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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE NIHILISTIC CHALLENGE TO CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY

by

YONG-SIK KIM



A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1991.



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
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
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.....
Dr. T. Carson


.....
Dr. T. Aoki


.....
Dr. L. Beauchamp


.....
Dr. E. Callan


.....
Dr. R. Burch


.....
Dr. J. Willinsky

Date: *January 21, 1981*

Dedicated to

my wife, daughter, and son

ABSTRACT

The focus of this research is the exploration of the "homeness" of pedagogy. The basic assumption is that the performativity principle is hegemonic in the realm of public education in Korea. This hegemony raises to prominence instrumental rationality and technicism. Such an orientation is rooted in the mentality of exploitation whose standard is efficiency. The mentality of exploitation requires clarity on all matters. It has lost all sense of wonder and mystery. In this context, education is an instrument to develop this mentality of exploitation. The result of such education is a homelessness. In the homeness of pedagogy we do not grant a ladder which one can climb blindly and mechanically without listening to the world. The homeness of pedagogy will be founded on the life-world of the subject. With it, teaching is a praxis. Teaching is not mere theoretical knowledge. Teaching is knowing of the possibility of a situation and helping realities actualize them.

This research is the researcher's personal journey toward the homeness of pedagogy. The study has six basic parts. The structure is a play between the practical concerns and the philosophical.

Chapter I sketches a ground consisting of concrete stories of Korean education and reflection on the nihilistic experiences to which these point. The stories show only surfaces, but they allow openings into the deeper realms of nihilism. In chapter II, I invite Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger to help us understand and explore these openings.

In chapter III I interpret, in terms of Kierkegaard's, Nietzsche's, and Heidegger's conceptions of nihilism, three concepts which underpin much of curriculum and educational practice in Korea: science, technology, and liberalism. I wish to show how each of these takes flight from the lived world of students and teachers, from their being and being itself.

In chapter IV I again invite Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger to take us beyond the blindness of pedagogy. To find the way to go beyond the blindness of pedagogy is to eliminate the false bifurcation between education and life. I discuss the meaning of authenticity and truth as a way of approaching the meaning of authentic education.

Chapter V attempts to show the meaning of the homeness of pedagogy through interpreting learning, teaching, and thinking from a Heideggerian perspective. Although the importance of the way home is disregarded as marginal in a technological society, this chapter argues that it should be emphasized in education. I thus focus on the possibilities in teacher education for creating a climate of homeness in pedagogy. To become a teacher is not to arrive at a certain destination, but to start over and over. I understand it as Tao, a name for whatever happens.

In chapter VI I reflect upon the experience of doing this study. This is to show the course of the researcher's transformation in thinking about curriculum and pedagogy.

The study is the beginning of an endless journey. This journey is an invitation to openness for teachers.

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This work would never have been undertaken or accomplished without the support of family, friends, and faculty. I would like to acknowledge them here.

It is with deep gratitude and love that I remember my mother who taught me the love of wisdom. Throughout my study my wife, Myoung-Sook, stood beside me inspiring which demonstrated her care for me. My children, Jung-Min and Hyoung-Jin, have also rejoiced in my successes. Their help has made it possible for me to do this work.

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Dr. Ted Aoki showed me a way of life beyond pedagogy. My encounters with him led me to extend the horizons of my life. He is a teacher who has taught me the meaning of truth. He opened up new possibilities of thinking in curriculum and pedagogy. I owe much of my inspiration to him.

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I have been fortunate to have Dr. John Willinsky as a member of my examining committee. His appreciation in post-modern thinking contributes to enrich my perspective.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

| | |
|--|-----------|
| I. A Ground of Korean Education | 1 |
| A. Articulating the Research Question | 1 |
| B. A Brief History of Modern Korean Education | 8 |
| C. A Figure of Modern Consciousness in Education | 10 |
| D. A Reflective View of Korean Education | 21 |
| | |
| II. Response to Nihilism: Three Thinkers' Viewpoints | 26 |
| A. Kierkegaard's Response to Nihilism | 27 |
| B. Nietzsche's Response to Nihilism | 34 |
| C. Heidegger's Response to Nihilism | 43 |
| | |
| III. The Quagmire of Modern Education | 52 |
| A. The Prude's Quip | 56 |
| B. The Scientific Technologist's Blueprint | 67 |
| | |
| IV. Beyond the Blindness of Education: Authentic Human Being in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger | 79 |
| A. Kierkegaard's Inwardness | 83 |
| B. Nietzsche's Overman | 86 |
| C. Heidegger's Authenticity | 89 |
| D. Heidegger's Essence of Truth | 92 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| V. Travelling Toward the Homeness of Pedagogy | 97 |
| A. Rebellion against Ordinary Learning | 100 |
| B. Rebellion against Ordinary Teaching | 103 |
| C. Essential Thinking | 106 |
| D. The Way Home | 109 |
| E. The Dim Image of the Homeness of Pedagogy | 111 |
| F. A Whispering from a Margin | 113 |
| G. Building a Bridge to Teacher Education | 123 |
| VI. Along the Country Road | 130 |
| A. The Night on the Country Road | 134 |
| B. The Dawn on the Country Road | 137 |
| C. Postscript | 140 |
| Bibliography | 143 |

CHAPTER I

A GROUND OF KOREAN EDUCATION

A. Articulating the Research Question

To question is to will to know. He who wills, he who puts his whole existence into a will, is resolved. Resolve does not shift about; it does not shirk, but acts from out of the moment and never stops. Re-solve is no mere decision to act, but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all action. To will is to be resolved. [The essence of willing is here carried back to determination <unclosedness>. But the essence of resolve lies in the opening, the coming-out-of-cover of human being-there into the clearing of being, and not in a storing up of energy for "action". But its relation to being is one of letting-be. The idea that all willing should be grounded in letting-be offends the understanding.] Heidegger, 1959, pp. 20-21).

One of the commonly accepted definitions of education is that education is a process of socialization. Education is a process of the adaptation of the individual to human society in general and to contemporary society in particular. The distinctive feature of the school curriculum is that it tries to find human being's and society's true nature. The guiding theme of traditional education is thus a conception of the essence of human being and society. This conception is based on the assumption that all human beings share as such a universal human common nature. The concern of educational theories is to point out educational principles and methods which can lead towards a proper realization of the essence of human being and society. Consequently, they present ideal models of education which aim at reforming human society. The goal of education, as suggested by traditional educational theories, is to create a human being as perfect as possible who will be able to function in an ideal social order.

It is easy to find an example of this in Korean education. According to the directives of the Korean school curriculum, the aim of education is to develop persons sound in spirit and in health, who can spontaneously decide their personal tasks and the community's plans, can

practice what they decide, can solve problems rationally and wisely, can use the knowledge and skill that they have learned, and who respect human being and love nature. In sum, the goal is to develop persons who are wholesome, autonomous, creative, and virtuous.

The foregoing concept is derived from the basic assumption that views, for example, human being as an amalgam of conflicting passions and interests, "a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths, both a lion and a man"(Plato: quoted in Rosenow, 1989, p. 309). If we want to be just and truthful, then all our actions and words should tend to give the truly human being within us complete domination over the entire being of human being and allow the human being to take charge of "the many-headed beast."

In short, education is understood as the mechanical process that makes a human being master of oneself. The basic tenet of this educational conception is that human beings should be trained from early childhood onwards to master impulses. But since this ability is not inborn and needs to be acquired, the educational process begins with external physical and psychological restrictions. The acquisition of habits and skills, the development of abilities, and the repression of drives are impossible without an external authority. Educational theories aim at the internalization of external authority so that the restrictions originating in that authority become an integral part of one's personality. Thus traditional education justifies its aim of forming or molding the child's soul.

The mainstream of traditional education is liberal education. The liberal tradition in education goes at least as far back as Plato, and today, remains influential through the writings of R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst (Bonnett, 1983, p. 30). It is maintained not only in the centrality of the development of rationality in its various forms, but also in the educational claim that liberal education be defensible in rational terms.

Over the past centuries, human beings have developed disciplines that purport to explain the phenomena and experiences they want to explain. These disciplines include canons of evidence, criteria of verification, rules of intellectual conduct, and procedures of enquiry, which together have succeeded in producing theories which promise explanations of what needs explaining. Moreover, rationality, objectivity, critical awareness, and rigor of thought are to be attained through an imitation and adherence of method to these ways. Hence, an educated person is one who has undergone this imitation, in sufficient depth and breadth, and who has developed those virtues which constitute the development of mind. According to this liberal tradition, knowledge offers explanations, along many dimensions, of our situation and human condition. Herein is the main defense of knowledge as a central educational aim.

Bonnett (1983, p.30) criticizes the liberal tradition in education. According to his opinion, the liberal tradition assumes that the essence of human being is rational. It assumes, therefore, that knowledge, as an authentic product of human beings' relationship with the world, is itself classifiable in terms of rational values and categories and that each of these categories is itself a category of rationality. Thus through its fundamental propensity for defending and ordering, the tradition itself has become an expression of the coming to dominance of the calculative essence of technology. The rationalist tradition brings with it an inevitable tendency for meditative thinking to be devalued and forgotten. Because meditative thinking is not a way of systematically representing reality, it becomes thought of as worthless. And because its canons are not those of the rational self-assertive thinking into which the 'educated' are becoming habituated, it comes to be seen as not only worthless but unintelligible. This tradition subverts those enterprises which are in their true nature meditative by trying to think them in calculative terms.

Quoting Nietzsche, Cooper (1984) also criticizes the liberal tradition. He argues that the liberal tradition as aiming to make human being into a currency- in the same way that coins are

currency. Coins are objects which human beings acquire and are acquisitive towards. Since utilitarian schooling aims to produce practical human beings, the knowing person is judged by how much and how quickly one has acquired knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge, in as much volume and haste as possible, bears witness to the union of intelligence and property.

This tradition has an interest in suppressing the inner person. The person whose primary concern is one's inner life is accused of elevated egoism and of an immoral epicureanism. Schooling that aims exclusively at producing people who will be like currency in the economy can have little time for those who wish to remain outside. And schooling which exclusively emphasizes initiation into disciplines has no place for human beings' inner life.

There is no denying the increasingly technological appearance and aspirations in our own Korean educational system, thereby reinforcing the set of attitudes that presses upon people as they go about their everyday business, reading newspapers, and watching television. It has ushered in the need to devise a curriculum suitable to the expectations of a technological society. It so dominates the wider society in which schools operate, that the effort to defend education against a take-over by the technological idea would be a formidable one. It is strengthened, too, by the organization of the school system, in particular by examinations and the need for certificates to be got or diplomas won. No doubt, a premium is placed upon acquiring and storing information.

It is also one that encourages respect of things that are current. To train for currency, in schools, will be to train students who will smoothly take their places in contemporary society. The meaning of this is clear enough in connection with schooling whose aims are practical and utilitarian. The tendency is inevitably to furnish students with theories and ideologies that presently prevail. Schools furnish students with a technological attitude and technological thinking in a technological society.

Coins are used to purchase what students will or think they will be happy to possess. Teaching, which emphasizes practical aims, makes students more productive in the belief that the more productive they are, the more happy they will be.

The above discussion can be summarized in two of Aoki's descriptions of the actual school situation. Aoki (1989) describes three views of school, each of which assumes a particular view of teaching. In one, school is meant primarily for "rational thinking"; it stresses intellectual skills and mind-building. Teaching is seen essentially as mind-building accomplished by filling empty containers with factual and theoretical knowledge.

In a second view, the school emphasizes practical skills, like the 3Rs. It is a preparation for the marketplace, and students are moulded into marketable products. This school has a utilitarian orientation; usefulness in the post-school work place is the guide to curriculum. Predominant is the the interest of the market.

A third view sees a school as being interested mainly in nurturing the becoming of human beings. Teachers and students are seen as individuals and as social beings. Teaching, in this case, is a leading out of students into a world of possibilities, while at the same time understanding the finiteness of the students as human beings. What is ignored in the liberal tradition and technology of education is this third view of school.

Rationality and technology come together to define the metaphysics of the modern epoch. Metaphysics here refers not to an abstract academic discipline but rather to the prevailing presuppositions and concrete interpretations of reality which uniquely stamp an age, for example, in the institutions and attitudes which that age accepts as a matter of course. It is inherent in the metaphysical way of ordering our view of nature and human being that it drives out every other possibility of revealing. It is a kind of blindness. In the metaphysics of the modern epoch, education is a process of socialization which emphasizes Aoki's view one and view two. As Guenther (1975) argues, in the development experience of the individual, the

process of transformation which we call growing up is actually one of a growing narrowness and frozenness. Inevitably, the result of this kind of education is alienation and depersonalization that is deeply connected with nihilism because students will be devoid of the meaning of "here" and "now" that is derived from a reflective viewing of the self and world, as well as the taken-for-granted assumptions that make possible our seeing and acting.

Heidegger suggests that modernity is a time of destitution, an age that lives in the wake of the death of God. Ours is an age in which the human being is caught up in a going beyond and against one's own essence, wherein one is so enthralled that one does not recognize it for what it is: the coming completion of nihilism (Bonnett, 1983, p. 21). Nihilism is a loss of meaning or seriousness. If nihilism were complete, there would be no significant private or public issues. Nothing would have authority for us, nothing would make a claim on us, and nothing would demand a commitment from us.

Nihilism poses a danger of loss of meaning and loss of seriousness. What is the cause of nihilism? How did we get ourselves into this nihilistic situation? These questions themselves form a project, which will be touched on in chapter two. However, this study's purpose is not confined to exploring the elements of nihilism in modern education. The purpose of this research is to find out the way to avoid and overcome nihilism in modern education. In other words, this research is interested in nurturing the becoming of human beings in education. Accordingly, nihilism is the departure point of my research.

According to Heidegger (1968, p. 5), "interest means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the center of a thing and stay with it." He goes on to say:

But today's interest accepts as valid only what is interesting. And interesting is the sort of thing that can freely be regarded as indifferent the next moment, and be displaced by something else, which then concerns us just as little as what went before. Many people today take the view that they are doing great honor to something by finding it interesting. The truth is that such an opinion has already relegated the interesting thing to the ranks of what is indifferent and soon boring (P. 5).

My interest in nurturing the becoming of human beings is that as an educator I will stay with it without being indifferent and without being bored. It is a sort of choice that is a commitment to living with difficulty or an alternative mode of being in education. It is a sort of resolve which acts from out of the moment and will not stop.

This study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter begins with the question, "what is the direction of contemporary education?" In this chapter, I describe and reflect on "a figure of modern consciousness in education" in Korea. This chapter is an exploration of the nihilistic elements in modern education with particular reference to the question of instrumentalism in education.

Chapter II is guided by the question, "why should we talk about nihilism in education?" Here, I discuss nihilism concentrating on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.

Chapter III is concerned more specifically with nihilistic elements in school curriculum and educational practice. In this chapter, I discuss science, technology, and liberalism which dominate modern schooling's thinking.

In chapter IV, I explore a transformative insight. This exploration is guided by the questions: "what do we eliminate in education?; where can we find the wisdom to avoid nihilism?" I discuss the meaning of authenticity and truth as a possible answer to the above questions. This chapter seeks to open up alternative possibilities in order to cure nihilism in modern education.

On the basis of the general response to nihilism in chapter IV, in chapter V, I focus more specifically on pedagogy. I raise the questions: "who is a teacher?; what is teaching?" These may yet be nothing but a dim imagination.

Finally, in chapter VI, though it opens upon the endless hermeneutic circle, I try to implant Oriental thought, which is defined as a comprehensive harmony with cosmic rhythm, in education.

B. A Brief History of Modern Korean Education

It was only after the latter part of the nineteenth century that along with Christianity modern education was introduced into Korea. In 1885, American Protestant missionaries began to found modern high schools, including a girls' school, in Seoul. A missionary group of the Northern Methodist Church of United States opened the first missionary high school in 1885. The school with its new educational philosophy and modern curriculum was the pioneer of modern education in Korea. In 1886, the first girl's school was founded in Korea. As for higher education, Yonhui College was founded in Seoul in 1905 and Soongsil College in Pyeongyang in 1906, both sponsored by missionary foundations.

The public education system changed rapidly, emphasizing foreign languages. An English language school employing American teachers was established in 1883 to train interpreters. In 1897, the first senior primary school was opened. In 1899, the Hanseong Middle School, which emphasized a science and humanities curricula, was established. The first teacher-training high school was established in 1895. Language schools for English, Japanese, and Chinese were established that year and Russian language school followed the next year. In 1900, a German language school was established.

The development of modern education was interrupted by the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). Although the number of public schools increased markedly during the colonial period, the education offered by these schools did not meet the rising aspirations of Korean people. Education was limited to only a small fraction of the Korean people. Education only served the purpose of converting Korean people into loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire. While admission to schools was strictly regulated, education degenerated into a mere means for serving political purposes. The imperialistic intent of the Japanese government dictated the

goals and content of education. The colonial education culminated in the imposition of a ban on the use of the Korean language in schools in 1938.

A number of wealthy Korean patriots donated their land and properties for the establishment of private schools. Much of the credit for actual achievements in Korea education went to private schools. In 1939, the percentage of Korean students enrolled in private schools was 2.5 % in primary, 26.2% in secondary, 15.5% in professional schools, and 56.5% in colleges.

The liberation from Japan in 1945 was a turning point for Korean education. It changed from totalitarian to democratic modes of education, and from centuries-old feudalistic ideas to liberal and democratic concepts. Under the United States Military Government, the educational system was changed from a two track line to a single line (6-3-3-4). From that time some educational innovation movements were begun in the name of educational science, the so-called New Education. The basic topics of these movements were curriculum, educational measurement, educational evaluation, community school, and audio-visual education. What guided these movements above all were educational theories imported from the U. S. A..

The Education Law promulgated in October 1949 set forth the purposes of education. The spirit of this law is to contribute to the common prosperity of mankind through the development of democracy and by nurturing the integrity of individuals equipped with the ability to lead independent lives and to become qualified citizens with altruistic ideals. On the other hand, the unique political situation of Korea imposed another mandate on education, that is, to educate the people against communism.

The most striking development in all aspects of education was the quantitative growth after the Korean war. Another significant development in education was the enforcement of compulsory education based on the principle of equal opportunity. Compulsory education has

been applied to a six-year period covering the ages from 6 to 12, and a plan has been formulated to extend this period to 9 years.

Korea has experienced a rapid economic growth through successful implementation of a series of economic development plans. This provided a dynamic force for development in all aspects of human life. It also affected education. In response to emerging needs, Korean education has intensively addressed itself to the development of technological know-how in the early 1960's. Efforts have been made to revise curriculum at all stages and to reform higher education with specific reference to emerging needs of industrialized society. The efforts aimed to relate school education to production in order to contribute to national development. This provides some indication of the origin of the figure of modern consciousness in education.

C. A Figure of Modern Consciousness In Education

He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how. (Nietzsche: quoted in Frankl, 1984)

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought. (Heidegger, 1977, P. 37)

After a time of decay comes the turning point. The powerful light that has been banished returns. There is movement, but it is not brought about by force. . . . The movement is natural, arising spontaneously. For this reason the transformation of the old becomes easy. The old is discarded and the new is introduced. Both measures accord with the time; therefore no harm results. (Ching: quoted in Capra, 1983)

The following conversation is a nonfiction which is re-told according to the facts by the researcher who participated in the real conversation. The conversation took place at a retired professor's house on New Year's day in 1987. The persons who were there were the retired professor's students. They went there to make a New Year's bow to their professor. They were

acquainted with each other. The conversation progressed in a comfortable atmosphere. They could tell their inmost thoughts to each other.

The New Year's bow is a traditional expression of public morality in Korea. It can be explained as a kind of rite expressing a piety to seniors. Usually we visit seniors whom we respect on New Year's day and we make a deep bow to them. At that place we report to the senior how we had lived during the previous year, and how we will live this year. We listen to the senior's sayings which involve wisdom. And then we exchange well-wishings to each other. Through this ceremony we reflect on our way of life and get a vitality which will sustain us into the coming year. The New Year's bow does not have a standard form except a deep bow. Its form is different according to the district and situation. What the important point is, however, that it is an invisible hand which sustains human relationship.

Professor: Mrs. C! As I know, you taught at the S girl's high school. When did you move to the H high school?

Mrs. C: One year ago.

Mr. M (an elementary school principal): I heard that many high school teachers wanted to move to the H high school, didn't they?

Mrs. C: I don't know. But when I was going to move to the H high school, ten or more teachers applied for the post. I am a lucky woman.

Dr. H (a teachers' college assistant professor): Is the H high school different from the S girl's high school?

Mrs. C: Yes, it is. The basic difference is that my school's parents' socio-economic status is higher than the S girl's high school's parents'. And they have an increased interest in education.

Mr. M: Perhaps, that is why many elementary, middle, and high school teachers want to teach in the K district schools where the H high school is located.

Mrs. B (an elementary school teacher): How about the monthly salary, Mrs. C?

Mrs. C: Almost same. But when I participate in extracurricular lessons, there is some extra salary which parents support.

Dr. H: Do all high schools have extracurricular lessons?

Mrs. C: Yes, nearly all.

Mr.S (a company director): Which subject-matter teachers participate in the extracurricular lessons?

Mrs. C: Most of subject-matter teachers participate in the extracurricular lessons. It is especially an obligation for the important subject-matter teachers to participate in the extracurricular lessons. As you know, my subject-matter is mathematics. So I am busy.

Mrs. D (a women's association leader): Professor, why do schools have extracurricular lessons? Does it have a pedagogical meaning?

Professor: I think that it has a pedagogical meaning when we use it for the sake of increasing students' capacities. But the main purpose of the extracurricular lesson is to prepare for the university entrance examination. It is a problem. I think that the entrance examination is the most difficult problem in Korean education.

Dr. H: Because of the entrance examination, all educational philosophies are destroyed. The result is that schools are degraded becoming preparatory schools for examinees, and teachers become technicians who deal with students as objects.

Mrs. B: We can find the phenomenon even in the elementary school. Parents take a growing interest in education. It is a good phenomenon in one respect. For instance, it makes students concentrate on studying and helps students to improve their abilities. But what they are

interested in education are not those things. For them, the evaluation is the important concern. I often find children's stories like the following two stories in the composition class.

Adults have too many faults. Parents compare their child with the other child. And then by implication they say to their child, "You should be more excellent than the other children."
I have one friend. He lives near my house. My mom compares me with him. His mom also compares him with me. If I get higher mark than he does in a test, my mom will feel good. If I get lower mark than he does, my mom will treat me cruelly. The attitude of his mom is like my mom's. It is an example of many faults which adults commit. I will try to make my mom and his mom good.

Another story:

I am feeling badly now. I want to commit suicide. Yesterday, as soon as I arrived home, my mom said, "J. Y., I heard that you did not get good mark on the last test." Although I knew the number that I failed in the test, I did not reply to my mom. My mom did not ask further. At that time I was very scared, because I thought my mom was going to treat me cruelly.
After supper my mom said, "Next year you will be in grade six. Do you know how important it is to get good marks on tests? Stupid!" On hearing my mom's saying, I thought about running away from home.
The examination makes students happy or unhappy. Sometimes I think the test system is good because through the examination we can evaluate our ability. However, what is a problem in the test is that we shall have a competitive mind, jealous mind, and hatred.
I want to live in a peaceful country where there are no tests. Of course, I know that there is not a country that does not have a test system in the world.

Dr. H: In spite of the coarse circumstances, children's minds are sound. I think it will be a hope to educators.

Mr. M: It is not too much to say that parents have a wild enthusiasm. One day a parent called me. She said that I should visit one classroom then because the classroom's teacher did not teach. I asked how she knew that. She said that when she looked at the classroom teacher through a telescope she saw her sitting on a chair in her apartment. I was at a loss for words.

Mrs. B: Shrewd parents, who know well the educational situation, first teach their children the content which is planned to be learned in the next class. They are satisfied with their children's reviewing what they taught in the class. They impress their children that it is a shortcut for success to get good marks. They always emphasize that children should study hard.

It makes children patients of a spiritual illness. They deprive children of children's innocent mind and right to live in a child-like way.

Mrs. D: Nowadays children are busier than adults. After school, they have to finish their homework in order to go swimming, to learn English, take piano lessons, fine art lesson, science, skating, writing, or computer programming. A friend of mine who has two elementary kids said to me that her kids were pitiable. Although she felt like that, she still sent her kids to extracurricular lessons. The reason is simple. If she did not send them to the extracurricular lessons, she would feel that her kids have fallen behind in a competition.

Mr. S: My colleague, who has an elementary school girl and a middle school boy, moved from the B district to the K district a year ago. He had a big, nice house in the B district. His house is smaller and worse than the old house now. I asked him why he had moved from the old house to the new house. He said that he decided to move for the sake of his son's and daughter's education. And then he made a long speech supporting the reason. His basic logic is that in order to succeed in life, their kids must have good friends who have good backgrounds. The K district schools' parents have higher socio-economic status than the B district schools' parents. Thus, his kids would have more chances to have such good friends in the K district than in the B district. He said that he had sacrificed himself for the purpose of his children's education.

Dr. H: Last Christmas I heard a gloomy story from my friend's wife. The following is the story.

Today we had a Christmas party at my daughter's kindergarten. We enjoyed the children's singing, dancing, and drama. Although they made some mistakes, they tried to do well what they had practiced. Whenever they made mistakes, there was a burst of laughter. Kids' and parents' faces were filled with joy. The last part of the program was Santa Claus's time, which all the kids were impatient for. At last Santa Claus with a big bag appeared on the stage amid kids' cheers. He told some interesting stories and sang some songs. But kids turned their eyes to the bag. What is there in the bag? What will he give me? Toy or story book? Large or small thing? They had a throb of joy in

their heart. As if Santa Claus knew the kids' minds, he said that any kinds of present were good. That is right. They are five or six year old kids. They do not have the ability to evaluate the quality of presents. Maybe they think that a large thing is good.

The presents are bought and sent to the teacher by each mom secretly. But kids will think that Santa gives them a present.

Santa gave the presents to the kids one by one. As the kids received the presents, some looked like they were happy. Some kids looked shy. They compared theirs with the others'.

When a girl received a present, all kids heaved a sign of envy. She received a big present which was taller than she. Besides the large present, there was another present of hers. In contrast to the other kids' faces, she exulted in her presents. I felt badly.

Santa was perplexed over the situation. He tried to make them calm. The kids soon calmed themselves down.

I can not understand her parents' mode of thought. I know that her parents are rich and that it is their freedom to please their daughter. However, why didn't they think that their conduct could wound the other children's hearts? They have a high academic background. What is the elite's ethic? I worry that the kids who are brought up by egoistic parents may become egoistic grown-ups.

Mr. S: I don't know how scholars define the elite. My opinion is that persons who lack morality can not be regarded as the elite. If we decide the elite according to the capacity for the pursuit of knowledge, we shall make a mistake. This thought is apt to bring forth egoistic persons. It makes me shudder to think that these persons lead our society. If schools promote the elitism without a mature consideration, schools will slide down to become institutions which produce egoistic persons.

Y. S. (researcher): The entrance examination system is a giant furnace which can melt any kind of human being's will. In front of the giant furnace most of the teachers feel frustration. In the long run, most teachers accommodate themselves to the system. Some teachers who feel frustration leave teaching and some teachers who can not accommodate themselves to the educational situation remain as failures or feel incompetence. It is important for us to think about what is a teacher's competence.

When I became a teacher, I taught middle school grade three social studies. There were eight classrooms in this grade. I was charged with four classrooms. Another teacher was charged with the other classrooms. Without being conscious of a test, I taught students

According to the method which I learned at the teachers college. I think at that time my students liked the method. But the results on the first test were not good. The test scores of the classrooms which I was charged with were lower than those of the other classrooms. I did not care about the result at first. The second test's result was like the first test's. From that time some students began to complain about my teaching method. And I could feel that the other classrooms' teacher was proud that he was more competent than I. Nevertheless, I held fast to my method. One day I found that some of my students read notebooks which they borrowed from their friends who were not my students. So I had a chance to know how the other teacher taught. The notebook had the contents which were important in tests.

