

Suspended between forms either disused or as yet unknown, the writer's language is not so much a fund to be drawn on as an extreme limit; it is the geometrical locus of all that he could not say without, like Orpheus looking back, losing the stable meaning of his enterprise and his essential gesture as a social being.

Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*

University of Alberta

Cutting out one's tongue – The Red Army Faction and the aesthetics of
body (anti)language

by

Kimberly Marie Mair

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology

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Abstract

Drawing from my archival research on the Red Army Faction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the urban guerrilla movement active in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland from the 1970s, my dissertation works *through* the RAF to speculate about the compulsion towards self-representation inherent to subjectivity. Such compulsion proffers an urgent and recurrent imperative to speak what cannot be said or to conjure what does not exist. This work argues that the perils and the failures of such enunciation, in the face of its compulsory demand, are felt not only in speech but in *choreographies of subjectivity* performed in *aesthetic convolutions* of space, gesture, and intonation. These convolutions are subject-forming material productions, rather than reflections or echoes of a pre-existing coherent subject, and trouble the notion of self-representation to the extent that they produce and re-produce the self.

While the body is formed by culture, it consistently circumvents the limits of the genres that govern speech communication, therefore, my work is concerned with tracing a *mise en scène of self-production* by emphasizing non-textual elements. The forms that this circumvention can take exceed the involuntary cry, gesture, uneven breath, or facial expression to include uses of space – space that is implicated in the body's formation – but the public legibility of such circumventions is not guaranteed. This work aims to refunction the RAF's declaration of the body as a weapon to the body as a medium for communication and to approach the aesthetics of a body (anti)language that extends beyond the

particularities of the urban guerrilla project to the situation of mundane subjectivity that repeatedly calls for enunciation.

My dissertation is a performative text that deploys formal interventions – such as collage, assemblage, photography, and interleaved texts meant to intrude upon the reader – that target instrumental language use. To illustrate that the ongoing production of subjectivity of the urban guerrilla is not alien to that of the politically recognizable citizen, my work contemplates practices of contemporary art and the production of material objects of signification that engage in practices of citation and disguise the incoherence of our acts.

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Abbreviations

APO	Ausserparlamentarische Opposition Extraparliamentary Opposition
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt Federal Criminal Investigation Office
BMG	Baader-Meinhof Gruppe Baader-Meinhof Gang (Red Army Faction)
BRD	Bundesrepublik Deutschland Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union Christian Democratic Union
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
DM	Deutsche Marks German Marks
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
K.1	Kommune 1 Commune 1
MG	Militante Gruppe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang)
RZ	Revolutionäre Zellen Revolutionary Cells
SDS	Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund Socialist German Student Union
SHS	Sozialistische Hochschulbund Socialist University Student Union

SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPK	Sozialistisches Patienten Kollektiv Socialist Patients' Collective
TW	Tupamaros West Berlin
2.6	2 nd of June Movement
4.2	Second-generation Red Army Faction

Production notes – an introduction

“Rumbling, drumming, droning, whistling: an installation in Merianplatz Underground station. This installation is a painful memory whose strength is in its openness. A room it is not possible to enter, as if it were a step into the interior of pain. Almost 30 years of German post-war history are included in this parenthesis to the title: many deaths, much terror, mourning and sorrow. Someone has scratched ‘Love + Peace’ on the window frame, probably years before, back when wishing still made a difference...it sounds like an echo before the sound. The Rote Armee Fraktion’s (RAF) armed struggle against oppression is not in the end a trauma of the Left. If you look through the pane into the bare room, long faded pictures spontaneously return, just as, for years, they must have followed Korn, born in ’65. Flickering TV pictures, buried deep in the collective unconscious, also begin to speak of isolation when faced with this room filled with infernal noise, from which everything which is subdued emerges as if from far away...”¹

Christoph Korn’s 2003 installation expresses an aspect of the difficulty of taking the Red Army Faction (RAF), or the Baader-Meinhof Gang, as they were known in the media, as a subject of study. The interior of the basement room of the underground station can be accessed by the spectator only in a highly constrained way – from the track, there is a view through a window of thick glass. There is a minor breach of the enclosed space – it is a telephone, a connection to the outside, but no one ever sees or hears it being used. Another small compromise in the otherwise impenetrable walls of the underground station is the glass that separates the viewer from the enclosure. While it enables an opening to see through, it drowns out what would otherwise be a deafening clamour of sound so that what

can be heard is so much less than what, in a deliberate gesture, is offered to the would-be listener.

What place is represented by the interior of the room? How might passersby – many of whom, it can be imagined, were unwitting and/or unwilling audiences submitted to this installation as they went about their daily urban transit routine – have interpreted their own location relative to the room? Who or what is this RAF that the installation addresses or indexes? Does Korn refer to particular acting subjects; to a set of events, actions, and experiences; or to a time period? If it is the case that the installation is set in a vacated office for a transit employee, a room that remains largely unaltered, why is it that one of the few central elements produced particularly for this installation, the soundscape, happens to be the very element that the audience cannot access, except in fragments, in a state of distortion, diminished almost to the point of erasure by the walls that surround the space? What is it that we are not hearing?

Korn's installation initiates a number of questions that highlight some of the challenges intrinsic to my endeavour. Perhaps most significantly, it highlights the problem of identity. It is the task of the spectator to consider who or what Korn's installation references – nevertheless, the spectator is implicated in it. With the installation's title, *RAF (1970-1998)*, the only referential qualification that Korn provides is a temporal one, signaled by the markers of the years during which the RAF was active. Acknowledging that "the RAF" indexes not only the most prominent of its members, especially those who appeared on wanted posters or died in the high-security prison Stuttgart-Stammheim (as well, perhaps, as the

lesser known members and those from other radical groups such as the 2 June Movement, the Socialist Patients' Collective, or the Revolutionary Cells, all of whom at times acted in solidarity) but that the RAF also refers to a spirit or a sense of hope. It also denotes an historical period defined by social relations in the ephemeral nation-state of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland and abroad in the context of the Cold War. As a movement, the RAF participated in dialogues and events beyond its membership, and its constitution was paradoxically both much more and much less fluid than was usually acknowledged. This uneven acknowledgement points to the limits of both politics and language. The RAF — as Korn's installation hints at very well by making prominent the themes of boundaries, containment, sides, and locations — is part of a much larger social landscape.

But, so is this undertaking part of something difficult to contain or to index. I can say that I have studied the RAF and to an extent I have written about the RAF but it might be better to say that I have written *through* the RAF to get at something else, something unspeakable. That is, the compulsion towards self-representation, which is inherent to subjectivity itself, proffers an urgent and recurrent imperative to speak what cannot be said, or to conjure, by virtue of what is said, a substance that just is not there prior to an act of self-representation such as the telling of a story. To take up the RAF as a point of departure is to take up the problem at its extreme example but not to leave it there. The urgency with which these urban guerrilla fighters enacted their partial, paradoxical, and precarious subjectivities, and the conditions of possibility within which they did

so, only makes starker the situation of mundane subjectivity that repeatedly calls for enunciation. The perils and the failures of such enunciation, in the face of its compulsory demand, are felt not only in speech but in choreographies of subjectivity that are performed in *aesthetic convolutions* of space, gesture, and intonation. I have attempted to emphasize these convolutions but not as sites of transgression. I have not intended to write about or to posit sites and practices of transgression, for even the performative programs of urban guerrilla warfare respond to the interpellations of power, since ideology produces the urban guerrilla just as it produces the docile citizen or the State. Rather, I have considered the body as a communicating materiality situated at the limits of speech, marking the ways in which the compulsion to enunciate takes many forms. In this, I acknowledge that this task is itself implicated.

The Shape of Writing

In his textual intervention into the paradoxically and simultaneously plural and singular ontology of objects, John Law acknowledges that the production of his text must perform the multiplicities and interferences inherent to his object of study. In formal terms, he creates rather than represents the subject/object of his text. He does this, he explains:

“by growing different stories alongside one another. Smaller narratives — a lot of smaller keys [metaphors]. Working in this way has a cost: we do indeed lose the possibility of an overall vision. But at the same time we also create something that was not there before: we create and make visible interferences between stories. We bring new and unpredictable

effects into being, effects that cannot be predicted or foretold from a single location”.²

Written more or less concurrently, the chapters that follow are intended each to stand on their own and yet they contingently cohere to the extent that they share the same concerns, while inflecting them with different intensities. What may appear as a mere intimation in one chapter emerges in the foreground of another. The chapters are not organized towards the demonstration of a progression of argument but rather towards a distancing from the privileging of speech communication and utilitarian deployment of language, since these are among my targets, and an approximation of a *mise en scène* of self-production. Confined to produce this work in and through the frequently instrumental use of language to the extent that such an exercise both demands and implies the transmission of information, I have attempted to circumvent this by imposing other forms, including some collage, assemblage, photography, and reflection on a collaborative photography project *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces*.³ I have at times written in ways that, through form, voice, tone, and rhythm, I hope are consistent with the interventions that Antonin Artaud attempted to make into the use of language in the theatre by insisting on “the passage and transmutation of ideas into things”.⁴ In turn, Artaud’s emphasis on a concrete physical language of gesture, movement, and intonation — a language that implicates the space within which it arises — has informed my approach to the practices that I have studied, from those of West German urban guerrillas to those of contemporary artists who have taken up the RAF as subject matter.

One formal intervention that needs explanation at the outset is that I have randomly interleaved brief texts between and within the chapters, which present *summaries of acts*, usually but not exclusively guerrilla actions allegedly undertaken in the BRD in the 1960s and 1970s. With this, my hope is to approximate the dramatic element of intrusion and noise not that the representation of these actions might have made as they were produced and circulated by the media, while also visibly troubling the narrative that this text may set out. As Michel Serres observes, communication depends upon the simultaneous achievement of contradictory conditions: the presence of horrible, uncontainable, unrelenting noise and the exclusion of threatening, distorting, parasitic noise.⁵

Confessions

I had set out to look at the extra-linguistic practices of the RAF — their movements and gestures, their production of images, their codes of action — but I was also concerned with the way in which the RAF itself had been taken up in contemporary art practices. In particular, I was committed from the start to consider Gerhard Richter's cycle of oil paintings *October 18, 1977*. The significance of contemporary art practices became more central to my work when I visited *Zur Vorstellung des Terrors: RAF Ausstellung (Regarding Terror: The RAF Exhibition)* organized by the Berlin KW Institute for Contemporary Art and held at Der Neuen Galerie am Landesmuseum Joanneum in Graz, Austria, in the summer of 2005. This exhibition became the archive that responded to the

concerns particular to my undertaking, since it delivered all of the unspeakable elements that official archives seemed to diminish or neglect.

My treatment of the exhibition artworks that I discuss appeals to the suggestion that the “solitary” discourse of subjectivity that Roland Barthes⁶ performs in his discourse is not all that differently oriented from the performance of guerrilla subjectivity (here, I am referring to guerrilla codes of conduct more than to specific acts of guerrilla violence) or the production of material objects of signification. It suggests that these are similarly oriented towards disguising the incoherence of our acts, acts that are not wholly our own but are engaged in a subtle, if not unrecognized, practice of citation.⁷ This solitary discourse is the unspoken discourse of academic research also, which involves frequent immersions into the abyss of fixation. Such fixation is implicit within this text and explicit within the physicalized objects that I have produced alongside the writing. Perhaps it makes sense to borrow from and amend the words of Barthes, then, and say that, at times, this work is not only about performance but is performance. Therefore, please note from the outset that this text is neither a history of the urban guerrilla movement generally or a history of the RAF specifically, nor does it attempt to pay its dues to what some people easily mythologize into a coherent unity called the “German left”, by citing whomever would be considered the right people. If anything, this text works from the contention that no-one owns or authors discourse but that everyone is compelled to borrow it.

Taking as one of my points of departure the notion of trial as a location for the performance of self-representation, this work considers how it is that self-representation as a project is bound up in something more than the outcome of the trial, something beyond its eventual verdict. The judgment that concerns the subject is not a final one, nor is it necessarily authored by those physically present in the courtroom. In other words, the judge and jury are not necessarily the addressees of the subject's performance. The testimony points to real and imagined audiences beyond the trial's time and place. The trial that is of concern here is one in which the sentencing is not what is at stake for the subject engaged in self-representation. The work that follows emphasizes a trial in which what is of vital concern for the subject is not necessarily to be understood but the no small consideration of telling, of performing, in what may very well slip frequently into an entirely other language, even if, in its assemblage, it appears to draw from an otherwise familiar set of words and grammatical conventions.

While I am interested in what occurred in the official trials of the RAF members — the refusals to recognize the court's authority, the writing and rewriting of procedure as the Stammheim trial was in progress (from 1975 to 1977), and the blurring of lines in terms of the determination of RAF membership, as their chosen lawyers were one by one designated by the state as members or collaborators and subsequently removed from the case and in some instances arrested — I do not remain within the confines of the notion of trial in the strict sense. Instead, I work from the assumption that the trial commences prior to the arrests. It commences with the, at times disparate, activities of the

subjects who as a group constituted the collective body known as the RAF and aimed towards *making something*, particularly through the active production of images and the play of contradiction in language. The notion of trial to which I hope to appeal entails a certain incoherence and illegibility and rests also on the assumption that the subject who tells a story is not by any means an omniscient narrator. Beyond the site of (self) representation, the trial is explored as the site of self-production.⁸

Archival work for this dissertation was carried out at the following institutions and venues: Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin, Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen Berlin, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, and *Zur Vorstellung des Terrors: RAF Ausstellung* (Regarding Terror: The RAF Exhibition) organized by the Berlin Kunst-Werke Institute for Contemporary Art and held at Der Neuen Galerie am Landesmuseum Joanneum in Graz, Austria 2005.

1. Auto pilot on trial

*To understand — is that not to divide the image, to undo the I, proud organ of misapprehension?*⁹

Please let me begin by bringing attention to the practice of self-representation in prominent trials. Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of counsel in favour of self-representation in his trial is but one significant example that was repeatedly cited in a decision that prevented Saddam Hussein from representing himself in his trial for war crimes. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "20th hijacker" in the 9-11 World Trade Center attacks, rejected counsel and insisted on representing himself against six counts of conspiracy. Moussaoui refused counsel even though he struggled to make himself understood in a language in which his grammatical use was often ambiguous.

The practice of self-representation, for those who stand in the accused position, called upon to account for themselves in a setting bound by conventions, practices, terminology, and references that seemingly exceed the subject's routine engagement,¹⁰ poses the question of what one may hope to achieve through self-representation when there exists vast differentials of power and so much is at stake. My assumption is that the motive for self-representation in such cases is not simply one of self-defense. Instead, the lure of the option to tell one's own story, regardless of the potential danger to oneself, responds to something more fundamental to the subject's predicament.

Self-representation strives but fails to transgress the boundaries of what is permissible. This striving toward transgression implicitly points to the limits of speech conditions, as illustrated in Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*,¹¹ when

Hieronimo bites out his own tongue because of his inability to be understood in the court. The spectacle of Hieronimo's act — that of biting out his own tongue — does not make him better understood but it does make material the expression of the loss of his son and his lost belief in the possibility of justice in a way that words failed to do. His act, which is preceded by the actual onstage murders of the two men guilty of killing Hieronimo's son, Horatio, forces his audience's slow but eventual confrontation with the fragile line between the play of fiction that they believe that they are watching and the event that is unfolding — the event in which they are unwitting but active participants.

While my opening remarks emphasized the assumption that the phenomenon of self-representation in trials suggests that subjects are compelled to tell their own stories, contained in that initial assumption is the paradox intrinsic to the practice of telling one's own story — namely, that it cannot be told. In such cases, a story is indeed told but everything from its authorship to its force is troubled. Whose story is it? Why is it being told? Why does it take the shape that it does? To what audience is it addressed? These are just a few of the problems that the examples of self-representation outlined herein raise. Finally, we may consider that *understanding* may be the least of all initiating motives for such story telling. Further, we could very well posit an absence of an intentional motive at the outset, after all: “How many assertions owe their strength to the lucky circumstance that as suggestions they were not understood?”¹² A fair number of them do, perhaps. Accident may very well be the underlying principle that threatens to disrupt our proceedings, but we must object to this line of

questioning. The trial status as a privileged site for the attainment of truth is built upon a preoccupation with communication as a relation. Paradoxically, wherever understanding is achieved, the relation is effaced, along with language, by an immediacy that challenges what is taken to constitute a body in a way that is fundamentally at odds with the assumptions of the trial and its process. Such unchartered and unrecognizable bodies cannot be tried in the court; after all, by who could such bodies be tried in the first place?

Our interest, however, exceeds that of the trial in the strict sense. As with the drama that unfolds in Kyd's play, in which the protagonist is situated in a physical space of overlapping significance — a court that is at once a place of judgement, state administration, entertainment, and a public venue for the communication of his necessary avowal — the drama that is to be explored here is the trial central to the formation of subjectivity. These considerations target the urgency of self-representation in everyday life and assume that the limits of speech that are routinely met in a formal trial constrain and permit the subject at the level of mundane identification. In other words, the trial is conceived here as a formative experience for all subjects, for our subjectivity is achieved through our status as the eternally accused, for which a definite acquittal cannot be obtained. At best, we can only hope for the attainment of an ostensible acquittal or the indefinite postponement of our case.¹³

We can learn much from the precedent of the Court of Inquiry vs. Joseph K., chief bank clerk — primarily, from this case we find that “everything belongs to the Court”.¹⁴ Also from this notorious precedent, we can proceed from the

assumption that, in all cases pertaining to the Law, we will be dealing with only lower officials. Despite the appearance that such lower officials charged with governing proceedings occupy the high chair of state, what they are seated upon is merely a kitchen chair covered with an old horse rug.¹⁵ As the records for the case of Joseph K. aptly attest, it is no easy task to submit a plea to the court, either with or without good counsel because “to meet an unknown accusation, not to mention other possible charges arising out of it, the whole of one’s life would have to be recalled to mind, down to the smallest actions and accidents, clearly formulated and examined from every angle. And besides, how dreary such a task would be!”¹⁶ Nevertheless, the case will continue on, with or without the accused’s capable vigilance in this regard.

It goes without saying that much of what happens in the trial court is speech, or perhaps it would be more accurate to submit to you that speech is the privileged mode of exchange in the trial setting. As James Clifford has observed, the trial record woefully “omits gestures, hesitations, clothing, tone of voice, laughter, irony...the sometimes devastating silences”.¹⁷ What remains is the speech itself, as fixed markings typed verbatim onto each page. But it is not the cleansed and partial court transcripts that ought to concern us here. Everyone knows that the purpose of the trial — its end, if you will — is our eventual arrival at the truth. It is held that truth can be obtained through language; some statements are true and some statements are false, and it is simply a matter of establishing which statements are which. And yet, so many trials remain inconclusive. It is because of this failure of language to deliver us to the truth that

we must accept that, in most cases, we face the aforementioned unappealing decision between ostensible acquittal and indefinite postponement.

Since the attainment of a definite acquittal can only come from the highest court officials, to whom, it has already been established, we have no access, it is an impossibility. In contrast, one can work towards an ostensible acquittal, the success of such work will confer onto the accused an ostensible freedom that is indefinitely subject to the continued circulation of the court documents — as “the Court never forgets anything”¹⁸ — and the potential for a judge’s subsequent order for the subject’s repeated arrest. In such circumstances, the case begins all over again, and the subject is returned to this same unhappy deliberation over the correct course of action to be taken.

The aim of an indefinite postponement of the case is, as its name implies, to ensure that the case cannot proceed beyond its first stages. This postponement can be achieved only through constant contact with the court. One must submit to routine interrogations, although the difficulty of these can be properly managed, since “it’s all a formality, the interrogations, for instance, are only short ones; if you have neither the time nor the inclination to go, you can excuse yourself...all it amounts to is a formal recognition of your status as an accused man by regular appearances before your Judge”.¹⁹ But, of course, the attainment and maintenance of an indefinite postponement only grants to the accused the illusion of freedom and the deferral of the ultimate sentence.

While it is recognized that both of these potential outcomes are less than ideal for a subject, it is best at the outset to discard of any misdirected notions that

advocate for schemes to gain influence in such cases. While attempts at gaining influence are advised, one should not assume that such influence will contribute to the desired outcome of the case. For even if the subject or the subject's counsel — where there is counsel amenable to speaking on the subject's behalf — were to secure access to the higher authorities, it has been duly noted that authority itself is not a property of persons;²⁰ it is not even the property of the highest judges: “As one who efficaciously speaks in the name of the law, the judge does not originate the law or its authority; rather, he ‘cites’ the law, consults and reinvokes the law, and, in that reinvocation, reconstitutes the law”.²¹

We were talking about speech but we were sidetracked when taking up consideration, quite ahead of ourselves, of the problem of outcomes, conclusions, and sentences. But, even this digression is permitted in the court, since it is the case that “[i]nterruption is the *law* of conversation”.²² Interruption is the law that has us always coming up against a hindrance inherent to speech — the unavailability of the correct word; forgetting; a discomfiting awareness of presence; the other's seeming lack of recognition; and the other's (un)welcome word — since it is said that “[e]veryday speech all the time runs up against failure of recognition....”²³ Interruption not only calls into question the content of what is said but the identity of the speaker, all in the paradoxical and impossible situation of producing a workable self-representation. Could it be true that the speaking subject realizes and says to itself, “When all is said and done, your discourse has no importance”, and therefore only half believes what it says?²⁴

The conditions presented by the law of interruption illustrate that the

analysis of testimony is everywhere fraught with difficulty. For the success of the trial, it would appear that we must move from the premise that self-representation seeks a mode of articulation that better facilitates understanding, but surely this starting point cannot be taken for granted. For this to be the case, we would need to establish first that the speaking subject has in advance a self-transparent and completed truth that, if communicated through an effective speech plan, would say it all. In this way, it would be possible to relegate speech to the ever-increasing realm of mimetic technologies. This is not to say that deeming speech to be a form of reproductive technology is at all a radical or unconventional formulation. Historically, speech has been cast as, on the one hand, an accurate, perhaps even noble, mimetic externalization of interior states of being and, on the other hand, an inferior copy or reproduction of authentic feeling or interior thought.

In the former instance, in which speech is the privileged and noble site of expression, we are all familiar with the necessity of transparent interpersonal communication. Nevertheless, it has been noted that such transparent communication is troubled in the trial context, since “[t]he actors in a trial must communicate effectively with one another even though many of the rules governing speech and action in the situation are foreign to the central participants — the witnesses and the jurors”.²⁵ Problems connected with the language that governs the trial context have been widely acknowledged. The language of the law has been referred to as a “sublanguage” with its own structure of grammar and syntax.²⁶ For instance, in his lament about the increasing divide between legal

language and language used in everyday speech, Adam Freedman notes the irony of this widening gap by pointing out that “the story of legal English is, in many ways, the story of the English language itself”, with the first English-language dictionary being a law dictionary printed in 1523,²⁷ but he suggests that the language of law is increasingly alien to most speakers and, therefore, he calls for the use of *plain language*. Hence, we find ourselves amidst the infamous and more recently heightened debates between the so-called “Precision School”²⁸ and the “Plain English School” of legal language scholars, with the Precision School charging the Plain English School of waging a “Plain English Jihad” and the Plain English School positing the Precision School’s participation in a “vast legal-industrial conspiracy”.²⁹ Nevertheless, we must avoid consideration of whatever exhibits these competing schools would offer to us, since, given what has been established thus far, their concerns reside outside of, or despite, our jurisdiction. We have submitted that our speaking subject, for whom all of this debate is ostensibly waged, may not even be concerned with matters of clarity and consistency.

Yet, in all matters, from those of utility to those of the heart, there resides the imperative towards clear and consistent communication, preferably devoid of style.³⁰ Such is the premise of any attempt to achieve mutual understanding. Although it is rarely considered that perhaps there are instances in which people simply do not want to be understood. Let us not rule out that possibility just yet.

act i: enough love – and hatred and imagination³¹

In the summer of 1977, the painter Theodor Sand invited a young couple to meet with him at his home in Karlsruhe. The couple had expressed their interest in Sand's paintings and said that they were looking to purchase some artwork for their new apartment. The young couple arrived, as expected, at the apartment of Theodor Sand. The couple spent much of the morning visiting and talking with the Sands about art and Sand's paintings in particular.

At midday, the tone of the visit abruptly changed when the couple produced weapons and announced to the Sands, in dramatic form, that they were about to carry out a Red Army Faction operation.

Soon afterwards, several more members of the RAF arrived at the Sands' apartment. The new arrivals methodically moved containers of metal objects from the back of a vehicle parked in the street, marked with a name of a fictitious commercial outlet specializing in customer service.

As some of the uninvited guests organized their collection of metal objects and began to assemble a larger contraption out of the smaller parts, others tied the Sands to their living room chairs. While securing the restraints on the Sands, the RAF members apologized for the intrusion but explained that their apartment was ideally located for a grand RAF operation – a major attack on the Federal Prosecutor's Office located in the building across the street.

In the weeks leading up to the day of the encounter in the Sands' apartment, Peter Jürgen Boock, a member of 4.2, had designed and manufactured all of the component parts of the RAF's very own rocket-launcher. The Sands were told that the contraption would be a rocket launcher with which they would fire upon the Federal Prosecutor's Office through the apartment window. As work continued, the Sands were offered several hundred DM in cash in case of damage to their apartment during the launching of the rocket and were invited to partake in a bottle of brandy.

After the potentially deadly contraption was assembled, the operation was able to move to the next level, all that they needed to do was to vacate the area to avoid arrest and to wait.

But, nothing happened. The subsequent communiqué issued by the RAF stated that the action was a warning that demonstrated that they had the love, the hatred, and the imagination to carry out large-scale operations. It became a matter of speculation how it was that the launcher did not ignite. Boock later asserted that he had deliberately sabotaged the action, but authorities held that he merely forgot to wind up the clock that was to govern the ignition process.

Self-representation and the limits of speech

At stake in self-representation, to the extent that its inherent speech acts are privileged, is not only the limits of speech itself but the potential of danger associated with speech. We ought to interrogate the presumption that there is a dissipation of danger associated with speech that accompanies the rise of liberal democratic society. Julia Kristeva holds that speech is not so much constrained as it has lost its efficacy,³² and Michel Foucault argues that speech has retreated to a more local and personal space.³³ In Kristeva's view, the capacity for revolt is reduced in advanced democracies that are marked by a "flimsiness of prohibition" and the disappearance of the human subject. It is necessary to understand her concern, that of revolt and its possibility (or impossibility) in contemporary culture, which she insists is marked by an entertainment aesthetic. Kristeva takes an etymological approach to the notion of revolt, reminding readers that the word echoes the senses of movement as well as time and space. She emphasizes revolt "as return, displacement, plasticity of the proper, movement toward the infinite and the indefinite..."³⁴ Kristeva asserts that the postindustrial and post-Communist democracies possess characteristics that have never been faced before. These characteristics around power and the individual call for reconsideration of the role of revolt. First, Kristeva points to the "power vacuum" — the unlocatable sites of power that operate in a process of "normalization". The interior of this vacuum, however, is characterized by an incessant deferral of responsibility and response. Instead of punishment, there are media spectacles, and this entertainment culture that permeates even the treatment of the most

serious events “falsifies” the new world order. For Kristeva, the conditions of this power vacuum offer a sort of repression.

Second, the new world order subjects the individual to a transformation that relinquishes the individual possessor of rights and substitutes it with that of the possessor of organs for sale. She writes:

“‘I’ am not a subject, as psychoanalysis continues to assert, attempting the rescue — indeed, the salvation — of subjectivity; ‘I’ am not a transcendental subject either, as classical philosophy would have it. Instead, ‘I’ am, quite simply, the owner of my genetic or organo-physiological patrimony; ‘I’ possess my organs, and that only in the best-case scenario, for there are countries where organs are stolen in order to be sold. The whole question is whether my patrimony should be remunerated or free: whether ‘I’ can enrich myself or, as an altruist, forgo payment in the name of humanity or whether ‘I’, as a victim, am dispossessed of it”.³⁵

In other words, first, we were freed to sell our labour but now we enjoy a new freedom, the freedom to cut apart and sell our bodies in fractions as well.

So, while Kristeva asserts that there is a repressive character to contemporary liberal democracies, the sources of this repression are elusive and not necessarily readily identifiable. To extrapolate Kristeva’s position to the problem set out here, speech seems to lose the designation of danger that it is believed to hold in other historical moments. One can presumably say anything in a society characterized by spectacle and lack of prohibition. So long as it entertains, the multitude of mouths can chatter on and on, but there is a trade off

or a cost. That is, we may speak and elude danger but our speech loses its meaning. Therefore, speech cannot provide the basis for revolt but this is not necessarily because speech is prohibited. That is, speech may very well be prohibited in some contexts but what is of concern here is the question of the efficacy of such speech where and when there is no apparent or imagined threat, neither to those who would pursue it nor to those whom would be targeted by its critique.

Foucault presents a different illustration of speech in liberal democracy in his genealogical treatment of parrhesia (most roughly translated as “free speech”) — a word that appears around the end of the fifth century B.C. A parrhesiastes is a speaker who is to say everything — that is, to say everything that one has in mind. While Foucault traces the ever-changing senses of parrhesia as a concept, he emphasizes two aspects at the outset. First, parrhesia may denote a constant chattering that is unstructured and unqualified. Second, parrhesia brings out the sense of telling the truth and presumes a correspondence between belief and truth. Still, Foucault notes that this correspondence between belief and truth for the Greeks occurred in verbal activity as opposed to the modern understanding that such correspondence must be structured by mental experience in the form of sense data. The issue of doubt over the status of a speaker’s truth is a modern one because, classically, it was the courage to say something different — to say something dangerous — that bestowed the status of truth on the speaker’s words. This approach to the designation of truth was not concerned with the question of evidence but was supported by an understanding that there is a relationship

between the speaker and what it is that the speaker says. Further, that relationship is embedded within one's social situation, which is assumed to differ from the social situations of those to whom the speaker's words are directed — that is, the parrhesiastes' audience.

The social situatedness of the speaker is significant in another way. That is, the relations of power between the speaker and the audience are not symmetrical. The speaker usually possesses the privilege of speech (often bestowed by the reputation of moral character) but still occupies a subordinate position in relation to the interlocutor (or perhaps a majority). A necessary precursor to parrhesiastic speech is the freedom of the speaker (this freedom is placed at risk through the act of parrhesia). The speaker must not be forced to speak. If force is involved, then that which is spoken cannot be parrhesia.

Foucault stresses that what is said presents danger to the speaker not because it implicates oneself (although it might) but because it provokes the interlocutor in some way. Parrhesia may be a sort of confession with a personal dimension for the speaker but it is a form of criticism, often with a political function. Foucault's tracing of parrhesia shows that, over time, the question of who ought to have the right to parrhesia moves to the forefront and there is an emphasis on the problem of truth. No longer is truth connected to belief and no longer does the courage to speak in the face of danger entitle one to the presumption of truth.

As the right to free speech proliferates, so does the sense that parrhesia demands a sort of special education, while parrhesiastic speech once demanded

citizenship; in either case, the preconditions for parrhesia are special privileges not presented to everyone. In Plutarch, parrhesia takes on a different sense; instead of a courageous expression of truth and a fluent release of all that there is to say, the problem of the parrhesiastes becomes the uneasy task of distinguishing between what ought to be said and what ought to remain unsaid.

Foucault points out that the treatment of parrhesia in the trial of Orestes (Aeschylus' trilogy) challenges the notion and reveals that it is in a state of crisis by drawing out both its positive and negative senses and the complication of the right to free speech that accompanies the rise of democratic institutions. If all have the right to speech, is it possible to preserve the notion of parrhesia? Foucault says no. It is not possible to maintain parrhesia in such a context, at least as it is understood as a positive but dangerous form of social criticism. Parrhesia then takes a role in relationships — in conversions that can occur in the relationship with oneself or with another. Parrhesia becomes an art (*techne*) in human relationships and governing that entails theoretical knowledge and the practical training that experience provides. What Foucault's uncovering shows is that over time parrhesia as a valuable form of social criticism became a problem. Foucault shows that the parrhesiastic character of this form of speech is lost in contemporary society. The negative sense of parrhesia takes the foreground and parrhesia invokes an image of constant chattering, a frivolous chorus of voices saying nothing.

Here it is necessary to return to the understanding of parrhesia that Foucault's study begins with, that which emphasizes the imperative to say

everything that one has in mind. Foucault points out that the emphasis on the transparency of this candid speech is linked to at least two points of consideration. First, the relationship between the speaker and that which is spoken. Second, the flux of the speech — the speech is uninterrupted and, in the haste of its relay, a promise of its genuine character is granted so that the speech is potentially free of all masking features. Both considerations point to the issue of authenticity in speech. This is not a question of the evidence of truth but of the sincere relationship between the speaker and the (uninterrupted) word. Underlying the relationship between the speaker and that which is said is an assumption of the speaker's knowledge not only of the world but of oneself. If not a conscious knowledge of oneself, then at least a knowledge that is accessible through the words that one speaks as though the words were stones along a pathway. So, the contemporary condition of speech, in which these considerations no longer hold, is one of devaluation even as it is celebrated.

Foucault states explicitly that his study is concerned with the activity of truth-telling and the way in which this activity was problematized. The two main aspects of this problematization that Foucault argues are relevant in contemporary philosophy include, on the one hand, the issue regarding the access to truth (reason) and, on the other hand, the relation between truth and the social world. What his method of problematization implies for the purposes of this discussion is that, the democratization of Western society was accompanied by a sense that the “authenticity” of truth has become a question of greater urgency. Here also truth splinters so that it is unknowable or multiple, and free speech retreats to personal

space — a space that is occupied by Foucault's 'care of the self'. In other words, the consideration of truth-telling has shifted focus from the act to the content and its authenticity.

Truth is a slippery item, even if the word still has an exchange value. What we find ourselves in is a long-standing crisis of meaning that has been expressed widely and variously. Bringing back Kristeva's concern that power is, to a significant extent, not locatable, reinforces this problem because it allows us the illusion that there is no longer any danger associated with speech or, the alternative to that, as Kristeva expresses, the space within which revolt is possible is under compression, demanding a carving out of new spaces. Despite the opportunities for hope to which Kristeva points, the conditions that she outlines are characterized by an illusive sense of freedom — the widespread sense that speech or revolt is unrestricted.

In contrast, Jacques Lacan's writing allows some retention and acknowledgement of the character of danger in speech. The location and shape of such danger differs in the Lacanian sense of it. The question of truth, or revolt in Kristeva's terms, changes sites, from the public to the personal. This either-or vision neglects the double character of speech. That is, that speech is at all times engaged in conversation with both the imago³⁶ and the absolute Other,³⁷ as Lacan insists is the thread running through analysis and mediated by the word.

In his interventions into the reading of Freud, Lacan reinstates to the word what he thought was its central place in psychoanalysis. His target is what he refers to as an aversion to the role of the word and language in psychoanalysis. An

aversion that perhaps calls for its own subordination to psychoanalysis to uncover what Lacan deems its internal defense mechanisms and *méconnaissance*, a crisis that is in part made manifest in the popularity of psychoanalysis at that time and constituted the dreaded breakdown of resistances to psychoanalysis.³⁸

Lacan's call for the analyst to take up the study of the word and its functions in analysis stems from his conception of the word as the intermediary of psychoanalysis. While the word is the intermediary, the theme that the word mediates is that of the tension between the little other and the absolute Other.³⁹ This theme is vital to the examination of the subject's speech because the very constitution of the subject finds a tie between the Lacanian mirror stage, the emergence of the ego in the void between the child and mirror reflection, and the introduction to the big Other in the acquisition of language. Implicit in the latter is the suggestion that 'all the world is a stage', and that there is no such thing as a private conversation for the subject.

For Lacan, what is absolutely crucial for the subject's successful management of distance or human reality is a sort of trial. Here, Lacan specifies the necessity of the confrontation with the conflicts, and the eventual resolution, of the Oedipal trial but — in the spirit of the Oedipal myth as that “permanent discourse that supports the everyday, the miscellany, of human experience”⁴⁰ — it is justifiable to rescue this imperative from the strictest of interpretations of the notion of trial. The trial here is understood to be the space of public discourse or authority also, since this cannot be divorced from whatever may be understood as internal discourse. What emerges is the centrality of the space that language

occupies in the life of the subject, whether the subject is inhabited (or possessed, in the case of the psychotic) by language. Language is both that which offers communion in the world and that which threatens to take “the world” (as structured by language) away and lock the subject up in a state of incomprehensibility.

Lacan describes the trial as a break away from “the permanent monologue” that he casts in terms of a “music for several voices”. This is the supporting discourse in unrecognizable form, that is, “augmented and recapitulated in antitheses”.⁴¹ And yet it is speaking out — the “tiny spot of speaking out” — that Lacan identifies as the impetus to psychotic episodes or the emergence of psychosis in a pre-psychotic subject. Lacan insists that the activity of speaking out is “one of the most difficult things that can be proposed to a man, which his being in the world does not confront him all that often...”.⁴² What that space of speaking out does is speak something other than the chorus refrain⁴³ to be conducted by the absolute Other, the figure we are always addressing, directly or indirectly.

Despite the status that Lacan grants to the spoken and full word as that which is unconstrained, that opportunity to speak, the chance and the necessity to tell one’s story, is not by virtue an emancipating space. There is a performative aspect to speaking out. Speaking, in itself, is an act that stretches out beyond the mere account, the content, or that which is said. The very act of speaking is not merely the relaying of words but is, in a significant way, a living of the story, or

an involvement in it, that is of absolute importance to the ongoing constitution of the subject. Consider, for instance:

“Everything that Marie meant to me from then on...was summed up in this tale of the paper mill in which, without speaking of herself, she revealed her inner being to me”.⁴⁴

In this way, unrestrained speech is necessary to the subject's coherence — it is the symptom of the subject. The import of this speech is maintained, regardless of the content, since its content is a mistake, an expression of multiple intentions that stand in opposition to one another.

Saying as an Invisible Form

In response to Western activist organizations that repeatedly called upon Czech thinkers and artists to join their peace movement, Václav Havel wrote of the word “peace” to point out that in Czechoslovakia the word had been “drained of all content” because of its repeated use in official discourse. For, with the campaign to motivate Czechs to participation in their movement, Western activists had been using one of the very words that was employed with regularity in a spectacle of official legitimization. Having been jailed for his participation in the Charter 77 manifesto and having been witness to much persecution during Soviet rule, Havel’s response to these calls emphasizes the threat of persecution under which Czech citizens had to negotiate in expression of any kind. He writes:

“[The average citizen knows that] there is no clear division between those ‘down under’ and those ‘up above’, that no one really knows who ‘they’ are and that all of us, drawn into the same plot, are in part ‘they’, while

‘they’ are at the same time partly ‘we’, ‘they’ are subordinate citizens dependent on some other ‘they’ ...”⁴⁵

What the above quotation underlines is that the identity of the interlocutor is not clear, nor is it stable. This is what Lacan gets at with his insistence on the tension between the little other and the absolute other as the “thread” in the analytic situation.

This instability is also the experience of dreams: the dreamer unproblematically becomes another and the other likewise morphs into so many other instances. The subject, who is both the object and unknowing author, is never startled by the slipperiness of identity in the exchanges of dreams. Rather the flux of subjectivity is the condition of dreams and the internal discourse contained therein. Although this seeming incoherence is not the way in which we characterize our dialogues, the seeming obvious and concrete addressee is not only the other in our immediate presence. There is a limit to the immanence of everyday speech and this limit is met by a fantastic Other, and this Other is imagined to be a transcendent one. This Other, however, is an constituting part of the subject. It demonstrates an internal split or cut but one that is externalized for the subject’s imposition of the coherent life story. The Other is granted outside status but has the advantage of being situated on the inside, as the quiet third party.

While the struggle over words appears to take place both within ourselves, in our precious interiority, and out in the world, this spatial distinction of interiority and exteriority is not sustainable. The imagined site of interiority is

where the big Other as language (language being only one instantiation of this habitation) makes itself at home and, therefore, such distinctions are elided. This problem is emphasized in frustrated wanderings around different senses of a word (for example, “peace”, as in the above mentioned instance), both or multiple senses unconsidered and passed around without meaning. This is what Lacan eludes to when he adopts Mallarmé’s comparison of language with a coin. Lacan writes:

“Indeed, however empty this discourse may appear, it is only so if taken at its face value: that which justifies the remark of Mallarmé’s in which he compares the common use of Language to the exchanges of a coin whose obverse and reverse no longer bear any but worn effigies, and which people pass from hand to hand ‘in silence’. This metaphor is sufficient to remind us that the Word, even when almost completely worn out, retains its value as a tessera. Even if it communicates nothing, the discourse represents the existence of communication; even if it denies the obvious, it affirms that the Word constitutes the Truth; even if it is destined to deceive, here the discourse speculates on faith in testimony”.⁴⁶

The import of a subject’s speech, for Lacan, is not merely the content of what the speaking subject says, but the act of speaking. The act of speaking itself, Lacan complains, is an invisible one. That is, the interlocutor tends to place the emphasis of interpretation on what is said, and the act of speaking falls away: “‘The fact that one says remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard’”.⁴⁷

Lacan distinguishes between language (as system or as law, existing ahead of us) and speech but only to say that speech is unable to detach itself from language. Language conceived as the instrument that documents the external world is not the bank of the subject's full word.⁴⁸ The full word, for Lacan, cannot exist without the expectation of a reply (although the reply is perhaps continuously deferred). To speak oneself, to speak some sort of truth, is to draw upon the language of one's dreams rather than, for instance, language as a set of codes. While, for Lacan, language is associated with the symbolic (the big Other of culture, for instance), speech is not detached from the imaginary or the real — spaces that are permeated by images that pose a sort of challenge for the subject. The speech of the subject constitutes a double, the subject's truth and the subject's figment and, while it anticipates an addressee, it does not reach one free of distortion or alteration.

What Lacan is concerned with in his distinction between language (as an “inheritance” with an instrumental function) and the speaking being, is the act of speech. The act of speaking is not the same as speaking *about* something, or, as Lacan explains, speaking of the declaration of love is not the same as the word of love: “what I say of love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it”.⁴⁹ It is not the act of saying in itself that is understood but “it is in the consequences of what is said that the act of saying is judged”.⁵⁰

There is a sort of detour in what a speaker says; the words may not lead the listener to the meaning of a speaker's sentence. This assertion is not to say merely that the words, each alone in themselves, are not enough in the

signification of meaning but rather that the sentence itself is a signifying structure. For Lacan shows that the signifiers — words or sentences — have little guarantee when it comes to the relation between meaning and what is said. Lacan's conception of the signifier is one that has the signifier be more than that which it says.

