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CREATIVITY AND CATHARSIS:
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE OF MELANIE KLEIN

by

DAVID W. WATTS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled CREATIVITY AND CATHARSIS: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE OF MELANIE KLEIN

submitted by DAVID W. WATTS

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION

.....
(Supervisor)

.....

.....

Date: August 27, 1986

DEDICATION

TO TRUDY HARROLD

who shared her own catharsis
and knows what this thesis
is all about
without reading it.

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the role of suffering and struggle in the creative act--elements axiomatic to most artists and innovators but largely ignored by educators and psychologists in North America. A fruitful source and perspective from which to treat this question is found in the writings of Melanie Klein, an analysist described as "perhaps the greatest psychoanalytic innovator since Freud."

The Introduction (Chapter I) raises the question of the neglect of the suffering and struggle aspects of creatvity, while Chapter II surveys the major currents in North American creativity theory to illustrate this lacuna.

Chapter III summarizes the views on creativity propounded by five psychoanalysts, showing while all of them treat two or more of the elements of suffering, creativity and childhood, none of them provides a complementary framework that incorporates all three. This leads to examination of Melanie Klein, who does.

Chapter IV surveys Klein's life and milieu; Chapter V summarizes her five major innovative contributions to psychoanalysis. Chapter VI attempts to construct a theory of creativity from the writings of Klein, with reference as well to those of her significant followers, principally Hanna Segal and Adrian Stokes. This is done by developing a metapsychological model, enumerating seven propositions on different aspects of the creativity question, and finally by

comparing and contrasting the Kleinian view with those of the analysts surveyed earlier.

The final chapter (VII) makes applications of Kleinian creatvity theory to early childhood education, shows how anxiety inherent in the situation of the pupil-teacher relationship, the space/time framework of the class/playroom and the evocative material in pictures, stories and songs, can be externalized and resolved in a cycle of creative integration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis spans a nine year journey--a solitary journey, but one punctuated by significant persons most unknown to each other. In particular, thanks are due to:

David Wangler, who first introduced me to Freud;

Peter Miller, my advisor, who suggested that I explore Melanie Klein

Dr. Otto Weininger, whose response to a 1983 article encouraged me to think I had something worthwhile to say about Klein;

Robert Rider, who urged me on to completion when I was tempted to procrastinate one last time;

Dr. Hanna Segal, whose comments in an informal session served to clarify my understanding of Klein's thought in a couple of respects in time for my final draft

Victoria Scott, who offered the time, space, and freedom to see the task through

And to those other guides and friends who have "suffered" with patience and humour my struggle to understand Klein and myself.

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EXPLANATION OF FORM/USAGE

"Psycho-Analysis and "Psychoanalysis" are interchangeable terms. The hyphenated forms predominated in the earlier years of the movement; today the unhyphenated form is more standard. In this thesis the hyphenated form is used only in quotations or in proper names (e.g., the Institute or Review of Psycho-Analysis)-where it appears/ed as such.

Phantasy/fantasy were often interchanged in the early years of psychoanalysis. Now, however, phantasy has come to be reserved for unconscious and preconscious processes (which is Melanie Klein's emphasis) while fantasy refers to conscious day-dreaming. Quotations, however, have again been left in their original form, even where this contradicts current usage.

He/she and s/he was confused in psychoanalytic writing even before the recent feminist movement! Since Melanie Klein generally refers to the analyst as "he" in her own writings, I have done the same here. Where referring to a patient whose gender is not specified or implied, I have used the modern s/he and him/her only in two situations: (1) to emphasize the sexuality of the child from the less defined sexuality of the pre-Oedipal (in Kleinian chronology) infant; and (2) to emphasize a broad humanity which encompasses both male and female persons. Here again, I have not tampered with quotations. It should be borne in

mind that, in Klein's native German, the word child is neuter (das Kind) which is significant in Freud's selection of the "it" (Es/"id") to denote the unconscious processes of the psyche.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> I would say the next two great literatures are coming from Russia and Latin America... (It) seems to be that misery helps... we don't do terribly well on happiness; that the contribution of the New World may have been to let people... lead decent, happy, humane lives. This is what God may have wanted for man, but it seems to be very bad for literature, for philosophy, great music and art.
>
> It's a haunting possibility... that human thought is a kind of cancer of the mind--that really first-class thought may be an excrescence--a devouring passion. The world of Galileo and Michelangelo... had in it a tyranny and violence of censorship that we love to forget when we go through our museums. We don't smell the dark of it. Could it be that the reason Europe continues to produce formidably... is attached to the tragedy of its history?[1]

George Steiner's question and its ramifications may strike sympathetic chords in the heart of many a philosopher or artist struggling away in a garret. Yet they are singularly absent from the current discussion on creativity in the North American educational context.

Educators and social scientists such as Guilford, Torrance, Getzels and Jackson, and their colleagues have run batteries of personality tests on the demonstrably creative in an effort to determine how they differ from their less inventive but equally intelligent peers. Others, notably Edward de Bono, have endeavoured to describe the cognitive

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[1] "George Steiner thinks!" Interview in [redacted]lean's, Toronto, November 20, 1978, pp. 12, 14.

processes by which creative persons approach problems and conceptualize situations. In so doing they have coined the term, and enunciated the concept, of "Lateral Thinking".[2] And neurologists, beginning with Penfield, have attempted to localize such functions in the brain, giving rise to popular notions of the differing functions of left and right hemispheres. Yet on the phenomena of struggle and suffering as ingredients of the creative process the theorists have remained almost unanimously silent.[3]

Perhaps this lacuna results from passive resistance--our personal and collective unwillingness to face the fact of suffering, and from the tenacity with which we still cling to the realisability of the North American Dream. Perhaps it is a matter of honest agnosticism--our inability to conceive of terms in which the question could meaningfully be put, or tools by which it could be measured. For instance, how does one obtain a control group, or establish a representative population sampling to test a struggle and suffering hypothesis? It would seem that this is a very private matter that can only be addressed in individual terms. Merely to raise the question on an

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[2] Edward de Bono, The Use of Lateral Thinking, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1967.

[3] Lawrence Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process, (University of Kansas Press, 1958) is a rare exception. Yet this work is limited to a consideration of pathological manifestations of suffering, and hence deals with only a limited aspect of Steiner's question.

academic level is to cause embarrassment, invite incredulity and to make oneself irrelevant, antiquarian and beyond the pale of serious discussion.

Yet it is not a meaningless question. If in fact a measure of suffering and struggle is a vital ingredient of the creative person, as many artists have long believed, then our continued ignoring of it can only add an air of unreality to the whole Creativity debate.

This thesis will explore an aspect of this neglected area of creativity theory within the psychoanalytic tradition, in particular the work of Melanie Klein, a neo-Freudian. Chapter IV will examine her life, and her thought on the early development of the psyche, and how her thinking evolved in relation to her practice. This chapter will also consider the relationship of her thought to that of her analytic contemporaries, for it is impossible to understand one branch of psychoanalysis without some reference to other branches and particularly to the Freudian mainstream from which it evolved.

Chapter V will summarize Klein's five major contributions to psychoanalysis. One of these is her identification of two universal "positions"--one paranoid-schizoid and one depressive--the successful negotiation or "passing through" of which is determined by the ego's means of dealing with anxiety and trauma. Chapter VI will sketch and elaborate a Kleinian theory of creativity based on the concept of the negotiation of depressive anxiety in the

depressive position. Finally, Chapter VII will consider some educational implications of this theory, the application of which may serve to facilitate and further the expression of creative energies by young children in early education settings.

First, however, I shall survey the field of North American creativity theory, and show how its silence on the question of necessary suffering and trauma leads one to consider the work of the psychoanalysts in the first instance, and of Melanie Klein in the second. This will occupy Chapters II and III.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATIONAL CREATIVITY THEORY IN NORTH AMERICA

It is the purpose of this chapter to make a cursory examination of the major currents of creativity theory and research in North America. Its scope will be limited to this continent not only because it was to the New World that George Steiner's challenge was addressed, but because the isolation and edification of creativity as a separate species of cognition was originally and until recently has been primarily a North American phenomenon. This examination will rely to a significant extent on the comprehensive survey of the literature on creativity undertaken by Emma Pivato[1] as an initial reference point.

The semanticist or logician may question at the outset how one can embark on such a study without having precisely defined the subject matter. The reason is simple. Each theory or school of research has defined creativity in its own operational terms, and it is the limitations of these terms that is the concern of this chapter. To start by adopting a definition that lies within them would, therefore, be self-defeating. Moreover, while there is considerable overlap among such elements as "divergence", "novelty", "laterality" and "flexibility" within these

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[1] Emma Pivato, "An Analysis of the Conceptual Basis of Modern Creativity Theory", Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1980.

theories, to seek to compress or consolidate them into a single set of criteria would at this point in the study be virtually impossible.

It must be admitted then, when talking of "creativity", to dealing with an elusive quality whose existence is inferred from the failure of other categories, notably general intelligence, to account for certain phenomena, somewhat analogously to the postulation of "black holes" by astro-physicists. It is thus appropriate at this point to briefly trace the emergence of "creativity" as a differentiated, identifiable concept.

The evolution of the noun "creativity" as a sub-species or independent species of intelligence was foreshadowed and paralleled by the mutation of the verb "to think" as a (sub) species of "cogitate" i.e., mental activity. In the English of the mid-1600's we find such statements as "Take no thought for the morrow"[2] in the Sermon on the Mount, and "Think and die" by Cleopatra's maid, in facing their final hour.[3] It is clear from context, philology and textual scholarship that "think" in these instances is not to be equated with the 1980's usage, but encompasses emotion and volition as well as "pure cognition". A more recent translation renders the biblical passage, "Do not be anxious

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[2] Matt. 6: 25-34 (KJV)

[3] William Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, Act III, Scene 13, lines 2, 3.

about tomorrow"; a contemporary rendering of the Shakespearean one would be close to "Ponder" or "Reflect...".

The more reductionist post-Cartesian view of thought reached its apogee in North America with the widespread educational reliance on intelligence testing in the Twentieth century. As late as the First World War, the term "intelligence" still encompassed aesthetic as well as verbal and computational elements in popular parlance, as can be seen in the popular conception of the intelligent man or woman as "sensible/sensitive" as well as "smart" and "clever". These former elements were not so readily measurable on Binet's tests. By mid-century, intelligence had become practically synonymous with IQ for many members of the educational establishment. This did not dispel the lurking suspicion that certain factors may have been left out of the equation--a conviction that gained ground when it became apparent that high scores on IQ tests did not necessarily correspond to achievements in the arts. Even in the sciences, some of the outstanding achievers were not predictable on the basis of intelligence testing, while many of those predicted to be "bright" from test scores did not appear to be as resourceful or inventive as their less IQ-endowed peers.

Prevailing North American creativity theory has laboured and suffered in the shadow of the intelligence testing whose inadequacies gave birth to it in the first place. Rather than regarding test scores as simply one

indicator of intellectual ability, many of the proponents and users of the tests had invested IQ with an ultimacy all its own. When faced with deficiencies in their tool, they might have acknowledged the inherently inevitable limits of any mode of measurement. Instead, the search was on for a new tool, more perfect and all-encompassing in its applicability.

This search followed two routes. One was to identify personality traits of unquestionably creative persons, and from these to develop a quantifiable scale distinct from, yet parallel to the IQ one. The first reference in Pivato's Selected Bibliography is to a 1922 article in the American Journal of Psychology by one R.M. Simpson,[4] who had devised a "Creativity Quotient". Simpson's CQ was based upon children's performance on a test of 50 sets of four small round dots as stimuli for drawings. A current and much more comprehensive approach based on the same principle is the "Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking",[5] derived from E. Paul Torrance's studies of creative personalities. Another relatively recent (1962) but lesser-known device is Sarnus Mednick's Remote Associates Tests (RAT). Mednick defines creativity in terms of novelty, which he operationalizes on

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[4] Simpson, R.M., "Creative Imagination", in American Journal of Psychology (1922), Number 33, pp. 234-243.

[5] Torrance, E. Paul, Tests of Creative Thinking, 1966, Personnel Press Inc., Princeton, N.J.

his test by making "the originality of a response ... inversely related to its probability in a given ... population."[6]

The second pathway of "quantifiable creativity" did not entail a separate scale or quotient for creative traits, but attempted to incorporate them into an expanded intellectual model going far beyond the standardized IQ. The best-known of these attempts are Guilford's "Structure of Intellect" model and Cattell's "Factor Analysis of the Creative Personality." Both of these conceive of creative talent inseparable from and imbedded in conventional intelligence. Both are highly complex, and both are based on methods of multivariate analysis.

Joy Guilford's model, devised in the decade following 1939 in the U.S. Air Force, depicts the intellect as a three-dimensional cube, one plane comprising 5 Operations, another, 6 Units, and the third, 4 Contents. This results in 120 cubic categories which Guilford denotes as cells, most of which have been researched individually. It is in the Operations plane (which includes Cognition, Memory, Divergent Production, Convergent Production, and Evaluation) where the creative-related traits may be observed, particularly in Divergent Production, which functions "to generate new information from known and remembered

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[6] Mednick, S.A., "The associative basis of the creative process," in Psychological Review (1962), Number 69, p. 221.

information", and Memory, "the retrieval of information [which]... is at the heart of creative thinking".[7]

Pivato acknowledges that Guilford

> radically reshaped the prevailing vague concept of creativity into an empirical construct by defining it as a continuous variable, and as a special ability which could be tested and measured.[8]

Cattell's Personality Theory is based on the study of proven creatives and their comparison with the general population. From this he distinguishes two types of intelligence: crystallized ability [which] "operates in areas where previous learning has taken place", and fluid ability which "... is an expression of the level of complexity of relationships which an individual can perceive and act upon when he does not have recourse to answers... already stored in memory."[9] Of these, fluid intelligence is obviously the more germane to creative ability. In building his profile of the creative personality, Cattell combines biographies of creative persons, historical theory, and factor analysis. The distinctive profile that results, he claims, holds true across different subject areas with only minor variations. Among the various cultural elements to

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[7] Guilford, J.P., "Creativity: A quarter century of progress", in Perspectives in Creativity, I.A. Taylor & J.W. Getzels, Ed., Chicago, Aldine, 1975, pp. 37-59.

[8] Pivato, p. 79.

[9] Cattell, R.B., "Genius and the processes of creative thought", in R.B. Cattell, Abilities: Their structure, growth & action, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. p. 99.

which he has assigned specific "factor loadings" are urbanization, international clashes, Nobel prizes won, civil disorders, and climatic stimulation (Huntington's Theory). His Theory of Cultural Pressure, which subsumes these factors, postulates a high correlation between creativity and stress. This he attributes to

> an increase in introversion and... super-ego control, resulting from the adjustment to greater social complexity[10]

--a conclusion which discords with most American thinking on creativity. Born and educated in England Cattell is the only mainstream (empirically-based) scholar to accord any recognition to Steiner's question regarding angst as a positive element in creative motivation. He is also the only one to invoke psychoanalytical concepts (the super-ego) as part of his schema. Could these be the influence of the European tradition? In any case, he is the only empiricist who attempts to deal with macro-cultural factors in his research.

In her summation and evaluation of these mainstream currents of North American creativity theory, Emma Pivato notes

> The varying points of view we have considered have all been expressed within the same ultimate framework of western positivism...
>
> Why have psychologists failed to undertake the necessary research on non-rational modes of knowing like intuition...?

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[10] Cattell, p. 419.

> ... Belief in or acceptance of non-rational knowledge is incompatible with the "ultimate framework" of positivism in terms of which psychologists and all other Western positivistic epistomology which underlies all our particular forms of knowledge in both the sciences and the humanities which will have to be revised if we are to come to terms with the historically well-evidenced phenomenon of non-rational knowledge. And it is our opinion that, until we do this, we will never resolve the creativity issue.[11]

We thus find ourselves in a dilemma. The limitations of North American creativity research (among which we include its failure to address the question of the role of suffering in the creative act) are, according to Emma Pivato, attributable to the limitations inherent in our rational, empirical approach. Yet the emergence of creativity as a focus of study is rooted in the same rationalist shortcomings, epitomized in the limiting of "intelligence" to what could be quantifiably measured on an IQ test. The admission of other (i.e., non-quantifiable) knowledge to the discussion may serve, not to illuminate the issue, but to cause it to disappear altogether:

> We believe that if it were possible to develop a fuller psychological understanding of non-rational modes of thinking... then the term, creativity, would cease to be a viable or necessary concept. Creative thinking would be recognized as an integral part of the thinking process if the concept of thinking were not so impoverished by the proscriptions of Western rationalism.[12]

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[11] Pivato, p. 196.

[12] Ibid., p. 195.

Pivato's opinion was echoed by Peter Drucker two years later:

> We know there is more than one kind of learning. And as we begin to understand associative learning, I predict that all that nonsensical talk about creativity will stop....
>
> ... The study of creativity is a fig leaf... under which there is no penis.
>
> ... Let's forget the Mozart phenomenon, which defies analysis. The ordinary creativity of ordinary human beings, which is the ability to look, not to conceptualize, can be trained. But not in the behavioral way...[13]

This issue of dimensionality was grasped and addressed by Wallach and Kagan in 1965 in a significant study entitled Modes of Thinking in Young Children.[14] At the height of the popularity of creativity as a subject of study, they raised the question of whether the majority of its professedly-empirical testing procedures were not self-fulfilling:

> The measures that have been construed as indicators of creativity are not indicators of some single psychological dimension parallel to and distinct from the dimension of general intelligence defined by conventional intelligence test indices... there is [no] considerable warrant for proposing the very conceptualization which most researches have proposed: that creativity is not intelligence, and that individual differences in creativity possess the same degree of psychological pervasiveness as individual differences in general intelligence.[15]

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[13] "A Conversation with Peter F. Drucker", in Psychology Today, December, 1982, p. 62.

[14] Wallach, Michael A. and Kagan, Nathan, Modes of Thinking in Young Children: a Study of the Creativity-Intelligence Distinction, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965.

[15] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Wallach and Kogan based this premise on a statistical analysis of the research data in Getzel's and Jackson's (1962) Creativity and Intelligence.[16] The title of that volume implies that the two concepts in question were at the same level of abstraction, with corresponding degrees of internal cohesiveness, even while recognizing that both terms subsume a range of specific intellectual abilities. Yet Wallach and Kogan discovered that the results of the five "creativity tests" administered to some 500 secondary students correlated as strongly with the subjects' IQ scores as they did with the results of the other tests in the creativity battery. Out of the five creativity tests, which "varied in psychological attributes [from]... the ability to make up mathematical problems from... numerical information... to compose appropriate endings for fables... to detect hidden geometric figures... to think up varied definitions for given stimulus words, and... to think up uses for a given object",[17] four correlated significantly with IQ for the girls tested, and all five for the boys. Two of the correlations for each sex were substantial. The IQ-creativity test correlation for the boys correlated substantially with the internal correlation of the creativity test results. For the girls, the IQ-creativity

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[16] Getzels, J.W., and Jackson, P.W., Creativity and Intelligence, New York: Wiley, 1962.

[17] Wallach and Kogan, p. 4.

test correlation correlated significantly with the internal correlation of the creativity test scores.

> ... if one wishes to argue from these data that a modicum of commonality underlies the creativity tests, then one must admit that almost the same degree of commonality also extends to the intelligence measure...
>
> Given the evidence just described, it is quite illegitimate for Getzels and Jackson to proceed to sum the five creativity measures into a combined score for particular individuals, as if these measures possessed something in common that was distinct from what they also shared in common with general intelligence.[18]

After citing a Thorndike (1963) study in support of their conclusion, Wallach and Kogan proceed to a comparable analysis, with comparable results, of similar creativity studies by Cline and Richards and associates, Flesher, and the Torrance and Guilford groups. Torrance is faulted for begging the issue by postulating two sub-categories of creativity, verbal and non-verbal (visual); why should these be considered aspects of a single phenomenon, Kogan and Wallach ask, when the correlation between them is substantially less than that between the verbal and performance indices of intelligence as exemplified in the Wechsler (1949) scale?[19]

Guilford, who does not explicitly generalize a single creative dimension, reaps similar criticism for his equivalent (in Wallach and Kogan's view) category of

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[18] Wallach and Kogan, p. 3.

[19] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

"divergent thinking". Comment on the similarity of the Guilford tests to others reviewed, they comment,

> The evidence that we have reviewed indicated relatively weak intercorrelations among procedures embracing this degree of diversity, or correlations that, when stronger among these kinds of procedures, were approximately as strong or were stronger between these procedures and indicators of a general intelligence.[20]

They cite Thorndike's analysis of test scores of three of Guilford's "factors" of general intelligence, and five factors situated in the "divergent thinking" area. The results are comparable to their own analysis of Getzels and Jackson: the correlation between general intelligence and divergent thinking approximates that among the divergent-thinking tests themselves, while that among the general intelligence assessors is almost twice as great.

Wallach and Kogan ask whether the similarity in correlation among the various divergent-thinking indicators, with that of each of the indicators with general intelligence, may be due to the similarity of the testing procedures used. In particular they question the importance of speed in the concept and measurement of Guilford's four divergent-thinking "fluencies": expressional, ideational, word, and associational:

> Such a feature seems not to fit one's intuitions concerning the type of situation within which creativity may manifest itself most naturally.[21]

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[20] Wallach and Kogan, p. 10.

[21] Ibid., p. 12.

t they are forced to conclude, on the basis of the evidence given,

> The present considerations suggest little warrant for conceptualizing a general cognitive dimension of creativity that is like the concept of general intelligence but exists apart from the latter.[22]

But where other researchers faced with this conclusion have tended to abandon creativity as an elusive entity to focus on one of its more definable processes or behavioral aspects, Wallach and Kogan questioned whether it was the interest in creativity that was misplaced, or the approaches to studying it thus far:

> It may be that too diffuse a set of operations has been placed in the creativity category, and that what is needed at this point is a new attempt at conceptual analysis on which to base measurement procedures.[23]

Acting on this hypothesis, and drawing on Ghiselin and Mednick, they identify certain qualities and situations that recur in the introspections of highly creative persons when describing their creative activity. Notions such as "combinatory play", "associative play" of ideas and images, ideas that "rose in crowds" and collided with each other, a "welling up", flow and "bubbling up" of ideas--these imply a freedom and spontaneity not present in the test setting. Specifically, the presence of time limit was found to be inimical to genuinely creative people, many of whose most

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[22] Wallach and Kogan, p. 12.

[23] Ibid., p. 13.

original responses to questions began to emerge only after they had been "generating" responses for some time. Originality for these individuals was actually often found to increase over time during a session, when contrasted with that of less inventive peers whose initial "stock" of ideas came quickly but was soon spent.

Secondly, the whole ambience of "testing", with its customary expectation of a "correct" response and accompanying competitive anxiety, was found to be inhibitory to the "free flow" of thought required for creative activity. Yet virtually all the measurement devices in use--Torrance's, Guilford's and Mednick's included--were referred to as "tests" and thus could have been expected to evoke a "testing mindset" for the subjects to whom they were administered, even if these were specifically told that there was "no one right answer".

Having identified these "blind" spots within mainstream creativity concepts and measurement, Wallach and Kogan propose an "associative conception of creativity" to be measured in a "game-like" atmosphere free of time constraints. Their method and findings--which showed evidence of a degree of internal cohesiveness among the various creativity components (lacking in earlier studies)--make up the balance of their book, Modes of Thinking....

Now it is significantly the element of associative thinking, identified by Wallach and Kogan as crucial to

creative thinking, that is also seized on by Drucker.[24] It also approaches Pivato's prescription of one of the non-rational modes of thinking that must be taken seriously if we are ever to "resolve the creativity issue", whether as a separate category or as a sub-species of an enlarged conception of thought. In our search for a promising area in which to examine the neglected aspect of suffering as an ingredient of the creative act and personality, the associative realm is thus one we must consider. Before resuming Pivato's summation of North American creativity theory, we must make reference to a European who has done much to explicate the notion of associative thinking under his own rubric of "lateralism".

Edward de Bono is British, yet his theory of "lateral thinking" has gained a wide following on this side of the Atlantic. This reason, along with his compatibility with, and complementarity of the "orthodoxies" of Torrance and Guilford, entitles him to a place in the New World creativity pantheon.

De Bono is concerned with the holistic, dynamic thought process that is characteristic of new discoveries and insights. His theory rests on no body of empirical

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[24] At face value Drucker eschews the study of creativity as a separate subject. Yet a closer reading of his comments reveals that the apparent difference with Wallach and Kogan is largely semantic, i.e., where they draw their categories. What Drucker rejects is the mystical invocation of creativity as a whole without definable attributes.

research, nor does he attempt a structural analysis of the intellect. He does not postulate a neurological description of what happens in the brain, although he does at one point speculate that logical, high-probability thinking may be the result of established neural connections.[25] He believes that the mind arrives at new understandings by conceiving of the elements in the given situation in a more fluid way, un-

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[25] de Bono, 124. Neural physiology as a perspective from which to study creativity first opened as the result of the commissurotomy (split brain procedure--curring the corpus callosum between hemispheres) performed on epileptic patients by R.W. Sperry in the 1960's. Subsequent observation and testing of these patients indicated considerable differentiation of function of the cerebral hemispheres. Speech and verbal ability appeared to emanate from the left side, while visuospatial perception, holistic comprehension and imagery seemed to be centered on the right.

Concepts of "left" and "right brain" are currently very much in vogue, and are used as facilely--and often as inaccurately--as the earlier Freudian buzzwords they have supplanted in "pop. psych" jargon. Upon the promising but scanty research foundations to date, a whole superstructure of speculative theories has been erected. Perhaps the most fantastic of these is Julian Jayne's The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, (1976, Houghton Mifflin, Boston) which situates the whole phenomenon of religion in the right hemisphere. Here the voices of the gods were heard audibly by the "pre-conscious" (hypostases--not to be confused with the Preconscious in psychoanalytic literature) men of the ancient world.

The creative functions such as divergent or "lateral" thinking, fluid intelligence and free association, as enumerated by other models, are usually situated in the right hemisphere. However, the complexity of hemispheric functioning and interrelatedness, as well as the subtle, intricate, and still only partially understood ensemble of characteristics that constitute the creative personality, weigh against any premature attempt to localize creative functioning on the homunculus. Brain physiology is a promising field of inquiry, but still an extremely tentative one, given the sketchiness of current definitive research.

trammelled by the need for logical consistency, standardized measurement, or fixed word meanings. Brain-storming, serendipity, free association, and children's free play are all means for arriving at this end.

At the outset, de Bono emphasizes that lateral thinking cannot be simply equated with creativity:

> Creative thinking is a special part of lateral thinking which covers a wider field. Sometimes the achievements of lateral thinking are genuine creations, at other times they are nothing more than a new way of looking at things.... Creative thinking often requires a talent for expression, whereas lateral thinking is open to everyone who is interested in new ideas.[26]

Later on he adds

> In his search for new ways of looking at things, in his dedication to breaking down the old conventions of perception, is not the artist the supreme user of lateral thinking? In the world of art it would seem that lateral thinking is going on all the time under the more self-satisfying name of creative thinking....
>
> The trouble with creative thinking in art is that it is so easy to stop halfway.... There is an enthusiasm to step down from the limitations of accepted order into the limitless potential of chaos, but too often this step is regarded as an achievement in itself, rather than only the first stage towards achievement.... Lateral thinking does seek to escape from the dominance of rigid and accepted ways of looking at things; but the purpose of the escape is a new and simpler order, not disorder.[27]

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[25] (Continued from previous page) See Michael Kieran, "A new look at brain waves", The Globe and Mail, January 11, 1982, and Philip E. Vernon, "The Right Brain: Is it Significant for Education", The ATA Magazine, Edmonton, Volume 63, Number 2 (December 1982), p. 9ff.

[26] de Bono, p. 14.

[27] Ibid., pp. 125, 127.

De Bono's emphasis on the dissolution of an order and the reconstituting of a new one approximates T.S. Kuhn's description of the breakdown and rejection of a scientific consensus and its supplanting by a new paradigm more adequately able to explain and integrate new phenomena. The same concept, as Jacques Ellul points out, underlay the annual desacralization (relaxing of tabus) at pagan festivals, in order that the in-rushing chaos could re-envigorate the cosmos and re-form it for another year.[28] This metaphor seems to be valid on the social and scientific, as well as on the artistic plane. De Bono's appropriating of it in his description of lateral thinking is a useful contribution to creativity theory.[29]

In their enthusiasm to study associative thinking as the promising portal out of the rationalist wilderness, creativity theorists have been neglecting an established resource at their disposal. This is the technique and theory of free-association developed by Freud and the psychoanalysts. Emma Pivato does mention psychoanalysis briefly--only to dismiss it as another unpromising form of rationalist determinism. Yet she does not accord the

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[28] Jacques Ellul, The New Demons, Seabury, New York, 1975, p. 52.

[29] Albert Rothenberg's concept of "janusian thinking" ("Creative Contradictions", Psychology Today, June 1979, p. 55) is a similar, more precise case. Rothenberg sees the ability to simultaneously entertain opposites as the mark of the creative personality, and the situation out of which a new conceptualization emerges. This can be viewed as equivalent, on the personal level to Hegel's dialectic.

analysts anywhere near the attention and examination she gives to other schools, leaving us with the belief she has overlooked something here.

She does give some consideration to third-force or humanistic psychology, which arose in America in reaction to the apparent mechanistic and deterministic orientation of the other schools. Foreshadowed by Jung in his concept of individuation, and most fully developed in Maslow's theory of self-actualization, it sees the person as neither the aggregate of atomistic traits nor as merely the product of psychic and environmental forces. Rather, the development of the self is seen as an ongoing process over which the individual has a certain degree of autonomy or self-determination.[30] Creativity is not identical to, but is closely linked with self-actualization.

The problem with this perspective is that creative self-actualization becomes the special province of the well-adjusted, balanced or harmonious personality. In Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the physical and social needs (e.g., sleep, nourishment, acceptance, affection) must be met before one can progress to the higher levels of development. Before one can be creative, therefore, s/he must be far advanced in this gnosis.

Now clearly this does not accord with historical experience, where some of the most creative talents have

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[30] Pivato, p. 185.

been among the most mal-adjusted. To acknowledge this fact does not commit one to accept its converse, nor does it follow that distress or disorder is prerequisite to creativity.[31] It is enough to note that there have been both many creative individuals (Van Gogh, Beethoven) and creatively prolific peoples (Jews of the Disperson, Russian dissenters) who do not qualify on Maslow's scale.[32]

At this point we are no closer to an answer to the challenge put by Steiner. The vast majority of the creativity theories encountered so far are agnostic towards suffering and deterministic in their orientation, allowing little autonomy to the individual. This shakes our sensibilities. The one apparent alternative, the humanistic school, acknowledges a measure of free will, but implies that creative development is contingent upon the elimination of suffering. This flies in the face of the facts and offends our good sense.

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[31] This is the point made by Lawrence Kubie (op. cit.)

[32] Humanistic psychology here has been equated with the perspective of Abraham Maslow. This reflects the survey in Pivato, who says: "Those who credit [Maslow] with being the founder of third-force psychology do so, we believe, because he has best articulated the aims or anti-aims of a very large and diffuse group of psychologists." (Pivato, p. 179).

Pivato refers to Maslow's 1930's background as a comparative psychologist, working with primates. She does not, however, deal with more recent and current events in this area. Her summary treatment of the Maslovian position (and mine by my adoption of her review of the literature) should not be taken as an outright dismissal of that position.

We thus return by default to consider the analytic stream, a fountainhead of thought on associative thinking, yet one which is largely ignored by the latter-day North American associationists. Now the analytic corpus is as exhaustive as the creativity theory surveyed thus far, and an equivalent chapter is required to do justice to it. The next chapter, then, will consider those aspects of Freudianism that caused Pivato and others to reject psychoanalysis as another veiled form of determinism and to dismiss its purported freedom of choice ("Where id was, ego shall be") as illusory. It will show how the analytic tradition has evolved beyond this genesis, and indicate aspects of the tradition--of Freud himself, his disciples, and schismatics--that are instructive in facing the role of suffering in the creative life and act. That this grew out of the European tradition of suffering of which Steiner speaks should not surprise us.

CHAPTER III

CREATIVITY AND THE ANALYSTS

It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the creative act and individual from the perspective of five representatives of the psychoanalytic tradition,[1] three Europeans and two North Americans. The Freuds, father and daughter, will be considered at some length, Sigmund Freud, not only as the founder of psychoanalysis, but because a misreading and misrepresentation of his thought has led to its summary dismissal by Emma Pivato and others in the New World studying the creativity issue. For this reason alone, a second glance here is in order.

Anna Freud is included, both as Freud's successor as custodian of the tradition, and because of her work as a pioneer in the analysis of children. Miss Freud's dominance of the child study field in Vienna, coupled with her differences with Melanie Klein, were factors in the latter's move to London. In a thesis on Klein, it is thus appropriate to know something of the younger Freud's position on child analysis, in order to compare and contrast it with the Kleinian one.

