we asked for a collective proposal with the signature of all the Chiefs (leaders of First Nations), but they couldn't deliver. They were not showing up in the meetings. Then we had to put negotiation on hold" (Interview, government official).

Furthermore, because of the internal conflict over revenue sharing, the actual revenue distribution had to be put on hold in Ontario, some of which was planned for community services, as shown by the quotes below. This delayed the materialization of the positive impact of the casinos.

Until Mnjikaning and the other First Nations agree on a revenue split, the 35 percent will be frozen by the province. If the matter proceeds to court the disputed portion of the revenue could be tied up for two to five years, said Williams (Chairman of the Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership) (*Packet and Times,* Jul 10, 2001)

Boyer [The chief of the Mississauga First Nation] says the government's delay in awarding the cheques [because of the dispute on revenue sharing between Metis, non-status Indians and First Nations in Ontario] is creating problems for reserves including his, although Mississauga's problems are not as serious as other First Nations. "I know of First Nations in remote areas that went ahead and borrowed money from banks to build their homes because the money was supposed to come in by April," Boyer said. "Now the banks are after them asking where's the money?" (*Sault Star*, Sep 8, 1999)

Additionally, other newspaper accounts pointed out that the internal conflicts may have obstructed First Nations from strengthening field positions by bringing about negative public sentiment toward First Nations.

> [The spokesperson of the Union of Ontario Indians speaking]: "Sometimes these animosities [around casino revenue sharing] have bubbled up to the surface on the floor of conferences. It doesn't look good to the outside world when we're fighting amongst ourselves"(*Toronto Star*, Jan 24, 2010).

Having explained the nature of the internal conflicts that First Nations experienced and that those conflicts created challenges for First Nations, I show in the following section how First Nations responded to the conflicts by "forging in-group consensus".

Redirecting In-Group Tension Toward the Governments

The first way of "forging in-group consensus" was by redirecting in-group tension toward the government. This means First Nations attributed the internal conflicts to provincial and federal governments. For example, the conflicting parties within the Akwesasne First Nation in Ontario, which newspaper articles extensively reported, established peace talks in which they traced the in-group tension to the long-lasting oppression by the government. The leaders pointed out that it was the governments (federal and provincial), as well as the mainstream society they led, that created severe economic conditions for First Nations. The poverty, in turn, motivated some members to pursue the quick money of gambling, from which the internal conflict began. The following quotes illustrate the discursive practice of redirecting in-group tension toward the governments:

> "We need alternative economic activities," said Harold Tarbell, head chief of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Council. "[because] the people are being held hostage to their economic despair." (*Windspeaker,* Vol 11-21, 1994)

> [A member in Akwesasne reflected] Gambling and smuggling would not be such an issue were Akwesasne-St. Regis not plagued with the bureaucratic nightmare of five overlapping jurisdictions, nor were other forms of livelihood not disrupted

by environmental pollution coming from outside the reserve. (*Whig-Standard*, Jun 4, 1990)

Some First Nation leaders explicitly highlighted that the common goal of the conflicting parties was to fight for self-governance, which means negotiating with the federal and provincial governments over political jurisdiction, a fight that was much greater than gaining the right to open a casino and one that must be fought by the whole community. They also emphasized that all First Nations have shared native identities, which enabled them to join the shared fight. They argued that such shared identities were still in place in spite of the different opinions regarding gambling. The documents show that the First Nations leaders initiated hearings themed "self-governance", in which the common goal of fighting for self-governance was emphasized.

> Earlier this month, outspoken gambling opponent Mike Mitchell, who is the grand chief of the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, and casino supporter Francis Boots, of the Mohawk Warrior Society, agreed to end the fighting. Native self-government [which means defying the dominance of the governments] was the theme of most of the briefs presented at the day-long hearing held at the Akwesasne Mohawk School on Cornwall Island. (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Jan 16, 1992)

> [Leader of the Band Council in Akwesasne First Nations speaking in a formal dialogue themed "self-governance"]: "We were neighbors, we grew up together, we went to the same school together and we share the same (Mohawk) traditionalist background. We also agreed that we have more in common than differences, and the real enemy is not among ourselves." In his brief to the hearing, Boots said the British colonial government accepted Mohawk sovereignty and so should Canada". (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Jan 16, 1992)

Enacting Communal Decision-Making

The second way of "forging in-group consensus" that I identified is enacting communal decision-making. While some First Nations that experienced internal conflicts redirected in-group tension toward the governments, others enacted communal decision-making, engaging community members in the decision-making process with respect to whether or not and how to carry out the entry process. First, the documents show that several First Nations implemented

formalized bottom-up decision-making procedures. In the nations where members held

conflicting views on casino gaming, the leaders commonly conducted opinion surveys, hosted

community hearings, and openly debated the pros and cons of native gaming, especially taking

into consideration the opinion of the elders. Community referendum was often used as the

ultimate decision-making device, facilitating the formation of agreements between members who

had conflicting views on gambling. The following quotes from the documents illustrate the usage

of these communal decision-making procedures:

> The band has a survey conducted by the Union of New Brunswick Indians that
> suggests up to 40 percent of the province's residents favor casinos. (*Windspeaker*,
> Vol 11-18, 1993)

> Not all the work that was necessary to provide all the information was completed
> [for the referendum]," said Regena Crowchild, head of Tsuu T'ina Entertainment
> Corp. "It's only fair that band members should be fully informed. (*Calgary
> Herald*, April 27, 1995)

The outcome of using these community-based decision-making procedures was that some

First Nations opted out of opening casinos (e.g. the Kahnawake Nation in Quebec and the Six

Nation and Walpole Island First Nation in Ontario), while some others emerged as the

champions in a relatively voluntary fashion (e.g. the Tsuu T'ina and the Enoch Cree First

Nations in Alberta, and the Whitebear and Kahkewistahaw First Nations in Saskatchewan). The

champions tended to be similar to each other in their attitude toward gambling. As a First Nation

leader reflected:

> Some bands didn't want to do it. So the chiefs who wanted to do it got together
> and tried to figure out what to do next. Now we've got our goal, we work together.
> (Interview, First Nation leader)

Second, the documents show that First Nations in the same province holding conflicting

views created open discussion and negotiation spaces at the provincial level. As noted earlier,

despite the champion First Nations in each province advocating for casino gaming, they held

contrasting views on whether to confront the government (e.g. in Saskatchewan and Alberta).

While some wanted to confront the federal and provincial governments, others believed that it

was important to collaborate with the governments. Given the differences, First Nations

cultivated space for discussion and negotiation among those located in the same province,

commonly in the form of task force organizations and conferences. For example, First Nations in

British Columbia organized the First Nation Gaming Summit, those in Alberta created the First

Nation Gaming Congress, and those in Manitoba organized the First Nations Gaming

Consortium. These task force organizations hosted discussions, trade shows, and conferences

where First Nations leaders discussed and negotiated the approach of entry in each province,

serving to accommodate the opinions of different First Nations.

> Bands in Nanaimo and Victoria are considering opening casinos on their lands.
> And the B.C. First Nations Gaming Committee has been formed to deal with
> gambling issues on reserves. (*Vancouver Sun*, August 19, 1993)

> Next month Chief Alphonse will be a co-chairman at a special national Indian
> trade show on gaming [organized by the First Nation Gaming Summit] that is
> expected to draw native leaders and economic development officers, government
> officials and investors to Vancouver from across the country. (*The Globe and
> Mail*, Nov 13, 1993)

> A Native gaming alliance's plans to open a series of casinos across Saskatchewan
> should unfold as soon as the court case involving last year's police raid on the
> White Bear Indian Band's casino wraps up. (*Windspeaker*, April 10, 1994).

As First Nations enacted communal decision-making, individual First Nations made

community-based decisions as to whether or not to participate in the gambling field, and First

Nations in the same province settled on how to interact with the provincial government. In

Ontario, for example, the Six Nation decided not to enter gambling after community consultation

and a referendum, and a similar case is the Hopi Tribe in Alberta. Regarding the approach to

interact with provincial governments, First Nations commonly settled on taking the approach of

business/political negotiation to enter the field, although they differed in how to coordinate the negotiation. For example, although First Nations in British Columbia decided to negotiate with the government on an individual (individual nation) basis, they adopted central coordination in Saskatchewan (i.e. the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations represent all the First Nations in Saskatchewan to negotiate with the provincial government). The reasons for the difference include heterogeneous political environment, the presence (or absence) of strong provincial-level First Nations leadership, and the different degrees of respect for heterogeneous members' decision-making power. Nevertheless, as First Nations settled within themselves regarding whether or not and how to enter the gambling field, they became more organized and prepared to gain government approval to participate in the field.

Antagonizing and yet Engaging the Government

The third way of "forging in-group consensus" is antagonizing yet engaging the government. *On the one hand*, First Nations antagonized provincial governments by adding the governments to the defendant list of the lawsuits against members in their own community. For example, when the Métis and non-status Indians in Ontario contended with the Chiefs of Ontario regarding revenue sharing stating that they needed to receive casino revenue, they not only sued the Chiefs of Ontario but also added the provincial government as a defendant. The Métis and non-status Indians argued that they sued the government because the government excluded Métis and non-status Indians from the initial negotiation of the gaming agreement, and that it was based on racial discrimination (see the quotes below). As the Canadian Constitution explicitly criminalizes racial discrimination, the Métis and non-status Indians were able to pursue the lawsuit to the Supreme Court of Canada, despite a ruling by the Ontario court in favor of the province and Chiefs of Ontario.

Some observers may see the case as in-fighting between two Aboriginal factions, a battle pitting Métis and nonstatus Indians against status bands. But MacRae [Robert MacRae, the lawyer representing the Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association] said it's the province his clients are challenging, not status bands. Métis and non-status Indians are simply fighting the Ontario government's attempt to exclude them through racial discrimination, he said. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 14-5, 1996)

"I want to go to the table and try to negotiate the same amount as they gave the other Aboriginal Peoples. We're still aboriginal people. We're still under section 35 (of the Constitution) as one of the Aboriginal Peoples," he [Metis Nation of Saskatchewan President Jim Durocher] said. "That seems to be the problem, particularly with Metis people. They [the provincial government] try to treat us differently. Even the questions that are asked of us are different." (*Star-Phoenix*, July 3, 1997)

Similarly, when the Chiefs of Ontario sought to reduce the share of the casino host—the Rama First Nation—and increase the share of other First Nations in 2001, the Rama First Nation also sued the provincial government in conjunction with the Chiefs, alleging the government was wrongly appropriating money from indigenous communities. The background to the conflict is as follows: the Rama First Nation believed that the initial agreement by which they took 35 percent was permanent, and that they needed the 35 percent to sustain or upgrade the casino facility. However, the Chiefs argued that the Rama had benefited enough between 1996 and 2001 in terms of revenue and employment, and should let poorer First Nations benefit more (see quotes below).

The Mnjikaning band claims that its 35-percent share of Casino Rama profits continues in "perpetuity." The Chiefs of Ontario insist this share was only intended for the first five years of operation and now net profits should be split equally among all First Nations groups. (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Feb 14, 2005)

"Mnjikaning (Rama) benefited before the casino even opened by getting a new arena, a new seniors' complex and new housing for some of its members," says Williams [Chairman of the Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership]. He says each Mnjikaning band member has received an average $126,000 in benefits from the gaming house profits alone, as opposed to an average $2,600 for non-Rama natives. "Where's the fairness here? They want it forever, but that just wasn't the agreement" (*Toronto Star*, August 23, 2003)

Documents show that in response to the bitter conflict, the Rama First Nation filed a lawsuit against the Chiefs of Ontario, however, adding the provincial government as a defendant. Since the government changed the original plan during the negotiation with First Nations that it would not take any revenue from the casinos and instead insisted on sharing 20 percent of the revenue, the Rama First Nation retrieved this issue and highlighted that this motivated the lawsuit. The Rama First Nation also stated that the government negatively intervened in the negotiation process among First Nations, preventing them from reaching a satisfactory agreement.

By pivoting the lawsuit among First Nations onto the government, the Rama First Nation complicated the case. As shown in the documents, the case lasted for nine years and ended up in the Supreme Court, where the Rama First Nation, the Chiefs of Ontario, and the Ontario government settled out of court.

> Also in dispute is the Tory government's whopping take - some $600 million to date - which has brought the bickering tribes together in a second lawsuit, against the province. "The previous NDP government said all the money would go towards the First Nations," Williams (the president of the Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership) says. "Then the PCs come in and say, 'There's a new government, there are new rules and this is it." (*Toronto Star*, August 23, 2003)

> [The lawsuit claims] The province has also, wrongfully and maliciously, encouraged the other Ontario First Nations to withdraw their support for that fundamental term of the contract between the province and Mnjikaning. (*Toronto Star*, August 23, 2003)

While First Nations antagonized provincial governments to manage internal tensions, they also engaged the governments by seeking conflict mediation. As shown in the documents, this was evident when the lawsuit between the Rama First Nation and the Chiefs of Ontario lingered for years and incurred enormous legal expenses for both sides. While the Supreme Court was ruling on the case, the Rama First Nation began to consider political mediation. They

96

appointed former Ontario premier David Peterson to mediate between First Nations for the

renegotiation of revenue sharing, which turned out to be successful, as all the First Nations

settled on a new revenue-sharing formula in 2010. Somewhat similarly, when a few First Nations

in Manitoba became angry with the Assembly of Chiefs for not selecting them as the hosts of

new casinos and threatened to "go headhunting", they engaged the provincial gaming minister to

settle the disputes among First Nation leaders. The government then organized a new selection

committee of First Nation leaders from every part of the province so that the interests of different

First Nations could be balanced. As shown by the quote:

> 'A new committee has been established to determine the site of Manitoba's next
> First Nations casino. Attorney General Dave Chomiak and Grand Chief Ron
> Evans of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs announced yesterday that four chiefs
> were appointed from around the province to make recommendations on a casino
> location this fall. They were chosen by the grand chief's office as a good cross-
> section of chiefs that were interested in economic development and business, and
> could represent a vast region of the province.' AMC [Assembly of First Nations in
> Manitoba] senior business adviser Ian Cramer said (*The Brandon Sun*, Jun 20,
> 2008).

Under the mediation of the government, the few agitated First Nations leaders decided to

follow the site selection decision, despite withdrawing their membership from the Assembly of

Manitoba Chiefs.

> Ontario's native leaders are hoping a 60-day mediation process can resolve a long-
> standing dispute over the division of millions of dollars of Casino Rama revenue.
> Mnjikaning Chief Sharon Stinson Henry and Grand Council Chief John Beaucage
> plan to work with a mediator in an effort to produce a new revenue-sharing
> agreement. "We'll try to work out a solution person-to-person, face-to-face, the
> way our elders taught us," said Beaucage, who represents 42 bands in the Ontario
> Union of Indians. (*Canadian Press Newswire*, Feb 11, 2005)

> Former Ontario premier David Peterson has been appointed to lead discussions
> with First Nations toward achieving a new agreement on sharing gaming revenues.
> (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Feb 19, 2005)

> "They set up a model which hasn't worked as we've seen in this negotiation,"
> Borotsik (Brandon West Progressive Conservative MLA) said. "If they have a big

picture for First Nations gaming ... I think it's up to the province, particularly (Chomiak), to step in right now and resolve the issue. (*Brandon Sun*, March 12, 2009)

In summary, forging in-group consensus, as a response to the challenge of "internal conflicts", was a key process that supported First Nations to gain the right to the gambling field. In the beginning, due to the different attitudes toward casino gaming and the different preferences for confronting provincial governments, First Nations experienced conflicts among themselves, which hindered their entry into the gambling field. To manage the conflicts, First Nation leaders engaged in forging in-group consensus by redirecting in-group tension toward the governments and by enacting communal decision-making at different levels of the group hierarchy. After First Nations started building casinos, some First Nations and indigenous groups contested with one another due to dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of revenue, which was detrimental to First Nations' position in the field. In response, First Nations antagonized the governments, adding them to the list of defendants, and yet still sought help from the governments to mediate between the conflicting in-group members. Overall, the ongoing process of forging in-group consensus helped First Nations overcome the challenge of "internal conflicts", increasing the readiness of First Nations to enter and become established in the gambling field.

Table 4   Additional Quotes for the Process of "Forging In-group Consensus"

Redirecting in-group tension toward the government

(a) Attributing the internal conflicts to provincial and federal governments	The three-day-old state of emergency on the Canadian portion of the St. Regis Akwesasne Indian reserve was to be lifted today. Talks began Wednesday to restore peace among warring Mohawk factions, which have been at odds for months over whether gambling casinos should be allowed on the reserve. The owners said the meetings were set up by Canadian and U.S. governments who have no authority over the reserve. "It is a last-ditch effort to work out among ourselves a solution to the chaos," said traditionalist chief Jake Swamp of the Mohawk Nation Council. The council has supporters on all sectors of the reserve, which straddles the U.S., Ontario and Quebec. "We have to find a solution because otherwise it will be imposed on us," he said, adding the U.S. National Guard could be called in to restore order. (*The Windsor Star*, Aug 31, 1989)	
	Mark Maracle, the spokesman for the militants, also known as Mohawk Warriors, said Thursday The Mohawk leaders participating in the talks "are puppets of the U.S. and Canadian governments," he said adding that by meeting with them the warriors would only be recognizing their legitimacy.(*The Ottawa Citizen*, Sep 1, 1989)	
(b) Highlighting the shared political fight for self-governance	Earlier this month, outspoken gambling opponent Mike Mitchell, who is the grand chief of the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, and casino supporter Francis Boots, of the Mohawk Warrior Society, agreed to end the fighting. Native self-government was the theme of most of the briefs presented at the day-long hearing held at the Akwesasne Mohawk School on Cornwall Island. (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Jan 16, 1992)	
	And last week, the two rival leaders were together in public for the first time, since the turmoil began, to lobby for self-government at a hearing organized by the Assembly of First Nations. Mohawk leaders say they want to establish their own justice system to stamp out bootlegging, smuggling, drug trafficking and gambling on this border reserve (*Toronto Star*, Jun 29, 1988)	

Enacting Communal Decision-making

(a) Implementing formalized bottom-up decision-making procedures	(In British Columbia) VLC and Mirage released a poll conducted to survey public support for legalized gambling because it included questions on Native gambling. It showed 28 percent of those surveyed believed gambling on reserves to be completely unacceptable, compared with 11 percent opposing gambling at resort destinations.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-26, 1995)	
	Tribal leaders slowed down the drive to build the casino, next to southwest	

	Calgary, but official notices predict another try will be made in June. No date was set for the vote. "Not all the work that was necessary to provide all the information was completed," said Regena Crowchild, head of Tsuu T'ina Entertainment Corp. It's only fair that band members should be fully informed." The Tsuu T'ina and a specialty firm working on their casino blueprint, Casino Magic of Minneapolis, refuse to make the plan public unless the reserve votes in favor. (*Calgary Herald*, Apr 27, 1995) During a recent public meeting that attracted about 125 people, Mr. Williams [Chief councillor of the Six Nation in Ontario] said the community raised concerns about vices often associated with casinos -- drugs, prostitution and alcohol abuse -- and the violence that erupted at the Akwesasne reserve in 1990 when a dispute over casino gambling erupted in gun battles that left two Mohawks dead. (*The Hamilton Spectator*, Nov 16, 1992) [Woodstock Band in New Brunswick] The band has a survey conducted by the Union of New Brunswick Indians that suggests up to 40 percent of the province's residents favor casinos.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-18, 1993) A divided native community here has for a second time canceled a vote to decide whether to build Alberta's first for-profit casino on its reserve beside southwest Calgary. And this time, no new date to try again is being set after questions, doubts, second thoughts and internal debates prompted band leaders to shelf a vote that had been called for June 28 after the cancellation of one set for April 28. (*Calgary Herald*, Jul 5, 1995)
(b) Creating open discussion and negotiation space	A gaming commission would be the first step for Alberta bands that want to dip into what they think is a deep revenue pool. "It's on everybody's mind," Lameman [Chief of Beaver Lake First Nation in Alberta] said. "There's nothing definite though. We're just talking, discussing the pros and cons, going to conferences, gathering information." (*Edmonton Journal*, Feb 15, 1993) Next month Chief Alphonse [Chief of the Cowichan First Nation near Victoria, British Columbia] will be a co-chairman at a special national Indian trade show on gaming that is expected to draw native leaders and economic development officers, government officials and investors to Vancouver from across the country. (*The Globe and Mail*, Nov 13, 1992) The Cowichan Indian band on central Vancouver Island has invited native leaders and provincial government officials to a conference Thursday on aboriginal gaming in Duncan, 50 kilometers north of Victoria. One of the key issues is expected to be the question of control over native-run gaming establishments.(*The Vancouver Sun*, Sep 28, 1992)