I think it is a problem in the teacher evaluation that it is regarded as a kind of teacher's competence to be able to make students get good marks in the test.

Mr.M: It makes teachers compete with other teachers. Eventually, it becomes a sort of vicious circle in education.

Mrs. D: I read a report in a newspaper a week ago about a middle schoolboy who committed suicide at his house. He left a suicide note which said:

I am not confident that I can work well. So I can not make my parents happy.
What is an important thing in my life? Is it an entire thing in a life to work well?
To solve an equation which is not eventually useful for my life, I lost my parents',
teachers', and friends' love which is the most valuable thing in my life.
Nowadays our happiness is determined by the result of the examinations. Do
the marks make us truthful human beings?
I am not a bird confined in a cage. Now I want to fly freely up to the sky.

Mrs. C: According to recent statistics, one hundred or more students commit suicide a year. Who is responsible for this?

Professor: Parents have a wild enthusiasm for their children's school career, but they show an indifference to the subject matter which their children learn in schools. They are only interested in their children's success in life. They have no concern for what kind of human

beings their children will become. Some cruel parents complain that schools do not make students prepare enough for the entrance examination in the name of their children's success in life.

Mr. S: Please, tell me the character of the test.

Mr. M: Generally speaking, the form of the test is a multiple choice method. As the method has a limitation, it depends on testing knowledge which can be learned by rote. In the test, what is important is how many events and facts students can memorize rather than what and how students think. So most of students who have a good memory ability can get high marks. The extreme case is that this method is used in the moral education test.

Mrs. D: Why don't teachers escape from that method?

Mrs. C: The university entrance examination is a kind of multiple choice method. It affects all schools' test method. And it decides what we should teach and how we teach. As everyone who is concerned with education regards the test as an important thing, teachers should have a care in managing it. Sometimes teachers must be responsible for the result of the test. To avoid their personal responsibility for the results, they accept a test method which is known as a scientific method. Science is a kind of myth in the modern epoch. Most parents and students show a tendency to believe in the explanation of science. Teachers can shift their responsibility on experts of evaluation, but they become slaves of the test method.

Dr. H: The entrance examination evil makes students, parents, schools, and teachers exhort each other. Parents exhort their kids to work hard and schools to make students prepare for the entrance examination. It makes students engage in a secret feud with their friends. Parents compete with other parents in order to send their kids to a famous university. Schools compete with other schools so that they may raise the number of their students' passing the examination. If universities change the method of the entrance examination, parents of failed

students will require universities to show the criteria for marking. Accordingly, universities take the multiple choice method as the entrance examination. All schools follow the test method.

Mrs. C: Students' minds get more and more dreary.

Mr. S: I read a novel. The novel's hero recollected his schoolboyhood as follows:

When I was in high school, I thought power was most important. I most respected the politicians, plutocrats, and bosses who are at the top of power. They control the world. Most human beings try to get more influence, more wealth, and more military force than they have now. These are the driving forces of the world. Because of these, the world is developed and sustained. The more we have influence, wealth, and military force, the more we have freedom. Human beings' lives are evaluated by how much personal freedom they have.

By the way, who are philosophers, religionists, and artists? They are the outsiders. They are the failures. They do not have influence, wealth, and force. So they cannot act and enjoy their freedom. Their desires for freedom and possessions make them pay attention to their inner life. Frustrated desires make them indulge in evil thoughts. Their inferiority complex makes them dream an illusion. In the long run they color their dream with a brilliant language.

At that time the world was an object which had to be conquered by me. I must try to get power. Everyone rushes forward to influence, to fame, and to money. Because these are the representative things which rule over the world. We must compete with others for getting more power than others. So the competition is fierce. During the process there will be a few victors and many failures. I should try to be a victor. The failures try to rationalize themselves and try to find out a lame excuse. Philosophers, religionists, and artists are the representations of failures.

Secular success is beautiful. We can not denounce it. It is a logic of failures to condemn secular success. I will not be among one of the failures. I will bring up my power. Through my power I will achieve my desires.

Dr. H: Education is the instrument to get good jobs. Roughly speaking, income can be a criterion of good jobs. Income can be a condition which determines what kind of houses we live in, what kind of clothes we wear, and what kind of foods we eat. In particular, whether we can educate our children or not is determined according to income. Naturally ordinary persons think that money is power. We can imagine that many problems are derived from that thought. We can not overlook that it will influence education and especially students' attitudes.

Mr. M: Whenever I read a report like the following in newspapers, as an educator I feel shame. Sometimes I regret that I became a teacher.

A man sued his son-in-law for riotous conduct. According to the petition his son-in-law, who was married one month ago, was cruel to his daughter everyday. The reason why he mistreated his wife was that his wife brought a dowry that was too small. The dowry which his wife brought was worth thirty million won (fifty thousand Canadian dollars). He compelled his wife to bring more money from her house. As his wife refused his requirement, yesterday he himself visited his wife's house and asked his father-in-law for more money. After a long quarrel, his father-in-law did not accept the demand. The son-in-law made an assault upon his father-in-law indignant at his refusal. He was a Ph. D. student at a famous university. His father-in-law said, "Although I know that it is a shameful conduct to sue my son-in-law, I sue him in order to let the people know and protect other parents who have daughters in a similar situation."

Professor: Usually those who have power, money, and knowledge consider themselves as an elite. I think it is derived from meritocracy. It instigates arrogance. Elites regard their capacities over others as their character over others. They think that they must become leaders of society and that others have to serve them. They think that they have the right to receive a special service.

Mrs. B: According to the direction of the school curriculum, the aim of education is to bring up persons who have sound spirits and healthy bodies, who can spontaneously decide their tasks and the community's plans and practice what they decide, who solve problems rationally and wisely use the knowledge and skill that they have learned, and who respect human being and love nature. It can be summarized like this: to bring up wholesome persons, autonomous persons, creative persons, and persons renowned for their virtue.

I think there is no one who disagrees with this aim of education among teachers and parents. But it is no more than a slogan. The reality of the educational situation is different from the slogan. Although the direction is beautiful, actually what is emphasized in schools is knowledge which has pragmatic values and concerns with the tests.

Mr. M: The direction of the school curriculum assumes that the epoch in which children will be active is an industrial information society derived from the expansion of knowledge and the development of science and technology. To make children live successfully in this epoch, what we should teach is definite. For instance, language arts, mathematics, and science in the

elementary school; language arts, foreign language(English), science, and mathematics in middle and high school. That is to say, what is called the important subject-matters is emphasized in schools.

Mrs. B: Professor, why are the theories, which we learn in pre-service education, different from the real educational situation? At first going to school, I tried to act according to the theories. But the results were not effective. I reflected on what was wrong again and again. A conclusion of mine was that my intention was too idealistic. It ignored the students' real world and the dynamic situation. Gradually I felt that what was important in education was to start from the actual situation. Frankly speaking, my attitude to the scholars' theories is a little bit negative now.

Mrs. C: As you know, my major is mathematics education. During my undergraduate years, I tried to learn mathematics but I did not think about mathematics education. The climate of my school department felt like the department of mathematics. It gave me an illusion that I should become a scholar. When I went to the school I taught students as if I had been a scholar during the first year. Because of my attitude, I often felt frustration. It made me have a great longing for the professors of universities. One day I realized that it was different from the way of a scholar to become a mathematics teacher. From that time, I began to read the books which were concerned with education but I found some theories which I could not agree with.

Dr. H: Sometimes I heard that in teacher education, theories which were developed by behavioral scientists in the U. S. A., were emphasized too much by the teachers whom I taught. They asked if it was a phenomenon of cultural subordination.

Mr. M: We can not deny that education is dominated by American educational theories.

Professor: My generation tried to overcome Japanese colonial education by introducing developed countries' education theories. I wish that the next generation tries to go beyond behavioral science in education. It is not easy but they have to try. I think it is up to teachers.

Y. S.: I often compare education to professional sports. In my metaphor students are players, parents are managers, and teachers are referees. And then schools are the playing grounds, society is audience, and the government is a promoter.

We often see that players, managers, and audience protest against a referee's decision in a game. Sometimes promoters reprimand referees for their misjudgment. Players and managers receive an ovation, but the referees' labor is always shaded. They only have a bitter feeling after a game.

Mrs. B: What should we teachers do in order to go beyond the referee's role?

D. A Reflective View of Korean Education

If you are too obsessed with success, you will forget to live. If you have learned only how to be a success, your life has probably been wasted. If a university concentrates on producing successful people, it is lamentably failing in its obligation to society and to the students themselves (Merton, 1979, p. 11).

Surely, education has no meaning unless it helps you to understand the vast expanse of life with all its subtleties, with its extraordinary beauty, its sorrows and joys. You may earn degrees, you may have a series of letters after your name and land a very good job; but then what? What is the point of it all if in the process your mind becomes dull, weary and stupid? (Krishnamurti, 1964, pp. 10-11)

From the preceding conversation, it is easy to point out some extraordinary phenomena: parents take a growing interest in education; entrance examination's competition is very fierce. The result is that schools devalue into preparatory schools for examinees and teachers become technicians who deal with students as objects. In short, schools are regarded as the instrument of success in life, and teachers are regarded as public servants whose role is primarily to implement what is intended by the public. And students' minds get more and more dreary.

What is the meaning of success in life in Korean culture? How is education connected with success in life? What phenomena are happening in education and Korean consciousness as the result of the first and second questions? , What is a teacher in the Korean educational situation now? To answer these questions fully we would need to take into consideration the deep Korean cultural and historical roots. Such a study is beyond this thesis' purpose. Thus, I will confine the inquiry to the present situation.

In the 1960's and 1970's the Korean government began an economic development policy in the name of modernization. There is no question that economic prosperity is good and is important. National defence, political stability, cultural vitality, and a richness of life very much depend on it. Although economic development is no more that a means to life, it has now tended to override other aspects of development in the political, the social, the cultural and the intellectual spheres. In this predominating economic perspective, money is moved up to a status of intrinsic value and other worthy activities are lowered to the status of instrumental values. Money becomes a means for something called human life. Money is needed for persons to grow, to mature, to learn , to work, to enjoy arts, to enjoy freedom, and to enhance the meaning of life in an enriching way. Other values are thought to be subservient to the economic. As money occupies the place of supreme value, people then focus on materialism. The process of material gains seems to create a nearly limitless appetite for more and more material gain. In this process, human beings lose other values in life. The process may crash against the desperate feeling that life is going nowhere.

Chung (1981, p. 17) coined the term "eminentism". It means the desire for getting ahead of others into positions of eminence and power. In the bygone days of basic poverty, where the means for economic production were meager, the only way to get richer than others was to get ahead of others into positions of power and eminence. This enabled one king, a governor, lord, or chief to get a bigger bite on the small pie to be shared. Such an eminentism persists in the

present. It is requisite that a position of power should carry task and responsibility. What the matter is with present day eminentism is that persons try to seek status, prestige, power, and economic reward more than respecting the responsibilities and tasks that are inherent in positions of power and eminence.

Motives for getting an education are significantly connected with eminentism since in the modern world the traditional class systems are replaced by modern socio-economic classes which are highly correlated with levels of education. Some say that in Korean education the only real operating philosophy is eminentism. In my opinion, it is not too much to say so. Education becomes a means to get positions of power and eminence. Persons rush forward to eminence and power. Parents make their children rush forward to fame and power. Schools and even teachers also rush forward to help them to survive. University entrance examinations play a role in getting a ticket which guarantees fame and power for students. It looks like an abode of demons. In this process, the competition is fierce. Parents compete with others in order to send their children to a famous university. Students are in a secret feud with their friends. Schools compete with other schools so that they may raise the number of their students' passing the examination. The result is that schools slip down to being preparatory schools for examinees. Teachers are no more than technicians in that situation.

When the Korean government took on an economic development policy in the 60's and 70's, schools became regarded as institutions which supplied manpower for the economic system. For the past decade the presumption that education provided by the state should serve the interests of the state, viewed primarily as an economic collective, has been growing in strength. Educational aims and procedures are evaluated in terms of the perceived needs of society in general and of industry in particular without reflecting on the lesson: "The more specific our skills, the shorter their useful life." (Jonathan, 1983, p. 9).

The government revised school curricula. The mainstream of curriculum development and implementation offered to classroom teachers were politically laundered and culturally sterile programs of learning in which students were taught to think componentially. Students developed a mechanistic cognitive style within classrooms that appeared at times to conform to Hyundai's assembly lines. The file keepers, accountability-mongers and knowledge specialists at the national level instructed teachers to segment behavior, measure fluid social activity in terms of "input" and "output", and reduce human beings to computer printouts. Teachers were encouraged to be good system people, to create synthetic environments for our students. They dished out knowledge like fast food.

The government maintained that the educational system was the equalizer of the free society. Success could be achieved by intelligence, hard work, and creativity. Believers in this suggested that inequality resulted from our established form of meritocracy, which provided students who were more capable with their right rewards and excluded those who were less able. They tried to develop a system which could differentiate the capable students from the less able. They were interested in the criteria of judgement rather than changing the game rules in education. As a consequence teachers became slaves of the criteria of judgement in education games.

Technocratic consciousness is looked upon as the new educational mechanism for generating classroom health. Teachers often give technocratic theories the benefit of the doubt and exhibit at times an incredulous penchant for following instructions and deferring to the experts. Some of the new curriculum technologies have even been teacher-proofed, which only contributes further to the devaluing and deskilling of teachers by removing them from the decision-making process (McLaren, 1989, p. 222).

The climate of schools has become an I-It relation. An I-It relation is one in which an independent being experiences and acts upon the world of things. This relation requires an

actor and an object to be acted upon. I am the actor and the things of the world are the objects of my action. I examine the world and construct a system of knowledge about it. The It does not enter into this relation on an equal and independent basis. The It simply receives the thought, action, and activity that I bring to it (Smith, 1977, p. 71). Persons' minds become more and more dreary.

Those phenomena are connected with material gains and therefore with materialism defined as the supreme value. Two kinds of consciousnesses are derived from the materialism. One is instrumentalism, the other is temporalism. Instrumentalism is to see the present moment of life as a means to the next moment. This includes one's present job, one's status, one's residence, one's human relations, and even oneself. What one does and has now does not have meaning of its own but only in term of instrumental value for the future. Learning subject matter has no meaning except for preparing for the entrance examination. School life is a means of getting a good job. A job is a means of getting rich and to get rich is a means of getting power and fame. When a life from birth to death is seen from an instrumental point of view, it totals up to having no meaning of its own.

Temporalism means to see the present as transient temporality, that it is going to pass away and that what counts is what comes next. For example, my present job is temporary; it is not worth devoting my soul to. What I have to be intent on is to be promoted to a director of bureau... and so it continues. If students and teachers think of their positions in that way-drifting in a train of dreamy thought and calculation about what they should be and what they should do next, we can not expect educational commitment and sincerity. Those consciousnesses are basically connected with the notion of alienation because people so oriented have no meaning of "here" and "now".

Where is the beacon of education? Who can lead us there? What can we find there? These questions return to the question of who I am as a teacher.

CHAPTER II

RESPONSE TO NIHILISM: THREE THINKERS' VIEWPOINTS

It is certainly true that the more meaningless we make life, the easier it is, and therefore life in one sense has actually become easier by abolishing Christianity. But this nevertheless has its difficulties; when a man or a whole generation must live in and for merely finite ends, life becomes a whirlpool, meaninglessness, and either a despairing arrogance or a despairing disconsolateness (Kierkegaard, 1967, p. 438).

The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain. But whence this: there ought not to be? From where does one get this "meaning," this standard? At bottom, the nihilist thinks that the sight of such a bleak, useless existence makes a philosopher feel dissatisfied, bleak, desperate. Such an insight goes against our finer sensibility as philosophers. It amounts to the absurd valuation: to have any right to be, the character of existence would have to give the philosopher pleasure (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 23).

The movement of nihilism has become more manifest in its planetary, all-corroding, many-faceted irresistibility. No one with any insight will still deny today that nihilism is in the most varied and most hidden forms of "the normal state" of man. The best evidences of this are the exclusively re-active attempts against nihilism, which, instead of entering into a discussion of its essence, strive for restoration of what has been. They seek salvation in flight, namely in flight from a glimpse of the worthiness of questioning the metaphysical position of man. The same flight is also urgent where apparently all metaphysics is abandoned and is replaced by logistics, sociology, and psychology. The will to know which breaks forth here, and its more tractable total organization, points to an increase of the will to power, which is of a different kind from that which Nietzsche designated as active nihilism (Heidegger, 1958, p. 47).

The problem of nihilism does not appear in serious philosophical writings in Western tradition until the nineteenth century. Gorgias' understanding of it is not nihilism in the sense in which Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger understand it. Gorgias' demonstration that nothing exists is merely a form of verbal play, that is, a kind of amusing intellectual game. There is no reason to assume that Gorgias seriously experienced the anguish of nihilism which was expressed in nineteenth century philosophy which reaches its climax in the writings of Nietzsche. The radical crisis in values which Nietzsche predicted would be the central characteristic of nihilism is with us today in full force.

Heidegger (1958, p.47) is not exaggerating when he says that nihilism is "planetary and all-corroding", the most varied and hidden condition of human being today. One may disagree about the genesis of nihilism or in what respects it is manifested in human thought and action, but it is difficult to deny that we are, in fact, living through nihilistic time. The loss of universally accepted values, the psychological sense of the meaninglessness of existence, the pandemic skepticism about all things, and the anxiety in the face of the most destructive possibilities attest to the presence of what can only be called nihilism.

The question for some is not, are we living in a nihilistic time, but how can we avoid being nihilists and how might we appropriately respond to the nihilistic features in modern life? Maybe there have been nihilistic periods of history in the past. But at no other time in history has there been such a self-conscious awareness of its presence. The spiritual doctors have never before diagnosed the disease and found that they were suffering from it.

In this chapter I will discuss nihilism concentrating on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Each of these philosophers suggests ways to avoid nihilism. And I will try to find what are the implications for education of these suggestions.

A. Kierkegaard's Response To Nihilism

As Kierkegaard was not particularly concerned with stating "what" it is to be a human being, what is involved in the concept of a human being as such, it is not sufficient to characterize Kierkegaard's approach as an analysis of the ordinary concept of individual existence i. e., as an instance of human kind. Kierkegaard speaks of individual existence in a special sense, in which a human being is not simply a biological, psychological, or a social animal, but an "existent", which is something far more exciting than the mere existence of a

particular organism. As authentic, this notion of existence is reserved for those who live as individuals, not biologically, but individually in their thought and their values. It is a term specially designed for those who are personally committed, who feel their freedom in despair, and who recognize their responsibility for their actions. The human being, who admits this special designation of one's life as existence, is the master of one's own life and the author of one's own values.

Accordingly, the meaning of existence is the significance with which one provides one's own life, through passionate commitment. In Kierkegaard's opinion, the ordinary unthinking human being and even the reflective professional philosopher, such as Hegel, understood existence in the uninteresting sense that it took up space, breathed, digested, excreted, and performed sufficiently sophisticated behavior that we call human being. This sense of existence is distinguished by the capacity for abstract thinking, but this is still far removed from true existence. It is the tenacious hold of "externals", that is, "the professor with one's tenure, the businessman with the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the financier with the exchange rate, the clergy with the collection box, the homeowner with the mortgage payments, the spouse with the partner's constancy, the lover with the beloved's devotion, the resident with the neighbour's gossip, the individual with the other's opinion" (Martinez, 1988, p. 110). For Kierkegaard the problem of philosophy is how to transcend this mere existence. The starting point of his philosophy is, therefore, a guide for authentic existence.

The meaning of human existence, according to Kierkegaard, lies in its constant and conscious inner striving. He took as his philosophical task the glorification and maximization of this striving at the expense of contemplation (Reason). For Kierkegaard to exist as a human being is to desire, to fear, to be, and, at least, to be passionate. According to Kierkegaard, the ultimate demands of passions must be outside the scope of Reason. One's choice of a way of life, as opposed to one's choice of a specific course of action within a well-established value

framework, has no reasons to support it. Departing from philosophy in the Western tradition, therefore, Reason for Kierkegaard plays no role whatever in answering the most pressing question of philosophy: What is the good life for human being? Paradoxically, this is not to say that Reason plays no part in coming to the conclusion that Reason has no part to play in answering this question. To the contrary, Kierkegaard's arguments to the effect that ultimate choices are irrational constitute his central contribution to philosophy. It is his doctrine of choice and freedom.

To achieve authentic individual existence is to commit oneself, passionately, to a way of life. Existence is a continuous confrontation with emergency, competing desires, and situations in which choices must be made. The ultimate meaning of existence is not an a priori given, but one's ultimate commitment. The choice is not to choose this or that course of action, but to choose a mode of existence within which all more particular choices may be determined. In other words, once the life style is known, the particular choices follow from certain rules concerning what is needed within that life.

How does one come to have an ultimate set of goals or a way of life? As these are ultimate, one can not appeal to some more ultimate consideration. Kant attempted to justify one set of these values by an appeal to pure practical reason. Kant shows that these values are transcendentally necessary for any morality. However, one can still ask why one ought to be moral. In other words, even if we grant that certain principles can be defended by appeal to Reason, one can then turn about and challenge the value of Reason itself. For example, if I ought to do the moral thing because it is the reasonable thing, why should I be reasonable? What will the Kantian answer be? Kierkegaard claims that no answer can be given, for the value of Reason can be challenged as any particular ethical principle can be challenged.

If the choice of ultimate criteria of a way of life cannot be made by appeal to some set of criteria, how can one go about choosing at all? Kierkegaard's answer is that one simply has to

choose, without appeal to further standard, without reasons, and without justification. One simply has to decide, irrationally, how one is going to live.

Reason, that is, the capacity to give reasons and justify one's choices, can play no part in this ultimate decision, for here one has the need for pure commitment, without appeal to any supporting principles. Thus, "choice is ultimately irrational" means that one cannot ultimately give reasons for one's choice, as all choices are founded on one's fundamental choice of criteria and that ultimate choice is itself unjustifiable.

The absence of ultimate justification is, in fact, an absence of ultimate objective justification. In other words, it is an absence of any justification which would justify a single way of life for all human beings. However, this is where subjectivity plays its most important role in Kierkegaard's philosophy, for there are subjective considerations which incline one to one way of life rather than another. "Truth is subjectivity" means that "the choice of a way of life can be made only by and on the basis of the person who has to live it" (Solomon, 1977, p. 204).

Although Kierkegaard recognized that nihilism was indeed a phenomenon linked with historical conditions, he also suggests that the nihilistic stage of existence is a possibility for any reflective individual in any historical epoch. For Kierkegaard nihilism is not only an abstract, theoretical conception, but it is a spiritual condition which an individual endures in his personal life. This existential confrontation with nihilism is "first presented in purely philosophical terms in Kierkegaard's phenomenology of the nihilistic standpoint" (Stack, 1975, p. 285).

Theoretical nihilism is merely an intellectual game, a perversion of serious thought which mocks what it claims to be doing. It is common for the theoretical nihilist to argue, by means of logical tools, in defense of a thesis or conclusion which is utterly irrelevant to one's own existence or understanding of oneself, and which has no bearing whatsoever upon one's own deepest personal commitments to one's job. Most theoretical nihilists do not, as Kierkegaard did, have the courage to accept all of the consequences of the negative

conclusions which their reason has discovered in order to permit their thinking to affect their emotions and their personal lives. The thought that human existence has no goal and purpose is profoundly disturbing and must be experienced and appropriated by an individual in order truly to be understood. The radical gap between theoretical and personal is a distortion of human experience. At any rate, Kierkegaard was primarily concerned with an analysis of a nihilistic standpoint in which there is a synthesis of theoretical and existential nihilism.

Kierkegaard characterizes nihilism as the culmination of critical reflection or the purely polemical use of reason. Accordingly, this theoretical nihilism is one's own personal sense of pointlessness, purposelessness, and spiritual emptiness. The contradictions of a multiplicity of metaphysical beliefs or systems seem to leave only a series of unsolved antinomies. The nihilism of reflection is a relatively late phenomenon in civilization since it may be a sign of intellectual fertility as well as theoretical syncretism. Those who have been sensitive to the nihilistic standpoint have usually been deeply affected by multiplicity, variety, and alternative possibilities. They are often aware of their own mutability and the complexity of their own being. The radical contradictions in one's life-experiences, the sheer confusion of concrete existence seem to nullify the rigid categories of pure rationalism or logical analysis. Concrete existence is not transparent to reason. Ultimately, nihilism entails the negation of reflection as an end in itself since its affirmation is its negation.

For Kierkegaard the experience of the nihilistic standpoint can be a significant moment in the dialectic of life since it may turn the individual back upon oneself. It may free one from unselfconsciousness or dogmatic slumber, and may generate a heightened sense of one's own existence and one's responsibility for what one becomes. That is to say, the experience of nihilism turns the individual back upon oneself in a search for personal meaning. This, for Kierkegaard, is "the value of enduring the nihilistic standpoint" (Stack, 1975, p. 285).

Kierkegaard was concerned with transcending the impasse of nihilism. He may be said to have transcended his own nihilism by achieving authentic individual existence. To achieve authentic individual existence is to commit oneself, passionately, to a way of life. Existence is a continuous confrontation with emergency, competing desires, and situations in which choices must be made. The ultimate meaning of existence is not an a priori given, but one's ultimate commitment. The choice is not to choose this or that course of action, but to choose a mode of existence within which all more particular choices may be determined. In other words, once the style of life is known, the particular choices follow from certain rules concerning what is needed within that life.

In general, subjectivity, inwardness, and individuality are concepts interchangeable in Kierkegaard's vocabulary (Matthis, 1979, p. 111). The reality of each lies always beyond the finite self. In this context, we have to understand Kierkegaard's conception of authentic existence.

Kierkegaard distinguishes three stages of existence, which are conceived in a hierarchical order: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious stage of existence. In the aesthetic stage of existence human being is absorbed in immediacy, that is, in one's existence as a finite being. This stage is characterized by a constant pursuit of pleasures of all kinds. It makes no difference whether the pursuit is of the satisfaction of material desires or more refined pleasure.

In the ethical stage of existence, human being has to eliminate the particular element within one and realize one's existence as an ethical human being. These two stages are mutually exclusive. And the choice between them confronts human being with a dilemma which forces one to make an existential decision. There is no compromise possible between the two. Thus one may choose either the aesthetic stage of existence or the ethical stage of existence. But both stages are inferior in degree to the third and supreme stage of existence, the religious.

From the perspective of the religious stage, human being's earthly existence is itself sin. Kierkegaard connects sin to human being's very existence. Human being is a synthesis of body and psyche, as well as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. This synthesis is possible owing to the spiritual element that exists in human being. The spiritual element is the absolute and eternal element, which spurs human being on to realize him or herself by means of a relationship to God. It is that element which arouses human being's passion to realize oneself as a subjectivity. But human being as an existing being is absorbed in this world, and is drawn to an immediate and finite way of life, which thwarts one's self-realization. The existing individual is thus in a terrible situation. On the one hand, one's yearning to realize oneself as spirit fills one with anxiety, for such realization is the negation of one's earthly existence. On the other hand, one's clinging to the finite and one's incapacity to realize oneself causes one to live in despair. This despair Kierkegaard defines as sin.

From the religious perspective, the immediate or aesthetic way of life is defective, not because of its goals, but because it constitutes a denial of authentic existence. Human being's true essence cannot be actualized so long as one keeps existing as an earthly and sensual being. On the contrary, such an existence constitutes the origin of one's suffering and torments. Human being, therefore, has to overcome and negate one's immediate being. Only in this way will human being be able to liberate oneself and to direct the driving force operating within one to one's authentic expression, which is religious faith.

Human being cannot realize one's authentic self in the ethical stage either, for the universal-human element to which one relates in this stage is not the element which distinguishes one as an individual and makes one an exception and an extraordinary one. This element can be realized only when human being relates to God. The mode of existence of this stage is religious faith, which is the highest stage an existing individual can attain.