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[1] As will be apparent from the inclusion of Carl Jung, the terms "psycho-analytic tradition" and "analysis" are intended here in the broadest sense to include Jung's "analytic psychology", so named by him specifically to differentiate it from Freudian psycho-analysis.

Next to be considered is the dissenter Carl Jung, whose break with Freud affected both men deeply. The non-rationalistic, intuitive, artistic aspect of Jung's practice and personality figured prominently in the break with the early, more scientific Freud. Years later, Jung's writings still reflect this dichotomy sharply, after Freud had refined his position. While the Jungian school claims fewer proponents than the Freudian one in North America, it is Jung's views on Freud's theories that seem to have been adopted in circles where the creativity issue is discussed here. Significantly for the purposes of this study, suffering is treated explicitly and at length in Carl Jung's thought on the creative process.

Finally, to be noted the work of two Americans, Lawrence Kubie and Rollo May. Both can be considered neo-Freudians, in that they claim to stand within the Freudian tradition, yet have explicated it with certain additions--including a typically North American resort to empirical studies as well as case histories--with which Europeans would probably not feel comfortable. Both Kubie and May consider the question of creativity and suffering--Kubie as the subject of a special study[2]--though they come to different conclusions.

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[2] Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process (op. cit.)

Another significant American contributor on the issue, Bruno Bettelheim, would consider himself less "neo" than "Freudian". Our references to him in this chapter are confined to his explication of the thought of Sigmund Freud; hence his own work is not treated separately.

Sigmund Freud's Views on the Creative Process

Emma Pivato dismisses Freudianism as an alternative to the logical positivism of North America; she characterizes his view of the personality as "a closed system...a steam-engine theory" of the instincts[3] as rigidly deterministic as the other views she has tried and found wanting. Many North Americans would probably concur in their impression of Freud. They are casually familiar with concepts of the libido or sex drive, and the tripartite formulation of the personality (ego, superego and id), and see their interaction as an essentially mechanistic one.

Others with a specific interest in art, plus a number of Europeans, are aware of the expulsion from the inner psychoanalytic circle of Jung and Rank, both who treated the question of the artist seriously and at some length. Such aesthetes often infer from this that there is no place for the intuitive in the rigorously scientific discipline of psychoanalysis. They may even be able to cite "wish

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[3] Pivato, pgs. 185, 186.

fulfillment" and other phrases by which Freud reportedly dismissed artistic fantasy as escapist illusion.

These views tend to overlook three important facts. First is the evolution of Freud's thought itself. From the background of a practising physician and neurologist (which he was until age 40) concerned primarily with scientific method, accuracy and exactitude, Freud's approach and outlook developed considerable amplitude and became increasingly analogical. His metaphors (e.g., mental illness, "drives"), purporting to describe the workings of the human psyche, were no more than they claimed to be metaphors, attempting to evoke an understanding of realities that cannot be directly define or apprehended. Along with a subtler, more ambiguous style, his content became more complex, variagated and at times paradoxical, leaving unexplored avenues, as he realized that many of the ideas with which he was wrestling could not be expressed in simplisms.

Secondly, through the insertion of Greek jargon into the English translation of his works, where in his native German Freud uses the vernacular, psychoanalysis ("examination of the soul") has become less humanized and more technicized in the English-speaking world that Freud ever intended. In North America this distortion has been reinforced by the monopoly on psychoanalysis exercised by psychiatry and the medical profession--a development Freud opposed. If psychoanalysis is thus seen as another form of

rationalist determinism by Pivato and her colleagues, they may be reflecting the North American ethos more than the essence of Freud.

Finally, far from being disinterested in cultural matters, Sigmund Freud's focus moved increasingly in this direction over his lifetime. Rather than seeing psychoanalysis as a cure for individuals' neuroses, or even as a tool for mass therapy (as in education), he saw its greatest usefulness as a perspective from which to study global issues, i.e., the condition of the race. North Americans' continued ignorance of and disinterest in such issues outside of the expressly political realm is perhaps the greatest indicator of the need for such a perspective.[4]

Freud saw culture as man's attempt to gain control over the internal struggle between opposing forces by which his soul (psyche) was rent.[5] In this he was anticipated by Nietzsche, who described the struggle in the metaphor of "Dionysian" and "Apollonian" man. Nietzsche's will to power

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[4] This was reflected in a recent comment by actress Meryl Streep that only in America, of all the countries in which she has been interviewed, does she never receive questions on broad humanitarian issues. (Maychick, Diana, Meryl Streep: the reluctant superstar, New English Library, 1985, p. 157.)

[5] It was the role of "Seelenzart" ("soul-doctor") in dealing with this tension that was Freud's preferred description of the psychiatrist. This is a title that still appears on the shingles of many European practitioners, and conveys a more organic concept of psychiatry than is held in North America.

and Freud's life drive (Libido) are foreshadowed in the writings of philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), a precursor to them both. Schopenhauer's seminal work, The World as Will and Ideal (1819), articulated the concept of a "life will" which encompasses both sexuality and survival, yet is much broader than the contemporary North American understanding of either "sex drive" or "survival instinct". Indeed, both Freud's and Schopenhauer's "trieb" (drive) connotes a much more dynamic concept than the "instinct" as it is us ually rendered in English.

It is against this European philosophic backdrop that the thought of Freud must be viewed. The classical myths and metaphors which gave their names to complexes in the Freudian conception, and which figure in Carl Jung's Collective Unconscious are part of a long European tradition of which only a small part has been transmitted to North America with psychoanalytic technique. Sigmund Freud was extremely literate, and lucid as a writer; he conveyed his knowledge to lay readers with a clarity which is unusual among experts. It is unfortunate that in the English-speaking world, and in North America in particular, he has been made to appear more scientific and obscure than is the case in his native German.[6]

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[6] From an interview with Dr. R.S. Stuc, Department of Germanic Studies, University of Calgary, February 29, 1984.

For almost half a century in the U.S. the popular conception--or misconception, as the case may be--of Sigmund Freud's view of creativity could be summed up in these words from an introduction to a work on Freud's one-time colleague and later critic, Carl Jung:

> Freud never really grasped the notion that art might be a way of enhancing man's grip on reality rather than escaping from it into wish-fulfilling phantasy. For Freud, the reductive approach of tracing psychological material to its infantile origin always took precedence over the possibility that the same material might contain within it the seeds of a better adaptation and thus be forward-looking.[7]

Then in 1958 Benjamin Nelson challenged this conception in a new edition of a selection of Freud's papers originally published in 1925 under the English title Papers on Applied Psycho Analysis. Attempting to throw new light on these works, which included such far-ranging topics as "The Moses of Michelangelo", "The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy Tales", and "A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth Century", Nelson entitled his edition On Creativity and the Unconscious. In the Introduction he wrote:

> This is hardly the place to institute a full-scale review, which is badly needed, of Freud's views on creativity, culture, and the unconscious. To suppose, as some have, that the "most highly valued products of our civilization"--so he describes the realms of culture in his Preface to Theodor Reik's Ritual--were simply a tissue of

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[7] Storr, Anthony, Jung, Fontana/Collins, London, 1973, p. 31.

> illusions and the efflux of illness is to commit an elementary logical blunder and miss both the nuance and force of his position.
>
> Creativity, he knew, was a complex process requiring deeper explication than that afforded by a psychology which construed all human action in terms of de liberative behavior. The omnipresent unconscious worked elusively, serving now as brake, now as spur to creative ful-fillment in every corner of man's conduct and culture--art, literature, love, even religion. Regressive passions and phantasies might well be the goads to attempts at creative integration, but it was less the illness than the power to engender form and achieve completed embodiment in the work of art which characterized artistic fulfillment as distinguished from neurotic or psychotic failure. In the case of the creator, regression served to mark out and light up the path to reconstruction.[8]

The popular mis-representation of Freud's view, if indeed such it is, claims as its basis such Freudian statements as the following, taken from an essay in the very selection in which Nelson, in his edition, explicates Freud:

> Now the writer does the same as the child at play; he creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously; that is, he invests it with a great deal of affect, while separating it sharply from reality...
>
> We can...(say) that happy people never make phantasies, only unsatisfied ones. Unsatisfied wishes are the driving power behind phantasies, every separate phantasy contains the fulfilment of a wish, and improves on unsatisfactory reality...

The later:

> If phantasies become over-luxuriant and over-powerful, the necessary conditions for an outbreak of neurosis or psychosis are constituted;

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[8] Freud, Sigmund, On Creativity and the Unconscious: Papers on the Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, Religion, Harper & Row, U.S.A., 1958, p. x.

> phantasies are also the first preliminary stage in the mind of the symptoms of illness of which our patients complain. A broad by-path here branches off into pathology.[9]

A superficial reading omits the initial "If", and makes of the possibility, Freud's "broad by-path", the probability or even the necessity of the main path. This conclusion Freud did most certainly not intend. Far from pure escapism, phantasies had a link with the present that could make of them means to the fulfillment of some intended plan or purpose:

> ...a phantasy at one and the same moment hovers between three periods of time--the three periods of our ideation. The activity of phantasy in the mind is linked up with some current impression, occasioned by some event in the present, which had the power to rouse an intense desire. From there it wanders back to the memory of the early experience, generally belonging to infancy, in which this wish was fulfilled. Then it creates for itself a situation which is to emerge in the future, representing fulfillment of the wish...(which thus) employs some event in the present to plan a future on the pattern of the past.[10]

Freud also allows how the phantasy, in artistic form, can benefit others:

> The unreality of the poetical world of imagination, however, has very important consequences for literary technique; for many things which if they happened in real life could produce no pleasure can nevertheless give enjoyment in a play--many emotions which are essentially painful may become a source of enjoyment to the spectators and hearers of a poet's work...

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[9] Freud, Sigmund, pp. 45, 47, 49.

[10] Ibid., pp. 48-49.

> ...when a man of literary talent presents his plays, or relates what we take to be his personal day-dreams, we experience great pleasure arising probably from many sources. How the writer accomplishes this is his innermost secret...[11]

Freud then speculates that the talented writer's (or artist's) work is pleasing because it "softens the egotistical character of the day-dream by changes and disguises", and because it offers a "release from tension in our minds".

Bruno Bettelheim goes even farther than Nelson in his indictment and elucidation of the manner in which Freud has been misrepresented. He contends that the breadth and humanism of Freud's thought has been lost in the English-speaking world due to poor translation, while in North America in particular, psychoanalysis has been reduced to a mere technique by its monopolization by the medical profession--:

> The English translations cleave to an early stage of Freud's thought, in which he inclined toward science and medicine, and disregard the more mature Freud, whose orientation was humanistic, and who was concerned mostly with broadly conceived cultural and human problems and with matters of the soul. Freud himself stated that he considered the cultural and human significance of psychoanalysis more important than its medical significance.
>
> ...Such simplification and reductionism opened the door to the interpretation of Freud's system as advocating "adjustment"--something that Freud never advocated--and to a disregard of his pessimistic and tragic view of life and its replacement by a pragmatic meliorism.

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[11] Freud, pp. 45, 54.

> With the mistranslation of Freud's thoughts to make them fit better into a behavioristic frame of reference--a frame of reference completely alien to psychoanalysis--it is understandable that in the English-speaking world his concepts were not only examined in this light but found wanting.[12]

This misappropriation is supremely evident in the rendering of Freud's model of the personality. In place of the familiar and immediate "I", "it", and "over-me" (Freud uses "ich", "es", and "uber-ich" in German), translators into English substitute the jargon of "Ego", "Id", and "Super ego". The effect of this is to reduce Freud's concept to a clinical, intellectual construct, and to make the analyst removed and distant, rather than in intimate communication with the innermost being of the patient.

> Translations of Freud into languages other than English show that there was no compelling reason--except an unconscious desire to create emotional distance from the impact that personal pronouns have, or to use as much as possible the special language of medicine--for having recourse to Latin in translating into English the German pronouns that Freud used...[13]

Another consequence, in Bettelheim's view, of the too literal and too clinical North American approach to Freud is the loss of the latter's use of metaphor--a loss which is highly significant when purporting to treat the aesthetic and cultural realm from a Freudian perspective. Freud's personality model, and indeed the notion of "mental ill-

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[12] Bettelheim, Bruno, "Freud and the Soul", in The New Yorker, March 1, 1982.

[13] Ibid.

ness" itself are conceptual devices which, if taken literally, will lead to erroneously simplistic notions of "cure" and "adjustment'. The use of metaphor, Freud realized, was a device the psychoanalyst shared with the poet:

> Because of...the influence of censorship, the unconscious reveals itself in symbols or metaphors, and psychoanalysis, in its concern with the unconscious, tries to speak about it in its own metaphoric language...Metaphors are more likely than a purely intellectual statement to touch a human chord and arouse our emotions, and thus give us a feeling for what is meant. A true comprehension of psychoanalysis requires not only an intellectual realization but a simultaneous emotional response; neither alone will do. A well-chosen metaphor will permit both. Because poets speak in metaphors about the contents of their unconscious, Freud insisted that they, and other great artists, had known all along what he had to discover through laborious work. (emphasis mine)[14]

Metaphors both permit and sustain a degree of ambiguity and paradox, qualities which North American intellectuals largely eschew:

> Psychoanalytic writing, which is concerned to such a large degree with the unconscious--itself full of ambiguities and contradictions--will in German try to do them justice, while good English style requires that such ambiguities be avoided. In theory, many topics with which Freud dealt permit both a hermeneutic-spiritual and a positivistic-pragmatic approach. When this is so, the English translators nearly always opt for the latter, positivism being the most important English philosophical tradition.[15]

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[14] Betteleheim, p. 67.

[15] Ibid., p. 69.

Bettelheim here provides us with a most definitive rebuttal to the "veiled positivism" charge with which Pivato dismisses Freudianism!

One of the most misunderstood--and hence rejected by American psychologists--of Freud's metaphors is that of the so called "death instinct" (Thanatos) which is in eternal conflict with Eros. It is misunderstood firstly because it is mistranslated. "Instincts" (a word which exists in German but which Freud chose not to use) are immutable and beyond the range of analysis; Bettelheim proposes "drive" or "impulse". Secondly, the notion is unintelligible apart from Freud's concept of man's "soul" which has escaped translation into English almost entirely. To understand the Eros Thanatos conflict metaphor, however, is to reach the heart of Freud's thinking on culture and its creation:

> For Freud, the I (ich) was a sphere of tragic conflict. From the moment we are born until the moment we die, Eros and Thanatos struggle for dominance in shaping our lives, and make it difficult for us to be at peace with ourselves...This struggle...makes emotional richness possible...makes alike for depression and elation; which gives life its deepest meaning...
>
> To imagine, as many Americans do, that psychoanalysis makes it possible to build a satisfying life on a belief in the sexual, or life, drive alone is to misunderstand Freud completely. Just as an exclusive preoccupation with the death drive would make us morbidly depressed and ineffective, an exclusive preoccupation with the sexual, or life, drive can only lead to a shallow, narcissistic existence, because it evades reality and robs life of what makes every moment of it uniquely significant--the fact that it might be our last one...

> Freud knew few periods of complete ease in his life. That he, like all sensitive human beings, had to suffer for feelings of uneasiness was something he recognized and accepted as but a small price to pay for being able to enjoy the advantages of the culture that is man's highest achievement...
>
> ...An inescapable sadness is part of the life of every reflective person, but is only part--by no means all--of living...
>
> We must recognize with Freud, what those creators of our humanity...accepted and endured in the realization that only in conflict with it self can the human heart (as Faulkner said) or the human soul (as Freud would have said) attain what is best in life.[16]

Sigmund Freud's views on creativity, their misapprehension by others, and replies to these misapprehensions have been dealt with at some length, for without them this thesis could have gone no further. Any attempt to treat the question of creativity and suffering from within a psychoanalytic perspective must rest on an assurance that such a treatment is at least inherent, if not explicit, in the foundations of psychoanalysis. Nelson and Bettelheim have shown that negotiation of internal conflict is not only compatible with but central to the creative process in Freud's thinking. It is now to be seen how this is reflected in the work of four others in the analytic tradition.

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[16] Bettelheim, op. cit.

Anna Freud's Contribution to the Creativity Issue

Anna Freud had little to say explicitly on the subject of creativity. She did, however, contribute significantly to the concept of stress and conflict in child development. Her work in this area, which diverged notably from that of Melanie Klein, made her an influence in her own right in Europe. In addition, her role as the inheritor and custodian of her father's papers and archives gave her a significant if not disproportionate influence in the subsequent shaping of the Freudian legacy of thought.

The youngest of Freud's six children, Anna came to psychoanalytic work after five years as a teacher in a Vienna primary school. In 1918, at age 23, she became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. She began to practise child analysis five years later. Another former teacher and the first female member of the Vienna Society, Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth, had from 1911 on been developing a method of psychoanalytic treatment for emotionally disturbed children which combined education and play therapy. With Hug-Hellmuth's untimely death in 1924, and Melanie Klein's move from Berlin to London two years later, Anna Freud became the undisputed leader on the Continent of what many were coming to regard as the most promising branch of psychoanalysis.

In 1926 Miss Freud was elected Secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Of all the analysts who worked with children, she was the one who most concertedly

attempted to define the relationship between psychoanalysis and education, which she did in a 1929 series of lectures to teachers in Vienna day care centres. These early writings abound in unbridled optimism superficially akin to that which permeated John Dewey's progressive education movement in the U.S. Educators and analysts alike expressed the belief that, with the abolition of rules, punishment and restraints ("elimination of the superego", in one extreme credo), it would be possible to raise a generation of children free of neurosis.

Such dreams were soon abandoned. A number of "free schools", founded on principles of "non-intervention" in the child's development, had sprung up in Europe in the decade following the First World War; most of those on the Continent were proving non-viable and facing closure even before the advent of the Nazi regime.[17] By the end of the 1920's, Sigmund Freud himself had conceded that "conflict and neurosis are bound up with growth. Childhood neurosis is not the exception but the rule; it is unavoidable."[18] In Civilization and its Discontents (1930), he went even further:.

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[17] Sol Cohen, In the Name of the Prevention of Neurosis: The Search for a Psychoanalytic Pedagogy in Europe 1905-1938. Pp. 202ff.

[18] Freud, Sigmund, An Outline of Psycho-analysis (1940). Pp. 41-42.

> Civilization has been attained through the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction. (The super-ego)...represents the ethical standards of mankind.[19]

Anna Freud echoed and explicated these sentiments in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1939). In the conclusion she states

> I do not believe that even the most revolutionary changes in infant care can do away with the tendancy to ambivalence or with the division of the human personality into an id and an ego with conflicting aims...
>
> (Mental distress) has to be accepted as a normal by-product of the child's dependency, his exposure to frustrations, and the inevitable strains and stresses of development...The hope of extirpating neurosis from human life is found...to be illusory.[20]

It was to the end of a more modest objective--that of bringing a greater measure of the self under conscious, self willed control ("where It [id] was, I [ego] shall be", in her father's phrase)--that Miss Freud wrote The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. The choice of title is instructive. Her focus is upon the ego, "the medium through which we get a picture of the other two institutions."[21] This set the book apart from the then-current (1936) preoccupation with the unconscious id processes.

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[19] Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and its Discontents.

[20] Cited in Cohen, p. 208.

[21] Freud, Anna, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, London: The Hogarth Press, 1968, p. 6.

In Anna Freud's thesis the ego comprises both conscious and unconscious elements, the latter being known to us only in the effects of their interaction with the id aspects of the personality:

> All the defense measures of the ego against the id are carried out silently and invisibly...This applies to successful repression. The ego knows nothing of it; we are only aware of it subsequently, when it becomes apparent that some thing is missing. ..(for instance) when we try to form an objective judgment about a particular individual, we realize that certain id-impulses are absent...[22]

Understanding this interaction, which is done through studying the ego's mechanisms of defense against the id, enables a balanced and comprehensive understanding of the whole self, i.e., psycho-analysis. One half of the texts consists of Miss Freud's enumeration and description of nine defense mechanisms that pertain to illness.[23]

More significant to our interest in creativity, however, is the non-pathological device she cites:.

> ...To these nine methods of defense, which are very familiar in the practice and have been exhaustively described in the theoretical writings of psycho-analysis...we must add a tenth, which pertains rather to the study of the normal than to that of neurosis: sublimation, or displacement of instinctual aims.[24]

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[22] Freud, Anna, p. 8.

[23] These are regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal.

[24] Freud, Anna, p. 44.

Now assumming that Anna Freud shared her father's view of sublimation of instinctual drives as the source of creative activity, we have here further evidence in support of Nelson's and Bettelheim's claim that artistic phantasy and creation were not to the elder Freud the regressive, escapist activity that many have alleged. They were, at very least, benign processes used in coming to terms with external reality. Anna Freud takes this contention even further in allowing such phantasies a positive role. Comparing two cases of children, one the celebrated "Little Hans" documented by her father, the other, a patient of her own, she states:

> Phantasies helped (Little Hans) to reconcile himself to reality...(and) conscious insight into the inevitable played no part here. Hans denied reality by means of his phantasy; (emphases A. Freud's) he transformed it to suit his own purposes, and to fulfil his own wishes; then, and not till then, could he accept it.
>
> Our study of the defensive processes revealed...that the fate of his neurosis was determined from, the moment...he displaced his aggressiveness and anxiety from his father to horses. But this impression is deceptive. Such a substitution of an animal for a human object is not in itself a neurotic process; it occurs frequently in the normal development of children...
>
> For instance, a seven-year-old boy whom I analyzed used to amuse himself with the following fantasy. He owned a tame lion, which terrified everyone else and loved nobody but him...
>
> From the little boy's analysis it was easy to see that the lion was a substitute for the father...In both children aggressiveness was transformed into anxiety and the affect was displaced from the father onto an animal. But their subsequent methods of dealing with the affects differed.

> Hans used his fear of horses as the basis of his neurosis, i.e., he imposed upon himself the renunciation of his instinctual desires, internalized the whole conflict, and...avoided situations of temptation. My patient managed things more comfortably for himself. ...he simply denied a painful fact and in his lion fantasy turned it into its pleasurable opposite. He called the anxiety animal his friend, and its strength, instead of being a source of terror, was now at his service. The only indication that in the past the lion had been an anxiety object was the anxiety of the other people...[25]

In each case these phantasies arise in the sublimation of anxiety. Anna Freud makes it clear that she considers the source of the anxiety unimportant, whether instinctual (id drives), objective (from something in the outside world) or anxiety of conscience (the super-ego). All produce painful effects which may be sublimated in phantasy, and the particular manner of dealing with them may be therapeutic or pathological.

But like the elder Freud in later years, she holds that pain cannot unendingly be avoided, but must ultimately be borne:

> When the ego has taken its defensive measures against an affect for the purpose of avoiding "pain", something more besides analysis is required to annul them, if the result is to be permanent. The child must learn to tolerate larger and larger quantities of "pain" without immediately having recourse to his defensive mechanisms. It must, however, be admitted that theoretically it is the business of education rather than of analysis to teach him this lesson.[26]

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25 Freud, Anna, pp. 73-75.

26 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

In Anna Freud's perspective "education...begins with the first day of life";[27] it is not to be equated with schooling. Nevertheless, one could substitute "culture", "the arts", or even "the creative process" for "education" in the above quotation without distortion to the underlying thought, as is clear from her conclusion:

> ...the ego is victorious when its defensive measures effect their purpose, i.e., when they enable it to restrict the development of anxiety and unpleasure and so to transform the instincts that, even in difficult circumstances, some measure of gratification is secured, thereby establishing the most harmonious relations possible between the id, the superego, and the forces of the outside world.
>
> ...the readiness with which such processes can be displaced assists the mechanism of sublimation, by which the ego achieves its purpose of diverting the instinctual impulses from their purely sexual goals to aims which society holds to be higher.
>
> ...instinctual danger makes human beings intelligent...In this respect instinctual anxiety has the familiar effect of objective anxiety. Objective danger and deprivations spur men on to intellectual feats and ingenious attempts to solve their difficulties, while objective security and superfluity tend to make them comfortably stupid. The focusing of the intellect on instinctual processes is analogous to the alertness which the human ego has found to be necessary in the face of the objective dangers which surround it.[28]

From the aforegoing statements of Anna Freud, it is possible to construct a theory of creativity, even though she never once uses the word:

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[27] Freud, Anna, Introduction to Psychoanalysis for Teachers, New York, 1928, cited in Cohen, p. 196.

[28] Freud, Anna, pp. 176, 175, 163-164.

1. The infantile ego is beseiged by anxiety arising from his instinctual drives (id), conscience (super ego), and the external world.

2. These anxieties may be dealt with by one or more of nine pathological defense mechanisms, or may be displaced or sublimated through phantasy.

3. Phantasies may be creative, as means to facing reality, indicated in the ego's ability to bear a measure of pain, or escapist distortions entailing further anxiety.

4. Instinctual anxiety and objective danger can thus motivate human beings to ingenious solutions and creative achievements.

Anna Freud has shown how the second generation of mainstream Freudians explicated and added to the elder Freud's thinking on suffering and sublimation in the creative process, particularly with respect to the development of children. Melanie Klein differed from Anna Freud's thinking in a number of respects, while still purporting to speak from within the Freudian tradition. Before examining her own approach to the creativity-and-suffering question, it remains to consider the question from the perspective of a one-time member of and later dissenter from the tradition, and from that of two New World neo-Freudians.

Carl Jung and Creative Transcendence

While explicit views on creativity are only occasional among the works of the elder Freud and incidental to those

of his daughter, Carl Jung is more obliging. One of the first to use art in psychotherapy, he has left us with a wealth of material on the experiences, both his own and his patients', of those who worked through and transcended their conflicts in this way. In addition, though he ranks artistic expression below religious experience (not to be equated with religious orthodoxy) as a unifying force in human life, many of the wholistic and healing effects he attributes to authentic religious encounter are equally attributable to art.

Nineteen years younger than Sigmund Freud, Jung was already developing his own orientation when he met the controversial Viennese analyst in 1907. The two immediately formed a close and intense relationship which, after numerous and persistent strains, was finally severed in 1913. Both men later commented on the trauma and sense of loss resulting from the split. It appeared to affect Jung the more deeply of the two, however, as much of his subsequent writing on creativity abounds in rebuttal of the 1912 Freud, ignoring the considerable evolution of Freud's thought in the two decades thereafter. In any case, it is difficult to summarize Jungian creativity theory without continual reference to the Freudian model it rejected and supplanted.

In its essence, Jung's thought differs from Freud's in three respects: (1) it is more maternalistic; (2) it is less rationalistic, and (3) it is more wholistic. In contrast

with Freud whose preoccupation with the father as an authority figure left the mother in a largely nurturing role, Jung's depiction of woman includes images of devourer and destroyer as well as protector. In this he foreshadows some of the maternal images of Melanie Klein. He is considerably less nationalistic and more eclectic than either Freud or Klein, however, and his postulation of quasi-mystical elements in the psyche was a major contributor to his break with Freudian orthodoxy. He is extremely well versed in both medieval alchemy and ancient mythology, for instance, but has been criticized for the liberty with which he treats this material in current events, as well as in dreams and phantasies.

The third remarkable characteristic of Jungian thought, its wholism--or, in the view of some detractors, its attempt to reconcile incompatible opposites--is attributed by some to Jung's life-long search for a replacement for the religious orthodoxy he had cast off in youth. However, it is also reflective of his psychiatric practice, and particularly of nine years' work with schizophrenics at the hospital at Bergholzli. Freud, by contrast, apart from a brief locumtenancy, had never worked in a mental hospital and had little experience with psychotic patients, a group he considered unreachable by means of psychoanalysis.[29]

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[29] Storr, Anthony, Jung, London: Wm. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1973, p. 16.

Jung acknowledged the efficacy of Freudian analysis for the predominantly hysterical and neurotic clientele with which Freud was dealing. But his own work with psychotics led him to concentrate on the mechanisms of splitting and dissociation, rather than repression, as the most injurious to his patients. His therapeutic approach, therefore, which he characterized as "analytic psychology" (to distinguish it from psychoanalysis) was oriented primarily to identifying and personifying these split-off parts of the personality, and subsequently to reconciling and integrating them within a broader psychic frame of reference.[30]

It was Jung who coined the term "complexes" to describe these partial or fragmentary personalities[31] in the unconscious, a condition which he thought was universal, the neurotic and the psychotic differing only in the degree of the dissociation. For the psychotic the dissociation was internal (i.e., lack of cohesion within the mind) as well as with the environment, and Jung was among the first to postulate a possible chemical cause for the disorder. But at the same time, he conducted an intensive study of the significance of schizophrenic delusions, hallucinations, and

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[30] Storr, p. 14.

[31] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

visions,[32] the results of which ultimately convinced him that

> (Freud's) procedure...to take the contents of a delusional system and to trace its origins to infantile sexuality...seemed to do less than justice to the creative complexity of the delusional material which might resemble a novel, a poem, or, more especially, a myth or fairy story.[33]

In a paper on the case of a paranoic, Schereb, written before the break with Jung, Freud had allowed that

> the delusional formation, which we take to be a pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction.[34]

This is the same concession one finds in Anna Freud. Jung, however, went farther. In a 1914 paper, he wrote

> Closer study of Schreber's or an similar case will show that these patients are consumed by a desire to create a new world-system, or...Weltanschaung, often of the most bizarre kind. Their aim is obviously to create a system that will enable them to assimilate unknown psychic phenomena and so adapt themselves to their own world. This is a purely subjective adaptation at first, but it is a necessary transition stage on the way to adapting the personality to the world in general.[35]

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[32] This study formed the basis of Jung's 1906 book, The Psychology of Demential Praecos, which led to his first meeting with Freud the following year.

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[34] Freud, Sigmund, An Outline of Psycho-analysis, Standard Edition, London: The Hogarth Press, 1964, Volume XII, p. 71.

[35] Jung, Carl, Collected Works, Volume III, p. 189.

Later he came to view the inner world and its images not as infantile phenomena to be outgrown, a mere transition stage on the road to an adult orientation, but

> on an equal footing with the external world. (Jung) sees the ego poised...between inner and outer, between objective and subjective, with an equal need to relate to each world.[36]

Jung experienced this dichotomy first-hand in a "mid-life crisis", which preceded and persisted through the First World War. In this period he came close to a psychotic breakdown, which he recognized in the similarity between his own inner images and hallucinations and those earlier recounted to him by his patients. Jung negotiated the crisis in part by painting as a means of objectifying these fantasies, giving birth to the therapeutic technique he afterwards described as "active imagination". While he refused to consider his paintings as works of art--and strenuously resisted the praise of those who regarded them as such--he nevertheless owned the similarity of his own experience to autobiographical descriptions of the creative process by artists in a, number of disciplines. Moreover, he saw the dreams and visions not as delusions but as revelations and

> himself and other creative people as being vessels through which superior or new insights were made manifest...as being ahead of their time, and... being in touch with a source of superior wisdom...[37]

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[36] Storr, p. 74.

[37] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

This "source" of wisdom and inspiration Jung characterized as the Collective Unconscious or, later in his life, simply as God. In one of his last writings, Freud had postulated a similar psychic stratum common to all humanity:

> Dreams bring to light material which can not have originated either from the dreamer's adult life or from his forgotten childhood. We are obliged to regard it as part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into the world, before any experiences of his own, influenced by the experiences of his ancestors. We find the counterpart of this phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends and in surviving customs.[38]

Jung enlarged on this concept:

> (The collective unconscious)...is a potentiality handed down to us from primordial times in... mnemonic images or inherited in the anatomical structures of the brain...there are inborn possibilities of ideas that set bounds to even the boldest fantasy activity within certain categories ...(that) appear only in the shaped material of art as in the regulative principles that shape it...[39]

In Jung's thought, then, the Unconscious has two sources: the experience of the race, which is subsumed in the Collective Unconscious; and that of the individual, which constitutes the Personal Unconscious or

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[38] Freud, Sigmund, Standard Edition, Vol. XXIII, pp. 166-167.

[39] The Portable JUNG, Joseph Campbell, ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1976, p. 319.

> (the) sum total of all those psychic processes and contents which are capable of becoming conscious and often do, but are then suppressed because of their incompatibility and kept subliminal.[40]

Jung believed that the first half of one's life was taken up with tasks such as independence from parents and finding a mate--tasks that entail coming to terms with his/her Personal Unconscious, and were largely amenable to Freudian or Adlerian treatment. From the age of 35 onward--a period neglected by the Freudians--a small number of individuals advance to a stage of development that Jung calls "Individuation". This concept, which is central to the thought of Carl Jung, involves persons with strong egos, to whom "normalization means nothing", and who embark

> (on) a spiritual quest (for truth and meaning in life)...(with) the end result (of)...becoming integrated individuals (each in his/her own right).[41]

This describes the disintegration and re-synthesis that Jung himself experienced in his mid-life crisis: the passing through and transcending conflicts on a new symbolic plain:

> One certainly does feel the affect and is shaken and tormented by it, yet at the same time one is aware of a higher consciousness looking on which prevents one from becoming identical with the affect, a consciousness which regards the affect as an object, and can say, "I know that I suffer."[42]

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[40] Campbell, Joseph, ed. p. 319

[41] Storr, pp. 89

[42] Jung, pp. 13, 15.