This is a matter that is nested within Lacan's concern with the way in which particular discourses produce something quite apart from what is said. In relation to the form that Lacan designates the analytic discourse, in particular, he says that it is only within the analyst's discourse that the signifier is able to be separated out as the product. This product entails a presupposition of a substance (i.e. the analysand as subject). What is said, or, the subject that is constructed out of, and at the same time features the performance of what is said, is presupposed by the master signifier that is the product of the analyst's discourse. But this presupposed subject does not exist as far as the Cartesian subject's thinking guarantees his or her existence, since Lacan does not grant the task of thinking to the subject but to the unconscious. He says: "It is precisely to the extent that the guy is willing not to think anymore that we will perhaps learn a little bit more about it, that we will draw certain consequences from his words... — words that cannot be taken back..."⁵¹

But Lacan goes further than that; he holds that there is no relationship between the auditory aspect of signifiers and the world. For him, Saussure's insistence that the relation between the sign and signifier is arbitrary does not go far enough. He states that "The signifier as such refers to nothing if not to a

discourse, in other words, a mode of functioning or a utilization of language qua link...a link between those who speak”.⁵² The world follows from the expression of signifiers; the world comes about through naming.

Still, Lacan suggests that the naming function has come to be turned around, offering an illusory image of the relation between language and the world, as though the world was primary. Language also presupposes being through the isolation of the verb “to be”. For Lacan, this ostensible stability of meaning (or signifieds) still awaits its Copernican revolution — or, better yet, one influenced by Kepler (throwing off the notion of the centre altogether). Lacan proposes that it is the analyst’s discourse that is able to achieve such a revolution.

If the signified comes not from hearing but from reading, then the signified must be read and yet Lacan insists that reading is located in the realm of analytic discourse. He asks: “What is it that we must read therein? Nothing but the effects of those instances of saying...We see in what sense these effects agitate, stir things up, and bother speaking beings”.⁵³

This is a question of reasserting form where the emphasis on content leaves form cast in a secondary role. The reaction to this inequality is to put into play the genre. That is, it becomes important to make form visible and to set into interaction the form with its content. The privilege of representation haunts all forms of expression. Whether the act of speech is conceptualized as an instrumental appropriation of language to serve a representational function, a literary work cast as a conduit for a worldview at a particular place and time, or a photographic image as a document of a perhaps distant reality, the significance of

the act or form is made invisible by the preoccupation with content as representation – or being itself.

This phenomenon is understood most starkly perhaps when considered in the context of the photograph. The photograph has been discussed as an anticipation of death.⁵⁴ That is, the unspoken yet explicit motivation that is the point of departure for most photography — personal photography, in particular — is the knowledge that this (the object of the photograph) will never be again (never mind that this is likely a personal myth in the first place). The smile of a baby, the last visit with a friend who is moving away, or the photograph of oneself at a significant point or threshold in one's life, a time that is ephemeral despite the coherence that later will be imposed upon it.

The status of the photograph as a document of the past distorts the ontological conception of the photograph as an object. The photograph as the record of the lost object — a conception that is embedded within the photograph's very emergence as a form, given that Benjamin⁵⁵ points out that Daguerre introduced the daguerreotype later in the same year that his panorama burned down (the panorama itself is an attempt to preserve an image, to bring a “snapshot” of the countryside “colonized” in its mythical serenity and uniformity within the seeming turmoil of the city under rapid urbanization) — forever links the photograph to the likeness of its content as though it were the content's alibi – or, as Blanchot would say, its cadaverous presence — rather than a separate object. For Blanchot, the image, like a cadaver, is resemblance, but resemblance

of nothing. The cadaver's object abandons itself for its resemblance in the image.⁵⁶

The act of saying, which Lacan wants to rescue from its relegation to a state of vacuity, is in its very form a sort of positivization. Here are echoes of Lacan's insistence that the word does not exist without the anticipation of reply.⁵⁷ The word, to whomever it appears to be directed, calls for a reply and, in this way, the act of saying is a significant act in itself. The use of "appears" as a qualifier above points to Lacan's understanding of to whom it is we speak. We may address the person(s) in our immediate presence but we more often than not address the big Other (of culture, history, or even the analyst) implicitly.

Making visible the form of saying does not eradicate the seeming inefficacy of the content of speech in a society that is characterized by entertainment spectacle and diffusion of power but that the word always anticipates a reply and always makes present a third party addressee, illustrates that the danger of speaking out locates itself in any type of speech. Albeit, the danger may be posed by the language barrier that stops the speaker from saying just anything or, more than that, it may be that modes of speech are subject-constituting so that changes in discourse are not without consequence. Nevertheless, at once, one is called upon to say it all and not to say it all.

Atomic Speech

If it can be taken from the above discussion that speech retains a dimension of danger, it is worthwhile to consider further where and for whom this danger is located. In this respect, the example of the formal trial will serve to set out some

of the problems relevant to such consideration, given the propensity towards legal designations pertaining to injurious forms of speech. Judith Butler's considerations of the treatment of speech in legal contexts take as a point of departure the idea that language is a force that acts upon and injures us, as though language is agency. Butler acknowledges that we are vulnerable to language, since it exists prior to us and we are constituted in it. In this way, we can understand language in terms of its prior existence and its power. She notes: "If we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes and conditions any decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were, by its prior power".⁵⁸ Since subjects are the effects of language, through the process of interpellation,⁵⁹ there is an inextricable link between subjects and language that is marked by both pleasure and pain. Language offers to the subject the simultaneous possibility of coherence and dissolution. Butler is concerned with theorizing the force that is intrinsic to language, and she asks: what is this force and what are its faultlines?

The implications of Butler's theoretical work have practical significance, since she is concerned with the status of speech acts in legal contexts and, in particular, with the legal category of hate speech. Hate speech is understood to have the capacity to wound its addressee or its referent. Butler's intervention into this phenomenon, primarily the under-theorized assumptions that underlie legal conceptions of injurious speech, implicates the work of J.L. Austin, who argues that utterances must be approached from the perspective of the "total speech situation" within which they occur. But, in response to this, Butler raises the

problem of defining or setting parameters around the totality. In other words, she gives attention to the significance of the ritual and historical character of linguistic convention in relation to individual utterances. This problem is raised by Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts.

Illocutionary acts are performative — that is, the utterances do what they say in the instance of being said. Austin points out that, in order for illocutionary acts to do what they say, they must be implicated within ritual and ceremony. In this way, there is a temporal dimension, implicating a ritual time of “condensed historicity” that exceeds the utterance. In contrast, perlocutionary speech acts produce effects that are quite apart from the saying of the act or the content of the act. This distinction has implications for understanding the wounding capacity of speech, at least from the one-directional image of dangerous speech that has the speaker potentially wounding the second or third party addressee. The utterance of a threat, for instance, is an illocutionary speech act that suggests an inseparable relationship between body and speech (or at least the body of the listener and the speech of the speaker) as well as the inseparable relationship between speech and its effects. For Butler, a threat and the act that fulfils it are both bodily acts, since the threat “prefigures or, indeed, promises a bodily act, and yet is already a bodily act, thus establishing in its very gesture the contours of the act to come....The threat begins a temporal horizon within which the organizing aim is the act that is threatened...”⁶⁰

Butler challenges Austin's emphasis on context or the total speech situation by drawing out further the implications of the ritual character of speech

acts. This challenge invokes the problem of agency in speech. Since Austin's notion of the illocutionary speech act distinguishes between the speaker's intention and the achievement of a performative, this implies that, for Austin, the speaking subject precedes the utterance. Butler reverses this order, however, by following Louis Althusser's assertion that it is the speech act that in fact brings the subject into being, at least in terms of linguistic existence, so that speech acts precede the uttering subject.⁶¹ This temporal aspect inherent to speech highlights the citational character of speech and provides the basis for Butler's challenge to Austin's insistence on the total situation or context of a particular utterance. There are implications then to the acknowledgement that speech does not belong first to, or originate with, the speaker or the context. Speech draws upon a historical community of speakers, and the sovereign voice necessary for the designation of an act as originating with a speaker is absent, fictive, or both. Therefore, according to Butler: "Responsibility is thus linked with speech as repetition, not as origination".⁶² What Butler works towards is the theoretical problematization of "the collapse of speech into conduct"⁶³ that underpins the legalistic notions of certain speech acts as forms of injurious conduct, but this bypasses some significant issues that Butler's work raises along the way that interest me, so I want to backtrack a bit.

In the development of her exploration, Butler draws upon the assertions of critical race theory to illustrate some of the initial coordinates of the problem that she wants to address. She considers, for instance, Richard Delgado's and Mari Matsuda's discussion and image of "words that wound" and Charles R.

Lawrence's designation of "verbal assault" to racist utterances to be combining linguistic and physical vocabularies, since they suggest physical impact even if this is often expressed only in metaphorical terms. Butler argues:

"...that physical metaphors seize upon nearly every occasion to describe linguistic injury suggests that this somatic dimension may be important to the understanding of linguistic pain. Certain words or certain forms of address not only operate as threats to one's physical well-being, but there is a strong sense in which the body is alternately sustained and threatened through modes of address".⁶⁴

I want to initiate here consideration that extends acknowledgment of the body's vulnerability to injurious speech or threat from that of the addressee's body to that of the speaker. If the speaker is not the originator of speech but, on the one hand, the product of language as it speaks the subject in question and, on the other hand, the conduit of its repetition, then it follows that the speaker is susceptible to its own tentative products, its own speech acts. To some degree, Butler acknowledges this predicament:

"There is no way to protect against that primary vulnerability and susceptibility to the call of recognition that solicits existence, to that primary dependency on a language we never made in order to acquire a tentative ontological status. Thus we sometimes cling to the terms that pain us because, at a minimum, they offer us some form of social and discursive existence. The address that inaugurates the possibility of agency, in a single stroke, forecloses the possibility of radical autonomy.

In this sense, an ‘injury’ is performed by the very act of interpellation, the one that rules out the possibility of the subject’s autogenesis (and gives rise to that very fantasy)”.⁶⁵

For Butler, the historicity of speech that surpasses the subject “in all directions”⁶⁶ provides the conditions for its survival or its demise at the discursive level. I want to consider this problem even in the context of the most banal of interpellative moments and their repetitious self- or other-initiated invocations of recognition to suggest that the compulsion to speak, to convey, to represent oneself, even in the mundane circumstance, is potentially treacherous for the speaker.

Routine and mundane speech, to the extent that it relies upon a considerable amount of faith, may offer the most apt instantiation of excitable speech, speech that is made under duress precisely because it is demanded and therefore ought not to be admissible but will be duly noted nevertheless. The subject and object of this speech cannot be held in place, precisely because of its historicity and because of its inextricable relationship to the context, in the broad sense, in which it arises. Butler has shown that the conflation of speech and conduct in a legal setting has been under-theorized and thus has permitted the emergence of politically problematic speech legislation. The difficulty of interest to me is that the under-theorized and taken for granted assumptions about speech as a primary form of effective communication (in the spirit of the primacy of the utilitarian exchange of pure information) obscure the ways in which compulsory speech is not only out of control but adheres to its speaker as though it were the substance of the subject’s conscious agency, even though what it says is

something remarkably different from what it perhaps would want to say and, hence, the product of its saying performs in little increments the damage imposed by a suicide bomb. The problem is not one of information, the passing of one object to another — but the compulsion towards, the impossibility of avoiding, the taking up of the assessment and constitution of oneself that is imposed seemingly from without.

act ii: Hinweis Nr. 6

Yet to be resolved is the riddle of the Stammheim deaths on the night of the hijacking.⁶⁷ The hijacking was carried out in cooperation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) with an aim to secure the release of the RAF prisoners in exchange for hostages, but the action ended unsuccessfully when the flight was intercepted by a special tactical team called GSG9. The official story holds that the Stammheim prisoners learned of the failed hijacking through a covert guerrilla communications system that they had secretly built and maintained in their cells⁶⁸ and, as a result, had arranged and executed a suicide pact. Despite this official account, many people believed that the deaths were state murders. Similar to the fallout after Meinhof's death by hanging roughly a year and a half earlier, and again after the death of another RAF prisoner Ingrid Schubert in her Munich cell in November 1977, several observers have noted that one's acceptance or refusal of the official story that the prisoners had committed suicide usually was taken as an indication of one's political position on the right or left, respectively. The coherence of attitudes within such categories is rarely so neatly divided, however. There were urban guerrillas who suspected the deaths to be suicides. Of the events in Stammheim in October 1977, Hans Joachim Klein from the Revolutionary Cells, for instance, argued:

“As soon as I knew that GSG9 had successfully pulled off their action at Mogadishu, I thought that Schleyer would be killed and that something would happen at Stammheim. Either a suicide mission or a suicide. You mustn't think I'm psychic: I knew that there had been weapons in the prison since 1975”.⁶⁹

Due to speculation about what may have occurred in Stammheim, protests followed. Accusations of murder were scrawled across buildings in the form of graffiti and on placards at demonstrations. Even the funeral of Meinhof in 1976 and the mass funeral of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe in 1977 looked more like political demonstrations than funerals, complete with an overwhelming police presence and arrests. Reactions to these deaths echoed the aftermath of Holger Meins' death of starvation in 1974 after a prolonged collective hungerstrike in prison in protest of the conditions of detention for RAF members. After each of these deaths, there were protests and attacks on German institutions or businesses.

Distrust of the West German state ran so deeply that various attempts were made to construct out of bits of evidence alternative explanations for the deaths at Stammheim. One of these alternative explanations, in part inspired by traces of sand that were reportedly found on Baader's shoes after his death, suggested that Baader had been flown to Mogadishu and used to trick the PFLP hijackers into releasing their hostages. Afterwards, it was believed, Baader had been shot and returned to his cell, where evidence consistent with a finding of suicide had been planted.

A Commission of Inquiry was ordered by the Stuttgart regional parliament to explain what happened on the seventh floor of the Stuttgart-Stammheim prison on the evening of October 17, 1988. In the morning of October 18 Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Irmgard Möller were found in their

cells in their day clothes (perhaps because they had anticipated the possibility that they would be exchanged for hostages taken aboard the hijacked Lufthansa flight). The prisoners were either dead or had life-threatening injuries. Baader had been shot in the head execution style and was dead when found. Two other shots had been fired in his cell, one had hit the wall and the other hit the mattress. Ensslin was also dead, she was found hanging from a noose fashioned from a stereo cable cord that had been attached to the window grating of her cell. Raspe was still alive but had a gunshot to the right temple. He died soon after being taken to the hospital. Möller had sustained four knife-inflicted chest wounds and was the only one of the four to recover from her injuries.

The official story was that all of these were the result of a suicide pact, even though Möller insists that she did not make an attempt on her own life and denies that the RAF prisoners had made a suicide pact: "I can only say that, for us, suicide did not come up as a question. There were no discussions about it and there was no long-term plan".⁷⁰ Möller says that she was awake most of the night and that at about 5.00 AM she heard noises. She could neither determine the source of the noise, what could have caused it or the direction from which it could have come. She had not been alarmed by the noise at the time. At some point while she was asleep, she had the sensation that she had lost consciousness and later she described a "loud rushing noise" in her head.⁷¹ When Möller awoke, she was already on an emergency stretcher.

As Aust illustrates, the inquiry's conclusions in support of the official story do more than raise a few questions because the report suffers from some inconsistencies that have not been explained adequately. Rather, for Aust, the treatment of these contradictions, most of which were blatantly ignored by the Commission, served as various "invitations to speculation". Although other prisoners in nearby cells at Stammheim were questioned for the purposes of the inquiry, none of them reports hearing anything that would have resembled the sound of gunshots. That some of the prisoners were able to be quite clear about what sounds that they could hear from the RAF cells in question makes this a point of contention for some observers. One prisoner, for instance, stated:

"Between 2.00 and 2.30 am, I could clearly hear Baader flushing the toilet in his cell, two or three times at regular intervals. And I heard footsteps now and then before the water flushed. Then I didn't notice anything more until the next morning...so I'm sure there were no shots fired in Baader's cell. If you can make out the sound of footsteps, a chair being moved and the toilet flushing in a cell, then if you ask me, you'd be bound to hear a shot".⁷²

International experts were invited to conduct autopsies on the bodies, but the delay involved in realizing these arrangements, although slight, meant that the exact time of death for Baader and Ensslin could not be determined. The experts agreed, however, that the findings of their examinations could support suicide as the possible cause of death for Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe.

Many active RAF members on the outside and other supporters, for the most part, interpreted the Stammheim deaths as state murders. Möller still insists: "At this time, we felt in every fibre that they wanted to annihilate us. Even in the

weeks and months before the Schleyer kidnapping, the refrain always was ‘Death penalty for terrorists’. The years of isolation, the conditions, they witnessed the hungerstrikes, and, finally, the contact ban was issued. They wanted us dead”.⁷³ The same bits of evidence that, for officials, supported suicide as an explanation for the deaths, for many RAF supporters, supported murder as an explanation. There were several unexplained elements that posed challenges to both the official story and the alternative story. According to Aust, who believes that the deaths were suicides, secrecy, inaccuracies, and carelessness marked the investigations in a way that invited suspicion. He cites several serious problems with the procedures of the inquiry’s commission, including that many of the commission’s meetings were held in camera and some of the minutes of those meetings are sealed. In the case of some of the witnesses who appeared before the inquiry, members of the public were prohibited from asking them questions. Aust also raises a number of other problems:

“The Commission of Inquiry made its report before the last of the technical criminal investigations had been completed. It contradicts itself on several pages in close proximity to each other. For instance, p. 88 speaks of ‘a nickel-plated Smith & Wesson pistol’, found in a hiding place in the wall in Cell 723, which on p. 90 has become ‘a chrome-plated Colt Detective Special revolver’.

No witness was asked the obvious question of whether the monitoring measures taken in Stammheim went on after the spring of 1977, whether the prisoners’ cells were bugged during the Schleyer kidnapping, whether there could perhaps be a tape recording of conversations or of sounds made on the night of their deaths”.⁷⁴

Questions remain unanswered in relationship to the inaudible gunshots and discrepant expert reports with regard to the distance from which the gunshot that killed Baader was fired. While there is agreement that the shot was fired from the pistol found in Baader’s cell, the commission inquiry, using expert investigations that examined the dispersion of gun powder and a pressure mark on the skin, found that the shot was fired at close range so that the gun had to be directly against the skin at the back of his neck when the gun was fired. Investigations carried out by Dr Roland Hoffmann, a scientist working with the Federal Criminal Investigation Office (BKA), contradicted the findings that the inquiry reported. Hoffmann’s investigations determined that the shots were fired from a distance between 30 and 40 centimeters away. Due to the location of the bullet entry, this distance would be inconsistent with a finding of suicide.

Aust points out that the inquiry’s failure to take up these inconsistencies in their investigations led to the report being the object of suspicion. He cites speculation born out of the inaudibility of gunshots and the lack of dispersion of gunpowder that raises the possibility that a silencer may have been used but, since no silencer was found at the scene, this would make Baader’s death out to be a murder.

Another point of contention is the way in which the gun must have been positioned in order to produce the wound. The official account asserts that Baader must have held the gun upside down in his right hand, with the handle pointing

upwards, pulling the trigger with his left hand. This account is inconsistent with that of the police at the scene, who argued that the gun was positioned the other way, with the handle pointed downwards.

Much more perplexing than this discrepancy is the handling of evidence. One piece of evidence, related to the varying findings with regard to the position of the gun, went missing. Criminal police who investigated the cell determined that the bullet that killed Baader, although it went through his skull, exited with much reduced residual energy so that it was found very near the body. This account is wildly different from that of the official report, which attributes to this bullet a mark on the cell wall. This mark on the wall was registered as evidence and listed as Clue No. 6. According to the description of evidence, the mark on wall included traces of blood or tissue, which apparently were sent for further study at the Stuttgart Institute for Forensic Medicine. Clue No. 6 disappears thereafter and is not addressed in any further documentation related to the Public Prosecutor's findings. Aust remarks:

“Even after the mysterious disappearance of Clue 6 became known, nobody could find the ‘parts of tissue or blood from the wall’. They had got lost in some Institute of Forensic medicine somewhere. Another invitation to speculation”⁷⁵

Although questions remained long after the Commission of Inquiry released its final report, the public prosecutor's office refused to address many of the specific concerns raised or to answer questions posed by media with regard to contradictory evidence or investigation findings. To the Green Party, the Baden-Württemberg government wrote:

“In our experience to date, information on details of the investigatory proceedings, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Justice have frequently given, is repeatedly used by interested parties to put forward new arguments designed to excite distrust of the results of the investigations. A ‘circumstantial report’ could contribute nothing further to the objectively justified interests of the general public as to information”⁷⁶.

2. Kamikaze and the Misrecognized Body

*Since they merge us with an image and drown us in it, let the image set their teeth on edge!*⁷⁷

*If people wanted to see these people hanged as criminals, that's only part of it: there's something else that puts an additional fear into people, namely that they themselves are terrorists. And that is forbidden. So this terrorism inside all of us, that's what generates the rage and fear, and that's what I don't want any more than I want the policeman inside myself — there's never just one side to us. We're always both: the State and the terrorist.*⁷⁸

*i do not have much to say. we believe that ulrike was hanged. we do not know how but we know by whom and we can characterize the calculation of the method...It was a cold conspiracy execution — how holger [meins] was executed, how siegfried hauser was executed. had ulrike resolved to die, it would have been because she saw it as the last possibility of her revolutionary identity against the slow destruction of will in the agony of isolation.*⁷⁹

Produced during the time period known as the German Autumn, Astrid Klein's collage *Kamikaze* (1978) references the guerilla activities that shook the Bundesrepublik Deutschland in the 1970s. Most prominent in the media and in the collective imagination was the Red Army Faction (RAF). Known for political actions such as prison breakouts, embassy and army base bombings, hostage takings, airplane hijackings, and bank robberies, the RAF explicitly set out to attack capitalist imperialism in all of its forms – from that of consumer culture, which they referred to as the Raspberry Reich, to the war machine that had made Vietnam its target. *Kamikaze* contains an iconic image of a so-called kamikaze flyer. Collaged over his eyes is the word “kamikaze”; across his chest is excerpted text from Wilhelm Reich on autoaggression. Since RAF actions did not take the form of suicide attacks, Klein's *Kamikaze* raises questions that offer openings for consideration of what constitutes threatening bodies – bodies that are threatening and acts that are threatening to bodies.

It is the case that the RAF meant to wage war upon the West German state, since they explicitly articulated their project as an effort to bring the imperialist war back “into the belly of the beast”.⁸⁰ Even during their imprisonment, the core members of the RAF continued to challenge the stability of the BRD, especially as subsequent “generations” of the RAF organized with an aim to force the release of RAF prisoners. In this context, a possible interpretation of Klein’s *Kamikaze* is that the alleged suicides of key RAF members Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ennslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe in the Stammheim prison in Stuttgart on October 18, 1977 — which followed an attempt to secure their release from prison through the (failed) hijacking of a Lufthansa flight — executed a kamikaze-like attack on the state. While the impact of the Stammheim prison deaths, and the murder of the RAF’s high profile hostage Hanns-Martin Schleyer in the immediate aftermath, was explosive, *Kamikaze* invites consideration of the body as exceeding that of a discrete entity bound by its perceived physical limitations. Rather, it offers the body as always situated in a mutually constituting relationship with the space it inhabits. Constituted as it is within the space that it occupies, the body can exist only within it, perhaps because of it, as a communicating body whose vocal expressions, postures, and gestures are shaped in a state of movement and directed action and reaction.

This chapter takes the limits of speech as a point of departure for consideration of the aesthetics of the body as a communicating and acting materiality, which necessarily implicates the place in which the acting body is situated. In turn, the place in which the acting body is situated is actively shaped

in ways that are informed by the both intentional and unintentional positing of a particular type of subject in advance; the built environment is molded in anticipation of the occupation of such a subject. In the context of the RAF — in which acting bodies were taken to be threatening to the state, and the state, through its aggressive counter-terrorist⁸¹ legal and policing measures, was understood to be threatening to those acting bodies — it is possible to consider the ways in which body and place are inextricable and destabilize the status and directionality of a real or imagined threat.

The body of the misheard

The term kamikaze came into vernacular use in connection with WWII attacks on Allied warships by Japanese military planes that would be destroyed along with their targets in the action, even though the attribution of the word to the particular action was a mistake. In fact, kamikaze was not the word that the Japanese military used to refer to the tactic. This much-used term is based on a word misheard. More than a problem of translation between languages, the life and longevity of this misheard word in common usage offers just one illustration of the way in which speech is limited in its capacity to signify or how meaningful relations are often based upon misrecognition.

Mikhail Bakhtin celebrates what he refers to as a rupture in European history⁸² that is characterized by Europe's "emergence from a socially isolated and culturally deaf semipatriarchal society, and its entrance into international and interlingual contacts and relationships. A multitude of different languages, cultures and times became available to Europe, and this became a decisive factor

in its life and thought”⁸³ Vital here is the polyglossic character of European society after the rupture that Bakhtin posits. For Bakhtin, the issue is not merely that several languages co-exist, since, as he points out, that has always been the case. Rather, what is significant to Bakhtin’s project is that polyglossia creates a situation in which a relationship of consciousness arises, especially between language and the world.

Bakhtin distinguishes between epic discourse and discourse that “comes into contact with the spontaneity of the inconclusive present”⁸⁴. Epic discourse is temporally bound and distanced from contemporaneity. While epic discourse takes the shape of national tradition, such tradition is a representation and not an objectively accessible thing. Nevertheless, national tradition is represented as objective, closed, above evaluative inspection, and out of the reach of personal experience; it is represented as an ‘absolute past’ that “excludes any possibility of another approach – and which therefore displays a profound piety toward the subject described and toward the language used to describe it, the language of tradition”⁸⁵. Important to this discussion is that Bakhtin observes that there exists a situation of inseparability between epic discourse and its subject. In other words, the judgment or appraisal of a subject already resides within the language used to describe it. The subject of epic discourse is ‘unfree’ because it is “constructed in the zone of an absolute distanced image, beyond the sphere of possible contact with the developing, incomplete and therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating present”⁸⁶

Despite his explicit focus on literature and literary history, Bakhtin's work is consistently and centrally concerned with questions of representation and ethics. In particular, for Bakhtin, representation and ethics are interrelated problems. In other words, representation may be understood as active and interested but not necessarily or completely intentional. Representation constitutes an expression of a particular relationship to the subject matter. Often, this is a relationship of origination or nomenclature. That is, representation produces the subject matter in the first place. Bound within this relationship, the subject matter is unwittingly accountable to its representation. The weight of this situation is more evident when considered in terms of the moment of interpellation in the constitution of subjecthood outlined by Louis Althusser. For Althusser, the hailing of an individual and the individual's recognition of, and subjection to, that hail, is an acknowledgement that there is nothing external to the state of affairs within which the subject is recognizable.⁸⁷ While the interpellated subject may very well object to the conditions of recognition and note its inherent failures, mistakes, and inaccuracies, the subject still responds to the hail, perhaps with the qualifying note to oneself that says something along the lines that Lewis Carroll's Alice says to herself about the rabbit who has mistaken her for his housemaid Mary Ann. Despite being misrecognized as Mary Ann, she devotes her full actions toward responding to the rabbit's mistake by fulfilling Mary Ann's tasks. As she runs to fetch the rabbit's gloves and fan (their location is of course unknown to her), she smugly says to herself: "He took me for his housemaid...*How surprised he'll be*

when he finds out who I am! But I'd better take him his fan and gloves — that is, if I can find them".⁸⁸

Interpellation, which occurs all in a moment (is not temporally successive) and happens over and over, "enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject". It is "a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not...determining it fully in advance"⁸⁹. That Althusser asserts that interpellation is specular in character is also significant to this discussion because it implies vision, spatiality, and corporeality; therefore, it suggests that interpellation does not necessarily occur in language or speech.

It could be said that interpellation belongs to the order of epic discourse. By virtue of being a listener or a reader of an epic, one is already interpellated as a subject who is distanced from the epic plane, subjected to it. The representation of time is key here. Bakhtin observes that the epic discourse is one of hierarchical time, and the hierarchical structure of time that underlies epic discourse is established through an absolute epistemology rooted in a tradition bound up with processes of nation building. While it is the case that Bakhtin does not explicitly dwell upon the role of the nation as it relates to power over subjects. This conspicuous or relative silence, given his topic material, can be attributed to the social conditions under which Bakhtin's texts were produced. Under the Stalinist regime, the suppression of texts was one factor that influenced Bakhtin's particular approach to topics, especially to the extent that their treatment could be

readily recognized as cultural and political critique. Beyond censorship and suppression, Bakhtin and his contemporaries feared disappearance, imprisonment, and state murder. One might suspect that this fear may account for the way in which Bakhtin's theorizations often remained couched in literary studies even though their resonance, as is the case with much of the literature that concerned him, exceeds the objects explicitly named.⁹⁰ Of significance is Bakhtin's observation with regard to Rabelais' novel, of which he produced one of his major studies:

“We may say with assurance that the entire novel, from beginning to end, grew out of the very depths of the life of that time, a life in which Rabelais himself was a participant or an interested witness. His images link the immeasurable depth and breadth of folk universalism with concreteness, individuality, and with a detailed presentation of living actuality....Beyond the images that may appear fantastic we find real events, living persons, and the author's own rich experience and sharp observation”⁹¹

I am interested in the connection between the characteristics of epic discourse that contribute to its representational power and the nation as a space in which subjects are interpellated — whether as good subjects or threatening subjects. Benedict Anderson argues that the nation as an imagined community only became possible when three fundamental cultural conceptions lost their dominance: the inextricable relationship between the sacred language of Latin and ontological truth; the organizing principle of cosmological monarchies; and the

inseparability of cosmology and history that implied a temporal conception marked by a sense of simultaneity and the revelatory idea of the end of time or ready anticipation of Christ's second-coming.⁹² Underlying the weakening of these conceptions, Anderson identifies a self-conscious and political relativization and territorialization of epistemology. Anderson observes that explorations had a relativizing impact on religious communities and other cultural formations through the circulation of travel writings that offered "boundary-oriented and horizontal" textual descriptions of the other societies encountered and their belief systems, as perceived or observed in the form of ritual by explorers.

There are echoes of Bakhtin in Anderson's observations. Significant for this discussion are the parallels with regard to: the polyphonic character/relativization of language; the re-spatialization of language; and the emphasis on shifts in dominant temporal conceptions — all of which allow consideration of Bakhtin's epic discourse in relation to the imagined space that is the nation. Anderson asserts that, to work towards understanding "the obscure genesis of nationalism", it is imperative to note the shift between notions of simultaneity. Medieval simultaneity crosses time and does not distinguish between past and present, while the contemporary notion of simultaneity that Anderson stresses as an idea that "more than anything else, made it possible to 'think' the nation"⁹³ is one of "calendrical coincidence". For Anderson, the concrete instantiation of the production of such simultaneity can be found in print-capitalism; the novel is one example (Bakhtin is in full agreement here) but the

newspaper is the one that offers “that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations”.⁹⁴

Bakhtin’s work establishes the connection between temporality and language in the context of the rise of vernaculars and national idioms. As the “world of objects and the world of language were immensely broadened and enriched”,⁹⁵ words that appeared in novels (such as in Rabelais’ novel) were often recorded there for the very first time, having the effect of regenerating words and objects. According to Bakhtin, these linguistic encounters, or this “interorientation of languages”, constituted a new awareness of time, in terms of its passage, that could not have been realized within a single language. Further, this consciousness of time, as it emerged in this polyglossic condition, fostered a sense of homeland and nationality, along with:

“the boundaries of epochs and philosophies and could for the first time embrace vast dimensions and measure the flow of time; it could realize the present, it could contrast ‘today’ with ‘yesterday’....The modern time became conscious of itself. It too could reflect its face in the ‘mirror of comedy’”.⁹⁶

The connection between the limits of a particular language or vernacular, something that can be acknowledged, and a concrete and historical space and the way in which, as Bakhtin argues, such languages are inextricable from living practice⁹⁷ is a productive point of departure for this discussion because the problem with epic discourse is that it springs from a tradition that, while it is associated often with a place such as a homeland, is completely removed from,

and alien to, any sort of lived practice or experience. Its story is an inheritance of sorts that has a claim to authority in its status as citation and, therefore, it is to be received from the “reverent point of view of a descendent”.⁹⁸

The epic discourse that Bakhtin describes shares its characteristics, and is of the same tradition, as the official, authoritative, and interpellating discourse of the law. In particular, the court of law exemplifies well the characteristic expressions of *truth* (a concept temporally oriented toward the past) and the ‘distant image’ of authority and conclusiveness in a setting complete with a reinforcing code of dress, conduct, gesture, and speech.

With respect to speech in an official setting such as a law court, Judith Butler, suggests that one of the ways in which speech has an injurious capacity towards its object is the *loss of context* that it imposes.⁹⁹ Speech carries with it considerable power which is derived from its prior existence. This problem is raised initially by J.L. Austin’s emphasis on the prevalence of illocutionary (performative) speech acts – those utterances that do what they say at the moment in which they are said just by virtue of being said, such as a judge’s ruling against a defendant as “guilty”. Austin acknowledges that, in order for these utterances to do what they say, they are necessarily implicated in ritual and ceremony, if not convention. The significance of time then exceeds the moment of saying and implicates a ritual time of a “condensed historicity”.¹⁰⁰

Bakhtin’s image of the mirror of comedy is a contrasting image, since the speech of contemporaneity breaks with the authority of that which is official and

indebted to the past. This break produces an ambivalence in which laughter and parody annihilate distance.

“The plane of comic (humorous) representation is a specific plane in its spatial as well as its temporal aspect. Here the role of memory is minimal; in the comic world there is nothing for memory and tradition to do. One ridicules in order to forget. This is the zone of maximally familiar and crude contact....In this plane (the plane of laughter) one can disrespectfully walk around whole objects... The object is broken apart, laid bare (its hierarchal ornamentation is removed): the naked object is ridiculous; its ‘empty’ clothing stripped and separated from its person, is also ridiculous. What takes place is a comical operation of dismemberment”¹⁰¹

Bakhtin’s depiction of epic discourse is useful to this discussion because it highlights all of the traits of the discourse of the law, the discourse that structured the terms and parameters of exchange in the Stammheim trial of 1975-1977. Bakhtin’s representation of epic discourse, however, is set up to elucidate the discourse of the ‘inconclusive present’, a discourse that he sees as characteristic of novelistic discourse. This representation of the two discourses may have the paradoxical effect of rendering two static and complete forms of expression, while emphasizing a linear, if not compartmentalized, modernizing progression through time. This interpretation, however, would be consistent with the tendency in North America to disregard the way in which Bakhtin constantly critiqued the use of power in both representation and language usage in a way that had resonances

beyond the forms or objects that he explicitly studied. If it can be accepted that Bakhtin's study of these differently spirited discourses can speak at all to the urgent and ubiquitous problematic of communication and power as it pertains to official and unofficial discourses, especially as they frequently intersect, these observations may provide an opening into consideration of the speech and corporeal dynamics that were characteristic of the Stammheim trial.

For the broader context of this discussion, the characteristics of epic discourse as an interpellating frame that establishes and works to maintain the parameters of communicative exchange in the trial — and, as will be considered subsequently, in media representations of general social practice — are productive in an attempt to reflect upon the symbolic and physical space in which the trial occurred. In other words, they allow consideration of the way in which the process at Stammheim was intricately woven within the fabric of a national project and how it is that speech acts in and around the trial were both enabled and limited, if not annihilated, by these circumstances. Further, reflection upon the conditions of speech in the trial — to the extent that it inflected national concerns, some generic to domestic preoccupations and others specific to the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970s — also point to the use and significance of a body (anti-) language deployed in the court.

act iii: ulrike's tale




Illustration 1 ulrike's tale. Collage.

National matters

Attention to the production of bodies through the disciplining of movement, gesture, and comportment has been a central concern of the state in nation building and in the continued project of shaping and reshaping national identity. In the German context, there are many concrete examples that illustrate the significance of the body and its movements to the idea of the nation. One example of this significance comes out of the 19th century when gymnastics became an activity that was directed towards German nationalism in the move towards the unification of Germany but also as a reaction against French domination under Napoleon. Gymnastics became associated with secret societies, plans for the organization of networks of saboteurs, the accumulation of weapons, and revolutionary aims.

The revolutionary declarations of gymnasts and the espousal of the usefulness of gymnastic movement in the development of potential soldiers through “the military utility of various exercises: games as a model for infantry tactics; night exercises to learn fighting in the dark; vaulting on the wooden horse so as to ride a real horse more steadily...”,¹⁰² led to fears of the gymnastic body as one that was identified as a threatening and revolutionary body; gymnastics as an activity was officially suppressed and the object of sustained surveillance. In the latter part of the 19th century, the gymnastics movement was still concerned with the question of nation building but in terms of the production of the bourgeois German male body that was both distinct from that of labourers and that of aristocratic subjects.¹⁰³

If it can be accepted that attention towards the movement of bodies — their comportment, gestures, coordinated actions — has long-been considered an ingredient of the nation-building project, especially to the extent that such attention and discipline constructs particular subjects and particular collective formations, then it is worthwhile to consider the condition of detention for the RAF prisoners at Stuttgart-Stammheim, as implemented by the West German state officials. If gymnastics could be understood as an activity that is potentially threatening, revolutionary, cohesive, and connected with identity formation, then it might be instructive to ask what kind of subject is produced under the disciplinary conditions implemented at Stammheim with regard to: contact, state of health, and isolation.

According to a Council of Europe commission report issued in 1978 on the admissibility of an application submitted by family members on behalf of core RAF members Ennslin, Baader, and Raspe (all three were already deceased by that time) under the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, the permanent features of the “conditions [of detention] were the separation of the applicants from the other prisoners, their exclusion from the social life of the prison, strict supervision of contacts with the outside world, and recourse to special security measures”.¹⁰⁴

The commission’s report shows that in July 1975, the Stuttgart Appeal Court ordered medical assessments of the RAF prisoners to determine their ability to stand on trial in the context of indications of their rapidly deteriorating health and difficulty concentrating. These reports were completed in the autumn of 1975

by psychiatrists and experts in internal medicine. These same specialists submitted several subsequent reports and recommendations over the following months and until April 1977. Some of their recommendations with regard to changes in the conditions of imprisonment were carried out at Stammheim in connection with the RAF prisoners, but prison procedural follow through of these recommendations was remarkably unstable and inconsistent. According to authorities, the rationale for this uneven follow through was informed by concerns around security.

In the fall of 1975, at the completion of the initial set of reports, the RAF prisoners Baader, Ennslin, Meinhof, and Raspe were found to be suffering from both physical and mental exhaustion. In addition to being approximately seventy percent of their respective expected weights, they all had low blood pressure. The reports also noted several symptoms that are of social significance and relevant to their participation in, and preparation for, trial proceedings: “They present the following symptoms in varying degrees: problems of concentration, marked fatigue, difficulties of expression or articulation, reduced physical and mental performance, instability, diminished spontaneity and ability to make contacts, depression”.¹⁰⁵ By April 1977, the reports concluded that, while the prisoners Baader, Ennslin, and Rapse (Meinhof had been dead since May 1976) were fit to be incarcerated, they had deteriorated much more significantly since the initial medical reports of 1975. Ennslin had deteriorated the most. Changes in her condition were described as: “loss of weight, very low blood pressure, premature aging, severer [sic] difficulties of expression and lack of concentration, motor

disturbances”.¹⁰⁶ Changes relative to previous findings with regard to the state of health for Baader and Raspe included: “decrease in activity and spontaneity, emotional regression, problems of articulation, hesitancy of speech”.¹⁰⁷

Significantly, the authors of the medical reports attribute the worsening state of the RAF prisoners’ health to a number of different but potentially mutually contributing factors, such as: the duration of their detention on remand; the conditions under which the RAF members were imprisoned; the toll of their hunger strike campaigns; stress related not only to the trial but to preparations for their defense, compounded by their efforts to represent themselves in the trial proceedings. While state officials had emphasized the role of the hunger strikes on the health and well being of the prisoners, arguing that if they are unable to stand trial it is due to their own self-destructive activities and therefore the trial ought to continue whether or not they can be present – several of the experts disputed the significance of the hunger strikes as a major contributing factor in the RAF prisoners’ health. According to the background of a decision with respect to an application that Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe made to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Commission reported:

“In the opinion of the majority of experts, these hunger strikes do not constitute a decisive factor and, in any event, are not sufficient to explain the state of exhaustion of the applicants observed several months after the end of the hunger strike in late 1974/early 1975. In this connection, Dr Muller and Dr Schroder state that experience of the immediate post-war

period indicates that six months of adequate nourishment will normally eliminate the great majority of vegetative disorders caused by under-nourishment when living conditions are satisfactory”.¹⁰⁸

In terms of the charge of sensory isolation in Stuttgart-Stammheim, it was found to be difficult to maintain, since the design and arrangement of their cells and the conditions of their imprisonment did not contribute to a significant enough disruption of sensory experience in the strict sense for such a charge to hold. It is the case that Ulrike Meinhof and Astrid Proll were subjected to sensory isolation and sensory disruption while incarcerated in the so-called “dead section” of Osendorf prison (Meinhof was at Osendorf from 16 June, 1972 to 9 February, 1973; she was transferred later to Stammheim). Astrid Proll has said of her time in Osendorf, where she was held in acoustic isolation, that she felt like she had been buried alive and was no longer a part of this world.¹⁰⁹ In contrast to the stark conditions in Osendorf, officials repeatedly pointed out that RAF prisoners in Stuttgart-Stammheim did not suffer from isolation or deprivation; officials boasted that the prisoners in fact had access to, among other items, many print and audio media sources that were available in cells that were furnished with desks and bookshelves.

In September 1977, just a little more than a month before the deaths of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe, the justice ministry of Baden-Württemberg released a document that detailed much of the contents of the RAF prisoners’ cells and some of the conditions of social contact or visits. The aim of this inventory was to answer to claims that the prisoners were being kept in a state of social isolation.

The inventory of communications items that the prisoners had access to included: radio; record player; television; a wide variety and large quantity of newspapers and periodicals; books – estimated in number to be approximately 2,000 between the RAF prisoners; and a typewriter for personal writing and correspondence.¹¹⁰ Many of these items, in particular the television, were provided to RAF prisoners on recommendation from independent medical reports that were ordered by the appeal court. Additionally, the document set out to describe the conditions for visits and the circulation of incoming and outgoing correspondence, attempting to show that the conditions for contact with the outside world were similar to those that govern the activities and contacts of prisoners in the regular population at Stammheim.

