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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE ROLE OF U.S. MEDIA IN THE FORMATION OF A CANADIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY

by 

BERTIL OSTLINGER

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled, *The Role of U.S. Media in the Formation of a Canadian Cultural Identity*, submitted by Bertil Ostlinger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Professor Linda Trimble (Supervisor)

Professor Judith Garber

Professor Susan Jackel

December 15, 1993

There's a difference between the *medium* and the *media*. [The] medium can be creative; the media is a branch of big business, government and all those other little things that happen to run people's lives. It is not creative, that is deadly.

Zappa (1940-1993), 1976.

DEDICATION

To my fabulous wife, Jennifer - my *Peaches* - without whom I am nothing.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the role and impact that United States media and culture have had, and continue to have, on Canadian culture and the Canadian cultural identity attendant thereto and its development. As such, this thesis is not confined to a purely political analysis, but is heavily informed by anthropology, history, sociology and, to a lesser extent, economics.

This study concerns itself exclusively with the impact that U.S. media have on the identity of English-speaking Canadians, and presents a three-pronged argument. Initially, Canada's cultural identity is inherently weak because Canada was expressly established as a British counterweight to the United States on the North American continent. Next, a weak Canadian infrastructure coupled with a continued Canadian reliance on foreign investment and other forms of non-Canadian influence, serve only to perpetuate the weak status of Canada's cultural identity. Lastly, those in charge of the creation, development, and promotion of culture in Canada have largely failed to make Canadian culture a viable alternative to U.S. culture. What has been is, instead, a "high"-versus-"low"-culture stratification that has rendered Canadian culture inaccessible and uninteresting to many Canadians.

While Canadians are different from Americans, because they are not Americans, their consumption patterns of culture are, in essence, identical with those of their American counterparts: culture is neither consumed on the basis of national origin, nor in an effort to reach a higher level of consciousness or sophistication. Rather, people consume culture because they want to be entertained. Therefore, the general conclusion of this thesis is that, much to the dismay of Canada's cultural nationalists, until Canadian culture becomes a viable alternative to American culture and, as such, is able to be as entertaining and compete on its own merits, Canadian culture will remained orphaned by the Canadian people.

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The basic blueprints for this thesis were made about five years ago in a course in American foreign policy at Bennington College in Bennington, Vermont. Since then, what is now the final product has gone through a number of stages and versions. In the course of this time, the thesis has benefitted from the advice, criticisms, suggestions, and other advice of a vast number of people, whom I hereby wish to thank.

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Unfortunately, I am unable to thank personally Frank Zappa, who recently passed away, much too soon. Frank's acute sense of the world we live in, in general, and the United States, in particular, shone through every aspect of his work. Assessing American culture, he said in a November, 1991, interview that "our culture is an accurate reflection of what we are. We like war, we like sports - sometimes in the other order. We like murder, at least on television. We think sex is interesting but we don't watch it; we like to hear people dressed in suits say words like *dong* on television. That's who and what we are." It would be difficult to overestimate Frank's influence and ability to inspire, and the world has, through his departure, suffered an immense loss. My debts to Frank, who I considered a close friend, are only surpassed by my respect and admiration, and he will be sorely missed.

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To those whose names have not been mentioned here but feel they should have been, my apologies. Please use a pen and add yours where you think it goes. To those whose names were mentioned but who wish they hadn't been - again, my apologies. All other remaining errors, distortions, and shortcomings contained in the following pages are my responsibility alone. And, for our American readers, don't forget to register to vote!

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Introduction

A CANADIAN IDENTITY PROBLEM

Preamble

In 1970, as waves of nationalism swept across Canada much like tidal waves roll in from sea, Margaret Atwood, one of Canada's most well-known and highly regarded authors, suggested that "[i]f the national mental illness of the United States is megalomania, that of Canada is paranoid schizophrenia."[1] While Atwood's characterization (or, for that matter, diagnosis) of either country and their respective conditions are quite exaggerated, they do suggest that in spite of their "next-door neighbor" relationship, the world's longest undefended border separates two countries that are quite different from one another, in spite of their many similarities. In both countries, aboriginal or indigenous peoples have had to make room for newcomers, most of whom are of European extraction. Moreover, English is the most commonly spoken language in both countries, and although there are large numbers of minorities, Caucasians predominate in both Canada and the United States

Nevertheless, Canada and the United States have, in spite of whatever first impressions one may have of the two countries, a great many differences between them. Canada, with her sparse population, is often referred to as a "mosaic," whereas the United States, with a population roughly ten times that of Canada, is considered a "melting pot." The Canadian mosaic favors a multicultural society and group, or collective, rights over individual rights. The American melting pot, on the other hand, is disposed toward the creation of a unified American culture at the core of which we find the sacredness of the individual and his or her rights. The Canadian mosaic and the American melting pot are, each in their own way myths, but as Michael A. Goldberg argues, the "truth of each myth is less important than the fact that Canadians cling to the mosaic myth and Americans to the melting-pot.... [T]he fact that a society clings to a myth is of vital importance."[2]

Assuming that Canadians really do cling to the myth of the mosaic - and it appears that this is the case[3] - it is a good thing that they do, for it is one of the few unifying symbols that Canadians have, and perhaps the only one that is recognized as such. As it happens, Canadians have great difficulty defining - for themselves as well as for others - what constitutes a distinct Canadian culture. To answer the question, *What makes a Canadian Canadian?* seems to pose a great deal more difficulty than does the question, *What makes an American American?*

Canada has, in other words, an identity problem. As the late Northrop Frye suggested, "Canadians are conditioned from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of a country of uncertain identity, a confusing past, and a hazardous future."[4] What Canadians can do, and do quite frequently, is to define themselves as "not American." To a certain extent, it is as if the defining characteristic of Canadians is that they are just that: "not American." Neither multiculturalism nor Canada's dual British and French heritage is as conducive to the development of a single, unifying culture and creed similar to those of the United States.

In this regard, a definition of the concept of culture is helpful, and the distinguished University of Pennsylvania anthropologist Ward H. Goodenough advances the following summary:

> Culture... consists of standards for deciding what is, standards for deciding what can be, standards for deciding how one feels about it, standards for deciding what to do about it, and standards for deciding how to go about doing it.[5]

Closely related to culture is the concept of cultural identity. Briefly, a cultural identity can be described as an embodiment of a society's culture, in which individual citizens can see a reflection of not only themselves, but also of the culture of the society in which they live. For Canadians, however, such a reflection consists of an increasingly dominant American element, together with lingering British and French influences, leaving very little room for a truly Canadian cultural identity.

Linguistic and regional tensions are further obstacles to the development of a pan-Canadian culture. Frye argues that "contemporary Canadian culture is not a national development, but a series of regional ones[;] what is happening in British Columbia is very different from what is happening in New Brunswick or Ontario."[6] June Callwood suggests that one of the reasons why definitions of what constitutes (a) Canadian are so vague, is that a

> national disinterest in Canadian history has created a vacuum in which a variety of desultory emblems and anthems have found accommodation. [For instance, t]he beaver, which has come to represent Canada as the eagle does the United States and the lion Britain, is a flat-tailed, slow-witted, toothy rodent known to bite off its own testicles or to stand under its own falling trees.[7]

The beaver may, in this regard, be seen as symbolic of what Atwood, Seymour Martin Lipset, Leonard Cohen, and Robertson Davies, among many others, have referred to, in one way or another, as Canada's "loser syndrome."

While Canadians probably are no more losers than are the citizens of other nations, the notion is rather firmly rooted in Canadian culture, and suggests a national vulnerability. This vulnerability is particularly salient when it comes to Canada's relationship with the United States, and nowhere is the vulnerability more pronounced than in the area of Canadian culture. This would imply that Canada's vulnerability is self-perpetuating. As John Meisel argues,

> Canada's cultural vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States is manifest everywhere. Book publishing,... film production and distribution,... theatre, [television, and] popular and so-called classical music - all have been dominated by foreign influences in Canada. *The indigenous product has had an exceedingly hard time getting started and surviving. This was so, in English Canada at least, largely because of the absence of a suitable native infrastructure and of an indigenous tradition, and because of the easy accessibility of, first, British cultural goods, and later, United States counterparts.*[8]

The Project

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role that United States media have in the formation of a Canadian cultural identity. Here, it is important to note that this thesis concerns itself exclusively with the impact that U.S. media have on the identity of English-speaking Canadians. While the thesis at hand is not devoid of references to Canada's French-speaking population, such references occur only in passing. However, this does not suggest the absence of a similar situation for the French-speaking Canadians. As John Meisel notes,

> United States styles, ideas, and products are never far away. There is, alas, a well-grounded fear that as a consequence, our perceptions, values, ideas, and priorities will become so dominated by those of our neighbours that the distinctiveness of Canada will, to all intents and purposes, vanish. The danger is greater with respect to anglophones than francophones, but even the latter have cause for alarm.[9]

The argument I make is three-pronged. First, Canada's cultural identity is weak because Canada was created not for her own purposes, but in order to preserve British colonial traditions and influence in North America, so as to offset the influence of a steadily growing United States and thereby prevent her expansion from one day encompassing the entire North American continent. Second, due to the presence of borrowed structures, as alluded to by Meisel in this preamble, coupled with a weak Canadian infrastructure that remains weak due

to continued Canadian reliance on foreign investment and other forms of non-Canadian influence, there is not an adequate Canadian cultural machinery in place to promote Canadian culture. This has less to do with the creation of culture, than with the ability to find or build an audience, and then retaining it, to which Canadian culture can be delivered.

Such an audience, however, must have sufficient reason to be attracted to Canadian culture - just because it is Canadian does not mean it will appeal to audiences. This leads us to the third and final prong of the argument. The Canadian content regulations, which were enacted in 1970 in order to increase the amount of Canadian radio and television programming, have largely been a failure. This is so for two reasons. First, the content regulations are less concerned with substance than with form (that is, they are quantitative rather than qualitative), and secondly - and more importantly - they are likely to have a limited impact on the cultural consumption patterns of Canadians because people do not, in general, consume culture on the basis of its country of origin, but because they want to be entertained. Canadians, therefore, must be able to find Canadian culture as entertaining, or more entertaining, than they do the imported culture, in order to consume it as willingly and vigorously. Thus far, those who create culture in Canada have not been very successful in this endeavor.

Chapter One of this thesis is considers the concept of culture in depth, as well as the different origins of Canada and the United States. Moreover, the chapter is also concerned with the two countries' social, political, and industrial and economic differences, along with Canadian regionalism.

Chapter Two focuses on television and how that medium is mandated by the Canadian content regulations to contribute to the promotion of Canadian culture and to Canada's cultural identity. Because of television's ubiquity, and due to the insufficiency of the content regulations, along with the broadcasters' reliance on advertising revenue, we will see how television has been rendered a rather inept contributor to, and promoter of, Canada's cultural identity.

Lastly, in Chapter Three, the presence and absence of a "high"-versus-"low"-culture stratification in Canada and the United States, respectively, is explored. Canada's cultural policy will be contrasted with the absence of a similar U.S. cultural policy, and the implications these states of affairs have for culture in Canada and the United States. Finally, the Canadian "loser syndrome" will be considered, and a loose definition of Canadian culture, as seen through the eyes of a Canadian sample, will be offered and examined.

As we will see in the following pages, the United States has tremendous influence on Canada, from culture to foreign policy to trade and beyond. Regarding culture and cultural identity, and for many Canadians, the American identity is a companion identity to the Canadian identity, and should the day ever come when the efforts to create and maintain a uniquely Canadian cultural identity are abandoned, a replacement identity will be available instantaneously. Indeed, Canadians may already cling to the American myth as much as the Americans do, and even have a "lease with an option to buy" the American identity.

NOTES:

1.Margaret Atwood, *The Journals of Susanna Moodie* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 62.

2.Michael A. Goldberg, "Comparisons of American and Canadian Cities." In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1986), p. 195.

3.See, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

4.Northrop Frye, "Canadian Culture Today." In Judith Webster, ed., *Voices of Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Culture* (Burlington, VT: Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, 1977), p. 1

5.Ward H. Goodenough, Culture, Language, and Society (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 22.

6.Frye, op. cit., p. 3.

7.June Callwood, *Portrait of Canada* (Markham, ON: PaperJacks Ltd., 1981), p. xxiii.

8.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In Flaherty and McKercher, eds., op. cit., p. 153. Emphasis supplied.

9.Ibid.

Chapter One

ONE REVOLUTION, TWO NATIONS: CANADA IN THE AMERICAN SHADOW

Preamble

"Over the years," Michael Hart argues, "Canadians have made a cult out of a perpetual national identity crisis, seeking to be a European nation, an Atlantic nation, a Pacific nation, and even an Arctic nation - anything but what we are, a nation of the Americas."[1] True, but to be a nation of the Americas has meant, and continues to mean, two things for Canadians: first, the constant awareness and re-affirmation that Canada's only neighbor is the United States, the world's sole remaining superpower; and second, that the Americans, through their own use accompanied by that of others, have come to have an almost complete monopoly on the use of the adjective "American" as a descriptive term typifying not any citizen of the North or South American continent, but specifically, a citizen of the United States of America. Thus, while Canada is a nation of the Americas, and Canadians, in a broader (and perhaps more accurate) sense of the term, are Americans, Canada is, in essence, also "the other America," making her citizens "the other Americans." The word "other" is of significance here, because it denotes one central, overarching difference between Canada and the United States: Canada is not the United States, and this is so, because those who founded Canada did so in explicit opposition to the United States - they did not want to be Americans.

This is sometimes less than obvious, despite the border which the two countries share. Invariably, in any work concerned with one aspect or another of the continuing Canada-United States relationship, the border theme is always present - this one is not an exception. The U.S.-Canadian border is unique for two reasons. First, the border is indeed "the world's longest undefended border," to use a common expression. In the absence of major differences between Canada and the United States, the border is representative, at least in theory, of a congenial and harmonious relationship shared by few, if any, other countries. Secondly, the nature of the border, and with that, the two countries' relationship, is representative of, in Roger Gibbins' words,

> the lack of significant geographical, racial, linguistic (except in the case of Quebec), or religious barriers between the American and Canadian populations, barriers which a political boundary might

reinforce under less fortunate circumstances.[2]

Why, then, is that 3,000-plus-mile border of such importance, to the point where it seems to almost have become an object of worship, or has, at the very least, incorporated some fetishist quality? There cannot, of course, be a completely exhaustive answer to that question, but suffice it to say that the border is a demarcation line between two nations that, although they are remarkably similar in a very large number of ways and are each other's closest ally, share a fundamental difference. In the words of Roger Frank Swanson,

> [t]he fact that there is a border to share is a monument to the fact that Canadians did not and do not want to be Americans.... [T]he story of Canada is the story of a people attempting to create a unified a distinct nation in North America. This is the very essence of the Canadian national experience.[3]

What the border represents and symbolizes, however, must not overshadow the significant differences which exist between Canada and the United States. In spite of having acquired a rather romantic and near-mythic aura, the border has been, and remains, a demarcation line between two societies which, their many similarities notwithstanding, have fundamental differences between them. To say that *what the United States does, so does Canada,* may be an exaggeration, but Canada has, for instance, not a fraction of the influence that her southern neighbor has - and this U.S. influence affects not just Canada, but the world in general. U.S. influence on Canada extends to just about every corner of the Canadian experience: culture, industry, economy, and so on and so forth. In short, Canada is a dwarf living next to, and in the shadow of, her giant, southern neighbor, the United States and, in many ways, the existence of Canada is contingent upon the existence of the United States. As the Canadian historian J.M.S. Careless writes, "[o]ne is tempted to conclude... that there could not be a Canada without the United States - [there] may not be a Canada with it."[4]

In this chapter, then, we will define culture, and look at how historical and political variables have affected Canada's cultural identity in the context of theasymmetrical Canada-United States relationship, and particularly as these variables relate to the founding of the two nations, and the prevailing differences regarding culture and its definition and application. Not only are the differences in the conceptualization of culture and its role of essence when addressing the issue of Canada's cultural identity, but also, they are at the heart of the argument of this work. Furthermore, we will consider some of the differences and discrepancies that are as integral to the Canada-United States relationship as are the aforementioned shared features. Among the differences, we find the substantially higher level of influence Britain has had on Canada. This is hardly surprising, given that Canada is a former British colony created in direct response to the presence of the United States on the North American continent. As well, we will consider the role of the

state, particularly a strong central government, in Canada's nation-building efforts, along with the development of regional political cultures in Canada. Lastly, we will look at some contemporary differences and discrepancies between the two countries in the areas of foreign policy and trade. The purpose of this exercise is to show that in spite of the much-touted harmony and affinity that really do exist between Canada and the United States, the Canada-United States relationship is nevertheless marred by Canada's vulnerability and reliance on the United States which, along with other disparities, tend to render it rather asymmetrical at times. Taken together, this will set the stage for a discussion of the role of media in the formation of a Canadian cultural identity.

Culture and Canadian Identity

For the purposes of this thesis, two definitions of culture will be used. The first of these two, developed by the distinguished anthropologist Clifford Geertz,

> denotes [the concept of culture as] an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [and women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop knowledge about and attitudes toward life.... Culture is the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action....[5]

The sociologist M. Michael Rosenberg and his team share this view, but add that

> the distinction between culture and society is artificial. A culture is created and maintained only by the presence of a society. Culture emerges from a society through interaction. It arises and is transmitted by the group. Neither a society nor its culture can be adequately understood without the other: the two concepts are indeed the cornerstones to an understanding of human behaviour.[6]

Related to culture, then, is the concept of cultural identity. Seeing as how the concept of cultural identity is derived from the concept of culture, for which there seems to be as many definitions as there are cultural anthropologists, sociologists, and other scholars, it is hardly surprising that there is also some debate over whether the term "cultural identity" or "national identity" should be used. For the remainder of this work, the term "cultural identity" will be used, and will be used to mean both "cultural" and "national" identity. It is my opinion that these terms denote the same phenomenon, as the ways in which a nation can manifest and embody itself, both tangibly and intangibly, are all cultural and/or

derived from culture.

Canada is in a precarious situation because she was created not for her own purposes or reasons, but so as to counteract perceived populistic excesses in the United States as well as to preserve the British presence and influence in North America. As a nation, Canada is fraught with regional tensions - and, to further compound the situation, also linguistic tensions; she is constantly in the shadow of her powerful southern neighbor; and she is still trapped by the remnants of British colonialism, in spite of the fact that the Canadian Constitution was finally patriated in 1982, complete with an American-style Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In light of all this, where could a dynamic, vibrant, and strong Canadian culture fit? Consistent with the above, it must emanate from the Canadian society. However, as Canada remains a fragmented society, preoccupied with regional and linguistic tensions and the struggle for national unity and cohesion, is it fair to assume that the societal machinery needed to develop and promote its culture never was in place? Or, if it is in place, that the switch remains in the "off" position? Needless to say, no actual mechanical device is referred to here, but rather, it is argued that the voices of Canada - certainly, there are a great number of Canadian writers, painters, film makers, and museums, but their rate of exposure is low - drown in a sea of regional and linguistic tensions, British traditions, and the influence of her powerful neighbor, the United States. Using Canadian writers as an example, Robertson Davies admits that

> [t]hey pretty much have to be regional writers. No writer writes about all of Canada. He [or she] isn't going to write about the whole country unless [he or she is] a political commentator. There is no single Canadian writer.[7]

Different Origin, Origins of Difference

"Americans," Seymour Martin Lipset writes, "do not know [it,] but Canadians cannot forget that two nations, not one, came out of the American Revolution. The United States is the country of the revolution, Canada of the counterrevolution."[8] When the leaders of thirteen British colonies in North America rejected the centralized British monarchical state, longstanding dissent and dissatisfaction with Britain among the colonists erupted into the Revolutionary War. This long and bloody struggle culminated with Declaration of Independence in 1776, and ended with Britain acknowledging defeat in 1783. Ratification of the United States Constitution by the thirteen original states was finalized in 1791 - although the Constitution was operating already by 1789.

Canada's independence, on the other hand, has been accomplished gradually. Nevertheless, Canada's independence can be characterized as a confirmation of the legitimacy of the British Crown and its interests in North

America. As such, and through the implied rejection of the American Revolution and Lockean individualism (along with the perceived "mobocracy" attendant thereto), Canada gained her independence - however relative such an independence may be - through a counterrevolution.

The different circumstances under which the United States and Canada emerged are reflected in their constitutions. As the Founding Fathers of the United States had an inherent and very real fear of the "tyranny of the monarchy" (as exemplified by the reign of King George III), they consequently sought to limit the powers of the government in drafting and ratifying the Constitution of the United States. In contrast, Canada's Fathers of Confederation were, with the exception of the Québéçois federalists, loyal monarchists who had no objections to a strong, centralized monarchical state. Canada's independence, then, was the result of not only the acceptance of British traditions, but also of the incorporation of these traditions into the Canadian system by the Canadian leaders. Moreover, the Canadian leaders took their orders from London, whereas their American counterparts took theirs from the people - at least in theory. Thus, when Queen Victoria in 1867 proclaimed the independence of Canada through the enactment of the British North America Act, Canada did not sever her ties with Britain. This has had, and continues to have, political, social, and other effects on Canada. Unlike Canada, the citizens of the United States can

> actually point to the reasons why [she became] a separate nation. These reasons [are] listed in a Declaration of Independence prepared and approved by the very men who made the nation independent.[9]

Canada's counterrevolution and subsequent independence left few reasons for her existence for her citizens to point to, and, as Roger Gibbins notes,

> [u]nlike the American Constitution, the [British North America] Act was not a full-blown constitutional document; it was merely a British statute passed for the purpose of confederating three of Britain's colonies in British North America.... Whereas the American [C]onstitution played an important role in the creation of a new American nationality, the role of the BNA Act was much more limited. Not coincidently, so too was the new Canadian nationality.... Unquestionably the BNA Act does not occupy the same place in the political socialization and mythology of Canadians that the Constitution occupies in the United States.[10]

Moreover, and in contrast with the United States, Canada has neither been bestowed upon with a "Manifest Destiny" nor a "Divine Mandate" (however self-assigned these may be); that is, Canada has "not a mission to perform but a destiny to work out. That destiny has never been manifest, but always exceedingly

obscure."[11] Living next to the United States, established in order to counterbalance the presence of the United States and so as to preserve some measure of British influence in North America, and still an active member of the British Commonwealth, however, it is not just her destiny, but also her identity, that have yet to be manifested. In other words, Canada suffers from a "somewhat more orthodox and less titillating version of *Portnoy's Complaint*: the inability to develop a secure and unique identity."[12]Are English-speaking Canadians first and foremost Canadians, or are they something else? Are they British? North Americans? "Near-Americans?"

Canadians, then, the people who, as it were, would not be American (although one could make a case that this is not necessarily so anymore), refused to embrace the populist-tinged American Revolution in 1776 and its rejection of the strong central government and the British monarchy. Their own counterrevolution, instead, did little to change the dynamics of late 18th and 19th Century British North America, where the national creed (if there was one) was "peace, order, and good government," in the words of Canada's first prime minister, the Conservative lawyer John Alexander Macdonald, from Kingston, ON.