This is the level of Self-knowledge and Other-knowledge experienced by the artist.

Jung's most explicit statement on creativity appears in a lecture delivered to the Society for German Language and Literature at Zurich in May 1922, entitled "On the Relation of Analytic Psychology to Poetic Art"[43] Written ten years after the break with Freud, it shows the continuing effect (and affect!) of the split in frequent allusions:

> ...to do justice to a work of art, analytic psychology must rid itself entirely of medical prejudice; for a work of art is not a disease, and...requires a different approach from the medical one.
>
> ...The reductive method of Freud...is essentially a medical technique for investigating morbid psychic phenomena, and it is solely concerned with the ways and means of getting round or peering through the foreground of consciousness in order to reach the psychic background, or the unconscious.[44]

In his zeal to rebut, Jung often oversimplifies and misrepresents the approach of his one-time mentor:

> If we were to interpret Plato's (cave) metaphor in Freudian terms we would naturally arrive at the womb (and would have proved) that even a mind like Plato's was still stuck on a primitive level of infantile sexuality.[45]

To draw such inferences from Freud is in itself reductive, and does not sufficiently acknowledge Freud's

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[43] Campbell, pp. 301-322.

[44] Campbell, pp. 308, 305-306.

[45] Campbell, p. 307.

expressed admiration and wonder before "the innermost secret (of) the artist...of literary talent."

Jung faults Freudian psychology--with questionable grounds, it would appear--for presuming to dismiss or explain away the artistic product. Jung himself does not attempt to deal with the question "What is art?", but limits his discussion to the process by which the product is arrived at:

> Only that aspect of art which consists in the process of artistic creation can be a subject for psychological study...(This) has nothing to do with (art's) innermost essence.[46]

Jung defines the creative process as an autonomous complex, rooted in the Collective Unconscious, by which the artist transcends his personal conflict in an archetypal symbol which, by his individual clear-sightedness and lack of social adaptation, he synthesizes and invests with meaning for his contemporaries.

Since this is not a simple concept, we shall elucidate each element in turn:

(a) an autonomous complex

> ...analysis of artists shows...the unborn work in the psyche of the artist is a force of nature that achieves its end regardless of the personal fate of the man who is its vehicle. (emphasis mine)[47]

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[46] Campbell, p. 302.

[47] Campbell, pp. 312-313.

Jung distinguishes two seemingly different modes of creation: (1) those works that grow from the author's intention to produce a particular result (He calls this class of works "introverted".),[48] and (2) those that "flow more or less complete and perfect from the author's pen...force themselves upon the author...bring...(their) own form."[49] In the first mode the material appears to be subordinate to the artist's purpose, while in the second the artist is subordinate to the process. Yet Jung feels that the artist's autonomy in the first instance may be illusory, as evidenced by the overtones of the poet who says more than he is aware of, and by the compulsive nature of his work.

The psychic formation or complex remains subliminal[50] until it gathers sufficient energy to cross the threshold into consciousness. Even then, it is conscious only to the extent of being perceptible, and not to that of being controllable, by the artist.

(b) <u>rooted in the Collective Unconscious</u>

> ...by inferences drawn from the finished work (of art) we can reconstruct the age old original of the primordial image... that constantly recurs in the course of history and appears wherever creative fantasy is freely expressed.

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[48] Schiller anticipated Jung's "introverted" and "extroverted" by his own "sentimental" and "naive" types, respectively.

[49] Campbell, pp. 309-311.

[50] Campbell, pp. 319-321.

> These images...are the psychic residua of inumerable...typical experiences of our ancestors. They ...are...products of creative fantasy and still...to be translated into conceptual language...
>
> The individual man cannot use his powers to the full unless he is aided by one of the unconscious representations we call ideals, which releases all the hidden forces of instinct that are inaccessible to the conscious will...[51]

The artist, then, has within his soul the same "ground water" as his contemporaries, but differs from them in being able to access it more readily. He can do this by . . .

(c) transcending his personal circumstances

The artist deals with personal conflict on a higher--or, if you will, a deeper--level than his contemporaries. He is not content to see his own struggle in purely private terms, on the one hand, nor as a more meaningless repetition of humanity in the mass, on the other. It is this insatiable thirst for meaning that makes him both more divided in nature than his fellows, and more driven than they to seek a resolution to the tension between internal being and external reality:

> The unsatisfied yearning of the artist reaches back to the primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the inadequacy and onesidedness of the present.[52]

The artist is abetted in this search by the strength of his own ego or, in more Jungian terms, his advanced state of

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[51] Campbell, p. 317.

[52] Campbell, p. 321.

individuation and his correspondingly less-developed social adaptation:

> ...the artist's relative lack of adaptation turns out to his advantage; it enables him to follow his own yearnings far from the beaten path, and to discover what it is that would meet the unconscious needs of his age. Thus, just as the one-sidedness of the individual's conscious attitude is corrected by reactions from the unconscious, so art represents a process of self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs.[53]

Art is effective when it speaks to the viewer's/reader's unconscious, which it does by

(d) investing symbols with meaning

> The artist seizes on (the) image, and in raising it from deepest unconsious ness he brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming it until it can be accepted by the minds of his contemporaries according to their powers...
>
> That is the secret of great art, and of its effect upon us. The creative process, so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present, and so makes it possible for us to find our way back to the deepest springs of life.[54]

In summary, then, Carl Jung saw the artist as a divided soul--more divided and tormented than his fellows, but also more capable than they of coping with the division and integrating the disorder. Indeed, it is his inner conflict which drives the artist to produce, out of the need to heal

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[53] Campbell, p. 322.

[54] Campbell, p. 321.

the split. The following quotation by Harrison Gough could have just as easily been uttered by Jung:

> The work of art...re-orders and brings into balance the tensions of form and space and... moderates the inner tensions of the observer, giving him a sense of encounter and fulfilment.[55]

Jung saw the mandala patterns, which appeared in his own artwork and that of his patients following the successful negotiation of a crisis, as symbolic of the artistic synthesis of discordant forces and elements in the Self.[56]

Kubie and the Preconscious

While Jung saw creativity and suffering as interrelated and often complementary, Lawrence S. Kubie sees them as purely coincidental and generally in conflict. In Kubie's view both creativity and neurosis are universal and independent processes, the only connection between them being that neurosis inhibits creative functioning:

> What men succeed in creating is in spite of their struggles to over-come their neuroses, and not in any sense the fruit of these struggles.[57]

Kubie is significant as a neo-Freudian practising in the U.S.--one who reflects both the European "storm and

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[55] Gough, Harrison, "Identifying the Creative Man", Journal of Value Engineering, vol. 2, no. 8, August 15, 1961, pp. 5-12.

[56] Storr, pp. 100-103.

[57] Kubie, p. 9.

stress" perspective and the more positivistic North American one. His 1958 work, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process, is the first explicit and prominent North American attempt to deal with the creativity-and-suffering question inherent in the Freudian tradition. Yet his approach is definitely American, in his reference to empirical studies and in his emphasis on the more mechanistic aspects of Freud's thought. While his conclusion is at variance with much of the European tradition and with the view of this thesis, his stance is convincingly argued, and should not be ignored by anyone addressing the creativity issue.

Kubie sets out to debunk the notion (1) that illness is an aid to creativity, and the later belief (2) that creative activity is any protection-against, or cure for neurosis. Moreover, in a sharp rebuttal of Jung's position--though he does not cite Jung by name--he denies that the artist's inner conflict has any inherently wider or transcendent value:

> The writer and artist may believe he is expressing the World's Neurosis;...in reality (he is dedicated) to the expression of his own Neurosis for all the world to see.[58]

Kubie see original thought of all types--scientific as well as artistic--as a function of free association in which ideas, words and symbols are taken and sh[illegible] ("cogito") from their accustomed contextual [illegible]orings to

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[58] Kubie, p. 9

re-combine "into new constellations on the basis of analogic characteristics.[59] It is only in those "processes of mentation" known as Preconscious thought where association can be most free--free from the need for logical consistency, on the one hand, and from the equal tyranny of unconscious drives and compulsions, on the other.

Reference to a System Preconscious, distinct from both conscious and unconscious thought processes, was first coined by Freud and is synonymous with William James' "fringe of consciousness" and implicit in the work of Ernst Kris.[60] Yet Kubie appears to be the first to invest the concept with significance as the locus of creative thought. He hastens to deny that he is delineating another "area" of the mind, either geographically, as some have done with the concept of right vs. left brain, or even ontologically, as others have done with Freud's tripartite structure of the psyche. The preconscious, for Kubie, exists only as a metaphorical, operational construct--as the no-man's-land or interface between conscious and unconscious processes; and it is the balanced, healthy interaction between these other processes that is most fruitful for the emergence of new ideas.

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[59] Kubie, p. 62.

[60] Ibid., pp. 24, 34, 47. Kris' ego-regression ("regression in the service of the ego") view of creativity distinguishes between the "partial regression" of the creative and the "uncontrolled regression" of the psychotic. (Pivato 170-171).

In conscious thought, verbal processes predominate, and words often work to screen or mask the emotional content of memories. As the mind and vocabulary matures, word meanings become more focussed and limited, aiming at but never achieving a one-to-one correspondence; exceptions to this chronologically increasing "fine tuning" are the "residues" of earlier multiple meanings such as slang, puns, and allegory. In unconscious thought we have a succession of symbols and images; it is not the symbols themselves but what they represent which remains unconscious. When unconscious processes predominate over conscious ones, we have a situation of complete dis-association--particularly the dissociation of feelings from the causes that is known as repression. Predominance of conscious processes leads to greater freedom, flexibility and adaptation--in short, to the antithesis of the compulsive repetition of behaviors that is the hallmark of illness and maladjustment.

Yet even the freely-chosen, conscious patterns of thought and action can become habitual ruts, and it is in preconscious free association that the mind shakes itself out of these. The preconscious system, therefore, is the repository and selector of both those functions that were originally learned consciously and subsequently became automatic (e.g., typing, riding a bicycle) and the subconscious currents that permeate semiconsciousness in dreams and symbols. It is the freedom to move and choose between the two types of thought, and make new connections

between them, that gives free association its strength and richness:

> Preconscious processes are nor circumscribed by the more pedestrian and literal restrictions of conscious language ...they add another type of sensory im ages which...approximate(s) less closely the limited one-to-one relationships of the fully matured language of conscious symbolic functions, but retain a broader overlapping base of multiple meanings...This enables them to use the symbolic process in a more allegorical and figurative fashion...
>
> ...preconsious processes make free use of analogy and allegory, superimposing dissimilar ingredients into new perceptual and conceptual patterns, thus reshuffling-experience to achieve that fantastic degree of condensation without which creativity in any field would be impossible. In the preconscious use of imagery and allegory many experiences are condensed into a single hieroglyph, which expresses in one symbol far more than one can say slowly and precisely, word by word, on the fully conscious level.[61]

In Kubie's perspective the effect of pain and struggle in the creative process is always negative; and even when it serves as a spur to creative activity, it has a distorting effect:

> ...the influence of painful emotions ...plays a significant role in determining the freedom with which even the most brilliantly equipped mind can function in creative work...
>
> ...The mind is an instrument that grinds its axes unconsciously more often than consciously; trying to prove points that it has to prove... Unconscious conflicts and necessities which are carried over from the nursery, from childhood, and from schooling, re-appear in many disguised forms throughout life...they may drive the creative zeal blindly in an effort to resolve some ancient

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[61] Kubie, p. 3.

> dilemma, to pay an old debt or settle an old grudge, to achieve the unattainable goal of a childhood fantasy, or to lift the curse from something which in childhood had been an overwhelming source of pain, humiliation and terror. Such is the quality of the rational yet irrational, unattainable yet necessary and unconscious purposes of free association.[62]

For Kubie, then, the task of both psychology and education, insofar as they relate to creativity, is to seek to identify and eliminate the neurotic, unconscious forces that inhibit the free association necessary to creative thought, and which drive and distort it.

May: Creativity and Encounter

I conclude the pre-Klein survey of the analysts with brief reference to the thought of another North American neo-Freudian, Rollo May. Like Kubie, he is not content to draw inferences from case histories, but cites a number of empirical studies with a wider population base. But he selects a different focus from Kubie's, and arrives at a very different conclusion.

While Kubie concentrates on the inner processes of creative thought, Rollo May emphasizes the external context of the creative act, and in particular that of the "encounter" between the artist's inner being and the non-

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[62] Kubie, pp. 59-62.

being or nothingness which surrounds him.[63] May's conception of the mental processes involved is not as precise or elaborate but, insofar as it goes, it is not significantly at variance with Kubie's. Both men emphasize the universality and ubiquity of the creative process, and both cite the tendency for solutions and ideas to "surface" during periods of rest or relaxation rather than at times of mental concentration.

May, however, links creative thought to the unconscious,[64] and though he subsequently enlarges this term to include both the preconscious and subconscious realms, his drawing of the conceptual lines in different places has significant consequences. Since he does not distinguish between subconscious and preconscious processes, he does not see the threat to free thought coming from unconscious drives as equal to that posed by logical and rational thought. Since he does not situate a second pole within the psyche, he does not find unimpeded mental processes a

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[63] May, Rollo, The Courage to Create, New World/Bantam, 1975, p. 89.

There is a similarity of language between May's concept and that of Arnold Toynbee "On the Role of Creativity in History", in Creativity Across Education, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 196 . Toynbee's "encounter", however, is more narrowly focussed, "between a creative personality and the establishment", which limits actualized creativity to the creator's impact on his social milieu: "If the innovator fails to change his contemporaries...his potential creativity will not have taken effect..."

[64] May defines the Unconscious as "the potentialities for awareness or action which the individual cannot or will not actualize." (p. 58.)

sufficient source for creative thinking, and must postulate another pole outside, in the "objective" environment.

May's encounter arises from the struggle of the artist to make sense of the nonsensical, objective reality around him or, as he put it in an earlier work, of

> ...the human dilemma as the capacity of man to view himself as object and as subject...[B]both are necessary...[I]n the dialectical process between these two poles lies the development, and the deepening and widening, of human consciousness. (emphasis May's)...It is not simply that man must learn to live with the paradox--the human being has always lived in this paradox or dilemma...But we must also take the implications...into our psychological theory. Between the two horns of this dilemma, man has developed symbols, art, language, and the kind of science which is always expanding in its own presuppositions. The courageous living within this dilemma, I believe, is the source of human creativity.[65]

This struggle is fraught with, anxiety--anxiety at the finitude and possible exhaustion of his own creative talent, and at "the hopeless discrepancy between conception and realization" [of the work].[66] But there is also anxiety arising from the anticipated result of the creative act itself, as any genuinely new insight must shatter the accepted order; in this connection May quotes Picasso, that

> Every act of creation is first...an act of destruction.[67]

May documents this anxiety with citations by such well-known figures as Alberta Giacometti, Cézanne, W.H. Auden,

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[66] May, The Courage to Create, p. 95.

[67] Ibid., p. 63.

and Søren Kierkegaard, as well as with reference to the studies of creative persons in art and science conducted by Frank Barron. Barron's "demonstrated creatives" preferred disorderly, chaotic designs on Rorschach cards, while his control group chose designs that were symmetrical and systematic.[68]

The ability to live with anxiety, then, is thus a distinguishing characteristic of creative people (a view also held by Carl Jung), and the angst itself is an inseparable element of the creative encounter. To eliminate the anxiety would not, May believes, serve to enhance creative functioning (Kubie's view), but would actually deprive it of its mainspring. This is clear in an extended footnote in which May contrasts the ecstasy ("ex stasis") of creative tension with the equilibrium ("stasis") of transcendental meditation:

> ...I feel it necessary to state my disagreement with a claim of...transcendental meditation that it is the "science of creative intelligence" and stimulates creative thinking. True, it does further one aspect of creativity--namely spontaneity, intuitively "feeling one's self into the universe," and similar things associated with..."comfort"...These are the aspects of creativity associated with children's play. But TM completely omits the element of encounter which is essential for mature creativity. The aspects of struggle, of tension, of constructive stress ...are forgotten in TM...[69]

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[68] May, The Courage to Create, p. 106.

[69] Ibid., p. 108.

This definition of the distinction between mature creativity and play--underscored earlier in May's reference to a remark by W.H. Auden that he always experiences anxiety when he writes poetry except when he is "playing"[70] is unique to Rollo May, insofar as I have been able to determine, in the psychoanalytic literature on creativity.[71]

The Analysts Reviewed

Whatever the divergences among its practitioners and theorists, the psychoanalytical tradition has not been silent on the question of creativity and suffering. Sigmund Freud saw man's mind/soul (the psyche) as rent by conflicting drives; sublimation in phantasies, which could become escapist as well as artistic, was a means of diverting these forces to higher ends. His daughter Anna extended the implications of this concept into childhood. While never invoking creativity by name, she showed how children's phantasies could be constructive means of dealing with internal anxiety in the same way as external danger and deprivation spurred men to intellectual feats and inventions.

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[70] May, The Courage to Create, p. 106.

[71] A 1980 paper by Reuban Fine treats "creativity [as] the ability to work..."and subsequently conceptualizes work analytically as "parallel to intercourse in the scheme of psychosexual development while play is parallel to masturbation." (Fine, Reuban, "Work, Depression, and Creativity, Psychoanalytic Perspective", in Psychological Reports, 1980, 46, pp. 1195-1221). Fine's conceptual framework is so different that his use of "play" does not detract from the uniqueness of May's distinction.

Dissenter Carl Jung placed suffering at the centre of the creative process. Out of his own experiences and those of his patients, he showed how the artist, by transcending his own inner conflict in a symbolic representation, could invest it with meaning for his fellows. Suffering was both a spur to the creative act and its outworking; the layperson and the artist differed only in their capacity to express the experience in universal terms.

Lawrence Kubie emphatically rejects this complementarity. He sees neurosis as invariably inimical and inhibitory to creativity, the two processes being univeral and independent in origin. Maximally creative thought is to be achieved in free association; this takes place in the (Preconscious) threshold between Unconscious and Conscious constraints such as logic, when/where neither system is strong enough to over-power the other.

Rollo May also situates the generation of new ideas in the Unconscious, but believes these processes are insufficient to issue in more than "play". Required for mature creativity is an encounter between the inner self and the outside world, in which the individual struggles to find meaning out of the subjective/objective polarity in which s/he is pulled.

In four of these five views (all but Kubie's) it is allowed the creativity and suffering have some direct relationship, and both intra-psychic and external sources of conflict and suffering are invoked.

Three of the four sympathetic studies (all but Anna Freud's) deal largely with creativity in adults, whether in acknowledged artists or throughout the population at large. Rollo May implicitly limits his consideration to adults in differentiating "mature creativity" from "play". It is implied that children, by their age and experience, cannot have undergone/resolved conflict to his point of encounter.

In the one study to deal expressly with children, Anna Freud is disappointingly reticent. Granted, the creativity issue is ephemeral to her study, but the framework on which one would build is sparse at this point. When and where do children's conflicts begin? Miss Freud is ambivalent here; she adopted her father's Thanatos concept, but did not apply it explictly to children. Sometimes she states that the conflict occurs between the child's inner and outer worlds, as in her interpretation of Little Hans' phantasies. At other times she seems to point to an internal origin.[72]

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[72] In the only explicit statement by Anna Freud on the creative process, that I have uncovered, (and that after preparing the last draft of this chapter), she says:

> It is fascinating...to compare this fight for freedom of artistic expression with the battle for free association and the uncovering of the unconscious mind which make up the core of an analyst's therapeutic work...There are even the same faults committed. The painter interferes with the process of creation when, in the author's words, he cannot bear the 'uncertainty about what is emerging long enough, as if one had to turn the scribble into some recognisable whole when, in fact, the thought or mood seeking expression had not yet reached that stage.' (Continued on next page)

Nor does she show how the resolution of conflict takes place other than in the child's phantasies and relationships, If creativity can be a means of this outworking, when and how does it appear? Is it to be considered synonomous with the child's first scribblings, or are these of interest primarily from a motor-development view?

There is, however, a child analyst for whom conflict, creativity and catharsis were central to her theory and practice. For these and related issues, we turn to Anna Freud's contemporary and counter in the child analytic movement--Melanie Klein, the principal subject of this thesis.

(Continued from previous page) Nothing can resemble more closely than this the attitude of haste and anxiety on the analyst's or patient's part which leads to premature interpretation, closes the road to the unconscious and puts a temporary stop to the spontaneous upsurge of the id-material.
(Foreword to Milner, Marion [Joanna Field] On Not Being Able to Paint, Heinemann, London, 1950, 1971.)

The congruence of this position with that of Lawrence Kubie--it could just as easily have been written by him--is instructive. It shows why Anna Freud was so readily adopted in the U.S.A., whose neo-Freudians concentrated on Freud's structural (id, ego, and superego) and topographic (unconscious, preconscious, and conscious) model of the psyche to the exclusion of his later dynamic or economic model with its death-drive postulate.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIFE AND WORLD OF MELANIE KLEIN

Melanie Klein considered herself unquestionably a Freudian in outlook and technique; even when she diverged from the thinking of the elder Freud at points, she saw these as being consonant with, explicative of, and corrective to an essential orthodoxy from which she never varied.[1] In this chapter I shall show how the formation and development of her thoughts situate her in respect of the Freudian mainstream, and where she departed from it. Mention must be made of her personal life and background influences; if these are important to understanding any individual of genius, they are particularly relevant in the realm where "the child is [deemed to be] the father of the man [/woman]".[2]

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[1] It is ironic that the major challenge to Klein's orthodoxy came from Freud's daughter Anna and her circle. Anna Freud admitted in her own practice to setting aside her father's technique on a number of points to which Melanie Klein remained staunchly committed. (Klein, Melanie, The Psychoanalysis of Children, London: The Hogarth Press, 1980, pp. xv-xvi.

[2] The biographical information in this chapter is largely drawn from Hanna Segal's Klein (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979). Until its publication there was virtually no biographical material on Melanie Klein available in print in North America. Phyllis Grosskurth's full-length biography Melanie Klein: her world and her work, (Continued on next page).

Finding Her Vocation (1882-1919)

Hanna Segal has identified three periods in Melanie Klein's development,[3] centering on her significant discoveries and publications. To these we must add a fourth: the preparatory, pre-analytic period which nevertheless comprised almost the first half (36 years) of her life. This period further divides almost evenly into two parts, one preceding her marriage, and the other, the years of the marriage itself.

Melanie Klein was born in 1882, the youngest of four children of a Jewish doctor-cum-dentist, Moriz Reizes and his second wife Libussa Deutsch, who ran an exotic plant and animal shop. Her father, past fifty when Melanie was born, showed little interest in her as a small child, but later proved an intellectual stimulus to her until his death in 1900. Widely read and self-taught in ten languges, he had originally been destined for rabbinical studies by his orthodox parents against whom he finally rebelled.

Her mother, fifteen years younger, was also from a rabbinical family but a more liberal one. Her shop--a rare undertaking for a woman of a professional family at the time--contributed significantly to the family income, both

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[2] (Continued from previous page) Hodden & Stoughton, London, 1986, having just been released, came too late for the preparation of this chapter, but has proven useful in correcting some biographical details, notably points of chronology.

[3] Segal, (1973, p. 1.)

in the early years of the marriage and later, during Melanie's studies when Moriz was ailing. She was much closer to Melanie, who appears to have idealized her in communication with friends. Grosskurth's research, however, uncovers a possessive and domineering woman whose closeness to her children was exacted and maintained at the cost of their relationships to each other, and to their spouses.[4] Libussa spent the last few years of her life in Melanie's home.

Of her four siblings, Melanie was initially closest to Sidonie, four years older, who taught her to read and write, and often protected her from the pranks of the elder two. Sidonie died of scrofula at age nine, after a long illness of which she was quite aware; she told her younger sister she wanted to pass along all her knowledge to her before dying. Growing out of a common interest in poetry, Melanie later developed a close relationship with her brother Emmanuel, five years her senior, which lasted until his death of a rheumatic heart condition at age twenty-five. She was never close to her eldest sister Emily (six years older).

At age fourteen Melanie decided she wanted to study medicine and specialize in psychiatry. Her brother, who had abandoned his own medical studies because of ill health, coached her in Greek and Latin for the university entrance

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[4] Grosskurth (1986), Chapters 2-4.

examinations. He also introduced her to many of his friends--a lively intellectual circle--among them her husband-to-be, Arthur Steven Klein. She became engaged to him the year after her father's death, and they were married two years later the day after her twenty-first birthday in 1903. This cut short her plans to study medicine; the intervening time was spent studying humanities at Vienna University. This was a decision she was often to regret, particularly when her theories of psychosis were later attacked on the basis of her lack of a psychiatric background.

Her marriage was never a happy one. Her husband's business took them to a number of small towns in Slovakia and Silesia to live, where she lacked the intellectual and social stimulation to which she had been accustomed during her upbringing in Vienna. She immersed herself in reading, learning and languages and parenting. A daughter, Melitta, was born in 1904, and a son, Hans in 1907.

The year 1910 marked a move with her husband to Budapest, where she found intellectual peers and where she discovered Freud in 1914 through reading his 1901 books, On Dreams (Uber den Traum). Although born and raised in Vienna, she had never heard of him there.[5] This belated discovery set the course for her life: the study, practice,

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[5] Klein first encountered Freud in person at the Fifth Annual Psycho-Analytic Congress, held in Budapest, September 28-29, 1918.

and enlargement of psychoanalysis. To this end she entered analysis with Sandor Ferenczi, possibly the same year (1914) as the death of her mother and the birth of her third child, Erich. Ferenczi encouraged her to analyze children; her first paper, "The Development of a Child", presented to the Hungarian Society in July 1919 (and subsequently the basis of her acceptance into membership), was a case study of Erich, which point was subsequently concealed in the published versions, where he was referred to as "Fritz."[6] In 1919 she also separated from her husband, who moved to Sweden.[7] These events marked the ending of one stage of her life, and the beginning of another.

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[6] This paper is an observation, not an analysis, and is distinctly amateurish by comparison with Klein's later work. Although evident to a few insiders, the identify of "Fritz" was not known by most contemporary Kleinians until Grosskurth's research, and proved troubling to a number of them. (Grosskurth [1986] pp. 75-79).

[7] Grosskurth's new and painstakingly-researched chronology is at variance at this point with Klein's own (and Segal's, which was based on Klein's). The latter date(s) the Klein divorce in 1922, and make(s) no mention of an attempted reconciliation in 1923-24. According to Grosskurth (89, 90, 97) the actual divorce did not come about till 1926. This discrepancy is too great to be a case of mis-recollection. It would seem that Klein wished to draw a clearer line between her old life and her new (analogous to some converts retrospection on their being "born again") than was actually the case. However, since any biographical attempt to divide a life into distinct periods must be somewhat arbitrary, Klein's/Segal's 1919/1920 is as valid interpretatively as any other cut-off.

A New Technique and New Ideas (1920-1934)

In September 1920, at the sixth international Psychoanalytic Conference in The Hague, she met Karl Abraham, probably through the offices of Ferenczi as Klein herself was relatively unknown at this time. Abraham was at this time secretary of the Psychoanalytical Association, a physician with six years training in psychiatric hospitals (including three at Burghölzli with Carl Jung), a member of Freud's inner circle ("The Committee of the Seven Rings") and a gifted linguist. He was also a very gifted analyst--a better clinician than Freud, in the opinion of Alix Strachey, who had been analyzed by both men, and of Ernest Jones, Freud's biographer.[8]

Abraham impressed Klein greatly. He encouraged her work in child analysis, in particular the approach adopted in the second, deeper part of her work with "Fritz" (Erich). Anton von Freund, an early benefactor of the Hungarian Society had been unimpressed by Klein's first (1919) case study, suggesting that she had not touched the child's unconscious. Subsequently she adopted a set time every day for analysis, which included the interpretation of his dream, play and phantasies. The child then became more withdrawn and anxious, a situation which increased when she managed to exact from him and interpret his sexual feelings

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[8] Grosskurth (1986), p. 114.

towards herself (the transference phenomenon).[9] Klein had already decided to disguise Erich's identity as "Fritz", a decision about which she had written to Ferencai in late 1920.[10] In the second part of "Fritz's" analysis, she came to rely to a deeper extent on Abraham. Abraham's support led to her move in 1921 to Berlin where he had founded a clinic that was coming to rival Vienna, and where three years later, she persuaded him to accept her as a patient.

Her analysis with Ferenczi, while encouraging in her work, was becoming personally frustrating to her. He did not analyze negative transference (the hostile feelings of the patient toward the analyst), preferring to take a more positive emphasis. Eventually he abandoned the "neutral interpretive technique" entirely to actively reassure or direct patients, leading to a split with Freud.[11] Abraham was habitually reluctant to analyze Berlin colleagues, but accepted Melanié Klein out of respect for the work described in her 1924 paper to the First Conference of German Analysts. He commented on it, "The future of psychoanalysis lies in play technique."[12]

Klein's technique had been evolving since her work with "Fritz", was centered on the home with occasional use of the

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[9] Grosskurth (1986), pp. 77-78.

[10] Ibid., p. 91.

[11] Segal, (1979), pp. 32-33.

[12] Klein, Melanie, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, London: The Hogarth Press, 1980, p. xi.

child's own toys. In 1923, with Klein's growing use of play to interpret transference and symbolism, thirty-three-month-old Rita--the youngest child every analyzed up to that time--toys acquired a more central place. In addition, she became convinced of the need for a venue separate from the child's home. Subsequent treatments took place in her own consulting room. In the case of seven-year-old Inge, a play-room with specific toys was establi[illegible]jacent to her. Both technique and setting were ful[illegible]eveloped by the end of 1923 and varied little thereafter.[13]

Melanie Klein's interpretation of negative transference feelings, (which Abraham had encouraged through to the resolution of the underlying anxieties (i.e., "deep" analysis) in children, led to sharp differences with Anna Freud, whose followers dominated the Berlin Society. Abraham's collegial support in the Society, of which he was President, and his analysis of Klein were cut short after only a year by his illness and premature death--the fourth close loss Melanie Klein was to mourn. His work on melancholy wa[illegible]ignificant influence conceptually as well as personally. She considered herself a disciple of Abraham, and carried on an intense and regular self-analysis for many years.

In 1925, at a conference in Salzburg, she met Ernest Jones, who supported a controversial paper she gave on chil[illegible]

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[13] Klein, Heimann & Money-Kyrle, pp. 403.

analysis--the first fully-developed elucidation of her play technique. Jones, at the instigation of Alix Strachey, another of Abraham's former analysands, invited her to lecture in London. Her six lectures, later incorporated in her first book.[14] were delivered over a three-week period which Klein recalled as among the happiest of her life. Buoyed up by this experience, the following year she moved to England, there to spend the rest of her life. She was accompanied by her youngest son Erich, (then thirteen), and later joined by daughter Melitta and her husband, Walter Schmideberg, both doctors and practising analysts. Eldest son Hans, an engineer, remained behind in Berlin.

In the British Psychoanalytic Society and London Melanie Klein found a milieu not only receptive to her ideas, but one which was already developing its own direction independent of Vienna. Ernest Jones, for instance, had raised doubts about the centrality of Freud's "castration fear"[15] and was considering the existence of anxiety as an instinct in its own right, though he did not equate this with Freud's Thanatos (death-drive). There was also an independent (of Anna Freud's orientation) interest in child analysis, enlivened by educator Susan Isaacs, pediatrician Donald Winnicott, Joan Riviere, Nina Searle,

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[14] Segal, (1979), pp. 74-75.

[15] Klein, (1980).

Sylvia Payne and others. Some of these became close friends to Klein, and pupils of her technique.