For RAF prisoners, however, there were many exceptions to the provisions outlined in the justice ministry's report — enough exceptions that the Commission for the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* found that the RAF prisoners were subjected to evident social isolation. Many changes in the detention of the RAF prisoners occurred over the duration of their imprisonment at Stammheim, therefore, provisions, as they are outlined in documents or reported to outside sources, provide only a snapshot of the prison conditions at the time of their preparation. Conditions tended to become more flexible in response to external pressures from medical professionals and appeal court rulings and tightened up more severely following major events external to Stammheim, particularly in response to guerrilla actions that were attributed to “second generation” RAF members on the outside.

Related to the latter was that the conditions of their imprisonment were subject to special security measures that allowed for visiting rights with family and/or defense council; access to communications media; circulation of mail; and contact with each other, any other prisoners, or the outside world to be revoked. These contacts were revoked on several occasions, sometimes for a considerable duration. Drastic measures were taken on 6 September 1977, the day after Hanns Martin Schleyer had been kidnapped by guerillas with an aim to negotiate the release of RAF prisoners. The RAF prisoners' access to mass communications such as radio and television broadcasts was revoked and all activities and opportunities to be in common space with each other or with other prisoners were suspended by order of the President of the Appeal Court. On 7 September 1977, the Federal Minister of Justice reinforced those measures and furthered them when he ordered the suspension of all contact: amongst RAF prisoners; between RAF prisoners and their lawyers; and with any other parties.¹¹¹

While the Commission report observes that much international literature in psychology and criminology addresses severe impairment of physical and mental health caused by social isolation, it states, on the basis of the medical experts' summaries, that there is a lack of psychological literature that addresses conditions that can be compared with the conditions of the RAF prisoners' incarceration. In terms of internal medicine, the comparisons would be made to documentation with regard to long-term prisoners in isolation and intensive care patients who have been kept alive artificially for an extended period of time.

Writing from her cell at Ossendorf after long periods of isolation and partial sensory deprivation, Ulrike Meinhof wrote about the sensations experienced in her imprisonment, which she described as the outcome of a form of torture. Her prose is fragmented and jarring; it is written in second person:

“Feeling yourself become dumb.

Impossible to recall the meaning of words, except very vaguely.

The use of loud hissing – s, ß, tz, z, seh – is absolutely unbearable.

The warders, the visits, the court, the celluloid reality.

Sick in the head.

Flashes.

No longer mastering the construction of sentences, grammar, syntax.

If you write – at the end of two lines, impossible to recall the start of the first”¹¹²

RAF member Holger Meins, a film student and a visual artist, died in Wittlich prison on November 9, 1974 after a 58-day hungerstrike. Prior his death, Meins had been kept in isolation in his cell on security measure orders. The security directives were extensive and included orders for: his complete search and change of clothing after each visit, which would be supervised by two guards; Meins to be handcuffed and accompanied by armed guards when he was outdoors for his exercise; his exclusion from all prison community activities, including the church services; and he was to be given a full body search daily.¹¹³

In very ill health after the fourth week of the hungerstrike, Meins was the first of the RAF prisoners to be fed artificially. Soon afterwards, several RAF

members imprisoned in other facilities were also force-fed by prison doctors. Meins authored a three page report on the practices of forcefeeding, which describes the use of physical restraints as well as the use of a crowbar to pry open the prisoner's lips and then teeth before locking the jaw open so that the tubes could be inserted down the prisoner's throat.¹¹⁴

Only days before his death, Meins wrote a letter to Manfred Grashof, a RAF prisoner who had just given up the hungerstrike. In his letter, Meins tries to persuade Grashof into again taking up the hungerstrike. Unlike much of the other circulated RAF correspondence with respect to the strike, which tended to emphasize the role of the strike in gaining concessions from the state,¹¹⁵ Meins' letter remains thoroughly situated in terms of identity. This being the very last letter that Meins wrote, it could have been addressed to anyone and to no-one, or perhaps to himself, as it stages a dialogue around the meaning of death by means of hungerstrike. His deliberations are fully resonant with an anticipation of his own impending death as he considers the relationship between one's death and one's life. The conclusion of the letter confirms that he writes more of himself than of Grashof: "A revolutionary in the struggle — with all of one's love for life, despising death". "In any case", he writes, "I was on the right side".¹¹⁶

Nation, time, and representations of the German Autumn

Soon after the RAF's public dissolution in 1998, Thomas Elsaesser's essay "Antigone Agonistes: Urban Guerilla or Guerilla Urbanism?" was published. In his essay, Elsaesser reflects upon the repetitious 'burial' of the RAF. As Elsaesser points out, the RAF's dissolution followed soon after the widely publicized

twentieth anniversary of the German Autumn in 1977, the period of heightened political turmoil, increased surveillance, and paranoia that accompanied and followed the Schleyer kidnapping and eventual killing, the failed hijacking of a Lufthansa flight, and the alleged suicides of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe in Stammheim. The significance of the public treatment of the twentieth anniversary of the German Autumn in Germany for Elsaesser's discussion is that it constitutes one of many symbolic attempts to 'bury' the RAF.

I am interested in how it is that Elsaesser's essay picks up on the significance of temporality in representations of the RAF, particularly representations of the RAF's burial — an act that, as he points out, seemingly needs to be carried out over and over again. Taking cinematic representation as a starting point, giving particular attention to the representation of the RAF in German history in the 1978 film *Deutschland im Herbst* (*Germany in Autumn*) and the 1997 commissioned and exceptionally high-budget made for television docudrama *Todesspiel* (*Death Game*) (that Elsaesser argues is a rewriting of *Germany in Autumn*), Elsaesser observes that:

“In Germany, the recoil and the soul-searching went deeper than the events of May 1968 had done, as if a different kind of ‘knight’s move’ had been made, backtracking into German history but also forward into an altogether discontinuous political space.”¹¹⁷

Elsaesser's use of the image of a chess move, the knight's in particular, suggests that a sort of topography of history dominates representations of the events surrounding the RAF and the so-called German Autumn, while highlighting and

reinforcing the allusion to a game from the made for television film title. Elsaesser's attention to how representations of the German Autumn produce a particular shape to German history in relation to these events allows him to point out that, in the case of the 1970s representation, the film *Germany in Autumn*, "the present of 1977 is first and foremost a function of the past, encasing it...in the paradigms of the 'return of the repressed'",¹¹⁸ while that of the 1990s, as illustrated by *Death Game*, "constructs a continuity, that of social democrats, remaining patriots by serving their country in war just as honourably as they stand by the nation in conditions of near civil war".¹¹⁹

The RAF presented a heightened and sustained political crisis for the West German government much prior to the German Autumn. Answering to the German public and to an international audience with regard to: the RAF prisoners' claims of torture; the RAF's life-threatening hungerstrike campaigns (which ended the lives of some prisoners); the brutal forcefeedings of prisoners; and notoriously drastic changes in the criminal code to effect proceedings of the Stammheim trial, to name just a few controversies, kept the governing social democratic party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), on the hot seat and provided constant invitations and political ammunition to the partisan opposition, primarily the right-wing Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU). Post-war, the SPD had worked long and hard for government leadership, losing much support from the young leftists along the way, while promoting themselves as viable in a neo-liberal global context. Ironically, it was political actors from among those many student members that the party had lost who would pose the

most consistent, prolonged, and potentially devastating challenge to their government. More accurately, it was a sustained crisis rather than a challenge for the social democratic leadership.

Heinrich Breloer the director of *Death Game* chose the then social democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as one of the main protagonists of the film's narrative, which alternately focused on Schleyer over the last days of his life while being held hostage by the RAF. Elsaesser notes that the film was extremely popular, a hit even, but that it placed its emphasis on dimensions and social actors entirely different from that of all of the earlier filmic attempts at representation that were produced in the 1970s and 1980s. The earlier films focused on the RAF members themselves, their families, or others who became embroiled in the events due to location or politics. Elsaesser points out that key here is a shift in the primary site of identification that *Death Game* achieves with its ratings success. He writes:

“It appears to have been especially popular among younger audiences, for whom the terrorists were by now political dinosaurs, but who became fascinated by the ex-Chancellor Schmidt's narrative. Identifying with the State, possibly not as a political entity, but as an institution whose mechanisms of power are rarely laid as bare as during a crisis, viewers could follow the unfolding events with a technocrat's appreciation of complex institutional and legal processes, a stance also adopted by the pragmatist Schmidt himself at the time, and in his retrospective tv-interview that allowed him to relive the drama.”¹²⁰

Breloer's film is concerned with the personalities of those in power during the crisis of the German Autumn. Elsaesser observes that *Death Game* is essentially a film about spin-doctors attempting to manage the media and representation generally. Schmidt and his advisory staff, the "lonely men at the top",¹²¹ tell their stories about making life or death decisions that put their careers, their political party, the lives of citizens, and even German democracy itself at stake. This team, as its members individually offer their accounts, attributes its ability to make decisions and to manage the crisis to the collective experiences of its members as soldiers in the Wehrmacht, mingling the crisis posed by the German Autumn with the experience of being a part of the Eastern Front. This narrative move initiated Elsaesser's observation that:

"To the extent that *Death Game* is about these former soldiers and their self-representation, it ironically grants the RAF one of its basic points, namely that senior politicians of the Federal Republic were bound together by a military, para-military code of conduct or even an outright Nazi past, and that they formed what were known as *Seilschaften*, old boy networks."¹²²

More than that, Elsaesser argues that *Death Game* sets out a reversal of the mythology that shapes earlier filmic representations of the RAF and the German Autumn — in *Death Game*, the heroes become the villains and the villains become the heroes.

Germany in Autumn is an omnibus film, initiated by director Alexander Kluge, consisting of several smaller film projects independently made by

prominent German filmmakers of the time, many of whom were associated with the New German Cinema movement that emerged in the late 1960s. The pastiche of filmic contributions — some of which are documentary, some are fictional, and others (as well as the final film a whole) challenge altogether such tidy distinctions — has meant that *Germany in Autumn* is considered to be a “non-fiction” film. Nora Alter describes the genre of the “non-fiction” film in this way:

“While borrowing many features of documentaries and actuality films, including the appearance of filming “reality”, the nonfiction films....do not claim to offer an objective – hence, true – vision of that reality. They do not disguise – indeed, they prefer to display – their artificiality, their artful and often biased manipulation of the “factual” images, celebrating these qualities.”¹²³

The significance of the “non-fiction” label is that it acknowledges the way in which the film does not make truth claims, although it is overtly sympathetic to the RAF and sympathetic to radical left politics. Further, the film depicts a deep chiasm between the bodies of governance and those who are governed (“terrorist” or not), since the overwhelming sense of fear — fear of being suspected, fear of proximity or association, fear of speech — is palpable across the contributed productions.

The film *Germany in Autumn* is framed by documentary footage from two funerals. First, there is abundant footage from the state funeral of Hans Martin Schleyer, who was killed by his RAF captors after fifty days. When negotiations for the release of RAF prisoners failed, along with the hijacking of a Lufthansa

flight LH181 from Mallorca to Frankfurt that was brought down at Mogadishu by a special unit called GSG 9, Schleyer was found dead. Second, the film included footage from the much maligned funeral for Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe. This funeral, held in the Dornhaldenfriedhof in Stuttgart, looked more like a political protest than a funeral, given the massive police presence and the large number of attendees who disguised their identities by covering their faces with scarves.

Planning for the funeral for Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe was obstructed in numerous ways. To begin with, many service providers refused to assist with the funeral but this was the least of the barriers. Designating them as terrorists, many vocal members of the public and local government did not believe that the three RAF members ought to be given a burial in the cemetery in Stuttgart. The very public and ferocious struggle over the burial of the RAF members grounds a recurring thematic that both implicitly and explicitly runs through the independently produced parts that comprise the whole of *Germany in Autumn*, Sophocles' tragic play *Antigone* figures prominently throughout. The problem of the appropriate burial of Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe, from the perspective of their relatives and friends and the view that, as terrorists, their burial in the cemetery would be in some way contaminating to the space and to the other German bodies buried there. This echoes Antigone's struggle over the burial of her brother Polynices, who is considered to be a traitor and, therefore, according to the law, his body cannot be buried. Instead, Polynices' body is left outside of the city wall to rot and to be consumed by scavengers. Antigone refuses the law and attempts to bury her brother.

The matter of the burial is not the only stark return to the figure of Antigone, since Heinrich Böll's written contribution, which was directed by Volker Schlöndorff, offers a satirical treatment of mass media in the context of the German Autumn, a period of surveillance and heightened efforts to contain not only sympathy for the RAF's motives or politics but, as some would argue, the young West German left in general. This was a period of not only state censorship and widespread scrutiny, but such an ethos of fear was fostered by counter-revolutionary institutional and policing measures that self-censorship was just as, or more, effective than the official initiatives, which ranged from subtle to not so subtle means such as media black-outs. Official measures that were initiated towards *Ausgrenzung* — the containment of the terrorist threat — were directed not so much toward the threat posed directly by guerilla actions but toward the threat of the spread of terrorist sentiments and the growth of radical group membership and included a process of blacklisting designed for the removal, and prevention of the placement, of potential sympathizers from public posts in the BRD. Incidentally, some commentators argued that these practices, by designating otherwise legal individuals illegal by excluding them from aspects of public life, threatened to contribute to the growth of the very groups that the state was attempting to eliminate. Böll, for instance, remarked elsewhere that

“‘Anti-radical’, ‘anti-extremist’ legislation—it is these atrocities that will drive hundreds if not thousands of youths into the Underground; and not only those presently banned from ‘public service’ but also those who, as a result of the actively circulating blacklists, have become ‘unmanageable’

in the private sector as well....There'll be ample copy for the columnists and headline writers of the sensationalist press".¹²⁴

The Böll–Schlöndorff piece in the film *Germany in Autumn* is set in a meeting in which broadcasters consider pulling the plug on a scheduled television broadcasting of a recently completed production of *Antigone*. The debate is structured by the fear that broadcasting the play will spark associations between Antigone and her sister Ismene and Gudrun Ensslin and her sister, who along with their father was a vital force in ensuring the burial of the three RAF members. The concern addresses at once how the play may be perceived by the authorities and how it may be perceived by youthful audiences in the wake of the events of October 1977 and the German Autumn. Is this classical play an incitement to terror? If it is the case that Sophocles' play can be seen as an incitement to terror, then there is something in particular about this particular time of the late 1970s, this particular place that is the BRD, and these conditions that threaten the possibility that the play will be effective at hitting its target signification as it fails to in other contexts. One might even say that in this piece the play itself is, in a sense, put on trial.

For Elsaesser, the figure of Antigone in *Germany in Autumn* illuminates, in part, the reversal of the mythology of the German Autumn that occurs more than twenty years later in Broloer's film *Death Game*. For Elsaesser, Antigone's presence has significant implications in terms of the representation of Germany's history:

“The appearance of Antigone in *Germany in Autumn* is thus overdetermined: it raises the question whether the film, by pointing to her presence, already specifies a particular reading of the historical-political dimension of the events with which *Germany in Autumn* is concerned. Is Antigone the hermetic key, in other words, for more than some merely accidental features of the ‘hot autumn’? Does she, thanks to Hegel [whose interpretation of the play emphasized the opposition between the state and the family] and Holderlin [whose interpretation highlighted the opposition of the individual and the state, while pointing to the impossibility of distributive justice in the face of the incommensurability that is ushered in when it is acknowledged that there is no singular law], embody or allegorise a recurring constellation in the history of modern Germany? Or, given the belated – and for the viewers of 1997 evidently plausible – reversal of the relationship between state and individual, does *Antigone* become the master-mythology of 1977 only because she served also to mystify what was at stake?”¹²⁵

The use of Antigone in *Germany in Autumn*, Elsaesser argues, places Germany’s history into the form of tragedy, whether it is that of *Antigone* or that of *Hamlet*. The fathers and sons thematic is dominant here also, especially to the extent that by all accounts — from the RAF communiqués to the literature of all forms produced by people who participated in the 1960s-70s West German student movement (many of those who constituted this movement voluntarily exiled from the social democratic party [the SPD]) to the numerous commentaries on the RAF

and radical politics in the BRD — the reaction of the then West German youth toward their parents' generation (the “Auschwitz generation”, as the RAF called them) and their silence with regard to the Germany's then recent past¹²⁶ was one of anger, guilt, and often expressed an imperative not only to reveal the true face of the parental (governing) generation's will to power but to act. For the RAF and the 2nd of June Movement, such action would be armed action, since the means of the state were militaristic and brutal.

Elsaesser shows that the reversal or inversion of the tragic structure of German history, as it manifested in the 1997 *Death Game*, has Creon as the hero. In *Death Game*, former Chancellor Schmidt is Creon but he is the character with whom the viewer is to identify. If the events that culminated in the German Autumn could be said to be a response to the previous generation and to the trauma of the Nazi era, then *Death Game* refunctions this generational schism. The generation of Schmidt and his counterparts in West German politics and big industry, reclaims the status that the so-called 68ers denied them. In other words, as Elsaesser points out, *Death Game* establishes them — to the extent that they are represented through the partisanship of the SPD — as “good fathers”.

While Elsaesser's essay raises a number of insightful points and questions with regard to the RAF's use of direct action and communication aesthetics, suggesting that the recurring presence of the thematic of tragic theatre neglects a shift in the medium by which not only the RAF communicated but by which politics operate in contemporary liberal democracies, these will be considered later. What ought to be mentioned here is the way in which the security measures

of the German Autumn have come to be viewed by many as not only a particularly extreme response to the RAF and other West German radical left groups designated as terrorist in orientation but as an *intentionally* exaggerated one. For the SPD, a party that had alienated much of its youth base, trading it in essentially for success in the federal election of 1969, urban guerilla sympathizers, thought to be represented throughout the range of leftist association, appear to have been a target for the SPD's discourse on terror, not to mention their witch hunt for anyone who could appear to be assisting or supporting terrorists in any way.¹²⁷

“The conventional view by the left of the result of the ‘hot autumn’ has always been that the State cynically played up the terrorist threat, in order to usher in a ‘law-and-order’ society, using the RAF as intimidation against reformist social movements, a stick to beat the moderate left with, but also as justification to invest in security equipment, surveillance technology, the introduction of electronics into the bureaucracies at federal, regional and local levels. It was as if capitalism shifting gears towards the information society had to invent terrorism in order to legitimate a (temporary?) curtailment of civil liberties and even human rights, as a politically expedient, broadly acceptable argument to allow the new military-industrial, electronic-surveillance complex to ease itself into place”.¹²⁸

Böll's suggestion that the state's drastic efforts towards the containment of guerilla actions and sympathies might actually serve as a driving force to the

growth of urban guerilla activity is difficult to assess in terms of its accuracy but the ironic outcome that he predicts was paralleled in the case of the West German state's harassment of publishers, even prior to the period of the German Autumn. The search and seizure of equipment at Trikont Verlag (a small publishing house that specialized in leftist titles) in Munich in 1975 by police officers with submachine guns is a case in point.

The target or impetus of the raid was a memoir *Wie Alles Anfing* (*How it all Began*) that Trikont had published. The memoir was written by Michael Baumann, then wanted for terrorism in the BRD and living underground. Written while Baumann was in hiding, *Wie Alles Anfing* offers candid reflections on his active participation in the post-war left-wing urban guerrilla movement that grew out of the 1960s and built up over the 1970s into a national security crisis for the BRD in confrontation with the notorious RAF and the 2nd of June Movement, of which Baumann was a member. While it is often referenced for its rare insights into the psychological development of a terrorist career, Baumann's autobiography constructs a rich description of the emergence of the West German urban guerrilla movement and stands out as one of the few accounts that proficiently acknowledge the significance of the role of the body in the rise of guerrilla warfare in industrialized cities in the 1970s.

Baumann's *Wie Alles Anfing* initiated a brutal demonstration of suppression on the part of the state against the production and circulation of texts that addressed the subjects of political violence and guerrilla activities in the BRD. The raid on the Trikont office in November of 1975, which facilitated the

seizure of three hundred copies of Baumann's text, left the small publisher, along with an even smaller-scale women's publishing collective located in the same building, economically and organizationally incapacitated. Police trashed the offices; apprehended files, bank information, financial records, and subscription mailing lists; seized several copies of unrelated publications ready for sale and distribution; and confiscated all of the equipment necessary to the daily operational activities of the publishing houses, such as typewriters and typesetting machines. The raid was carried out at gunpoint by thirty police officers over a period of approximately five hours. The handful of employees, who were present at the time of the operation, were not only held at gunpoint but subjected to body searches. In fairly close succession, several smaller search and seize operations were carried out in major urban centres throughout the BRD on small alternative book distributors and booksellers in what appeared to be an attempt to curb distribution of the Baumann text.

The larger context of palimpsest law in the BRD at the time, in particular the tightening of censorship laws, challenges the apparent motivation to block circulation of the book. While the office of Trikont was shut down as a result of the seizure of their materials and equipment, in addition to the state's legal prosecution of the publishing house (its editors were convicted under the "Law for the Protection of Communal Peace", censorship legislation that was passed after the publication of Baumann's book and the raid of the publisher's office), interest in the book peaked so that it "pushed a book which might otherwise have had a

fairly restricted readership—the initial press run was 3000 copies—into the international limelight”.¹²⁹

Indeed, Baumann’s text achieved much attention internationally and was published and republished in various translations in Europe and in North America, sometimes under the title *Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann’s Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerrilla*. In its latter incarnations, the text is supplemented with statements written by novelist Heinrich Böll and activist-author Daniel Cohn-Bendit (known as “Red Danny” in the 1968 revolts in France) that argue for recognition of the broad social significance of the text and against its suppression. These statements, also produced while Baumann remained in hiding from state authorities, are constructed with an eye towards his eventual capture and judgment. While they exercise much care in addressing (perhaps attempting to contain) the imminent danger lying dormant like a bomb that was about to be tripped in Baumann’s confessional text, these statements openly target the explicit formations of official censorship that arose during this period — formations that rendered the very *telling* of one’s own story, if one were an urban guerrilla fighter or political dissident, illegal in the BRD.

So harsh was the West German state’s response to the “terrorist threat” that the international community increasingly was called upon to get involved — whether through applications to commissions regarding treatment of prisoners that appeared to challenge human rights treaties to which the Federal Republic was party or through, for instance, the independent and external commission with regard to the death of Ulrike Meinhof in Stammheim prison in May 1976. Only

months earlier in 1975, there was the widely noted and internally controversial visit to Andreas Baader in Stammheim prison by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre had responded to a request from Ulrike Meinhof and greatly angered some officials because his visit was perceived as an instance of meddling and as an act of judgment on the West German state by a foreigner.

Beyond what was partially visible or suggestive to the international gaze, however, was the internal documentation of state surveillance protocols, procedural changes, and other state activities that were placed under a thirty-year ban (Sperrfrist), which was to expire in 2007. Even so, however, many documents remain classified and the lifting of the ban only means that applications to view the files can be submitted. At the time of writing, I have found no announcement or confirmation that demonstrates that the ban has in fact been lifted. On the contrary, recent developments in Germany, particularly around the 2007 G8 summit, have reinitiated the old practices of surveillance, raid, arrest, and conditions of detention that were brought in specifically to deal with the urban guerrilla phenomenon of the 1970s, and the state authorities are now deploying them to deal with a contemporary radical formation known as the *Militante Gruppe*. Further, formerly imprisoned RAF members are still subject to the state's surveillance apparatus and can be prosecuted under § 81g of the code of criminal procedure, therefore, much fear remains today around the prospect of speaking out.¹³⁰

Elsaesser sees not only the initiation of the RAF in 1970 but also the group's self-dissolution in 1998, following the well-received television broadcast

of *Death Game*, as acts that represent a sort of symbolic identification with the state. Elsaesser suggests that “the RAF took the state at its word, mirrored the demand made upon the individual by the state, accepted the symbolic mandate that is implied in being a citizen”¹³¹. While the RAF’s statement of dissolution in 1998 acknowledges a failure of the group to meet its aims, the perspective that Elsaesser takes of symbolic identification seems to suggest that the RAF’s failure was located primarily at the level of political recognition within Germany —a mutual failure of such sought after recognition between state and citizen, to the extent that the citizen achieves membership in a social group that provides a recognizable location from which to speak. This suggestion may be somewhat justifiable and holds some value, especially in relation to a political analysis particularly of the BRD up to reunification, but it is restorative and threatens to leave out entirely, or at least to collapse, the aesthetic convolution that is one of the RAF’s achievements.

Between the refusal of speech and hyper-verbal intervention

Both symbolic and material conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany were of considerable import to the development of the RAF and other radical groups of interest here. Further, the relationship between the RAF and the state was a mutually constituting relationship so that the Federal Republic, even the SPD and other parties such as the CDU, who were vying for political power, were marked by the real actions of the RAF and their own imaginings of them. It is the case that the RAF attempted to gain political recognition as a group and as individuals, even within the context of the BRD. While the RAF’s explicit aims, as they were

outlined in communiqués, were envisioned in an internationalist context in solidarity with guerilla actions organized in the periphery and in concert with both actual and imagined dialogue with such groups, RAF members made several attempts to gain recognition through official means both within and outside of the BRD, especially once the ‘first generation’ guerillas were caught and imprisoned — often in quite severe circumstances, as discussed above. When considered in the context of an aesthetic of self-representation, such voluntary confrontations with official sites appear to constitute either rhetorical moves or lapses in what otherwise might be understood as a posture of refusal.

The RAF recognized that their survival and their actions depended upon the solidarity of others — they relied upon not only the material assistance of other external groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP — involved with the OPEC action of 1975 in which participating oil ministers were kidnapped from a meeting in Vienna), the government of then East Germany (DDR), or even more casual participants, who offered temporary shelter to guerillas between actions, and passive, anonymous sympathizers, who at times placed pressure on government authorities through vocal dissent and public disapproval. An early survey conducted by the Allensbacher Institute of Public Opinion in 1971, in an attempt to measure public sympathy for the RAF, reported that a quarter of respondents under the age of 30 years of age expressed sympathy for the RAF and that ten percent of North Germans and five percent of all Germans would be willing to provide shelter for a night to a member of the group. Indeed, RAF actions, at all times, were heavily dependent upon passive and active

assistance from non-members. Still, the RAF presented a strong challenge to their allies, often willing to risk entirely alienating them over tactical disagreements and what, to outsiders, might have appeared to be relatively minor political differences.

The relationship between the ‘first generation’ RAF members and the activist group Red Aid is an example of one in which some imprisoned RAF members posed such a challenge. Red Aid operated several campaigns and distributed literature that was concerned with trial preparations and the conditions of detention for RAF and other leftist political prisoners. RAF prisoners had at times a hostile reaction to the approach and the positions taken by Red Aid. Baader wrote to the other RAF prisoners about one of the Berlin Red Aid documents, in rather harsh words he characterized their work as merely blathering away, “Fucking themselves into the ground with those documents of theirs...” and compared their position on the question of violence to that of “the pigs”.¹³² In these cases, and in the context of the correspondence that circulated amongst RAF members through their informal and illegal communications system in which they specified and debated particular aspects of the content of information campaigns and written statements to be distributed for mass media publication, it is possible to find their attitude toward political recognition inconsistent, if not wildly contradictory.

One such instance that contributed to confusion over the position of West German urban guerrillas in connection with German history was their relationship of solidarity and participation in concrete operations with some Palestinian

groups. In exchange for the material and human assistance with West German guerilla actions that organizations such as the PFLP provided, some West German guerillas participated in PFLP actions abroad. Two members of the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), an offshoot of the RAF and the 2nd of June Movement, participated in the hijacking of an Air France flight from Israel to Paris (this action is often referred to simply as “Entebbe”, since it was in Uganda that the hijackers were confronted by special forces) in which Jews were separated out from the rest of the passengers.¹³³ Involvement in this action sparked challenges to the explicit anti-fascist standpoint of the urban guerrilla movement as a whole in the BRD.

To the reflections on the experience of consuming the RAF in popular culture in West Germany in the 1970s written in an essay by Michael Dreyer, who characterized the RAF’s violence as though it were a form of music, Elsaesser responds with surprise, arguing that, in fact, the RAF was “hyperverbal”.¹³⁴ As Dreyer describes the violence of the RAF guerillas, like “a percussion cutting into the monotone of his everyday, a form of bodily ‘sensation’ which, rather like rock music, delivered non-verbal expression and opened up a new subjective space”,¹³⁵ Elsaesser casts Dreyer’s reflections as a “slip of memory” that would “confirm that the verbal was not perceived as words, but as material signs, and the signs not as messages, but as shapes, sounds and colours”.¹³⁶ Here, Elsaesser remains concerned with the matter of symbolic identification for political subjects, particularly in the case of those who constituted the audience for RAF actions and statements, and he suggests that members of this audience “were called upon to be

counted either ‘in’ or ‘out’”, even if they were “not sure in the name of what” they felt interpellated.¹³⁷

The active communication of actions plays an important role in urban guerilla tactics in the form of “armed propaganda”. This approach involves, on the one hand, providing explanations through mass media of direct actions in hopes of mobilizing public support from at least some segments of the population and, on the other hand, the development of clandestine modes with which to communicate and to agitate. An important point to consider is that the RAF modeled itself and designed its tactics on the examples of urban guerilla movements located in so-called peripheral or “third world” countries, particularly as they were described in circulated communiqués or manuals. They saw themselves as fighting alongside those movements but from behind the enemy lines. That is, they felt that they had a role to play from within and against a Western industrialized nation, in this case, the BRD, which they considered to be a perpetrator active in an imperialist war of capitalist expansion.

From this perspective, urban guerilla Carlos Marighella’s insistence that “[t]he rebellion of the urban guerilla and his persistence in intervening in public questions is the best way of insuring public support of the cause we defend”,¹³⁸ particularly with his emphasis on public questions and the interests of the masses, challenges the notion that the RAF was consistently and wholeheartedly addressing the West German public with their communiqués rather than an international audience. Even from the perspective of the RAF’s own analysis, in which the people of the Federal Republic of Germany were characterized as

distracted and pacified by the “Raspberry Reich” of consumer culture - or “Konsumterror”, it appeared that there could be little identification between domestic public questions and the urban guerilla fighter’s cause. Even still, there is a discernable sense that RAF texts were produced and targeted towards an unstable addressee — certainly multiple addressees over time, as the group members struggled to maintain control over their self-representation against the public work of organizations such as Red Help (Rote Hilfe) that were engaged in using more conventional forms of political agitation to achieve greater public support and better conditions of detention for imprisoned RAF members.¹³⁹

In terms of guerrilla tactics, the role of a legal organization working on the ground is a necessary component of guerrilla strategy; it constitutes what Régis Debray referred to as a political army engaged in not only the dissemination of materials but a covering for the armed cells. Nevertheless, there existed a huge disconnect between the material, territorial, and social conditions described in the texts that informed the RAF’s struggle and that of the RAF’s confrontation with the urban centres of West Germany and the surveillance complex of the West German state. This disconnect inevitably had implications for the lines of action available to groups and individuals trying to assist imprisoned guerrillas. Many sympathizers —from legal organizations, such as RH; to intellectuals and authors, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Heinrich Böll; to RAF members still on the street — became the objects of imprisoned RAF members’, often cruel, scrutiny and ridicule. This paradoxical, even self-destructive, reaction towards legal supporters troubles the notion of a coherent and concrete addressee for which the RAF

communiqués were produced. It also calls into question the conscious relationship between the content of the texts and the guerrilla tactics of “political struggle” (rearguard practices of mobilization) within the larger project of “armed propaganda”, as, for instance, the Armed Forces of Liberation organized their operations in South Vietnam in the 1960s.

I want to suggest then that the RAF, despite its limited and sometimes idiosyncratic use of speech and texts, was not hyper-verbal. By specifically taking into account the body as assuming a sort of interventional posture, especially in confrontation with the significance of the body in the context of the nation, I want to challenge Elsaesser’s dismissive characterization of Dreyer’s recollection of the RAF as non-verbal and his reception of them as something like a rock band.

Dreyer’s observation underlines the significance of culture in the Federal Republic in the 1960s and 1970s to the conditions out of which West German urban guerrilla movements grew, the way in which those groups represented themselves, and the way in which the groups were perceived by others such as Dreyer, who situates himself in relation to the RAF as a spectator. Getting at the cultural experiences or tone of this period raises several challenges — most significantly, that any attempt to capture a sense of the time is dependent upon a set of ready-made representations. This dependency on representational mediation is acknowledged also by the so-called “68-ers” themselves, who have struggled without interruption to give shape to, and to rescue from forgetfulness, the culture of the student movement ever since, especially by putting their stories down on paper.¹⁴⁰

It is important to note here the limitations inherent to the student movement as a label to describe what could be more accurately and inclusively referred to as the counter-culture of the West German youth movement. While the universities did constitute active sites for the rise and development of the counter-cultural movements of interest, young workers and others were indispensable to the practices of shaping the West German counter-culture, which became increasingly politicized throughout the 1960s and 70s. To some extent, the politicization of working class youths and students happened in independent spheres and took shape differently. That their lives were marked by different material realities was reflected subtly in respective approaches and relationships to the question of violence in political struggle. While the students debated the problem of armed struggle, it was the working class youth that first took up illegal actions and, less often, violent actions that were explicitly politically motivated, and these operations were accompanied by astute, often satirical, cultural critiques of West German culture, particularly at the levels of consumer culture and the mass media.

The significance of contemporary music for the counter-culture cannot be overlooked, especially in the context of Dreyer's suggestion that the RAF was West Germany's great superband of the 1970s. The music that is so fondly recalled in the literature that has come out of the radicalized West German counter-culture, since it was embedded into the daily lives of the youths and the 'communards' of this generation, is not German in origin. In the absence of a thriving domestic music industry, West German youths were reliant upon rock

imports. In this respect, Elsaesser suggests that German youths experienced a form of “reverse identification” with American youth culture. For him, this identification, which manifested itself in both envy and disdain, was fueled by, on the one hand, the occupying presence of U.S. Army and NATO bases located in West Germany that brought with them fragments of American pop and consumer culture as embodied in the sometimes visible leisure activities of soldiers on the bases and, on the other hand, consciousness of the events unfolding in Vietnam, respectively. Elsaesser’s assessment highlights the way in which the counter-culture was somewhat marked by – perhaps more accurately than “reverse” identification – a *paradoxical* identification with aspects of American youth culture, as it was imported through the conduit of American cultural imperialism. It ought to be mentioned, however, that the influence of U.S. music imports over the West German counter-culture is slightly overemphasized here because Elsaesser’s observations neglect the significance of music and popular culture imports from the U.K., which were considerable.

To be fair, it is worth noting Dick Hebdige’s emphasis on the ambivalent, if not hostile, reaction to the flow of American cultural influences into Britain. As in the BRD, the long-term American military presence in Britain and the physicalized instantiation of the American at leisure assisted in the production of a widespread disapproving image of Americans in the perception of: their affluence; their “easy morals”; and the disposable character of their culture.¹⁴¹ American culture, as expressed through the import of consumer products, was seen in terms of a “leveling down”, and the BBC was ideally positioned to

exercise policies that for a time attempted to restrict the flow of American media products and images to the British public, including (perhaps, especially) that of popular music.¹⁴² In this context, it is important to acknowledge in my discussion of the West German counter-culture the difficulty inherent to demarcating the youth cultures of respective nations in the context of cultural flows facilitated by the physical mobility of individuals and the mediatized exchange of cultural products, since there is no authentic, tightly cohesive, or interior youth culture as such.

Most significantly, however, whatever cultural identifications were forged during the post-war years in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland cannot be understood without acknowledgment of the repeated subterranean identity fractures that preceded and characterized West Germany as what can in retrospect be called an ephemeral political and cultural configuration. It is not just in hindsight that the BRD, as a state, can be seen as a temporary geopolitical solution, since the hope for, and expectation of, a future reunification with East Germany (DDR) was an ever-present part of the culture and cannot be downplayed, even in the context of popular music and the counter-culture of the 1970s in West Germany generally. Situated after two wars and the subsequent occupations on carved up territory, but much before the anticipated reunification of the East and the West, the period was marked by both psychic and physical fracture.

The extent to which the youth of the post-war period pulled away from German culture, as it had been represented to them through the institutions of

learning (both formal and informal education in and outside of the home) and popular culture, needs to be recognized to make sense of the reliance upon, or complex identification with, music that was borrowed from abroad that became not only the conduit of imported popular cultural references but a vital sense-based source material for counter-cultural experiences that were also thoroughly corporeal.

Michael (Bommi) Baumann's autobiography *Wie Alles Anfing* or *Terror or Love?* (mentioned above) illustrates this well. Considered a traitor by some members of the guerrilla cells that he left behind and being sought by the authorities to face charges, Baumann wrote his autobiography while living under a false identity. Produced at a very critical moment in Baumann's life, his text shows him actively mediating between several imagined reading audiences, revealing an internal struggle to articulate himself — a self-constituting project — from a polyvocal position. Not only does Baumann anticipate that his imagined reading audiences make incommensurable demands (simultaneous avowals and disavowals of his life as an urban guerrilla fighter) but he seems to anticipate that these imagined audiences issue their demands in different 'languages': official, unofficial, and familiar. My assumption is that Baumann's turn to the body within the text is vital because words are inadequate to the explication of his life as a guerrilla fighter; rather, his guerrilla activities are concretely *unspeakable*. Ubiquitous in the text are his references to popular music and, for him, the responsive kinesthetic sensations of the body express a form of knowing. Further, Baumann's autobiography could be said to choreograph rather than justify his

posture as an urban guerrilla fighter. For instance, he writes: “When I heard Chubby Checker’s ‘Let’s Twist Again’ for the first time, I got up out of bed and danced the twist exactly as I saw it done later. I had intuitively understood what the guy was trying to get across”.¹⁴³

Against the rigid silences of their parents’ generation — silences that were echoed and repeated throughout West German culture — with regard to WWII and the Holocaust, the youth of the 1960s and 70s were still coming to grips with the tremors of their late realization, or the hindered puzzling together, of their nation’s past (and, therefore, present). (Auto)biographical literature produced by or about members of the RAF repeatedly express a theme of shock in response to the slow revelation of their nation’s then so recent past and its enduring traces on everyday life in the BRD.

RAF member Margit Schiller, for instance, recounts the horror that she felt while growing up when she realized that what had constituted the content of her piano lessons were songs that had been composed with the intention of the glorification of the Third Reich.¹⁴⁴ From this point on, Schiller would distrust the otherwise benign-seeming products of German culture, such as songs. The corporeal element of the significance of Schiller’s disturbing childhood discovery should not be taken lightly, since the bodily or sensorial impacts of piano lessons are totalizing in respects that exceed other forms of cultural instruction. The reflexive repetitions of movement, acoustics, and tactile sensations acquired and refined through musical training are as subtly shaping as are other centrally formative instructive experiences, such as, for example, classed, raced, or

gendered comportment. The practices inherent to the gradual mastery of not only an instrument but the repertoire of melodies that constitute the sacraments of a nation's civil religion find as their site the living body of the citizen, who exists in the double-bind of being both the benefactor and the heir of hegemonic cultural instruction.

David Schwarz has observed the National Socialists' systematic attention to music in their project to reshape German culture and to produce a coherent collective identity. He notes that this involved a re-writing of music history to eradicate the music of "the other" and to create "a musical fantasy of a unified, right-wing Germany".¹⁴⁵ Schwarz emphasizes the sensorial significance of music in the complex identification that the Nazis hoped to initiate for the public. In an important way, sound is a particularly effective means to inculcate subjects. Due to the body's "acoustic vulnerability", by which sound permeates the skin:

"We can close our ears to loud sounds, but this gesture always only mutes, never cancels out sound. And at night, our subjectivity is utterly open to sounds. Sounds thus carry a profoundly imperative agency for us. Sounds enter our bodies as carriers of messages of intent from agencies benevolent, malevolent, or indifferent".¹⁴⁶

Acoustic vulnerability, then, also offers a vulnerability to the interpellative power of music. In this way, one is interpellated by the sound and experiences a trace of guilt that precedes identification. This sense of guilt emerges out of a feeling of complicity with the social order, since the subject is sustained through that order –

– in this case, that of the state and the shared lie that it fosters. Therefore, the shared lie is more effective as an ideological basis than the imagined truth.¹⁴⁷

That many of the re-written German folk and war songs were amended to include accompanying sets of gestures only further insinuates the corporeal performance of the unconscious relationship of complicity between the subject and the social order and echoes Bakhtin's observation that the subject is tied, or accountable, to its representation through epic discourse, since the musical fantasy constructed by the Nazis was oriented towards epic representation and appraisal. In this respect, music is a form particularly suited for the forging of bonds between the citizen body and the state.

In the face of these slow realizations, by those who came to participate in the counter-culture of the 1960s in West Germany, that located within their very gestures were inflections of the inculcated fascist citizen-subject, a complex identification with imported or imagined cultural forms became an overriding theme in the formation of individual and collective subjectivities. While it is often acknowledged that several of the activist and social groups that sprung from within the West German counter-culture, and the counter-culture generally, had at least a political and social orientation that was cosmopolitan in character and, in the case of some of the specific groups (including the RAF), was strategically influenced by South American guerrilla movements, it is rarely conceded that a complex identification with the Latin or South American guerrilla (as represented in the writings of Che Guevara, Régis Debray, and Carlos Marighella) was a critical aspect of the 1970s West German counter-culture. By the close of the 60s

and the beginning of the 70s, several small and deeply radicalized groups had emerged in West Berlin. Around this time, members of the RAF but also members of other loosely formed groups, took up guerrilla fighter training from the PLO in Jordan. These training sessions and the relationships forged in Jordan set the stage for German guerrilla fighter participation at both the Entebbe hijacking and the hostage takings and killings of members of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. Those who returned from Palestine influenced a reframing of the issues in such a way that domestic issues played a reduced role in the conceptualization of issues. The Blues (an earlier incarnation of The 2nd of June Movement) became the Tupamaros West Berlin (TW), invoking the framework and ongoing legacy building of the guerrilla movement active in Uruguay from 1967 to 1972. By naming themselves thus, the TW initiated identification with an imagined foreign contemporary, such an acknowledgement in concert with the training in Jordan issued a call to action but one that, as Bommi Baumann later observed, was out of place in the city of West Berlin:

“These Latin American experiences that were still fresh then had not been properly reflected on; that is, Latin America is (a) Third World, and (b) has completely different metropolises that still naturally contain the general chaos of a Third World city that a settled European capital doesn’t have. Because of that, you can still survive there in the most dire circumstances better than you can here in the best of circumstances. Of course, we didn’t realize that”.¹⁴⁸

One notable exception to this lack of acknowledgement in the literature is an essay by Jamie Trnka, which recognizes that the very shift towards an explicitly urban guerrilla orientation represents a significant break from the circulating discourses of the student movement (even though these were already internally fractured and diverse) by taking up active identification with Latin American groups engaged in struggle. Further to this, Trnka highlights another related shift that is consistent with the central concerns of my project. That is, the West German urban guerrillas of the 1970s, and particularly the RAF, engaged in:

“a radical *physical* identification in struggle that supercedes moral or political identifications. This ideology of physicality shaped rhetorical and communicative strategies, and privileged an analysis of the social-symbolic dimensions of material violence over the implications of violence as such”.¹⁴⁹

While the question of physical identification and its strategies for communication that the RAF took up raises issues that intersect with several dimensions of my argument about the aesthetics of self-representation, Trnka’s concerns are of particular interest to this discussion of culture and identification, particularly as it relates to the gap between Elsaessar’s claim that the RAF was hypervocal and that the association that Dreyer expresses between the RAF and the realm of the non-verbal.