The process of becoming an individual does not find direct expression in social and political involvement, but proceeds primarily within the individual's consciousness. It is accompanied by an incessant intellectual process of reflection. Its purpose is to bring the individual to full self-awareness of one's true essence. This awareness is the way of religious conversion, which is the only way to self-realization as an authentic individual. The authentic individual is the meeting point of the temporal and the eternal (Martinez, 1988, p. 116). And it is a condition for the attainment of the eternal happiness, and salvation (Rosenow, 1989, p.9).

Any statement about authentic existence may be formulated only negatively. For example, one's substance is not aesthetic, not rational, not emotional, and even not ethical. If what distinguishes human being is subjectivity, then this subjectivity cannot be expressed positively and communicatively, for any such expression receives a dimension of publicity which contradicts subjectivity. Authentic existence can be characterized only by negation, which cannot be articulated or communicated. Thus an "infinite resignation" of the dimensions of one's being is necessary. The existing individual has to negate his immediate being.

B. Nietzsche's Response To Nihilism

Among the commentators, there is no agreement about the proper interpretation of the philosophical issues raised and explored by Nietzsche: his critiques of traditional philosophy, morality, religion, his doctrine of eternal recurrence, will-to-power, overman, and his perspectivism (Magnus, 1974, p. 6). Much of his work reads, nevertheless, like the self-diagnosis of a desperate physician who, suffering the disease on our behalf, comes to prescribe as a cure that we should form a new idea of health and live by it (Heller, 1988, p. 2). For

Nietzsche nihilism is the diagnosis which he was suffering on our behalf and a transvaluation of values is the prescription to effect a cure.

A quite interesting preliminary glimpse into Nietzsche's diagnosis can be caught from a single entry in *The Twilight of the Idols*.

How the "true world" finally became a fable
history of an error

1. The true world; attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous one-he lives in it, he is it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively clever simple, persuasive. Circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")
2. The true world; unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous one ("for the sinner who repents"). (progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, deceptive, incomprehensible-it becomes female, it becomes Christian...)
3. The true world; unattainable, indemonstrable, un-promisable, but the thought of it- a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (The old sun at bottom, but penetrating through mist and skepticism; the idea has become elusive, pale, nordic, Königsbergian.)
4. The true world-unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained, also unknown. Consequently, also not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: to what could something unknown obligate us?... (Gray morning. First yawn of reason. Cockrow of positivism.)
5. The "true world"-an idea which is no longer useful for anything, not even obligating-a useless idea, an idea become superfluous, consequently, a refuted idea; let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; Pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world we have abolished: Which world remained? The apparent one perhaps?... But no! With the true world we have abolished the apparent one as well! (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) (Nietzsche, 1954, pp. 485- 486).

In this aphorism of Nietzsche, the first five stages represent a history of the devaluation of values. These represent the history of philosophy as the devaluation of values itself. The highest traditional values, reason, God, the absolute, the moral law, and truth itself have ceased to hold sway in philosophy or over the individual. They no longer inform or sustain Western culture. And the sixth stage reflects the new reality which follows in the wake of this devaluation.

What is left after the abolition of the true world is an aimless becoming. Nietzsche characterized this aimlessness as nihilism. What is tragic is that human being accepts this event not with resignation but in total unawareness. Nietzsche's most forceful statement concerning this point is expressed in *The Madman* which says that God is dead.

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning, ran to market place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!" Since many of those who were standing around just then did not believe in God, he provoked much laughter. Did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? (or) emigrated?- Thus they yelled and laughed all together. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his glances. "Whither is God?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him-you and I. We are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, to all sides? Is there still an up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite void? Does not the breath of empty space press upon us? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on constantly? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of the godly decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead! God remains Dead! And we have killed him! How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world hitherto possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood from us? With what water can we cleanse ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed and whoever will be born after us, for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto." Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners: They too were silent and stared at him strangely. At last he threw his lantern on the ground and it broke and went out. "I come too early," he said then, "my time has not yet come. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering-it has not yet pressed upon the ears of man. Lighting and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done in order to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars- and yet they have done this themselves...." (Nietzsche, 1964, pp. 95-96).

Nietzsche not only saw that the values which had informed and sustained European culture were untenable and had become bankrupt, but knew fully that this realization was unpalatable to his contemporaries (Magnus, 1974, p. 12).

"God is dead." "This is the very core of Nietzsche's spiritual existence, and what follows is despair and hope in a new greatness of man, visions of catastrophe and glory, the icy

brilliance of analytical reason, and fathoming with affected irreverence those depths hitherto hidden by awe and fear" (Heller, 1988, p. 3). Much of Nietzsche's work is the prophecy of human being's fate after the death of God. Eventually, his *The Will to Power* gives a full diagnosis of what he termed nihilism, the state of human beings and societies faced with a total eclipse of all values.

For Nietzsche nihilism is an experience. It is not a proposition about the world which can be proved or disproved. As an experience, it is something which we live. Moreover, it is an experience which is common to an age.

The fundamental experience of nihilism is one of meaninglessness, valuelessness, aimlessness. We can no longer find an answer to the question of "why?" All questions about the meaning, value, and purpose of existence-both the existence of the world and our own personal existence- find no answers. The experience is a radical one in the sense that it leads us back to the roots of meaning, value, and purpose, only to discover that the roots are simply dangling in the nothingness of the void. The world lacks aim, unity, truth, being itself. It appears that nothing is left.

The experience of nihilism can be seen as a problem of categories. According to Hinman, this problem exists on two levels (1977, p. 92). The two levels of the problem can be briefly stated as follows. (1) A belief in the Christian moral interpretation eventually leads to nihilism, for the categories of such an interpretation refer to a fictitious world: Moral nihilism. (2) A belief in any interpretation of the world, where the world itself is taken to be the foundation of the categories of that interpretation, may result in nihilism, for we ourselves are the ultimate and sole ground of the categories in terms of which we interpret existence: Epistemological nihilism.

Nietzsche roots the experience of nihilism in Christianity. The mere experience of distress is of itself insufficient to lead to nihilism. The distress which flows as a necessary consequence of the Christian moral interpretation, however, does lead to nihilism. Skepticism

regarding morality is the decisive factor which leads to nihilism. Other remarks center around the demand for truthfulness in Christianity as the significant factor which drives human being toward realizing the fictitious character of one's categories. And it is our faith in the categories of reason which is identified as the cause of nihilism. These comments need not be taken as contradictory, but rather represent different aspects of the Christian moral interpretation of the world. This interpretation, when believed in fully, leads to nihilism in that it demands a commitment to moral and metaphysical categories; at the same time, it demands truthfulness, and it is this demand which eventually leads the believer to discover the fictitious character of the categories to which one had previously been completely committed. The shock of this discovery leads to the belief that everything is false.

For Nietzsche to move beyond nihilism does not involve replacing one set of fictitious categories by another set of categories which we take as rooted in the very nature of things. The nihilism which Nietzsche saw as characteristic of his age was indeed occasioned by a specific set of categories, those belonging to Christian moral interpretation of the world, but this specific example of nihilism does not exhaust the experience of nihilism. What is fundamentally at stake here is the belief in any set of categories which are claimed as absolute and whose absoluteness is asserted as being grounded in anything other than the will to power of the interpreting subject. The Christian moral interpretation is a specific instance of a more general phenomenon, that is, belief that one's categories are absolute and grounded in the nature of reality itself. It is this which makes nihilism possible.

The way in which nihilism is transcended is through the realization that we create the categories in terms of which we deal with the world. This realization makes the affirmation of our creativity possible. The nihilist holds back from such an affirmation because one expects that the world should be different, and only when one overcomes this expectation can one realize and eventually affirm one's creativity in the process of constructing categories. This activity of

creating categories is, for Nietzsche, an exercise of the will to power as interpretation (Solomon, 1977, p. 182).

If by a nihilist we mean one who maintains that all is false, then we cannot call Nietzsche a nihilist. If, on the other hand, a nihilist is one who sees and affirms all categories as creative acts of human being rather than as being grounded in the nature of some real world, then we can justly call Nietzsche a nihilist. The categories in terms of which one interprets the world are one's own creations, and one affirms this. One can only become creative, in Nietzsche's philosophy, after freeing oneself from any absolute categories which are thought to be grounded in anything outside of the interpreting subject's will to power. Nihilism is a necessary step in the process of self-liberation and self-overcoming, but Nietzsche does not stop at the fanatical faith of the nihilist to revert to an objectivist position. He asserts human creativity as the key to the overcoming of nihilism (Bales, 1986, p. 144).

"God is dead" is interpreted as atheism. But in Nietzsche atheism is connected with existentialism. That is to say, atheism has been subjectivized, nihility has become the field of the so-called ekstasis of self-existence, and the horizon of transcendence opens up not in an orientation to God but in an orientation to nihility. The question of atheism is not originally tied up with human existence alone. It has to do with the existence of all things of world as such. Atheism must also be a signal of fundamental conversion in one's way of looking at the world.

According to Nishitani (1982, p. 55), "what we are dealing with here is a catastrophic change similar to what took place in natural history when dry lands rose up out of the sea and the many animals that had once lived in the sea were forced to become inhabitants of the land." This meant radically altering their way of looking at things, and their habits—in short, a fundamental reorientation in their way of being and valuing. The shift to atheism is like the entire land sinking back again into the sea, forcing all the land animals to revert back into sea animals. It represents a change so fundamental that not only the human mode of existence but

even the very visible form of the world itself must undergo a radical transformation. Individual things, for example, lose their substantiality when they are grounded on nihilism and come to look instead like the waves of the sea. This is how the world looks from the viewpoint of the "eternal return." It requires, moreover, a fundamental conversion in the human way of being.

Nietzsche's atheism is different from the ordinary atheists. Although Nietzsche emphasized an "un-human" way of being, he was not advocating something to replace, on the same plane, what is normally spoken of as the human. His is rather an attempt to posit a new way of being human beyond the frame of the human, to forge a new form of the human from the far side, beyond the limits of human being-centered existence. This is the sense of his image of the "Overman," who embodies the doctrine that "Man is something that shall be overcome." (Nietzsche, 1966, p.124)

The Overman is the creator-the ultimate synthesis of Dionysian passion and Apollonian control-the one who actually does live one's life as a work of art. The Overman is one who overcomes oneself, one who masters all of the beastly destructive; especially self-destructive; the all-too-human passions and fears which would lead one to be comfortable and secure rather than creative.

What makes human being overcome itself is the "will to power" (Lingis, 1978, p. 195). Nietzsche's concept of power signifies potentiality, especially the potential to overcome. In short, power is the ability to overcome. What is to be overcome? It is clear that Nietzsche's concept of power is more specific than this. All powers are manifestations of the "will to power", but all powers are not equal. Striving for good health and physical strength is the lowest manifestation of the "will to power". Similarly, overcoming one's neighbor is a relatively important manifestation. However, the highest Will to Power is self-overcoming.

What does "overcoming oneself" mean? Firstly, it refers to the social and cultural mechanisms that determine mankind's nature and shape one's character. The aim of these

mechanisms is to adapt human being to human society and to cultural tradition, thus molding him according to a uniform norm. Since human being is essentially a unique being, these mechanisms repress one's true self. Nietzsche attacks them all. But his target is not the political, cultural, and social establishment, but its system of values. According to Nietzsche, Christianity and morality, philosophy and science, culture and art have one and same function, that is, to repress human being's nature and deny one's freedom. The first prerequisite of human being's self-realization is, therefore, the overcoming of one's adopted nature.

The first stage in human being's realization of one's individuality is, therefore, rebellion against established norms and values. Nietzsche conceives of the current religious and moral systems of values as ingenious ideological mechanisms designed by the society and the church in order to promote human being's subjugation and the falsification of one's nature.

Human being has to overcome not only the conventional moral values, but also the reverence for scholars and philosophers who teach us to regard reason as the essence of one's being and who encourage us to repress natural instincts for the sake of rationality. For Nietzsche the overcoming of morality and reason is a necessary stage on the individual's way to self-realization. However, Nietzsche is concerned not with a revolution in the social and political order, but with a reformation of the individual's consciousness, which takes place not in empirical reality but in the human being's mind.

However, overcoming morality, reason, and cultural tradition is a dangerous enterprise. Nietzsche is well aware of this. If authenticity can be gained by giving up reason and by surpassing morality, then human being may throw off all restraints and set free one's most sinister impulses. It seems to give vent to the licentiousness of human being's wildest hidden desire. But he adheres to the traditional moral concept of human being's responsibility, especially human being's responsibility toward oneself alone. This is why human being has to overcome one's self as well (Rosenow, 1989, p. 315).

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the climax of Zarathustra's self-overcoming is his overcoming of love. Nietzsche's concept of love is the reverse of the conventional conception. For him love is basically an expression of the will to power and therefore is an attempt to dominate and to master. Conventional love is self-love. Its origin is mankind's inability to love itself. Love, therefore, is mankind's escape from itself. The true love Zarathustra teaches is different. The true love is the love of the most distant, which is the longing for the Overman, that is, a longing for the realization of one's authentic being. This is why human being has to overcome one's false self-love and to learn to love properly.

Overcoming love is thus the culmination of the process of self-overcoming. It is the most difficult and terrible challenge human being has to face, since this last overcoming signifies a sacrifice of one's own self. It means the sacrifice of one's personality for the sake of the Overman, that is, for the sake of surpassing and transcending the self.

This meant radically altering one's way of looking at things, and one's habits- in short, a fundamental reorientation in one's way of being and valuing. The overcoming of self is like the entire land sinking back again into the sea, forcing all the land animals to revert back to sea animals. It represents a change so fundamental that not only the human mode of existence but even the very visible form of the world itself must undergo a radical transformation. Individual things, for example, lose their substantiality when they are grounded on nihilism and come to look instead like the waves of the sea. This is how the world looks from the viewpoint of the "eternal return." It requires, moreover, "a fundamental conversion in the human way of being" (Nishitani, 1982, p.55).

C. Heidegger's Response to Nihilism

Nietzsche had conceived of nihilism as the consequence of the devaluation of traditional values to the point of meaninglessness, and he endeavored to overcome nihilism through a revaluation. Heidegger, however, sees nihilism as the relentless terminus of value-thinking itself, regardless of whatever kind (Bales, 1986, p. 146).

..so long as nihilism is understood only as the devaluing of the highest values, and the will to power, as the principle of the revaluing of all values, and is thought from out of a re-positing of the highest values, the metaphysics of the will to power is indeed an overcoming of nihilism. But in this overcoming of nihilism value-thinking is elevated to a principle (Heidegger, 1977, p. 104).

To Heidegger, Nietzsche's philosophy of the *Will to Power*, far from effecting an exit from nihilism, represents the ultimate expression of nihilism. Thus Heidegger's observations on the phenomenon of nihilism have to be summarized within a metaphysics viewed from the perspective of value.

Plato removed Being from this world and allocated it to a realm of suprasensible Ideas. He established, thus, two distinct worlds: a true world of eternal Ideas which alone were real, and the merely apparent world of sensible things, forever changing and eluding us. From this moment axiology assumed an importance as a concern of philosophy. According to Heidegger (1961, p. 106), this value-thinking functioned as a principle factor in a subtle process of metaphysical decline which culminated two millennia later in Nietzsche's philosophy of the *Will to Power* in the nihilism of the present century.

According to Heidegger (1958, p. 16), the Greeks prior to Plato originally experienced Being as *physis*, as the power that emerges in that which is. *Physis* was Being encountered as emerging from concealment, as spontaneously unfolding itself. It was the overpowering shining-forth of Being from beings. This shining-forth was an appearing. Appearance belonged

to Being. Appearing lay in the very essence of Being, since Being meant to shine-forth into the light, to maintain constant appearance. Being meant appearing. Here, appearing was understood not in the sense of a mere seeming, but as a coming-to-presence. For something to appear was for it to expose itself in its Being. It was such appearance that the earlier Greeks called *idea*. *Idea* was the shining of the Being and a mode or determination of Being.

This understanding of "idea" altered in Plato's philosophy (Driscoll, 1967, p. 18). The *idea*, as appearance of the being, came to constitute its 'what', i. e. , its essence. *Idea*, as whatness, became the Being of the being. *Idea* came to be construed as the whole of Being. Being, as *idea* or essence, was then separated from the being; the becoming distinct from the phenomenon. The phenomenon was looked upon as mere appearance, as semblance, and as unreality. Being was exalted by Platonism to a suprasensory realm, that is, somewhere on high, and at the same time the phenomenal world was degraded and declared to be one of mere appearance. Thus was established the polarity which occasioned the entrance of value into philosophy.

The Idea became an ideal serving as a prototype for copies. Beings only approximated the actuality of the Idea. The distinction between 'Being-Idea' and 'being-semblance' inevitably implies a preference for the former over the latter and a corresponding evaluation. Things had come to be measured against the Idea and assigned higher or lower value themselves in accordance with their degree of correspondence. Valuating, as a mode of thought, had made its debut.

Heidegger's writings suggest a second fundamental attitude of valuating which is the striving for the realization of values in beings in the history of Western thought. In his first critique, for example, Kant asserted that the thing-in-itself, whether regarded as transcendental object or noumenon, was in either case beyond the grasp of our knowing power. Ultimately Kant's critique had the practical effect of restricting the extension of valid knowledge to the world

of empirical science - to that alone which was determinable in mathematical-physical thinking. Being and being were regarded as unknowable in their 'what.' Scientific knowledge alone was possible, but scientific knowledge masters only the 'how,' not the 'what' of things. Eventually, thinking became "calculative thinking" directed solely toward the augmentation of dominion, and beings became mere objects of endless and variegated business. Standards of production and consumption came to be reckoned as values not only in the world of commerce, but also in that of the spirit. Usability and manipulability came to rank as the foremost determinants of value, superseding all others. Technics, as manipulating, assumed preeminence and today it tyrannizes in every sphere of human endeavor. Value-thinking has thus shackled human beings and brought them to dwell under a dictatorship of technocracy.

It is from the perspective of this background situation that Heidegger formulated his critique of value. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger recognized that values are not ontological. When human beings deal with values, instead of responding to Being they are simply engaging themselves with mere things. Value-thinking is thing-thinking. Engrossed in value-thinking, human being no longer needs Being. One is far from even catching a glimpse of Being. One becomes immersed in a world of objects wherein one sits in stupefied curiosity, fascinated by their ever increasing intricacies and manipulabilities. For Heidegger such a state represents the zenith of alienation.

Human beings no longer feel quite at home within their world. They experience their existence as that of so much flotsam adrift in a void. Human beings have become strangers. They are alienated from self, from others, and from God. For Heidegger, however, all such alienations are secondary. They have as their ground in the radical homelessness of human being's estrangement from Being.

Human being is *Dasein*. By one's nature human being is destined to serve as the site or clearing wherein Being discloses itself. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that the essence of

Dasein lies in its existence and that the substance of man is existence. Here, the word Existence is used in a unique sense. To say that human being ex-sists is to say that one is the being which stands out from itself into Being. Human being is essentially the being which is correspondent with Being. One is not one's own end, sufficient unto oneself. Human being is the shepherd of Being. One exists solely for the sake of Being. One belongs to Being. It is Heidegger's conviction that human being's dignity, one's glory, lies simply in one's abiding as the locus of Being's self-revelation. Human being's true vocation is to be a shepherd of Being.

Utility and manipulability reign supreme. Man's greatest achievement has been to thrust a package into the reaches of space or something equally insane. Being, which is more essential than all values and all beings, has come to be forgotten. And beings are looked upon solely in terms of usefulness.

Man represents all beings according to idea and esteems everything real according to values. The decisive point is not which ideas and which values are set, but that the real is expounded according to ideas as all, that the world is weighed according to values at all. One should rather come to understand that it is exactly through the characterization of something as value, that it loses its dignity. This is to say that through the estimation of something as a value, one accepts what is evaluated only as a mere object for the appreciation of man. But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, much less when the objectivity has the character of value. All valuing, even when it values positively, subjectivizes the thing (Heidegger, 1977, p. 297).

For Heidegger this passion for action to the utter disregard of Being constitutes nihilism. In other words, "the forgetfulness of Being and the exclusive concern for beings which is exemplified in calculative thinking constitute Heidegger's nihilism" (Driscoll, 1967, p. 22).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that human being's primitive mode of being is undifferentiated primitive everydayness. This undifferentiated everydayness is characterized by the fact that it is unreflective. One has not yet raised the question of being. One has not yet considered one's possibilities. As average everydayness, one does not define oneself uniquely, but one defines oneself as public. *Dasein*, as a part of the public, has one's identity in

one's social roles; one is a college professor, an education student etc.. These social roles are defined, not by the individual, but by the public itself. As "being-with," as one of the public, Dasein resigns one's right to project the possibilities for oneself. The possibilities no longer become one's own responsibility. The power to determine what *Dasein* is belongs not to oneself, but to the self of the anonymous public, the others. However, these others are not definite others.

The who is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The who is the neuter, *das Man* (Heidegger, 1962, p. 164).

As *das Man*, Dasein's understanding of its own possibilities is restricted to the standards of success and failure which are imposed on *das Man*, by no one in particular. The goal of *das Man* is to be average. Dasein, as *das Man*, is relieved of the responsibility. As the standards of *das Man* are directed towards averageness, Dasein as *das Man* can take things easily and make them easy. *Das Man* makes life easy for Dasein. In *das Man*, the everyday itself of Dasein finds stability. Thus Dasein is tempted to remain in the mode of *Existenz* dictated by *das Man*. Dasein, as *das Man*, is completely oblivious of its own ontological structure, which is to exist as the being-in-the-world, and is consequently equally unmindful of Being itself as well. In its average everydayness, Dasein's attitude toward its world is one of domination and manipulation.

In *Being and Time*, Dasein is defined as care (Sorge). Each individual must look after one's interest in order to achieve the good life. It is crucial to see that Heidegger does not regard self-interest to be pursuit of personal wealth and 'the good life'. For Heidegger the highest kind of life is openness to the structure and possibilities of what is. The intellect can know the essence of things only insofar as it becomes the clear surface on which the essence of things can impress itself. Genuine insight occurs only when one becomes what one most

properly can be within the temporality which provides the horizon in which things can be understood as what they are. As long as one tries to turn oneself into things, one cannot be what one really is. Such reification occurs in part because one is unable to confront one's own finitude and mortality, which are intrinsically bound up with one's temporality. To be authentic means to be open to the possibilities inherent in the concrete, factual life-situation in which one finds oneself at that particular moment. As long as one is egoistic, however, one is not open to the possibilities before one, but instead one tries to manipulate the situation in a way which is pleasing to one's ego. As an inauthentic being, one regards everything merely as an object for the subject, a commodity to be consumed, raw material for the enhancement of power of the individual. As an authentic being, one opens oneself up to the particular situation in a way independent of the demands of the ego. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated and the commonsense of the *das Man* knows only the satisfying of manipulatable rules (Zimmerman, 1979, p. 102).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that individuals become inauthentic because they lack the courage to face no-thingness which is able to let new possibilities emerge. No immediate experience of Being is to be had. We know Being not in itself, but only insofar as it shines forth in and through beings which it is not. The recognition of this *not* is essential. We must thoroughly understand that Being is the completely Other; that it is not a being; that it is non-being. It is Nothing. Being, though it is always the Being of beings, nevertheless transcends beings.

In one's proximate inauthenticity one exists immersed in a world of the immediately tangible which is disturbingly inconstant. In moments of dread an overwhelming realization of the elusive nature of the "what-is" in totality is thrust upon *Dasein*. In such a mood, is it the "what is" that is bothering us? It is not "what-is". It is something indefinite. It is nothing. The flighty indifference of vanishing "what-is" reveals the Nothing, but the Nothing forces *Dasein* back

again face to face with "what-is" as such. "What-is" is other than Nothing. Dread lays bare Being and beings as mutually Other (Driscoll, 1983, p. 26). This mysterious Nothingness plays an important role in Heidegger's overcoming nihilism.

For Heidegger the obvious phenomenon of nihilism is the state of contemporary culture which is defined by technology (Lovitt, 1980, p. 67). Increasingly it impinges on human life everywhere, affecting our ways of thinking and acting, changing our relation to persons and things, and confronting us with possibilities and problems that appear to be unique to our time. In the grasp of technology human being is held fast to beings and fails to transcend into Being.

Being has withdrawn. Everywhere modern human being presents one's challenge to the reality around one. One thinks oneself lord of all one surveys. If complete control eludes one, it is only because one's calculating is not sufficiently accurate and one's plans not sufficiently far-ranging. One sets oneself diligently to ordering every element of nature and human being in accordance with one's calculations. Commanding everything forth into place as available supply, one forces everything to be present in such a way as increasingly to accomplish one's control. Thus the importunate gathering together that deprives everything of its uniqueness takes place. And one's proud certainty of standing alone in one's dominion remains nothing but an illusion. The gathering is no merely human action and attitude. It is the manner in which technology is itself happening pervasively in the modern age. In accomplishing technology, and bringing everything to appearance as "standing-reserve", human being, as a being in Being, is according with Being's manner of happening in withdrawal, even though one knows it not. Being is happening now only as the presencing of the "standing-reserve". The world is looked upon as just so much raw material waiting to be used up, to be shaped and transformed by labor. For modern human being, to be is to be re-presented or posited(*gestellt*). Heidegger calls this new understanding of Being "*Ge-stell* ", or the "enframing". He says in terms of his use of it to speak of the gathering-place that

accomplishes itself in techne as a bringing-forth that delineates, shapes, and reveals. When Being has withdrawn, *ge-stell* can but speak of a despoiling structuring, a delimiting that brings everything, to appear only as a semblance of itself.

It is as this enplaning, annihilating summons that modern technology holds sway. Ruled by this claim, human being is estranged from oneself in the modern age. For the claim is concealed. Modern human being does not experience oneself as the one who is providing the openness for Being's happening. Such are the facets of the nihilism which Heidegger describes as permeating to their depths the most varied and most hidden forms of the normal state of human being today.

For Heidegger the overcoming of nihilism is based on the restoration of metaphysics (Driscoll, 1983, p. 26). In Heidegger's analysis metaphysics-past, technology, oblivion, and nihilism, are closely interrelated phenomenon. That the overcoming of nihilism is to be based upon the restoration of a true metaphysics as opposed to the erring, forgetful metaphysics of the Western philosophical heritage, we can readily grasp.

In *The question of Being*, Heidegger says that the overcoming of nihilism is only attained when, instead of the appearance of negative nothingness, the essence of nothingness which was once related to Being can arrive and be accepted by us mortals. The essence of nothingness which Heidegger speaks of here is Being as withholding itself in mystery and reserve. To have intuited the positive behind the seeming-nothing, to have perceived the Nothing as mystery, is already to have overcome the nihilism of negative nothingness. We never get to know a mystery by unveiling or analyzing it. We get to know it only by carefully guarding the mystery as mystery. It is in the mere hearing of the question, aside from a seeking after answer, that the mystery is sustained as mystery, in its integrity.

The task that lies ahead is to understand in depth and extensiveness what the releasement from the will to power means. To some extent this means that we must give more

thought to the way in which our dwelling in the world has been permeated by it from top to bottom. As we think, we begin to learn again how to dwell in such a way that releasement, as "let Being be", not the will to power and domination, will permeate our being in the world.

If our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to bring about a change in human nature... (Heidegger, 1956, p. 209).

The call to which thinking responds is far from being ethically irresponsible. It may turn out that the call to "let Being be" is a serious challenge. It is a call to step back from the will to calculate. And that, in turn, is a call toward a radically different world (Bales, 1986, p 149).

CHAPTER III

THE QUAGMIRE OF MODERN EDUCATION

Let any one examine the pedagogic literature of the present; he who is not shocked at its utter poverty of spirit and its ridiculously awkward antics is beyond being spoiled. Here our philosophy must not begin with wonder but with dread; he who feels no dread at this point must be asked not to meddle with pedagogic questions. The reverse, of course, has been the rule up to the present; those who were terrified ran away filled with embarrassment as you did, my poor friend, while the sober and fearless ones spread their heavy hands over the most delicate technique that has ever existed in art-over the technique of education. This, however, will not be possible much longer; at some time or other the upright man will appear, who will not only have the good ideas I speak of, but who in order to work at their realization, will dare to break with all that exists at present: he may by means of a wonderful example achieve what the broad hands, hitherto active, could not even imitate-then people will every where begin to draw comparisons; then men will at least be able to perceive a contrast and will be in a position to reflect upon its causes, whereas, at present, so many still believe, in perfect good faith, that heavy hands are a necessary factor in pedagogic work (Nietzsche, 1971, p. 512).