Because of the earlier conflict in Vienna, and the controversy that later spread to and surrounded her work in England, there is a tendency among some opponents to regard Melanie Klein's orientation in hindsight as inherently revisionist from its beginnings. This was certainly not the case in this early period, during which she continued to present her findings in the terms of the theoretical legacy of Freud and Abraham. When she diverged, it was in the nature of forays into unexplored areas; this was characteristic of the fluid state of British analysis before Freud's death. Upon the publication of her 1932 book, The Psycho-Analysis of Children,[16] Edward Glover, eventually to be one of Klein's most outspoken critics in the later controversy, wrote a ten-page review in which he declared the work a milestone:

> And I have no hesitation in stating that in two main respects her book is of fundamental importance for the future of psycho-analysis. It contains not only unique clinical material gathered from first-hand analytic observations of children, but lays down certain conclusions which are bound to influence both the theory and practice of analysis for some time to come.[16]

Likewise Dr. Clifford M. Scott, the "grand old man of Canadian psychoanalysis" and a one-time student but never unqualified disciple of Klein, recalls her approach as

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[16] International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 18 (1937), p. 406ff. Cited in Segal (1979), p. 76.

essentially analytical and cautious in the enunciating of new ideas:

> She always looked very carefully for evidence, for facts and sequences of facts...If anybody wanted to generalize, she would always force them back to the material. In supervision, when there was any controversy, she would urge people back to the evidence. She would say, "What are we going to base those conclusions on? Have we got the material? If we haven't, then let's wait."[17]

Of the new ideas emergent in Mrs. Klein's pre-1934 work, most of which can be found in The Psycho Analysis of Children, one must include:

A pre-genital origin of the Oedipus complex, and a correspondingly earlier origin of the superego. Classical theory had considered the resolution of the Oedipus complex prerequisite to the emergence of the superego. Klein found:

> In the course of my analysis of small children...I came upon certain facts which seemed to allow of an enlargement...of Freud's theory...There could be no doubt that a superego had been in full operation for some time in my small patients of between two and three quarters and four years of age,...whereas according to the accepted view the superego did not begin to be activated...until about the fifth year...[18]
>
> ...In these games [Erna] used to punish her doll and then give way to an outburst or rage and fear...
>
> These games...proved that this anxiety referred not only to the child's real parents, but also, and more especially, to its excessively stern

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[17] Grosskurth/Scott, Journal..., pp. 19-20.

[18] Klein, Melanie, "The early development of conscience in the child", in Heirs to Freud, p. 254. According to Segal (1979), 63, this paper was read in 1933.

> introjected parents. What we meet with here corresponds to what we call the super-ego in adults. The typical signs, which are most pronounced when the Oedipus complex has reached its height and which precede its decline, are themselves only the final stage of a process which has been going on for years. Early analysis shows that the Oedipus conflict sets in as early as the second half of the first year of life and that at the same time the child begins to build up its super-ego.[19]
>
> It appears to me to be justified to call the early identifications made by the child "early stages of super-ego formation" in the same way as I have used the term "early stages of the Oedipus conflict." Already in the earliest stages of the child's development the effects of these object cathexes exert an influence of a kind which characterizes them as a super-ego, although they differ in quality and influence from the identifications belonging to later stages. And cruel as this super-ego formed under the supremacy of sadism may be, it nevertheless even becomes at this early stage, the agency from which instinctual inhibitions proceed...[20]

The "excessively stern introjected parents", which Klein saw as the source of the monsters and terrors in fairy tales,[21] were <u>imagos</u> of the child's parents, though not corresponding to them in reality. (In one of his very few direct references to Melanie Klein, Freud agreed on the latter point.[22])

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[19] Klein, (1980), p. 7. This argument is set out at length in Chapter VIII, based on the 1928 paper "Early Stages on the Oedipus Conflict".

[20] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 139.

[21] Klein, in <u>Heirs to Freud</u>, p. 255.

[22] Segal, (1979), p. 60.

A recognition of other "internal objects". The super-ego--an internalization of the parent--was the first recognized by Freud. Klein saw various "part-objects", particularly the breast and the penis, emerging in her young patients' phantasies and symbolized in their play:

> [Erna's] phantasies [were] first oral, then anal-sadistic...At the beginning of her treatment, she put a toy man and a toy woman together. She said that they were to love one another...But soon she made a third figure (a little man) run them over, kill them and eat them up...Many games ended in parental figures being roasted and eaten up...[once] while cutting up paper she was associating...making mincemeat and that blood was coming out of the paper...[on another occasion] she made...an "eye salad" and said she was cutting fringes out of Mrs. Klein's nose...She also played many games, symbolizing the eating of her mother's breast or her father's penis, which she called something "long and golden".[23]

Abraham had also recognized "partial love" of part-objects in his work on melancholia, yet had followed Freud's belief in infant narcissism up to the end of the anal phase.[24] Klein went farther, seeing the love (narcissism) as being in fact directed at the part-object the child had taken into him/herself (introjected). The object(s) could be split into "good" and "bad" aspects, the good breast, for instance, being phantasized as a nurturing/nourishing one, and the bad breast as an attacking one in response to/projection of the child's own phantasized attacks on it.

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[23] Segal (1979), p. 46.

[24] Ibid., p. 49.

An expanded understanding and elucidation of the defense mechanisms of splitting, projection, and introjection. This grows out of Klein's concept of internal objects. Each of the three mechanisms was an established part of the psychoanalytic conceptual apparatus before Klein came on the scene, but acquired new meaning as her specific part-objects gradually supplanted a more generalized invocation of the superego. Splitting is a means of keeping good and bad aspects of an object separate from one another. Projection further puts a psychic object or attribute outside of the self, to prevent its over-powering, or being over-powered by, another object or attribute, usually its opposite. Introjection, conversely, is the taking of the object or attribute into the self. In the case of a good object, it is for the purpose of internalizing or appropriating the good qualities. A bad object may be introjected to keep it from attacking some good external object which has been projected outward. Each of these mechanisms is explicated by Klein in specific case studies.

Identification of an anxiety which for girls is equivalent to Freud's male castration fear. Female penis-envy was a manifestation of castration fear, in Freud's view. Klein observed, almost universally in young girls, a deep seated fear of attack upon their own bodies and the "scooping-out" or "emptying" of their contents (including babies); she inferred that this was due to fear of

retaliation for similar phantasized attacks on the mother's body and its contents or, even earlier, the mother's breast as part-object. Eventually Klein came to see even the male castration fear as derivative of his phantasized attack on the mother's breast and body. This will be dealt with in the next chapter at greater length, as part of Klein's conception of female sexuality.

An enlarged view of the role of symbolism. In a 1923 paper[26] Klein identified symbolism as

> the foundation of all sublimation and of every talent, since it is by way of symbolic equation that things, activities and interest become the subject of libidinal phantasies.[27]

This conclusion, which was not far removed from the thought of Ferenczi and Jones,[28] grew out of her analyses of children's inhibitions in various aspects of their school work.

In 1930 her thought on the subject showed a major advance in the paper "The Importance of Symbol-Formation in

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[26] "The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child", in Klein, Melanie, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, London: The Hogarth Press, 1950, p. 68ff.

[27] Ibid., p. 237.

[28] Ferenczi held that identification and symbolism arose out of the baby's endeavour to rediscover in every object his own organs and their functioning; Jones that the pleasure-principle makes it possible for two...different things to be equated because of a similarity marked by pleasure or interest. (Ibid.)

the Development of the Ego",[29] where she added:

> ...upon [symbolism] is built up the subject's relation to the outside world and to reality in general...the child's earliest reality is wholly phantastic; he is surrounded with objects of anxiety, and in this respect excrement, organs, objects, things animate and inanimate are to begin with equivalent to one another. As the ego develops, a true relation to reality is gradually established out of this unreal reality...[30]

This discovery arose out of her analysis of a four-year-old psychotic,[31] Dick, who neither talked nor played nor manifested any interest or affective relations with people, or objects save trains and stations, doors and door handles.

With this slender thread, Klein took a toy train which she called "Dick-train" (another, bigger one was "Daddy-train") and rolled it into a station called "Mummy", saying "Dick is going into Mummy", thereby eliciting an anxiety response which became the basis of further therapy. She later commented:

> A sufficient quantity of anxiety is the necessary basis for an abundance of symbol-formation and of phantasy; an adequate capacity on the part of the ego to tolerate anxiety is essential if anxiety is to be satisfactorily worked over...

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[29] Ibid., pp. 236-250.

[30] Ibid., ("The Importance of Symbol-Formation..."), p. 238.

[31] Dick's diagnosis today would probably be "early infantile autism". (Segal, 1979, pp. 70-71.

> In Dick there was a complete and apparently constitutional incapacity of the ego to tolerate anxiety...The ego had ceased to develop phantasy-life and to establish a relation with reality. After a feeble beginning, symbol formation...had come to a standstill...
>
> It had been possible for me, in Dick's analysis, to gain access to his unconscious by getting into contact with such rudiments of phantasy-life and symbol-formation as he displayed. The result was a diminution of his latent anxiety, so that it was possible for a certain amount of anxiety to become manifest. But this implied that the working-over of this anxiety was beginning by way of a symbolic relation to things and objects, and at the same time his epistemophilic and aggressive impulses were set in action....[32]

The importance of this observation cannot be over-rated. Not only does it have implications for creativity and aesthetics (points to be subsequently enlarged upon), but it opened--theoretically, at least[33]--an avenue for the treatment of psychotics that had so far been unexplored by the analytic mainstream.

In her conclusion to the paper, Klein, while demuring on the matter of diagnosis, nevertheless raises the possibility of a more widespread occurrence of schizophrenia among young children than had heretofore been recognized.[34] It was her impinging, as a non-medical analyst, on this "last bastion" of clinical psychiatry, that was later to bring her

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[32] Klein, Contributions..., pp. 238, 241, 145.

[33] More exactly, it provided an orthodox explanation and rationale for the approach Jung had been using with such patients for some time.

[34] Klein, Contributions..., pp. 248-249.

findings under attack by Edward Glover. At the time of this paper, however, her foray in this area passed largely unnotice and unopposed.

—The aforegoing are not all-inclusive of the many new ideas that surfaced in the early period of Melanie Klein's work, but they include the major constellations of her thought. Some points that may have been omitted here will appear in the next chapter, to be considered among her most enduring contributions to psychoanalysis.

Like the preceding period in Melanie Klein's life, the end of this open was marked by personal upheaval and suffering. Her eldest son Hans was killed in an alpine accident in 1933; and relations became particularly estranged with her daughter Melitta, in London after 1932. Added to her earlier losses, it is not surprising that depression and mourning were to figure prominently in the next period of her life and work.

A New Outlook in Contention (1934-1945)

Her 1934 paper, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States",[35] can be said to be the first enunciation of an autonomously unique Kleinian perspective--not merely a technical refinement, extension or correction of existing psychoanalytic theory, but a wholly new outlook,

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[35] Klein, Contributions..., pp. 282-310. An abridged version was read before the Thirteenth International Psych-Analytical Congress in Lucerne.

model or, in Kuhnian terms, paradigm of human psychic development. This new thesis, that of the "Depressive Position", its elaboration, and defense from attack were to occupy Melanie Klein for the next decade against a backdrop of international conflict. Clifford Scott reports that even after a successful struggle and recognition of her viewpoint within the British Society, two months after the end of the war she was still despondent, and feared that many of her ideas might die with her.[36]

The Depressive Position is one of Klein's enduring contributions that will be treated in the next chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that Klein came to regard an infantile depression, or a viewpoint or "position" of its world, inner and outer, analagous to that of depression in adults, as a universal transitional experience in the child's development, beginning at the point when s/he could conceive of the mother as a "whole-object" (about 3-6 months). Negotiation of this primal depression, through the building up of a strong, loved and idealized internal object, was crucial for subsequent development.

This theory is not altogether novel or surprising to those who have followed the evolution of Klein's ideas to this point. She has already taken Freud's findings back into infancy, showing that aggression, transference, Oedipal conflict, superego formation (and by implication, the ego

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[36] Grosskurth/Scott, Journal..., p. 7.

itself) occur at an earlier age than had previously been believed. Here she merely adds another adult condition, depression, to the psychic world of early childhood. Yet this latest addition streamlines and subsumes many of her earlier ideas into a cohesive whole. Henceforth it is not necessary for her to postulate as many independent complexes and drives; they become subsidiary aspects of her new overview. Nor does she need cite her mentors, Ferenczi and Abraham, to as great an extent as authorities for her findings in points of detail. She still situates the main body of her thought within their legacy, but comes increasingly to explain it in self-sufficient terms. The depressive position, then, is more than a viewpoint from which the infant regards his/her world; it has also become a paradigm from which psychology views child development.

As T.S. Kuhn points out in his seminal discussion,[37] a new paradigm emerges because it more adequately explains more phenomena than preceding conceptual frameworks. The scientific revolution, however, unlike its political counterpart, does not topple the old regime at a blow, nor supplant it even within a generation. It is fiercely resisted by advocates of the prevailing viewpoint which continues to hold the field to itself, only to die out eventually because it cannot afford fruitful avenues of

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[37] Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, enlarged edition, 1970.

enquiry for contemporary questions. Kuhn's description may be an apt one of the emergence and eventual role of Melanie Klein's thought in the psychoanalytic pantheon. Certainly it describes the intense opposition and polarization that Klein's new viewpoint provoked.

Criticism came from three quarters. There was, first of all, the opposing school of child analysis led by Anna Freud; this acquired a renewed immediacy with the arrival in England of many European analysts, including eventually both the Freuds, as a result of Nazi persecution. This "government-in-exile" of the international psychoanalytical movement threatened for a time to take over the British movement, and challenged the independent direction in which the British Psychoanalytical Society had been evolving.

Secondly, a very strenuous opposition arose within the British Society from Edward Glover and a few adherents, who claimed that Mrs. Klein's 1935 paper and its aftermath had exceeded her depth and grasp. Her differentiating of the depressive position from the (then still-to-be defined) situation that preceded it entailed frequent references to psychosis, which Glover felt presumptuous for a person untrained in medicine. He was joined in this attack by Klein's daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, another medical psychiatrist and one of his analysands.

Thirdly, a number of members of the British Society, heretofore tolerant of Klein's views but non-partisan to either side of the discussion, felt that the sweeping claims

of her latest statement and the dissension they produced called for defense and clarification, if for no other reason than to get the professional house in order. It was out of this situation, and under Ernest Jones' leadership, that the "Controversial Discussion" were convened.

Before these are considered, mention of some concurrent events in Melanie Klein's personal life is appropriate. With the outbreak of war, her son Erich joined the British army, leaving his wife and baby son Michael with his mother. In 1940[38] the three Kleins moved to Cambridge for a few months, then to Pitlochry in Scotland, where they stayed for more than a year. There Klein continued the analysis of Dick, now in puberty, and for four months analyzed a new subject, Richard, who was nine years old. Richard's analysis contributed to certain revisions of her thinking on the Oedipus complex; these figured in a 1945 paper.[39] It also formed the eventual basis of Klein's Narrative of a Child Analysis, to be published toward the end of her life.[40]

The Controversial Discussions were a series of extraordinary meetings of the British Psychoanalytical

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[38] This dating derives from Grosskurth's (Journal..., p. 7.); Segal (1979), p. 92, puts the move in 1939.

[39] "The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties", in Klein (Contributions...), p. 339ff.

[40] Klein, Melanie, Narrative of a Child Analysis, London: The Hogarth Press, 1961.

Society convoked by President Ernest Jones, for the purpose of clarifying Klein's position in relation to the metapsychology of Sigmund Freud. They proved to be as much a test for the British Society and its ability to tolerate dissenting views as for Melanie Klein and her ability to defend them. Originally deferred with the onset of war, they comprised eleven sessions from January 1943 through May of the following year. They had a large attendance with a number of "notables" including, occasionally, the Princess Marie Bonaparte.[41]

Discussion was based on four pro-Kleinian papers. The first, by Susan Isaacs, set out to elucidate Klein's use of the concept of unconscious phantasy. Fundamental to this concept is the view

> that there is enough ego at birth to form rudimentary object relationships and use primitive mental mechanisms...Phantasy is not considered...as a pure id phenomenom, but as an elaboration by the ego of impulses, defenses, and object relationships.[42]

This assertion drew charges of "heresy" and "mysticism" from Glover.[43]

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[41] Grosskurth/Scott, (Journal...), p. 13.

[42] Segal, (1979), p. 101.

[43] Boulanger, J.B., "Early Object Relationships in the Light of Contemporary Scientific Research", in The Journal of The Melanie Klein Society, Volume 1, Number 2, (December 1983), pp. 27-34.

The second paper, by Paula Heimann, dealt with the early ego and object relationships, especially the role played by the mechanisms of introjection and projection in the formation of the ego and superego. Central here was the contention that the Freudian conceptions of

> auto-eroticism and narcissism are ways of dealing with frustration and are linked with phantasies about interal and external objects. The auto-erotic and narcissistic, purely egocentric object relations gradually give way to more mature object relationships, but projection and introjection continue throughout life.[44]

The third paper, on regression, was a joint presentation of Heimann and Isaacs, dealing further with phantasy and early object relationships. They pointed out that the Freudian theory of regression, as a mechanism leading to neurosis, preceded his dualistic view of the instincts and could therefore be expected to be modified in view of his later findings. Fixation of libido was not a cause but an effect of illness and

> situations of guilt and anxiety due to aggression are part of normal development...anxiety can be a spur to development, to reparative phantasies and a movement of the libido to higher levels or organization. Whether it will lead to a fixation or to progress depends on the degree of anxiety.[45]

Klein herself concluded with a fourth paper restating her developmental view, including the

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[44] Segal, (1979), p. 105.

[45] Ibid., p. 107.

centrality of the depressive position, correlating this with the later thought of Freud, and that of Abraham.[46]

The Discussions ended in a stand-off. They did not resolve the differences in outlook--if anything, these were even more polarized afterward--but neither did they result in the outright schism that some had feared. For training purposes at the British Institute, two groups were recognized: Anna Freud and her adherents, who demanded their own clinical seminars; and the remaining members, including both the Kleinians and the uncommitted. Both groups were to be equally represented on the governing bodies of the British Psychoanalytical Society. Edward Glover resigned from the Society entirely;[47] Melitta Schmideberg and her husband emigrated to the U.S.

The Discussions can be said to have had a beneficial effect on Melanie Klein and her work. The need to defend her ideas had forced a more thorough-going formulation of them, both by Klein and by her supporting colleagues. The verdict, if not a vindi-

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[46] Klein, Melanie, "The Emotional Life of the Infant, with Special Emphasis on Depressive Anxieties". This paper was never published in its original form.

[47] While Glover claimed to be making the case for "classical analysis", Scott recalls his departure as more or a personal power struggle. Prior to his resignation, Scott had circulated a letter to other members of the Society, urging them to join him in quitting, but few did so. (Grosskurth/Scott, Journal..., p. 17).

cation of her position, was at least an acknowledgement that it had as much claim to analytical orthodoxy as that of her opponents. This meant she could train candidates in her own approach without harrassment at the Institute, and utilize the media of both the British and International organizations as fora for the dissemination of her views, as those of a member in good standing.[48]

However, she found these concessions unsatisfying. For she longed most not to be just another rival contender for the Freudian mantle, but to be recognized as the disciple and heir to Freud she believed she was. It was at this point that Clifford Scott recalled her despondency. She felt that Jones, while publically supportive of her work, had been indecisive and placed the political neutrality of the Presidency ahead of personal convictions.[49] She was also hurt by Freud's lack of support for her work, which she felt to be close to his, in favour of that of his own daughter, which digressed from his at a number of points. In late 1945, according to Scott, she actually considered

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[48] Klein had in fact read a paper at every International Congress since 1919. (Segal, 1979, p. 111).

[49] Grosskurth/Scott, (Journal...), p. 1[illegible] Segal (1979), p. 171.

resigning from the Society herself, to form her own organization.[50]

But ultimately British pragmatism triumphed over the purity of Continental idealism; the Society remained intact and Melanie Klein remained in it. It is thus appropriate to close the summation of this period of her life with a comment from the Introduction to her 1945 book, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis,[51] written by Ernest Jones--her sometime mentor, arch-mediator of the Discussions, and preserver of the analytic entente:

> When, more than twenty years ago, I invited Melanie Klein first to give a course of lecture and subsequently to settle in London, I knew I was securing an extremely valuable recruit to the British Psycho-Analytical Society. But I had no perception at that time of what commotion this simple act would result in. Until then, and for a while afterwards, our Society had been a model of cooperative harmony...Before long, however cries began to be raised that in the views she rather vehemently presented she was "going too far", which I think simply meant she was going too fast.
>
> The division in the British Society will, presently, I doubt not, be reproduced in all other psycho-analytical societies, and in the absence of colleagues with first-hand experience of Mrs. Klein's work she must expect adverse critics to be in the majority...
>
> Now what is all this storm about? Will the opposition to Mrs. Klein's work be evanescent or has she raised winds that will rage with increasing reverberations?

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[50] Grosskurth/Scott, (Journal...), p. 6.

[51] Klein, Contributions..., op. cit.

> Freud's investigation of the unconscious mind...had revealed unexpected aspects of childhood, but before Mrs. Klein there had been little attempt to confirm these discoveries...To her, therefore, is due the credit of carrying psychoanalysis to where it principally belongs--the heart of the child...
>
> Nor Freud had shown that the child's mind contained in its depths much besides the innocence and freshness that so entrance us. There were dark fears of possibilities that the most gruesome fairy tale had not dared to explore, cruel impulses where hate and murder rage freely...Of the world outcry at this derogation of smiling infancy this is not the place to speak; Mrs. Klein is still experiencing much of its aftermath...
>
> Mrs. Klein's boldness did not stop at the study of normal and neurotic infantile development. She has extended it into the field of insanity itself, no doubt somewhat to the dismay of those psychiatrists who regard this field as the last preserve of the medical profession. But this extension was unescapable. The resemblance between certain infantile processes and those so blatant in paranoia, schizophrenia and manic-depressive insanity could not be overlooked...I am confident that Mrs. Klein's work will prove as fruitful in this field as it has already shown itself to be in the more familiar one...[52]

Jones' closing remark was to prove prophetic of Klein's achievement in the fourth and final period of her life.

Position Secured (1946-1960)

The final fourteen years of Melanie Klein's life can be said to replicate on the professional plain what the work of her depressive position does in the life of the developing infant. Having warded off those persecutors from whom her work had been under attack (and whose psychic equivalents

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[52] Contributions..., pp. 9-12.

she was now to define in developmental terms), she turned her attention to consolidating the "good object" that had come out of the conflict. This task was punctuated by times of depression and pessimism, as well as by periods of fruitful creativity.

A 1946 paper, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms"[53] was a significant step. Only twenty-three pages, it provided a conceptual framework for the infant's world view even earlier than that addressed by the depressive position. Klein had already identified schizoid mechanisms as distinguishing characteristics of the pre-depressive orientation. Now she claimed sufficient bases to postulate a "Paranoid-Schizoid position" as universally recognizable an experience as the depressive one that followed it. This initial position was designated "paranoid" because it is marked by intense persecutory anxieties, and "schizoid" because the primary means of dealing with these anxieties was in splitting their objects into separate "good" and "bad" parts.

Klein traced the source of these early anxieties to Freud's death-drive. In this she went further than Freud, who attributed infantile anxiety to castration fear, and in any case did not conceive of an ego capable of experiencing anxiety as early as Klein situated it.[54] Yet this paper

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[53] The Writings of Melanie Klein, Volume III, pp. 1-24.

[54] Segal, (1979), p. 114.

failed to incite the intense opposition aroused by some of her earlier works, or to come later in response to Envy and Gratitude.[55] Perhaps this was because her opponents had spent themselves in the controversies of the three years preceding. In any case, it seems to have been received at the time as but an extension to her previous work (which it was) rather than as the new departure it now appears in retrospect.

In 1952 Melanie Klein turned seventy years of age. To mark the occasion the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis brought out a special issue dedicated to her work, with about a dozen pupils and colleagues contributing papers. Most of these were three years later to be included in a new book of twenty-one essays, two by Klein herself, entitled New Directions in Psycho-Analysis.[56] Once again it was Ernest Jones who captured the spirit of the moment.

In the preface to the volume he stated:

> It is a matter for wide satisfaction...that Mrs. Klein has lived to see her work firmly established. So long as it was simply deposited in what she herself had published there was always the hope, but by no means the certainty, that it would be taken up by future students. The situation has now moved beyond that stage; her work is firmly established.[57]

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[55] Segal, (1979), pp. 147-148.

[56] New Directions in Psycho-Analysis, (Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann & R.E. Money-Kyrle, Editors, Tavistock, London, 1955).

[57] Ibid., p. v.

Klein's final significant theoretical work was the book Envy and Gratitude,[58] published in 1957. This made the clearest differentiation attempted to date of the concepts of jealousy, envy, and greed. Of the three, Klein saw only envy as primary, its earliest object being the breast, the "source of all creativeness."[59] Its aim was the total despoilation of the object; its primary mechanism was destructive projective identification, a concept first sketched out at length in New Directions....[60]

Penis-envy in girls, whose derivative nature she had noted in a 1945 paper,[61] is incorporated into the earlier envy of the mother's body, which at one point is phantasized to contain the father's penis. This more autonomous understanding of female sexuality is one of Klein's enduring contributions to be considered shortly. Envy, for Klein, is a component of jealousy that influences the Oedipus complex and may, if excessive, lead to homosexuality in males, because of its preventing the establishment of a good internal object. She also recognized a strong

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[58] Klein, Melanie, Envy and Gratitude; a study of unconscious sources, Tavistock Publications LImited, 1957.

[59] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[60] Segal, (1979), p. 137.

[61] "The Oedipus Conflict in the Light of Early Anxieties".

constitutional basis for envy and its derivatives; this could ultimately frustrate therapy.[62]

Publication of this view led to controversy reminiscent of that provoked by her characterization of the depressive position. Essentially it is akin to her earlier contentious "revelations", in adding envy to the constellation of infantile emotions that many analysts preferred to reserve to a later period.

A 1958 metapsychological paper re-asserted Freud's duality/duelity of Eros and Thanatos as the instinctual basis of love and hate.[63] Like the elder Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents,[64] she shows her a heightened consciousness of her own mortality and the tentativeness of the human venture. Where Freud's pessimism reflected the onset of Naziism and the holocaust in his homeland, Klein's was affected by the spectre of global nuclear war. Other possible sources were the death of her long-standing friend and secretary, Lola Brook, and the acrimonious ending to her friendship and collaboration with Paula Heimann. Mitigating somewhat the negativity from these sources was a friendship with Michael, her eldest o grandson and the only one to whom she felt personally close.

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[62] Segal, (1979), p. 147.

[63] Ibid., p. 149.

[64] Freud, Sigmund, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI, pp. 138ff.

Significantly, her paper to the last Congress she attended (the Twenty-First in Copenhagen, 1959) was entitled "On the Sense of Loneliness". This was still unfinished and under revision at the time of her death. Another 1959 essay, "Our Adult World and its Roots in Infancy",[65] stands out as a rare and lucid statement of her theory for lay persons.

In 1960 Klein was still teaching and supervising students, though she had reduced her case load to three analysands. She invested considerable effort in preparing and editing Narrative of a Child Analysis[66]--a day-by-day account of her ninety-three sessions with Richard at Pitlochry during the War. The Narrative... stands as a monument, surpassing her earlier ...Psycho-Analysis of Children[67] as a clear and concise explication of her theory and technique and the inseparability of the two. She completed the revisions in hospital in London where she died before the end of the year. Her death, at age seventy-eight, was due to a hemorrhage which came a few days after an apparently successful cancer operation.

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[65] The Writings of Melanie Klein, III, pp. 247-263.

[66] Klein, 1961, op. cit.

[67] The Writings..., Volume II.

Postscript: Klein as Suffering Artist

Until the appearance of the Grosskurth biography, Melanie Klein's private life was almost as obscure as the psychic life of the infant before she described it. I did not have access to Grosskurth's store of biographical information at the time of the writing of this thesis. This was probably an advantage, since my study was not of Klein's life but of her creativity theory. Had Grosskurth's exhaustive work been available, her interpretation might have coloured and overwhelmed impressions that were to be based on Klein's writings alone.

As it turned out, the Grosskurth biography appeared in time to enlarge and correct certain aspects of this chapter in the final draft. More important, however, it has provided corroboration for my conclusion in the next two chapters, in showing the inseparability of Melanie Klein['s]...World and Her Work. That Klein was herself a creative genius is evident from her insights. That she suffered considerably in her private life in apparent but never developed at length, in Segal.

Grosskurth greatly substantiates these two aspects and brings them together. She cites new examples of Klein's personal creativity as seen through the eyes of her contemporaries; many of these recognized an artist as much as a scientist in Klein's approach. Grosskurth also emphasizes Klein's suffering which, far from undermining her analytic insights, makes them more valid, suffused and

fortified with personal experience. That the biography succeeds in this endeavour was recognized in Sherry Turkle's review of the book in The New York Times:

> Just as each new analysand develops a phantasy about the successful analyses of his or her new analyst, the analytic movement perpetuates myths about the successful analyses of its founder and major theorists. Phyllis Grosskurth's new biography of Melanie Klein explodes such simple myths, forcing us to ask once again if the status of psychoanalytic theory is challenged by the vulnerability of psychoanalysts, but it also provides rich new material for thinking through this problem. It testifies to the courage if not the calm, of a woman who drew on her own unresolved suffering to bring other analysts face to face with the witches of the night.[68]

For Klein, like Jung, catharsis through personal suffering, and her own awareness of it, provided the means, the material and the motivation for her creative achievement. It is thus appropriate to consider her expressed views on the subject of creativeness.

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[68] Read in a symposium on Klein at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, June 25, 1986, and transcribed from an ICA tape of the proceedings.

CHAPTER V

KLEIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

To attempt to summarize Melanie Klein's life work in a single chapter is only slightly less presumptuous than to do the same with the father of psychoanalysis himself. Klein was not nearly as prolific a writer as Freud, who wrote on a diversity of topics. Klein, however, wrote at considerable depth in the narrower field of object relations and child analysis. The four volumes of her collected writings are a formidible resource that continues to yield new insights and applications. Her own writing, and the growing corpus of explicative material by others both during her lifetime and posthumously,[1] gives "an analytic picture of mental development...[that] is not easy to summarize without distortion", in R.E. Money-Kyrle's description.[2] Yet it is this seemingly impossible task that must be undertaken here.

A pamphlet of the (British) Institute of Psycho-Analysis refers to Melanie Klein as "perhaps the greatest

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[1] This was first gathered on a broad scale in a special issue of The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis published in March, 1952, in honour of Melanie Klein's seventieth birthday. Eleven of the original essays in the issue, together with two by Klein herself, were subsequently published as New Directions in Psycho-Analysis, op. cit..

[2] Ibid., p. xii.

psychoanalytic innovator since Freud".[3] Critics may question her metapsychology; they cannot deny her place in the psychoanalytic pantheon. Of the ample and intricate legacy left by Klein, there are five contributions[4] that appear to be of a particularly enduring and/or innovative quality. These innovations emerge in different focal planes or perspectives. One is a technique, one an expanded field of inquiry, and three are theoretical orientations. Of the latter, two are schema or constellations of ideas; one is a single idea whose interpretation is radical and far-reaching.

Such an eclectic list is open to the accusation of mixing apples with oranges. It is also, I believe, the only way to encompass the breadth of Klein's contributions without losing sight of the sequential manner in which her ideas are deived from practice. The following list, then aims to avoid the extremes of redundancy and reductionism. While there may be overlap among the points, the Kleinian kerygma would not be complete without any one of them:

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[3] A Guide to Psycho-Analysis in Britain, Institute of Psycho-analysis, London, 1983, p. 15.

[4] While none of these five points is original to me, the enumeration and ordering of these points is essentially my own.

1. Klein's development of play technique is the base upon which her other innovations are built. This opened the door to the analysis of young children and infants, and from it subsequent contributions were derived.

2. An expanded awareness of object relations grew out of the observation and analysis of children; it can also be said to summarize Klein's life work. Her entire meta-psychology, including the following three more specific contributions, is an interpretation of her findings in this area.

3. Klein's feminine perspective on female sexuality affords a balance to the "phallo-centrism" of Freudianism, and meets a need inherent in the bipolar nature of analysis. Training analysts have not completed their course requirements until they have analyzed patients of both sexes; the Freudian view of sexuality was equally incomplete until the advent of a female analyst of Klein's depth and genius.

4. The postulation of a constitutional basis of infantile anxiety remains the most contentious tenet of Kleinian metapsychology. Her observation and interpretation of infantile phantasies led her to espouse Freud's concept of a death-drive, and to see it as operant from birth.

5. The discovery and description of paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, based on shifting patterns of object relations in earliest infancy, prefigures tendencies to pathology in later psychic life. This is analogous to

the way in which "ontogeny recapitulates philogeny" biologically in pre-natal development.

We shall now examine each of these contributions in turn.

Play Technique, and the Psychoanalysis of Children

Psychoanalysis as developed by Freud was essentially a tool for putting patients in touch with their subconscious, to identify and disarm the traumas that lurked there, crippling subsequent behavior. Now while, in Freud's belief, the original of the trauma generally lay in childhood, its point of detection was, with a few exceptions in adulthood, where verbal fluency and reflection were sufficiently developed to permit free-association as an analytic technique.

An analysis became more established and less pre-occupied with the remediation of notably pathological cases, the desirability of treating personality disorders closer in time to their point of origin became recognized. This led to an increased interest in child psychology. Yet for all its potential, the child psyche remained, until the 1920's a largely unexplored frontier.

