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On the (Proper) Citizen and the Abject

by

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of citizenship and abjection which focuses on the works of Engin Isin, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben primarily. It is about marginalizing and exclusionary processes as a consequence of the conceptions and practices of 'citizenship.' Marginalization and exclusion are not understood in the mere sense of lose of a natural right at a given moment but as a constitutive process within theoretical and the political practice of citizenship. Thus, citizenship is understood not only as rules and rights but also as political practice within which subjectivities are constituted. Problematizations of abject figures of politics are inherently related to the project in that they are discursively activated to alter sedimented concepts that orient our political existence rather than being treated as political pathologies to amend. The thesis outlines a discussion of the ideal of the city seen as a breakthrough in the human subjectivity so as to discuss the myth of social contract and the social-spatial perspectives, orientalism and synoecism that founds this myth of breakthrough.

To *İzmoce* ...

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INTRODUCTION:

This thesis is a study of citizenship and abjection which focuses on the works of Engin Isin, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben primarily. It is about marginalizing and exclusionary processes as a consequence of the conceptions and practices of 'citizenship.' Marginalization and exclusion are not understood in the mere sense of lose of a natural right at a given moment but as a constitutive process within theoretical and the political practice of citizenship which is thus understood not only as rules and rights but also political practice within which subjectivities are constituted. Problematizations of abject figures of politics are inherently related to the project in that they are discursively activated to alter sedimented concepts that 'orient our ways of being political' rather than being treated as political pathologies.

The particular concern of this thesis is the normative effects of the dislocating processes that strip one of his or her assumed status and dignity. Putting the word 'proper' in parentheses, I want to imply simultaneously that the argument here is specifically about the propriety or the social and political relevance of the subject with regards to a polity, and that it is a determinate element in the making of the citizen, recognition of one's 'biological existence' and one's assumed dignity.

Accordingly, here, I do not consider in detail the historical development of citizenship studies or alternative theories of citizen subjectivity and sociality. While the thesis concerns the discursive relationship of the city to the constitution of consciousness and political orientations of self, it does not provide a history of different definitions of the city. It rather outlines a discussion of the ideal of the city as a breakthrough in the human subjectivity in order to discuss the myth of social contract and the social-spatial perspectives, orientalism and synoecism that founds this myth of breakthrough.

Lastly, while this research is inspired by Turkish modernization discourse and its relation to the ethnic groups, i.e. the Kurds and Gypsies, I do not engage in the anthropology of these groups.

Framing a Problem: Citizenship as "Legal Status" versus as "Desirable Activity"

In their essay "The Return of the Citizen" [1], Kymlicka and Norman survey the renewed interest in the citizenship studies in 1990s which they see as a response to the demands of justice and group membership that were central to political debates in 1970s and 1980s. These two lines of criticisms have been directed towards the legacy represented by T.H. Marshall that emphasized the primacy of participation in the 'common culture' as full and equal members and empowerment of individuals with

[1] Kymlicka and Norman 1995. "The Return of the Citizen: A survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." In *Theorizing Citizenship.* Ed. Ronald Beiner. New York: Sunny Press.

social rights to ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights[2]. In this sense, citizenship was understood as a standardized relationship of services and entitlements modeled on the national taxation system.[3] One set of criticisms pertains to envisioning citizenship not only as a legal status but more crucially as an identity. Hence, founding this identity on an ideal of empowering the standard common man or a common culture has not overcome inequalities or exclusion but has privileged the white middle class man, ignoring differential needs and belonging in the society. The question then is how to balance group-differentiated rights with inclusion in the common belonging. What can be the source of unity for citizenship given the understanding of differentiated desires and attachments of different communities that consist a polity?[4]

The second attack on this legacy rejects the empirical and theoretical validity of associating political participation and the just society with social empowerment. Affiliated with the New Right, this position has argued against the primacy of social rights for political participation since they pacified the individual rather than

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[2] Ibid, p. 318. *See* also Marshall, T. H. 1965. *Class, Citizenship and Social Development.* New York: Anchor.

[3] Isin, Engin, and Turner, Bryan. 2007. "Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies." *Citizenship Studies* 11(1): 5 – 17.

[4] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, pp. 301-309. *See* also Young, Iris Marion. 1989. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." *Ethics* 99: 250-274; and Young, I. M. 1990a. *Justice and the Politics of Difference.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. I. M. Young is one of the most influential critics that argued against unity as the guiding concept for citizenship and proposed differentiated citizenship: special representation rights, multicultural rights, and self government rights. See also I.M. Young and N. Fraser debate: Young, I.M. 1995 "Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory'" *New Left Review* 222: 147-160. Fraser, Nancy. 1997. "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics." In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 18.* Salt Lake City. Fraser, Nancy. 1995a. "Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 3 (2): 166-80; Fraser, Nancy. 1995b. "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age.'" *New Left Review* 212: 68-93.

promoting a self-reliant individual. It was not structural operations to blame for inequalities but rather individual incapacities, disincentives or the so-called dependency culture created by the welfare state. Rather, the individual was responsible for both the success and the failure of individual and social freedom. The virtues of initiative, self reliance, and self-sufficiency promoted by the integration of individuals' lives in market relations (through freer trade, deregulation, tax cuts, the weakening of trade unions, and the tightening of unemployment benefits) would result in a just society and political participation because self-seeking individuals would check each other to avoid an oppressive society.[5] These points are commonly heard in the political debate between advocates of communitarianism and liberalism, or negative and positive freedom,[6] the relationship between duties and rights has been put into question. Yet, the outcome of the New Right politics did not get the disadvantaged on their feet or increase political participation. In many countries, voter apathy as well as poverty and social isolation increased and the policies of the state that were dependent on voluntary citizenship participation have been in crisis. Hence, citizenship studies became the terrain of a possible balance between rights and duties evoking old discussions of civic virtues because the attitudes and the qualities of the citizens have been seen as indispensable to realization of democratic ideals. Kymlicka and Norman write:

> These events have made clear that the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its 'basic structure' but also on

[5] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p. 288, 291, 311.
[6] See Plant, Robert. 1996. "Social Democracy." In *The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain.* Eds. D. Marquand and A. Seldon. London: Fontana Press.; Skinner, Quentin. 2002. "The Idea of Negative Liberty." *Philosophy in History.* Eds. Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Skinner, Quentin. 1998. "The Neo-Roman Theory of Free States." *Liberty before Liberalism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

> the qualities and attitudes of its citizens, for example, their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable.[7]

Kymlicka and Norman's review of works on citizenship shows that there is a consensus in the literature (that they refer to) on the vitality of a "virtuous citizenry" for democracy and justice. Public policy relies on the responsible life style decisions of the citizens despite their reliance on different agents like market, family, civil associations, general system of education to equip the citizenry with civic virtues (e.g. active citizenship, public participation, self reliance, common obligations, responsible citizenship, public spiritedness, civility, cooperation, self restraint, responsible use of power, tolerance, virtues of mutual obligation, courage, law-abidingness, loyalty, independence, open-mindedness, work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change, capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse). [8]

Referring to the civic republican agenda of virtues that sees political life as supreme over the private life, Kymlicka and Norman note that this is at odds with how most people define good life and citizenship:

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[7] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p. 284
[8] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, pp. 291-301

> Most people find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in politics. Political participation is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, activity needed to ensure that government respects and supports their freedom to pursue these personal occupations and attachments.[9]

They put forth that as much as the modern democracy defines politics as a means to private pleasure, there stands the question of modern indifference to political participation. Besides, most of the suggestions to promote good citizenship encounter the dilemma of how to accommodate a public policy that will not threaten the images of good life in the private realm and at the same time teach public consciousness and virtues.

> They [civil society theorists] face the question of when to intervene in private groups in order to make them more effective schools of civic virtue; liberal virtue theorists, on the other hand, face the question of when to modify civic education in the schools in order to limit its impact on private associations. Neither group has, to date, fully come to grips with these questions.[10]

Hence, Kymlicka and Norman argue that the problem of how to promote good citizenship and with what sort of policies still requires an independent theory of citizenship from the prevalent discourses of justice and democracy which have been timid to apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy.[11] Also, Kymlicka and Norman identify two main hazards in the works on citizenship which obscure the foundation of a specific realm of citizenship theory which considers actual policy solutions: (1) an inability to focus on policies due to the limitlessness of

[9] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, pp. 293-294
[10] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p. 300
[11] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p. 301

the issues between state and citizens, (2) and the confusion of two different concepts: citizenship-as-legal status and citizenship-as-desirable activity.[12] They write:

> [M]ost writers believe that an adequate theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues. Few of them, however, are proposing that we should revise our account of citizenship-as-legal-status in a way that would, say, strip apathetic people of their citizenship. Instead, these authors are generally concerned with the requirements of being a "good citizen." But we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen, just as a theory of the good person is distinct from the metaphysical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person.[13]

This proposal for a study of the normative requirements of being a good citizen independent of the legal conception of what is to be a citizen is very crucial and requires further elaboration and even scepticism. Even while Kymlicka and Norman identify this inability to separate citizenship as legal status and desired activity as hazardous, their policy suggestions to open up public policy discussions strictly depend on normative justification of a particular ethical subject, and organization of one's life accordingly through restriction or obligation of some definite practice.[14] Moreover, their discussion of different political agendas shows that virtues enacted by public policies are not already agreed universal norms. Rather they are historically

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[12] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p. 284

[13] Kymlicka and Norman 1995, p284-285

[14] They themselves argue that the policies enacted by the new right justified by the critique of welfare state as the creator of dependent subject for the sake of the self-reliant citizen culminated in further isolation of the poor and disenabled citizens from enjoying their rights: "We can imagine more radical proposals to promote citizenship. If civility is important, why not pass Good Samaritan laws, as many European countries have done? If political participation is important, why not require mandatory voting, as in Australia or Belgium? If public-spiritedness is important, why not require a period of mandatory national service, as in most European countries? If public schools help teach responsible citizenship, because they require children of different races and religions to sit together and learn to respect each other, why not prohibit private schools?" Kymlicka and Norman 1995, pp. 300-301

constituted and the result of battle for their institution between different antagonistic groups and agendas.

Citizenship as Political Practice

The political history of citizenship has taught that the very realm of virtues is not that of universally recognized a-historical truths but a socio-political battleground in which the virtuous is defined against vice. While socio-political history has referred to the citizen as the superior form of political existence of the human being (almost colonizing the very territory of the human way of living), as a moment of breakthrough, citizenship has been, among all, the struggle over the virtues that guard the legal definition of the citizen (or "the truth of being citizen") and the legal disavowal of characteristics associated with 'vice.' This struggle is presented as a battle to maintain 'the purity of the life of the society'- against others who may include women, the 'black,' the 'possibly disloyal' ethnic minority groups, the non-heterosexual, people of dangerous nations, certain religious affiliation and so on. Thus, it is crucial to understand how the denial of legal citizenship has been accompanied by discourses of perversion and abnormality, putting one's right to citizenship in question or incapacitating by showing a threat to the normative project[15]. If the ground nurturing the content of the virtues and their assemblage for

[15] A recent example is that in an official declaration, the commander general of the Turkish Army referred to the Kurds in Turkey as "so-called citizens" in 2005 questioning Kurds' loyalty to the country. Following the declaration, the leader of the Democratic Turkey Party, representative of the Kurdish in Turkey, required the army to apologize to the Kurdish who had fought for and sacrificed themselves equally for a common flag during the liberation war. See Yeğen, Mesut. 2006. *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa [From Intended Turkish to So-called Citizen]*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. *See* the related news: Hatip Dicle: Genelkurmay'ın Kürtlere bir özür borcu var. *Millliyet* April 10, 2005. Website: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/04/10/son/sonsiy12.html. Retrieved on August 26, 2006.; Herkes bayrağa sahip çıktı. *Radikal* March 23, 2005. Website:

particular agendas is inflected by different political agendas and already existing discourses that isolate groups of people on the axis of superiority and inferiority, vicious and virtuous or profitable and non-profitable (like patriarchy, xenophobia, orientalism and so forth), it is problematic to pursue an ideal of an independent realm of an a priori ethical subject beyond the question of how this subjectivity is constituted.

While modern democracy has adhered to the separation of private/reproductive life from the political/community life, it has aimed at freeing and caring for the 'private life' as well as the society by making politics a means for happiness and efficiency in the private life and has sought its dignity. Lifestyle and the choices for a dignified living have been the tensional terrain for this desire to transform natural reproductive life into an individualized and yet an ethical life or 'the good life'[16]. This corresponds to what Foucault identified as *governmentality,*[17] the point at which the *technologies of self*[18] coincide with *technologies of domination* where individuals are oriented and

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http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147350. Retrieved on August 26, 2006.; Bayrağa saldırıya tepki yağdı. *Radikal* March 23, 2005. Website: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147350. Retrieved on August 26, 2006.

[16] This notion of ethical life or the good life has been delineated with different contents in different moments of history and by different societies and subcultural groups: work ethos, consumption aesthetics (*See* Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. *Work, consumerism and the New Poor.* Philadelphia: Open University Press.), national pride and so forth have constituted different sources and references for virtues, dignity, health and the well being of the individual as well as the society. In this thesis, I will not go into the discussion of these. Rather I will focus on the nature and implications of the 'inflection' between the desired identity/activity of the citizen (and thus the abject) and their legal (and thus non-legal) status. It is also interesting to note the prevalence of citizenship acts that depend on consumer ethics since 1990s. See Isin, Engin and Wood, Patricia. 1999. "Consumer Citizenship and the end of History." *Citizenship and Identity.* London: Sage Publications, pp.157-158.

[17] *See* Foucault, Michel. 1990. "Method" *History of Sexuality v.*1. New York: Vintage Books., pp 92-102; Foucault. 2003a. "The Subject and Power" *The Essential Foucault.* Trans. N. Rose and P. Rabinow. New York: The New Press.; Foucault, Michel. 1993. "The beginnings of the hermeneutics of the subject- two lectures at Dartmouth." *Political Theory* 21(2):198-227.

[18] "[T]echniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and

known by others is linked to the way they conduct and know themselves. It is also this point at which subjectivity is constituted. For Foucault, subjectivity is not a hidden essence to be discovered but is pieced together "from figures other than themselves."[19] This double bind subjugates and makes able. By relations of power, individuals act upon the possibilities of action of others and structure the possible field of action of others.[20] Foucault understood historical transformation of exclusionary practices into disciplinary and regulative operations in a similar way. Segmentary and individualizing discipline is applied to the "confused space of internment" with the methods of analytical distribution --measurement, supervision and correction of the abnormal-- to "individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion."[21] All the mechanisms of power "to brand" (characterization by binary division) and "to alter" the abnormal individual (recognition) are marked by this transformation.[22]

Along with these processes of constitution of subjects and their relationship to the polity, politics, however, increasingly reveals categories that are hard to characterize other than via a principle of survival and vulnerability. The coincidence of caring for the life of the society and the dignity of the individual in his/her private life produced these categories. The very fact of living is confused with a life worth living. Rather

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this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on." Foucault, Michel. 1993. "The beginnings of the hermeneutics of the subject- two lectures at Dartmouth." *Political Theory* 21(2):198-227, p.203

[19] Harrer, Sebastian. 2005. "The Theme of Subjectivity in Foucault's Lecture Series *L'Herméneutique du Sujet.*" *Foucault Studies* 2:75-96, p. 81.

[20] Foucault 2003a, p.138.

[21] Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* New York: Vintage Books, pp. 198-199.

[22] Ibid.

than being "paroxysmal,"[23] modern societies produced spaces in which individuals are stripped of their assumed dignities with the supplementary processes of different forms of exclusion and put their humanness in question by simultaneously excluding and making them open to subjection of all. The 2003 report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees announces that more than 10.4 million refugees, 1 million asylum seekers, 9 million stateless peoples and 20-25 million internally displaced people worldwide are living without a political community, expelled from nation-states.[24] In the body of the citizen, the 'right to dignity' due to *nativity* and due to *nationality* is confused; one's humanness is evoked only as a subject of rightlessness and subject of aid. It is thus not accidental that *Sans-Papiers* in France[25] or irregular-citizens[26] in Canada have been struggling to reclaim citizenship rights at once affirming the very persistence of the nation-state and its crisis. People are stuck in this confused space between different immigration and residency laws, different and changing norms of loyalty and propriety. Lives of people are politicized and made vulnerable at the boundaries of polities, at the camps, zones, gates, frontiers and in the anomalous spaces of cities where citizens should move in at their own risk.

Overview of the Thesis

Accordingly, in contrast to Kymlicka and Norman's argument, in this thesis, I will contest that the study of what I will call the inflection between the 'citizenship as

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[23]Rabinow, Paul and Rose, Nikolas. 2003a. "Thoughts On The Concept Of Biopower Today." Website: http://www.molsci.org/research/publications_pdf/Rose_Rabinow_Biopower_Today.pdf. Retrieved on November 17, 2005, p.7

[24]Isin, Engin F., and Kim Rygiel. 2007. "Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps." Pp. 181-203. In *Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror*, edited by E. Dauphinee and C. Masters. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave., p. 199

[25] McNevin, Anne. 2006. "Political Belonging in a Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-Papiers." *Citizenship Studies* 10 (2): 135–151, p. 139.