Science does not think. This is a shocking statement. Let the statement be shocking, even though we immediately add the supplementary statement that nonetheless science always and in its own fashion has to do with thinking. That fashion, however, is genuine and consequently fruitful only after the gulf has become visible that lies between thinking and sciences, lies there unbridgeably. There is no bridge here- only the leap. Hence there is nothing but mischief in all the makeshift ties and asses' bridges by which men today would set up a comfortable commerce between thinking and sciences. Hence we, those of us who come from the sciences, must endure what is shocking and strange about thinking- assuming we are ready to learn thinking. To learn means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at the given moment. In order to be capable of doing so, we must get underway. It is important above all that on the way on which we set out when we learn to think, we do not deceive ourselves and rashly bypass the pressing questions; on the contrary, we must allow ourselves to become involved in questions that seek what no inventiveness can find. Especially we moderns can learn only if we always unlearn at the same time. Applied to the matter before us: we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally. To do that, we must at the same time come to know it (Heidegger, 1968, p. 349).

In a talk given to the specialist councils of the Alberta Teachers Association, as I have noted before, Aoki (1989) described three views of school, each of which assumes a particular view of teaching. In one, school is meant primarily for "rational thinking"; it stresses intellectual skills and mind-building. Teaching is seen essentially as mind-building accomplished by filling

empty containers with factual and theoretical knowledge. Being a student is being like a blotter, absorbing knowledge.

In a second view, the school emphasizes practical skills, like the 3Rs. It is a preparation place for the marketplace, and students are moulded into marketable products. This school is utilitarian oriented; usefulness in the post-school work place is the guide to curriculum. Predominant is the interest of the market.

A third view sees a school as being interested mainly in nurturing the becoming of human beings. Teachers and students are seen as individuals and as social beings. Teaching, in this case, is a leading out of students into a world of possibilities, while at the same time understanding the finiteness of the students as human beings. Modern schooling emphasizes the first and second views, giving scarce attention to this third view.

Two of Aoki's three understandings of school are rooted in modernism. View 1 represents the liberal education. View 2 emphasizes sciences and technology. View 3 is an existential philosophical perspective. What should be pointed out is that usually educational controversy was concentrated between view 1 and view 2 in the history of education. And view 3's voice has been minimized.

The enduring question for curriculum is what knowledge is of most worth. Often usefulness is the criterion of worthy knowledge. The argument centers on whether knowledge disciplined the mind, whether it was useful or ornamental, and whether it developed the moral and cultured "gentleman".

In this context, there are different meanings given to the concept of usefulness in education. Usefulness can be seen as narrowly utilitarian directly preparing for specific employment in general. It may be understood as the acquisition of knowledge which may be applied as a vocation in business, the professions, and so on. And finally, usefulness may refer

to the relation to a more intangible end, having nondirectly observable results, e.g., disciplining the mind or development of intellectual habits associated with a cultivated personality.

As I have noted before, Bonnett (1983, p. 30) criticizes these viewpoints in education. According to his opinion, they assume that the human beings' essence to be rational. It assumes, therefore, that knowledge, as a product of human beings' relationship with the world, is itself classifiable in terms of terms and categories and that each of these categories is itself a category of rationality. Through its fundamental propensity for defending and ordering, the tradition itself has become an expression of coming to dominance of the calculative essence of technology and brings with it an inevitable tendency for meditative thinking to be devalued and forgotten. Because the latter is not a way of systematically representing reality, it becomes thought of as worthless, and because its canons are not those of the rational self-assertive thinking into which the 'educated' are becoming habituated, it comes to be seen not only as worthless but also as unintelligible. This tradition subverts those enterprises which are in their true nature meditative by trying to think them in calculative terms.

Nietzsche (1872) criticized these viewpoints more than one hundred years ago. He said:

As much knowledge and education as possible; therefore the greatest possible supply and demand-hence as much happiness as possible:-that is the formula. In this case utility is made the object and goal of education, -utility in the sense of gain-the greatest possible pecuniary gain. In the quarter now under consideration culture would be defined as that point of vantage which enables one to 'keep in the van of one's age,' from which one can see all the easiest and best roads to wealth, and with which one controls all the means of communication between men and nations. The purpose of education, according to this scheme, would be to rear the most 'current' men possible, - 'current' being used here in the sense in which it is applied to the coins of the realm. The greater the number of such men, the happier a nation will be; and this precisely is the purpose of our modern educational institutions: to help every one, as far as his nature will allow, to become 'current'; to develop him so that his particular degree of knowledge and science may yield him the greatest possible amount of happiness and pecuniary gain. Every one must be able to form some sort of estimate of himself; he must know how much he may reasonably expect from life. The 'bond between intelligence and property' which this point of view postulates has almost the force of a moral principle. In this quarter all culture is loathed which isolates, which sets goals beyond gold and gain, and which require time: it is customary to dispose of such eccentric

tendencies in education as systems of 'Higher Egotism,' or of 'Immoral Culture-Epicureanism.' According to morality reigning here, the demands are quite different; what is required above all is 'rapid education,' so that a money-earning creature may be produced with all speed; there is even a desire to make this education so thorough that a creature may be reared that will be able to earn a great deal of money. Men are allowed only the precise amount of culture which is compatible with the interests of gain; but that amount, at least, is expected from them. In short: mankind has a necessary right to happiness on earth-that is why culture is necessary-but on that account alone! (pp. 508-9).

Nietzsche's critique is that education which emphasizes usefulness rears creatures who, caught within the dogmas of modern political economy, will aim to earn a great deal of money. Thus, education will come to ignore the nurturing the becoming of human beings. The result of this kind of education is 'higher egotism or epicureanism' which leads creatures to nihilism.

Eventually, emphasis on knowledge which is of most worth beckons us to docile students within a political economy system. This stream of education, from Foucault's viewpoint, orients itself to discipline. In this context, Jagodzinski (1989) agonizes:.

.... We live in an Age where the Earth is dying and the nuclear Shadow covers her face. We need an education where the wonderment of the cosmos needs to be rekindled. Unless such an education is found Jeremy, Carolyn and I will be always running. But running away from what? And to where? (p. 57).

In this chapter, I will discuss Jagodzinski's 'what'. In order to perform it, I will compose a conversation of three characters: a prude who represents liberal education, a technologist who represents usefulness, and a teacher who pursues pedagogical meanings. Through a conversation, I will reflect, from Kierkegaard's, Nietzsche's, and Heidegger's viewpoint, on scientism, technicism, and disciplinary orientation which dominate the modern school curriculum's stream. The main target will be the Korean educational situation and the forms of North American education which has enormously affected Korean education.

A. The Prude's Qulp

Teacher: Let's start talking from Alan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*. Those of us concerned about public education hear every 20 years or so something unfriendly in that tone because it sounds so elitist, so anti-pluralist, so rejecting of the young for whom we feel most responsible. As we also are troubled about the life of the mind today, we are bound to take the implicit challenge seriously.

Prude: Although the focus of Bloom's remarks is a select and narrow band of students at elite universities, he intends his discussion to be a commentary on American society itself and its drift away from communal norms. This argument against compulsory public schooling reflects the inability of public education to establish a renewed understanding of its mission in light of the weakening of its foundation.

Teacher: What does foundation mean?

Prude: This foundation is a belief in the progress of science and technology. This belief has been challenged in recent times. Few any longer believe that the extension of the scientific method will reestablish the communal norms which technology itself threatens to destroy. The objectivity and neutrality of science have been questioned not only by the religious right, but also by philosophers and scientists.

We live in an age of slack morality and self-indulgence. It is these characteristics that the best and brightest carry with them into the university and which the university has been too weak of will and neglectful of purpose to counter.

Teacher: What is the root of the problem?

Prude: The root of the problem is the language of relativism and the attempt to get "beyond good and evil."

Teacher: Does "beyond good and evil" mean Nietzsche's philosophy?

Prude: Yes, it does.

Teacher: What is the matter with it?

Prude: The result of the attempt to get "beyond good and evil" is a blase response to events that confront us. A deep admiration for the fanatic seizes the moment and carves out the universe of values. A version of Nietzsche's and German philosophy won out over the Enlightenment and the belief in a rational order of things. Creativity, authenticity, and doing one's own thing were victorious over natural law and the insight of reason. Once value claims were no longer accountable to rational deliberation, the door was opened to the popular relativism that we find today.

Teacher: To blame Nietzsche and Heidegger for the rejection of reason seems to overstep the bounds of rational argument. It is derived from too much emphasis on conservative values which ignore the individual and the meaning of becoming a human being.

Prude: The reason is simple, because they deconstruct the traditional values. Anyway, Americans have discovered relativism, but they have ignored the sense of inner despair that accompanied it.

Teacher: It seems to me that you misunderstand Nietzsche's and Heidegger's philosophy. As far as I know, their philosophies' main point is to save human being from inner despair. We have to remember that *Thus Spoke Zarathustra's* subtitle is *a book for all and none*.

What is the university's mission?

Prude: The university exists as the preserver of refined public values. The Enlightenment thinkers had a clear purpose in mind for the university. It was to provide a house for reasoned discourse where knowledge is the goal, that is, competence and reason are required of those who pursue it. Bloom's vision provides us with a prefabricated culture. The public can assimilate this culture but cannot participate in its creation. The Enlightenment

thinkers discovered the laws of nature, and it is the public's task to follow them as best it can.
When we break the laws of nature, we invite retribution.

As women break the laws of nature when they follow the temptations of feminism and as the universities do when they adopt the latest educational fad, children grow up scarred, and students graduate miseducated with their souls impoverished.

Teacher: Then, what is the purpose of education?

Prude: Education is the process of initiation into the character and ways of a democratic society. The proper initiation for the elite is an introduction to the great writings of Western civilization which have potential values.

Teacher: Do you mean education should be devoted to training the intellectual virtues?

Prude: Yes, education should be devoted to the habits resulting from the training of intellectual power.

Teacher: It looks like R. M. Hutchins' opinion: education implies teaching; teaching implies knowledge; knowledge is truth; the truth is every where the same; hence education should be everywhere the same.

You are driven by an impulse to rest education on a solid, uninterpretable basis. This is what drives you to appeal to the certainty of natural laws uncovered by Enlightenment thinkers.

Prude: Education does have a moral mission and its mission has to do with the creation of a public in a democratic society. It is that there is a preestablished standard that can be used to determine membership in the public and that it is the function of education to see that everyone is given the opportunity to learn to act in accordance with that ideal.

Teacher: Thus, do you mean that to provide a world already interpreted is to avoid the uncertainty of a world the meaning of which must continuously be interpreted and negotiated?

Prude: Yes. It is a view which tries to avoid relativism.

Teacher: But an induction into the public involves an active engagement with the material and symbols of a society and that an active engagement requires that communal symbols be connected to the meanings that are already present in the student's world. The reason for this is that a democratic public is always in the process of constituting itself and imposition of unexamined meanings retards the self-formative process.

Prude: Bloom's argument is a good warning against education which pursues a ticket to a nice job in the industrial society.

Teacher: According to this view, students are regarded as a container which should be filled. And then, what is excellence in that view?

Prude: Excellence is equated with superiority of thinking power and the power to acquire knowledge. The typical example is academic brilliance.

Teacher: Even if it is a good alarm, to pursue only knowledge does not go beyond the "bond between intelligence and property." It means that knowledge is power. It is also a kind of utilitarian viewpoint.

I agree with Maxine Greene. It is a contemporary angst strutting around in a Platonic mask. According to her, she is troubled by banality, narrow-minded materialism, and lack of commitment and concern. But she rejects "the new Bloomusalem" for another city - one of multiple voices and ever-wider dialogues - a city in which the open mind can transform the lived world (Greene, 1988, p.7).

According to Carson (1990, p. 22), the school reforms of the 1980's have basically a conservative political agenda, just as the agenda of the 1960's was largely liberal reformist. In a sense, Bloom's book emphasizes a standard which consisted of resurrecting an idealized past. It is akin to the school reforms of the 1980's.

From now on, let's talk about liberal education. Liberal education is concerned with Bloom's view. Because both of them derive from conservatism which emphasizes initiation into the ways of the public. For Oakeshott, conservatism:

is a disposition appropriate to a man who is acutely aware of having something to lose which he has learned to care for; a man in some degree rich in opportunities for enjoyment but not so rich that he can afford to be indifferent to loss. . . . To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss (1962, p. 168).

In light of this view, I agree with Carson's (1990) argument that the eighties reforms reflected the conservative interest both in their emphasis on market forces, on standardization, efficiency and accountability, as well as in their solutions, which consisted mainly of resurrecting an idealized past, enhanced by some modern technology.

One of the oldest and most persistent problems in education is liberal versus useful education (Kimball, 1986, p. 575). There is a variety of theoretical, or philosophical tensions that have appeared in the debate between liberal education and that host of other kinds of education that are often grouped together and associated with utility. The contentions are that useful is more important than liberal, that liberal is better than useful, that useful is actually liberal, and that liberal is actually useful. Bloom's argument can be categorized into one of these.

Please, tell me its lineage.

Prude: According to Horace, from the Homeric period down to the fifth century B. C., the Greeks did not differentiate between productive or practical arts that were theoretical or ornamental: The word *tekhnē* applied to all. By the fourth century B. C., this distinction had begun to appear, especially in the works of Aristotle, who distinguished between art and science along those lines. Aristotle was inconsistent in using these terms, but he, and Plato to a lesser

extent, are commonly regarded as the source of the distinction about utility that is thought to found the debate between liberal education and careers.

By the fourth century B. C., the Greek word *banausos*, referring originally to things of fire or the forge, has come to mean "mechanical," "technical," or "vulgar"; while *eleutherios* (liberal) was applied to affairs of the free citizen with wealth and opportunity for leisure. Taking up these terms in the *Politics*, Aristotle maintains that arts pursued during leisure must be higher than those of work because people work in order to obtain leisure. Arts of work are therefore studied for the sake of those of leisure. Aristotle then distinguishes, according to his systematic schema of knowledge, between arts that are useful in the most immediate sense and those that pertain to moral virtue or to highest goodness, meaning the pursuit of knowledge for its sake. It is these latter arts, he concludes, that are higher and thus should occupy one's leisure time. And from Aristotle, this distinction between practical arts and gentlemanly arts was transmitted and repeated in the subsequent tradition about liberal education.

Teacher: What is the criterion in distinguishing liberal arts from others?

Prude: Notwithstanding that continuity of argument about liberal arts being gentlemanly arts for leisure, we need not conclude that utility has been the primary, or even actual, criterion in distinguishing liberal arts from others. Aristotle, in the *Politics*, proceeds to declare that certain useful arts may also be liberal and vice versa. Whether a discipline is a means to an end is not the determining factor. Rather, Aristotle states, arts may be declared *banausoi*, instead of *eleutherioi*, if they exhibit any of four characteristics: (1) if they degrade the body or mind, (2) if they are pursued for profit or gain, (3) if they are "specialized" in the sense of keeping the mind preoccupied on a narrow topic, or (4) if they are pursued insincerely, that is, out of constraint or on the insistence of others and not due to sincere, personal need or the desire to be virtuous.

Teacher: The concept of arts degrading the body or mind can be traced to the *Republic*, where Plato asserts practically the same point, a view presupposing the neat division of the

human being into body and soul, or mind. Similarly, Plato divides the arts into those of the soul and those of the body and asserts that the former are to be preferred over the latter, because the highest human goal is contemplation of the divine.

Prude: This distinction of psychology, so to speak, is a central Platonic legacy in the Western tradition of education and has pervasively and persistently served to distinguish arts called liberal from other kinds.

Teacher: When did utility become an important issue?

Prude: It was only after the empiricism of John Locke that utility became an important issue in regard to liberal education. Empiricism amounted to denying the long-standing dualism of body/mind by emphasizing sensory experience and denying transcendent ideas. From this perspective, the contemporary discussion about the relationship between "experiential education" and the liberal arts would appear to be closer to the root philosophical issues.

A reason for the semantic difference in common debate may arise from another way to treat the distinction between body and mind, or soul. In other words, a liberal art is a pursuit rationalized in terms of systematic principles, whereas a mechanical art is one that does not involve reflection on its principles, but rather is concerned solely about the desired effect. Under this interpretation, professional education is aligned with liberal education and rationality, and utility is associated with the material and the exterior.

Teacher: How is this to be reconciled with the assertion that useful arts may be liberal?

Prude: It is derived from the point that arts that are profitable and gainful may also prepare the mind for higher reflection and contemplation of the truth, which is the goal of education for the free citizen. Implicit are the assumptions that arts always have ends, goals, and purpose and that such ends can be differentiated according to whether they elevate the mind above or degrade it toward material pursuits. This was Plato's and Aristotle's view.

Teacher: If it is so, can any discipline be liberal arts?

Prude: According to Aristotle's distinction between liberal and illiberal arts, not every discipline can be. A study that is "specialized" and keeps the mind preoccupied on a narrow topic will also tend to degrade the mind in the sense that such a study delimits the mind to ends-in-view rather than encouraging it to contemplate unseen ends. Aristotle's view was particularly linked to the root meaning of free citizens and of citizens with leisure. The value of leisure transcends the mere opportunity for study afforded by free time from labor. Leisure means that one has no end in view. In contrast, a specialized study would constrain the mind by preventing it from pursuing a given line of thought beyond the bounds of the speciality. For instance, a law student who becomes fascinated with the topic of ecology in the course of working on the subject of environmental law is not free to drop the legal study in order to pursue the new interest. This restriction is why such an education cannot be called liberal.

Teacher: In this respect, liberal education is concerned with how and why a person is studying rather than with the subject matter being studied.

Prude: Even admitting that, however, liberal education has historically more often been distinguished from professional, vocational, technical, and mechanical education by the breadth of its curriculum, by the uncoerced motives required for its study, by the leisure time required of its students, but most of all by its purported devotion to mind or soul to the exclusion of the sensory and material world (Cheit, 1975, p.2).

Teacher: As you say, it is a Platonic legacy which divides human being into body and soul. In Plato's philosophy, the idea is to constitute its essence. Idea is the Being of the being. Idea is construed as the whole of Being. Being, as idea or essence, is then separated from the being; the "on becoming" distinct from the phenomenon. The phenomenon is looked upon as mere appearance, as semblance, and as unreality. Being is exalted by Platonism to a suprasensory realm, that is, somewhere on high, and at the same time the phenomenon world was degraded and declared to be one of mere appearance. Idea is an ideal serving as a

prototype or copies. The distinction between idea and semblance inevitably implies a preference for the former over the latter and a corresponding evaluation. Liberal education is to pursue the Platonic idea. From Heidegger's perspective, the result of liberal education becomes nihilistic because human beings deal with values; instead of responding to Being they are simply engaging themselves with mere things.

In an actual school situation, liberal education is expressed in the forms of knowledge. According to Hirst (1965, p.122), knowledge is separable into a number of distinct forms: mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy, and moral knowledge. The forms of knowledge, or disciplines are another expression of subject matter.

Prude: These forms of knowledge are not mere collections of information but rather complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved. Hirst (1965) says:

... by form of knowledge is meant a distinctive way in which our experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public symbols. The symbols thus have public meaning, their use is in some way testable against experience and there is the progressive development of a series of tested symbolic expressions. In this way experience has been probed further and further by extending and elaborating the use of the symbols and by means of these it has become possible for the personal experience of individuals to become more fully structured, more fully understood. The various forms of knowledge can be seen in low level developments within the common area of our knowledge of the everyday world. From this there branch out the developed forms which, taking certain elements in our common knowledge as a basis, have grown in distinctive ways (p. 128).

Teacher: What are the criteria with which Hirst catalogued the forms of knowledge?

Prude: The developed forms of knowledge possess distinguishing features:

- (1) They each involve certain central concepts that are peculiar in character to the form. For example, those of gravity, acceleration, hydrogen, and photo-synthesis characteristic of the sciences; number, integral, and matrix in mathematics; God, sin, and predestination in religion; right, good, and wrong in moral knowledge (pp.128-9).
- (2) In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts that denote, if perhaps in a very complex way, certain aspects of experience, form a network of possible relationships in which experience can be understood. As a result the

form has a distinctive logical structure. For example, the terms and statements of mechanics can be meaningfully related in certain strictly limited ways only, and the same is true of historical explanation (p. 129).

(3) The form, by virtue of its particular terms and logic, has expressions or statements. . . that in some way or other, however indirect it may be, are testable against experience. Each form has distinctive expressions that are testable against experience in accordance with particular criteria that are peculiar to the form (p.129).

(4) The forms have developed particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions, for instance the techniques of sciences and those of the various literary arts. The result has been the amassing of all the symbolically expressed knowledge that we now have in the arts and the sciences (p.129).

The implications of this view for the school curriculum are pretty clear. Syllabuses and curricula must be constructed so as to introduce students as far as possible into the interrelated aspects of each of the basic forms of knowledge, each of the several disciplines. And they must be constructed to cover at least in some measure the range of knowledge as a whole.

Teacher: Aoki (1990) describes a school which emphasizes this view as follows:

View 1 is a school given primarily to "rational thinking," a school where the curriculum emphasizes intellectual skills. The curriculum likely will be a thinking curriculum. It is a school that understands a teacher or students as split into mind and body. Teaching is seen essentially as mind-building, accomplished by filling containers with factual and theoretical knowledge; being a student is being like a blotter, absorbing knowledge, the more the better and the faster, the better as the assessment people get closer (P. 40).

This orientation ignored the insights offered by phenomenology, hermeneutics, the Marxian tradition, and especially the existential point of view.

Prude: As liberal education's view is that education is the development of mind through the acquisition of knowledge, it emphasizes the cognitive component of knowledge and abstract and theoretical knowledge which neglects practical knowledge.

Teacher: Its attempt to set up literature and fine arts which are in their nature meditative as a form of knowledge is to try to think them in calculative terms. According to liberal education, the arts are properly characterized as somehow making statements which can be assessed for

their truth or falsity according to socially devised criteria and that these lend them objectivity and provide their justification for a place in a liberal education. I think that this is pure rationalistic dogma. It assumes that human being's essence is to define and represent things to oneself as against letting them shine forth as they are through participation in them. Like all metaphysical positions it pays no attention to its warrant for setting things up in its way, for in its oblivion of Being it overlooks the fact that it represents a particular relationship with Being at all.

Prude: The legacy from the past consisting of curricula as comprised today is not simply to be dismissed overnight. The reasons for the existence of curricula may be difficult to unearth and state in exact terms, but I find it hard to believe that there are no good reasons as to why curricula of this type remain with us today.

Teacher: What is a problem then is that it ignores questions concerning the historically and socially determined production, reproduction that legitimates knowledge, and fails to realize that knowledge reflects the interests of the dominant group in a society at a particular time.

Liberal education sees theoretical knowledge as superior to practical knowledge. Let's reflect on what theory is from a Heideggerian viewpoint. According to Dreyfus (1981, pp. 510-1), in Plato's time *theoria* meant contemplation, seeing the systematic order of all of reality. It was all implicit as soon as the Greeks came to believe that the theoretical, detached attitude was our fundamental access to reality.

There are five features of theory according to Dreyfus. The first is objectification. Objectification starts when Plato posits ideas as ideal objects over against a knower who, while not yet understood as a subject, is already understood as other than these ideas that he contemplates.

The second is the attempt to make everything explicit. Socrates had a passion for getting people to articulate completely the principles by which they lived. He has gone to the poets and asked them to tell him what it is that their poetry means in precise prose and they

cannot do it. He concludes that they understand nothing of what they say. The trouble with the poets is that they cannot make explicit and justify the principles expressed in their poetry.

The third is that theory, by making everything explicit, takes it out of context. It belongs to the very essence of theory that the theorist must decontextualize one's subject matter.

The fourth is that theory always forms a system or a whole. Theory decontextualizes its object in order to recontextualize it, but, whereas the old context was implicit and open, the new context is explicit and complete - publicly shared commitments and the everyday perceptual world are replaced by an abstract system of ideas.

The final feature is what Heidegger calls seeing the world as a picture. It takes a long time for this aspect of theory to emerge, but in the Classical Age the subject stands outside of and over against whatever it is one knows, and sees it as an objective, explicit, context-free, total picture. According to Heidegger, Plato's introduction of theory was already implicitly nihilistic.

Prude: Liberal education is initiation into worthwhile activities, understood in terms of traditional modes of understanding (theory). It is the ability to participate in a conversation which distinguishes the human being from the animal and the civilized mankind from the barbarian.

Teacher: Thus, such a view of education is conservatism which emphasizes the value of current institutions and traditions, and of continuity. It does not leave room which the meaning of "becoming a human being" goes into.

B. The Scientific Technologist's Blueprint

Teacher: In modern society, science and technology influence issues that we deal with individually and as members of society. Societal needs and concerns often influence technological problem solving and scientific inquiry. They influence education so that science

and technology are emphasized in education. At the commonsense level, what is the distinction between science and technology?

S. T.: Science is the process of answering questions that arise from curiosity about natural phenomena. Science orders our knowledge of the natural world, and allows us to predict the outcome of natural events. Technology, on the other hand, is the process of using scientific knowledge and other resources to develop products and processes. When we engage in technology, we attempt to solve practical problems in order to meet the needs of an individual or society. An engineering approach rather than a scientific approach is used in technology.

Science and technology interact and advance one another. Scientific principles frequently contribute to the development of technological devices and processes. These technologies, in turn, may identify significant questions that lead to the discovery of other scientific principles. Sometimes a technological device or process is developed without knowledge of the scientific principle behind it. This technology may then lead to the discovery of new scientific principles.

Teacher: What is emphasized throughout the science program in schools?

S. T.: Learning to understand natural objects and events, and to apply knowledge gained to a variety of real life situations is emphasized throughout the science program. Today's society requires that students are active investigators, possessing the critical and creative thinking skills that will enable them to interpret and evaluate information gathered through the senses. A focus on the nature of science and the inquiry process will enable students to understand the way in which scientific knowledge is gathered, as well as this knowledge in conducting investigations of their own.

Teacher: You say that education focuses on the nature of science. What is the nature of science?

S. T.: It is too difficult for me to define the nature of science. What I said means that learning activities used throughout the science program will enable the students to recognize, for example, that science is a disciplined way to develop explanations for the events and objects of the natural world; how scientific knowledge is gathered through observation and experiment; why scientific knowledge is not certain, but based on theory which may change as additional evidence accumulates; that science is comprised not only of an accumulated body of knowledge, but also of the processes by which that knowledge is developed.

Teacher: Is the relationship between science and technology emphasized throughout the science program in schools?

S. T.: Science and technology combine to affect almost every aspect of our lives. The science program provides for an understanding of what science and technology are, and how they interact in producing familiar products and processes.

Teacher: What does the science program enable students to recognize about technology?

S. T.: They will recognize that, for example, technology is concerned with the solution of practical problems; that significant aspects of the technological problem-solving process include approaching a problem in a planned way and developing a practical design as a means to support alternative ideas for solving a problem; various technologies as they are used in practical situations.

It goes without saying that science and technology are the backbone of industrial society. It is natural that science and technology are emphasized in education.

Teacher: There is a good example in Korea. As the government promoted modernization through industrialization, science and technology education was given a heavier weight in the curriculum at all stages. The direction of the school curriculum assumes that the epoch in which children will be active is an information saturated industrial society derived from

the expansion of knowledge and the development of science and technology. To make children live successfully in this epoch, what we should teach is definite. In short, scientific technology is emphasized in curriculum. I think this recognition stems from the assumption that education be regarded as an instrument. This recognition itself is a form of technological thinking.