Antagonizing yet Engaging and the Government

(a) Adding incumbents to the defendant list of the lawsuit against in-group members	Last week, however, Mnjikaning chief Sharon Stinson Henry announced that her community planned to file a statement of claim against the province to retain its more than one-third share of casino revenue. Mnjikaning has until Oct. 31 to take legal action. (*Packet and Times*, Jul 10, 2001) Although the OFNLP [Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership] is at odds with Mnjikaning First Nation about the split of net revenues from the casino, both have filed suits challenging the 20 percent the province scoops from the gross. "We want to help them win that 20 percent," said Mnjikaning Chief Sharon Stinson Henry. Distributing 20 percent of the gross to other First Nations was part of Mnjikaning's original proposal, court documents filed by Mnjikaning indicate. (*Packet and Times*, Dec 22, 2001) Later, both Mnjikaning and the Chiefs of Ontario filed lawsuits, claiming the 20 percent tax contravenes the earlier understanding that First Nations were to be the sole beneficiaries of the casino. Those lawsuits are still active. Stinson Henry [Chief of the Rama First Nation] said she hopes the Liberals will make a political decision that will remove the issue from the courts. "But if we aren't successful with the new government, we'll continue with the lawsuit," she said. Dolson, who is president of the Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership, is also hopeful the Liberals will be more receptive to their appeal than their predecessors. (*Packet and Times*, Nov 15, 2003) The band's lawsuit states the Mnjikaning position clearly. The court document contends that the Rama Indians' 35 percent take was a "fundamental term of the contract" negotiated between the Mnjikaning and the province during the original site selection, and "these fundamental terms have never been amended." The province, the suit claims, "has wrongfully failed or refused to be bound by its contractual commitment that 35 percent of the net revenues of casino Rama be paid to Mnjikaning. "The province has also, wrongfully and maliciously, encouraged the other Ontario First Nations to withdraw their support for that fundamental term of the contract between the province and Mnjikaning." (*Toronto Star*, Aug 23, 2003)
(b) Seeking help from incumbents to resolve in-group conflicts	The Chiefs of Ontario, which represents Ontario Indian bands recognized by the federal government, are siding with the province (during the lawsuit with Metis and non-status Indians) (Star – Phoenix, Jul 23, 1996) After three years of haggling and court battles, Ontario's First Nations finally seem close to a deal that would let them tap into $350 million in profit from aboriginal-run Casino Rama. A special "closure committee" of government and aboriginal representatives is meeting this month to hammer out the remaining issues "as quickly as possible," says a First Nations bulletin on the talks. "There is strong political will on both sides

	to complete arrangements for the fund," said Tom Bressette, the Ontario regional chief, in the bulletin. "I am optimistic that the closure committee will be successful in a short time period." (*Canada Press Newswire*, Feb 4, 2000) The new deal could also allow aboriginal communities to share in revenues from other casinos around the province. Former premier David Peterson was appointed as Ontario's representative last year in talks to give First Nations a share of all provincial gaming sites.(*Canadian Press NewsWire*, Mar 28, 2006)

2: Regulative Maneuvering

In this section, I detail the second key process, regulative maneuvering. By drawing on my analysis of the texts of the relevant legislation and regulations, I first show how these regulations or laws challenged First Nations during the entrance into the gambling field. Next, I explain the three subprocesses of "regulative maneuvering" that I identified, including attempting regulative inclusion, forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks, and compromising the power of the competing frameworks.

When First Nations attempted to participate in the gambling field, they encountered a challenging regulative environment. The Criminal Code of Canada designated that provincial governments and their licensed charities should be the only legal entities to conduct gambling activities, as shown in the documents prepared by gambling researchers:

> The central government, in return for 100 million dollars from the provinces, would change the Criminal Code to grant the provinces and their agencies the sole legal right to conduct or have conducted lotteries and games of chance (Labrosse, 1985. p. 199).

> Also, to directly quote the Criminal Code of Canada:

> (2) Subject to this Act, a licence issued by or under the authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council of a province as described in paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (f) may contain such terms and conditions relating to the conduct, management and operation of or participation in the lottery scheme to which the license relates as the Lieutenant Governor in Council of that province, the person or authority in the province designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council thereof or any law enacted by the legislature of that province may prescribe. (Criminal Code of Canada. S, 204(8))

As this designation by the Criminal Code gives provincial governments the exclusive right to own and regulate gambling, it became a significant barrier to First Nations. Without overcoming this barrier, First Nations would be deemed as illegal field participants.

After First Nations obtained government approval and began to run casinos, they also encountered a regulative barrier stating that the operation of the casinos must be regulated by

provincial governments (in all the provinces) and First Nations cannot manage the casinos freely

to maximize competitive advantage and strengthen their field positions. First Nations across the

country felt such regulation constrained the development of the casinos in different aspects.

Specifically, because the regulations gave provincial governments the authority to decide where

to build future First Nation casinos, First Nations were unable to build new casinos in the

locations that would give them the most competitive advantage. For example, First Nations in

Manitoba and Saskatchewan wanted to build new casinos on reserves close to population centers;

however, the provincial governments rejected the proposed locations. As shown by the following

quotes, the governments may have acted from the perspective of protecting the competitiveness

of government casinos.

> A First Nations-owned and -operated casino just outside Brandon on the Trans-Canada Highway - the main artery connecting all of Canada - was likely viewed as a threat to the Manitoba government's monopoly on gaming in the province. The Manitoba government perhaps feared a proposed world-class casino in Brandon would rival existing gaming revenue from the provincial-owned casinos….The provincial government knows that if a First Nations casino is not built on one of these high-traffic strategic locations in Manitoba, there will be no competition to the Manitoba government-controlled gaming industry. [Excerpt from an article written by Alan Isfeld, a publisher of First Nations Voice. The article was written with support by Grand Chief Morris Swan Shannacappo of the Southern Chiefs' Organization] (*The Brandon Sun*, Aug 1, 2009)

In addition, the following excerpt from an interview with a key First Nation leader shows

that, due to the regulation that First Nations must subordinate to the provincial governments

regarding casino operation, First Nations could not achieve an ideal scale of business.

> Interviewer: What are the main difficulties you are facing in terms of casino operation?
> Interviewee (First Nation leader): We would want 30-50 more slot machines, because that's where most of the profit comes from. But the province said we can't. The province makes plans for every casino. If we can get 30-50 more machines, we would be out of debt much sooner.

Overall, the documents and interviews show that the regulations or laws populated in the gambling field made it challenging for First Nations to become prominent in the gambling field. In response, First Nations engaged in the process of "regulative maneuvering", which consists of three subprocesses, as explained below.

Attempting Regulative Inclusion

The first subprocess of "regulative maneuvering" that I identified is attempting regulative inclusion. First, the First Nations whose gambling houses were raided by police in the late 1980s (in Ontario and Manitoba) pursued lengthy lawsuits against their provincial governments, hoping that a favorable ruling might pressure the case law system to legalize First Nation casinos. Those First Nations argued that they had the "constitutional right" to build native casinos, because the Constitution of Canada gave them the right to independently organize any activities on reserve. However, the Supreme Court simply dismissed the case when the First Nations appealed the provincial court ruling. As First Nation newspapers reported:

> The general attitude of the judges toward the case was easily apparent, however. They shied away from arguments that Native self-government is provided for in the Constitution. They were also unreceptive to the idea that Aboriginal Constitutional rights would allow a judgment that would override the jurisdiction of the Criminal Code in certain situations like gambling (*Windspeaker*, Vol 13-12, 1996).

In addition, some First Nations leaders attempted to include First Nations in the gambling field by attempting to change the Criminal Code. The documents show that the National Chief of Assembly of First Nations rallied at gaming conferences to "*force the minister to make changes to the Criminal Code that would benefit First Nations (in their attempt to operate casinos)*" (*Canadian Press Newswire*, Aug. 9, 1997), and a few First Nations from Manitoba and Ontario organized a demonstration in front of the parliament, requesting the change to the Criminal Code. In addition, some First Nation leaders called for a change in the Indian Act to give First Nations

more power to act independently, so that they could gain the right to the gambling field with a stronger legal foundation.

> Chief Guy Lariviere of the Canoe Lake band said public demonstrations and protests would not solve the problems facing Indian people. In any event, he said he welcomes many of the amendments to the Indian Act, some of which are designed to give bands more power over their business affairs. "We were being restricted by the old act," said Lariviere. "The new one is going to help us a lot." (*Star-Phoenix*, April 8, 1997)

Second, some First Nations attempted to create a new, separate regulative structure that would legalize First Nations membership in the gambling field. As shown in the documents, some First Nation leaders lobbied the federal government to pass legislation similar to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in the U.S., legalizing First Nation casinos at the federal level (see the quotes below). However, the federal government insisted that the Criminal Code of Canada had delegated gambling affairs to provincial governments. As the official at the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Lynne Boyer, the media relations office in the Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs) responded: "*Not only is it a provincial matter, but we encourage First Nations to work with the provinces in terms of gaming and any agreements that must be negotiated*" (*The Gazette*, Mar 30, 1995). Aside from the attempt to create separate legislation, about 20 First Nations across the country attempted to organize the National Native Gaming Alliance, which would function as a federal-level regulator for First Nation casinos like the National Indian Gaming Commission in the U.S. However, it seems that the effort gradually subsided, because no further actions were reported in the documents.

> The province and the Indian federation will ask Ottawa to give the agreement the once-over and take any measures necessary to ensure the agreement complies with Criminal Code provisions covering gambling, Bellegarde (National Chief) said. Peltier said various aboriginal groups from several provinces are negotiating with the federal government "to draft a process" that would result in gambling permits being issued to aboriginal groups. Officials from the offices of Premier Jacques Parizeau and Public Security Minister Serge Menard had a comment yesterday. (*The Gazette*, Mar 30, 1995)

Overall, First Nations attempted regulative inclusion by pursuing enduring lawsuits and changing the Criminal Code and the Indian Act, as well as creating a new regulative structure, but all of these attempts failed. Nevertheless, while First Nations were attempting regulative inclusion, they also engaged in the second subprocess of "regulative maneuvering"—forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks—which turned out to be more successful, as explained below.

Forcing the Enactment of Competing Legal-political Frameworks

I identified that First Nations forced competing legal-political frameworks as another subprocess of "regulative maneuvering". As the legal-political landscape for indigenous issues is very complex and contains self-contradictory elements, there existed opportunities for First Nations to enact legal-political frameworks that counter the Criminal Code of Canada. The documents show that First Nations took those opportunities by forcing three specific legal-political frameworks, including the contentious indigenous sovereignty framework in the Canadian political discourse (i.e. indigenous peoples may govern themselves entirely independent from any levels of Canadian government), the legal-political custom that First Nations do not fall under the jurisdiction of provincial governments, and the Constitutional designation that First Nations have the inherent right to practice their culture. Below, I explain how First Nations gave force to each of these frameworks.

First, First Nations across the country strongly asserted indigenous sovereignty in media reports and public and/or private meetings, stating that First Nations had been sovereign for thousands of years before colonization and thus are historically legitimate in conducting any activities on their land, including gambling (see the quotes below). First Nations also highlighted their sovereignty is protected by the Treaties and upheld it faithfully. As such, First Nations were

able to anchor the discussion of gambling on sovereignty and jurisdiction, asserting that whether

or not to allow First Nation gambling is a matter of whether or not to respect indigenous

sovereignty, and exerting a stronger legal-political pressure on provincial governments.

> Although details of their 90-minute meeting at the provincial legislature were not available, Shepherd [Chief of the Whitebear First Nation] and Mitchell [Saskatchewan Justice Minister] both said the central issue is one of jurisdiction. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-25, 1993)

> "We really feel the province does not have jurisdiction," said Cowichan band Chief Philomena Alphonse. We maintain we can organize and run casinos ourselves. If we're talking self-government -- government to government -- then Premier Harcourt will have to honor that." (*Vancouver Sun*, Oct 5, 1994)

> The only way we have made progress on our rights is through the assertion of our rights," he [National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations] said, calling on bands and tribal councils to enact their own laws in areas like childcare and gaming, even if it leads to clashes with the provincial and federal governments. If people want to challenge the laws, well, let them challenge them. We have arguments...The only way we are going to exercise self-government is to do it ourselves. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-16, 1992)

> Second, First Nations highlighted that they had always been the responsibility of the

federal governments, which means that they can bypass provincial governments when it comes

to participating in the gambling field. As a First Nations newspaper described:

> Canadian Natives insist on negotiating with the federal government, which has jurisdiction over Native affairs….Ottawa is the only government outside band councils that can exert authority on reserves. It must make Indian gaming a priority before relations between bands and provincial governments deteriorate further. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-5, 1993)

> Third, some First Nations in British Columbia and Alberta appealed to the Constitution

designation that First Nations can practice indigenous culture independently by framing

gambling as part of the indigenous culture. If gambling is a cultural tradition like fishing and

hunting, First Nations have the right to gamble, as shown in the following quotes:

> "We were here before anyone. We had dice carved from antler bones . . . we've always gambled [Shuswap Chief Ron Ignace of the Skeetchestn First Nation speaking]" (*The Province*, May 10, 1994)

First Nations also had archaeologists and historians support their claims.

> (From a cultural anthropologist) The tradition of gambling goes back thousands of years and that artifacts of s'lahal — or bone games — are often found in archaeological digs. Blankets, copper, any number of things considered valuable would change hand. There was even one Clallum chief (from Washington State) who lost his wife in one of the bones games, so the stakes could get pretty high. (*Times Colonist*, Agusut 27, 1998)

The documents show that this framing was somewhat advised by native Americans in the United States, as one native leader from the United States spoke at a Canadian native gaming conference:

> [An American casino gambling expert speaking]"If natives can prove gambling is an aboriginal right, governments may not be able to control casinos on reserves…. [If] gambling is intrinsic to aboriginal culture, gambling would be viewed as an inherent right, like fishing" (*The Province*, May 10, 1994)

In conjunction with discursively forcing competing legal-political frameworks, First Nations across the country forcefully substantiated the competing legal-political frameworks (especially indigenous sovereignty), defying the Criminal Code of Canada. The documents show that several First Nations threatened to open casinos without engaging provincial governments: some purchased gambling machines or planned to smuggle machines from the U.S., some signed provisional management contracts with private operators, and some even opened casinos without notifying the government. After the unilaterally opened casinos were raided by the police, the owning First Nations threatened to block highways or unilaterally open the casinos again.

> Two Edmonton-area native bands will defy the province and open casinos on their reserves if the government tries to shut them out of Alberta's gambling industry. "They will go ahead and set up their own casinos with or without governmental approval," said Alain Dubuc, who is handling casino development deals for both the Louis Bull and Enoch First Nations. "They'll just do it in defiance of the law. It's not the way we would like to see it happen, but I know that's what they're going to do." (*Edmonton Journal*, Aug 30th, 1995)

> RCMP raided an unlicensed casino yesterday on the reserve. Officers seized 25 slot machines, alleging they had been smuggled into Canada, and criminal

charges may be pending against some members of the Dakota Tipi band, near Portage La Prairie."We are going to be taking further civil disobedience by blockading the railroad tracks within two weeks. I believe Mr. Filmon is going to be announcing his election [today], so we're going to be looking to do that during the election," he [Chief Dennis Pashe] said. (*National Post*, Aug 17, 1999)

As First Nations forced competing legal-political frameworks, both discursively and in action, they first encountered strong pushback from provincial governments. Provincial governments commonly rejected First Nations claims, especially the claim that indigenous sovereignty can support First Nations opening casinos without involving provincial governments. As the following quotes elaborated:

"Unless natives gamble under the (provincial) policy regime, this isn't going to work...We need to have one law for all British Columbians…..How can you have two separate regimes? How can you have separate laws for separate races?" [Independent MLA David Mitchell of British Columbia speaking] (*Vancouver Sun*, Oct 5, 1994).

Moreover, some provincial governments (Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan) sent police to seize machines and First Nation people in the unilaterally opened casinos, laid legal charges against some First Nation leaders, and threatened to raid the casino again if First Nations dared to re-open it.

They (the government police) burst through the doors with their AK 47's pointed at the casino employees. They were dressed in black and wearing balaclavas. "Chief, they're raiding the casino! They have helicopters, and they have a roadblock set up at the resort entrance. I am going off the reserve because they've jammed the cell phones!" (Shepherd, forthcoming. p. 1).

Despite the pushbacks from provincial governments, the actions to force indigenous sovereignty helped demonstrate First Nations' determination and their ability to carry out a serious battle, which in turn pressured provincial governments to seriously consider First Nations casinos. As one government leader reflected during the interview:

"So that confrontation about jurisdiction, you know, between First Nations and police and government led to negotiations. I guess no one can afford a battle like that". (Interview, Government official).

The documents show that after First Nations forced the competing legal-political

frameworks, provincial governments began to survey public opinion about First Nation casinos,

establish policy committee, discuss the casinos in the cabinet, and permitted native gambling in

moderated forms such as lottery schemes and bingo games. For example, in British Columbia,

the gaming commission prepared two different reports for the cabinet, the Saskatchewan

government allowed White Bear to operate a temporary gaming house without slot machines,

and the Manitoba government allowed natives to experiment with bingo games.

> Various government departments are now working on a report on gaming, which
> is expected to go before the cabinet in the near future…Saskatchewan Gaming
> Commission spokesman Dave McInnes said the government has been looking at
> models which would be legal under the Criminal Code. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-12,
> 1993).

> Tory MLA Judy Gordon is preparing a report on native gaming, which is
> expected to make recommendations to the government. Premier Ralph Klein said
> Friday the province is examining the authority of Indian nations to establish
> gaming and the whole situation as to how the profits from gambling will be
> distributed.(*Calgary Herald*, Mar 23, 1996)

After provincial governments took the above steps, First Nations and provincial

governments began to reach gaming agreements in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which signals

that First Nations had been given the permission to enter the gambling field. In the next stage---

strengthening field positions, First Nations engaged in regulative maneuvering by compromising

the power of the competing legal-political frameworks, differing from the stage of seeking

participation, where First Nations fully and forcefully pushed forward those frameworks.

Compromising the Power of the Competing Legal-political Frameworks

After First Nations obtained government approval to run casinos, they still believed they

held sovereignty and thus should be exempted from government control when it came to casino

operations. However, they pushed forward sovereignty to a limited degree despite the availability

of more forceful actions that could have maximized their interests. The documents show that

First Nations compromised the power of the competing legal-political frameworks in two ways.

First, First Nations discursively asserted the competing legal-political frameworks but

showed compromise in action. In the cases where a few First Nations sought to build new

casinos in urban centers (e.g. Saskatoon and Brandon) and encountered objections from

provincial and municipal governments, they first claimed that indigenous sovereignty supported

them in doing so, but eventually conceded by moving the casinos kilometers away from the

urban centers. In a similar vein, when a few First Nations leaders (e.g. in Saskatchewan and

Ontario) were alleged to have corrupted casino proceeds, those First Nations that were involved

in the issue decided to open their accounting book for government auditors, even though they

initially pushed on sovereignty claims and refused to open the book (as shown in the quotes

below). When provincial auditors revealed misspending of casino proceeds, the First Nations

took measures to improve casino governance.