By refusing to incorporate populism into the "Canadian Way of Life" (or was it really the "British Way of Life," modified for Canadian purposes?), Canada's leadership rejected the anti-statist and anti-elitist tendencies that in many ways have shaped the United States into a very different society. Moreover, her reaffirmation of the relationship between Canada and the British Crown, and her view that a strong central government was necessary in order to ensure Canada's survival and growth as a nation, whether truly sovereign or not, set her further apart from the United States. For instance, socialism has never gained a foothold in the American society, as opposed to Canada and many other Western democracies.

Different Roles for the Governments

The political system in the United States does accord the executive (the president) immense powers, making the office of the president a very powerful one. Still, these powers are not limitless, even though one may often get the impression that they are. Through the system of checks and balances the two houses of Congress are not only able to curtail the powers of the president, but also keep tabs on each other.[13] Conversely, the president can halt Congress' legislative action, mainly by vetoing bills that have passed in both houses. This arrangement, which has the support of a majority of the American public, was instituted by the Founding Fathers as a means by which to limit the "tyranny of the government"; that is, its size and ability to get involved in the lives of individual citizens. Lipset argues that Americans in favor of a weak and decentralized government consistently outnumber those who would prefer a strong, more

centralized form of government in the United States.[14]

Next, although both the American and Canadian societies are market-driven, commercially oriented, capitalist societies, the claim can be made that comparatively speaking, commercial interests have a greater influence on the political, social, and cultural structures and processes in the United States than they do in Canada. These patterns are consistent with the different attitudes the two countries have toward individual and collective rights. These different attitudes are perhaps a little less surprising than one might ordinarily suspect, considering how the institution of government is viewed differently in the two countries. As Michael A. Goldberg suggests, "Americans pride themselves on a rugged individualist frontier[,] while in Canada, for a number of reasons, [the citizens] have had to be a more collective society."[15] Consistent with anti-elitist and anti-statist views, the role of the government in the United States was purposely designed so as to limit its reach and ability to interfere with the lives of individual (and later on, also corporate) citizens.

In Canada, on the other hand, the country's vastness, in tandem with her sparse population, has made a strong Canadian government a necessity; that is, a government bestowed upon with the necessary powers to take action and implement programs where private incentives are not sufficient or, due to the desire for profit, non-existent. As compared with the U.S. government and its citizens, then, the powers granted the Canadian government by the Canadian people are far greater than in the United States. Put differently, Canadians are, in general, far more likely to be staunch supporters of a major role for government in the socio-economic life of Canada, and this difference is "a pervasive [Canadian] social phenomenon born of historical tradition, which entails a greater acceptance of the legitimacy and authority of the government to attend to social concerns."[16]

Furthermore, while many Americans may exhibit both fascination with and curiosity for the institution of monarchy, very few of them would actually prefer that the United States were a monarchy instead of a republic. While there were certain regal elements to the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, it remains a living fact (as opposed to a mere historical footnote) that the "United States of America may be said to be the only country in the world... founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian principles,"[17] as Leo Strauss writes, and Lipset adds, in opposition "to the power of the Prince."[18]

Ideological Similarities, Political Differences

Canada remains caught between the residual vestiges of the British Empire, on the one hand, and her close proximity to the United States, on the other. Although Canada is a formally sovereign and independent nation, she is still an active member of the British Commonwealth, and the Queen, however symbolically, is the official head of state in Canada. The British heritage is not

limited to symbolism, however, but is reflected in Canada's political structure and parties, as well. Not surprisingly, the Progressive Conservative Party (PC) is a direct descendant of its British predecessor, to which it also owes its streak of toryism, and today shares with the present-day British conservative party. What perhaps is somewhat surprising is that the presence of socialism in the Canadian political arena - as most successfully represented by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and its successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP) - also has its origins in British political tradition.

The reality of the Canadian political landscape, then, is at variance with many commonly held views about the overall similarity between Canada and the United States - certainly most Americans know of no differences between the two. Richard G. Lipsey quotes Willis C. Armstrong:

> The experience of the general public in the United States... with their Canadian opposite numbers... is very limited indeed.... The public is conscious of the fact that there are intergovernmental relations, but sometimes wonders why there is an American embassy in Ottawa, because it is not clear to them that Canada is a country, let alone a foreign country.[19]

Thus, judging from popular (American) perception, the U.S.-Canadian border does not constitute a line of demarcation between two political systems, but is merely the border - if even that - between two open societies in which the tenets of liberalism reign supreme. Upon closer examination, however, we see that this is, at least in the Canadian case, a truncated view of reality. The Canadian political tradition is one that is essentially liberal, but indeed "with either a tory or socialist tinge,"[20] neither of which figure greatly in American political tradition.

Approximately 60,000 of the British colonists in what is now the United States condemned the revolutionary activities in the British colonies in the 1760s and 1770s, fought against the American patriots, and remained loyal to the British Crown following the United States' Declaration of Independence in 1776. For those who made such a decision, it was not without consequence. Loyalists who kept their views to themselves and those who chose to leave their homes - and many of them did - generally escaped the wrath of the patriots and were able to emerge unscathed in the sparsely populated "wild" West, or they simply chose to return to England. On the other hand,

> Loyalists who did not leave their homes, but whose sentiments were known, often found themselves shunned by their neighbors. Some were tarred and feathered, and many lost their property by state confiscation or patriot plundering. Others were treated as traitors and were imprisoned or exiled to towns far from home.[21]

Most of the Loyalists who eventually left their homes in the United States,

either voluntarily or through expulsion, wound up in Upper Canada or the Maritime Provinces. Most of them "believed fervently in monarchy and in Empire unity,"[22] as well as in "law and order," and were strongly opposed to "American populistic excesses."[23] These Loyalists had, however unsuccessfully, sought to create a replica of the conservative British system in North America, rather than a new and liberal political structure. Thus wending their way northward to British North America, they became "heroes who endured exile and hardship to demonstrate their attachment to the Crown and the British connection and their abhorrence of mob violence and democratic excesses."[24]

As the frontier was pushed westward beyond Upper Canada, and to counter-balance the soaring French-Canadian birth rates, the British

> imperialists in central Canada as well as on the periphery held firmly to the belief that the prosperity of the Dominion and the Empire lay in promoting even more immigration, most desirably from the British Isles.[25]

The numbers of British-born immigrants to Canada, then, averaged between 150,000 and 200,000 per decade in the years following the War of 1812 and for the next one hundred years.[26] Unlike the relatively small numbers of American Loyalists who had preceded these later waves of British immigrants, however, the different social classes of the British society they left behind were not equally represented. To the contrary, while the upper and middle classes were scarcely represented, the vast majority of these immigrants were skilled and unskilled laborers, artisans, and farmers.[27]

In this regard, it is safe to presume that by the end of the 19th Century, many of the immigrants who arrived in Canada from Britain (and elsewhere) had been exposed to socialist doctrines. Consider, for instance, the formal establishment of the Fabian Society in London in 1884, the year after Karl Marx was buried there. Unlike the Marxists, however, the Fabians advocated socialism not by revolution, but through a series of gradual, evolutionary changes. Many of the British socialists were therefore Fabians rather Marxists. Furthermore, due to the pervasive impact of toryism on British society in general, exposure to socialist doctrines was, for this reason, inevitable. According to Gad Horowitz,

> [s]ocialism is an ideology which combines the corporate-organic-collectivist ideas of toryism with the rationalist-egalitarian ideas of liberalism.... [But] because socialism has a conception of society as more than an agglomeration of individuals pursuing happiness - a conception close to the tory view of society as an organic community - that it finds the liberal idea of equality (equality of opportunity) inadequate.[28]

This is one of the two keys to answering the question, "Why is there

socialism in Canada but not in the United States?" In spite of the two countries' great many similarities - which, then, include being two open societies in which liberalism is the dominant ideology, for instance - the tory streak present in the Canadian political tradition is by and large absent in that of the United States. In the latter, where a Lockean individualism predominates, individual achievement, rather than a "common good," is at the center and thus removes, and perhaps even obliterates, class-based thinking.[29] The celebrated status of individualism and entrepreneurship, which is also influenced by the Aristotelian notion of self-sufficiency, and embellished by the image of the United States as a melting pot, is indeed the cornerstone of U.S. political tradition. The immigrants who came to the United States, therefore, had to align their political ideals and values with the predominant and near-omnipresent liberal ideology "before being granted full citizenship."[30]

In Canada, however, the immigrants were, with the exception of the French-Catholic element, for the most part of British stock until the country stood at the threshold of the 20th Century.[31] Her status as a sovereign nation-state was arbitrary at best, as Canada was still in the colonial throes of the United Kingdom. Like the United States, therefore, Canada was separated from Britain by an ocean, but unlike the United States, Britain was still her "mother country." Canada had never severed her ties with the United Kingdom as had the United States through the Revolutionary War of 1776 through 1783, but rather, once again, Canada was "founded upon a rejection of the American revolution... "[32] Thus, for the individual who immigrated to Canada, there was no process of Canadianization to be undergone, but in many ways, life in Canada was simply a North American continuation of Britain. This made the prospect of becoming an "alien" and/or having "alien" beliefs in Canada far more remote a possibility than south of the border.

In the case of socialism, then, this was certainly not a belief system unknown to the British society. As was mentioned earlier, toryism breeds socialism. Canadian socialism, then,

> is un-American in two distinct ways. It is un-American in the sense that it is a significant and legitimate force in Canada, insignificant and alien in the United States. [It] is also un-American in the sense that it does not speak the same language as American socialism. In Canada, socialism is British, non-Marxist, and worldly; in the United States it is German, Marxist, and otherworldly.[33]

Supporting Horowitz's argument, Lipset elaborates as follows:

> It is not surprising... that, like British socialism, the Saskatchewan CCF, from the time of its formation and right down to the present [circa 1948], has had a moralistic and religious emphasis. The CCF stresses its support of Christianity and the fact that many of its

> leaders are religious.... Since the CCF is dominated by those who think that socialism and Christianity are but secular and sacred versions of the same philosophy, the few in the party who hold Marxist materialist views have kept these in the background.[34]

Canada thus saw socialism develop side-by-side with toryism. Both ideologies constitute two essential strands of the Canadian political tradition, and not just in the sense that they were "imported" from Europe either through colonization and/or subsequent immigration. In addition, the presence of either ideological strand has tended to perpetuate the presence of the other, and thus, "the relative strength of socialism in Canada is related to the relative strength of toryism...."[35]

The American Threat

With the exception of the War of 1812 (which, then, preceded Confederation by more than half-a-century), the Aroostook War in 1842 (also known as the War of Pork and Beans), and the perennial Fenian raids of the 1860s and early 1870s (which did not take place on orders from the United States Government, although it may have been aware of the raids), it would seem that U.S. plans for an annexation of Canada never went far beyond being just plans. As such, they were imbued with a great deal of wishful thinking on the part of some American lawmakers who had conjured up a utopian vision of a United States occupying the whole of North America. Still, the fear of annexation remained strong in Canada, and it was not until the 1930s that the purported U.S. threat to Canada's independence no longer was considered to necessitate inclusion in the defense plans of Canada's military strategists.

In more recent times, however, Richard Preston writes that

> Canada's concern about the United States intentions and actions has concentrated on the possibility that superior American economic strength might restrict Canada's capacity to decide her own destiny.[36]

Border disputes may be a thing of the past, and a host of treaties and agreements are indeed in place to regulate trade, tourism, and military matters. However, as Preston continues,

> Canadians are still worried lest growing American investment in Canada, American exploitation of Canadian resources, and American predominance in a military alliance in which Canada is inevitably a second-grade partner, might bring about what was not earlier achieved by force, namely the American absorption of Canada.[37]

Regarding the strong state and whether the presence of elites once were of benefit to Canada, then, it can be assumed that the Fathers of Confederation, as individuals, represented a very narrow segment of the population in what became the Dominion of Canada on 1 July 1867. Virtually all of them were white men of property and, lest it be forgotten, of British extraction (with the exception of the few who were French). In their capacity as individuals, they probably had a great personal interest in seeing that "peace, order, and good government" continued unhampered. As nation-builders, however, their belief in "peace, order, and government" transcended self-interest (although by no means disposing of it), because they knew that in order to hold the new nation together and fend off potential American aggressions, a common purpose had to be found and a sense of national unity be established, above and beyond regional and personal interests and characteristics. As caretakers of the nation, then, it was, perhaps more than any other, the National Policy that ensured that Canada was able to wend her way through her national childhood and adolescence. The National Policy, as an adjunct to the Canadian creed of "peace, order, and good government," was a three-pronged program designed to serve as both protection of, and a catalyst for, Canada's national growth. It called for high tariff barriers so as to insulate the budding Canadian agricultural and manufacturing industries from already well-established foreign competitors; it increased numbers of immigrant settlers to populate the barren and desolate Canadian interior; and, lastly, it provided for the construction of a transcontinental railroad.

The National Policy

Given the highly stratified system that was installed upon Confederation in 1867 and subsequently maintained by a succession of governments mostly at the helm of John A. Macdonald, it is hardly surprising that socialism has been able to gain a foothold on the North American continent. Its existence may have been overshadowed by the preponderant presence of the United States and her liberal-egalitarian form of government, but nonetheless, consistent with what has been described so far, the form of Canadian conservatism that developed during the first three decades following Confederation was one that heavily emphasized the value of privilege. For instance, "[t]his ready acceptance of society as constituted by a graded series of social classes could easily be seen in the creation of the Canadian Senate," wherein representation was and continues to be determined by appointment, and not through a popular vote.[36]

It would be wrong to suggest that in spite of the streak of business liberalism inherent in any conservative form of government, including the Canadian - and here, such a streak is in addition to its inclination towards toryism - that such a streak posed an obstacle to the realization of national political goals in Macdonald's Canada. The vastness of Canada - at least as it was envisioned to

one day stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic Oceans - precluded a small and decentralized government. Rather, the role of the Canadian government has always been larger than has the United States government, although perhaps not always involving the same duties or public expectations as nowadays. Central to the establishment of Canada as a political entity on the North American continent, however, was the task of preventing the former British North America from absorption by the United States. In order to realize this task, a strong government was imperative. Indeed,

> Macdonald, whatever some of the other Fathers of Confederation might have envisaged, preferred a strong central government, if possible, a legislative union, in order both to avoid what he had analyzed to be the major weaknesses in the American federal system, and to endow the Canadian general government with sufficient powers to engage in the important task of building a transcontinental political unit in British North America.[39]

In order for this to take place, the government itself had to be a pragmatic unit, operating within a pragmatic and flexible political system, and bestowed upon with sufficient powers in order that it may be able to adequately carry out its mission. Here we see the corporate-collectivist strands of toryism as applied to Canada. Not only was there a realization on the part of the corporate interests of the young nation that their government had to be a strong one, but also, these same interests exhibited, time and again, a readiness to rely on and to use the government as they deemed it necessary. In such a manner, the Canadian National Railways, Canadian Pacific Railways, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, among many other large Canadian businesses and corporations, were created; the national creed of Canada could have been established as "public power to achieve national purposes."[40] To hold the nation together, because of her vastness and young age, on the one hand, as well as to prevent her from disintegrating prematurely and being absorbed by the United States, on the other, the Canadian government therefore came to serve not only as a government, but also as Canada's mucilage. As Lipset has suggested,

> [t]o protect itself against a constant tendency of the Canadian frontier to identify with the United States, the Canadian government emphasized centrally controlled structures.[41]

The National Policy is but one example of this strategy which, to Horowitz, "is one of the primary characteristics differentiating Canadian conservatism (touched with toryism) from purely individualistic, purely liberal American conservatism."[42]

It was this conservative yet pragmatic approach that guided the Canadian governments as Canada was settled, much like the United States, from east to west. Canadian immigration regulations and settlement patterns, however, differed

greatly from those employed in the United States. David Smith notes that

> Canada insisted on its immigrants being agriculturalists, the United States did not. As a result the Canadian immigrants moved West immediately, while the American ones stayed in the East.[43]

Lipset, on his part, suggests that the two nations' different settlement policies "resulted in contrasts between authorities on the frontiers, populist and settler-dominated in the United States but central-government-controlled in Canada."[44] Unlike the United States, law and order preceded the arrival of the settlers in Canada, and Lipset continues, quoting Wallace Stegner: "In the American West men came before law, but in... [western Canada] the law was there before settlers, before even cattlemen, and not merely law but law enforcement."[45]

The Transcanadian Railway and Regionalism

The transcanadian railroad sought to serve several purposes all at once. On the one hand, it was a bribe of sorts to British Columbia in order that it join the Confederation, which it eventually did in 1871. Completion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad took another fourteen years. On the other hand, by bringing in British Columbia under the umbrella of the Confederation (and thereby averting a potential American annexation attempt), as well as by completing the railroad, the country was held together, however artificially, from coast to coast. Yet another purpose of the railroad was to facilitate the westward movement of people (i.e., immigrants who had cleared the immigration procedures in Montreal, Halifax, and New York City) and goods. In so doing, the young nation was held together also by the human element which is, as such, perhaps less artificial than a railroad. The usefulness was also demonstrated, however incidentally, when it was used to dispatch members of the militia to apprehend Louis Riel. Because of the railroad, it was felt that this episode was brought to an end much faster than had the government been left to the traditional devices of horses and wagons. At the time of the Riel incident, many people, both in and out of politics, had grown very disenchanted with the railroad project, which proved to be a lot more time-consuming and far more costly than at first projected and budget. The use of the railroad in Riel's capture caused many of them to change their minds, as they saw the usefulness of this new mode of transportation.[46]

Here, however, three factors appear to have mitigated the success of the railroad as a means by which to achieve national unity and cohesion. First, Canada's harsh climate; next, the Canadian Shield; and, lastly, the fact that the railroad, by disturbing existing regionalisms, may actually have caused additional fragmentation, and especially as the CPR was joined by the Canadian National Railways in 1919.

First, it *is* cold in Canada. At the time of writing (late September, 1993), fall has advanced in central Alberta to a point which the northeastern United States will reach in circa three weeks. Close to the international boundary, the climate is quite similar in both the United States and Canada, but the farther one moves from the border, the greater the climate disparities. As Mason Wade explains,

> Canada has no equivalent of the rich Atlantic tidewater area, no semi-tropical Florida, Southwest, or Southern California; no vast corn, winter wheat, and cotton belts extending from the Atlantic piedmont to the Gulf of Mexico.[47]

Next, the harsh climate, a result of Canada's northerly location, and a jet stream that frequently flows south of the international border, is reinforced by the Canadian Shield which, in turn, has had and continues to have repercussions for the population level and its distribution. Wade suggests that the Shield is the foremost reason why Canada's population is just ten percent of that of the United States, despite a territory that is 25 percent larger than the area covered by the United States.[48] He continues:

> The Shield is also a grim monument to the first and greatest contribution of Canadian natural resources to the United States, for glaciers repeatedly pressing down from the Arctic crushed and scoured the Shield and left most of its soil in the north-central United States.[49]

Kenneth McNaught continues in the same vein, and links these factors also to Canadian demographics:

> [T]he cooler temperatures and shorter growing season of Canada have reinforced the population pattern imposed by the Shield, with the result that more than 90 percent of all Canadians live within 200 miles of the United States border. Long, bitter winters on the prairies meant, also, that the Canadian west attracted substantial population only after the most easily available lands to the south of the border had been occupied.[50]

Indeed, the near-artificial settlement patterns generated by Ottawa's immigration and settlement policies meant, as Smith argues, that the

> West was a federal creation. Its immigrants were there because of policies set down in Ottawa, while the land they occupied was surveyed and administered by officials ultimately directed from the national capital. The myth of "the West" should have become (as it did in the United States) the myth of the larger federation. But it did not. Except for Manitoba before 1900, the prairies were not an

extension of settled Canada.[51]

Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why nation-building and the task of achieving national unity have been, and continue to be, quite difficult and strenuous - if not altogether elusive - endeavors for Canadian leaders. Politics and cultural pitfalls aside, geography and climate have worked against such efforts, too, and so have, in a peculiar and probably unintended way, the transcontinental railroads. Certainly, they brought the nation together, and did facilitate travel and transportation (at least in the days before cars and air travel became the mainstays of popular and commodity transportation) across a continent. In so doing, however, the railroads may also have exacerbated regional tensions and perhaps caused additional fragmentation to a country where national unity and cohesion have yet to be taken for granted.

Because of a political boundary that essentially disregards natural and geographical boundaries, the various regions of Canada often enjoy a relationship with similar regions in the United States - a relationship that is perhaps closer than that which they have with Ottawa. British Columbia, for instance, has more in common with the State of Washington and Oregon, than it does with Ontario and, needless to say, Quebec. The same situation can be said to exist for Alberta and Saskatchewan, on the northern side of the border, and Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota, to the south. Arbitrarily and insensitively drawn boundaries have contributed to the existence of such relationships, as have topography, climate, and natural resources, among other factors. The railroads, however, may in this regard be considered as a boundary more real and palpable than the international boundary, and thus, a boundary that causes more east-west fragmentation than cohesion. Thus is the argument of Garth Stevenson, who argues that "the struggle to assert an east-west axis of communication against the pressure of a more natural regionalism is the major theme of Canadian history."[52] Stevenson then cites Paul Sharp, who describes how the railroad sliced the prairie once more (in addition to the de jure boundary, and then once again), and thus became a de facto boundary, or, at the very least, an adjunct boundary. An obviously frail relationship between the Canadian and American prairie settlers, separate and independent from the equally frail relationship the Canadians had with Ottawa, was thus shattered. Stevenson notes:

> That the disruption of existing regionalisms was a difficult, artificial and by no means inevitable achievement was a fact apparent at the time both to those who supported and those who opposed the effort to build a Canadian nation.[53]

In trying to bring and hold the country together, it would thus appear that while the nation-builders sought to erase various regionalisms considered impediments to the national unity (and also succeeded in doing so, at least some of the time), they also created new ones - many of whose presence, it can be

presumed, are still felt. Stevenson provides a brief summary of the various Canadian regions' (or provinces') cross-border relationships (and they are plentiful), and ends his summary by assessing what is perhaps the most well-developed relationship of them all as follows: "[T]he belief that Washington State is less 'foreign' than the other provinces of Canada is found [in British Columbia] on every part of the political spectrum."[54] It would thus appear that adding the word "British" to "Columbia," as Queen Victoria did in 1859, as part of the effort to distinguish the British possession from the American region,[55] as well as to avoid linking the two in any way (including being synonymous with one another), has had little effect, even if the current situation does not go quite as far as to a movement to have British Columbia join the United States. In light of this, however, it does indeed seem as if "all the traditional devices and strategies that served to reinforce the international boundary have faltered and collapsed. The result has been the resurgence of regionalism and provincialism...," making the prospect of achieving Canadian national unity and cohesion even more remote.[56]

A Nation of Regions

The struggle for Canadian national unity and cohesion has two sides to it, then, but neither of them could rightly be considered an "up-side." On the one hand, Canadians have always felt threatened, in one way or another, by the United States and what her proximity means for Canada. On the other hand, if the opposite of unity and cohesion is disintegration, Canada remains locked in a struggle where she continuously has to ward off such forces in trying to hold the country together. Although the separatist (independence) sentiments in Quebec represent the most well-known, visible, and perhaps also most readily understood expression of this unity-versus-separation syndrome, such sentiments obviously run rampant throughout the country. One might even go as far as to say that where Canada's leaders have sought to strengthen the country along an east-west axis, and thereby offsetting the north-south pull, substantial numbers of Canadians have instead preferred enhancing the north-south ties, and have a lot less interest in maintaining the artificially induced east-west relationship. Once again, this scenario may very well be closely related (or even a direct descendant of) to Smith's reference to the West as a "federal creation," where, "[e]xcept[ing] Manitoba before 1900, the prairies were not an extension of settled Canada."[57] To approach the situation from a slightly different angle, this may be one of the more negative aspects of being a mosaic and not a melting-pot, as Canada and the United States, respectively, are often likened to. What holds the country together is not necessarily a vital part of the actual mosaic, and thus, by definition, artificial. In the case of Canada, then, it appears that the scarcity of a natural (that is, not artificial) form of cement to hold the Canadian mosaic together, has caused the concept of national unity and cohesion to become a very sore spot.