Emphasis on the importance of sensual experience in political struggles in the urban centres intervened in the debates around theory and practice. Increasingly, the emphasis was on the need to act, and references to the struggles

of Latin American groups contributed to an unspoken distinction that contrasted the industrialized West with the “Third World” (in this case, Latin America), coupling theory with the former and action (thus physicality) with the latter. The resolve that, in order to achieve revolution, the urban guerrilla must fight from behind the lines — from within the capitalist imperialist metropolis, as the RAF asserted in its communiqués¹⁵⁰ — has the unintended but potential effect of usurping the “Third World” guerrilla position in what might be interpreted as a neo-colonial move. As Trnka observes:

“the difference is that of positioning oneself in solidarity with urban guerillas and the insistence on *being* urban guerilla leaders, aspiring to re-center the revolutionary struggle in the metropolises”.¹⁵¹

That the revolutionary struggle moves to the urban centres is not the crucial problem, however, but that, in the RAF project, it is re-centred in the metropolises of the industrialized and mediatized West. Indeed, the urban built environment, marked by proximities and complex fields of surveillance and social control — characteristics that are heightened in industrialized contexts in which the protection of capital provides the underlying logic for social organization — is in most guerrilla fighter manuals pointed to as a futile site for revolutionary struggle. Régis Debray argued, following Fidel Castro, that the city is a cemetery for revolutionaries.¹⁵² Not only is the city far too dangerous for the guerrilla fighter and unfriendly to the necessary coupling of revolutionary and political organization (or “armed propaganda”) that can be fostered in rural contexts not entirely susceptible to external surveillance because the customs are not known to

alien observers — the city can be no more than a “lukewarm incubator” for a revolutionary cell. That is, the material dimensions of city life have such an impact on the guerrilla as to undermine or transform, the once insurgent guerrilla subjectivity to no longer apprehend “the vital importance of a square yard of nylon cloth, a can of gun grease, a pound of salt or sugar, a pair of boots....even a comrade who spends his life in the city is unwittingly bourgeois in comparison with a *guerrillero*”.¹⁵³

For Debray, the city is a place that debilitates by making the guerrilla fighter dependent on the wait for outside assistance and supplies. The city necessarily transforms the guerrilla fighter into a consumer. Even if the resources are gained through illegal activities — from petty theft to broader-scale armed robberies, as the RAF carried out — the consumer transaction becomes central to the guerrilla’s tactical program. Debray’s concern is that the ‘givenness’ of life in the city, even if mediated by consumer transactions, impresses upon the body in a way that makes the guerrilla fighter dependent upon the infrastructures of the urban environment. It is possible to grasp from Debray’s own description the emphasis that he places on the way in which surroundings impact and shape a body and its propensity for particular forms of stasis and movement:

“The jungle of the city is not so brutal. Men garrote each other in order to assert their superiority, but they no longer fight to survive. Life is for all — — unequally given, but given nonetheless. It exists in the shops in the form of finished products — butchered meat; baked bread; running water; the possibility of sleeping under a roof, sheltered from the rain, without the

need to stand guard; electrically lit streets; medicines at the pharmacy or hospital. It is said that we are immersed in the social, and prolonged immersion debilitates. Nothing like getting out to realize to what extent these lukewarm incubators [cities] make one infantile and bourgeois....it is a battle within the *guerrillero* himself to overcome his old habits, to erase the marks left on his body by the incubator — his weakness”.¹⁵⁴

The disadvantages of the city as the terrain for guerrilla warfare culminate in the conclusion that the urban guerrilla cell can only work as a complement to the rural cells. Generalizing to a global context, one might consider how it is that the rise of urban guerrilla warfare, particularly in the industrialized cities of so-called core nation-states during the 1970s, could only serve a subordinate role of assistance in peripheral struggles by, as Debray observes in the Latin American context, tying up the army and other institutional policing bodies at the heart of capitalist production and consumption, while freeing up space for the growth and further entrenchment of guerrilla forces in the hinterlands. In the case of the West German urban guerrilla movement, while the explicit motivation was subordinated to peripheral struggles, at a cultural level, ironically these struggles were subsumed by the capitalist legibility of media representations of groups such as the RAF and the 2nd of June Movement. Such representations of the audacious, stylish, and counter-cultural West German “superband” could be immediately recognizable and exchanged as a commodity form. Not just the guerrilla movement itself but its individuated photogenic stars were featured on countless covers of the West German weekly glossy magazines such as *Der Spiegel* and

Stern. Inside, the features would be accompanied by the inexhaustible biographical inventories of the infamous “Bande” members (here, with the use of the word “Bande”, I am playing on the German word for “gang”). On the world stage, the arrival of guerrilla tactics on the terrain of the industrialized city street offered a generous palate of unusual and sellable stories, replete with paradoxes and drama. The authoring of scripts and chacoons¹⁵⁵ with which the RAF attempted to direct itself, ironically may have worked towards the effacement of international attention to the guerrilla struggles within Latin America, while unwittingly emphasizing and convoluting the drama of the burgeoning security crisis in the BRD and in other major industrialized urban centres.

Attention to the urban guerrilla movement needs to be seen in the context of not only the counter-cultural context of West German cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s but that of the historically-relative affluence characteristic of industrialized centres during this period. Richard Sennett’s book *The Uses of Disorder* was published in 1970 and it responded to the unrest, or what Sennett referred to as a search for community, illustrated by the heightened political activism that characterized the late 1960s in wealthy industrialized countries. Writing in particular about the situation in the United States, Sennett was concerned with individuals and groups not suffering from poverty but languishing in abundance. His understanding was that the social unrest demonstrated by the activist generation of ‘68 articulated the way in which the relative abundance of the post-war years had revealed a form of self-imposed tyranny in the face of the fear of freedom. This self-imposed tyranny, according to Sennett, involves the

creation and inhabitation of a rigid self-image posited in advance of lived experience. Interestingly, Sennett describes this inhabitation not only as a self-making activity of an adolescent subject but finds this process reflected in the broader society. In particular, Sennett cites the practices of city planning and its strategy of projecting needs to determine the shape of developmental and infrastructural designs, taking projections as more “true” than what is to come. Sennett sees in these strategies of rigidity and projection an attempt to avoid the pain intrinsic to unexpected conflicts associated with the real diversity of social life. The strategy, according to Sennett, involves the creation of a purified identity that leaves its possessor somewhat impervious to threatening dissonances. Since the maintenance of such a purified identity depends upon acts of will rather than real experience, it depends upon projections of cohesion that are likely to be fictitious, purified rituals, and patterns of avoidance that are often based on indifference. His argument, as it relates to the potential underlying motivations of the activists of 1968, is that they were in a way participating in a refusal of what Sennett referred to as the secure cocoons that their parents’ generation had engineered.

While I acknowledge that the economic conditions, or conditions of abundance, to which Sennett refers, would be quite different – arguably harsher – in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the BRD than they would have been in the United States at that same time, Sennett’s point still resonates. This is the case not because the majority of core RAF members were university educated and from families of considerable middle class privilege for instance, a point that has

received much emphasis in accounts of the group (note that, in contrast to the RAF, the 2nd of June Movement was constituted largely by working class and unemployed members), but because Sennett's use of "abundance" as a marker is arguably relative to previous points in history internal to Western industrial nation-states themselves but also relative to the conditions of contemporaneous non-Western nation-states.

Even though it alludes to this relationship between purified identity and the orientation of radical groups in the 1960s but does not spend much time unpacking the relationship itself and instead follows through on the realizations and implications of this purified identity at the level of society, it seems to me that Sennett's *The Uses of Disorder* offers an insightful observation into the phenomena under consideration in this discussion, even if it is done in passing. Perhaps with the exception of its semi-accidental inception, I argue that the RAF did not operate under a rationally calculated methodology towards the realization of particular results. I do not believe that individual members of the RAF explicitly saw themselves as playing a decisive role in the overturning of rule by global capital, despite the calls to arms expressed in their communications. The so-called "hyper-verbal" instantiations of RAF production that can be examined – for instance, the overtly sloganistic and painfully repetitive communiqués, the constant berating of self and other in internal correspondence, and the alienating treatment of supporters while they were admittedly dependent upon those very supporters — all point away from any instrumental plan of communication. The predictable appeals to human rights regarding conditions of detention and

challenges regarding their fitness to stand trial, all represent an unspoken but clear pact with the state to play out a particular scene. The hyper-verbality that is cited has one curious dimension to it that I would like to underline, that is, the RAF's espousal of liberal democratic ideals which are seen as intrinsic to the good working order of industrial capitalism — those ideals that the state, not the RAF, is invested in being seen as their embodiment.

While this does not refute all of the implications of Elsaesser's thesis of the RAF's symbolic identification with the state, it does trouble some aspects of it. In particular, the notion that the RAF was looking for a particular form of recognition from the other of the state. Although, if it can be held that the RAF stood in a position of symbolic identification with the West German state, then could it not be posited with just as much or more force that the state likewise stood in a position of symbolic identification with the RAF and the West German urban guerrilla movement generally? It was after all an arm of the state that initiated the first acts of explicit physical threat, when the state's own intelligence agent, Peter Urbach, infiltrated the 2nd of June Movement, bringing with him the first explosives to be used in guerrilla actions — explosives authorized and purchased with BRD funds. Perhaps we are to take seriously the allusions to classical myth that have repeatedly framed the telling of the RAF story – allusions to *Antigone* and to *Hamlet*. That is, the urban guerrilla phenomenon in West Germany represents a generational struggle in the wake of the ethical horror felt by the 68ers. Perhaps, what this expresses is merely the image of two generations looking into the mirror and hoping (not) to see the other in oneself.

Elsaesser notes that the RAF and the police together constituted a shaping force in the transformation of the public sphere and the realization of that transformation in way that made it perceptible. In this task, the street — the space within which these struggles occurred — was significant, according to Elsaesser, to the extent that it re-coded space as a political category. He asks:

“[W]as the RAF in 1977 harbinger also of a shift from the (élite) politics of stage/parliament/ agora to the (street) politics of an event-and-entertainment culture, across the switch from literature and drama to the photographic, print and electronic media?”¹⁵⁶

While this argument regarding the RAF’s mediatization of politics is significant, that space, or the street to be more specific, becomes politically coded by the RAF’s particular pursuits misses the extent to which it is not the coding of space so much as the corporeal-situatedness of urban guerrilla action. The street is necessarily politically coded, and it is possible to argue that the mediatization of urban politics in Germany precedes the RAF and the West German urban guerrilla phenomenon. Even so, it ought to be noted that the 2nd of June Movement and its predecessors such as Kommune 1 routinely performed rather sophisticated street entertainment and produced satirical media in advance of the RAF. This is true also of German urban-based activist movements going back at the very least to the anti-atom bomb movement of the 1950s. Activist groups in the urban centres routinely produced biting satirical leaflets for mass distribution and mobilization in the streets on a range of political issues. Relevant to this study, however, in response to Axel Springer’s public comparison between the student groups and

fascism, a leaflet was produced and circulated with a picture of Springer in an S.S. uniform with the caption: “Who is the Nazi here and who is the Jew?”¹⁵⁷ The Springer publishing company had a reputation for strong right-wing partisanship and some of its prominent staff had been accused of anti-Semitism.

While it is the case that the RAF, like all good urban guerrilla fighters, used the street as a major site of its performance, the RAF also carried out its performances in elite and official spaces, such as the courtroom. In fact, West German urban guerrillas staged fantastic reversals in official, ritualized, and highly scripted spaces, thereby, deploying the kind of comedic dismemberment that Bakhtin observes as the successful intervention into epic discourse. Or, as Henri Bergson puts it, in a similar spirit:

“The ceremonial side of social life must, therefore, always include a latent comic element, which is only waiting for an opportunity to burst into full view. It might be said that ceremonies are to the social body what clothing is to the individual body: they owe their seriousness to the fact that they are identified, in our minds, with the serious object with which custom associates them, and when we isolate them in imagination, they forthwith lose their seriousness”.¹⁵⁸

It seems to me that the urban guerrillas frequently carried out such isolation or, rather, they physicalized it. This physicalization or materialization of comic dismemberment is consistent with Antonin Artaud’s call for the creation of not a stage but a theatre of action that breaks down the separation between spectator and spectacle and makes space speak rather than relying on the instrumentality of

directed speech.¹⁵⁹ Artaud places expression within space rather than in language proper. He calls for a new and unique language, one that resides somewhere in between thought and language. Speech, for Artaud, must grant to words the significance that they have in dreams and the material side of language must be apprehended and emphasized so that words are embraced in their incantational capacities, the voice is extended so that we may recognize its “grain” (to take from Barthes),¹⁶⁰ sounds must be pile-driven – they must make contact. For Artaud, gesture’s lyricism matters.

One example of the realization of this theatre of action occurred in one of the many trials against emerging guerrillas, when Karl Pawla defecated in front of a judge’s bench (the presiding judge was a former S.S. man) and then wiped himself with the judge’s file. Pawla was sentenced to ten months in prison for his spectacular courtroom act.¹⁶¹ Another instance occurred in 1971 during a trial for the assault of a journalist Horst Rieck. Just prior to the attack on Rieck, the reporter had published a story in the tabloid *Quick* about the New Left in Berlin with speculations about political bombings. Thomas Weisbecker, Michael (Bommi) Baumann, and Georg von Rauch stood trial for the assault on Rieck. The judge set bail for Baumann and Weisbecker, but it looked as though von Rauch could face up to a ten year sentence for his involvement in the attack. Baumann and Weisbecker were released on bail but actually von Rauch and Weisbecker, both bearded with long hair, had made a successful attempt to each pose as the other in the courtroom, so that when Weisbecker was released from the courtroom, it was actually von Rauch who walked out as a free man under

everyone's watch, giving von Rauch time to slip underground. By the time Weisbecker's true identity was revealed it was too late and von Rauch was out of reach. About this, Baumann remarked: "So once again there was a man out, in a perfectly simple way, through one of these sleight-of-hand tricks. Of course, it's a much better thing to get out like this, than in one of those revolver numbers. There's more wit behind it, more imagination plays a part in it".¹⁶²

3. The Aesthetics of Crisis and the Refusal of Speech

*I have nothing to say and I am saying it*¹⁶³

At the end of 1972, the core members of the RAF declared the body a weapon when they organized their first hunger strike campaign in response to their imprisonment in social isolation: “Our last and strongest weapon is the body; collectively, we have put ours into the battle...”.¹⁶⁴ Even prior to their capture, the RAF denounced speech as a viable form through which to carry out their aims and insisted upon armed struggle.¹⁶⁵

The RAF, a group committed to urban guerilla tactics of South American guerillas such as Carlos Marighella, grew out of the radical student movement in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) in the late 1960s. The RAF saw its constitution as a return to class struggle that had been abolished under nationalist-socialist rule. The radicalization of the student movement was intertwined with the post-war rise and political metamorphosis of the Social Democratic Party in the BRD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD). After WWII, the SPD had opposed a foreign policy of integration with the West and instead was interested in focusing inward on a process of German re-unification. At the level of economics, the SPD emphasized the benefits of the nationalization of industries and did not support neo-liberal economic policies. The SPD was able to attain political acceptance at the state level, gaining strong representation after state elections but they did not perform well in federal elections. The party’s Godesburg Programme (1959) overturned their previous positions in exchange for an increasingly comfortable attitude toward Western integration and free market

economics, which made the SPD a more attractive option for voters in the federal election of 1969. Even prior to the election, the SPD's student group the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) did not support these changes in political direction and became a growing source of criticism for the party's policy positions. As the political gap between the SPD and the SDS widened, divisions led to the formation of a new student group the Sozialistische Hochschulbund (SHB).

Increasingly disenchanted with the direction of partisan politics, many students who previously worked under the auspices of party-affiliated student groups broke away and developed the Extraparliamentary Opposition (Ausserparlamentarische Opposition – APO). There, they sought to work through national concerns in the global context of the Cold War; in this respect, they were a part of what the last members of the RAF would later refer to as a “global wave of revolt” that characterized the politics of the late 60s and the 70s. The target of their actions was imperialist rule and its ideology as it maintained itself in the so-called West in part through consumer culture, which they viewed as a distraction from the real conditions of the then present and how those conditions had roots in the Third Reich. Dieter Kunzelman from Kommune 1 argues that consumerism had put the lid on Germany's history so that West Germans could forget their fascist past.¹⁶⁶ The main instantiation of imperialist rule that served as a concrete site of focus for the West German student movement was the Vietnam War. It was within the forum of the Extraparliamentary Opposition that dialogue over the

tensions between action and theory led to an active debate about the use of armed struggle. A popular slogan was “smash the thing that smashes you”.

It was against this backdrop that the Red Army Faction was realized in May 1970 in a successful attempt to free Andreas Baader, who was imprisoned for his participation, along with Gudrun Ennslin, Thorwald Proll, and Horst Söhnlein, in the political arson of two Frankfurt department stores. The accidental shooting of staff member Georg Linke at the Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen (German Central Institute for Social Questions) in Berlin during the escape out of a window forced the group underground, as they were then wanted for attempted murder, alongside the illegal break-out of Baader. From then on, they were on the run: dwelling in temporary apartments, inhabiting multiple constructed identities, and answering to various names conferred by forged documents.



Figure 1 *Escape Route, The German Autumn in Minor Spaces 2007*

In their paper “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla” (The Urban Guerilla Concept), the RAF situates itself within the disenchantment expressed in the formation of the APO, with their assertion: “The urban guerilla is the consequence of the negation of parliamentary democracy that has long been carried out by its very own representatives”¹⁶⁷. For them, the question of armed struggle was settled by their perspective that social democracy, in the form of the SPD government, which failed to alter significantly the conditions in the Federal Republic that were fostered by two consecutive conservative governments after the fall of the National Socialist regime, did not provide a substantive break with the past. Hanns Martin Schleyer, a hostage taken by the RAF during its 1977 Offensive in an attempt to free RAF prisoners, was a figure who exemplified for the RAF Germany’s failure to break with the Third Reich and the way in which leftist interventions could be incorporated into projects that strengthen the capitalist structure. As the director of Daimler Benz and the chair for the German Federation of Industry, the selection of Schleyer as a target of a hostage-taking was as symbolic for his then current posts as he was for his past as a member of the National Socialists’ SS Army – Schleyer’s biographical history could be seen as an echo of the Federal Republic’s twentieth century history. The RAF saw Schleyer as working toward the same economic goals that were pursued by the Nazis: the end of class struggle in Germany to be achieved through the elimination of resistance to capital and for Germany to lead Europe as an economic region. Schleyer’s prominent industrial role in the Federal Republic

under the SPD's social democratic model involved continued adherence to these goals. The RAF wrote:

“As the chief of industry, Schleyer was continually building up a system to contain social resistance to the conditions of capital – for example, by locking out workers – and to integrate workers into the system by means of negotiated contracts for social security....The continuity of the system which Schleyer embodied – in the 1970s during the period of the social democratic model – was a crucial moment in the building and development of the Federal Republic of Germany”.¹⁶⁸

The arrests of the core organizers of the RAF were carried out in mass police action over several weeks following the Red Army Faction's May Offensive in 1972: a series of bomb attacks on United States Army bases located in the Federal Republic of Germany; the Hamburg office of the print media monopolist Axel Springer Publishing (responsible for the daily newspaper *Bild*); and the Augsburg police headquarters. In one of the letters that claimed responsibility for the attacks, the RAF expressed that they had come to the conclusion that “demonstrations and words are of no use” in working towards their political aims.¹⁶⁹ While in prison, the RAF members internally distributed, through their secret communications system, a code of conduct for their imprisonment. The code emphasized a refusal of speech: “Not a word to the pigs, in whatever guise they may appear, particularly as doctors. Not a single word”.¹⁷⁰

Their refusal to speak to the senior doctor Dr Henck at Stammheim-Stuttgart prison came at a high price, as subsequent attempts to initiate complaints

and appeals with regard to the conditions of their detention and their fitness to stand trial were deemed inadmissible both in the Federal Republic and at the level of the Council of Europe, in part, on the grounds that they refused to be examined by Henck.¹⁷¹ Further to their decision not to speak with authority figures, a never completed book outlining the main principles of the Red Army Faction, if it had ever been finished, might have carried Baader's proposed title "The Gun Speaks", which starkly acknowledges the limits of language in self-representation, at least as expressed in conventional speech. As prisoners preparing for their trial, the RAF members were critical of not only the state appointed defence lawyers, with whom they refused to engage, but their own chosen lawyers, from whom they demanded self-criticism and an understanding of what was important to the group: the matter of "identity".¹⁷²

The RAF prisoners were kept in various degrees of isolation. Ulrike Meinhof, a well-known West German journalist prior to her move underground and author of most of the early RAF communiqués, was kept in physical and acoustic isolation in a white cell with fluorescent lighting on for 24 hours a day for several months. She wrote of the disorienting effects of the partial sensory deprivation under which she was living:

"...I no longer knew myself. I couldn't get myself together any more. I couldn't connect anything I heard, even from my comrades in prison, with what was happening to me....I finally realized I had to pull myself out of this....it was my duty to fight my way out of it. By whatever means there are of doing that in prison: daubing the walls, coming to blows with a cop,

wrecking the fitments, hunger strike. I wanted to make them at least put me under arrest, because then you get to hear something....”¹⁷³

The RAF’s ambivalent use and refusal of speech highlights the double-character of speech in external communications as a potentially dangerous conduit of personal and collective vulnerability. This sentiment is also consistent with the explicit position of the group known as the Sozialistisches Patienten Kollektiv (SPK, Socialist Patients’ Collective) from Heidelberg, whose membership often crossed lines into the “second generation” RAF (also referred to as 4.2) and the 2nd of June Movement (also referred to as 2.6). The SPK consisted of a group of politically radicalized psychiatric patients under the care of the highly controversial medical doctor, Dr Wolfgang Huber, at the Psychiatric Neurological Clinic at Heidelberg University. Huber led group therapy sessions with patients up until his dismissal from the clinic in early 1970. Huber was able to mobilize his patients to protest the clinic’s decision to dismiss him. While the clinic’s administrators would not reinstate Huber’s official position there, they extended his salary and provided him with meeting space on the university’s campus. In this unconventional capacity, Huber, along with his patients, established the SPK. Among the SPK’s organizing principles was the insistence that late-capitalism was the cause of illness at both the level of society and the individual and that hope for a cure resided solely in the successful revolutionary overthrow of the system. This assertion was outlined in the first of a series of pamphlets called “Patient Infos” that the SPK distributed to the general public. “Patient Info no. 1” declared:

“Comrades! There must be no therapeutic act which has not previously been clearly and uniquely shown to be a revolutionary act. For this there are already criteria which we shall develop further. In the liberated rooms only that may happen which we know serves the struggling workers!

The system has ‘made us sick’. Let us strike the deathblow at the sick system”.¹⁷⁴

The SPK’s manifesto “Scientific Representation” dated July 1970 outlined the following working groups: Working Circle Dialectics; Working Circle Marxism; and Working Circle Sexuality, Education, Religion. New working groups were organized subsequently and these included the following formations and key tasks: Working Circle Photography to photograph Heidelberg police buildings, vehicles, and officers; Working Circle Judo/Karate to master these disciplines; Working Circle Radio Transmission to build instruments that can receive transmissions necessary to the surveillance and obstruction of police communications; and Working Circle Explosives, led by Huber’s wife, to build explosives necessary to SPK operations.¹⁷⁵

Despite the production and issuing of pamphlets and a manifesto, the SPK took an austere approach to the use of speech in the program of tactics. Their intention was to turn illness itself into a weapon but to, as their “Patient’s Info no. 51” states, work in a “total refusal of speaking to and acting with every kind of authority” and at all times to avoid collaboration with the press.¹⁷⁶ Similarly, in their prison writings, the core first generation RAF prisoners gave much attention

to the significance of verbal exchanges with prison staff and other authorities. Their approach to this problem suggests considerable importance of speech in relation to subjectivity, as though speech itself were to constitute a sort of permeable and vulnerable skin.

Out of order

The Stammheim trial began on May 21, 1975 and tried together those whom were believed to be the leaders of the RAF: Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ennslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and Jan-Carl Raspe. The state designed and built a special courthouse (referred to as the multipurpose room) on the prison grounds, explicitly in response to their assessment that routine transport of the defendants to an external location for proceedings would constitute a major state security risk. The trial process was complicated not only because of the RAF's attempt to have their activities recognized as part of political and military conflict (as urban guerrillas, they saw themselves as participating in an on-going military struggle with domestic as well as international states and institutions of governance), which already sets it apart from most criminal trials but because of the ways in which its handling strikingly departed from convention (and, in some respects, trial law) and was plagued by controversy and constant threats to its legitimacy that set the stage for an extended run performance in what could be considered a sort of state theatre. The trial not only ended in a crisis of legitimacy, with all four defendants dead by what appeared to be suicides in a prison that boasted a heightened level of security that ought to have precluded that eventuation (and, hence, the deaths

were widely suspected to be state murders), but the trial began with an exaggerated spectacle of security.¹⁷⁷



Figure 2 The “Multipurpose Room” at Stammheim prison in Stuttgart 2007

Stefan Aust describes the opening day of the Stammheim trial in the following way:

“It was a sunny day; people crowded around the fortress built for the trial as if it were a fair. Mounted police patrolled the perimeter of the building, which was protected with barbed wire. Aircraft were banned from the air space over the prison and the multi-purpose hall. The inner courtyard and the roof of the courtroom building were covered with steel netting, so that explosive devices dropped from the air could do no harm”.¹⁷⁸

Further, there were daily mass confiscations of even the most innocuous-seeming objects belonging to anyone entering the court. Arguably, these measures may have been appropriate, given that many of the RAF's associates were extensively skilled, and it would have not been unreasonable to fear that ordinary objects in the courtroom might have hidden properties and multiple uses. RAF members had secured a strangely fortuitous and productive relationship with a metalworker, whom they had convinced to fashion all sorts of innovative espionage gadgets and creatively deceptive weapons by posing as filmmakers producing a film about revolution. With only minor modifications to the metalworker's inventions, the film props became sophisticated weapons and instruments for heightened and covert operations. Another associate knowingly designed and began construction of a helicopter — a freedom mobile — to aid in a prison rescue plan for RAF organizers.



Figure 3 *Helicopter No. 21 (Flucht – und Befreiungsfahrzeug)* 2003 Franz Ackermann.

Despite this, the trial was marked by more than the excesses of the high-security prison prevention methods that were used to secure the space. These include not only the excesses of interpretation of in terms of due process, as the rules governing the trial were continually revised to meet the obstacles that putting the RAF members on trial presented to the legal system but even the sheer number of legal personnel involved and the construction of the special courtroom at Stammheim.

While the defense team of lawyers for the RAF was extensive, the relationship between the defendants and their lawyers was complicated in at least

two significant ways. First, constantly evolving emergency laws and revisions to the Code of Criminal Procedure led to increasingly blurry distinctions between actual participants in RAF activities and ordinary citizens critical of the state, which culminated in a routine practice of casting RAF defense lawyers as members themselves, as threats to national security, or even as potential terrorists.¹⁷⁹ Throughout the proceedings, several lawyers were either thrown off of the case, prevented from practicing law, or arrested and charged. Second, the RAF leaders' insistence that they themselves would together decide how their defense would be carried out was held as a governing principle for the lawyers. Lawyers who were not willing to take direction from the RAF leadership were either dismissed or ignored. From the defendants' position, the whole concept of the defense lawyer was troubled in the first place, since the trial was controlled completely by the state. This fact ensured — as even the press would later note¹⁸⁰ — that the outcome of the trial had been determined in advance. With public proclamations such as those that critiqued the process, the trial itself became a space for the RAF's work and dissemination of thought, but over time this became more performative than instrumentally communicative. In the intersections of these conditions, the defense lawyers could be, and often were, subject to suspicion from both sides.

Even from the earliest moments on the opening day of the trial, speech in the courtroom became a central matter of tension, beginning when Meinhof tried to issue a complaint about the assignment of compulsory defense lawyers appointed by the court. The state's assignment of defense lawyers is curious since,

with the exception of Baader, the defendants had sought out and obtained lawyers to represent them. This gesture predicted that the chosen lawyers would not be able to carry out their roles to the trial's completion. Meinhof's attempt to speak her concerns was halted temporarily because the tape recorder had not been started properly. The matter of the interruption escalated to shouting and arguing in the courtroom. At one point, Judge Prinzing tried to prohibit further speech from Baader. When the RAF members expressed suspicions that the microphones were actually set up with a double function — not only to project their voices throughout the courtroom during testimony but to capture speech between the defendants and their lawyers for the purpose of surveillance — the judge replied: “I am afraid your meaning is too obscure for me. I don't know what you are trying to say”.¹⁸¹

On the third day of the trial, the defendants' microphones kept being shut off because they repeatedly spoke out of turn, refused to remain seated, and demanded to be allowed to leave the courtroom. At times, even the spectators in the court participated in the chaotic symphony of voices. Additionally, the two camps of defense lawyers — the chosen and the appointed — were divisive and frequently engaged in disruptive disagreements with each other. For the RAF, the main point was to keep the appointed defenders — who Baader referred to as puppets in a show trial — from speaking at all because, as Ennslin said to one of them, “You're not speaking for me!”.¹⁸²

They lost their petition to have the court appointed lawyers removed. Despite this, the RAF members made it clear to the court that whenever one of the

compulsory defense lawyers spoke, the defendants would leave the courtroom to demonstrate their failure to recognize the lawyers as their representatives. The prosecuting lawyers had argued against the defendants' petition by pointing out that, while the chosen defense lawyers were allowed by the defendants to speak during the trial proceedings, they had a similar disrespect for them as they did for the court appointed ones. Prosecutor Widera stated:

“The defendants say that the court-appointed lawyers do not have their confidence. On the other hand, the defendants also describe the court-appointed lawyers as swine and request them to shut up or shut their big mouths, which is exactly the tone they repeatedly adopted, as can be proved, towards their own chosen lawyers outside of the context of this trial. They frequently described these lawyers, at least in writing, as swine, sows, arseholes, shits and clapped-out bastards”.¹⁸³

Early on in the proceedings, and before the charges had been formally read out in court, the RAF members had tried to be deemed unfit to stand trial after being kept imprisoned and awaiting trial in isolation for three years. They demanded examinations by an independent doctor. This demand was deferred for quite some time. When doctors were finally brought in to examine the prisoners, they were found to be have severely deteriorated health and, therefore, the examiners determined that the defendants were unfit to stand trial, but the court officials refused to accept these reports.

The matter of having the Stammheim trial recognized as a political trial, rather than a criminal one, also met with frequent and explicit refusals from court

officials. Prepared statements that outlined the justification for the trial as political in nature were dismissed on the stated grounds that the relevance of these statements to the trial was unclear. The defendants' multiple attempts to respond to the informal charges of terrorism involved the use of examples such as the United States' military actions in Vietnam. These attempts to elucidate, what was to the RAF, a fundamental distinction between actions against the state and actions directed at citizens were met with annoyance and the eventual refusal to allow the defendants to speak on the matter any further.

When the formal charges were finally read on the 26th day of the Stammheim trial, the defense lawyers chosen by the RAF were absent from the courtroom in an act of protest. The defendants themselves were also absent when the official charges were read, since they had been formally removed from the court and returned to their cells for refusing to answer questions. Only the compulsory defense lawyers were present when the charges were finally read.

At this time, the new paragraph was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure that governed the trial. Paragraph 231 allowed the trial to carry on without the presence of the accused. Also, the defense lawyers that were chosen by the RAF were one by one being dismissed from the court by the judges, fulfilling the prediction that a court appointed team would be necessary. Even in this predicament, the RAF members still would not accept help from the compulsory defenders. In fact, the accused were only sporadically in the courtroom during the proceedings. When they were there and they tried to speak, they were repeatedly told that they were out of order.

Throughout the duration of their trial, the RAF members conducted themselves and organized their expression often in an explicit refusal to defend themselves. While they made use of speech in the courtroom, their approach implicitly acknowledged the extent to which words are assumed to be anchored through relations of power in the context of a trial setting. By refunctioning the meanings or conventions of words, the RAF was able to disrupt the norms of verbal exchange, thereby destabilizing, even threatening, some of the practices of the court. As the trial unfolded, contestation over the meanings of words became routine to the point that progression of the proceedings was a near impossibility. The members of the RAF relentlessly challenged the usage of words such as “terrorist” and “gang” by exposing the situatedness of these words within established power relations. One example of this is their concept of *Konsum Terrorismus* (consumption terrorism).

On trial for his participation in the operation to break Baader out of prison, lawyer Horst Mahler also refunctioned the words routinely employed to describe the group’s activities. Mahler set words such as “terrorist” and “gang” back on to the state with his argument that the Bundesrepublik Deutschland constituted a part of “the most monstrous criminal union in history”. Mahler’s statement at his trial held at the West Berlin Supreme Court of Justice in 1972 illustrates the multiplicity of the word that characterized the difficulty of exchanges that occurred during the Stammheim trial:

“They accuse me of having, with other comrades, ‘formed a closely-knit group, united to fight with all means and especially violence the social

conditions in the Federal Republic following the model of the South American urban guerrilla, and thus to create favourable revolutionary conditions which promise victory'. The accusation rebounds on its authors. They themselves, this gang formed by General Motors, Ford, ARAMCO, General Electric, ITT, Siemens, AEG, Flick, Ouantd, BASF, Springer, Unilever, United Fruit, and others — the transnational capital partnerships, the imperialistic monopoly as a whole — are the most monstrous criminal union in history. To destroy this with all necessary and attainable means is a necessity of life for more than three thousand million men".¹⁸⁴

Mahler's designations of "gang" and "criminal union" were interpreted as nonsensical in the courtroom, perhaps because his usage of the terms were considered too broad and too loose. This was also a problem during the Stammheim trial when the defendants were trying to establish it as a political trial. The opposite occurred also; one of the witnesses Gerhard Müller, a former member of the RAF, complained that the court took too narrow of a reading of his words, that they took every word too seriously.

These verbal interventions could only occur as part of a refusal to employ language as a defense of oneself, as Meinhof observed: "I am in no position to defend myself, and naturally I can't be defended either".¹⁸⁵ Meinhof argued that the state's control over the prisoners' available contexts for speech amounted to torture:

“in a situation when you are in isolation, there are just two alternatives,...[interruption]. Either you silence a prisoner...[interruption]. By which I mean he dies, or you get him to talk. And that means confession and betrayal. That’s torture”.¹⁸⁶

The trial space — the courtroom — is the site of a pact, an agreement to tell the truth. Its authority rests on that precarious structuring of the dramatic gesture taken up by a speaking community produced in the convergence of individuals to that particular public space, to take part in the legitimization of the setting and its relationship to the truth of what is said. For this reason, the West German state’s design and construction of a multipurpose room in the Stammheim prison to serve first as a courtroom specifically for the high-tech security requirements of this trial, was an exercise of faith in a particular understanding of language. The legitimacy of the court of law in part rests on the assumption that the statements given are either true or false — that these statements are “constatives” that merely report a state of affairs — and the objective is to establish the status of these statements in relation to a whole event.

In the informal RAF literature, speech is taken up as an activity that can displace, make transparent, damage or annihilate the body not only of the listener or addressee but of the speaker. This view of speech goes beyond and in fact expresses quite a different sense than the notion that words are no longer effective but rather that it is a time for action.¹⁸⁷

Meinhof’s observation about the relationship between speech and torture references social, as well as physical, injury. The view that speech is physically,

socially, and existentially dangerous to the speaker highlights a problem separate from the imperative concerns that Judith Butler¹⁸⁸ addresses, in response to the way in which courts have selectively taken up and ignored linguistic theory that grants injurious capacity to words, the idea that we can, as J.L. Austin put it, ‘do things with words’. For the RAF prisoners, concern around the matter of speech was not directed at the way in which speech was used to constitute them — as members of a violent gang or as terrorists, although they argued against those designations. Rather, their concerns appear to have centred upon the risks to the speaker. There was a frequent expression of the fear that speech made one more susceptible to being ‘broken down’ by the authorities. What was at stake in being ‘broken down’ had nothing to do with being found guilty, since the prisoners all acknowledged from the outset that they would be convicted in what they referred to as a “puppet trial” that had been scripted in advance and that the success or failure of their insistence on chosen defense lawyers would have no impact on the trial’s outcome.

When each were called upon to singularly account for themselves in the court room, the RAF defendants each engaged in a sort of choreography of refusal, using their bodies in what may be described as a “body (anti-) language” in a way that is consistent with their hunger strike campaigns. They used gestures, threats, and physical-spatial stunts that employed all available space. Since they were restricted to only a small and specific space within the courtroom, they used not only horizontal but vertical movements. When ordered to stand, they refused to stand. Similarly, they refused to sit when asked to be seated.¹⁸⁹ Further, they

climbed over and around structural barriers and, at other times, refused to walk so that they would need to be moved forcibly. In at least one instance during her 1974 trial for her part in helping Baader escape from prison, Meinhof simply stood and repeatedly slammed her chair down on the floor, not saying any words at all.¹⁹⁰ When they used speech as their medium for communication, it was in an explicit refusal to take up the speech conventions required by the court.¹⁹¹ Their approach oscillated between shouting out words such as “swine” in response to the demand to account for oneself and refusing to speak at all. Baader warned the court, “Oh, all right, carry on with your ridiculous procedure. I shall create a disturbance as long as I’m in here”.¹⁹²

At the same time, within the prison structure, there was much concern about the state of Baader’s messy — quite filthy — prison cell. Baader’s cell was littered with refuse and rot: strewn with bits of paper, ashes, cigarette butts, and decaying food. The cell’s contents had attracted flies and created a terrain of obstruction. This multisensory tableau, perhaps constituted another expression of body (anti-)language. It placed the prison staff and authorities in a double-bind, especially when a government-ordered Commission of Inquiry was initiated to investigate prison conditions at Stammheim. On the one hand, prison officials thought that having the staff clean the cell would be a futile project, given that Baader appeared to be intentionally creating and maintaining disorder in his cell. On the other hand, using the removal of privileges to encourage Baader to clean up his own cell would be in violation of medical orders that sought to intervene into the negative impacts of long-term isolation.

Without using conventional speech, these concrete interventions constituted powerful forms of expression worth considering in the context of Michel de Certeau's observation that forms of state power tend to work towards the establishment of concrete and delimited places within which exteriorities can be administered and contained, but that within these there are opportunities to be realized.¹⁹³ More than forms of expression, these interventions can be seen as necessary performances of subjectivity aligned within and against the spaces of inhabitation, such as the prison or the courtroom.

act iv: napalm, yes. pudding, no



Illustration 2 Napalm Custard Powder. Collage.

By 1965, after progressive escalations and, in particular, attacks by the United States Army against civilian populations, the subject of the war in Vietnam became a site at which the impacts of imperialist expansion – a process in which West Germany, home to US army and NATO bases, had fully implicated itself – could be seen concretely. The Vietnam War was by then an event around which increasing radicalization occurred not only within the West German student movement, but amongst West German working class youths and youth counterculture generally. One aspect of the emerging counterculture was that of communal living. The slow but certain rise of urban communal living in the latter half of the 1960s represented widespread cultural and political interventions in West German life. For working class youths who were drawn to communal experimentation, disenchantment with the potentials of family structure and

labour conditions appear to have preceded their politicization,¹⁹⁴ for which the Vietnam War eventually served as a decisive catalyst.

When Dieter Kunzelmann's commune project, Kommune 1 (K.1), began in Berlin in 1967, it initiated a program of intervention into the daily lives of those who joined. This intervention into the everyday targeted the sense of social isolation and aimed to remove social, sexual, and political inhibitions imposed by practices of socialization. Members of K.1 worked to liberate themselves from social norms at as many levels as possible; they shoplifted their groceries, pirated and distributed texts, and initiated both spontaneous and planned political operations.¹⁹⁵

When the impending visit of US Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to Berlin (April, 1967) was announced, plans for mass demonstrations were immediately underway. K.1 planned its own contribution to the demonstrations. They would throw custard at the visiting representative of the American government as a performative reference to America's sustained and systematic bomb attacks on civilians in Vietnam.

Commune members prepared a large quantity of custard in advance and went to a local park to execute a trial run of their plan to see what sort of visual impact their project would produce. Rumours spread about the broader and more insidious plans underlying the tableau of splattered trees left behind by the test-run of this action. The domestic news press, led by Axel Springer publications, already widely noted to be hostile to the mounting political radicalization of youths, published sensationalized headlines asserting that a group of people were conspiring to commit a bomb attack on Vice-President Humphrey during his visit.

Arrests followed but, since the only evidence that could be gleaned by investigators was the K.1 supply of custard and other edible items, the suspected bombers were released. The arrests led to further suspicion amongst the left that the news media were deliberately distorting the facts to illegalize political protest and resistance. In particular, *konkret* journalist Ulrike Meinhof responded with her editorial critique of the official response to K.1's activities: "Napalm, yes. Pudding, no".