There were some exceptions. First and chief among them was Freud's "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy",[5] the famous "Little Hans" case, published in 1909. This

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[5] Freud, Standard Edition, X, pp. 5-149.

substantiated Freud's speculations on the Oedipus complex and childhood roots of neurosis. Two years later Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth, the first female member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, attempted a form of psychoanalytic treatment using education and play therapy with emotionally distrubed children.[6]

Yet these incursions into psychoanalysis in childhood were occasional and circumscribed. Freud himself initially felt that such an analysis could be conducted only by the father, the approach he had followed in the "Little Hans" case.[7] Hug-Hellmuth considered her analytic approach suitable only for children over six years of age.[8] Klein related that her first presentation of child material to the Berlin Society, more than ten years after "Little Hans", was met with outright antipathy at the idea of talking to children directly about sexuality.[9] Systematic study of the infant psyche was hindered not only by lack of a suitable approach but, it would appear, by continuing presuppositions of childhood innocence.

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[6] Cohen, Sol, In the Name of the Prevention of Neurosis: The Search for a Psychoanalytic Pedagogy in Europe 1905-1938, pp. 191-192.

[7] Segal, (1979), pp. 35-36. He later modified this view.

[8] Klein, Contributions..., p. 38.

[9] Segal, (1979), p. 36.

The analysis of children on a wider scale was first practised in 1919, when both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein began to develop their respective techniques. That of Miss Freud followed in the path pioneered by Hug-Hellmuth, who had intended to see child analysis established as a branch of special education. Anna Freud and her followers also saw analysis as having an educative aim, but of a more general and preventative, rather than a remedial orientation. There were thus significant differences in direction between Klein and the younger Freud from the outset of their work.[10]

Klein saw the child psyche as less different from the adult's than most of her peers had supposed--the primary difference being not its essence but its mode of expression, which was less verbal. What was needed, therefore, was not a new orientation in dealing with young children, but a new technique to unlock the wealth of material already there. "Play analysis" became for Klein the key to the less verbal world of childhood and, ultimately, to the previous impenetrable first months of infancy, a period characterized by Freud as "obscure and filled with shadows".[11] She found that:

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[10] Many of the later differences between the two schools can be traced to this simple fact. The second generation of Freudians, of whom Anna Freud was a central figure had come largely from the teaching profession (Cohen, 191) and saw psychoanalysis as a means of social betterment. (Continued next page)

[11] Geets, Claude, Mélanie Klein, "Psychothèque, Editions Universitaires, Pairs, 1971, p. 13.

> The child expresses its phantasies, its wishes and its actual experiences in a symbolic way through play and games...it makes use of the same archaic and phylogenetically-acquired mode of expression, the same language, as it were, that we are familiar with in dreams; and we can only fully understand this language if we approach it in the way Freud has taught us to approach the language of dreams.... Early analysis of children has shown again and again how many different meanings a single toy or single bit of play can have, and that we can only infer and interpret their meaning when we consider their wider connections and the whole analytic situation in which they are set... Very often children will express in their play the same things that they have just been telling us in a dream, or will bring associations to a dream in the play which succeeds it. For play is the child's most important medium of expression. If we make use of this play technique we soon find that the child brings as many associations to the separate elements of its play as adults do to the separate elements of their dreams. These separate play-elements are indications to the trained

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[10] (Continued from previous page) Some left teaching to practise child analysis full-time. Many were involved in the establishment of new schools; by applying analytic principles to education, these were intended to eliminate neurosis as a given in child development. Though this goal was eventually abandoned as illusory, its pursuit fashioned a whole generation of Freudians on the Continent. (See Cohen for a full-length treatment of this issue).

Melanie Klein on the other hand had come to psychoanalysis as an end in itself. She was not prepared to compromise the rigours of Freudian technique for some dimly-defined social good for a greater number. While her original (1919) paper speculated on the possibility of kindergartens under the headship of female analysts, her later works emphatically eschewed any congruence between educational and analytic methods. (See The Psycho-Analysis of Children, pp. 13, 55, 75). In fact, she can be considered as determined an opponent of psychoanalysis becoming the handmaiden of education as Sigmund Freud had been at its becoming a servant of the medical profession.

A judicious comparison of the two major schools of child analysis--Anna Freud's and Melanie Klein's-- appears in Smirnoff, Victor, The Scope of Child Analysis (New York, 1971).

> observer; and as it plays, the child talks as well, and says all sorts of things which have the value of genuine associations.[12]

Using play analysis as the medium, Klein saw no need to otherwise modify analytic technique in working with young children. Close observation had convinced her that the same forces and phenomena were at work in the child, and being symbolically expressed, as in the adult. Clinical experience, and Abraham's early encouragement, had assured her that the infantile ego, far from being imperilled by unmasking of its anxieties, was actually relieved and ultimately strengthened by facing them:

> In ordinary play, where the child remains largely unconscious of the content of his incestuous and aggressive phantasies and impulses, he nevertheless experiences relief through the very fact that he expresses them symbolically...In analysis we should aim at getting access to deeply repressed phantasies and desires and thus helping the child to become conscious of them...I believe it to be a fallacy that there could be any harm to the child or to his relation to his parents from translating...his unconscious...desires and his criticism into concrete words.[13]

Moreover, Klein claimed that children are often in fact more amenable to analysis than adults, because less "digging" is required to dislodge unconscious material:

> It is surprising how easily children will sometimes accept the interpretation and even show unmistakable pleasure in doing so. The reason probably is that in certain strata of their minds, communication between the conscious and the unconscious is as yet comparatively easy, so that

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[12] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, pp. 7-8.

[13] Klein, Narrative..., p. 47.

> the way back to the unconscious is much simpler to find. Interpretation often has rapid effects, even when it does not appear to have been taken in consciously. [These] show themselves in the way...they enable the child to resume a game once it has broke off in consequence of an... inhibition, and to change and expand it...And as anxiety is thus resolved and desire to play restored, analytic contact, too becomes established once more.[14]

In the last year of her life, in editing her final work to be published, Klein reiterated this difference with Anna Freud in a footnote:

> There are analysts who take the view...that the analysis of anxieties should be left for a later stage and that defenses...should primarily be analyzed...I do not agree with this view...my first aim in analyzing a child...is to analyze the anxieties that are activated.[15]

In summary, Melanie Klein's approach differed from Anna Freud's in three major respects: (a) Klein's insistence upon an objective analytical, as opposed to an educational (i.e., of strenghtening the superego) goal; (b) her belief in a child transference (to the analyst) neurosis; and (c) her emphasis upon analyzing infantile anxieties. Underlying all these points was Klein's conviction that the infant was not as different from the adult as had been supposed in respect of having an ego strong enough to withstand calassical analysis.[16]

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[14] Klein, The Psycho-analysis of Children, pp. 8-9.

[15] Klein, Narrative..., p. 27.

[16] Juliet Mitchell has described Klein's orientation as "superego psychology" in contrast to the "ego psychology" of Anna Freud. The latter in turn had coined "ego psychology" to differentiate (Continued on next page)

However, to describe Klein's technique in terms of analytic principles is to sell it short. In his Introduction to her 1945 book, Ernest Jones had noted that

> ...in the absence of colleagues with first-hand experience of Mrs. Klein's work she must expect adverse critics to be in the majority.[17]

This is because the theoretical prospect of making conscious the infant's "incestuous and aggressive phantasies" is offensive to adult sensibilities, unless, that is, one can conceive of the natural and spontaneous way such material arises and is handled in the play-analysis situation.[18] Klein's genius lay in her observation of and interaction with her young patients, and in creating a milieu in which this could take place. It is necessary therefore, to turn to a consideration of the analytic <u>setting</u>, using Klein's own words:

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[16] (Continued from previous page). her emphasis from that of the earlier Freudians upon the id-processes. (from a panel discussion at the Institute of Contemporary Art, London, June 25, 1986). Klein believed the infant's need was not for a strengthening of its ego, but for a mitigation of its tyrannical and sadistic superego; hence the basis of Mitchell's description. But where some idealistic educators called for the "dissolution of the superego" (Cohen, 194-195), in the total abolition of external punishments and constraints, Klein maintained that these constraints were a necessary part of reality testing, i.e., in order to moderate the expressive phantastic super-ego with a real bearable one. (For this observation I am grateful to Dr. Hanna Segal, in a personal interview in her home in London on April 3, 1986.)

[18] I am convined that had the evaluation of Klein's work taken place in the context of the case room rather than on the Congress floor, the criticism would have been not nearly as strident, nor negative.

> On a low table in my analytic room are laid out a number of small and simple toys--little wooden men and women, carts, carriages, motor-cars, trains, animals, bricks and houses, as well as paper, scissors and pencils. Even a child that is usually inhibited in its play will at least glance at the toys or touch them, and will soon give me a first glimpse into its complexes by the way in which it begins to play with them or lays them aside, or by its general attitude towards them.
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> ...The smallness [of these toys], their number and their great variety give the child a very wide range of representational play, while their very simplicity enables them to be put to the most varied uses...toys like these are well suited for the expression of phantasies and experiences in all kinds of ways and in great detail. The child's various "play thoughts", and the affects associated with them...are presented side by side and within a small space, so that we get a good survey of the general connections and dynamics of the mental processes...and also...of the time-order of the child's various phantasies and experiences.[19]

The human figures of both sexes were of two sizes, to lend themselves to adult and child roles, but otherwise were nondescript, without uniforms or other features that might lead the play along specific lines. Klein intuitively selected very small toys, feeling that these were best suited to represent the internalized figures of the inner world. Psychologist Donal Winnicott considered her introduction of these tiny toys a major innovation in child analysis.[20]

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[19] Klein, The Psycho-analysis of Children, pp. 16, 32-33.

[20] Segal, (1979), p. 42.

In addition to the above items, there were often balls or marbles, string, paint, plasticine, and

> ...a quantity of illustrative material in the room. The most important of these is a wash-basin with running water. This is usually not much used until a fairly late stage in the analysis, but it then becomes of great importance. I have gone through a whole phase of analysis with a child playing round the wash-basin (where are also provided a sponge, a glass tumbler, one or two small vessels, some spoons and paper). These games with water afford us a deep insight into the fundamental pre-genital impulses of the child, and are also a means of illustrating its sexual theories...[21]

The playroom itself was furnished with a table and chair for the child, a small couch, and a chair for the analyst. These furnishings, as well as the walls and floor, had to be virtually indestructible, as the child was

> at liberty to abreact her affects in many... ways...to break her toys or cut them up, knock down the little chairs, fling the cushions about, stamp her feet on the sofa, upset water, smudge paper, dirty the toys or the wash basin...and so on...[22]

While violence to property was permitted, it was made clear that the analyst was physically inviolate.

The child patient also had certain "inviolables". S/he had a set of toys not used by any other patient nor for any other purpose; these, together with "renewable" materials and any toys brought from home, were kept in the patient's own private drawer (or box) between sessions.[23]

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[21] Klein, The Psycho-analysis of Children, p. 33.

[22] Ibid., p. 54.

[23] Ibid., p. 209.

The child's fifty minute daily (five days a week) session was as unvarying as an adult's, and its contents were confidential, even from parents. No notes were taken during the session; Klein felt that this would distract the child and inhibit the flow of associations.[24] The use of the time was entirely the child's choice:

> In many analyses drawing or cutting out play a large part. In others--especially withg girls--the child's time is mostly spent in making clothes and finery for itself, its dolls or its toy animals or in decking itself with ribbons and other ornaments.... The phantasies and imaginative games which develop out of ordinary play with toys are of great significance. In its games of make-believe the child acts out in its own person what in another...earlier, stage of its analysis it shows by means of its toys...[25]

Learning through play and play therapies of various descriptions[26] have become so commonplace in the past decade that it is possible to overlook the innovative significance of Klein's sixty-year-old approach. As the fountainhead of her other discoveries and a foundation-stone of child analysis, play-technique alone has earned Melanie Klein a place among the pioneers.

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[24] "Another possibility of obtaining literal accounts is the use of a recording machine, either visible or hidden--a measure which, in my view, is absolutely against the fundamental principles on which psychoanalysis rests, namely the exclusion of any audience during an analytic session..." (Klein, in Narrative..., p. 11).

[25] Klein, The Psycho analysis of Children, p. 34.

[26] See Axline, Virginia M., Play Therapy, Ballantine Books, New York, 1969.

Expanded Awareness of Object Relations

The awareness of the significance of object relations is the most intricate and elusive area of Klein's work. It is difficult to describe this to the layperson without distorting, since many of the objects in question--particularly the breast and the penis--are already charged with associations in the vernacular. Their direct and unqualified analytical use before a lay audience is wont to conure up images that are facile, crass, and which do not do justice to the depth and subtlety of Klein's thought. The conjuring-up of images is, of course, what object relations is all about, but not in the purely literal sense. The two levels of apprehension--literal and symbolic--are closely linked in the psyche.[27]

It is not the purpose here to set out Melanie Klein's theory of object relations, even in summary; whole books have been devoted to that subject, and its continued explication is the aim of The Journal of the Melanie Klein Society. Rather, it is to explicate the concept of object

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[27] In Julian Jaynes' view (The Origins of Consciousness...) man did not become "conscious" until he had evolved arm's-length words to describe the process i.e., to think about thinking. The modern English thought-vocabulary is almost entirely derived in this way (e.g., cogitate, reflect, motivate, inspire) and it is difficult to conceive how we could discuss thinking without them--or if we were to still take their original meanings literally (cogitate = "to shake about", though we do that with "compute"). If this is so for conscious, mental processes, it is going to be even more so in the case for unconscious ones which are known to us only by fleeting symbolic representations.

relations as it existed when Melanie Klein began her work, and to show how she enlarged it into a significant analytical construct.

Klein has been accused, as was Freud before her, of anthropromorphism in her description of the psyche. But her internal objects are not tangible entities that can be sited in the body, any more than Freud's superego was a minature father that could be localized on the homunculus. Both were alluding to unconscious phantasies humans have about their makeup.

The first internal object recognized in analysis was Freud's identification of the superego. In a 1933 paper, Klein describes this Freudian concept clearly:

> ...the person's conscience is a precipitate or representative of his early relations to his parents. He has in some sense internalized his parents--has taken them into himself. There they become a differentiated part of his ego--his superego--and an agency which advances against the rest of his ego certain requirements, reproaches and admonitions, and which stands in opposition to his instinctual impulses.[28]

But Klein went farther than Freud. It has already been pointed out that she purported evidence of the superego at a much earlier age than he did. In her view, internalization of the parent did not have to await resolution of the Oedipus complex, or even recognition of the parent as a person (a "whole-object", in Kleinian terminology). The

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[28] Klein, in Heirs to Freud, p. 253.

infant related to, and internalized the earliest aspect of the parent he experienced--the mother's breast--which became, for Klein, the first "part-object".

Klein inferred the breast-phantasy from the Freudian concept of instincts. While Freud himself was ambivalent in his view,[29] it seemed clear to many of his followers than an instinct, by definition, could never be conscious--only its "psychic representative" could be. Now the infant's sucking instinct is operant from birth, its aim being the satisfaction of hunger, and its object, the breast. It was natural to conclude, therefore, that along with the instinct was an equally innate phantasized source of gratification.[30] This primitive phantasy was no more than that of an internal feeling of well-being resulting from nourishment. Only from experience--the reality of being fed--did this psychic representative-phantasy acquire concrete olfactory, taste and tactile associations from the real breast (or bottle).

This pattern was of course dependent on gratification following the hunger and phantasy in short order. If a real source of nourishment was not available, was for some reason

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[29] Segal, (1973), p. 12.

[30] "Some analysts think that these phantasies arise later and are retrospectively projected into babyhood. This is surely an unnecessary additional hypothesis, especially as there is a marked consistency between what we can observe in infants' behavior, in phantasies which are actually expressed...and the analytic material in the consulting room." (Segal, 1973, p. 14).

refused, or if the infant was not able to feed, the phantasy of the good breast gave way to that of a bad, "persecutory" one, reciprocating in phantasy the anger projected onto it. This activated various mechanisms of defense, which will be considered at greater length at a later point.

In the primitive psyche of even a normal infant, "good" and "bad" breasts would alternate in phantasy. In normal development, due to positive reinforcement from the external world, the good phantasies would predominate. Therefore

> unconscious phantasies are ubiquitous and always active in every individual. That is to say, their presence is no more indicative of illness or lack of reality-sense than is the presence of the Oedipus complex. What will determine the character of the individual's psychology is the nature of these unconscious phantasies and how they are related to external reality.[31]

With growing awareness of his/her own somatic stimuli, and greater perception and experience of the external world, additional part objects--the penis, hands, face, etc.--enter the child's phantasized world. Each of these has an ensemble of relations with the others and with the infant ego. In time these give way to awareness of "whole objects"--the mother, father, significant others, and a transitional stage at which the mother's body is imagined to contain part-objects, and another in which the parental couple is phantasized as a single body.

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[31] Segal (1973), p. 12.

Klein enlarged the Freudian view of object relations in the depth with which she treated them, the number she identified, and in the importance she accorded them in child development. Freud also considered the breast as the child's first object; but for him, the love for the breast was linked to the infant's auto-eroticism (narcissism). For Klein, however, the breast eventually acquired importance not just as the object of the sucking instinct, but as an object in its own right.[32]

Secondly, Melanie Klein identified and explicated a far greater number of objects than had been done before. From an early inclusion in the superego of all those objects with which the child did not identify, she came to treat most of these separately, reserving the superego category for only the punitive ones.[33] Finally, the ensemble of objects, their interaction, and relations between them and the ego came to assume foremost importance in her metapsychology, as not just one factor, but the determinant of personality development:

> The analysis of very young children has taught me that there is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external or internal; in other words, object-relations are at the centre of emotional life.[33]

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[32] Ibid., pp. 104-105, 49. Klein interpreted auto-eroticism as the infant's love of the introjected (in phantasy) object.

[33] Segal, (1979), p. 65.

Until the emergence of a recognizable Kleinian school, "object relations theory" was the label applied to Melanie Klein's perspective. Now, even though the term is used to refer to other analytical orientations (including some who abandoned the Freudian tradition entirely),[34] its enlargement is still the stated aim of the Melanie Klein Society. This certainly is recognition of her role in the development of the awareness of object relations in the first place.

A Feminine Perspective on Female Sexuality

Critics of Freud long before the modern feminist movement saw his view of female sexuality as at best a derivative, and at worst as a castrated, form of his view of sexuality in the male. This was epitomized in his concept of penis-envy, which viewed the female on the basis of a male attribute she lacked. Closely related was the Freudian emphasis on the clitoris as the seat of feminine sexual stimulation; in its diminutive likeness to the male organ, it served to the female as a constant reminder of the one she had lost.

Melanie Klein provided a corrective to this inbalance from within the Freudian perspective, on the basis of her observation and analysis of young children. Before 1932 she wrote:

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[34] Segal, (1979), p. 162.

> Psychoanalytic investigation has thrown much less light on the psychology of women than on that of men. Since the fear of castration was the first thing that was discovered as underlying motive force in the formation of neurosis in men, analysts naturally began by studying aetiological factors of the same kind in women. The results obtained in this way held good in so far as the psychology of the two sexes was similar but not in so far as it differed...[35]

In the original Freudian perspective the initial discovery of the penis, and with it the anatomical difference between the sexes, was crucial for the development of both sexes thereafter. The boy's realization that not all humans have one prompts the fear that he might somehow lose his own.

This "castration complex" leads to the inhibition and eventual renunciation of his attraction to his mother as a love-object, the fear of the father as his omnipotent rival becoming internalized, as his superego. This developmental point marks both the resolution of the Oedipus complex and the beginnings of a conscience, in Freud's view.

The female discovery of her lack of a penis is perceived, according to Freud, as an insufficiency which she seeks to fill by a relationship with her father and, ultimately, with a mate. Desire for a child is seen as a substitute for the phallic organ, and the taking of a husband is seen as a means to get one. In the orthodox Freudian view, then, for the girl there can be no fear of an

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[35] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 194.

organ to be lost, no castration complex, and no hatred for/rivalry with her mother; the Oedipus complex is thus a much less significant factor in female development than in the amle. Ernest Jones, Josine Miller, Karen Horney, Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, and Melanie Klein rejected this conclusion.

Klein's rectification of this position, which is perhaps the most far-reaching purporting to come from within the Freudian tradition, can be summarized in three discovery-postulates: (a) early fear by the female of an attack upon the interior of her body; (b) an early awareness of the vagina; and (c) a concept significant to the development of both sexes, i.e., envy of the breast.

(a) A primitive female anxiety, equivalent to castration fear in the male, was inferred by Klein as early as 1921:

> ...the girl's deepest fear is having the inside of her body robbed and destroyed. As a result of the oral frustration she experiences from her mother, the girl turns away from her...[and produces] sadistic phantasies of attacking and destroying her mother's inside and depriving it of its contents. Owing to her fear of retaliation, such phantasies form the basis of the girl's deepest anxiety-situation.[36]

Internal phantasies of being scooped out, devoured and despoiled surfaced repeatedly in the analysis of small girls.

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[36] Klein, The Psycho Analysis of Children, pp. 194-195.

(b) Awareness of the vagina by both sexes, a discovery dated in puberty by Frued, was observed by Klein in the earliest masturbation phantasies of young patients.[37] Often this awareness became conscious as a result of assault, masturbation or sex games with other children. This knowledge was generally repressed or denied in young girls, however, due to the intensity of the above-noted anxiety.

(c) Envy of the breast plays a more primary and pervasive role in child development, according to Melanie Klein, than does phallic envy for Freud. The breast personifies the nourishment, warmth and nurture upon which the child depends; it exists symbolically even for the child who has been bottle-fed. Envy of the breast entails the desire to have the "source" to oneself (as is internalized in phantasy), thereby denying of dependence upon the Other. It also extends to imaginary, phantasized attacks upon that source for its other-ness. It thus differs from classical Freudian envy which is often closer to jealousy in the Kleinian perspective. Jealousy implies a third party, a rival for the desired object, while envy is directed solely at the object itself.[38]

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[37] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 210.

[38] Etchegoyen and Rabih (Journal..., Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 50-80) find an antecedent for Klein's theory in Joan Rivière's 1925 paper "Jealousy as a Mechanism of Defense". Rivière was the first to distinguish between triadic (Oedipal) jealousy and dyadic (pre-Oedipal) jealousy. (Continued on next page).

Klein first raised her concept explicity in the paper "On Envy", submitted to the Geneva Conference of 1955; this must be considered alongside her essay "On Identification"[39] of the same year, in which she enunciates projective identification as the major mechanism of envy. Two years later, in Envy and Gratitude,[40] her theory is set out at length. While the validity of this theory has been challenged, notably by some participants in the British Society's 1969 symposium on "Envy and Jealousy", even her detractors concede the originality of Klein's concept of the constitutionality of breast envy.[41] Moreover, while earlier analysts (Eisler and Abraham) had identified envy as an oral trait, it was Klein who firmly established the breast as the object of this envy.

To seize upon Kleinian envy of the breast as a literal and polemical counterpart of Freud's penis-envy must be tempting to the feminists. However, this would be an over-simplification and a disservice to Klein as well as to Freud. A 1945 paper, in which she treats penis-envy as an

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[38] (Continued from previous page) This distinction, which had been ambiguous in Freud, anticipated Klein's distinction of the basis for the neurotic and the psychotic personality. The more primitive condition, according to Rivière, was envy, rooted in the relation of the child to the breast. Remarkably, this significant observation does not figure in Rivière's subsequent works.

[39] Writings, Volume III.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Etchegoyen and Rabih, p. 59

expression of feminine bisexuality,[42] could be cited in support of such a position. However, Klein's mature thought as expressed in Envy and Gratitude is much subtle and complex, and encompasses both male and female sexuality:

> ...the woman's penis-envy can be traced back to envy of the mother breast...In men, the envy of the mother's breast...[if excessive] opens the way for severe difficulties...such as impairment of genital potency, compulsive need for genital gratification, promiscuity, and homosexuality. In both male and female, envy plays a part in the desire to take away the attributes of the other sex, as well as to possess or spoil those of the parent of the same sex. It follows that paranoid jealousy and rivalry...are in both sexes...based on excessive envy towards the primal object, the mother, or rather her breast.[43]

In summary, it may be said that the Kleinian perspective on female sexuality--and of sexuality as a whole--re-emphasizes the inter-dependence of both sexes, male and female, in their striving for completeness.

The Constitutionality of Infantile Anxiety

In order to appreciate Klein's contribution here we must review the legacy of Sigmund Freud. In the final two decades of his life, Freud's metapsychology underwent a major reorientation. Unable to explain the persistent and often insidious nature of aggression in terms of his

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[42] "The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties", op. cit.

[43] Klein, Melanie, Envy and Gratitude: a study of unconscious sources, London: Travistock, 1957, pp. 36, 38, 39.

original thesis of frustrated libidinal (sexual) energy, he postulated a countervailing death-drive in conflict with the life forces and eventually triumphing over them. The adoption of this revised position came about by degrees. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920)[44] he first advanced the possibility, almost reluctantly, that his heretofore central libido might not be sufficient to account for destructive and suicidal behavior. In "The Ego and the Id" (1923) this as yet unnamed "something else" was personified: Thanatos, in combat with his rival, Eros.[45] In this Freud's most definitive statement on the personality structure, this internicine struggle becomes the dynamic worked out through the tripartite model of ego, id, and superego (the "I", the "it", and the "over-me"). And finally, in "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930)[46] the struggle is elevated to a clash of Wagnerian proportions on which the future of humanity, as well as of the individual, depends.

This revision scandalized many of Freud's contemporaries, as it continues to divide his followers today.[47] Some were inclined to dismiss it outright as a

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[44] Freud, S., Standard Edition, XVIII, pp. 7-64.

[45] Ibid., pp. XIX, 12-66.

[46] Ibid., p. XXI.

[47] Erich Fromm, for instance, deals with the problem by positting two types of aggression, defensive and destructive. (Fromm, Erich, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Holt, Reinhart & Winston, New York, 1973.)

loss of heart and mind in the face of advancing age and of the approaching international conflict.[48] Others treated it as "philosophical speculation"--a biological theory never applied or developed in his clinical work. Even Ernest Jones, Freud's close friend, biographer and disciple, admitted to "serious misgivings" about the death-impulse theory; this was the one major respect in which Jones felt obliged to note a disclaimer from Klein in his otherwise supportive Introduction to her Contributions to Psycho-Analysis.[49]

Segal points out that Melanie Klein was the only one of Freud's major followers to adopt the Thanatos theory in its entirety. She not only accepted it, but applied it--or rather, saw its application, in her clinical work with young children.

For Klein had been observing the effects of anxiety in infants going back as early as her analysis was able to

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[48] The spread of Naziism and the onset of War prompted a similar resurgence of dualism/duelism among avante-garde German theologians. Karl Barth, frustrated by increasing recourses to the Devil by many of his colleagues in the clergy, is reported to have stood up in a gathering to ask" "Why all this talk of demons? Why not just admit that we [Germans] have been a bunch of political idiots!" Twenty-five years earlier the approach of the First World War had brought on a parallel (to Freud's personal crisis for Carl Jung, which he had recognized as analogous to psychotic breakdown in many of his patients.

It would seem, then, that Klein is on firm ground: the onset of attack leads to a "splitting" into "good" and "bad" objects on the global, as well as the individual plain!

[49] Klein, Contributions..., p. 12.

penetrate. What in the Freudian schema would have been interpreted as castration-fear was apparent in both girls and boys, and evident long before the age of genital awareness. Freud's postulation of the death-drive, just after Klein had begun her clinical work, thus provided a ready-made theoretical framework for her observations.

Yet there is a discernible difference in tenor between the Freudian and Kleinian concepts. Freud's death-impulse, at least until his 1930 formulation,[50] is more quiescent--a sort of psychic inertia or entropy in which the biological clock of the organism runs down, seeking the lowest state of existence, i.e., the inorganic. Klein's is more activist, incorporating sadism and masochism, relentlessly driving the organism to seek its own destruction. And this difference between the two may explain why Klein's view offended even those Freudians who accepted Thanatos as formulated by Freud. One may reluctantly accept limits to human progress and perfectibility in the guise of a "run-down clock" theory, if for no other reason than the inevitability of death. But Klein's relating of this impulse to violence and aggression, and then situating it in early childhood was neither orderly nor inevitable. It re-evoked in secular guise the evangelical view of the child as "fallen" and in need of redemption.

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[50] "Civilization and Its Discontents", op. cit.

Klein claims to base her additions on ideas inherent in Freud's statements. She cites "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" to show that sadism results from a fusion of the life-and-death-drives occurs at the outset of life. Some of this is deflected outward, but a significant part remains internalized. She adds to this that

> ...the danger of being destroyed by this instinct of aggression sets up...an excessive tension in the ego, which is felt by it as an anxiety...A division takes place in the id, or instinctual levels of the psyche, by which one part of the instinctual impulses is directed against the other.
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> This...earliest measure of defense on the part of the ego constitutes...the foundation stone of the development of the superego, whose excessive violence in this early stage would thus be accounted for by the fact that it is an offshoot of very destructive instincts...
>
> This view...makes it less puzzling...why the child should form such monstrous and fantastic images of his parents. For he perceives his anxiety arising from his aggressive instincts as fear of an external object, both because he has made that object their outward goal, and because he has projected them on to it...[51]
>
> The anxiety evoked in the child by his destructive instinctual impulses makes itself felt in the ego...in two directions. In the first place it implies the annihilation of his own body by his destructive impulses, which is a fear of an internal instinctual danger; but in the second place it focuses his fears on his external object, against whom his sadistic feelings are directed, as a source of danger.

At the time this was written Klein still followed Abraham in the belief that the neonate's initial response to

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[51] Klein, Heirs to Freud, pp. 256-257.

the breast was pre-ambivalent, followed by a later cannibalistic oral stage at which aggression and anxiety appeared.[53] Even before Envy and Gratitude, however, she had come to see these negative forces operating from the outset of postnatal life.

Melanie Klein's innovation in the area of anxiety was in linking it to Freud's death-drive, Thanatos. This enabled the streamlining of the anxiety theory, and the elimination of the previously-supposed various and different origins of anxiety. Henceforth in her work, anxieties differed not in their sources but in their manifestations. The way in which the child responds to this innate anxiety--either in splitting-off its objects into "good" and "bad", or in tolerating a measure of ambivalence--formed the basis of her developmental theory of positions. To this final major contribution of Kleins' we now turn.

Paranoid-schizoid, and Depressive Positions

So numerous today are child development theories, with their respective stages, complexes and operations, that one may be forgiven for asking what another outlook on early childhood can possibly add. Melanie Klein did not set out to invent another theory, nor did she. She observed certain phenomena that led her to refine Freud's and Abraham's

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[52] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 127.

[53] Segal, (1979), pp. 23, 24, 50.

concepts of early childhood. Then, following a further decade of observation, she developed a description of psychic life in earliest infancy, and how this differed from and corresponded to the psychic phenomena she had previously described. This two-tiered conception

> extended Freud's structural theory of the mind.* Both the ego and the superego are further analysed in structural terms. This enlarged structural theory has given a more precise diagnostic tool. It provides for a differentiation between psychotic and neurotic processes, with a place for borderline phenomena at the interface of the two positions, and allows a comprehensive view of neurosis and character formation...This gives a yardstick for measuring the progress of an analysis, and a framework in which to assess fluctuations, even in individual sessions.[54]

Klein's choice of the term "position", to describe this development, was taken advisedly. She wanted a word to evoke not just a point in time, but in psychic space or a viewpoint. A "stage" or "phase" is either negotiated or not; its characteristic behavior emerges later we are obliged to speak of regression. A position is more fluid it may be assumed once or several times in the face of certain circumstances:

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*Interaction between the ego, id, and superego are described by Freud's structural model. The description of conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious layers of the mind constitutes his topographic model, and that of the instincts and energy (Eros vs. Thanatos) is considered his economic or dynamic model.

[54] Segal, (1979), p. 163.

> ...though the phenomena involved occur in the first place during early stages of development, they are not confined to these stages but represent specific groupings of anxieties and defences which appear and re-appear during the first years of childhood.[55]

To describe thoroughly Klein's two positions would require an extended treatment of her object relations theory. Here we shall but summarize the constellation of defenses and other [redacted] characteristics of each position.

In the paranoi[redacted]zoid position, reality is perceived as fragmentary, and the ego is felt to be under attack. Paranoid, then, denotes the perceived persecutory nature of many objects, and schizoid, the ego's fundamental recourse to splitting its objects into good and bad entities. In the first quarter of post-natal life, the infant's world consists solely of part-objects, not only because of his splitting tendency, but because of the limitations of his perceptual system.