[26] Burman, Jenny. 2006. "Antidetention/Antideportation Activism in Montréal: Absence, 'Removal,' and Everyday Life in the Diasporic City" *Space and Culture* 9(3): 279-293.

legal status' and 'citizenship as desirable activity' itself is a fundamentally important question for the citizenship studies. This implies that the study of the constitution of the self in relation to political space indispensable for citizenship studies. While this thesis elides the discussion of particular themes in different moments that constitute exclusionary practices marked by the definition of the 'good citizen and dignified life,' it focuses on the nature and implications of the close relationship between the desired identity/activity of the citizen, and thus the abject, and his legal and thus illegal status. As the nativity and nationality of one confuses in the body of the citizen and politics refers to one's humanness at the moments of rightlessness. I argue that this inflection not only concerns the oscillating boundary between the citizen and the good citizen. It also continuously re-determines the value and, thereby, the non-value of human –civilized-- way of living. Therefore, the question does not concern the oscillating distinction between friend and enemy but that of human and inhuman. Following Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault, this thesis argues that the only way to overcome this ontological dilemma is to focus citizenship studies on the question of subject.

In order to engage with this question bearing on citizenship studies, the thesis proposes a joint reading of the recent works of Engin Isin and Giorgio Agamben. These authors' works suggest reading the ideals of Western political philosophy, particularly social contract and the citizen from a perspective of alterity. They problematize the myth of the social pact or contract which constitutes a breakthrough in the political existence of the human being. This breakthrough is one's distance

from one's mere existence as a living being and ties assumed by birth. The human subject is constituted as a speaking being who has an additional capacity for judgement and being judged. It is the idea of the city that contract and this universal citizen subject finds his (and later her) dwelling as an aesthetic-ethical being. Isin understands citizenship[27] not only as a status defined by rights and duties, but also as a political practice where identities are staked and rights are contested. Citizenship orients our political existence and bears on the question of "how and against whom the citizenship was defined as a group identity and what kinds of strategies and technologies of citizenship were assembled to make citizens, strangers, and outsiders."[28]

Isin's *Being Political* is devoted to expanding on the different logics of exclusion constituted by different technologies and strategies of modes of being political. These are presented as agonistic, alienating and solidaristic practices of citizenship. Thus, this study of citizenship as alterity emphasizes different categories of otherness formed by these modes of being political in relation to the polity and the political community of the citizens: strangers (merchants and artisans in the polis or sansculotte and workers in the metropolis are examples of strangers) , outsiders (slaves in the polis, vagabonds in the eutopolis, or refugees in the cosmopolis), aliens

[27]Isin and Wood define **citizenship** as "... both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity." It is regarded as both status and practice in that "...[citizenship is also] the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand and maintain existing rights." As for **identity**, it is referred to here as "points of temporary attachment to subject positions constructed by discursive practices." It is also taken as a relational concept that "presupposes a dialogical recognition of the other." *See* E. Isin and P. Wood. 1999. *Citizenship and Identity.* London: Sage Publications, p 4, 16, 19.

[28] Isin 2002, p.21

(for ancient Greeks and Romans, "barbarians," for modern Europe "orientals," for contemporary Eurocentrism, "Islam").[29] For Isin, it is crucial to note the differences in these configurations of technologies and strategies in that they play a particular role not only in the exclusion of strangers, outsiders and aliens but also how they themselves constitute their ways of being political by "overturning various strategies and technologies of citizenship in which they were implicated and thereby constituted themselves differently from the dominant images given to them."[30] Isin writes:

> For citizens to establish themselves as virtuous, there ought to have been those who "lacked" their virtues. Against whom did citizens define themselves? How were strangers and outsiders constituted in relation to citizens? Rather than focusing on the glorious images given to us by the victors, would it not be more revealing to problematize the margins or points of contact where the inside and outside encounter, confront, destabilize, and contest each other?[31]

Seeing citizenship as an alterity, the city occupies a crucial role in Isin's work in that being citizen is inextricably associated with the being of the city. He argues that throughout the centuries struggles over citizenship have always taken place over the city:

> The city is neither a background to these struggles against which groups wager, nor is it a foreground for which groups struggle for hegemony. Rather, the city is the battleground through which groups define their identity, stake their claims, wage their battles, and articulate citizenship rights, obligations, and principles.[32]

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[29] Isin 2002, p.31
[30] Ibid., p. 33
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., pp. 283-284

It is thus imperative to question contractual understandings of the constitution of the city and citizenship. Isin's *Being Political* engages with synoecism (a way of seeing the polity as embodying spatial and political unification) and orientalism as two spatial perspectives that enabled the narration of a particular western subject called citizen and defined within a rational order of confraternity or the social pact. As for Agamben, in *Homo Sacer*, he elaborates on *a very old distancing/differentiating act that he sees inherent in the legacy of metaphysics grounding Western political philosophy.* Politics appears as the truly fundamental structure of western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is realized. In the politicization of the mere fact of living (that Agamben names as bare life) the humanity of the living man is decided. The fundamental distinction between bare life and the good life lived in accordance with the logos proposes humanity as a political project by means of exclusion of bare life from the political realm. This project lies upon the exclusion and simultaneous inclusion of bare life in that good life is both what bare life is not and what bare life transforms into. This metaphysical separation is between the living being and the speaking being; or between bare life and the political-good life of the city that defines the dignified life of the human subject -- the life worth being lived. Both accounts direct our attention to the ban or exclusion that the myth of social pact implicitly rests upon. Agamben continues with the argument that the political system no longer orders forms of life and juridical norms in a determinate space but a *dislocating localization* that marks the political space of modernity. This he calls the camp, and

he concludes that not the city but the camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the Western modernity.

Accordingly, the *first chapter* of this thesis explores the discourses on the city that organize affects and subjectivities and orients ways of seeing our and others' political existence. For that aim, it focuses on Engin Isin's critique of synoecism and orientalism that mark the understanding of city and citizenship.

The *second chapter* is consecrated to Foucault and Agamben's understandings of subjectivity. This chapter elaborates on the implications of the substitution of the city with camp as the paradigm of Western modernity for the constitution of the subjectivities.

The *third chapter* reviews Foucault's problematization, Rancière's disensus and Agamben's paradigm as concepts of epistemological investigation. This chapter particularly focuses on the epistemological implications of paradigmatic relationship as described by Agamben and how I relate this particular relationship to problematization and disensus. Briefly, this chapter is a theoretical elaboration of the question of 'how do we understand democracy if we take *Homo Sacer* or the refugee as its paradigm instead of the *citizen;* and how this question simultaneously implies a different ontology putting the assumed relationships around the phenomenon in question.

Lastly, the thesis concludes with a discussion of the Gypsy[33] reidentification in Turkey concurrent with the gentrification of the areas they have previously settled in. The abjection of Gypsies can easily be followed from the laws and the police code that ban the entrance of Gypsies into the country and subject them to continuous surveillance and abandonment by the police. It can as well be seen in the vocabulary that defines the Gypsy and the idiomatic expressions that refer to them. The Gypsies are seen as a people defined by a self-conscious absence of willingness to conform to the ideas of rational, civilized society: not willing to be educated, have 'proper' ways to earn a living, thus lacking the capacity to have proper consumption habits and lifestyles. The stereotypes and idioms of the Turkish language define the state of Gypsiness as disorder, dirtiness, misery. For example, consider the idiom: "The Gypsy plays, the Kurd dances." The dictionary provides us with two explanations: the first is "a place where there is complete disorder"; the second is "persons one worse than the other.[34]" Accordingly, I argue that the Gypsy's reclamation of citizenship has not necessarily been confronted because of its potential 'fragmentation threat' against the unity of the national sovereignty.[1] Rather, their stereotyped way of living is regarded as a 'menace to human dignity' (i.e. delimited by work ethos and consumption aesthetics that designates health, well-being, wealth, standard of living, security). Hence, it is not accidental that the Gypsy organizations redefine Gypsiness as the general name of itinerant artisans overarching all human ethnicities and narrating it in such a way that they appropriate virtues that reference work ethos

[33] For the purposes of this thesis, I prefer to use the Gypsy instead of Roma or Romany as suggested by the leaders of the local Gypsy organizations in Turkey. It is not used as a pejorative. There exists an unresolved debate around this naming issue in the Romany/ Gypsy studies literature.
[34] Turkce-Ingilizce RedHouse Sozlugu, 4th Ed. 1981. Istanbul: Redhouse Press, p. 256

(artisanry), inclusion and the power of women in the community life, and welcoming all ethnic groups as the difference in their culture[35].

In this particular discussion of the Turkish case, I believe the quotations which I will be providing represent the main questions of this thesis very well. I will try to exemplify different ethnic group's exposition to abjection and their bearing witness to being stripped of dignity (desubjectivation) and dehumanization. That is followed by a resubjectivation embedded in the discursive violence towards others in its constitution and inflected by virtues that operate on the axes of superiority and inferiority. Namely, the Turks being called barbarian, oriental and backward and their splitting themselves from Arabs and Persians in their reconstitution of themselves; the Kurd's desubjectivation evident in the feeling of "being elephant" and resubjectivation into Kurdish identity as "we do not beg- not being this kind of human" in which the same violence operates against the Gypsy.

Consequently, this thesis follows Agamben and Isin to ask if there can be an ethical position as a remnant of subjectivation and desubjectivation and how the city can be reclaimed. This thesis overall is a prelude to reasserting Lefebvre's notion of the 'right to the city" eluding its synoecist and orientalist references by reconsidering the city and its abjects.

[35] *See* "Biz kimiz?[Who are we?]" and "Cingene Kimdir? [Who is a Gypsy?]" at www.cingeneyiz.org.

CHAPTER ONE

I. Life of the City

"Man is not only a natural body, but also a body of the city, that is, of the so-called political part."[36]

Thomas Hobbes, *De Homine*

In various accounts of 'societal development', the level of urbanization in a country is associated with that of its modernization and democratization.[37] Even in the accounts that have distanced themselves from developmental approaches, the city and the city life are opposed to the idealizations of the cohesive community which are assumed to harbour the potential for authoritarian regimes of racism and ethnic chauvinisms[38]. The city, in contrast, is seen to shelter differentiated and not necessarily binding relations of association with fellow men and women. In its ideal form, the city makes it possible that one can cohabit with others despite one's difference from other groups by nature and despite one's estrangement from what one is by birth or from one's primordial group. The city animates a particular virtuous individual capable of judgment. This can transform what one is by birth. The principle of cohabitation is an idea which underlines contractualist ethics. In that sense, the city is depicted as a breakthrough in human agglomeration and confraternity. It has been the womb for a particular human subject- the citizen. Hence, the city is deemed to mark our social and political existence as an archetypical space. This chapter explores the ideal of the city that lays claim to subjectivities and to how it orients us, our knowledge of others

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[36] Cited in Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.* Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 125

[37] Peet, Richard. 1991. *Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development.* New York: Routledge.

[38] Young, Iris Marion. 1990b. "The ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference." In *Feminism/ Postmodernism.* Ed. Linda J. Nicholson. New York: Routledge.

and action upon them. The first section reviews accounts that focus on the city as constitutive of this ethical subject. The second section follows Agamben to review this ideal space of political philosophy by shifting the orientation from the city to the camp as a dislocating localization elaborates on Engin Isin's criticism of indistinction and the 'ban'orientalism and synoecism founding citizenship discourse.

I.i. City, Civilization, Citizen

Famously known for her rejection of the idea of unity as the foundation of an individual's participation in a polity, Iris Marion Young criticizes political approaches which propose an 'ideal of community' as a response against the alienation and individualism of capitalist patriarchal societies. She is critical of their repression of difference:

> Community usually appears as one side of a dichotomy in which individualism is the opposite pole, but as with any such opposition, each side is determined by its relation to the other. I argue that the ideal of community exhibits a totalizing impulse and denies difference in two primary ways. First, it denies the difference within and between subjects. Second, in privileging face-to-face relations it seeks a model of social relations that are not mediated by space and time distancing. In radically opposing the inauthentic social relations of alienated society with the authentic social relations of community, moreover, it detemporalizes the process of social change into a static before and after structure.[39]

Besides Young's rejection of an essentialist formula to understand social political experience, she founds her argument on the premise that we live in a modern mass urban society where one cannot conceive of a collapse of 'temporal and spatial

[39] Ibid, p. 305.

distancing' and of some level of differentiation. Any social and political project should assume that we live as "strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense, relating across time and distance".[40] The ideal of community, for Young, imagines a society without a city, which is an unrealizable project for transformative politics and differentiated citizenship that will exhibit an openness to unassimilated otherness.[41] While she acknowledges an "ambiguity" to the liberatory possibilities of capitalist cities, she underlines that people who would be seen as deviant in communities where close, face-to-face relations are prevalent, enjoy some anonymity and freedom in the city.[42] Moreover, the city is the "being-together of strangers"[43] that comprises and composes the inherent aesthetic differentiation of city life. "They are externally related, they experience each other as other, different, from different groups, histories, cultures, which they do not understand."[44] The city acts as the network of different temporal moments in the history of the people who have lived there as well as the sedimentation of discreetly understood spaces within it.

> City life implies a social exhaustibility quite different from the ideal of the face-to-face community in which there is mutual understanding and group identification and loyalty. The city consists in a great diversity of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public spaces. People belong to distinct groups or cultures and interact in neighborhoods and work places. They venture out from these locales, however, to public places of entertainment, consumption, and politics. They witness one another's cultures and functions in such public interaction, without adopting them as their own.

[40] Ibid., p. 300, 312, 317.
[41] Ibid., p. 300.
[42] Ibid., p. 317
[43] Ibid., p. 318
[44] Ibid., p. 318

> The appreciation of ethnic foods or professional musicians, for example, consists in the recognition that these transcend the familiar everyday world of my life. ... The possibility always exists of becoming acquaintance with new and different people, with different cultural and social experiences; the possibility always exists for new groups to form or emerge around specific interests.[45]

As Young counters the possible regressiveness of the ideal community with the progressiveness of the ideal of a city, she actually evokes the virtues of contractualism and uses it to oppose another cluster of virtues of social-political existence on the axes of supremacy and inferiority. While she points to a dichotomous relationship between the community and individualism, "each side is determined by its relation to the other,"[46] Despite her indebtedness to Derrida, she leaves this relationship unexplored. Rather, she reverses the relationship and suggests an ideal of city over that of community. Thus, she is unable to displace the hierarchical opposition between the ideal of community and the ideal of the city. On the contrary, by affirming the myth of social contract, she disregards the discursive debt between the constitutions of the both ideals. She treats these discourses as if they were possible without each other.

Similarly, Silvia Walby and Nira Yuval-Davis[47] emphasize the importance of urban space for the emancipation of the women. Walby reproaches Turner for asserting the 'male point of view' in this comparative framework of citizenship since he considers the realm of family as a space from state intervention in which "individuals can

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[45] Ibid., p. 319
[46] Ibid., p. 305
[47] Yuval-Davis, Nira and Webner, Pnina Webner. 1999. "Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship." In *Woman, Citizenship and Difference.* Ed. Yuval-Davis, Nira and Webner, Pnina Webner. London and New York: Zed Books.

pursue self-enhancement and other leisure or spiritual activities"[48]. For Walby, regardless of its distance from the state intervention, woman is not autonomous in the family. Besides that, family cannot be thought as an institution with unitary interests since different members enjoy different social positions and resources within it. As for Yuval-Davis, she writes:

> [I]ndividual private pursuits routinely take place outside the family, in civil and bureaucratic contexts, while the space of metropolis offers *privacy and autonomy*, especially for woman of ethnic minorities, to escape from familial controls exerted in the name of 'culture' or 'tradition.' [49]

In the above accounts, the city is idealized in such a way that it has a priori constitution void of ethnicity or gender. The city marks the breakdown of small kinship circles and opens up social space to fulfill individual autonomy. Various individuals, strangers to each other, bring their particularity into this a priori empty-universal space named as city. The city organizes these self-aware people into memberships that are determined by definitions, albeit these memberships do not assume the total control of the individual.

Moreover, these assertions reveals a striking scission as an 'anomaly' on the socio-political space, more apparent in the last comment by Yuval-Davis, when they are read as being about two distinct habitations within a polity; one that binds the individual to his/her ties coming with birth or familial connections (namely the ethnically condensed neighbourhood, ghetto or slum, especially for non-Western

[48] Walby 1994, p. 383 cited in Yuval-Davis and Webner 1999, p. 16.
[49] Yuval-Davis 1997 cited in Yuval-Davis and Webner 1999, p. 16, my emphases.

ethnic minorities) and another one that constitutes the individual within relationships that carries a person beyond what she or he has been by birth. Hence, the city conceptualized as such assumes some form of a pact, and tolerance between individuals within a rational spatial order (as opposed to a kinship/communal order) leaving an anomalous space outside. It is, thus, not accidental that totalitarian ideas and chauvinisms have been easily assumed to originate from 'homogenous' districts, slums or villages without scepticism despite those ideas rationalized and schooled in the city[50].