> An audit pointed out that Lerat had made about $360,000 in expenditures that were unaccountable. There was no paper trail and the auditors flagged the situation to the provincial government… Earlier in the week, the Saskatchewan Party had demanded that the provincial government fire the whole SIGA board…At first, the FSIN (Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations) raised the issue of jurisdiction but in the end it was put aside…In the give-and-take of negotiations, the province insisted on certain controls and got them….The jurisdictional argument was a non-starter and clearly dealt with in the agreement. The FSIN wisely backed away from that argument and saved the issue of provincial jurisdiction in First Nations affairs for another day. (*Star-Phoenix*, Jun 23, 2000)

Second, some First Nations took actions to enact the competing legal-political

frameworks but later reversed their actions. This was particularly evident in the case when the

federal and provincial governments banned smoking in casinos and other public places. For First

Nations, the ban on smoking means a reduction of customers and profits, as some customers

prefer to smoke while gambling. As a response, some First Nations in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba proactively enacted sovereignty and passed bylaws to allow smoking in their casinos. However, after criticism from the public and small business owners, those First Nations that passed the bylaws reversed their actions, banning smoking or creating non-smoking areas in the casinos.

> "Personally, I think smoke rooms would be a good thing for our communities. It gives a clean atmosphere and a choice for those who choose to smoke", Bird [The Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations] said in an interview. (*Moose Jaw Times Herald*, Dec 24, 2004)

> In the case of the Great Blue Heron, the Mississaugas of Scugog Island, who own and claim legal jurisdiction over the casino located on their reserve, say they have given in to pressure from patrons and staff and will ban smoking entirely at the end of this month. "Many employees and customers have come to expect smoke-free facilities and the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation will make their smoke-free regulations effective at the same time as Ontario's," Chief Tracy Gauthier said in a statement. (*Toronto Star*, May 15, 2006)

The documents show that as First Nations compromised the power of competing legal-political framework, provincial governments conceded in the aforementioned disputes between First Nations and the governments. For example, when First Nations compromised the power of sovereignty, banning smoking or creating non-smoking areas in the casinos, provincial governments made it clear that they would respect the decision of First Nations and showed support to First Nations. One government leader in Manitoba defended First Nations as following:

> [Heather Leonoff, director of constitutional law in Manitoba's Justice Department, said] Manitoba wants to argue that the charter guarantee of equal treatment under the law was meant to address historical wrongs. Not make everybody treated the same, not level the playing field necessarily, but to have an opportunity to address certain historically disadvantaged groups. (*Telegraph-Journal*, Oct 30, 2006)

Even though some government officials attempted to persuade First Nations not to allow smoking in the casinos, they stepped sideways, focusing on the negative impact of smoking on health and respecting the competing legal-political frameworks that First Nations had raised.

> "We tried, we tried to influence the First Nations communities and leadership, particularly the leadership, to recognize the importance of our no-smoking laws in the province. We tried to get them to go there. At the end of the day, they made it very clear to us this would be a decision they would make, and we want to respect that", said Deputy Premier Clay Derby in Saskatchewan (*Prince Albert Daily Herald*, April 9, 2005)

In a similar vein, after First Nations compromised the assertion of sovereignty, opening their accounting books to provincial auditors (in Saskatchewan and Ontario), provincial governments stopped threatening to shut down the casinos, and even appreciated First Nations' willingness to open their books and the concerted effort to improve casino governance (as shown by the quotes below). Importantly, the governments also helped First Nations improve casino governance, providing governance guidelines for the reorganization of board structure, which improved the management of the casinos and made them better organizations.

> SIGA's success in the ensuing 10 years has been remarkable, despite a brief lapse in regulations, policy and controls under the former regime for which former SIGA CEO Dutch Lerat became the lightning rod and subsequent fall guy. His replacement…Edmund Bellegarde, has been instrumental in seeing the organization through the free-spending days of Lerat. The result has been a proactively regimented system that unilaterally developed policies and procedures that were so effective that they were later adopted by the Romanow administration. (*Saskbusiness*, Jun/Jul 2005)

In summary, the existing field-level regulations or laws challenged First Nations' participation in the gambling field. Because the Criminal Code of Canada designated provincial governments as the only legitimate owners and regulators of casino gaming, First Nations were considered as illegitimate casino owners. Although First Nations attempted regulative inclusion, including themselves in the field by changing existing regulations, the attempt quickly failed. Nevertheless, First Nations forced competing legal-political frameworks, such as the contested

sovereignty and the Constitutional right to practice indigenous culture, which pressured provincial governments to take cautious steps to allow First Nations into the field. After First Nations obtained government approval to run casinos, they faced regulations that constrained them to run the casinos to their best interests. In response, First Nations compromised the power of competing legal-political frameworks, gaining moderated competitiveness (conferred by the competing framework) as new field members.

Table 5 Additional Quotes for the Process of "Regulative Maneuvering"

Attempting Institutional Inclusion	
(a) Attempting to include First Nations as new field members by changing the Criminal Code	First Nations people need a national strategy to lobby the federal and provincial governments to gain control of their own casinos. That's what Roger Jones, an Assembly of First Nations legal representative, said Wednesday at the first ever Canadian First Nations Gaming Conference and Trade Show in Prince Albert. "We need a nationally coordinated effort," Jones told more than 100 people at the conference. "Nothing less than a coordinated First Nations effort will get results." It's an uphill battle to reform the law through the political process, he said, and aboriginals must be prepared to be patient before the change will come. Jones proposed that the phrase "First Nations" should be written into section 207 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which gives provinces the authority to conduct and operate electronic machines, such as slot machines. (*Star – Phoenix*, Aug 10, 2000) The highest court in the land unanimously dismissed the gaming case on Feb. 26 without hearing arguments from the federal and provincial governments. The case, which was scheduled to last two days, was thrown out after only a half-day of arguments from lawyers representing Native bands and organizations. The case involved members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake bands of northern Ontario, who appealed to the Supreme Court after the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld their conviction on gaming charges.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 13-12, 1996) The new leader of the Assembly of First Nations says the B.C. government should allow native-run casinos. "We have to make them realize it's in their best interest to allow First Nations to operate casinos," Phil Fontaine told regional chiefs and other native representatives Friday at a gaming conference sponsored by the Osoyoos Indian band. "We have to force the minister to make changes to the Criminal Code that would benefit First Nations (in their attempt to operate casinos)." (*Canadian Press NewsWire*, Aug 9, 1997)
(b)Attempting to create separate gambling regulative system for First Nations	[Phil Fontaine, former Chief of the National Assembly of First Nations] proposes that Manitoba's 62 bands set up a gaming commission to run a small number of casinos on reserves near Winnipeg, sharing profits with all bands. (*Financial Post*, Feb 20, 1993) Canada's First Nations should establish their own national gaming authority to regulate casinos and other gambling activity on reserves, two prominent Indian leaders said Monday. Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) Chief Perry Bellegarde and Ontario regional chief Tom Bressette said such an authority would affirm First Nations jurisdiction and eventually allow Indian governments in any province to run gaming operations on reserve. (*Star – Phoenix*, Nov 23, 1999) Delegates from across Canada gathered in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. for

	three days in early August to come up with a plan to create a national First Nations' gaming association., In October, we held the first meeting of those First Nations who would be interested in a gaming strategy. We came together in Saskatoon, and we had five recommendations from that gathering, and essentially, one of the recommendations was to proceed to establish a national association. Basically, you want a national association so you have consistency in regulations, that you have some principle gaming strategy, and that you set up some principles with respect to First Nations gaming," Jim (Assembly of First Nations Vice-Chief the Chapaynajak First Nation, Yukon) said. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 18-5, 2000)

Forcing the Enactment of Competing Legal-political Frameworks

(a) Discursively asserting the competing legal-political frameworks that favor First Nations	But the Roseau River Reserve in Manitoba wants to assert its right as a nation to run and operate a casino. And it claims the province has no jurisdiction on its land."We as a First Nation are as capable of running credible, good operations and also being able to legislate our own laws," band member Carl Roberts said.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-21, 1993)

A band in New Brunswick is going ahead with plans to launch a casino despite objections from the province. "That's a contentious and touchy area as far as the provincial government goes," said band councilor Ray Tomah. "But our position is that the province does not have jurisdiction on Indian land"(*Windspeaker,* Vol 11-18, 1993)

"I think part of the whole exercise was basically to have a look at two governments, compare them side by side. And we took care of First Nations government. So if you look at First Nations government, we've been in government for thousands of years. We had our own systems; our own tribal laws et cetera. We were a society with all those laws". (Interview, First Nation leader)

"If there is no way to negotiate self-government, we will just do it," Mercredi [former National Chief of First Nations Assembly] writes in In The Rapids, Navigating the Future of First Nations, to be released Oct. 16. And one way to assert native sovereignty is to "exercise jurisdiction over gaming," says the man who represents the chiefs of about 600 Indian bands across the country. He says bands will assert their rights "without discussion and they will not wait for permission from the federal or provincial governments. (*Edmonton Journal*, Oct 2, 1993) |
| (b) Taking actions to substantialize the competing legal-political frameworks | And one way to assert native sovereignty is to "exercise jurisdiction over gaming," says the man who represents the chiefs of about 600 Indian bands across the country. The Beecher Bay Indian Band in the Metchosin [British Columbia] area is already taking gaming matters into its own hands. The band has announced it will establish a temporary casino on its |

117

	reserve within the next 1 months, and a major hotel-casino complex within a year. (*Times – Colonist*, Oct 2, 1993)
	The Bear Claw casino operated on the White Bear reserve, 200 kilometers southeast of Regina, Saskatchewan, for several weeks before RCMP raided and closed the facility March 22. All of the casino's gaming equipment, including slot machines and video lottery terminals, was confiscated in the pre-dawn raid that resulted in the arrest and charging of chief Shepherd. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-3, 1993)
	The Skway First Nation has signed an agreement (without the permission of the provincial government) with a Vancouver Stock Exchange-listed company, Sungold Gaming Inc., and Reno-based Comstock Hotel and Casino Ltd. to open a small casino in Chilliwack. The deal also puts the Skway band into a growing lineup of aboriginal groups wanting to open casinos on their lands. At least eight other bands have signed letters of intent with a Kelowna-based company and an international casino operator. Comstock co-owner Dan Douglas confirmed from Reno that his family-owned company will operate the Skway casino.(*The Vancouver Sun*, Mar 18, 1994)
	Chief Dennis Pashe says his band will block the Trans-Canada Highway if Manitoba tries to shut down *an unlicensed casino* slated to open during the Pan Am Games. This week, Manitoba's Native Affairs Minister David Newman blamed native protests at the Manitoba legislature this spring for the government's decision not to grant licenses to two First Nations casinos, one which was Dakota Tipi. (*Nanaimo Daily News*, Jul 10, 1999)

Compromising the Power of Competing Frameworks

(a) Claiming competing frameworks but eventually giving in	Trustees from the First Nations Fund will soon be running advertisements in major daily newspapers explaining how gaming proceeds from Casino Regina are being used to help First Nations and the rest of society, Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) Chief Perry Bellegarde said Wednesday. "We want to let people know things are being done in an open and transparent manner to help our own people and non-Natives," said Bellegarde, one of the fund's trustees. "It's a jurisdictional issue," Bellegarde said. "We're just following the terms of our gaming agreement with the province. But we're going to run the ads showing our audit soon. We're going above and beyond our gaming agreement by running the ads." (*Star – Phoenix*, Dec 16, 1999)
	A 1994 plebiscite showed a majority of Saskatoon voters were opposed to a new casino in the downtown area. Lerat [the former CEO of the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority] said he was hopeful an agreement could be reached with the city but suggested SIGA would look at alternate locations outside the city limits if city council refused to

	endorse the idea. (*Saskatchewan Sage*, Vol 4-3, 1999) Recently re-elected Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) Grand Chief Perry Bellegarde told Windspeaker he doesn't dispute any of the auditor's findings."No. We've already implemented 75 percent of the provincial auditor's recommendations. So we've concurred. We want to be open and transparent about everything. So, nothing to dispute. We want to make sure that what has happened in terms of the SIGA situation doesn't happen again in the future. So, one, the problem's been identified and, two, we're working to correct it," he said, during a phone interview on Nov. 22…."When we say mistakes have been made, we're not trying to lessen it by any means because files have been forwarded to the Department of Justice and if things have to happen that way through the legal route then let due process take its course," he answered. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 18-8, 2000) The bylaw, proposed by the White Bear First Nation on Dec. 9, would ban smoking in enclosed spaces, but would allow bingo halls, accommodation units and the Bear Claw Casino to set aside up to 40 percent of their business as a smoking area. *(Moose Jaw Times Herald*, Jan 14, 2005)
(b) Reversing the enactment of the competing frameworks	After the FSIN [Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations] said in December it was unlikely to follow the provincial smoking ban in native-run casinos because they have jurisdiction on their land, the NDP indicated it must respect the First Nations' jurisdiction on the issue. [By contrast] The bylaw, proposed by the White Bear First Nation on Dec. 9, would ban smoking in enclosed spaces, but would allow bingo halls, accommodation units and the Bear Claw Casino to set aside up to 40 percent of their business as a smoking area.(*Moose Jaw Times Herald*, Jan 14, 2005) After almost a year of planning, the Roseau River First Nation [in Manitoba] is set to open a gambling house that will be a haven for smokers. The reserve is taking advantage of the fact that Manitoba's anti-smoking law -- which forbids people lighting up in bars, restaurants and other public places -- does not apply to aboriginal reserves. The government has said that's because the reserves fall under federal jurisdiction. "It is an advantage," Roseau River Chief Terrance Nelson said Wednesday. (*Alberni Valley Times*, Aug 18, 2005) Reversing the decision: They [the province] call for smoke-free facilities where video lottery terminals are located. Nelson [Chief of Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation] said that means the room where the VLTs are hooked up. The gaming lounge and the smoking room opened on Monday. The other five First Nations could follow Roseau's lead and do the same thing. (*The Brandon Sun*, Jan 23, 2009)

3: Resourcing Stigma

In this section, I explain the third overarching process that supported First Nations'
participation in the gambling field, resourcing stigma. Similar to explaining the previous two
overarching processes, I first describe the obstructive nature of the stigma that First Nations
carry, using excerpts from the documents and interviews to highlight the key aspects of First
Nations' experience. Following this explanation, I detail how First Nations engaged in
resourcing stigma through three subprocesses: transforming stigma suffering and stigma into
sources of legitimacy, smoothing resource acquisition with stigma, and differentially leveraging
stigma suffering and stigma.

I see that First Nations have been carrying the stigma of indigeneity. Indigeneity is a
broad term that not only refers to native ethnicity but also to indigenous history and culture. First
Nations are often stereotyped as "drunken Indians", dishonest people and untrustworthy (see the
quotes below),

> In many circles, the stereotype of the "drunken Indian" was once all-powerful. It
> was assumed by some that if you were of aboriginal ancestry, whether you were
> Métis, Inuit, non-status or First Nation, then you had a drinking problem. (*CBC
> News*, Oct 22, 2008)

> The best is when they follow you around in shoppers drug mart [a local
> supermarket], then make an announcement about security to go to some aisle
> (which I'm usually in), or pay attention to some security cameras [suspecting you
> have stolen things from the store] (Excerpt from an informal conversation with a
> First Nations leader)

> Speaking after a fact-finding mission to the region, Renu Mandhane (Ontario
> Human Rights Commissioner) said everyday incidents experienced by First
> Nations people include being unduly scrutinized in stores or at the mall, hassled
> when using status cards, being called "dirty Indians," or being yelled at by
> motorists to go back to their reserves. (*The Star*, Mar 13, 2018)

Also, because of the history of indigenous people needing financial support from the
governments, First Nations are stigmatized as free riders and lazy.

This year, a research project based on the data from the Canadian Council for Aboriginal Business reported several stereotypes about aboriginal peoples: 1) Aboriginal people don't pay taxes.2) Aboriginal people are not entrepreneurial. 3) Aboriginal businesses are not very successful… The labels — lazy, dependent on the public purse, unwilling to improve their lives… is not worth celebrating. (*The Star*, June 21, 2012)

In addition, indigenous cultural traditions such as oral history and spiritual ceremonies stigmatize First Nations as "savages" or "uncivilized".

The same year, Macdonald (The first Prime Minister of Canada) told the Commons [House of Commons]: "When the school is on the reserve, the child lives with his parents who are savages; he is surrounded by savages, and though he may learn to read and write, his habits and training and mode of thought are Indian. He is simply a savage who can read and write." (*The Ottawa Citizen*, May 22, 2015)

There has been an increase in another stereotype – the mythic Noble Savage. Elevated to a sphere of goodness unreachable by those in contaminated White society and usually possessing some spiritual connection to the land, the Noble Savage communes in a cloud of mysticism and places no value on material possessions. Not even the popular Thunderheart avoids the romantic brush. "That movie says that every time you get half a dozen Native people in a room, you can get a prophecy or a vision," says Canadian Cayuga actor Gary Farmer. (Excerpt from an online article published by Canada's Center for Digital and Media Literacy)

The documents and interviews show that this stigma of indigeneity manifested as a significant barrier for First Nations to participate in the gambling field. Provincial governments were commonly concerned that First Nations might not be competent enough to own casinos. They feared that First Nations would corrupt casino proceeds, mismanage the casinos, or would not be able to control the negative impact of gambling, as shown in the following quotes:

[Chuck Koppang, manager of the Native Gaming Division of the Manitoba Lotteries Foundation speaking] As gaming is a cash business, there are many opportunities for participants to 'skim' revenue. The foundation sees a continuing role for its staff, as experienced resources in organizational matters, staff training, audit and enforcement (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-19, 1992).

It is true that we must ensure that our aboriginal population becomes better educated, able to obtain well-paying jobs and as well off as everyone else in

society. However, gambling expansion will only create ongoing social and economic injustices by taking advantage of those with gambling addictions, many of them aboriginal, poor and mentally ill (By an independent writer. *Star – Phoenix*, Oct 16, 2003)

The interviews with First Nations leaders highlight that these concerns of provincial governments might stem from the stigma that First Nations carry.

[with the respect to the problem of stigma] If there was stigma that was gonna be applied to it, it was, "Could the Indians operate a big enterprise like this? (Interview, First Nation leader)

Furthermore, the documents show that indigeneity created difficulties for First Nations to acquire important resources. As one official in British Columbia almost mockingly stated: "First of all, good luck getting financing" (Vancouver Sun, October 5, 1994). This resonates with the newspaper accounts in First Nations' media. For example, when a few First Nations attempted to acquire financial resources from mainstream financial institutions, those institutions were not willing to help First Nations, due to racial discrimination. As the following quotes show: "We [A group of First Nation leaders in Saskatchewan] went to all the financial institutions. We were a joke to them. They wouldn't touch us with a 10-foot pole.' " (Windspeaker, Vol 11-5, 1993).

Overall, the stigma that First Nations carry created several challenges for First Nations to enter the gambling field. Not only did it discredit First Nations as competent new field entrants, but also created the difficulties to acquire resources. In the following section, I describe how First Nations responded to the challenges by resourcing stigma.

Transforming Stigma Suffering and Stigma into Sources of Legitimacy

The first subprocess of resourcing stigma that I identified is transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy. First, First Nations across the country transformed stigma suffering (i.e. the economic, social, and political suffering resulting from stigma) into a source of legitimacy by explicating the suffering. First Nations stated that they had

suffered too much economically from their stigma (indigeneity), and that provincial governments

must allow their entry so as to alleviate the suffering. They claimed they had suffered from

discrimination in the labor market, extremely high unemployment rates, and severe poverty; and

that their economic conditions had deteriorated to the extent that survival was difficult. Thus, if

the gambling business had proven to be lucrative, provincial governments must allow First

Nations to enter the gambling business as a way of alleviating their suffering and helping First

Nations revive themselves, as the following quotes show:

> People have asked me "Why gambling, Robert? Gambling is dirty money. Well, I
> don't know of anyone in B.C. who says 'Here's $60 million to become self-
> sufficient in a very short period of time. We have no resources left, no lumber, no
> fish, land claims are being held up. We can't develop without a land base"; he
> [Chief of the Snuneymuxw First Nation in British Columbia] said in an
> impassioned and often angry speech.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-21, 1993)

> The only harvest in the area, about 200 kilometers north of Winnipeg, is despair.
> There's nothing to do. We have no drop-in center, no nothing. It's just dead. The
> casino industry presents us with a desperately needed opportunity [Representative
> of the Lake Manitoba Band speaking] (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-21, 1993).