The first perceived part-object is his mother's breast. This the infant attempts to internalize in phantasy, in order to have the source of nurture within himself. But the breast does not represent unmitigated good to the baby. There are moments (e.g., delayed gratification) that it becomes the object of his anger and aggression, and in his phantasies these imagined attacks are reciprocated, making

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[55] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, Preface to the Third Edition, xiii.

it a menacing persecutor and the imagined source of his innate destructive anxiety. The infant's fragile ego cannot tolerate this dichotomy; in his fragmentary perception there is a splitting of the object into two parts: a "good" breast which nourishes him, and a "bad" one that threatens him. His worst fear (not conscious) is that his ego will be overwhelmed and destroyed, and he thus attempts in phantasy to keep the two objects separate, and to ally himself with one against the other. Generally he effects this by phanatasizing the good object within himself, that is in introjection, while situating the bad one outside himself, that is projection. At times, however, the situation is reversed; he feels so overwhelmed by his death-drive inside that he will identify with the aggressor and project the good object outside. The same pattern is repeated for later part-objects such as the penis.

When these three basic defence mechanisms are insufficient, he may resort to extreme idealization of the object. This may be observed in so-called "perfect babies" who never cry, treating all stimuli as good ones. Similar in its effect is omnipotent denial, in wich the total annihilation or non-existence of the persecutors is imagined.

More serious, and tending toward pathology is idealization of the persecuting object; here it is not the object that is denied, but the infant's emotions/response to it. A significant mechanism first identified by Klein, and

one which carries over into the depressive position, is that of projective identification. Here parts of the self are projected onto the object, with which the self then identifies.[56] An ultimate, most desparate defence is disintegration of the ego. In this unusually pathological measure, the ego fragments in phantasy, generally projecting the fragmented parts; this simulates a situation in which there is no longer a self to experience anxiety.

These defense mechanisms can all produce anxieties of their own. Projected bad objects become new external persecutors; introjected ones re-issue in internal anxiety such as hypochondria. With a predominance of good experiences over bad ones in the external world, however, they pave the way for a more organized and differentiated perception of reality. Splitting enables the ego to bring order out of chaos, and becomes the basis of later discrimination, and the ability to suspend the emotions while making a judgment, persecutory anxiety provides the wherewithal to recognize and react to danger. Idealization leads to a belief in goodness, and from projective identification empathy and symbol formation eventually develop.

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[56] This is the converse of introjective identification, in which the qualities of the object are taken into and identified with the self. A mature adult would express projective identification as "I see myself in him/her", whereas introjective identification would be "I see him/her in me."

The depressive position begins, chronologically, when the child begins to perceive his mother as a whole person or, in Kleinian terms, to form whole-object relationships. Existentially, it is marked by the ability to tolerate ambivalence. With the perceptual integration of the mother's breasts, hands, and face into a single composite individual, there is emotional acceptance and awareness that "good" and "bad" stimuli can issue from a single source (e.g., his mother) and be experienced by a single object (e.g., himself):

> [at]...between four to five months of age...the ego is faced with the necessity to acknowledge psychic reality as well as the external reality to a certain degree. It is thus made to realize that the loved object is at the same time the hated one; and...that the real objects and the imaginary figures...are bound up with each other...The first...steps in this direction occur...when the child comes to know its mother...and becomes identified with her as a whole, real and loved person. It is then that the depressive position...come[s] to the fore. This position is stimulated and reinforced by the "loss of the loved object" which the baby experiences over and over again when the mother's breast is taken away from it, and this loss reaches its climax during weaning...
>
> Not until the object is loved as a whole can its loss be felt as a whole. (emphasis Klein's)[57]

Anxieties still occur, but with different aims and objects. To his envy of his mother (arising from his dependence) is added jealousy, out of his awareness of her other interests and relationships. When her presence and

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[57] "The Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States" in Klein, Contributions..., pp. 306-7, 284.

affection are withdrawn, he may feel hate and destructiveness, and may even imagine that he has destroyed her. This gives rise to new anxiety that his phantasies may have been fulfilled. While his earlier, paranoid fears were primarily for his ego (from persecutors), his depressive ones are now for his object (from his own destructive impulses). Self-preservation continues to be a concern, but with it is mixed the beginnings of altruism--a concern for the object in its own right.

To alleviate these anxieties, and to atone for the phantasized destruction of his object, the child engages in reparative phantasies and sublimation. In Klein's thought, this mourning of the lost object and the need to restore it are basic to creativity, as will be discovered shortly. Sublimiation of his destructive impulses is the infant's means of fortifying the loved object against further attacks. This is achieved through the defense mechanisms of represssion, inhibition, and displacement, which succeed splitting as means of dealing with anxiety. Projective processes thus give way to introjective ones as the object is idealized and internalized. It is from the fact that these mechanisms are neurotic rather than psychotic, and that the associated emotions of loss, guilt and mourning are characteristic of depression in adults, that the depressive position is named.

With the re-appearance of his mother and the gratification of his physical needs, the child's phantasies,

both positive and negative, are modified by reality. Feelings thought to be omnipotent in the paranoid-schizoid position are now tested out on external objects which prove independent of his emotions. With a predominance of positive experiences, and through successive cycles of internal destructiveness, loss and reparation, the child's ego is strengthened and enriched by the objects he has reconstructed, increasing his trust in his own potential.

In the depressive position the character of the superego changes. The ideal and persecutory objects of the previous position are now integrated and internalized in a single object which can still occasion guilt and self-accusation, but is less severe and more benevolent, capable even of being ambivalently loved.

Though a partial working through of the depressive position ensures that continuing, later personality difficulties will not be of a psychotic nature, the position is never fully negotiated:

> The anxieties pertaining to ambivalence and guilt, as well as situations of loss, which reawaken depressive experiences, are always with us. Good external objects in adult life always symbolize and contain aspects of the primary good object...so that any loss in later life awakens the anxiety of losing the good internal object and, with this anxiety, all the anxieties experienced originally in the depressive position. If the infant has been able to estblish a good internal object relatively securely in the depressive position, situations of depressive

> anxiety will...lead...to a fruitful working through leading to further enrichment and creativity. (emphasis mine)[58]

From her development of play technique and the analysis of children, Melanie Klein greatly expanded our knowledge and awareness of object relations. From the constellations and interaction of these internal objects she drew new insights into female and male sexuality, infantile anxiety, and child development. These three areas of discovery are intricately connected in the Kleinian conception of creativity.

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[58] Segal, (1973), p. 80.

CHAPTER VI

KLEINIAN CREATIVITY THEORY

Melanie Klein died at the beginning of the decade in which "creativity" emerged as an object of popular interest and took educational psychology by storm. Her writings make periodic mention of "creativeness" and "creative activity", and these ideas are implicit in much of her discussion of the depressive position. Her 1929 essay on "Infantile Anxiety..."[1] is her one explicit treatment of the topic, and highlights reparation and anxiety as key components. Her last major work to be written, Envy and Gratitude,[2] makes some significant additions. However, she left no unified corpus of her thought on the creativity question.

Even had she lived longer, there is no reason to believe that she would have written such a work. Increasingly after her formulation of the depressive position (1934), her writing served to streamline and simplify her themes, not sub-divide them. As Clifford Scott points out she came to shun eclecticism and "rushing into print" on topical issues; she set her own agenda, and later works evolved out of the mainstream of her own thought and practice. She would have seen no reason for a separate

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[1] "Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse", in Contributions..., p. 227ff.

[2] Writings..., Volume III.

study of creativity any more than for phenomena such as the thirst for knowledge, or exploratory drive--one-time topics later subsumed into her more integrated overview. Klein would probably see "creativity" as a universal part of post-depressive development, and best studied in that context.

It is the purpose of this chapter to undertake this separate topical treatment that Melanie Klein would never have undertaken herself. Since Klein is the one significant follower of Freud to take seriously his theory of the death-drive and the conflict this interposes in human life, one can expect her views on creativity to reflect this struggle. The focus on "Kleinian creativity" in this thesis is not in another theory per se, but in its relevance to the initial question on the role of suffering in the creative act and process. To study this entails formulating a systematic and cohesive statement of Klein's views on the creativity issue, even where such a crystallization may cut across the evolving "longitudinal drift" of her thought.

I shall proceed as follows. I shall begin with an abridgement of Klein's metapsychological model, showing how, in her own terms, creative activity is an aspect of object-relations from infancy to adulthood. I shall then set out and explicate seven sequential and categorical propositions on creativity inferred from Klein. Finally, to sharpen the focus, I shall show how the Kleinian outlook contrasts with the other analytical models considered in Chapter III. A consideration of the educational and child-rearing

implications of Klein's theory will be reserved for a subsequent chapter.

The Metapsychological Model

The infant's first experience of creativeness originates outside himself. It is that of the Other that nurtures and sustains him--his mother, represented initially by her breast. With this he associates not only feeding and warmth but the totality of the outside world, and often those sensations originating within himself as well.[3] Within his wholistic and undifferentiated perception, the boundaries between "inside" and "outside" are very blurred, confused and chaotic.

The negative and destructive impulses arising within himself are also associated with this Other. These are manifestations of his unconscious innate anxiety (the death-drive), perhaps activated by the birth trauma, but in his primitive awareness they are attributed to external causes. For instance, the breast is not always there when the infant wants it, and this unleashes anxiety. "On these occasions" the breast is experienced as bad, and this badness is intensified by projection. If he hates it, then it must

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[3] In my April 1986 interview with her in London, Hanna Segal emphasized that the father is also "there from the beginning" felt as a potent, sustaining force, represented by the penis which is often phantasized as part of a "combined" (copulating) parental couple.

hate him too--such is the nature of his reality. He desires the breast as a part of himself, and he envies the breast because it is not, and because of his dependence on it.

To speak of "on these occasions" is perhaps misleading. As yet for him, there is no differentiated time and space; all is here and now.[4] The infant's first creative act, then replicates that of the gods in the creation-myth: division of the chaos by time (sequence/causality) and space (inside-outside). He effects this by "splitting" his experience into "good" and "bad" objects, and in situating some of

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[4] Having arrived at what I thought was an original formulation here, I was interested to note a similar treatment by Juliet Mitchell (editor) in her introduction to The Selected Melanie Klein, Penguin, England 1986. She writes:

> In placing anxiety at the centre of the theoretical elaboration of the clinical picture Klein is...dealing with present-day or persistent, potential actuality...The child of three or four is dealing with sexual or aggressive problems or hypochondriacal worries in the present. Where in Freud repression is a defence that creates a past and a symptom is a return of that past, Klein is appropriately more interested in the defences which have no such dimension of time past and with atemporal inhibitions of the ego, not with symptoms.
>
> ...Klein's contribution is to chart an area where present and past are one and time is spatial, not historical. This area has all the characteristics of a descriptive unconsciousness, an unconscious that has not been constructed by repression.
>
> This absence of historical time is evident both in Klein's innovations and her omissions. Thus the concept of regression plays no role in Klein's theory.

these external to himself (projection) and others internal within himself; with the latter he identifies.

Because of the viscissitudes of his instincts, these objects which he has created and endowed are in continual alternation. His ego is fragile, feels threatened, and will therefore identify with whatever seems strongest. When he is being fed and nurtured, the good breast is within him both physically and psychically; the bad one is pushed to the perimeter of consciousness. Here it hovers and can return to threaten him the moment the positive stimulus is removed or weakened. When the threat becomes too great, he will identify with the bad object; then the good one is relegated to the outer-world.

External reality plays an ever-growing part in these psychic perceptions. If positive experiences predominate, then his good object will be in the ascendancy, situated within his ego, strengthening it and strengthened by it. A preponderance of negative experiences will have the reverse effect.

In Klein's thought it is premature to speak of infantile creativity in this, the paranoid-schizoid position. Separation of good and bad stimuli is not deemed to be a creative response out of love for the object; it is a self-preserving reaction to fear of persecution. Yet this discrimination is prerequisite to, and paves the way for later creative integration.

The possibility for genuinely creative activity emerges with the capacity to love the object in and for itself; this coincides with the perceptual and psychic integration of the mother occurring in the depressive position. Anxiety and aggression still manifest in phantasized attacks on his object. But the continuity of his real mother imposes a measure of reality on these phantasies. No longer can the hated mother be split off and divorced from the loved one. He is forced to face the effects of his hate as it persists and pertains to the loved object and vice versa. In other words, he sees the ambiguity of his object and, at the same time, his own ambivalence to it. He is the one who hates and hurts (whether in phantasy or reality) the mother he also loves.

Since he now has but one object[5] both to love and hate, and that object--assuming successful negotiation of the paranoid-schizoid position--is internalized, he can no longer separate it in psychic space. He can only alternate in his feelings toward it, hating and loving it by turns. But continued belief in the power of his phantasies, combined with a primitive notion of consequences, fetters

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[5] Within the depressive position, there is also the emergence of the father, and further, "significant other" figures. Since their place in the child's psychic world generally parallels, later and to a lesser extent, that of the mother in the matter under discussion here (i.e., ambivalence), we shall treat the mother as an archetypal object at this point, differentiating other objects as the child's own subsequent sexual development differentiates him/her.

even his indulgence in phantasy. When anger is overwhelming, he phantasizes the destruction of his object, i.e., wishes his mother/parents dead. Then, seized with new anxiety and guilt at the imagined effect of his wish-fulfillment, he must atone for the loss and restore the object(s). This need for restitution or reparation is the mainspring of creative motivation in Melanie Klein's thought.

The quantity and timing of anxiety is critical here. If it is excessive at the outset (as in the sadistic imagos of the early superego), it will inhibit the expression of his anger and hence his (phantasized) destruction of the object. If it is insufficient afterwards, there will be no incentive to reparation. Since anxiety is instinctional, the only situation in which it can be insufficient is one in which it is denied or repressed. What is at issue here, then, is not the availability of anxiety, but the ego's ability to bear it.

Mourning is thus a key feature of the destructive and recreative process, for it is here that the child faces the consequences of his phantasized attacks on the object. Manic devices, such as denial and/or "magical" reparation of the loss, short-circuit this process. If the pain of the loss is fully felt (i.e., the anxiety is borne), then the lost object can be rebuilt, and the resulting experience--as much as the reconstructed object--will further enhance the child's creative potential.

Each successive and successfully negotiated cycle of anger, destruction, guilt, mourning and reparation strengthens the object and ego, facilitates subsequent cycles, and enriches the phantasy-resource material for creativeness. As in the previous position, a preponderance of positive over negative experiences in the external world will further the growth in the inital stages. The stronger the ego and the internal object, however, the greater the capacity to endure external adversity which, if not overwhelming, will lead to further internal strengthening. While the only essential quality for creativity, then, is the ability to bear anxiety and ambivalence--(the same as for remaining in the depressive position in general), the further advanced one is within the position, the less will be the tendencies to resort to manic defenses under stress. Hence, the greater the working-through of depression in the position, the more fruitful will be the resulting creative activity.

The shift from part-object to whole-object relations prefigures and facilitates the sexual reorganization of impulses from the pre-genital to the genitality of the Oedipus complex. In the early depressive position the child's world was differentiated between the self and the Other (primarily the mother); there now occurs the further differentiation between the mother and the father, followed by that among other "significant others" in his world. Differentiation of the external parents as male and female

is paralleled by internal differentiation of his/her own sexuality, in which s/he alternates between the two polarities before finally establishing a stronger identification with one parent and a libidinal desire for the other.

Creativeness in the depressive position was first marked by idealization and envy of the Other, followed by the building up of a good internal object which could increasingly endure the loss of the external one. Now the internal configuration must be revised to accommodate the differentiation of the child's external significant others, and his/her more sexually-specific self-awareness.[6]

When the father is perceived as a separate person, the child's internally-felt sexual attributes are organized into specific differentiated constellations. The father's presence and potency, represented by his penis, become an attribute that restores the mother from the child's phantasized attacks; this is symbolically seen as giving her more babies. The father thus becomes an agent of repara-

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[6] In the shadowy, undifferentiated part-object world of the paranoid-schizoid position, the penis is probably felt initially as a menacing object, due to the child's own urethral sadism. When the breast is experienced as bad or frustrating, however, the penis may become a desired object--a sort of surrogate breast. This is particularly true in girls. In the evolution from part of to whole-object awareness, the penis is phantasized variously within the mother's breast and as part of the contents of her body. Here its perspection as "good" or "bad" depends on the perception of the mother at the time. In one negative phantasy, it is incorporated in a combined figure of the two parents engaged in intercourse.

tion, and therefore, of creativity. As such he is viewed sometimes as a desired object and sometimes as a hated rival--as an object when the child desires him sexually, as a rival when the child's desire is focussed on the mother.[7] The phantasy-concept of creativeness is now broadened from that of simple desire for internalization of an object within the self, to an open-ness of the self to the other in a two-way stream--"inter-course" in the fullest sense of the term.

The rest of life, as seen from an object-relations view, is spent in more advanced negotiation of the depressive position in bearing anxiety through/in strengthening of the internal object. From a sexual-development perspective, it can be viewed as a continuation of the genital post-Oedipal quest for completeness in relation to a sexual object; this is based on one's prior identification with one parent and the search for a substitute for the other. Subsequent creative reparation is thus modified by this sexual divergence.

In the female, the fact that she incorporates the sexual object anatomically gives her an assurance of her omni-present ability; she is not as compelled as the male to

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[7] Klein postulated that children of both sexes undergo both a "direct" and an "inverse" Oedipus conflict. In the boy's inverse situation, or "feminine position" he identifies with the mother (here as rival) and desires his father.

prove her creativity in external acts undertaken for her own sake. In bearing and nursing a child, this potentiality is actualized. Her original envy of her mother's breast is dissolved in the realization of her own creative capacity.

The male's inability to incorporate an object anatomically may serve as a spur to strengthen his psychic object internally. Even as his sexual (pro-) creativity must take place outside of himself (through the female) so his artistic creativity must be actualized through his external handiwork.

Adolescence, adulthood and age furnish increasing and repeated opportunities to repair and refashion the lost object of early childhood. Romance and ambition, frustrated and even achieved, serve but as a reminder of the elusive ideal. In the female creative activities are more likely to be undertaken in the service of others (e.g., external causes); in the male they are often primarily means of proving himself.

Propositions

From the model of Kleinian creativeness sketched out above, and against the broader backdrop of her whole metaphsychology, we can summarize Melanie Klein's thinking on creativity in the following seven propositions:

1. The creative impulse is universal, motivated by the longing to restore/repair the lost idealized object, first symbolized by the mother and her breast.

2. The ideal object must be sufficiently loved and securely introjected for the loss and restoration to take place.

3. With successful introjection achieved, anxiety serves as a spur to creative activity, in a cycle of object destruction and reconstruction.

4. The loss of the object must be fully mourned and not denied to permit creative reparation, which is a work of integration and not merely a dissociative expression.

5. Successive cycles of less and less reparation, which may be experienced vicariously, will result in more uninhibited creative motivation and in richer material.

6. Innate creative talent can be inhibited by failure to bear anxiety; a less gifted individual's faculties can be strengthened by successful negotiation of it.

7. The creative individual and the pro-creative culture will be ones conscious of their insufficiency, and seeking to fulfill it.

We shall now look at each of these in turn.

Proposition 1:

The creative impulse is universal, motivated by the longing to restore/repair the lost idealized object, first symbolized by the mother and her breast.

Among those with even a casual acquaintance with Melanie Klein, the term "reparation" is immediately identified with her theory of creativeness. This is a

complex concept, and cannot be dealt with in summary fashion. Our interest at this point will focus not upon the reparative process itself, but upon (a) its motivational aspect, (b) its universality, and (c) its primal origin.

(a) creative motivation--Klein does not deny the existence of innate and varying creative talents. Her emphasis, however, is upon the internal and environmental psychic dynamic which brings them into play in both artist and amateur. Actual artistic expression, in her view, is more dependent upon the outworking of these universal psychic forces than upon factors of individual endowment. The relationship between these two aspects will be further considered in Proposition 6.

(b) universal activity--If creativeness is a consequence of reparation and reparation is a function of the depressive position, then it follows in Klein's thought that creativity is a ubiquitous human activity. This is indeed the case. I shall cite examples linking the "longing to restore" with creative activity in adult and child, male and female, homosexual and bisexual, and in the artist and his/her audience. In fact, the only exception to the creative phenomenom is the psychotic, as will be seen in Proposition 4.

In her seminal essay on "...the Creative Impulse", Klein quotes an account[8] of Ruth Kjar who, having never painted in her life before, suddenly sprang into full-grown artistry by painting a life-sized nude on her wall in an empty space that "seemed to coincide with an empty space within her". [her melancholy] After that initial success she painted a number of evocative portraits. Klein concludes:

> ...the desire to make reparation, to make good the injury psychologically done to the mother and also to restore herself, was at the bottom of the compelling urge to paint these portraits of her relatives. [The painting] told of the old woman, on the threshold of death, seems to be the expression of the primary, sadistic desire to destroy. The daughter's wish to destroy her mother, to see her old, worn out, marred, is the cause of the need to represent her in full possession of her strength and beauty. By so doing the daughter can allay her own anxiety and can endeavour to restore her mother and make her new through the portrait. In the analyses of children, when the representation of destructive wishes is succeeded by an expression of reactive tendencies, we constantly find that drawing and painting are used as means to restore people...[9]

In a later paper on "Weaning, Klein identifies and explicates this activity as it relates to earliest childhood:

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[8] An unspecified article by Ka[illegible]chaelis, cited in "Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse", in Klein, Contributions..., pp. 232-234, 235.

[9] Ibid.

> These tendencies...I have found in...small children to be the driving forces in all constructive activities and interests, and for social development. We find them at work in the first play-activities and at the basis of the child's satisfaction in his achievements, even those of the most simple kind for example, in putting one brick on top of another, or making a brick stand upright after it had been knocked down--all this is partly derived from the unconscious phantasy of making some kind of restoration...But more than this, even the much earlier achievements of the baby, such as playing with his fingers, finding something which had rolled aside, standing up and all sorts of voluntary movements--these too, I believe, are connected with phantasies in which the reparation element is already present.[10]

Hanna Segal cites Marcel Proust as an example of a mature artist who was extraordinarily conscious of his motivation:

> According to Proust, an artist is compelled to create by his need to recover his lost past. But a purely intellectual memory of the past, even when it is available, is emotionally valueless and dead. A real remembrance sometimes comes about unexpectedly by chance association. The flavour of a cake brings back to his mind a fragment of his childhood with full emotional vividness. Stumbling over a stone revives a recollection of a holiday in Venice which before he had vainly tried to recapture. For years he tries in vain to remember and re-create in his mind a living picture of his beloved grandmother. But only a chance association revives her picture and at last enables him to remember her, and to experience his loss and mourn her. He calls these fleeting associations: "intermittences du coeur", but he says that such memories come and then disappear again, so that the past remains elusive. To capture them, to give them permanent life, to

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[10] Klein, Melanie, Love, Guilt and Reparation and other works: 1921-1945, New York: Delta, 1975, p. 294.

integrate them with the rest of his life, he must create a work of art.[11]

For two final examples of this life-long quest by the artist, we turn to the study of Canadian author Gabrielle Roy, written by Phyllis Grosskurth. The first is an autobiographical reference to Roy's own childhood seen in retrospect through the eyes of Christine (nick-named, significantly, "Petite Misère") in Rue Deschambault/Street of Riches:

> During that interval I discovered almost all the things in nature I have never since ceased to hold dear: The motion of the leaves of a tree when you watch them from below, under their shelter; their neither sides like the bellies of small animals, softer, paler, shyer than their faces. And basically all my life's voyages ever since have merely been going back to try to recapture what I possessed in that hammock--and without seeking it.[12]

Later, in La Montagne Secrète/The Hidden Mountain, Roy portrays the creative act through the eye and hand of artist Pierre Cadorai, who has completed his life-long quest in the painting of a mountain:

> The resplendent mountain was once
> before him.
> But his mountain, in very truth.
> Freshly conceived, refashioned in its dimensions,
> in its facets and masses, wholly his, his own
> creation; a mathematics and a poem of the mind...

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[11] Segal, Hanna, "A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics", in New Directions..., pp. 338-339.

[12] Grosskurth, Phyllis, Gabrielle Roy, Toronto: Forum House, 1969, p. 39. Cited from Roy, Gabrielle, Street of Riches, tran. by Harry L. Binsse, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1965.

> The mountain of his imagination had almost nothing in common with the mountain in Ungava. Or at least what he had been able to caputre of the latter he had, and his own inner fires, softened, melted, cleansed, to cast it anew, in his own fashion, making of it a new raw material...And certainly it was no longer any question of who had the better succeeded with his mountain, God or Pierre, but merely that he, Pierre, had likewise created.[13]

I have cited five examples of the universal impulse to creativity irrespective of age, sex, sexual orientation, or specific talent. These factors do, however, impart some difference to the outworking of the creative impulse. It may be said that differences in creativity based on age (chronological or kairological) are a function of the number of cycles of loss and reparation undergone, while sex and sexuality-based differences figure both in the success of internalization of the original object and in the sense of self-sufficiency. These differences will be treated in the context of Proposition 5, and of Propositions 2 and 7, respectively. The effect of talent is dealt with specifically in Proposition 6.

(c) primal origin--In our earlier discussion of Klein's concept of object relations as derived from Freud (see page 114ff.), it was indicated that an instinct infers an object. Since there is a hunger drive evidenced in the sucking reflex, for instance, it follows that there must be an

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[13] Grosskurth, Phyllis, p. 47, cited from Roy, Gabrielle, The Hidden Mountain, Trans. by Harry L. Binsse, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1965.

object to satisfy that drive (i.e., the breast). Thus, if we have demonstrated the universal longing for a past ideal object, then we may suppose that there exists/existed something to satisfy that thirst. Klein's postulating of an idealized breast as this object derives from her view of the breast as the primary object, and from the inseparability with which she views psyche and soma:

> I have repeatedly put forward the hypothesis that the primal good object, the mother's breast, forms the core of the ego and vitally contributes to its growth, and have often described how the infant feels that he concretely internalizes the breast and the milk it gives...
>
> I would not assume that the breast is to him merely a physical object. The whole of his instinctual desires and his unconscious phantasies imbue the breast with qualities going far beyond the...nourishment it affords.
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> We find in the analysis of our patients that the breast in its good aspect is the prototype of maternal goodness, inexhaustible patience and generosity, as well as of creativeness. It is these phantasies and instinctual needs that so enrich the primal object that it remains the foundation for hope, trust, and belief in goodness.[14]

The belief in a universal longing for an ideal object as the mainspring of creativity is shared by many other schools of thought, principally religious, that do not endorse the breast as this sought-for object. Significantly, however, the terms in which they couch their beliefs in "alternate ideal objects", such as past-life

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[14] Klein, Melanie, Envy and Gratitude: a study of unconscious sources, London, Tavistock Publications, 1957, pp. 5-6.

inspiration or hope of immortality, can often be interpreted as supporting the Kleinian hypothesis.[15]

Proposition 2:

The ideal object must be sufficiently loved and securely introjected for the loss and restoration to take place.

In Klein's object-relations view, it is the ability to bear ambivalence that situates one within the depressive, as opposed to the paranoid-schizoid position. For the child's object to withstand negative feelings, even temporarily, it must be secure--secure in a predominance of loving feelings towards it, and reinforced in the infant's experience of reality. This means there must have been a sufficient preponderance of positive experiences for the "good breast"/mother to have become the phantasized mother, and internalized within the ego.

The same criterion applies to creative activity. If the ideal object is sufficiently secure, then it can tolerate the child's aggression towards and phantasized destruction of it, opening the way to the reparative cycle:

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[15] Much pre-Freudian, Victorian hymnody by female poets attributes maternal characteristics to the Christ-figure: e.g., "I thank Thee, Lord, that here our souls,
Though amply blest,
Can never find, although they seek,
A perfect rest,
Nor ever shall, until they lean
On Jesus' breast."

Adelaide Proctor
(1925-64)

> The "good" breast that feeds and initiates the love relation to the mother is the representative of the life instinct and is also felt as the first manifestation of creativeness. In this fundamental relation the infant receives not only the gratification he desires but feels that he is being kept alive. For hunger, which rouses the fear of starvation--possibly even all physical and mental pain--is felt as the threat of death. If the identification with a good and life-giving internalized object can be maintained, this becomes an impetus towards creativeness. (emphasis mine)[16]

It is important that one sees the breast as a symbol here. Even if an infant has not been breastfed--a situation in which Klein could acquiesce, though she did not advocate it--it is still possible to form a relationship in which his mother's introjected presence is good and resilient, capable of surviving his angry attacks. When this has been established, physical weaning will not pose so monstrous a threat; likewise the loss of her external presence can then be borne because of her psychic ideal within:

> It is evident that a good human relationship between the child and his mother at the time when these basic conflicts set in and are largely worked through is of the highest value. We must remember that at the critical time of weaning the child, as it were, loses his "good" object, that is, he loses what he loves most. Anything which makes the loss of an external good object less painful and diminishes the fear of being punished, will help the child to preserve the belief in his good object within. At the same time it will prepare the way for the child to keep up, in spite of the frustration, a happy relation to his real mother and to establish pleasurable relations with people other than his parents. Then he will succeed in obtaining satisfactions, which will

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[16] Klein, Envy and Gratitude, p. 39.

> replace the all-important one which he is just about to lose.[17]

In Klein's view, then, anything that impairs the formation of a good initial relationship with the breast/mother, and ultimately with its/her physical representative, will also inhibit creative expression. Such an inhibitor is breast-envy or, in less anthropromorphic terms, envy of the otherness on which the child depends:

> ...envy of creativeness is a fundamental element in the disturbance of the creative process. To spoil and destroy the initial source of goodness...results in the good object being turned into a hostile, critical and envious one. The super-ego figure on which strong envy has been projected becomes particularly persecutory and interferes with thought processes and with every productive activity, ultimately with creativeness.
>
> The envious and destructive attitude towards the breast underlies destructive criticism which is often described as "biting" and pernicious"...
>
> ...the person who can ungrudgingly enjoy other people's creative work and happiness is spared the torments of envy, grievance, and persecution...This is...the basis of inner resources and resilience which can be observed in people who, even after great adversity and mental pain, regain their peace of mind...Such capacity for resignation without undue bitterness and yet keeping the power of enjoyment alive has its roots in infancy and depends on how far the baby had been able to enjoy the breast without excessively envying the mother for its possession...An infant who has securely established the good object can also find compensations for loss and deprivation in adult life. All this is felt by the envious person as something he can never attain because he can never be satisfied, and therefore his envy is reinforced.[18]

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[17] Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation..., pp. 296-197.

[18] Klein, E[redacted] and Gratitude, pp. 40-42.

The "hostile, critical and...persecutory superego" characteristic of envy can also figure in other situations. Lack of consistent positive reinforcement such as feeding and fondling, or an otherwise non-friendly environment can lead to the child's "bad" objects becoming as strong as or stronger than his "good" ones. This condition requires continued recourse to schizoid defense mechanisms, with the monstrous superego preventing the integration necessary to creativity.

In the next proposition it will be shown how anxiety can be a contributory factor to the creative-reparative process. This can happen only after an idea-object is firmly in place, however. A preponderance of anxiety before secure introjection of a loved object will lead not to the creativeness of the depressive position, but to psychotic illness.

Propositon 3:

With successful introjection achieved, anxiety serves as a spur to creative activity, in a cycle of object destruction and reconstruction.

In the summary of Klein's major contributions I noted that her theory of infantile anxiety was the most contentious aspect of her work. (See pages 110, 131-136 above). Her invoking of the death-impulse to explain anxiety in infants disturbed many of Sigmund Freud's contemporaries; her insistence on the analysis of children's

anxieties "in depth" (as opposed to analysis of defense mechanisms) set her apart from Anna Freud and her followers. Given her belief in the ubiquity and constitutionality of anxiety, it follows that Melanie Klein saw its mastery as the task of child development, and of human life.

Given that the creative impulse is also universal in Klein's metaspychology, it is not surprising that the two phenomena--anxiety and creativity--should in some way be related. In fact, the "creative tension" of popular parlance is, in Klein's view, none other than a bearable level of anxiety arising from the inter-play of the life and death instincts. It is the normal and healthy oscillation of these forces, in the phantasied destruction and reparation of the beloved internal object, that constitutes the cycle of creative activity.

In this bipolar cycle anxiety is of two types. First there is destructive/aggressive anxiety, expressed in attacks on the object--initially the mother, then joined by the father, siblings, and other "significant others" in the child's life. As has been noted, these objects must be sufficiently secure in the child's affections for him/her to give "free vent" to destructive phantasies towards them. Phantasizing can be inhibited both by an unduly relatiatory superego, and by the pretense that all feelings towards the object are positive ones. An excessivly idealized object, then, is a sign of insecurity and not of strength.