Anyway, let's talk about the scientific technology of education. Our contemporary images of science and technology are much more sleek. And these images have penetrated contemporary education. In education we talk about diagnosis and prescription, of entry and exit skills, of the use of token economics, and of feedback loops for inputs that fail to meet specifications when they become output. Such talk reminds me of Eisner(1984) who told a story of a conversation between a senior officer of a large corporation and a new business school graduate.

"Sir, I think that by bringing up a small model to simulate aggregate income-expenditure alternatives over various time frames, by integrating those results with appropriate Z B B reviews to assess minimum core expenditure levels, and then by relating to managers in an M B O framework, we can get this administration moving again," said the young colleague with eagerness and authority.

The senior man gazed out the window, pondered the words so redolent with modern technology, then spoke:

"Shut up,": he explained (p. 35).

Maybe, you want to call the young colleague's expression rational mentality.

S. T.: That's true. What is the matter with it? Do you remember that Thorndike said:

A complete science of psychology would tell every fact about everyone's intellect and character and behavior, would tell the cause of every change in human nature, would tell the result which every educational force-every act of every person that changed any other or the agent himself would have. It would aid us to use human beings for the world's welfare with the same surety of the result that we now have when we use falling bodies or chemical elements. In proportion we get such a science, we shall become masters of our souls as we now are masters of heat and light. Progress toward such a science is being made (Thorndike, 1910, p. 168)

What we can see here is an expression of faith in the power of scientific inquiry to determine the future and thus to enable human beings to create a better, more predictable world. To have a science of education is to know how and why. A scientific technology of education would reduce noise in the system and make the system more systematic, more efficient. Hence, it gives the taxpayers the products they wanted: schools that produce.

Teacher: Scientific technology is an ideology because any perspective one embraces comes replete with values and assumptions about what is valid, trustworthy, what methods are legitimate, and what counts as evidence. And it helps determine the ends that are worth pursuing. If an aim cannot be accommodated within the dominant ideology, it is dropped from view.

S. T.: There are some assumptions in the effort to build a science of education. These will help you to understand our effort. Do you think that education can become a discipline in its own right? I think it is rather an area of study and the most promising way to study that area is through the social science disciplines.

Teacher: But the concepts that constitute theory in social sciences were not designed for educational phenomena. Such a theory illuminates what education has in common with other phenomena rather than what is unique about schools, classrooms, teaching or curriculum. As I pointed out the problem of theory in the dialogue with the prude, theories alienate teachers from the actual educational situation.

By the way, what are other assumptions in your effort?

S. T.: What we can learn through research about learning will be less ambiguous if the units treated are segmented and small. Once these small units are brought under control, variables can be isolated, effective educational treatments identified and then a technology of educational practice can be built. A prescriptive educational science will make the prediction

and control of human behavior possible, and such achievements are educationally desirable: the more prediction and control, the better.

Teacher: Since the believability of the conclusions of research is no more than the reliability of the instruments used, the instruments used to measure need to be very reliable indeed. It means that what is educationally significant but difficult to measure or observe is replaced with what is insignificant but comparatively easy to measure or observe. Hence, we have a spate of studies that use the majestic to treat the trivial that their practical utility is next to nil. Your effort's tacit assumption is that such knowledge is cumulative and independent of context.

S. T.: If we pursue effectiveness of education, in education the scientific technological orientation is unavoidable. One reason for the popularity of scientific technology in education is its compatibility with the "effective schools" movement. The effective schools movement was particularly prominent in the last two decades. As their name implies, it provided a definition of the characteristics of the effective schools. Among these characteristics were such elements as clarity of academic goals, emphasis on basic skills, direct teaching (teachers assuming a clear responsibility for taking charge of the learning process; expository, teacher-telling methods), and frequent monitoring and evaluation of student progress. Scientific technology has provided ways for effective schools advocates to create these classroom conditions.

Teacher: Your talk reminds me of Bloom's mastery learning. His theory grounds his work in behavioral science with its emphasis on quantitative, empirical research and the objective verification of the effectiveness of any intervention strategy. He seeks to use the investigatory methods of the social sciences to derive scientifically proven principles and theory to guide practice in schools. He has little faith in personal experience-based conclusions about what is going on in classrooms or will work with students. Instead, his focus is on conducting objective, statistically verifiable tests of reality, and then letting the data speak for themselves.

There is a fundamental optimism in Bloom. The teaching act is clearly understandable. This understanding comes from the scientific, controlled study of the process of teaching and learning. Out of this study, just as in other disciplines, are developed tested principles and theories. There is created a science of teaching. Science makes the outcomes of teaching predictable. Science makes good teaching replicable. Scientific tests can provide practical, results-oriented answers for all of us to employ. A corollary to this optimism about the possibility of finding a teaching approach that works is the faith that with proper teaching all children can and will learn.

A major responsibility for a teacher within this model is to be very clear on the learning objectives for students. The teacher needs to resolve the question of what exactly students are to learn so that everyone concerned knows what is expected, and also to give direction to instructional and evaluative activities.

S. T.: You are too skeptical toward the scientific method based on quantification of phenomena. It is important that science enables us to create a richer reality than those of culture without science. For instance, the Bushman and the Indian peasant have not been cowed by science. . . They have failed in culture: in making a picture of the universe rich enough: subtle enough--one that they can work with and live by beyond the level of the Stone Age. What then, is your alternative?

Teacher: You are right. By any practical, civilized standards, science has enabled human beings to create a rich, complex reality founded in sensate awareness. But I counter your quotation with the following story:

A student, travelling one day in the country, came upon a farmer who was watering a large vegetable garden in a very curious manner. He had laid out ditches as if for a regular irrigation project. Then he took an earthen pot, climbed down into his well, filled it, and walked back, puffing with exertion and clutching the pot in his arms, to empty it into one of the ditches.

The student watched him do this several times, with great labor but very little effect. Then he spoke to the farmer kindly. "You know," he said, "there is a sort of mechanism you could use, that would water a hundred gardens like yours in a single day. It requires very little effort to accomplish a great deal. Wouldn't you like to use it?"

The farmer looked up at him and asked, "How does it work?"

"You cut a wooden beam so that it is heavy behind and light in front. Using it as a lever you can lift water as easily as if you were scooping it up in your hand, and as rapidly as boiling water flows over the sides of a kettle."

The farmer laughed scornfully and said, "I have been taught that in order to produce mechanical devices, there must be elaborate contriving, and that elaborate contriving requires an artful mind. When the mind is artful, one's natural character can no longer maintain its integrity, and peace of mind is impossible. . . I know well enough the sort of device you are talking about, but I would be ashamed to use it." (Quoted in Creel, 1953, p. 5)

What this story says is that there is something that goes beyond the realm of technology. I embrace scientific technology as an indispensable way of thinking, while at the same time I want to argue against scientific technology's metaphysics. Metaphysics here refers not to an abstract academic discipline but rather to the prevailing presuppositions and concrete interpretations of reality which uniquely stamp an age. It is inherent in the metaphysical way of ordering or destining our view of nature and human being that it drives out every other possibility of revealing.

S. T.: What is the point of what you want to say?

Teacher: What I really want to do is to invite you to Heideggerian thinking in order to share a meditation with you. You will be bored by my tedious and long talk.

S. T.: That's O.K. Begin your talk.

Teacher: According to Heidegger, the scientific attitude is a function of a human being's view of the world as such and of the interpretation of the way of beings encountered within the world. In other words, it is grounded in a philosophical attitude or stance by which a human being interprets the whole of one's experience (Richardson, 1964, p.511). Since meditation on beings as beings is called metaphysics, the philosophical attitude is in effect a metaphysical

attitude. It is with the metaphysical attitude implied in the modern scientific attitude that Heidegger finds fault, rather than with the attitude itself.

S. T.: Let me know this more in detail.

Teacher: The scientific method implies that the scientist conceives of oneself as a subject and of the beings with which one deals in research as objects that are posed before one to be investigated. This relationship between the scientist and the research material is made possible only by antecedent projection of a blueprint of the being under investigation, and it is only to the extent that the being conforms to this projected blueprint it becomes an object at all. In other words, the antecedent project filters out every element in a being that makes it what it is, except that aspect by which it becomes an object for the scientific gaze. Since the object-ness of the phenomenon under investigation is the only aspect of it that is relevant for the scientist in terms of the rigor of one's method, the risk is that the phenomenon is, for the scientist, only relevant to the extent that it is an object to be measured in research. The method of science requires, thus, a metaphysical attitude that sees the beings encountered in the world to be no more than objects for a subject.

S. T.: Why should this be a matter for criticism?

Teacher: In the simplest terms: because for Heidegger reality is much more than that, an agglomeration of subjects and objects. If everything that "is" becomes pressed into the categories of subject and object, then something in them is lost—the wondrous depth, the beauty, the deep-down freshness (non-objectifiable) of things is overlooked. The marvelous mystery of their presence to human being, of human being's presence to them, even of human being's presence to oneself and to the world, is disregarded. It is this presence of beings (including human being) that Heidegger understands by their Being, that which accounts for the fact that they *are* (present), the "Is" of what is. In short, with the emergence of the subject-object polarity, the Being of beings is forgotten. For the scientist as for the metaphysician, to

neglect Being as *aletheia* (the process of revelation), is to overlook the mystery of Presence which surrounds and permeates the scientist and reduces beings to the level of so many empty shells of object-ness, moved about and controlled like pawns in a game. It is against the impoverishment of science that Heidegger protests, not against its unquestionable wealth.

S. T.: Is the impoverishment connected with nihilism?

Teacher: Impoverishment, as he sees it, has taken a terrible toll on contemporary society. For this we have to turn to Nietzsche and his testimony on nihilism. But according to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, values had become currency as an attempt to ascribe importance to beings once their genuine source of importance, their Being, was forgotten in the subjectivism of Descartes. Thus value became the goal of all intercourse with beings. Soon the intercourse was considered as culture, the values as cultural values, the goal of all human creativity, which, in turn, is placed at the service of human being in achieving certitude of oneself as a subject. From here it was easy to reduce values themselves to the level of mere objects submitted to human being's control in an effort to establish a special place for oneself in the world conceived as a collective object. At this point, values become as shallow and empty as the mere objectness they mask. Nietzsche deeply experienced this emptiness. For Nietzsche, values had ceased to have any meaning, and since he took God to be the symbol of the entire hierarchy of values of which He was necessarily the head, God himself was dead. Since values meant nothing at all, Nietzsche could speak of this nothingness of values as a nihilism. In this context, the scientific attitude, to the extent that it fed upon the deicidal subjectivism, must share the blame for God's demise.

The tragedy of it was, however, that Nietzsche himself could not break the iron circle (Richardson, 1968, p.527). In trying to overcome the nihilism of values, which was grounded in a metaphysics that had forgotten Being (*aletheia*), Nietzsche himself fell into merely another type of subjectism. In Nietzsche, beings were still conceived as objects. The result was a new

nihilism all the more profound. This type of nihilism, where forgetfulness of Being masquerades as technological progress, Heidegger calls "technicity". It is such a nihilism, forgetfulness of Being (*aletheia*), that Heidegger himself is striving to overcome through meditation on the meaning of Being.

S. T.: What is technology in Heideggerian sense?

Teacher: As you said, technology is a human activity. Technology is a means to an end. These definitions are so correct that they apply to the older handwork technology as well as to modern technology. This instrumental definition in a sense brings us into a particular relationship with technology. By perceiving it as a means to an end, we relate technology by wanting to control it.

S. T.: But what if our understanding of technology were different?

Teacher: We must go beyond the instrumental if we are to grasp the essence of technology. Heidegger (1977, p. 12) says that technology is a way of revealing. Although this revealing of technology would seem to be a positive way in that technology can allow us to see and use nature in new ways, he sees a danger in the way that this revealing takes place. The manner in which the revealing is done is in an ordered, scientific way. The nature which exists "out there" is seen as a "standing reserve", there for the ordered use by human beings. This inevitably puts nature into a particular frame of reference for us. He calls it "enframing".

The ultimate danger of this "enframing" is that human beings begin to perceive everything around them as a "standing reserve" as something that is ready for use in an ordered, means/end manner. This "enframing" keeps us from actually coming to understand the true essence of anything. We begin to perceive all things and even human beings in terms of "readiness" for use. It conceals the essence of things and keeps us from ever encountering things as they truly are. This, of course, is true of the way in which we eventually encounter ourselves as well.

It is also a forgetfulness of Being. Technology is deeply connected with nihilism.

There are other ways of revealing - especially a revealing that lets be what something is be. According to Heidegger, *Techne* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. *Techne* belongs to bringing forth; it is something poetic. Therefore *techne* has a poetic quality to it. Just as a poem can bring forth the truth of a moment, so the word *techne* connotes a bringing forth. Technology can be perceived as a revealing which is a bringing forth the essence of something (*aletheia*). Thus

of technology can be "freeing". In other words, the essence of technology enables nature as it truly is. In this sense it is an "opening up".

S. T.: So, is your endeavor to liberate ourselves from technology, to give ourselves the liberty of assuming or not assuming technology, to utilize it perhaps for something different, or to wholly overthrow it in order to pursue a pre-technological existence?

Teacher: No, what is at stake is neither to change nor to refuse technology. What is at stake is Truth (Being), to which human being in one's deepest essence is destined. The return to an origin is necessary in order for us to find a ground upon which technology can be understood.

CHAPTER IV

BEYOND THE BLINDNESS OF EDUCATION: Authentic human being in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger

We understand ourselves in an everyday way. . . not authentically in the strict sense of the word, not steadfastly from the most proper and uttermost possibilities of our own existence, but inauthentically. We understand ourselves, to be sure, but such that we do not have ourselves for our own, as we have lost in the everydayness of existing into things and men. Not authentically means: that we are at bottom not able to be ourselves for our own. Yet this Being-lost has no negatively evaluated meaning but means something positive, something which belongs to Dasein itself. The average self-understanding of Dasein takes the self as inauthentic. This inauthentic self-understanding of Dasein signifies totally and absolutely not an impure self-understanding. Just the opposite: this everyday self-being with factually existing, passionate dealings with things can be very pure indeed, whereas all extravagant burrowing into the soul can be in the highest degree impure, or even eccentric and pathological (Heidegger, 1976, p. 228).

Over the last decade there have been reports on the sorry state of education. A few brief excerpts suffice to set the tone:

The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 9).

American schools are in trouble. In fact, the problems of schooling are of such crippling proportions that many schools may not survive. It is possible that our entire public education system is nearing collapse (Goodlad, 1984, p. 1).

Whatever the issue at hand, it was concluded that the condition of education does not seem to be a healthy one. Similar statements regarding the training of teachers can be found in recent reports. Upon reflection, none of these complaints about education is very new. The focus shifts; that is, yesterday it was science, today it is basic to getting students to think critically

and solve problems. Apparently, we have always had a crisis in education. Perhaps no age has thought its education good enough.

The complaint about education is derived from that what we would regard as the function of the school. Today, our schools are increasingly expected to play a key role in intentional social change. Thus, the achievement of valued and explicit social purposes of an immediate utilitarian character has been assigned as the central function of schools. They are expected to bring about explicit improvements in a troubled society, to save "a nation at risk". That is why school curricula emphasize science and technology.

Students, at the height of science and technology face the world as a field for their activities, their hunting grounds. Everything in the world is considered as related to human being. The earth does not appear as earth to them but always as the object, or the multitude of objects, for exploitation. Being for them is placed forward and related to them objectively. Being is being-represented.

In this context, the educational system is regarded as the equalizer of free society. Success could be achieved by intelligence, hard work, and creativity. Students who are more capable are awarded their right rewards, excluding those who are less able. This tendency makes education enhance the eminentism mentioned in Chapter I. The result is that students pursue power as in the story that the novel's hero recollected in Chapter I.

The hero sees the meaning of his life in complete domination or ruling of the world. The world is for his use and exploitation, and this exploitation is the meaning of human life. The meaning of the world is derived from human being, and the meaning of human being is placed in the conquering of the world. This reciprocal relation of world and human being is a meaningless circle.

The remarkable utilitarian power attributed to schooling signifies a growing paralysis of displacement of responsibility for facing our mounting individual problems. We have lost faith in our vaunted ability to control our own fates as the son-in-law ill-used his wife.

The son-in-law is speeding toward the extreme of his subjectivity to hold the world completely in his hands. He believes he will then be fully man. If indeed he is not seizing the world any longer, who is he? What is his meaning? By regarding his exterior, e. g., marriage, the emptiness of the son-in-law expresses itself in the rating of his worth.

In Nietzsche's sense, we fall into the "herd". The "herd" does not want to assume responsibility for its existence. It would prefer to believe that God grants the ultimate meaning to human life, and, even if belief in such a God is lacking, it would believe that real responsibility involves slavish obedience to whatever norms and standards are in force at the moment. For Nietzsche, responsibility arises only if a person takes over the burden of giving oneself meaning for one's own life.

And the result of the utilitarian view of education is, in Kierkegaard's sense, "mere existence" which is with "externals". To be with the externals, the crowd is to be, the professor with one's tenure, the businessman with the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the financier with the exchange rate, the clergy with the collection box, the homeowner with the mortgage payments, the spouse with the partner's constancy, the lover with the beloved's devotion, the resident with the neighbour's gossip, the individual with the other's opinion.

Nietzsche's notion of the "herd" and Kierkegaard's "mere existence" are similar to Heidegger's "they" (*das Man*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger begins to analyze human existence at the level of everyday life. According to him, I (ego) inhabits the everyday world. Interpreting oneself as an ego is a kind of self-objectification which conceals the fact that we are really finite openness. Since we understand ourselves as separate objects in need of

gratification and security, we tend to manipulate people and things. The everyday self is, thus, egoistical. When this everyday egoism is intensified, we become inauthentic.

In this egoism or self-objectification of everyday life, I understand myself according to the expectations of the "they":

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise, we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find shocking what *they* find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness (Heidegger, 1962, p. 164).

Dasein as the "they" is not its own self, but the self as another. It is not a self-reliant being. The "they" goes to work at one's appointed hour. After work one looks for some sort of entertainment or relaxation. In one's life there are no problems because these problems are solved by the "they". One must take it easy and live comfortably following the rules of the "they". Under the rules of the "they" it is easier to live because one depends on another; one is secured in another, and finally nobody is responsible.

The "they" is nothing definite since it differs somewhat for each person. Each of us lets oneself be guided by the judgements and attitudes of others. Each of us is the "they" insofar as we glibly pass along ideas and opinions which we have not really made our own. The "they" has only as much power as I give to it. It is not a group of people but a way in which individuals exist.

Everydayness is the egoism whose two main traits are self-objectification and selfishness. Egoism is unavoidable. Because I tend to conceal my Being, I tend to interpret my self as a thing. I encourage this tendency because I find it difficult to accept my finitude and shoulder the responsibility of freedom. In seeking gratification, I often regard people and things as objects to be manipulated. This selfishness is the ordinary way in which I try to make myself "mine".

Where is the way to go beyond the utilitarian view of education which is deeply connected with nihilism? To find the way, we must eliminate the false bifurcation between education and life. Merton (1965) said:

Life consists in learning to live on one's own, spontaneous and free wheeling: to do this one must recognize one's own - be familiar and at home with oneself. . The purpose of education is to show a person how to define himself authentically and spontaneously in relation to one's world - not to impose a prefabricated definition of the world, still less an arbitrary definition of the individual himself (p. 3).

For him education meant the existential voyage of self-discovery in the world. This is not the narcissistic idea of freedom and self-fulfillment so prevalent in our society. It is an engagement at a much deeper level.

In our own time the obsession with technological training has all but destroyed the potential for that inwardness that recognizes the purpose of our existence here, namely, to find our true selves. And for this we cannot look to our educational situation which bid us only to consume more.

What I want to say is that education is gradual learning to live appropriately through seeing things as they are. In this chapter I will discuss the meaning of authenticity and truth as a way of approaching the meaning of authentic education.

A. Kierkegaard's Inwardness

For Kierkegaard, inwardness, with which Christianity is identified, is opposed to "externality". It is noticeable that inward and self, and external and world, are used as cognate terms. Inwardness and externality are spatial metaphors. In this context inwardness corresponds to the "self" and is predicated as infinite, while externality corresponds to the

"world" and is qualified as finite. Though such conceptual formulation is intellectually legitimate, it tends to regard the self and the world as two heterogeneous principles.

Externality frequently denotes the absence of conscience. It signifies the refusal to act on the basis of one's own conscience and the temptation to ward off the impingement on oneself of spirit. In a human world, these impersonal options are embodied in institutions, associations, organizations, and crowds. These are not negative in themselves. They are depicted unfavorably only because the human being tends to revert to them for the express purpose of dodging the strenuous task of becoming the single individual.

Insofar as conscience is the direct link to the Eternal, whose demands might be perversely judged too heavily by the individual, the natural thing to do is to seek help elsewhere, relying "on the outside" in the world. This practice of reverting to the external is what Kierkegaard denounces. It is the manner of existing that must at all costs be avoided.

Yet, to extricate oneself from the lures of the world is understandably difficult for the mass of mankind. It is common knowledge that "united we stand, divided we fall." More is stronger than fewer. This conviction is even more compelling when applied to human groups.

Reasoning proceeds that since a group of people is composed of human beings, then the group too is human. But Kierkegaard (1962, p. 112) disagrees. According to him, a crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders the individual completely impatient and irresponsible, or at least weakens one's sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction. For crowd is an abstraction.

The emphasis is placed on individuality in opposition to group activity because one's sense of personal responsibility, when one acts in a group, is not as sharply felt as when acting alone. In any given venture, how bold we often feel when accompanied by others. The individual then entertains a feeling of invulnerability, as if one cannot be the unmistakable target of any attack whatever. There is a feeling of being protected by others. Further, this is the

manner in which each member of the group reacts. Who, then, is doing the protecting?

Kierkegaard's response is "no one".

Corresponding to individuality is responsibility. This is so because the individual's active concern is with the absolute that is independent of human being's thinking. Furthermore, this absolute is "the unconditional" which does not cease to be necessary. In fact, to live in the unconditional is impossible to human being. But on the other hand, without relating oneself to the unconditional, human being cannot in the deepest sense be said to live. He may continue perhaps to live, but spiritlessly.

In asserting that the eternal concern of the individual is with the absolute, one is in the same breath relegating pleasure, pain, and desire to peripheral roles in one's existence. One is also claiming that the individual excludes comparison with others. In this context responsibility involves both one's neighbour and the supreme value. The individual considers foregoing the satisfaction of pleasure, determines to endure the torments of pain, and decides to waive the favor of desire, in order to do what is unconditionally worthwhile. Yet, as long as one is a natural organism, an animal bent on sustaining its organic functions, engaged in the process of being alive, one will continue to respond favorably to pleasure, to recoil from pain. Further, in relating oneself to the unconditional, he excludes comparison with others. Indeed, to compare oneself with another is to confer validity on oneself based on mere relative values.

The individual involved in the activity of inward deepening is therefore in virtual struggle between the ego-centricity of the natural human being and the personal response of the single individual to the concrete promptings of the absolute. What is involved in inwardness is a growing capacity on the part of the individual not only to distinguish between one's organic dependence, but the sustained effort to live out this recognition. This intellectual apprehension of the truth translated into actual living Kierkegaard calls repetition.

In general, the individual wraps oneself around an object or an event that one has freely produced, thus turning one's back on the freedom which would enable one to produce more. One thereby stunts one's growth. In encircling oneself around a given product of freedom, one freezes what is fluid. When originality in seriousness is acquired and conserved, then there is succession and repetition, but when originality is lacking in repetition we have habit. Repetition indicates that the individual possesses the courage to do tomorrow what one does today, with the same zest and zeal.

Inward deepening is a strenuous activity. It is to be practiced with fear and trembling, for it is a task that ensures no easy achievement. Accordingly, Kierkegaard posits it as an ideal, but an ideal that functions both as the aim of endeavor and donor of meaning, and as the unconditional, the absolute, that which is necessary in the every exercise of freedom.

B. Nietzsche's Overman

Nietzsche's overman is the transformed kind of human being who enhances one's own Will to Power by a kind of self-creating which involves the founding of new values and standards through the ultimate confrontation with and affirmation of human finitude. According to Nietzsche, living beings are characterized by the Will to Power. They strive to make themselves stronger. Nietzsche asserts that because there is no life after death, the goal of human being should not be the preparation of the soul for the after-life, but instead should be the enhancement of finite human existence. According to this view, a genuine value is a standard which contributes to enhancement of life. Nietzsche rejected the notion that there is only one kind of value which best enhances life. He held that belief in any absolute was an illusion. Thus

there can be many kinds of value, all of which can contribute to the strengthening of life by making it more novel, varied, and creative.

A presupposition for the concept of the overman is that human being can change and develop oneself. That is, a human being can create a way of existence for oneself. But the vast majority of human beings simply lack the capacity to create something valuable with their lives.

Nietzsche's view of the overman as self-creator arises from his belief that art is the highest expression of the Will to Power. For in artistic activity, a human being opens up in the spirit of pure enjoyment new perspectives from which to view oneself and one's world. Truth is a value whose importance lies in the fact that it enhances life. Although truth and art are both creations which enhance life, for Nietzsche art is worth more than truth. This points to the great life as a work of art.

There are obstacles which are thrown in the path of the creator. These obstacles arise not only from the herd which fears and resents creative or exceptional individuals, but also from our own selves. But the worst enemy is self-perversion. To avoid self-perversion, the creative individual must engage in a violent struggle against deception and delusion.

The effort to remain true to one's own ideals is so difficult that even the strongest are tempted to make things easier by taking pity on themselves. Nietzsche claims that pity is the greatest obstacle which overman must overcome. According to him, pity is an insidious emotion which, under the guise of kindness, weakens the person being pitied and thereby tends to make one the slave or debtor to the one who pities. Nietzsche asserts that self-pity, which is created by theories about God and heaven, is a form of self-revenge. For with the creation of an eternal world beyond the real world, a human being takes total revenge upon one's temporal existence, by denying that finite life is real or significant. What might seem to be pity for human being's painful earthly lot thus turns out to be a form of human being's self-hatred. A human being denies the meaning of one's own life. To overcome pity is to confront human finitude.

For Nietzsche pity and compassion are distinguished. Compassion is an exhibition of genuine love and concern, in which a person seeks to make the other free for oneself, thus strong and independent. Compassion threatens, however, to turn itself into pity because a human being always desires to gain command over the other. But true power is power over oneself. To have compassion requires that a person be rich and strong enough to allow the other to become strong, too. According to Nietzsche, cruelty to the other always arises out of weakness, never out of strength.

Nietzsche insists that the creation of new values always involves the destruction of old values. To destroy former values is a tremendous responsibility for it causes much pain and suffering. The greatest temptation for the overman is to shrink back from one's creative activity because it brings such pain to others, and thereby to oneself.

Responsibility is often associated with guilt which arises when someone tries to act outside of the normal table of values. But Nietzsche rejects this notion as being a form achieving genuine creative autonomy. To feel guilty because one has surpassed a norm is in effect to admit that one is not yet strong enough to give oneself the law, in the sense of creating one's own standards. Guilt can thus be taken as a form of self-pity, for it is easier to be guilty than to take over the enormous responsibility involved in all creative action. Mass society, or the herd, attempts to produce guilt and self-pity in all of its members, for it fears and resents anyone who threatens the old table of values. Most human beings cannot accept responsibility. Most of us are not creators, and for that reason, we depend upon the available values to guide and sustain us in life.

The overman is the new kind of human being who has the courage and creativity to step out beyond the leveling restrictions of the old world. The overman is able to construct a novel, powerful self from one's own historical possibilities. The overman has the strength to overcome the abyss of death. The overman is able to give meaning to life, as long as the individual

continues to strive to be oneself, and not a member of the herd. Nietzsche has particular insight into the darkness and tragedy of life, but he also has the stamina to have the insight that life is worth the pain and suffering as long as the individual continues to overcome the obstacles set before one by oneself.