> Also, First Nations explicated stigma suffering by vocalizing their perception of social

injustice. They expressed the perception that a gambling field without First Nations has a

character of racial discrimination and double-standards, as shown below:

> Governments set a double standard when they actively oppose on-reserve gaming.
> Millions of dollars have poured into federal and provincial coffers through the
> sale of lottery tickets. Manitoba runs a palatial gambling house in downtown
> Winnipeg. Bingo halls and smaller casinos are popular in many provinces
> [Commentary by First Nation media] (*Windspeaker*, Vol. 10: 21, 1993)

> [Representative of the Roseau River First Nation in Manitoba speaking]When
> non-Indians do something, it's considered honest and viable; when first nations do
> it, it's automatically crooked. (*Windspeaker*, Vol. 10:19, 1992)

> Moreover, First Nations voiced a view that it was socially unjust that natives had

successfully entered the gambling field in the United States while First Nations in Canada were

still excluded. Similarly, First Nations who considered gambling later stated that it was not

socially just that they had not been accepted given some early movers had gained permission. To

fulfill the obligation of pursuing social justice, provincial governments must allow the entry

requests of all First Nations.

> Indian leaders, who already have limited opportunity to negotiate gaming
> agreements for their reserves, want the same freedom to run full-scale casinos that
> nearby Minnesota bands enjoy (*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-5, 1993).

> [name omitted] Conservative MLA from Lesser Slave Lake, demanded to know
> Thursday why Swan River the Swan River reserve in her riding can't open a
> casino when Ontario has promised to approve an application from a First Nation
> (*Edmonton Journal*, May 28, 1994).

Second, First Nations transformed stigma itself into a source of legitimacy by embracing

it. Many First Nations not only openly rejected the stereotype that First Nations were not as

experienced and competent to own casino business (as shown by the quote below), but also

asserted that exactly because they are indigenous, they are by nature entrepreneurial; for instance,

they were the first to explore the land, and they used to control the fur trade.

> [Chief of the Snuneymuxw First Nation in British Columbia speaking] "Give us
> credit to run our own businesses. Just because we're Indians, does it mean we are
> incapable of operating things?" (*Windspeaker*, Vol 14-2, 1996)

> Interviewer: How did you respond to the skepticism [about First Nations' ability]?
> Interviewee: I think the first thing you got to remember is that entrepreneurship is
> in our DNA. We've been entrepreneurs in Canada for thousands of years. We
> were the ones that controlled the fur trade, controlled the price of fur, controlled
> who can go on what region and sell that, originally. And so, like we were always
> entrepreneurs, we're not strangers to business. (Interview, First Nations leader)

The documents and interviews show that as First Nations explicated stigma suffering,

they elicited the moral obligations of provincial governments, appealing to governments'

responsibility to alleviate economic suffering, reduce racism, and improve social justice. As such,

provincial governments became more receptive to First Nations as casino owners, as shown by

the following quotes:

> [The Consumer Minister in Ontario speaking] Many of our reserves ... don't even have running water, and this is an economic development opportunity for First Nations that will help them in some cases get out of the Third World kind of conditions in which they live. (*The Windsor Star*, Feb 2, 1994)

Besides, calling out the suffering of racial injustice seemed to create pressure on the governments to maintain conversations with First Nations, as elaborated by the following quotes:

> [a senior official in the British Columbia government speaking] [The bands] would criticize us up the ying-yang if we tried to act in such a paternalistic manner. (*Vancouver Sun*, March 26, 1999)

> The government did not reject the opportunity for conversation with First Nations about gambling, because if they do, they will potentially be racist. Social justice is important for the government. (Interview, Government leader)

Smoothing Resource Acquisition with Stigma

The second subprocess of "resourcing stigma" is smoothing resource acquisition with stigma. While First Nations engaged in the first subprocess, transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy, they also attempted to acquire resources that are essential for the casino business, including business knowledge, personnel, and financial resources. The documents and interviews show that First Nations sought these resources from similarly stigmatized actors and "the wise", namely, the non-native professionals and politicians who were friendly to First Nations.

First, as native people have a sense of "we-ness" and consider each other as "our people", First Nations sought resources from those who are also stigmatized as "native"; namely, natives in the United States who had successfully run casinos. First Nations in different provinces sought business knowledge and experience by inviting the experienced American natives to conferences and workshops (e.g. the First Nation Gaming Summit in British Columbia, conferences hosted by the Alberta Native Gaming Commission and the National Native Gaming Alliance), and to help draft business proposals. Besides, some First Nations trained their members in American

native casinos, and some others acquired startup loans from a few wealthy American native

tribes. The American natives were enthusiastic about providing these resources, as shown by the

following quotes.

> All we're doing is helping them (First Nations) to obtain their rights….I'm also an Indian, and I believe in Indian rights [The owner of the Indian Entertainment System in the State of New York speaking] (*Windspeaker*, Vol. 11: 5, 1993).

> We had great help from native people in the United States. They gave us what we needed, money, knowledge, people. (Interview, First Nation leaders).

Besides, several First Nations collected knowledge and experience from a small number

of First Nation individuals who had professional careers outside the gambling field, such as in

banking and civil law. Because First Nations lack professional education on average, these

indigenous professionals were highly visible in the indigenous community. As First Nations

leaders reflected in the interviews, these indigenous professionals advised First Nations on

financial and legal matters or were even hired as casino executives.

> So I was approached working in the Bank[name omitted] -- in banking, very highly regulated the handling of cash, internal controls, and good governance structure. In the financial services industry...So casinos -- while the business model was different a lot of the principles of cash handling, security, internal controls in that function were very similar to banking. So I was recruited quite heavily by casino recruiters…In 1997, I took on the job of General Manager of the Casino [First Nations casino' name omitted] (Interview, First Nation leader)

Second, First Nations commonly collected resources (mainly business knowledge and

experience) from "the wise". "The wise" in this context are non-indigenous professionals, such

as business consultants, lawyers, or even politicians, who are inclined to support First Nations

because they have friends, relatives, or working experience in indigenous communities and

understand First Nations' suffering. These actors provided knowledge and experience to First

Nations in ongoing (often at reduced rates) consultation sessions or private meetings. One

example is that the Alberta premier Ralph Klein, whose wife was Métis (an indigenous

population), suggested to First Nations in private meetings that they should frame the casino as an entertainment center. Furthermore, some of these indigenous-friendly professionals even became the key personnel planning the casinos, as shown below:

> I give credit to the former premier of Alberta – Ralph Klein. I think his wife is Metis (an indigenous population). He says in order for you to get into gaming, you need to build a resort. At that time, we thought it was just another way again to discourage us from opening a casino, because it's going to cost thousands of hundreds of dollars. Now we consider it as a blessing. (Interview, First Nation leader)

> Interviewer: Who was involved in those early steps of planning? Do you remember that?
> Interviewee: Like I have on staff a lawyer, I had on staff an ex-RCMP who was trained for gaming like when there are Exhibition Associations, they come into the States, wear American shoes and [clumping 0:09:37]
> Interviewer: Are these people native?
> Interviewee: No, but he came from [Pye 0:16:33] which had a high Indian population and he understood the real world and he had a good rapport with Indians. So we got along just great. His name is [omitted 0:16:50]. (Interview, First Nation leader)

Certainly, First Nations were not equally effective in smoothing resource acquisition with stigma. Depending on the cohesion within First Nations and the characteristics of native politics in different provinces, First Nations in some provinces turned out to be more effective. For example, as First Nations in Saskatchewan had a stronger sense of unity, and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations functioned successfully as the umbrella native political organization, their resource acquisition from similarly stigmatized and "the wise" turned out to be more efficient. In comparison, due to disagreements and fragmentation within the communities, First Nations in British Columbia were less efficient in smoothing resource acquisition with stigma. It took much longer for them to gather resources from similarly stigmatized and "the wise" and persuade the government to open the door to them.

While First Nations collected business knowledge and personnel resources from similarly stigmatized and "the wise", they gained a better understanding of the casino business. They were able to show to the provincial governments, backed up with statistics, that the benefits of native casinos would outweigh the negatives, and that their entry could bring benefits to the adjacent non-native communities, reducing the financial burden for the government. The following interview excerpt demonstrates this.

> And then we did our numbers and the charters, we watched the flights, we kept close track to that, researchers. When we find and done in numbers through an accounting firm, there were over half a billion dollars for to the U.S. and that's basically to Las Vegas Nevada. That's not all the other gaming casinos. Then I got a call from them and they said, "Chief, let's go to Vegas and we will see what you are talking about". (Interview, First Nation leader)

As First Nations envisioned the mutual benefits of their entry to provincial governments, the governments began to substantially explore those mutual benefits through joint initiatives with First Nations. One First Nation leader reflected:

> "If you can convince them that something is in the government's best interest, then they have to go back to cabinet with a new mandate -- with a new decision item. That's very important" (Interview, First Nation leader).

Specifically, provincial governments established task forces to study the impact of native gambling, exploring the mutual benefits of First Nation casinos stated by First Nations. Besides, some governments and First Nation leaders co-organized tours in the American native casinos, helping the governments gain first-hand experience of the benefits of native casinos.

> Leaders on both sides decided that, prior to making a final determination about First Nations gaming, it would be wise to visit a US tribal casino. The committee traveled to Mystic Lake Casino in Minnesota and the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Bingo Association in Idaho….Most committee members were impressed with what they had witnessed. (Belanger, 2006. p. 128)

After provincial governments recognized the mutual benefits of allowing First Nations' entry, they began to announce in media outlets initial decisions that First Nations could

128

participate in the gambling field. Then provincial governments and First Nations began to negotiate concrete terms on casino governance and revenue sharing. During the negotiations, First Nations insisted that they wanted the casinos to be free from government control and to take the full share of casino revenue, whereas provincial governments asserted that they must centrally govern the casinos and share casino revenue with First Nations. As the negotiations repeatedly entered stalemate, I see that the resources First Nations acquired through similarly stigmatized and "the wise" gradually began to motivate First Nations to concede to the governments. As First Nations had put in great effort to acquire those resources, they could not afford to sink the resources if they continued to contend with the government such that the governments became angry and terminated the negotiations. To prevent this, First Nations began to concede to the government, however reluctantly, and quickly struck gaming agreements, as shown below.

> But Lorraine McRae, Chief of the Rama First Nations, says "I was very shocked to hear that they wanted to take some money from the revenues. Our big concern is that the [casino] project is going to be coming to a halt and that's going to hurt a lot of people" (*Canadian Press Newswire*, Feb 12, 1996)

> So we had to be identified as charity and had to share revenue with the government. The government wants us concessions. We felt we didn't have a choice. We have been planning this for many years. (Interview, First Nation leader)

As First Nations became motivated to concede, the personnel resources First Nations acquired—namely, similarly stigmatized and "the wise" professionals (e.g. lawyers and consultants)—more directly led First Nations and the governments to settle on the distribution of power and interests (i.e. casino governance and revenue sharing). These professionals actively mediated between First Nations and provincial governments, facilitating high-level private meetings and forging agreements. According to several First Nations leaders, a very important reason why First Nations reached agreements with the governments is that those professionals

helped forge agreements (see the quotes below). The meetings between those professionals and

government officials seemed to be important avenues where First Nations and provincial

governments settled on the control of the government over First Nation casinos and the formulas

of revenue sharing.

> Interviewer: What do you think are the most important factors that led to those
> agreements?
> Interviewee: We had good negotiators. We had business people that understand
> the nuts and bolts of making deals with the government, and we had our lawyers.
> The revenue sharing idea came from suggestions by their lawyers, and our
> lawyers made it work for us. They worked between us and the government.
> Interviewer: Are these lawyers and business professionals native?
> Interviewee: Some are. There are some white people but we know them.
> (Interview, First Nation leader)

Since First Nations conceded, and professionals actively forged agreements between First

Nations and provincial governments, official agreements on native casino gaming in British

Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario came out in the late 1990s and early

2000s, marking an important milestone during First Nations' entry into the gambling field.

Differentially Leveraging Stigma Suffering and Stigma

The third subprocess of "resourcing stigma" shows how First Nations maximized the

alleviation of stigma suffering while compromising on the embrace of stigma. First, First Nations

maximized the alleviation of stigma suffering by not only using the casinos as tools to greatly

alleviate their suffering, but also by amplifying the meaning of the suffering alleviation. They

made the casinos into the driving force behind indigenous development, employing thousands of

native people in the casinos, donating casino proceeds to indigenous education and social

services, and using casinos as places to revive indigenous culture (e.g. hosting indigenous

ceremonies), which greatly helped alleviate the suffering of First Nations in economic, social,

and cultural lives. Moreover, as shown below, First Nations amplified the meaning of the

alleviation of stigma suffering by connecting it with "building confidence into young generations"

and "saving lives", and by spreading out the amplified meanings through celebration events and

reports in the media.

> [General manager of Saskatoon Tribal Council as well as president of Saskatoon Tribal Council Casino Holdings Limited Partnership speaking] The casinos build confidence in our young people. Whether they continue working in the gaming industry or if this is like an entry level to get them into the workforce, it builds confidence and maybe gives them something to help them go back to school or choose a different career.(*SaskBusiness*, Jun/July, 2005)

> We haven't had any suicides in 10 years…The casino only added to the community's growing a sense of purpose and long-term vision. We've taken a lot more ownership, more pride in who we are and where we're going. [The director of the Rama First Nation social services department speaking] (*Packet and Times*, Apr 10, 2003).

While First Nations maximized the alleviation of stigma suffering, they compromised on

the embrace of their stigma: indigeneity. This means when First Nations could have fully

embraced their indigeneity in casino operations, First Nations compromised on the embrace of

indigeneity. For example, when First Nations could have fought for smoking in the casinos by

asserting that smoking had significant spiritual meaning in indigenous culture, First Nations

acknowledged the negative impact of smoking on public health, banned smoking, or created non-

smoking areas in the casinos (see the quotes below). Similarly, when environmental

organizations complained that the light on the tall Tipi (i.e. a traditional indigenous architecture

for spiritual ceremonies and teachings) in front of a casino disturbed migrating birds, the

involved First Nation did not insist on the spiritual importance of Tipi for First Nations; instead,

they acknowledged corporate responsibility and turned off the light (see the quotes below).

> "Some casinos are considering installing smoking rooms to help protect workers and non-smoking patrons, he said. "It will eliminate all the smoke from the floor, from the public center, from the restaurant, from the employee lounge," Bird [The Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations] said. (*Star-Phoenix*, Jan 31, 2005)

131

Bright beams of light form a giant teepee on top of the Painted Hand Casino in Yorkton, a signature trademark of three First Nations casinos operated by the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA). Last week, officials with the Yorkton casino became aware that many different species of migratory birds _ from a few to possibly hundreds were found dead around the city. And the lights are likely to blame. (*The Canadian Press Newswire*, Sep 16, 2008)

SIGA spokesperson Steve Shaheen said the staff is now monitoring the lights each night and turning them off if they spot any birds nearby. The lights were switched off earlier this week when one bird was caught in their glare, he said. 'We certainly want to be a good corporate and responsible citizen and a good neighbor at the same time. And certainly it was never our intention to offend or be harmful to any wildlife." (*The Canadian Press Newswire*, Sep 16, 2008)

The documents and interviews show that as First Nations differentially leveraged stigma suffering and stigma, maximizing the alleviation of stigma suffering while compromising on the embrace of stigma, provincial governments began to appreciate First Nations casinos and help First Nations strengthen field positions. Provincial governments openly acknowledged First Nations casinos in conferences, celebrations, and casino opening ceremonies, affirming the value of First Nations' field membership, as shown below:

Hundreds of chiefs and delegates from Saskatchewan's First Nations stood up and applauded after Premier Lorne Calvert announced approval to build a new casino. "We anticipate this development will have a significant draw from not only the southwest region of our province but drawing in interest and tourism and significance for economic development from our neighbors in Alberta and in the northern United States of America," Calvert later told reporters. (*Whitehorse Star*, Oct 22, 2004)

If you come to our 10th anniversary [First Nations casino anniversary], you will see how much good the casino has brought to the community. It's remarkable. Heartfelt difference. (Interview, Government Official).

Also, provincial governments lent substantial help for First Nations to become more competitive in the gambling field. Some (e.g. Manitoba and Saskatchewan) gave First Nations startup loans when these First Nations had trouble financing new casinos; some (e.g. Saskatchewan and Ontario) helped First Nations improve casino governance and stakeholder

management when corruptions of casino proceeds were found, and some others (e.g. Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan) facilitated negotiation between First Nations and non-native adjacent communities when First Nations sought to build more casinos. In addition, provincial governments commonly channeled casino revenue into addiction treatment and social services. Overall, as provincial governments openly acknowledged and helped First Nations with operational matters, First Nations garnered not only legitimacy but also competitiveness as new field members.

> Grand Chief [of First Nations in Manitoba] Ron Evans said a sod-turning for the Spirit Sands Casino, to be built off Highway 5 about 16 kilometers south of the Trans-Canada Highway between Carberry and Glenboro, is scheduled for the third week of September. "It's a lengthy process," Evans said. "We've got a lot of bureaucratic hurdles we have to overcome."...Recently, the Manitoba government agreed to guarantee a loan of up to $750,000 towards the project, according to a cabinet document. (*Winnipeg Free Press*, Aug 26, 2010)

> Enoch's casino proposal has been before the provincial gaming commission for two years. "The process is taking too long," Morin [Former Chief of the Enoch Cree First Nation in Alberta] said Saturday. After Friday's meeting, Klein [Premier of Alberta] told reporters the province would try to sort out any problems. (*Edmonton Journal*, Sep 21, 2003)

> Gaming ministers from Saskatchewan and Manitoba promised Thursday to strengthen ties with First Nations business groups and continue to channel revenue into addictions counseling for problem gamblers. Saskatchewan Gaming Minister Glenn Hagel told a national gaming summit his province in ensuring Aboriginal people benefit from the economic opportunities in the billion-dollar gaming industry. (*Sault Star*, Apr 12, 2002)

In summary, the stigma that First Nations carry, namely indigeneity, represents the third challenge that they had to overcome during the entrance into the gambling field, discrediting First Nations' competence as field members and creating difficulties for resource acquisition. To overcome the challenge, First Nations engaged in resourcing stigma, which includes three subprocesses: transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy, smoothing resource acquisition with stigma, and differentially leveraging stigma suffering and stigma. The

first two subprocesses helped First Nations obtain government approval to open casinos, and the third subprocess helped First Nations become stronger field members.

Summary

To summarize, my empirical investigation shows that all the three challenges oppressed groups may experience during the entrance into mature fields, as suggested by the literature, did surface for First Nations; specifically, these challenges were internal conflicts, existing field-level regulations or law, and stigma. These challenges created difficulties for First Nations throughout different stages, and First Nations had to overcome these challenges. To manage "internal conflicts", First Nations engaged in "forging in-group consensus" by redirecting in-group tension toward the government, enacting communal decision-making, and antagonizing yet engaging the government. To overcome the challenge of "existing field-level regulations or laws", First Nations engaged in "regulative maneuvering" by attempting regulative inclusion, forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks and compromising the power of competing frameworks. Finally, to overcome the challenge of stigma, First Nations engaged in "resourcing stigma" by transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy, smoothing resource acquisition with stigma, and differentially leveraging stigma suffering and stigma. Through these processes, First Nations not only obtained government approval to become part of the gambling field, but also become prominent field members.