Telling stories

Vital here is consideration of Butler's distinction between "telling a story about oneself" and "giving account of oneself". Giving an account of oneself, as required in a trial context, demands the existence of a knowable, transparent self and, as Nietzsche argued, the acknowledgment of a causal relation between oneself and the act. Butler observes: "If the identity we say we are cannot possibly capture us and marks immediately an excess and opacity that falls

outside the categories of identity, then any effort ‘to give an account of oneself’ will have to fail in order to approach being true”.¹⁹⁶ The call to give an account of oneself cannot accommodate the range of distinct gestures and forms actually taken up by subjects. In the case of the RAF trial, which constituted only one of many sites of exchange between the RAF members and the state, the fundamental change to the Code of Criminal Procedure through the legislation of Paragraph 231 (September, 1975) answered back to the prisoners’ use of speech and spatial-physical interventions by allowing the trial proceedings to continue in the absence of the defendants, therefore, dismissing such expressions as merely nonsensical. Further, the implementation of Paragraph 231 implicitly acknowledged the state’s own recognition of failure with regard to the calculated management of the trial setting. Ascendancy in the realm of court dialogue, its transcription, and its distribution was inadequate to the process of containment in the face of the physical-spatial program of tactics deployed by the RAF defendants.

Communication is inherently sensual and demands an emphasis on forms of expression outside of speech or the realms of the textual, such as what is recorded in the trial record. I borrow Antonin Artaud’s notion of “concrete language”, which acknowledges place as physical and in full relation to its inhabiting subjects whose senses are materially implicated in that relation. Artaud’s concrete language is a physical language, which engages the senses in a poetic form. A poetry of the senses, as with a poetry of language, approaches the dimensions of experience that are inexpressible through conventional speech acts by challenging restricted relations of signification. Poetry, Artaud observes,

“brings into play all of the relationships of object to object and of form to signification”.¹⁹⁷ I am interested in the epistemological force of the senses in communication, which is neglected perhaps through the privileging of that which is considered to be rational and measurable. It is the case that we lack a rich or even adequate “vocabulary” of the senses — the senses then are not conducive to the assumption of the constative function of language. That is, they do not contribute to the determination of truth or falsity of utterances or acts.

The actions of the RAF defendants and the Federal Republic seemingly compose a score of point/counterpoint: imprisonment in isolation; hunger strike as a weapon against the state, to which the state responded with force-feedings; the physical-spatial tactics in the courtroom; and the legislation of Paragraph 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that excluded the defendants from the trial proceedings. These strategies and tactics highlight the way in which communication occurs in a state of movement not stasis, as both the word “constative” and its implications for signification imply. Acknowledging crisis in its sense as a ‘turning point’, elaborates crisis as a spatial concept that embraces the senses and movement. If communication is always marked by limits, if it is in crisis, then it is productive to consider how theoretical neglect of the senses, the body, and movement obscures by privileging a grammar of communication. By grammar, I mean the ways in which communication is expected to result in a successful transmission of information governed by a structure and its rules directed toward an affirmation of the pact of truth-telling or establishing the truth.

The ontology of movement that crisis suggests challenges the objectives of constative speech — the capacity to discursively anchor a state of conditions as though they were constituted by discrete moments or events. Even as crisis invokes the notion of judgment, it is more consistent with the illocutionary speech act (that which performs the act through saying it) than the constative speech act, since judgments, to the extent that they establish a relationship to the place in which they are made (such as a courtroom) and to the body of the subject who voices them (such as a judge, jurist, or accused), have an interpellating impact on the subjecthood of their addressees.

Illegibility

I am specifically interested in the form in which expression *takes place*. Drawing again from Artaud's notion of concrete language and poetry of the senses, it is possible to acknowledge that communication in crisis assumes forms other than speech. I even want to take this further, to point to the specific tactics of guerrilla warfare as forms of communication that fall outside of speech, as is suggested by the handbooks for guerrilla operations. For instance, Régis Debray argues that “the physical force of the police and army is considered to be unassailable, and unassailability cannot be challenged by *words* but by *showing* that a soldier and a policeman are no more bullet-proof than anyone else”.¹⁹⁸ What Debray is asserting is that the use of words is not the most effective means to communicate a very specific idea — in this case, that the police and army are not impervious to concrete challenges deployed by an extra-military force.

But what I find significant in the context of this discussion is the potential for, and compulsion towards, the expression of something in excess of a static and explicitly intentional transmission of communication. Derek Sayer observes in initial reactions to 9-11 “that abrasion between the words we have no choice but to use and the worlds to which they refer”.¹⁹⁹ In particular, those responses that were delivered by some participants of *The London Review of Books* symposium “11 September” in the cool detachment of academic prose presumably aimed to answer an imagined demand for them to make sense of the event but the disgust and the resolve towards staying “in the place where ‘Holy fucking shit’ is the most that can decently be said”,²⁰⁰ with which readers responded to these explanatory or instrumental offerings suggests that:

“commitment to words felt like a betrayal, because the words always came freighted with associations, none of which seemed to belong in the same universe as what had occurred. Tragedy, atrocity, calamity, disaster—giving a name to the thing at all seemed already to diminish it, reducing it to an ordinary scale of thinkability”.²⁰¹

Contrasted to the symposium’s attempt to make 9-11 publicly legible or at least to make it speakable, is the photographic exhibition *Here is New York* that was constituted by images alone, images of that day shot by anyone. Organized on a whim by volunteers and intended for only a brief run, *Here is New York* provided a space that the public sought, first in its physical location and then in the form of a website. Of the reception to *Here is New York*, Sayer remarks:

“Walter Benjamin could not have been more wrong. It is precisely the capacity of the photograph to replay time and again as image what has occurred once and once only in real time that gives it a power of witness that no other representation, whether visual or verbal, possesses. This auratic quality of the photograph is likely to be especially important when words fail us, and we intuit in that failure a chasm between language and life. The unique ability of the camera to capture the ghost of *what once was* holds out the promise of holding onto what language effaces, to keep faith with what gets lost as soon as we try to put it into words”.²⁰²

What this may help to impress is that expression may not be the successful transfer or exchange of information or about making things clean and legible. The desire to tell one’s story, or to enact another form of expression or physical movement, is not necessarily carried out within the confines of an instrumental relation or the wish to understand or to be better understood. Expression might not even be other-directed, at least to the extent that communicative exchange is assumed to be directed at the present other who requests an account of oneself.

Butler’s observations with regard to the opacity of the self and the truthfulness or failure in accounting for oneself, are consistent with an assertion that the form that the communication takes is vital to the subject’s expression, even if the form leads to increased misunderstanding between parties. The question of form is not only a question relating to the categorization of speech acts (already a matter of linguistic contestation); rather, it takes up the epistemological problem posed by aesthetics as a science of the senses. That is,

forms of representation outside of speech are vital to expression, even if they do not contribute to the realization or success of outcome-oriented procedures. Even more than that, this is a problem that exceeds expression and action. As de Certeau insists:

“Henceforth, the important thing is neither *what is said* (a content), nor the *saying* itself (an act), but rather the *transformation*, and the invention of still unsuspected mechanisms that will allow us to multiply the transformations”.²⁰³

“Indeterminate trajectories” as refusals of legibility

Another way of thinking about this is offered by de Certeau’s use of the idea of “indeterminate trajectories”, which are meaningless circumventions of vocabularies that remain at least somewhat consistent with “prescribed syntaxes”²⁰⁴(which here applies not only to language in the strict sense but to systems of temporalities and spatialities). The regimes of communication that privilege speech, as constituted in the formulaic and expected routes of the pact at work in a trial setting or the mundane settings of everyday life — for we are not exempted from those conventions and their implicit agreements, even when we are at home in the most ordinary and informal sites — enforce repeated engagements with particular desires from which we cannot extricate ourselves completely. Notably, the desire to be understood is an ambivalent one to the extent that subjects are compelled to produce potentially legible stories about themselves that achieve a mapable or logical link between themselves and their actions (both of which are fraught with difficulty in terms of the kind of

accounting demanded). These fictions are necessary at the level of subject identification; they are necessary to the subject's positioning in a way that makes them recognizable to, and addressable by, others. The failings, the gaps, and the unavoidable illegibilities that, despite all best attempts at narrative structure, plot, and character development, are inherent to such stories call for another mode conducive to engagement with, and response to, the assumption of the desire to be understood.

In this respect, it is important to clarify that to be understood is to be recognized rather than to achieve understanding in the strict sense — as a sort of realization of the ideal image of communication in terms of a clear and successful transmission of internalized states of being to an exterior site or the addressee. Such an achievement would be impossible from the perspective put forth here, since it demands that there is something such as a state of being, thought, or feeling that is definitive, located at an interior level, and that is knowable in the first place in order that it is transmissible without noise. Since the concrete and social space in which a subject is situated is inextricably tied to subject identification, there can be no faith placed in interiority. Or, to put it another way, there can be no dependence on the deep and authentic something that must be excavated to be presented to the other and received in a particular structure of meaning, as though it were a gift. The very concept of self-representation becomes problematic since representation implies mimicry; the act to which I refer must be production rather than representation.

In this regard, the desire for understanding is bought into at a very high cost to the subject through complicity in a particular presentation/production of self, which involves entrance into, and emulation of, a frozen likeness or effigy.²⁰⁵ Within the confines of that role, the body, disciplined as it is, performs with a certain agility. Nevertheless, the body and its movements remain to some extent sites of illegibility, even if the body is subject to far more cultural shaping than is routinely acknowledged. For instance, de Certeau asks:

“Where and when is there ever anything bodily that that is not written, remade, cultured, identified by the different tools which are part of a social symbolic code? Perhaps at the extreme limit of these tireless inscriptions, or perforating them with lapses, there remains only the cry: it escapes, it escapes them. From the first to the last cry, something else breaks out with them, the body’s difference, alternately *in-fans* and ill-bred, intolerable in the child, the possessed, the madman or the sick — a lack of ‘good manners’ ...”²⁰⁶

While the body is formed by culture, through both representational and concrete means, the body nevertheless consistently circumvents the limits of the genres that govern speech communication in little ways. The forms that this circumvention can take exceed the involuntary cry, gesture, uneven breath, or facial expression (the way in which a flinch quickly crosses the face to reveal weakness in response to an affront) to include uses and/or misuses of space — space that is implicated in the body’s formation. In any case, the public legibility of such circumventions is not guaranteed — despite, for instance, the assurances

that justify post-9-11 efforts to scientifically categorize and translate facial expressions of airline passengers during screening for the purposes of greater airport security.

The hunger strikes of the RAF prisoners and their use of gesture and other physical-spatial tactics in the courtroom are forms of communication rich in aesthetic power. While the practice of hunger strikes is consistent with a whole history of individual and collective protest-culture, it could be argued that the hunger strikes that were carried out in Stammheim disrupted ready regimes of interpretation for a number of reasons. First, the hunger strikes served as an activity through which the individual bodies of the group members could be coordinated and disciplined against the assumed borders of individuality, as though they together constituted one coherent body. That is, the hunger strike facilitated the constitution of the RAF itself as a body. Second, the prisoners' use of space, gesture, and movement, as well as the effects of their hunger strikes, subsequent force feedings by prison authorities, and frequent blow-outs with guards constituted a major *intervention into normative body formation* in terms of posture, movement, extreme reshaping of the body through starvation, and the violence incurred by refusals to comply (e.g. routine force feedings). Third, closely related to the last point is that amongst the many items that had been smuggled into Stammheim over the course of their imprisonment was a Minox camera with which the RAF prisoners covertly photographed their emaciated and emaciating bodies. The rolls of film were in turn smuggled back out of the prison. Federal investigators found some of the photographs taken at Stammheim in an

illegal residence. The significance or legibility of some of the photographs to the prisoners, and to the RAF members still at large who collected them, is ambiguous but it establishes a body of *visual and material documentation of corporeal signs with multiple, fractional, or absent referents*.

It has been speculated that there may be a link between some of these practices and the group's very particular interest in two texts that they read and to which they made frequent reference: Bertolt Brecht's play *The Measures Taken* and Herman Melville's novel *Moby Dick*. Meinhof adapted the song "Praise of the Party" from Brecht's play into "Song of the RAF. Praise of the Anti-imperialist Struggle", with the lines:

"The RAF is in the van of the masses,
it fights their battle
with classic methods...
Strike the fascists where it hurts".²⁰⁷

Moby Dick provided the inspiration for code names for the RAF members to facilitate written and verbal communications while under surveillance. Gerrit-Jan Berendse argues:

"Both *Die Maßnahme* [*The Measures Taken*] and *Moby Dick* displayed an intense concentration on bodily experience, including pain. Both were concerned with the dynamics of group belonging, with leadership, loyalty and exclusion...Stammheim had turned their lives upside-down: in contrast to their underground existence outside the prison walls, incarceration rendered the terrorists themselves the objects of terror. In

spite of regarding this terror as issuing from the prison authorities and their old enemy the state, the terrorists had themselves invented a new species of terror. A new concept of collective suffering — of the victimized ‘*corpus terrorismus*’ — initiated by the collective and modeled in part on literary tropes, emerged from the experience of the group in prison. Evidence of this new situation was consciously presented to the outside world as a source of examples for future counter-cultural actions by next generations of the RAF”.²⁰⁸

Evidence of this relates in part to the photographs taken in Stammheim and found in illegal residences as property of then still underground guerrillas.

The potential illegibilities of these interventions may stem from a conflation, or elision, of, in the first place, recognition of a particular call from an other and, in the second place, the interpretative work involved in authoring a response to this call. That is, if such a two-fold process can be understood as such in any way other than for analytic or illustrative purposes. In concrete terms relating particularly to the orientations of the so-called first generation RAF, while it appears that their program of actions were produced and represented with an eye fixed on a global field of conditions, power relations, and processes, the fact that the RAF members were occupied in the context of a politics of *identification* with imagined actors external to those of their own milieu rather than in the context of a politics of recognition provides a point of departure for consideration of their actions in the context of Lacan’s concept of the act, as elaborated by Slavoj Žižek in terms of an unconditional necessity to perform an

act that bypasses the deliberation intrinsic to the above-stated two-fold decision grounded in a mediation by the symbolic order.²⁰⁹ This conflation that is implicit in the act does not rely upon translation of an abstract call into a strategic program of action by way of indebtedness and adherence to a set of mutually agreed upon norms and values. Rather, it involves the suspension of social pacts and even the suspension of any distinction between the symbolic order and the other for whom the subject acts. What is at stake here may not be so much the extent to which the actions of the RAF, during or preceding their imprisonment, were understandable or legible but the way in which their actions may have destabilized perceived limits and, in so doing, “[changed] the very coordinates of what is perceived as ‘possible’”.²¹⁰

Bodily circumventions suggest an alternative program of performance for the urban guerilla, described by Carlos Marighella in his infamous “Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla” as having intimate knowledge of the terrain: “to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, its high and its low points, its turns, its irregularities, its regular and its secret passages, abandoned areas, its thickets, etc.”²¹¹ Once arrested and imprisoned, the urban guerrilla is exiled from the physical environment that is necessary to its constitution. After imprisonment in Stammheim prison, the RAF’s terrain was constituted by an architecture of forms of their own making. Instead of the alleyway or the street intersection, the prison cell and the trial room were potential sites for guerrilla struggle directed toward communication marked by the necessity of aesthetic convolution and the

deployment of body (anti) language rather than the utility of language directed towards self-defense.

4. Phantasmagoria and the Painterly Utterance – Intersensoriality and genre in Gerhard Richter's *October 18, 1977*

*It is impossible for me to interpret the pictures. That is: in the first place they are too emotional; they are, if possible, an expression of a speechless emotion.*²¹²

In the winter of 1989, fifteen of Gerhard Richter's paintings were exhibited for the first time at a small museum, Haus Esters, in Krefeld, Germany. The fifteen oil paintings took as their subject matter the first generation of the Red Army Faction. In shades of grey, Richter's paintings echo several photographic images that, each singularly, are immediately recognizable to many Germans to the extent that they, even as fragmented images of a much larger whole, signify a stark and protracted period in German post war history. Even a blurry black and white image of bookshelves brings back the sense of shock and terror that many West German citizens felt during a period marked by fear and uncertainty; particularly in the fall of 1977 and afterwards during the German Autumn.



Figure 4 *Cell (Zelle)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 201 x 140 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

Many critical responses to Richter's work make unreasonable demands in terms of their call for definitive meaning. Richter takes shots from all sides for not offering the accompanying commentary that adequately redeems, condemns, or effaces the RAF. Richter's approach to the October works, involves painting from photographs already in existence for purposes other than pictorial reference. In this case, the model photographs had already been in mass circulation in the media for more than a decade. Richter's project *October 18, 1977* references several well-known press photographs of first generation RAF figures as well as recognizable places in which the events that culminated in the German Autumn occurred. These places were familiarized through a process of reiteration in which these images were key instruments.



Figure 5 *Youth Portrait (Jugendbildnis)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 72.4 x 62 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

A portrait of Ulrike Meinhof called *Youth Portrait (Jugendbildnis)* is based on a posed photograph taken before her move underground; nevertheless, it would be highly recognizable to German spectators. On the one hand, portraits of Meinhof had been frequently published or shown on television during the two years that she was sought by the police in connection with her participation in the

armed freeing of Andreas Baader from prison while he served time for the political arson of two Frankfurt department stores. The freeing of Baader led to the accidental shooting of Georg Linke, a librarian at the Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen (German Central Institute for Social Questions), therefore, those suspected of participating in the action thereafter faced charges of attempted murder. On the other hand, Meinhof had been a recognizable public figure well before she became illegal. Meinhof was a leftist journalist and editor for *konkret*, a hip political and cultural magazine in West Germany. As such, she was often invited to participate on panels addressing various political topics hosted by news and current events television programs. She was a dynamic and articulate speaker who stood out in panel discussions for making sharp and critical commentaries. Her presence and speech stood in vivid contrast with the other more stylistically and ideologically conservative panel guests usually invited to participate. Further, Meinhof was well-respected enough as a journalist and a writer that her screenplay *Bambule* (roughly translated as Riot), which addressed the poor treatment of young girls in state care, was produced by a public broadcaster. After backing this production with both human and financial resources to its completion, the broadcaster pulled the television play at the very last minute before it was to air because, only days before the program's scheduled air date, Meinhof made what appeared to be a sudden and incomprehensible leap from her increasingly promising middle-class life to that of a fugitive when she took up the committed practices of urban guerrilla warfare.

Instead of watching the anticipated broadcasting of Meinhof's television play, the public was treated to images of Meinhof on the evening news and her image on posters, announcing that she was wanted by authorities on suspicion of attempted murder. These posters were plastered throughout urban centres. The wanted posters promised a reward of 10,000 DM for information leading to Meinhof's capture.



Figure 6 Wanted poster 1970

Seen in the context of the sustained mass media attention that surrounded Meinhof's biography and her sudden turn to a life in hiding that only ended a little more than two years and several guerrilla actions later, in June 1972, when Meinhof was finally arrested, Richter's painting *Youth Portrait* contains, contrary to a sense of beginning or hope usually associated with such images, a sense of an abrupt end to a life not understood. In referencing the beginning of Meinhof's adult life, *Youth Portrait* succeeds in transgressing the borders of an individual's biography by implicitly referencing not only the future in terms of the bitter and quick end of Meinhof's life but a whole series of events and emotions that, on a collective level, challenged the hopeful discourses whispered within the young West German state that was wishing for recovery from the self-inflicted wounds sustained under the Third Reich.

Three other paintings from the series *Dead (Tote)*, *Dead (Tote)*, and *Dead (Tote)*, together share the same title and content. Based on a widely published press photograph, first appearing in the popular German magazine *Stern* in May 1976 when the shocking news of her sudden death, reportedly by suicide, was announced, the paintings depict Meinhof from the shoulders up dead on the floor of her cell after she had been cut down from a noose fashioned from a strip of towel. Distinguishable from each other by the size of the painting, the degree of proximity to the subject as suggested by the composition, and (to use a concept from photography) the depth of field (or focus) of the image, the paintings appear to make direct reference to the practice of photography, thereby, perhaps staging a reversal of the aesthetics of the pictorialism of late 19th century and early 20th

century photography, when some photographers explicitly sought to achieve a painterly perspective through the lens of a camera.²¹³



Figure 7 *Tote (Dead)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 62 x 73 cm.
Courtesy of the artist.



**Figure 8 *Tote (Dead)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 62 x 62 cm.
Courtesy of the artist.**




Figure 9 *Tote (Dead)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas 35 x 40 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

Reaching back in time, Richter's paintings *Arrest 1* (Festnahme 1) and *Arrest 2* (Festnahme 2) were produced from two press photographs of the Meins and Baader arrests that were carried out just outside of a garage in Frankfurt on June 1, 1972. When authorities responding to a tip arrived at the garage, two men were inside. They were Holger Meins and Andreas Baader. Meins was a visual artist and young filmmaker who had attended the German Film and Television Academy in Berlin, Andreas Baader was, by all accounts, an unemployed 'bad boy', intimidating in his presence but charismatic. Soon afterwards, the police and federal border security authorities (BKA) had surrounded the garage and blocked

the exit. Meins and Baader responded with laughter from within the garage; eventually, they fired their weapons at the police from within.

A detective remarked that, from his vantage point through a window at the back of the garage, where he and his colleagues were preparing openings through which they could attack Meins and Baader, they could see that the two were smoking cigarettes, laughing, and waving their pistols about. Authorities were shocked that the two did not surrender. After throwing canisters of tear gas into the garage through newly formed openings in the glass, authorities demanded the surrender of Meins and Baader; they removed the obstacle at the exit to allow the two guerrillas out of the structure within which they had been trapped. Baader surprised them, however, by emerging from the garage with the tear gas canisters in his hands, which he threw at the police and federal agents. He then continued to enjoy his cigarette, as he and Meins situated themselves only partially within the opening to the garage in such a way to have cover from police fire but also to limit exposure and not to succumb to the tear gas inside the garage. In the meantime, affected by the canisters that had been unexpectedly thrown back at them, the police were forced to retreat temporarily before more gunfire was exchanged. When Baader was finally hit by a gunshot to his right thigh fired by a sergeant who had occupied an area resident's third floor apartment window, Meins surrendered to police and was arrested. Baader was found wounded on the garage floor.²¹⁴

These arrests signaled to federal authorities a visible end to the terrorist threat. While it was the case that the events on the street depicted in two of

Richter's paintings were to prove to be a turning point in the relationship between the RAF and the West German state, with several other key arrests closely following, including that of Ensslin on June 7 and Meinhof on June 15, it was by no means the beginning of the end. If anything, the image of this street, vacated except for the armoured vehicle from which authorities took down Meins at gunpoint, represents a change in emphasis for the RAF and the severity of its organized actions. The events on the street on June 1, 1972 provided the hailing and subsequent birth of the so-called second generation RAF.



Figure 10 *Confrontation 1 (Gegenüberstellung 1)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 112 x 102 cm. Courtesy of the artist.



Figure 11 *Confrontation 2 (Gegenüberstellung 2)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 112 x 102 cm. Courtesy of the artist.



Figure 12 *Confrontation 3 (Gegenüberstellung 3)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 112 x 102 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

Richter's cycle of paintings include three of Gudrun Ensslin after her arrest from within a Hamburg clothing boutique. In these paintings titled *Confrontation 1* (Gegenüberstellung 1), *Confrontation 2* (Gegenüberstellung 2), and *Confrontation 3* (Gegenüberstellung 3) Ensslin is dressed in prison-issued clothing. Each painting depicts a different photograph of Ensslin taken while in

custody and each articulates a different level of visual distortion. By chance, the photographs that document Ensslin's walk, as though on a fashion runway in her newly acquired prison attire, echo but reverse the stylistically fashionable presentation associated with and expected of members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and of other anarchist groups in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland in the 1970s. Photographs of Baader's arrest, for instance, show him in style; even while suffering from a gunshot wound, he is clad in rayban sunglasses. Most distorted, however, is the painting *Hanged* (Erhängte), a reproduction of a photograph of Ensslin, five years after her arrest, dead from hanging in her cell.

The paintings *Man Shot Down 1* (Erschossener 1) and *Man Shot Down 2* (Erschossener 2) show, from two only slightly different perspectives, Baader dead from a gunshot wound to the head on the floor of his cell. Two other paintings accompany the previous two: one of Baader's prison cell *Cell* (Zelle) that is trained specifically on his book collection, rather than on his bed or the overall composition of the cell and its contents, and another of his record player *Record Player* (Plattenspieler). Both of the latter paintings reference the original photographs that, on the one hand, reveal the sites in which the RAF members allegedly hid the weapons used in their own destruction, since in order to show that suicide was a plausible explanation for the 'Stammheim deaths', prison officials needed to give an account of the presence and accessibility of the handguns. The cells, it had to be shown, harboured tools for the facilitation of inter-prisoner communication and weapons with which they could take their own

lives. Baader's record player was found to be internally modified in such a way that it could conceal the firearm used in his death.

On the other hand, these two images implicitly offer visual documentation to support a well-worn theme in then long-standing debate and coverage about the RAF Stammheim prisoners. That is, the circulated images of the cell and the record player perhaps unconsciously respond to the controversy over the conditions of detention for RAF prisoners and the question of social isolation. In response to frequent charges from prisoners, human rights organizations, and independent medical examiners, state authorities continually cited the lists of mass mediated objects, including books and record albums, available to prisoners in their cells.²¹⁵ As though in anticipation of the crescendo of mounting accusations and political fallout that was to come, these two photographic images attempt to have the last word (or last image?), so to speak, on the question of the prisoners' treatment by the state. This question is one that has still not been put to rest. At the time of their first appearance, however, Richter's paintings *Cell* and *Record Player* usurp that last word asserted by the publication of the original photographs by re-accentuating the images and re-circulating them almost twelve years later.

The final painting in the series *Funeral* (Beerdigung) reproduces on a large scale a photographic image of the combined funeral for Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe, which was held in at the Dornhaldenfriedhof in Stuttgart even though many people vehemently opposed the burial of the guerrillas in the cemetery. The image depicted in the painting is so distorted that it can be identified as a funeral

only within the situating context provided by the cycle of paintings as a whole, but only for viewers with knowledge of the events surrounding the RAF phenomenon and the German Autumn.

Early responses to this cycle of paintings *October 18, 1977* took Richter himself, or his biography as it was perceived, as a subject of scrutiny. That is, much of the commentary and critique took Richter's authorial position of these works to task. Such critiques were marked by the construction of Richter as a bourgeois painter, showing these works in a venue characterized by bourgeois significance, Haus Esters having been designed by architect Mies van der Rohe. Within a particular circle of debate, one of the central questions was not so much whether the subject material of *October 18, 1977* was appropriate (although many others insisted that it was not) but if Richter, from his subject position, ought to have been *the one* to take up this topic area. Some of the initial critiques were marked by suspicion, if not a sense of disappointment. One commentator remarked:

“There is a puzzling timidity to his approach. In the case of the prison deaths, no one really believes in the suicide hypothesis anymore, and as shocking, accusatory images, political images, the works arrive too late, too blurred...”²¹⁶

From these ad hominem responses to Richter's work there eventually sprung several debates strictly concerning the role of painting as an artistic medium, with some critics even declaring the end of painting.²¹⁷

Whether Richter's approach to the works was a timid one, as the above quoted critic asserts, is not a crucial question but a diversionary one. Certainly, Richter was not the first German (or even foreign) artist to take the RAF as subject matter and nor was he the last one to do so. Therefore, the works neither approach unexplored and unoccupied territory, nor can it be the case that the works "arrive too late", when they take on a subject matter that clearly still resonates for the public.

It is fair to say that the subject of the RAF, or even its victims, was by no means alien to art either inside or outside of Germany.²¹⁸ From within the BRD, the late seventies saw the production of several cultural objects that dealt rather explicitly with the RAF and other radical left and anarchist movements of the period, as well as with the government reaction to the radical operations that these groups had undertaken. Many of these early representations were found in the medium of film; in some instances, the films were produced by several of the most gifted filmmakers in the country. Notably, the film *Deutschland im Herbst* (Germany in Autumn) produced in 1977/78 and was a pastiche of shorter film contributions from a number of filmmakers including: Alexander Kluge, Volker Schlöndorff, and Rainer Werner Fassbinder.²¹⁹ The events of the fall of 1977 were still raw when the film was released, and all of the raging political fallout surrounding still unanswered questions, for instance, about how weapons got into Stammheim prison, suggested that the RAF was not yet buried. Furthermore, the membership of the RAF was regenerating.

Even in the realm of fictional literature, with Heinrich Böll's novel *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum*, there was treatment of the sometimes suffocating and distorting social and personal impacts that state counterterrorist measures imposed on the population, particularly those associated with leftist politics, on youths in general, or on anyone who might be seen as a sympathizer. In his novel, published in 1975 — before the German Autumn but in the same year as the commencement of the Stammheim trial — Böll makes a controversial but apt observation with his suggestion that the news comes first and then reality follows, thereby events come to fulfill pre-circulating media representations.

In Böll's novel, an ordinary young woman's life is usurped by the mutually complicit complex of overzealous security officials and unrestrained media speculation that she is involved with a terrorist organization, until circumstances lead to a situation within which she kills a reporter and, in that act, realizes the very construction of her that has been shaped by the press. *Deutschland im Herbst* and *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum* constitute just two examples of early treatment in Germany of the events surrounding the first generation RAF but the subject has continued, in each subsequent decade, to be addressed in art, film, and literature.²²⁰

Beyond the subject matter of *October 18, 1977*, the way in which, on the one hand, the content is composed on the canvases, in other words, the grey and blurry presentation of the images, and, on the other hand, the way in which Richter's own comments frame the completed cycle may provide hints as to why they received the reactions that they did from critics.

act v: getting to Paris

Astrid Proll followed her brother Thorwald Proll, who had participated in the Frankfurt department store fires, into the activities of the RAF. Proll's first involvement was as the driver of the getaway car. She played a key role in getting the four who were to serve time for arson across the border by also arranging for false identity documents. The first stop on their escape journey: Paris. Hiding out in the Latin Quarter, they stayed in the apartment of revolutionary Régis Debray, whom Baader later read while imprisoned at Stammheim. Proll, as a student of photography, had brought her camera along.

Arguably, Proll's most significant role was played through her use of photography. Her photographs and the edited collection of photographs that she later compiled for publication, provide, as she explains it, an approach to the history of the RAF, a history that is largely mythologized. Proll's photographs are clearly documents. Without words, they mark significant moments, perhaps even intervene into the course of events. Proll remarks, for instance, that the Paris café photographs are markers of a farewell to legality.

Blurred intonations

In order to approach Richter's project, an observer encounters a palpable tension, which is posed by the source material, around the question of the identity of the paintings' contents. Is the RAF the main subject matter of the paintings? Since Richter's paintings are based on actual press photographs that provide a visual documentation of the arrests and deaths of the core, first generation RAF members, the subject of the cycle may be the press photograph as a form, demonstrated at the limits of its potential as a representational medium, instead of the RAF itself as a social and political phenomenon.

Can the rhythm of the cycle avoid making explicit reference to the practices of reiteration in the representation of the RAF and the broader social and historical context of their representation in the mass media? Astrid Proll, a photographer and member of the early RAF, who says that she could not even stand to look at the original press photographs of the dead, suggests that Richter's

paintings have emancipated these images from the mass media context.²²¹ Regardless of Richter's intentions, of which little is known, the structure of the paintings appear to answer back to the press images that they echo, press images that are immediately recognizable to many would-be spectators to the Richter paintings. The contours of the images present reverberations of the original photographs through the subtle repositioning of their subjects and the distortion of lines.

Repetition is expressed within the very structure of *October 18, 1977*, with two series within the cycle *Man Shot Down* and *Dead* specifically articulating the reiteration of an image. Subtle topographical re-articulations of the image take liberty with the spatial perspective that the viewer can possess. In a sense, the audience becomes displaced as each spectator's gaze moves, for instance, from *Dead* to *Dead* to *Dead*. Here, not only is one treated to a visual experience but a kinesthetic one, since together in succession, the three paintings suggest movement.²²² They manipulate the perception of proximity and focus as the lines that distinguish between objects progressively blur. Richter's project seems to refunction the medium of painting to deliver a mimetic performance of the precision and calculation produced by the camera lens. It is worthwhile to note the status of the photograph as a form of documentation, a material witness, so to speak.

In his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility", Walter Benjamin observes the distinction between reception to the photograph and the painting around exhibition value, noting the inclusion of

the photograph as a valid contribution to the trial record.²²³ This status is conferred onto the photographic medium due to its capacity to dissect and to make visible those aspects of reality that are not readily accessible to the human eye unaided by advanced technological enhancements. Paradoxically, where the technological capacities of the camera are acknowledged for the greater precision of vision that they afford, the photographic medium contributes to the distortion and alienation of our senses that is characteristic of the rush and chaos of the modern age.²²⁴ The heightened sensorial affronts of urban and factory life that were associated with modernity were increasingly accompanied by mass entertainment technologies such as the magic lantern and the diorama, so that, as Susan Buck-Morss notes, phantasmagoria offered to the public a collective anaesthetic of distraction.²²⁵ Significant to Buck-Morss's coupling of phantasmagoria and anaesthetic is the relationship of anaesthetic not only to the sensorium but to memory. That is, anaesthetic and, by her claim, phantasmagoria are charged with the task of the manipulation or repression of memory.

While Richter's October paintings suggest a phantasmagorical intervention into the viewer's perception of space and time to the extent that several of the series internal to the cycle represent action on either the part of the subject or the viewer: *Arrest*, *Confrontation*, *Man Shot Down*, and *Dead*, they also intervene with respect to the intonation of the image. Since all of these images have been circulated again and again, as visual utterances expressed to the public, Richter's use and manipulation of these reiterations repeat the image with new intonations. In reference to speech, Mikhail Bakhtin²²⁶ emphasizes the uniqueness

of each utterance, even drawing strict distinction between two or more utterances constituted by the exact same words ordered in the exact same way. This differentiation is possible because, as Bakhtin observes, expression occurs not through the use of single words or even sentences. Rather, expressions are governed by genres.

While it is the case that Bakhtin's theory specifies the *speech* genre, I suggest that his distinction is relevant to the problem of media images and collective instruction²²⁷ as it relates to the reiteration of cultural images. Further, I want to stress that the adoption of Bakhtin's work on speech genres does not represent a move that reduces the image to a model of language or speech. Rather, I argue that the significance of the sensory dimensions of expression are inherent to Bakhtin's work, since he insists upon a firm demarcation between utterances, on the one hand, and units of language (such as words and sentences), on the other hand. While he does not give particular and explicit attention to the inter-sensorial dimensions of his theory of speech genres (he only makes brief references to the extra-verbal), his demarcation necessarily rests upon an assumption of a point of contact that is not only situated temporally and spatially but is thoroughly sensorial. What is at stake in this distinction is the expressive intonation (or meaning) of referential content. For Bakhtin, units of language, such as words or sentences, are neutral, do not belong to anyone, and are not addressed to anyone; they are merely tools for communication. In contrast, utterances (which most certainly make use of the units of language) are individual and assume a position in relation to that which has preceded them and actively

anticipate a response. They are tied to, and shaped in relationship to, the sphere of communication in which they are expressed. That is, utterances take shape depending on the context of communication in which they are participating; in other words, the generic form of the utterance is a constituent aspect of what is being expressed, and recognition of that demands attention to the utterance as an “inseparable link” in the chain of communication.²²⁸

The concept of genres is productive to making sense of the way in which a project such as *October 18, 1977* can effectively draw so closely from, what may be considered from the point of view of a German audience, an iconic press photograph. If it can be permitted that the images, articulated by the individual paintings, be considered utterances, then it is the case that they express those already recognizable utterances with different intonations. Rather than two utterances constructed out of the same words in different tones and different social contexts, these images offer to their viewers the same subjects – whether it is that of the sensational arrest of Holger Meins (and that of the others, not depicted but signified), or the shocking, grizzly, and puzzling discovery of the death of Andreas Baader on his cell floor (which signifies both past and future, particularly the onset of the German Autumn) – but the subjects are articulated by altered figures and modified lines. Further, the contextual conditions in which Richter’s October paintings are introduced are remarkably different than those in which the original photographs appeared.



Figure 13 *Man Shot Down 1 (Erschossener 1)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 100.5 x 140.5 cm. Courtesy of the artist.



Figure 14 *Man Shot Down 2 (Erschossener 2)* 1988 Gerhard Richter. Oil on canvas, 100.5 x 140.5 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

On the one hand, there is the temporal or historical context in which the paintings were produced and displayed, which was remarkably different a decade after the failed Lufthansa hijacking, the Stammheim deaths, and the discovery of the body of RAF hostage Hanns Martin Schleyer. At the time of the appearance of Richter's paintings, the central question in the BRD was that of impending reunification with the East. On the other hand, the *sphere* in which the paintings are presented also *reaccentuates* the images, despite their iterative pasts. In this particular case, the move from the context of reportage, how ever sensational it sometimes was, to that of an art exhibition represents a shift in genre and acts as an intervention into the very possibility of what range of expression is being offered by the presentation of these images. Therefore, when considering the original press photographs and the October paintings, even though the subjects depicted are the same, the subjects that are signified cannot be the same, even when each photographic image is considered singularly with its painted counterpart. As Richter himself observes: "Even when I paint a straightforward copy, something new creeps in..."²²⁹

Richter's project as a totality, however, sets up another problematic, as it seems to exceed the referential gesture towards individual images and instead responds to and mimics the repetitious practice of mass circulation as it relates to the presentation of these images in a series. As a cycle, these images, together, tell a story central to the collective instruction offered at a particular point in, by, and on postwar German history.

Images are tied to our cultural memories. Susan Sontag argues that we learn from the images that are circulated in our society; those images that are presented to us repeat elements. Although some people speak of a collective memory, to which iconic images belong, Sontag stresses that memory is individual and not reproducible. For this reason, she observes that, rather than collective memory, what we share is collective instruction.²³⁰ The reiteration of images instructs us about what is important and presents a range of im/possible cultural identities and actions. Existing as we do in an image-saturated environment, we often fail to consider that even the activity of seeing and recognizing images as representations of objects in the world is an activity that we have learned.

Much like the public story as it was told in popular media, marked by Freudian parapraxis, represented by gaps, silences, lapses in memory, mispeakings, or slips of the pen, Richter's *October 18, 1977* expresses its own fissures and absences and not only because one cannot help but ask: Why this image and not that one? Rather, the sense of burial is structurally inherent to the cycle in what has been painted over or left out. That is, Richter's cycle makes present the absences of paintings that he actually produced but left out of the cycle. These exclusions include two other incarnations of *Hanged*, one other of *Man Shot Down*, and a painting of the much circulated and shocking photograph of Holger Meins, six feet tall but a mere ninety-two pounds, taken after his death by starvation after participation in one of the RAF's hunger strikes in Stammheim

prison, 1974. The painting of Meins and some of the other works were overpainted but, as Robert Storr observes, so as to leave traces behind:

“[B]eneath the surface [...] lie layers that are not ‘underpainting’ in the traditional sense but the intact archeological sediment of deliberately obscured pictures. Their cancellation is part of the meaning of the finished abstract work insofar as finding new ways to make images visible – or invisible – is at the heart of Richter’s enterprise”.²³¹

As artifacts, these images more than index a set of historical events or characters whom audiences feared and, simultaneously, with whom they somewhat identified. Rather, the paintings as a cycle point to the iterative practices of representation. Individually or as a whole, the paintings that constitute the cycle, rather than offer inroads to ready-made meanings that can be attributed to Richter’s project, reflect upon meaning as a problem that transcends the spheres of either exhibition or reportage.

The October paintings unframed

Richter’s own framing or (un)framing of the October paintings perhaps points to the source of ambivalent and negative reactions posed by some critics to this particular project. Of the paintings included in *October 18, 1977*, Richter observed:

“Their presence is the horror of the hard-to-bear refusal to answer, to explain, to give an opinion. I am not sure whether the pictures ask anything: they provoke contradictions through their hopelessness and desolation; their lack of partisanship”.²³²

With this and other remarks, Richter's attempt to evade the act of framing his cycle nevertheless impressionably frames the paintings as refusals, specifically in the case of the *Confrontation* series, depicting Ensslin as "neutral". While Richter resists giving any explanations of the works that constitute *October 18, 1977*, or routinely rejects even a discussion as to the motivations that provided the inspirational impetus to the works, his claim that, for instance, the paintings in the *Confrontation* series approach a sense of neutral is not satisfying to his critics. His descriptive qualifier, "almost like pop stars",²³³ resonates with the experience of encountering the images (as mentioned earlier, the images that the *Confrontation* series are based upon echo fashion plates from a runway shoot) this resemblance offers an uncanny reflection upon the ways in which, for some German youths, the RAF members were considered to *be* pop stars.²³⁴

Richter's bold hesitancy, if such a posture can be posited, applies also to his selection of models for the production of other paintings. *Uncle Rudi* (1965) is a painted portrait of Richter's uncle in his army uniform. Uncle Rudi was a Nazi soldier, proud of the soldier's uniform that he wore. Only a short time into the war, Uncle Rudi was killed. Richter worked from a family photo of his uncle to create his painting. The significance of this as a work imbued with personal subject matter is eclipsed by the impact of such a painting on the German public. Despite the fact that it is a painting, *Uncle Rudi* immediately invokes the photographic medium of its model, perhaps more so than that of the subject itself (Uncle Rudi as an individual or the Nazi soldier as a figure) because photographs of young Nazi soldiers are found throughout family photo albums. Occupying

their ambivalent spaces in the photo album, the photos are traces of events and relationships that can neither be spoken nor buried.

Another portrait of a family member produced in that same year references again this period in German history that has been relegated to an uneasy silence. This painting, also from an old family photograph, is *Aunt Marianne* and it depicts Richter's aunt when she was only a baby, in the arms of her sister, Richter's mother. This painting is loaded with both biographical and historical significance, since it is not only based upon a photographic image of yet another family loss in advance but it is paradoxically intertwined with that of *Uncle Rudi*. Marianne's absence was present for Richter while he was growing up because he was frequently warned as a child not to act out or he would become like "crazy Marianne". When Aunt Marianne, Rudi's sister, reached adulthood, she was institutionalized for mental illness but was later killed under the Nazi regime's systematic killing of patients. In contrast to *Uncle Rudi*, there is nothing inherent to the portrait of Aunt Marianne that would have symbolic impact for audiences without further knowledge of its subject, though the social relevance is striking, both individually and in connection with some of Richter's other works such as *Uncle Rudi* and especially a painting called *Mr. Heyde*, also produced in 1965.

