

Paradoxically, however, the latter were used in similar ways in the *anti-toleration* arguments of the Massachusetts Bay leaders. Rawls also believes that the principle of toleration originally protecting individual rights of conscience is easily generalized to 'identity politics'. Hence the right to have the religious beliefs one chooses is morally similar to one's right to be gay or lesbian. Yet tolerationists were concerned with extending legal and political protections against persecution to achieve a *modus vivendi*. And such moral minimalism, Murphy argues, is far different from a gay rights advocate's insistence upon respect and affirmation for a person's life-experience. Compared to Murphy's 'intellectual history' — which cannot be praised enough — this substantive argument needs to be elaborated. Still, it should motivate philosophers to look more critically upon Rawls's definition of '*modus vivendi* as purely interest-based ... armed stalemate' and to consider the significance of the fact that his 'standards are never justified by any historical referent' (284).

**Roderick Nicholls**

University College of Cape Breton

**Frederick Neuhouser**

*Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom.*

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000.  
US\$49.95. ISBN 0-674-00512-4.

Frederick Neuhouser's *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory* is a welcome addition to the English language literature on Hegel's political philosophy. Neuhouser's approach is to read Hegel's *corpus* through an analysis of Hegel's idea of social freedom. In so doing, he bridges the Anglo-American tradition of political theory, which has tended to read the *Philosophy of Right* in isolation from the rest of Hegel's work, and the Continental tradition, which has tended to focus on Hegel's speculative system, neglecting his attention to questions of politics. By reading the speculative system through Hegel's more overt political problematic, Neuhouser manages to render Hegel's political thought clearly for those unfamiliar with his work. Locating Hegel's conception of freedom in the context of the conversation initiated by Kant, Spinoza and especially Rousseau, Neuhouser does not simply 'translate' Hegel for political theory (a daunting enough task) but offers a spirited defense of the kind of freedom Hegel imagined for the rational social order.

Neuhouser points out that for Rousseau and for Hegel both, the (rational) state is both the enabling condition *for* freedom, and the vehicle *of* freedom. In this sense, the freedom Neuhouser finds — and endorses — in Hegel's and

Rousseau's thought alike, is the freedom of the individual will to will the free collective will. As Neuhouser tells it, Hegel's philosophy can help us think through the idea that a social order can be understood as self-determined, and therefore free, when it exhibits the rational structure of the Concept. This, of course, is to submit the social order itself to the standards of Hegel's logic, a logic that suggests that every philosophical opposition must be both part and whole, forming a self-sufficient entity. Moreover, Neuhouser suggests that what Hegel imagined by freedom is not, as many of Hegel's critics have suggested, merely a hymn of praise to the Prussian state — a view that suggests Hegel offers no normative ground on which citizens might critique their political institutions. Rather, by reading Hegel's analysis of the institutions of modern life through his logical system, Neuhouser reveals a standard of critique in Hegel's thought that continues to be relevant to contemporary participants engaged in debates concerning democratic citizenship. On this view, Hegel's famous notion of *sittlichkeit* — or ethical life — is rendered interesting to non-Hegel specialists as a theory of social life.

As Neuhouser points out, for Hegel, the task of *sittlichkeit*, (the organic community) is to accommodate both our public, rational lives as citizens, and our private and particular lives as members of civil society and families. On this view, the modern state is the ongoing sublation of the apparent contradictions of modern life; it reconciles our ethical obligations to the larger community, such that our particular, individual existences are most thoroughly validated in the context of our universal, collective lives. On this basis, Neuhouser reminds us, Hegel makes the case for the ethicality of the modern state — in, among others, *The Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History*. As a thoroughly rational institution, the state manages to bridge the subjective freedoms of family life and modern commerce with the objective freedoms of the law. In this way, Neuhouser responds to the problem of why Hegel considered it necessary to conceive of social freedom as a unity of objective, rational law on the one hand, and the subjective disposition of social participants on the other. On Neuhouser's reading, Hegel thus emerges as a lively participant in the question of the kind of freedom modern individuals can achieve through the state.

The greatest limitation of this approach is that it tends to flatten out Hegel's thought. Neuhouser renders the complexity of Hegel's metaphysics — his profound dialecticity — in a way that somewhat distorts the enormous ambition of his philosophical project. Despite Neuhouser's claim to have attended to the questions arising out of the continental tradition, therefore, the question of what it is that Hegel's thought covers over or leaves out — the question which has preoccupied the continental tradition from Heidegger to Derrida — is insufficiently addressed.