For the purposes of this thesis, it is central to elaborate on the discourses that enabled the constitution of the propriety in the body of the citizen. Following Engin Isin, the following section focuses on orientalism and synoecism as two spatial perspectives in the Western tradition that enabled the narration of a particular Western subject called the citizen defined within a rational order of confraternity or a social pact.

I.i.ii. Orientalism, Synoecism: the City and the Rational Subject

In *Being Political*[51], Isin argues that investigating citizenship should include skepticism toward the harmonious accounts of the progressive evolution of citizenship that defines itself with epic victories against the distant others like outsider cultures, distant aliens, barbarians and so forth. He attaches crucial importance, rather, to the study of the immanent others of a society in his work in that this

[50] Balibar 1995, p.19
[51] Isin, E. F. 2002. *Being Political.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

narrative of harmony and domination of the distant other actually hinders the account of their domination:

> As a result, [dominant groups'] dominated others appear as the distant and transitive (barbarians), rather than the near and immanent (strangers, outsiders, and aliens). That is among the reasons why citizenship has been interpreted as a unique occidental institution whose conditions were lacking in the Orient. At the root of the Occidental conception of citizenship lies the invention of the oriental city as its Other and the distinction between (civilized) peoples with cities and (barbarian) peoples without cities.[52]

The establishment of the early cities is often taken as a breakthrough in social-cultural relations. What was crucial about the city was not merely the aggregation of people in larger numbers but the effect of "moving closer together:"

> The simulating interdependencies and cultural conventions created by socio-spatial agglomeration –moving closer together- were the key organizing features or motor forces driving virtually everything that followed.[53]

Although he was not alone among the ones who were fascinated by this revolutionary leap, Weber has been one of the most influential scholars in the development of the socio-political conception of the city. For Weber, the city and citizenship were unique institutions to the West that were foundational for the development of capitalism. [54]

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[52] Ibid., p.5
[53] Soja 1989., p. 46 cited in Isin, 2002, p.6
[54] Weber, Max. [1927] 1961. "Citizenship." *General Economic History*. New York: Collier Books., pp. 233-249.

While Weber acknowledged that the city was a socially and culturally diversified community which brings together strangers and outsiders,[55] he emphasized *unification,* synoecism[56], as the universal principle for the very existence of the city. The city was only possible as a *unified* agglomeration of tribes 'settling together.'[57] Yet, the free association and confederation of the tribes to form the city actually was the assumption of the ancient Greek citizens themselves that Weber took for granted without any skepticism or explanation.[58] He elaborated his argument showing that as synoecism founded the cities, it was the rise of the plebs that originated citizenship.[59] Moreover, he based his analysis on a comparison between Occidental and Oriental settlements. He concluded with a 'universal' definition of the city as the distinguishing character of the Occident, constructing an ontological difference between the Orient and the Occident and a cluster of absences in the Oriental settlements.

According to Weber's definition, the city had five essential characteristics: "fortification, market, autonomous law and administration, association, and autocephaly."[60] Self-reliance and organization for defense, and religious brotherhood enabled existence of the autonomous Occidental city to develop in its unique form. Different groups were united by brotherhood of arms for mutual aid and protection,

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[55] Isin 2002., p.10
[56] "Synoecism" is a way of seeing the polity as embodying spatial and political unification. (Isin, E. F. 2005. "Citizenship after Orientalism: Ottoman Citizenship." In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences,* edited by F. Keyman and A. İçduygu. New York: Routledge., p.31)
[57] Isin 2002, p.6
[58] Ibid., p.11
[59] Ibid., p.11
[60] Ibid., p.8

and the usurpation of political power.[61] Confraternity, the "oath of brotherhood" is, for Weber, what connects the medieval "communes" in Europe to the ancient "synoecism." Weber writes:

> It requires 400 years longer before in 1143 the name Commune Venetiarum turns up. Quite similar was the "synœcism" of antiquity, as for example the procedure of Nehemiah in Jerusalem. This leader caused the leading families and a selected portion of the people on the land to band themselves together under oath for the purpose of administration and defense of the city. We must assume the same background for the origin of every ancient city. The polis is always the product of such a confraternity or synœcism, not always an actual settlement in proximity but a definite oath of brotherhood which signified that a common ritualistic meal is established and a ritualistic union formed and that only those had a part in this ritualistic group who buried their dead on the acropolis and had their dwellings in the city.[62]

Unlike Occidental cities, Oriental cities never dissolved their tribal bonds and could not invent the city as a confraternal association[63] and "the concept of a burgher (*as contrasted to the man from the countryside*) never developed in the Orient at all and existed only in rudiments."[64] The peculiarity of the Occident was in the eventual subjection of the rural man to the rule of law and thus his transformation to a moral agent. It was the link that bound the pagan to the villager. As well as art and sciences, Weber argues that the city found the specific religious institutions; Judaism, early Christianity and Puritanism and Pietism are all urban phenomena because "a peasant

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[61] Ibid., p.8
[62] Weber, 1961, pp. 236-237
[63] As it is in the sense of a contractual organization (*See* Isin 2005)
[64] Weber 1921,p. 1227 cited in Isin 2002, p. 9, my emphasis.

could not conform with the ritual of the law"[65] and "[t]hat a peasant could function as a member of a religious group is a strictly modern phenomenon"[66] Weber continues:

> In Christian antiquity the word paganus signified at the same time heathen and village dweller, just as in the post-exilic period the town-dwelling Pharisee looked with contempt on the Am-haaretz who was ignorant of the law. Even Thomas Aquinas, in discussing the different social classes and their relative worth, speaks with extreme contempt of the peasant. Finally, the city alone produced theological thought, and on the other hand again, it alone harbored thought untrammeled by priestcraft. The phenomenon of Plato, with his question of how to make men useful citizens as the dominant problem of his thought, is unthinkable outside the environment of a city.[67]

That the city in the middle ages possessed its own law and court and an autonomous administration (in varying levels) has conditioned the appearance of the citizen in the Occidental world. The social unification that is named as the citizenry was only possible by people's association with another under law and participation in the selection of administrative officials.[68] There were always different classes like entrepreneurs and hand laborers elsewhere but nowhere outside of the West, they together constituted a unitary class of citizenry.

Weber saw a close connection between the ancient polis and the medieval communes of Europe in that the entry of the plebs into the citizenship weakened clan or tribal ties and spatial and occupational membership gained more importance. However, the ancient polis could not complete its trajectory towards a fraternized association because they were incorporated into the Hellenistic and Roman kingdoms. Thus it

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[65] Weber 1961, p. 234
[66] Ibid., p. 234
[67] Ibid., pp. 234-235
[68] Ibid., p. 235

was only the medieval city which was a commune from the very beginning that gradually took its able to form bounded by the legal concept of the 'corporation.'[69]

Accordingly, Weber provides two main reasons for the impediment of the development of the city in the Orient: the despotic control of the Oriental rulers over the arms and the persistence of magic and religious barriers among the tribes (as opposed to the qualities that characterized the Occidental city).[70]

> Whether the military organization is based on *the principle of self equipment* or on that of equipment by a military overlord who furnishes horses, arms and provisions, is a distinction quite as fundamental for social history as is the question whether the means of economic production are the property of the worker or of a capitalistic entrepreneur. Everywhere outside the west the development of the city was prevented by the fact that the army of the prince is older than the city.[71]

Whereas the Occidental city emerged as an autonomous defense group, because of the irrigation problem, great kingdoms were established in the Orient to regulate water sources.[72] That subject classes were dependent on the functioning of the bureaucracy of the king stipulated the persistence of the bureaucracy, the compulsory service of the dependent classes and the monopoly of the king over the martial capital.[73] As this monopoly hindered subjects owning and developing their own means of warfare, autonomous political administration and the participation of the subjects in the affairs of their local governments never fully developed. Although the

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[69] Isin 2002, p. 12
[70] Weber 1961, p. 237
[71] Ibid., p. 237, my emphases
[72] Ibid., p. 238
[73] Isin 2002, p. 9

oriental city seemed to have economic characteristics of the city and clan associations and sometimes the occupational associations instrumented the political action they never developed the collective character of the urban of the West.[74] The city association in the West decided on the obligation owed to the lord and the martial organization and the citizens were required to join the sworn confraternization in order to stay within the city: "The noble and patrician families, which had founded the association would administer an oath to all inhabitants qualified by land-ownership; those who did not agree to take it were forced into exile." [75]

Secondly, the persistence of magic related ideas and institutions in the Oriental religions. This prevented the dissolution of the barriers between clans and the religious brotherhood, hence urban piety.[76] Weber saw the uniqueness of the occidental city in its facilitation of the formation of groups based on bonds and ties other than lineage kinship.[77] For instance, hereditary membership in the caste regulated the social distance between members of different castes. Hence, fraternization among castes was impossible because of inviolable barriers against commensalism.[78] In contrast, in the Occident, apprentices working under a master were able to move to different occupations from their parents. Despite violent struggles among the guilds, this transferability facilitated the growth of fraternization in the community.

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[74] Isin 2002, p. 8
[75] Weber 1921, p. 1253 cited in Isin 2002, p.18
[76] Weber 1961, p. 238
[77] Isin 2002, p. 10
[78] Ibid., p. 15

For Weber, Christianity has also played an important role in breaking down the religious barriers and "refusing to regard any people as pariah means the origins of commensalism are specifically Christian, which cut across nations and groups"[79]. Isin argues[80] that Weber's way of seeing the Occidental city as foundational to citizenship was expressed best in his reference to a letter by Paul to the Galatians in which Paul upbraided Peter because after he had eaten in Antioch with the Gentiles, he withdrew and separated himself.

> The elimination of all ritual barriers of birth for the community of the eucharists, as realized in Antioch, was, in connection with the religious pre-conditions, the hour of conception for the occidental 'citizenry.' This is the case even though its birth occurred more than a thousand years later in the revolutionary *coniurationes* of the medieval cities. For without commensalism—in Christian terms, without the Lord's Supper—no oathbound fraternity and no medieval urban citizenry would have been possible.[81]

Moreover, various religious associations habituated the citizens in forming coalitions in the pursuit of common interests, and by providing models for political leadership, which, Weber believed, was entirely absent in the ancient or medieval oriental city.[82] Along with this active membership in the association and autonomous law and administration in the city, for Weber, one of the most crucial achievements in the occidental city was that one could possess, inherit and transfer the urban land. It was the later municipal taxation that leaded the advent of modern occidental citizenship[83]. The gradual extension of the autonomy of law and administration made "the ascent

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[79] Isin 2002, p. 15
[80] Ibid.
[81] Weber, 1917, pp. 37-38 cited in Isin 2002, p.16.
[82] Weber, 1921, p. 1258 cited in Isin 2002, p.18.
[83] Ibid., p. 1260 cited in Isin 2002, p.18.

from bondage to 'freedom by means of monetary acquisition was possible;"[84] and hence, for Weber, the expression that 'city air makes man free', emerged in central and north European cities, represented the unique character of the occidental city[85].

Taking up the Weberian division between the oriental and occidental city, Turner also argues that Islam hindered the dissolution of clan ties and actually reinforced the fissiparous character of the oriental city. Since the Islamic city composed of subcommunities lived in separate quarters or districts each of which had their own separate organization and market and controlled by external patrimonial rulers, the Islamic city could not produce rich life of the burgher associations:

> It was in the city that urban piety, legal autonomy, occupational associations and political involvement developed; hence, the autonomous city had very important connections with the rise of European capitalism. In Islam, Weber argued, it was the combination of a warrior religiosity with patrimonialism which limited the growth of autonomous cities and which in consequence precluded the growth of urban piety within the lower middle classes.[86]

These districts or as Turner calls them "'villages' within cities" formed around the religious identity of the subcommunity imported rural feuding arrangements into urban life[87] and led to the persistence of kinship association as a principle opposed to confraternal forms based on the spatial principle. Similarly, for Turner, Islamic guilds did not develop and founded by workmen to protect themselves and their craft but rather were created by the state to supervise the craft and workmen and above all to

[84] Ibid., p. 1238 cited in Isin 2002, p.10.
[85] Isin 2002, p.11; Weber 1961, p. 244
[86] Turner, 1974, p. 98 cited in Isin 2002, pp. 13-14
[87] Ibid., p. 100 cited in Isin 2002, p. 14

protect the state from autonomous institutions.[88] "The guilds were a facet of patrimonial control. The Islamic city lacked "group feeling" and also failed to provide corporate institutions that would protect individuals."[89] In contrast, for Turner, Christianity played a fundamental part in the development of the associational character of the occidental city by helping tribalism to dissolve and lead people in common action.[90] The Occidental cities were not only legal persons but also political agents. Their martial independence made them free in their fighting wars, concluding treaties and making alliances. Thus, "It was in the city that urban piety, legal autonomy, occupational associations and political involvement developed."[91] Thus, the autonomous city had been a foundation for rise of European capitalism. However, in Islam, Turner argues following Weber, the growth of autonomous cities were prevented by warrior religiosity and patrimonialism; consequently, they "precluded the growth of urban piety within the lower middle classes."[92] Thus, as Isin points out, for Weber, the city has allowed the advent of the citizen as the universal rational subject who is able to form associations founding in ties beyond lineage or kinship, the basis of which were contract and secularism:

> The figure of the citizen that dominated the occidental tradition is the figure of that sovereign man (and much later woman) who is capable of judgement and being judged, transcending (and much later her) his tribal, kinship, and other primordial loyalties and belongingness. The figure represents an unencumbered and sovereign self in a direct contractual relationship with the

[88] Turner 1974, p. 103 cited in Isin, 2002, p. 14
[89] Ibid., p. 104 cited in Isin 2002, p. 14
[90] Ibid., p. 97 cited in Isin 2002, p. 13
[91] Isin 2002, p. 13
[92] Turner 1974, p. 98 cited in Isin, 2002, p. 14

> city. By contrast, the orient never invented that figure and mimetically reproduced it with only limited success.[93]

Isin in *Being Political* cites several works[94] that have showed kinship and magic ties were never dissolved in the ancient poliesis and civitates or medieval cities and contemporary studies empirically questioned the "Oriental despotism" that founds Weber's argument. Yet, the crucial discussion is not these emprical flaws but how Weber's work overlooked the otherness of citizenship and how the myth of social contract is utilized in his work:

> To put it bluntly, the occidental city was never a confraternity. Rather, it was a difference machine that simultaneously assembled and dispersed various groups and their differentiations across social and material space, enabling them to govern themselves and others by using various solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies. While the city was not a confraternity, there were various orders of fraternization and confraternization as solidaristic and agonistic strategies that always formed from struggles among these groups. Nor was the ancient city a rationalized order dissolving kinship and tribal ties. Citizenship always included kinship or tribal identifications and networks, which served as the basis of solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies.[95]

Isin maintains[96] that the frequent response to the argument of the underdeveloped city and citizenship in the Orient have followed two lines. Both contributed to the affirmation of the founding dualism and thereby the supremacy of the West. First is to confront the argument of absences with presences, trying to show that what is argued to be lacking already exists and thus to repeat the orientalist definition as given and to try to demonstrate corresponding institutions. Second is accepting the division and

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[93] Isin 2005, p. 32
[94] Isin cites various works by Clarke, King, Love and Springborg. *See* Isin 2002.
[95] Isin 2002, p.281
[96] Ibid., p.21; Isin 2005, pp.39-40.

arguing that those institutions of citizenship were never developed. In these accounts, citizenship is argued to develop to a minimal/insipient level or in an eclectic manner in the Orient and only under periods of integration or close contact with the Western world.

In contrast, Isin suggests that, to avoid the orientalist comparison, one should include differences as peculiar to the examples themselves and try to trace the reasons for their particular development. Secondly and more crucially, occidental citizenship should be thought as a generalized question of otherness and as a way of being political without any appeal to an ontological difference between the Occident and the orient. Thus, we have to also "alter the question that framed these histories, asking how and against whom the citizenship was defined as a group identity and what kinds of strategies and technologies of citizenship were assembled to make citizens, strangers, and outsiders."[97]

The aim of proposing to study citizenship distanced from orientalism does not aim to abandon the difference between and amongst various world historical moments, but to refuse to reduce them to fundamental ontological differences along the axis of inferiority or superiority.[98] Orientalism is less about the orient and more about provoking various assemblages of meaning that make possible various actions upon the orient. These meaning structures affect the way we think about our political existence. Orientalism is relational and dynamic not static. No work will be sufficient

[97] Isin 2002, p. 21
[98] Isin 2005, p. 42

and will fall behind in response to the continuous production of orientalist claims unless the fundamental categories that produce the basic breach between the occident and orient are overturned.[99]

Isin's argument resonates with what Balibar calls 'new racisms' which operate with variations of the idea that "the historical cultures of humanity can be divided into two main groups, the one assumed to be universalistic and progressive, the other supposed irremediably particularistic and primitive. [100] New racism works within a framework of racism without races. Its dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, "a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life styles and traditions."[101] In this sense, Balibar[102] argues racism organizes affects conferring upon them a stereotyped form.