To be sure, there are occasional outbursts of regionalist sentiments also in the United States. For instance, some Vermonters have a desire to see Vermont declare itself independent again, as it was between 1777 and 1791. Similarly, in Texas, some want to erect a "Great Wall of Texas" around the state; others want it the state to secede from the Union as it did in 1861, or once again become an independent nation, as it was from 1836 to 1845; yet others want to do both. As Stevenson points out, however, this may have more to do with *sectionalism* than with *regionalism*; in the United States, not even Texas or California consider themselves distinct regions, in spite of their sizes, in the way that Canadian provinces do.[58]

Still, although there are a great many differences between Texans and Vermonters (size, demographics, topography, climate, natural resources, history, and so on and so forth), there is clearly a much stronger bond between them as Americans, than one can expect to find between Albertans and the Quebeçois, or between a British Columbian and a Newfoundlander. While one may disagree with Richard Gwyn's choice to use the word "require" in the following section, he nonetheless expresses a similar argument:

> [T]he very term "pan-Canadian" continues to challenge one of the cardinal characteristics of being Canadian: people here aren't required to be Canadian in the way that all Americans are required to be American. Many instead are Alberta Canadians or Ukrainian Canadians or whatever, and only become unqualified Canadians when outside the country.[59]

Few Americans, if any, are forced to be Americans in the way that Gwyn seems to intimate, and although some are Afro-Americans, Native Americans, or Italian-Americans, the concept of the "hyphenated American" simply does not exist the way that the "hyphenated Canadian" does. A Utahan or a Michigander may indeed be very proud of being from Utah and Michigan, respectively, but it is highly unlikely that such a pride exceeds or, for that matter, altogether supersedes his or her pride in being an American. Although some groups, or segments of groups, may experience a great deal of alienation from the concept of being American (such as Native Americans or Afro-Americans), Americans are, on balance, first and foremost Americans, and at all times. With the exception of some dissatisfied and marginalized segments, then, along with the Confederate States during the Civil War, national unity and cohesion have never been issues in the United States in ways similar to those in which they remain in Canada. To be sure, Southerners reflect a somewhat different history and thinking, but even this Southern mentality has not been an impediment to the realization and the acknowledgement that they, too, are Americans before anything else.

The East-West Axis and the North-South Pull

Great portions of the Canadian interior remain largely unsettled, even to this very day, and it is of little help that Canada remains not only one of the world's most sparsely populated nations (her population density is not quite 7.5 inhabitants per square mile; contrast that with the United States, for which the same figure is 70.5!), but also one of the world's most *unevenly* populated nations. Complicating matters further, then, it is within 200 miles of the U.S.-Canadian border that in excess of three-quarters of the Canadian population live. This has produced some rather interesting demographic comparisons with the United States,

> whose populace in its northern tier is sparse and scattered. By contrast, in southern Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta the population is both more evenly distributed in the rural districts and more concentrated in larger metropolitan centres than in the adjacent American mid- and far west. Winnipeg, Calgary and even Regina with 150,000 people are larger than any city to their south for over six hundred miles. Nowhere else in Canada is the United States as accessible and contact so limited as on the prairies.[60]

However, where the Midwest is in the United States, Richard G. Lipsey writes, there is in Canada the Canadian Shield, which has not provided Canada with a sizable agricultural area similar to that of the Midwest. Furthermore,

> [t]he enormously strong influences exerted on American attitudes by the Midwest are absent from Canada....
>
> The narrow belt of heavy population running from Montreal through Toronto to include the peninsula that is southern Ontario is geographically a part of the American Midwest. Toronto, for example, is closer to the enormous population and industrial area bounded by Chicago, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and Detroit than are Minneapolis and St. Paul. In sociological terms, however, Toronto and Montreal are not Canada's Chicago; rather they are its New York (or any of several other eastern cities). Although geographically a part of the American Midwest, they are, in American terms, eastern rather than midwestern.[61]

Thus, while Ottawa today is more accessible physically to any present-day Canadian than at any other time, it is not at all clear that the relative distance between a given province and Ottawa is smaller than that between the province and a given state south of the border.

However, if Ottawa does exert an unwarranted degree of control over and influence on the provinces - an influence which is legally safeguarded and firmly

rooted in the Canadian conscience - this influence can appear rather lightweight compared to the influence on and control over Canada exerted by the United States. Although treaties and a variety of legal regulations exist to coordinate the Canada-United States relationship, these often take on the appearance of being nothing more than guidelines, at best, and decorative filler-up material, at worst. The Canada-United States relationship is "for real," but equally real and significant are Canada's differences vis-à-vis the United States. These differences are often attenuated by the two countries' skewed and highly asymmetric relationship, and have great impact on Canada's cultural industries.

The United States, A Pre-Condition for Canada?

Differences in national unity and cohesion aside, Canada and the United States stand apart from the rest of the nations of the world, in that they both were purposely created and established. Even if the former was created to be a counterweight of sorts to the latter, no other nation can point to a specific cause or set of specific causes underlying its creation, in the way that both the United States and Canada are able to. Herein, however, lies another problem related to Canada's identity problem: she was not necessarily created for herself and her own purposes, but to counterbalance the United States, and so as to preserve the British tradition and presence in North America. One can thus pose the following question: if Canadians made a conscious decision to become Canadians because they did not want to be Americans, if Americans had never become Americans, would Canadians ever have had a similar choice? Would there be any Canadians at all? Is the existence of the United States a precondition for Canada? Herschel Hardin (whom Richard Gwyn describes as "iconoclastic") shares J. M. S. Careless' view, and suggests that "[i]f the United States did not exist, neither would Canada, because there would be no outside threat to keep the diverse regions, particularly Quebec, inside Confederation."[62]

If one assumes, for the sake of the argument, that Canada would not exist were it not for the United States, and that she thus rose into existence only to counteract and limit the spread of the United States, and that she even was *conceived* as such, then we might come even closer to the root of the Canadian identity question: Canada did not come to exist for her own sake, and with that, came an absence of many of the factors needed to build an identity. National myths, icons, unifying symbols, and so on, are largely absent from Canadian folklore - if such a thing exists. The maple leaf or the beaver may come close, each in their own way, to take on the status of national symbols. However, the red-and-white maple leaf flag is not even thirty years old, and on the nickels, the beaver competes for space and attention with none other than the Queen. Meanwhile, the transcanadian railroad obviously is not an adequate symbol, as it, due to the budget cuts enacted by the heirs of Macdonald's national-building

efforts, now is a bleak replica of its former self, and something of a living relic. As Robertson Davies suggested in a 1963 interview:

> Canada is a planned baby - whereas the United States was ripped from the womb of the greatest empire of the time. That is why it has developed myths and Canada has developed none. Look at Champlain - a great man by any standards - rejected. Lord Durham, "Radical Jack" - a first- class aristocratic democrat - rejected. Sir John A. Macdonald - "Old Tomorrow" - rejected. We have all kinds of heroes, but as Douglas LePan said in one of his poems, Canada is "wild Hamlet with the features of Horatio."[63]

As an added aside, it might be noted that on the border between New York and Vermont, lies Lake Champlain, named for Samuel de Champlain, who founded New France in 1608. The opportunity was there.

Elsewhere, in his address during the *Symposium on 20th Century Canadian Culture* in Washington, DC, in 1977, Davies elaborated on the presence of national icons in the United States and their absence in Canada:

> The myth of national character is familiar to us all: in the United States it is summed up in the figure of Uncle Sam, a Down-East Yankee in the dress of 1830 or thereabouts, totally unlike most U.S. citizens in every way, though now and then, in the streets or in a photograph, one spies the reality on which the stereotype was founded. We all know John Bull, who is not at all like any Englishman we have ever met, and Marianne, that generous-hearted, big-breasted female who is such an incongruous symbol for modern France. But where is the Canadian stereotype? We had one once, a grinning fellow called Jack Canuck, who looked as if he were engaged in wheat farming on a large scale, but we got rid of him because he simply didn't do. Of late years two stereotype figures have arisen from the pressures of our political situation; one is a wistful, large-eyed, pitiful girl in the peasant dress of the eighteenth century, and the other is a coarse-grained, large-footed, evil-visaged Scottish banker, to whom she is bound in a hateful marriage from which she seeks to escape. The mismated pair are, of course, Quebec, La Belle Province, and the other part of Canada. A queer song-and-dance team they are. But whatever reality they may have in Canada - and certainly they have some roots in popular belief, which is not to say roots in fact - they are not recognized outside Canada, and the essential point about national stereotypes is that they should have a wide acceptance among people of other nations.[64]

All these factors - a fragile sense of national unity, strong regionalisms, less than natural reasons for her existence, absence of national myths and icons - have, when taken together, served to create a very unstable foundation for the formation of a uniquely Canadian cultural identity.

A Few Words About Bilingualism

As suggested earlier, the Canadian experience also includes linguistic tensions. Although this work is concerned exclusively with Canada's cultural identity as it applies to English-speaking Canadians and the Canada-United States relationship related thereto, a word or two about Canada's French-speaking minority is necessary.

Tension between the English-and-French-speaking elements in Canada has existed as long as Canada, and shows no sign of disappearing soon. Demands from an increasingly vocal and well-organized (but not more violent - at least not nowadays) movement for the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada stem from a belief that the French-speaking minority is accorded a secondary and inferior status to Canada's English-speaking majority. Although Canada is an officially bilingual country (that is, all federal laws, regulations, and publications must be made available in both languages, and all federal agencies and institutions must conduct their business in both languages), only one province, New Brunswick, is officially bilingual. With the exception of Quebec, all provinces and territories are unilingual (except for in the realm of government affairs, but to what degree varies from province to province (territory)) in English, whereas Quebec is the only officially French province.

The aspect of the perceived secondary status of the French language that concerns us here is that, to French-speakers, language and culture represent one, indivisible entity, whereas to English-speakers, language and culture are two separate, and separable, parts. As Edward Veitch explains,

> [t]he two language groups diverge on equality. For anglophones it seems that the majority are already equal since the constitution recognises two official languages.... The fact that francophones must use a second language in the marketplace or at work does not appear, in the eyes of the majority, to be any diminution of the status of the minority as Canadians. The position of the majority is to be explained by their belief that language and culture are divisible, [whereas t]he francophone minority urge that language and culture are indivisible....[66]

In the context of the Canada-United States relationship, however, and especially in the realm of culture where the proximity of the United States is

perceived as a threat to Canadian culture, it is clear that for Quebec, the language barrier has served to cushion the American onslaught. In that regard, then, the Quebeçois enjoy an advantage over other Canadians, as seen from the standpoint of the cultural nationalists. As Paul-André Bourque says:

> We are trying to be neither French nor American nor Canadian but Québéçois. The more conscious we are of our national identity, the less dangerous is American influence; in fact, in can now be turned to our advantage.[66]

In fact, one may take this assertion one step further, and suggest that many Quebeçois simply do not consider the American influence to be a great concern - there are other, more urgent matters:

> The grievances [Quebec] has with the rest of Canada, along with the province's protective cultural and linguistic insulation, and its acute need for developmental assistance, make the American presence a low-priority concern which, at least for the moment, can largely be left to *les Anglais* to worry about in their own bailiwicks.[67]

The Asymmetric Relationship

Put bluntly, the Canada-U.S. relationship is a master-servant one, where the United States more often than not leads and Canada follows. Official public relations policies may indeed suggest that an atmosphere of harmony and reciprocity in the name of democracy prevails; for example, neither Canadians nor Americans are required to carry passports or visas to enter the other country. Quite often, however, the Canada-U.S. relationship can best be characterized as one of contention and dichotomy, and where the level of reciprocity is highly uneven. The United States is able to exert a great deal of influence, and her leverage along with her ability and willingness to use those powers, should not be underestimated. Through skilful diplomacy at times, by subtle (and, occasionally, not-so-subtle) reminders of her strength at other times, but most often a combination of both, the United States does indeed get what she wants most of the time. As Prime Minister Laurier once lamented during a Parliamentary session, the United States is "very grasping in [her] national actions and determined on every occasion to get the best in any agreement...."[68] But, one may ask, who would not be determined to get the best deal possible in any agreement?

Because of the two countries' long-standing relationship, Canada may have been insulated from some of the more adverse aspects of the not-necessarily fair trading practices and political shenanigans of the United States. Granted, the United States has abrogated treaties in revenge (consider the cancellation, in

1866, of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, as a direct consequence of Britain's support for the Confederate forces during the Civil War), driven very hard bargains in land and/or border disputes (such as the Alaska Boundary Tribunal in 1903), or otherwise used her leverage, augmented with filibuster and seeming indifference, in order to emerge victoriously from a given negotiating process. For instance, consider the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which went into effect on 1 January 1989. According to Daniel Drache, the FTA is a shining example of the United States' ability to get what she wants. Applying her domestic policy objectives to her foreign policy agenda, the FTA was, says Drache, a negotiating triumph for the United States. The agreement gave

> the U.S.A. *all* of its strategic objectives starting with its top key demand, namely, control over Canadian energy pricing and supply. In effect, Canada... agreed to a continental energy policy which prevents it from restricting energy exports to the U.S.A. in time of need. The U.S.A. [was] granted non-discriminatory access to Canada's energy supplies when in short supply. The final text states that the U.S.A. will have proportional access to the diminished supply.... Under the new rules, the federal government cannot demand export, local content, local sourcing or import substitution requirements on U.S. investments. On the other hand, American multinationals are allowed to divest or sell their operations *without restrictions*.[69]

Still, however much junior and senior partners Canada and the United States, respectively, may be in this relationship, it is clear that they also are each other's foremost ally - not only geographically, but historically, politically, and culturally, as well. Indeed, while the relationship has been rather contentious at times, it has also been characterized by an amicability that is rare. This sentiment is not new; on the contrary, it dates back to the turn of the century. As the United States' chargé d'affairs in Ottawa stated in a letter to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1933:

> I submit that our relations with Canada are and should continue to be exceptional.... Our trade relations with Canada, often described as our "best customer," economically our most powerful neighbor, indissolubly and immediate part of the economic system of this hemisphere, are and must be considered on a different footing from our trade relations with distant nations or with all nations....[70]

It is worth noting that this statement was made when both Canada and the United States were in the throes of the Great Depression; as well, it was not until after World War II that the United States overtook Britain's position as Canada's foremost ally. Canada and the United States now form the world's largest bilateral

trading bloc, and even before the ratification of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in late 1988, the volume of trade between the two exceeded US$130 billion.[71] To further underscore this relationship, it should be noted that the two are each other's foremost trading partners. Close to 80 percent of Canada's sum total exports are shipped south of the border, whereas the United States exports more goods and services to Canada than to any other nation - almost 70 percent of U.S. exports go to Canada.[72] Yet another case in point is U.S. trade with Ontario which, in 1986, alone exceeded that of U.S. trade with Japan.[73]

Nevertheless, this veneer is perhaps as thin as it is glossy. It is only in a few scattered areas, such as hockey and foreign policy, between which there is little obvious continuity, that the Canadian record is markedly different from that of the United States. Even here, however, what is Canadian is gradually becoming less and less distinct. We will discuss the cultural importance and socio-economic ramifications of hockey for Canada in a subsequent chapter. What follows here is a brief summary of the overall nature of the foreign policy aspects of the Canada-United States relationship during the post-World War II era. The United States' dominance could be felt very strongly in Canada through the effects of bilateral trade alone; however, U.S. foreign policy reinforces the asymmetrical relationship, as the following illustrates.

The Canadian position during the Korean War, continued Canadian-Cuban diplomatic relations, criticism of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and Canada's voting record in the United Nations, are but a few indications that Canada's post-World War II foreign policy has, contrary to popular belief, not necessarily been synonymous with U.S. foreign policy. Nonetheless, an alignment with U.S. policies, however slow and subtle, appears to be under way. For instance, no Canadian leader has criticized the conduct of any U.S. president the way Prime Minister Pearson criticized President Johnson's escalation of the U.S. presence in Vietnam. Following Pearson's speech at Temple University in Philadelphia, PA, wherein he criticized the U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam, Pearson visited Johnson at Camp David. Johnson, furious over Pearson's audacity to criticize him, lifted Pearson by the collar of his shirt and roared, "You peed on my carpet,"[74] whereupon Canada was relegated to the "No. 1 kennel" in the Washington dog house.[75] There has, in essence, not been any major foreign policy disagreement between Canada and the United States since Pearson, and consequently, Canada has not been shunned by the U.S. again. Furthermore, there has, as of late, not been any Canadian domestic policy initiatives that so deeply offended U.S. sensibilities as did Prime Minister Trudeau's National Energy Plan and Foreign Investment Review Act, and no U.S. president since Nixon has enacted any punitive measures aimed at Canada. Finally, the 1980s saw the abandonment of the century-plus-old National Policy with its protective provisions, in favor of a tariff-eliminating Free Trade Agreement with the United States, with a potential companion agreement coming soon to the North American continent, ranging all the way from Ellesmere Island to the Yucatan.

As Canadian criticism of the United States has ceased, however, domestic

criticism of the Canadian silence has increased, as have the references to the canine species. Canada was the "lap-dog" of the U.S. in the mind of former Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton,[76] and, as John W. Holmes suggests, "[Canadians] could fear the day when [they] had become so infected with the North American syndrome,... that the Canadian prime minister would appear at those high-class summits more like the president's pet poodle."[77]

Much of the thawing of United States-Canadian relations in general, and the overhaul of Canada's foreign policy to make it more consistent with U.S. foreign policy, in particular, took place during Brian Mulroney's tenure as Canada's Prime Minister. Lawrence Martin sums up the approaches of Mulroney's predecessors as follows:

> Until Mulroney came to power, Canadian tradition prescribed a role for Ottawa as an agent of restraint against Washington's more aggressive tendencies. Ottawa was the peace-broker, the bridge-builder, the cool eye on the hot rhetoric. The post-war era saw Pierre Trudeau's world peace mission, his cutbacks in NATO, his attempts to lower the temperature of Soviet-American confrontations; it saw Pearson's honest-broker role in the resolution of the Suez crisis and his opposition to Lyndon Johnson's bombing in Vietnam; it saw Diefenbaker's fulminating against what he felt was needless adventurism on the part of the Kennedy administration.[78]

In the 1980s and 90s, then, Canadian foreign policy became something of an adjunct to U.S. foreign policy. Canadian involvement in the Gulf War was an American expectation - and rightly so, as Canada had given the United States every reason to expect its participation. In fact, as Martin continues, Mulroney's

> government became arguably the most hawkish Canada has seen. The Mulroney Tories backed the invasion of Panama and supported the bombing of Libya; they led the allied charge in support of the United States in the Gulf War, breaking the custom that Canadian troops serve only as peacekeepers; they were among the last of the cold warriors to recognize historic change in the Soviet Union; they threatened to be in the vanguard of a military invasion of Haiti; they increased defence spending following the disappearance of the Soviet threat; and they cut back on foreign aid and began tying it to economic structural adjustment toward a free-market base.[79]

This is hardly surprising. While no U.S. President from Nixon to Clinton has had quite the demeanor and temper of Lyndon Johnson, it is still hard to imagine that any Canadian Prime Minister would look forward to being subjected to the kind of verbal assault that Prime Minister Pearson was subjected to in 1965. This, however, is something that Mulroney never had to worry about.

Nonetheless, while Canada still is a little too important for the United States to be treated as a "pet poodle," the fact remains that U.S. treatment of Canada in many ways has left, and continues to leave, something to be desired. The treatment accorded other nations with which the United States interacts has been wanting in the Canadian case. In fact, as Stephen Clarkson charges, the U.S. has treated Canada as little more than

> a backyard neighbour rather than as a distinct foreign power for whom [she] needed an explicitly articulated foreign policy. The clichés repeated *ad nauseam* in political speeches about the thousands of miles of undefended border [express] a basic truth: a convergence of world views and a mutual satisfaction with Canada's economic and cultural integration [have] laid the foundations for an impressive stability in the Canadian-American relationship.[80]

Judging from Clarkson's assessment, the unpleasant truth is that the United States has, in many ways, performed a *de facto* annexation of Canada. Although U.S. territorial limits have not been formally extended so as to include Canada, she is not treated as significant neighbor, ally, or distinct nation by the United States. President Carter, for instance, did not visit Ottawa even once during his tenure in the White House, with the pedestrian U.S. reason being "that there are not enough problems between [Canada and the United States] to warrant a visit."[81]

Indeed, Canada is the junior partner in this relationship, and Ottawa has little else to do but to take its cues from Washington, DC. For instance, in the case of trade, the percentage figures quoted above may indicate a fairly even trade balance, but real numbers tell a different story: a most uneven trade balance, and especially when measured relative to the GNP. Considering that the U.S. market is ten times the size of the Canadian, an argument can be made that Canada's need for access to the U.S. market exceeds the U.S. need for access to the Canadian market:

> For trade with the United States to disappear would be an absolute disaster for Canada; for trade with Canada to disappear would be a very serious, but quite surmountable, problem for the United States.[82]

To be frank, Canada, as a result of being the only major industrial nation without a large internal market, has no domestic industrial base. Consequently, she has in many ways become a nation of sub-contractors, and primarily for the U.S. market. Indeed, U.S. corporations have established "so many [Canadian] subsidiaries in mining, manufacturing and distribution in the Canadian economy... that Canadian-owned firms in many sectors [have] found themselves operating at a disadvantage in their own market."[83] One of the foremost indicators of the precarious situation of the truncated Canadian economy - which Clarkson considers "a miniature replica of the American"[84] - is, in the words of Daniel

Drache, that

> the key value-added activities such as R&D, product innovation as well as product design are conducted outside Canada. Many of [the] "exports" consist of intercompany transfers of sub-assembly and sub-component parts. Little wonder then that Canada lacks a core of value-adding, export-oriented, wealth-creating industries in the full sense of the term.[86]

Here, it is appropriate to ask who owns Canada - that is, to what degree is the Canadian economy controlled by U.S interests? In 1986, U.S. direct investment in Canada exceeded US$50 billion, meaning that U.S. citizens and/or corporations have a greater stake in the Canadian economy than those of any other nation.[86] Does such a massive dependence on the United States suggest that Canada should become a part of the United States, in one way or another? Some already think so. In the mind of the member of the U.S. House of Representatives Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Canada is indeed a "trust territory" of the United States, seeing as how so many aspects of Canada's economy are dominated and controlled by the United States.[87]

Conclusion

Throughout her 125-plus-year history, then, Canada's mission has been to distinguish herself socially, politically, and otherwise, from the United States, by often doing and being what the United States does not and is not and vice versa. With the exception of her political system, Canada has fallen far short of her objectives in carrying out her mission, which does not seem to have yielded the desired outcome of a strong and truly independent Canada. The degree of Americanization that Canada has undergone should neither be underestimated nor ignored. Her British history and "French fact" having influenced her direction greatly until the end of World War II, these two founding influences are now, along with whatever naturally occurring Canadian content there is, being drowned out by a flood of American ideas.