Table 6   Additional Quotes for the Process of "Resourcing Stigma"

Transforming Stigma into a Source of Legitimacy and Power	
(a)Invoking stigma suffering	'The casino industry presents us with a desperately needed opportunity... Extraordinary high unemployment, poverty and poor health conditions plague our communities. Community infrastructure including basic services such as a good supply of potable water, roads and sewers are all needed", said the negotiator of the Algonquin Golden Lake First Nation in Ontario. (*The Ottawa Citizen*, Sep 2, 1993) In this climate of increasing acceptance of Native responsibility, it is hard to imagine why a political battle is emerging over the issue of on-reserve gaming. Bands need new revenue sources for community development and business foundations if they are to grow. But in a climate of spending cuts in the name of deficit reduction and the transfer of programs from Ottawa to the provinces, one thing is certain: The feds cannot be relied on to subsidize on-reserve development that fulfills the potential of so many communities.(*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-21, 1993) We want them (the province) to lift economic barriers, the economic sanctions," said Roseau River band member Carl Roberts [from Manitoba] during an interview at the conference. He called the present system patriarchal and prejudicial against Natives, who he said want to regulate their own industry. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-19, 1992) They [First Nations] look enviously at U.S. reservations that have hit the jackpot with Las Vegas-style gaming operations that provide employment and money for economic development - with the federal and state government's blessing - and they want a roll of the dice. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 10-21, 1993) Onion Lake First Nation is planning a casino near Lloydminster while the Tribal Chiefs Association of St. Paul wants to build one as well. It's to the Alberta government's advantage to let native people get into the casino business, said Shade, whose reserve of 9,000 people has 1,400 names on its waiting list for housing. "There's a big social ill in First Nations because of unemployment," he said. "The jails are full of First Nation people. Social welfare agencies in urban centers have a high content of First Nations." Casinos could help aboriginals rebuild, Shade said. (*Edmonton Journal*, Mar 31, 2000)
(b)Embracing stigma	Proving that an activity is an integral part of aboriginal society is difficult, Jones [an Assembly of First Nations legal representative in Saskatchewan] said, but he added that First Nations have been practicing gaming in some form for many years.(*Star – Phoenix*, Aug 10, 2000) Told by Simon Fraser University criminologist Colin Campbell that "First Nations have arrived too late on the gaming scene" to compete with charity

| | casinos and the private sector, Ignace [Chief of the Skeetchestn First Nation near Kamloops in British Columbia] laughed. "We were here before anyone. We had dice carved from antler bones . . . we've always gambled." (*The Province*, May 10, 1994)

In B.C., natives require the same approval to operate gambling facilities as non-natives. But some natives argue they deserve a bigger share of the profits from gambling on reserves, since gambling is a traditional activity like fishing or hunting.(*The Vancouver Sun*, Aug 19, 1993)

Morahan [Band lawyer of the Beecher Bay Band in British Columbia] said he plans to introduce evidence that gambling is a long-held cultural tradition among the Coast Salish. Linda VandenBerg, a cultural anthropologist who works extensively on behalf of First Nations in B.C., said the tradition of gambling goes back thousands of years and that artifacts of s'lahal -- or bone games -- are often found in archeological digs. (*Times-Colonist*, Oct 5, 1998) |
|---|---|

## Smoothing Resource Acquisition with Stigma

| (a)Acquiring resources from similarly stigmatized actors | The White Bear band [in Saskatchewan] then went shopping for investors in the U.S., where management companies offer to front bands the money for casinos, supply equipment and then run the operations, usually for 40 percent of the take. The White Bear entered into a five-year contract with the Native-run Indian Entertainment Systems, Inc., of Wisconsin, which provided the band with 100 slot machines and six blackjack tables, for a 60-40 split. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-5, 1993)

Seminars focused on topics such as success stories from the U.S., where Indians own and operate multi-million dollar casinos with the government's blessing, a review of Canadian laws, feasibility studies and marketing and the social impact of gaming operations on tribes and surrounding communities. (*Windspeaker*, Vol 11-5, 1993) |
|---|---|
| (b)Acquiring resources from "the wise" | And so, because we wanted to build an entertainment center, we were first out of the block, we had to have our lawyers and our negotiators, people who support our community. (Interview, First Nation leader)

More than 130 delegates from six provinces gathered in Bemidji on Saturday for the three-day meeting. Also represented were the Canadian justice system and the RCMP. Their agenda includes tours of area casinos, and seminars on the business of gambling (*Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, May 19, 1992) |

Differentially Leveraging Stigma

(a)Maximizing the alleviation of	Casino Rama [in Ontario] spokesperson Sherry Lawson said the money is part of $500,000 the casino donates to grassroots organizations in Orillia and the surrounding area. "They do good work in our community," said

stigma suffering	Lawson, during a short presentation outside the native women's center on Thursday morning. (*Packet and Times*, June 20, 2003) It's not easy to find benefits in the legacy of the residential school system that was imposed on Canada's aboriginal population. But the aboriginal operators of the St. Eugene Golf Resort in British Columbia and Casino have managed to do just that, converting an abandoned mission school near Cranbrook/Kimberley into a high-end resort property.(*The Windsor Star*, Jun 21, 2008) An average of 12,000 gamblers - 20 times the population of Mnjikaning - spin the wheels in the big-box gaming house every day, dropping more than a million dollars every 24 hours. Gross revenues for the fiscal year ending March 31 totaled $538 million. The largest employer of aboriginal people in Canada, the casino has brought unimagined prosperity and growth to this small Chippewa community that for generations nestled quietly among pastureland, woodlots and cottages on the east shore of Lake Couchiching. (*Packet and Times*, Aug 4, 2000)
(b)Compromising on the embrace of stigma	Initially, we planned to allow smoking in 30 percent of the casino because we need the space for smudge and pipe ceremony (where tobaccos are burned), but eventually that space was reduced to 25 percent because people said you got too much smoking going on (Interview, First Nation leader) Bright beams of light form a giant teepee on top of the Painted Hand Casino in Yorkton, a signature trademark of three First Nations casinos operated by the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA). Last week, officials with the Yorkton casino became aware that many different species of migratory birds from a few to possibly hundreds were found dead around the city. And the lights are likely to blame….. SIGA spokesperson Steve Shaheen said staff is now monitoring the lights each night and turning them off if they spot any birds nearby. The lights were switched off earlier this week when one bird was caught in their glare, he said. ``We certainly want to be a good corporate and responsible citizen and a good neighbor at the same time. And certainly it was never our intention to offend or be harmful to any wildlife." (*The Canadian Press Newswire*, Sep 16, 2008)

Figure 7 A Process Model of Oppressed Social Groups Gaining the Right to Participate in Mature Fields

| Field Membership Granted | ⟶ | Field Membership Preserved |

| 1. Transforming Stigma and Stigma Suffering into Sources of Legitimacy | 2. Smoothing Resource Acquisition with Stigma | 3. Differentially Leveraging Stigma Suffering and Stigma |

Resourcing Stigma

| 1.Attempting Regulative Inclusion | 2. Forcing the Enactment of Competing Legal-political Frameworks | 3. Compromising the Power of the Competing Frameworks |

Regulative Maneuvering

| 1. Redirecting In-group Tension towards the Government | 2. Enacting Communal Decision Making | 3. Antagonizing yet Engaging the Government |

Forging In-group Consensus

Stage 1: Seeking Participation

Stage 2: Strengthening Field Positions

Critical point: First Nation Gambling Agreements Signed

138

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, I aimed to understand how oppressed social groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields. Drawing on a rich set of documents and interviews, I demonstrated that this process can be very challenging for oppressed groups because of ongoing intra-group tension that weakens their collective action, field-level regulations or laws that explicitly render them as illegitimate entrants and constrain the strength of their field positions, and the stigma that discredits their arguments and actions. The challenges of intra-group tension, field-level regulations/laws and stigma created ongoing problems for First Nations, manifest in specific ways at different stages of the process. However, as shown in Figure 7, my findings suggest that oppressed groups may gain the right to field participation in the face of these challenges by engaging three overarching processes: forging in-group consensus, regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. Each of these processes entails evolving subprocesses that support concrete accomplishments and milestones, which accumulate to help realize prominent field positions. In my empirical case, the subprocesses on the left of the dashed line in Figure 7 occurred in the first stage, helping to obtain approval for field participation; the subprocesses on the right occurred in the second stage, preserving and strengthening field positions. In this chapter, I explain the key insights brought forward by the findings and how this study contributes to the literature.

A Bold, Confrontational Change Pathway for Actors with Low Resources and Power

First, this study contributes to the field literature by showing that actors with low resources and power can effect change in mature fields through a bold, confrontational pathway, contrasting with the depiction in the extant literature that these actors can only accomplish such change through a quiet, gradual pathway (Ansari & Philips, 2011; Leblebici et al, 1991; Reay et

al, 2006). The boldness and confrontational nature of the pathway that First Nations undertook manifested strongly in the process of regulative maneuvering and resourcing stigma. Specific to regulative maneuvering, First Nations persistently forced competing legal-political frameworks to contest field boundary and incumbents' power, openly dismissing formal boundary rules and defying the orders of incumbents. Facing the failure of regulative inclusion and the punitive threats from the incumbents, First Nations continued to insist on the legal-political frameworks that support their membership in the field, projecting a powerful presence despite their actually lower power positions. In terms of resourcing stigma, First Nations openly voiced stigma suffering, blaming the incumbents for their suffering and antagonizing the incumbents as the roots of all their problems. They also refuted incumbents' discriminatory discourse by asserting that their stigmatized identity not only enables them to be exempted from field rules, but also qualifies them as new field members.

Juxtaposing the quiet change pathway in the literature with the bold pathway shown in this study, I contribute to the literature by discussing potential contingency factors along which low power actors may take a quiet or bold pathway when initiating change in mature fields. A key difference between the literature and this study is that, despite all the change agents being actors with low resources and power, those in the literature have a much higher degree of embeddedness in the field than the actors in this study, which I suggest may be the first contingency that explains why the literature revealed a quiet, gradual change pathway while this study demonstrated the opposite. In the literature, the high degree of field embeddedness is considered to enable the agency of actors with low resources and power (Reay et al., 2006). Exactly because of high field embeddedness, those actors, despite being constrained by low resources and power, are very knowledgeable about the malleability of field practice and the

bases of pragmatic legitimacy, and thus can effect change by quietly and gradually adapting local routines or technologies (Leblebici et al., 1991; Reay et al., 2006; Ansari & Philips, 2011). By contrast, the actors in this study, as oppressed outsiders, are distant or even isolated from the field and their embeddedness in the field is minimum. Such low embeddedness means that they are unfamiliar with field practice, lack relational ties with incumbents and have very limited knowledge about how to take actions at the right time. As such, they lack the enabling factor to undertake a quiet, gradual pathway of change.

In the meantime, because of the lack of field embeddedness, they are not constrained by role identities, relational investments and entrenched field-level power hierarchies, which saves them from potential threats if they are to take a bold, confrontational pathway. In other words, the lack of field embeddedness may motivate low power actors to resort to bold, confrontational measures to effect change. In the literature, those highly embedded actors could not afford a serious battle with powerful incumbents, because backlashes may jeopardize relational ties and role identities in which they have greatly invested (Reay et al, 2006). However, when field embeddedness is lacking, just as the oppressed entrants in this study, it may not only de-activate the possibility to take the quiet, gradual pathway, but prompt a bold, confrontation pathway because there seems few constraints.

Another important contingency by which a bold versus quiet change pathway may unfold may be the nature of interaction patterns prior to the change being initiated between low power change agents with field incumbents. In the literature, those low power actors instigated change in the context where they had collaborative, or at least non-hostile, interactions with powerful incumbents (Reay et al, 2006; Ansari & Philips, 2011); however, the actors in this study had interacted confrontationally with the incumbents at the societal level for decades. As

the interactions patterns between institutional actors tend to reproduce due to entrenched roles and scripts (Scott, 2014), those who had interacted confrontationally may be unable to think of any other ways to interact when they collide in field change processes. As such, those low power actors who have interacted with field incumbents in confrontational ways, prior to initiating changes in the field, are more likely to take a bold, confrontational pathway.

The Expansion of Field Boundary and Stability of Field Governance

The second contribution of this study is to illuminate that field governance can remain intact while field boundary is expanded as a result of the entrance of new actors. Building on the idea that the participation of new actors may greatly alter patterned interactions between field members and the resources and ideologies they bring to the field may propel redistributions of power and interests (Grodal, forthcoming; Sauder, 2008), this study paid particular attention to the impact of new actors on field governance while examining the changes of field boundary that are commonly associated with the entrance of new actors. Echoing previous research (Sauder, 2008; Swilder, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), this study found that the entrance of new actors expands field boundary; however, it differs from previous research by showing that field governance, rather than altered with field boundary, can remain intact. This enriches our understanding of the relationship between field boundary and governance in the face of new actors, rectifying the depiction in the literature that the entrance of new actors necessitates the convolution of field boundary and governance (Grodal, forthcoming; Holm, 1995; Sauder, 2008; Swilder, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).

In contrast to the literature that suggests field incumbents alter field boundary and governance simultaneously to accommodate new actors (Grodal, forthcoming; Sauder, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), this study shows that the incumbents may use the expansion of field

boundary as a leverage for the stability of field governance; in other words, admitting the actors on the condition that the existing field governance by which they dominate the field must stay as the same. As evident in First Nations' experience, although First Nations pressured field incumbents to negotiate field boundary and governance by forcing competing legal-political frameworks and resourcing stigma, those pressuring actions triggered the incumbents to strongly assert their dominance during the negotiations. The incumbents not only demanded that First Nations must surrender to existing field governance if they are ever to be part of the field, but that First Nations must contribute part of acquired resources to the incumbents. As the incumbents insisted on these conditions while the resources First Nations acquired through resourcing stigma became material and relational investments, First Nations had no other options but conceding to the incumbents.

This finding echoes with Fligstein and McAdam (2012) that field level outcomes emerge from a process similar to negotiating settlements, but specifies how such negotiation process may unfold when oppressed groups act as field entrants, and prompts researchers to focus on the power positions and negotiation dynamics between entrants and incumbents when examining the field outcomes of new entrants. Differing from the literature where new entrants and field incumbents are not vastly distant in their power positions (Grodal, forthcoming; Sauder, 2008), this study demonstrates a kind of negotiation dyadic where the entrants are located in a significantly lower power position than the incumbents. As such, similar to Zietsma et al. (2017), it calls for comparative field-level studies that juxtapose the entrances of new actors in the context of power symmetry versus power asymmetry.

Also, adhering to the interactional nature of the field concept, this study paid close attention to the negotiation dynamics between new entrants and field incumbents. It shows that

First Nations negotiated forcefully in the beginning but their earlier actions compelled them to concede later in the negotiations, and such negotiation dynamics seem to play an important role in leading to the stability of field governance and expansion of field boundary. This finding suggests that future theorization on the type of negotiation dynamics may help us more systematically understand the impact of new actors on field boundary and governance.

The Variety of Successful Field Entrants

The third contribution of this study is to demonstrate that successful field entrants can come from a variety of social positions, from not only dominant social positions but also disadvantaged or oppressed positions. This is achieved by explicating the processes by which oppressed actors gain the right to mature fields despite oppression. Extant literature on fields tends to focus on mainstream, privileged actors as successful field entrants, but this study demonstrates that by engaging in the processes in Figure 7, oppressed social groups can also enter mature fields.

In the field literature, the understanding has been that mainstream-dominant groups are more likely to be successful field entrants, not only because they play the role of "rule-makers" in our society, creating rules that give them access to any field, but also because they dominate the sphere of cultural reproduction, rendering their membership in most fields as unproblematic or taken for granted (Bourdieu & Wacquant,1992; Bourdieu, 1994). Consistent with this theoretical understanding, empirical studies have documented several cases where mainstream-dominant actors, such as government and corporations, successfully enter mature fields (Sauder, 2008; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Russo, 2001).

However, this study demonstrates that actors who are oppressed in society can also successfully enter mature fields. It therefore draws attention to the variety of successful field

144

entrants. It echoes the emerging thought that actors are commonly agentic and capable of reconstructing their institutional environment regardless of social positions (Feldman, 2004; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Zietsma et al., 2017), but gives particular focus to the agency of those located at the lowest end of the social hierarchy (i.e. the oppressed). Specifically, it shows how oppressed actors can overcome the constraining forces of institutions by purposefully using the very devices of oppression, such as regulations, laws or stigma, to accomplish field entry, and that the use of those oppressive devices tends to attract strong backlash and require persistent boldness of the oppressed.

The Distinctive Nature of Field Entry by Oppressed Groups

The fourth contribution of this study is to provide insights into the distinctive nature of the process by which oppressed groups gain the right to mature fields. I started this study with the premise that social positions can significantly influence actors' agency and the ways by which they effect change (Wright & Zammuto, 2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), and thus considered that oppressed social groups, due to their unique social positions, may gain the right to mature fields in distinctive, characteristic ways. In the following section of this chapter, I discuss the distinctiveness of this process vis-a-vis field entry by mainstream dominant groups.

Pre-steps for Framing the Entry Prior literature has suggested that field entrants must frame their entry as non-threatening or adding to the interests of field incumbents as part of the effort to legitimize themselves as new field members (Ansari et al., 2016; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001). This can be challenging, because the entry may indeed reduce the resources distributed to the incumbents (Grodal, forthcoming). However, when field entrants are oppressed at the societal level, framing the entry as aligned with the incumbents' interests seems to encounter distinctive challenges. In this study, First Nations experienced difficulty convincing governments

that their entry into gambling could benefit the governments, because they were unable to, first and foremost, layout compelling analysis of and arguments for the benefits of their entry. Given that First Nations are disconnected from the mainstream, this means that for oppressed entrants, framing the alignment between field entry and incumbents' material interests may be obstructed by their alienation from and unfamiliarity with field activities; and therefore, they may need to first address any gaps in their understandings of field activities. In addition, as this study depicted, government officials were unsure about First Nations' entry because they suspected that First Nations may be unable to acquire startup funding. They also felt that instead of materializing the economic benefits of gambling for both sides, First Nations may actually turn the casinos into breeding beds for organized crime if the casino business became too complicated for First Nations. This means that oppressed entrants may have difficulty convincing the incumbents that they can materialize the envisioned benefits, as the incumbents may doubt the oppressed can acquire the essential resources for field activities, as well as competently manage field activities. By contrast, field entrants from mainstream society tend not to have these problems. In the case of Edison's company entering the lighting field (Hargodon & Douglas, 2001), they were well versed in the lighting business and thus could effectively convince field incumbents (e.g. gas companies, institutional agencies, and consumers) that electrical light would benefit the entire field. They were also technically experienced enough to convince others that the promised benefits would be realized. If Edison's company had not been embedded in the mainstream and known as innovators with a successful track-record, they may have engaged in rather different framing processes.

The findings of this study suggest that oppressed entrants may fill the gaps in their understandings of field activities and take the pre-steps of the framing exercise by acquiring

146

material resources and knowledge about the activities from similarly stigmatized actors and "the wise". Specifically, as the experiences of First Nations demonstrated, resources such as business knowledge and personnel that they acquired from similarly stigmatized actors and the "wise" remedied their insufficient understanding of gambling, helping them show governments how their entry could benefit both First Nations and the governments. This means that for oppressed entrants who lack understandings of field activities, framing the alignment between their entry and field incumbents' interests may be carried out by first acquiring such understandings or the resources that could produce such understandings from those who are similarly stigmatized or sympathetic to stigma suffering.

The similarly stigmatized and sympathetic actors can also help cast away the doubts that the oppressed are incompetent to materialize the envisioned mutual benefits, and thereby strengthen the framing that the entry of the oppressed could be aligned with the incumbents' interests. In this study, the resources that First Nations acquired from similarly stigmatized and sympathetic actors helped convince the governments that First Nations were business-ready to enter the field, and the presence of the resourceful, similarly stigmatized and sympathetic actors seemed to build a "logic of confidence and good faith" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; p. 357) in the governments. Overall, this study suggests that acquiring resources from similarly stigmatized and sympathetic actors (as part of the resourcing stigma process) may be a necessary pre-step for oppressed entrants to frame the alignment between field entry and incumbents' interests, which may represent an important feature that distinguishes field entry by oppressed entrants from mainstream entrants.

A Focus on Moral and Legal Benefits The findings suggest that oppressed entrants tend to highlight that their entry is in the interest of the incumbents on moral grounds; in other words,

their entry can bring salient moral benefits to the incumbents. This can be achieved through one of the subprocesses of resourcing stigma, transforming stigma suffering and stigma into sources of legitimacy. In this study, First Nations actively called out stigma suffering and framed that the entry into gambling as the only way to relieve the suffering, and that facilitating entry of First Nations allows the provincial and federal governments to be more morally fulfilled. Besides, First Nations pressured on the social-justice front that any resistance to their entry could be understood as racial injustice or disrespectful of their cultural traditions, which may potentially undermine the morality of the governments. This emphasis on the moral benefits of field entry contrasts with prior literature, where mainstream entrants focused on the material benefits of their entry for the incumbents (Ansari et al., 2016; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001), and represents another distinctiveness of field entry by oppressed groups. More specifically, it is through calling out stigma and its associated suffering that the emphasis on moral benefits for the incumbents becomes highlighted, which echoes the broad literature on social change where disadvantaged actors (e.g. HIV patients and African Americans) tend to rely on arguments based on social justice to push forward change (Maguire et al., 2006; Wooten, 2015), but differs from prior literature where moral benefits tend to be conveyed on the basis of authenticity, sustainability, or other value ideals (Weber et al., 2008).