Although the empirical validity of the concept of race has been eroded, the biological theme as well preserves its place (with the differentialist racism) within the discourse of biological and biophysical causes of culture, biological reactions to cultural difference like social aggression, cultural closures and individual aptitudes.[103] Culture in this sense can also function like a nature; it can fix individuals and groups a priori

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[99] Isin 2005, p. 32
[100] Balibar, Etienne. 1991. "Is there a 'Neo-racism'?." In *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous identities.* Eds. E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein. London: Verso, p. 25
[101] Ibid., p. 21
[102] Ibid., p. 21.
[103] Ibid., p. 26

into a genealogy, "into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin".[104] Thus, Balibar concludes, "cultural difference is our true 'natural milieu.'"[105]

Žižek makes a similar point regarding the notions of respect and tolerance in discourses of multiculturalism that he calls 'Eurocentric distance' which enhances European subject with privileged empty universal position.[106]

> [T]he ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats *each* local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people—as 'natives' whose mores are to be carefully studied and 'respected'. That is to say, the relationship between traditional imperialist colonialism and global capitalist self-colonization is exactly the same as the relationship between Western cultural imperialism and multiculturalism: in the same way that global capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing Nation-State metropole, multiculturalism involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one's own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a 'racism with a distance'—it 'respects' the Other's identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed 'authentic' community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position. Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he doesn't oppose to the Other the *particular* values of his own culture), but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged *empty point of universality* from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures—the multiculturalist respect for the Other's specificity is the very form of asserting one's own superiority.[107]

Accordingly, this thesis agrees with Isin's conclusion that although along the history of citizenship the citizen has been well criticized by socio-political movements as a

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[104] Ibid., p. 22
[105] Ibid.
[106] Žižek, Slavoj. 1997. "Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism." *New Left Review* 225: 28-51, p. 44
[107] Ibid.

universal category, its relationship to the spatial perspectives of synoecism and the orientalism that shapes our understanding of political existence and political action still requires further examination. This also requires a transformation in the fundamental categories that we work with in order to allow alternative critical interpretations. Isin writes that:

> Such an analysis requires transforming some of the fundamental categories of occidental social and political thought. Briefly, this analysis regards the formation of groups as fundamental but dynamic processes through which beings articulate themselves. Through orientations, strategies and technologies as forms of being political, beings develop solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating relationships. I maintain that these *forms* and *modes* constitute ontological ways of being political in the sense that being thrown into them is not *necessarily* a matter of conscious choice or contract. It is therefore impossible to investigate "citizenship," as that name that citizens – as distinguished form strangers, outsiders, and aliens - have given themselves, without investigating the specific constellation or figuration of orientations, strategies and technologies that are available for deployment in producing solidaristic, agonistic and alienating multiplicities.[108]

The recent works of Giorgio Agamben is invested to explore what he calls 'a very old distancing/ differentiating act which he sees inherent in the legacy of metaphysics that Western political philosophy rests itself upon'. He argues that the political system no longer orders forms of life and juridical norms in a determinate space but a *dislocating localization* marks the political space of modernity which he calls camp. He asserts that it is not the city but the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the Western modernity. The second chapter of this thesis engages with Agamben's latter argument and its implications for the question of subject in general and Foucault's formulation of subjectivation in particular.

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[108] Isin 2005, p. 40

CHAPTER TWO:

II. *Life* of the City and of the Camp: On Subjectivation and Desubjectivation

The concept of politics rarely announces itself without some sort of adherence of the State to family, without what we call a schematic of filiation: stock, genus or species, sex (Geschlecht), *blood, birth, nature, nation – autochthonal or not, tellurian or not. This is once again the abyssal question of the* phúsis, *the question of being, the question of what appears in birth, in opening up, in nurturing or growing, in producing by being produced. Is that life? That is how life is thought to reach recognition.*[109]

Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*

In the first chapter, I argued that the discourse of city fabricates a split in the very space of polity in which subjectivities are constituted by concurrent determination of what one is by birth and one's distance from it. In this chapter, I will continue elaborating on this relationship with the discourses of the city and constitution of subjectivities introducing Agamben's concept of camp and abjection into the framework. In the first chapter, I discussed Engin Isin's argument that the political categories of western politics should be reconsidered in order to avoid orientalism and synoecism that is reproduced in the idea of social contract and see citizenship as alterity. Accordingly, this chapter expands on the recent works of Agamben who similarly observes a distancing act in the categories of western political philosophy that obscures the envisioning of the fundamental operation of biopolitical power-inscription of the split between speaking being and the living in the politics. What is exemplified in the term camp is dislocating localization. It does not refer to a distinction between enemy and friend but continuous re-determination of the value

[109] Derrida, Jacques. 2005. *Politics of Friendship.* Trans. George Collins. London: Verso, p. viii

and non-value of living and a continuous hunt and abandonment of the undesired- a life that is not worth living. Thus for Agamben the task is not to look for actual camps but examine its mutations diligently.

II. i. Subjectivation and the City

Foucault associates the development of the experience of the "technology of the self" (reflection on modes of living, on choices of existence, on the way to regulate one's behaviour, to attach oneself to ends and means) with the growth of urban society[110]. For Foucault, there have been two major models of control that have organized the territory of the town in the West: the model of leprosy and that of plague[111]. While the former was about the social practice of exclusion and purification, casting out the impure, the leper, outside of the walls of the town, the latter operated as individualization of the plague victim, extension and subdivision of the power into the grain of his individuality by a 'constant and insistent observation.'[112]

In his 1974-1975 lectures on *Abnormal*, Foucault explains the exclusion of the lepers in the West throughout the middle ages as a distancing practice, a rule of no contact between one or a group of individuals with another. Hence, two distinct masses were constituted, each foreign to the other. The lepers were cast out into "outer darkness", "a vague, external world beyond the town's walls, beyond the limits of the

[110] Foucault, Michel. 1998. "Subjectivity and Truth." In *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth.* Trans. Robert Hurley. New York : New Press, p.89
[111] Foucault, Michel. 2003b. *Abnormal.* Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, p.44
[112] Ibid., p.46

community."[113] For Foucault, the exclusion of lepers also implied (not exactly a moral but) a juridical and political disqualification of these individuals:

> They entered death, and you know that the exclusion of lepers was accompanied by a kind of funeral ceremony during which individuals who had been declared leprous had been declared dead (which meant that their possessions could be passed on) and they departed for the foreign, external world.[114]

Foucault argues that this model of exclusion of the leper continued until the end of seventeenth century being extended with the hunts for beggars, vagabonds, the idle, libertines and so forth.[115] But then, a different model that was as old as that of leprosy was reactivated and has become persistent. This model emerged in pertinence with the problem of plague and the investment of the town's administration in the spatial partitioning and control (*quadrillage*) of the plague[116].

Unlike the model of leper, the concern with the plague resulted in the inclusion and individualization of plague victims. Closing the territory of "quarantine" was not to purify the community but rather to expose it to a fine and detailed analysis.[117] The organization of power across the territory was continuous. Everything observed had to be permanently recorded in registers and every quarter was subject to continuous visual examination. Each individual was assigned to a window. Not appearing by the window meant that the individual was ill thus dangerous and intervention was

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[113] Ibid., p.43
[114] Ibid., p.43
[115] Ibid., p.44
[116] Ibid., p.44
[117] Ibid., p.45

required.[118] What mattered was not picking out the impure but continuous observation of differences between individuals who were ill and who are not. Thus:

> It is not a question of driving out individuals but rather of establishing and fixing them, of giving them their own place, of assigning places and of defining presences and subpresences. ... While leprosy calls for distance, the plague implies an always finer approximation of power to individuals, an ever more constant and insistent observation. With the plague there is no longer a grand ritual of purification, as with leprosy, but rather an attempt to maximize the health, life, longevity, and strength of individuals. Essentially, it is a question of producing a healthy population rather than purifying those living in the community, as in the case of leprosy.[119]

This was the political dream, the marvellous movement when political power is exercised to the full:

> The movement of the plague is one of an exhaustive sectioning of the population by political power, the capillary ramifications of which constantly reach the grain of individuals themselves, their time, habitat, localization, and bodies.[120]

Accordingly, elsewhere and in his work "The Subject and Power", Foucault calls this *new distribution, new organization of a kind of individualizing power*[121] from the eighteenth century onwards as biopower. The intention of this new power is to function primarily for 'care and multiplication *life*'. It is a positive form of power that fashions, observes, knows, and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects.[122]

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[118] Ibid., p.46
[119] Ibid., p.46
[120] Ibid., p.47
[121] Foucault, Michel. 2003a. "Subject and Power." In *The Essential Foucault.* Trans. N. Rose and P. Rabinow. New York: The New Press, pp. 126-144
[122] Foucault 2003b. p, 48

This new organization of power oriented at individualizing and ensuring salvation in this world where salvation takes on different meanings – health, well-being, wealth, standard of living, security. The power was coextensive and continuous with life- production of the truth of the individual himself. The modern state is a very sophisticated structure in which individuals can be integrated submitting this individuality to a set of very specific patterns. Its sophistication was due to its operation as both totalizing (globalizing and quantitative - concerning the whole body of the population) and individualizing (analytical concerning the details of individual desire) at the same time. Foucault called the former, the biopolitics of the population, the *regulatory controls*, which has been founded on the biologicality of the body as the species being; and the latter is the *anatomo-politics of the human body,* focused on the body as machine- disciplining power: disciplining, optimizing the capacities of and extorting the forces of the body. That required the simultaneous increase of the docility and efficiency of the body. The agents and aims multiplied for this development of the knowledge of man and distributed according to differential individualities.

This bipolar technology – anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed towards performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life- are the supervision over and intervention in the propagation, birth, level of health, life expectancy and so on. The old power of death that symbolized the sovereign power was carefully displaced by the administration of bodies and the calculated

management of life.[123] Subjugation of bodies and control over populations emerged as the beginnings of the bio-power:

> Life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The 'right' to live, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to satisfaction of needs, and beyond all operations or 'alterations,' the 'right' to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this right – which the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending- was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty.[124]

Yet, this did not mean that legal power and its institutions were withering away; rather, the law has increasingly been acting as a norm, as regulating, normalizing, correcting operations but not as a body of force for absolute confirmation. Hence, the juridical apparatus has integrated into a "continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on)."[125] Hence, norm plays not a repressive but a productive role and from the eighteenth century onwards the establishment of power was not conservative but included inventive and transformative processes[126]:

> [T]he norm consequently lays claim to power. The norm is not simply and not even a principle of intelligibility; it is an element on the basis of which a certain exercise of power is founded and legitimized. ... [T]he norm brings with it a principle of both qualification and correction. The norm's function is not to exclude and reject. Rather it is always linked to a positive technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project.[127]

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[123] Foucault, Michel 1990. "Right of Death and Power over Life" *History of Sexuality History of Sexuality V.*1. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, pp.139-140.
[124] Ibid., p.145
[125] Ibid., p.144
[126] Foucault 2003b., p, 52
[127] Ibid., p, 50

Foucault understood transformation of the exclusionary practices, isolating one from human contact, into disciplinary and regulative operations in a similar way in that segmentary and individualizing discipline is applied to this "confused space of internment" with the methods of analytical distribution- measurement, supervision and correction of the abnormal- to "individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion."[128] All the mechanisms of power "to brand" (characterization by binary division) and "to alter" the abnormal individual (recognition) are marked by this transformation.[129] The excluded is given a distinctive identity.

The double bind of power on the subject that is at once controlling and individualizing thus meant to 'conduct the conduct of individuals' and management of the possibilities.[130] Foucault writes:

> [E]ven though consent and violence are instruments or results, they do not constitute the principle or the basic nature of power. ... [I]t operates on the field of possibilities in which the behaviour of active subjects is able inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions. ... [T]o conduct is at the same time to 'lead' others ... and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities[131]

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[128]Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* New York: Vintage Books, pp. 198-199.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Foucault 2003a., p. 138
[131] Ibid., p. 138

Foucault shows that there is no one way of operation of the borders, walls and spatialisation. The city is a cluster of *dispositifs* where different models have been at play. Borders and walls do not only function to distance, exclude and separate but also to articulate different spaces and individualize and control subjects. The binary oppositions themselves do not mean much without projecting on the 'complex series of articulating and individuating processes and technologies'[132] that at once subjugate and mediate individuals through self-knowledge and makes subjects able to act. There is no subject without becoming attached to an individuality and singularity but also being subjugated.

Agamben, however, sees an *aporia* in the works of Foucault to which he attaches a crucial importance for elaboration of the question of subject. Whereas Foucault writes that "one must care for one's self, in all the forms of the practice of self," he also refers to an opposite theme: "the self must be let go of," "[l]ife is over if one questions oneself about one's identity; the art of living is to destroy identity, to destroy psychology."[133] This leads to an *aporia* in which 'a care of self should lead to a letting go of self.'

Agamben thus argues that Foucault's the question of subject should be seen as concomitant processes of subjectivation and desubjectivation, with an interval

[132] Agamben, G. 2006. *Metropolis.* Seminar given at the Nomad University in November 2006. Trans. by Arianna Bove.
[133] Cited in Smith, Jason. 2004. "'I am sure that you are more pessimistic than I am . . .': An interview with Giorgio Agamben." *Rethinking Marxism.* 16(2):116

between these two processes[134]. Agamben thinks that the modern state functions as a kind of desubjectivation machine:

> [I]t's a machine that both scrambles all the classical identities and, as Foucault shows quite well, a machine (for the most part juridical) that recodes these very same dissolved identities. There is always a resubjectivation, a reidentification of these destroyed subjects, voided as they are of all identity. Today, it seems to me that the political terrain is a kind of battlefield in which two processes unfold: the destruction of all that traditional identity was (I say this, of course, with no nostalgia) and, at the same time, its immediate resubjectivation by the State—and not only by the State, but also by the subjects themselves.[135]

In the interval between subjectivation and desubjectivation, the individual witnesses his or her own nakedness, muteness or formlessness. Agamben asserts that what is often lacking is the awareness that every time one takes on an identity one is also subjugated. Modern *dispositifs* not only entail the creation of subjectivity but also and equally processes of desubjectivation, which make understanding these processes more complicated.[136] Agamben writes:

> One way the question could be posed is: what would a practice of self be that would not be a process of subjectivation but, to the contrary, would end up only at a letting go, a practice of self that finds its identity only in a letting go of self? It is necessary to maintain or "stay," as it were, in this double movement of desubjectivation and subjectivation. Obviously, it is difficult terrain to hold. It's truly a matter of identifying this zone, this no man's land

[134] Ibid.,p.116
[135] Ibid.
[136] Agamben 2006.

between a process of subjectivation and a process of desubjectivation, between identity and nonidentity. This terrain would have to be identified, because this would be the terrain of a new biopolitics.[137]

In the following section, I will elaborate on what Agamben means by this terrain between subjectivation and desubjectivation and how he develops it as an ethical proposal.

II. ii. Shame and Desubjectivation

In *Remnants of Auschwitz,* Agamben builds his conception of subjectivity, production of consciousness in the event of discourse,[138] on the affective moment of shame[139] which he sees as the fundamental sentiment of being subject- being subjected and being sovereign. Shame is a consequence of the absolute coincidence of subjectivation and desubjectivation, self-possession and self-loss, sovereignty and servitude.[140] However, shame is defined by neither culpability nor responsibility. What is experienced in shame is not bearing witness to one' lack or imperfection but

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[137] Smith 2004., p.117

[138] Agamben 1999, p.123

[139] Agamben's analysis of subjectivation and desubjectivation- two constitutive moments of subjectivity not only founds on *shame* as an emotive tonality of subjectivity but also on modalities of language. I will confine the discussion to the former and will not go into the latter linguistic analysis because of its complexity for the scope of this current project. Agamben elaborates on the linguistic analysis in Chapter 4 of *Remnants* and Mills' article, "Linguistic Survival and Ethicality," provides a critique. Although I cite Mills' article here, I do not agree with her criticism. She reproaches Agamben's analysis for ignoring the question of other in the constitution of self and possibility of enunciative event of 'I'. Yet, in her article, she ignores the decisive point (which I will be elaborating in this section below) about testimony in which the witness and the Muselmann enter into an existential relationship that they are no more distinguishable. *See* Mills, Catherine. 2005. "Linguistic Survival and Ethicality." In *Politics and Metaphysics and Death.* Ed. By Andrew Norris. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

[140] Agamben 1999, p. 107, 128.

an inability to keep distance from the exposure of the inassumable presence of self to the self:

> It is as if our consciousness collapsed and, seeking to flee in all directions, were simultaneously summoned by an irrefutable order to be present at its own defacement, at the expropriation of what is most its own. In shame, the subject thus has no other content than its own desubjectification[141]; it becomes witness to its own disorder, its own oblivion as subject. This double movement, which is both subjectification and desubjectification, is shame.[142]

Connecting brief remarks of Heidegger who pointed to the ontological character of shame and disgust in which self is exposed, and Benjamin's short analysis of disgust in *One- Way Street* as the fear of exhibition and repulse against the awareness of that which is akin to animal in oneself, Agamben concludes that

> Whoever experiences disgust has in some way recognized himself in the object of his loathing and fears being recognized in turn. The man who experiences disgust recognizes himself in an alterity an absolute desubjectification.[143]

This experience of being present at one's own being seen constitutes the double movement of subjectivity. The reason why Agamben sees constitution of subjectivities as a double movement is the reciprocal relationship between one's active seeing of oneself and passive vision of being seen. The experience of shame

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[141] 'Desubjectification' and 'desubjectivation' (or 'subjectification' and 'subjectivation') are different translations of the same concept. I prefer to use desubjectivation (and subjectivation) but I will use the quotation as they are in original texts referred.
[142] Agamben 1999, p. 106
[143] Ibid., p.107

makes one respond to what deprives him of speech.[144] This response constitutes the subjectivity:

> This is why subjectivity constitutively has the form of subjectification and desubjectification; this is why it is, at bottom, shame. Flush is the remainder that, in every subjectification, betrays a desubjectification and that, in every desubjectification, bears witness to a subject.[145]

Kristeva is another author who elaborates on the feeling of disgust beyond its being a mere emotion. For Kristeva[146] abjection looms, like uncontrollable vomiting what is inside but not parted with out of the body when one loses access to habitual distinction with the collapse of signification[147] "directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable".[148] "Abject", she writes,

> is not an ob-ject facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire. What is abject is not my correlative, which,..., would allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to *I.* If the object, however, through its opposition settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what is *abject,* on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses.[149]

Abject is not a lack of health in a body but like death infecting life; what disturbs identity, system, order disrespectful of borders, positions, rules; though not in a

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[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid., p.112
[146] Kristeva, Julia .1982. *Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection* New. York: Columbia University Press.
[147] Ibid., p.4
[148] Ibid., p.1
[149] Ibid.

fashion that one denies morality, rather in-between or ambiguous like "a traitor, the liar, a criminal with a good conscience" that stands outside the rules of the game that the master inscribed.[150] In this sense, abjection refers to a threshold between a space for negation and a breath breaking effect in consciousness exposing fragility of self (destabilizing the symbolic order and identity) that which hinders a complete negation (the abject itself turns into an ambiguous sign), and that which opens the possibility for a construction of a new, mutating identity or a 'new order' in Kristeva's[151] terms where she sees signification as constantly oscillating between instability and stability in a productive fashion (in her terms- 'powers of horror').