As we have seen in this chapter, Canada's past and present history is dominated by domestic tensions along an east-west axis. These tensions are further exacerbated by a seemingly relentless north-south pull, as manifested in the sheer proximity of the United States and the accompanying relative internal remoteness of Canada; Canadian reliance on U.S. industry and manufacturing trends; and the increasing conformity of Canadian foreign policy to that of her U.S. counterpart. With this in mind, it is useful to point out that the views of Congresswoman Kaptur above, are not new, but have existed, in various forms, ever since Confederation in 1867. Indeed, one may want to strongly consider

whether there is any truth to the suggestion that Canadians have a lease with an option to buy the American identity - or have they maybe even already bought it? As early as 1907, Samuel E. Moffett suggested that

> [t]he conclusion to which all the converging lines of evidence unmistakably point is that the Americans and the English-speaking Canadians have been welded into one people. The French Canadians are of course different from both, but even in their case the international boundary is not a dividing line.... But French Canada is merely a little island in the midst of a sea of English-speaking people, of diverse origins indeed, but unified by a common language, common institutions and common habits of life. The English-speaking Canadians protest that they will never become Americans - they are already Americans without knowing it.[88]

Not surprisingly, therefore, there are many difficulties involved in defining what Canadian culture is and what constitutes a unique Canadian cultural identity. Due to the impact of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled industries, whether cultural or otherwise, very few aspects of life in Canada are truly Canadian. Whereas

> [o]ther countries regulate foreign content[,] Canada regulates domestic content [, and] not particularly well.... If what little ownership, control, and presence [Canada] currently exert[s] are further diminished by the cultural concessions that U.S. interests seek in the bilateral trade negotiations, the concept of cultural sovereignty - "[Canada's] control of [her] future and nature," in the words of [then-Secretary of State for External Affairs,] Joe Clark - will be less of an ideal, and even more of a bitter irony.[89]

That the Canadian relationship with the United States remains fraught with friction and resentment is amply illustrated by the statement above. Representative of the sometimes dormant but often antagonistic Canadian attitude towards her powerful neighbor, the statement illustrates well that although Canadians may no longer fear a violent annexation attempt by the United States, they dread the possibility of absorption. But, is it really fair to expect anything else? As Richard Gwyn argues,

> [a] society that tolerates and even cherishes cultural and racial and regional differences cannot survive unless it accepts the constancy of ambiguity, for any single collective policy is bound to threaten some group, some minority, some region, some province. This is the lesson that Quebecers taught to all Canadians.[90]

At the same time, however, while the United States has sought and continues to seek an unimpeded flow of information for her cultural exports, access to foreign markets such as the Canadian is not the only vital aspect needed for such exports. There must also be a market *per se* - that is, consumers - for the products the United States seeks to export to Canada. This, then, is the flip-side the Canadian antagonism towards and aversion to her powerful neighbor: Canadians are avid consumers of U.S. cultural exports. Does this render hypocritical or even invalid Canadian criticisms of the United States and U.S. culture? Not necessarily, but clearly, there is a dichotomy at work here. As John Meisel says:

> [i]nside every Canadian, whether she or he knows it or not, there is, in fact, an American. The magnitude and effect of this American presence in [the Canadian citizens] varies considerably from person to person but it is ubiquitous and inescapable.[91]

In the next chapter we will look specifically at how American inroads into the realm of Canadian culture have had a drastic impact on the development of a Canadian cultural identity. The emphasis of the discussion will be on how the broadcasting industry, as the most pervasive medium, has, due to its reliance on inexpensive American imports along with its failure to produce competitive Canadian programming, contributed to the "slippery slope" decline of the efforts of creating and maintaining a unique Canadian cultural identity. The means for cultural mass dissemination that the United States has at her disposal are not only far superior to those of Canada, but they are equalled by no one. As the flow of American information washes in over Canada like tidal waves, then, it has become, in Edwin R. Black's words,

> very difficult to build and hold a set of tiny rings within which Canadian performers might develop their talents in any way distinctive from the mass tastes of the giant market to the south.... The problem is in trying to serve [29] million people in two [major] language groups who live in tempting, embarrassing, and almost smothering proximity to [255] million Americans who speak the language of Canada's majority [, and] have the world's most penetrating and effective system for transmitting ideas en masse. "Canada, more than any other country, is naked to that force, exposed unceasingly to a vast network of communications which reaches to every corner of [the] land."[92]

NOTES:

1.Michael Hart, "Canada Discovers Its Vocation As a Nation of the Americas." In Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1990-91: After the Cold War* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), p. 83.

2.Roger Gibbins, *Canada As a Borderlands Society* (Orono, ME: Borderlands Project/University of Maine, 1989), p. 1.

3.Roger Frank Swanson, "An International Perspective: The Foreign Policy of Adjustment." In William Metcalfe, ed., *Understanding Canada* (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 536-537.

4.J. M. S. Careless, "Hooray for the Scars and Gripes." In A. W. Purdy, ed., *The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the U.S.* (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1968), p. 134.

5.Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 89, 145.

6.M. Michael Rosenberg et al., *An Introduction to Sociology* (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983), p. 115.

7.Robertson Davies, "College Master Looks at His World: Author Davies Finds Youth Little Change." Interview by John Cunningham. In J. Madison Davis, ed., *Conversations with Robertson Davies* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), p. 68.

8.Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 1.

9.Daniel J. Boorstin and Brooks Mather Kelley with Ruth Frankel Boorstin, *A History of the United States* (Lexington, MA: Ginn and Company, 1981), p. 80.

10.Roger Gibbins, *Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 28-29.

11.William Lewis Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (2nd ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 86.

12.Ramsay Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), p. 188.

13.Hence, the term "gridlock." Whether justified or not, then-President Bush chose to make "gridlock" one of his most frequently used themes in his 1992 re-election bid. In so doing, he sought to describe how he perceived his own relationship with

Congress, as well as the relationship(s) between Democratic and Republican members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to be fraught with gridlock; that is, it took a long time for things to get done, if at all.

14.Lipset, op. cit., p. 21.

15.Michael A. Goldberg, "Comparisons of American and Canadian Cities." In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1986), p. 195.

16.Peter N. Nemetz, W. T. Stanbury, and Fred Thompson, "Social Regulation in Canada: An Overview and Comparison with the American Model." In *Policy Studies Journal* 14 (June, 1986), p. 595. Cited in Lipset, op. cit., p. 132.

17.Cited in Lipset, op. cit., p. 20.

18.Lipset, op. cit., p. 20.

19.Cited in Richard G. Lipsey, "Canada and the United States: The Economic Dimension." In Charles F. Doran and John F. Sigler, eds., *Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), p. 70.

20.Keith Archer, *Political Choices and Electoral Consequences* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), p. 3.

21.Boorstin et al., op. cit., p. 89.

22.Kenneth D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History." In Louis Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 239.

23.Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 12.

24.McRae, op. cit., p. 235.

25.David Smith, *The Regional Decline of a National Party: Liberals on the Prairies* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 3.

26.McRae, op. cit., p. 245; Smith, op. cit., p. 7.

27.McRae, op. cit., p. 245.

28.Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

29.Ibid., p. 5.

30.Ibid., p. 25.

31.Smith, op. cit., pp. 3-8.

32.McRae, op. cit., p. 266.

33.Horowitz, op. cit., p. 24.

34.Seymour Martin Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (rev'd ed.) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), p. 170.

35.Horowitz, op. cit., p. 3.

36.Richard Preston, "Introduction: National Imagery - The Canadian Image of the United States Today." In S. F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 9.

37.Ibid.

38.William Christian and Colin Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada* (2nd ed.) (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1983), pp. 26-27.

39.Ibid., p. 93.

40.George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), p. 14.

41.Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, p. xiv.

42.Horowitz, op. cit., p. 10.

43.Smith, op. cit., p. 123.

44.Lipset, *Continental Divide*, p. 91; footnote omitted.

45.Cited in ibid., p. 91. SPECIAL NOTE: Both law and lawlessness, as well as the servants of the law and the outlaws, have provided Hollywood with one of its most enduring themes. Reinvented and regurgitated in perpetuity, this theme has become one of Tinsel Town's most reliable sources of revenue, as we shall see later.

46.Kenneth McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada* (5th ed.) (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 178.

47.Cited in Mason Wade, "The Roots of the Relationship." In John Sloan Dickey, ed., *The United States and Canada* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 46.

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50.McNaught, op. cit., p. 15.

51.David Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party: Liberals on the Prairies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 131; footnote omitted.

52.Garth Stevenson, "Canadian Regionalism in Continental Perspective." In R. D. Olling and M. W. Westmacott, eds., *Perspectives on Canadian Federalism* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1988), p. 124.

53.Ibid., pp. 124-125.

54.Ibid., p. 126.

55.McNaught, op. cit., p. 145.

56.Stevenson, op. cit., p. 126.

57.Smith, op. cit., p. 131; footnote omitted.

58.Stevenson, op. cit., p. 123.

59.Richard Gwyn, *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 189.

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63.Robertson Davies, "An Editor, His Newspaper, Its Community." Interview by Ralph Hancox, 1963. In J. Madison Davis, ed., op. cit., p. 7.

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69.Daniel Drache, "Canadian-U.S. Free Trade: Not A Muddle, Not A Mess, But An Unparalleled Disaster." In *The Round Table*, #307, 7/88, p. 252. Emphasis in original.

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72.Ibid., p. 9.

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75.John English, "Speaking Out On Vietnam, 1965." In Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1992), p. 148.

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77.John W. Holmes, *Life With Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 101.

78.Lawrence Martin, *Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the Mulroney Years* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1993), p. 160.

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81.Holmes, op. cit., p. 5.

82.Lipsey, op. cit., p. 77.

83.Clarkson, op. cit., p. 6.

84.Ibid., p. 7.

85.Daniel Drache, op. cit., p. 257.

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88.Samuel E. Moffett, *The Americanization of Canada* (New York: Columbia University, 1907; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, reprint), p. 114.

89.Brian Anthony, "Negotiating Canadian Culture: What's At Stake?" In *Canadian Business Review*, Vol. 13 (Summer 1986), p. 17.

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91.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In Flaherty and McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1986), p. 152.

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Chapter Two

CANADIAN AIRWAVES, AMERICAN CONTENT

Preamble

The discussion in the previous chapter sought to illustrate how the Canadian nation-state, as a calculated effort to not only counteract the influence of the United States on the North American continent, but also to preserve British traditions and institutions in North America, is plagued by a number of weaknesses. Regional and linguistic tensions, an underdeveloped domestic industrial base, geographic barriers, and scarcity of population are some of the domestic problems that one must factor into the situation. Additionally, Canada's geographical, historical, linguistic, and cultural proximity to the United States, along with her status as a member of the British Commonwealth, are other variables that in various ways have contributed, and continue to contribute, to these weaknesses.

Present throughout the Canadian experience - sometimes at the center, sometimes in the periphery - is a very weak Canadian cultural identity. As suggested in the preceding chapter, the concept of cultural identity does not lend itself very well to definition - but this may not always be a disadvantage for the individual involved in an analysis concerned with the concept. Its very vagueness can, in fact, be a testimony to its importance, in that it is only through its absence or weakness that we are able to perceive a difficult or otherwise less than satisfactory situation. We know this from psychology: the individual who has a keen sense of identity is not only more likely to survive, but also to thrive, than is the individual who, for whatever reason, suffers from a weak identity, in any given way. In that regard, the life of a nation(-state) does not differ much from that of an individual. Applying this mode of reasoning to the present discussion on United States-Canada relations, Charles F. Doran has suggested that a cultural or

> national identity is the collective personification of the individual ego at the nation-state level. When the ego is abused or challenged, its natural response is to strike outward at the challenger. Because, in some cases, Americans have been careless about how they approach issues involving the Canadian political and cultural identity, they have earned the kind of anti-Americanism they are surprised to discover.[1]

Whether the anti-Americanism is justified is subject to debate. However, in

addition to the daily or near-daily element of anti-Americanism resulting from perceived American dominance and ignorance, as suggested by writers such as Doran, Anthony, and Drache, among others, it would seem that Canadian anti-Americanism takes on another dimension as well. Harking back to the very reason for the establishment of Canada, this form of anti-Americanism involves the conscious decision of some North Americans to not become *Americans*. As Frank Underhill wrote,

> [t]he oldest and most tenacious tradition in our communal memory centres around our determination not to become Americans.... In fact it would be hard to overestimate the amount of energy we have devoted to this cause. One can never tell what will be the next occasion on which we'll gird up our loins and save ourselves once again from the United States. One can only predict with confidence that the occasion will come.[2]

In this chapter, which deals expressly with the Canadian and American cultural industries as they relate to Canada's cultural identity, we will consider the impact that U.S. media have on the formation of a Canadian cultural identity. Although media other than television will be considered, the bulk of the discussion will lean heavily on that medium, due to its pervasiveness. We will see that while there are substantial reservations about the prevalence of U.S. cultural artifacts throughout the Canadian society in general, and on the nation's airwaves in particular, and that while these reservations are augmented by a not insignificant amount of anti-Americanism, strong popular aversion and resentment of U.S. cultural artifacts are conspicuously absent. In other words, while many Canadians may harbor strong resentment of and even contempt for the United States and her presence in Canada, they are nonetheless avid consumers American television, books, magazines, films, and music. The reasons for this apparent dichotomy are manifold, but the three that will be stressed here are, initially, the Canadian dependence on the United States; the absence of strong domestic structures for the promulgation of Canadian culture; and, lastly, the mechanics of production, distribution, and exhibition, as they relate to advertising and Canadian content regulations.

Borrowed Structures

In the previous chapter, we referred to Gordon Robertson's argument that culture and industry are inextricably linked. He is not alone. Borrowed structures from the United States do not necessarily become less American, or more Canadian, just because they are transplanted into, or superimposed on, the Canadian system. A random selection of corporate logos and names bears out this

thesis. Consider, for instance, *Rubbermaid Canada*, *Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.*, and *Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd.* These and other corporations, by their presence in the kitchens of Canada, in the libraries and on the bookshelves of Canada, and on the Canadian dinner tables, not to mention in front of the television sets and in the movie theaters scattered across the nation, exert their own, however subtle, influence on Canadians. Corporate presence is, thus, not necessarily different from cultural presence and may, in some cases, even be synonymous with each other. Witness, for example, the types of concert sponsorship in which corporations making brown soft drinks (i.e., *Pepsi-Cola* and *Coca-Cola*) and amber not-so-soft drinks (i.e., *Budweiser* and, Canada's own, *Molson*), have participated. Not only has their participation yielded bumper stickers with inscriptions such as, *Corporate Rock Still Sucks* (and, thus, its own form of counterculture), but perhaps more importantly, their participation has also contributed to a further blurring of the line between cultural promotion and advertising. There is a very strong relationship between culture and its promotion, on the one hand, and advertising and consumption, on the other, as it takes place on television in present-day Canada. It is, however, not a new concept. In addition to the absence of governmental controls on businesses in the United States, the right to own property has a near-sacred status in the United States. Unlike the Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution contains provisions making it unlawful for states and the federal government alike to deny the individuals the right to own property.[3] Goldberg notes that although

> the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms granted a broad array of rights to Canadians[,] property rights (partially as a result of the American experience) were explicitly excluded. Some constitutional scholars believe that when one has a constitution with enunciated rights, and there are classes of rights that are left unenunciated, those unenunciated rights have no force. Thus the decision in Canada is to rank property rights at a much lower level than other civil liberties.[4]

The rights to property and ownership, then, can be seen as implying the right to consumption or, at the very least, they do encourage consumption. The rights to property and ownership are, each in their own way, market stimulants, and hence, stimulate consumption - which, one might argue, gives rise to its own culture:

> The historical relationship between popular culture and consumerism was structured in 19th century industrialism and, in particular, in the industrialization of culture through the emergence of leisure institutions, services and goods. Popular culture became increasingly disciplined in the technological transformations and economic imperatives of generating and sustaining production, markets and consumption on a mass level.... Popular sentiment in any given

historical period is organized and articulated through the symbolic constructions and practices of popular culture.[5]

Regarding the overall relationship between culture and industry in Canada, then, Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance in then-Prime Minister Pearson's first cabinet and a strong advocate of a truly autonomous Canada, argued that

> [f]oreign control of the Canadian economy has an important effect on Canadian culture. The actions of big business in the United States and other foreign countries influence public policy and the way of life in Canada, through their control of so many of the larger companies in our country.[6]

In the same vein, the former editor of *Saturday Night,* Robert Fulford, concurs with Gordon's argument and assesses the American impact. Quoted at length here, he contends that

> Canadians are the world's greatest internationalists - we watch foreign television stations, read foreign magazines, see foreign movies and work in buildings designed by foreigners - and it is ironic that we have lately been accused of nationalism. Until recently, we prided ourselves on having no identity, on being pliable. A popular belief among members of the Canadian literary community was that the typical Canadian virtue was to be open to everything, to have no rigid rules. We were proud of the fact that Canada did not really exist. About ten years ago [circa 1967] tension began to build up between this traditional internationalism and what is now called Canadian nationalism.
>
> Americans set standards for the whole country. Canadians live inside a reality in which they do not participate, which is a very alienating experience. American influence is felt on two levels in Canada. At the highest level, artists, poets, and novelists are not overwhelmed by American culture; in fact it may be a positive influence. At the level of mass art and media, however, it is an extremely negative force. The Canadian media, playing to an audience accustomed to an American culture, are caught up in a desperate struggle to imitate American models. Americans have conditioned our cultural climate so that we try to act like Americans, and in many cases we don't even try to develop uniquely Canadian forms of culture. Television producers try to reproduce American situation comedies, although in most cases they lack the money to succeed. Our newspapers and magazines assume American styles and standards.[7]

Fulford's argument is interesting for two reasons. First, it emphasizes, however indirectly, just how porous the border between Canada and the United States is, and shows that stemming the flow of information is a difficult, if not impossible, task - and especially if Canada wants to remain an open society and the United States' foremost ally.

Secondly, his statement raises the question, *Why would Canadians try to act like Americans and refrain from developing a uniquely Canadian culture, unless there was a great deal of semblance and identification with America and the Americans?* Clearly, this would suggest that the international boundary is not only an unnatural boundary, but also an artificial one, and in every sense of *that* word. While the border may be a demarcation line between two different political structures and their distinct political cultures, the national culture experienced by Americans and Canadians alike is neither affected nor impeded, whether directly or indirectly, by the boundary. Although historians may suggest that Canadians, time and again, have made a conscious decision to *not* be Americans, it may be that such a conclusion is more academic than anything else. To quote John Meisel from the previous chapter, "[i]nside every Canadian, whether he or she knows it or not, there is, in fact, an American."[8] Given this, it would be too much of a coincidence that Canadian regionalisms, discussed in the previous chapter, have been very much conducive to the kinds of cross-border relationships that now line the border from Washington State and British Columbia to the Maritimes and New England.

Here one must be receptive to the idea that the United States may, in various ways, have a vested interest (however indirect) in Canadian regionalisms and their continued presence. Sharing Robertson's and Gordon's lines of thinking, Careless argues that

> the United States ministers to sectional divisions in Canada. Pulls to the south ally the various Canadian regions with their more powerful American neighbours, thus thwarting the development of strong east-west ties within Canada herself. Through mass media, as in travel, Canadians look south to New York or Hollywood, to Chicago, Boston, or Miami. And the power of American investment may develop our resources and technology, but sap our control and determine our lives within our own country.[9]

The American Presence

Many English-speaking Canadians do worry about the American presence, and how it influences the Canadian cultural identity. This situation is compounded by a fundamental difference between the two nations, regarding how culture is viewed and treated. Whereas in Canada, culture is considered one of the defining

characteristics of a nation, Americans add one more, equally important, dimension to the definition of the concept: the financial aspect. The cultural industries are multi-million dollar industries in the United States, whose influence is felt world-wide, and as such, are treated much like the manufacturing industries: they both produce and market products. The tension between these different approaches give rise to a latent, not unfounded, albeit rather tempered, Canadian form of antagonism toward the United States which, at the present time, seems to once again be gaining in support and is rising to the surface. As Brian Anthony suggests,

> [i]t is important that Canadians have access to the works of Canadian creators, works that reflect Canadian experiences and aspirations from a Canadian perspective. It is equally important that Canadian creators have access to a Canadian audience. If we do not ensure such access, we will continue to view ourselves increasingly through the distorting mirror of a foreign culture. The spirit of our people and our nation will be diminished. If some Canadians consider it embarrassing to speak of our culture as the heart and soul of our national life, Americans find it completely baffling. The industries that we call cultural are viewed by Americans as simply commercial industries for which the Canadian market is a highly lucrative one, and whose relationship to culture and Canadian cultural sovereignty is non-existent. They are businesses, like any other, and what matters is money.... U.S. interests exert an overwhelming influence in the Canadian cultural market.... Moreover, given the size of the U.S. market, cultural products - films, records, books and television programs - can earn back the investment in the U.S. market, and the Canadian market is almost pure profit.[10]

Since many U.S. corporations are well-established in Canada, there is, then, in Canada, a sometimes active, sometimes dormant, but always present fear that U.S. corporations not only extract resources, but that they also blaze the trail for an increased U.S. cultural presence in Canada. Culture and industry can thus be seen as being inextricably linked:

> If cultural development is important for the attainment of a greater sense of common identity in Canada, and if Canadian control of vital resources is thought necessary for Canadian independence, of equal importance and difficulty is the transition of the Canadian economy from its traditional reliance on raw materials and staples to a more mature industrial base.[11]

This is not without consequence - especially as it pertains to the cultural industries in Canada. Concern over the Canadian cultural identity is exemplified

in many ways, one of which is to place it in the context of that portion of the Canadian cultural market which consists of Canadian cultural goods and services. In this regard, it is viewed as being under constant attack from abroad, and primarily from the United States. The following data reveal why such a concern is warranted, and although they are included mainly for reference, they do create a better idea of just how vast the American presence is in the cultural sphere of the Canadian mosaic.

To begin with, Alan Rugman notes that in 1984, "Americans owned 76.3 percent of the stock of foreign direct investment in Canada...."[12] Such a figure also has an indirect effect on the content of television programming, through advertising, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. While American ownership in broadcasting may not exceed 20 percent, as per the Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1968, this limitation has not worked very well to stem the flow of American programming.[13] This is hardly surprising: Americans do not need to own any aspect of the broadcasting industry in Canada in order to ensure that the American fare is made available to the Canadian viewing audience; that need is taken care of by the Canadian broadcasters, who quite willingly meet the demands of the audience, as well as those of the advertising agencies by importing U.S. programming. Similarly, Richard Gwyn reports that in 1972, 95 percent of the Canadian publishing industry was controlled by foreign ownership,[14] with 80 percent of the Canadian imports coming from the United States in 1969.[15] Looking at the reverse side of the topic - that is, Canadian consumption of Canadian cultural products - more recent data suggest that Canadians are giving increasing economic support not to their own cultural industries, but to those of other nations, and primarily those of the United States:

> * In 1982, Canadian consumer outlays for cultural goods and services were CAN$5.3 billion - 2.3% of total consumer expenditures or CAN$216 per person;
> * In 1982, foreign-controlled film and video distribution enterprises accounted for CAN$209 million (73%) of that industry's gross yield of CAN$288 million, while only CAN$7.7 million was paid out to Canadian copyright owners.
> * The 1983 gross revenues of the Canadian recording industry amounted to CAN$324 million. 82%, or CAN$267 million, was earned by foreign-controlled companies.
> * In 1983, there were, according to reports, 202 book publishing firms in Canada. The estimated 1983 sales of books in Canada was CAN$1.2 billion, of which 75% (CAN$935 million) was derived from the sale of imported books.[16]

As is obvious from statistics such as these, industrial penetration, in general, and cultural penetration, in particular, from abroad do indeed have a tremendous impact on Canadian culture and the Canadian cultural identity, as well as

Canadians' cultural consumption patterns.