Mr. Heyde was the doctor who had engineered the strategies that were used in the elimination of populations deemed to be undesirable under Nazi rule. In other words, Heyde, as a key figure in extermination programs, was responsible for the death of Aunt Marianne. Even after the war, Heyde went

unpunished for his integral involvement in the atrocities committed under the auspices of medicine during the Third Reich. With a new identity, Heyde was allowed to continue practicing medicine with the cooperation and protection of authorities. Heyde was taken into custody in 1959 after his identity was revealed and he committed suicide before he went to trial. The painting depicts Mr. Heyde accompanied by a police officer. Again, in this context, the portrait of Aunt Marianne stands out for its cultural-historical invisibility, since it does not have a way in to possible readings of its historical significance for audiences not bringing knowledge of Marianne's fate to the subject. *Mr. Heyde*, however, to the extent that it references both an actual event represented in the domestic mass media and as an echo of, and preview to, the ever-present anticipation of the discovery of war criminals, has cultural resonance at the visual level and is aided by a caption internal to the work.

Consistently occupying a posture of uneasiness toward interpretative practices in relationship to his paintings, Richter maintains a tension between the intimacy and distance of these works. While arguably the paintings are thoroughly intimate, Richter builds distance in when it comes to speaking about them. Statements Richter has made in relation to his work include: "I don't believe in anything"; "I don't care about anything"; and "the motifs in my paintings have no meaning whatsoever, I might have just as well painted cabbage"²³⁵ Of these comments, Richter reflects:

"I made those statements in order to provoke and in order not to have to say what I might have been thinking at that point, not to pour my heart

out. That would have been embarrassing, I didn't know why I painted *Uncle Rudi* or *Aunt Marianne*. I refused to admit any kind of meaning that these had for me".²³⁶

For establishing and maintaining this sort of distance from interpretations of his work, Richter has been charged by critics as being an aesthetic cynic – that is, he is accused of refusing to take a firm position on things or confirming meanings that others have conferred to his paintings.²³⁷

Richter, when he does offer a sort of opening though which to approach this work, rails against the perils of ideology. Born in 1932, Richter was a contemporary of founding RAF members such as Ulrike Meinhof and Horst Mahler,²³⁸ all having experienced childhood in the war period, during which, Richter's father had been a member of the National Socialist Party and fought on the Eastern Front. Raised as a Protestant, Richter became convinced in his teen years that God did not exist. Richter grew up and was schooled in the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), where he also began his training in the arts. The aesthetic expectations that marked his education in painting, with an emphasis on Socialist Realism, presented various limits to the work that he could produce as an art student. His weariness of idealism and suspicion of ideology rooted themselves early, so that through his work Richter tends to take these (idealism and ideology) as subject matter, perhaps unconsciously challenging even his own wish to occupy a position wholly external to such attachments.

Richter's elusive responses to those who pursue an explanation of *October 18, 1977* fail to achieve approval perhaps in part because his responses (or

refusals) do not apologize for the paintings' content. He neither aims to be seen as having attempted to paint over the postwar German history that is characterized by the presence and activity of the RAF, nor to have critiqued the group and its organized actions. He neither renounces the practice of treating this subject matter, nor does he express regret. In a sense, Richter is charged for his refusal to offer the remorse demanded from the remaining RAF prisoners themselves. The unapologetic appropriation and use of images that associate with the RAF is perhaps perceived on some level as an act of complicity, as critics confer alibi status on the artist who would take RAF images as a point of departure. But what Richter's works seem to produce, if taken in the context of his statements, is the public yet forlorn search for a site outside of ideology. Richter's search is reflected in his intervention into the medium of painting, not normally associated with the dissecting practices of photography and film, to produce a phantasmagorical sideways glance at the iteration of images in the mass media context that makes visible the anaesthetic effects of reportage.

5. Regarding an accusation of love: the RAF exhibition

*On the one hand, this is saying nothing; on the other, this is saying too much: impossible to adjust. My expressive needs oscillate between the mild little haiku summarizing a huge situation, and a great flood of banalities.*²³⁹

*(Someone tells me: this kind of love is not viable. But how can you evaluate viability?...)*²⁴⁰

*Love falls outside of interesting time; no historical, polemical meaning can be given to it; it is in this that it is obscene.*²⁴¹

When the Kunst-Werke Institute for Contemporary Art in Berlin was compiling art for *Zur Vorstellung des Terrors Die RAF/Regarding Terror The RAF Exhibition*, outrage from some members of the German public threatened the exhibition's funding. To save the show, organizers raised money through an e-Bay auction of donated art. *Regarding Terror* brings together works that "present a different image of the 1970s" from that which was constructed in the collective memory through media iteration of people and events connected with the West German urban guerrillas the Red Army Faction.

Zur Vorstellung des Terrors: RAF Ausstellung

Reactions to Richter's *October 18, 1977* anticipated to some extent those that would be leveled at the curators of *Regarding Terror: The RAF Exhibition* that opened first in Berlin and later in Graz, Austria in 2005. *Regarding Terror* was the site of struggle long before it was realized. In many respects, the reaction it faced was far worse when it was a mere abstraction at the organizing stage than when it materialized with a series of public talks and screenings over the duration of the exhibition's run. Anticipation of an art exhibition that took the RAF as its focus made some observers angry, while several people, including relatives of

some of the victims of RAF operations, lobbied to block public funding of the project and the debate spilled into Parliament.

After *Regarding Terror* was open to the public, reactions produced within the popular media appeared to articulate satisfaction that the exhibition had confirmed the concerns that had preceded it. In other words, these reactions positively answered expressed expectations that the exhibition would contribute to a project that would produce images of the RAF in iconographic proportions and by extension lead to the glorification of terror. German MP Friedbert Pflüger (CDU) charged that within the show “there is no distinction between culprits and victims”, while a political science scholar from Munich University Christoph Daase took the exhibition as a sign of the weakening of the power of the RAF from within political spheres and that it had traded its political significance for ornamentation. Daase argued that the image of the RAF has become a fashion accessory: “People wear the RAF insignia, but only because it looks chic”.²⁴²

Beyond the content of the exhibition, the form was also the target of vocal critique. In one example, the form of the exhibition was described in this way: “Sometimes more reportage than art exhibition, the show failed to provide a rigorous historical analysis”.²⁴³ Since the art exhibition, as a form of representation, tends to emphasize the display and viewing of its objects at the expense of descriptive textual elements, it is not customarily the site of “rigorous historical analysis”. Although a call for contextualization in the case of a show that has as its focus a set of historical events of serious proportion spanning approximately thirty years is arguably understandable, this criticism seems

misplaced, given the attention to historical documentation evident in the structure of *Regarding Terror* as it was actually exhibited.

Against the one hundred art works exhibited, *Regarding Terror* included two media rooms, highlighting both print and broadcast media focusing on twenty-nine dates of particular relevance to the history of the RAF as it was represented in print and by television. A third room, in which political tracts, posters, and leaflets were displayed, was complete with hours and hours of related documentaries and film shorts that could be viewed by visitors. In addition to these resources, there was a work-based archival room stocked full of manuscripts about the RAF, related political groups, works by the authors and theorists whose writings RAF members read and cited, extensive annotated bibliographies, and books addressing various aspects of the historical milieu (both domestic and international) in which these groups were active. A computer was available so that visitors could access resources on the internet.²⁴⁴

The critique then needs to be restated because it cannot be claimed, as it could be in the case of Richter's *October 18, 1977*, that the exhibition suffered a lack of context. Rather, there was an overabundance of context in the structure of the *Regarding Terror* exhibition. The exhibition was designed in the visible anticipation of active visitors willing to work through, at various potential degrees of commitment, the architecture of contextual materials offered within the exhibition. The unspoken dimension of the critique leveled at the curators is that the historical material artifacts, those both textual and non-textual, were not ordered nor subsequently re-interpreted for exhibition audiences.

It must be noted, however, that *Regarding Terror* has also been critiqued for the context that it was perceived to provide. Wolfgang Kraushaar, for instance, acknowledges the inclusion of historical source materials within the exhibition but he argues that this “combination” of art and contemporary history itself constituted the contextualization offered by the exhibition. The problematic that Kraushaar raises pertains to the relationship or “reciprocal distance” between the artworks and the historical materials within this combination. In other words, what is the direction of the relationship – does the history elucidate the art or does the artwork elucidate the history? Echoing art historian Martin Warnke, who asked: “How is it that this historical period that shocked an entire generation could become the playmaterial for a subsequent generation?”,²⁴⁵ Kraushaar asks: What allowed for the move toward the posthumous popularity of terrorism?²⁴⁶

I am interested in the ways in which *Regarding Terror* represents and is represented through critique. Even this distinction presents a fundamental challenge, not because the exhibition cannot be separated from the discourses that surround it, although this is true to an extent, but because there is an inherent difficulty – perhaps, an impossibility – in the task of establishing and assigning a dominant meaning to the exhibition as a whole, as in the example above, as an expression of an emerging popular interest in terrorism. Dierk Spreen’s review, the title of which translates to “Neon Sign for Terror”,²⁴⁷ targets what he considers to be the context of the exhibition and suggests that the messages of individual artworks are compromised by the context. For Spreen, the exhibition constructs the members of the RAF as the victims of the West German state,

depicted as powerful and paranoid, while presenting political terrorism as though it were free of violence. He describes the exhibition in this way:

“Relativization, mythologization (“Victim”) and aestheticization of the forces against the right are the messages of the exhibition. They are so thickly lain on that individual works of art are overpowered by the context and can no longer be seen to their best advantage”²⁴⁸

Rather than the lack of context that is described by MP Friedbert Pflüger and others in opposition to the exhibition, Spreen sees an overabundance of context that threatens to smother, corrupt, or annihilate the (true) meanings of particular artworks included in the program. A concrete example of this that Spreen offers in his review is that of a video installation by Rainer Kirberg entitled *Überfahrt (Crossing)* (2004). In the video, a fictional work, three young members of the later RAF sit in a rowboat on the Oder-Spree Kanal. The location resonates not only with the title *Crossings*, since the canal links the Spree and the Oder rivers, but in relation to the possibility of securing political asylum in East Germany, in which subsequent manifestations of the RAF maintained contacts important to the security, economic stability, and temporal longevity of the group. Situated here, at the crossing, the activists debate the conditions of their situation and the question of identity. The boat trip offers a space of reflection for their lives and the expression of criticism and self-criticism that was central to the internal practices of the RAF and other West German urban guerrilla groups. The production of new personal identity documents is necessary for this relocation (in most accounts of the RAF — documentary and fiction — the problems of both

material and immaterial identification are the staples of their communications). The RAF members roughly outline the necessary parameters of their proposed identities on a piece of paper, while struggling with questions around the assumption of a new identity and its remainders. One of their papers, folded into the shape of a boat, is placed into the water, where it floats alongside their humble rowboat until its structure is breached by the surrounding waters and it sinks slowly, remaining unretrievable to the desperate grasps of the video's characters. From the title of *Crossings* to the imagery of the boat drifting on the water to the writing over of identity, all of the elements in this video are rich in terms of their possibilities for multiple signification. Spreen, however, interprets over or around the inherent complexities of the work, and understands it as the deconstruction of RAF discourse in which pity and regret are finally possible. He laments that in the context of the exhibition, the video seems to say something more: "[I]n the context of the exhibition this film had the effect only as a further contribution to the tale of the terrorists as victims (in this case as victims of their own ideology)".²⁴⁹ He argues that in the case of the RAF-exhibition, through a context of directed meaning, "the art exceeded its limits".²⁵⁰

In the midst of such reactions, interested observers are confronted with a paradoxical expression of the problem of context surrounding this exhibition. The curatorial thesis or program underlying *Regarding Terror* is accused of providing too much direction, for instance, in the spirit of Spreen's reading of the exhibition as being too heavy with pre-packaged meaning and the construction of victim-mythology, *and* at the very same time, the exhibition is accused of providing a

lack of direction and only a troubled and suspect attempt at social-historical grounding, as is evident in Kraushaar's observations, for example.

Barthes and *A Lover's Discourse*

Roland Barthes designates the lover's discourse as a solitary one. Even more, he insists that it is one of *extreme solitude*, even though it is "spoken, perhaps, by thousands of subjects (who knows?)."²⁵¹ Further, Barthes describes his book — his lover's discourse — as a necessity. This discourse itself, which is "warranted by no one; it is completely forsaken by the surrounding languages: ignored, disparaged, or derided by them, severed not only from authority but also from the mechanisms of authority (sciences, techniques, arts)"²⁵² is a necessity. That is, Barthes' book is not a book *about* the lover's discourse but *is* the lover's discourse in simulation, and this discourse, Barthes tells his readers, is a necessity. Unyielding and compulsive, this discourse cannot be abandoned by the *I* without changing languages altogether. This characterization echoes Lacan, who insists that one cannot speak *about* love but rather stupidity, and that such stupidities provide an opening into a new subject.²⁵³ Perhaps it must suffice merely to hope for the adoption of what Barthes refers to as an "un-heard-of form of consciousness",²⁵⁴ one that prefers to decorate rather than interpret, cut-up, understand.

With Barthes' discourse, left behind is the linguistic notion of discourse as "language above the sentence or above the clause"²⁵⁵ and exaggerated are extra-linguistic notions of discourse as social practice, including relations of power and ideology,²⁵⁶ or discourse that incorporates technologies of the body into its

armory.²⁵⁷ Discourse here implicates the body, and Barthes' discourse everywhere assumes so:

“The other's body was divided: on the one side, the body proper — skin, eyes — tender, warm; and on the other side, the voice — abrupt, reserved, subject to fits of remoteness, a voice which did not give what the body gave. Or further: on the one side, the soft, warm, downy, adorable body, and on the other, the ringing, well-formed, worldly voice — always the voice”²⁵⁸

But the body's implication is not situated in the body of the other but that which is taken from it through the *I*'s discourse — that which strives to produce meaning out of absolutely nothing. It not just that every word demands or anticipates a response,²⁵⁹ rather: “Every contact, for the lover, raises the question of an answer: the skin is asked to reply”.²⁶⁰ Here, we are in the mysterious realm of gestures, movements, proximities, proportions, temporalities — all of those occurrences for which no dictionaries have been authored that could guide us into that (un)comforting slide into our beloved concrete indexicality that is so characteristic of speech communication. Here, there are no such illusions and still there is no meaning.

Moreover, Barthes' discursive site is like a city at once both old and new. This site is constituted by crumbling ruins and massive reconstruction initiatives of a violent gentrification process, and the pedestrian trying to negotiate this city will need to re-trace this terrain on a regular basis to work around this or that ephemeral obstruction. Such re-tracing will be a thoroughly individual task even

though countless others will need to make the very same calculations, also singularly. Within this city-site, the pedestrian is without a pre-determined route, without a certain and concrete destination, without a map. Rather, this chaotic pedestrian operates in the mode of *dis-cursus*, “the action of running here and there, comings and goings, measures taken, ‘plots and plans’”.²⁶¹ Such plots, Barthes will tell his readers, are taken against oneself rather than the other. This is not a matter of grammatical structure, word order, or the proper ingredients for effective communication; it is perhaps a matter of last-minute evasions. But, whatever this discourse is or is not, it is necessary.

Barthes describes the fragments of discourse that he outlines in this work as “figures” to elaborate the discourse as a gymnastic and choreographed feat. The figure, however, captures and moulds the body in time and space so that “the body’s gesture is caught in action and not contemplated in repose: the body of athletes, orators, statues: what in the straining body can be immobilized”.²⁶² It is not a question of what is said because what is said is conjured in what might be a sort of panic in the face of something (or everything) overwhelming. Instead, what is said in this case is a “rather stupid word”, or “a blank word, an empty vocable” and, in an attempt to say it all, it says absolutely nothing other than to announce “the end of language”.²⁶³

For all of the valour this discourse holds in the realm of literary achievement, from Ronsard to Goethe (even if it is, as Barthes insists, derided by all of the major systems of thought), it frequently makes itself manifest in the form of pure prose. Prose, from the Latin “*prosa oratio*”, is mundane and ordinary

speech or writing but, more than that, its referent is *straightforward* discourse. If this is so, then why is it that it is much easier to translate plot than it is to translate prose? The directionality and shape of this discourse's movement is challenged by Barthes' treatment of the lover's discourse in fragments, as figures.

Barthes collects these figures and presents them but not in any sort of straightforward or linear manner — appropriately, they are *out of order*. This persistent discourse takes its protagonists out of the narrative structure. Arguably, there are no introductions, no developments, no plot arcs, no perfectly placed obstructions and their accompanying poetic resolutions that imply a causal relation to eventual outcomes, and, what is worse, there are no defined conclusions — except for what is tacked on in the end:

“There is a deception in amorous time (this deception is called: the love story). I believe (along with everyone else) that the amorous phenomenon is an ‘episode’ endowed with a beginning (love at first sight) and an end (suicide, abandonment, disaffection, withdrawal, monastery, travel, etc.). Yet the initial scene during which I was ravished is merely reconstituted: it is *after the fact*. I reconstruct a traumatic image which I experience in the present but which I conjugate (which I speak) in the past...”²⁶⁴

Another way of thinking about it is that there are no explanations; there is nothing to understand. Established after the fact is this story that is authored and imposed upon a series of chance associations that could have, and in fact may have, been otherwise. This discourse may be an anthology of fictions — each of which is

without unified form and each of which is constituted by topics, both fleeting and random.

The relationship between the concepts “topic” and “tópos” (place) is an explicit one for Barthes and it underlines his structuring use of figures. The implication of tópos as place or field and, in adjective form, topikós as *commonplace*,²⁶⁵ affirms the concreteness of the subject’s movement within a particular locality or position, both physically and in terms of themes or interests. Place implies locations haphazardly visited, they make up an unplanned retroactive itinerary of becoming — or an itinerary of accumulated identification. These visits are not planned visits but accidental ones, detours, re-routings, and bypasses.

Consideration of these concepts, essentially those of place and topic, and their intrinsic connection to one another serves to remind that concerns and preoccupations of all kinds — possibly the ingredients of ongoing identification and, hence, performative subjectivity — arise from meetings between concrete situations and movements within those contexts. Further, such deliberation invites a troubled but necessary conflation of the (extra)ordinary. That is, similar to the lover’s discourse, which is, as Barthes asserts, a discourse of devaluation and, therefore, a discourse of solitude that is spoken by many (if not all), the discourse of a large-scale art exhibition regarding terror illustrates by virtue of its figures (the artworks) the way in which this extraordinary and singular thing, a strange and ineffable preoccupation is spoken singularly by many. Of a lover’s discourse, Barthes writes:

“I refer the devaluations of love to a kind of obstructionist ethic, to a let’s-pretend realism, against which I erect the realism of value: I counter whatever ‘doesn’t work’ in love with the affirmation of what is worthwhile.”²⁶⁶

Figures

Contained within the opposition to *Regarding Terror* was an expression of fear that the exhibition would further glamourize the RAF members and their actions. Indeed, such reservations have been expressed perennially in a long-time struggle over cultural products that address, or appropriate images that depict or resonate with, the RAF and the history of the urban guerrilla phenomenon in the BRD. The sometimes pejorative term “Prada Meinhof” suggests an ongoing glamourization and aestheticization of the RAF; for instance, the group was the inspiration for one of fashion designer Josephus Thimister’s line of trenchcoats. Similarly, the appropriation of the RAF into popular and consumer culture through, for example, the production and sale of t-shirts and underwear that depict the RAF logo, sparked a critique of glamourization and aestheticization. Of Prada Meinhof, Matt Worley writes:

“A predilection for radical chic has been omnipresent throughout late twentieth century culture — Warhol’s Mao Tse-Tung, Joe Strummer and the Red Brigade, the Stone Roses’ lemons, Public Enemy and the S1W, Black Grapes’ Carlos etc. etc. etc. Concurrently, the astute revolutionary has always retained a sense of ‘pop’ — be it Lenin’s celebration of cinema or the Red Army Faction’s penchant for crushed velvet flares and white

Mercedes. More recently, however, due respect has been eclipsed by shallow parody as the once inspirational became an empty aesthetic for ad lads and art school fashion designers — people who, if their subject matter had their rightful way, would be swinging from the nearest lamp-post. The revolutionary has been repackaged as fashion accessory, and where Victorian dinner party hosts once invited Marx or Engels ‘round for nibbles, today’s chattering classes book a holiday to Cuba and purchase situationist clothing from London’s more fashionable boutiques”.²⁶⁷

Aspects of the Prada Meinhof critique are echoed (although with differing political inflections) in many of the critical responses to *Regarding Terror* that warn that the exhibition offers a program of mythologization, iconographic representation, the glorification of terror, and perhaps even the erasure or perversion of history.

Interestingly, when Felix Ennslin answers to critiques with regard to artists and others taking up the RAF as a subject, he cites not only love but the process of *falling in* love. In particular, to the charge of “abstract radicalism” that is sometimes leveled at not only the adoption of RAF imagery into popular culture but at cultural producers involved in work around the RAF, which suggests that such consumers and/or producers attempt to appropriate or vicariously take up the RAF’s radicalism, Ennslin responds:

“It’s like falling in love with something you would like to be a part of, of which you yourself want to be, without having the means or the will to attain its qualities yourself. On one level this is a banal argument, as with

any activity with which you engage in the world it is a ‘fight against the loss of significance’. On another level it leaves out the issue of why a certain object has the power to help you fight this loss by choosing it as your subject matter”²⁶⁸

Incidentally, performance artist Erin Cosgrove produced a film short entitled *A Heart Lies Beneath* (2003), which is based upon her satirical romance novel *The Baader-Meinhof Affair*. The satirical bite is only heightened by the fact that the film short stars Fabio. The love story is set within a contemporary college Baader-Meinhof reading group, which provides an appropriate cover for a covert group of students who actually wish to emulate the RAF. Cosgrove’s project explores and emphasizes an inextricable relationship between love and cultural myth, as the passionate relationships developed within the narrative somewhat depend upon the absorption and internalization of trivia culture related to the RAF story, as it is constructed within the group. Cosgrove’s project is not the only one to develop what may at first seem to be an odd connection between lessons in RAF trivia and romantic seduction. The Canadian film *Monkey Warfare* (2006), directed by Reginald Harkema, is about a burned out and disenchanted couple of post-60s radicals with a secret past and their chance meeting with a young bicycle revolutionary. An informal crash course in the history of the RAF and the loaning of Astrid Proll’s book *Baader Meinhof Pictures on the Run 67-77* decidedly marks the initiation of intimacy and passion between two of the film’s protagonists.

With all of the above in mind, it may be productive, then, to consider how it is that the accusation contained in the opposition to the exhibition could be called an *accusation of love*. Nevermind that one of the curators Felix Ennslin is the son of core RAF member Gudrun Ennslin, many of the included artworks address the theme of love – from the explicit examples, such as Cosgrove’s *A Heart Lies Beneath* (2003) and Bruce LaBruce’s art porn film *Raspberry Reich* (2004) to the more implicit ones, such as Dennis Adam’s *Lullaby* (2004), Gerhard Richter’s *Atlas (Panel 470)* (1989), or Joseph Beuys’ *Dürer, ich führe persönlich Baader+Meinhof durch die Dokumenta V* (1972).

Imagining the RAF exhibition as guilty of love, in what follows, I will take up Roland Barthes’ lover’s discourse in relation to some of the included works as Barthesian *figures*. In this spirit, the artworks will be treated as though they are constituted by gymnastic and choreographic outbursts that emphasize space, gesture, and movement in the offering of counter-images — not *of* the RAF but — that reference the RAF. Following Barthes’ use of discourse in the full sense, as action — “of running here and there”, one might consider how the curatorial principle of *Regarding Terror* and the solitary practices of the individual contributing artists make use of the lover’s discourse.

Lullaby

*Maybe I was never properly socialized: use value is something I prefer to transgress.*²⁶⁹

It would seem that Dennis Adam’s *Lullaby* references a photograph originally taken during initial investigations of the Stammheim deaths on behalf of the

public prosecutor's office. This photograph has been significant to the popular imagination in the context of the story of arguably the most significant date in the history of the RAF, October 18, 1977. The photograph reveals (only after digital manipulation of the original colour photograph) the title of the LP that was sitting on Andreas Baader's turntable in his Stammheim prison cell when he was found dead from a gun-shot wound to the back of the head. Amongst the images that circulated in the press after the Stammheim deaths in October of 1977, was a black and white photograph of Baader's record player, upon which Eric Clapton's 1975 blues album *There's one in every crowd* was placed with side two facing upwards. Side two includes the songs: "Singin' the Blues", "Better Make it Through Today", "Pretty Blue Eyes", "High", and "Opposites".

When this photograph was originally circulated during the flurry of press coverage of the Stammheim prison deaths, the album title could not be identified. It is significant that it was only through the heightened interest in this particular photograph, demonstrated in the production of contemporary art around the topic of the RAF (before Adams, Gerhard Richter painted the photograph of Baader's record player as part of his cycle of oil paintings *October 18, 1977*), that the computer enhancement and imaging work required to decipher the text on the record album has been carried out.²⁷⁰

The original image of Baader's record player had the power to capture the popular imagination because of the haunting suggestion of presence inherent to it — that is, the photograph pointed to the album as a very particular, active, and potentially meaningful trace of Baader. The Clapton LP on the turntable spoke

and it said: “Baader was just here, and this album is the last thing that he must have listened to”. Note that this is exactly what Robert Storr invokes while writing about the record album, as the photograph is included in Gerhard Richter’s notebook:

“Given what occurred during the night or early morning of October 18, 1977, the lyrics of several of these songs — ‘We’ve Been Told (Jesus is Coming Soon),’ ‘Swing Low Sweet Chariot,’ ‘The Sky is Crying,’ ‘Better Make it Through Today’ — are, to say the least, eerie and depressing. However, none of the cuts is more so than the last song on side two of the album, the side facing up on the record player. Titled ‘Opposites,’ its single, hauntingly repeated verse goes: ‘Night after day, day after night, /White after black, black after white,/Fight after peace, peace after fight,/Life after death, death after life.’”²⁷¹

But, what meaning can be taken from the identity of the record album on the record player and this selection of songs in particular? While, if we accept that Baader’s death was an act of suicide, the album on the turntable, along with his book collection, and the state of his cell generally, could be interpreted as elements constituting a larger tableau of self-representation. That is not to say, however, that the meaning of it is clear or that there is a carefully crafted or even a conscious authoring of a particular and translatable message. Even if Baader’s death was a suicide, it appears to have been performed as a murder, and the scene that it entails ensures a lingering and haunting ambiguity surrounding the conditions of his death. During the drawn out hostage-taking of Schleyer, 72

prisoners held in various institutions in the BRD were impacted by a state issued contact ban. Baader, Ennslin, Raspe, and Irmgard Möller each formally appealed the conditions of the ban. Soon afterwards, the prison doctor had determined that Raspe was suffering from severe depression and appeared to be at risk of committing suicide (and only a week and a half before the deaths of Baader, Ennslin, and Raspe), Baader wrote:

“Putting together all the measures adopted over the last six weeks, one can conclude that the administration is hoping to incite one or more of us to commit suicide, or at least to make suicide look plausible. I state here that none of us intend to kill ourselves. Supposing again in a prison officer’s words, we should be ‘found dead’, then we have been killed in the fine tradition of all the judicial and political measures taken during these proceedings”.²⁷²

Baader was shot execution-style, and this demanded that a string of ballistics experts would be brought in to analyze and to determine whether it would be possible for him to have shot himself at that range and in that physical location. Just as the song’s title “Opposites” suggests, the song’s lyrics themselves, that Storr finds exceedingly eerie and depressing, could as easily be interpreted as a comforting and affirming refrain that refuses finalities and completion.

In Adams’ assemblage sculpture *Lullaby*, the manipulated image of the album on the turntable is surrounded by a steel encasement. The title *Lullaby* points beyond the image to the object that it signifies, drawing upon the

assumption that Clapton's album was the last voluntary acoustic exposure that Baader experienced before that of gun-fire (and potentially that this music played on as he was dying). The title also suggests affection; perhaps an offering for Baader's vulnerable passage into an everlasting slumber. For all of the cultural weight that the photograph indexed in Adams' project carries, the work could stand on its own with the photograph as one of its referents but his assemblage has an audio component. Somewhere beneath the photograph, a mechanism is produced to play the tracks from Clapton's *There's one in every crowd*. With this, Adams seems to want to draw the audience's attention to time, since the audio track is decelerated, and the songs play in a slow, dragged out, distorted manner.

With this, both formally (in terms of the assemblage's production) and conceptually, *Lullaby* challenges not only the photograph and its circulation but memory — particularly “selective” memory, which Adams states is one of the themes he frequently takes up: “I try to bring forward what is being left out. I'm fascinated with the politics of silence”.²⁷³ Consideration of this poses questions about the relationship between the photographic (forensic and media) exhibits of the Stammheim deaths; the social conditions that followed the events of October 18, 1977; and the accepted readings of the events that still have concrete political and social impacts in Germany today. These relationships and the objects that signify something about the photograph still matter, even after all of this time has passed. Note that, as far as it is known, the photograph was not even further examined until the production of the Museum of Modern Art's catalogue for Gerhard Richter's October paintings, published in 2000. Is it not the case that

“[s]ometimes the metonymic object is a presence (engendering joy); sometimes it is an absence (engendering distress). What does my reading of it depend on? — If I believe myself to be gratified, the object will be favorable; if I see myself as abandoned, it will be sinister”²⁷⁴

But, again, this is not all that is curious about lingering preoccupations with the photograph or especially the record album itself as a signifier for the events of the night of October 17, since Baader’s record player might not have even been functional at the time of his death. The record player, inspected in the aftermath of the October events, was found to be housing a makeshift holder that had been constructed out of paper clips. The holder was determined to be large enough to conceal a pistol. For this reason, it is believed that the record player served to hide the weapon that ultimately ended Baader’s life.²⁷⁵ These objects that haunt us, after all, may have no use value.

The title of Adams’ work may hint at the anaesthetic properties of the circulation of, and preoccupation with, these images — and not just in the press, but more so amongst those (amorous?) subjects for whom it matters dearly (who can say why?) just which record album actually sat on Baader’s turntable on the night that he died. *Lullaby* then would also constitute a self-implicating act for Adams as well. For whom is the lullaby?

Atlas (Panel 470)

*They are the almost forlorn attempt to give shape to feelings of compassion, grief and horror (as if the pictorial repetition of the events were a way of understanding those events, being able to live with them).*²⁷⁶

Over several decades, Gerhard Richter has assembled several albums of collected images. These images are both personal family snapshots and publicly circulated press and archival photographs, and among them are numerous photographs related to the RAF. *Atlas* consists of groupings of these found images in various panels that include landscapes, family photos, pornography, intellectuals, prisoners of concentration camps, animals, objects, and murder victims. Many, but not all, of the found images that constitute *Atlas* became source documents for Richter's painting. For instance, his series of paintings *Eight Student Nurses* (1966) is based on source images included in *Atlas*.

As Robert Storr has noted, the panels are organized sometimes thematically and sometimes taxonomically, often producing surprising or disturbing associations:

“[W]hole panels devoted to concentration-camp pictures are set against others devoted to pornography, an incommensurable pairing Richter once considered as the possible basis for an exhibition of paintings but abandoned when he found the concentration-camp photographs ‘unpaintable’...The editorial mind at work in forming these ensembles seems as determined to disrupt patterns as to create them, as eager to draw attention to certain pictorial equivalencies or disjunctions as to nestle the most personal or shocking items or clusters of items in settings that obscure their meaning to the artist and stymie interpretation based on conventional attitudes regarding intrinsic significance. At once a vast index of primary material and a device for reviewing and rethinking the

many possible relations of one image to another as icons in their own right, as image-types, or as entries in his intellectual and artistic autobiography, *Atlas* is a mechanism for simultaneously organizing and disorganizing information, a way of showing the artist's hand and of camouflaging his intimate connections to the contents on display".²⁷⁷

Atlas (Panel 470) is just one of many panels concerning the RAF — its members, their funerals, and sites of significance to the RAF 'story'. *Panel 470* consists of eight black and white photographs that Richter reproduced with an exceptionally blurry quality. A few of these served as source images for paintings in his cycle *October 18, 1977*, including the *Confrontation* series of paintings of Gudrun Ennslin.²⁷⁸

While Richter's practice of collection, as realized in *Atlas*, could be understood as a form of research that *supports*²⁷⁹ his painting, it may be illustrative to consider seriously the practice of collection as a form of action in its own right, rather than as a means to an end for which a definitive value can be attached. The collection of found objects — whether systematic or chaotic, whether avowed (for example, the stamp or antique collection attributed to taste, discretion, and enjoying a conflation of use and exchange value) or unacknowledged (for example, the seemingly haphazard collection of discreet objects void of any determinable use or exchange value that is readily attributed to 'packrat' habits) — is a widespread, and often solitary, pursuit. Incidentally, the solitary character of collecting may even be asserted in connection with public or official practices of collection, as illustrated by the ever-expanding collections

of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Federal Criminal Investigation Office in the BRD during the height of RAF activity, which was originally charged with border security but turned toward policing the interior in the context of terrorist threat. Central to its procedure of policing were practices of seemingly boundless collection. So much was collected to be almost meaningless, as though the practice of collecting was an end in itself, since the BKA kept files on thousands of people in their database entitled “Persons, Institutions, Objects, and Items”, which even documented the acquaintances of people under surveillance. The BKA also kept an extensive writing sample database in the “Central Handwriting File”. Stefan Aust accounts how the BKA’s chief commissioner Horst Herold felt that the public identified better with members of the RAF than they did with him. Herold himself had more than a strong level of identification – one might even suggest obsession – with RAF members, particularly with Baader. Herold once asserted: “Baader was the only man who ever really understood me, and I am the only man who ever really understood him”.²⁸⁰ In either case, the reason why a particular object must be kept and another can be abandoned without a second thought is often not something that can be articulated by the collector, and the dear item that must be treasured at one point in time can be hastily hurled into the trash bin at another, as though it were an alien object.

Against Storr’s assertion quoted above that Richter “nestle[s] the most personal or shocking items or clusters of items in settings that obscure their meaning to the artist and stymie interpretation based on conventional attitudes regarding intrinsic significance”, is it not conceivable that, rather than trying to

conceal the meanings that these images hold for him, Richter does not have a fully authored program of relevance in mind with regard to these images, and that his assemblage of the panels may be more intuitive than ordered? That many of the images are of semi-iconic proportion and that they are set among personal snapshots (particularly, if *Atlas* is taken as a whole, rather than as completely isolated and bordered panels), suggests the reciprocal vulnerability of images and subjectivity, tied by intrinsically fallible remembrance. One does not know why one is compelled towards an object, person, or thing, but such a compulsion pauses on the threshold of the solitary realm, on the one hand, and that of the mass transfer of common images, on the other. In this way, the collector's compulsion does not belong to the collector alone but is found, borrowed, and stolen. Not only that, the collector's compulsion is not a choice but an order, a demand, that is issued from elsewhere:

“The body *which will be loved* is in advance selected and manipulated by the lens, subjected to a kind of zoom effect which magnifies it, brings it closer, and leads the subject to press his nose to the glass: is it not the *scintillating* object which a skillful hand causes to shimmer before me and which will hypnotize me, capture me? This ‘affective contagion,’ this induction, proceeds from others, from the language, from books, from friends: no love is original”.²⁸¹

Dürer, ich führe persönlich Baader+Meinhof durch die Dokumenta V

Produced for Documenta 5 in 1972, Joseph Beuys's sculpture *Dürer, ich führe persönlich Baader+Meinhof durch die Dokumenta V* (*Dürer, I will personally guide Baader + Meinhof through Documenta 5*) is constructed out of two wood-fiber boards painted yellow with its title and Beuys' signature scripted in black paint. The two boards are each supported by a wood plank, each of which is set into a felt slipper filled with rose stems and fat (one of Beuys' staple materials). The sculpture emulates a walking figure but in a state of tentative stasis, waiting for its charges to be taken on a tour of re-socialization into West German society. It presumably stands in as an alibi for Beuys himself, who spent 100 days at Documenta 5 debating participants as part of his dialogue for Direct Democracy.

In the spring of 1972, Baader, Meinhof, and several other core members of the RAF were still underground when Beuys issued this call. The sculpture represents a double-address to the extent that it not only called upon the RAF to reconsider their tactics and aims but it was also "an appeal to their followers and supporters to return to the fold rather than pursue revolution outside of the broad counterculture front in which Beuys saw himself as one of the father figures".²⁸² It was also an attempt to suture the divide within the political left of the BRD.

I want to consider the way in which Beuys' sculpture and its implicit restorative gesture can be understood as stemming from not only the wound that its author perceives to be located in an external site (for example, within the other or within the loved one, *who does not speak*²⁸³) but the wound within the author that can be expressed only through an explicit externalization of it, in a spirit of at

least a partial disavowal of one's own implication in it. To some extent, Beuys' sculpture, particularly in its promise of re-socialization, echoes a parental plea and the adoption of the loved object as a personal project, offering to do for the other that which one cannot do for oneself. This "project" conflates the self, the other, and the big Other of authority in a multiple address inflected with affection, urgency, and the infantilization of the explicit, but not ultimate, addressee.

In November 1971, only months after the announcement of the RAF's formation, Renate Riemack, Ulrike Meinhof's foster mother,²⁸⁴ published an open letter to Meinhof in *konkret*, the publication for which Meinhof had previously worked as a journalist and for some time as co-editor. Riemack urged Meinhof to give up her continued illegal activities and underground life as a member of the RAF. Riemack's explicit concerns predict with much foresight what would occur up to and throughout the Stammheim trial. She wrote:

"This country offers, at most, suitable conditions for a gangster drama. Ulrike, you know that you and your friends can expect nothing but bitter enmity from the German public. You also know that you are condemned to play the part of a company of spectres serving the forces of reaction as an excuse for a massive revival of that anti-Communist witchhunt which was perceptibly discouraged by the student movement.

Who — apart from a handful of sympathizers — still understands the political and moral impulse behind your actions? A spirit of sacrifice and the readiness to face death become ends in themselves if one cannot make them understood".²⁸⁵

Riemack's letter is implicitly addressed as much or more to the public and to the West German state authorities as it is explicitly to Meinhof. The letter opens with the line: "You are not like that, Ulrike", and goes on to construct an image of Meinhof that is in excess of the representation reiterated in the press and media frenzy that followed her involvement in the successful guerrilla action that broke Andreas Baader out of prison in 1970. The letter describes Meinhof's attributes on a personal level and on a public level, as a long-time committed and experienced anti-violence activist; Meinhof was involved since the 1950s with the anti-atom bomb movement. Meinhof also reportedly had a long-standing aversion to guns and to violence generally.²⁸⁶ In its double-voiced address, Riemack's letter condemns in advance the state structures that would, true to her estimation, use the RAF to implement a body of law²⁸⁷ to crush dissent in the BRD and to tame, through fear and suspicion, the unrest of a generation grappling with the legacy of its nation's history.²⁸⁸

Found in a trash bin at Wittenbergplatz in Berlin some weeks after Riemack's letter was published, were several documents and some ammunition in a bag. Among these things was a response to the letter. The response is believed to have been written by Meinhof, but the authorship is not confirmed. It reads:

"A Slave Mother Entreats Her Child

Ulrike, you are not like your picture on the Wanted poster, but a slave child — you are a slave woman yourself. So how would you be capable of firing upon your oppressors? Don't let those who refuse to be

slaves any more lead you astray. You cannot protect them. I want you to remain a slave — like me....

Revolution is great — we are too small for it.

Slave souls are quicksands upon which no victory can be built...

You are a good child. It wasn't you who climbed over the masters' fence, it was the others. But they set the dogs on you.

Oh, child, you deserved better. To think of what you might have been! I'm sure you would have risen to be an overseer.

Don't you see how strong our masters are? All the slaves obey them. Even those who did protest, and won a victory, will lay that victory at their masters' feet, so that they may go on being slaves....

Do not transgress, my child. Do penance, even if our masters impose dreadful punishment on you. It is God's will.

Be subject to the authorities who have power over you.

Give up, Ulrike!"²⁸⁹

More than a response to Riemack's letter, "A Slave Mother Entreats Her Child" represents a re-writing – a reiteration — of it. Employing still the narrative *I* in Riemack's voice, the force of Riemack's letter is refunctioned to reveal that the fear that she expresses is not only outwardly directed towards her child but one that is deeply entrenched within her own subjectivity. Despite the cold tone of this response and those that Meinhof and/or other members of the RAF extended to similar pleas or gestures made by author Heinrich Böll, philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, and professor and pastor (and Meinhof's friend) Helmut Gollwitzer, it

calls its interlocutor's most personal motivations into question by holding up a metaphorical mirror to the plea. Such responses, even if they appear to be — or are even issued in an intentioned attempt at — dismissal and cruelty, offer a full acknowledgement of what the initial plea expresses, which is a performance of a kind of (temporary) truth²⁹⁰ about oneself perhaps more so than about the other.

The Raspberry Reich

Bruce LaBruce's erotic/avant-garde homosexual art porn film *The Raspberry Reich* could be said to offer a version of the Prada Meinhof critique, both formally and conceptually. Formally, *The Raspberry Reich* is characterized by a slick aesthetic and, at times, fast-paced montage edits. Perhaps the visual equivalent to sound bites would be LaBruce's image bites, which are not just constituted by the frequent intrusions of the sloganistic title frames that saturate the film but the use of revolutionary imagery, logos, and icons that are easily recognizable, if only because of their currency within contemporary popular and consumer culture.

The film takes as its protagonist a young woman, Gudrun (who models herself after Gudrun Ennslein of the RAF), the radical leader of a band of, as LaBruce himself puts it, “ostensibly heterosexual” men. Gudrun is the ideologue of the group; she wears t-shirts with phrases such as “The Revolution is my Boyfriend”. Gudrun's sloganistic discourse rules the group's activities and motivates its members for radical and revolutionary action. Even when she insists that heterosexual monogamy is nothing but a bourgeois construct — but one that must be abolished in order for the realization of revolutionary subjectivity and, hence, the revolutionary transformation of societal structures — she is able to

convince the members of her shadow RAF cell to have sex with each other for their cause. Of this, LaBruce wittily notes that it “just happens to be the perfect set-up for a gay porn movie”.²⁹¹

In some respects, all of the elements of the Prada Meinhof critique are present in *The Raspberry Reich*, particularly in a performative gesture, to the extent that it is difficult not to laugh at Gudrun’s hyper-militant approach to everything that she does, even if she is excessively glamorous while doing it. With this, the film echoes or points to the aesthetics of radical chic that has permeated consumer culture and that is the target of such critiques — critiques that are indeed leveled at cultural products such as *The Raspberry Reich* and some of the venues that host the film, such as the *Regarding Terror* exhibition. But most of what Gudrun does is *speak* or, more accurately, what she mostly does is *cite* the words of others, casting these words into the form of orders directed at the other members of the group. In this way, the film indexes the perhaps predominant sense that, in the contemporary particularly post- 9/11 political climate, concrete action just might be impossible to realize and that all we have at our disposal are slogans and that the only possible action might be a somewhat empty appropriation and redeployment of radical signifiers.