Moreover, oppressed entrants may argue that allowing their entry can avoid legal-social costs for the incumbents, which may be achieved through one of the subprocesses of regulative maneuvering, forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks. In this study, First Nations pressured the governments by arguing that if the governments continued to resist First Nations, they might begin a lengthy legal process where the governments were not guaranteed to win. If the governments lost the lawsuit, they would face a great loss of material resources and

possibly public image. Previous studies have not portrayed that mainstream entrants often highlight their entry can save legal-social costs for the incumbents (Ansari et al., 2016; David et al., 2013; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001), but the findings of First Nations' entrance suggest that oppressed entrants may tend to do so. This echoes Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) as they described how forestry companies let First Nations into the forestry field partly due to the fear of a costly legal battle. Since legal designations of rights may be the bottom-line protection for oppressed groups (Morrill et al., 2010), oppressed entrants may be more likely than mainstream entrants to caution field incumbents that the cost of preventing their entry would be legal in nature; in other words, allowing their entry is in the incumbents' best legal interests.

Contextually Invoking Difference The findings also suggest that oppressed entrants may develop new understandings of field boundaries that parallel existing ones by emphasizing that they are culturally and politically different from, and not inferior to, field incumbents. In this study, First Nations embraced their stigma, indigeneity, as a way of highlighting that they were culturally different; and forced sovereignty claims to emphasize their political difference. This approach contrasts with grass-feeding farmers demoralizing mass production (Weber et al., 2008) and environmentalists undermining existing modes of production (Hoffman, 1999; Van Wijk et al., 2013). As First Nations focused on cultivating the incumbents' respect for differences, it potentially exempted them from the membership rules of the field. It echoes Lyons et al.'s (2017) proposition that laying out expansive opposition claims—claims that expand the basis of legitimacy to include undervalued identity attributes—may precipitate positive social change for oppressed or stigmatized groups. However, it emphasizes that oppressed entrants claim that their oppressive attributes—for example, First Nations claiming indigeneity—do not constitute inferiority, but instead an equally respectable difference.

Nevertheless, oppressed entrants may need to compromise the previously sharply framed differences after they initially enter the field; otherwise, they may attract legitimacy challenges and even endanger their field membership. As demonstrated in this study, First Nations had to moderate the cultural distinctiveness of their casino facility (e.g. taking away the lights on Tipi when environmentalists suggested they disrupted bird migration), and smoking practices when the difference caused public controversy and criticism. Had not First Nations compromised the differences, they might have been considered as deviant field members, and their legitimacy would have been undermined. This contrasts with prior literature, where new entrants may retain or continue to develop their distinctiveness in order to gain a competitive advantage (Navis & Glynn, 2010; Wry, Lounsbury & Glynn, 2011). For oppressed entrants, compromising differences after initial entry may be essential, since their power disadvantage may render it likely that other field members can cancel their membership if the differences make them overly competitive. Taken together, the findings suggest that by contextually invoking difference, oppressed entrants may attain prominent membership in mature fields. This focus on contextually invoking difference may constitute another distinctive nature of the field entry by oppressed groups.

Surrendering to Existing Field Governance The last distinctiveness, as suggested by the findings of this study, is that oppressed entrants may need to surrender to the existing field governance structure in order to gain admittance into the field. According to Zietsma et al. (2017), ideas, resources, and power in fields are for all actors to grasp. Thus, the new membership arrangements negotiated between field entrants and the incumbents may not only designate how field entrants share field resources, but also how they can be governed within the existing distribution of power. As demonstrated in this study, First Nations and the governments

had to not only negotiate the operational model of First Nation casinos, but also how the casinos would be governed in the field. The gaming agreements that First Nations and the governments created permitted First Nations to enter the field, and yet put First Nations casinos under government control. In fact, the latter was the pre-condition for the former. Even though First Nations disagreed during the negotiation that their casinos should be controlled by provincial governments, they had to concede, because they were not powerful enough to challenge that. This suggests the new membership arrangements negotiated between oppressed entrants and field incumbents may give the entrants the permission to enter the field, allowing them to access field resources, but may not change existing field governance structure where the incumbents hold ultimate control. If field entrants are as powerful as the states, they may be able to negotiate membership arrangements that alter field governance, placing themselves as new governance actors (Fligstein, 2002; Grodal, forthcoming); however, when the entrants are disadvantaged as oppressed groups, they may need to surrender to the existing governance structure for the sake of entering the field and accessing field resources.

Stigma as a Resource

The fifth contribution is to the stigma literature, as explained below. As previous literature suggested, stigma can lead to exclusion and discrimination (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Tilsick, 2011), and therefore may obstruct oppressed groups from gaining the right to mature fields. The findings of this study showed that First Nations experienced resistance stemming from their stigma, indigeneity, but, more importantly, demonstrated that First Nations resourced the very stigma, transforming it into a resource that supported their participation in the gambling field.

I use the phrase "resourcing stigma" to stand for the overarching processes through which First Nations used stigma to their advantage. The term "resourcing" originates from Feldman (2004) and has been increasingly used by scholars (Howard-Grenville, 2007; Feldman and Worline; 2012, Wiedner, Barrett & Oborn, 2017). It refers to making use of the things at actors' disposal that are conventionally not considered as resources. "Resourcing" and "bricolage" (Baker & Nelson, 2005) both represent agentic responses to resource constraints; however, resourcing focuses on creatively using things that might be normally treated as "waste" such that they come to resemble resources, while bricolage focuses on making connections between things that are usually not connected (Lévi-Strauss, 1967; Baker & Nelson, 2005). As such, resourcing stigma means making do with stigma that is often considered as a negative feature. Notably, I characterize "resourcing stigma" as a 'tactical" rather than "strategic" response to constrains. As Skeggs (1997) and Liu (2017) stated, the notion of "strategic" best characterizes the actions of those who possess great power, while "tactical" characterizes the actions of the powerless to cope with institutional constraints. Since oppressed groups are apparently much less powerful than the mainstream, their resourcing stigma may very well be tactical. By characterizing it as tactical rather than strategic, I acknowledge the involuntary nature of "resourcing stigma"; that is, oppressed groups may engage in resourcing stigma because they have very few options.

The notion of "resourcing stigma" contributes to the stigma literature in several ways. First, it echoes the emerging thought that sometimes certain actions to manage stigma may bring surprising benefits (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Shantz et al, 2018), but modifies and enriches the existing notion of "leveraging stigma" by drawing on the concept of "resourcing", highlights that the leverage of stigma is produced as actors cope with resource constraints and make-do with stigma which is conventionally not considered as a resource.

Second, the subprocesses of resourcing stigma provide a much more systematic understanding of how actors may use stigma to their advantage. In the literature, scholars have depicted embracing stigma as the major tactic of leveraging stigma (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al, 2018), risking to oversimplify the mechanisms of leveraging stigma. In contrast, this study systematically investigated the use of stigma and uncovered three subprocesses that are much more encompassing and nuanced than embracing stigma per se. The subprocesses not only add new meaning to the tactic of embracing stigma, but also reveal new tactics of leveraging stigma. Moreover, they illuminate that embracing stigma and other tactics of stigma use may generate positive outcomes through largely different mechanisms from the literature has suggested. I elaborate on these contributions in the following paragraphs.

Regarding embracing stigma, the findings of this study resonate with the literature by showing that it is an important tactic of leveraging stigma, but demonstrate that embracing different aspects of stigma may generate different outcomes and embracing stigma may result in positive outcomes by exempting stigmatized actors from mainstream rules, rather than attracting receptive audiences as suggested in the literature (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al., 2018). In First Nations' experience, they embraced their stigma---indigeneity, creating moral and political pressure on field incumbents to allow their participation. While embracing the cultural aspect of indigeneity (i.e. because gaming is part of indigenous culture and ingenious people have the right to practice their culture, they have the right to gaming) did not lead to positive outcomes, as the court easily rejected First Nations' claims, embracing the political aspect of indigeneity (i.e. indigenous peoples have the right to decide what to do on their land) pressured the governments into allowing First Nations' participation in the gambling

field. The different outcomes sensitize us to the effects of embracing the different aspects of stigma, and indicate that embracing the political aspect of stigma may generate more power. Besides, as scholars have suggested, stigma is essentially a human difference that becomes a socially constructed marker with many negative connotations (Link & Phelan, 2001). First Nations embraced their stigmatizing difference, arguing that they could be exempted from the existing rules of field membership exactly because of their difference (especially political difference), which helped them gain the right to the gambling field. As such, embracing stigma may work to exempt actors from existing rules, which differs from the existing literature where the benefits of stigma mostly come from drawing in receptive audiences (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al., 2018).

Apart from bringing a more nuanced understanding of embracing stigma, the findings of this study also demonstrate other important tactics of leveraging stigma, as well as the mechanisms by which they generate positive outcomes. One important new tactic is invoking stigma suffering, which means detailing the unbearable social-economic conditions that are resulted from stigma. In First Nations' case, they strongly emphasized that their stigma has led to extreme poverty, and that resistance to their field participation could be perceived as racial injustice. In doing so, they exerted moral pressure on the governments to maintain conversations with First Nations. The process of invoking stigma suffering contributes to the literature by highlighting that stigma suffering can be an important construct in which the benefits of stigma reside. Also, the working mechanism of invoking stigma suffering largely differs from that of embracing stigma---"the alignment of taste" (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016), since it produces positive effects through moral mechanisms, exerting moral pressures on resistant audiences.

Another new tactic of leveraging stigma is acquiring resources from similarly stigmatized actors and "the wise". First Nations did so as a response to the difficulties of acquiring resources from mainstream resource providers. As similarly stigmatized actors and "the wise" are a small group of actors, this finding resonates with the existing literature that stigmatized actors may acquire resources from a small segment of the society (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016). However, it also differs, because the actors who provided resources to stigmatized actors in the literature (e.g. MMA organization) are receptive to the actors' activities, while the similarly stigmatized actors and "the wise" provided resources in this study because they are sympathetic to stigma suffering. In other words, sympathy may be the driving force behind resource giving by the audience of stigmatized actors, rather than the alignment of taste suggested in the literature (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016), which may be especially true for stigmatized social groups compared to stigmatized organizations attended by the existing literature.

"The wise" is a notable group of actors. By Goffman (1963), "the wise" see through the negative stereotypes of the stigmatized and treat them the same as normal. Despite Goffman (1963) describing "the wise" at quite some length, "the wise" has not received much attention from organizational scholars. This study, on the contrary, highlights the importance of "the wise", showing "the wise" were instrumental in First Nations' entry. Furthermore, it emphasizes that "the wise" are different from the "receptive actors" in the literature, because "the receptive" actors seem to be coupled with the stigmatized and against the mainstream (Helms & Patterson, 2014), whereas "the wise" are more similar to savvy brokers and not necessarily against the mainstream.

Third, the findings contribute to the literature by showing a non-linear relationship between leveraging stigma and social approval, contrasting to the literature which depicts that social approval arises from leveraging stigma in a straightforward way (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016). In the literature, scholars tend to portray the process by which leveraging stigma leads to social approval as linear; that is, the more stigmatized actors engaged in leveraging stigma, the more others will accept the stigmatized actors (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016). Certainly, the findings of this study indicate that the degree of approval by field incumbents increased over time as First Nations resourced stigma. However, they showed that the process was not straightforward. While resourcing stigma made the government gradually accept First Nations, it also created intense contentions and pushbacks along the way. For example, the government openly rejected First Nations' claims that gambling is an indigenous cultural tradition. As such, reversals and adjustments may be normal on the path on which resourcing stigma leads to social approval.

Fourth, the findings contribute to the literature, which only focuses on stigmatized organizations (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al., 2018), by demonstrating how stigmatized groups can leverage stigma in different ways from stigmatized organizations. As discussed above, while the literature suggests that stigmatized organizations mainly leverage stigma through embracing stigma (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Shantz et al., 2018), stigmatized groups may engage in other tactics than embracing stigma, such as invoking stigma suffering and acquiring resources from "the wise". Besides, these tactics specific to stigmatized groups may bring positive outcomes through moral emotions such as sympathy, which has not been highlighted in the literature on leveraging organizational stigma.

Finally, this study showed the actions by which actors deal with stigma that can neither be concealed or revealed, adding another contribution to the stigma literature. Although the stigma literature has suggested that situationally revealing and concealing stigma are important ways to deal with concealable stigma (Goffman, 1963; Hudson, 2008), we know little about how actors can deal with stigma when stigma can neither be revealed nor concealed, as in the cases of ethnicity or physical deformity. As the stigma that First Nations carries is un-concealable (especially the ethnicity dimension of indigeneity), the ways by which they resourced the stigma study enrich our understanding of how actors can deal with such stigma.

Promoting Stigmatized Identity to Effect Change

Building on the notion of resourcing stigma, the next contribution of this study is to demonstrate that oppressed groups can bring about change in highly institutionalized settings by promoting stigmatized identity, contrasting with the studies that suggest oppressed groups acculturate to the incumbents to bring about change. Although scholars incorporating social movements have revealed that acculturating to the incumbents seems to be the only viable way for the oppressed, and that any effort to promote their stigmatized identity would fail to bring about change (Clemens, 1993; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2005), this study began with the premise that this insight was based on the investigation of change aimed at broader social change and thus may not necessarily hold for field entry. Through the systematic examination of First Nations' entry into the gambling field, it demonstrates that acculturating to the incumbents is indeed not the only recipe for the oppressed to effect change, but that almost the opposite holds true: the oppressed can realize change by promoting their stigmatized identity. As is evident in this study, First Nations were able to overcome the resistance of the government

exactly because they adhered to and promoted both the political and cultural aspects of their indigeneity.

This finding resonates with the proposition of Maguire et al. (2004) that low-power positions may sometimes afford the possibility of change for change agents and push to the next level of specification by articulating how it operates. By specifying enacting stigmatized identity as the mechanism, this finding sheds light on one of the persistent theoretical challenges in institutional theory—how actors in low-power positions can affect change in highly institutionalized settings (Hardy & Maguire, 2017)—and extends the institutional change and social movement literature by highlighting a new mechanism by which oppressed groups can effect change.

As noted above, although the studies that examine how oppressed groups effect social change broadly suggest that acculturating to the incumbents or curtailing the stigmatized identity of the oppressed can help bring about change, this study demonstrated that the opposite to the literature—promoting the stigmatized identity—works to facilitate field entry. I propose that this departure may result from the diminished practicality of mobilizing other identity groups in the context of field entry. When the change is aimed at field level and limited in its scope to field entry, oppressed groups may not be able to recruit and engage a variety of identity groups, as opposed to changes aiming at the societal level where the oppressed often mobilize as many groups as possible (e.g. the women's rights movement). As the literature has suggested, having other identity groups participate in field entry may not be beneficial for the entrants, because these groups may vie for resources after the entry is accomplished (Grodal, forthcoming). For oppressed groups who already lack resources, they may, as a result, choose not to recruit other groups as a way of protecting their interests. Indeed, as this study demonstrated, First Nations did

not want to mobilize the Métis and non-status Indian groups (who are often considered as relatives to First Nations) to enter gambling together. As oppressed groups do not recruit entry participants from other identity groups, they forgo the opportunity to mobilize resources from these groups. This highly constrained situation may push them to enact or promote their stigmatized identity as the only practical or possible course of action. As a result, we observe that oppressed groups enact or promote stigmatized identity to enter mature fields, as opposed to curtail their identity and acculturate to the incumbents.

Managing Tensions Within Oppressed Groups

The fifth contribution of this study is to draw attention to the tensions within oppressed groups and demonstrate ways to manage the tensions during collective actions. Existing studies that engage oppressed or disadvantaged groups tend to portray them as homogenous, unified collective actors. Despite scholars sensitizing us to the tension within these groups (Bertel et al., 2014; Denis, 2015), the literature has remained silent on how such tension can be managed during field entry, in particular, and during collective actions more broadly by oppressed groups. In this study, I draw on the emerging idea that oppressed groups may experience internal tension during collective actions but push it forward by explicating the ways in which such tension can be managed in the context of entering mature fields.

In this study, I found that intra-group tensions surfaced intensely during First Nations' field entry, and that it was critical for First Nations to manage the tensions; otherwise, the negotiation of new field membership arrangements would be postponed and First Nations could not maximize the strength of their membership. The literature suggests that field entrants need to negotiate new field membership arrangements with the incumbents (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), which can become difficult if the entrants have conflicts or compete

among each other (Grodal, forthcoming). The findings of this study demonstrate that for oppressed entrants, such in-group conflicts or competition may be more imperative to resolve, as the incumbents may demand resolution as a prerequisite for negotiating new membership arrangements. As is evident in First Nations' experience, the governments wanted First Nations to come up with collective, coherent business plans before negotiating gaming agreements. To resolve the conflicts, First Nations had to forge in-group consensus in different ways over time. This finding suggests that oppressed entrants may need to forge in-group consensus as an essential step to negotiate with the incumbents about field membership arrangements. To be sure, field incumbents may require mainstream entrants to also resolve in-group conflicts before negotiating membership arrangements; however, oppressed entrants may be more likely to do so if required, since their power disadvantage may give them little leeway to act otherwise.

This study also reveals "forging in-group consensus" as the overarching process to manage the tensions within oppressed groups during field entry. Among the three subprocesses of "forging in-group consensus", the second subprocess, enacting communal decision-making, mainly involves the oppressed entrants, but the other two subprocesses unfold in the entrants' paradoxical relationship with the government. Specifically, First Nations antagonized the government in the first subprocess, while they antagonized and yet engaged the government in the third subprocess. This finding sensitizes us to the role of the government in managing the tension among oppressed entrants. It suggests that managing intra-group tension among oppressed entrants may occur *in the relational dynamics between the oppressed entrants and the government*, rather than separately exist inside oppressed groups. This echoes Denis (2015) in that the dynamics among oppressed members need to be understood in the broad social context;

and contrasts with Bertels et al. (2014), where resolving the heterogeneity among the less powerful actors (challengers) was described as relatively independent from the out-groups.

Further, a closer examination of the findings suggests that oppressed groups can purposefully shape the relationship with the government into antagonistic or collaborative so as to manage intra-group tensions, depending on the degree to which they have become part of the field, or, more broadly, the extent to which they have achieved the purpose of their collective action. When First Nations were outside the field, they solely antagonized the government to manage intra-group conflicts; however, when First Nations were already part of the field, they sought to work with the government despite antagonizing them at the same time. When First Nations were outside, antagonizing the government may not only have helped manage the intra-group tensions, but also generated the energy for them to collectively fight for entry (in the name of fighting for self-governance). Nevertheless, when they became part of the field, antagonizing the powerful government may have jeopardized their membership, as they held only subordinate positions in the field. Extending this finding to collective action suggests that oppressed groups may be more likely to engage the government to manage intra-group tensions at later stages of collective actions.

Tackling Oppressive Regulative Institutions

The sixth and final contribution is to reveal (un) successful ways in which oppressed groups can tackle oppressive regulative institutions during field entry, and, more broadly, inform the literature on regulative institutions how oppressed actors can deal with oppressive regulative institutions. Although regulations or laws are important pillars of institutions, our understanding of how less powerful actors can tackle their coercive power is relatively lacking (Scott, 2014).

By focusing on field entry, this study illuminates the agentic responses of oppressed actors to regulative institutions, enriching the literature on regulative institutions.

In this study, I found that the existing regulative institutions in the gambling field prohibitively discouraged First Nations from entering the gambling field and weakened their ability to strengthen field positions. In response, First Nations engaged in regulative maneuvering by attempting regulative inclusion, forcing competing legal-political frameworks and compromising the power of the competing frameworks. While the first subprocess---attempting regulative inclusion, did not turn out to be successful, the second and third subprocess generated positive outcomes for First Nations.