Similarly, Agamben develops this double movement of subjectivity on the testimonies of survivors of Auschwitz the lesson of which was described by Primo Levi's testimonies as brotherhood in abjection.[152] Levi wrote that no group was more human than any other; what they share was lack of dignity.[153] This assertion makes Agamben focus his book on the question of what remains after human under absolute degradation and inhuman. What does it mean for a human to become non-human? Is there a humanity of human beings that can be distinguished and separated from human beings' biological humanity?[154]

In the testimonies of survivors lack of dignity is not only expressed by the fact that the experience they were consigned to was inhuman but also the knowledge that when one camp inhabitant was killed, he died in place of self:

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[150] Ibid., p.2-8
[151] Ibid.
[152] Agamben 1999, p. 17
[153] Ibid., p.47
[154] Ibid., p. 55

> Rather, it is as if he were ashamed for having to die, for having been haphazardly chosen — he and no one else — to be killed. In the camps, this is the only sense that the expression "to die in place of another" can have: everyone dies and lives in place of another, without reason or meaning; the camp is the place in which no one can truly die or survive in his own place. Auschwitz also means this much: that man, dying, cannot find any other sense in his death than this flush, this shame.[155]

What this shame was interrupting was the dignity of self, the justification of one's continuation of his/ her living as a camp inhabitant. The only flee from this shame and lose of dignity was the possibility of giving testimony and to keep bearing witness to this inhuman experience that no human being should have assumed to experience. This possibility of speech and keeping conscious track of what had been lived was the justification for camp inhabitant's dignity- being human. What is at stake at the 'extreme situation' is remaining a human being or not. The task was to resist becoming a *Muselmann.*

Der Muselmann was a term, among many others, used by inhabitants of Nazi camps to refer to the people who were responsible for carrying the prisoners into the gas chamber, cleaning the body remnants, and collecting valuables off the body like gold teeth for the Nazis. They were the ones who suffered from the harshest malnutrition in the camps. Levi calls them, "non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them."[156] They were non-men because they give up responding to the environment around them, even to the torture by SS soldiers. They stopped seeing and they were deprived of speech. They gave up being persons, they became objects. They were the most hated in the camp. They were like animals in that all their

[155] Ibid., p. 104
[156] Ibid., p.55

concern was to watch the moment to steal food from other inhabitants or beg for it. Thus, *Muselmann*'s was non-man who lacked testimony and dignity. His life was not a life as such.

> It was the giving up of all feelings, all inner reservations about one's actions, the letting go of a point at which one would hold fast no matter what, that changed prisoner to Moslem. ... Prisoners who understood this fully, came to know that this, and only, this, formed the crucial difference between retaining one's humanity (and often life itself) and accepting death as a human being (or perhaps physical death).[157]

Yet, Agamben asserts a dilemma into this formulation that then it was not the witness who actually bore witness to the inhuman. It was actually the *Muselmann*, the drowned, who saw the most inhuman that a human being should have never seen and which deprived them of speech.

> The *Muselmann* embodies the anthropological meaning of absolute power in an especially radical form. Power abrogates itself in the act of killing, The death of the other puts an end to the social relation. But by the starving other, it gains time, It erects a third realm, a limbo between life and death. Like the pile of corpses, the *Muselmänner* document the triumph of power over the human being. Although still nominally alive, they are nameless hulks. In the configuration of their infirmity, as in organized mass murder, the regime realizes its quintessential self.[158]

For Agamben, Foucault's biopolitical power accounts for degradation of death in our time when power concerns multiplication of life and death is a refuge from power. However, sovereign power, for Foucault, is realized as an abstention from the right to

[157] Ibid., p. 56
[158] Ibid., p. 47-48

kill. Foucault formulates it as 'make die and let live'[159]. Agamben thinks that Foucault's analysis becomes problematic when it confronts the totalitarian states of our time. Although, Foucault is aware that these two distinct forms of power can conflate in certain cases, he maintains that they will however remain conceptually distinct[160]. Then, "*[h]ow is it possible that a power whose aim is essentially to make live instead exerts an unconditional power of death?*"[161] For Foucault, the coincidence of biopolitics immediately with thanatopolitics represents a genuine paradox[162]. He relates this paradox to the racism that lets biopower mark caesuras in the biopolitical continuum of human species:

> In the biological continuum of the human species, the opposition and the hierarchy of races, the qualification of certain races as good and others, by contrast, as inferior, are all ways to fragment the biological domain whose care power had undertaken; they are ways to distinguish different groups inside a population. In short, to stabilize a caesura of a biopolitical type inside a domain that defines itself precisely as biological.[163]

The fundamental caesura divides the biopolitical domain between people and population "transforming essentially a political body into an essentially biological body, whose birth and death, health and illness, must then be regulated."[164] Agamben argues that "biopolitical caesuras are essentially mobile, and in each case they isolate a further zone in the biological continuum, a zone which corresponds to a process of increasing Entwürdigung [debasement] and degradation."[165] Biopolitical caesuras have reached their final limit in the camp and degradation has become immanent in

[159] Ibid,, p. 82
[160] Ibid., p. 83
[161] Ibid., p.84, my emphasis.
[162] Ibid., p.84
[163] Agamben (cites Foucault) 1999, p. 84
[164] Ibid., p.84
[165] Ibid., p.85

daily activities of camp where survival has become the rule. The body of *Muselmann* is this limit when Jew turned into a deportee who then turned into a prisoner and biopolitics operates on the border of what life worth living and not. At the point in which the prisoner becomes a *Muselmann*,

> [T]he biopolitics of racism so to speak transcends race, penetrating into a threshold in which it is no longer possible to establish caesuras. Here the waver link between people and population is definitely broken, and we witness the emergence of something like an absolute biopolitical substance that cannot be assigned to a particular bearer or subject, or be divided by another caesura.[166]

The formula that defines the most specific trait of twentieth-century biopolitics is neither make die nor to make live, but to make survive. The decisive activity of biopower in our time is the production not of life or death, but rather of a changing and virtually infinite survival:

> In every case, it is a matter of dividing animal life from organic life, the human from the inhuman, the witness from the Muselmann, conscious life from vegetative life maintained functional through resuscitation techniques until a threshold is reached ... Biopower's supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body the absolute separation of the living being, zoē and bios, the inhuman and the human — survival.[167]

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[166] Ibid., p.85
[167] Ibid., pp. 155-156

Agamben argues that Auschwitz marks the end and the ruin of ethics of dignity and conformity to a norm. Human beings are reduced to the mere fact of living – bare life -- without a norm of demand or conformity. Belonging to the species is the only norm. For Agamben, the touchstone of new ethics is the knowledge that there is still life in the most extreme degradation while it is possible to lose dignity and decency beyond imagination.[168]

> He [*Muselmann*] does not merely embody a moral death against which one must resist with all one's strength, to save the humanity, self-respect, and perhaps even life. Rather, the *Muselmann*, as Levi describes him, is the site of an experiment in which the morality and humanity themselves are called into question. The *Muselmann* is a limit figure of a special kind, in which not only the categories such as dignity and respect but even the very idea of an ethical limit lose their meaning. ... Simply to deny *Muselmann*'s humanity would be to accept the verdict of the SS and to repeat their gesture. The *Muselmann* has, instead, moved into a zone of the human where not only help but also dignity and self respect have become useless. If there is a zone of the human in which these ethical concepts make no sense, then they are not genuine ethical concepts, for no ethics can claim to exclude a part of humanity, no matter how unpleasant or difficult that humanity is to see.[169]

Then, who is the subject of testimony if the complete witness is the *Muselmann* but what he experienced was the limits of speech and vision? Agamben answers that there is no subject of testimony because it is witnessing desubjectivation. It is crucial to understand here the constitutive relationship that Agamben sets between the witness and the *Muselmann*. As I have touched on above, bearing witness to the inhuman was the source of subjectivity of the survivors since they assumed that they were living on because someone else had been dead on their behalf. Their dignified existence was the possibility of speaking about what they have seen. Yet, they were

[168] Ibid., p. 69
[169] Ibid., p. 63-64

not the actual survivors of this inhumane experience that blurred the boundaries between human and non-human. Rather, it was the Muselmann who were left speechless. What the survivor bears witness to is actually the Muselmann, the inhuman, the living being without speech. Thus, what enables the survivor to speak is what the Muselmann experienced- his impossibility to speak. In this sense, every subjectivity is simultaneously subjectivation and desubjectivation in that the survivors dignity is broken by and depended on the inhumane that Muselmann was to experience:

> The subject testimony is the one who bears witness to a desubjectification. But this expression holds only if it is not forgotten that "to bear witness to a desubjectification" can only mean there is no subject of testimony ("I repeat, we are not. . . the true witnesses") and that every testimony is a field of forces incessantly traversed by currents of subjectification and desubjectification.[170]

The witness is the remnant of these currents.

II.iii. Camp, Monstrosity, 'A-*ban*-doned'

As much as the city has been the terrain of subjectivation where the idea of social contract has enabled the subjects within the normative project to imagine themselves and their relation to each other beyond their natural being, biological ties. Agamben argues that "the political system no longer orders forms of life and juridical norms in a determinate space; rather it contains within itself a *dislocating localization* that exceeds it and in which virtually every form of life and every norm can be

[170] Ibid, p. 121.

captured"[171]. He calls this *dislocating localization* camp[172] where *Homo Sacer*[173], the abject, resides and we witness our own desubjectification. Camp is that where the urbanite, the civilized is desubjectified or one can say the urbanite witnesses the drowned/ abject, the speechless.

It is the human's nature that is of the question of politics- the natural, biological being of the individual. The idea of social contract is very much connected with this nature; whether to include, recognize it by accepting in the social contract thus declaring one human or including to the contract by the very exclusion of one from being a human form the civilized world of contract defined as confraternity.

Accordingly, one can think of the state of exception or the camp, and its 'temporal and spatial organization,' not as an anomaly of an underdeveloped city but foundational to its construction and the idea of social contract. The state of nature in Hobbes or the vague, darker outside where the leper was sent to death in Foucault can be rethought in terms of state of exception where the differences between individuals dissolve and the humanity/ dignity of the individual is under question. Thus the banning from the city does not operate as normalization of difference through

[171] Agamben 1998., p.44

[172] One can think of *camp* both in the form of ghetto, slum or the gated community where the rules and norm are constituted within their inner logic and where general rules that supposed to apply to the whole community excepted. It becomes the site for the "dislocating localization" in modernity when any moment any individual is subject to lose of status at any moment, from citizen to alien, resident to non-resident, regular to irregular, healthy body to the brain-dead etc.

[173] This figure *Homo Sacer*, which Agamben digs out of the archaic Roman Law, is the *sacred man* the decision on the criminal act of whom make his *sacrifice* a *ban*, but at the same time, his *murder unpunishable*. (Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.* Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press., p.71-83) Agamben cites Festus as follows "The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide... This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred." (Agamben 1998, p.71)

identification and re-identification or inclusion of it by the institution but rather as abjection- as a total denial without re-identification. The very existence of the camp is a question of human's constructed proper being, the separation of the human from the realm of animality and backwardness. Thus, Agamben asserts that one needs to reconsider the *polis,* the paradigmatic space of politics and the construction of a particular form of proper life as its *telos.*[174] In that sense, the opposition between life (*zēn*) and good life (*eu zēn*) in the Aristotelian definition of the *polis* ("born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life"[175]) requires further elaboration but not only in the sense, the modes, and the possible articulations of the "good life" as the *telos* of the political. Rather, one should ask "why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life. What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion?"[176]

> The peculiar phrase 'born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life' can be read not only as an implication of being born (*ginomenē*) in being (*ousa*), but also as an inclusive exclusion (an *exceptio*) of *zoē* in the *polis,* almost as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicized were always already bare life. In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men.[177]

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[174] Ibid.. p.7
[175] Ibid., p.7
[176] Ibid.,. p.7
[177] Ibid.

The very space of *polis* is also the transition from "voice to language". For Agamben, "the link between bare life and politics is the same link that the metaphysical definition of man as 'the living being who has language' seeks in the relation between *phonē* and *logos*."[178] Aristotle writes in *Politics* that:

> Among living beings, only man has language. The voice is the sign of pain and pleasure, and this is why it belongs to other living beings (since their nature has developed to the point of having sensations of pain and pleasure and of signifying the two.) But language is for manifesting the fitting and unfitting and the just and the unjust. To have the sensation of the good and the bad and of the just and unjust is what is proper to men as opposed to other living beings, and the community of these things makes dwelling and the city.[179]

At this metaphysical moment when the relationship between logos and the living being is realized, the 'humanity of living man,' is also decided by one's potential to sense and decide between good and bad, just and unjust:

> In the "politicization" of bare life -- the metaphysical task *par excellence*-the humanity of living man is decided. ... The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/ enemy but that of bare life/political existence, *zoē / bios,* exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.[180]

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[178] Ibid., p.7
[179] Ibid., p.7-8
[180] Ibid., p.8

In *Homo Sacer,* Agamben references half-man half-animal figures in ancient European laws in order to further explain what he means by this inherent relationship between the city and the state of exception, the exclusion of bare life from the city:

> The ancient Germanic law was founded on the concept of peace (*Fried*) and the corresponding exclusion from the community of the wrongdoer, who therefore became *friedlos*, without peace, and whom anyone was permitted to kill without committing homicide. The medieval ban also presents analogous traits: the bandit could be killed (*bannire idem est quod dicere quilibet possit eum offendere*, "'To ban' someone is to say that anyone may harm him" [*Cavalca, Il bando*, p. 42]) or was even considered to be already dead (*exbannitus ad mortem de sua civitate debet haberi pro mortuo*, "Whoever is banned from his city on pain of death must be considered as dead" [ibid., p. 50]). Germanic and Anglo-Saxon sources underline the bandit's liminal status by defining him as a wolf-man (*wargus, werwolf*, the Latin *garuphus*, from which the French *loup garou*, "werewolf," is derived): thus Salic law and Ripuarian law use the formula *wargus sit, hoc est expulsus* in a sense that recalls the *sacer esto* that sanctioned the sacred man's capacity to be killed, and the laws of Edward the Confessor (1030-35) define the bandit as a *wulfesheud* (a wolf's head) and assimilate him to the werewolf.[181]

This liminal status of the 'bandit,' 'the wolfman'(the man banned from the city) in the collective unconsciousness has a decisive importance for Agamben. The life of this monstrous hybrid of human and animal is divided between the forest; thus, it is still connected to the law and the city. Yet, he dwells in "the passage between animal and man, *physis* and *nomos*, exclusion and inclusion ... [he is] "*neither man nor beast*, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to neither."[182] Accordingly, that state of nature, if understood in the sense of 'state of exception', "is not a real epoch chronologically prior to the foundation of the City but a principle

[181] Ibid., pp.104-105
[182] Ibid.,p. 105

internal to the City."[183] Thus, the ban inherently constitutes the city and the myth of contract.