In her Narrative of a Child Analysis, Klein observes that a freedom from internal anxiety facilitates a greater capacity for external environmental stress.[19] Her patient, ten-year-old Richard, who initially been fear-ridden at the prospect of going out into the street alone, arrives at the "decision" (not implemented) of accompanying Mrs. Klein to London to continue his analysis, though quite cognizant of the dangers of the blitz. Klein associates this risk-taking with creativity, and attributes this change to a growing freedom from his internalized father. Internal freedom is prerequisite to creative activity; it is achieved by the ability to attack and destroy in phantasy the idealized internal object, thus:

> Every act of creation is first an act of destruction.[20]

After the object has been destroyed in phantasy, depressive anxiety sets in. This is exemplifed in the experience, commonly recalled in children and adults, of having wished the parents/sibling/lover dead, then feeling acute apprehension lest the wish be fulfilled. Depressive anxieties entail mourning, guilt and repression for both the object and the self; they differ from paranoid anxiety in that the loss is felt as "Oh, how could I do this to

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[19] Klein, Melanie, Narrative of a Child Analysis, London: The Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 433, Note 1, pp. 446-447.

[20] Picasso, in May, op. cit., p. 63.

myself/Mama?", rather than attributing the loss to an external aggressor. Since the phantasized injury to the object is seen as coming from the child's own wishes and actions, the child perceives him/herself as capable of rectifying the damage caused:

> Play-analyses show that when the child's aggressive instincts are at their height it never tires of tearing and cutting up, breaking, wetting and burning all sorts of things like paper, matches, boxes, small toys, all of which represent its parents and brothers and sisters, and its mother's body and breasts, and that this rage for destruction alternates with attacks of anxiety and a sense of guilt. But when, in the course of analysis, anxiety slowly diminishes, his constructive tendencies begin to come to the fore. For instance, where before a small boy has done nothing but chop bits of wood to pieces, he will now begin to try and make those bits of wood into a pencil. He will take pieces of lead got from pencils he has cut up, and put them in a crack in the wood, and then sew a piece of stuff round the rough wood to make it look nicer...
>
> ...in the course of its analysis, the child begins to show stronger constructive tendencies in all sorts of ways in its play and its sublimations--painting or writing or drawing things instead of smearing everything with ashes, or sewing and designing where it used to cut up or tear to pieces...[21]

Where Klein says "anxiety...diminishes", it is clear from the context here and made explicit elsewhere in her writings, that anxiety is no less a motivator of the reparation that follows.[22] What abates is the

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[21] Klein, Contributions..., p. 274.

[22] See Klein, "The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego" (1930), in Contributions..., 236ff., for an extended treatment of Klein's theory of anxiety.

aggressive anxiety that issues in destruction; what ensues is its sublimation into constructive activities. Crucial in both manifestations is the ego's capacity to bear anxiety.

External causes of anxiety can abet and instigate the creative-reparative cycle at both its destructive and reconstructive junctures. These causes may be actu[illegible] sources of danger, deprivation and suffering which the ego successfully neg[illegible]es and transcends through the strength of its internal object. They may also be imaginary, stimulated by and simulated in a dream, novel or other work of art.[23] The questions of vicarious experience of the creative cycle will be considered more fully under Proposition 5.) In either case, as in one's internal psychic phantasies, the efficacy of the anxiety is relative to its quantity and "bearability". In Proposition 2, I considered one limit to anxiety-tolerance, in the object's ability to withstand attack. The other limit, relating to the reparation pole of the cycle, is the ego's capacity to experience the anxiety of the phantasized loss. To this I now turn.

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[23] In his preface to Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights, (Washington Square Press, Inc., New York, 1960), Albert J. Guerard points out that the author's lack of real-life experience was no liability to her achieving powerful insights: "For Emily Brontë had the wisdom to accept her limitations and convert them into strengths. She nourished rather than fought her introspective bent, and so achieved an intense awareness of inward conflict--and, even, some intuitive knowledge of the unconscious."

Proposition 4

The loss of the object must be fully mourned and not denied to permit creative reparation, which is a work of integration and not merely a dissociative expression.

The onset of mourning marks an important arrival in the infant's awareness: that of causality, of accepting the consequence of his acts, even of phantasized ones. Henceforth the child can no longer split off and project his destructive impulses onto objects relegated to the fringe of consciousness; the fact of his destruction must be faced, the loss lived through, and the sadness sustained. Then, and then only can reparation take place. This is the essence of the depressive position and of creative motivation.

The hypothesized relationship between creativity and suffering is here focussed most unequivocally. For in mourning the subject clearly suffers, even if it is the phantasized loss of an internal object. And to make the point doubly clear, Klein distinguishes between genuine reparation, where this occurs, and manic or "magical" reparation, in which the subject tries to short-circuit the process by denying the loss. Hanna Segal describes the case of a four-year-old girl who exhibited manic reparation in one session, and later allowed herself to feel the loss:

> In the days preceding the two sessions I am going to describe, she furiously attacked the box of paints, digging out the paints with her knife, mixing them up and dissolving them in water. She

would then use the dirty coloured water to "drown" the little toys in the drawer. This was interpreted to her mainly as representing an attack on her mother's breast with teeth and nails...

In the next session, manic repar[illegible] predominant. She came into the [illegible] went immediately to her box of paint[illegible]ized that by now it was unusable. She as[illegible] had got a new box for her, and, when [illegible] saw that I had not, took [illegible] draining board and said, "You must mend [illegible] quickly and make it just exactly as it [illegible]re."...

The emphasis was [illegible]reparation done by magic, quickly...The re[illegible]n for this was so that guilt and loss could be denied; reparation must be so swift that Ann would have no time to mourn or feel guilty...

The next session shows a complete change of mood, in which manic mechanisms recede and true reparation sets in. As soon as she came into the room, she went again to the box, opened it, gave a little sigh and said, "Isn't it a pty it's so spoilt?," then turned to me and said "Let's try to mend it together." This time she did not insist either on the speed or on the completeness of the process, nor did she want the box to be exactly as before...[24]

Segal also describes the case of an older girl

with a definite gift for painting. An acute rivalry with her mother made her give up painting in her early teens. After some analysis she started to paint again and was working as a deocrative artist. She did decorative handicraft in preference to what she sometimes called "real painting", and this was because she knew that, though correct, neat and pretty, her work failed to be moving and aesthetically significant. At the time when I was trying to interpret her unconscious sadistic attacks on her father, the internalization of her mutilated and destroyed father and the resulting depression she told me the following dream:

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[24] Segal, Hanna, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, London: The Hogarth Press, 1973, pp. 96-99.

> "She saw a picture in a shop which represented a wounded man lying alone and desolate in a dark forest. She felt quite overwhelmed with emotion and admiration for this picture; she thought it represented the actual essence of life; if she could only paint like that she would be a really great painter."
>
> It soon appeared that the meaning of the dream was that if she could only acknowledge her depression about the wounding and destruction of her father, she would then be able to express it in her painting and would achieve real art. In fact, however, it was impossible for her to do this, since...her small capacity to tolerate depression led to its manic denial and to a constant make-believe tha all was well with the world...Her dream showed...that the effect on her painting of her persistent denial of depression, and in relation to her painting the denial of the depth and seriousness of her depressive feelings produced the effect of superficiality and prettiness in whatever she chose to do--the dead father is completely denied and no ugliness or conflict is ever allowed to disturb the neat and correct form of her work.[25]

The aforegoing cases have been recounted at length because they illustrate so aptly this central tenet of Klein's thought, namely, that the experiencing of the depressive emotions of loss, guilt and love--even for objects harmed only in unconscious phantasy--is an essential precursor to and part of creative expression and development.

As distinct from many theorists who equate creativity with free-association, the unfettered expression of cognitive processes, or "free play" of instincts in a cultural context, Klein characterizes it as <u>work</u>--a working

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[25] Segal, in Klein, Heimann & Money-Kyrle, <u>New Directions...</u>, pp. 390-391.

through of the depressive position. True, there is an element of free expression--in phantasized attacks on the object, for instance--but that too is a labour in the depressive context; the anxiety must be "worked through" to the reconstruction of the object and ego that ensues. In this respect it is significant that Klein's child analysands saw and described their treatment as "work", even in the setting of the playroom.

Even children's play is an "outworking" in this sense, and can qualify as creative work on an elementary level. The only human situation in which creative activity is impossible, then, is the one in which the players are incapable of the work of integration, and continue to treat all stimuli as events to be split and kept apart, i.e., psychosis:

> ...schizophrenic children are not capable of play in the proper sense. They perform certain monotonous actions, and it is a laborious piece of work to penetrate from these to the unconscious. When we do succeed, we find that the wish-fulfilment associated with these actions is pre-eminently the negation of reality and the inhibition of phantasy.[26]

The psychotic cannot create or even phantasize; he can only project stereotypic and fragmented images in his flight from reality. The neurotic may be inhibited by his condition, but is capable of creating insofar as he is capable of mourning his lost object. Manic reparation is a

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[26] "Personification in the Play of Children", in Klein, Contributions..., p. 215.

partial and unsuccessful attempt to deny psychic reality. Given help and/or propitious circumstances, it can nevertheless lead to a full facing of the loss and genuinely creative reparation of it. At an advanced level of negotiating the depressive position, neurosis need not deter artistic expression; one could say that Proust's insight (see page 159) into his sufferings provided both impetus and imagery for his creativity.

In the Kleinian perspective, then, the only qualitative prerequisite to creativity is the ability to bear ambivalence in mourning the consequences of one's own destructive impulses. The psychotic is an extreme case capable of neither mourning nor creating. Manic reparation is a marginal situation where creativity and mourning are inhibited. With successful mourning this inhibition and its attendant manic mechanisms will diminish. This brings one to the quantitative aspect of creative functioning.

Proposition 5:

Successive cycles of loss and reparation, which may be experienced vicariously, will result in more uninhibited creative motivation and in richer material.

This might be summarized as "more mourning, greater creativity." In Klein's thought, repeated cycles of successful mourning and reconstruction will result not only in a more fluent creative process, but in a richer phantasy life expressed in the creative product:

> It seems that every advance in the process of mourning results in a deepening in the individual's relation to his inner objects, in the happiness of regaining them after they were felt to be lost..., in an increased trust in them and love for them because they proved to be good and helpful after all. This is similar to the ways in which the young child step by step builds up his relations to external objects, for he gains trust not only from pleasant experiences, but also from the ways in which he overcomes frustrations and unpleasant experiences, nevertheless retaining his good objects (externally and internal). The phases in the work of mourning when manic defenses relax and a renewal of life sets in, with a deepening in internal relationships, are comparable to the steps which in early development lead to greater independence from external as well as internal objects.[27]

Segal makes even more explict the effect of "recycling" on the quality of the creative product, when she says

> The richness, depth and accuracy of a person's thinking will depend on the quality and malleability of his unconscious phantasy life and his capacity to subject it to reality testing.[28]

Two inferences may be drawn from this. First is that the creativity of adults differs from that of children only in degree and not in kind. Given the same degree of psychic health, the adult artist with greater experience of life--more loves lost and mourned, more situations of anxiety experienced and negotiated--will have a richer storehouse of material on which to draw.[29] Conversely the child, given

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[27] Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation..., pp. 360-361.

[28] Segal, Introduction..., p. 23.

[29] This is not to be confused with the greater technical proficiency of the adult artist, which is born out of longer experience of his tools and of his medium. (This subject is treated at greater length in Proposition 6.) Nor can one overlook the "screening" (Continued on next page)

greater ubiquity and accessibility of his phantasies,[30] may have a more "artesian" source, but once expressed in his dreams and his play, these creations are often soon forgotten. It would seem, then, that the bringing to consciousness and retention of this material (i.e., recall) is a cardinal feature of the creative adult. Analysis can serve as a means to this end.

Secondly, the loss-and-reparation cycle can take place unconsciously, as we have observed in children's play,[31] or vicariously in the experiencing of a work of art. Klein's significant 1929 paper[32] illustrated all the elements of the depressive cycle--the sadistic attack on the mother, the resulting alienation from the world, and eventual restoration--in Colette's libretto of a Ravel opera. But it is not only the creator--artist who derives the cathartic benefit; his audience shares in the experience with him.

Segal treats this aspect at length in her essay on aesthetics:

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29 (from previous page) that takes place over time, i.e., most children experiment with one or more artistic media at some point but without reinforcement, born of achievement and/or acclaim, will not likely continue into adulthood.

30 Klein, Contributions..., p. 191. See also p. 115 this thesis.

31 See page 116 this thesis.

32 "Infantile Anxiety-Situations...", Klein, Contributions...

> The artist withdraws into a world of phantasy, but he can communicate his phantasies and share them. In that way he makes reparation, not only to his own internal objects, but to the external world as well.
> ...
>
> The reader identifies with the author through the medium of his work of art. In that way he re-experiences his own early depressive anxieties, and through identifying with the artist he experiences a successful mourning, re-establishes his own internal objects and his own internal world, and feels, therefore, re-integrated and enriched.[33]

In non-verbal arts, visual and performing, the relationship is more elusive. However, Klein herself offers a possible hypothesis in her 1923 paper on "Infant Analysis":

> According to Freud the hysterical attack is simply a pantomime representation of phantasies, translated into terms of motion and projected onto motility. An analogous assertion may be made of those phantasies and fixations which, as in the artist, are represented by physical motor innervations, whether in relation to the subject's own body of some other medium... (emphasis mine)[34]

As this was written four years before the first appearance of Klein's concept of reparation, and while she was still drawing heavily on Freud and Ferenczi for her thought on the arts, this citation should perhaps not be stressed too heavily. However, it is a valid inference that the rhythms of the dance, the shading and contours of a scene or object, and the timbre and tonalities of a musical

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[33] Segal, in Klein et. al., New Directions..., pp. 398, 400.

[34] Klein, Contributions..., p. 99.

composition may evoke images or prompt proprioceptive stimuli analogous to those wrought by the written and spoken word.

Having elucidated a certain quantitative relationship between reparative cycles and creative fluency, one must resist the temptation to go a step further and reduce the creative process to an arithmetic equation. Even a comparison of a child and adult creatives is not simple or unidirectional for, as noted, the greater experience of the adult may be offset by the greater accessibility of the child phantasies. The arithmetic relation can only be said to hold true all other things being equal, and it is hard to hypothesize the case of any two human beings where this is so. The validity of the hypothesis, therefore, may be limited in practice to a comparison of creativity in the same person as a child and as an adult.

When one compares the creative powers of the artist with those of his audience and critics, the question becomes even more complex. Here we are confronted with the elusive quality or combination of qualities called "talent", on the one hand, and the psychosocial factors that affect its appreciation or recognition, on the other. While Klein's concept was concerned mainly with the motivational side of creativity, she was, however, quite aware of the constitutional aspect, and made occasional references to it. I shall now briefly consider these.

Proposition 6

Innate creative talent can be inhibited by failure to bear anxiety; a less gifted individual's faculties can be strengthened by successful negotiation of it.

This is a corollary of the Kleinian tenets of the universality of the creative-reparative urge, and its relation to the bearing of anxiety, as set out in the preceding three propositions. It follows, then, that in the particularly gifted individual we will find the artistic talent tempered by the same motivational factors as will be found at work in the population at large. Klein's earliest reference to a special creative endowment appears in the context of her analogy of art to hysteria, in the 1923 paper to which we referred in Proposition 5. She continues:

> ...the development either of an interest in art or of a creative talent would partly depend upon the wealth and intensity of fixations and phantasies represented in sublimation. It would be of importance not only in what quantities all the constitutional and accidental factors concerned are present and how harmoniously they operate, but also what is the degree of genital activity which can be deflected into sublimation...
>
> Genius differs from talent not only quantitatively but also in its essential quality. Nevertheless we may assume for it the same genetic conditions as for talent. Genius seems possible when all factors concerned are present in such abundance as to give rise to unique groupings, made up of units which bear some essential similarity to one another--I mean, the libidinal fixations.

> ...one determining factor in [the] success [of sublimation] was that the fixations destined for sublimation should not have undergone repression too early, for this precludes the possibilities of development.[35]

As noted, this work predated by four years Klein's elucidation of the reparation concept, and was written at a stage when she had simply adopted Freud's concept of sublimation as the basis of creative activity. Since reparation was but a refinement and an elaboration of the Freudian concept,[36] however, one may safely substitute "reparation" for "sublimation" and "manic reparation" for "repression too early" in the above quotation, without undue distortion of Klein's thought.

While Melanie Klein speaks of talent as a singularity, her reference to "all the constitutional...factors" makes it clear that she was conscious of the multitude of variables that makes up the creative disposition. Moreover, the intricacy and range of these traits (as noted in the review of Guilford's and Cattell's work, in Chapter II) makes evident the impossibility of drawing a hard and fast distinction between constitutional and motivational factors, as one is wont to do in casual conversation of "cognitive" and "emotional" dimensions of personality. Even "purely-

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[35] Klein, Contributions..., p. 99.

[36] "The attempts to save the loved object, to repair and restore it...are determining factors for all sublimations...[Reparative] phantasies...enter into all the activities, interests and sublimations..." (Klein, Contributions..., pp. 290, 316.)

perceptual" faculties such as visual acuity (colour, shape, ground/base discrimination) can be affected by emotional factors--inhibited by depression and enhanced by elation, for instance. This is probably even more true for the ensemble of associative processes and functions that goes into drawing inferences, relationships, and symbolic representations--all factors in a work of art.

This is more succinctly expressed in Klein's later work. In a footnote to a case study of an unusually gifted teacher and writer, she states:

> His fear of his bad imagos, which made him endeavour to deny and subdue his unconscious to a more than ordinary degree, had a great deal to do with the inhibition of his productive powers. He could never abandon himself completely to his unconscious, and so an important source of creative energy was closed to him.[37]

In the Appendix to this work, she re-iterates her anxiety theory explicitly:

> The anxiety which the child has as a result of its destructive impulses...coincides with its fear of dangerous internalized objects and leads to definite anxiety-situations;...and these...can never be entirely done away with. Analysis can only weaken their power...
>
> The more analysis can do in the way of reducing the force of the child's early anxiety-situations...the more successful it will be...[38]

Considering the goal of analysis as the bringing to consciousness ("Where id was, ego shall be"), we can sub-

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[37] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 275.

[38] Ibid., pp. 280-281.

stitute "artistic expression" for "analysis" in the above quotation, to give us a statement of the relationship between the creative urge and creative talent, as follows: The self-knowing, and therefore creatively expressive artist is the one who externalizes anxiety without denial or delusion. Others, whether talented or not, may participate in the "magic" of the artist's work, and may even emulate it, without being aware of its essence. Conversely, a self-knowing individual of more average endowment may, while never approaching genius, be able to execute works that serve the same purpose for him/herself, and may occasionally aid others in their own externalization. The common element is that of self-awareness, as expressed by poet Paul Valery:

> Tout homme crée sans le savoir
> comme il respire.
> Mais l'artiste se sent créer.
> Son acte engage tout son être.
> Sa peine bien-aimée le fortifie.[39]

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[39] Inscription sur Le musée de l'homme, à Paris.

"Everyman creates unaware; likewise he breathes.
But the artist creates consciously.
His act involves his whole being.
The sorrow he yearns strengthens him."

(translation mine; verified by Georges Robert, Edmonton).

Proposition 7:

The creative individual and the pro-creative culture will be ones conscious of their insufficiency, and seeking to fulfil it.

This is a macro-psychological restatement of the first proposition, and goes beyond the Klenian kerygma.

Klein showed little interest in social psychology, and even those inferences she makes about the artist's audience[40] are always traced back to the working of the individual psyche. To the extent that sexual traits can be considered a group phenomenonm, she does make some generalizations on group lines based on the differentiation of male and female sexual development. These are more subtle and comprehensive than the allegedly-Freudian sexual stereotypes that often emerge in popular parlance. From the Kleinian understanding of sexuality and its relation to creativity, it is possible to draw certain cultural analogies: the environment that tends to emphasize certain qualities or values that are stereotypically considered "masculine" or "feminine" will show corresponding patterns of creativeness.

At the outset of this argument, it is necessary to re-emphasize that if the creative urge is synonomous with mourning for the lost idealized object (Proposition 1), then

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[40] "Infantile Anxiety-Situations..., in Contributions..., p. 227.

it follows that the individual or group who is most conscious of the loss will be the one to most freely mourn it, and hence be the most motivated to create. This is reflected in such statements as

> The lover does not write poems to his beloved in her presence.[41]

and

> Can the wedding guests fast when the bridegroom is with them?[42]

Having the lover or bridegroom present does not mean that one has actualized the Kleinian primal object. With a surrogate present, however (and the beloved is certainly an idealized object, even if not the ideal one) there is less need to search for an ultimate ideal. Klein recognized the role of lesser, surrogate objects, in saying:

> Thought, superficially this [identification with a good and life-giving object] may manifest itself as a coveting of the prestige, wealth and power which others have attained, its actual aim is creativeness. (emphasis mine)[43]

Then she adds

> The capacity to give and preserve life is felt as the greatest gift.[44]

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[41] Ellul, Jacques, The New Demons, New York: Seabury, 1975.

[42] Mark 2:19.

[43] Klein, Envy and Gratitude, p. 39.

[44] Ibid., p. 40.

Since the life-giving/preserving capacity is most evidently reposite in the female of the species, it may be inferred that the female, particularly the woman who has given birth and nourishment, will feel more self-contained, and hence in less need of proving her creative capacity in the realm of external objects, as the male is obliged to do.

Klein also sees this equation of creativity with child-bearing evident in the male, in the Feminine Position of development:

> In many of his sublimations, particularly his intellectual and artistic efforts, the boy makes extensive use of the feminine mode of mastering anxiety. He utilizes books and work, in the significance of bodies, fertility, children, etc., as a refutation of the destruction of his body which, in the feminine position, he awaits at the hands of the mother who is his rival.[45]

In the development of the female, this creativity capacity--which the boy only simulates in art and phantasy--is actualized in puberty, whereupon the external acting-out of it loses impetus. With the subsequent development of the boy, the feminine position decreases in strength, and further creativity is associated with potency, concommitant with identification with a paternal super-ego.[46]

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[45] The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 189.

[46] Klein's earlier comparisons of male and female creative drives are more influenced by the Freudian concept of penis-envy. Although this was later subsumed into her own concept of envy of the breast, the following comparison, drawn in 1928, is not markedly different from what can be inferred from Envy and Gratitude, even though her meta-psychological model has changed: (continued next page).

The same constellations of factors that differentiate creativeness on a sexual plane may be seen to operate in a comparative cultural context. Here the question of whether fulfilment is intrinsic or extrinsic to the self is replicated in the choice of cultural values, and this in turn is conditioned by the presence of and response to

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(continued from previous page) "...women especially possess a great capacity...for dis-regarding their own wishes and devoting themselves with self-sacrifice to ethical and social tasks...[To explain this] we have to take into consideration the peculiar conditions of the formation of the feminine super-ego...the more the identification with the mother becomes stabilized on the genital basis, the more will it be characterized by the devoted kindness of a bountiful mother-ideal...When it comes to the active conversion of [this] emotional attitude into social or other activities, it would seem that it is the paternal ego-ideal that is at work. The deep admiration felt by the little girl for the father's genital activity leads to the formation of a paternal super-ego which sets before her active aims to which she can never fully attain. If, owing to certain factors in her development, the incentive to accomplish these aims is strong enough, their very impossibility of attainment may lend an impetus to her efforts which, combined with the capacity for self-sacrifice which she derives from the maternal super-ego, gives a woman, in individual instances, the capacity for very exceptional achievements on the intuitive plane and in specific fields."

"The boy, too, derives from the feminine phase a maternal super-ego which causes him, like the girl, to make both cruelly primitive and kindly identifications. But he passes through this phase to resume...identification with the father. However much the maternal side makes itself felt in the formation of the super ego, it is yet the paternal super-ego which from the beginning is the decisive influence for the man. He too sets before himself a figure of an exalted character upon which to model himself, but, because the boy is 'made in the image of' his ideal, it is not unattainable. This circumstance contributes to the more sustained objective creative work of the male." Klein, "Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict", Contributions..., pp. 211-212.

anxiety. Is the collective psyche, through cycles of destruction, mourning and reparation, to be given full rein to articulate its own ideals? Or is it to be assuaged and deterred by the "surrogates" [redacted] affluence, political-military domination of others, and/or technological prowess?

One can predict, for instance, that the nation, tribe or social class that has recently undergone hardship and suffering will be more creatively prolific than the one that has enjoyed a long period of unbroken comfort and prosperity.[47] In the case of a revolutionary struggle (as

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[47] Two apparent exceptions in British history are the cultural flourishings associated with the Elizabethan and Victorian periods. In the first half of the reign of Elizabeth (I), however, England was recovering from the trauma of the religious persecutions that had wracked the nation during the latter years of Henry VIII and during the six year reign of his daughter ("Bloody") Mary. During this time England also was threatened externally; the Spanish Armada attacked, and Scotland was a separate and hostile power to the north.

In the Victorian era the creative expressions that were to prove the most enduring were protests against both the achievements and sufferings of the times. There were the "Romantic" poetic appeals for a return to rural life, on one hand, and Dickensonian criticisms of the oppressiveness of the new, industrial order, on the other.

An example of the converse of this principle emerges in a column by Arnold Edinborough "Myth, paradox, delight in the Swedish tradition", The Financial Post, Toronto, May 14, 1983, p. 26:

"...Sweden's glory days were centuries ago--not now...Sweden has now come to peace, prosperity and benign neglect by its political neighbours in the 20th century. ...[T]he country is probably the most advanced welfare state in the world... (Continued on next page)

opposed to a bloodless coup), the armed conflict is underscored by symbolic attack on the father/mother figure; a period of intense creative reparation often follows the conclusion of hostilities. Such was the case in both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.[48]

A convincing example of the "sense of insufficiency" factor in creativity is afforded by an artist of the time and place with which I am most familiar: the post centenary culture of English-speaking Canada. For many of my language and generation, Stan Rogers was the embodiment of that culture par excellence--a man who took idioms and experiences from four different regions and, through his own gift of metaphor, wove them into works of art that expressed a common spirit of Canadians often at odds with each other. It is not within my scope to examine the cultural ethos out of which Rogers' songs grew, and in which they found their following. Rather it is to see this sense of separation,

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[47] (Continued from previous page) ...[C]reativity is not a Swedish tradition. There is no Swedish dramaitist within a country mile of Ibsen's greatness; no Swedish composer to match Sibelius in Finland or Neilsen in Denmark."

[48] A countervailing trend of many revolutions occurs when the new leaders and institutions become deified, resisting further innovation, and ultimately becoming as oppressive as the ones they deposed. The Revolution having become the raison d'etre for all that follows, it cannot itself be called into question without allegations of counter-revolution or treason. Jacques Ellul traces this phenomenom of the "re-sacralization of the agent of desacralization" in The New Demons (op. cit.)

loss and insufficiency which figures so clearly and self-consciously in the songs themselves. (See Appendix)

The "inescapable sadness" that Bettelheim sees as "part of the life of every reflective person" is even more the lot of the consciously creative person. For the holding of an inner ideal (object) is held in tension with the trauma of the outer world. These the sensitive human being must simultaneously incarnate, and the artist, as the human spokesperson, express. In Klein's view, as in Rogers', this universal longing goes back to birth. But for Klein, it can never be satisfied:

> ...the infant's unfilfilled desires--which are to some extent incapable of fulfilment--are an important contriutory factor to his sublimiations. and creative activities. The absence of conflict in the infant, if such a hypothetical state could be imagined, would deprive him of enrichment of his personality and of an important factor in the strengthening of his ego. For conflict, and the need to overcome it, is a fundamental element in creativeness.[49]

The Analysts Revisted

In this final section of the chapter I shall compare Melanie Klein's creativity theory with those of the five analysts whose work was surveyed in Chapter III. In this way it will be more apparent in what respects her thought extends, modifies or contradicts the work of each of the others, and of the analytic tradition in general.

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[49] Klein, Envy and Gratitude, p. 15.

Sigmund Freud

Klein extended and explicated Frued's concept of sublimation with her concept of reparation. Her elucidation of the reparative cycle of destruction, loss and restoration--both in the artist and in the populace at large--answered at least partially the elder Freud's musings on the "innermost secret [by which the artist] gives pleasure to his audience." (page 33) Her recognition of infantile sadistic phantasies and their part in the cycle led her to accept Freud's theory of the death-impulse, and to invest it with a wider practical significance than Freud probably intended. While Freud, particularly in his later years, came to view conflict as an inevitable part of human life, he never linked it specifically with creative expression. Klein's linkage of the two was entirely original, but constructed on the Freudian foundation.

Anna Freud

The conflict between Klein and the younger Freud centered on the issue of infantile anxiety--its origins, importance, and the depth at which it could and should be treated in infant analysis. While Anna Freud belatedly admitted a larger role for anxiety than she had allowed at the time of the 1927 Symposium on Child Analysis,[50] it never held for her the central place it occupied for Klein. On

[50] See "Postscript, May 1947," to the Symposium, in Klein, Contributions..., pp. 182-184.

the impossibility of mixing of education and analysis they were also implacably opposed. While Anna Freud did allow a positive role for anxiety in practice, in stimulating sublimitive phantasies, it may be said that Klein's view on creativity owed nothing to hers and added nothing to them.[51]

Carl Jung

Kleinian creativity shares more with Jung than with any of the other analytical figures we have surveyed. While this may appear curious given Klein's professedly unswerving allegiance to Freud, it is not altogether surprising, given a number of parallels between the two. Both were highly original figures in their own right, and both owed a part of that originality to specific fields of endeavour that set them apart from Freud. Jung's specialty was his clinical work with psychotics; Klein's was her analysis of very young children. Both diverged from the staunchly patriarchal

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[51] In her Foreword to Joanna Field's work on creativity, Anna Freud refers to the Kleinian stance on reparation and, though no dismissing it outright, diminishes it by implication.

> With regard to the analytic controversy whether psychic creativity seeks above all 'to preserve, re-create the lost object', [Field] takes the stand that this function of art, although present, is a secondary one. According to her, the artist's fundamental activity goes beyond the re-creation of the lost object to the primary aim of 'creating what has never been' by means of a newly acquired power of perception. There is, here, another correspondence with the results of analytic therapy.

super-ego enunciated by Freud, both saw sadistic aspects of the maternal figure, and both made special note of bi-sexual elements in individuals of both sexes. (Jung characterized this dichotomy in the adult with his animus/anima concept; while Klein saw in child development a feminine position that played a part in the male, as did a masculine position in the female.) And finally, both were accused of mysticism and heresy by some of their analytic colleagues, the difference between them being that Jung was totally ostracized from the psycho-analytical mainstream on the continent whereas Klein, due to the greater pluralism of the British Society and Institute, remained to lead a school within the British movement.

Jungian Rosemary Gordon also notes similarities between Jung's psychology of death and the Kleinian concept of the tension between instincts to which the newborn ego is exposed, and between his concept of the archetype and hers of unconscious phantasy as "the mental expression of instinct."[52]

Specifically on the creativity issue, both Jung and Klein see an essential role played by conflict and death, though admittedly in the Kleinian perspective, it is the fear of death occasioned by Thanatos. Both also see creativity as a means of resolving the conflict (Jung would

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[52] Gordon, Rosemary, Dying and Creativity: A Search for Meaning, The Society of Analytical Psychology Ltd., London, 1978, pages xii, 27-28, 32.

have said, of transcending it), Klein in her concept of reparation of the destroyed object, and Jung in re-integration of opposing forces, as he experienced in painting and as did some of his psychotic patients.

Lawrence Kubie

Kubie argues from an ostensibly Freudian base, which may be equally alleged as a North American bias. In an unrepentantly "process" view that approaches Pivato's caricature of the psychoanalytic position in its mechanistic simplicity, he maintains that creativity and suffering are entirely separate, and that "never the twain shall meet". When they do meet, their interaction can only be a Neurotic **Distortion** of the Creative Process. (emphasis mine)[53] It would appear, therefore, that Klein's and Kubie's views are unalterably opposed.

On closer inspection, it will be seen that where Kubie treats creativity and neurosis as autonomous processes, Klein sees both as functions of more extended phenomena--the reparative cycle, in one instance, and constellations of defense measures of the depressive position, in the other. The depressive anxiety which Klein postulates as a prerequisite to creativity cannot be simply equated with "neurosis" in Kubie's schema. Conversely, Kubie nowhere says that simple anxiety is incompatible with creativity,

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[53] Kubie, Lawrence, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process, University of Kansas Press, 1958.

though he comes very close to this. Klein's quantitative contention (that creativity requires a "critical level" of anxiety which if exceeded, can lead to illness) is not specifically addressed in Kubie's thesis, though it seems probable he would reject it.