In the literature, scholars have considered that overcoming regulative barriers is important to entering mature fields (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Russo, 2001), which can be typically achieved by head-on contesting the existing understanding and seeking to replace them (Weber et al., 2008; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Van Wijk, et al., 2013). In this study, although First Nations attempted to do this by creating new legislation specifically for native gaming, changing the Criminal Code designation (regulative inclusion) and the Indian Act, they failed quickly because of their dismissal by major political and legislative organizations. This means when field entrants are oppressed in society, seeking to replace existing regulations of field boundaries may not necessarily work, not only because they do not hold the power to formalize and institute new regulations for the field, but also because the incumbents who hold such power can easily dismiss or fail the replacement effort.

Nevertheless, the findings suggest that oppressed entrants may accomplish field entry by forcing alternative legal-political frameworks at the societal level, even if such frameworks are contested. In this study, First Nations forced the sovereignty and other legal-political frameworks

that are contested at the societal level, defying the exclusive designation of field membership, which resulted in immediate punishment (e.g. provincial governments raided the unilaterally opened casinos), but eventually pressured the incumbents into allowing First Nations to enter the field. This echoes the insight in the literature that oppressed entrants would be immediately punished when they tackle field-level regulative institutions by defying them (Goffman, 2014), and, more importantly, reveals that contesting the field-level regulative institutions with the societal-level legal-political frameworks may work in the oppressed entrants' favor. As scholars have suggested, regulations and law, despite being often considered rigid, can be ambiguous or self-contradictory (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). By drawing on the legal-political frameworks at the societal level that are at odds with the field-level, exclusive membership regulations, oppressed entrants can justify their actions, exert pressure on field incumbents, and caution them about the legal-political risks of resisting the oppressed. By extension, this finding of regulative maneuvering demonstrates the influence of the societal-level legal-political ambiguities for field-level actions, drawing attention to the much-needed focus on the linkages between fields and the society (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). In addition, the findings suggest that oppressed entrants may need to compromise the leverage of the competing legal-political frameworks if they are to strengthen field membership after initially entering the field. As described in the study, First Nations had to compromise sovereignty in different scenarios when securing field membership; otherwise, they could have been penalized for being too different and overly competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the field. This indicates that there is a limit to what extent oppressed groups can force competing legal-social frameworks, and such a limit can result from the pressure of institutional conformity and the motives of the oppressed to protect achieved interests.

Extending these insights to how oppressed social groups can tackle unjust regulative institutions broadly, we may consider that, by anchoring actions in the societal-level regulations that dominant groups designed to alleviate the tension with the oppressed, such as equal-rights or civil freedom regulations (in this case, contested sovereignty), oppressed actors may have a better chance of success in tackling regulative institutions. In this study, the First Nations persistently pushed on the treaty rights that conferred upon First Nations the political position to do things differently from other social groups, leading the government to seriously consider First Nations as part of the gambling field. As treaty rights were historically designated by the colonizers in exchange for the domination of society at large, this means the rights conferred by the dominant to the oppressed, often as a buffer for explosive class conflicts, may help the oppressed progress in fighting regulative injustice if deployed properly.

Boundary Conditions

Similar to most field-level studies that focus on a particular field (Zietsma, et. al, 2017), the findings of this study are subject to boundary conditions. As Zietsma et al (2017) suggested, delineating boundary conditions increases the explanatory power of field theories. In this section, I discuss four boundary conditions that are salient to understand the findings.

Condition 1: Societal-level Ideology I suggest that researchers are most likely to observe the three processes uncovered in this study, especially regulative maneuvering and resourcing stigma, in those societies that ideologically pursue equality and human rights. In Canada, equality and human rights are actively pursued, which constitutes the state-level context in which First Nations' participation in the gambling field occurred. As fields are embedded in societal institutions (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), the occurrence of field-level processes are often conditioned by broader social structures and competing ideologies. Only in those societies

where the ideology of equality and human rights is prioritized, there may exist pieces of regulative institutions that support the actorhood of oppressed groups, upon which oppressed groups can draw to engage in regulative maneuvering. Also, only in those societies, when oppressed groups engage in regulative maneuvering, it is more likely to constitute a threat to the legality of the existing field boundary.

Also, only in societies that endorse equality and human rights, oppressed groups are likely to engage in resourcing stigma to participate in mature fields. As these societies pursue equality and human rights, they may recognize and problematize the stigmatization of certain social groups, and associate institutional ethos (Voronov & Weber, 2017) with the alleviation of stigma suffering. As reflective actors, oppressed groups in these societies are likely aware of such ethos and use it to their advantage by invoking stigma suffering. In addition, when equality and human rights are pursued as ideals, societal-level efforts may be taken to naturalize human difference, enabling the embrace of stigma.

Condition 2   Social Movements Concerning the Focal Oppressed Group The second boundary condition is the uprising of social movements concerning the oppressed group that seek to participate in a particular field. When First Nations were attempting to participate in the gambling field, indigenous rights movement had gained momentum. Waves of protests, demonstration and political mobilization began to create increased pressure on politicians and law-makers, demanding the recognition of indigenous rights. This means that the uprising of social movements itself may constitute a favorable opportunity structure that motivates the oppressed to participate in a field. In other words, an oppressed group is more likely to attempt field participation when movements concerning that group take shape.

Moreover, I suggest that the uprising of social movements can increase the likelihood that the concerned oppressed group accomplishes field participation. As social movement studies suggested, mobilization at the societal level can render political frames that favor oppressed groups available in ideational spaces, and hence positively shape the way by which the mainstream society perceives the political reality (Tarrow, 1998). The more the mainstream perceives a shifting political landscape in which oppressed groups are becoming powerful threats, the more likely they fulfill the local, intermediate demand of the oppressed (Tilly, 1978), such as the demand to participate in a field. As social movements open up opportunity structure at the societal level, the incumbents at the field level may be sensitized to allow the participation of the oppressed, in order to avoid the loss of legitimacy for the entire field. By contrast, when social movements are missing at the societal level, the attempt of the oppressed to participate in a particular field may be considered as an idiosyncratic effort; field incumbents may not perceive a shifting political reality, in which their legitimacy would be undermined if they do not grant the oppressed the right to participate in the field.

When social movements concerning the entrant oppressed group gather momentum, not only are the oppressed group more likely to succeed in obtaining field participation, but also the processes described in this study are more likely to emerge. As social movements may antagonize the elite, dominant class (Tarrow, 1998), they may provide discursive templates for oppressed field entrants when the oppressed redirect internal tensions towards field incumbents, increasing the possibility that such process will occur. Also, social movements may contest the institutional basis of existing regulative frameworks by raising alternative beliefs or values (Weber et al, 2008), and such contestation can enrich the discursive repertoire from which oppressed field entrants can draw upon to contest field-level regulative institutions. As evident in

this study, First Nations were able to force the enactment of contested indigenous sovereignty was largely because indigenous rights movements had surfaced the sovereignty framework in the Canadian political discourse.

Condition 3   Life Stage of the Field   In the field literature, scholars have distinguished mature field from emerging field. As Zietsma et. al (2017) suggested, mature and emerging refer to different stages of a field's life course. As the gambling field in this study represents a mature field, I suggest that the processes observed in this study (especially forging in-group consensus and regulative maneuvering) are more likely to occur when the field in question is mature.

In mature fields, actors have a shared understanding of field boundary, legitimate practice and governance structure (Scott, 2014; Zietsma et al, 2017). Thus, when oppressed groups attempt to participate in mature fields, the issue at stake is to confront the crystallized institutional forces and explore pathways in highly institutionalized structures. As field boundary and governance are well-established, the oppressed are likely to have clear targets of confrontation. In short, the processes that they engage are associated with a clearly-defined context of action. As evident in this study, the processes that First Nations engaged are responses to clearly understood field boundary and institutionally backed field governance.

However, in emerging fields which are characterized by under-defined field boundary, competing governance models and multiple templates for legitimate field practice (Grodal, forthcoming), oppressed groups will have very different issues at stake when they attempt field participation. As field boundary is in flux and domination structure is not clear, the key issue for the oppressed may be to adapt the envisioning of field positions while navigating through the evolving field space. Without the presence of settled regulative institutions in the field, the oppressed is unlikely to engage in regulative maneuvering as depicted in this study. Also,

without the pressure from a strong field incumbent that demands internal settlement from the oppressed (as in the case of this study), the oppressed may not forge in-group consensus, but rather, subgroups may openly compete with each other for positions in the field.

Condition 4   Prior Success in Other Jurisdictions   In this study, First Nations' participation in the Canadian gambling field was preceded by the legalization of native gaming in the United States, that is, the participation of American natives in the U.S gambling field. The success in the U.S. not only motivated First Nations, but also facilitated the accomplishment of First Nations. First Nations believed that they could achieve the same success as their U.S counterparts, and the American natives transferred their knowledge and experience to First Nations, helping First Nations overcome various obstacles. Therefore, I suggest that prior success in other jurisdictions may be another important boundary condition for the occurrence and success of oppressed groups gaining rights to field participation.

In the institutional literature, scholars have theorized diffusion as a key mechanism of institutionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). Prior adoption of practices can have a legitimizing effect on later adoption, creating normative pressures and serving as cognitive templates. Despite that later adopters must engage in local translation (Zilber, 2006), researchers have demonstrated the powerful impact of previous adoptions on later adopters. Relating to this study, this means that when oppressed groups successfully enter mature fields in certain jurisdictions, such success may function to legitimize their participation in other jurisdictions, whatever the oppressed must do locally.

As a very important reason why oppressed groups tend to perpetuate in oppressed social positions is they may not perceive a sense of agency due to the embeddedness in oppressed positions, it is particularly important to consider "success in other jurisdictions" as a boundary

condition. Such success may serve as a cue that triggers a focal oppressed group to re-examine their institutional environment and regain a sense of agency. This insight is consistent with the institutional theorizing that exogenous shocks often serve as catalysts of change since they evoke a sense of agency from deeply embedded actors (Zietsma et al, 2017).

In summary, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it demonstrates a bold, confrontational change pathway by which actors with low resources and power can bring about change in mature fields. Second, it illuminates field governance may remain stable while field boundary is expanded in the face of new actors' entry. Third, it draws attention to the variety of field entrants by showing the processes through which oppressed groups can successfully enter mature fields. Fourth, it reveals the distinctive nature of the process by which oppressed groups gain the right to participate mature fields, vis-à-vis field entry by mainstream dominant actors. Fifth, it contributes to the stigma literature by showing how social groups can use stigma as a resource, as well as how non-concealable stigma can be managed. Sixth, it highlights the tension within oppressed groups and provides insights into how such tension can be managed in the relational dynamics with field incumbents or dominant actors broadly. Lastly, it illuminates the ways in which oppressed actors may tackle regulative institutions.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In this study, I show how oppressed groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields. My qualitative investigation of First Nations' gained participation in the Canadian gambling field demonstrates that despite the challenges of internal tensions, existing field-level regulations or laws, and stigma, oppressed groups can gain the right to mature fields by forging in-group consensus, undertaking regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. In the literature, although scholars have increasingly paid attention to the process of field entry, the existing studies tend to focus on mainstream-dominant actors as field entrants (Asnari et al., 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Hargodon & Douglas, 2001; Sauder, 2008). Although oppressed social groups do succeed in gaining the right to mature fields, as evidenced by the entry of low-caste Indian workers into the high-tech sector in India and by Saudi Arabian women entering the taxi industry, we know little about how oppressed social groups can gain the right to mature fields.

This study sensitizes us to the specific challenges that oppressed groups may encounter when attempting to participate in mature fields. Although the literature has suggested it can be very challenging (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), we have yet to understand what challenges might block the way of the oppressed. In this study, I specify three challenges: internal tensions, existing field-level regulations or laws, and stigma. In doing so, I provide a more nuanced understanding of how gaining the right to mature fields is challenging for oppressed groups.

More importantly, this study demonstrates that in the face of the challenges, oppressed groups can still gain the right to mature fields by engaging in the process of forging in-group consensus, undertaking regulative maneuvering, and resourcing stigma. These processes represent oppressed groups' agentic responses to challenging situations and institutional

170

constraints, re-emphasizing that actors in disadvantaged social positions are still capable of exerting their agency and affecting change (Hardy & Maguire, 2017). By explicating these processes, I demonstrate that field entrants can come from a variety of social positions and draw attention to the variety of field entrants. Furthermore, this study shows that these processes were featured by boldly challenging the powerful incumbents. Specifically, forging in-group consensus involved redirecting internal tension toward the government as one important subprocess, regulative maneuvering involves forcing the enactment of competing legal-political frameworks that directly challenge the authority of the incumbents, and resourcing stigma pressures the incumbents on moral grounds. Taken together, these processes highlight the possibility that oppressed groups can effect field-level change in a bold manner, contrasting with the literature where less powerful actors quietly innovated local practices as a way of gaining field membership or effecting field change (Leblebici, et al., 1991; Reay, Golden-Biddle, Germann, 2006). In addition, as these processes worked together to bring about the stability of field governance and expansion of field boundary, they may be considered as the mechanisms by which field governance may remain intact while field boundary is expanded by new actors' entry.

While the processes that I observed in this study may be generalizable to other oppressed groups and fields, I believe that my findings are particularly meaningful for settings where there exist societal-level ideological pursuits for human rights and equality and social movements concerning the oppressed field entrant are uprising. Besides, the findings are also more meaningful when oppressed groups aim to participate in mature fields versus emerging fields, as well as when success cases existed in other jurisdictions prior to the case in question.

In the future, scholars who continue to study field entry by oppressed groups may consider the following directions. First, scholars may consider studying how oppressed groups

gain the right to mature fields in societies where social equality is not strongly emphasized and social movements concerning the oppressed group in question are not present. In this study, First Nations resourced stigma, which created moral pressure on provincial governments and hence helped them gain the right to the gambling field. However, this occurred in the Canadian context where social equality is being actively pursued. In societies where inequality across social class and ethnic groups is considered as "normal" and forward movements are not present, it is unclear if resourcing stigma can create moral pressures on field incumbents. In addition, such societies may also have minimal legal support for oppressed groups. In this study, First Nations forced the competing sovereignty framework as an important process to enter the gambling field. This was based on the constitutional designation, however contested, that First Nations situationally possess the right to conduct activities on their own. However, in societies where oppressed groups have little legal support, it is unclear how oppressed groups may still enter mature fields when they cannot legally argue for anything. If two of the key processes, resourcing stigma and regulative maneuvering, may not be effective in those societies, future research may investigate how oppressed groups gain the right to mature fields in those societies.

Second, scholars may investigate how oppressed social groups gain the right to emerging fields and how the processes differ from those uncovered by this study. As scholars have suggested (Maguire et al., 2004; Zietsma et al., 2017), emerging fields have different characteristics from mature fields. While mature fields tend to have established boundaries, shared understanding of field membership, and settled distribution of power and interests, emerging fields entail relatively open social arenas where field actors only begin to define field boundaries, membership, and the structure of field governance. Thus, when oppressed groups enter emerging fields, they may experience different kinds of challenges and take different

approaches. For instance, they may not encounter explicitly defined rules of field membership that exclude them (as in mature fields), but they may need to compete with all the other entrants to be the first ones to occupy important positions in the field. This means they may need to actively shape the symbolic and social boundaries of the field (Grodal, forthcoming), navigate through field-level uncertainties and ambiguities, and construct their legitimacy against an evolving understanding of field membership. It is unclear how oppressed entrants can accomplish these processes given their disadvantaged social positions.

In closing, this dissertation addresses the question of how oppressed social groups can gain the right to participate in mature fields. It reveals the challenges for the oppressed groups along the way and, importantly, the processes that can help overcome the challenges and eventually lead to the attainment of field participation. The nature of this process, as highlighted by this dissertation, reminds us that those at the bottom of society can address the concerning inequality in today's world through creative, unique and self-empowering ways by themselves.

REFERENCES

Abler, K. 2018. Kanyen'kehà:ka (Mohawk). Retrieved from
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/mohawk

Aguirre, A., & Turner, J. H. 2004. *American ethnicity: The dynamics and consequences of discrimination*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Alfred, G.R. 1995. *Heeding the voices of our ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk politics and the rise of native nationalism*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Anand, N., & Peterson, R. A. 2000. When market information constitutes fields: Sensemaking of markets in the commercial music industry. *Organization Science*, 11: 270–284.

Ansari, S., Garud, R., & Kumaraswamy, A. 2016.The disrupter's dilemma: TiVo and the U.S. television ecosystem. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(9): 1829-1853.

Amis, J., Munir, K., & Mair, J. 2017. Institutions and Economic Inequality". In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T. B., & Meyer, R. E (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism:* 705-736. London: Sage.

Armstrong, E. A. 2005. From struggle to settlement: The crystallization of a field of Lesbian/Gay organizations in San Francisco, 1969-1973. In Davis, G., McAdam, D., Scott, W. R., & Zald, M (Eds.), *Social Movements and Organization Theory*: 161-187. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, T., & Nelson, R. E. 2005. Creating something from nothing: resource construction through entrepreneurial bricolage. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50(3), 329-366.

Barker, R. L. 2003. *The social work dictionary (5th ed.).* Washington, DC: NASW Press.

Belanger, Y. 2006. *Gambling with the Future*. Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd.

Belanger, Y. 2011. *First Nations Gaming in Canada*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.

Bertels, S., Hoffman, A. J, DeJordy, R. 2014. The varied work of challenger movements: Identifying challenger roles in the US environmental movement. *Organization Studies*, 35(8): 1171-1210.

Bobo, L. & Hutchings, V. L. 1996. Perceptions of racial group competition: Extending Blumer's theory of group position to a multiracial social context. *American Sociological Review*, 61(6): 951-972.

Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L, J.D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflective Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1994. Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field. *Sociological Theory*, 12 (1): 1-18.

Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L, J.D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflective Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, C. S, Hartnagel, T. F., & Smith, G. J. 2005. The legalization of gambling in Canada. Retrieved from
https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/10297/Campbell_Hartnagel_Smith%20Research%20Gambling%20EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Clemens, E.S.1993. Organizational repertoires and institutional change: Womens' groups and the transformation of U.S. politics, 1890–1920. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98: 755–798.

Creswell, J. W. 2007. *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.

David, R. J., Sine, W. D., & Haveman, H. A. 2013. Seizing opportunity in emerging fields: How institutional entrepreneurs legitimated the professional form of management consulting. *Organization Science*, 24:356-377.

Denis, J. S. 2015. Contact theory in a small-town settler-colonial context: The reproduction of laissez-faire racism in Indigenous-White Canadian relations. *American Sociological Review*, 80(1): 218-242.

Dempsey, H. A. 2016. Blackfoot confederacy. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/blackfoot-nation

Devers, C. E., Dewett, T., Mishina, Y., & Belsito, C. A. 2009. A general theory of organizational stigma. *Organization Science*, 20(1): 154-171.

DiMaggio, P., Powell, W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2): 147-160.

Dong, S. 1995. Too many Asians: The challenge of fighting discrimination against Asian-Americans and preserving affirmative action. *Stanford Law Review*, 47: 1027-1057.

Dyck, N., & Sadik, T. Political organization and activism in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-people-political-organization-and-activism

Edelman, L. B., Erlanger, H. S., & Lande, J. 1993. Internal dispute resolution: The transformation of civil rights in the workplace. *Law & Society Review*, 27(3): 497-534.

Edelman, L. B., Smyth, A. C., & Rahim, A. 2016. Legal discrimination: Empirical sociolegal and critical race perspectives on antidiscrimination law. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 12: 395-415.

Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. 1997. The Legal Environments of Organizations. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23: 479-515.

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. *Academy of Management Journal,* 50: 25–32.

Feldman, M.S. 2004. Resources in emerging structures and processes of change. *Organization Science*, 15(3):295-309.

Feldman, M., & Worline, M. 2012. Resources, resourcing, and ampliative cycles in organizations. In K. Cameron & G. Spreitzer (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of positive organizational scholarship:* 629–641. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fligstein, N. 2002. *The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of Twenty-First century capitalist societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fligstein, N. & McAdam, D. 2012. *A theory of fields*. New York: Oxford University Press.

First Nations People of Canada. n.d. Retrieved from https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/ach_lr_ks_rrds_fnpc_1302786002220_eng.pdf

Ferraro, F., Etzion, D. & Gehman, J. 2015. Tackling Grand Challenges Pragmatically: Robust Action Revisited. *Organization Studies*, 36: 363-390.