In his reading of Hobbes, Foucault[184] too argues that what the idea of social contract is trying to eliminate is the problem of conquest in both historical discourse and political practice. What is implied in social contract is regardless of war or no war, defeat or no defeat, Conquest or covenant, it all comes down to the same thing:

> 'It's what you wanted, it is you, the subjects, who constituted the sovereignty that represents you.' The problem of the Conquest is therefore resolved. At one level, it is resolved by the notion of the war of every man against every man; at another, it is resolved by the wishes—the legally valid will—expressed by the frightened losers when the battle was over.[185]

Foucault also makes a similar reference to abandonment in *Abnormal.* He shows the discussions of the bestiality of the criminal throughout the 18th and 19th century when a new discourse of criminal psychology was being formed out of the medical discourse and law. The criminal's nature was of a special interest for justice in that intentionality of the subject, his perception of right and wrong, was at stake.[186] What is especially interesting in Foucault's account is the discussions after King Louis XVI's trial between 1792-3 in that these were followed by depictions of the monarchs

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[183] Ibid.,p. 105
[184] Foucault, Michel. 2003d. Society must be defended : lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76 . Trans. David Macey. New York : Picador. p, 98
[185] Ibid.
[186] Foucault 2003b., pp. 86-90

as well as anarchists and revolutionaries as monstrous beings in the popular pamphlets.

What is striking about these later discussions is the convergence of the question of one's natural existence or humanity, and the question of his executablility in that question of whether being included in the social contract or not. For example, Foucault talks about the reaction of St. Just to the punishment of Louis XVI:

> And yet, Saint-Just said, this [being crushed as one crushed an enemy or monster] is too much, because if one asks the entire body to crush Louis XVI and get rid of him as its monstrous enemy, one opposes the entire social body to Louis XVI. That is to say, one admits, as it were, a relationship of symmetry between an individual and the social body. Now Louis XVI never recognized the existence of the social body and only ever applied his power by ignoring its existence. ... Should the laws be applied to him? The problems that arise in the discussions of the manner in which Louis XVI should be sentenced will be transposed in the second half of the nineteenth century to born criminals, to anarchists who also reject the social pact, to all monstrous criminals and all those nomadic figures who circulate around the social body but whom the social body does not recognize as belonging to it.[187]

Foucault cites one of Mopinot's writing in 1793.[188] Mopinot tells that at the origin of humanity there were two kinds of people those who devoted to agriculture and animal husbandry, and those who had to protect them because of ferocious wild animals. When the wild animals were gone and no longer a threat- the hunters were disturbed by their uselessness. They thought they would lose their privileges as hunters. Then, they became the wolves of mankind. They became the tigers of mankind. "Kings are

[187] Ibid,. pp. 95-96
[188] Ibid., p.97

nothing else but tigers, these hunters of earlier times who took the place of the wild beasts prowling around the first societies."[189]

The figure of the human monster continued to appear throughout the 19th century, especially referring to Marie Antoinette:

> In pamphlets of the time, Marie-Antoinette takes on a number of features peculiar to monstrosity. First of all, there is of course that fact that she is not part of the social body. She is therefore the wild beast with regard to the social body of the country in which she reigns; she is in any case a being the state of nature. Furthermore, she is the hyena, the ogress, 'the tigress,' who, Prudhomme says, 'once she has seen ... blood, cannot get enough of it.'" So, we have the cannibalistic, anthropophagic side of the sovereign, greedy for the blood of people. Then there is also the scandalous, debauched woman who abandons herself to the most outrageous licentiousness in two privileged forms.[190]

The opposite of the royal monster is in the anti-Jacobin, counter revolutionary literature. "Here it is not the monster of the abuse of power, but the monster that breaks the social pact by revolt. The monster is no longer the king but the revolutionary people who are the mirror image of the blood thirsty monarch.[191]

Debauchery and cannibalism, the two themes of "sexual and alimentary prohibition," are intertwined in the figure of human monster that breaks the social contract, the law of people. Besides, these two prohibitions were not only the concern of the law and

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[189] Ibid., p.97
[190] Ibid., p.97
[191] Ibid., p.98

punishment but also later of psychoanalysis and the anthropology which accounted on the habits of alliance- marriage and cuisine of the non-Western countries.[192]

State of Exception and Camp

The decisive fact about the characteristic of modern politics, for Agamben, is that "life [inclusion of zoē in the polis] as such becomes a principle object of the projections and calculations of State power. Together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, *bios* and *zoē,* right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction." [193] Accordingly, what links democracy to totalitarianism is its failed aspiration to avocate and to liberate *zoē* by seeking the *bios* of *zoē* for freedom and happiness of bare life, resulting in a gradual *transformation of the bare life into a way of life*. Hence, bare life is subjected by the double sovereign bind which constituted it by individualization and simultaneous totalization of structures of modern power.

The ambivalent relationship between politics and life that inheres within the juridico-political order reappears in the paradox of sovereignty and the sovereign exception. It is difficult to define the boundaries of politics and law when 'the sovereign is, at the

[192] Ibid., p.103
[193] Agamben 1998, p. 9

same time, outside and inside the juridical order,' [194] as in Schmitt's definition of the sovereign,[195] who decides on the state of exception. The biopolitical body that constitutes the new fundamental political subject is neither a *quaestio facti* (for example, the identification of a certain biological body) nor a *quaestio iuris* (the identification of a certain juridical rule to be applied), but rather the site of a sovereign political decision that operates in the absolute indistinction of fact and law.[196]

The state of exception, 'what the sovereign each and every time decides', "takes place precisely when naked life –which normally appears rejoined to the multifarious forms of social life – is explicitly put into question and revoked as the foundation of political power. The ultimate subject that needs to be at once turned into the exception and included in the city is always naked life." [197] The state of the exception is the rule because the power is legitimatized only in the state of emergency; but power is immanent and "continuously refers and appeals to emergency as well as labouring secretly to produce it." [198] Since naked life, which has been the hidden foundation of sovereignty, has meanwhile become the dominant form of life everywhere. "Life –in its state of exception that has now become the norm- is the

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[194] Ibid., p. 15
[195] Schmitt argued that the question of order is *the* question of politics, which is, how to install, maintain or question order. Order is identified with nomos, a principle of ordering, rather than the law, centering the sovereign in the core as who decides over the exception, that is, who decides when to declare and to end the state of emergency. The sovereign can, in a state of emergency, outlaw the actual laws which he is otherwise 'meant to protect'. That is personifying the order by standing above it.
[196] Ibid., p. 171
[197] Agamben 2000, pp. 5-6, my emphasis
[198] Ibid., p. 6

naked life that in every context separates the forms of life from their cohering on into form-of-life."[199]

The state of exception becomes now a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by naked life that increasingly cannot be inscribed into order. "*The increasingly widening gap between birth (naked life) and nation state is the new fact of the politics of our time and what we are calling 'camp' is this disparity.*" [200] To an order without localization (that is the state of exception during which the law is suspended) corresponds now localization without an order (that is the camp as permanent state of exception).[201]

Accordingly, asserting the concept of '*camp*' as the nomos our time is not an act of deductive definition referring to a barbaric anomaly of past that reappears occasionally but rather questioning the juridico-political structure that such events ["the most absolute *conditio inhumana* that has ever existed on earth was realized"] [202] could take place. The camp becomes the permanent spatial arrangement with a paradoxical status as a space of exception. Its existence outside the normal juridical order is not simply an externality, an outside; but being taken outside, included through its own exclusion. It is a new juridico-political paradigm in which the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exception. What is legal or illegal; what is just and what is unjust make no sense, calls no signification. The camp is thus the

[199] Ibid, p. 6
[200] Agamben 1998, p. 171
[201] Agamben 2000, p. 43
[202] Agamben 1998, p. 166

structure in which the state of exception – the possibility of deciding on which founds sovereign power- is realized *normally.* "*The camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the terms have become indistinguishable.*"[203]

Entering the camp one moves into a "zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and the rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any sense. ... Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation. This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and *Homo Sacer* is virtually confused with citizen. Everything becomes possible." [204]

The decision on the humanity of living is life-threatening or fatal in that it attempts to clarify borders between the lives worth living, of the just, of the right, of the citizen and their nons. This is a simultaneous act of biopolitical desire to be borderless, immanent, synthesizing all lives in the very project of efficiency and 'happiness' and purity. This *aporia* ends in a totalitarian desire of termination of the ones included in the *nomos* through exclusion. We are all in under an unconditional threat of death, and the exception is the very *nomos* because these borders are continuously redefined (and left indeterminate). This indeterminate border strips people of their rights (whether human or natural rights). Thus, the relation of sovereign decision to the

[203] Ibid., p. 170
[204] Ibid., pp. 170-171

naked body is left unmediated by making the law lose its significance and leaving law in a becoming immanent in naked life through its suspension. This is the moment of collapse of sovereign power and biopower.

Agamben proposes for the analysis not to mistake naked life separate from its form in its abjection, for a superior principle –sovereignty or the sacred:

> The Marxian scission between man and citizen is thus superseded by the division between naked life (ultimate opaque bearer of sovereignty) and the multifarious forms of life abstractly recodified as social-juridical identities (the voter, the worker, the journalist, the student, but also the HIV-positive, the transvestite, the porno star, the elderly, the parent, the woman) that all rest on naked life.[205]

The bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity is the converging realm for both operation of the disciplinary procedures making man the object of State power and the modern democracy in which man presents himself to himself as the subject of political power. The state of exception is the foundation of this political system. It simultaneously excludes bare life from and captures the bare life within the political order. When state of exception's borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that inhabits there "frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and the object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both organization of State power and emancipation from it."[206]

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[205] Agamben 2000, pp. 6-7
[206] Agamben 1998, p.8

CHAPTER THREE:

III. Problematization, Distribution of the Sensible and Paradigm.

Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stakes par excellence of the political struggle, a struggle which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world. [207]

Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*

This chapter expands on the question of how one comes to know the set of issues that becomes unintelligible as discussed in the works of Foucault on 'problematization,' Rancière on 'distribution of the sensible' and Agamben on 'paradigm.' While this chapter mainly concerns Agamben's notion of paradigm, I suggest a reading of Agamben's notion by introducing two other concepts of epistemology - problematization and distribution of sensible- to be thought of jointly with paradigm. What binds these three concepts together is their reference to the relationship between the event of knowledge and the inertia of the sensible that consequence in a new ontological context.

Agamben founds his understanding of paradigm on Foucault's works. Hence, I believe it is crucial firstly to look into how Foucault delineates his analytics. Accordingly, in this chapter I follow an order that will begin with elaboration of Foucault's problematization followed next by Rancière's disensus and lastly by Agamben's paradigm. I will conclude with Agamben's assertion of the refugee as

[207] Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.236.

paradigm of the political subject in order to sum up how I see these three concepts can be read together.

II. i. Problematization

As one reads Foucault, one is encountered by a series of rejections or distancing in order to engage in the search for another way of looking at the phenomena. Foucault repeatedly distinguished his work as *analytics* or as historico-philosophical practice from history of ideas, history of philosophical doctrines, the analysis of representations as semiotic systems, and from 'culture' as a given object of analysis. He avoids approaching historico-social phenomena with an ontological standpoint, the endeavour which is deemed to be *a particular analysis* despite its overall aspiration for defining the phenomenon in its ontological totality and for displaying *the* privileged subject matter of a discourse (i.e. trying to define 'what sovereignty is and the source of its legitimation' as *the* primary subject of the discipline of politics). For Foucault, his endeavour in his practice of thought is:

> to describe history of thought as distinct from both the history of ideas (by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the history of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action). It seemed to me that there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought –this was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problematizations.[208]

He adheres to a certain *historico-philosophical practice* in the domain of which experience refers to neither inner experience, nor fundamental structures of scientific

[208] Rabinow, P. and Rose, N. 2003b. "Introduction." *The Essential Foucault.* Trans. N. Rose and P. Rabinow. New York: The New Press, p. xvii

knowledge. It is not an elaboration or recount of a group of historical contents granted as ready-made facts.

> [I]n this historical-philosophical practice, one has to make one's own history, fabricate history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would be traversed by *the question of the relationships between structures of rationality which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it.*[209]

Historical-philosophical practice is to question the historical contents itself that are granted or valued as true. It is to ask: " '[W]hat, therefore, am I,' I who belong to this humanity, perhaps this piece of it, at this point in time, at this instant of humanity which is subjected to the power of truth in general and truths in particular?"[210] It is to desubjectify the philosophical question by way of historical contents and "to liberate historical contents by examining the effects of power whose truth affects them and from which they supposedly derive."[211] It analyses an empirical period within which "relationships between power, truth and the subject appear live on the surface of visible transformations".[212]

Similarly, problematization does not refer to "the representation of a pre-existent object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true or false and constitute it as an object of thought (whether in the form

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[209] Foucault, Michel. 2003. "What is Critique?" *The Essential Foucault.* Eds. by N. Rose and P. Rabinow. New York: The New Press, p. 272, my emphasis.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.

of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)."[213] For Foucault, the most profound thought is that which remains on the surface in that the analysis of problematizations is not to reveal a hidden and surpassed contradiction; rather it is to address that which has already become problematic.[214] Problematization emerges when a prior uncertainty appears, when familiarity or provocation of some difficulties around it is lost:

> When thought intervenes, it does not assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these difficulties; it is an original or specific response –often taking many forms, sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects- to these difficulties, which are defined for it by a situation or context, and which hold true as a possible question.[215]

His works tries to rediscover at the root of these constructed truths the general form of problematization that has made them possible in their very opposition and to ask, "what has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions?"[216] This in a way proposes to change the understanding of 'thought' from one that is a given that generates problems to be solved to one that is a 'question' whose formation and obviousness must itself be subject to analysis in order to unbind possibilities.

Problematization is also related to his rejection of the oppositions between ideology and reality or signifier and signified. His analysis is concerned with the way knowledge was utilized as part of or a function in a material practice. Discourse is not

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[213] Rabinow and Rose 2003b., p. xvii
[214] Ibid.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Ibid.

a disembodied imaginative representation prior to any juncture with the real, but it forms at the nexus of knowledge-power relations acting in and on the material world. Discourse is language that has already made history.[217]

Similarly, for Foucault knowledge exists at the edge between language and the rest of material reality[218]. Discourse in his writings does not refer to sentences, propositions or representations, and is not organized or unified according to any psychological, logical or grammatical categories nor body of texts for interpretation of their common themes or ideas, language or ideology, meanings (conscious or unconscious) or representations. It is a transcultural practice in that it erases the intellectual and physical clustering because of the very immanence of knowledge in discourse as a part of everyday practices, and of material conditions' operation on the conceptual formation of knowledge. Hence, knowledge is argued to operate in the playground of concepts and materiality, in the domain of objects and specific historical practices.[219] He also avoids using the concept of ideology, which he argues it to be confined within a theoretical humanism of the Subject (presupposed human subject endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize upon). Discourse is not that which disguises. Rather, it is "the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized." Hence, its effect is not masking but it "is the thing for which and why there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to

[217]Young, Robert. 2001. *Postcolonialism.* Oxford: Blackwell., p. 400
[218] Ibid.: 399
[219] Ibid.

be seized."[220] People are inserted into subject positions through discourses which at the same time mediate them through self-knowledge and makes subjects to act. Resistance is immanent to power relations, not outside them. Resistance is the production of alternative discourses. [221]

Accordingly, Foucault asserted that the relation of governmentalization to its critique *as not to be governed like that* and conditions of acceptance to its conditions of refusal cannot be separated.[222] Resistance is productive like power. It is an indispensable part of government, it is never independent or beyond government. The play of refusal and acceptance makes the possibility of the surface for the emergence of regimes of truth as effects of power. Moreover, that surface is the very realm for subjectification, both enabling by the regimes of truth and subjugating. In Foucault's writing, critique, which seems to be the very space that may avoid the truth effects of power or be beyond power or be against power, is conceptualized as an inherent part of power, its effect in deed. Therefore, he argues, while engaging in analysis, one should look at the very moment of acceptance rather than addressing questions of how it is legitimized. The analysis should be directed towards the emergence of the phenomena when both the conditions of its acceptance and rejection are on the surface and towards the power effects that generate the truth regimes. Hence, he offers to turn our face to its relations of power rather then knowledge by itself.

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[220] Purvis, Trevor and Hunt, Alan. 1993. "Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology ..." *British Journal of Sociology* 44 (3): 473-499, pp. 486-488
[221] Ibid.
[222] Foucault 2003c, pp. 272-278

II. ii. Distribution of the sensible:

Rancière[223] writes that a surface is not simply a geometric composition of lines but a certain distribution of the sensible. The 'sensible' here does not refer to what is displayed as good sense or judgment but to "what is capable of being apprehended by the senses."[224] Thus, it is simultaneously vision, division and exclusion. Accordingly, the distribution of the sensible can be defined as

> [The] implicit law that governing the sensible order that parcels and forms of participation in a common world by first establishing the modes of perception within which they are inscribed, ... produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set of horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done. Distribution refers both to forms of inclusion and to forms of exclusion. The sensible does not refer to what shows good sense or judgement but to what is *aisthēton* or capable of being apprehended by senses.[225]

The distribution of the sensible delimits spaces and times of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise and determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the spaces and possibilities of time. [226] Distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do. It defines what is visible or not in a common space. It refers to the system of self evident facts of sense perception which at the same time "discloses the existence of something in common and the

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[223] Rancière, Jacques. 2004. The politics of Aesthetics: the Distribution of the Sensible. New York: Continuum, p 15.
[224] Ibid, 85.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Ibid., p 13.

delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it."[227] Rancière understands disagreement, accordingly, as a break or an opposition in the understanding of "what is meant by 'to speak' and 'to understand' as well as over the horizons of perception that distinguish the audible from the inaudible, the comprehensible from the incomprehensible, the visible from the invisible." *Disensus* concerns this realm of conflict. Yet, it is not a battle over interests or opinions.