A Lease With An Option to Buy

We have seen how the Canadian search for a uniquely Canadian identity is a struggle whose end has yet to come. Having freed herself from British colonial rule (though a case can be made that such a Canadian freedom is arbitrary at best, and not at all complete), Canada did so only to fill the British void with a preponderant U.S. presence which, as we approach the end of the 20th Century, appears to extend to and reach every aspect of the Canadian experience.

With English being the predominant language in both Canada and the United States, and with both countries espousing liberal traditions (albeit somewhat differently) in pursuit of an open society, the U.S.-Canadian border can hardly be considered a very strong barrier against the onslaught of American media. This is a predicament peculiar to Canada; indeed, in other former British colonies, notably Australia and New Zealand, the national identities are unique and thriving, despite their histories as former British colonies.[17] Neither Australia nor New Zealand, however, share a border with the United States, or any other superpower. To make matters worse, from a Canadian point of view, Canada's vastness is equalled only by the that of the United States and Russia's, as she stretches across seven of the world's time zones in some of the most rugged terrain known to mankind (and womankind).

In light of this, it could be suggested that at worst, Canada does not have a cultural identity of her own or, at best, that Canada has "a lease with an option to buy" the American cultural identity. Judging from the following statistics, such a transaction is well advanced at this point.

Looking at the publishing industry in Canada once again, but with a greater U.S. spin than previously, Paul Audley notes that in 1981, over four-fifths, or 83.3 percent, of Canada's sum total book imports originated in the United States. "Canada," Audley contends, "accounts for about half of all the exports by the U.S. book publishing industry and U.S. book publishers tend to see the Canadian market simply as an extension of their own."[18]

For the magazine arm of the Canadian publishing industry, the situation is even less gratifying, as seen from a Canadian point of view. In addition to increases in production and mailing costs, the seven percent Goods and Services Tax (GST), and tightened advertising policies - tobacco advertising is now severely restricted, for instance (as an added aside, one may wonder whether this is for medical or moral reasons) - several major U.S. weekly or monthly publications are preparing specifically Canadian editions. Time Warner's flagship (or one of them), *Sports Illustrated*, did, in fact, launch its Canadian edition in the spring of 1993. What this does to the Canadian magazine industry, writes Sandra McKenzie of the *Vancouver Sun*, is that with its Canadian edition of *Sports Illustrated*,

> Time Warner can afford to undercut Canadian advertising rates because the cost of printing a Canadian edition is minimal. The $250,000 revenue [Time Warner] realized in the inaugural issue of *SI*'s Canadian edition is, after the costs of printing, free money.[19]

What further undermines the current situation for the Canadian magazine industry, is that publishers are wrestling with a two percent profit margin. As McKenzie continues,

> [b]oth *Chatelaine* and *Canadian Living* easily outsell their U.S. counterparts, while more Canadians read *Maclean's* than read *Newsweek* and *Time* combined. [Canadians] support about 1,160 home-grown titles with a combined circulation of 183 million. [That, however,] accounts for only about 25 percent of the magazines [Canadians] buy and only about six percent of those reach their readers through the newsstands.[20]

Moving from the print media to the visual and broadcast media, we see that of all the films shown in movie theaters across Canada, 95 percent of the sum total annual yields are generated by U.S. productions, and as little as three percent of "all theatrical screen time in Canada is devoted to Canadian films."[21] Meanwhile, as the global home video consumption grows, and with that, its production, it is worth noting that in Canada, U.S. productions are never categorized as "foreign films." Canadian films, however, whether *Black Robe, Jesus of Montreal,* or *Not A Love Story* are, to the extent that they are at all promoted and carried by distributors, theaters, and retailers in the United States, always classified as "foreign films." As for drama on broadcast television, Rick Salutin asserts that "95 percent of English-language TV drama is non-Canadian."[22] Finally, approximately 90 percent of the material aired on Canada's cable music network, *Much Music,* is not Canadian in origin,[23] a reflection of the fact that only ten percent of Canadian record and tape sales are of Canadian recording artists.[24]

Canadian Culture On the Fringe

Surely there is culture in Canada, a culture that does not come in direct contact with the powerful cultural industries of the United States. There was the Group of Seven, and its successors, among whom we find Alex Colville, Harold Town, and Yves Gaucher. The Montreal Symphony Orchestra under Charles Dutoit, and its Torontonian counterpart, until recently under the conductorship of Andrew Davis, are world-renowned symphony orchestras. There is the Shakespeare Festival in Stratford, ON, and elsewhere in Ontario, in Niagara-on-the-Lake, there is the Shaw Festival. The doyen of literary critics, Northrop Frye,

was a Canadian, as are authors Margaret Atwood, Robertson Davies, and Alice Munro.[25] But, while these are well-known to Canadians (although not all Canadians, judging from a series of rather unscientific interviews conducted for this thesis), their reach outside Canada is often limited, if not altogether non-existent. Is it because they represent "high-brow" culture? Or, are they too "Canadian"? Perhaps it is more accurate to describe them and their work as "marginalized," as opposed to "mass" or "popular" culture, regarding the level of exposure they enjoy outside Canada - though, it is to not clear whether these and other Canadian authors are somewhat marginalized in Canada, too. Nonetheless, by using the term "marginalized," unnecessary and unwarranted value judgments can be avoided, and we will instead be able to consider these artists', writers', and performers' locations on the scale of human consciousness and cultural awareness. It is not that they are inevitably destined to lead a professional life in the margins of society, nor do they write and perform with the intention of being or becoming relegated to the margins. Rather, while their voices are, presumably, as loud and clear as those of their American and other non-Canadian counterparts, they lack, to make an analogy with present-day musical technology, the necessary amplification; that is, they do not benefit from the support of the productional and distributional machineries that are available to their non-Canadian counterparts.

The borrowed structures referred to earlier in this chapter most certainly apply to the cultural industries in Canada, and they have been present for quite some time. Morris Wolfe writes that "[b]y the late 1920s, eighty percent of the radio programmes Canadians listened to were American."[26] At this time, there was neither a public nor a private radio broadcasting network in Canada, with the exception of the radio department of the Canadian National Railways, which broadcast programs in the lounge cars of its trains for the entertainment of the passengers. There were radio stations in Canada, but as CKGW in Toronto became an NBC affiliate in 1929, so did CFCF in Montreal a year later. Meanwhile, CKAC, also in Montreal, had already become a CBS affiliate.[27] As the Aird Commission reported in 1929:

> At present the majority of programs heard are from sources outside of Canada. It has been emphasized to us that the continued reception of these has a tendency to mould the minds of young people in the home to ideals and opinions that are not Canadian. In a country of the vast geographic dimensions of Canada, broadcasting will undoubtedly become a great force in fostering a national spirit and interpreting national citizenship.[28]

The predecessor of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) was established in 1932; however, it was not until 1936 that the CBC came on the air, following the disbanding of the CRBC. As Wolfe notes, "[a]t the end of its life in 1936, the CRBC owned only three stations and leased four others. Its six hours a day of

programming reached less than half of Canada's population." On the other hand, by 1946, the CBC "had extended its reach to ninety percent of the population and was broadcasting eighteen hours a day."[29]

Borrowed structures, or weaker structures juxtaposed to stronger ones, can only go so far, however. Eventually, they will disintegrate, be absorbed, or those in charge will realize the limits of the structures. As Richard Gwyn writes,

> [b]y the early 1980s, the ideology of nationalism had dominated the public debate about culture for two decades [, but now it] had gone as far as it could go. It had helped lever into existence, and to sustain, even if only at the commercial margin, all those performing arts companies and painters and writers. But Canada's popular culture of movies, TV soaps, magazines, and popular music was as American as it had ever been, more American than ever, in fact.[30]

Canadian Airwaves, American Content - Part One

The data presented in this chapter shed light on the Americanization of the Canadian society in general, and of Canadian culture in particular, that Gwyn refers to. Faced with an ever-increasing Americanization of her culture, however, Canadian lawmakers, broadcasters, artists, and other cultural personalities have responded neither with indifference nor not at all, but rather vigorously, although with differing levels of intensity. In the remainder of this chapter, we will concentrate the discussion on the medium of television in order to better illustrate the continuing struggle for a uniquely Canadian cultural identity. While the discussion occasionally will be augmented with a few insights from television's one-time foe, the now relatively close ally of the motion picture industry, there are several reasons why the discussion will focus on television. To begin with, of all the cultural activities in which Canadians can and do participate, there is none which they do as frequently and so avidly as watching television. Aside from the Belgians, Canadians have better access to cable television than do any other nationals in the world.[31] In 1977,

> [m]ore than 70 percent of the people in Canada [could] hook up to a cable system bringing them not only all the Canadian network programming available, but also as many as seventeen American channels.[32]

By the fall of 1984, the number of U.S. stations available to Canadians had risen to 99.[33]

Additionally, television's pervasiveness exceeds that of any other medium - more people use and rely on it for entertainment and information, and more

people are exposed to television for reasons that go above and beyond entertainment and information, than to any other communications system. It is

> unarguably the linch pin in any modern nation's system of communication. In Canada, by far the largest proportion of the public's leisure time is spent listening to the radio or watching television. While this in no sense diminishes the importance of other forms of cultural expression, it means that broadcasting offers Canadians their greatest opportunity to share a [cultural] vocabulary that reflects the diverse and distinctive elements of Canadian culture.[34]

Lastly, consistent with the above, it can be argued that the power and pervasiveness of television have rendered "mankind [(and wo-mankind)]in the late 20th century... almost a mirror of the television screen that is at once his[/her] master and his[/her] servant."[35] With that in mind, if the mirror held up in front of Canadians does not show a predominantly Canadian image, this situation is likely to escalate and to have some rather adverse ramifications for the development of a uniquely Canadian cultural identity.

Unlike the United States, then, where the broadcasting systems are privately owned and, in essence, represent free enterprise capitalism, the Canadian Broadcasting System, along with its French arm, *Société-Radio Canada*, are the government-sponsored and -owned national broadcasting system. Obviously, such a broadcasting structure constitutes not only *public* broadcasting in every sense of the word, but it has also become a de facto branch of the Canadian government with which it can promote its agenda. In matters relating to Canadian cultural identity and its promotion, then, the role of the CBC was articulated in Sections 2(b) and 2(g)(iv) of the Broadcasting Act of 1968. The national broadcasting service, it is written,

> should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada [, and] should contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity.[36]

Since 1953, however, when the monopoly it once had on television broadcasting in Canada was ended in order to allow competition, the CBC's share of the market has dwindled steadily. As a result of this, the Canadian television industry now includes, in addition to the CBC, a number of private broadcasters, cable television companies, and most recently, pay-TV and programming via satellite, available directly to the consumer at his or her discretion.

The bulk of the programming offered by CBC, the four private broadcasters, and the cable, satellite, and pay-TV broadcasters is *not* Canadian in origin. Rather,

most of it is American, and as we have seen, this has been the situation since well before the CBC was even established. This state of affairs has been perceived as a problem by a variety of royal commissions on broadcasting, and continues to be perceived as such by cultural nationalists, as it has not changed significantly over the past half-a-century, in spite of repeated recommendations and new regulations. The strongest recommendation was offered by the Massey Commission in 1951, which stated that the three main objectives for Canadian broadcasting were

> an adequate coverage of the entire population, opportunities for Canadian talent and for Canadian self-expression generally, and successful resistance to the absorption of Canada into the general cultural pattern of the United States.[37]

Six years later, in 1957, the Fowler Commission elaborated on this position when it characterized the relationship between Canadian broadcasting, American broadcasting, and Canada herself as follows:

> It is... clear that [Canada] would have cheaper radio and television service if Canadian stations became outlets of American networks. However, if the less costly method is always chosen, is it possible to have a Canadian national identity at all? The Canadian answer, irrespective of party or race, has been uniformly the same for nearly a century. We are prepared, by measures of assistance, financial aid and conscious stimulation, to compensate for our disabilities of geography, sparse population and vast distances, and we have accepted this as a legitimate role of government in Canada.[38]

Canadian Content

The recommendations of the Massey and Fowler Commissions, together with the unity and identity clause of the Broadcasting Act of 1968, laid the foundation for the adoption of regulations on Canadian content, which went into effect in 1970. While these regulations do not apply to programming carried by cable, satellite, or pay-TV broadcasters, they do apply to the public and private broadcast television licensees. The Canadian content regulations can be seen as an adjunct of the aforementioned national unity and identity clause. In essence, the regulations prescribe that of the sum total broadcast hours in a given year, an average of 60 percent of the programming on the CBC must be Canadian in origin for the entire broadcast day, and have a minimum of 60 percent Canadian content during prime time viewing hours; that is, from 6 PM to 12 midnight.[39] The regulations are somewhat less stringent for the private broadcasters, in that a reduction of the Canadian content to 50 percent is permitted, but only in prime

time.

In order to get an indication of whether the Canadian content regulations have been successful in stemming the tide of American programming in Canada, let us now look at some statistics on the amount of Canadian content on Canada's airwaves from the days before the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement. In 1984,

> there were approximately 52,000 hours of English-language programming available to Canadians. 47% of this figure, or over 24,000 hours, was offered by U.S. stations. Even so, the fraction of the programming that is Canadian is disproportionately small. For instance, of 17,600 hours of drama programming in that year, only 2%, or 352 hours, was Canadian. Also, of the 6,300 hours of French-language drama programming in 1984, only 10% was Canadian in origin.[40]

Thus, while content-based regulations enacted in order to promote domestic television production may have been a good idea, it was so in that sense alone. Indeed, given the method by which the level of Canadian content is determined, the frequent exceptions to requirements granted by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and the fact that such content-based legislation are a de facto form of censorship, however indirect and subtle, it is not surprising that they have not worked very well, as is amply illustrated by the example above.

To begin with, in measuring the Canadian content of a given television program, the CRTC applies a point system. Points are awarded on the basis of the nationality of the personnel involved in the production and, naturally, the only nationality that qualifies for points is the Canadian. In order that a given program may be "certifiably Canadian," it must score a minimum of six points, on a scale whose maximum is ten. Writers and directors are considered the most important personnel, and are "worth" two points each, whereas editors and composers are not regarded as quite as indispensable, and get only one point each.

The nationality of the personnel and its use as the paramount criterion for determining the level of Canadian content, opens up the possibility for some rather interesting procedural effects of these regulations. Theoretically, a television documentary about one aspect or another of life in Canada may, if its production crew does not contain enough Canadians, not qualify as "Canadian." On the other hand (and this does happen quite frequently), a production concerned with one or more aspects of life in the United States may very well, if its producers, directors, writers, and other vital personnel are Canadians, be considered Canadian - and most often, such productions are, even though they are not about Canada. This is, David Ellis writes, because

> [w]hereas the system is applied for a cultural purpose, it uses what

> is essentially an *industrial* definition of "Canadian," based on place of residence, not on anything intrinsic to the theme or values of the program itself.[41]

The arbitrariness of the system is made even more apparent by a series of loopholes in the regulations, which creates another set of problems. What happens, for instance, if a given program is a co-venture with a non-Canadian co-producer or production company? While this enables the programming to retain its status as a "Canadian" production, it does so in form only, with the aid of non-Canadian financing - and with financing comes control. A non-Canadian financier will have at least as much control over the production as his or her Canadian counterpart, and perhaps even more so, since Canadian producers, being perpetually underfunded, are more likely to have approached the other party, than the other way around. Ellis gives the example of the CBS series, *Night Heat*, which was originally commissioned by CTV, and ran on CBS for six years between 1985 and 1991:

> Because it was more cost-effective to do so, the series was shot in Canada. *Night Heat* was popular and showed American network executives and producers that an American-style series could be produced just as well in Canada as in the U.S.... [H]owever, the producers went to great pains to ensure that viewers would have no clue that the program had any connection whatsoever with Canada. By altering or disguising street signs, currency, licence plates and other cultural symbols, the producers managed to create a disembodied setting for the show that could have owed its origins to any medium-sized North American city. In other words, the show was Canadian in name but not in spirit.[42]

As with so many other things, there is nothing new about the American practice of borrowing a Canadian location and disguising it to make it look like a given location in the United States. Films like *Stakeout*, *The Accused*, and *The Unforgiven* are but three films released within the last ten years to be filmed in Canada but made to look as if production took place in the United States.

On the other hand, *Night Heat* represents a new and growing trend in American television. Such shows, Ellis notes, represent a format referred to as "reality show." A number of shows using the format have appeared (and some have also disappeared) in the course of the past ten years. Some of them are re-enactments of actual events involving servants of the law and criminals (for instance, *Top Cops*), and in others, a camera crew simply follows a police patrol or state trooper on the beat. One such show, *Cops*, follows crime solving units in various parts of the United States and, thus, has little direct connection with Canada, but it has nevertheless been quite successful in Canada. A series like *Top Cops*, however, is not only produced and directed by Canadians, but also

written and acted by Canadians, despite the fact that it is set exclusively in the United States. As with *Night Heat,* the viewer has few, if any, indications that the show is shot in Canada. Reality shows, Ellis writes, are "cheap to produce and short on artistic insights. Even though the stories may emanate from Canada, programming has a way of blurring the lines of program nationality."[43] Still, they qualify for "Canadian content" status, and reality shows like these are immensely popular with both American and Canadian audiences. They are also popular with broadcasting executives, because they keep the ratings up and attract advertisers. Furthermore, they represent a kind of hybrid programming between news and drama shows. Given that colorful, graphic, and flashy footage is very popular with producers nowadays, television news have come increasingly to take on the appearance of televised crime shows. Considering how much broadcasters rely on ratings figures and advertising revenue, however, it is, therefore, is not surprising that the rule in television news is, *If it don't bleed, it don't lead.* Finally, the reality shows (and increasingly, by implication, also television news) represent the latest variation on the theme of law and lawlessness. As mentioned in Chapter One, that theme has proved to be one of Tinsel Town's most enduring and lucrative themes ever.

The reality show format, then, is a rather comfortable way for Canadian producers and broadcasting executives to meet the Canadian content regulations. Not only do such shows enable them to meet their quotas, but additionally, they draw large-scale audiences which, in turn, attract advertisers, on whose financial support present-day broadcasters depend almost exclusively.

Canadian Airwaves, American Content - Part Two

This introduces the relationship between the production of television programs in Canada and advertising yields. With television being the most expensive of all media, the hardships of the current economic realities must not be underestimated. It is far cheaper to produce news shows, game shows, and the aforementioned reality shows, and to telecast sports events, than to produce drama shows and made-for-television movies. Moreover, it is even cheaper to buy such programs from abroad (that is, from the United States), than to produce them at home. For instance, in circa 1980,

> [I]t cost $1 million per episode to produce the *Lou Grant* series in Los Angeles. The CBC buys *Lou Grant* at $30,000 per show, or $800,000 for a series of 26. The CBC, for its part, has to spend $300,000 for each episode of a "substantial" Canadian series or a total cost of $8 million for 26 weeks. The figures speak for themselves. The CBC can purchase *Lou Grant* for one-tenth the cost of producing its own series (and for three percent of the original

cost...).[44]

The high costs involved in the production of some programs, then, serve as a deterrent for Canadian broadcasters to produce their own shows. In general, Canadian broadcasters do not have the means to produce and market shows that attract large audiences and, with that, advertisers. The American shows do, however, and so do American border stations. Citing a CRTC study, Paul Audley notes that

> where two commercial U.S. channels were added to an existing two Canadian channels, they typically took 40 per cent of the television audience. Where three U.S. networks were added to the two major Canadian networks, they took 53.3 per cent of the audience.... [T]he major effects are two. First, to the extent that major multinational companies can reach Canadian consumers by placing their ads on U.S. networks, they are not likely to bother as much or even at all with television advertising on Canadian networks. Second, to the extent that the percentage of the Canadian television audience reached by Canadian stations and networks is reduced, their attractiveness as an advertising vehicle is reduced.[46]

The differences in advertising revenue bear out this thesis. In 1977, the per capita television advertising revenues in the United States were $46.00, compared to $18.60 in Canada.[46] Three years later, in 1980, the figures were $58.40 for the United States, and $27.20 for Canada.[47] The effects of this discrepancy have been somewhat mitigated by "simulcasting," or "simultaneous substitution"; that is, when the programming in the U.S. and Canada is identical, Canadian cable operators substitute not only Canadian signals for the U.S. signals, but they must also substitute Canadian commercials for U.S. commercials. Possibly the result of the failure to induce in Canadian broadcasters the desire to produce Canadian television to a greater degree than at present, the measure of simultaneous substitution is designed to be of benefit to Canadian businesses through the mandated advertising of Canadian goods and services, and to the Canadian broadcasters, whose yields from this mandated advertising is on the order of CAN$100 million annually.[48] In order not to lose their viewers and thereby incur ratings losses, however, Canadian broadcasters are likely to streamline their programming with that of their U.S. counterparts, meaning that one can watch the same show on two channels at the same time, and even though one channel is a U.S. station and the other is Canadian, both channels' programming is interspersed with Canadian commercials. Consistent with the above, it would seem doubtful whether this will lead to more Canadian programming.

In addition to cable television, the 1980s also saw the emergence of satellite broadcasting and pay-TV as viable competitors to the public and private broadcasters. None of these specialty broadcast services are required to follow the

CRTC's theoretically very stringent Canadian content regulations - as Wolfe writes, "when it comes to enforcing its rules, the CRTC has been and continues to be a paper tiger."[49] The specialty broadcast services are, therefore, much more in a position to offer what one might call "audience-and-advertiser-friendly" programming; that is, in most cases, American shows and movies that keep the audiences glued, the ratings up, and the advertisers happy. The motion picture industry has, in this regard, been able to offset some of the losses it has incurred due to declining audience attendance figures by licensing films to the various broadcasters (whether network, cable, satellite, or pay-TV), for television exhibition, as well as through the ballooning home video market. The latter, though not a direct form of television viewing, is indirectly linked to the medium of television and the cultural (and perhaps also behavioral) activity of watching television, as it usually takes place in the same environment and under the same circumstances as "regular" television viewing, whether one is watching *The Gong Show, Hockey Night in Canada, Make Me Laugh,* or *The CBC Prime Time News.*

The home video industry further reduces the presence of Canadian content programming in the lives of Canadians. Between 1987 and 1991, the number of video rentals in the United States surged from 3.3 billion units to 4.09 billion, at a market increase from $7.42 billion to $10.23 billion. Meanwhile, the sell-through market (that is, where a customer purchases a video cassette) more than doubled; in five years, it went from 115.6 million units to 290.7 million, or from $2.47 billion in 1987 to $4.63 billion in 1991. While these figures are for the U.S. market (similar figures do not exist for the Canadian market), it is "safe to presume that the five-year trends indicated for the U.S. are generally applicable to Canada."[50] Why would they not be, seeing as how the amount of Canadian culture the average Canadian is exposed to is vanishingly small?