C. Heidegger's Authenticity

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger proposes to answer the question of the meaning of Being through the analysis of human *Dasein*. Heidegger claims that human being is peculiar in that one's Being, one's existence is always at issue for one. It is because human being is a question for oneself, because one must decide who one will be, that the characteristic of selfhood can belong to human being. For Heidegger, human being can exist as a Self in one of two ways: one can be an inauthentic (un-owned) Self, or one can be an authentic (owned) Self. As an inauthentic Self, human *Dasein* takes its self-understanding from the "they" (*das Man*). The inauthentic Self tends to fall away from itself in the sense of concealing from itself the nature of Being.

According to Heidegger, there is an intimate but very obscure relationship between the Being of human being and Being as such. Insofar as human being is unable to disclose one's own Being, that is, as long as one fails to recognize the finite and potential nature of one's Being, then one will also fail to gain insight into the nature of Being as such. One of the primary features of human *Dasein* is that it discloses other beings along with itself. That is, human being has an understanding of Being as such which allows one to understand other entities. Human being's Being acts to provide a clearing within which entities are un-covered and are thereby made encountable.

The major feature of the authentic is that it confronts and affirms its own essential finitude, its thrownness into definite historical possibilities. Thus authenticity struggles against falling into the inauthentic mode of existence, in which it conceals the certainty of its own impending death. The inauthentic mode of existence is the "they". The "they" refers to the fact that most human beings conceal their finitude by existing as interchangeable members of the anonymous "public". To exist in this way is to allow all of one's decisions to be made by everyone. To be authentic is to confront the fact of one's own death, a confrontation which is made possible within the mood of *Angst*. What *Angst* discloses is no-thing at all, for *Angst* reveals the impending possibility of no-thingness, death. To disclose one's own death individualizes *Dasein* and tears it away from the soothing clutches of the "they", for no one takes over the death of another.

Authenticity demands that I exist in a way which discloses my Being. For Heidegger, the Self is not a substance or thing, but a mode of existence, a kind of power-to-be. The inauthentic Self conceals this fact from itself. The authentic Self discloses to itself its finitude and its historical possibilities. Heidegger claims that human being's essential finitude is grounded in the fact that one's Being is nothing but the activity of the "temporalization of temporality". The difficulty of achieving authentic Self lies not only in the fact that *Dasein* must disclose that its own Being is not a pre-defined, pre-determined substance or thing, but also a time-producing power which is constantly in the process of becoming. To be able to disclose that one's Self is not yet finished means that one must accept responsibility for becoming who one becomes.

According to Heidegger, each *Dasein* has within its own Being a silent voice which reminds us that we are deluding ourselves and that we can exist authentically. The call of conscience reminds us that in a very important sense we are guilty. Heidegger rejects the usual interpretation of guilt as referring to our responsibility for some deed, or as referring to the fact that we are in debt to someone, or as referring to a kind of lack, for only things can lack, and

Dasein is not a thing. Guilt itself points to the finitude and facticity of Dasein. The call of conscience, which discloses our essential nullity and finitude, is a necessary element in the possibility of authentic existence. Becoming authentic requires that Dasein individualizes itself, that it ceases to exist as the "they", that it resolves to achieve its own historical possibilities.

Authenticity anticipates its finitude by disclosing death as the possibility of the impossibility of existence, a possibility which cannot be avoided. Such anticipation includes the resolve to take hold of one's own historical possibilities, without deceptive existence of the "they" self. Such authentic existence is the joyful affirmation of the possibilities of existence, wherein Dasein is owned by its own Self. The joy arises from the fact that Dasein has finally enabled itself to face the fact that its existence is limited, and that the disclosure of this fact allows *Dasein* to become who it is, instead of being determined all the way to death by possibilities which are not its own.

Heidegger's earlier concept of authenticity overemphasized the role played by individual resoluteness, will, and courage in disclosing the truth. It is a kind of subjectivism which characterizes Nietzsche's concept of the overman and which is what conceals from us the meaning of Being. Heidegger's later concept of authenticity develops in a manner different from the subjective elements of *Being and Time*. In order to overcome the subjective elements in his earlier work, Heidegger began to speak of *Ereignis* (appropriation), a concept which describes the relations among truth (un-concealment), Being (presencing), and *Dasein*. The idea of *Ereignis* is relatively free of the anthropocentrism implicit in the former claim that Being occurs only insofar as human Dasein exists. Human being's understanding of Being is only one of the ways in which Being manifests itself. In this context authenticity is understood as owning up to flux (Caputo, 1987, p. 258).

D. Heidegger's Essence of Truth

According to Heidegger, truth, as the agreement between cognition and the thing known, is not sufficiently primary thought. For a thing to agree or disagree with cognition, this thing must appear, reveal itself, come out of concealment. The thing in its disclosure is in a more primary sense true than in its agreement with the mind. The truth as agreement Heidegger calls "correctness". Correctness is not located in reality like the truth as disclosure, but in sentences. Correctness states something concerning a thing but never reveals its essence. Only where a revealing takes place, does truth occur.

The truth as correctness began with Plato, since for him the correct looking or seeing is of more importance than the disclosure, *aletheia*, as such. In this change of the essence of the truth is also accomplished a variation of the place of the truth. As disclosure it is still the basic feature of Being itself. As correct looking it becomes a distinction of the human attitude toward being.

The truth as correctness presupposes truth as disclosure. Disclosure is, in turn, rooted in Dasein which is openness. Disclosure implies the appearing being and the attitude which gives meaning to the how of this appearance. Disclosure can only be disclosure in the openness of Dasein. It is beyond the split of subject and object and thus beyond their agreement. World can only be disclosed by a being openly existing in the openness of the world. Human being as Dasein is not just the source of the truth but rather truth itself. Being comes into light in Dasein. Dasein is the truth of Being.

That human being is the source of truth does not mean that human being creates or throws out from oneself all different truths. Human being does not create the truth just as one does not create the things. But by allowing things to appear the way they are, human beings allow them to be true. One's attitude is not ruling but respectfulness. Dasein is the necessary

horizon for things to become visible, to be revealed. Only as Dasein is human being in the source of truth and correctness.

In human being's openness to Being, one subordinates oneself to the truth of Being. This subordination makes a human being become one's true self and gives one one's freedom. The openness of attitude, as the innermost possible rendering of correctness, is based in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom. The essence of human being is Dasein, the disclosure. As the disclosure, human being is in accordance with one's essence. The need of to-be-disclosing for human being is the need of to-be-free. Thus, freedom is never merely a property of human being. Therefore, truth is never a result of logical play with terms, but is an event of Being. Because Being comes to be, human being can stand in its openness.

Heidegger's understanding of truth is a deepened understanding of truth. It penetrates the most basic layers of truth on which correctness rests. Correctness presupposes the truth of Being on which it is based. For Heidegger the truth of Being is ontological truth; he refers to correctness as ontic truth. Scientific truth is a mode of ontic truth.

Truth is located not in things and in human being but in the openness of Being, itself. Disclosure is not an act of human being but being. Human being merely participates in this disclosure or in the truth of Being. One takes over the truth of Being and inherits it as one's true self. By being one's true self, one is free, and freedom is truth.

Since freedom is not a property of human being, it escapes human being's control. On the contrary, it itself befalls human being and applies one for itself. The befalling of disclosure constantly penetrates human being thoroughly. This, however, is never a fatality of control. Because human being actually becomes free by belonging to the real of befalling and thus becomes a hearer but never a slave. Truth thus is not located primarily in a philosophical system established by one or another philosopher in history. Truth does not belong to a philosophical system. On the contrary, philosophical system belongs to truth. Standing in the

openness of Being and guarding it, human being is the guardian of the truth of Being. As one of the ways of guarding truth, a philosopher guards it in one's philosophical system. To be a guardian of the truth of Being and to be free are one and the same.

Although human being is essentially related to the truth of Being, one is not steady in the truth. Freedom allows a being to be such and such a being. On the other hand, freedom may allow being to be something it is not rather than something it is. Since freedom is not the unruly actions of human being but one's subordination to Being, therefore untruth as well as truth primarily is rooted in Being. Truth as freedom is disclosing, which is only possible due to the concealment. Since truth is an event of Being, as its coming from concealment into disclosure, it can only happen thanks to the disclosure (truth) as well as to the unconcealment (untruth). Truth expresses Being as dynamic, as becoming, as time.

The early Greeks thought of being as revelation. Such revealing or disclosure went right along with the concealment of Being. Being withdraws itself by revealing itself in beings. Light, by bringing the illuminated objects into illumination, keeps itself in concealment. Nevertheless, even in the mode of concealment, light reveals itself as that which is concealed. The illuminated objects are visible, and light reveals itself invisible; however, in the visibility of the objects, light reveals itself as invisible, and as such it holds all revelation in unity and is its ground. Being was the base upon which everything disclosed was resting. Things (truth) were not what they were merely in their relation to a human subject, but in their relation to the light of concealed Being itself.

Physis (coming-forward) is the utmost truth. This truth is in no way an agreement of a subject and an object. Such a truth, correctness, can take place in a world. Therefore such a truth is not the ultimate truth. The ultimate truth is the truth of *physis*. It grants a world in which a subject as well as an object can take place and be in accord or in disaccord with each other. Such a truth cannot be proven; nevertheless, it can be experienced. Such a truth is the

foundation which cannot be reached and experimentally investigated by scientific methods. Science cannot give any information about the primary truth. Science is not a primary event of truth, but always merely a cultivation of one section of already opened truth, and that by the grasping and founding of all that appears as possibly or necessarily correct. A scientific person does not accept anything as true which is not reasonably founded, in the sense that it is represented in one's mind. Consequently, a scientific person only considers as true a subjective truth (a truth representable in the mind), truth subordinated to human being. Whereas truth, which opens a world for things to appear and for human being to live one's life and make one's decisions, is a truth that exceeds human being. Such a truth is no longer merely a human truth, but the truth of Being itself.

For Heidegger art is the truth's placing of itself in the work of art. Truth here is not truth as correctness but truth as disclosure (*aletheia*). 'Placing' means bringing to a stand. What is notable is that truth is not created by an artist and is not born in an artwork as something which never was. An artwork brings to sight that which already is hanging in the air.

An artist is not the maker of the artwork and of the truth which is revealed by it. Truth as that which is located in the physis belongs to physis rather than to the artist. An artist merely spells out that which is already assembled into words in physis. An artwork is not at all an object or a thing which has some specific characteristics or properties distinguishing it from other objects or things.

What an artwork is, can only be understood in the realm where it belongs, the realm which is arrested by the artwork in the sense that it is brought to stand. This realm is its world. Hence, the same thing in a different world is a different thing. An artwork is that by which truth is brought to a stand and by which a world is opened - a realm within which anything whatsoever can take a place and sojourn. For instance, the light of the moon is not its own. The moon merely assembles it and brings it to a stand. By assembling the light unto itself, the moon

assembles everything in the realm of this light. The moon opens up a world. If there were no moon in the sky (if there were no artwork), the light of the sun (the light of truth or physis) would not be brought to a stand, and the village below would lie in darkness (a world would not be opened).

CHAPTER V

TRAVELLING TOWARD THE HOMENESS OF PEDAGOGY

Alas! There come the time when man will no longer launch the arrow of his longing beyond man - and the string of his bow will have unlearned to whizz! What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star? - so asketh the last man and blinketh. The earth hath then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. We have discovered happiness - says the last man and blinks thereby (Nietzsche, 1927, p. 64).

An education in thinking in the midst of the sciences is part of preparatory thinking and its fulfillment. To find the suitable for this, so that such education in thinking does not fall victim to a confusion with research and erudition, is the hard thing. This objective is in danger, then, above all when thinking is simultaneously and continually under the obligation of first finding its own abode. To think in the midst of the sciences means to pass near them without disdaining them (Heidegger, 1977, p. 56).

Subjectivism as well as objectivism belong to the same level of thinking. An object can only be an object for a subject, and a subject is always opposed by objects. Therefore, subjectivism and objectivism are essentially the same.

In subjectivism, the world is considered as an object faced by a human being - subject. Such an understanding of world is an anthropological understanding. Human being as a subject is representation in the sense of putting things forward. Representation means the placing of something in front of oneself and toward oneself. In representative consideration, whatever is considered is considered as standing-in-front-of-us. In this context, world becomes that which is standing in front of us, as that which we face. Thus it becomes a picture. The original concept subject did not signify human being alone. It meant a substantial being having a number of accidents based in it. Whenever a human being became the only true subject, everything else was considered in respect of the human being, and therefore everything else became objects.

According to Heidegger, metaphysics is marked by subjectivism throughout its whole history. Therefore, metaphysics can be called humanistic (anthropocentric) in all its different forms. The turn to metaphysics began with Plato; for him, being began to be considered as that which stands in the aspect of the viewpoints. However, things for Plato, and for Greeks, not only appeared through out-looks, through viewpoints to them, but they also appeared as things in their truth by entering the range of these viewpoints. Their being-seen belongs to their sojourn in revelation. Such being-seen of things is a perception of them the way they are in themselves, and not a forcing of them into certain ways of seeing, into determining viewpoints imposed upon them. A being is a being not by the fact that it is a being in the light of human seeing but by the fact that it is being in the light of Being.

The modern attitude toward things has a character of seizing. Things are comprehended by attacking them and capturing them in concepts which express them as objects faced by a subject. Things or beings are no longer a sojourning being, but a representative being; a being as set forward in front of a subject and fitted to one's sight. Human being faces the world as a field for one's activities. Everything in the world is considered as related to human being. Forests are resources of building materials. Mountains are rich in coal. Rivers are a supply of water for the irrigation of the fields. Even human beings are man-power. Everything is considered in relation to human being as a subject - a builder, an engineer, a manufacturer, etc., but is not considered as it is in itself. Never does earth appear as earth to the modern human beings but always as the object for exploitation. Totality is ignored by modern human beings. For them a whole is a sum or the total of that which is faced by them. Being for human beings is placed forward and related to them objectively. Being is identical with thinking insofar as the objectivity of objects is joined and construed in the representing consciousness.

Modern human being sees the meaning of one's life in complete domination or ruling of the world. The world is for one's exploitation, and this exploitation is the meaning of human life.

The meaning of the world is derived from human being, and the meaning of human being is placed in the conquering of the world. Modern human being is speeding toward the extremes of one's subjectivity to hold the world completely in one's hands. One believes one will then be fully human being. However, if human being is not seizing the world any longer, what is one's meaning? It is an emptiness.

The emptiness of modern human being expresses itself in the rating of one's worth by regarding one's exterior, e. g., dressing, marriage, entertainment, etc.. One's emptiness can only be distinguished from another emptiness by something external added to it. This addition which makes human being distinguishable one from another becomes one's essential feature. This addition is one's uniform which represents one's function in society. Human being without a uniform today gives an impression of the unreal. Such a minimization of an individual and accentuation of a group does not mean a refutation of subjectivism as such. Subjectivism is still subjectivism even though we or a group of I's replaces I.

In this context, what is education? What is obvious is that education does not look like a 'gradual learning to live appropriately through seeing things as they are'. It is a homelessness. Only by sparing things we spare these ultimate realities. Things approximate these realities to us. To spare here does not mean to indicate to be left alone, but to have a positive aspect of taking care. Hence, by sparing things, we ourselves sojourn in the neighborhood of that in which everything whatsoever takes its start by being held in unity by it. This neighborhood is the ultimate root of homeness. Home, as the neighborhood to Being, can be properly realized by sparing things. When we rule things, as a modern human being does, we are homeless. We are homeless even though we have a place to live. A human being is homeless not because one has no house, but because one does not spare the things and does not dwell in the proper sense of dwelling. According to Heidegger, the meaning of education is to think.

An education in thinking in the midst of the sciences is part of preparatory thinking and its fulfillment. To find the suitable for this, so that such education in thinking does not fall victim to a confusion with research and erudition, is the hard thing. This objective is in danger, then, above all when thinking is simultaneously and continually under the obligation of first finding its own abode. To think in the midst of the sciences means to pass near them without disdaining them.

We do not know what possibilities the destining of Western history holds in store for our people and the West. Moreover, the external shaping and ordering of those possibilities is not primarily what is needed. It is important only that learners in thinking should share in learning and, at the same time, sharing in teaching after their manner, should remain on the way and be there at the right moment (Heidegger, 1977, p.56).

To induce primary thinking on the essentials of education, it will be worthwhile to attend to certain insights expounded by Heidegger in his work, *What is called Thinking*, which has a direct bearing on the educational problematics. These insights revolve around the teacher, the student and their mutual enterprise, which is to think.

A. Rebellion Against Ordinary Learning

In order to learn, one must dispose everything one does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to one at any given moment. This statement includes concentration and self-motivation. But a lively and an audible interest in anything is no evidence of essential disposition or readiness. Incessant preoccupation may only give the stubborn illusion that there is interest, and therefore authentic learning. Intensive study and serious preoccupation, though useful and worthy task, do not in themselves guarantee authentic learning which obtains only where and when there is primary thinking. Therefore, making objects of study merely interesting would be an exercise in pedagogical futility like Heidegger's (1968, p. 5) explanation.

What then is there that one needs to do to learn, short of which one merely is trained or conditioned into the crowd culture? According to Heidegger (1977, p. 355, p.347) "to learn

means to make everything we do answer to whatever address us as essential." To learn is to think. But the "most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."

Naturally we must not misunderstand the above statement as Heidegger's denial of any kind of thinking, because he acknowledges having an opinion or notion as a form of mental activity, or representing or having an idea about something or a state of affairs as still another popular mental act, or that ratiocination or developing a chain of premises which lead to a valid conclusion is an important activity of human being, or that conceptualization or systematization has its place and function. Heidegger observes that all these conceptions of thinking are so stubbornly around because they have their own truth. And yet Heidegger does not regard any of the above as authentic thinking.

But if we grant that to learn is to think, and none of the above is an act of thinking, what claims does Heidegger then make for thinking? Heidegger responds to the agony of the question at this point by further denying authentic thinking of all of the following: 1) thinking does not produce knowledge as do the sciences; 2) thinking does not promote usable practical wisdom; 3) thinking does not solve any cosmic riddles; 4) thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act; 5) thinking does not give human being any salvation.

Since all the above are recognized as of paramount value to mankind, in this sense, essential thinking may be regarded as being inferior to them. Heidegger would concede this. But his response is sufficient warning against the temptation to wave aside the importance and relevance of thinking.

Man as he is today is not prepared to form and assume a world government. For today's man lags behind, not just here and there,--- no, in everything he is, in all his ways, he lags curiously behind that which is and has long been. That which really is, Being, which from the start calls and determines all beings, can never be made out, however, by ascertaining facts, by appealing to particulars. That sound common sense which is so often "cited" in such attempts is not as sound and natural as it pretends. It is above all not as absolute as it acts, but rather the shallow product of that manner of forming ideas which is the final fruit

of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Sound common sense is always trimmed to fit a certain conception of what is and ought to be and may be. The power of this curious understanding extends into our own age; but it is no longer adequate. The organizations of social life, rearmament in moral matters, the grease paint of the cultural enterprise--- none of them any longer reach what is. With all the good intentions and the ceaseless effort, these at the most are no more than makeshift patchwork, expedients for the moment. And why? Because the ideas of aims, purpose, and means, of effects and causes, from which all those attempts arise--- because these ideas are from the start incapable of holding themselves open to what is (1968, pp. 65-6).

Little reflection should enable us to feel the radical implications of the above statement on any human endeavor that pretends to result from human learning. Whenever and wherever human being arrogates unto oneself sole responsibility for one's destiny, one alone shall bear the yoke of one's loneliness. For to learn to think is not to manipulate, nor dominate, much less subjugate Being. That is the folly of secular humanism, with which the earth shrivels and passes away.

But what must human beings do to learn to think? How is one to make everything one does answer to whatever essentials address themselves to one at the given moment? Human being must allow oneself to become involved in questions that seek what no inventiveness can find. For human being can learn only if one always unlearns at the same time. Thus, we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally. To do that, we must at the same time come to know it.

Once human being learns that there is to learn more than mere practice or drill, more than just gaining facility in the use of tools, more than merely gathering knowledge about the customary forms of things one is to make or do, then one can truly make oneself respond to the different kinds of essentials, depending on the realm from which they address human being. One's answer becomes more than just empty busywork; it becomes a learning, a thinking relatedness.

A wise one thus is not speculative, one with intellectual or spiritual capacities by which one orderly forms and subdues reality, but one turned to sparing things. Heidegger says:

A cabinetmaker's apprentice, someone who is learning to build cabinets and the like, will serve as an example. His learning is not mere practice, to gain facility in the use of tools. Nor does he merely gather knowledge about the customary forms of the things he is to build. If he is to become a true cabinetmaker, he makes himself answer and respond above all to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood - to wood as it enters into man's dwelling with all the hidden riches of its nature. In fact, this relatedness to wood is what maintains the whole craft. Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business concerns (1968, p. 355).

A cabinetmaker's apprentice looks like *wu-wei* (not forcing). *Wu-wei* is the life style of one who spares things, and must be understood as a form of intelligence - that is, of knowing the principles, structures, and trends of human and natural affairs so well that one uses the least amount of energy in dealing with them. It is also the innate wisdom of the whole organism.

B. Rebellion Against Ordinary Teaching

If one is to teach another, the venture is even much harder, as all of us who have been trying to do just that very well know. Why is teaching more difficult than learning? According to Heidegger, "not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it always ready. teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: "to let learn". In fact, the real teacher lets nothing also be learned than- learning" (1977, p.356). A teacher may drill, one may quiz, one may examine, one may grade, one may reprimand, one may befriend, one may assign reports and papers. But there is only one thing he can make one's student learn - to learn to be totally responsive to the call of that which beckons to be learned or thought of and for.

Thus, according to Heidegger, a teacher's conduct often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from a teacher, if by learning we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information, because a computer or an encyclopedia may do a much better job in many instances. To teach is not being a funnel for social heritage. To teach is to lead in a distinctly human way, not as a repository of wisdom, but as a greater seeker of wisdom. That is why now the greater is the need and the demand that we be not just informers but be teachers. Heidegger describes the true teacher:

The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they - he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less sure of his material than those who learn are theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the learners is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It still is an exalted matter, then, to become a teacher - which is something else entirely than becoming a famous professor(1968, p. 356).

How is one to do precisely this - to let others learn to learn? The answer is intriguing because Heidegger links teaching to imparting a handicraft. That is,

In the common view, the hand is part of our bodily organism. But the hand's essence can never be determined, or explained, by its being an organ which can grasp. Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands. The hand is infinitely different from all the grasping organs - paws, claws, or fangs - different by an abyss of essence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can handily achieve works of handicraft. But the craft of the hand is richer than we commonly imagine. The hand does not only grasp and catch, or push and pull. The hand reaches and extends, receives and welcomes - and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives its own welcome in the hands of others. The hand holds. The hand carries. The hand designs and signs, presumably because man is a sign. Two hands fold into one, a gesture meant to carry man into the great oneness. The hand is all this, and this is the true handicraft, and commonly we go no further. . . . Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element(1968, p.357).

And this precisely is what it is to teach, to let the student or taught or learner speak. And yet to speak is not just to vocalize utterances, however logical. For to truly speak and think is to

let-lie-before-us and to take-to-heart the Being of beings, which keeps and develops into incomparable nearness by withdrawing from human being, thereby leading a human being on forever to be precisely what one is fated to be, a pointer.

It is in the view of the above description of the true teacher that Heidegger refers to Socrates as the pure thinker of the West for having done nothing else all through his life and right into his death than place himself into this draft, this current that being of beings as if it were trails as it withdraws from human being and yet ever tarrying within the horizons of thought. This is the precise meaning of human creativeness which is other than inventiveness. For as Heidegger remarks, what is thought-provoking, what gives us to think, is then not anything that we determine, not anything that only we are instituting, only we are proposing.

As we are drawing toward what withdraws, we ourselves are essentially pointers pointing toward it. We are who we are by pointing in that direction. This is not only an incidental adjunct to being mankind. Drawn into what withdraws, drawing toward it and thus pointing into the withdrawal, human being first is human being. Human being's essential nature lies in being such a pointer. One teaches by pointing to what withdraws, so that the learner may likewise point and be what they are. In pointing, human being is a sign. But, according to Heidegger, modern human being has not known true thinking as yet.

It seems to me that teaching is a way of life, a calling to which many people devote their entire lives. In popular perspective, a strong movement exists whose purpose is to professionalize teaching like the long established professions of law and medicine. It has been thought that such professionalization would enhance the status of teachers as well as the monetary remuneration for their services. I have no quarrel with people trying to enhance their status and financial compensation as long as these are deserved and the means to achieve them are justifiable. But I must remark that teaching cannot be so treated, and because of what it is, a mode of being in the world, not just a way to earn a living.

Teaching is an undefinable mode of being in the world. As Denton says:

Perhaps the language of teaching is similar to the language of love, in that it is about an experience so holistic, so immediate, and so close to us that we can't say what it is (1974, p. 107).

This is important. No claim that the being of teaching has been revealed in full, that its definition has been established, can be accepted as justified. The truth of teaching appears only in thinking. Teaching is a *praxis*, not a theory. Whoever wants to know what teaching is must look not at the theories and definitions, but at the actual teaching of teachers. Teaching is not mere theoretical knowledge; neither is it technological knowledge, the knowledge of lesson plans, of teaching methods, of skills, of classroom management. These things which so many people, including specialists, identify with teaching, are only remotely connected with it. They are not teaching, nor are they components of teaching.

Teaching is knowledge beyond the given. It is allegorical knowing, knowing of the possibility of a situation, the way in which its *logos* may be brought to our presence. Teaching is not primarily a performance, a task, even though there is still a strong movement to detail performance criteria of teaching. Teaching is a mode of knowing that apprehends specific possibilities with its reality and helps reality actualize them. Thus, there is no teaching without essential thinking.

C. Essential Thinking

According to Heidegger (1977, p.345), true thinking is primary thinking. Such thinking does not stand in human being's disposition and is never one's instrument. It is a response of man to Being rather than to one's saying. Primary thinking occurs as an echo to the word of the

soundless voice of Being. It is a thinking belonging to Being. Human thought is not simply human. It does not belong to human being, but is primarily bound to Being itself.

So-called logical thought no longer responds to Being. It is thinking which has lost Being, the true element of thought. Such thinking is de-ontologized thinking, and as such it ceases to be authentic thinking. Without Being, thinking cannot remain fundamental thinking. An attempt to judge thinking with sole regard to its correlation to logical rules is an attempt to measure it by the wrong criterion. Primary thinking is not irrational thinking because primary thinking is ontological thinking, the thinking of Being. Such thinking transcends logic. By transcending logic, it also transcends irrationalism, because rationalism and irrationalism belong on one and the same level of thinking. Primary thinking goes beyond this level into the realm of Being. Logical clear-sightedness alone is meaningless because logical thinking is a mechanism of thinking, enclosed in itself and cut off from Being.

In our thoughts we guard Being. This guarding of Being is a response to Being which calls us into our essence. By our response we render ourselves possible. By thinking we free ourselves to our self. According to Heidegger, whenever a cabinetmaker's apprentice learns his trade, he does not learn it merely by being handy with the tool alone, but basically one gets into one's trade and becomes a cabinetmaker through one's acquaintance with diverse kinds of wood and all their potentialities to give such and such forms, since each kind of wood is suitable only to certain forms. These hidden forms in the qualities of the wood represent the talk of Being, and the cabinetmaker's apprentice, who brings these forms to actuality, is responding to Being. By this response one becomes what one is, a cabinetmaker. That is, by following the call of Being, we become ourselves.

According to Heidegger, the old English *thencan*, to think, and *thancian*, to thank, are closely related. The old English noun for thought is *thanc* or *thons* - a thought, a grateful thought, and expression of such a thought. Today it survives in the plural thanks.

Thanking thinking is the gathering of all that concerns us, all that we care for, all that touches us insofar as we are as human beings. But this gathering is not an after-the-fact collection of what basically exists, but the tidings that overtake all our doings, the tidings of what we are committed to beforehand by being human beings. That is, primary thinking enables us to recognize our roots and to retrieve our sense of belongingness. But thankful thinking is not a recompense. It remains an offering, a thankful disposal, not a sending off, but bringing the matter forth and leaving it where it belongs. This is thankful thinking, whereby human being may rearrange but never disarrange. And what is spoken in the word thinking, thanking remains for us in the realm of the unspoken.