Yet this limitation is also the book's greatest strength; Hegel's infamously baroque philosophical system is here admitted to the liberal political tradition of social contract. Placing the problem of 'will' at the centre of Hegel's thought, Neuhouser foregrounds the important links between the Rousseauian notion of the general will and Hegel's conception of freedom. While

the strong links between Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's basic communitarianism have been well rehearsed, this book renders that link in terms that do more justice to Hegel's logical and metaphysical commitments than we have seen before. This book is thus an excellent resource for those approaching Hegel's political writings for the first time; there is a clear need for a reading of Hegel that brings his work to bear on contemporary questions about democratic theory.

**Catherine Kellogg**

*(Department of Political Science)*

University of Alberta

**W.H. Newton-Smith, ed.**

*A Companion to the Philosophy of Science.*

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

2000. Pp. xvi + 576.

US\$110.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-17024-3);

US\$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-23020-3).

*A Companion to the Philosophy of Science* is published in the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. It is a compilation of 81 articles by 58 scholars, many of them distinguished in the field, including Fred Suppe, Ron Giere, John Dupre, Mary Hesse, and Gary Gutting. 20 articles discuss particular thinkers, either scientists or philosophers of science, who have had a profound impact on the field. Included are, for example, articles on Einstein, Galileo, Mach, Kuhn, Mill, Quine, and Hume. The remaining 61 articles deal with particular topics of interest to contemporary philosophers of science ranging from 'Axiomatization' and 'Biology', to 'The Unity of Science' and 'Verisimilitude'. The articles are typically three to ten pages long.

Taking the biennial PSA programs to be representative of what philosophers of science are up to these days, the articles in the volume do a good job of representing the field in its current state. For example, there are articles on 'Incommensurability', 'Pragmatic Factors in Theory Acceptance', 'Models and Analogies', and 'Space, Time, and Relativity'. Indeed, I was surprised to see that there was no article on either 'Bayes' or 'Bayesianism', but Colin Howson did author the article on 'Evidence and Confirmation'. I have been told by one contributing author, and Newton-Smith in fact confirms this (page xv), that the volume has been a long time in preparation. In fact, three contributors had died before the volume was produced, and

at least one other has died since. The articles, though, are still very much up-to-date.

The volume is nicely produced, with large easy-to-read type, and, though there are some spelling mistakes, they are few in number. As a good reference book should, this volume has extensive cross-referencing between the various articles. Further, each article is accompanied by a bibliography, many of which are excellent, though some articles do make reference to works that do not appear in their bibliographies. There is also a very good index.

Most of the articles make enjoyable and engaging reading. I especially enjoyed reading Ernan McMullin's article 'Values in Science', Kathleen Okruhlik's article 'Feminist Accounts of Science', J.D. Trout's article on the Paradoxes of Confirmation, and Dudley Shapere's article 'Scientific Change'. McMullin does a wonderful job of identifying the variety of ways in which values affect science, distinguishing between the values or goals of science, the ethos of science, the value judgements that are an inevitable part of doing science, and the impact of nonepistemic values on science. Indeed, too often these distinctions are not recognized with the result that many philosophers have lost sight of what is at stake in the various debates surrounding the impact of values on science. Okruhlik's article is structured around two key objectives. First, she reminds us of the heterogeneity of feminist accounts of science. The subtleties that distinguish various feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, she argues, are too often overlooked. Second, Okruhlik forcefully argues that the concerns raised by feminists theorizing about science should matter to philosophers of science in general. Trout's article deserves praise for different reasons. His is a clear and concise presentation of the paradoxes of confirmation, the standard concerns, but they are presented in a manner that is wholly accessible to undergraduates. Shapere's article provides the historical background on the issue of scientific change, the relevance of the discovery/justification distinction for the issue, Kuhn's impact on the debate, and reactions to it, and concerns surrounding the notion of scientific progress. Like Trout's article, Shapere's is noteworthy for its clarity, accessibility, and thoroughness.

As one might expect, in a compilation of this sort and size, some of the articles are weak. Oddly, it is Wesley Salmon's article on 'Logical Empiricism', and John Watkins's article on 'Popper' that are amongst the weakest. Both articles drift from topic to topic without adequate sign-posting, leaving the reader wondering what will be discussed next. But, these articles are the exception, for most of the other articles are straightforward and clearly written.

The main concern that I have with this volume is that it does not seem suited to either of the audiences for which it is allegedly intended. We are told on page ii of the *Companion* that the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 'provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists'. Indeed, many undergraduates taking a course in philosophy of science look for a good reference book to supplement what they are learning from their instructors. But, too