Production, Distribution, and Exhibition

The home video industry also reflects the attendance figures at the movie theaters, in that it is American productions that have the blockbuster yields, both when released theatrically and for home video consumption. The Canadian releases are seldom, if ever, as competitive, or regarded as having as much commercial potential, as their American counterparts. Of the 48 feature films produced in Canada between 1987 and 1990, only three grossed more than $500,000, whereas 36 grossed less than $100,000. Only two English-Canadian films have, according to Ellis, grossed in excess of $1 million, *Black Robe* and *Dead Ringers.* By comparison, the Columbia release, *Honeymoon in Vegas,* earned more than $10 million during its first week of release.[51]

Ellis offers two reasons for this uneven landscape. First, the Canadian movie theater business is "dominated by two chains, Cineplex Odeon and Famous Players. Cineplex Odeon is a Canadian company that is part-owned by MCA, while

Famous Players is owned by Paramount Communications, formerly Gulf+Western."[52] The combined share of the Canadian movie theater market held by these American-controlled chains is approximately two-thirds. Such an arrangement has an impact on the distribution and exhibition patterns of films in Canadian theaters. In order that the chains be licensed to show a blockbuster or otherwise popular release, they must agree to show other, less commercially viable releases as well. The net result is that independent productions, or productions not linked to any of the major seven in Hollywood,[53] are squeezed out of the three-pronged process of production-distribution-exhibition. Moreover, since Canadian productions generally are not blockbusters, they are likely to be subject to less popular exposure, and relegated to limited runs in a limited number of markets. The Canadian films do seldom, if ever, benefit from the kind of heavy promotion such as that which preceded and accompanied the releases of recent American blockbusters such as *Dances With Wolves, Silence of the Lambs,* and *Jurassic Park.* This has nothing to do with the quality of the film, but is based solely on an assessment of how well a film will be able to attract large-scale audiences and, if a merchandizing aspect is present, to sell products related to the film as well. Eventually, many of the theatrical releases will be made available for home video consumption and/or shown on broadcast, cable, satellite, or pay-TV. Based on the above, it can be deduced that in all likelihood, few Canadian releases will have a post-theatrical release aftermath much different from the situation that prevailed while at the box office.

The Hollywood studios and the television industry remain, in spite of a general warming of relations, adversarial on some levels. For instance, in the United States, the three networks have, in many ways, altered the form and style of their programming in order to compete better with

> unedited films on pay movie cable channels and rented tapes on cassette recorders.... [They have, for instance,] relaxed standards on the treatment of sex and violence. Shootouts on "Hunter" (NBC, 1984-[1991]), and "Miami Vice" [(NBC, 1984-1989)] began to resemble those on feature films. On one sitcom, a teenage boy worried about not having lost his virginity; on another, a high school student had an abortion. The female lead [Cybill Shepherd] on "Moonlighting" (ABC, 1985-1989) was violently raped by her costar [Bruce Willis]. Such explicitness would have been unthinkable in TV series twenty or thirty years earlier, when the networks only had to worry about small-town moralists.[54]

This situation has ramifications that extend to Canada and Canadian television programming, and especially those on CTV. That network has, Wolfe writes, citing the Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA),

> acted as an effective and powerful catalyst in the Americanization of

> Canadian mass culture. Not only do... programmes produced in the United States make up almost ninety per cent of the peak 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. viewing hours... but the quality of these programmes is of such a nature that CTV [is considered] the most violent network on the continent.[55]

Furthermore, the CTV has violated the Canadian content regulations more than any other Canadian broadcaster, whether public or private. Currently (Fall, 1993), the CTV is seeking a renewal of its broadcasting license from the CRTC. During recent hearings, CRTC commissioner Gail Scott charged CTV with "committing to less [Canadian content] in the year 2000 than in 1991. I don't see any quantum leap forward [in promoting Canadian productions].[56] While the CTV claims to be committed to Canadian productions, its programming does not show it very well. Most recently (in fact, as this is written), the CTV's simulcast of the American production of the World Series baseball championship games between the Philadelphia Phillies and the Toronto Blue Jays, was made "Canadian" through the insertion of Canadian commercials. Commentators, camera crews, and most of the players are Americans, however. In other words,

> CTV [is] simply plug[ging] into the CBS television feed; thereby bumping all U.S. stations off [Canada's] cable system. CTV gets its program and the advertisers get their protection.
>
> This leaves Canadian viewers along the CTV network without a Canadian version of a Canadian-based team in a major sports event.[57]

The CRTC and the FCC

The CRTC, despite its lax enforcement of the Canadian content regulations, is, as a regulatory agency, much more powerful than its American counterpart, the Federal Communications Commission. This is quite consistent with the basic difference between the two countries' governments, and where the FCC has proscribed deregulation, the CRTC has ordered regulation. Whereas the FCC is seeking to encourage competition through its deregulation efforts, and whereas American specialty services, such as Showtime and A&E (Arts & Entertainment) "operate without any form of programming licensing by the FCC,"[58] the CRTC has excluded all U.S.-based movie cable channels from availability in Canada, in the hopes that this will help bolster Canadian productions. Comparing the CRTC and the FCC, as well the two countries' domestic communications policies, Theodore Hagelin and Hudson Janisch, cited by Meisel, contend that the policies "differ both in their ends and their means. Canadian policy seeks cultural development; United States policy seeks consumer choices. Canadian policy relies on program content

regulation and a strong public broadcasting system to achieve its objectives. United States policy relies on structural, or industrial, regulation and a strong commercial broadcasting system to achieve its objectives."[59]

The CRTC is thus authorized to censor broadcasting activities. The FCC is, at least in theory, a strict regulatory agency for technical matters; its charter contains no provision that authorizes it to issue to content-based regulations. This is yet another basic broadcasting difference between the two countries. While many Canadians agree with at least some level of cultural protectionism, for Americans, the argument against such activities is steeped wholly in the tradition of the First Amendment: "Congress shall m · ·.e no law abridging the freedom of speech...."[60] The more restrained Canadian approach, as Davidson Dunton suggests, is

> probably not understood easily by many in the United States. To many Americans, brought up in the tradition of the First Amendment, any attempt to tamper in any way with activities of any [medium] is abhorrent.... Most Canadians adhere in general to the same principle,[61]

but do not wish for complete American domination of the Canadian cultural sphere.

The Broadcasting Act of 1991

Still, it appears that the Canadian content regulations increasingly exist in a vacuum or, at the very least, without a rigorous legal foundation. This is so because the Broadcasting Act of 1968 was replaced with the Broadcasting Act of 1991, which lacks any form of unity and identity clause, such as that one contained in its predecessor.[62] While the content-based regulation, derived from the aforementioned clause, still applies, the unity and identity clause was removed when the House of Commons ratified Canada's new Broadcasting Act. As a basic premise for broadcasting in Canada, it no longer exists - or, in other words, broadcasters no longer have any legally binding obligation to promote Canadian unity or a Canadian cultural identity. One of the reasons for this surprising move was, equally surprisingly, freedom of expression. As then-Minister of Communications, Marcel Masse, stated in the House of Commons:

> I have removed from the CBC its obligation to promote Canadian unity because it is, first, maintaining this political value artificially, and second, it was a constraint on freedom of expression. This obligation also opens the door to intolerable interference. In removing it, we will rather place greater emphasis on the capacity of Canadians to recognize each other through their values.[63]

Conclusion

The question that remains for Canadians to answer is whether it is better to have an artificially inseminated cultural identity, than to remain locked in orbit around the United States and its culture. Furthermore, does the establishment of such an identity rest on the potential infringements on the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press? Completely aside from whatever financial sacrifices the establishment of a Canadian cultural identity requires of Canadians, is a contraction of individual rights something that Canadians would embrace in order that a uniquely Canadian cultural identity may be established? Would such sacrifices be part of the identity? Clearly, as shown in this chapter, regulations have done little for Canada's cultural identity. Is there, however, a great popular demand for such a Canadian cultural identity? Do Canadians really care? Are Canadians able to clearly distinguish Canadian culture from American culture? These and other questions will be addressed in the following chapter.

NOTES:

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3.See the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

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7.Robert Fulford in ibid.

8.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In Flaherty and McKercher, eds., op. cit., p. 152

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18.Paul Audley, *Canada's Cultural Industries* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1983), p. 89.

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20.Ibid.

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23.David Taras, "Defending the Cultural Frontier: Canadian Television and Continental Integration." In Helen Homes and David Taras, eds., op. cit., p. 178.

24.Ibid.

25.This section is based in large part on Gwyn, op. cit., pp. 133-136.

26.Morris Wolfe, *Jolts: The TV Wasteland and the Canadian Oasis* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1985), p. 104.

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50.Ellis, op. cit., p. 113.

51.Ibid., pp. 99-100.

52.Ibid., pp. 97-98.

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Chapter Three

AMERICANS, NOT-AMERICANS, AND CULTURE

Preamble

Through his assertions in the previous chapter, Robert Fulford joins the ranks of those for whom culture is not simply culture, but for whom it is necessary to distinguish between "high" and "low," or "mass," cultures. Such a position gives further credence to the presence and influence of elitism in Canada, as discussed previously, and it also bespeaks of a sharp difference in matters relating to culture and how these are perceived in Canada and the United States. In addition, Fulford's view conforms very well with puristic notions of culture; that is, that culture is a value-laden concept, and some manifestations of culture are "worth" more than others and, conversely, that some forms of culture contain a greater element of insignificance than others. The fact remains, however, that a given culture or cultural activity is inherently devoid of qualifiers such as those used by Fulford and others. It is such a subjectiveness that impedes the development of a better understanding of, and more tolerant attitudes, toward the cultures that are different from our own.

Unfortunately, it appears that some members of the Canadian artistic community are seeking to create the impression that the elitist view is applicable not to Canada, but to the United States, and that elitism is nowhere present in the cultural realm in Canada. According to this view, then, it is American culture that is stratified, not Canadian. One such proponent, Pierre Berton, purporting to speak on behalf of all Canadians to an imaginary American, claims that

> [a]s for culture [, Canadians and Americans] don't even speak the same language. [Americans] think of culture in terms of opera, ballet, and classical music. [For Canadians, culture] covers everything from Stompin' Tom Connors to "Hockey Night in Canada." What is merely "industry" to [Americans] is culture to [Canadians]. Books, magazines, movies, radio, television - all culture. Anne Murray is culture..., *Maclean's Magazine* is culture. The government subsidizes them all, in one way or another, because all are genuine Canadian artifacts, distinct and unique, something that nobody else has - the ingredients of our national mucilage.[1]

In this chapter, then, we will consider the differences between American and Canadian culture, and offer further insights into why there is such a great interest in consuming, and attraction to, American culture in Canada, to the point where the quest for a uniquely Canadian cultural identity may degenerate into an obsession of an increasingly dwindling number of Canadians and, as such, reduced to something of a quaint national artifact.

The "High"-versus-"Low"-Culture Syndrome

Purporting to speak for all Canadians, then, Pierre Berton suggests that whereas Americans "think of culture in terms of opera, ballet, and classical music," Canadians' perception of culture does not have the trappings of European-style aristocracy.[2] Since culture in Canada, according to Berton, includes what is in essence the full spectrum of the human experience, it follows from Berton's polemic that culture is a far more democratic, or democratized, concept in Canada, as compared with the United States. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that this is not quite accurate an assessment; rather, it is the American attitude toward culture, *laissez-faire* oriented and Darwinian as it is, and augmented with the mechanisms for widespread dissemination, that has rendered American culture almost universally accessible. Furthermore, because of the virtual absence of different tiers or strata of culture, American culture has become a considerably more democratic form of culture than its Canadian counterpart. While Berton may have the best of intentions for his inclusion of "everything from Stompin' Tom Connors to 'Hockey Night in Canada'" under the Canadian cultural umbrella,[3] his argument hides a most important fact: government subsidization of anything that is defined as culture does not mean *equal* subsidization. In making a decision as to how much funding should be allocated to a given form of culture or a given organization concerned with one form or other of cultural expression, the government makes an assessment that must necessarily be qualitatively and quantitatively based, as well as value-laden. It follows that those organizations or forms of culture receiving less funding or no funding at all must not meet the government's criteria for qualifying for such funding. In this regard, if government subsidization of culture suggests the evolution of a domestic public or civic culture, then certainly there are different levels and, conversely, a different status accorded each of the different forms of cultural manifestation within such a civic culture.

Thus, it is of little consequence that of the $926.6 million allocated for cultural activities in Canada by the federal government for the 1980-81 fiscal year, over sixty percent, or $577.5 million, constituted the budget of the CBC, Canada's public radio and television broadcasting network.[4] This is so because as Canadians spend well in excess of half their leisure time watching television,[5] they access airwaves and cable systems that are saturated with approximately 75 percent American and other non-Canadian programming. This process seems

largely counterproductive, not just because the CBC continues to have to justify its existence as Canada prepares for admission to a 150-plus channel universe, but also since Canadian federal funding is used, at least in part, to purchase non-Canadian forms of culture. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, in the minds of cultural purists and pundits alike, there is a differentiation between "culture" and "mass culture," between fine arts and mass media, and so forth. Objectively speaking, there is, of course, a difference between, for instance, a painting and a television program - a painting is not a television program. However, there is also a value-laden, highly subjective differentiation between the two, where the painting is more likely to be treated as a specimen of "fine art" or "high" culture, and the television program winds up in the "mass culture" department. Contrary to Berton's assertions, this is not representative of a democratic, non-stratified culture.

The national mucilage of Canada is, Berton's words of praise notwithstanding, becoming less and less Canadian, both in nature and content. Why, if Berton's view was accurate, would Canada's various cultural institutions be experiencing such a massive and unabashed flight to the culture and cultural institutions of the United States? What seems to be at work here is confusion over the status and position of culture in the two societies. Granted, there are, as Berton asserts, Americans who do view culture through a rather narrow lens, encompassing only such "European-style" activities as opera, ballet, and classical music. Surely there are Canadians who have the same limited view, and Americans for whom culture is a wide range of human expression. Clearly, if Berton's assertions had any merit and were as applicable as he would like his audience to believe, the vast majority of Americans would live "outside" the realm of culture, as outlined by Geertz and Rosenberg et al. previously, and as Fulford suggested that Canadians increasingly do. Conversely, Canadians would lead a very "cultured" existence. How could they possibly do anything else, since anything and everything that can be tangibly and intangibly marked, *Made In/Fabriqué au Canada*, and is produced with or without government subsidies, qualifies as a specimen of Canadian culture? In this regard, Berton is either severely misguided or, for that matter, the distinction between the two societies is so vague that when concerned with culture, that same distinction becomes even more artificial. Lest it be forgotten, it may very well be that Berton is an advocate of cultural purism which, it seems, is not quite as compatible with the Canadian mosaic as it is with the agenda of the Reform Party or, perhaps, le Bloc Québéçois.

Where Berton's assertion may have some merit, however, is where he distinguishes between American culture as "industry" and Canadian culture as simply "culture." To create culture and to contribute to a nation or society's culture does not mean that exposure will follow automatically. Culture in the United States does not exist for its own sake, nor is it viewed as a defining characteristic of the nation as culture is in Canada. As mentioned previously, the concept of culture has taken on the extra dimension of not only being consubstantial with a given product or set of products, but also, culture can be used to generate revenue through merchandizing of products and through the commodification of the culture concept

itself.

Given the perceived general usefulness of culture and cultural artifacts in promoting merchandise in the United States, then, it is difficult to see why the United States has been classified, by some purism-oriented cultural experts (some of whom can be found within the ranks of the cultural nationalists in Canada), as a cultural wasteland. This would seem to be a rather ethnocentric view - why should anyone presume that there is a minimum level of attention that one must pay to culture, lest one be judged to not care or be adequately concerned about culture? Culture is important but not sacred, and it is dynamic but never static. To treat culture as a sacred and static entity would constitute elitism, because the influences to which such a culture is exposed are reduced to a minimum.

In this context, Doran argues that Americans "do not take their own culture very seriously" - and hence, perhaps, the tendency of non-Americans to devalue and consider American culture unimportant to the evolution of the species. Indeed, Doran continues,

> Americans, for the most part, could care less about that which is termed *high* culture or about the dispersion of American cultural values.... [M]any Americans believe that culture - in the valuational, or linguistic, sense that the French, for example, treasure it - will take care of itself. Critics often equate this attitude with the absence of culture....
>
> America epitomizes the development of spontaneous, mass culture that is petite bourgeoisie in origin and not yet self-conscious. Most members of the society have struggled too hard for material betterment to spend much time on the luxury of cultural reflection. Culture is to be created and to be enjoyed for its own sake....[6]

Clearly, this assessment gives further evidence to the degree to which culture is viewed differently in Canada and the United States. To approach the matter differently, it can be inferred from some of the statements made about U.S. culture by some puristic cultural observers that, to them, there is "real" culture in Canada, but none that is worthwhile in the United States. She has been charged with either having no culture at all, at worst, or with having a culture that oscillates between the bland and the mediocre; a culture without substance that appeals heavily to the lowest common denominator, owing to its "melting-pot" traditions, at best. To them - and one may pick any of the aforementioned critics - culture in contemporary America is the result of a rather unholy liaison between the "populistic excesses" at the core of the American experience. The commercial industries are considered equally close to the core of what it means to be an American, and the resulting culture is not for the refined tastes, but is suitable for mass consumption only.

Assuming that there is any merit to such an sarcasm-riddled assessment, in what context does such a contemptuous view place Meisel's suggestion that

there is an American living inside every Canadian? Indeed, not only is it Canadian culture that *is* stratified, but hence, the appeal of American culture. Meisel suggests that one of the foremost reasons why American culture has been able to establish itself so successfully in Canada, is that "the more low-brow an American cultural activity, the wider its appeal in Canada."[7] One should keep in mind, however, that "low-brow" and "high-brow" are qualifiers that are added here in Canada; they did not come with the cultural activity in question.

From yet another perspective, it can be argued that the view of culture as an inherently stratified concept has a stupidity quotient attached to it. Those who consume and enjoy a "lesser" form of culture do so because that particular cultural activity appeals to the lowest and most basic instincts found in the human species, offering little or no challenge, and rendering the consumers' instincts dull and obtuse. On the other hand, those who seek out "higher" and more "refined" forms of culture must, it follows, have instincts and needs that go beyond the lowest common denominator. One could thus argue that it is not a given cultural activity that perpetuates the behavior (ranging from "basic" and "low-brow" to "refined" and "high-brow") of the consumers; rather, it is the value assigned to different forms of culture by those who have a stratified view of culture and society. Such cultural elitists are trying not only to stultify a given cultural activity, but also those who partake in it, thus perpetuating the notion that because the cultural activity is considered "stupid" or "low-brow," he or she must, therefore, be the same. It is of interest here that

> it is largely Canadians with middle- and upper-class backgrounds and with middle- and highbrow tastes who are concerned with the health and viability of Canadian culture. A nationalist foreign cultural policy is therefore more likely to appeal to a minority of the population.[8]

Is A Cultural Policy Really Desirable?

Canada and the United States differ in the area of cultural policy. Canadian cultural policy, whose mainstay consists of considerable governmental subsidization, and coupled with a mandate for Canadian content (discussed in the previous chapter), has, in essence, no American counterpart. While U.S. agencies such as the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) administer federal funding for a variety of artistic endeavors; the National Archives preserves official documents and other American historical records; and the National Parks and Monuments Administration is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of national parks, monuments, and other historical and cultural landmarks, the United States Government has generally refrained from making inroads into the realm of culture. Consistent with

the standard American approach that culture will take care of itself, the U.S. government has, rather than establishing a cultural policy similar to that which exists in Canada, largely let the arts meet their own destinies, and concentrated on other things. Indeed, as the late Frank Zappa noted,

> most people in the United States don't care about art. Certainly nobody in the government cares about it. That's reflected in the amount of money for the [NEA] budget. And because we don't care about art, it makes it a little bit difficult for us to be a real international player, because other cultures on this planet can project their will, or project the personality of their people through their culture, and they have a ministry of culture, or they have some mechanism by which the better thoughts of that society are projected to other nations. We don't have that. We never cared about it. What we project to other nations is military force. Now think about that. We're supposed to be the land of the free, the home of the brave, but actually, we're turning into bullies, and we're turning into cowardly bullies at that. Worse than that, indebted cowardly bullies. We don't even have enough cash in our own bank account to go out and buy the weapons that we're using to impress everybody. We've got a national debt because we borrowed money to build bombs that we're never going to use. So that means that we're not only an indebted bunch of cowardly bullies, we're also really, really stupid, and pretty bad businessmen to boot.[9]

A less critical view comes from William H. Sullivan, President of the American Assembly, who writes that

> [a]s a nation that has always taken pride in pragmatism, the United States has always found it rather difficult to establish the proper place for the arts in its constellation of public values. While other governments have had their ministries of culture and have decreed national policies with respect to the arts, our political leaders have generally shied away from attempts to define an American public policy toward the arts.[10]

By contrast, while Canada has a well-developed cultural policy, the Canadian situation is still under the onus of a dichotomy, in addition to the complex situation imposed by the U.S.-Canadian relationship. "In principle," D. Paul Schafer writes,

> there is a consensus within the country that cultural development must be grass roots in nature and local in origin [and, thus, satisfying both democratic notions and regional tensions]. In practice, however,

> Canadian cultural development has been largely the product of federal, and more recently provincial, initiatives.[11]

The tasks of the various federal cultural institutions and agencies in Canada, then, are to preserve and to promote, and to some extent also to create, aspects of Canadian culture. Among these, we find, in addition to the CBC, the National Film Board, the Canada Council, the National Arts Centre, and the National Museums of Canada, with the latter comprising institutions such as National Museum of Man and the National Gallery of Art. Although similar institutions exist in the United States as well, they are, with few exceptions, private organizations supported by private endowments, private and/or corporate donations, and/or other private and/or commercial funding. Consider, for example, the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the American Assembly. All of these, and many others, are in private or corporate hands, and the absence of governmental involvement has in no way hindered the development and continued existence of a vibrant American culture, ranging all the way from dance to poetry, from poetry to the print media, and from television and film to ballet and music. On the other hand, the NEA has funded, and continues to fund, public exhibitions and displays of art.

Judging from the uproar the some NEA-sponsored projects have resulted in, however, one may argue that in the United States, culture may actually benefit from not having any government involvement whatsoever. For instance, NEA-administered funds were used for an exhibition involving a photograph by Andres Serrano, depicting a crucifix immersed in urine and entitled, *Piss Christ,* as well as for another photographic exhibition showcasing the work of the late Robert Mapplethorpe, wherein a fraction of the photographs on display depicted various forms of homoerotic sex. Both exhibitions gave rise to outrage and fury, both inside and outside Congress, and were considered "offensive" and "obscene" (used here as legal terms, and not as moral terms, though it is likely that at the time of the Mapplethorpe debacle, it was the other way around). The point to be made here is simply that while governmental support or subsidization of culture may be desirable, it also bestows upon the government agency the capacity to make assessments as to what forms of culture should be funded, and which ones should not. In other words, the government gets a license to determine what forms of culture are "good" and deserving of funding, and which ones are "bad" and, consequently, should not be funded.

A Canadian Civic Culture - But For Whom?