Despite the ambiguities of interpretation with regard to the revolutionary aims of the film’s characters, and what some aspects of the film might imply about broader social practices amongst either the political left or the rise of commodified radical chic — two realms that theoretically stand in sharp opposition — LaBruce’s film itself deploys a kind of guerrilla action:

“[M]y movie is about a group of very inept, would-be terrorists who emulate the Baader-Meinhof in a kind of comical way. I was referencing movies like Fassbinder's *The Third Generation*, Godard's *La Chinoise*, and Dusav Makavejev's *WR: Mysteries of the Organism* - agit-prop films that playfully illustrate revolutionary principles with narrative skits, direct camera address, or even documentary elements. My movie isn't exactly supposed to be taken seriously as an investigation of the fundamental principles of terrorist abduction, but in a strange way, any time you make a movie, especially a low budget one, you become a bunch of urban guerillas. We worked completely without permits, shot in ad hoc locations without permission, shot people surreptitiously on the street without them knowing it, etc. We got kicked out of our location in a great old East Berlin apartment building on Karl Marx Allee because the neighbours started to complain when they saw guys in ski masks holding guns running in and out of their building. So in a way it did approximate that kind of feeling of trying to evade the authorities and operate under the radar. Also when you make a movie you inevitably adopt this conviction that you will get it done by any means necessary, whatever it takes, that the ends justify the means completely. Shooting a porno always feels like a guerilla activity, like you're contravening some law, morally if not legally”.²⁹²

More than the practical elements of shooting in locations without permissions and circumventing social norms and mores that LaBruce outlines, his film, which he refers to as a “genre exercise”, mobilizes a form of guerrilla operation that is

aimed directly at subjectivity. While the film is overwhelmingly comical at times, LaBruce does acknowledge that the work intentionally constitutes a serious critique not only at the level of norms generally but a critique that particularly targets radical movements that hold to rigid notions of sexual and gender identification, refusing to recognize that the sexual is political — for him, such groups include the radical left, the punk movement, and gay communities. Sexual and gender identification are inextricably tied to subjectivity, and LaBruce’s project can be understood as concerned with the acknowledgment of, and the potential to destabilize, the role of prohibition at the heart of subjectivity. Nevertheless, here, as with the other works addressed above as Barthesian figures, taking the RAF as subject matter is not in itself politically transgressive, nor does it imply an intent to carry out acts of (abstract) radicalism.

“Show me whom to desire”²⁹³

*..we can’t simply discard and forget a story like that; we must try to find a different way of dealing with it.*²⁹⁴

If the fire storm of reaction to the public funding of KW Institute for Contemporary Art’s research and preparation for *Regarding Terror* can be said to imply, even in the most subtle fashion, an accusation of love, there are certainly many instances that could readily confirm its guilt in this regard. Everywhere, the show expresses compulsion, obsession, affection, attachment, and ambiguities of all kinds. It does so at the levels of: the individual production of participating artists; the curatorial research, work, and overriding programming principles; and

the consumption of the exhibition by visitors and critics. To the extent that *Regarding Terror* can be seen as an archive not just of the RAF and its representation but of necessary compulsions, it is worth taking seriously curator Felix Ennslin's response to critics who object to the taking up of the RAF as subject matter (or as "play material"), when he, following Gerhard Richter, insists that it has something to do with the "fight against the loss of significance" and he compares projects of engagement with this subject to the process of falling in love.

That process of falling in love — intertwined as it is with matters of self-representation and identification (although not necessarily with the loved object) — is arguably a most (un)welcomed activity. It is certainly not a pursuit with which one would consciously choose to occupy oneself in all sincerity. It is the stupidity that, when all is said and done, offers a diagram, or schema, for movement into a new sort of consciousness, which is temporary. This movement, pre-mapped ahead of us, does not belong to us and nor does the object that seemingly motivates it. Barthes' schema implicates more than the loved one but the whole of the situation and of life. The process of falling in love is a temporary and, despite all appearances, a completely solitary refuge — much like Proust's description of the toilet in Combray, about which he writes:

“Intended for a more particular and more vulgar purpose, this room...long served as a refuge for me, doubtless because it was the only one where I was allowed to lock the door, a refuge for all of my occupations which

required an invincible solitude: reading, daydreaming, tears, and pleasure”.²⁹⁵

The use of the RAF as a loved object, as a site upon which to choreograph the outbursts of a subject struggling within the limits of language and the prohibitions inherent in identification, operates not as an act of transgression. Instead, attachments that develop into “projects” or Barthesian figures (meaning that they take recognizable forms, as do episodes of the lover’s discourse) constitute a working through of identification that is as much about the prohibition associated with taking up controversial subject matter with which the authoring subject stands in an ambiguous relationship as it is about responding to the authority of dominant regimes of cultural representation. The RAF imagery is iconic, and its reiterations, both preceding and following the completion of the figure, answer to the call that demands *show me whom to desire* by inviting the occupation of a subject position oriented towards desire and identification.

act vi: the answer to everything was soaked in formaldehyde...



Illustration 3 the answer to everything. Collage.

Several years after Ulrike Meinhof's death by hanging in her Stammheim prison cell in May 1976, it was discovered that her brain had been removed from her corpse by order of the state for the purposes of study into the mind of a terrorist. Subsequently, it was revealed that the brains of Gudrun Ennslin, Andreas Baader, and Jan-Carl Raspe had also been stolen from their corpses. Meinhof's daughters successfully petitioned the courts for the return of the brain for burial, the other three brains have reportedly gone missing.

The above image is assembled in part out of an old news article cutting that I found at the Deutsches Zentralinstitute für soziale Fragen in Berlin, which features a reproduction of a x-ray of Ulrike Meinhof's brain. It indicates the site of a once suspected tumour for which Meinhof underwent surgery in 1962, before she took up urban guerrilla fighter activism. It also indexes the site of a metal clamp that had been implanted to suspend the bleeding of a hemorrhage, which had caused blurred vision and severe headaches. The x-ray is significant to the extent that it was a contested sign of the *true* origin, and thus the explanation, of Meinhof's seemingly abrupt turn to the life of an urban guerrilla fighter or terrorist. The state's secret collection of urban guerrilla brains housed in West German universities and quietly traded between scientists engaged in neurological study suggests the desire to reduce what became a twenty-eight year phenomenon to the discovery of particular and detectable features in the human brain. In *The Times* article that announced the story of the discovery of Meinhof's missing brain, Roger Boyles describes it as "soaked in formaldehyde, wrapped in plastic and then placed in a cardboard box, where it stayed forgotten for more than 20 years", until Meinhof's daughter had to track it down herself. This description is used to frame the image conceptually. It remains questionable whether the brain was in fact forgotten, but its seizure by the state as a possible vessel for the answer to the terrorist problem is an uncomfortable reminder of the medical

research conducted under the Third Reich. The final dimension to this assembled image is an approximation of Jacques Lacan's figure of the master's discourse, which here is meant to trouble the relative positioning of the state and the guerrilla fighter and to suggest the necessity of mutual, fantastical identification.

6. As autumn turns to winter – the spectre of monument

Someday you be walking down the road and you hear something or see something going on. So clear. And you think it's you thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. It's when you bump into a rememory that belongs to somebody else. Where I was before I came here, that place is real. It's never going away. Even if the whole farm – every tree and grass blade of it dies. The picture is still there and what's more, if you go there – you who never was there – if you go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen again; it will be there for you, waiting for you.²⁹⁶



Figure 15 *Yield, The German Autumn in Minor Spaces 2007*

Here we have reached the space reserved for conclusions, but I am in no position to give the last word on the topic in the space that follows. My point of departure for this body of work was the limits of speech, informed by the assumption that the production of self in speech is partial, hesitant, and always frustrated, and yet speech is the privileged mode in which subjects are compelled to convey something of themselves, or to tell their stories. Given these concerns, my work

has invited consideration of the aesthetics of the body as a communicating and acting materiality, which necessarily implicates the place in which the body is situated and the inextricable conjunctions between kinesthetics, chronotope, and the authorship of memory. My intent is not to advocate a substitution by which corporeal choreographies of subjectivity are privileged over speech as liberating or more authentic modes but to argue for attention to them as equally worthy yet neglected forms of communication.

This work has been concerned with, on the one hand, the possibilities of corporeal forms of communication to the extent that the body consistently circumvents the limits of the genres that govern speech communication and, on the other hand, the forms that this circumvention can take and their potential for the performance and production of subjectivities. Consistent with the spirit of those concerns, the production of the work itself has performed parallel circumventions into the process of academic research. This mirroring between form and this particular content is not out of place, since academic research is communicated in a site-specific mode of storytelling, albeit guided if not obscured by the specificities and limitations that govern its hegemonic genre.

Of particular relevance to the research that I set out to do were the limitations posed by the voice of the archive. While archives were crucial to the completion of this work, they frequently refused to deliver the materializations that I had previously hoped and imagined they would contain. To clarify, this is not to say that the objects for which I was looking did not exist and that they instead had to be conjured up. Rather, the official archives did not provide direct

access to these objects, even if they were somewhat haunted by them.²⁹⁷ Disproportionately represented amongst the materials were texts over images and explanations over descriptions. Granted the authority to decide by virtue of presence what constitutes an historical source, the archive issues both invitations and refusals.

The core members of the Red Army Faction produced: images, film, photography, and visual art; movement through their use of space in the city, the courtroom, and in their prison cells; and idiosyncratic language events, as illustrated in their journals, courtroom speeches, and silences. Many of these things were absent from archival records, and those that were not absent were barely represented. It is not just that the archive may be understood as the alibi for official voices on the topic — voices perhaps motivated to select carefully what ought to be conveyed and what ought not to be conveyed, although that is likely somewhat the case. Rather, more significantly, the archive also privileges, and therefore excludes, certain forms of expression. Namely, it often excludes the extra-textual or the *mise en scène* of the circumstances it aims to preserve through collection and documentation. It appears as though the archive's voice is too often committed to a sort of transcribed speech and, therefore, tends to reaffirm the limitations into which I was seeking signs of intervention.

Increasingly, I considered the idea that the city itself must have a capacity to archive something of what I was seeking. The suggestion that the built environments of the cities where RAF operations were carried out could perhaps maintain some (im)perceptible traces of the urban guerrilla phenomenon is

consistent with considerations within this work of the relationship between the acting body and the space that it inhabits. It is tempting for me to say that the key here is memory, which I consider to be an inextricable part of the intersensorial experience of subjectivity at stake in this work but to make such a claim would not be quite correct in this instance. Those who can make claim to place-specific memory in relation to some of these phenomena are not the only ones for whom the attachments matter.

Necessary at this point is the qualification that memory is a production, often elicited by means of interpellation, rather than something static and dependable to which we may and do return on a voluntary basis:

“Subject to neither command nor possession, [remembrances] make a mockery of the hope that they might be ‘managed’. We do not remember, and make the convenient mistake of thinking that we have forgotten. But the unremembered are always waiting to come home again, and there is good reason to crave and fear their homecoming”.²⁹⁸

Memories such as these homecomings are experienced corporeally and involuntarily. While we are condemned to the necessary and intrinsic ambivalence of reference in the usage of the word “memory”, on the one hand, the employment of a distinction between slippery memory and reconstruction²⁹⁹ may be helpful. On the other hand, it is worthwhile to recognize the kind of reconstruction (or what I have been calling collective instruction, following Susan Sontag) that is fully social in character. For I have been dealing with things that are not my memories but to an extent I have intoned them, *spoke* them, as

figures³⁰⁰ as though they could be my own; this, despite the geographical, experiential, and temporal disconnect with (aspects of) my subject matter. But, I am not making assumptions of ahistorical universality. It is not just that the contemporary conditions of production, circulation, and consumption of images, traces, and voices pose a sensorially charged mingling of imprints but that, as Avery Gordon has stressed, there is an inherent sociality to these reconstructions; although in her words these are called “the picture of the place” or “rememory”:

“The picture of the place is not personal memory as we conventionally understand it, private, interior, mine to hoard or share, remember or forget. The picture of the place *is* its very sociality, all the doings, happenings, and knowing that make the social world alive in and around us as we make it ours. It is *still out there* because social relations as such are not ours for the owning....The possibility of a collectively animated worldly memory is articulated here in that extraordinary moment in which you — *who never was there* in that real place — can *bump into a rememory that belongs to somebody else*”.³⁰¹

Approaching the city itself as a potential archive, then, facilitated in many different respects the collection of materials for this work. In connection with the force of the above discussion, one of the ways in which I used the city as an archive was to map out the places of significance to events I was studying in my archival research. This mapping was a wish-list dimension of this work and it motivated a collaborative photography project *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* with visual artist Allen Ball. In its initial form, it was exhibited in a group

show entitled “Small” held at the Art Gallery of Alberta (January 19 – March 24, 2008) and then in expanded form as solo show at Harcourt House Gallery for the Arts in Edmonton (February 19 – March 21, 2009). *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* maps out visible and invisible traces that remain on the surfaces of the urban landscape from the events leading up to the so-called German Autumn of 1977. The vehicle for presentation for the initial iteration of this project is a single digital LCD picture frame. The 18 photographs that constitute *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* cycle sequentially, one image dissolving into another in a repetitious documentation of the sites of shoot-outs, breakouts, and hide-outs — events that occurred in minor spaces within the otherwise vastness of the industrialized and highly policed city in the context of coordinated counter-terrorist measures. As a formal element, the digital picture frame serves to reflect, through a small medium, events that still reverberate in their significance to the weight of post-war German history, and the cool manufacture of the star that encases the picture frame stands in sharp contradiction with both the snapshot quality of the images and the RAF’s infamous logo of a red star with a Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine gun in the centre. The picture frame itself suggests the mundane and the domestic, acknowledging that the inconspicuous actions of the urban guerrilla occur alongside and within the familiar of the everyday. The expanded version of the show includes the eighteen photographs on aluminum panel and, with measurements of 48”x32”, they express the scale of advertising that was consistent with representations of the RAF in glossy magazines throughout the groups’ tenure.



Figure 16 *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* installation at the Harcourt House Arts Centre 2009

The photographs for this project were taken in three German cities, Berlin, Kassel, and Stuttgart in June 2007. The aim was to photograph mostly unmarked and seemingly negligible sites relevant to the history of the urban guerrilla movement in West Germany from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s. The project addresses the suppressed significance of public spaces that otherwise make up the passages of everyday life in the city today, as sites of shopping, entertainment, residential living, and routine civic engagement.



Figure 17 *Shoot-out, The German Autumn in Minor Spaces 2007*

Writing at the end of the 1960s, Richard Sennett³⁰² set out to make sense of the search for community that youths embarked upon in the post-war years in the United States. Sennett was interested in the revolutionary movements that arose in industrial, urban spaces of affluence. He argued that, despite freedom from the struggle against scarcity that marked the post-war era in industrialized cities, young revolutionaries were responding to the problem of needing to make a social life and to found a sense of community. Additionally, Sennett argued that, while the abundance of the West had offered a release from toiling against deprivation, Western cities had likewise invited new forms of social tyranny: notably a self-imposed slavery in the service of security. Sennett's project aimed to combat what he called an anti-urban bias against cities that had proliferated

amongst revolutionary movements. In response to this anti-urban sentiment, Sennett extolled the virtues of disorder and chaos, emphasizing how social groups could *use* the large-scale systems and bureaucracies that are characteristic of the urban environment.

Sennett's contention is that the vastness and the loneliness of the city have "positive human value" because this loneliness demands contact even in the face of the risk of potentially painful social situations. He argues that attempts to avoid differences and conflict are inherent to affluent societies and are intertwined with the pursuit of purified selves that are self-limiting and contained, and this is reproduced on a larger scale, for instance, in city planning in which projections of cohesion and solidarity precode experience, so that *acts of will* come to substitute for *acts of experience*. In the 1960s generation of revolutionary activists, Sennett saw an emerging refusal of this tendency. In this way, he codified the disorder that the activists authored as a positive reaction against the impulse toward security.

Contrary to the suspicion towards the city that Sennett observed in revolutionary movements in the United States during the late 1960s, in the case of the urban guerrilla movements in West Germany, the industrialized urban environment was considered a most vital and productive site from which to wage a form of warfare against not only the West German state but the practices and logic of imperialist expansion on a global scale. West German urban guerrilla fighter cells were motivated to work in conjunction with so-called "Third World" guerrilla struggles but they saw themselves as positioned to carry out a strategic

attack from within the urban centres at the heart of capitalist expansion. West Germany at this time was home to a number of NATO and American army bases. For these underground cells, the significance and urgency of inhabiting a nation from which troops, weapons, and capital were deployed in armed struggles across the world, including that of the Vietnam war, represented a demand to act by bringing the guerrilla struggle into industrialized urban centres of capitalist expansion, bombing department stores, embassies, army bases, and publishing houses, while hiding out in illegal residences and holding political hostages in the jungle of high density urban housing complexes.³⁰³

An underlying assumption of this project is that consciousness is established in the reiterative meetings of body and built environment,³⁰⁴ acknowledging that one's experience of a space is shaped not only by personal biography but by cultural instruction, reconstruction, or *the picture of the place*, as Avery Gordon would have it, that takes shape through the production and circulation of representations manifest in, for instance, the repetition of images in media or narratives such as those found in historiography or popular literatures. These recurrent meetings between the body and the built environment constitute the pre-requisites to knowing a place³⁰⁵ and the basis for the potential for one site to have multiple social existences. Further, as I have emphasized, urban spaces were necessary to the production of the urban guerrilla subjectivity of the core members of the RAF and, subsequently, the high-security prison environment became key to the production of a different, more entangled, corporeal subjectivity for those who were in state custody in the 1970s.³⁰⁶

A photographic cartography of the urban guerrilla phenomenon in the former West Germany offers documentation of the mobility, action, and posture of the urban guerrilla fighter — *even in its physical absence* — offering a corporeal-based counter-point to the anticipated but uncertain release of official yet secret state documents that have been sealed for thirty years relating to controversial security measures and procedural changes in law taken in response to the left-wing guerrilla activism of the RAF and other underground cells, such as the 2nd of June Movement and the Socialist Patients' Collective.

Minor Spaces

With the concept of minor spaces, *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* refunctions what Deleuze and Guattari capture in their notion of minor language — a language of escape that “*stops being representative in order to...move towards its extremities or its limits*”.³⁰⁷ A minor language is a language of non-grammar or of a different grammar — one of silences, interruptions, repetitions, and strange inflections that deterritorialize words from sense. In their attempts to elucidate their concept of minor language, Deleuze and Guattari draw upon spatial and architectural examples. Since the photography project is concerned with the uses of spaces rather than language, it foregrounds their illustrative spatial elaborations of the rhizome or burrow as a space endowed with trick passageways. The use of minor spaces to frame this project articulates the political and historical reverberations contained within the condensed spaces within which particular events unfolded to become part of a larger story reiterated in both official and unofficial forms and demonstrates that the documented sites exceed their

routinized public functions and significance, but it stresses that this excess cannot be inscribed upon the politically uneven topology of public spaces, even 30+ years later.

The German Autumn in Minor Spaces takes as a point of departure the limits to the potential of public space as a site for memorialization through art, which works towards the achievement of preferred meanings or interpretations of the events or people represented. Acknowledging the relations of power that govern the hierarchy of meanings intrinsic to such projects, which are achieved through negotiation and the consensus of a few, it proposes the humble category of minor spaces as a counterpoint to the problems associated with projects of monumentalization – problems that beset their negotiation and their reception within a given set of power relations.

The City as Document

This project takes the city itself as a type of document that is more conducive to the study of the urban guerrilla phenomenon than is the traditional archive, and cuts across locations of former illegal residences, guerrilla actions, and confrontations with the police. Its spaces, in this case often empty of any concrete traces, still reverberate with the echoes of events, both as they were represented and as they were experienced physically and repeatedly by participants and spectators. Amidst its clamouring silences, the street continues to be a site of battle over the interpretation of events, and a place in which people struggle to project something from the past into the future. More than this, the fall-out of such events has implications for the present so that it is possible to speak of

contemporary participants in the context of the endless perennial construction of key moments in the urban guerrilla phenomenon, not through a form of collective memory but through the continued production and circulation of images and stories that provide the constituent elements of self-making and identification for contemporary human subjects, particularly for contemporary left-wing activists in the major cities of today's reunified Germany. This is the reconstruction of things for which there are inextricable attachments.

The spectre of the RAF, simultaneously glamourized and derided, still haunts the city streets because of its appropriation into present struggles that interpretively resonate with contemporary issues contextualized within a presumption that history takes a particular, linear, course. The contention here is that the appearance of such linearity is a byproduct of collective instruction³⁰⁸ — the way in which contemporary struggles can be framed so that their resonance with past events seems obvious and necessary contributes to the adoption of a range of potential social actions, prefiguring a program of reference to communicate, and to shape preferred meanings for, actions that exist on the threshold of legality/illegality. This threshold applies, however, to both the activists and the state, since the state, while dealing with the crisis posed by active guerrilla cells, passed a number of pieces of legislation during the 1970s that bypassed or negated key principles entrenched in the constitution. In other words, appealing to the past of the urban guerrilla fighter cells in West Germany provides the instruments for revolutionaries and law-makers to carry-out particular actions today.

The wildly uneven power relationship between activist groups and the state is significant though and has been made strikingly evident in events in Germany as recent as 2007. An underground cell called the Militante Gruppe (MG) has emerged but their organized actions occur on a much smaller scale than did those of the RAF. In comparison with the bombings, bank robberies, and hijackings of the RAF, the MG's activities pale somewhat, since their activities are confined to the burning of military and federal vehicles and arson attacks on urban renewal projects, and yet the German state has mobilized the full range of their extended powers that it justified during the height of its counter-terrorist efforts in the 1970s: to raid apartments; to use exhaustive and covert surveillance methods; and to detain prisoners in excessive conditions (such as solitary confinement with extended bans on visits) without releasing the full evidence against them to their legal counsel. Here, even the state, newly constituted after the *turning point* initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall, compulsively returns to its ritual practices of collection in relation to the RAF and the German Autumn of the 70s. The surveillance, arrest, and solitary confinement in summer 2007 of Andrej Holm, a professor of urban sociology, whose research specializes in the gentrification of the former East Berlin, and the arrest and detainment of another academic was justified by the Federal Prosecutor's office by the allegation that the academics were not only associated with the MG but that they may in fact be the authors of MG communiqués.³⁰⁹

The Federal Prosecutor's office bases its allegation of authorship on a number of assertions, including the academics' access to research institutes and

libraries that would help to facilitate the production of writing that is contained in the MG communiqués, which are concerned with issues of gentrification especially pertaining to the urban spaces of the former East. Further, the Federal Prosecutor's office has carried out a systematic analysis of the academics' research publications and their inherent grammatical or stylistic patterns, including the use of particular words, phrases, and other markers embodied in written texts, such as the presence or absence of periods between letters in acronyms. The Prosecutor's office cites the overlapping of words and phrases between the scholarly works and the MG communiqués as evidence of involvement. What is more, Holm is accused in part because of meetings that he allegedly held with others suspected of association with the MG. These meetings, according to the Federal Prosecutor's office, were covert in nature because Holm had left his mobile telephone at home. In this, the state demonstrates its compulsion not only to collect material things such as handwriting samples, objects, information on persons and institutions³¹⁰ but to collect absences such as punctuation and mobile telephones or substitutions — the presence of this word rather than that word.³¹¹

Despite the incriminating link that the Federal Prosecutor's office establishes between concerns about the uses of urban space and the incitement to terror, the city has long been and continues to be a site of important struggle for material existence and meaning-making. In the late autumn of 2002, frequent riots occurred over several weeks in the city centre of Hamburg, due to conflicts over housing issues. The interior minister, a former judge who is known for his severe

law and order approach, had issued an eviction notice for a squat that had housed artists, students, circus performers, and workers, who had taken up residence in circus wagons and construction vehicles in the development of an alternative form of society there for approximately a decade. Commune experimentation has a long history in the major cities of Germany, with the infamous Kommune 1 and Kommune 2 of the 1960s and 70s having had direct and sustained involvement in anarchist actions and the urban guerrilla fighting of the RAF and other underground cells during the period. The inhabitants of the squat in Hamburg acknowledged this historical connection to their living practices by calling their alternative community Bambule, a word that means riot, but selected to reference Ulrike Meinhof's made for television film of the same title, which was never shown because the state feared that it might contain covert incitements to anarchist terrorism. While the inhabitants of the squat Bambule had been cleared out, they regularly took to the streets in protest of their eviction. The protests, which at times erupted into the breaking of windows, smashing of vehicles, and street fighting, were brought to the city centre during the peak hours of Saturday Christmas shopping. Confrontations with the police were particularly volatile and on one occasion the police even brutally attacked *each other*, when uniformed police began a fight with plain-clothed police from another region.³¹²

Even in the absence of markers in particular locations of significance, contestations over the meanings of urban spaces are carried out in re-unified Germany. This struggle in its most obvious form occurred around the renaming of streets in the former East Berlin but since then has surprisingly occurred in

connection with the history of urban guerrilla actions of the 1960s and 70s, a phenomenon that, for many, is considered to be merely a product particular to the existence of the BRD as an ephemeral nation-state.



Figure 18 *Kochstraße, The German Autumn in Minor Spaces 2007*

One example of this is the attempt to rename Kochstraße, a Berlin street that intersects with Friedrichstraße in the city centre. A major event in the militarization of the student and worker movements in West Germany was the assassination attempt on the life of prominent student activist Rudi Dutschke. In April 1968, a house painter from Munich named Josef Bachmann traveled by train to Berlin carrying with him a cut out from a newspaper published by the right-wing Springer Publishing. The article's headline read: "Stop Dutschke now!". The content of the article published approximately two weeks earlier

suggested that the activities of the radical left student movement would lead to civil war and encourage the imminent arrival in West Germany of revolutionary trouble-makers from abroad.



Figure 19 *“Stop Dutschke Now!”*, *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* 2007

Bachmann walked from the zoo station to Dutschke's home at 140 Kurfürstendamm and waited for Dutschke to emerge from his apartment. When confronted with the man that Bachmann recognized from press photographs, he shot Dutschke three times, hitting him in the right cheek, the shoulder, and the head.³¹³ While Dutschke survived his injuries in the short term, he died some years later from enduring complications. On the same day of the shooting, barbed wire fences were installed around the perimeter of the Springer offices located on the east side of Kochstraße. News of the shooting and Springer's defensive response spread across the city and prompted a barricade and a partially coordinated, partially spontaneous attack on the Springer building. Protesters were determined to stop the delivery trucks from leaving the site with the newspapers for delivery that day. Demonstrators blocked the exits with a line of vehicles, threw rocks, and damaged property.



Figure 20 Springer Publishing buildings on Kochstraße in Berlin 2007

This event, known as the Easter Attacks, provides the historical basis for recent efforts over several years to rename the street after Dutschke, which were divisive but eventually successful. The struggle for the realization of the name-change speaks to the impulse to grasp and fix meaning to past events and to the spaces – otherwise emptied of their traces – within which these events occurred.

Today, the Springer Publishing complex, which has recently expanded beyond its stronghold on print media into television broadcasting, takes up considerably more space on the streetscape than it did in 1968, when it was represented only by its solitary looming golden tower, situated just west of the Berlin Wall, which is of course now absent – except for a singular line of bricks embedded into the otherwise sutured road, tracing its former contours.

The Spectre of Monument

While *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* is concerned primarily with unmarked sites, it does not call for the monumentalization or memorialization of sites upon which these events of great historical weight in the history of post-war Germany occurred. On the contrary, the underlying approach is critical of what could be called the spectre of monument, or the impulse toward the closure of meaning through the imposition of nodal points for the practices of hegemonic signification of public spaces.

My contention is that, to the extent that memorialization constitutes the materialization of a fierce struggle over meaning, it both obeys and enforces the limits of knowledge and experience. Memorialization attempts and fails to pose an adequate intervention into a nagging sense of loss by endeavoring to exorcise routine spaces of excess traces that cannot be singularized or articulated. It trades the ontological accumulation of imprints, echoes, and trajectories embodied in everyday spaces for both physical and conceptual containment in a form that is subject to hierarchies of meaning to which public space is ultimately accountable.



Figure 21 *The Magic Flute, The German Autumn in Minor Spaces 2007*

Taking the impulse towards the memorialization of past events – a compulsion that is materialized almost everywhere in the city of Berlin in particular – as a constitutive part of the process of self-making or subject formation, leads one to consider Frederic Jameson’s observation that “...at an outer limit, the sense people have of themselves and their own moment of history may ultimately have nothing to do with its reality...”.³¹⁴ In a different spirit, however, one might wonder whether securing a connection to reality actually matters in such a case, or, if reality is what is actually at stake in projects of memorialization.

In the face of such questions, the tensions that I experienced during the visits to Ulrike Meinhof’s grave in Berlin and to the shared grave of Gudrun

Ennslin, Andreas Baader, and Jan-Carl Raspe in Stuttgart in the context of the production of the broader photographic cartography project, resonates with the observations that Michael Taussig has made about his and other people's visits to the grave site of 20th Century critic Walter Benjamin to the extent that such visits and the underlying motivations that they suggest raise questions about the tension between absence and presence, memory, and subjectivity.

Having fled the Nazis but denied entry into Spain in the autumn of 1940, Benjamin committed suicide on the French-Spanish border. Taussig relates that the philosopher Hannah Arendt visited the cemetery only months after Benjamin's death but she could not find his gravestone anywhere. Apparently, however, Benjamin was buried under a reversal of his name; he was buried as a Catholic named "Benjamin Walter", which accounts for Arendt's inability to locate his gravestone. Since records show that the plot was only paid up for a period of five years, Taussig notes that it is believed that Benjamin's body was later interred in a common grave, now part of an undifferentiated mass of human remains. Yet, today, the cemetery is inhabited by both a gravestone and monument to Benjamin. The monument, completed in 1994, is an iron stairwell cut into the rock of a mountain, leading to the sea; the gravestone, however, rests over the absence of Benjamin's body. Taussig's initial reaction to his dissonant realization that the grave is a fake — that the stone in fact does not mark the location of Benjamin's remains — was one of indignation. But, he later remarks in his essay:

“[Y]ou must ask yourself whether such carefully crafted invisibility of the public secret is not the most significant monument imaginable. What real monument of stone or glass, people’s names or lofty literary quotation, can compete with invisibility?”³¹⁵

noting also that: “we find meaning in the world not only from smoothly functioning symbols...but also from an awkwardness of fit between signs and what they refer to”.³¹⁶



Figure 22 Ulrike Meinhof’s grave in Berlin 2007

Following these considerations, Taussig echoes something that decades earlier struck Arendt when she went in her failed search for Benjamin’s grave, by focusing on the landscape of the cemetery rather than its markers and musing about the way in which the landscape invites a different kind of monument. He

writes: “To sit on a ledge by the sea and watch the waves is to invite us, for a moment, at least, to slow down and think....That is a memorial, too, a type of monument, to slow down and think”.³¹⁷

My visits to the gravesites of the core members of the RAF were infused with intense and conflicted feelings about what it meant to be there. I experienced the visit to Meinhof’s grave with a tinge of panic, for we arrived at the gates, with a map only vaguely indicating the location of her stone, only minutes before the cemetery was scheduled to close and with no time left to reschedule visits. The fervent efforts to capture images before a cemetery employee anxious to leave for the day drove us out of there (of course, no such person ever actually materialized), meant that the visit was experienced largely through a camera lens and through the anticipation of its immortalization in photographic images.



Figure 23 Entrance to Ulrike Meinhof's apartment 2007

What needs to be explored, I think, is this sense of loss or nagging sense of inauthenticity that accompanies my memories of the visit. There is an overriding notion that gravesites are to hold an intrinsic connection to their inhabitants as referents but just what is the referent to which a gravestone refers? What actually *rests* there? Why does a gravesite hold the cultural power that it does when the streets, stairwells, and floors that the dead once tread upon day in and day out — or the architectural structures within which the sounds of their voices echoed— are discounted and are easily restored with a veneer of neutrality? Perhaps the gravesite — as, arguably, the most obvious and most reverent formation of the practice of public memorialization — articulates a desire to divide up and to banish such significances from our everyday spaces out of an unspoken fear of being consumed by an ever-present accumulation of multiple and shifting memory that will be there, in place, waiting for you.

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Notes

¹ From a review of Christoph Korn's installation *RAF (1970-1998)* by Christoph Schütte, "Ein Schritt ins Innere des Schmerzes. Rauchen, Wummern, Brummen, Pfeifen: Eine Installation in der U-Bahn-Station Merianplatz", published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21 June, 2003. Nr. 141, S. 62. Accessible at SoOderSo-online

<http://www.sooderso.net/subdomains/badkleinen/texte/korn.htm>.

² John Law (2002) *Aircraft Stories. Decentering the Object in Technoscience*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, p. 5.

³ *The German Autumn in Minor Spaces* is a photography and mixed media project produced in collaboration with Allen Ball.

⁴ Antonin Artaud ([1938]1958) *The Theatre and its Double*. Translated by Mary Caroline Richards. New York: Grove Press, p. 109.

⁵ Michel Serres ([1980] 2007) *The Parasite*. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

⁶ Roland Barthes ([1977, 1978] 2002) *A Lover's Discourse. Fragments*. Translated by Richard Howard. London: Vintage Classics, p. 1.

⁷ Judith Butler (2005) *Giving an Account of Oneself*. New York: Fordham University Press.

⁸ While self-representation is my point of departure, I will make a conceptual shift towards self-production, which will be most explicitly worked out in the chapter "The aesthetics of crisis and the refusal of speech". I will retain the term self-representation for the initial chapters because of its currency in relation to my references to trials and the law, which are at times concrete and at other times tropes.

⁹ Roland Barthes ([1977, 1978] 2002) *A Lover's Discourse. Fragments*. Translated by Richard Howard. London: Vintage Classics, p. 60.

¹⁰ The problem that legal language, which has been critiqued as unnecessarily convoluted and unevenly accessible, poses to trial participants is a subject of considerable debate in legal scholarship. While I draw upon some of these debates in what follows, I am primarily interested in the relationship of power implicit in the trial context (which I define broadly) than with the use of legal language and the barriers that it presents to communication. My concerns with regard to language acknowledge that even the so-called vernacular is charged with the difficulties and absurdities that can be leveled at what would be considered legal language in the strict sense.

¹¹ The significance of Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy* for my purposes is that it dramatically and vividly captures and performs something central to my initial concerns in this dissertation. Namely, that speech fails to register *matters* of import the way that a *scene* is experienced, and, as a frame story, this theatrical play makes this failure both visible and palpable.

¹² André Gide ([1921] 1957) *The Immoralist*. Translated by Dorothy Bussy. New York: Vintage Books, p. 86. The preface to *The Immoralist* might be said to be Gide's own 'defense speech' but in alibi for his protagonist Michel. Gide appears wounded in advance by characterizations of Michel and particularly concerned to

emphasize that “If by ‘problem’ one means ‘drama’, shall I say that the one recounted in this book, though the scene of it is laid in my hero’s soul, is nevertheless too general to remain circumscribed in his individual adventure. I do not pretend to have invented this ‘problem’; it existed before my book; whether Michel triumph or succumb, the ‘problem’ will continue to exist, and the author has avoided taking either triumph or defeat for granted” (p. x).

¹³ Franz Kafka ([1925] 1968, 1988) *The Trial*. Translated by Willa and Edmund Muir. Revised and with additional material translated by E.M. Butler. New York: Schocken Books. Definite acquittal, ostensible acquittal, and indefinite postponement are the three options that the court painter poses to Joseph K. in Kafka’s *The Trial*, although it is said that definite acquittal is, of course, impossible.

¹⁴ Kafka, *The Trial*, p. 150. The significance of this text here is that it incessantly performs the frustrating paradox of subject-hood: that there is no real authority and yet no realizable freedom. There is neither a centralized subject, nor a truth to externalize. As human subjects, we are always accused, and we stand in the face of the ever-present demand to produce truth.

¹⁵ Kafka, *The Trial*, p. 108. This “dreary task” is also an impossible one. As Judith Butler observes, we cannot answer to the demand to give an account of oneself because “there is no ‘I’ that can fully stand apart from the social conditions of its emergence, no ‘I’ that is not implicated in a set of conditioning moral norms, which, being norms, have a social character that exceeds a purely personal or idiosyncratic meaning”, *Giving an Account of Oneself*. New York: Fordham University Press, p. 7.

¹⁶ Kafka, *The Trial*, p. 128.

¹⁷ James Clifford (1988) *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, p. 290.

¹⁸ Kafka, *The Trial*, p. 159. The Court here can be understood perhaps as the realm of the Symbolic Order of language, history, and culture.

¹⁹ Kafka, *The Trial*, p. 161. Again, this points to the failure to register speech communication and its tendency towards soundproof chatter.

²⁰ The invocation of oneself is an invocation of an alibi, an attempt to conjure what is absent through citation of an absent or fictional source.

²¹ Judith Butler (1993) *Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”*. New York and London: Routledge, p. 107.

²² Jacques Lacan ([1975] 1988, 1991) *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book 1: Freud’s Papers on Technique*. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated with notes by John Forrester. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 270. Emphasis added.

²³ Lacan, *Freud’s Technique*, p. 270.

²⁴ Lacan, *Freud’s Technique*, p. 37.

²⁵ W. Lance Bennett (1978) “Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment”, *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 64: 1-22, p. 1. The model of social judgment forwarded by Bennett works upon a conception of the subject that is

inconsistent with the subject assumed in my project, since his subject is coherent, rational, and knowing. Nevertheless, the presumptions inherent to his study confirm the problems that I am raising and, inadvertently, highlight a Barthes-inflected ‘death of the author’ situation in which “ordinary people” (jurors) actually (re)author “stories” from courtroom proceedings. Note, for instance, Bennett’s observation that “even when evidence is introduced in the often disjointed ‘question-answer’ format in a trial, the key elements generally will be abstracted by jurors and arranged in story form during deliberation”, p. 4.

²⁶ Adam Freedman (2007) *The Party of the First Part. The Curious World of Legalese*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

²⁷ Freedman, *The Party*, p. 6. In the context of these deliberations, the fact that this dictionary was written by John Rastell, who in addition to being a lawyer was a playwright and theatre producer, is of particular interest.

²⁸ The debates have intensified as several programs have been initiated to reform the use of legal language in Europe. While Freedman, cited within this text, is representative of the “Plain English School”, Alfred Phillips is representative of the “Precision School”. Phillips draws upon post-structural theory to establish that ordinary language is just as fraught as is lawyers’ language but, ultimately, he turns to the work of Jürgen Habermas to defend both the use of legal language and the representational legitimacy of law. See Alfred Phillips (2003) *Lawyers’ Language. How and why legal language is different*. London and New York: Routledge.

²⁹ Freedman, *The Party*, pp. 14-15.

³⁰ Willam Strunk and E.B. White (*The Elements of Style*), for instance, are to communication what Adolf Loos is to architecture (except with more painfully bland results), since they incessantly rail against the use of mannerisms and adornments in writing.

³¹ My reconstruction of the story of the rocket launcher relies on the description provided by Stefan Aust. (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, pp. 413-415. The title used here comes from the RAF’s statement about this failed action.

³² Julia Kristeva ([1996] 2000) *The Sense and Non-sense of Revolt. The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis*, translated by J. Herman. New York: Columbia University Press.

³³ Michel Foucault ([1983] 2000) *Fearless Speech*, edited by J. Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

³⁴ Kristeva, *Sense and Non-sense*, p. 29.

³⁵ Kristeva, *Sense and Non-sense*, p. 6.

³⁶ In Lacan’s mirror stage, the imago is the (mis)recognized image of oneself. It is, however, significant to note that the image is imagined; it does not fully coincide with the subject since it is spatially and sensorially displaced. The imago is experienced as other, though not necessarily acknowledged as such.

³⁷ The absolute Other or the big Other refers to the symbolic order of language, law, history, and ideology. It represents the alterity that the subject desires to eliminate, usually by way of attempting to address the absence or gap that stands

between the subject's experience of itself and the imago. The big Other is crucial to the process of interpellation discussed in the chapter "Kamikaze". The subject sees itself as addressed by an absolute Other and wonders what the Other wants from it, without realizing that it – the subject – issued the address.

³⁸ Jacques Lacan ([1953] 1981). "The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis." Pp. 1-87 in *The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*, translated by A. Wilden. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

³⁹ Jacques Lacan ([1955-1956] 1997) *The Psychoses 1955-1956: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III*, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller and translated by Russell Grigg. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 252.

⁴⁰ Lacan, *The Psychoses*, p. 250.

⁴¹ Lacan, *The Psychoses*, p. 250.

⁴² Lacan, *The Psychoses*, p. 251.

⁴³ Lacan posits the "refrain" as the opposite of the "word". He writes: "There, the word – with its full emphasis, as when one says *the word for, the solution to, an enigma* – is the soul of the situation. At the opposite pole there is the form that meaning takes when it no longer refers to anything at all. This is the formula that is repeated, reiterated, drummed in with a stereotyped insistence. It's what we might call, in contrast to the word, the refrain" in *The Psychoses*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ W.G. Sebald (2001) *Austerlitz*. Translated by Anthea Bell. Toronto: Vintage Canada, p. 263.

⁴⁵ Václav Havel ([1985] 1987) "An Anatomy of Reticence." Pp. 164-195 in *Václav Havel or Living in Truth*, edited by J. Vladislav. London and Boston: Faber and Faber, p. 171- 172.

⁴⁶ Lacan, *The Function of Language*, p.13.

⁴⁷ Jacques Lacan ([1972-73] 1998) *On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX Encore 1972-1973*, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller and translated by Bruce Fink. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Lacan, "The Function of Language".

⁴⁹ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 12.

⁵⁰ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p.16.

⁵¹ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 22.

⁵² Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 30.

⁵³ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 46.

⁵⁴ See for example, Susan Sontag ([1973] 1977) *On Photography*. New York: Picador USA.