Foucault, M. 1988. *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*. New York: Vintage Books

Freeman, M. A. 2015. Inuit. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/inuit

Gadacz, R. R. 2015. First Nations. . Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/first-nations

Gehman, J. & Grimes, M.G. 2017. Hidden Badge of Honor: How Contextual Distinctiveness Affects Category Promotion Among Certified B Corporations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 60: 2294-2320.

Gehman, J., Glaser, V. L, Eisenhardt, K. M., Gioia, D., Langley, A., & Corley, K. G. 2018. Finding theory-method fit: A comparison of three qualitative approaches to theory building. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 27(3): 284-300.

George, G., Howard-Grenville, J., Joshi, A., & Tihanyi, L. 2016. Understanding and tackling societal grand challenges through management research. *Academy of Management Journal*, 59(6): 1880-1895.

Gephart, R. P. 2004. Qualitative research and the Academy of Management Journal. *Academy of Management Journal*, 47: 454 – 462.

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. 1967. *The discovery of grounded theory*. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.

Gioia, D.A., Corley, K.G., & Hamilton, A.L. 2013. Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. *Organizational Research Methods*, 16: 115-131.

Goffman, E. 1963. *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

Goffman, A. 2014. *On the run: Fugitive life in an American city*. Chicago University Press.

Green, S. E. Jr., & Li,Y., & Nohria, N. 2009. Suspended in self-spun webs of significance: A rhetorical model of institutionalization and institutionally embedded agency. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52(1): 11-36.

Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. 1996. Understanding radical organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. *Academy of Management Review*, 21: 1022-1054.

Grimes, M.G., Gehman, J. & Cao, K. 2018. Positively Deviant: Identity Work through B Corporation Certification. *Journal of Business Venturing*. 33: 130-148.

Grodal, S. forthcoming. Field expansion and contraction: How communities shape social and symbolic boundaries. *Administrative Science Quarterly*.

Gurses, K., & Ozcan, P. 2015. Entrepreneurship in regulated markets: Framing contests and collective action to introduce pay TV in the U.S. *Academy of Management Journal*, 58: 1709–1739.

Hall, A. 2011. Treaties with indigenous peoples in Canada. Retrieved from

https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-treaties

Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. 1996. Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies. XLIV: 936-957.

Hampel, C. & Tracey, P. 2017. How organizations move from stigma to legitimacy: the case of Cook's travel agency in Victorian Britain. *Academy of Management Journal,* 60(6): 2175-2207.

Hargadon, A. B., & Douglas, Y. 2001. When innovations meet institutions: Edison and the design of the electric light. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46: 476–501.

Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. 2017. Institutional entrepreneurship and change in fields. In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T.B.,& Meyer, R.E. (Eds), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (2nd ed., pp. 261-280). Sage.

Helms, W., & Patterson, K. 2014. Eliciting acceptance for "illicit" organizations: The positive implications of stigma for MMA organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 57(5): 1453–1484.

Henderson, W. B. 2017. Indian Act. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indian-act

Heimer, C.A.. 1996. Explaining Variation in the Impact of Law: Organizations, Institutions, and Professions. In Silbey, S & Sarat, A. (Eds), *Studies in Law, Politics and Society*, 15:29-59.

Hoffman, A. J. 1999. Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42: 351–371.

Holley, L. C, Stromwall, L. K., & Bashor, K. H. 2012. Re-conceptualizing stigma: Toward a critical anti-oppression paradigm. *Stigma Research and Action*, 2(2): 51-61.

Holm, P. 1995. The dynamics of institutionalization: Transformation processes in Norwegian fisheries. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40: 398–422.

Hudson, B. A. 2008. Against all odds: a consideration of core-stigmatized organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 33(1): 252–266.

Joachim, G., & Acorn, S. 2000. Stigma of visible and invisible chronic conditions. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 32(1): 243-248.

Kelley. R. 2001. "First Nations gambling policy in Canada." *Gambling in Canada Research Report* No. 12. Calgary: AB: Canada West Foundation.

Kluttz, D., & Fligstein, N. 2016. Varieties of field theory. In S. Abrutyn (ed.), *Handbook of Contemporary Sociology* (pp. 185-2014). Palgrave Press.

Langley, A. 1999. Strategies for theorizing from process data. *Academy of Management Review*, 24: 691- 710.

Labrosse, M. 1985. The Lottery---From Jacques Cartier's Day to Modern Times. Stanke, Montreal.

Lawrence, T. B., 2017. High-stakes institutional translation: Establishing North America's first government-sanctioned supervised injection site. *Academy of Management Journal*, 60(5):1771-1800.

Lawrence, T.B. Hardy, C. & Philips, N. 2002. Institutional effects of inter-organizational collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45(1): 281-290.

Leblebcic, H., Salancik, G. R., Copay, A., & King, T. 1991. Institutional change and the transformation of interorganizational fields: An organizational history of the U.S. radio broadcasting industry. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36: 333-363.

Lee, G. K., & Lieberman, M. B. 2010. Acquisition vs. internal development as modes of market entry. *Strategic Management Journal*, 31-2: 140-158.

Lévi-Strauss, C. 1967. *The Savage Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. 2001. Conceptualizing stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27(1): 363-385.

Liu, H. 2017. Beneath the white gaze: Strategic self-Orientalism among Chinese Australians. *Human Relations*, 70(7): 781-804.

Locke, K. 2001. *Grounded theory in management research*. London: Sage.

Lounsbury, M. 2001. Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college and university recycling programs. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46, 29–56.

Lounsbury, M. 2005. Institutional variation in the evolution of social movements: Competing logics and the spread of recycling advocacy groups. In G.F. Davis, D. McAdam, W.R. Scott and M.N. Zald (eds), *Social Movements and Organization Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–95.

Lounsbury, M., Ventresca, M.J., & Hirsch, P. M. 2003. Social movements, field frames and

industry emergence: A cultural-political perspective of U.S. recycling. ***Socio Economic Review***, 1: 71–104.

Lu, C., Reay. T. 2016. Preserving a settlement despite ongoing challenges: The case of Native Indian Gaming in the United States. ***Research in the Sociology of Organization***, 48(B): 1-35.

Lukes, S. 1974. ***Power: A racial view***. Macmillan Press. London.

Lyons, B., Pek, S., & Wessel, J.L. 2017. Towards a "sunlit path": Stigma identity management as a source of localized social change through interaction. ***Academy of Management Review,*** 42(4): 618-636***.***

Maguire, S; Hardy, C; & Lawrence, T. 2004. Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 47 (5). pp. 657-679.

Mair, J., Martí, I., & Ventresca, M. J. 2012. Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh: How intermediaries work institutional voids. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 55: 819-850.

Marshall, T. 2015. Idel No More. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/idle-no-more

Marshall, T., Posluns, M., & Hall, A. J. 2006. Assembly of First Nations. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/assembly-of-first-nations

Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. ***American Journal of Sociology***, 83(2): 340-363.

Micelotta, E., Lounsbury M., & Greenwood, R. 2017. Pathways of institutional change: An integrative review and research agenda. ***Journal of Management***, 43(6): 1885-1910.

Miller, J. r. 2018. Residential Schools in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools

Moran, R. 2017. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/truth-and-reconciliation-commission

Morrill, C., Tyson, K., Edelman, L. B., & Arum, R. 2010. Legal mobilization in schools: The paradox of rights and race among youth. ***Law & Society Review***, 44(3/4):651-693.

Myers, M. D. 2009. ***Qualitative research in business & management***. Thousand Oaks, CA, : Sage Publications Ltd.

Navis, C., & Glynn, M. A. 2010. How new market categories emerge: Temporal dynamics of legitimacy, identity, and entrepreneurship in Satellite Radio, 1990-2005. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 55: 439-471.

Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. ***Academy of Management Review***, 16(1): 145-179.

Paetzold, R. L., Dipboye, R. L., & Elsbach, K. D. 2008. A new look at stigmatization in and of organizations. ***Academy of Management Review***, 33, 186–93.

Palmer, H., & Driedger, L. 2015. Prejudice and discrimination in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/prejudice-and-discrimination

Patton, M. Q. 2001. ***Qualitative research and evaluation methods***, 3rd Ed. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications

Patvardhan, S. D., Gioia, D. A., & Hamilton, A. L. 2015. Weathering a meta-level identity crisis: Forging a coherent collective identity for an emerging field. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 58(2): 405–435.

Pescosolido, B. A. & Martin, J. K. 2015. The stigma complex. ***Annual Review of Sociology***, 41: 87-116.

Petty, R. E., Fleming, M. A., & White, P. H. 1999. Stigmatized sources and persuasion: Prejudice as a determinant of argument scrutiny*. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76(1), 19-34.

Plowman, D., Baker, L., Beck, T., Kulkarni, M., Solansky, S., & Travis, D. 2007. Radical change accidentally: The emergence and amplification of small change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50(3), 515-543.

Provinces and territories of Canada. n.d. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_and_territories_of_Canada

Pyke, K. D. 2010. What is internalized racial oppression and why don't we study it? Acknowledging racism's hidden injuries. *Sociological Perspectives*, 53(4): 551-572.

Raghunath, N. 2010. The Indian IT industry and meritocracy. (Working paper series No. 140). National University of Singapore (NUS): Asia Research Institute.

Ragins, B. R. 2008. Discolusre disconnects: Antecedents and consequences of disclosing invisible stigmas across life domains. *Academy of Management Review*, 33(1): 194-215.

Rao, H. & Dutta, S. Free spaces as organizational weapons of the weak: Religious festivals and regimental mutinies in the 1857 Bengal Native Army. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(4): 635-668.

Reay, T, Golden-Biddle, K., & GermAnn, K. 2006. Legitimizing a new role: Small wins and microprocesses of change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49: 977–998.

Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. 2005. The recomposition of an organizational field: Health care in Alberta. *Organization Studies*, 26(3): 349–382.

Reay, T., Goodrick, E., Waldorff, S. B., & Casebeer, A. 2017. Getting leopards to change their spots: Co-creating a new professional role identity. *Academy of Management Journal*, 60: 1043–1070.

Ridgeway, C. 1982. Status in groups: The importance of motivation. *American Sociological Review*, 47:76-88.

Russo, M. V. 2001. Institutions, exchange relations, and the emergence of new fields: Regulatory policies and independent power production in America, 1978-1992. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46: 57-86.

Sauder, M. 2008. Interlopers and field change: The entry of U.S. News into the field of legal education. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 209–234.

Scott, W.R. 2014. *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Shantz, S. A., Fischer, E., Liu, A., & Levesque, M. 2018. Spoils from the Spoiled: Strategies for Entering Stigmatized Markets. *Journal of Management Studies*, In press.

Shepherd, B. A. forthcoming. *Operation fleck: The battle for economic sovereignty*.

Sine, W. D., & Lee, B. H. 2009. Tilting at windmills? The environmental movement and the emergence of the U.S. wind energy sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54: 123–155.

Skeggs B. 1997. *Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable*. London: SAGE.

Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. 2008. Social movements and the dynamics of institutions and organizations. In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T.B.,& Meyer, R.E. (Eds), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (2nd ed., pp. 281-310). Sage.

Schneiberg, M. & Soule, S.A. 2005. Institutionalization as a contested, multilevel process: The case of rate regulation in American fire insurance. In G.F. Davis, D. McAdam, W.R. Scott and M.N. Zald (eds), *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 122–160.

Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. 1998. *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for*

developing grounded theory (2nd Edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Suchman, M. C. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. ***Academy of Management Review***, 20(3): 571-610.

Suchman, M. C., & Edelman, L. B. 1996. Legal rational myths: The new institutionalism and the law and society tradition. ***Law & Society Inquiry***, 21(4): 903-941.

Suddaby, R. 2006. What grounded theory is not. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 49(4): 633-642.

Sutton, R. I., A. L. Callahan. 1987. The stigma of bankruptcy: Spoiled organizational image and its management. ***Academy of Management Review***, 30: 405–436.

Taylor, J. L. 2016. Indigenous peoples and government policy in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-people-government-policy

Terminology. N.d. Retrieved from https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/terminology

Tilcsik, A. 2011. Pride and prejudice: Employment discrimination against openly gay men in the United States. ***American Journal of Sociology***, 117 (2): 586-626.

Tracey, P., & Phillips, N. 2016. Managing the consequences of organizational stigmatization: Identity work in a social enterprise. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 59(3): 740-765.

United Nations. 2007. ***Discrimination of aboriginals on native lands in Canada***. UN Chronicle, (3).

Vaara, E., & Lamberg, J. 2016. Taking historical embeddedness seriously: Three historical approaches to advance strategy process and practice research. ***Academy of Management Review,*** 41: 633-657.

Van Wijk, J., Stam, W., Elfring, T., Zietsma, C., & Den Hond, F. 2013. Activists and incumbents structuring change: The interplay of agency, culture, and networks in field evolution. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 56(2):358-386.

Weber, K., Heinz, K. L., & DeSoucey, M. 2008. Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the movement for grassfed meat and dairy products. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 53: 529–567.

Whiteman, G. 2009. All my relations: understanding perceptions of justice and conflict between companies and indigenous peoples. ***Organization Studies***, 30(01): 101-120.

Wiedner, R., Barrett, M. I., & Oborn, E. 2017. The emergence of change in unexpected places: resourcing across organizational practices in strategic change. ***Academy of Management Journal, 60*** (3), 823-854.

Wooten, M. E. 2015. ***In the Face of Inequality: How Black Colleges Adapt***. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Wright, A. L., & Zammuto, R. F. 2013. Wielding the willow: Processes of institutional change in English county cricket. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 56: 308–330.

Wry, T., Lounsbury, M., & Glynn, M. A. 2011. Legitimating nascent collective identities: Coordinating cultural entrepreneurship. ***Organization Science***, 22(2): 449-463.

Zietsma,C., Groenewegen, P., Logue, D. M., & Hinings, C. R. 2017. Field or fields? building the scaffolding for cumulation of research on institutional fields**. *Academy of Management Annals***, 11(1): 391-450.

Zietsma, C., & Lawrence, T. B. 2010. Institutional work in the transformation of an organizational field: The interplay of boundary work and practice work. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 55(2): 189–221.

Zhao, E., & Wry, T. 2016. Not all inequality is equal: Decomposing the societal logic of patriarchy to understand microfinance lending to women. ***Academy of Management***

Journal, 59(6): 1994-2020.

APPENDIX

CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPATION (Non-indigenous Interviewees)

Research investigator   **Supervisor:**
Chang Lu, PhD Candidate   Trish (Patricia) Reay, Associate Professor
Alberta School of Business   Strategic Management and Organization
PhD Office, Business Building   School of Business
3-23 Business Building   4-21D Business Building
University of Alberta   University of Alberta
Edmonton. AB. T6G2R6   Edmonton. AB. T6G2R6
Email: clu5@ulaberta.ca   Email: trish.ready@ualberta.ca
Tel: 587-336-5018   Tel:780-492-4246

Dear Madam/Sir:

My name is Chang Lu. I am a Ph.D student in Strategic Management and Organization, University of Alberta. I am currently doing my dissertation on "The diffusion dynamics of First Nation casinos in Canada". My supervisor is Drs. Trish (Patricia) Reay.

As you may have witnessed, 18 First Nation casinos have opened in the past few decades in Canada, following the trend in the United States. However, there have been disagreements surrounding the development of some casinos. I am curious about how First Nations initiated the adoption of casinos, what contestations they faced, how they resolved contestations, and the resolution outcome.

To address these puzzles, I would like to invite you for a semi-structured interview, which may take about an hour. I believe your extensive knowledge of First Casinos will be of great value to my research.

There are no foreseen risks associated with your participation in this study. Your participation in this study will contribute to the understandings of the spread of First Nation casinos in Canada, helping to identify ways to better manage this economic sector.

Confidentiality and anonymity: I will take my best efforts to ensure that any information that is collected from you, and that can be identified as having come from you will remain confidential. All information gathered will be used for the purpose of the research and confidentiality and anonymity will be protected to the best of my abilities. My supervisor and I are the only ones who will have access to interview transcripts. Since it is common for research based on interviews to report quotations from participants, if your quotations are used in written reports, your name and position title will be disguised. Quotations that would allow identification of the source will not be used in research reports and publications. You will be given the opportunity to review your interview transcript. Reviewing the transcript will entail providing me with a mailing or email address.

Conservation of data: The data collection consisting of digital recordings and transcripts of interviews will be kept in a secure manner. Digital recordings will be stored on my university computer that is encrypted and password protected. Interview transcripts will be saved on computers used by me only. Access to these computers is protected by passwords. Files will be stored in a locked cabinet in my supervisor's office. Data will be stored for a period of 10 years from the time of publication.

Voluntary Participation: You are under no obligation to participate in this research. If you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw about 2 weeks after the interview, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be deleted.

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact my supervisor or me. Our contact information is written on page 1 of this document.

This research proposal has been reviewed by a Research Ethics committee at the University of Alberta. If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Alberta Research Ethics Office at 780-492-2615.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Chang Lu from the University of Alberta School of Business.

There are two copies of the recruitment and consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature: _____ Date: _____

Researcher's signature: _____ Date: _____

CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPATION (Indigenous Interviewees)

Research investigator	**Supervisor:**
Chang Lu, PhD Candidate	Trish (Patricia) Reay, Associate Professor
Alberta School of Business	Strategic Management and Organization
PhD Office, Business Building	School of Business
3-23 Business Building	4-21D Business Building
University of Alberta	University of Alberta
Edmonton. AB. T6G2R6	Edmonton. AB. T6G2R6
Email: clu5@ulaberta.ca	Email: trish.ready@ualberta.ca
Tel: 587-336-5018	Tel:780-492-4246

Dear Madam/Sir:

My name is Chang Lu. I am a Ph.D student in Strategic Management and Organization, University of Alberta. I am currently doing my dissertation on "The diffusion dynamics of First Nation casinos in Canada". My supervisor is Drs. Trish (Patricia) Reay.

As you may have witnessed, 18 First Nation casinos have opened in the past few decades in Canada, following the trend in the United States. However, there have been disagreements surrounding the development of some casinos. I am curious about how First Nations initiated the adoption of casinos, what contestations they faced, how they resolved contestations, and the resolution outcome.

To address these puzzles, I would like to invite you for a semi-structured interview, which may take about an hour. I believe your extensive knowledge of First Casinos will be of great value to my research.

Respect for Aboriginal Customs: I will take my best efforts to respect your unique history, culture and customs. I have taken my best efforts to familiarize myself with your communication customs. Should any inappropriate language or gesture do you identify during this interview, please tell me. I will stop the interview immediately.

The interview will be conducted on the principle of "respect for persons", ""concern for welfare" and "justice" outlined by Canadian Panel of Research Ethics with respect to aboriginal populations.

Risks and Benefits: The possible risk is that you may feel tried when thinking more about cultural issues. The benefit is that your participation in this study will contribute to the understandings of the spread of First Nation casinos in Canada, helping to identify ways to better manage this economic sector.

Confidentiality and anonymity: I will take my best efforts to ensure that any information that is collected from you, and that can be identified as having come from you will remain confidential. All information gathered will be used for the purpose of the research and confidentiality and anonymity will be protected to the best of my abilities. My supervisor and I are the only ones who will have access to interview transcripts. Since it is common for research based on interviews to report quotations from participants, if your quotations are used in written reports, your name and position title will be disguised. Quotations that would allow identification of the source will not be used in research reports and publications. You will be given the opportunity to review your interview transcript. Reviewing the transcript will entail providing me with a mailing or email address.

Conservation of data: The data collection consisting of digital recordings and transcripts of interviews will be kept in a secure manner. Digital recordings will be stored on my university computer that is encrypted and password protected. Interview transcripts will be saved on computers used by me only. Access to these computers is protected by passwords. Files will be stored in a locked cabinet in my supervisor's office. Data will be stored for a period of 10 years from the time of publication.

Voluntary Participation: You are under no obligation to participate in this research. If you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw about 2 weeks after the interview, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be deleted.

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact my supervisor or me. Our contact information is written on page 1 of this document.

This research proposal has been reviewed by a Research Ethics committee at the University of Alberta. If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Alberta Research Ethics Office at 780-492-2615.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Chang Lu from the University of Alberta School of Business.

There are two copies of the recruitment and consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature: _____ Date: _____

Researcher's signature: _____ Date: _____