While it is clear that Canadian culture has benefitted greatly from being the recipient of governmental funding, without which it may not have survived as a separate entity, it is not at all clear *for whom* such a Canadian culture has

survived. With the exception of the CBC, most of the public funding for culture in Canada is used to support those cultural activities which, generally speaking, are considered to be representative of "high" culture or the so-called "fine arts." The CBC, however, is not devoid of a similar penchant for a vertical differentiation of the various forms culture in Canada. Quoted at length, Susan Crean dissects the Canadian situation as follows:

> Most Canadians harbour a distinct impression, no doubt well founded, that the fine arts are not for them.... People feel inhibited by the trappings of big-C Culture - museum marble, opera-house plush, and fancy balls - because, even though top hats and tails at opening night are no longer *de rigueur,* arts events are still society events. This is borne out by the continuing use of pretentious architecture for cultural institutions. It is evident in the way opera and ballet are televised on the CBC as "special events" in the manner of a royal tour. And it is apparent in the attitude of the patrons....
>
> Arts organizations receiving heavy government support are not generally available to Canadians as vehicles of their cultural expression. Far from it. By and large, our fine arts experts have ignored or discounted the fine arts of all but a minority, an élite who are basically ashamed of being Canadian. This outlook permeates the approach, presentation, and, of course, the content of the programs, which tend to be oriented to a rootless North American middle-class audience.... The masses are expected to assimilate an aesthetic which, in terms of both class and nationality, postulates their inferiority.[12]

Little wonder, then, that vast numbers of Canadians would turn in the direction of a culture, or a set of cultural manifestations, that are available to them at low cost and without efforts to leave them with an inferiority complex. While American culture may be a great deal more commercial than her Canadian counterpart, there is nothing inherently wrong with using culture as a money-making device. What is undesirable about commercialization of culture is that it may contract and limit the cultural sphere, thus fostering an atmosphere of conformity. *That* is the worst aspect of commercialization, and only aspect where "high" culture has an advantage over "mass culture" (terms used advisedly).

Another reason why Canadian culture continues to lag behind its American counterpart - that is, in terms of the visibility and levels of consumption of Canadian culture, both *by* Canadians and *in* Canada - may be that the type of nationalistic, pro-Canadian, and often anti-American behavior that many Canadians exhibited with great fervor during the 1960s and 1970s, was severely weakened in the 1980s.[13] Perhaps an indication of the decline this nationalism has undergone, less research has been conducted since the 1980s on Canadians' cultural consumption habits. For instance, most of the studies concerned with the

viewing habits of the Canadian television viewers took place during the 1970s and early 1980s.[14] As is evident here, the bulk of the data used for this thesis hails from research conducted during the period prior to the decline of Canadian cultural nationalism; that is, during the fifteen-year period ending in circa 1984.

While Canadians do indeed spend more than half of their leisure time watching television, they are also engaged in a number of cultural activities that have little or nothing to do with television. For the survey, *A Leisure Study - Canada 1972*, respondents were asked what types of cultural activities they participated in at least once during a three-month period. The results speak for themselves: 94 percent answered that they watched television at least once, but only one percent attended an opera, operetta, or a ballet performance. Public art galleries and museums were visited by three and four percent of the sample, respectively, whereas "historic sites" drew five percent. In contrast, 35 percent went to a movie, and 23 percent attended a hockey or football game, or other sports event, at least once in the course of three months.[15]

Here, it is important to remember the ubiquity of television: its reach, penetration, and accessibility are unsurpassed by any other medium. Close to 100 percent of Canadians, regardless of where they live, are able to watch the CBC's television broadcasts, if only they have or have access to a television set. Moreover, "[n]ext to Belgium, Canada is the world's most cabled country, with 76 percent of available households subscribing."[16] Since the license fee of $2.50 per year (frozen for the duration of its 17-year long existence) was abolished in 1953, and with a basic cable package of approximately 25 cable channels plus the Canadian networks costing the average cable subscriber approximately $25 a month, television must be considered, judging by contemporary standards, one of the very few forms of inexpensive entertainment available nowadays. Finally, because of the accessibility and reach of television, its penetration far exceeds that of any other medium. For instance, the typical Canadian feature film released theatrically in Canada is likely to have a total viewing audience of approximately 75,000 people, and grossing $100,000. The same feature, when shown twice on broadcast television, will deliver an audience of approximately 1 million viewers, or 67 times the size of the theater audience.[17] Consistent with what was stated in the previous chapter, therefore, it is not difficult to see how the ubiquity of the medium of television would not only undermine the Canadian theater market, but also the position of Canadian television - within Canada. Since the major box office hits are, with vanishingly few exceptions, of American origin in both Canada and the United States, the films most likely to contribute to high ratings figures during the ratings sweeps that all broadcast and cable television networks conduct, are not the Canadian features, but the American blockbusters.

Identity, Jingoism, and Nationalism

The issue of Canada's cultural identity is a matter that has assumed a more or less permanent position in Canadian mentality, and perhaps also in regards to how Canada is viewed throughout the world. As Richard Preston writes,

> Canadians often appear to suffer from a pronounced inferiority complex resulting from their proximity to the United States. They are probably the only people in the world whose nationalism consists mainly in complaining that there is no real national identity in the country.[18]

The harshness of Preston's comments aside, his point is not without merit. That Canada is not the United States, nor a part of her, seems clear, but what are distinct and distinguishable Canadian traditions and characteristics? How is Canada different from the United States, and why is it desirable - for anyone - to treat her as such? Is there perhaps an element of purism present here, coupled with an effort to develop a Canadian cultural identity for its own sake? Richard Collins argues that "[b]ehind... Canadian nationalists' advocacy of Canadian national culture and hostility to the United States is an ethical judgment that Canadian culture and its artefacts are morally superior."[19] The ramifications of such a stance can be quite dangerous, and would certainly qualify as a menace to a society that has come to pride itself so much in being an open and tolerant society, where differences are not only respected, but also valued. On the one hand, a situation may evolve wherein a political party or another interest group begins to advocate a policy of governmental non-intervention in the realm of domestic cultural affairs; that is, a government would take a neutral stance concerning the status of any given cultural and or ethnic group in society, whether minority or otherwise. Abstention from intervention, however, would mean tacit and indirect support for an already firmly established culture and/or ethnic group, whereas the position of less fortunate groups would dwindle. Such seems to be the position of Canada's Reform Party, which during the 1993 federal election campaign advocated that all funding for multiculturalism and bilingualism be discontinued. The net effect of such a policy, should it ever be implemented, would not only be a severe blow to Canada's visible and non-visible minorities, but also serve to further strengthen the dominant position of the white, male, anglo-saxon, Protestant segment of Canadians - the bulk of Preston Manning and the Reform Party's grass-roots support system. On the other hand, interest groups of a cultural nationalist persuasion may seek to promote a very stereotypical view of what an ideal Canadian may look like and be like. While such an approach could very well lend itself to racism, it need not necessarily do so. However, very few Canadians would be able to see themselves in such a stereotype, much like many Jews may not be able to identify themselves with the Jewish stereotype promoted by the

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. As Frank Zappa argued,

> [t]he idea of the organization is to manufacture a homogenized image of Jewry, a plastic, non-existent image of the ideal Jew which must be shown to all people who are not Jews.... Any deviation [in the behavior of Jews and Gentiles alike] from this manufactured image of Jewishness [is] wrong. And there is no way that any ethnic group or part of society is totally perfect, no matter how much money they spend on P.R.[20]

In that regard, it may not be a weakness that the Canadian society, given its high level of both actual and policy-based multiculturalism, has failed to create a stereotypical image along the lines of Uncle Sam, Marianne, or the Jewish Princess.

Jingoism aside, that Canadian cultural nationalists would have taken a stance such as the one which Collins suggested above, is not a uniquely Canadian one; most societies follow similar strategies in bracing themselves against the onslaught of any alien element. However, the Canadian situation, wherein the torrents of American information meet with few and relatively weak barriers at any Canadian port of entry, has given rise to the a concept. This new concept, known as *Canadianization*, is defined by Collins as "damage to polity and culture, destabilizing one and debasing the other."[21] Put differently, Collins' definition of "Canadianization" implies a state of affairs where the national infrastructure is undermined to the point where the domestic culture, from the standpoint of the local population, sustains (permanent) depreciation. Obviously, this has little to do with the standard definition of "Canadianization," which is the nationalization of non-Canadian corporations operating in Canada. Considering the Canada-United States relationship, then, one can ask, however rhetorically, whether Canadianization has resulted in permanent damage to the Canadian cultural identity. One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the loss of control by Canadians and commercialization by Americans of the Canadian cultural institution of hockey. The following illustrates well how a distinctly Canadian cultural institution is gradually becoming a quaint cultural artifact as it disappears into the American melting pot.

The Disappearance of Canadian Culture

Commencing with the 1993-94 season, 26 teams play in the National Hockey League. While most of the players are Canadians, over two-thirds of the franchises are now based in the United States. Of the five most recent expansion teams, four are based in the U.S. (the San Jose Sharks of San Jose, CA; the Tampa, FL, based Tampa Bay Lightning; the Florida Panthers of Miami, FL; and

the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim, located in Anaheim, CA), with the Ottawa Senators rounding off the quintet. This is a reflection of the increasingly southward pull (that is, toward the United States, and/or, away from Canada) operating in the machinery of the National Hockey League. This is further evidenced by the move of the Minnesota North Stars from Bloomington, MN to Dallas, TX, where the franchise now is known as the Dallas Stars. As Bruce Kidd writes:

> Enjoying generally a more lucrative market - larger population, higher incomes - than their Canadian counterparts, American hockey entrepreneurs have been able to pay higher salaries and attract the best Canadian players away from the Canadian teams that employed them.... Commercialization of the game has even affected traditional Canadian television habits. The larger U.S. market has given the American network priority over the Canadian networks in the telecasting of weekend games.... When there is a conflict the Canadian network must be happy with second choice.[22]

Since 1969, when Kidd wrote the above, little has changed - if anything, matters have deteriorated even more. Not only have U.S. commercial interests more or less taken command of the National Hockey League (as represented by, for instance, the Disney Corporation's and Blockbuster Video's ownerships of the two new franchises - the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim and the Florida Panthers, respectively - premiering during the 1993-94 season), but also, as this is written, the level of popularity enjoyed by professional hockey in the United States is below those of baseball, football, and basketball. Unlike these three sports, furthermore, hockey is currently without a major television contract in the United States. Television exposure of hockey in the United States is presently limited to local cable television sports networks, such as PASS in Detroit, MI; PrimeTicket in Los Angeles, CA; and MSG in New York City. During the 1992-93 playoffs, ABC did indeed agree to broadcast five games played on Sundays, but without any contract extensions in order to follow the season to its end and the Stanley Cup final. Due to the comparatively small television audiences, however (approximately two million per game), ABC has, as of now (late September, 1993), not committed itself to telecasting hockey during the impending season. The yield of advertising revenue is too low, and viewer ratings were not to the satisfaction of ABC. The absence of a major television contract for the sport may, over time, pose a threat to the survival of hockey in the U.S., and therefore, due to the increased commercialization of the game, also in Canada.

The Myth About Canada

The Canadian susceptibility to outside influence, then, is the result of a wide range of factors, among which we find, not surprisingly, the long, undefended, and porous Canadian-American border; Canada's close relationship with the United States; Canada's domestic linguistic and regional tensions; and a very weak domestic industrial base. These factors have, each in their own way(s), contributed to the volatility and precarious position of the Canadian cultural identity. What may further have exacerbated this predicament, however, is the myth about Canada, as augmented by a series of misconceptions. While this may seem incongruous with the arguments in previous chapters (that is, unlike the United States and her history, Canadian history is essentially devoid of mythology and has not spawned any national myths or heroes), what we are dealing with here is *not* a *Canadian myth*, but a *myth about Canada*. Into this myth and its companion misconceptions, we must factor the notion that Canada is a northern, frozen, white wasteland where the Indian and the buffalo still roam free; a land where not just the Eskimos[23] live in igloos, and where people travel by dogsleds, rather than by car; that Canada is, if not a U.S. state, at the very least *like* a U.S. state, but where people play hockey rather than baseball or football, and all the time; and, lastly, a combination of all the above, with the added notion that all Canadians are, in essence, boring because although they want to be Americans, they just happened to be born on the other side of the border.

While many Americans cling to these notions that make up the myth about Canada as if they were the truth, they are, of course, not true. Still, the myth has created what is, in many ways, an unenticing and unflattering image of Canada which, in turn, has fostered perceptions of Canada and Canadian culture; perceptions which, unfortunately, seem to be held not just by outsiders, but are also perpetuated by many Canadians themselves. In this regard, Schafer suggests that

> [c]ultural creativity can often prove exceedingly painful. Much of Canada's cultural creativity to date - in poetry and prose, music and painting [, and might one add, film and television] - has been taken up with depicting Canada as a nation of victims, martyrs and compromisers.... It is also that the country can be so spectacular at times that it makes Canadians feel pale by comparison. This has caused many of the country's writers to depict the average Canadian as introverted, diffident and taciturn.[24]

Lipset seconds this opinion, and suggests that the "'loser' mentality of Canadians is another theme bearing on the effects of the country's counterrevolutionary origins.... Such a background could be expected to produce a people uncertain about themselves and highly self-critical.[25] Robertson Davies

adds that "[m]odern Canada is a prosperous country, but the miseries of its earliest white inhabitants are bred in the bone, and cannot, even now, be rooted out of the flesh."[26] Margaret Atwood goes even further, arguing that

> [t]he central symbol for Canada... is undoubtedly Survival, *la Survivance*.... [Canadian literary] heroes survive, but just barely; they are born losers, and their failure to do anything but keep alive has nothing to do with the Maritime Provinces or "regionalism." It's pure Canadian, from sea to sea.[27]

Most Americans, on the other hand, like to portray themselves as successful, as winners, and as "number one," and very frequently they also do so, and perhaps expect others to view them as such as well. Consider many recent Hollywood productions, such as the three *Rambo* films, *The Last Action Hero*, and even a drama such as Barbra Streisand's *The Prince of Tides*; or just any randomly chosen speech given by any U.S. President, but particularly Ronald Reagan and George Bush; or the works of writers such as Ernest Hemingway, John Updike, or Norman Mailer: heroism, bravery, and winning are essential to all of them.

Let us then suppose that the views that the two countries' citizens have of themselves are also the views they have of each other; that is, not only do Canadians think of themselves as losers and Americans think of themselves as winners, but Canadians think Americans are winners, and vice versa. This would be a very powerful incentive for the citizens who view themselves self-deprecatingly as losers (assuming that the above view is correct), to turn away from a culture that reinforces such a view, in favor of a different one that presents a considerably more flattering and positive view. In a global society that values success over failure, then, it is hardly surprising that many Canadians, living next door to the only remaining superpower ("the winner," as it were) and the foremost of promulgators of such a set of beliefs, would come to treat these American views as if they were their own. In addition, while treating the Canadian view as if it were Canadian (or, conversely, treating the American view as if Canadians were Americans, too), Canadians are slowly and quietly disposing of their own negative, Canadian, self-image, and the culture that has fostered it.

Television and Cultural Winners and Losers

Regarding the relationship between television as a medium for cultural diffusion, and culture as a concept essential to identity formation, and how this applies to Canada, it is important to remember the three pillars of the relationship: initially, television and other forms of mass media have been "expected to unite [Canada's] scattered pockets of population and social groups into a bilingual and

multicultural society."[28] Almost as if aiming to turn Canada's perceived negative self-image into a self-fulfilling prophecy, however, Canada's new Broadcasting Act contains, unlike its predecessor, no unity clause, as stated in the previous chapter.

Next, television and the other mass media are still "expected to create a body of popular beliefs and historical sagas which can provide the basis for a unique Canadian identity."[29] Judging from a 1992 survey of Canadian teens, however, in the future that Canadian identity is likely to contain the historical sagas brought to Canadians by CNN, Ted Turner's Atlanta, GA, based Cable News Network, and feature the antics of Guns 'n Roses and Julia Roberts, along with the popular beliefs and conventional wisdoms spun into motion by Dan Rather, George Bush, and a host of other non-Canadians, most of whom are Americans.[30] Moreover, if the level of Canadian content, as discussed in the previous chapter, is measured with a greater emphasis placed on form than on substance, it matters little whether the minimum level of required Canadian content is zero or one hundred percent: the popular beliefs and historical sagas will still be replete with foreign content, as will, consequently, the "Canadian" cultural identity. With or without Canadian content regulations, three-quarters of all television viewing in Canada is of American programming.[31]

Lastly, "broadcasting makes culture democratic. It is the most economic way to bring culture to every Canadian and not only to those who can afford it."[32] There can be little argument about the degree to which television is the most democratic medium and tool for cultural diffusion - but whose culture is it that is being diffused? It should come as no surprise that most of the cultural diffusion on the Canadian airwaves and cables is not Canadian in origin. According to Stan Staple, Director of Research at the CBC in Ottawa, during the 1988-89 TV season the share of Canadian programming of all prime time English TV was 25.4 percent.[33]

There is, however, a difference between the programming share that is Canadian and the number of Canadian viewers who watch television, as well as a difference between the viewers who are cable subscribers and those who are not. Staple argues that

> non-cable subscribers spend a larger portion of their viewing time with Canadian programs than do cable subscribers. While over a third (35.7 per cent) of the time non-cable subscribers spend with TV is spent with Canadian programs, the comparable figure for cable subscribers is 26.7 per cent.[34]

Overall, however, the viewing preferences of Canadians are numerically consistent with the amount of Canadian programming available to Canadian television viewers. Staple writes that

> in the 1985 calendar year, less than one-quarter (23%) of the programming available on English TV during prime time was Canadian and this Canadian programming accounted for 22 percent

of the time spent watching English TV throughout the 1985 calendar year.[36]

Indeed, as the Canadian actor Martin Short once said, "When Americans watch TV, they're watching TV, but when Canadians watch TV, they're watching American TV."[36] The distinction is subtle, but it is there. Additionally, it is worth noting that Short is an expatriate Canadian, whose acting career brought him success in Hollywood.

Negatively Canadian - A Way of Life?

What does all this mean for Canadian culture and Canada's cultural identity? Primarily, for Canadians who are interested in Canadian culture and who wish to consume no American culture, they are, in many ways, left to their own devices. Being a Canadian nationalist has not been made any simpler in the 1980s or 1990s. While there most certainly is a Canadian culture, it is quite hard to define as *positively* Canadian, as opposed to *negatively* Canadian; that is, defining Canadian culture in terms of what it is *not*, which most frequently means, "not American." Respondents sampled unscientifically for this thesis tended to identify Canadian culture less in terms of an esthetic, or esthetically oriented, culture, than in terms of a social culture. Among the items identified as Canadian and representative of Canadian culture, one can discern such widely disparate items such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and back bacon; bilingualism, multiculturalism, and the word, "tuque"; and, perhaps more frequently then any other item, Canada's social programs were mentioned as the quintessential Canadian trait. Few individuals suggested names of particular individuals who have contributed to Canadian culture, but among those who did, the names that were mentioned included authors Robertson Davies, Margaret Atwood, and Farley Mowat, and athletes Terry Fox and Wayne Gretzky.[37]

Elsewhere, behavioral characteristics have also been identified as being typically "Canadian," which translate as differences between Canadians and Americans. These differences suggest that whereas "Canadians are more traditional, tolerant, law-abiding, egalitarian, collectivety-oriented, and multicultural [,]Americans are more entrepreneurial, individualistic, materialistic, and religious."[38]

However, Canada's proximity to the United States and the impact of this close relationship is visible throughout the Canadian experience, and in some ways, Canada's multicultural attitude and her mosaic may actually serve to buttress the American influences, rather than sustaining and strengthening her own culture. Hence, it is quite understandable why many Canadians tend to identify themselves negatively or, for that matter, identify themselves more with the United States and American values than with Canada and Canadian values, seeing as how the United States is, in many ways, Canada's only point of comparison. As

Roger Gibbins writes,

> the Canadian-American border plays a much more important role [for Canadians than for Americans] in shaping perceptions of the international environment, even though the extent to which Canadians see the United States as a "foreign" country is open to question. In part, this importance springs from the fact that the United States is Canada's only neighbor, and, thus, the only mirror within which Canadians can view their own reflection.[39]

This is one of the two foremost aspects of the border, as it applies to the present discussion: although the border is the official demarcation line between the two distinct, sovereign nation-states, there is a certain ambiguity to the *raison d'être* of the U.S.-Canadian border that obscures, and perhaps even obliterates, the distinctions that borders normally accentuate and sometimes embellish. The symbolic meaning of the border seems to remain largely intact, however. Stemming from the reality of the U.S.-Canadian relationship, the border is a living monument of how the two countries emerged from the same revolution, one in response to the other, with one seeking to lay the foundation of something new, the other created in order to preserve a colonial legacy. Further undermining of the border's status as a full-fledged demarcation line between two societies arises from the high level of openness and intimacy that characterizes the relationship between the two countries, something which few nations have ever enjoyed.

To Canadians, however, the border, while retaining its porousness, represents the difference between a superpower and its vastly smaller and less powerful neighbor. This aspect of the relationship has a much greater effect on Canadians than on Americans, involving more ambiguity regarding the actual function of the border, and especially as

> the border itself extends much more deeply into Canada than it does into the United States. It is, significant, for example, that Canadians flying south to the United States go through American immigration clearance before leaving Canada rather than upon arriving in the United States; the border is crossed not in Chicago or San Francisco, but in Toronto or Vancouver. The societal impact of the United States is not restricted to the immediate borderland environment; it is felt throughout the country through vehicles such as cable television. Cable subscribers in Calgary, for example,... have direct access to four American network channels and three competing Canadian channels.... The point here is... simply to note that the border per se has a negligible impact, at best, on the flow of American culture into Canada.[40]

In August, 1986, less than three months before the 50th birthday of the

CBC, Alphonse Ouimet, the President of the CBC between 1958 and 1967, charged that the

> American domination of our TV channels constitutes an ever growing menace to our Canadian identity[, and] that, at the national level, private television, cable and commercialization have in general proven to be agents of Americanization, not of Canadianization.[41]

Although Ouimet's fear is understandable, one may ask whether the American domination of the Canadian airwaves really constitutes such a formidable threat to Canada's cultural identity, since 1) Canadians seem to be quite willingly engaged in mass consumption; 2) this avid consumption of American culture is not the result of U.S. pressure on Canadians to consume as much American culture as they actually do, but rather, it is self-inflicted; and 3) it is questionable whether the average Canadian is really that concerned about the state of Canada's cultural identity. Based on research conducted for this thesis, Canadians generally seem more pro-Canadian than anti-American, although for the most part, their pride in being Canadian is most often defined in terms involving negative comparisons with the United States. In matters related to culture, however, the presence of American culture in Canada seem to be of little or no concern to the average Canadian. Canada's cultural purists and anti-Americanists may be concerned but, as Meisel submits,

> [i]t would be foolish to ascribe the popularity of entertainment provided by CBS, NBC, ABC or PBS to its being crammed down reluctant Canadian throats. On the contrary, a great many Canadians have an avid thirst for most things American and feel perfectly at home surrounded by them. This applies not only to anglophones but also to francophones, as their mass annual exodus to Florida, among other things, shows. The fact that these sentiments are induced in part by the hype emanating from Hollywood and the United States entertainment industry makes the Canadian empathy no less genuinely felt.[42]

Regardless of whether the average Canadian shares these concerns, it is doubtful that he or she watches television or visits a movie theater on the basis of the national origin of the program or the movie. To be sure, if there are Canadian programs or films available, consumers may very well not be aware of them. Still, although the CRTC, the CBC, and the CTV, among others, may be concerned with Canadian content regulations (albeit for different reasons), one may safely assume that whatever culture Canadians consume, it is done on for entertainment purposes, and not on the basis of national origin. This debunks, in part, the notion that Canadian culture is boring.