⁵⁵ Walter Benjamin [1927-1940] 2002) [1927-1940] 2002. *The Arcades Project*. Translated by H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

⁵⁶ Maurice Blanchot (1999) "Two Versions of the Imaginary." Pp. 417-428 in *The Station Hill Blanchot Reader. Fiction and Literary Essays*, translated by Lydia Davis, Paul Auster, and Robert Lamberton and edited by George Quasha. New York: Station Hill Press, Inc., Barrytown. Ltd.

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- ⁵⁷ Lacan, “The Function of Language”.
- ⁵⁸ Judith Butler (1997) *Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative*. New York and London: Routledge, p. 2.
- ⁵⁹ Interpellation will be elaborated in the chapter entitled “Kamikaze”.
- ⁶⁰ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p. 11.
- ⁶¹ This is the process of interpellation or hailing.
- ⁶² Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p. 39.
- ⁶³ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p. 23.
- ⁶⁴ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p. 5.
- ⁶⁵ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, pp. 26-27.
- ⁶⁶ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p. 28.
- ⁶⁷ Except where specified otherwise, this discussion is informed primarily by two texts: Stefan Aust (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head and Oliver Tolmein (2002) *RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung. Ein Gespräch mit Irmgard Möller über bewaffneten Kampf, Knast und die Linke*. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag.
- ⁶⁸ Note that Irmgard Möller insists that there was no communications system. Of the supposed communications system, Möller says: “That is all very imaginative but it doesn’t make any sense”. Quoted in Tolmein, *RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung*, p. 126. My translation.
- ⁶⁹ Hans Joachim Klein in Jean Marcel Bougereau. ([1978] 1981) *The German guerrilla: terror, reaction, and resistance*. Translated by Peter Silcock. London: Cienfuegos Press/ Minneapolis: Soil of Liberty, p. 53.
- ⁷⁰ Quoted in Tolmein, *RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung*, pp. 132-133. My translation.
- ⁷¹ Möller quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 538.
- ⁷² Werner W. quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 538.
- ⁷³ Quoted in Tolmein, *RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung*, p. 133. My translation.
- ⁷⁴ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 545.
- ⁷⁵ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 549.
- ⁷⁶ Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 550.
- ⁷⁷ Jean Genet ([1958] 1960) *The Blacks: a clown show*. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- ⁷⁸ Gerhard Richter ([1993] 1995) *The Daily Practice of Painting. Writings 1962-1993*. Edited by Hans-Ulrich Obrist. Translated by David Britt. London: MIT Press, pp. 185-186.
- ⁷⁹ Erklärung von Jan-Carl Raspe im Prozess in Stuttgart-Stammheim am 11.5.76 pp. 21-23 *Texte der RAF* (1977) Schweden Cavefors Lund, p. 21 my translation.
- ⁸⁰ The Red Army Faction (1998). “Die Abschiedserklärung der Rote Armee Fraktion März 1998”. Reproduced in Oliver Tolmein. (2002) “*RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung*”. *Ein Gespräch mit Irmgard Möller über bewaffneten Kampf, Knast und die Linke*. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag. (The Final Communiqué from The Red Army Faction).

⁸¹ I use the term counter-terrorist here (and critically the words terrorist and terrorism at times throughout), rather than the more accurate term counter-revolutionary, since the West German state viewed the RAF's activities as constituting a form of terrorism and acted in accordance with that perspective, however, attacks on civilians were not an explicit part of the RAF's project. The matter of civilian targeting by the RAF is arguable in some instances. In the case of an attack on an Axel Springer Publishing office in the city of Hamburg during the May Offensive of 1972, a bomb was placed in the proofreading room and a bomb was placed in a washroom (reports vary as to the number of bombs used in this action). Consequently, several Springer employees were injured. The RAF cell claiming responsibility, the 2 June Commando, had made several calls to the office in advance of the explosions, warning that there were bombs in the building and that it needed to be evacuated but management ignored the warnings. The argument put forth by the RAF cell that took responsibility for the action was that, since the evacuation was not carried out, Springer management was more concerned with productivity than with their employees' well-being, hence employees were needlessly and avoidably injured. It should be noted that there was much internal strife within the RAF about the Springer action in Hamburg. Since the structure of organization inherent to guerrilla actions is fractured into cells, there is no central or top-down decision making process. In other words, not all group members are aware of or approve of all actions. Many of those who did not participate in the Springer action renounced it both publicly and privately in internal correspondence. The Springer operation was one point around which the group's solidarity could not be maintained.

⁸² Mikhail Bakhtin ([1975]1981) *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*. Edited by Michael Holquist and translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin, University of Texas Press. The notion of a rupture is strong and gives the impression that Bakhtin has in mind a break at a specific point in time when he finds expressions of polyglossia and a new frame of representation at various moments in literary history, especially in times of change and within folklore. See Pp. 38-40.

⁸³ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, p. 11.

⁸⁴ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, p. 27.

⁸⁵ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, Pp. 16-17.

⁸⁶ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, p. 17.

⁸⁷ Louis Althusser ([1970] 1994) "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in *Mapping Ideology*. Edited by Slavoj Žižek. London, New York: Verso, Pp. 100-140.

⁸⁸ Lewis Carroll ([1865] 1946) *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass*. Harmondsworth, Baltimore, and Ringwood: Penguin Books, p. 52. Emphasis added.

⁸⁹ Judith Butler (1993) *Bodies that Matter. On the discursive limits of "sex"*. New York: Routledge, p. 95.

⁹⁰ The consequence of this is that Bakhtin's texts, as they become available in English translation, appear to be limited in terms of readers' applications of this

work. Despite Bakhtin's attempts to avoid censure both through the way in which he framed his work and by keeping much of his writing out of circulation, he was imprisoned by the state and sent to Kazakhstan for his intellectual activities.

⁹¹ Mikhail Bakhtin ([1965] 1984) *Rabelais and His World*. Translated by Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Pp. 437-438.

⁹² Benedict Anderson ([1983] 2000) "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism" in *Theory of the Novel. A Historical Approach*. Edited by Michael McKeon. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp 414-434.

⁹³ Anderson. "Imagined Communities", p. 421.

⁹⁴ Anderson. "Imagined Communities", p. 428.

⁹⁵ Bakhtin, *Rabelais*, p. 455.

⁹⁶ Bakhtin. *Rabelais*, Pp. 467-468.

⁹⁷ Bakhtin. *Rabelais*, see Pp. 470-471.

⁹⁸ Bakhtin. *Dialogic Imagination*, p. 13.

⁹⁹ Judith Butler (1997) *Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative*. New York & London: Routledge.

¹⁰⁰ Butler. *Excitable Speech*. "The 'moment' in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance", p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Bakhtin. *Dialogic Imagination*, Pp. 23-24.

¹⁰² Daniel A, McMillan. (1996). *Germany Incarnate: Politics, Gender, and Sociability in the Gymnastics Movement, 1811-1871*. PhD Dissertation, Department of History, Columbia University, New York, p. 75.

¹⁰³ Berit Elisabeth Dencker (2002) "Class and the Construction of the 19th Century German Male Body" *Journal of Historical Sociology* 15.2: 220-251.

¹⁰⁴ Commission on the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (Council of Europe). Decision of 8 July 1978 on the admissibility of the APPLICATIONS/REQUETES No 7572/76, 7586/76 et 7587/76 (joined/jointes) G. ENSSLIN, A. BAADER & J. RASPE v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

¹⁰⁵ Commission, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶ Commission, p. 5.

¹⁰⁷ Commission, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Commission, p. 5.

¹⁰⁹ *Baader-Meinhof. In Love with Terror*. Documentary. Great Britain 2002.

¹¹⁰ EA 1/107 Bü 656: Justizvollzugsanstalt Stuttgart-Stammheim: Verwahrung und Selbstmord von RAF-Mitgliedern, Untersuchungen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen, 1977.

Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

¹¹¹ Commission, p. 3.

¹¹² Ulrike Meinhof. "Ein Brief Ulrike Meinhofs aus dem Toten Trakt" (February 25, 1974, Köln-Ossendorf) published in Mario Krebs (1988) *Ulrike Meinhof: ein Leben in Widerspruch*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, p. 242-243. I am indebted to parts of Paul Buck's translation of this letter, as it is published in Christopher Barnett

(1984) *Last Days of the World and other texts for theatre*. Clifton Hill: Rigamarole Books, Pp.43-44. I used some of this translation's constructions where they seemed to capture better than mine the sense of Meinhof's writing. I chose to leave the hissing sounds (which only appear in some reproductions of the letter in German and, incidentally, not in Krebs' version) untranslated because the significance of their reference: to language, to the multiplicity of speech, and its emphasis on the gap between what is spoken and what is heard, is completely lost in its translation into English.

¹¹³ Gerd Conradt (2001) *Starbuck Holger Meins. Ein Porträt als Zeitbild* Berlin: Espresso Verlag GmbH. p. 143. Also, Stefan Aust (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, pp. 239-240.

¹¹⁴ "Holger Meins, Bericht zur Zwangsernährung, Wittlich 11. Oktober 1974", in Conradt, *Starbuck*, pp. 148-150.

¹¹⁵ For instance, an article published in the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* on February 6, 1975 "Der Durststreik war ein Schlag ins Wasser" contained excerpts of a RAF statement on the hungerstrikes that emphasized them as the last weapon that the prisoners had in the mobilization of anti-imperialist politics. EA 1/107 Bü 655 Zwangsernährung von Strafgefangenen, Hungerstreik der Baader-Meinhof-Häftlinge, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

¹¹⁶ der letzte brief von holger meins (am 31. 10. 1974) pp 13-15 in *Texte der RAF* (1977) Schweden Cavefors Lund. My translation.

¹¹⁷ Thomas Elsaesser (1999) "Antigone Agonistes: Urban Guerilla or Guerilla Urbanism? The Red Army Fraction, *Germany in Autumn* and *Death Game*" in *Giving Ground: The Politics of Propinquity*. Edited by Joan Copjec and Michael Sorkin. London and New York: Verso, p. 268.

¹¹⁸ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 283.

¹¹⁹ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 283.

¹²⁰ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 270.

¹²¹ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 271.

¹²² Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 272.

¹²³ Nora M. Alter (2002) *Projecting History. German Nonfiction Cinema, 1967-2000*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, p. 1.

¹²⁴ Heinrich Böll ([1975] 1979) "Heinrich Böll: A Statement" in *Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann's Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerilla*. Translated by Helene Ellenboden and Wayne Parker. New York: Grove Press.

¹²⁵ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 273. Brief clarifications are added in text to the quotation in parentheses.

¹²⁶ W.G. Sebald ([1983] 2005) "Constructs of Mourning. Günter Grass and Wolfgang Hildesheimer" Pp. 97-123 in *Campo Santo*. Translated by Anthea Bell. New York: The Modern Library.

¹²⁷ This witch-hunt for sympathizers is the target of Heinrich Böll's novel *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum*.

¹²⁸ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 293.

¹²⁹ "Introduction" by Pulp Press to Bommi Baumann. *Terror or Love?*, p. 8.

¹³⁰ See, for instance, Oliver Tolmein. (2002) “RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung”. *Ein Gespräch mit Irmgard Möller über bewaffneten Kampf, Knast und die Linke*. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag. Irmgard Möller was imprisoned in Stammheim in 1977, and was found with several knife wounds on the morning that Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were found dead in their cells. She survived her injuries and maintains that she did not inflict the wounds upon herself. Tolmein points out that his interview with Möller was shaped by the ongoing threat of criminal prosecution that she faces. Since it is difficult to speak about the development and problems of an illegal group like the RAF without further incriminating members, Tolmein acknowledges that his discussion with Möller was limited and many questions could not be answered.

¹³¹ Elsaesser. “Antigone Agonistes”, p. 294.

¹³² Stefan Aust. 1987. *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, p. 242.

¹³³ Hans Joachim Klein is a former member of the RZ and was almost recruited for the Entebbe operation. He observed: “The problem is that they [the West German guerillas] claim their actions are independent but that they aren’t any longer. Each time they were dependent on Wadi Haddad [leader of PFLP and several operations] and his group. For every action in support of the liberation of prisoners the guerrillas are dependent on others because they need countries where they can seek refuge. They depend on others for their money and weapons, All that has a price: the participation of German guerrilla members in other actions. Since Haddad needs people who aren’t Arab for his operations. That even goes as far as participating in actions which are fascist like the one at Entebbe. That’s exactly what Entebbe was. What happened at Entebbe is Auschwitz as far as I am concerned”. Quoted in Jean Marcel Bougureau ([1978]1981) *The German guerrilla: terror, reaction, and resistance*. Translated by Peter Silcock. Minneapolis: Soil of Liberty, p. 31.

¹³⁴ Elsaesser. “Antigone Agonistes”, p. 289.

¹³⁵ Elsaesser. “Antigone Agonistes”, p. 289.

¹³⁶ Elsaesser. “Antigone Agonistes”, p. 290.

¹³⁷ Elsaesser. “Antigone Agonistes”, p. 289.

¹³⁸ Carlos Marighella. “Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla” appendix to *Urban Guerilla Warfare* by Robert Moss. International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Aldelphi Papers, no. 79.

¹³⁹ See, for instance, the following volume of internal RAF correspondence, much of which pertains to struggles and attempts to define the group against the representations of Red Help. *Dokumentation über Aktivitäten anarchistischer Gewalttäter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. (1978) Herausgeber: Bundesministerium des Innern.

¹⁴⁰ See, for instance, Ingo Cornils (2003) “Writing the Revolution: the Literary Representation of the German Student Movement as Counter-Culture” in *Counter-Cultures in Germany and Central Europe from Sturm und Drang to Baader-Meinhof*. Edited by Steve Giles and Maïke Oergel. Bern: Peter Lang AG, European Academic Publishers, pp. 295-314.

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- ¹⁴¹ Dick Hebdige (1988) *Hiding in the Light. On Images and Things*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 53.
- ¹⁴² Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light*, p. 55.
- ¹⁴³ Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, p. 24.
- ¹⁴⁴ See Jeremy Varon (2004) *Bringing the War Home. The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, p. 32.
- ¹⁴⁵ David Schwarz (2006) *Listening Awry: Music and Alterity in German Culture*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, p. 85.
- ¹⁴⁶ Schwarz, *Listening Awry*, p. 88.
- ¹⁴⁷ Schwarz's argument draws on Zizek's notion of "interpellation prior to identification".
- ¹⁴⁸ Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, p. 60.
- ¹⁴⁹ Jamie Trnka (2003) "The West German Red Army Faction and its Appropriation of Latin American Urban Guerilla Struggles" in *Counter-Cultures in Germany and Central Europe from Sturm und Drang to Baader-Meinhof*. Edited by Steve Giles and Maike Oergel. Bern: Peter Lang AG, European Academic Publishers, p. 317.
- ¹⁵⁰ For instance, The RAF (1998). "Die Abschiedserklärung der Rote Armeefraktion März 1998".
- ¹⁵¹ Trnka, "Appropriation of Latin American Urban Guerilla Struggles", p. 320
- ¹⁵² Régis Debray (1967) *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*. Translated by Bobbye Ortiz. New York: Grove Press, Inc., p. 69.
- ¹⁵³ Debray, *Revolution*, p. 70.
- ¹⁵⁴ Debray, *Revolution*, p. 71.
- ¹⁵⁵ A chacon is a diagram of movements and gestures, a choreographical map, used in the improvisational theatre of the commedia dell'arte, for which the absence of a script helped to assist the performers in avoiding punishment for their satirical productions. See Meredith Chilton (2001) *Harlequin Unmasked. The Commedia dell'Arte and Porcelain Sculpture*. New Haven and London: The George R. Gardiner Museum of Ceramic Art with Yale University Press, Pp. 122-134.
- ¹⁵⁶ Elsaesser. "Antigone Agonistes", p. 287.
- ¹⁵⁷ RepVIII/BRD1/F11/M2 (27) Illustriertes Flugblatt gegen die Nazi vergangenheit von Springer (Feb 68) "Wer ist hier Nazi und wer Jew?" Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin.
- ¹⁵⁸ Henri Bergson ([1911] 2005) *Laughter. An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*. Translated by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., p. 22.
- ¹⁵⁹ Antonin Artaud ([1938]1958) *The Theatre and its Double*. Translated by Mary Caroline Richards. New York: Grove Press.
- ¹⁶⁰ Roland Barthes (1977) "The Grain of the Voice" in *Image, Music, Text*. New York: Hill and Wang.

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- ¹⁶¹ Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, p. 61
- ¹⁶² Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, p. 80.
- ¹⁶³ John Cage quoted in Robert Storr (2003) *Gerhard Richter. Doubt and Belief in Painting*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, p. 52.
- ¹⁶⁴ Manfred Grashof in a letter to his lawyers, quoted from Grashof am 19.2.1973 an seine Rechtsanwälte zum Hungerstreik. *Dokumentation über Aktivitäten anarchistischer Gewalttäter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1978* Herausgeber: Bundesministerium des Innern. My translation.
- ¹⁶⁵ In their first communiqué, in which they call for the building of the Red Army (“Die Rote Armee aufbauen” (1970)), the RAF advocated the use of arms and dismissed other efforts for political change as only leading to a reformism that would result in better means of capitalist exploitation and discipline. Even though the use of the designation of this group of loosely organized guerillas as the RAF will seem unproblematic, this designation is somewhat misleading not only because the RAF’s activities spanned a 28 year period, from 1970 to the announcement of their disbanding in 1998, with unstable membership and organization throughout its duration but also because it is possible to argue that the RAF participated in a larger social and political landscape that problematizes the sense of its distinct identity borders within and without the Federal Republic of Germany. Throughout this section, my references to the RAF are limited to the so-called “first generation” of the group and the time period between 1967 and 1977.
- ¹⁶⁶ *Baader-Meinhof. In Love with Terror*. BBC Documentary. Great Britain 2002.
- ¹⁶⁷ RAF in “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla” (1971). My translation.
- ¹⁶⁸ The Red Army Faction (1998). “Die Abschiedserklärung der Rote Armee Fraktion März 1998”. Reproduced in Oliver Tolmein. (2002) “*RAF – Das war für uns Befreiung*”. *Ein Gespräch mit Irmgard Möller über bewaffneten Kampf, Knast und die Linke*. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag. (The Final Communiqué from The Red Army Faction).
- ¹⁶⁹ Stefan Aust. (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, p. 213.
- ¹⁷⁰ Holger Meins am 5.Juni 1973, quoted in Gerd Conradt (2001) *Starbuck: Ein Porträt als Zeitbild*. Berlin: Espresso Verlag GmbH, p. 147.
- ¹⁷¹ Commission on the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (Council of Europe). Decision of 8 July 1978 on the admissibility of the APPLICATIONS/REQUETES No 7572/76, 7586/76 et 7587/76 (joined/jointes) G. ENSSLIN, A. BAADER & J. RASPE v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
- ¹⁷² Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 244. Also, for example, “Baader distanziert sich von Wahlverteidiger Schilly. Angeklagter halt politische Argumentation für unzureichend — ‘Unser Prozeß ist der Volksaufstand’”. EA/107 Bü 346 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1975-1977. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.
- ¹⁷³ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 246.
- ¹⁷⁴ Jillian Becker (1977) *Hitler’s Children. The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang*. Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, p. 229.

¹⁷⁵ Becker, *Hitler's Children*, p. 228.

¹⁷⁶ Sozialistisches Patienten Kollektiv Website <<http://www.spkpfh.de>> Accessed on October 30, 2006.

¹⁷⁷ "Kein Vogel kann sich unbemerkt der Zelle nähern" von Manfred Geist *Die Welt* (Nr. 36) 12.2. 1975. EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

¹⁷⁸ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 295.

¹⁷⁹ "Bundeskriminalamt: Anwälte der Baader/Meinhof-Bande sind ein Sicherheitsrisiko — 22 Juristen arbeiten für Gudrun Ennslin" *Die Welt*, Hamburg 23.11.1974. BKA says that the lawyers are the greatest security risk. There are concerns that the lawyers may be capable of participating in an escape attempt. The BKA suspects that the lawyers are mediating communication between the prisoners and underground terrorist organizations, using the RAF's self-chosen code names. EA 1/107 Bü 348: Terroristen-Anwälte, 1974-1980. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart;

"Fast alle Spuren führen in das Büro von Croissant. Häftlinge führen die Ermittlungen in die Wälder um Stuttgart" *Badische Zeitung*, Freiburg 13.1.1978. Discusses the possibility that lawyers smuggled weapons into Stammheim. EA 1/107 Bü 657: Justizvollzugsanstalt Stuttgart-Stammheim: Verwahrung und Selbstmord von RAF-Mitgliedern, Untersuchungen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen, 1977. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.; "Zweiter Baader-Anwalt ausgeschlossen. Nach Croissant auch Groenewold / Entscheidung des Oberlandesgerichts" 7 Mai 1975 *Frankfurter Allgemeiner*. EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.; "Anwälte als Kurier der Baader-Meinhof-Gefangenen. Die Außschließungsgründe gegen die Wahlverteidiger Croissant, Groenewold und Ströbele" *Frankfurter Allgemeine* 23.5.75 EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

¹⁸⁰ "Is the Baader-Meinhof trial making a sham of justice?", Dan van der Vat. *The Times*, Tuesday, September 2, 1975, page 12; Issue 59490; col. D.

¹⁸¹ Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 297. Also, "Überraschung im Baader-Meinhof-Prozeß" 22.5.75 *Der Tagesspiegel*

EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Baader accuses the court of using the microphones to listen in on their discussions with their chosen defence lawyers.

¹⁸² Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 304. Also, "Die Terroristen: 'Entweder diese Schweine oder wir!'" 11 juni 1975 *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*. EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

Ennslin remarked: "...if these swine over there speak, then we are leaving!"; "Streit um die Pflichtverteidiger in Stammheim" 11 Juni 1975 *Stuttgarter Zeitung* EA 1/107 Bü 345 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1974-1975 . Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

To the compulsory defenders, Ennslin demands: "For whom do you speak?".

¹⁸³ Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 306.

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- ¹⁸⁴ Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 324.
- ¹⁸⁵ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 324.
- ¹⁸⁶ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 336.
- ¹⁸⁷ This sentiment is expressed repeatedly in RAF communiqués: “Don’t sit around on the shabby, ransacked sofa and count your loves, like the small-time shopkeeper souls”. The Red Army Faction. “Build Up the Red Army!” 1970. Originally published in *Agit* 883. Translation by R.W. Rynerson. <http://home.att.net/~rw.rynerson/rafgrund.htm>. Accessed January 27, 2006.
- ¹⁸⁸ Judith Butler. (1997) *Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative*. New York & London: Routledge.
- ¹⁸⁹ “BM- Verfahren wurde “Phantom-Proßess. Vernehmung zur Person und Verlesung des Anklagesatzes ohne Angeklagte” Badische Neweste Nachrichten, Karlsruhe 20, August 1975. EA/107 Bü 346 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1975-1977. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. The prisoners stand up, refuse to take part, Meinhof says “I want to leave, you asshole”. Baader calls Prinzing a “fascist old asshole”.
- ¹⁹⁰ “Frau Meinhof removed from court”. *The Times*, September 18, 1974; page 6; Issue 59165; col. G.
- ¹⁹¹ “Vernehmung zur Anklage nächste Woche” 29.8.75 Stuttgarter Zeitung EA/107 Bü 346 Baader-Meinhof Prozeß in Stuttgart-Stammheim, 1975-1977. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Meinhof says that Prinzing’s sense of justice “stands in the tradition of the Third Reich”. My translation.
- ¹⁹² Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 325.
- ¹⁹³ Michel de Certeau (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Translated by Steven Rendall. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 36.
- ¹⁹⁴ See, for instance, the personal accounts of Bommi Baumann ([1975] 1979) *Terror of Love? Bommi Baumann’s Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerrilla*. With statements by Heinrich Böll and Daniel Cohn-Bendit and translated by Helene Ellenbogen and Wayne Parker. New York: Grove Press, Inc. and Hans Joachim Klein in Jean Marcel Bougureau. *The German guerrilla: terror, reaction, and resistance*. Minneapolis: Soil of Liberty.
- ¹⁹⁵ Baumann, *Terror of Love?*
- ¹⁹⁶ Judith Butler. (2005) *Giving an Account of Oneself*. New York: Fordham University Press, p. 42.
- ¹⁹⁷ Antonin Artaud. ([1938]1958) *The Theatre and its Double*. Translated by Mary Caroline Richards. New York: Grove Press, p. 43.
- ¹⁹⁸ Régis Debray (1967) *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*. Translated by Bobbye Ortiz. New York: Grove Press, Inc., p. 51. Emphasis added.
- ¹⁹⁹ Derek Sayer (2008) “Wittgenstein at Ground Zero” *Space and Culture* 11.1:12-19, p. 13.
- ²⁰⁰ Sayer, “Wittgenstein at Ground Zero”, p. 16.
- ²⁰¹ Sayer, “Wittgenstein at Ground Zero”, p. 13.
- ²⁰² Sayer, “Wittgenstein at Ground Zero”, p. 15.
- ²⁰³ de Certeau, *Practice*, p. 152.

²⁰⁴ de Certeau, *Practice*, p. 34.

²⁰⁵ Barthes speaks of systems of language (e.g. Marxism and psychoanalysis) in terms of their tendency to produce images that complete and constrain subjects: “This is how on any object, a good language-system *functions*, attacks, surrounds, sizzles, hardens, and browns. All languages are micro-systems of ebullition, of frying... The language of others transforms me into an image, as the raw slice of potato is transformed into a pomme frite”. Roland Barthes ([1984] 1986) *The Rustle of Language*. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, p. 355.

²⁰⁶ de Certeau, *Practice*, p. 148.

²⁰⁷ Aust, *Baader-Meinhof*, p. 236.

²⁰⁸ Gerrit-Jan Berendse (2003) “Aesthetics of (Self-) Destruction: Melville’s *Moby Dick*, Brecht’s *The Measures Taken* and the Red Army Faction”, pp. 333-351 in *Counter-Cultures in Germany and Central Europe. From Sturm und Drang to Baader-Meinhof*. Edited by Steve Giles and Maïke Oergel. Oxford, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Wien: Peter Lang, p. 335.

²⁰⁹ Slavoj Žižek (2001) *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion*. London and New York: Verso, p. 162.

²¹⁰ Žižek *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?*, p. 167.

²¹¹ Carlos Marighella. “Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla” appendix to *Urban Guerilla Warfare* by Robert Moss. International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Aldelphi Papers, no. 79.

²¹² Gerhard Richter ([1993] 1995) *The Daily Practice of Painting. Writings 1962-1993*. Edited by Hans-Ulrich Obrist. Translated by David Britt. London: MIT Press, p. 174. Richter’s comment is given with regard to his *October 18, 1977* cycle of fifteen oil paintings in shades of grey dealing with the subject matter of the Red Army Faction, particularly that of the Stammheim prison deaths.

²¹³ Note that Robert Storr makes observations with respect to this, but his observations reference the cinematic approach visible in the works: “The ordering and repetition of some images in the cycle evoke cinematic techniques as well; action or stop-action sequences in *Arrest 1* and *Arrest 2*, and *Confrontation 1*, *Confrontation 2*, and *Confrontation 3*, the close-up and the fade-out in *Man Shot Down 1* and *Man Shot Down 2*, and three versions of *Dead*. Overtly dramatized narrative is thus introduced or implied by reference to film effects to which the viewer will almost involuntarily respond”, in Robert Storr (2003). *Gerhard Richter. Doubt and Belief in Painting*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, p. 243.

²¹⁴ Much of my description of the arrest is indebted to the information offered in Stefan Aust. 1987. *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, p. 215.

²¹⁵ EA 1/107 Bü 656: Justizvollzugsanstalt Stuttgart-Stammheim: Verwahrung und Selbstmord von RAF-Mitgliedern, Untersuchungen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen, 1977.

Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

²¹⁶ Sophie Schwarz quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 200.

²¹⁷ For instance, “These paintings shockingly reveal that painting is dead, incapable of transfiguring events, of giving them sense, Painting in the present tense becomes the victim of the historical reality that it had sought to examine. They state pictorially that any attempt at the constituting of meaning via aesthetic means would be not only anachronistic but cynical...If nothing can be altered, because all representation must necessarily end up asserting the inadequacy of the medium, what is the point of these paintings?” Stefan Germer quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 202.

²¹⁸ A particularly controversial example of a contemporary artwork that takes this up is *Die Toten* [1998] by Hans-Peter Feldmann.

²¹⁹ *Deutschland im Herbst* is discussed in the chapter “Kamikaze”.

²²⁰ Art and exhibition practices in relation to the RAF is the subject of the subsequent chapter.

²²¹ Astrid Proll (1998) *Hans und Grete. Die RAF 1967-977*. Steidl.

²²² More than suggesting movement, the works *invite* movement. While interviewing Gerhard Richter about the October paintings, Jann Thorn Prikker observes: “Yesterday I was watching the visitors to your exhibition. They were constantly trying to find the right viewing point, walking up and down, trying it from every angle, sometimes close up, sometimes standing well back”, in Richter, *Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 199.

²²³ Walter Benjamin ([1936] 2002) “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility. Second Version”, pp. 101-133 in Walter Benjamin. *Selected Writings Volume 3, 1935-1938*. Edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

²²⁴ See, for instance, Susan Buck-Morss (1992) “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered” *October* 62: 3-41.

²²⁵ Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics”, p. 22.

²²⁶ Mikhail Bakhtin ([1952-53]1986) *Speech Genres & Other Late Essays*. Translated by Vern W. McGee and edited by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.

²²⁷ Susan Sontag asserts that what is often referred to as collective memory is instead the product of collective instruction. See Sontag (2003) *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. For this reason, the RAF images evoke the collective recognition that they do in Germany only in response to the regime of reiteration that familiarized the public with these images within a particular set of discourses.

²²⁸ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, p. 100.

²²⁹ Richter quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 53.

²³⁰ Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*.

²³¹ Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 236.

²³² Richter, *Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 175.

²³³ Richter, *Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 175.

²³⁴ See Thomas Elsaesser (1999) “Antigone Agonistes: Urban Guerilla or Guerilla Urbanism? The Red Army Fraction, *Germany in Autumn* and *Death Game*” in

Giving Ground: The Politics of Propinquity. Edited by Joan Copjec and Michael Sorkin. London and New York: Verso. The comparison of the RAF to rock stars is discussed in the chapter “Kamikaze”.

²³⁵ Richter quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 161.

²³⁶ Richter quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 161.

²³⁷ See Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, p. 160.

²³⁸ Incidentally, Mahler has since taken a sharp turn to the political far right. Recently, German authorities temporarily seized Mahler’s identity papers and passport to prevent him from participating in an international conference convening with the purpose of questioning the extent and veracity of the Holocaust. This drastic political transformation is impossible to comprehend, especially since Mahler was in the 1970s an articulate and passionate critic of fascism and targeted the BRD’s unwillingness to redeem itself in a concrete way from the shame of its Nazi past.

²³⁹ Roland Barthes ([1977, 1978] 2002) *A Lover’s Discourse. Fragments*. Translated by Richard Howard. London: Vintage Classics, p. 98.

²⁴⁰ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 23.

²⁴¹ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 178.

²⁴² Quoted in Shannon Smilly, “Germany Debates ‘Terrorist Chic’; Art and Fashion Stir Memories of Leftist Violence in ‘70s” *The Washington Post*, February 20, 2005.

²⁴³ Mark Gisbourne. “‘Regarding Terror’ at Kunst-Werke”, *Art in America*, June 1, 2005.

²⁴⁴ My description pertains specifically to the exhibition as it was at Der Neuen Galerie am Landesmuseum Joanneum Graz, Austria in the summer of 2005.

²⁴⁵ Wolfgang Kraushaar. (2004) “Zwischen Popkultur, Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Von der Schwierigkeit, die RAF zu historisieren” http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/portal/alias_zeithistorische-forschungen/lang_en/tabid_4020821/default.aspx Accessed on March 3, 2005. Quotation is my translation.

²⁴⁶ Significantly, Kraushaar’s critique is motivated in part by his observation that there remain several significant, even urgent, “knowledge gaps” in the history of the RAF and terrorism in West Germany, and he outlines several problems and questions that remain unanswered (particularly as they relate to the internal structure of the RAF, communications between groups, and the international connections between West German groups and externally situated guerilla organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). There are several structural obstacles to the completion of this sort of research because access to information is controlled, for obvious reasons, by the individuals themselves who are implicated in the relationships and by states that have sealed records. German courts have restricted access to several files pertaining to the relevant period. A recent resurgence of guerrilla activity in German cities (with the activities of, for example, the Militante Gruppe) has made some of the state’s covert procedural changes in response to the RAF in the 1970s desirable to officials in contemporary policing practices.

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- ²⁴⁷ Dierk Spreen (2005) “Leuchtreklame für den Terror”, *artnet Magazine*
URL: <http://www.artnet.de/magazine/reviews/spreen/spreen/03-09-05.asp?print=1>
Accessed on March 12, 2005.
- ²⁴⁸ Spreen, “Leuchtreklame”, my translation.
- ²⁴⁹ Spreen, “Leuchtreklame”, my translation.
- ²⁵⁰ Spreen, “Leuchtreklame”, my translation.
- ²⁵¹ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 2.
- ²⁵² Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 2.
- ²⁵³ For Lacan, stupidity is the product of analytic discourse, and this new subject is situated at the level of the unconscious. Jacques Lacan ([1972-73] 1998) *On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX Encore 1972-1973*, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller and translated by Bruce Fink. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 12 & 22.
- ²⁵⁴ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 61.
- ²⁵⁵ M. Stubbs in Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland (eds.) ([1999] 2001) *The Discourse Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 1.
- ²⁵⁶ Norman Fairclough (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- ²⁵⁷ Michel Foucault ([1975] 1977, 1995) *Discipline & Punish. The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.
- ²⁵⁸ Barthes’ *Discourse*, p. 71.
- ²⁵⁹ Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*. Edited and Translated by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press and Jacques Lacan ([1953] 1981) “The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis” Pp. 1-87 in *Language and the Self. The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*. Translated by A Wilden. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.
- ²⁶⁰ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 67.
- ²⁶¹ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 3.
- ²⁶² Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 4.
- ²⁶³ Barthes, *Discourse*, pp. 18-21.
- ²⁶⁴ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 193.
- ²⁶⁵ John Ayto (1990) *Dictionary of Word Origins. The Histories of More than 800 English-language Words*. New York: Arcade Publishing, p. 536.
- ²⁶⁶ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 22.
- ²⁶⁷ Matt Worley (1999) “Prada Meinhof” in Crash! <<http://www.scottkind.co.uk/crash.html>> Accessed March 24, 2004.
- ²⁶⁸ Felix Ennslin cited in Kirsty Bell and Felix Ennslin “Debate: Regarding Terror” *frieze*. March, 2005; Issue 89, p. 77.
- ²⁶⁹ Dennis Adams quoted in “An Interview with Dennis Adams” by Peter Doroshenko in the *Journal of Contemporary Art* <http://www.jca-online.com/adams.html> Accessed on December 17, 2007.
- ²⁷⁰ See Robert Storr (2000) *Gerhard Richter October 18, 1977* New York: Museum of Modern Art, footnote 24, p. 117.
- ²⁷¹ Storr, *October*, p. 117.

²⁷² Quoted in Tom Vague (1994) *televisionaries. the red army faction story 1963-1993*. Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press, p. 78.

²⁷³ Dennis Adams quoted in “An Interview with Dennis Adams” by Peter Doroshenko in the *Journal of Contemporary Art* <http://www.jca-online.com/adams.html> Accessed on December 17, 2007.

²⁷⁴ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 173.

²⁷⁵ Stefan Aust (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head, p. 450.

²⁷⁶ Gerhard Richter ([1993] 1995) *The Daily Practice of Painting. Writings 1962-1993*. Edited by Hans-Ulrich Obrist. Translated by David Britt. London: MIT Press, p. 174. Richter’s comment is given with regard to his *October 18, 1977* cycle of fifteen oil paintings in shades of grey dealing with the subject matter of the Red Army Faction, particularly that of the Stammheim deaths.

²⁷⁷ Robert Storr (2003) *Gerhard Richter. Doubt and Belief in Painting*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, p. 44.

²⁷⁸ See previous chapter.

²⁷⁹ Incidentally, or not, the word “atlas” entered into English language usage in reference to a person conceived as a “supporter”, as an elaboration of the Greek myth of the Titan Atlas, who had the burden of carrying the heavens. See John Ayto (1990) *Dictionary of Word Origins. The Histories of More than 800 English-language Words*. New York: Arcade Publishing, p. 41.

²⁸⁰ Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group*, p. 177.

²⁸¹ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 136.

²⁸² Storr, *October 18, 1977*, p. 88.

²⁸³ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 3.

²⁸⁴ Riemack, an art historian, was a close friend of Meinhof’s mother. Both of Meinhof’s parents died while she and her sister were young. Riemack had shared an apartment (and political viewpoints, since they both opposed the National Socialists, who were in power at that time) with Meinhof’s mother (then already widowed) and the two girls, had taken on a significant parenting role in Meinhof’s young life even prior to her mother’s death and continued to take care of Meinhof and her sister after their mother passed away. Later, Riemack became a significant figure in the lives of Meinhof’s own twin daughters, taking care of them while Meinhof had to have brain surgery, following their birth and again when Meinhof went into hiding underground after participating in the operation to free Andreas Baader from prison.

²⁸⁵ Riemack’s complete letter is published in Stefan Aust’s book, *The Baader-Meinhof Group*, pp. 172-173. Aust was a friend of Meinhof from her time with *konkret*. He also knew other members of the group and played a central role in retrieving Meinhof’s daughters who had been kidnapped by guerrillas and were to be sent to a PLO training camp.

²⁸⁶ Jillian Becker (1977) *Hitler’s Children. The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang*. Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippencott Company.

²⁸⁷ Such laws were indeed implemented, including the Radicals Edict, which allowed the removal of people from civil service and teaching posts for membership in political groups designated as in opposition to the state.

²⁸⁸ In addition to a number of laws that provided a means for the authorities to bypass civil rights in dealing with suspected sympathizers, it was the RAF that was used to justify the large-scale expansion of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Federal Criminal Investigation Office, that went from dealing with border control to being the headquarters of terrorist tracking with an annual budget of DM 54.8 million. Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group*, p. 177.

²⁸⁹ Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group*, p. 174-175

²⁹⁰ Jacques Lacan ([1975] 1988, 1991) *Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 1*. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated with notes by John Forrester. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company.

²⁹¹ Quoted from Richard Huffman "Interview with Director Bruce LaBruce on his new film 'The Raspberry Reich'" Baader-Meinhof.com <<http://www.baader-meinhof.com/essays/LaBruceInterview.html>> Accessed December 26, 2007.

²⁹² Quoted from Huffman "Interview with Director Bruce LaBruce."

²⁹³ Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 136.

²⁹⁴ Gerhard Richter ([1993] 1995) *The Daily Practice of Painting. Writings 1962-1993*. Edited by Hans-Ulrich Obrist. Translated by David Britt. London: MIT Press p. 194.

²⁹⁵ Quoted in Barthes, *Discourse*, p. 131.

²⁹⁶ Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, quoted in Avery Gordon ([1997] 2008) *Ghostly Matters. Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, p. 165.

²⁹⁷ It is also the case that more unofficial collections exist presumably. A problem inherent to this project that is directly connected to the limits of how I was socially situated in relation to this topic is that, without access to insiders, I relied on official routes of communication to locate sources since no other route became available and, in either case, the structural barriers to getting access were numerous. Nevertheless, the process itself is revealing in terms of the circulation of materials, the politics of inclusion/exclusion, and the assumption of ownership of discourse.

²⁹⁸ Douglas Sadao Aoki (2000) "Remembrances of Love Past" *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 13.1: 1-9, p. 7.

²⁹⁹ Sigmund Freud (2002) *The Wolfman and Other Cases*. London: Penguin. p. 251. While I am not invested in drawing a distinction that underlines whether there exists an original and concrete originating occurrence for a memory, psychoanalytic theory addresses this in such a way to accommodate the uncertain status of memory in the first place. In his study of the Wolfman, Freud argues that the Wolfman's first anxiety dream could not have referenced the patient's accidental witnessing of his parents having sexual intercourse, as the patient himself insists. In his explication of the dream, Freud refers to *memory imprints* as connected to events that occur around which subjects weave stories. The

Wolfman's assertion that he witnessed this primal scene prior to his dream of six or seven wolves in a tree is, according to Freud, a *reconstruction* based upon specific memory imprints from the Wolfman's early childhood, none of which are related to the witnessing of a primal scene as such. Nevertheless, and significant to generalization to the concerns of my project, is the extent to which from a psychoanalytic perspective, it matters little whether in fact the scene was witnessed but that the patient believes that it was.

³⁰⁰ See my previous chapter on *Regarding Terror: the RAF exhibition* and the discussion of figures in Roland Barthes' *A Lover's Discourse*.

³⁰¹ Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, p. 166.

³⁰² Richard Sennett (1970) *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life*. New York: Vintage Books. Sennett's work in this context is also discussed in my chapter "Kamikaze".

³⁰³ See also my chapter "Kamikaze".

³⁰⁴ Kimberly Mair (2007) "Arrivals and departures in the sensual city – WG Sebald's itineraries of the senses in *Austerlitz*". *Senses and Society* 2.2: 233-246.

³⁰⁵ Mair, "Arrivals and departures".

³⁰⁶ See my chapter "The aesthetics of crisis and the refusal of speech".

³⁰⁷ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari ([1975] 1986) *Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature*. Translated by Dana Polan. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

³⁰⁸ Susan Sontag (2003) *Regarding the Pain of Others* New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

³⁰⁹ "Open Letter to the Generalbundesanwaltschaft", *Einstellung der §129(a)-Verfahren – sofort!* < <http://einstellung.so36.net/en/openletter>. Accessed September 6, 2007.

³¹⁰ See my chapter "An accusation of love: The RAF exhibition".

³¹¹ I am indebted here to William Ramp for this observation and to fascinating discussions about collecting and absences in the fall of 2008 at the University of Lethbridge.

³¹² Jeevan Vasagar. "Hamburg prepares for war of worlds – Squatters to clash with city centre shoppers over eviction notices" (*The Guardian*, November 30, 2002).

³¹³ Stefan Aust (1987) *The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. Translated by Anthea Bell. London: The Bodley Head.

³¹⁴ Frederic Jameson ([1991] 1999) *Postmodernism. Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 28.

³¹⁵ Michael Taussig (2006) *Walter Benjamin's Grave*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., p. 19.

³¹⁶ Taussig. *Water Benjamin's Grave*, p. 25.

³¹⁷ Taussig, *Water Benjamin's Grave*, p. 29.