According to Heidegger, since science deals with beings but not with Being, science on its part does not think and cannot think. Scientific thinking, as an instrument in human being's hands, is not the true thinking which is primarily in the hands of Being as logos and to which we are subordinate. True thinking does not result in firm conclusions on which the subsequent series of thoughts can be built without having to return again to the beginning. True thinking constantly starts over and over again. We cannot stop thinking, as though we had arrived to a certain point where thinking is no longer needed. Thinking does not arrive at a certain place but always remains on the way. Thinking itself is a way. We correspond to this way by being on the way. By going this road we, in a certain sense, create this road and ourselves as travellers thereon. True thinking, by not resulting in universal conclusions and by not coming to a determined end, remains uncertain and manifold. In this diversity, human being remains open to Being in one's essence as a traveller. But it is possible when we dwell poetically on this earth.

D. The Way Home

According to Heidegger (1977, p. 327), to dwell means to be freed within the openness that spares everything in its essence. When human being is dwelling, one is sparing everything within the openness of Being, the world. Such a sparing lets things be the way they are. To spare a thing means to spare the foursome - the earth, sky, gods, and mortals. Hence, dwelling is being open to the world, to the ultimate realities.

Things are spared when they are taken care of in the sense of being cultivated or built. According to Heidegger, the German word *Nachbar*, neighbor, in its archaic form was the *Nachgebauer*, one who dwells nearby. To dwell nearby means to cultivate and to build things in the neighborhood. Hence a neighbor is one who is open to the higher realities next to us. In the modern world the neighbor merely dwells next door spatially. Such ties tie loosely and break easily. This is often exemplified by modern neighbors who may live next door for years without even knowing what the neighbor is cultivating or building. But neighborhood, in Heidegger's sense, is different from the neighborhood of the modern world.

To make a thing does not mean primarily to cause something as far as its form or construction is concerned or to mold a disposed reality according to some idea possessed by us, but it rather means our own being-disposed to the higher realities and standing under their directions. Building brings the foursome forward in a thing. For example, a built bridge assembles the world as the interplay of the foursome and shows or allows the four of the foursome to appear in their true essence.

By sparing things we are open to the earth and sky, to gods and mortals. By sparing things we spare these ultimate realities. Things mean approximating the world. Things approximate these realities to us. Hence, by making or sparing things, we ourselves sojourn in the neighborhood of that in which everything whatsoever takes its start by being held in unity by

it. This neighborhood is the best feature of homeness. The most proper and best feature of homeness rests in the being-near to the source, and nothing but this. Therefore, faithfulness to the first source is innate to such a homeness.

Home, as the neighborhood to Being, can only be properly realized by sparing things. When we rule things, we are homeless. Home for the modern one is something subordinate to one just as any other thing or instrument he possesses. Inasmuch as any other instrument is easily exchangeable or replaceable, so also is a home. A home becomes identical to a house.

To be in the neighborhood of Being is to take care of things and to dwell in one's home with a respectful or with an open attitude to the worldly realities. Human being is homeless not because one has no house, but because one does not spare the things and thus does not dwell in the proper sense of dwelling. Home is the neighbor of gods and earth, and to dwell means to sojourn in this neighborhood. In this neighborhood, the neighbor of human being is also rooted. A neighbor is the one who spares things and thus spares the higher realities nearby.

Anyone who merely exploits nature can never be in nature's neighborhood. By not being one's own self, one can never be anyone's neighbor. One's homelessness rests in one's being closed away from Being. It is one thing only to abuse the earth, and another to receive the blessing of the earth and to become at home in the law of such reception in order to guard the homeness of Being.

To dwell is to be exposed to the earth and the gods. Since a modern person rules the earth, and since the things which he handles are the rationalistically determined results of his planned activities, he no longer knows the earth as worldly reality but only as matters which are disposed to one's planning and activities.

The things of a modern person do not reflect anything any more because they are fully controlled and thus are suppressed things in the sense that they are not allowed to be what they are. When a thing is not suppressed, it approximates the world to us so that we can become at

home in its neighborhood. A modern person, since he is essentially homeless, is also a worldless one. The world he lives in is a perverted world because it is a man-made world. In such a world everything succumbs to human rule, everything reflects human being in his self-centered happiness. Human being who is the center of one's world can no longer have aims. One's aim is establishing and securing of one's world-centric position. In such an aim lies one's subjective or egocentric happiness. Nietzsche calls such a man, the last man.

To be human means to guard the truth of one's world in works. A world cannot be a world without someone who is in the world and who guards it in its worldness, just as a road cannot be a road without a traveller who guards to bring forward the roadness of the road. The works of human being are their answers to the demands of world-realities. These answers are not self-satisfaction which disregards any higher realities and simply makes everything servile to oneself. These answers constitute the human beingness of human being.

Dwelling is the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist. Dwelling is worthy of questioning and remains worthy of thought. But thinking itself belongs to dwelling. Thinking is inescapable for Dwelling. It is also insufficient for dwelling so long as it busies itself with its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one another. It is able to listen, if it remains within its limits and realizes that the one as much as the other comes from the workshop of long experience and incessant practice.

E. The Dim Image of The Homeness of Pedagogy

The travel into the realm of the homeness of pedagogy is not a tour beyond the world. The homeness of pedagogy belongs to the world and can be experienced. In the homeness of pedagogy we do not start with experience with the intention to leave it behind us and proceed

merely speculatively in the higher realm of reality. Pedagogy cannot leap beyond experience. It remains within experience. To experience here is to see. Thus, pedagogy is making-see (opening) instead of granting a ladder of speculative proofs which one can climb blindly, mechanically without really seeing oneself.

The problem of the homeness of pedagogy is not provable, but it can be seen because it is real. To investigate it means to attempt to see that which we already know and always did know - that which has merely been dulled by our over-subjectivized attitude.

Aoki's (1990b) attempt is an excellent example which travels into the realm of the homeness of pedagogy. He appropriates authentic teaching as watchfulness. He says:

Teachers understand the meaning of belonging in absence growing out of their own experiences of watchfulness. Teachers know that children come to them clothed in a bond of entrustment of teachers, and parents know that they in entrusting their children to teacher, they can count on the watchful eyes of teachers. So, too, teachers know, that at the end of the year, they and their students will part, the students to the next grade or to another school. Yet, having lived together, teachers know that in the students leaving there hovers a belonging that makes possible their return. And the teachers know that watching the students depart at the end of the year is a watchfulness that is filled with hope that wherever they may be, students do well and be well, but mostly that they be let be in their own coming to be. Authentic teaching is watchfulness, a mindful watching flowing from the heeding of the call in the pedagogical situation that the good teacher hears. Indeed, teachers are more than they do; they belong to that which is beyond their doing; they are the teaching. (p 16)

Who is a good teacher? In this context, a good teacher is one who dwells at home which can be properly realized by sparing things. And being a good teacher is being in the neighborhood of Being. To be in the neighborhood of Being is to take care of things and to dwell in one's home with a respectful or with an open attitude to worldly realities. In subjectivism (logocentrism) a teacher's conduct, which depends on mere theoretical knowledge, only produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from a teacher. So, to become a teacher is something else than becoming a famous professor (Heidegger, 1977, p. 356).

To become a teacher is to start over and over again. To become a teacher is not to arrive at a certain destination, but to always remain on the way. To become a teacher is a way. By going this road a teacher creates this road and oneself as traveller thereon. A teacher as traveller remains uncertain and manifold. It can be only experienced (heard) in the voiceless utterance.

F. A Whispering from a Margin

Hegemonic, in the realm of public education of Korea, is "the performativity principle". This hegemony raises instrumental rationality, technicism, input/output logic, and the criterion of efficiency as the predominant standards of evaluation. In this framework, education aims for optimal contribution in the performativity of the social system. The performativity principle reduces education in theory and practice to supplying the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions.

The performativity principle compels students to tackle the world competitively under the name of excellence. At the level of ideology, the notion of excellence emerges as an answer to technocracy's legitimation problem. Excellence relies on technical criteria, because technocratic thought lacks a reflexive dimension. It is unable to account for its own world-view, without an appeal to external normative criteria. As such, excellence postulates a vision of the good compensating for technocracy's failure to supply a legitimate moral realm.

The technocratic world-view shapes the language and workings of key social institutions. It deals with "thingness", systems, planning and techniques. In a technocratic context, the call for excellence is an attempt to graft a moral dimension onto an inherently valueless world-view. Thus, excellence loses any substantive or critical referent and is reduced

to the level of pure instrumentality. It becomes the very symbol of technocratic achievement. Excellence helps to deflect the need to create new and meaningful terms of evaluation, for it offers the lure of quality.

Calls to excellence are designed to legitimate the expansion of technocratic strategies being advanced by dominant elites. In school systems, excellence has been marshalled as an ideological response to impending socio-economic crises. It is aimed at the restructuring of social divisions through the relegitimation of meritocratic principles. What this involves is an effort to use the schools for instrumental as well as for educational purposes.

Bowers (1986, p. 228) argues that schools reproduce in the consciousness of students the conceptual categories and assumptions essential to modernization, the so called technocratic world-view. Educators do not consciously promote modernization. Their concerns are more with subject matter, teaching techniques, and managing the social relationships essential to the ecology of schools. The rationale they give for schooling is that education strengthens the self-development of individuals and empowers them in an economic and political sense. Although this ideology is not entirely naive, it seems to hide the relationship between schools and the problematic aspects of modern consciousness that it reinforces. This ideology serves, especially, to obscure the contradiction between the claims made on behalf of individualism and democracy and political and cultural processes actually going on. According to Bowers (1986, p.129), the chief elements of modern consciousness reinforced through schooling include a taken-for-granted attitude toward the idea that individuals are autonomous beings who have feelings, make rational judgments, choose their own values, and are responsible for their own success or failure. The second element of modern consciousness reinforced in schools is that the rational process, expressed either as critical reflection or as theory buttressed by data, is the primary source of power and authority. Other elements of modern consciousness include a taken-for-granted attitude toward the progressive nature of

change, the legitimacy of technological innovation, and the authority of expert knowledge. These elements of modern consciousness are not taught directly or made explicit. Rather, they are transmitted as part of the conceptual framework within which the facts and explanations provided by teachers and textbooks must be interpreted.

In the realm of the performativity principle, curriculum is, in reality, increasingly preoccupied with technological literacy. Aoki says:

This orientation, strongly instrumentalist in orientation, is rooted in the human interest of intellectual and technical control of the world. Valued are efficiency, certainty, and predictability. The root human activity within this orientation is work - intellectual (theoretical) and technical (practical). With the forms of knowledge within this orientation we are all familiar with - facts, generalizations, principles, laws, and theories. To explain is to give causal, functional, or hypothetical deductive reasons. Within this orientation man and world are deemed separable; hence, man can manipulate the objects in the world. Subject and object are separate domains; hence, one is able to understand reality that is out there and distanced objectively. Underlying this view is a belief that life can be explained away with certainty (at least with probability) and with predictability (1988, p 409).

This orientation is rooted in the mentality of exploitation. The exploiter is a specialist, an expert. The standard of the exploiter is efficiency. The exploiter's goal is profit, money. The exploiter asks of works how much and how quickly they can be made to produce. The exploiter wishes to achieve as much as possible by as little work as possible. The competence of the exploiter is in organization. The exploiter typically serves an institution or organization. The exploiter thinks in terms of numbers, quantities.

Relating differently to the world, the mentality of exploitation needs clarity on matters. Our civilization seems to have a compulsive need for clarity on everything. It has lost all sense of wonder and mystery. Everything must be secured in clear concepts, for modern man is entirely insecure in his worldless solipsism. In this context, education is an instrument to develop this mentality. Accordingly, the result of education is homelessness, for in the

homeness of pedagogy we do not grant a ladder which one can climb blindly and mechanically without listening to the world.

World is neither the world of things around us nor is it the world of nature. It is neither the world of essence nor of substance. It is not the universe as the sum total all ontic things. World is not the subjective region of the teachers, which consists of all those things that go to make up a teacher's metier. Rather, world will always be other than ontic. It will eventually be founded on the life-world of the subject. It will ever appear as the unreal, untrue, the strange, the uncanny. It is beyond our rational ken.

In the sense of the world, a teacher is a nurturer. The nurturer is not an expert, a specialist. The standard of the nurture is care. The nurturer's goal is health and wholeness - his students', his own, his family's, his community's, and his country's. The nurturer asks a question that is complex and difficult: How much can be taken from things without diminishing them? The nurturer expects to have a decent living from his work, but he wishes to work as well as possible. The nurturer serves human being, nature, and universe. The nurturer thinks in terms of character, condition, quality, and possibility. The following story may sense as a description of this:

Once upon a time, there was a rich man who had only one son, whom the family loved dearly. He wished that his son would become a person of noble character. On the contrary, the son got wilder each day. At last, the rich man could not deal with his son, because not only did the son not listen to what he said, but he also took a defiant attitude. It was beyond his capacity to modify his son's rudeness.

One day, he made up his mind to find a teacher who could modify his son's behavior and could teach the son knowledge that would make him successful in life, regardless of the expense. He asked his friends to recommend a good teacher. One of his friends recommended a person as the son's teacher. The teacher was famous for his academic career. The rich man was interested in the teacher's career. He thought that the teacher could modify the son's rudeness enough. So, he sent the son to the teacher's house. But everything went wrong. The teacher's method was ineffective. In fact, as a teacher he made his student ruder and more wild. The teacher gave up his plan to modify his student's behavior. The teacher returned the boy to the rich man's house. After this attempt, many other specialists tried to modify the son's behavior, but no one succeeded. The rich man despaired of his son. He spent many days in sadness.

One day the rich man heard from his friend of an eminent Buddhist priest who lived in a deep mountain. He visited the priest and explained the son's situation. And he earnestly requested the priest to take care of his son. The priest assented. However, the priest said that he would take care of the son for only one month.

The rich man sent the son to the temple in which the priest lived. When he bowed to the priest, he seemed to be tired and afraid of something. Because all of his previous teachers had dealt with him severely, he thought that the priest would deal with him more severely than any other. Then, the priest guided him to his room and said kindly to take a rest. This was an unexpected surprise. "Take a rest." That was all the priest said to him for the whole month.

The priest did not mind what the student did. Every day he offered his student breakfast, lunch, and supper himself. He cleaned his student's room, made the room warm, and laundered his student's clothes. He did not require the boy to do anything. He did his best to make his student comfortable.

At the beginning, it was strange to the student that the priest dealt with him like that. He thought that it was a trick that would make him get into trouble. So he felt uneasy. As the days went by, he began to experience a peace of mind. He did whatever he wanted to do without anyone's interfering in his actions. He enjoyed his everyday life. He even forgot that the days passed.

One morning the priest visited his student. He brought new clothes for his student. He asked the student to change into the clothes, and to pack up all his student's belongings. After finishing this, the priest asked the student to come to his room. Then, he went back to his room.

At that moment, the student realized that the duration which the priest promised to his father had passed. While he was picking up his belongings, he felt tears gather in his eyes. He could understand the meaning of tears. He felt that his stubbornness was melting into tears. He regretted that he had passed time idly, and what he had done till then.

This story helps us to understand who the nurturer is and who the exploiter is. And what they can do. The priest was not a specialist. He did not have a predominant plan. He was only a listener and an observer of the world and pedagogical moment. What the priest showed is a higher acting which is concealed in releasement rather than what is found in the machinations of all mankind. It is the Zen way of thinking and doing - the way of refraining from thinking and doing contrary to the natural and spontaneous way of things. The goal is health and wholeness.

By health we mean little more than how we feel. We are healthy, if we do not feel any pain or too much pain. If we become unhealthy, then we go to a doctor who we hope will cure us and restore us to health. But the concept of health is rooted in the concept of wholeness. To be healthy is to be whole. To be whole is to be holy, because human beings have no body distinct from the soul. So, the definition of health is more elaborate than that given to it by most

medical doctors. If the body is healthy, then it is whole. Our bodies are not distinct from the bodies of other people, on which they depend in a complexity of ways from biological to spiritual. Our bodies are not distinct from the bodies of plants and animals, with which we are involved in the cycles of feeding and in the intricate companionships of ecological systems. They are not distinct from the earth, the sun, the moon, and the other heavenly bodies. Health is a way of connecting man, nature, and universe. Health is understood by Orientals as a comprehensive harmony with cosmic rhythm.

Intellectually, we know that these patterns of interdependence exist. We understand them better now perhaps than we ever have before. But modern social and cultural patterns (technology) contradict them and make it difficult or impossible to honor them in practice, especially in education. They cut us off from receiving the awareness that we are a part of universe. Accordingly, we become unhealthy, and feel alienation and nihilism.

Thus, we need the nurturer as a teacher in education. The nurturer's goal is wholeness. Personal wholeness as a path for teachers in their own professional endeavors is not the usual concern of schools, nor of college education departments. There may be a connection between the ignorance of wholeness of teacher in schools and the fact that the schools are run not by the authority of teachers, but by legislatures and administrations. It is the inner life of the teacher that gives the organism of the school its uncommon energy, direction, and inspiration. The inner life of the teacher comes from a teacher's life. The teacher is in life. Though books may be lost, their words remain forever intact in living reality.

Teaching nowadays is becoming technology, while neglecting substance. Teachers are cautious about substance. They are cautious about truth. Truth is changing from an absolute form to a form of relationships. We are in a period when the change is taking place. Truth is not a uniform static formulation. The spirit of truth lights up in all parts. The parts can be understood in relationship to the whole. The spirit of truth is connected with the art of seeing the whole in

every part. This is a new way of seeing. For it means seeing more than one thing at a time. It means seeing each student and seeing the higher being at the same time. It means experiencing summer and autumn and winter and spring as rhythms of the earth's breathing. It means feeling oneself as part of something more.

Teaching is a praxis. Teaching is not mere theoretical knowledge. Teaching is knowledge beyond the given. Teaching is knowing of the possibility of a situation and helping realities actualize them. It is the nurturer's way.

In the realm of a mentality of exploitation teachers refuse to be nurturers and thus they cannot truly be there. They cannot find their proper place in the world and on the earth. They find it difficult to find a place for themselves in a world and thus they make a place by force. But it is a place built on ego and not on authentic self. They teach what they were taught by the exploitation mentality.

The problem of the nurturer's way is that it is unteachable. It may be learned from personal experience in the world. Nurturing is the wholeness in which we participate. Its lessons are learned in every part of daily life like Tao.

It is difficult to say what Tao is, but usually it is understood that Tao is just a name for whatever happens. In other words, the principle of Tao is what happens of itself (Nature, in Korean jay-yun). Thus Tao is the course, the flow, the drift, or the process of jay-yun . Jay-yun means the spontaneous, which is so of itself. We might call it the automatic or automotive were it not that these words are associated with mechanisms and artifacts which are not truly so of themselves. Jay-yun might be taken to mean that everything grows and operates independently, on its own way.

It is basic to the Taoist view of the world that every thing-event is what it is only in relation to all others. The earth, and everything upon it, inevitably goes with the sun, moon, and stars. It needs them just as much as it needs its own elements. This is the principle of mutual

arising. The principle is that if everything is allowed to go its own way the harmony of the universe will be established, since every process in the world can do its own thing only in relation to all others. Thus everything's own way is the the own way of the universe, of the Tao. Because of the mutual interdependence of all beings, they will harmonize if left alone and not force into conformity with artificial order, and this harmony will emerge jay-yun without external compulsion.

Wu-wei is "not forcing". Wu-wei is the life style of one who follows the Jay-yun, and must be understood as a form of intelligence- that is, of knowing the principles, structures, and trends of human and natural affairs so well that one uses the least amount of energy in dealing with them. But this intelligence is not simply intellectual. It is also the innate wisdom of the whole organism. Wu-wei is a combination of this wisdom with taking the line of least resistance in all one's actions. Chuang-tzu tells the story of seeing an old man fall into a cataract and come out safely downstream. Asked for an explanation the old man says:

No, . . . I have no way of doing this. There was my original condition to begin with; then habit growing into nature; and lastly acquiesce in destiny. Plunging in with the whirl, I come out with the swirl. I accommodated myself to the water, not the water to me. And so I am able to deal with it after this fashion. . . I was born upon dry land and accommodated myself to dry land. That was my original condition. Growing up on the water, I accommodated myself to the water. That was what I meant by nature. And doing as I did without being conscious of any effort so to do, that was what I meant by destiny (Giles, 1972, pp. 239-40).

On the contrary, in the realm of the mentality of exploitation, students are brought up to mistrust their own organism, and are taught to control their thoughts, emotions, and appetites by muscular effort such as clenching the teeth or fists, learning to concentrate attention, scratching the head to think, staring to see, holding the breath to inhibit emotion. Those who teach students in this way are unwise teachers who think that mere force can achieve anything. The exploiters are like tourists who study guidebooks and maps instead of wandering freely and looking at the view. Theories and models are undoubtedly marvelous, but for this very reason

they have a hypnotic and fascinating quality which can lead to the neglect of the nature of pedagogy.

Consequently, the exploiter's behavior's is a routine habit acquired by a stereotyped repetition of a series of identical acts. Their effortlessness results from its becoming ingrained in the determinisms of their mechanical stimulus-response situations. This automatism entails a gradual diminution of the voluntary quality, the originality, and the experiential involvement of the repeated acts. And the permanent disposition created by this automatism is a settled disposition to act in an automatic fashion. Their way is to teach by rote, and to give the impression that long periods of boredom are the most essential part of teaching. In that way a student may go on for years and years without ever getting the feel of what he is doing. Thus, it contradicts the way of nurturer.

There is the irresistible temptation in us to find out how, which is to learn the secret by a linear, step-by-step method, or to be told in words. For instance, people ask for dancing to be explained to them instead of watching and following. But the expert cannot always explain the secret of his craft. Here is the wheelwright's speaking:

In making a wheel, if you work too slowly, you can't make it firm; if you work too fast, the spokes won't fit in. You must go neither too slowly nor too fast. There must be co-ordination of mind and hand. Words cannot teach it to my son; nor can he learn it from me. Consequently, though seventy years of age, I am still making wheels in my old age (Giles, 1972, p. 172).

As the story says, the Tao cannot be defined in words and is not an idea or concept. It may be attained but not seen. In other words, it may be felt but not conceived, intuited but not categorized, divined but not explained. Thus, our way of apprehending it is by watching the process and patterns of nature, and by the meditative thinking of allowing our minds to become quiet, so as to have vivid awareness of what is without verbal comment. Accordingly, the way of nurturer is learned in every part of daily life by following jay-yun .

The nurturer's behavior is different from the exploiter's routine habit. The nurturer's behavior is virtuous (duk, in Korean). Virtuous behavior is not acquired by repetition of identical acts but begins to behave in accordance with the Tao (logos). In the Heideggerian sense, virtuous behavior begins to respond to the dialectical self-enriching of Being. Virtue is in the whole. It begins with a tension between the one and the many. It is not a settled disposition to act in a stereotyped manner, but the ever emerging and self-enriching disposition. In Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's sense, this self-enriching is re-petition (re-again; petere-to search). This re-petition is not mechanical repetition of routine habits, but the going-back-into the self-enriching of Being. The progressive achievement of virtuous behavior proceeds through a re-newal of its primary data, and through presenting its past data as future possibilities. And it is only through continual vigilance that one can prevent one's virtuous behavior from turning into the killing routine of habits. Here is an example which Zukav writes:

I asked Huang how he structures his classes.
 "Every lesson is the first lesson," he told me. "Every time we dance, we do it for the first time."
 "But surely you cannot be starting new each lesson," I said. "Lesson number two must be built on what you taught in lesson number one, and lesson three likewise must be built on lessons one and two, and so on."
 "When I say that every lesson is the first lesson," he replied, "it does not mean that we forget what we already know. It means that what we are doing is always new, because we are always doing it for the first time."
 This is another characteristic of a Master. Whatever he does, he does with the enthusiasm of doing it for the first time. This is the source of his unlimited energy. Every lesson that he teaches (or learns) is a first time. Every dance that he dances, he dances for the first time. It is always new, personal, and alive (1978, pp. 8-9).

In short, this story tells the difference between the exploiter's and the nurturer's way. And where is the way in which we shall escape from the burned-out situation in teaching?

In the realm of performativity principle, the nurturer is incompatible with the exploiter. By the standards of instrumentalism, the nurturer is merely an anachronism. In the technological society, the nurturer is thrown away as marginal. The possibility of the margin's existence would

seem contemptible, not just to the majority of educational experts, but to the majority of influential people of other kinds. And yet we must ask why. And we must be careful not to accept too hasty or easy an answer. For no matter what may be said by the current standards of technology or cultural fashion about the nurturer, there is still no legitimate way of withholding respect from the nurturer. In a time when many teachers are finding it easy to accept a dependence on welfare, and when many teachers are dependent on social security and other public means of support, there will be the nurturer who works until he dies, taking care of himself and of his part of the world.

G. Building a Bridge to Teacher Education

Korean teacher education has experienced euphoria based on the scientific attitude, so-called competency-based teacher education. Teacher education became more "scientific" from the early 1960's. Various specialist disciplines were added in an expanded curriculum, simultaneously setting up many barriers against one another that any form of interdisciplinary activity was hardly possible. Many lecturers adopted one-sided interpretation of science preventing them from embarking on discussions about aims, values, anthropological ideas and ideologies in general. They tended to express themselves only in factual terms, thus neutralizing the disciplines.

Such a change was supposed to raise the prestige of teaching as a profession. But it was not recognized that it was sought at the expense of the nurturer's way. The techniques of teaching special subjects are ranged in the prescribed syllabuses. Matters have reached such a pass these days that we may well ask whether there is anything pedagogical left in teacher education institutions.

The flood of foreign theories penetrated as early as kindergarten classes and dazzled both teachers and students. Over some areas the scientific attitude is synonymous with power. And it is thought to be a natural phenomenon. They regard it as mockery that pedagogy tries to plead for any holistic way of nurturing. But it is overlooked by them that such a way of nurturing has always done something to keep the focus on the student and not just to see facts which the student learns by rote learning.

Teaching is subjected to planning and strategies for learning aimed at making, in theory, the learning process more structured. But it is not realized that teaching involves not only rational steps but also intuition and personal involvement and that teaching involves pedagogical moments in the process of education when students really comprehend what it is all about.

Much has gone on under the rubric of competency-based teacher education, but the key notion seems to be that identifiable behaviors, competencies, and characteristics of teaching can form the basis of teacher education and teacher certification. Those who believe in competency-based teacher education are directing a major portion of their efforts and expenditures toward cutting through the logjam in the sea of opinions that surrounds the performance of teachers and toward identifying scientifically demonstrated behaviors that define good or at least competent teaching (Kliebard, 1973, P.15). Its basic assumption is that teaching is a technical process. For instance, teaching, like typing, consists of a set of standard ways to do a particular thing.

According to Kliebard (1973, p.16), although teaching is usually considered to be a highly deliberative process, there may be blind, spontaneous factors at work that have much to do with the effects and effectiveness. In fact, these nondeliberative tendencies may have more to do with what the schools accomplish than do the deliberate particular behaviors that teachers exhibit in the classroom. The spontaneous tendencies of human beings account in such large

measure for the impact of schooling that the particular modifications we introduce are not sufficient to show up in statistical measures of school achievement. So, whatever the strength of the statistical relationships may be, it is difficult to derive great optimism about a science of teaching from the scientific findings.

Accordingly, what we need is to understand the nature of pedagogy. An important step toward an understanding of the pedagogical nature of teaching may involve nothing more spectacular than natural history research. This involves making observations in the world and seeing what goes on, because being a good teacher may involve infinitely possible human excellences and appropriate behaviors. As we attempt to observe and understand teaching, we may discover that teaching, after all, does not involve only the exercise of a technical skill. According to Carson, "Teaching means to live in the flux of the newness of the world and in the play of competence and vulnerability (1990, p. 14)." Carson goes on to say:

If teaching means to live in the tension of vulnerability and competence, what are our responsibilities as teacher educators? We understand first that teacher education is not discontinuous with teaching itself. It too is exposed to the same flux of vulnerability and competency. We must be prepared, at times, to set aside our own answers and solutions to listen to the stories the student teachers tell about their journey to becoming teachers (1990, p. 15).