> It is a political process that resists juridical litigation and creates a fissure in the sensible order by confronting the established framework of the perception, thought, and action with the inadmissible- political subject.[228]

This is the point at which Rancière sees a close connection between aesthetics and politics. Aesthetics concerns the distribution of the sensible that determines a mode of articulation between forms of action, production, perception, and thought.[229] As he states:

> Aesthetics refers to a specific regime for identifying and reflection on the arts: a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making and their corresponding forms of visibility and possible ways of thinking about their relationships.[230]

Aesthetics, in this sense, configure experiences that create new modes of sense perception forms and include novel forms of subjectivity.[231]

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[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid., p 85.
[229] Ibid, p 81.
[230] Ibid, p 10.
[231] Ibid, p 9.

II. iii. Paradigm: "Knowledge Embedded in a Practice"

Agamben elsewhere underlines that he is not an historian; yet, he employs historically singular phenomena, (i.e. camp, state of exception, *Homo Sacer*, *Muselmann* and so on), as *paradigms* to establish and make intelligible a wider set of problems rather than explaining objectified phenomena historically.[232] Whereas the concept of paradigm is usually quickly associated with how Kuhn[233] used it, Agamben appropriates and isolates it from Foucault's work, for example his elaboration of 'panopticon' and development of it to set of *dispositifs* named as 'panopticism' to understand disciplinary societies. Although Foucault's methods are thought to be metaphorical as opposed to metonymical, Agamben disagrees in that Foucault worked with paradigms and in order to understand how paradigms operate, one should see that the logic of the example has nothing to do with the universality of the law or by belonging to one single genus.

In that sense, Agamben sees a distinction between the uses of paradigm in Kuhn and Foucault's work[234] that should be elaborated. As is well known, Kuhn used the term

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[232] Agamben, G. 2002. "What is a Paradigm?" A lecture by Giorgio Agamben at the European Graduate School, August 2002. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/agamben/agamben-what-is-a-paradigm-2002.html. Retrieved on September, 15 2006.; Raulff, U. 2004. "An interview with Giorgio Agamben." *German Law Journal* 5(5): 609–614., p. 610

[233] Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[234] Although Agamben argues that Foucault uses the term paradigm very often in his work without defining it, I did not come across the word paradigm in *Archaeology,* in both the English translation of and French original. Rather, the term model is used frequently. He uses the term, 'model,' referring to Bachelard and Canguilhem. There is only one match of 'paradigm' in *The Order Of Things* (in page 43) and the rest of the book uses the term 'model'. He there uses paradigm when he writes, 'with the help of paradigms borrowed from linguistics or psychoanalysis paradigm' of psychoanalysis or linguistics.' In the French original of *Abnormal* as well the term 'model' is used instead of 'paradigm' where Agamben refers to Foucault usage it as paradigm (namely, Agamben writes the paradigm of leper while Foucualt uses the model of leper). Agamben in this essay on paradigm quotes from Dreyfus and Rabinow who writes *"it is clear that his work follows an orientation which makes use of these*

"paradigm" in two different senses. While one means the whole of techniques, patents, perceptions, and values shared by the members of a scientific community which organizes the way members of that community see the reality, the other refers to a single element of a whole, a common model or an example that stands for the explicit rules and thus defines a coherent tradition of investigation and standards for scientific conducts. As such, for Agamben:

> The rules can be derived from the paradigms, but the paradigms *can guide the investigation also in the absence of rules.* The paradigm is in this sense just an example, a single phenomenon, a singularity, which can be repeated and thus acquires the capability of tacitly modeling the behaviour and the practice of scientists.[235]

Agamben associates Kuhn's second meaning of paradigm with Kant's explanation of the example in the Critique of Judgement in paragraph eighteen. For Kant, aesthetic judgement can be exemplified only if all men agree in the judgement and if the example can stand for the universal rule which cannot be stated. Thus, the example, for Kant, refers to an absent or ineffable law; the example is the example of a rule which cannot be stated. However, Kant did not let this status release the example to exist free from the law. Agamben quotes Kant in "*Critique of Pure Reason*":

> "[E]xamples are the crutches and the leading strings of a weak judgment. By a judgment I mean that which can only understand the universal in *abstractum* and is unable to decide whether a concrete case is covered or not by the law."

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notions. His method consists in describing a discourse as historical articulations of a paradigm." Yet, there is no citation to check. Agamben might be referring to the frequent use of the term 'model' in Foucault and calling it paradigm. Regardless, for the purposes this thesis, it will be sufficient to understand how Agamben reads Foucault and how he formulates paradigm out of this reading.

[235] Agamben 2002.

Agamben, however, proposes the use of paradigm as a specific form of example which one has to think beyond the limits of induction and deduction or particularity and universality. He thus asserts that the logic of the example in his work should be seen beyond the universality of the law.

Agamben notes that while Foucault himself did not develop a conceptual understanding of "paradigm" in his writings, he called the objects of his investigation "knowledge embedded in a practice" to distance his work from the objects of historians. In that sense, panopticism for Foucault was a "model of functioning which can be generalized, which allows the definition and establishment of new sets in the relationship between power and the everyday life of man."[236] Panopticon is no longer merely a architectural form but "the diagram of a mechanism of power in its ideal form."[237] Besides, with this form, the set of issues or problems are not only made intelligible but also a new ontological context is constituted simultaneously.

> This means that the panopticon functions as a paradigm, as an example which defines the intelligibility of the set to which it belongs and at the same time which it constitutes. Foucault always works in this way. There is always a concrete phenomenon - the confession, the juridical inquiry, etc, which functions as a paradigm, because it will decide a whole problematic context which it both constitutes and makes intelligible.[238]

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[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.

In order to understand this specific relationship of paradigm to the set as a singularity and how a paradigm, which is a singularity, can "create a new analogical context, a new generality", it is crucial for Agamben to neutralize oppositions between universal and particular, general and individual, and even also form and content. In this sense, the paradigm analogy "produces a field of polar tensions which tend to form a zone of undecidability" in which rigid oppositions are neutralized. This relationship does not concern two separate zones or elements distinguished by a caesura but "a field where two opposite tensions run." Therefore, it is not dichotomic or oppositional but dipolar and tensional. Paradigm is a singularity which, showing itself as such, produces a new ontological context."[239]

In his reading of Aristotle's Analytica Prioria, Agamben points to the question of paradigm which literally in Greek means *"what shows itself beside"* as a specific movement that orients from part to the part instead of moving from a part to the whole or from a whole to the part. This means that for Aristotle, the paradigm does not move from the particular to the universal, nor from the universal to the particular, but from the particular to the particular. While, like Kant, Aristotle wrote in the *Rhetorics*, 1357b,that "the two singularities in the paradigm are under the same genus" (which Agamben finds inadequate), he adds that "[b]ut only one of them is more knowable than the other."[240] This latter point is striking for Agamben which brings forth the question of 'excess of knowability' that differentiates one over the homogenous other. He sees the answer (and a possible source for Foucault's

[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.

conception of paradigm) in Victor Goldschimdt's reading of Plato's *Statesman* in his *The Paradigm in Plato's Dialectics*[241].

Goldschmidt shows in Plato that what the example, the paradigm and the phenomenon have in common is not substance or a kind of common material element but a relationship that one has to grasp which kind of relationship and between what. In the paradigmatic relationship, the generality or the idea is not reached from a logic consequence by means of induction from the exhaustive enumeration of the individual cases:

> Rather it is produced by the comparison by only one paradigm, one singular example, with the object or class that the paradigm will make intelligible. The paradigmatic relation does not occur between a plurality of singular objects or between a singular object, and the general principle or law which is exterior to it, the paradigm is not already given, but instead the singularity becomes a paradigm - Plato says it becomes a paradigm by being shown beside the others. Thus the paradigmatic relationship takes place between the single phenomenon and its intelligibility.[242]

Exhibition of this knowability is the relation which an example and an object shares. "What makes something intelligible is the paradigmatic exhibition of its own knowability."[243] In this sense, what an example displays is its belonging to a set. However, at the very moment when the example exhibits it belonging and defines the set, it steps out from this set and excluded. Paradigm is an element of the set which is withdrawn from it by means of the showing its belonging to it. As such:

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[241] Goldschimdt, Victor. 1947. *Le paradigme Dans la Dialectique Platonicienne* [1. éd.] [*The Paradigm in Plato's Dialectics*]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
[242] Agamben 2002.
[243] Ibid.

> [T]he rule applies to the example only as a normal case and not as an example. The example is excluded from the normal case not because it does not belong to it but because it exhibits its own belonging to it. In way, it is the reverse case of the exception. If we define the exception as an inclusive exclusion, in which something is included by means of its exclusion, the example functions as an exclusive inclusion. Something is excluded by means of its very inclusion.[244]

Appropriating Plato's use of paradigm in dialectics, Agamben proposes to treat hypothesis as paradigm to reach the "non-presupposed principle," to treat hypothesis as hypothesis not as principles or origins. To regard what is actually presupposed in the hypothesis as given is a fallacy since the origin, the unpresupposed principle, remains unexposed. In contrast, when a phenomenon is shown in its original paradigmatic character, "in the medium of its knowability," there is no presupposed principle but the phenomenon itself as the origin:

> While in the hypothesis, the intelligibility of something is presupposed to it and then reached by induction or by deduction, in the paradigm the thing itself is shown beside itself exposed in its own knowability.[245]

Consequently, Agamben argues that the object cannot be presupposed in many theoretical or historical investigations; therefore, one can reach and construct it by means of paradigms.

> [T]he intelligibility of the paradigm is never presupposed, on the contrary, the specificity of the paradigm resides precisely in the suspension of its

[244] Ibid.
[245] Ibid.

> immediate factual reference and in the exhibition of its intelligibility as such in order to give life to a new problematic context.[246]

II. iv. Refugee as the Paradigm

It is this context of paradigm that gives meaning and application of the limit figures of Western politics detailed in Agamben's work. The refugee, who Agamben sees the contemporary of *Homo Sacer,* is one of those limit figures that I want to elaborate to provide an overview of this chapter that has brought together the notions of problematization, disensus and paradigm.

> If refugees ... represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, *nativity* and *nationality,* they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis. Bringing to light the difference between birth and nation, the refugee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain –bare life- to appear for an instant within that domain. In this sense, the refugee is truly 'the man of rights', as Arendt suggests, the first and only real appearance of rights outside the fiction of the citizen that always covers them over. Yet this is precisely what makes the figure of the refugee so hard to define politically.[247]

The *Refugee*, for Agamben, occupies a difficult space for Western politics that obscures definitions of the subjects of the political- the human, the citizen and so forth.[248] Yet, at the same time, Agamben argues, the refugee is the only thinkable figure of *people*[249] of our time. This whole tensional schema of the political context that gives birth to the figure of refugee problematizes both the notion of the citizen

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[246] Ibid.

[247] Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.* Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 131.

[248] Agamben, Giorgio. 2000. *Means Without End: Notes on Politics.* Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 16

[249] Agamben find the term 'people' enigmatic as well in that while in the political history the term, the People refers to the sovereign integral body politic, it etymologically - also the poor, the underprivileged, and the excluded. The same term names the constitutive political subject as well as the class that is excluded — *de facto*, if not *de jure* — from politics.

and the human conceived as legal subjects defined by rights either granted or removed by the institution of political society. The crisis of the subject exhibited by the paradigm of the refugee pertaining to the citizen and the human brings about its own solution as well. By breaking the legal schema that defines human subjectivity displayed by the problematic event, a new ontological context is founded - the context in which one can make sense of the unintelligible experience. In this sense, the paradigmatic relationship connects with what Rancière defined as disagreement and disensus as a crisis in the given distribution of the sensible. The ontology operating by the modalities (potentiality, necessity, possibility and contingency) that define subjectivities, one's capacity to act, this crisis in the intelligibility can harbour new political orientations as well as spatial definitions for the subject's existence and ability to act. By that means, Agamben can suggest an ideal of not a Europe of nations but an extraterritoriality or a territoriality in which every one is refugium – refuge in singular:

> Instead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, it might be possible to imagine two political communities insisting on the same region and in a condition of exodus from each other—communities that would articulate each other via a series of reciprocal extraterritorialities in which the guiding concept would no longer be the jus (right) of the citizen but rather the refugium (refuge) of the singular. ... [R]esidents of the European states would be in a position of exodus or refuge; the status of European would then mean the being-in-exodus of the citizen (a condition that obviously could also be one of immobility). European space would thus mark an irreducible difference between birth [nascita] and nation in which the old concept of people (which, as is well known, is always a minority) could again find a political meaning, thus decidedly opposing itself to the concept of nation (which has so far unduly usurped it).[250]

[250] Agamben, Giorgio. 2000. *Means Without End: Notes on Politics.* Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 24-25

This space would coincide neither with any of the homogeneous national territories nor with their topographical sum, but would rather act on them by articulating and perforating them topologically as in the Klein bottle or in the Möbius strip, where exterior and interior in-determine each other. In this new space, European cities would rediscover their ancient vocation of cities of the world by entering into a relation of reciprocal extraterritoriality.[251]

[251] Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Belonging and the City

The relation between Gypsies and argot puts [correspondence of *factum loquendi*[252] and *factum pluralitas*[253]] *radically into question in the very instant in which it parodically reenacts it. Gypsies are to a people what argot is to language. And although this analogy can last but for a brief moment, it nonetheless sheds light on that truth which the correspondence between language and people was secretly intended to conceal: all peoples are gangs and coquilles, all languages are jargons and argot.*[254]

Giorgio Agamben, *Means Without Ends*

In this thesis, I tried to engage in the discourses that constituted the city as a breakthrough in the socio-political existence of human beings, which gave birth to a particular ethical consciousness- the citizen subject. In this legacy of thought, the political space is split by the axes that distinguish between normality and perversion, law and despotism, mind and body, reason and desire and difference and a zone of formlessness[255]– namely the city and the anomalous spaces of the city - exterior of the civilization. Being out of the city meant being out of civilization. The bond between the city and the camp is not one of paroxysmal relationship. Instead, the camp shows its belonging to the city as a dislocating localization in which the discourse of the civilization collapses.

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[252] "Simple fact that human beings speak and understand each other"
[253] "Simple fact that human beings form a community"
[254] Agamben 2000, pp.66-67.
[255] Diken, Bulent. 2004. "From Refugee Camps to the Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City." *Citizenship Studies* 8(1): 83-106.

Following Agamben and Isin, I argued that the discourses of the city that define it as a breakthrough in human existence nurtured by the old metaphysical split between the living and speaking being or the logos. This metaphysical separation is between the living being and the speaking being or bare life and the political-good life of the city that defines the dignified life of the human subject or, briefly, the life worth being lived. Thus, the city has represented by this split the politicization of the bare life and become the realm in which the humanity of the living man is decided. The fundamental distinction between bare life and the good, just life lived in accordance with the logos proposes humanity as a project, with being beyond itself. This project lies upon the exclusion and simultaneous inclusion of bare life in that good life is both what bare life is not and what bare life transforms into.

The contradiction is imperative since it orients the ways the subjects constitutes themselves politically and attach themselves to identities. The city is constituted as the terrain in which one assumes an ethical being by fabricating what one *is* by birth, or primordial bondage. However, by a distancing act, the city simultaneously becomes the realm in which being by birth and what is beyond it are determined and excluded as such, outside of the city, and outside of what might be encapsulated in the house or in the community. It is thus this split that nurtures the existential bond between these two realms. One is defined by anomaly, the other as civilization. It is again this split on which the legal subject of contractualism is constituted. Resting upon this split, politics pushes and snares individuals within this crisis of nativity and nationality. It is within this double bind -- simultaneous determination of what one is

by birth and distancing from this construction-- that individuals are resubjectivated by 'betraying' every discourse of abjection that makes aware of being tied to an identity. In every moment of resubjectivation, ethical life is reconstituted distancing one from what one is constituted as birth. As Derrida writes:

> The concept of politics rarely announces itself without some sort of adherence of the State to family, without what we call a *schematic* of filiation: stock, genus or species, sex (*Geschlecht*), blood, birth, nature, nation – autochthonal or not, tellurian or not. This is once again the abyssal question of the *phúsis*, the question of being, the question of what appears in birth, in opening up, in nurturing or growing, in producing by being produced. Is that life? That is how life is thought to reach recognition.[256]

In this thesis, I also tried to show that it is this metaphysical split that brings forth the crisis of the subject which, understood in legal terms, defined the human being on the basis of rights either assigned or denied by the institution of political society. Rather, following Foucault and Agamben, I suggest problematizing the ontological dilemma of the human being of a subject of law with the question of subject as the relationship of the self to itself and the relationship to the other. This means to understand citizenship in the context of government of possibilities by the acts of individuals on themselves and others. It is, in this sense, crucial to understand the split in the very space of polity between the camp and city by which the humanity of man decided each time. Camp stands for this very realm of abjection and abandonment in which the self has to respond to its own destitution and denial of humanness by reattachment to a new identity within the double movement of self loss and self possession-resubjectivation.