However, many Canadians may shun Canadian culture because, indeed,

they have negative feelings toward it, but they may not necessarily opt for an American alternative because it is American. Nevertheless, this is how Canadians' tastes seem to have been construed by the Canadian media. There are, for instance, a number of Canadian television shows in the drama category that have been really quite successful, and have become favorites of the Canadian television audience. However, some of these shows, such as *Danger Bay*, *E.N.G.*, and *Street Legal*, are, according to John Haslett Cuff, television critic at *The Globe and Mail*,

> American in everything but cast, crew, and locale. It's significant that the success of the "officially Canadian" television shows is measured by each product's ability to mimic the cosmetic look, facile emotions, easy violence, and hyper-thyroid syncopation of the American shows.[43]

This underscores the common assumption that "'Canadian' equals unpopular and poor quality in programming.... [T]his belief shows the extent to which American ideals and values have infiltrated the Canadian psyche and political awareness."[44] Both Robertson Davies and Mordecai Richler have elaborated on this notion,[45] arguing that there is in Canada an attitude among those Canadians who consistently shun Canadian culture, that unless a specific Canadian cultural artifact has been bestowed upon with a non-Canadian seal of approval, it is of no value. This would require a Canadian play to be performed in, for instance, London, Frankfurt, or New York, before it could receive its premiere in Toronto or Montreal. Similarly, works by Canadian authors will not appeal to a Canadian audience unless favorably reviewed in *The New York Times*, *Le Monde*, and/or *The Times*. Indeed, the content requirement is a sore spot for the broadcasting industry in Canada. Private radio programmers, for instance, refer to the Canadian record play list needed for the minimum compliance of thirty percent Canadian content as the "Beaver Pile."[46]

Conclusion

While Canadians may be genuinely concerned that Canada remains Canada and does not become a part of the United States, the concern seems to have its limits. A Canadian cultural identity can survive only through the resistance of influences from abroad, and by ensuring that non-Canadian symbols become nothing more than symbols.[47] Canadians have neither resisted outside influences, nor refrained from letting the symbols go beyond being symbols - so who is to blame? In this regard, there might be a great deal of truth to John Kenneth Galbraith's suggestion that unless the price is right, Canadians are not willing to pay the price of a unique Canadian cultural identity.

NOTES:

1.Cited in John Herd Thompson, "Canada's Quest for 'Cultural Sovereignty': Protection, Promotion, and Popular Culture." In Helen Holmes and David Taras, eds., *Seeing Ourselves: Media Power and Policy in Canada* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1992), p. 188.

2.Ibid.

3.Ibid.

4.Canadian Conference on the Arts, *A Strategy for Culture* (Ottawa: Canadian Conference on the Arts, 1980), p. 39.

5.Pierre Juneau, *Broadcasting: An Essential Element of Sovereignty and Democracy* (Address to the Conference on the Future of the Canadian Broadcasting System, 10/16/85)(Ottawa: Canadian Conference on the Arts/Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1985), p. 3.

6.Charles F. Doran, *Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 98.

7.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In Flaherty and McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1986), p. 156.

8.Ibid., p. 152.

9.Frank Zappa, interview on KPFK, Los Angeles, CA, 6/21/90.

10.William H. Sullivan, "Preface." In The American Assembly, *The Arts and Public Policy in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984), p. vii.

11.D. Paul Schafer, *Aspects of Canadian Cultural Policy* (Paris, France: UNESCO, 1976), p. 36.

12.Susan M. Crean, *Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture?* (Don Mills, ON: General Publishing Co. Limited, 1976), pp. 15-16.

13.Richard Gwyn, *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 136.

14.From a telephone conversation with Emmett Will, Manager of the CRTC's library in Ottawa, 10/29/93.

15.Data cited in Joan Horsman, *The Arts and the Media* (Toronto: Canadian Conference on the Arts, 1975), pp. 4-5.

16.David Taras, "Defending the Cultural Frontier: Canadian Television and Continental Integration." In Holmes and Taras, eds., op. cit., p. 181.

17.David Ellis with Julia Johnston, *Split Screen: Home Entertainment and the New Technologies* (Toronto: Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, 1992), pp. 100-101.

18.Richard Preston, "Introduction: National Imagery - The Canadian Image of the United States Today." In S. F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth Century Political Attitudes* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 14.

19.Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication and National Identity: The Case of Canadian Television* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 261.

20.Frank Zappa, "Zappa Busy As Every While Coming Out of Joe's Garage." Interview by Michael Davis. In *Record Review Magazine*, 2/80, p. 11.

21.Collins, op. cit., p. ix.

22.Bruce Kidd, "Canada's 'National' Sport." In Ian Lumsden, ed., *Close the 49th parallel etc The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 259-60, 264.

23.While Canada's Inuit population may very well be referred to as Inuits by Canadians in general, to Americans they remain, for the most part, Eskimos, hence the use of that term here.

24.Schafer, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

25.Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 67.

26.Robertson Davies, "Signing Away Canada's Soul." In *Harper's* 278 (1/89), p. 45. Cited in ibid., p. 67.

27.Margaret Atwood, *Survival* (Toronto: Anansi, 1972), pp. 32, 34.

28.Schafer, op. cit., p. 59.

29.Ibid.

30.David Staples. "Canadians Slam-Dunked in Poll on Teen Favorites." In *The Edmonton Journal*, 9/12/92, pp. A1-A2.

31.From a telephone interview with Philip Savage, Research Officer at the CBC in Ottawa, on 10/29/93.

32.Juneau, op. cit., p. 6.

33.Stan Staple, *Who's Afraid of Canadian Content? An Audience Analysis of English-Canadian TV Viewing Patterns.* Presentation to the June 4, 1993, Meeting of the Canadian Communications Association, Carleton University, Ottawa, p. 4. SPECIAL NOTE: Thanks to Mr. Philip Savage, Research Officer at the CBC, for sending me a copy of this unpublished paper, and to Mr. Staple for agreeing to this. It should be noted that in spite of repeated phone calls to the CTV, the network never replied to my requests for programming information and information regarding its overall compliance with the Canadian content regulations.

34.Ibid., p. 6.

35.Ibid., p. 1

36.Rick Marin, "The Most Entertaining Yanks? Why, They're Canadians, eh?" In *The Edmonton Journal,* 7/11/93, p. D2.

37.Approximately 75 individuals were interviewed in informal settings during a period of twelve months, from November, 1992, to November, 1993. Respondents were, with few exceptions, born in Canada. Most respondents are from Alberta, but the sample included British Columbians, Ontarians, Saskatchewanites, and Prince Edward Islanders, as well. This survey claims no scientific value.

38.Irving Goldman and James Winter, "Mass Media and Canadian Identity." In Benjamin D. Singer, ed., *Communications in Canadian Society* (Scarborough, ON: Nelson Canada, 1991), p. 148.

39.Roger Gibbins, *Canada As a Borderlands Society* (Orono, ME: Borderlands Project/University of Maine, 1989), p. 12.

40.Ibid., p. 13.

41.*The CBC 1987-1988* (Ottawa: CBC, 1988). No page numbering.

42.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., op. cit., p.155.

43.Cited in David Taras, "Defending the Cultural Frontier: Canadian Television and Continental Integration." In Helen Holmes and David Taras, eds., op. cit., p. 184.

44.M. Patricia Hindley, Gail M. Martin, and Jean McNulty, *The Tangled Net: Basic Issues in Canadian Communications* (Vancouver: J. J. Douglas Ltd., 1977), p. 88.

45.See, for instance, several of the pieces contained in J. Madison Davis, ed. *Conversations With Robertson Davies* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), and Mordecai Richler, *Joshua Then and Now* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980).

46.Hindley, Martin, and McNulty, op. cit., p. 90.

47.Peter Jennings, *ABC News*, 7/5/93.

Conclusion

What Does It All Mean For Canada's Cultural Identity?

Some Quick Sketches

Definitions of Canadian culture and Canada's cultural identity are, as we have seen in the preceding pages, quite elusive and, almost by definition, vague and obscure. The levels of difficulty one may have in describing what constitutes Canadian culture and a Canadian cultural identity are, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, surpassed only by the relative simplicity with which one can describe what they are not: "not-American culture," and a "not-American identity." In this thesis, then, we have seen how the weaknesses of Canadian culture and Canada's cultural identity have their roots in the rather unusual circumstances under which Canada was created. Canada, as a British rampart whose sole purpose was to prevent the perceived unchecked continental spread of the United States on the North American continent, has in this regard not even a foundation for a unique national culture, nor for a unique cultural identity.

This situation has, in turn, drastic ramifications for Canada's infrastructure or, as it frequently has been referred to here, Canada's "borrowed structures." Canada's reliance on outside advice, expertise, and, perhaps most importantly, investment in any given field, has created a climate that is not very conducive to domestic initiatives, whether culturally, socially, economically, or otherwise. As a result, whatever Canadian culture there is - and lest it be suggested differently, there most certainly is a distinct Canadian culture; the trick is how to find it - is largely unknown to and almost hidden from Canadians. One may even go as far as to suggest that due to the level and magnitude of non-Canadian influence on, and control of, Canada, Canadian culture has become alien matter, even within its own society. Furthermore, due to its scarcity and relative obscurity, Canadian culture has been stamped "boring" or "uninteresting," by large segments of the Canadian public. Consequently, its audience is dwindling.

Finally, we have seen that the unattractiveness of Canadian culture, as perceived by the Canadian public, in large part stems from the treatment accorded culture in Canada by those who are responsible for its promulgation and dissemination. Differentiating between "high" and "low" culture, this view tends to impose a general inaccessibility on the bulk of Canadian culture which, due to the attitudes of those who are in charge of Canada's cultural institutions and agencies, ends up in the realm of so-called "high" culture. As Lynne Wright charges,

> [t]he champions of modern art sniff at the general public's unsophisticated taste, claiming that we will only accept as great art only those works that fit into traditional styles of expression.... Is modern art really so complex and important that society must support a cadre of intellectuals to study and glorify it? What the art aristocrats fail to acknowledge is that their world is plagued by a self-serving elitism.... [W]hat does a piece like Barnett Newman's Voice of Fire (bought by the National Gallery for $1.8 million) offer the viewer other than befuddlement?[1]

Cultural Differences and Currents

Given this, it is not surprising that many Canadians, feeling both alienated from and, as a result, unattracted to Canadian culture, would drift toward a culture that does not bestow upon them an inferiority complex - and American culture does not Here, it is important to note a fundamental cultural difference between Canada and the United States. In Canada, one gets the impression that culture has a near-scared status similar to that with which devout churchgoers view religious icons; that is, consistent with the "high"-culture approach, this is the view held by those who are responsible for cultural promotion in Canada. The average Canadian seems far more inclined to regard culture as something as commonplace as the air we breathe; we would notice it only through its absence, and until that happens, culture is best left alone. As William D. H. Johnson so eloquently sums up the argument,

> [t]here is a vast difference between talking about Canadian culture, in the sense of the *real culture of Canadians,* and Canadian culture in the sense of the (marginal) difference between the culture of Canadians and the culture of the Americans. To talk about Canadian culture in the first sense is to talk about Canadian culture as it is in itself, as it can be measured and defined. To talk about Canadian culture in the second sense - Canadian culture in so far as it is distinct, different, is not to talk about Canadian culture as it is in itself, but only as it is in comparison to some other culture. It is an extrinsic, relational concept.[2]

The precarious state of Canadian culture is further exacerbated by the lingering regional tensions together with the regional identities and cultures. From Newfoundland's Codco to Quebec's *Carnaval de Bonhomme* to the Calgary Stampede - these and other cultural manifestations are conduits for regional identity formation, but do little, if anything, for the pan-Canadian identity. This sentiment is coupled with a feeling that such a pan-Canadian identity, and its

unifying symbols and institutions, are often synonymous with those of Ontario - and neither the Ontarians nor the rest of Canadians hold the other in very high regard. Using the broadcasting system as an example, Johnson argues that "[m]any Westerners resent the domination of Toronto over the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and feel more at home with American television than with the CBC."[3]

This view also suggests a significant lack of cohesion and unity among Canadians. Adding to Richard Gwyn's argument in Chapter Two, and consistent with the overall nature of the cross-border relationships discussed in Chapters Two and Three, Johnson contends that

> the differences within each of the two countries are far greater than the mean differences between the countries. To put it another way, a university professor from Canada is more like a university professor from the United States than a Canadian university professor is like a fisherman from Newfoundland or an Alberta rancher.[4]

The Dangerous Symbols

At the end of Chapter Three, it was suggested that the only way to ensure the survival of a Canadian cultural identity is to make certain that non-Canadian symbols remain symbols, and nothing else.[5] As one looks across the Canadian cityscape nowadays, however, one can see that whether large city or small hamlet, present-day Canada is cluttered with non-Canadian symbols, all of which, each in their own way, represent a slice of life that is not Canadian. To those mentioned in Chapter Three, we can now add a seemingly endless number of fast-food chains, such as Pizza Hut, Arby's, and McDonald's, all of which have corporate logos identical with those of their American counterparts, save for the added stylized maple leaf which, presumably, makes the food offerings Canadian. We can also include many publishing houses, from Random House Canada, Inc. to the Macmillan Company of Canada Limited to Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., and beyond, where the addition of the word "Canada" conceals, it might be suggested, the fact that these companies are but subsidiaries of their U.S. mother companies. The same situation applies to motor vehicles, where Chrysler Canada, Ford Motor Company of Canada, and General Motors Canada produce cars for Canadians - cars that were designed in the United States.

Adding a new twist to this theme, however, is a Canadian corporation that is perhaps a rather unlikely contestant, and especially when one considers that it was an essential component in the nation-building efforts of Sir John A. Macdonald and his fellow Fathers of Confederation: the Canadian Pacific Railway, or, as it is known in the trade nowadays, CP Rail System.

As it happens, the CP Rail System (CPRS) recently unveiled its new corporate logo, much to the dismay and severe irritation of Canada's cultural nationalists. Seeing as how the new logo consists of a maple leaf that flows into the Stars and Stripes, there is little wonder that the logo has caused them such upset - after all, what better symbol to use than the U.S. flag, if one wants to invoke the ire of Canada's cultural nationalists! There are perhaps many others, however, who do not consider themselves nationalists, but who nevertheless find it frustrating that yet another one of Canada's foremost cultural symbols is going south - and this time, in more ways than to just transport goods.

Defending the move, Kenneth F. Key, Assistant Vice President for Communications and Public Affairs at the CPRS headquarters in Montreal, writes that the

> CP Rail System's new maple leaf/stars-and-stripes symbol was designed to be used in promotional instances to draw attention, at a glance, to the fact that [the CPRS is] no longer a "Canadian" railway, but a railway based in Canada, with North American coverage. The symbols used on our locomotives, which move freely on our trackage between both countries, permits CPRS to use these moving billboards to promote our dual-country service.[6]

Only 16 percent of the CPRS' traffic moves entirely within the United States, leaving 60 percent entirely within the territorial limits of Canada, while the remaining 24 percent involves crossing the U.S.-Canadian border.[7]

It is interesting to envision the possibilities that one could have with the CPRS' move - they are about as logical as they are unlikely. Consider, for instance, that Amtrak, the U.S. passenger rail service, has trains bound for both Montreal and Toronto. If the CPRS has started a new trend, we may soon see a Canadian flag (or, at the very least, a maple leaf) on Amtrak's Canada-bound engines. Similarly, major U.S. air carriers, such as American, Delta, Northwest, and United, all fly to major Canadian cities such as Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto, and Montreal. Meanwhile, Air Canada flies to Boston, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and very soon, American Airlines will quite possibly control 25 percent of near-bankrupt Canadian Airlines. For all these airlines, are we likely to see their fleets don not just the U.S. flag, but also the Canadian, within the near future? In the case of the American Airlines-Canadian Airlines merger, does that mean that their names will merge, too, into something like, *Canerican Airlines?* In all likelihood, however, none of these things will happen. In today's corporate world, the giant corporations are not very likely to take their cues from their smaller competitors, just like large nations generally do not listen to small nations. Consider, for instance, what happened when Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson had the audacity to voice Canadian criticism of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's bombing raids on Vietnam. The mouse that roared was effectively quieted for a few years.

Nonetheless, the reasoning above would apply not just to the Canadian and American transportation giants, but also, one may assume, to the major American and Canadian communications industry giants. Lest it be forgotten, however, most of the new logos and corporate names would probably involve the American companies that were established in Canada. One could easily imagine CBS' "eye" with a maple leaf where there is, at the present time, a pupil, or, in the case of NBC, a peacock with a maple leaf substituted for a multicolored feather plume. Likewise, why not add the word "Canada" to CNN's logo, especially as it is as readily available to Canadian cable subscribers from Vancouver to St. John's, as it is to American cable subscribers from Seattle to Miami? Why not? However, as Pierre Berton, quoted in earlier chapters and also the chief mythologizer and chronicler (to use Michael Valpy's terminology) of the Canadian Pacific Railway, said in a commentary on the new CPRS logo: "I suppose it's a minor thing.... But it's interesting - no American company would ever think of [including the Canadian maple leaf flag in its logo in order to improve its business opportunities in Canada]."[8]

Whether U.S. corporations would ever follow the example set by the CPRS, is really quite irrelevant - chances are, they will continue to be able to do good business in and with Canada, as Canada is extraordinarily reliant on the United States. Certainly the communications and cultural industries will be able to satisfy the entertainment needs of Canadians also in the future. Indeed, as John Meisel argues,

> Canadians not only like American programs, they also believe that they are entitled to have full access to them. They may not share their southern neighbours' conviction that they have an inalienable right to carry a gun, but they make up for it by insisting that they must not be deprived of all the gun-play being shown on American television.... There is, in [Canada], an enormous interest in United States programming which reflects the liking of countless Canadians for the United States and the responsiveness among them to the diverse facets of American life.[9]

A Canadian Cultural Identity

If all these various components, ranging from television programs to fast-food restaurants, from corporate logos to Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and from Canadian content regulations to a "high"-versus-"low"-culture struggle, all contribute to the undermining of a Canadian cultural identity, why should anyone presume that having a cultural identity is important? After all, is the struggle for a cultural identity a form of "cultural" nationalism and, as such, any less strident and particularistic than those forms of nationalism which foster

racism, ethnocentrism, and maybe even armed conflict?

Certainly, such a "cultural" nationalism may become just as particularistic as the more prevalent forms of nationalism, such as those in present-day Europe - but it is not inevitable. A cultural identity need not be particularistic, and does not necessarily imply complete domination. The importance of having a cultural identity should not be underestimated, however. The reasons for its importance are manifold. A cultural identity is important because it promotes cultural development. Furthermore, a cultural identity bestows upon individuals a sense of belonging to a given culture; it offers them better insight as to who they are; and it provides them with a mirror so as to better understand others, as well as to have others understand them better. This is true for Canadians and Americans alike, as well as for all citizens of any country. From a decidedly pro-Canadian perspective (but, he assures the reader, without an anti-American sentiment), John Meisel argues that "[t]he greatest threat to Canada lies in the possibility (some might even say probability) that, as the result of the strong presence of American influences, our cultural development may be stunted."[10]

In the case of the Canadian cultural identity, however, to blame Americans and the U.S. media for Canada's weak cultural identity is an ill-informed and short-sighted answer to a very real social and cultural problem. To be sure, many Americans quite often deny Canadians a unique Canadian cultural identity, thinking that the American cultural identity includes Americans as well as Canadians; i.e., that Canadians are not different from Americans. This is quite consistent with the *myth about Canada*, outlined in Chapter Three. As Charles F. Doran argues,

> [t]he denial hurts in particular because it cuts to the core of Canadian uncertainty regarding the nature of the Canadian identity. Canadians are thus forced to examine their own historical development and social ethos; the denial forces them to contend with the question of bicultural or separate national-identity. American denial of the Canadian identity also demands of Canadians an assessment of what their preferred relationship is with the United States. But to assert that the Canadian identity is little more than a facsimile of the American identity is infuriating to Canadians, first, because it is factually and historically incorrect, and second, because it seems to condemn Canada to precisely the perpetual subordination that most Canadians reject.[11]

In the final analysis, however, it seems as if a great deal of such a subordination has been self-imposed. Susan Crean suggests that the most pervasive form of Canadian cultural nationalism sought

> merely to replace American content with its Canadian-made equivalent.... Canada must resist European and American concepts of national culture being a single, unified entity, because it obviously

> does not fit our heterogeneous and highly regionalized "national culture." All too often, those who have set out in search of the Canadian identity have been looking for something that does not exist: Canadian culture as it would be if Canada were the centre of an empire.[12]

Moreover, the borrowed structures have not served to mitigate the flow of external information; they may not have increased them, but in all likelihood, they have not facilitated the creation and dissemination of internal information. It would thus seem as if the prospects of a Canadian cultural identity rest less on the removal of the borrowed structures and on stemming the tide of external information, than they do on the establishment of domestic structures with which to produce and disseminate Canadian information. As Meisel contends, if Canada's "cultural life fails to develop and maintain its own viable infrastructure and its own healthy institutions, the political will to preserve an autonomous state may also wane."[13] Restricting the flow of outside information will only make it more attractive. The alternative, domestic information, must be able to appeal on its own merits. When and if that happens, Canadians will, Meisel writes, "be more true to [them]selves, better world citizens, and more useful neighbours if [they] maintain and enhance [their] distinctiveness."[14] So far, Canadian culture has failed drastically to appeal to the majority of Canadians on its own merits, and hence, the success and attractiveness of American culture in Canada. Should the day ever come when a majority of Canadians support a resolution that would mean total and irreversible Canadian absorption into the American sphere (that is, that present-day Canada would cease to exist, and the provinces be broken up into several states), Canadians will have few, if any, problems adjusting to American culture in general, and American entertainment culture in particular. They may already know them better than most Americans.

NOTES:

1.Lynne Wright, "Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder - or the Elite?" In *The Globe and Mail*, 11/29/93, p. A19.

2.William D. H. Johnson, "Canada and the United States: Two Polities, One Society?" In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1986), p. 173. Emphasis in original.

3.Ibid., pp. 173-174.

4.Ibid., p. 171.

5.Peter Jennings, *ABC News*, 7/5/93.

6.Kenneth F. Key, "Letter to the Editor." In *The Globe and Mail*, 11/24/93, p. A25.

7.Ibid.

8.Cited in Michael Valpy, "Trading Tradition for a Few Measly Bucks." In *The Globe and Mail*, 11/18/93, p. A2.

9.John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border." In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., op. cit., p. 156.

10.Ibid., pp. 152-153.

11.Charles F. Doran, *Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 99-100.

12.Susan Crean, *Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture?* (Don Mills, ON: General Publishing Co., Limited, 1976), pp. 277-278.

13.John Meisel, "Some Glosses on Johnson's 'Canada and the United States.'" In David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., op. cit., p. 178.

14.Ibid.

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