In short, then, Klein's and Kubie's positions, while contradictory, are divergent in their starting-points as much as in the conclusions. In concentrating on the pre-conscious processes, Kubie has emphasized Freud's descriptive or topographic framework of the mind. Klein's view, with the weight it accords to the interplay of the life and death-drives, is presented more in terms of the dynamic or economic Freudian model. Kubie's conception has little to add to Klein's model. Klein's concepts of reparation and unconscious phantasy could be considered an elaboration of Kubie's preconscious processes, though Kubie himself would almost certainly reject them as such.

Rollo May

May shares with Klein a belief in the indispensibility of anxiety in the creative act. He, like Klein, believes that this anxiety manifests itself in destruction (of the established order) as well as in reconstructive activity. May's emphasis on "encounter" with external "non-being" leads him to set the struggle in the tension between the inner and outer worlds. Klein's invocation of Thanatos, a concept to which May makes no reference, enables her to

situate the struggle, and the creative locus, within the self. It would appear that in May's perspective, creativity is thus not constitutionally self-contained, and is not activated until the ego is faced with environmental opposition. In Klein's view, the instincts-at-war will furnish sufficient anxiety for the reparative cycle. The concept of reparation, with its roots in ambivalent (depressive) anxiety, and its attendant affects of guilt and mourning, has no equivalent in May's outlook.

Internal Struggle, The Kleinian Creativity Legacy

The concept of reparation is generally recognized as a unique Kleinian contribution to creativity theory, even by those who do not fully accept or understand it. Less recognized, however, is the essential role of anxiety in the reparative cycle. Klein's emphasis on anxiety is shared by Jung and May; she is alone, however, in asserting its constitutional basis. In her view, the child need not wait until confronted with a hostile external world before s/he begins to suffer; because of the struggle within, s/he knows suffering from the beginning. The external world becomes the projection screen for testing out this internal psychic reality. While the sway of the child's phantasies is thus ultimately subject to external reality, there remains an extent to which the psychic reality is autonomous of the outer, causal and temporal one. The creative work is thus

one means, and possibly the means par excellence, of imposing the internal ideal on the external reality, and of externalizing the inner struggle in a tangible catharsis. Correspondingly, the suffering experienced from the environment, if not overwhelming (and tolerance grows with successful experience) provides an incentive to further creativeness and material for expression. Such sufferings are thus invested with meaning; Klein would never have said "transcended", yet the significance is there nonetheless.

In the Kleinian perspective on creativity, then, the question is not one of "whether suffering?" but "Whither?", "how much?" and "how is it to be borne in a healthy and fruitful life?". Given the amount of time which the child spends in an educational environment, it becomes important that this not be working at cross-purposes with the constitutional infuences that contribute to creative activity. Minimally, the educational milieu should help the child to bear the inner struggle with which s/he is confronted; desirably, it should have a beneficial role in helping to negotiate that struggle. I thus turn to the early education implications of Klein's creativity theory in the final chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER VII

IMPLICATIONS FOR EARLY EDUCATION

At the outset of the last chapter I admitted attempting a task that Melanie Klein herself would likely have never undertaken. Such a statement applies even more to the purpose of the present chapter, for, if there was one issue that epitomized Klein's opposition to the approach of Anna Freud, it was Klein's contention

> ...that it is impossible to combine in the person of the analyst analytical and educational work...If the analyst, even only temporarily, becomes the representative of the educative agencies, if he assumes the role of the super-ego, at that point he blocks the way of the instinctual impulses to consciousness: he becomes the representative of the repressing faculties.[1]

In the only paper she ever devoted specifically to the subject of schooling, she made the same point from another perspective:

> In the life of a child school means that a new reality is encountered, which is often apprehended as very stern...
>
> ...by its demands school compels a child to sublimate his libidinal instinctual energies...
>
> It is...the necessity of abandoning a more or less passive feminine attitude, which had hitherto been open to him, in order now to put forth his activity, that confronts the child with a task new and frequently insuperable for him.[2]

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[1] "Symposium on Child Analysis" (1927), in Klein, Melanie, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, London: The Hogarth Press, 1950, p. 182.

[2] "The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child" (1923), in Klein, Ibid., p. 68.

The fact that schools are now less stern and more feminized (at the primary level) than when Klein wrote does not diminish the essential difference between educational and analytical objectives. It may be asserted, for instance, that the feminine superego, with its emphasis on neatness, order, and nurturing, can be every bit as oppressive as was its masculine predecessor. More important, however, is the indispensability of the superego; it is not simply an arbitrary, superimposed authority but (in the words of the latter-day Freud) "the ethical standard of mankind".[3] This means that whenever one is dealing with society, or group relations, some external standard (superego) will apply.

This can be seen with reference to Klein's original and fundamental analytic innovation, that of play-technique. With "free play" and "learning through play" now commonplaces in early childhood education, one may be tempted to view the kindergarten or nursery as a ready-made setting for infant analysis. Not so, in Klein's perspective. For the effectiveness of her technique depended heavily upon her patients' freedom to act out their phantasies in play, including the destructive and sadistic ones. This can be allowed in the one-to-one (child to adult) analytic setting where each child has his/her own

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[3] Freud, Sigmund, "Civilization and its Discontents", in Freud, Standard Edition, London: Hogarth Press (1963-74), Volume XXI,

toys, and the only prohibition is upon physical violence to the analyst. It is not feasible in a group setting with common property and overlapping relationships.

To be sure, there are many aspects of Klein's thought and technique that can be applied to education, thought not by a simple transplant from the caseroom to the classroom or nursery. Susan Isaacs and her colleagues undertook to explicate a number of these areas; their contributions, while dated in respects, continue to be relevant in others.[4] My concern here, however, is with Klein's creativity theory, and I shall limit the study of its implications to the age group of the author's greatest experience and expertise: the five through eight-year-olds generally considered under the label of "early (childhood) education."[5]

Summarizing the theory in its simplest terms one may say (a) that creativity accompanies the successful outworking of depressive anxiety; (b) that this anxiety must be phantasized, externalized, and worked through to a point of inner reconstruction; and (c) that it arises both out of the child's own life experiences (including unconscious

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[4] See Isaacs, Susan, The Nursery Years, London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1929, also, Intellectual Growth in Young Children, London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1930.

[5] In Canada this would generally encompass Kindergarten through grade 3; in the U.K., Primary 1 through Primary 4.

phantasies), and in external situations which the child experiences vicariously, and is strengthened thereby.

Now it is my contention that early childhood education has been singularly successful in ignoring anxiety whenever it occurs naturally, and in excluding from the curriculum any experiences and material where it might be encountered second-hand. In so doing it circumvents the very situations which, in Klein's view, motivate and enhance creativity. This avoidance is not accidental, but grows out of a misguided belief in "protecting" the child from "harmful" ideas and influences.

To advocate that children be exposed to anxiety may be construed as a type of psycho-social "shock treatment", and conjure up images of Milgram's famous experiment[6] of (allegedly) provoking pain. This is not the case. A more appropriate analogy would be that of giving the child a diet of "natural" food that has not been sterilized of all the micro-organisms that s/he is going to encounter in the "real" world, and so to build up a tolerance of them. For in Klein's view anxiety is omnipresent in human life; all that is required is that we recognize and deal with it rather than resorting to denial and self-delusion.

In the early educational context there are two modes in which this anxiety-acclimatization can take place. One is

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[6] Milgram, Stanley, Obedience to Authority: an experimental view, London: Tavistock, 1974.

the "responsive" or "permissive" mode, in which the anxiety the child brings with him/her (both innate and from other aspects of the environment) is allowed and encouraged expression in the educational setting. The other can be called an "evocative" or "simulative" mode, in which the songs, poems, stories and pictures to which s/he is exposed aid in externalizing the anxiety within. Both are to be distinguished from the "active" or "provocative" approach to anxiety implied by Milgram's experiment.

In the balance of this chapter I shall make passing mention of three aspects of the early educational environment--the role of the teacher, the physical setting, and free play--that can function in the permissive mode. Each of these aspects could be expanded into a study in its own right. Then more extended treatment will be made of three of the evocative media--pictures, stories, and songs--through which the child can experience anxiety vicariously. In this I shall be continuing the task begun by Segal in her "...approach to Aesthetics".[7]

Permissive Factors in Creative Anxiety

The role of the teacher is obviously a pivotal element, and could occupy an entire volume. Analytically-trained teachers were once wont to insist that all other teaching

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[7] "A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics" in New Directions in Psycho-Analysis, Klein, Heimann and Money-Kyrle, editors, London: Tavistock, 1955, pp. 384ff.

personnel in their schools be so trained, or at least have undergone analysis themselves. Without going this far, one can still require a more rigorous screening of prospective early childhood teachers with a view to determining emotional and personality problems that are likely to figure in relationships with children.

From the perspective of aiding creative development, the teacher's role will be more that of a midwife than of a provocateur, to help the child to work out his/her own anxiety, anger, and mourning--the travail out of which a creative work is born. This means, first of all, that the teacher must endeavour to be non-judgmental of the child's feelings (though their mode of expression may not be condoned, when this entails violence to others). This applies particularly to the child's dramatic play and symbolic representations. Games that simulate killing and war are often rejected out of hand by advocates of non-violence. Likewise, sadistic phantasies like chopping off heads or cannibalism are normal aspects of development to be negotiated and not necessarily indicative of pathology. Where illness is involved, the extreme and recurrent nature of phantasies may be a clue that a specialist should be consulted.

Similarly, it is not abnormal for some small children to make penises out of playdough or plasticine, to talk about "pipi" in games at the water table, or to draw pictures with exposed genitals or smeared with brown or

yellow to represent "poop" or "pee". Such "creative" expressions should be neither encouraged nor discouraged in and of themselves; in my experience they are seldom emulated by other children on a wide scale. Any problems that arise generally do so when the creator-child "shows off" the work to others, who then run to call the teacher. There are times when a teacher may feel it advisable to intervene in sadistic play that is adversely affecting others, or to temporarily "lift" an offending drawing or sculpture which is being widely "exhibited" (which may be inauspiciously returned to the child afterwards, indicating that these are things that bother some other people). Here it is important that the teacher try to be clear whose interest is being served by such intervention--the child(ren)'s, or simply his/her own sensibilities?

Secondly, the teacher must be aware of the transference-phenomenon-that s/he becomes in some measure a surrogate for the child's parent(s)--and to be able to cope with both positive and negative expressions of these affects without undue reaction. On limited occasions it may be possible to help the child to be aware of the significance of these expressions, i.e., to interpret, in analytical terms. ("Are you feeling angry with Mommy/Daddy/baby brother/sister this morning?") Such "mirroring" is best done in a low-key manner, in a one-to-one situation.

Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the teacher must be prepared to be a "friend" when the child wishes it. This

means being involved in the child's play and taking the parts "scripted" for him/her by the child, being able to "take teasing" when the child gives it--in short, not hiding behind "busyness", "adulthood", or the roles of Professional, Teacher, or Diagnostician. A teacher who knows him/herself will enable children to come to know themselves better; and in this taking apart (analysis) and putting together of the roles and relationships that make up the self, creative work and activity takes place.

The physical setting of the early childhood class/playroom is another "permissive" factor in the expression, bearing and outworking of the child's anxiety. In The Psycho-Analysis of Children[8] (quoted on pages 118-120 above) Klein dealt with the toys, equipment and furnishings of her playroom. Two of her basic requirements were the virtual indestructibility (to children) of the equipment, and a large supply of disposable materials (paper, paint, cardboard, etc.); these are now standard features of many nurseries and kindergartens. Another essential is the availability of alternatives for free choice--not only among various activities such as painting, manipulables, sand and water, but between polar opposites such as open and enclosed spaces, order and chaos, risky and secure situations, and individual and collective activities.

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[8] Klein, Melanie, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, London: The Hogarth Press, 1980, Chapter II.

There need to be open areas for large-motor movement and group activities, for instance; there is an equal need for private corners, cubby-holes and hide-away spaces where children can be alone. Most children will evidence a preference for one or the other, but all need both alternatives open to them. Likewise, a compulsively orderly and bare working area can be as anxiety-producing--or more--than an ever-cluttered one. The same criteria applies to noise and quiet.

Free play and playtime are permissive elements par excellence in the creative outworking of anxiety. Many studies and textbooks for teachers have been written on play from a cognitive-developmental standpoint. Suffice it to say, from a pro-creative perspective, that "free play" must in fact be free. Like the physical setting, it must afford genuine child-choices of activities (or inactivity), with sufficient stretches of time for these to run their course, and the opportunity to engage in some singly, in parallel, or in a group setting. This means that among the various activities and interest centres offered there should be some designed for and limited to one or two persons at a time. It also means that a substantial number should be open-ended and non-directive in their possible uses. Much Montessori apparatus, "matching of opposites" and "Workjobs"[9]-type

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[9] This is the title of a recently-popular teacher handbook on learning centres, many of which were no more than 3-D versions of work-sheets.

activities such as sorting buttons, measuring beans and nails, etc., are not really "play" at all. They are often selected by teachers who pay lipservice to the "learning through play" philosophy, while simultaneously wanting to impress the Management By Objective evaluators looking over their shoulders for measurable results. The anxiety that arises in these situations is not creative--unless it is expressed in their phantasized overthrow, that is(!)--and the cognitive preoccupation and implicit agenda of these activities is incompatible with "play" in the Kleinian perspective.

Evocative Media for Creative Anxiety

Pictures

A frequent opening to evangelical sermons in my boyhood was the story of a child's reaction to a painting of the crucifixion. Similar stories occur in a number of religious writings, often autobiographical, in the English-speaking world of the past three centuries; these variously set the child before other epic scenes such as the Last Judgment, the giving of the Ten Commandments, the crossing of the Red Sea, and Daniel in the lions' den. While many of these episodes may be aprocryphal, using the child as an oracle, they nevertheless reflect a reality that has all but disappeared--a time when children were regularly exposed or had access to adult works of art on serious themes. Such work were not necessarily great art, or even religious. The

type of engravings in many a family Bible was similar to that found in a book of Grimm's Fairy Tales; then there were Norse sagas, Greek myths and farther afield, the Arabian Nights, and African and (North American) Indian legends. What these diverse traditions have in common was a gargantuan and often tragic or ironic view of life. The showing of such pictures to children seems to assume that the child was capable of making some sense of them, even if s/he did not understand the stories.

How different from the outlook reflected in most of the pictures put before children today! An over-riding emphasis on figure-from-ground differentiation has led to an elimination of complexity in content, subtlety in shading, and ambiguity of perspective; what we are left with is a blown-up and often over-simplified figures set against a generally bland and indeterminate background. The emotional content of these pictures is likewise purged of ambiguity and symbolism; we are presented with a single, explicit affect--"happy", "sad", "scarey", etc. This is generally up-beat but when negatives are introduced, they are carefully controlled in time and space, made "manageable", so as not to overwhelm the child. These stereotypical, simplified visual presentations grow out of an allegedly "child-centered" view which until recently held undisputed sway in early childhood education.

This view, associated with Jean Piaget but not wholly attributable to him, held that the young child is

unequivocal in his/her perceptions, incapable of appreciating paradox, and of putting him/herself in another's shoes; hence incapable of ambiguity and altruism. Piaget's outlook has now been effectively challenged on the perceptual plane; the consequences of this challenge on the affective plane are still to be explored experimentally.[10]

In Klein's view the child is capable of ambivalence on reaching the depressive position (well before the second year of life). Moreover, s/he has an awareness of sexuality, fear and aggression, born of experiences of love and hate, envy and gratitude, and destruction and reparation in the inner world of object relations. S/he expresses these unconscious phantasies in play, dreams, and relationships long before being capable of verbalizing them. It follows that s/he is capable of responding to representations of them by others, through appropriate symbolic media. A balanced early educational regime will thus take account of the full panoply of emotions already present and at work in the child. Failure to do so will result in inhibitions in relationships as well as in creativity.

It has been suggested that even if the "still" pictures on the walls and in children's books are narrow in their emotional spectrum, that the violence and melodrama of TV

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[10] Donaldson, Margaret, Children's Minds, London:Croom Helm, 1978. Also, Early-Childhood Development and Education: readings in psychology, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

may be providing an alternate channel for catharsis. I believe that its usefulness here is limited. Because of the speed of the action, there is often little opportunity to reflect rather than react; the viewer is as captive to the producer's viewpoint as in the one-dimensional children's pictures we have described. Even if the action could be slowed down or stopped--as is now possible with home video recorders--it often lacks the depth and breadth to reflect upon. In my experience, children's play that grows out of television viewing usually consists of no more than stereotypical sequences mindlessly repeated. This is analogous to the compulsiveness of the neurotic, and totally lacking in the variety and improvisation that characterize both creative art and a viable folk tradition.

Stories

The same factors apply here as we have just noted with respect to visual materials. The plot and characters and their interaction in many contemporary children's stories are singularly devoid of the negative emotions of anger, guilt and grief that are a part of human relations--emotions whose expression, Klein believes, is a pre-requisite to creative activity. There is little in them with which many normal children can identify. Consider, for instance the representations of families in these stories. They are harmonious; seldom, if ever, do they fight; their babies are always wanted and parents loved and loving. Where are the

sibling rivalry, jealousy of newborns, and resentment of parental prerogatives that lurk never far below the surface in real-life situations?

This avoidance of conflict and violence has extended to the re-writing of traditional fables and folk tales. In contemporary versions, the first two [of The Three] Little Pigs and the two small Billy Goats Gruff escape their adversaries, the wolf and the troll, respectively; in the original stories they were eaten up. Melanie Klein commented upon this practice of literary revision in her original paper to the Hungarian Psycho-Analytical Society:

> I have...selected listening to Grimm's tales without anxiety-manifestations as an indication of the mental health of children, because of all the various children known to me there are only very few who do so. Probably partly from a desire to avoid this discharge of anxiety a number of modified versions of these tales have appeared and in modern education other less terrifying tales, ones that do not touch so much--pleasurably and painfully--upon repressed complexes are preferred. I am of opinion, however, that with the assistance of analysis there is no need to avoid these tales...[11]

A century or more ago, the anxiety-factor does not appear to have caused concern. The Bible stories, Greek myths, and fairy tales that were then a staple part of the diet of children's literature contain many episodes that we consider shocking. There are cases of incest (Oedipus), fratricide (Cain and Abel), and violence on a scale sur-

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11 "The Development of a Child", in Klein, Contributions..., p. 67.

passing many a modern western (Jack the Giant-Killer). It may be argued that these were merely reflective of a world which was unquestionably more violent, and whose passing we should not mourn. It can equally be alleged that they reflect an inner psychic reality which has not changed, and which we ignore at our peril.

Klein herself is ambiguous here. Her advocacy of the "unexpurgated Grimm" is in the context of a professional analytic tool, a use which does not apply prima facie to most educators. She further qualifies in a 1947 postscript to the whole paper in which she says

> The educational conclusions...in this paper are...in keeping with my psychoanalytic knowledge at that time...if I were to put forward at the present time suggestions regarding education, I would considerably amplify and qualify the views presented in this paper.[12]

We may safely assume that were Klein writing today, she would not be advocating the reintroduction of literary material which has long fallen into disuse, and is blatantly offensive to present tastes and sensibilities. She would more likely be urging the externalization of anxiety through cultural forms and media more consonant with the spirit of our age.

One such contemporary expression is to be found in the work of Maurice Sendak.[13] Both in his compactly-crafted

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[12] Klein, Contributions....

[13] Sendak, Maurice, Where the Wild Things Are, Harper and Row, 1963.

narratives and in the accompanying illustrations, his books show an intuitive and ageless understanding of children's phantasies. I have observed four and five-year-olds identify with his images, and so express, confront and sublimate their own anxieties.

A type of example that may be considered contemporary is the "universal folk tale" that recurs in recognizable form in a number of different times and places. It is contemporary not in being composed in our own culture, but in its widespread familiarity and almost archetypal significance. An English form of one such tradition is the story of the old woman whose pig will not cross the stile. To make him comply, the woman seeks the help of a dog, who refuses until he is compelled, and so on in turn. At last a cow agrees to give some cream unconditionally; this the woman takes to a cat, who drinks it. Then

> The cat began to kill the rat
> The rat began to gnaw the rope
> The rope began to hang the butcher
> The butcher began to slay the ox
> The ox began to drink the water
> The water began to quench the fire
> The fire began to burn the stick
> The stick began to beat the dog
> The dog began to bite the pig
> And the pig crossed over the stile.

What we have in universal terms is a creature's rebellion and refusal to perform an expected function. The mistress/master intends retaliation, but each intended act is thwarted by a subsequent refusal, until the creation comes to a standstill. Then one creature complies

voluntarily (significantly with a gift of milk--the primal food), the punitive chain is set in action, the rebellion punished, and order restored.

The violence here is more contained than in Grimm, but it is unmistakeable nonetheless. And the acts of drowning, biting, burning and beating, not to mention killing, correspond to Klein's description of the earliest infantile sadistic phantasies. The telling and hearing of this story will, therefore, in Klein's view evoke and externalize the child's latent and pent-up aggression in a cycle of destruction, mourning and restoration.

A 1909 first reader used in Alberta consists largely of stories constructed on this pattern, with corresponding incidents of violence. The fourteen stories in the book are all folk tales drawn from eight different cultures including Hebrew, Greek, French, German and Russian, in addition to the Anglo-Saxon tradition.[14] This material apparently remained in use into the 1920's, when it was replaced (significantly in the aftermath of the Great War) by a homogeneous collection of stories expunged of any violence, even among the animals who were explicitly enjoined to "Please be kind, and do not eat each other up."[15]

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[14] The McCloskey Primer, Boston: Ginn & Company, 1909.

[15] In Animal Land, New York: Macmillan, 1924. See story "The Picnic".

Songs

Music provides a powerful link between visual and verbal associations in both children and adults. Klein recognized that words themselves perform a more fluid function for the child:

> ...children are still for the most part under the sway of the unconscious, whose language, as dreams and play show, is presentational and pictorial. As we have occasion to see over and over again, children have a quite different attitude from adults to words. They assess them above all according to their pictorial qualities--to the phantasies they evoke...[16]

These pictorial qualities are evident, I believe, in children's affinity for onomatopoeia, and in their preference for words that depict motion over those denoting states of being. It follows, then, that any supportive cues or structures, such as poetic rhythm, rhyme and alliteration, will enhance the imagery-formation even further. When we add melodic variation and the texture of an accompaniment, we have available a weave in which experiences, associations and ideas can be encoded and reinforced. Appropriate songs and tunes can also, conversely to "bring up" associations stored in the unconscious.

The over-drawn and artificial distinction between the child and adult psyche that Klein so resisted can rob children of access to some of the riches of these

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[16] Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 32 (footnote 2).

associations and experiences. Nowhere is this privation more apparent, I believe, than in the sterile and frequently insipid repertoire often characterized as "children's songs". With their simplistic vocabulary, overly-familiar themes, and shallow feelings, sung repetitively till rote-perfection, singing becomes not an un-locking but a straitjacket on the supple mind of the child. The rhymes and jingles that play their part in basic language development are often continued long beyond having served this purpose, till music itself becomes bland and boring by association.

Now here is a song that children do like to sing, that has been sung over and over again by more than three generations of North American children at cookouts and summer camps and which, when introduced in U.K. schools, proved an instant "hit" from nursery to adolescence:

Johnny Vorbeck's Machine

Refrain: Hey, mister, mister Johnny Vorbeck
How could you be so mean?
I told you you'd be sorry
For inventing that machine.
Now all the neighbour's cats and dogs
Will never more be seen:
They'll all be ground to sausages
In Johnny Vorbeck's machine.

1. Once there lived a Dutchman
His name was Johnny Vorbeck
He used to live on sausages
And sauerkraut and specht;
He made the finest sausages
That you'd have ever seen
Till one day he invented
A sausage-making machine...

Refrain

2. One day a little Dutch boy
He walked into a store
He bought a pound of sausages
And laid them on the floor;
The boy began to whistle
He whistled up a tune
And all the sausages stood up
And danced around the room...

Refrain

One day the sausage machine broke down
The darn thing wouldn't go
So Johnny Vorbeck climbed down inside
To see what made it so;
His wife, she had a nightmare
While walking in her sleep
She gave the crank one heck of a yank
And Johnny Vorbeck was meat...

Refrain

Traditional

Let us leave aside the symbolism of sausages. What we have in the action of the song is a grownup (father-figure?) who perpetrates violence on small creatures with whom children identify, and who, by a twist of fate (and represeed rage of his wife?), reaps the same gruesome fate that he has meted out to others (justice is done, and good restored). The theme of butchery is mitigated by the pleasure children derive from the sausages; the song evokes anxiety, but this is dealt with in a positive and therapeutic manner. Children apparently derive some sense of release from singing this song.

It must be remembered, however, that it is not mere anxiety, but a tolerable level thereof, successfully borne, that is required if the experienced is to be cathartic. Following is a song on a similar theme, which I have sung for

some of the same groups as the preceding one, but with a far less pleasurable response:

Four Wet Pigs

1. Here's a little song about four wet pigs
Here's a little song about four wet pigs
Two of them little and two of them big
They danced all night to the pig-town jig.

2. The two that were little were only half-grown
The two that were big were big as a barn
Big as a barn, tall as a tree
Take 'em on down to the factory.

3. Slice 'em into bacon, cut 'em into ham
Chop 'em into hot dogs, squeeze 'em into Spam
Throw their little eyes out in the rain
Pickle their feet and scramble their brains.

4. Here's a little song about two wet pigs
Leaning on the slop-trough, smoking their cig's
Hoping to God that they never get big
They danced all night to the pig-town jig.

Lyrics & music by Greg Brown[17]

Although the fascination of sausages is missing here, pigs and "piggies" have proven a popular topic in other songs. Here, however, it may be that the more explicit butchery of the animals makes identification with them too uncomfortable, and leads to an unbearable level of anxiety. Nor is there any justice in the outcome, other than the notion that "little is better (safer) than big". This song, then raises more anxiety than it resolves.

Although it may play a useful part, sadism is not an ever-present element in creative catharsis. In fact, some

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[17] Bryan Bowers, Home, Home on the Road (audio-disc), Chicago: Flying Fish Records, Inc., 1980. Side 1, Band 3.

of the most popular and evocative songs I have used with young children are "pure" laments (depressive), mourning for a lost ideal, such as:

The Biplane, Evermore

1. Way out in London airport
In Hangar Number Four
A lonely little biplane left
Whose name was Evermore
Whose working days were over
No more would he sail
Upon his wings above the clouds
Flying the Royal Mail...

Refrain: Bye, bye, biplane
Once upon a sky-plane
Bye, bye, hush-a-bye
Lullaby plane.

2. All the mighty jet-planes
Would look down their nose
They laugh and say "Oh I'm so glad
That I'm not one of those."
And evermore would brush away..
The tear-drops from his wings
And dram of days when he again
Would do heroic things...[18]

Or the following chorus to a Portuguese sea song:

Yea-ho, little fish
Don't cry, don't cry
Yea-ho, little fish
You'll be whale by-and-by...

Traditional

Among the most requested of this genre--even by four and five-year-olds--are traditional songs of the "ship loss" theme:

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[18] The Irish Rovers, All Hung Up, (audio-disc).

The Sinking of the Reuban James

1. Have you heard of a ship
Called the "good Reuban James"
Armed by hard fighting-men
Both of honour and fame...

She flew the stars and stripes
Of the land of the free
But tonight she's in her grave
At the bottom of the sea...

Refrain: Tell me, what were their names
Tell me, what were their names
Did you have a friend
On the good Reuban James?

2. It was there in the dark
Of that uncertain night
That we watched for a U-boat
And waited for a fight--
Then a whine, and a rock
And a great explosion-roar
And they laid the Reuban James
On the cold ocean floor...

Refrain

3. One hundred men went down
To a dark and watery grave
When that good ship went down
Only forty-four were saved;
T'was the last day of October
That we saved the forty-four
From the cold, icy waters
Of that cold Iceland shore...[19]

Refrain

And "The Ship Titanic", whose refrain goes:

It was said, it was sad
It was said when that great ship went down
Husbands and wives
Little children lost their lives
It was sad when that great ship went down.

Traditional

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[19] Fred Hellerman, of "The Weavers".

I have had discussions with early childhood educators who maintain that such material is eminently unsuitable for use with young children; yet when introduced, it continues to be requested time and time again by the children themselves, and to be the basis of much creative output, including dramatic play, modelling and art work. Why is this so?

Melanie Klein gives us an explanation. We do not have to endorse her world-view of omnipresent sexual symbolism to appreciate her insight that creativity grows with catharsis--from an externalization of anger and sadness from deep within the self.

Such an experience can take place in an educational environment that does not shrink from facing anxiety--that is willing to sensitively risk exposing the child to the agony and ecstasy of our humanity, so that s/he may become a more fully conscious, caring and creative individual. This requires adults who are aware and unafraid of these emotional wellsprings in their own lives. It is not likely to be found in the superficial, happy-face setting of many of today's kindergartens and classrooms.

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*Since my undertaking of the initial research into Klein, a new collected edition of her works has appeared under the title The Writings of Melanie Klein. With a few exceptions this subsumes all her published works. Because this new edition is not yet widely circulated, however, I have continued to refer to most of Klein's works in the pre-Writings... editions, titles, page numbers.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Stan Rogers, who died in an aircraft fire in June 1983, was a lusty man in the broadest sense of the term--solidly-built, forthright, robust in his themes, characters and in his presentation of them on stage. At first glance, a less promising candidate for "creativity through mourning" can scarcely be imagined. Yet a closer examination of his work reveals otherwise:

Of the forty-five of his own songs recorded on five albums, more than one-quarter deal with the sea ships. Of these, four-fifths (20% of the total) mourn losses, either a phsycial one such as a marine disaster, or a by-gone era or experience. In some of these his intentions for the song are quite explicit:

> Come all ye lads, draw near to me
> That I be not forsaken
> This day was lost the Jeannie C.
> And my living has been taken
> I'll go to sea no more.
> ...
> "My God", I cried, as she went down
> "That boat was like no other
> My father built her when I was nine
> And named her for my mother."
> I'll go to sea no more.
>
> And sure I could have another made
> In the boat shop down in Dover
> But I would not love the keel they laid
> Like the one the waves rolled over...[1]

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[1] Stan Rogers, Turnaround, Fogarty's Cove Music, Hannon, Ontario, Canada, 1978.

In this song, as in "Fisherman's Wharf", "Bluenose", "Flowers of Bermuda" and "The Last Watch", the loss is seen as irreplaceable; the song alone makes the object or way of life immortal.[2] In two notable exceptions, however, "The Blue Dolphin" and "The Mary Ellen Carter", the story centers on the theme of salvage (reparation), and Rogers is quite clear in his intent:

> Rise again, rise again, that her name not be lost
> To the knowledge of men
> Those who loved her best and were with her til the end
> Will make the "Mary Ellen Carter" rise again.
> (emphasis mine)

The theme of reparation is expanded from that of the ship to human loss in general in the final chorus:

> Rise again, rise again--though your heart it be broken
> And life about to end
> No matter what you've lost, be it a home, a love, a friend
> Like the "Mary Ellen Carter", rise again.[3]

Lest I be accused of excessive Freudianism in limiting our survey of Rogers songs to those of ships, with their obviously feminine association in the English language, it should be pointed out that a further eleven of his songs deal with mourning in other contexts, and these, together with the ship-mourning songs, make up more than one-half of his original lyrics. In two of these additional songs it is

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[2] See Hanna Segal, in New Directions..., p. 388ff. on the quest for immortality through works of art.

[3] Stan Rogers, Between the Breaks.....Live! Fogarty's Cove Music, 1979.

a lost or distant love that is mourned ("So blue" and "Turnaround"); in three, lost success ("Night Guard", "Front Runner" and "Second Effort"); in one, lost youth and beauty ("Lies"--the loss in this case being manically denied); in two a life-style ("Make and Break Harbour" and "Free in the Harbour"); and in two, loss of or separation from friends ("California" and "First Christmas Away From Home"). In a final example, "Delivery Delayed", the theme of loneliness is traced back to the primal separation. This song so fully illustrates the Kleinian leitmotif that it is set out in full:

> How early is "Beginning"? From when is there a soul?
> Do we discover living, or somehow, are we told?
> In sudden pain, in empty cold, in blinding light of day
> We're given breath, and it takes our breath away.
>
> How cruel to unformed fancy, the way in which we come--
> Over-whelmed by feeling and sudden loss of love
> And what price dark confining pain, (the hardest to forgive)
> When, all at once, we're called upon to live
>
> By giant hand we're taken from the shelter of the womb
> That dreaded first horzon, the endless empty room
> Were communion is lost forever when a heart first beats alone
> Still, it remembers, no matter how it's grown
>
> We grow, but grow apart--
> We live, but more alone--
> The more to be, the more to see,
> To cry aloud that we are free
> To hide our ancient fear of being alone
> ...

And how we live in darkness, embracing spiteful
cold
Refusing any answers, for no man can be told
That Delivery is delayed until at last we're made
aware
And first reach for love, to find twas always
there.[4]

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[4] Rogers, Between the Breaks...