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[256] Derrida, J. 2005. *Politics of Friendship.* Trans. by George Collins. London: Verso, p. viii

The importance of Agamben's work to this thesis should be read accordingly. What is striking about Agamben's emphasis on the question of the subject as an ongoing process of subjectivation and desubjectivation is his ethical argument. The ethical subject for Agamben is constituted in one's bearing witness to one's own desubjectivation. This formulation is a flight both from the legal subject and the hermeneutical or psychoanalytic subject constituted around a hidden guilt. The paradigm of the camp has been decisive for the argument of this thesis in that I tried to read it in parallel with the question of constitution of consciousness. The bond between birth and good/ ethical life that is founded by exclusion of being by birth by the split between the city and the camp is the continuous process of re-determination of the value and non-value of living. This continuous hunt and abandonment of the undesired -- a life that is not worth living -- is what one should bear witness. Thus, for Agamben, the task is not necessarily to look for actual camps today but to examine its mutations diligently -- the new themes for vice, different primordial relationships, cultures, vice individuals and re-determiantion of the humanity and civilization:

> [T]he camp -- as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception) -- will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize.[257]

Understood in this regard, city is a difference machine which ties individuals to their birth and their distance from it- their identity- and reproduces this split with a different theme and opposition at every discursive moment by different modes of

[257] Agamben 1998, p.123

political practices. Therefore, Isin defines citizenship as apolitical practice orienting different group formations and solidaristic, agonistic and alienating forms of being political. Lastly, one can also read this split in parallel with the framework Žižek provides to understand multiculturalist tolerance that differentiates between primordial and universal subjectivities and locates a priori universal position as that of a particular sovereign subject. The individuals of the city and civilization, the universal subjects, are assumed to be at total distance from what is restrictive and primordial by birth as opposed to the primordial communal subjects that are locked into their birth.

In sum, this problematization of the discourse of the city as a breakthrough proposes to see citizenship as a political practice and alterity which reject the ontological split in the citizenship programmes for independent study of citizenship as legal status and citizenship as desired activity. This thesis has suggested placing the question of subject as an indispensable part of citizenship studies. It is the question of subject that citizenship studies can be focused to overcome this ontological dilemma and epistemological violence embedded in this proposed split.

While engaging in this theoretical project in subjectivity and citizenship, I had in mind the Turkish nationalism and its modernization-westernization discourse. The whole nationalist discourse of Turkishness is constituted around a response to the orientalist argument of barbarity and backwardness of Turks. The idea of Turkish citizen fabricated within this tensional desire for belonging to *the* civilization which is

represented contemporarily by the West. Problematizing this tensional relationship to understandings of being of *the* civilization is decisive to understand the subordination and abjection of ethnic groups in Turkey and their reconstitution of their difference from Turkish ethnic identity. I agree that despite their legal citizenship, ethnic groups in Turkey still occupy a sojourner position with regards to their claim to '*sincere citizenship*' because of their being '*Turkish by citizenship*' but not by being ethnically Turkish; and they are welcomed as long as they are *loyal* to the unity of the Republic[258] calling themselves 'Turkish' regardless of their ethnic-cultural identity. However, I insist, the historical- moral references of this quality of being a Turkish citizen needs problematizing besides this argument of loyalty. Accordingly, the recent organization of Gypsies to claim full participation in the society as well regarded citizens has not necessarily been confronted because of this claims' 'fragmentation threat' against the unity of the national sovereignty, but rather, their stereotyped way of living[259] is regarded as a 'menace to human dignity' (i.e. defined by work ethos

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[258] Mesut Yegen analyses the state discourse on citizenship in Turkey regarding the Kurdish case. He points to the hierarchical separation in 1924 constitution of Turkish republic between actual Turks and Turks by citizenship (as a superseding name) referring to other ethnic groups. See Yeğen, Mesut. 1999. "The Kurdish question in Turkish State Discourse" *Journal of Contemporary History* 34(4): 555-569; and Yegen, M. 2004. "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 40(6): 51-66;

[259] A quick look to the **Turkish vocabulary and idioms** or **various local names** attributed to gypsies may be a ("Drummers" (connotes noisiness) in Urfa, "dark-skinned citizens" or the "Romany" in Edirne, Mitrip (temperament; selfish) in Nigde and so on. But there are some old etymological names meaning artisan works like basket making, sieving or tinning (i.e."Poşa" [sieve]). It is of interest to me when and why the artisan labels have been replaced with those degrading words.), and demarcation of the quarters they live in as residence of stealers, kidnappers, shameless beggars may provide rough information: "**Cingene** 1. gypsy; the Gypsies 2. l. c. mean, miserly fellow **-borcu** petty debts. - calar, Kurt oynar **[The Gypsy plays, the Kurd dances]** : said of 1. a place where there is complete disorder, 2. persons one worse than the other. - cergesi 1. **gypsy tent** 2. dirty and miserable looking place - cergesinde musandira aranmaz proverb no use looking for fine furniture in a gypsy tent - corbasi [-**soup**] confusion - dugunu 1. **gypsy wedding** 2. disorderly gathering -kavgasi noisy quarrel -kizi gypsy girl; dancing girl ... -lik **[the quality of being gypsy]** 1. meanness, miserliness 2. paltriness, shabbiness 3. vagabondage [Turkce-Ingilizce RedHouse Sozlugu, 4th. Ed. 1981. Istanbul: Redhouse Press, p. 256]

Actually, there are many parallel situations in different parts of Turkey where gypsies are forced to relocate without social policy due to a justification that these areas are stereotyped as home of stealers

and consumption aesthetics that defines health, well-being, wealth, standard of living, security and leisure.). Thus, "nationalism", "identity", "citizenship" should also be discussed in terms of judgements over life. The problematizations of discourses on dignity and the good life are indispensable to the study of citizenship. With the focus on the abjection of an ethnic group, I contest, problematizating discourses over life and the ethics founding on the discontinuity between nativity and nationality can interrupt the sutured categories of dignity and 'the good life' and flourish new discourses over life.

I want to conclude with some examples referencing ethnic group relationships in Turkey to relate my theoretical elaboration to an actual case.

The Spectres of Ottoman Empire

> With their words and concepts in the divan[260] literature, the Arabs and the Persians succeeded in the invasion which they had never succeeded in with their troops.[261]

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and actually the legislation that binds the action of police let police to arrest gypsies as potentially dangerous people whether they are caught committing crime or not (See official declaration of 2nd International Romany Conference, Edirne, Turkey – source: www.cingene.org). Another parallel municipal act against Gypsy is in Kirklareli where the municipality has been trying to abandon horse cars of gypsies from streets.

[260] The term '*divan literature/poetry*' gained usage by the reformists/nationalists in the 19th century to denote the unapproved literary style which they associated with degeneration of the Ottoman Empire. Actually, the word, *divan,* used to mean the book in which a poet collected his literary works. It was also the name for Ottoman State Council and the pathway nearby it in the Topkapı Palace. Today, '*divan*' is translated to English as the classical Turkish literature but this was not acknowledged in 1930s when this quote was uttered. *Divan* was not regarded as genuine Turkish literature. (*See* Holbrook, Victoria. 1998. *Aşkın Okunmaz Kıyıları.Türk Modernitesi ve Mistik Romans* [Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernization and Mystic Romance]. Trans. E. Köroğlu ve E. Kılıç. İstanbul: İletişim., f.n. 27)

[261] Original: "*Araplar ve İranlılar ordulariyle yapamadıkları istilayı, divan edebiyatında kelimeler ve mefhumlarla yapmışlardır.*" The quotation is taken from the speech of the future Minister of Education (between 1938 and 1946), Hasan Ali [Yücel], during the First Turkish Language Congress between September 26 and October 5, 1932 (Cited in Şavkay, Tuğrul. 2002. *Dil Devrimi* [Language Revolution]. İstanbul: Gelenek., p. 67, my translation).

The first quotation is from an earlier speech in 1932 (during the first congress of the Turkish Language Studies) of the future Education Minister of the young Republic of Turkey. The quotation reveals the resentment of the nationalist modernization/ westernization discourse towards the so-called oriental degeneration of the Turks because of the linguistic and cultural interaction between the subjects of Ottoman Empire. The new regime required 'modern-nationalist-secular' citizens who would *see* themselves as members of the Turkish nationality and experience the requirements and virtues of this membership in their daily lives. [262]

Both the 'disclosure' of this undesirable interaction and necessity of its erosion were vital to the nationalist modernization in that a historical progressive (western-civilized) selfhood *before* 'the interaction' (oriental- regressive) and to the constitution of this membership thereby a particular *way of seeing*[263] of themselves. Therefore, the adoption of Latin Alphabet and language studies were *not* mere mediators of an education–instruction leap, as they have been argued elsewhere. Rather, they enabled the new life style set by the symbolic world of Turkishness, and the narration of this style. The Turkish language represented the genuine *symbol of national identity and the terrain of its purification from the taints of the traditional:*

[262] The national education system, cultural and academic institutions like the Turkish History and the Language Society, the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, the art schools, the Peoples Houses and the village institutions which rose in 1930s were crucial agents of this intervention/invasion in the collective consciousness. See Yeğen, Mesut. 1999. "The Kurdish question in Turkish State Discourse" *Journal of Contemporary History* 34(4): 555-569 ; Yeğen M. 2003. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt sorunu,* 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003, p. 91

[263] I use the term in the sense of aesthetics from Rancière as in the third chapter.

the moral, ethnic and cultural hybrid- the Ottoman language/ semiotics.[264] A "process" of marginalization of any ethnic or religious variety from the cultural center has accompanied the cultural intervention.[265] In that sense, Turkishness represented the desired modern/ civilized/ western virtues as opposed to oriental backward culture and inflicted in the discourses of marginalization and exclusion of other ethnic groups. Interestingly, language and history studies in 1930s came up with a series of 'scientific theses' which argued that Turkish race originated the Aryan race and Turkish language was "the first language that originate all the civil languages" thereby "the origin of Indo-European languages." They were actually trying to argue against the European discourse which located Turks as a barbaric nation by saying that there had been civilized cultures outside Europe and Turks deserved to be included among the contemporary civilized nations. However, their 'scientific theses' were actually a re-articulation of the orientalist racist argument dating back to late 18th century European political romanticism which asserted that the people of Aryan descent and of the Aryan language were to be distinguished from those of non-Aryan descent.[266] Despite thematic differences, this schizophrenic relationship of Turkish identity to what it saw as the Western identity which it wants to unite with but at once stands against it as colonizer, still dominates the nationalist discourse. The

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[264] Holbrook, Victoria. 1998. *Aşkın Okunmaz Kıyıları.Türk Modernitesi ve Mistik Romans* [Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernization and Mystic Romance]. Trans. E. Köroğlu ve E. Kılıç. İstanbul: İletişim.

[265] See Yeğen Mesut 1999; 2003; Holbrook 1999; Etienne Copeaux *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Büşra Ersanlı *İktidar ve Tarih* (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2003)

[266] Bernal provides a detailed account for racist- colonialist sources of scientific discourse in terms of sociology of knowledge in especially chapter. IV where he deals with 18th century sources for European hatred and devaluation of other races and civilizations esp. Afro-Semitic civilizations. He summarizes i.e. under titles of "Christian Reactionism", "Progress against Egypt", "Europe as the 'progressive' continent", "Racism", "Romanticism". See esp. introduction and chapter IV (*ibid:* 1-63, *189-224*) in Bernal, Martin. 1987. *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985,* Vol. 1. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press.

paradigmatic references of this belonging to *the* civilization still operate within the contemporary discourses of being proper citizens of Turkey in particular.[267]

Ok, But who does İstanbul belong to?

Karaman[268]**:** In the first years, in 1999, in 2000 there were people coming to quarrel with us. They were saying, 'You are from PKK[269], you are terrorists.' Ten people were attacking one person. They have thought we were elephants. Since you are from the East, they think that every Kurdish is a terrorist, and every terrorist is an elephant. Now they say, 'what do you have to worry about?' You pick garbage; I will ask you what you are worried about! ...
Aktan: Where is your spot [that you always pick garbage]?

Karaman: In Kizilay. Gypsies used to come [there]; they were spreading the garbage all over. The Policeman said, 'if you shoo away those gypsies from that spot, I will allot there to you.' What should I have done? This is how I have earned my keep. I thus did contest with the gypsies. We have fought everyday for a month. One day I took all of their bags and threw in the garbage cart. They said they were going to kill me. Yet, I don't get scared of anyone. Because I did not grow up in such a way. I have seen such crud in Adana, would I be scared of these? I realized that I might have lost my earning. If I had not, they would have shooed me away; I did attack. They can sell tissue or beg, and feed themselves. Yet, I would starve.
Aktan: Can't you sell tissue or beg?

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[267] This is a mimic aesthetic sense of Western dignified subjects, (or aesthetics as what is capable or apprehended by senses) and it delimits a conception of human dignity that makes a life worth to be living. I refer here to the concept mimicry articulated by Bhabha (1994:121- 131) who has taken this psychoanalytic term and used it his article on ambivalence of colonial discourse and potentiality of hybrid bodies to turn the colonial gaze against itself. By becoming a second-hand, artificial object of colonial desire, mimic man's repetition, contaminates and decentres the originality of the colonial discursive purity. By its incompleteness or contamination of the colonial discourse by the linguistically and ethnically different native self, the hybrid body produces an image that is almost total/same but not quite. This failure in total duplication exposes the janus-facedness of colonial discourse in that mimicry itself serves as a menace rather than resemblance, a rupture rather than consolidation. *See* Bhabha, Homi. 1995. *Location of Culture.* London: Routledge., pp. 121- 131

[268] From Irfan Aktan's interview with a Kurdish migrant in Ankara, Mehmet Karaman, earning his life by garbage picking. His family had to leave their village because of the civil war in 1990s. Many villages were demolished and many other families lost their properties and faced forced migration. (*See* Aktan, Irfan. May 2006. Interview with Mehmet Karaman. "Bizi Fil Saniyorlar [They think We are Elephants]." *Express* 4 (Special Issue: Kurt Sorunu Turk Sorunu [Kurdish Question Turkish Question]), May, 6-10.

[269] Abbreviation for Kurdistan Workers' Party (In Kurdish: *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*).

> **Karaman:** Man, no. I would rather die, but never beg. Don't ask such stuff to us, we don't beg. 'God bless you if you give me penny!' I were to be a different kind of human to be able to say that.[270]

In the quotations above, the destitution of Kurdishness can be read similarly within the context of nationalist politics in Turkey that produces an experience of self-loss by exposure of denial of one's humanness. This is formulated in the statement that 'they think we are elephants.' This can be seen as a moment of desubjectivation that reveals one's awareness of the discourses of abjection. The same logic, though, is reproduced in Karaman's attachment of his identity to a moral position that makes it impossible for him to beg -- a destitute being -- in a position that requires a different kind of human being-- that is Gypsy.

> "**Deren**: There is an Istanbul that belongs to me. In another place, outside of Istanbul, I can say I am an Istanbulite. I have a relationship with Istanbul, a place where I have achieved political and other relations, and I am a creator of this Istanbul myself.
> **Nimet**: If you say you are Istanbulite, your accent says you aren't.
>
> **Deren**: That isn't important. I'm talking about my own Istanbul."[271]

This last quote is quite revealing in that accent as a marker of one's being constituted against the being of the city is overturned in the moment it tries to interrupt the attachment of one to the city. This overturning reveals itself as a political claim 'my own Istanbul' that breaks with the locking that ties one's being to birth. However, the

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[270] Aktan, Irfan. Interview with Mehmet Karaman. "Bizi Fil Saniyorlar [They Think We are Elephants]". *Express.* May 2006 (Special Issue: Kurt Sorunu Turk Sorunu). p.6-7, my translation.

[271] From Anna Secor's focus group interviews with Kurdish women (migrant, low-wage piece workers) in Istanbul on their experience of citizenship. See Secor, Anna. 2004. "'There Is an Istanbul That Belongs to Me': Citizenship, Space, and Identity in the City." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94(2): 352–368, p.365.

question remains of how this moment of disensus that breaks with the sensible can be carried to the moment one bears witness to the constitutive relations of subjectivities without recourse to violence.

This thesis has provided a reading of constitution of subjectivity in relationship to the city as paradigm problematizing its constitutive abjects and how it affects our sense of subjectivity and belonging. This problematization harbours the question of whether it is possible to constitute and reclaim the city and its relationship to the subjectivity as a critical process beyond epistemological violence. In this sense, I believe, a study of the gentrification of slums and shanty towns as a problem of subjectivation as well as abjection could bear further questions in this realm.

In the next project following this thesis, I want to read the relationship between the city and the subjectivity through a case study of gentrification in Turkey. The event of gentrification is a very telling process because it defines a district and a group of people dwelling there as disorder. Besides, very detailed discourses are activated against the group to define this disorder, justify it and legalize it. By that very means, it defines the order, past and future. Moreover, this whole process desubjectivates and resubjectivates the individuals defined by disorder, and includes them in itself while wanting to demolish them.

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