From this point of view, we go toward a radical reformulation of the question in teacher education and a critical exploration of the directions of new paths.

The nurturer's way is a new path. The problem is that the nurturer's way is difficult to implement in teacher education institutions. Although it is a difficult problem, we need someone who will sow the seed of nurturing. Without sowing, we cannot expect a harvest. But who will sow the seed in the foreign soil?

Korean students live in a bewildering tension between a rapidly industrialized and outwardly westernized environment and an idealized life dominated by Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Even if the former's orientation is stronger than the latter's, two distinct

personalities reside within the individual. This conflict in Korean culture is a kind of dis-ease.

The result of this is a longing for a hidden Savior.

Who will play the role of Savior? Teachers. Are you sure that teachers will play a role? No, I only hope so. Why? Because their time has not yet come. According to post-structuralism's viewpoint, at any given historical period in a specific culture, a certain discourse achieves a favored position while others are marginalized or even suppressed. Then, at another historical point, these discursive relationships are rearranged. Thus, must we wait for the teachers' time without acting? No. Then, what? Teacher educators have to be working quietly to deconstruct the competency-based teacher education in teacher education institutions as some North American teacher educators are doing.

If my understanding is right, teacher educators must practise what they think rather than trying to build theories. Their effort is different from competency-based teacher education. Even though they are in the margin now, they must try to decenter the division. The University of Alberta "Task Force on Teacher Education Models", which is one of many discussions about practices in North America, says:

A bright spot for us, as teacher educators, is that we do not have to wait for conditions in the universities, the schools, and the teaching profession to change: We hold the power to make an impact that will improve the quality of all three institutions concurrently and immediately (Mapping the Future, 1989, p. 33).

Henderson (1989) proposes a more radical idea than "task force on teacher education models". He says, "One way to conceptualize this environment - and to facilitate the open, nonthreatening discursive exploration associated with 'positioned reflective practice' - is to design a preservice teacher education program in which students are protected by a Praxis Bill of Rights (p.12)." This Bill of Rights says the following:

1. As a student of education, I have a right to deconstruct fixed, reified discourses associated with teaching. I, thus, have a right to explore meaning difference and deferral in relevant educational significations. This is an

autobiographical/historical project which demystifies the language that affects my teaching.

2. As a student of education, I have a right to deliberate over all relevant historical, learning content and personal interpretations associated with particular educational problems. I recognize that my deliberations and subsequent decisions will generally occur in a rhetorically charged, open-ended, and, to varying degrees, an unconscious context.

3. As a student of education, I have a right to expand my horizons. I recognize the incompleteness of any one discourse - particularly in the complex work of teaching. I have a right to engage in an open-minded discovery of meaning throughout my career.

4. As a future educator, I have a right to act on my discursive deliberations in accordance with my own professional purpose and then reflect on the consequences of these actions.

5. As a future provider of educational services, I realize that I exercise my rights in a socio-political arena. I, therefore, am willing to defend my deliberative and self-contemplative actions in light of locally reasonable discourses, which provide social/professional cohesiveness, and in several interactive contexts: teacher-to-student, teaching peer-to-teaching peer, teacher-to-administrator, and so on (pp. 12-13).

This would provide students with a wide variety of opportunities to engage in publicly defensible activities based on deconstruction, decision, and discovery. It would be a necessary condition to create a climate (ethos) in teacher education, but it cannot be a sufficient condition, because artificial laws do not go beyond a slogan's meaning. At any rate, if my understanding is right, some North American teacher educators' efforts attempt to make the soil fertile. It has the possibility to make the nurturer's seed germinate. It, thus, relates with the nurturer's way.

The nurturer, however, is a way, a life style. To be a nurturer, we need a revolution of inner life which make us look at things differently. Heidegger says, "Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality for our understanding (1944, p.344)." That is to say, metaphysics is the questioning beyond the things that are, in order to regain them as such and in the whole for the purpose of comprehension. Brock's following interpretation of Heidegger gives some implications for the nurturer's way.

... Heidegger ventures to offer a new formulation for his own outlook, defining strikingly the great import of the metaphysical experience of "nothingness" for human knowledge of beings. Only through the transcending to "nothingness"

does man approach the things as what they are and only thus do they come truly into their own.

As to the second aspect, the import of the experience of "nothingness" for the scientist and scholar is emphasized. Through the exposure to "nothingness" the strangeness of the things that are will be newly and deeply felt. Only when they are impressing one as strange can the genuine astonishment be aroused, which impels us, as if we were the first to do so, to ask for reasons, for argument and to commence research (1944, pp. 219-220).

In the nurturer's way what we need is that kind of experience which derives from inner life. It is not an easy way. It would happen through teacher's commitment. Then, the teacher may remain silent. Many of the most successful Zen masters have remained silent, and their silence has thundered. For the student learns not from what the teacher says, but from his action. It is proper to Carson's saying:

Reflectivity in teacher education means that we hope that students will be becoming aware of themselves becoming teachers. As they record and recall the difficulty of becoming teachers, they come to accept that there are many roads that the journey might take and the journey is never over. As teacher educators we have a responsibility to sustain students in their difficulty by encouraging their conversations and by helping to build within our classrooms the contexts that will support them (1990, p. 15).

In this context, what we need as teacher educators is to quietly pour out our souls to student teachers. We call it *jung-sung* in Korean. In Chung Tzu it is expressed in the following way:

Wood worker Ch'ing carved a piece of wood and made a bell stand, and when it was finished, everyone who saw it marveled, for it seemed to be the work of gods or spirits. When the marquis of Lu saw it, he asked, "What art is it you have?"

Ch'ing replied, "I am only a craftsman-how would I have any art? There is one thing, however. When I am going to make a bell stand, I never let it wear out my energy. I always fast in order to still my mind. When I have fasted for three days, I no longer have any thought of congratulations or rewards, of titles or stipends. When I fasted for five days, I no longer have any thought of praise or blame, of skill or clumsiness. And when I have fasted for seven days, I am so still that I forget I have four limbs and a form and body. By that time, the ruler and his court no longer exist for me. My skill is concentrated and all outside distractions fade away. After that, I go into the mountain forest and examine the Heavenly nature of the trees. If I find one of superlative form, and I can see a bell stand there, I put my hand to the job of carving; if not, I let it go. This way I am simply matching up 'Heaven' with 'Heaven'. That's probably the reason that people wonder if the results were not made by spirit (1964, pp. 126-127).

This jun-sung may be the seed of a nurturer's way in teacher education. From this spirit we can build a bridge to teacher education which will be a fertile soil and a warm climate. The way home will derives from this climate and soil. And then, pedagogy will find its home. It is an endless journey.

CHAPTER VI

ALONG THE COUNTRY ROAD

I put forward at once the three tasks for which educators are required. One must learn to see, one must learn to think, one must learn to speak and write: the goal in all three is a noble culture. Learning to see - accustoming the eye to calmness, to patience, to letting things come up to it; postponing judgment, learning to go around and grasp each individual case from all sides. That is the first preliminary schooling for spirituality: not to react at once to a stimulus, but to gain control of all the inhibiting, excluding instincts. Learning to see, as I understand it, is almost what, unphilosophically speaking, is called a strong will: the essential feature is precisely not to will - to be able to suspend decision. . . . To have all doors standing open . . . is ignoble par excellence. Learning to think: in our schools one no longer has any idea of this. Even in the universities, even among the real scholars of philosophy, logic as a theory, as a practice, as a craft, is beginning to die out (Nietzsche, 1954, pp. 511-2).

Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining under way. . . . We must get on the way, that is, must take the steps by which alone the way becomes a way. The way of thinking cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere like a well-worn rut, nor does it at all exist as such in any place. Only when we walk it, and in no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questioning, are we on the move on the way. This movement is what allows the way to come forward (Heidegger, 1971, p.168-9).

From the marketplace I arrived onto the country road at midnight. This country road was different from the marketplace street which I trod. The only light came from the stars twinkling in the sky. It was a road that I walked on at my own risk. It was a road of self-responsibility, whereas the marketplace street which I had walked was a road of the herd who did not have self-responsibility. The country road was not a road of crowds, but of rare travelers. It was not a man-made highway with pavement, but belonged primarily to the meditative way. It was a steep path on which I walked alone.

In the marketplace, I found myself imprisoned by my own subjectivism. Thus, I became aware that I faced the world as a field for my hunting ground. Everything in the world I considered as being related to me. The more I embraced the world, the more the world I conquered is exposed. I saw the meaning of my life in the domination or ruling of my world. The

world was present for my use and possible exploitation and the meaning of my life seemed to lie in that exploitation.

In the marketplace, I admired scientific technological thinking. I had come to believe that a complete behavioral science could tell every fact about every student's intellect, character and behavior and moreover, could tell the result of every educational force. I had come to believe that the scientific technological thinking would aid me in using human beings for the world's welfare and that we should become masters of our own souls as we were masters of heat and light.

For I was imprisoned in calculative thinking. I did not know that reason had been institutionalized. Why did I not know that reason had been institutionalized? I did not know that in the marketplace, all problems are conceived as technological problems for which an appropriate technology of behavior is required. I am reminded of Caputo who says:

The world has become the raw material for the various technologies of power - political technologies which manipulate and control public opinion and policy; social technologies which set standards of conduct; educational technologies which insure the normalization and regulation of schools and children. It is not only nature which must submit to our control but education, sexuality, the political process, the art - in short, the whole sphere of human practices. Nuclear power and bio-power; power/knowledge; the will-to-know and knowing as willing. This is what is coming to pass in science and technology, in the sense that this is the frame of mind of culture dominated by the success and prestige of science and technology. And the university bends slowly under the power of the principle of reason (1987, p. 233).

As a teacher I was a puppeteer who pursued the prestige of science and technology. I was speeding toward the extreme of my subjectivity in the hope of holding the world completely in my hand. And with the world in my hand, I believed I would then be fully a teacher. In the marketplace, I did not meet Nietzsche's madman who said, "God is dead." I did not even hear that Nietzsche's madman had appeared. If I had met or heard of the madman, likely I would have yelled and laughed. Why? Because I believed in reason instead of God.

Thus, I was a believer of rational thinking. I liked curricula which emphasized intellectual skills. I regarded teaching as mind-building accomplished by filling containers with factual and theoretical knowledge. I depended on a script or a pre-structured sequence for guarantees about effective teaching. Accordingly, I regarded students as blotters who absorb knowledge.

I lacked insight that students did not simply respond to stimuli. Much time elapsed before I came to understand that students construe situations, that they make sense of classrooms, that they anticipate the work within which they live. I came to understand that what constitutes a stimulus depends not simply on what is injected in the classroom but also on what students take from it; that what different students take from the classroom and what they make of what they take differs. I came to understand that the classroom teacher deals with unique configurations that change over time; that the role of teacher is closer to that of the negotiator than that of the engineer; that what skilled teaching requires is the ability to recognize dynamic patterns, to grasp their meaning, and the ingenuity to invent ways to respond to them, that simply possessing a set of discrete skills ensures nothing. When these became my realization, the complete emptiness of my beliefs and absurdity of my self as teacher was revealed to me. Fitting is Gotz's description of an absurd teacher:

A year is finished. Another is about to start. And this process of finishing and starting has gone on for years, and it will go on for years, until one is too tired to begin anew or too decrepit to know one has finished. This is a cycle of meaninglessness, the never-ending repetition of the same motions, the same questions, the same answers, the same assignments, the same memos, the same drills. This is the rock one pushes up every year, to see it roll down when the new year starts. " So I continue to continue.....
It is never enough to teach one class. One can never do one's teaching job so perfectly that one could exhaust all the myriad possibilities latent in what it means to be a teacher. The " essential " teacher evades one's grasp. It is a vain pursuit of a cloud that always stays ahead. And so one multiplies the trails, and one begins again and again. It is not, really, that one still hopes to fulfill the expectations of being a teacher. It is not that one expects that, perhaps this year, one will become what one has failed to become year after year up to now. The absurd teacher knows this will never be, and so quantity takes over the place of fulfillment, and one simply continues to continue.... Perhaps many words will say what one utterance alone could never mean; they may fulfill the potentialities of being a teacher.

One strives to inform, but one knows that information must be received, that words, once uttered, must be heard, that questions require answers that cannot be truly plucked from the answerer as one plucks apples from a tree. One cannot make another see. One can present oneself and hope one will be noticed. One's words must hang loosely in the air until a ready spirit captures them and makes them its own. So many meanings die for want of a ready mind, so many feelings go away!

And so one faces those others in the classroom with the forlorn hope that, perhaps today, they will accept, and one will be finally fulfilled as a teacher. But one is afraid to look too close, to scrutinize the faces directly in front: eyes with a glazed, opaque quality like the haze that dims the horizon, sign of the distance between the teacher and the taught; hands that move routinely, in habitual, studied ways, to tick off an answer here, erase an error there, turn a page to show one has been reading, scribbling something to show one has been listening (even though, in truth, one has been enjoying the sunshine in the fields, last summer, or the one before, when butterflies danced among the flowers, and the sky was blue); clanging bells, the flurry of activity that is too nervous to be spontaneous, sign of pent-up energy seeking temporary release. This is the mechanism of classroom procedure that makes the teacher feel alien to it all, a person among mannequins, the ghost in the machine.

If only one could communicate that inner vision, the meanings one has found, the relevances one has discovered! But there is a denseness about experience that makes it impenetrable to all but the one who has been graced by it. One cannot destroy the walls that circle all individuals and render them unique. One's insight must remain one's own, one's anguish is one's burden. And to this one adds the solitary despair of seeing others make the mistakes one made, without being able to teach them the lessons that one learned.

So the years pass, and classes come and go, and death approaches, and what one set out to become, the teacher, still remains an unapproachable ideal. One is not nearer now than one was when one started it all. But time is running out. One must not lose the lucidity and awareness one has gained, even though the temptation is strong and ever-present: the fawning respect of parents and even of students more interested in a high grade than in true learning, the learning that cannot be measured; the false sense that one has "taught" someone something, that one has been "shaping character," that one has reduced a soul from the darkness of ignorance and let it "up the steep and rugged ascent" to the light of wisdom. All this is illusion, and its effect is the clouding of lucidity, of the awareness that teaching, in fact, never fully takes place. One must retain one's lucidity and not let oneself be deceived by the pretense that one "knows" what one is doing, that one "knows" what others don't, that one has seen what others have not, that one can guide others through the night toward the dawn of a new day. Above all, one must avoid the lingering hope that one day "they will return," their minds enlightened, their hearts aflame, to thank one for the kindling of the fire that burns without consuming - the craving for knowledge. One never fully accomplishes anything. One is never fully teacher. Even if some were to return, the absence would be sufficient to remind one that the fullness of teaching can never be realized.

The rock rolls down: a class departs, and one strides in to meet another. One does not know if one has ever, really, taught. One knows that one can never, fully, be a teacher. But the doing of it is, in itself, enough to fill one's heart. The meeting of people and minds, the merging of hearts, year after year, in the knowledge that we are fellow travellers in quest of temporary abodes, is, itself, a most enjoyable experience. One must imagine the teacher happy (1987, pp. 272-273).

Feeling a bit troublesome made me come to the country road which was overgrown because it was rarely trodden. On the country road I became a true traveller, because with my own feet and not with a man-made apparatus (techno-scientific method) I struck the earth, the true natural pedagogical world. Sometimes I found that the road ended suddenly in tracklessness, and in this tracklessness I often got lost.

A. The Night on the Country Road

He was dumb. He could not hear and speak a single word. He suffered in silence on the country road. What was worse was that when he arrived on the country road, he had no sense of direction because it was too dark and there was no signpost. Only stars were twinkling in the sky. At that time, what the dumb person could do was to try to find a fellow traveler who could guide him along the country road. Fortunately, the dumb person found some travelers in the dark. They told him something, but the dumb person could not hear what they said because he was dumb.

Although they came up to the dumb person and kindly explained, he could not understand what they were saying. But the dumb person could see their mild faces which were different from the marketplace persons' faces. The seeing of the difference gave some consolation to the dumb person. He made up his mind to follow the fellow travelers' heels. It seemed to the dumb that they enjoyed walking on the country road. They talked of landscapes, of stars, of plants, auroras, and of traces.

Sometimes they seemed to be happy. Sometimes they seemed to be solitary, but they walked earnestly on their road. The dumb person envied them and doubted whether or not the day when he was able to join in their conversation would come. Some travelers extended

friendly help to the poor dumb. On the endless road, they tried to lead him by using body languages or writing into the endless road. So, the dumb person was able to know even vaguely the meaning of the country road. What he dimly grasped was that it was a road leading into the beyond of scientific modes.

Even though he was dumb, he could know that there were action researchers, phenomenologists, deconstructionists, hermeneuticists, critical theoreticians among the travelers who were walking along the country road. To the dumb person who came from the marketplace street, those travelers were strange. They talked about Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, Georg Lukas, Walter Benjamin, Antonio Gramsci, Ernst Bloch, Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, and Roland Barthes. Those stars were strange to the dumb person.

And they spoke strange terminologies which were different from the terminologies spoken in the marketplace streets. Accordingly, the dumb person could not understand them. The dumb person was busy looking up the strange twinkling stars. Looking up at the strange stars, he wandered what paths there were on the stars and doubted whether or not he was able to become familiar with the remote stars. If he were able to become familiar with the stars; where would he find the way to reach the stars?

From that time the dumb person became a kind of begging one who went about asking for alms. In the dark, the dumb person climbed some hills, waded across some streams, and waded through mud in order to reach the path. But the stars were twinkling in the distance. On rainy days, the dumb person could seldom find shelters, and even if by fortune he did find a shelter, the dumb person was not able to stay there, for the shelter was too shabby. To follow at the fellow travellers' heels, the dumb person had to go and go about asking for alms without pledge.

One day, the dumb person met a sightseer who came from the same marketplace that the dumb came from for the sake of getting information about the country road. He asked the dumb person, "Where are you going?" The dumb said, "I don't know." He asked, "What have you seen?" The dumb person said, "Nothing!" "If so, you are wasting time on the country road. It is not too late for you to change your course. The marketplace wants persons who will pave the road which will lead to an advanced place." "But I enjoy walking on the country road." "It is strange to me." "To me, too."

The dumb person said, "Someone who is born and reared in a country home, and who for a succession of years has been living in a city where one moves from one section of the town to another and constantly occupies different homes knows - when one comes back to one's country home - what homeness means. One knows it when one sees the weather-beaten dwellings and barns of one's ancestral country home, when one hears the rustling trees protecting one's home from winds and suns, and when one walks on the paths on which one used to run as a child. Home for one is the place where one has seen the earth bearing fruits for one and for one's people in the blessed years or failing to give sufficient crops in lean years. Here one has learned to understand the mild summer skies which send the warmth of the sun and winter skies tearing the roofs of the dwellings or breaking the branches of the trees. Home for one is the place where one has heard one's parent's clamorous words to the heavens in the days of calamities and their grateful words in days of favor. Can you understand the country boy's experience?" "So what?" "I mean that in spite of my roaming, I am comfortable now."

When the dumb person was a little more familiar with the fellow travelers' mode of thinking, one of the dumb person's favorite fellow travelers pointed a finger at a constellation. The dumb person looked up to the constellation where many stars were twinkling. Among the stars, three special stars were specially twinkling. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger.

They opened a way for the dumb person. It was a milestone that the dumb person had a chance to watch the stars. Because from that time the dumb person began to realize the meaning of his walking on the country road. The dumb person's epistemology began to change from the marketplace to the country road. And it was at that time the dumb person began to speak. The dumb person could hear a loud voice. The dumb person began to stammer. The dumb person asked himself, "Where is pedagogy in the country road? Is pedagogy an exclusive possession of the marketplace people?" The dumb person's first answer was that he would try to find pedagogy which would give light in the dark. The way home.

B. The Dawn on the Country Road

When the dumb person met the stars, he started to reflect on what the dumb person had done in the marketplace and who he had been. What the dumb had done was to pursue calculative thinking because he had believed that calculative thinking would aid him to use human beings for the world's welfare and that he could become master of his own soul. Thus, the dumb as a teacher tried to implement pre-structured knowledge rather than conceptualize pedagogical practices; he had become a technician knowing not the meaning of what it is to be a teacher.

The dumb person was nothing but the *they*. He took pleasure and enjoyed himself as *they* pleased. He read, saw, and judged about disciplines and subject matters as *they* saw and read. He preferred to believe that real responsibility involved slavish obedience to whatever norms and standards were in force at the moment. He ignored the fact that he was really finite openness because he interpreted himself as a kind of self-objectification. Since he understood himself as a separate object in need of gratification and security, he tended to

manipulate students and things. So, the dumb person as a teacher pursued the prestige of science and technology without engagement of the world at a much deeper level.

He became a dumb on the country road, where his eyes came to be opened. Now he could see even in the dark a more further horizon. The first understanding that occurred to the dumb was that he had rushed toward the nihilistic point in the marketplace. It was an ineffable experience which appeared and disappeared like an aurora. It made the dumb person linger on the meaning of pedagogy. The dumb person asked himself, "From now on, what should I do?" He went on walking along the country road.

While he was walking along the road, he met 'inwardness', 'overman', and 'authenticity' in the forest. These were the maps which showed the dumb person a direction which he would follow. Walking along the paths, these edified him. For him it was a finding of the meaning of walking along the country road. The dumb person asked himself, "Where should I then go? Where is pedagogy which can lead beyond nihilism?"

The dumb went into the forest and lost his way. It was cold and dark. But the stars were twinkling as ever. Although those gave some consolation to him, he was anxious about losing his way. He felt his way in the dark. He strayed from forest to forest to find a road for a winter. When he reached a spot, he could sense someone's approaching. He was the dumb person's favorite fellow traveler who had pointed a finger at the constellation. He pointed a finger at a steep hill. The fellow traveller seemed to say that the dumb had been roaming in a different world. It looked like a caution against the dumb. The dumb interpreted it as he had to go over the hill. It was not until that time that the dumb noticed that he was in a different world and he had to be in the world of pedagogy.

It was not easy for the dumb person to climb the hill because it was different from the marketplace's hill which was paved. With the fellow traveler's aid, the dumb person could climb the hill. While the dumb person was climbing the hill, even in the dark, he could see a

landscape which was different from the marketplace's. The landscape, which could not be caught even by the sensitive video camera, was beautiful. The dumb person asked himself, "How can I explain it to the marketplace people?"

On the hill, the dumb person could see a wide river flowing in the distance. The fellow traveler told him to go to the river and cross over it to the far side. The dumb person went to the river. It was too wide and too swift. It was impossible for anyone to cross over it without a ferry. The dumb person asked himself, "What is there on the far side? How can I make a ferry?" He answered, "Nobody knows what there is in the far side. At any rate, I have to build a ferry in order to cross the river."

To build a ferry, the dumb person made a blueprint according to his experience which made him linger on. He anticipated that the blueprint would not be perfect, because he knew that during the building, he had to respond to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within the wood. After seeing the dumb person's blueprint, the fellow travelers allowed him to build the ferry.

To build the ferry, the dumb person had to make implements and gather wood by himself. And while building the ferry, he responded to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within the wood. Although it was difficult to build the ferry, it made the dumb person happy. While the dumb person was making the ferry, he had much time to look back upon his country road's day. He tried to show that the marketplace people's pedagogical consciousness was dominated by utilitarian thinking (a kind of egoistic thinking). He asked the three stars' counsel, to find the way which would lead beyond the nihilistic viewpoint in pedagogy. He dialogued with his past consciousness, to change his thinking from calculative thinking to meditative thinking. He tried to find some wisdom in the three stars, to widen his narrow minded-thinking in pedagogy. And he tried to find the path to live in peace, because he had a great yearning for home.

To the dumb person, walking along the country road was an important experience which gave him the same feeling of homeness that Barrett experienced.

Rocks and trees. I have grown to know them particularly this winter; they have accompanied me on my walks, or rather I have learned to enter into their company. Winter trees are more beautiful than under the fat heavy foliage of summer. Now they lay bare their secret structure, the naked and living line of branch and bough, the supple harshness of their enduring struggle with the elements. . . . With some I have come to know the particular curves and twists of their branched like the individual features of friends. The rocks are no less individuals. Whoever thinks matter is mere inert stuff has not looked long at rocks. They do not lie inert; They thrust forward, or crouch back in quiet, self-gathered power. . . . In the gray light of winter they come alive in their color too - smoke-gray or blue gray, molded and subtle in their shading that shifts as the gray light shifts. The living rock! More than an idle phrase. Out of the living rock the waters of spirit. For the moment I have passed outside the world of man. . . . The important thing is to find freedom in the movement of your body first, let the mind be what it will. By the second mile I am set free in the body, the havoc of the mind and the idiocy of its ideas recede. I am no longer homeless. I am there. The trees are there too, and the rocks; I have come into this stringent but secretly lavish life of winter (1967, pp. 368-369).

This experience was not a vague feeling. It was an articulate experience at which the dumb person wanted to dwell for a long time. He was no longer homeless in pedagogy. It was an irony that he felt homeness in the foreign land. The dumb person's agony was how he could move the homeness to the marketplace.

C. Postscript

This study does not lead my thought beyond the world realm in pedagogy. It remains an attempt to carry thought to the utmost sources and grounds of reality without leaning on any prejudice whatsoever. It leads my thought to the utmost peaks of human being's walkable ground.

This study is meant to be a path leading me into the realm of meditative thinking - a path which may help me penetrate and explore this realm, to become acquainted with it, and to feel at home in it. I know that in the eyes of many marketplace people dumb person's ferry is a joke, but during the walk along the country road I glimpsed the beautiful landscape in the dark, and during the building of my ferry, I began to understand the meaning of "things as they are". Jung says:

Meditative thinking is characterized by serenity - the receptive reverence of things as they are in themselves - while calculative thinking implies dominance, manipulation, and utility. Serenity is no willed, nonforced, and nonconcerned activity, that is, an active responsiveness in man to the "natural light" of a thing. It is then "a will-less letting in of everything," the spontaneity that sets a thing free to be nothing but itself. . . . Heidegger's notion of serenity or releasement parallels the Taoist idea of *wu wei* and the Zen way of thinking and doing - the way of refraining from thinking and doing contrary to the natural and spontaneous way of things. . . . The notion of Nature - *jay-yun* in Korean - signifies a "serene" or "reverential" composure for the "natural spontaneity" of all things, the "thisness" or "thatness" (or "thusness") of everything living or nonliving (1987, p. 234).

To understand "things as they are" is to respect and to thank Nature (*jay-yun*). It means to save things and to let harmony be. It means to dwell. To dwell means to cultivate and build things in the neighborhood. Hence a neighbor is one who is open to the higher realities next to me.

Perhaps an object says, "Meditative thinking is mystical. The thinking of mystics occurs in the corners of real life, and it may do little to address current social and political problems. Indeed, the exponent of meditative thinking may become part of such problems. Look at Heidegger's a short involvement with the Nazis. Thus, meditative thinking is irrelevant because it occurs in the heads of a few philosophers, but the real world goes on despite all this."

I suspect that many have had at least some of these sentiments at one time or another. Yet it is beside the point here whether Heidegger's life was ethically good. The question here is about thinking as the overcoming of nihilism; and I do not believe nihilism can be overcome by

focusing directly on social and political problems while ignoring the underlying absence of meaning and seriousness in people's lives. The objector has forced upon thinking the traditional category of subjective. Thinking is an essential element in dwelling. Thinking and dwelling are not related as theoretical and practical. Thinking satisfies its essence in that it is. And it is by letting Being be. Still, the importance of ethical and political problems cannot be dismissed. In particular, I have to think about the discrepancy between a thinker's philosophical achievement and a thinker's sin, and about how the philosophical achievement can be developed to address moral and political problems. But such questions are beyond this thesis' purpose. Thus, they remain to be explored.

My ferry is waiting for the day of launching. And "I", who become "i", am looking forward to the day of the far side that will be a new beginning of travel, without why.

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